Doing Politically Engaged Conversation Analysis with Talk by Lesbians and Gay Men: Categories, Person Reference and Heteronormativity in Action

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Abstract

This thesis reports the findings of conversation analytic studies exploring how sexuality categories and other issues relevant to lesbian and gay lives become relevant in ordinary talk-in-interaction. Drawing on a naturalistic data set of over 150 recorded telephone calls comprising the incoming and outgoing calls from five non-heterosexual households in the UK, these studies explore when and how sexuality is spontaneously oriented to as relevant by participants (Chapters 2-4). The research presented in this thesis also shows how talk by speakers who are (as it happens) lesbians or gay men can be categorised as other than relevantly ‘lesbian/gay talk’ and/or as talk produced by some other category member (Chapters 5-6). Overall, this thesis is a concrete demonstration of how conversation analytic work with an explicit political commitment can be situated in and contribute to three fields of research: (i) interdisciplinary lesbian and gay studies; (ii) sexuality and language research; and (iii) conversation analysis. To lesbian and gay studies, this research furthers our understanding of coming out, not coming out, passing, and covering; explicates some of the similarities and differences between sexuality categories; adds to our understanding of mundane heterosexism; and contributes to our knowledge about how lesbian and gay people navigate the social world. The thesis also contributes to sexuality and language research: by showing the relevance of sexuality in mundane interaction; by demonstrating problems of conceptualising a ‘lesbian or gay language’; by showing how sexuality becomes relevant through action in talk; and by demonstrating the viability of CA for language and sexuality research. In addition to showing how CA can be appropriated for politically engaged research, the work in this thesis: contributes to our understanding of categorisation in talk-in-interaction; demonstrates how we might approach the study of category-bound activities; furthers our knowledge of the practice of person reference; and contributes to our understanding of correction.
Contents

Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... vii
Author’s Declaration ...................................................................................................... x
Publications ................................................................................................................... xi

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction: Why study lesbian and gay lives? ............................................................ 1
Lesbian and gay studies: A feminist perspective ......................................................... 8
   The emergence of lesbian and gay categories: A precondition for the field ........... 8
   Contemporary lesbian and gay studies ................................................................. 10
Feminism .................................................................................................................. 12
   Who are you calling ‘gay’? The terminology of lesbian and gay studies.............. 15
      (a) Identity v. category ......................................................................................... 15
      (b) Which categories? .......................................................................................... 17
Sexuality and language ................................................................................................ 21
   Existing research ................................................................................................. 22
      (a) Lexical items .................................................................................................. 23
      (b) Lesbian and gay language .............................................................................. 24
      (c) Doing sexuality in language ........................................................................... 26
      (d) Future directions ............................................................................................. 31
Conversation analysis .................................................................................................. 33
Ethnomethodology ................................................................................................... 34
   Key features of conversation analysis .................................................................. 35
Doing politically engaged CA ......................................................................................... 40
      (a) Feminists’ and critical researchers’ reservations ............................................ 41
      (b) Conversation analysts’ reservations ............................................................. 43
My approach to doing politically engaged CA in practice ........................................... 45
Data .......................................................................................................................... 45
      (a) CA’s data ....................................................................................................... 45
      (b) My data: The Land corpus .......................................................................... 49
Avoiding essentialism ................................................................................................. 54
   Talk as constitutive of the social world and relationships ..................................... 57
Participants’ orientations ......................................................................................... 59
   Using CA with an explicitly political commitment .............................................. 63
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 67
Overview of the thesis ............................................................................................... 68
Chapter 4: Indexing Sexuality Beyond Coming Out

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 169
Beyond coming out .................................................................................................... 169
Overview of the chapter ............................................................................................. 171
Indexing LGBT sexuality .......................................................................................... 173
Talking about relationships .................................................................................... 173
(a) Explicit sexual references, joking and innuendo ........................................ 174
(b) Topic talk (about ‘couple’ relationships) .................................................... 176
(c) Person reference forms ......................................................................... 178
(d) The use of a locally initial ‘we’ ................................................................. 181
Talk about participation in LGBT events .............................................................. 186
Labelling speakers as members of sexuality categories ....................................... 190
Displaying and reproducing understandings of LGBT lives ............................... 193
Shared understandings and problems in talk about LGBT relationships .......... 194
Marriage and partnerships ............................................................................... 197
Families of origin .............................................................................................. 203
Having children ................................................................................................. 206
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 210
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Overview of the chapter ................................................................. 316
Overview of the findings of each analytic chapter ......................... 316
Contributions ................................................................................. 320
Contributions to lesbian and gay studies ...................................... 320
(a) Coming out, not coming out, passing, and covering .............. 321
(b) Similarities and differences between sexuality categories .... 322
(c) Mundane heterosexism .......................................................... 324
(d) Navigating the ordinary social world ...................................... 326
Contributions to sexuality and language research ..................... 328
(a) Sexuality in mundane interaction .......................................... 329
(b) Not ‘lesbian and gay language’ .............................................. 330
(c) Sexuality becomes relevant through actions in talk .............. 331
(d) The viability of CA for language and sexuality research ....... 332
Contributions to conversation analysis ....................................... 335
(a) Categorisation ................................................................. 336
(b) Category-bound activities .................................................... 337
(c) Person reference .............................................................. 339
(d) Correction ........................................................................ 340
Strengths and limitations ............................................................ 342
Strengths of the research ............................................................ 343
Limitations of the research .......................................................... 345
(a) Sample ........................................................................... 345
(b) Topical restrictions .......................................................... 347
(c) Unanswered questions ....................................................... 347
Some directions for future research ............................................. 348
Developing research themes ....................................................... 348
(a) Categorisation and person reference terms ....................... 348
(b) Default person reference ................................................ 349
(c) Constructing gender ......................................................... 350
New research directions ............................................................. 351
(a) Negotiating the move into and out of ‘institutional talk’ and its relationship with ‘ordinary conversation’ .............. 351
Final comment .......................................................................... 356

Appendix I: Consent form .............................................................. 358
Appendix II: Transcription notation ............................................. 360
References .................................................................................. 363
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The thesis is dedicated with love
to the memory of Karen

You always believed in me and you showed me what it meant to have
strength and courage. You touched my life
in the most profound way.
Author’s Declaration

This is to certify that I am responsible for the work submitted in this thesis and that this original work is my own except as specified in acknowledgements, footnotes, or references. Neither the thesis nor the original work contained therein has been submitted to this or any other institution for a higher degree.

