THE ROYALIST ARMY IN NORTHERN ENGLAND
1642 - 45

(Two Volumes) VOLUME 1

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The researching and writing of this thesis have necessarily obliged me to pursue something of a lonely course. In several respects, it is entirely original and innovatory, for no detailed study of the royalist war in the north of England has yet been written; nor has any attempt been made, so far as I am aware, to analyse the nature of the army which fought that war. However, my path was at times made easier by the kindness and willingness to assist which many people showed to me. I must thank most particularly, but not in any order of precedence, D.P. Graham of the Northumberland Estates at Alnwick Castle; M.Y. Ashcroft of the County Record Office Northallerton; Miss S.J. MacPherson, Archivist in Charge at the County Record Office, Kendal; Mrs. Rossitter, formerly of the Cumberland and Westmorland Record Office at Carlisle; David Burnett of the University Library, Durham; Mr. J.E. Fagg and Mrs. Drury of the Department of palaeography and Diplomatic in the University of Durham; Mr. R. Sharpe France, Lancashire County Archivist; Mr. N. Higson, Archivist at the Brynmor Jones Library of the University of Hull; Mr. P.S. Morrish, Sub-Librarian at the Brotherton Library of the University of Leeds; Mr. W.J. Connor, Senior Assistant Archivist in the Archives Department of Leeds City Council; Mr. R. Norris of the Dean and Chapter Library, Durham; the staff of the York Minster Library; of the Yorkshire Archaeological Society at Leeds; of the Department of Manuscripts and Printed Books in the British Library, and of the Public Record Office. I must also express my thanks to John Burgess, a fellow research student at the University of York, with whom I discussed certain aspects of my findings and whose criticism and comments were most helpful; to my father, who took me to visit many battlefields throughout northern England; to Peter Miller, a graduate of the University of York, who went out of his way to provide me with useful secondary works; and to my wife Rosemary, who helped check my figures, who listened to endless expositions, and who provided coffee, sympathy and peace and quiet when she would rather have got on with her own research. Finally, I must single out my supervisor, Professor G.E. Aylmer, who, with patience and interest, taught me how to conduct my research. I do not think that I could have been better supervised.

The theories, conclusions and arguments, with their errors (for I am sure that I cannot have ironed them all out) remain my own. In many respects something of a pioneer work, this thesis may be open to revision by other scholars should it succeed in its primary objective. That objective has been to encourage further research into the history of the royalist armies of the civil war period generally.
ABSTRACT

There has been an imbalance in scholarship concerned with the years 1642-60. The most detailed research carried out, has tended to be concerned directly or indirectly, with the successful Parliamentary party, or with the Interregnum Royalist opposition. In the work which follows, I have attempted to do two things. To re-examine the course of the first civil war in northern England from the point of view of the Royalist army raised there; and to analyse the composition of the officer class of that army in order to see who the Royalist activists were. By an examination of the backgrounds and careers of individual officers, it is possible to arrive at some worthwhile view of the nature of northern Royalism. I have endeavoured to show, in the first instance, that the northern army was for a long time capable of securing a decisive victory on the King's behalf, and, that it failed to do so, was due less to the power of the Parliament than to uncertainty and lack of an overall strategy on the part of the Royalist commanders. The lack of cohesion between forces to the east or west of the Pennines has been demonstrated, and the extremely 'local' nature of the forces engaged, stressed. In the regimental analysis, it will be seen that the Royalist officer class was composed largely of the minor gentry, most of whom had no significant standing in terms of office or court position, prior to 1642. It will also be seen that, contrary to much accepted opinion, in the north at least, the Catholic section of the community contributed officers to the Royalist cause far in excess of their numbers in the northern counties generally. The nature of northern Royalism has been dealt with in general and in the particular, as it expressed itself in commitment to armed defence of the King.
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<td>Arch. Ael.</td>
<td>Archaeologia Aeliana.</td>
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<td>CAM</td>
<td>Green, M.A.E., ed: Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money, 1883.</td>
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<td>Catalogue</td>
<td>A Catalogue of the Lords, Knights and Gentlemen (of the Catholick Religion) that were Slain in the late Warr, in defence of their King and Country.</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
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<td>CJ</td>
<td>Commons Journals.</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Record Society.</td>
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<td>CSPD</td>
<td>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series.</td>
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<td>CWAS</td>
<td>Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society.</td>
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<td>DNB</td>
<td>Dictionary of National Biography.</td>
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<td>EHR</td>
<td>English Historical Review.</td>
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<td>HMC</td>
<td>Historical Manuscripts Commission.</td>
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<td>Index</td>
<td>M.G.W. Peacock, An Index of the Names of the Royalists whose Estates were confiscated during the Commonwealth, Index Society, 1878.</td>
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<td>Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire.</td>
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<td>LCRS</td>
<td>Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire.</td>
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<td>List</td>
<td>A List of Officers Claiming to the £60,000 granted by His Sacred Majesty for the Relief of His Truly Loyal and Indigent Party.</td>
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<td>LJ</td>
<td>Lords Journals</td>
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<td>M.A.</td>
<td>Mercurius Aulicus</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office</td>
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<td>Rushworth</td>
<td>John Rushworth, Historical Collections</td>
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<td>S.P.</td>
<td>State Paper</td>
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<td>Symonds</td>
<td>C.E. Long, The Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army during the Great Civil War, kept by Richard Symonds, Camden Society, 1859.</td>
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<td>T.T.</td>
<td>British Museum, Thomason Tract.</td>
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<td>TRHS</td>
<td>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.</td>
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<td>Vicars</td>
<td>John Vicars, Parliamentary Chronicles, 1644.</td>
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<td>YAJ</td>
<td>Yorkshire Archaeological Journal</td>
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<td>YASRS</td>
<td>Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The study of history, like virtually all fields of human interest and activity, is subject to fashion. Scholars, usually consciously but sometimes in spite of themselves, create a direction for research to take, pose various problems and use their skills for the solution of them. Where the problems and the proposed solutions impinge upon, or arise directly from, contemporary political, social or economic theories, the particular period of history in question may almost seem to be lost under the weight of academic cut and thrust. Most particularly is this true of the study of the English Civil War and Interregnum, whether seen as a great revolution or merely as a temporarily successful rebellion. The intensity of scholastic debate can rival in vehemence and proliferation of works, the intense blow and counter-blow of the Royalist and Parliamentarian tract writers. All historians, of course, deal in theories: all historians approach their work with some form of bias, which is the result of their experience, of their environment, or of their study. Fashion dictates the dominant field of theory at any one time, as it also dictates style of approach and presentation. The Whig and Tory historians of the civil war, from the 17th century to the 20th, were most markedly narrative historians, taking a good long look at their period and presenting it as a whole, with such evidences to support their differing views and opinions, as seemed good to them. If their opinions now seem dubious, their literary merit was high: if their attitudes were rigid, their ability to think in wide terms remains noteworthy. If they did not analyse their sources in minute detail, they for the most part grasped the spirit of them. In Gardiner and Firth, the narrative style and the modern analytical approach found fusion: the obvious consequence of that, lies in the great importance still attached to their work in a modern world of specialisation and critical analysis.

"In history" wrote Hilaire Belloc, "we ought not to look down a perspective but to travel along a road". Belloc, that most unfashionable of Catholic narrative historians (for whom all of history was a speciality), who arrived on the scene too late to be acceptable, might be classified by Professor Lawrence Stone as an "antiquarian fact grubber"; a description which Stone feels all historians stand in danger of meriting. Nonetheless, and risking censure, it can be argued that Belloc and other, greater, narrative historians have set apposite guide-lines for even the most analytical of historians to follow: for there is a point at which detailed study and the broader view can meet, as Gardiner's work demonstrates. Careful analysis of any single aspect of the period can be justified for its
own sake, and ought not to serve specifically, the theorising of the researcher, but the general knowledge of the period under examination. The "antiquarian fact grubber" provides the materials for the theoriser, and is responsible only for the accuracy of his findings, not for their interpretation along the lines of any general theory. The danger of a solely theoretical approach to research is that evidence may be shaped quite unintentionally, and made to fit into preconceived notions, serving neither scholarship nor wider knowledge.

These prefatory remarks are intended to explain the approach which I have taken, both in the study of the northern campaigns and of the regiments which fought in them. The relation of my findings and conclusions to general theories, except insofar as direct contradictions require elaboration has not been attempted.

The nature of the work:

The study of the military history of the civil war, in detail, and in particular of the Royalist armies, was long neglected. Until Gardiner and, later, Firth, took the trouble to make their descriptions of campaigns as accurate as possible, military history turned almost solely upon the biographies of outstanding figures like Prince Rupert, Thomas Fairfax and, of course, Oliver Cromwell. Their victories were clear cut, their failures understandable. Of their armies, of the men without whom the generals would not have established their reputations, little was known. Scholars dealt in round numbers, computing the size of rival armies and neglecting to consider their composition. Even where historical study was concerned with the loyalties of individuals, no analysis of their military careers beyond the oft-repeated details of widely known fact or supposition, was attempted. To all intents and purposes, the campaigns of the civil war, on which its outcome turned, were fought by anonymous men.

Firth and Davies, in their remarkable study of the regimental history of Cromwell's army, established a new field of research, but it was one into which few scholars ventured until, in recent years, the desire to know more of the social origins of Republicans, Presbyterians and Levellers has led to a more analytical study of the Parliamentary officer cadre. Even here, attention has been paid largely to the New Model Army, whilst the vast mass of the Parliamentarian Provincial Armies has been practically ignored. If this is the case with the victorious armed forces, how much more true has it been of the defeated Royalist military organisation.
Scholars and others who have directed their attention to the Royalists have been few. The late Norman Tucker's work on North Wales; Peter Young's forays into Royalist campaign history; Dr. Ian Roy's continuing study of the Oxford army; and Dr. Wanklyn's research into Royalist officers in Devon and Cornwall, these represent almost the sum total of research. The reasons for this neglect are apparent. Clearly, the losing side attracts less scholarly interest than the victorious, particularly where the victorious armies, as in the case of the English civil war, are generally represented as serving a revolutionary, progressive ideal. Lack of sympathy with Royalist "backwoodsmen"; the view of them as simple reactionaries or as obscurantists, has led many otherwise careful scholars to dismiss the bulk of royalist activists out of hand. Yet it would seem that, even accepting the most rigid view of Parliament's sympathisers, the study of the Royalist soldier and officer is extremely valuable. There were an enormous number of these "reactionaries" and "obscurantists", clinging to an old order in a futile effort to stem the tide of change. In the regimental analysis contained in the Appendices (Vol. 2) it will be seen that we are concerned with 2024 persons holding commissions in the six northern counties of England or in regiments raised there. Nor is this total final, since many others, whom we know by rank, defy regimental classification. It is self-evident to observe that there could not have been a civil war without two relatively strong opposing sides. Historical balance demands that greater attention be paid to the losers.

The neglect of the Royalists has not entirely been due to scholastic fashion. A serious limitation on research is imposed by the lack of source materials. The defeated officers tended to burn their papers: personal effects were rifled and dispersed on the battlefield - what, after all, became of the Marquess of Newcastle's cabinet contents seized on Marston Moor and sent to London? Paper proof of an individuals part in the Royalist army was easily destroyed. It is a daunting prospect that presents itself to the student of Royalist military history, and the problems of the sources will be discussed shortly.

This study of the northern Royalist army has been divided into two parts. The first concerns its campaigns, dealing with the course of the war in the north between 1642 and 1645. The second section, contained in the Appendices (Vol. 2) concerns the regiments and the officers. In the regimental analysis, the intention has been to discover just who were the men that formed the officer cadre of the northern army. The north of England was chosen primarily because of its neglect, certainly insofar as Royalist history is concerned, and also because it was the source of the most powerful Royalist military machine outside of the Oxford army. It fed
the Oxford army with regiments from August 1642 to January 1644, and after the defeat at Marston Moor (July 2nd 1644) and the collapse of York (July 16th) the bulk of the surviving Royalist cavalry regiments raised in the north, considerably strengthened the King's army in the south.

The northern counties were, moreover, held by the Parliamentarians to be the seat of a dreadful Popish conspiracy, and it is this factor of Catholic and Recusant activism and its controversy, which required more detailed research. On December 19th 1642, the earl of Newcastle's army, which had only shortly before entered Yorkshire for the defence of that county, was estimated at 7000 horse and foot, whereof no less than 4000 were said to be Catholics, and the rest dismissed as Church Papists. Parliamentarian propagandists, raising the bogey of papist conspiracy behind the royal army, and playing upon what Lawrence Stone has called the paranoid fear of Catholicism that marked 17th century England, took trouble to name every Catholic officer captured over the next few years, as if to press home the threat. As with all propaganda of whatever age, it was a collation of some truth and some falsehood: Laudians, for example, were no better than convicted Recusants in the eyes of Puritan divines, and a defence of episcopacy such as that written by (Colonel) Sir Francis Wortley before the outbreak of war, was enough to damn even a firm Protestant in the eyes of the carefree propagandists. Persons of irreproachable Puritan leanings, such as Conyers Lord Darcy and Conyers, who happened also to be Royalists, were ignored. The eyes of London's tract writers were fixed on the north and on northern Catholics. Clarendon, years later, might deny that there were ever any Recusants in arms for the King, but that was wilful distortion of truth on his part. The Parliamentarians could name them, and the sources which remain for a study of the Royalist army and its officer class, support the Parliamentary view to a notable extent. Scholars who have felt sympathy for the Catholics as a persecuted minority, have tended to further obscure the picture by associating themselves with Clarendon (a curious alignment) in refuting the claims of Parliamentarian writers. The evidence, however, shows quite a startling picture of Catholic activism, which will be gone into in depth shortly. Suffice it now to say, that whilst the identifiable Catholic and Recusant participation in the northern Royalist army was a little over one third of the identified officers (any attempt to classify rank and file is impossible), in the elite cavalry arm, for example, the Catholic field officers closely rivalled their Protestant comrades in numbers and influence. The implications of this will later become apparent. As a minority of the population, their activists would obviously be a minority in any serving army, but the positions of authority and of influence which they held under Newcastle, argue against any view of their presence as at all insignificant. This is what the Parliamentarians knew.
In examining any specific area of civil war campaigns, some line has to be drawn, as often as not arbitrarily. In a study of northern regiments and campaigns, however, the fine geographical limitations impose themselves more or less wholly. The Scottish border marked not only a national boundary, if less markedly than in the 16th and earlier centuries, but also a limit upon the fighting. It was not until 1644 when Montrose began his Scottish expedition by leaving Carlisle, that the war moved further north and, even then, he fought largely unaided by English forces. Accepting this northernmost limitation, therefore, the southern boundary requires some explanation.

The Earl of Newcastle's commission as General in the north extended beyond the limits selected for this study, the counties of Yorkshire, Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire. He had responsibility for Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire and also, if he could ever get there, for Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. He recruited forces in practically all of these counties - with three exceptions in East Anglia - but geographically they cannot be considered as 'northern'. Rather are they 'north midland' shires, and few of their regiments played any part in the civil war in the six northern counties. Their one confirmed appearance in the north came in 1644, when they formed a small part of Rupert's army which fought at Marston Moor; but other than that, the Staffordshire and Derbyshire regiments particularly, were countyforces maintaining a precarious foothold in their own recruiting grounds and they can, with reason, be excluded from the study. Officers from these counties certainly served in the north, in otherwise northern regiments, as did professionals from elsewhere in England and from Scotland, but the survey can accommodate these by distinguishing their geographical origins. In many of their cases, moreover, it is impossible to reach any definite identification. To incorporate a Staffordshire regiment in an otherwise northern survey would merely involve their omission from the statistical analyses. One regiment, that of Colonel Sir Francis Fane's Foot (see Vol. 2), might be considered a Lincolnshire force. However Fane was seated primarily at Aston in South Yorkshire, recruited some Yorkshire officers, and was Governor of Doncaster, hence his inclusion.

For the same reason, northern regiments which served elsewhere in England are included in the survey, for to leave them out would be to convey an incorrect impression of northern Royalism. Several of these regiments, particularly those drawn from Lancashire, contained prominent Catholic officers, and served at one time or another in the north, anyway. They will, of course, be distinguishable from regiments which had an entirely northern origin and career.
If there is any problem in the definition of the 'north', it seems to be in regard to Cheshire. Local historians and others have tended to lump Cheshire and Lancashire together, not always arbitrarily, but in much the same way that Cumberland and Westmorland are associated. Newcastle's authority did not extend to Cheshire, indeed, his exact responsibility for Lancashire is doubtful, but in view of my earlier remarks, that in itself is not sufficient or good reason, for excluding Cheshire. After much consideration, it was decided that military and political considerations, rather than geographical or administrative, demanded Cheshire's exclusion. Most clearly was the fact that at no time from the outbreak of war was Cheshire even temporarily Royalist controlled, unlike the situation in Lancashire and the other five counties. Further, the campaign history of Cheshire was inextricably bound up with that of North Wales and the Welsh border, whilst its involvement with Lancashire was minimal. The earl of Derby made the odd sortie into Cheshire in 1642/4, and the Parliamentarians there occasionally returned the visits, but otherwise there was no link. There was, similarly, little overlapping in regimental recruitment where Cheshire and Lancashire were concerned. For this reason, I have excluded from my survey those Cheshire regiments which had a tiny proportion of Lancashire officers, such as Lord Rivers's Foot, Edward Fitton's Foot and Charles Gerard's Foot. A similar tiny proportion of Cheshire (and North Welsh) officers in Lancashire regiments, like those of Tyldesley, Molyneux, Gilbert Gerard and Derby himself, are distinguished in the survey, in the same way that the Kentishmen and Cornishmen in the otherwise Yorkshire regiments of Newcastle and Colonel Sir John Mayney, are noted. Cheshire is, anyway, questionably defined as a northern midland county, and for all of these reasons, military, political and, less importantly, geographical, has been excluded from this study.

The Sources:

Before going on to consider the findings of the regimental analysis, it is as well to pause to discuss the sources available for the study of those regiments, as well as for the campaigns themselves. It has already been said that the bulk of contemporary material has simply not survived, but it is nonetheless possible to piece together such as there is, to provide a Royalist campaign history, and the biographies of a large number of individual officers. No study of the officer class, however, would have been feasible without the existence of the list of officers who petitioned Charles II for relief, as indigents, in 1663. A List of Officers Claiming to the Sixty Thousand Pounds &c. Granted by His Sacred Majesty for the Relief of His Truly Loyal and Indigent Party, contains nearly 7000 names of commissioned officers, that is, officers above the rank of sergeant, who claimed to have suffered in their fortunes as the result of their active service in the civil wars and the harsh punitive measures employed by the
Parliamentary and Interregnum regimes. The book is systematically organised. Each officer who filed a claim, was listed under the Field Commander that he claimed as his senior. These field officers, whether Colonels, Lt. Colonels or Majors, were listed, not by rank, but alphabetically by surname and forename only. In some cases, the claimant also stipulated the particular troop or company commander under whom he had served, so that it is possible to construct accurate regimental structures from the List. Technical difficulties can sometimes be obstructive, for the lack of rank designation for field commanders may tend to confuse, in that a single regiment may be listed two or three times in the List under Colonel, Lt. Colonel and Major respectively. An example will suffice. The Marquess of Newcastle's own regiment of foot has two entries, one composed of claimants who gave the Marquess as their field commander, the other composed of those who gave Colonel Sir Arthur Basset. Basset, a Cornish professional, was appointed Colonel by Newcastle, and appears in the List prior to Newcastle himself. The link between the two columns of names is easily established from other sources, but in less well documented cases it can often be intensely frustrating. For example, whilst Colonel George Wray's regiment of horse can be identified, it is not apparent from the List that the officers claiming under Ralph Millot were claiming under Millot as Wray's Lt. Colonel. Such difficulties will be dealt with as they arise.

There are other problems. The confusion of the names of field officers as in the cases of Howard and Tempest, makes for difficulties and demands caution in assigning any one officer to any one field commander. Printers' errors, too, not covered by the provided errata, crop up from time to time. The same man may appear twice, as in the case of an officer of Sir Philip Musgrave's regiment of horse, or appear twice, apparently with a different name on one occasion, as in the case of Captain Talbot Lisle of Lambton's Foot who also appears as Talbot Lesley. Double claims are also not unusual, the most striking being that of Captain, later Lt. Colonel, Collin Munro or Monro, an unidentified Scottish professional. He fought in both civil wars of 1642/6 and 1648.

This raises an additional problem. It is not always possible to be sure of the dates of an individual officer's service, and there are cases of activism in 1642/6, 1648 and 1651. Thomas Tyldesley, for example, held a Colonel's commission in all three wars, and clearly some of his officers, for example, Alexander Rigby of the Burgh, can only have been in arms in 1648 and 1651. It is usually possible to identify later war service, as in the case of Major John Harling, who served under Tyldesley, by reference to composition proceedings, but these, too, have their drawbacks, as will be explained.

It is also the case that certain known field commanders certainly
do not appear in the List. Colonel Sir Thomas Metham, for example, commanded a regiment at least until the early part of 1643, and then became commander of Newcastle's Life Guard, but no claimant filed under his name. It must also be said that certain 'officers' traditionally said to have held the rank of Colonel, cannot be traced or positively identified as such. An example is the case of Sir Bryan Palmes whose military service seems to have been confined to the immediate pre-war years, and who does not appear to have commanded a regiment after the outbreak of war, although he was a prominent Royalist.

Without the List, such a regimental study as has been attempted, would have been impossible. To stress the difficulties is only to say that they can be overcome with care. Yet we have come a long way from the enthusiasm with which Peter Young greeted the discovery of the List. He described it as "virtually the Cavalier army book", and in his own research has continued to use it as such, apparently without qualification. It is far from being a source complete in itself. Most obviously, the book was never published with this intention, as the preface clearly states:

"for as much as the Honourable the Commissioners appointed by act of Parliament for Distribution of the said Moneys, are upon good grounds persuaded to believe, that many Certificates have been unduly introduc'd, whereby not only every man's share will be lessened, through the Multitude of Pretenders; but without a Strict and Accurate Inspection a great part of the Moneys will fall into wrong hands....Upon Consideration hereof....the Commissioners aforesaid have resolv'd upon a Printed List of the Persons Certifi'd, as the most apt Expedient for the Discovery of any Fraud...."

The criterion for determining a man's entitlement to reparation was clearly established also:

"...Indigent officers who have had Real Command of Soldiers according to their Several Commission, and who have never Deserted his Majesty nor His Blessed Father's Service During the late times of Rebellion and Usurpation...."

The dangers for the military historian are therefore clearly set out. The real value of the List can only be arrived at by relation to other available sources which will be discussed shortly. Its publication was intended to reveal fraudulent claims, by enabling interested parties to give evidence against those presenting false certificates. I have only identified one or two such false claims, but if there were as many as was suggested, they must surely be sought amongst the lists of officers who filed a claim without indicating the field officer under whom they served. Identification of fraud so many centuries after the event would be a hopeless task, and fortunately, insofar as the north is concerned, it is possible to be sure of the authenticity of many of the claims we are concerned with.
The problems presented by the List have not gone altogether undetected. John Childs, in his study of the army of Charles II observed that it had to be approached with "caution". Childs, however, did not notice that there is an additional drawback, although it is one which Young, if he had attempted to verify the officers with which he was concerned, ought to have found. It is best here to give a hypothetical case to explain my point, and we will suppose that we are dealing with three claimants from a cavalry force as they appear in the List. The names are fictitious.

SMITH, James
Yorks : Smith, Thos. Captn.
L & W : Brown, John, Lieut.
Linns : Jackson, Wm. Corn.

Here we have the field commander's name and the names of three claimants. It will be noted that preceding each claimant's name is a county designation, which Young assumed to be the county in which the claimant was ordinarily resident (L & W here representing London and Westminster). This is not always the case, and county designation can be misleading in the extreme. In every case, county identification represents the county from which the claimant filed his certificate in 1662/3, and it does not necessarily give a true indication of the county in which the claimant was resident when he began his military service. Here are instances in which complementary sources are essential. From James Smith's Horse, it would be hard to say where the force originated territorially, particularly if James Smith himself were to defy identification. By a consideration of Quarter Session Records, Protestation Returns, Recusancy Records and Composition Papers, it is normally possible to interpret the bare essentials given in the List. Thus Captain Thomas Smith may be positively identified as a Yorkshireman, whilst it may be shown that Lieutenant Brown, claiming from London in 1662, was in fact resident in Yorkshire in 1642. He may have lost his property in that county by 1660, or he may have gone to London to press his claim personally. Cornet Jackson might have been temporarily domiciled in Lincolnshire in 1662, or have removed to that county between 1642 and 1662. There are, naturally, various permutations, but this illustrates the point sufficiently well. The regimental survey contains several cases of this kind.

It has been said that the List must be tackled in the light of other material, which is often extremely fragmentary in terms of military detail. It consists, for the most part, of stray documents in family archives or in artificial collections which ordinarily have no importance in themselves but become significant when placed beside a name in the List. It would be pointless here to list each and every one of these odd scraps of information particularly since they are alluded to in the regimental survey anyway.
We can however, look at the more general of the available sources. First and foremost, although its apparent significance does not stand up to close inspection, is that dubious work, *The Army Lists of the Roundheads and Cavaliers*, edited by Edward Peacock in 1863. I am not qualified to judge the accuracy of the Parliamentarian lists, but for the Cavalier regiments certain observations must be made. Peacock was, for a long time, the single easily available source for a study of Cavalier forces in 1642. Indeed, his source was a contemporary pamphlet *A Copy of a List of all the Cavaliers of his Majesties Marching Army*.

The overriding point to be made, is that the army of 1642, by which we mean, that army which was formed in the summer and which marched to Edgehill, underwent radical change during the early part of 1643. It must be for this reason that it is virtually impossible to identify with any certainty, any of the officers said to be serving in such northern regiments as are quoted in the source. The commanders of such regiments are easily identified: Newcastle himself, Sir Thomas Glemham, Sir Francis Wortley, John Belasyse and Sir Edward Osborne. From this point, identification of the names of other officers ceases to be viable: as will be seen in the context of the regimental studies under these aforementioned colonels, the officers given in the 1642 list stand out like rather forlorn ghost figures, defying identification for the most part, but given a certificate of authenticity by the contemporary tract. Peacock’s editing, where it existed, was largely fanciful. We know as little about this 1642 list as Peacock knew in 1863, and we are unlikely to know more without the key being discovered somewhere in a hitherto unknown document or series of documents.

Attention has already been drawn to the limitations of the Compounding papers, although they are still a prime source. That is to say, from the composition papers it is possible, not to construct regimental lists, but to put flesh on the bones of the List itself. In very few cases, perhaps 5 per cent, where an individual made his composition, was any mention made of his regiment or rank if he had been in arms. In slightly more cases, about ten per cent, there may be some vague allusion to an overall commander like Newcastle or the earl of Derby, which gives nothing more than a general idea of a compounder’s sphere of activity and dates of service. In about 25 per cent of cases concerning a compounder who had been in arms, the rank is referred to vaguely – there was quite naturally, a desire on the part of the victim to minimise his actual involvement. Allusion to arm of service, horse or foot, is altogether too scarce. For the most part, we must be content with passing allusions to a man having been in arms, whilst the county and London committees adopted a very lax terminology indeed. This might mean that a compounder would be described as having ‘adhered to’ the King, or as having ‘assisted’ Royalist forces, without any precise details.
being given, in most cases, of what that assistance entailed. To be in arms was fairly specific: but what are we to make of a term like 'assisted' when it was applied indiscriminately to male and female Royalists, and on occasions can be shown to have been applied to officers in the army? The List here provides a means of resolving the degree of commitment on the part of very many compounders of whose military service we are told little or nothing.

The composition committees were willing to come to terms with delinquents as quickly as they could, and it was not in their interests, or in those of the delinquent, to make too much fuss. Certain cases involving notorious Royalists were more lengthy, but these are rare, in the north at least, for a good many of the diehards simply went abroad and made no attempt to compound. The same was true of Catholic Royalists who had been in arms, for they were debarred for a long time from compounding at all, and one of the weaknesses of the Catholic neutrality argument has been the failure on the part of its proponents to grasp this. Catholics in arms simply do not appear in the composition proceedings in any numbers relative to their actual involvement. One or two managed to compound by denying or concealing their commissions, or through abjuring their faith, and it is well known that local committee men tended to connive with their neighbours who appeared before them. This was not, however, commonplace where Catholic activists are concerned. The fullest list of Catholics in arms, but by no means exhaustive, is that which can be made up from the names in the three Land Sale Acts of 1651 and 1652, where a large number of northern Catholics appear who held military command and who appear nowhere in the composition records.

For the Protestant Royalist officer, the composition records not only convey considerable personal details, including social standing, but tend to leave the false impression that the northern Royalist army was almost entirely Protestant in persuasion.

In endeavouring to identify Catholic officers I have, as has been said, been obliged to resort to sources other than composition records, and to relate those sources to the List. Recusancy records and Quarter Sessions records, particularly for the North Riding of Yorkshire which was a strong Catholic and Royalist area, provide ample clues and frequent positive identifications. In the composition papers, it is occasionally possible to pick out a Catholic officer who compounded by concealing his commission, his religion, or both, or who abjured the one. There are often references to Recusancy indictments prior to 1642 in such a person's papers.

The Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, for the years immediately after 1660, contain numerous petitions from Royalist officers which assist in identifying individuals given in the List and elsewhere.
There is one curious source for Catholic officers which I am not aware has been used previously. This is a broadsheet published, apparently, and anonymously, in 1662 or 1663, detailing the sufferings of Catholic Royalists during the civil war. The only extant copy of this broadsheet, which is entitled *A Catalogue of the Lords, Knights and Gentlemen (of the Catholic Religion) that were Slain in the late Warr, in Defence of their King and Country*, is in the British Library, catalogued as a printed book under 'Catholic'. It lists by social and military status, 154 officers of commissioned rank, the vast majority of whom were clearly northerners. For the most part, the accuracy of the Catalogue can be confirmed by other sources, including the List. In view of the degree to which its claims can be verified, I have taken it as a limited but primary source in cases where religious persuasion is doubtful. It is this document, however, which makes the claim that Colonel Sir Henry Slingsby (see Vol. 2) died a Catholic when he was executed in 1658. No hint of a conversion comes from any other evidences for Slingsby's life, and one would be tempted to dismiss the claim were it not for the overall veracity and accuracy of the other details given. Moreover, the Catalogue, if it were spurious or concocted, would surely have included the more widely known rumour that the earl of Derby died a Catholic, which it did not. The Slingsby case is discussed in his biographical details.

Parliamentary sources are also useful in identifying Royalist officers. Contemporary newsletters and tracts abounded with lists of Royalist captives, often quoting name and rank, sometimes with distinction by arm of service. Not uncommon, too, were additional allusions to a man as a "great Papist" or "a notorious Papist", but with such additions one has to exercise caution and to seek corroboration elsewhere. As has been said, too close an association with Laudianism might earn for a Royalist a quite unjustified label of Papist or Catholic. More reliance can be placed upon lists of prisoners supplied by northern Parliamentarian officers and generals, like Lord Fairfax, who meticulously listed Catholic Royalists and who was in a good position to know what he was writing about. For the average Parliament sympathiser in London and the home counties, these lists of names must have been a mystery, for they can scarcely have been familiar with the obscure northern gentlemen who, going quietly about their religion for years, now found themselves thrust into the forefront of national interest to endure the calumnies of the mob and its orchestrators. Thus, whilst Parliamentary prisoner of war lists have their value, often extremely pertinent, caution has to be exercised in dealing with these religious labels hung with lack of discrimination around all manner of necks.

Moving on to other sources, we come to those which also have a direct bearing upon the history of the fighting itself. Memoirs can be valuable.
both for officers' names and for campaign details. Sir Henry Slingsby's diary, although compiled in full at a later date and not kept as a day to day, or even as a month to month, journal, is useful for the names of certain field commanders and their whereabouts at any given time. It is also a prime source for the fighting in Yorkshire from 1642 to 1644, and for the war in northern Lancashire in the latter year. Yet it is fragmentary, as is memory itself, and Slingsby tended to overlook or to ignore crucial minor officers and engagements. For example, he does not mention any officers of his own foot regiment (apart from his Major), although from the List they would seem to have been men well known to him as neighbours. It may be that when compiling his 'diary', and fearing its discovery, he deliberately omitted references that might prove embarrassing to his old officers. Colonel Sir Hugh Cholmeley's Memoirs of the defence of Scarborough suffer from a similar deficiency, although, written much later, not for the same reason as has been suggested for Slingsby's work. The long tedium of siege conditions produced more detailed diarists, Isaac Tullie in Carlisle and Nathan Drake in Pontefract. But with their writings, we are dealing with an army which had ceased to be strictly organised, when all regimental cohesion had gone and officers, now Reformadoes wanting employment in regular regiments, formed temporary alliances and military units for the purpose of garrison work and defensive warfare. Even so, Drake is of particular value in preserving with minute attention to detail, the names of many Royalist officers of whom we would otherwise know no more than a passing reference in the List.

To briefly consider other campaign sources. There is no single corpus of material which covers the war in the north from 1642 to 1645, and consequently the narrative has to be pieced together from Parliamentarian and Royalist memoirs, tracts and correspondence. Two important sources, the life of Newcastle and the memoir of Sir Thomas Fairfax, whilst valuable for the years 1642-4, terminate in the latter year, Newcastle going into exile in July, and Fairfax, after serving in Cheshire early in the year, returning briefly to Yorkshire for the siege of York and the battle of Marston Moor. As has been said, Slingsby's diary is of value for the course of the fighting although far less detailed than the two referred to. John Vicars, in his Parliamentary Chronicles, pieced together into a useful continuous narrative, the material which he gleaned from Parliamentarian tracts and, like Rushworth, must be taken as an important source even for Royalist campaign history, although with caution. The same caution has to be applied to the tracts themselves, and these have to be compared with extant Royalist sources such as Newcastle's Life, and with the official Royalist accounts found in the pages of Mercurius Aulicus. Royalist tracts and pamphlets are far rarer. The somewhat complicated process of
interpreting, selecting and fusing together sources often divergent and contradictory, has led in the past to many misunderstandings of the war in the north in general, and of particular incidents in that war. A case in point is that of the fighting in Yorkshire between January and April 1644, where entire battles have been overlooked, misdated and sometimes gathered together by later writers. The inherited errors in dealing with this particular period of fighting have led, in turn, to a failure on the part of many writers to appreciate the real significance of the battle of Selby on April 11th 1644 which can be seen as the decisive turning point in the civil war in the north. Other problems of interpretation will become apparent as the narrative unfolds and cannot be referred to here. It will, however, be clear that in using the sources for campaign history as well as for regimental and officer history, the same principles apply. The sources must be analysed minutely and, initially, in isolation from other sources, until gradually a complementary pattern emerges. Only in this way can errors and contradictions be tracked down and disposed of. Although I do not suppose that I have succeeded in eliminating all such, I have gone some way towards a thorough revision of the accepted view of the course of the civil war in the north, in the same way that I have endeavoured to cast light upon the composition of the Royalist officers who fought that war.

As other researchers have found, family archives from Royalist origins abound. County Record Offices are full of them, but they are, for the most part, utterly devoid of military material. The Beaumont of Whitley archives at Huddersfield, for example, contain only one civil war document. The entire extant series of letters sent to Major Thomas Beaumont by Colonel Sir William Saville, lie in the Bodleian Library. The Wentworth of Woolley papers in Leeds contain two or three minor documents, whilst the Meynell family papers at Northallerton lack any military material whatsoever, which has led some researchers to suppose, quite wrongly, that the Meynell's were neutral Catholics. The best chronological sequence of military papers lies in the little used Musgrave collection at Carlisle, whilst the Temple-Newsam Mss. at Leeds contain several useful papers concerning the garrison of Skipton Castle where Colonel Sir John Mallory was governor. A full listing of family archives in which military papers have been identified, will be found in the bibliography. The scant nature gives emphasis to the point already made, concerning the wilful destruction by officers of their incriminating documents.

To labour the problems of sources is rather akin to excusing oneself before blame has been apportioned. It is, anyway, not so much a question of what materials there are, as it is of how those materials are used. The regimental history of the Royalist army, and of its campaigns, can be built up from ancillary sources as well as from specifically military
archival material. If the pieces of the jigsaw can be made to fit easily together without losing anything of their original shape, the construction lines need not show. It needs but judicious removal of extraneous aspects which may have accrued over centuries of neglect or of unsystematic piecing together. If one is to pursue what in many respects amounts to a pioneer course, it is a duty to let nothing go unquestioned.

There is one body of sources, in some senses secondary, which no researcher could function without, but which few acknowledge their supreme indebtedness to. I refer to those vast indices, genealogical works and calendars compiled largely during the 19th century. Mrs. Green's work on the records of the Committees for Advance of Money and for Compounding has become an essential adjunct, which is right since it was intended to be so. But her work, and that of less widely known "antiquarian fact grubbers" must not be simply taken for granted. Where northern history is concerned, the names of Horsfall Turner, Joseph Hunter, Clay and Foster deserve and require proper acknowledgement. Their painstaking concern for detail in the composition of family pedigrees, often using materials that are no longer extant: their careful compilation of calendars of wills and probates; their meticulous attention to details however trivial; without their years of work, no research involving the analysis of hundreds of individuals would be feasible. Sometimes in error they may have been, but error on so vast a scale is understandable. Often reworking the same ground, particularly where genealogies were concerned, they provided a means of cross-referencing and checking their work which makes it possible to pinpoint their occasional errors. Genealogies and probate indices are essential in identifying individual officers mentioned in composition proceedings or elsewhere, in determining their family status, their social standing, their age, and, occasionally, their religious persuasion. By all these means, then, we can rescue hundreds of officers from the virtual anonymity of the List, and make that document itself of major importance, as the problem of Catholic activism most clearly demonstrates.

Having introduced the problems of the sources, and having shown in what way apparently disparate materials can be made to complement and to supplement each other in order to overcome a lack of directly pertinent sources, we must now turn to the subject matter of the research. I am primarily concerned now with explaining the purpose of the regimental Appendices, and in drawing together the findings of the officer analysis involved.
The Regiments and their Officers:

As will become apparent, within the normal 17th century framework of Horse, Foot and Dragoons, there was plenty of room for exceptions to the norm. Moreover, in dealing with a nation in which there was no standing army at the outbreak of war, there was ample room for innovation, largely born of 'making do'. Nor was there any lack of gentlemen or of yeomen ready to officer either the Militia or Trainband formations initially utilised in 1642, or to take over the commissioned regiments that appeared later in that year. Lois Schwoerer in her study of the attitudes toward military forces on a permanent footing, showed that anti-militarism was directed almost entirely against the idea of professional common soldiers officered by professional officers. In building up the Northern Army, early in the war at least, efforts were made to base the largely infantry forces upon the old Trainband system, calling to their colours regiments like those of Thomas Metham or Robert Strickland, leaving the active gentry free to raise their own troops of horse or, if ambitious enough, their own cavalry regiments to supplement the foot forces. This explains, incidentally, the Catholic predominance in cavalry forces. The penal legislation barred them from service in the Trainbands - although it must be noted that both Metham and Strickland, and they were not unique, were known Catholics - and consequently, they may well have tended to gravitate towards the cavalry arm. Throughout the war, Catholics were more strongly represented in the horse than in the foot.

Nor, let it be said, was the appearance of Catholics in arms universally welcomed by Protestant Royalists. The earl of Cumberland, the first general in the north, actively avoided employing them, and some regiments remained free of them throughout the war. The evidence is overwhelming that Catholics tended to gravitate towards certain regiments, where a Catholic Colonel welcomed them. Thus, insofar as the officers are concerned, we can identify certain almost exclusive Catholic regiments, generally cavalry, in service by mid 1643 when the earl of Newcastle's sensible relaxed policy gave them opportunity. Examples of these 'Catholic' regiments will suffice. All such can easily be identified in the regimental analysis contained in the appendices. In Yorkshire, the regiments of Sir Walter Vavasour (later under Francis Hungate); William Eure, and Sir Robert Clavering were largely officered by Catholics. In Durham, George Wray and Sir William Lambton drew co-religionists to their colours: in Northumberland Edward Grey and Sir Edward Widdrington did the same, whilst in Lancashire Thomas Tyldesley and Viscount Molyneux are noteworthy. From Lancashire, too, came those two regiments which formed part of the elite of the Oxford army, the Queen's regiments of horse and foot, her Lifeguards, commanded by Henry Jermyn.
Indeed, where the supply of home-grown Catholic officers failed to meet the demands of the Queen's regiments, French soldiers of fortune filled their places. Men like Charles Charbo, Anthony de St. Mark and a Captain St. Michel rubbed shoulders with Lancashire Recusants such as John Cansfield, Lawrence and Gervase Clifton and Thomas Brockholes.

What are we to make of this polarisation of Catholic Royalists in certain specific regiments? It was not an overall policy, for several Catholic colonels had very few identified co-religionists on their staff. John Belasyse, for example, who raised at least three regiments in the King's interest, never had so many Catholic officers as did Robert Clavering in his single cavalry regiment. Similarly, whilst Walter Vavasour attracted Catholics to his colours by some means or other, George Middleton had less than a handful. The want of a coherent pattern is frustrating, but that there was a pattern of some kind seems clear. Catholic regiments did exist, but how they came about, how colonels selected their officers, is obscure. Family connection was the answer in some, but not in all, cases. The single factor which emerges is that of a shared religion, and of a shared experience of persecution. But the number of Catholic field officers in regiments predominantly Protestant or commanded by a Protestant colonel, is sufficient to warn against any general theory of Catholic and Recusant group identification. On the other hand, we tend to find occasional instances of Protestant Lt. Colonels or Majors serving Catholic colonels who might be of inferior local or social status. It begins to look as if the Catholic Royalists as often as not, gave the lead in resorting to arms in 1642.

For what is irrefutable and remarkable, is that almost from nowhere, in late 1642 and early 1643, Catholics hitherto debarred from Trainband service and military experience, came forward in numbers large relative to their proportion in the population of the north, until they formed one third of the commissioned colonels and one third of the commissioned officers that it has been possible to identify. Their influence in the army, and their sacrifices on the field of battle, were out of all proportion to their numbers in the population and in the army. The Marquess of Newcastle's army owed much of its strength and success to these men.

In 1642 Parliamentarian and Royalist sympathisers alike, found comfort, such as it was, in having the social system reflected in the military organisation - freeholders in arms under the local gentry. This is evidenced strongly by the fact that the few professional soldiers employed in the north were as often as not, subservient in rank to amateur officers who were also peers, baronets, knights or esquire. Thus Newcastle, though he hearkened to their advice, kept his professionals - with the single exception of James King - firmly in their place. Even in the critical
months of 1645 the King himself, casting the dice for the last time, chose to place the courtier, Digby, in command of the remnants of his cavalry, making Langdale, most brilliant of northern brigade commanders, ostensibly second in command. The professionals remained very much in the background, although let it be said that by 1644 most of Newcastle's field commanders could justifiably claim to have become professionals and veterans. By professional at this stage, we must mean, those men who had made their way in the world in the profession of arms. James King is a prime example, Charles Lucas another. Such men took the blame, and little of the credit. Thomas Glemham, a remarkable garrison commander, was by-passed by the King who gave a peerage to Charles Gerard in which Glemham had some claim.

What is remarkable is that, as the war grew more bitter and more widespread, the local Trainband officers found, often to their surprise, a capacity for military command few of them would otherwise have found lay in them. Even merchants, men whose entire lives had been centered around the business of trade and acquisition of money, like Sir John Marley of Newcastle, became proficient commanders in the face of dire necessity.

The point will be made in Chapter One that the Royalist army in the north, as elsewhere in 1642, was improvised. Although the Trainband formed the basis of the infantry, there is very little evidence for the survival of Trainband units into mid 1643. Metham's Foot completely disappeared, or so it seems, and his active colonelcy lapsed, although he retained the rank as an honour whilst serving as Captain of Newcastle's Lifeguard. He was, anyway, a very old man in 1642 and his first and last fight was on Marston Moor two years later. Of other identifiable Trainband regiments, that of Conyers Lord Darcy went to Oxford under his heir's command and acquitted itself well. Robert Strickland's, George Wentworth's, William Saville's and William Widdrington's, all infantry formations, fought on in the north, but prestige did not attach to them as it attached to newly commissioned foot regiments like Lambton's or Huddleston's. The York City Trainband, under Henry Slingsby, disappeared only to reappear as a normal volunteer regiment. Sir Henry Griffiths's infantry probably disbanded in the autumn of 1642. In Lancashire, the Trainband system was in disarray from the first, and the Royalists there recruited from scratch, probably because the local Parliamentarians had a firm hand on the most populous Trainband areas anyway. The Trainband system survived in Cumberland and Westmorland, with all its deficiencies, not least the failure of many of its commanders to decide precisely which side they were on.

Nor is there any identifiable continuity between the army of 1642/3 and that raised in 1639/41. Of the commanders of regiments then appointed, although several served the King during the civil war - Jacob Astley and
George Goring for example - only one northern commander, Thomas Glemham, held a colonelcy on both occasions, but the officers of his regiment in 1640 bear no relation to his officers given in the List for 1642/6. The fact is, that several minor officers in arms in 1640 went on to become field commanders in their own right in 1642/3, and a few examples will serve to illustrate this point. Lt. Colonel [Henry] Waite, who served under Sir William Wentworth in 1640, commanded his own regiment in York in 1642/4. Captain Stradling of Newport's regiment became colonel and governor of Carlisle Castle. Major Basset of Ogle's became Colonel of Newcastle's Foot. Others of course, appeared as Parliamentary officers, for the army of 1639/41 was not a model for the Royalist forces of 1642/6. In much the same way, officers returning from European service found themselves suddenly elevated in rank and offered commissions by King and Parliament. Lt. Colonel Richard MacKoyler of Duncombe's Horse had been, as late as January 1642, merely a cavalry trooper with Irish service. Promotion was not quite so rapid in all cases, but it is marked enough. The Royalist army was to a large extent built upon promotion through merit, even if as a policy, it was not pursued beyond the initial development stage or even openly advocated.

In the north we can identify certain periods of intensive recruitment. The accusation levelled at Newcastle, that he distributed commissions with scant regard for their fulfilment, has been discussed elsewhere. Having recruited his own army in Durham and Northumberland in 1642, he found on his arrival at York in December of that year, that the earl of Cumberland had demonstrably failed to organise a military force worth anything, after the King had marched away with such regiments as had indeed, been recruited there. With the arrival of the Queen from Holland in March 1643, there was more recruiting, to provide men to accompany her to Oxford, and to fill the gaps made by the departure of regiments as escort forces, virtually all of which were to remain in Oxford with the King. It was at this time, for example, that Darcy's Trainband Foot left the county, and hundreds of soldiers were drawn away from Lancashire to form the nucleus of the Queen's two Lifeguard regiments. With the renewal of the siege of Hull in September 1643, Newcastle raised fresh forces to replace those left stationed in Lincolnshire under Sir William Widdrington, and again, in November, commissions were issued to recruit men for service in Derbyshire and Staffordshire. The invasion of the Scots in January 1644 meant a renewed burst of recruiting both to meet the threat and to safeguard Yorkshire in the rear. To this period we can positively date the raising of Anthony Byerley's Foot in Durham, which regiment, like many others, cannot have existed for more than three months at most.

A perpetual drain upon the northern army came from the departure of forces summoned to assist that at Oxford. The poor earl of Derby was
seriously handicapped by the loss of newly recruited forces at critical moments. Tyldesley's, Molyneux's and Gilbert Gerard's marched away to Oxford. Newly raised troops and companies formed the basis of the Queen's Lifeguard. These losses contributed in no small way to the Royalist collapse in Lancashire by the early summer of 1643. Things were not quite so bad in Yorkshire and the east. The earl of Newcastle had greater reserves of manpower upon which to draw, and he had so successfully out-generalled the Fairfaxes and their fellow commanders, that he was never really in any danger of being overwhelmed, unlike Derby. Belasyse's and Pennyman's had departed for the south in August 1642. Over the next year, they were followed by Darcy's Foot, Eure's Horse and Foot, perhaps by Osborne's Horse, as well as by other units which came to make up, in time, the foot regiments of Thomas Pinchbeck and Henry Percy. Of these, only Eure's cavalry came back to Yorkshire, to go down on Marston Moor where William Eure and his lt. colonel, both of them Catholics, lost their lives. Tyldesley's and Molyneux's also came to Marston Moor and took a beating, but for the most part, served in the south.

The Trainband system had determined that no man should serve outside his native county. The development of the war made this an impracticable anachronism. If the Trainbands were rife with parochialism, they had to be replaced or purged, and it is perhaps surprising that Darcy's Foot went so easily with the Queen, who must have attracted a good deal of personal popularity. Even so, and during the war's later stages, certain regiments never left their native counties - Muschamps and Forster's, for example, in Northumberland, and Byarley's in Durham - so, clearly, Newcastle respected certain traditions even if he brushed others aside. It may have been, of course, that these local regiments provided an easy means of policing the Royalist hinterland. Garrison regiments were, of course, a different case altogether, being intended solely to maintain a town or an important castle. Mallory's in Skipton, Cuthbert Clifton's in Liverpool, Scrope's in Bolton in Swaledale and Marley's in Newcastle upon Tyne, were never in any danger of being marched away and may well have been Trainband in origin. Marley's certainly was. Whatever regimental cohesion these garrison regiments possessed, must have gone by 1645 (for those that survived) when their ranks became crammed with Reformadoes from broken field regiments. Pontefract is a case in point, where whatever regimental structure Colonel Lowther may have had, was utterly lost by the time the siege began in December 1644. The same is demonstrably true of Scarborough, where a large number of Royalist field commanders came together in the last defence, and where several of them died. Garrison regiments were, anyway, distinguished by a marked versatility in improvisation, cavalry doubling as infantry and vice versa, something no self-respecting cavalryman would have considered in the field.
Having observed that neither the Trainband system, nor very many of its regiments, survived into 1643, we ought to consider the means by which a regiment was raised. It is not altogether clear just where the power to issue commissions lay. Certainly, the King and his generals could and did personally distribute authorisations for raising regiments: the earl of Newcastle would, for example, sign a commission for a colonel and then for a captain, without following any recognisable system other than the prescribed wording of the commission. The extent to which Colonels chose their own officers cannot be truly assessed in the north, although such evidence as there is suggests that the choice was primarily their own, subject to the sanctions, perhaps, of Newcastle and his chief commanders. In this way the earl could, if he wished to do so, prevent a man receiving a commission: the earl of Cumberland, for example, simply ignored Catholic supplicants and seems to have tried to make do with what Trainband forces he had.

It probably need not be said that both sides might have preferred to fight the war with Trainband formations. The issuing of commissions meant that at one peal of the trumpet or beat of the drum, the property qualification for military service went by the board. Into the rank and file came the unemployed, the landless and the rogues, as well as the sincere Royalist sympathisers from the yeomanry and minor gentry classes, though I do not mean here to imply that genuine Royalism was confined to specific classes. In both civil war armies, perhaps more obviously in that of the Parliament, the volunteer nature of the forces was a tool for social levelling. That it had any permanent effect one would doubt, since war conditions were, after all, exceptional conditions in which exceptional things, unheard of in peace, might be temporarily acceptable. For the northern Royalist army between 1642 and 1645, we can envisage the freeholder element as a leaven in the rank and file, but no longer as the hard core of any single regiment. It was the improvised nature of these forces that enabled Newcastle to march his regiments wherever he wished, untroubled by Trainband traditions, and subjected only to obstacles such as lack of pay or want of victuals. For the most part, these volunteer regiments fought with a dogged obstinacy that at times, was almost sacrificial. The Whitecoat regiments on Marston Moor, for example, marched all the way from Durham and Northumberland, stood, and died, whilst native Yorkshire cavalry fled the field. It must be that men who had, prior to the war, wanted some means of identifying themselves with their society, found in their regiments a community, and in their officers very immediate leadership. It cannot be denied, moreover, that the Royalist soldier, whether he felt it deeply or not, was fighting for a cause just as much as his Parliamentarian counterpart. Asked to define it, he might have been hesitant (as might the Parliamentarian), but it had a lot to do with shared hardships, regimental colours and officers who stood
shoulder to shoulder with their men. That is part of the essence of war.

Thus the Trainband system gave way to an improvised organisation far more efficient for the waging of civil war. It had hardly been a matter of choice, however. Even ignoring the Trainband disposition to think in narrow, parochial terms, there was a more major factor in preventing the war being fought by Trainbands. These were, after all, peace time civilian regiments and troops, in which officers and men of various religious and political leanings, worked together. The sudden jagged split in national cohesion split the Trainbands as well, setting officer against officers, soldier against soldier. A regiment of foot might be ruined by its colonel's decision to accept the Commission of Array, whilst two or three of its captains might try to take their own companies over to the Militia Ordinance. It would not be taking the argument too far to say that the outbreak of war decreased the numbers and effectiveness of the available national military forces, and from their ruins emerged the two opposing armies, in a haphazard fashion almost everywhere, until events and strong men began to shape and to direct resources. The difficulty in identifying Peacock's army list of 1642 may be explained by the fact that at least until the spring of 1643, regiments were changing shape and composition: that October to March can be seen as a period of transition. For example, Edward Grey rode down to Marlborough in December 1642 with his regiment of Dragoons, but by the spring of 1643 he was back in the north with a regiment of Horse. Two of his officers, John Roddam and Ralph Hebburn, found themselves promoted, Hebburn to the command of his own regiment of foot. Robert Brandling, the turncoat Yorkshire infantry officer, had been a Captain until early 1643. Edward or Edmund Duncombe, the despised temporary commander of Strickland's Trainband Foot in the summer of 1642, was later a Colonel of Horse in his own right, the case of trooper MacMoyler has already been alluded to.

Impressment was, however, a common resort of both armies. Volunteers would very rarely bring a foot regiment up to prescribed strength, and conscription was a necessity. In April 1646, Ralph and Nicholas Stevenson of Bishop Burton, husbandmen, petitioned that the Committee for Compounding had unfairly drawn them into its net, for "when the Earle of Newcastles Armie prevailed in the North Sr Marmaduke Langdales forces compelled yo3 peticonRS to go wth them and after four daies spent amongst yt unhappie Crew yo2 peticonRS got away...." Keeping men once they had been rounded up must have been a constant nightmare for the conscientious commander. Gabriel Garsid of Rochdale was, in 1642, summoned by the earl of Derby to provide a Trainband soldier at a Warrington muster, but having complied with the letter of the demand, Garsid at once withdrew the man and sent him into the Parliament's army. Yet the authorisations for impressment were perpetually hopeful. In January 1644, a bad time for the northern Royalists, John
Belasyse, then Governor of York, trying desperately to provide the Marquess of Newcastle with reinforcements with which to resist the Scots, issued orders for conscription. These were to apply on the old Trainband principle for the Wapentakes of the North Riding, and if the required number was not met, "you are to raise all men of able bodies beinge ffreeholders or ffarmers of five pounds per annum".\(^{15}\)

It was less of a problem to find officers. Sir Henry Slingsby noted that when he sought a commission at the start of the war, he found that "\(^{16}\)King had so many yt wait'd for Employment, yt unless I would find arms for \(^{16}\)they were rais'd, it would not be grant'd u". John Brackenbury was so eager for a commission that he paid over ten pieces of gold to Newcastle's secretary, even though Brackenbury was the brother-in-law of Colonel John Redman. He does not seem to have succeeded in his endeavour.\(^{17}\)

Impressment for the cavalry must have been negligible, if it operated at all. A large number of the rank and file troopers must have shared social standing with their officers, although the old Trainband requirement by which men of substance provided horse and rider for a local troop doubtless helped in completing troops.

What is evident anyway, is that neither infantry nor cavalry regiments reached their prescribed strength, except in certain cases.\(^{18}\) Regiments to which prestige attached, particularly if not solely, cavalry regiments, would ordinarily expect to maintain their quota, at least until the disasters and heavy losses of 1644. Newcastle's own, Edward Widdrington's, Thomas Tyldesley's, Robert Clavering's and Marmaduke Langdale's, for example, would probably have been close to full strength much of the time, filling gaps as men were killed or incapacitated or captured, fairly easily. The problem of manning was not new, however, as will be seen by a consideration of the 1642 strengths of Thomas Metham's Trainband regiment, contained in the appropriate appendix. Prestige could attach to a regiment in two ways, either cast upon it by the eminence of its commander, like Newcastle's own Horse, or by its record in action. Regrettably, we know so very little of the achievements of individual regiments, although, and from enemy sources, we receive occasional glimpses of their failures.

Before going on to consider the officer cadre in more detail, we must round off this regimental discussion by briefly examining two crucial aspects of raising an army. The soldiers' pay, and their equipment.

For these essentials, without which no army can survive intact for long, regardless of success in the field, there is relatively little that can be said beyond the obvious. The question of pay was adequately dealt with by Ian Roy in his thesis,\(^{19}\) and although he was largely concerned with the Oxford army, his observations appear to hold good for the Royalist armies.
as a whole. In brief, pay depended upon the regular income of the army which was drawn from the local population of the north by loans, by weekly taxes or assessments, or by the profits from sequestration of the estates of Parliamentarian sympathisers. Loans were the more reliable, in that these tended to come from rich peers and gentry who were, many of them, already militarily committed. Often, rather than being general loans for the use of the army as a whole, those rich enough to do so chose rather to finance a regiment or regiments of their own, providing pay and equipment as best they could. No coffers, however, were bottomless, and doubtless as the war dragged on, the efficiency of the fighting regiments tended to slacken. Unfortunately, we possess really very little material for a full examination of the northern regiments in these terms. At best, we can examine the scales of pay stipulated, generally in the Oxford army, and so gather an idea of the vast sums involved in maintaining the Marquess of Newcastle's forces.

Roy identified rates of pay in the Oxford army in some detail, and his work requires little modification or repetition. A foot company, for example, at full strength 20 (which many were not) would require about £50 a week. A troop of cavalry, again at full strength, in the region of £80. At the start of the war, recruits for the Oxford army were drawn in by promises of six shillings weekly for musketeers, twelve shillings for dragoons, and seventeen shillings and six pence for light cavalry. Symonds, the Oxford army's painstaking diarist, noted that two hundred men would cost £40 a week to maintain, but this was at a later stage of the war, for by 1645 the average garrison wage in Oxford was four shillings.21

A series of documents dating to mid or late summer 1642, and concerning northern Trainband regiments, gives an interesting breakdown of individual rates of pay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>£1. 0. Od. per diem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>10. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>6. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>4. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>4. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mate to Surgeon</td>
<td>2. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provost Marshal</td>
<td>4. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>4. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waggonmaster</td>
<td>3. Od.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that this list of rates of pay concerns regimental staff only, in a foot regiment, as opposed to company officers, commissioned and non-commissioned.22 From another document of the same period, we can obtain the following information concerning foot company rates of pay:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>£2. 16. Od. (per 7 day week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>1. 8. Od.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sergeants</td>
<td>16. 4d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Corporals</td>
<td>17. 4d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 drummers</td>
<td>14. 0d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It will be noted that this list does not include the ensign. We are also fortunate in having an assessment of Dragoon officers' pay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>£1.0.0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>15.0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>10.0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>6.0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>5.0d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difficulties in raising money and in maintaining a reliable supply were amply illustrated by Sir Henry Slingsby, and are dealt with elsewhere.

There were also anomalies. John Woodworth, of Eccles in Lancashire, received one shilling a day plus six pence a day extra for service out of the county, when he marched in the rank and file of Derby's Foot. Adam Hodson of Aspull in Lancashire, was induced to join the colours by a bounty of twenty shillings, a red coat, a musket, bandolier and knapsack, all provided by a rich yeoman farmer, Ralph Wood, as his contribution to the war effort. Unfortunately, Hodson found that in the course of the six months service he undertook, he went for twelve or fourteen weeks with no pay at all.

The fact of the matter must be that both officers and men often went for long periods without pay, partly a reflection of the breakdown of money-raising schemes, partly as a consequence of there being insufficient funds to go round. At such times, the officers, if they were fortunate enough to be able to do so, dipped into their own pockets in order to pacify their men. Success in battle meant plunder, and before it is condemned as a thoroughly bad business, it has to be remembered that for some men at some time in their military service, it was their only way of obtaining food, clothing and other essentials, as well as money.

The matter of equipment is also not so clearly illuminated as we might wish. Under the Trainband system, each man was required to provide his own weapon, inscribed with his name, and to keep it in a serviceable condition. With the outbreak of war, these arms were at the disposal of whichever side could seize upon them first, as a consequence of which, the King certainly was short of weapons at the very start. Indeed, there is no way of knowing how good were the weapons that the Royalists could lay hold on, or whether they were of a uniform style and effectiveness. There were also arsenals of weapons in the county towns throughout the north, composed either of Recusants' arms seized from their owners on 'permanent loan', or the arms of private individuals other than Recusants, stockpiled for issue to the Trainbands or to the untrained reserve forces of the county, in the event of national crisis. It is small wonder, then, that the outbreak of war in Lancashire in 1642 was connected directly with the earl of Derby's attempts to gain control of magazines at Preston, Manchester, Wigan and other places.
But it was not simply a question of muskets and pikes, and where needed, body armour. There were Trainband commitments to provide horses, for example which fell upon individuals who exercised discretion as to quality. It was a simple matter to overcome the unwillingness of a man to supply his quota horse, as John Wytham found when the earl of Cumberland forced his horse from him in the autumn of 1642. Supplying the cavalry was essential, if the Royalists were to hope to achieve a signal victory, and while most officers supplied their own mounts, sometimes also for their troopers, the greater gentry and non-combatant men of substance were responsible for finding large numbers of mounts in excess of those needed for their own requirements. This could be done either by actual donation of horses, or by providing money to pay for them from elsewhere, on a three months basis initially at two shillings and six pence a day. The enormous expense involved can be judged from the numbers set against individual subscribers, as Lord Coventry, 100 horses; the duke of Richmond 100; and the earl of Cumberland 50. It is hardly surprising that after the first flush of enthusiasm had waned, individuals should have been slow in meeting their Trainband or other commitments.

Control of northern ports like Newcastle and Scarborough gave the royal army means of bringing in weapons from abroad. When the Queen arrived from Holland early in 1643, she brought with her enough weapons to equip Sir Marmaduke Langdale's infantry, and supplies were still reaching Scarborough in May 1644. But campaigns consumed equipment, and in May 1643 Thomas Beaumont, deputy Governor in Sheffield, was advised "use your snaphaunce pieces to keep century with. They will save our match." Careful records were kept of stores issues at main arsenals like that of York. The city had been selected as an arsenal by Newcastle in 1643, and saddle-making had been in full swing there in late 1642. Basic commodities like musket balls were manufactured practically everywhere, but it is interesting to note that Sheffield was a centre of musket ball manufacture and was supplying Pontefract, for dispersal elsewhere, in 1643.

It is evident that the Royalist army which took the field in 1642 was an improvised, makeshift affair. In the north, by trial and error, and under the firm hand of the earl of Newcastle and of his advisors, was forged a fighting machine with which the King's cause was well maintained. To offset the deficiencies in money and supplies, was the enthusiasm of the officers, which, together with the resolute behaviour, for the most part, of the rank and file when in action, time and again brought the army to the very edge of victory. Having dealt at some length with the regiments in general, we must now turn to consider those officers who, by their example, helped to overcome those deficiencies referred to.
In the regimental analysis contained in the appendices, attempts have been made to identify each known officer. Naturally enough, the more elevated the rank, the easier the identification, for we are dealing with an army in which, by and large, military and social rank tended to go together. As the scale of ranks is descended, the success rate of identifications tends to fall off. In the case of Quartermasters, it is so slender that it prohibits any worthwhile analysis at all. Consequently, whilst these quartermasters are included in the total of 2024 named officers, the 105 identified quartermasters have not been included in the analysis of identified officers. Thus we are concerned with 986 officers, instead of with the 1091 who have been positively or reasonably tentatively identified.

Rank and file study is impossible. Muster rolls are rare for the army of the Parliament, and virtually non-existent for the northern Royalist forces. This is due, partly, to destruction of records, but we cannot suppose that accurate and consistent details were always kept, anyway. Only one Royalist muster roll, apparently that for Colonel Sir George Wentworth's regiment of foot, appears to have survived. The matter is open to some doubt, since it consists of a 19th century copy of a now lost document. It is undated and virtually none of the names on it are capable of positive verification, although it both sounds and looks correct. Concentration on the officer class is, therefore, unavoidable, but is, anyway, more rewarding in view of its relation to similar studies of the Parliamentary army, and to other works dealing with Royalist gentry in general. Certain important points must now be made, however, for clearly, in any analysis, specific terms of reference have to be applied, and cannot be altered to suit cases which may present problems or be exceptions to a general rule.

So far as rank is concerned, I have taken the final rank of each known officer. That is to say, if a man was commissioned as a captain in 1642, but by the end of the war had risen to the rank of colonel, he is dealt with only once, as a colonel. In his biographical details will be found, if known, the process by which he reached this rank. For the purposes of clarity, however, and in accordance with the practice of the time as, for example, in composition proceedings, it is the final rank with which we must be concerned (provided always that that final rank was attained within a regiment with which we are concerned, or within the timescale of 1642/5). Thus, of a total of 126 colonels of horse, foot or dragoons (or combinations thereof) 19 were men promoted from lower ranks during the course of the war. These promotions are harder to pinpoint the lower one goes in the ranks, and beyond Majors it is virtually impossible to arrive at any valid figures.

However, whilst taking the final rank for the purpose of analysis, in the case of religious and social standing, I have endeavoured to ascertain
the correct classification for 1642. This is justified by contemporary usage. To consider the problem of social status first, I have recognised and employed the following classifications:

**Peers:** inclusive of, but distinguished in the biographies, peers of Irish and Scottish creation.

**Baronets:** those who held this title in October 1642.

**Knights:** those who held this rank in October 1642 (excluding war-time elevations which are noted in the various biographies).

**Esquires:** those who held this status in October 1642, as well as heirs to peerages and baronetcies not otherwise distinguished.

**Gentlemen:** the younger sons of peers, baronets and knights, and of esquires, as well as country gentlemen so distinguished by contemporary sources.

**Yeomen:** so distinguished in contemporary references.

**Others:** merchants (being those who ordinarily made their living from trade and who were not otherwise socially distinguished); doctors of law and of medicine, sea captains and clerics. These latter groups are so minimal, perhaps one or two examples of each, that we are dealing with an army officered almost exclusively by the gentry.

Where possible, the relationship of any officer to his family, whether as head of that family, heir to the head, younger son or younger brother, has been noted. In many cases, particularly of lesser ranks, this cannot always be accurately traced, so that any attempt to arrive at an overall picture by purely numbering would be inhibited for want of certainty from the rank of lieutenant downwards. It must be said, however, that few cases of split families have been identified, in which brother opposed brother for example. Families hitherto supposed neutral or luke-warm can be shown to have had a foot in the armed Royalist camp in the shape of a younger son or brother. This is particularly relevant as regards Catholic and Recusant families, for although it can be shown that head of family commitment was great amongst them, proponents of the neutrality theory have failed to recognise younger sons in arms in families otherwise not involved. This matter will be gone into in more depth shortly.

From the tables which have been compiled from information to be found in the appendices, it will be seen that in attempting to identify officers who had held local, national or court office prior to 1642, or who had received a university education, a remarkable lack of any such experience emerges. Quite clearly, and probably the high Catholic presence tends to accentuate this tendency, in the north at least the Royalist armed forces were composed of minor gentry in the officer cadre even if colonelcies went to eminent figures. Since no comparative study has been made of the north in general, in terms of gentry figures related to office holding figures, this may or may not be significant, but it requires emphasis.

I have steered clear of the rising/declining gentry controversy.
The terms of reference which I set myself were wide enough and created problems sufficient without adding to them the contentious issues raised in that aspect. Dealing for the most part as I have been, with immediate civil war sources and others covering the years prior to and subsequent to, 1642/5, it is only possible now and again to identify a man whose financial position was declining or improving. It has been found, however, that in cases where such an identification presents itself, the two possibilities appear to balance. Financial insolvency or improvement have been noted in individual biographies, and since all the officers are named, it would be possible to compare the regimental lists with those that have been produced, or may be, in county or regional gentry studies. It seemed to me to be sufficient for my purpose, to seek to know from which classes the northern army drew the bulk of its officers: the distribution of those classes in terms of arm of service and military rank: the representation of wholly committed families as against those represented by younger sons or brothers: and the religious persuasions of the officers where ascertainable.

The problem of religious persuasion is really insoluble in a sense. Here again, particularly in tracing Catholic officers, I have been concerned with evidence of continuity in Recusant families, or specific allusions to Catholic sympathies immediately prior to 1642, between then and 1660, or in the early Restoration period. In certain families, for instance, that of the Sayers of Worsall in the North Riding of Yorkshire, the indictments for Recusancy are so frequent prior to the war, that Catholic opinions can be assumed for the war years, when Recusancy presentments were a thing of the past. Want of composition proceedings supports this view. In other cases, a single instance of presentment or of indictment in, say, the mid 1630's, cannot be used as a means of determining religious leanings in 1642 (since a man may have conformed in the meantime sincerely or otherwise) unless there is some familial tendency which suggests Church Papist. A lot of prominent Catholics, moreover, escaped indictment and presentment, but were well known for their attachment to the old faith, so that in identifying these as Catholics, if not as Recusants, we are more reliant upon contemporary opinion, even upon that of Parliamentary writers who had an axe to grind.

In several cases, it has been a matter of exercising judgement on the strength of what evidence there is, and consequently I have, to give two instances, accepted the Howards of Naworth as Catholics, but have excepted the Brandlings of Leathley in Yorkshire. At all points I have endeavoured to err on the side of caution, so that some officers classified as Protestants or as of religion unknown, may be Church Papists in the strict sense of that term, or unconvicted non-communicants. The lower in the ranks the analysis goes, the more difficult does identification of Catholics, even of Protestants,
ome. This is particularly so in Durham, where Fenwicks and Erringtons abound and seemed to delight in adopting in every generation the same narrow group of forenames as their ancestors. One is tempted to wonder whether the Catholic hunters of the 17th century had as much difficulty in getting their man as the 20th century researcher and, indeed, whether they bothered to exercise very much caution.

In brief then, for the purposes of regimental analysis I have taken the final rank of each individual, his social standing in 1642, his familial position in that year and, where possible, his religious persuasion. I have also concerned myself to discover whether they had held local or national office, court positions, or had had a university education and military experience abroad.

Admirers of the record of the New Model Army for promotion according to merit (although this threw up some unsavoury characters) would apparently find little to please them in the northern Royalist army, or, indeed, in the Royalist armies as a whole. But this is only really true if the (false) analogy is made between promotion by merit and promotion of an officer of humble social status. Whilst rank was generally according to social status, within the gentry class as represented in the army, promotion by merit was not unusual, since the merit lay in military capability. That rank had to accord with social standing was a consequence of the nature of society. Royalist and Parliamentarians alike, in 1642 and 1643, had to give commands to men with territorial influence, money, and the ability to raise and command tenants and friends. The majority of Royalist colonels of northern regiments either were, or became as a consequence of their rank, knights at the time of their commissions. Thus military rank could lead to social elevation within the narrow gentry spectrum, but Parliament, let it be noted, did not recognise such distinctions and dealt with compounding Royalists in terms of their social entitlement in 1642 or, if they had succeeded to their estates after that date, then by the social title to which they were become entitled. Thus, Colonel Sir George Middleton, knighted after the outbreak of fighting, though he abjured his faith to compound, was regarded as George Middleton Esquire. Military promotion and/or social promotion was rare for those of non-gentry origins, and only three positively identifiable cases have been found in the northern regiments. Reference has been made to Richard MacMoyler of Duncombe's Horse: there was also Colonel Sir Richard Page of Pennyman's Foot, and Colonel Sir Henry Bard (later Viscount Bellamont) the second commander of Pinchbeck's Foot. There are, of course, instances of senior military officers whose rank was due to experience and not so much to eminence socially. James King, later Baron Eythin, Newcastle's chief advisor, is a case in point. There are some others, all noted in the regimental analyses or in the campaign history. Even so, it would be very
wrong to look upon the Royalist officer cadre in general terms as a club of landed gallants assuming military roles for which they were not suited by background or temperament. They proved themselves to be, on the whole, extremely courageous, usually competent commanders, some of them emerging as brilliant tacticians in their own right. Newcastle himself, much maligned even to the present, the victim of undeserved jibes, proved himself to be a passingly sound commander, always conscious of his amateur status, always ready to listen to experienced professionals, and capable of quite sound strategical thinking. Regimental officers like Colonel Sir William Lambton and Colonel Sir William Huddleston built and trained regiments that were among the finest in the Royalist armies, north or south of Trent, whilst minor figures like Colonel Sir Gamaliel Dudley or Colonel Sir John Mayney discovered that they were capable of exploits which would not have shamed more famous men like Rupert and Langdale. The northern regiments were, on the whole, well officered by men whose military rank was consequent upon their social status.

There are also some instances when military rank and social status do appear to have been at odds. For example, John Smith of Eshe in Durham, a Catholic country gentleman, raised and commanded what was intended to be a full cavalry regiment, the elite arm of the forces. Then again, we have Sir Thomas Bland, Bart., Lt. Colonel in a foot regiment: and Captain Sir John Goodrick, Knt., in a cavalry force as a troop commander only, the regiment being that of Colonel Sir William Saville, Bart. It has to be pointed out here, that the first captaincy in a cavalry regiment - the first captain raised his own troop, whereas the ordinary captain commanded the troop raised by a field officer - was probably more prestigious than possession of major's rank in a foot regiment. The proliferation of men of fairly high social standing technically, in terms of their rank entitlement in society, not always compatible with financial well-being, can be accounted for in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates how many of the knightly class and of the squirearchy were eager to serve the King, too many for the limited supply of colonel's commissions. I do not think that this particular argument can be stretched too far. It is far more likely that military and financial considerations went hand in hand, and that the strain upon the purse would account for the degree of authority enjoyed by Goodrick or Bland, by Smith and others. This would introduce the aspect of financial solvency into the qualifications for possession of high rank, but if it were purely a matter of that, as opposed to territorial influence for example, we would expect to find more of the merchant class represented in colonelcies, whereas the nearest we do get to trade is in the colliery owning or renting colonels. They are not quite the same type of figure as Sir John Marley and his senior officers in Newcastle upon Tyne. The conclusion must be that
social standing corresponded by and large with military rank, but that financial difficulties could in certain cases lead to rank falling short of what, socially speaking, would have been expected. That this view is further qualified by the finite number of commissions available for the many who desired them, goes without saying. On occasions, military rank reflected professional expertise and could lead to social elevation, although that elevation was not recognised outside the Royalist camp. It need not be stressed that this socio-military balance was not in itself a weakness.

We shall shortly be considering the statistical material drawn from the regimental analyses. Initially, however, it would be as well to deal with the peripheral information that has emerged from the biographies of individual officers.

The problem of officer mortality can be dealt with fairly summarily. Any attempt to try to arrive at a definitive mortality list for one regiment, let alone for an army, would be futile. Colonels and lieutenant colonels tended to be noted as they fell in action, or as they died of wounds or privation. Those that died obscurely did so in the years after 1646. Majors were less often noted. Captains passed from the scene almost without comment, whilst lieutenants, ensigns, cornets and quartermasters were heaped anonymously with troopers and infantrymen. Full burial pits on many a battlefield contained, still contain, tumbled together, the naked corpses of officers, gentlemen and rank and file. Colonel John Fenwick, killed with his regiment around him on Marston Moor, could not be brought off for separate burial: Colonel Thomas Metham was tossed into a pit; their passing only noted because of their rank and social standing (particularly in Metham's case). Hundreds of other commissioned ranks passed without comment from friend or foe alike. Thus an attempt to reach a mortality rate will be restricted to colonels and lieutenant colonels, barring even majors for want of definite information concerning many of them.

Of the 126 colonels included in the analysis (this excludes seven others who cannot be identified), 51 died between 1642 and 1660, or 40 per cent (rounded down).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed or Died of Wounds</th>
<th>Died</th>
<th>Executed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that the mortality rate for Catholic colonels whose deaths can be attributed directly to active service, is markedly higher than the Protestant level. This suggests that, as Catholics, they were the more likely to be denied mercy on the field. The number includes, of course, men like Colonel Sir Thomas Tyldesley killed in action as late as 1651.

*Let it be noted that cavalry colonels suffered highly, an arm in which Catholics predominated at field command rank.*
In the case of lt. colonels, 94 are known of which number 21 cannot be identified. Of the 73 included in the analysis, 17 were killed in battle and a minimum of four died before 1660. Of those killed in action, no fewer than 12 were Catholics out of a total of 31 identified Catholics holding this rank. The heavy Catholic losses, 70 per cent of those known to have been killed or to have died of wounds received in action, compare favourably with the impression gained from the colonels. It has to be stressed that this high Catholic mortality rate at field officer level has misled those who have propounded the neutrality theory: they simply have not been aware of certain officers. Unfortunately, as has been said, no continuing analysis is worthwhile for the ranks of major and beyond, for want of a reasonable body of evidence.

Ordinarily, the regimental field officers fought at the head of their respective regiments, setting an example for their men to follow. Several colonels were killed outright exposing themselves in this fashion: Thomas Howard at Piercebridge in 1642, another Thomas Howard and George Heron at Adwalton Moor in 1643. All were horse commanders, they were well ahead of their men, and provided easy targets. Since their behaviour was the rule rather than the exception, it must be judged remarkable that out of the total of 199 colonels and lt. colonels with which we are concerned, only 38 can be said positively to have died in battle or from wounds. Of that number, 24 were Catholics. The survival of many others must be accounted for by their skill in arms, and, in the case of escaping death by musket fire, by their plate of proof which was ordinarily worn. Another factor, less edifying but for which there is some evidence, lay in the ability of horse commanders to flee a stricken field. Infantry colonels, who ordinarily rode at the head of their troops, could also get away: Thomas Fairfax left his foot to their own devices on several occasions, as will be seen. When Sir William Lambton died with his regiment on Marston Moor, he had clearly dismounted, effectively depriving himself of hope.

Death from wounds was commonplace. Colonel Guilford Slingsby, cut down at Gisborough in January 1643, had to have his legs amputated and died as a consequence, presumably from loss of blood or from gangrene. Two governors of Pontefract, Colonels Sir John Redman and Richard Lowther, died of consumption aggravated by conditions within that castle. The dashing young cavalry commander, Colonel Sir Robert Clavering, seems to have suffered a physical breakdown in the summer of 1644 which led directly to his death. One of the youngest of field officers, his constitution clearly cannot have been strong. Colonel Cuthbert Clifton, a Lancashire Recusant, was confined by his captors in late 1644 and died of hard usage. Countless officers of lesser rank must have died from maltreatment. Proponents of the 'war without an enemy' theory do not consider this.
Age analysis is possible only for colonels, with a cursory survey of lt. colonels. Of the 126 colonels, the ages of 71 are known, ranging from 72 years at the oldest, to: 17 years at the youngest. This gives an average age of 35, (median, 34). Broken down by arm of service, we find:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horse/Dragoons</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Horse/Foot/Dragoons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>30(Median 25)</td>
<td>38(Median 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 17 year old, Charles Viscount Mansfield, is something of a mystery. The matter is dealt with in his biography, but it should be said here that he may have been even younger.

Before going on to consider in detail the more significant aspects of officer analysis in ranks excluding that of quartermaster, certain general observations need to be made. It has been said that, inclusive of the quartermasters, we are dealing with a total of 2024 regimental officers. Not included in this total, but given brief cover in Appendix 4 (Vol. 2), any analysis of which would be valueless, are those officers of northern origin who cannot be classified by regiment or, additionally, by arm of service. In some cases their precise ranks may even be in doubt, and the origins of many remain a mystery. It might prove possible in time, to ascribe to some of them some definite regimental designation, but that need not necessarily mean that a northern regiment will be found for them. The List, for example, contains many northern officers, omitted from this study, who served in regiments raised outside of the northern counties. These were, usually, prestigious regiments like those of the King, Prince Rupert, Byron or Charles Gerard. The officers in question may have left the north in August 1642 and transferred to regiments of the Oxford army (see Walter Slingsby of Strickland's Foot).

The total of 2024 officers is broken down as follows. Those about whom nothing, or very little, is positively known, are listed as unidentified, and will disappear from the analysis at this point. As has been said, the Quartermasters are also to be excluded, whether identified or not, since no worthwhile survey of them is possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Identified</th>
<th>Unidentified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonels (Horse, Foot, Dragoons)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonels</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains (Horse/Dragoons)</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains (Foot)</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenants (Horse, Dragoons)</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Identified</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenants (Foot)</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornets</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensigns</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermasters (Horse)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermasters (Foot)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excluding those unidentified, and all quartermasters, we are dealing with a total of 986 officers in the survey which follows.

The number of captains is not disproportionately high, for it must be remembered that, for every regiment with the usual three field officers, in an infantry regiment there would be ten captains (admittedly ideally), and, in a cavalry regiment, six. If the regiments with which we are dealing had all been at full strength, then the number of captains would indeed, be disproportionately low. It should also be pointed out, that whereas a cavalry troop had its own quartermaster, only one such man was appointed to each infantry regiment, hence that discrepancy in numbers.

Before commencing the analysis of each rank in socio-religious terms, a few brief points must be stressed. The minute processes by which the following figures have been arrived at, cannot be set out here. The details will be found in each individual biography for the 986 officers with whom we are concerned, as it will be also apparent why 933 have been described as unidentified and excluded from the analysis, quite apart from the 105 quartermasters. In the table of Catholic officers set out below, it will be noted that a number of officers from each rank are entered as 'religion unknown'. That a proportion of these were themselves Catholics, either Recusants or Church Papists, is obvious. Problems arise in identification where we have a common name for which upwards of five or six possibilities can be found in Recusancy lists and suchlike. Comment has already been made on the difficulty of determining Fenwicks and Erringtons, and the same is true of names like Watson, Brown, Smith, Carnaby and Jackson. It will also be apparent that of the 933 omitted altogether, a substantial number may well have been Catholics, perhaps as many as a third, which is the number that appears after study of identified officers. This means that the total of Catholics in arms is a figure which can only rise in itself, and their percentage of the total of officers would probably remain the same were the evidence available to extend analysis.

In the tables which now follow, particular attention should be paid to the degree of Catholic involvement, not only numerically, but in terms of rank representation and family commitment and social standing. A similar comparative survey of, for example, South Wales would be extremely valuable in setting these findings in perspective.
Having established a substantial Catholic and Recusant presence in arms in the northern regiments (34 per cent of all officers identified in terms of religion), it will now become apparent that, contrary to the findings of Keith Lindley, they were predominantly of lesser gentry status, more often than not, lacking entitlement to the term Esquire. Whilst the Catholic presence in field command rank is noteworthy, particularly in the mounted arm whether horse or dragoon, it is even more striking at company or troop command level, and given the strong probability that the figure may be increased eventually, argues for a more thorough-going Catholic Royalism than has recently been supposed. It may be that the traditional view of Catholic Royalism was not, at least where the north is concerned, so far-fetched as it has been made to seem.

The distinction drawn between cavalry and infantry officers below the rank of colonel and lt. colonel merely serves to emphasise the markedly Catholic and Recusant presence in the former arm of service. Dragoons and horse are categorised together for convenience, since in terms of troop and regimental structure they were identical. Lack of any number of specifically dragoon regiments renders any separate analysis pointless anyway, since more often than not, dragoons formed a troop, perhaps two, attached to a cavalry regiment, the colonel of which exercised a dual command. For the social, family and political analyses which follow in due course, this nice distinction will be dropped, having explained the nature of it.

We must now turn to specific rank analysis.
Of the total of 133 known colonels, we are concerned with 126 (including 19 promotions) who can be positively identified. The seven excluded from analysis, for want of identification, were, with two exceptions, officers from places outside of the north. These seven were:

- Colonel Edward Vero, horse.
- Francis Trafford, horse (Catholic, possibly northern).
- (Sir) William Mason, horse.
- William Stuart, dragoons.
- Thomas Pinchbeck, foot.
- Godfrey Floyd, foot.
- (Sir) Richard Page, foot (possibly a Yorkshireman).

The geographical locations, broken down in terms of religion, of the 126 we are dealing with, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The marked Catholic presence at regimental command level amongst colonels from the six northern counties (35 per cent) would not be materially altered by identification of the seven excluded from analysis, but might alter slightly if the nine whose religion is not positively known, were shown to have been Protestants or Catholics predominantly.

The distribution of the 102 northern colonels whose religion is known, by county, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yorks</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'ham</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N'land</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumbria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Catholic numbers for Durham and Lancashire reflect the larger percentage of Catholics in their populations in 1642. The figures for Cumberland and for Westmorland, however, raise a question. Catholics and Recusants were a small proportion of the population in Cumbria, but what is remarkable is that these two counties produced the highest number of Protestant colonels after Yorkshire. The matter is of some importance, since attention has already been drawn to the fact, which is enlarged upon both in the campaign history and the regimental analyses, that commanders here were extremely lax and wanted conviction. Taking Cumbria in isolation from the rest of the north, it would appear, superficially, that where there was a tiny Catholic gentry presence, there was a small active Royalist group. Yet it must be said that for those Cumbrian colonels who stayed at home and did little but squabble amongst themselves, there were an equal number who led their men in the major campaigns. It may therefore be the case that Cumbria was reluctantly Royalist because of its strategic encirclement.
In the case of Durham and Lancashire, however, it is possible to be far more definite. Although it has been said that Catholics in these two counties formed a higher percentage of the overall population than elsewhere, they were still a minority. Bossy gives a notional figure of Catholic households in each, in 1641, as 'more than 20 per cent' of the whole, and from this 20 per cent came 57 per cent of the commissioned colonels in Durham and 68 per cent of the commissioned colonels in Lancashire. Not only does this argue for a Catholic commitment to the Royalist cause in the north, but it can also be shown that there was far more family commitment by heads of families or by their heirs than there was on the part of Protestant Royalists. If it were possible to take Durham and the North Riding of Yorkshire as a single area, which has not been attempted in the analyses, and a broad survey made of all officer grades (which would require more evidence than we possess) it would probably be feasible to speak of a Catholic heartland in the north, stretching from the mouth of the Tyne to the mouth of the Tees, inland in a tapering belt through Durham and the Cleveland Hills to join northern and western Lancashire, which put men into the field out of all proportion to their percentage of the population in the north as a whole, sufficient to substantiate the traditional view of Catholics as King's men. Further, as has been suggested, these colonels drew into their regiments Catholic officers not domiciled within the expected catchment area for a regiment, so that it is now possible to speak of a northern Catholic Royalist grouping sufficiently numerous to demand attention.

Social Standing.

The following analysis of the 126 colonels is intended to show both the social representation in that rank, broken down also in terms of religious persuasion. Social status is that applying in October 1642.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peers</th>
<th>Barons</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Gents</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between October 1642 and July 1646, fourteen of these colonels received the honour of knighthood, seven of whom were Catholics. Six were elevated to the peerage, of whom two were Catholics.
Family Status

Such an analysis is only feasible for the upper ranks of regimental command, captain to colonel. I have recognised four classifications:
1) Heads of families, 2) Heirs to heads of families, whether eldest son or brother; 3) Younger sons, and 4) Younger brothers. These last two groups were usually in arms if there was some marked degree of Royalist sympathy shown on the part of the head of the family. Cases of split families are rare, perhaps only three or four coming to light in the 986 cases with which these analyses are concerned. If the family were taken as meaning something broader than I have chosen it to mean, in the sense that we would speak of three or four brothers, each the head of his own family unit, as being part of a family united by a common surname and parentage, such cases might multiply. As it is, I have taken 'family' as meaning the head and those identified as being dependent upon him, generally meaning, those living in the familial home or drawing an annuity or allowance for their maintenance. Naturally, classification 2) Heirs to heads of families, must include younger brothers independent of the actual head, but with expectations which link them closely with the family group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Colonels</th>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>Heirs</th>
<th>Yng. Sons</th>
<th>Yng. Bros.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public Office and Experience

Most remarkable in the case of northern regiments is the small number of colonels who had achieved any local or national prominence in terms of office by 1642. This may partly be accounted for by the presence of a body of Catholics who were, if Recusants, debarred from place or office by the law. That cannot, however, be the whole picture, and clearly we must be dealing with persons whose social standing was insufficient, or who wanted connection or who lacked the money, to enable them to achieve office. Those who have marked the rise, during the Interregnum, of very minor gentry into places of importance, have not noted the rise, in 1642, of very minor gentry into important military rank in the King's army. This demands study, and argues for a broader Royalist commitment in terms of the social spectrum than has perhaps been supposed.

Such an analysis is only really feasible for colonels, but can be tentatively applied to lt. colonels, subject to revision, for comparative purposes.
The classifications employed here, are as follows. 1) Colonels who were or who had been, members of parliament in, or prior to, October 1642. 2) Those who held, or who had held, positions at Court. 3) Those who held, or who had held, local office in their particular counties, i.e. Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Deputy Lieutenants. 4) Those who had received a University education, ordinarily followed by admission to the Inns of Court or to the Temple. 5) Those who had seen active service outside England and who brought military expertise into the regiments they commanded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonels</th>
<th>MPs.</th>
<th>Court</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Military Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 24 MPs, 20 were from the northern counties, and all are included in the total of those who held local office. There does not seem to be any marked correlation between university education and membership of parliament, nor, for that matter, between local office holding and university education. Of the 12 colonels who had seen active service abroad, six of these came from places outside of the northern counties, and this compares with 15 who can be traced to similar external origins (excluding the seven not in the survey). Two of the 12 did not actually serve under Newcastle, so that it can be said that the earl seems to have pursued a policy of commissioning experienced men where possible, to supplement rather than to supersede the Trainband and inexperienced local gentry.

**Lt. Colonels**

Of the total of 94 known lt. colonels we are concerned with 73 (including 11 promotions) who can be positively identified. The 21 excluded cannot be listed here, but it will be apparent who they are. Three were Scots and one an Irishman.

The geographical locations, broken down in terms of religion, of the 73 we are dealing with, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lt. Colonels</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Catholic presence in this rank is marked, particularly in the north (44 percent of known lt. colonels), and it should be remembered that in horse and dragoon regiments they predominated.

The distribution of the 59 northern lt. colonels whose religion is known by county, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yorks.</th>
<th>D'ham</th>
<th>N'land</th>
<th>Cumbria</th>
<th>Lancs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Catholic predominance in Lancashire, already noted amongst the colonels, is here even more strikingly maintained: but for Durham we have a marked increase in Protestant presence at this rank which may be pure coincidence. The small number of lt. colonels in Cumberland and Westmorland, compared to commissioned colonels from those counties, indicates very strongly the lack of real regimental structures there, although we must here allow for want of evidence.

Social Standing

The following analysis of the 73 lt. colonels we are concerned with, is intended to show both social representation in that rank broken down also in terms of religious persuasion. Social status is that applying in October 1642.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peers</th>
<th>Barts</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Gents</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The, single Catholic peer here represented was Henry Constable, Viscount Dunbar in the Scottish peerage, who was killed in defence of Scarborough Castle in 1645. One of the four Gentlemen, whose religion is given as unknown, may have been entitled to be styled Esquire, but little is known about him beyond fragmentary composition records. He was Lt. Colonel Carleton of Colonel Colonel Sir Henry Fletcher's Foot.

Family Status

The classifications employed here have already been set out in the case of the colonels and do not require repetition. We are dealing with 73 persons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Lt. Colonels</th>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>Heirs</th>
<th>Yng. Sons</th>
<th>Yng. Bros</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pronounced Catholic commitment at the extremely vulnerable level of family headship, and of heirs to headship, noted in the colonels, is here maintained.

Public Office and Experience

As has been pointed out in the case of the colonels, such an analysis is really only feasible for comparative purposes, but is in no way finalised, where lt. colonels are concerned. Classification has already been given.
Lt. Colonels  MPa  Court  Local  University  Military Service
73  1  3  5  2  2

The single MP came from outside the northern counties, Lt. Colonel Thomas Smith of the Queen's Lifeguard of Horse.

MAJORS

Of the total of 98 known majors, we are concerned with 67 who can be positively identified. The 31 excluded from the survey cannot be given here but will be apparent in the regimental studies. Two were Scots, and one came from Staffordshire.

The geographical locations, broken down in terms of religion, of the 67 we are dealing with, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be remembered that Catholic majors were most markedly represented in horse and dragoon units. Here again, the preponderance of Catholics at the rank of major is highest amongst those from the six northern counties, (45 per cent).

The distribution of the 48 northern majors whose religion is known, by county, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Catholic predominance in Lancashire is once again maintained strikingly, although again in Durham it has given ground. In these two counties, and particularly in Durham, it does appear that Catholics played a significant role in the two senior ranks of each regiment, which is a further argument for their commitment to the Royalist party.

Social Standing

As before, we are concerned here to show the social standing of the 67 majors broken down in religious persuasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peers</th>
<th>Barts</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Gents</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0 1 1 15 50 0

- 48 -
Family Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Majors</th>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>Heirs</th>
<th>Yng. Sons</th>
<th>Yng. Bros.</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Catholic Field Officers: Statistical summary.

In what follows are drawn together the findings concerning Catholic activists in the ranks of colonel, lt. colonel and major. Comparison with Protestant activists having already been made, this summary is meant solely to give as concise a view of known Catholic officers, as is possible, for the regiments.

We are dealing with a total of 97 identified Catholic field officers, from a total of 266 such officers, or 36 per cent of the total of identified field commanders inclusive of those 20 of whose religious persuasion we cannot be sure.

Social Standing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catholic Field Officers</th>
<th>Peers</th>
<th>Barts.</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Gents.</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most striking aspect of these figures is the degree of commitment by the heads of Catholic families. Some 41 per cent (the figure is rounded down) of the total number of Catholic field officers in northern regiments were heads of families. Heirs accounted for 23 per cent. Catholic field officers as a whole, accounted for 36 per cent of the total of 266 identified officers with which we have dealt. This may be compared with Bossy's recent critical reassessment of Catholic numbers in England as a whole in 1641 as totalling 60,000 men, women and children (or 1.5 per cent of the population of 4 millions). Figures for individual counties at this date are hard to arrive at, but in terms of households, Bossy suggests the (notional) figures for Durham and Lancashire of more than 20 per cent, and for Yorkshire and Northumberland between 11 and 20 per cent. No figures can be arrived at for Cumbria where the Recusant population was extremely tiny. Any future work on the size of the Catholic community in the northern counties could do no other than add emphasis to the impression of an armed Catholic commitment out of all proportion to their percentage of the population.
CAPTAINS (HORSE AND DRAGOON)

Of the total of 333 such captains, we are concerned with only 176 who can be identified. The geographical locations, broken down in terms of religion, of these 176, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captains H/D</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assess the 152 who originated in the north, and whose religion is known, in terms of county distribution would be of small value. In dealing with 176 of a total of named officers of 333 we are dealing anyway with only 52 per cent, and to analyse 152 (45 per cent) would beg as many questions as it would answer. We can, however, consider the captains of cavalry in terms of social and family status.

**Social Standing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barts.</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Gents.</th>
<th>Yeo.</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the Catholic presence in minor and middling gentry has to be noted.

**Family Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, the cavalry troop commanders evidence the commitment of Catholic heads of families to the Royalist cause. The large number of Protestants unidentified as to familial status (18 per cent of the overall total we are dealing with) is quite pronounced and suggests that they would have to be fairly evenly divided between younger sons and younger brothers for the most part, since the majority were gentlemen and should otherwise be traceable if they were heads of families or heirs to heads. The combined total of Catholic heads and heirs to heads gives us 17 per cent of the overall total.

Catholic presence in the infantry is less marked.
CAPTAINS (FOOT).

Of the total of 385 such captains, we are concerned with 203 who can be identified. The geographical locations, broken down in terms of religion, of these 203, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captains (F)</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the case of captains of cavalry, it is not intended to assess religious and county distribution, for whilst this would create some imbalance, it is also more than apparent that in the infantry, Catholic participation was significantly lower.

Social Standing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barts</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Gents</th>
<th>Yeo.</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures serve to emphasise the Catholic commitment right across the rank and social spectrums, when seen in conjunction with those given earlier. At field and company or troop command, their presence was quite significant even if it was contained in certain specific regiments as the evidence bears out. That containment was not, however, complete.

Family Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>Heirs</th>
<th>Yng. Sons</th>
<th>Yng. Bros.</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most notable here is the number of younger sons of Catholic families, which might suggest that for the Catholic Royalist family (and this matter has been raised elsewhere in considering the regiments as a whole) had immediate preference for the elite arm. But the matter is inextricably bound up with the question of Trainband infantry, and this too has been discussed. In the case of the captains, and as with the field officers, we must also note the continued appearance of Catholic heads of families. Of a total of such persons for horse and foot of 60, Catholics accounted for 23 or 38 per cent of them all. This compares with a Catholic total of officers of both arms of 103 or 27 per cent.
OTHER COMMISSIONED RANKS

For the lieutenants of horse, dragoons and foot, as for the cornets and ensigns, only a brief survey in terms of geographical distribution and religion is feasible. The lower in the ranks one moves, the less is the material extant on which to build anything like a worthwhile socio-religious analysis.

LIEUTENANTS (HORSE AND DRAGOONS)

Of a total of 178 such, 106 are identifiable. The number is broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here again, of those whose religion can be identified, the Catholic presence in the elite arm is emphasised by 28 (35 per cent) of the 79 so identified.

LIEUTENANTS (FOOT)

Of a total of 179 such, only 64 are identifiable. The number is broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures again show the marked want of Catholic participation in the infantry officer cadre, although 14 represents 28 per cent.

CORNETS

Of a total of 203 such, only 102 can be identified. The number is broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 26 Catholic cornets represent 35 per cent of the total of persons whose religion has been identified. The figure is remarkably consistent with that for the lieutenants, and with the overall Catholic presence in commissioned ranks.

ENSIGNS

Of a total of 169 such, only 69 can be identified. This number is broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The want of Catholics in large numbers is again noteworthy, 14 representing 24 per cent of the total of those whose religion is identified.

We have been dealing with a total of 986 officers, of whom 815 can be identified in terms of religion. Of these, 282 or 34.6 per cent were Catholics.
The Campaigns.

The study of the Royalist regiments raised in northern England between 1642 and 1645 is intended to complement the overall examination of the course of the war in the north during those years. The north as a whole, indeed, even where particular counties are concerned, has been neglected by scholars. There have been valuable studies of many English counties, predominantly of southern England, whilst such work as there has been on the Royalist armies has also tended to concentrate on this area. Thomas-Stanford's work on Sussex; Wood's pioneer study of Nottinghamshire; Everitt on Kent; Ketton-Cremer on Norfolk; Underdown on Somerset; and Andriette on Devon, to cite but a few, have really done very little original research into the actual fighting. On a large scale, Kingston on East Anglia; Sherwood on the Midlands; and Holmes on the Eastern Association, have extended their interest to larger regional studies, the latter most successfully although his terms of reference were political rather than primarily geographical. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that with the single exception of Lancashire, we are in want of a comprehensive study of any single northern county. In attempting to write a worthwhile history of the campaigns conducted by the northern Royalist army, therefore, which must by definition cover several counties, it has not been possible to refer to earlier work. This has meant re-examining contemporary accounts exhaustively and in two lights, that of each individual county, and that of the region as a whole. Such a pioneer approach avoids inherited error, but may fall victim to overmuch attention to minor detail.

For Lancashire, Ernest Broxap's study of the military campaigns is unique, but has to be revised so far as the events of 1642/3 are concerned. The reputation of this work is justifiably high, although admittedly it has had no rival of a serious nature to contend with it. If there is an overall fault, it is one to which all county campaign studies are subject, that of seeing events in isolation. By tackling the northern region as a whole, I hope to have overcome that difficulty, although when dealing with regions it is necessary to be even more aware of national developments as well.

The only attempt to write a history of the civil war in Yorkshire has been that of Clement Markham, whose chief purpose was to write an at times adulatory, biography of Thomas Fairfax. In consequence, the narrative is closely concerned with Fairfax's career, which, after December 1643, took him away from the north except for the interlude of the siege of York and the battle of Marston Moor. The study is, anyway, incomplete and extremely partisan.
As for the remaining counties, these have been touched upon only briefly. Cumberland and Westmorland saw very little fighting until the siege of Carlisle was begun by the Scots late in 1644. The publication in the last century of Isaac Tullie's contemporary journal of the siege has not been followed by any subsequent study, whilst the Musgrave Papers in the Carlisle Record Office have scarcely been looked at from the point of view of the military history they reveal. Durham and Northumberland present a similar picture. Fighting in these counties began in earnest with the arrival of the invading Scottish army in January 1644, and the only detailed study of the campaigns, painstakingly written, was carried out by Terry over seventy years ago.

This lack of attention to the military history of the north is thrown even more sharply into relief, by the considerable work that has been done on other aspects of the years 1640/60. Mention can be made of Cliffe's thorough examination of the Yorkshire gentry, which is complemented by P.G. Holiday's thesis 'Royalist Composition Fines and Land Sales in Yorkshire.' J.A. Hilton and J. Cosgrove have carried out studies on Recusants in Durham and Lancashire; and B.G. Blackwood completed a thesis on the Lancashire Gentry 1625/60 (this work was not made available for my use). C.B. Phillips has published a paper on local government in Cumbria 1642/60, but his military view was limited. No research directly pertinent to the actual events of the first civil war in the northern counties has, so far as I am aware, been conducted.

If a history of the fighting must be justified, there is sufficient justification in the need for such an overall study. Yet it must be said that military history, as such, has been neglected in serious research for so long that it has become something of a 'poor relation'. I cannot see that such neglect is excusable or even understandable. It is impossible to fight a civil war without armies, and those armies surely must be held to represent the committed persons of both sides (at least, where the officers are concerned). It does not seem to me to be satisfactory to explain the causes of civil war, long or short term, or the results of civil war, without due and careful attention being paid to the events of the war years on the field of battle. There must of necessity be a gap in any gentry study not dealing in generalities, if the activities of individuals during the years of actual fighting are overlooked or summarised briefly, and often, from ignorance. The question of why a particular battle was ever fought, and why it turned out as it did, if answered properly, can tell us a lot about the characters and attitudes of rival commanders. To those who would object that history has moved away from the study of personalities, I would suggest that on the contrary, the very nature of socio-economic analysis, or
whatever other type of analysis, brings us back to individuals. Those scholars most given to statistics, logarithms and slide rules, should remind themselves forcibly that they are dealing with human beings, many of whom put their lives at risk for one side or the other between 1642 and 1660. What they may have believed, what they attempted to do, and what they did or failed to achieve, are subjects worthy of study. To attempt a full study of the campaigns of one army may be an innovatory step, but it ought not to be.

In writing a military history from the Royalist point of view, in dealing with Royalist rather than Parliamentarian, strategy and tactics, an additional innovatory step is taken. It is evident that the victorious side in any conflict attracts, if not the sympathies, then at least the interest of scholars. This is particularly the case where the victorious side, as has been said, can be seen as representing a broader, more revolutionary scale of values than those of a merely rebellious faction. In examining the Royalist officers, the intention was to show the type of men who served the King in the field, their social background and the degree of their commitment. We have a picture, valid for the north at least, and probably for much of England, of the men who stood against that tide of change, and who probably viewed the Parliamentarians as 'rebels' rather than as 'revolutionaries'. To look at events from the point of view of the strategy of the Royalist army is really to help dress the balance. The assumption is inherent in this work, that the Royalist armies were fighting for a cause every bit as distinctive as that for which their enemies fought.

The problem of the sources has already been stressed. In the study which follows, it has been necessary to re-examine Parliamentarian material in order to draw out material strictly pertinent to the Royalist army. In conjunction with available memoirs and diaries, tracts and manuscripts (such as they are) it has been possible to compile a fairly exhaustive and extensive account of the fighting in the north. Battles often examined in isolation are here drawn together in a campaign sequence, and campaigns are linked together to provide a continuous narrative without which it is impossible to understand the eventual outcome of the wars.

In retrieving various battle studies from their isolation, it has been essential to sift the plethora of errors, exaggerations and, sometimes, downright falsehoods, that abound as much in secondary writers as in the contemporary sources. Often, this has entailed making educated guesses based upon a consideration of possibilities, where strictly pertinent sources have been lacking. Such instances, and they are few, will be apparent. Where some anomalies have defied scrutiny they have been permitted to stand subject to explanation.
In approaching the fighting from the Royalist viewpoint, it has been necessary to question the importance attached by contemporaries and later historians, to certain actions and incidents. For example, it has been necessary to question the significance attached to the largest battle of the entire civil wars, that fought on Marston Moor on July 2nd 1644, which has long been held to have been the crucial action which marked the end of Royalism in arms in the north. The importance attributed to what was, undeniably, a fierce and most bloody battle, may well be the consequence of a lack of any overall study, leading to the creation of a misleading impression. It will be argued that whilst Marston Moor can be seen as marking the end of any coherent and unified Royalist strategy north of Trent, the real cause of the loss of control there was the battle of Selby fought on April 11th 1644.

It will be shown that the fortunes of the northern army can be marked by a series of important events directly and indirectly military. The appointment of the earl of Newcastle in late 1642 as overall commander in place of the docile earl of Cumberland began the determined Royalist military activities throughout the north. The arrival of the Queen from Holland early in 1643 marked the point at which any Royalist attempt to dominate Lancashire was bound to fail, by her drawing away south with her, the Lancashire regiments raised by the earl of Derby; although at the same time, her arrival brought over to the Royalist side the important coastal garrison of Scarborough. The battle of Adwalton Moor at the end of June 1643 can be seen to be the high water mark of the earl of Newcastle's campaigns, and that having won so much, he lost ground as the result of indecision and of overmuch caution. With the arrival of the Scots in January 1644, Newcastle was obliged to fight on two fronts, and though he gave a good account of himself, the loss of the Yorkshire infantry at Selby forced him south to defend York and so led to the disaster on Marston Moor.

It will further be shown that, despite the catastrophes of 1644, and despite Newcastle's abandonment of the struggle, with almost the entire general staff, the loss was not beyond repair. Rupert, hovering uncertainly in Lancashire, was the culprit who threw away the north when it was not irretrievably lost. He left what remained of the northern army to pen itself up in garrisons like Carlisle and Pontefract, or to fight their way south in desperate fighting, as Mayney's Brigade did in September. We are dealing with a history of lost opportunities and of unrealised advantages. Until now, this has obscured the fact that in the north was a fine fighting army beaten by circumstances rather than by a superior enemy.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. PRO S.P. 29/68
2. DNB.
5. Peacock, M.G.W., Index of Royalists.
6. See chapters 11 and 13, siege of Pontefract.
7. See chapter one, passim.
9. See chapter one.
11. See chapter one.
12. Several examples of commissions are given in the regimental analyses in the appendices in volume two.
14. Stanning, J.H. ed: The Royalist Composition Papers...so far as they relate to the County of Lancaster, LCRS, Vol. 29, p. 2.
15. Leeds City Library, Vyner Mss.
18. See the regimental analyses, volume two.
20. For these strengths, see the Explanatory Notes to the appendices in volume two.
25. See below, chapter two.
27. Brownbill, ibid., Vol. 96 p. 337.
29. Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, III, p. 149.
31. CSPD 1644, pp. 120, 157.
33. Leeds City Library, Temple Newsam Mss.
34. HMC, 17th Report, Appendix Part 1, Portland Mss., pp. 70/1.
36. For a discussion of this problem, and a transcript of the roll, see the regiment in the appendices.
38. See the Explanatory Notes to the appendices in Volume two.
40. Ibid., pp. 187/8, 404/5.
42. Markham, C., A Life of the Great Lord Fairfax, 1870.
43. Jefferson, S. ed: Isaac Tullie's History of the Siege of Carlisle, 1840. (The original draft is Harl. Ms. 6795).


NORTHERN ENGLAND 1642-45

Showing principal Royalist cities, towns and garrisons, together with the major battles.
The English civil war did not begin with any formal declaration of hostilities. By the time that the King had raised his standard in Nottingham, individuals on either side had been killed, or attacked, by their political enemies. The northern counties, as elsewhere in the country, saw the violent actions of the more extreme of the rival protagonists, which emphasised the reluctance on the part of the majority to commit themselves, to any irrevocably violent solution. At his trial in 1651, James Stanley, earl of Derby, was accused of causing the first death of the wars; but such a charge was hard to substantiate, and his sentence and execution did not rest, of course, upon its viability. That such a scapegoat should be sought after so many years of fighting, however, exemplifies the unwillingness of Parliament, at least, to accept responsibility for the warfare. Yet to interpret the haphazard drift into war as a deliberate political ploy aimed at shifting the blame for its commencement onto the other side, is to deny what must be taken as a genuine desire to avoid hostilities which in turn demonstrates that the bitterness which the wars aroused, was not in itself instrumental in bringing them about.

Yet reluctance to fight and unwillingness to fight are not one and the same thing. When all the apparently possible political moves had been exhausted in the summer of 1642, both sides were able to field armies which, however much they differed in quality, were on the whole committed to the defence of their distinctive causes. Perhaps the willingness to fight lay in a belief that a swift military campaign would lead to a military settlement on which a lasting political solution could be built. Certainly, the Royalists in northern England seem to have hoped that this would be the case, at least until mid November. In the north, the drift into civil war became actual war with the arrival of an army at York commanded by the earl of Newcastle, in early December.

King Charles had reached York, which was to be, next to Oxford, the most important of Royalist garrison towns, on March 18th, having begun his journey north on the 1st of that month. At the manor of Theobalds, a little above twelve miles from London, he had rejected the overtures of delegates sent by the Parliament to discuss the Militia bill. The decision of the Parliament to draft the Militia Ordinance, and the King's journey into the north, created the political and the physical gulf necessary to an outbreak of war.
The Militia Ordinance was a direct challenge to the Royal prerogative, in that, by implication, Parliament claimed to be able to act without the Royal consent in the most important field, of raising forces. In the event of a need to resort to arms, Parliament could reasonably hope that the Lord Lieutenants of the counties of England, who held effective command over the local Trainband units and their colonels, would, given prior sympathy for the Parliament, use their authority to enforce the Ordinance's provisions and so raise what soldiery there was, for the Parliament's service. The initial reluctance to use force, on Parliament's part, may have been reluctance to see cemented in rebellion the already revolutionary legislative measure which they had adopted.

The only full study of the civilian forces available initially to either side, has been that of Boynton. The Militia, or Trainbands, were by definition unprofessional civilian forces, officered, wherever possible, by experienced soldiers. During the Tudor organisation of these citizen troops, the country had been divided into areas of importance, and it is noteworthy that none of the northern counties were included in that most important of recruiting areas, the Maritime Counties, which brought in at its most northerly, Lincolnshire. Lancashire was located with the Inland counties of secondary importance; Yorkshire was in a third category, on its own; whilst Northumberland, Durham and Westmorland formed a fourth group. On a most cursory examination, therefore, it would seem that if the training had been up to requirements, the southern and eastern counties, from which Parliament drew the bulk of its forces immediately, ought also to have had the best available.

The authority of the Lord Lieutenant in any given county, had been increased by the decision in the 1580's, to make him responsible for the appointment and pay of the professional soldiers who were intended to supervise the training of the local levies - the Muster Masters. A lethargic attitude on the part of the Lord Lieutenant, and the reluctance of local gentlemen to commit themselves to what was often an expensive business despite the prestige of military rank, could mean that the Trainband was valueless. The position of the Muster Master was difficult. He had full responsibility not only for the training of the men, but also for the nomination of the non-commissioned officers. This latter factor, coupled with the likelihood that the Muster Master would be an outsider, must have caused a degree of friction with the commissioned officers drawn from the local gentry. Particularly so, when the Muster Master had also to report to central government on the condition in his own area, but drew his pay from a locally administered fund.

The commissioning of local gentlemen as officers in the Trainbands,
exemplified the intention of the Elizabethan administration, that the force should be composed of safe citizens, of freeholders and of yeoman farmers who would have a vested interest in the maintenance of order. For this reason, a narrow sense of duty combined with a parochial outlook, made it unlikely that the Trainbands would willingly, if at all, serve outside their locality. Periods of informal coaching together with specific days, a few each year, set aside for training, sufficed in most areas, and the hiring of substitutes by well-to-do civilians with Trainband commitments, meant that a cohesive unit was likely to be a rarity.

Under James I, perhaps as a consequence of his pacific foreign policy, the Tudor Trainbands declined in effectiveness and in quality. Affluent gentry, who had previously supplied the officers, responding to this atmosphere, let their commissions drop in order to save themselves money, whilst the Lord Lieutenants tended to rely heavily upon deputies. The Muster Master chiefly, and the keen officers as well, experienced intense frustration. Many probably found their way back into the European wars, although there is no way of knowing whether the Muster Master requirements were met in full or not.

What amounts to a decade of inactivity was followed by spasmodic enthusiasms attendant upon the possibility of war with Spain from 1613. By the time that King and Parliament came to need the local levies for internal war, they were probably, with exceptions, in a fairly good state of training. Whether this applied to the north is debatable. Boynton identifies a "northern niggardliness"\(^2\) ensuant upon the accession of James I and the stabilisation of the border with Scotland, for his reign marked the virtual end of the days of the steel bonnets and border rievers. Musters became infrequent and often uncoordinated, as if the north, responding to being categorised as of minor importance under Elizabeth, looked to the south for defence in the event of war with Spain. In the atmosphere of war that accompanied the accession of Charles I, Trainband organisation was stepped up. Officers were brought home from Europe to supervise training, and drill books began to circulate. Whilst convicted Recusants and, perhaps, suspect Catholics, were barred from service, and infantry received an influx of men from outside the Freeholder and yeoman class, hoping to escape impressment. The armies which faced each other at Edgehill, owed a lot to the prevalent fear of foreign war in the 1620's, and to the actualities of European war in the decade following.

Training apart, what was important to both sides in 1642 were the influences upon these civilian forces. The Lord Lieutenant could either enforce, or defy, the Militia Ordinance, but with the accession of James I and the virtually permanent standing of the Lieutenant's office, much of the
responsibility for the forces had devolved upon the deputies. In certain cases, these deputies might also be colonels in the Trainband themselves, combining the obligations of rank with those of office. If the structure of Royalist regiments during the civil war is anything to go by, family involvement in specific companies or troops of any given regiments, as well as in the regiment proper, would count for much of the authority of the Lord Lieutenant. Thus, while the Militia Ordinance and the royal Commission of Array could be issued and would guarantee, at least at first, the obedience of the Trainband as a whole, individual officers would be capable of determining the allegiance of their own soldiers. If the armies of 1642 relied initially upon the Trainbands, the mere fact of civil war would necessarily cause fragmentation within these forces, and render essential the recruitment of other regiments on a purely personal basis, by commission either to old Trainband field officers, or, as in the case of the northern Royalist army, to Recusants of social status debarred from Trainband experience.

This factor is of importance in understanding the development of the Royalist armies, and particularly of that in the north. If the Militia Ordinance was the crucial issue in bringing the country to arms, its provisions and potential were of temporary importance. The Trainbands were superseded by, or swallowed up in, the growth of an army raised specifically by loyal King's men for the service of the King. This new army was not bound by the traditional parochialism of the Trainbands, although vestiges of this did survive. The regiments would march where they were needed, composed of paid volunteers who came in in response, in the north, to beat of drum and call of trumpet. Impressment certainly followed, to make up numbers and to overcome losses, but the essential characteristic of both armies was their largely volunteer nature.

On May 10th, whilst negotiations between London and York were ostensibly still underway, six regiments of the London Trainbands were reviewed in Finsbury Fields by members of parliament. On the 11th, the King issued commissions for "y6 severall Regiments of foot of ye Trainbands for Yorkshire" to assemble. The day difference between these two acts must mean that the King's was probably not a response to that in London, although early in the same month he had issued a letter to the High Sheriff of Yorkshire forbidding the Trainbands to rise without specific command from him. On May 27th, this order was made general, applying to all the Lord Lieutenants, in a denunciation of the Militia Ordinance.

The first specifically military development in the north, pre-dating the commission of May 11th, seems to have come from a local justice of the peace, Sir Francis Wortley. According to a report, he unambiguously drew his sword on May 3rd and publicly declared for the King, and by the 12th was
recruiting 200 gentlemen to form a Royal Lifeguard of horse? A Trainband infantry regiment was also brought in as a Lifeguard, that of Colonel Sir Robert Strickland who, despite his suspected Catholicism, had enjoyed the colonelcy of a Trainband regiment during the crises of 1639/40. Some importance seems to have been attached to this event, for on May 16th Lord Howard of Escrick, then in York, was writing to Lord Keeper Littleton at London of some uncertainty as to whether the regiment would appear or not. By the 23rd the regiment was in York, and Howard wrote:

Strickland's regiment being met together, their officers have drawn them hither to this city, and billeted here, where, by Course, divers are called to attend at the Court, as a Guard for His Majesty's Person: We do not hear that there is any Colonel, or Lieutenant Colonel; but one Captain Duncombe, who was Serjeant Major...is the active man, that both raised them and commands in chief (9).

Duncombe had been one of the signatories of the petition to the King, in April, requesting him to prevent the Hull magazine from falling into the hands of Parliament. Hull was, anyway, firmly in Parliamentary control, with Sir John Hotham as Parliament's agent: this raising of troops in May by the King was probably a response to the failure to secure the town and its port facilities.

For a time, the King did not seek to expand his 600 foot or the horse which Wortley had organised. The Prince of Wales had been made Captain of the Horse Guards, and one of the Byron brothers from Nottinghamshire their lieutenant. A general meeting, intended to encourage the loyal Yorkshire gentry to appear, was proclaimed for Heworth Moor near York, on June 3rd. The fact that it also turned into a display of dissent by the gradually forming Parliamentary party, may have been due to the organiser, that most decidedly uncommitted man, Thomas Lord Saville. Sir Henry Slingsby recalled that "their meeting produc'd nothing else but a confus'd murmur & noise, as at an Election for Knights of ye Parliaments, (some crying ye King, some ye Parliament)." The Heworth Moor meeting was a moral victory for the friends of the Parliament.

Elsewhere in the north, events were gathering a momentum of their own. These were not always agreeable to the King or to his advisors, we must suppose. In Lancashire, the Recusant gentry seized the opportunity afforded by developments at York, to make a show of force, apparently on behalf of the King. Sometime around May 25th, a large body of them assembled seven miles from Lancaster, with what real intention is not clear. In London, this news was met with horror, and the Commons ordered the suppression of the Catholic activists. The Sheriff of Lancashire, John Gerlington, dispersed them without difficulty, but whether he was obeying Parliament or whether, in view of his subsequent career, he was acting in the King's interest, is debateable.
It is extremely unlikely that the Recusants and their sympathisers intended any armed demonstration prejudicial to the King, and their meeting may have been a gesture of premature support. It may also have been the result of a very real fear that their Puritan antagonists in Lancashire would seize the opportunity of the times, to deal with them. The particularly bloody nature of the war in that county was due almost entirely to this religious polarization. When the Commission of Array for Lancashire was published in June, it was directed to, among others, certain prominent suspect Catholics, of whom Richard Viscount Molyneux, George Middleton and Thomas Tyldesley were most prominent. All three became active Royalist commanders. Gerlington was also named in the Commission, but the first name on the list was that of James Stanley, Lord Strange, heir to the earldom of Derby.

Having received their orders, Gerlington and his fellow Commissioners convened a meeting of the Lancashire gentry for Preston Moor on June 20th. According to Broxap, the exact location was Fulwood Moor, and the meeting coincided with seizure of the magazines at Preston, Warrington and Liverpool, on the orders of Strange. According to Alexander Rigby, who was to become a far from distinguished Parliamentarian colonel in his native county, the Preston meeting resembled that at Heworth near York. He told the Speaker of the Commons, in a letter written a few days subsequent to the gathering, that although some 5000 came to the summons, by the time that it was all over only 700 remained. Sir John Gerlington stipulated that only Protestants were to attend the meeting, but he came to the field in the company of Lord Molyneux. The Commission of Array was read, despite Rigby's attempt (as he claimed) to prevent it, and commissions were issued on the field to Strange, George Middleton, Sir Alexander Radcliffe, Thomas Tyldesley, William Ffarrington, Gerlington himself, and Thomas Danson, his under-sheriff. Of all these named, only Radcliffe had no time to fulfill his commitment, since he was shortly after arrested and sent away prisoner to London as a delinquent, where he remained.

Rigby, who stayed to the end of the business, and who protested at the whole affair, was told by Tyldesley that he "should receive an answer from Yorke", whereupon Gerlington called for all who were for the King, to follow them. Rigby stated triumphantly that only 400 actually did so. It was an inauspicious start to the Royalist cause in Lancashire, and immediate events were equally as unsatisfactory.

Having taken the magazines of Preston, Warrington and Liverpool into his hands, Lord Strange deposited some ten barrels of powder for security, in the rooms of a house he owned in Manchester. Sending for this later, his agents found that some of the townsmen had forestalled them and had taken the powder into their own care. One of the men responsible, Ralph Assheton,
wrote an account of what followed, for the Speaker, in itself somewhat vague. Strange responded by ordering such forces as he had at his immediate disposal, to rendezvous at Bury, which strook a great terror and amazement into the Countray, so that instantly for their safety and defence, the Townsmen of Manchester put themselves into Arms. Assheton implied that this resolution, coupled with the not unimportant fact that the Royalists were heavily outnumbered, caused Strange to negotiate. He suggested that the powder remain in Manchester, restored to his house, and that one man of each side share responsibility for its care. The proposal was rejected, and it seems that the Royalists were dispersed to their homes, and that the townsmen stood down. Had Strange felt able to challenge the town militarily, he might have secured an early and significant success, for unlike some of the Yorkshire cloth towns (Bradford, Halifax, Huddersfield), Manchester had a strong Royalist element in its leadership, as events were to prove. For it was not only Strange who desired to talk. It seems that almost immediately upon the dismissal of his men, he received an invitation from the city fathers to a banquet, at which the business of the powder and of other problems could be discussed. For what followed, there are two eyewitness reports: one from a Parliamentarian sympathiser, John Rousgore291 and the other, altogether fuller, from an anonymous Royalist. Strange arrived in the town in his coach at about five p.m., attended by 30 horse "being but his ordinary attendance". With his fellow Commissioners and their servants, among whom were Gerlington, Molyneux, Radcliffe, and Tyldesley, this probably made up the 120 horsemen "well accoutred" that Rousgore described. The Royalists would have been very foolish indeed, to have treated the meeting as some every-day affair. They were met by over 100 horse who escorted them through the streets, which were lit with bonfires and apparently, strewn with flowers! The Parliamentarian faction, built around persons antagonistic to Strange anyway, could not afford to let this display for his sake, go without challenge. Barely a quarter of an hour had elapsed, when Strange and his fellows were either informed, or heard for themselves, that something was afoot. Two or three of the Militia leaders, led by one Captain Holcroft, were marching in the towne with scouldiers armed with pikes and and muskets, with their matches lighted and cockt, also a drum beating before...to assemble more companie (their muskets also were charged with bullets, as appeared by those which were taken from them) who presented themselves in the street in a warlike posture, and at that time two other
companies in like manner assembling in two severall streets of the said town environed his Lordship.

Sir John Gerlington, in his capacity as Sheriff, went on horseback and alone, to command Holcroft to disperse, which Holcroft refused to do. Meanwhile, Lord Strange and, according to Rousgore, Viscount Molyneux, disturbed by Gerlington's long absence, set off on foot to find him. It was a brave and, in a sense, a foolhardy thing to do, for as Strange walked through the streets

\[\text{He was shot at with two pistols out of a window by Sir Thomas Stanley and another by him... but God be thanked, they both missed... there was also a muskett shot at his Lordship from a shop in the streete, which was seen to hit the wall neare by him.}\]

Having at last met up with Gerlington, who it seems was actually mounted on Strange's own horse, they found their retreat blocked by a company of foot under a Captain Birch, who

bad them give fire, but the raine being so great, put out most of their matches; and being resolutely commanded to advance their pikes were much afraid, and some obeyed, especially their Captaine, who hid himself under a cart which stopped in the streete.

By this time, although neither source confirms it, Strange's full retinue must have come up to his aid, and, all thoughts of the banquet dismissed from their minds, they proceeded to leave the town. In the process, they were assaulted from the rear by a body of townsmen, and an unknown Royalist took a cut on the head from one Richard Perceval, a linen webster, who was in his turn, shot and killed.

Perceval's death was seized upon as the first of the war, and in September 1642 when Strange was impeached, he was additionally charged that he had "Maliciously, Traiterously, with Force and Armes, and in a hostile and warlike manner, kill, murther, and destroye" Perceval. Others attributed Perceval's death to Thomas Tyldesley.

The allegations can be dismissed as pure politicking, for even Rousgore admitted that the riot was the work of the townsmen, and that Strange's party suffered 10 or 11 men wounded, against Perceval who was killed and another injured.

Both Rousgore and the anonymous Royalist writer agreed that the attempt on Strange's life had been made by his "Lordship's knowne enemies", Rousgore adding that on the next morning a deputation of townsmen called upon Strange to disavow the action and to request his help in clearing Holcroft and the rest from Manchester. It is unlikely that he needed much persuading. The powder was still there, and he had been deliberately provoked. For Strange, there was only the one course to pursue.

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It seems that Strange made a brief journey to York at about this time, but of his meeting with the King little is known. His intention may have been to clear his way for the attack on Manchester, but he certainly left orders behind him for the mustering of troops. According to one source, the townsmen did not expect any sudden assault, and over the weekend of July 2nd and 3rd, stood down some 7000 Militia who had come in for review. The figure is certainly grossly exaggerated. There were also plans for a committee meeting on the 4th, the day on which the attack came.

Strange sent a trumpet ahead, demanding that the magazine be restored to him: the townsmen, now firmly in the grip of the Parliamentary activists, replied that it was their only safeguard and could not be relinquished. The Royalists advanced nearer and "shot off three or four muskets". The following day, at about nine in the morning, a Captain Smith led up the assault and "gave a fierce firing against the Inhabitants", but was forced to retire with two dead. Spasmodic but bitter skirmishing then ensued, until the town drew out ten companies of foot into the field (about a 1000 men). After two hours exchange of fire, during which the Royalists were said to have lost a further seven men against two townsmen, Strange gave up. At sunset he drew off, with casualties reckoned by the townsmen to include 27 dead "as is justly supposed".

The bulk of his forces retired to Knutsford, although he himself went to his house at Knowsley. The committee in Manchester, their confidence not a little boosted, sent a message after Strange asking him to return all the seized magazines to their original stores, which was ignored. A more pressing message came with a Serjeant from the House of Commons, carrying an order for Strange's apprehension. On July 8th, a local guide led the Serjeant to Knowsley, but was beaten up for his pains by the soldiery there. The order was not enforced.

Strange had learned a hard lesson, that resolution was itself not enough in the face of determined resistance from the inhabitants of Manchester, and if he was to wipe out the memory of his defeats, his own forces had to be efficiently trained and made more reliable. There was also their equipment to look to.

As for equipment, there was one source that could not be overlooked. Strange sent an order to William Ffarrington the older, whose son was a captain in Strange's own regiment.

My pleasure is that upon sight hereof you deliver or cause be delivered by an Indented Note such Recusants armes, armour and furniture as bee and remaine in Magazine at Chorley, unto the hands of Captain Charnocke and Captain Standishe, by them to be delivered to such soldiers under their conductions as bee conformable Protestants, and already enlisted and enrowled of the freehold land; to be forthwith employed upon his Maties p'sent service. (28)
It was not so easy for Ffarrington to continue his activities as Commissioner of Array. Rumour was rife. Colonel Sir Gilbert Houghton had his tenants stand to arms all day on July 6th when it was said that 20,000 Cheshire men had entered Manchester to stiffen the town's resistance. The success of the townsmen had put heart into Parliament's sympathisers, and William Ffarrington clearly expressed his fears to the King, for he received the following letter from York:

Whereas you have, by virtue and in obedience to Our commission of Array Moved unto Our County Palatine of Lancaster, done divers services leading to the putting in Execution the said Commission, for which you are threatened to be arrested and carried out of the said County, although We still have especial occasion to use your service therein. Our express will and command therefore is, that you fail not to extend us personally forthwith upon signification made unto you on this behalf during Our abode in these parts; And therefore We straightly require you upon your allegiance, that you depart not nor absent yourself out of that Our County Palatine...neither suffer your- self to be engaged, detained, or kept from giving your ready attendance accordingly....

On July 8th, there was to be a general muster at Preston, attended by Strange, Gerlington, Gilbert Houghton and Thomas Tyldesley, who were together at Walton on the 7th. A similar muster was arranged for July 12th, the warrant for which betrays the concerns that the Royalist commanders must have felt. All the "several Collonels of the forces within the Countie" were commanded to bring in their captains and their companies, fully armed, "to be viewed, trayned and exercised, and to receive further Commands as by the said Commission is appoynted."

Nothing exemplifies so much the drift into war as this series of events in Lancashire, during which the Royalists learned a hard lesson. It remained to be seen whether they would draw the lesson.

Of events in Cumberland and Westmorland during the summer of 1642, we know very little, and, as will become apparent, both of these counties enjoyed a period of relative peace, at least until August 1644. No sense of urgency in the activities of either side can be discerned, which may be pure parochialism or a consequence of the actual fighting being far away to the south and across the Pennines. The Royalist forces under the earl of Newcastle were to receive supplies of infantry and some horse from Cumbria and, since little or no resistance was offered to their departure, we must suppose that Cumberland and Westmorland were either largely indifferent, or dominated by a gentry leaning towards the King.

Three letters in the Musgrave Papers do, however, present an interesting picture of the situation in the two counties, although the first of them, dated to June 19th, was written a good three months before the other two. In the first, written by Edmund Mauleverer to Sir Philip Musgrave, who was the
de facto Royalist leader in the area, the Commission of Array had only just been published, leading to a curious train of events.

Mauleverer reported that the "commons" had gathered together at Kirby Lonsdale in "great Companies", and were there proclaiming their intention was in response to the tension created by the gentry and clergy, who had used the Commission of Array to safeguard their own persons. The "commons" who were either neutrals or had been inveigled into their action by Parliament's men or Musgrave's rivals, also alluded to Catholics sheltering under the Commission. Rumour said that Appleby was to be garrisoned.

The commons have appointed to meete again on Monday at Kyrby 2 of every towne to p'fect that they have begun; & to draw up articles to be subscribed to in manner of an association for the securing of themselves against all such as shall molest them, they seeme to be willing to maintaine some forces in these parts for the Country's safety.

Mauleverer urged Musgrave to come to speak to them, chiefly because he had already, apparently, pacified men in Ravenstonedale in similar circumstances, and also because Mauleverer feared that if he did not, a challenge to his leadership was likely. Sir John Lowther, later a colonel of somewhat dubious loyalty, was hinted at as Musgrave's rival, and as a possible leader for the "commons". What is most noticeable in the activities of the commons, is the similarity which they bear to the Clubmen in western England later in the war, or, perhaps more reasonably, to the Clubmen who temporarily assisted the Lancashire Royalists early in 1643.

Since we are to refer to these Lancashire Clubmen shortly, it will be worth digressing for a moment to make the point that the Clubmen phenomena is somewhat involved and perhaps cannot be ascribed solely to war weariness in later years. Their earliest manifestation in Lancashire in 1643 as Royalist auxiliaries bears no relation to their appearance in western England as aggressively neutral freeholder bands in 1644/5. We would appear to lack the material for a detailed study of the Clubmen, but the term is anyway generic and will not stand a single clear interpretation unless we are to see it as meaning 'armed irregulars' of whatever kind. Certainly in a northern context, it has to be applied to Royalist auxiliary forces, particularly those raised in Lancashire in 1642/3, and also to Parliamentarian levies in the West Riding at the same period. What Mauleverer was alluding to at Kirby Lonsdale was most clearly, a coming together of the 'unled' in search of a leader, whatever forces were promoting their grievances or their fears. Since we hear no more of them, then either Musgrave or Lowther pacified or gave them employment.

The second letter, dated September 19th, was written by Musgrave himself, and although badly worn, the main drift of the report can be arrived at. Some days before, the Cumbrian gentry had met to consider a request from Lord Strange that they co-operate with him in unspecified military actions in Lancashire. The fact that Strange should request, rather than order, such

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assistance, illustrates something that the gentry themselves were only too well aware of. Whilst Strange was without question, by status and wealth, the acknowledged Royalist leader in Lancashire (his father, the earl, was a dying man), he was technically assumed to be under the direction of the man appointed by the King to command in the north, the earl of Cumberland. The earl of Newcastle, altogether more competent, was at this time busy in his Northumberland lands and of small moment in terms of matters of subordination and duty. Musgrave and his fellow Commissioners could return Strange no direct answer, until Cumberland had received notification of the request. Interestingly, notification was also sent to Newcastle by Colonel Sir Patricius Curwen. Musgrave suggested to his unknown correspondent, that a full meeting of the Commissioners for Yorkshire, Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland, be held to discuss the implications of such a request and the appropriate action. It is also probable that several of the quasi-Royalist commanders in Cumbria, found the uncertainty of their exact duties quite agreeable, but the whole situation illustrates the want of organisation in the north in the early months of war. It was probably the same everywhere.

The general meeting did not take place until late in October, as the third letter, again from Musgrave and dated October 23rd, shows. That Sir Philip was not altogether happy with events in his area, despite his claim, that since the commission of array came into Cumberland and Westmorland, the gentrie of these counties have taken verie much care and paines to preserve these counties in their loyaltie and obedience to his matie is shown by his subsequent complaint that Sr George Dalston who had honour to be made of the quorom in the commission of Array hath never hitherto appeared...nor given us anie assistance....i hope he is not able to doe us much harme.

There was, in fact, very little reason to doubt Dalston's loyalty. He was to sit as an MP for Oxford, and to contribute financially to the defence of Carlisle in 1644. His son was shortly to become a colonel. What Musgrave was up against was the combined consequences of reluctance to commit on the part of most of the gentry, and his want of any real stature that would have made him an inevitable leader. In Cumbria, Royalism was plagued by the rivalries and jealousies of social equals, and Musgrave's position was to be forever ambiguous.

Thus, in the counties so far considered, the Royalist party could claim no particular achievements. In Lancashire, Strange and his supporters had sufficient enthusiasm but had not yet settled down to the details of their commitments. In Yorkshire, what on the surface would seem to have been a source of strength, the King's presence, in fact militated against any definite military preparation in that county. York had become a royal
court, open not only to swordsmen like Sir Francis Wortley, but also to the representatives and friends of Parliament, and to neutral or uncommitted gentry. If any political settlement was to be reached at all, it would have at least to be begun in York; so that the King, who had both to prepare for war and to be ready for peace, gave indirect countenance to the county's ambivalence. This goes a long way towards explaining the lack of preparedness on the part of the Yorkshire gentry, who found themselves forced to fight a real war in the wake of the battle of Edgehill.

It may be no accident that the one really decisive Royalist success in the north during the summer centred around the person of William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle. This man, who was to dominate the northern Royalist campaigns until the disaster on Marston Moor in July 1644, and who then went into voluntary exile, dejected by events, has been subjected to some unfair and unreasonable criticism by later writers even more than by his contemporaries. Sir Philip Warwick, whose memoir contains a little more in the way of impartiality than most of the period, was also a shrewd observer. His comment upon the earl is probably the best, the most succinct, to be had, particularly since Warwick had, so far as is known, no personal axe to grind:

a Gentleman of grandeur, generosity, loyalty, and steadiness and forward courage; but his edge had too much of the razor in it: for he had a tincture of the Romantick spirit, and had the misfortune to have somewhat of the Poet in him. (36)

It may be contentious to consider Newcastle as more the country gentleman than the courtier (although his love of horses was more than that of the dilettante courtier), since his rank and flamboyance would tend to tell against such a view. Yet there is no doubt that although no soldier, he inspired confidence in his men by his acknowledgement of his own limitations, by his use of professional advisors, and by his personal part in several fierce engagements. He took his command seriously, and for the most part, sacrificed all else to his duty. He was more in his element in the north than he had ever been at court.

On June 20th the King ordered the earl to go to take control of the town and port of Newcastle, intending to safeguard it for the receipt of arms, ammunition and money which the Queen was then busily raising in Holland. With this order went supreme command over Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and Westmorland.

The exact sequence of events attending the earl's march to Newcastle and his actions there, needs to be consulted closely for the first glimpse we have of the earl's abilities. Unfortunately, an overall picture needs to be built up from many sources, many repetitious, and most of them hostile. The Duchess of Newcastle wrote that when her husband set off to obey the King's instructions, he was in urgent need of men, money and arms. Moreover,
when he came thither he neither found any military provision considerable for the undertaking that work, nor generally any great encouragement from the people in those parts, more than what his own interest created in them. (39)

This last allusion must have been, in part, to the earl's position as Lord Lieutenant and the more or less effective power which it gave him over the Newcastle upon Tyne Trainbands. However, it needs to be remembered that his chief territorial power lay well away to the south, around the Trent, so that he had to rely heavily on his deputy, Sir John Marley, who was fortunately one of the acknowledged leaders of the mercantile interest on the city council, which was by then largely Royalist in persuasion.40

That the Parliament had also understood the value of Newcastle as a port, in particular from which coal was shipped to London and the south, is made clear by a report that the earl beat them to the town by only a few days.41

To make up his want of officers, the earl, passing through Durham, and in his capacity as commander in that county, ordered the Sheriff to levy the Trainband to provide a temporary garrison for Newcastle until a Volunteer force could be raised.42 This suggests that initially, the earl was far from sure of the reliability of the Trainband in the town itself; but, in demanding men from Durham, he infringed the prerogative of the Trainbands to serve in their own county, and shortly after he had moved on toward the town, there was, as the Duchess puts it, a "great mutiny" in the Durham forces. In fact, it would appear that latent Parliamentarian sympathies emerged, and the earl was obliged to return to pacify them, which he did, successfully.

Much was made at London of the incidents which attended the creation of Newcastle as a garrison. In fact, the earl had things very much his own way. Allusion has already been made to the merchants and to their Royalist sentiments,43 so that the combined influence of the earl, of Mayor Nicholas Cole, and of Marley, facilitated the takeover. Such reaction as there was, was aimed partly at the merchants, and partly, also, was due to the forced labour which the earl employed in the business of making fortifications.44 This needs to be remembered when considering the interpretation put upon events by Parliamentarian writers at the time.45

The earl entered the town with some 500 of the Durham men, and wasted no time:

The Earl of Newcastle came here on Friday last, to be Governor....He hath taken up a great many soldiers and our Town is now guarded...the Drums go about for all Soldiers that will take up Arms to serve the King and Parliament (as they say); they refuse none, whatsoever condition they be of...

The first sign of Newcastle's disregard for the old Trainband structure.
Three hundred Soldiers is sent down to Tynemouth Castle, to guard it; and they have all Arms given them out of the Magazine here in this Town.\footnote{(46)}

The earl's decision to garrison Tynemouth was probably a surprise to the local people, for it was in an extremely ruinous condition, and plans to repair it in 1626 had had to be abandoned because of the cost involved. The soldiers themselves expected to be sent away by ship, requiring the earl to reassure them.\footnote{47} Repair of the fortifications went ahead, and six cannon were incorporated in the defences.

Newcastle chose as governor of Tynemouth, a Durham merchant of decidedly Catholic sympathies, Sir Thomas Riddell of Fenham. That he should have chosen a man of that kind, so early in the war - in fact, at a time when there was no actual warfare - must be seen as evidence that Newcastle was not to be concerned too much with his officers's religion, so long as their loyalty was unquestioned. Riddell had probably accompanied the Durham Trainband on its march to temporary garrison duty in Newcastle.\footnote{48} The appointment was not universally approved of, not least by Sir John Marley, not for any religious scruples, but because Marley, deputy governor of Newcastle, felt that his own authority ought to extend to outlying garrisons.\footnote{49} Riddell's younger brother, George, was the earl's judge advocate during the war, up to his death in 1643 or 1645.\footnote{50}

The business of repairing the fortifications around Newcastle and Tynemouth was conducted by German specialist engineers, and the labour came from local colliers. It was these men who, on July 11th and 12th, mutinied against the earl, for want of pay. The Parliamentarian pamphleteers claimed that the colliers had reacted against "insolency and violence" used by the Durham Trainband garrison. Whatever, the colliers, aided by disruptive townspeople, attacked the Trainband in their bulwarks and, with the assistance of surprise, dispersed them, clearing the town and, apparently, killing eleven men. It was reported that the earl himself had returned to York for reinforcements, but the affair seems to have blown over, and the city council to have re-established control with their own Trainband levies. On August 19th, Mayor Nicholas Cole and others agreed to loan the King £700, the gesture of a city that was, and was to remain, loyal until its fall two years later.

Whilst Newcastle upon Tyne became, for a time, the centre of speculation - it was even reported in London that the King intended to raise his standard at the port\footnote{51} - the King began to move against the recalcitrant authorities in Hull. There is, however, some reason to believe that the advance on the port was not simply an attempt to reduce it to obedience. Sir Thomas Gower the elder, whose son was to become a colonel of dragoons for the King, wrote on July 22nd:
If you will have my opinion, I believe Hull is but the pretext to draw forces together...{(52)

Gower was at his residence at Stittenham to the north of York, and had heard that no less than five regiments of horse and two of dragoons were to be raised by the Commission of Array in the county. Gower may have been able to know better what was happening, than the writer of a pamphlet in London who reported that only 250 Horse were to be raised, by subscription. Yet the additional information provided by the pamphlet, together with other evidences concerning the 'siege' of Hull, introduces a new element into the military situation. The commissioning of gentlemen widely suspected, or known, to be Catholics, although not on so wide a scale as when Newcastle took control. The anonymous Parliamentarian referred specifically to Sir Thomas Metham, who, outwardly conforming, had been a Trainband colonel; to Sir Peter Middleton; to a Mr. Thwing, probably Alphonso Thwing of Heworth who was to become a captain of foot; and to John Belasyse. Early records concerning the commission of Catholics are scant: but it is a valid speculation that the King and his advisors, after the fiasco of Heworth Moor, and considering news from Lancashire, were beginning to realise that they had at their disposal a strong reserve of force hitherto underemployed in time of peace.

The advance on Hull began on July 3rd, and by the 15th the entire army then at the King's disposal, lay before the port. The first shots of the siege were fired, apparently on July 10th, by Sir Thomas Metham. Inside the town, the conduct of the defence lay in the hands, not of Hotham, which was probably as well, but in those of a professional soldier of Scottish extraction, John Meldrum. On the 12th, he made his first sally, capturing a handful of Royalist officers.

London was told that the Royal army was extremely unwilling, and that some Trainband units had to be disbanded and their weapons distributed to more reliable men. Further

Our Trained Bands of the two broken regiments of Sir Thomas Metham and Sr. Robert Strickland, goe coldlie to the service against Hull, and are resolved to come never near the waft of a windmill.

Sir Thomas Gower, already quoted, observed that these forces "I cannot call them an army", lay no nearer than one mile from the port, and he estimated their numbers at 8,000.

No attempt at an assault was made, partly because the King probably lacked heavy cannon, and Broxap has noted that the 'siege' was conducted largely by raiding cavalry. Clearly, cavalry, at this period of the elite arm, being composed of committed cavaliers drawn together by men like Wortley, would have more resolution in the business than the half-hearted Trainband levies. The demonstration of force before Hull would serve as a means of keeping the infantry together, whilst the cavalry practised.
Meldrum, watching from the security of the port, proved on July 27th his capacity for seizing the initiative, which, had he not been killed later in the war, would probably have put him in the first rank of Parliamentarian commanders. His action on the 27th was described in some detail, again by Sir Thomas Gower, and seems to have forestalled a projected assault attempt, although this is by no means certain. The King had, between July 3rd and 27th, perambulated between York, Beverley, Newark and Lincoln, endeavouring to gather support, and had ventured down toward Doncaster, disrupting local Trainband levies brought out by the Militia commissioners, but without actually coming to blows. Just who it was that commanded in Yorkshire in his absence is not known, probably military authority was vested in a quorum of the Commissioners of Array.

On the 27th, Meldrum with 50 horse and some 200 foot, sallied from Hull and fell on a Royalist quarter at Anlaby, where Robert Strickland's regiment was billeted. Strickland was not there, but his (new) lt. colonel, Edward Duncombe, and his major, Anthony Frankland, were. Meldrum took them by surprise, slipping by the "corps du Garde", killing a sentry in the village, and beating up the quarter even as the soldiers woke in the morning. In the melee, the Trainband lost some twelve men, wounded or captured. Part of the village was put to the torch, and a barn stacked with ammunition was fired, which "so frightened the regiment so abominably, that the next day at noon the highways were filled with runaways". Mustered after the attack, Strickland's regiment, supposedly three companies in strength (about 300 men) could only find 15 at their colours.

The skirmish spread something akin to panic through the rest of Trainband forces about Hull. A counter attack by Royalist cavalry, which was in reality a token raid by eight horse on a group of some 40 of the Hull garrison outside their walls, and which saw two Hull men killed and four captured, did not redress the balance. Gower reported that the Trainbands resented the horse cavaliers, who lodged in Beverley whilst the foot kept the works before the port.

The demoralisation before Hull of the Trainbands brought an effective end to the King's attempts, although at first it seems that new Trainband levies were marched in, under two men from outside of the north, colonels Lunsford and Fielding. This was merely a gesture, for the King was already preparing to leave Yorkshire, and a strong troop of horse had marched off to Newcastle to assist in the pacification of the colliers there.

The march to Nottingham, where the Royal standard was raised, denuded Yorkshire of the bulk of its cavalry:

his Army at this present consists of Horse especially, which are intended to be about Four Thousand, in several regiments; in which Number, we conceive, is not included the Five Hundred
Horse, which certain of the gentry of Yorkshire promise to raise, nor the Train of the Court, estimated at Five Hundred Horse. (61)

The same report noted that very few infantry had been left behind, chiefly due to the disintegration of the Trainbands, and that such as there were, consisted of the scum of the shire, raised by drum beat, all volunteers looking for regular pay. It was said that some 13,000 infantry were aimed at, although the 5,000 mentioned by some Royalists seems to have been nearer the mark. Rumour said that many Recusants were resorting to their local churches in order to qualify for commissions, and with the departure of the King, an atmosphere of near anarchy prevailed in some areas. The house of Sir Henry Cholmeley at Selby was pillaged by local activists ostensibly of the royal party, and at Nun Monkton on the edge of Marston Moor 24 cavalry raided the home of the Parliamentarian George Marwood, in broad daylight.

The raising of the standard at Nottingham obliged the gentry of the north to look to their own defence. The situation in Yorkshire was more difficult in some ways, than that in Lancashire or the other counties. The removal of the levied Yorkshire horse left a gap that had urgently to be filled, for the Parliamentarian party had suffered no depletion of strength at all. In his choice of the man who was to command in Yorkshire, however, the King, whilst acknowledging social status, made a mistake in military terms. Henry Clifford 5th and last earl of Cumberland, was by no means too old - he had been born in 1591 - but, by temperament and attitudes was not fitted to his position. The only agreeable feature of his appointment, in the military sense, was that the active control of forces was vested in a professional soldier of Suffolk origins, Sir Thomas Glemham.

Politically, of course, Cumberland was a sensible choice. His territorial dominance made him an obvious leader: his loyalty was not to be called in question, nor his firm Anglicanism. However, unlike the earl of Newcastle who was shortly to succeed him, Cumberland was unable to subordinate religious to military considerations, and this was not simply because, as Warwick put it, his "Genius was not military". The Recusants busily resorting to church, would have to wait some months before they would receive their commissions. Few or none would be favoured by Henry Clifford. He leaned towards men of proven Anglican principles, if not quasi-Puritans, as in the instance of Sir Richard Hutton, who was preferred to the logical choice of Sir Henry Slingsby for responsibility in putting a garrison into Knaresborough Castle. Clarendon wrote of Clifford:

a man of great honour and integrity, who had all his estate in that country, and had lived most amongst them, with very much acceptation and affection from the gentlemen and the common people: but he was not, in any degree, active, or of a martial temper; and rather a man more like not to have any enemies, than to oblige any to be firmly and
resolutely his friends, or to pursue his interest....
In a word, he was a man of honour, and popular enough
in peace, but not endued with those parts which were
necessary for such a season. (65)

Since Clifford was not conceited, we must suppose that Thomas Glemham exercised
more influence on events than did the earl.

By the end of August, rumour had it that Sir John Hotham, having recruited
in and around Hull with little or no interruption, proposed to make a move
against York itself,

whereupon there was a great meeting at the Towne Hall for
the defence of the City, and the Earle of Cumberland was
sent for, whereupon it was agreed by them that the three
Troopes of Horse should be quartered within the City, viz
The Earles Troop, Sir John [Goodrick's] Troop, Sir John
Gibson's Troope. (66)

After the earl's commission had been read to the assembled aldermen and city
fathers, and the bringing in of three troops of horse agreed to, such ordnance
as there was, was placed on the various bars of the city. Friday, September
2nd was chosen for a major review of the Trainbands, to be held on Heworth
Moor. A finance committee assessed a sum of £8000 to be raised in Yorkshire,
to pay the army, which was to be directed by "strangers" to the county,
Glemham and one Wayst; probably (colonel) Henry Waite, a Gloucestershire
professional soldier who had at one time been a Muster Master, and who was to
become sub-governor of York. But for all the activity at York, Captain John
Hotham, son of the Governor of Hull, ranged through the southern and western
parts of Yorkshire at will.

For ammunition and other equipment, the city relied upon such as was
landed at Newcastle, and early in September a sizeable convoy began to move
south with supplies. The system seems to have been that each county through
which such a convoy passed, was responsible for its safety, and on September
12th a warrant was issued to the Constables of Darlington and Stockton wards
in Co. Durham, to provide between them 140 horse for that purpose. The
earl of Newcastle, however, did not rely upon the Durham Trainband levies, and
sent with the convoy (which contained 12 cannon), some 300 of his own cavalry
as an escort. Another report claimed that the escort consisted of three
troops of horse and some 500 foot, who returned to Northumberland when they
had delivered the supplies. Some, at least, remained in Yorkshire, if only
for a time:

a regiment of Northumberland Horse is permitted to pass the
very length of the county; who upon intimation that Sir
Edward Rhodes did affect the Militia, by commission from
his Majesty, fall upon him to take his arms; after a short
defence, his barn was burnt for so doing...(75)

The seat of Rhodes was at Great Houghton, near Barnsley, some considerable
distance away from York itself.
Map to show the six Hundreds of Lancashire. Only those of Salford and of Blackburn were Parliamentary from the beginning of the war.

(After Broxap).
Whilst the earl of Cumberland and his commanders were organising themselves in York, away in Lancashire the earl of Derby (as Lord Strange must henceforth be called) was preparing himself for yet another attempt on Manchester. His energy and determination make a strong contrast with his fellow peer, and it is a pity that C.V. Wedgwood's view of him as "narrow-minded, vain and silly" seems to be a not uncommon opinion, however ill-informed. In purely military terms, James Stanley may have been over-enthusiastic, but he promoted competent officers, and, like the earl of Newcastle, did not put religious principles before military necessity. It has been said, and will become further apparent, that a large part of his failure in his native county was due to external factors and not to the inadequacies of his character, real or surmised. To accuse him of conducting brutal warfare, as Wedgwood insists upon doing, is a nonsense. The brutality in Lancashire was a consequence of religious polarisation, and Derby was of neither extreme, Catholic or Puritan. The excesses in that county came from the Parliament's friends initially, and led to a like response. There was no plan in it, and certainly no Royalist initiative.

So soon as the royal standard was raised at Nottingham, Derby fell to work with a will. Having virtual control of four of the Hundreds into which Lancashire was divided, he brought in the Trainbands and issued commissions for volunteer foot companies. In Lonsdale Hundred, "Mr. Thomas Dalton of Thurlum raised a troop of Horse" at the head of which he was eventually to die at Naseby. Dalton, a Recusant, was a companion in arms of the secret Catholic, Thomas Tyldesley.

In Amundenses among the Papists there were several Companies raises under the leading of Mr. Thomas Tildesley of Merskoe as Coloneill, a man much esteemed in the Country, most were willing to comply with him. All the Captains raised by him were Papists...(77)

The account which follows of the siege of Manchester is compiled from several fairly complementary sources, although for the most part they were of Parliamentarian origin. However, by relating each to the other, a fairly definitive sequence of events can be attained.

The size of the force which the earl of Derby gathered together is variously estimated at from two to three thousand horse and foot; and, more specifically, at 2000 foot and 600 horse. The letter written after the siege by a defender of the town, in the Sutherland Ms., estimated the Royalists at 3000 foot with five troops of horse, whilst the True and exact Relation gave the defenders only 1000 men. Despite being outnumbered, they appear to have been forewarned. Lancashire's Valley of Achor and A True and faithfull Relation state that word reached the town on September 13th that an assault was being prepared, Derby apparently having access to some Cheshire men, in...
which county the Commissioners of Array had successfully disarmed the unreliable Trainbands and made their weapons available for loyal troops. Manchester was also fortunate in having the services of a professional military engineer, the German Rosworm, who, in his lengthy complaint Good Service Hitherto Ill Rewarded, recorded that on September 22nd, after the completion of mud walls and other defences, chains and posts were hung across the various streets giving access to the town to hinder any attempt by the enemy cavalry.

I fortified and barricadoed up every streete end, with the addition of Mud-walls, which were unfinished when the Earl came upon us, I advised how our men should be assigned through each part about the Town; But Salford bridge, the onely place of manifest danger, greatest action, and least defence....I undertook myself: though by my engagement I was not bound to fight at all.

A true and exact Relation identified the main defences at Salford Bridge, Deansgate, Market-street-lane, Millgate and Suedhill, but gave Deansgate as the position which bore the brunt of the attacks.

The Royalists appeared on Saturday September 24th, towing with them some six or seven heavy cannon, and accompanied by a large number of the Commissioners of Array for Lancashire, and other gentlemen. Newes from Manchester and A true and faithfull Relation, noted Derby himself, Viscount Molyneux, Sir John Gerlington, Sir Gilbert Houghton, Sir Alexander Radcliffe, Sir Gilbert Gerard, Thomas Tyldesley and, among many others, future Royalist field officers such as Roger Nowell of Read Hall, Charles Towneley of Towneley, John Byrom of Byrom, and Thomas Prestwich. It was probably the greatest muster of Lancashire Royalists since the Preston Moor fiasco early in the summer.

The approach of the Royalists was, however, slowed by heavy rain, and Colonel Sir Gilbert Gerard, who commanded the vanguard, had trouble with the guns in the mud. This apparently enabled some 2000 reinforcements to slip into the town, according to Newes from Manchester, although the number seems excessive. The actual hostilities did not begin until Sunday the 25th, a fact which the author of the Valley of Achor considered, told against the earl and accounted for his eventual defeat.

That the fighting began on the Sunday, and terminated on or around the 2nd of October, is clear. So, too, the sequence of events; but not so, the actual dates for each separate action. A true and faithfull Relation gave the first actual move of the Royalists at nine o'clock on the Sunday morning "when sundry companies and their colourd appeared in open view". Derby's force was now composed of volunteer units, Trainband regiments, and (along with some "Welchmen") some Freehold bands. Theoretically, the Trainbands would be synonymous with Freeholders, but the source for the composition of
the Royalist army, the letter in the Sutherland Mss., draws a clear distinction. We must here be meeting, for the first time in Lancashire, those irregular Clubmen forces to which reference has already been made: indeed, the term Freeholder band and Clubmen become interchangeable by 1643 in Lancashire. There were also present, according to News from Manchester, some Manchester gentlemen who had gone over to the Royalists, who had gone with Derby to Shrewsbury to see the King prior to Edgehill, and who were now returned hopeful of clearing their town of its dominant Parliamentarian faction. It is not clear who these men were, but evidently they had been ousted from office and position, or had chosen to physically disassociate themselves from Rosworm's employers.

Returning to A true and faithfull Relation, the townsmen sent two of their number to learn the reasons for Derby's appearance before the town. The earl replied by sending a request that he be permitted to enter, which was denied. There followed some minor skirmishing, and on Monday 26th Derby endeavoured to avert the impending fight by again requesting negotiations. A contemporary report, The Lord Strange, His demands propounded to the Inhabitants of the Town of Manchester, gives what may be a spurious account of the earl's proposals, delivered in between actions, which decline to the level of the ludicrous. He firstly demanded the town yield all its arms to him, and permit him to parade through the streets like a conqueror. Then, that they pay him £1000 to go away. Thirdly, that he would after all, settle for a straight 200 muskets, later amended to 50. All of these demands were refused by the defenders. I refer to these demands as possibly spurious, because they originate from a Parliamentarian pen, and look like an immense joke at the earl's expense, whilst glorifying the defenders: an early exercise in propaganda. If Derby were a "vain" man (cf. Wedgwood) he would hardly lose face by decreasing his demands to the absolute minimum. Even if he were not, it is inconceivable that he would give the Manchester men a moral as well as a military success. However, it is only suggested that the demands were a concoction. It is impossible to be sure.

At noon on Monday the Royalist cannons opened fire on Deansgate and on Salford Bridge. From the weight of the shot, between 4 lbs. and 6 lbs., the main ordnance at Derby's disposal seems to have been the minion, or the saker, fairly light field pieces hardly designed for siege warfare. That Rosworm had to fend off heavy attacks at Salford Bridge, apparently directed by Thomas Tyldesley, is clear; but he did not come under attack until well into the afternoon. During the morning he sent 20 musketeers to reinforce at Deansgate, who did not return to him because of the heavy fighting there, so that he eventually faced Tyldesley with only 30 men but "gave them a sound repulse". During the afternoon, according to the true and faithfull Relation,
"the fight was hot on both sides, most of our men constantly charging and discharging [their muskets] to the great admiration and terrour of the enemies". The Sutherland letter adds the information that the cannon continued their bombardment for the space of the seven hours left of daylight.

Salford Bridge withstood a series of attacks, and there is no doubt that Rosworm and his men acquitted themselves well, despite the fact that this duty was not in his contract. Elsewhere, probably near Deansgate, the earl, having failed to gain entry, fired two barns and some houses and launched a fierce storm under the cover of the smoke, which blew into the defenders's faces. The Puritan divines of Manchester might be forgiven for observing that "God that rides on the wings of the wind did very seasonably turn the wind till the rage of the fire was abated" and the assault was repulsed. Lancashire's Valley of Achor reflected that it was, after all, a Fast week.

At Salford Bridge, Tyldesley occupied a house giving fire onto the defences, and continued steady sniping throughout the ensuing night. At dawn on Tuesday morning, a Royalist attempt on the Market-street-lane was driven off, and an immediate sally rounded up a few stragglers. It was probably from these prisoners that the author of Lord Strange, His demands [to] the Town of Manchester learned that "they have neither meat nor money, but what they get by robbing". Pillage of surrounding villages was also remarked upon by Newes from Manchester. In the dawn attack, according to the Sutherland letter, the Royalists lost seven prisoners and a quartermaster killed, against a loss of two townsmen.

Rosworm, down at Salford Bridge, received a fairly steady bombardment from Tyldesley's cannon most of the day:

which being a strange noise, and terrour to my raw men, sixteen of them took their heels; the rest, some for fear of my drawn sword, others out of gallantry, resolving rather to die, than to forsake me, stuck close to me, and to the safety of their Town.

Additional volunteers from amongst the townsmen eventually raised Rosworm's numbers to 28. By five in the afternoon, the earl had exhausted his renewed assaults, and sent a trumpet for a truce, with the message that should the townsmen continue defiant, he would facilitate the departure of their women and children to a place of safety first. There is no reason to doubt the honesty of the offer, although implicit in it was the threat that the town would be the scene of a massacre if he gained entry by force of arms. He gave them until seven on the following morning to consider their reply.

During the truce, the Royalists (and, probably, the defenders) were far from idle. Cannon were moved into Salford to reinforce the presence there against the bridge, an action confirmed by the Sutherland letter. A force of some 150 men from Bolton, marching toward Manchester to reinforce its
garrison, and obviously as raw as Rosworm's musketeers, was set upon some
distance away by marauding cavalry, and scattered, losing two men dead. When
the townsmen finally sent their rejection of the earl's terms, they alluded to
this incident in a markedly sanctimonious fashion:

some of our friends coming in a peaceable way to our
relief, have been cruelly murdered and slain by some
of your Souldiers.

The earl fought on, choosing to remove the cannon from Salford that he
had put there on the Tuesday evening. They came off, however, with no little
difficulty. On Thursday, the last major attack was launched against Salford
Bridge, but Rosworm tells us nothing of it, which suggests that he may then
have been elsewhere. The Royalists were led on by Captain Thomas Standish,
the eldest son of Thomas Standish of Standish and Duxbury, a member of parl-
liament with uncommitted views. Haranguing his men (we do not know that he
was doing so, since enemy leaders must die dramatically to point the lesson),
Standish was shot down by a sniper from the walls, whereupon "his Souldiers
fled, and other Souldiers by scores, yea, by hundreds". A true and faithfull
Relation claimed that nearly 200 Royalists were killed in this last attempt,
for the loss of four townsmen.

Throughout Friday, the earl maintained a desultory cannonade with the
odd fusilade of musketry, but he had already lost the battle. On Saturday,
he exchanged prisoners with the garrison and by noon, was marching his beaten
army away from Manchester. Many stragglers, both horse and foot, were
captured by patrols from the town during the day, who were probably following
Derby to be sure that he had really given up.

The earl's decided beating does not reflect too badly upon him. There is
evidence that he endeavoured to avert it, although the town could not have
yielded to his demands without giving up their important strategic position.
There is also the possibility, of course, that the earl, finding Manchester so
well fortified by Rosworm, and realising the utter inadequacy of his artillery
- it reportedly killed only one person, and he a half-wit who failed to hide
in time - tried to talk his way out of an impossible situation. He had no
suitable artillery, and may have run short of powder. From the early stages
of the war, his losses were quite heavy and must have made a bad impression
on the Trainband forces he had with him. The Sutherland letter reported that
the graves of 120 men at least, were discovered by the defenders; a further
five bodies were dragged out of the river near Salford Bridge. In the
fighting on the Thursday, as well as Captain Standish, the earl lost Captain
Snell in a running fight when Snell and a troop of horse, supported by a
company of musketeers, collided with some 200 of the garrison making a sally.
Manchester must be regarded as the baptism of fire, certainly for the Royal-
ists, and, in a way, for the Parliamentarians.
Yet there is other evidence that the earl did not have complete control over his own activities. One source suggests that orders came from the King himself to break up the siege, since Derby's regiments were needed to reinforce the royal army, which was marching towards the Edgehill engagement. If this was so, and there is no reason to doubt that it may have at least contributed to the earl's withdrawal, then it brings us to the one problem that continually beset him, with which he had to contend as much as with the enemy, and which ultimately, in 1643, robbed him of any military advantage which he may have had. In an indirect way, the repeated drawing out of Lancashire of the earl's volunteer forces, firstly by the King and later by the Queen, was a compliment to him. Evidently he commissioned capable field officers, and the level of training must have been high. Some of the regiments drawn away, now and in 1643, achieved a notable fighting record, most particularly Thomas Tyldesley's, Viscount Molyneux's, and the handful of cavalry troops and foot companies that became, in time, the Queen's Lifeguard regiments. Yet the fact was, that every time the earl came to take the initiative, he was forced to rely upon Trainband or irregular forces, and to recruit afresh from disappearing reserves of potential officers. Hence, probably, his reliance upon the Freeholders in 1643. All this, together with the ambiguity of his position as a local commander in relation to the earls of Cumberland and of Newcastle, were frustrations he could well have done without. There is sufficient evidence to show that he needed but to be left alone, or to have his exact position in northern command defined, to make his name in something other than last ditch stands. His critics have not sufficiently weighed these factors, and have wanted that generosity in considering his character that has been over-lavished on men like Thomas Fairfax.

Rosworm believed that the Manchester fight prevented the earl from raising an army 9000 strong, but faced with these other difficulties, Derby had no prospect of getting anywhere near that number without irregulars.

Beaten at Manchester, and his regiments ordered away by the King, the earl found it a suitable opportunity to indulge in talks aimed at one of those local truces of which proponents of the neutrality theory make so much. Whatever they may have signified elsewhere, in Lancashire the half-hearted talks were the consequence of a deterioration in the Royalist military position, and were not the product of anything more positive.

The talks, or, more properly, the possibility of talks, are poorly documented on the Royalist side. Apart from a series of letters, there is really little evidence that the earl seriously intended to try to bring the talks to any successful conclusion. To have gone too far would have been to appear to betray the trust reposed in him by the King. His agent in the business was Captain, later Lt. Colonel, Roger Nowell of Read Hall, who acted
in conjunction with William Ffarrington the elder, Alexander Rigby of Burgh, John Fleetwood, Saville Radcliffe and, possibly, Sir Thomas Barton and Robert Holt of Castleton. An interesting point is, that none of these men, with the single exception of Nowell, were actively in arms, although most of them must have contributed to the earl's war chest. Ffarrington was a Commissioner of Array, and had served as Sheriff in 1636. He was also one of the earl's Collectors for the Hundred of Leyland, responsible for bringing in funds. He had enjoyed the rank of colonel in the Trainband before the war, but in 1642 military activity had passed to his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. Alexander Rigby of Burgh had been a JP before his son, also called William. 