.................................................................. (Signed)

.................................................................. (Date)
Parts of this thesis have already been published, or are under review for possible publication, elsewhere.

(a) A version of Chapter 2 has been published as:

(b) An article comprising parts of Chapters 3 and 4 has been published as:

(c) A version of part of Chapter 4 is forthcoming as:

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Introduction: Why study lesbian and gay lives?

Lesbian and gay people are imprisoned under laws which police the bedroom and criminalize a kiss; they are tortured to extract confessions of “deviance” and raped to “cure” them of it; they are killed by “death squads” in societies which view them as “disposables”; they are executed by the state which portrays them as a threat to society (Amnesty International, 1999: 6).

Amnesty International only recognised lesbian and gay people as political prisoners in the 1990s and, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 70 states still have laws that prohibit same-sex sexual behaviour (Amnesty International, 2001: 12). In countries such as Malaysia, Jamaica, and Saudi Arabia breaking these laws is punishable with lengthy prison sentences and physical violence, such as hundreds or even thousands of lashes administered publicly. Even in states where corporal punishment is not officially sanctioned, those caught often face extremely brutal treatment from the state officials they encounter, and case studies have revealed such instances even where the state does not legislate against same-sex sexual behaviour. Amnesty International has documented numerous examples of homophobic attacks from police and prison officers. In some countries in which there are no laws criminalizing same-sex sexual behaviour, such as Russia and the Ukraine, there exist compulsory state programmes to ‘cure’ lesbians and gay men. In such places, being caught might result in being forced into psychiatric hospitals. Violence is not only meted out by state institutions, in many societies the family or community at large are the perpetrators or supporters of attacks against homosexuals (Amnesty International, 2001). Under conditions such as these it is hardly surprising that
many lesbians and gay men are forced to seek asylum outside of their country of origin. However, they then often face difficulty gaining international protection on the grounds of sexual orientation despite the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) policy stipulating sexual orientation does constitute grounds for seeking protection (Amnesty International, 2001: 49).

Lesbians and gay men in the West can condemn and campaign against the tragedy and injustice of these events that occur across the globe while feeling thankful that we do not live under such conditions. In the West, ‘[c]ommentators who speak on behalf of heterosexuality … regard something called “equality” for the homosexual citizen as both desirable and already achieved’ (Bricknell, 2001: 213). Indeed, this was exemplified in a recent headline in the UK newspaper The Guardian, in which Fanshawe (2006) proclaimed: ‘Society now accepts gay men as equals’, not as an item of news in itself (rather this information was treated as already known, obvious, and beyond question) but, rather, in service of the point of the article in which he questioned the ‘childish’ behaviour of gay men (as a gay man, of course).

Society has indeed changed and lesbians and gay men are living lives that would have been unrecognisable to their brothers and sisters a couple of generations ago who mostly lived lives of secrecy, stigma and shame (e.g., Wildebloode, 1959; Goffman, 1963; Lee, 1977; Potter & Darty, 1981; Pillard, 1982). In the UK the law criminalizing sex between men was repealed in 1967 (Jivani, 1997) and in 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the list of mental illnesses catalogued in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (Rubenstein, 1995). More recently, in the UK the bar preventing openly lesbian and gay people in the armed forces was lifted (BBC News, 2000), Section 28 – which banned local authorities from promoting homosexuality or teaching ‘the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship’ (Jivani, 1997: 195) – was repealed (BBC News, 2003), it has become much easier for lesbian and gay people to adopt and foster children (Hicks, 2005), and rights for same-sex couples were enshrined in law with the advent of civil partnerships (which afford rights equivalent to marriage) in December 2005 which led The Independent (2005) to proclaim it was ‘a bright
day for equality'. Aside from laws and policies, there have been other changes that indicate greater inclusion and visibility for lesbians and gay men, such as, increasing numbers of lesbian and gay characters on television and in films, growing numbers of lesbian and gay books and other publications in mainstream outlets, and a climate of apparent greater social acceptability for lesbians and gay men. This change has been documented in sociological research (Seidman et al, 2002; Seidman, 2004).

Despite these seemingly progressive changes, scratching just beneath the surface reveals that life for lesbian and gay people in the West is not as rosy as it might first appear. From New Zealand where a 'hierarchical, heterosexist social order is represented as “equal”' (Bricknell, 2001: 229) to the United States where there is ‘an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community’ (Herek et al, 1998: 17), research continues to highlight injustices – from small disruptions and difficulties to abuse and violence – experienced by lesbian and gay people as a result of their sexuality. Many indications of greater social inclusion are not all they seem, for example: civil partnerships fall short of full equality with marriage by ‘creating an apartheid system of state-recognized relationships’ (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2004: 133); despite no official injunctions, lesbians and gay men continue to have their applications to foster or adopt rejected due to their sexuality (Hicks & McDermott, 1999); and positive teaching of LGBT issues is lacking or non-existent in schools, which is particularly problematic given the scale of homophobic bullying (Warwick et al, 2004). Although there are more lesbian and gay characters on television, the BBC’s representation of lesbian and gay people continues to rely heavily on caricatures and stereotypes and often for comic effect; they do little to tackle issues of homophobia and heterosexism; and they appear reticent to depict lesbian and gay people living everyday lives (Cowan & Valentine, 2006) and this is a trend that is replicated in movie portrayal of lesbian and gay people (Hari, 2006). Furthermore, campaigners are often acutely aware that advances that have been made may be revoked in the future so there is a need for vigilance, which partially explains why the recent appointment of someone who has been noticeably silent on (probably as a result of opposition to) issues relating to
lesbian and gay rights as the UK’s government minister for equality has (understandably) caused great concern for lesbian and gay activists (Russell, 2006).

In the UK, Stonewall’s (1996) study of “Queer Bashing” found that many lesbian and gay people experience violence and harassment and nearly three quarters have been subject to verbal abuse. They also found that most lesbian and gay people took steps to avoid this violence and abuse such as avoiding public displays of affection, making a concerted effort not to look ‘obviously gay’, or passing as heterosexual. Only 4% of their sample claimed not to take any measures to prevent this harassment and violence. These activist organisations work to highlight the ongoing injustices faced by oppressed groups and to help those who need it: from the global campaigns to end state sanctioned torture on the basis of sexuality (e.g., Amnesty International, 1999, 2001) to the more local issues such as Stonewall’s (2004) ‘Education for All’ campaign to challenge homophobic bullying in schools in the UK and to raise awareness about the abolition of Section 28.