Of Saville Radcliffe of Todmorden, we know extremely little, except that he died in 1652. Sir Thomas Barton does not figure elsewhere as a Royalist, and may have been a token neutral. Robert Holt was a deputy lieutenant, and had been the man proposed by the earl in the early summer, to share control of the powder stored at Manchester. A Commissioner of Array and Collector for Salford Hundred, he came in to the Parliament in December 1645, but does not appear to have ever been in arms.

In view of the above, it may well be that the earl was bowing to the wishes of the less hard-line of his supporters, and giving himself a breathing space at the same time. There was also some propaganda value in the affair. Blackburn, and then Bolton, were chosen as meeting places between the two sides, and the date fixed for October 18th. Yet, on the 12th, Roger Nowell wrote to tell Ffarrington that he had been commanded away by the earl and could not take part, which may be significant. The truce idea was quashed by the Parliament, and was never raised again.

Reference has already been made to the appearance in arms, in Yorkshire as well as in Lancashire, of men of suspected Catholic leanings. In Lancashire, the inclusion of Recusants in the Royalist ranks had been more pronounced, and not long before the abortive truce proposals, a large number of the convicted Recusant gentry signed a petition to the King, who was then at Chester. The delivery of the petition and the King's favourable response coincided with the first shots against Manchester at the end of September.

Under the penal legislation enacted against practising Catholics since the reign of Elizabeth, the need to disarm them and thus to render them
incapable of rising in arms (as it was suspected that they would do, given opportunity) had meant the zealous seizure of their weapons and the removal of them to central stores for safekeeping. In the atmosphere of danger that the drift into civil war created, the Recusants must have felt themselves peculiarly vulnerable. The tide of invective from Parliament's friends tended to identify all Catholics, both overt and secret, as the prime movers of civil dissension, and it was no great stretch of the imagination to the prudent Puritans to associate Recusancy with Royalism.

The Lancashire Recusant's petition was signed by many who were to become Royalist officers, notably Christopher Anderton and, most prominent of them all ultimately, John Cansfield of Robert Hall, subsequently Major, Lt. Colonel and Colonel of the Queen's Lifeguard of Horse. They stated that they were:

not sufficiently provided for the defence of your Royal Person, and our own families.

They requested that they be given back their seized arms for their use so long as the emergency lasted, and that after peace had been restored, sums of money in lieu of the weapons be paid over to them. The King told them that

the laws made for disarming Recusants were made only for a provision to prevent danger in time of Peace, and were not intended to bar you from necessary use of Arms in time of actual war.

Since many of the stores had been taken for use by the Parliament (and by Derby), the King granted them liberty to re-arm themselves and promised them financial reimbursement so soon as it could be done.90

It can be argued that the only way in which potentially neutral Recusants could acquire weapons wherewith to defend their neutrality, lay in appealing to the King as if they were whole-heartedly his partisans. Yet examination of the regimental strengths of the northern Royalist army indicates that the expressions of loyalty were not mere forms. Armed Recusants played hence-forward a prominent part in the King's war.

Shortly after Roger Nowell had been ordered back to the army by the earl, word spread around Lancashire that another attempt was to be made on Manchester.

Captain Cunnie [Coney]7 his troop of horse and some others are returned towards Lathom, and some of his troopers privately affirmed to their friends, their designe would be for Manchester; and that they expect strong assistance, from some lately arrived at Liverpool.

This was the news from Newton in Makerfield on October 14th; and the Countess of Derby had also heard, indirectly, that there was to be a "bloody day" at Manchester.91 But it seems that this Manchester assault was merely a consequence of the speculation bound to attach itself to the town after the earl’s earlier efforts. Coney and his troop were intended to do no more than serve as a guard at Lathom House, the earl's other residence.92 The "Traynband
and free hould bands are returned back to their own houses". The earl had
gone into Cheshire with nearly a full regiment of volunteer foot.

Under the now expressed approval of the King that Recusants should be
armed, Colonel Sir Gilbert Houghton sometime around October 17th, supported by
the Amounderness Trainband, seized the Recusant arms stored in Whalley for
re-distribution. The Parliamentarians at Blackburn, commanded by Colonel
Richard Shuttleworth, set off in pursuit, attacked and recovered the weapons
with a few prisoners. Broxap identified this action as taking place on
November 27th, but this seems to be a misreading on his part of the confused
sources available for both months. It is likely that the skirmish between
Houghton and Shuttleworth was one of many incidents reported around October
17th.

There followed a period of consolidation by the Royalists, their main
garrisons being established in Preston, Wigan and, particularly, Warrington
where defences were built. It seems to have served, for a time, as Royalist
headquarters. A meeting was held there on October 21st to discuss the
settlement of Cheshire, and on the 24th the Lancashire Commissioners of Array
met there to finalise arrangements for the muster of cavalry at Ormskirk, as
the levies came in from gentlemen who had subscribed to provide horses and
men. Richard Shuttleworth at Blackburn received news of the Royalist
dispositions on October 26th.

That at Warrington are billeted between 300 & 400.
att Preston 300.
att Wiggen 200.
att Ormskirke 300.
att Echleston (Ecclestone) 100.
att Presberye 100. These soldiers are certainly knowne
to be billetted in these places & made ready to join in one
body together threaten the disarming of Blackburn Hundred...

As High Sheriff, Sir John Gerlington was responsible for mustering the
gentry, and on November 3rd sent the following summons, typical of many such,
into the Leyland Hundred:

His Gratious Ma'tie being advertised of the present Insurrection
and rebellious p'ctises within this County, auctorised and
strictly required those of his Loyal Subjects his officers of
this County to Pceed in all legal ways for the speedy suppress-
ion of tumults. I therefore by directions from the Lord General
and the rest of his Ma'ties Comm. of Array, will and require
all the gentlemen of the County of what rank or quality or
profession soever, to repair with all their forces, sonnes,
tenants, and servants betwixt the age of 16 and 60, with their
compleat armes and best furniture they can provyde, upon Monday
the vijth day this instant November, to the house of Thomas
Martin, Vintner, in Preston. (100)

The earl of Derby and Sir Gilbert Houghton were reported to be in Preston on
November 8th. Houghton himself seems to have attracted a good deal of
hostile speculation. On November 6th, he was rumoured to be marching into
Cheshire, and shortly before, to be expected to march against Clitheroe:

It is reported and that credibly, that Sir Gilbert Houghton did raise forces in the morninge and they by commission being again retyrred, yet the forces he again recollected and that there is a troop of horse in readiness to be with us ere they sleep, besides other great forces. There aim is at our Castle and for our town. (102)

By early December, the Recusant gentry were also recruiting, and another Parliamentarian report stated that:

wee are credibl informed that beside what Number of horse they had beforeý Mr. John Cansfield and Mr. Thomas Dalton are nowe raising eithr a troop, and (as we are ceretely told) Mr. Cansfield hath already raised fifty fyve, and that they papists doe all ryse and Joyn with them; and howe wee shall be able to withstand them the Lord knoweth. (103)

Simultaneously, the earl of Derby sent some two hundred men into Cheshire apparently "intendinge to have plundered mr. Maynwaring's of Caryncham & some other", and to seize upon some Parliamentary supply waggons. There is no record of any fighting, only that the Royalists "miste of their purposes" and retired into Lancashire again.104

As the winter season of 1642/3 began, the war in Lancashire was to take on a more systematic appearance. Since the early summer, the earl had been organising, recruiting and preparing an army. He had lost some of his best regiments when the King summoned them for Edgehill but, by December, he was ready to unleash his forces in full scale civil war.

Across the Pennines in Yorkshire, the earl of Cumberland and Sir Thomas Glemham were preoccupied with settling garrisons, particularly at Pontefract where there was some need to establish at least a presence on the edge of the West Riding cloth towns, fast becoming areas of Parliamentarian activity.

On September 23rd, the Militia Ordinance was enacted at Rotherham and Bradford:

To countenance which (as he declared at Snaith) came Captn. Hotham from Rotherham to Scanbyleys...with 3 companies of foot and 1 troop of horse from Hull; and takes possession of Doncaster. In this interim, the commissioners in Sheffield had been suitors to the nursery at Hull for officers, and begun to oppose the King's passages through their town, and deny the Sheriff their arms. (105)

There was also some contact between the Yorkshire Parliamentarians and the emergent Parliamentarian group in Derbyshire. Towards the end of September, Sir John Gell with a body of Derby horse, who had been to Hull, was diverted to Sheffield on his return journey to suppress a mutiny of the Trainband. Unlike most of the West Riding towns, Sheffield was to become a Royalist garrison in time, and clearly there was some reaction there against the Militia Commissioners. Gell put down the mutiny, but was pursued on his way back to Derby by raiding cavalry under Sir Francis Wortley. In an action for which the details are virtually non-existent, Gell halted the Royalists near Wirks-
worth, and so continued his way molested no further.

At some time in September, Glemham had been sent from York to "settle Pontefract a garrison". The Parliamentarians claimed that the Trainbands had been coerced into going to Pontefract by "threats of plundering, imprisonment and death" - for such was Gervase Neville's proclamation in Wakefield church. Neville, evidently a Commissioner of Array, was a younger son of Henry Neville of Chevet, and may have been a captain of horse. He and his brother Francis were prominent activists, and the charge was laid against Francis that he was one of the first to muster men for Pontefract garrison. Gervase was captured in 1645 in that garrison, Francis in 1644 at Bolton in Swaledale. From Pontefract, reinforcements were sent to Glemham in October when he made his first armed attempt against Lord Fairfax at Leeds. However unwilling some of the garrison may have been, they carried through an exploit on September 30th which aroused a good deal of Parliamentarian anger. A patrol set upon and captured Sir John Saville of Lupset, killing two of his servants, and carrying him off to Pontefract.

By the end of September there was a definite Royalist presence in Pontefract and probably also in Wakefield. The other garrisons settled at this time, of which it is possible to be sure, included that at Knaresborough.

Sir Henry Slingsby left an interesting account of the Knaresborough affair in his diary. He had received warning that Lord Fairfax intended to put men into the castle, probably to keep a watch on York. Slingsby was in Knaresborough arranging for a local guide to conduct Patrick Ruthven and other loyal Scottish officers to Skipton, and told Ruthven - who was to become general of the Oxford Royalist army - what he had learned. Ruthven advised him to garrison the castle himself, and to bring in some of the Trainband.

Whereupon I got y\textsuperscript{e} Keys of y\textsuperscript{e} Castle, cau\textsuperscript{e}d a bed to be carry\textsuperscript{e}d in, & y\textsuperscript{e} very night comes Sr Richd Hutton, & part of y\textsuperscript{e} trainbands wth commission from my Ld Cumberland to hold it for y\textsuperscript{e} King....

It can be no coincidence that Hutton was chosen in place of Slingsby. Sir Henry's family had considerable interest in the town, with their main seat at Scriven. Hutton, who resided not far away at Goldsborough, could claim no such connection, except by association, as sometime MP for the town, and as Steward. What Hutton did have in his favour, and which may have impressed Cumberland, was his fervent application of the penal laws against Recusants both as a JP, and as Sheriff of Yorkshire. Some doubt attaches to Slingsby as a stern Anglican conformist.

Whilst making military decisions, the earl of Cumberland attempted to secure a localised truce in the county at the end of September. Unlike the earl of Derby, he selected as spokesmen for the Royalist party men who were, or would become, actively in arms. Sir William Saville, Sir John Ramsden and
Sir Edward Osborne were loyal Trainband colonels; Ingram Hopton was to die, as a major, in 1643. The remaining two, Francis Neville and Henry Belasyse, may not have borne arms, although, as has been said, there is a possibility that Neville held a rank. Belasyse was the eldest son of the Catholic peer, Lord Fauconberg.

The Parliamentarians in London believed that the peace overtures, which in fact originated from Parliamentary gentry, were the result of the military failure of the Royalist party. Unable to defeat the Militia Commissioners - although it cannot be claimed that Cumberland had ever really tried - they must therefore beat them at a treaty, in a house on Rodwell haugh, with six on a side. The West Riding men for the Militia were circumvented, and must condescend to certain articles as wild in sense as substance, or they were to be finally forced thereto, which yet did not bear the strictness of the law in the breach thereof, as the malparty would seem to expound it. (113)

Royalist details of the talks are not to be found. Yet it seems that even whilst the negotiations were in hand, Glemham at least was not idle. According to the same source, soldiers from Pontefract descended on Doncaster, seized some cannon and, commanded by Captain John Batts of Okewell and Lieutenant Richard Horsfall of Storthes Hall, carried them to Pontefract.

As in the case of Lancashire, and elsewhere, the Parliament put an end to truce talks and so obliged the Royalists to adopt a more positive military stance. The earl of Cumberland was not suited to the changed circumstances, as he had scarcely been suited to his responsibility in the weeks preceding the Rothwell talks. The committed Royalist gentry had, in fact, begun their overtures to the earl of Newcastle as early as September 26th. The full correspondence between Newcastle and the Yorkshire Royalists was given by Firth in his edition of the Life of Newcastle, taken from a tract of 1645. A New Discovery of Hidden Secrets. This consisted of correspondence found intact in Pontefract after the castle's surrender. On September 26th the following letter was sent to Newcastle:

It is the desire of us, and the most of the gentry of this country to crave assistance from your Lordship in this time of Mr. Hotham's infesting the country; which favour we shall always acknowledge from your Lordship, and we are the bolder in this business, because we know it to be a great service to his Majesty, by the preservation of this country, and will be much to your honour, to preserve in peace and safety.

The letter was signed by sixteen gentlemen, of which number, ten had or were to obtain, military commands. These were Colonels Sir Henry Slingsby, Ferdinando Leigh, George Wentworth, John Mallory, Richard Hutton, William Saville, John Kay, Thomas Gower the younger and John Ramsden; with Captain John Goodricke. The other signatories were Thomas Lord Saville, Sir Peter Middleton, Francis Neville, William Ingram of Cattal, Sir Thomas Ingram of
Sheriff Hutton, a Commissioner of Array, and Robert Rockley, whose son Francis was a Commissioner as well.

It is unlikely that this group of 16 represents a distinctive group that opposed Cumberland. Slingsby may have had reason to be in such a group, but that would not account for Hutton's presence. With the possible exception of Slingsby himself, the group was composed of reliable Anglicans, and must be seen as fairly representative of the inner circle of men upon whom Cumberland had to rely.

The earl of Newcastle received the letter from the hands of Sir Marmaduke Langdale, who was to become, under Newcastle's command, one of the finest cavalry brigade commanders of the entire war. The earl sent his reply from Newcastle upon Tyne on September 30th, in which he willingly assented to give his aid, but reserved his position by proposing certain articles which the Yorkshire gentry would have to agree to before he would actually march south. The articles were extremely practical, and serve to illustrate the type of leadership wanting in Yorkshire. The earl required that his army be paid for the time they were serving in the county, by an assessment levied by the Yorkshire commissioners. Failing that, that free billet be temporarily provided for the soldiers, although he stipulated that the officers were to be paid in cash, a necessary proviso since most officers were financially responsible for at least part of their men's equipment. He required that a committee of the gentry be formed to co-operate with him and with his commanders in whatever other matters should arise during the service, and which was to accompany the army on campaign. Provisions were also to be made available.

The earl ended his demands with the statement

That since this army was levied a purpose to guard her Majesty's person, that it shall not be held a breach of any engagement betwixt us if I retire with such numbers as I shall think fit for that service.

This is the first evidence which we have that demonstrates the intention of the Queen to land in the north, eventually, when her work on her husband's behalf in Holland, should be brought to conclusion. In the event, she was to land in Yorkshire, and thus spare Newcastle the need of sending part of his army back into the two northernmost counties as an escort.

The articles were discussed at York by a larger cross-section of the loyal gentry, and agreed to in a lengthy and undated letter which was signed by some 24 persons. As well as the original signatories to the first, the earl of Cumberland himself signed the engagement, which must be taken as an informal relinquishment of command. The other new signatories included Sir Henry Griffiths, Sir Conyers Darcy, Sir Robert Strickland and Sir William Wentworth, who were all to hold rank under Newcastle. They consented to an assessment of £8000 to be levied in the county, which would be paid over when
it was raised, until when, free billet would be provided. This suggests that the gentry believed the earl would not be long in coming, but if they thought that, they were mistaken. The committee requested by Newcastle was also selected, to consist of Sir Edward Osborne, Sir Marmaduke Langdale, Francis Tyndall of Brotherton, a Commissioner of Array,\textsuperscript{116} and Richard Aldburgh who carried the reply to the earl.

There was, however, one omission in the general agreement to the earl's stipulations, and a very important one, as he made clear in his letter of October 30th:

\begin{quote}
I beseech you to give me leave as I intend faithfully to serve you, so to deal freely and clearly with you, which I hold a duty; the truth is, I am very sorry you pleased to leave out the article for the officers' pay, or coldly referred to it to your committee, being the principal thing in all the articles, for you know the soldier is encouraged with nothing but money, or hopes of it, and truly last night when I was going to bed, there came colonels and lieutenant-colonels, and said they had heard you had left it out, and for their parts that they must think that if you were so cautious not to grant it in paper before we came in, and they doubted very much of it in money when they were there, and that the workman was worthy of his hire, and such like discontented words; so the truth is, rather than not come cheerfully to serve you, I will not come at all, for I see beforehand I shall either disband with a mutiny, or fall of plundering without distinction, either of which would be destructive to me... Could I pay them or his Majesty, you should not have [had] such an article, but since that cannot be, you will pardon me in telling you how I am capable to serve you, and how not...
\end{quote}

Such a blunt letter reveals the earl as a hard-headed administrator, already dealing with the realities of waging effective war. Moreover, his comments contain what may be a clue to some uncertainty on the part of the Yorkshire Royalists much more fundamental than the issue of providing pay for the officers. Newcastle wrote this letter on October 30th, and on the night before, as he said, his officers had heard of the omission. This means that the reply from Yorkshire cannot have reached the earl until around October 28th, although Newcastle's original articles had been sent on September 30th. Although there is no other evidence to support the view, it does strongly suggest that those in favour of bringing Newcastle in, had come up against some opposition which involved at least two weeks of discussion before any reply was sent. It is possible that it was purely the financial aspect which caused problems. Slingsby noted that:

\begin{quote}
Wn they summon'd yd head constables & gave their warrants for raising 8000l. formerly charg'd upon yd country, & yd considering how to hinder Hotham from ranging yd Country, the head constables obeys, & makes to appear a willingness in yd service, but wh' all puts in doubts & obstacles, some real, some imaginary, & devis'd so as little or nothing to any purpose was effected. (117)
\end{quote}
As will become apparent, during this period of debate, the Parliamentary forces were active, and the situation worsened for the Royalists in Yorkshire. The earl of Newcastle could not come soon enough, and the business of the officers' pay seems to have been overcome, possibly by the Yorkshire committee waiting upon him in Northumberland. On November 6th, Sir William Saville received a letter from Langdale:

We find my lord of Newcastle very unwilling to adventure his honour and reputation in Yorkshire, until he be very well provided of soldiers and officers...he hath not as yet 3000 horse or foot, few or no horses for carriages, yet he is getting horses and men every day, and this day hath positively set down to begin his march on Tuesday next...

The Duchess of Newcastle was later to claim that her husband had had some 8000 horse and foot ready to march in early November, but as Langdale told Saville there were difficulties:

Sir William Widdrington is raising men about Alnwick where he finds much resistance by the earl of Northumberland's and Lord Grey of Wark's tenants...Like stories Sir Timothy Featherstonehaugh tells us out of Westmorland and Cumberland, alleging that the King hath got the worse of the day and they will not go to be killed...(119)

Nonetheless, on November 9th Langdale wrote to the earl of Cumberland and the Yorkshire Royalists, to have bread and other supplies available against the earl's coming, and that forces were already on their way to the Toes to secure the passages into Yorkshire. Some £2000 was urgently needed, and the earl of Newcastle had written a declaration to be printed in York, 500 copies of which were to be sent back to him on the road for consumption in Northumberland and Durham. Orders were also sent for the manufacture of light-weight cavalry saddles in York, for which the earl intended to pay cash. The Parliamentarians in Durham, few as they were, wrote to Speaker Lenthall that "the enemy grows strong and draws nearer everyday".

By the time the earl eventually set foot in Yorkshire, the situation there had gone from bad to worse. It was to be expected that after the earl of Cumberland's virtual abandonment of authority, signified in the approaches to Newcastle, the Parliamentarians should take advantage of Royalist weakness. Captain John Hotham made the first move, against the fortified manor house of Cawood lying between York and Selby, which had been garrisoned tentatively by the Archbishop of York, who had put Soulgiers into a Scotsman, one Captain Gray, to be governour...but Soulgiers being most of townsmen, upon his coming quit house, with Gray & a few Keeps to capitulate, & makes conditions for selves.(122)

Hotham had large forces at his disposal on October 1st, and some 800 to 900 foot and a troop of horse in Selby, with 300 foot and another troop at Doncaster. The attack on Cawood came on October 4th, Hotham marching up from Selby where he had been reinforced with two foot companies. These "gready-coats" shortly after "gained the character of the most exquisite plunderers".
Having taken the house, Hotham remained there on a semi-permanent basis until February 1643, as a sequence of letters written by him shows. At the end of the month his father, Sir John, reported that there were 600 foot in Cawood with a troop of horse, which represents a substantial garrison. There does, however, seem to have been a Royalist counter-attack almost immediately after October 4th, launched from Pontefract by Colonel Sir Thomas Gower, who on the 5th was within six miles of Cawood. This seems to have come to nothing, somewhere near Sherburn in Elmet. The Royalists may have been chased away by Hotham's superior strength, for on the 7th he raided Pontefract with 500 foot and 300 horse, wounding Francis Neville in the skirmishing.

In mid October, the Royalist commanders at York, having established a forward party in Leeds, determined to take the war into the enemy camp by a raid on Bradford, where Lord Fairfax was reported to be enacting the Militia Ordinance. The actual attack came on October 23rd after two or three days raiding to test the Parliamentary resistance. A force of some 500 foot and 240 horse, with, according to Sir Thomas Fairfax, two cannon, was assembled at Leeds under the command of Glemham, Sir William Saville, Sir John Kay and Captain Sir John Goodricke. Bradford was defended by four companies of foot and about half a troop of horse. Sir Thomas Fairfax remembered:

"We drew out close to ye Towne to receive ym. They had advantage of ye Towne being compassed wth Hills, wch made us more exposed to their Cannon Shott, from wch we received some hurt, yet not withstanding, or men defended those passages which they were to descend, so well, yt they got no ground of us. And now, ye Day being spent, they drew off, and returned back aga to Leeds." (131)

The defenders followed the retreating Royalists, and spent the following night encamped between Bradford and Leeds.

It was now the turn of the Royalists to sustain an attack, a few days after the Bradford failure. The Parliamentary troops, reinforced by Captain Hotham with some horse and dragoons, drew near Leeds. According to one source, Sir John Goodricke rode out to engage them. There was one cannon in the place, a drake, ordinarily used for firing case shot, which produced a shrapnel effect, against infantry. It was never used. Heavily outnumbered "Sir Tho. Glenham...quit ye place & considering ye fource he had was not able to encounter his adversary." The garrison fell back hastily on York, and Sir Richard Hutton evacuated Knaresborough. In Pontefract, it was alleged, a handful of Parliamentary prisoners were shot to death by panicking Royalist officers.

There was now a thorough disintegration of morale on the Royalist part, soldiers and committee men falling back on York, which was quickly cut off to the south, east and west. Wetherby and Tadcaster received Parliamentary
garrisons, and Stamford Bridge was occupied by Sir Hugh Cholmeley, the adroit
Whitby man who was to become governor of Scarborough. Fuel supplies were also
cut off, and there can have been small comfort in the news that on October
23rd, in Warwickshire, the King had inflicted a defeat on the earl of Essex at
Edgehill, and so opened the road south to London.

The middle of November saw the war carried into the North Riding for the
first time, by fast moving cavalry commanded by Captain Hotham, Captain
Hatcher, and Sir Christopher Wray. The Royalists at York proved unable to
hinder them, and all that they could do was to send further emissaries to
the earl of Newcastle in order to hasten his departure. It was news of these
emissaries that induced the Parliamentarian raids, which set off from Tadcaster
to Wetherby, sending their accompanying foot away to Topcliffe. Somewhere
in their progress, they apprehended Sir Henry Constable of Burton Constable,
Viscount Dunbar, the leading Recusant Royalist in the East Riding, and took
him along with them.

The Parliament's cavalry rode the length of the North Riding and crossed
the Tees before they met with any resistance. Word had gone before them of
the capture of Dunbar, and at Darlington an advance post of the earl of New-
castle's army was waiting for them, commanded by Captain Pudsay and Captain
Lawrence Sayer. Either Hotham rode faster than was expected of him, or else
the Royalist scouts were lax, for the Parliamentarians had the advantage of
surprise. Pudsay, seeing them come toward the town, was under the misappre-
hension that they were, in fact, Sayer's men, and "he came directly up to us"
Hotham reported afterwards, "until he found his error by our shooting bullets".
After offering brief resistance, Pudsay with what Hotham claimed were four or
five full troops of horse, retreated into the Bishopric. The Parliamentarian
pamphleteers were jubilant:

At Darlington they have the first advantage, which, by
lighting upon a troop of the enemy which resisted little,
gave good fleshing to their soldiers. For, besides the
routing of it, it struck such a terror through the Bishopric
of Durham, that itself could not be confident of its security.

The North Riding, particularly that area along the Tees valley, with
Durham itself, was one of the heaviest Royalist recruiting areas, providing
a number of prominent field officers, many of them Recusants or covert
Catholics. Hotham's raid may have helped the earl of Newcastle's indecision,
for it carried the war perilously close to his own areas and would give cour-
age to the Parliamentarians there. It was reported in late November that
Sir William Widdrington was having to employ cannon to overawe the tenants
of the earl of Northumberland.

On their return to the West Riding, the successful raiders appear to
have encountered token resistance somewhere near Tollerton. This may be a
reference to Northallerton, although there is a village called Tollerton near Easingwold on the road to York.

At York itself, the situation grew daily more serious. Sir Henry Slingsby, most probably himself in York at this time, wrote:

The Gentlemen of York began to be in a bad condition, in a manner blockt up: Hotham from one side by Cowood; by yt time it was light day you should see him facing y° town wth a Troop of horse & sending y° town a jear yt wn he comes he finds y° still in their beds; on y° other side from Tadcaster beating in our Scouts, & taking some prisoners; & my man, his horse & arms, was one of y° was taken prisoners; an officer of theirs was so bold, as one day he rode up to y° very barrs in middlegate, where some soulgiers were at work, & shot a townsman in y° neck, who stood looking on y° at work, & so he rid his ways. (140)

Such provocation was not to be taken without attempts at redress, if the morale of the soldiers in York was to be preserved. According to Slingsby My Ld Cumberland once again sent out Sr Tho. Glenham to beat up Sr Tho. Fairfaxces Quarters at Wetherby, commanding out a party both of horse & dragoons. (141)

Sir Henry's is an important source for the attack, and can be supplemented by Sir Thomas Fairfax's own recollection, and a contemporary news report. According to this last source, the assault was "the bravest they ever made" which, had it been followed up, would have met with success, but "God would not permit it"; Slingsby noted that the Royalist forces approached the town unnoticed, which argues for the unexpectedness of the attack and some degree of over-confidence on the enemy part. At sunrise, probably on November 21st, the cavalry were drawn up before the town, after being guided down alley ways by a local man, and their appearance was the first warning the town had.

Sr Tho. Faifax yn draughing-on his'Boots to go to his Father at Tadcaster, he gets on horse back, draws out some pikes, & so meets our Gentleman: every one had his shot at him, he only making out at y° wth his sword, & y° retires again under y° Guard of his pikes....

Elsewhere in the town, a Royalist party led by a Lt. Colonel Norton, and made up of dragoons, fighting on foot, found themselves confronted by a body of cavalry. Norton came face to face with an enemy officer:

Attkisson misseth wth his Pistol, y° other pulls him off his horse by y° sword belt; being both on y° ground Attkisson's soulgiers comes in, falls Norton into y° ditch wth y° butt end of their musketts; y° comes Norton's soulgiers & beat's down Attkisson & wth blows at him broke his thigh bone, whereof he dy'd.

Slingsby evidently had this account from an eye-witness, perhaps from Norton himself, and he added, "a sore scuffle between two yt had been neighbours & intimate friends".

Thomas Fairfax gave the Parliamentarian force in Wetherby as being 300 foot and 40 horse, having been sent there by Lord Fairfax. His memoir agrees
very well with Slingsby's, describing Wetherby as

a place very open...there being so many back ways to
enter, and friends enough to direct, & acquaint ym
wth all yt we did.

Fairfax timed the attack to six o'clock, and estimated the Royalist force at some 800 strong; excusing the fact that he was taken by surprise by alluding to the density of the woodland around about which hindered his own scouts. The fact was, that the Parliamentarians were over-confident, and Fairfax himself careless, so that they were lucky to escape as they did. He ought to have concerned himself to see that, quartered in so disadvantageous a place, the woodlands were properly patrolled. Even in the town, he admitted, "y^e Guards were all asleep in houses". He himself was only up and about because he was to go to Tadcaster. Hurriedly, he sought out his Court of Guard and found just four men at their posts, with which four he resisted "when Sr Tho. Glenham wth about 6 or 7 Commanders more charged us".

As his men came to their stations, however, he fought off this first attack. The second Royalist assault was that in which Captain Atkinson was mortally wounded. Fairfax added one piece of information that Slingsby had either not known of, or had forgotten.

During this conflict, o^e magazine was blowne up, wch strook such a terro^e in the enemy (thinking we had cannon, wch they were informed we had not) yt they instantly retreated, & though I had but a few Horse, they pursued y^e enemy some miles, & tooke many prisoners.

It was from these prisoners that he probably learned of the cause of the sudden retreat. He estimated his own losses at between eight and ten killed, seven in the powder explosion, but "y^e enemy many more...". Slingsby recorded one Royalist trooper killed in the initial assault, and "one Major Carr, a Scotchman, kill'd wthin ye town". The problem of reconciling conflicting claims on casualties is insurmountable.

The exuberant news report claimed the entire defence was definitely conducted by only 30 men, of which number "one serjeant-major, one cornet, and thirteen common soldiers" were killed. In this case, the Royalist casualties were set at a captain and two common soldiers.

The failure before Wetherby was the failure of untried men, if Sir Thomas Fairfax's reason for their retreat itself is believed. An attempt to boost morale had turned into abject failure, and there must have been many a sigh of relief when it was learned that, on December 1st, the earl of Newcastle had crossed the Tees with his army on his rescue mission.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE.

1. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia. Much of what immediately follows is based upon this valuable study.

The Commission of Array, the King's answer to the Militia Ordinance, was a traditional means of levying manpower in time of war. The King authorised specific persons in each county, not necessarily the Lord Lieutenant, more often the Sheriff, to summon all men between 16 and 60 to bear arms. Persons named in the Commission became the military commanders in their respective areas with the power to levy men given them by the King.

5. T.T. 669 f. 5 (16) By the King.... [A Letter to the Sheriff of Yorkshire]
6. T.T. 669 f. 5 (31) A Proclamation forbidding the Trainbands or Militia to rise by virtue of any order of Parliament.
8. York Public Library, Civil War Tracts and Manuscripts, M 63.
10. ibid., V, p. 15.
13. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 77.
25. T.T. E 154 (39) A True and Perfect Diurnall of all the Chief Passages in Lancashire from the 3 July to the 9.
26. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, pp. 24/7, q. The Beginning of Civil Warres in England, or terrible newes from the north, and p. 28 q. Manchester's Resolution against the Lord Strange. What follows is a compilation of these sources.
27. T.T. E 154 (39), and for what follows.
29. T.T. E 154 (39).
30. Ffarrington, Farington Papers, p. 77.
31. T.T. E 154 (39).
32. Ffarrington, Farington Papers, p. 78.
33. Cumberland and Westmorland Record Office, Musgrave Papers.
34. For a discussion of the careers of Lowther and Musgrave, see Vol. 2.
36. Warwick, Sir Philip, Memoires of the reigne of King Charles I, 1701, p. 235.
37. The earl of Newcastle's career is discussed in Vol. 2, in connection with his regiment of horse.
40. Sir John Harley is dealt with as a colonel in Vol. 2.
42. LJ, V, p. 170.
43. For a detailed examination of the politics of Newcastle upon Tyne, but one which again relegates the siege virtually to footnotes, see Howell, R., Newcastle Upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution, Oxford, 1967.
44. T.T. E 153 (18) Sir John Hotham's Resolution...
45. The sources are T.T. E 107 (4) True Relation of a fight performed at Newcastle. T.T. E 154 (5) Lamentable and Sad Newes from the North. Terry, Scottish Campaign in Durham and Northumberland, Arch. Ael., XXI, pp. 146/7.
46. LJ, V, p. 170.
48. Northants Record Office, Finch Hatton Ms. 133. An unpaginated list, compiled by William Dugdale, of the King's Commissioners of Array.
50. Surtees, R., History and Antiquities of the County of Durham, (Gateshead section), Sunderland 1903, p. 82.
52. HMC, Fifth Report, Sutherland Mss., p. 191.
55. T.T. E 107 (30).
59. ibid.
63. Warwick, Memoires, p. 235.
64. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 81.
67. Torr, F., Antiquities of York, p. 104. See also T.T. E 116 (4) The Declaration of the earl of Cumberland.
68. T.T. E 116 (9).
70. For the little evidence we have concerning Waite, see Vol. 2.
71. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 77/8.
72. CCC, p. 1917.
73. T.T. E 116 (43) A Remonstrance of all the Proceedings, passages, or occurrences at Nottingham, Yorke and New-Castle.

75. Johnson, Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 473/4.

76. Wedgewood, G.V., The King's War, 1958, p. 179.


79. A Description of the Memorable Sieges and Battles, p. 117.

80. Ffarrington, Farington Papers, pp. 81/3.

81. Broxap, Civil War in Lancashire, pp. 29, 56, 58. He was arrested in 1646, released in 1647 and died ten years later.


88. Broxap, Civil War in Lancashire, p. 56.


93. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 11.


96. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 16.

97. HMC, Fifth Report, Cholmondeley Ms. p. 347.


100. Ffarrington, Farington Papers, p. 88, see also pp. 89/91.


102. ibid., pp. 305/6, 311.

103. ibid., p. 312.


106. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 78.


ed: Nathan Drake's Journal of the First and Second Sieges of Pontefract Castle 1644/5, Surtees Society, Miscellaneous, Vol. XXXVII, Pt. 1 1861, passim. For Francis Neville, see Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, II, p. 3.


110. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 81/2.

111. Hutton's career is dealt with in Vol. 2.

112. This is fully discussed in Vol. 2.


114. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 189/91.

115. T.T. E 267 (2)


117. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 80.

118. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 13.


120. Ibid., pp. 70/1.

121. Ibid., pp. 75/6.

122. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 79.


125. HMC Tenth Report, Portland Mss., I, p. 66.

126. HMC Fifth Report, Sutherland Mss., p. 191.


131. Ibid.

132. York Minster Library, Civil War Tract 42.11.43, a True and Perfect Relation of a Victorious Battell obtained against the earl of Cumberland. (This tract collection is in process of being calendared).

133. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 78/9.

134. T.T. E 126 (1) The officers were Captains Thomas Wheatley and Binns. They are dealt with in Vol. 2.


137. HMC Tenth Report, Portland Mss., I, p. 68.

138. T.T. E 129 (9) A Most True Relation of the Battell...near Tollerston in Yorkshire.

139. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 82/3.

140. Ibid., pp. 83/4.

141. Fairfax, Short Memorials, p. 208.

142. Johnson, Fairfax Correspondence, II, p. 419.

143. Slingsby in recording this incident, expressed it badly, and made it seem to relate to an action at York rather than at Wetherby. Later writers have fallen into the trap. The relation of the report to that of Fairfax shows that Atkinson was killed at Wetherby.
CHAPTER TWO

THE WAR EAST OF THE PENNINES
Royalist Recovery December 1642 - March 1643

Lying to the west of Darlington, where the earl of Newcastle's men had first met the successful raiders commanded by Captain Hotham, is the small village of Piercebridge. The medieval bridge which there spans the Tees, lies between heavily wooded slopes, and the terrain cannot have changed much since December 1st 1642. On that day, Captain Hotham's run of victories was brought to a sudden conclusion. The actual date on which the earl of Newcastle began his march into Yorkshire is not certain, but it must have been late in November after he had settled the unrest among the tenants of the earl of Northumberland. Leaving garrisons in Newcastle upon Tyne, Tynemouth and Hartlepool, the army rolled towards the river which marked the frontier between the earl's old sphere of command and what was to be his new.

Hotham's raid on Darlington had probably been made by way of Piercebridge. Pudsay's rout there had left the position unguarded. There is uncertainty as to whether Hotham retired into the West Riding personally after that fight, or whether he and some of his men remained in the area. Whatever may have been the case, on December 1st he was in control of the bridge, probably with a forward party on the northern slope of the Tees, and the bulk of his men to the south. According to the Duchess of Newcastle there were 1500 enemy forces there, which number seems excessive, unless Hotham had received some reinforcements, of which we know nothing, to help hold the crossing. To dislodge them, the earl sent forward:

- a regiment of dragoons, commanded by Colonel Thomas Howard,
- and a regiment of foot, commanded by Sir William Lambton

which they performed with so much courage, that they routed the enemy, and put them to flight...

A contemporary Parliamentary report suggests that Hotham had thrown up breastworks before the bridge, and had created "a hold too tenable to be forced". The fighting was probably fierce whilst it lasted, but Hotham was pushed back by the two Durham regiments. Yet the Royalist victory was not without its pyrrhic quality. "Here was the first man of note slain on either side, since this storm began". The casualty was Colonel Thomas Howard, shot dead in the storm; the fourth son of Lord William Howard of Naworth, Thomas was, like Sir William Lambton, a Catholic. He was interred next day at Coniscliffe. Lambton, who had shared the victory, was to die on Marston Moor eighteen months later.

This single victory at Piercebridge caused the Parliamentarian military presence outside the West Riding and Hull, to collapse like a house built of cards. John Spalding wrote that Hotham was "shamefullie routed thairfra into..."
Hull, whilst Lord Fairfax at Tadcaster a fortnight later reported that over 1000 men had laid down their arms and returned home in the North Riding: Sir Matthew Boynton had taken shelter in Selby with 130 men, and Sir Hugh Cholmeley was busy fortifying himself in Scarborough with some 700 men. Cawood Castle was still garrisoned, and Wetherby was occupied, which was a thin spread of such forces as lay at Parliament's disposal. Part of the defence force at Piercebridge, fleeing south, took rest in Knaresborough town under the walls of the castle, into which the Royalists had put fresh troops under "one Croft" who gave fire onto the town in order to dislodge the visitors. There was an exchange of musketry for almost twenty four hours, but suddenly, in darkness, the Parliamentarians evacuated the town and made for Wetherby.

Newcastle's army wasted no time in coming to York, enemy observers counting 8000 men under 64 colours, both horse and foot. Lord Fairfax, on December 10th, reported that of these 8000, some 2000 were cavalry or dragoons. The earl did not immediately enter the city, but drew up his army, according to the Duchess and Sir Henry Slingsby for inspection. Slingsby went on:

On ye forest side near Skelton drawn up in batalio, horse, foot, & cannon. Here my Ld of Cumberland with all ye Gentlemen in York meets my Lord of Newcastle & so waits upon his Lordship into ye town, where my Ld of Cumberland delivers up ye keys unto him, but not willingly...(10)

The Duchess made no allusion to any unwillingness on Cumberland's part, but she stressed that the keys were handed over by Sir Thomas Glemham who, as Governor of York, was responsible for them.

Thus my Lord marched into the town with great joy, and to the general satisfaction both of the nobility and gentry, and most of the citizens.

The earl of Cumberland now fades from the picture, living as a private gentleman, at Skipton and in York, until his death in the following year. The command had passed into more capable and, perhaps, more committed hands.

After the celebrations were over, symptomatic as they had been of the intense relief which the earl's arrival had caused, the routine administration had to be attended to. Slingsby's account reflects the concerns which the earl had expressed in his letter of October 30th.

now ye soldiers begin to enquire after their pay; they had spent their mony's in ye march from Newcastle, they cannot longer be without; they hop'd to find mony plenty here; but this was ye mischief of it; Here was neither treasure or treasurer; ye commissioners had allot't'd out an assessment thro' ye country, but nothing yet collect'd. The soldiers must be ye Collectors & in ye mean time live upon free Billett, whch caus'd great wast to be made, especially where ye horse came, & put ye countryman at a great charge, so great as not to be imagin'd. Well ye Soldiers must be satify'd, but how it must be done ye Gentlemen & Commissioners must be consulted wth; whom he sends for to come unto him, & prpounds to ye to subscribe
their names w+ every one will lend, & himself begins & subscribes two hundred pounds, & so ye rest follow'd untill it came to my turn to subscribe one hundred, wch I paid y+ night unto Sr Wm Carnaby treasurer at warr. (11)

So graphic a description requires no interpretation. Slingsby, with his estate at Moor Monkton in the Ainsty, would have had first-hand knowledge of the imposition of free quarter amongst his own tenants.

The evidence suggests that the earl of Newcastle brought with him an entire military command structure, for such seems to have been lacking in Yorkshire. He maintained Sir Thomas Glemham as Governor of York, at least for the time being, and probably also Henry Waite as sub-governor. For the rest of the command structure, what might be termed the General Staff, many of whom were field officers as well, we have the list given by the Duchess.12

Lord General Newcastle stood supreme as commander in chief in the north. His second in command, styled Lieutenant-General of the Army, was firstly Mountjoy Blount, earl of Newport, then about 45 years of age. He was the illegitimate son of Charles Blount, earl of Devonshire, and had been advanced to an Irish peerage by James I as Lord Mountjoy of Mountjoy Fort. In 1627 he became Lord Mountjoy of Thurveston in Derbyshire, and in the following year was created earl of Newport by letters patent dated August 3rd.13 A man of experience in European wars, and Master General of the Ordnance to the King, he did not long enjoy his position under Newcastle, whose suspicions he aroused. Although he did not die until 1665, Newcastle replaced him in 1643 and Newport's subsequent career was extremely mixed. He was replaced by James King, afterwards created Lord Eythin and Kerrey in the Scottish peerage. King, 53 years old at his appointment, became Newcastle's principal advisor and, as will appear, too much of a restraint on him. In both Newport and King, we see evidence of Newcastle's preference for experienced, professional soldiers at his right hand, and a survey of King's career will be found in connection with his regiments (see Vol. 2). Clarendon states that he was given overall command of the infantry,14 but it is unlikely that he was at York until into 1643, perhaps not arriving in England until January at the earliest.

The General of the Ordnance was Charles Cavendish, Viscount Mansfield, Newcastle's fifth son and heir. The controversy surrounding his date of birth has been examined elsewhere (see Vol. 2), but he cannot have been much more than eighteen in 1642, which suggests that the rank was honorary and that others, notably his immediate deputy, carried out the real work. He died in 1659.

The General of the Horse was that flamboyant cavalier, George Lord Goring, then in his 34th year. The son of George Goring earl of Norwich, he had seen
action in Europe before returning to England in 1640, playing in the following year an inauspicious role in the 'Army Plot', which he betrayed to the Parliament. Appointed to command in Portsmouth, he declared for the King in 1642, abandoned Portsmouth to the Parliamentary forces, and went into Europe. He was probably still abroad when Newcastle appointed him to his command, but returned early in 1643 and served with distinction. He died in Spain in 1657.

Colonel General of the Army, and Governor of York, was Sir Thomas Glemham, the former rank meaning that much of the time he was absent from the city, where the command probably devolved upon Henry Waite.

Major-General of the Army was Sir Francis Mackworth of Chester, from a prominent merchant family of decidedly Royalist sympathies. He may have seen service in Europe, certainly he was abroad at the time of his appointment, and he served prominently until Marston Moor, after which he went into temporary exile with the earl of Newcastle. Returning late in 1644, he commanded in the south-west at Langport under Lord Hopton, and was later to serve at sea under Prince Rupert, and then in the Dutch Fleet.

Lieutenant-General of the Horse to Lord Goring was 'Mr. Charles Cavendish', the second son of William Cavendish earl of Devonshire, who was 22 years old in 1642. He died as Colonel of the duke of York's regiment of horse in Lincolnshire in the following year, but was not immediately replaced. (See his career in Vol. 2). His eventual successor was the taciturn and competent Sir Charles Lucas, the earl of Newcastle's brother-in-law by his second marriage to Lucas' sister. During his brief service in the north, Lucas distinguished himself in several actions, was taken prisoner at Marston Moor, and was eventually shot to death by the order of Sir Thomas Fairfax, in 1648. The circumstances surrounding Lucas' death, it must be said, are not so straightforward as Fairfax's apologists have pretended.

Commissary General of the Horse was firstly an unidentified Colonel Windham, who was replaced fairly soon by Colonel William Throckmorton. In this instance, it would appear simply that Windham stood down, for he was still with the army after Throckmorton took over. The latter was the eldest son of Sir John Throckmorton of Burnebutts in Yorkshire, his father having been killed at the siege of Breda. Sometime Governor of Stamford Bridge in early 1643, he fought at Adwalton Moor where he was wounded, and died eventually, obscurely, in Holland before the restoration. Throckmorton's successor was George Porter, the undistinguished son of the splendid courtier Endymion Porter. Born in 1620, George was volatile and unstable, doing not a little that was harmful to the Royalist cause in Yorkshire in 1644. He died in 1683.
Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, Viscount Mansfield's deputy, was Sir William Davenant, whose appointment Sir Philip Warwick, half-seriously, saw as a consequence of Davenant's literary abilities and Newcastle's liking for poetry. Certainly a skilful and stylish writer, Davenant was 36 years old at the time of his appointment, but how often he was in the north attending to his duties is not clear. Although he was a successful cavalry commander late in 1643, he was also present near Gloucester in the same year. It is a belief common to all ages, that a poet cannot, by definition, have any practical abilities: a belief perhaps essentially Puritan in origin, and one which has caused scholars to overlook an important factor in Davenant's appointment. His nominal superior, Mansfield, was far too young to exercise so important a post, and consequently, in view of Newcastle's marked choice of competent men on his staff, we must suppose that Davenant had the qualities and abilities the job required. Unconsidered, out of hand dismissal of Davenant as a mere 'poet' is a part of the unfounded criticism levelled at Newcastle.

The Treasurer of the Army, as we have seen, was Sir William Carnaby, to whom Slingsby and others had paid their contributions to the assessment upon the earl's arrival at York. Carnaby may have taken over the collecting of money in Yorkshire too. From a suspect Catholic family, he was styled as of Thern(h)am and Bothell, Northumberland. Knighted in 1617, he had served as a deputy lieutenant and JP in his native county, had sat as MP for Morpeth and, in 1640, for Marlborough in Wiltshire. He was 49 years old when he became Treasurer and, along with Throckmorton, represents the only purely northern element on the General Staff, at least insofar as the upper echelon of that body was concerned.

Quartermaster-General was Ralph Errington, who had served as such in the army of 1639/41.

The Duchess gave the Advocate-General of the Army as Dr. Liddal, which Young, in his extremely brief sketch of the General Staff, rendered as Liddel. He was, in fact, Dr. George Riddell, the younger brother of Sir Thomas Riddell, Governor of Tynemouth.

The Providore-General, responsible for victualling the army on the march was Gervase Neville of Chevet, Esquire.

Scoutmaster-General was Michael Hudson, Doctor of Divinity of Queen's College, Oxford, then aged 37. Ejected from his living in 1644, to which he may have tried to return after the northern collapse, he died in brutal circumstances during the fighting in 1648.

Waggonmaster-General Baptist Johnson has defied identification.

President of the Council of War (a body composed of the General Staff or
a part thereof, supplemented occasionally by selected Field officers) was Sir William Widdrington of Great Swinburn, Northumberland, another suspect Catholic. He was also to become commander in chief for the counties of Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire and Rutland when Newcastle's authority was later extended. As Colonel of horse and foot in his own right, he has been dealt with elsewhere. He was 32 in 1642.

Any attempt to establish an average age for the General Staff is thwarted by the uncertainty that attaches to nine of the nineteen persons named. If the ten for whom we have details, may be taken as representative of the whole, the average age was a little over 34 years. This compares with an average age of 35 for 71 of 126 colonels whom we have considered. Newport, James King and Carnaby were the eldest; the youngest, Viscount Mansfield, was General of the Ordnance, whilst Carnaby held no field command at all.

Typical of the age, and of the Royalist army in general, the earl of Newcastle relied upon young men.

The earl's arrival in Yorkshire must also have led to the recruiting of regiments in that county, which had not advanced very far under the earl of Cumberland's control. Sir Philip Warwick, in his pen picture of the earl of Newcastle, alluded to the issue of commissions for raising regiments, very critically:

he endeavoured to raise the reputation of his army by multiplying his commissions for new regiments, troops, and companies, for which they received some advance-money, and quarters assigned to them for their men, which they scarce ever raised in such number as to embody; and yet in such a number as did harass and impoverish the country, and lying with their few men scattered and thin, were often surprised, and then the enemy had the reputation to have defeated a regiment, where there was perchance but half a company or troop. And this I believe was a very great wound to him from the first; for had he recruited his first or old troops and companies, and not thus loosely aimed at new, his army would have been more powerful, though nominally less numerous, and could have lain closer together, and so consequently have been stronger in itself, and more active upon the enemy. (29)

The criticism was, in some respects, justified. The Royalist army in general had few regiments that ever attained anything like maximum strength, and from the point of view of efficiency, concentration on older rather than on raising newer units, was wise. Warwick's complaint was by no means rare. An undated petition to the Oxford Council of War, from a number of veteran officers (of whom several were northerners) called for strengthening of older regiments rather than the raising of new, but stipulated that veteran and raw troops should not be mixed. Of course, the comparison is not exact. Warwick was clearly writing of the situation in late 1642, early 1643, whereas the Oxford petition may date from late in 1644. Newcastle was unable to boast any veteran forces so early.
Another factor which may account for some of the actions that inspired Warwick's criticism, was that of availability of gentlemen willing to become officers. Cliffe has shown, or rather, has confirmed what was long suspected that the majority of activist families in Yorkshire were of Royalist persuasion. Indeed, an examination of the northern regiments indicates that many of the supposedly 'neutral' families often had a foot in the Royalist military camp through the commission of a younger son or a younger brother of the head of the family. Of course, this qualification of Cliffe's work must of necessity be lacking in finality because, whilst giving numerical totals for actives and neutrals, Cliffe does not give a name list against which to make comparison. To arrive at what may be taken as a neutral family, requires the relation of genealogical evidence and contemporary sources, to names of men who came before the committees for compounding, and for advance of money. Since Recusants in arms were forbidden to compound until the 1650's, and since younger sons or brothers might have no estate to be sequestered, the neutrality case rests solely upon negative evidence. By relating regimental lists to the other sources, the whole argument for neutrality, at least in Yorkshire, can be shown to be far from proven.

Given, therefore, that the earl of Newcastle was confronted by many gentlemen willing to serve in the army, what could he do? He could not afford to offend the very class from which much of the finance to pay and to supply the army would have to come, and indeed, was coming. Nor could he reasonably imply that he was calling in question a man's loyalty, by refusing a commission when one may have been granted to a man's near neighbour or relation. It cannot be too strongly stressed, that the civil war, as a war of improvisation, was fought within a social structure, with its own values, respected by both sides. There were no relevant precedents by which to work, for European examples were, by implication, irrelevant. Warwick made what is a not uncommon mistake on the part of the observer, which is: that whilst seeing the results with a detached eye, he failed to appreciate, because of that very detachment, the intricacies of the causation.

Some gentlemen there may have been, who could be accused of dereliction of duty once they had received their commissions. It is unlikely that gentlemen in an area under Royalist authority, would simply receive and then forget their commissions (if that authority was immediate and powerful). That when confronted, when recruiting, by the difficulties of raising men, they then failed to reach their specified quota, is much more likely and much more understandable. Yet we cannot know, and this, too, Warwick failed to appreciate, precisely what Newcastle's expectations were. Warwick's is, altogether, too harsh a judgement.

The earl of Newcastle wasted very little time in going onto the offensive.
and on December 7th struck at Wetherby and Tadcaster. The earl of Newport commanding 1200 men, was to clear Wetherby and then to swing round against Tadcaster, against which the main army of some 7000 men was to be sent. Forewarned, probably by his scouts - Slingsby remembered that Newcastle's army was, on the 6th, quartered in "the towns near adjoyning to Tadcaster" - of the Royalist approach, Lord Fairfax, Parliament's commander, assisted by his son Thomas and by Henry Giffard, decided to evacuate, judging the town to be untenable.

But before we could all march out the enemy advanced so fast yt we were necessitated to leave some Foot in a Sleight worke above ye Bridge, to secure or Retreat. But the enemy pressing still on us, forced us to draw back & mentaine ye 6th ground. We had about 900 men, ye enemy above 4000, who, in Brigades, drew up close to ye 6th workes, and Stormed us. (33)

The first assault was repulsed by the defenders, and the fighting from then on, between eleven in the morning and five in the afternoon, was carried on with cannon and musket. Royalist marksmen secured a house overlooking the bridge, but Giffard counter-attacked, recovered the house, and took many prisoners inside it. Another assault was beaten off, although the Parliamentarian sectional commander, Captain Lister, was killed there. During the hours of darkness, according to Fairfax, the Royalists drew off to regroup, leaving upwards of 200 dead and wounded before the town. Taking their opportunity, the Parliamentarians evacuated and retired on Selby.

The projected assault from Wetherby by the earl of Newport, never took place, which led to the failure to storm the town. It probably also led to Newcastle's suspicions concerning his fellow peer. Slingsby, who did not appear to have been present, recorded:

\[ \text{Newcastle appears with his army before Tadcaster, having his own regiment & some of our Yorkshire trainbands; body, falling upon ye enemy to ye bridge & within their works.} \]

This must have been the point at which Lord Fairfax decided that he had no option but to hold the town. The Royalists were then forced back, ye 6th enemy making good their ground; & so continu'd wth light skirmishing till night part'd ye 6th. My Id of Newport command'd the horse, who sent 1500 horse & dragoons by Wetherby to fall on, & keep ye 6th busy on ye other side of Tadcaster & beyond ye 6th river: but his march was so trouble-some having wth him 2 Drakes yt it grew too late, & a Counter order sent him on Clifford more to march back to Wetherby & there Quarter. (34)

The Duchess of Newcastle recorded what must have been general incredulity, concerning Newport's failure, "whether it was out of neglect or treachery that my Lord's orders were not obeyed." Slingsby gave him the benefit of the doubt, but there is alternative evidence to suggest that the order which caused Newport to fall back on Wetherby was a deliberate ruse by Captain John
Map to illustrate events in the West Riding, December to March 1642/3.
Hotham. Francis Drake, the historian of York, stated that Hotham, having understood the Royalist tactics, sent a forged letter to Newport ordering him to delay his march until the following day. If this is true, it illustrates both Hotham's ingenuity and Newport's gullibility, in the latter of which it is hard to believe. The story sounds far-fetched, although such things could and did happen, whereas Slingsby's more mundane explanation has a ring of truth. It is curious, however, that two drakes, of small value against Tadcaster, should have been permitted to delay a cavalry and dragoon force the task of which was to harass the enemy in their rear and to deny them any escape from Tadcaster. Had Newport fulfilled this duty, the resistance by Lord Fairfax would have been less determined, for it relied for its effectiveness upon means of escape provided by control of the bridge over the river. Newport, by design or by incompetence, threw away a victory.

A contemporary Parliamentarian account referred to two distinctive Royalist regiments, neither of which it is possible to identify with any certainty. A Red regiment, (an allusion to the colour of their coats) came on resolutely, and this became them who were the lifeguards and choicest men. Their black, which should have seconded them, were so galled by our drakes, as they durst not approach fairly; yet, by the help of some houses which they found near the works, did much annoyance. (37)

This Red regiment, described as a lifeguard, can only have been Newcastle's own foot regiment. Yet, tradition, founded on the Duchess's writing, calls Newcastle's infantry regiment a Whitecoat force, and by that style it has become virtually legendary. The truth of the matter seems to be that whilst Newcastle's own regiment (commanded by Colonel Arthur Basset, see Vol. 2) wore Red, the Northumberlander and Durham infantry wore white. The black regiment, clearly that against which Giffard launched a counter-attack, defies all identification. Probably a Trainband force, the symbolism of the colour may suggest the regiment of that puritan Royalist, Conyers Lord Darcy.

The same source recorded that with darkness, the attackors drew off half a mile from the town, followed by a troop of Parliamentarian cavalry who were sent to observe. Skirmishing ensued between these cavalry and men sent back to scour the field for wounded, some seven cart loads of whom apparently went to York the following day.

Yet despite the inconclusive nature of the engagement, the Royalists had achieved a limited success. Fairfax withdrew from the Wharfe and fell back on Selby, towards Hull garrison. Slingsby observed that the action enabled the earl to make contact with Pontefract garrison, and that he was there in person shortly afterwards. The situation to the south and west of York had been thrown wide open at last, and the earl was not slow to take advantage.

Now ye E. of Newcastle laid betw: us and our Friends in ye West Riding, & so, equally Destructive to us both. (38)
Sir Thomas Fairfax was commanded to take 200 foot and three troops of horse into the West Riding to encourage the forces there, under the information that the Royalists had moved slowly and were only as far as Sherburn in Elmet. Marching towards Ferrybridge, Fairfax was warned that the earl had, in fact, reached Pontefract already, leaving 800 men to guard the ferry. In haste, Fairfax returned to Selby, followed by several hundred Royalist cavalry who had chanced upon him.

The information that Newcastle lay at Pontefract was, in fact, gathered from prisoners, that Fairfax states he took somewhere on the way from Selby to Ferrybridge. This must have been during a skirmish at Monk Fryston, on or around December 10th, referred to by Lord Fairfax in an official despatch. Thomas Fairfax confused his memoir at this point, and later historians have failed entirely to notice the Monk Fryston fight, tending to see it as one and the same as the heavier skirmish fought a few days afterwards at Sherburn in Elmet.

The fight at Sherburn was significant not simply because it represented a Parliamentarian victory, of a modest kind, but because it showed effective raiding cavalry could be, although Fairfax himself, who commanded in person, does not seem to have been expecting the fight. Slingsby noted that after Tadcaster had been taken, and the earl's army had occupied the village between there and Pontefract,

we were a little to secure: we had thought ye enemy to be disheartn'd as yt he would not dare to look upon us any more; but it prov'd otherwise to our cost, for just yt day 7 night we beat ym from Tadcaster /on December 14th/ cometh Sr Tho. Fairfax wth a party of 300 horse, & it seems hearing yt ye horse in Sherburn were to have a feast, comes at noon day, beats up their Quarters, takes commissary Windham, Sr Wm Reddall, & many others prisoners, & havinge ransackt their quarters takes away their best horses & returns back to Cawood wth ye prize. (40)

Thomas Fairfax and Captain Hotham had intended to raid a quarter at Fenton, but had found it evacuated. Riding on towards Sherburn, intending to "give an Alarme there", they were seen, and some 200 horse were sent from the village to obstruct their passage. Fairfax at once charged this body, chasing them back into Sherburn, where a barricade was quickly thrown across the street. The Parliamentarians, finding themselves in a narrow lane, unable to turn about without incurring heavy losses from the fire of the defenders, stood their ground and endeavoured to storm the barricade at sword point. Finding a narrow gap that gave entrance to the village, Fairfax himself rode in, followed by his own troops and by John Hotham's. The Royalist defence melted away, riders scattering to other quarters with news of the attack.

Hurrily, Fairfax decided upon a retreat before help could arrive, but he was scarcely on his march when cavalry commanded, apparently, by Goring,
appeared, and gave pursuit. Both Windham and Riddell - the latter was the elder brother of Sir Thomas Riddell, Governor of Tynemouth - were subsequently exchanged.

An attempt was now made by the earl to carry the war into the West Riding, to those 'friends' about whom Sir Thomas Fairfax was so concerned. The chosen target was Bradford, the town before which Glemham had failed in the previous October. The attack, which took place on the 17th or 18th of December, was formidable. The van of the Royalist army was commanded by Colonel Sir William Eure, the Catholic younger son of William Lord Eure of Halton. The rear was under the command of a suspect Catholic, Sir Francis Howard of Corby, second son of Lord William Howard and brother of the Colonel Thomas Howard killed on December 1st at Piercebridge on the Tees. Eure's section was composed of 100 foot, three troops of horse and two companies of dragoons fighting on foot. Howard had his own troop of cavalry, a troop of Captain (later Lt. Colonel) Robert Hildyard's, of Winestead, and six companies of Colonel "Eddrington's" dragoons, supporting 100 foot. "Eddrington" may have been Sir William Widdrington or, alternatively and more likely, Colonel John Errington of Hutton Rudby, a convicted Recusant. The other commanders were colonels Sir William Saville, Sir Marmaduke Langdale, Sir Thomas Glemham and Captain Sir John Goodricke commanding the horse. The infantry were commanded by Captain Sir Ingram Hopton of Arnley Hall in Yorkshire, Captain Neville (possibly Matthias Neville of Strickland's Foot), Captain John Batt and Captain Binns.

The storm of Bradford has been clearly described by Markham, whilst Lord Fairfax's own despatch, the Rider of the White Horse, and the memoirs of Joseph Lister and Captain Hodgson provided extremely well detailed accounts of the fighting.

All sources agree that Sir William Saville, as a preliminary to the attack, had established a presence in Leeds and Wakefield. Lord Fairfax dated the appearance of the Royalists before Bradford to the 18th of December, at ten o'clock in the morning, although advance warning had been brought by Parliamentary scouts. The garrison at this point consisted of only 80 muskets and a few irregulars armed with farming implements (according to the Parliamentary sources). Carrying two drakes, the Royalists fired on the town 17 times until the gunner was picked off by a marksman. The defenders sallied, taking upwards of 30 prisoners, and killing (the report is erroneous) Colonel Eure. Such a brief summing up suggests that the defenders had things very much their own way, which the other sources tend to qualify.

The Rider of the White Horse, a report perhaps compiled by a Bradford man, noted that the "malignant humour being predominant" in Leeds, enabled the Royalists to lie securely within a day's march of Bradford, where the latent
Royalist sympathies of some townsmen, hitherto overawed by the more numerous Parliamentarian party, now appeared "breathing forth nothing but threatenings"; some of the Parliament's friends gave up, and left the town. A delegation of Bradford Royalists rode out to meet Sir William Saville, who to all intents and purposes, seems to have commanded the assault, and brought back from him a warning that if the town were to resist, he could not prevent its plunder. If this report is factually accurate, then the Royalists counted the town as all but theirs which, had it been simply a matter of numerical superiority, would have been true.

The panic in Bradford was, understandably, serious. There was no senior officer present, the Trainband forces were away with Lord Fairfax, and such soldiers as were there demanded their pay if they were to stay. By the time that the attackers appeared on Sunday morning, Bradford must have resembled a ghost town, houses boarded and shuttered, with a few armed men standing behind barricades. The Royalists approached the east end of the town, their army divided into two bodies under the commanders already mentioned, with the artillery under the direction of a Dutch professional with a remarkable Cornish name, Major Carew. It was rumoured that Goring and Newport were also present, but there is no evidence to support this, unless they were simply observers. Indeed, it is almost as if, in the presence of Saville as sole commander, we have a token of the over-confidence which the Council of War felt.

Help for the town was at hand in the form of volunteers from Halifax, commanded by Captain Hodgson, to Markham only little less a hero than Thomas Fairfax. Although they did not arrive until after the attack had begun, Hodgson stating that they found the church under attack when they came upon the scene, it is likely that this reinforcement was to tip the balance.

The defenders began the fighting by firing from the church steeple onto the Royalists, who may have been approaching the town a little carelessly, in expectation of surrender. "Something daunted", Saville directed his men to occupy some houses near the steeple, taking with them some cannon, and sent Captain Goodricke's troop of horse to prevent the defenders from hindering these dispositions. Goodricke skirted the town to the west, in the process, it was alleged, committing atrocities, and came up to the sentries at that end, who killed two or three horses and, reinforced by a body from Bingley, forced Goodricke to retire out of range.

The Royalist gunners under Carew, drew nearer the church, seizing two houses barely 30 yards away, and positioned their guns to fire up Kirkgate towards the steeple.

Our steeple had a notable advantage of them, which our musquittiers there especially improved against them, for when any buffe or skarlet coat appeared, they laid 2 or
3 of their pieces in one hole, and discharged at once upon them... and thereby deterred the rest from relieving their men in the houses, and thus they continued till high-noone.

Joseph Lister referred to the defenders using "long guns", and it seems that there may have been game-keepers using fowling pieces in the steeple. At this point, the reinforcements from Halifax arrived, being a party of club-men, or such as had scythes laid in poles, fell upon their horse on one side, and the musketeers in the houses, that were ready to storm the church, on the other side, and so beat them off. (49)

In fact, the Halifax men did not carry the day by themselves. As the Rider of the White Horse made clear, the garrison in the church were ready for an assault, and were troubled by the "largeness of the church windows" through which cannon and musket fire could be poured. They therefore grouped for a sally, chose a moment when the Royalist musketeers were reloading, joined the Halifax men who had just appeared on the scene, and rushed the houses, bursting in and killing several Royalists taken by surprise. The remainder retreated into a neighbouring field, where the fighting came to hand to hand, the Royalist unable to discharge their muskets in the confusion of such an action.

...manifested great courage, but they smarted for it; our scythes and clubs now and then reaching them, and none else did they aim at. One amongst the rest in a scarlet coat, our club-men had got hold of (and he in all probability was Colonel Goring) and were spoiling him. Their horse fearing the losse of such a man, became more courageous then they intended, leaped over the hedge, and rode full upon our men, forcing them to give a little ground...

The defenders rallied, returned to the attack, and eventually forced both horse and foot of the Royalists to leave the field, giving no quarter to any, which the writer attributed not to their cruelty, but to their ignorance. Once the Royalists had been dispersed, the defenders came again under heavy fire from musketeers who could now fire freely, and "rained such a shower of lead upon our men, as forced them to retreat".

Saville drew his men back from the town. Captain Binns had been killed, or mortally wounded, probably in the melee in the field. Captain Sir John Goodricke had been unseated when his horse was killed with a scythe, and himself wounded in the back. Major Carew was a prisoner, and the defenders estimated over 100 Royalist soldiers had been wounded. No engagement yet fought in the north, had been so bitterly contested as this struggle for Bradford.

Another source gives details omitted in the tract, for example, during the fighting near the church:

a stout, gallant officer, commanding a company of foot, came running down a field, shaded with a hedge, intend-
ing to come running into the church, and so cut off the men both in the church and steeple; but the men in the steeple having a full view of their design, ordered a few men to meet them, and give them a charge: and the commander coming first, two of the townsmen met him, and struck him down: he cried out for quarter, and they poor men not knowing the meaning of it, said - 'aye, they would quarter him', and so killed him...they sent a trumpeter to request his corpse, which was the next day delivered to them.

He being now fallen that was their champion, his men that had followed him thither were more easily driven back to the body of their army, which stayed within a little of where their guns were planted.

The townsmen cannot have been so ignorant as to suppose that their victim was asking them to mutilate him, and Lister's excuse for their behaviour, which in the civil war was exceptional, particularly so early, is a nonsense. The victim was rumoured to have been a son of the earl of Newport, but no such son can be identified. This officer, and the man in the scarlet coat thought to have been Goring, may well have been the same, particularly since both incidents occurred in open fields. The victim may have been Captain Binns, but whoever he was, the killer was Ralph Atkinson.\footnote{51} Remembering the death of a Captain Atkinson at Wetherby in October, the Bradford incident may have been due to vengeance.

At Christmas 1642, the earl of Newcastle’s achievements had been somewhat mixed. In rapidly executed movements, he had carried the Royalist presence into the West Riding, occupying Leeds and Wakefield, re-establishing contact with Pontefract garrison, isolating the enemy at Cawood and Selby and utterly disrupting Lord Fairfax’s communications. In action, however, his army had sustained setbacks: at Sherburn and at Bradford. Even so, it cannot be said that the future of the army depended upon winning or losing such minor actions, and the defeat did not cause him to reorganise his dispositions. He did not, for example, assume a defensive posture. The Parliamentarians had won some breathing space, and had preserved their morale. The important thing would be to see which commander now took the initiative.

For much of December and January, the earl of Newcastle remained in Pontefract.\footnote{52} Together with the maintenance of his military position, the earl was still concerned with recruiting, as two letters given by Firth in his appendices to the \textit{Newcastle Memoirs}, show.\footnote{53} On January 8th, from Pontefract, Newcastle was writing to Colonel Guilford Slingby, a Kentishman now resident in Yorkshire and commissioned to raise a foot regiment. The earl had apparently received a letter from Slingby requesting reinforcements, probably because his recruiting area, the Cleveland Hills, was vulnerable to Cholmeley’s raiding cavalry from Scarborough. Newcastle’s reply showed other concerns beyond Slingby’s localised problems:
I...should be very glad to give you all the assistance you desire, and more, to prosecute your present levies, but I was informed that you had of your own levies 400 foot besides your troop of horse. And as the case stands I cannot furnish you with any more forces for the present. For these reasons, first, the forces of the Bishoprick were levied upon the condition to remain in the country for the security thereof...

This must refer to Trainband, as opposed to volunteer, regiments.

...and besides, they are appointed to guard the ammunition through their country, and if need be further; which I hope they will obey, for I hear Colonel Huddleston nor Colonel Clavering can either of them march for that convoy as was intended, and therefore I have appointed Sir Robert Strickland and his forces to wait upon that service, and I desire you will do so too, for I hear that they have a design to surprise it if they can, and it deserves our best care to secure it... For the 500 arms you desire a warrant for, it will be very inconvenient to serve it upon their way, and therefore for it you must have a little patience.

This letter marked the beginning of a brief but savage period of fighting in the North Riding, and requires comment.

The reference to Colonel William Huddleston of Millom, Cumberland, is the first which we have to a regiment raised partly in that county, operating outside it: it is a misfortune that we do not know the tactical considerations which led to its being based near to Durham. The other regiment referred to was that of Colonel Robert Clavering, which has already attracted attention as heavily Recusant and Catholic in its officer cadre. From Callaly in Northumberland, Clavering was able to move his volunteer regiment where he wished without any Trainband parochialism. The ammunition to which the earl referred, was that which was stockpiling at Newcastle upon Tyne, presumably sent from Europe by the Queen's efforts, although Newcastle had agents there also. The 'they' feared likely to attack it as it was conveyed south, were the Scarborough raiders. Slingsby must have had detailed knowledge of the activities of those cavalry, and it is a pity that his original letter(s) to his superior have not survived. From Newcastle's reply it is clear, however, that Slingsby, a man of wide experience military and administrative (see Vol. 2), did not consider himself in sufficient strength to resist Cholmeley on his own, particularly if he was in need of arms, as it appears. In the event, it was Slingsby alone, unaided by Strickland, Huddleston or Clavering, who faced Cholmeley's effective raiding cavalry. The earl's letter to him went on to discuss routine matters:

For the lady you mention use your own discretion towards her, for I have not been ever used to take ladies prisoners. For any goods or arms you shall take of disaffected persons or in their possessions, keep them to your own use, the goods upon account for paying your soldiers (for we can get no money here to supply you) and the arms for arming your men, and though they be part of the Trained-band arms, yet being taken by you
as a prize, they shall be accounted so. For fortifying those castles you mention, I do not understand of what consequence it can be to you, except it be some one for your retreat and place of residence whilst you are levying your regiment... For the paying of your troop you propose one of three ways, but to resolve which of them is to no end unless there was money to pay, but in that you shall have all the right that may best be, in time. Till then, as I told you before, you may make use of such moneys and goods you take of delinquents or so much thereof as will serve you, for I perceive you meet with good store.

The problem of money had not been resolved by January 1643, which does stress that the earl had marched into Yorkshire even though he cannot have received anything like the assurances which he had asked for in preliminary letters. Indeed, there is even a hint here that Slingsby should send any spare money to York, so evidently, Guilford was an efficient collector. The Parliamentarian lady to whom the earl referred is unknown, although she may have been one of the Hobys, nor can we know which castles Slingsby had wanted to put men into. Mulgrave, which became a garrison, and Richmond, which did not, suggest themselves.

The garrisoning of castles and of fortified manors was a problem not easily surmounted. Newcastle's advice that Slingsby select one castle into which to retreat if necessary, was sound advice, in the sense that with but a single troop of horse and an incomplete foot regiment, he was in no position to adopt an offensive posture, or to divide his men. He could not have functioned as a field force responsible for patrolling the vast expanse of the Cleveland Hills and Tees valley and, at one and the same time, maintain garrisons. As things turned out, Slingsby was caught far from any shelter, and heavily outnumbered.

Certain castles, of course, served useful purposes by being kept permanently garrisoned. Skipton, for example, where Colonel Sir John Mallory of Studley, was governor, occupied a strategically important route through the Craven valley, giving access to north Lancashire and to Westmorland. Newcastle upon Tyne and Tynemouth controlled the port facilities of the river which was, similarly, one of the functions of York, if shipping could get past Selby, presently occupied by the enemy. Pontefract lay across the main route north out of Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire, and also on the edge of the cloth areas, giving moral support to garrisons lying at Wakefield, Sandal Castle, and Leeds. Good cases for these garrisons could be made out, as they could for the enemy strongpoints of Hull, Scarborough and, in the west, Manchester. Yet these were garrison towns, not simply castles, with mercantile life to protect as well as strategic considerations. Successful prosecution of the war on either side depended upon commercial life keeping as near as possible, to normality. Beyond this, there was no cohesive policy towards garrisons, at least, not one that is now recognisable. The Duchess
of Newcastle gave a lengthy list of the garrisons established officially by her husband between 1642 and 1644, noting 21 castles and towns in the northern counties. Westmorland alone appears never to have had a garrison, even though Cumberland had two, Carlisle and Cockermouth Castle.

Not all of these twenty-one garrisons were held at the same time, but were set up to serve the needs of circumstances. Carlisle cannot properly be considered a garrison town until 1644, although as the Duchess implies, it had a Royalist presence from 1642 onwards. In Durham, it is worth noting, the county town and its castle was not considered worth the trouble of a garrison, although Raby Castle, seat of the Parliamentarian Vanes, and Hartlepool were garrisoned from 1642 until they yielded to the Scots in 1644. Of the 21 garrisons, 15 were in Yorkshire, which was to be expected, in view of that county's importance both as a theatre of the war and as a barrier between the south and the extreme north. Of these 15, Scarborough became a Royalist garrison in March 1643 when Sir Hugh Cholmeley returned to his allegiance, and became, along with York itself, Pontefract, Sheffield, Doncaster and Skipton, an important stronghold. Tadcaster, Halifax and Stamford Bridge were occupied and evacuated at will, and according to the dictates of the military situation. Helmsley, Bolton in Swaledale and, in a sense, Scarborough as well, were the preserves of particular individuals, respectively Colonels Sir Jordan Crossland, John Scrope and Henry Chaytor, and Cholmeley. Wortley Hall, another of the garrisons given by the Duchess, was the seat of Sir Francis Wortley, whose activity as a field commander seems to have declined during 1643 and who then retired to his house and maintained a force there. The other three garrisons were Tickhill, a rambling and ruinous castle in the West Riding; Eyrmouth, near Selby, and Sandal, which became important in 1644/5 when the siege of Pontefract was underway.

This list in no way takes account of the very many private houses which, according partially to documentary evidence and partially to legend, were held in the King's interest. One example will suffice. Hunsingore, lying less than ten miles west of York, beyond the River Nidd, and within view of Marston Moor, was one of the manors of Sir John Goodricke, a cavalry troop commander under Newcastle. The mansion which had been raised on the older Norman earthworks, was subjected to attack and destruction at some stage during the war. Unverifiable tradition locates the incident to the period of the siege of York, or the aftermath of the battle of Marston Moor.

It is particularly worthy of note that whilst the Duchess in her list referred to Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland and Yorkshire, as well as to Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire and Derbyshire, she made no allusion to Lancashire. There, the garrisoning of castles and manors seems to have been at the earl of Derby's discretion. Lathom House, Liverpool, Warrington, Preston,
and Wigan, with the castles of Thurland, Greenhalgh and some others, were held at one time or another, as will be seen. This gap in the Duchess's list may be accidental, but it does serve to stress again the apparent isolation of Derby's command. It may be that by the time Newcastle was on the offensive in a large way, in the summer of 1643, it was too late to do anything in Lancashire where the Royalists were on the run, and consequently no formal garrisons were established. Yet one would expect, in view of Newcastle's technical authority there, to find him responsible for garrisons that existed from December 1642 until April 1643, but the Duchess, by her silence, implies otherwise. This problem of Lancashire, emphasised by the fact that Newcastle drew forces from that county, one supposes by virtue of his powers as Lord General, whilst Derby exercised actual command there, continues to defy a real solution being arrived at.

A garrison, in a positive sense, controlled the area around it so long as enemy activity was confined by the field army and reduced to minor raids. It provided shelter during times of crisis, and a guaranteed link in lines of communication. In a negative sense, it was a parasite upon the surrounding countryside, drawing victuals and money from the rural communities open to it and contributing little or nothing to the day by day waging of campaign warfare. A garrison came into its own, and proved its worth, when it was able to tie down large numbers of enemy forces in siege operations. On such occasions, a competent governor could perform wonders with a mere handful of men, as at Pontefract in 1645, and Scarborough. Newcastle's lack of interest in garrisons, indeed, his explicit order to Slingsby not to create them, indicates on his part an approach to war in terms of field armies and wide campaigns. If the war in the north was to be won, it could only be won with such an attitude, and it does Newcastle credit.

Together with the letter from Newcastle found on Slingsby, was another document, a general warrant or proclamation issued, doubtless, to most of his colonels early in 1643. It is worth giving at length:

The county of Yorkshire to be universally disarmed of all private arms, both of horse and foot, and those not borne in service to be brought into a magazine at York. The trained bands that rose with Hotham to be compelled to rise again, and serve in their persons, or every man to send an able-bodied man to serve for him. Considering her Majesty intends to commit her person into the protection of this county, a magazine is to be made at York to enable an army to subsist there in case of extremity or necessary retreat. All the gentry of Yorkshire to be unanimously moved to resort thither with their families and movables, as the contrary faction do daily to Hull, by which means the persons and estates of such as are not well affected will be secured, as such as refuse or decline it shall discover themselves and every man's fortune and family being there engaged they will more actually move with a joint concurrence for the preservation of the place, which must be the retreat for the
safety of the Queen's person, no other place being
defensible and considerable to balance Hull. Those that
decline this proposition are to understand that they must
at their own peril undergo the plunder of the soldiers,
if any fall out. The garrison in York shall be daily
employed in making regular works upon the avenue and out-
works, and encroachments upon the hills and other places
commanding the town. No markets or fairs to be held in
any place in the county except York. Some of the iron
ordnance, sent over by the Queen:to be sent for at the
charge of the county to place upon the avenues and fort-
ifications.

This document, which we are fortunate to have, illustrates the ruthless nature
of Newcastle's approach to his command. His orders were sound, but we cannot
say that they were ever fully implemented. There are some cases in the papers
of the Committee for Compounding, concerning gentlemen charged as delinquents
who protested that they had merely resided in the city of York whilst it had
been a garrison, although it is to be noted that none of them cited such an
order as that given above. This implies a degree of willingness on the part
of most who were decidedly not Parliamentarian in sympathy, so that the order
may have been intended to encompass certain elements about whose loyalties
there was some doubt. There were, anyway, difficulties in putting such an
order into practice, and it is likely that gentlemen not in arms moved their
families or themselves into their nearest garrison, as was the case with
Skipton and Scarborough, for examples. It would also have been necessary for
full implementation of the order for there to be a definite, unchallenged
Royalist sway in any given area, and in the West Riding, obviously, there were
areas of uncertainty in which both sides came and went without establishing any
lasting presence.

The importance now attached to York made it possible for that city to
resist the great siege of April to July 1644, when the earl's foresight in
the matter of fortifications and victualling paid off. By banning markets
throughout the Royalist controlled North and East Ridings, and parts of the
West Riding, the earl effectively channelled foodstuffs and other essentials
into his headquarters town, although, conversely, there must have been a rise
in prices on commodities travelling lengthier journeys than ordinarily they
would have done. Sound military considerations dictated this regulation of
trade. Markets and fairs required protection, for raiding enemy cavalry would
be a constant threat to places where quantities of foodstuffs and clothing were
to be had, and Newcastle could not waste troops on perpetual market assignment
when he intended to launch an offensive war.

Colonel Guilford Slingsby's last, and his first, action, was fought on
January 16th. Sir Hugh Cholmeley was prowling the countryside to the north-
east of York. On the 15th he descended on Malton, where about 240 horse
under the command of Captain John Cansfield, were on their way north to meet
the ammunition convoy. Cansfield was captured (to be restored to liberty
when Cholmeley changed sides) and several of his men killed and wounded.

On the day following, Cholmeley had joined forces with Sir Matthew Boynton.
His official despatch is the best source extant for the events that followed
this junction:

> Col. [Robert] Strickland and Col. Slingsby were marched to
> Guisborough...with some troops of horse...Sir M. Boynton
> being come to me with 2 troops of Dragoons I joined to
> them one more of mine, 130 foot and 1 troop of horse...we
> marched into Cleveland to assault the enemy who lay at
> Gisborough...with 400 foot and 100 horse...they advanced
> a mile out of the town to encounter us and placed their
> musketeers under hedges in places of advantage. But
> after two hours skirmish we beat them, first from the hedges
> and then out of the town... We have taken above 120
> prisoners, amongst them Col. Slingsby and 12 Frenchmen that
> were troopers... (57)

Lord Fairfax, reporting the fight to the Speaker, stated that many of the
prisoners, of a total of 140, were Catholics.

Strickland was probably not with Slingsby when the action was fought.
The strength attributed to the Royalists - 400 foot and a troop of horse -
sounds very much like Slingsby's own regimental strength, to which Newcastle
had referred in the letters discussed above. If that is the case, then just
when Strickland left and where it was that he went, is unknown. Possibly, if
he had been with Slingsby, then the outcome of the action might have been
different. Slingsby himself, taken prisoner, was severely wounded, and after
the amputation of both his legs (a hazardous undertaking at any time), died
in Scarborough.

Cholmeley retired to Scarborough after the action, although he left a
token garrison in Malton, dangerously close to York, and in his official
despatch referred to warnings that the Royalists were planning to oust him.

In fact, his worries were premature. In the West Riding, the Parliamentarians had been organising themselves for an offensive, and their target was
to be Leeds, which they appeared before in force on January 23rd.

The Parliamentarian capture of Leeds and, incidentally, of Wakefield too,
was their most signal success so far. It was also a source of much material
for pamphleteers of the time, so that the accounts of the action are fairly
well detailed. They include the recollections of Sir Thomas Fairfax, with
letters written between him and his father, and Captain Hodgson of Halifax's
memoir. The only Royalist source seems to be a brief reference in Mercurius
Aulicus, which estimated the entire Royalist defence force at a bare 200
men.

The Royalist commander in Leeds was Colonel Sir William Saville, with

- 120 -
according to Lord Fairfax writing on January 26th, 1500 men and two brass sakers - cannon firing a ball weighing from five to seven pounds. We know that Saville's own regiment of foot was present, from a reference by Fairfax to Major Thomas Beaumont of Whitley, reputedly drowned in the general flight from the town. The presence of the regiment is also verified by the lists of prisoners and slain supplied in two contemporary tracts, A true and plenary relation of the great defeat and A Relation of the taking of Leeds and Wakefield. Unfortunately, not all of the officers can be identified, even though A true and plenary relation insisted that they were all Catholics! Of seven captains named, three can be fairly positively identified. Of seven lieutenants, similarly only three can be ascribed to regiments. Of six ensigns, two only permit of identification.

Captain Hemsworth (or Hunsworth) of Leeds was probably Gabriel Hemsworth, a merchant defending his native town, and an officer in Saville's own regiment at this date, although later in the war he served under a former officer of Saville's, Thomas Wheatley. Captain Waterhouse was Robert Waterhouse of Netherton, also of Saville's foot. Captain Witherington or Widrington may be the Captain-lieutenant Henry Widdrington of Butelandt, Northumberland, who served under Colonel Sir Edward Widdrington of Cartington, and who was very probably a Catholic Recusant.

Lieutenant Audley later became a captain in Saville's. He was John Audley of Bentley in Emley, another local man. Lieutenant Burrell may have been Redmain Burrell, later major in Colonel Sir Francis Fane's regiment, but the link is tenuous. Lieutenant Garret may be a reference to Anthony Garnett, later Captain Garnet of Sir William Widdrington's regiment of foot.

Ensign Benson may well have belonged to Colonel Sir William Eure's foot. Ensign Errington may have been Anthony Errington of Sir William Widdrington's foot.

Certainly, from the list of officers, there were a good deal more than the 200 men, cited by Mercurius Aulicus, to defend the town.

The decision to attack Leeds was made on or around January 9th, when Sir Thomas Fairfax wrote to his father from Bradford:

> These parts grow very impatient of our delay in beating them out of Leeds and Wakefield, for by them all trade and provisions are stopped, so that the people in these clothing towns are not able to subsist, and, indeed, so pressing are these wants, as some have told me, if I would not stir with them, they must rise of necessity of themselves in a thing so great importance. (63)

Sir Thomas seems to have been ordered, by his father, to take only defensive actions, and so had written asking for advice, but he added that he could count on 300 musketeers and 3000 countrymen to assist him. Lord Fairfax did not fall in with this idea but, accepting the need for an attack, sent his son
reinforcements, chiefly horse and dragoons, who were to go into the West Riding anyway to assist in recruitment. Sir Thomas Fairfax confirmed in his memoir that there were 1500 men in Leeds, but stated also that there were some 1200 in Wakefield. From the demands of the local Parliamentarians which Thomas communicated to his father, it is plain that Saville and, in Wakefield, Colonel Sir George Wentworth of Woolley, were very active commanders. They visited us every day with their Horse (for ours went not far from ye Towne, being so unequall in number) yet they seldom returned without losse. Sir Preoccupied with fortifying Bradford towards the middle of January began to organise his army for an assault. He brought in many of the local Trainbands, distributing arms which seem to have come from the capture of Bradford and from his father. When he had recruited his infantry to the number of 800, he felt able to make an attempt on the two Royalist garrisons. we made a body of about 12 or 1300 men, wth wch we marched to Leeds, and drew ym up wthin halfe Cannon Shott of their works in Battalia, and yn sent in a Trumpett with a Summons to deliver up y° Towne to me for y° use of King & parlam. Sir William Saville apparently sent reply that they had come too near the town before delivering their summons, and stated that he would defend it with his life. A general assault followed, Fairfax apparently striking at all points, in the hope of forcing a rapid entry before his "unexperienced fresh-water Soulidiers" (as A true and plenary relation called them) grew dispirited.

For two hours, according to Sir Thomas, the Royalists disputed the defences with them, but were eventually forced from their works, and the barricades across the streets thrown down. The entry of the Parliamentary cavalry led to a general surrender by the soldiery, and Saville with other commanders was forced to swim the river to make his getaway. Fairfax reckoned that the Royalists lost about 40 dead, together with a large store of ammunition "wch we had much want of". News of this disaster caused Colonel Wentworth to evacuate Wakefield and to fall back on York.

Other sources add additional information to the rather cursory reports given by both Fairfaxes. Captain Hodgson remembered that they marched on Leeds by way of Aperley Bridge, Rawdon and Woodhouse Moor where Captain Hotham met them with additional troops (that Thomas Fairfax should neglect to give Hotham his due is not surprising). The advance was hampered by torrential rain which made Woodhouse Moor heavy going, forcing the Parliamentarians into the valley where Leeds lay (hence their near approach, complained of by Saville).

A detailed breakdown of the Parliamentary strength is given in a very well informed contemporary report that was written, probably, by an officer in
the assault forces. Fairfax, when he began his march, had 1000 infantry and 2000 irregulars draw in from the cloth towns and the surrounding countryside. His mounted forces consisted of six troops of horse and three companies of dragoons. What reinforcements Hotham brought is not stated, but this estimate of strengths falls far below that given by Thomas Fairfax himself. In view of the detailed knowledge of the anonymous writer, however, concerning the actual engagement, some credence must be given to his assessment of their strength. Putting aside Thomas Fairfax's congenital unreliability in matters numerical, it is possible that Hotham substantially increased the fire power of the assault army.

A True Relation states that Fairfax split his army, sending a company of dragoons and 1000 irregulars south of the river Aire onto Hunslet moor, which lies south-east of Leeds and towards Wakefield. The remainder marched by Aperly Bridge to the north (this is the route taken by Hodgson), and when both forces were positioned, Fairfax sent the summons which Saville rejected.

Selecting five colours of "his expertest soldiers", Fairfax sent them towards the water along the trenches, drawn two yards breadth and height from Mr. Harrison's new church along the south side of the town to the water, an inner trench being divided and drawn on the inside that long trench near near the waterside, compassed about the declivity of the hill a little above the water.

A little above this, some 100 musketeers of the garrison were posted, who opened fire at about two in the afternoon. Fire was returned by snipers under the cover of a hill to the south, whilst men advanced to the west of the church covered by a screen of cavalry. Royalist sentries located near 'Beiston' were dislodged from their works, enabling the enemy to approach near enough to fire down on the bridge over the Aire, against which Saville sent up a cannon. South of the town, a general advance was ordered, under heavy fire from musketeers inside the trenches, until the defenders were obliged to evacuate what had become an untenable position.

A storm of the earthen defences forced the defenders to fall back on the houses of the town, where they endeavoured to make a stand. The capture of what may have been a house, turned the Royalist flank.

The enemy flying down a street or lane, from the 2 contries neare the water, into the heart of the townes, where the other [cannon] lay to guard the passage, Sir William [Saville] met them, and enquiring the cause of their flight, was answered that their workes were entered; he called on them, go beat them out, promising to lead then, yet they denied: which he seeing, and that 12 musketeers had gained that cannon by killing the canoneere...he and the rest...about an houre after the first centry was entered, fled away...

Saville and his companions made first for the bridge, hoping to get to Wakefield, whilst some 40 or so got as far as Hunslet moor where they were taken. Finding this route blocked, Saville determined to cut his way out by the old
church and so, by force of arms, make good his escape. In this he was successful.

According to this source, some 460 prisoners fell into Parliamentary hands, together with the two cannon, after two hours fighting. At midnight, Wentworth evacuated Wakefield and headed for Pontefract, where the earl of Newcastle was still established.

The loss of these two towns obliged the earl to fall back on York, perhaps expecting a general enemy offensive was likely. A garrison was left in Pontefract to maintain the castle at least, whilst a force was also left at Doncaster, where it underwent siege by the local Trainbands. Tadcaster was also garrisoned at this point.

This startling Parliamentarian success, which virtually cleared the West Riding of Yorkshire, is hard to account for. Saville had a strong enough force at Leeds, even if it was not the full 1500 the enemy were to claim. The town was fortified to a point, and there were reinforcements available at Wakefield, even if Newcastle at Pontefract was a little too far away to give immediate help. Part of the Parliamentary troops' victory must have lain in the element of surprise, and if this is so, Saville's cavalry patrols must have been extremely lax at this point, which tends to indicate over-confidence. One factor, which is probably an imponderable, can be considered in the light of events elsewhere in the north during the war, and is not confined simply to this problem of Leeds. That is, the psychological effect upon a relatively strong garrison of finding its works stormed suddenly and violently. If Saville's own regiment formed the bulk of the garrison, it cannot have been in arms long, and it may be that under pressure they lacked the experience to stand firm. The Parliamentarians achieved nothing by ruse or particularly cunning tactics, but by a sledgehammer blow that demolished defences and morale at once. Saville, at least, showed that he lacked neither resolution or courage, particularly when his soldiers deserted him.

As it turned out, if the earl of Newcastle had feared a general offensive, it was not to come. The Parliamentarians came to a standstill in the midst of their triumph. Before long, the tide was to turn in the favour of the Royalists.

The ammunition convoy, long expected at York, and in defence of which Guilford Slingsby had lost his life, reached the Tees at the end of January. As has happened at Piercebridge the previous December, so now, at Yarm, Parliamentarian resistance was met with. As at Piercebridge, that resistance was effectively broken by a determined Royalist charge over Yarm bridge and into the market town that lay to the south.

It was a sizeable convoy, given by Mercurius Aulicus as "120 Wagons
laden with Mony, Armes & Ammunition, and 140 horses laden with muskets, and 16 pceces of ordnance". The Parliamentarian force obstructing the Yarm passage of the Tees, was commanded, apparently, by Sir Hugh Cholmeley, and consisted of 400 foot, three troops of horse and two cannon. Aulicus gave the enemy as two full regiments, which may, technically, have been correct, if they were Cholmeley's own horse and foot not up to strength. One is reminded of Sir Philip Warwick's strictures.

Against Cholmeley came the cautious and experienced newcomer, Lieutenant-General James King, who had the advantage of the terrain. Yarm lies south of its bridge, and the road slopes down quite steeply to the river from the north. Egglescliffe church, standing high on a bluff overlooking Yarm, would have given King sufficient means to survey Cholmeley's dispositions, for it would seem that Sir Hugh and the bulk of his men lay in Yarm proper. Like Thomas Fairfax at Leeds, James King employed no niceties of tactics, but pushed his way into Yarm by sheer force, killing about 40 of the enemy and capturing nearly all of the foot, whom he sent away to Durham. The Duchess of Newcastle recorded that Cholmeley lost 17 horse colours, or cornets, and if this is so, it was one of the most sweeping victories which the Royalists had yet achieved: it may have gone no small way towards unsettling the loyalty of the governor of Scarborough to the Parliament.

Not long after Yarm fight, dated to February 1st, Sir Hugh Cholmeley sustained another setback, with the loss of Stamford Bridge. He had garrisoned both Malton and Stamford during his January forays, to watch York and to interfere with communications, although both places were susceptible to a resolute attack. With the main Royalist army now at York, there was both the means and the opportunity to be rid of the enemy presence.

The exact date of the capture of Stamford Bridge is unknown. John Spalding, who occasionally recorded events in northern England, referred to the fight at Yarm happening after the Stamford Bridge episode. Since he also gave the Parliamentary losses at Yarm as 3000 dead and 4310 taken prisoner, however, there is good reason to suspect the accuracy of his chronology. By an interpretation of Sir Henry Slingsby's memoir, it is possible to locate the capture of Stamford between February 1st and February 23rd, probably nearer to the latter date. Slingsby noted that Sir Marmaduke Langdale's newly raised foot regiment was armed out of the ships that had accompanied the Queen to Bridlington where she arrived on February 22nd. Slingsby's own regiment of foot was left in garrison then at Stamford, whilst the main army marched to meet the Queen, and, according to Slingsby, the town had been taken "a little before" this time.

My Regiment was left in Stamport bridge by order from ye Mayor General [Sir Francis Mackworth] & to receive further orders from Collonell Thronmerton ye was left their governor
He had a little before beaten ye enemy out of Stamford bridge command'd by one of ye Darleys wth 100 men.

Cholmeley cannot have considered his hold on Stamford to have been anything other than temporary, and subject to the situation in York, for he had not concerned himself with elaborate defences. A breastwork had been thrown up on the eastern bank of the river, and the central portion of the bridge broken down (and, presumably, fitted with a draw bridge).

Throgmorton command'd ye party, & falling upon them by ye time it was light day, plac'd his Dragoons to play hotly upon yem from ye bridge, while he pass'd his horse over at ye ford: so ye enemy without any more dispute quit ye Town & shift every man for himself: hereupon his excellence makes him governour, who fortifies, sends out for contribution, seizeth upon delinquents & their goods....

Throckmorton remained in command at Stamford Bridge until late in March, when he was succeeded by his lieutenant-colonel, Edward Cary. Cary's identity is open to question, but he appears to have governed Hartlepool in 1644, and to have been active in North Wales in 1645. It is curious that Throckmorton's own regiment, if it actually existed, was not put into Stamford Bridge under his command instead of Henry Slingsby's. There is practically no evidence for the existence of Throckmorton's regiment, and he may never have fulfilled his commission since he was Commissary General of the Horse by this time.

On May 5th Slingsby was appointed governor in place of Cary, who probably joined Throckmorton in Derbyshire. Slingsby's activities as governor are interesting, in that he gives a fairly detailed account of the financing of the garrison.

Throckmorton, as we have been told, seized on delinquents and their goods makes sure of Sr Richd Darley's estate, sews his own land wth his own corn, lays a tax upon ye country 3d. upon every horse load of corn ye passeth by his garrison: & thus he kept ye Town wth a great deal of vigilance.

When Slingsby took over in May, he found the soldiers "in some distress" and lacking pay and regular supplies of victuals, because "ye providers committ'd great abuse upon ye Country". Sir Henry probably reported on the matter to the committee at York, for

Mr. Nevill one of ye Commissioners was sent by ye Comittee at York, to make an establishment of an Assesment wth in ye east riding, ye souligers might have their pay after 6 shillings a week to every souliger, & ye officer to have his pay out of it; wch by dead pays might procure some little matter to him; but ye countrymen came so slowly in wth their assessments, ye horse belonging to ye garison was employ'd wholly in fetching it & such persons as refus'd: & sometimes making no difference, would injure those ye were well affected & had duly paid...

Slingsby, during his eight week tenure of the command, lifted the corn tax imposed by Throckmorton, and agreed with the country people on a weekly
contribution to be made to the garrison. What arrangements were made subsequently, when Colonel Sir Robert Strickland and his regiment took over from Slingsby, is not known.77

Having taken Stamford Bridge, the earl of Newcastle proposed to march against Malton, which would probably have been evacuated without a fight by Cholmeley's garrison. Anticipating this, the army marched by way of Sheriff Hutton and Pocklington,78 intending to cut off the enemy retreat. At Pocklington, the earl received word that the Queen had landed at Bridlington,79 which caused him to alter his plans. He immediately sent Goring with the cavalry to meet her, whilst the rest of the army followed. The Queen's arrival was very welcome, not only in view of the supplies which she brought. Mercurius Aulicus listed these as 2000 cases of pistols for the cavalry, and £30,000 in cash, together with over a thousand "old experienced Souldiers".80 Some 200 wagon loads of arms and other munitions trundled into York during the next week or so.81

The best source for the arrival of the Queen is Royalist. The Duchess of Newcastle82 suggested that the march into the East Riding was intended simply to be ready for her landing, which contradicts the view of Sir Henry Slingsby that the real motive was to take Malton.83 He stressed that her "coming was not known, till we were at Pocklington" where Captain Millet came from the Queen to announce her presence at Bridlington. Millet was probably the future Lt. Colonel Ralph Millot of Mayland in Co. Durham, a Recusant.

The preparations for the attack on Malton were disrupted.

We [Had] remarch'd ye first night to Sherif Hutton & there lay 2 nights, Lieutenant [General] King being sent to view ye place; yn after we had our army drawn up together in ye park, & march'd forward to Stanford bridge & so to Pocklington. Here General Goring wth all ye horse was sent over ye woulds to hinder if we can their retreat to Hull: (84) But comes too late; they were got before wth all their force, horse, foot, & artillery; yn his excellency prepares wth all speed to march to Burlington to meet ye Queen...

The Queen had a narrow escape during her first night on land,85 but Slingsby and the Duchess of Newcastle cannot agree that Newcastle had already made contact with her before the incident. To follow Slingsby:

That night she lodg'd by ye Key, & ye next morning was awaken'd by ye cannon thundring from ye Parliament ships; who, tho' they knew ye Queen to be there, yet endanger'd her very much by ye shooting, & ceas'd not to shoot untill Vantrump, ye states of Hollands admirall, who convey'd ye Queen hither, sent a Message to ye Parliament [Ships] to wist ye to give over shooting, for he would be no longer made a looker on.

Slingsby recorded, and this is confirmed both by the Duchess, who probably had the story from the Queen herself, and by the Queen, that with the Duchess of Richmond and her waiting ladies, the Queen had to take shelter away from her house:
under ye bank of a little gullet of water yt run into ye sea, at ye Harbour, wch running deep between two banks gave security to those yt sat under ym: here having Cloakes cast under ym, & about ym did ye Lady's sit & take notice wthout danger where every bullet grazed: & yet for all yt, a little farther there did lye, from ye key of Burlington to ye town, in ye very bottom of ye way, or in ye hollow within ye banks, ye body of a soulgier torn and mangl'd wth their great shott...

It may be that the real target of the Parliamentary gunners was the little supply fleet lying then in harbour. Slingsby himself suggests this, but since they were clearly over-shooting their mark time and again, the disregard for the Queen's personal safety betrays, on the part of the commander of the enemy ships at least, an intensification of the war. The Queen's injury or death would have created bitterness so far-reaching, that for the Royalists the war would have at once become a search for vengeance.

James King, taking the situation in hand, hurriedly raised two earthen batteries near the harbour and positioned guns to prevent the enemy ships from coming closer to land. This, with the Dutch threat, proved too much for the enemy, who drew off with the next tide.

After a leisurely progress, pausing at North Burton and at Boynton Hall, the Queen entered York itself on March 7th. One of Newcastle's commitments was now fulfilled, leaving him free to prosecute the war.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO.

2. Johnson, Fairfax Correspondence, II, p. 418.
3. Ibid.
4. For Colonel Thomas Howard's career, see Vol. 2.
7. Ibid.
10. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 84. Torr, Antiquities of York, p. 104, states that there were 10 pieces of ordnance.
11. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 84. See also Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 15.
15. See Vol. 2.
16. DNB.
19. Davies, Dugdale's Yorkshire Visitation, p. 84.
20. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 93/4.
23. DNB.
25. Nelson, Impartial Collection, I, p. 431. For the problem of identifying the many Erringtons with similar forenames, see Vol. 2, passim.
26. Young, Marston Moor, p. 170.
32. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 85. Johnson, Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 420/2.
34. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 85/6.
35. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 16.
37. Johnson, Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 420/2.
38. Fairfax, Short Memorials, p. 209.
40. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 86/7.
CHAPTER THREE

THE WAR WEST OF THE PENNINES
The Royalist Failure December 1642 - June 1643

After a series of setbacks during the summer and autumn of 1642, some due to the demands of the King, by December the earl of Derby was probably in a position to adopt more offensive tactics. From the end of November, however, until 1643 had begun, it is hard to identify anything more than the series of spasmodic skirmishes and engagements which had marked the preceding months. In point of fact, Derby's officers appear to have followed their own inclinations to a degree that was not true of the war in Yorkshire, perhaps a further reflection of the ill defined authority which Derby exercised.

There were two clashes at the end of November for which the sources are solely Parliamentarian. The first, news of which was published in London on December 9th appears to have been a separate engagement from that referred to in a letter of December 2nd written from Lancashire by a Parliamentary observer. It is necessary to stress the word 'appears', since for these local fights, where sources are slender and partisan, it is not always possible to identify separate engagements. Propagandists eager to point the moral are never much concerned with detail. Broxap, in a largely satisfactory study of the years 1642/3 in Lancashire, try as he might, could not unravel certain anomalies.

Londoners read on December 9th, and the writer of the letter referring to the second engagement confirms it, that there was a skirmish on "Leigh and Loaton Common" between forces of the earl of Derby and some "country people". Word had been received that Royalists were moving along the Chowbent, and a little way from Leigh were met by a force purported to be 3000 strong, which forced the advancing soldiers back towards Leigh. Parliamentary regular cavalry, carried away by this success, over-rode their own foot and chased the Royalists onto Loaton Common. The cavalry were, it seems, "farmers' sons" transported "with a fervent desire to overtake them, and to doe some notable service upon them". On the Common, the Royalists turned at bay and there followed a "sharpe although a short encounter", from which the Royalists drew off, losing, as was claimed, some 200 men prisoner, which sounds excessive.

The writer of the letter already referred to, living at Atherton which lies due north of Leigh, went on to describe an engagement to the south-west which is supported by Lancashire's Valley of Achor. According to Achor, this second fight took place on or around November 27th, and seems to have been the climax of Colonel Sir Gilbert Houghton's military activity, at least for the time being.

Colonel Houghton was reported to have "set his Beacon on fire, which
Map to illustrate the war in Lancashire November 1642 to July 1643.
stood upon the top of Houghton Tower", his chief residence, and which was a signal for the Royalist forces in the Fylde and in Leyland Hundred to stand to their arms. This is, in itself, an interesting method of communication, and one for which, in the north at least, there is very little further evidence, although the defenders of Pontefract, Sandal and Newark in 1645 would contact each other by this method whenever they had news. Houghton's own beacon was presumably one of a chain, and if so, argues for a permanent Royalist watch in part of Lancashire.

Houghton's men mustered at Preston, and marched towards Blackburn, disarming suspected Parliamentarians. A force of enemy horse and foot, claimed to have been 8000 strong, which sounds, and is, ludicrously high, particularly in view of the mere 300 or so irregulars given by Achor to the Royalists at Blackburn, marched towards Hinfield Moor to meet them. A sharp encounter followed, but the Royalists were unable to stand their ground and scattered in disorderly retreat. Sir Gilbert Houghton quit his Horse, leaped into a field, and by the comming on of the night escaped through fur bushes and by-ways to Preston, and there makes great defence by chaining up the Ribble bridge and getting what forces he can into the Towne for his security, out of which the Countries swears they will have him....

Achor cut down the zealous Parliamentary force to a mere 200 men with "Club-men", by no means well-officered.

The want of skill in Souldiers and skilfull Captains to supply that want, caused a consultation on Hinfield-Moore, which received Determination(...)from the resolute will of these stirring Souldiers to dispossesse those forcible Tenants (Houghton's men).

Having chosen two Captains from amongst their number, they carried the fight to Blackburn itself and, divided into two groups, to south and east of the town, forced an entrance and scattered the defenders.

This single struggle illustrates the difficulties of the Lancashire source already alluded to, for whilst both Achor and the letter writer referred to the Hinfield Moor fight, the one stresses that it took place on the moor, the other, in the town of Blackburn. The only possible solution seems to be that it was a running fight, moving from the moor into the town, and that Houghton was beaten.

On December 10th the earl of Derby and his fellow Commissioners of Array met at Preston, semi-fortified by Houghton, to discuss the raising of money with which to finance a force of 2000 foot and 400 horse. Two figures, £8000 and £700 were fixed, to be rateably assessed on the various Hundreds, and the responsibility for the collection was put in the hands of a committee of three: Colonel Sir John Gerlington, Adam Mort the Mayor of Preston, and William Pfarrington the elder.
Each of the Lancashire Hundreds (see the map, p. 77) was included in the proposals for raising the assessment, although of them all, only Leyland, Amounderness and, possibly, Lonsdale would be considered as Royalist areas. West Derby, Salford and Blackburn Hundreds contributed little or nothing at all, yet even so, had collectors appointed whose work would, one supposes, have been dependent upon the improvement of the military position.

Five days later, the Royalists secured a victory on Houghton Common, but, since all the sources are Parliamentarian in origin, and therefore tended to under-estimate the defeat, it is difficult to know how much of a victory it was. One source, without going into much detail, concluded that the defeat was a disaster, "a great greef and discouragement to the Parliament party all the County over". This was a noteworthy admission from a Parliamentarian writer, and ought to be employed as a gauge against which to assess the other reports. Broxap alluded to the fight merely in passing. Lancashire's Valley of Achor identified two incidents, the second of which entailed a defeat. According to Achor, a party of Parliamentarian infantry marched towards Wigan "to plunder a Papist's house". Disturbed by a force out of Wigan, these retreated without what they had come for, which may be why a second force went out, somewhat stronger, although Achor states that their goal was a different Papist's house (presumably somewhat more remote). Once again, Wigan had warning, and put into the field a second countering party.

The raiders, rather than retreat, took refuge in "a close of ground upon the side of Houghton Common", where for three hours they exchanged shots with the Royalists:

but lest they should escape...God fires their Magazine, and cools their courage, they sound a Parley, have quarter given them for their lives, but loose their Arms and Libertie; three Captains and eight score soldiers were shut up in the hand of the enemie, the first and foulest blow God gave us...

The raiding party apparently came from Bolton, and this same source gave the Royalist force as outnumbering them by five to one, whereas Achor estimated the Wigan men at about a thousand.

By December 24th the Wigan forces were in sufficient strength to march out to Leigh, where they established a post. Manchester garrison sent out a force to dislodge them, which was met with slight resistance, when the Parliamentarians were barely 200 yards away. Leigh was overrun, and its defenders captured, but there were losses for the attackers, and two men were buried in Bolton that same day, "slayne in the battayle att Leigh".

On the same day as the Leigh incident, Colonel Gilbert Houghton attempted to take his revenge for his discomfiture at Blackburn, by an assault on that town. Raising men in the Fylde and Amounderness, he mustered at Preston on the 24th and marched directly against Blackburn with a cannon in tow. Achor
contrasted the 400 defenders, supported by irregulars, with the 5000 men that Houghton brought, but he cannot have had many more than 1000, if that. From the north, he fired upon the town during the night with his gun, and at noon on the 25th called for a parley. Achor stressed that he used the time in which to move his "God (the greatest Field Piece) nearer to the town," and that the Royalist force was commanded by no fewer than five priests and Jesuits. The inference was, that with such leaders, there could have been nothing but deceit in the call for the parley. No one actually saw these priests, for they were kept hidden in a nearby tithe barn, but it stood to reason that no force of Fylde or Amounderness Royalists could have been other than Catholic led and inspired. There was some truth in it, generally speaking, even if this particular instance was sheer romance. Houghton's attempt came to an indecisive conclusion, and the Royalists drew off later on Christmas day.

The earl of Derby, who seems to have remained somewhat aloof for much of the month, issued orders for the dispositions of his growing army. These orders demonstrate not only the size of his fighting force at this date, but also the positions which the earl expected to hold. Leigh was reoccupied with a token force of 20 men and two mounted dragoons. Warrington had 300 men in residence, including two companies raised in North Wales. In Wigan, where the earl himself was, three companies of foot were to be recruited to a figure of 100 men in each company; there were also 200 dragoons and a troop of horse in attendance. At Preston, he placed 200 men, whilst Sir Gilbert Houghton organised billetting for an unknown number at Brindle. The earl enjoined his officers to exercise their men daily. It would seem that he had not much above 1000 men at his disposal, far short of the number planned for at Preston on the 10th.

For the month of January 1643 there is no evidence of any fighting, but some localised skirmishing must have gone on. Derby was probably occupied with recruiting and training, so that it was not until February 9th that anything decisive happened. On that day, the Parliamentarians made a totally unexpected attack on Preston.

Preston, fortified with "Brick Walls outer and inner" recently raised, was an ideological target. Perhaps the most papist town in Lancashire, it also commanded the crossing of the Ribble between north and south Lancashire, and had primary strategic importance for both sides. The Parliamentary attack was commanded by a newcomer, a professional soldier sent up from London to Manchester, Sir John Seaton. With about 300 foot, and joined by levies from Bolton, Seaton marched to Blackburn where some 500 infantry and nearly 2000 irregulars were reported to have met him. These figures seem high, and contrast with another contemporary source which put the attacking army at about 1600 men, of which only 600 were irregulars. They marched by night,
forming up between Ribble bridge and Preston itself, where local guides met
them and led them to Friars Gate and to the East Barres.\textsuperscript{15}

A true relation reported the garrison's tenacity

The garrison fought it out stoutly: they kept their
inner works with push of pike, and also the breach
they kept with their swords, which aggravates the
matter.

Three or four attackers were killed outright, but the Royalist losses at the
end of the day were far heavier, five or six "lying in one street" and in the
houses, where they refused quarter.

as if men must have been picked out for slaughter, we
could scarce have picked out better, the Mayor - Adam
Mort\textsuperscript{7} (that was resolute to desperateness in the cause,
that he oftentimes had been heard swear 'He would fire
towne ere he gave it up, and beginne with his own
house) was slain...

A perfect Relation stated that it took the attackers two full hours to
gain entryl Seaton finally forcing his way down Church Street, his men clearing
musketeers from the church. Adam Mort, pike in hand, stood his ground and
killed one of Seaton's men before being despatched in the rush of men.

Mr. Adam Morte came up to the souldiers very fiercely
but was slain in a short space. Ratcliff Hoghton,
brother to Sir Gilbert, being in the street with Dr.
Westby a Phisitian and two butchers of the towne one
of them called Mitton making resistance all were slayne.(16)

The victors captured three cannon, many muskets and horses (Achor stated that a
troop of horse confronted the first to gain access to the town\textsuperscript{17}) two or three
colours, and the wives of Sir John Gerlington, Sir Gilbert Houghton and Charles
Towneley. Houghton himself, who seems to have been present, escaped yet again
from the Parliamentarians and took his way to Wigan.

It was a most markedly bloody affair, quite unlike anything that had
preceded it. The furious resistance of the townsmen cannot be ascribed to
their being all Catholics, as was commonly reported - certainly, Mort was not,
although Dr. Westby, one of the younger sons of Thomas Westby of Mowbreck, of
an active Royalist family, may have been.\textsuperscript{18} The brutality at Preston, which
was to be manifested elsewhere in the county in the years ahead, was the
consequence of religious polarization, itself caused by the even balance in
Lancashire between Catholic and Puritan. It may even be that where a large
Catholic population existed, it was unusual to find moderating Anglican
feeling, and it may be a truism to say that the existence of Catholicism was
an essential for the development of extreme Puritanism. There is no doubt
that in Lancashire the equation of Royalism = Catholicism was perfectly
valid, and perhaps here, more than elsewhere in the north, the civil war was
seen in religious terms by the mass of the populace. Where Preston is
concerned, we do not know that the defenders were ever offered quarter, since
no source makes mention of it. If they were not, if they had no choice but
to die as best they could, this was a sinister development that, fortunately,
was not imitated throughout the country generally. Nonetheless, it is an
unavoidable fact that excessive brutality was an instrument employed, now and
again as deliberate policy, by the Parliament’s commanders. The real blame
for Rupert’s sack of Bolton in 1644 must rest with those who initiated the
style at Preston in February 1643, a style which was to be employed with
calculated thoroughness at Basing House and Drogheda.

Sir Gilbert Houghton, having fallen back on Wigan, hastily endeavoured to
levy fresh troops, perhaps intending to launch a counter-attack on Preston,
perhaps to safeguard Wigan from assault. His command, as a Commissioner of
Array, has survived:

These are in his Maties name straitly to chardge and command
you [the constables of Houghton cum Middleton] that immed7 on
receipte hereof you [give] sumons and warninge to all the able
men betweene the age of sixtene and threescore yeares within
yor township and constablery that they (armed and furnished
wth there and every of there best and completeste armes
weapons and habiliments of warre and likewise with provisions
of victuals…) bee and appeare at the towne of Wigan upon
Monday next beinge the XIIIt day of this instante February by
eighte of the clock in the affore noon of the same day then
and there to receav such further orders as shall upon his Maties
behalfe be geeven them in charge. Requiring and chardging them
and every of them upon payne of being esteemed ayders abettors
assistants to the rebells and of being proceeded against as
rebells and traitors; not to neglect these service and duty so
neerely concerning the welfare and safety of the whole county.
And that then also you bringe with you and deliver unto us upon
yor respective oathes a true and pIfecte liste of the names and
qualities of all such able men within yor said township to the
end that it may appeare whoe are refractory and that therupon
course may be taken wth them according to the nature of their
several contempts and offences whereof faile you not as you
will answer the contrary at your uttermoste perills…(19)

Had Houghton but known it, the imminent peril was that in which he himself
stood. Houghton Tower was to be the next target of the victorious army
under Seaton. On February 14th 300 men under regular captains, with "most of
Blackeborn men" left Preston. The Tower was garrisoned with barely 40 musketo-
eers, but there were three cannon and a good supply of powder. Upon the
appearance of the Parliamentarians, however, the commander asked for quarter,
which was granted for an immediate surrender (Houghton was not himself in the
house). The Royalists marched out, whereupon "Captain Starkey" and some men
entered, and went up to the room where the powder and ammunition were kept.
There,

they were most treacherously and perfidiously blown up
by two of them to whom they had before given quarter, who
had a traine of powder laid, and when Captain Starkey and
his men, to the number of above one hundred, were above in
the House, gave fire to the said traine, and blew both him
and all his men, with the top of the House, up, threescore
whereof were afterwards found, some without armes and some without legges...(20)

What happened as a consequence, to the six Royalists they were able to catch, is not known. It was a grim vengeance for the spoiling of Preston, and there is no reason to doubt that it happened as reported. It must be said, however, that the author of Achor attributed the explosion to the drunken Parliamentary soldiers. This unknown puritan divine was always quick to point the moral, and it sounds very much as if he seized upon the incident to turn to his own advantage, for he could not but add

0 that this thundering Alarm might ever sound in the eares of our Swearing, Cursing, Drunken, Tobacco-abusing Commanders and Souldiers unto unfaigned Repentance. For do they think that those upon whom the Tower fell and slew them, were sinners above the rest of the Army? (21)

In a way it is a relief to learn thus indirectly, that the Parliamentary forces in Lancashire were soldiers much as other soldiers, and the Achor claim can be dismissed with a small reservation.

King Charles cannot have had news of what had befallen Houghton Tower, for on February 23rd he directed a letter to Sir Gilbert, in response to letter from the latter, and told him

repaire unto and continue at your proper Mansion with your family and usuall retinue. (22)

Sir Gilbert had no habitable manion to repair to, and so was unable to encourage his neighbours by his continued presence there, to resist the "most forcible disturbance of Lancashire", as the King put it. Colonel Houghton's war had been a series of narrow escapes, defeats and frustrations. His wife was a prisoner, at least temporarily so, and his son Ratcliff had been killed in action at Preston. Retiring eventually into Chester which was a Royalist garrison, he died at the lowest point of the his King's fortunes. We cannot say that he was an incapable commander, since fortune was so clearly against him, but of his enthusiasm and loyalty there has been ample evidence.

After so much Parliamentarian activity, it was time for the earl of Derby to carry the war to them. Two days after the destruction of Houghton Tower, that is, on February 16th, the Royalists fell upon Bolton and so ushered in a campaign that was not to end until the earl's army had been entirely overawed by internal and external factors. Yet not before the earl had demonstrated his own skill as a tactician, as will be seen.

For the assault on Bolton, all the more importance sources agree in most of their details. The author of Achor even provided an explanation for the loss of the initiative by the Royalists, which is partly supported by a reference in another report. It seems that the earl of Derby was not with the army, and that command devolved upon three men: Colonel Sir Gilbert Gerard of the Bryn, Hugh Anderton of Euxton, who was to become lt. colonel to Thomas
Tyldesley, and Captain James Anderton of Burchley. The force under their command consisted of 11 companies of foot, two of dragoons, and some troops of horse, with light ordnance.

The attack was unexpected, coming in a "suddaine, and violent manner" from the Wigan direction by way of the "the Picks", and was not discovered until within a mile of the town. Achor added that the advancing Royalists surprised a few scouts at that point, at about nine o'clock in the morning, whilst the garrison was at prayer, and that they had pressed on resolutely, which, if stuck to, would have found the defenders "unprovided of Ammunition". Instead, "fetching a compass that they might come on in a more ominous way", they swung round by Great Lever, giving the garrison time to organise itself.

A punctuall relation states that whilst the main assault went in, no less than seven companies of foot and four troops of horse were occupied plundering around Little Lever, which may be true, but the forces involved seem too large, if the total Royalist numbers given by the same tract are correct. It sounds rather as if the second wave of attack failed to support the first, which argues for bad management on Gerard's part.

To follow A punctuall relation, the first Royalist assault went in at Bradshaw gate where there were three earthen sconces. These were cleared at the first charge, the defenders falling back on the mud walls of the town proper, some of them being cut off by the fast moving Royalist foot. Without losing impetus, the attackers came to the mud walls and to the chain across the street where

there was such sharp service for a great while together as I think hath seldom been heard of.

The ordnance was levelled point blank at the walls, through which the balls passed easily, supporting the infantry, who

came up to the breast of our workes, even upon the mouthes of our muskets, but we received them...valiantly.

Someone opened the door of his house to permit the Royalists to enter, who established themselves in an upper room, from which to shoot down on the inside of the walls, causing temporary panic. Rallying, the Parliamentary musketeers beat their way into the house with their musket butts and cleared it. A second house, similarly occupied, had also to be dealt with

where there was such a threshing as never was heard of before, for besides the hand blows that past, the enemy was so desperate that three times they came to the ends of their muskets, and catcht hold of them as they went off.

The bitter personal combats were resolved by additional Parliamentarian troops, who cleared the house and forced the Royalists to fall back, although not before they had fired other houses nearby. Captain John Ashton of Viscount Molyneux's foot regiment was wounded in the retreat.
According to the First Assault on Bolton-le-Moors, there had been a prospect of additional levies coming in to Bolton at the start of the attack, but that Gerard's cavalry, patrolling roads and bridges, forced these back. The attack at Bradshaw gate also involved some fierce hand to hand fighting, where the Parliamentary officer in charge was forced to resort to a dagger to defend himself as he fell back on the town with his men. After the occupation of the houses by the Royalist musketeers, the defenders poured into them "such storms of bullets...as powdered them to purpose". By this time, the levies kept away by the patrolling cavalry seem to have gathered in some force and to have made their way through the Royalist screen.

Another source noted that some of the Royalist foot in fact scaled the mud walls, commanded by a son of Alexander Rigby of Burgh, the Commissioner of Array, but were all shot down in the street. Achor noted that when the houses were first fired, the wind bore the smoke and flames down into the town, until it suddenly veered about and bore the nuisance towards the attackers. Yet Achor stressed that these houses were fired before the Royalists actually occupied any, which contradicts A puntuall Relation, but the point is not of particular importance. The author of Achor also alluded to a "new invented mischievous Instrument" which the Royalists had devised with their "wittie malice". The weapon was a staff six feet in length, with a nine inch iron head into which 12 iron spikes were bolted, with one centrally placed "to stab with". This weapon, a variation of the medieval mace, the Royalists liked to call a 'Roundhead'.

The Parish registers relate that the fighting lasted all of four hours, and that the Royalists fired their ordnance some 14 times. As at Preston, the fierce commitment of the Royalists is testified to by their opponents, whilst at Bolton there seems to have been no claim that the attackers were largely Catholic or led up by priests.

Three days later, on February 19th, a company of foot and a troop of horse were sent out from Preston to examine the possibility of fortifying the town of Lancaster, which already had a strong castle. The earl of Derby appears to have had similar ideas, for when the Parliamentary force marched unopposed into the town, they found a small Royalist party in the castle commanded by Sir John Gerlington and "Master Kirby". The Royalists made their escape unmolested to carry the news of the enemy presence to the earl of Derby, who selected Lancaster as his next target. Yet, before his army was on the march to dislodge the enemy, occurred the curious incident of the Spanish ship.

A contemporary report, entitled God's Lift up Hand for Lancashire and strongly reminiscent of the Valley of Achor, provides a fitting introduction to the story. The Parliament, busy garrisoning Lancaster, had only the one piece of ordnance in the castle, until:
the lift up hand of the God of the Seas was working with
the windes to bring a Dunkirke Ship, a man of War, that
came from Spaine, furnished with one and twenty Pecces of
Brasse and Iron Ordnance fit to supply our present wants
and to carry them so neare our strongest Castle...

This ship ran aground off Rossall Point, probably on March 3rd, and was
heard off the coast, firstly by the Parliament's friends in the area and,
almost immediately after, by Royalist sympathisers who sent word to the earl.
Sir John Seaton, the victor of Preston, was in Manchester plotting an attack
against Warrington, when he received a letter informing him of the wreck. Six
companies of foot were despatched to the scene under a Major Sparrow, to find
some 400 Spanish seamen on shore. No-one seems to have bothered very much
about the sailors, but promptly, the Parliamentary officer ordered the removal
of the powder and guns from the wreck. The work was only half done, when
my Lord comes over the ford at Kiskebank wth 300 horse,
Our foote wold not advance to the schip feareng that
my Lord had had foot as well as horse, so they marched
over to the oth" syde of the water to preserve the
amunition wch they had gotten out of the schip, there
were but 12 musquetirs left in the schip & these fled
away. (31)

Derby, who apparently had no infantry with him, set fire to the ship and left
it to burn itself out, returning by way of the ford at Hisket Bank. Moving
on Layton Common by way of Fleetwood, Derby ran into a body of Parliamentary
horse under Colonel Dodding, who were "so drunk with the Joy of the schip"
that they did not realise their danger until it was too late. Prisoners in
tow, the earl journeyed on to his house at Lathom.

Yet, as Seaton explained, the fired ship burned to the water-line and
floundered, making it possible for the Parliamentarians to recover the ordnance,
"to the number of 22, wherof 8 were of brass, 2 demi-cannons, one minion, 5
sacres whereof 3 were broke and made useless".

The news that the enemy had recovered all the guns from the ship must have
alarmed the earl, causing him to hurry with his attack on Lancaster. He had,
anyway, to make some positive attempt to reverse what was fast becoming a grave
military situation. The war was going slowly, but decisively, against him.
His two main garrison towns, Wigan and Warrington, lay in the south of the
county, the latter on the edge of Cheshire, where the forces of the Parliament
were slowly gaining the upper hand. Preston and Blackburn being in enemy
hands, effectively blocked the route north towards Westmorland, whilst enemy
occupation of Lancaster further north still would increase the stranglehold.
The only point in the Royalists' favour seemed to be the concern of the Parl-
liamentarians with maintaining and consolidating their new garrisons, which
gave Derby a breathing space. It is curious that at no time during this
period does he appear to have sent to York for help: indeed, from the capture
of Captain John Cansfield at Malton in January, it is clear that forces were
still leaving Lancashire for service elsewhere. Derby could not be continually patching up his army with new recruiting drives, and if he was to hope to reverse the decline, he had to take advantage of Parliamentary defensiveness to strike a firm blow somewhere. Had he not done so, the Royalists would have found themselves gradually penned into the western area of Lancashire, fighting with their backs to the sea. By moving against Lancaster which would involve a long sweep north from Wigan, Derby might force the war into his favour, and give his officers and men a necessary boost in morale.

Mercurius Aulicus published a lengthy account of the march and of the siege, culled probably from an official despatch, but here again, the sources are, for the most part, Parliamentarian. It gave the Royalist army as made up of 600 foot and 400 horse when it left Wigan, the earl at its head, on Monday March 13th. On Tuesday night, this force quartered at Kirkham "where the countrie people, to the number of 3000" came in to offer their services, "being wearied with the insolence and tyrannie of the Rebels". These must have been the "Clubmen thus sodenlie raised" referred to in a Parliamentarian account, over whom Derby appointed two captains, John Hoole of Singleton and John Ambrose of Plumpton. Writing to Prince Rupert on March 22nd, after the siege, Derby spoke of these levies as largely unarmed, that is to say, lacking muskets and pikes.

Yet further reinforcements were to come to his aid. Viscount Molyneux was in Lancashire from Oxford, recruiting, and put his men at the earl's disposal. In a forgotten skirmish on March 18th, Molyneux routed a body of Parliamentary horse.

On Wednesday March 15th, to return to Mercurius Aulicus, the earl acquired an additional 600 men brought into him by Thomas Tyldesley and Sir John Gerlington, whereof 300 were musketeers. On Saturday, March 18th, this army, the largest which the earl of Derby had yet had under his command, appeared before Lancaster, and the town was duly summoned. The earl's letter sent to the Mayor and Burgesses of the place and not to the Parliamentary commander, was short and sharp:

I am come into these parts by His Majesties speciall command, to free you from the bondage of those declared traitors that now oppress you, and endeavour your destruction by bringing you into their own condition. I will not now mention your former neglect of the King's service, nor, I hope, I need not tell you what forces I have, or might have upon occasion, nor how joyfully all the country in my march have joyned themselves unto me. If you will submit the towne and your armes unto me, and likewise endeavour with me to re-obtaines the castle, you shall have all fair usage from me; if not, expect from me what the laws of the lande and of warre will inflict upon you. (37)

The author of Achor was generous enough to observe in his account of the fighting, that once this summons was rejected by the townsmen, they could
hardly complain at the treatment they were to receive, which was harsh. But
the tone of the war in Lancashire had already been set at Preston and, to a
lesser degree, at Bolton.

The officer in command in Lancaster was the same Holcroft who had created
the riot in Manchester in the previous year when the earl of Derby had come
within an inch of losing his life. This may have been why the earl summoned
the Mayor and ignored the military.

Mercurius Aulicus dealt summarily with the fighting. After two hours,
the town was entered at sword-point, and the soldiers driven back on the
castle. Captain Shuttleworth, Richard Shuttleworth of Gawthorp, MP for
Clitheroe, with some townsmen, was cut off at the castle gate and taken,
although Aulicus erroneously reported that he was killed. Once the town was
taken, Derby laid siege to the castle, and it looked to be only a matter of
time before Holcroft would have to surrender.

A noteworthy Parliamentary account is the tract Lancaster's Massacre, the
title illustrating the message. According to this, the defenders of the
town were forewarned of the coming assault, and sent for help to Bolton and to
Manchester. A relief force, under Ralph Assheton, set off, but turned back
at Garstang. The tract maintained that Assheton believed he had frightened
off the Royalists, whereas, in fact, he seems to have been faced with a mutiny.
Unopposed, Derby surrounded and stormed the town, entering, as Aulicus said,
after two hours hard fighting, during which the defenders saw "two or three
of their colours fall, at once, and bodyes lye on heaps". Forced back into
the castle, the soldiers left the citizenry to the wrath of the earl of Derby,
at least according to the tract. One is tempted to wonder why, if Holcroft
had warning of what was to come, he did not make provision in the castle to
receive the citizens, at least the women and children. He clearly knew that
failure to accede to Derby's summons would very likely lead to the sack of the
town, and if he made no arrangements for the peoples security, Holcroft must
share the blame for whatever atrocities did take place.

Before examining the claims of Lancaster's Massacre, it might be as well
to consider the atrocity theme in propaganda a little more. Most of such
tracts circulated in the relatively 'safe' areas directly under Parliament's
control, that is, London and the home counties primarily, where the war was
known of, where its peripheral activities were seen, but where real fighting
was a story some distance away. To maintain any war, as months slip away into
years, it is necessary to keep the civilian populace as much on the alert, as
the soldiers in the field. Atrocity propaganda, linked with scares concerning
papist hordes unleashed in the north, was an ideal means of doing this. By
implication, it associated the civilians with the soldiers, and with the
civilians living in areas of actual fighting. The maintenance of hatred -
directed not at the King, but at those who 'misled' him, papists and secret Catholics alike as they were ordinarily styled — was the primary objective of compilers of atrocity material. Certainly, they had genuine cases to seize upon, but the most objective survey of the fighting during the civil wars cannot show more than a score of serious cases, and of these, many relate to the butchery of Irish troops and their womenfolk by the Parliamentarians, as at Naseby. A detailed study of propaganda during the civil war period is called for, which would illuminate something we know little enough about.

The Royalists, it was said
entered the town, and killed man, woman, and children, with all barbarous crueltie, dragging poore people from their houses, and cutting their throats with butchers knives...

The author of Achor, who might have been expected to have had something to say to amplify this, in fact reported that only soldiers in arms received no quarter from Royalist troops "raging mad". The real damage was done when Derby fired the town on Monday, March 20th, as will be seen.

Once in the castle, to return to Lancaster's Massacre, the soldiers found themselves short of food and with the well rapidly drunk dry. How Holcroft could have permitted things to get to this state, can only be wondered at. A sudden sally was made into the town to try to collect victuals, which proved successful.

One source, not friendly to the Royalists, noted that when the town was first entered, the earl of Derby, pike in hand, was at the head of his troops.

Derby's attempt to take the castle was, however, thwarted. On the 20th he learned that a strong relief force, under Sir John Seaton, was marching from Preston, and the earl decided more could be gained than by staying to fight with the defenders at his back and Seaton in front. As he later put it to Rupert in a letter:

Having got some advantage (which was the first that I had ever had since these unhappy times) I thought well to slip on to Preston. (41)

Thus, modestly, did the earl refer to a quite startling tactical manœuvre which turned a dangerous predicament into a victory. He displayed the alacrity of mind and of action which had hitherto been wanting in him, and evened the score with Seaton, the professional.

Aulicus concluded its report by stating that before leaving Lancaster, the earl set it on fire, "that it might be no receptacle to the beaten Rebells" which contradicts Lancaster's Massacre. This pinned down the firing of the town to a point between its capture and the start of the siege of the castle. This latter view is supported by Achor, although the fire is here said to have been begun before the town was actually entered, and that it raged unchecked.
during the fighting in the streets. On the whole, the Aulicus report would appear the more credible, since there was small point and considerable inconvenience in firing Lancaster whilst laying siege to the castle. Unless, of course, Lancaster was fired not by the earl, but by the Parliamentarians as they withdrew, which they would certainly not own to having done. The Royalist claim, however, is so definite, that what may have happened was that various isolated fires were started during the fighting, by accident or intent, and that from the various smouldering buildings it was possible for the earl to spread the conflagration again when he needed to. Some 90 houses went up in flames, and after the war £3000 was raised indiscriminately from the estates of Recusants and others believed to have been present when the town was fired, to compensate the citizens. An analysis of the relevant documents suggests that the local committee men were not too particular whom they chose to tarnish with that brush.

The fiasco of Seaton's relief march cannot be explained away, for however it is looked at, the earl's counter-manoeuvre was both unexpected and well executed. Achor complained that Seaton's 2000 "were divided and diverted, walked and breathed to and fro, whilst the Earle fires Lancaster, recovered Preston, and rifled Blackburn". It was a veritable turning of the tables, with the Parliamentarians disorganised, the independence of their men becoming a liability, whilst the Royalist army marched and fought like an efficient, well trained, cohesive whole. This may have had something to do with Viscount Molyneux and his officers, or with Tyldesley, establishing himself as a competent field commander.

Seaton's account of events is extremely long, but repays careful examination. It begins with a significant exculpatory passage:

Preston is lost again to us & that by the cowardice of the sogiors & by the malignants wthin the towne who declared themselves enemies so soon as the enemies forces assaulted, & shot upon or garde wthin the towne from the windowes, wch was a cheef cause they were beat from there postes. I enjoyed Preston & Lancaster a month peaceablie

During this month's tenure, Seaton had been laying plans for the capture of Warrington and had also been distracted by the business of the Spanish ship. Reports came to him, prior to the earl's attack on Lancaster, that Sir John Gerlington and Thomas Tyldesley were recruiting in the Fylde to make an attack on that place. Seaton also noted that some forces from Yorkshire appeared to assist in that assault, which, although not supported by other evidence and contrary to observed tendencies, may nonetheless have been true. Perhaps a contingent from Skipton garrison. At any rate, the numbers must have been small, and no Royalist account mentions them.

Just about this time the sogiors of Preston rose up in a mutine, about a 100 mad men wth polaxes & they socht to
have my heart blood, why forsuth, I had given a sogior a
knok or 2 for shooteng off his peece between 6 and 7 at
nicht after the watch was sett...

Apart from illustrating Seaton's rough and ready manner with his men, this
remark explains the failure of Ralph Assheton to intercept the earl as he
moved on Lancaster. The claim of Lancaster's Massacre that Asshaton believed
he had caused Derby to retreat, has to be dismissed. The situation in the
Parliamentary forces was serious:

by Gode mercie I had past threw a howse neere to the gard
& so went throw barns & stables to see some feeld to make
a work upon, presentlie these furious sogiors followed me
& socht me in that howse but found me not, watched my
lodging wth a gard all nicht to catch me if I should go
home, Comanded the gards at every avenu not to let me out
of Towne, so yt I was forced to ly out of my howse that
nicht, and the next morning was faine to leepe ditches &
hedges to get to Lancaster.

Seaton arrived there to find eight companies of infantry setting the guns from
the Spanish ship into position whilst officials from Manchester and Bolton,
and some from Preston, argued about equal shares of the ordnance. The
Royalist muster, however, becoming daily more threatening, obliged Seaton to
go back to Preston, where, in his absence, Colonel Shuttleworth had appeased
the mutineers.

I sent for all the troopes I could have from Blakborne &
Bolton, & had comanded Colonell Holland wth his regement
from Manchester to set upon Warinton, I got 12 Companies
of foote togither, but haveng received a greate falle
from my horse yt nicht I came from Lancr I could not stir
out of my bed...

He therefore ordered Assheton with nine companies of infantry to set off to
intercept the Royalists or to "assault the enemie in the reare". The troops
which Assheton took had only recently been in a mutinous state, and when the
strength of the earl's army was discovered, Assheton either would not, or could
not, lead his men into action. Instead, he sent word to Seaton that if he
were to seek battle, and lose, the entire county would be lost, and before
Seaton's order to remain where he was, at Garstang, was received, Assheton
had started to retreat to Preston. This was observed by Royalist scouts.

Seaton took to his horse at once "sore as I wes" with a few cavalry and
over 1000 infantry, leaving Preston in the care of about 1000 men, of which
half were local irregulars, all commanded by Colonel Holland, and headed for
Lancaster. Approaching the Royalist army, the earl of Derby was seen to at
once retire "to attempt against Preston wch they carried malureuslie". When
Seaton, out-manouevred, endeavoured to march after the earl, his soldiers
refused to move, claiming they were too wearied after a march of 20 miles.

Coll. Stanlies 3 comp® who were into /-the castle-7 caused beat
there drums in spyt of my teeth, & when I caused schut the
gates, they swore they wold fyre the Canons & the castle & be
gon, so yt I was faine to cause set open the gates, none of

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Coll. Schutleworth regent wold stay, so yt I was in a greater perplexitie then ever.

Some of Holland's captains told Seaton they would stay with him at Lancaster, but would not go with him to Preston. With the news that Preston had been taken by assault, Lancaster castle was evacuated, the soldiery dispersed, a few going with Seaton towards Clitheroe and so on to Manchester. Even there, the Scotsman was not out of trouble:

scarslie dare I come to the strete for feare of killing of me, Wee are presentlie to go to the feelds to seake the enemie, & ether fecht with then or attempt some Towne, But yet I am in als bad a Case as before the sogiors say they will kill me because I gave them not the plundrage & Papists goods, of Preston wch I never meddled with.

This appalling picture of indiscipline, mutiny and want of resolution has no equal in the annals of either side during the war in the north. The hitherto successful Parliamentary army had practically disintegrated at the peak of its triumphs. Seaton, the professional and an outsider, could neither control his men by normal military discipline, nor inspire in them any sense of loyalty. It might be argued, with some justification, that this situation assisted the Royalist army considerably, but it is unlikely that the earl of Derby knew of, or took into account, Seaton's predicament when making his own plans, and it would be altogether too easy to detract from the earl's success, as many have done, by suggesting that he could not have been otherwise than successful at such a time. All other considerations aside, the flank march to Preston was rapidly and brilliantly conceived and prosecuted. It hurt Seaton the more, because of his own impotence.

The point has already been made that, for both sides, the civil war was one of improvisation. Enthusiastic amateur soldiers cannot fulfill the roles of professionals, nor can professional officers ever achieve much with men whose degree of devotion to duty must ever be commensurate with the degree of success or failure. Oliver Cromwell perceived this in 1642 and, in a sense, the New Model Army was an answer to this problem. The Seaton episode most graphically illustrates the point, as well as explaining the sudden Parliamentary collapse in March 1643.

Mercurius Aulicus justifiably made much of the taking of Preston. At Seaton's approach to Lancaster, the earl of Derby drew up some of his army as if intending battle, which must have caused Seaton to hesitate:

and in the meane time, whilst they expected to be charged, sent a considerable body towards Preston, being thus left destitute...

Aulicus did the enemy too much justice. By Seaton's own admission, we know that the garrison of Preston was reasonably strong. In the storm, over 80 of the defenders were killed, including a captain, and some 3 to 400 were captured, with a cannon.
Lancaster's Massacre explained the success as a consequence of the town being poorly defended, and accused Derby of falling upon it rather than face Seaton in the field.

Leaving Seaton in "pplexitie" behind him, the earl marched towards Preston by way of Ellel, adopting a low profile to avoid giving advance warning to the town. When he was eventually spotted, panic gripped the defenders. A summons was sent to the mayor, a Parliamentarian nominee who had replaced the dead Adam Mort. It was refused.

the earl gave orders to assault the works in three places by Captains Edward Chisenall, Molyneux Radcliff and Edward Rawsthorne. Captain Chisenall entered first, and being supported by the reserve, the town, after about an hours fight, was subdued, and about six hundred of the enemy killed; and the rest made prisoners, except some who escaped by way of the river, which was fordable. (47)

Captain Edward Chisenall of Chisenall, later to achieve justifiable fame as a defender of Lathom House, was to become a colonel. Captain Molyneux Radcliff remains unidentified, and was later killed in the defence of Lathom after several courageous actions. Edward Rawsthorne or Rostern of Newhall in Tottington was promoted to the colonelcy of a regiment of horse by Rupert in 1644, and to be governor of Lathom.

The earl remained four or five days in Preston, whilst some of his army marched out and took Blackburn without a shot. To return to Aulicus, after the said Towne was taken, his Lordship had especial care to preserve the place, and only gave command that the houses of those who had betrayed the Towne before should be responsall to his Majestie for their Masters treason, whose goods his Lordship ordered to be seized and equally divided among the soldiers. That the next morning, being March 22, the whole country came in with apparent joy... flinging up their hats, and shouting out, God bless the King, and the Earle of Derby. And finally, to make up the summe, it was advertized also in the same Express, that the Same day Sergeant Major Brewyer, who commanded his Lordships regiment of horse, did with a troope of his defeat two troops of dragoones, being 140 in the toall...taking the Captaine himself prisoner, together with 40 of his soldiers, and having killed no less than 50 in the very place...

All of this rings true. That the earl should have avoided plunder would fit with the undoubted predominance of Royalist sympathy in Preston, the chief town of Amounderness Hundred, itself a notable Royalist recruiting area. The relief of the populace at Derby's re-appearance must have been great, since the excesses of the Parliamentary soldiery during their stay in Preston are hinted at by Seaton in his complaint that he had been accused of endeavouring to prevent the plunder of Catholic houses, when he had done no such thing.

The defeat of the two troops of dragoons by Brewer ought also to be accepted. The state of the Parliamentary army was such, that they could well
have gone to pieces when attacked by a confident enemy. Brewer was probably Thomas Brewer of Lighthousworkhouse, a Recusant (see Vol. 2).

The earl did not simply stop at Preston to congratulate himself. The success had created a momentum that had to be carried on, and it seems that an attack on Manchester, now an important garrison town for the Parliament, was planned. In view of the Parliamentary condition, and since one full regiment at least, that of Colonel Holland, had been drawn away from the town to supplement Seaton, this attack might have met with the success denied earlier. At this critical moment, the earl was thwarted by those external factors which constantly plagued him. Orders came to Viscount Molyneux from Oxford, to return to the King with his regiment and the rest of his recruits.

Yet this alone was not the sole cause of the loss of the initiative by the Royalists. Instead of turning directly against Manchester, the earl let himself be drawn into an attack on Bolton, a lesser target. Molyneux was still with him at this time, and the assault took place on March 28th. Aulicus gave Molyneux premature credit for having taken the town.

The single best source for the events of the attack is in the Valley of Achor. Bolton was apparently strongly garrisoned, and there was a relief party at Bury. The Royalists appeared before the town at about three o'clock in the afternoon, forming into battle order within range of the garrison ordnance:

> our Cannoneer drew his Cannon into a Croft on the backside of the Towne, and at the second shot killed two horses neare a mile off.

The town was summoned, and returned a refusal. The defenders went to prayer, and at sunset they had a furious assault. The enemy came on desperately even to hand blows, and some of them leaped upon the Works, where they found Club-law. The enemy retreated, and left ten men dead.

A lull ensued, during which the Bury relief column entered the town to add to the garrison. A second assault struck the south end of the town, the Royalists creeping in close to the mud walls under cover of the darkness. An attempt was to be made to fire some houses, but the light of the kindled fires, according to Achor, illuminating the attackers in their vulnerable position, caused them to draw off suddenly. A third assault at the west was hotly received, and eventually the Royalists drew away, leaving "upon the ground at this assault three and twenty men". These 23 dead were all tumbled into one common pit on the following day. When the sun rose, the Royalists had gone, their attempt finished; they had also, in a few brief hours, lost the impetus gained at Preston.
It is unlikely that the earl of Derby was present at Bolton, the conduct of the attack probably resting with Viscount Molyneux. The earl was certainly at Lathom shortly afterwards, regrouping, and the way was now open for a Parliamentary counter-offensive. Their objective was to be Wigan.

The author of Achor fancied that the loss of Wigan, attacked on April 1st, was a sore blow to the earl, but it need not have been so. Another tract, Manchester Joy for Derbies Overthrow estimated that there were fully 1400 Royalists within the town, in arms, which was "the only place of receipt for papists goods and treasure of papists". The commander there was a compatriot of Seaton, a Major General Blair, sent up from Oxford by the King to assist the earl. To enhance the achievement of his own side, the author of Achor described Wigan as 'impregnable':

> the Enemies pride and presumption, our fear and despair; of which we sometimes said, it was not possible to take it by assault, or not without much blood. (55)

Although far from impregnable, Wigan, like Preston before it, put up a fierce defence when the day was clearly lost. A cursory reading of Manchester's Joy with its exuberant list of 800 prisoners and 1000 arms, and 500 others fled away, does no justice to this. The two sources of most importance are Achor and the narrative of the German engineer Rosworm. He, though it was not in his contract, being asked to take a command in the assault, consented to do so. By his own account, it was as well for them that he did.

The town was rapidly entered, within an hour, whereupon some 500 of the attackers were sent away to Bolton to boost the garrison there. A party of Royalists, however, at the moment that the town had been entered, fell back on the church with its tall steeple, previously made ready for a last ditch stand, and from this vantage point "killed...more men, after the taking of the Town, than we had lost in the whole assault before". The Parliamentarians fell to exchanging shots with the church, and in the midst of this new siege, a party of Royalist cavalry appeared outside the town.

> I went speedily with some few horse to view the state they stood in. I found them only three slender troops of Horse, who observing us to present a resolute face towards them, they instantly tried their heels, and gave us language enough in their disorder, to tell us we need not trouble ourselves with such Enemies.

Returning to the church, Rosworm found Colonel Holland in a "shaking agony of fear", due partly to his experience at Preston and partly, one suspects, to a not unreasonable suspicion that the "three slender troops" might be the advance guard of a larger body. He was determined to retreat from Wigan with his 2000 foot and 300 horse whilst there was still time, and refused Rosworm's request that he leave him 500 musketeers to finish the business at the church.

His answer was, Stay, that stay would, he nor any of his men
either would or should stay. I could also have torn my flesh at this answer; yet suppressing my passion, with deep intreaties, and repeated persuasions, he was at length wrought so farre, as to promise a stay till I had forced those who had possessed the advantage of the Church steeple wholly to surrender...

Either that, or he would blow the church up. Rosworm summoned them to yield, "but in vain", until he began to prepare explosives, whereupon the entire garrison of 86 men filed out.

This did not prevent Holland, however, from fleeing immediately, leaving behind all the prisoners, two cannon and whatever else was worth the taking, but remembering to carry along "the very utensils and plate belonging to the communion-table".

What, precisely, Derby was doing between the failure at Bolton and the loss of Wigan, is hard to say. From Lathom, he appears to have marched to Warrington, proposing from there to move against Manchester. This, at least, is how Mercurius Aulicus noted events. On April 3rd, not far from Warrington, he fought the battle of Stockton Heath with a combined body of Cheshire and Manchester men. Aulicus supplies the best account, indeed, virtually the only one extant.

The Cheshire commander was the hitherto victorious Sir William Brereton, who had apparently crossed into Lancashire to assist in the defence of Manchester, and to intercept the Royalist army if he could. Not far from Warrington, he succeeded in his intent, but "being well beaten at the first onset...had no minde to go away till he had perfected the earles victorie and his owne overthrow". Joined by Manchester men, Brereton came once more into the field:

to play double or quits. Which being perceived by the Earle of Derbie, hee purposely held off from accepting the battaile till the duke of the evening, and then sent some of his owne men under Brereton's colours to make towards them...

The colours had been captured in the first skirmishing. Such a ploy must have occasioned the sour observation in Manchesters Joy:

the said Earle had no greate cause to boast of his great victories, for had he not prevailed by his treacherous designs more then by his martaill attempts?

Treacherous or not, the manouevre worked

The Royalistes being taken and indeed mistaken for their owne party, were suffered to joyn with them or come very neare them upon the one side; and then the Earle charging very hotly upon the other, they made a great impression on both sides, and having thus caught them in a trapp, defeated them with greater slaughter and little labour.

Brereton and the Manchester men made their get away as best they could, to rally elsewhere. At this juncture, additional enemy troop movements in Cheshire were reported to the earl. A few companies of foot under a Captain Ardern were marching towards Warrington:
the Earle p'ceyvinge their strength but smale, & neither
Colonell Brereton nor Manchester men come upp, yssued
furthe wth greate forces over the Bridge into Cheshire
where the said Captain Arderne...and Soldyrs were. The
said Earle settinge upon them wth his forces slave some
of them, & tooke other some of them p'ersoners, and had
byn likelie to have slayne & Rowted them all, had not
Colonell Brereton wth Manchester forces come Just to theire
Ayde. (60)

Beaten as he was, Brereton had prevented the march against Manchester, and
Derby was now cornered in Warrington. The Parliamentarians wasted little time
in attempting a storm.

Manchesters Joy describes Warrington as a "town of great strength", and
it certainly had the usual complement of mud walls about it, whilst to the
south the Mersey made a natural hazard to attackers, across which they must
come by the bridge.

There was initially some success, as Manchesters Joy makes clear:

The Manchesterians...gave a suddaine a valiant onset
against the town, which put the said earl and his forces
to such a non-plus, that maugre their resistance they were
forced into the Church, to secure themselves, where
without all question the said Earl is surprised or slain...

If Manchester's joy depended upon that news, it was short-lived. The Church
was defended by Derby and his men with "Manhood and great valour". The enemy
incursion, forced through defences on the bridge, had been the prime cause of
the retreat into the church, but not before the earl had fired part of the
town to hinder the attackers. Having secured the bridge

& a fayre house of one Mr. Bridgmans, & some of theire owne
works, /the attackers/ had wthin a smale tyme wonne the
Towne; wch the Earl p'ceyvinge did sett the midle of the
Towne on ffyre; p'testing hee wold burne the whole Towne
before Brereton shold have ytt. See that the fyer
encreasinge and they p'ceyvinge his Crueltie, to save the
Towne from utter desolacion, Colonell Brereton Reased the
seige & withdrew his forces away, after they had lyen
agaynst ytt three dayes. (62)

The concluding remark of this particular writer demonstrates that Brereton,
far from being motivated by compassion for what was a decidedly Royalist town,
simply could not capture it. Even forced into and around the church, the
Royalists maintained a vigorous defence that must have been costing Brereton
dearly in men and time. The attempt on Warrington had been repulsed with
success.

On the same day as this assault, that is, on April 5th, Nicholas Byron
wrote to Lord Capel, the Royalist commander in North Wales, urging him to
make some display of force to distract the Cheshire men. Capel wrote on
the 6th "Lord Darby and his Majesty's servants in Lancashire have preserved
their lands beyond expectation". This must be taken as an allusion to the
manpower problems which the earl had been coerced into accepting. It was
as Derby himself had complained to Rupert on March 22nd, flush with his taking of Preston,

> you know my plaints of old for arms from my Lord Newcastle...
> if it had pleased God and the King that I had but 1500 men armed, or arms for so many, I could have done some service worth the knowing... (64)

The earl's forces were now widely dispersed about the countryside. He had reoccupied Wigan, he had a garrison in Preston and, presumably, in Blackburn. Warrington would need extensive refortification and an increase in the military presence there. Lathom was garrisoned. From Cheshire, he had for the first time come under pressure, whilst he had so far failed to carry the war into the Parliamentarian heartland around Manchester. By the end of April, he would be everywhere on the defensive, his lines of communication threatened, his extended forces cut off and dealt with piecemeal. He had certainly achieved things "beyond expectation" but he had, for reasons already referred to, not achieved enough, and much would now depend upon a single trial of strength. On April 20th, the long postponed battle was fought.

The battle of Whalley saw the last array of the leading Lancashire Royalist commanders, at least until 1648. Derby himself, Viscount Molyneux, colonels Sir Gilbert Houghton and Thomas Tyldesley are all mentioned by one tract. In view of the size of the Royalist army, which mustered at Preston, most of the county colonels and commissioners must have been present. A True Relation estimated their strength at 11 troops of horse, 700 infantry and nearly 4000 irregulars, or "club men" as the tract called them. The Valley of Achor gave them as 2000 strong, which number would fit the regular troops without the additional clubmen. Predictably, Achor gave the Parliamentarians as a mere 400 men, chiefly "firemen" or musketeers.

That Molyneux should still have been present is a puzzle. He had been ordered to return to Oxford, but it may be that no urgency lay in the order, or, that he had been ordered rather to attend upon the movements of the Queen then at York. Alternatively, in view of the gravity of the situation in Lancashire, it may be that Molyneux had elected to remain to give what help he could, and was postponing his departure.

On April 19th the Royalists marched from Preston to Ribchester. An advance party of Parliamentary horse, at Dunkenhallgh Hall, sighting them, retired on Padiham, sending messengers far and wide to raise the local levies. Derby's actual intention is unclear - it was merely reported that he was planning a raid into the Blackburn area, which must have meant a punitive expedition, since Blackburn was then still in Royalist hands. To follow A True Relation, the initial rally of the Parliamentary army mustered no more than 500 men, "at the first", whilst the Royalist army proceeded toward Whalley Abbey.
The Parliamentary horse followed in the wake of the Royalist army, and outside Whalley captured the servant of an enemy officer. This, giving the alarm to the Royalists, caused a retreat back on Padiham, whilst some 150 horse out of Whalley, in their turn, followed the retreating Parliamentarians. The latter halted at Read-bank, where they were reinforced by their foot, and where the early fighting was to take place.

Read Hall was the residence of the Nowell family, almost entirely Royalist with two or more serving officers.

Maister Tildsley was one of the foremost & having gotten the top of the hill, he enquired of a woman that dwelt in a little house by, where he was and how that place was calde. Sir said she you are at Read-heughe, above the house of Mr. Nowell of Read. I am the more sorry said he; I would not have his wife disquieted (Mr. Nowell was a strong Malignant)". (69)

A True Relation states that the Parliamentarian musketeers formed up behind low stone walls to await the Royalist cavalry, evidently commanded by Tyldesley. They must also have had some cover from thick woodland in the battlefield was then as it now is, and the road toward Read Hall extremely vulnerable to ambush. A Parliamentary officer acted as decoy, to lure the Royalist horse nearer to the walls, and at an appropriate time discharged his pistol as a sign that the musketeers should give fire. The Royalist party broke up in disorder, dead and wounded men falling in confusion on the narrow road, the remainder fleeing back towards Whalley. Some 40 prisoners fell into enemy hands. Victorious, the musketeers descended the slope from their walls, passed over Sabden Brook where the carnage had taken place, and set off in pursuit.

At Whalley, the earl of Derby had gone into the abbey with his commanders, with their ordnance drawn up before it, but apparently not expecting an attack. Tyldesley and his fugitives came there only a little while before the enemy appeared, and whilst some kind of defensive battle order was organized, the cannon were used to keep the enemy at bay. The Parliamentarian foot took cover in hedgerows, from which they shot upon the Royalists as the earl tried to form his men into some order. The surprise and steady fire of the Parliamentary musketeers broke the Royalist foot, who scattered at the first contact, but the cavalry stood their ground. The enemy advanced as far as Lango Green, where they clashed with the cavalry at a little distance, exchanging shots. The appearance of the enemy cavalry at a crucial moment caused the Royalist horse, in their turn, to break and to scatter, being pursued back to Ribchester.

And most of their great ones had some touch, or some narrow escape, as themselves report. And having thus driven them out...we retreated to Padiham, where having a good Minister, some hours were spent in thanksgiving for this great deliverance, and be assured it is to be taken (next the first bout at Manchester) the greatest deliverance we have had...
Derby himself made his way to Penwortham, at the start of what looks like a fugitive’s journey from there to Preston, to Wigan, to Lathom, and then, by way of Kirkham, Hornby Castle, through north Lancashire into Furness over the next month or so. At some stage he visited the Queen at York to seek some assistance. His losses in men cannot have been that heavy, at least in terms of those killed, but he may have been short of officers: “an emenent Captaine of much respect with [The earl]... his name was Coney was shot in the one of his eyes whereof he died afterwards”. Much more disastrous was the impact of the rout on Royalist morale, from which the earl was never able to recover. On such brief contests can the course of a war turn.

With the earl in disarray, the Parliament returned to the business of Wigan, which fell to them on or around May 6th. Broxap suggests that it was captured on April 22nd or 23rd, but that suggestion is a misreading of one source. The most likely date of May 6th, possibly a trifle late, depends on three sources. The second of these, Vicars, seems to be the most reliable in details, and may have been culled from a source now lost.

The...Manchesterians under the command of Collonel Ashton, with about 22 hundred horse and foot, marched towards Wiggon where Collonel Tilsley commanded for the Earl of Derbie with nine troops of horse and 700 foot. But when...Collonel Ashton appeared before the town, the enemies were immediately smitten with astonishment of heart, durst not stand to it, but fled away from thence to Lathom, leaving Wiggon to their possession.

The captors demolished all the mud walls and the new gates and posts set up since Rosworm’s visit, and took an oath from the inhabitants never to bear arms again for the earl.

Vicars states that the earl was at Lathom when Wigan fell. Achor gave the date for the start of the Parliamentarian march as April 28th. Tyldesley, with demoralised forces, had no chance of making good the town, and Ralph Assheton simply walked into it, and Tyldesley headed for Lathom.

From this point, until the dated capture of Warrington on May 28th, the chronology of events is hard to determine. The sources are mixed, slim and lacking in vital linking information from which to be precisely sure of all developments. It must be borne in mind in trying to interpret events, that the Royalist army had suddenly disintegrated, all command apparently shifting to Lord Molyneux, Tyldesley and probably Gerlington. Derby and Sir Gilbert Houghton virtually disappeared from the military scene, although on Derby’s part this was occasioned by his attempt, at York, to secure military aid from the Queen which, but for a fatal mischance in Yorkshire, would have been forthcoming.

The lengthiest account of what followed the defeat at Wigan is that in Achor, although here again, as has been suggested, certain factors are missing.
Wigan fell in the course of a Parliamentary campaign aimed at Lancaster. From Wigan, they marched on to Prescot where, according to Vicars, Derby and Tylodesley had gone from Lathom, only to return to the latter place, plagued by indecision. The Parliamentarians marched to Ormskirk "where we marred an intended muster". It must be the same incident as that given in A Discourse of the Warr, where some Parliamentarian scouts, pushing too hard on the rear of Molyneux and Tylodesley's cavalry, were killed, although the Royalist horse moved on to Kirkham, to quarter temporarily.

Preston was next recovered, and not in mid-April as the Discourse claimed, without a shot being fired. Blackburn, too, must have yielded at this time. Rumour of a Royalist reaction caused the Parliamentary forces to move hurriedly on to Lancaster, although the rumour may have been connected with Derby's journey to York, the exact date for which is not known. Siege forces now lay about the Royalist garrisons of Thurland and Hornby castles, and after sojourning some days around Lancaster, the main enemy body returned into the southern part of the county.

Before going on with Achor into June, it is worth stopping to take stock of the situation at the end of May, and to see what other evidences there are for this month. Clearly, the Royalists by the end of the month were in a disastrously bad position, having lost in one sweep Wigan, Preston and Blackburn and, on the 28th, Warrington as well. Lathom, Thurland, Hornby and Greenhalgh were the only garrisons, whilst what was left of the army perambulated about the less populous parts of the county, winning token victories but never able to regroup into a formidable force again.

From Lathom, a letter dated April 30th had been sent to the Queen at York, but had been intercepted by Parliamentary troops. The letter bluntly stated that unless assistance in the form of 3000 horse and foot came to the earl of Derby within a week, then he must abandon the county entirely. This letter was signed, not by Derby interestingly, but by some Scottish nobles who had paused at Lathom en route for Scotland, which journey they had eventually to complete by sea.

As for what was left of the field army, its actions can be noted, but the dating becomes even harder to determine. In early May, having evacuated Ormskirk, Molyneux and Tylodesley were at Kirkham and at Clifton. At some point, Tylodesley left for York, perhaps with Derby, although we cannot be sure just when the earl made his journey, all of the sources being frustrating in their vagueness. Some at least of the fighting that follows, may have taken place in June, most of it probably at the tail end of May, but that is as much as can be said with any certainty. Parliamentarian pressure built up again from the direction of Preston, forcing Molyneux to leave the Fylde and to go to Hornby Castle, whither Ralph Assheton followed him. Going on
into Kirby Lonsdale, Molyneux seems to have turned at bay, for Assheton, not wishing to over-reach himself, fell back on Preston, pausing on the way to go plundering in Cartmel.

Molyneux was certainly reinforced at this point for when next we hear of him, he had 1000 horse and 500 foot at his disposal, brought in by Colonel Sir George Middleton and Colonel Sir John Gerlington. With these, he marched into Cartmel and Ulverston (following Assheton?), and Mercurius Aulicus picked up the news:

the Lord Molineux, to whom the Earle of Derby had committed the command of his Army, had reduced all of the Marish parts of Lancashire, being the part thereof which lyeth towards the sea. (83)

But Molyneux had had enough. After beating up a Parliamentary quarter at Chorley, he rode to Lathom and so, by Hale Ford, into Cheshire. He was not to return to his native county again until the summer of 1644, when Prince Rupert re-lit the fire of Lancashire Royalism.

By the start of June, the last blow had been struck at the earl of Derby with the fall of Warrington, after a brief siege. The Royalist governor was one of the earl’s former infantry captains, Edward Norris of Speke, of a Recusant family. He had been appointed to the post in December 1642, and may then have been promoted to Major. On May 14th, in daily expectation of an attack, he had summoned all the levies he could raise, into the town:

\[\text{To the Constables of Hulme and Winwick, and all other constables within the parish of Winwick...this day I have received intelligence by 3 several messengers that the enemy intends very speedily to assault us.} \text{ (86)}\]

Norris required all able-bodied men to be with him on the 15th, but the order, passed from constable to constable and duly signed by them all, was still being circulated after darkness had fallen on that day.

The town was very strongly fortified, the local inhabitants having “brought thither a great part of their goods, plate &c”. It was reported that the papists and those that adhere to them, betook themselves to a town called Warrington, and another town called Whitchurch, which places were both very strongly fortified both with Men, Ammunition, Powder and Ordnance. (88)

The Parliamentarian forces appeared on May 19th, and at an early parley Thomas Tyldesley (it is not clear that he was actually one of the defenders) endeavoured to secure terms permitting the garrison to march away with their weapons. He was refused. The 1600 strong garrison lost 80 men killed in the fighting which followed over a full five days siege, an indication of the fierce resistance which Norris put up. The enemy losses are not known, but must have been proportionately higher. That the town did eventually fall, Colonel Edward Chisenall, supposed author of the journal of the siege of Lathom attributed partly to the defeat sustained at the same time at
Wakefield in Yorkshire by George Goring, who was expected to march into Lancashire in response to Derby’s request for aid.

Against the town the Parliamentarians brought six guns, but they had to fight every inch of the way, taking first one area, and then another. A tract entitled *Exceeding Joyful Newes* contains the most detailed, if fragmentary, account, whilst the verbose author of *Achor* noted that the fall of the town proper on the 28th was preceded by the loss of the church on the 26th.

*Exceeding Joyful News* has it, that Norris evacuated the church on the 26th in order, probably, to form a more defensible line in a smaller area of the town. The Parliamentarians, for a time, did not realise that the defenders had shifted, which gave Norris the lull that he needed. We do not know the exact instructions Norris had received, but they cannot have been to hold the town at all costs, otherwise Tyldesley would not have tried to negotiate terms before the siege had really begun. We must suppose that Norris fought on his own initiative, perhaps inspired to desperate measures by the memory of the sack of Preston. Whilst there are many instances in the civil wars, of fortified points such as castles and houses, being defended to the last ounce of powder, cases of towns resisting fiercely after entry are few and far between. Particularly so, where the governor, as Norris did, seems to have adopted a deliberate policy of contesting control street by street. When the Parliamentary forces warily scaled the works, and began to infiltrate the streets and alleyways, they came upon and occupied the empty church. Norris may not have foreseen the consequences of abandoning that building without firing it, for it dominated the town, and the enemy lost no time in shifting cannon onto the roof.