Even in the sanctity of our homes we can switch on the news to hear about a woman being stabbed because she is lesbian (19 November 2003) or individual councils clinging to the legacy of Section 28 even after the law has been abolished (17 November 2003). Or, we can open our newspapers to read reports of a man being murdered in a homophobic attack (*The Times*, 2005), findings of a survey that show most gay teachers experience abuse (*The Guardian*, 2006), or a report of an employee being sacked for being gay (Gillian, in *The Guardian*, 2006). These are clearly gross injustices that have real detrimental and devastating effects on the lives of those who experience them. The research, campaigning, and reporting that highlights and challenges these oppressive practices is crucial to the lives of individual lesbian and gay people and to lesbian and gay movements.

However, there is another type of oppression that impacts on our lives that is much more subtle and insidious. Jackson (2006) describes the way in which ‘heterosexual privilege is woven into the fabric of social life, pervasively and
insidiously ordering everyday existence’ (p.108). Although these instances of everyday heterosexism are not as shocking or detrimental as rape or physical violence for example they are much more frequent and attract little or no publicity outside of academia, but they constitute the background to our everyday lives. The concept of heterosexism was created to undermine the psychological implications of the term ‘homophobia’ which accounts for anti-lesbian and anti-gay sentiments and actions with reference to an individual’s pathology (Kitzinger & Perkins, 1993; Kitzinger, 1996). ‘Homophobia’ produces the opposition to non-heterosexuality ‘as simply too uniform, too directed, too personally individual, too pathological, and too fixed’ (Plummer, 1992: 19). ‘Heterosexism’, on the other hand, is more consonant with sociological endeavours since it locates these attitudes and actions within a social context and encompasses the institutional and broader social influences that constrain, shape and oppress lesbian and gay people. Researchers studying heterosexism have predominantly relied on self-report data gathered from participants’ agreement and disagreement with statements relating to lesbians and gay men, the most well-known of these is perhaps Herek’s (1994) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) scale. However, a major problem with these scales – in addition to the problems of participants self-reporting their attitudes – is that they rely on the researcher’s preconception of what constitutes heterosexism and as such ‘scale items incorporate a particular, contested, definition of prejudice against lesbians and gays’ (Kitzinger & Peel, 2005: 175). This invariably means constructing heterosexism in line with liberal understandings of sexuality, a position that is inconsistent with many feminist perspectives (see Kitzinger, 1987). Although such scales retain some contemporary appeal, more recently researchers have begun to examine the discursive construction of heterosexism (Baker, 2004; Meyers, 1994; Morrish, 1997; Speer & Potter, 2000, 2002; Stokoe & Smithson, 2002). However, while this research has tended to focus on public discourses (e.g., Meyers, 1994; Baker, 2004) or researcher-generated talk (e.g., Speer & Potter, 2000), my interest is in how heterosexism is produced, managed, and oriented to in ordinary, everyday interaction. I will be building on the sociological tradition of the study of the everyday and the mundane exemplified by Goffman (1963) in his work on the management of stigmatised identities. But, unlike Goffman, I use empirical data and I will focus on a specific type of
stigma management (i.e., managing non-heterosexuality in a heterosexist society).

In her study of talk produced in Lesbian and Gay Awareness Training (LGAT) sessions, Peel (2001) examines how heterosexism is subtly reflected and reproduced. She refers to this subtle, everyday heterosexism as mundane heterosexism. Incidents of mundane heterosexism include, for example, occasions when we have to listen to heterosexist jokes and comments, particularly when in unfamiliar company, and then have to manage not aligning with it but, at the same time, not challenging it overtly because this will be treated as impolite or socially inadequate ("you can't take a joke"). I usually find creating a diversion a useful strategy for this, but it makes me feel uncomfortable to have let it go unchallenged and it is additional 'work' that I would not have to do if the world was not set up such that people can expect to be able to make heterosexist comments without being challenged.

Numerous instances reveal heterosexist assumptions that must be challenged on an almost daily basis. One such occasion occurred when my (female) partner and I arrived on holiday. I had booked a hotel room via the telephone and, when we arrived, one of the owners greeted us looking embarrassed saying that she had the booking recorded as a double room. She had apologised for her error before we had time to speak and offered to prepare a twin bedded room for us instead. I said that there hadn't been a mistake; I had booked a double room. Her husband (as she immediately referred to him) then arrived at reception and I had to repeat the explanation when he also tried to offer us a different room. On another occasion, I had started a new job and one of my co-workers and I were chatting in the break, she asked me where I lived and whether I lived with my family and I told her I lived with my partner, at just this point we were interrupted and then had to return to work. Later in the afternoon she called across the room “what did you say your chap's name was?” therefore putting me in the position of having to come out to a room of strangers on my first day. Luckily for me, my co-workers responded with 'that's okay' and ‘it doesn’t bother me'!
Crucially, in these two instances, it is not that people were intentionally being oppressive or malicious, quite on the contrary, in the first instance they were just trying to solve what they perceived to be an error on their part and not make us uneasy by having to share a bed, and in the second instance my new colleague was simply showing interest in my life and, as it turned out, was including us on the evening out she was arranging. However, in the course of doing these things they presumed I was heterosexual thereby creating an awkward situation for me and for themselves – one which more often than not I feel I am somehow responsible for and end up working twice as hard to get the interaction back on an even keel.

Thinking about these experiences reveal many more instances than could be documented here. They are so frequent that they become almost matter-of-course. However, they are never going to find their way into the news and, because of their subtlety, they are less likely to be reported by research participants. But, they do cause awkwardness, social unease and annoyance as they disrupt the ongoing activity of our lives. These are the incidents that anyone whose life challenges heteronormativity faces on a regular basis. The study of this kind of subtle and pervasive oppression is one of the objectives of the research presented in this thesis.