Norris now offered a parley to discuss terms, but Colonel Ralph Assheton had the scent of outright victory in his nostrils and was not to be robbed of it. Norris offered to resist, but in the first attack, backed by the guns at the church, the Royalists were broken and scattered through the town, some 300 falling prisoners to Assheton.

The fall of Warrington marked the end of Royalist military resistance in Lancashire, except for a few garrisons restricted to their castles and the vicinities thereof. The little army which Derby had worked so hard to raise and to keep in the field was finished, its best regiments drawn away to serve elsewhere, its colonels and field officers bereft of men. The business which had begun so half-heartedly months before on Preston Moor had come to an abrupt end, beaten by a determined enemy and, more, by factors beyond the earl’s control. It had had its high moment of success – the out-maneuvering of Seaton and the storm of Preston – and its moments of tragedy, as in the storm of Preston in February where Adam Mort and the Royalist officers held out to the last. It is unfashionable to discover heroes when writing history, but
the study of military history throws them up time and again and they are not to be ignored. Adam Mort and his fellows had had a choice, the more so in that most of them held no military rank, and in the balance, opted for self sacrifice. No cause is worth anything, Royalist or Parliamentarian, unless men die for it, and it may be that Mort's sacrifice would have been more worthwhile had Derby's army not been, as it was, the forgotten army of the Royalist war machine. It had never taken the war into the enemy camp after October 1642, it had fought constantly in its own recruiting areas, and it had had to rely on irregulars to boost its strength at critical moments. When it went down, Lancashire and its ports were swallowed up by the committee men who had sat all along at Manchester.

Nothing, now, lay between the Parliament's men at this point in their career, and the hitherto quiet counties of Cumberland and Westmorland. The Royalists there, however, or at least, the genuine Royalists, did not shirk their duty.

Shortly after Warrington fell, forces that can only have come from Cumbria, lay siege to Lancaster castle. According to the Valley of Achor, a march towards the encircled castle from a point somewhere to the south forced these Royalists to lift the siege, putting some additional men into Hornby and Thurland: "the rest of the Forces marching into Westmorland and thence into Yorkshire, to joyn with the Queen of Armies". The Lancaster relief column turned against these two garrisons, and "the attempt upon one, was blessed to win both". Three companies of foot were sent to keep watch on Hornby, who clashed with a body of cavalry and musketeers lying in ambush. The Royalists had the worst of it and drew off, but one of them, taken prisoner, voluntarily or involuntarily, told the Parliamentary commanders of a weak place in the walls, "a great Window at the end of the Hall" and offered to lead a force to it:

The Companies drawn out for this Designe, accomodated with scaling ladders, great Hammers, Ropes, Mattocks, and some combustible matter for the Gates, were appointed to play upon that side towards the Gates, to draw them from that side, where the rest were to force their entrance. After enduring a hail of iron and stones from the castle, the main attack reached the gates and set fire to them, whilst the men at the window endeavoured to force their way in. This was enough for the garrison, and a parley was offered, with the castle surrendering upon promise of quarter. The following day, Thurland castle also surrendered without a shot being fired, but upon "unkept conditions". That is to say, it was reoccupied much later in the year, probably at the instance of Sir John Gerlington, whose property and home it was.

The earl of Derby stayed neither at York nor in Lancashire, but at the end of June took ship to the Isle of Man. His departure can be seen as a form
of honourable exile, the recompense of the King and his advisors for a military failure that was not Derby's responsibility alone. There was, however, some reason for his presence on what was, after all, his family's province. Fear of a Scottish invasion on Parliament's behalf was rife, and the King sent word to the Queen at York, that he had heard reports of a dangerous confederacy on the island which was likely to make it a stopping off point for any invading force. A former retainer of the duke of Buckingham, Edward Christian, a native Manx man, was taking advantage of the earl's preoccupation with Lancashire to foment unrest. In early July, the earl arrived and called a meeting of the Tynwald at which the unrest was looked into and pacified. John Greenhalgh of Brandlesome was appointed Governor of the Isle, and he divided the island into four sections each under a major with military control. Between the earl and Greenhalgh, both of whom died in 1651, Greenhalgh on Worcester field, the Isle of Man remained from July 1643 until the year of Worcester, the only continuously occupied Royalist enclave in the British Isles, a place of refuge more than once for hard pressed King's men. It was the only enduring service that Derby did for his cause, and its effectiveness perished with him.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE:

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 123
8. Ibid., p. 63, The latest printed News from Chichester, Windsor, Winchester, Chester, Manchester and York.
12. T.T. E 89 (22) A perfect Relation of the Taking of the Towne of Preston.
13. Ibid.
14. T.T. 669 f. 6 (105) A true relation of the Taking of the Town of Preston...
16. Ibid.
23. T.T. E 91 (1).
24. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, pp. 76/8 q. First Assault on Bolton ie Mores by Lord Derby's Wigan Forces...
29. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, p. 89.
32. M.A., 28.3.43, p. 159.
33. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 28.
34. Stanley Papers, II, p. 83.
35. Anon, Memorable Sieges and Battles, p. 120.
36. M.A., 24.3.43, p. 150.
38. Ibid., pp. 130/2.
42. Broxap, Civil War in Lancashire, p. 29.
45. M.A., 24.3.43, p. 150.
CHAPTER FOUR

Newcastle's Campaigns
March to July 1643

With the safe arrival of the Queen at the earl of Newcastle's headquarters in York, began that series of campaigns and engagements which were to lead to a promising Royalist military position at the end of the summer. The earl's commitment to safeguarding the Queen's person was now less of a distraction: there was now no need for any to fear that he would have to leave Yorkshire for the far north, as had been a possibility when he first arrived in December. How far this obligation had imposed a limit upon an aggressive policy is hard to say, though it must have been an important factor in determining the development of tactical decisions.

Away in Scarborough Sir Hugh Cholmeley, the successful Parliamentarian governor, was wavering in his loyalty to that cause. His last service was performed at Thornton, near Pocklington, sometime between the 10th and 12th of March. Royalist forces, pushing towards Scarborough, had occupied Pickering, and a party had ridden to Thornton where they apparently pillaged a house belonging to Sir John Hotham. As Hotham told Lenthall in a letter on the 17th:

> divers Papists...made suit to pillage a little house and \( \frac{7}{7} \) of mine, which accordingly they did and took away all my breed of horses and \( \frac{7}{7} \) that I had there, but in their return Sir Hugh Cholmeley with his troop of horse and dragoons charged them very gallantly, broke their horse all to pieces, killed divers, took prisoners... (1)

These prisoners included a major, a captain and two cornets, with one colour. Evidently, on the 17th Hotham had no inkling of Cholmeley's intentions, and the first semi-official contact between the Scarborough garrison and the Royalist commanders may have occurred when Sir Francis Mackworth, reinforcing Pickering, entered into negotiations with Cholmeley for the release of the prisoners taken at Thornton.

For Cholmeley's return to his allegiance, there is his own account which can be supplemented by a Parliamentarian view, A true and exact Relation of all the proceedings of Sir Hugh Cholmeley's Revolt. The actual declaration came on March 26th, and prompted Sir John Hotham to observe in a letter to Newcastle that Scarborough was

> an old Castle which will cost you more keeping than it is worth, his Captaine and souldiers are all here and have left him naked... (7)

Scarborough castle was privately owned at the time that Cholmeley first went into it in 1642 when falling back before the approach of Newcastle's army. The owner, Stephen Thompson, a Scarborough merchant, had enjoyed a yearly
income from the property of £49.10.0d., and Cholmeley had apparently offered to purchase it outright on Parliament's behalf for £300, or to rent it for so long as was necessary, at £50 yearly. Thompson, in his composition petitions, complained that he had never received any of this, intimating that this was due to Cholmeley's desertion of the Parliament although the Parliament was still obligated. He does not seem to have got anywhere with his claim for arrears, despite his protestation that he had "ever bin very active for the Parliamte". Thompson, in fact, went into the castle when Cholmeley turned it over to the King, and remained inside until July 1644, though he protested that he had done so merely to avert Cholmeley's "private spleene uniustlie taken agte" him. Cholmeley, who had reason to know and no reason to tell anything but the truth of the matter, claimed that Thompson "was verie much affected to the King's cause". From the size of Thompson's fine, Parliament clearly thought so too.

Cholmeley's own account of the proceedings which led to his declaration is lengthy and detailed and rings true. He stated that after the Queen had arrived, he was "solicited by some of her friends and allyes" to reconsider his duty. One of these friends may have been Mackworth. Cholmeley argued that by returning to his allegiance, he was working for the good of the county and its eventual pacification, which in a sense was true, since the Scarborough garrison was no longer a threat to the North Riding or to the East.

Early one morning, with the earl of Newcastle's written pass, and with a patch over his eye as a disguise, he rode to York to speak with the Queen. He had two requests to make:

that shee would be pleased to give him her royall assurance
not to divert the King from performing those promises hee
had made to the Kingdome, [and] that shee would endeavour
the speedie settling the peace of the Kingdome.

These were extremely reasonable requests, and could as easily have been made by a Royalist gentleman of standing. The Queen gave him her assurances on both of these points, whereupon Cholmeley agreed to declare for the King. He asked for three full weeks in which to remove his family from London and then to return his commission as a Parliamentary officer to the earl of Essex. He declined an offer of armed men to assist him upon the return to the garrison, and after a night or so spent in York, rode back.

From Scarborough, Cholmeley despatched a servant to London bearing letters to the earl of Essex, presumably to be delivered after his family had left the city. At this point the scheme fell through insofar as an original plan was concerned, because the letters were opened and read by Hotham at Hull, who had apparently stopped Cholmeley's messenger. There is, however, a mystery here. Cholmeley did not name his messenger, but from a later reference it appears that it may have been an officer, Captain Browne Bushell, as will be seen.
Hotham, apparently, did not have cause to suspect Cholmeley's intentions, but it may be that the messenger voluntarily delivered himself up to Hotham, being out of sympathy with Sir Hugh's plans. Whatever happened, Hotham wrote privately to Cholmeley urging him to retract his decision, and in a second letter, advised Captain John Ledgard of what Cholmeley intended to do. Sir Hugh, forced to act sooner than he had anticipated, chose to address the whole garrison.

Ledgard seems to have made an attempt to assassinate him, and the details can also be found in *A true and exact Relation*, which must be taken as support for Cholmeley's own claim. Ledgard and two Dutch professional soldiers made their attempt at Breakfast, but Cholmeley was armed and sat pistol in hand, which suggests that he may have been warned. Ledgard was placed under arrest, and the announcement was made to the garrison without further mishap. Of the entire garrison, totalling some 600 infantry, 100 horse and a similar number of dragoons, Cholmeley said that only 20 men, with Ledgard and the Dutchmen, chose to make their way to Hull to serve the Parliament. Ledgard's brother remained in Scarborough.

After a few days, Cholmeley went back to York, and in his absence, Hotham released from captivity Browne Bushell (which suggests Bushell was indeed the original messenger) who promised to take Scarborough back into the Parliament's fold. With 40 Hull seamen, he entered the town and turned out the soldiery, who, in the absence of Cholmeley, lacked resolution and were probably anxious. The pro-Cholmeley officers were arrested, and the town garrisoned by citizens sympathetic to the Parliament. Cholmeley, advised of the turn of events, hurried from York with a body of troops, and quartered at Falsgrave, sending word to Bushell that he wished to talk. He seems to have expected to be admitted to Scarborough, but found the gates shut against him. Bushell did not immediately appear on the walls, but the townsmen not of Parliament's interest, made a display of rejoicing at Cholmeley's return and Bushell, torn by friendship for his old commander and his duty to Parliament, found the display in the town too much of a threat to ignore. The gates were opened and the keys turned over to Sir Hugh.

Before long, the garrison dismissed by Bushell returned to their colours, and henceforth the town remained firmly under Royalist control. Cholmeley officially surrendered his command to James King, who re-invested him with it at once. Scarborough as a garrison, was not in the same class of importance as Hull to the south or as Newcastle or, indeed, Hartlepool, to the north. Its significance lay in its strength and in the return of its extremely competent governor to his allegiance.

Cholmeley's decision to turn Scarborough over to the earl of Newcastle led directly to the first major defeat which the Parliament was to sustain in
Yorkshire. Hitherto, the East Riding had been very much at the mercy of raiders from either Hull or Scarborough often, as has been shown, working together or otherwise complementing each other. Now Hull was on its own, and Lord Fairfax, lying at Selby, become suddenly vulnerable. He planned to evacuate that town, and to retire into the West Riding to Leeds, where his son lay. To that end, he ordered Sir Thomas to make a show of force about Sherburn in Elmet to cover the flank of the forces marching from Selby. Sir Thomas' manœuvre was, however, not enough for him, as Captain Hodgson of Halifax remembered: "Sir Thomas, exceeding his commission at the request of the club-men, he marches to Tadcaster". However Markham, Fairfax's biographer, might gloss over the incident, it is beyond contention that Sir Thomas' disobedience brought on his own discomfiture.

Newcastle's army was grouping at Malton, probably to give moral support to Cholmeley, and on March 28th Lord Goring with 1200 foot and 400 horse went down to Wetherby. In face of his march, the Lord Fairfax began his retreat from Selby, drawing the garrison out of Cawood at the same time.

Sir Thomas Fairfax has left the longest account of the action which led to his defeat on Seacroft Moor on March 30th. Although he does not say as much, the Royalist force lying on Clifford Moor to which he makes reference, was clearly Goring's, and it was this force that was thought likely to intercept Lord Fairfax's march. Lord Fairfax's force, of 1500 men with ordnance, was not small, and it may be that he required his son's presence as a cavalry screen for what was primarily an infantry formation.

Thus Sir Thomas' version. Captain Hodgson's criticism has already been given, and he added that Sir Thomas trifled out his time for so long, that Goring came by way of Thorp Arch and drew so near that all retreat without fighting was impossible. In view of Sir Thomas' instructions, his action in gaining a temporary advantage, put the entire operation in danger.

According to Fairfax, Goring hesitated when he was advised of the attack on Tadcaster, by which time the earl of Newcastle and the main army had joined him near Wetherby. Newcastle wasted no time, but ordered Goring to take 20 troops of horse and dragoons against Tadcaster to force Fairfax out.

We were newly drawne off when he came. Goring passed over ye River to follow us; But seeing we were so unequall to him in Horse (for I had not above 3 Troops, & to goe over Bramham Moor, a large Plaine) I gave directions to ye Foot to march away while I stayed with ye Horse to Interrupt ye Enemys passage in those narrow lanes ye led up to ye Moor.
Map to illustrate events in the West Riding, March to July 1643.
With a heavy exchange of fire, Goring pushed his way forward, forcing the enemy to retreat progressively. Sir Thomas, expecting to find that his infantry had made the most of what cover he could give them, found them lined up on the moor when his own retreat brought him onto it. In haste, he formed the foot into two divisions, with his cavalry to act as a rear guard, and began to march forward, followed by Goring some eight hundred yards in his rear. The Royalists made no attempt to fall on, and when the enemy came to Seacroft Moor, begirt with small enclosures, discipline slackened and order became hard to maintain. A false sense of security swept over forces that had always known success. Whilst the officers tried vainly to rally them and to draw them away from houses where they sought refreshment, for the day was hot, Goring circled them and reached the moor. Fairfax pressed on, whilst Goring, probably intentionally, let him believe that he might yet escape. Suddenly they seeing us in some disorder, charged us both in Flanke & Reer. The Countrymen presently cast down their Armes & fled; and ye Foot soon after, wch, for want of pikes were not able to stand their horse. Some were slaine, & many taken prisoners. Few of or Horse stood ye Charge. Some officers, wth me made or Retreat, wth much difficulty...

Hodgson put it succinctly at Seacroft they fell upon us and totally routed us. Our poor foot suffered much, but the horse escaped to Leeds.(15)

If the condition of Sir Thomas' forces was indeed as he claimed, he had no business to extend or exceed the limits of his orders from his father. He had put himself in a dangerous position, and had failed completely to safeguard his infantry by adopting tactics which required far more than the three troops of horse which he claimed to have had at his disposal. Soldiers are judged expendable by poor commanders, and their safety is of minor importance. To waste men on an unnecessary, minor action in the hope of achieving some additional glory, was what Thomas Fairfax did.

Sir Thomas and some of his cavalry, after fighting their way clear for two hours or so, eventually reached Leeds, where Lord Fairfax had arrived.

This was one of ye Greatest Losses we ever received, yet was it a great providence yt it was a part, & not ye whole Forces wch received this losse...

He claimed that his attack on Tadcaster saved the army from a greater defeat, but many of the 800 prisoners carted away to York must have felt as Hodgson felt. Some 700 were held in the Merchant Adventurers' Hall, and were still incarcerated there on May 4th. Some 10 or 12 horse colours were also taken as trophies.

It is a pity that for Goring's actions, there is only the interpretation put upon them by the beaten commander. Goring may have hesitated, although in view of his record that seems unlikely; he may well have realised his
advantage and waited for the most propitious time at which to strike, to take both a psychological and a military opportunity. His force cannot have been much more in number than that of the enemy.

For much of April the earl of Newcastle fell to consolidating his position, and to improving his presence in the West Riding. The enemy siege of Pontefract was lifted as a consequence of Seacroft, and Sir Thomas Fairfax went from Leeds to Bradford to stiffen the resistance there with 700 foot, whilst the Royalists occupied Wakefield again, with some 3000 men. An indication of the Royalist strength during this month can be gathered from a letter which Goring wrote to Rupert on the 22nd. He reported the total strength at some 16000 men, of which 3000 were mounted troops, whilst a further 2000 infantry had been raised but were not yet armed. Warburton thought the numbers excessively high, but there is no reason to suppose that Goring was deceiving Rupert. Newcastle's army was building up to its height of power and prestige. With the Queen's presence, it had become virtually a royally led army. Goring himself had been recruiting busily, on the 16th April calling in the able-bodied men, whether Trainband or not, to Wakefield. Throughout the period, skirmishing was an almost daily affair, particularly in and around the vicinity of Leeds, where the Parish registers reveal several burials of Parliamentarian officers and soldiers. Leeds was in a state of virtual siege, if somewhat informal, and Thomas Fairfax at Bradford was anxiously enquiring after some reinforcements from Lancashire which he was expecting on the 20th. Royalist forces had penetrated into Barnsley, and at Elam a company of Parliamentarian foot had changed sides.

The only continuous narrative for the month is that given by the Duchess of Newcastle. In it, she referred to an action which followed upon that at Seacroft but which, with one exception, is not noticed elsewhere. She wrote:

Immediately after, in pursuit of that victory, my Lord sent a considerable party into the west of Yorkshire, where they met with about 2000 of the enemy's forces, taken out of their several garrisons in those parts, to execute some design upon a moor called Tankerly Moor, and there fought them, and routed them; many were slain, and some taken prisoners.

The corroboration for this action, if it is corroboration, is in the form of a report in Mercurius Aulicus. This report, received in early May, dated the action to the end of April, which would tend to suggest that it cannot be the same. However, the details sound so familiar that it may be that the Duchess, recording her husband's memory, made a chronological error or accepted Newcastle's error.

the Earle of Newcastles forces in the North encountered... with a body of the Rebels, consisting of 3000 men (which were going, as it is conceived, to the relief of Leeds) & had so fortunate success therein, that they totall...
routed the whole body of them, 150 of them being killed in the place, 240 prisoners taken.

This battle, perhaps to be designated as the battle of Tankersley Moor, does seem to have occurred. The Aulicus report is factual and unembellished, but that of the Duchess, whilst apparently chronologically late, seems also to accentuate events a little. Tankersley lies 4\frac{1}{2} miles south of Barnsley, and the fight was probably connected with Royalist encroachments into the West Riding. It is curious that no Parliamentarian writers noted this signal if localised defeat.

To return to the Duchess's narrative, the earl of Newcastle selected Wakefield as a garrison town "it being large and of great compass, and able to make a strong quarter". Whilst providing it with defences, word came of Parliamentarian recruiting at Sheffield and Rotherham, neighbouring towns to the south. Leaving behind in Wakefield forces under Goring and Mackworth, the earl marched down to bring those towns under obedience. The Duchess, with hindsight and hinting at Goring's defeat at Wakefield some time later, observed they did, as they might well, conceive themselves master of the field in those parts, and secure in that quarter, although in the end it proved not so, as shall hereafter be declared, which must necessarily be imputed to their invigilancy and carelessness.

Newcastle marched first against Rotherham, where an enemy garrison had been installed behind makeshift fortifications. A summons was duly refused, whereupon

my Lord fell to work with his cannon and musket, and within a short time took it by storm, and entered the town that very night; some enemies of note that were found therein were taken prisoners; and as for the common soldiers, which were by the enemy forced from their allegiance, he showed such clemency to them, that very many willingly took up arms for his Majesty's service, and proved very faithful and loyal subjects and good soldiers.

This may sound like an ideal development, and other sources call the Duchess's account into question, although the point which she was making was, that a town taken by storm after refusing a summons could expect no clemency. Her portrayal of her husband's generous character is understandable, most surely if she was aware of the accusations levelled against him at the time. Lord Fairfax had written on May 23rd that Rotherham resisted for a full two days and yielded upon treaty, to be spared plundering and everyone except for six named (but unidentified) Parliamentarian officers to be permitted to go free. Fairfax claimed that Newcastle broke the treaty, permitted plundering, and coerced the soldiery into adopting the King's colours. From all that is known of the earl/sounds unlikely, although some of his men may have acted against orders. The other problem is that of date. Lord Fairfax's letter clearly must allude to events in May, not in April, whereas
the Duchess conveys the impression that the single day's fighting and storm took place in the latter month. A date of May 4th for the surrender is given by one source, which adds that the town was weakly defended. If so, it can hardly have resisted Newcastle for two full days, which is what Lord Fairfax claimed. Alternatively, Mercurius Aulicus gave the quantity of arms captured in Rotherham as 1400, which suggests a larger force and this would support two days resistance. Some £5000 in money was also taken, which must have been welcome to the earl's treasurer, Sir William Carnaby. The Aulicus report is dated May 9th, which supports the other sources for a May dating, but the exact date must remain doubtful.

With the loss of Rotherham, Newcastle's forces could now range freely into Nottinghamshire. With the capture of Sheffield, Derbyshire would become open territory and Sir John Gell in Derby would have to look to his defences. Immediately upon the fall of Rotherham, therefore, the Royalists swung against Sheffield.

After my Lord had stayed two or three days there, and ordered those parts, he marched with his army to Sheffield, another market town of large extent, in which there was an ancient castle; which when the enemy's forces that kept the town came to hear of, being terrified with the fame of my Lord's hitherto victorious army, they fled away from thence into Derbyshire, and left both town and castle (without any blow) to my Lord's mercy.

Lord Fairfax confirmed this in his letter already quoted from.

Although the Parliamentarian element within Sheffield was strong, the Duchess reported that my Lord so prudently ordered the business, that within a short time he reduced most of them to their allegiance by love, and the rest by fear, and recruited his army daily; he put a garrison of soldiers into the castle, and fortified it in all respects, and constituted a gentleman of quality governor of both the castle, town and country; and finding near that place some iron works, he gave present order for the casting of iron cannon for his garrisons, and for the making of other instruments and engines of war.

The "gentleman of quality" was Colonel Sir William Saville, who did not, however, immure himself in his castle walls. He appointed as his deputy the major of his foot regiment, Thomas Beaumont of Whitley, who remained in the castle up until its surrender to a siege army in 1644. Under his care, Sheffield became the major source of munitions for the Royalist army in Yorkshire, manufacturing cannon and shot. In June, quantities of musket balls were being transported from there to Pontefract, and Beaumont was authorised to confiscate lead from the earl of Arundel's bailiff when raw materials ran short.

A half-hearted Parliamentarian attempt was made to interfere with these preparations, somewhere between Attercliffe and Sheffield, but it came to
Within days, Colonel Sir William Widdrington was raiding into Derbyshire with his cavalry. In mid-May, a Royalist raid from Sheffield carried the war to Otley, which was pillaged. Skirmishing around Barnsley was also common.

On April 24th, the Queen wrote a letter to her husband that he must have found disturbing and, indeed, in view of the success attending the Royalist army at that time in Yorkshire, was ominous. The Queen was referring back to events just after Seacroft, when the siege of Pontefract had been lifted by the Parliamentarians in their general retreat into the West Riding. The Queen herself accompanied the main army from York, part of which at least was to go to Pontefract to force the enemy clear should they have displayed any reluctance to go.

and by the road, I gave six thousand pieces, for without that, they could not have marched; but this truth should not be known by everybody.

It is clear that the money seized at Rotherham must have been a Godsend.

On May 21st was fought that disastrous action at Wakefield to which the Duchess referred in her own narrative in disparaging terms. In fact, the fight was serious in a limited sense. Goring and Mackworth were badly beaten, that is true, and as a consequence Wakefield was lost to the enemy, whose morale received a sharp boost. The general military impact was, however, slight, insofar as Newcastle did not take long to recover the situation. The real impact of the defeat was felt in Lancashire where, as has been shown, the earl of Derby needed and expected armed assistance from across the Pennines. Goring's defeat deprived Lancashire Royalists of that aid at a critical time, and so, with Derby finished by June, the Lancashire Parliamentarians were free to send men into Yorkshire, which they in fact did, with decidedly mixed success. If anything, the northern Parliamentarians were more parochial than their Royalist counterparts. There is, moreover, evidence that the action at Wakefield could have been avoided, and it is strong evidence. Mercurius Aulicus reported in late April that before Wakefield was even garrisoned, an advance had been made towards Leeds, and that a parley had been asked for by the Parliamentarians there. During this parley, fresh forces came into the town, and all talk of negotiation was then broken off. Some of the Royalist commanders demanded a storm, but James King, never a man to take any but the most calculated of risks, advised Newcastle against such a move, and, as a consequence, Wakefield was selected for a garrison. The Queen, in her letter already cited, noted that James King felt the attack would "cause the ruin of all the army, by too severe a slaughter". Lord Goring, the Queen herself, and the "fresh commanders" (which meant, presumably, the non-professionals) favoured a storm, but Newcastle followed the advice of his professional advisors, which he ought to have done, in a sense. Yet the failure to take Leeds led directly to the loss of Wakefield.
The sources for the battle of Wakefield are several, virtually all of them Parliamentarian, and originating from the reports and memoirs of Lord Fairfax and of his son. Lord Fairfax compiled his report two days after the battle, and gave a fairly comprehensive list of prisoners, from which it is possible to arrive at a good idea of the composition of the Royalist garrison. He gave the reason for the attack as being the worrying scarcity of victuals, and of other goods in the Parliamentarian towns, supplies being imperilled by the Wakefield Royalists in much the same way as Sir William Saville, months earlier, had been able to do. Coincidentally, Saville's activities had also led to his expulsion from Wakefield, although with less ignominy than was to attach to the persons of Goring and Mackworth.

about Leeds, Bradford and Halifax, being a mountainous barren Country, the people now begin to be sensible of Want, their last Year's Provisions being spent, and the Enemies Garrisons stopping all provisions both of Corn and Flesh, and other necessaries, that were wont to come from more fruitful Countries to them; their Trade utterly taken away and this Army...cannot defend them from Want. (37)

Consequently, Lord Fairfax ordered 1500 men out of Leeds, Bradford, Halifax and Howley Hall, to be commanded by Thomas Fairfax, to march against Wakefield. This force appeared at four in the morning, only to find the Royalists standing to their arms, expecting them. Fairfax gave the enemy strength at some six full regiments of foot and seven troops of horse, although his estimate of 3000 foot suggests that the regiments were at half strength. The Parliamentarians did not hesitate, but attacked at once: they did not, note, summon the town.

notwithstanding the thick vollies of small and great shot from the Enemy, charged up to their works, which they entered, seized upon their Ordnance, and turned upon themselves, and pursued the enemies so close, as they beat quite out of the Town the most part of the horse, and a great number of the foot, and made all the rest prisoners.

These prisoners were put at 1500, with four guns, 27 infantry colours and three horse colours. Parliamentary losses, Fairfax reckoned at seven dead, which sounds incredible, and many wounded, doubtless many mortally, since field surgery techniques were hazardous.

Sir Thomas Fairfax's official despatch gave the Parliamentary force at 1000 infantry, three companies of dragoons and some eight troops of horse. The rendezvous was at Howley Hall, the garrisoned home of Thomas Lord Saville of Lupset, at between midnight and two o'clock on May 21st. The advancing army came to Stanley, two miles north east of Wakefield, where it collided with some Royalist dragoons and cavalry, which they disposed of and took prisoners. At four o'clock they appeared before Wakefield, but the alarm was already given.

where, after some of their Horse were beaten into the Town, the Foot with unspeakable courage beat the Enemies from the
hedges, which they had lined with Musketeers, into the Town and assaulted it in Two Places, Wrengate and Norgate; and after an Hour and a Half fight, we recovered one of their Pieces, and turned it upon them, and entered the Town at both Places at one and the same Time; When the Barricadoes were opened, Sir Thomas Fairfax with the Horse fell into the Town, and cleared the streets, where Colonel Goring was taken by Lieutenant Alured...yet in the Market Place stood Three Troops of Horse, and Colonel Lampton's Regiment of foot to whom Major General Gifford sent a Trumpet, with offer of Quarter if they would lay down their Arms. They answered 'They scorned the Motion'.

Thomas Fairfax brought up the captured cannon and fired it point-blank into Lambton's regiment before sending in an assault which, in the circumstances, broke the resistance of the regiment and scattered it. According to the despatch, Lambton's had entered the town during the course of the fighting, probably having been quartered near by. It is worth noting that this regiment was also to make a stand at Marston Moor, and indeed, is one of the few northern regiments which we find specifically alluded to in contemporary documents. It must also be considered as one of the most distinguished.

Sir Thomas Fairfax, in his later memoirs, gave an expanded account of the fighting, prefaced by a few remarks relating the attack on Wakefield to the fight at Seacroft. His reasons for the attack, given years later, differ from his father's, in that Sir Thomas suggested that Wakefield was seen as an opportunity to capture large numbers of prisoners with which to barter for the liberty of the men taken at Seacroft and then in York. Sir Thomas had, he claimed, made repeated overtures to the earl of Newcastle for their release, "most of ym being Countrymen, whose Wives and Children were still Importunate for their Release". It is unlikely that so dangerous a move as an attack on a strongly garrisoned Royalist town would have been undertaken for such a motive, and the more likely interpretation seems to be that Sir Thomas, when drawing up his Memoir, recollected guilty feelings about the Seacroft prisoners whose fate he had been directly responsible for. It also seems to have been typical of his Memoir, to misinterpret or to ignore the orders originating from his father. Doubtless Thomas made much of the numbers of captives which he took, but his primary motive for the attack must have been that which led his father to sanction the move - the need to relieve pressure on the cloth towns.

upon Whitsunday, early in y⁰ morning, we came before ye Towne, but they had notice of or coming, & had manned all their workes, and set about 500 Musketeers to line y⁰ hedges about ye Towne, wch made us now doubt of Intelligence....

Apparently, the Parliamentarians were under the impression that the Royalist force was 900 strong at most, and if this is so, then their scouts cannot have been too good. The warning at which the Royalists took to their works must have been the skirmish at Stanley.
after a little consultation, we advanced, and soone beat ym back into ye Towne, wch we stormed in 3 places. After 2 hours dispute ye Foot forced open a Barricado where I entered with my owne Troop. Coll: Alureds & Capt. Brights followed with theirs. The Street wch we entred was full of their Foot wch we charged through, and routed, leaving ym to y° Foot wch followed close behind us...

The three Parliamentarian troops were fiercely charged by horse under Goring himself, no laggard on the battlefield (although either he or Mackworth should have been exercising a central command): after heavy fighting, Goring was unhorsed and taken, and his men fell back, leaving several dead behind.

If Sir Thomas Fairfax's memoirs are noteworthy for anything other than their exculpatory style, it must be for the anecdotes concerning his own narrow escapes (and, by definition, his courage). They contrast remarkably with the self-effacing writings of the Royalist, Sir Henry Slingsby. At Wakefield, Fairfax had such an escape, and since he was clearly, in the early year or so of the war, a forward and sometimes foolhardy officer, it is quite credible. Taking two prisoners with him, who had given their paroles not to try to escape, Sir Thomas found himself unexpectedly in the vicinity of a regiment of foot drawn up in the market place. Evidently, these would have been Lambton's men.

I espied a lane wch I thought would lead me back to my men ag'n; At the end of this lane there was a Corps du Guard of ye Enemys, wth 15 or 16 Soldiers wch was, y'm, Just quitting of it, wth a Sergeant leading ym off; whom we mett; who seing their officers came up to us. Taking no notice of me, they asked y'm w't they would have them to doe, for they could keep y° work no longer, bec: y° Roundheads....tame so fast upon y'm. But y° gentlemen, who had passed their words to be my true prisoners, sd nothing, so looking upon one another, I thought it not fit, now, to owne y'm as so, much lesse to bid y° rest to render y'selves prisoners to me; so, being well mounted, & seing a place in y° worke where men used to go over, I rushed from y'm, seing no other Remeady, and made my horse leap over y° worke...

Quite apart from the amusing nature of this anecdote, and the healthy sense of self-preservation which Fairfax displayed (as he had, indeed, done at Seacroft) there are other pointers of interest. Clearly, unlike the situation that had prevailed when Sir William Saville held the town, there was no disintegration and panic in the Royalist ranks. Lamentably, there was rather a lack of command, as is evidenced by the story of the sergeant and his squad of men seeking advice as to what to do. Goring had evidently not allowed for any such attack as he was now forced to face, and the chain of authority had broken down thoroughly, which may have been a significant failure that made no small contribution to the Royalist defeat. Further, the curious gentleman's agreement between Fairfax and his prisoners admirably illustrates the nature of the civil war, at least in these early stages. Of course, that this gentlemanly behaviour backfired on Fairfax is evident, for the silence of his
prisoners at once put Fairfax himself in danger, and by leaving them to make good his escape, he effectively ended their obedience to him as their captor.

Additionally, Fairfax makes an allusion which has not been given any consideration by those writers who have bothered with the battles in northern England, an omission that may hold true for the rest of the country. Fairfax stated that having decided upon flight, he noticed an alleyway which he felt would lead him safely to his own men which, in fact, it did. It is interesting to speculate how far familiarity with a town, such as Wakefield, could contribute to a victory given initial advantage by either side. Wakefield was, presumably, well known to Sir Thomas, less well known to Goring and to Mackworth, who were 'strangers'. Since a street combat, such as this was, could turn upon a single effective flank march, then knowledge of the by-ways of a town would be invaluable. Does this, in part, account for the success at Wakefield against an enemy apparently resolute and far from panic? Local guides had been employed, for example, when the earl of Derby took Preston, and when Wetherby and Tadcaster had been taken by Newcastle in December. In the heat of battle, civilian guides would become a liability, and so knowledge of any given locality on the part of a commanding officer would be invaluable. This may seem self-evident, but it ought to be stressed, and to be borne in mind when considering similar engagements to Wakefield.

Fairfax having rejoined his men, found that Major General Giffard had dragged up the captured cannon to the churchyard and had pointed it into the market place. According to Fairfax, in his Memoir let it be noted, the regiment "presently rendered themselves". This is ungenerous, since in his own despatch written probably on the very day, he made it apparent that the regiment was not shifted until it had been fired upon and then charged. It must be concluded that Fairfax's memory was somewhat at fault, and that in compiling his memoirs, he did not make use of his own papers. Sir Thomas listed 1400 prisoners, 80 officers, 28 colours and quantities of ammunition "which we much wanted".

Lord Fairfax, in his letter of May 23rd, listed the prisoners, foremost of whom was Goring (Mackworth seems to have escaped, which was as well). No colonels were taken, but there were three lieutenant colonels. Sir Thomas Bland of Kippax was lt. colonel to Colonel Sir George Wentworth's foot; Lt. Colonel Macmoyler was serving in Colonel Sir Edward Duncombe's horse; Lt. Colonel St. George cannot be positively identified. The captains Fairfax listed, and whom it is possible to identify, were John Wildbore, also of Wentworth's foot, a Lincolnshire man still in custody in 1651; Captain John Pemberton, taken with his regiment in the market place, of Aislaby, who was soon after exchanged, only to be killed in July; Captain Crofts, probably Christopher Crofts of Conyers Lord Darcy's Trainband foot; Captain Ledgard
who was almost certainly Richard Ledgard of Ganton, from Scarborough garrison, and the son of the man who had tried to murder Cholmeley; and Captain Lieutenant Benson, probably the Captain Benson of Lambton's regiment.

All the named lieutenants can be identified. Lieutenant Monckton was probably a lieutenant in Sir Marmaduke Langdale's regiment of foot; lieutenant Robert Thomas served under colonel Sir Hugh Cholmeley, and his presence at Wakefield, like that of Richard Ledgard, must be seen as a deliberate move by Newcastle to have Cholmeley put some troops into the main army as a token of good intention. Lieutenant Wheatley was of Sir George Wentworth's foot; Lieutenant Kent was probably Samuel Kennet of Lambton's, later a captain in the regiment, from a Recusant family situated at Coxhow in Co. Durham; Lieutenant Nicholason may be a reference to Captain Thomas Nicholson, also of Lambton’s foot.

Of 15 named ensigns, it is possible to be only sure of two; Ensign Robert Squire, later Captain in Langdale's foot; and Ensign William or Robert Lambton of Lambton’s foot.

The Parliamentarians did not stay in the town, but marched away again, leaving behind a Major Carnaby and a Captain Nuttall, wounded, prisoners, on their paroles. Neither of them can be positively identified.

From this list, it is plain that Lambton's regiment bore the brunt of losses, a direct consequence of making a stand. Other regiments present were primarily raised in the West Riding or in the southern areas of the East. Cholmeley's men are interesting, and the suggestion that they represented a tangible commitment to the cause equally so. Darcy's was the only purely Trainband regiment still in the field in its original form, as will be shown later.

The earl of Newcastle was either at Pontefract or in Sheffield when Wakefield fell.

my Lord receiving intelligence that the enemy in the garrisons near Wakefield had united themselves, and being drawn into a body in the night time, and surprised and entered the town of Wakefield, and taken all, or most of the officers and soldiers left there prisoners (amongst whom was also the General of the Horse, the Lord Goring, whom my Lord afterwards redeemed by exchange), and possessed themselves of the whole magazine, which was a very great loss and hindrance to my Lord's designs, it being the moiety of his army, and most of his ammunition, he fell upon new counsels, and resolved without any delay to march from thence back towards York...(41)

It has been said that Wakefield was less of a disaster than might be supposed, and indeed, from the Duchess's observations and those of Sir John Hotham, it could be seen as a great defeat. Hotham on May 24th wrote to Lord Fairfax from Nottingham, "Our misery is, we know not where his force lies, nor in what condition he is". On June 2nd, he was reporting the Royalists "so weak
and in such a distraction, that we conceive it far unfit to force your lordship in your quarters.  

Yet these observations cannot be taken on their face value. In the first place, the main Royalist magazine was still at York, and that at Wakefield can only have been a mobile campaign magazine, probably a waggon train. Secondly, the prisoners were soon exchanged, Newcastle letting those held since Seacroft go, in return for those of his own lost at Wakefield, so that there was no formidable manpower shortage to overcome. The Parliamentary forces did not capitalise upon their success, but evacuated Wakefield and continued to hover around Leeds and Bradford. It needs to be remembered that Hotham in Nottingham, was probably trying to induce Lord Fairfax to make some show in that county against the developing Royalist presence in Newark, which was being fed with troops by the earl of Newcastle. Indeed, on the 2nd of June, when Hotham reported the earl's army to be in distraction, he also reported the movements of "a good strength of horse and foot" sent from the earl. If Newcastle had been so badly hit as was claimed, he could not have afforded to let men leave the main army for garrison duty to the south. Wakefield was really a blow to the prestige of the Royalists, not a material blow, and it was anyway to be more than made up for in the weeks ahead.

The other sources contain minor details concerning the fighting, some of them contradictory. It was a local tradition around Wakefield that Goring and his officers spent the night of the battle playing bowls at Heath Hall, which hints at a certain laxity: whereas Mercurius Aulicus, on May 28th, reported that they had been up all that night on double watches, expecting trouble. The reports cannot be reconciled, unless to wile away sleepless hours the officers played at bowls. The point is really academic anyway, since Fairfax did not have surprise in his favour. On his return from Wakefield, Fairfax apparently attacked a local garrison at Houndhill, but this is inconclusive.

Newcastle fell back on York to regroup, summoning Widdrington back from Derbyshire in the process. They were in Doncaster on May 22nd, where Colonel Sir Francis Fane had a Royalist garrison, and mustered at Pontefract before the retreat. There followed a period of inactivity for the army, although the Parliamentarian governor of Wressell Castle, lying on the Derwent eight miles east of Selby, reported seeing Royalist cavalry patrols between himself and that town. On June 6th, it was reported in London, there was fighting on Bramham Moor, but the evidence is not open to corroboration. Around that time the Parliamentarians were burying Royalist prisoners of war in Leeds, who had died of their wounds, including Treasurer Sir William Carnaby's secretary.

During this period of withdrawal from the offensive by Newcastle, an incident occurred in the far north which, militarily unimportant in itself,
exemplified the power of the Parliamentarian navy. Understandably, Durham and Northumberland had been quiet ever since the departure of the earl of Newcastle in the previous December. Durham was a recruiting area, and in early April recruiting had been going on unopposed from there to as far north as Berwick, with defensive construction work at Hartlepool. On June 1st this virtual placidity was shaken by the last in a series of incidents that mounted steadily in impact.

The 'Antelope', a 160 crew 3rd rater under Captain Haddock, was cruising off the east coast. On May 24th it had taken two corn ships off Tynemouth, which must have given warning to the Royalists along the coast, but on the 25th the sailors landed to plunder a house at Newnham belonging to a Mr. Cramlington. The owner was absent, but his servants had put up a brief armed resistance against the attackers before being overcome.

Rejoining their ship, the raiders sailed on north to Berwick, where Colonel Sir Thomas Haggerston, a notable local Catholic, was recruiting his regiment. In a sudden raid, Haggerston was captured and taken aboard the ship, and a vain attempt made by his men to rescue him was easily beaten off.

On May 29th the 'Antelope' sailed back down the coast toward Holy Island, where a small Royalist garrison occupied the castle. A summons was duly sent to them, which was refused, and after a preliminary cannonade, the ship anchored and put 100 raiders on shore. Talks between them and the garrison followed, and upon offer of one full year's pay in advance (probably made up from money plundered from Cramlington and Haggerston), the defenders declared for the Parliament. Some of them went home, but their numbers were made up on the island by some of the crew. Henceforth, Holy Island remained a Parliamentarian enclave in Royalist territory, although, of course, its effectiveness was limited by its geographical disadvantages. In 1646, long after the war had swept clear of the north, the turncoat governor of Holy Island, a Captain Shafto, died, and it was feared that a Royalist coup would re-take the castle and the island.

The earl of Newcastle at York was not only concerned to overcome the setback at Wakefield. The Queen, for whose safety he had first raised his northern army, had decided to march south to join her husband at Oxford. The date chosen for departure was June 6th, and the Duchess of Newcastle described the preparations:

her Majesty being resolved to take her journey towards the southern parts of the kingdom, where the king was, designed first to go from York to Pomfret, whither my Lord ordered the whole marching army to be in readiness to conduct her Majesty, which they did, himself attending her Majesty in person. And after her Majesty had rested there some small time, she being desirous to proceed in her intended journey, no less than a formed army was able to secure her person:
wherefore my Lord was resolved out of his fidelity and duty to supply her with an army of 7,000 horse and foot, beside a convenient train of artillery, for her safer conduct, choosing rather to leave himself in a weak condition (though he was even then very near to the enemy's garrisons in that part of the country) than suffer her Majesty's person to be exposed to danger. Which army of 7,000 men, when her Majesty was safely arrived to the King, he was pleased to keep with him for his own service.

The decision to send such a force was made at Pontefract, as will become clear. The Royalist commander was to be Lt. General Charles Cavendish, although he did not go with the force when it left Lincolnshire for Oxford. It might seem as if the Duchess was sniping at the Queen for depriving the earl of so many men, when she could have remained safely in York and let him get on with his campaigns. From what we know of Henrietta-Maria, she was not much concerned with her personal safety: but at such a distance, her influence in the King's counsels was minimal. Newcastle must not be criticised for sending so many men, for he did not seriously weaken himself at all. His first duty had always been, to prepare for such an eventuality. In his negotiations with the Yorkshire gentry in 1642, he had stressed that if he came into the county, it was on the understanding that the needs of the Queen would at all times come first. He would have failed in his duty had he sent an insufficient force as an escort, and if the King chose to retain control of those he did send, that was not to be helped. From a study of the earl's army, it is clear that at least three full infantry regiments - those of Viscount Molyneux, Thomas Tyldesley and Sir Conyers Darcy - left Yorkshire, with William Eure's cavalry regiment, Molyneux's and Tyldesley's horse, and some companies of infantry, newly raised or drawn from standing regiments, that were to be formed, at Oxford, into the regiments of Henry Percy and Thomas Pinchbeck. Of the rest of the formation we know little.

The size of the force was not arrived at without a full discussion of the implications, as Slingby recalled:

Now ye Queen was preparing to march to ye King, & his excellence wth his army convey'd her to Pomphret, where his excellency caus'd a councell of warr to be caus'd, y't advice might be taken wth were ye most usefull servise in ye army, whether to march up wth ye Queen & so joyne wth ye King, or else wth ye army to stay, & only give order for some regiments to wait upon her majesty. If he march'd up, his army would give a gallant addition to ye King's, but yn he left ye country in my Ld Fairfax his power, & it might be he should have him march in ye rear of him, joyne in ye parliaments forces. If he stay'd, he might send some forces wth ye Queen, & yet be able to lay seige to my Ld Fairfax in Leeds, or fight him in ye field. Well, this latter was resolv'd on... (55)

The prospect of Newcastle accompanying the Queen was one that spread before her march in wildest rumour. Samuel Luke at Newport Pagnell, whose journal is replete with rumours, reported as early as May 19th that the entire
northern army was on the road to Oxford. As it turned out, and as Slingsby explained, the earl took the best course open to him, to fulfill his duty to the Queen and his obligations to the Yorkshire gentry. Here, as on every other crucial occasion, the emphasis is on the earl's taking of advice, which stresses the view given of him earlier. It argues a nice sense of his great responsibilities, and, for a grandee such as Newcastle was, a marked deference to the experience of professionals. It is a pity that we do not know any of the details of the Pontefract council of war, for example, whether James King, who had argued against a siege of Leeds earlier, was now in favour of it in view of the hazardous nature of a march south. If he was, it can be asked why a siege was more acceptable with an army less 7000 men, than it had been at full strength. If he was against it, and in favour of accompanying the Queen, which faction was it that convinced Newcastle to remain in the north? The Yorkshire gentry perhaps, or the local colonels who did not want to leave their territory unguarded. We do not seem even to know the Queen's preference though she may, quite properly, have kept her views to herself in what was an internal matter for the high command. The traditional view of Newcastle would lead one to suppose that he himself was against the march south, since he could not bear to subordinate his authority to that of any other general, perhaps even that of the King himself. Let it be said, however, that since the traditional view of Newcastle is being justifiably challenged, such an argument deserves scant respect.

The Queen marched from Pontefract to Newark, where she remained until July 3rd. Leaving behind her Cavendish and some 2000 of her army for duties in that area, she pushed on south, terrifying the Parliamentarians in the midlands in her progress to Oxford, where she arrived on July 14th.

There is no getting away from the fact that the lost 7,000 men had to be made up rapidly. A flurry of recruiting activity occurred in Cumbria as a consequence, and by the end of July Mercurius Aulicus reported some 2000 horse and 3000 foot levied there. John Spalding noted "Forces in Cumberland and Westmoreland both on horse and foot daylie rysing for the king..." Yet in early June Sir Philip Musgrave had looked askance at requests from Sir Thomas Glemham to provide men, and had replied with a long catalogue of complaints:

I shall observe your commands to the utmost of my power, and give full and true information of the condition of these counties, which at this time, are not so well as I could wish, and it is doubtful may be worse, monies are extreme scarce, and assessments come slowly in, nor is it possible that one or two troops, can raise them in all parts of both counties and attend the garrisons in Cumberland and Westmoreland....

Musgrave complained that "some private men" were sitting at their homes reaping the benefit of assessments, whilst the powerful gentry, who "could make their neighbours conformable" were on their way or had already gone to the King's

the cheefe man that is now left Sr Henrie Fletcher haveinge publickly slighted my authoritie from yo\'self and noe satisfaction is made to mee, experienced soldiers wee want, ammunition we have little or none and if you caule for 1000 men from amongst us, verie few armes can be spared for them and leave anie in the countrie...

He requested Glemham to organise assessment collection by committees, and to lift some of the burden from himself, but primarily, to postpone his demand for soldiers until the situation created by the departure of the Oxford men could be overcome. Yet by the end of July, as it seems, Musgrave had raised the men. By then, the earl of Newcastle had taken the field anyway. To this poorly documented period of recruitment in Cumbria, must belong the regiments of Sir Timothy Featherstonehaugh, Sir William Dalston, Sir Henry Fletcher, John Lamplugh and others unspecified.

The departure of the Queen from Pontefract, although it meant the loss of some regiments, left Newcastle free to carry the war back into the enemy heartland. One of the most striking differences between the war east of the Pennines and that to the west, was this ability of the Royalists in the east to keep the war away from their own recruiting areas. From the time of the earl's arrival until well into 1644, the Parliamentarians fought a defensive war, and that they managed to survive at all, was due to a large degree to no effort on their part, but to the Royalist failure to follow up their triumphs. It is also true that the Scottish invasion in January 1644 saved northern Parliamentarianism: without it, Hull would have become a last refuge. It has been shown how, after Seacroft, James King successfully argued against an attack on Leeds, and how as a consequence, momentum was lost, and Wakefield stormed by the enemy, which surprised them as much as it enraged the Royalists. That it was no significant setback, is demonstrated by the ease with which Newcastle returned to the offensive after the Queen's departure, but it did mean that the earl was obliged to virtually fight the campaign all over again. Naturally, this meant that a thorough victory involving the clearance of the West Riding and the isolation of Hull was harder to achieve. It is worth considering what would have been the outcome had the earl listened, not to James King, but to George Goring and the Queen in April, and had gone on to storm Leeds. It is hard to believe that with the infantry losses at Seacroft, the obvious damage to enemy morale that they entailed, that Leeds could or would have resisted for very long. The loss of Leeds at so critical a moment would have had two results. Most obviously, the disintegration of cloth town resistance would have followed and, along with that, forces could then have been released to carry the war into Lancashire to repair the damage there. On a grand scale, had the Royalists followed through after Seacroft, there is no reason why, when the Queen left for Oxford, a substantial and victorious
army could not have swept south with her. It may be that this would have
been the turning-point of the war. Such speculation, however, is one of the
venerable benefits of hindsight; James King, whose judgement must be given
due credence, thought Leeds could not be taken without severe loss to the
Royalists, and he may have been right. Since no attempt was made, his view
was not tested, but it is arguable that due to this decision, Wakefield was
lost and ultimate victory for Newcastle was postponed and rendered beyond
achievement. Whatever triumphs now lay ahead of him, his command was to be
distinguished by the excessive caution of James King rather than by the
reckless attitude of men like George Goring.

It can be argued that there were factors militating against any such
thorough Royalist victory quite apart from those outlined. The cloth towns
were the centre of Parliamentarian resistance, and there men were fighting as
much for their homes as for their cause. Newcastle's army might have taken
Leeds, and then have fought itself to a standstill against resolute if frag-
mented resistance. Momentum could have been lost by dint of too thorough a
clearance attempt being made. It can hardly be argued that either Lord Fair-
fax or his son were capable of out-generalling the Royalist commanders, since
Lord Fairfax was somewhat sedentary and left his field command to a son who,
as has been seen and will become further apparent, was not suited to obeying
orders, to sacrificing his self-esteem, or to winning pitched battles. Sir
Thomas functioned best with a small, fast moving force, and was temperamental
a cavalry brigade commander, rather than a foot commander or a general. That
he did achieve fame was a result of his command of the New Model Army, made up
of field officers and soldiers vastly different from those that he had to
command in Yorkshire in 1642/3. Much has been made, by Thomas's biographers,
of his victories at Wakefield, for example, or at Leeds but, in comparison
with those which he lost, at Seacroft and at Adwalton, they were of minor
strategic importance. Objective consideration of his military carrera cannot
but lead to the conclusion that the fame which has attached to him is open to
fairly severe qualification. It is almost as if his biographers found in him
the ideal moderate Parliamentarian, standing up for principles and standing
against the extreme party which killed the King. Unfortunately, if this
picture is believed, it has to be said that Thomas Fairfax did not stand up
quite so fiercely for principle after 1648, and that in the 1650's he was most
decidedly equivocal in his attitudes. It may well be that he was merely a
country gentleman with a flair for cavalry command, as many of his class did
have, and was not suited to any higher duties than those which that entailed,
although such were thrust upon him by the exigencies of the time.

Therefore it must be said that had Newcastle pushed on vigorously after
Seacroft, he might well have brought the war in Yorkshire to an end, have
revived Lancashire, and contributed significantly to a Royalist military victory in the country as a whole.

With the earl preoccupied with the departure of the Queen, some of the pressure was taken from the East Riding, and Sir John Hotham felt free for the first time in weeks, to venture out. The result was a skirmish with Sir Hugh Cholmeley at Beverley fought on June 30th, although from the sources it is hard to say which side had the worst of the encounter. Sir Hugh was trying to coerce the Parliamentary governor of Wressell Castle to surrender or to declare for the King. Hotham, hearing of the movements of his rival, planned to intercept him at Beverley, and did so. According to the news as it was heard in Cambridge, on July 3rd, Cholmeley was not overawed and kept up a spasmodic, running fight for ten hours until Hotham sent reinforcements and ammunition to his men, whereupon Cholmeley fell back into Scarborough. The parish registers of St. Mary's, Beverley, recorded "Or great scrimmage...God gave us the victory at that tyme". Some thirteen Royalist soldiers were buried in the churchyard after the fight. Hotham could not, however, hold Beverley as an outlying garrison, and by July 8th Cholmeley had returned in force and had occupied the town.

With Cholmeley doing his job in the east, the earl of Newcastle began his march into the West Riding from Pontefract so soon as the Queen and Charles Cavendish were on their way to Newark. He had recently, a unique event, been reinforced by a regiment of foot sent from Oxford to his aid, that of Colonel Gervase Holles. This single evidence of Oxford's awareness of the war in the north might, however, be a misinterpretation. Holles's regiment could have been sent to serve as part of the Queen's escort and have come too late to fulfill that duty. It remained at least until the end of August, when it fell back into Newark as a garrison force. But it saw action on June 22nd when Newcastle captured Howley House.

he met with a strong house well fortified, called Howley House, wherein was a garrison of soldiers, which my Lord summoned; but the governor disobeying the summons he battered it with his cannon, and so took it by force. Howley belonged to Thomas Lord Saville, but was garrisoned by his uncle, the Parliamentary officer Sir John Saville of Lupset. Sir Henry Slingsby was the only writer to refer to Sir John by name, in his brief allusion to the storm. The earl of Newcastle had ordered, according to the Duchess, that no quarter be extended to Sir John, but that after the house was taken, an officer brought Saville, unharmed, to the earl's presence and was promptly rebuked for ignoring the order. The Royalist offered to kill his prisoner then and there but

my Lord would not suffer him to do it, saying, it was inhuman to kill any man in cold blood. Hereupon the governor kissed the key of the house door, and presented
it to my Lord; to which my Lord returned this answer, 'I need it not', said he, 'for I brought a key along with me, which yet I was unwilling to use, until you forced me to it'.

Another Royalist source, An Express Relation of the Passages and Proceedings of his Majesties Army under the Command of his Excellence the Earl of Newcastle, is more detailed.

We marched from Pomfret towards Bradford, and in our way thither we summoned Sir John Savile, commander of Howley, to deliver up that house, and lay down his arms so unjustly taken up, who returned an uncivil answer, and that he would keep it maugre our forces, whereupon we planted our cannon against that house, and environed it upon Wednesday the 21st of June in the afternoon, and next morning took it by assault, and in it the said commander-in-chief and all his officers and soldiers, about 245, some few whereof were slain, the rest taken prisoners;

Mercurius Aulicus gave the total as 300 defenders.

Markham, in his biography of Thomas Fairfax, referred to the shameful nature of the earl's order of 'no quarter'. Such a criticism demands an answer, because it is so demonstrably unreasonable. Howley was, after all, not Sir John Saville's property; technically, he had trespassed upon it in the absence of Lord Saville who was with the King in Oxford, and had fortified it against the Royalist army. In time of war, of course, niceties of what may or may not be, legally proper, have to be dispensed with, but in storming the house and ruining it, Newcastle was acting against the seat of a fellow Royalist peer. Sir John had received a summons, and had defied it. By all the conventions of warfare, neither he nor his fellows could expect mercy in the event of capture by storm, nor can he have expected to be able to hold out very long; thus his resistance was pointless and would involve the deaths of some of Newcastle's men for no tactical or strategic advantage. In ordering that no quarter be shown to Saville, the earl was in fact restraining his soldiery, by implying that the rank and file were to be spared. Moreover, when Saville was, contrary to orders, carried safe from the house, the earl exercised mercy. This is hardly a shameful episode, and Markham, whose hero Thomas Fairfax, committed two cold-blooded killings outside Colchester in 1648, had no grounds whatever for casting aspersions on the earl of Newcastle.

The taking of Howley was but the preliminary to the greatest pitched battle that the earl was to fight as a commander in his own right. The sources are several and most of them extremely detailed, for the battle of Adwalton Moor, fought on June 30th, was, next only to that of Marston Moor, the greatest battle fought in Yorkshire during the civil wars.

Sir Henry Slingsby remembered that after Howley fell, the Royalist commanders were uncertain of the precise course of action that they should
take, "yt wch must be ye master peice, ye taking of Leeds & Bradford, or

giving battle if my Ld Fairfax durst venture in ye feild".71 The issue was
decided for them by Fairfax and his son, who had now benefited from events in
Lancashire by the arrival of reinforcements from that county. One source
estimated these as 2000 strong when they left Lancashire on June 16th,72 whilst
another gave 1500 infantry and three troops of horse.73 Another source, how-
ever, stressed that few of these were in the battle, except as a rearguard
for the main Parliamentary army.74 This was not quite Rosworm's view, that
efficient German engineer, who wrote:

The earl of Newcastle with no small Force made an angry
approach towards Lancashire, our men were sent out to
oppose his passage...The issue was, our men were soundly
beaten at Wisked-hill in Yorkshire, and pursued into
Lancashire by the Enemy... (75)

This is the only source which emphasises the Lancashire contribution, but it
does indicate how the Manchester Parliamentarians looked on their action. To
them, they were not so much assisting Fairfax as trying to keep the war away
from Lancashire. This view is supported indirectly by such other allusions to
the Lancashire men as we have.

Sir Thomas Fairfax wrote a lengthy exculpatory account of the battle in
his memoirs, and it would be as well, perhaps, to consider the view of the
fighting taken by the Parliamentary commanders, first. Fairfax gave Newcastle
as having between 10 and 12,000 men, their first objective being to lay siege
to Bradford.

My Father drew all ye Forces he could spare out of ye
garrisons hither. But seing it Impossible to defend
ye Towne, but by strength of men, and not above 10 or
12 Days provision for so many as were necessary to keep
it; we resolved, ye next morning very early wth a
party of 3000 men, to attempt his whole Army as they
laid in their Quarters, 3 miles off: Hoping thereby to
put him into some Distraction; wch could not (by
reason of ye unequall number) be done any other way.

Thus far, Sir Thomas's account is straightforward, although his estimate of his
own strength must be viewed with caution. In what follows, however, there is
a definite attempt to shift the blame for the defeat onto other shoulders, as
if he was unable to admit that he had been beaten fairly in the field. He
wrote that the muster of the army was to be organised by Major General Giffard
for four o'clock in the morning (of the 30th), but Giffard "so delayed ye
execution of it, yt it was 7 or 8 before we began to move", not without, as
Fairfax added cryptically, "without much suspition of trechery in it". It
may be a congenital defect in the make-up of the amateur soldier, that he
cannot accept a beating or understand it. Whatever, accusations of treachery
from Sir Thomas were not infrequent, and it must be said that there are no
grounds whatsoever for doubting that Giffard was any less a good Parliamentary
soldier than his senior.

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Coming within view of the earl's forces, Sir Thomas found them already drawn up in battle order.

We were to goe up a Hill to ym, wch or fforlorne hope gained by beating theirs into their maine Body, wch was drawne up halfe a mile furthur, upon a place called Adderton Moore. We being all up ye Hill drew into Battalia Also.

Fairfax commanded his right wing, consisting, according to him, of 1000 foot and five troops of horse. Giffard had the left, of about equal numbers, whilst old Lord Fairfax commanded overall. They rolled forward, driving Royalist skirmishers from enclosures onto the moor before them. At this point, 10 or 12 troops of Royalist cavalry charged them on the right, but Fairfax was still in the enclosed ground

wch was good Advantage to us who had so few Horse. There was a Gate, or open place to ye Moor, where 5 or 6 might enter a breast. Here they strove to enter, and we to defend; But after some Dispute, those yt entred ye passe found sharpe entertainmt; & those yt were not yet entred, as hott welcome from ye Musketeers yt flanked ym in the hedges. All, in ye end, were forced to retreat, wth ye loss of one Coll: Howard, who commanded them.

The Colonel Howard killed in this desperate attack, under circumstances not dissimilar from those in which Colonel Thomas Howard had been killed at the Piercebridge crossing in 1642, was another Thomas Howard, probably a Catholic, the eldest son of Colonel Sir Francis Howard of Corby, whose regiment he was commanding. His death was not the only serious loss sustained by the earl's army in the battle.

On the left, Giffard was pushing back the Royalist infantry opposed to him, whilst Fairfax withstood another attack from a larger body of cavalry. This time, the Royalists forced an entrance into the enclosed ground, and the fighting must have been severe before Fairfax once more pushed them back. Left dead behind them was Colonel George Heron of Chipchase in Northumberland, whose death occasioned another of Thomas Fairfax's anecdotes:

I cannot omitt a Remarkeable passage of Divine Justice. While we were engaged in ye fight wth ye Horse yt entered the gate, 4 Soldiers had stript Coll: Herne naked as he laid dead on ye ground (men still fighting round about him), & so dextrous were these villaines, yt they had done it, and mounted ym selves agn before we had beat ym off. But after we had beaten ym to their Ordinance (as I sd) and now returning to or ground agn, ye Enemy discharged a peice of Cannon in or Rear; The bullet fell into Capt: Copleys Troop, in wch these 4 men were; Two of ym were killed and some hurt, or marke remained on ye rest, though dispersed into severall ranks of ye Troop...

Amazing indeed, if true. It is hard to say whether 'Divine Justice' was felt by Fairfax to have visited these men because they were despoiling an officer and a gentleman, or because they stopped to do it when they should have been fighting.
According to Fairfax, these two rebuffs given to the Royalist cavalry seemed to cause them to make some move towards retreating. He claimed that some actually left the field. But, in this wavering condition,

One Coll: Skirton, a wild & desperate man, desired his Gen: to let him charge once more, wth a stand of pikes, wth wch he broke in upon or men; & they not relieved by or Reserves, commanded by some ill affected officers...

This sounds like a reference either to the Lancashire levies, or to traitors other than Giffard...

...& chiefly, Major Gen: Gyfford... or men lost ground; wch ye enemy seing, pursued yr Advantage by bringing on fresh Troops.

The Royalist onslaught was fierce and determined, which tells against the idea of a progressive drift away from the field. Cut off from communication with the left wing, "we not knowing wt was done" there, Fairfax held his ground until ordered to retreat from the field. Finding escape to Bradford cut off, he took a lane towards Halifax, which he reached safely, although in the flight 60 men were killed and 300 taken prisoner. Of his other casualties on the field, Fairfax referred only to a captain and 12 men killed in the last action.

Just who the Colonel 'Skirton' was who, single-handedly, turned the tide of battle in the Royalists' favour, it is hard to say. It must be considered that perhaps Thomas Fairfax was too literal in his interpretation of the event, seeing his ultimate defeat as the result of a wicked stroke of fortune but for which, he would not have lost the battle. Skirton may have been the mysterious Posthumous Kirton or, equally as probable, either Robert or Thomas Strickland, one of whom, at Selby in 1644, showed an equal determination at a critical moment. There is, however, other evidence which suggests that the crucial charge was inspired by the earl of Newcastle himself, as will be seen, although there is no reason why there cannot have been two such incidents, of only one of which was Fairfax aware. It would be ungenerous to suggest that he would deliberately play down the earl's personal role.

Captain Hodgson of Halifax was also present on the field. For this section his chronology is suspect, since he put the capture of Goring after Seacroft, at Leeds instead of Wakefield, and otherwise tended to telescope events.

It was observed by some, that the land was like Eden before him [i.e., Newcastle], and behind him as a barren wilderness. He marcheth up to Atherton and there pitcheth. All the forces we could spare in Leeds, Halifax, and Bradford, with some Lancashire regiments, were drawn up towards Wiskett hill...

Hodgson tends to emphasise the presence of the Lancashire forces, and confirms Rosworm's allusion to Wisked Hill, where relics of the fighting used to be found.
After some time they joined battle with the great army, and beat them off their ground, put them to the foil, and in all probability had beaten Newcastle off the field, but the matter changed in a trice, and a party of their horse coming on, our party retreated, and never faced again that day. (78)

On July 1st, Thomas Stockdale, who had been on the field, wrote to Speaker Lenthall from Halifax just prior to evacuation. He broke down the Parliamentary army into component parts, 1200 men from Leeds; seven foot companies from Bradford; 500 men from Halifax, Pontefract siege lines (the siege apparently laid again), Paddleworth and Almondbury; 12 companies of Lancashire infantry; 10 troops of Yorkshire cavalry, three from Lancashire, and many Clubmen "who are fit to do execution upon a flying enemy, but unfit for other service". If Stockdale's assessment is correct, and he was in a position to know since he attended upon Lord Fairfax the overall commander, Sir Thomas Fairfax's estimate of the numbers is seriously at fault. He, it will be remembered, gave them as 3000 strong. Stockdale's figures, provided the various companies were more or less at strength, give a Parliamentary infantry force of about 3,600 men and a cavalry body of 780, which figures excluded the unnumbered irregulars who, from comparative considerations, must have been in the region of 2000 men. Thus the Parliamentary fighting army at Adwalton must have been at least 5000 strong, probably more. Whilst still numerically inferior to the Royalists, if properly generalled, such a deficiency might be overcome. The Parliamentarians, after all, chose to stake everything on a pitched fight and must have supposed that they had a prospect of victory.

Stockdale said that the Royalists, after quitting Howley House, came to Adwalton three miles from Bradford, and occupied the hill alluded to by Fairfax, and the open moorland where their cavalry could operate freely. Stockdale estimated the Royalist army at something considerably greater than Thomas Fairfax's total of 10 to 12000: Stockdale reckoned them at 15000 foot, of which half were newly raised (this is unlikely in so short a space of time from the Queen's departure), and probably 4000 horse. He counted about 80 cornets, or troop colours, which is vastly below 4000 men, even with each troop at full strength. "Many both of their horse and foot were slenderly armed" he added. The Parliamentary advance moved in distinctive order, the forlorn hope composed of horse, foot and dragoons preceding the main army. According to Stockdale, it was the Bradford garrison and not the Lancashire foot that brought up the rear.

The horse were commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax, who should have led the main battle, if the Lord General could have been persuaded to absent himself.

Evidently Sir Thomas thought his father was getting too old for such command.
Although Stockdale agrees in essentials with Thomas Fairfax as to the course of events, he makes certain telling remarks. He concluded that the Parliamentary forces advanced too far, which, taken in conjunction with what Thomas Fairfax implied, is as good as saying that Fairfax over-reached himself yet again. Outflanked by an adroit manœuvre on the part of the Royalists, the Parliamentarians "unacquainted with field service" fell back after fierce fighting, Thomas Fairfax leaving the field early (1) whilst his father and Stockdale remained virtually to the last, and came into Bradford by a round-about route.

Our loss of prisoners taken by the enemy was great, but the number is not equal to the fear and distraction it hath begotten in the country, which is increased by the Lancashire forces, who are retired home, the commanders not being able to persuade them to stay, only we have got some 20 horse and 200 foot of them to stay with us at Halifax, upon promise to pay them ready money.

The allusion to Halifax was a mistake for Bradford, for Halifax was evacuated fairly quickly, Thomas Fairfax falling into Bradford with the remains of his command.

It is interesting that Thomas Stockdale made no mention of any movement in the Royalist ranks indicative of retreat. It may be that what Fairfax took to be a movement from the field was, in fact, an outflanking movement which eventually broke the Parliamentary army. If so, Fairfax made a very serious error of judgement if he misread the developments on the field.

The Duchess's narrative put the Parliamentary army at at least 5000 musketeers, inclusive of Lancashire forces, which figure is nearer to that of Stockdale than of Fairfax. Her narrative is extremely detailed but then, since she was recording her husband's recollection, she reflected the great importance attached at the time, and subsequently, to his major victory. She stated that having resolved to move against Bradford, the earl found his march unexpectedly interrupted:

by the enemy drawing forth a vast number of musketeers, which they had very privately gotten out of Lancashire... which had so easy an access to them at Bradford, by reason the whole country was of their party, that my Lord could not possibly have any constant intelligence of their designs and motions. For in their army there were near 5000 musketeers, and eighteen troops of horse, drawn up in a place full of hedges, called Atherton Moor, near to their garrison at Bradford, ready to encounter my Lord's forces, which then contained not above half so many musketeers as the enemy had; their chiefest strength consisting in horse, and these made useless for a long time together by the enemy's horse possessing all the plain ground upon that field; so that no place was left to draw up my Lord's horse, but amongst old coal-pits.

The Duchess here indirectly supports Stockdale's view that the Royalists had poorly armed foot, and we know that most of the men sent with the Queen had
been trained infantry. The detail concerning the coal pits is of interest, and unlikely to be fabrication, since it would account for the piecemeal way in which the cavalry tried to force Fairfax from his enclosed ground, attended with serious losses if the deaths of two colonels are anything to go by. What is puzzling is that the Duchess seems to imply that the enemy chose the ground for the action, whereas the Parliamentarian sources imply that the earl was already in position when they came up. The difference seems to be beyond solution, and it may simply be that the earl was camped, not expecting battle, but nonetheless at a standstill when the enemy swept onto the hill. Thus to both sides it would appear that the other was awaiting them.

The Royalist cavalry were seriously hampered according to the Duchess. There was "a great ditch and high bank betwixt my Lord's and the enemy's troops", which could not be crossed except by two riding abreast within musket shot. This narrows the gap in the enclosure as described by Thomas Fairfax, but agrees in detail concerning the hazard's advantage to the Parliamentarians.

In the meanwhile the foot of both sides on the right and left wings encountered each other, who fought from hedge to hedge and for a long time together overpowered and got ground of my Lord's foot, almost to the environs of his cannon; my Lord's horse (wherein consisted his greatest strength) all this while being made, by reason of the ground, incapable of charging.

After a while, the musketeers in the Royalist foot gave place to the pikemen, apparently a deliberate manouevre, against the enemy's left, and particularly those of my Lord's own regiment, which were all stout and valiant men, who fell so furiously upon the enemy, that they forsook their hedges and fell to their heels. At which very instant my Lord caused a shot or two to be made by his cannon against the body of the enemy's horse, drawn up within cannon shot, which took so good effect, that it disordered the enemy's troops.

The enemy horse against which the ordnance was fired must have been Sir Thomas Fairfax's troops, if his anecdote is anything to go by. In the disorder that suddenly prevailed amongst those cavalry my Lord's horse got over the hedge, not in a body (for that they could not), but dispersedly two on a breast; and as soon as some considerable number was gotten over, and drawn up, they charged the enemy, and routed them. So that in an instant there was a strange change of fortune, and the field totally won by my Lord, notwithstanding he had quitted 7000 men, to conduct her Majesty, besides a good train of artillery, which in such a conjuncture would have weakened Caesar's army.

It is worthy of note that the Duchess, intentionally on her husband's advice, or because she did not know of it, omitted to mention her husband's own gallantry in the fight. Yet, in the preamble to Newcastle's patent as Marquis drawn up in October following, it was stated
our Army was so prest upon, that the soldiers now seemed to think of flying; He, their General, with a full Career, commanding Two Troops to follow him, broke into the very Rage of the Battle, and, with so much violence, fell upon the Right Wing of those Rebels, that those...turned their Backs...(80)

Newcastle's action at Adwalton Moor compares with his similar display of lack of concern for his personal safety at Marston Moor almost a year later.

The Duchess concluded her account by alluding to some 3000 men taken prisoner, which does seem a little excessive, and to some 700 of the enemy killed in the field and, presumably, in the flight, which may well be near the mark.

An Express Relation of the Passages and Proceedings of his Majesty's Army, referred to previously, and probably compiled from Newcastle's own official despatch sent to Oxford, noted that after the fall of Howley bad weather forced the Royalists to remain in its vicinity for some days. At length, on the march to Bradford we found a great body of men, a greater number of foot than we, and almost all musketeers, and some twenty troops of horse, and had possessed a place called Adderton Moor, and taken the most advantageous places thereof, and lined several hedges with musketeers, and played so fiercely upon us, and that before the whole body of our foot could be drawn up, and their horse likewise possessing a plain field and a great ditch betwixt us and lined with musketeers, and keeping our horse in a ground full of pits, that for the space of two hours or thereabouts we were forced to give ground, though very little.

This agrees so closely with the Duchess, that she may well have consulted the document in compiling her own account. The repeated assertion that the enemy foot were either more numerous than the Royalists or, if not numerically superior, better armed, suggests that Stockdale expressed himself badly when alluding to 15000 Royalist foot half of which were badly armed. He may have mean to say that of an army 15000 strong, half (7000) were ill armed foot. If this is so, it means that allowing for recruiting after the Queen's march south with her escort, Newcastle's infantry at the start of June may have numbered almost 12000 to 14000 men. If this interpretation of Stockdale is accepted, it would give the Parliamentarians superior fire power, in which the Royalists were deficient and hence their reliance upon pikes to turn the tide of the battle, as described by the Duchess.

When, An Express Relation goes on, the Royalist ordnance was in place, and the foot properly drawn up, within the space of half an hour Fairfax's wing was broken and pursued, the killing going on far beyond the moor. Some 1400 prisoners were taken (a more credible figure perhaps), but the victors had "many soldiers hurt, two colonels of horse slain...and some officers hurt". Among these latter were colonels William Throckmorton, Francis Carnaby and
Captain, later Colonel Sir William, Mason, "all recoverable". Killed on the field were a score of Royalist rank and file, which seems too low for the intensity of the fighting.

Sir Henry Slingsby provides the last Royalist account of any merit, important because it is evident that he was there, and because he witnessed the earl of Newcastle's courage. He also made the shrewd observation that in fact, neither side knew of the other's intention to give battle. 

they both draw out, his excellency thinking to find Lord Fairfax within his fortifications; my Lord Fairfax draws out, advancing forwards towards his camp where his excellency lay. The forlorn hope of his excellency's army met unexpectedly with ye van of ye enemy. They skirmish & are put to retreat. He encourageth his men & puts ye enemy to a stand. They come on fiercer, & beats enemy from hedge to hedge, from one house to another; at last they are driven to retreat & we recover ye moor: there ye enemy had like to have gain'd our cannon; but was manfully defended by a stand of Pikes; so now ye battle began to decline on ye other part, so yt their reserve was sent for; but seing Lieutenant General King advance with all ye horse yt remain'd & wheling about to get between ye town and their forces, & also ye colours advancing in a thick body up ye hill, (for all ye musquaters were drawn out to equall their shots,) Stockdaile who stood at my Lord Fairfax's elbow, adviseth my Lord not to hazard ye rest, seing all was lost, but to shift for himself: so yt they were totally rout'd...

Accepting Slingsby's usual reliability, and bearing in mind Stockdale's statement that Lord Fairfax was last on the field, then Sir Thomas must have taken flight before the battle was conclusively lost. Perhaps he even precipitated the utter collapse of the Parliamentarians.

The battle of Adwalton Moor had not been looked for, and initially the Royalists received a setback by virtue both of the conditions of the terrain and their lack of musketeers. They they eventually turned the tide was due to a combination of circumstances. The earl of Newcastle's personal example, perhaps together with that of the mysterious 'Skirton' (for we must suppose these were two separate incidents), leading on the pikemen who proved too much for the enemy; the outflanking movement by James King which took advantage of an enemy over-reaching themselves; and the collapse of Fairfax's wing under severe pressure (an experience he was to expect at Marston Moor in 1644 where the terrain was against him). Treachery had nothing to do with it, although the story received great attention in the cloth towns:

there was one Major Jeffries [Major General Giffard] keeper of the ammunition, who, proving treacherous, and withholding it from the parliament's men, who called for it, and could get none, were forced to slacken their firing; which the enemy perceiving, and probably had private notice from the traitor, they presently faced about and fell upon Fairfax's men, with that fury, that they presently regained their guns...
The writer erroneously stated earlier that the Royalist ordnance had actually been captured.

...and put them to the route...(84)

This story is a nonsense. If the Parliamentarians ran out of ammunition for their muskets, it was due to heavy expenditure during the fighting, for each musketeer carried an average of 12 shot in a leather pouch, and 12 charges of powder, perhaps with a little extra of both essentials. Giffard was not a traitor - he was a victim of Thomas Fairfax's paranoia over Cholmeley and events in Hull - and was to acquit himself bravely in the months ahead without any further aspersions cast upon him, even by Fairfax.

Lord Fairfax and his son stood on the brink of destruction. The Lancashire forces for the most part fled back to their native county and there prepared to defend themselves. Rosworm, hearing that Halifax had been lost to the advancing Royalists, informed himself of the nature of the passes, by which the Enemy could most easily come in upon us; and finding them capable of a sudden Fortification...I quickly helped Nature with Art, strengthening Blackeston Edge, and Blackegate, and manning them with Souldiers...(85)

Halifax was not yielded without a fight apparently. Hanson, in his popular history of the town, relates the existence of a "Blood Field" which was to be the site of a school. During the digging of foundations, musket shot, broken swords, horse shoes and suchlike were found.

The victory of Adwalton was followed by a complete rout of the broken Parliamentary army at Bradford, into which place they had fallen for security. "What a sad discouraging daye was that!" wrote Joseph Lister, a Bradford man, "all the Lancashire men, horse and foot, ran away home, and could by no means be persuaded to stay in Bradford". As with Adwalton, the details can best be given by examination, first of the Parliamentarian sources (such as they are) and then of the victorious Royalist accounts.

Sir Thomas Fairfax must again be turned to for the fullest narrative of the Parliamentarian side, although it will be necessary to go back to Joseph Lister's account for a civilian rather than a military point of view.

Leaving 800 foot and 60 horse in Bradford, Lord Fairfax made his way rapidly to Leeds, ostensibly to secure that town, in reality to make a progress towards Hull and refuge; for there, the conspiracy of Sir John Hotham who had anticipated a Royalist victory and had tried to look to his own safety, had come to nothing. His plan to turn the port over to the Royalists had been foiled, and had no material influence on Royalist strategy. For three or four days, the earl of Newcastle drew up his siege lines around Bradford and ordered his cannon raised on the hills "with in halfe a musket shott", commanding all the town. From two such vantage points, a bombardment began...
whilst feigned attacks caused the defenders to spend ammunition freely.

Or little store was not above 25 or 30 Barrels of powder at ye Beginning of ye Siege; yet notwithstanding ye E. of Newcastle sent a Trumpett to offer us conditions...

Fairfax agreed to surrender provided satisfactory conditions could be worked out, and sent two officers to confer with the earl. During this parley, however, Fairfax observed that the Royalists continued with their siege preparations "contrary to agreement" as he claimed, causing Fairfax to suspect something was afoot. He sent for the Royalist spokesman again, who came at 11 at night and returned "sleight answer" to Sir Thomas's questions.

The warm summer's night was shattered by a bombardment of Cannon and musketry.

All ran presently to ye workes wch ye enemy was storming.

Here for 3 Quarters of an hour was very hott servise; but at length they retreated. They made a 2d attempt, but were also beaten off. After this, we had not above one barrell of powder, & no match...

Fairfax called his officers together, and concerted a plan to evacuate the town before dawn broke, using darkness as a cover. It would mean fighting their way through a point in the Royalist lines, with an element of surprise. The infantry were infiltrated to the outside of the works by little lanes "to beat up ye Dragoones Quarter & so to goe on to Leeds". Fairfax himself and some officers, with the cavalry, chose to take a more open route, firstly sending out scouts to discover the Royalist dispositions. They reported a body of cavalry on a hill close to the route Fairfax proposed to take. All this had taken so long, that dawn was breaking when Fairfax rode out with him, and he had barely gone 40 yards when the guard on the hill was seen. He reckoned them to be 300 strong. Backed by David Foulis and the 'traitor' Giffard, whose time for changing sides had come and gone, Fairfax charged them with 12 horse, Sir Thomas and three others cutting their way through with the impetus of surprise.

Behind him, the Royalists recovered, fell upon the bulk of the cavalry, and killed or took them, capturing also Fairfax's wife, whom he had abandoned in the fray.

Sir Thomas's dismay, and self-reproach, can be imagined, but it was too late to do anything. He could, after all, trust to the earl of Newcastle's generosity towards ladies, in which trust he was not mistaken. Pausing to look back, Fairfax was left behind by his two companions, who galloped on for Leeds, but he eventually trailed after them unmolested.

Once again, his infantry fared badly, as they had done at Seacroft. At first, they succeeded in beating the Royalist dragoons, but panic seized the rearguard and the whole body fell back into the town where, next day, they were all made prisoners. Some 80 or so of the most forward kept going,
and finally came to Leeds, "all mounted on horses wch they had taken from ye enemy, where I found ym wth I came thither, wch was some joy to ym, all concluding I was either slain or taken prisoner". These fugitives must have captured the dragoons' horses, but even so, that they should have come to Leeds before Sir Thomas is doubtful.

Joseph Lister gave a clearer description of events in Bradford:

At last a little army was formed, and got to the works and centrries, but Sir Thomas Fairfax was forced another way, and so got to Halifax, with those few horse he had left, and he came to Bradford the next day; whose coming did greatly hearten the soldiers in the town; but alas! their joy was but short, the enemies were encamped at Bowling-Hall, so near the town on that side of it, that they planted some of their guns against the town, and some against the steeple, and gave it many a sad shake.

Bowling Hall was the home of a Royalist colonel, the Recusant Richard Tempest, who had long been a prisoner in enemy hands. The 'joy' of the defenders or citizens of Bradford that was so short lived was not necessarily upset by the Royalist preparations - they surely expected to have to fight - but by Thomas Fairfax's decision to leave the town to its own devices. Lister may fairly represent the general view of the civilians that, after supporting and financing the Parliamentary army for so long and so loyally, they were now being left in the lurch by those very forces at a time when they were most needed.

Great wool packs were tied to the steeple to resist cannon shot, but Royalist marksmen shot the cords that held them in place "and shouted full loudly when the pack fell down". On the Sunday morning, a drum was beaten by the Royalists to call for a parley, to which Thomas Fairfax referred. Fairfax also alluded to continued warlike preparations going on whilst talks were in progress, and Lister detailed these

all that day (during the parley) they spent in removing their guns, just against the heart of the town, and into the mouth of it, into that end of the town called Goodman-end, and also brought their army, both horse and foot, round about the town, no way being left of making their escape, and but few men in the town, and most of the arms and ammunition, being either lost, or left at Adwalton, and no match but what was made of untwisted cords dipped in oil.

At sundown the parley broke up, and the cannonade began, the first shot killing three men "sitting on a bench...before the inhabitants were aware". For much of the night, the sky was lit up by the explosion of the guns firing repeatedly. The townsmen now realised that they were going to be deserted by the soldiers

in the dead of the night the captains were called, and a council sat to resolve what was best to be done; it was presently resolved that the soldiers should be told they must all shift for themselves, only the officers were resolved to make a desperate adventure of breaking
through the enemies army. This is not quite how Fairfax told the story, and whatever he may have intended Lister's recollection must represent the view of the rank and file and the townspeople. The soldiers, left to their own devices, "broke through and made their way by dint of sword, and so got away towards Hull". Lister graphically described the terror in the town:

Oh! what a night and morning was that in which Bradford was taken! what weeping, and wringing of hands! none expecting to live any longer than till the enemies came into the town, the Earl of Newcastle having charged his men to kill all... and to give them all Bradford quarter, for the brave Earl of Newport's sake.

There is no evidence that any such order was given, and Lister went on to admit that it was "retracted" as a result of a disturbing dream the earl had that very night whilst at Bowling Hall. The likely truth is that the Bradford townspeople, responsible for the brutal killing of a Royalist officer in 1642, now expected retribution; but the earl of Newcastle was not a vengeful man. Lister admitted that when the town was entered

Some desperate fellows wounded several persons, that died of their wounds afterwards; but I think not more than half a score were slain.

It was more than Bradford expected and, in military terms, more than they were entitled to expect, having resisted an overwhelming enemy without hope of relief. The earl of Newcastle's humanity was not unique during the civil war but it requires mention. Lister, however, although fair, could not attribute this mercy to Newcastle's natural disposition but instead gave thanks to "God, who tied their hands, and saved our lives".

Lister's own adventures during the entry to the town are lengthy and do not strictly concern what is Royalist military history. He got away to Colne and eventually returned to Bradford

and found few people left, but most of them scattered and fled away. I lodged in a cellar that night, but oh! what a change was made in the town in three days time! nothing was left to eat or drink, or lodge upon, the streets being full of chaff, and feathers, and meal, the enemies having emptied all the town of what was worth carrying away, and were now sat down and encamped near Bowling Hall, and there kept a fair and sold the things that would sell.

To turn, now, to the Royalist accounts, the primary of these is that of the Duchess, although for events directly prior to the evacuation of the town by Fairfax, it is lamentably brief.

my Lord caused his army to be rallied, and marched in order that night before Bradford, with an intention to storm it the next morning: but the enemy that were in the town, it seems, were so discomfited, that the same night they escaped all various ways, and amongst them the... General of the Horse, whose lady being behind a servant on horseback, was taken by some of my Lord's soldiers, and brought to his quarters, where she was treated and attended with all civility and respect,
and within a few days sent to York in my Lord's own coach, and from thence very shortly after to Kingston-upon-Hull, where she desired to be attended by my Lord's coach and servants.

Having entered Bradford, the very presence of the Royalists caused the enemy to quit Wakefield and Leeds hastily and to make their way towards Hull.

An Express Relation is more detailed:

That night we came before Bradford, a strong town, and ill approaching to it, yet we made our approaches that night, the next day we had placed our cannon and made places of batteries very near the town and church, where they had two drakes upon the top of the steeple, and lined the steeple with woolpacks; yet our cannon dismounted their drakes upon the top of the steeple, and battered the steeple so as none could stay on it, where they had many musketeers, and so we got both the ends of the town before Sunday night. (91)

Sir Thomas Fairfax's escape from Bradford was by no means the end of his immediate troubles. Somehow, he and his father with their men had to cover the open country between Leeds and Hull, their destined place of refuge.

My Lord, knowing they would make their escape thither, as having no other place of refuge to resort to, sent a letter to York to the Governor of that City, to stop them in their passage; yet by neglect of the post, it coming not timely enough to his hands, his design was frustrated. (92)

There is no doubt that the apprehension of the Fairfaxes, or even the death of Thomas, would have brought the northern Parliamentarian cause down in ruin. The governor at York, Sir Thomas Glemham, may not have had opportunity to intercept, but there were roving cavalry forces lying around Selby which, if not taken by surprise, might have interfered successfully. To return to Sir Thomas's own narrative

At Leeds, The Council of War newly risen, where it was resolved to quit ye Towne & make or Retreat to Hull (whch was 60 miles off, and many garrisons of ye enemy in ye way) whch in 2 hours time was done; for we could expect no less yn ye enemy should presently send Horse to prevent it, for they had 50 or 60 Troops within 3 miles.

Nonetheless, they came safely to Selby, although the town was under some surveillance from the Royalist forces quartered at Cawood Castle. Lord Fairfax, pressing on ahead, had reached the Ouse ferry, when Royalist cavalry were reported nearby, and word immediately sent to Sir Thomas, bringing up the rear. Immediately, Thomas and 40 horse hastened to provide cover, the rest following on as best they could. Drawing up in the market place of Selby, under the shadow of the abbey church, Sir Thomas confronted three troops of horse, who hesitated, giving him time to charge them. Split in half, the Royalists scattered, some down the road towards Brayton with Sir Thomas in pursuit, but the rest of the Parliamentary horse arriving in the town, and misunderstanding the situation, failed to second their commander, in the belief that he was having the worst of it and they "under discouragement of ye misfortunes of many days before". At the end of the street going to Brayton
a lane turned off towards Cawood, and here the Royalists came to a stand when
hand to hand fighting ensued.

Here, Sir Thomas was badly wounded in the wrist, and had to withdraw from
the action for attention. In the meantime, the bulk of the Parliamentary
horse rallied, and drove the Royalists back towards Cawood. Lord Fairfax
had succeeded in embarking himself and his men on the ferry and so was safely
on the way to Hull, but Sir Thomas was obliged to ride overland towards the
port, continually harassed by Royalist cavalry attacks until, at Barton, he
was able to reach a Parliamentary ship anchored there and, with a great
stroke of good fortune, escaped.

An Express Relation described the situation in Leeds at the time that
the Parliamentarians fled from the town on the first stage of their journey
east.

came a captain of ours, who among divers others prisoners at
Leeds, finding that my Lord Fairfax and his son were inclined
to leave the town (as they did) attended with three or four
troops of horse, 200 dragooners, and 300 foot, broke out of
prison, possessed themselves of the magazine, took all the arms,
which were 1500 at least, eight barrels of powder, and 12 pieces
of ordnance, with a very great proportion of match and ball,
and so kept the town till I sent forces into it, besides the
enlarging of 700 prisoners there.

It requires no very great stretch of the imagination to picture the scene of
confusion and panic in Leeds, made much worse by the jubilant Royalist captives
who must have been exchanging fire with the fleeing enemy. Lord Fairfax lost
his 300 foot in the process, who "run away from him". An Express Relation
admitted the reverse sustained at Selby by the Cawood cavalry, but added that
in the panic-stricken urge to escape many of the Parliamentarians were drowned
by falling from the ferry or by trying to swim the river. On the same day,
Lord Fairfax's house at Denton was taken, although whether it was actively
defended is not known for sure.

Slingsby's account of the enemy flight to Hull is a little more anecdotal
than his usual style:

\[Sir Thomas\] comes to Leeds to his father, ill accoutr'd,
    having broke his stirrop and lost his Pistoles; wh he
came to his father he found him resolved to fly to Hull,
    wh he endeavour'd to diswade but could not; my Ld like an
old Gamester knew y' hazard of venturing on still upon hard
luck; so having really'd up all their remaining horse makes
for Hull with all speed....

Slingsby confirmed that Newcastle sent word to York to have their flight
intercepted, but that the orders were "ill obey'd and slowly taken", hence the
defeat sustained by unsupported cavalry in Selby market place.

It was a staggering, sweeping series of triumphs that the earl had
achieved, and is not to be underestimated. He had recovered from the loss of
Wakefield and the departure of the Queen with consummate ease, and had capitalised at last upon initial advantage. His army was exuberant:

The late victory...gave new strength courage & health to every soulgier; & he yt before was mutinous against his officer, & faine would be discharged, began to like better of his employment, & more content'd wth his pay; imputing it to his living idle & not employ'd yt bred such bad humours in him...Now ye country was clear to ye very gates of Hull (saving only Wressel Castle) & no enemy to oppose. wch moved his excellency to march out and visit Darbyshire...(93)

The question now, was, how would the earl exploit his victory, for all would hinge upon his next decision.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR:

1. EMC 13th Report Portland Mss., I, p. 106. The letter is damaged and has gaps as I have indicated.
3. Ibid.
5. T.T. E 95 (9)
9. Firth, Cholmeley's Narrative, p. 570.
10. M.A., 31.3.43, Sir Hugh's character and career are dealt with in Vol. 2 under his regiment of horse.
12. Markham, Life of Fairfax, pp. 95/7.
13. M.A., 4.4.43, p. 174. The enemy tried to fire Cawood in the process of leaving, but failed.
18. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 20.
24. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 45.
25. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 20/2.
29. M.A., 9.5.43.
30. Gatty, A. ed: Joseph Hunter's Hallamshire. The History and Topography of Sheffield in the County of York, 1869, p. 133. This important local history contains virtually all of the relevant military correspondence of Major Thomas Beaumont, desposited in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Several letters, given in full by Hunter, refer to the manufacture of munitions.
31. Ibid., p. 135.
32. M.A., 28.5.43, p. 284.
33. LJ VI, p. 66.
35. Green, Letters of Henrietta Maria, pp. 188/93.
37. LJ VI, pp. 66/7.
40. The unidentified ensigns were: Vavasor, Maskew, Duckett, Stockhall, Baldwinston (given twice? also as Ballinson), Davis, Carr, Gibson, Smelt, Smithwaite and Halliburton.
41. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 22/3.
Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 45/6. Captain John Hotham had been beaten by a Royalist force on May 18th somewhere between Hull and Lincoln, losing 60 dead and wounded, see Philip, I.G. ed: Journal of Sir Samuel Luke, Oxfordshire Record Society, 1947-53, p. 78. However, it must be said that Luke recorded more rumour than truth when noting northern events.

43. Green, Lady, The Old Hall at Heath, Wakefield 1889, p. 35.

44. M.A., 28.5.43, pp. 283/4.

45. Wilkinson, J., Worsborough, its Historical Associations, 1872, p. 131. Like many local historians, Wilkinson failed to give his source.


47. CSPD 1641/3, p. 465.

48. T.T. E 106 (3) Another Miraculous Victory.

49. Lumb, Leeds Parish Registers, p. 163.

50. M.A., 4.4.43, p. 175, and 29.4.43, p. 219.

51. The details of this particular incident are covered in Vol. 2, see Haggerston's Foot.

52. T.T. E 59 (6) A True Relation of Very good service done.

53. CSPD 1645/7, p. 500.

54. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 23, 27 f.n.

55. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 95.


60. Musgrave Ms.

61. T.T. E 60 (4) Two Letters...from Sir Hugh Cholmelay to Captain Gotherick.


63. HMC 7th Report, Lowndes Mss., p. 553.

64. M.A., 8.7.43, p. 358.


68. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 95.

69. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 415.

70. M.A., 27.6.43, p. 337.

71. Markham, Life of Fairfax, p. 103.

72. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 96.

73. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, p. 145 q. Continuation of certain Special Passages.

74. Ibid., p. 146, q. Parliamentary Scout No. 2.

75. Ibid., p. 228, Good Service Hitherto Ill Rewarded.

76. Sir Thomas's account is Fairfax Memoir, pp. 213/4.


80. Collins, Historical Collections, p. 31.

81. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 24/5.

82. Ibid., pp. 215/7.

83. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 96/7.


85. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, p. 228 q. Good Service Hitherto Ill Rewarded.


90. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 25/6.

91. Ibid., pp. 216/7.


93. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 97/9.
It cannot have been long after the triumphs at Adwalton and Bradford, that Sir Philip Warwick came from Oxford on the King's behalf to confer with the earl of Newcastle. As Warwick himself explained it, his purpose was to persuade the earl to march south with his successful army, sweeping the countryside towards London in conjunction with the movements of the Oxford army. It has already been explained that this could have been done after Seacroft if Leeds had but been taken, contrary to the advice of James King. After Adwalton, it was even more feasible, for the disaster that had befallen the Parliamentarian army in Yorkshire would take a long time to repair.

Warwick claimed that the earl was not happy with the idea, chiefly because, as Warwick suspected, he had no desire to come under the command of Prince Rupert. Certainly, the earl was jealous of his own authority, and after the defeat on Marston Moor, when he felt that his rank and service had been ignored, chose exile rather than to continue with his reputation tarnished, as he believed. This has been seen as a failing in the earl, which it in a sense was, for it meant that he could not be expected to co-operate with other commanders in a shared command, a type of 'lone wolf' attitude that can lose wars. Warwick felt so, believing that by his reluctance to go south, the earl brought upon himself the defeat on Marston Moor, the loss of the north and, by inference, the defeat of the Royalists as a whole.

Newcastle's attitude was not, however, altogether negative. He told Warwick that so soon as Yorkshire was secured, by which he must have meant the reduction of Hull, then, with the Northumberl and Durham regiments of his original army, he would move south as requested.

In view of the gradual loss of the initiative by the army over the ensuing months, Warwick's assertions demand consideration. On his part, he could point to the very positive achievements of the earl. The Parliamentary army was broken and what remained of it, shut up within Hull. The populous areas of the West Riding were firmly under Royalist control. The Lancashire forces had barricaded themselves inside their own county and did not dare to venture forth. Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland and Durham were secure. To Oxford eyes - to Warwick's eyes - nothing could be more propitious for a successful campaign to the south.

Newcastle and James King could argue fairly easily against the Oxford viewpoint. Hull, after all, remained in enemy hands, the more firmly so since the overthrow of the Hothams. The port, which could be supplied by sea and
from across the Humber, was a potential threat in the rear, and could, given time, undo all the work done in Yorkshire whilst the earl was away in the south. It might even necessitate his return north, with everything to do again.

Weighing the two views, accepting that there must have been considerations of which we cannot be aware, it does look as if Newcastle was right. Had it been possible to isolate Hull, to invest it by sea as well as from land, then by leaving the Yorkshire regiments behind him, the earl could have marched away without anxiety as to what was happening. Such full scale investment was out of the question, and not only because of the Parliamentary control of the sea and the cross-Humber route - Lincolnshire could, after all, be cleared by the earl as he moved south. Newcastle's army was, as we know, ill armed, at least where the infantry were concerned. A sizeable train of artillery had gone with the Queen, and without artillery a siege was pointless. The earl would have had to fight his way toward London, and would in consequence have had to be sparing in what experienced troops he could afford to leave in Yorkshire.

Warwick's idea - the scheme of the Oxford council of war - was, though it looked good on paper and answered many needs, strategically and practically sound, beyond realisation. To borrow a phrase, there was no such thing in the field.

Warwick's charge that, by his refusal, the earl brought about the defeat on Marston Moor, cannot be ignored. Sir Philip implied that a decisive move south would have broken Parliament's armies and have forced a peace, which in turn would have meant no Scottish invasion in 1644; even when the Scots did come, they dragged their feet with painful slowness. Following Warwick's assumed reasoning, Parliament was given time to organise a Scottish invasion, which in its turn, led to the Marston Moor defeat. By this approach, we are already one step removed from Warwick's direct connection of events, and closer analysis confirms this. The Scottish invasion was to lead indirectly to the siege of York, which in its turn necessitated the relief march by Rupert, which in its turn led to the battle on Marston Moor. Yet the real cause of the siege of York was Newcastle's rapid retreat from Durham occasioned by the loss of the Yorkshire army, or a good part of the infantry of that army, together with the then governor of York and many of his leading commanders, at Selby in April 1644. This will be dealt with later: suffice it now to say, that Warwick's observations suffer from a falacious deduction. In choosing not to march south, the earl of Newcastle chose correctly. He doubtless hoped to mop up in other counties for which he was directly responsible (Lancashire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire) and cut off the Humber to Parliamentary ships. If that was his objective, success was within his reach. That he failed to capitalise upon his victories was a result of dispersal of effort, lack of co-ordination, and hesitation on the part of the Yorkshire high command, for which faults Newcastle must bear partial responsibility.
The overwhelming impression gathered from a study of the Royalist campaigns after Adwalton is one of surprise that so little was, in fact, done with the victory. To speak of a struggle for supremacy between the two sides in the north, when one was so thoroughly routed and demoralised, ought not to be possible, but all the evidence indicates that there is no alternative. The Royalist army, attempting too much at once, dispersing its forces into neighbouring counties, virtually threw away its advantages one by one. The earl and his advisors ought to have opted for a definite policy and to have followed it single-mindedly, once they had resolved not to march south. They ought to have gone directly for Hull, rather than to leave it until late in September, perhaps with a diversionary movement over the Humber to keep Cromwell and other Parliamentarian commanders fully occupied with their own area. An alternative might have been to revive Royalism in Lancashire, perhaps by a circuitous march through Derbyshire and into Cheshire which could have been assisted by the North Wales Royalists. What in fact happened was that the earl attempted all things at once, with the exception of the siege of Hull which was left so late, that it took place in poor conditions and improved enemy circumstances and was doomed from the start. Whilst it is true that for much of the rest of 1643 the Royalists in the north retained the superiority they had won in June, it was a superiority almost always under attack from an enemy which, if routed, was not thoroughly beaten. Was Newcastle to blame for this? Superficially, the answer must be that he was; and yet, as has been shown and as will become further apparent, aware of his own limitations, he relied heavily upon his professional staff, notably James King. Their caution doubtless communicated itself to the earl who, as was seen in November 1642 during the talks with the Yorkshire gentry, was by nature wary of committing himself entirely to one line of action. Laudable in its way, in that options thus remain open, at times such equivocation can be fatal. Such a time came in the months following Adwalton, and the extreme caution of the Royalist high command in the north must be blamed for the frittering away of earlier success.

Yet such criticism is, after all, with the venerable 'benefit of hindsight'. In following the columns of Newcastle's hopeful army from July to December, we are following men who saw for the first time, and with good reason, clear signs of ultimate overall victory over Parliament.

The Royalists lay about Bowling Hall for some days after the capture of Bradford, and it was there that the Council of War must have met to consider the next move. A summons was sent to Manchester on the 4th or 5th of July:

> I presume you are not ignorant of the success it hath pleased Almighty God to give unto his Majesty's army under my command, and the great desire I have to avoid the effusion of Christian blood, which moves me before I proceed any further towards you, to make you an offer
of his Majesty's grace and mercy. If you will submit yourselves, lay down your arms, so unjustly taken up in contempt of the law of this Kingdom, and immediately return to your due allegiance, his Majesty is graciously pleased to authorise me to receive you into his favour and protection, which I am as willing to do as to enforce your obedience. If you will refuse, I cannot but wonder, whilst you fight against the King and his authority, you should so boldly offer to profess yourselves for King and Parliament, and most ignominiously scandalise this army with the title of Papists, when we venture our lives and fortunes for the true Protestant religion established in this kingdom. Be no longer deceived, for the blood that shall be shed in this quarrel will assuredly fall on your own heads. I have no other ends in this but to let you see your error, if you please; for my condition is such that I need not court you; if not, let me receive your answers by this messenger, and you may expect to find little favour (if you force my nature) but such as is due to high contemners of his Majesty's grace and favour now offered to you...(2)

That the earl drew up this summons himself, and probably dictated it to his secretary, is indicated by the wording. It reveals the views and opinions of the earl far more clearly than much contained in his wife's biography of him, the extreme simplicity of the decision which he took to serve the King rather than to remain neutral. It should not be supposed, however, that the simplicity of that decision betrayed a want of political acumen. The decision to follow the King taken by a majority in 1642 was a traditional expression of loyalty: only the Parliamentarians really required to set forth in detail their motives for taking up arms. Newcastle believed that his actions had been poorly understood or deliberately misrepresented, hence his sensitivity over the papist issue. The earl and many of his commanders saw themselves, justifiably, as defenders of the Anglican tradition: the Recusant and covert Catholic officers, whilst hardly defending that, were fighting, if not solely out of loyalty to the throne, then against a system that, from everything that had gone before, threatened to be even more tyrannical in their imposition of the penal laws than the Stuarts, in their half-hearted way, had been. In Puritan eyes, on the other hand, the alignment of Laudian Anglicans and Catholics presented a threat for the future. Whatever other problems might be ironed out as prelude to peace in 1643/4, that of religion was insurmountable. It was a question in the summer of 1643, not of how peace might be achieved, but in fact, whether either side knew it or not, a question of which side would secure the armed victory that would enable it to impose conditions and to enforce them. The town of Manchester refused the summons.

From that summons it would seem that Lancashire was to be Newcastle's next objective, but such attempts as there were, were minor. Nor are the exact dates of those attempts known. The Lancashire Parliamentarians do not seem to have planned to fight it out along the border of the county. There were a mere 1200 in Rochdale, and some 800 stationed on Blackstone Edge where
Rosworm had thrown up works. Some time before July 17th, 200 horse ventured to the edge from Bowling Hall, but were repulsed with losses. Reports boasted of Parliamentarian successes at Colne, Clitheroe and Thornton as well. This does not sound like a definite opening to a long campaign, and to send cavalry against earthen defences without support from infantry argues that Newcastle was merely probing to the west. No plans to make Manchester come to heel can have been seriously considered, which seems surprising. The reason may be that the earl and his advisors, like the King at Oxford, did not really consider Lancashire's part in the war to be all that important, and now that it was lost to them as a recruiting ground, they would leave the Royalists there to their own devices. Such an attitude is hard to understand without knowing in more detail the precise strategic thinking behind it. It is also puzzling that no effort was ever made to persuade Sir Philip Musgrave to leave Cumbria and to take a limited offensive south. It is almost as if the war stopped where the high Pennines started.

From Bowling, a summons was also sent to the Parliamentarian garrison in Middleham Castle in Wensleydale. The old Neville fortress was a strong position to hold, but just when the enemy occupied it is unknown. It may have been entered in the wake of Adwalton and the fall of Bradford, the result of panic amongst North Riding Parliamentarians. What possible value there could otherwise be in holding such a place is hard to say, but whether the summons, worded like that sent to Manchester, was refused is not clear.

At the end of July, the Skipton garrison made a raid against Thornton, to the house of Sir William Lister. This is probably the engagement alluded to by the Parliamentarian pamphleteers earlier. The house was taken after some fighting, in which a Parliamentarian captain was killed. The parish registers of Thornton record 13 soldiers buried in July 26th, and those for Skipton have a "Wm. Gill, a soldier, slain at Thornton".

It may have been developments in Lincolnshire which distracted the earl from an attack on Lancashire. The Duchess implied as much in her account:

My Lord, receiving news that the enemy had made an invasion into the next adjoining county of Lincoln, where he had some forces, he presently despatched his Lieutenant-General of the Army away with some horse and dragoons, and soon after marched thither himself with the body of the army, being earnestly desired by his Majesty's party there.

It will be remembered that on her march south, the Queen had left behind in the county Charles Cavendish and some 2000 men to strengthen the Royal forces raised there, although Cavendish himself had wished to continue his journey to Oxford. The Royalist commander in Lincolnshire, responsible to the earl of Newcastle, was Robert Pierrepont earl of Kingston, whose active Royalism had come about slowly although by July 1643, he was absolutely committed.
On or around the 16th July, the earl of Kingston had been attacked at Gainsborough and captured. Charles Cavendish, contrary to orders, at once went onto the offensive, and on July 28th was beaten in battle by the combined forces of Lord Willoughby, John Meldrum and Oliver Cromwell who had come from Grantham, on a site two miles from Gainsborough. Charles Cavendish was himself killed in the action, cut from his horse and shot to death where he lay. With him died a colonel, a lt. colonel, a major and 200 soldiers. Some 150 men were captured.

Following after James King, Newcastle ferried his forces into Lincolnshire over a bridge of boats, and, to continue the Duchess's narrative:

The forces which my Lord had in the same county, commanded by the then Lieutenant-General of the Horse, Mr. Charles Cavendish, second brother to the now Earl of Devonshire, though they had timely notice, and orders from my Lord to make their retreat to James King's forces, and not to fight... yet Cavendish being transported by his courage (he being a person of great valour and conduct) and having charged the enemy, unfortunately lost the field, and himself was slain, his horse lighting in a bog...

The triumph of the combined Parliamentary forces was short-lived. The earl, hurrying his own march, joined James King and at once sought out the enemy. Their field army dispersed rather than face him.

The first garrison took in Lincolnshire was Gainsborough, a town standing on the river Trent, wherein (not long before) had been a garrison of soldiers for his Majesty under the command of the then earl of Kingston, but surprised, and the town taken by the enemy's forces, who having an intention to convey the said earl of Kingston from thence to Hull, in a little pinnace met with some of my Lord's forces by the way, commanded by James King...

King apparently intended to bring the pinnace to a halt by firing cannon across its bows, but the gunners either aimed badly, or mistook the speed of the vessel in the current. The first shot smashed into the pinnace itself, instantly killing both the earl of Kingston and a servant with him. It was a tragic opening to the campaign.

Newcastle, approaching Gainsborough, was confronted by a show of enemy cavalry on a nearby eminence, and sent some of his own horse to test their intentions who no sooner came within their sight, but they retreated fairly so long as they could well endure; but the pursuit of my Lord's horse caused them presently to break their ranks, and fall to their heels, where most of them escaped, and fled to Lincoln...

The earl summoned Gainborough, but the governor refused to yield the town. The Royalist artillery was drawn up and positioned, and after a brief bombardment, the governor sent an offer to treat.

The Duchess maintained that her husband thought it better to agree on terms rather than to risk lives, and ordered that whilst the garrison might
depart safely, their arms must be piled in the town and left there, together with the keys. The Duchess noted that this was not done, or at least, that the garrison merely threw their weapons away anywhere and then made for safety. Sir Samuel Luke, however, recorded what he believed to be the evidence of an eye-witness that, contrary to agreed terms, Newcastle's army plundered the town and fired a part of it.16

The Duchess's interpretation of events was somewhat different, the blame for the pillage (which she admitted) being put upon "the prisoners that had been kept in the town" who, freed, "began first to plunder", whereupon they were imitated by a part of the army, "against my Lord's will and orders". What exactly happened is impossible to say, and which interpretation of events is preferred, must take into account what we know of the earl and what we know of propaganda. The Duchess was probably right.

Gainsborough having fallen on July 30th,17 it was newly garrisoned by the earl before a march on Lincoln was begun, where he entered without great difficulty, and placed also a garrison in it, and raised a considerable army, both horse and foot and dragoons, for the preservation of that county...and constituted a person of honour Commander in Chief with intention to march towards the South...

It would seem from this almost casual remark, that a definite plan had evolved in the wake of developments, but caution has to be exercised. It would appear that that which the earl had been unwilling to contemplate after Adwalton, had now become a feasible project. It may be that Newcastle had been impressed with the ease with which he had broken resistance in Lincolnshire, and hoped to use his momentum to carry him toward London whilst the enemy stood in disarray. According to the Duchess's emphases, Sir William Widdrington (the "person of honour") was to be responsible for safeguarding the earl's lines of communication with the north, his appointment part of a specific plan. Yet the fact remains that Newcastle had fulfilled none of the conditions which he had set himself as essential prerequisites for the march south when and if it took place. Hull was not reduced, nor was the Humber crossing absolutely controlled. The Yorkshire regiments, which he would have to leave behind, would have to contain Hull and resist incursions from Lancashire into the cloth town areas which would necessarily follow upon the move toward London. One could not, for example, conceive of James King approving such a strategy, so if there was any truth in what the Duchess wrote, then the plan was entirely spontaneous and probably of the earl's own contrivance. The imponderable element in the business must be whether the earl's sudden decision would have been militarily correct and have led to success. It was never put to the test, for urgent messages came from Yorkshire that the earl...
return into that county, especially upon the persuasions of the Commander in Chief of the forces left there, Glemham, who acquainted my Lord that the enemy grew so strong every day, being got together in Kingston upon Hull, and annoying that country, that his forces were not able to bear up against them; alleging withal, that my Lord would be suspected to betray the trust reposed in him, if he came not to succour and assist them; he went back...

If Glemham was responsible for the tone of the request, then Glemham knew his man, for Newcastle was sensitive on matters of personal honour and reputation. He was being politely reminded of the agreement that had brought him into the county in the previous year; but it must be asked whether the removal of the entire army back into Yorkshire (with the exception of Widdrington's forces) may not have been an over-reaction. It looks almost as if, as has been suggested, the march south was viewed so unfavourably by some of the earl's advisors, that the reports from York were seized upon as a means of blocking the new strategy.

Exactly when the earl turned back is not clear. On August 7th he was at Lincoln writing to Prince Rupert, and on or around that date a summons was delivered in the earl's name to the enemy garrison of Nottingham. Some of the Newark garrison had managed to establish an armed presence actually in the town for some time, but the earl now had neither the means nor the leisure to lay effective siege and, as with the summons to Manchester in July, it was not followed through.

"And now about this time, the 6th of August" wrote John Vicars, the Parliament being credibly and comfortably informed out of Yorkshire, that...Lord Fairfax had in much competent measure recruited his Armie at Hull, and got together some troops of horse and companies of foot, that so he might the better both increase and strengthen his forces, the Parliament sent him many muskets, Carbines, Pistolls, hooks and spiked Clubs...Roundheads...

In the moment of Parliamentary defeat, the control of the sea proved the saving element in the situation. By leaving Hull alone, the earl had given Lord Fairfax time to rebuild morale, reorganise his shattered forces, and conjure materials from the London arsenals and, probably, from across the Humber in Lincolnshire. Sir Thomas Fairfax had an active part in these developments:

Of first businesse, now, was to Raise new forces, wch, in a short time was 1500 Foot & 700 Horse. Hull being little I was sent to Beverley wth ye Horse, and 600 Foot; but my Ld Newcastle (who now looked on us as inconsiderable) was marched into Lyncolnshire; onely leaving some garrisons at Yorke & other places. (20)

It is surprising to learn that although the Parliamentarians had reoccupied Beverley sometime in July, that no record remains which suggests that Sir Hugh Cholmeley attempted to do anything about it. He was in a perfect position at Scarborough to at least harass Sir Thomas's movements, but he does not seem to
have stirred from his castle. The Parliamentarians, having now flexed their new muscles, sent a force against Stamford Bridge.

But ye enemy, upon ye Alarme, fled thither, wch put all, there, in such a feare, as they sent earnestly to desire [the earl] to returne, or ye Country would agn be lost...

It is a pity that there are not more details concerning the military preparedness of the Parliamentary forces, for on the strength of what Sir Thomas himself had to say, the governor of York might be accused of over reaction. The answer can only be that Newcastle had taken with him so many troops that Glenham doubted even the possibility of a successful defensive action, and if this was so, it argues for a lack of foresight on the part of the generals advising Newcastle. For now, a return into Yorkshire must entail the final reduction of Hull, at the end of a summer in which virtually nothing had been achieved.

There is a little evidence, not at all conclusive, that the earl had additional reasons for returning. Quantities of arms and ammunition had reached Scarborough, and with Thomas Fairfax now roving the East Riding, those supplies were in danger. It is possible that it was concern for these that reinforced appeals from York, and also that their safety may have caused Cholmeley to sit tight in Scarborough. However, the direct evidence for the return suggests otherwise, and Slingsby was certainly clear as to the motives of the Yorkshire gentry:

Lord Fairfax begins to enlarge his Quarters, & held Beverley too, & doubt'd not wthin a while to be able to visit his dearly belovId yG west Riding again. This I say [caused] Gentlemen to send to his excellency, to desire him to come back; & being come gave their opinions yt his only way would be to besiege him in Hull: & of yt opinion was Leivenetan General King...(22)

There had also been an incursion into Yorkshire from across the Pennines by a body of Lancashire troops.

This day wee were certified by Letters from Yorke, that about foure hundred of the Rebels of Lancashire came stealing into Yorkshire, hoping to have surprised some of His Majesties horse quarters about Halifax; which being timely perceived by Sir Francis Mackworth, he fell upon them and routed them, killed above forty in the place, & took fifty, the rest (as they were taught) ran away...(23)

The decision to leave Mackworth in the West Riding, of which we are not made aware until mid-August, was wise, and it indicates that the earl felt himself vulnerable in the west when he marched away into Lincolnshire. In view of this precautionary move on his part, it is surprising that no such steps were taken at least to keep watch on Hull. It was too late, now, to do anything other than follow the advice of the Yorkshire gentry and of James King. The siege of Hull was about to begin.
Newcastle's full strength during the siege was given by Vicars and Rushworth at some 15000 horse, foot and dragoons, with heavy ordnance some of which fired 36 lb. shot. Slingsby noted new recruitment for the business it might be won if ye Gentlemen would undertake to raise an addition of four to those out of ye Country. They go about it, & in several parts of ye Country sits in commission, makes great levies if they could be kept together. (25)

The siege opened with a movement on Beverley, still garrisoned by Sir Thomas Fairfax. On August 25th the main army was at Stamford Bridge, and to return to Sir Thomas's account

I lying yn at Beverley, in the way of his march, finding yt we were not able to mentaine such an open place, agt an Army, desired orders from my Father to retire back to Hull; But ye Committee there having always more mind of raising money, yn to take care of ye Soldiers...would not let any orders be given for our Retreat...The enemy marcheth from Yorke, wth his whole Army, toward us. Retreat we must not; Keep ye Towne, we could not: so, to make or Retreat more Honorable, and usefull both, I drew out all ye Horse & Dragoones, toward ye enemy, & stood drawne up by a woodside all ye night. The next morning, by Day, or Scouts and theirs fired at one another. They march on wth their whole Body, wch was about 4000 Horse, & 12000 Foot. We stood still till they were come very neare to us; I yn drew off, (having given directions before, to ye Foot, to march away toward Hull) thinking to make good ye Retreat wth ye Horse. The enemy, wth a good party, were upon or Rear.

Fairfax retired with the horse into Beverley and ordered the gates to be shut, only just in time. In the shooting, a Parliamentarian major and two other men were killed. The Royalist advance guard hesitated, not sure of Fairfax's dispositions, and waited for the rest of the main army a mile in the rear.

This gave our Foot some advantage in their Retreat, it being 5 miles to Hull, on narrow banks, & so fittest for or Foot. I sent ye Horse by Cottingham, an opener Road, who got well thither; But they overtook ye Foot, wch, notwithstanding, made good their Retreat till we got to a little Bridge 2 miles from Hull; where we made a stand, ye enemy following close. Here or men gave ye a good volley of Shott wch made ye draw back, & advanced no furthur; so leaving a small Guard at ye Bridge, we got safe to Hull.

Other evidence tends to contradict Sir Thomas's view of the Beverley action, notably that of Sir Henry Slingsby, who wrote

Sr. Tho. Fairfax draws out of Hull to Beverley, intending to try one encounter more wth his excellence, but being not able to keep ye feild keeps ye town; only himself wth his horse draws forth wthout ye Town, & faceth ye forces of his excellency in their advance, but forced to retreat and in conclusion quits ye Town.

If Slingsby was right - and there is other evidence to support him - then Sir Thomas had orders to resist at Beverley, hence the unwillingness of the Hull Committee to authorise his retreat. It was not a matter, as Sir Thomas in his memoir implied, simply of ignoring the decision of a committee which was out of touch with military reality. On the contrary, if the Committee was
responsible for military as well as for financial concerns, then Lord Fairfax himself must have had a voice, certainly a seat, on that committee. Sir Thomas is notably silent about his reception upon his return into Hull.

It was later charged against William Hardy, then the constable of the parish of Wetwang, that he provided intelligence relating to the defences of Beverley, to Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and was instrumental in turning the town over to the Royalists. In view of the fact that these charges were made within two years of the events, and by the victorious Parliamentary party, they must be held to indicate sabotage by Hardy of an intended stand at the town. Indeed, mere allusion to the condition of the defences supports Slingsby in his contention, and there is additional, and more damning evidence, against Sir Thomas.

Sir Thomas did not long remain in Hull. With the deliberate flooding of the countryside by the defenders when the sluices were opened, and with the Royalists raiding up to the walls, it was impossible for the cavalry to forage for their horses. Under these circumstances, the cavalry was a liability and was soon sent across the river into Lincolnshire to be of more use.

The additional evidence concerning Beverley comes in a letter written at Hull on October 29th by Robert Burton, a townsman who had experienced the vicissitudes of the siege. It is the longest and most important single source for events, beginning with a general statement of the miseries of the defenders. "Few men will be able to pay any rents", he told his friend Sir Thomas Barrington, for all the livestock had been driven away by the Royalists, the corn "lost in the fields, our hay devoured, spoiled and wasted": fed to the horses of the Royalist army and to the oxen which towed the ordnance, or thrown into ditches to make footways. This statement is of the utmost importance where Beverley is concerned.

As Burton implied, these losses of livestock and of grain were the direct consequence of the town having no time to prepare for a siege. In other words, Hull needed time to prepare, and that makes the order to Thomas Fairfax to make a stand at Beverley all the more important militarily. For clearly, if he could but hold up the Royalist advance by a resolute stand for two or three days, it would provide ample opportunity for the Hull men and the neighbouring villagers to gather their stock together within the safety of the walls. Burton indicated that it was generally expected that Newcastle would be stopped on the road, and spoke of a force sent to Beverley consisting of 1600 infantry, five field pieces, and no fewer than 20 or 21 troops of horse. If these troops were at full strength, that meant nearly 1200 cavalry. It was a fighting army, and although heavily outnumbered, might have held the town for the required time. In opting to lead his cavalry to the field and to leave the foot to their own devices, more or less, Fairfax displayed his
cavalry commander mentality to the full. If the question is asked, could he have held up so great an army by a resolute defence, the answer is explicitly in the affirmative. The history of the civil wars is replete with instances of inferior forces defying numerically superior forces by the maintenance of towns and castles. Beverley defences must have been adequate - after all, Sir Thomas himself referred to the shutting of the gates and not to putting chains or barricades across street entries. Even if the walls had been of earthen construction, so had they been at Warrington, Wigan and Preston.

The retreat from Beverley was on August 28th, according to Burton, and the pursuing Royalists were temporarily halted at Newland by musket fire, where a man and a horse went down. They fell back on Beverley which had been occupied without a shot being fired. On the 29th, the defenders made an attack towards Cottingham, which was to be the earl's own headquarters, where a body of Royalists was apparently forced to give ground before rallying and re-taking the village. This may have been the engagement involving Langdale's forces referred to by Mercurius Aulicus.

For upwards of a month, the siege was one long round of skirmishes highlighting the usual tedious business of siege operations. Occasionally, the garrison cavalry raided towards Newland, hampering fortification work there, and out to Anlaby, whilst the besiegers constructed elaborate earthen defences at Stoneferry and other places. Some forts were put up close by Hull, notably at Sculcoats, and between Hessle and the town, with an even greater work at Gallow Clowe on the Humber. A partially successful Parliamentarian raid captured some ordnance there.

From Sculcoats, the 'Queen's Pocket Pistol' fired at least 80 of its big 35 lb. balls into the town during the siege which, if they did little serious material damage - which is hard to believe, whatever the Parliamentary sources claimed - must have damaged the civilian morale. The bombardment may have been responsible for the wrecking of the northern block house and its magazine, in which five men were killed, although it was said that negligence on the part of one of the men occasioned the disaster.

With the coming of October, a cold and wet month, the fighting grew hot. On the 4th, Burton noted that 500 soldiers and townsmen volunteers raided some Royalist works, returning with prisoners. There was a report current in the town that "one Coronell Vavasor was slain and buried at Cottingham", but this is unsubstantiated. Certainly, it was not Colonel Sir Walter Vavasour of Hazelwood, who survived the war. A work at Newland, or nearby, was abandoned as a consequence of the raid, but two others were strengthened.

On the 5th the earl of Manchester, commanding in Lincolnshire and the eastern counties for Parliament, sent into Hull 1000 reinforcements under the command of the competent Sir John Meldrum. From the moment of Meldrum's
arrival - although he was technically subordinate to Lord Fairfax - the town adopted a more aggressive policy. Burton said that a sally was planned for the 7th, but that on that day the Royalists launched a sudden assault and took two outlying works, driving off the defenders in panic. On the 9th, Meldrum and, according to Burton, Lord Fairfax himself, led out the postponed sally against the West Jetty fort. The sources tend to confuse the matter of dates and it is not altogether clear whether this was merely a probing attack or the real thing, which Rushworth has on the 11th. Meldrum's own report, sent on October 14th to the Speaker, indicates that on the 9th the garrison made a direct response to the Royalist attack of two days earlier, and that in the fighting for the outlying works, three Royalist officers were killed. One of these was Captain Thomas Denton, of Sir Robert Strickland's Foot, a regiment which had lain before Hull to little purpose a year before. A stand of pikes, however, halted the attack on the 9th, drove off Meldrum's men, and led to Royalist recovery of their ground. Rumour had it that James King, engaged personally in the fighting, sustained two wounds.

It is evident that between October 7th and 11th, the fighting was so continuous that it defies a definite chronology. Rushworth has it that on the 11th, after feigning preparations to the north, the defenders suddenly marched out 1500 strong on the west, stormed and cleared the front siege lines or trenches, and then lost them again in a counter attack. The Parliamentary forces charged a second time, retook the lines, and then fell back before a fierce counter-attack, the day ending in a bloody stalemate. The fighting as described by Rushworth, and that as given by Meldrum, sound the same except for details. Burton adds local colour, alluding to the feigned movement in the north, and then to a real attack on Milton Quay where the defenders, after initial success, panicked for no reason and fell back. Meldrum rallied them, they charged again, took the works for a second time, capturing guns and 60 prisoners, and so retired into the town with honour, the Royalists reoccupying the trenches. Discouragement was rife: Royalist companies and troops fell to wholesale plunder, and in this wretched state of demoralisation, the siege was lifted on the 12th.

Slingsby's account, a gloomy despondent piece of writing, is the only worthwhile Royalist source. Newcastle, on the 18th of September, had written to Rupert that "I have no despair in time of Hull", but despair must have set in quickly enough. Slingsby:

it fell out to be an ill-season, to lay siege to yt Town yt lyeth so low and in water, ye sumer being spent & ye season falling out to be exceedingly wott; howsoever his excellence would put it to ye tryall, wt might be done, & so falls on work...

He suggests that it was the Royalist pressure which forced Fairfax into Lincolnshire, after which
at last they fight, ye enemys making sallies out to beat us from our Works, & we again attempting to take from ym their own works, & did no less, but was beaten out of ym again...

The daily, tedious, dangerous enactment of siege warfare. For a time the earl tried to fire the town with red hot cannon balls, "but they did no hurt at all".

thus having tyr'd out his soulgiers with hard duty, many falling sick with cold and wet lying, & few of ye array'd men abiding it, he was forc'd to give over ye siege...

for want of carryage was forc'd to burn his boats wch he had to march along wth him out of Northumberland for ye passing of his army at any river. (36)

The earl had burnt his boats in more ways than one. The summer had been wasted. It requires only a little imagination to picture the long columns of infantry, soaked with mist and rain, trudging back towards York. Behind them the broken landscape around Hull, the wreckage of a pointless siege marked here and there with the graves of men dead from disease as well as from wounds. Few of the Royalist commanders relaxing in the sunshine at Bowling Hall in July, would have believed that within three months their victorious colours would be smeared with the mud of the East Riding; or that the great success in Lincolnshire in August would have been undone by one minor battle fought at Winceby.

The battle of Winceby, or of Horncastle - it was fought approximately half way between the two villages - is one of the few with which we are concerned, on which any recent work has been done. The best study remains that by Burne and Young whilst Professor Holmes, in his definitive study of the Eastern Association, touched upon it briefly. The later study by Young and Richard Holmes adds little. To quote Burne and Young, "The importance of the battle of Winceby was out of all proportion to the small numbers engaged in it and to the brevity of the conflict". It has already been said that the battle virtually undid all the work done by the earl of Newcastle in Lincolnshire in August, but it is doubtful if the commanders of the Parliamentarian army expected such a result, which was anyway, in part, due to the retreat from before Hull by the main Royalist army and a general reorganisation around York.

The Duchess of Newcastle believed that the engagement was the direct consequence of diversionary tactics employed by the earl of Manchester to interfere with the siege of Hull:

The enemy...endeavoured by all means (from Hull, and other confederate places in the eastern parts of the kingdom) to form a considerable party to annoy and disturb the forces raised by my Lord in Lincolnshire...where the enemy being drawn together in a body, fought my Lord's forces in his absence, and got the honour of the day near Hornby Castle in that county; which loss caused partly by their own rashness, forced my Lord to leave his design upon Hull,
The view that Winceby occasioned, the end of Hull siege is a little too strong. That it contributed to it, in the sense that its psychological impact must have been enormous, cannot be denied. Further, it meant that Newcastle's southern flank was no longer secure, although it has to be said that the earl of Manchester showed no strong desire to take the offensive in Yorkshire. In fact, whilst it would be hard to say whether or not the Lincolnshire Parliamentary forces and their allies were in a position to do so, by not doing so, the earl of Newcastle had breathing space allowed him in which to prepare to take the offensive once more in his last winning campaign at the very end of 1643.

These observations, although pertinent, tend to take us away from the consideration of Winceby fight. The sources for the fight are several, of which, apart from the Duchess's brief reference already given, only one is Royalist, although important in that it came from the Royalist commander, Sir William Widdrington. It is also true, however, that the sources tend to confuse rather than to elucidate the issue, and it is best to give a brief summary of the action before examining the materials in any detail.

Whilst Newcastle lay before Hull, his fellow peer the earl of Manchester, was besieging King's Lynn, which capitulated on September 16th. From King's Lynn, the Parliamentarians marched into Lincolnshire where they were joined by cavalry commanded respectively by Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax. That Manchester was not initially thinking of giving battle may be demonstrated by his despatch of Meldrum and 1000 men into Hull early in October.

Manchester's apparent intention was to reduce Bolingbroke Castle, a small Royalist garrison dangerously exposed in the east of the county, and to prevent this Sir William Widdrington drew together a force composed of cavalry and dragoons with few, if any, foot, sharing his command with Colonel Sir John Henderson out of Newark and Colonel Sir William Saville. The Royalist force consisted of some 2,500 men, that of the Parliamentarians of at least 6000.

On October 10th Manchester's foot moved against Bolingbroke, whilst his cavalry commanded by Fairfax scouted towards the west to obtain the earliest possible warning of any Royalist counter-manoeuvre. On the 11th, Sir Thomas had fallen back on the main army, which concentrated around Bolingbroke, apparently unworried by the garrison within the castle, which must have been overawed. From Bolingbroke, Manchester advanced to meet the Royalists, perhaps hoping to gain advantage of terrain, whereas in point of fact, when both armies came to a standstill facing each other, both were on ridges with a valley between them. The Royalists, having now to rely entirely upon fast cavalry movement in view of the numerical superiority of their enemy, placed
their dragoons in the van (perhaps dismounted) whilst Widdrington, Henderson and Saville commanded each a division of the horse. After a lull, the dragoons of either side met in the dip in the ground, whereupon some of the Royalist cavalry advanced. They clashed with Cromwell's regiment, in which fighting Cromwell was firstly unseated when his horse was shot from under him, and then knocked to the ground by (Major) Sir Ingram Hopton, who was killed in the ensuing struggle.

Cromwell's regiments, by dint of weight, pushed their opposing cavalry back onto the main body, where some confusion ensued. Henderson, in his turn advancing, broke the resistance of some of the Parliamentarian foot, but the turning point of the action seems to have been Sir Thomas Fairfax's charge at Saville's cavalry, which may have broken without resistance, although the matter is not clear. Burne and Young accepted this story, but so did Mercurius Aulicus, at first, only to retract it subsequently, as will be seen.

Sir Thomas Fairfax's account is lengthy and should be given first consideration since, as Burne and Young forcefully argued, his action seems to have tipped the balance of the battle. The point needs stressing, in view of the claims that Cromwell was responsible for the Parliamentarian victory. This is not the place for an analysis of the respective merits of Fairfax, Cromwell and Manchester. Suffice it to say that Burne and Young cogently argued for Sir Thomas's instrumental part in the proceedings.

Sir John Henderson, according to Fairfax, had planned to intercept the Hull cavalry before they joined with the earl of Manchester's horse under Cromwell, but had failed to act. Fairfax claimed that Henderson at this point had 5000 men at his disposal which sounds excessive, for if the total Parliamentary horse at Winceby as computed by Burne and Young, came to only 1600, they can hardly have been more in number in September. Henderson, no reluctant soldier, would certainly have made some attempt against so inferior a force. From Sir Thomas's own account, however, it does seem that Henderson tried to force them to a battle but was thwarted by circumstances.

He marched 3 or 4 days near unto us, but for want of good Intelligence, we did not know so much...one morning he set upon our Guards at Horne Castle, which being but newly raised in ye Country, fled towards Lyncolne, without giving any Alarne to our Quarters, who lay dispersed & secure. But Sir John Henderson marching slowly with his Army, gave ye Alarne to some of our out Quarters, which was soon taken by all ye Rest, (but with some Disorder, before we could get into any Considerable Body).

Fairfax was saved by the timely appearance of Lord Willoughby's cavalry and dragoons, followed, after some skirmishing, by the main Parliamentarian army. Henderson under such circumstances, had no choice but to retire. Fairfax indicated that this was on the 10th of October, for he states that on the "next day" the dispositions were made for the Winceby action. Thus, according to
Fairfax, the Royalist force at Winceby was some 5000 strong at least, which cannot be right, since the Royalists were virtually all horse or dragoon, and such a substantial body of mounted men would be out of the question for a subsidiary part of the earl of Newcastle's army, if Manchester with his main body could not field much more than 2000 men. Moreover, Fairfax suggested that the Royalist commander in chief was Henderson, but this cannot have been so. That Widdrington was present we know from his despatch, and we also know that Widdrington was commander in chief in Lincolnshire, so that Henderson, out of Newark, would have come under his authority.

Lt Gen: Cromwell had ye van; I The Reserve of Horse. My Lord Manchester all ye Foot. After we had faced one another a little while, ye Forlorn Hopes began ye Fight; presently ye Bodys mett in ye plaine, where ye Fight was hott for halfe an hour, but ye we forced ye to a rout.

Fairfax gave some 200 killed and nearly 2000 prisoners, which again was excessive. "This was ye Issue of Horne Castle (or as some call it Winceby) fight".

In the quiet of the aftermath of battle, the Parliamentarians heard a distant rumble from the guns at Hull, "wch was a Sally my Father made, out of ye Towne, upon my Lord Newcastles Trenches". Fairfax concluded his account by observing that these two defeats - Winceby and Hull - kept the Royalists quiet for the rest of the year. That was far from so.

Vicars estimated the Royalist losses at 2000 horses and 1000 men taken prisoner, which may be nearer the mark, with 35 colours. They had gone into battle with the watch-word 'Cavendish' on their lips, in memory of the Royalist commander killed at Gainsborough. Like Cavendish, Widdrington was a victim of impetuosity, if the Duchess of Newcastle is to be believed. Yet it is hard to see what else Widdrington could do but give battle to an enemy dangerously close to the Royalist garrison towns in Lincolnshire.

Widdrington had not initially been with Henderson when Sir Thomas Fairfax landed from Hull, but had been at Gainsborough, which he left on September 24th with 20 troops of horse. Writing to Newcastle after the defeat, Widdrington described his force as composed of three divisions, two commanded in person by Saville, and the third, made up of elements of James King's horse and the Newark garrison. This third division was the only one to achieve anything, "But Saville's regiment totally running, disordered and so put to rout our whole Army". Mercurius Aulicus picked up the story at first, but in December retracted it as having been a false rumour. It is not clear whether this retraction was meant to vindicate Saville's regiment of horse, upon which Widdrington placed the blame, by shifting responsibility onto the Lincolnshire levies. Widdrington concluded his report by giving his strength at barely 800 men "extremely dispersed", and Henderson trying to reorganise quarters for these between Newark and Gainsborough. A second letter from
Widdrington, which fell into enemy hands, was intended for Oxford, appealing to Henry Jermyn and Patrick Ruthven to try to put pressure on Lincolnshire to the south to give the Royalists a breathing space. Of the contemporary tracts relating the battle, the best is An Exact Relation which alluded to Royalist entrenchments being raised at Wansfleet for winter quarters. Manchester's advance on Bolingbroke forced them to retire. It is not clear which Royalist forces the tract was alluding to, but the point that is raised is quite important, since it implies that Widdrington was perhaps thinking in October of merely holding his own during the winter, in which case, Manchester's advance would involve a new strategy.

The earl of Manchester's main quarters were at Kirby, a mile from Bolingbroke, with his cavalry about six miles away (under Fairfax) to watch for any Royalist approach. At Bolingbroke, about 1000 men were laying siege to the castle and to the church, which had been fortified. When the Royalist forces appeared, they marched so fast as they were discovered but two hours before they came... by which means the alarm could not be so speedily given to the horse quarters of the Earl of Manchester, so as to get into a full body before the enemy was at Horncastle. Yet such was the vigilance and industry of the Earl, that he went from his own quarters towards Horncastle upon the first alarm, and got many of his horse into a body at Horncastle town's end. This seems to be an account of events on October 10th, for which day Sir Thomas Fairfax has little to say.

Manchester kept his ground at Horncastle for some time, but then fell back towards Kirby to await the arrival of all his horse. Two troops of these coming from the direction of Lincoln collided with three bodies of Widdrington's horse near Horncastle, and had to fight their way through to the rendezvous with Manchester. On the 11th, when the earl drew his army up at Bolingbroke and prior to his advance to give battle, the tract implies that he had also made ample provision for retreat:

- drew all his horse and foot into battalions upon Bullingbroke Hill, having a very safe place of retreat into Holland...

The rest of this tract agrees in detail with the Fairfax version.

Before the 20th, Lincoln was again in Parliamentarian control and the Royalists were falling back on a wide front, converging on Newark. Looking at the general consequences of the march into Lincolnshire, and the siege of Hull, the impression cannot be avoided that it had all been to no purpose. It cannot be said that any great strategical gain was at the end of the manœuvre. Lincolnshire in August had simply been swept through by the earl of Newcastle, not properly dominated: the siege of Hull, as has been said, was doomed so long as Parliament controlled the sea and could thus ferry men.
and supplies into the besieged town. There is something ominously familiar about the sequence of events. After Seacroft, the earl of Newcastle was left with it all to do again in consequence of the Wakefield defeat, and the failure to take Leeds. In October, as a result of failing to pursue a single strategic plan, the earl was back where he had started from, at York, although admittedly the vast area of the West Riding was still under his control. Once again, he demonstrated remarkable powers of recovery, an energy and a determination that, if employed to better purpose, and if not influenced quite so much by James King's caution, might have achieved great things. That is the kernel of the Royalist tragedy in the north: this fine army was beaten, not in the field with an outright Parliamentary victory, but in the councils of its high command.

Lancashire Interlude: The Fight for Thurland Castle.

Whilst the siege of Hull dragged on, Lancashire, which had enjoyed some calm since June, erupted again near its border with Westmorland, where some of the Cumbrian forces adopted almost an offensive posture.

The single best source for the events we are concerned with, is a letter from Alexander Rigby to Speaker Lenthall, but the memoir of Thomas Parker, High Constable of Furness, and a Royalist sympathiser, supplements Rigby.

Sometime at the end of June, or in early July, Colonel Sir John Gerlington, who had been High Sheriff in 1642 and was one of Derby's leading cavalry commanders, reoccupied his castle of Thurland.

he began to plunder the Country, and commit Robberies and Murthers, and thereupon for the suppression of him and his adherents, I repaired thither, and after seven weeks straight siege of the Castle it was delivered to me to be demolished, upon agreement to suffer him and all his in the Castle to passe away with their lives...

The siege was begun by Rigby in early August.

During most part of the siege the greatest part of the Forces of Westmerland lay within our view, and daily threatened us, but God confined them to their own County, and every day more and more inclined the hearts of the Commons of Westmerland to decline any attempt upon us, though we then lay in an Out angle of our County, far from Supplies, and whilst these things were in suspense a Design was set on foot by all the Malignant Gentry of Westmorland and Cumberland, and by Roger Kirby and Alex. Rigby of the Burghe, two Lancashire men, to raise all the forces of Cartmell and Furness part of Lancashire, to joyn with Cumberland and Westmerland, to surprise Lancaster and Hornby Castles, and to assault us on all sides, and to raise our siege, and then to proceed further into Lancashire and as upon credible information I beleive to joyn with Lathom House...
If Rigby's information is 'credible', then whatever else the Royalist gentry in northern Lancashire may have lacked, it was not imagination. Unfortunately for such a campaign, it would have been necessary to rely heavily upon the Cumbrian forces, at least at the first. Cartmel and Furness were sound Catholic areas, but their population was sparse, and could offer few recruits. The main Furness regiment, that of Colonel Sir John Preston, was probably now with the main Yorkshire army.

Rigby noted a march of Cumberland forces into Furness, which he estimated at 1,600 men. Thomas Parker numbered them at 1,500, but of these - all foot - only 200 were musketeers and the rest Clubmen. The Royalist commanders were Colonel Sir William Huddleston of Millom and Colonel William Pennington. Rigby stated that these forces intended to march from Furness into Cartmel, there to be reinforced.

in their way they tooke and imprisoned divers of the best affected, and caused the rest of them to fly out of the Country, who posting to us, I forthwith took 500 foot, 2 Drakes, and 3 small Troops of Horse, parcell of my forces at Thurland, and with them in one day I marched almost 30 miles, over mountains, and thro Sea sands and waters...

"the more discoursed of", wrote Bulstrode Whitelock, "because Rigby was a lawyer" 54

Parker reckoned Rigby's force at seven or eight foot companies, and three troops of horse. The similarity between the two sources stresses accuracy, a refreshing aspect of contemporary sources. Parker, however, made the signal observation that Rigby's foot were all of them musketeers, with only a score of pikemen. Such a notable firepower must be held to have outweighed any numerical inferiority on the part of the Parliamentarians.

On the Lord's Day

we found the Enemy in the Field, standing with a body of Horse and another of foot in a posture to receive us, upon a ground chosen for their own advantage; and when we were within half a mile of them, we committed ourselves to God's protection, and began our work with publick prayers...

Whereupon, Rigby ordered a charge. His forces set on with such resolution "as I might have...deemed that they had made hast to have saluted their friends than to have encountered their enemies". The religious intensity of the Lancashire war cannot have been better exemplified than by the respective watch-words of the two armies, at least as Rigby noted them: 'God with us' marching against 'In with Queen Mary!'

Parker noted that the Royalists appeared on the field on September 31st, rested at Ulverston, and on October 1st heard prayers on Swartmoor before marching towards Lyndale Close, where the battle was to be fought. The horse took up position on Lyndalcotte, the foot along the Close, during which time the Parliamentarians taunted them with shouts. Parker makes the telling
remark that for half an hour or so the Royalist foot were arming themselves, which can only mean that their weapons were brought up on carts. This does not sound as if the Royalist commanders expected to have to fight so soon, strengthening the claims of Rigby to have performed some prodigious marching in order to confront the enemy.

According to Rigby, the Royalist cavalry dispersed without a shot, but Parker is silent - the silence, perhaps, of shame. The infantry, few of them used to service, threw away their weapons and fled.

they all trusted to their feet then to their hands; they threw away their arms and colours, deserted their Magazin drawn by 8 oxen, and were totally routed in one quarter of an hour's time; our horse slew some few of them in the pursuit and drove many of them into the sea; We took their Colonel Huddleston of Millam, 2 Captains and an Ensign, and about 400 Prisoners, 6 Foot Colours and one horse Colour, and their Magazin, and some horses and more Arms than men; and all this without the losse of any one man of ours; we had only one man hurt by the Enemy and only another hurt by himselfe with his own Pistoll, but neither mortally.

It cannot be said that Rigby had saved Lancashire from another period of warfare, since it is impossible to say what might have befallen the Royalist attempt had it managed to penetrate to Lancaster or beyond. Indeed, we have only Rigby's word as to what was intended. Yet it would be unreasonable to limit Rigby's victory to some small local success; the implications for Lancashire were wide.

The triumphant army returned to the siege of Thurland, "except one Troop of horse and one foot Company" left in the Lyndale area. At Thurland, the siege went on, uninterrupted by what Rigby claimed were Cumbrian forces treble his own in number, stationed at Kirby Lonsdale. After a day or two, Sir Philip Musgrave came to confer with Rigby, and the outcome was that the garrison marched away unmolested, the castle being left to Rigby.

Thurland agreed to be rendered unto me to be demolished, which is accordingly done, and though I endeavoured to have preserved all the combustible materials therein from fire, yet I could not therein prevale with the common Souldiers without great displeasure.

Victory or not - perhaps, in a way, because of it - Rigby like many a Lancashire Parliamentarian officer, suffered still from wilful rank and file.

Rigby concluded his report with a request for financial reimbursement of the expenses involved in demolishing Thurland, and added that he desired his prisoner, Colonel Huddlestone, be removed from Lancashire.

Colonel Huddlestone (who yet hath a Regiment in Yorkshire in or near Halifax) is as I heare Serjeant Major General of Cumberland, and the most considerable man in Cumberland and our next neighbour to Lancashire, and one whom, without further danger to the peace of the Countie, I cannot conceive can be kept Prisoner here, I have therefore presumed to send him unto you...
Huddlestone could claim no such inflated title as Rigby gave him, unless it was purely in the context of Musgrave's command, since it is evident that Musgrave himself bore, at that time, no other title than that of Colonel even though he performed the duties of commander for the two counties.

It must be remembered, however, that for the Royalists at Lyndale it was their first service of the war. The Parliamentarians, on the other hand, had experienced the severe fighting of the spring, which gave them a natural advantage.

From November until the early part of January of the following year, the earl of Newcastle was continually on the offensive. He had been unable to take advantage of the Thurland incident, which was, from that point of view, badly timed, although when Gerlington reoccupied his home, it had been in the wake of Adwalton when an invasion of Lancashire was clearly felt to be on the cards. From October 1643, the earl of Newcastle was not to enjoy the clear run which his victories in June and July had given him, and his autumn and winter campaigning can be seen as no more substantial than punitive forays on a large scale. Moreover, the dam had broken in the West Riding, and from the mid part of October until well into December, there was considerable skirmishing between Lancashire forces allied to local Parliamentarian irregulars, and Sir Francis Mackworth's men still holding the area.

On or around October 17th a force of Parliamentarians, having mustered at Rochdale, marched to Heptonstall near Halifax, about 800 strong, of which number the vast majority were irregulars. This force occupied Sowerby on the 21st, and two days later stormed a local garrison at Hollins Hall in Warley where, after a stiff fight, they took the garrison of 43 men prisoner. Sir Francis Mackworth set off on November 1st to force the enemy back into Lancashire, and came to Heptonstall, intending to come upon the town from the heights about it. Even while marching into position, the Royalists were set upon and routed, leaving 40 prisoners behind them. Encouraged by this success the Parliamentary raiders tried to carry the fighting closer to Wakefield, with the support of some Lancashire regular cavalry.

Commissary General Windham had placed a company of foot in position to watch the road along which the enemy were to march. This company of regular soldiers took the full brunt of the enemy attack, outnumbered about six to one.

At first it was handsomely disputed on both sides, the Commissaries one Company of Musketeirs stoutly defending their Passage against above 600 Rebels, and afterwards sent the Commissary word what danger they were in, upon which advertisement he came in to their relief with two Troops of Horse... (56)

With Windham at their head, the Royalist cavalry charged the enemy force and "in a short space hee totally routed them", killing about 100 on the field,
taking 70 prisoners and some 300 arms. Thus, for a time, the danger to the
West Riding was averted.

Whilst this was going on, the earl of Newcastle and the bulk of the army
had left York for Pontefract and from there, had marched down into Derbyshire.
The two best sources, indeed, the only detailed sources now extant, are
Royalist. One, that of the Duchess, is well supplemented by a tract, A True
Relation of the Passages of the Army...in Derbyshire, whilst other
incidental documentation indicates that this was a serious threat to the
Parliamentary party in Derbyshire and elsewhere, particularly Cheshire.

Sir William Brereton in Cheshire was certainly taken aback by what he
described as heavy Royalist pressure building up in Derbyshire. In a letter
to Speaker Lenthall, he estimated that some 3000 foot from Westmorland would
soon be marching south, whilst in Halifax some 30 infantry companies were
reported. In fact, although the earl was yet again storming his way forward,
the policy for Derbyshire was very much akin to that employed in Lincolnshire
in August: the raising of local regiments with which to maintain whatever
ground was won. There was a shortage of arms, however, and the earl, still
in Derbyshire on December 8th with a Commission of Oyer and Terminer, was
writing desperately to Yorkshire for equipment for his new regiments.

As for Westmorland, whatever Brereton may have heard was very far from
the truth. Sir Philip Musgrave, whose complaints have already been considered
on other occasions, was experiencing his usual problems. It is clear that
orders had certainly gone from either Yorkshire or from the earl in Derbyshire
for a mustering of reinforcements, but that was as far as the matter went.

I am verie much afflicted that I am forced to trouble you
still with the divisions in this Countie but my dutie to
his Matie and those authorised by him inforceth me to
informe you that since my comeing hither I sent my warrant
to Penrith for a generall muster, but Sr Henry Fletcher
haveing a Civill Letr sent from me to give him notice of
yor order; and that if he pleased he might be present
to see my proceedings which should be equall and just, I
received a Letr from him which I will give noe opinion
off...(62)

Fletcher had ordered his own Lt. Colonel to disband the muster and to prevent
men from appearing at Penrith as Musgrave had required. Fletcher was said
to have threatened anyone who appeared, and Musgrave observed

this is not the first tyme I have bene disobayed by this
Gentleman in iust comands, and therefore Least the like
may happen when it may prove of much greater disadvantage
to his Maties affairs, I do appeale to yor selfe and desire
a hearinge of the whole business before you in a Counsell
of Warr...

Although it is not evident to whom this letter was addressed, it is a likely
guess that the recipient was Colonel Sir Thomas Glemham, who seems to have
acted as Newcastle's liaison officer with the Cumbrian Royalists on other
occasions. Musgrave alluded to the recipient as being in Newcastle upon Tyne, and Glemham does appear to have been there, at the latest in December, having relinquished the governorship of York to Colonel Sir William Saville at some time in the weeks after Hull siege.

If Musgrave did not feel, as late as December 1643, that his ability to raise men was crucial to the King's cause, as he implied, then this can only serve to show that the Cumbrian gentry were, indeed, quite out of touch with realities both to the south and, particularly, to the north for the prospect of Scottish invasion was strong. Glemham had no reason to be in Northumberland unless he were preparing militarily for the invasion.

But these aspects of the closing weeks of 1643 ought not to take away from the earl of Newcastle the very real success which he enjoyed in his last offensive campaign. The Duchess:

\[\text{My Lord,}\] receiving intelligence that the enemy was got into Derbyshire, and did grow numerous there, and busy in seducing the people, that country being under my Lord's command, he resolved to direct his March thither in the beginning of November 1643, to suppress their further growth...

The 'enemy' newly come into Derbyshire was none other than Sir Thomas Fairfax, who, fresh from Winceby and the capture of Lincoln, had, according to a True Relation, marched to Chesterfield and was there in contact, presumably, with Brereton in Cheshire, with the Lancashire commanders, and with Sir John Gell the governor of Derby.

As will be seen, Fairfax was swept away from Chesterfield by the earl's approach, who in his turn occupied that town and quartered his army around it.

During the time of my Lord's stay at Chesterfield... he ordered some part of his army to march before a strong house and garrison of the enemy's, called Wingfield Manor, which in a short time they took by storm.

Wingfield, like Cawood in Yorkshire, was certainly heavily defended with all the best principles of a fortified manor house. The walls were some 15 feet high and 10 feet thick.\(^6\)

A True Relation of the Passages of the Army goes into much more detail, and was probably written by a senior officer on Newcastle's staff. Having noted Fairfax's appearance at Chesterfield,

a part of our horse marched near unto them and beat in their scouts, and a troop of their horse, and showed themselves upon a hill within the view of the town a little before sunset, where they remained till it grew dark; then the soldiers set the whins and gorse on fire upon that hill, which gave them such an alarm in the town, that Sir Thomas Fairfax presently called to horse, and about twelve o'clock in the night they quit... that... town and in great disorder away they fled to Nottingham without any stay, having lost many of their men, most of which are now our prisoners.
It is interesting to note that Sir Thomas Fairfax himself made no mention at all of the Chesterfield business. Consequently his biographer, Markham (and, later, M.A. Gibb) similarly overlooked it, the consequence of regarding what Fairfax wrote as sacrosanct and not to be subjected to even a modicum of scholarly scrutiny. Fairfax's lapses of memory and distortions, at least where his memoir dealt with the northern campaigns, have been remarked upon before, but the matter assumes importance again, for there is an entire episode missing between Winceby and his excursion into Cheshire in December and January 1643/4. This may be the place to observe that it is about time Sir Thomas was subjected to the scrutiny of an objective biographer, for whilst his career is in a sense peripheral to the subject matter of this study, the anomalies are often so glaring as to make it impossible to ignore them. Markham's biography of Fairfax has influenced the military history of the civil war to no little extent: his paragon of virtue, the product of Parliamentarian propaganda which Markham merely added to, was not the honest, utterly unselfish homely figure he is represented to have been. It is not a question of going to pains to discredit Fairfax: it is a question of clearing up the mythology to do justice to Fairfax's opponents and, consequently, to the man himself. He ignored those things that reflected badly upon him, and the Chesterfield incident is a good example of this.

It is easy to suggest that the forces which chased Fairfax out of the town, in fact had to deal only with a portion of his cavalry under an inferior officer. However, Fairfax is cited by name in the Royalist account, and that account was clearly written by a serving officer on campaign. He could have known from the prisoners taken, if he had not known before, of Fairfax being present in Chesterfield. The defeated commander fled to Nottingham and then prepared to go into winter quarters.

Having occupied Chesterfield, the earl sent forces against the village of Alfreton, 14 miles north east of Derby, where a Parliamentary garrison held the church and the manor house.

against which we sent two hundred musquetiers, who fell upon the church and took it by assault (without any loss on our part), and about twenty men in it, together with their arms; whereupon the house and arms were surrendered with this condition, that they might march away to their own houses, making first protestation never again to bear arms against his Majesty.

It is curious to note that at Alfreton, as at Chesterfield, the earl seems to have dispensed with the practice of the summoning of garrisons, since no allusion to any summons is made. The conditions agreed to at Alfreton may have been the result of an offer from the garrison and not from the attackers. The conditions themselves were typical of many such laid down throughout England by either side, since there were few facilities for guarding prisoners on campaign. How far the men kept their paroles is hard to say.
Colonel Gamaliel Dudley, Major General of the earl's Dragoons, marched towards the Peak District in response to troop movements by the enemy. At Ashford "he encountered with at least five hundred foot and three troops of horse". These he charged and eventually routed, killing some and taking 20 prisoners before darkness ended the pursuit.

Fighting was now general and heavy, Newcastle having carried the war once again, to the enemy. Many local skirmishes have long been forgotten, and those recounted in the Royalist tract must be only the more significant. Chronology is again a problem. Mercurius Aulicus published details of a fight on the Yorkshire/Derbyshire border which may have occurred late in October, as part of Mackworth's manœuvres against incursions from Lancashire which could also have been intended to assist Newcastle's campaigns to the south.

about two thousand Foot of the Manchester Rebels, going to joyne with their good Earle the Lord Kimbolton, were met at a place called Woodhead in Derbyshire...by 400 of the Marquess of Newcastle's horse, under the command of Sir Francis Mackworth, who so bravely charged this great body, that he totally routed them, killed 2 or 300 in the place, took divers prisoners. (64)

A general plan of campaign emerges from these reports, and from further considerations of the tract. Whilst the main army, commanded in person by Newcastle, drove into Derbyshire triumphantly, from the West Riding Mackworth and Windham were harrying the Parliamentary forces in the neighbouring counties whenever they made a hostile display. The successful execution of this two-pronged campaign tends to look as if the earl had finally intended to try to isolate Lancashire, if it might be done, and particularly if the rumour of a Westmorland advance, mentioned by Breretong, had any sound basis in reality; as it seems that it did. If this was, indeed, a recognisable and well planned campaign of strategic importance, rather than merely a punitive foray suggested earlier, whatever happened to it?

The Parliamentarian resistance was broken with ease. Nowhere could the enemy make a stand, and everywhere they fought briefly or not at all. It was like the aftermath of Adwalton all over again, it was similar to the enemy collapse in Lincolnshire in August. To credit the local Parliamentarian commanders with anything like a sophisticated policy of evading action would be to detract from the sheer impact of the northern Royalist army. Yet, with everything apparently in his favour, something induced Newcastle to stop short once more of achieving a singular triumph.

It has been said that events were similar to those in Lincolnshire, and this not only in terms of victories. As in Lincolnshire, to quote the Duchess when my Lord had raised in that county as many forces, horse and foot, as were supposed to be sufficient to preserve it
from the fury of the enemy, he armed them [with difficulty] and constituted Lord Loughborough Commander in Chief of all the forces of that county and of Leicestershire; and so leaving it in that condition, marched, in December to Welbeck in Nottinghamshire.

The obvious answer is that the imminence of the Scottish invasion forced Newcastle to look to his rear again, as the raiding from Hull had drawn him back from Lincolnshire. There is evidence to indicate, as will appear, that Newcastle was not personally convinced of the coming Scottish incursion until virtually on the eve of it. The impression is that, as in Lincolnshire, the offensive had lost momentum before other events caused a new direction to be taken. The caution criticised earlier must be again to blame, the need to be fully confident that conquered territory would remain passive whilst the successful army moved on. Great generals are not made by such excessive caution, nor are great things ever achieved by constant attention to the minutiae of administration in conquered territory, exemplified by Newcastle's presence on a Commission of Oyer and Terminer in early December. By mid November he had been on the verge of a classic success; it can only be that the fear of failure with its inherent ignominy served to rob the Royalist army of that success. The man who preferred ‘exile to duty after Marston Moor was, unhappily, just the type of man who would have feared to run a great risk, and with James King to support the caution, the course seems to have been inevitable.

Such a point can be laboured indefinitely to the limits of tedium. Yet in the context of the north, it has to be stressed, since the figure of Sir Thomas Fairfax and his attendant myth looms so large across the years 1642/3. This point has been made, but it emphasises the view of the northern Royalist army as bedevilled by caution.

To return to A True Relation, whilst Gamaliel Dudley was winning his victory at Ashford, in the West Riding Commissary General Windham was again on the move, working this time in conjunction with the garrison of Skipton, against a local insurrection.

Commissary Windham going out with a party of horse and dragoons into Craven, was there encountered by some rebels, which he presently forced into a house (belonging to Colonel Sir William Saville) called Airston Hall, where though he had some few men hurt, and himself shot through the shoulder (not without good hopes of recovery), yet continuing their assault, they took the house and sixty men in it (together with all their arms), whom now they have prisoners in the Earl of Cumberland's castle in Skipton.

On November 27th Gamaliel Dudley, who was attending the Commissioners of Array at Bakewell whilst they there levied forces, made a punitive expedition to Hartington near the Staffordshire border. Advised of his approach, the enemy there formed themselves into battle order before the village, some 2000
strong "and with a hideous noise, proclaimed the expectation they had of a sudden victory". Dudley, leaving a small reserve in hand, did not form a battle order, as might have been expected, but with his cavalry in a single body, attacked the waiting Parliamentarians.

with his horse he beat quite through their rear of foot into the midst of their horse, and forced them to a disorderly retreat; and not willing to give them time to recollect, he pursued and slew above one hundred of them upon the place, following the chase into Staffordshire near five miles together (almost to Leek), and doing sharp execution all the way.

Behind him, his infantry had broken their opponents, some 300 of whom retreated into Hartington church which had earlier been prepared with barricades. The Royalist foot broke down one of the church doors, forced an entry at push of pike and soon had 'taken and slain every man of them'. Three officers, 10 foot colours and a horse colour fell into the hands of infantry.

It is a pity that so few sources remain concerning the exploits of individual Royalist officers of field command rank. Gamaliel Dudley appears only once more by name after these Derbyshire campaigns, in the heavy fighting against the Scots in early 1644. He seems to have had all the panache of the great Royalist cavalry leaders - men like Rupert, Langdale and Lucas - and, as in this case at Hartington, a fine sense of timing and improvisation.

Whilst Dudley's men rested in the village, they were warned of the approach of some 300 cavalry sent by Gell out of Derby who had intended to reinforce the Hartington muster. Gell's men fell back on their garrison without a shot. In the night, the Royalists returned to Bakewell, where Dudley reported five men hurt, including Lt. Colonel George Preston (probably of Colonel Sir John Preston's Furness cavalry). George Preston, like Sir John was a Recusant. There were no deaths to report. Two days later, in the wake of Dudley's victory, Chatsworth House was yielded with a garrison of 300 men quite voluntarily, no summons apparently having been sent.

By mid December that, more or less, was that. The Duchess reported that the army marched away from Chesterfield to Bolsover and so to Welbeck, the earl's residence in Nottinghamshire:

to his own house and garrison, in which parts he stayed some time, both to refresh his army and to settle and reform some disorders he found there, leaving no visible enemy behind him in Derbyshire, save only an inconsiderable party in the town of Derby...not worth the labour to reduce it.

There is no evidence that Newcastle ever intended to make an attempt on Derby, and Gell, as cautious as his adversary but less efficient, was probably glad of it.

From Welbeck, Newcastle (since October elevated to the rank of Marquess
as a reward and, probably, as an inducement, from a grateful monarch), endeavoured to bring about the capitulation of Nottingham. It has to be said, that it was not done in any earnest way, but rather it would seem, as a token gesture in view of the town's proximity. Two of Newcastle's colonels, Sir Richard Dacre and Sir Marmaduke Langdale, who were quartered with their forces at Watnall and West Hallam respectively, were instrumental in the overtures made to the Parliamentarian governor, John Hutchinson. The correspondence that was exchanged was given extensively by Firth in his edition of the Hutchinson biography. Hutchinson was, as Alfred Wood observed, certainly under pressure, virtually surrounded by Royalist forces which quartered free of interference by the 'successful' enemy troops controlling Lincolnshire.

Newcastle chose Dacre to be his emissary to governor Hutchinson, since Dacre was a close friend of the governor's brother George, as Mrs. Hutchinson noted:

had been a familiar acquaintance of Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson’s when he was in the north, and they loved each other as well as if they had been brothers. (67)

In considering the events which were to follow, it has always been assumed that there was absolutely no connivance between George Hutchinson and Dacre, but that Dacre made offers for the surrender of the town which were rejected by everyone who received them. This, however, does depend on interpretation of the evidence which is, unfortunately, nearly all Parliamentarian in sympathy, and recorded by Mrs. Hutchinson in her spirited apology for her husband's part in the civil war. Fortunately, we have to some extent broken with the view of staunch Republican figures as being paragons of all the English virtues.

John Hutchinson was opposed to a meeting with Dacre, since he no doubt felt that it would betray a want of resolution on his part, but the committee and his brother George favoured it, so that the governor was obliged to send permission for Dacre to enter the town. He did not fail to put on a show of force for the colonel’s benefit. Whilst the governor remained in the castle, his brother went down into the streets and greeted Dacre, who had left his officers of the escort at a convenient distance. The two friends fell into conversation, and certain remarks were made which, as given by Mrs. Hutchinson, sound hardly credible:

said that if he could but be convinced that the king first entertained papists into his army, and that the parliament had none in theirs, he would never fight more on his side. The lieutenant-colonel then told him he should easily be able to do that. 'Well!', said Dacre, 'you and I must have some discourse in private, and I shall be glad if you can satisfy me in that'.

For Dacre not to have been aware that many of his fellow commanders were either overtly or secretly Catholic, is beyond belief. If Mrs. Hutchinson had the remarks at second-hand, the account may have been garbled: it is far more
likely that George taxed his friend with the old 'papist army' propaganda, and that Dacre asked in return whether Parliament's army was so free from Catholic involvement. The point is, that such a conversation would fit better into the context of Dacre's endeavours to win Hutchinson over to the King's party, which the whole business was about anyway. It is unlikely that Dacre would have suggested his own uncertainty as to his role in the war (supposing that he entertained any doubts), since he would have lost by so doing whatever psychological advantage he may have had: it is quite beyond credibility that the Marquess would have employed Dacre if the latter had been at all questionable. The important passage must be Dacre's suggestion that he and George retire to some secluded place to continue their talk.

During this period, Mrs. Hutchinson does not convey the impression that George was adamantly opposed to listening to what Dacre had to say. At his friend's request, George sent some men to bring his friend's escort into the town. Their appearance created a considerable furore amongst the townspeople quite out of proportion to the Royalist numbers, and which suggests strongly that rumour of capitulation was rife in the town at the time.

the town rose in an uproar, and came to the governor with a high complaint, that I know not how many cavaliers were come into the town, and rode up and down armed, threatening the people to their great terror.

If Mrs. Hutchinson was right in what she wrote, then by implication George Hutchinson must also have been complained of in allowing them entry. Such criticism of George, imputing motives to him, by a logical step, would tend to tar the governor himself with the same brush, hence John's reaction.