The research on which this thesis is based is a conversation analytic study that relies predominantly, but not exclusively, on talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers, with a focus on when and how sexuality becomes relevant in talk-in-interaction. I situate this research in and contribute to the three disparate fields of lesbian and gay studies, research on language and sexuality, and conversation analysis. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of lesbian and gay studies, which includes consideration of the relationship between lesbian and gay studies and feminism and attending to some issues of terminology pertinent to the research presented in this thesis. I will examine existing research on sexuality and language and consider some directions for future research in this field. I will then present the methodological approach for this research, which includes: discussion of the key features of a conversation analytic approach; consideration
of how conversation analysis can be combined with politically engaged work; and a description of the data corpus upon which this research is based. Finally, I will provide an overview of the composition of the thesis.

**Lesbian and gay studies: A feminist perspective**

Lesbian and gay studies is an inherently politically engaged field of research. It emerged out of the lesbian and gay movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Munt, 1997). This field of research 'is not a single discipline with a single object of study' (Weeks, 2000) so I can provide only a brief sketch here. In this section, I outline the emergence of sexuality categories (which was a precondition for the development of lesbian and gay studies) and development of social constructionist conceptualisations of these categories. I then delineate the scope of contemporary lesbian and gay studies before considering the relationship between this field of research and feminism. Finally, I attend to two terminology issues that are pertinent to lesbian and gay research and justify my choice of terminology in the research presented in this thesis.

**The emergence of lesbian and gay categories: A precondition for the field**

The emergence of the notion of a distinct type of person who participates in same-sex sexual activity was a necessary precondition for the development of lesbian and gay studies. Prior to the nineteenth century the Church was the dominant regulator of sexual behaviour in Europe (Healy, 2004). Deviant sexual behaviour included sex outside of marriage (and thus all same-sex sexual activity), sexual activity within marriage other than sexual intercourse for procreative purposes (such as oral sex), masturbation, prostitution, and so on. Engaging in same-sex sexual activity was a sin (and for men also a crime\(^1\)) but

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1 Sexual contact between women was less acknowledged and, with widespread denial that such activity took place, the law did not explicitly prohibit women from same-sex sexual activity (see Oram & Turnbull, 2001).
conceptualisation of a particular kind of person who behaved this way did not exist. There were no distinctions between different acts of sexual deviance ‘whether between man and woman, man and beast, or man and man’ (Weeks, 1977: 12).

Then, with the advent of the discipline of sexology, there came the emergence of the notion that there were particular kinds of people and, as a result, the creation of sexuality categories: Ulrichs’ ‘urnings’ (Goldstein, 1996) and ‘uranians’ (Plummer, 1998); Ellis’ ‘inverts’ (Calder-Marshall, 1959); Carpenter’s ‘intermediate’ sex (Hekma, 2000); and it was Karl Kertbeny who, in 1869, first publicly used the term ‘homosexual’ (Katz, 1996). There had been some terms previously used in some sectors of society to refer to people who engaged in same-sex sexual behaviour (e.g., catamites, sodomites, pederasts) but these new terms (e.g., homosexual, invert, intermediate sex) emerged during a period in which the concept of a particular type of person (i.e., the contemporary ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay man’) solidified: ‘The sodomite had been a temporary aberration: the homosexual was now a species’ (Foucault, 1978: 43). This shift underlies both the pathologicalisation of homosexuals, and the challenges of the lesbian and gay movement. It was from the lesbian and gay movement that lesbian and gay studies as an academic pursuit first developed during the 1970s (Hogan & Hudson, 1998), since many people were both activists and academics (Munt, 1997).

At the time that these early theorists (e.g. Ellis and Kertbeny) were creating categories of sexuality they were working within a scientific-medical paradigm such that they were labelling a ‘condition’ that had always existed but that had gone undiagnosed, in this sense then, they adopted an essentialist view of sexuality (Epstein, 1987). It was not until much later that constructionist researchers began to examine the emergence of the homosexual as a social construct (e.g., Foucault, 1978; Stein, 1990) and from this developed an understanding of sexuality as a complex social role rather than a condition (McIntosh, 1968). Within sociology, the classic paper by Mary McIntosh (1968) ‘firmly established what subsequently became known as the constructionist-essentialist debate’ (Plummer, 2000: 50). This debate is now well rehearsed in
lesbian and gay studies and, although the positions remain central as theoretical foundations for contemporary research, the argument itself is frequently regarded as 'wearisome' (Weeks, 2000: 2) and 'exhausted' (Healy, 2004: 201), although see Bricknell (2006) and DeLamater & Hyde (1998) for good contemporary discussions. Over the last thirty years or so, studying the construction of lesbian and gay identities has become a fruitful and popular endeavour for researchers contributing to the study of lesbian and gay lives (e.g., Dank, 1971; Epstein, 1987; Plummer, 1975; Ponse, 1978; Simon & Gagnon, 1967; Troiden, 1988; Watson & Weinberg, 1982). However, while these studies have tended to be broad in focus by examining ‘general patterns’ of identity formation (Troiden, 1988: 261) and ‘the life cycle of the homosexual’ (Simon & Gagnon, 1967: 178), they have rarely explored the everyday production of and orientation to participants’ sexualities. It is the mundane production of sexualities that is the focus of my own research. Moreover, the few researchers (e.g., Watson & Weinberg, 1982) who have researched ‘the collaborative interactional construction of...homosexual identity’ (p.58), have tended to do so in researcher-generated interaction such as interviews. My focus, by contrast, is on the spontaneous relevance of sexuality in naturalistic talk.

Contemporary lesbian and gay studies

Lesbian and gay studies ‘does not comprise a coherent field’ (Bristow, 1992). Rather, it is an interdisciplinary enterprise with perhaps most of its research being born out of sociology, psychology, and women’s studies. Other disciplines that contribute to the field include: linguistics, literary studies, media studies, politics, history, philosophy, law, and economics. There are problems associated with interdisciplinary bodies of research such as difficulties integrating across disciplinary boundaries (see Cameron, 1996) or researchers being unaware of existing work due to the lack of a ‘real disciplinary home’ (Kulick, 2000: 246). However, as with other interdisciplinary research areas (see Mills, 1995), this pluralist approach benefits from ‘the rich tapestry’ (Weeks, 2000: 1) of methodological and theoretical perspectives.
Making visible oppression and the study of heterosexism (e.g., Baker, 2004; Kitzinger & Peel, 2005; Meyers, 1994; Morrish, 1997; Peel, 2001; Speer & Potter, 2000, 2002; Stokoe & Smithson, 2002) has been one of the key features of this field of research. But, the topics of investigation for lesbian and gay studies are even broader than the disciplinary approaches taken. Lesbian and gay studies subsumes research on every aspect of lesbian and gay lives, including: same-sex ‘couple’ relationships (Heapy et al, 1996; Murphy, 1996); sexual activity and sexual desire (Ridge, 2004; Simon & Gagnon, 1984); lesbian and gay families (Clarke & Kitzinger, 2004; Tasker, 2002; Weston, 1991); becoming lesbian or gay and coming out (Bowleg et al, 2003; Lewis et al, 2001; Markowe, 2002; Whisman, 1996); abuse, violence, and homophobia (Herek & Berrill, 1992; Robohm et al, 2003); media representations (Kooijman, 2005; Mazur et al, 2002; Wilton, 1995a); lesbian and gay people at work (Dunne, 2002; Woods, 1996); and health and illness (Adam, 1992; Rogers et al, 2003; Wilkinson, 2002). Moreover, the remit of lesbian and gay studies expands beyond the study of lesbian and gay lives:

[W]e are also concerned with other things outside that, from legal codes to cultural representation, defining parts of lived life, certainly, but developing modes of interpretation and audiences that are often distinctive, and throw stark light on heterosexuality as much as homosexuality (Weeks, 2000: 2).

Eager to address the heterosexual bias and invisibility of lesbian and gay people (at least outside of a deviance framework), early researchers attempted to remedy the problem by studying the lives of lesbian and gay people. But, ironically, these studies also contributed to continuing heterosexual bias by reproducing heterosexuality as the default, unmarked position. More recently, in line with the trend for putting other dominant, unmarked groups under the spotlight, such as white as a racial category (e.g., Fine et al, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993; McIntosh, 1988) and men as a sex category (e.g., Georgakopoulou, 2005; Gough, 2001; Kiesling, 2005), researchers have begun to examine heterosexuality qua heterosexuality (e.g., Katz, 1995; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1993; Jackson, 1999;
Richardson, 1996). In the contemporary field of lesbian and gay studies, then, all sexuality categories fall within the researcher's remit.

A major topic of investigation in lesbian and gay studies has been the study of coming out (in terms of sexuality) as this is a distinctive lesbian and gay phenomenon. However, advancement in our understanding of this is limited due to the fact that ‘[r]esearch on the coming out process has relied entirely on retrospective accounts’ (Rothblum, 2000: 203). Gathering data in this way allows researchers access to talk about the topic – for the purposes of studying the events, incidents, thoughts, and attitudes reported – that they are interested in. However, there are inevitable problems with using self-report data: 'memories can be fallible, stories can be embroidered, participants may be more interested in creating a good impression than in literal accuracy, speakers sometimes contradict themselves and sometimes deliberately lie' (Kitzinger, 2003: 126). Despite this, talk about the phenomenon in question remains the central form of data for studying that phenomenon in much lesbian and gay research. By contrast, my interest is in the study of 'real life' interaction through which issues pertaining to sexuality become apparent. In this way, I can access participants' lives 'first hand' (Kitzinger, 2003). I will contribute to our understanding of coming out as a lesbian and gay event in three main ways: first, I will explore the effects of coming out (or not) as they 'leak' beyond incidents in which coming out is relevant; second, I will analyse actual instances of coming out as they arise in talk-in-interaction; and, third, I will examine data in which speakers index their (and others') sexuality but which do not comprise occasions of coming out.

Feminism

The purpose of research within lesbian and gay studies is not only to describe and analyse the nature of lesbian and gay people's lives, but also one of the defining characteristics of research in this field is a commitment to greater sexual equality and the desire to challenge the oppressive social order (Weeks, 2000). Challenging an oppressive social order is also a feature of feminism. Feminism has been a motivating factor in the development of lesbian and gay movements
and lesbian and gay studies (Zimmerman, 1997). Initially, feminism had more of an influence in the creation of lesbian studies and it was within women’s studies departments that lesbian studies had an environment in which to grow (Zimmerman, 1997). Moreover, it was not only that feminism and women’s studies provided a home to lesbian studies but, rather, for many it was also that the concerns of feminist research was – and is – necessarily interwoven with those of lesbian and gay research. The very possibility of the existence of categories such as ‘lesbians’ and ‘gay men’ is inextricably linked to the rigid binary social system of sex that is linked to a society of male dominance.

Homosexuality is a by-product of a particular way of setting up roles (or approved patterns of behavior) on the basis of sex; as such it is an inauthentic (not consonant with “reality”) category. In a society in which men do not oppress women and sexual expression is allowed to follow feelings, the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality would disappear (Radicalesbians, 1970: 18).

More recently the ties between feminism and lesbian and gay studies may be considered to have strengthened further since the study of gender has been recognised as ‘intimately tied to sexuality’ (Wong et al, 2001: 11) and researchers have increasingly acknowledged the importance of examining the intersection of multiple oppressions (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004; Fenstermaker and West, 2002; Mercer, 1991; Wilton, 1995b).

Although feminism might have been of more obvious value to lesbians, gay men ‘have found it to be a source of powerful arguments and theories as well’ (Zimmerman, 1997: 147). For example, the comparatively greater problems faced by gay men who adopt behaviour traditionally associated with women has been understood with reference to a patriarchal, sexist society in which traits associated with women are devalued (Weeks, 1997). Moreover, it has been argued that ‘lesbian feminist theory … produced the most developed theoretical analysis of homosexuality (Plummer, 1992: 6). It was not only the ideas and
theories of feminism that were useful to lesbian and gay studies, but also ‘the emphasis on the reflexive approach, which involves listening to, engaging with, and responding to the people we are researching’ (Weeks, 2000: 3).

However, this harmony should not be overemphasised: there were – and to a lesser extent, there still are – two main tensions between feminism and lesbian and gay studies. First, there were tensions between feminists who were lesbian (who may or may not be lesbian feminists) and heterosexual feminists. Therefore, the relationship between feminism and lesbian studies has not always been uncomplicated. Many classic feminist works perpetuated the myth of ‘natural’ heterosexuality and often ignored lesbianism (see Rich, 1980) and therefore many lesbians argued that lesbians should organise separately to mainstream feminism, which would always privilege the experiences and goals of heterosexual women above those of lesbian women (e.g., Claudie et al, 1981). Additionally, many heterosexual feminists did not want to be associated with lesbians, believing they would damage their reputation (Jivani,, 1997) and this sentiment was famously encapsulated in Betty Friedan’s coinage of the phrase ‘Lavender Menace’ to refer to lesbians in the women’s movement (Jay, 1999).