This the governor thinking to be true, was vexed at it, and sent down an angry letter to his brother, requiring him to send up the men that came last into the town.

The governor would have to react strongly, of necessity, in such circumstances even if it meant humiliating his brother in front of Dacre and his escort. The point is not that John Hutchinson was really contemplating surrender - his entire career would tell against such an assertion - but that George either was, or was believed to be, thinking of it as a possibility. This would explain the nature of his conversation with Dacre as it can be deduced; it would also explain the governor's actions when confronted by a deputation of townsman, for his relations with them would never be particularly noted for warmth.

Dacre, when the letter came to George, asked that his officers be sent back outside the town, and that he himself would go up to the castle to answer for them. Astonishingly, George agreed to let the Royalists leave the town, directly disobeying his brother, which may or may not have been a fit of pique. Dacre left with them, and at his departure extended an invitation, which was accepted, that George dine with him in his regiment's quarters in a day or so.
George Hutchinson confronted his brother, "taking it something unkindly that his brother should write such a letter to him, and worse, that others should have suspicion of him". In a grand gesture, George was able to make known the invitation to dinner, and then to say that he would not now take up the invitation, and wrote a polite letter to Dacre to that effect. Governor Hutchinson also wrote to Dacre inviting him back to the castle and apologising for the incidents that had occurred.

Sir Richard in his turn wrote to another officer in the garrison, Captain Poulton, who was not native to Nottinghamshire apparently, which may be significant. In this letter, he urged Poulton to persuade George to dine with him a few days later, and to bring the governor with them if they could. We do not know what John Hutchinson's reaction was, but his wife stated that the committee in Nottingham were in favour of George going, and that George refused to do so. In the end, Poulton went alone.

Captain Poulton only went to excuse it, and two...officers were sent along with [him], with charge, if they could, to find out how the enemy lay. When Captain Poulton came, the colonel entertained him very kindly, and expressed a great deal of trouble that the lieutenant-colonel was not come, and took him aside...

Poulton's associations within Nottingham are not known; whether he was one of George Hutchinson's friends, or connected with the town committee, is a mystery. The two officers who went with him "to find out how the enemy lay" may well have had another purpose, to watch Poulton, but that is to carry speculation a little far. Colonel Dacre, feeling that chances to convey Newcastle's offer to the governor, and his brother were getting fewer, took Poulton to one side and told him that if the governor would yield, he should have £10,000 in money and a peerage to make him "the best lord in the country" (by which we should perhaps understand 'county'). For delivering up the bridges and works, George would have £3000 and a command in the Marquess's army. Poulton was offered £2000 if he would secure the compliance of the Hutchinson's. According to Mrs. Hutchinson, Poulton refused to have anything to do with the scheme, even when Dacre showed him a warrant signed, or so it was said, by Newcastle himself, authorising Dacre to make "large promises". Poulton at length agreed to the proposal that he should pass the offer on, and returned to Nottingham. There, the Hutchinsons' reaction was to inform the committee, and thereupon to write a disdainful letter refusing the offers.

In the meantime, Dacre had been ordered elsewhere, and the letters declining the offers were delivered instead to Sir Marmaduke Langdale, who opened them and read them, and from his reaction, was unaware of what had gone before.

The details as recounted by Mrs. Hutchinson were those which her husband had made known to the committee by letter, which was given by Firth. To
Colonel Dacre, the governor returned a very high-minded reply:

Your propositions...were so unworthy of a gentleman, so wicked, and base, that once I thought in contempt and scorn to have forgotten them; yet lest my silence receive too favourable an interpretation from you, know and tell your general that set you on this brave employment, that I abhor the thought of treason to my country, though I might thereby grow as great for wickedness as he.

This was unfair to Newcastle, of course, since there is no evidence that the Marquess had authorised the exact nature of the "large promises" which, at least according to Poulton, he had given Dacre warrant to make. Nor is the matter so clear cut, for whilst the size of the offer made to John Hutchinson might be said, at the time, to have thrown his disdain for it into high relief, the fact of the matter is that we do not know precisely what was said between Dacre and Poulton. Nottingham cannot have been so strategically important to the Marquess, that he would have sanctioned an offer to make a man like Hutchinson into a greater peer than himself. If it was so important, armed force would have been employed against it. In December 1643 it was an isolated, panicking town which the Marquess idly thought of reducing without bloodshed. Nothing more. Whether Dacre ever made such offers as Poulton claimed, we can never hope to know. Cautious doubt is here as valid an approach as one of disgust which Mrs. Hutchinson, in her recounting of the tale, tried deliberately to arouse in her readers. Yet even if it were true in all its essentials, there is nothing so dishonourable in the proceedings as was inferred, and one is left with the impression not that Hutchinson may have felt the proposals to be dishonest, but rather, that he was irked that his character should have been seen as one likely to be influenced by offers of money and place.

As for George Hutchinson, over whom there must be some doubt as to his motives, he returned to Dacre a letter equally as strong as that which his brother sent.

I once thought it possible that some rash misled young men might still among the Cavaliers have retained a sense of gallantry, and honour, though no religion, and have been enriched with those moral virtues which made the heathen famous; such a one I believed you to be; but since you did attempt to buy me to so great a villainy, as you did in your late propositions...I must needs be persuaded you would never offer me what you yourself would not have done.

The letter was one long diatribe, but contained one interesting sentence:

Dacre, 'twas base in you to think so of me; I am sure you cannot so misinterpret any act of mine, as to receive from it the least ground of encouragement to such an opinion.

George's letter finished with a curt flourish: "Farewell [the name of friend] for evermore between us".
That reference by George Hutchinson to some action which he may have performed - something he may have said - which Dacre could have misunderstood sounds significant. It may be that he was referring either to the initial entry into the town by Dacre, or to his acceptance of Dacre's invitation to dinner. On the other hand, it may be that George Hutchinson at least had some reason to fear suspicion in the town, and thus covered himself, since a copy of the letter must have been shown to, or read by, the committee.

What Dacre thought, subsequently said or might have written down, we cannot tell. His last word on the subject was in a brief note to Poulton, in which he wrote

upon my word it troubles me to think, that all honest men should not be of one side...tell [George] I wish him as my own soul.

Dacre was killed on Marston Moor in the following year.

Langdale, having read the letters through, wrote a joint reply to the Hutchinsons and to Poulton.

[...] am sorry you so much mistake Colonel Dacre his affection for you, in endeavouring to draw you from that rebellious course of life you seem to glory in. If you please to read all the histories of this nation, from the conquest to this time, and you shall find all rebels' pretences of taking up arms against the sacred person of the king varnished over with the title of love to the laws of the land, liberty of the subject and loyalty to his majesty.

Langdale was a blunt, plain man, and a devoted Royalist. He implied that which he believed, that Dacre had probably suited the nature of his offer to the natures of the recipients, and the Hutchinsons - John, at least - cannot have liked it. As for Newcastle, Langdale observed "you are much mistaken in his desire to corrupt any man" and, although he knew nothing of the business except what the letters had revealed to him, insisted that the Marquess had acted properly. It could be argued that Newcastle, with the memory of the wasted weeks before Hull in his mind, preferred barter to siege where Nottingham was concerned: but as has been said, it may well be that Nottingham was quite incidental to his plans. Whatever, there was far more to the Dacre-Hutchinson issue then, than now meets the eye.

The year 1643 was coming to an end. The middle part of December was spent in the Nottingham business, and by the end, Newcastle was marching back into Yorkshire. His old adversary, Sir Thomas Fairfax, on December 29th left his winter quarters in Lincolnshire and marched across country to reinforce Sir William Brereton, the Cheshire commander and to draw upon Lancashire Parliamentary regiments. Lancashire had acquired new importance in November, with the appointment of a new Royalist commander there by Rupert, the volatile John Lord Byron. His task was apparently to reorganise the Cheshire, Lancashire and North Wales Royalist forces to receive large reinforcements from
Ireland. King Charles had issued an order on November 11th for all "the other Lancashire regiments to march away also with all expedition, to join themselves with the said Lord Byron's regiment", which meant the Lancashire forces around Oxford, notably those of Viscount Molyneux and Thomas Tyldesley.

The 'Irish' reinforcements have been misnamed. They were, for the most part, English Protestant soldiery returning from the Irish wars, or forces raised in Ireland amongst the settlers. There must also have been a fair sprinkling of Catholic Irish as well, soldiers of fortune for the most part, and it was these that the Parliamentary propagandists seized upon as proof of the unholy alliance between the King and the emissaries of Rome. Some 5000 men were landed at Mostyn, the Lancashire Parliamentarians falling back in face of them, and on November 20th Lenthall was informed that 11 shiploads of soldiers had come to the Wirral, whilst another report spoke of 19, and yet another of a full 10,000 men having been landed. Eventually it was confirmed that three regiments, strength unknown, had definitely arrived, with some 10,000 more to follow when shipping was available.

But this invasion, terrible as it was made to appear by the London press, was as nothing compared to that gathering just over the border in Scotland. The only difference was that where the Scots were concerned, the Royalists were fairly confident. From Oxford, a Mr. Harrison wrote to a friend at Paris:

The Parliament will have it still that the Scots will come in; but do what they can, the bordering counties Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland and the Bishopric are ready to attend them, Sir Thomas Glemham being Governor of Newcastle, Sir William Saville Governor of York, and the Marquis of Newcastle himself being still in the north. (75)

Cumberland and Westmorland, at least, were far from prepared, but the traditional route of invasion lay through Northumberland, and the Scots were bound by that tradition. It remained to be seen whether they could be stopped.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

4. Ibid., p. 147.
5. Ibid.
7. The evidence is slender. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 106 f.m. 28. See also, Dawson, W.H., History of Skipton, 1882, passim.
11. See the Duchess of Newcastle's account, below.
22. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 99/100.
23. M.A., 11.8.43, p. 433. Mackworth was still in Halifax on August 19th, see Eastwood, J., History of the Parish of Ecclesfield, 1862, p. 43; Gatty, Hunter's Hallamshire, p. 139. Mackworth remained in the West Riding on a permanent basis until January 1644.
25. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 99/100, and for events of the siege.
27. CAM, p. 1319.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
36. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 100/01.
41. Burne and Young, Great Civil War, pp. 116/7
42. Fairfax, Memoir, p. 218.
43. Vicars, II, p. 42f.
44. Warburton, I, p. 510.
47. Ibid., 2.12.43, p. 693.
48. T. T. E 71 (15) A Letter from Lord Fairfax to Robert earl of Essex. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 62/5. See also T. T. E 71 (22) A True Relation of the Victories obtained by the earl of Manchester...


54. Whitelock, Memorials, p. 73.

55. Hanson, T.W., History of Old Halifax, Halifax 1920, pp. 154/9. Hanson discovered some obscure details of the civil war in his area, but meticulously covered his tracks by quoting no sources whatsoever.


57. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 31/3.


62. Musgrave Mss.


64. Ibid., 28.10.43 p. 613. Newcastle had been elevated to the title of Marquess at the end of October, see his biographical details in Vol. 2.

65. Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War, p. 60.


67. Ibid., pp. 159/62 for this and what follows.

68. Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War, p. 223.

69. Fairfax, Memoir, p. 219.


71. Ibid., pp. 329/30.


73. HMC 13th Report, Portland Mss., I, p. 156.

74. Ibid., pp. 156/7.

75. CSPD 1641/2, pp. 508/9.
CHAPTER SIX

The Winter War
The Fight against the Scots January to April 1644

For a monthly subsidy, agreed in negotiations in September 1643, the Scots put an army into the field which was to draw the Marquess of Newcastle away into the far north in the first and last defensive campaign that he was to fight. The year had been, on the whole and throughout England, a dark one for the Parliament; but now a cold grey light was beginning to shine amongst the barren snowscapes of Northumberland and the border counties as the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant prepared itself to confront the successful army of the northern Royalists. Slowly, often reluctantly it would seem, the Scottish soldiery fought their way across Northumberland and the Bishopric to the walls of York, coming up against fierce and bitter resistance throughout their march which must have owed something to centuries of border warfare and feud that had gone before.

The only study of the war which the Scots waged, that of Terry, whilst a masterpiece of the use of source materials and a singular example of how military history can be written, conveys an impression of disintegrating Royalism facing an invincible enemy. This picture is not altogether accurate, and demands revision. For that reason, the analysis of the war against the Scots as, initially, an isolated sequence of events, is justified. The success of the Scottish army owed less to the force of their arms, however, than to other contributing factors: the situation in Newcastle's rear, in Yorkshire, which has long required study, will be dealt with subsequently. There is also the matter of tactical decision-making. There was a general sense of relief amongst the friends of the Parliament in Northumberland, which eased the progress of the Scottish army; "The Inhabitants of that Countie come into them daily, and the more because the Gentrie of the Countie join with them and take the Covenant". As the lines of communication stretched further with the forward march, supplies and other essentials which were not plundered wholesale from the estates of Royalist gentry or from others less enthusiastic for the invaders, came into the Scottish forces from the Parliamentarians. An attempt by Colonel Sir Thomas Glemham to initiate a policy of 'torched earth' was resisted by fellow Royalists and came to nothing. Two years of relative calm had created in the Northumbrian and Durham populace, on the whole, and unless they were firmly committed to the King's cause, a desire for the war to be carried away to the south and into Yorkshire, where it seemed properly to belong. And, of course, and for the first time, Newcastle was fighting in his own hinterland, in his recruiting areas, which, as the earl of Derby had found in Lancashire, was psychologically inhibiting.

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Sir Philip Warwick claimed later that the Marquess had been forewarned of the Scottish plans, but had failed to act, choosing not to believe what he was told. It will be remembered that as early as June, there was reason to suspect a Scottish incursion into England by way of the Isle of Man and Lancashire, although it can be justifiably wondered whether this rumour might not have been played upon to pacify the earl of Derby and to coerce him into accepting the minor role of guardian of the Isle. That the talks between the Parliament men and the Covenantant leaders were widely spoken of in Royalist circles goes without saying, so that if Warwick is to be believed in his view of Newcastle’s inaction then, by default, the Marquess must bear much of the blame for the military developments of the winter of 1644.

Warwick claimed that Newcastle could see no reason why the Scots should enter the war and, technically speaking, there was no immediate cause. There had been no hostile acts against them by the Royalists, nor was there any military threat to them. On the other hand, it required only a little imagination - and in Newcastle, who was a poet, imagination cannot have been wanting - to foresee that the Scots would view the defeat of the Parliament as but the first success of the Anglican church and its military arm. That Scotland would be next on the list, and possibly unable to resist the veteran forces at the King’s disposal, must have played upon the susceptibilities of the Scottish leaders, many of whom, unlike Newcastle, dealt in sober pessimism where human activity was concerned. Warwick was correct when he said that (virtually) no steps had been taken by the Marquess to prepare against the possibility of invasion, but it is worthwhile endeavouring to understand why that should have been so.

It would be incompatible with the view of Newcastle and his chief advisor as excessively cautious men, if it were simply accepted that in this instance they displayed a reckless disregard for security. The matter is of too great importance. James King, at the least, would have understood the disastrous consequences of trying to fight a war on two fronts, which was in fact what the Scottish incursion must mean. Therefore, if James King did not use his influence late in 1643 to organise some form of defence in Northumberland, there had to be a good reason. It is facile to suggest that James King, a Scotsman, was playing a double game with his loyalties. Yet nothing was done, although we know that by December Sir Thomas Glemham was at Newcastle upon Tyne and was there in communication with Sir Philip Musgrave concerning the raising of troops, so some minor preparations were in hand. The answer may well be that James King, as a Scot, could claim the ability to speak authoritatively on Scottish issues and that Newcastle would, as was ordinarily the case, listen to his views rather than to those of others. King could suggest, for example, that the Scots would not act so long as the success of the Royal army seemed assured. That the loyal nobility in Scotland would be able to restrain
the rebellious elements in the Covenanting faction – indeed, this was one of the points that Warwick himself admitted. Warwick condemned the loyalist nobility for their failure to take positive action to stop the plans of the Covenanters, and whilst this is no place to go into the details of Scottish domestic politics, Warwick was undoubtedly justified. Thus the Marquess may have felt, or have been led to feel, that it was highly likely that the Scots would prefer to co-exist with a successful Royal party, than risk destruction themselves should they foolishly decide to succour the Parliament. It might be added, that there was political advantage for them in sitting still and doing nothing. Even at the tail end of 1643 it has to be remembered that the Marquess and his commanders no doubt felt themselves to be at the head of an army which, like other Royalist armies, was on the verge of victory. Natural caution would only serve to strengthen that assurance, and with it, possible dangers would be bound to appear less real than if there had been serious and identifiable obstacles to the Royalist victory.

Newcastle's reaction to the Scottish invasion was mixed. The enemy were at Berwick and on the border around that town on January 18th, with, according to Vicars who culled the relevant tracts, 18000 infantry and 3000 horse, 500 dragoons and a train of artillery consisting of no fewer than 120 guns. Ships were conveying ammunition and other supplies to Berwick, which was firmly in Parliamentary hands. It was a massive invasion force, and the Marquess took immediate steps to recruit his own army to confront them:

his excellence had intelligence brought yt ye Scots were upon their march, & already passed yt River Tweed. He makes all ye preparations he can to meet them, he calls Gentlemen together & gives out Commissions to array County, least ye enemy should get advantage by their speedy march. (4)

Thus Slingsby remembered events in Yorkshire where all was a flurry of activity from mid January. The Marquess was still in the county on the 28th of that month, writing to Rupert:

I Know they tell you, sir, that I have great force; truly I cannot march five thousand foot, and the horse not well armed. The Scots advanced as far as Morpeth, and they are fourteen thousand as the report goes. Since I must have no help, I shall do the best I can with them...(5)

It was true that Newcastle had no assistance except that which he could provide for himself, which meant, as Slingsby stated, recruiting men yet again in Yorkshire and Durham. The Duchess of Newcastle referred to her husband's measures:

the report came, that a great army of Scotland was upon their march towards the northern parts of England, to assist the enemy against his Majesty, which forced the nobility and gentry of Yorkshire to invite my Lord back again into those parts, with promise to raise for his service an army of 10,000 men. My Lord (not upon this proffer which had already heretofore deceived him, but out of loyalty to preserve those
parts which were committed to his care and protection) returned in the middle of January... And when he came there, he found not one man raised to assist him against so powerful an army, nor an intention of raising any. Wherefore he was necessitated to raise himself, out of the country, what forces he could get... (6)

The Duchess superficially disagrees with Slingsby as to exactly when the Marquess heard of the invasion, but the point is not purely academic. Slingsby implied that the Scots were already over the border, and as will be seen, there were Royalist forces well forward in Northumberland which could have passed on the word directly to Glemham and so from Glemham to the commanders at York. The Marquess, according to the Duchess, arrived in Yorkshire in mid-January, which is somewhat vague but suggests that he appeared at roughly the same time as the Scots actually crossed into England. The Duchess was implying that her husband acted quickly, whereas in fact, we know that he was reacting rather belatedly; clearly, she was endeavouring to cover this fatal blind spot in her husband's strategy.

On January 25th a warrant went out for the raising of forces to assist the Marquess, typical of many such. It was sent from York by the new governor of that city, John Lord Belasyse, a Catholic who had succeeded Colonel Sir William Saville a few days earlier. Belasyse had fought most of the war with the Oxford army, and his return north, back to the area from which he had come with his regiments in 1642, is the only indication that we have of any assistance coming to the Marquess from the King's main army. Poor Sir William Saville, after an energetic war on the King's behalf, had died from an illness which he may have contracted on campaign. Belasyse's warrant is interesting from several viewpoints. It was directed to Colonels Sir John Mallory, Sir John Ramsden, Sir John Kay, Richard Tempest of Bowling Hall, and to Major William Vavasour and Sir Thomas Harrison. It commanded them to raise the Trainbands in the northern Wapentakes, which were to be used to reinforce the main army as it marched north to meet the Scots?

Newcastle had several problems to contend with quite apart from the Scots' approach. There was, for example, the need to guarantee the Royalist control of Yorkshire, since Yorkshire would be his hinterland, his eventual refuge if things went badly, and his source of supplies of men, money and victuals. Saville's death had come at a bad time, but Belasyse was an experienced field commander and a suitable replacement. Even so, it was not possible for the Marquess simply to leave Belasyse to do his best. Forces had to be left in Yorkshire with which to keep the Hull garrison at arms length, and particularly to try to safeguard the West Riding in the event of Lancashire incursions or local risings by the old Parliamentarian gentry. Lincolnshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire would have to fend for themselves, although apparently the Marquess established a military presence in the Isle of Axholm where
Colonel Sir John Mayney had a force which included elements of Sir William Saville's old regiments.

Newcastle's plan seems to have been - and this is conjectural, since no definite evidence has survived - to have left the bulk of the Yorkshire foot in the county under Belasyse, to maintain Royalist supremacy there and to preserve the communications across the North Riding to the Bishopric. The Marquess himself would march north, to effect a junction with Sir Thomas Glemham, with the old Durham and Northumbrian regiments, reinforced on his way or when and where possible, by additional levies made in Yorkshire and Durham. In this way, the veterans of Adwalton would be split into two armies, with fresh recruits drafted into the northernmost. Just what part the Cumbrian Royalists were expected to play is altogether obscure, but clearly in view of their geographical location, it would be likely that they, too, would have to send such men as they could, into Northumberland.

The success of this plan would depend upon various factors not directly under the Marquess's control or susceptible to his influence. This was no fault of his dispositions, which were sound. Most obviously, Belasyse's ability to keep a firm grip on Yorkshire would depend not so much upon the forces left to him, as upon the speed with which the Parliamentarians could take advantage of the situation to conduct an offensive campaign. What actually happened in Yorkshire is dealt with in the next chapter; suffice it now to say that Newcastle's action against the Scots would rely heavily upon the maintenance of Yorkshire, for the risk of such a war as that which he was about to fight, lay in the danger of enemy pressure in front and rear. If the Marquess could beat the Scots both rapidly and convincingly, his problems were at an end; but he was outnumbered, as he himself admitted, and time was no longer on his side - if it ever had been. When he finally began his march, it was with a force of 5000 foot and 3000 horse, "the number of his Foot is still uncertain, since many are to come into him as he passes through the Bishopric".

Whilst Newcastle busily organised affairs in Yorkshire, away in Northumberland the Royalists watched and waited. Glemham was in Alnwick Castle on January 20th, perhaps he had been there earlier, and his most generous forward position was at Wooler where Colonel Sir Francis Anderson, a rich Newcastle merchant, was stationed with a cavalry regiment.

The Last night I had notice that Welton's regiment was quartered in Warke Barony, at Preston, Leermouth, Wark and Mindrum, it was twelve of the Clock at night before the intelligence came to me, whereupon I immediately caused the guards to be strengthened and doubled, my Scoutes attending untill the morning for more perfect information, that I might advertise you of it; it is now confirmed by one that was this morning amongst them, that there is six Colours of Horse, which were drawing out, and the Drums beating for the calling-out of some
Map to illustrate the campaigns in Northumberland, January and February 1644.
Companies of Foot, which also are come over, but the certain number of Foot, I cannot as yet learne, but suppose them to be a part of the Lord Maitland's Regiment, which lay at Calstreame. I shall endeavour to keep my Quarters hereabouts, until I receive farther orders from you. I am now drawing my whole regiment into Wooler, having heard for certain as I was now writing, that a great body of the Enemies foot, and very many Troopes of Horse advanced over Barwick bridge yesterday, and were as far as Haggerston; it is conceived they will forthwith march towards Belforde, for they are quartered on the English side; you will please to take these things into a present consideration, and afford a present answer.(9)

This letter, later printed at Oxford, was probably the first definite news that reached the Royalist capital. *Mercurius Aulicus* first noted the arrival of "those holy Pilgrims come lately into Northumberland" on January 30th. With Anderson's request for instructions, Glemham at Alnwick had a letter from the Parliament's commissioners, marching with the Scottish army, and then in Berwick. The commissioners requested Glemham not to make any resistance, and enclosed a copy of the Covenant the taking of which had been prescribed for the benefit of Parliamentarian and Royalist alike. Sir Thomas did not, however, find the medicine at all agreeable (or necessary), and returned an evasive answer:

"I have received by your Trumpeter a Letter from your Lordship and Sir William Armyne: It is long and of great concernment. And the other directed to Colonel Gray, who for the reason before mentioned, and for the reason that there are none here but officers, he cannot return you an answer so suddenly by your Trumpeter. But I will send presently to the Gentlemen of the County to come hither, and then you shall receive my Answer, with the officers and theirs by themselves, by a Trumpeter of my own." (13)

Colonel Gray was Colonel Edward Grey of Chillingham, who was to become a prominent Royalist conspirator during the Interregnum.

The officers and gentry met together at Alnwick on the 22nd, whilst the Scottish army commanded by the earl of Leven rolled slowly nearer. Glemham was playing for time, desperately in need of Newcastle's forces which were still in Yorkshire for the most part, and anxious to keep the Scots as close to the border as he conceivably could. Yet there was very little that he could do.

Resistance in the field was presently out of the question, and the proposed scorched earth policy was resisted by the local gentry who were now, quite naturally, looking to their own affairs more cautiously. At length it was decided to fall back before the Scottish advance, and a letter of defiance was drawn up to which those present appended their signature. They were nearly all officers who signed ("there are none here but officers" as Glemham had written): Glemham himself, and Colonels Robert Clavering, Sir Richard Tempest of Stella, Edward Grey, Charles Brandling, George Muschamp of Barmoor,
Francis Carnaby, Francis Anderson and (Lt. Colonel) Ralph Millot. Anderson had evidently been ordered back quickly from Wooler. Four civilians appended their signatures.

Glemham was a formidable soldier, who was to make the last ditch stands at Carlisle and Oxford into Royalist legends. On his retreat from Alnwick, beset by the lack of co-operation from uncommitted local gentry, he did what he could to hamper Scottish progress. Aln bridge was destroyed and an attempt was made to do the same at Feltham, or Felton, on the Coquet:

but the Masons and workmen which hee brought thither for that purpose, were so affrighted by reason of the exclamations and execrations of the Countrey women upon their knees, that while Sir Thomas went into a house to refresse himselfe they stole away, and before hee could get them to returne, hee received an alarum for our Horse which made himselfe flee away with all speed to Morpeth... (17)

Remorselessly, the Scots pushed on in foul weather conditions, the deep winter snows thawing by day, "which so swell'd the waters... that oftentimes it came up to their middle, and sometimes to the arme-pits of their Foot". Wooler was occupied on January 23rd by General Bailey with six foot regiments and one of horse. Two further cavalry regiments joined him there from Berwick. Belford and Adderstone were occupied, and the temporary headquarters set up at the latter village, until the train of ammunition could be brought over the Tweed, which Vicars said was done when a hard frost froze the river on the 24th. The projected date of arrival at Newcastle was, according to the writer taking note of these dispositions, set at January 27th - slightly premature. Vicars states that Alnwick itself was entered on the 24th, whilst Glemham slipped away through Morpeth into Newcastle.

The earl of Argyle, from Alnwick, captured the garrisoned Coquet Castle. J.C. Hodgson believed that this episode did not involve the Coquet Island garrison, but was a reference to Warkworth Castle which was then commanded by an unidentified Major Bemerton on behalf of the Brandling family, which had two colonels in the field. Hodgson gave no reasons for this opinion. Warkworth itself lies between Alnwick and Coquet Island, a powerful castle strongly fortified by the Percies at the close of the middle ages. If the garrison of 70 men given by Hodgson is correct, they would be insufficient to hold such a place, and it may be that Warkworth capitulated at the same time as the Island.

The garrison of 70 is alluded to in A True Relation of the Scots taking of Cocket Castle, whilst another source referred to a garrison of fully 200 men, whilst both sources agree that seven pieces of ordnance were taken. There seems to be sufficient evidence here to support the view of two actual capitulations rather than one.
On the 28th, the day that the Marquess of Newcastle took to the road with
his army, the Scots took Morpeth without resistance. By now, the word had
gone round the county for the Royalist gentry to stand to their arms:

*Feb. 4... the Day yt all men were warned to goe against
  yé Scotts, and yt Day was yé Beacons set on fire to warn
  all yé Country.* (24)

Further indication of the somewhat primitive but nevertheless effective method
adopted by the Royalists in remote areas for raising their men. Sir Gilbert
Houghton had done the same in Lancashire early in 1643.

By chance, the town of Newcastle had now become the object of a race
between the Scots from the north, and the Royalists coming up through Durham.
The Scots had long been aware of its importance, as had the Parliament in
London. An attempt had been made in December to win the Mayor, Colonel Sir
John Marley, from his allegiance. The earl of Lanark had visited him in the
town after the arrival of Sir Thomas Glemham, who had assumed overall
authority

\[\text{Lanark}\] had sum dealing with Schir Johne Morall, governour
of Newcastle, to betray the towne to our Generall Leslie.(25)

Apparently there was a rumour amongst the Scots that Marley and Glemham were
at odds, and it was believed in London in early January that

a great difference hath lately arisen between Sir Thomas
Glenham (appointed by the Earle of Newcastle to be Governor
there) and Sir John Marlow, now Mayor and Governour of that
Towne. (26)

This same source claimed as early as January 24th that Newcastle was already
occupied by the Scots, but as one Parliamentarian wrote, "because it is so
much desired, and every man's expectations are upon their coming, we will now
believe it".

Some of the hatred vented on Sir John Marley in October, when the town
finally fell, may have been due to the fact that he ignored Lanark's offers
and proved himself, discontented with Glenham or no, one of the most stubborn
of all Royalist garrison commanders in England. Howell, in his study of
Newcastle during this period, claimed that the town's Royalism was "little
more than a front", which remark in view of events now and later, looks and
is, unworthy and ill-considered.

Nonetheless, in one sense there was an element of bluff in the town's
resolution. John Chamberlain, a seaman, gave information in London that he
had been in the town on January 26th - although, admittedly, this was before
the main Royalist army had arrived. Chamberlain estimated the garrison at
500 men, all of them of the town's Trainband. Glemham was then at Alnwick.
The castle was the only properly fortified strongpoint, whilst Tynemouth was
overloaded with 400 men of Colonel Sir Thomas Riddell's regiment. No arms or
ammunition had evaded the Parliamentarian navy to reach the town since early
December or before, only 150 barrels of powder, 500 small arms and 500 muskets from Amsterdam by way of Scarborough. Chamberlain reported that Glemham had nearly 5000 men with him at Alnwick, which sounds excessive, and it may be that Chamberlain assumed the regiments of the colonels who signed the defiance to have been at full strength. It is more probable that if Glemham had 3000 men, he considered himself fortunate. Chamberlain anyway added that half of those were unarmed.28

The advance of the Scots, although as fast as conditions permitted,29 was seriously hampered by weather conditions and by caution. The weather was bad in Co. Durham, too, but it did not stop the Royalists, who reached the town first.

The Scots were got near Newcastle, & his excellency at Durham sends before his own regiment with Sr. Arthur Basset, who gets into ye town ye night before ye Scots came. (30)

The regiment was Newcastle's Foot, Basset being their field commander, and they moved fast. Basset was not, however, the first to enter the town, as a letter written on February 13th by the Marquess makes clear.

Your Majesty may be pleased to understand that the greatest part of this winter was necessarily spent in suppressing the rebellion in Derbyshire, which otherwise had grown to an irresistible head. And by the time we had reduced that county, and put it in a defensible posture, the disorders in Yorkshire, together with the rumour of the Scots' invasion called us back...very much wearied and toiled, both horse and foot...

The Marquess, it will be noted, still talked of 'rumour' almost as if he had had no concrete information of Scottish intentions. What the 'disorders' in Yorkshire were, is not at all clear, but something was afoot there. The matter is dealt with in chapter seven.

We remained there not above a fortnight, but the Scots had invaded the kingdom with a very great army, although the season of the year and a great snow at the very instant did persuade us that it was impossible for them to march. Yet not trusting to that, my Lord Lieutenant General James King hastened away with all expedition with such horse and foot as were quartered nearest to those parts, and, receiving intelligence of the Scots continuing their march, he hasted to Newcastle in his own person some days before his forces could possibly get thither; where truly he found the town in a very good posture, and that the mayor, who had charge of it, had performed his part in your Majesty's service very faithfully; and all the aldermen and best of the town well disposed for your service. And though our charge was very tedious, by reason of floods occasioned by the sudden thaw of the snow, yet I came thither the night before the Scots assaulted ye town, which was done with such a fury as if the gates had been promised to be set open to them...(31)

The last reference reminds one of the stories circulating concerning Marley, who was clearly innocent of any conspiracy. However, there is other evidence to support the contention that the Scots expected to march in
unopposed which, if not due to over-confidence on their part due to their numerical strength, suggests saboteurs within the walls. The Duchess noted, doubtless recording her husband's view, that "they marched up towards the town, with such confidence, as if the gates had been opened for their reception". Later, she referred to "much treachery, juggling and falsehood in my Lord's own army", although if Sir Thomas Fairfax's cries of 'treason' when things went badly for him, are to be treated with suspicion, the same attitude ought, objectively, to be extended to the Newcastle claims. The only thing that can be said is that there may have been within the town, certain elements in the merchant class (like the Maddisons) who were prepared to surrender rather than to risk a storm. These need not have been outright Parliamentarians, although the Maddisons were certainly sympathetic, but merely persons anxious for their property. Local rivalries and jealousies, political differences with Marley and his group, would also influence such men. That the earl of Lanark had gone to Sir John Marley might be held to demonstrate that the mayor, a merchant of some substance, was clearly the person to whom the Scottish terms should be put, but it may be that this was merely courtesy and that Lanark made contact with the anti-Marley faction.

Unfortunately the Duchess, in her account of the events before the town, in February, tended to telescope her relation to make it alarmingly brief. She did, however, note that the Scots were surprised to find the Marquess actually in the town, "and the General of their army seemed to take no notice of my Lord's being in it, for which afterwards he excused himself".

The earl of Leven had left Morpeth on February 1st, but his march had been delayed at Stannington by swollen waters, and this delay was crucial for the Marquess who entered the town unknown to the Scots. On the 3rd, the enemy commanders summoned the mayor and council which, in view of the Marquess's presence, was a breach of etiquette. Terry accepted, and no one has ever questioned it, that the earl of Leven and his advisors acted in ignorance of Newcastle's presence, but that is unacceptable. Sir Thomas Glemham, as they well knew, had been appointed governor of the town and was consequently superior to Marley. Glemham had left Alnwick and must have been known to be in the town when the Scots arrived, thus propriety required that a summons be addressed to him. The Scots tried a rather shabby trick in endeavouring to coerce the town council in by-passing the governor. If they could do that, they could quite as easily insult the Marquess if they chose so to do.

The summons was lengthy and threatening, but the reply of the council was firm:

We have received a letter of such a nature, from you, that we cannot give you any Answer to it more than this. That His Majesties Generall being at this instant in the Towne, we conceive all the power of Government to be in him. And were he not here, you cannot sure conceive us so ill read in
these Proceedings of yours, as to treat with you for your satisfaction in these Particulars you write of, nor by any Treaty to betray a trust reposed in us, or forfeit our Alegiance to His Majesty...

Of the 17 men who signed that defiant document, only Marley, the former mayor Sir Nicholas Cole, Sir Francis Anderson, Sir Alexander Davison and Ralph Grey held military rank. Of the rest of the council, some must have remembered the Scottish occupation four years earlier, and have been determined not to lightly let it happen again; whilst others - Lionel Maddison for example - wondered if it might not be better to surrender, for various reasons, some political, some selfish. These, of course, kept quiet, for the Marquess was there, and the soldiers had taken upon themselves the decision that the Scots hoped might have rested solely with the aldermen and councillors.

To help impress the impact of the summons, the Scots made an almost immediate assault against a partly finished earthen sconce lying outside the walls:

The first attempt ye Soots made, was upon a sconce yt lay on ye North Side of ye Town; but was gallantly defend'd by Sr Charles Slingsby who gave ym such a repulse, yt they forbore after to make any more attempts, but lay at a defensive guarde... (36)

Mercurius Aulicus reported the same incident

gallant Colonell Slingsby & his Townes-men, that within three houres you might see a Mickle Midding of Scots lye dead before the Sconce. (37)

The Scots and Parliamentarians had a different story to tell, which might seem like another incident altogether, except that the reference to a lack of artillery (which arrived on or around February 7th) indicates that the actions were one and the same.

Some of our men were drawn up to a stone-Bridge a quarter of a mile from the town, at the entrance into the Shield-field, to beat out some men of theirs out of a little Sconce that lay near it, and did it presently without losse; but they retired to a sharper work near the Windmill, where the controversie was more hot, and our arguments not strong enough; the great pieces being not come in regard of the uncertainty of the Sea by which they were to come... In six hours assault or thereabouts, wee lost only fourteen men. The enemy having lost about seven or eight, fled to the Town, and we possessed the Fort, which is within halfe-musket shot of the walls... (38)

If the Scots, with all their strength, could do no better in so long a fight, it is a tribute to the resistance offered by Colonel Slingsby, who was to die later on Marston Moor.

The artillery reached Blyth on February 6th and by the 7th were being positioned before Newcastle. On the 8th, the Scots seized upon boats and lighters which they used to ferry men across the Tyne to Co. Durham intending to occupy Gateshead, and to dig in amidst the coal pits and slag heaps there.
After that they sent forth eight Troops of Horse which the Generall-Major of the Horse charged with five, though they could not charge above three in breast together in respect of the Coale-Pits; notwithstanding which the charge was so hard upon the enemy, that they presently retired into the Town, there was none killed on either side, only we took two prisoners, whereof one was a Lieutenant, who cursed and railed for haile an hour together...

The Marquess and James King, in their letter to the King at Oxford already alluded to, indicated that the Scots were not having the best of it, and as will be seen, this is borne out even by the Scottish sources.

The truth is, the town soldiers gave them such an entertainment (few of our forces being then come into the town, and those extremely wearied in their march), as persuaded them to retire a mile from the town, where they have remained ever since quartered in strong bodies and raising the whole country of Northumberland, which is totally lost, all turned to them, so that they daily increase their army; with English troops! and are now striving to pass part of it over the river, so to environ us on every side, and to cut off all provisions from us. But we have hitherto made good the town and river, and shall do our best endeavour still to do so. But your Majesty may be pleased to know that the enemy's army consists of at least fourteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, and daily increase their numbers; and we cannot possibly draw into the field full five thousand foot and about three thousand horse...

The Marquess's advantage, if he had any, lay in his cavalry, and had it not been for weather conditions, these horse might well have proved to be a severe obstacle to a siege army that was far from effectively deployed. As will be shortly apparent, the Royalist cavalry lacked nothing of their old dash.

On the evening of the 8th, according to a True Relation, the town ordnance kept up a steady fire against the Scots, "but to little purposel and with the onset of darkness, Newcastle ordered that the suburbs be razed by fire.

The town of Newcastle brynt up the suburbis thairof lest the enemy could tak advantage thairof; and, as was reportit, oure army had gottin the worst anne or twys, and so many hurt that chirurgeonis wes send out of Edinbrugh to cure then. (41)

The Marquess also attempted to sink shipping in the harbour as an obstacle to a naval assault, but according to A Faithfull Relation of the Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army, was thwarted in his endeavours by the townsmen. This cannot have been true, however, since one of the charges levelled against Marley in 1645 was that he had conspired to sink the ships and that he had done so.

On or around the 11th of February, the Scots secured what must be taken as their first real success, albeit minor, in the siege. A Faithful Relation states
A Squadron of our Horse, above 15 men, with whom other 10 accidentally joyned, fell upon 100 Muskettiers of the enemy sent from Tynemouth for that service, killed 14 or 15 of them, and took prisoners 50; whereof the General kept only 2, and sent 48 into Newcastle; and the Marquesse sent back 7 or 8 of ours, who were catched straggling...

Another source dated March 9th, but alluding to the same action, gave the Royalists as only 50 strong, intent upon destroying stores of corn to which the Scots had access. An anonymous letter written from Morpeth on February 19th had it:

On Saturday last there came 60 musketeers, and 20 horse came out of the castle of Tynemouth with intent to burn some houses and corn which lay near the Scots quarters, but were met with 15 horse...who fell on them and took 50 of them prisoners. (45)

The Royalist account reduced the numbers of the Tynemouth men also to 50.

Thomas Riddell sent about 50 musketeers from Tynemouth Castle to destroy some corn in the enemy's quarters, from whence they were drawn out as he was informed, But it seems his intelligence betrayed them to the enemy, about 45 of them were taken prisoners, who being carried to Leslie he sent them to me as a token...(46)

The Marquess's cavalry, as will be apparent, were not quartered within the town, but lay south of the Tyne in Co. Durham. These horse kept the town free of complete encirclement not so much by dint of force, but by the explicit threat in their very presence, the Scots preferring to lie to the north and west whilst their commanders wondered what they were to do. Cavalry lying idle, however, are of no positive value, and by mid-February the Marquess had decided to let them see what they could do to disrupt the Scottish army.

The action which followed, at Corbridge, has been so hedged around with falsehood and conflicting claims that it still seems hard to be able to say conclusively that the Royalists won a victory. Yet the preponderant impression from Royalist and Scottish sources alike is, that the Scots sustained a beating for which they were quite unprepared. A letter from Morpeth written on the 20th, the day after the Corbridge battle, a copy of which reached Samuel Luke, observed, "I believe the Scots had the worst of it" and that is an opinion which the evidence, when examined thoroughly, supports.

On the one hand, there is the thorough-going Royalist interpretation as given by the Duchess:

there were three designs against the enemy, whereof if one had but hit, they would doubtless have been lost; but there was so much treachery, juggling, and falsehood in my Lord's own army, that it was impossible for him to be successful in his designs and undertakings...

The Duchess's accusations have already been dismissed for want of evidence. The 'three' designs to which she referred, one of which was the Corbridge fight, must be understood as extending over the entire Northumbrian campaign, and that in Durham, and not as having meaning solely for the events of early and mid
February. Her habitual telescoping of events is frustrating. However, though it failed in the enemy's foot-quarters, which lay nearest the town, yet it took good effect in their horse-quarters, which were more remote; for my Lord's horse, commanded by a very gallant and worthy gentleman, falling upon them, gave them such an alarm, that all they could do was to draw into the field, where my Lord's forces charged them, and in a little time routed them totally, and killed and took many prisoners, to the number of 1500. (48)

The "gallant and worthy gentleman" was that taciturn East Riding man, Colonel Sir Marmaduke Langdale, who was to make his name as a cavalry commander of outstanding qualities.

C. H. Firth following Rushworth, and possibly the editor of Slingsby's Diary, confused this fight when editing the Duchess's narrative, and dated it to February 5th. Terry distinguished the separate actions.

Another Royalist source, that of Slingsby, confirms the Duchess's view and must be seen as independent corroboration...

...& albeit his excellency drew out & offer'd ym battle, yet they would not, but kept in fast places of advantage, for we exceed'd ym as much in horse as they did us in able foot; yet Sr Marmaduke Langdale met wth ym at Corbridge, where he fell upon Kilcowbie & took 200 prisoners, besides wt was killed, & all of ym sent to York.

The number of prisoners sounds more convincing, and their departure for York marks a shrewd move by Newcastle, who intended the sight of the Scottish captives should hearten the Yorkshire gentry.

The Scottish/Parliamentarian view is extensively given by A Faithful Relation. The Scottish force consisted of two cavalry regiments, under strength, with 15 troops between them, commanded by Lord Balgony, and some other cavalry under the Lord Kircudbright which lay at Corbridge in the town. The Royalist attacking force comprised 25 troops of horse and some 400 muskets Langdale apparently seconded in his command by a local man, Colonel John Fenwick of Hexham.

According to this account, the two forces drew up facing each other between Corbridge and Hexham, until the Scots began the engagement when a Lt. Colonel Ballantyne charged the Royalist front. Twice he charged, and twice the Royalists gave ground. But not satisfied with that, gave a third charge, which drive them to their Musquettiers which were placed behind them, and being thus engaged with horse and foot, our Troups were disordered and had a very strait retreat through a gap, where some men were lost, but the enemy pursued not far, for they were, I suppose, loath to engage beyond their foot, notwithstanding their advantage.

It would be all too easy to read into this a deliberate ploy by Langdale, intended to lure Ballantyne into a trap, although it may be that the idea was
formed during the fighting, for Ballantyne certainly over-reached himself, being apparently unsupported. Wheeling from the Royalist musketry, the Scots found themselves cut off by another body of Royalist horse under the command of the future turncoat Colonel Robert Brandling, a Yorkshireman. Brandling had crossed the river below Corbridge with 10 troops of horse which, if at full strength, gave him a force of 600 men, possibly his own regiment, intended to attack the Scots in rear. It may be that Langdale deliberately fell back at first to give Brandling time to execute his manœuvre, for the Scots, who began the fight, may have taken the initiative away from the Royalists. As it fell out, Brandling was as much surprised as the enemy, for it fell out to be the Front in their returne. Brandling forwardly rode out before his Troupes to exchange a Pistoll, and one Lieutenant Elliot rode up to him, and when they had discharged each at other, and were wheeling about to draw their swords, Brandling's horse stumbled, and the Lieutenant was so neere him as to pull him off his horse, which when his men perceived, they retreated, which gave courage to our men to fall on, which they did, and drove them over the River againe, killed some, and forced others through the water so hastily, that there were some of them drowned, and thus was the day divided...there were about 60 men killed on the place...we have taken Colonell Brandling, one Lieutenant, none else of note. We are upon moving.

This tract was probably drawn from a letter, written on February 20th at Morpeth by Sir Henry Vane, one of the Parliamentary commissioners with the Scottish army, for both agree in essentials. Vane's letter and, consequently, the tract, gave the Scots the deserved credit. Another report stated that Langdale was initially repulsed by Scottish lancers - one innovation the Scots brought with them - but rallied, overran the Scots, took 200 of them prisoner, and kept up the chase for three miles, killing more of them and taking an additional 150 prisoners. One of these troops of horse so mauled was Leven's own Lifeguard.

Given these incompatible accounts, preference must be given to that of Sir Henry Slingsby, who was a thoroughly objective writer and may have written from first-hand knowledge. Langdale won a victory, even though a part of his force under Brandling, experienced difficulty in executing a flanking manœuvre. A clue to the Royalist success may lie in the claim that Colonel John Fenwick was able to entertain, in his house at Hexham, various Scottish prisoners. Nor was this the only success of the day.

From Prudhoe Castle the Royalist governor, Colonel Sir Gamaliel Dudley, who had proved himself a competent brigade commander during the Derbyshire campaigns, led a raid across the river. His target was a Scottish infantry quarter, and he had total surprise on his side.
slew and took all that was in it, which was 55 prisoners, and gave such an alarm to four of their quarters that they quit the same in disorder and some loss...and Colonel Dudley, perceiving a greater force preparing to assault him, retreated, and in his retreat took eight of the Scots prisoners, both horse and man, but they took four of his dragoons, whose horse were so weak that they could not pass the river. (56)

It could hardly be claimed by even the most fervent apologist for the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant that their first month in England had been successful. They had been delayed by the weather, had failed to walk into Newcastle as they had (it seems) expected to do, and were now laying a half-hearted siege to that town whilst their quarters lay at the mercy of raiding cavalry. There is, fortunately, an interesting contemporary account of the state of the army by a fellow Scot, Sir James Turner.

While I was at Newcastle I looked upon the posture of this armie of the Scots (of which the Parliament so much boasted) were in. I found the bodies of the men lustie, well clothed and well moneyd, bot raw, untrained and undisciplind: their officers for most part young and unexperienced.

Turner was a professional soldier with experience in Ireland, and he knew what he was looking for.

They had divided themselves in severall bodies, and in severall quarters, overie one or any of which might with a resolute sally been easilie beate up, and then, in my opinion, the rest would have runne.

Turner could not understand why James King, a man whom he somewhat admired, did not seize his opportunity to do just that, and his observation is strong support for the accusation that King was carrying caution to excess. "He was a person of great honor", Turner wrote, "but what he had saved of it...in Germanie, where he had made a shipwracke of much of it, he lost in England". Little need be added to this judgement.

The main consideration for the Scottish generals was the best way in which to ferry men across the Tyne and to hold the southern bank. On the night of February 8th - it will be remembered that this was the date on which the two sides clashed amongst the Sunderland coal pits - the Scots had made an effort to achieve that.

they indeavourd one night to bring boats from the glasse houses, or above them, to the river, and so make a bridge. Bot fearing the King's forces should fall out upon them that were at worke, Argule and his committee sent over Colonel Steuart with 1200 foot, to stand betweene the workmen and the toune. They had bot a little narrow bridge to passe in their goinge and cominge, and if 2000 had fallen stoutlie out of the towne on them, they had kill'd and tane them eveirie man, for retire they could not...

Turner may have been referring to the stone bridge near the sconce. Argyle hearing that Turner held this view of the dangerous state of the passage, asked his advice. Turner told him that some form of false alarm should be
given to divert any intended sally by the garrison, and was sent to the earl of Leven with his proposal. Leven and James King had much in common apart from their nationality:

I was ashamed to relate the answer of that old Captain; which was, that he feared the brightness of the night... would discover the burning matches to those on the walls. I told him, the moon shine was no prejudice to the designe, for it would hinder the matches to be seen; for the more lysts were seen, the better for a false alarme.

Turner had his way, and that so effectively, that the alarm intended to disconcert the garrison frightened the Scottish soldiery as well, "some great persons...called eagerlie for their horses, and ...rode away". He often remembered that occasion, "to see men affrayd at their own shadow, men runn away from ane allarme themselves had caused make". The detachment sent across the river, under a Colonel Stewart, returned at a run, also frightened by their own alarm, and Turner remembered how "my old Colonell Steuart, when he was returned... would vapour and bragge of the orderlie retreate he had made without loss of a man, when there was not so much as a foot boy pursuing him".

This is far from a picture of a competently generalled, fighting army that Turner gives. Had James King been other than the man he was, and had the Marquess of Newcastle listened perhaps to the more reckless of his commanders, the Scots might have been stopped in their tracks at the Tyne and sent fleeing back north. But of course, had James King been less cautious, back in the heady days of the summer of 1643, he would not now have found himself and his master in so perilous a predicament.

The Marquess's letter to the King on February 13th exemplified this far better than anything else:

that absolutely the seat of war will be in the north, a great army about Newark behind us, and the great Scotch army before us, and Sir Thomas Fairfax very strong for the West Riding of Yorkshire, as they say, and his father master of the East Riding; we are beset, not able to encounter the Scots, and shall not be able to make our retreat for the army behind us.

This was demonstrably untrue, though it could be said that Newcastle was envisaging a situation that would prevail in late March. On February 13th he could not, however, have foreseen events, and the Royalists were as capable of going onto the offensive against the Scots as they had ever been or would ever be. One has to be wary of complicated analyses of motives where evidence is slender, but Newcastle was either fishing for reinforcements (which he frankly did not need immediately) or, expecting he might achieve something, was building the enemy up to be greater than they then were. His words did, as it turned out, have a curious way of fulfilling themselves.

The virtual stalemate at Newcastle cannot have been agreeable to either side, although for the Royalists it was the more endurable so long as Yorkshire remained under Lord Belasyse's dominance. So far as the Marquess was
concerned, the immediate danger lay in a decision by the Scottish generals to leave the town partially invested and to march on into Durham, for such a decision would oblige the Royalists to return to the field and so throw the issue into the balance of battle. Such a move by the Scots would bring to an end the rumours circulating throughout southern Yorkshire, which Gervase Lucas, Royalist governor of Belvoir Castle, gave as fact in a letter on the 24th of February and doubtless based upon the Corbridge victory a few days earlier,

> My Lord of Newcastle hath given the Scots some foil... the Scots have desired to parley with his Excellency, and are contented to retreat upon conditions. (59)

By the time that particular letter was written, however, the earl of Leven had made his decision and was already leaving the siege in favour of a march southwards. Siege warfare, when unlikely to succeed because of poor dispositions or because of the strength of the defenders, constitutes a terrible strain upon an army and, when complemented by successful sallies from the garrison and its supporting troops, becomes a positive drain on morale. These factors must have forced Leven to move, the one decision that the earl could take which would be disadvantageous to the Royalist commanders. It is, however, unlikely that the Scottish army was in so bad a condition as was claimed: "sometimes their whole army had neither meat nor drink, and never had above twenty four hours provisions beforehand". They had probably scavenged as much as they could in the immediate vicinity of Newcastle, and in the wintery conditions a movement was perhaps the only solution to what would have become a problem of supply.

Leaving some regiments behind on the north side of the Tyne to watch the town, Leven began his march on February 22nd, according to The Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army. On that date, the Scots moved to Heddon on the Wall, and encamped by the crossing of the Tyne at Newburn for a night. The Royalists, following their success at Corbridge and their capture of Hexham, had fortified the crossing, and apparently the Marquess intended to give battle by disputing it, although according to the Duchess's account "that day proved very stormy and tempestuous, so that my Lord was necessitated to withdraw his forces, and retire into his own quarters". Bad weather for the Royalists was obviously bad weather for the Scots, and here again the reluctance to resort to battle can only be surprising, since the Scots who had to cross the Tyne were necessarily under disadvantageous conditions. The Marquess's own report is lengthier and gives better reasons than merely those of weather:

> after I had made true inquisition of the passes over the river Tyne, I found that there was so many fordable places betwixt Newburn and Hexham, about twelve miles distant one from the other, that it was impossible with my small number of foot to divide them so as to guard and make good every place, but to hazard the loss of them at any one place, and yet not to do the work; so I resolved of two evils to
choose the less, and left them to their own wills: so
they passed the river, and after some days quartering
upon the high moors which was beyond the river Derwent,
so that I could by no means march to them, for the
situation of these quarters gave them great advantage
against our approaches, they marched thence...to
Sunderland. (63)

This list of reasons for avoiding an engagement at the Tyne crossing sounds
convincing, and yet the very emphasis upon the difficulties tends to stress a
want of resolution, an unwillingness to take even the most calculated of risks.
By positioning his forces at some point mid-way between Newburn and Hexham -
at Eltringham, perhaps, or Stocksfield - on the south bank, with a good relay
system of riders to act as watchmen, it is just conceivable that the Marquess
might have been able to force the Scots to a stand wherever they tried to
cross. By failing to do this or even to attempt to do it, Newcastle assured
for himself a rearguard campaign, fighting in the course of a retreat, with
the Scots inching their way forward. Little short of an outright victory in
the field could save him now, and nothing could have been more beneficial to
Scottish morale than the ease with which they passed into Co. Durham.

On February 23rd, according to The Late Proceedings, the army marched to
the river and quartered "along the river side, from Ovingham to Corbridge,
about two miles distant from Hexham". The Royalist cavalry stationed at
Hexham and probably commanded by Colonel John Fenwick, made a show of force,
but shortly after evacuated the town - probably on Newcastle's orders - leaving
behind them "Major Agnew" who had been taken at Corbridge, "for a safe-guard
to the house of Colonel Fenwick, who had used him courteously". The foul
weather conditions to which the Duchess had alluded now intensified, for, with
a blizzard on the 21st, on the 24th came "a terrible storm of Drift and Snow".
Delayed by the storms, the Scots camped in the open until the 28th, with the
Royalists likewise exposed to the elements across the river. On the 28th,
"we passed Tyne, without any opposition, at three several Foords, Ovinghame,
Bydwell, and Altringhame betwixt these two". The Scottish infantry waded the
icy waters and camped in and around the villages on the south bank.

Although the swollen Tyne had subsided somewhat to facilitate this
crossing, the weather then grew worse again.

When we had passed Tyne, we marched to the water of Darwen,
where we found an impetuous flood, and still waxing so, that
there was no possibility for our Foot to march over, but at
a narrow Tree-bridge near Ebchester; where the half of our
Foot marched over the Bridge by files, the other half stayed
on the other side till the next day; so that the whole army
was necessitated to quarter all night in the fields. Upon
Friday the rest of the Army came over and we directed our march
towards Sunderland.

That was on March 1st. Throughout all this lapse of time, the Marquess, as he
said, made no attempt to hinder, let alone to stop, the Scottish progress,
which at times, as the Scots reported, could fairly easily have been done.
It may be, of course, that the Marquess had resolved to fight it out somewhere
in Durham where he might expect to select his ground, if the weather would
improve for long enough, and if this was so, there was some wisdom in it.
The Bishopric was probably the largest Royalist recruiting area in the north,
in terms of a striking predominance of Royalist activist gentry as opposed to
Parliamentarians and the uncommitted, and in this it was unlike Northumberland
where the Scots appear to have found dormant support from sections of the
population. It cannot be coincidental that Durham lay in the centre of the
Recusant belt in northern England, and that these Catholics, with memories of
Scottish excesses during the 1639/40 struggle, would have been resolved to
resist this time rather than to endure repeated indignities. On two separate
occasions, as will be seen, the Marquess did attempt to give battle, and on
each was thwarted by what can only be seen as the earl of Leven's reluctance
to commit all his forces to a single action.

The Late Proceedings was clear as to the nature of the countryside into
which the Scots had marched:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{L'927 entered Sunderland upon Monday the 4. of March: All} \\
\text{that day, and the day following, was spent in taking care to} \\
\text{supply the Army with Provisions, which we obtained with no} \\
\text{small difficulty, being the enemies Countrey; for so we may} \\
\text{call it, the greatest part of the whole Countrey being either} \\
\text{willingly or forcedly in Arms against the Parliament, and} \\
\text{afford us no manner of supply, but what they part with against} \\
\text{their wills.}
\end{align*}
\]

This is confirmed by an independent source:

The people of the country are unwilling to give intelligence
or supplies, and all, either of their own accord or by force,
are in array, 'see great a power hath the cathedral here'. (64)

The activities of Durham Royalists must account for the report, not elsewhere
supported, given in Mercurius Aulicus that on March 2nd "the Lord Marquesse
of New-castles Horse cutt off part of \[The Scots\] Reare, and tooke great
store of their baggage".65

Aulicus also reported that some "Two thousand stout Voluntiers are come
out of Cumberland to joyne with the Lord Marquesse",66 but it is hard to say
which of Musgrave's regiments, if indeed they were organised along regimental
lines, these may have represented. Nor is it altogether clear that the 2000
men would have been raised by Musgrave, who was always in severe difficulties
when it came to fulfilling his quota.

Before going on to examine the Marquess's attempts to halt the Scottish
offensive in Durham, a summary of the situation would be useful. The invasion
had begun badly for the Scots. They had found Newcastle and Tynemouth held
resolutely against them, and had sustained setbacks from the Royalist raiding
cavalry. The weather had delayed execution of their plans, and had more than
Map to illustrate campaigns in Durham, March and April 1644.
Once put them into positions so vulnerable that a single concerted Royalist action might have ended the business for good and sent them back home. The evidence of Sir James Turner indicates that morale was low, and that the bulk of the army was made up of inexperienced officers and men who, technically, should have been no match for the Royalist army staffed largely by professionals or by experienced amateurs, with two years campaigns behind it. Once across the Tyne, the support of the local population that had been enjoyed in Northumberland, ended, so that when most they needed collaboration, the Scots now found themselves in hostile territory, having to forage for themselves and as a consequence, having to provide armed escorts for their foraging parties.

For the Royalists, in a sense, matters had gone well. Newcastle had been held, and would be held. Marley and his fellow aldermen were stubborn in its defence, and Leven had been obliged to give up the idea of an investment in favour of a forward march which had, as has been shown, certain specific risks. In Durham, the Marquess had the support of the majority of the population - it is hard to say how much of this support was due to coercion, but presumably not so much as the Scots might have liked to suggest - and, to some extent, the choice of battlefields. The habit of caution, however, is hard to lose, although on the surface everything was now in the Royalists' favour, once again Newcastle and James King signal failure to exploit it.

On March 7th and 8th was fought - or, more nearly, was almost fought - the battle of the Bowden Hills. The sources for this two day attempt at the pitched battle which, it would seem, neither side actively wanted at that time, are several and, fortunately, come from both sides. The Duchess's account is brief:

...the Scots army, finding ill harbour in those quarters, marched from hill to hill into another part of the bishopric of Durham, near the sea coast, to a town called Sunderland; and thereupon my Lord thought fit to march to Durham to stop their further progress, where he had contrived the business so, that they were either forced to fight or starve within a little time. The first was offered to them twice, that is to say, at Pensher hills one day, and at Bowden hills another day... But my Lord found them at both times drawn up in such places, as he could not possibly charge them...(67)

The salient feature of that curt comment is the implication that the earl of Leven was wary of committing himself to a single battle, but that the Marquess was, on the other hand, eager for it. It seems too simplistic altogether, although that Leven was reluctant has to be accepted, not only in view of the condition of his army, but also because he must have realised that so long as he pushed on and kept himself on favourable ground, the Royalists would have no option but to fall back before him, and thus no matter how slowly, the progress of the invaders would have been steady.

The Marquess was himself more detailed:
they marched...over the new bridge near Chester (Le Street) to Sunderland, which pass our horses in respect of the inclosures could not hinder them or charge them. Upon Wednesday the 6th of this instant March, at one o'clock afternoon, our first troops passed Newbridge and within a while after the enemy appeared with some horse; when they advanced towards us with more than they first discovered, after some bullets had been exchanged and they appeared again with a greater body, we backed our party with my Lord Henry's regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Scrimsher commanding them - being part of Colonel Dudley's brigade, with which he drew up after them - with whom we also sent some musketeers; which caused the enemy that day to look upon us at a further distance...(68)

The regiment which formed a part of Gamaliel Dudley's hitherto successful brigade, was that of Lord Henry Cavendish, a younger son of the Marquess. Lt. Colonel Scrimsher was the active commander in view of Lord Henry's extreme youth, and may have been a Scotsman.

For much of the rest of the afternoon of the 6th the Scottish horse, estimated at 500 in all, remained within view of the Royalist forces, the Marquess and his advisors using their "perspectives" now and again in hopes of spotting the main Scottish army. On the following morning, the 7th, finding the Scots still in formation on the hill, the Royalists formed battle order and marched toward them. The Scots at this manoeuvre, turned "obliquely from us on our right hand". They were making for Sunderland, reforming on Pensher Hill.

This development placed the Scots army at some distance from Sunderland, and also meant that a battle was again postponed. The Marquess was angry: "which truly we little expected, considering what great brags they had made". Orders were given for the Royalists to march directly for Sunderland to draw up between the town and the enemy, so that a battle must be fought if the Scots intended to enter the port.

A part of their forces, made up of cavalry and musketeers, was positioned in such a way as to obstruct this direct Royalist march, and when the intention of the Marquess became plain, Leven sent the bulk of his army to reinforce that obstruction.

The convenient passage we could find to it being through some fields of furze and whin bushes, where we were to make our way with pioneers through three thick hedges with banks, two of which they had lined with musketeers, there also being a valley betwixt us and them, besides they had possessed themselves of a house, wherein as we guess they had put 200 musketeers and a drake, which flankered those hedges which were betwixt us, and from thence there ran a brook, with a great bank, down to the river Wear...

This hazardous terrain, favourable to the Scots, would have to be crossed if there was to be any fighting on a large scale. The way the Marquess described developments suggests strongly that Leven may have had a better idea of what
he was doing than at first appeared to the Royalists, and that far from
avoiding battle, he had ordered his dispositions so that all the advantages
would lie with him. The Marquess could now either charge straight through,
which might have been successful but would have been extremely bloody – James
King was not one for risking heavy casualties – or try to circumvent the Scots.
As for the last choice, as he himself observed, "we must have fetched so great
a compass about, that they would have been upon the same hill again to have
received us that way".

There being no real choice, the Royalists retreated to higher ground,
where the night was spent in the open, the snow and the wind bitterly cold.
Both armies were in such straits that, as the Marquess noted, "we seemed so
far to become friends as in providing against those common enemies". On the
next morning, the 8th, both armies drew again into battle order, but all day
the snow fell, and by nightfall the Royalists had had enough.

by reason of the great fatigations of the horses, it being
the third day they had received little or no sustenance,
it was thought by the consent of all the general officers
not expedient that the army should suffer such extremity,
or for that time seek any further occasion to engage an
enemy whom we found so hard to be provoked, who found from
us, I believe, contrary to their expectations, so much
forwardness as they might plainly perceive we endeavoured
what we could to fight with them, and were confident enough
of our own strength could we have come unto them upon any
indifferent terms of equality . . .

Newcastle's emphatic statements that he had wanted to give battle may sound a
trifle artificial, were it not for his description of the Royalist actions
which were noted in other sources yet to be considered. The Marquess, looking
back on the campaign in later years, might well have felt that little or
nothing was actually done to halt the Scots, and might well have held himself
to blame for their successful march into Yorkshire. No general can escape
the responsibility for a failure in which he is directly concerned, but with
all fairness, the Marquess, despite his caution, does appear to have made
every effort to bring on a battle. Between March 6th and 8th he found himself
outmanoeuvred by an extremely reluctant enemy, and it is self-evident that it
is hard to fight with an enemy who will not put himself in a position to be
fought with. The strain and weariness of marching in the bitter cold, the
want of victuals that must have afflicted both horses and men, combined with
Leven's avoidance of battle, were forces against which the Marquess could not
prevail. It would have been the utmost folly on his part to keep his army in
the field until, debilitated, they became the prey of a numerically superior
enemy.

We being now resolved to march off, and they having been so
niggardly to afford us occasion to try what mettle each
other was made of, in some measure to satisfy the great
forwardness we found in our people, and also to give the
enemy warning that they should not be too bold upon our
...we sent off 120 horse to entertain them near their own leaguer...
The rearguard action to which the Marquess alluded, was essential, although it led to harder fighting than he may have expected. According to him, the commander of the 120 horse was Colonel Sir Charles Lucas's regimental major, and this is in itself important, since the mention of Lucas indicates that reinforcements had arrived from Yorkshire, where Lucas had been operating since early February, having been sent by Prince Rupert to boost the army at Lord Belasyse's disposal. Newcastle had probably sent for Lucas sometime in late February, although, as will later be seen, the situation in Yorkshire in early March was such that Lucas could not really be spared.

As this rearguard drew close to the Scots, some 200 of the enemy cavalry drew out and gave a charge. Half of the Royalist party took the impact, stood, and forced the Scots to fall back on their musketeers who were drawn up before a hedge and who opened fire. The Royalists did not falter, and their advance drove the Scottish horse in flight from the field, leaving their musketeers to hold off the attack. These took to their heels, the Marquess reporting that some 40 or so were killed and nearly a 100 captured, although a sudden advance by lancers forced the Royalists off. Five were wounded and one killed, but they made their escape.

Amongst the enemy prisoners taken were three Englishmen, one of whom was peremptorily hanged as a deserter from the Marquess's army. This is the first instance that we have of the firm application of martial law by the Royalists, but it cannot have been unique and was not improper.

With the general retreat of the Royalist army, the Scots seemed likely to try to attempt something, and for the fighting which followed the Marquess's description can be supplemented by that of Colonel Sir Philip Monckton, who held a command during the retreat. Allowing for Monckton's inclination to write his own eulogy, it is a graphic account:

The retreat that was made from the Scots at the battle ofBowden hill, I made; having the command of four hundred horse for the guard of the left wing; as Major Jackson had for the right wing: but he being presently beaten by the forlorn of Scots that came against him: I was drawn to the rear of the body of the army: which was to march a mile and a half in a plain campania in fair day before the Scotch army came to descend a hill in the inclosure. Both the forlorns concentrated against me, and I made good their retreat without the loss of a man, until I came at the brink of the hilles, where they fell into the rear of the last body that drew off, and pursued it into the inclosure (where almost all our army was in confusion) but these were repulsed by two parties that I had sent in before; upon which, the body of their horse came down upon us whilst we were in that disorder, and had routed our army, but for Sir William Huddlestone's regiment of foot. (69)

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Monckton indicated that the retreat was not so orderly as the Marquess later implied, and it may well be that resolute action taken by Monckton and by Huddleston's own foot saved the day. Colonel Sir William Huddleston, it will be remembered, had been made prisoner in Lancashire and was perhaps still in enemy hands, in which case, his field regiment was probably commanded at this action by Lt. Colonel Henry Clayton.

The Marquess did not mention Monckton, or any officer, by name; they therefore sent down about 600 horse and as many musketeers to try, as I suppose, our behaviour in our retreat, as also to requite us if they could, sending three bodies of horse into the field next the moor, by the side of which we passed, but still under the favour of their musketeers, which lined the hedges; but we, being content to play with them at their own game whilst we amused them by presenting some horse before them, our musketeers, which in the meantime stole down upon their flank towards their passage, gave them such a peal, that it made the passage which they retired over seem I believe a great deal straiter, and the time much longer than at their coming over, after which they were a great deal better satisfied with our retreat, and this was all we could do with the enemy.

Here we have Monckton's action, and Huddleston's must have been the regiment which gave the Scots "such a peal" of musketry.

The Scottish accounts, naturally, gave a different interpretation of what, from Royalist eyes, was a successful rearguard action to cover retreat from a position fraught with dangers which threatened the entire army. The Late Proceedings noted the arrival of Colonel Lucas from Yorkshire with a full 12 troops of cavalry, which if true, must have given the Royalist overwhelming superiority in horse (and, by inference, have seriously depleted Belasyse's cavalry arm), one reason perhaps, why the Scots so studiously avoided an engagement, although it would be expected that in heavy snow conditions the manoeuvrability of cavalry would be curtailed. The Scottish report gave the Marquess's strength as 14,000 horse and foot, which can only be a poor excuse for not engaging them, for it is doubtful that Newcastle can have mustered as many as 10,000 men in this retreat through Durham, even after Lucas's arrival. Late Proceedings also suggested that another reason why Leven did not engage with the Royalists was that only part of his army could be drawn into battle order on the 6th, and it will be remembered that the Marquess himself on that day had watched them keenly with his perspective glass in the hopes of being able to spot the enemy's main body, so that this claim by the Scottish writer has to be accepted.

On the 7th, apparently in contradiction of Newcastle's report, the Scots are said to have made a move against the Royalists who in consequence pulled back. This sounds very much like a telescoping of events, ignoring the efforts of the Royalists earlier in the day to force a battle, and alluding directly to the situation prevailing towards nightfall. The next day gave the "advan-
tage that was, to our side", several Royalist prisoners being taken in skirmishes, but the Marquess recorded no such details. It is by no means so simple as to say that where greatly detailed accounts conflict with sources less detailed, or generally vague, those with the greater detail - in this case that of the Marquess - are necessarily to be taken as accurate. It may often be the case that greater detail obscures the truth, deliberately or not. In view of the Marquess's overall report, however, the evidence must tend to support the Royalist interpretation rather than the Scottish. There are, even so, references in The Late Proceedings, to incidents that are not found in the Royalist source. For example, the Marquess noted only his own retreat, but did not note, as did the Scottish writer, that to cover this retreat villages were burned to provide smoke with which to conceal movements. This would be credible despite the Marquess's silence, were it not for the fact that The Late Proceedings totally ignored the skirmishing involved in the rearguard action fought by Monckton, claiming instead that heavy snowfall prevented them from coming to blows. Here it is not a case of the Marquess versus the Scottish writer, for there is the relatively independent evidence of Sir Philip Monckton himself to support a view that the Scots sustained setbacks after having made an attempt to interfere with the retreat.

We understand since from very good hands, that through the extremities of the weather these two nights (the enemy lay in the fields, and there hastened march to Durham) they have suffered great losse, many of their men and horse dying, but more run away: We hear they have lost of their Horse 800 besides the losse of their foot; we sustained some losses... no wayes considerable.

Thus the Proceedings concluded the official view of the Scottish side, supporting in somewhat strong terms the Marquess's admission that his army had suffered from exposure to the elements and want of victuals.

Two other sources merit mention, although only one, Mercurius Aulicus, can claim to have anything worth saying. The other sources we have discussed, although tending to qualify the Scottish claims, appear fountains of wisdom beside that dubious tract, Experimental and exact Relation upon that famous and renowned siege of Newcastle, Together with a succinct Commentarie upon the Battell of Bowden Hill, and that victorious Battell of Yorke. As will be gathered immediately, this was written, or concocted, at the earliest in November 1644, after Newcastle had fallen and long after Bowden Hill had been fought. It is one of the wildest, most inaccurate and flagrantly dishonest examples of Parliamentarian propaganda to emerge from the northern campaigns, and would ordinarily demand no mention at all, were it not for the fact that some writers, admittedly for the most part local historians for whom the course of the campaigns was incidental, have given it credence. They have been responsible for perpetuating the myth that Bowden Hill was fought on March 20th two days before the battle of Hilton. The reason for the error, set out in
the above tract, seems to have been two-fold. Firstly, the failure of the writer to organise his materials properly and secondly, because the battle at Hilton was fought over very much the same ground as the engagements at Bowden Hill, Hilton Castle lying below the high ground. As will be demonstrated, Bowden and Hilton were two distinct engagements separated by nearly fourteen days which indicates for how long the Scots marked time in Co. Durham, itself a tribute to the delaying tactics which the Marquess had, either by default or intent, come to use. It is not impossible, of course, that the tract writer deliberately glossed over this enforced Scottish delay.

Mercurius Aulicus traced the Royalist march to Bowden, from Chester le Street on the 6th, quartering at Lambton Castle overnight, and on the 7th coming into view of the Scots near Sunderland. On the night of the 7th the Marquess quartered near Bedwicke, and on the 8th, in the retreat, some 24 Scots were reported killed and 69 taken prisoner, and these figures are so far from being 'rounded' or excessively high that they have to be accurate. In which case, so much for the claim of the Proceedings that there was scarcely any engagement at all.

For some time the armies of the Marquess and of the Scots did not come into contact, the former concentrating around Durham, the latter at Sunderland "a place of so great consequence to us" that they did not dare leave it until it had been fortified. Clearly, its port facilities were essential. A march towards Durham petered out for want of fodder for the horses, and so, for the time being, Leven made no further effort to thrust on south. In the circumstances, 'thrust' is a misleading word anyway. Newcastle's main army could now rest at Durham and hope to renew its energy for the inevitable confrontation should Leven begin to roll south. Under these circumstances, the Marquess of Newcastle found himself solicited for aid by James Graham, earl of Montrose, that master of an art of warfare which today would be called 'guerilla'.

In the meantime, it happened that the earl of Montrose came to [Durham], and having some design for his Majesty's service in Scotland, desired my Lord to give him the assistance of some of his forces; and although my Lord stood then in present need of them, and could not conveniently spare any, having so great an army to oppose, yet out of a desire to advance his Majesty's service as much as lay in his power, he was willing to part with 200 horse and dragoons to the said earl. (73)

It was later said that Montrose secured only 100 horse, "and those very lean and ill appointed, and two small brass field pieces". Montrose's argument was itself strategically and tactically sound. He told Newcastle that if he had sufficient men, he could disrupt the border areas of Scotland as thoroughly as to force Leven to weaken his pressure in Durham. The Marquess, cautious as ever, does not seem to have thought much of the idea. One wonders what
James King thought of Montrose, for that surely will have had a lot to do with it. Even so, Montrose, in demanding men from the Marquess, was asking a lot, for it would mean weakening forces which, if all the evidence is to be believed, was weakened already by the weather and want of food. Newcastle could hardly be expected to regard with enthusiasm a project which might or might not work, when the consequence of weakening his own position was only too real and not many miles away. The token force of 1 or 200 men was, under the circumstances generous; there was the allied danger, after all, of too drastically cutting the numbers of the one arm in which he retained superiority, the cavalry. Nonetheless, Newcastle sent orders to the commanders in Cumbria to supply the earl's needs so far as they were able, which was a sensible decision. After taking part in the battle of Hilton, Montrose left for the western counties with his small retinue, where he met with 800 infantry and three troops of horse. In view of what he was later to achieve with small forces, this was not a bad beginning, save for one problem, the opposition of the powerful and locally influential Sir Richard Graham of Nateby, ostensibly a Royalist, but who nurtured a grudge of some kind against his kinsman.

Montrose, Musgrave, Lords Crawford and Arboyne, met at Penrith on April 10th. After a muster, they marched to Carlisle on the 12th and on the 13th to a rendezvous five miles away. With additional forces, the little army crossed the border on the 14th and on the following day took the town of Dumfries. At some time prior to, or just after, this, Sir Richard Graham engineered a mutiny amongst the English soldiery who, practically en masse, returned into Cumberland, although Newcastle's 200 or so may have stayed with the earl under their commander, Sir Robert Clavering. Graham's motives can only be guessed at, and it is kindest to suppose that his primary concern was for the defence of Cumbria. Whether it was so or not, is another matter.

Although the Scots remained in and around Sunderland for some time, they were not idle:

On the 15. at night, a party was commanded out to assault the Fort upon the south side Tine, over against Tynemouth Castle, which they did, but with no success, though with little losse: after we had considered this repulse two or three days and fasted on the nineteenth, the Fort was again assaulted by another party; for the encouragement of which the Generall went with them in person, and on the 20. being Wednesday in the morning we tooke it with the losse of nine men, the hurt of more; In it we found five Peeces of Iron Ordnance, seven Barrels of powder, seventy Muskets; the men escaped in the dark to the water-side where boats received them, only the Lieutenant, and foure or five more were taken Prisoners; This fort was commanded by one Captaine Chapman and inhabitant of the South-Shields...I confesse I wondered much to see it taken on that manner.

This account, given in a True Relation describes the capture of what must have been a particularly strong sconce. Terry was unable to identify where
it may have been, and the passage of years has made this problem no easier of solution. Another tract, The Taking of the Fort at South Shields, suggests that that was the exact location, but this is by no means certain. It may have lain some distance from the town itself. The Taking of the Fort was, in fact, the printed form of a private letter written in April after the Scots were established at Wetherby.

According to this, for the second assault a force numerically smaller than that which made the first attempt, was employed. The tract does not mention that the 'General' led the men, which is curious, since such an event would be worthy of notice. If by 'General', A True Relation meant to imply that Leven himself, or Argyle, was present, this would argue strongly for an unwillingness on the part of the soldiers to make a second assault on so strong a position. That the second attacking force was smaller in size would tend to suggest either that specialist soldiery was employed, or else that it was a matter of volunteers only. To omit the presence of the 'General' from the April letter would seem to support this view, and the omission would be consonant with attempts to conceal the condition of Scottish morale.

From The Taking of the Fort we gather some idea of the nature of its strength:

the Fort was very strong, the Graffe without being esteemed 12 foot broad, and 11 deep, the work above ground three yards high, and within it five iron piece of Ordnance, some nine pound ball, some more, an hundred soldiers, seventy musquetiers, and thirty Pike men: It was situated with great advantage, being defended on the one side by the Ordnance of Tinemouth Castle, and on the other by a Dunkirk Frigot with ten pieces of Ordnance...

The Marquess of Newcastle had clearly intended this place to be a key feature in the defence of Newcastle and its garrison, since between the Fort on the one side and Tynemouth Castle on the other, the mouth of the Tyne was controlled. The proportions of the ditches and embankments sound formidable, and with such a garrison defending it, the Scots must have sustained greater losses than they admitted. The armament consisted of some guns of the demi-culverin type, and probably of culverins which fired a 15 lb. shot.

In the assault, the Scottish infantry carried bundles of faggots with which to fill the ditch so as to provide access for men carrying scaling ladders to the banks. Some 140 men, having achieved this - surely with heavy losses in wounded if not in dead - mounted the ladders at sword point, seconded with a body of musketeers and then by a force of pikemen. For an hour the Royalists fought it out along the breastworks, for the Scots do not seem to have gained an entry at any time and, according to the tract, some 28 cannon balls were fired at the approaching Scots. That most effective of anti-personnel weapons, case shot, was also employed. These were small wooden
boxes or barrels stuffed full with musket balls, lumps of lead generally rolled or squared of half a finger's length, fragments of iron, nails, indeed, anything that would give an effect similar to that which shrapnel gives. Fired at an angle so as to burst upon impact with the ground amongst advancing troops, they could create considerable confusion and ought to have been sufficient to break the enemy's ranks. Perhaps this type of weapon had been employed during the attack on the 15th which was driven off. Scots losses were heavy on that day. Spalding wrote

Thair cam word to Abirdene of ane bloody fight betwixt the Kingis men at Newcastell, and oure army lying thair, upone the 14th of Marche, quhair our men had the worst. (79)

In this second assault, however, the Scots finally won the day. At push of pike and at the sword's point, they forced entry at the gunports. The Royalist defenders now fell back toward the seaward side of the fort, leaving 16 dead behind them. A lieutenant and five men served as a rearguard, and held the Scots at bay until the rest were safely taken aboard the Dunkirk frigate which fired a few salvoes as it pulled away.

In view of the nature of the defences and of the types of weapon used, and in view of the way in which the Scots had to come to the fighting, it has been suggested that they seriously and deliberately underestimated their own losses. 'A few killed' or 'some wounded', such terms often concealed more startling figures, and in this respect the only Royalist account of the fight for the fort is of importance. It was written on March 22nd from Wycliff, two days after the fall. It will be remembered that A True Relation gave the duration of the assault as lasting from March 19th when the attack first went in, until its capture on the morning of the 20th. The Royalist garrison was said to have escaped under cover of darkness, so that the final success of the Scots must have been achieved between midnight and first dawn light, which at that time of year would have been about five o'clock in the morning. This is a lengthy period, and indicates that the Scots may well have drawn back time and again during the night, renewing their assault each time and eventually penetrating the defences.

The Royalist writer referred firstly to the assault on the 15th, and stated that it was followed up almost immediately on the same day, which neither of the Scottish sources admitted, but which would account for the significance attached to the fighting by Spalding.

Upon Wednesday gon a sennet, the Scotes set upon a litel fort at the Sheldes and was forced backe, but the horse would not let the foute runne. Upon the place where they first assaulted it there laye maney deade bodeyes. Upon the next assault, being the same daye, they brought of there men, but with great losse to them.

This sounds very much like the eye-witness report of a defender which may have been communicated to the Royalist correspondent, William Tunstall. "There
laye maney deade bodeyes" is an evocative comment, and carries more weight than vaguer protestations of negligible losses.

Tinemouth castle and the fort playing hotly upon them, and it was thought they lost tow hundred men that days; but they gave it not over.

The situation is not hard to conceive of. The Scots, having been twice thrown back with heavy loss, coming under fire from across the river and from a ship lying off the fort, as well as from the fort itself, were reluctant to return to the attack. Some days elapsed, one of them spent in prayer, almost as if the Scottish commanders were steeling their men against the next assault. On the 19th, a 'General' came forward to harangue the soldiery and lead them up, giving it was to be hoped, the essential spark that they needed. It worked.

...they set upon it againe, and gained the fort and five eyron pece of ordnance in it, our men fleing doune to a penisse in which it was reported that Sir John Pennington was in, but the penisse dischargeing some ordnance at the Scots, they retreated; and it is said they lost 3 houndred men at the takeing of it, and we losing but five men...

All in all, considering the three attacks, the length of the third, and the conditions, that 300 may well represent an accurate assessment of Scottish dead and wounded. Of course, it was a necessary triumph for them in view of the strategic significance of the sconce, but it had proved bitterly costly.

On the day that the Scots first attempted to take the sconce, the King sent a letter from Oxford to assure the Marquess that I am well satisfied with the relation of your proceedings. By which I judge the Scots rebelles to be in much worse case than your army; so that I hope to have good news from you shortly...I pray lett us have them, at least once a week (indeed twyce would doe better) &; though there be none, it contents us to know that... If I knew greater faultes to you, you should heere of them. (81)

The heartening style of the letter betrays the anxiety at Oxford, for the appearance of the Scots must have necessitated a good deal of tactical re-thinking on the part of the council ofwar. It cannot be that this particular letter was a reply to that from Newcastle and James King written in mid-February, and so we must suppose that since Corbridge and Bowden Hill, the Marquess had begun to feel a little more optimistic and had communicated this optimism in letters now lost. It also indicates that whatever Sir Philip Warwick may have felt about the Marquess and his advisors, he was not passing his views on in royal circles.

It cannot have been long after this letter was received by the Marquess that the Scots determined to make their move. Between the capture of the fort and March 23rd, a body of Scottish horse fell upon Royalist quarters at Chester le Street and, with the advantage of surprise, beat up some cavalry and captured 40 men with their arms. This was probably a probing movement.
heralding the Scottish advance south and the last attempt at battle which was to be made by either side. On March 24th was fought the battle of Hilton, described by Terry as the last attempt by the Marquess to rout the Scots who were probably forced back onto the offensive by their need for new areas for supplying their army. But it was more than this. Newcastle had successfully contained the enemy since they had crossed the Tyne: his tactics had forced them to make a desperate bid for new ground: and his strategy now, undoubtedly, was to take the war to them to try to break them before they could put their plans into operation.

The Royalists were established at Durham, with sections of the army at and around Chester-le Street and Bishop Auckland. On the 24th these forces marched towards Hilton north of the Wear, returning to the Bowden Hill area, to bring about a decisive action. Part of its success would have to depend upon the degree to which the Royalist cavalry could overcome their debilitated condition. They found the Scottish army drawn up on Cleadon Hill to the east of Hilton, between there and the sea. A True Relation gives the best enemy account.

On the 23. of this instant the Enemy drew up their Army, from Durham and thereabout toward Chester, and on the 24. being the Lords day, drew up in the north side of Ware, at a place called Hilton, two miles and a halfe from Sunderland, the same distance as when they faced us before.

One Royalist regiment at least was now fighting very much on home ground, that of Colonel John Hilton the luckless owner of Hilton Castle, the grim remains of which now grotesquely anachronistic, are surrounded by suburban sprawl.

...we accordingly drew up on a hill east from them toward the sea. Our Cannon were at Sunderland our head quarter, but by the help of the Sea-men lying in the haven, wee conveyed one great pece over the water, who themselves drew itt up to the field where it was to be planted, the tide failed for the carrying the rest at that time, some small field peeces we had. After the Armies had faced each other most part of that day, toward five aclock the Cannon began to play, which they bestowed freely though to little purpose, and withall the commanded Foot fell to it to drive one another from their hedges, and continued shooting till eleven at night, in which time we gained some ground, some barrels of gun-powder, and ball and match; wee lost few men, had more hurt and wounded...

In recovering some ground, the Scots were able to assess the Royalist losses in this desultory form of action, "we know they had more slaine, as we finde being masters of their ground".

The tract The Taking of the Fort at South Shields continued its narrative to take in the Hilton action, and stated that the advance of the Royalist took the Scots by surprise, "in Sermon time, and being a foggie day". The Scottish scouts were, however, alert, and soon carried warning to their main body. The Royalists, having occupied Bowden Hill "sent down...some commanded
Musquetiers to line the hedges betwixt them and us, and wee did the like". This was due, so it was claimed, to the fact that a general engagement was not possible because of the enclosures below the hill.

Our Dragoones beganne the play, and then the Musquetiers in the hedges upon both sides, our bodies of Foot advancing at all Quarters to the hedges, the Enemies Cannon discharging upon them an hour and a halfe with very small hurt. This service continued very hot, till after twelve of the clockes at night.

Many of the Scottish officers "who have been old Souldiers" said that "they had never seen so long and hot service in the night time; there was divers killed on both sides" and "the number of their slaine did farr exceed ours, as wee understood by the dead bodies wee found". Since the Scots were admitting to heavy losses themselves, the slaughter overall must have been high, and since the Royalists were not able to hold the ground on which their dead and wounded lay, nor were able to carry away the bodies, the Scottish claim to have won the fight receives indirect support.

The constable of Bowden later told the Scots, moreover, that he had seen "seven waggons drawght of dead and hurt men not able to walk" go through his parish towards the city of Durham. The Royalist musketeers fell back on their main body which still kept to Bowden Hill.

Mercurius Aulicus gave an unusually lengthy account, in which the victory was claimed for the Royalists:

\[\text{Newcastle}\] got the Scots out to West Bedwick near Hilton Castle...where they sat fast upon Bedwick Hill: my Lord Marquis had often invited them to fight, with overtures of many advantageous opportunities, but could not possibly draw them out.

Terry remarked that this was quite contrary to the facts of the campaigns, but his interpretation of events must be challenged. Since the attempted fight at Bowden Hill, where the actual engagement was brought about only when the Royalists retreated to higher ground, the Scots had remained solidly around Sunderland, ostensively to reorganise their supplies. Terry himself remarked earlier in his study that the Scottish movement which led to Hilton was occasioned by their need to find fresh supply areas, and this sounds a fairly negative reason for claiming that the Scots had not earlier avoided battle. Leven was as cautious as Newcastle, the only difference between them being, that Leven had time on his side, and even the Marquess needed to bring the issue to battle as soon as might be done. Moreover, according to The Taking of the Fort, it was the Royalists who went looking for the fight at Hilton, and not the Scots. If Mercurius Aulicus claimed that the enemy had shown reluctance to put their army to the test, it was merely stating the obvious.
On ZB-edwicg Hill four regiments of his Excellency's foot fell to work with six regiments of the rebels. The fight began about three in the afternoon and continued from that time till night, and continued more or less till next morning, the rebels all this time being upon their own Mickle Midding, and there they lay all night.

This contradicts both the Scottish accounts, for these made it clear that they occupied ground held by the Royalists during the fighting. It is possible, however, that the Scots merely advanced in the wake of the Royalist foot as these fell back on their main body, temporarily occupied the evacuated ground, and then retired whither they had come. Mercurius Aulicus anyway added further details.

Next morning (being Monday) the Lord Marquis followed them till afternoon, and then they vanished instantly into their trenches and retirement in Sunderland. Then his Excellency (seeing no hope of getting them out) drew off towards his quarters, and they being sensible of so many provocations, came on his rear... Neither of the Scottish sources referred to this Scottish withdrawal, but in view of the fact that they had drawn out in the first place to meet an enemy, to retire again towards Sunderland would be expected. It was now, according to Aulicus, that the real fighting began as far as the Royalists were concerned, and, as Terry observed, it is difficult to reconcile the two views so as to come to a definite decision as to which side came off best. Before looking at this problem anew, for Terry's conclusion was that it looked like a stalemate, in which he has been followed by all subsequent writers, it is worth seeing what Aulicus had to say:

The Scots came on his rear (being 500 horse) with all the horse they had (for as yet they never looked the Lord Marquis in the face), but the rear (with the loss of some thirty men killed and taken) presently faced about, being seconded by that valiant knight, Sir Charles Lucas, with his brigade of horse, who fell on so gallantly that forced all their horse (which is about 3000) to hasten up the hill to their cannon. All the way doing sharp execution upon them so as their Lancers did lay plentifully upon the ground (many others being taken and brought away prisoners) their cannon all that while playing upon the Lord Marquis his horse with so little success as is not easily imagined. In both these fights on the 24th and 25th March they that speak least reckon a full 1000 Scots killed and taken which cost the Lord Marquis 240 of his common soldiers, scarce an officer being either killed or taken, though many of their leaders are certainly cut off. Their foot ran twice, and would not stand any longer than their officers forced them on with the sword; the Lord Marquis hath taken many of their arms, especially of their Scottish pistols.

Certain aspects of this account can be set aside as doubtful. The numbers of slain on either side must be questioned, particularly the high Scottish figure, whilst the reference to Scottish cannon, implying that there were several, would seem to be a contradiction of the Scottish claim that they had only one piece in the engagement. On closer examination, however, the facts reveal
themselves a little. On the 24th, during the infantry fighting, one cannon had been brought to the field by the seamen, and the outcome of this struggle was that the Royalist foot fell back, and their advanced position temporarily occupied by the Scots. They in their return to Sunderland, abandoned the battlefield and were followed by the Marquess who now deployed his cavalry. At Sunderland, the Scottish artillery that had not reached the field was drawn in position, and it was these guns that fired upon the Royalists on the 25th, though what their effect was is beyond conjecture, despite Aulicus's claims. On the 25th, the Marquess found himself unable to force a fight for Sunderland, and, in endeavouring to retire, was set upon by Scottish cavalry who were, in their turn, routed by Lucas's resolute charge. This would seem to be a fair outline of events, and on the whole, would give the honours of the field to the Royalists although, strategically, the struggle was of small importance. Terry did not closely scrutinise the contents of the sources, otherwise he would have noted certain details which support this view of Hilton as a costly Royalist victory.

For example, the Aulicus account referred specifically to Scottish lancers in the later stages of the fighting on the 25th, whereas the first reference was merely to 'horse'. Not all of the enemy cavalry were lancers, and since the lancers were anyway an innovation into cavalry warfare for the northern Royalists, they would clearly have noted especially any engagement involving them. In the same way that the Scots, on the 24th, occupying the advance positions of the Royalist foot, could with justice assess heavy Royalist loss, then so too, the Royalist cavalry, routing their opponents, would notice and report the bodies of lancers strewn between them and Sunderland. Further, the Royalists took prisoners, from whom they must have learned that many of the enemy foot had to be forced into action, and this cannot be dismissed as the merest propaganda. Sir James Turner's view of Scottish morale has been given. There is the explicit evidence of the attack on the sconce on the 15th and 19th/20th of March. There is no reason to doubt that in bitter fighting such as that of the night of the 24th/25th, bitter enough to occasion remark from hard-bitten Scottish officers, the raw and untrained Scottish infantry would have been reluctant to expose themselves to an enemy who, however numerically inferior, were veterans of two years warfare.

The problem of Hilton is similar, although on a smaller scale, to that of Edgehill. Both sides claimed a victory, and historians in such cases tend to emulate the caution of prudent generals and pronounce 'stalemate'. No battle can ever be a true stalemate. In the history of the entire civil war, there is no single instance of two opposing armies being in the same condition after a fight as they had been in before. Men had been killed, morale shaken or improved, ground fought over and then fought over again. At Hilton an initial Scottish success achieved overnight was turned into a Royalist cavalry victory.
the following day. The Scots were back where they had started from, and the Marquess occupied the battlefield. In other words, the Royalist commanders successfully extricated their army from a situation in which it would have been impossible to fight a full scale engagement, and in so doing, gave the enemy a beating when they tried to interfere. The manoeuvres about to be made would not be a consequence of Royalist failure, but of a new assessment of prospects by the council of war in the light of such deficiencies and strengths as the Hilton fight had revealed. If the Scottish sources ignored the cavalry action, it was because they had nothing to be proud of. Royalist cavalry had proved yet again to be a force to be reckoned with, particularly under leaders like Lucas.

The conclusions to which the Marquess and his advisors came after the fighting were briefly set out in a letter to Prince Rupert written at Durham on March 25th. If this letter reflected the situation after the fighting of the previous day, and before the outcome of the rearguard action was known, that would account for Newcastle’s comments.

For all the affairs in the North I refer your Highness to this bearer, Sir John Mayne, who can tell your Highness every particular; only this I must assure your Highness that the Scots are as big again in foot as I am, and their horse, I doubt, much better than ours are, so that if your Highness do not please to come hither, and that very soon too, the great game of your uncle's will be endangered, if not lost...

It is the allusion to the superiority of the Scottish horse that calls in question the circumstances under which this letter was written, if we are to dismiss the idea (which we cannot altogether do) that it was written with the intention of bringing Rupert north. What Mayney had to say, of course, we cannot hope to know, but so important an emissary must be held to betoken important business. Newcastle’s cavalry may have been weak through want of forage and exhaustion, but with the injection of Sir Charles Lucas’s force they were, as they proved on the 25th, every bit as good as their opponents. Unless we are to suppose that Leven was receiving mounts by sea at Sunderland, we are obliged to assume that the letter was written prematurely on that day.

Nonetheless, on the 25th or 26th the Marquess and his advisors decided to retreat across the length of Durham. For the course of this retreat, which lasted more or less until mid April, the only sources are, regrettably, Scottish in origin, and in no way explain the reason for Newcastle’s decision. Terry, who could find no clue, made no attempt to explain a development which would seem to be of major importance. There appear to be no letters from Newcastle or from any of his officers which can assist in unravelling the motives, but the safest conjecture which has not hitherto been considered, is that Newcastle was responding to developments in his rear, in Yorkshire. As will be shown in the next chapter, these were serious and, on April 11th, left
the Marquess with very little choice but to shut himself up in York. In following the course of the retreat, it is necessary to remember that the retreat did not become earnest until April 13th, but then it became a matter of life or death. The Scottish commanders do not seem to have realised this until a little too late to do anything about it.

The first and briefest Scottish account is that contained in Intelligence from the Scottish Army which is best summarised. The Royalists withdrew from Hilton towards Durham, followed after a few days by the Scots, who made first for Easington mid-way between Hartlepool and the city. "Those quarters we kept till April 8." whereupon they marched to Quarrendon Hill close to Durham. This slow progress by the Scots is once again noteworthy, for it seems to suggest that as late as April 8th they may have suspected that the Marquess was luring them to a pitched fight. When the Scots appeared on the hill, the Marquess "drew as many forces as could be spared out of Newcastle
Surely an error for Durham? and Lumley Castle to uphold his strength of foot", apparently intending to give battle if necessary. Battle was not, however, now joined, whether from reluctance on his part, or because the Scots were playing their old waiting game is hard to say. The tract suggests that the two armies faced each other from the 8th to the 12th, and that on the 12th or possibly early on the 13th, the Marquess made his decision to evacuate Durham and the entire Bishopric. The Scottish writer ascribed this decision to the news of the defeat of the Yorkshire army of John Belasyse at Selby on the 11th; this was correct, and the resolution of the 12th or 13th April is sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that the defeat in Yorkshire was of far more significance that day, than the presence of the Scots on Quarrendon Hill. Selby wrecked whatever strategy Newcastle had evolved.

On the 13th the whole Royalist army, abandoning its supplies, marched westward to Bishop Auckland and camped the night there. On the 14th, the army rolled down towards Barnard Castle and Piercebridge where the Scots expected them to quarter again. For the first time, the earl of Leven showed resolution, as if he had finally persuaded himself that the game was up for his opponent. After ransacking Durham, the Scottish army pushed on, coming on the 14th to Darlington on a parallel line with the Royalist march. The Scottish writer claimed that Leven proposed to shadow the Royalists "till they shall have advantage to fight with them, or shall meet with the Lord Fairfax to enclose him". This sounds a little bit like retrospective reasoning, hinting at the siege of York which was begun when the letter was still to be written, whilst the suggestion that Leven was looking for a battle must be treated cautiously. He had not yet actively sought one, and even with the Royalists in retreat, made nothing approaching an attempt to force one, not even on the Tees crossing.
Behind him, Newcastle had left only a handful of garrisoned strongholds, evacuating Lumley Castle on the 12th. Newcastle upon Tyne, Tynemouth Castle, and Hartlepool were in Royalist hands, and so, probably, were Lambton and Raby castles. Otherwise, the Marquess had thoroughly given up the Bishopric, and did not even entertain the idea of making a stand somewhere on the southern bank of the Tees. The Marquess was racing against time now, with no other goal in sight but to reach York before it was taken in the wake of Selby. Now he could not afford to give battle, he could not risk delay, and he demonstrated a capacity for making a sound retreat that might have done him more credit had he not been followed by an enemy that had no intention, whatever their propaganda claimed, of interfering with him. There was much boast, but little of truth, in the claim:

that formidable Papish Armie of the Marquis of Newcastell, which was the greatest in England when our armie went in, hes beene so closelie followed as a great part of his forces both foot and horse, ar ather killed, takin, run away, & disbanded...(90)

The letter of John Somerville, written on May 1st from Yorkshire, was more comprehensive.

Upon the penult. of March the armie marchit from the quarteris beyd Sunderland and went to the Bruntfield Murhoussis [Hoochouses], and vpon the morn being the first of Apryll, the armie marchit from thair to Eisington hill, and stayit thair till the eight of the said month; and from that we marcheit...to the Quarintoun Hills, vpoun the south syd of Durhame, within a mile or two of the town; and upon the 10. day at 12. o'cloack at night...sum commandit men went out and took 20. men and threttie hors, with pistollis and saiddillis, and on of the men was a capitane. This is the only reference to a little skirmishing around Durham, which went on until the Royalists left. On the 11th, the day of Selby, some keels coming up the Wear from Sunderland to fetch coal were set upon by Royalist dragoons from Lumley castle, who killed and captured the guards and set the keels adrift.

...vpoun the 12. day, in the nicht, the Marquis of Newcastell with his armie fled from Durhame; and we get no intelligence till the 13. day att 3 o'cloack in the afternoon and then the armie maircheit efter them with all the haist they micht; bot they had ever geat a fair start, and we came to the Ferrie Hill that nicht; and upon the 14. day, being Sunday, we marcheit verrie airie bofor the soon rais, and the hors men followit in haist and cam to [Darlington] bofor 7. acloak in the morning and sent out a pairtie of hors to persew their reir. Our major commandit the pairtie; he with his pairtie tuik fourtie men and many horses and slew many of their straggillars and gat tuo thousand markis worth of silver plait, and mikil cheis, pork and bread, and we stayit there till nicht and the haill armie crosit Teis water that nicht and day...

The fighting at Darlington, a foregone conclusion if the forces engaged on the
Royalist part were indeed stragglers, though they may have been a baggage guard - unless the silver plate was plundered in the town from the citizens who may have collected it together in one place - was the nearest Leven came to giving battle in the pursuit.

On the 16th the advancing Scots occupied Thormanby and with wide-spread plundering for provisions, marched on to Boroughbridge. On the 18th they were at Wetherby, where they at last linked with the Yorkshire dragoons and cavalry of Sir Thomas Fairfax. In four days they lay before York to begin the siege of that city.

The Marquess had won the race, although the result was that he was now invested in the city: but he had little choice in the matter once Selby had opened Yorkshire up to a full scale Parliamentarian offensive. At least now, the allied army was tied down in a siege which was to last until July, and the determined defence which the Marquess put up did much to make up for the failure to hold the Scots in Durham which had, anyway, not entirely been his fault.

Newcastle sent away his cavalry, as Lord Fairfax had done during the defence of Hull the year before.

in the nicht the haill trouppes that the Marquis...had in York went out and fled and our troups with my Lord Fairfax his troups followed and tuik 60 prisonars and many horses; and they war so hard chasit that they war forcit to tak the cullouris from the standaris and ryd away with /them/ and live the staff behind them, and they ar to the King to Oxfuird; and we and Fairfax his forces are lyng about the City of York and their haill foot is within, with 4. troups of hors. Sir Marmaduke Longlie is fled and gon to the King with the haill hors that was in the Kingis northern airmie, and is myndit to bring Prince Ruppert and the haill forces that they can mak to rais the seidge at York.

Exactly where the Royalist cavalry went, and whether they split into two or more bodies of horse, is not altogether clear, although their dispositions will require analysis when we come to consider the great relief march which Prince Rupert, as Somerville rightly conjectured, was to make in June.

In this manner, between January and April, did the Scottish invasion army at last join with the forces of the Parliament. They had not achieved this junction by force of arms, nor by any very remarkable tactical thinking. Their army was reluctant, ill-trained and wanting in resolution: the earl of Leven was as cautious as, if not more so than, the Marquess and James King, and had achieved his objective by default. Part of his army was tied down at Newcastle. The Royalists, lacking the resolute generalship which they so desperately needed in February, were exhausted by continued field service and exposure to fierce weather conditions that told against them. Wherever they had been able to force a fight, they had shown themselves to be hardened.
campaigners, which must have contributed to Leven's wariness where pitched fights were concerned. In considering the Royalist campaign against the Scots during that bitter winter, it is the misfortune born of caution and of events elsewhere over which they had no control, that comes clearly to the eye. For all the effort, courage and tenacity of 1643, the regiments of north countrymen had won nothing enduring, unless it were good repute. In the winter of 1644 even that seemed almost lost, only to be regained in the last fight for many of them, on Marston Moor on a summer evening.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. T. T. E 33 (4) A Declaration Concerning Sir Edward Deering...
2. Warwick, Memoirs, pp. 266/7.
4. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 101/2.
11. Ibid., 30.1.44, p. 807.
18. Ibid.
21. CSPD 1644, p. 32 (15).
24. CSPD 1644, p. 31.
25. Ibid., p. 33.
26. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 156.
27. Ibid., pp. 157/8.
28. Ibid., p. 158.
30. Ibid., p. 33.
31. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 156.
32. Ibid., pp. 157/8.
33. Ibid., p. 158.
34. Vicars, II, p. 159.
35. Rushworth, III II p. 613.
36. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 102.
40. T. T. E 33 (17) op. cit.
41. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 161.
42. T. T. E 33 (17).
43. Tory, Scottish Campaigns, p. 161.
45. T. T. E 35 (2).
46. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 200.
50. Parsons, Slingby Diary, p. 102 f.n.
51. Ibid.
53. CSPD 1644, p. 42.
58. Warburton, II, p. 381.
59. Ibid., p. 378.
60. Rushworth III, II, p. 615.
61. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, pp. 164/5.
63. Ibid., pp. 200/3.
64. HMC Fourth Report, Denbigh MSS., Civil War Letters, I, p. 264.
66. Ibid., 2.3.44, p. 859.
67. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 34/6.
68. Ibid., pp. 200/3.
70. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, pp. 166/7.
73. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, p. 36.
76. For a full discussion of the evidence, see Graham's career in Vol. 2.
77. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, pp. 167/8.
78. Ibid., pp. 168/9.
80. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 169.
82. Rushworth III, II, p. 615. Parker, M.B. ed: The Register of Bishop Middleham, Durham and Northumberland Parish Registers Society, Vol. XIII, 1906, p. 158 has the following entry of a burial: "A pegrin, a South country man and a soldiery, taken by ye Scotts at Chester". He was buried in April, probably dead from wounds. There were few regiments in which a southern soldier might have been found at this time, the strongest possibles being those of Charles Lucas or of John Mayney.
83. Northallerton Record Office, Hutton of Marske MSS., ZAZ.
84. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 171.
85. Ibid., p. 172.
86. M.A., 30.3.44. Also given in Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 203/4. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, pp. 172/3.
87. Terry, ibid., p. 172 f.n. 106.
89. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, pp. 175/6.
90. Meikle, H.W. ed: Correspondence of the Scottish Commissioners in London Roxburgh Club, Edinburgh 1917, p. 27.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Defeat of John Belasyse
Yorkshire January to June 1644.

The general neglect with which the course of the first civil war in the north had been treated can be no better illustrated than in the case of the Yorkshire campaigns of January to April 1644. Those historians who have concerned themselves to examine the north, have chosen to be led away with the Marquess of Newcastle to meet the Scots in Northumberland, or to go along with Sir Thomas Fairfax into the Cheshire war. Yorkshire, as a consequence, has been virtually ignored. Young, in his study of Marston Moor, dealt so simply and summarily with the campaigns that led to the battle, that it is almost as if Marston Moor had no other cause than the arrival on July 1st of Prince Rupert to raise the siege of York. Markham, in his biography of Sir Thomas Fairfax, naturally followed his hero into Cheshire: he devoted only two pages to events in Yorkshire in his absence. Upon coming to the battle of Selby, he admitted that his cursory treatment was due to the lack of material and then, enigmatically, almost as an afterthought, claimed that nevertheless, Selby was the cause of Marston Moor. This was not strictly true. As will appear, Selby was important perhaps the most important single engagement of the whole civil war in Yorkshire: but it led directly to the siege of York, which in turn brought about the battle of Marston Moor.

There are problems attendant upon a study of the Yorkshire campaigns, not least the very limited source materials. Perhaps because of their scant nature, such sources as there are tend rather to confuse than to clarify events, so that in Yorkshire, as nowhere else at any other time, does the business of writing a military history seem so much like piecing together a jigsaw in which the parts appear so similar and some, frustratingly, and often crucial to the picture, missing altogether. Thus in depicting events, particularly for March and parts of February, for thereafter some clarity returns, some educated assumptions have had to be made. There is such a lack of reliable contemporary chronological material - even Sir Henry Slingsby was vague to the point of distraction, which suggests he was with Newcastle - that even the most minor, incidental evidence, where it conveys dates however loosely, assumes a significance not ordinarily the case. This is a pity, for in the defeat of John Belasyse were sown the seeds of the defeat of Royalism in the north altogether.

The military situation in Yorkshire at the start of January 1644, was still somewhat stable. Whilst Hull had remained in Parliamentarian hands despite the siege of the previous October, its offensive arm - Sir Thomas Fairfax's cavalry - had been occupied first in Lincolnshire and, from late
December, away in Cheshire. The Governor of York, Colonel Sir William Saville, perhaps fortunately in view of his health, had little to which to attend except for the day to day administration of the Royalist headquarters and the garrison reliant upon it. Away in the West Riding, Sir Francis Mackworth still held down the traditional Parliamentarian recruiting grounds, whilst the various forays from Lancashire had, on the whole, fared badly at his hands. Whilst it is true that the Marquess and his advisors had done little or nothing of long term significance with their victorious army - except insofar as they failed to act and thus threw away their advantage - that army was still intact and a danger to any Parliamentarian attempt to renew the Yorkshire war in earnest. The impending Scottish invasion would change all that, and without it, it is improbable that the Parliament would have been able to achieve anything.

No better opportunity could have presented itself to the Parliament's commanders watching from Lincolnshire or from Hull, than the march of the main Royalist army into Northumbria at the end of January. From that moment, unless the Yorkshire Royalists could maintain their grip on the West Riding, it was to be expected that the war would creep back into the county, taking advantage of the considerable conflict of duties which Saville's successor as governor, John Belasyse, had to tackle. On the one hand as Governor of York and Commander in Chief in Yorkshire, his duty was to maintain the Royalist supremacy which was essential to successful fulfilment of his second duty, that of supplying the northern theatre with recruits and materials for the Scottish fighting. Naturally, the duty to supply reinforcements told against his capacity to maintain the county so that, to all intents and purposes, John Belasyse had a problem that would have taxed the ingenuity of greater generals than he.

Belasyse, a prominent Catholic Royalist with considerable military experience in the Oxford army, was probably about 30 years old, somewhat younger than most of Newcastle's generals, and somewhat younger, too, than the average age of field commanders. His predecessor, Saville, had been 32 at his death. Created Baron Belasyse of Worlaby in Lincolnshire by the King, probably after he had already departed for the north, John was not an obvious choice as Saville's replacement. His main connection with Yorkshire had been as MP for Thirsk, and since August 1642 he had probably not set foot in the county. Who appointed him to the post - whether he was asked for by the Marquess, volunteered himself, or was nominated by the King - is a mystery. Newcastle might well have chosen one of his own generals, perhaps Mackworth, who had held the West Riding down since July 1643. Newcastle's own view of Belasyse's activities, as given by the Duchess, is brief and critical which might tend to suggest that the Marquess had not selected him.

Before Belasyse arrived at York, there had been a renewal of fighting in
the West Riding. A body of Parliamentarians from Heptonstall had raided a Royalist quarter at Sowerby on January 4th, capturing a captain and some men. A cavalry force, carried away with this success, was caught at Mixenden and, in attempting to return to Sowerby to their main body, were routed. Amongst the prisoners taken by Mackworth were two former Royalists who had deserted their colours, and these were hanged in Halifax shortly afterwards. On the 9th, Mackworth with reinforcements 1500 strong from Heighley and neighbouring quarters, advanced on Heptonstall to attempt to clear it. The enemy evacuated the town without resisting, and it was partially burned and plundered. To this series of actions must belong the tradition of fighting near Farnley. On the 28th of January, however, just prior to Newcastle's departure for the Scottish campaign and when Belasyse had just taken over in York, Mackworth was recalled from Halifax. He does not seem to have been with Newcastle, and so may have remained in York as Belasyse's second in command. His recall may certainly be seen as a move by Belasyse, since if the Marquess had wanted him for the northern theatre he would not have left it so long to bring him back. Anyway, a cautious commander like the Marquess would perhaps have preferred to leave Mackworth where he might do some good even if he sat idle with his men, to watch the West Riding.

Before Belasyse had arrived in Yorkshire, there had been some reinforcements from Prince Rupert's army, in the shape of Sir Charles Lucas and about 1000 horse. These had joined Newcastle in Nottinghamshire, for on January 4th the Marquess, then at Welbeck, had acknowledged their arrival in a letter to Rupert. "I am infinitely bound to you for giving Sir Charles Lucas leave to come to this army, and to come with so many horse". One of the problems of the chronology of the ensuing months lies in the exact whereabouts of Sir Charles Lucas at any given time, or rather, this has been a problem, for the sources do not always distinguish between Charles Lucas and Sir Gervase Lucas the governor of Belvoir. All this will become apparent, but it is interesting now to note that even though he had received this reinforcement commanded by his future wife's brother, Newcastle did not take them with him into Durham. On January 20th, Lucas was fully occupied with the Royalist forces in Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire and Derbyshire, so that his presence may have been, on the Marquess's part, a precautionary addition to the total force he was to leave behind him when he marched north.

It will be remembered that the Duchess had claimed that her husband was promised substantial recruits in Yorkshire, and that efforts had been made to see that he got them. The Duchess went on:

when he had settled the affairs in Yorkshire, as well as time and his present condition would permit, and constituted an honourable person Governor of York and Commander-in-Chief of a very considerable party of horse and foot...he took his march to Newcastle...
In a last cryptic reference to Yorkshire, the Duchess observed:

the Governor whom he had left behind with sufficient forces for the defence of that country, although he had orders not to encounter the enemy, but to keep himself in a defensive posture... (8)

In shifting all responsibility for the disasters in Yorkshire onto Lord Belasyse, the Duchess indicated that her husband's orders, had they been obeyed, might have avoided them. We cannot know the exact details of those 'orders', for the vague statement that Belasyse had to act defensively conveys little. To act defensively is not to avoid battle, which is what the Duchess implied. If the order to avoid battle was the most important Belasyse received, there was little point in his being at York, since it implied retreat, flight, or whatever term is suitable, rather than risk any fight. If, on the other hand, Belasyse was ordered to fight a defensive war where necessary, then the nature of 'defensive war' is open to discussion. He could, of course, lie in and around York and let the county around be swallowed up, which would have been disastrous for the Marquess and the lines of communication north. He might have evacuated the West Riding and have endeavoured to maintain a rough line drawn east and west from York which would retain control of the North Riding and the direct roads into Durham. Alternatively, and this is what Belasyse did, it could mean adopting such a posture as to challenge any offensive action by the enemy wheresoever that action fell out. On the whole, not only was this better for the morale of the troops, but it was also tactically sound, for it has to be remembered that Belasyse was commanding an army which had established itself by force of arms, and the propaganda use which might be made of a general falling back would serve the cause of rallying the sympathies of the cowed civilian population in the cloth areas. Since the Duchess's brief comments are all that she had to offer concerning Belasyse, it is worth showing that they were unfair, militarily unsound, and if there is any truth in their implications, it must lie in the interpretation which will have to be put upon Belasyse's activities in February and March.

Belasyse's biographer, his secretary, was unfortunately extremely brief too, although what he had to say remains important:

my Lord was again commanded northwards, where a considerable employment attended him, the government of York and Lieutenant General (under the Marquis of Newcastle) of Yorkshire during his absence against the Scots' army who entered England to the assistance of the Parliament, their fellow Rebels and Covenanters. Saville died on January 23rd or 24th, by which time Belasyse was already on his way. So it would seem that Saville's death was anticipated, or he had become incapable of fulfilling his duties. The earliest date for Belasyse's arrival which we have, is January 25th, on which date he and his committee were issuing recruitment orders to various colonels in the North Riding. Newcastle left the city on the 28th, so that what with all the preparations
for the march, and his new Lieutenant General settling in, there would not have been much time for discussion and, whatever the Duchess may have said, the Marquess might well have left it open for Belasyse to interpret the orders for a defensive posture.

Belasyse

found great disorders amongst the King's party, by reason of the factions and discontent occasioned by the ill government and discipline of my Lord Newcastle's army. He endeavoured to compose the factions and rectified all abuses, by rallying many loose troops together, before rendered useless to service, and destructive in their quarters to the Country.

The writer, as was the Duchess, was an apologist, but if what Moone had to say was accurate, then this was an extremely serious condition for the Yorkshire regiments to be in. The reference cannot be to the forces which went north with the Marquess, but only to those which came under Belasyse's immediate command. Since there is no corroborative evidence, it might be said that Moone was making wild claims to throw his master into a good light. The truth of the situation might be that under the command of Saville, discipline had lapsed as a consequence of his being too ill to enforce it. The nature of Saville's illness is unknown, but he was one of half a dozen Royalist colonels who died during the war whilst relatively young men, so that it is possible that some disease - dysentery, perhaps - might have been to blame. If Saville was languishing for weeks, even from the time that he took up his appointment when Glemham left for Northumberland, then Saville may have been a stop-gap to fill the position until Belasyse could come to take over. It is a pity that in so important a matter the sources are so quiet. Nevertheless, this might account for the condition in Yorkshire with which Belasyse was said to have had to contend.

So far so good. But what of these 'factions and discontents'? It is a remark lightly made but not easily dismissed. There is no evidence whatsoever, that the Marquess's high command was beset by bitter disputes, although it would be expected that the less cautious, younger commanders might have organised an opposition group to James King, which might have translated itself into factional alignments. In this case, it might be no more than a type of generation gap, understandable but not to be made too much of and certainly unlikely to influence the discipline of whole regiments. The criticism does sound very much like an indictment of the Yorkshire gentry, and this would fit in with criticisms levelled, for example, in the Duchess's narrative time and again. In this case, there would be the 'swordsmen', the activists, noted in 1642, with Sir Francis Wortley, and the 'reluctant' activists, those who for one reason or another wanted either the war taken away from the county, or a negotiated peace. In this sense, the factions would be quasi-political, and it is likely that this was the core of the problem with which Belasyse had
to deal. Over and above that there was the question of the new governor's religious beliefs, which although they had never made him a Recusant - he had sat as MP for Thirsk - would be widely known. Some of the Royalist gentry, men like Colonel Sir John Kay for example, might not take kindly to a Catholic in overall command. They might even have had a rival claimant for the position which he occupied.

Belasyse formed several bodies of horse into three general headquarters, at Leeds for the west, at Malton for the east, and York for the North Ridings, and he settled considerable garrisons of foot at Halifax, Doncaster, Leeds, Stamford Bridge and other places, and all the castles and forts which he found possessed with good garrisons. Besides the care incumbent on him to preserve the country, my Lord Newcastle had imposed that of providing for his Army on the Bishopric with money, provisions, ammunition and recruits of men and horses, so as no difficulty could possibly be greater to any person in His Majesty's service than those he was involved in through this employment.

Just when Belasyse organised these forces is not known for sure, but it was probably well into February when he began his work, as will be seen. The secretary's assessment of his master's difficulties was sound; it was a demanding task for a man who, however competent, had hitherto had no experience of such a command.

The reference to Doncaster is not strictly accurate. This garrison had been organised by Newcastle himself as he came up from Welbeck. On January 24th the Marquess was still concerning himself with it - the governor was Colonel Sir Francis Fane - as a letter to Major Thomas Beaumont, Saville's deputy in charge of Sheffield, indicated:

I cannot expresse ye sorrow I have for the losse of your noble Colonell...but since it hath pleased God to call him from us, you may be pleased to take notice that I intend to take the governmt of Sheffield Castle & that garrison into my owne hands, & to imploy you as you have formerly beene in that charge: & therefore I doe hereby desire your care in ye execution of all things thereunto belonging, as commander in cheef there: hereby requiring you to receave orders from mee, ye Lord Lieutenant Generall, or such other commanders in cheef of ye Army as shall have authority from mee to comand you, & none else. And for the 100 men you were commanded to send to Doncaster, I pray you faile not upon sight hereof to send 20 more to make up them already sent 100...(11)

Clearly, Fane's own regiment must have been under strength if was with him in Doncaster.

Other evidences for Belasyse's activities, apart from the warrant of 25th January, consist of an order issued on the 29th for some 200 men to be levied who were to serve as a permanent garrison for Clifford's Tower - an indication of his determination to make York itself secure - and again, on the 25th, he gave evidence of his watch on the west. He made a general call for reinforcements for himself, to watch the Lancashire border, to watch Lincoln-
shire to the south and to keep an eye on Hull, matters to which Saville had also given thought in November. 13

The first definite military challenge to Belasyse came some time in February, between the 9th and 20th of that month. The uncertainty which attaches to the date is due entirely to the vague source material available. That the challenge came from Hull and was inordinately successful, is beyond dispute. One of the key accounts is that of Sir Henry Slingsby:

Now was Sr. Wm. Constable crept out of Hull wth their horse; making their Carrocols upon ye Woulds, & was heard of as far as Pickering. Against him Collonell Belasyse sends all our horse, & some foot, together wth Sr. Charles Lucas, to force him to keep wthin Hull, or else to fight him. They march & Quarter about Colham: they send about for intelligence where he lay: but he could not be heard of: wth yt night, they little fearing of him, he comes and beats up their quarters, takes many prisoners, & so returns to Hull. The Regiments he fell upon were Sr. Water Vavasour, Sr. John Kayes, & my brother Tho. Slingsby's whose Major was taken prisoner.

Slingsby added the following, vitally important, observation:

The committee of Gentlemen of York were daily in expectation of some good news out of ye north, & hop'd yt his excellency before this would have beat ye Scots out of Northumberland; they judg'd it to be like a fray at a Markett Cross, soon begun and soon end'd; but long experience hath taught their Generall to wisely to detract fighting, knowing yt a victory could not gain him so much as a bad disaster might prejudice.

It is incidental that Slingsby confirms the impression gathered from a study of events in Northumberland and Durham. The really important remark is in the line "before this (i.e., before the attack at Colham) would have beat ye Scots out of Northumberland". The Scots left Northumberland at the end of February. On and around the 22nd of that month reports were rife that Newcastle was securing a victory, which must put the fight at Colham into mid February. For reasons which will become apparent, I tend to place the action on February 10th. Peter Young, in his appendices to Marston Moor, succeeded in confusing the fight at Colham with an action fought at Hunslet outside Leeds in early March, which has not helped in unravelling the tangled skein of events. 14

Colham, or Colden, lies near Headon to the east of Hull, and can have no relation whatever to an engagement fought on the outskirts of Leeds by forces which, moreover, were of a totally different composition, as will be seen.

It is worth remarking that from the three regiments cited by Slingsby, those of Vavasour, Kay and Thomas Slingsby, it seems that the Marquess had left his Yorkshire regiments behind him as he had always promised to do should he have to leave the county. Since these three were horse regiments, it is apparent that the Marquess's cavalry arm must have been relatively powerful, since he retained cavalry superiority in Durham even with the Yorkshire regiments left behind.
The fight at Colham was but one of several successes which attended Sir William Constable's raiders. On the 12th, the conjectured date in view of the Royalist failure to force him back into Hull, Constable took Bridlington which was commanded by an unidentified Major Newnham with 250 men, cannon and 500 small arms. "This place being within 6 miles of Scarborough, will make Sir Hugh Cholmeley, that perfidious apostate, to look about him" crowed John Vicars. A letter written on February 11th, probably from Hull, by one John Bourchier to Sir Thomas Barrington, which did not report the capture of the port, but referred to the fight at Colham, strengthens the chronology arrived at.

Sir William Constable with part of my Lord General's forces has given the enemy a great blow in taking many commanders and troops. (16)

Dating a list of prisoners taken to the 10th of February, Bourchier noted Captains Vavasour, Newstead, Horsefield, Winell and Tiffen; Lieutenants Kirk, Lowther and Ward; Cornets Wharton, Blockley, Wastead, Robinson and Brown; with three quartermasters, three surgeons, three corporals, three trumpeters, a minister, a secretary to "Sir Key" and 173 troopers and their mounts. Although it is not possible to identify all the officers taken, the mere reference to a secretary of Sir John Kay's confirms that this is the same engagement as that reported by Slingsby, who alluded to Kay's regiment. Captain Vavasour may have been John Vavasour of Colonel Sir Walter Vavasour's Horse, and the ranks of the prisoners support the Slingsby version that only cavalry were involved. This is, in a way, puzzling, since Captain [John] Horsfield, or Horsfeld, if it is one and the same, is known as an infantry captain under Colonel Sir William Saville. It may be that here we have a clue to what became of the Saville regiments when their colonel died in January.

Vicars added Major Grey to the list of prisoners, and Andrew Grey, a Scotsman, was Thomas Slingsby's Major, whilst Sir Henry Slingsby noted the capture of his brother's major without naming him. To follow Vicars for the moment, he noted that after Bridlington had fallen, the Parliamentarians scored another success "at a place called Driffield, between Malton and Scarborough". Driffield is not exactly on such a line, but Vicars was in London and the name put forward by him for the town where the action took place is to specific to be queried. Here, according to Vicars, Sir William Constable captured a full 300 cavalry, including Colonel Washington (not positively identified, and the rank was probably that of Lt. Colonel), a Major, three captains, with the rank and file. A local tradition that Watton Abbey, the former Gilbertine house, was stormed by a Parliamentary force may relate this incident or to the events of what had become a minor Parliamentary campaign sweeping up the east coast as if to taunt Cholmeley, whose capacity for raiding they were now emulating.

On the 20th, the progress was rounded off by a successful assault on
Whitby, Cholmeley's residence in time of peace. Vicars reported that it yielded with 500 officers and men, 1000 pressed seamen, no fewer than 20 Commissioners of Array, and over 100 cannon from ships in the harbour. One is tempted to wonder whether Constable had any support from Parliamentarian warships off the coast, although there is no evidence for such. Lord Fairfax's taking of Whitby would seem to put the glory onto the Lord General who remained, in fact, in Hull, Constable having the field command. In London, the capture of "a very strong Garrison of the Earle of Newcastle's" must have been the subject of much relieved conversation. Whitelock also noted these engagements, but his chronology was so bad that it is fortunate his work is not a primary source (indeed, his Memoirs for this period at least, are the merest compilation of published tracts, to which he added little of which we do not know from other sources). Constable concluded his rampage when he "took Stamford Bridge, and three peaces of Ordnance". This probably occurred on February 22nd at the latest, and it must also mean that Belasyse had not then established his cavalry command at Malton with responsibility for the East Riding, otherwise some engagement would surely have been fought. Stamford Bridge was too close to York for comfort. In view of the fact that nothing further was done, the dispositions to which Belasyse's secretary made reference must have occurred after Constable's campaign and perhaps in response to it, and can therefore be positively identified as 'defensive' in nature. On the whole this seems a sound conjecture.

Between February 22nd and March 3rd, there is no record that anything else was attempted by either side, although Belasyse must have been extremely busy reorganising to meet the cavalry threat from Hull. His choice of Leeds moreover, as a headquarters for controlling the West Riding, may date to this period. Whilst the town may seem an obvious choice, in view of its easy communications with York, militarily it might have been better to establish a command deeper in the cloth towns, perhaps to go back to Halifax. As it was the Parliamentary commanders had seized upon the opportunity afforded by the uncertainty that had initially prevailed in Yorkshire, to go onto the offensive in a limited way, almost as if they were probing the strength of the Royalist dispositions. On March 3rd - again, the date is conjectured - was fought the first of two battles staged at Bradford before April 11th. No one has yet realised that there were, in fact, two distinct engagements, whilst very few have bothered to note that there was even one. Briefly, since it will help in analysing sources that are so confused as to be almost beyond interpretation the first fight at Bradford was an attempt by Belasyse to prevent the Parliamentarians from establishing a foothold there. This battle was fought partially in the town, partially outside it. The second Bradford action, fought on or around the 25th of March, was an attempt by Belasyse to dislodge the Parliamentarians who had in the interval firmly occupied the town.
On both occasions the Royalists suffered a reverse, which fact might have contributed to the confusion surrounding the incidents.

The clue to the chronology lies in the activities of Sir Charles Lucas, who fought in the first action around March 3rd but who, by the time that the second was fought on March 25th, was in Durham. It will be remembered that he was actively commanding in the battle of Hilton at that time. Slingsby remembered:

Sir Charles Lucas at this time was sent out of ye south wth a 1000 horse & Dragoons, to do us cervise in ye North, & now sent for by his Excellence; but Collonell Bellasyse yt command’d all ye Yorkshire forces, desir’d an assistance before he went, thinking yt wth their joynt forces, they should be able to beat out of ye town [of Bradford] some few forces of Collonell Lamberto yt lay in it; but ye success prov’d not; they assault’d ye town but was beaten from it wth loss, having some prisoners taken, & some kill’d. Strange fortune we have had at this Town, for untill his excellency took it after ye battle upon Allerton Moor, we never attempt’d any thing upon it but receiv’d an affront, once by Sr. Tho. Glemham, once by my Ld Goring, & now by Coll. Bellasyse. (22)

Slingsby's determination to refer to Belasyse as 'Colonel', when he was quite properly to be designated Lt. General, suggests Sir Henry may have been one of the group opposed to Belasyse's appointment. But that is incidental. The reference to Lambert as definitely in the town might seem to make this section an account of the March 25th action, except for the very positive reference to Charles Lucas. Slingsby's recollections were extremely vague where dates were concerned, so that it is a misnomer to call it a Diary. In the first engagement, however, we can be sure that Lambert did have a foothold in the town.

Captain Hodgson of Halifax was in the first Bradford fight, even though he had been with Thomas Fairfax in Cheshire, and Fairfax was still absent on March 3rd. Lambert, the new Parliamentary figure to loom in the West Riding, seems however to have been detached from Fairfax's main army, and to have returned into Yorkshire in late February, so that Hodgson came with him.23

We marched back out of Cheshire to Sowerby, and from thence to Halifax, and back to Kighly, and so to Bradford, Major General Lambert commanding the whole party. We found the enemy in Bradford, but they overran the Kirk. Our horse had some pickering with them up to the lane head, and was put to flight; but our foot gave them such a salute with shot, as made them run for it. We retreat [in] to Bradford, and quartered there a while, and after marched to Leeds, and after, took Selby...

The vagueness of Hodgson's closing remark suggests that between March 3rd and April 11th he saw little, if any, active service. He made no allusion to the Hunslet engagement, nor to the second Bradford fight at the end of March.

John Vicars, when he came to describe the first fight at Bradford, seems to have confused his sources24 That he intended to describe the March 3rd
The West Riding in February, March and April 1644.
action is evidenced by his allusion to the Parliamentary capture of Tadcaster which might have occurred immediately after the first battle, but from the moment that he set pen to paper he made several important errors. In brief, after indicating that Lambert was marching on Bradford, as indeed he was, Vicars gave Belasyse as commanding there in person, which is highly improbable for the first action but highly likely for the second. His sources for the second engagement then took over completely, so that his details became virtually worthless in their context, and the only value in them for the March 3rd fighting was a specific reference that can only apply to that date, that Belasyse sent men to 'releeve' a Royalist garrison in the town. After the fighting, Bradford was Lambert's headquarters, as will be seen.

This represents the sum total of evidence for the first Bradford fight, gleaned from the larger body of sources that prove a second fight for the town. Doubtless this problem would have been resolved long ago had anyone concerned himself to examine the war in the north in detail, but even Lambert's biographer whilst noting the first engagement, did not perceive the clues for a second.

Within two days, on the night of March 5th/6th, Lambert, flexing his muscles, won a second success, this time at Hunslet, the fight which Peter Young confused with that of Culham in February. For this fight, we are fortunate in having Lambert's own despatch, written on March 6th, to his old commander, Sir Thomas Fairfax:

The last night I sent out a party of horse and foot, commanded by Captain Asquith, to fall upon the enemy's quarters at Hunstett, which accordingly was done, through God's assistance, with good success. We took some prisoners; Major Vavasour, Captain Hughes, Captain Cardhouse, Captain Laine, Captain Labourne, and Captain Talbot; three lieutenants, four gentlemen, about 200 common soldiers, besides some slain...

It may be that Peter Young confused the two incidents - Hunslet and Culham - because of the similarity between Captain Vavasour, taken at the latter, and this Major Vavasour who headed the list of Hunslet prisoners. In this case, the major was probably Thomas Vavasour, a Recusant, field officer in the horse regiment of Sir William Bradshaw. Bradshaw's regiment was in Yorkshire at this time, and we shall have occasion to come across it again at the second battle for Bradford. Captain Cardhouse may be a reference either to Captain Thomas Carnes of Sir George Middleton's regiment of Horse, or to Lt. Colonel Carvis of the same regiment. Middleton and Bradshaw both raised their regiments initially in Lancashire, and they may well have operated together since leaving the county after June 1643. Captain Labourne must be the Captain Leyburn of Middleton's horse, the problem of whose identity has been gone into thoroughly elsewhere. Captain Hughes, and Captains Talbot and Laine cannot positively be identified, but if they did not belong to either of those regiments, belonged to a third, unknown, force present at Hunslet.
Three soldiers buried in Leeds between March 5th and 6th must have been (Royalist) casualties, either from Hunslet or from Bradford.  

There is a Cheshire source which specifically tied down the action at Hunslet to March 6th - Ash Wednesday - and which adds further details of prisoners that suggest Middleton's regiment was the one that suffered most. As well as giving Major Vavasour, Captains Leyburn, Talbot, Hughes (it does promote Hughes to major and adds the forename William, although this does not help identification), Laine (Lance), Cardhouse (Cares), this source adds Captain Walmeslow and Lieutenant Christopher Harris, of Captain Plumpton's troop. Harris was definitely from Middleton's regiment, but the only Captain Plumpton who can be identified in the northern army, served under Sir William Eure and was killed at Marston Moor.

Vicars has a reference, not to Hunslet, but to another action at Kirklees in which Lambert was also successful, although precisely when it took place is unknown. In this action, some 11 troops of Royalist horse were attacked and, according to Vicars, lost four lt. colonels and majors, seven captains, the full 11 cornets and 300 men as prisoners. We know that Belasyse had withdrawn his concentration from the Halifax area to Leeds, and Kirklees lies on the outskirts of Huddersfield, so if this action is not fanciful - and whatever Vicars occasionally did to the truth, he rarely wrote romance - and if it is not a confused account of Hunslet, which is doubtful, then Belasyse must have kept an advanced party towards the Lancashire border, which was sensible in the circumstances.

Thus far have been unravelled the tangled evidences for events in early March. That Lambert, in his letter on March 6th, made no reference to the Bradford fight of the 3rd, can be explained by assuming that he had already sent a despatch which has, unfortunately, not survived. It is unlikely that Lambert would have sent so brief a communication on the 6th, if he had not already reported at some length on his successful, and important, occupation of Bradford. There is, however, one more letter of his which on the surface, defies explanation.

The letter, written from Bradford on the 11th, was concerned chiefly with securing money with which to pay the Parliamentarian forces under his command. The second part of the letter was made up with news.

I shall only trouble you farther with what news I hear. The Scots are certainly at Durham and Hartlepool, the latter whereof they fortify and settle a garrison. There hath lately been some blows, and the report goes by divers who came to us from them that Sir Richard Hutton's regiment is cut off. This you may credit, that many wounded soldiers are brought to York. My Lord General hath taken Stamford Bridge and some good ordnance. More of the particulars I cannot relate. The enemy is fortifying Tadcaster; even now I hear that he is marched towards Leeds with eighteen colours of foot and the demi-cannon. I should not in
the least kind have credited it, but that I know the relater to be very faithful, and reports that his friend saw it.

This reads very much like a letter from someone badly in need of something to say. Some of his remarks were transparently untrue, others concerned news so stale that his recipient must already have known of it. The Scots, for example, were not in Durham city on March 11, but entered in the wake of Hilton two weeks later: nor had they occupied Hartlepool. Lambert did not mean that the invaders were in Co. Durham, for he specifically used the word 'at'. Hartlepool may have been an error for Sunderland. He had wrong information where Hutton's regiment was concerned, too. A force raised in Yorkshire and closely attached to the city and Ainsty of York, Hutton's foot almost certainly remained with the army under Belasyse, and we may here have a confusion of Hutton with Huddlestone, for we know that the latter's infantry were in the Bishopric. They were not, however, 'cut off', which meant that they had been utterly destroyed.

When Lambert wrote, Stamford Bridge had been taken about two to three weeks earlier by Sir William Constable on his progress through the East Riding, but it had not been garrisoned since it would have been untenable in view of its closeness to York. Lambert cannot have heard of its capture so belatedly as is implied, unless communication between Hull and Bradford was ruled out by Royalist cavalry patrols. The allusion to Tadcaster being fortified may have been accurate: most important is the remark that 'he', meaning the enemy, was marching to Leeds with large forces. If this was a reference to the strategic dispositions which we know that Belasyse was making for control of the county, then they were taking place remarkably late and must be seen as in keeping with Newcastle's orders that he should act defensively. If Leeds had had no real Royalist presence on March 5th, then that would explain how a small body of Parliamentarians from Bradford could fall upon Hunslet with impunity. Thus Belasyse's decision to establish a regional command centre in Leeds was a direct response to offensive action by the Parliamentarians and was by no means a breach of the Marquess's vague orders, or what we know of them. It might have been better if he had acted earlier, and had put sufficient troops into Leeds to thwart Lambert's activities at their inception, instead of having to try to oust him from the Bradford area once he had gained access to the county.

It is Lambert's incredulity in response to this news of Belasyse's actions that is puzzling: "I should not in the least have credited it" he wrote. He cannot have thought that with the victories at Bradford, Hunslet and Kirklees, that he had won control, undisputed, of the West Riding, for Lambert, whatever else he was, was no fool. He must have expected to be challenged sooner or later, unless, of course, he believed his own stories about Co. Durham and thus that his credulity was due to his belief that Belasyse would be heavily
preoccupied with ferrying supplies to Newcastle and making up numbers as columns of wounded returned to York. If Lambert's overall tactics were based upon so complete a misunderstanding of what was happening in the Royalist camp, then he was more or less putting himself in a position of extreme danger. Had Belasyse known this, things might have turned out differently: had there been a resolute thrust into the West Riding from York, Lambert might have been hurled back into Lancashire and Cheshire and the entire course of the war drastically changed. But Belasyse's orders, as we understand them, forbade such a policy on his part: he was constrained to adopt a make-do and mend approach at a time when it could do most harm. In other words, the real consequences of the caution exhibited by Newcastle and his advisors, were to be felt by Belasyse and would lead to the destruction of the Marquess's entire achievements.

Since the Lambert letter supports the view that Belasyse, contrary to the Duchess's criticism, was acting in accordance with his orders, it is worth examining the military situation in Yorkshire as it stood in mid-March. Lt. General John Belasyse, Governor of York, had at his disposal probably the bulk of the Yorkshire regiments together with some from Lancashire which had been in action outside that county for almost a year. With these forces, Belasyse had to defend York, maintain supremacy at least in the North Riding, around the city, and, if it could be done, in the West Riding, and prevent any definite Parliamentarian incursion. Thus he could, on the one hand, ignore the Hull raiders, regarding them as purely nuisance value unable to maintain any territorial incursion: whilst looking upon the developments in the West Riding as the real threat. He had mistakenly endeavoured to contain Sir William Constable, and had suffered defeat at Colham, and he does not appear to have tried again (nor, for that matter, did Constable) although he may have refortified Stamford Bridge and have garrisoned Tadcaster. Thus by mid-March, unless Cholmeley in Scarborough were active, and there is no evidence one way or the other, the Hull garrison could, if it wished, range the East Riding to a limited extent, keeping its distance from Malton where Belasyse had a force.

In the West Riding the situation was superficially the same. With the withdrawal of Mackworth's firm hand in January, the area had become open for the long dominated Parliamentarians to try their hand again. The result had been three defeats in a row - Bradford, Hunslet and Kirklees - with an almost inevitable consolidation of the Parliamentarian foothold. Lambert had doubtless had an influx of volunteers, who were never wanting in the cloth towns, and his forces must have been increasing daily. They threatened Belasyse in several ways. Obviously, they represented the danger of losing the West Riding entirely; and the organisation of the county into three command zones,
with Leeds for the west, was Belasyse's answer, limited as it necessarily was by the commands of the Marquess. Further, Parliamentarian control of the west would mean easier access for Lancashire reinforcements, and a powerful army under Lambert could either fight to establish a link with Hull, or break into the North Riding and so disrupt Belasyse's flow of supplies and of men to the army fighting the Scots.

The military situation for the Royalists was, clearly, far from satisfactory. All the initiative lay with the enemy, for Belasyse's hands were tied both by his orders and by his responsibilities. Under such circumstances, whatever Newcastle or James King might have done, Belasyse did that which seemed to him to be for the best. By no means so cautious as his superiors, he elected to fight a short, defensive campaign aimed at unsettling Lambert before he capitalised upon his success. The Royalist manoeuvres were limited in intention, and that the scheme failed was due to circumstances that, but for orders, Belasyse might have been able to avoid. In mid-March he made the decision to attempt Bradford again, using greatly increased forces.

The observations made by his secretary are here of the utmost importance, since the first move was to be made in the chain of events which led inexorably to defeat at Selby. Moone made it clear that his master was actually established in Selby a fortnight before the battle there, and that he did not precipitately seize upon it out of choice as a place at which he felt that he could encounter the Parliamentarians.

\[he drew\] all his troops together and rendezvous at Selby, where he formed a small army of 5000 foot and 1500 horse, and marched in person from York to command them, with six pieces of cannon and a train. At Selby he made a bridge of boats over the river Ouse to communicate with the East Riding; from hence he marched 1000 foot and 500 horse more to attack Bradford... (32)

Here we see Belasyse organising Selby as a base from which to conduct his campaign, having decided that it was more advantageous to operate from that town rather than from York. It stood four-square between Lambert and Hull. It became, by implication, a field headquarters which by April, was to come under attack, and critics of Belasyse's military judgement would do well to realise this integral factor. The Duchess did not, nor did her husband.

Before the attack on Bradford began, Belasyse, to follow his secretary's account, received reinforcements in the shape of George Porter and Sir Gervase Lucas. Lucas, governor of Belvoir, was styled 'George' by Moone, and it may well be that students of the period in realising this was an error, compounded the mistake of identifying only one Bradford fight by calling Lucas 'Charles', since Sir Charles was indeed at the first battle. Sir Charles Lucas, as has been said, was by now in Durham, so that the identification of 'George' with Gervase is obvious. If it be asked what the governor of Belvoir was doing in
southern Yorkshire, then the answer lies in the events in Nottinghamshire in mid to late March, to which we must briefly turn.

If further proof is required to show that Belasyse did not act rashly, it will shortly become apparent. On March 21st, Prince Rupert had raised the Parliamentarian siege of Newark, inflicting a heavy defeat on Sir John Meldrum. The best account of events is still that given by Alfred Wood whilst the following summary is meant only to indicate the military situation outside Yorkshire in the light of which Belasyse formed his plan of attack upon Bradford and, indeed, his march to Selby.

With the departure of the Marquess to the Scottish war, and the withdrawal of forces northwards to assist him, the counties to the south of Yorkshire over which he exercised authority were left to their own devices. In consequence the Parliamentarians had returned to the offensive and had, by early March, thoroughly invested the important garrison town of Newark on the Trent. The Parliamentary force, commanded overall by Meldrum, was particularly strong, drawn as it was from virtually all of the neighbouring counties as well as from Nottinghamshire itself. In February, an outlying body of Royalist cavalry in the Isle of Axholm had been driven back into Yorkshire by Meldrum. The force, commanded by Colonel Sir John Mayney, apparently rode straight on north to join the Marquess in Durham but it was claimed that Mayney had lost 100 men prisoners, eight guns and 300 small arms The siege of Newark was completed by February 29th. On the 18th of that month, Prince Rupert in Cheshire had there received news from the King of these developments, with a request that he create some diversion to relieve the pressure. By March 16th Rupert had decided to march directly to the relief of Newark. On the 21st, after a rapid march in which his army was reinforced by troops which included men under George Porter, Rupert came upon Meldrum's siege army and trapped it between his own men and the town garrison. Meldrum, unable to fight his way clear, offered negotiations and was permitted to depart for Hull. In the wake of this victory, Lincoln, Gainsborough and Sleaford were evacuated by the enemy, and the pressure was lifted from Nottinghamshire.

Thus, when Belasyse occupied Selby and inaugurated his campaign, he was capitalising upon a sudden weakening of the overall Parliamentarian position. Gervase Lucas and George Porter, released from activity and the need for constant alertness, were able to assist him in his march, and circumstances could not have been more propitious. Since the sources do not go into sufficient detail to show Belasyse in a favourable light, it is doubly necessary to show their deficiencies if an objective view of his period of command is to be arrived at.

Thus, having everything in his favour, Belasyse, to follow his secretary a little longer,
fell on with the foot, and had certainly taken [Bradford] but for a gallant sally Lambert made through our horse, commanded on that side by Colonel George Porter, and escaped to Halifax, so as the pursuit of him engaged us so late at night as, our ammunition being spent, we drew back to Leeds.

Vicars completely confused his account of both battles, but the section dealing with that fought on or around March 25th/26th is in one unit and can be lifted cleanly from the muddle.

for 7 howres space the...disputation was fiercely continued; at length Col. Lambert perceived he had the better of his enemies; but yet...for want of powder he knew not what to do ...A Council of Warre was sodainly called...and...it was agreed, that before they would offer any parley to the enemy, the horse should charge once more; which, in that desperat exigence, was performed with such undaunted courage and resolution, that the Enemies Horse began to give ground...

Whereupon, as Vicars had it, the Parliamentarians turned at bay and put these horse to a rout, capturing no less a prisoner than Colonel Sir John Gerlington, the former High Sheriff of Lancashire.

As is not unusual, these forces saw the battle from different angles, and their chroniclers tended to differ as to the outcome of the battle, so that it is best to omit conclusions until other material has been examined. Strangely, the most important of these comes from Samuel Luke, largely because of the specific nature of his dating. On April 2nd, a Tuesday, Luke noted that he had received a report from Manchester that "last week" 40 troops of horse and 1200 foot commanded by Sir William Bradshaw had attacked Bradford, but that Lambert drew out his men, faced them, and captured both Bradshaw and another gentleman (Gerlington?) in the rout. Since the report reached Luke from Manchester, it is not surprising that emphasis was given to the part played by the Lancashire Royalist officers, and not too much should be read into the allusion to Bradshaw as commander instead of Belasyse. The quite definite statement that the fight took place during the course of the week preceding April 2nd supports the contention that the action took place on or around March 25th/26th, which date anyway fits in well with Rupert's success at Newark.

Bulstrobe Whitelock noted this action, and alluded to the capture of a Colonel 'Bagshaw', whilst acknowledging that Belasyse was in command. Vicars belatedly gave 'Bagshaw's' capture, so that one is forced to wonder whether Whitelock did not rely on Vicars heavily when compiling his own Memoirs. An additional contemporary letter, dated April 4th, reported Lambert's victory and some 200 Royalists slain.

If Bradshaw was indeed taken, he was exchanged not long after, since he fought with distinction on Marston Moor. Precisely how long Gerlington was held is not known. The battle at Bradford seems to have had three or four
stages. At first, Lambert held on to the town, sustaining a fierce attack until his ammunition ran low. Thereupon, he resolved to fight his way clear, and in doing so, created confusion in a part of the Royalist cavalry commanded by Porter (which probably included Bradshaw's regiment and perhaps Gerlington's) and broke them. Once clear of the town, Lambert then turned at bay, drove off what was left of the horse with some loss and, when the main Royalist army retired on Leeds, returned and probably reoccupied his ground. It was clearly a Parliamentary victory due largely, if not entirely, to the failure of George Porter.

It is not stretching the evidence to blame Porter. He seems to have been himself ashamed of his part, or to have resented Belasyse, for there is a letter to him from Colonel Samuel Tuke of the duke of York's regiment of horse written on March 28th:

> you perceive the distress of the North and now the choice is whether you will desert yr Countrie now gained and possesst or serve against a fresh enemie, I pray resolve speedily of it. (44)

Porter had ridden back into the now trouble-free areas of Nottinghamshire. Three letters of his, written between March 28th and 30th, survive, which help to show his state of mind. He had been ordered to return into Yorkshire, no doubt by Belasyse who was his superior officer, but was writing to Rupert for permission to remain where he was to recruit his forces. This request does suggest losses which, since they were not suffered at Newark relief, can only have been due to the Bradford fiasco, although he made no allusion to it. Nor did he hurry north, so that his deliberate slowness - or dereliction of duty - contributed in no small way to the defeat at Selby.

The battle of Selby was the result of a conjunction of forces which Lord Belasyse was not equipped to defeat, and which in a sense he could not have foreseen as occurring so soon as it did. It will be remembered that Sir Thomas Fairfax had been in Cheshire in early March, although some of his army led by Lambert, had returned into his native county to make the most of the Royalist predicament there. It is now possible to go back to that useful memoir of Thomas Fairfax's for his interpretation of events in April and the battle of Selby.

my Father commanded me back into Yorkshire, yt by ye conjunction of Forces we might be more able to take ye feild. We met about Ferry Bridge; he being come out of Hull thither wth ye Intention to fall upon ye enemy's Garrison at Selby. Here I received another command from ye Parlant to march Immediately wth my Horse & Dragoones into Northumberland to Joyne wth ye Scotts Army. The E. of Newcastle who was ye, at Durham, being much stronger in Horse ye they; for want of wch they could advance no furthur. But it being resolved, wthin a day or 2 to storme Selby, I stayed till yt businesse was over; wch proved as effectual for ye Releife of ye Scotts Army.

If anything is surprising, it is that Belasyse should have remained personally
in Selby from March 26th to April 11th without making any movement at all. He
may have been misled by his information, or he may have trusted to his strength
to be able to hold Selby and thus, if he had any inkling of the enemy strategy,
to tie down their army for a time at least. It cannot be argued that Belasyse
ought to have evacuated Selby and return to York, even if that would have
avoided battle, since once Selby was emptied of troops, a great Parliamentary
barrier would stretch from Halifax to Hull. Having selected Selby as his
field headquarters, Belasyse had no option but to defend it if he could, and
he was not the man to leave the command to a subordinate whilst he himself kept
securely within York.

The Governor of Yorke lay in ye Towne with 2000 men, we drew
Horse and Foot close to it. Sr John Meldrum led on ye Foot
wch had their severall posts appointed, where they should
storme. I wth ye Horse ready to second them. The enemy,
within, defended ymelves stoutly, a good while; or men, at
length, beat ym from ye Line, but could not advance furthur
bec: of ye Horse within. I getting a Barricado open, wch let
us in betweene ye Houses and the river, we had an Encounter
with their Horse. After one charge they fled over a bridge of
boats, to Yorke. Other Horse came up and charged us agn,
where my horse was overthrown, being single, a little before
my men, who prestently releived me, & forced ye enemy back, who
retreated also to Yorke. In this charge we tooke Coll:
Bellases, Governo of Yorke; By this time ye Foot had entered
ye Towne and also tooke many prisoners. This good success
gave the view of the opposing commander, since the
memoir was, like that of the Duchess, compiled from conversations and from
dictation.

Belasyse's secretary gave the view of the opposing commander, since the
memoir was, like that of the Duchess, compiled from conversations and from
dictation.

Sir Thomas Fairfax with 2000 horse from Lancashire, where he
had lately defeated the Lord Byron's forces, joined his
father's and Lamberts Meldrum's forces from Hull in the
Isle of Axholme and advanced against my Lord to Selby, where
they attacked him, April 11th.

By break of day he defended the place gallantly for the space
of eight or ten hours, and at last by the treachery or cowardice
of one Captain Wilson, afterwards condemned to death by a
council of war, at his post, Sir Thomas Fairfax's horse entered;
whereupon my Lord charged him in person at the head of his
horse. But they (the officers only excepted) not advancing,
but taking occasion to fly over the aforesaid bridge of boats,
he found himself engaged in the midst of Sir Thomas Fairfax's
troops, who killed his horse under him, and discharged some
pistols and blows with swords at him: so as he had certainly
been slain but for the goodness of his arms, and thereby
received but two wounds; one in his arm, the other in his head;
both with swords: so as ( tho' he asked it not), yet they gave
him quarter, and carried him to the Lord Fairfax, their General, and my Lord's near kinsman, who treated him civilly and sent his chirurgeons to dress his wounds, and ordered his going down the river, together with Sir John Ramsden, Sir Thomas Strickland and the other prisoners taken to Hull.

It would be valuable to know precisely when Belasyse was taken, whether his capture destroyed the morale of his infantry or whether they were broken before that point. The sword wounds he sustained convey a picture of a typical civil war field commander, but his forwardness in the action was not really the role of an overall commander unless it was a last desperate flourish, like that of Rupert was to be on Marston Moor. It might repay a study of crucial actions throughout the period, if it could be shown that respective commanders were taken from the scene early by capture, wounds or death. Perhaps Belasyse lost control early. The Duchess observed, accurately in a sense, although she meant it as a reproach:

he being a man of great valour and courage, it transported him so much, that he resolved to face the enemy, and offering to keep a town that was not tenable, was utterly routed, and himself taken, prisoner, although he fought most gallantly. (48)

Enough has already been said to show that the Duchess's account of the action left a lot to be desired.

Sir Henry Slingsby had a useful account to give, since he suggested that Belasyse was expecting the union of the Hull and Cheshire forces for some time, by an intercepted letter sent from Lord Fairfax to his son. We do not know precisely when this letter was intercepted, supposing Slingsby to have been correct, but it might explain why Belasyse selected Selby as his field headquarters, although there were other considerations. Of the battle, Sir Henry wrote

\[ \text{Ld Fairfax had ye benefit of ye river to pass w\text{a} & where he would. Whereupon Collonell Bellasyse resolves to hold ym out at Selby. They send in their summons; he sends ym word back again he would not deliver it up to a rebell; this answer insens'd my Ld Fairfax; they prepare to storm; Coll. Bellasyse to defend himself; Coll. Strickland offers, that give him but 200 men, & he would undertake to make good yt part of ye town wch should be judg'd ye weakest, & falls a working yt night.} \]

That was on April 10th.

The next morning my Ld Fairfax falls on & in a short time enters ye town both w\text{th} horse & foot: such as could get over the bridge (for a bridge they had made of boats) made speed to York, some to Cawood: taken & list'd as prisoners to ye number of 80 officers besides Comon soulgiers.

This proved a fatal blow to us, much lamented for ye loss of Coll. Bellasyse, of whom at first none could give any certain report whether he was kill'd or taken; so it proved of consequence to ye parliament as ye very dawning of ye day wch brought prosperous success unto ym....
compiled his memoir, especially since he added for emphasis:

they had long expect'd ye assistance of ye Scots, & now ye was come he could neither get farther, nor my Ld Fairfax come at him, without this obstacle were remov'd or ruin'd. The countrys of ye North were much wasted, & ye armies could not long dye one against ye other, but starve. Their horses dy'd and their men weary of such hard duty being in Winter frost & Snow, would not endure longer but began to run away. The Scots must be forc'd to retreat, not having Sr. Tho. Fairfaxe's assistance as was look'd for, if this unfortunate news had not come unto ye of ye beating & routing our Yorkshire forces.

Slingsby's shrewd comment requires little amplification. It is both concise and accurate, and establishes Selby as the crucial battle of the civil war in northern England. Indirectly, perhaps, the most crucial action of the war so far as Parliament was concerned.

The Duchess of Newcastle's criticism of Belasyse has been dismissed, but it is worth noting that her husband did not, at the time, feel that the blame for the defeat lay with the governor. From York on April 18th he wrote to tell the King that "all this had been prevented if the Ld Loughborough and Col. Porter had given Col. Bellasis assistance, as they had time enough to have done, and orders, too!" The news of the defeat must have come like a cold shock of water at Oxford, where on the 16th Sir Edward Nicholas could tell Patrick Ruthven:

We believe that the news of Col. Bellasis being beaten by L'd Fairfax is either altogether or in good part false, for yesterday there was no news of it at London, and we have not yet had it seconded. (51)

There are various other sources, including tracts to which reference will shortly be made, which refer to the action, but none of them except one add much to the story. Whitelock gleaned his account from tracts, and mentioned 1600 men taken in the town, with four colonels, four majors, 20 captains, 130 "inferiour officers", some 2000 arms, ships and pinnaces in the river Ouse, and on the day following, some 500 fugitives were apprehended at Hemingborough. Sir Roger Burgoyne, writing on April 13th, noted 1800 prisoners of all sorts, and 1000 dead and wounded. These figures are not excessive. It was reported in London that "divers slain, and lyes strewed in the Way to York, for Four Miles; others that fled to Pontefract we pursued to Ferry Bridge." Before considering these Royalist losses, it is worth pausing to look at the accusation of treachery made by Belasyse's secretary.

It has often been remarked in this study that the claims of treachery made to account for a defeat were flung around with scant regard for truth. In this case, however, we have the officer's name, Captain Wilson, the statement that he commanded at a barricade, and the additional information that he was shot by order of the council of war, either on the field, or later at York.
Whoever Wilson was, it is no longer possible to know. To support the charge, however, is Sir Thomas Fairfax's own admission that he entered the town at a barricade after initial failure. The statement that Wilson was shot supports the view that something was amiss, and there is one vital piece of evidence that exists to substantiate a charge, if not of treachery, then of dereliction of duty in the face of the enemy. It occurs in a letter written on December 25th 1644 from Holland by an exile, Major William Vavasour of Colonel Sir Walter Vavasour's Horse:

For myself, that Selby business, which I must never allow to be ascribed to disobeying orders or ill-conduct, but to the cowardice of some foot officers proving so unfortunately, my brother Bellasis taken, my regiment spoiled, and I, finding strange unexpected entertainment at York [the siege], thought fit to leave those few remaining men, and to take care, with my Lord's leave to get myself into some fitter place than a besieged town...to have my hurts cured...(55)

Vavasour's is the only letter which we have written by an officer in the Royalist forces which fought at Selby. Slingsby was either at York or with Newcastle. Because of this, it is fortunate that what it has to convey is so significant. Although Vavasour had a reason for vindicating Belasyse, his conclusion that the defeat had nothing to do with disobedience is supported by an objective examination of the whole Yorkshire fighting, whilst his claim that cowardice led to the enemy entry supports what Belasyse's secretary had to say on the matter. A letter written in December 1644 was written at a time when mutual recriminations amongst the exiled northern Royalists must have been high. Newcastle and James King were then in Holland, with many of their former staff. John Belasyse, still a prisoner, had no way to defend himself against a campaign of innuendo and slander that arose from the need of men to find a scapegoat for their own shortcomings. Clearly, William Vavasour felt it his duty to defend the governor of York, and to set the record straight even in his correspondence. The letter, in fact, casts a little light into the dim twilight world of the depressed and frustrated exiles for whom everything was as good as lost. In re-examining the accusation made by the Duchess, a whole hidden aspect of the Royalist war is uncovered.

More important still, where Vavasour's letter is concerned, is the contribution which it makes to the other aspect of the Selby defeat, and one which has never been examined properly, although its significance for a full understanding of the strategic consequences is great.

It is fairly conclusive that Selby brought about both the siege of York and, indirectly, the Royalist defeat on Marston Moor. It is also evident that the defeat was a misfortune contributed to by Porter's failure to appear, and by the cowardice or treachery of a barricade commander at a vital moment. From an examination of all the sources - and now we must come to the relevant tracts - it is plain that Selby was important in another way. That, in brief,
at Selby the Yorkshire foot regiments were utterly broken, beyond repair, a severe loss to the Marquess of Newcastle. Vavasour wrote that his own regiment - a cavalry regiment - did not escape from the town but was 'spoiled', and he spoke, too, of abandoning his few men that were left, to go to recover from his wounds. He went in fact to Scarborough and so over to Holland, probably when Newcastle left from there after Marston Moor. If an entire cavalry regiment such as Walter Vavasour's, could be so badly mauled, what hope had the infantry of escaping death or capture?

To assist in assessing the grievous nature of the loss which befell the Yorkshire forces, it is necessary to examine the lists of captured officers that have remained extant. These are extremely full and, although they tend to overlap, by careful scrutiny it is possible to arrive at a fairly accurate list. The published lists were, of course, by no means complete - publishers may well have shortened lengthier columns of names, so as to convey the general impression of the victory without going deeply into details. Then again, it is possible that really exhaustive lists were never completed at all. The following table has been compiled from Vicars, A True Relation, A Letter from Lord Fairfax, and the list in the Lords Journals. There is a fairly accurate rendering of these sources in Morrell's History of Selby.

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Although such a list of names can be tedious, it serves to illustrate better than any other method, the heavy losses in men captured which the Royalists sustained at Selby. Of course, not all of the regiments named were
necessarily present in strength: there may have been representative troops or companies. At the same time, many of the men about whom nothing is known, may have belonged to regiments not named elsewhere in the list, or to regiments such as Vavasours which were 'spoiled'. If each regiment present were at half strength, in some cases even less; and if of that strength of approximately 500 men in an infantry regiment, some 250 were taken prisoner, which from the numbers of the officers would appear not unlikely, the enormous loss of man-power becomes apparent. What became of the prisoners we do not know, though at first they were marched to Hull with their officers, where the rank and file probably went free having given their paroles not to fight again. Belasyse at least was sent to London before being exchanged, and did not fight at Marston Moor. Hardly any of the regiments at Selby can have had more than a token presence, if even that, at the battle on July 2nd. It will be seen that Belasyse drew men from Skipton garrison, Colonel Sir John Mallory's preserve, and that there were some men at least on the field drawn from Sir Henry Slingsby's regiment. If Belasyse were reduced to filching men from garrison duties for his campaigns, then his strength cannot have been very great anyway, hence the reliance on assistance from George Porter. If we can say, as from all the evidence it seems that we may, that Belasyse's Yorkshire infantry ceased to exist after April 11th, then this was a loss to the Marquess of untold seriousness. If for no other reason than this, the battle of Selby was crucial.

If the Royalist forces in Selby numbered the 1500 Horse and 800 foot given by A Letter from Lord Fairfax, and in this instance there seems to have been no attempt to overestimate the enemy in order to enhance the triumph, then of these 2,300 or so no fewer than 1500, chiefly infantry, can have been made prisoner. This does not account for those killed or who died later of their wounds. Many of the fugitives who did escape, with no regimental colour around which to rally, might well have headed for home thankful to be alive.

To summarise. Selby was a battle that could not have been avoided by Belasyse without giving the enemy a free hand in Yorkshire. It fall out by chance, and was not deliberately sought by the Royalists, who had throughout followed their instructions to act in a defensive manner sufficient to maintain control of the county, or at least of those areas from which Newcastle might be supplied. The defeat at Selby broke the Yorkshire army beyond repair, and enabled the Parliamentarians and the Scots to join together, forcing the Marquess to abandon the struggle in the Bishopric for the sake of the security of York, for had York been lost - and it well might have been in the turmoil of the loss of its governor and the panic which must have ensued upon so total a defeat - there is no doubt that before Rupert or anyone could have succoured the Marquess, he would have been brought to battle somewhere in the North Riding and annihilated. As it was, his success in reaching York first merely
postponed the reckoning, which came on July 2nd at Marston Moor. There can have been few such actions as that of Selby, where small forces were engaged, which had had such far reaching consequences. St. Albans in 1455 may have been a similar case.

Newcastle, hearing of the Selby defeat

marches with all speed to York lest this late victory might so heighten the enemy & discourage us, as they might attempt some on the City of York, having diverse with them inhabitants who had forsaken their houses, & gone with them, & many in York did but faintly assist, being wearied with payments. Like those who are in pain, thinks they could endure better any where then where they are.

His excellence his coming was diversely received; we in York were glad we had assistance of his army, foot to be put into the City for defence of it, & horse to march to Prince to enable him better to relieve us. The country man was glad he came with the Scots at his back, for now they said they should pay no more subsidies, which was but hope to ease a Gall’d horses back by shifting saddles. The Scot follow him, & would be now and then troubling him in rear making their march together. (67)

Slingsby's fortunes were at a low ebb when he compiled his account, which might be the reason for his stark realism. Sir Thomas Glemham returned to his old post of governor of the city, and doubtless other commands devolved upon those Northumbrian colonels whose infantry regiments were now virtually all that were left for garrison duty.

The decision to send away the cavalry was unavoidable. They were of small use cooped up behind the walls, whilst if they were at liberty to combine with other forces, they might do much, as well as induce Rupert to attempt a relief march. The exact dispositions of the Northern Horse, as they must henceforth be collectively termed, during the months of May, June and early July cannot always be accurately assessed, although initially they, or a part of them, made for Newark. How they eventually joined with Rupert must be left to the next chapter.

Throughout Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland the Royalist forces were on the defensive. The only bodies of fighting men free to act as they chose were small by comparison with the allied army of the Scots and Parliamentarians. Sir Hugh Cholmeley, in Scarborough, was to prove that he had not lost his prowess for raiding, whilst Montrose and his English second in command, Colonel Sir Robert Clavering, was shortly to return to England with some success. Throughout this period, however, Cumberland and Westmorland, the only counties where there was any hope of recruiting a new army, remained as aloof as ever.

Whilst the main allied army settled down to try to blockade York, small detachments were sent out to mop up local Royalist garrisons. On April 24th, Stamford Bridge, newly garrisoned after the raid by Constable, surrendered. The senior officer there, with 80 men under him, was only a lieutenant, ;
which might be an indication of the way in which Belasyse drew upon garrisons prior to the Bradford and Selby actions. The officer and his men had leave to enter York. According to this same source, it was on the 24th that the Royalist horse evacuated the city, for on the 25th the allied army "goe by Selby toward Ferribridge, to meet with most of the enemies horse, who were to march that way...from Knaresborough, where they had gon the night before from York". The date of the departure cannot be confirmed from any other source, but there seems no reason to doubt it.