Second, the relationship between lesbian feminists and gay men was – and is – often strained: ‘one must speak of a “gay community” with caution, since only the most fragile bonds link the lives of lesbians with those of gay men’ (Stanley, 1974: 49). Rather, ‘early feminist manifestoes for lesbianism either had little to say about gay men or saw gay men as having much more in common with male oppressors than with lesbians’ (Marcus, 2005: 194, also see Jeffreys, 1989; Kitzinger, 1987; MacKinnon, 1987; Stanley, 1982). However, others objected to feminists’ portrayals of gay men (e.g., Sedgewick, 1985). The debate continues to simmer but, for better or worse, there remains ‘a unique link between lesbians and gay men’ (Wilton, 1995b: 10).

Although in practice some feminist work does marginalise lesbian women’s experience (Wilton, 1995b), in principle feminism often speaks of recognising the intersection of multiple oppressions. Likewise, criticisms of lesbian and gay research for focusing on gay men at the expense of lesbians’ experiences is a
criticism that has generally been targeted at the way in which work is carried out and not at how it is possible for it to be carried out. The two fields of research have so much to offer each other and this is recognised by the use of terms such a ‘lesbian/feminist perspectives’ or ‘lesbian/feminist theory’ (e.g., Richardson, 2000) such that, for me, it is sometimes impossible to separate the influence of lesbian and gay politics from the influence of feminism. Both remind me to be attentive to oppression and the operation of power however it occurs and I draw on the insights of feminist work in doing lesbian and gay research. For example, the recent surge of research concerned with explicating and demonstrating the practice of ‘feminist conversation analysis’ (e.g., Kitzinger, 2000, 2003; Kitzinger & Frith, 1999; Speer, 2005a) provides an invaluable resource for developing my own approach to using CA for lesbian and gay research.

Who are you calling ‘gay’? The terminology of lesbian and gay studies

(a) Identity v. category

In this thesis, I examine how issues pertaining to sexuality arise in the course of talk-in-interaction. By sexuality I mean ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘bisexual’, ‘transgendered’, ‘transsexual’, ‘intersexual’, ‘queer’, ‘heterosexual’, and so on, which I refer to as ‘sexuality categories’. In the literature these terms are often referred to as ‘sexual identities’ (and sometimes ‘sexuality roles’ or ‘sexual orientations’). The difference between ‘categories’ and ‘identities’ is usually not explicated and sometimes researchers appear to treat them synonymously (e.g., Berard, 2005), or they may use ‘identity categories’ (e.g., Bucholtz & Hall, 2004; Kulick, 2000). However, others suggest – albeit, I would argue, vaguely – that the two terms (‘category’ and ‘identity’) refer to different albeit connected concepts: ‘notions of category membership and social identity are crucially linked: a reference to a person’s social identity is also a reference to their membership of a specific category’ (Widdicombe, 1998: 52-3).
Chapter 1: Introduction

'Sexual identity' is potentially problematic for constructionist ethnomethodological research because it connotes that the individual defines her/himself in such a way that is central to her/his identity. This raises epistemological issues regarding what, as an analyst, can be properly understood as accessible and what we can treat as knowable. The concept of identity retains psychological connotations despite efforts to instate understandings of the socially produced aspects of the concept. For example, Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) definition of identity includes recognition of 'the social ground on which identity is built, maintained, and altered' (p. 587) and emphasis on how it 'is constituted through social action, and especially through language' (p. 588), however, they also argue that 'individuals' sense of self is certainly an important element of identity' (p. 587)

For some 'identity' is a more expansive concept than 'category'; if categories are defined as only the broad social categories such as 'age, gender, and social class' (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 591), then identities may indeed be a more encompassing term:

[I]dentity emerges in discourse through the temporary roles and orientations assumed by participants, such as evaluator, joke teller, or engaged listener. Such interactional positions may seem quite different from identity as conventionally understood: however, these temporary roles, no less than larger sociological and ethnographic identity categories, contribute to the formation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in discourse (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 591).

However, I believe it is more logical to reverse this argument such that 'categories' becomes the more inclusive concept. Categories, at their most basic level, are groups that have one or more characteristic(s) or attribute(s) in

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2 Researchers do adopt ethnomethodological approaches for social constructionist research, but there is some opposition to this type of research (see Speer, 2005a: 76-7 for an overview).
common. Furthermore, categories are constituted, produced and oriented to in interaction. All identities relate to some category membership. However, there are memberships in categories that do not have corresponding identities. This is similar to the way in which Brown (1965) claims ‘[i]t is not customary to regard all social categories for which there are norms as social roles’ (p.155), rather, there has to be ‘a substantial number of norms’ (ibid.) before it is considered a role – exactly how many is unspecified and unspecifiable since this is dependent on variable social, cultural, interactional, and historical factors. Likewise, whether membership in some category is an identity is socially negotiable and not decided a priori. Therefore, my decision to refer to categories and category memberships (and not to identities) in my analyses is grounded in an understanding of ‘identity’ as having already incorporated an unacknowledged and unarticulated degree of analysis. However, because of the overlap and blurring of the boundaries of the concepts across the literatures, I do draw on research and theories pertaining to identities.

(b) Which categories?

Having justified my decision to refer to sexuality categories rather than sexual identities, I will now explain why I have selected ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ (given the myriad of sexuality categories available) in particular. At the outset of his review of gay and lesbian language, Kulick (2000) highlights the inevitable difficulties in employing suitable terminology:

What to collectively call people whose sexuality falls beyond the bounds of normative heterosexuality is an unavoidable and ultimately unresolvable problem (Kulick, 2000: 243).