At about the time that Stamford Bridge was taken, there were two vain attempts by the Parliamentarians to capture Cawood, but these failures were exceptions. It was only away to the north that the Royalists tasted success again, where Montrose had returned into the country after taking Dumfries, perhaps in an effort to draw the Scots away from Yorkshire by a show of force.

On May 10th he laid siege to Morpeth castle and town which was then garrisoned by a Scottish commander, Somerville of Drumm. Having entered Newcastle upon Tyne to reinforce his army - which indicates how poor a siege Leven had left behind him - and assisted by Clavering and Lord Crawford, he summoned the enemy garrison and then launched an assault which was beaten off. Sending for cannon from Newcastle, Montrose settled down to a three week siege which was not, apparently, seriously challenged by the regiments left behind by Leven in Northumberland. In the course of the siege, it was said, over 180 men were killed, including three Scottish captains and a major, before the enemy surrendered on May 29th. Mercurius Aulicus gave Montrose's forces as 6000 strong, which sounds like an over-assessment, and added that Lumley Castle was also taken in. If this was now permanently garrisoned again, it was once more a threat to coal supplies along the Wear. A few days later, Aulicus reported an engagement near Hexham involving Montrose and Clavering, but no details remain.

From the wording of the decree of forfeiture drawn up against Montrose it would seem that the prime mover in these events was not the Marquess, but Clavering who, since he was socially inferior to Montrose and was to die very soon, has consequently been eclipsed.

For Joyning himself v* collonell clavering and his forces about the tyme of the invading of the said castle of morpeth.(74) After the capture of Morpeth, and with the assistance of the Royalist forces in South Shields, Montrose recaptured the sconce which had been so bloodily disputed on March 15th and 19th. Captain Thomas Rutherford, commanding, did not put up so bold a resistance as his Royalist predecessor, Captain Chapman, had done, and Clavering took the surrender. Rutherford was later tried for complicity with the Royalists but the case was not proven.
Royalist garrisons around York on April 16th 1644.
From the sconce, the victorious Royalists moved against Sunderland and, if they had been successful here, would have opened up the war in the Scottish rear so wide, that of necessity Leven must have sent men back into the Bishopric to fight the battles they had avoided fighting on their way south. At Sunderland, however, whatever the proclivities of the Scottish soldiery, the seamen held firm and resisted what may have been an attempt to surrender the port without a struggle to Clavering. By June 20th, the Royalists had fallen back into Newcastle. On the 16th, some 1000 horse from the siege of York had gone north after Sir Henry Vane, Parliament's commissioner driven from Durham by the Royalist resurgence, had persuaded Leven and Lord Fairfax to take some action.

The defenders of York must have heard word of these events to the north, and could not be blamed if they took hope from what they heard. Yet Montrose and Clavering were in no position to challenge the allied or even the Scottish army alone, with their vastly superior forces, and it may have been the departure of decisive cavalry additions to the Scottish army which forced the Royalists back into Newcastle upon Tyne. There were, anyway, minor successes in Yorkshire, which effectively challenged the paper supremacy of the allied generals.

Some time around May 16th, the Royalist garrison at Buttercrambe to the north-east of York fell to the Scots.

On the 19th, Cawood was taken by Meldrum, with its Scottish governor and some 140 men, some of whom took the Covenant and joined the siege army around York. A Royalist garrison in Crayke yielded at about the same time. A counter-attack was immediately launched from Pontefract, a cavalry raiding party releasing some of the prisoners and doubtless taking them safely back with them. The Parliamentarians claimed that it was a raid intended to recapture Cawood, but that sounds unlikely.

According to Manifest Truths and to Hull's Managing, Meldrum went on to take 'Airemouth fort', claimed as one "of ye strongest places in England". A contemporary reference to this fort described it as "commanding a considerable pass upon the West Riding". It has never been properly located, although it is interesting to note that despite the retreat into York, some token Royalist presence was maintained in the West Riding for at least a while, in a garrison independent of Pontefract or of Sandal. The site of this fort may have been at Airmyn, which lies three miles from Howden at the junction of the Aire and Ouse, hence the confusion of the name Airmyn with Airemouth. Peter Young chose to interpret Airemouth as 'Eyrmouth', but no such place name corresponds with the original spelling anywhere in Yorkshire.

On May 27th Bramham Hall near Boston Spa fell to the Scots as well, but
as at Cawood, the allies did not have things all their own way. Pontefract raiders were probably responsible for the surprising of a body of Scots at 'Yarid Bridge' which Peter Wenham suggested was meant to imply Yearesley. If Yearesley is the correct rendering of the name, then the engagement in the North Riding - Yearesley lies four miles north-east of Easingwold - may have been due to a raid from Scarborough or from Skipton, and an alternative location may be Yarm Bridge, which would have come under Cholmeley's reach, for he was at this time active with his cavalry. Indeed, the impression is easily gathered that, from the reports which reached the London publishers, a good deal of localised skirmishing was going on throughout May and probably in June as well. It is possible that Newcastle, in his hurried march to gain control of York in April, had left behind him detachments of foot and cavalry which were left to their own devices - as, for example, in the action at Northallerton in mid May - and it is probable that we do not know of half of the minor actions that were actually fought. If Newcastle and James King had had time to think and to prepare, they might have left behind them in the North Riding bodies of raiders whose task was to interfere wherever possible with Scottish communications. Such continued action when the Marquess was to all intents and purposes shut up in York, argues for a violent reaction against the Scots which may not have been purely Royalist, but which certainly did not need the presence of the Marquess and his army to foster. Then, of course, it must be remembered that the perennial problem is one of want of information: defeated armies left little behind them, and the victors rarely numbered their own defeats.

On the night of June 3rd/4th, the allied forces at Buttercrambe received an unexpected visitation from the Scarborough raiders. The drawbridge was still down despite the fall of darkness, and a Parliamentary commissioner, Henry Darley, in residence when Cholmeley's men arrived. They took him a prisoner with a minimum of fighting. Cholmeley himself recorded the event:

Mr. Henry Darley one of the Parliament's Commissioners employed for bringing in the Scotts, and still resident with them, laye att his father's house 4 miles short of Yorke att a place called Buttercram, and thought himselfe in great security in respect of the army which besiedged Yorke were quartered round and about him, and that there was noe enemy nearer than Scarbrough, which had noe considerable forces; besides between him and that place close att his door was an unfoordable river, over which was a draw bridge, which (through confidence of securitie) the Governor understood was often undrawne up in the night, heere upon the Governor drawes out fiftie of his best horse and choisest men putting them under the command of Major Crompton, communicating the designe onely to him, which was to march to Buttercram, and to endeavour the surprising of Darley, this was about 9 of the clocke in the night, and Crompton soo well performed the service, that hee had Darlie out of the enemies reach before they made anie parsuite, and brought him to Scarborough the next day by 12 a clocke.
Whilst Cholmeley's men were winning this triumph, Royalist garrisons were still collapsing wholesale. A fortified manor near Barnsley fell to the Parliament at the end of May, followed by Wortley Hall. On June 3rd, Colonel Sir Francis Wortley, commanding his own house of Walton Hall, surrendered it to the enemy after they had successfully stormed the bridge leading to it with the loss of 12 men. Wortley and 120 men were taken prisoner, and Wortley himself was not exchanged, so bringing to an end the military career of one of the King's earliest Yorkshire swordsman.

On June 17th, Mulgrave Castle in the North Riding capitulated, its governor Captain Zachary Stewart, choosing to agree terms rather than to fight it out.

The ease with which these garrisons fell suggests that there had been no plan in mind when they were created. It is likely simply that local Royalist gentry, or disorganised units, finding the county flooded with Scots and their allies, barricaded themselves in wheresoever they could, and either chose the first opportunity to surrender favourably or, after a token resistance, chose to save their lives. Only York, Skipton, Scarborough and Pontefract can be considered to have been solid and intended Royalist garrisons, and not one of these four showed any indication of even considering surrender, although it is of course true, that only York was under any immediate threat, the enemy concentrating on minor strongholds which would not require heavy siege weapons. In London, naturally, much was made of the fall of these minor garrisons, but strategically their loss signified little. If they are to be seen as having any importance, then it must be as pointers to the way in which the northern war was going.

The siege of York itself has been dealt with adequately by Peter Wenham, whose work has been frequently referred to. There would be small point in covering the same ground, but it might be as well to look briefly at the siege from the points of view of two rival officers, Sir Henry Slingsby and Sir Thomas Fairfax. From them it may be possible to catch some hint of the atmosphere in and around the city before the arrival of Prince Rupert at the end of June. To consider the besiegers first, from the point of conjunction between Sir Thomas and the earl of Leven at Wetherby:

for this works it was thought fit to have more men, The Towne being large in Compasse, and Strongly Manned; Therefore ye E. of Crawford, Lyndsey & myselfe were sent to ye E. of Manchester to desire him to Joyne wth us in ye saidge, wch he willingly consented to, bringing an addition of 6000 Foot, and 3000 Horse wth him. So now ye Army had 3 Generalls, Lesly, Manchester & Fairfax; who lay apart in their severall Quarters before the Towne.

Manchester was slow in arriving. On May 24th he was still at Gainsborough and he himself reached York ahead of his army, on the 27th to confer with Leven and Fairfax. The reinforcing army remained at Selby from the 28th to the 1st of June, when they marched to concentrate to the north of the city. By June
5th the construction of batteries was going on in earnest.¹²

in my Ld Manchesters Quarters, Approaches were made to St Mary's Tower; & soone came to myne it; wch Coll: Crawford, a Scotchman, who commanded yt Quarter, (being Ambitious to have the honoʳ, alone, of springing ye myne) undertooke, without acquainting ye other Generalls wth it, for their advice and concurrence, wch proved very prjudiciall; for having engaged his party agt ye whole strength of ye Towe, wthout more force to second him, he was repulsed wth ye losse of 300 men; for wch he had surely beene called to Acct, but yt he escaped ye better by reason of ye Triumvirall Government. Soone after Prince Rupert came to releive ye Towe...

Victorious armies tend to play down their internal differences, but there are hints in what Fairfax had to say, of dissensions within the allied high command.

Turning to Slingsby's account,⁹³ we have a far more detailed and, from the Royalist point of view, interesting picture of affairs. Lord Fairfax initially took up his quarters at Fulforth and Heslington, with the Scots at Bishopthorpe and Middlethorp, thus leaving open the northern approaches to York which were only closed up with Manchester's arrival. It was through this northern gap that the Royalist cavalry had made their escape.

provisions we had in good store in ye town but mony we had none; wch bred us some trouble to help out, & many complaints both from soulgiers and Townsmen. My Ld took a course to have ye billet'd, & proportionally laid upon, both ye Gentlemen & officer, either to find ye meat, or mony after a groat a man pʳ diem; wch for my share came to 4l. 5s. a week, ye mony being rais'd out of ye corn wch I brought into ye Town; this fell heavily upon somel yt being Sojourners & in great want, yet was forc1d to maintain a Soulgiier, tho' they were put to ye shift to borrow; and their was no remedy, for ye soulgier knew him yt was appoint'd to pay him, & if he refus'd ye soulgier lays hands on him or any thing he had.

Here again, Slingsby's direct and simply style of recording events strikes one all the more forcibly. Whoever was responsible for the arrangement in the city, and it must have been agreed between Newcastle, the Mayor and the Governor at the highest level, so organised it that each civilian was directly associated with the business of defence. It may sound somewhat anarchistic, with individual soldiers turning looter when their pay was not forthcoming, but it really is hard to see what alternative there was to this unpleasant method of securing money.

Outside the walls, the enemy raised a battery on Windmill Hill by Heslington, and occupied the suburbs outside Walmgate bar, where they fell to mining. Manchester, established at Heworth and Clifton, ordered mining at St. Mary's, as Thomas Fairfax noted, and with his cannon broke down part of the wall near the King's Manor.

We fall to work & make it up wth earth & sods; this happen'd in ye morning: at noon they spring ye mine under St. Mary's tower, & blows up one part of it, wch falling
In this action around the King's Manor, Newcastle's Whitecoats gave evidence of the tenacity they were to show on Marston Moor. The question as to whether they were one regiment (Newcastle's own) or an amalgam of several will be found discussed elsewhere. Also killed in the action were Lt. Colonel Samuel Brearey, probably of Henry Waite's garrison foot, and a Colonel Huddlestone. Just which of the several Huddlestones in arms this one was, is not clear from the sources. Robert Skaife identified him as Richard Huddlestone, Lt. Colonel of his father's foot regiment, even though the entry for his burial in York Minster records no Christian name. On the whole, this is more likely to have been Major Ralph Huddlestone who might, for all that we know, have been promoted to a Lt. colonelcy in the exigencies of the siege.

At Walmgate, to revert to Slingsby's account, the mining attempt by the attackers was thwarted when Glemham channelled water into a counter-mine. As for counter-attacks outside the walls, there were few of these, having only middlegate barr open, & a little sally port at Munk barr, where we once made a sally out against Manchester's men. Our horse guards would be pikering, & now & yn killing, & taking of ye Scots, & among ym one Bellintine, a major, whom they made great moan for...

Ballantyne, "that valiant warrior...Scotland never produced a man of greater courage and daring", was, according to Payne Fisher, killed by one Donnelle, "a man of obscure origin but a gentleman in all he did". Wenham could not identify the slayer of so notably an adversary, but he may have been the Captain William Dunnell who was already, or was later to appear as, an officer in Marmaduke Langdale's regiment of horse.

The attackers stormed and took outlying redoubts, Slingsby mentioned such actions at Bishopfields and on a hill towards Bishophorpe. But this was no great loss more ym killing of ye men; for but one they kept, ye other they slight'd, & we still send to ye fields to keep our cows and horses: but our provisions still wast'd & would have an end without we had reliefe; therefore my lord would make tryall to send to ye prince to inform him of ye condition ye town was in; he chuseth out 8 undertakes to go to ye prince & either pass ye Scouts, undescern'd or else break thro' them; but all or most of these were taken; we made fires upon ye minster wch answer'd us again from Pomphef, but a messenger could hardly pass. They kept so strict guards, as I could not get any either in ye night, or day, to go to Red house & bring me back word how my children did, but were taken either going or coming...
It is curious that Slingsby's family resided away from York, in view of the express orders issued in 1643 by Newcastle that gentlemen's families were to be persuaded or coerced into residing in the city. We know from the extant parish registers that many serving officers, even from Lancashire, had their wives and children with them. It may be that when the siege became likely, Sir Henry obtained permission to send his children away to Moor Monkton rather than expose them to the dangers of siege warfare. It is a reflection upon the type of war being fought, that the enemy did not make use of Slingsby's paternal affection for their own ends, since the children were decidedly in their power.

In the midst of these difficult times, "he whom we so long look'd for was heard of coming to our relief", although for a time it was doubted if it might not be a rumour. Then it was observed that the Scots had drawn off their guards from accustomed places, "their Centinells had given over talking" with the Royalist sentries on the walls, "as usually they had done". Colonel Sir Gamaliel Dudley, commanding at Walmgate, sent out a dozen infantrymen to probe the enemy lines. These were followed, contrary to orders, by others, who found the enemy huts empty. A body of cavalry commanded by Major [Ralph] Constable, also of Langdale's regiment - this tends to cause one to wonder whether this regiment, or a part thereof, might not have remained in the city - pushed on further, but was met by enemy horse and forced to retire. They made a stand to cover the retreat of the infantry when the enemy pursued, but this took so long that eventually the opposing cavalry clashed

they took some of ours prisoners, & we kill'd a Cornett of theirs wch they said should have marry'd Sr. Tho. Notclift his sister, & they shot Capt. Squire a Yorkman in ye back. Thus they part'd...

The wounding of Captain Robert Squire, also, let it be noted, of Langdale's foot regiment, was the last incident of the first part of the siege of York. Before both armies now lay the broad pastureland of the Ainsty and the broken gorse moorland known either as Hessay or Marston moors.

It is now time to look at Prince Rupert's relieving army, and the campaign which led to that fight on the moor on July 2nd.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Markham, Life of Fairfax, p. 138.
2. For Belasyse's career, see Vol. 2.
7. Firth, Hutchinson Memoirs, p. 422.
8. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 33, 35.
10. See above, p. 240.
14. Young, Marston Moor, p. 178.
18. ibid., p. 154.
19. ibid., pp. 156/7.
22. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 103/4.
23. Hodgson, Memoir, p. 144. Thomas Fairfax was seeking permission to return into Yorkshire on March 6th, see Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 81/2.
25. But see below, p. 291.
27. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 94.
32. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 95.
35. Wood, Civil War in Nottinghamshire, pp. 67/82.
36. See above, pp. 271/2.
37. Vicars, II, p. 147. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 128. Alnwick Castle Mss., 'Services Performed by Sir John Mayne of Linton in the County of Kent, Kn: and Baronet', f. 181. Mayney wrote, 'St John Mayne was left Governor of the Isle of Axholme, and had the charge of the Frontier against St John Meldrum. He had the command of Sir William Savilles Regiments of Horse and Foot, and the Lord Widdrington's Regimentof Foot, with which, and his own Regiments, he had severall fights with Sir John Meldrum, with good successes against him. He took in one fight, Col. Lassels and all his men, which he sent prisoners to York. He also beat up St John Meldrum's quarters, killed many of his men, and took above a hundred prisoners; and took also his Arms and Ammunition; St John Meldrum narrowly escaping, run away without his doublet. He afterwards gave St John Meldrum a defeat, when he attempted, with seventeen sayl of Ships from Hull, and six thousand Foot soldiers, to surprize the Isle of Axholme: besides many other services which he performed there'. Mayney's career is covered in Vol. 2. This record of his services, written, as has been explained there, to show him in the best light, did not mention his being driven from the Isle, although there is ample evidence to show that he was. His estimate of Meldrum's 6000 may be
excessive, but in other points his account was accurate.

38. See also T. T. E 39 (8) A brief relation of the siege of Newark. T. T. E 39 (10) and T. T. E 40 (11) Britain's Remebrancer.


41. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 81.

42. Vicars, II, p. 200.

43. HMC 7th Report, Verney Mss., p. 477.


47. Moone, Belasyse Life, pp. 384/5.

48. Firth, Newcastle Memoir, p. 36.

49. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 105/6.


51. CSPD 1644, p. 121.

52. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 82.

53. HMC 7th Report, Verney Mss., p. 447.

54. LJ, VI, p. 522.

55. CSPD 1644/5, pp. 197/8.

56. Vicars, II, pp. 204/6.

57. T. T. E 43 (6) A True Relation of the great victory it hath pleased God to give...

58. T. T. E 43 (14). This tract admitted heavy Parliamentarian losses

59. LJ, VI, p. 522.

60. Morrell, W. W., The History and Antiquities of Selby, 1867, pp. 158/60.

61. See Abraham Gero, this regiment, Vol. 2.


64. Perhaps an error for Quartermaster Robert Wright, this regiment, Vol. 2.

65. Highly unlikely, but see Todd, Hilton's Foot, Vol. 2.

66. Possibly either of Sir Richard Dacre's or Sir Ferdinando Leigh's horse.

67. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 106/7.


69. M.A., 5.5.44, p. 967.

70. Buchanan, Montrose, p. 145.

71. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 176. Murdoch and Simpson, Wishart's Montrose, p. 116. Spalding, Memorials of the Troubles, II, p. 379, "Thair was ane fight about Morpot, quhair divers of our Scotts foot souldiours were overcum by the Banderis Newcastle upon Tyne Trainbands/7 strippit of thair clothis and armes, and send hame naikit".


73. Ibid., 25.6.44, p. 1051.

74. Terry, Scottish Campaigns, p. 177 f.n. 117.

75. See above, p. 264 f.

76. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 262.

77. Ibid., CSPD 1644, p. 257.

78. CSPD 1644, p. 241.

79. LJ, VI, p. 561. At about this time, according to Leven's chaplain q. by Wenham, Siege of York, p. 24, "160 Horse fall in at Northallerton, where some of our dragooners out of the regiments lay. A serjeant, with some muscaters, beat them off, kill some, among whom a Lieutenant Colonel, and take some". This is understood to be a reference to the death of Lt. Colonel Gerard Salvin, who according to family tradition (see Vol. 2) was killed at Northallerton in 1644. However, Salvin was probably second in command of a foot regiment, and although that is no bar to his taking part in a cavalry engagement, puts the matter in some doubt. Salvin's death may properly belong to actions during the great retreat to York in April.

80. Wenham, Siege of York, p. 24 q. Leven's chaplain. T. T. E 343 (1)

82. CSPD 1644, p. 176.
83. Young, Marston Moor, p. 286.
84. Wenham, Siege of York, p. 25.
86. T.T. E 50 (30) Exact Relation of the Siege Before York.
88. T.T. E 50 (30).
89. See Wortley's career, Vol. 2.
93. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 107/12.
94. See Vol. 2. Firth, Newcastle Memoirs, pp. 37/42, "the General of the Associate army of the enemy, having closely beleagured the north of the town sprung a mine under the wall of the Manor Yard, and blew part of it up; and having beaten back the town forces (although they behaved themselves very gallantly), entered the Manor House with a great number of their men, which as soon as my Lord perceived, he went away in all haste - even to the amazement of all that were by, not knowing what he intended to do - and drew 80 of his own regiment of foot, called the White Coats, all stout and valiant men, to that post, who fought the enemy with that courage, that within a little time they killed and took 1500 of them; and my Lord gave present order to make up the breach which they had made in the wall". There is nothing inherently improbable in this account of a small force repelling a greater, for it would depend upon the element of surprise, and the morale of the attackers, among other things. The slain and taken number of 1500 must, however, be excessive.
98. Wenham, Siege of York, pp. 131, 141 f.n. 50.
99. See Vol. 2. Wenham's identification, in which he was assisted by Young, is often curious. See the case of Frizzell, or Freisal, of James King's Foot regiment.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The Siege of Lathom House and the coming of Rupert
January to July, 1644

From June until December 1643, Lancashire had experienced an uneasy peace. The single outbreak of fighting, that for Thurland Castle in the autumn, had passed over with a thorough Parliamentarian victory in the field and the capture of the stronghold. Royalist presence in the county was, however, maintained by the garrison at the earl of Derby's fortified house of Lathom, lying south east of Ormskirk and some distance due west of Wigan in what had been, the Royalist heartland. The earl of Derby himself was on the Isle of Man, but there was probably little difficulty in preserving contacts between the Isle and Lathom where his wife, the stalwart Lady Charlotte de Tremoille, was in command. There was doubtless some area of the county where the Parliamentary control was in name only, particularly along the borderland with Cumberland and in the remote fastnesses of Furness, but these areas did not trouble the Parliament's officers and they, for their part, did not trouble them. Lathom, however, must have seemed to the devout Puritan ministers and committee men, to be a constant reminder of the dreadful forces which they had only partially overcome. They quite probably felt that, as a wound will, if untended, turn septic and ultimately infect the general body itself, so Lathom, each day growing stronger and its garrison more confident, would eventually provide a focal point for forces not dead, only sleeping.

Consequently, when Sir Thomas Fairfax entered Cheshire and gave a beating to the Lord Byron, who was titular commander for Lancashire, the Manchester committee decided that Lathom's time had come. It was not, however, as easy to achieve as to plan. The Countess of Derby possessed all those qualities which a garrison commander under attack must need: courage, resilience, tenacity and, above all, military abilities. By the time that Prince Rupert on his march to relieve York, entered the county in May, sweeping the enemy field commanders before him like so much chaff, they had already been grimly humiliated at the hands of that redoubtable lady. The defence of Lathom, made possible to some extent by the personal loyalty felt by its garrison for the earl and his lady, showed what could be achieved by a determined stand in the face of an over-confident enemy.

The defence of Lathom must rank with the defence of Pontefract, Carlisle and Newcastle, in importance. No great military issue turned upon it so much as was the case with Newcastle upon Tyne, for example. But as with all these defences, Lathom contributed its share to whatever legend has attached to the Royalist cause in northern England. Lathom's hardest test was to come in the months after the departure of Prince Rupert in the wake of Marston Moor, when
the Countess had ceased to exercise command there, but it would be churlish to deny her justified praise, as it would be unkind to deny the same to that indomitable Parliamentarian, Lady Brilliana Harley, defender of Brampton Bryan.

The neglect with which the civil war in northern England has been treated has been stressed sufficiently. It has to be said, however, that another of its consequences had been, until now, the obscurity which still surrounds the great siege operations at Lathom, Carlisle and Pontefract. All three of these strongholds had their diarists, all of them were extremely detailed in their notation - a consequence, probably, of the tedium of garrison duties - and all of them have had their work printed and so made widely available. Despite this, virtually no scholar has devoted any time to a study of these remarkable documents, so that to examine them now, in a history of the Royalist campaigns, is to give them attention long overdue.

The Lathom journal has been printed three times. The first edition, in 1823, gave the credit for its compilation to Captain, later Colonel, Edward Chisenall, who fought at Marston Moor as well as in the defence of the house. In 1905 the journal was republished as a companion to one of several editions of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson which well illustrates the way in which importance has been attached to the documentary material of the victorious side. In this edition, the writing of the journal was accredited to another of the defenders, Captain Halsall, and was rendered into modern English usage, unlike the 1823 edition. George Ormerod published an untranslated verbatim edition in his collection of civil war tracts of Lancashire, which amounted to more or less a reprint of the 1823 edition. Ormerod suggested that the author, or possibly co-author, was Ralph Brideoak D.D., the Countess's Anglican chaplain, and that the notes taken at the time were drawn into order between June and August, when Lathom was free from pressure. The problem of the authorship is by no means settled, since any one of these three men, or any combination of them, might well have produced the work, although Chisenall's claim seems to be the most likely. In what follows, I have worked from the Ormerod edition which corresponds to that of 1823, supplemented where possible by additional materials, generally Parliamentarian in origin. There is also additional and detailed source material in John Seacomb's study of the Stanley family, which looks as if some of it were culled from documents now lost.

On May 27th 1643 after the capture of Warrington, Colonel Holland returned to Manchester and sent a summons to the Countess to surrender Lathom House, into which many Royalist fugitives had fled. The Lathom diarist stated that: her ladyship denyed both - shee would neither tamely give up her house, nor purchase her peace with the losse of her honour. But being then in noe condition to provoke a potent and malitious enemy, and seeing noe possibility of speedy assistance, shee desired a peacable abode in her own house, referring all her Lord'e estate to theire dispose, with promise onely to kepe
soe many men in armes, as might defend her person and house...

Naturally, this proposition was unacceptable, and for the rest of 1643 the house and its environs sustained several forays from the enemy, varying in violence, perhaps intended to induce her to make her peace without obliging them to resort to a full scale siege. Such conditions could, however, be endured indefinitely and by restraining her own soldiery, the Countess avoided provoking the Parliamentarians into a general offensive.

At the start of February 1644, however, "her garrison souldiers had a skirmish with a troope of horse...wherein they rescued some of her friends, taking prisoners". They must have been encouraged in this undertaking by Royalist troop movements on the Yorkshire/Lancashire border where, according to Mercurius Aulicus, "Sir John Preston and Sir John Gerlington are in the field for His Majesty with 24 Troops of Horse and 1600 Foot". In fact, Preston and Gerlington were fully occupied in Yorkshire where Lord Belasyse was endeavouring to contain Parliamentary inroads from Cheshire led by John Lambert. There is, moreover, vague evidence that as early as January 20th, the Countess had taken an offensive action, in sending out riders to raid Parliamentary quarters at her husband's other seat at Knowsley. On January 21st, Colonel John Moore drafted a letter in which he implied that such a raid had occurred.

The rescue of the prisoners, probably during the Cheshire campaign, induced the Manchester committee to take action against Lathom. The Lathom diarist stated that on February 24th Colonels Alexander Rigby, Ralph Assheton and Banckhall were ordered "to go with all speed agst Lathom, of which her Lap had some broken intelligence" on the morning following. Having an agent with close connections in the committee, her "secret friend", she sent to him for fuller details, and began to provision the house.

The garrison of the house was now organised for war, and divided into six companies each with a captain at its head. These were probably units in which cavalry and infantry were combined, the former reverting to their mounted service as occasion demanded. The officers in charge of these companies were Captain William Ffarrington of Werden; Captain Roger Charnock; Captain, later Colonel, Edward Chisenall; Captain, later Colonel and Governor of Lathom, Edward Rostern of Newhall; Captain Cuthbert Ogle; and Captain Molyneux Ratcliffe. Of these, Chisenall, Charnock and Ogle had served under the earl of Derby in his foot regiment in 1643, and their duties now were to "train, instruct, and encourage her men, being yet unskilfull and unfit for service". Overall military command went to Major William Farmer, a Scottish professional of whom very little is known, and who was later killed in arms serving under Chisenall on Marston Moor.

On Monday February 26th, the Parliamentarian forces gathered at three
musters in Bolton, Wigan and Standish, "with pretence to goe for Westmerland" as it was said. At these muster points, their preachers whipped up fury against Lathom with the type of harangues that can only be too well imagined. Coming together in one body, they were within three miles of the house on the Tuesday, and on Wednesday a summons was sent to the Countess to surrender, signed primarily by Sir Thomas Fairfax. Lathom was the one setback which Fairfax suffered in his campaign in the west, so it is not surprising - indeed, from what we know of him, it is only to be expected - that virtually no mention at all is made in his memoir of his part in the business.

The Countess requested that she be given "a weekes considerac'on" to "resolve doubts of conscience", but she was only playing for time. Fairfax, naturally, perceived this and suggested in another letter that she come under safe conduct to confer with him outside Lathom, but she sent back a refusal, believing "it more knightly that Sr Thomas...shold waite on her than shee upon him". There was more to it than simply courtesy, and it was not that she feared that she would be seized, since if Fairfax gave his word, to a lady at least he tended to keep it. She might not have trusted the local committee men, however. Whether it was her idea or not, it was intended to put on a show of strength for Fairfax should he enter, a subtle move intended to convince him that perhaps Lathom was, after all, not worth his time and trouble. The Lathom diarist does not mention that Fairfax himself came to the house, although it was Seacomb who mentioned that he did, and the problem cannot be resolved. Seacomb also noted that Major Farmer had the garrison paraded, with some on the walls "in such manner, that they might appear to be, both numerous, and well disciplined".10

Ralph Assheton and Alexander Rigby certainly entered, where they set out their terms to the Countess. All arms and ammunition were to be surrendered to Fairfax: the Countess and her men were to have leave to go to any other loyal garrison which they chose: alternatively, she with a 20 man escort, could go either to Knowsley or the Isle of Man and, if she chose the former, then all her husband's property in Derby Hundred was to be at her disposal.

These proposals were extremely generous, and one suspects that Fairfax must have had a hand in them. They would tend to imply, otherwise, that the local committee men put a greater importance on reducing Lathom than, from their previous record, would seem to have been the case. The Countess, however, had absolutely no intention of complying, and after consideration, or a show of it, sent counter proposals for the enemy to consider. She desired one month of liberty to remain in Lathom, at the end of which time she would go to the Isle of Man. In the meantime, she promised that there would be no further hostile acts by her men, provided the Parliamentary forces withdrew from the
proximity of Lathom and of Knowsley. She also demanded that none of her husband's tenants nor any of her soldiers, were to suffer punishment after her final departure.

The Parliamentary commanders, still with Fairfax in attendance, refused these counter proposals as dangerous in implication, and Fairfax endeavoured to compromise by agreeing to the one month's liberty provided that all ordnance in the house - Rigby and Assheton had probably seen the guns and had been duly impressed - was left behind at her departure. The garrison was to be disbanded immediately, to ensure no further hostile acts, and a guard of 40 Parliamentary soldiers for the Countess was offered as an alternative. Fairfax, having successfully called her bluff, awaited her reply.

The Countess sent back her last word on the matter, saying that she "was truely happy...shee had rather hazard her life, than offer propositions again".

At this point, the Parliamentary commanders decided upon siege lines and blockade rather than a direct storm. This was a curious decision in a sense, but Seacomb gave reasons for it which seem to explain it. According to these, during the negotiations a Lathom chaplain (Brideoak ?) had seemed to show favour to the enemy propositions, and had let it be known that there was only sufficient provision in the house for barely a fortnight, and that she must then surrender or starve. That this was believed by the enemy is evidenced by a second summons settled by the committee and passed to the house at the expiry of 14 days, which was again turned down, by which time Fairfax and his fellow commanders must have realised that they had been duped. Farmer had had two crucial weeks in which to train his men.

On the night immediately after the end of the first series of talks, the besiegers began to throw up earthworks, described by the diarist as "night-workes", sheltered from the garrison ordnance by the nature of the terrain: and in the days following large numbers of country people were drafted in to dig trenches and to set up other works. This labour, however, was probably somewhat desultory, the attackers believing that the need for provisions would induce the Countess to surrender. Their second summons was delivered on March 10th.

Six local gentlemen carried the new terms to the Countess, but were given a cold reception even though they were not, apparently, closely identified with the Manchester committee. The next day, Assheton himself went to see her, a man of "even and civil behaviour", but he carried harsher terms. The garrison was to swear never to bear arms against Parliament again, and having done so, would have leave to go wheresoever they wished. The Countess and 100 men could remain in Lathom for the space of 10 days to prepare for departure. The Countess "scorned to be a ten dayes prisoner in her owne house", and
rebuked Fairfax as a man "not very conscientious in the performance of his subscriptions, so that from him I must expect an unsinewed and faithless agreement".

That Sir Thomas should have ignored this episode in his memoirs is here explained. Not only had the Countess successfully misled him into believing her position vulnerable, but she had also proved, and this was the nicety of the remark, that Fairfax's gentlemanly behaviour decreased as he supposed his advantages to have increased. Fairfax cannot have liked that imputation at all.

She also suggested that, anyway, these offers ought properly to have been made to her husband, whose servant she was.

On the 12th, the garrison struck at the enemy lines in a foray so sudden and unexpected that it carried all before it. Seacomb has a brief allusion to this action, stating that 200 men commanded by Farmer stormed and cleared the enemy trenches, killing 50 men in their panic flight, which is credible, and, losing two men themselves, took 50 of the enemy prisoner. The diarist was more detailed:

Captain Farmer, a Scotchman, a faithfull and gallant souldier, with Lieut. Brethergh ready to second him and with 12 horse under Lieut. Kay, determined to doe something that might remember the enemy there were sooldiers within. He marcht up to their workes without a shoot, and then fireing upon them in their trenches, they quickly left their holes, when Lieut. Kay, having wheel'd about with his horse from another gate, fell upon them in their flight with much execulon; they slewe about 30 men, tooke 40 armes, one drum, and 6 prisoners.

The Royalist retreat was covered by Captain Cuthbert Ogle, "a gentleman industrious to returne the curtesie w'ch some of there party shewed to him when he was taken prisoner in the battell at Edgehill". Captain Rostern seconded Ogle in this manouevre, and the raiders thereupon retired safely into the house.

From this point, much of the initiative lay with the defenders, for they had successfully established themselves, far from being vulnerable, as the dominant force. Fairfax had already gone back into Cheshire, and the local colonels were just not up to the business.

The nights of the 13th to 16th of March were made noisy by feints from the house, by sniping at the enemy lines, and by general activities which gave the attackers no rest and plenty about which to worry. Then, at three in the morning on the 17th, Captain Chisenall with 30 musketeers and Lieutenants Brethorgh and Heape, crept out by a rear door, and moved towards the enemy trenches adjacent. Their coming, however, was revealed to the enemy by the burning match which each musketeer carried either in his hand or between his teeth, for the purpose of discharging his heavy musket. The enemy, observing these dancing lights, and understanding what they meant "ran faster than the
Captayne or his souldiers could pursue, secureing their flight in a wood close by, where, not willing to engage his souldiers in unnecessary dangers, hee left 'em, onely killing 2 or 3, and chasing the rest in flight".

Parliamentarian morale was cracking under the strain, "theise sallyes and allarums soe diseased the enmye that theire work went slowly on". In three weeks no platform on which to raise ordnance had been built. Now the enemy commanders fell to work with a will, exposing their soldiers and the drafted labourers to the threat of sniper fire, "with the losse of many mens lives, compell'd to doe desperate service". The diarist noted that

It mov'd both wonder and pitty to see the multitudes of poore people soe enslaved to the reformers' tirrany, that they would stand the muskett and lose their lives to save nothing, soe neare are theise to the times complained by the historians, when they would noe less feare men for theire vices, than they once honor'd them for their virtues.

On the 19th a cannon was finally set up which gave fire on the morning of the 20th, shooting three balls of 24 lb. weight, aiming first at the wall and then against the towers, "to please ye women that came to see the spectacle". The ordnance sounds like a demi-cannon, although ideally these fired a 27 lb. shot, but it was undoubtedly a siege gun that the Parliamentary commanders had managed to obtain, and it was potentially extremely dangerous if it could be maintained and if the gunners were competent.

The earl of Derby was, by this time, in Chester, and to him Sir Thomas Fairfax sent a request that he order his wife to cease resistance. Derby left the decision to the Countess, and her decision had been made long since.

Nonetheless, the developments in the siege occasioned some concern in Chester, where the Lancashire regiments were gathering having come up from the Oxford army to assist Byron. It is possible that at this time some of the Lancashire units earlier operating in Yorkshire were drawn away, although it is certain that Sir William Bradshaw's Horse, at least, were still with Belasyse on March 25th. A group of senior regimental officers signed the appeal to Oxford for relief for the Countess, dated March 23rd, the senior of the signatories being Colonel Sir Thomas Tyldesley. The others were Lt. Colonel Caryll Molyneux, brother and heir to Colonel the Viscount Molyneux in whose cavalry regiment he held his command; William Walton, Lt. Colonel of the newly raised regiment of Sir Robert Byron; Major John Bermingham of Edward Vere's Horse; and Captain James Anderton of Tyldesley's. This appeal, one of many such, contributed to the direction which Rupert was to take on his relief march to York.

Two days later the attackers had positioned another cannon, a culverin firing a 15 lb. ball, and this gun and the demi-cannon managed to blow a hole in the main gate, which was promptly filled with "beds, and suchlike
impediments". On the 28th, the enemy fired five further shots at the house without success, but the state of morale within the besiegers' ranks had not improved. An incident occurred on that day, the details of which were not known to the Lathom diarist, which led to fighting amongst the men in the trenches, observed from the walls.

The day following the first recorded Royalist casualty of the defence was suffered. A soldier "vainly provoking danger with his body above a tower, was shot to a present death". The bombardment was renewed, and a falling battlement crushed another defender beneath its weight. The direction of the cannons was altered on the 31st, to fire direct into the residential quarters where the Countess was living, and although this attack was renewed on the 1st of April with case shot, chains and iron bars, no serious damage was done.

The Parliamentary commanders had managed to procure a mortar in the meantime, a slow but extremely powerful weapon firing an 80 lb. stone ball. The defenders must have suspected that it was coming, or at least, professionals like Major Farmer would have known, for special earthworks were constructed to harbour it. It cannot have been positioned without loss to the enemy, since it lay to the south west within half musket shot, about 200 yards, from the walls. A full moon ditch was excavated around it, with ramparts rising 2½ feet above the ditch bottom. The mortar went into action on the 4th, but the single stone ball and a grenade fired that day overshot the house where the garrison was waiting with wet hides to dampen down any red hot shot that the attackers might employ.

By the 4th, the siege forces were themselves in imminent danger, not only from the garrisons officers, who were plotting a raid on the mortar, but from Royalist forces operating out of Chester. Colonel John Moore, who now commanded the siege army, wrote on that day that he had been threatened by Tyldesley's cavalry, raiding Parliamentary quarters and putting in danger the small garrison at Knowsley, the earl of Derby's other principal seat. Tyldesley had, it appears, been turned back at Hale Ford by artillery fire, but Colonel Edward Vere had managed to infiltrate the county to the extent that he could beat up quarters and sequestrators and their agents at Sefton. Vere's attack on Knowsley was extremely successful, although we can only know this as much from what Moore did not say, as from what he actually said.

Vere had at his disposal three troops of horse and three companies of foot. The route by which he had re-entered Lancashire is unknown, but he clearly evaded the defences which stopped Tyldesley at Hale Ford, unless Tyldesley's move was a diversionary tactic. The Parliamentary force at Knowsley was not standing to its guard, but lying in loose quarters in and around the house. Vere struck, capturing four men and 20 horses, and forcing the survivors into the house. The Parliamentary commander, Ireland, seems to
have fled — though he may have been wounded and unable to command — for Vere, offering terms to the senior officer in the house, discovered him to be a mere quartermaster called Hutchins. The Colonel told Hutchins that if he would hand over the house, he should share the command there with a Royalist officer, have an establishment of 200 men, and be suitably promoted. It seems that Hutchins' sense of duty was stronger than his desire for advancement, for Moore reported "our men carried themselves very gallantly; and although they lost their horse, yet I hope we shall keep the house in despite of their forces". Vere withdrew.

On April 10th the Lathom garrison "resolved to waken" the enemy. At 11 that night, Major Farmer and Captain Molyneux Ratcliffe with Lieutenants Penketh and Worral and 140 men, marched from a postern gate and beate the enemy from all their works and batteries, which were now cast up around the house, nail'd all their cannon, killed about 50 men, took 60 armes, one collours, and 3 drumes...
The Lathom diarist might have over-estimated the death toll, but the impact of a surprise attack in darkness might have created sufficient confusion in which the Royalists, acting as a unit with pre-determined plans, could indeed have wreaked such havoc.

Capt. Ratcliffe deserves this remembrance, that with 3 soldiers, the rest of his squadron being scattered with execulon of the enemy, he cleared 2 sconces, and slew 7 men with his owne hand.

Lieutenant Worral, separated from his men, found himself cut off and under attack — it must be admitted, somewhat half-heartedly — by a large force of the enemy. Major Farmer fought his way through and covered Worral's retreat "to the wonder of us all, [he] came off without any dangerous wound".

A second Royalist detachment, commanded by Chisenall, stood ready at the sally port of the house to act as necessary either to assist in the attack or to cover the retreat, had the force under Farmer been "putt to the extremity". As it was, Farmer and Ratcliffe rallied their men and marched in good order round the walls, entering at the main gate with impunity, whilst the panic in the enemy lines slowly subsided, if it subsided at all. Up on the walls, Captain Rostern had command of the musketeers, who fired upon the disorganised enemy and so, by implication, assisted Farmer in performing his confident manoeuvre.

The whole attack was directed by an observer from the Eagle Tower, Captain Fox, who "gave signall when to march and when to retreate, according to the motions of the enemy, which hee observed att a distance".

Mercurius Aulicus reported this remarkable sally, and kept fairly strictly to realities, although these in themselves were remarkable enough. It reported 45 of the enemy dead and 60 or so wounded, and added that there were taken

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two Pieces of Ordnance, with Colonell Moores Colours and Drumes, one who had heretofore eaten much bread in Lathom House, and therefore this brave lady caused his Colours to be nayled on the top of the highest Tower of the house...

Seacomb confused his sources, giving command of the sally to Ratcliffe and Chisenall, with Farmer in the reserve, but he stated that the attack lasted for half an hour, which would be sufficiently long enough to wreck the cannon and to overturn others which were on carriages.

The sally was marked, however, by a singular piece of butchery if the Lathom diarist is to be interpreted correctly. He stated that in the attack, having lost one man, the Royalists captured an enemy officer, and offered Moore an exchange of his officer and others taken earlier, for Royalist prisoners then lodged in Preston, Lancaster and Manchester. The diarist implied that Moore initially agreed, but then changed his mind, and that this occasioned a greater slaughter than either her LaPP or the Captaynes desired, because wee were in no condic'on to keepe prisoners.

This seems to mean that the captives were shot in cold blood, and if it were so, ought to have been recorded by enemy propagandists as an example of the usual bloody goings on in Lancashire. That all other sources are silent save for the diarist might be held to call the matter in question, except for the brief, matter of fact and unapologetic way in which the incident was recorded. It is hard to imagine that a chaplain, if Brideoak was indeed the author or co-author of the diary, would have let the incident go unremarked, since by any criteria it required explanation. A military man like Chisenall, for example, might well have passed over the matter as being unfortunate but necessary. Killing of prisoners was, however, highly unusual during the civil war, although the Parliamentarians did it a little more often than did the Royalists, witness the barbaric scenes when Basing House fell, or at the storm of Drogheda. Perhaps such an incident was, however, more common in Lancashire where the Catholic-Puritan conflict was most vivid and so coloured the war anyway. But the most probable explanation of the diarist's remarks is, that from this point forward, enemy soldiers were offered no quarter on the field, and that those prisoners already held were treated properly.

It is interesting to note that the attack on the 10th followed upon four days of prayer prescribed for the siege forces, so that the answer to their prayers must have been violently demoralising.

The incident may, however, have led to stiffer attitudes on the part of the Parliamentarian commanders. Alexander Rigby, not long after, took over control of operations, and as Seacomb recorded, "to give him his due, though a rebel, was neither wanting in care or diligence to distress the house". His cruelty was "beyond the barbarity of a Turkish general", for "he denied a pass to three sick gentlemen to go out of the house, and would not suffer a
midwife to go into the house to a gentlewoman in travail; nor a little milk for the support of young infants". Rigby probably felt he had good reason, but his extreme attitude betrayed insecurity in his command.

On the 12th the enemy, having ripped the choking wood and nails from their mortar, fired it twice against the house, but the success on that day belonged to the gunner directing a saker, which managed to blow a hole in the wall of the Countess's own chamber with a 5.7 lb. ball. The next day they fired their demi-cannon, and on the 15th the mortar was fired five times with its usual lack of success, although the psychological impact of its bombardment must have been hard to adjust to.

Early on the 16th the besiegers "had a hott alarum, having not yet quitt themselves of the fright they took at the last sally". There was a burst of musketry against the house, and at 11 o'clock the mortar fired first a stone ball and then a grenade which landed in the garden, sank into the earth some distance, and exploded, forcing fragments up and into the air which caused considerable devastation in the confined place. It was the first shot that had really shown what the mortar could do, and the garrison was suitably impressed.

The mortar piece was now more terrible than formerly, insomuch that the captaynes, to prevent the soldiers fears, lodged in the upproomes within clay walles, as not esteeming the force of the granfloe...

It was a calculated risk on the part of those officers, but one to which their rank called them, and the garrison must also have been heartened by the death of one of the gunners working at the mortar, who was shot by a marksman when he clambered onto the rampart of the mortar battery to observe the impact of the grenade.

If the Royalists were now impressed with the mortar's capacity, Rigby was not. On the 18th he addressed something of a curt letter to Sir William Brereton in Cheshire from whom, apparently, he had acquired the weapon, stating that the mortar would be of little use unless Brereton sent them half a dozen or more shells for grenades. Rigby promised that Brereton would be paid for them, and that if any were left over, they would be handed back when Lathom fell. The reference to 'shells' requires some explanation. Unlike the normal solid, cast iron cannon ball, or the sculpted stone ball which was fast being replaced, the grenade shell was a spherical, hollow iron container with a hole through which combustible materials, nails, lead, and anything likely to inflict injury, could be thrust into the cavity, together with explosive. The principle was a development of the case shot idea, and quite as terrifyingly effective if the gunners were competent. Such a grenade, one that had not exploded otherwise it would have broken into pieces, was discovered on Adwalton Moor in the 19th century, which indicates that the Marquess of Newcastle must
have had a mortar with him, for the attack on Bradford.

On Easter Saturday, April 20th, the enemy gunners directed their demi-
culverin and culverin against a postern tower, but 30 shots only succeeded in
dislodging part of the upper wall and battlements. A Royalist sniper succeeded
in killing a gunner, whereupon they reverted to the mortar and fired about
seven stones all of which fell short of the house. The siege at this point
seems again to have attracted an audience of country people, for the diarist
noted a large rabble watching on the 22nd when musketry fire and an artillery
bombardment were briefly renewed. After dark, further to entertain these
spectators, three Royalist musketeers slipped from the house and, probably by
darting from point to point and firing at will towards the enemy lines, created
another panic. The next day, Rigby moved his cannon against the Eagle Tower
and poured 23 shots onto it, which forced the Countess to evacuate her normal
chamber for safer quarters. Some of the shot, striking a stair case wall,
breached it. However, "it saved the Tower some buffetts that day that 2 of
their gunners were discharged of their employment by our marksmen from the
top of the same tower wch they were battering". After dark, lighted matches
were stuck in balls of clay which were then tossed towards the enemy lines,
provoking a round of pointless musketry against an imagined attack from the
house.

On the 24th Rigby had his new supply of grenades from Cheshire, at a time
when he was in some desperation according to the diarist, having expended men,
money and shot to little effect, although he had clearly abandoned the somewhat
leisured approach of his predecessor in the command. The next day, he sent a
summons to the Countess to surrender the house, unconditionally, demanding her
answer by two o'clock the next afternoon. The Countess sent for Rigby's
messenger, tore the paper in pieces before his face, and told him

Tell that insolent rebell, hee shall neither have p'sons, goods,
nor house: when our strength and provision is spent, we shall
find a fire more mercyfull than Rigby, and then if the providence
of God p'vent it not, my goods and house shall burne in his
sight: my selfe, children, and soldierys, rather than fall into
his hands, will seale our religion and loyalty in the same
flame.

It being fashionable to look somewhat cynically upon such protestations, or to
call in question the accuracy of their reporting, it ought to be said that
there is nothing inherently improbable in the Countess's resolution or in the
way in which she expressed it. The letter from Rigby had confidently told her
of his supply of grenades with which she would find her house set on fire
unless she surrendered: hence the allusion to fire, which should not be seen
as a threat of self-immolation. Moreover, that the Countess spoke—for her
men must, on the whole, be accepted, and at this point she cannot have been in
expectation of immediate relief by Rupert or anyone. She had even heard,
probably, of the retreat of the Marquess of Newcastle into York and of the way in which the allied army ranged at will in Yorkshire. It was a black hour, and her determination must be given due weight and credit.

It was, however, insufficient simply to wait for Rigby to do his worst. The Countess and her officers consulted together, and on the 26th they had devised a scheme to try to seize control of the mortar, to wreck it or to bring it into the house. At four in the morning, almost at dawn light, Captains Chisenall and Fox, with Lieutenants Brothergh, Penketh, Walthew and Worral with their selected men were ready to go into action. Captain Ogle had command of the rearguard to cover their retreat to the south, whilst Rostern had the same responsibility at the sally port on the east. Ratcliffe had command of the musketeers on the walls, and Major Farmer held a reserve body to second the attacking force as need arose.

All things thus disposed, Capt. Chisenall and to Lieuts. issues out at the eastern gate, and before he was discover'd, got under their cannon, marching straight upon the scouts, where they had planted their great gun. It cost him a light skirmish to gain the fort: at last he entered: many slain, some prisoners, and some escaping.

The capture of this battery assuring retreat, Captain Fox marched up with his division, clearing the enemy trenches from the east to the south west and so coming upon the earthwork where the mortar stood.

wch being guarded with 50 men, he found sharp service, forcing his way through muskett and cannon, and beating the enemy out of the sconce with stones, his muskett, by reason of the high works, being unserviceable.

The action must have been extremely fierce, the Royalists scrambling up and hurling stones at the defenders until they could get into a position to employ their weapons to advantage. The guard around the mortar indicates that Rigby had now organised his own defences properly, and the struggle must have been touch and go for a while, until, after about a quarter of an hour

his men got the trench, and scal'd the rampier, where many of the enemy fled, the rest were slain. The sconce, thus won, was made good by a squadron of musketeers, which much annoyed the enemy, attempting to come upp agayne.

The Parliamentary soldiers clearly lacked the determination, perhaps even the inspiration, of their foes, for they must have been able to bring up enough forces to far outnumber the small Royalist contingent.

Captains Fox and Chisenall, having thus secured the two sconces, kept a watch whilst a body of servants and others from the house, directed by a Mr. Broom, carefully levelled the trenches around the mortar sconce. Then, attaching ropes to the heavy gun, "by strength of men drew it into the house, Capt. Ogle defending the passage agt another companye of the enemie which play'd upon their retreate". A similar attempt to seize the heavy siege artillery failed, because there was not time to level all the ditches to
facilitate their movement, and probably because there were insufficient men to
drag them back.

however our men tooke tyme to poysone all the canon round,
if anything will doe the feate, Capt. Rawstone still
defending the first passage agt some offers of the enemy to
come up by the wood.

The fighting lasted for an hour altogether, the Royalists losing two men killed
who, as they died, continued to fire upon the enemy until the retreat of the
main body into the house was achieved.

What number of the enemy were slayne is not easy to guesse.
Besides the execulon done in their trenches, Capt. Farmours
and Capt. Ratcliffes reserves, wh the best marksmen, play'd
upon them from the walls with much slaughter, as they quitt
their holde. Our men brought in many armes, 3 drums, and
but 5 prisoners, preserved by Capt. Chisnall, to shew that he
had mercy as well as valour.

From the prisoners, the Countess learned of a plan by Rigby to drain away the
house's water supply if it could be done, but nothing seems to have come of
this as a result of the disastrous failure of Rigby's men either to stand to
their posts or to rally against the raiders. But as the diarist noted, no one
feared for the morrow now that the mortar was in their possession, and there
seems to have been a general and understandable celebration for the rest of
the day.

During the day, the Parliamentary forces dragged their remaining cannon
further from the "madmen in the garrison". Apart from keeping a weather eye
open for attempts to drain off the water supply, the garrison now had little to
do, except to send out dogs at night with lighted match tied to their tails,
to discomfort the already disintegrating enemy, or to indulge in other ruses.
The diarist noted that many of the siege force were quitting their posts
altogether, and that there were demands for pay from among the remainder.
Rigby, the eulogised victor of Lyndale Close, was reduced to absolute military
bankruptcy, his prowess proving to have been as ephemeral as his threats had
been. A deserter from the siege lines was received into the garrisons ranks,
and it was from him that the defenders learned of Rigby's predicament. Even
so, justifiably cautious, they would not resort to another general attack,
perhaps because Rigby had now doubled his guards and was constantly on the
alert. In May, it would have been hard to say which of the two sides was on
the defensive.

In mid-May Rigby sent to Manchester for assistance. On the 1st, he had
written a report for the deputy lieutenants sitting in committee there, "the
siege of Lathom House is a matter of great consequence to this whole country,
and hath a further influence in other places". He complained that with the
departure of Fairfax and of Ralph Assheton, he had been left with too small a
force, which he had had to finance largely from his own pocket, a lawyer's
pocket, to the tune of £2000. (The Lathom diarist had cryptically remarked
that Rigby had never been worth so much until he became a lawyer). "We have had many nights together alarms", he told them, "and beaten them into the house six and seven times in a night". One wonders if the recipients of this letter knew the truth of the business. He eventually concluded his appeal by stressing that his forces were suffering from desertions by men not prepared to do the double duties, whilst reinforcements promised had not arrived, and he "languished under the burden".

It is possible that the Manchester committee no longer shared the view which had inspired the siege in the first place, and the initial enthusiasm may have been due to a false expectation of its early capitulation. The policy of the Parliament was, nonetheless, curiously indecisive. They had neither pressed the siege home with the strength that they could have done, nor had they altogether resolved upon keeping a token presence near the house. Men and money had been wasted in fruitless enterprises which had rebounded upon their soldiers time and again. The siege of Lathom, full of honour for the defenders, was a disgraceful episode for the Lancashire Parliamentarians.

The deputy lieutenants in Manchester were themselves in a quandary, receiving not only a request from Rigby for reinforcements, but also from the earl of Denbigh in North Wales. On May 16th the committee, sitting in conference, sent a reply to Denbigh in which all their troubles were listed:

our dangers increased. The siege at Lathom House... continues not to be broken up unless we resolve to begin the whole work anew. The Earl of Derby in Worrall, and that part of Cheshire, all along the river over against us, is very potent, makes inroads upon us and keeps us in continual alarms; besides the secret plots within ourselves, striking at our chief garrisons, and as reports give us, the enemy's rising in Westmorland is fully resolved for Lancashire. The forces commanded to the siege at York Thomas Fairfax's are there still retained: so that unless we resolve to break up the siege at Lathom or relinquish the frontiers of our county bordering upon the enemy - either of which would hazard the whole country - we are in no wise able... to assist you.

The comments on the Westmorland "rising" must have been figments of the collective imagination, for whatever forces there were there in arms at that time, were for the help of Montrose against Dumfries, and were anyway in some disarray. The Manchester committee had no desire to relinquish control over its marching army, such as it was, and Denbigh's request had to be dismissed politely but firmly. The emphasis on Lathom siege and the northern areas of the county thus served this purpose.

The fact seems to have been, that a period of prolonged peace in the county had worked against the Lancashire forces. Their appalling record before Lathom must have been a reflection of a general loss of control, a critical inability to retain what they had won, which was to serve Prince Rupert well thereafter. The committee did not honestly know what to do for the best,
particularly in view of the fact that Cheshire was now threatening them and the
earl of Derby, looking for vengeance, was back in the field. It would be
interesting to know exactly what relationship Derby had in terms of military
rank, to Lord Byron, recently appointed commander in chief in Lancashire, but
no evidence seems to survive to give us any information.

Back in Lathom, word was surely come that Rupert was on his march. On
the night of May 23rd a Royalist soldier had slipped from the house through
the siege lines, and returned after killing a sentinel. He brought with him
certain news that Rupert was in Cheshire. On Sunday 26th, as the ring of
sentries around the house grew perceptibly less organised, a sally with 200 men
was proposed.

Capt. Ogle and Capt. Rawstone were allotted for the acc'on:
but they, like good p'veident fellows, thrifty of their owne
lives, p'vented the Capt. this hono', who heareing of the
Prince's victorious entrance into the countrey (by the defeate
of Col. Duckenfield...and others, who kept the passe at
Stockport, the second key of the county), stole away betwixt
12 and 1 o'clock in the night....

Thus was the first siege of Lathom lifted, and the determination of the Countess
and her competently officered garrison entirely vindicated.

Prince Rupert's March to York.

The basic chronology for the following account is taken from Firth's
edition of the journal of Prince Rupert's marches, an extremely valuable
document. It is unfortunate that nothing equivalent to it was ever compiled
(so far as we know) for the northern army, chronology only having been extens-
ively noted in the siege journals of Lathom, Pontefract and Carlisle. The
details of the march are fairly straightforward, and Rupert's most recent
biographer, Patrick Norrah, adds little of moment to his account.

It must be remembered that in examining the relief march, we are obliged
to deal with not one, but two, distinctive Royalist forces, although for one
of them, the documentary evidence is slim and consists almost entirely of
Parliamentarian reports, some accurate, some fanciful. The two forces were
those of Rupert himself, coming up with Welsh border troops and reinforced in
Cheshire with those Lancashire regiments which had gone thither in 1643 to
assist Byron: and those of the Marquess of Newcastle. Newcastle's army, from
the beginning of York siege, had been divided into three parts. One part,
chiefly of infantry but with, as has been seen, some cavalry which may have
included Sir Marmaduke Langdale's regiment, had remained within York as a
garrison. A second force had been left behind in the north with Montrose, and
had effectively returned from Scotland under Clavering to harry the Scots
around Newcastle. The third part, and that with which we are now concerned as
an affiliated force with Rupert's, consisted of the bulk of the northern
Prince Rupert's march through Lancashire May and June 1644.
cavalry, termed henceforth the Northern Horse, a contemporary title which came into use later in 1644. Of its exact strength and composition we know next to nothing, except that George Goring was overall commander assisted by Charles Lucas and the various regimental commanders. It was the Northern Horse which fought so well at Marston Moor, when Rupert's own cavalry disintegrated.

The first definite news which the Manchester committee probably received of Rupert's intended march came to them in a letter written from London on May 6th. Thus, at the time that Rigby and Denbigh were individually pressing for men, the committee were anxiously looking about them to try to prepare against Rupert's coming. They were far from happy with the condition of their forces, as they informed Denbigh on the 16th:

We fear we have armed divers amongst us who are enlisted in several companies when, if we should remove our old tried soldiers out of the country, we durst not trust either in our garrisons, siege, or confines, especially in the Earl of Derby should appear amongst us....

That Derby's name was still a potent force to be reckoned with in part of Lancashire, to the extent that the committee were worried about their own men's loyalties, must have been due to heavy recruitment in the old Royalist areas since June 1643. Such forces would have been unwilling anyway, and in the event of a determined Royalist return, extremely unreliable. It is curious, however, that no steps seem to have been taken to disarm untrustworthy units, unless in attempting that the Parliamentarian commanders might have done more harm than good.

Whilst they were thus preoccupied with their difficulties, the Prince was pushing on northwards with 2000 horse and a reported 6000 foot. Sir Thomas Tyldesley was raiding Lancashire, and had, on May 14th, attacked a body of Parliamentary cavalry near Garstang, who were apparently escorting some Royalist prisoners to Lancaster. The Parliamentary horse were travelling away from Tyldesley's own house at Myerscough and were heedless of danger, when a troop of Royalist cavalry attacked them, rescued the captives, and then began to stir up some of the local inhabitants. A larger body of Parliamentary troops under Colonel Dodding, appearing at an opportune moment, restored the situation, recovered the prisoners and conveyed them without further molestation, to Lancaster.

On May 24th the earl of Denbigh received intelligence that Rupert's army and Newcastle's horse were not far off their rendezvous, and claimed that the combined force would be scarce 7000 strong. His information, apparently gleaned from deserters from Rupert's ranks, was in error both as to the numbers involved and the nearness of the conjunction of the two forces, and may have been typical of the uncertainty and rumour which surrounded Rupert's entire progress. Rupert at that time was advancing towards Stockport from Knutsford,
to the first fight of the march, and entry into Lancashire itself. The army had, apparently, been delayed in its progress by "the Roughness of the wayses, and weather".29 Contrary to Denbigh's views, the Committee of Both Kingdoms on the 25th was sure that the Northern Horse alone, having ravaged Leicestershire Staffordshire and adjacent counties, had raised at least 10,000 infantry in their progress, which report was going from one extreme to the other.

At Stockport on the 25th the Parliamentarians had their first chance to resist Rupert's progress, and failing even to stand to their guns, their behaviour set the pattern for the entire campaign, with one or two small exceptions. Stockport "a large village in the confines of Lancashire Manour" was devoid of fortifications, although there was a bridge which had been held for a time during the campaigns of 1643. Rupert intended to quarter there overnight, and approached the village where, "after a little dispute from hedges and ditches", a concerted attack caused the defenders to abandon their posts and, under cover of darkness, to escape unscathed to Manchester, although they were pursued. "Noe man" it was said, "lost of eyther side".30 Within two days, Rigby's army before Latham had raised the siege.

On the 27th the Prince's forces proceeded to Eccles, whilst Rigby with his siege force of some 2000 men (if this figure is accurate, and since it comes from Seacombe it must be questioned) marched unbeknown to Rupert, into Bolton, where his forces raised the garrison strength there to some 3000 men.31 Thus Rigby, escaping as he thought from one predicament, found himself on May 28th in another, for on that day Rupert stormed Bolton.

The sources for the attack are many and various, the Parliamentary reports being marked by an almost hysterical denunciation of the Prince's army and of the earl of Derby for his part in the assault. Sir John Meldrum, who on the 28th was in Manchester, wrote to tell Lord Fairfax that this combination threatened to reduce Lancashire unless a great army were sent to the aid of the local commanders.32 Meldrum had clearly been sent to Manchester by Fairfax, either as an observer to ferry news back to the siege at York, or else with a token body of troops to assist the Manchester forces. There was speculation as to precisely what Rupert intended to do:

whether he will attempt Liverpool or strengthen his army in Lancashire, Cumberland and Westmorland, and then march up to York is much doubted in this country. The greater part think that he, having a great party by the Earl of Derby's presence who begin to flock to him with their arms, and the forces of the county who stand right being separated and hardly being brought together without manifest hazards, it is impossible to save this county, Cumberland and Westmorland without one great army being sent here to interrupt his course, or follow at his heels if he march towards York or Scotland, and another army to oppose his passage towards either of those places; which if it be not quickly done, in my judgement, those northern counties of Cheshire, Lancashire, Westmorland, Cumberland and
Yorkshire, will afford such supplies of Popish and Malignant party that all will be put to hazard.

Meldrum, when he wrote this speculative letter, was not aware of the storm of Bolton, and went on to consider ways of employing the local Parliamentary forces to effect, whilst the Bolton fighting threw the issue wide open again.

This country people have had so many distractions amongst themselves that unless Colonel Ashton and myself had come to the town of Manchester any enemy might have had them all at a very easy rate. The country people are extremely well affected, but unwilling to be brought to any order or discipline, there being no officer or commander amongst them of any experience.

There were scarcely sufficient provisions for his own and Assheton's regiments for above a week, and none at all to permit him to follow Rupert on his march. He felt that the decision to withdraw from before Lathom was wrong, and referred to a suggestion that Liverpool also be evacuated in equally disparaging terms since he felt that in regard the country thereabout who formerly lurked as neutrals do now show themselves in arms for the Earl of Derby, and the Cheshire men complain heavily that they are neglected by their neighbours here.

In Meldrum's view, the remedy for the situation lay either in Sir Thomas Fairfax or David Lesley, marching into Cheshire with forces drawn from Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire to join with Lord Denbigh, and so make a rendezvous at Manchester in order to follow and watch Rupert in his progress. He felt that if this course, or anything similar, were to be devised by the generals at York, then my hopes are great that this fierce thunderbolt which strikes terror among the ignorant may be easily reduced within narrow compass. If the present opportunity be neglected it will be too late to think upon anything else.

Meldrum was correct in his remarks, indeed, events had overtaken them at Bolton, but his assessment, although written in ignorance of that loss, is still worth following. He insisted that either Rupert's army, or the Northern Horse, had to be routed in the field. They still lay apart, the latter in Derbyshire, and there was still an opportunity if the generals would but seize upon it. The Northern Horse were reported to be "not in good case either for horse or arms", and might be the best target for any pitched fight. "My prayers and endeavours", Meldrum concluded, "shall not be wanting in any such course as shall be resolved upon". Nothing was resolved upon, no one appeared to know quite what to do. Rupert seemed invincible, as the defenders of Bolton found.

Bolton was to become the Prince's quarter for the night of the 28th/29th May, and he was aware on his march from Stockport that it was manned with about 4000 men. The town had "only gates and highways fortified lightly", but the storm was hindered by torrential rain and the fighting dragged on for an hour or two before, by an "impetuous" attack it was taken, perhaps 1000 of
the defenders being killed, 600 made prisoners and 20 colours taken. Plunder was wholesale, for Rupert, unlike Newcastle, enforced the harsher rules of war more often than not.

The Prince's army assembled for the attack on Dean Moor to the west of the town, giving the defenders ample opportunity to abandon their charge or to strengthen their defences. His summons was answered by gunfire, which can have done nothing to sweeten the Prince's temper, and once the defences had been breached then, according to *An Exact Relation of the Bloody and Barbarous Massacre at Bolton*, it was a case of every man left...shift for himself.

A lengthier account of the action was given by Seacomb, who gave verbatim the text of a contemporary tract, *The Siege and Taking of Bolton*.

According to this tract, Rupert had apparently considered moving against Manchester after Stockport, but changed his mind for reasons not given, and advanced on Bolton. This town, "of a small circuit", was likely to be fiercely defended by its garrison, and it may be that Rupert deliberately chose a tougher proposition than Manchester in order to establish his presence in the county firmly. If it be wondered whether Bolton could, indeed, offer stronger resistance than Manchester, it is necessary to remember that Meldrum, who was in Manchester on the day that Bolton fell, reported what a distraction the town was in, lacking direction and with few provisions. Rupert may have felt - it would have been in character - that more could be gained psychologically by storming a place likely to be defended by a cohesive force. That would imply that Rupert never for a moment doubted that he could take it, but the fact is that Rupert rarely, if ever, doubted his own capacity, and his luck had not yet changed.

The assault was performed with much gallantry and resolution by his men; but being greatly annoyed from the walls by the enemies cannon, and the multitude of the defendants, were obliged to retreat, and quit the assault, with the loss of two hundred men.

Rupert's coming seems to have renewed that old intensity which had always marked the war in Lancashire, for 200 dead and wounded admitted in a Royalist tract cannot be an over-estimate and might well be deliberately low. Not only did this intensity revive with Rupert, but so did a fiercer hostility, for in a lull after the first assault, some captured Royalists were "murdered...in cold blood, upon the walls before his eyes".

It would have been an understatement to say that Rupert was "highly provoked", and he summoned a second council of war to organise a new attack. At this council the earl of Derby, "considering how much he was concerned for his Lady and Children", requested that he be given command of two companies of his old army, then under Tyldesley, and with them, to provide the van of the
next assault:

he would either enter the town, or leave his body in the ditch. His Highness appeared unwilling to hazard a person of his worth in so desperate an action, yet upon his importunity complied with his request; and things being prepared and ready, the Prince gave orders for an assault on all parts of the town where it was possible to make any approaches. The Earl...with his two hundred men marched directly to the walls, and after a quarter of an hour's hot dispute, entered the first man himselfe, who being bravely seconded with fresh supplies, the town was instantly attacked on every quarter; Rigby himself got away, but left two thousand of his men behind him, most of whom were slain upon the place, the Prince forbidding to give quarter to any person then in arms, because they had so inhumanly murdered his men....

The success of this second attack was "chiefly attributed to that courage and resolution of the brave Earl of Derby" and to the boldness of the 200 Lancashire men that he commanded.

The Lathom diarist naturally, heard details of the assault at second-hand, doubtless from the messengers who carried to Lathom all the colours captured from Rigby when the town fell, sent by Rupert as a gift to the Countess. To the Lathom garrison, the greatest joy in the affair lay in the discomfiture of Rigby, who, retiring from Lathom, had apparently been in something of a dilemma. He had first gone to Ecclestone Green standing there in a great suspense whch way to turne. Att last imagining the Prince would either march through Blackburne or Lancaster for the releife of Yorke, hee intends not to come in his ways, but diverts to Bolton, formerly a garrison, and still fortified. In this town the Prince intended to take upp his quarter, being truely certified by his scouts, that it was not without an enemy; but being happily prevented by Rigby and some other auxiliaries from Coll. Shuttleworth, to the number of 4 or 5000 in all, his Highnes on Tuesday drew upp his army before the town....and forthwith with all gallantry and resolucion led up his men to an assault. The Earle of Derby desiring to be one of the first avengers of that barbarousness and cruelty expressed to his Lady, with a part of the Prince's owne horse charged a troope of the enemy, wh braveringly issued out of the townes, to disorder and vexe our foote in the assault. These hee chact to the very walls where he slewelthe the Cornett, and with his owne hand tooke the colllours, being the first ensigne taken that day.

By this action, the diarist concluded, Prince Rupert relieved and avenged "the most noble Lady his cosen", leaving 1600 of her besiegers dead in the streets. It will be noted, however, that the diarists interpretation of the earl's feat of arms differs strikingly from that of the tract given by Seacomb, in that in the latter the implication is that Derby advanced on foot with two companies to support him, whereas the diarist put him at the head of a cavalry force. It would not have been unusual for the earl to take the lead in an infantry attack, as witness the action of the earl of Newcastle at Adwalton Moor and in the defence of York; but the absolute divergence of the two sources defies our obtaining certain knowledge beyond the fact that the earl did carry himself bravely.

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To return to An Exact Relation of the Bloody... Massacre, as the Parliamentary writers liked to describe the fight for Bolton, we have the most striking alternative account. The Parliamentarians claimed that Bolton, on the day of the assault, was "almost destitute of men, ammunition, or other means of defence" until it was reinforced by that "noble cordiall commander, Col. Rigbie". If Bolton was indeed so "destitute", then Rigby's 2000 or so would have made little difference in the face of Prince Rupert's army, and their best course of events would have been to surrender on terms, thereby saving their manpower for another day. They might even have evacuated, made a 'tactical withdrawal'. Instead of this, Rigby fortified, defied a summons with gunfire, and brought upon himself - or more properly upon his soldiery - all the horrors of a town stormed after refusing to yield. However much Parliament's apologists then and since, might denounce the storm as a barbarous business, the fact remains, inescapable and self-evident, that Rigby brought it upon himself by endeavouring to hold an untenable position in the face of a superior foe, without prospect of relief. This particular amateur soldier, whose reputation had rested entirely upon his defeat of a thousand ill armed irregulars at Lyndale Close the previous year, suffered from all the failings of the untrained commander with few, if any, of the advantages: his military sense was narrow, his strategic and tactical understanding limited, his egocentric character unsuited to the care of his men, which is not the least of the duties of a commanding officer. Men must die in war, but should not be thrown away in fruitless displays of bravado by their commanders. Rigby was good at getting his men killed, and that was about it.

The writer of the Parliamentary tract complained that Rigby could have held the town provided firstly, that promised reinforcements had arrived and, secondly, that certain inhabitants of the town had not hindered its preservation. The second complaint could be substantiated, for not only Royalist but even Parliamentarian citizens would naturally desire to spare their town a sack if it might be done, and Rigby probably found a good deal of reluctance on the part of the local people. His treatment of the country folk at the siege of Lathom, where he exposed them to constant danger of death in his haste to raise siegeworks, must have been widely spoken of. As for the reinforcements, there is no sign that any were expected at all, and this type of excuse was common to both sides when seeking to explain away a disaster due to impetuosity or, as in this case, incompetence.

The writer of the tract, probably an eye-witness, described the advance of Rupert's men with an almost lyrical style:

they made their approaches... on the More south west from the Town. Their number was... about 12,000. They appeared at first like a wood or cloud, and presently were cast into several bodies...
Rupert's scouts approached, seeking means of entry to the town. The first assault followed in their wake, and there was "halfe an hours sharpe entertainment". The second assault was more fiercely pressed, with the known outcome. The pamphleteer bemoaned the town's fate:

    alas, what could naked men do against horse in an unfortified place: besides, it is conceived that a Townsman was their convoy to bring them on through a place called the Private Akers...and when once the horse was got into the town, there could be no resistance almost made, but every man left to shift for himself.

The reference to the Royalist cavalry making first entry tends to support the Lathom diarist's view of Derby's part in the attack.

    At their entrance, before, behind, to the right, and left, nothing heard but kill dead, kill dead was the word in the Town.

There followed, only to be expected, a lengthy list of atrocities which it serves no purpose to question. In the sack of a town these were common, and what would pass for the normal exigencies of warfare in the field, would appear as barbarities in civilian terms. That Rupert's army committed savage reprisals against those who pointlessly resisted them cannot be denied, and doubtless Rupert would have argued that in trying to maintain an untenable town, the garrison had caused the deaths of Royalist troops needlessly. There was some justification on both sides, but one cannot escape the smell of the slaughters of the Thirty Years War as one follows Rupert's progress through Lancashire. Admittedly, there had been precious little fellow-feeling between the two sides in Lancashire anyway, nothing like that between Parliamentarian and Royalist elsewhere in England, but to Rupert it was as foreign as he himself appeared to be to his enemies. If a comparison between Rupert and Newcastle is not too far-fetched, it would be simply made. Newcastle spared Bradford the horror of sack in 1643, though he had every provocation. Rupert would not have spared Bradford, and he had not spared Bolton. The civil war had come home to the complacent Lancashire Parliamentarians with a vengeance.

Desperately Meldrum, casting around for assistance, wrote to the earl of Denbigh for aid. The Royalists were now "in the bowels" of Lancashire, "wasting and spoiling", and would soon raise "a mighty army" if there were not immediate action. Meldrum was wasting his time, and although Rupert entertained no idea of attempting Manchester now, Lancashire was utterly at his mercy, and by now he had decided to move against Liverpool where Colonel John Moore, the somewhat lukewarm commander in the first stages of the siege of Lathom, was esconced.

Meldrum did, however, have good information and his assessment of Royalist strength on May 30th sounds right. On that day, Rupert had marched to Bury where he had made rendezvous with the Northern Horse. Meldrum was not aware that Goring had actually marched to Bury when he wrote, and spoke of these
cavalry lying between Woodhead and Stockport 3000 strong with 100 foot. The Prince's own army, reinforced as it had been by local levies that had come in to the earl of Derby's standard, was estimated to be now 4000 strong in horse and 7000 in infantry, and it would have been a bolder man than the earl of Denbigh who would risk an encounter with such a force, generalled by such a man as Rupert, and flushed with victory. Lancashire had never seen an army of this size, and its colonels had been used to small scale battles and running fights, to skirmishes and chance engagements. They lacked the experience to resist. Meldrum, of whom something might have been expected had he been given opportunity, could only watch helplessly now.

He was not, of course, alone in seeing the desperate position in which Lancashire lay. The Committee of Both Kingdoms sitting in London, although necessarily somewhat behind in its news, endeavoured to persuade the earl of Manchester, who was occupied at York, to take some action with at least a portion of his large army. On May 31st, the Committee told Manchester that they had heard that Rupert was on his march, and that his army, estimated at 8000 with 50 guns, was likely to double in size as a result of the earl of Derby's influence. Whilst this was a wild over-estimate, deliberate or due to bad intelligence, the consequences of failure to stop Rupert were only too clear:

If the Parliament should lose that county which has so many arms, and to which there may come an increase of strength from the bordering counties and also from Ireland, our affairs which are now in a hopeful condition would be set back there and throughout the whole Kingdom. We therefore in a special manner recommend to you the timely prevention thereof in such a way as upon conference with the Scots and Lord Fairfax, shall be judged fittest. (41)

The Committee no doubt suspected that Manchester would take some persuading, hence a second letter dated June 1st virtually recapitulated the arguments of the first:

Prince Rupert may probably, as we are informed, double his army and make the passes into the county inaccessible, and by fortifying them come with his forces into other counties at his pleasure, and by sea have great supplies out of Ireland and make the war very long; Liverpool being, as we hear, the Prince intends, a most considerable haven for that purpose. We apprehend the greatest advantage the enemy can have is by this design of Lancashire, and if those forces were suppressed, their hopes and ends would sink and be frustrated. We refer to your consideration the securing of the passes betwixt Yorkshire and Lancashire. (42)

Regular information was being sent from Derby by Colonel Sir John Gell, the Parliamentarian governor there. He had had opportunity to observe the proceedings of the Northern Horse, and it is from him that we learn that it was divided into two bodies before joining with Rupert at Bury on May 30th.

Goring with his company has lain some time near Sheffield, part of his force in our county, the rest in Yorkshire
purposing to join with Prince Rupert about Halifax, but his passage that way being too dangerous, on Thursday last with all his horse and carriages, except such as were drawn by oxen, these being left at Sheffield Castle, he marched through our country into Cheshire, his men are all armed but poorly provided with ammunition, numbering about 2000.

Gell had probably been aware only of the movements of Goring's own body, and not necessarily of that which, according to him, had lain in Yorkshire. The Derbyshire Royalist colonels, John Frescheville, John Milward and Rowland Eyre, were marching along with Goring but cannot have added much to his strength. Gell finished, "Goring's company are extremely barbarous and plunder all but Papists".

Gell, of course, had taken no steps to interfere with this progress, no doubt feeling that if they were actually leaving his area, it was best that he did not encourage them to stay. Manchester, for his part, could not be shifted from York despite the entreaties of the Committee, and on June 1st he wrote to them a lengthy, self-exonerating letter:

I assure you that I took all care to bring on our engagement with the [Harquess] of Newcastle's horse which came from York, but they would not stay within 20 or 30 miles where my horse were. The time they employed in plundering about Leicester, most part of my horse were on this side Trent, unable to move by reason of the heavy rains. As soon as they had notice that Major General [David] Lesley and my horse were marched towards Nottingham, thinking to intercept them in their march northward, they marched in such hot haste towards Uttoxeter that they left great numbers of their horse dead on the highways, passing the Trent at Burton, and so got into Derbyshire.

Sir Thomas Fairfax himself had been sent to encounter them when it was said that they were approaching Rotherham and Sheffield, but upon notice of his approach, the Royalist horse "marched into those parts of the county in which it would be very difficult to pursue them". In fact we know from Gell, that the Northern Horse were for a time at Sheffield, so Fairfax cannot have pressed the point too much. Manchester reported that he and his fellow generals had held a council of war to decide what to do about Lancashire, and the outcome had been that "it was concluded that if we divided our forces we might lose the whole design we are now upon", meaning the siege of York. The council resolved to order Meldrum to maintain Manchester at least, and once York was taken, then the main army would be free to act against Rupert.

It seems that the allied strategy depended upon Rupert concerning himself to reduce Manchester, and if this was indeed the consideration which prompted the commanders before York to postpone dealing with him, it betrayed a singular lack of appreciation of the man with whom they had to deal. Rupert's prime objective was to relieve York, and he was certainly not going to put his forces into a lengthy siege himself. The earl of Manchester and his fellow generals probably felt that a temporary loss of Lancashire would soon be overcome, and that whilst they pressed on with the siege of York, Rupert might be expected to
drag his feet by attempting to oust Meldrum.

It would be extremely tedious to go into more depth in the problem of the virtual immobility of the allied army in the north. Meldrum seems to have been the only commander on the spot who understood the situation, and the impression cannot be avoided that Manchester may have felt his own army, allied to those of Lord Fairfax and Leven, more than a match for Rupert should the latter dare attempt to cross into Yorkshire. Having dwelt upon Parliament's colossal impotence, we must return to Rupert himself.

Having been joined at Bury by Goring and the Northern Horse, it would seem from the journal of his march, that Rupert lingered in that area until at least June 3rd, returning to Bolton on the 4th. For purposes of adequate provision, the Royalist forces were obviously quartered over some distance, which probably accounts for the attack made by Parliamentary forces at Warrington upon the regiment of Colonel Tempest. Goring told Rupert that the attackers were repulsed with 12 dead, but solicited a guard of musketeers for Tempest's quarter or else permission to move it to a safer distance. Since the regiment alluded to was clearly a cavalry force, it must have been either Colonel Sir Richard Tempest of Stella's Durham and North Riding regiment, or else Richard Tempest of Bowling Hall's North Riding force. Proceedings of His Majesty's Army has a brief detail concerning the period May 30th to June 5th which indicates that Rupert was consolidating his forces before attempting the next objective:

"As wee lay in the Country about Bolton Generall Goring came with his Northern Army, partly from the Marques of New Castle, partly from Newark consistinge of 5,000 horse and 800 foote, not soe well appointed as was expected, with a great drove of cattle out of the Enemies quarters as they march. All this while great numbers of horss and foote resorted to the Prince, brought by the Earle of Derby his meanes and Sir Thomas Tinsley, but unarmed most of them. Wigin a large towne some 20 myles from Bolton received the Prince and his army with great tokens of joy, the streetes being strowed with rushes, flowers, and boughes of trees.

This entry of Prince Rupert into Wigan, reminiscent of a Roman triumph, must be taken as factual. Wigan, next only to Preston, was a Royalist town, where the earl of Derby's interest had long been paramount. With the general revival of Royalism in the county as a whole, that Wigan should have laid on an elaborate welcome, perhaps directed by Derby's agents, seems not unlikely. The Prince would most certainly have been gratified.

From the numbers of the Northern Horse and their infantry auxiliaries it would seem that Goring had managed to pick up good reinforcements on his way. It will be remembered that Meldrum, barely a week before this, had given Goring at 3000 strong with about 100 foot, so we must suppose that part of his force now included the Derbyshire contingents which were, nominally, under the Marquess of Newcastle's command. From Wigan, Rupert sent forces towards Liverpool.
On June 4th the earl of Manchester was finally convinced that Rupert would not bother with Meldrum, and would come into Yorkshire as soon as he might. "I am careful to have good intelligence of his movements", the earl told the Committee in London, "and though I am now quartered about York, yet I shall obey your commands", which were, to intercept Rupert if the latter turned south. This reference was to an expectation, not entirely confined to the Parliamentarians as will be seen, that Rupert would suddenly turn back towards Cheshire to join with his uncle's army, the main Oxford army, which at this time was out-manoeuvring the earl of Essex and William Waller in the West Country. There does not, in fact, seem to have been any intention on either the King's part or on Rupert's, to effect such a junction, although militarily it would have proved formidable to the enemy. It would, however, have meant sacrificing York, for it is to be doubted that the Marquess would have retained hold there, if the long awaited assistance from Rupert should have proved to be a vain hope. To say that the suspicion was not confined to the Parliament alone, is supported by a letter written to Rupert as late as June 13th by Lieutenant General Sir William Davenant.

I fear lest the rumour, which is common at Chester [Davenant was at Hale Ford, and had probably left York with Goring and the Horse], of the King's necessities, and consequently of your Highness's marching towards him, may come to their ears, who will not fail to convey it to York, which would prevail upon the people there more than their want of victual, or the enemy's continual asassault. To prevent this I have written that the reason of your not marching thither yet, was by being necessitated to call upon the enemy in Lancashire, which also had been in posture to have marched at the heels of your army, with a great and a formed army, which is now dispersed by several great actions in this county; and that you are hastening towards York. I will presume to put your Highness in remembrance, that if the pressures upon the king force him to march northwards, he will hardly be followed by those armies which consist of Londoners; for it was never heard that any force or inclination could lead them so far from home. If your Highness should be invited towards the King, you lose immediately eight hundred old foot in Yorkshire, which, with those that may be spared from the garrisons of Newcastle, Hartlepool and [Tynemouth], with those under Clavering, under my Lord Crauford, Montrose, Westmorland and Bishoprick forces, will make at least 74,000 foot and horse, which is a much greater army than ever the south will be able to raise in his Majesty's behalf: besides your Highness will by that diversion receive the three great mines of England (coal, alum, and lead) immediately in the enemy's possession, and a constant treasure made from them; which formerly my Lord Marquis had done, but that he was hindered by want of shipping: and they having the advantage of the sea, will make those mines a better maintenance to their cause than London hath been. I humbly beseech you to excuse for this presumption...

This letter, a mixture of the shrewd and of the incomprehensible, requires careful consideration. It will be immediately apparent that if the "rumour" to which Davenant alluded, and to which both the earl of Manchester and the London Committee had had cause to refer, were indeed merely a "rumour", then Davenant went to a lot of pains to point Rupert in the right direction. It
will be seen shortly that the King, at least, understood what was best for his 
nephew to do, and was compiling a letter to him on the day that Davenant was 
writing his own. Rupert's deliberate lingering in Lancashire can best be seen 
as contrived hesitation. He needed to know what had befallen the King before 
he would commit his forces too far in the York enterprise, and Davenant's 
letter provides the crucial evidence to support this contention. Sir William, 
to pacify fears within York that Rupert might not, after all, come to the 
city's aid, had written to the Marquess to tell him that the Prince was firstly 
concerned to "call upon the enemy in Lancashire, who...had been in a posture to 
have marched at the heels of his army, with a great and a formed army". 
This was simply not true, not on June 13th when he wrote, and not even at the 
end of May. Sufficient evidence has been produced to show that the Lancashire 
Parliamentarians were in complete disarray from the moment that Rupert had 
taken Stockport. Davenant had stretched the truth to bolster York morale. 
He had also, in his presumption, given Rupert an excuse for dawdling on the 
road if he needed it. Having done this, Sir William then went on to stress 
the advantages of keeping to the York plan even if the King were forced to 
march northwards due to Parliamentarian pressure in the south.

Davenant's arguments were shrewd, and his estimate of the disadvantages 
accruing to a return south, sound. Yet in putting forward arguments for the 
York plan - and, it will be noticed, he did not emphasise the necessity of 
relieving that city, though he may have taken it for granted - he began to 
write in terms incompatible with the known situation in the north. He seems to 
have hinted at the possibility of a complete conquest of the north, involving 
the dispersal of the allied army as a whole, and this to be done with 14,000 
reinforcements which would be at the Prince's disposal. The 'eight hundred 
old foot' to which he referred are a puzzle. He cannot have meant the 
infantry garrisoning York, who far exceeded that total - unless he were trying 
to impress upon Rupert the vulnerability of that garrison - so we must suppose 
that he was referring to various regiments and part-regiments scattered between 
the various Royalist strongholds in Yorkshire, Skipton, Scarborough, Pontefract, 
Sheffield, Doncaster and other places. How these were to be drawn into the 
field without risking their strongholds is to be wondered at. Further, it is 
hard to see how the garrisons of Newcastle, Tynemouth and of Hartlepool could 
hope to join Rupert across territory solidly under Scottish control, especially 
since Davenant implied that token forces from those places would be sent. 
Clavering's unit cannot have been more than 1000 at the most, whilst Montrose's 
force, if it can be separated from Clavering's, not many more. Of Crawford's 
dispositions we know next to nothing. As for Westmorland and, presumably, 
Cumberland, the reluctance of the Royalists there to fulfil their obligations 
must have made them the most unreliable of potential allies. Thus the forces 
which Davenant was describing as at Rupert's disposal, were figments of his
imagination. Now, either Sir William was a fool, which he was not, or else he was trying to influence Rupert's decision by any means he could because he felt that the whole York march was in the balance.

Superficially it would seem that Davenant's imagination ran away with him concerning the richness of the mineral deposits which would be at Rupert's command - coal, alum and lead. He pointed out that the Marquess would have utilised these had he had control of the sea routes, and since the situation at sea had far from improved for the Royalists - it had probably worsened - then if Newcastle had been unable to exploit them, how Rupert was to do so is baffling. As has been said, these remarks were superficially erroneous, but Davenant might well have meant to convey that mere possession of the mines, even if they could not be used to advantage, would deprive the enemy of a rich mineral source.

This letter represents Davenant's clearest, personal involvement in high level decision making that we know of. If Rupert paid it any heed, he would certainly have appreciated the motives behind it, and he was not the man to be swayed by elusive goals. However, we must concede that Rupert having entered Lancashire, was far from decided whether to push on or to turn back. Events were to make up his mind for him. Patrick Morrah, Rupert's recent biographer, does not seem to have seen anything at all strange in this delay in Lancashire, nor to have considered the prospect of a return south at all, although the evidence for the possibility is to hand. Without this delay, York might have been relieved at least three weeks earlier than it actually was, and the loss of the fight on Marston Moor averted.

From Wigan, Rupert marched on June 6th to Prescot and on the 7th he quartered at Banck Hall facing Liverpool. From then until the 10th, his army was engaged in the reduction of that important port. On the 6th, Lord Goring and presumably, most of the Northern Horse, went into quarters at Leigh, with Tyldesley advancing and occupying Preston. The Proceedings of His Majesty's Army gave a succinct account of the siege and capture of the port.

Wee pitched before Liverpoole with our whole army, having beleaguered it with our horses the day before; it had mudd walls with barrs and gates, 14 pieces of ordnance, 1,000 soldiers (as was supposed); the matter was disputed very hotly until the tenth day of June with muskett and great shott without measure out of the towne and from the shippes, uppon which day our line approached within a coites cast of the gate where our great shott had almost filled the ditch with the ruines of the sod wall, and about noone a furious assualte was made by our menn where a terrible fight was on both sydes above the space of an houre upon the worke, the Enemy resolute, ours not seconded retreated with some loss.

Despite this notable success, the defenders clearly could not hope to resist a third or a fourth assault. Consequently, after dark on the 10th, the enemy commanders ferried their possessions and themselves onto the ships lying in
the port, hoisted sail, and drew off into the roads. Behind them they left 10 colours on the walls as if to signify a continued resistance.

Their departure was observed by the Royalist commander whose lines were nearest to the river, Henry Tillier, whereupon he entered the town with caution and met little or noe resistance, found about 400 of the meaner sorte of menne, whereof most were kill'd some had quarter, 14 piecees of ordinance, left uppon theyr carryages att theyr batterys, whatsoever was desiderable was the souldiers right for theyr hard service, 26 smale vessells without tacklings left in the harbour.

Since no mention is made of the artillery captured having been found to be sabotaged, this sounds very much like a precipitate flight of the garrison command, leaving their men to take the consequences. It sounds, too, as if Rupert's forces repeated the Bolton spectacle on a smaller scale - "most were kill'd some had quarter" - which might have been a response to the town's initial method of refusing to surrender. According to Mercurius Aulicus, Lord Molyneux had personally summoned the port, accompanied by a trumpeter sent from Rupert, and, although under safe-conduct, this trumpeter had his horse shot from under him. It seems that the local Parliamentary commanders really had no idea how to treat with their young adversary, for a similar incident followed by a more heinous atrocity, had inspired the sack of Bolton.

Another account of the Liverpool storm is contained in the tract The Siege and Taking of Bolton which has already been examined for the subject of its title.

Upon the Prince's arrival near Liverpool, he was informed that it was well fortified with a strong and a high mud wall, and a ditch of twelve yards wide, and near three yards deep, inclosing the town from the east-end of the street called Dale-street, and so northward to the river; and from Dale-street end east, and south-east, being a low marshy ground, was covered with water from the river, and batteries erected within to cover and guard against all passage over or through that water. All the street ends to the river were shut up, and those to the land inclosed with strong gates, defended by cannon...There was also a strong castle on the south, surrounded with a ditch of twelve yards wide, and ten yards deep, from which to the river was a covered way, through which the ditch was filled with water, and by which when the tide was out, they brought in men, provisions and stores of war, as occasion required.

The defences of Liverpool sound impressive. Today, the consequence of post-Industrial sprawl, with the loss of its castle, Liverpool, like Sheffield and Doncaster, defies attempts at reconstructing the scene in 1644. Pontefract, which has altered vastly also, still possesses at least the ruined shell of its powerful fortress as an aid to the scholar, but Liverpool of 1644 is as lost as the men who fought for it.

It is perhaps worth noting that no attempt was made to retain control of the castle, at least even for a time, as was done when Newcastle fell later in
the year. With the cannon from the ships lying off the port, it might have bothered Rupert for some time, and one can only suppose that there was some fundamental weakness in the place of which we know nothing. Alternatively, John Moore and his staff may have left in such a panic that no direction was given, either to spike the guns, or to retreat to the castle. The rank and file were certainly found and killed in the streets where they stood, perhaps taken by surprise and offering resistance.

We learn from the tract that in and upon the castle walls were planted numerous guns, both to bombard Rupert's army at a distance and to cover the harbour area. In addition, a sconce of eight cannon strength lay between the castle and the river to control that passage at low water. The mud walls were made stronger, in a sense, by the utilisation of vast quantities of wool, stored in the port by refugees from Ulster, which they laid along the summits of the breastworks to take the impact of musket balls from the attackers. Rupert's judgement, having taken the place, was that "it might have been an Eagles nest or a den of Lions".

Daily, Rupert organised a rota system for various detachments to perform some work on siege trenches, particularly on a ridge of high ground running from the north of Townsend-mill, where the batteries for his cannon were established with trenches beneath them for the guards. The soldiers in service at the batteries and in the trenches were relieved every twelve hours, so that fresher men could keep up the continual bombardment. The expenditure of powder must have been enormous, and this point should be borne in mind.

The tract related two views of the final capture, which did not contradict each other. In one view, the defenders at the northern side of the town deserted their works and so permitted the Royalists to enter, under Tillier. Other say, that Colonel Moore, observing that they must be taken, to ingratiate himself with the Prince, to save his house and effects at Bank-hall [Rupert's headquarters], near it, gave directions to the soldiers to retreat from those works; but be that as it may, deserted they were on the north side, and the Prince's army entered the town on that side about three in the morning, and put all to the sword they met with, from their entrance to the High Cross...where they met with a regiment of soldiers from the castle, drawn up in battle array, who beat a parley and demanded quarter; which on treaty they were allowed. But without any other articles than prisoners of war, and surrender of the castle, with their persons and arms; upon which they were all sent to the Tower, St. Nichols's Church, &c....

An attempt had been made to relieve the Liverpool garrison, perhaps instigated by Meldrum, although the relief force set off from Warrington. According to the Proceedings of His Majesty's Army, this force was intercepted on June 8th by Goring and Colonel John Marrow from Cheshire, and was routed with the loss of two Scottish officers taken prisoner.

An undated Parliamentarian account of the loss of Liverpool, of extreme
importance as originating from the pen of one of the town's officers, gave an interesting sidelight on the final hours. He was Captain Andrew Ashton, one of the officers of the watch, and what he had to say, whether the implications can be accepted on face value or not, said much for the state of the morale within the port towards the final day or so of the siege. Ashton wrote of treachery within the command, notably of the behaviour of Sir Thomas Stanley, that arch-enemy of the earl of Derby who had tried to assassinate the earl in 1642 - who referred derogatively to the Parliamentary garrison as "pricke eared rogues", and who had undergone such a change of heart as to be heard to say "he would rather fight against Manchester yn any towne in England for they were a company of puritanicall rascals". If this were true, Stanley must have been in a state of panic, for outside the walls, as he well knew, was not only Rupert, but Derby as well. The risks of falling into Derby's hands must have been too much for Stanley to endure, and his panic might well have infected the officers at a critical stage in the siege. Of course, this would only have significance if it were considered possible to hold Liverpool indefinitely: if that were not the case, then whatever Stanley said would have had little influence on military thinking within the town. At most, it cannot have done the rank and file much good to hear rumours of his opinions. Needless to say, Stanley escaped aboard one of the ships and so saved his neck.

On the 10th, Ashton said, the Royalist cannon played from two in the morning until noon, resulting in a fire in part of the town. At this point the assault went in to which Proceedings of His Majesty's Army referred, which was driven off after desperate fighting. Despite this success, Ashton and his men - note that even a captain was unaware of the plans of the commanders - at about midnight, learned that ships were putting out of the harbour, "wch his soldiers were much dismayed" by. Ashton went to find out what was going on, and discovered the commanders evacuating hurriedly. When Ashton then tried to rally his men to resist Tillier's entrance, discipline was gone, and none of them would fight further.

If Ashton's story was true, insofar as its depiction of events was accurate, and leaving aside the question of treachery, it is really a very serious indictment of the authorities in the port, particularly since their soldiers would appear to have been ready to continue the fight. The anonymous author of the report which appeared in Mercurius Britannicus on June 17th clearly wrote about some fictitious Liverpool, in a report which would have sickened Ashton.

The brave repulse which Colonel Moore, Governor of Liverpole, gave twice to Rupert (who assaulted that place with greate fury) is worthy of your notice. The seamen were very active in that service, and all are resolute to defend that place... 400 English and Scots are sent from Manchester to Warrington, and from thence by water to Liverpoole, for their better assistance...
Clearly, the force beaten up by Goring and Marrow on the 8th.

...and the Ships in the Harbour are well fitted to defend
and make good a part of that town... the prudent Governor,
with the loss of not above sixty men, killed him fifteen
hundred...

Ashton's first-hand view of that "prudent governor" would have been considerably
at variance with this piece of wanton propaganda intended for the consumption
of the London citizenry.

On June 12th Prince Rupert himself rode to Lathom House to greet the
Countess, and found it "Most strangely shattered by the enemies cannon and
mortar pieces". Taking over authority there, he ordered the erection of
bastions and countercarps and other earthworks, and appointed as Governor
Captain Edward Rostern, whom he promoted to Colonel on the spot. Chisenall
was also singled out for a colonelcy, with orders to recruit a regiment to
march with the main army. Why Major Farmer received no promotion is puzzling.
It may have been that Rupert wanted to promote men with territorial influence,
which clearly Farmer, as a Scot, had not: perhaps Farmer himself did not wish
to exchange his rank. Whatever, he fought and died under Chisenall's regiment
colours enjoying his old rank. Derby and his Countess were ordered to retire
to the Isle of Man, a short, sharp marching order from Rupert that defies
explanation. Even if the Prince had not wanted Derby with the relief army on
the way to York, since he was taking Lord Byron with him, Derby was the ideal
choice as commander in Lancashire, but the appointment was not made.

On the 13th, Rupert returned to Liverpool where he appointed Colonel Sir
Robert Byron to be Governor, and issued commissions for a garrison regiment to
be commanded by a prominent Lancashire Catholic, Colonel Cuthbert Clifton,
himself newly commissioned for the work.

For the space of six days or so, Rupert remained either at Liverpool or
at Lathom, supervising refortification work at both places, but also pondering
his next move. The best description of the impact of his presence thus far,
can be found in two reports sent from the siege army at York to the Committee
of Both Kingdoms. One, from the earl of Manchester, presented what might be
termed the official army view. The other, from Sir Henry Vane, Parliament's
commissioner with the Scottish army, represented the official London view, since
Vane was, after all, their spokesman.

The earl's report was lengthy and need not be considered in full. He
carefully, in an almost detached fashion, noted the series of disasters that
had befallen the Lancashire Parliamentarians:

About 14 days since, when we first heard of Prince Rupert's
bending his course towards Lancashire, the forces of that
county, estimated at least at twelve troops of horse and 7000
foot were ordered to be drawn together on the frontier of the
county towards Cheshire, where there are only two passages
the one by Stopfort and the other by Warrington, which those
forces might easily have made good against Rupert's army, not then exceeding 8000 men, part horse and part foot; yet to give the more encouragement to the country, we sent Sir John Meldrum with two regiments of foot and two troops of horse from hence, who arrived not at Manchester until the Lancashire forces had deserted Stopfort, and left that passage open for the enemy....

Meldrum might have made a more inspiring leader in Stockport, but the fact remains that whatever the Lancashire commanders did who were confronted by Rupert, those Parliamentarian commanders from outside the county did no more.

As a consequence of this failure to hold Stockport, Manchester reported curtly, the Prince had doubled his army and had gone on to take Bolton, "so that we conceive all Lancashire is in hazard for the present". The earl stated that whereas Meldrum could hold the Manchester garrison in readiness, the rest of the county was lost, and in order to hinder Rupert, Yorkshire would have to be put in danger, which Manchester and his fellow commanders were not prepared to consider. Clearly, neither Manchester, nor Leven, would consider carrying the war to threaten Rupert across the Pennines, so that even as Manchester wrote (on June 5th), if Rupert did not return south to meet the King, Yorkshire would obviously be next on the list for him. Manchester argued that to quit the siege of York would do no good, since Rupert might easily by-pass him, whilst the Marquess of Newcastle might leave York and re-establish himself in Yorkshire. These were superficial reasons which could have been demolished by any one of the committee members in London. They concealed indecision, uncertainty, and an astonishing lack of contingency planning. All that had been done had been to quarter some horse and dragoons between Ripon and Otley, with advance guards on Blackstone Edge.

Vane, writing on the 11th when news of Liverpool must have come to him, had only reached the siege army on the 9th due to bad weather. He had at once had a conference with the allied generals about Lancashire, but "no certain resolution was taken concerning the same". Vane, however, had been persuaded that the siege army was not large enough, either in foot or in horse to risk splitting it in order to confront Rupert (who might, anyway, have gone away), and he intimated to the Committee in London that he felt it better to pursue the siege rather than be diverted into other actions. Vane had initially supported the views of Ralph Asheton and Alexander Rigby that action should be taken to recover Lancashire, but he had been won over by the united caution of the allied generals. It would be interesting to know what Sir Thomas Fairfax's views were, or, for that matter, Cromwell's. "The truth is" Vane wrote, "I could not satisfy my own judgement that anything considerable could be done for Lancashire by these forces until the business of York were decided".

Thus the situation between June 11th and 19th was entirely in Rupert's
favour. He had conquered everywhere he had marched, he had taken Bolton and Liverpool; Preston and Wigan had welcomed his men. Enemy garrisons in Manchester and Warrington watched his progress, but did not dare to move in view of the absolute immobility of the great allied army before York. Gell in Derbyshire, and the earl of Denbigh, were only too pleased to see Rupert out of their territory. Whatever Rupert now did, he would do unmolested and undeterred by the threat of an active enemy. Critics of Rupert's generalship, such as Peter Young and other less informed writers, have seen him as a glorified cavalry commander, but it was something more than such a man who could so utterly paralyse an enemy with indecision. Further, his own want of decisiveness was coming to an end.

George Goring was, quite properly, representing the Marquess of Newcastle's plight to Rupert. On June 11th he wrote him a letter urging him to ignore other counsels and to march into Yorkshire. It was, however, the King's letter to Rupert written at Tickenhill on June 14th which finally persuaded him for Yorkshire, and which doubtless came to Rupert on the 18th or 19th. The letter has been printed so many times in so many secondary works, the original resting in the Victoria and Albert Museum, that it might be unnecessary to give it in full, were it not that the wording of the letter requires examination since there is one feature of it to which no attention has yet been paid.

Nepueu. first I must congratulate with you, for your good successes, assuring you that the things themselves are no more welcome to me, than that you are the means: I know the importance of the supplying you with powder for which I have taken all possible wais, having sent both to Ireland and Bristow, as from Oxford this bearer is well satisfied, that it is impossible to have at present, but if he tell you that I may spare them hence, I leave you to judge, having but 36 left; but what I can gett from Bristow (of wch there is not much certaintie, it being threatened to be besieged) you shall have But now I must give you the true state of my Affaires, wch if their condition be such as enforces me to give you more peremptorie comands then I would willingly doe, you must not take it ill. If Yorke be lost, I shall esteeme my Crown little lesse, unless supported by your suddaine Marche to me, & a Miraculous Conquest in the South, before the effects of the Northern Power can be found here; but if Yorke be relived, & you beate the Rebelles Armies of both kingdoms, which ar before it, then but otherwise not, I may possibly make a shift, (upon the defensive) to spin out tyme, untill you come to assist mee: Wherefor I comand and conjure you, by the dewty & affection which I know you beare me, that (all new enterpryses laid aside) you immediately March (according to your first intention) with all your force to the relife of Yorke; but if that be eather lost, or have fried themselves from the besiegers, or that for want of pouder you cannot undertake that worke; that you immediatly March, with your whole strength, to Woster, to assist me & my Army, without which, or your having relived Yorke by beating the Scots, all the successes you can afterwards have, most infallibly, will be uselesse unto me: You may belive that nothing but an extreme necessity could make me wryte this unto
you, wherefor, in this Case, I can no wayes dout of your punctuall compliyance with...Your loving Oncle...

We can dismiss as irrelevant the comment given by Warburton, who had it from the notes of Rupert's chaplain, that when this letter was completed, John Colepepper who saw it criticised it as a direct order to fight with the allied army. As Wedgwood has pointed out, whether it was a direct order or whether it was nothing of the sort, Colepepper was in no position to know that such a fight would end with the defeat on Marston Moor, when, anyway, at the time of the battle, the issue was for long uncertain. The obvious question is, however, whether this letter did represent a clear order to fight or whether the matter was left open for Rupert. To answer this point is to deal with an accumulation of scholarly views, but there is another point, which is, whether this letter at all merits the detailed attention that has been paid to it. Since Rupert received it whilst he was in the vicinity of Liverpool, and that thereafter he marched directly to the east and to the relief of York, and then pursued the fleeing allied army and brought it to battle against the will of its commanders, it might be said that Rupert took the letter as such an order. Peter Young, accepting the Warburton story, remarked: "A modern staff-officer would be hard pressed indeed to make of this a direct order to fight a battle after York had been relieved." Quite so. We are not, however, dealing with a modern staff officer, nor with a modern general staff structure. We are concerned with a letter written by the commander of the Royal armies, the King himself, to a field officer holding an independent command giving him certain wide areas for freedom of action. The letter is not a letter of instruction, neither explicit nor implicit, but a letter of information, news and advice. The King was not ordering anything, but merely confirming that what Rupert had marched north to do, was still in the King's view a worthwhile operation.

To examine this 'crucial' letter carefully is to strip from it much of the legend that has accrued to it over the intervening centuries. Most importantly the emphasis which has been laid upon the line, "If York be lost I shall esteem my crown little less" demands attention. Young chose this half sentence as the introduction to his Foreword in his study of Marston Moor, but it is only a half-sentence. It should properly conclude with the words "unless supported by your suddaine Marche to me, & a Miraculous Conquest in the South, before the effects of the Northern power can be found heere;". It cannot be argued that the King was equating the loss of York with the loss of the war, therefore it cannot be argued that Rupert was summarily commanded to go to York for its relief whatever the odds. Indeed, the King provided us with an interesting view of Rupert's condition which an examination merely of his Lancashire successes tends to conceal. Rupert had pressed the King for powder, for his cannon and for his musketeers without which the efficiency of two arms of his force, artillery and infantry, would necessarily be impaired. The King, it
will be noted, could not guarantee supplies at all, and towards the end of his letter gave his nephew a clear escape clause which serves further to emphasise that this letter was not a peremptory order based upon a view of the siege of York as the critical issue of the war. The King wrote:

I comand and conjure you, by the dewty & affection which I know you beare me, that (all new enterpryses laid aside) you immediatly March (according to your first intention) with all your force to the relife of Yorke; but if that be eather lost, or have fried themselves from the besiegers, or that for want of powder you cannot undertake that wonke; that you immediately March...to Woster, to assist me & my Army...

Leaving aside the normal stylistic presentation of a royal letter, the "comand and conjure you", this letter, read, by a man who had had many such and would have understood how the King wrote and how to interpret his letters, gave Rupert an excuse not to go to York based upon solid military considerations. Whether York held out, or whether the garrison had put the enemy to flight, if Rupert's powder supply was so low as it seems to have been, he need not have marched into Yorkshire. It is hardly likely that if the King had viewed York's importance as in such a light as Young and others have supposed that he did, that he would not then have moved heaven and earth to let his nephew have the vital powder for the performance of the duty. We know, we have the King's own comments to substantiate it, that Rupert was low on powder. Here was no direct and uncompromising set of orders for the Prince to obey, but a letter of advice and information. Throughout this period, Rupert was a commander acting almost entirely on his own initiative, and it is apparent that this letter was important for what it did not say. It did not oblige Rupert to go south at once, as it had been rumoured that he might have to do, and it left him free to act as he thought fit. The King cannot be blamed for Marston Moor, no more than, as will be explained, Rupert himself.

Having looked at this letter and considered what it said and did not say, it is now essential to consider it in another light. We cannot say more of this letter than that it appears to have caused Rupert to decide, as he hovered around Liverpool, to march for York.

Sir Philip Warwick accused Lord Digby of "giving a fatall direction unto that excellent Prince Rupert to have fought the Scotch army". This has been seen by many as implying that Digby was behind the letter of the 14th. Moreover, Warburton claimed that Rupert carried this letter (and here we are led to suppose that we are still concerned with the letter of the 14th, and everyone has assumed as much) until his dying day, never showing it to anyone, but as proof of his obligation to fight on Marston Moor. This story, for it is substantiated by nothing more than marginalia in a 17th century script dated 1676, in a copy of Heath's 'Chronicle' to be seen in the London Library, has been given so much credence that where Rupert is concerned, we are observing narrowly the manufacture of a myth.
If the King and Rupert were constantly exchanging despatches, as they probably were, otherwise Rupert would not have been uncertain whether to press on or to turn back south, each new despatch containing further information, how is anyone to be sure that the letter of the 14th and that which, according to scribbled marginalia, Rupert carried about with him to his death, were one and the same? How are we to be sure that Lord Digby's "fatall direction" was the same as the letter of the 14th? By what mythological process did it come about that Maurice Ashley in his study of Rupert could suggest, as others have suggested, that Digby wrote the King's letter when the letter is so obviously a document in which the habitual formalities jar with the rest of the personalised content? If Rupert did receive an order to fight, after he had received the letter of the 14th, we do not know. But an analysis of the King's letter shows conclusively that whatever else it was, it was not such an order, and it was not a document in which the fall or relief of York was presented as the single critical issue of the war. It will be argued subsequently that Marston Moor did not destroy northern Royalism, that there was still opportunity in the north. It has been necessary to turn away from the Lancashire campaigns in order to look thoroughly at a document which has become the central point of an historical myth, a document in face of which the critical faculties of eminent scholars have failed them. The only significance that can be attached to the letter is that it cleared Rupert of worries for the King for the time being and gave him time to go to York. The decision to fight on Marston Moor was his decision, and his alone, for without the existence of a subsequent letter ordering him to fight, we must suppose that the story was rooted in the high command friction that beset the Oxford army. If there was a direct order to fight, he did not receive it until the end of June. Why did Rupert, then, decide to make for York after all?

There were, of course, factors Rupert considered of which we must remain ignorant. A picture can only be made up from the sources that we have. With that qualification, the following analysis of Rupert's position between June 13th and 19th, and of what may have been his strategic thinking, can be made.

He knew that he was not needed in the south immediately, and that he was free to make his own decision. Lancashire was, to all intents and purposes, under his control. The Parliamentarians were walled up in Manchester and Warrington, with other places, and would not venture out, being outnumbered and thoroughly cowed. York was under siege, and apart from sending Meldrum to preside at the fiasco of Parliamentary arms, the allied generals had shown no inclination to seek Rupert out. He must have known from local intelligence and from his own scouts, that a few bodies of Parliamentary horse were on watch around Blackstone Edge and the Yorkshire border, and these were not intended to hinder him, but only to bring the siege army early warning of his approach.
The entire Parliamentary and Scottish armies were adopting a cautiously defensive posture. For Rupert, that was an invitation.

One of the tests by which a great military figure is assessed, is to examine his overall strategic thinking. Critics of Rupert, can, with some justice, deny that he ever took a long term view of his campaigns, but merely went where he was sent, won his victories, and went elsewhere. During the Interregnum, he was not noted at the exiled court for his ability to work in harness with groups pursuing definitive, long term policies aimed at an eventual restoration. It may be that he was, by virtue of his character, an anti-organisation man, best left to his own devices, and acknowledging superior authority only where that authority was indeed, by custom and law, superior. Thus, when we consider the decision which Rupert finally made to go to relieve York, we are examining his immediate considerations. It is highly unlikely that Rupert considered what to do after he had relieved York, until he had actually done that thing, or that he had any clear strategic intentions after the battle on Marston Moor. Rupert was an opportunist in the truest sense of the word, and that is not meant to sound pejorative.

The enemy around York were at a disadvantage. They had failed to storm the city; indeed, as Rupert must have known, they had received some decisive setbacks. There must have been advisors with Rupert who knew of Leven's natural caution and Rupert himself must have had a shrewd idea of the earl of Manchester's limitations. It would have seemed to the Prince, debating the matter in Liverpool or at Bank Hall, that a direct march might do one of two things. It might force the allied army to make a stand with its back to York, in which case Rupert's cohesive army, flushed with victory, and supported by the York garrison, could almost guarantee a victory - perhaps even a surrender as at Newark. Alternatively, a direct progress towards York might cause the allied army to disintegrate, the Scots looking to their own best interests, in which case the relief march might terminate in a grand mopping up operation. At the end of the march would be the powder that Rupert needed, either from York stores, or from the stores of the allied army. On Tuesday June 19th, he rode to Lathom, his march to York resolved upon.

The siege commanders had poor intelligence. Vane, writing on the 20th, stated that Rupert had "by the best relation, but 4000 fighting horse and 4000 others warned for baggage horses, and some 4000 or 5000 foot". There were troop movements in Cumbria of which Vane knew nothing, as well. Goring wrote to Rupert on the 19th that these forces were likely to brush aside Parliamentary scouting parties near Skipton.

On June 21st Rupert's army was at Croston, and on the 22nd marched to Preston where Tyldesley was already stationed. Vane reported to London on the 23rd that "Prince Rupert with all his horse and foot, about 11,000, has his
Rupert's march to York and his retreat after the battle of Marston Moor.
rendezvous this night at Preston, which looks this way". It is apparent that no one at York knew what was going on. Vane added, "it be conceived he will not advance yet a while, which makes it very questionable whether we should go and attack him in Lancashire, blocking up this city still", and he could still find no resolution in the allied generals other than to wait and watch. 64

On the 24th Rupert's army came to Clitheroe, where a garrison was put into the castle and another garrison sent to Greenhalgh. 65 Rupert himself was still at Liverpool, for on that date he wrote to Goring from there, concerning the Cumbrian forces which Sir Philip Musgrave was sending to his assistance.

I intend to be tomorrow at Ormis Kirke with all my forces, and if it please you to let the earl of Newcastle know that I am upon my march towards him and that no time shall be lost you will [do] be a favour...Postscript, I beseech you, to hasten the Westmorland and Cumberland forces and do not spoil our quarters. (66).
The exact nature of the forces which Musgrave was sending - for Sir Philip did not come himself - cannot be arrived at. They probably included Colonel Sir Timothy Featherstonehaugh's regiment of infantry, and perhaps Colonel Henry Chaytor's regiment. A family tradition that Sir Richard Graham, who had sabotaged Montrose's march to Dumfries earlier, fought at Marston Moor cannot be evidenced, nor is it altogether clear that he actually commanded a regiment; but if he did, and if he was at the battle, it was now that he came forth from his native county. The other forces, if there were others, remain unknown.

On the 25th the army marched to Gisburne, and on the day following to Skipton. "By the way", the author of the 'Journal' noted, "was Sir William Lister's house taken: we stayed at Skipton to fixe our arms, and send into Yorke". Lister's house at Thornton will be remembered as the objective of a temporarily successful raid by the Skipton garrison cavalry in the summer of 1643, and clearly it had changed hands since. On the question of Rupert's delay at Skipton, there is evidence that he may have taken steps to adapt the town for a major base. One of the historians of the Craven valley has given it as his opinion, based upon local tradition, that Rupert ordered the digging of earthworks near Bracewell, Howber and on Gildesber hills. 67 It may be that by pausing at Skipton, now within easy striking distance of York, Rupert hoped to tempt the allied generals into making some decisive movement either against him, or away from him. On the 29th he advanced to the Fairfax mansion at Denton. Lionel Watson, the earl of Manchester's Scoutmaster General, advised his superior on the 30th from Long Marston (the allied army had withdrawn from before York) that

the enemy's horse and foot did advance this day towards Otley, and quarter there and the towns thereabouts this night, hath occasioned us to draw all our horse of both nations upon the moor close by Long Marston. (68)
On that day Rupert's advance forces entered the Royalist garrison town of Knaresborough, where the castle may have been partly invested, thus forcing the allied troops there to fall back on their main army which was now hovering indecisively around York and its Ainsty.

The Duchess recorded Rupert's arrival at York:

At last after three months time from the beginning of the siege, his Majesty was pleased to send an army, which, joining with my Lord's horse that were sent to quarter in the aforesaid countries, came to relieve the city under the conduct of the most gallant and heroic Prince Rupert...upon whose approach near York, the enemy drew from before the city into an entire body, and marched away on the west side of the river Ouse, that runs through the city, his Majesty's forces being then of the east side that river. (69)

Having feigned a direct approach on the allied side of the river by seeming to come through Boroughbridge, Rupert swept along the Ouse to the walls of York, retaining all the time the element of surprise and the military initiative. He was now in a hurry, and it remained to be seen whether the allied army would march faster to get away, than he would march to halt them and to make them fight.
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. There is no recent study of the Countess, but see Rowsell, M.C., The Life-Story of Charlotte de la Tremoille Countess of Derby, 1905.


3. The Life of Colonel Hutchinson and the Siege of Lathom House, Bohn's Standard Library, 1905.


5. See Chisenall's biography, Vol. 2. Since no journal was kept of the second siege, when Chisenall was not present, this might be evidence to support his authorship.


8. HMC Tenth Report, Appendix Part IV, Stewart Mss., pp. 69/70.


10. Ibid., p. 228.

11. Ibid., pp. 231/2.

12. Ibid., pp. 236/7.

13. Stanley Papers, p. 102. On March 7th the earl of Derby wrote to Prince Rupert from Chester, q.v. Warburton, II, p. 383, that he had hoped to see him as early as March 5th, since Lathom was hard pressed and Lord Byron would do nothing to assist without Rupert's support. The earl added that barely 50 men garrisoned Liverpool and that it was ripe for taking.


17. Ibid., p. 240. It is possible, of course, that this remark may have been a threat never carried out, for we hear nothing more of it from either side.

18. CSPD 1644, p. 126.


20. CSPD 1644, p. 164.


23. CSPD 1644, p. 149.

24. Ibid., p. 164.


27. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 49.

28. CSPD 1644, p. 177.

29. 'Proceedings of His Majesty's Army'.


32. CSPD 1644, p. 176.

33. 'Proceedings of His Majesty's Army'.


36. Ibid., pp. 136/7. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, pp. 188/95.


38. 'The Siege and Taking of Bolton'.


40. Ibid., p. 188.

41. Ibid., p. 187.

42. Ibid., p. 192.

43. Ibid., pp. 190/1.

45. CSPD 1644, pp. 202/3.
46. Warburton, II, pp. 434/5.
47. HMC Ninth Report, Pt. II, Traquair Mss., p. 255.
51. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 52.
52. CSPD 1644, pp. 206/7.
53. Ibid., pp. 223/5.
55. Ibid., II, p. 438.
57. Young, Marston Moor, p. 38.
58. Warwick, Memoirs, p. 274.
59. See, for example, Morrah, Rupert of the Rhine, p. 149.
62. CSPD 1644, p. 257.
64. CSPD 1644, pp. 265/8.
65. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 53.
67. Morant, A.W. ed: Whitaker's History and Antiquities of the Deanery of
68. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 111.
69. Firth, Newcastle Memoir, p. 38.
CHAPTER NINE

Marston Moor and its Aftermath

The fall of York, and the war in the west, July - December 1644.

Rupert's rapid advance on York forced the siege army to draw off from the city, onto moorland known variously as Marston or Hessay moors, five miles west of the city. It is unlikely that this was purely a move preparatory to giving battle, in that it drew the siege army into one force and removed the risk of a sally from York should the engagement take place in and around the siege lines. There was as much indecision in the allied high command as there had been in the two months preceding the relief of York. Sir Thomas Fairfax remembered:

"We were divided in our opinions, what to do. The English were for fighting them; the Scots for retreating, to gain (as they alleged) both time & place of advantage. (1)"

According to one Robert Grifens, whose letter concerning the battle of Marston Moor was published in London in the tract A More Exact Relation of the late Battell Neer York, this was not in fact a retreat, but an attempt to locate Rupert and to bring him to battle somewhere near Bramham Moor where it was rumoured that he was. This opinion of Grifens is at variance with the ascertainable facts of the case, the Parliamentary and Scottish commanders knowing full well where the relief army was, and Grifens view must be seen as an attempt to conceal the reluctance of the Scottish commanders to come to a fight. Lionel Watson, to whom we must refer again, the earl of Manchester's Scoutmaster General, whose account of the battle formed the main part of the tract in which Grifens letter appeared, stated that after the rendezvous on Marston Moor the allied army was intended for Cawood:

"and so to Selby, partly to possess the River entirely, so to hinder him for furnishing York with provisions, out of the East Riding; As also to interpose between him and his march Southwards, he having no other way to march, (the Earl of Denbigh and the Lancashire forces interposing between him and his march West-wards, the way he came)."

The burden of this supports the view that the allied army desired at all costs to avoid a battle, and had adopted a defensive posture aimed at interfering with Rupert as much as possible without incurring the risks of full scale action. It is hard to say how much weight should be laid upon Watson's view of the powers of Denbigh and Meldrum. Certainly, Meldrum gave Rupert's forces a lot of trouble in the late summer as they tried to reach Cheshire, but by then Meldrum was stronger anyway, and the Royalists similarly depleted after the fight on Marston Moor.

There is, however, some support for Watson's opinion in the account given by Thomas Stockdale in a letter written to the Speaker of the Commons on July
The letter was given, verbatim, by both Firth and Young, and whilst Stockdale must claim attention in view of his interesting report of the battle of Adwalton Moor in the previous year, it has still to be remembered that the allied army had a lot of covering up to do so far as its tactical and strategic planning, or perhaps lack thereof, was concerned. Stockdale can be seen, however, as supporting the view that battle was not intended without substantial help from Denbigh and Meldrum.

Upon fryday last 28 Junie the three Generalls received some intelligence of Prince Rupert's speedy march towards Yorke with a very numerous army, to wch were added the forces from the 4 Northern Counties raysed by Clauering and Musgrave &c., whereupon they resolved to raise the seige of Yorke and march towards him, for which preparation was made...

Clavering's men did not, in fact, join Rupert until after the battle, but if it was believed by the allied generals that they had - and here they would be reliant upon intelligence sent to them from Scottish forces in Co. Durham and Northumberland - this might have weighed heavily with them in deciding to avoid battle. There is a slight link here with Grifen's report, although less specific, in that Stockdale alluded to marching towards Rupert...

but the execution delayed until more certenty should be brought of the E. of Denbys approach & Sr John Meldromes with the forces of Chesshire &c., for if they should come in such time as to joyne with our horse, dragoones, and foot designed for that purpose, which might be able to encounter Prince Rupert, then it was intended both to continue the seige and give the Prince battell.

This plan is hard to believe in. If Denbigh and Meldrum had had enough men at this time to march to the aid of the allied army, then it is strange that they should not have attempted to molest Rupert's army in Lancashire when he had not the accession of Cumbrian strength. Stranger still, that Meldrum at least had argued that he himself needed reinforcement if he were even to maintain that part of Lancashire which he controlled. It could be that here, Stockdale was reporting the deliberations of the allied council of war as revealed to him by Lord Fairfax, and that the allied generals, albeit their subordinate advisors were hot for action, chose to conceal their unwillingness to fight under a cloak of proviso's.

But Letters from the E. of Denbgh & Sr John Meldrom coming to certifie that untilt Wednesday night they could not bee at Wakefield which is 20 myles short of Yorke, and certen intelligence being brought that Prince Rupert and all his forces were come to Knaresborough within 12 myles of the leaguer, upon the last Lords day at night, it was then resolved to rise presentlie with the whole army to encounter him.

Stockdale was deceiving himself or his readers. The army, as we know, moved off west to the moorland, consolidating south of the Ouse. Stockdale implied that this was because Rupert was expected to come by that route, whereas in fact he successfully outmanouevred them and came along the north bank of the river. In his march, he captured a bridge of boats at Poppleton, which loss
completely upset the allied plans, again according to Stockdale, the bridge having been intended "for a passe for our Armyes to the North side of Ouse" had Rupert indeed come that way after all.

Stockdale claimed that whilst the army was in array south of the Ouse, it had not been overlooked that Rupert might come by the northern route. Yet how the entire allied army was to pass over a single bridge of boats in order to encounter an enemy that would have controlled the north bank, defies all comprehension. Nor can the bridge have been very well guarded, or the allied scouts have been properly deployed to give notice of the real route taken by the Prince. Stockdale was face-saving, glossing over the facts of the case in order to present the victory on Marston Moor in the best of all possible lights.

In view of Rupert's choice of route, the allied generals now decided to give up thought of battle and to march to Cawood. In this retreat (for the march, whatever it became, was initially purely that) Stockdale noted that the Scots, far from concerning themselves about Cawood, Selby or the Ouse, had got as far forward as Tadcaster when they were called back to fight.

To recapitulate the allied position. They had for a long time been uncertain as to what to do in face of the relief march, indeed, they had been unsure whether he would ultimately reach York at all, or turn back south. Unwilling to leave the siege, they had been equally as unwilling to support Meldrum in Lancashire. Leven was a cautious man; Lord Fairfax was not a particularly capable general; and the earl of Manchester, as courageous personally as any, lacked the solid political fervour of, say, Cromwell, and would have been prevailed upon by the combined councils of Leven and Fairfax. By the time that Rupert's march to York became known for sure, the allied commanders had probably talked themselves into thoroughly negative state of mind, where all possible escape routes, rather than battlefields, were examined again and again. Even if Fairfax and Manchester had been keen on fighting, as Thomas Fairfax implied - and this we do not know - an unwilling Scottish army would have been a factor that would have swayed them against action. It may even be the case, although this is mere surmise, that Leven had threatened to withdraw his forces if his plan were not adhered to.

It will be seen that Rupert's advantage over the enemy was great as he drew near York. The morale of his army must have been strong, having triumphs in Lancashire fresh in their minds, and having fulfilled the relief mission. From what had gone before, and from what his scouts told him, the Prince must have realised the state of the enemy forces. It would be a magnificent piece of work to rally the York garrison and, with an increased army, pursue a reluctant enemy and destroy him in a single action. We can be sure that this is what Rupert wanted and believed himself capable of doing. Leaving
aside the problem of the infamous 'letter', it was within Rupert's character to take full advantage of such a situation.

Yet, on July 2nd, his army was shattered on Marston Moor by an enemy as much surprised with the victory as Rupert at his defeat. The obvious reasons for that defeat, as they have been recorded, more or less explicitly, in contemporary accounts, will be dealt with shortly. Yet even before Rupert faced the allies on the moor, he had lost the initiative, or rather, had had it taken from him, not by the competent generalship of the enemy, but by the actions of a Royalist general. To seek the fundamental cause of the Prince's defeat, we must look at the activities of James King, Newcastle's professional advisor whose caution has been criticised frequently. At this critical moment his caution became unequivocally obstructive. The word sabotage is not too strong, for King could not have harmed Rupert more had he been - which he was not - a paid agent of the allied generals.

The Duchess of Newcastle's qualified account of what happened on July 1st, is valuable not only for what it says, as for what it does not say. To elucidate, it is better to consider her account on its face value, before seeking its hidden implications, although it must be said that these are all supported by other sources.

When Rupert drew near the city:

My Lord immediately sent some persons of quality to attend his Highness, and to invite him into the city to consult with him about that important affair, Rupert's plan to fight and to gain so much time as to open a port to march forth with his cannon and foot which were in the town, to join with his Highness' forces.

Clearly, this indicates that the Marquess was ready to co-operate. There would be some delay, since the gates of the city, heavily reinforced with debris and earth against the siege, would have to be opened properly to facilitate movement of men. Naturally enough, the Marquess would have seen this as a suitable opportunity to discuss the plan in detail. Rupert, however, did not enter the city, and the Marquess was obliged to go to him, which probably rankled somewhat, for at this meeting Newcastle advised the Prince against battle. He argued - not unreasonably - that the enemy would probably break up without a fight, and we may suppose that this was a possibility. Rupert proved adamant, however, and the Marquess changed his line of argument and gave, on the whole, fairly sound advice, if somewhat contradictory of his first argument. He suggested to Rupert that they wait for a day or two until Montrose and Clavering could bring up their reinforcements and so, probably, give the Royalist forces a numerical supremacy in the field, or at least, bring the army to a size equal to that of the enemy.

Rupert informed the Marquess that he had "a letter from his Majesty... with a positive and absolute command to fight the enemy". If this was the
famous letter of the 14th to which he was referring, then it was no such thing.
Either Rupert had received a subsequent command to fight, or else, finding
himself in danger of being thwarted, he misrepresented his case knowing that a
direct royal command would carry weight with the Marquess. Newcastle, so far
as we know, did not see the letter and, understandably, could not insist on
being shown it. Rupert's motive was clear. He did not want to give his
enemy any further time to reorganise, and even if he were to fight with forces
numerically inferior, he still had the element of surprise on his side. If
it was a ploy employed against Newcastle's arguments, it worked:

my Lord replied, that he was ready and willing, for his part,
to obey his Highness in all things, no otherwise than if his
Majesty was there in person himself; and though several of
my Lord's friends advised him not to engage in battle, because
the command (as they said) was taken from him; yet my Lord
answered them, that happen what would, he would not shun to
fight, for he had no other ambition but to live and die a
loyal subject to his Majesty.

These were probably Newcastle's honest sentiments, but we must come back to his
role shortly.

We are unfortunate in that no record of events has survived, even assuming
that any were written by a senior officer on Newcastle's staff. Slingsby
himself, usually so informative, was silent on the matter of this meeting,
preferring rather to concentrate on the battle. There is, however, the
narrative of the Governor of Scarborough, Sir Hugh Cholmeley. Cholmeley was
not present at the battle, but he was in a particularly good position to hear
reports of what happened from men whose opinions would have been various.
After the battle, it was to Scarborough that the Marquess and most of his high
command travelled, to take ships there for Europe and exile—temporary for
some of them—escorted by a contingent of cavalry commanded by a brigade
commander who had fought on the moor, Colonel Sir John Mayney. It cannot have
been otherwise than that these men had much to say on the subject of the
battle, and even if Cholmeley sifted his reminiscences in preparing his account,
he deserves serious consideration. We take up his narrative on June 30th,
when the allies had evacuated their siege lines, which became apparent to the
defenders on July 1st:

the besieged when they saw the enemy had quit their trenches,
did not understand the cause till about noon that day Captain
Leg brought news of the Prince's approach, who marched through
the Forest of Galtres on the north side of the city, knowing
that to lie most open; That evening the Prince sent General
Goring to the Marquess to desire him might the next morning by
four a clock have all his forces drawn out of the city to join
with his, for which the Marquess presently gave order...

In constructing a chronology for the events of July 1st and 2nd, this order
from Rupert sent by way of Goring must have come before the Duchess's allusion
to the breaking open of a gate to permit the army to leave the city, and
consequently the Marquess's own meeting with Rupert took place after Goring had visited him. If we were to try to reconstruct the old command structure of Newcastle's successful army of 1643, and to identify within it the cautious and the reckless field officers, it is fairly certain that James King would stand on the one side, and George Goring on the other. The Marquess gave orders to prepare to join Rupert when he received Goring's order, but between then and his meeting with the Prince, his mind was changed by those whom the Duchess called his 'friends'.

Cholmeley noted that an order was issued within the city for the foot to be ready to move at two in the morning; then there came an order from General King, that they should not march till they had their pay whereupon they all quitt their colours and disperse.

Cholmeley added, "this I had from a gentleman of quality of that country who was a colonel and had a command there and present at the time". It is a pity Sir Hugh gave no clue as to this man's identity, but since there is no reason to suspect the accuracy of the report, the evidence is vital. It is made more so, by Cholmeley's willingness to give the other side of the argument; in justification of King, some say that there was not half the foot, for many of them being plundering in the enemy's trenches where they found good booty, they could not be drawn together so soon; true it is many were wanting yet doubtless there was a considerable number; again King denies he sent any such message, but that it being pay day the soldiers would not out of the city without it and raised this of themselves; certainly a report was divulged that King sent such an order, from whencesoever it came, and that dispersed the soldiers...

This 'accident' Cholmeley concluded, proved prejudicial to the issue of the battle, for Rupert might otherwise have acted something upon the enemy in their retreat or before they had put themselves into order or gained that place of vantage they had at the battle.

It will be seen that Cholmeley tended to support the view that King was personally instrumental in wrecking Rupert's plans. It must be remembered that the York foot were those stubborn veterans who, in the darkest hour on Marston Moor, stood in disciplined ranks until they were virtually wiped out. They were not a rabble. If they had fallen to plundering, there was no reason why King could not have drawn them into order with a little bit of effort. Whether he actually commanded them not to march, or whether they were permitted to break ranks and to fall to their own devices, James King was guilty either of deliberate sabotage or of outright disobedience and insubordination. Dereliction of duty is the least charge that can be laid at his door.

Of course, Cholmeley is not the single source for this delay on the part of the York infantry. There is the letter written on July 6th at Richmond, probably by one of Rupert's cavalry, a man called Ogden, to a friend:
The Prince marching towards Yorke Munday July the 1st, the
Enemy rayesd there seige and went away: the Prince having
intelligence wh way they went, marched towards them, haveing
left order wh the Marq. of Newcastle to meete him next
morning with his foote, wh he did not till 4 of ye Clocke
in the afternoone.

If that assessment was correct, and again Ogden should have known what was
happening on the field, that appearance of the York foot was exactly 12 full
hours after the time appointed for them to join with the Prince outside the
city for the pursuit. The reason for the delay, Ogden ascribed to plundering:
the search of the enemy siege lines that produced four thousand pairs of boots
and shoes, three mortars, ammunition and carriages.

Arthur Trevor, who was not present on the field but wrote a compilation
account from reports which he had received, to send to the Marquess of Ormond,
concluded:

the armies faced one another upon Hessam-Moore, three miles from
Yorke, about 12 of the clock [noon on July 2nd], and there
continued within the play of the enemies cannon until five at
night; during all which time the Prince and the Marquess of
Newcastle were playing the orators to the soldiers in York,
(being in a raging mutiny in the town for their pay) to draw
them forth to join with the Prince's foot; which was at last
effected, but with much unwillingness. The enemy perceiving
the advance of that addition to the Prince's army, instantly
charged our horse....(8)

There was a good deal of error in Trevor's overall account, but that does not
invalidate the point. Trevor was reporting gossip, garbled accounts which had
grown in the telling, so that the disorganisation within York had grown into a
'raging mutiny' which is hard to credit. The fact is, Trevor was saying what
many must have been saying, what must have been the burden of most stories
whether first-hand or second-hand.

It is immediately apparent that when Rupert set off for the moor on the
morning of the 2nd, he had not the York infantry with him, and that they did
not appear until the afternoon, by which time, unable to launch a full scale
attack against a retreating enemy, Rupert was obliged to adopt a defensive
posture on disadvantageous terrain to wait for the reinforcements to arrive.
He had lost the impetus of the march, and the initiative.

The next scene in this sorry story took place on the moor itself, when
both armies were facing each other in the afternoon. How had Rupert passed
the time between the departure from York, and noon?

Clearly, he left the city for the moorland without supporting infantry,
perhaps without any of the York garrison whatsoever. The Marquess did not go
with him, neither did James King. He had insufficient forces to pursue so
powerful an enemy, even if it was retreating, and so had to use time to gain
some advantage? He failed.
There was an allied rearguard, probably quite sizeable, on the moor when Rupert's forces appeared there, according to Lionel Watson at nine in the morning. Thomas Stockdale confirmed this time, and an anonymous Parliamentarian account by a Captain W. H. was quite explicit:

On Tuesday the second of July we pitcht in Hasham-Moore, where no sooner looking about us, but the enemy with displayed colours entered the same place, bending towards the left hand, by reason of some advantage they perceived there; which we striving to prevent, made for it, before they should possess themselves of it; in the means time the main body of their Army pitched in that very place and neare unto it which we left. (10)

Rupert's forces were moving towards the Captain's left hand, which means, towards the ridge of land dominating the moor to the north and, to the south, the route taken by the retreating allied army. Lacking his full numbers, the Prince obviously hoped to retain control of the ground in the best way possible facilitating observation of the enemy. The race for the ridge was won by the allies (initially by their rearguard) for when Rupert appeared, English counsels prevailed upon Scottish and the army was ordered back to face him.

Wee feeling that they were in earnest to fight, and wee as much as they desiring it, presently commanded all our foote and Ordnance to come back with all speed...(Watson)

the Generals gave present order to call back the foote with the Ordnance, ammunition, and carriages, which returned and by Generall Leven and the other commanders they were all putt into order for a feight in Marston feilds upon a ground of advantage...(Stockdale).

we recalled the armies and drew them up on a corn hill at the south side of the moor...(11)

Lieutenant General Cromwell, Major General Leslie, and myself Thomas Fairfax, being appointed to ring up the Rear; we sent word to the Generals, of the necessity of making a stand. For else, the Enemy, having the advantage, might put us in some disorder; but, by the advantage of the ground we were on, we hoped to make it good till they came back to us. (12)

The allied army was fortunate in the three men left to command the rearguard, who made good the ridge line and drove off an attempt by Rupert to seize a foothold upon it. Sir Henry Slingsby noted this vain attempt:

upon ye top of ye Hill they face & front towards ye prince, who till now was persuad'd yt they meant not to give him battle, but to march quite away. Now ye prince bestirs himself, putting his men in such order as he intend'd to fight, & sending away to my Ld of Newcastle to march w th all speed. The enemy makes some shot at him as they were drawing up into Battalio, & ye first shot kills a son of St Gilbert Haughton yt was Capt. in ye prince's army, but this was only a shewing their teeth, for after 4 shots made them give over, & in Marston corn feilds falls to singing psalms...(13)

Captain Roger Houghton of Viscount Molyneux's Horse was killed early in the day, since he was carried back to York and buried there. Slingsby, who was
in the city when this incident occurred, coming to the field later with the Marquess and probably in the Marquess's Lifeguard, since his regiment of foot remained behind in garrison, may well have seen the body.

Thus by early afternoon Rupert must have been watching anxiously both for his York reinforcements, and for the first sign of an offensive move by the enemy. However, even though Fairfax, Cromwell and David Leslie had dragged Leven back to the field, the old man showed no signs of wanting the fight, and the afternoon slipped away with a desultory cannonade from both sides.

It is contended that the root cause of the defeat which was now about to ruin Rupert's record of invincibility lay in the activities of James King, and we come now to the second stage of his part in the disaster. An anonymous source, termed 'Prince Rupert's Diary', is extremely valuable in that, although compiled after 1660 (this from internal evidence) the compiler named his informant. According to Colonel Sir Francis Cobb, a troop commander under Rupert after the battle, and before, Governor of Clifford's Tower in the defence of York, the Prince had sent to the Marquess an order to fight:

The Marquesse sayd he would bring all ye garrison out to his Assistance. And King dissuaded him sayin do.............. your Garrison.

The missing words might have been something like, "do not risk losing your Garrison", but that is not really important. Cobb, who knew because he was there, clearly put the blame on King for what happened. Further, it is just possible reconsidering an earlier source, that Cobb was also Cholmeley's informant, since both were East Riding men, and Cholmeley, hearing the story in July 1644, had it confirmed later. However, to continue with the 'Diary'

ye P draws over ye Passe, and set his men in battle, ye Enemy retreated... The P sent Messages to ye Marquess from time to time...to bid him make haste but he came not till ii a Clock; The P would have attaqued ye Enemy himself in their Retreat, if he had not expected ye...Assistance; but at last instead of 10,000 men, he had not above 2500, and those all drunk.

This last comment ties in with Cholmeley's report that not so many came to the field as were expected, but perhaps Rupert had not reckoned on the Marquess deciding to leave some regiments behind in garrison, perhaps as a sop to James King. The regiments left behind were Slingsby's, the absent Lord Belasyse's, and probably those of Glenham and Waite. Glenham remained in the city.

The Duchess's account can now be examined:

[After the Marquess reached the moor] the Prince and my Lord conferred with several of their officers, amongst whom there were several disputes concerning the advantages which the enemy had of sun, wind, and ground. The horse of his Majesty's forces was drawn up in both wings upon that fatal moor called Hessom Moor; and my Lord asked his Highness what service he
would be pleased to command him; who returned this answer, that he would begin no action upon the enemy till early in the morning; desiring my Lord to repose himself till then. Which my Lord did, and went to rest in his own coach that was close by in the field, until the time appointed.

The time at which the Marquess and his forces arrived on the moor has been set at either two o'clock or at four. If the foot came at two, there was time for battle, for as the afternoon wore on the sky became overcast and thundery, so bringing early darkness. If, however, the Marquess himself arrived at two with his mounted escort, but the foot and James King not until four, that two hour gap would have ruled out battle on that day so far as Rupert was concerned, for the York foot had to be accommodated in the battle lines which could not be done rapidly, if it meant new dispositions for the Prince's own foot who were standing in a defensive posture and who would not have left a gap in the lines unguarded.

Much has been made of the fact that Newcastle fought in the battle as a private gentleman or merely as the commander of a troop of horse. This has been seen either as Rupert proving difficult in view of the York delay and not according his fellow general proper respect, or, alternatively, as an example of the Marquess in a fit of pique. This 'black and white' attitude must be a consequence of a tradition of scholars as 'pro' or 'anti' Rupert men, and it does not help. In fact, the Marquess was consulted upon his arrival, but Rupert, putting off battle, perhaps intended to postpone the allocation of dispositions until the York foot arrived in full. That the battle began suddenly and unexpectedly at about the time of their appearance threw all further conferences to the wind, and Newcastle, far from having any choice, was able to do no more than take up his sword and fight as best he might.

Cholmeley gave the time of the Marquess's arrival on the field as nine in the morning, but this may have been a simple error. There would have been matters to attend to in York which would have required his attention, not least the problem of coercing King into action. If Newcastle did in truth arrive so early, it only emphasises the dilatoriness of his foot commander. Yet, accepting that he in fact turned up between noon and two o'clock, we return to Cholmeley:

the Marquess accompanied by all the gentlemen of quality which were in York (who cast themselves into a troop commanded by Sir Thomas Mettam) came to the Prince who said, 'my Lord, I wish you had come sooner with your forces, but I hope we shall yet have a glorious day'; the Marquess informed how that his foot had been plundering in the enemy's trenches and that it was impossible to have got them together but that he had left General King about the work, who would bring them up with all the expedition that might be. The Prince seeing the Marquesses foot were not come up, would with his own foot have been falling upon the enemy, but the Marquess dissuaded him telling him he had 4000 good foot as were in the world...
Here, Newcastle's military judgement was probably shrewder than Rupert's, and he prevailed. He might have been vindicated if the York foot had indeed come up more rapidly than they did. Perhaps the Prince had been angry and inclined to do something reckless, in which case, a little caution would have been no bad thing. Anyway, the Marquess was right when he described his foot and their quality: they were proven, fighting regiments which had passed through 1643 with honour and had fought the Scots, whenever they could get them to a fight, with resolution. They had defended York stubbornly and vigorously. Regiments like that of Colonel Sir William Lambton would have been an asset to any army, and on Marston Moor, when everyone else had fled or been driven into confusion, they stood like a wall.

One cannot escape the suspicion that the plunder excuse may have been partly fabricated to cover the rift in the York command. For, before pursuing Cholmeley, let us consider what it was that, in all her account, the Duchess did not say. She did not say anything about James King. Not once, from the description of Rupert's arrival to the decision to leave for exile, did she mention the man who had been at her husband's right hand for so long. When Cholmeley's narrative was full of the most damning evidence, gleaned from officers, the Duchess's own was marked by an absence of comment. Can it be that Newcastle, a man so sensitive of his honour, in reminiscing chose to overlook or to suppress the disagreeable course of events that had led to his ruin and exile? Was Newcastle ashamed of his reliance on King? Such questions may be rhetorical, and negative evidence cannot be pressed too far to answer them. Yet the questions are valid, and raise themselves.

Cholmeley again:

about 4 a clock in the afternoon General King brings up the Marquess's foot, of which yet many were wanting, for here was not above 3000. The Prince demanded of King how he liked the marshalling of his army...

This must have been at the conference immediately prior to the battle to which the Duchess alluded.

...who replied he did not approve of it being drawn too near the enemy, and in a place of disadvantage, then said the Prince, 'they may be drawn to a further distance'. 'No sir', said King, 'it is too late'; It is so, King dissuaded the Prince from fighting, saying 'Sir your forwardness lost us the day in Germany, where yourself was taken prisoner', upon the dissuasions of the Marquess and King and that it was so near night, the Prince was resolved not to join battle that day, and therefore gave order to have provisions brought from York...

King's allusion to Rupert's defeat and capture at Vlotho, where his father's cause suffered a severe setback at the hands of Imperial troops, was a little too strong. King himself had been instrumental in that defeat as well. The fact was that Rupert had presented King with a fait accompli, had made it impossible to fight that day and had, without doubt, robbed the Royalists of
victory.

Cholmeley not only gave the details of these passages, but also tried to assess their importance. He acknowledged that much criticism had attached to Rupert, and perhaps wrote his own account to rectify the matter.

many do impute much to the Prince, that he would engage to fight that day...

The Parliamentarians felt the same, let it be said.

If Prince Rupert, who had acquired enough honours by the relief of York in the view of three generals, could have contented himself with it, and retreated, as he might have done, without fighting, the reputation he had gained would have caused his army to increase... (16)

But the criticism is misleading. If Rupert had retreated, what was to stop the allies returning to the siege? Even if Rupert's army had gained fresh support as a result of the exploit, to what purpose would it have been? An army is an instrument for waging war, and if the terms are advantageous to it, then it cannot shirk the issue of battle. If the basis of criticism of Rupert is made up of this type of reasoning, it is extremely dubious. Marston Moor was not Rupert's error, nor was it entirely his responsibility. The culprit was James King, and it is strange that so recent a writer as Young could convey the contrary impression so that Margaret Toynbee, in her foreword to his book, could still write "the tragedy of Rupert's failure is his own." 17 Rupert had all the advantages, and these were lost, not because of his own folly, but because of deliberate disobedience on the part of King.

To return to Cholmeley

considering not only many of the Marquesses foot were wanting, but even of his own horse to the number of 1500 or 2000 which were gone rambling into Yorke; and that if he had deferred the fight a few days, Colonel Clavering had been up with a thousand or 1200 fresh men, he came into the country with such dread and reputation, he might not only have increased his own army, but surely the enemy would have diminished.

Cholmeley here, objectively, gave the view of Rupert's critics, but if Rupert did have an order to fight - which was not the letter of June 14th and on which subject, as we shall see, Cholmeley cast fresh light - then to wait even two days would have permitted the enemy, already in full retreat, to draw clean away, perhaps into Lincolnshire, perhaps to concentrate at Hull. We can suppose, but we cannot know, that the Scots might have given up - this was Young's contention and part of his criticism of Rupert rested upon it - but had they not, we can be sure that given more time and more agreeable surroundings, the allied army would have been better prepared for a battle than it clearly was on July 1st when Rupert decided to fight.

in answer to which in the Prince's behalf it is said, he did neither know the Marquesses men would fall short, nor that so many of his own were absent, that all had orders to be in readiness of Tuesday morning by four o'clock; that he was obliged not to let the enemy march too far out of his reach,
having a command from the King to fight the Scottish army
wheresoever he met them;

All these views were valid, and countered the criticisms fairly, although the
story of some of Rupert's own horse being absent is a new one and if it were
true, makes possible one charge against Rupert that can be sustained. The
intriguing reference is to a command to fight the Scottish army wherever he
found it. If the letter of June 14th cannot be made to seem like an order to
fight, then it is even harder to see it as an order to fight the Scots. This
supports the probability of a subsequent despatch. Wise counsels at Oxford,
might have decided that the Scots, a weaker force in terms of morale, would be
shattered in a pitched fight. Such conclusions based upon their record in
Durham and Northumberland would be understandable. Was there, then, another
letter, and can we interpret Cholmeley's remark as support for its existence?
The problem defies final solution, but enough has been said to show that the
matter is far from settled.

Cholmeley was in no doubt as to which interpretation he put upon the
evidence. After referring briefly to James King's view that the dispositions
on the moor were bad, came this passage:

It is considered those which had relation to the Marquess his
army did not in their affections so harmoniously comply to
this great work as was requisite, in respect of the Prince had a
supreme commission above the Marquesst so that his forces came
very untowardly out of York though they performed their part
well in the battle....

Which they did. The course of the battle has been described so many
times as to render such a description here superfluous. Certain problems of
terrain and of documentary interpretation would prove too lengthy to go into
here and would, anyway, add little to the development of the overall theme.

Briefly, the battle began towards evening when the allies advanced from the
ridge, seizing upon the momentary disarray occasioned by the march of the York
foot into line. On the Royalist right wing, Rupert's cavalry were rapidly
broken and driven from the field, on the left, a similar fate befell Sir Thomas
Fairfax's cavalry, who were dispersed by Goring and the Northern Horse. How-
ever, whilst Goring and his successful cavalry were slow to turn about and to
move against the allied infantry in the centre, Cromwell and David Leslie kept
their horse together and began to roll up the Royalist foot. Darkness, cannon
smoke and the natural consequential confusion of a battle conspired to make
each contemporary account narrow and inclined to mislead, so that what actually
happened is still obscure. It would seem that Cromwell's wing, sweeping around
the field to the north, collided with Goring returning to the fray and put him
to flight, or, at least, broke up his forces. In the meanwhile, in the centre
of the moor, the Royalist foot, most particularly the York garrison, stood
their ground until they were swallowed up in the enemy victory, the Northumbrian
and Durham regiments, the Whitecoats, sustaining exceptionally heavy losses in
their refusal to give ground or to accept quarter.

The Duchess of Newcastle recorded her husband's exploits on that day in her biography, and these are worth giving as an illustration of the state of the Royalist army. Nor must her account be dismissed as 'improbable', as Young quite unreasonably did.  

Her husband had just retired to the coach for the evening, when the battle began with a general allied advance. Arming himself, the Marquess climbed onto his horse, to be confronted by the flight of Rupert's cavalry:

and though my Lord made them stand once, yet they immediately betook themselves to their heels again, and killed even those of their own party that endeavoured to stop them.

The Duchess then rather pointedly remarked that it was the Marquess's own horse, the Northern brigade under Lucas and Goring, that gave a good account of themselves, rendered the more satisfying in that it was Sir Thomas Fairfax who took the beating. In this confusion

my Lord (accompanied only with his brother Sir Charles Cavendish, Major Scot, Captain Maze, and his page), hastening to see in what posture his own regiment was, met with a troop of gentlemen volunteers, who formerly had chosen him their captain, notwithstanding he was general of an army; to whom my Lord spake after this manner. 'Gentlemen', said he, 'you have done me the honour to choose me your captain, and now is the fittest time that I may do you service; wherefore if you will follow me, I shall lead you on the best I can, and show you the way to your own honour'.

Riding into the midst of the fighting, passing on their way between two bodies of infantry firing muskets at each other over a distance of 40 yards, the troop of gentlemen, most probably that commanded at its formation by Colonel Sir Thomas Metham who was killed in the fighting, attacked a Scottish infantry formation. This they routed, my Lord himself killed three with his page's half-leaden sword, for he had no other left him; and though all his gentlemen in particular offered him their swords, yet my Lord refused to take a sword of any of them. At last, after they had passed through this regiment of foot, a pikeman made a stand to the whole troop; and though my Lord charged him twice or thrice, yet he could not enter him; but the troops despatched him soon.

In all these encounters my Lord got not the least hurt, though several were slain about him; and his White Coats showed such an extraordinary valour and courage in that action, they were killed in rank and file...

According to the Duchess, the Marquess was the last general officer to leave the field - apart from Lucas and Porter who were prisoners - and that when it was clear to him that all was lost, he headed for York where he met Rupert and James King, who had already quit the field.

Cholmeley, in his account, alluded to some 2000 Royalist horse who, as dawn broke on the 3rd, remained intact on the field. "[They] had great inclination to have acted something upon the prevailing party of the enemy's
"other wing", meaning Cromwell's successful cavalry, "but that they were prevented by an order to retire to York". This is supported by the account given by another Royalist officer, Sir Philip Monckton, who held a field command in the battle.

I saw a body of some two thousand horse that were broken, which as I endeavoured to rally, I saw Sir John Hurrey, major-general to the Prince, come galloping through the glen. I rid to him and told him, that there were none in that great body, but they knew either himself or me, and that if he would help me to put them in order, we might regain the field. He told me, broken horse would not fight, and galloped from me towards York. By that time it was night, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale having had those bodies he commanded broken, came to me, and we staid in the field until twelve o'clock at night, when Sir John Hurrey came, by order of the Prince, to command me to retire to York. (21)

Cholmeley and Monckton agree in essential details, so it may be that these cavalry drew off the moor some distance and were brought back into York in the early hours of the morning. Whether they might have achieved anything is open to question, although certainly the allied armies, for all their victory, were in disarray, and took several days to return to the siege of the city. Which forces composed these 2000 cannot be said: they may have been a part of the successful Royalist left wing, part of a body of the right wing which had rallied when the rest fled, or a combination of troops from both wings. It may be, if Cholmeley was right, that these were the horse that had gone cavorting around York instead of marching to the field, and that they arrived too late to be of service but were intact and ready for action.

Rupert himself did not give up hopes of re-fighting the battle. Again Cholmeley noted:

the next morning the Prince had thoughts of a new supply of fresh foot out of York, to have attempted something upon the enemy, but that he was dissuaded by General King, and though the enemy was much broken and dispersed and not possessed of the Princes cannon and baggage till the next morning, yet at the present their state and condition was not so generally known, and therefore King's counsel not to be condemned.

That may be. It is arguable, however, that the body of 2000 Royalist horse left on the moor who desired to attempt Cromwell's cavalry, were surely in a position to have some idea of the enemy condition. It may be that King was once again, and this time without difficulty, exercising his influence against the plans of the Prince.

The battle of Marston Moor was more of a defeat for the Marquess of Newcastle than for Rupert. His infantry, badly mauled at Selby in April, had been destroyed, except for the two or three regiments in York. His cavalry, attached to Rupert since May, would not lightly be let go by the Prince, and, indeed, Rupert took them with him on his retreat. Critics of Newcastle's decision to go into exile have not taken this into account, but it was crucial.
A general is of no value without an army, and Newcastle had no army left after Marston Moor. It was that disgrace which he feared, not the fact that he had lost a battle. Had he stayed, he would certainly have been involved in the ignominy of the surrender of York, or hounded through the north by the allied army. That he would have gone to Oxford was, in view of his character, out of the question. He might have gone there as a conqueror, but never as a beaten man.

The losses of the northern army on Marston Moor were enormous, not necessarily in numbers, but in the proportion of officers to rank and file. Ralph Verney was told in a letter from a friend:

Captain Winget told me from an honest man that overlooked the dead, that amongst them all he thought there were two gentlemen to one ordinary soldier that was slain...(22)

Slingsby wrote:

Here I lost a Nephew, Coll. John Fenwick, & a kinsman Sf ChaS. Slingsby, both of ye slain in ye field; ye former could not be found to have his body brought off, ye latter was found and buried in York minster. (23)

Arthur Trevor noted the deaths of Colonel Sir Thomas Metham and Sir William Wentworth, a brother of the earl of Strafford, who was probably in the Marquess's troop since he held no field rank. Lionel Watson reckoned that a hundred Royalist officers had been taken prisoners, including Lucas, Porter, Major-general Henry Tillier of Rupert's army, as well as 1500 rank and file:

but I cannot think, but of all dead in the field, in the woods, and mortally wounded (which would die within a day) there are between three and four thousand.

Stockdale estimated some 4000 Royalist dead alone, and over that number wounded. He may have been in error, since he gave Sir John Hurry as the principal officer killed. Sir Thomas Fairfax concurred in the estimate of 4000 Royalist dead.

From various sources, the following list of northern Royalist officers killed on the moor has been compiled. It cannot be anything near complete but it does convey the relevant impression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel Sir Richard Dacre</th>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel William Eure</td>
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<td>Colonel John Fenwick</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Charles Slingsby</td>
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<td>Colonel Sir William Lambton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel Francis Salvin</td>
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<td>Lt. Colonel Henry Topham</td>
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<td>Major William Farmer</td>
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<td>Major Thomas Vavasour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain Sir Richard Gledhill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain Edward Bradley</td>
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Colonel Dacre, who fought as a brigade commander, was the man who had tried to win the Hutchinson brothers away from their duties at Nottingham. Lt. Colonel Henry Topham was of William Eure's regiment, which must have taken a terrible beating to lose its two senior officers. Major William Farmer was he who had so competently defended Lathom. Captains Bradley, Butler and Swinglehurst were of Colonel Sir Thomas Tyldesley's regiment of foot which, although a northern regiment, may have come up with Rupert. The list does not include Colonel Sir Thomas Metham, who may have resigned his commission in 1642 to become Captain of Newcastle's Lifeguard.

Within two days of this battle York, the city for which the relief march had been made and the battle fought, was left to its own devices. The Governor, Sir Thomas Glemham, with what was left of the infantry of Newcastle's army, had orders to hold out in hopes of further relief. Rupert and the cavalry rode off to the west, Newcastle and his staff to the east. It was the end of organised Royalism in northern England, and it would have seemed to the survivors that all the sacrifice had been in vain.

Turning to Cholmeley for the last time, we have a graphic account of the events in York on July 3rd.

The Prince after two days rest having rallied together about 4000 horse and some few foot, marcheth towards Westmorland, he and the Marquess having once agreed that the Marquess would go to Newcastle, whither the Prince would return as soon as he could recruit his foot; which if it had accordingly been pursued had been of great advantage to the King's affairs, for had the Marquess remained in those parts surely a great number of the broken foot would have rallied together, and it would have given encouragement to the King's friends and party there, whereas upon his departure almost everyone (especially such as had particular relation or affection to his person) quitt the King's service and went to their own home...

The thread of Rupert's own activities will be followed later. It is interesting to learn that Cholmeley believed the Marquess had agreed to go to Newcastle upon Tyne and not into exile, although this implies that York was to be abandoned, Glemham to be left to hold out so long as he might in order to pin down the allied army, and then to make what terms he could. There seems to have been some anxiety about Newcastle garrison, for Ogden, the Royalist soldier writing on July 6th, stated that the town "being left by the Marquess in the Mayors trust, tis feared that it may bee by him betrayed". It is hard to understand the suspicion that attached to Sir John Marley, for events were

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to prove him a loyal, tough and obstinate garrison commander. Yet these
rumours had been afoot late in 1643, it will be remembered.

Cholmeley, having made this point, returned to his criticism of James
King. Were it not for other evidence and for Cholmeley's presentation of both
sides of the case, it might appear like a vendetta, which it was not.

as is said General King considering the King's affaires
absolutely destroyed by loss of this battle persuaded the
Marquess (against all the power of his other friends) to
quit the kingdome...so that the Marquess leaving Sir Thomas
Glemman in York to gain as good terms for the city as he
could, himself with King and other particular friends, goes
to take shipping at Scarborough, whither he was at first a
little shy to come, being informed the governor Sir Hugh
Cholmeley would not permit him passage, but keep him prisoner,
but the Marquess soon found the contrary, by the governor's
usage, who knew his duty was to obey his general, and not to
questions his errors, and the governor was so far from
interrupting his passage, as that when he found the Marquess
resolved, he gave him all the expedition, fearing his stay
there might draw the forces at York sooner against Scarborough;
The second day after the Marquess his coming to Scarborough,
he took shipping for Hambrough, being accompanied with his two
sons [Lord Henry Cavendish and Viscount Mansfield] the Lord
Faulconbridge [John Belasyse's father], Lord Widdrington...
and some other of his special friends; General King, the Lord
Carnwath, and persons that had relation to them went in another
ship...

In view of the attention drawn to the fact that King's name was omitted by
the Duchess from her biography, it is interesting also to note that he was not
included amongst those "special friends" on this depressing sea journey.

Let it also be noted, that when Newcastle left the country he left with
his rank of General intact, and it appears that his exile was regarded in Oxford
as a temporary absence from the scene, his authority being now put into
commission and shared between Glenham and Goring.25 We may dismiss as rumour
the story of Rupert, learning of the complete departure of the northern staff,
"tear'ng my Lo'd Newcastle's commission before his face".26

Having seen what Cholmeley had to say on the matter, it is worth turning
to the official Newcastle view as given by the Duchess, at the end of her
narrative of the battle.

That night [2nd/3rd July] my Lord remained in York; and
having nothing left in his power to do his Majesty any
further service in that kind; for he had neither ammunition,
nor money to raise more forces, to keep either York, or any
other towns that were yet in his Majesty's devotion, well
knowing that those which were left could not hold out long,
and being also loath to have aspersions cast upon him, that
he did sell them to the enemy, in case he could not keep them,
hetook a resolution, and that justly and honourably, to forsake
the kingdom; and to that end, went the next morning to the
Prince, and acquainted him with his design, desiring his
Highness would be pleased to give this true and just report
of him to his Majesty, that he had behaved himself like an
honest man, a gentleman, and a loyal subject. Which request
the Prince having granted, my Lord took his leave; and being conducted by a troop of horse and a troop of dragoons to Scarborough, went to sea, and took shipping for Hamburg...

Lacking alternative evidence, the official Newcastle interpretation of the exile decision would seem fairly probable. For here again, as has been said, the Duchess pointedly did not mention James King.

The 'Rupert Diary', however, is more forthright:

Sayes Gen'l King wt will you do. Sayes ye P I will rally my men. Sayes Gen'l King now you wt Ld Newcastle will do?
Sayes Ld Newcastle I will go in to Holland (looking upon all as lost).
The P: would have him endeavour to recruit his forces.
No (sayes he) I will not endure ye laughter of ye Court and King sayd hee would go with him; and so they did and left ye Govern'r of York wt force he had to defend himself...
The P offer'd to stay with ye E. of Newcastle and to try to recruit in ye West Riding and form an Army; but he would not hear out.

This report has enough in common with both the Duchess and Cholmeley to be acceptable, and perhaps the informant may have been Colonel Sir Francis Cobb, suggested as the source of some of Cholmeley's information concerning James King's activities.

Sir Henry Slingsby continued to preserve an honourable, if frustrating, silence where James King was concerned. Nothing is to be gleaned from his account which was a straightforward note about the departure into exile. Slingsby's entire 'diary' is rather remarkably free from scurrilous innuendoes and unpleasant facts.

Rushworth gave a fairly complete list of the persons who went into exile with Newcastle. Many more tried to go, but as Cholmeley said there was divers other gentlemen of that country who desired to pass at the same time, but the governor [Cholmeley] would not permit them, it being as he conceived prejudicial to the King's affairs.

Newcastle's sons, Charles Viscount Mansfield, his General of Ordnance, and Henry Cavendish, both of whom had titular colonelcies of regiments, naturally shared the exile. So did Sir Charles Cavendish, his brother. James King, recently elevated to the peerage as Lord Eythin and Kerrey, his Lieutenant-General, went, as was to be expected. Major General Sir Francis Mackworth, the Treasurer of the Army Sir William Carnaby, and the colonel of Newcastle's own infantry regiment, Sir Arthur Basset, were also listed. Basset returned from exile and fought with honour in his native Cornwall after only a few months had passed. Colonels Francis Carnaby and Walter Vavasour also went, perhaps to be included as "special friends" of the Marquess, although Carnaby returned to his native north in 1645 and was killed in a brief battle in the East Riding. The Marquess's other known companions were the Scottish peer,
Lord Carnwath; Dr. John Bramhall, Bishop of Londonderry; Lord Falconbridge, and Captain [John] Mozin or Mazine.