However, despite the inherent difficulties, there must be a pragmatic solution that permits adequate and appropriate reference. Mostly I refer to ‘lesbian and gay people’ (or ‘lesbians and gay men’), but sometimes I refer only to ‘lesbians’, and occasionally I use the terms ‘LGBT’ (the initialisation commonly used to refer to
‘lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered people’) and ‘non-heterosexuality’. This apparent inconsistency is designedly so. The talk I have collected as data is predominantly that of lesbians (although not exclusively – see ‘My approach to doing politically engaged CA in practice’ section under ‘Data’ heading) and therefore ‘lesbian’ is sometimes the most appropriate term. More often, I will use ‘lesbian and gay’ in extrapolating from lesbian experience to gay men’s experience (or vice versa). I do this with extreme caution since there are many problems with unifying lesbian and gay male issues under one umbrella (Stanley, 1974). Therefore, I do this only when there is a case that there is sufficient shared ground to warrant it. And, for that reason, I have opted to use ‘lesbians and gay men’ which encompasses recognition of differential experience of women and men, rather than the generic ‘gay people’ which is often hearable as erasing lesbianism (Shapiro, 1990). Furthermore, the diversity of lesbian experience is great enough that the inclusion of gay men is only problematic insofar as there is also a problem with talking about lesbians (as a group) on the basis of the talk analysed here.

I am cautious in my use of ‘LGBT’ because there are problems with the increasing popularity of the use of initialisations to refer to collectives of sexuality categories: ‘LGB’ (e.g., Bontempo & D’Augelli, 2002; D’Augelli & Grossman, 2001); ‘LGBT’ (e.g., Epstein, 2003); ‘LGBT&F’ (Kulick, 2000); ‘LGBTQ’ (e.g., Stevens, 2004); ‘LGBTQI’ (e.g., Lindsey, 2005); and even ‘LGBTTSQ’ (Kulick, 2000). However, each addition that serves to include one more group of people also makes starker the exclusion of another: ‘appending

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3 Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
4 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered
5 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, and Friends
6 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, and Queer
7 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Queer, and Intersexual (intersexed people are those who have biological characteristics that have been culturally assigned to females and biological characteristics that have been culturally assign to males, see Kessler, 1998).
8 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Two-Spirit, Queer or Questioning. ‘Two spirit’ is a term that is born out of Native North American communities and refers to people who have both masculine and feminine traits or ‘spirits’ (Jacobs, Thomas & Lang, 1997).
queer/bisexual/transgender to lesbian and gay ironically has the effect of
connoting the exclusionary properties of all lists' (Munt, 1997: xiii). Also, there
is the problem of empty inclusion such that the name of a group may be added
but there is no corresponding shift in the focus of study or recognition of the
group as a whole. Furthermore, the differences between sub-groups often
outweigh the similarities.

Although work in lesbian and gay studies has often been accused of
discriminating against (Dollimore, 1997) or ignoring (Bell, 1994) bisexuality, I
have drawn a distinction between ‘lesbian and gay’ and ‘LGB’ because in some
instances the differences between lesbian and gay people and bisexual people are
such that the findings cannot be appropriately or sensibly applied to the latter
(see Chapters 3 & 4).

The incorporation of transgendered people into the singular category of ‘LGBT’
is more problematic in many senses. Additionally, ‘transgendered’ is often
treated as synonymous with ‘transsexual’, for example, Amnesty International
(1999) uses the term ‘transgendered’ but offers a definition that appears to refer
to ‘transsexual’ (also see Fragment 9, in Chapter 6 of this thesis). Transgendered
people do ‘not necessarily fit into existing [gender] categories’ (Watling, 1999)
but rather ‘transgender’ ‘sits astride the existing gender boundaries’ (ibid.) and ‘it
is possible for transgender people to identify somewhere along the gender
spectrum or identify with no gender at all’ (May, 2002). The category
‘transsexual’ is, for some, a subcategory of ‘transgender’ (e.g., Gilbert, 1997).
Transsexuals are people who were assigned one sex at birth but ‘choose to live
their life as another - either by consistently cross dressing or surgically altering
their sex’ (May, 2002). It seems that these categories are better placed within the
domain of gender studies (Cameron & Kulick, 2006). ‘Transsexual’ and
‘transgender’ are not necessarily sexuality categories but rather sex and gender
categories respectively. It is only because ‘[i]n the heterosexist binary-gendered
world, gender and heterosexuality prop each other up’ (Prosser, 1997: 312) that
these categories are more routinely conceptualised as sexuality categories (see
Butler, 1993). However, because we do exist in a culture in which the
differentiation along the lines of sex are intrinsically bound up in the
maintenance of compulsory heterosexuality, 'transgendered’ and ‘transsexual’ do share common ground with categories such as ‘lesbians’, ‘gay men’, and ‘bisexuals’. For example, the heterosexual definition of ‘marriage’ that discriminates against lesbian, gay and bisexual people, also impacts on transgender, transsexual and intersexual people:

As long as marriage is open only to male/female couples, and civil partnerships only to same-gender couple, the British government is ... constructing and reinforcing an essentialist notion of gender...It presumes that each of us can clearly be labelled as either ‘male’ or ‘female’ and that the gender of the partners is a crucial defining factor of the relationship (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2006: 2).

Moreover, there are similarities in research themes pertaining to these two groups of sexuality categories. For example, just as lesbian and gay people have often conducted searches into the historical occurrence of same-sex sexual behaviour and treated the people who engage in this type of behaviour as evidence of our existence throughout history (e.g., Blumenfeld & Raymond, 1993: 31-32), transgendered people often treat the groups who transgressed gender boundaries in the past as evidence of the existence of transgendered people through history (e.g., Feinberg, 1996). Similarly, some researchers have opted 'not to treat “doing sex” (i.e., sexual behaviours) and “doing gender” as distinctive activities, since...sexual behaviours are profoundly gendered, and gender is in part constructed through sexual behaviour' (Kitzinger, 2006b: 170). However, I have decided to avoid the routine use of ‘LGBT’ unless it is clear that the point is relevant to all groups within the initialisation. This is based on the belief that the unthinking ‘adding on' of ‘T’ (transgendered) works to exclude transgendered people in the course of attempting inclusivity. Therefore, although I will use initialisations when referring to literature in which they are used, in my own analyses and findings I refer to transgendered people and collectives of sexuality categories only when it is analytically meaningful to do so (e.g., when participants orient to them as relevant).
'Queer' is the term of choice for many contemporary researchers and the conceptualisation of non-heteronormative sexuality has solidified in queer studies which has superseded lesbian and gay studies in many – but certainly not all (see Munt, 1997) – academic departments. However, the category 'queer', similar to the use of initialisations, suffers the problem of obliterating differences between the multitudes of groups it encompasses. Furthermore, 'queer' may include people who also consider themselves (and may be considered) heterosexual if their sexual behaviour or identity extends beyond the normative organisation of sexuality (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004; Jeffreys, 2003). Additionally, while some feel the word has been fully reclaimed, for others the sting of insult and abuse imbued in 'queer' will never fade (Gamson, 1995). Therefore, the term 'has never been accepted by a large number of the people it was resurrected to embrace' (Kulick, 2000: 244).