It does not come within the scope of this study to pursue these men into their exile, except to quote from a letter written by a son of the Catholic Royalist Lt. Colonel Henry Constable, Viscount Dunbar. John Constable was resident in Rotterdam on July 30th, and in a letter to his father who was probably by then serving with the Scarborough garrison - he may have been one whom Cholmeley refused to permit to depart - John wrote:

the Marquess of Newcastle is still at Hamburg in a poor condition...I believe he now repents his folly, but General King is in great pomp. (28)

It would be hard to find a more fitting way to conclude what has necessarily been a lengthy study of the first three or four days of July. We can now turn to the sad condition of the city of York.

Thus were we left at York, out of all hope of releif, y⁰ town much distract'd, & every one ready to abandon her; & to encourage y⁰ yt were left in y⁰ town, & to get yt to stay, they were fain to give out false reports, yt yt prince had fallen upon y⁰ enemy suddenly & rout'd yt, & yt he was coming back again to yt Town; yet many left us, not liking to abide another seige; wch after began; for yt enemy taking a few days respite to burry their dead, to provide for yt wound'd, & to gather up such scatter'd troops of foot & horse as had left yt field... They were now in readiness to march back again to York; they make at their 2d coming new batteries ...& had made a bridge to clap over yt Fosse & store of Hurdles for a storme... (29)

It will become apparent that reports of Rupert's return to Yorkshire were not entirely figments of the imagination of the commanders of the garrison. Yet Slingsby graphically depicted the condition of soldiers and civilians left very much to the mercy of the enemy, symbolically already lost when the Marquess turned his back on the city.

The confusion within York had begun on the eve of the departure of Rupert and the Marquess. The Royalist fugitives from the moor, fleeing in their hundreds towards the city, were halted at Micklegate bar by Sir Thomas Glemham, who shut the gates against them.

We came late to York, wch made a great confusion: for at yt barr none was suffer'd to come in but such as were of yt town, so yt yt whole street was throng'd up to yt barr with wound'd & lame people, wch made a pitiful cry among yt. (30)

In certain respects, the material condition of the garrison must have been much improved on what it had been. Rupert had rounded up cattle on his march to the city, and in the plundering of the enemy lines some provisions must have been seized. The garrison ranged far afield, plundering from civilians as well, according to one source.³¹

According to Ogden, the Parliamentarians returned to the siege on the 4th, although the Scots were apparently again unwilling to commit themselves.
The Scottish commanders seem to have been concerned by the dual problem of a freshly provisioned city—which did not take into account the strength of the garrison, which was a skeleton force—and by their uncertainty as to what Rupert and Newcastle intended to do. Perhaps it was news of Newcastle's exile that led them to commit themselves to a second siege, and it might be argued that it was the Marquess's decision which was instrumental in bringing about the reduction of the city in mid July. Yet we cannot escape the possibility that York was now considered expendable.

On the 4th a summons was formally delivered to Glemham calling upon him to yield the town: he refused, and sent a letter to Rupert reporting the situation.

This afternoon, about one of the clock, the enemy's van marched from their quarters at Long Marston to Middlethorp, the rest of their army follows. The three generals have sent a letter to me and my Lord Mayor to deliver them up the town in six hours, or else I must expect all extremities of war. I shall not obey their summons, but keep it for the King as long as I possibly can...not doubting, but your Highness will take us into your consideration to hasten for the relief...(32)

The ability of the city to hold out would depend not only upon Rupert coming to their relief again, but also upon the strength of the garrison. From what has been said of the losses on Marston Moor and at Selby, it will be apparent that there cannot have been many fit fighting men at Glemham's disposal. Unfortunately, the only assessments of his strength are of Parliamentarian origin, but they must be tentatively accepted since the siege forces, observing the departure of the garrison when the city surrendered, would have been able to make close estimates if not an actual head count.

A full Relation of the late Victory obtained... reckoned that there were only 500 men able to defend the place, together with citizen volunteers who cannot have been thick on the ground under the circumstances. This does sound a trifle low, since there were at least three regiments which had not been at Marston Moor even if one of them, Belasyse's Foot, had been at Selby. A nearer calculation may have been that contained in Simeon Ashe's account, Manchester's chaplain, who gave the garrison as the City Regiments and about a 1000 "mercaries", quite a pejorative term not to be taken at face value.

On July 11th Glemham agreed to a parley. On the 13th the Parliaments envoys, Colonels Sir William Constable and John Lambert, entered the city to commence talks, and there agreed that official commissioners would be appointed by both sides. The surrender terms, given in full by Wenham, can be summarised briefly, and must be noted in view of what Slingsby had later to say about the breach of the terms made by the enemy. The "Governor, and all Officers and Souldiers, both Horse and Foot", with the officers of Clifford's Tower and of the other various parts of the defences, were to march from the...
city with their weapons, their colours flying, drums beating, match lit and "Bullets in their mouths" and with all their baggage. It was further promised by the allied generals that the officers and men would not be molested on their march to another garrison, and would be given proper quarter at the end of each day that they were under escort. The wounded would be permitted to remain within York, until they were recovered, and would then enjoy the same terms as the fit men. "No Officer or Souldier shall be stopt or plundered upon his march". No attempt was to be made to lure the officers of their men away from their allegiance by promises of reward or favour. Both of these two last conditions were cynically broken, as Slingsby recorded.

The rest of the terms concerned the civilians in the city, and are not strictly relevant to the theme. The allied generals believed that the leniency of the terms might be misconstrued in London, and wrote to Parliament to exonerate themselves from such charges. Simeon Ashe, surely a most competent apologist, put the point more cogently:

> the benefit which could be expected for our Armies, or the Kingdom, by taking the Town by storm, could not possibly in any measure counterveil the miserable consequences thereof, to many thousands. Who knows how much precious blood might have been spilt in so hot a service?

If this did have anything to do with it, however, Ashe's concluding comment, one might almost say conclusive, was probably nearer the mark:

> How much would this Country have suffered in the ruines of this Citie? And how many of our good friends in other places who drive Trades with citizens here, would have been pintched in their estates, by the impoverishing of their Debtors? (40)

Could York have been hold? Glemham thought not, and though he won terms favourable to the garrison - if they had been kept strictly by the enemy - he clearly had no intention of risking even one assault. Glemham was a fine commander of garrisons doomed to defeat, as we shall see at Carlisle, and as he was to be at Oxford. He did not give up without good solid reasons, and we must allow him to pass unscathed by criticism. His forces were small and weak, and as Slingsby had made clear, morale was low despite provisions within the town. If there had been any hope of relief from Rupert, it evaporated with the approach of the allies, and it may be that it was the surrender of York on July 16th which prompted Rupert finally to turn south, although this is something to be considered shortly. The question that has to be asked is how important was the fall of York for future Royalist military efforts in the north, and this question can be taken as encompassing the results of Marston Moor.

Quite clearly there had been a psychological as well as strategic factor at stake when it was resolved by Rupert to relieve the city. It had been, after all, the scene of King Charles's preparations for war, and had remained
solidly and unquestionably the Royalist headquarters for the northern army. It was probably, in this sense, the most important city after Oxford itself. Its loss was a mortal blow to northern Royalism in that, coupled with the departure of the Marquess, a focal point had suddenly been wrenched away. Skipton and Pontefract, Scarborough and Sheffield might still hold out, and Carlisle might suddenly become important for many months, but none of these places, although valiantly defended, had anything of the aura attached to York. They were, by virtue of their coming importance, symbolic of defeat whilst York had been for so long, symbolic of victory. There were, it is true, large Royalist cavalry forces operating in Lancashire at least until the autumn, but with York gone, their value was practically minimal for want of direction, and dangerous though they were locally, their future was bound to lie with the main army still operating from Oxford.

Perhaps that is the key. For, after Marston Moor and the fall of the city, there simply ceased to be a single northern army. One of the corner stones of Royalist strategy had gone, whilst fragments – the Northern Horse for one – sought service and pay to the south. Unless Montrose could prove so effective in Scotland as to draw the bulk of the Scottish invasion army back into its own territory, there was really very little hope for the King on the field of battle. Yet in saying this, it has also to be said, that Marston Moor, whilst considered by many to symbolise disintegration, would not have come about without the brief fatal battle fought at Selby in April.

On July 16th the Royalist garrison marched out of York according to the articles agreed upon. They came through Micklegate at the start of their journey towards Skipton, the road lined on both sides for a mile by the triumphant allied forces, whilst, according to Ashel Parliamentary officers accompanied them to prevent any breach of the terms. In this they were thwarted by the determination of their soldiery, or else did not try very hard to do their duty. Slingaby gave a mournful picture:

we march out, but find a falling in ye performance at ye very first, for ye soulgier was pilleg'd, our Wagons plunder'd, mine ye first day, and others ye next. Thus disconsolate we march, forc'd to leave our Country, unless we would apostate, not daring to see mine owne house, nor take a farewell of my Children, altho' we lay ye first night at Hessey within 2 miles of my house. The 2 day of our march was to Knasborough, & in our March we were much molest'd by Manchester's horse, yt cast Stone at us, & tho we had a guard of 7 Troops, yet could they not, or would they not, prevent ye from plundering, but in ye field before Allerton Nauleverer where we made a hault till our rear was brought up, we were forc'd to endure affronts by some of ye enemies yt came among us & would snatch ye Soulgiers hats from their heads, & their swords from their sides, & tho we complained of it to ye officer yet could we have no remedy; & going a little further into a straight Lane they overturn'd ye first waggon, wch was my Lady Wottons, & fell a plundering it,
& ye rest before we came to Knaresborough. Whaley, Cromwell's
coll: meets us & goes along with us, discoursing of
ye fight on Marston Moor, desirous to see Sr. Richard Hutton
at whose house he quartered, & would fain have invit'd him to
his own house where his Lady was; but he would not; & likewise
would have persuadid me to abide at home, shewing how much he
desir'd to shake hands with me...(42)

Not only, it would seem, were the terms of the surrender broken where plundering
was concerned, but Slingsby was clearly showing that Whalley endeavoured to
draw both himself and Hutton from their allegiance contrary to the terms, for
by no other means would they be allowed to visit their homes. It is plain
that Slingsby, that punctilious, forthright man, would not so much as shake
the hand of the rebel.

The allies could not deny that the articles had been breached. Instead
Ashe went to some trouble to explain away incidents such as that to which
Slingsby alluded. He claimed that the fault lay with the officers, who had
failed to advertise their men of the terms of the articles, but as Slingsby
showed, whether this was the case or not, the officers did not try to inter-
fere, either from indifference or from fear. Some of the offenders were tried
by courts martial - so Ashe claimed - and punished, but the fact remains.
The quality of an army is best measured by its magnanimity in victory, and
whilst the Marquess of Newcastle's army had, for the most part, shown itself
merciful in its career, this allied force besmirched its triumph with excuses.

Rupert's Cavalry and the loss of Lancashire, July - December.

In the aftermath of the battle of Marston Moor, the only intact Royalist
force left in northern England which was capable of taking the field, belonged
to Rupert. It was made up of his own cavalry, of the Northern Horse under
Goring, later to be commanded by Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and of the forces
commanded by Sir Robert Clavering which came to him on his march toward
Lancashire. The precise strength of this force when all its component parts
came together must have been in the region of 5 or 6000 with a few foot.
Cholmeley reckoned that when Rupert left York he had with him 4000 men. Slingsby said that he took with him "as many of his footmen as he could
force", but he cannot have had more than a few hundred. Lionel Watson
reckoned Rupert's horse at 2000 strong, whilst a Captain Robert Clarke
estimated that he had 3000 but "not any foote lefte". With the accession
of Clavering's men, some 1300 strong according to the 'Journal of Prince
Rupert's Marches' - on which much of the following chronology is based - we
must consider that Rupert had at his disposal some 5000 men or more. In
short, he had the nucleus of an army left to him which might have been built
upon to facilitate a return march to York.

As we shall see, however, this force was to be fragmented by Rupert
himself, almost as if he were determined to throw away any chance of recovering the north. Goring and Clavering, with Montrose, left him with probably 1500 men to go to Carlisle. In northern Lancashire, Colonel Sir John Mayney with about 1000 men was left to recruit in Furness, where he was to be joined by Slingsby from York with a few additional horse. Marching down towards Cheshire Rupert detached Thomas Tyldesley and Viscount Molyneux whilst he himself carried on at a rapid pace. The most cursory of examinations would suggest that the Prince had abandoned the north and had also abandoned some of his fighting men, but it is by no means clear that this was his first intention. Indeed, he may not have decided to give up the north until July 20th or thereabouts, as will be shown.

On July 3rd Rupert and his forces came to Thirsk, joined somewhere on the road by Clavering. It will be apparent that the Marquess had been right in saying that reinforcements from the north would have arrived at York within a day or two of July 1st, but on the 3rd that was water under the bridge, and it serves no purpose to go into the rights and wrongs of the decision to fight yet again. From July 4th to 6th the army paused at Richmond for the stragglers to catch up, and here Rupert was joined by Montrose. We know nothing of the discussions that ensued between the two men, but either on the 6th or just after, Montrose, with Goring and Clavering, detached himself and made for Carlisle, a city then free from investment and immediate threat, to prepare for a return into Scotland. Clavering must by now have been a sick man, for he died in Westmorland before the summer was out, and his command passed to his lt. colonel, John Forser, a Recusant from Co. Durham.

On Sunday July 7th, the army came to Bolton in Swaledale where it was joined by Colonel Sir John Mayney. Mayney had had the care of an important duty which had carried him away from York on the 3rd into the East Riding: he was commanded with his Brigade to convey the Marquess of Newcastle, and General King to Scarborough. From whence he marched after Prince Rupert, and forced his passage through the Enemies quarters. And beat up their quarters near Pr... and after came to the Prince to Scroop Castle. (50) Scroop Castle can only be a reference to Bolton, which was a seat of the Scrope or Scroop family, and was at that time defended by Colonel John Scrope, the illegitimate son of the earl of Sunderland. The place where Mayney beat up the enemy quarter, designated only by the initial letters 'Pr' may have been either Preston in the East Riding, although this would have been too near Hedon perhaps; or, more likely, Preston Underscarr in the North Riding near Leyburn. If this latter place was the scene of the fight, the forces involved on the enemy's side can only have been Scots.

We know at least the name of the senior officer who acted as the Marquess's escort, although it is to be found in no other source. Mayney must have conveyed some information to Cholmeley, to judge by the latter's remarks.
Map to illustrate Rupert’s retreat through Lancashire, July 1644, and events in the county July to December 1644.
in his narrative concerning the defence of Scarborough.\footnote{51}

the Governor sett a good countenance of the business, and
beganne to fortifie the Towne, having given advertisement
to Prince Rupert of his condition, whoe put the Governor in
some hopes that hee might recrueite suddenly in Westmorland
and Cumberland, and would then come and raise the siedg att
Yorke, which yett held out, how ever the Governor conceived
during that hee should be in no great danger, but with in
3 weekes Yorke was rendered.

That Rupert should have chosen Mayney to command the Marquess's escort indicated
a nice sense of what was proper. Mayney, although a Kentishman, had been one
of Newcastle's field officers and not until the battle of Marston Moor had he
been associated with Rupert, although he had acted as a messenger to the Prince
earlier in the year and was clearly a man of standing. Had Newcastle really
been in fear of arrest, it was reassuring on Rupert's part to send Mayney along
with him.

For the next ten or so days Rupert wandered indecisively through northern
Lancashire. On the 9th he was at Ingleton, on the 10th at Hornby Castle, and
on the 12th at Garstang. At Preston on the 14th, he returned to Garstang on
the 17th, and from the 18th to the 20th was established at Kirby Lonsdale.
This curious peregrination can be explained in the context of an entry in the
'Journal', that on the 20th at Kirby "Newes there of Sir John Mainyes action in
Fournesse".

Until the discovery of the Mayney document, the only known source for
events in Furness was that account contained in Slingsby's writings. It was,
however, misleading, for Slingsby did not join Mayney until late in July, by
which time the other had already won at least one fight and was on the verge of
two more, fought after Slingsby's arrival. Mayney's account explained that
having joined Rupert in Bolton

his Highness then comanded him to march, with S\textsuperscript{2} John Preston,
to Cartmell and Furnesse in Lancashire and there to endeavour
to make a Levy of Foot-souldiers, and at a Place near Cartmell
he was assaulted by Col: Fiell's men, Col: Dodding's, and the
Governour's of Lancaster Garrison forces, and divers others of
the rebellious inhabitants there: notwithstanding which, he
forced his passage with good success, and took and killed above
two hundred of them. (52)

This fight, wherever it took place, probably occurred on the 17th or 18th of
July, and word came to Rupert at Kirby Lonsdale on the 20th. It cannot have
been much later than the 19th that Rupert learned of the surrender of York, and
from that point his determination to return south became markedly clear. On
the 20th he went back to Garstang, on the 21st to Preston and the next day to
Lathom, where he left Colonel Edward Rostern as governor before marching to
Liverpool on the 23rd. The bulk of the cavalry passed through Haleford, and
by the 25th Rupert was at Chester.

It may be unnecessary to point out that Meldrum and Denbigh did nothing at
all to interfere with his march, preferring to wait until he had gone and then
to mop up in his wake. If they were not fit to attack a small, fragmented
body of men in retreat, then the Parliamentarian claim made from the York siege
lines in late June that they would fight with Rupert if he had tried to turn
south without attempting York, was pure fantasy. What is much more important
is that Rupert lingered in Lancashire and on the Westmorland border intending
to recruit and then to return into Yorkshire, and that he was forced to abandon
this not by threat from Meldrum and Denbigh, but because of Mayney's problems
in Cartmel and the surrender of York. The fragmentation of his cavalry
becomes understandable in the light of developments. Joined by Montrose and
Clavering, too late for them to perform any service, Rupert sent them about
the business of Scotland, sending Goring along with additional horse that were
probably to return by a specific date. We know, from lists of prisoners
captured at Oswestry and Malpas later in the summer, that Clavering's regiment
at least, then commanded by Forcer, was back in England. Thus, with the
forces which he had had from York, Rupert moved forward into Lancashire, sending
Mayney ahead to beat the drum for footmen. The main army meanwhile marked
time perambulating around northern Lancashire.

It will be noted that the Lancashire forces chose rather to attack Mayney
and his smaller contingent rather than to risk an encounter with Rupert, and
came off badly, so that there was no immediate hazard in lingering there.
As it was, the attack on Mayney did show that recruitment would be contested,
and Rupert's main army could not long remain to act as policemen during a
period of drum-beating. This, and the surrender of York, caused Rupert to
drop his plans and to go south instead, leaving behind in Lancashire not only
Mayney, who could handle himself well, but Tyldesley and Molyneux who, as will
appear, were far more vulnerable. They may have been left behind, like
Mayney, to recruit, or to cover Rupert's retreat into Cheshire.

It is hard to be sure of the numerical strength of these forces left
behind. On July 30th Sir Thomas Fairfax writing to the Committee of Both
Kingdoms estimated Rupert had with him about 2000 men, and that the presence
of Montrose, Goring and Clavering at Carlisle posed a threat sufficient for
the Scots to risk going north to deal with it. The earl of Manchester
confirmed this on August 1st. Sir William Brereton, on the spot in Cheshire,
wrote on August 2nd that Rupert had a full 5000 horse with him, with an
additional 800 near Tarvin. We must suppose that this represented an
accession of strength from Cheshire and North Wales, and that of his original
5000 or so, Rupert had left about half behind him, divided between Mayney,
Tyldesley and Molyneux, and Goring and Montrose. The Committee in London,
according to other intelligence (Brereton?) believed Rupert had no fewer than
9000 horse and dragoons assisted by the earl of Derby, "very active and of
great power". One is tempted to wonder, however, if the rewards given to
messengers were comensurate with the gravity of the news which they brought.

Derby was not in Lancashire at all, the 'Journal', for example, noting that when Rupert arrived at Lathom on his journey south, the earl was not there, which would suggest that he was expected to be so.

It will be noticed that practically nothing was again done to recruit in Westmorland, although it had been the intention. There, the old feuds and disputes between the Royalist gentry went on unabated, and it may be that Goring went with Clavering and Montrose as Rupert's spokesman to flatten out obstructive local officers and to speed the business of recruiting for Scotland. Whilst he was at Kirby Lonsdale, Rupert received a petition from Colonel Sir John Lowther that, better than anything, illustrates the shocking conditions in Cumbria. They were 'hives' of inactivity, where disconsolate Royalist commanders argued one with another, and where some retired to avoid further involvement, as was the case with Henry Parker, Colonel the Lord Morley.57

The petition from Lowther must have made Rupert shake his head in disbelief and disgust. As one reads it, it is almost as if the war lay a thousand miles away from Cumbria. Further, it looks as if Lowther had decided to take due advantage of the departure of the Marquess, who had always supported Musgrave, to score a point against the latter. Their relations had always been bad.

On May 20th, before Marston Moor was fought, Lowther had been typically obstructive:

That Sr John Lowther the Recorder of Kendall and Seriant Maior Dudley refuse to joyne with the comaunder in Cheefe and the rest of the Comaunders to enter bond for anie money to be pr'vided fF his mat's forces at this tyme.

That whereas the Comaunder in Cheefe and other Comaunders by them called to joyne in certaine Orders as a Counsell of Warre for the good of his mat's service, the said Sr John Lowther (after the orders were drawne up in wrytinge and intitled orders by a Counsell of Warre) did refuse to subscribe to those Orders, untill the wordes (Counsell of Warre) were put out, sayinge he would joyne as a Commissioner of Array but did not understand the Counsell of Warre. (58)

These charges were not drawn up by Musgrave alone, but were signed by five others, not all of them necessarily identifiable as Musgrave's men.

Early in 1644 Musgrave had complained to Newcastle:

The Gentlemen of best quality now in the Country (Sr Richard Graham excepted), namely Sr Henry Ffletcher, Sr John Lowther, Sr Christopher Lowther have by underhand practices endeavoured to make y⁰ Comons have a bad opinion of mee...(59)

Lowther's petition to the "high & Mighty Prince Rupert" ran

yor Petitioner hath shoyne all loyalnes and Obedience to his Maties and hath used all his endeavours in promotinge his Maties service, And yor Petitioner haveninge a Commission granted for the govermt of Browham Castle wherein yor Petitioner hath both bestowed cost and laide in some provision of Corne
and fireinge at his owne Charge, for preventing an enemie from possessinge the same, Yet see it is that Sr Phillip Musgrave Barront without any cause knowne unto your Petitioner hath set a sentry upon the Castle and endeavoureth as it seems to possess himselfe thereof; to the greate disrepute and discouragement of your Petitioner and the Country thereabouts where your Petitioner's Regiment is raised.

May it therefore please your highnesse to grant unto your Petitioner redresse herin, whereby he may be the better enabled to serve his Maties and your Highnes and the Country satisfied and your Petitioner vindicated...

Rupert probably knew nothing whatsoever of the situation in the two counties since 1642, or if he did, he did not very much care. When he wrote his reply, scribbled in his own hand on the foot of the petition, on the 20th, his mind was occupied elsewhere. Lowther's petition, in view of what Musgrave and others had to say, sounds like sheer fabrication, and there is also an implicit threat detectable in it that unless it were granted, his 'regiment' would simply cease to function, supposing that it ever had.

Rupert's reply supported Lowther unequivocally, confirming his charge of Brougham "without any lett or Interruption from Sr Phillip Musgrave or any other person."

This digression to consider an episode in Cumbria suffices to show that in considering the Royalist cavalry actions in Lancashire they were, for the most part, fought without hope or expectation of aid from the north. One is tempted to wonder whether, had the earl of Derby been given authority over the two counties similar to that enjoyed by Newcastle in Durham and Northumberland, there might not have been a different story. Musgrave, for all his diligence, simply had not the power or the prestige to carry through his commission.

We must now return to Sir Henry Slingsby on his march from York towards Skipton on July 18th.

Upon Knasborough forrest we made a handsome shew with those Troops of our guard, for we march'd with their Colours, but not with above 6 or 7 score men.

Namely, one of Coll. Titus' (62), one of Sr Jn Girlington's, & one of mine, with such only of ye prince's men as were left in York, & Sr Tho. Glemham's 9 colours, but they soon left their colours & would take ye nearest way to go to ye prince. Our guards we discharg'd at Otley & so march'd on to Skipton, where we were given to understand yt ye prince was yn at Leverpoole who had been not long before at Kirby Longdale, whither we were yn a marching.

Rupert had left Kirby Lonsdale on the 20th, and was at Liverpool on the 23rd, so clearly Slingsby had taken a week to march from York to the Westmorland border. It had been prescribed in the articles agreed for surrendering York, that 10 miles a day would be the maximum distance that the escorted garrison would have to travel, but having discharged their escort at Otley, which was within range of Skipton garrison raiders, the Royalists must then have made good time.
At Kirby Lonsdale, Slingsby met Sir Marmaduke Langdale who, with a party of horse, was entering Westmorland "for raising a 1000 men in yt county and a 1000l. in mony". At Kirby, Slingsby and his old comrade in arms Sir Thomas Glenham parted, Glenham choosing to go to Carlisle where he was to assume command of the garrison.

I steer'd my course into Cartmell & Fourness, a part of Lancashire where at yt time Sr. John Mainye was with a Brigade of horse of broken shatter'd regiments, consisting of one regiment of his own, one of Sr John Pristin's, one of St. Robert Dallyson's, & one of Coll. William Ever's, & some of my Ld Henry Cavendishe's, my Ld of Newcastle's son's, regiment.

For Preston, this was home territory, since his manor, called The Manor, lay in the Furness heartland and was a Recusant centre. Dallison's regiment had no previous connection with the northern counties, having come up with Rupert, but it must have been severely mauled at Marston Moor and so have remained with Mayney. Eure's regiment had been badly handled in the battle too. It will be remembered that Eure and his second in command had been killed, so it is likely that Major Robert Busbridge now commanded in the field.

Here also was Major Palmer with about 100 foot soldiers of Sr Michael Earnley's Regiment with order to recruit ym in this country. It is a kind of an Iseland, not to be got into but upon low water, over huge Falls as it lies towards Cumberland & part of Westmoorland. (63)

Earnley's was one of Rupert's Irish regiments, and not part of the original northern army. It seems as if rather than drag numerically reduced units along with him, Rupert intended them to do their best to make up their numbers in Lancashire and to join him later.

To avoid complicating the issue of events in Lancashire as a whole, it is intended now to follow Mayney and Slingsby, complementing what they had to say where possible with other evidence - although other sources are slender - and indicating, where necessary, the activities of other Royalist units in the county. Mayney's own account, although terse, agrees well with that of Slingsby, so that we can with justification consider the Royalist viewpoint as, upon the whole, accurate. Chronology is exceedingly difficult to establish, neither Slingsby nor Mayney referring to activities elsewhere by which to arrive at any precise dates, but we may conceive of them evacuating Lancashire in early September at the latest, for reasons which shall become apparent.

Mayney did himself less than justice in his own account, and it is to Slingsby that we must turn for the details of what Sir John passed over so cursorily. In Cartmel and Furness we found our Quarters sweet, not sullied by others trading having had no soldiers to trouble ym before we came, wth made y's countrymen not so kind to welcome us.

There was action almost immediately, described by Mayney:
the said enemy joyned with General Tatton who commanded a Squadron of ten Parlt Ships, and they all joyned together, and fell upon his quarters at Cartmell, where he likewise gave them a repulse. The next morning they fell upon his Horse Guards, but Sr John Mayne came to their seasonable relief, and fought them, and took and killed above a thousand of their men. Some of which prisoners he sent to Prince Rupert at Leverpool, and the others to Sir Thomas Glenham at Carlile. He took also five waggon-loads of Arms from the said Enemy, with which he armed a Regiment of Foot which he raised there: in which service he was hurt and his horse shot dead under him.

It is hard to reconcile the conflicting evidence here as to date. Mayney implied that the engagement took place whilst Rupert was at Liverpool, on the 23rd/24th July. We know that Slingsby was present at this action, as we shall shortly see, but he had been at Skipton on the 23rd. It is unlikely that the action can have occurred much before the end of July, and it may merely be that Mayney was ignorant of Rupert's departure by then from Liverpool.

Slingsby's version was also that of an eye-witness, but fuller:

The Countrymen having assembl'd ym selves together wth yt aid they got from ye parliament ships wch lay by ye pile of Foudres resolve to beat these forces out of ye country. Sr. Jn. Mayne was advertised herof by some yt gave intelligence, & by letters intercept'd wherein they seem to undertake their adversary, giving out they were but a few inconsiderable horse that had run away, & if ye country would rise they should see ym fly as fast as ye hare before ye hounds.

Mayney was quartered at Dalton, about four miles from the enemy rendezvous point, in an unfortified town which obliged him to move onto the open field. The Parliamentarians, trusting in their strength and in the rumour of Mayney's poor soldiery, came openly towards Dalton: "they meant not to come by way of surprise, but would try ye mastery by source of arms". These local levies made the usual mistake of imagining that "broken shatter'd regiments", as Slingsby himself evaluated Mayney's brigade, were by inference unlikely to resist for long. They were to discover, as others were to do in months that lay ahead, that the Northern Horse had been too long at war to be scattered like so many raw recruits.

Mayney marched from Dalton with his horse to a position not far from The Manor, the seat of Colonel Sir John Preston who was also present. The enemy, observing this defiant manoeuvre, took up position in an unnamed village, about 800 yards off, their cavalry, less in number than the Royalists, drawn up in their rear. The musketeers meanwhile infiltrated amongst the houses and gardens, whereupon

Sr. Jn. draws his horse into 2 bodyes, two he sends to beat off ye foot, & himself charges directly forwards into ye town. After one shot given they quit ye Town and retreat to ye rest of ye foot in ye feild: those in ye [pinfold, walled with stone] were taken or killed: Their horse had ye advantage of a deep cross way, yt our horse could not but with difficulty come at
y mower; & seeing y mower not stick at any difficulty betakes y mower to their heels, & y mower foot after y mower.  

The pursuit of the Parliamentarians was carried to the Parliamentarian ships off Fouldrey, the 'pile of Foudres'.  

There was taken, besides killed, 200 foot whch were sent to the Prince; & 17 sailors and some rich countrymen were kept prisoners at Dalton Castle, whom y prince had given for Exchange, & make their advantage by ransom or otherwise.  

The Royalists lost no men in the action, but amongst the wounded was Colonel Preston who, falling from his horse, was beaten to the ground by some of the fleeing enemy infantry - he had clearly been in the forefront of the charge - and he lay "in a swoon and speechless many days".  

Having routed his opponents, Mayney now determined to launch a counter attack, choosing as his target Northscales, a village on Walney Island where the Parliamentarians had a quarter. "A narrow screed of land", it was difficult of approach, Mayney having to choose his time well, when the tide was at ebb.  

Approaching under cover of darkness, evidently with a local guide who knew the sands, the Royalists were spotted. A volley of musket fire greeted the cavalry as they drew into order, killing Mayney's own horse - which, interestingly, had been the mount of Colonel Guilford Slingsby when the latter was killed at Gisborough in January 1643 - and an officer. The Royalist horse, their surprise lost to them, drew off.  

On the following day the Parliamentarians evacuated the town, and Mayney coming back to it, fired it against their future use.  

The Royalists were now left to their own devices, and by their victory had won over the local people who had hitherto been antagonistic towards them not, one suspects, because they were Royalists, but because they drew the war to an area so long undisturbed. Mayney raised 1000 men in the area, enough to form a foot regiment, and Slingsby stated that he saw them all armed, whilst we know from Mayney that the weapons came from those captured from the enemy near Dalton. He also raised £2000 in hard cash, "part of it ye King's rent". Half of the money he sent to Glemham, and with the rest he paid his cavalry.  

Having raised the foot regiment, although we do not know who was the Colonel of it, Mayney established their base at Ulverston and permitted them, as they requested, to remain in the area and not to march away. "None" Slingsby observed, "were willing to be taken out of their Country".  

To return to Mayney's narrative for the last time in this context: the Scottish Army, being then near Carlisle, with intent to besiege it, Sir Thomas Glenham Governor of that Garrison being in great want of Ammunition and Provision, and also money to buy necessaries for his Souldiers, and to give them some pay.
for their better encouragement, they being all ready to
mutiny, he the said S'^ John Mayne tendering his Maties
service more than his own particular interest, sent a
Convoy of Horse with a thousand pounds which S'^ Thomas
Glenham received for the seasonable supply of the said
Garison, by which he was enabled to defend the said Siege.
After which, S'^ John Mayne marched with his Horse and Foot
to Skipton....

Time was passing, and the sending of the money to Glenham probably took place
in late August, although it is difficult to be sure, for the Scots were dilatory
in actually getting down to the business of laying a siege. They were
rumoured to be coming against Carlisle long before they actually did so.

Other siege preparations were in hand to the south, where Neldrum was
organising against Liverpool held by Colonels Sir Robert Byron and Cuthbert
Clifton. The naval craft lying off Fouldrey were summoned away toattend that
business, but before they went; their commander, the Captain or General Tatan
alluded to by Slingsby and Mayney, offered to exchange prisoners. Tatan was
probably Captain Peter Tatum who, in 1644, was in command of a 20 gun merchant
man, the 'Peregrine'. He promised to engineer the release of men captured
in the Isle of Axholm in the earlier part of the year - it will be remembered
that Mayney had held a command there when Newcastle marched north to fight the
Scots - and, apparently, Mayney took his word of honour and released his own
captives into Tatum's hands, but, as Slingsby wrote

But hereof there was no performance by Capt. Tatan, for he
had to deal with one of another element & therefore might
easily delude him.

Tatum probably concocted a deception in order to regain some of his sailors
before making for Liverpool.

The Royalists marched to Holker, where Colonel Preston gave them fine
hospitality, untroubled by enemy forces.

a house free for all comers, & no grudging at any Cost, tho'
we eat him up at his table; & y^ Troopers in y^ feild,
steealing his sheepe, & not sparing his corn yt stood in ye
feild; & here we took our pastime, & would go out to hunt
& course y^ dear: untill Dodding on Lancaster side, & y^
Scots on Westmoorland side, made us to look about us how to
secure our selves.

Preston's unstinting generosity suggests that he was not one of the Royalist
gentry 'in decline', unless he were merely a spendthrift. Slingsby's brief
reference does, however, illustrate the impunity with which the Royalist
cavalry passed a few weeks in Lancashire.

The pressure to south and north causing the commanders to consider their
next step, a plan to fortify and to defend the castle at Fouldrey was rejected
as impracticable.

we resolve, to march out of ye Country wth such forces as we
brought into it, saving yt wch Lievet. Coll. Kirby brought
into ye country & were willing to march out wth us...

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Lt. Colonel Roger Kirby, who had probably begun his career as a captain in Colonel Sir Gilbert Houghton's Dragoons, is difficult to place in any known regiment, although by 1644 he was clearly an infantry field officer. He had fought at Lyndale Close in October 1643, and had some connection with Westmorland, so he may have been attached to Colonel William Pennington whose regiment was mauled at Lyndale.

There was also some desertion to worry about. A Captain Jackson, sometime quartermaster to the earl of Cumberland, and who had acted with his troop as an outlying guard for the main Royalist force at Holker, turned his men over to the Parliament at Lancaster.

The resolution to leave Lancashire was followed by a debate as to where to go. Some desired to go south to the Prince, particularly Major Palmer of Earnley's regiment, despite the hazards of the journey. Mayney persuaded them that they should at least endeavour to remain in the north, perhaps at the command of Glemham in Carlisle, to act as raiders against the Scots. To this end he went into Westmorland to confer with the local gentry to see if they would be prepared to finance the cavalry and keep them provided with essentials. Sir Thomas Glemham, however, had already been obliged to send away some of the Carlisle garrison cavalry to the south, where they might be of more use to the King, and told Mayney that Carlisle had nothing to offer him. The Westmorland gentry proving obdurate, the brigade had no alternative but to turn away from the north west. On September 10th - the only date Slingsby saw fit to record - they rode towards Skipton. We must, for the time being, leave them upon the road.

Elsewhere in Lancashire, the defeat which Mayney had fought off and turned into a local victory, was beginning to creep nearer to the forces left behind by Rupert. These, commanded by Viscount Molyneux and Thomas Tyldesley, with John Lord Byron apparently in overall command, had been occupying the Hundreds of West Derby and Amounderness, at least until the 10th of August, the date on which Sir John Meldrum, reinforced let it be noted by Yorkshire troops, began to move out from Manchester to give battle. At York, now Lord Fairfax's headquarters, the decision to reinforce Meldrum had not a little to do with a general fear, expressed by Lord Fairfax in a letter to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, that a Royalist attempt on York was still likely. On August 12th, in this letter, Fairfax reported that Glemham and Langdale were in the field in Cumberland with a full 3000 men, and that "it is not improbable that such a design is on foot". It is no small tribute to the Northern cavalry that they should have aroused such misgivings in their enemies at a time when they were themselves at a low ebb. It may be, of course, that old Fairfax was somewhat over-cautious, and that his view did not reflect the general opinion in the Yorkshire high command.
On or around the 15th and 16th of August two engagements took place in Lancashire, at Ribble Bridge where the Royalists achieved an initial triumph, and then at Walton Cop where that triumph was utterly undone. Tyldesley had retired into the Fylde, probably with Molyneux and Byron, although the sources tend to mention only Sir Thomas, leaving a few scattered cavalry detachments around Preston. Some of these joined with a small body of horse coming from Carlisle under the command of Lord Ogilvy, a companion of Montrose, on his way to Oxford, and a Colonel Huddlestone. It is by no means sure that this was Colonel William Huddlestone of Millom, for it may have been one of his several brothers. Sir William, it will be recalled, had fallen into enemy hands at the battle of Lyndale Close in October 1643, and had been considered dangerous enough to be sent away from the area. Whether he had been exchanged by now, and was again in arms, or not, we do not know.

Ogilvy and Huddlestone had at their disposal a force of 400 cavalry when they descended on Ribble Bridge. According to one source this was on the 15th and the engagement was by chance, the Royalists being bound for Lathom House. A Parliamentary quarter, commanded by Colonel Dodding, was fallen upon and beaten up. The Parliamentarians had been "utterly routed...had not Col. Shuttleworth (who quartered near) come to their assistance". This much is clear, but the sources now serve only to confuse the issue. Rushworth implied that this action at Ribble Bridge was virtually a Royalist triumph, and that Dodding lost 12 dead apart from prisoners taken. A contemporary tract, the Perfect Diurnall, indicated that no sooner was this action finished, than Shuttleworth, reinforcing Dodding, brought the Royalists to battle again.

The Lord Ogilby and Col. Hudleston marching towards Lathom House in Lancashire, encountered with Colonell Doddington not far from Preston, and at the first dispute was very difficult, but Colonell Shuttleworth received an alarm upon this engagement, (his quarters being nears), delayed not any time to rescue the first undertakers; upon whose approach Colonell Doddington's men were put in great courage, and these two valiant Colonells being joined together, charged the enemy with such brave resolution that they were put into disorder and many of them slain in the place. The enemies party, consisting of about 400 Horse, of which number was taken about 50 and 40 prisoners; the rest being totally routed, thought to have secured themselves in flying to Lathom House, but finding the siege there well maintained...

This was in fact untrue, as will become apparent

...were most of them taken in the action; the men of note which were taken prisoners, were the Lord Ogley himselfe, Lt. Col. Hudleston, Mr. Maxfield, and Cornet Grimes.(71)

'A Discourse of the Warr' put a slightly different interpretation on the actions. According to this source, Shuttleworth was marching from Blackburn to Preston when he fell upon the Royalist cavalry at Walton Cop with the success noted. Not apparently related to this action, was the fighting at
Ribble Bridge where the Parliamentarians "came off with honour and safety" with some difficulty. According to this source, the Royalists at Ribble Bridge seem to have lost an officer of some note:

a brave, portly man; what his name was they could not learme, for they were so hard put to...(72)

What appears to have happened was that the Royalists, moving cautiously, through enemy territory, chanced upon Dodding and, with surprise on their side, routed him from his quarter at Ribble Bridge. Fugitives, fleeing the field, met Shuttleworth who came to their aid and pursued the victors who had by that time moved on, probably bringing them to battle in a running fight which the Royalists could not sustain.

These actions were but a foretaste of that which was to be fought at Ormskirk on the 20th. In brief, to quote again from Perfect Diurnall,

The 20 of this instant the Lancashire forces near Armeskirke beat the whole strength of the Enemy, took about 300 prisoners, 500 Horse, killed about 100, and forced the rest into Chester intending to follow them; and have taken Colonel Hervey, besides 7 Captains and many other considerable persons; and Sir Thomas Tilsley and Colonel Preston are either killed or fled privately: for except their corps were among the dead, and being stript, not known, which may be, we cannot tell what is become of them. (73)

Colonel Hervey cannot be identified, but it is certain that Sir John Preston was, at this juncture, in Furness with Mayney and Slingsby. Tyldesley was not wounded in the action at all, but in other respects, it was quite a striking victory achieved by Sir John Meldrum.

The clarity of the Perfect Diurnall report is misleading. Here again, conflicting sources are hard to reconcile, particularly in the case of who exactly was in command of the Royalist forces, whether it was Tyldesley or Molyneux, Byron or Langdale, or any combination thereof. 'A Discourse of the Warr' stated that Lord Goring had come from Carlisle and had joined Tyldesley in the Fylde before the 20th, so he may have had the overall authority, although Byron was of course, commander in Lancashire and had been since 1643. To follow the 'Discourse', however, on August 16th Sir John Meldrum marched into Preston whilst Shuttleworth was occupied with the Walton Cop business. There, Sir John received intelligence concerning the main Royalist body in the Fylde, which lay quartered around Lytham and Poulton, foraging and apparently undecided what to do. Meldrum's march from Preston, probably on the 18th or 19th of August, caused these forces to draw together in a single body on Freckleton Marshes, intending to cross the Ribble at the first opportunity, for the river was then temporarily in flood. Meldrum was now obliged to hurry, but his passage over the marsh was delayed by the mud which bogged down his guns, and by the time that he came near enough for his advance party to exchange shots with the Royalist rearguard, the bulk of the Royalist force had
crossed the river in face of resistance from a Colonel Ashton.  

Momentarily deflected, Meldrum fell back on Preston, detaching Colonel Dodding to keep in the garrison of Greenhalgh Castle near Garstang which had become active. On the 20th, Meldrum marched out again with his forces, and moving at a great rate, collided with the Royalists near Ormskirk, scattering them in all directions, towards Haleford and Liverpool, and some back towards the Fylde who, coming near Greenhalgh, beat up Dodding's siege forces as they passed.

Sir John Meldrum's report to the Committee of Both Kingdoms has been preserved, and it more or less clearly conveys what he was trying to do, something not to be gleaned from other reports.

On the 19th Meldrum approached the Royalist force then on the north side of the river, sending horse and foot to the other side (Ashton's force?) hoping that this would prove sufficient to deter the Royalists from crossing, thus obliging them to fight Meldrum on the north bank, or to try to escape back northwards. His strategy seems to have been, although this is nowhere made explicit and, in fact, even in the reports of senior commanders during the war, actions described were rarely related to any preconceived strategic plans, to prevent them from reaching Cheshire intact, if at all.

The Royalists, however, secured a tactical advantage at the outset by breaking down a bridge lying between them and the advancing enemy. Meldrum could not force his passage

the pursuit of them was interrupted by the breaking of a bridge, which could not be repaired for an hour's space, they having a body of Horse which stood firm on the other side of the bridge for their retreat...

Given this advantage, the Royalist forces crossed the river at low tide, and Meldrum, unable to pursue them immediately since his infantry were some distance away, wanting victuals and wearied by three nights on the march - some of them had come from Cheshire to assist him - retired to Preston. His letter, written on the morning of the 20th, notified the Committee that he was once again marching out intending to follow the Royalists hoping to bring them to battle at Haleford.

If Hale Ford be any ways difficult, I shall use my best endeavours to trouble them in their passage, but if be passable it lies not in my power to stop their entry into Cheshire. I have before intimated to you the necessity for employing a great part of the earl of Manchester's Horse in this service...

He estimated from close contact, the Royalists had about 2500 cavalry and only 200 infantry at their disposal, most of them badly armed.

To help with his plan to halt them at Haleford, he sent a message ahead to Vice Admiral Swanley who was lying somewhere off the coast near Liverpool.
He asked Swanley to interfere with the movement of ferry boats from that town which might be used by the enemy. This was probably Captain Richard Swanley who was at this time active in interfering with the passage of troops from Ireland to assist the King, and whose barbarity towards Irishmen captured on the sea undoubtedly earned him approbation in Parliamentary circles in London.

Meldrum’s next letter was written on the 21st, after the fight at Ormskirk, at which place he had, unexpectedly, caught them, they having failed to make the most of their opportunities. Driven from the town, they formed in battle order a mile away on a level moorland where, at eight in the evening, the opposing cavalry met in a head on charge. The Royalist horse were at last scattered, but after having inflicted very heavy losses on Meldrum’s men, which Meldrum hoped the darkness had served to exaggerate. Lord Byron had been unhorsed in the action, and Molyneux’s mount had been taken, but Meldrum could not report the capture of any Royalist field commander.

Perfect Occurrences No. 3 gave a rough list of the prisoners taken, after briefly describing the action, which can in no way be made to conform to Meldrum’s view. In this generously Parliamentarian tract, the Royalist horse were said to have fled after a few rounds of musketry fire from the Parliament infantry, and were pursued in a general rout by the cavalry. Meldrum knew otherwise. The northern regimental officers captured on this occasion were Captains James Anderton and John Butler of Tyldesley’s Horse, John Brooks of the same regiment, and perhaps Captain Lee or Leigh of Colonel Sir Ferdinando Leigh’s Horse. From the list of prisoners, probably far from complete, it would seem that the defeat fell heavily upon Rupert’s original forces as distinct from those he had collected in the north. Colonel Thomas Prestwich, a senior field officer taken, was from Cheshire.

A letter written two days later from Chester to Prince Rupert gave the only account of the action from a Royalist viewpoint, and that concerned more with personalities than events. It would seem, however, that part at least of the Royalist force was not engaged in the battle, and escaped into Cheshire unscathed by way of Haleford. The letter looks a little critical of Rupert, but it was written by his great friend Will Legge, and he could probably get away with blunt speaking.

My Lord Byron, upon your authority, commanded Sir Marmaduke Langdale so far that he was engaged between the enemy and Liverpool; where they advancing upon him with their army, he had no means of saving his horse, but by retreating over Haleford, and here I met him with all his troops, and an order from my Lord Byron to quarter at Wrexham...

Legge does not mean here that Byron, who was evidently in overall command of the army, was in receipt of immediate orders from Rupert, only that in commanding Langdale in what to do with his forces, he used as his warrant his commission from Rupert making him commander in Lancashire. This does sound
as if there was some friction amongst the Royalist commanders, and it may be
that Langdale kept the bulk of the Northern Horse with him, which may account
for their escaping the Ormskirk fight with few, if any, losses, as the sources
suggest. The evidence is insufficient to support the view that Langdale was
at this time struggling to establish an independent cavalry command, but in
view of the development of the Northern Horse as such a unit, it is possible to
believe that such a struggle was in hand. There was, after all, no reason why
Langdale's cavalry might not have been swallowed up in the Oxford army, nor
does there seem to have been any reason why Langdale should have risen to so
important a rank in practical terms, as he did.

In this retreat from Ormskirk, my Lord Byron, with Lord
Molineux's brigade, being fifteen hundred horse, brought up
the rear, and engaging himself upon the enemy, when he needed
not, received the repulse, his men running and dispersing
themselves; they had been totally cut off, and did not Langdale
wheel, and so stopped the enemy, and after retreated himself
without the least disturbance. But of Molineux, Tilsly, and
the Lord Byron's regiments, the amount is very short, the few
that kept together being here with the rest. Thus your
Highness sees, we shall utterly lose the men we have in the
north. I despair of any good in Lancashire; who, to divert
the war from themselves, have exposed their own quarter to be
lost, we to be ruined in our quarters, and this body of horse,
who might well have subsisted where they were, to be starved,
as they must be if they continue here. Sir Marmaduke hath
written to your Highness how he thinks to dispose of himself,
and hath been at me for advice, which I dare not meddle in.

Langdale clearly resented Byron's authority, and Legge implied that it was
fortunate for Byron that Langdale had not gone too far afield when the battle
was joined, and so was able to swing back and to make a show of force enough
to stop the headlong pursuit of the Parliamentarians. It will be noted that
no mention of this is made in the enemy accounts, but the letter from Legge
must be given priority, for he made no bones about the situation. As for
Langdale's intentions, which he intimated to Legge and in a letter to Rupert,
and which he formulated apart from Byron, he met near-disaster shortly after
as shall be seen.

Events to the south of the Mersey do not ordinarily concern this study,
but since we are now observing the departure of Newcastle's veteran cavalry,
with whom we cannot further be concerned for seven months, a brief digression
to follow them to action at Malpas is in order.

Thomas Malbon, the Cheshire Parliamentarian diarist, gave a concise
account of the series of incidents following upon the Ormskirk action, although
it will be seen that he noted news down as it came to him and not in any
chronological order of events.

On ffryday mornynge (beinge Bartholomewe Eve) [August 23rd]
Newes was sent to Namptwiche, to the Councill of Warr theire,
That a thousand of the horse of the Kings ptie wire taken
in Lancashire; foure hundred & odd prsonrs, & many Slayne;
Sir Bernard de Gomme's scheme for the fortification of Liverpool, the old Parliamentary fortifications shown as a broken line. This sketch is based upon a representation given by Lt. Col. W.G. Ross in his paper "Military Engineering During the Great Civil War, 1642-9" in Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. XIII, 1887, plate ix.
And that they had dryven those of them wch wire lefte furthe of Lancashire into Cheshire.

This was the news of the battle at Ormskirk as Malbon heard it.

On Sondaye evening the 25th of Auguste 1644, the Kinges ptie. being about Malpas, Colonell Brereton, almost wth all the horse and foote in Namptwiche to the number of eighth or Nyne hundred, marched towards them; whose, having intelligence of their Comynge, tooke their ground on Oldcastle heath, a waytinge Colonell Brereton's comynge; whose on bothe sides fell to the fight soe soon as they came togethe, very bravely and boldly, until the came to hande blows; But in the ende, the Kinges ptie. beinge about two thousand & a halfe (all horse) fledd. Theirs were slayne of them Colonell Vayne, Colonell Cuthbert Conyers, Seriant Major Hesketh, & about three or foure score more; And taken persons of theim Major Thomas Cromwell (82), major maxye, Captyn Major Thomas Craithorne (83), Captyn Parker, Lieutenant Mountayne (84), and Nyneteene Comon sol. dyers.

Rushworth adds little to this account of Malpas, except that Langdale was commanding the force, which was clearly for the most part the old northern cavalry; and that the Colonel Vayne alluded to by Malbon was, in fact, Lt. Colonel CJohn Baines of Sellett, formerly of the Lord Morley's regiment of horse. Vicars added that Langdale was wounded in the fighting. Lord Byron, in his report, gave it as his opinion that "the officers did as much as they could", but that the rank and file had been in a poor state of morale. From the prisoners named, it certainly does seem that the officers were at the forefront again, and held the Royalist forces together so long as they could.

This was not the end of the Marquess of Newcastle's cavalry. Under Langdale they performed at least one more exploit that was to do them great honour. Until they were broken at Naseby, they remained a potent cavalry force in the Oxford army.

The Capture of Liverpool.

The ignominious collapse of the Parliamentarian defence of Liverpool in June, when the town had been under attack from Rupert, led, as we have seen, to the establishment of a Royalist garrison under the control of Colonel Sir Robert Byron. Byron, a veteran of the Irish wars, had his own regiment together with that of Colonel Cuthbert Clifton, raised chiefly in the Fylde area. They did not long enjoy their tenure of the town, although whilst it was in their hands, for much of June without molestation, it was a centre of Royalist sequestration activity as local gentry took their revenge on their Parliamentarian neighbours. By August naval operations against the port were in progress: Captain Tatum had been called away from Furness to assist; and Captain Swanley had been able to intervene on behalf of Meldrum on the eve of Ormskirk.
By September 10th, the date that Mayney and Slingsby marched away from Lancashire, and long after the defeats sustained by the Royalists at Ormskirk and at Malpas, the London Post of that date summed up the situation for its readership in the capital:

There are but two garrisons only which now resist the Parliament, which are the garrisons of Liverpole and Latham...

What of Greenhalgh?

From Liverpool we are informed that they are in good possibility to submit with speed to the mercy of the Parliament. The noble Sir John Meldrum with great success hath made his approaches to it by land, and brought the siege very neer unto their works and to their walls. Colonel Moore, who was the Governour of it before Prince Rupert made it acknowledge another master, hath besieged it by sea.

One is tempted to wonder, not altogether seriously, whether his means of escape from the town had proved palatable to Moore.

The sad inhabitants from both elements are deeply distressed; and finding no hope of reliefe, it is thought they will speedily acknowledge another master and a better government. The siege of Lathom House is still continued, and they now fear no Prince Rupert to necessitate them to raise the Siege. The Earl of Derby is now in the house. (89)

Derby's exact whereabouts are not known, but it was claimed in the Perfect Diurnall for September 14th, that he had endeavoured to relieve Liverpool by land and his forces had been scattered by Brereton. There seems to be no other evidence to support that. On September 22nd, a small support garrison for Liverpool, at Birkenhead, evidently surrendered.

Parliamentarian hopes for the rapid surrender of Liverpool were premature, for Byron managed to control the situation within the town which had, in similar circumstances, driven Moore to the sea. Meldrum was obliged to invest it as thoroughly as he could, and to guard against possible relief attempts from the south, particularly from Chester. He had the advice, the excellent advice we might say, of Rosworm who was Master of the Ordnance for the siege. The garrison managed, towards the end of September, to send infantry across the Mersey to Tarvin, where they dug in at length and in such a manner that Meldrum, who reported the fact to the Committee in London, was unable to shift them and so concentrated all his energies on the siege. He was not, however, happy with his soldiers, and complained to the Committee on October 2nd that they had been unpaid for eighteen weeks and were inclined to drift home to assist in the harvest. He also reported intelligence that the Liverpool garrison were trying to induce Colonel Vere, who was then in Lathom, to raid Meldrum's lines to further create havoc.

The effectiveness depended upon Meldrum's being unable to receive help from Cheshire, and was aimed at destroying the morale of the siege forces; but on October 8th Brereton marched into the Wirral and took up a position at
Tranmore to watch the town. He reported to the Committee in London that desertions from the garrison were frequent, and that it was only a desperate band of "Papists and Irish rebels" who insisted on holding out. This description could hardly apply to the commanders who were stubbornly holding out, since none were Irish, and only Cuthbert Clifton was certainly a Catholic if not a Recusant. Nonetheless, Lord Byron, established in Chester, wrote to tell Rupert on October 9th that the garrison there was mutinous for want of pay, and that if the town were to be lost, Chester would stand in danger.

Whatever the condition within Liverpool, and the disease of mutiny did not spread very rapidly, finding an outlet in desertions, the siege dragged wearily on. On October 23rd Brereton reported that over 100 of the garrison had deserted, bringing word that the meat ration behind the walls was horse flesh.

Though the works are very strong and those within the town desperately bent to hold out. On the 28th a body of Royalist horse from within the town made a sally against Meldrum's lines, although, since Brereton reported this, and he was none too clear, it may have been part of a relief attempt from Chester. The cavalry were beaten back and two cornets, Hopton and Slegge, killed in the fighting.

It is a great pity that the only authoritative sources for the siege of Liverpool are Parliamentarian and, at the same time, slender. Lord Byron's views do tend, however, to support the general view of deteriorating morale in the face of a concerted siege effort, albeit that Meldrum's army was in a dilatory mood. On November 1st, the town capitulated.

About fiftie of the English souldiers two or three dayes before made escape out of the Garison, and drove away most of the cattle about the towne, and came to Sir John Meldrum... The fact that the garrison still had cattle at their disposal at the end of October suggests that the horseflesh diet was not absolute. More significantly it shows that Meldrum's siege cannot have been so fierce as he had intended, if the defenders were able to graze their beasts beneath the walls.

which the English-Irish within the Garison perceiving, and that they were now in a desperate condition, for that quarter was before refused them, consulted together, and seized upon all their commanders or otherwise secured them, and thereby delivered up the town to Sir John Meldrum, laying their owne lives downe at his feete, who no doubt will recompense this exploit by shewing them more mercy than other ways, they could have expected, and (as we since here) they are to be sent to Ireland, from whence they came. There were taken in the towne two Colonells, two Lieutenant Colonells, three Majors, fourteene Captaines and other officers, besides Common Soldiers, Ordnance, Armes and Ammunition a great quantity. The Malignants in the towne have shipped most of their best goodes and treasure, thinking to convoy the same away by night; but Sir John by the helpe of some long boats prevented the designe, and surprised the same. The taking of this Garison will conduce much to the taking of West-Chester....
That account represented the official despatches from Brereton and Meldrum, and needs little explanation, except to say that Chester held out a good year longer despite the collapse of Liverpool.

In Liverpool two complete Royalist infantry regiments were lost. Byron and Clifton, the colonels, were taken, and Clifton was to die obscurely and within the year, probably from harsh usage. He was, after all, a Recusant family's eldest son in a county where the religious clash was paramount. One wonders whether Alexander Rigby, for example, would have been as merciful towards the Irish soldiery as Meldrum showed himself, although Meldrum had no real choice in the matter since the deserters and mutineers had done his work for him. Vicars mentioned two other officers, a Major Robert Bambridge and a Lt. Colonel Hugh Anderton. Bambridge may have been Busbridge, acting commander of William Eure's cavalry regiment. Anderton, a Recusant, does not properly belong to either Clifton's or to Byron's regiments, but to that of Sir Thomas Tyldesley. Busbridge cannot have held a regimental command in the garrison, and was certainly not Clifton's major who was called William Westby.

Meldrum's report to the Committee in London stated that when the town surrendered the garrison was 700 strong, but that 400 others had by then left, which is staggering. After surveying the defences, he informed the Committee that it would take 300 men to effectively provide a garrison there, and that it would be better to raze it. He gave it as his opinion, the opinion of a professional, that Liverpool was "one of the strongest places I have seen in Europe". At the end of the month the Committee ordered the defences to be slighted, in accordance with Meldrum's advice.

After a brief resurrection of Royalist predominance in the county, in which they controlled an area not much smaller than that controlled by Derby in 1642/3, the Parliamentarians had re-established their own dominance. This time, however, there was no prospect of Rupert returning to the scene. Lathom House kept alive the Royalist cause alone and virtually unaided.

Carlisle—The Beginning of the Siege.

After two years of relative peace, the counties of Cumberland and of Westmorland were now to become the centre of Scottish military activity in the north-west. Carlisle, the red stone walls of which still appear more massive than many castles in northern England, had, by the close of 1644, become a Royalist enclave in increasingly hostile territory. As the lukewarm Royalist gentry fell away from their cause during the autumn and winter, some to actively assist the Scottish forces laying siege to the town, it became easier to distinguish the Royalist party in those counties, dominated by the
Musgraves, and including in its leadership Colonels Sir Henry Fletcher, Sir William Dalton, Sir Thomas Dacre and Sir Timothy Featherstonehaugh.

After a general Royalist convergence on the town during August, the forces there had dispersed again. Montrose had gone into Scotland, Goring and Langdale back south towards Rupert with the Northern Horse. Behind them, they left Sir Thomas Glemham as Governor of Carlisle assisted by the Royalist commanders already referred to. Before September 10th, Glemham had sent away his cavalry, or the major part thereof, and had declined an offer of help from Mayney's brigade, since there was little that could be done by cavalry that could not subsist within the walls, nor be provisioned outside.

The Musgrave papers give an interesting insight into the way in which Carlisle was garrisoned in the period prior to this sudden excitement. Since nothing so similarly detailed has survived for York, or for the more important garrison towns and castles like Newcastle, Pontefract, Skipton and Scarborough, it is worth pausing briefly to examine the material.

The commander in chief of the Carlisle Castle garrison during 1643 and throughout the siege was a professional soldier, Sir Henry Stradling. In a letter of his to the Commissioners of Array, written at some time during 1643, Stradling revealed that the garrison owed immediate obedience to the Marquess of Newcastle:

> yt is an absolute & peremptory breach of his highnesse order to Conclude any thinge Concerninge this Garrison by any Comittee not sittinge there, and without my privitie. To consider yt the estates of delinquents may be (for yor better ease of the countrye) disposed of for your maintenance of this Garrison. That I may not be kept as hitherto I have been in ignorance of what yo intend for a monthly provision for this Garrison & Sr philipp Musgrave's Troup.

The reference to Musgrave's troop as being attached to Carlisle shows that some kind of rota system was enacted for garrison duty, otherwise the county forces would have drifted away to their homes for want of employment. A document dated November 15th of the same year, and signed by Musgrave, gives an even fuller idea of this system:

It is concluded that the men in garrison at Carlisle be releived by sending thither in liewe theireof on the 22 instant 300 men to be raysed as followeth viz. By Sr William Dalton under the command of whom he shall appoynte - 60 - men armed: and by Sr Christo: Lowther under the command of whom he shall appoynte - 60 - men armed: and By Sr Edward Musgrave under ye Command of whom he shall appoynte likewise - 60 - men armed.... which three Companies shall continew at Carlisle a month unless in the same tyme armes be not sente for yoF/companies/ if armes doe some in the meane tyme then their shall be immediately : 200 for that purpose arrayed. And for the 3d : 100 theise to be immediately raysed by ye Commissioners proportionably in the Countie Viz.
From the time of the surrender of York, Carlisle became the goal of many hundreds of Royalist officers and men who, under Glemham, desired to carry on the war. The contemporary account of the siege contains a lengthy list of their names, although not, unfortunately, of their several ranks. It does appear, however, that from the end of July 1644 the rota system must have of necessity lapsed, and that the garrison became filled with soldiers from various Cumbrian regiments who did not at once return to their homes, or find themselves suddenly under the command of a man who, hitherto ostensibly Royalist, had overnight experienced the desire to be associated with the allied powers of Parliament and the Scots.

Again, one could wish that the documentary evidence for events in these counties was fuller than it is. The first hint that we have of this drift away from the King's party – perhaps we should say, the first overt movement, since several men had been covertly at odds for months – concerns an incident on September 18th when, according to Vicars, some of the Royalist gentry met "to feast together" and to recruit, but the "Country People" rose up against them and drove them into Carlisle, capturing 40. This may not have been the same incident as that related by Isaac Tullie, with which he opened his narrative of events around Carlisle by sniping at the Royalist commanders. Tullie, although actively in defence of the town, may have been something of a neutral, anti-Scottish rather than anti-Parliamentarian or pro-Royalist.

Leslie marched with about 800 hors as far as Salkeld without opposition; but when he came to passe the ford of Eden, which was not very shallow, he found the other side manned with regiments of hors and foot, with the Gentrie of Cumberland and Westmorland had raised to oppose him; which so appalled him, yet he refused to march on, and fell arailing at Barwise [the MP for Carlisle and Parliament's agent] who had persuaded him that he should meet with no enemies. And needs he would retreat to Newcastle, till great Barwise set himself first into the water; and the rest, following him, so frightened the fresh water country Whiggs yet all of them answered the Motto, veni, vidi, fugi; some of the chief of the Country, whom I will not name, gave occasion to this shamefull flight. Sr Phil. Musgrave, Sr Henrie Bellingham, Sr Henry Fletcher, with other Gent. would have joyned Issue with Leslie, if they had not been [ ]. Most of the fugitives took straight for Carlisle, with Leslie pursued them and drew up his horse within view of the Cityye on St. Nicholas Hill, near the galowes: [Harraby Hill] a place more proper for them he could not have chosen.

This was probably Colonel Edward Grey's cavalry, a Northumbrian and Durham regiment of Newcastle's army. It is the only identifiable northern horse regiment which we can associate, for a time at least, with the defence of the town.
To follow the operations in and around Carlisle until the end of 1644, Tullie’s invaluable text has been taken as the basic source, supplemented by other sources where necessary and where available.

After pursuing the Royalists to the town, Leslie turned away from Cumberland and retired back on Newcastle. Tullie claimed that this was from purely mercenary motives:

Y® corn was then all in ye stock; and Lesley knew well yt if he had stayed to beggar the towne, he might have taken it whin a few weeks; but it was believed, his purpose was to give y® King’s party leisure to victual it, that he and his soldiery might have longer pay.

This sounds as if Tullie was recording a joke circulating in the garrison, but whilst Leslie may merely have been needed at Newcastle, there was some truth in what Tullie said. It would not require too much prescience to foresee the end of the civil war, by negotiation or by military victory of the Parliament, and the Scots—out for rewards as much as for religion—would be in a better bargaining posture if they could be left holding towns like Carlisle when peace came. Nonetheless, siege operations at Newcastle upon Tyne were being stepped up. Before leaving for there, Leslie organised the local levies to keep a watch on the town, and raised forces which were put under the command of some of the turncoat gentry. Tullie:

Lesly having instantly ordered to raise the countrey for the Parlam’t, under ye® command of Col. Lawson and Col. Chomly, marched y® next day towards Newcastle.

Lawson was the former Royalist lt. colonel Wilfred Lawson. Henry Cholmeley had no earlier Royalist sentiments, but Lawson was not the only one who had changed sides. Sir William Armyne, who had come to Cumberland to act as a liaison officer between the Scots and the local gentry, noted on October 8th 110

Sir John Lowther, Sir Patricius Curwen, Sir Richard Sanford, and Sir Thomas Sanford, and divers others of the prime gentlemen of both counties have taken the Covenant...

Lowther, Curwen and Thomas Sanford had been commissioned as colonels of the Royalist party.

Wilfred Lawson, early in October, intercepted some cannon which had been landed at Whitehaven for the Carlisle garrison from an Irish ship. Armyne, in the same letter as that in which he listed the apostate Royalists, reported on the general condition around Carlisle:

Carlisle continues still obstinate, but they have of late been kept in that the country hath received little damage by them. Only the charge is very great to maintain such forces, as must of necessity be about Carlisle for the keeping them in all sides. Sir P. Musgrave, Sir H. Fletcher, Sir Wm. Dalston, Sir Thos. Dacres and Sir T. Fetherston, and divers others remain in Carlisle....

He added that Sir Edward Musgrave, the Royalist Sheriff of Cumberland, was garisoned in Scaleby Castle, an extensively reconstructed fortified manor not
far from Carlisle. Leslie, on his march back to Newcastle, had taken in Thirlwall Castle, but two other garrisons, at Naworth and at Millom, were still defiant.

The local forces, however, did not press home the business as Leslie was to do on his return. Tullie noted

Ye garrison plyd their liberty vigorously in fetching in great store of Corn from all the adjacent fields, besides meat, salt, coles, and cowes, chiefly from about Wigton 71 miles south west of Carlisle, ye nest of the Roundheads in so much that an Oxe might have been brought in their towne for 18d at this time.

To finance the garrison, funds had to be raised from the officers and citizens within Carlisle. On September 21st the Council of War ordered the Mayor and Aldermen to raise the sum of £300 towards expenses, but the Mayor (William Atkinson) and his Aldermen contented themselves to agree to pay exactly half.

Upon a warrant from the president and Councell of warr directed to the Maier and Aldermen for the raising of the summe of 300li upon the Inhabitants of Carliell It is this daie ordered and agreed upon with the unanimous consent of the Maier Aldermen and Capital Citizens of the said Cittie that the moyitie or one halfe of the said 300li be forthwith raised upon the most able Inhabitants thereof by the wale of free loane for the present subsistence of the Garison upon engagement from the Gentry of the Country for repaiement thereof within one month next after.

The parsimony of the mercantile interest within Carlisle argues that they felt the sooner the business was over, the better for their real interest, that of trade. The military were obliged to go along with the loan. Colonels Sir Philip Musgrave, Sir William Dalton, Sir Henry Fletcher, Sir Thomas Dacre, Sir Timothy Featherstonehaugh, Richard Kirkbride: Lt. Colonels William Carleton, and George Denton: and Major Thomas Warwick, together with Sir Richard Graham, bound themselves to repay the £150 by October 15th. A similar bond was entered into in the following year. The absence of Colonel Edward Grey's name may be evidence that he and his regiment had already departed.

The command structure within Carlisle must have been similar to that which had prevailed in York earlier in the year. In Carlisle, as at York, Glenham exercised overall authority, although the command of the castle fell to Sir Henry Stradling as, in York, command of Clifford's Tower had gone to Colonel Sir Francis Cobb. Musgrave, however, must have found his position somewhat ambiguous. We have already noted that his position within the overall command structure of the Marquess of Newcastle's army, was like that of the earl of Derby, far from defined. It is no help to have Tullie, who in a sense should have known, telling us that at this juncture Musgrave was Lt. General for Cumberland, since that does not tell us what authority he exercised within Carlisle, or whether the real command there was in commission amongst several officers. Nor do we know precisely when, or from whom, Rupert or Newcastle,
Musgrave received this rank. If the command in Carlisle was in commission with Glemham at the head, we do not know if it was Goring himself, or Goring acting on behalf of Rupert, who arranged it. Whatever the case, the feuds and private wranglings of the previous two years gave way to a markedly uniform determination on the part of what we can, at last, call a Royalist party in Cumbria. That this party should include a man like Fletcher, whose quarrel with Musgrave has been noted, is not surprising. Now we must examine the Carlisle garrison, insofar as we can, from Tullie's list of officers.

Tullie's list suffered from several defects, not least the innacuracy with which he recorded individual names and ranks. The lack of forenames for the most part, renders identification difficult, but on the whole, his list does confirm the view of Carlisle as a refuge for broken regiments and scattered die-hard officers.

We know already of the presence of the local colonels - Dalton, Dacre, Fletcher, Musgrave and Featherstonehaugh - and of Stradling: with these we must include "Hudleston". He was clearly on the Millom family combatant list, but cannot have been either Sir William, who was a prisoner, or Richard, who was killed at York. This Hudleston was probably either Edward, formerly major of Sir William's Foot or, if not of the direct Millom line, then perhaps William Huddlestone of Richard Kirkbride's Foot. Although Tullie did not mention him, we know from other sources that Richard Kirkbride was in the garrison, so perhaps what was left of his infantry regiment was with him. One "Philipson" can be distinguished from Captain (or Major) Robert Philipson listed separately by Tullie, and so may have been Christopher Philipson of Calgarth and Melsonby?

With Glemham to Carlisle came, interestingly enough, "some white coats" and about 200 Reformadoes, or officers without regimental association, due to the destruction or disbanding of their original regiments, "most of them of great prudence and proneness in arms". Clearly, these were the backbone of the garrison, the veterans against whom Leslie was to have to fight. Tullie did not, however, distinguish between the Whitecoats and the rest of Glemham's force, and Colonels Sibthorp and Woodhall cannot be identified with any certainty. There was, however, a Captain Woodhall in Edward Grey's regiment of dragoons in 1642, and since Grey was at Carlisle in September, it may be that Woodhall was there also and that Tullie misconstrued the rank. Lt. Colonel Maikarty mentioned by Tullie was probably the Captain Darly Mackery of Glemham's own foot regiment. Major Gosnold was at that time possibly a major of Glemham's own foot, and can be identified with the Colonel Robert Gosnold serving in Oxford in 1645/6.

There were some Scottish soldiers and gentlemen in the garrison too, perhaps left behind by Montrose, namely "the Lord Aboyne, Lord Maxwell, Lord
Tullie then went on to list quartermasters and non-commissioned officers, "sans nombre" as he put it. The garrison also included Dr. Isaac Basire, the notably Laudian clergyman from Co. Durham.

Sometime towards the end of October, David Leslie returned to the scene and began to construct siege works in earnest. He raised sconces to the west of the town, at Newtown; at Stanwix to the north, separated one from another by the rivers Calder and Eden "scarce passable, but over the Bridges". Wilfred Lawson had his headquarters to the north-east, and Henry Cholmeley lay on and around Harraby Hill gallows. Tullie gave the enemy force as about 4000 strong horse and foot, and the garrison at this point, including the citizens in arms, as 700 men.

Leslie's own headquarters were at Dalston Hall, about four miles from the town, and an attempt was made to surprise him there, led by Captain Philipson and a Captain Birkenhead or Birbeck. It is interesting to note that a Captain Birkenhead was listed for Grey's Dragoons. A party of reformades with Capt Philipson marched from ye towne to alarm him. But instead of supprizing the enemies Quartrs, wch they might have done, they made a halt, and stay'd forsooth till Capt Forester came up to them; who with greater numbers, put them to flight, kild Capt Birbeck wth diverse others, and had the chase-of them for 2 miles.

Tullie explained this "ominous begining" as the result of the jarring "of the Reformades, who could not agree upon a Leader". Apparently no officer was prepared to yield advantage, and consequently, or so Tullie conceived, without a reserve, they were easily routed.

Within a few days, Glemham himself commanded a party of dragoons in a raid to Cholmeley's quarters near the gallows.

Capt. Marshall entered the work wth the Dragownes, but was beat out of it, having received a hurt in his thigh. And this second attempt was successlesse; whether because the horse surrounding close the worke, left no place for the assaulted to escape, or that God was not pleased wth the order given the assaylants, in determining to give no Quarter; but this order was never given afterwards....

The order of 'no quarters' was quite remarkable coming from a garrison under siege, although something of the same type had occurred at Lathom House in the early part of the year. The implication was that Glemham himself gave the order, and it may have been that he felt that if he could terrify the local levies sufficiently, he might disrupt Leslie's siege and cause the latter to draw off, or else spread demoralisation amongst the English. There was certainly, as we shall come to see, a good deal of resentment between the allied commanders.

Glemham next ordered the firing of the suburbs to prevent the Scots from...
securing a foothold too close to the walls, and this was carried out without hindrance from the enemy, although the fire at Newtown was close to one of their sconces. Now, or shortly after, Glemham convened a Council of War to discuss what to do:

whether the Garrison should fight to relieve themselves, or expect relief from the King's Forces; it was determined to abide the siege.

Tullie wrote, reflectively, that had they then known, as they were to find out, that Leslie was so chary of committing his forces to action, then the garrison with the townspeople might well have made a full scale sally and have succeeded in ending the siege at one blow. He believed that many of the local forces outside the walls were "in their hearts friends to the town", and would have gone over to the Royalist side given the opportunity. We cannot know this, any more than we can reject what Tullie believed, who was there and who knew the prevalent mood. As a result of the decision to defend the town, Colonel Edward Grey and his cavalry were given leave to make their way south, and this they succeeded in doing without encountering any difficulty.

For the next six weeks until Christmas or thereabouts, the siege was nothing more than a series of sallies, occasional skirmishes with the Scots, and seizure of livestock by the garrison. Captain Forest, who had killed Birbeck in the attempt on Dalston Hall, "was the only man who kept the Cavaliers in play". He was killed in a skirmish, and as Tullie observed,

His loss was as much lamented within the walls as without being the only Enemy of Remarkable valour.

Here we must leave Tullie and his fellow defenders for the time being, to return across the Pennines to the east to follow Royalist fortunes there after the fall of York.
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

1. Fairfax, Memoir, p. 221.

2. T.T. E 100 (12).


5. Firth, Newcastle Memoir, pp. 38/9.


7. Firth, Marston Moor, pp. 71/2. Young, Marston Moor, pp. 217/8.


9. Young's estimate of the numbers engaged on Marston Moor, based upon a re-examination, seems likely to be accurate. He gave the allied armies as between 27,000 and 28,000 men, the Royalists about 18,000 of which fully 7,000 were horse. It will be at once apparent why Rupert, finding his enemy turning at bay, so much needed the reinforcements. Young, Marston Moor, pp. 59/60 and 68.

10. T.T. E 54 (11) A Relation of the good success of the Parliament's forces...

11. CSPD 1644, p. 311.

12. Fairfax, Memoir, pp. 221/3.

13. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 112/3.

14. Young, Marston Moor, pp. 213/4 gives the relevant section. The original is in the Wiltshire Record Office, Trowbridge.

15. See, for example, Morrah, P., Rupert of the Rhine, pp. 50/1.


17. Young, Marston Moor, p. xvi.

18. The best study of the battle of Marston Moor remains that of Colonel A.H. Burne in his The Battlefields of England, 1950. He, at least, perceived that the sources raised as many problems as answers. Austin Woolrych gave a clear, concise description of the battle in his Battles of the English Civil War, 1961. Lt. Colonel H.C.B. Rogers study of the battle in Battles and Generals of the Civil Wars, was at times topographically confused, but on the whole sound. The eminent work by Firth has been alluded to. Young's study, is chiefly of worth for his verbatim use of source material and for his estimate of the numbers of the opposing forces. Numerous other secondary studies have been done, nearly all of them repetitious and containing no new research. However, A.D.H. Leadman's paper, contained in his Battles Fought in Yorkshire, 1899, cannot be overlooked.

19. A detailed study of the problems of relating sources to terrain will be found in my forthcoming paper, Marston Moor - The Sources and the Site to be published by the Borthwick Institute of Historical Research in 1978.

20. Young, Marston Moor, p. 218.

21. Firth, Marston Moor, pp. 52/3 f.n. Young, Marston Moor, pp. 222/3.

22. HMC Seventh Report, Verney Mss., p. 448.

23. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 114.

24. All of these officers can be found in Vol. II.


28. CSPD 1644, p. 386.

29. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 114/5.

30. Ibid.

31. T.T. E 47 (8) A Particular List of Divers Officers taken Prisoners at Marston Moor...


33. T.T. E 54 (19)
34. Quoted by Wenham, Siege of York, p. 90.
35. T. T. E 4 (6) A Continuation of True Intelligence.
36. Ibid.
37. Wenham, Siege of York, pp. 93/5.
38. A musketeer, in the heat of action, would carry one or two musket balls in his mouth for easier re-loading. A particularly unpleasant side-effect of this was that a single ball could be chewed and then rolled in sand or grit before firing.
39. CSPD 1644, p. 359.
40. T. T. E 4 (6)
41. Ibid.
42. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 116, 122.
43. T. T. E 4 (6)
44. See above, p. 375.
45. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, p. 114.
46. T. T. E 100 (12).
47. Firth, Marston Moor, pp. 76/9
48. CSPD 1644, p. 351. Committee of Both Kingdoms to the earl of Essex on July 9th estimated 4 to 5000 at full strength.
49. Buchan, Montrose, p. 146.
52. Mayney Services, f. 181a.
53. CSPD 1644, p. 385.
54. Ibid., p. 388.
55. Ibid., p. 392.
56. Ibid., pp. 375/6.
57. Firth, Marston Moor, pp. 76/9. "there came into Kendall on Monday last July 8th the lord Morley and 3 other great Commanders hardly with men to attend them, and there lyeth very sad and discontent..."
58. Musgrave Mss.
59. Ibid.
60. See Vol. 2
61. Musgrave Mss.
62. This man is unidentified.
63. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 122/4.
64. Ibid., pp. 124/31. Mayney Services, f. 181a.
65. T. T. E 669 f. 9 (8) Summer Guard 1644. Sometime before 1647, acc.
   T. T. E 669 f. 4 (16) he had ceased active command.
68. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 59.
69. CSPD 1644, p. 422.
71. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, pp. 204/5.
72. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 54.
73. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, p. 206.
75. Colonel Ralph Assheton? Vicars, III, p. 12 referred to the said Ashton taking 200 horse near Holland and 60 near Preston, probably but not necessarily connected with the present service.
76. See also, Vicars III, p. 12 and T. T. E 7 (25) A True Relation of two great Victories obtained of the Enemy...
77. See Powell and Timings, Documents Relating to the Civil War, passim.
78. CSPD 1644, pp. 440, 442.
79. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, p. 204.
80. Warburton, III, pp. 21/2.
82. Duke of York's regiment of Horse, see Vol. 2.
83. Ex-Clavering's Horse, now John Forcers; see Vol. 2.
84. Possibly Captain James Mountain, ex-James King's Horse.
86. Vicars, III, p. 16.
88. See Stanning and Brownbill, Lancashire Royalist Composition, passim.
89. Ormerod, Lancashire Tracts, p. 206.
90. Ibid., p. 207.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 229, Good Service Hitherto Ill-Rewarded.
93. CSPD 1644, p. 543.
94. CSPD 1644/5, p. 91.
95. Ibid., p. 50.
97. CSPD 1644/5, p. 67.
98. Ibid., p. 77.
100. For Anderton, see Vol. 2.
101. See Vol. 2. Westby was probably captured as well but not named, since Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 105 mentioned three majors among the captives.
102. CSPD 1644/5, p. 95.
103. Ibid., p. 91.
104. Ibid., p. 168.
109. Tullie, pp. 7/12.
111. Vicars, III, p. 44.
112. For the mystery of Musgrave’s identity, see Vol. 2.
113. For all of these men, see Vol. 2.
115. See Vol. 2. for all of these identified officers.
116. For these, see the map, in an otherwise unremarkable paper, in Ferguson, R.S., ‘The Siege of Carlisle in 1644/5’, CWAS, Vol. XI, 1890, pp. 104/16.
117. See Vol. 2.
CHAPTER TEN

Royalism on the Defensive

War in the East and the Siege of Newcastle, July - December 1644.

In the aftermath of Marston Moor, Lancashire became, temporarily, the likely base for any renewed Royalist offensive across the Pennines. The threat from Lancashire, however, was not matched in Yorkshire, where the collapse of resistance at York heralded a steady Parliamentarian expansion. By December, when resistance in the west had come to centre upon Carlisle and Lathom, in the east Scarborough, Pontefract and Skipton alone flew the flags of defiance. Against these last three garrisons the allied wave broke time and again; and Pontefract, like Lathom, can be seen as enduringly a tribute to the stubborn last ditch stand of committed northern Royalism.

At first, however, the Parliament had things very much its own way. After the wholesale collapse of garrisons during the early weeks of the York siege, very few remained to the Royalists by the time that Marston Moor had been fought. The first of the few to fall was on July 26th, when Tickhill Castle, garrisoned by Arthur Redhead on behalf of the King, yielded to John Lilburn and Henry Ireton. Redhead and his brother (or son ?) Henry, are mysterious figures about whom the evidence is slight. Vicars described Arthur as a colonel but there is no supporting evidence for this, nor any trace of a regular regiment attached to him, or in the ranks of which he might have risen.

Tickhill lay in an advantageous position to interfere with the normal routine of trade in the West Riding. Vicars stated that Redhead and his men seized upon cloth moving between Halifax and Leeds and other places, and sold it back to its owners at inflated prices, which must have created an enormous indignation amongst clothiers who supposed the profit motive was all their own: sufficient, anyway, to call down retribution on the castle once the allied forces were free to move after the capture of York. The earl of Manchester took it upon himself to reduce Tickhill, for, as he told the Committee in London on the 27th, the garrison posed a constant threat to the peace of the Isle of Axholm, which lay within the jurisdiction of the Eastern Association. "The place is of consequence" he wrote, "lying so as to hinder all commerce betwixt Derbyshire and those parts"; he was then in Doncaster.

Against the castle he sent a force of 300 dragoons, which was quite sufficient for the task, although there is evidence that the moving spirit in the capture was Henry Ireton, a climbing man whose relations with his superior reflected a growing rift between Manchester and Oliver Cromwell.
Tickhill was, however, of secondary importance to that other great fortress of Sheffield, for long a source of munitions for the Marquess of Newcastle's army, and ably governed by Major Thomas Beaumont. Since the death in January of Colonel Sir William Saville, the Governor of York, who had been given responsibility for Sheffield by the Marquess in 1643, Saville's widow had moved into the castle, taking with her men, arms and, most importantly, the same type of courage as that which had made the Countess of Derby a force to be reckoned with in Lathom. According to one source, Lady Saville was pregnant when she entered Sheffield, but refused to yield the castle even when the enemy made that a condition upon her receiving the normal medical aids.

On the day after Tickhill yielded, that is, on July 27th, the earl of Manchester directed his summons to Beaumont:

Being in these parts by command of the Parliament, to reduce such places as yet refuse obedience to their commandes, I have sent you this summons that you deliver to me the Castle of Sheffield now in your possession, with the arms, ordnance, and ammunition therein. In the performance thereof you may expect all civilitie becoming a gentleman of your quality. (8)

Beaumont and Lady Saville preferred, however, to trust in their defences, described by Vicars, as consisting of walls six feet thick behind a trench or ditch 18 feet deep, with strong pallisaded breastworks. The artillery at Beaumont's disposal consisted of eight heavy guns and two mortars. There were 200 men in the castle, together with a troop of cavalry whose obvious duty would have been as infantry.

Manchester's agent in the attack on Sheffield was Lawrence Crawford, the impetuous springer of the mine during the siege of York, assisted by Lord Fairfax's cavalry and 300 infantry. On August 4th Crawford issued his own summons:

I am sent by the Earle of Manchester to reduce this place you hold, and therfore send you yet a sumons, though my trumpett was shot att, against the lawes of arms, the other day. You may easily perceive I desire not the effusion of blood, otherwise I should have spared myself this labour. If you think good to surrender it, you may expect all fair respects befitting a gentleman and soldiers: otherwise you must expect those extremities which they have that refuse mercy. I desire your answers within one hour....(11)

Beaumont was defiant, and siege preparations were begun.

Vicars went into considerable detail concerning the preparation of the assault:

ours advanced into the town, and there quartered that night (24th) August, in which night and next day they raised two batteries within threescore yards of the enemies outworks, where our ordnance fell to play upon them, and did as much execution on the walls as pieces of their bignesse could doe; the greatest being but a demi-culverin firing a 9 lb. ball. And after about foure and twenty hours playing and plying them thus with their ordnance, and finding it would protract
too much time to be thus battering with their pieces, they resolved to send to my Lord Fairfax for the Queen's pocket-pistoll and a whole culverin 15 lb. ball, which accordingly were soon brought thither and presently mounted: and the next morning betimes, after their coming, those three began to play, which did very great execution upon one side of the castle, and brought the strong walls thereof down into the trenches, and made a perfect breach. And the noble Major-General having prepared all things in readiness for storming the castle, both faggots, ladders, and other accommodations thereunto, & digested the form of storming by a council of warre, it was resolved to send another summons to the castle, which produced a present treaty between three gentlemen sent out of the castle. (12)

A contemporary tract, the Journal of the Earl of Manchester's Army gave a clearer idea of chronology. On August 1st Manchester's army was marching from Doncaster towards Rotherham by way of Conisbrough when Crawford was detached to take in Sheffield. Vicars probably gleaned much of his detail from this tract:

Sheffield is of a very considerable strength, both for naturall scituation being in a triangle with 2 Rivers, the water deep in the West and East sides of the castle, slackered on all sides, a strong Fort before the gate pallisado'd, a Trench 12 foot deepe, and 18 broad about the Fort, and the other parts of the castle, and a Breast-worke pallisado'd within the Trench.

Today it is almost impossible to visualise this. It is almost as if the wind, which blew away the powder smoke of the siege and the dust from falling masonry, had blown the landscape out of shape. As at Liverpool, there is no tangible relic of the past.

According to the Journal, it was on August 2nd that guns were sent for from York, and the culverin upon arrival was set up in the 'Parke', which after three shots pierced the governor's chamber wall. It was then that a trumpeter was sent, who was shot at, as Crawford, in his summons of August 4th mentioned. Whether it was against the law of arms, under the circumstances, was a matter of opinion. Since we have no reason to doubt what must be the official Manchester record of events, then the earl's summons of July 27th must have heralded Crawford's arrival: one can only be surprized that Crawford went to so much trouble to avoid storming the castle by attempting no fewer than three summons to parley, the last when he was on the verge of assault.

On August 3rd a Parliamentarian captain and a gunner were shot dead by snipers, according to the Journal, "out of all view of the castle". That curious observation, thoroughly tantalising in that nothing was added, can only be interpreted as meaning that someone, or a group of Royalists, was firing upon the siege forces from behind their lines. Perhaps a sympathiser within the town. On August 7th fresh supplies of ammunition reached Crawford, and on the 8th he blew down the battlements and part of a tower, dislodging a drake.
On the 9th additional guns were brought (from York?), and on the 10th Beaumont sent out his spokesmen in answer to Crawford's last offer of terms. For the duration of the talks, the Royalists handed over two hostages, a Captain Hemsworth and Colonel Sir John Kay who had taken refuge in the castle.

Joseph Hunter, in his thoroughly researched history of Sheffield, alluded to a lost manuscript document which he had seen, compiled apparently, by Lawrence Crawford. In this, Crawford stated that he first advanced on Sheffield in face of heavy resistance on the Rotherham road, and it may be that this was the single service performed by the troop of cavalry attached to the garrison.

The Royalist commissioners, acting as spokesmen for Beaumont and Lady Saville, were Captains Gabriel Hemsworth and Samuel Saville, and a civilian, Thomas Robson. The terms were agreed on the 10th, and were generous: the castle, with its guns and stores, was to be yielded officially at three o'clock on the afternoon of August 11th; the Governor and his officers were to march out with colours flying and drums beating, eachman with a horse, saddle and pistol (where appropriate), to go to Pontefract or wheresoever they pleased. The same terms applied to the rank and file. Wives and children and personal servants, likewise all personal property, were to go with the garrison.

As for Lady Anne Saville, she was even then in labour (her child was born on the 12th), and Crawford agreed that she and her children would stay in the castle until she was fit enough to return to Thornhill, her home, or wherever she wished to go. For the civilians who had taken shelter in the castle, Crawford promised no molestation, and seven days was to be allowed to all for the removal of their possessions. He also made it a provision of the terms, however, that he keep the hostages until they had been fully performed. This was Sir John Kay's way out of a service that he had never really been happy in.

Whilst Crawford thus took in Sheffield, the earl of Manchester's army had marched on, capturing Welbeck, the Marquess of Newcastle's normal place of residence in Nottinghamshire, on August 6th. On August 22nd Lord Fairfax reported to London that his own forces now lay before the garrisons of Pontefract, Knaresborough, Scarborough and Helmsley. Yet he admitted it was more to keep the Royalists within their own walls than to storm and take the strongholds.

Matters were certainly going well for the victors of Marston Moor, and by September attention was turning more towards Pontefract at the start of a long and bitterly fought siege. At the same time, and unbeknown to the Parliamentarians, a storm was brewing away to the north-west that was to burst in the vicinity of Pontefract in but a little time. Sir John Mayney was on his way out of Lancashire.
The Parliament's forces got off to an inauspicious start where Pontefract was concerned:

Colonell Sands Commander in chief, of the forces before Pumphret Castle, marched with his own regiment, consisting of seven Troops of horse to Kippax, within 6 miles of Pomfret where we had notice that the enemy had drawn out 400 horse...

If these horse were accurately assessed, and came from the garrison alone, this is an indication of the way in which Pontefract had become a focal point for broken regiments.

...as if intending to have fallen upon our quarters, but we drew that night into the field, and planted ourselves in so convenient a place, that had they fallen upon our quarters where our Colonell only left enough to draw them on with the greater eagerness. We had fallen into the flank and rear of them.

The Royalists, however, all of them veterans of the Marquess's army, were not to be so lightly fooled. The author of the report observed:

But I fear the Malignants and ill-affected of the Countrey gave them notice in what posture we were.

Hearing nothing further of the Royalist horse, the Parliamentarian troops rode to Brotherton, two miles from the castle, and at two o'clock in the morning drew into the field in battle array, moving towards the castle and coming to a halt within half a cannon shot, under the brow of a hill. The Royalists, however, refused to be drawn, and Sands had no choice but to retire to Medley [Nathley]. On the following day, Sands returned, and found a contingent of horse and foot from the castle drawn out to give him the action he so much desired.

They with their Horse skirmished the greatest part of the day with us, we forced them several times that day to retreat, but the hedges being lined with Musqueteers we were forced to forebear the pursuit; But towards the Evening, having pulled down some hedges, our Col. sent a party of horse (being under their cannon) to fall in the rear of their Ambuscade, both of horse and foot, which they perceiving stayed not to make a retreat, but shamefully ran; We pursued them to the castle gates, and killed there a Lieutenant and four Volunteers of quality: Sir John Redmayn son narrowly escaped...on foot. (19)

It is a pity that the journal of the siege of Pontefract, kept by Nathan Drake and to which we shall have to pay considerable attention later, did not begin until December, since a Royalist interpretation of these curious trials of strength would have been valuable. Sands had not come out of it so well as the letter given above would imply, for it would seem that the garrison had displayed their freedom of action particularly well. Sir John Redmayn, or Redman, of Thornton in Lonsdale, was at this time governor of the castle, a veteran of the Irish wars, but now sick with a consumptive condition. By Christmas the governorship had passed to a successor, as we shall see:20

Sands had no sooner settled down to begin a blockade of Pontefract, than
he was discomfited by that raiding cavalry brigade which, under Mayney, was sweeping across Yorkshire from northern Lancashire.

It will be remembered that having been turned away from Carlisle by Glemham, on September 10th the brigade had begun to move towards Skipton. Mayney's account of what followed was extremely brief:

Sir John Mayne marched with his horse and foot to Skipton with above a thousand head of cattle, part of which he delivered for the relief of that Garrison, and the rest of the Cattle for the relief of Pontefract Garrison, which was then besieged by the 1st Fairfax's Regiment, Col: Sandys Regiment, Major General Lambert's, and Col: Lister's, & divers others; with all which he engaged, and fought them, and beat them, and had pursuit of them sixteen miles, and took and killed above five hundred of their men besides Officers, and took six of their Colours; in which service Sir John Mayne was shot through his thigh, and his horse shot, and he remained in Pontefract for cure one moneth. (21)

Before examining the relevant sources for this exploit, apart from Mayney's own, we must endeavour to try to come to some idea of the chronology. We know, fortunately, that the brigade left Lancashire on September 10th for Skipton, and since it was driving cattle with it - in itself, no mean achievement through what became increasingly hostile territory - cannot have reached the Pontefract area until the 13th at the earliest. Mayney's relief of the garrison can therefore be pinned down to the 14th or 15th. As we shall see, Slingsby suggested that the brigade left the town again on November 8th, but Mayney's own estimate of the time that he lay in cure gives us a departure date of around October 11th. Since Slingsby's is the most detailed account which we possess, and since he can be taken as more accurate than not, in the sense that he rarely, if ever, can be shown to have twisted facts to suit a purpose, we can turn to him.

...upon ye 10th of September we set forwards our march towards Skipton, & by marching in ye night pass'd thro' ye enemy yt lay on every side; we had but one stop wch was at a place near Ingleton, where ye enemy had set a guard, but we soon made our passage, & but wth yᵉ loss of one Leivet. of horse, who was shot in ye body & dy'd by ye way, as he was carry'd....

Ingleton is only seven miles or so from Kirby Lonsdale, and well before Skipton, so these guards must have been local Lancashire Parliamentarian levies.

...and but one false alaram, wch was given at Settle, yt hindre'd our march & caus'd our horse to draw back above a mile; but wth it came to be understood, it was but a row of Trees wch they took for ye enemy.

One can think of certain diarists and memoirists who would have forgotten that type of thing.

Pausing at Skipton, where Colonel Sir John Mallory gave them a "little refreshment", the brigade set off again during the night and marched near to Bradford without interference. At that place, however
 came so suddenly upon a new rais'd Troop...as we took some of ym prisoners, & Capt. out of his bed: thus wth a speedy march we gott to Pomfrett. Yet had Coll. Sands intelligence (y laid about Pomfrett wth 15 colours of horse) of our march, report'd to be ye prince's horse, & a greater number y we were...

This assumption on the part of the Parliamentarians is shown by a report that Mayney's raid was, in fact, an attack by Cheshire Royalists. In view of the fact that the allies dominated much of Yorkshire, and of the distance between Skipton and Pontefract, their intelligence services must have been extremely inefficient.

Sands had sent to Lord Fairfax at York for reinforcements, but Fairfax, who as we know had been anticipating the return of Rupert with a good deal of anxiety, ordered Sands to quit the siege and to fall back on York. Mayney, however, was looking for a fight:

Sr John was resolved to fight wth Sands, & therefore desires ye governour of Pomfrett Castle Sr Jn Redman y lay sick in deep consumption at ye time, to assist him wth some foot out his Garison.

If Mayney was able to force Sands to battle contrary to the orders Sands had received, then the enemy must have been in a curiously disadvantageous position. If the Royalist cavalry came by way of Bradford to relieve Pontefract, they must have moved south of Leeds and probably approached the action by way of Castleford. Sands, who had been operating, so far as can be understood, from Brotherton, had his base to the north of Pontefract and across the river. Thus if he sent back to York for reinforcements and received instead orders to fall back, as Slingsby said that he did and would have known from prisoners, Sands can only have been extremely dilatory in moving to be caught, as he was, both sides of the river and sandwiched between Mayney's and Redman's forces. Can it be that Sands was expecting an attack from the south-west, from forces coming from Cheshire? And if that was so, then Mayney's passage through the West Riding driving a herd of cattle before him which cannot have gone unnoticed in that fiercely Parliamentarian area, was misinterpreted by the enemy commanders in the field. Thus Sands' defeat was partially caused by the ineptitude of the Parliamentarians.

Sr Jn Mainy had drawn up his horse wthin ye park & having got ye Garison soulgiers in readiness likewise, he causeth his horse to march thro' ye Town wthout stop, & advanceth towards Ferry bridge.

The enemy was got in readiness likewise, & drawn out on ye other side of ye bridge towards pomfret; Sr John sends a part to charge, & beats ym off their ground by ye help of ye foot soulgiers. They retreat beyond ye bridge, & would make good ye bridge; but Sr John's men animat'd seing ym forsake their ground, comes wth more courage. The bridge had a Turnpike over ye middle of it, wch they had fastn'd. Our men allights from their horses, takes out of a Smith's shop a Hammer or such an Instrument, & breaks open ye Turnpike. The enemy drew up again in Brotherton feilds,
meaning to charge us in ye narrow lane; we fight for
ground to fight on, & they to keep us in yt straight...
The attempt to close the bridge rather than to put men in a position to
challenge the crossing by Mayney's forces argues for a degree of panic on the
Parliamentarian side that can only have been due to the complete surprise
secured by the Royalists.

... & making good our ground we became at last masters
of theirs, but fain to seek it thro' Gapsteads & places
of disadvantage. But having gotten ye feild we at once
both charg'd ym & put ym to flight, giving chase to ym
as far as Sherburn; We took above 50 prisoners: & amongst
ye rest Sr Wm Listers Son, who had march'd out of York wth
us, being Capt. of ye princes Army; & ye next sight of him
wasn y e Soulgiers were about to strip him.

On September 20th, Lord Fairfax wrote a reply to a warning concerning
Mayney that had been sent from London the 16th of that month:

We are informed at the sudden appearance of near 2000 Horse
and Dragoons about Pontefract, which may endanger the city
of York. (24)

Fairfax told the Committee that the Royalists had fallen "unexpectedly upon
some troops of mine", although this was not true, since according to Slingsby,
who, as has been urged, was in a position to know from prisoners what had
taken place, Sands had been commanded back to York in face of the danger.
Fairfax admitted that his men were "put...to retreat with some loss". To
counteract this threat, from a force barely 1000 strong as Lord Fairfax
reported, he had drawn so many forces together that garrisons hitherto confined
were once more at liberty. Colonel Sir William Constable, marching against
Pontefract, forced Mayney's brigade to march away towards Newark, leaving their
commander behind them, wounded.

Mayney's own adventure is worth recounting, although Slingsby alone noted
it down:

Sr John was lost in ye chase & could not be heard of till
ye next day we heard he lay wound'd at a Town 3 or 4 miles
off, & going wth a party to fetch him off, we met him
coming in a Cart; for he had given out where he lay yt he
was of ye Parliament side, & some Soulgiers of ye garison
of Pumphrett going out to see wt boats they could take upon
ye river [Aire]. The town in question must have been that
of Beal] was told yt an officer of ye parliament's lay
wound'd at ye Town. They were glad of this prize, goes unto
him, and would have pillag'd him. He desir'd yt to take
nothing from him in this place; but after they had carry'd
him to pumphrett, all he had should be theirs. So they
provide a cart for him, being not able to stir by a wound he
had in his thigh, & brings him away wth a great deal of Joy.
But ye soulgiers were amaz'd w3I we met ym; & w3I he was
known, here was much joy yt he was return'd...

With Mayney safely esconced in Pontefract for his wounds to be cured, the
commanders of the brigade fell to discussing what they should do. Slingsby
was involved, probably Sir John Preston, and almost certainly Sir Samuel Tuke
who was colonel of the duke of York's regiment of horse. Since large numbers of cavalry could be a liability to a garrison, the march to Newark was resolved upon, Slingsby remaining behind with Mayney.

& after they were gone, comes Sr Wm Constable wth ye Yorkshire horse, & takes a circuit about ye Town, & only one man yt would charge in ye Town was kill'd dead in ye streets. There was not in ye streets 300 souligers to do duty; But at least 80 Officers & Gentlemen yt came for shelter. These & their servants made a fair troop, & was offered me to command, but in ye end they could not all agree, some being for one and some for another.

After Mayney was recovered, which Slingsby reckoned took eight full weeks, the two men resolved to go on to Newark, leaving behind them Pontefract garrison and what was left of the war in the north.

In view of the diligencd with which Slingsby recorded these events and with which we have pursued them, it would be unsatisfactory not to know what befell Mayney on the march to Oxford. His brigade, which had left for Newark shortly after the relief of Pontefract, had been badly beaten up whilst lying in quarters near the garrison town of Newark. Mayney was able to acquire some new horses and additional cavalry when he reached the river fortress, and after two weeks there he set off for Oxford. His journey was hazardous, and at Daventry his small force was attacked by a larger body of Parliamentary horse, from which action Slingsby barely escaped the field on a borrowed horse, whilst Mayney was once again wounded and lost in the confusion. He was later found by some of the earl of Northampton's cavalry in enemy hands, and brought to safety. At Daventry Slingsby and Mayney parted company, to meet up again in Oxford.

It is self-evident that in a flat land the slightest rise of the ground will bear notice. So it may be argued, can the exploits of the Mayney brigade be said to stand out in the north after Marston Moor, when the Royalist field forces of the old army had been entirely dispersed. Generous though such a judgement may be, there was far more to it than simply that. Mayney had shown how he could turn to his advantage a situation inherently desperate, as in Lancashire, and how he could avoid a disaster with an elan that Rupert's cavalry wanted at Ormskirk, or the Northern Horse at Malpas. He had then marched, virtually unmolested, straight through hostile territory and down into the Parliamentarian heartland of the West Riding, following open routes and driving cattle before him and, at the end of his march, he had met and routed a Parliamentary force which ought to have had every advantage over him. Mayney showed, on the small scale that his 1000 men were capable of, what might have been achieved had Rupert regrouped in Lancashire and returned to fulfill Lord Fairfax's deepest forebodings. The Royalist war in the north was not lost beyond repair on Marston Moor, but was thrown away in the weeks that followed.
It must be said, however, that whilst Mayney could disrupt the Parliament's activities, he could not put an end to them. The sieges would go on so soon as he was on his way to Oxford, or so soon as his brigade was making for Newark. Each Royalist garrison could, as we shall see, assist another in time of severe pressure, but many of the incidents of the last three months of 1644 in Yorkshire must of necessity be lost to us, the minor skirmishing which relieved the tedium of siege warfare but were in themselves of no moment to either side. One man who could be sure of a good press from the Royalists as time went on, was Colonel Sir Hugh Cholmeley whose Scarborough raiders experienced, for the time being, no difficulty in carrying on their old trade.

On Monday was fortnight \(\text{c. September 24th}\) Sir Hugh sent out a good Party of horse to visit the Rebels at Pickering Lithe, (14 miles from Scarborough) and there found some Rebell Dragooneers, 37 whereof were brought prisoners into Scarborough. (30)

On the other side of the coin, Vicars noted that in early October forces under Lambert and Sandys fell upon a Royalist troop in Craven, and that 120 horse were captured at Plumpton. This latter incident may have been that referred to by Whitelock, although his chronology was appalling, in which 140 Royalist cavalry commanded by an "Irish rebel" were set upon, and many taken. The Craven incident may have been a response to a raid sent from Skipton by Colonel Mallory against Ripon on October 3rd:

\[\text{this day seavennight Sir John Mallory Governour of } \text{Skipton} /\text{for His Majesty, sent out betwixt sixe score and seavenscore horse commanded by Colonell } \text{Edward} /\text{Gray and Major } \text{John} /\text{Hughes...}\]

Evidently, Grey had ridden from Carlisle direct to Skipton, but how long he remained there we cannot know. Mallory probably felt that he would make good use of Grey's men whilst he had them.

\[\text{...they marched as farre as Ripon, (18 long Northerne miles) where 400 of the Rebels horse lay quartered, on purpose to blocke up Knaresborough Castle and to sequester honest men's estates...but Colonell Gray and the Major...some got admission into the Rebels quarters at Rippon, killed some of them in the place, hurt others...}\]

They also captured Colonel James Mauleverer, 37 men. 150 horses and eight colours.

A curious report given by Sir George Vane on November 6th referred to the capture of Middleham Castle from the Royalists about that time. It will be remembered that Middleham had been in Parliamentarian hands in July 1643. The sources concerning events there, and the change of control, are apparently no longer extant, but it must have changed hands at some time in that same year at the height of Newcastle's supremacy. Vane reported that it had now been recovered without a shot being fired, although a Royalist clergyman had been killed.
The main Parliamentarian success before the end of the year came with the capture of Helmsley Castle, which had been under siege since early August. Sir Thomas Fairfax had been wounded seriously before the castle in September, but he did not delay in returning to the siege, once recovered, although in his memoir his reference to events in the north after Marston Moor is extremely brief.\footnote{36}

The Royalist governor of Helmsley was Colonel Sir Jordan Crossland, a suspect Catholic from Newby, not far away from the fortress that was in his charge. His deputy governor was Colonel John Talbot of Thornton le Street, very probably a Catholic also.\footnote{37} The defenders greatly assisted by the efforts of other garrisons to bring them relief, as in early November when an attempt was made from Skipton, assisted by detachments from Pontefract and Knaresborough castles.

some horse from Pontefract castle, Skipton and Knaresborough met at a Rendezvous, & went together towards Helmsley; the rebels understanding these Horse marching towards them, were unwilling to sit it out, and therefore rose from before the Castle, but these horse made such discreet haste, that they came to Helmsley e're the Rebells had packt up, and then fell on so gallantly that the Rebells instantly scattered, their Commanders...were most of them taken Prisoners...\footnote{38}

This report clashed in every particular with that in Vicars, where the victory was given to the siege forces, the Royalists losing five or six dead, 44 men captured along with eight or nine officers, the senior being a captain. Since the siege continued, even if the assault had been partially or totally successful, it had no lasting effects, except to cheer the morale of a hard pressed garrison.

On November 22nd, Helmsley surrendered, its garrison of 200 agreeing to favourable terms.\footnote{40} Crossland and his officers were given leave to go to Scarborough (where Sir Jordan continued his military career, going finally into Newark), accompanied by their men with matches lit, loaded muskets, colours flying and drums beating. They were even permitted to carry away two of the nine cannon in the place with them, an unusual procedure. The terms had been agreed on November 6th, and had been held in abeyance until the 16th in order to give time for relief if it could be procured. It did not come, and on that date, Crossland surrendered Helmsley.\footnote{41}

These minor victories and defeats were overshadowed, however, by violent events to the north where the town of Newcastle upon Tyne, thought least likely to hold out, finally went down to a storming assault after prolonged resistance. The man responsible for the defiance was the target of the most vitriolic Parliamentarian propaganda - Sir John Marley.

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The Siege of Newcastle, July to October 1644.

There is an abundance of source material available for the study of the renewal of the siege of Newcastle, and for events leading to its capture by storm. Unfortunately, and almost without exception, this material is either Scottish or Parliamentarian in origin, and any attempt to write an account of the siege from the viewpoint of the garrison, would necessarily be limited. Moreover, the extant allied sources were used to such good effect by C.S. Terry in his paper on the siege, that any study of the period must of necessity rely heavily upon his own shrewd interpretation of his documents, as upon his verbatim transcription of the bulk of them.

The impression must already have been conveyed that Terry wrote some of the finest military history yet written on the civil wars, although his concern was chiefly with the army of the Covenant, rather than with their English allies or their Royalist opponents. In what follows, I have endeavoured to re-examine the sources which Terry used, so as to give an account of the siege relating, as nearly as may be, to the experience of the garrison rather than of the besieging army.

The hatred felt by the English Parliamentarians for Sir John Marley, Mayor and Governor of Newcastle, has to be clearly understood. To Vicars he was "Atheistical and most desperately Malignant". When the town finally fell, he was put under close guard by the Scots, for fear, it was said, that the mob would lynch him: "for he is hated and abhorred of all, and he brought many Families to ruine". The impression conveyed by the enemy sources was that Marley, through a reign of terror within the city, forced the citizens to suffer all the exigencies of a storm. Yet, on the other hand, he was able to inspire in the defenders "patience, courage and devotion" as Terry put it. As we shall see, this man, about whom the Royalist party itself had reservations, carried himself with dignity, devotion to duty and a stubborn quality of loyalty that, had he been a Parliamentarian garrison commander, would have won for him unstinting praise from the London pamphleteers. As it was, these tract writers, safe from the rigours of war in the Parliament's capital city, were able to darken his name.

As has been shown, York surrendered because Sir Thomas Glemham was not prepared to risk the savagery of a storm. By the same token, Carlisle in 1645 and Oxford in 1646 were also to come to terms. Why Newcastle should have been the exception seems puzzling, in the sense that its strategic importance had all but vanished with the collapse of the northern army. Indeed, it can be argued that once the Marquess took the war against the Scots into the Bishopric, the town was no longer of real value either to the Marquess or to...
Map of the walls of Newcastle
to show towers and gates
mentioned in the text.*

(Based on Graham, F., The
Castle and Walls of Newcastle,
Newcastle, 1972).
the King's cause in general, except that it tied down enemy forces that would otherwise have been operating in the field. This has to be borne in mind in examining events, for it would appear that Marley, whatever his shortcomings may have been, saw his town as a symbol of resistance to the second invasion inside four years. From the beginning, he regarded the Scots as foreign enemies of the King. Perhaps he might have been less resolute had the siege army been composed of Parliamentarian forces alone, but we cannot know that: it would be to question the expressions of single-minded loyalty to the King which his letters to Leven and the Scottish commanders contained with marked emphasis. That he caused the citizenry of Newcastle to be subjected to all the terrors of a storm by refusing to yield is undeniable: but these terrors were largely unrealised, and unlike John Moore in Liverpool when confronted by Rupert, Marley at least put his own life in extreme danger.

Lithgow, a Scottish observer, wrote of the town that it

standeth mainly upon the dwelling face of a continuing hill falling down steep to the bordering river, where one narrow street runneth alone from Sandgate to Clossegate. (48)

As at Liverpool, Sheffield and other places, the major part of the city walls have been swept away in a tide of industrialisation.

The walls about the Town are both high and strong, built both without and within with saxo quadrato; and maynely fenched with dungeon Towres...

Lithgow should be understood here to mean 'donjon' towers, or towers of such strength and size as to be, at least in the eyes of a Scotsman used to the peles and tower houses of the lowlands, to all intents and purposes keeps in their own right.

...interlarded also with Turrets, and amongst with them a large and defensive battlement, having eight sundry ports.

Of the Royalist strengthening of these older defences, Lithgow observed that every street running from each of the six gates was casten up with defensive breastworks, and planted with Demi-culverines of iron: And above all other workes, the Towne Castle itself was seriously enlarged, with diverse curious fortifications, besides breast works, Redoubts, and terreniat Demilunes; and withal three distinctive Horne-workes, two of which exteriorly are strongly palosaded, and of great bounds.

The battlements had been blocked up with stones, leaving small slits for the musketeers to fire from, and the great capstones had been levered free and under-pinned with small stones to facilitate the dislodging of them onto the heads of attackers. The external trench had been deepened, and the walls themselves coated with mud and small pebbles to prevent attempts to scale them. Much of this work must have been carried on after the departure of the main Scottish army to the south, leaving behind a handful of regiments which far from keeping Newcastle occupied, came under pressure from Clavering.

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With the absence of Leven at the siege of York, and partly as a much-needed response to the activities of Montrose and Clavering, on June 9th a commission was issued to the earl of Callendar to raise a second Scottish army. To its charge was committed the reduction of Newcastle and of Tynemouth, and the security of Sunderland which had been threatened in May by a conspiracy from within engineered by Montrose. Callendar's orders, however, were far too wide for his army to fulfill, although it was said to be 10,000 strong, a figure which might have been rounded-up. He not only had to put men into Sunderland which was too far from Newcastle to be his permanent headquarters, but he had also to lay siege to a town open to the north, west and east, and contain an outlying garrison in Tynemouth. More, he had to take back into Scottish hands those fortified places lost to Montrose in May, especially Morpeth and Lumley castles. The port of Hartlepool, which had seemingly been always under Royalist control, was also a threat in that it gave access to the sea.

Callendar organised his priorities correctly. Leaving Scotland on June 25th, he recaptured Morpeth and crossed the Tyne into Durham at Newburn. On July 24th - the earl was nothing if not leisurely - he took the surrender of Hartlepool and, at a distance, that of Stockton on Tees. The impression is too strong to ignore that Callendar, having news of Marston Moor, had determined to bide his time and not to risk his army until the main Scottish forces should return north. Nonetheless, on July 27th he gave his troops action when they captured Gateshead:

I marched with the armie within two myles of Newcastle, and gave orders for beating of the enemies in, which was done, so that before the soune sett they were verie neir the port at the bridge end, and at night made the port unusefull for the enemies falling out by barricadoeing of it, so that there is nothing without the port in Gaitsyde unpossessed by us. ....if the generall /Leven/ resolve not to march hither, or that I be pressed by a powerful enemie, which I verie much doubt, I shall be necessitate to quitt it, and reteir to Sounderland. (54)

Callendar was referring to the possibility, in his eyes slender, of the forces under Goring and Langdale, then in Cumberland, advancing to relieve Newcastle. It is an indirect tribute to the Northern Horse that they could, simultaneously, inspire Lord Fairfax with fears for his tenure of York, and the Scots with fears for their activities in Northumberland. Yet Callendar must have received intelligence that the cavalry was now fragmenting, with Montrose gone into Scotland again, and Rupert, going into Cheshire, exerting a pull on the rest to follow him.

Callendar's possession of Gateshead did not go unchallenged. On the 28th according to Lithgow, an attempt was made to dislodge the Scots. The Royalists had retained half of the bridge in their own possession, and sought to make good their hold. They "courageously defended" their section, but by
sheer weight of numbers, the Scots gained the better halfe of the Bridge, and with much adoe fortified the same with earthen Rampiers, and Artillerie which still so defensively continued, untill the Toune was taken in by storm.

Callendar then erected five batteries opposite the town, and moved his own headquarters nearer to them. A fleet of 10 Parliamentary ships had at the same time sailed into the Tyne to prevent assistance coming to the garrison by sea. One wonders how near they could come for their blockade to be effective without danger from the guns of Tynemouth.

There followed a period of calm for the Newcastle garrison, whilst Callendar waited impatiently for the appearance of the earl of Leven. He made his feelings plain in a letter written on August 4th - Leven did not personally leave the Leeds area until the 7th - from Usworth. Alluding to the demands upon his depleted mobile forces, the earl described the Royalists as controlling "all the boats and keills" on the Tyne, with which they could hinder his own movements.

Leven appeared at Bishop Auckland on the 10th, and met Callendar on the following day. They toured the siege works, such as they were, for a day or so, and then Leven crossed the Tyne and set up his headquarters at Elswick. Callendar, too, crossed the river, and established himself on the east of the town, facing the walls between Sandgate and Carliei Tower. Tynemouth was in his rear.

On August 16th, Leven sent a letter to the governor and his advisors inviting them to nominate spokesmen to discuss the rendering of the town. On the day following, came the first direct contact between Leven and Marley since February, in the form of a lengthy letter:

Wee have perused and well weighed your Letter, and must return this Answer, That whereas you desire to make manifest your intentions for the purity of Religion, his Majesties happinesse and peace of his Kingdomes, we wish it were so (and not rather pretences), and whereas you write in a speciall manner, to give satisfaction of your desires of our weall and peace, Is it possible we should believe you in this, when We see you are the one and only disturbers of our welfare and peace? But to remove all scruples and misunderstandings...

This was a parody on the wording of Leven's original letter, "That all scruples and misunderstandings may therefore the better be removed".

...Wee doe declare to you, and the whole world, that our love and obedience is so much to King and Parliament, that if you can show us commission from his Majesty and the Parliament, to undertake what you desire, wee shall most willingly condescend thereunto: but otherwise we neither dare, nor will meete, or treate in matters of so great importance, And besides must needs thinke all your intentions and designs are but to delude ignorant people; And to conclude, if your high respects to his Majesties honour, the shunning of further effusion of blood, the preservation of Newcastle from ruine
and extremity of War, be real, return home with your Army, 
live in peace, and let your neighbours enjoy the same: If 
not we know and trust, that God who is with us, is above all 
against us, and in this confidence we shall ever remaine, 
Your affectionate friends, if you please....

Apart from Marley himself, whose signature was first at the foot of the letter, 
this declaration was signed by eight others. Four of them had been, were, or 
were to become, officers, although the most prominent, Sir Alexander Davison, 
was too old. He was the head of a merchant family in the town which was whole-
heartedly committed to the King's cause. A former Mayor and Sheriff, Sir 
Alexander was killed in the final storm, with his youngest son Joseph. Sir 
Nicholas Cole, Bart. of Kepyer was the son of a merchant said in his time to 
have been "the richest man in the north", and was one of the Royalists exempted 
from pardon in 1646 (so, not surprisingly, was Marley). Either at this time 
or in the 1648 rising, Cole was a cavalry field officer. Sir Thomas Liddell 
was a captain in the Newcastle garrison Trainband regiment, and had a suspect 
Catholic background. Robert Shaftoe may have been a former cornet in Colonel 
Sir Richard Dacre's regiment, although his social standing may mean that this 
was another of the same name. Robert Shaftoe of Tanfield, clearly the 
signatory, was a colliery owner. The other signatories were either Aldermen 
or leading merchants within the town, Ralph Cock, Ralph Cole of Brancepeth, 
Sir Francis Bowes and Leonard Carre. 

Leven now pressed on with his siege, and occupied the suburbs around 
Sandgate, Closegate, Pilgrim street gate, and Newgate, to facilitate the digging 
of mines. He also entertained fugitives from the town, Aldermen and others 
whose views no longer coincided with Marley's own, although these had for the 
most part joined in the defiance in February. They could see the wreck 
coming, and were determined to salvage their own fortunes if they could, by 
being on the victorious side.

The Royalists launched a counter-attack to disrupt mining work at Close-
gate. It was eminently successful, scattering the enemy and leading to the 
capture of a Scottish lt. colonel. The guns on the walls, too, were proving 
effective and giving the enemy little rest. On the 24th a second Royalist 
outfall - or the second of which we know anything - struck the Newgate area, 
routed the Scottish guards protecting the mine works, and then retired back 
into the town. It is a pity that we must forever remain in ignorance of the 
names of the Royalist commanders responsible for these undertakings. 

By September 3rd, Montrose's activities in Scotland were such as to draw 
away forces from Leven's siege army, including Callendar, although he returned 
shortly. It may be that Marley was relying on Montrose to have this effect, 
but it was minimal. The mining was now well in hand, and on September 7th 
another letter was sent to Marley signed, this time, by Sir William Armyne, 
Parliament's agent, and Lord Sinclair. This letter was, in fact, aimed not
simply at Marley, but at those less stalwart spirits that might be around him, as will be seen.  

because we have seen by experience, you have heretofore trusted to rotten reeds and broken staves (and peradventure some amongst you may persuade with you to do so still) not trusting only to your own strength within, but also relying upon others without your walls who may fail you if you lean upon them, and in your greatest confidence utterly deceive you....

At this date, the Scots must have been fairly sure that no attempt to relieve Newcastle would now be made, although Mayney and Slingsby were at large on the Lancashire/Westmorland border and Montrose was a free agent. However, the wording of the Scottish letter betrayed some uncertainty, which the departure of men for Scotland to deal with Montrose must have occasioned. Marley was probably feeling reasonably hopeful.

Levens's tame Newcastle Aldermen also had a hand in compiling a second letter, although this was delivered tied to stones and thrown over the walls at night. It was intended for dissemination amongst the populace, and was couched in threatening terms, calling upon the Citizens, and Soldiers, for the preservation of your Towne, the safety of your Persons, Estates, and Families, to think upon some way of a speedy Accommodation, and no question you shall meet with a very favourable hearing. It is no more wisdom, nor Honour, but extreme madness, any longer to hold out, when the danger is present and certain; and when all your hopes of relief have now failed you. (72)

Marley and his fellow commanders treated this letter with contempt, since they did not allude to it in their reply to the official Scottish notice. The governor's letter was brief and dignified: 

whereas you tell us we trust to broken Reeds and rotten staves, we confidently say again and again, that the God on whom we rely, is our strength, and the Rock of our Faith, wherein the strength of our walls doth consist is so firm, that we fear not your threats, your Canon, nor what can be invented against us; And desire you to consider this... (73)

A bombardment followed this rejection, directed at the north-western corner of the town, at the Andrew Tower and St. Andrew's Church. The heavy fire succeeded in breaking down the wall to very nearly ground level, creating a substantial breach, but the Royalists repaired it very rapidly with timbers and stones and cart loads of earth.

Shortage of powder caused a temporary cessation in the Scottish fire, and nothing very much seems to have been attempted by either side until the 21st of September. On that day, and on the 23rd, Marley launched two sallies against the besiegers. Mercurius Aulicus, noting these, and playing them up for all they were worth to boost morale at Oxford, observed that the hungry Scots have been so beaten by it, that the number before the Towne lookeis so small as if none were there but honest Scots.  

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A week later, an attempt by the Scots to mine beneath Sandgate or the wall in that area nearest to the riverside, was discovered by the defenders. The usual answer to mining was to drown the works and the workers, and so Callendar, who had returned to the siege, fired the props prematurely and withdrew. As Terry said, "so far, the besieged were giving a very good account of themselves". On October 3rd, two further mines were discovered and drowned, and this success was followed by the loud ringing of church bells to broadcast the fact to friend and foe. This caused Lithgow to complain that the Royalists were now growing "insolent".

Terry suggests, that this was very much a matter of keeping spirits up inside the walls. Quoting extensively from contemporary London newsletters, he endeavoured to convey an impression of wholesale destruction within the town, without questioning the validity of the reports. It was variously claimed that the Royalist cannon had been silenced by those of the Scots, and that disease was rife in the town and food low. Refugees from Marley's rule of terror were said to be leaving the town with difficulty and coming into the Scots. There was, however, no corroboration of these statements in official or semi-official reports of the time; indeed, the Royalists were holding their own very well, and it was this continued defiance that led Leven at last to decide upon a wholesale storm. Not, however, before he had exhausted the possibilities of negotiation, and this raises two points worthy of discussion.

Most importantly, how was Leven to address Marley? All the Scottish letters indicate that Marley was seen as Mayor, responsible to the Aldermen, rather than as the Marquess of Newcastle's appointee as Governor. The point is significant. If Leven had dealt with Marley as Governor, even if Newcastle's commission to him had waned with the Marquess's departure into exile, he was responsible only to Marley in the exchange of views and opinions. If, on the other hand, and as was the case, he wrote to Marley as head of the town council, he could contact the less stalwart members of that council and so, indirectly, hope to exert influence on the Mayor to surrender on terms. There was a suggestion that Marley perceived this and endeavoured to treat Leven's correspondence as concerning him in his military capacity, whereas Leven constantly regarded Marley as a civilian. This factor should be borne in mind in examining the last days of the siege which we are now approaching.

The second point is that treaty discussions were begun, not by the garrison command, but by Leven. The overtures came from the Scots at the start of August, and this is a point conceded by Terry.

The Scottish summons of October 14th was addressed by Leven to "The Maior Aldermen, and Common-Counsell of the Towne of New-castle". In the letter, Leven demanded that Newcastle be surrendered, in return for good terms not clearly specified. Marley was cajoled.
by no means conceale this our last offer and warning from the Citizens, and Souldiers; As you will be answerable to God and these whom it may concerne. If in these things you fail, you may then expect the extremities of warre...(80)

On the 15th, Marley and 29 of the Council met to discuss the letter, and sent back a unanimous reply designed, Terry suggested, to spin out time. It may be, however, that in this letter we see Marley bowing to the wishes of some of the less committed or resolute councillors, although who they were, we can probably never know, though it is fair to assume that they existed. The Royalist reply ran

Wee have received your Letter wherein you require and Summon us to give up and surrender the Towne, as you say, for the use of the King and Parliament: alledging diverse reasons mixt with threats to move us thereunto, all which we have well weighed and considered, and as formerly, so now return this Answer, that wee declare to you and all the world, that we keep this Town for the use of his Majesty, and that wee have full Power and Authority from his Majesty so to doe...

Marley was here, surely, stressing his military command.

...and if either you, or any other can show us better or later warrant from his Majesty, we will submit. And allthoughe wee neither dare, nor will acknowledge that disloyalty to our lawfull King (which you call reducing to just obedience) is the way to preserve us from Ruine, and to enjoy the fruits of a settled Peace; yet, that you and all the world may see we desire to shunne the effusion of Christian blood; we desire you send us in writing upon what terms and conditions you would have us deliver up the Towne, and then we shall return you a further answer (which we hope will be satisfactory) and if this will not give you content, proceed and prosper as your cause requires, and let the blood that is, or shall be spilt, lye upon their soules and consciences that deserve it, and if we be the fault, Let this subscribed under our hands, testify against us.

This blunt statement was followed by 30 signatures. Marley, Nicholas Cole, Thomas Liddell, Alexander Davison, Francis Bowes, Ralph Cole, Leonard Carr and Robert Shaftoe signed as before. Ralph Cock, however, was not present, nor did his name appear again. He may have recanted and kept to himself, or it is possible that he went over to the Scots sometime after the letter of August 17th. Of the remaining 22 signatories, several held military rank either in the garrison, or as Reformadoes from broken Royalist regiments.

Probably the most prominent of these officers as set their hands to the defiance was Thomas Riddell. It can be questioned whether this was not Thomas Riddell the elder, in great old age: but the true identification may be the old man's son and namesake, Colonel and Governor of Tynemouth. Although there is no evidence conclusively to support this latter choice, it is conceivable that during these exchanges of letters, Colonel Riddell may have been given safe conduct through Scottish lines to confer with Marley. If the main garrison were to surrender, the lesser must automatically follow. The Riddells were a leading Catholic family. Richard Tempest, another of the signatories, was very probably Sir Richard Tempest of Stella, a convicted
Recusant. His main military activity was to come in the 1648 rising. Captain Cuthbert Carre, Sheriff of Newcastle, served in the city regiment. Edward Stote, a city merchant, was also a captain in Marley's foot. Of the others named, either Thomas or Charles Clarke may have been the Major Clarke of Riddell's regiment of the Tynemouth garrison, and if so, this would support Thomas Riddell's identification as a signatory.

Leven responded quickly to this letter. He urged that hostages be appointed by the council and that a time be set for a meeting between nominated "judicious men" of either side, at some point between the town walls and the Scottish lines. Marley and the council sent their response on the following day - playing always for time - the 16th.

We received your second letter, directed as the former, and upon good consideration we could have wished (that according to our desires in our former letter) you would have sent in writ the conditions and terms you desire the Town upon, that we might altogether have considered and condescended to what had bin most fitting and convenient for us to grant, but since you like not that course, but desire hostages may be sent, and some appointed to meet and treat at a place convenient: we must acknowledge and confess that we do not hold that power in us to grant, as Major /Mayor/, Aldermen, and Common counsell, but solely to be in Master Major as he is Governor of the military affaires, who we find very willing to condescend to any thing that may tend to the honour of His Majestie, the welfare of Newcastle, and the shunning effusion of blood; if you please to write unto him for that purpose, and so wishing a happy and honest peace....

The earl of Leven was now obliged to negotiate directly with Marley as Governor, and added a little force to his next letter, which was sent on the same day. He demanded an answer by 10 o'clock in the morning of the 17th, to the request for hostages and nominated spokesmen. This letter was carried to Marley, who delayed a reply until the next morning when he told Leven that the Scots ought to nominate their own spokesmen first, and that Marley would then select persons suited to their rank and status.

The Scots were impatient to see an end to this protracted business, and Leven fixed noon as the hour for the meeting, naming his own representatives. This put Marley on the spot, but he effectively delayed yet again, although he may have been genuinely unable to keep to the commitment imposed by the earl, as he explained: "I have received your letter, and doe approve of those men you name to treat, being all strangers to me...." Clearly, Marley would have taken exception to men like Sir William Armyne or any of the fugitive Newcastle Aldermen. Leven, however, was keen to keep the business as closely Scottish as he could. His emissaries were to be Sir Adam Hepburn, the Scottish Treasurer at War; Colonel Sir David Home of Wedderburn; and John Rutherford, attended by a secretary.

...you desire that the meeting may be at twelve of the clock, and that I will send the names of those I intend to appoint
as hostages, to be exchanged at the time and place above mentioned, which is impossible; for I received your letter half an hour after twelve, and certainly you mean not twelve at night; but I will keep promise, and to that purpose, this night I will send you the names of the hostages I intend to send to the place appointed and the time to be tomorrow at nine of the clock in the forenoon; as for those that are to treat, I intend to supply the place of one my selfe, and shall send you the names of the rest....

Marley's willingness to leave the town for talks personally, must tell against the view that he and he alone was keeping the defence going. Of course, if he was merely time-wasting, these observations are irrelevant, but if he was genuinely ready to talk at least, then he could not have feared any form of coup during his absence. It is likely that the faint hearts and lukewarm Royalists had long since vacated the town.

Later on the 17th he named the hostages. These were all to be officers the chief of them being Colonel Charles Brandling of Alnwick. The other two were Lt. Colonel Thomas Davison, the eldest of the sons of Sir Alexander, a commissioned officer in Marley's garrison regiment; and Captain Cuthbert Carr. Negotiations were to be conducted by Marley himself, Sir Nicholas Cole, Sir George Baker the Recorder of Newcastle, with a secretary.

At nine in the morning on the 18th the hostages passed out of the town and the Scottish commissioners entered. What happened within the town was recorded by Hepburn, the Scottish Treasurer, and taken at its face value, it suggests strongly that Marley was merely prevaricating. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the meeting took place after all, inside the walls, since Leven had initially suggested, and Marley had apparently agreed to, a spot between the walls and the siege lines.

According to Hepburn, Marley, Cole and Baker "gave us big Words" but no matter what the Scots said, "they would not so much as come to speak of conditions". After three or four hours, the Royalists promised only to consider the terms put forward by the three Scots - although we do not know what these terms were or how favourable they were. It may well be that Leven, having secured a conference, endeavoured to force harsh terms upon the defenders, and that Marley, quite properly, balked at them. Hepburn, however, insisted that Marley and the other two showed no inclination to act promptly, nor to put forward counter-proposals, and told the Scots that anyway, once terms were agreed, the garrison would demand 20 days in which to hope for relief before they were fulfilled.

Hepburn pointed out that they were empowered to conclude an agreement or to withdraw by nightfall, and offered to convey a letter to Leven, which Marley refused to write, although he offered to send one on the following morning, the 19th.

I went thus far with them, which was more then in Policie I
should have done: yet so fain would I have effusion of blood shunned, that I told them in plain terms, That if they did write anything, it should be that night.

The Royalists sent out a letter after all, probably when the Scottish spokesmen had gone, at eight that night. It was brief:

We have had some discourse this day with your Commissioners; but you have bound them to have our answers to your demands in so short a time, as we could not give them that satisfaction as we would gladly; considering they demanded that which was not according to your propositions; namely, his Majesties honour, and the welfare of Newcastle. But we are so unwilling to see Christian blood shed, as that if you please to rest satisfied until Monday [the 21st], we shall then, God willing, send you Propositions as we hope will give content... (88)

Hepburn denounced this letter as averring "many untruths", but it is hard to see what he meant. If we knew what Hepburn and his fellow commissioners had said, it would be possible to judge, but Terry's flat acceptance of the Scottish interpretation cannot be supported.

During the afternoon of the 18th, probably whilst the talks were in progress, the Scots made obviously offensive dispositions around the walls, to add impact to their negotiations. Although Terry did not point this out, such proceedings must have been in violation of whatever temporary truce prevailed to facilitate the talks. It may be that Marley, Cole and Baker, advised of enemy troop movements, took exception to them: they may even have been threatened by Hepburn. If their apparent obtusity was due to the Scots' behaviour, it was justified. Leven, however, on receipt of the letter written on the evening of the 18th, criticised Marley for his slackness in the talks;

Sir, I admire how you are not ashamed still to continue in your delatory way, and draw on the guilt of innocent blood upon your head. You demanded a treaty...

This was not true.

...and Commissioners to be sent into Newcastle, which was accordingly granted, who expected you should have proposed conditions and propositions to them...

That remark was valid only if Marley had instigated the talks, which he had not.

...This your dealing makes it too apparent, that what ever your pretences be, your intentions have not been real...

Even so, Leven now listed his conditions in full. We need not go into them minutely, but the burden of them was this: officers and soldiers were to leave the town for any destinations within a 40 mile radius, provided that such a destination was not already Royalist held. (There must have been doubt on Marley's part whether his military rank would be recognised and the terms be held to admit him and other Aldermen). Refreshment would be provided on the march. Strangers and persons not ordinarily resident would enjoy similar conditions, whilst the sick and wounded would be allowed to remain until they were fit enough to enjoy the provisions of the general terms. The citizens
were guaranteed immunity from plunder, and the ancient rights and privileges of the town were to be respected. There would be no free billet without consent, and only a detachment of the army would actually enter the town as a garrison.

Behind these terms, and again we do not know that they represented the terms propounded by Hepburn and the other commissioners, was the threat of storm. Leven told Marley that hostilities would not cease until eight in the morning on the 19th, at which time, he expected a reply, "if you fail...I shall take it as a refusal, and give up all treaty". With daylight on the 19th came a bombardment directed at Sandgate, Pilgrim street gate, Westgate and White Friar Tower.

The letter from Marley, Cole and Baker which arrived on the morning of the 19th was somewhat more defiant.

Wee received your Letter, wherein you say, we cannot make good that your Commissioners demands are either against his Majesties honor, or the welfare of Newcastle; we will give you but one reason amongst many; Whether it be for his Majesties honour that the Town of Newcastle should be rendred to any of another Nation; nay more, if it be for the honour of the English Parliament: and that it is not for our welfare is so clear needs no answer. And whereas you say, you wonder we are not ashamed to be so delatory, having demanded a Treaty; We say, we wonder you can be so forgetful, knowing we have your Letter to show that the Treaty was your own motion; but for Answer to the rest, and to your Articles; We say, the delivery of Newcastle is not of so small moment, but if you intend as you say, time may well be given till munday for giving answer, for in case we should give consent to let you have this Towne, there is divers more Articles then you have set downe, both fit for us to demand and you to grant. Therefore if you would shun effusion of blood, as you profess, forbeare your acts of hostility, untill we give you Answer upon Munday, wherein we will not faile; otherwise we doubt not but God will require an account at our hands, and besides, will keepe and preserve us from your fury.

This letter clearly shows that the struggle was as much a matter of English against Scots, as of Royalists against Covenanters. Hepburn called it a "bitter invective letter". Leven ignored it, having resolved that it must now come to a storm.

Receiving no response to this letter, Marley sent out another to Sinclair which the Scots saw fit to take as a jibe against Leven, and certainly Marley's humour had not deserted him. In fact, throughout the correspondence between the garrison and the besiegers, one can detect at most times a wry irony in what Marley had to say.

I Have received divers Letters and Warrants subscribed by the name of Leven, but of late can hear of none that have seen such a man; besides, there is strong report that he is dead; therefore to remove all scruples, I desire our Drummer may deliver one Letter to himself; thus wishing you could think on some other course to compose the difference of these sad
distracted Kingdomes, then by battering Newcastle, and annoying us who never wronged any of you; for if you seriously consider, you will find that these courses will aggravate, and not moderate distempers....

In *A True Relation of the Taking of Newcastle*, an anonymous Scottish writer noted that when Leven was shown this letter, he told Marley's drummer who had carried it to him that "hee hoped to doe him some service yet before he died".94

The general storm of the town on the 19th was fiercely resisted, and a clearer understanding of the main points of the action will be gained from reference to the plan of the walls. Terry95 gave a definitive and detailed examination of the Scottish preparations remarkable for its lucidity, but he provided no plan or map against which to set his description. In what follows, I have relied heavily upon Terry's interpretation, which requires neither revision nor any but the smallest of criticisms.

Quoting Lithgow, Terry gave a vivid impression of the strength of the town:

The walles here of Newcastle, are a great deale stronger then those of York, and not unlyke to the walles of Avineon, but especially of Jerusalem.

Lithgow had probably not seen Carlisle, which might have made a more immediate comparison. The strength of walls, however, had been created at a time when artillery was still fairly primitive, and Terry pointed out that at all sides, with the exception of the northern, it was vulnerable to concentrated fire. The ground outside the eastern wall, from Sandgate to the Carliol Tower, was sufficiently elevated to provide excellent artillery positions, even though assault on foot was there extremely hazardous. A little to the north-east of Carliol Tower stood a sconce held by Marley until the 18th, the Shieldfield Fort. Since it was abandoned prior to the storm, we need pay little attention to it, although Lithgow described it minutely. Why Marley evacuated it is a mystery, unless he felt that the men within it were in risk of being cut off.

The most easy access for a direct assault by the Scots could be had at any point from Andrew Tower to the Neville Tower near Closegate.

By the 19th, the Scottish artillery had made breaches in the walls at Carliol Tower, Closegate and at Newgate. The breach at Newgate and that referred to earlier as at St. Andrew's Church must have been one and the same, and these breaches can only have been superficially repaired by the garrison. To add to the breaches, on the morning of the 19th preparatory to the assault, four mines were sprung: two of these were at Sandgate, the other two at Westgate and White Friar Tower respectively, although the Scottish assault did not involve a direct attack on Sandgate. The only substantial portions of the walls remaining are on the west, between Westgate and Newgate, and the breach at Westgate must have been between the Durham and Herber Towers at the point where the present Stowell street emerges from the city proper.
In the afternoon the Scottish forces were organised into three assault formations or brigades. One faced the breached wall from Westgate down to Closegate. A second faced the walls at Newgate; whilst the third prepared to attack on the line from Pilgrim street gate to Carlilol Tower. Callendar held a fourth force opposite Sandgate. Terry judiciously assessed the Scottish strength on the eve of the attack at 12,600 men, some 4,500 of whom were facing Newgate. Of the dispositions of the defenders, we know much less. Captain Cuthbert Carre commanded at the Newgate, where he made a fierce resistance although he cannot have had more than 300 men. At Pilgrim street gate Captain George Errington had about 180 men, probably two companies of the city regiment, since Lieutenant William Robson and Ensign Thomas Swan ranked under him in command. It was said by Hepburn that the Scottish entry at Pilgrim street gate was made "not without dispute", whilst local story had it that Errington refused to surrender even when the town was thoroughly occupied, and shot upon those of his own side who tried to induce him to lay down his arms.

A Letter from Newcastle, Hepburn's account of the storm, gave a brief but vivid description of the Scottish attack. At Newgate "great dispute was made....and some of our officers killed, whereof one Major Robert Hepburn cannot be enough lamented".

They within the Town made all the opposition they could, on the Walls, and in the Streets. Some houses are burnt: The Maior and some others are fled to the castle, and did presently beat a Parley, which the Generall would not hear, at that time, in respect they had been the instruments of so much bloodshed.

The official Scottish account is that contained in A Particular Relation which showed that the attack went in as daylight began to fail. One is tempted to wonder whether Leven saw some advantage to the side that attacked with oncoming darkness, for this is what he had done at Marston Moor, with effect. According to this source, the attackers met with no small opposition, and nothing was left undone by the enemy to repell the fury of the assault; They played very hotly and desperately from the Castle upon the breaches, and from the flanking towers of the walls with scattered shot

This may be a reference to the use of case-shot by the Royalists, but anyway indicates that the garrison's artillery was by no means silenced. the difficile-accesse to the breaches, and the mighty advantages of their walls and workes within the Towne, made a considerable loss of Souldiers and Officers of good quality....after two hours very hot dispute upon the breaches, they found their first entry at the mine sprung on the west-side of the Towne, neere to Close-gate; and after their entry, were furiously charged three severall times by the horse which were in Town, but the charge was gallantly sustained and the place maintained, whilst the reserve came to assist.....
Resistance now gradually collapsed, the regiments found that the Royalists retired within doors. Marley, however, with two Scottish Royalists, Lords Crawford and Maxwell

and others of the perverse crew, authors of all the evils which might justly have fallen upon the Town, so exceedingly obstinate, according to the rule of warre, did all betake themselves to the Castle, whence they cast over a white flag, and beat a parle, but before notice could be taken thereof, all the service was neere done.

According to a letter written from Sunderland on that night the principall of them fled into the Castle, and offer to submit upon Quarter, which his Excellency refuses to give, unless they submit to his mercy...

Amongst the many Royalists killed in the fury of the storm, were old Sir Alexander Davison and his youngest son, Captain Joseph Davison of the city regiment.

Marley and his companions wrote to Leven from the Castle on the 21st, a letter which Terry described as 'submissive', but retains the old dignity of earlier, more confident communications.

Although you have the fortune of War against me (and that I might, I confesse, have had honourable tarmes from your Excellencie). Yet I hope your Noblenes will not thinke worse of me, for doing my endeavours to keepes the Towne, and to discharge the trust reposed in me, having had strong reasons so to doe, as is known to many....

Marley may have been referring here to his commission as governor, rather than to his duties as Mayor, but he may also have been aware of the slanderous rumours attaching to his name in Royalist circles even before the siege was joined. If this latter reason contributed to his decision to hold out, he had in that sense, vindicated himself.

....And now whereas I am compelled to betake my self to this Castle, I shall desire, that I and those with me, may have our liberty, and your License, to stay, or goe out of the Towne with your safe Passe, to his Majesties next Garrison, which is not beleagured, with our Horses, Pistolls and swords; And to have 14. daies time to dispatch our Journey, so many as please to goe. And truly, my Lord, I am yet confident to receive so much favour from you, as that you will take such care of me, as that I shall receive no wrong from the ignoble spirits of the vulgar sort; for I doubt no other. I must confesse, I cannot keep it long from you, yet I am resolved, rather than to be a spectacle of misery and disgrace to any, I will bequeath my soule to him that gave it, And then referre my Body to be a spectacle to your severity...

Leven must have conveyed a promise to Marley that he would be safe, and on the 22nd Sir John turned the castle over to the Scots and was taken into custody. Although there is no evidence for it, it would seem from his treatment that Leven was regarding him as he had formerly, as Mayor and not as Colonel and Governor of the town. Escorted first to his house, on the 23rd he was locked up inside the castle and remained there until the 29th when he was delivered to
the Parliamentarian Sheriff of Northumberland. He was eventually conveyed to London and imprisonment, from which he escaped and went into exile.\textsuperscript{102}

The treatment of the rest of the Royalist Council and commanders was just as severe. Sir Nicholas Cole managed to escape from the town, but Sir Francis Bowes, Sir George Baker, Sir William Riddell (the brother of the Governor of Tynemouth), Captain Metcalfe Rippon, Captain Edward Stote, Captain Henry Marley, Lieutenant William Robson and several others were all carried to London and imprisoned in various places, gradually being released during 1645. Such wholesale captivity was unusual, but how far Leven was responsible, or was working in conjunction with Parliament's representatives, we cannot know.

The surrender of Tynemouth was now a mere formality, since it served no useful purpose to hold out longer. The terms agreed upon between Riddell and Leven were generous: officers, gentlemen, soldiers and clerics were to march out with their own weapons and possessions, whilst less portable belongings were to be kept in store for them. Those wishing to go to Oxford were to have safe passage, whilst those choosing to return to their homes were not to be proceeded against for anything done by them during their period within the castle.\textsuperscript{103}

Terry's observation that "The fall of Tynemouth virtually concluded the Civil War in the north" ignored the defence of Carlisle, although certainly it gave the allies control of Northumberland and Durham. With the news of the surrender of the two garrisons, Spalding noted, came an unwelcome visitation from Newcastle: "The pest cam to Edinburgh with the victorie fra Newcastell."\textsuperscript{104}

The question can be debated endlessly, and to little purpose, as to whether Marley ought to have resisted for so long. His motives have been examined insofar as it is possible to discover them from the wording of his several lengthy letters. That the Scots viewed the resistance as futile is understandable, but there was no reason for Leven to treat Marley as if he were a recalcitrant civilian, for Marley was a commissioned officer of the King. Whilst the strategic value of the city had virtually disappeared, there was some symbolic importance to its being held for so long as events made it possible. Marley was keeping alive, in desperate circumstances, the Royalist cause in Northumberland and Durham, and had tried, or had implied, that it was a struggle as much against a foreign enemy as against the rebellious English. The fury with which the defenders, heavily outnumbered, maintained the breaches, at a time when Marley would have been in no position to personally control his officers' actions, indicates that he was not without some large measure of support within the town. Not too much should be read into the claims that he was hated by the common people, for the mob will sway according to the wind, and can be no criteria for assessing the correctness of Marley's behaviour.
What cannot be in doubt, is the courage and resolution displayed by the Royalist commanders. As has been said, had they been Parliamentarians, the praise for them would have been as wild in the London tracts as the vituperation actually employed. By inference, they whom the Parliament's propagandists most abhorred, must have had some qualities quite exceptional in their own cause. If guilt was to be apportioned, and if it is still to be apportioned, for the storm of Newcastle, it cannot be fixed on Marley, but upon the general circumstances of the civil war. If, at the end, Marley was merely trying to show that the rumours about him in 1643 and in the summer of 1644 had been baseless, his was not an entirely selfish act, for whilst suspicion of treachery would rub off on the Royalist party as a whole, then so too, would determined loyalty bear its own fruits.
3. Ibid.
4. CSPD 1644, p. 380.
5. CSPD 1644/5, pp. 148/9.
6. CAM, p. 1078.
10. CSPD 1644, p. 422.
16. Gatty, Hunter's Hallamshire, p. 142. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 113/4. The earl of Manchester and Lord Fairfax took an inventory of the captured stores to divide between them for payment of their soldiers.
17. CSPD 1644, p. 404.
18. Ibid., p. 447.
20. For Redman, see Vol. 2.
22. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 130/4.
24. CSPD 1644, p. 510.
25. Ibid., p. 520.
28. Warburton, I, p. 522. Mayney was still at Pontefract on October 12th when he wrote to Rupert.
29. Parsons, Slingsby Diary, pp. 134/7.
31. Vicars, III, p. 44.
32. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 103. This may be Tibbutt, Luke Letter Books, p. 81. Luke reported that Glemham sent 140 cavalry from Carlisle to raid Helmsley siege lines, but after initial success, delaying to plunder on their return, they were attacked and 60 of them taken prisoner.
34. CSPD 1644/5, p. 97.
35. See above, p. 205.
36. Fairfax, Memoir, p. 222.
37. For Crossland and Talbot, see Vol. 2.
40. Ibid.
41. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 121/2.
43. Terry, The Siege of Newcastle by the Scots, Arch. Ael. Vol. XXI.
44. Vicars, III, pp. 46/7.
46. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 199.
47. Rotated by Terry, Siege of Newcastle, pp. 211, 188/9.
48. See the accompanying plan of the walls of Newcastle.
49. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, pp. 180/1.
51. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 181.
52. Thurloe, State Papers, I, p. 41.
55. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 184.
59. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 185.
60. Ibid., p. 189 q. Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer No. 69, for the reply also see V. T. E 16 (5) A Particular Relation...
61. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 195, implied Leslie had already routed the Royalists on the Eden near Salkeld, but Leslie did not leave for Carlisle until September 18th.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 191.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 192, q. The London Post No. 3.
69. Ibid., p. 192.
70. T.T. E 16 (5) A Particular Relation...
71. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 195, implied Leslie had already routed the Royalists on the Eden near Salkeld, but Leslie did not leave for Carlisle until September 18th.
72. T.T. E 16 (5).
73. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 195 q. The Weekley Account.
74. Ibid., p. 196.
75. M.A., 5.10.44. Murdoch and Simpson, Montrose, p. xxiii.
76. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 198.
77. Ibid., p. 199.
78. Ibid., p. 200.
79. Ibid., p. 209 f.n. 156.
81. Ibid.
82. All are dealt with in Vol. 2.
83. T.T. E 16 (5).
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid. For these officers, see Vol. 2.
87. T.T. E 14 (8) A Letter from Newcastle, also Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 206.
88. T.T. E 16 (5)
89. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 207.
90. T.T. E 16 (5)
91. Ibid.
92. T.T. E 14 (8)
93. T.T. E 16 (5)
94. T.T. E 14 (4)
95. Terry, Siege of Newcastle, p. 211 f.
96. Ibid., p. 218.
97. T.T. E 14 (8)
98. For these officers, see Vol. 2.
99. T.T. E 14 (8)
100. T.T. E 14 (4)
101. See Vol. 2.
102. For Marley's career, see Vol. 2.
104. Spalding, Memorials of the Troubles, II, p. 245.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Sieges of Pontefract and of Scarborough Castles
War in Yorkshire December to July, 1644-5.

In the wake of the battle on Marston Moor and of the fall of York; in the weeks following upon the abandonment of Lancashire and the storm of Newcastle, many Royalist field commanders threw down their swords to accept the terms of Parliament. They were more in number than those who rode south to Oxford to continue the war, or who sought shelter in other Royalist garrisons. They far outnumbered those who sought voluntary exile in Holland or in France. The war during the year 1645 - the last full year of fighting in the north - was waged on the Royalist behalf against vastly superior enemy forces, by a mere handful of commanders. Sir Hugh Cholmeley, Sir Thomas Glemham, Sir John Mallory and Sir Richard Lowther, governors, respectively, of Scarborough, Carlisle, Skipton and Pontefract, were the last survivors of the Marquess of Newcastle's magnificent field army of 1643. Lesser figures, in a sense, like Colonel Edward Rostern at Lathom, Jordan Crossland at Helmsley who had gone into the Scarborough garrison, Colonel Edward Grey, Colonel Sir George Wentworth, Colonel Sir Richard Hutton and Colonel Sir John Ramsden in Pontefract, were the few who had chosen, for it was always a matter of choice, to continue in arms.

Throughout England, there were very few cases of Royalist field officers who went over to the Parliament to serve against the King. The most notorious case in the north was that of Lt. Colonel Wilfred Lawson, although it can be said that he, like others in Cumbria, may merely have gone along with the prevalent opinion until circumstances enabled him to reveal his true colours. Yorkshire, however, possessed a turncoat of quite another type. He was Colonel Robert Brandling of Leathley, a man from a markedly Recusant background, closely allied to the Royalist Hoptons, whose prime motives appear to have been financial. He had not been one of the original commanders in Newcastle's army, but had probably assumed command of the regiment of Colonel George Heron when the latter was killed at the head of his cavalry at Adwalton in 1643. In York at the rendition of the town, Brandling approached Lord Fairfax and offered his services, being given in return a new commission to recruit a regiment for the Parliament. Until 1646, he served his new cause "with much Fidelity". In 1650 he provided forces for the campaigns that led to the battle of Worcester. Yet, by 1656, he had become despised of both sides, suspected of conspiring on the part of Charles II by the one, whilst Sir Marmaduke Langdale, that stern man of principle, spoke for the other when he called Brandling a "very knave".
Branding's actions are not referred to merely to point a moral, but to give some significance to a raid from Skipton castle by the Royalist garrison cavalry early in 1645 that, although it turned out badly for the raiders, had a punitive motive behind it. Vicars

About the 16 instant of February we were informed by Letters out of the North, that about 150 of the Enemies horse from Skipton, fell upon the Parliaments at Heightley where they suddenly surprizing our Guards, they came into the Town and took near an 100 prisoners, and 60 horse with their booty; But as they were about to retreat, Col. Lamberts men being quartered near hand took the alarum and came to relieve their fellows, rescued all our own prisoners, killed 15 of them on the place, took about 20 of them prisoners, wounded and took the Commander in Chief of the Enemies party, Major John Hughes; killed his Lieutenant also and pursued the rest to the very gates of Skipton.

Major Hughes died of his wounds and was buried on February 19th.

It was Whitelock who noted that the victim of the Skipton raid was "Colonel Brandling", who was quartered with the men of his new regiment. That was the reason that led the Skipton raiders so deep into hostile territory.

Such raids as this were becoming fewer as the Parliamentarians tightened their grip on Yorkshire, and, one by one, began to capture the stubborn garrisons that still resisted them. The garrison that gave them most trouble, apart from that of Skipton, which survived until December 1645, was that at Pontefract.

The Siege and Relief of Pontefract, December to March 1644/5.

The journal of Pontefract siege, kept meticulously by one of the defenders, Nathan Drake, a gentleman volunteer, is one of the most detailed and scrupulous records which has survived the civil war in the north of England. Yet, as with that for the first siege of Lathom, it has barely been touched. It was first used by Boothroyd in 1807, but his editing was often lax. Richard Holmes edited the Journal in 1887, and two manuscript versions are known to the present writer. For what follows, however, reliance has been placed upon the 1860 edition by W.H.V. Longstaffe, who for the most part avoided the errors of Boothroyd and those into which Holmes was subsequently led by what seems to have been reliance on Boothroyd's genealogical work. Additional sources consist largely in evidences for the relief of the castle in March 1645, when the siege suddenly became of importance on a national scale. The relief was achieved by the Northern Horse under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and was to be one of their finest exploits of the war.

Drake has left us with a fairly complete list of the officers and gentlemen who made up the garrison between December 25th 1644 and the relief of the castle, compiling his list on the former date. From the analysis which
follows, it will be seen that the forces at the governor's disposal were made up from various regiments, so that it is virtually impossible to identify a distinctive garrison regiment at this time, although one had existed when Redman was governor. In examining Drake's list, I have avoided reference to Boothroyd and to Holmes, who tended to be led astray. No subsequent study has been carried out, although Peter Young attempted a cursory identification by relating the names of officers to names in the List. I have not followed Drake's original structure, in which he differentiated between, for example, knights and lt. colonels, for in one instance, that of Sir Thomas Bland, the two titles were synonymous.

I have, instead, followed Drake's listing of the officers of each of the four divisions into which the garrison was formed, referring back to his list of officers undistinguished by divisional associations where there is any contradiction or omission. In his compilation, Drake also drew a distinction between officers and gentlemen volunteers, but the line between the two was somewhat blurred, insofar as that certain 'volunteers' can be shown to have been serving officers at some stage prior to December 1644. In this case it may well be that a man who had laid down his arms at, for example, the defeat of Selby or at the surrender of York, later returned to the war as a volunteer. That the present writer should take issue with a man who wrote such a detailed account of events from first-hand knowledge, should be seen purely as a matter of differing emphases. For the most part, the men whose names follow will be found dealt with in Volume 2 under their respective regiments. Where, however, there is uncertainty as to a man's regiment, or lack of corroboration to support his rank or commission in general, this has been noted either in the text or by an appropriate footnote. Finally, in what now follows, I have endeavoured to give each man identified his full or proper name, his rank and, where necessary, the regiment from which he came.

The Governor, Colonel Lowther, presents a minor problem. We do not know how he came to succeed Sir John Redman in the post, although he may have been Redman's lt. colonel. Curiously, both Redman and Lowther died of consumption. Young identified the governor as Sir Richard Lowther of Ingleton setting at rest the false identification by Boothroyd and by Clay. Sir Richard was the eldest of four sons of William Lowther of Ingleton, who was himself the younger of the eight sons of Sir Richard Lowther, High Sheriff of Cumberland. Drake alluded to the governor's reliance upon his brother Robert, who acted as his aide. Robert was the youngest of the sons of William Lowther, and became in 1666, Chancellor of Carlisle. Sir Richard's son Gerrard was also in the garrison command.

Immediately below Lowther as governor, although technically his equals in rank, were seven colonels. Four of these were divisional commanders, and must
be considered to have been the senior colonels present in the garrison at that time. This may be the only clue which we have to individual status of gentry sharing a similar rank, and it is a pity that it is not possible to extend it further in the analysis of the officers and of their regiments.

The four divisional commanders were: Colonel Sir George Wentworth of Woolley, who had raised a regiment of Foot for the King based in the West Riding; Colonel Sir Richard Hutton of Goldsborough, also a Colonel of Foot and formerly the High Sheriff of Yorkshire; Colonel Sir John Ramsden of Longley, a former Sheriff; and Colonel Edward Grey of Cowpen and Chillingham in Northumberland, a Catholic cavalry commander whom we have come across in the garrisons of Carlisle and Skipton in the months after Marston Moor. His reluctance to leave the north, although neither Carlisle nor Skipton could provide shelter for his troopers, is interesting. He did not, for example, seek to join Mayney's brigade, although eventually he left for Oxford after the relief of Pontefract.

The other three colonels named by Drake present problems. Colonel Sir Gervase Cutler of Stainborough does not appear to have received a field rank at all, although he was a Commissioner of Array. He was by nature a Puritan, and he died during the siege. Colonel Vawhan or Vaughan defies accurate identification, but he may have been Sir Henry Vaughan of Whitwell, Yorkshire. Colonel Middleton may have been either Colonel Francis Middleton or his brother, Colonel Sir George Middleton, of Leighton in Lancashire. George was certainly a Catholic. Regimental analysis supports George as the colonel given by Drake, but the latter may here be in error and have meant a Lt. Colonel, possibly William Middleton of Sir John Gerlington's Horse, a regiment elsewhere represented in the garrison.

The Officers and Volunteers:

The Governor and his Staff

Colonel Sir Richard Lowther of Ingleton, Governor.

Mr. Robert Lowther, his aide.


Major [Godfrey] Dennis, of Sheffield (?), ex: Francis Trafford's Horse.


Captain ? Munro.

Captain Gerrard Lowther, the Governor's son.

Captain ? Musgrave.

"The gentlemen volunteers were listed in 4 divisions".
The First Division: Colonel Edward Grey's Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry Darcy</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Belasyse's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Edward Ratcliffe</td>
<td>Volunteer(19)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Francis Ratcliffe</td>
<td>Volunteer(20)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Portington</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Metham's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Huddlestone</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Grey's Foot(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Huddlestone</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Portington</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Saville's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Grimston</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Saville's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Vavasour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Best</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Wheatley</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Floyd's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Lumsdall(22)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachary Seaton(23)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Wheatley(24)</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Wheatley's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm Smith(25)</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Grey's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Latham</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Cavendish's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Perry (?Pearcie)</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Cape</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Thimbleby</td>
<td>Volunteer/Lieutenant</td>
<td>Trafford's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Jackson(26)</td>
<td>Volunteer/Captain</td>
<td>Saville's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Tofeld</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Hammerton(27)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Stapleton</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Anne(28)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Ratcliffe(29)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuthbert Metcalfe</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Metcalfe</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Abbot</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Spurgeon</td>
<td>Cornet/Lieutenant</td>
<td>Saville's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Harrington</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Herbert</td>
<td>Cornet/Ensign</td>
<td>Trafford's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? French</td>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Also included in Grey's division were seven Aldermen and merchants of Pontefract, and three clergymen.*
The Second Division: Colonel Sir Richard Hutton's Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>? Constable</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Musgrave(30)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffith Standen(31)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Belasyse's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Leyburn(32)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Croft</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Darcy's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Smith(33)</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Antrobus</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Naylor</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Cavendish's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionel Bamford(34)</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Mathewman</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Gravener</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Empson</td>
<td>Volunteer/Captain</td>
<td>Wentworth's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Atkinson(35)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Preston</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Johnston</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Massey(36)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Maddocks</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Tatom(37)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Hutton's division there followed a list of men, some 24 in all, who for the most part, Drake did not distinguish by the prefix Mr., as in the case of gentlemen volunteers. Of these 24, some at least must have been former commissioned and non-commissioned officers. John Oxley had been a lieutenant in Saville's Foot, for example, but of the rest it is impossible to be sure. They remain, for the most part, unidentified. The divisional chaplain was shared with Grey's, and an amanuensis was appointed for Hutton's. This division, although listed second of the four, seems to have been markedly less well officered than Grey's, and in imbalance compared to Grey's, Ramsden's and Wentworth's. One is tempted to wonder how far men were appointed to a specific division and how far they were permitted to select their own.
The Third Division: Colonel Sir John Ramsden's Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Gervase Cutler</td>
<td>Colonel/Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Tyndal</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Ramsden's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Ward(38)</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Wentworth</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Saville's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Pilkington</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Ramsden's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Morrit(Mollet)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Horsefald</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Saville's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Swillovant</td>
<td>Captain/Lieutenant</td>
<td>Leigh's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Standeven(39)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Clough</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Strickland's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Beale(40)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Shaw</td>
<td>Captain/Lieutenant</td>
<td>Fane's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Harrington(41)</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Nunnes</td>
<td>Cornet/Lieutenant</td>
<td>Saville's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Saville</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Saville's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Fleming (42)</td>
<td>Lieutenant/Captain</td>
<td>Eure's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Burton</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Bamforth</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Carwike</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Strainger</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Gascoigne (43)</td>
<td>Volunteer/Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Peirse(44)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Tindall</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Hodgshon</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Peirse(45)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Jackson</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Reeser</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Tindall</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Foster</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Hitchin</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also included in this division were the Mayor of Pontefract and three or four Aldermen. This was Nathan Drake's own division. There were three clergymen attached to it, and listed at the bottom of the list of names was John Oxley, whom we have apparently encountered before in Hutton's division.
### The Fourth Division: Colonel Sir George Wentworth's Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas Bland</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Wentworth's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Vaughan</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Wentworth</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Kay's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Copley</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Saville's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Beaumont</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Mountaine(46)</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hilton</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Hilton's Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Harris</td>
<td>Captain/Lieutenant</td>
<td>G.Middleton's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Ramsden</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Benson</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Saville's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Chadwick</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Washington(47)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gervase Neville</td>
<td>Volunteer/Providore Gen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Thimbleby</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Anne(48)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryan Stapleton</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Emson</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Hammerton(49)</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Rookes</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Lister</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Andesay</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Sanderson</td>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Dacre's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Cooke</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Newcastle's Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Cuthbert</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Hilton's Foot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were an additional 14 names in Wentworth's list, including three Aldermen, but we do not know if the other 11 were gentlemen volunteers or, as in the case of the other divisions, perhaps non-commissioned officers. Wentworth's had four clergymen attached to it.

From the foregoing analysis, it would seem that the remains of no fewer than 23 Royalist regiments went into the making of the garrison. Young, in his survey, identified 18 only, but he may only have considered those names with a regimental rank given by Drake.
Pontefract Castle and its immediate environs.

KEY

1. Round Tower
2. Red Tower
3. Torture's Tower
4. Gardener's Tower
5. Castle Tower
6. East Gate House
7. South Gate
8. Man Guard
9. All Saints Church
We can now turn to the business of the siege in earnest, which began for the Royalists on December 25th 1644, when the Parliamentarians, having at last recovered from the fright which Mayney had given them in September, occupied the town and drove the defenders into the castle. The Royalist artillery fired into the town to give a welcome, and kept up a desultory bombardment for two ensuing days.

On Saturday 28th a Royalist outpost, at the Low Church as Drake called it, more properly All Saints to the east of the castle, was overrun and its garrison of 11 men forced into the steeple. Attempts were made to relieve them:

the beseeged made 3 sallyes downe to the Low Church with losse of 3 men being killed in the church yeard and 11 men more wounded, whereof are dead since Captin Waterhowse of Netherton and 3 other more men.

Drake did not list Waterhouse in his divisional groupings. He was Robert Waterhouse of Nethershillington, a Catholic who had refused knighthood at the coronation of Charles I. He had served previously in Colonel Sir William Saville's regiment of foot.

Unable to relieve the church, the defenders fired their cannon 11 times into the town. Reports came to them of some 40 or so wounded being carried away, which was a substantial return for the outlay of shot at a time when the Royalist gunners must have been feeling their way against forces not yet formally disposed of for siege.

On the 29th, the 11 men in the church steeple decided to make their own way back to the castle, having been without food and drink for some time. Their leader, (Captain) Joshua Walker, a rank that he seems to have assumed or that Drake bestowed on him, swung down first from the steeple by a rope, but he was shott into the thigh (but since recovered) and one other of them killed in the church yeard. All the rest escaped without any hurt at all.

Already we are made aware of the bitterness of the siege, for in the space of four days the garrison had lost seven men and an officer killed. What the true Parliamentarian casualties were in terms of dead we cannot know, but they must have been high if the wounded men given by Drake are any guide.

There was a steady bombardment from the castle until January 5th, when a Mr. Pattison, not apparently a gentleman volunteer, since he was not listed by Drake "was killed upon the topp of the pound tower, being shott into the head with a muskett bullit from the beseegers".

Between the 5th and the 9th, the governor despatched some of his cavalry away from the castle as no longer serviceable. These were 140 strong, under the command of Captain Tully. Drake did not elsewhere mention Tully, but in this single context noted that they were making for Newark. They do not
seem to have remained there, since Young, in his study of the Newark garrison, did not mention him.\footnote{52}

On the 9th the Parliamentarian commander, Colonel Forbes, had a narrow escape when a cannonball, fired at Newhall from the castle, broke down a wall and showered him with fragments of stone. Sir Thomas Fairfax seems to have been present at the time.\footnote{53} The garrison was not short of cannon balls to judge from Drake's record of salvos. On the 16th, for instance, after 24 salvos in the previous five days:

The besieged played 1 cannon into the closes below the town, among the cutters up of clottes, but what was killed is not knowne, but they came there no more, and the besieged plaid 6 cannon more. And during all this time there was 15 sling pesses shot. There is in all 128 cannon shot to this day.

A 'Sling' was an alternative way of referring to the culverin, which fired a 15 lb. ball, and this may have been what Drake was alluding to.

To counter the garrison's fire, the Parliamentarians brought up on the 16th six pieces of cannon "the same which had beene at Hemsley and Knavesbrough before". These cannon included "one carrying a bullit of 42 li. weight, another 36 li., 2 other 24 li. a pese, and the least 9 li.". If we are not here dealing with mortars, the nearest cannon corresponding to these would be for the 42 lb. shot, the Cannon proper; for the 36 lb., something between a Cannon and a demi-cannon; the 24 lb. would probably be a Demi-cannon, and the 9 lb. a demi-culverin.

We hearing that they would plant them against Piper tower and betwixt that and the Round Tower where there was a hollow place all the way downe to the well, the gentlemen and soldiers fell all upon carrying of earth and rubbish and so filled up the place in a little space, and we rammed up the way that passed through Piper tower with earth 4 or 5 yeardes thick.

Having brought up the guns, Lord Fairfax, who was responsible for all the siege operations in Yorkshire, sent a summons into the governor.\footnote{54}

In performance of the trust reposed upon me by the Parliament for the service of the publique and particular safety and preservation of this contrie, I have marched parte of the forces under my command on the reducing of that castle, which hitherto opposed the Parliament and infinitely prejudiced the contrie, to obedience of the Kings and Parliament; for which much desire may be effected without the effusion of blood, and to that end now send you this summons to surrender the castle to me for the service of the King and Parliament, which if you presently doe, I will engage my power with the Parliament, for your reception into mercy and favour therewith; but your refusing, or deferring the same, will compell me to the triall of the success which I hope will prevale for the publique good....

Forbes carried the message to Lowther.

The language of the summons, as it has come down to us, sounds somewhat stilted, but the whereabouts of the original, or of the original copy, are now
unknown. Its message was clear, however, and Sir Richard Lowther sent back a suitable answer:

According to my allegiance to which I am sworne and in pursuance of the trust reposed in me by his Majestie, I will defend this castle to the uttermost of my power, and doubt not by Godes assistance, the justnes of his Majesties cause, and the vertue of my comrades, to quell all those that shall oppose me in the defence thereof for his Majesties service. For the blood that is like to be lost in this action, lett it be upon their heads who are the causers of it. This is my resolution which I desire you certifie the Lord Fairfax...

This letter was not, however, delivered. To reinforce the summons, Fairfax began a bombardment on the morning of the 17th:

There was a cannon planted upon the west end of the castle upon Mr. Lunne's back yeard. The besiegers begun to play with their cannon about 7 in the morning. That day they played 400.

Alderman Lunne was himself in the garrison. The heavy expenditure of shot by the Parliamentarians provided a useful means of replenishing the garrison stock, as Drake noted: "Our men went out every day into the graft ditch and fetched in their bullets for 4d. a piece".

On the night of the 17th, Captains Munro and Leyburn went down into the ditch to inspect damage to the wall, and found a breach a yard and a half wide, "whereupon our men was commanded to carry earth to strengthen the wall within, which was done with all speede". Over the 18th/19th January Drake, wiling away the tedious of siege warfare, counted 634 salvoes from the enemy guns, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 19th was Piper tower beaten downe ther having beene 78 shott made that morning before it fell, by which fall a breach was to be made into the Castle wall, and which fall 2 brothers of the Briggses....was killed and 3 or 4 much hurt by they are all againe recovered, and 27 of the besiegers men blowne up with their owne powder by a shott from the castle which hitt their match and so struck fire into the pouder.

Thereafter, the attackers reduced their bombardment, and in the space of five days shot only 333 salvoes, which the defenders answered with a slow return of 16 shots. On the 21st, two more defenders were killed. One, an enlisted man, John Spence, was killed when his musket exploded in his face due, so Drake learned, to his overcharging of the weapon. It may be that Spence loaded his gun with a poorly shaped musket ball, so that it jammed in the barrel and contained the explosion. The other casualty was a Captain Brown, again missing from Drake's original lists, who was shot dead as he stood in the castle barbican.

On that same day, Forbes sent a drummer to the castle gates to sound a parley and to deliver a letter, which Lowther refused to receive.

he would receive no letters from him unless they would cease battering, whereupon command was given that the cannons should
cease playing, then the drumme was commaunded to go down to the lower gates, and then they lett him in. Forbes' letter was brieft demanding an answer to the original summons of the previous week and advising Lowther that Lord Fairfax himself was in the siege lines awaiting it. He also sought an exchange of prisoners, since the garrison had apparently captured a Mr. Ogales or, failing an exchange, "for money, and if so, for what summe". Ogales is properly rendered as Ogle, and this misspelling of the name is the consequence of transcription, for the sentence written by Drake is more correctly: "whether Mr. Ogle is exchanged...".

Lowther ignored the matter of the exchange, and having already compiled a letter which had not yet been delivered to Forbes, showed it to the officers and volunteers and asked them if they would stand by what he had written, "unto which they all assented with great allacrity". Forbes had, meanwhile, drawn up his forces in view of the walls as if to attempt a storm at Piper tower. Drake observed that the Parliamentary infantry had, many of them, sprigs of rosemary in their hats. Folklore associated the herb with protection for the wearer against spirits, fairies, lightning and injury, or positively as an aid to success in any enterprise undertaken. The Parliamentary infantry, however, had probably assumed it as a symbol of devotion, which it was also known as, in this case to their cause.

Immediately upon giving the letter to the drummer, Lowther ordered all men to their posts. He commanded all the drummes to be beate and trumpettes to sound upon the battlements, all men commanded to armes, every squadron to their severall poastes, as they were before sett out, expecting the enemy with as much cheerfullnes as if they had beene going to a feast. Doubtless the prospect of coming to grips after so long at cannon's length inspired the gaiety. Throughout the afternoon the garrison stood to their posts, whilst a steady bombardment was maintained by the enemy gunners against the breach and the King's tower, no fewer than 189 "great shott". For all this bravado, however, no attack came. The Parliamentary foot, finding the garrison resolute, at least, this is what Drake maintained, began to break ranks, some of them openly running away and being pursued by their own cavalry who "could recover but some few of them". Drake probably watched this fiasco from the walls, and attributed it to deception on the part of Forbes and his officers:

the commanders persuaded them that they neede not strike a blowe but that the castle would be delivered upon a summons, now, after they had made a breach.

It would be interesting to know whether the grand display was put on by Forbes for Lord Fairfax's benefit, or whether the old man was impatient with the way things were going.
From comments made by Drake, it does look as if Lord Fairfax and his son were responsible for the attempt. They had both travelled from York and had been received in the siege lines in fine style, "gaurs of horse and foot ready to receave them, with great showting and volly of voyces and vollyes of shott..."; but after the dismal showing of the infantry, the two men "went away without either beating of drum or sound of trumpitt".

Between January 22nd and the 27th the attackers maintained a desuýtory bombardment, firing 27 times in all, and wounding a Royalist gunner "James Ellyate (the little gunmaker of Yorke)", who had to have his arm amputated, successfully let it be added. During this period and up to and including February 1st, the garrison responded with 22 shots. This infrequent exchange of fire continued without much incident to Shrove Tuesday. On the 6th, however, 16 horsemen left the garrison en route for Newark, commanded by a Mr. Corker. Of Corker, Drake observed that "he was the onely man that procured Sr. Marmaduke Langdall to com to releeve us".

By the 15th, on which date Corker was well on his way to fulfill his mission, although we do not know if he acted on his own initiative or whether Lowther had sent him, the defenders started a fire in the town with their shots. The Hospital came under bombardment from Swillington tower, and on Shrove Tuesday, the 18th, two shots were aimed at sentry posts of the enemy near Northgate which was then set on fire by the besiegers, and 1 cannon into the Markit place, and the besieged killd 5 men out of the Round tower into their workes from Wardes howse along the ditch with muskett shott.

The next day a Parliamentarian captain was shot dead, and on the day following a Royalist marksman was shot in his turn whilst at his post in the barbican. On the 22nd the defenders had a field day, if Drake's assessment was right, killing "above 30 men in sevrall places" with cannon and musket fire. It may be, however, that Drake was here compiling a tally for several days or weeks of action, since the enormous loss on one day does not equate with the rather spasmodic salvoes from the castle. Nevertheless, the action was increasing in heat. On the 23rd three Parliamentarians were killed, and on the day following musket fire from the siege lines slew a Royalist in the barbican and wounded Captain Smith, whose face was cut by flying stone dislodged from a wall by a musket ball. The defenders returned fire, sending a shot into the Park where "3 men was seen to fall". A steady exchange of fire built up throughout that day, and a further five or six of Forbes' men were killed.

On the 24th, the Parliamentarians were reinforced from York:

There came marching over Fezrybridge 6 collors, 250 men to the besiegers, haulth marching thorow the Parke to the towne and the other haulph thorow the Frealles to the church, the besieged giving them a kind salutation from the castle....
Not without effect. At seven that evening, the defenders heard two volleys of shot from the siege lines, not directed at the castle. It may have been that some deserters from the action on the 21st had been executed, since the arrival of reinforcements from the direction of York strongly suggests that Lord Fairfax felt the siege forces needed strengthening. Drake, however, perhaps with undue optimism, hoped that the volleys indicated the funeral of "summe great commaunders".

On the 25th the defenders killed "many men in divers places", and on the next day fired upon the Market Place. It was a sad day for the garrison however, for Captain Maullett or Morrit "upon the top of the Round tower" was "shott into the head with a muskit bullit" and killed outright.

On the last day of February, the garrison noted strange developments in the enemy lines, though they cannot have known immediately what was presaged:

The besiegers fired Elizabeth Cattell's howse and the howses below Munkhill...That night [they] tooke away all their cannon and marched over Ferry brigg. That night the besiegers drew of their cannon and begunne to march with it away, having shott 1406 cannon against the castle.

On March 1st

The besieged shot 12 cannon to the besiegers when they was drawing of their armye from divers partes both into the towne and about the towne, and noate this, that there was not one day since the castle was besieged but that there was summe of the besiegers killd by the besiegedes muskitts besides those killed with the besiegedes cannon.

The confusion in the Parliamentary lines was the direct result of a magnificent piece of cavalry campaigning by the Northern Horse, which brought them before Pontefract on March 1st. The sources for this exploit, many and varied, reflected the prestige which attached to the action, and serve now to underline the competence of the Marquess of Newcastle's old cavalry and their field commander, Colonel Sir Marmaduke Langdale.

It has been said before that the Northern Horse was made up of the cavalry regiments which had, on the whole, given a good account of themselves on Marsto Moor and which had left Yorkshire with Rupert after the defeat. Their relief of Pontefract, occasioned according to Drake by the entreaties of a Mr. Corker, did not fit into any overall strategy on the King's part, although Langdale and his men were now part of the Oxford army. They had presented a petition to the King desiring leave to return north for the relief either of Pontefract, or of Carlisle. Warburton, who gave this petition in full, criticised the "yeomanry nature" of the cavalry and their disinclination to serve away from the north. The composition of the upper ranks of the Northern Horse refutes the allegation that the officers were small freeholders preoccupied with the security of their own property and locality, which is what Warburton implied. The field officers of the Northern Horse had conceived of a plan to turn the
resistance at Pontefract and Carlisle to the King's advantage, by offering to return to the north and to reawaken the old Royalist fervour now suppressed by the encroaching allied armies. Without giving the petition in full, certain passages are worthy of remark.\textsuperscript{55}

Whereas we are confident that we have sufficiently to the satisfaction of your Majesty asserted our loyalties against whatsoever contradictions or jealousies may suggest to the contrary; and now, seeing our native counties as valuable and considerable, as we conceive, as any other parts of your Majesty's dominions, lieth enthralled under the pressures and insolencies of the enemy.....

This was true. The abandonment of the north, although superficial reasons can be found to explain it, was nonetheless so sudden and entire that many must have wondered at it. The Marquess of Newcastle was, of course, partly to blame in that he went into exile voluntarily, and with him took his command structure, or such as was left of it: but then again, he had not had the men with which to continue to fight. The loss of York was, for example, inevitable. Rupert, on the other hand, had seriously considered returning to Yorkshire, but had abandoned that idea in the latter half of July 1644, since which time Royalism in the north had been everywhere on the defensive. The stubborn determination of Marley in Newcastle, Mallory at Skipton, Glemham at Carlisle, and of the commanders in Pontefract, illustrated that which the commanders of the Northern Horse claimed: that the north could be reactivated and serve to draw pressure from the Oxford army and the south-west.

The failure of Royalist strategy to take this into account might be seen as the consequence of the narrow outlook of the Council of War at Oxford. To that body, immediate concerns increasingly outweighed long-term or far-off projects, and Rupert, if he carried as much weight after Marston Moor as he had done before, does not appear to have given the north a second thought, most particularly as 1644 drew towards its close and Newcastle, with Knaresborough, Helmsley and other strongpoints, fell to the enemy. The petition of the Northern Horse, seen as mutinous by some, was a desperate attempt to widen the field of vision of the King and of his military advisors, and had the petition been successful in all its aims, leading the King to sanction a commitment of resources once more in the north, the outcome of the civil war might have been different. It is, however, always easy to indulge in speculations of this kind. It turned out that a compromise solution was reached, whereby the Northern Horse was given leave to ride for Pontefract to relieve it, but beyond that it was not to be permitted to go. In this sense, Pontefract relief can be seen at one and the same time, as a remarkable assertion of the old power of the Northern cavalry, and as a defeat for a wider strategic concept that might have saved the war for the King. This is not to say that the relief, however brilliantly executed, had purely negative results. It is unlikely that Pontefract could have held out for so long as it did, had relief not come
when it did; and since Pontefract tied down Parliamentary forces, that in itself cannot have been entirely on the debit side so far as the King’s interests were concerned.

In the following analysis of the signatories of the petition, we can gain some idea of the composition of the Northern Horse. I am concerned here, only with those regiments raised in the six northern counties, and where an officer was connected with a regiment from Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Nottinghamshire, or Lincolnshire, I have not gone into any regimental detail.

### The Northern Horse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signatory</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Fetherstonhaugh(56)</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Deelengtill</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Robert Hilliard</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Langdale's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Forcer*</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Clavering's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Fetherstonhaugh</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Dacre's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Sayer*</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Clavering's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Brooke</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Thornton*</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Blakiston's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Brandling(57)</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Langdale's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Millot*</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Wray's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Middleton</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Middleton's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Bland*</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Vavasour's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim. Calverley</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamaliel Dudley</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Anderson</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Hungate*</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Vavasour's</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Smith*</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Monckton</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Reveley*</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Howard's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Tong</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Anderson's</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gilbert Markham</td>
<td>?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Galliard</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Mason's</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Tompkins</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Vaglor (Vavasour)*</td>
<td>Lt.Colonel</td>
<td>Vavasour's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho. Brocke</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Mason</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Blackiston</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Shallcross</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Fleetwood</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Saville's</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Langdale, of course, did not sign this petition, neither did Colonel Francis Carnaby, although their senior officers did so. This may be an indication of Carnaby's standing in the brigade.

The burden of the feeling of these officers is exemplified in this extract from their petition:

And seeing that many of our soldiers are already wasted, and do daily moulder away, and that the main of our present strength consists of officers, gentlemen of quality, and their attendants, unmeet for these duties which are expected and required; and that the loss of any of them is not small, but involves in it such multitudes as may, by their power and respect, be raised if they once approach their own habitations.

The relief of Pontefract was carried out by these "officers, gentlemen of quality, and their attendants".

Let us return briefly to Drake's account of events, to see the impact which the appearance of the Northern Horse had upon him as a member of the relieved garrison:

About 3 of the clock, Sir Marmaduke Langdall's forelorne hope did appeare upon the topp of the hill on this side Wentbridge and so marched, one company after another, till his whole army came all into the Chequor field, where both the armyes mett, and faced one another till almost 6 of the clock, the Parlament armyes allwaies giving ground (when Sir Marmadukes armye advanced) till they came to their foot which they had placed, and lyned the long hedge from Englandes house to the hill toppe, where the first encounter begunne very furiously the enemys foot (behind the hedge) giving fire upon the front of our horse very valiantly, which was soone asswaged, for then our foot from the castle coming on and the horse charging with the foot 4 or 5 times, recovering the hedge from them, beat them quite away towards Ferry bridge, continually charging them all the way, there being left dead and wounded upon the ground about 160 men. And at Ferry bridge the enemy played 3 times with one cannon, viz. 2 case shottes and 1 cannon bullitt, killed there 4 of our men, but we bett them from their cannon, and tooke it and brought it away, and followed them in chase betwixt Shearburne and Tadcaster
kill'd 140 of their men (as is reported) in the chase, took
600 prisoners, commanders and officers 57; doble barrells
of powder 47, containing 124 lb. a piece; armes 1600; collores
for horse and foot above 40; and many wounded men brought and
many dead since, and we lost not above 20 men in all the fight,
the enemy being allmost 6 for one. There was brought into the
castle near upon 20 carriages with all their match, muskets,
pikes, bullits, and all other provision, and many packes taken
in the chase, and the plunder of the field was to the souldyers
and to the contrey about....

Drake here described a complete and overwhelming victory, more clear cut than
many larger battles fought during the civil war. The attempt by the enemy
commanders to make a stand is graphically depicted, and there is in this
narrative of Drake's, so distinct from the propaganda representations that were
to come later for wider consumption, an element of accuracy that is refreshing.

The success of Langdale's relief march was in part due to the amazing
speed with which it was carried out, commencing somewhere near Oxford late in
February. So fast did the Northern Horse ride that they outstripped all news
of their approach sent by one Parliamentarian commander on their route, to
the next. For example, on March 4th Sir Thomas Widdrington in London wrote to
warn Lord Fairfax "We hear of Sir M. Langdale's going northwards, with 2000
horse, which I hope is no news to you....". On the 11th, Widdrington was
obliged to commiserate with his friend for "the sad accident in Yorkshire".59

On February 28th Sir Samuel Luke, the diligent recorder of much news that
came to him at Newport Pagnell, noted:

I had word [that] this party of horse which are gone towards
Newark are certainly to join with Prince Maurice, also, which
to me seems a riddle because when they were at Chipping Norton
[having marched there from Salisbury] they were as near
Shrewsbury as they were to Newark whither it seems they are
going....(60)

Luke, like many a Parliamentarian commander, was guessing wildly as to what
Langdale intended. On March 2nd, the day after the siege of Pontefract had
been raised, he was writing

Last week there passed by 2000 horse under Sir Marmaduke
Langdale which must join with those coming toward you....

and on the 3rd:

which way they be rid is uncertain.(61)

The first news to reach Luke concerning the relief was that Lord Fairfax had
won a great victory, but Luke was obliged to note on March 13th that

the great overthrow of Sir Marmaduke Langdale's forces by
Lord Fairfax [a fantasy]...without striking a blow, they
going into the castle through a quarter of Col. Somes, whose
regiment formerly had been in the King's service....Lord
Fairfax's horse (which could not be made to stand) [were
chased] as far ad Ferrybridge, where they made a great
slaughter...(62)

The blame attached to Colonel Somes or Sands, was quite plainly unfair, for
as Luke observed in his entry on the 14th, "some reason must be surrendered for our misfortunes". Later, however, in receipt of more definite information, he noted that part at least of Sands' regiment deserted, although whether we are to take this as meaning an actual change of sides rather than merely flight from the field, is hard to say. Luke could not resist a self-righteous piece of atrocity-mongering, either:

This march of theirs was accompanied with many unheard-of cruelties. They robbed all the country people of their goods and took away their cattle. They ravished the women and bound men neck and heels together, and ravished their wives before their faces... (64)

The operative word here is "unheard-of". The Northern Horse, apart from being composed largely of officers and gentlemen, expressions which on the whole meant something then, had no time to waste in plundering and spoiling. These accusations were of the type normally levelled at infantry, and then often unjustifiably, at least where the old Northern regiments were concerned. Luke was simply quite unable to give the Royalists the benefit of their triumph without tarnishing it in some way, if only to set his own mind the better at rest.

Apart from the Parliamentary versions, which we shall return to, we have two important Royalist despatches. The first of these was written at the request of Langdale, on March 4th when the brigade had reached Newark. The writer was Colonel Sir Gamaliel Dudley. The march began at Banbury on 23rd February, and the brigade was accompanied on its march, as far as Daventry, by Colonel Sir William Compton, with whom they fought a sharp encounter against enemy troops near Northampton. Whitelock recorded this action:

A party under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, marching Northwards, fell upon a party of the Parliament's in Northamptonshire whom they routed, killed some, and took divers of them prisoners, and the rest shifted for their lives, and by flight saved themselves. (66)

The Royalists rode on towards Market Harborough, expecting to have to give battle again, and on the 25th they collided with a Parliamentary cavalry force at Melton Mowbray. The two sides were presumably evenly matched, for Dudley noted 2000 enemy horse and dragoons, and the strength of the Northern Horse was at that figure. Dudley noted briefly that the enemy charged first and were then routed. Whitelock did a fine job of turning defeat into victory by wishful thinking:

[The Royalists] were met by Colonel Rossetter near Melton, where they had a sharp encounter, and loss on both sides. Of Langdale's party, were slain Colonel Tuke, Major Ketlington, Captain Markham, and about 100 others; of Rossetter's about 50, and no officer, he lost one Colours and took two. (67)

Luke recorded that Rossiter lost all of his colours. Langdale, in a letter to Prince Rupert written on March 6th, noted "we routed Rossetter's forces at Melton Mowbray, and drove the Yorkshire forces from Kelford to Doncaster...".

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Whitelock's report of Royalist casualties cannot be substantiated. Colonel Tuke was not killed in the action, nor can a Major Ketlington be identified. There was, however, one serious loss, and since it was of a man who was so long and so actively concerned in the Royalist cause in the north, we can pause to comment upon it. The officer killed at Melton Mowbray was the former High Sheriff of Lancashire, Colonel Sir John Gerlington. His death had been so much desired by the Parliament that reports of it had circulated on several occasions in the previous year or so. This time, however, there was no mistake. *Mercurius Aulicus* recorded this tribute:

> that most Valiant Loyall Knight Sir John Girlington of Lancashire, whom from his Majesties first coming to Yorke, devoted his life and fortunes to His Majesties service against this odious Rebellion. (71)

On the 26th the brigade was four miles north of Newark, having paused at that garrison briefly, the Yorkshire Parliamentarians falling back before them. On the 27th, 800 men from Newark reinforced Langdale (this is according to Dudley), and if this is so, and if the relief force at Pontefract was then 2000 strong as it seems to have been, then when Langdale met Rossiter at Melton Mowbray he was outnumbered by the enemy nearly two to one. However, we cannot know that the Newark reinforcements marched all the way to Pontefract siege, and the problem of numbers remains unresolved. On March 1st, some 1500 Parliamentarian horse and dragoons at Wentbridge were surprised by Langdale, but they provided sufficient delay, Dudley explained, to enable the enemy to draw up their larger body, of 2,500 foot and 4000 horse, in battle order.

Between four and five in the afternoon - it will be remembered that Drake timed the first appearance of the relief force to 3 o'clock - the brigade came onto the hill near the castle, "and now methought we viewed them with the fancy of that great Captaine when he first encountered Elephants". This was Dudley's wry way of comparing numbers. In the fight that ensued, the details of which tally with Drake's report, the enemy advance force was driven back on their main body, and then for three hours no clear cut decision could be reached. At this point three bodies of Royalist cavalry, each 120 strong, hitherto held in reserve, launched themselves into the fray seconded by 200 musketeers out of Pontefract castle. The Parliamentarians broke and fell back, fleeing for six or seven miles and hotly pursued all the way. At Ferrybridge their attempt to make a stand was thwarted, their cannon all taken, and a general loss, Dudley estimated, of 300 dead, 7 or 800 taken prisoner, with 44 officers and no fewer than 22 foot colours. This loss of the foot colours does suggest that Luke, when he recorded the flight of Lord Fairfax's horse, had it right.

On March 2nd Langdale organised fresh provisions for the garrison, but
then, threatened by powerful enemy concentrations at Rotherham and Doncaster, he was obliged to march away to Newark.

Captain Hodgson had been present with some of the old Halifax veterans, and left us his version, straight and unvarnished as always:

Sir Marmaduke Langdale comes out of the south, with a body of horse, to raise the siege of Pontefract; and Colonel Lambert meeting them at Wentbridge engaged himself so far, that he came busily off; and, after some little bustle, most of our forces fled to Ferrybridge; only our regiment stayed on the field; and if we had but two troops of horse with us we had kept the field, but we were totally routed. The castle-foot being on one side, and the horse on another, they put us to the rout. Many were taken prisoners, but these were soon released...(72)

Once again, it was the Parliamentary cavalry that appears to have been the problem. The evidence is sufficient to charge them with leaving the foot to fend for themselves, a situation depressingly familiar to Hodgson from the activities of Sir Thomas Fairfax in 1643.

There was also some failure in Parliamentary communications. Sir John Saville wrote to Lord Fairfax on March 2nd:

Being now drawn off with my horse and foot from Sandall to Bradford...I thought it expedient to give your lordship an account thereof, and the reasons which induced me to do it.

My lord, it was past three in the afternoon on Saturday last [i.e., March 1st] before your orders came from Colonel Forbes to draw off to Ferrybridge, which (though I used all possible expedition therein) I could not do until within night, and then began to march with not above 240 horse and foot in all; for reason of the sudden notice, many of my men were absent, expecting to have found no enemy either at Pontefract, or Ferrybridge, but discovered them at both places, by intelligence from some of them whom we took prisoners. Whereupon we were forced to break up their quarters in Longhoughton...

Mercurius Aulicus noted this minor engagement as well. It was achieved, as Saville's report indicated, against a party of the Northern Horse resting after their efforts of the day:

...where some troops of Colonel Carnaby quartered. We forced our passage there with divers of their horse and some men of theirs prisoners, and it was generally conceived most secure to make for Bradford, in regard we did not know how the enemy had dispersed themselves towards Leeds...your Lordship may perceive by these enclosed what a distraction this late accident hath wrought in these western places. I have...summoned/ all within this division, from sixteen to sixty, to be in readiness with such arms as they have at Bradford...(74)

Nothing conveys better the full impact of Langdale's achievement in the area outside Pontefract than this letter from Saville. The panic and the consternation would have done credit to a larger force than the 2000 or so which Langdale had marched all the way from Banbury, through three actions, before actually routing a superior enemy force which had all the technical advantages of terrain and leisure to dispose itself, outside Pontefract. The small Royalist garrison in Sandal castle, relieved of Saville's pressures,
"ranges at pleasure" as Saville reported on the 3rd, whilst he himself "scarce knew whither to turn".  

Langdale did not remain long in Pontefract. Drake recorded that Sir Marmaduke Langdall coming into the castle betwix 10 and 11 of the night, having quartered his horse in the townes about, and he continued about the towne, refreshing of his men, till the Munday following, being the 3 March, at which time he marched away with the most of all his horse and foot. 

The relief of Pontefract, like the defence of York, produced a tribute in the form of a poetic eulogy. Partisanship set aside, it was on all counts a remarkable achievement, both for speed and for the planning that had gone into it. Whilst it is true that the brigade was assisted by the incompetence of the enemy commanders, it is also true that that incompetence was the result of panic induced by the fear of the Northern Horse, for it would seem that rumour sped before them as it had been used to do before Rupert in the months prior to Marston Moor. As Marston Moor wrecked much of Rupert's legend, so Naseby field was to reduce the Northern Horse to a mere fragment of their former strength. Yet the relief of Pontefract, coming at a crucial moment for both sides, was Langdale's victory, and the victory of his veteran commanders, the "gentlemen of quality and their attendants" who had returned to their native shire in fine style. 

The Fight for Scarborough, December 1644 to July 1645.

Pontefract was not the only Royalist garrison in Yorkshire to have its own chronicler, although at Scarborough the writer was no less a person than the Governor, Colonel Sir Hugh Cholmeley. Whilst there are indications in Nathan Drake's journal that it was written up at a later date, or partially so, Cholmeley's was evidently a work induced by the need in later years, to set the record straight on his own behalf. Ordinarily, such writing can be viewed with inordinate suspicion, and yet, unjustifiably so in most cases. Exculpatory writing does not by definition involve distortion of facts, but more likely, and more easily identifiable, occasional suppression of memories (for example, the Thomas Fairfax memoir) together with different interpretations of events. Thus in taking Cholmeley's own memoir as the basis for what follows, there does not seem to be any insurmountable problem, and this is fortunate, for contemporary sources of Parliamentarian origin are few and far between. 

Attention has already been paid to the 'Memorialls Tuching Scarbrough' in relation to Cholmeley's return to his allegiance in March 1643. We have also examined what he had to say in the context of the Marquess of Newcastle's departure for Europe, and the clues which Cholmeley gave to Rupert's initial plans after Marston Moor.
Cholmeley's memoir is probably trustworthy insofar as the details of the actual siege are concerned, but in approaching the beginnings of the struggle for Scarborough, we are at once confronted by an almost insoluble problem. Did Cholmeley, in the summer of 1644, consider surrender: can we read into his denial that he had considered it, evidence that the idea had crossed his mind: can we determine at what point he decided to fight it out, if we accept that he was in doubt as to what to do. As will be seen, the problem is crucial to the memoir.

But to come to the siege of Scarborough, the Marquiss was no sooner shipped, but the Governor bagenne seriously to consider his condition, which indeed was verie sad as the case stood; for the Towne was nott att all fortified, and (if itt had beene) not tennable with less then foure times the number of men then in the Garrison, and though the Castle was strong by scituation, itt had not with in itt either habitation for soldiers or places for magazine, and as the provision for victuals was but small, see for warre less, there being but 23 barrells of powder and 3 bundles of matche.

This lack of preparedness Cholmeley explained as due to the Marquess of Newcastle's belief in his military superiority in the field: even though Sir Hugh had represented Scarborough's case to him, Newcastle must have continued to draw upon supplies of munitions that were landed there. After Marston Moor, the deficiencies became serious, but Cholmeley had felt in no immediate danger. York was still resisting the allies, and Rupert had notified him of a plan to recruit in Cumbria and then to return to the field. Quite suddenly, Cholmeley's confidence received a blow:

with in 3 weekes Yorke was rendred; and the gentlemen and straingers then with in Scarbrough, partlie in that the Artickles of Yorke were so plausible, and partlie that they found the place soe ill provided, quiet itt, procuring passes either to goe to Prince Rupert or to live att there owne houses. The Generall's departure and the gentlemen's thus quitting the towne strucke soe great a terror into the common soldiers, as that they ranne away dayly, see that the Garrison was reduced to 300 foote and 200 horse, and many of those wavering.

In the wake of the fall of York, Scarborough came under threat. Sir Thomas Fairfax with 1000 cavalry, to be followed by 3000 infantry, made approaches through the East Riding. At this point, Sir Hugh either developed a clever scheme to provide himself with time to resist, and to give time for the allied high command to make further strategic decisions, or else, decided to try to come to terms without bloodshed. He called together his officers and "two or three gentlemen of qualitie that remained in the Towne...whoe hee knew verie firme to the King's cause", and after discussing the condition of the garrison, these men drew up a set of proposals which were to be presented to the enemy for their acceptance, which would in turn lead to the rendition of Scarborough.

It would be all too easy to say that Cholmeley was about to trick the allies, as it would be too easy to say that he genuinely intended to yield
but finally did not do so as a consequence of altered circumstances. Surely Cholmeley's own private memoirs would give the answer, but they do not. So determined was he to avoid accusations of double-dealing - to which, as a side changer he would be subjected more than most, with the exception in the north of Marley - that his very vehemence in maintaining that it had all been a ploy looks suspicious. Most certainly, Cholmeley did resist in the end, and fought on doggedly virtually to the last shot: but whether he intended that in July and August 1644 is open to question. If we are to hope to come somewhere near a solution to the problem, it can only be by a consideration of what Cholmeley himself said at the time, in the proposals and in the nature of their presentation, and what he said subsequently when he was drawing his recollections together.

At the meeting of the officers and gentlemen, it was decided to propose terms to Parliament, not through Lord Fairfax at York, but direct to the Committee of Both Kingdoms in London. It was intended to secure from Lord Fairfax a cessation in hostilities of 20 days to enable time for a messenger to reach London and to return with the Committee's answer. The messenger was to be Henry Darley, the unfortunate Parliamentary commissioner captured in May at Buttercrambe by Cholmeley's raiders and kept in Scarborough ever since. Darley, "being greedie of libertie" was only too keen to go, but when he suggested to Cholmeley that the proposals should be put to Fairfax, Sir Hugh told him in so many words, that he did not trust Fairfax to keep to any terms in view of the breaches in the York articles. Cholmeley later claimed that this had been a deliberate decision to gain time for himself, and that may be the case. It certainly fulfilled that end. Yet it is not altogether clear whether the decision to fight was already made, or whether it was made as circumstances altered during the cessation.

Darley arranged the 20 day truce with Lord Fairfax before leaving for London, and also informed the allied commanders that Cholmeley was in no position to hold out. If Darley, who had been in Scarborough, believed that was the case, then the serious nature of conditions there must have been worrying to Sir Hugh. As it was, the cessation enabled Cholmeley "to gaine tyme...to have all the armyes at Yorke dispersed". A line was drawn on the map six miles from Scarborough, across which Cholmeley's men could not go, but, similarly and more to the point, across which the allies could not move. Harvest would be gathered in, in peace: whilst the allied army split up to move against Newcastle upon Tyne, Pontefract, Helmsley, and other points. So, quite suddenly, whether or not he expected it, Cholmeley found that huge and ominous gathering around York had broken up into more manageable units.

It may have been at this time that Cholmeley decided to abandon his plan to surrender, if we suppose that it had originally been genuine. Time was on his side.
Cholmeley's own comments on the purpose of the proposals require us to examine them in detail. He remembered

This treatie tooke such impression that itt was generally reported and beleived Scarbrough would be rendred, though to anie rationall and impartial man, whose seriouslie peruseth the propositions, there will little appeare to give an occasion of such construction....

It was surely not the precise terms offered by Cholmeley, with which few can at the time have been conversant, but the mere fact of offering to negotiate a surrender which aroused suspicion. The "rationall and impartial" observer has been the desire of virtually all men placed, by fortune or ambition, in the light of history. The fear of being misunderstood is probably greater than the fear of ruin, for it precludes ultimate vindication. Thus, in pausing now to see if the proposals were really spurious, we have to attempt to adopt that "rationall and impartial" standpoint which Cholmeley demanded. Certainly, he was very eager to clear himself of all accusations of disloyalty, and there must have been some criticism at the time of which we know nothing, but at the nature of which we can guess. He continued

.....it is evident not onlie certaine perticulers are required which either the Parliament could nott or assuredlie would nott grant; but to prevent the Governor's beeing surprised by thare complyanse and concession, in the last artickle he reserves 3 dayes time after the returne of the Committye8 answear, to consider how farr hee would consent and accept, with out beeing concluded by ought had passed in the Propositions; and further, hee dispatched messengers to the King and Prince Rupert with coppies of the articles, shewing the streight he was in, and necessitie to sett on footo this treatie, but with assurance of his fidelitie to his Majesties service, and that this was meerely to gaine time and accomodations.

We can hardly question Cholmeley's fidelity to the King. His entire career, from March 1643, was that of a Royalist gentleman. He could, after all, have thrown down his command in July 1644 and gone into exile with Newcastle, being well placed to do so, and still have claimed to be loyal. Yet he could also have displayed fidelity by abandoning Scarborough and going south to join the Oxford army, arguing that the castle had been untenable. Shrewd as he was, Cholmeley must seriously have asked himself whether, in the wake of the fall of York, he could conceive of holding Scarborough for such a length of time as to be of continuing service to the King. It would have been the height of folly and a betrayal of trust if he had decided to waste men in a pointless defence, and thus it could be argued now, and may have been argued at the time, that the proposals were a serious alternative to such a pointless exercise. Yet, after deciding to fight it out, as a consequence of improving conditions in the castle and the scattering of the allied army, Cholmeley, precisely because of his concern to appear dutiful, insisted that his overtures had never been genuine. Now that we are to examine the propositions, it will be seen that certain of them provided obstacles to his completion of the negotiations if he
desired. That they were deliberately inserted with that end in view seems likely, but that would not in itself invalidate the view that initially, Sir Hugh countenanced surrender.

He set out the terms of the propositions in full under the heading 'The Propositions sent from Sir Hugh Cholmeley to the Committee for both kingdoms resident at London carried thither by Mr. Henre Darley'. The first two propositions concerned the security of the traders in Scarborough and did not bear direct relation to the military position, except insofar as that Cholmeley could, at a later date, point to them as evidence of the concern he had shown for the civilian population, should he have needed to turn to them for help.

Proposition three stated: "That the Garrison placed here be at least 2 partes of 3, Yorkshire men". This was a curious stipulation, one not met with elsewhere in the north so far as is known, and that it was aimed at the Scots is obvious. Supposing that Parliament had agreed to this proposal, which they did, Cholmeley might have hoped for some administrative problems in the allied command in the north.

Proposition four: "That such officers and soldiers both of horse and foot, and all others who shall desire it, may have libertie to march with there horses and armes, cullers flying, trumpets sounding, drums beating, matches lighted at both ends, to the Prince's army, or the next Garrison which they shall make choice of, beeing allowed accomodation for there quarters, and not march above 10 miles a day; and euery soldier to have 12 charges of powder and bulletts and match proportionable". There was nothing exceptional in these, and the ten mile limit corresponded with the York terms. The "fowerth" was "approved of" by the Committee.

Proposition five: "That all persons who have any goods in the Towne or Castle may have libertie to dispose them in what plaice and in whose hands they please within in the Towne, or to carry them to what place they desire within the Kingdome or beyond the seas, and to have protections and passes for there securitie and better conduct of there said goods". Again, there was nothing exceptional here, and the Committee consented provided that no goods prohibited by statute from being taken overseas, were to be included in the terms.

Proposition six: "That all and everie person of what qualletie and degree soe ever, which is with in the Towne or Castle att the rendition there of, may have free power and libertie to remove himselfe and family, and to live att his owne house or else where as hee pleaseth, and to pass and travell quietlie about his occasions with out molestations, and to have protection and passes from the three Generalls then att Yorke for his and there better securitie." The Committee approved this.
Proposition seven: "That all officers, soldiours, Gentlemen, Townesmen and every other person which shall be in the Towne or Castle att the Rendition thereof, may have power and liberty to departe with there armes, and to dispose of there estaites reall and personall as they please, and shall not be charged with other taxes and payments then is charged upon the Countrie in generall, and paid in a proportionable way by those which are of the Parliament's side and party". The Committee balked at this somewhat, and stipulated that such terms could only apply insofar as they were the terms agreed at York, and that the persons subject to the terms had been in Scarborough since August 1st. Cholmeley's attempt to avoid the penalties of sequestration for himself and his officers was not necessarily a sticking point for the London committee, which was prepared to waive normal procedures to secure immediate advantages. The fact was, however, that time and again in subsequent years, persons exempt from sequestration found themselves in danger of it, or victims of it, most particularly in the sweeping measures that followed the 1648 rising. The point is that Cholmeley was not to know this at the time, and proposition seven can be seen as quite a serious factor in deciding whether or not to surrender the garrison. If Cholmeley, in Parliamentarian eyes a turncoat, could escape penalty, he had a lot to lose by continuing the fight, for he would not get such terms again. Of course, it may be that Sir Hugh, with an eye to the theatrical gesture, inserted this in order that it might be seen just what he was throwing away by holding to the castle.

Proposition eight: "That all and everie person that hath interest in anie shipp now lying in the harbour or belonging to the towne, may have power and libertie to disspose of the said shipp and ordinance, tackling, and all things belonging to her, as they please to there best advantage". The Committee consented, providing only that the ships were not employed in the King's Service at a later date, and that any guns previously taken from Parliamentary ships were to be restored.

Proposition nine: "That all clergie men which are now in the Towne and shall be att the Rendition thereof, and are dispossessed of there spirituall or temporall estaites and livings by reasons of these troubles, may be restored to them, and enjoy there estaites reall and personall and disspose the same as they please, and that they may live quiettlie at there owne howses and have protections from the three Generalls for that purpose". This was a proposition that Sir Hugh knew could not conceivably be accepted. The Committee responded: "Ninth disaproved, excepting Mr. Remmington to whome the proposition is granted". If this was Robert Remington M.A., the reason for his exclusion from an overall denial is unknown. In 1647 his living was confirmed as having been sequestered. It was hardly likely that the Laudian clergy who had taken refuge in Scarborough would be treated differently from their fellows up and down the rest of the country since Parliament appears to
have treated them as even greater 'malignants' than many a Royalist layman in arms.

Proposition ten: "That noe man with in the towne or Castle att the Rendition thereof be enforced to take any oath other than such as is settled by Act of Parliament, nor be troubled or molested for refusing any oath not settled by Act of Parliament". The Committee disapproved of this outright. Cholmeley was here endeavouring to avoid the prescribed taking of the Covenant, one of the agreements reached between the allied commissioners prior to the Scottish invasion. It must also be seen as an adroit use of words by Sir Hugh, for it would be possible for a Royalist to argue that any Ordinance of Parliament passed since the outbreak of hostilities, not being sanctioned by the King, could not be obeyed. The Royalist Parliament at Oxford, on the other hand, was unlikely to pass any Acts imposing oaths that a Royalist could not take.

Proposition eleven: "That neither the Governor nor anie of his command be questioned for anie matter or thing that hath been donn or acted by them or anie of them either by sea or land". The Committee confirmed this for Sir Hugh and his family, but referred the officers to the general terms of the rendition articles.

Proposition twelve: "That the vêtes passed against the Governor in the House of Commons be revoked, and that hee be put in the same capacetie hee was before they passed". The Committee "disapproved". By rejecting this proposition, however, the Committee by inference threw into doubt their acceptance of earlier propositions directly concerning Sir Hugh.

Proposition thirteen: "That the Governor may have libertie to pass to what Countrie hee please beyond the seas, and power to dispose his estate reall and personall as hee pleases, and protections from the three Generalls for himselfe and servants for better security in this point". This was approved, and it will be apparent that it touched upon proposition seven.

Proposition fourteen: "That the Governor's wife may have libertie to live att his house att Whitbie without molestation, and that the soldiers there may be removed and noe other put into the same". The Committee consented.

Proposition fifteen: "That when the Towne and Castle shall be rendred Sir Henry Cholmeley, Brother to Sir Hugh, may be Governor of the place and have command in cheife". Sir Henry Cholmeley was a Parliamentarian colonel, and a former MP, who had never waivered. Cholmeley's familial interest was really unacceptable, as he must well have known, and the impression cannot be ignored that this was a frivolous proposition thrown in to add to the more ponderous and equally as objectionable terms. The Committee noted they thought "itt not reasonable Sir Hugh Cholmeley name his successor", and
clearly, they took it seriously.

Proposition sixteen: "That in case these articles be agreed on Coll. John Bellasyse to be released". The Committee suspended their decision on this, if that is what "Sixteenth suspended" can be taken to mean. Sir Hugh's concern for Lord Belasyse, a prisoner since Selby in April, was probably genuine although there were plenty of other northern officers in enemy hands whose names he could have inserted. Belasyse was eventually exchanged, but in no way because of these articles.

Proposition seventeen: "That the Governor may have assurance from the Commity for both Kingdoms and the Lord Fairfax that these articles shall be punctually observed without any breach or violation, and that they will promiss to obteine an order in the House of Commons for the confirmation of them within in one forthnight after the surrender of the Towne and Castle". The Committee refused to commit itself, stating that it would use "utmost endeavours" to see that the terms were kept. This was as good as saying what was anyway self-evident to both sides, that the London Committee had less practical power over the actions of field commanders than in theory it had. Or perhaps the Committee was leaving itself a safety valve. Cholmeley was putting the case far more strongly than most garrison commanders had done or would do, and demanding terms very much as if he were the victor and the other side, the vanquished.

Proposition eighteen: "That betweene this and the 4th September the Governor may receive answeare how farre the Commity for both Kingdomes and the Lord Fairefax doe consent to these articles, after the receiving of which the Governor desires and reserves 2 dayes time to consider before hee returne a conclusive answeare, and after hee shall declare his assent to the articles which shall be condissended to the Commity and the Lord Fairefax, hee promisseth in the woord of a Gentleman with in 5 dayes to render itt into the hands of such persons as the Parliament or Lord Fairefax shall appoint, and authorise for that purpose, the Towne and Castle of Scarbrough, with all victualls, armes, and amunition and ordinance but such as was formerly excepted in these articles". The Committee consented to all this.

Proposition nineteen: "And whilst these articles are in agetation their may be a cessation from all acts of hostelities, and under this the Governor subscribes his name". The Committee left the business of the cessation to Fairfax, who had already agreed to it.

It has to be said that if Cholmeley had succeeded in securing the London approval of all of these articles, it would have been something of a victory in surrendering the castle. Insofar as a rebellious, or revolutionary party can be bound by precedents, these articles would have been a marked success for all defeated Royalists. Yet, weighing up the demands made by Cholmeley,
the feasible interspersed with the outrageously presumptive, credence has to be given to Sir Hugh's claim that what he most desired, was time, and that he did not truly contemplate surrender. Unless he was prepared to withdraw certain articles, particularly nine, twelve and fifteen, there was nothing here on which to bargain, and Cholmeley gave no indication that he was willing to withdraw anything. That said, we must of necessity revert to the original view that we cannot really be sure one way or the other.

Henry Darley put all possible speed into going to London and returning, Cholmeley suspecting that his haste was due to a desire "in hopes to be Governor", since the whole business took him only 12 days. He carried with him not only the Committee's reply, but a letter from the Committee signed by the earl of Northumberland and Lord Maitland empowering him to confer with Sir Hugh as the Committee's representative, implying that accommodation on the rejected articles might be made, or offering Cholmeley a means of backing down on them.

Cholmeley maintained the pretence of talks until the full 20 days were up, since "most of the corne being designed to be brought into the Garrison" was still in the fields within the six mile limit. It is clear that he and Darley must have consulted at length during this time, even if it was now all a fabrication on Cholmeley's part, but what was said between them remains unknown. If actions are to be better understood than words, then we must suppose from what Cholmeley actually did, that this had been an entirely successful plot on his part for some time:

Now for the Governor to holde on the treatie, with out being further Ingaged or not discovering some glimpse of his resolution to breake with them in the conclusion (which would have interrupted his provisions), was a verie nise point; yet soo managed as itt was kept on foote to the last day.

This really does present a problem. With all the provisions going into the castle, "400 loads of corne and a good quantity of hay with other provisions", how did Cholmeley contrive to keep this from the ears of Darley and Fairfax? Did he seize upon the corn in the fields and the hay in the stacks, or did he pay for it all? Had he seized upon it, could he have prevented disgruntled local people leaving the six mile limit with stories of what was going on? Would an interruption of the normal civilian traffic into and out of that limit not have aroused the suspicions of the Parliamentary soldiery stationed around the area? Did Henry Darley notice nothing in his talks with Cholmeley, presuming that they took place in Scarborough and not at some neutral point between the two camps? If Lord Fairfax knew what was going on, even he would have realised that he was playing a double-game with Cholmeley, and if he did not, he must have had men about him who were naturally suspicious of the doings of a turncoat. The questions are beyond answer, because there is no direct
or indirect contemporary clue available to us, but they have to be asked, because they are crucial. Either Cholmeley was an even cleverer man than we may suppose him to have been, and his actions and writings show him to have been shrewd and competent; or Lord Fairfax was far more incompetent than we might expect for a man responsible since 1642 for Parliamentarian interests in Yorkshire. The fact of the matter may be that in the East Riding, as elsewhere, Parliamentarian intelligence systems simply did not exist, or were thoroughly inefficient, which deplorable state of affairs would be beneficial to the Royalists. Yet this development at Scarborough raises again the problem of the Mayney relief march to Pontefract with which we have dealt, and both raise a question easier to put than to answer. Briefly, was the element of surprise which Mayney particularly possessed, but Cholmeley also had, due to a fundamental sympathy for the Royalist cause on the part of the common people? Was the essential conservatism of the rural population in the East and West Ridings Royalist in sentiment? For from the local populace would have to come the intelligence upon which the military power in York could build, and if it was not forthcoming, as it was not where Mayney was concerned, and was probably not in Cholmeley's case, can we see it as a positive rather than as a negative attitude? This question is integral to another, greater question with which this study is not concerned: did the Parliament ever reconcile the rural populace to its revolution?

At the end of the 20 days Cholmeley writes to the Lord Fairfax and Mr. Darley, that since his propositions were not answered by the Committy according to his demand, nor the expostulations since uppon them produced ought more to his satisfaction, hee would noe longer continuue the treaty.

At the same time Cholmeley drew into Scarborough his cavalry which had, presumably, been patrolling the six mile line, so that when Fairfax's horse advanced "and quartered in all the villages and places convenient adjacent" with 500 infantry to assist them, everything was ready. A Parliamentary ship was boarded off the coast, and a vast quantity of match seized by a Captain Allan who carried it into Scarborough and so, opportunely, replenished the mere 40 yards of the stuff left in the magazine. Whilst the blockade by land proved effective, for a long time the essential provisions continued to reach the garrison by sea, "coales, salt, and corne".

The garrison cavalry was at this stage 200 strong, but this did not prevent it from carrying out exploits which had marked Cholmeley as a very dangerous man in his Parliamentarian days and during 1643 and early 1644. Some 13 of his own troop breake out, and march above twentie miles into Cleaveland, where many of the Scottish army were quartered after the taking of Newcastle; they encounter with 15 Scotts, kill two, and returne to Scarbrough bringing each man a prisoner and there horses with them.
This was in early November. Cholmeley wrote of his cavalry, and we can share his opinion, as "verie good men and perpetually in action, and grew so formidable the enemie durst not stand to looke them in the face". At the end of December they secured another success, raiding a troop of enemy cavalry and capturing a colonel. But this ability to take the war to the enemy was to be curtailed at the opening of the new year, for in January 1645 there arrived on the scene one of the ablest of Parliament's field commanders, a match for Cholmeley in some respects, Lieutenant General Sir John Meldrum. His arrival heralded a new intensity in the siege, and can be seen as a sign that Scarborough had assumed real importance in the mind of Lord Fairfax, a constant taunt and reminder of a wasted summer. For Meldrum it was to be his last service for the Parliament which he served, so it may now be observed that, but for his nationality (he was a Scot), his birth, and his now imminent death, his name might have echoed louder in the military histories of the civil war period, for he had no equal amongst the Parliamentary commanders in the north, not even Lambert.

Meldrum quartered at Falsgrave, and occupied the Mill Hill which, by the eminence, commanded the town and harbour. His force of 2000 foot and 1000 horse was dispersed according to siege principles. The seizure of Mill Hill was a blow to Cholmeley, as the latter remarked:

The Governor understood well of what consequence the place was, and would not have left it without fortification; but that hee wanted men to maintaine itt, and never intended to holde the town in caise any assaunt should be offered, for 2 thousand men were scarce sufficient to maintaine the towne, and there was not 700 in itt with the Townesmen, most of which verie wavering.

Nonetheless, the town had to be secured until safe magazines were built in the castle and all provisions carried there. Additional stores came into the town, captured at sea, so many in fact that Cholmeley remembered "there were more prizes brought into the Harbour in one month past, then ever had beene in all the time Scarbrough was a Garrison". We may suppose that Cholmeley had ships directly under his command which preyed on coastal traders.

Meldrum had come to press the siege to conclusion, but he was wary of Cholmeley, as Cholmeley was wary of him. The town was held three weeks from Meldrum's arrival without action, save for desultory bombardment by the enemy, but even so "for 10 days together not any soldier stirred from his poast". A Royalist ship positioned to defend the harbour with its guns was savaged by Meldrum's artillery, but two sallies against the enemy trenches proved successful. Caution dictated Meldrum's actions, and he sent for reinforcements to General Leven, procuring a 1000 Scottish infantry under a Colonel Stewart. When these arrived, he sent a summons to Cholmeley:

in an imperious style to yeild the towne; the Governor returnses answere hee verie well understood the towne was not tenable, that hee would not have kept it soe long against
this was something of a jibe at Meldrum
that he held it thus long meerely to gett his provisions
into the Castle, which beeing now donne, he was resolved to
quitt itt in few days, and that if hee durst make his attempt
against the Castle, hee should be received by persons
resolute to mainetaine the place and the King's right...

Meldrum was not, however, prepared to wait until he could walk into the
town without difficulty. Cholmeley was informed that an attack was to be
made, and instantly withdrew his cannon into the castle. At the moment that
the enemy began to move towards the town, he also withdrew his men into the
castle

without making the least show of opposition; soe that the
ennemie, finding the entrance in the towe so easie, takes
the hardiness to advance to the gaite of the Castle, from
which they are instantlie repulsed with the loss of many of
there lives, and if the Church had not beene neare for there
retreat, they had surely suffered much more.

This sounds like a ruse on Cholmeley's part, drawing on the enemy and then
suddenly turning at bay, but as will be seen, his account did not tally with
those of the enemy. Whitelock noted:

Letters from Sir John Meldrum informed, that Feb. 18 about ten
a Clock the Town of Scarborough was stormed in four places by
the English and Scottish Souldiers, who gained the Town and
Church with the loss of eleven men; in the Church they took 80
Souldiers, and the Governour of Hemsley Castle...

It is not clear that Sir Jordan Crossland was captured at this time, but if he
was, he was released soon after, for he went from Scarborough to Newark where
he still was in 1646.

....Cholmeley perceiving the Town like to be lost, fled into
the Castle, and was pursued and one of the Works taken, but
the White Tower in the Castle commanding it, they beat out
Meldrum's men with stones. Cholmeley laboured to escape by
sea in a little Pinnace he had there, which he called his
'Running Horse', but Meldrum got boats between him and the
Pinnace, and forced him back again into the Castle.
Sir Hugh Cholmeley had five Dunkirk vessels lying in the Road,
who interrupted Meldrum's men in the Storm, but his Canoniers
sunk two of them, and the other three fled away. Meldrum
took in the Town and Church, 32 pieces of Ordnance, with store
of Arms, and other prize, and in the Haven 120 ships.

Virtually the whole of this report, not simply because it does not tally with
Cholmeley, has to be disregarded. We do not even know whether Meldrum
compiled such a letter or letters as Whitelock suggested, since Whitelock
drew virtually all of his military reports from contemporary tracts which
circulated in London (as did John Vicars), and these ranged from the bare
factual reports, to the most outrageous fabrications. From everything that
Cholmeley had said previously, we must accept his interpretation of events,
even if the question of the losses at the church remains unresolved. We do
know that Crossland had gone into the garrison after Helmsley fell.
Vicars printed a letter, allegedly from Cholmeley, and probably, if so, intercepted on its way to an unknown recipient (perhaps Rupert?). It was said to have been written on the 24th, six days after the town was occupied by Meldrum. The letter's despondent quality must be understood in the context of the appeal for help, the blacker the picture painted, the more likely would relief be attempted.

We are now blockt up close in the Castle, and divers of our soldiers run away to the Enemy, and it is to bee feared that the ill accommodation will daily decrease our number: You know the consequence, and believe me it requires speedy supply, for reasons which I may not expresse; I pray you signifie where or from whence I may expect and hope for relief, and whether any expectance from the Queen, or Ireland, or probability of a good issue from the Treaty; of which particulars I desire to bee satisfied, and that I may not bee totally ignorant: Not that the failing of any, or of all of these, shall make mee quit this trust otherwise than becomes a Gentleman...(82)

Scarborough Castle cannot have been in quite so bad a condition as this letter suggests, and if the text was not 'doctored' by London propagandists, we must accept it as a deliberate attempt to create concern. Certainly, Cholmeley felt cut off perched on the promontory where the castle was situated, but he had known what was to come and had prepared against it. Returning to his memoir, we find a sound picture of conditions:

At the entering into the Castle most of the Townes men quitt the Governor, except one of the Bailiffes and four or five others which retir’d thither with there families. The number of the forces that entered into the Castle were about five hundred, of which threescore gentlemen and officers, 250 foot, and the rest troopers most of them having horses, of which there being noe use within the Castle they all betooke themselves to musketts, and did the dutie of foot soldiours, which they performed verie gallantlie being as stoute resolute men as was in the world.

The first forthnight produced little action, for those within the Castle hoped for reliefe, (which had been long and often promised from Oxford); they endeavoured in the interim to make themselves as strong as possible might be, and to that end were imploied in fortifying some places which were most requisite, soo the enemie having the Church att the foot of the Castle began to make other places of securitie against attempts from the Castle...

Meldrum continued to bombard Cholmeley with summons to surrender, and to be answered with the usual rejection. Similar letters were sent to the officers and gentlemen in the garrison, and it is not a little remarkable that Cholmeley let them be delivered, although he was probably sure of his men, observing that they expressed to Meldrum in their replies "there resolution to stike to the Governor". To reach the rank and file, arrows with messages attached were fired over the walls, but these had little effect, for all the waverers - Cholmeley reckoned there were 40 or so - had run away within a few days of the fall of the town.
To add extra impact to his demands, Meldrum brought up ordinance, nearly all demi-cannons, but one "whole cannon" firing a 64 lb. ball. This was a Cannon Royal, the largest ordinance available to either side during the war. Meldrum ordered the cannon to the cliff tops for better range, and went up himself to instruct the gunners:

Meldrum there in person giving directions about them, his hatt blowes off his head, and hee catching to save that, the winde being verie great blows his claoke over his face, and hee falls over the cliff amongst the rocks and stones at least steeple height; itt was a miracle his braines were not beaten out and all his bones broken, but itt seemed the winde together with the cloake did in some sorte bear him up, and lessen the fall; yet hee is taken up for dead, lyes 3 dayes speechless, his head opened and the bruised blood taken out, though a man above threescore years old, recovered this soe perfectlie that with in six weekes he is on foote againe, and begins to batter the Castle.

How Cholmeley came to learn all these details we shall shortly see. Meldrum was a tough old man.

A sudden cessation in activity puzzled the governor. The new ordinance was silent where it had been placed: "The enemie was verie quiett and kept close in there workes and the Church." He determined to learn what had happened, and ordered a sally.

Captaine Wickham...with 50 men [Fell] upon the Scottish garde att the end of the Castle next to the harbour, made manie of them runne into the sea, whoe thincking thereby to esscaipe fire died by water; this was att noone day, and soe gallantlie performed as hee returned with above twentie prisoners, left a hundred killed and wounded; by these prisoners the besieged had first notice of Meldrum's misfortune...

The impact of the sally lay in its complete unexpectedness, since Cholmeley recorded no earlier such, although he implied them. The captain was William Wickham of Rowseby, related by marriage both to Cholmeley and to Cholmeley's regimental Major, Toby Jenkin³.

Upon Meldrum's recovery

\[\text{He}\] falls to batter soe furiously that in 3 days the great Tower split in two, and that side which was battered falls to the ground, the other standing firme beeing supported by an arch of stone that went through the midst...

Cholmeley noted that some 20 persons standing on the top of the tower, the ruin of which is today much as Meldrum's guns left it, managed to jump onto the safe part, but two in a chamber in the wall were crushed to death when it fell.

The fall of the Tower was a verry terrible spectacle, and more sudden then expected, att which the enemie gave a great shout, and the besieged nothing dismayed betooke them to there armes, exspecting an assault, by omission of which the enemie lost a faire opportunitie, the falling parts of the Tower having obstructed the passage to the gaite house soe that the guard there for present could have noe releafe.
from there friends; this fall of the Tower put the enemie into much heart and confidence, so that the next day, about six a clocke in the evening, Meldrum writes to the Governor that hee intended that night to be maister of the Castle and all the woorkes, that if the Governor would render, hee should have good conditions, but if hee would not, and that anie of his soldiors lost a drop of blood in the entrance, theire should not a person with in the Castle have quarter.

Cholmeley refused to return an immediate reply, but that did not stop Meldrum, who launched an attack at nine o'clock that evening. The objective was the gatehouse, which had by this time been reinforced, and the Royalists fought back fiercely until the enemy retired leaving divers dead bodies in the woorke, and having of there partie slaine and wounded above two hundred in that encounter; the stones of the falne Tower were throwne freellie amongst them and did the greatest execution.

Cholmeley made a digression in his narrative to recount a curious incident and in view of a not dissimilar occurrence at Carlisle during the siege there, and which we shall deal with in its turn, it will stand retelling. Shortly after the abandonment of the town, Captain Richard Ledgard fell sick, at a time when it was his company's turn for duty at the gatehouse. Ledgard's under-officers, making their round, were surprised to find all the walls hung with black, as if for a funeral, and upon entering another part of the castle, a similar spectacle confronted them. They reported the incident to Ledgard, who convinced them that they had suffered an hallucination, "deceptio visus". Cholmeley nonetheless observed that the officers in question were men of "courage, as noe one that knew them could judge any misstake arose through feare and weakness of spirit". The point of the digression was this. That of Ledgard's company, the lieutenant and two sergeants were shortly after killed; Ledgard and another gentleman were talking in the castle yard when a 64 lb. ball passed between them, killing the gentleman and rebounding from the wall to break Ledgard's leg; and the only men killed when the Tower collapsed were two of Ledgard's company.

The collapse of the tower obliged Cholmeley and his family and some others to move into ramshackle cabins in the bailey, exposed to the fire of enemy ships lying off the promontory. Meldrum, meanwhile, used all his ordinance against the main gate until the walls were reduced solow that the Royalists had no choice but to evacuate. Immediately, Meldrum sent in a company of foot, who were driven out again by Captain 'Neueston' who may have been a Reformado from Colonel Sir Richard Dacre's Horse.

A second time the Parliamentarians forced an entry, and were a second time beaten out by 30 or so Royalists commanded by Captain Hugh Cholmeley. Sir Hugh's identification of this officer as 'Hugh' may have been an error,
since whilst such a man cannot be identified, there was a Captain James Cholmeley in the garrison.\footnote{86}

This double defeat caused Meldrum to think again, and for 10 days the disputed gatehouse area lay unoccupied by either side. However, Meldrum was enabled to draw his ordinance nearer to the castle:

> the besieged were forced to retire nearer to the Castle, which gave opportunitie to the enemy to draw up two demi cannon to the ridge of a hill close to the Gaite house, which being planted commanded the passages and principal workes in the Castle.

This threat had to be faced immediately. Cholmeley ordered Major Crompton whom we have met with before in the Buttercrambe exploit a year before, to make a sally. Supported by 60 men, he cleared three separate works, defended by 80 men in each, overturned the demi-cannon and ruined their carriages which was as much as could be done in that place and so short a time, and was of soe great consequence as the cannon could not be made serviceable in ten days, in which time the besieged had fortified themselves, and raised up divers new workes. Crompton had soe maulled and frighted those upon the guard as the rest within the town were ready to run away, probable if it had been a little darker they had done soe, and as it was the officers had much to do to keep the soldiers together...

This signal exploit, not unnaturally, grew in the telling:

> Skerbrough had relieved themselves, killed all their officers excepting 2 or 3, and had killed and taken 300 men, dismounting their great iron gunne and 2 pockitt pistoles with all the rest of their cannon there, and that they had nailed their gunnes and burnt their carriages there, and had taken Skarbrough town.(87)

It was not so widespread a triumph as that, although it was worthy of praise. As Cholmeley observed

> the place which Crompton was possessed of could not be kept, the enemies cannon plaid soe upon itt, and therefore having dismounted the cannon the Governor commands his retreat...

Yet over and above this tactical triumph there had been an even more severe blow dealt the siege forces, and the allied cause in general. Meldrum had fought his last fight

> in this scuffle Meldrum received a shot in att the bellie and out of the backe; hee had often both in words and letters protested hee would either take the Castle or lay his bones before itt, and though hee dyed with in six days of this wound, hee before had escaped verie great dangers for beside that fall hee had been shot through the codds and perfectlie recovered....

Thus ended a career which had begun early in the century in Ulster, and which has never yet had justice done it by a military historian.

With Meldrum's death the last "action of consequence" had been fought, although a further 12 weeks of siege lay before the garrison. The Royalists,
too, had sustained losses to which Cholmeley, chary of naming individuals at the best of times, did not refer. One of the dead was Lt. Colonel Henry Constable, Viscount Dunbar, a hard drinking, heavy gambling Recusant from the East Riding, killed, according to the pedigrees, by a cannon ball. Another casualty was Captain Michael Wharton of Beverley, also a Recusant, and also slain by cannon fire.

for what by reason of sickness and want of prother the besieged had noe power, and those without, knowing that time must reduce the place, endeavoured cheifelie to secure themselves....

They had also, let it be added, been so badly handled on so many occasions, that they must have been wary of risking another setback, however desperate the conditions were within the castle.

....which they did in soe strong workes as itt was difficult to take them as the Castle, in soe much did the soldiers of the Castle say to the enemie, 'doe you besiegd us, or wee you?'

The garrison artillery was now silent, for want of powder, and this led to the Parliamentary forces approaching closer to the walls. They kept up a steady bombardment themselves, causing the garrison to occupy their time in repairing fresh breaches almost daily. Throughout all this time, Cholmeley was able to boast, the soldiers and officers received their pay regularly, one shilling a week to the men with an additional six pence for every day spent in labouring to maintain and secure the walls. Sir Hugh bore much of this charge out of his own pocket, but when even his largesse failed, he proposed that those within the garrison holding plate should contribute some towards the minting of siege money - silver cut into shapes and "passed currant according to there severall weights, some of them had the stamps of a broaken Castle and this inscription 'Caroli fortuna resurgam'". Here, Sir Hugh found the spirit of sacrifice not so large as his own.

those who had more then double to what was in the Garrison besides, were not onelie unwilling to parte with any themselves, but underhand wrought upon others to be adverse to itt; see that rather then to breed the least disquiett by taking any man's goods against his will, the Governor made use of the plaite which belonged to some persons hee had perticuler interest in, which was cutt in pieces...

The curious phrase "persons hee had perticuler interest in" conceals some mystery. Perhaps Cholmeley meant, persons who were obligated to him either for small or large loans, or for other reasons; alternatively, persons who had left their silver in his care, so that by using it, he put himself under an obligation to reimburse the persons concerned at a later date. But that he kept the soldiers paid was no mean feat. There was, anyway, another and altogether graver problem with which he had to contend, as he explained in some detail:

all the actions from the enemie did not see much trouble him, as the pragmatticall practices of some personns with
in his owne Garrison, whose by there cunning and plauseable deportment had gained a good repute amongst the generalitie, making huge shew and pretence of zeale to the King's cause, though the Governor had cautions from some hee ought to beleive and give obedience to, not to trust those persons too farre in the businesses concerned the King....

Cholmeley gave no names. One is tempted to dismiss his observations as one dismisses, for example, the claims made by the Parliamentarians about treachery at Adwalton Moor, or the Duchess of Newcastle's view of treason influencing the campaigns against the Scots. But this will not do. Sir Hugh, without naming names, was really rather specific, for he alluded to warnings from "some hee ought to beleive and give obedience to". This reference can only have been to Newcastle himself, or to Prince Rupert, and the warnings must have come to him in July 1644. We do not have anything like a list of the civilians within Scarborough, although by late 1644 it was one of the few places - the others were Skipton and Pontefract and, if not too far away, Carlisle - into which Royalist adherents could go. The motives which may have compelled a civilian to enter a garrison at this stage of the war, when they were under no coercion from Newcastle so to do, can only be guessed at. Clearly, genuine loyalty would compel a man to associate himself with whatever garrison was maintaining the cause. There would also be a general fear of living isolated in somewhat hostile countryside, known for a Royalist, with Scottish and Parliamentary soldiery prowling about in all the arrogance of anticipated victory. Catholics, for example, whether Royalist or not, would doubtless have felt safer in a garrison, particularly if, at its surrender, they could take advantage of generous articles, and who is to blame them for what was a matter of survival? It is in this last group - and I do not mean solely amongst Recusants - that Cholmeley's "pragmatikkall persons" ought to be sought.

By June 1645 the castle of Scarborough was in a sad condition. As Cholmeley remarked himself, it was but a matter of time and the enemy did not need to storm, or could wait to storm it until weakness within would give them easy access. There must have been some Royalists within the castle who, by this date, had realised that relief and, less likely, Royalist military victory would be denied. Lacking military discipline, lacking also the outlook of the veteran soldier, some of these persons would view Cholmeley's continued resistance as courting disaster. Should the castle be stormed, what was to stop the enemy, with Meldrum's death to avenge, from putting everyone in sight to the sword? In the conditions of the early summer of 1645, that such persons would seek to avert catastrophe by influencing both the soldiery and the officers has to be accepted. Against their prophecies of doom and their appeal to the natural instinct for survival, Cholmeley could present hardly any case, for if he had had to explain what it was that caused him to hold on so fiercely to an untenable stronghold, he might have replied - indeed, one
would expect him to have replied - that it was all a matter of honour, personal collective and party.

...he plainelie perceived they tooke advantage of the straite and necessities the Garrison was in, to infuse discontents into the soldiers upon all occasions, yet these particulars being more certaine then clearely to be proved the committing or questioning of them would but breed dissturbance or discontent in the Garrison, which was verie unseasonable, espetiall there having a neere relation to some whoe had a command, and were really affected to the King's cause; and soe to exclude them out of the Garrison were to give more knoledge and advantage to the enemie; soe that for these 2 reasons the Governor att the quitting the Towne, admitted them into the Castle, and att both places connived att many particulers hee should nott have donne had the enemie beene more remoate.

Sir Hugh's difficulties were serious. His allusion to these defeatists as being nearly related to prominent Royalists does not bring us any nearer to identifying them, largely because we do not have anything approaching a list of persons in Scarborough garrison. The composition records do not help much. If some of those within the castle were some of the would-be exiles whom Cholmeley had restrained from going with Newcastle in July 1644, that might explain their attitude: but one would have expected these to have left long before the siege intensified. The mystery is insoluble.

The defeat of the King's field army at Naseby on June 14th, and with it the wreck of the Northern Horse, was reported to Cholmeley by a drummer sent from the allied camp. The victory was celebrated outside the walls with bonfires, cannon shot, and volleys of musketry against the castle, in response to which Cholmeley ordered his trumpets to be sounded, the drums to beat, and muskets to be fired "and made such cryes and hollowing as they caused the enemie to decist from there jolletie...". The garrison may have considered this report to be either a ruse, or only partly true, even though the defeatist element must have leapt at it. For the next eight weeks, however, they continued to resist "in hopes of reliefe, or att least to understand how affaires went with the King".

The situation deteriorated slowly. The enemy ships, no longer under threat from the castle guns, drew in closer to the promontory and fired upon parties sent to fetch fresh water from beneath the cliffs. The "miseries of the Castle began exceedinglie to multiply".

Halfe of the soldiers were either slaine or dead of the scurvy, of which disease neare the otherhalfe laid soe miserable handled they were scarce able to stirr hand or foot; there was but 25 of the common soldiers able to doe dutie, and the gentlemen and officers which were glad to undertake it in there roome, were almost tierd out of there skinnis; there dyed tenn in a night, and manie layed two dayes unburied for want of helpe to carrie them to the grave; there was corne sufficient, but not hands to make the mills goe, in soe much that most in the Garrison had
not eaten a bitt of bread for divers dayes before the render, and the Governor had often in person turned the mills to get himselfe bread....

It goes without saying that the garrison was inspired, in these extremities, by Cholmeley's own deportment, although he avoided suggesting as much. The picture of the terrible conditions within the castle is tragically clear, for all Cholmeley's economy of words. To add to their troubles, the well within the castle was insufficiently supplied with water, and the cavalry horses were sickening too. By July, half a barrel of powder remained, and Cholmeley now consulted his officers as to what was best to be done. They intreated him to take into consideration the weake estate of the Garrison, where upon hee summons to a meeting all the Gentlemen and officers in the Garrison, which were able to make appearance, where it is unanimouslie resolved requisite to enter into a treatie...

Terms were agreed on July 22nd, and the garrison finally marched out three days later. Carried out in blankets, unable otherwise to move, were 180 sick men, who died then or in the town. Sixty officers, gentlemen and soldiers, "many of them infirme in health" marched from the castle in column, Cholmeley himself bringing up the rear. That night these men slept four miles away from the castle, and seem to have been treated with respect by the enemy, who probably found themselves amazed by the diligence of a garrison so riddled with disease as this was. At Selby, the columns broke up, Cholmeley and Major Crompton choosing to sail for France. A good part of the men able to walk elected to continue resistance, and commanded by Colonel Sir Jordan Crossland and Major Toby Jenkin, made their way to Newark.

Scarborough so graphically illustrates the state of Royalist fortunes that it would be pointless to expand upon it. The defiance of the garrison had burned for a time as brightly as any flame elsewhere, at Pontefract or Carlisle, as brightly as at Newcastle upon Tyne: but it was in reality merely a flicker of defiance, fanned for a time by the winds of hope, but ultimately and poignantly trodden out by conditions against which prowess in arms was no defence.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. For Brandling's career, see Vol. 2.
2. LJ, IX, p. 497.
8. Holmes, R. ed: The Sieges of Pontefract Castle 1644/48, Pontefract 1887. This book is chiefly important for discussions of the siege works and points of local interest.
11. Young, Marston Moor, pp. 182/4.
16. A Scot? Drake did not place him in the overall list.
17. He had been a cavalry captain, his horse command passing to Mr. Robert Lowther.
18. He defies identification.
20. Later 1st earl of Derwentwater.
21. See also Vol. 2., Huddleston's Foot.
22. LJ, VIII, p. 349. A Capt. Lumbsdaine, ex Governor of Cawood Castle, was in Newark garrison in 1646. Drake called him a Scot.
23. Drake calls this man a Scot, but see Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, II, p. 226.
24. Wheatley's Foot appears to have been a post March 1645 unit. See Vol 2.
25. Missing from Drake's overall listing.
26. See also, Vol. 2, Trafford's Horse.
30. The same as of Lowther's staff?
31. This seems a not unreasonable transcription of Drake's spelling 'Standeven'.
32. See Vol. 2., George Middleton's Horse for this recurring problem.
33. See Grey's Division.
34. Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, III, pp. 70/1.
37. Probably a son of Alderman Tatum who was himself in the garrison.
38. Boothroyd, History of Pontefract, p. 156.
39. See Hutton's Division.
40. Davies, Dugdale's Yorkshire Visitation, p. 189. Possibly one of the six younger sons of Oliver Beale of Woodhouse. The eldest son, George, was dead by 1643.
41. See Grey's Division.
42. Not in the overall list.

44. Davies, Dugdale's Yorkshire Visitation, p. 325. Peirse of Lazenby: Richard and John Peirse were brothers and Sewers in Ordinary to the King. John had two sons, also named Richard and John, the eldest of whom died in 1666. The problem seems insoluble.

45. Ibid.

46. Davies, Dugdale's Yorkshire Visitation, p. 362. Of Westow, Yorkshire, nephew of an archbishop of York. Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, II, p. 79. He was the son of Isaac Mountaine, who sent horses to the Royal army. Sir Thomas Fairfax wrote of George, "I am informed this gent. carried himself verie civillie and unchargeable to the Countrie in the late warr and his wife is one to whom I am n" alyed and could wish that for her sake all lawful favour and respect be afforded to him". Whether he was the Mountney who surrendered at Tickhill Castle on June 26th, or not, is unclear. This last may have been (viz. Davies, op. cit., p. 200) Richard or John Mountney, sons of Nicholas Mountney of Rotherham.

47. Davies, Dugdale's Yorkshire Visitation, p. 273. James was the son and heir of Darcy Washington of Ardwick, Yorks. Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, III, p. 181, his father's papers.

48. See his father, Grey's Division.

49. See Grey's Division.

50. See the plan of Pontefract castle.

51. See Vol. 2.

52. RCHM, Newark, The Civil War Siegeworks, op. cit. Peter Young wrote the biographical material.

53. Markham, Fairfax, p. 184. It is possible this may refer to a later incident on January 22nd.

54. This summons, much mutilated, was rewritten by Boothroyd and by Nathan Drake's descendant, Francis Drake. The following is Longstaffe's.

55. Warburton, III, pp. 70/1.

56. Warburton gave the initial letter of the forename as 'F', an error.

57. Ex Robert Brandling's Horse, when Brandling changed sides, he continued loyal. See Vol. 2.

58. This regimental designation may be later than March 1645.

59. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 166/7, 182/3.


61. Ibid., pp. 175 (writing to Brereton in Cheshire), 178.

62. Ibid., pp. 191/2.

63. Ibid., p. 193.

64. Ibid., pp. 204/5.

65. MA., 8.3.45, pp. 1401/07.

66. Whitelock, Memoire, p. 129.

67. Ibid., p. 130.


69. Warburton, III, p. 27.

70. See Vol. 2.

71. MA., 1.3.45, p. 1395.

72. Hodgson, Memoir, pp. 144/5.

73. MA., 8.3.45, p. 1501. See also Saville's letter of March 3rd in Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 178/9.


75. Ibid., p. 179.

76. Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Mss. Collection, Ms. 329, Sir John Reresby's poem (one of several, some political satires).

77. Firth, Cholmeley's Narrative of the Siege of Scarborough, op. cit. Firth's editing was slender, and confined largely to points of major importance. He made no attempt to analyse the content.

78. CSPD 1644, pp. 450/2 also gave the articles and Parliament's replies.

80. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 128.
81. Vicars, III, p. 110 gave a similar story.
82. Ibid.
83. See Vol. 2.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., Roger Nevinson, Dacre's Horse.
86. Ibid.
87. Longstaffe, Drake's Siege of Pontefract, p. 45 dates it to May 26th.
88. See Vol. 2 for these officers.
CHAPTER TWELVE

"Great and Memorable for Loyalty"

The Struggle for Carlisle December 1644 to July 1645.

Tullie's description of Carlisle, that it was "little in circuite, but great and memorable for loyalty", might be applied with equal justice to any of the surviving Royalist strongholds in the north after Marston Moor. It is almost as if, having remained firm when many other garrisons had yielded, they felt the eyes of friend and foe alike upon them, and were determined to live up to the image of themselves presented by Royalist propaganda. At the time at which we take up Tullie's narrative again, in December 1644, Pontefract had not yet been relieved, Scarborough stood firm and knew nothing of Meldrum, whilst Skipton and Lathom sent raiders at will around their respective areas. By summer, Scarborough, Carlisle and Pontefract were gone, swept away in the wake of Naseby field, disheartened or beaten into submission by the enemy or by the attendant exigencies of siege warfare. Yet they did not go down easily.

When we left Carlisle, the siege was desultory. David Leslie had been drawn away to the siege of Newcastle, and the local Parliamentarians had enjoyed small success. By Christmas of 1644, the enforced idleness of a half-hearted siege was driving the Royalist garrison into repeated sallies: "the restlesse spirits, weary of Rest, went out a pickquering every day, and seldome returned without pray or prisoner".

The administration of the town concentrated upon preparations for the hardening of the siege. All corn was taken from the citizens and stored in a central magazine, and the slaughter of cattle was centrally directed, the work being transferred to the castle, from which place meat and bread were to be distributed to the citizens according to their need. An order also went out to bring in silver plate for coining - similar to what had been done at Scarborough, although in that instance it was more toward the end of the siege. The action taken by Glemham was somewhat earlier. Perhaps that was why, as at Scarborough, there were difficulties, although Tullie criticised the actions of the military:

an order was published to every Citizen to bring in their plate to be coyned, which they did cheerfully; but this satisfied not the Governors; soe officers were ordered to come sodainly into the houses, as well of Country Gentlemen as of Citizens, and undr pretence of searching for plate, to take from them what moneys they found: wch they exactly performed....

Tullie's own brother escaped the searchers twice, under circumstances which Tullie related. Having heard that Colonel Sir William Dalston had had his
The city and castle of Carlisle taken from a 16th century plan.
Map to illustrate Carlisle and its environs, showing places mentioned in the journal of the siege.
house searched and money taken, Tullie’s brother filled his pockets with ready money rather than leave it in the house, and went to church. On his way home afterwards, he was accosted in the street:

these searchers met him, and Capt Powley came merrily towards him, telling him his pockets swelled to much, but Mins with held him, saying himselfe would search his studdy...

Some of the officers were, clearly, less happy with the order than were others. On the second occasion

my Mother seeing them come fastly to her house, my brother gave the key of his desk to his sister, biding her convey the money somewhither; but she had scarce opened the desk till the searcher entered the house; whereupon she was soe amazed, yt she left the money wth the cover of the desk open. The searchers demanding ye key of my mother’s desk, straitway went to yt room where the aforesaid desk was; wch when they saw open, and by chance covered wth some linnen, one of them laying his hands upon it, said “there’s nothing in the I’le warrant, else thou hadst not been open;” soe they departed wth some small moneys of my mother’s.

Such proceedings are unknown for other Royalist garrisons in the north, and Glemham does not seem to have done the same thing at York in his time there. Whilst it was possible that some persons, even men of Royalist persuasion, might wish to conceal their tangible wealth, it seems strange that an unequivo-cal Royalist field officer like Dalston should have been subjected to this treatment.

It has been said that this coining of plate occurred early in the siege, which is what Tullie implied. Nanson, however, from a surviving list of plate delivered to the castle, believed that it first took place in late May 1645. Where the reconciliation of documents is impossible, an explanation for divergence must be sought, and it may be that Tullie recorded the initial stages of collection, whilst the Nanson document was simply one of a series which has survived where earlier ones have not. It is an interesting list, showing a total weight of 1,162 ounces valued at five shillings an ounce, and with the donors names recorded. These were, for the most part, civilians, but certain officer’s names appear. Colonel Richard Kirkbride gave a silver bowl and four spoons weighing 13 ounces. Sir Thomas Glemham donated two candle sticks weighing 44 ounces - they must have been splendid, and one is tempted to wonder if he had carried them with him on campaign, for such was not an unusual pratice. Colonel Sir Henry Fletcher handed over a tankard, a salt cellar, a tumbler, two wine bowls and six spoons, weighing 55 ounces in all. Colonel Sir William Dalston parted with two salt cellars, one large and one small, a bowl and eight spoons, weighing 63 ounces, and Colonel Sir Thomas Dacre gave two bowls at 19 ounces. Amongst other names on the list, Captain John (or Edward) Aglionby gave a bowl weighing 10 ounces; Captain John Cape gave “2 beare bowles”, two gilt salt cellars, “one Colledge pott”, a can and a beaker, weighing 89 ounces - clearly a man of some substance, and perhaps
one who had not successfully avoided the searchers, although that may be to
misjudge him. Captain Johnson gave a tankard and a salt cellar, weighing 30
ounces, whilst Isaac Tullie's unfortunate mother had five spoons, weighing six
ounces, listed against her name. From all this plate, coin to the value of £42 8 4d. was made, although silver worth £21.10s was lost in the coining
process.

Several officers were missing from this list drawn up on May 13th, which
does suggest that they - Musgrave, for example, and Stradling - may already
have handed over what they had earlier. The largest single donation of 145
ounces of silver ware, came from a civilian, Frederick Tonstall or Tunstall,
and the smallest, a spoon weighing an ounce, from Robert Sewell. Sewell could
probably have concealed this single item, and it would scarcely have been
missed, so we must suppose that whatever other citizens must have felt about
the coining, Sewell identified himself with the cause and gave gladly.

"Look not at this short diary to read of Others conquering kingdoms",
wrote Tullie, "the plate here in itself was inconsiderable". He went on:

The daily skirmishes were none of them for the defence of
the walls, wch the Enimie never assaulted, but about ye
fetching in of Cattell, or ye tenting ym in their places of
pastures, and now and then ye sleighting of a work. More
was ye pitie, that such brave men as ye besieged should be
confined to such worthesless adventures as these, recorded by
no abler pen [then] this of a boy not 18 years of age.

This passage, whilst it describes the nature of the siege of Carlisle rather
well, also indicates that Tullie, like Cholmeley and Nathan Drake, rewrote his
journal or drew notes together at a later date.

The pasturing and tenting (or tethering) of the cattle and horses outside
the walls and, as Tullie said, "not far from the enemies works wheresoever they
were", went on interrupted now and again by a Scottish attempt to seize the
stock. The horses were grazed

with their saddles, pistols, and bridles with their bits out
of their mouths; when any danger appeared, every man put
the bit in his horse's mouth, mounted, and drew up for a
charge. The Cattell were driven and kept by townsmen.

Four officers, each with his quota of soldiers, took it in turns to guard the
horses on these occasions. Captains Phillipson, Musgrave, Topham (or Coppam)
and Scisson (or Silson) were the officers assigned for the task. Early in
January, one of these officers found himself beset by a body of Scottish horse
and sought to make his escape to the city driving the cattle before him, but a
troop of garrison horse was at hand, and succeeded in driving off the raiders
with some loss to the enemy.

Tullie's picture of cattle raids and forays, although in the best border
tradition, was not entirely accurate. Just a week or so after the incident
just related
a score of the Garrison's horse, went a vapouring to beyond Cholmeley's worke, and were encountred wth a troupe of the enimye, who were chased to their very works, several of them wounded, and one killed; Corporall Rapier one of the Garrison was shot through the thigh....

It was highly unusual for a soldier of so inferior a rank to be mentioned by name in contemporary annals, although Drake also named a few such where necessary. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to accurately identify Rapier, since the rank was, naturally, confined to the 'common' soldier who was numberless and nameless. Perhaps Tullie knew the man personally, or himself held such a rank, formal or otherwise, and had an interest in his fellows. He listed several in his survey of the membership of the garrison, and was to go on to mention others.

...Shortley after, a p'tye of horse isshued out to Newtowne, the Scots Quarters, who drew out more than twice as many horse, wth a great number of Musketeers; but the beseiged p'ty let them into the town so fast, yt having killed one and slashed many, the Musketeers within the work threw down their arms and run behinde Condall hall, the beseiged wanting but orders, and a dosen foot to the sleighting of their work.

Tullie's editor identified Condall hall as Coldale Hall. It has to be said that in abandoning their work, the Scots were not necessarily showing signs of panic or poor morale. The raid was necessarily limited, and the raiders would have to retire, whereupon the work would be reoccupied. If it had been slighted, it would have required rebuilding, but that was all. It was in the Scottish interest to avoid pitched fights for their positions, since so long as they were a siege army, they could regain mastery simply by waiting and watching from a safe distance. It may not have been particularly gallant, but it was highly practicable.

Within the town, Glemham published further regulations to control the daily life of the inhabitants, military and civilian alike. The brewing of ale was restricted to a few persons in every street, and families were rationed in their consumption, for there seems to have been an excess of drunkenness. Tullie noted that in expectation of relief, no fewer than 50 bushells "of Carlisle measure" were used up every week in making ale until Glemham imposed his controls.

There was also a shortage of fuel, serious in the winter months, for Carlisle was, as it still is, a bleak city. To refurnish stores of combustible material, Glemham ordered out a body of horse with some carts to Caldcoats on the Newtown road, within a musket shot of the Scottish works. This was an exploit that the Scots might well have interfered with to advantage, since it concerned essential supplies for the garrison, but as Tullie noted:

\[\text{The Royalists brought in ye timber of ye houses in spite of Lesley's horse. Half a score of the Garrison's horse went a quarter of a mile from the rest of ye troupe, to a house where}\]
they took prisoners four Scots, and brought away two Cattell and as they were going again to the said house, Captaine Noble with a troupe came betwixt them and the body of the Cavalreeres but the little p'ty charged him, killed one of his men, unhorsed himselfe, and brought him away prisoner, without the least hurt, saving one Simond had a little cut in ye head.

Another party of garrison horse, riding to New Laithes grange on the Dalston road, was intercepted by a troop of local Parliamentary cavalry commanded by Major Barwise (Richard Barwise, the MP for Carlisle?), and were put to flight. One Royalist, "Mr. Arnol" was captured when his horse stumbled, but on the day following he was released. Yet, as Tullie noted, "the wood being all brought in from under the besieger's noses within a manner", it had been a successful enterprise. One point that may need elucidation concerns the wood itself. It does sound as if the Royalists were actually dismantling the woodwork of houses at Caldcoats and at New Laithes grange, which indicates that these places were deserted by their inhabitants, not surprisingly in view of their position between the city and the siege lines. What is rather surprising is that, unless the Royalists were merely stripping wainscoting from internal walls, the Scots did not make any definite attempt to interfere with what was otherwise demolition work. From what Tullie had to say, it does not appear that there was any strong guard attendant upon the workmen, who may have been soldiers anyway but who could not have defended themselves and carried on the labour.

On January 23rd occurred one of those incidents which, in the tedium of a siege, become a subject of conversation for long afterwards. It made a strong impression upon Tullie. Some new arrivals in the enemy camp, a body of dragoons commanded by a Lieutenant Frisle "lately arrived from France", being drunk, or "Cupshittl as Tullie pictureesquely put it, made a show of bravado before the walls.

They came on foot upon ye sands to catch a scab'd horse, but being dissatisfied with their prize, marched over the stone bridge, within pistol shot of the walls, and fetched some Linnen from women yt were there, there being no horse ready at that port, and Frisle playing in defyance of the Musketeeres, who fired at him from the Walls....

One of the defenders, John Hinks, who rejoiced in the nickname Red Coat, left the city sword in hand to settle the matter. Frisle had retired over the bridge by the time Hinks caught up with him...

the Livetenant received p'sently from Hinks, two or 3 cuts of the head, and afterwards five more.

The Scottish forces at Stanwix, observing this, sent out a lieutenant with another horseman, to rescue Frisle, but Hinks, having dealt with the drunken dragoons, "did so pelt them wth stones, that the lieutenant drew off sore bruised...." Frisle, meanwhile, recovered himself, and beat Hinks to the ground, but by this time Captains Macarte (Darly Mackerly) and Swinnow
(Swinhoe?) had come to Hinks aid. He, nevertheless, had already overpowered Frisle and had taken him prisoner, whilst Macarte had killed one of Frisle's companions and two more were killed before the incident was ended, causing Tullie to remark that the linen which they had seized from the women served "for their winding sheits". Frisle was attended to by the garrison surgeon, and then released, probably in response to the release of Mr. Arnol. Tullie did not say so much, but this could have been an exchange. Hinks was called before Glemham, "who gave him a broad...." - Tullie did not finish the sentence, so that we do not know what reward, if it was a reward, Sir Thomas bestowed.

Sir Richard Graham, who had been in the garrison since the beginning of the siege, requested permission to go to the King, which Glemham gave him. It looks very much as if Graham may have been asked to convey the state of the city to the King in hopes of relief, but Graham did not do as he had said; he instead retired to his house at Netherby "till [Scaleby?] Castle was delivered to the Scots". The point which Tullie was rather obscurely making, still eludes us. The implication seems to be, and would fit in with Graham's dubious record since 1643, that in some way Graham misled Glemham and then had a hand in the surrender of Scaleby where, it will be remembered, Sir Edward Musgrave was holding out. Certainly, Glemham had to send another messenger to Oxford, this time a Cornet Philipson, so the first contention - that Graham misled Glemham - seems to hold good. For the second, the evidence simply is not to hand, and must, with reservations, be dismissed. Sir Edward Musgrave surrendered Scaleby sometime in February.

On February 5th "A Numbr of Gentlemen w'thout arms, and Gentlewomen, Rid a hunting into [Blackwell?] feilds...". Not surprisingly, this show of disdain for the enemy - Blackwell lying two miles or so to the south of the city's then limits - almost ended in disaster. Scottish horse from Harraby chased them back to the walls. On the 6th, a body of cavalry from the city rode in the same direction, towards Cummersale, where some cavalry supported by muskets awaited them. The Royalists charged, directly, forcing off their mounted opponents and causing the infantry to vacate the hedges into which they had been drawn. Captain Story, the Bailiff of Brough - these were clearly local levies - was cut in the head staying to fight and, as he turned to flee, was shot in the back. His plate, however, was sound and he made his escape.

On the 17th, another raid was directed towards Cummersale, but this time there was no opposition. The main body returned to the city, but a party of 20 horse commanded by John Hinks, Andrew Knaggs and Arnol' remained behind, and fought a sharp action in which Arnol and Hinks were wounded. The raid seems to have been a cover for another wood-gathering foray to Caldcoats, for some civilians, with a few soldiers in attendance, spent all day there, cutting down trees, and returned unmolested to the city.
On the following day

Sr Thomas Glenham, admireing ye sweet temper of ye Enimie, sayled out himselfe next morning, wth all ye horse and two hundred foot...

This was a raid on the grand scale. The force was formed into five divisions, commanded respectively by Captains Macarte, Philipson, Surmow (Swinnow?), Nesbut and, notably, James Gordon, Viscount Aboyne, one of Montrose's early companions. Two or three scouts rode out ahead to drive off the enemy sentries, and to do this at sufficient distance from the main body as to conceal its approach. The Scots sent out half a dozen cavalry to settle Glemham's scouts who, espieing the body of the Cavaleres advanced wthin a Muskett shott of their works, galloped back. They in ye work run all away, not staying the firing of one Muskett; see instantly the Cavaleres foot sleighted their works, and the horse pursued, but could not reach the enemy; only, in their return, they took ye Commander of the work.... killed four, and took 24 Muskateeres, who had all better Quarter than their unparalleled Cowardice deserved. With them were brought of a great Number of cloaks and arms, with the said prisoners, and six Cowes. Lesley, the next morning, raised his works again.

Whether David Leslie was right in letting raids like that run their course and then to return and do whatever repair work was necessary, is a matter of debate. If he knew what he was doing, and if we accept this we have to suppose that it was not so much cowardice on the Scottish part as a normal response to raiding, one is tempted to wonder how the local Cumbrian commanders viewed it. As we shall see in the early summer, the relations between Scots and English in the siege lines were deteriorating rapidly.

Scottish attacks were so few and far between, that when they did occur, it was either in a state of drunken bravado, as with Frisle, or so took the garrison by surprise that they did not react before the enemy had fled away again. Tullie noted just such an incident, which he dated to February 16th. This would seem to have been an error on his part, since in his narrative the incident followed upon that of the Glemham raid, and seems to belong anyway to some period after it.

hal a score of Scotts Commanders all foxed (drunk) came over the bridge at Etterby [to the north-west of the city] where one of them was shott in ye breast, and another had his horse shot under him; whereupon the foxt Scotts made a sober retreat.

The dead horse was carried into the town, "a very stately beast, very fat". The carcase was cut up, cooked, and served at Glemham's own table that night, "the first horse flesh yt was eaten in Carlisle siege". Since the town had been stocked in September and October, and since the civilian population had not been evacuated; since also, this horse meat was eaten out of preference on Glemham's part; it is apparent that the defenders were in command of ample provisions.
The Scottish officers, having been thus received, drew off, but were pursued by Captain Lainyon or Lanyon, a former officer of the Marquess of Newcastle's own foot regiment. He caught up with the senior enemy officer Captain Pattin and wounded him. Pattin rode hard towards New Laithes grange, but was overtaken by Lanyon and captured, being carried into the city where he died on the following morning.

In discussing the siege of Scarborough, attention was paid to the curious incident of the black-draped walls and Captain Ledgard's company. Reference was then made to a similar incident at Carlisle, and we have come to that point. Although the two cases are not strictly comparable, yet they provide an interesting digression from consideration of more important themes. Yet even as 'light relief' they must not be discounted, since they show, far more vividly than much else, what was the common talk at a period of time when we know much less than we would wish to know. This particular case excited the speculation of both defenders and besiegers. Tullie wrote:

About this time [middle to late February] there was a common report that Capt. Forester appeared often at the round head's works at Botcherby [a mile east of the city]; fiercely demanding of them if they were not yet converted to the King; when they replied 'no', hee was wont to call on Capt. Philipson to fall upon them with horse and foot. Instantly to their imaginations, horse and foot fired upon them, and they answered them with shot from the works, which being heard at Stanwix, some horse were sent to assist them, two of which were drowned in crossing the ford at Rickerby. Major Barwis, being asked by Phillipson at a parley of the truth hereof, protested he could bring 500 soldiers eye witnesses of it.

Superficially the incident could be dismissed as a ruse by one or two of the garrison gallants, which it may have been. Philipson, for example, was peculiarly well informed, and there was a hint that Tullie was not altogether sure of the story. What it does indicate is the degree to which the local Parliamentary forces, for it concerned them only, were susceptible to panic, whilst Captain Forester's post-burial conversion to Royalism arouses a smile.

On February 28th, Captain Philipson and Major Wiltshire with 16 of the garrison cavalry, rode out "to take the aire" as Tullie chose to put it. They were watched at a near distance by 60 of the Parliamentary forces, horse and foot. The Royalists rode towards Botcherby by the side of the river, towards a troop of enemy horse with 40 or so foot in attendance. Philipson and 10 of the garrison horse charged these foot, pushed their way through, and killed eight, capturing a further six. A Parliamentary relief force which the raiders estimated at some 60 or so, merely watched from a distance. When the Royalists drew off, these followed in their wake, but were so gallantly kept in play by three and no more, Knaggs, Corporall Vere, Jas Evins, yet their 60 horses could not advance 20 yards in a Quarter of an hour; yet these three being above a Quarter of a mile from Philipson, put them all to the Chase, in which Vere being close at their backs
was unfortunately shot into the breast, and some 4 days after died.

Evans may have been Lieutenant Randolph Evans of Keverstone, one of the prisoners taken at Selby in April 1644 and afterwards released. The name was common, however, and Tullie's use of the forename sufficiently precise to leave the matter in doubt.

By the beginning of March, there were problems for the siege forces quite apart from the raiding garrison. On that day, as Tullie later learned, Langdale relieved Pontefract, and occasioned a small rising in the countryside south of Carlisle.

upon Sir Marmaduke Langdale's coming to raise the Siege at Pontefract... there were diverse Skermishes betweens Colonel Briggs and the Country People whereupon the Papists and Malignants made Use of the Opportunity, and chiefly Sir John Lowther, a notorious Delinquent...

Lowther, let it be remembered, had already taken the Covenant and had opted out of the war. His sudden reappearance did him some credit:

....and others, possessed themselves of Bolton Church, four miles north of Appleby appointed the Country People to come to a Randezvous there, with an Intent to seize upon all the Strengths and Forts in those parts: According to this intimation, the Country mett; the Lady Lowther furnished them with Ammunition; and the Enemies gaurrison at Skipton were draweinge out for their Assistance; But all their Designes were disappointed, and the Meetinge of the Country People dissolved, upon the Appearance of the Scottish horse...(15)

Whitelock noted the incident curtly:

An Insurrection in Westmerland, and a design to have surprized a Magazine of the Parliament's there, was suppressed.(16)

These events must have induced the Parliamentary commanders, at least, to propose a parley with the garrison, although it cannot have been done without Leslie's consent. Tullie noted

and Cholmly had a parly, to whom was sent Col. Woodell, Capt. Gosnold, and Capt. Philipson; at the meeting the sack was merrily treated; but about twenty Country Gentlemen, who were brought by Col. Wilfred Lawson, to see the articles concerning the rendering of the town, wondred that the meeting was broken up, and no such matter intended.

Colonel Woodell is a mystery. A Thomas Woodhall, not apparently a northern man, held some field command during the war, but escapes identification. A Captain Woodhall had served in Edward Grey's Dragoons in 1642, but that formation had long since ceased to exist.

The danger in which the siege forces stood blew over, with the return of Langdale to the south and with the suppression of Sir John Lowther's attempt at a rising. During the enforced lull, however, messengers came to, and went from, the city. On March 1st itself, Corporal Wood and Lieutenant Brathet,
without Glemham's leave, if that is what Tullie meant by "unknowne to any" slipped from the city, killed a sentry in the enemy lines, and eventually passed unmolested down the length of England to join Prince Rupert. They, it would seem, had had enough of the siege.

Cornet Philipson, who had gone south to solicit aid in January when Sir Richard Graham failed the garrison, returned on March 17th. He had come up with the Northern Horse, after which, making his way to Carlisle, he was taken prisoner at Wetherby and sent to York to confront Lord Fairfax. Fairfax, suspicious and nervous,

found the King's letter about him, and by the council of Warr sentenced him to be racked the next morning; but he leaped the walls ye night, and with the assistance of Mr. Watson of Corkfield... came safe to Carlisle, with the King's p'mise to relieve them before the ninth day of May; with newes also of the releif of Pontefract, at which he was an actor. Which good newes was entertained with bonfires that night, and discharge of Canons.

This section is extremely valuable in several ways. Most importantly, the King's promise to relieve Carlisle was one that could not be kept. Whether Glemham expected it to be fulfilled we cannot say, for he had bad memories of Rupert's plans to return to York. Yet, one can imagine the garrison counting the days and, as May drew nearer, watching from the walls yet more intently, for the tell-tale movements in the enemy lines, or for the appearance of banners that were never to break upon the skyline.

Despite the ease with which the garrison pastured their livestock and rode out from the city, clearly news was not so easily obtained, since the statement which Tullie made indicates that not until March 17th did they hear word of the relief of Pontefract from one who had been present. This does seem rather a long time, and it has to be noted that earlier in his narrative Tullie wrote on the date March 1st:

Intelligence was brought in of the Prince's forces about Ferribridge; that he had rooted Fairfax, killed 2000, and taken scores of Prisoners, and arms; thereupon, as we were informed, Lesly was about to quit his Quarters, and Philipson was sent out that way to observe his motion, March 12, but the enemie not stirring, Philipson went from thence towards Newlathes, and sent a p'ty before towards Cummersdale, viz: ten horse, who met with a company of foot, of whom they pistol'd 4 or 5.

It is all rather obscure. Let us suppose that rumour of the relief came to Carlisle on the 3rd of March, for example, and that later rumour of the Scottish departure reached them, which led to Philipson's scouting of the siege lines. At the conference between Woodhall, Gosnold, Philipson and Sir Henry Cholmeley, some mention must have been made of the Pontefract exploit so the garrison should have been fairly well informed. Yet it was not until March 17th, if we interpret Tullie correctly, that bonfires were lit to celebrate, when Cornet Philipson brought definite news. It may be that

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Glemham was cautious and wanted accurate information, or it may be that the bonfires were lit as much to celebrate the promised relief as to signal the Pontefract success.

The third point which emerges from the paragraph quoted, concerns Philipson's treatment. Discarding the view that what amounts to a 'throw-away line' was invented by Philipson, or embroidered by Tullie, it is even so extremely unusual to find such primitive methods of torture employed by high authority. There is scant evidence of such methods being employed in the north at least, by either side, and recorded incidents of over-zealous junior officers resorting to them are rare. It might be said that since Fairfax had the King's letter, that would have told him all that he needed to know, and that there was no point in torturing Philipson although the Cornet may have carried some additional remarks in his mind. Perhaps the Royal letter was in cypher, and Fairfax wanted to learn the key to break it, but there was no reason why a mere Cornet should have known the key, nor any reason why, if he carried the information in his head, he should also have carried a letter, decidedly incriminating if he should be searched by soldiers on routine patrol. It must be allowed that in the days immediately after the relief of Pontefract, Lord Fairfax must have felt even more insecure than usual, and may have feared that Philipson was carrying information that portended grave misfortunes for the northern allies. Yet the resort to torture was an extreme step, and one is at a loss to explain it satisfactorily. Lord Fairfax may have authorised it, or he may have been coerced into approving it by his advisors, the 'counsell of Warr'; or the story may be a downright falsehood. One is inclined to take Cornet Philipson's word for it, if only because there was nothing for him to gain by telling such a story: his honour was highly enough enhanced anyway, to require no further tales of hazard and danger.

On the 19th, Cornet Philipson and 12 horse rode out to Blackwell, but was cornered by two or more full troops. The two sides intermingled, and Philipson's horse was seized by the bridle and he was ordered to surrender himself:

They offered him quarter, which he scorned to receive, and wounding those yt were next him, maintained his retreat, without losse of any, only Richard Grave was run into the back by Major Cholmley, and presently recovered.

This raiding party, returning to the town, was ordered on another excursion by Glemham, towards Newtown. The Scots had recently occupied Caldcoats, probably to prevent further wood gathering forays, and Philipson was to test their strength.

They saw the enemie, with five times their number, drawing neere them, whom they charg'd with pistoll, and having killed one of their Commanders broke resolutely in amongst...and put them to a retreat. The Cavalleres and their horse being weary, they came in without the least hurt, save a cut in the face of Philipson's horse.
Success in cavalry skirmishes, and this is not to speak of pitched cavalry battles or larger engagements, relied heavily upon reckless courage. That Philipson should have got the better of a force at least 80 strong with a mere 16 is not to be wondered at, if he possessed the advantage of surprise, coupled with reliable veteran cavalry and limited objectives. Military historians tend to over-emphasize the problem of exaggeration of numbers made by contemporary writers, but this can often be a mistake on the part of those keen to reach their approximation of the truth, and cannot be indulged in too often.

On March 22nd the siege forces endeavoured to lure out the Royalist horse and to induce them to ride into an ambush, by sending false rumours of a great force of Westmorland Royalists coming to their relief; but as Tullie remarked, nonchalantly, "they failed of catching old birds with Chaffe". Four days later Captains Gordon and Dixon captured two Scots near Cummersdale. On the 28th, Sir Thomas Glemham took a personal hand once again:

The pleasantness of the day invited Sr Thomas Glenham, wth many other Gent. and Gentlewomen, to take the aire neere Bocherby; agt whom the enemie drawing out all their horse, stood to see them course a Haire and take it, under their noses; some week opposition they made, but Capt. Dixon having run one of them up to the hilts, they fairly drew homewards.

That same day, in the evening, Captain Lanyon brought in a prisoner from Harraby, whither he appears to have gone alone. At another part of the town, Quartermaster Wood and Thomas Scot with two comrades, rode towards Botcherby. They were challenged by a Captain Rose with a body of horse, Rose riding well in advance of his men determined to bring the four Royalists to action. Quartermaster Wood retreated to the end of a stony lane, who having Rose wth his Mirmidons, inclosed in the same lane, faced about, with none but Scot with him...

This was so obvious a ruse it is surprising that Rose fell for it, as he did:

...whereupon the Capt. retreated faster than he advanced; and after he had received as many blows as Wood could give him in riding of 80 yards, he got safe away, by the strength of his armes, with all his troupe to their worke: if the other two had come close up to him, they had taken him prisoner.

Some comment is called for concerning the prowess in arms of inferior and non-commissioned Royalist officers, over commissioned officers of the enemy forces. It is a legend, although it is not a myth, that gentlemen officers, whether Royalist or Parliamentarian, were invariably the persons who indulged in shows of bravado, risking extremely dangerous encounters as much for personal prestige as for any recognisable military gain. That we should men like Quartermaster Wood or Corporal Vere, or any of the others Tullie named, indulging likewise, and with success, must be due to the fact that they were
in Carlisle garrison. To be in that garrison meant that, almost without exception, each officer, non-commissioned or commissioned, and each of the rank and file, were to all intents and purposes, volunteers. The men who had left York with Glemham, for instance, had the choice of laying down their arms. To give up the fight almost guaranteed reasonable treatment from the Parliament, and little or no comeback if the King were to turn the tables and win an overall victory. We may be sure that those who remained in arms in the north in mid 1645 were the die-hards, men who were, some of them, soldiers by profession, or men who had become veterans and who had found a way of life temporarily agreeable to them, whether they were winning the war or whether they were not. Some of them, obviously, were men who either would not, or could not, accept that their cause was virtually prostrate, and who clung tenaciously to their duty. When all motive factors that led men to assume arms for King or for Parliament are discarded, there must have been a large number of men for whom the civil war was what we might now call a war of ideologies. Carlisle garrison, like Skipton, Pontefract and Scarborough, was garrisoned by the hardest men left in the northern Royalist army. Nothing illustrates that point so well as the way in which Scarborough was clung to when it had been rendered totally untenable, when a storm might at any time have overrun the defences that were left, and would have led to a general massacre. The task of the military historian of the civil war is to constantly remind others that the war was waged by men, individuals who put their lives upon a line, not, in the final analysis for mercenary motives necessarily, but for a concept of loyalty whether to King or to Parliament. Outside Carlisle lay a Scottish force, not strong enough to attempt a storm, or at least, not yet. With it were local forces officered, in part, by men whose sympathy for their cause was suspect - Lt. Colonel Wilfred Lawson, for example - and made up largely with pressed men. Inside Carlisle were soldiers who had come there for one reason, and that was to fight. If they had wanted safety they could easily have gone elsewhere. Numerically inferior, the garrison of Carlisle, like garrisons elsewhere in the north, was more than a match for the forces opposed to it, collectively and individually. The real enemies of such a garrison were hunger, disease and civilian unrest. Courage was of no avail against these.

Another of those freelance raids took place on March 30th, ideal for letting off a lot of pent up energy, but occasionally costly: "yea they lost more men in such unwarrantable skirmishes without ord[8], then in all commanded services in y° siege". This was a raid which ended in tragedy for the garrison. Quartermaster Wood, Andrew Knaggs, Thomas Scot, and two of Sir Thomas Glemham's servants, rode out to Botcherby and encountered 50 or so of the enemy cavalry:
put them to retreat. Wood, coming of, found himself shot between the belly and the thigh, and was hardly persuaded not to charge them again, but of this wound he died within a few days. The Garrison lost here a man of unparalleled courage and judgement in arms...

At the commencement of March, the provisions within the city had begun to give out, although not drastically as the siege forces might have hoped, for Tullie estimated that there were 2100 bushells of corn in the central store. Nonetheless, Glemham restricted consumption to half a hoop for each person each week. By early April, the fodder for the horses had also run low, and unless they were to be fed with "the Thatche of houses", they had to be sent outside the walls to graze. This had hitherto been quite normal procedure, but from what Tullie said, it would seem that it had stopped some time before, perhaps because the Scots had moved nearer - they had, for example, occupied Caldcoats. Glemham now appeared to be in some difficulties, for he resolved to try to raise the local people against the Scots, whether in an armed relief attempt, or merely to force provisions through their lines to the beleagured city is not clear.

Glemham's agent in this enterprise was to be Colonel Sir Thomas Dacre of Lanercost, who had tenants not far away in and around Gilsland. He was supplied with match and ammunition from the magazine to distribute to them, and slipped away. He apparently arranged for them to fall upon the siege lines, probably those to the east of the city lying between Gilsland and Carlisle, on April 6th: "It was intended after the Scotts were beaten out of the worke, to man it, and keep yt quarter open...". April 6th came and went. "The heart of the Gilslanders failed them, and they durst not come". Glemham at once opted for action, and commanded all the garrison cavalry to raid Scotby where the siege army had some cattle at pasture. The total force was about 150 strong, divided into five parties of equal size. Captain Dixon was to ride direct to Scotby with his detachment, and to round up as many of the animals as he could. The second party, this of 42 Reformadoes and commanded by Lt. Colonel Mins, were to keep the enemy at Harraby occupied. Captain Philipson, commanding the governor's own troop, was to face Botcherby. The fourth troop, commanded by Captain Silson, went to Gallows Hill to watch Harraby from that side. Captain Topham, with a dozen horse, went to St. Nicholas' Hill, to cover any sudden retreat.

Dixons p'ty was gone half a mile before the rest marched out of the Towne; he drove homewards 42 cowes. The round-heads horse began to draw out against him, but were let in by Philipson. Then they sent out a company of Musketeres to a place called Durran Hill, near Botcherby, by which Dixon of necessity was to bring the Cowes. Philipson was p'vented by a great bog, from falling upon them, but Dixon resolutely drove y'Cattell within 20 yards of them, and with the losse of one horse, and one Cow, brought them home. Those of Hereby came with horse and foot, to reskue the
against whom Mins sent 14 horse, to divert them; but they despising the number, or not mindeing them, marched by them.

This attempt to bring on a skirmish appeared to have failed, but for Captain Lanyon. He led a charge onto the enemy flank, which broke them, and forced them to scatter for safety. Tullie believed five or six of the enemy were killed in the fight, a lieutenant wounded, and two prisoners taken. The Royalists lost a servant of Colonel Woodhall's who died in the city on the following day.

Shortly after this escapade, Captain Topham having guard of the cattle who was to pasture them outside the walls towards Caldcoats, took the hill at Caldcoats in a brief action to give himself additional security. He was joined there by Captain Philipson, and there, they found themselves visited by a body of Scottish officers, led by Captain Noble and Lieutenant Frisle. Frisle and Noble had brought with them some sherry, and proposed a cessation whilst they and their Royalist counterparts drank together. This may sound strange, except that the siege had never really been built up into a full scale struggle, and Frisle, after all, had been, as a prisoner, well cared for by the Royalist surgeons. As it was, Tullie stated that the Scots intended some underhand trickery once they had made the Royalist officers drunk.

And indeed, some of them were so drunk, yt they could hardly sit on horseback. Capt. Noble secretly employed some to fetch in great numbers of Scotch Horse; who, having got all things ready for his purpose, drew out in five bodies, about five in the afternoon, each consisting of 50 horse, who fell all upon Philipson, who had onely half a dozen horse with him; but the rest that were grazing under the hill, were p'sently put in order, by Coronett Philipson, his brother; himselfe the while keeping his ground, though continually engaged amongst them. There suddenly began a very hot skirmish, not to be discerned for the smoake, till the Philipsons put ye Scots to a retreat; yet they were handsomely bought off by the Scotch officers in the arreare, who were the greatest part of Lesly his Regiment. The Cavelleres in this Ingagement were 80 horse, who p'formed as neat a piece of service as was at any time during the Seige.

Both sides were facing problems in mid-April, and that in the garrison was serious. One or two attempts by Glemham - they were not specified by Tullie - were foiled by the enemy in such a manner, that it became apparent an agent was at work within the city. A man called John Head, who supplied the forces with provisions smuggled in through the enemy lines, was suspected, and when arrested and questioned, found to be in possession of a letter written by "Dick Lowry in the Garrison...to his wife at Wigton". In this letter, Lowry told his wife that she must inform Barwise that there was food in the town for no more than three weeks. Head and Lowry were committed to the Marshall Generall (this probably means, Provost Marshal), and were then racked until they confessed their duplicity. This is the second reference which we have to the
use of torture, this time by the Royalists, and again, so unusual that attention must be drawn to it. From what Tullie said, it appears that the proof of the betrayal was found on Head originally, and that Lowry was clearly implicated. Of course, if Head had denied any knowledge of what the letter contained, he might hope to escape punishment: but Tullie implied there were other reasons for suspecting Head already. If Glemham sanctioned torture, it was to find out, most probably, whether there was a network within the city. Yet the measure was extreme, and if Fairfax's use of the rack can be put down to his anxiety, then we cannot excuse Glemham from the same motive.

The problem besetting the allies was equally as serious, although of a different kind. Tullie either knew nothing of it, or did not think it worth recording, and what evidence we possess is disjointed. On April 16th the Committee of Both Kingdoms, in a letter to Lord Fairfax, alluded to reports of animosity between local people and Scottish soldiers. On April 21st there were reports of a "large tumultuous assembly" of the local people, addressed by no less a person than Leven himself, who told the English that he was prepared to withdraw his forces from the area (!) if the English Parliamentarians could guarantee to replace them with enough men to keep Carlisle invested. We can break the chronological sequence sufficiently to pursue this dispute into the early summer. In early June, Sir Wilfred Lawson's Lt. Colonel wrote a letter of complaint to the Committee, accusing the Scots of attacking him. Lawson's officer reported that after spending much of the winter working on a sconce facing the city, he was ordered to vacate it to make room for a Scottish garrison. When he failed to do this, Lord Kircudbright, acting apparently on orders from Leven, lay siege to the sconce with 300 foot and three full troops of horse and forced the Parliamentarians to evacuate. On the 17th, Lord Kircudbright accused Sir William Armyne of attempting to negotiate with Glemham without consulting the Scots, and Leven supported this approach by telling Armyne that in all such talks, David Leslie was to be present and, if the city were to surrender, was to become commander in chief in it.

On June 24th a list of charges and allegations against Sir Wilfred Lawson was conveyed to London, having been drawn up by the Scots. Lawson was condemned as a "knowne Malignant", that he "was actually in Rebellion under the Earle of Newcastle against the Parliament, and continued in Armes till those Countyes were reduced to Obedience". He was also accused of protecting Catholics and of harbouring men from Montrose's army. With Lawson we are dealing not only with a turncoat, and it is a pity that that term is so pejorative, for if he did use his influence to assist his less fortunate or less discriminatory fellow countrymen he cannot have been thoroughly or even fundamentally Parliamentarian; we are dealing also with a man typical of many up and down the face of England, a Vicar of Bray character for whom the sole
expedient was survival, and the cost of which survival was rarely, if ever, too high. The Scots mistrusted him, the Royalists likewise, particularly the more high-minded of them; yet there was no reason why he should do as Sir John Lowther had done, and revert to his original allegiance if the times were to change. Parliament, however, had some confidence in him—there was a shortage of men of his stature in the north-west—and confirmed him at the end of the year as Deputy Lieutenant for Cumberland. This dissension within the allied camp continued up to the very eve of the surrender of the city, and no doubt beyond it.

On or around April 23rd, the Scots reverted to a tactic employed earlier with no success, that of luring the garrison horse into an ambush. Information was passed to the city that a large force of Royalists had entered Westmorland and had come to Penrith, and was awaiting a sally by Glemham before attacking the siege lines. Glemham, however, was not so easily taken in, and merely sent out three riders to survey the area. These were captured near Brougham Castle, and their failure to return betrayed the Scottish design before it had come to fruition.

The cattle seized at Scotby were by now consumed, and Glemham ordered another raid. The garrison cavalry was divided into four groups. Two of these, commanded respectively by Captains Philipson and Silson, with Captain Musgrave and Cornet Philipson, were to raid around the village of Cargo to the north west, to sweep up what cattle they could find. A third party, led by Topham, had command of the retreat. Tullie stated that he had "the guard of the Cattell", but since there were no cattle (according to Tullie) at least not until the raid was carried through, this makes no sense. The fourth party, of Reformadoes and led by Lt. Colonel Mins, was to move with Topham toward Newtown, to keep the Scots within their works. Mins also had with him about 50 foot.

The raid on Cargo was carried out initially, under fire from the Scots at Etterby, but the Royalists succeeded in rounding up 67 cows and herding them back. The local people, said Tullie, "run after ye Cavalleres, beseeching them to baste the basterly Scots, who had p'mised safety to them and their Cattell". One wonders whether the local people were complaining about the Scottish laxity or the Royalist theft. Topham and Mins, meanwhile, charged a body of Scottish horse attempting to interfere with the movement of the cattle, and in the charge, Topham was shot dead. Captain Philipson, rallying his own party, came to second Topham's and Mins' troops, and drove the Scots clear out of Newtown, some of them being caught between Mins and Cornet Philipson as they endeavoured to reach New Laithes grange.

The Royalist infantry garrisoned Newtown, and set to work to fire the place. In the process, however, they found
and gave over firing at the work and Towne; which encouraged the Scotch foot to fire upon them; who shot one through the nose, when the can was at his mouth. After him they hurt another, and killed a third, and were all so drunk yt when they returned into the towne, they forgot to bring him of.

Topham was buried in the city on the following day "with all Martiall solemnityes p'per to his funerall".

In the aftermath of this blow to their morale, the Scots built a new entrenchment at Caldcoats to add to the strength of the Newtown work and to guard approaches to it. They further determined to make an attempt to take back the cattle, which were grazing on the east side of the city.

The day chosen for their attempt was April 26th. Early in the morning, Captain Philipson drew out the cattle to graze them as far as Botcherby Hill. In the meantime, the sentries on the walls noticed that the barricade blocking the road which entered the Scottish quarter at Stanwix had been removed, and reported this to Glemham. Orders went to Philipson to draw the cattle nearer to the walls, which he did. Even so, not to be thwarted, at noon, signalled by the discharge of a cannon, some 800 Scottish cavalry appeared from Stanwix, including forces drawn for the purpose from Botcherby, St. Nicholas's and Rickerby. They came down so fast that Philipson and his men were unable to retreat:

both he and they were engaged on every side; yet the guard desperately charged through the enemie, and brought the cattell with them, wth the losse of 6 Coves and 15 horses; when in all probability neither horsenor man could escape them.

Although Tullie did not say, it is likely that Philipson achieved this successful counter-attack by driving the cattle before him in stampede, enough to scatter and put into disorder any organised body of horse. The loss of 15 Royalist horses does strongly suggest that the cavalry were bringing up the rear.

Philipson run one Kenity through the body, up to the hilts, who turning suddenly about, wrested his sword out of his hand, and went of to his quarters at [Park-broom?] with the sword in his body, boasting yt he had encountered and Disarmed little Philipson. Major Agnew, a Scot, was 3 times shot, but not mortally; Lieutenant Scot was killed, and divers others slain and hurt. The Cavaleres lost one Anderson a trouper, and a poor old townsman, who was no souldier [drover?]. A servant or two, who bore arms, were hurt.

The "poor old townsman" was probably a civilian stockman. That Tullie should have known the names of virtually all of the Scottish officers who came to his notice because of their wounds seems surprising, and is hard to account for, unless he took the trouble to learn them subsequent to the incidents which he noted, or which were reported to him.

Three days later the Royalist cavalry returned the raid, with an attack
on New Laithes grange, killing two of the Scottish scouts. On May 1st, Philipson, coming under fire yet again as he grazed the cattle, drove a party of enemy musketeers from a hedgerow, also killing two of them in the process. This was but the beginning of an intensified struggle for the possession of the meat supplies of the garrison, into which the Scots put all the energies they might have better employed in closely investing the walls as they had done at Newcastle. The motives behind Scottish strategy are hard to arrive at, but that the war was coming to an end, they were well aware, and a foothold anywhere in England would be advantageous to them. Carlisle would be theirs, in time, if they only waited. That can be the only explanation, as has been already urged, for an otherwise deplorable want of enthusiasm.

The events of the cattle raids between May 3rd and 11th can be summarised, insofar as that the basic ingredients remained the same, and only the consequences of each encounter differed. On the 3rd, to cover the pasturing, the Royalists raided to New Laithes and killed a scout, but were driven off again from attempting anything more ambitious by a troop of enemy horse. The next day, shots were exchanged between the cattle guard and the Scots which led to the death of one of the enemy. This developed into a minor skirmish, when the Scots brought up musketeers to line a hedgerow from which to fire down upon the guards, but Captain Philipson led an attack which drove them off. His return to the guards was interrupted by Major Cholmeley at the head of a body of cavalry, and a sharp encounter ensued, Philipson forcing his way through the surrounding enemy at the point of his sword. The Royalist reserve, commanded by a Lieutenant Ray, disparagingly referred to as a "blockhead" by Tullie, this time failed to perform, and the enemy drew off without further action.

On the 10th, Tullie alluded to a "Capt. Philipson jun." as in charge of the cattle, who was seconded during an engagement, by "philipson". This sounds like Robert Philipson's son, but the pedigrees of the family are wholly inadequate, and there may be an error here for Cornet Philipson, Robert's brother. Captain Robert Philipson sent 20 horse towards Stanwix to fend off what seemed to be an attempted raid from that quarter. The two sides encountered, and Philipson came off again with advantage, having killed five Scots and taken two prisoners without loss. So successful a counter-raid was this, that Tullie remarked "If they had had any foot, they would have brought in their cannon". In the afternoon, Philipson rode out again and gave the Scots a taste of their own medicine by stealing 11 of their horses which were grazing on Legget-hill on the banks of the Eden. An attack by the Scots intended to release the animals was driven off, Philipson with a musket shooting down the lieutenant commanding the enemy party.

A Royalist soldier "pleing with a skott" was shot dead on the 11th in
Weary holme whilst Captain Silson kept the guard of the cattle.

About supper time [May 13th] the alarum bel tolled, upon the advance of all the enemy's horse from every Quarter towards the Cattell, neere the Swift: whereupon Little Philipson, having got a sword, galloped to the Cavaliers who were in no order, rallied ym Quickly into rank and file, put the Roundheads to retreat, and fired at them a great way in the arrere.

In the confusion, Captain Lanyon, Andrew Knaggs and some others rode to Stanwix and seized three horses, which they carried away to Carlisle without hindrance.

If any censure this brave and prudent psom. for exposing himself to soe many shots, for soe poor a booty, let them call to mind that of Tacitus: 'Nullum magnum ingenium sine aliqua mixtura dementiae'.

In Tullie's mouth, one is not sure if that was a compliment or not. Perhaps he had heard Lanyon quote the phrase in defence of himself, and remembered it as noteworthy.

That same evening there was another example of this type of bravado. "Young Philipson", disdaining to draw back from a clash with the enemy, was shot in the back and was thus rendered "useless during the seige". Hinks, alias Red Coat, made a one-man mission to the sands outside the city to draw in two horses which Lanyon had overlooked, all the time under heavy enemy fire.

During this time, a letter was smuggled into the city for Glemham which had been sent on from Skipton. According to Tullie, this was a firm promise from the King that the relief of Carlisle was not far off. (This, incidentally meant that Scarborough was to be left to its own devices). It was as far off as it had ever been, if truth be told, and Glemham probably did not put too much weight upon it. May 9th had, after all, come and gone, and this letter served only to remind the garrison that the King, although he had not forgotten them, had failed them. The letter can only have been meant to keep up a morale that might have flagged, for the main Royal army operating out of Oxford, was now moving inexorably to that clash at Naseby which would render the King even more incapable of doing his loyal adherents even the smallest service.

In May 1645 the King cannot have seriously entertained the idea of a march solely to relieve Carlisle. It would have to be part of a more general strategic move, and even then merely incidental to it. Glemham was on his own, and he was veteran enough to know it. One wonders how far the garrison as a whole, was aware of it. On the 15th, Andrew Knaggs was shot dead with a bullet through the heart in a skirmish.

On the day following, the siege forces began to construct a work near Swift hill on the east to prevent further pasturing of livestock on that side of the town. A guard of 100 infantry and 40 horse, under Captain Philipson, was ordered out to safeguard the animals, the cavalry not being allowed to dismount for fear of a sudden attack. A body of Royalist musketeers filed...
behind a hedge near to the enemy work, and an attempt to move them was easily
repulsed. At nine in the morning, however, Lord Kircudbright and 300 cavalry
appeared from Stanwix and charged the line.

but was so galled by their continual fireing, yt he was
forced to retreat; and Philipson wth his few horse charging
their rere, the whole body come upon him soe fast, yt he
began to make an easy orderly retreat, towards the Musketeres,
whch he could not reach; wherefore he engaged wth them and
routed them; two he killed in the pursuit, and Capt. Rose.
They carried away many led horses, but said they lost not
their Riders. Of Capt. Philipson's p'tie, there were 4 hurt,
but none slaine. The besieged on ye walls could never see
the Cavaleres p'tie after they closed, and were inclosed with
the Scots, but believed yt the Scots were carrying them to
Stanwix, when they grieved; at length they were chaising the
Scots thither.

The Scottish cavalry must have been badly led, or pretty poor troopers, though
some had surely seen action on Marston Moor and in the Durham campaigns of
1644. The repeated success of the Royalist garrison cavalry, made all the
more believable by Tullie's restraint in giving numbers of the enemy slain or
captured, strikes the imagination. It has already been pointed out that they
were resolute, desperate men. The Royalists had less to lose by exposing
themselves to the fury of action than had the Scots, and both sides behaved
in this light.

Cholmeley had some of the local Parliamentarian forces construct a sconce
facing the southern gate of the city "which would have utterly deprived ye
horses from grazing any longer". Glemham ordered a mass attack to disrupt
the work and to destroy what had been constructed. Captain Moore rode to
the south west with 60 men, whilst Captain Dixon with 60 foot advanced straight
down the road and took up position in a ditch. Five bodies of cavalry issued
from the city at the same time, one to ride to St. Nicholas Hill to prevent
the enemy from retreating to Cholmeley's quarter, whilst the rest rode
directly to assist Dixon's detachment of foot. Quite suddenly, a fierce
engagement took place, quite out of proportion to much that had gone before
during the long weeks of the siege.

After a little halt...Moore, with a fast march, advanced
towards ye south side of ye works; ye enemy fired brandly
\uncertainly\ upon him, but hee returned them no answer,
till he came within pistle shot. At the same time, from
Chomlies mount, 100 foot advanced to assist ye little mount;
while one of Dixon's company threw in a fire ball, whch fell
amongst their powder, and blew up spades, mattocks, and men.
See yt once they leaped out of the work...

The hand grenade was still in its primitive form, and this effective weapon
wielded by one of Dixon's musketeers may have been something more akin to
what we would now term a molotov cocktail. Its success must have lain in
what we would now see as a purely fortuitous fact that it exploded in the
right place. "...Mour entrd it, haveing killed Conyers the Commander, who
stoutly defended it". It will be noted that the first enemy officer to whom
Tullie gave credit for courage, since Captain Forester long since dead, was an English Parliamentarian.

... The first division of the Cavalier horse met those in the face, who fled out of ye work, and had a Lamentable execution of them. Then they pursued the 100 foot afore mentioned to their very works; this Done, ye horse returned to the town, and ye foot sent in 39 prisoners, where of diverse were pitifully burned by the grenade. Then they levelled the work to the ground, and set the water in its right Course, wch the enemy had diverted, thereby to stop ye mills; and then returned with Six Dead men, 60 Muskets, &c., without the loss of any, save one Nesbut, shot through the head. In the afternoon they grazed their Cattle where Troy once stood: I mean that bloody work...

The Royalists themselves now raised a sconce to defend the grazing of cattle in that area, although theirs was somewhat nearer the town.

On May 23rd provisions within the town, probably of corn, were running low, and two volunteers were sent out to try to discover what had become of the promised relief. They returned on the 26th, conveying a letter from Colonel Sir Richard Willis, Governor of Newark, which purported to convey a message from the King. In this letter Glemham was told "The King was come as far as Latham House, with resolution to relieve them, in convenient time". This was far from the truth. The King was perambulating around Cheshire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire, at this time, and came nowhere near Lathom. It stood to reason that Willis was in no better position to know what the King intended, than was Glemham, and it is unlikely that Sir Thomas accepted the information at its face value. That night, the siege commanders called a parley, but it was brief and pointless: "The Scotts business was for a surrender; but the governors would hear of nothing but sack; soe they parted merrily".

The rumour of the King's whereabouts was given a fresh boost on the 30th by a Captain Blenkinsop, who came into the town with word that the King was in Westmorland and that the Scots were ordering up wagons to carry away their baggage. Blenkinsop's news, as unfounded as all that had gone before, carried nonetheless, some weight with the defenders: it "caused the Joyfull garrison to eat that day Three days provision, and repent with a cup of cold water for three days after". The skirmishing went on as before. On the 29th:

A countrie Capt., not to be known but by ye burning of his boote at one of the garrison's bonfires, disdainning that 25 horse should approach soe-neer his peacefull Quarters, drew downe in two bodies, each consisting of forty a piece, soe eagerly as if he had not got his breakfast; but the Royalists begun to charge, he faced about, having forgott his foot at home; ye party pursued him half a mile to Comersaile. They killed 4 or 5, and brought away three prisoners...

The Royalists had barely begun their return journey, when the "countrie Capt." returned to the scene with a 100 foot to support him. Six of the garrison
horse rode warily toward that body to observe it.

but he, scorning to contest with six, face about againe; some say, as fast as if all the horse in the townes had been at his heels; and, to show how much he slightted to take advantage of them, threw away his sword, whch was taken up by one of the pursuers.

Who this unfortunate officer may have been is a mystery, for Tullie, usually soon able to furnish names, did not know him. The incident of the burning boots does suggest, however, that he had been first encountered when the enemy work was blown up by Dixon's men in the fighting on the 19th.

Suddenly, under the entry for June 5th, Tullie brought his narrative to a grim picture of life within Carlisle. It appears that on that day a Major Baxter, perhaps shouting to the sentries on the walls from between them and his own lines, attempted to mislead Glemham by reporting that Manchester, of all places, had fallen to the King. As Tullie observed, "facile credimus quod volumus: and no wonder...their small quantity of hors flesh without Bread or salt. ...hempseed, dogs, and rats were eaten, made them listen after releif". Here was a weapon more potent against such a garrison than all the actions of half-hearted enemy forces, the threat of famine. Indirectly, this does show that whatever else the Scots had failed to do, they had successfully blockaded Carlisle. Individuals might pass in and out of the town with ease, but cart-loads of supplies were things of the past, and doubtless most of the cattle that had hitherto escaped the attention of Glemham's raiders, had been moved to a safer distance, whether their owners willed it or not. The situation was growing desperate, and Glemham sent out competent men to try to discover what had become of the long expected relief. Captains Lanyon, Moore and Norgate, and two civilians, left on the 6th or 7th for this purpose.

The thing to do now was to keep the garrison busy, and to try to give them work that might lead to an amelioration of the food problem. On the 8th a Major Macdaggal and a Captain Bartram were ordered to take 200 foot to assault Stanwix, to cover a raid by Philipson who intended to ride for a point beyond that quarter to bring in some 37 cows reported to be pastured out there. Macdaggal sounds very much like MacDougall, and he was certainly a Scottish Royalist, for there is no trace of such a man in the northern regiments. A Captain Francis Bartram had ridden with Clavering's cavalry and he may have been the other officer, particularly since we know that Clavering had long been associated with Montrose, so that one or two of his officers might have remained in the far north when the Northern Horse departed for the south.

The raid was a success. The horse under Philipson rode clean through Stanwix, followed by the infantry who captured most of the cannon there, with supplies of arms and grain.

June 9th. Feild and ensine Orton came in with streight
stories, but as grosse lies as any of the former, of the kings being in Yorkshire, and Smarmake langdailes hastie march towards them through Lankashire...

The end was in sight. The idea of relief had been given up, and the food problem would not be alleviated by raids to fetch in a few cows.

Now were Gentlemen and others so shrunk that they could not chuse but laugh one at another to see their close hang as upon men on gibbets; for one might have put their head and fists between the doublet and the shirts of many of them. The foot would be now and then stealing away, but not a man of the Cavalerie.

Desertion, hunger, privation and realisation that relief was not going to come. These forces would do what the Scots, in their half-hearted way, could not do.

We do not know that disease within the city was rife at this time, but had there been an outbreak, we know sufficient from Cholmeley's memoir of Scarborough to see how debilitation might create circumstances propitious to a Scottish storm.

On the 11th, a desperate raid was made towards Cummersdale by a party of horse, who fetched in between them 14 bushells of corn. Unloading this, they returned to the same area for some that they had been obliged to leave behind, but were caught in the process by a body of Scottish cavalry from the regiment of Lord Dalhousie:

After a small debate the Cavaliers, overcharged with numbers / according to Tullie, there were 14 Royalists/ were repulsed to the water side; but there they rallied, charged their first p'ty, and made them retreat. But ye whole body charging, the kebs / a semi-endearment, to Cumbrians at that time implying the forelorn/ were put to a second retreat, leaving Mackarty and Philipson with others engaged amongst them who continually relieving one another, fought themselves free, and came to their p'ty without hurt, save a sleight cut which Philipson received in his face.

The victories were now harder to win, almost as if everything had quite suddenly conspired against the garrison.

The cavalry, which had gone to seize the remaining corn, finding their reserve engaged with heavy odds, threw down what they had come for and attacked a company of enemy foot marching to assist in the wreck of Philipson's body. The enemy infantry fired steadily and accurately, causing the Royalist horse to fall back, and determining them to try to break through Dalhousie's force. A stroke of luck assisted them

they resolved to break through Dalhowes his regiment; who, supposing them to be of their own p'ty, enquired of them which was the best way to charge Philipson through the water. They answered 'this', and every man directing his pistoll at an enemies face, they charged through the whole body to Philipson, who encouraged by them and some other horse that came to him from the town, gave them forthwith a third charge soe gallantly, yt he forced ye whole regiment to run, killed 13, wounded many...
"Hunger was soe extreme" wrote Tullie; "yt it could scarce be concealed from the enemies". Gleham now had to make what shift he could to secure the best terms he could, and to this end, sent out under a flag of truce, Captain Philipson to be conducted to Lord Fairfax at York:

Philipson was therefore sent to York, with an English and Scots parliament Capt. to know my Lord Fairfax and generall Leslyes pleasure; whether ye surrendered to ye English or Scotch...

According to Tullie, Fairfax opted for the English party as the one to which Gleham should make overtures, but Lord Fairfax himself wrote to tell the earl of Leven of Philipson's mission, so it would seem that Fairfax did respect rank in this case, whatever his personal inclinations may have been. This was on June 21st, and on the 20th Leven had informed Sir William Armyne that the Scottish negotiations were to be conducted by David Leslie. This led to further difficulties, so that when, on June 26th, Leslie was obliged to postpone a meeting with the English representatives since he had to confer with Gleham, they complained that he was ignoring them and acting entirely on his own initiative.

During Philipson's absence on his mission, rumours and stories flooded Carlisle, since the cessation that must have prevailed permitted easier contact between the rank and file of both sides.

the kings Forces, under prince Maurice, had taken Glocester by storm; yt ye king himselfe had taken Leicester, Derby and Chesterfield, with all the enemies bagg and baggage; and was marching day and night to the releife of Carlisle.

As Tullie bitterly remarked the only truth was, yt the King had taken Leicester; wch was a bate laid in his way, till they were ready to give England yt fatal Blow at Naseby...

The garrison learned of that battle when the siege forces began a great shout, shooting off muskets and cannon, and general festivities. Fired with the success of the Parliament's army in the south, the enemy now "grew insolent, and vapoured amane".

Tullie's contention, that Leicester was permitted to fall into the King's hands as a bait, thus delaying him until the Parliamentarian army could come to grips with him, is highly original. Whilst this is not the place to go into the possibilities, it ought to be stressed that such a plan was quite conceivable, and any future study of Naseby might take this into account. One is also struck by Tullie's identification of England with the Cavalier party, something of a change from the normal emphasis put first upon the crown and then upon the country, and which suggests that the writer was less parochial or provincial in his outlook, than many senior officers of either side. To say that is not, of course, necessarily to endorse his opinion. Approval or disapproval are not part of the historian's brief.
Glemham took stringent steps to control food distribution: on the 17th of June:

diverse officers came with soldiers into the common bakehouse and took away all the horse flesh from ye poor people, who were as neere starving as themselves.

six days later

The towns men humbly petitioned Sr Thos Glemham yt their horse flesh might not be taken from them as formerly; and informed him yt they were not able to endure ye famine any longer; to wch he gave no answer, nor redresse, in 4 dayes space; at which time, a few women of ye scolds and scum of the city, met at ye cross, brailing against Sr Henry Stradling, there present; who first threatened to fire upon them; and when they replied they would take it as a favor, he left them with tears in his eyes, but could not mend their Commons.

Surrender was at hand. It was somewhat fraught with problems, however, since the Parliamentary agents were determined to interfere with the Scottish plan to take control in Carlisle. The Parliamentarians succeeded in provoking Glemham:

you engaged yourselves unto me you would assure the consents of Lords Leven and Fairfax for the rendering of this town on honourable conditions to the English forces before it, when necessity might enforce us to it. To that end Capt. Philipson was employed by me, as your desire, unto them both. His journey has been ineffectual, and himself is detained having your pass. Within you stop several of our prisoners whose ransoms are already paid by us...You have written now what honourable conditions I shall make with you concerning the surrendering of this place shall be confirmed by both Houses. The former are not made good, and I have no assurance from anyone general of the latter by your letters. If necessity compels me to capitulate for the rendering of this town, you may assure yourselves it shall be to those who show me the assurance of a general for it, from whom I may expect performance of conditions.

On June 27th, David Leslie added to Armyne's anger by informing him that he had concluded surrender terms with Glemham. All that the Parliament's men could do was to grumble that they had been left in the dark throughout the whole affair, and to demand an English governor and an English garrison; Leslie, however, was to assume control.

Tullie provided two amusing sidelights on the surrender negotiations, and little else, since he was not privy to the terms, which were similar to those agreed for York. Tullie's 19th century editor gave them in full.

Dr Burwell was ye only man who to this time had preserved a little barrel of strong ale, unknowne to any but Sr Tho. Glemham. Ye first commander sent to treat with Sr Tho., was made so drunk with this ale, that, at his return to Lesly, he could give him no account of his errand, nor utter a wise word.

There was as much method as mischief in this. It would convey to Leslie, unless his information to the contrary was reliable, that the town was not so
hard pressed as he might have supposed. It could, wisely employed, induce the Scots to consent to terms even more favourable than those which finally prevailed. On the day following, Glemham struck again:

Lesly sent in a graver person; who, being assured by Sr Tho. yt the towne should be surrendered, offered to take his leave with great satisfaction; but was, in civility, conducted by him to ye Scots port [the North Gate] where ye corporall being ordered not to appeare, soe yt the Scott could not presently passe, Sr Tho. intreated him to take a short repose In the next house, whch was Chancellor Burrels quarter; where, calling for his ale, the Cavallerres drank water, and ye Scot ale soe excessively, yt he returned to Leslie in yt same pickle with ye former, professing yt ye Garrison was every where full of strong drink.

On June 25th the surrendered city passed into Scottish control: Tullie said that the terms were "punctually performed, both to those yt marched out, and to the citysons yt staid at home". Glemham and his fellow commanders rode south, and on the 28th the Scottish garrison marched into the town with colours flying, no doubt watched by Armyne, Barwise, Cholmeley and the rest of the English Parliamentarians.

The siege of Carlisle was unique in the north. No attempt was made to bombard the city, and no effort to carry it by storm was ever made. The Scots, who had shown what they were capable of at Newcastle upon Tyne, here preferred to remain outside the walls, actually avoiding engagements even when to.do so boosted Royalist morale. The Royalist garrison had acquitted themselves honourably, by any criteria, and most of them had gone away with Glemham to continue the war elsewhere.

In 1662 occurred a curious case, when Michael Studholme, a former Parliamentarian, found himself charged with manslaughter. The deed dated to June 1645. When the city surrendered, Royalist, Scottish and Parliamentarian officers and men intermingled in the crowded streets, probably, for the most part, drinking together and exchanging tales of the siege. On one occasion, however, a party of Royalist officers and a party of English Parliamentarians met in the Sun Inn, and an argument developed. The Parliamentarians, with Studholme among them, left the inn and were crossing the market place, when they found themselves pursued by the Royalists, who called them "Parliament rogues". With drawn swords, the two sides set upon each other, and in the brawl, before the Scottish authorities separated them, a Royalist, Leonard Milborne, was killed. It was with his manslaughter that Studholme found himself charged 17 years after the event. He was probably acquitted. Had he been convicted, it might have been vengeance, but it would have been neither just nor fair.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWELVE


3. Edward Aglionby compounded, see CCC, p. 1668, and ibid., p. 162 has a Julian of whom little is known. Captain John Cape appears, without regimental designation, in the List, col. 154, as an infantry officer.

4. The problem of identifying individual Philipsons has already been referred to. See also, Vol. 2.

5. For all the possible identifications, see Vol. 2.

6. Major Coppam was cited by Tullie as a Reformado.

7. See Vol. 2, Glenham's Horse.


9. He may have been Stephen Arnold, former Quartermaster to the Prince of Wales's Horse, a Yorkshireman, List col. 25.

10. He is unidentified.

11. For Aboyne, see for example, Murdoch and Simpson, Montrose, passim.


13. Unidentified.


15. LJ, VII, p. 454.


17. See Vol. 2.

18. Braithwaite's identity is a problem. Thomas Braithwaite of Huworth, Gentleman, a Recusant, was in the Treason Act of November 18th 1652, see Welford, Royalist Composition in Durham and Northumberland, p. xxxiii. Alternatively, Richard Braithwaite his brother, Recusant and delinquent, is in Clay, Yorkshire Royalist Composition, III, p. 34, probably also of Catterick, ibid., p. 196. It would seem that Richard yielded in 1643, and for a further, unlikely, alternative, see Vol. 2, Dacre's Horse.

19. Gordon is unidentified, but perhaps this was Aboyne? For Dixon, see Leigh's Horse, Vol. 2.


22. CSPD 1644/5, p. 413.

23. Ibid., pp. 422/3.

24. Ibid., pp. 552, 558.

25. Ibid., pp. 597, 600/01.


27. Possibly Robert Moore, Clavering's Foot, see Vol. 2.

28. There is a gap in the Ms. here.

29. See Vol. 2.

30. CSPD 1644/5, pp. 603/4.

31. Ibid., pp. 600/01.

32. Ibid., pp. 613/4.


34. Ibid., p. 619.


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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Last Months at Pontefract

Siege warfare in Yorkshire March to July 1645.

The battle of Naseby, fought on June 14th 1645, was not only crucial for the remaining Royalist field armies in the south, but also for the garrisons still holding out in the north. By the end of July, Carlisle, Scarborough and Pontefract had fallen, all of them surrendered on terms when internal privation and no prospect of relief induced the Governors to call for treaty. Thereafter, Skipton in Yorkshire and Lathom in Lancashire were the last important mainland garrisons remaining to the King in the six northern counties.

In following the siege of Pontefract for the last months of its defence, we are examining a siege quite unlike that at Carlisle, or even at Scarborough. In the weeks before Langdale's relief of March 1st, the Parliamentarians had shown themselves quite prepared to batter the castle into submission, and this desire intensified after the departure of the Northern Horse. There was very little reluctance on the part of the siege forces, as we have observed on the part of the Scots outside Carlisle, and in consequence, whilst sallies and forays were still common, they were bloodier and savoured more of desperation on both sides, than those proverbial border cattle raids of Carlisle.

The fervour of Lord Fairfax's commanders against Pontefract is not hard to understand. Unlike Scarborough or Carlisle, and unlike Skipton, too, Pontefract was a major strategic threat to the Parliamentary heartland of the West Riding. It symbolised the Royalist foothold which the Marquess of Newcastle had carved for himself by force of arms in that otherwise rebellious part of Yorkshire. Left alone, or only partially invested, Pontefract would have been able to seriously annoy and hamper the normal routine of Parliamentary administration, and might join with the powerful Newark garrison to conduct a series of raids which could have undone a good deal of the work of the enemy commanders. Rather as Hull had been a thorn in the flesh of the Royalists during 1643, and a constant reminder of a war still to be won, so Pontefract now served its turn, although to describe it as the Royalist's Kingston on Hull would be to ignore certain obvious obstacles to such a comparison. Like Hull, however, it flew an enemy banner in the midst of otherwise successful Parliamentary forces. It was, of course, lacking the advantages which Hull had enjoyed in 1643. It could not be supported from the sea, and it had no prospect of military aid from neighbouring, friendly territory, as Hull had had from Lincolnshire and the army of the Eastern Association. The capture of Hull by the Marquess would have required an enormous stroke of good fortune. The retention of Pontefract by the Royalists would have required a miracle. Naseby put that miracle out of the question altogether.
The basic source for the continuation of the siege of Pontefract remains Longstaffe's edition of Drake, supplemented where possible with other material. The unfortunate truth of the matter is, however, that the tedium of siege warfare attracted little notice from the sensationalising Parliamentarian press; only incidents like the exploit of the Northern Horse, or the final surrender, would attract more than passing notice in London. Were it not for Drake, Tullie and Cholmeley, we would know less about these Royalist last ditch fights than now we do, and whilst for the most part their narratives seem to have been accurate and not given to hyperbole, the lack of corroborative sources requires caution.

Langdale had marched away from Pontefract on March 3rd, and until the 10th "there was but little done... but fetching in of provision and other necessaries for the use of the castle". Colonel Sir Richard Lowther was, however, in communication with Lord Fairfax, and his letters reveal a generosity of spirit that is so archetypal Cavalier in character, that one is fortunate to find them in a Parliamentary source. On the 5th, for example, Lowther wrote to Fairfax:

Your officers will inform you how far you are short in medicaments, the number of the wounded considered. Here is a chirurgeon of your party that will go as far as he can with such things as he hath received. Your lordship will receive with this a list of officers and soldiers, if I may receive the like from you upon a safe-conduct. I shall send officers to treat of a general exchange, and remain, My Lord, Your humble servant, Richard Lowther. (2).

The cynical historian will argue that Lowther had here an eye to the future and, was showing compassion only in order to reap the benefit when he and his garrison came to be in need. Cynical historians are not, however, given to perceiving the truth of things any more than objective historians, and Lowther's consideration for men wounded in the relief must be taken at face value. Particularly so, in view of the fact that not only did he release a Parliamentary surgeon without exchange terms but sent medical supplies with him from the garrison's own stores.

Lord Fairfax's reply to this letter has not survived, and one suspects that it was burned, along with most of the garrison paper work, prior to the surrender. Lowther's second letter, however, clearly alluded to it, and Fairfax seems to have proposed a meeting to discuss exchange of prisoners:

Your lordship's of the 7th of this instant came but this morning [March 9th]: for the time and place, the first is precipitated, for the other it is at too great a distance. If your lordship please to give a meeting at Ferrybridge, upon mutual engagements for the safety of those who shall be appointed to treat upon both parties, I shall agree to it, and to that purpose desire a new safe-conduct for such as I shall nominate; the time, Wednesday next, by nine in the morning. The list your lordship sent of our prisoners with yours is altogether imperfect. I desire a particular under
whose commands and in what regiments they have served, as also a list from Hull and Teressell /Wressell/ in the same way. For your chirurgeon I cannot admit of him; but if the medicaments be sent, I shall join my own surgeons with one of your party, a prisoner here, to use the best of their art in the cure of the poor wounded soldiers....

It is evident that Lowther intended the exchanges to bring in prisoners held elsewhere in Yorkshire, and not only men taken in the Pontefract area, who cannot have been many. One is tempted to suggest that he intended to operate a selection procedure, and that that is why he required to know the precise rank and regiment of each prisoner listed by Fairfax. We do not know if his request was complied with, although it probably was. Had Fairfax's new list survived, and had he kept the strictures imposed by Lowther, that document would have been extremely valuable to any study of the northern Royalist army.

On March 11th the garrison of Pontefract returned to the offensive.

Captin Layborne & Major Mownteynes men rid out towards Wenthill and betwixt that and Ferrybridge tooke Mr. Ellis of Brampton, that great sequestrator and one quartermaister & brought them into the castle.

Two days later, a similar raiding party rode to Turnbridge beyond Ackworth and captured two Parliamentary lt. colonels, named Lee and Ledger. Local tradition, at least in the 19th century, for it is doubtful that it still survives, associated this incident with a small skirmish between Ackworth and Houndhill.

Sir John Saville, one of Fairfax's commanders whose distraught condition at the start of March has already been noted, wrote to his superior on March 14th: he was writing from Wakefield, with his foot quartered in Leeds, although the civilian population was somewhat restive in their presence. Saville was still haunted by the Northern Horse, and was preoccupied with sending scouts out toward Newark and Nottinghamshire to watch for indications that Langdale might be coming back, or another Royalist force be on the march. He added:

Colonel Broadling /Robert Brandling/ I have sent for to come together at Methley, and to make good that pass. Yesterday at 3 o'clock, he heard nothing of the enemy, but only Pontefract horse fetching in provisions; neither know anything of the cause of Colonel Forbes leaving Leadston. And he then lay quartered at Badsworth, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, for Sir Joseph Worstenholme would not let him quarter at Nostall. Brandling was clearly giving evidence of that fidelity to his new cause which was later affirmed by his superiors. But even as he had fallen victim to the Skipton raiders, so now he fell victim to the Pontefract cavalry, for on the very next day, the 15th of March:

There went out a party of horse towards Dauncaster and in that way they mett with Collonell Brandlin's regiment and routed them, tooke one major, one captin, one lieutenant, 3 officers, 67 souldyers, and about 100 horse.
Map to illustrate Pontefract and its environs, showing places mentioned in the journal of the siege.
Thus ill luck dogged Brandling's footsteps now, and for much of the rest of his career.

On the evening of the same day, the garrison raided Turnbridge and plundered a store there, returning with 40 pairs of boots and other essentials. This was but a lull before the storm, for on the 21st of March at two in the afternoon, the Parliamentary forces stormed and captured the upper part of Pontefract town, and shot dead Captain Redman on the bridge, another soldier exposing himself atop the Round Tower, and took three prisoners. This attack seems to have had all the elements of a surprise, and perhaps the garrison had become a little over-confident since March 1st. Captain Redman was probably William, eldest son of Colonel Sir John Redman by his first marriage?

The garrison replied with a cannonade against the upper town, whilst "the Lower towne we had at liberty". Wood was brought into the castle from burned houses, whilst the enemy remained more or less where they were. It was said in the castle that the intention of the Parliamentary commanders was simply to keep the garrison penned up whilst the entire countryside was stripped of all victuals and possible provisions, as a means of dissuading Rupert from coming on a visit. Certainly Sir John Saville was occupied elsewhere:

Your lordship may remember your lordship's order to Captain Spencer for his march to the rest of my regiment at Wakefield, to join with me in securing Sandall Castle, which he did accordingly; since that (beyond my expectation) another order from your lordship is come to his hands, for his march to Colonel Bright's regiment, there to remain till the difference be determined. My lord, it hath been my desire from the beginning to put an end to the controversy, if at least there be any; but, my Lord, he being now with me in obedience to your lordship's first order, and this last order procured in my absence, and upon suggestions which Captain Spencer himself disaffirms (for he denies the supply of either men or armies [arms] from Colonel Lambert), and besides the common soldiers being unwilling to part from the regiment; my request to your lordship is, that they may stay with me....

This letter tends to argue that Lord Fairfax for one, was not quite sure what his next move was to be. Drake noticed that the forces before Pontefract were "not so strong by much as was thought", and Saville was being given forces on the one hand, only to have them taken away with the other.

We do not know precisely when Sandal was garrisoned by the Royalists, although it was sometime late in 1644, for Drake alluded to it in his journal entries prior to the relief of March 1st. It was to become even more important henceforth, as a stopping place for the Royalists between Pontefract and Newark, and as a signal station between the two garrisons. On March 23rd, Sir John Saville informed Fairfax

I have endeavoured to inform myself of their strength at Sandall, and find that they are one hundred foot and fifty horse, besides those fifty horse lately gone out upon a party from Pontefract garrison, and could not return to it again by reason our leaguer there. I advised with the
officers here, and the result was, that we were too inconsiderable to lie in Sandall, for we are not above 150 foot, now that Captain Spencer is marched...we humbly conceive 300 foot and six troops of horse, of fifty in every troop, to be a proportion small enough for that attempt...(9)

Precisely what party of cavalry Saville was here referring to, that had come from Pontefract and had been unable to return, we do not know. Drake gave no indication of any incident around this date, so we are left to conclude that this may have been the raiding party which destroyed Brandling's regiment, except that Drake implied that the prisoners from that engagement were carried into Pontefract. Anyway, access to Pontefract castle was still possible up to March 21st, and in a limited way for some time thereafter.

Between March 23rd and 27th, the garrison fired a few spasmodic rounds into the occupied part of the town, killing three men on the latter date with sniper fire. On the 28th, a Royalist was shot down when the musket of a companion misfired:

We had two of our own men shot that day, the one by the cock of his pike at unawares shot his next man into the thigh, and the other the barrel of his musket burst and so hurt himself.

Allusion has been made on several occasions to the hazard of exploding firearms. Care and maintenance of weapons was the duty, obviously, of each individual, supervised by the Gentleman at Arms, a company officer of non-commissioned rank, although the term may have been applied to a skilled enlisted man and have carried nothing with it except responsibility and a little additional pay. An exploding musket could be repaired if the damage were superficial. In the Constables Accounts for York in 1644, given verbatim by Wenham are two references to the repair of muskets, costing respectively 4d. and 8d. The size of the repair can be better understood by comparing it with an entry recording the exchange of a musket with one damaged by an explosion:

Paid to William Syer for a musket, instead of a musket that Robert Jackson broke when he hurt his face...4.0d.

The exchange of fire between garrison and besiegers continued for some days. On March 30th, one of the garrison, Nicholas Baune, was shot dead as he stood by his cannon perched on the Treasurer's tower. The next day, after a preliminary bombardment directed into the town and into the Park, which killed three of the enemy, Captain Smith and 30 men left the castle and attacked a sentry post, killing the guards and burning it to the ground. Drake did not give the location of the post, except to say that it was a lathe, or barn, probably converted into something akin to a block house. That it needed 30 men to take it, argues for quite a substantial building.

Between April 1st and 4th, Drake noted at least three of the enemy killed,
at Munkhill, at All Saints Church, and in an unnamed house. The relative passivity of the siege forces was not entirely due to Lord Fairfax's indecision, however, for Drake had noted on March 22nd that trenches were being dug at various points around the castle, and it was evident that the Parliamentary commanders intended to safeguard themselves as well as they could from raids. On the night of the 4th, such a raid came. A body of foot, divided into three companies, and 90 strong, attacked another barn being used as a sentry post, burning it to the ground and killing a captain and three enlisted men. The lower end of the town was swept clear of Parliamentarian sentinels, but a Royalist was captured in the skirmishing. An attempt was made to cut off the raiders, signalled by the raising of colours at Skinner Lane, but the cannon on the King's Tower shot them down and made an end of the business for the night.

The next day

Our horse did sally forth under the command of Captin James Washington and Captin Beale and 40 musqueteers under the command of Captin Malcolm Smith. Our horsemen behaved themselves valiantly, facing a whole troop with 5 men, made them retreat within the town and double their number of horses...fall forth with 100 musquetears & lined a hedge

Most of this fighting must have been taking place amongst the gardens of the houses, difficult terrain for the cavalry of either side to deploy in. During the heavy exchange of fire, two butchers carrying horse loads of fresh meat into the town were seized by the Royalists, and redirected into the castle "which did very good service to the garison upon Easter day" as Drake recalled. The Royalists retired with two horses and a prisoner, having killed, all that was known for certain, one man on Baghill.

The enemy basely stayed all wine from coming to the castle for serving of the Communion upon Easter day, although Forbus (their Governor) had granted protection for the same, and one Browne of Wakefield said if it were for our damnation we should have it, but not for our salvation. If Forbus had indeed issued a pass for the wine, not unusual a gesture, then clearly the supply was stopped at source, by the supplier perhaps. Deprived of their special celebration at this festival, the garrison commanders chose another.

that day, being Easter day, which was prepared for the health of our soules, was prepared for the liberties of our bodyes, for, after sermon done...the Governor gave strait command that all men should presently be in arms, which was as willingly done both with horse and foot.

Captains Washington and Beale were given command of the cavalry. Captain Munro and 50 musketeers were to sally from the Swillington tower into Northgate. Captain Flood (Hugh Floyd, ex-Gerlington's Horse) and another 50 muskets left by the Lower Gate to attack the enemy trenches near Halfpenny
Some 50 gentlemen volunteers were drawn into two bodies, to second each of the four musketeer units. The gentlemen were chosen on a quota basis from each of the four divisions in the garrison: 12 from Hutton's, commanded by Captain Croft; 10 from Wentworth's, commanded by Lieutenant Ward; 10 from Ramsden's under Captain Benson; and 10 from Colonel Sir Gervase Cutler's division (Cutler had taken over from Edward Grey, who had gone south with Langdale on March 3rd) under Captain Oglebie. Cutler's promotion had involved some degree of divisional reorganisation, Cutler himself leaving Ramsden's division, and Lieutenant Ward now served under Wentworth, whilst Benson had moved from Wentworth's to Ramsden's.

These resolute spirits (having received orders) cheerfully passed upon their service, entered their trenches, gave a long and strong alarm, and returned with honour. Our cannonade also plaid their parte bravely and did good execution in the Markit place and other places in the towne. We killd in that sally 26 men or more, tooke one prisoner, and divers muskittes and swords and drummes and we had 2 men killd & 2 men wounded and we shott 26 cannon wherewith is supposed could be no lesse than 100 men killed.

Quite feasable, if the cannon were aimed into large numbers of panicking infantry driven from their trenches by the sudden assault.

But we lett them not rest thus, for the same night, about 10 of the clock, Captain Smith, Capt. Ratcliffe (15) & Lieutenant Wheatley with 100 musqueters, fell upon Northgate and so into the Midle street of the towne (above their trenches) gave fierce fire amongst them and did bloody execution for almost one hower, where was very many of the besiegers killd, and we had but one man killd (his name was quartermast Dawson). And one, a common scoudyer, was wounded, and we shott of 6 cannon then, where the enemies powder was sett on fire at Mr. Lunnes and about 20 men burnt, but few of them likely to live.

The 6th of Aprill, Easter Day, had been a disastrous day for the Parliamentary forces, and Drake's allusion to the stopping of the communion wine, does seem to infer that the disasters might have been avoided had the man Browne at Wakefield been less spiteful.

On the 7th, another sally was made to Baghill, 12 horse who there captured an enemy horse and killed a soldier. They also brought away "one Wilson, a trooper, prisoner". Marksmen on the Round Tower reckoned that they had accounted for eight to ten of the enemy at the same time. The attack on Baghill was repeated the next day, by cavalry under Captains Washington and Beale, supported by a body of musketeers under Lieutenant Moore. The cavalry faced the enemy horse, keeping them from making a move, whilst the musketeers moved onto the hill, but the appearance of a large force of enemy infantry caused the Royalists to fall back, Lieutenant Moore being wounded in the arm in an exchange of fire. On the 9th, the fighting on Baghill was resumed, when Lieutenant Perry single-handedly charged an enemy scout, dismounted him and twice wounded him, but the man escaped when no assistance was forthcoming to
enable Perry to bring man and horse in. That evening, as the sentries changed, the cannon fired into the town and killed two of them, as well as a woman who was present. Five waggon loads of wounded men were observed leaving for York, crossing Ferrybridge on the 10th. On the same day, Sir John Saville's colours were seen in the town, which caused Drake to remark that he was "being newly come from Sandall with little comfort". After dark, two salvoes of case shot were fired into the enemy trenches, "where the enemy was heard to crye 0 is me, 0 is me, divers times".

The attacks on Baghill had been too frequent to be ignored, and on the 11th the Parliamentary forces drew out to counter any further attack. They placed 30 musketeers in hedges on the hill, but after two hours, finding the garrison unwilling to oblige them, they drew off, whereupon a marksman from the Round Tower killed one. The next day, an enemy marksman picked off Alderman Thomas Wilkinson, former Mayor of Pontefract, as he stood at the barbican gate. A sally from the castle, bent on revenge, rode to Munkhill but failed to come to blows, although two horses were killed.

April 13th proved an unlucky day for the siege forces. They were seen from the walls drawing troops of horse together in a show of strength, and just before noon two troops rode down to below the New Hall within range of the cannon on King's Tower. Most of the garrison were at a sermon, but the gunner on the tower fired down upon the cavalry, "dismounted a whole file, kill'd 2 dead both man and horse, the other 4 were sore hurt". Drake noted that this display of cavalry was larger than anything seen before, so that it must have seemed that Lord Fairfax had made up his mind to concentrate resources against Pontefract.

On the following day occurred an incident reminiscent of Carlisle. A herd of cattle from the castle had been driven out to pasture below Swillington tower, whereupon a party of enemy horse approached to seize them, "but our musketers caused them to runne away and saved the cattell". Waggon loads of ammunition and weapons were seen passing through the town from Ferrybridge, which the garrison interpreted as a sign that the enemy forces in Yorkshire were preparing to resist an advance by Prince Rupert. Some 3000 Scots were rumoured to be encamped at Leeds, and reports had come in of forces drawn from Knaresborough, York, Cawood and Selby, as well as from Scarborough siege lines, moving in the general direction of the Leeds area. Sir Hugh Cholmeley did not record, or remember, any diminution of the siege forces at this time, let it be added.

Similarly reminiscent of Carlisle was a private raid conducted by 20 of the regular soldiers under the command of William Wether, nicknamed Belwether. Longstaffe interpreted the nickname as being a compilation of Bill Wether and Bell-Wedder, the latter a Northamptonshire vernacular expression meaning a
"spoilt child". Longstaffe's evident lack of sympathy for exploits like this ought not to have led him to make such a far-fetched remark, let alone to have supposed that a term current in Northamptonshire would have been in use in Pontefract. Belwether was probably a nickname derived both from William Wether's own name, and from the word 'wether' current in northern England even today, used for sheep. A wild and hairy appearance (and manner) might account for the sobriquet here.

Wether and his men attacked New Hall where a body of enemy troops was lining a barricade. They came suddenly upon their works, & beate the enemy from it and they fled to their horse gaurds, but our men fell a pulling downe theirc worke so long as their horsemen were ready to charge them and then our men retreated. They had not any command to doe or any commander to command them but one William Wether...

An unofficial sally, or reconnaissance, to Baghill by five infantrymen ran into trouble. Lieutenant Perry and "Johnathan Sir Jarvis Cutler's man" rode to their assistance and drove off the enemy. Johnathan, however, seeing some of them reluctant to go, charged them with drawn sword, and put them to flight. "So our men retreated with credit".

Wether's action was not punished. Later that day, with six "firelockes" he attacked trenches near Broad Lane and drove off forces there. In the hard fighting, a Parliamentary commander with "a buffe coat and a black skarfe" was shot dead together with three soldiers, whilst cannon fire from the castle accounted for others.

The distinction which Drake drew between musketeers and "firelocks" was a nice one, but one made often in contemporary sources. The normal musket was a matchlock, fired by placing a lighted taper or match to the powder charge. The firelock was a novelty in the civil war period, and according to Burne and Young was normally used for escort duties, such as guarding the passage of cannon. It was a transitional stage between the wheel-lock, at this time a mechanism normally associated with pistols carried by the cavalry, and the later flintlock musket, in which the weapon was fired by ignition from sparks and not by the application of a naked, smouldering match. A point to be made here is that the term Fire-lock had come to mean not only the weapon itself, but the man who carried it, and Wether's attack with firelocks did not imply necessarily that the new weapons were carried at the particular engagement described.

On April 15th another attack was made on Baghill by two musketeers, who, having scattered enemy sentries, returned to the castle. The castle gunners fired down into the town and out to Baghill, without doing any visible damage. Marksmen accounted for one of the enemy on the hill later in the day, two at Munkhill and one in the trenches. At noon, a force of Parliamentary
musketeers occupied the hedgerows on Baghill and kept up a steady fire against the castle until a cannon ball landed in their midst "which caused them to make a great lamentation". A Royalist infantryman, identified by the initials T.G., caught outside the castle after dark, was wounded four times before killing one of his attackers and making good his retreat into the castle.

At ten in the morning on the 16th took place another of those major sallies which dispirited the enemy and relieved the garrison from the tedium of sentry-go and watches. Fifty musketeers under Captain [Gabriel] Hemsworth marched out against the trenches near Alderman Lumne’s house by the Lower gate. Captain Munro with another 50 went from Swillington tower to Northgate into the upper enemy trenches. Once again 50 gentlemen volunteers were drawn out to second the professionals, again by quota: 12 from Hutton’s under Captain Croft, 14 from Wentworth’s under Lieutenant Ward, 12 from Cutler’s under Ogleby and 12 from Ramden’s under Lt. Colonel Galbraith. Galbraith was not listed by Drake prior to March 1st, and may have been exchanged during the talks between Lowther and Fairfax later that month, for he was captured in May 1644.

An additional party of 12 musketeers commanded by Lieutenant [John] Favill of Hemsworth’s company brought up the rear, probably to act as a covering party in the event of a retreat.

All the rest followed Capt. Himsworth who assaulted the great trench. They cleared the little worke and the great trench with much valor, beat the enemy up to another trench nearer the bridge; there was killed in the great trench 17 men, and many hurt. Our cannon plaid 20 shott during the time and did much execution. There was one Captain Wade taken prisoner and 4 soldiers; it is thought there was killed, hurt and taken prisoners 50 men at least, 1 lieutenant killed, taken 60 armes, 7 drummes.

Whilst all this was going on, the cavalry under Captain Beals and Cornet Speight rode to Baghill to keep the enemy there from breaking out and coming to the assistance of their fellows in the town. In the afternoon, Speight and Captain Washington returned to Baghill and there captured an enemy quartermaster. To cap the success of the day, a messenger arrived from Sandal Castle to report a successful sally on Saville’s men.

Drake noted that the sally had been in three parts, and had led to the killing of 42 of the Parliamentary siege force there and to the capture of a further 50 or so, including a captain. Sir John Saville "with his treacherous and hypocritical rebels" beat their drums for prayers, and began to sing psalms. This appears to have had some unpleasant effect on Sandal’s governor, Captain Bonivant, who caused his drummers to beat to prayers, so that they thought they were secure, but our men after they had dedicated themselves unto God, with upright harts and religious prayers in breefe manner: To Armes, and fell upon them.

The garrison in Pontefract noted seven wagggon loads of wounded going away to York, additional evidence of the effectiveness of their raid on the 16th.
A livestock raid in the Carlisle tradition took place on the 18th. Observers on the walls saw 44 oxen and milk cows grazing not far off, whereupon Captain Speight (1) and Captain Beale led out 30 horse, supported by Major Bland and Major Godfrey Dennis with 50 foot, and succeeded in driving the stock, having one of their number wounded in the process. Later in the day, a force of 800 Scots commanded by Colonel Montgomery appeared in the siege lines, "commanded men without collores". This substantial reinforcement meant, as Drake observed, that "we are beleagured round about again", and their appearance was greeted by a furious cannonade from the castle, directed also against Baghill where a body of musketeers was lined up to prevent a sally. A Royalist gunner was, in his turn, killed, when a musket ball passed through the gunport in the wall and struck him as he was about to give fire. Further exchanges of fire between the Scots and the garrison brought that day to an end.

The Scots were directly in the front line against the garrison, and here, as at Newcastle, and strikingly unlike the situation at Carlisle, they did not avoid involvement. On the 19th the garrison sent out a few musketeers towards Munkhill where, in three attacks they three times routed the Scottish guards, killing two of them and "divers (was seen) to faule", on other occasions. Case shot was directed towards Baghill which burst in the hedges there, "and there was seen diverse hattes to fly, of and is supposed many men killed". The next day, the Scots set fire to the upper end of Munkhill at four in the afternoon, either to clear brushwood, or to use the smoke as cover for trenching work that began at the same time. They began to make works from Sandgate across to New Hall, and so round towards Munkhill. The garrison set up a cannonade against the new entrenchments

we played 5 cannon, whereof one was to theire barricade upon the back of the schoolhouse, and shott it thorow, where there was many of their men, & is supposed did great execution. The rest was shott into the town, & one of them to Newhall. This day the Scottes made a strong alarum among themselves, and a musketer of theirs killd a major of theires for a Cavelear.

Lowther, in view of the intensification of the siege, now redeployed his artillery. An "iron gunne", hitherto established above the Upper gate of the castle, was drawn to a rising ground before the main gate, where a battery was being constructed, but as Drake noted, this took four days to complete the work, and the gun was silent for that time. Throughout the work, they came under fire from musketeers along the hedges on Baghill, who fired "very vehemently but did no hurt there".

On the afternoon of April 21st occurred a rather grim incident. The Scots - Drake did not specify whether acting upon orders or not - sent a drum to the castle for a parley, whereupon Lowther sent down Captain Flood and a soldier, Anthony Foxcroft, to bring him into the barbican. When they had come
within range, musketeers in the Scottish trenches on Munkhill opened fire
shooting the soldier in the leg and wounding Flood as well. This sounds very
much like a play by a group of Scots, rather than a piece of trickery connived
at by Montgomery or his staff, for it was foolish to set such a precedent which
might work against the Scots and the Parliamentarians on a later occasion.

Whilst the garrison worked on the new battery for their "iron gunnel" the
Scots worked furiously at their own entrenchments. The Parliamentary forces
now took over from their allies in firing down into the castle to disrupt the
battery work, but again with small effect. Then, quite suddenly, on the night
of 22nd April: "the Scottes marcht all away from Newhall thorough the Parke
that same way they came". The departure of the Scots must have been part of
a general movement northward noted by Whitelock, and to fill the gap in the
lines, Sir John Saville reappeared again from Sandal and occupied the positions
around Newhall. The Parliamentarians kept up a steady volley of musketry from
Baghill, which led to the death of "a young maid [who] was drying of clothes".
Drake noted two of the besiegers were killed during the day.

Between April 24th and 27th, there was considerable activity. Drake did
not say so, but the departure of the Scots must have taken on significance for
the defenders, particularly when Belwether, out foraging, captured a woman near
Newhall carrying ale to the Parliamentary forces. Having relieved her of her
money, he conducted her, with the ale, into the castle, where she told the
officers who questioned her, that the siege forces were likely to depart from
before the castle in a few days. The reason she gave was that the King had
won "the battell which was made about Westchester" a few days before. It
will be remembered that around this time, the Carlisle garrison had been
expecting a forward movement by the King which was to bring them relief by
May 9th. Tullie, however, did not note any battle, or rumour of such, at
Chester, whilst the King was himself still in winter quarters at Oxford at this
time.

The exchange of musketry grew fiercer during the 24th, and one of Saville's
men was killed during a sally to Munkhill. On the following day, the Parlia-
mentarians put on a show of strength at Baghill, 50 musketeers to fire into the
castle, and several troops of horse for display. The garrison returned fire
with their cannon, and "we saw either hattes or heades flye up at the fall of
the bullits". Whilst Baghill was thus the scene of most of the action, a
body of Royalists sallied to Munkhill and skirmished with Saville's men, clear-
ing the houses and gardens there, and capturing one prisoner. From the Round
Tower, as night drew on, the gunners believed that they had killed at least
four of the enemy at the moment of changing sentries, presumably in the same
area.

Samuel Luke, away in Newport Pagnell, heard a curious story relating to
these last few days of the siege, and duly noted it, probably because he 
believed it:

Pontefract was the other day much endangered by a sally and 
had not Forbes with a regiment done extraordinary service 
we had been beaten from before it. (28)

Drake dutifully recorded every sally, and it is hard to find anything in mid 
or late April, certainly before the 26th when Luke was writing, that could be 
held to correspond to this report.

On the day that Luke recorded this fanciful tale, intended probably to 
inflate Parliamentary pride in view of their failure to achieve anything at 
Pontefract, musketeers from Baghill kept up a steady fire on the castle for 
what Drake estimated to be five or six hours, without doing any harm. In 
return, the garrison fired a cannon towards the market place, and there "killd 
one man, against Mrs. Jackson doore and so grased up the Markitt place". The 
indiscriminate nature of cannon fire, particularly when directed from the 
castle into the town, rather than by the besiegers against a distinctively 
identified enemy, must have been terrible. Drake noted a man killed on this 
occaision, and although there was no need to refer to him as a soldier, it may 
well be that the victim was a civilian. There must have been very many such, 
killed or maimed by the Royalist artillery, but Lowther could hardly concentrate 
his firepower on obviously military targets, since the effectiveness of the 
garrison cannon would depend upon the unexpectedness of each target and, there-
by, the possibility of catching enemy forces in exposed conditions. One could 
suppose that in view of the number of civilians in arms within the castle, 
that the Royalist officers and gunners, if they bothered to question the moral-
ity of their cannonades, might have argued that those who were for the King 
were in the garrison, and those outside, women excepted perhaps, were by 
implication, opposed to the King. Admittedly, this is, and would have been 
a dire over-simplification, but it has to be remembered that many of the 
gentlemen volunteers in the castle were local men who, when it was all over, 
might have to justify their carnage to neighbours and acquaintances who had 
been in the town throughout the siege. The point is that if Drake appeared 
to have displayed as much incidental indifference toward civilian deaths, as 
to mortality amongst the enemy soldiery, it was because any defence would have 
been impossible if it had been otherwise. Normal standards go by default in 
time of war, and it is doubtful that the civilian casualties in Pontefract 
exceeded the civilian casualties in Newcastle upon Tyne.

At noon on the 26th, a party of eight Royalists sallied out again to con-
front Saville's men at Munkhill, killing one and wounding another, but 40 horse 
seemed likely to cut off their retreat. The alacrity of the Royalists saved 
them, for they ran back within musket range of the walls and the horse would 
not pursue them so far. Two hours later, another party raided Munkhill,
sweeping the enemy trenches and taking a prisoner, before retiring to Denwell to regroup. They returned to the attack, killing an enemy cavalryman who "came braving up towards them". At four o'clock a third attack struck Munkhill, this time by seven or eight Royalists who masqueraded as Parliamentarians. They called to a mounted officer, who mistook them for his own men, and rode towards them:

who cam allmost close to them & then saw he was mistaken & cockt his pistoll at them, but they discharged 2 muskits upon him and shott him thorow his side but his horse carryed him of to Newhall, there being little hopes of any life in him...

But the ploy was not yet finished. The Royalists, having dealt with the officer, marched up to the Abbey Close and called out insults to their comrades on the castle walls, "bidding them come forth out of their houlds if they durst, and called them Papists". Having thus established their credentials as God-fearing Parliamentarians, they marched back to try to rally some genuine Parliamentary musketeers to go with them, but after they had gone a little way, only one was prepared to join them, who was subsequently disarmed and carried away prisoner.

These raids may seem incredible, unless it is appreciated that they took place for the most part in and around hedged gardens and fields, where shrubs, trees and clumps of woodland interfered with the view of each section of the siege army. Thus, the movement of small parties from the garrison was easily facilitated by terrain, and since both sides were not distinguished to any degree by style of dress, it was quite possible for the Parliamentary officer riding at Munkhill to confuse a group of Royalists with his own men, until, in his case, he came close enough to realise that they were strangers to him. Nonetheless, with these advantages in their favour, the Royalist raiders put themselves in extreme danger on every occasion that they ventured out, since once a precedent had been set as in this instance, the enemy would be likely to shoot first and leave the questions for later. The one factor which the garrison had always in their favour, was the view from the castle towers, which enabled them to know, fairly accurately, precisely where the enemy forces were disposed at any given time, so that a concentration of effort by the Parliamentarians at, for example, Baghill, would make a raid on Munkhill easier to carry out.

At six that evening, after such a day of alarms and excursions in the enemy lines, a force of 150 infantry moved up to Newhall to reinforce Saville's men there and on Munkhill. Two were killed by marksmen from the walls, and two others were wounded. An additional company of foot was also seen to go to Baghill and to dig there yet another trench.

When midnight struck, Lowther sent out Captain Smith and Lieutenant Favell with 60 men from the Swillington tower, to raid Northgate. They
gave them a strong allarme, which caused them to beate their drummes and faule to theirs armes, both in the towe and throughout all our men shooting at them very hard with their muskitts for the space of hauph an hower, and so retreated without any loss at all.

On the other side of the castle, 16 men commanded by Lieutenant Smith struck yet again at Saville's forces, even though they had been strongly reinforced, and drove them towards New Hall.

With the morning, the Parliamentarian musketeers at Baghill resumed a steady fire, shooting "very hard at any they could see whether within or without the castle with about 100 musketeres". This steady fire prevented the pasturing of the garrison livestock, but did not prevent them from seizing three hogs which had strayed near to the barbican. At 11 that night, a party of Royalists commanded by one "Lowder" raided All Saints Church. Clearly, this was not Gerrard Lowther, whom Drake knew, nor was it likely to have been Robert Lowther, the governor's brother. A possible identification in view of the identified regimental representation in the garrison, at least prior to March 1st, is Cornet Thomas Lowther. Lowther drove off the sentries there towards Newhall and then retired without loss.

The Parliamentary entrenchments on Baghill proceeded but slowly, Drake said, in view of the stoney nature of the ground. Through the night of April 27th/28th, 100 men had continued to dig, and in the morning 150 others relieved them. Their guards were nervous, and "shott very furiously upon the least occasion". There was a good deal of movement in the siege lines as well, Drake noting that during the morning 200 cavalry from the siege and "townes there-aboutes" rode away towards Ferrybridge. The sallies continued unabated.

Poor Saville's men were attacked again at Munkhill, and had one of their number killed. In the afternoon, the attack was repeated, although this time without "any order or knowledge of the Governour". "Lowder" led them, "a good stout soldier", but this time Saville was ready for them.

from New Hall issued fourth neare 100 souldyers. Our men charged them bravely till they came almost close to one another, where our men killed 2 of theirs, and wounded as many men (as is thought) of theirs as went up of ours, and then they basely runne away, and tooke one of the killed men along with them, but the other our men brought downe with them to Denwell and buryed him by the other was killed 2 daies before...

Drake added, bitterly

...though they suffered our men which were killed at the Low church to lye there 10 dayes unburyed, having been often sent to and requested to doe it.

A point here. Panicking soldiers do not stop to carry away dead bodies, and it looks as if the forces engaged at Newhall were ordered to fall back. The same remarks made concerning these clashes at Carlisle, when the garrison invariably came off victorious, apply here. Briefly, the siege forces had far
more to lose by these actions than had the garrison, and unless they could achieve a tactical superiority guaranteeing them a triumph, they were better advised to draw off and let the Royalists depart, as they would have to do. Drake's journal was very "matter of fact", and can convey the impression that the Parliamentarians were really rather poor soldiers. Without consideration of the foregoing points, such an opinion would be erroneously held, but if only for the reason that such an opinion would reflect upon the achievements of the garrison, it has to be stressed that tactical considerations would oblige the siege troops to adopt a low profile. It is certainly true that in some cases the enemy showed untoward panic, but that would be an inevitable risk of the very tactical policy which the commanders adopted. Soldiers who were not commanded to resist each and every sally, would soon have become nervous, perhaps seeing themselves as victims when they ought to have been in the dominant position. It would be harsh to pass judgement upon the courage and experience of the Parliament's men for the decisions of their officers.

Desperately, the trenching work at Baghill went on. Drake estimated no fewer than 300 men were labouring there through the night of April 28th/29th. To give them a distraction, the Royalist gunners now and again fired a salvo into their midst "but what execution was done is not knowne". The trenching went on through the following day, whilst musketeers fired time and again against the castle to discourage any sally. Nonetheless, such a raid came, once more directed to Munkhill, driving Saville's men yet again from a trench before retiring without loss into the castle.

After darkness had descended, four Royalist officers, attended by their servants and a few armed men, left for Sandal, intending to journey on to Newark. Who they were, or why they were going, we do not know, but it may be that they felt there would be more to do at Newark than hitherto there had been in Pontefract. They were escorted by Lt. Colonel Galbraith, to whom Drake applied the designation of 'the' Lt. Colonel, which suggests that Lt.Colonel William Middleton, listed in December 1644, had left the garrison at the relief. Galbraith took 20 musketeers and firelocks with him, who left the wayfarers in Newhall Park, and turned back, taking or killing an enemy scout on their return. They circled the castle, made a sudden attack upon an enemy trench, and then retired inside the gates.

The trenching work carried on at Baghill had rendered it a difficult place to raid, and so the marksmen on the Round Tower were left to do what they could, with varying success. At Munkhill, Saville was taking steps to prevent further sallies by destroying houses that no doubt interfered with observation:

the enemy burnt poor Cate Lillhole howese on Munkhill and also...they burnt a little howse under the Castle wall...

On May 1st the Baghill work was finished
they had made a Triangle worke, and walled it with stone, and filled it with earth, and, as we conceived, there was a little work within it for officers to sitt in & to shelter them from rayne.

The garrison determined to test the strength of the work, and playd one cannon to it that morninge, which burst the stone wall without and we supposed shott through the inworks allso where they was drinking (for they had a great store of ale brought them that morning) and very many of them runne out of that worke very fast.

Drake, humourously, added "we supposed the cannon did good execution".

In the afternoon, Munkhill was raided, where Saville had drawn out 60 musketeers along a hedge and a ditch. Volleys of musketry from the castle preceded the sally, since the enemy was alert and wisely disposed for such an eventuality. Then eight of the garrison infiltrated the ditch and driving the enemy before them, cleared it, killing two officers. The Royalists then withdrew to receive fresh ammunition carried to them from the castle, whereupon Saville rallied all his cavalry to support his foot, and although not willing to venture within musket shot of the castle walls, temporarily put paid to a second sally. However, much later, Munkhill was raided twice again, with the loss of two Parliamentarians. Yet another raid, conducted like the others by a handful of men, was made, but in retiring finally toward the castle a local barber, Nathaniel Sutton, was shot and killed by enemy musketeers. A Captain Dent was wounded in the same retreat. Drake criticised Dent and Sutton as acting without orders in making the third attack, feeling that they had tempted providence by so doing and had suffered the consequences. A third man, a company drummer, had been with them and was slightly injured.

After repairing the Baghill sconce, the Parliamentarians planted cannon in it, one a "long drake belonging to Sr. John Saivell". This did not, apparently, do much damage, and the exchange of musket fire was still the rule. Snipers killed 14 Parliamentarians from the Round Tower, but when the garrison sentries were being changed, a Royalist soldier was shot dead, "we knew not whether the bullitt came from Baghill or Munkhill but we supposed from Munkhill".

Drake noted a gradual diminution in the enemy fire-power. The musketeers contented themselves in picking off livestock grazing beneath the walls, but the carcasses were retrieved by the garrison and added to the immediate food supply. The days passed by with occasional shooting by musketeers of either side, but the casualties were low amongst the enemy, and scarcely any at all in the Royalist ranks. Baghill was virtually silent after the concentrated expenditure of shot during the digging of the Triangle work. On May 6th, two townsmen were seen to carry ale into that sconce, whereupon the first cannon plaid full into that work, & made a breach into it, & we supposed did summe execution for they runne
away very fast out of the worke; and the other cannon drive
away 3 or 4 stones from the toppe of the worke amongst them
which was within...

At Munkhill, Saville's demolition work was finished, and he had "made waye
through all the burnt howses along the toppe of the hill" to facilitate move-
ment of forces in the eventuality of garrison raids. One wonders whether Cate
Lillhole and others received compensation, or whether they ended up on Parish
relief, supposing that they had few funds of their own.

There were also desertions from the Parliamentary ranks, or rather, cases
of soldiers simply changing sides, since Drake was in no position to know if
any were simply deserting their colours and leaving Pontefract behind them.
An enlisted man appeared before the castle gates on May 4th and was admitted,
and two days afterwards a sergeant came over to the Royalists "which told us
summe news of the enemies proceedings in the townes". If Drake was privy to
the sergeants revelations, he did not commit his knowledge to paper. Nor did
he divulge the content of letters which came into the governor from Newark
concerning the King's activities.

Saville's drake on Baghill was badly manned, and its missiles flew clean
over the castle walls. The lower town was the scene of a brief skirmish on
May 7th when 10 of the enemy "vaporing with their swordes" appeared at All
Saints Church, only to be driven off by a party of musketeers. The expression
'vaporing', which Tullie used frequently in describing the activities of both
sides at Carlisle, intrigues. That it bore some relation to 'vapour' is self-
evident, but it must have conveyed something at that period which it no longer
conveys; unless we are to suppose that 'vaporing' soldiers were soldiers who
appeared and disappeared rapidly, as mist will do, when dispelled by the wind.

More soldiers left Pontefract on May 8th, Belwether going to Newark on
some mission, and Captain Richard Horsefald riding to Sandal with his company
(doubtless hardly at full strength). The passage was made below Baghill, but
the enemy did not stir, and the escort was able to return unmolested. The
next day, Baghill erupted again:

there was hard shooting on all sides where we saw one man to
tfall in the portehole upon Baghill, and we kild 2 more by
their workes below Brodelane end, whereof one was an officer
(all in redd) with a staffe in his hand...the other was a souldyer.
Another spell of demolition marked the close of day. Houses and barns were
burned in Northgate and along Micklegate.

Saville began additional works on Munkhill to preclude further sallies
by the garrison. Drake noted that on May 10th "the enemy made a new worke
...in manner of a haulph moone", and no attempt was made to interfere with the
work by the garrison. Indeed, there was a sudden slackening off of effort by
Lowther's men, which Drake did not explain, but which may have been connected
with additional fortification work inside the castle, since Drake had noted the
digging of a trench in the barbican some days previously. Incidents now were infrequent, although Sunday May 11th was marked by the wounding of three Royalists, one of them an officer, who, walking atop the Round Tower, was speaking with a Parliamentary officer outside the walls when he was hit by a marksman, the ball striking the Royalist's belt buckle and bursting it, but otherwise doing no harm. On the next day, the Royalist cannons played to Baghill accompanied by an exchange of musketry, but little else was either done or attempted by either side. That night

about 9 a clocke, our gentlemen and souldyers being merily disposed, did drinke whole heallthes (of the New well water) to the King and all his good freindes, pledging one another with such hallowes and shoutes, as the enemy, wondering what should be the cause of such sudden joy, took an allarum, drew out all their horse into the feild and dobled all their gaurdes (which pleased us well) and then, our taptoo being beat, every man to his gaurdes or to his bed.

Drake seems to imply that a new well had been sunk within the castle, but there is no corroborative evidence. The castle had been so completely ruined by the end of 1649, after its second siege, that many traces of structures alluded to by Drake have now vanished, and with them may have gone a new well. Clearly, the healths were drunk by the officers at their posts, hence the shouting which occasioned such alarm in the siege lines. This was an unusual sight, so Drake said, for he noted that ordinarily "they grow now so fearfull that they will scarcely looke out of their trenches". There was also a pronounced movement of waggons loaded with provisions, and of livestock, towards Ferrybridge, which led the garrison to expect that the enemy "will not stay long". Nothing, however, came of it, and the enemy marksmen continued now and then, to snipe at the soldiers who revealed themselves on the walls. Cornet Thurley was wounded as he walked in the barbican.

The evening was full of events. A troop of Parliamentarian cavalry galloped into town from the Doncaster direction, some to Newhall and some into the town proper. There followed a general array of the cavalry in view of the castle, and Lowther sent out Captain Benson towards Sandal to try to discover what it portended. The sentries on the walls saw the night sky illuminated by "divers fires abroade this night", but they did not know the cause.

With the summer coming on, and the warmer weather, Lowther took steps to guard the garrison against disease. A "filthy pond" in the castle yard which had begun to give off "noysome smolles", was filled up with rubble and earth. A drain was dug to draw away the water underground. Whilst this far-sighted work was in hand, Thomas Lowther - presumably the same man identified earlier - and two soldiers saw two enemy lieutenants emerge from their trenches to watch the carrying in of timber from the lower end of the town by some of the garrison. Lowther and his companions made an unauthorised attack on the enemy officers.
& one of them struck at Lowther with his partisan, but he
awarded the dangerous blow and runne him quite thorow with
his raper; and another of his fellow souldyers shott him
thorow the thigh, but was not slaine, but brought into the
castle; the other lieutenant runne away.

The wounded man was tended to by the surgeon, and exchanged within two hours
for a Royalist lieutenant held at Cawood Castle. At night, Belwether returned
from Newark with letters from the King, which Drake did not go into detail
about, and from Sandal came another messenger, Thomas Hanson.

Munkhill was visited on the 16th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, when a
sudden sally drove the staggered sentries back on Newhall, where they rallied,
were reinforced, and returned to their trenches, by which time the Royalists
had retreated. At five o'clock another Royalist party raided the trenches
that had been dug around All Saints Church, but came under heavy fire from a
nearby barn, causing them to take cover in an orchard. After half an hour of
shooting, the Royalists drew off "without any hurt to our knowledge". Drake
ought to have known, and this does sound as if he was covering an exploit that
came off badly for the defenders. A plan to attack the Abbey Close at 11 at
night was betrayed to the Parliamentarians, "by report a woman got out of the
castle and gave them intelligence". It seems that on this occasion, the
Royalists merely ran into an enemy officer who was more alert than his fellows,
for when Captain Smith and 40 men sallied out, they found the hedges lined with
musketeers and after a fruitless exchange of fire, withdrew with two wounded.
Drake was clearly surprised by this reception, and concluded that betrayal was
to blame: "it is sure they had intelligence, for they had lined all the hedges
thereabouts".

The next day began with the lossof one man on either side, a prelude to
the appearance of emissaries from the Parliamentarian camp. At a point like
this, as in the case of letters delivered to Lowther, one could earnestly
wish that Drake had not only been a diligent diarist, but also one of the
officers privy to what went on in the command. As it is, all that we have
concerning the embassy is brief and tantalising:

There was this day a drummer from the town & allso a trumpiter
from the Lord Mountgommeryes brother; both came to the castle
together. The trumpiter was fetcht up into the Governor's
chamber and stayd there for about hauflph an hower, and so they
went away both together...The trumpiter told us the enemy was
not above 8000 both horse and foot in all the country.

Two points emerge here. It would seem that the Scots were not entirely with-
drawn from the siege, if the trumpeter from Lord Montgomery's brother is taken
as coming from a Scottish force. It is also interesting to note that of the
two messengers, Lowther saw the trumpeter, and that the latter was also willing
to talk freely with the garrison gentlemen. Of the drummer, nothing further
was said. What passed between the trumpeter and Lowther must remain forever
a mystery, but little of benefit to either side, one would think, to judge by
the events of the following day.

Being Sunday, after prayers was done in the morning, the Governor staid the sermon, and gave order that all should to arms, which was with all willingness performed. Ould Major Ward(32) was commanded to the New mount within Barbican to observe all the towers in the castle towards Baghill that no man or woman should make any signs either with hatt, hand, or handkercher, or anything else that might be perceived to be a signe to give notice.

This curious order might partly have been issued to give "Ould Major Ward" something to do, but coming after Drake's previous comment about betrayal, it hints that something was afoot in the castle. One is tempted to wonder whether the Scottish trumpeter had said or done something to arouse Lowther's suspicions, or perhaps it was just that the Governor was determined to err on the side of caution rather than to risk losing men in the intended sally.

In the intrim, Captin Smith & Captin Flood, Ensigne Killingbeck(33) and Sargent Barton went out first over the bridge towards Munkhill. Capt. Smith with 30 souldyers went up by Denwell lane to the outworks upon the back of Munkhill & beat them from those workes & so went along theire trenches & cleared them as he went to their first lower worke. Captin Flood with Achnient Killingbeck and 50 souldyers charged up the High Street to Munkhill toppe, fired the howses there, and so fell upon their first workes in the High strete by Scottes and entered that worke where he met with Captin Smith.

Simultaneously, Captain Munro, with Ensign Otway and a sergeant called Copeland with 70 men, charged the trenches at All Saints church head on, stormed them killing as many as they could as the Parliamentarians fled, fired the house nearby and runne up the lane to the Graunge barne and killed all that was within it who was drinking healths (after their dinner) to the higher howse of Parlament, from thence went up to Munkhill to the workes there, and overtooke the other companys at Cherry orchard head neare Newhall.

A third party, commanded by Galbraith, Lieutenant Ward and Lieutenant Willoughby with 60 muskets, occupied the enemy positions at All Saints as a rearguard. Behind them, Major Ward and Lieutenant Favell lined the barbican walls with musketeers to oversee the operation. Munkhill was now occupied by a Royalist force some 120 strong, with a further 100 men disposed to advantage at All Saints and on the barbican wall. In addition, Captain Beale and a score of cavalry rode towards Munkhill, but found his way blocked effectively by the new trenches in that area and so could be of no service to the main body. Fortunately, the 120 needed no such assistance, for they marched to New Hall and took it, killing two enemy soldiers in the place, whilst the rest of them "runne away basely by 40 at a time over St. Thomas hill towards Ferry Bridge and what way they could soonest take". It was an overwhelming victory for the garrison.

Our men did greate execution, both breffly and gallantly, having not left one man in all their trenches but dead, and retreated honorably the same waies they went out, and
in their retreats looked over the slain men, and, though they staid not to strippe them, yett they tooke some of their best loose garments as hattes and shooes, not forgetting their pockites, where they found in some 10 groats, some 5s., some 10s., some more, which gave them some encouragement in want of pay. Having left dead upon the ground 50 or 60 men and mawked (we believe) as many more, and brought into the castle 2 prisoners & 2 leguer ladies (which ladies we presently dismist), we having onely one man killed, a gallant gentleman and a brave souldier, his name was Corronet Blockley...

The death toll exacted from the Parliamentarians would have done justice to many a more noteworthy skirmish in the open field, and if Drake was right in what he reported, and there is no reason to doubt it - indeed, he may even have participated, particularly since he was so knowledgeable about the contents of the pockets of the dead - it was quite a shattering blow that Lowther had delivered. Longstaffe, in editing the journal, alluded to the "leguer ladies" only to explain that "leguer" meant camp. These women were, in fact, the camp followers which attached to every army of the 17th century, even to the New Model, and no matter how Godly the generals boasted themselves to be. For the most part common law wives or whores, some were actually married to soldiers. The garrison showed gallantry in releasing them, but it is likely that they had sufficient of their own anyway.

During the raid, a Parliamentary troop of cavalry, likely to give trouble, was blown to pieces by cannon fire from the Kings Tower, whilst the musketeers on Baghill were silenced by rounds of case shot which "tooke at least 10 yards compass just upon the toppe of their worke at Baghill" and silenced the enemy for two hours or so. To mark the end of such a successful day, "a great fire was seene upon the toppe of Sandall Castle, which continued for the space of 2 hower".

Not surprisingly, after such an experience, the Parliamentary forces were quiet. They "kept their worke so close that we could scarce gett any shott betwixt the Round Tower and the Kings tower". To rouse the enemy, the Royalists gathered on the tops of towers and began to shout

A prince, a prince, so loud and so strongly as that the enemy tooke a strong alarum, fetcht all their horses from grass suddenly, saddled them, and drew them into the Graunge lane. There went down from the town 42 men to Newhall, and as many to Baghill to strengthen their gaurdes. In their running to and from we killed 3 or 4 more of the enemies, and wounded as many.

The memory of Mayney's and of Langdale's raids must have been fresh in the minds of Parliamentary officers and men alike, for the garrison to have such an effect with so obvious a strategem.

On May 20th the watchers on the walls saw large numbers of cavalry riding down from Ferrybridge, passing by to the Park where they came under fire from the gunners, who killed at least two of them. "And then they made haste"
Drake wrote, "behind the ridge of the hill in the Parke, out of sight". At evening they were reinforced by six or seven additional troops of horse, and made their way towards Wakefield. A Parliamentary cannon at Baghill returned fire, but Drake commented caustically "we neither know nor can learn where it hitt or gave any impression".

Heavy rain set in which put an end to skirmishing for a time, although an attempt by the garrison to fetch in wood from the lower town was resisted by heavy fire from the Baghill and from Munkhill. A force of 500 of the besiegers then appeared, marching through the town with colours flying and drums beating, to Newhall, to replace the forces that had been there previously, probably those forces of Saville's which had taken such a beating time and again. Saville's men returned into the town, "to refresh themselves, for they had scarce ever been in bed since they came to Newhall".

Expectation of relief was as strong at Pontefract as it was at Carlisle, at this time, although we know that Cholmeley in Scarborough had put little faith in it. On May 22nd Lowther received letters sent, probably by way of Newark, informing him that the King was on his march to their relief. He had also, it appears, a letter with a similar message from Sir Harmaduke Langdale. Whatever plans the King may have had, they were ruined by the turn of events and the battle at Naseby, but on May 22nd Lowther and his men knew nothing of what was to come, and put their faith in Langdale and the King.

"In the interim", Drake noted, "we yet have no want of viotuals but are fully resolved to maintaine the castle against all REBELLS whatsoever".

Pontefract was not only in touch with Sandal and Newark, and through them with the Royal army to the south. It was also able to receive letters from Skipton away to the north-west, and from Lathom House, still holding out in Lancashire. On May 23rd there was still, apparently, a Royalist garrison in Greenhalgh Castle near Garstang, for Drake reported letters revealing that Skipton Castle and Lathom Hall...sent aid and relieved Grinoway Castle in Lancashire with 60 beastes and other necessaries when it was at the very poynct of yeilding to the enemy for want of victuals, and being a very considerable place.

Greenhalgh, rather like Sandal, was one of the minor garrisons concerning which the contemporary sources are virtually silent, even the records of the Parliamentary siege forces. It had been garrisoned in the wake of Rupert's departure from Lancashire in July, and, as was the case with Lathom, was not really troubled by local siege operations until well into 1645. It was a small castle - the present ruins are fragmentary - and far from the "very considerable place" that Drake supposed it to have been, except, of course, in the sense that it carried a Royal flag when few places in the north could show such.

With these letters came messengers, one a tenant of Major Thomas Beaumont
the former governor of Sheffield, who may still have been in Pontefract at this time, reporting that there was a general movement of the Scottish forces northwards. Whitelock noted on May 24th that the two houses had sent urgent messages to the Scots to try to bring them south, anticipating the oncoming trial of strength between the Parliamentary and Royalist armies which finally took place on June 14th. The Scots, however, anticipating the march of the King into the north, appeared to be reluctant to move, and the news at Pontefract on the 23rd corresponded with the same recorded by Whitelock on the 27th. The Scots' fears were confirmed, in the minds of the garrison, when a Parliamentary Captain, asking for a parley with Captain Speight, informed him that "the kinge was advancing to relieve us with all speede". To try to raise more news, Lowther sent out Captain Washington and Lieutenant Wheatley to Sandal, and at night a bonfire was lit on the roof of that castle which Drake and his comrades understood to be an indication of good news.

Nothing, of course, came of this anticipated relief march. We have noted the depression in Carlisle, and have seen the reaction of the Royalists in Scarborough. The general anxiety of the Scots was largely a waste of nervous energy on the part of Leven and his commanders, and it would be pointless to dwell upon the ramifications of the supposed relief march insofar as they interfered with allied plans in the north. Suffice it to say, that the crucial nature of the defeat at Naseby has been indicated, and that it was only the prospect of drawing the Royalist army back into the north that gave the defenders of Pontefract, Scarborough and Carlisle the will to resist so well as they did. It can be argued, of course, that Cholmeley might have held onto Scarborough for as long as Mallory held Skipton, that is, until December 1645, had it not been for the destruction of the walls and the naval blockade, but in the case of Pontefract, as in that of Carlisle, we can be sure that once the news of Naseby was known, the decision to surrender was but a matter of agreeing terms.

Overnight, the Pontefract garrison replied to the bonfires at Sandal by firing their own beacons on the Round Tower, which prompted the enemy to conduct a steady fire against that point. On the next day, four or five of the garrison went down to All Saints church, whose appearance caused the enemy sentries to flee, except for their officer:

He stayed behind, and threw stones so fast that our men could not enter in of good time, but at length one Thom. Lowther, a man who, if his judgement had beene according to his vallor, was as sufficient as most men, he boldly entred upon the leutenant, and without all question had brought him along with him, had he not beene unfortunately shot by the enemy at that instant thorough the boane of his legg, which the enemy espying runne in all hast to catch him, but our men (with much labour) brought him offe into the castle, where he had his legge presently cutt off, and now removers very fast again. (38)
Lowther was lucky to recover, although the ability to withstand amputation had a lot to do, then, with general constitutional fitness. It will be remembered that Colonel Guilford Slingsby, severely wounded early in 1643, had died as a result of necessary amputation.

Additional news came into the garrison, that the Royal army was now in two parts, half, led by the King in person, marching for Pontefract, and the other half, commanded by Prince Maurice, moving towards Carlisle. The spread of news and of rumour was rife, and on this same day John Hutchinson, the incorruptible governor of Nottingham, wrote to tell Lord Fairfax that the forces in Newark were in the field, "whether to the North or to the King is uncertain" he added. Additional intelligence, added as a postscript, told Hutchinson that the intention of the Newark horse was to take part in the relief of Pontefract.

To inspire the Parliamentary troops with a little more fervour in face of the threat from the south, the commanders before Pontefract gave out that the King was being pursued by Cromwell. Drake noted the result:

This night the enemy shot very freely, but towards morning they exceeded, giving whole volleys of shot round about the castle and crying A Cromwell, a Cromwell, the officers having possessed the scoulders that Cromwell was marching (in his Majesty's REAR) with a strong army...

Houses were also fired in Northgate and the water mill in Bondgate was put to the torch. The inhabitants were ushered out rather brusquely, and two who apparently resisted, "a poore tailor and his wife" were marched away, Drake believing they had been arrested. The others, in confusion, ran towards the castle for shelter from the flames and the incendiaries, whilst the garrison gave them covering fire, killing an officer near the water mill door and wounding another. The garrison was puzzled by this treatment of the civilians, and since no military advantage was immediately apparent, Drake put it down to punitive measures:

- to draw on the townsmen to pay their assessment freely (which about 2 daies before they had assessed) or elles they would burne the town.

These assessments, normally levied at a weekly rate, provided ready money for the victualling of the siege forces and for their equipment, perhaps also to supplement their pay. Thelevying was normally at the discretion of individual commanders, and we cannot know at what rate the inhabitants of Pontefract had to settle, but in virtually all cases, civilians resented having to hand money over to the military. If the Parliamentarian officers resorted to punitive measures such as house burning, it might in a sense be counter-productive in specific cases, but on the whole would have a good effect in producing the requisite money from others.

Whitsunday was celebrated by both sides with a cessation of hostilities,
although guards in either camp "kept strickt watch", particularly in the siege lines, "least we should sally forth as we had done the Sunday before". On the following morning, Lowther moved his iron gun back to its original platform by the Upper gate (it will be remembered that he had moved it to a battery called the Mount) and from there gave fire upon a sentry position in the town. A drake was also carried up to the roof of Swillington tower, and gave fire against hedgerows near Paradise orchard. An amusing incident occurred:

There was one Will. Jubbe and a boy went out of the castle to fetch in some grass for the horses and cattle (as there went out many more besides them) but, they being too negligent to looke well about them, the boy was shott in the mouth side and throrow the cheeke but not any mortall wound, and Jubbe was taken prisoner and carryed up into the townes, where, they finding him to be but a simple man, many came about him and gave him good store of stronge ale till they had soundly foxt him, thinking then to have gott good intelligence out of him and in the night brought him towards Newhall there to be examoned, but in the way (the scouldyers being not too vigilant over him) he tooke his opportunety and slipt away from them and came into the castle again before 11. a clock.

Jubbe's return coincided with that of Captain Washington, who came from Sandal with certain news of a relief army. There was some truth in the report that Sir William Brereton had broken up the siege before Chester in fear of being trapped there by the Royalists, but Washington also reported that the Prince-one suspects that by this he was understood to mean Rupert, although earlier reports attached Rupert's brother, Maurice, to the western march - had summoned Manchester and ordered them to clear the women and children from the town before he fell upon it. This news, coupled with that from Scarborough concerning the brilliant sally ordered by Cholmeley, induced euphoria in the garrison: "Whereupon for joy was a bonafire made upon the toppe of the Round Tower....". 

One cannot but feel sympathy for the garrison of Pontefract, who were so soon to be bitterly disillusioned, and who could solace themselves only by reflecting that the will to relieve them had been real enough, but the circumstances had conspired against them. The courage and tenacity of the garrisons in the north was futile, in the light of the defeat at Naseby, and the only thing that could have spared this judgement of futility, relief, was denied them. Their experience was similar to the experience of the Marquess of Newcastle's field army in 1643. No matter what great efforts they made, no matter what triumphs they achieved, there was always one more skirmish, one more battle, as if the enemy were a many headed hydra against which, the longer they fought, the less likely were they to win. The innate strength of the Parliamentarian party, feeding upon London and the south and east, controlling the sea and better supplied with ready money, might have been broken in 1643. When it was not, it became but a matter of time before that strength would tell against dispersed Royalist forces. The war in the north, particularly
when exemplified by the trudging army of 1643 or the tenacious garrisons of 1645, assumes an aspect of tragedy, rendered the more real when it is realised that from June 14th the Royalists themselves saw the end coming. When, in consequence, the garrisons of Pontefract, Scarborough and Carlisle surrendered, they gave in to the severe pressure which they had been under, both in terms of siege and the arms of the enemy, and in terms of the internal nervous strain which fighting a defensive war necessarily entails. Seen in this light, the continued resistance of Lathom, Skipton and Sandal can look folly to those who cannot conceive of the civil war in terms of ideological struggle. It is self-evident, however, that there would have been no Royalist party working so earnestly in the Interregnum, had not men like those in the northern garrisons held on as they did.

On the 27th, Lowther commanded out another sally. The day began with the killing of a Parliamentary sentry "who was taking a pipe of tobacooe in the lane by the Primrose close". The marksman was 'Captain' Joshua Walker, about whose exploits Drake had been silent since the evacuation of All Saints steeple in January. The sally by the garrison, which took place after darkness had fallen, and probably as late as midnight or just after, was somewhat different from those that had gone before. It was attended with extra importance in that it would coincide with the arrival at the castle of 40 to 50 cavalry, brought, perhaps from Sandal, by Captain Washington and Lieutenant Wheatley, who were driving before them over 100 cattle. The garrison was in position about 11 o'clock:

Parts of them van in Barbicau neare to the Sally poart, and the rest was betwixt the Lower gate and the Mount at the Castle gate expecting a signe when they should sally forth. The bellowing of the cattle was the first that the garrison knew of the approach of the cavalry, and to avoid falling into an enemy ambush, Lieutenant Wheatley rode down before Baghill as if he had been a Parliamentary officer, shouting as he rode "Armes, Armes, to your armes, a prince, a prince". Immediately, "all the 3 great gunnes discharged presently, which was a signe for us to sally forth". Drake evidently took part in this raid

...which we did presently with all speede. Cap. Flood, with Captin Ogleby and Lieutenant Killingbeck with 50 musketeeses was commanded to Baghill and was not to enter the enemies worke but to stay under the hill side close to their worke and to give fire upon them if they should sally forth which they performed very bravely without daunger of shott.

Lt. Colonel Galbraith, with Lieutenants Smith and Ward, followed behind with 40 musketeers and drove the enemy out of Primrose close into the main work at Baghill, intending to contain as many as they could in that position. Behind these came Captain Smith with 30 muskets

who went up to Elizabeth Cattell's howse and to the Burnt howse thereafterwa who shott from thence to theire lowest
Captains Munro and Bartram, with Sergeant Barton sallied from the lower gate to attack the enemy works around All Saints, containing the Parliamentary forces there likewise. Joshua Walker, with 20 "snaphaunces" or firelocks, infiltrated through the houses to the south of the church, into the gardens and closes at their rear, and onto the cleared summit of Baghill and there met the cattle being brought in by the cavalry.

Captain Hodgson noted this incident, and recorded:

they began to be in a low condition within, and one Tuesday night, Sandal-men coming at unawares, got in some fifty beasts. Our men took thirty from them at the castle side; six or seven horsemen were forced into the castle, that had not liberty to come out. After this, they grew quiet and made no sallies. They then began to turn out women and children, and one old man; and our governor, Colonel Overton, examining them, sent them in again....

For the concluding remarks which Hodgson made, we must leave them for the time being. As to the loss of some of the cattle, this was confirmed by Drake, although according to him, the circumstances were somewhat different. Walker's men having met the cattle and their escort,

and then went all back again excepting some 10 or 12 which helped to bring downe the cattell to the castle, but, they driving them downe the hill too fast, they lost many of them. But they brought in 97 into the castle, and a foale above a yeare old which runne in with the cattell. And then our drummes beate a retreate for all our men to fall of and retire to the castle, which they very orderly did, and during which time our iron gunne plaid 3 times to their workes in the towne and about the towne.

They celebrated the relief of the castle by further bonfires on the towers, and it is this reference by Drake to the 'relief' which brought them "great comfort" that is the first indication which we have that the garrison was in any want of provisions at all, although Hodgson knew that they were. Evidently, the necessity for the King to march to the north was strong, and that Sandal was able to provide this service, under great risk, an indication of the emptiness of the castle stores.

They played with our cannon from the Kinges tower into Mrs. Oates house in the Markitt place in signe of this great releef which God had bestowed upon us...

Contrary to Hodgson's comment that henceforth the garrison remained quiet, Drake noted that

Our commanders had very much to do to kepe their men from falling upon their workes both at Baghill, and also they would needes goe up to Newhall, though they had command to the contrarye.

Lowther was clearly not prepared to take unnecessary risks whilst still in expectation of the arrival of the main Royal army.
On the day following the usual exchange of words between the garrison and the siege lines was interrupted, Drake believing that the enemy were "so ashamed that they, having so many men in all their works, should suffer us to be thus relieved". He noted that the soldiers who had been on duty at the time reported that at least 500 men must have come with the cattle, not to mention the sally from the garrison. Colonel Overton, the new commander of the Parliament's forces, a firm anabaptist and probably already a republican, sent in a letter to Colonel Lowther ordering him to return the cattle to their owners; "which our Governor presently answered that if he should take the castle, he should have the cattell". Nonetheless, Overton kept a strict watch on the castle, and when the Sandal guards that had remained with the livestock tried to leave at night, forced them back within the walls by steady musketry (hence Hodgson's remark), wounding one in the face. A barricade was also erected to prevent any further sallies by the garrison to Baghill. Overton appears to have come to grips with the problem of containment.

During the first siege, it will be remembered that the Parliamentarian expenditure of ammunition had been vast. From the hundreds of cannon balls directed at the castle, Lowther had been able to supplement his own munitions stock by offering four pence for every ball brought in from the external ditch by volunteers. By late May, the pressure from without was such, that the reward was transferred to the gathering in of grass for the horses and cattle to feed upon. Drake noted that

one covetous man, having beene 6 times before (and had 4d. for every burden) went out the 7th time, and would not come away with the rest of his fellows, and so was shot by the enemy. And after they had taken him and given him quarter, another of the enemies runne him thorough and so kill'd him quite, but could not take him away, so we fecht him off.

Occasional salvoes were directed towards New Hall when the guard was changed, whilst the siege forces began another triangle work close to Swillington tower, at Denwell. On May 30th, the siege guns began to shoot "very hard from all their works", as if Overton intended to resume the intensive activity of his predecessor in January and February. The garrison fired upon the new sconce at Denwell from the summit of Swillington tower and cleared it after six rounds from a drake, but overnight it was repaired and manned again.

31. This morning one of our soldiers killed a woman in the Markit place with a muskit from the Round tower.

Rightly or wrongly, the marksman had chosen his target, and the woman's death was not the result of indiscriminate shooting as might have explained other cases. Once more, the siege forces poured heavy fire from all positions into the castle, and it does seem as if the garrison was obliged to keep below the parapets, since Drake observed that

In the interim we sent some shottes amongst them with our muskitts when we saw the least opportunitie, to keepe them
in play, and likewise we mixed amongst them some cannon shott. Most of the cannon fire was directed toward the Market Place, where some waggons were being loaded, and although three men were seen to be carried away, the garrison only succeeded in causing the waggons to be drawn off nearer to Ferrybridge: "they was loaded with goodes out of the shoppes". Perhaps this was an example of Overton restraining on the goods of those unwilling to pay their assessments.

On the last of May and on June 1st, the governor was the recipient of several letters, including one from Overton suggesting a meeting which was apparently ignored. Others gave the garrison more confidence. It was reported that Langdale had summoned Derby, and that the siege of Scarborough had actually been raised. This was the time at which Pontefract learned of Meldrum's death, and the story of the sally by Cholmeley's men had clearly grown in the telling.

Overton's request for a meeting was responded to on the 2nd, when Colonel Lowther sent a Mr. Massey into the town for talks. It was said that the Parliamentary officers told their men that Massey had come to discuss preliminary surrender terms, whereas Drake noted that Massey's task was to arrange exchange of prisoners, a subject broached firstly by Overton on the previous day. Massey reported upon his return, that whilst he had been in discussion with Overton, a Parliamentary officer had come in and told Overton that there was danger of a mutiny, either generally or at some point in the siege lines: "whereupon their Governor was not well pleased that he should speake it before Mr. Massey". Annoyed or not, Overton and Massey came to terms as regarded exchange of prisoners, and the Parliamentarian commander "sent away for them presently where before he fallsefied his word". We know nothing of the other occasion on which Overton and Lowther had discussed exchanges, since Drake did not record it, supposing that he was aware of it. Perhaps this was a rather confused reference to dealings with one of Overton's predecessors, perhaps with Forbes or Montgomery.

The digging or building of siege works continued, for during the night of June 1st/2nd, another breastwork was raised between Baghill and All Saints Church. In view of the lengths gone to by the Parliamentarians to contain the Pontefract raiders, we can only agree with Drake when he wrote that these lines "puttes them to extraordinary hard duty to maintaine all theirs workes, which makes them wondrous lean and in bad liking".

The news of the King's capture of Leicester came to the garrison on June 3rd, at six in the morning:

the king took Laister by an assault in 2 howers, took 1000 horse, took 1000 men prisoners besides the governor of the towne with many great officers (besides all which was killed in the assault), tooke a countis was in it with hur 3 coatches, took allso 8 peses of cannon with all their ammunition and
powder (which is said to be very great), hath also sent to Newarke from Leistershire, Darbishire, Nottinghamshire and other places 4000 horse least the enemy should follow after them with any carriages, and from thence march to Darby, after which (God willing) he will visit and relieve these North parts.

The storm of Leicester, a particularly bloody affair in which Rupert again showed the character of his warfare which had been revealed at Bolton in 1644, was the last triumph of the Northern Horse, now divided into two brigades commanded respectively by Sir Marmaduke Langdale and Colonel Sir William Blakiston. Immediately afterwards, the Northern Horse came near to mutiny again, and once more the issue was one of whether or not to march north, although everyone knew that relief of Pontefract was proposed. Nonetheless, Symonds noted:

The Northern horse left his Majesties army, and notwithstanding his promise to them on the word of a King he would go into Yorkshire and after Oxford was relieved; but upon persuasion returned and marched with us.

This was probably the one instance when mutiny would have achieved some sound military end. A decisive march by the Northern Horse, numbering 1500 men at this time according to Symonds, would have broken up the siege of Pontefract, where the Parliamentarians were plagued by rumour and were by no means resolute in the business. They had taken a severe setback at Scarborough within the previous week, and the memory of Mayney and Langdale was fresh. Likewise, had the King done on this occasion that which he had done in February, and sent Langdale away to the north, the Northern Horse would have survived Naseby field, and might have provided a focal point for reorganisation after that disaster. Indeed, perhaps the King would have listened to Rupert and not have fought at all if the Northern Horse had been away. Of course, it would have been more feasible, perhaps, after the fall of Leicester, to march swiftly north and not to have been lured on by the New Model. As it was, the King's army and the Northern Horse went down tragically on June 14th, and although in the months afterwards, the Northern Horse remained essential to what was left of the cavalry arm; it was merely a broken remnant of what had been, on the eve of Naseby, a strong, veteran force of cavalry who believed that nothing was beyond them. Belief is half way to victory. Pontefract could have been relieved between June 1st and June 14th, Carlisle siege disrupted and the war given a new twist.

Drake recorded no celebrations within the garrison at the news of Leicester and we must suppose that provisions were too tight to permit of any. Nonetheless, we find no reference to bonfires or to great shouts of victory from the soldiery, and this is strange, indeed, exceptional. Instead, Drake listed two soldiers shot and wounded by the enemy, and the usual exchange of cannon and musketry.

On the 4th the Parliamentarians were quiet, losing two men from the fire.
of snipers on the Queen's tower. Occasional musket shots marked the day until seven that night, when, with the changing of the guards, the enemy fired a furious volley of musketry "as if they intended presently to take the castle with their muskitts". New entrenchments were begun, about 120 yards from those which had been recently raised between Baghill and All Saints, and drew the attention of the Royalist gunner on the King's Tower, without success.

On the following day "there was great shooting" by both sides. The garrison marksmen killed an ensign and wounded another man, but had a boy wounded as he gathered grass for the livestock outside the walls. The new work under Baghill came in for some punishment, three shots from the iron gun seeming to do some execution there. At the changing of the guard in the enemy lines, two more of their men were picked off by garrison marksmen, but whether killed or wounded, Drake did not know.

In the early hours of the next day, a party of four Parliamentarian soldiers crept down to the mill below the castle walls to carry away the iron from it, whilst a diversion was created by some troops of horse which appeared to the south. One Royalist, however, spotted the activity at the mill:

one of our men espyinge runne downe and cryed Coms-on, we shall take them all, and 3 of them runne away and then our souldyer tooke the 4th man and brought him into the castle.

From this prisoner the governor learned that Royal forces had been reported at Tuxford, and that the troops of horse which had created a diversion had originally been quartered at Tickhill and other places north of Doncaster. Clearly, Lord Fairfax was drawing in his forces, and from the prisoner it was also learned that men were being impressed into service in all the villages within four miles of Pontefract. This must have been partly to repair losses, to make up for the desertions of which Drake had already spoken, and to increase the forces at Fairfax's disposal. All of this information cannot but have helped to stiffen the determination of the garrison to hold on until relief came, even though they were, now, closely pressed. Later that same day, random cannon fire was directed into the Market Place and to the works near Baghill, with one known enemy fatality, and the siege forces stood to their guard throughout the hours of darkness.

On June 7th and for much of the 8th, the desultory exchange of shots continued, until suddenly, at about six o'clock on the 8th, a large body of Parliamentarian cavalry appeared from the south, in the Wenthill direction, and rode towards the town. There, they divided, five troops moving off towards Knottingley within range of the castle. They were some 400 strong, and subsequent reports gave out that these were falling back before a Royalist advance. Anticipation in the garrison increased, and when the guards were changed on Baghill at nine that night, the Royalists gave fire upon them, killing one and wounding another, so far as was known. During the night,
cavalry activity continued around New Hall, and a messenger came riding furiously into the town from the direction of York, Lord Fairfax's headquarters. In view of the fact that Drake was not privy to any of the proceedings in the siege lines, he conveyed nonetheless a sense of the anxiety and uncertainty which must have abounded there, particularly if the normal intelligence system of the Parliamentary forces was as bad as it had been in February, or in September 1644.

On the morning of the 9th, "the enemies drumme reported it openly at the Lower Barbican wall that the king had taken Derby", and if those outside the walls believed these reports, it is small wonder that the garrison was so confident of relief. Far off, cannon fire was heard, which some interpreted as coming from Sheffield, and some as coming from Welbeck, the Nottinghamshire seat of the exiled Newcastle. By eight that night the usual round of firing heralded the coming of darkness, and during the night one of the Sandal soldiers trapped in Pontefract since the arrival of the cattle, slipped away to Sandal. Bonfires burned on Sandal towers, and were answered from Pontefract, "we hope presaging some good news".

On the 10th, the Parliamentarians recommenced their entrenchment work: in a close near Baghill called Moodies close to prevent any provision for coming to us, they likewise begun to works near to Swillington tower, but, seeing espied by our guards from thence, we made them to leave works in haste. Towards evening, another body of cavalry marched up from Doncaster, drew up at Carleton, and rode on to Hardwick. A troop from Darrington came into the town, and one from Ferrybridge which, after appearing at Newhall Park, broke into several sections, all of which dispersed.

Events in the town, coupled with the news that had come into the garrison, induced Lowther to attempt another raid in the old tradition. It was partly, one suspects, to test the resistance and confidence of the enemy, and partly to give his men something to do after some time of inactive watching from the walls. Drake, unfortunately, never saw fit to note the precise orders and objectives outlined by Lowther prior to any sally, so that to assess the achievement of each raid, it is necessary to examine Drake's blow by blow accounts in isolation from what would be essential preliminaries. Drake was also, fortunately and unfortunately, a self-effacing diarist, rather like Tullie and Slingsby, so that it is often extremely hard to know whether he himself went on any particular raid or not, the evidence for his activity having to come from a close interpretation of what he had to say. Thus, when Drake observed that at two in the afternoon on June 11th, Lowther issued orders for a raid, we have no idea precisely what Lowther wanted to achieve.

about 2 a clocke the Governor commanded all men to their Armes, which was presently performed, but there fell a shower of raine for a good time, so as all men gott under shadow till
the rayne was over. About 4 a clocke, when it was cleare agane, and then having orders what to doe, they sallyed forth.

The lead party was made up of 30 musketeers commanded by Captain Munro and Lieutenant Moor, with Sergeant Barton. They marched to All Saints where they found the trenches and church empty, and pressed on to "Mr Kellomes howse" where they disturbed a party of the enemy who promptly fled. There, Munro halted and disposed his men to hold the place.

The second party was 80 strong, commanded by Captains Smith and Flood, with Ensigns Otway and Killingbeck.

they followed after Capt. Munro, through the Church, and so through Zachary Stables howse up to the lowest worke the enemy had, neare to his orchard head, where Capt. Smith and his company led up first to the worke, and so past by it a little farther along the hedge above the worke, to prevent the enemy from sallying forth of their upper workes to the releefe of those who was in the lowest worke, which place he bravely mayntayned.

It seems that Lowther was making a punitive sally intent upon wreaking as much havoc and alarm as he could.

Capt. Flood and his company fell upon the workes, which were very hard to enter, because but one little place for entrance, and that so narrow and low that one man could scarce enter but must stoopes; there he played upon the worke and shott in at most of the porthoales where the enemies within mayntayned the worke very stoutly, and shot very hard at our men so long as first entrance was made, but during the time, 8 or 9 got out over the worke, but one or two of them was shott and taken, the rest got away.

It looks as if the enemy trenches were badly manned, in this area at least, but it is interesting to note both the strength of the earthworks, and the now determination on the part of the soldiers manning them. Nonetheless, Flood stormed and took the work, capturing the enemy captain, the sergeant, the corporal and eight more wounded men. He then withdrew, bringing his captives into the castle.

Throughout the engagement, Lt. Colonel Galbraith, and Lieutenants Ward and Wheatley, with a body of 40 soldiers and volunteers, had held a reserve post in Zachary Stables's orchard, but they had found themselves with nothing to do. Lieutenants Willoughby and Middleton, with a sergeant called Parker and 40 muskets, had infiltrated the houses on the north of All Saints "about the Starre" inn, and resisted an attempt by the Parliamentary forces to break through that way from Munkhill. In this, Willoughby and Middleton had assistance from a Lieutenant Monkes who, with Barton and 20 men, had been detached from Munro's section towardes Munkhill to stoppe the passage, least they should issue forth; where they played theire partes bravely. The enemy and they striving both for one wall and a hedge, with that little company our men both got the wall, and mayntayned
it, bringing up one file at once to the most convenient
place, where they gave fire freely, and fell off again,
and another company came up. So that the enemy suppose
to be there a great company, and so our men beat them
bank to Munkhill again, and kill'd one man all in redd,
and supposed to be an officer, and shot 2 or 3 more, and
so at the beating of our drumes for a retreate...they
come off with honor.

Captain Joshua Walker, with three files of snaphaunces and firelocks,
some 20 strong, marched to All Saints and occupied the steeple with food to
man it for 24 hours.

This seems, in a sense, to have been another objective of the raid, to
establish a foothold, temporarily, in the enemy works and so to disrupt the
intensity of their investment. Walker's presence in the steeple seems not to
have been noticed by the Parliamentarians, for when the main Royalist force
eventually fell back, the enemy approached the works openly and were promptly
riddled with shot from the steeple, some 12 men being killed outright, "one of
them was supposed to be a lieutenant colonell or a captain at least", for he
was distinguished from his fellows by a "gallant suit of apparell, with a
great redd skarfe". Many more were wounded.

From the castle, the musketeers kept up a steady fusilade against the
enemy works in general, killing an officer on Baghill and others elsewhere.

This raid cost the Parliamentarians 40 dead, 11 prisoners and uncounted
wounded. Muskets, pikes, powder, ball, match and other equipment was taken
away by the raiders, the fighting having cost them one dead and one wounded;
but some raiders returning to the churchyard to gather grass for the horses,
were fired upon and lost another dead, the exploit almost ending in disaster.

12. This morning came the Lord Fairfax and the new Generall
Pointes from Yorke to Pomfret with 4 troops of horse to
guard him. It is said that Poyntes came to take an
account of what scouldyers theould generall did deliver
to him.

Colonel General Sydenham Poyntz was to cast his shadow over the last weeks
of the siege. As an officer with responsibility for the North and an army of
10,000 men at his disposal, he has received very little attention. The family
was split in its sympathies - Newdigate Poyntz had been killed in 1643 whilst
serving as a captain in the Duke of York's Horse but Sydenham was a diligent
Parliamentarian field officer whose sympathies did not waver until 1647/8. The
garrison knew of his coming by a bombardment they underwent towards evening:

the enemy shott very hard from all their workes round about
the castle, at least a whole volley of shott from every place,
whereunto we gave them answer from the castle, and what with
shooting and showting we gave the enemy a strong allarum; which
caused the enemy to bring up their horse in small companies
to the further side of Baghill but staid not there any while.
Poyntz must have been in the town, carrying out his tour of inspection, whilst Walker and the men in the steeple shot down half a dozen of the Parliamentary troops, losing one man wounded themselves who was going from the church to the castle. Fairfax and Poyntz rode away towards York, and Walker was relieved in the steeple by Munro.

On the following day, June 13th, the eve of Naseby field, Poyntz came back to Pontefract. The garrison was occupied on his return, in digging a trench from the lower gate of the castle, to All Saints for the safe passage of men between the two points. Lowther was going to hold what he had won. The trench does not seem to have been quite finished, but "blindes of bowes and soddes", captured from the enemy, were erected to provide cover for gathering in grass for fodder. Additional covering fire from the steeple facilitated the collection of 100 burdens of grass — probably hay by now — so that the enemy "durst not looke out of their workes". A Parliamentary soldier was killed near Baghill in the shooting, and towards evening, using the partially completed trench, Lieutenant Willoughby relieved Munro in the steeple.

Further Royalist successes followed on the 14th, whilst unbeknown to them the King's army, forced by circumstances and the decision of the generals, to turn back to fight Thomas Fairfax, drew up on Naseby field. A lone soldier sallied out to the town and killed a Parliamentarian, returning unharmed. Marksmen on the castle walls succeeded in killing a woman "was bringing a stand of ale from Munkhill" and wounded some enemy soldiers. During a march by some 300 men from New Hall into the town, a Royalist gunner, distinguished by Drake as "the Dutchman", fired into their column, killing three for certain and wounding others. Captain Hemsworth relieved Willoughby in the steeple. The next day, Royalist gunners added to their tally of enemy dead when they fired upon a file of cavalry in Bondgate. Captain Cartwright relieved Hemsworth in the steeple.

June 16th was the blackest day that the garrison was to know. A young boy and a man, going to gather apples below the castle walls, were badly shot up by the enemy musketeers who were in a state of euphoria:

There was great shooting shotting and rejoicing this day by the enemy, and bragging that theyre forces had beaten and routed the Kinges forces, and that the King was fled and could not be found, and sent to us a letter of it into the castle....

Naseby was not quite a rout. It was as bitterly fought as Marston Moor had been, but, unlike Marston Moor, it had ended in a severe defeat for the whole Royalist army, with heavy losses. The relief of Pontefract, of Carlisle, was now impossible.

...Generall Poynts sent downe a gallant man in apparell with a drumme and a letter like to summons to our Governor, to deliver up the castle, for they had great forces coming towards us, but yet there was mercy if he would yield.
Lowther did not send a written reply, but told the drummer "he neither feared his forces nor valued his mercy, and bid him presently be gone and tell [Poyntz] so". Lowther's resolution was in part due to mistrust of the enemy claims, and in part to the contents of a letter, written from Newark on June 14th, and brought secretly to the castle on the 16th. In this letter Lowther was told that, on the 14th,

the King was that night at Melton Mowbray and intended, God willing, to be with us within 10 days, and this battell, which the enemy speaks of should have been the day before [i.e. the 13th of June] which we conceive not to be true.

The garrison watched much coming and going in the town, and at that night, as normal, relieved the steeple, Captain Smith replacing Cartwright and his men.

A heavy cannonade kept the Parliamentarians occupied much of the next day, and Lieutenant Wheatley marched out to relieve Smith in the steeple.

This evening about 8 a clockes our soldiers were disposed to be very merry, hearing that the enemies letters which they had sent into the castle the day before were nothing but lyes (as indeed it is their usual trade)...

So confident was the garrison, that even when a messenger slipped into the castle to report that the King had indeed been beaten, neither Drake nor anyone else believed him. The messenger was Captain John Ward, whom we do not find in the garrison list for December 25th 1644. He may have come in subsequently or he may never have been on the strength and have come perhaps, from the Royal army itself, or from Newark. Drake stated simply that "Captain John Ward maintained it upon his solvation to Sir George Wintworth that the King was routed at the battell". There is a problem however. The only identifiable Captain John Ward would have been, at this time, in Lancashire and probably in Lathom House. It is possible and may be susceptible of proof, that John Ward was a Parliamentarian, who was either sent by Poyntz or came to Wentworth on his own authority, for it is curious that he should not have been interviewed by Lowther, if Drake was accurate in alluding only to Wentworth. It would also serve to explain why his report was so easily dismissed, whether he swore on his salvation or not.

On the 18th additional letters came into the castle. One, from Newark, reported the King to be at Melton Mowbray and on his march to Pontefract by way of Newark. The letters also contained news of troubles in London, where there was dissension amongst Parliament's supporters, or so it was reported. In the town, Poyntz, Overton who was Governor of Pontefract town was now second in command to the Colonel General, summoned a Council of War. During the day, waggon loads of arms and of ammunition with an armed escort, came down from Ferrybridge going towards Doncaster, but there was hardly any shooting, and Captain Kitchin relieved Wheatley in the steeple. On the fourth day after Naseby fight, the garrison was still looking for positive news, and garrison routine went on as before.
The activities in the Parliamentary lines went on for much of the 19th as well. A general muster of the siege forces in the Market Place drew the attention of the Royalist gunners, notably Will. Ingram, who fired the iron gun to the area "where it grazed but a little before them." At evening, Walker returned to the steeple with his firelocks, and killed two of the enemy in an exchange. This fusilade may have been intended to give cover to Captain Washington and Lieutenant Emson, who slipped away to Newark. Drake again gave no indication of their mission, but under the circumstances it can only have been to try to obtain new information about the King's activities. They passed through Denwell lane and the closes thereabouts without being discovered, and a bonfire at Sandal that night probably signalled their safe arrival there.

June 20th was the day on which the governor learned the first definite news of the Naseby defeat, from an unimpeachable source. Lady Cutler, the wife of Colonel Sir Gervase Cutler, a divisional commander since March, was permitted by Poyntz and Overton to enter the castle where her husband lay gravely ill, probably as a result of privation. One wonders how healthy Pontefract actually was, for although Drake was silent on the matter, Colonel John Redman had fallen into a deteriorating consumptive state whilst there, and Lowther, also, had his own consumption aggravated. Of the lesser ranks, we know next to nothing, although the surgeons were adequate in that many wounded men recovered. This last is the only, incidental, information which we have from Drake concerning medical conditions in the castle.

Lady Cutler was undoubtedly the source of the "newes brought us of the battell which the enemy gott against the Kinges forces near to Harborow". Even so, that news was confused and disjointed, in that Drake noted a story that on June 15th Goring, coming to the King's rescue, had routed the enemy and recaptured the artillery lost on the 14th. It was even said that Cromwell was dead on the field. Clearly, however, there must by now have been deep consternation in the command, for the news partially confirmed the stories from the Parliamentary lines, and added a secondary account that they knew nothing else of. In the afternoon, Poyntz sent a cannon up to New Hall and to a position on Munkhill which he had been two days preparing. The objective was the church, where the small garrison, relieved every 24 hours, was a grave obstacle to complete investment of the castle. The work on the battery continued into June 21st, and Walker was relieved at the steeple by Lieutenant Smith with 20 musketeers.

21. This day we had a poore man who before this seige dwelt at Munkhill and having his house burnt by the enemy came into the castle for suckor, and going forth this morning to gett grasse for the cattell by Munkhill mill, was there shott dead upon the place...and fetcht in at night and buryed.

Attempts were made, unsuccessfully, to disrupt the battery work at Munkhill by the gunners on the King's tower, and the musketeers had little success either.
Overton and other officers paid an inspection visit, and by the end of the day, despite shots from the castle, the work was done and the cannon established. Nonetheless, the party at the church was again relieved, Lowther deciding not to abandon it, by Lieutenant Willoughby.

During the evening there came in "a souldyer from the enemy, who brought with him his muskitt and his sword". This soldier, an arrayed man, one of those pressed into service by Overton some time before, conveyed news that the Newark garrison had won a substantial victory in the Isle of Axholm. He also confirmed the Parliamentarian defeat of the King's army, but added that Goring had indeed reversed the situation on the following day. It really is rather remarkable that seven days after Naseby had been fought, the siege forces as well as the garrison in Pontefract had no definite or accurate information. The Parliamentary deserter was a particularly brave man, or extremely foolish, for if desertion from the colours was not punishable by death, then desertion to the enemy most certainly was. No terms agreed upon for the surrender of Pontefract would have included any agreement for such persons to go free, and if the King's fortunes were at so low an ebb as they certainly appeared, whatever the truth of the Goring story, the soldier cannot have supposed that the castle would really be relieved. We do not know his name, nor what became of him, but it is likely that he was a Royalist in sympathy, perhaps he had even served in Newcastle's army and had then been disbanded, only to be drafted by his former enemies.

With the setting up of their cannon, Poyntz and Overton now decided to take the church. So, at two in the morning on June 22nd they launched an attack from all sides, whilst a force entered the trench communicating from the advance post to the castle gate and moved along it. Drake estimated the force which attacked the church at 100 strong, and that it forced an entry into the building:

but our men within the Steeple and the Church topp plaid their parte very bravely, and beat them both out of the trench and highway, out of the Church, and out of the Church yeard, for they shott with their muskitts and likewise threw down stones amongst them both into the Church and Churchyeard.

From the castle the fire of cannon and musket poured onto the attacking force:
We killed 4 or 5 of the enemyes men, which we saw them dragg away...besides many was shott and wounded, and carried away; for, after our men in the Church by ringing the bell there had given us an allarum into the castle, we made them too hott to tarry there and then every man fled to their workes carrying their dead and wounded along with them.

Evidently, the Parliamentarian attempt, using darkness as a cover, had been intended to have the advantage of surprise, but the sentries on the church steeple had been alert, had spotted the approach, and had rung the bells, clearly with a pre-arranged signal for the castle garrison to stand to arms.
Having failed to storm the church, the demi-culverin was employed to beat down the steeple. Drake recorded that it fired 13 times with little effect, the cannonade lasting an hour and a half. It was by now almost dawn, since the fight around the church had lasted barely half an hour or so. The Royalist gunners returned fire from the castle, and after five shots, succeeded in blowing the demi-culverin from its battery on Munkhill and so, temporarily, silenced it. For the rest of that day there was no shooting, and towards evening Lieutenant Favell relieved Willoughby, who had given such a good account of himself in the defence of the position.

Early in the morning on the 23rd, the Parliamentary cannon again began to fire against the church, and after 16 attempts, blew a hole in the "Lanterne of the Steeple". They then directed three shots lower down, to weaken the structure. In the afternoon, firing alternately at church and at castle, they expended 34 shots, and a Royalist resting in the lower barbican was shot and wounded by a musketeer on Baghill. The siege had now begun to bear resemblance to the heavier fighting of January and February, so clearly Poyntz wanted the business settled as rapidly as he could. He had no intention of starving the garrison out, and with the battle of Naseby fought and won, had no fear of dire consequences should he fully commit his men to the siege.

At night, Lowther had decided that the church could not be held, but sent out Lieutenant Moore on the usual relief. Moore and Favell retired to the castle together with their men, but two sentries remained behind, to give a token presence. A party of musketeers took up positions in houses near the church, to form an ambush, for Lowther had hit upon a scheme that was intended to cost the enemy dear. The iron gun was moved down to "the Gardin within the Gatehouse" where a platform was hurriedly constructed for it, and a sconce set up to protect it. In the early afternoon, the Parliamentary forces played one cannon against the church, and then attempted a second storm, but found themselves under heavy fire from the musketeers in ambush and from their iron gun on its new platform. Defeated once more, they drew off, although with what losses, Drake did not say. The church was proving to be a costly objective, but it could not be held indefinitely, as Lowther knew.

On the evening of the 24th, Lowther sent down Ensign Otway with some musketeers to the church, with orders to remain there "till tapptoo beate" and then to retire into the castle under cover of darkness, leaving no men whatever behind. Thus, when on June 30th Whitelock noted that "M.G. Pynes took the church at Pomfret", this was not strictly true. It was left empty for him to walk into, for his attempts to storm it had failed signally.

25. This morning about 1 a clocke the enemy entred the Church, and the lower end of the Towre, there being none to resist them, at which time our musketeers from the castle shott very hard at them, and likewise we played 5 peses of cannon from the Kings tower to the Church steeple and alse the iron gun from the
Guarding played 5 shott into the Church so that they durst not
appear in the Steeple, but what execution was done is not known.

Once again the garrison was confined within its walls, and this tightening up
procedure was also seen at Sandal, where Colonel Thomas Morgan, a Welshman and
future associate of George Monck, had gone to give the siege a sense of
purpose. We know very little of the business at Sandal, not a fraction of
what we know concerning Pontefract, and only a little less than what we know of
Skipton. Neither, so far as we know, possessed a Drake or a Tullie, and
because of that many of their exploits remain hidden.

On the day that the Parliamentarians finally retrieved control of the
church, Colonel Sir Gervase Cutler died in the castle. Determined to break
the garrisons resistance, Poyntz or Overton had adopted harsh measures toward
the dying man:

> the enemy not suffering any fresh meat ever to be brought to
> him since he fell sick, one of one chickin and one poor joint
> of meat his lady brought with her 2 days before he departed,
> neither will the enemy suffer him either to be buried in the
> Church....

They were, at the time, digging up the churchyard to make additional bulwarks,
uncovering "dead mens corpses".

> or conveyed to his owne habitation to take place with his
> auncestors.

Consequently, Cutler was buried in the castle on June 26th:

> This day we allso buryed that worthy knight, Sir Jarvis Cutler
> who was first cophined and then cophin and all wrapped up in
> lead, and after a funerall sermon he was buryed in the Chapell
> within the castle, with 3 gallant volleys of shott according to
> the honor of such a brave souldyer as he was: from whence his
> corpse may be conveyed to the place of his auncestors (after
> the seege) when his freindes please.

Poyntz was not prepared to permit Lady Cutler to leave the castle.

Drake's silence concerning Naseby and its effect upon the garrison is most
marked. It is unlikely that Lowther still held out much hope of relief,
however he may have carried himself towards his men, but he had probably
decided to hang on so long as he could and simply to hope. For the first time,
however, we find an example of desertion:

> This night allso there runne a rouge out of the castle to the
> enemy, his name was Medcaulph, who tended of Alexander Medcaulph
> being sick of the gout. He stole of the chamber a riding
> coat, a doblitt, a pare of britches, a pare of stockings,
> a pare of shoees, a hatt and 3 bandes and a rapire and got
> over the Barbican wall, his company being that night upon the
> watch there: and, coming to the enemy, he caused the chirurgeon
> and the drumme (which used to dress the prisoners woundses and
> to bring victualls to the prisoners in the castle) to be
> committed to prison; informing to theire Governor against them
> that they brought newes into the castle, and likewise that they
> brought us tobackoe.

Metcalf's desertion was important quite apart from its indication of declining
morale in parts of the garrison. The arrangement whereby a Parliamentary surgeon tended Parliamentary prisoners held in the castle is nowhere else alluded to, unless that early exchange of letters between Lowther and Lord Fairfax on March 5th and 9th has any connection. How long the arrangement had held, we do not know, but this was a certain means by which the governor could have learned the truth about Naseby, particularly if, as appears, the surgeon was reasonably friendly to the Royalists. Drake's infinite care for detail in certain respects, failed him in others. Many day to day, thoroughly routine incidents, such as the coming and going of a surgeon, would have seemed trivial to him. Exact knowledge of when the surgeon visited, however, would help to get closer to the date on which Lowther learnt the truth of Naseby in the same way that it would enable us to discover how many prisoners were held by him, and whether or not there was any sickness in the castle. One supposes that if Overton arrested the surgeon on Metcalf's evidence, that his unfortunate men went without medical attention.

The day after Cutler's funeral was marked by considerable cavalry activity in the siege lines, with forces marching and counter-marching, which Drake saw as an attempt to mislead the garrison into supposing there were fresh forces on the scene. On the other hand, Poyntz may simply have been exercising his horsemen, who had had nothing to do for some weeks and were doubtless bored and restless. Occasional shots were exchanged, on one occasion a cannon ball bursting through the castle drawbridge and the lower gate, and on another two Royalists wounded by musketry. In return, a marksman on the Round Tower picked off one of the enemy. Fires on Sandal and Pontefract towers lit up the night.

Rumour flourished. On the 26th word had come that Sir Richard Granville and his Cornishmen had stormed and taken Taunton, although it was far from true. On the 28th, the Newark horse were said to have thoroughly routed 500 Scots near the town, killing virtually all of them. Rumour received doubtful support when it was "generally reported" that a convoy of wagons had been sent heading north through Ferrybridge whilst the Scottish forces, or what was left of them, had gone into quarters near Rotherham and Doncaster.

Overton, meanwhile, appeared to relent in his treatment of Lady Cutler, and sent a drummer to inform Lowther that she might pass from the castle. Poyntz, however, arriving on the scene, apparently countermanded the order, hence the disgraceful scenes recounted by Drake:

But when she came to the enemy's first gaurd, they stript both hur and hur wayting maid to hur very smock, and likewise hur chaplain and a tenant of hurs which came downe with the chaplain to the sally poart, to search for letters but they had none. They cept the Lady and hur mayd at theire gaurd all night till the next day at noone, and would suffer her not to goo up towne.

Poyntz then sent Lady Cutler and her maid back to Lowther, not having fed them
during the time they were held captive. Lowther, however, refused to re-admit them. This was not, on Lowther's part, an ungentlemanly gesture. On the contrary, Lady Cutler had no place in the garrison, having come merely to tend her sick husband, and Overton, whether Poyntz liked it or not, had given her permission to pass through his lines. Lowther wanted to force the enemy to behave with a modicum of courtesy, and Poyntz had no moral authority to force Overton to break his word. The day wore on, Lady Cutler at the gate, the opposing forces watching over her, until, as night fell, Poyntz weakened, sent for her, and sent her home.

On the last of June the Parliamentarian cavalry and some foot held a general muster near Brotherton, Drake reckoned about 1000 of them. Of these, 400 rode to Baghill and pastured their horses behind it, whilst others began to take up positions that reminded the garrison of the dispositions adopted by the enemy on the eve of Langdale's relief. "We well hope he will come again" wrote Drake, striving to find a thread worth hanging onto.

Other companies went to Carlton and townes thereabouts, and many stayed at Ferry bridges and Knottingley. So that we conceive that the most of theire forces lyes now hearabouts which makes us think that we have some forces coming to our releafe, and that these either intend to give battell hearabouts to the King or else to draw northward very shortly.

Lowther, apparently, suspected that these troop,movements might well have presaged an imminent assault on the castle. It was noted that some 600 foot relieved the guards at New Hall and Munkhill, and then marched into the town again. The assault, however, did not come, though the garrison stood to their guard throughout the evening and night. Instead, the enemy fell to work felling trees with which to erect yet further barricades with a purpose, as Drake wryly observed, "lest we should sally forth upon them". The new timber barricades around Baghill were pierced with loopholes to give means for firing down upon raids.

Of which they have shott since very hard, making it full of poart holes...This day there was very hard shooting with muskitts on both sides, and we cannot conceive but that we killd very many of them, for we shott ful amongst them late into the worke, where was seene divers to fauls, so that there is many wounded or killd.

Once again, however, the Royalists stood to their posts all the ensuing night expecting an assault.

In the morning a soldier on the walls was shot dead when he was lured into conversation with one of the besiegers. The 'Dutchman' levelled his gun at the Market Place and killed there two or three soldiers before the ball ever struck the ground. Cannon from the Round Tower played to Baghill amongst a cavalry troop "where we saw one horse runne away without his rider". In the evening, the Parliamentary cavalry were again on the move, going in so many directions that Drake was hard put to it to make any sense of their intentions.
Lowther kept his men on double watch, volunteers as well as regular soldiers.

Overton now had a favour to ask of Lowther, for on July 3rd he sent a trumpet to request permission for the mother of one of the prisoners in the castle, who was ill, to have access to her son:

This day came in the enemy's general trumpitt desiring that Captin Clarkes's mother might come to see hur sonne, and alsa that they might bring in Doctor Oyston to see him, and that they might bring victualls to the prisoners themselves, and deliver it to them, which was all graunted, and they came into the castle....

Lowther's generosity stood in marked contrast to the behaviour of his opposite numbers over, for example, the Cutler case. It may be said that it was in his interests to show generosity in such a matter, for he had much to lose in the circumstances, but his action was in keeping with his character so far as it can be discerned. That night, messengers went out to Sandal and one of Captain Cartwright's soldiers dropped over the wall and fled.

Drake did not mention the prospect of relief on this occasion, but it was surely in his mind. At noon, all the enemy cavalry rode to Wentbridge and drew up on a hill in view of the walls, before returning to the fields close to the town. Drake estimated their number at not "so few as 2000 horse". Some eventually drew off, but the rest remained in the field overnight, lighting camp fires to warm themselves and to cook their rations.

The next day a brief round of cannon fire was directed to the castle, and the drawbridge was again shot through, whilst the enemy cavalry appeared once more at various points in the siege works. The garrison kept double guard, and at nightfall "there was 2 boane fires made upon the topp of Sandall Castle" of which Drake wrote, rather pitifully, "We did suppose that by those 2 boane-fires at Sandall we was to have ayd within 2 daies".

Nothing so better illustrates the condition of the garrison as that single sentence. For all Drake's reticence in referring to conditions within the walls, a chance statement such as that can say more than a catalogue of woes, which might be ascribed to a desire to throw the resolution of the garrison into stronger relief. The fortitude of the Royalists is beyond dispute: their capacity to inflict telling blows diminished only by the strengthening of the enemy works and not by any lack of courage. Yet, deprived of relief, the need for it became ever more urgent, until the simplest of signals - for two bonfires was not unusual and had not attracted such interpretations before - played upon the imaginations of men wearied with constant watch and desperate for some favourable news. Through the long watches of the night
every movement in the enemy lines attracted attention, gave vent to the wildest of interpretations (we may suppose Drake somewhat more restrained than most) and every flicker of far-off Royalist activity assumed proportions out of keeping with reality.

The garrison had now but two weeks life left in it. Lowther was to hold on so long as he reasonably could, but with every passing day the relief grew more remote. Pontefract was isolated, serving no other use but that of defiance of rebellion. From July 6th to the 8th, the tedious daily round went on, the sentries watching the siege lines, the marksmen picking off a soldier here and there who did not keep sufficiently under cover at Baghill or Munkhill, and very little firing, if any, from the enemy lines. Then, towards night on the 8th:

Genrall Poyntes [came to the works against Barbican gate and asked to speak with our Governor, but the Governors sonne [Capt. Gerrard Lowther] being there made him answer that his father was not there, which if he had beene he would not refuse to speak with him. Then the Genrall begunne to demand the castle to him, which if we did within 3 daies or there abouts, we should have honorable terme, but if we stayd 10 daies or 14 daies we should then looke for nothing but to walke with a white rod in our handes, as souldyers doe in the Low contreyes when they march away upon a forced composition.

This threat, from a professional soldier, might have carried some weight with fellow professionals or with Dutchmen, but Gerrard Lowther treated it with contempt, even though he knew, or should have known, that without relief surrender was inevitable.

Captin Lowder made answer, that the castle was cept for the King, and if they stayd 14 daies, and 14 daies more after that, there was as many gentlemen within the castle as would make many a bloody head before they parted from it (or wordes to the like effeckts)....

It sounds as if Drake was exercising censorship over what Captain Lowther actually said, in view of the next sentence...

Then the Genrall begunne to give harsh language, and say that our souldyers did abuse him in base words. But Capt. Lowder answered him, that neither he nor his father could rule the souldyers tounges, but they would speaks what they pleased. And then the Genrall bid good night and went away.

One wonders if Poyntz had expected to be shot at during the parley, since the precedent had been set by the Parliamentarians on other occasions.

During the lull in the fighting the garrison was told by some of the enemy soldiery that relief was, indeed, on its way. If this, and other similar incidents may appear strange, it has to be remembered that there were Pontefract men inside the castle and Pontefract men outside, impressed into Overton's forces. The fact that they were constrained to shoot at each other did not prevent them from remembering that they had been, and would one day again become, neighbours and very probably, friends.
Additional siege works were begun on the 9th near Swillington tower, with the raising of a "fence all along the hedge side... into Denwell lane" from which snipers tried to shoot foragers gathering grass. "And yett", Drake observed, "we fetch in grass and parsneppes all day long as we have done the most parte this 3 weekes". After dark, messengers slipped away to go to Newark to seek news of the Royal relief army.

The next day there was "hard shooting", the enemy hugging their trenches and trying to bring down foragers, "which they cannot doe" since "they get grass still as much as will suffice, though it be at a dears rates". This sounds very much as if Lowther may have doubled the reward of 4d. a bundle that had prevailed earlier. A Parliamentarian was killed by a sniper from the lower gatehouse walk. In return, a Royalist sentinel on the Round Tower was shot dead. The determination of the Royalists was given a boost the same day by two incidents. Firstly, word came to them, how Drake did not say, that Goring had defeated Thomas Fairfax in battle at Taunton, whereas in fact, Goring's army had been broken beyond repair at Langport. The second occasion was when a drummer came from Newark to discover what had become of the Pontefract garrison. It seems that the enemy around Newark had spread the word that Pontefract had either fallen, or was about to fall. The drummer, with a pass issued by the Newark siege forces, had been sent to discover the truth.

The incident is vivid and amusing, as well as instructive. It would seem that such conversations were nothing out of the ordinary, and that provision for womenfolk to speak to their husbands or relatives was quite the order of the day, provided that a soldier, in this case a drummer, accompanied the women. Whilst the drummer's attention was distracted by someone speaking with him, Mrs. Washington seized the opportunity not only to relay a verbal message but also to hand over letters for others in the garrison, perhaps letters for the governor himself carried from Newark. Mrs. Washington may have been the wife of Captain James Washington, who we know was in the garrison at this time.

That night four bonfires burned at Sandal, and this time Drake and his fellows interpreted them differently. Having lost faith in the equation of each bonfire equalling one day's wait for relief, Drake wrote "wereby we know that all our men got cleare away the last night". Five messengers had been sent out by Lowther. "And allso by them we had notice how nearre our helpe
was coming to us". It does not sound as if he really believed this.

On the 11th several messengers returned to Pontefract, but not all of them could slip into the castle. "Yett they showed forth such signes as we knew we had good newes towards us". It is truly remarkable that of those who did manage to gain entrance, from Sandal and from Newark, none carried a true report of the state of the King's army, unless it were that Lowther prohibited knowledge of the King's condition from reaching the rank and file, in which number we must count Nathan Drake. All we know is that Drake heard the Sandal letters gave notice that they were "to expexte helpe very shortly". The Newark letters were in code, and it was some time before the key could be discovered to permit them to be read. When the cypher was finally broken, they found that "both the day and time of the day sett down when Sir Marmaduke Langdall intendes to be with us". Drake added, in parentheses, "if God permitt". The magical name of Langdale might still be potent in the north, but his cavalry carried slight meaning for the Parliamentarians. The validity of these letters can best be judged by the additional information that Goring had indeed beaten Fairfax, which turned out to be a cruel deception, if quite unintentional.

Everything which Poyntz now did or ordered to be done, acquired fresh significance. The construction of a gun emplacement at Ferrybridge led the garrison to believe that a battle was imminent, and that Poyntz was preparing to take defensive measures against Langdale, or the King, or Rupert, or any combination thereof. There was some uncertainty in the enemy camp:

This night the enemy had an allarum in the towne, sounded their trumpitts, lighted their matches and called To horse, horse, where they stood upon their guardes all night.

Elsewhere in Yorkshire, early July saw a Royalist offensive. Whitelock noted under the date July 7th\(^2\)

The King's forces from Bolton Castle surprized Raby Castle, belonging to Sir Henry Vane, but were again close blocked up by Forces raised by Sir George Vane.

This was the same day on which the committee in London wrote to tell Poyntz that they wanted something done about it.\(^3\) Raby was, in fact, hold until July 28th,\(^4\) but its very seizure must be seen as an indication that the like-lihood of a Royal advance in the north was seen to be strong. This is, incidentally, one of the few references which we have to the garrison in Bolton Castle. It will be remembered that Rupert, on his retreat from Marston Moor, paused there to be joined by Sir John Mayney coming from Scarborough. It does seem to have been held continually by the Royalists from 1642, although if so, that was in itself an indication of its minor strategic importance.

The present governor of Bolton may have been Colonel Henry Chaytor, who had not joined the King until 1644, having come over from Ireland and having

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been a companion in arms of George Monck. The qualification that he 'may' have been Governor at this time is important. It is not altogether clear that Chaytor ever replaced the commander who had held Bolton prior to 1644, John Scrope, the eldest of the illegitimate sons of the earl of Sunderland, whose favour towards Catholics had been notorious in the pre-war administration in the north. Of events at Bolton we are unhappily ignorant, but it must be noted that although the castle did not surrender until November 1645, Chaytor later claimed that he had surrendered and then gone into Pontefract garrison, which by November was no longer a Royalist garrison at all. It is possible that there had been an interlude between 1644 and the summer of 1645 when Bolton was ungarrisoned, and that it had recently been reoccupied, perhaps by Skipton raiders.

But whilst these events in Swaledale and Co. Durham can be said to show that a handful of Royalists, otherwise isolated, still possessed spirit and resolution, they meant nothing to the garrison of Pontefract, who were probably thoroughly ignorant of what went on to their north when their own eyes were fixed firmly on the south. Skipton and Bolton were, likewise, peripheral to the concerns of Poyntz, and enter but briefly into the contemporary annals. We know, for example, that a party of Royalist cavalry was intercepted and captured trying to reach Skipton after Naseby was fought, but who they were, and how close they were to Skipton when they were apprehended, we shall probably never know. Similarly, although in a sense Sandal was important to Pontefract for the relaying of messages and for the succour of messengers and their refreshment, it was purely a side issue for Poyntz, a small castle with limited strategic significance that could be dealt with in time. Pontefract dominated the Yorkshire war on its own in 1645, in much the same way as Lathom in Lancashire was important, and the records by their very imbalance, reflect this importance. It is unlikely that the full story of the defence of Skipton, let alone of Sandal or of Bolton, can ever be told. Whilst Pontefract to some extent, formed part of a small chain of garrisons that could be said to have centred on Newark, the same could not be said of garrisons further north, nestling in their dales and dominating nothing more than a tract of wild moorland, posing no threat to lines of communication now that the Yorkshire/Lancashire border near Halifax and other points was wide open for free passage of forces and supplies. Pontefract, far more than Carlisle, posed a persistent threat, was a permanent focal point for renewed northern Royalism, controlling the crossing of the Aire at Ferrybridge and poised ominously on the edge of the West Riding cloth towns. It was traditionally Royalist, for it had held firm from October 1642 when Leeds, Wakefield, and other towns yielded time and again to the Parliament. It cannot be gainsaid that by 1645, Pontefract castle and northern Royalism were closely identified in the minds of Poyntz, Fairfax, Overton and the Committee of Both Kingdoms. In just such a way, it again had
its name written bloodily across the events of the 1648 rising, when some of the garrison which had served Lowther, returned to their duty under Morris. But now Pontefract was falling. Like Scarborough, like Carlisle, it could not survive indefinitely under close siege, no matter how successful its raids and how stubbornly the soldiers stood to their guns. Naseby ruined more than the King’s last real field army: it broke the north of England, it stripped from the King those few places where his banner had flown with such marked loyalty. The importance of the field actions south of the Trent have tended to obscure the fact that the fall of the northern castles, heralded the end of the King’s war since, although he turned north in the late summer, there was no single strategically important point at which to aim.

Poyntz had moved his command post into the fields west of the castle, his quarters being a tent, and on July 11th Drake noted enemy forces were tending to concentrate at that part of the environs of the town; artillery was set up in the Market Place, out of range of the castle guns, indeed, out of view of the walls.

From the Parliamentary forces the garrison learned that a force of Royalist cavalry had, on the previous night, passed by Sandal coming, as was supposed, from Skipton. "If they bee" Drake wrote optimistically, "they are gone to Sir Marmaduke". Throughout the following day, Poyntz had his men labouring on additional entrenchments, around the tents in the west fields, and strengthening those against Swillington Tower with the addition of loopholed palisades. The explanation of all this activity, when it came to the garrison, was far from satisfying to them, for the nature of Poyntz’s fears did not encourage hope:

It was told us...by the enemies owne souldyers that there was 5 souldyers buryed this day of the plague: they dyed in the howses in the Barley markit place, and that they intend tomorrow to remove there souldyers out of all the towne into the West feild and make that there League.

Lowther resorted again to sending out men to try to gather certain news, but this time the Parliamentarians were alert, and captured one of the two as they left the castle. From this prisoner, they learned of the route to be taken by the other, and although he took alarm and was able to get back into the castle, he was closely pursued.

Early on the morning of the 15th, Lowther sent out some men to gather apples near Northgate. As the light increased, however, they were spotted in the trees, having clambered up into the branches:

and on that the enemy’s souldyers called and said Come alone, they are all ours, when our souldyers leapt all down amongst them, but the enemy either killed or tooke 2 of them, the rest gott all away without any hurt, excepting one man which gott 3 or 4 blowes; and since that time they call to us and bid us fetch of our dead men, but we heare since they are not killed, after which time we had another man went out to get peares and was shott...

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There was a good deal of free enterprise in this fruit gathering. Drake said that apples and pears would fetch a penny for a half dozen from the women in the garrison. This cannot all have been soldiers working on their own initiative, however, since Lowther and his surgeons must have needed fruit to supplement the rations.

The professional artilleryman in the garrison, the 'Dutchman', was wounded twice by enemy marksmen, who must have singled him out. Even so, in "restitution" he returned to his gun:

there was about 4 troops of horse went downe from the towne through the Parke to Newhall and soo faced about and came back againe and he seeing them made ready his gunne against they came backe, and gave them a shott into the Parke where we saw both one man and a horse to fall.

In the afternoon, a drummer came to the gate with a note which he read to his own comrades as he passed. He told them that Fairfax, Cromwell and Rossiter had routed Goring and Langdale, and this was the burden of the note which he then handed to the guards at the gate. Shortly after this, Poyntz sent in a letter from the committee in York. For the first time, we have what amounts to a rough précis of the letter:

That whereas they had heretofore sent to sommone the castle which was still rejected, but now taking into consideration the great care and love to so many gentlemen and souldyers which weare within the castle, and the misrye we lived in, and the effusion of so much innocent blood, which was likely to be made, and many a sackles /i.e. foolish/ man in it, they thought good once more to sommone us and to give us to understand that if we pleased to come to a treatye about the surrendring of the same, they would treate with us upon honorable tearmes, and with conditions fitting for such a garison, and give hostages for the same.

This looks as if the York committee had overruled Poyntz's attitude, if his earlier remarks and behaviour toward Gerrard Lowther are anything to go by.

Sir Richard Lowther now accepted that the moment had come to discuss terms, and though he put off an immediate answer, returned reply that he would confer with the officers and gentlemen in the castle.

Hostilities did not cease as a consequence of this overture. A Royalist foraging for apples, was wounded by a shot to the head on the following morning. That afternoon, Lowther appointed his emissaries who were to meet with four of the enemy to discuss the proposed surrender. These were Colonel Sir Richard Hutton, Lt. Colonel Sir Thomas Bland, Major Godfrey Copley and William Tindall. They met their opposite numbers in the town, but Drake wrote that it was only "to drinke and be merry", and that they remained two hours. During their absence, Lowther summoned a general meeting of the garrison, at which spokesmen were nominated on behalf of each distinct group within the garrison. To represent the gentry, were chosen Hutton, Colonel Sir John Ramsden and Colonel Sir George Wentworth. The spokesmen for the clergy were to be Mr. Hirst and Mr. Key. Hirst may have been Thomas Hurst, D.D., Rector of Leadenham and
Barrowby in Lincolnshire, who subsequently served in the Newark garrison. His views are best summed up in his own words, quoted against him after the war: "If this damnable work of Reformation went on but two or three years longer all ministers would become fellow commoners with Nebuchadnezer". Mr. Key was John or Edmund Kay, vicar of Rothwell near Leeds. To represent the volunteer group and the Reformadoes, were chosen Mr. Hodgson and Mr. Harebread. William Harebread had been a captain in Viscount Mansfield's Horse. Hodgson cannot easily be identified. The townsmen also had their own spokesmen, Alderman Lunne and Mr. Austick. For the soldiers, Lt. Colonel Wheatley, Captain Gabriel Hemsworth and Captain Munro.

During this time there was a parley round about the castle, of men and women of all sortes, and, during this time also, the souldyers on both sides agreed to robbe an orchard and agreed well to bee in the trees together at least 20 of a side or more.

In the morning of July 17th Lowther sent a drummer to Poyntz with a letter stating that the garrison was now ready to treat for the surrender, but it was Poyntz's turn to prevàricate. Until four in the afternoon during which time both sides fraternised as on the previous day, nothing was heard. Then a note came from Overton "to this effecte, that they would take time to treate, and not bee so hasty as they was". This sudden time-wasting move by the enemy was explained soon after.

It seems a captin of the castle which went out the day before after the gentlemen, (unkowne to the Governor and without order,) tould one of their officers that we had but victualls for 5 daies, which caused them then to refuse to treate, and moreover the enemies souldiers reported that they intended to starve us, and to strippe the souldiers at their going out, and likewise that they would have all the pillage of the castle.

This dismaying intelligence was somewhat alleviated by a letter which came to Lowther along the old communications route from Newark by way of Sandal. According to this letter, on July 12th Langdale with his brigade and some 4000 Irish levies had begun a relief march aimed at Pontefract, and that Gervase Neville had gone from Newark to hasten his approach. Yet this same letter repeated the story that Sir Thomas Fairfax had been severely beaten by Goring, and added that Montrose had overcome the Scots and had killed their commander. The news concerning Montrose was correct in terms of his victory, but events in Scotland, however much they favoured the Royalist party there, were too far away for the King to capitalise upon. As for the relief march on which Langdale had embarked, this was too truly a "vapor".

Lowther, finding that he might still expect relief, and conscious of the dangers of an attempt to starve him out sent into all the gentlemen's chambers within the castle to see what provision they could find, allowing to themselves no more than a common souldyer, that wee might all live or
want together, which being done, there was provision found
to keepe us all at a reasonable rate of dyate about Z-

Drake left out the number, which is extremely perplexing, but the fact that it
was calculated in days rather than in weeks, stresses that even with diligent
controls, the garrison could not survive beyond, say, ten or twelve days at
most.

At six that evening, the garrison was mustered in the castle yard, and
Colonels Hutton and Wentworth were requested to read to the men the letters
that had passed between Lowther and Poyntz. The letter from Newark was also
read to them. Hutton and Wentworth told the assembled rank and file that the
gentlemen would stand by the restrictions of the rationing, "and was willing
to sacrifise their lives rather than yeild to such conditions". If the worst
came to the worst, and neither relief came nor conditions offered by Poyntz
improved, they would burn the castle and fight their way out with the sword.
This was the type of fighting speech that, at such a critical phase in the
defence, would have done wonders, but there is no reason to dismiss it as a
prime example of sabre-rattling. The evidence of the siege is sufficient to
show that many of the officers and men would have accepted such a termination
willingly.

At which wordes the souldyers all with one consent said they
were ready to runne the same hazard that the gentlemen did,
and was content with the like dyate, and withal threw up their
hatts and made 3 great and lowd shoutes within the Castle
yard and then the Governor sent out 2 flagges of defiance, the
one to be sett upon the Kings tower and the other upon the
Round tower which was instantly done and displayed, and the
flagge left standing upon the Round tower: and presently gave
commound for our cannon to play.

One wonders if Poyntz was a good judge of human nature. By resorting to crude
threats, he had lost for the time being all opportunity of securing his goal
with a minimum loss of blood on his side. In view of the many promises which
the garrison had received of relief, and which had been broken time and again,
it is unlikely that the story of Langdale's coming inspired them quite so much
as did Poyntz's threatenings, reminiscent of European war.

The Dutchman directed a cannon ball into some forces standing in rank in
the Market Place to signal the continued resistance. Fire was given against
Newhall. The iron gun, shifted back to the upper castle gate, blew down a
house which had been manned by the enemy, killing several and causing the rest
to flee. A second shot, directed into the enemy works near the barbican, did
some damage: "we saw lighted matches struck downe, but what hurt was done was
not knowne to us". Overton, suddenly finding himself under fire, sent a
drummer to the castle gate with victuals for the Parliamentary prisoners, but
this time Lowther's generosity was not to be counted upon, and the drummer was
initially refused admittance.
As night drew on, Overton sent a letter to Lowther, apologising for his earlier intemperate words and disowning the rumours spread by his men. He explained that the delay in the treaty discussions was due to Poyntz's absence at York, and his own inability to act without his superior's primary authority.

The Parliamentary commanders backed down all along the line. They cannot have been so sure of themselves as they pretended, for Lowther's determined attitude can only have forced them to adopt a milder approach. By 10 in the morning on July 18th, Poyntz had sent a letter to the Governor appointing time and place for the negotiations, but whether Lowther had, in the meantime, accepted Overton's apologies, we do not know. It would seem likely. If the preliminaries to the talks are to be seen as a game of bluff and counter-bluff, Lowther had won it.

A tent was set up in a close below Baghill, and at four in the afternoon Poyntz, Overton and nine other officers came to the barbican gate and met the Royalist committee. This latter was chosen after deliberations by the various spokesmen elected in the garrison, and comprised Colonels Hutton, Ramadan, Wentworth, Lt. Colonel Galbraith and Mr. Hurst. The two parties walked together to the tent "which they had sett about with gaurdes of musketeers about 100 yeardes distant from the tent on every side". Drake did not say that hostages had been exchanged, but it would have been a matter of form for some of the nine officers that went with Poyntz and Overton to go into the castle for the duration of the talks. The meeting went on until nine at night, with nothing agreed, and then adjourned until nine in the morning. Poyntz and Overton spent some time in the tent, although they were not part of the Parliamentarian committee, where they "drunke with them".

At eight in the morning on the 19th, the Dutchman fired his cannon against the Market Place. "Whether he had any orders for it or not I cannot heare", wrote Drake. Perhaps the gunner merely felt like hastening the talks along a little. For the rest of the day, there was no further firing by either side, and the talks resumed in the tent at nine o'clock. After a further fruitless day's discussion

our Committee came away, declaring to them our full intents that they did not vallue theire lives but theire honors, and that they would fight it out to the last man, and soe, with that resolution, came away, and Sir John Ramsden, (being in the gout), ridd clear into the castle attended with Captin Samond on horseback to the Castle gate, and 5 or 6 more officers came along with him.

The Parliamentary committee, however, hastened after them, and requested another meeting on the day following to bring an end to the business "if possible they could".

Drake's journal ended at that point. From Whitelock, we learn that the
Parliamentarians yielded ground to the garrison:

Letters informed the surrender of Pomfret Castle upon Articles, which were the more favourable, by reason the Plague was hot in Pomfret Town...(62)

The plague was the spur which forced Poyntz to lower his demands. Vicars made as much clear by the way in which he alluded to the surrender:

We thought fit to summon Pontefract Castle, which caus'd the enemy to desire a treaty it was agreed that the castle shall be delivered up at 8 of the clock in the morning, with all things therein, save that the Officers were allowed to carry away what was properly their own, the soldiers to march to Newark, with 200 muskets and 200 pikes. We consented to so good conditions, because the Plague was so hot in the Country, and especially in that Town, of which some of our Soldiers are dead...(63)

Vicars's distortion of events can be overlooked. The garrison dispersed, some to Newark, some to Welbeck. According to Drake, the Royalists had lost, during the siege from December to the surrender, 99 men, women and children. Apart from those killed in action, some also had died of various diseases, which is the solitary clue which we have to any decline in conditions within the walls. Apparently, however, the plague had not penetrated.

Sandal held on until October, Skipton until December, Bolton until November. On July 28th, Whitelock noted that Sir Charles Howard of Naworth Castle and some Royalist horse had been captured, trying to make their way between Skipton and Newark. The war was not entirely over in Yorkshire, although there was nothing like a field force at the disposal of the remaining garrison commanders with which they could challenge Parliament's control, or assist the King's army when, belatedly, it tried to revitalise Royalism in the north. Newcastle's regiments had virtually all vanished, broken in the field or dispersed of their own accord. Great efforts, and not a little collective and individual heroism, had come to nothing. Pontefract and Scarborough, which fell within days of each other, exemplified the Royalist resilience and tenacity within their own narrow sphere of action and their capitulation, coming on top of Naseby and of Langport, token of a wider defeat.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1. Longstaffe, Drake's Narrative, pp. 18/81.
2. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 185/6 for both letters.
3. See the map of Pontefract and its environs.
5. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 179/80.
6. See above, p. 442.
7. See Redman's Foot, Vol. 2.
8. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 180/1.
9. Ibid., pp. 181/2.
10. Wenham, Siege of York, pp. 177/89.
11. Conjectural, see Vol. 2.
12. For Croft's identity see above p. 447, and Vol. 2.
13. See above, p. 449.
14. Unidentified.
16. Whitelock, in his Memoirs, referred to an incident in the siege at about this time that is a trifle mysterious: "Some of Pomfret Garrison sallied out, but were beaten back with the loss of Colonel Tindall, Lieutenant Colonel Middleton, and other officers, and many Soldiers". Under the date of April 5th, Whitelock also noted that: "A party under Major Smithson fell on the King's Forces at Ridmore in Yorkshire, killed four and took Captain Bainbrigge, and forty seven Prisoners". Both of these references seem to be fictitious, further proof that Whitelock relied heavily upon contemporary tracts for the compilation of his memoir.

For the first incident, it is likely that Tyndal and Middleton had left with Langdale, when Edward Grey also left. Although it is not conclusive, Drake did not mention any incident likely to correspond with Whitelock's claims. For the second incident, at Ridmore, the place name defies identification, unless it be Ridgemont near Hedon in the East Riding, which would, under the circumstances, seem to be unlikely.

17. Longstaffe, Drake's Narrative, p. 24 f.n.
18. Burns and Young, The Great Civil War, p. 10.
20. Lj, VI, p. 561. He is not positively identified.
22. Speight cannot be clearly identified, though he may be the Lieutenant Spright mentioned in Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 122, of Helmsley garrison, Crossland's Horse. He was a prisoner in York in 1644, as late as November, and may have been exchanged by Lowther.

23. Bonivant held Sandal until October, but has not been identified.
25. Longstaffe quoted Whitelock as alluding to this under the date April 21, but no such reference appears.

26. For these locations see map, above, chapter 11.
27. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 139.
29. See Trafford's Horse, Vol. 2.
30. Possibly, Robert Dent of Byker, see Welford, Royalist Composition in Durham and Northumberland, pp. xxxiii, 182/3.
31. Perhaps Robert Thornley of Belasyse's Horse, see Vol. 2.
32. See above, p. 448.
33. See Wentworth's Foot, Vol. 2
34. Willoughby cannot be identified.
35. For Lathom, and Lancashire in general, see Chapter 14, below.
37. Ibid., p. 143.
38. If the identity of Lowther is right, he probably needed his gratuity in 1662/3.
39. Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 222/3.
40. See above, p. 478.
41. Hodgson, Memoir, p. 145.
43. Possibly Marmaduke Monckton of Wentworth's Foot, see Vol. 2.
44. Firth, Cromwell's Army, 1902, p. 34.
45. See Vol. 2.
46. See Vere's Foot, Vol. 2.
47. See Wheatley's Foot, Vol. 2.
49. Drake described this gun as a demi-culverin firing an 18 lb. ball, but the prescribed weight for such a gun was 9 lb. The culverin fired a 15 lb. ball ordinarily, and the demi-cannon a 27 lb. ball.
51. Ibid., p. 147.
52. Ibid., p. 151.
53. CSPD 1645/7, pp. 7/8.
55. For Chator, see Vol. 2. For the problem of Bolton, see also Chapter 14 below. Chaytor may have been Rupert's appointment in 1644.
56. For Scrope see Vol. 2.
58. For the officers who served again in 1648, see the regimental listings, Vol. 2., where careers are discussed.
60. Ibid., p. 394.
61. See Vol. 2.
62. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 156.
63. Vicars, III, p. 201.
64. Long, Symonds Diary, p. 224.
65. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 158.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The End of the War
Lancashire and Yorkshire July - December 1645.

Since July 2nd 1644 we have been following the fortunes of a beaten party in the north of England. For a time, this party showed something of its prowess and competence, particularly in the case of the two reliefs of Ponte-fract. For the most part, however, we have been observing defensive measures taken by men who refused to acknowledge that they were beaten. To follow the fortunes of an army in decline is never the easiest of courses, since much important documentary material tended to be destroyed by officers or lost in the general confusion. Without Tullie, Drake and Cholmeley, the narrative of the war in 1645 would have been impossible to construct without relying solely upon the unsympathetic Parliamentarian and Scottish records, and often found there to be comprised in the merest of footnotes. With the fall of Carlisle and Pontefract, there ceased to be kept (so far as we know) any record of the six months or so that remained.

Rushworth in May 1645 reckoned that there were eight garrisons left in northern England flying the King's colours. Garrisons only, not field forces or anything that could amount to them. In that vast stretch of England, which had been almost solidly for the King in the high summer of 1643, Lancashire apart, there remained eight garrisons. Apart from Pontefract, Carlisle and Scarborough, Rushworth mentioned Lathom and Greenhalgh in Lancashire, Skipton, Bolton and Sandal in Yorkshire. He did not add Walton Hall, which appears to have had some token presence during the summer, nor, of course, did he mention Raby in Co. Durham which was temporarily occupied in July. By August 1st, this handful had been reduced to Skipton, Bolton, Sandal, Lathom and, perhaps, Greenhalgh. Of Walton we can say no more than that the evidence is entirely inconclusive.

Yet it was now, when it was too late for the north and too late for the King, that Charles chose to return to the areas from which he had begun his war in 1642. With the ruins of his army, he came back to the ruins of the north, and found nothing there for his help or for his comfort. Had he not been lured to Naseby field, had he but listened to those who advised him to march north in April and May, he might have saved some garrisons and given himself time to regroup and recruit. This is, of course, merely speculative, and whilst the possibilities can be pointed out, they cannot be dwelt upon for any time. It is with failure, after all, that this chapter is concerned.
Lathom House - The Second Siege.

It will be remembered that Lathom, having withstood a siege under the direction of various Parliamentary commanders early in 1644, had been relieved by Rupert on his way to York. The Countess of Derby who had commanded in the house, vacated it, and in her place one of her captains, Edward Rostern, was appointed governor. Promoted to colonel, it was apparently he who directed the defence of the house between July 1644 and December 1645, although no close siege began until July of the latter year. For much of the second siege, we are reliant upon the account given by John Seacomb in his study of the Stanley family, which was partially compiled from early material which is now lost. It is really quite a vivid account, and does not convey, as those of Tullie and of Drake conveyed, anything of the tedium of siege warfare. That may be as well, since a close consideration of those two journals must by now have conveyed sufficient idea of precisely what it meant to defend a castle or a town against an enemy strong enough to lay siege but not strong enough to bring the siege to storm. Much of the Royalist account that follows is thus drawn from Seacomb.

It was Lathom's lack of strategic importance that delayed the full scale siege. For some time, the Parliamentarians were content to leave the garrison alone, even though the Royalists did not return the favour. All through the winter of 1644/5 their raiders struck at all points within a 12 mile radius of the house, supplementing their supplies and generally creating havoc. For a time, Lathom was seen by the Parliament's commanders as a bargaining counter to be used in talks with the earl of Derby to try to induce him to surrender the Isle of Man. In November 1644, before returning to Yorkshire and to his death at Scarborough, John Meldrum informed the Committee of Both Kingdoms that he had entered upon talks with Derby's representatives, John Greenhalgh and William Farrington the elder, and that he had insisted that Lathom and Greenhalgh Castle be yielded if any compact were to be arrived at. Initially, Derby showed some willingness to come to terms, and on November 21st Meldrum told the Committee that Lathom and Greenhalgh would be surrendered if Derby could be sure of receiving "fair and noble dealing." By December 16th, however, the talks had all but broken down, and Meldrum told the Committee that Derby was prevaricating. Consequently, he had given orders for the blockade of the two garrisons. Meldrum soon after left the county, and the local commanders showed their usual dilatoriness. Egerton, responsible for reducing Lathom, must have complained to the Committee himself, for on April 29th the Deputy Lieutenants for Lancashire were ordered to fulfill their quotas and to see to it that Lathom was thoroughly invested.

According to Seacomb, although Rupert had directed additional defences to be built, by the time that the Parliamentarians came to besiege Lathom it was
short of provisions, largely consumed "by the Prince's army". This really sounds rather unlikely, since Rupert's forces had not been near Lathom since August 1644, and the siege proper did not get under way until July 1645, or June at the earliest. It does not seem that Meldrum's blockade had been put into practice, and consequently, if Rostern was the man of "diligence and care" as Seacomb described him, stores must have been gathered in during the winter raids. There was also, apparently, a shortage of powder and of match, and this general want on the part of the garrison would suggest that the defence of Lathom was really a pointless exercise in last-ditch Royalism. However, the house held out for about six months after the siege was enforced, so evidently, as Seacomb noted, Rostern had not been idle:

"He was neither wanting in care or diligence, nor in any other good offices for the supply of the garrison with provisions and all other necessaries for sustaining a siege."

The organisation of the defence forces has been dealt with in considering Rostern's regiment of foot and troop of horse? Major Munday, a professional soldier, and Captain William Kay, a local man, commanded the horse. The officers of the foot were Captains Roger Charnock, formerly of Derby's foot regiment; William Farrington junior, also from Derby's foot; Molyneux Ratcliffe, whose exact identity remains a mystery; Henry Nowell of Redo Hall, of a prominent Royalist family; and unidentified Captain Roby, who may have been a Scot; and a Captain Worral.

In July the siege army was estimated at almost 4,000 men. This sounds excessive, but in a contemporary Parliamentarian tract we learn that the work they had to do was fairly extensive.

"This day there came news of the good success of our forces in Lancashire against the enemies that nest in the garrison at the Earl of Derbies house. They kept there three garrisons. One is Lathom House itself; the second is a gentleman's house, and the third is a house called the Lodge; both within cannon shot of the first; and that garrison called the Lodge was kept by Irish rebels ever since we took Liverpool for those rebels were they that had quarter given them when we took Liverpool."

The "gentleman's house" defies identification, not unnaturally. As for the Lodge, this may have been Briars Hall to the north of Lathom, or a house in the small village of Otterheads to the south-west. Either would be a lengthy cannon shot from the garrison, however, and the Lodge may have been an out building on the Lathom estate proper, which from the name is highly possible.

If the garrison of the Lodge was indeed composed of soldiers who had served under Byron in Liverpool, that in itself was curious. Given quarter, one would suppose that Meldrum exacted from them a promise to lay down their arms. If they had given their paroles, then to continue in arms afterwards particularly if they were Irish Catholics, which is what the tract hinted at was to court disaster. The butchery of Irish soldiers by the Parliament was becoming habitual, and thus their presence in the Lodge must arouse either
amazement at their folly, or regard for their devotion to duty.

To return to the tract:

Our forces having blocked up those rebels in this garrison, sent them a summons to deliver up the said garrison to the Parliament but they refused, saying they would keep it for their good King, by whose authority they were put in there. Whereupon our forces placed their batteries, and plaid upon the House, and having made some breaches in it, marched up close to the enemy and stormed them; and it was a very hot fight of both sides for the time it lasted, and we had divers hurt and some slain, as in so hot a storm as that was could not be averded; but our men followed on so gallantly, that notwithstanding the violent opposition...yet our men broke in upon them, killed and tooke them alle. So farre as they can perceive, a man escaped them not, of which good successe here followeth the list.

The tract ended with a total of 40 killed on the Royalist side, 60 captives including the commander of the Lodge and 12 officers, with a Catholic priest, arms, powder and baggage.

It is a pity that we know no more of that small band in the Lodge. To set their defiance in context, it needs to be stressed that when they chose to die rather than yield, Carlisle had fallen, Naseby had been fought, and in Yorkshire Scarborough and Pontefract were on the way out. The summons to surrender must have informed them of these things. If they were, indeed, for the most part Catholic, whether Irish or local men, their refusal to yield must reflect the treatment they expected to receive if they threw down their arms. What became of the 60 wounded and captured we do not know: nor what became of the anonymous priest.

Egerton established his siege headquarters at nearby Ormskirk. Rigby did not come back to the scene of his discomfiture, having been "laid aside". Rostern, advised of the approach, and probably prior to the attack on the Lodge, felt he should welcome Egerton with a sally from the house.

He ordered out a strong party of horse and foot; the first was commanded by Major Munday, the foot by Captain Molineux Radcliffe, and the rear was brought up by the Governor himself.

This was somewhat unusual for the Governor to take an active hand in a sally. Neither Lowther nor Cholmeley, not even Mallory in Skipton, ever did so, although Glemham at Carlisle had risked it now and again.

In this order they attacked the enemies camp and quarters with so much courage, resolution and bravery, that they took all the guards of the enemy both horse and foot, routed their whole body (of whom they killed and took many) the General himself with difficulty escaping, by flying away in his shirt and slippers.

The Parliamentarian magazine fell, intact, into Rostern's hands. The known contemporary Parliamentary sources did not refer to this incident, and it may well have been less spectacular than would appear, but that does not detract from its success.
In this exploit Colonel John Tempest, who served only as a volunteer, did most worthy and excellent service. The Governor animated the whole action, and indeed exposed himself to more hazard and danger than he ought to have done, as chief commander.

John Tempest was a long way from home, for he was the son and heir of Sir Thomas Tempest of Old Durham, and from a notable Catholic family. He had evidently not laid down his arms as many others did, for he had been the colonel of a Durham based infantry regiment in 1644. He was certainly a Royalist die-hard as he showed during the Interregnum.

This gallant attempt and success so amazed the enemy...that for three weeks (in which time the enemy were largely recruited) they continued masters of the field, and after braved the enemy every day in their head quarters....

Gradually, however, despite the ascendancy which Rostern had acquired, the want of powder and of ammunition began to tell. Apparently, they had been receiving secret shipments from Manchester, through the services of friends in that town:

But the ammunition of the garrison now almost spent, and they out of hopes of recruiting their stores from Manchester, &c., as formerly, and their intelligence with some friends there being discovered, they were obliged to suspend all action abroad, and suffer the enemy to make nearer approaches, and confine them closer within their own bounds....

The Parliamentarians did not show any inclination to attempt a storm, for their engineers "drew a line a flight-shot from the house", intending to establish their guns and forces so as to confine and starve the garrison. The trench which was dug was three yards wide and two deep, marked at various points by eight strong sconces "wherein their soldiers might lie with some security, and be able to relieve one another upon sallies from the house". To the north of Lathom, where the ground was more exposed to the garrison's fire, a deep trench was dug to the moat, intended to drain it, since the ground sloped away from the walls. There were also plans to mine from that area, but there being within...some skilful colliers, who had as much experience in mining and drawing of water as [the enemy] was master of, and they being employed by the governor to oppose him, always wrought counter to him; and keeping full chambers of water above, they at pleasure opened them and drowned both his works and men.

All this entrenching work and Royalist counter-measures brought the siege to September, at which time the garrison expected relief. The King, however, plagued by want of men and by a competent enemy, came to grief near Chester at the battle of Rowton Heath and thus brought to an end the hopes of the garrison. In consequence, the King ordered Rostern to make what terms he could for surrender, and Rostern, having some advantage over the Parliamentarians in that they were ignorant of the state of affairs within the walls, made overtures at once.

Commissioners for both sides were thus appointed and a place of meeting agreed upon, wherein those on the
part of the besiegers offered, that if the governor, and
officers with him, would surrender the house and all the
cannon, they should be permitted to march away with bag
and baggage, drums beating and colours flying; that the
Lady Derby and her Children, should enjoy the third part
of the Earl's estate...

The Countess was not, let it be added, actually in Lathom, but Rostern was
securing the best terms that he could get, and the widest.

...and that all his good should be safely conveyed to...

Knowsley. That all officers and gentlemen should
compound at one year's value for their estates.

The three Royalist commissioners and their advisors could not agree among
themselves. Two were apparently in favour of concluding acceptance then and
there, but the third declined to support them unless the garrison might carry
away with them the artillery; "whose indiscretion and obstinate, perverse
humour, broke off the treaty, to the ruin of the besieged".

It does seem, however, that the Committee of Both Kingdoms put an end to
the proposed terms. On September 27th they directed a letter to the Lancashire
committee rejecting the clauses which had been agreed between both sides.
They regarded them as "very unreasonable", in that they showed too much favour
to enemies decisively beaten and on the run. It is a moot point whether the
London Committee was right to adopt such an attitude, smacking of exploitation
of its advantageous position for the sake of mere form. Lowther in Pontefract
had shown that he would not yield to harsh terms, though he might have yielded
promptly on favourable ones. Rostern seems to have been prepared to follow
suit, but there were few Royalist garrison commanders who were prepared to
accept anything dictated by the enemy rather than endure the difficulties of
sustaining a hard siege.

The London Committee took exception to certain calculated clauses which
appeared to favour Derby himself too much. Briefly, these were that the earl
was not to be required to make formal submission in London: the Countess was
to have had full liberty of movement; and Lathom was to be held by the Stanley
family servants. The London Committee told the local men that favourable
terms would be acceptable, and added that Lord Fairfax at York had been ordered
to send over the mortar which had been seized during the first siege and
carried to York by Rupert, where it had remained ever since. Brereton, it
seems, was not to get his mortar back at all.

On the night that the terms were broken and all talks ended, an Irish
soldier within Lathom dropped over the wall and deserted to the enemy.
He immediately informed the commanding officers there, that
the rejection of their proposals, and the breaking of the
treaty, were highly displeasing to the garrison; that there
was not bread enough in the house for two days, nor any other
provisions or stores to hold out the siege any longer.
Seacomb's chronology is much at fault here, for according to him, this
desertion took place on the eve of the actual surrender, which did not take
place until early December. Certainly, the rejection of the terms propounded,
a rejection that came from the garrison on the one hand and the London Committee
on the other, can be dated to late September. This left two months for which
we have virtually no account of what the garrison was doing, and it looks as if
Seacomb telescoped his interpretation of whatever materials he was working
from.

Of the actual surrender we have the following Parliamentary account dated
December 6th:12

This evening...there came letters to the Speaker of the Commons
House, of the surrender of Lathom House in Lancashire...by which
means the whole County of Lancashire is absolutely freed and
reduced...
The taking of this place gives faire probability of the more
speedy reducing of Chester, whither no doubt these Lancashire
forces will next move to assist the besiegers, or else against
Skipton in Yorkshire.

The conditions agreed upon were that Rostern, with horse, arms and £10 in cash,
was free to go where he willed. The rest of the garrison, without money or
arms, were to make their way to Ashby de la Zouch in Leicestershire, to Sidbury,
or to their homes. The terms were harsh, and in keeping with Seacomb's account
of the final day of the garrison which we will shortly come to. Vicar's13
confirmed the news, dating the actual surrender to December 2nd, and adding
that all commissioned officers were to keep their swords. In the house were
found eight guns, 500 other arms and provisions.

Colonel John Tempest, incidentally, either at this time or at an earlier
date, made his way to Skipton.

To return to Seacomb. According to his narrative, the desertion of the
Irishman and the news which he gave the enemy caused them on the next morning
to send a peremptory summons:

The enemy next morning summoned the garrison to an immediate
surrender of the house and themselves prisoners, upon the
bare terms of mercy, which the soldiers, being all in confusion,
resolved to accept of, notwithstanding all the intreaties by
the governor to the contrary, who gallantly and bravely proposed
to them, to join him, and fight their way through the enemy,
sword in hand, and either...save themselves with honour and
reputation, or bravely die. But the worthy and valiant Governor
not being heard by them, the house was yielded up to a merciless
enemy, and all the rich goods therein, became a booty to them.
The rich silk hangings of the beds, &c., were torn to pieces, and
made sashes of; the towers and all the strong works razed
to the ground and demolished...a monument of their fury and malice.
And thus was ruined and brought to destruction...by the obstinacy
and indiscretion of one man, and the treachery of another...the
ancient, noble and almost invincible house of Lathom....

History is fickle mistress, for despite Seacomb's flourish "this most heroic
and gallant Defence, can never be forgot whilst History remains in the World".
justice has yet to be done to the Royalist garrisons of northern England.

In view of the contradiction between Seacomb and the contemporary enemy tracts, a brief summary of what appears to have happened is useful. It would seem that, in obedience to the King's authority, Rostern sought terms from the enemy when they were willing to settle without bloodshed. These talks were frustrated by one of the Royalist commissioners who, finding the Parliamentarians willing to concede almost anything, stuck out for the ordnance. This created a hiatus in the discussions, and during the interval, the London Committee, advised of what was happening, forbade any such terms as those partially agreed upon. Thus, even had the Royalist commissioner dropped the demands over the artillery, the subject was closed so far as the enemy were concerned. The siege then dragged on in October and November, without much action, and by the end of the latter month the conditions in Lathom were so bad that the desertion of one man ruined the morale of the rest, who yielded to worse terms than they would have had in September had it not been for circumstances.

Seacomb, however, was not finished with the siege of Lathom, for he went on to detail a few of the incidents of the siege, which, hard to date, must stand on their own merits.¹⁴

The garrison chaplain was Mr. Rutter. This was Samuel Rutter, of Waberthwaite in Cumberland, later to be Archdeacon of Sodor and Man then Bishop.¹⁵ During the siege "he managed all correspondence and intelligence by cyphers and characters: wherein he first made use of a woman, one Widow Read". It was her task to carry out messages and to bring them in, escorted in this dangerous work "by sallies appointed for that purpose". She was eventually captured, Seacomb said after a year's service, and taken to Manchester for questioning for "the enemy could not discover or interpret" any of the coded papers. Nonetheless, she "stoutly denied or refused to confess anything" even though in the process three of her fingers were burned away.

Of the officers of the garrison, Seacomb had much to say:

Amongst the officers, the brave and gallant Captain Molineux Radcliffe, merits perpetual remembrance for his most valiant services; who commanded the van in twelve sallies, and always brought off his men with success; but at last this gallant gentleman had the misfortune to be slain in storming a fort of the enemy.

This shows that despite the lack of information, the fighting around Lathom must have been bitter, as it was at Pontefract. The allusion to an enemy fort, or sconce, shows that these sallies occurred during the late summer or autumn of 1645 and do not belong to an earlier period. Of the other officers, Seacomb was equally praising, stating that they deserved "better recompense than the King's affairs would allow them to expect". Of Major Munday, a duel was recorded:
Major Munday, during the siege, being challenged to fight his troop against so many of the enemy, cheerfully accepted the challenge: both troops were drawn out into the park, in the sight of the house, and the enemy's army; in the engagement the Major received a shot in the side of the face, by which an artery being cut, bled excessively, upon which he desired his Lieutenant to make good the fight till he got the artery sewed up. The fight was made good till the Major returned, and then upon the first charge the enemy fled....

Munday was eventually shot to death at the battle of Worcester.

Captain Kay being also challenged by a trumpet from the enemy, to fight hand to hand on horseback with Capt. Asmall, a Captain of the adverse party, he accepted the challenge: both troops met in the park, and stood aloof, whilst the Captains fought single. In the engagement, Captain Asmall had discharged both his pistols at Captain Kay...Kay immediately rode up to him, and thrust him through the neck with his javelin, on which he fell down dead from his horse....

Of the internal organisation of the garrison we know more than we do concerning Pontefract. Corn and meal was rationed, ½ lb. a week being given to every man, "from the governor to the meanest soldier". Horses killed or rendered useless for service during sallies were "broiled upon coals and frequently eat, without either bread or salt".

Nor was there shortage of fuel. The colliers who were busy counter-mining found in the course of their work "coals and water in abundance within the house to their great comfort". Thus a water supply was maintained when the moat was spoiled by the enemy, either through draining attempts or by use of it for waste disposal. One wonders whether the colliers had struck a rich seam, or one that was cleared easily by open cast workings.

There was amongst the soldiers about fifty pounds in money, but of no use at all to them, but to play a span-counter with; they lent it one to another by handfuls, never telling or counting any; one day one soldier had all, and the next another, till at last all their sport was spoiled, the enemy at the gate stript them of every penny....

'Span-counter' must have been a game similar to that in which five counters or stones are balanced on the back of the hand, tossed in the air, and caught on the back of the hand on the way down. It would be an easily improvised, impromptu game for the men on sentry-go to indulge in, particularly with ready money available.

With Lathom, the last Royalist foothold in Lancashire was gone. Of Greenhalgh, we know next to nothing. The author of A Discourse of the Warr alluded to it briefly, as being in the hands of an unidentified Anderton, and that when he died during the siege, the castle surrendered, various attempts at mining having been beaten by the rocky ground. It cannot have survived Lathom, but when it actually fell remains a mystery. Thus was the war in Lancashire brought to its end, at least, until 1648. It had never been a successful theatre for the Royalists, depleted as they were by demands from
Oxford and from the Queen, and fighting for much of the time in their own recruiting areas. That it should have been Lathom which held out to the last, appears entirely appropriate, for in the same way had the earl of Derby cast his shadow over the county in 1642 and 1643, creating in his enemies more terror by his presence than ever his forces in the field could have done. After the fall of Lathom, Skipton alone flew the King's flag in the north.

The Last Fight of the Northern Horse.

Of Yorkshire, there is little left to tell, and much of that is bound up with the exploits of those northern cavalry regiments, or what was left of them. From the fall of Pontefract, the county was lost completely, the Skipton garrison confined within its castle walls and the Parliamentary and Scottish forces roaming at will through the heartland of Royalist recruitment. The Northern Horse, demolished at Naseby, battered in several successive actions, came back to the north to fight its last two battles, one at Sherburn in Elmet in the midst of that long-fought over area south of York, and the last of all, at Burgh by Sands beyond Carlisle.

It was believed that apart from Sandal, Bolton and Skipton, Walton Hall was still garrisoned for the King in July. If so, it must have yielded at the same time as, or a little before, Pontefract, since no further reference to it has survived. It was, anyway, of small importance, and as to who held it and with what men, we are entirely ignorant.

Poyntz, freed from concerns for Pontefract, now turned his attention to Sir John Mallory and the Skipton garrison. On August 8th he wrote to Lord Grey of Warke, in London:

On Saturday, I came within a Mile of Skipton, with some Horse and Foot, from Pontefract, where I stayed, in expectation of the Bishopric and Lancashire Forces coming in to me, till Monday; and then forced an Entrance in this Town, finding small opposition, the Inhabitants being fled with their families and Goods into the Castle, where they still remain. Their conduit-water we have...deprived them of, so that they have but One little Drawing well to serve the Castle. We take their Men and Horses daily; others come in to us. When I have settled this Leaguer, I shall return to my Forces at Doncaster and Rotherham.(18)

Skipton was not a fortified town, consequently Mallory could not hope to hold it even if he had had the men, which he certainly did not. As at Scarborough, the Royalists fell back on the stronghold, which, standing today virtually as it stood then in terms of curtain walls and towers, was formidable place to storm. Despite the loss of the piped water, the garrison had a further four to five months before it was obliged to yield.

Whitelock noted that when Poyntz entered the town and cut off the water, he also took the church, so this sounds as if Mallory had put men into garrison there. The principles of defence did not differ much from those at Pontefract.
On the same day that he made this entry, Whitelock also noted: "The King left Wales, and went with 3000 of his horse Northwards".

The King's northward march, as has been said, too late to do him any good, momentarily distracted Poyntz from the work at Skipton. The Royal army, according to Symonds, who was with it, numbered 2,200 cavalry and 400 foot. Of the cavalry, Langdale's Northern Horse apparently numbered some 700 men, but this must have been due to the inclusion of loose troops and Reformadoes from other regiments. On August 15th Lord Fairfax was informed in a letter written from York:

> the King quartered today at Staley House, belonging to Colonel Sir John Frescheville Governor of Welbeck, six miles from Sheffield, the number of his forces 3000 besides the 1500 Newark Horse and 500 Dragoons joined with him... It is supposed they intend for Halifax and so northward.

The commanders are Sir Thomas Glemham and Sir Marmaduke. (21)

In point of fact, the King was still in the Welbeck area on August 17th, moving into Yorkshire on the following day. Colonel Charles Gerard with 800 horse moved against Tickhill, a Parliamentary garrison within easy reach of the Royal army. On the 19th, the King arrived at Doncaster:

> The foot which were at Pontfract Castle when it was yeilded were putt into Welbeck house...and when his Majestie marched to Doncaster he drew them out, vizt. 250, four blew colors and one red. (22)

However, on August 20th the Royalists turned back to Retford, marched to Newark on the next day, and so away south.

Some light is cast upon this seemingly futile manœuvre by a letter written on August 16th at Welbeck by George Digby. The recipient was to be Prince Rupert, but it appears to have been intercepted: it clearly revealed the ebullient spirit of the writer, seen at its best when least appropriate. He told Rupert that the decision to march north had been made at Lichfield, and that the purpose was to recruit another army, to reorganise Yorkshire resistance after the loss of Pontefract and Scarborough and, presumably, to act as circumstances dictated. The evacuation of Doncaster by Poyntz's men was taken as a good sign, and Digby reckoned that within 24 hours sufficient men would have been mustered to give them some 2000 infantry and some 3,500 horse, with which to march to Ripon, an area free of garrisons and "both best affected and best armed". Certainly, Ripon had a considerable Royalist interest represented by the majority of its neighbouring gentry, men like Mallory, Crossland and the former High Sheriff, Sir William Robinson. But Digby either could not or would not see, that these men were already finished, exhausted physically and financially after three years of warfare that had been followed by Parliament's dominance with all the problems of sequestration, assessments and compositions.

Nonetheless, the appearance of the King, apart from causing Doncaster's
A Royal pardon had been formally proclaimed for anyone who would desert the
Parliament and return to their true allegiance. Sandal, on the verge of
surrendering when the King appeared, issued a letter of defiance.

But it was all for nothing. The approach of David Leslie with some 5000
horse and dragoons, showing more enthusiasm than he had shown at Carlisle,
obliged the King to turn back. Vicars reported that 100 Royalist horse were
apprehended by Poyntz, who was said to be hovering at Doncaster with 10,000
horse and dragoons. Wherever Poyntz was, exactly, he was certainly not at
Doncaster, nor were any of his men.

The Scottish approach to Rotherham forced the King to retrace his steps,
"so leaving many a poor Man that had shown his willingness to the King's
Service, to the Mercy of the Rebels."

The King's army came to grief on September 24th near Chester, in the fight
on Rowton Heath. Symonds gave a detailed chronology of its marches between
leaving Yorkshire and coming to Rowton and the campaign and its outcome are
not of direct relevance to northern England. However, in the defeat,
several northern officers were killed or captured, and we can pause momentarily
to note them. Most were men who had served in the Carlisle garrison, and who
had ridden south after the surrender with Musgrave and Fletcher.

Colonel Sir Philip Musgrave was captured, wounded, and sent away to
Pontefract and there confined. Colonel Sir Henry Fletcher, who had thwarted
Musgrave so regularly and so successfully in 1642 and 1643, was killed on the
field. Colonel Sir Thomas Dacre of Lanercost, and the former Governor of
Carlisle Castle, Sir Henry Stradling, were also captured. It was reported,
erroneously, that Glemham himself had fallen into enemy hands. Colonel Francis
Malham of Elslack, a Yorkshire Catholic, was also taken. Amongst the lower
ranks, particular notice must be taken of the capture of Captain Gerrard
Lowther. After the fall of Pontefract, he had evidently gone into Newark and
must have joined the King's army in August. Lieutenant John Skipwith, who
had marched with Robert Strickland's foot in 1642, was taken at Rowton.

Rowton was not the last fight of the Northern Horse, although it was
engaged heavily in the battle. Colonel Malham was undoubtedly one of its
officers. The brigade seems still to have been divided into two, under
Langdale and Blakiston, and rode with the Royal army to Lichfield after the
battle. By early October, the King had decided to strike north yet again,
this time to try to reach Montrose, whose string of victories in Scotland
offered the last ray of hope to the Royal party. With his cavalry mauled at
Shelford, where the Queen's Lifeguard of Horse, a largely northern regiment,
was ruined - the King came to Tuxford on October 12th, and was at Welbeck on
the 13th. There, news came of Montrose's setbacks, and torn with indecision,
the King fell back on Newark. However, at a council of war it was agreed that the Northern Horse should push on towards Montrose. Sir Marmaduke Langdale had favoured the northward march and had argued for it strongly, so the King may have given in to Langdale's pressure. Even so, in this last campaign, Langdale was denied control of events, and as overall commander, rejoicing in the title of Lieutenant General of the Northern counties, the King appointed George Digby. Digby was a man of no little courage, and too little field experience. His detractors should be reminded, however, that he had had small opportunity in which to demonstrate his capacity or incapacity for military command.

Even so, there is a tragic irony in this choice of Digby to fill, albeit indirectly, the shoes left vacant by the Marquess of Newcastle. He could not claim greater ability than his nominal subordinate, Langdale, and was no better a soldier than many of the northern cavalry colonels and regimental officers under his command. Digby's biographer dealt summarily with this episode in his career, and one is left to speculate as to how far Digby did direct the tactics of his force of 1500 men - the Northern Horse with some of the remaining cavalry - and how far he bowed to Langdale. Even if Digby took his own abilities more seriously than Langdale may have done, Sir Marmaduke was not the man to bemoan the strokes of fortune; he was stoical, austere man who commands respect but little warmth. It may be that between them Digby and Langdale wrecked the Northern Horse by fighting a battle that, with a little shrewd manœuvre, could have been avoided.

Initially, the Royalist thrust north met with success. On October 15th, Langdale and Digby scored a victory:

The King sent the Lord Digby and Langdale Northward, who got to Ferrybridge, and surprised 400 of the Parliament's party at Sherburn, with their arms, and shattered C. Wren's regiment of Horse. (38)

In their rear, however, an enemy force under Colonel Copley was alert, and which had shortly before destroyed Royalist quarters at Worksop and taken a number of prisoners. Colonel Hutchinson, governor of Nottingham, reported on October 15th that the cavalry under Langdale and Digby were tired and ill armed, and that reports made them out to be dejected and daunted. This was probably true, there was every reason for them to have been so, so that the victory at Sherburn was a boost for morale and may have given Digby a false sense of confidence in his own skill. For what happened next, we possess Colonel Copley's account.

The Parliamentarian commanders were uncertain as to what the King would do. A march on Doncaster was expected first, but when the Royalists went into quarters at Worksop, the Parliamentarians hesitated. The King, having decided to return south, took advantage of this indecision on his opponents' part, and despatched the Digby Brigade which passed unmolested through
Doncaster, put a body of Parliamentarians to the sword at Cusworth, and marched by way of Scawsby-Keyes and Ferrybridge, towards Sherburn. In the latter town, Copley stated, were some 800 of Poyntz's forces who were caught utterly unprepared by the sudden appearance of the Royalists. In a brief fight, the enemy cavalry scattered and their foot were taken or killed.

Copley was now pursuing, slowly, for fear of Royalist dragoons lying in ambush in the hedges and enclosures of the area around Milford. He need not have worried. Digby, if it was he who exercised complete command, had not concerned himself to look to his security, and was wasting time at Sherburn. When Copley was finally seen, it was far too late for the Royalists either to retreat, or to choose the ground on which they would fight.

According to Colonel Copley, Langdale made a speech to his men before the battle which, whether reported verbatim or not, is important. That such a speech was made, whatever its Shakespearian echoes, seems not unlikely, and Copley could have had details from either a Royalist prisoner subsequently, or from some of the Parliamentary foot herded in the town.

Gentlemen, you are all gallant men, and have done bravely, but there are some that seek to scandalize your gallantry for the loss of Naseby Field, but I hope you will redeem your reputation, and still maintain that gallant report which you ever had. I am sure you have done such businesses, as never have been done in any war with such a number, your march from Oxford, first beating of Rossiter, and the relieve of Pompret, and like I believe was never done; And I hope you are Gentlemen and that you will still maintain it, and redeem that which you have lost, For mine owne parte, I will not have you upon any designe, but where I will lead you myself...

If this speech was reported accurately, it reveals a lot. It shows a brigade where morale was low, partly through defeat in general terms, partly through being blamed for the Naseby disaster, which was nothing short of unfair, for the Northern Horse gave as much as they could in the battle. Yet most importantly, we have Langdale's closing remark: "I will not have you upon any designe, but where I will lead you myself". This can only indicate that there was some resentment amongst the northern officers concerning Digby's appointment. This was only to be expected, in view of Langdale's long command and better qualifications for the military position that Digby had been given. It may be that if Langdale had actually exercised authority, the brigade would not have lingered in Sherburn, but would have fought its last battle somewhere in Scotland with Montrose.

Langdale charged at the head of his men. The two cavalry forces met head on, and whilst Copley's left wing was driven from the field, so the left of the Royalists was also broken. In this critical moment, Copley's numerical superiority told against Digby, for he had reserves, and it was these that won the day. It was Copley's opinion that the Reformado element in the Royalist force was by far the best, which tells against the Northern Horse and suggests
that even with Langdale to lead them, they had nothing left to give. According to Poyntz's relation, this was the defeat of "a raging enemy", and Langdale himself, engaged in the front of the fighting, narrowly escaped death, having four pistols discharged at him at point blank range. When it was all over, barely 300 Royalists escaped the field, riding, according to Poyntz, toward Skipton. This, out of a force that numbered 1500 men at the start of the action.

Langdale may have escaped death, but the Northern Horse in general suffered severe losses. Colonels Francis Carnaby and Sir Richard Hutton were killed on the field, Carnaby's dying words being, reportedly, "Lord, have mercy upon me, bless and prosper his majesty". He had gone into exile with Newcastle in July 1644, but like several others, had come back, and finished his brief military career where it had begun, in the battle zone south of York. The prisoners included several prominent northern field officers. Colonel Sir Francis Anderson was taken; Lt. Colonel Nicholas Chaytor; Lt. Colonel Mathew Wentworth; Lt. Colonel James Gordon; Major Thomas Craithorne, of Clavering's old Horse; Captain Nicholas Lanyon, one of the heroes of Pontefract and now Digby's Master of the Ordnance; Captain James Cholmeley, formerly of the Scarborough garrison; Captain Ingram Marshal; Captain [Major] Peter Pudsey of Preston's Horse; and four other captains, all wounded on the field. With the other prisoners were Robert Lowther, advisor to his brother in the command in Pontefract, and Marmaduke Tunstall, a prominent Yorkshire Catholic who had aroused Lord Fairfax's animosity in 1642. The colours of Clavering's (now Forcer's) and of Carnaby's regiments were taken, and some 40 or so dead found about the area.

On October 24th Sir Mathew Boynton wrote from York that since Sherburn fight, and the earlier battle at Rowton, there were 500 Royalist prisoners in the city, most of them former commanders in the army. Some satisfaction may have been gleaned from the fact that, despite their condition, Boynton felt them to be a danger to the peace of the city.

Sir Marmaduke and Lord Digby, with the remnant of the cavalry, made their way without further mishap, to Skipton, where they found the castle in a turmoil. Mallory was too ill to govern, and the place full of fugitive field officers. Digby's authority permitted him to reorganise the command structure there until such time as Mallory should recover, and he put the governor's post into commission. It was shared between Sir John Middleton of Stockhold; Colonel Sir Thomas Strickland, Colonel Sir Francis Cobbe, Colonel William Middleton and Lt. Colonel Francis Carre, formerly of Richard Dacre's Horse.

The brigade did not long remain at Skipton but, reinforced from there and from Bolton, Digby and Langdale resolved to push on towards Scotland, choosing a route through Cumberland. The last fight has been badly neglected, but the
According to these, the Royalists marched directly towards Kirby Lonsdale where the presence of a substantial party of enemy horse obliged them to take a circuitous route towards Carlisle. They struck across the northern part of Lancashire, and were met by Colonel William Huddleston, who had apparently been released from confinement. Huddleston guided them over the treacherous sands of "Partmaket" to his seat at Millom, intending to ship them to Scotland aboard ships lying off the coast which were found, on closer inspection, not to be Irish merchantmen but Parliamentary naval vessels.

Huddleston, going either himself as a guide, or sending a local man with the Royalists, directed them north to Carlisle. Their entire journey was watched by Scottish cavalry and an English regiment, in all about 1100 strong, but the local guide led the Royalists so well, that all attempts to bring them to battle were thwarted by adroit use of the terrain. The Scots lost touch with this "nimblebrigade" but, quite unexpectedly, Colonel Sir John Browne with his regiment, stumbled upon the Royalists near Carlisle sands. Without hesitating, he resolved to give battle, finding the terrain negotiable. Langdale drew up to meet him, leaving Digby in reserve, and contemporary accounts estimated the Royalist strength to be somewhere near 1000 men. This was a nonsense, even allowing for reinforcements from Bolton and Skipton and some men picked up in the Furness area. A better estimate would be about 5 to 600 men at most, against which Browne could field a full regiment, if we suppose it up to strength.

The Parliamentarian charge was well supported by its reserve, and Langdale could not resist it. The Royalist horse broke, and Digby, either unable or unwilling to use the reserve, permitted them to scatter as well. His colours, like Langdale's, fell into enemy hands, along with half a dozen officers and about 200 troopers. It was said that 100 Royalists were killed in the brief action.

The stragglers were progressively mopped up. Some were picked up trying to reach Bolton and Skipton, some roaming pointlessly in Westmorland. A body of about 100, striving to reach Dumfries, was captured to a man. Digby, Langdale and Huddleston reached the Isle of Man, where the earl of Derby sheltered them and refused Parliamentarian demands for their persons. Sir Marmaduke emerged again in 1648, when he took to the field only to be taken, finally escaping into exile where he found some peace of mind in his conversion to Catholicism.

Bolton Castle surrendered on or around November 8th. The siege had been desultory and intermittent and had taken little of the interest of the London pamphleteers. In March, however, the Committee of Both Kingdoms had sanctioned an attempt to reduce the castle by instructing Lord Fairfax to let John Scrope's
mother speak to her son. By August 8th, however, little had come of it, even though the Committee informed York that Scrope had been ready to treat. He was to have been given extremely generous terms in order to encourage Skipton to yield, but it may be that Henry Chaytor overruled Scrope and thus held out until November when he surrendered on terms. Whitelock had the news on November 11th.

In Skipton Mallory, a dying man, returned to his command by late November, and on December 21st agreed to discuss surrender. Terms were rapidly reached by the Royalist commissioners - Major Sir Richard Tancred, formerly of Hutton's Foot; Colonel Sir Ferdinando Leigh; and one William Layton. Mallory marched out on the day following, December 22nd.

The Royalist war in the north was at an end.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOURTEEN

2. Beanbom, Discourse of the Warr, pp. 60/1.
4. Ibid., p. 137.
5. Ibid., p. 191.
7. See Vol. 2.
10. For Rowton, see below, p. 581.
11. CSPD 1645/7, pp. 165/6.
16. Beamont, Discourse of the Warr, p. 60.
22. Long, Symonds Diary, pp. 224/5.
24. CSPD 1645/7, pp. 70/1.
25. Ibid., p. 92.
26. Ibid., p. 74.
27. MA, 16, 8, 45, p. 1701.
29. Ibid.
33. Musgrave and all of these officers, with the exception of Stradling, will be found in Vol. 2.
34. Long, Symonds Diary, p. 249.
35. HMC Sixth Report, p. 80.
36. Walker, Discourses, pp. 135, 144.
37. Townshend, George Digby, pp. 80/1.
38. Whitelock, Memoirs, p. 162.
39. HMC Sixth Report, p. 80.
42. History of Northumberland, V, p. 333.
44. Leeds City Library, Vyner Mss., 5815 T/3/2/4.
46. Harland, Lancashire Lieutenantcy, p. 121.
47. CSPD 1644/5, p. 338.
48. CSPD 1645/7, p. 54.
49. Longstaffe, W.F., Richmondshire, Its Ancient Lords and Edifices, 1852, p. 100.
CONCLUSION

There are some sort of Writings devoted to the Passions and lower Agitations of the Soul, to stir Anger and whet up a rusting Animosity: But (of all others) it worst becomes an Historian to be dipt in any Drudgery of that nature. 'Tis an Affront to a Civil Reader who comes with a good Appetite, hungry for the Truth, to grate upon his Teeth with Reproaches and Aggravations; or on the other hand, to turn his Stomach with Nauseous Flourishes, and Slavish Adulation. The Reader comes not to Engage or List himself on a party, but expects with an Honest Neutrality to make Profit and a laudable Spoil from the Quarrels and Miscarriages of others....

Thus did Nathaniel Ponder preface the first edition of the Memorials of Bulstrode Whitelock published in 1682. The admonition was apt, and is no less so. In attempting to examine the history of the Royalist war machine in northern England between 1642 and 1645; in endeavouring to redress the balance of recent historiography only a little, the assumption is easily made that if the balance of historical research can be held to reflect the prevalent interest and sympathy of scholars, then such a work as this must reflect a contrary sympathy. Yet I think mere redress of balance can in itself be justification for such a work, without dragging up "rusting Animosity" however much the views of certain historians might demand severe criticism and revision.

A central theme of this study has been the need, as I have seen it, to deal with certain of the myths that have accumulated around the defeated Royalist party. Particularly in the north, I have tried to re-assess the Marquess of Newcastle's role in the light, not of popular contemporary diatribe or adulation, but of the military situation in its widest sense. My view of Newcastle as a competent, efficient and resilient commander is, I feel, supported by the evidence. In the same way, his weakness, which grew from a strength, was that he relied too heavily upon the cautious views of a man like James King, who had no vested interest in the civil war at all, and whose past and future lay in Scandinavia. Newcastle was a typical Royalist gentleman, if we are to believe the mythology of romance. He was generous, kind, gallant and far from vindictive. How these natural traits of his character could possibly blend harmoniously with the demands of warfare in his native country, is hard to say: but what drove him into exile in 1644 was his sensitivity. What defeated him was a combination of circumstances, over most of which he had no control: but the evidence is conclusive that Parliament alone could not hope to defeat him in the field. Without the Scottish invasion, lethargic and uncertain as it for a long time was, there would have been no collapse of Royalism in the north in 1644, and the civil war itself might well have ended with a Royalist military victory, or at least with a dictated peace concluded at Oxford by a gratified monarch.
The myth of Newcastle as a court gallant, quite unsuited to his military command and responsibility, has long rubbed onto his army. In point of fact, Newcastle's regiments, over-officered as they may have been, were on the whole amongst the finest at the King's disposal. They were rooted in specific areas of the north, as often as not in areas heavily populated with Catholic and Recusant gentry. Newcastle's enlightened attitude towards the Catholic gentry enabled him to construct an army that, bedevilled as it was by the caution of the senior commanders, time and again proved its worth in the field of battle. Much of its success was due to the example of the commissioned officers, colonels particularly, who expended their own money and, some of them, their lives, in defending a monarchy which, as they believed, was under attack. That there was, for long, nothing certain about the outcome of the civil war, was due in large part to the greater and lesser gentry who rallied to tradition and monarchy throughout England and Wales, so that it must be impossible to seriously speak of the Parliamentary party as the 'popular' party. This historiographical heirloom, handed down from the Whig historians, can be dismissed.

If a distinction were to be drawn, at least insofar as the north is concerned, between the opposing factions in 1643, it would not be hard to do. Whilst it is true that the Parliamentary party cannot be viewed as synonymous with Puritanism, it is certainly true that puritanism ran, as a common thread, clean through the leadership. On the contrary, in the Royalist command structure, Anglican, Catholic (whether covert or overt) and Puritan stood side by side: men like Newcastle himself, John Lord Belasyse and Conyers Lord Darcy and Conyers typify this unity in the face of crisis. This abandonment of irrelevant peace-time hostilities by the Royalist gentry contributed a good deal to Newcastle's ability to fight as he did.

I have shown, moreover, that one aspect of contemporary Parliamentarian propaganda which has been called into question in recent years, that is, the claim that vast numbers of Catholics made up the bulk of the King's army, had some truth in it. Both in the Introduction, in the course of the narrative of the years 1642/5, and in the regimental biographies in Vol. 2., I have demonstrated that Catholics played a very important part in the manning of Newcastle's fighting army. Moreover, far from being reluctant participants in events, the Catholic gentry, whether greater or lesser, committed themselves as much as, if not more than, their Anglican neighbours. The reasons for their involvement must have been many, but a central factor could only have been an attachment to tradition and to monarchy, which lay at the heart of Royalism as a military and political force during the years of rebellion and Interregnum.

In the field of military strategy and decision-making, I endeavoured to

*Lord Darcy's Puritanism may be called in question, and he anyway left the north with the Queen if not before: but there were certainly, officers serving under Newcastle with Puritan leanings.*
approach the source materials in a fresh way. That is, by relying upon my own judgement first and foremost, before examining the views of others with a view to amendment where it might seem necessary. Thus I have endeavoured to show that the failure of the Royalist army to capitalise upon several sweeping victories in 1643 was due, not to the competence of the opposing generals (particularly Thomas Fairfax) but to hesitation on the part of the Royalist high command. This has entailed a sharp revision of the role of Sir Thomas Fairfax, which could only appear somewhat harsh if seen in the light of the quite unreasonable adulation and approval which has been showered on him for centuries. That same adulation reflected upon an objective examination of Fairfax's opponents, and the re-appraisal of the one led of necessity to the re-appraisal of the other.

Crucial to the examination of the military campaigns has been the contention that Selby, fought on April 11th 1644, was the single most important action in the north. It paved the way for the siege of York and the defeat on Marston Moor, but had it gone the other way - had Belasyse won the battle, or avoided fighting it - then the outcome of the war might have been totally different. At Selby the northern infantry regiments raised in Yorkshire were broken, and Newcastle's old army crippled beyond repair. On Marston Moor, what was left of it went down fighting, and afterwards nothing was left with which the Marquess could continue to fight, since Rupert took the cavalry away with him. It really does seem that had Cromwell fought at Selby, and not at Marston Moor, this would have been perceived long ago, although I have not claimed to originality. Even Markham, Fairfax's biographer, perceived the significance of Selby, and had he not been concerned with biography might have enlarged upon his view and so rectified the undue importance attached to Marston Moor long ago. Of course, in giving Selby its due position in the military campaigns of the first civil war, it has not been necessary to reject Marston Moor as of minor importance. Marston Moor saw the end of Newcastle's field army: it was momentous in that sense, and it could be argued that Oliver Cromwell laid the foundations of his military reputation on the bodies of Newcastle's infantry and the first major blow to the reputation of Prince Rupert. Thomas Fairfax's reputation, on the other hand, was never much more than a propaganda myth until he secured command of the New Model, but that stage in his career lay outside the scope of this study.

Newcastle and his commanders built a fighting army out of the miscellaneous groups of volunteers and regimental structures which the King left behind him in the north in the summer of 1642. Newcastle recovered from the terrible setbacks which the earl of Cumberland had suffered, and forged a fighting machine that was invincible in the field until it was forced to fight on two fronts in the winter of 1644. No army can survive such a war, however veteran.
its troops. Yet the capacity of the northern army for recovery, shown time and again in 1643, was even better exemplified in 1644/5 when what was left of its cavalry regiments, performed two remarkable reliefs of the garrison of Pontefract. Sir John Mayney in September 1644, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale in March 1645 demonstrated the calibre of the horse that Newcastle had raised and trained.

If Newcastle and his army stood in need of a new study, the same was equally true of the earl of Derby and the Lancashire Royalists. If Newcastle has been depicted as a courageous but vainglorious courtier holding a military rank to which he was not suited, and if that view of him can be shown to be untenable: then as much is true of Derby, whose reputation for cruelty and stupidity has survived into the present century, so that even an historian such as C.V. Wedgwood can add authority to the myth. Derby was certainly more conscious of his honour than even Newcastle, but it has to be said that Derby was fighting two adversaries: on the left, as it were, the Parliamentarian forces based on Manchester and Salford Hundred, and on the other his fellow Royalist commanders in Yorkshire and away at Oxford, who drew upon his fighting men whenever it pleased them, given authority to do so by the King himself. The truth of the matter is that Derby never had a chance to show what he could do. His very military position in relation to that of Newcastle for example, was unclear: he could not even command Colonel Sir Philip Musgrave to send Cumbrian forces to his aid.

Lancashire never seems to have played an important role in the military strategy of the Oxford council of war. It was always peripheral, and the Royalists there - apart from the formed regiments which were drawn away to fight elsewhere - left to their own devices. In other words, the Oxford commanders failed to perceive how important Lancashire was. Had they made a real effort to support Derby - whatever they may have thought of him - they could have provided themselves with a base from which the Irish regiments that eventually came over, could move out across England. They could also have kept control of a county where Royalism was strong and prevalent throughout the community. The religious polarisation there - the bitterness of the Puritans towards the high Catholic population of parts of the county - could have been capitalised upon. Instead, Derby was left to fight a war no one was much interested in, with a diminishing army and a lack of clear cut authority. Had Derby listened to the overtures of the Parliamentarians in 1642, and gone over to them, although it would have gone against everything for which he stood, instead of fighting as he did, matters would have been very serious for the earl of Newcastle in 1643. Indeed, Royalism might have been on the defensive throughout the north by the summer of that year. Derby's role was crucial to the achievements of his fellow peer, and his failure was no fault of his own.

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Compared with Yorkshire and Lancashire, the other northern counties had a quiet war, at least until 1644. Northumberland and Durham contributed their fair share of regiments to Newcastle's army - it was, after all, Northumbrian and Bishopric regiments which perished on Marston Moor in the justifiably famous stand of the Whitecoats. Cumberland and Westmorland, however, seem to have existed in a world of their own, until Carlisle siege began and the Scots encroached on a hitherto peaceful area. The local commanders bickered amongst themselves, for after the departure of a few regiments to Newcastle's army - those of men like Huddleston, Featherstonehaugh and Dalston - the colonels that remained behind possessed no sense of unified purpose. Sir Philip Musgrave did all that he could, but was constantly balked by jealous fellow gentry who, apparently, could not bring themselves to accept his designated authority. It really did not matter so long as Newcastle was winning his victories, and so long as Lancashire Parliamentarians were content merely to hold what they had won and not to embark upon any invasion of Cumbria. But it certainly mattered in the autumn of 1644, and then Cumbria collapsed, only Carlisle and Scaleby holding out, defended by, we must suppose, the gentry which had always been loyal to the King, as opposed to elements which had paid lip service to Royalism so long as they were dominated by a Royalist overall authority situated at York, but which reverted to neutralism or outright Parliamentarianism when times changed. The curious case of Sir Richard Graham, dealt with in some detail, exemplifies the ambivalence to be found in the largely Protestant fells and dales of the north west.

The years 1644/5 in the north were years of decline. Royalist enclaves held out sturdily, or, as in the case of Newcastle upon Tyne, went down bloodily, in hope of resurgence in the south and relief from the King. The long sieges of Pontefract, Scarborough and Carlisle, as well as of Lathom, Greenhalgh, Skipton, Sandal and Bolton, occupied numerous Parliamentarian and Scottish forces for months on end. The grand futility of the defenders has to be seen as proof of their concept of loyalty, for the die-hard will always appear futile to the mercenary or the pessimistic. In a sense, Lowther in Pontefract, Cholmeley in Scarborough, Mallory in Skipton, Marley in Newcastle, Glemham in Carlisle, Rostern in Lathom, Chaytor in Bolton and others, vividly demonstrated that defeat in the field was not defeat for the principles of Royalism as they understood them. Some politicians in London in 1645 and in 1648 and 1650/1 must have realised that there was no peace to be had with the defeated party. For all their victories in the field, it was, after all, the Parliamentarians who fragmented and lost direction. The Royalists in the Interregnum years might have differed over tactics, but the fundamental monarchic principle remained common to them all.

The history of the Royalist army in northern England is the history of failure. It was the failure of a military enterprise, but not the failure of
Royalism itself. It is almost self-evident to say that such a study is not concerned solely with anonymous bodies of troops, or the decisions of leading military and political figures. It has also to do with individuals, men about whom history is ordinarily silent, and I am not aware that hitherto any attempt has been made to identify the officers of one of the major Royalist forces engaged in the first civil war. It will surely tell us much more about the nature of that war, if we can discover who were the men who took up arms for one side or another, what their social status was, their family status, and, where possible, their religious persuasion. In Vol. 2 my work on the Royalist regimental officers will be found, as complete as it has been possible to make it: whilst the statistical findings have already been examined and discussed in the Introduction. In giving the biographical details where such have been ascertained, it has been my wish to put meat upon the dry bones of statistical tables. For in writing a military history, it is essential to keep in mind the fact that we are dealing with men who, for the most part, made a choice to put their lives at risk.

It has been my contention that a wider understanding of the forces at work in 17th century England, and especially and particularly during the years of civil war and Interregnum, can be arrived at by a study of all degrees of society. The logical extension of this work would be, if it were possible, a detailed biographical analysis of a single regiment or of selected regiments, chosen on county and regional factors with particular reference to religious and social considerations. In Vol. 2, in the appendices, will be found an attempt to do this on a wider scale. It may be that the wider scale is the only valid way in which to conduct such a study, at least where Royalist regiments are concerned.

My sympathy for my subject, for the northern Royalists, will have been apparent. Yet I have endeavoured to avoid that "sort of Writings devoted to the Passions and lower Agitations of the Soul" and those "Nauseous Flourishes" which Nathaniel Ponder denounced in 1682. Until now, there has been no attempt to examine the men or their actions between 1642 and 1645, the years of civil war in the north. This work has tried to make up for that, to redress as I have said, the historical balance.