I also use the term 'non-heterosexuality' as this is the most effective term for containing all of us who escape the boundaries of heterosexuality. But I use this term with some trepidation. To define something by what it is not is arguably problematic since it shifts the focus away from features of the referenced group to features of the non-referenced group and this is even more problematic when the non-referenced group – as in this case – has privileged status. However, sometimes it is useful to deploy this kind of reference as it is inclusive of all counter-(hetero)normative sexuality categories and draws a stark contrast with heterosexuality. Finally, I do occasionally use alternative terms when the participants use them. These may include 'gay' to refer to women or 'queer' (for example, see Fragment 3, Chapter 5).

Sexuality and language

The research in this thesis examines language – or more specifically talk-in-interaction since talk is 'the primordial site of human sociality and social life' (Schegloff, 1987a: 101) – in order to contribute both to the field of language and sexuality research and to interdisciplinary lesbian and gay studies. My objective,
as with many others who have contributed to this field, is not to study language per se but rather to study the social world that is revealed and constructed through language use in interaction. The most prominent body of work in this area has been some form of investigation regarding ‘how gays and lesbians talk’ (Kulick, 2000: 245) or, to a lesser extent, how lesbian and gay people communicate through other forms of language use. Associated with this kind of work, there have also been studies of other sexuality categories. However, more recently some researchers have proposed a change in focus of the field of language and sexuality research such that Cameron and Kulick (2006) define the study of language and sexuality as ‘an inquiry into the role played by language in producing and organizing sex as a meaningful domain of human experience’ (p. 1). And, Harvey and Shalom (1997) maintain ‘[t]he verbal medium is … central in the process of maintaining and deepening relations founded upon love and desire’ (p. 2). In this section, I will outline the main areas of investigation within language and sexuality studies and consider why some researchers have proposed a need to re-specify the field (in terms of ‘desire’), before detailing my own approach to this research.

Existing research

Although researchers have been producing work that falls under the rubric of the study of language and sexuality for nearly a century it has only been since the 1990s that there has been the emergence of a distinct ‘field of language and sexuality’ (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 469). There is now sufficient work in this field for it to have its own anthologies (e.g., Cameron & Kulick 2006; Livia & Hall, 1997a; Leap & Boellstorff, 2004) and review essays (e.g., Jacobs, 1996; Kulick, 2000).

Just as feminism has been influential in the development of lesbian and gay studies, it is also the case that language and gender research – which has been and still is closely tied to feminist work – has been influential for the development of language and sexuality studies. The field of language and gender studies precedes the study of language and sexuality (at least insofar as
there can be regarded as a ‘field’ of research) and many maintain that research on
lesbian and gay language, linguistics and discourse ‘owe a clear debt to the work
of scholars in language and gender studies’ (Harvey, 2002: 1146). The
connection between language and gender and language and sexuality is reflexive,
therefore the relationship between the two research areas is complementary
(Bucholtz & Hall, 2004). Moreover, there is overlap between the researchers
studying language and gender and those focusing on language and sexuality
(Bucholtz & Hall, 2004) such that it is not always possible – or desirable – to
discern where one ends and the other begins.

The following four sections explore some of the major themes in sexuality and
language research: first, I provide an overview of the studies of lexical items in
sexuality and language research; second, I document the development of the
search for a ‘lesbian or gay language’; third, I describe the more recent move
towards treating sexuality as an action or performance that is achieved in
language; and, fourth, I will consider some future directions for sexuality and
language research.

(a) Lexical items

A substantial proportion of the earliest work on language and sexuality was
concerned with the identification and cataloguing of lexical items used by
homosexuals (e.g., Cory, 1951; Farrell, 1972; Legman, 1941; Max, 1988;
Rodgers, 1972; Spears, 1981; Strait, 1961). Overwhelmingly, these compilations
of homosexual argots pertained to men’s usage, while lesbian’s language use
remained largely unexplored\(^9\). For example, Legman (1941), who compiled a
glossary of words used by (male) homosexuals, maintained that these language
phenomena did not exist for lesbians due to lesbians’ ‘gentlemanly constraint’
(p.20) and their focus on the ‘emotional [rather] than simply sexual’ (ibid.).
Cory (1951), who studied the words used to describe (male) homosexuals and the

\(^9\) Lesbian representation in language and sexuality research continues to be comparatively small
vis-à-vis that of gay men (Cameron & Kulick, 2006).
codes used by homosexual men to communicate secretly, claimed that such codes, if they existed for lesbians, would be much less complicated.

Researchers who were critical of these compilations of lexical items abstracted from their actual usage continued to study vocabulary and terminology but they broke from the tradition of earlier studies by beginning to locate language in context. Sonnenschein (1969) sought a more sociological account of the worlds of speakers by conducting fieldwork in which he asked respondents about how they used words and the variable meanings depending on the context in which they were used, and Stanley (1974) examined how the gay liberation movement influenced gay slang and she also addressed men and women in her research.

Although these types of studies no longer occupy a centre-stage position within the field of sexuality and language studies, some contemporary researchers continue to study the lexical items used (Harvey, 1997a; Leck, 1995; Lucas, 1997) but with increasing emphasis on contextualised and variable meanings, often through the investigation of why speakers use particular terminology and usually through the use of self-report data. For example, Harvey (1997a) studied the words used by gay and straight men to refer to their partners by asking interviewees to talk about their lexical choices and the reasons for them and Leck (1995) highlights the importance of claiming sexuality labels for oneself.

(b) Lesbian and gay language

As these studies of lexicon became more contextualised this paved the way for research that examined the way in which lesbian and gay people use language and the beginning of the search for an elusive 'lesbian and gay language' (e.g., Crew, 1978; Hayes, 1981; Leap, 1996). In this sense, then, the development of sexuality and language research mirrored the development of gender and language research in that the study of lexical items used by men and women (e.g., Lakoff, 1975) was superseded by the search to identify (most usually) women's language and (more infrequently) men's language in language and gender studies.
Hayes (1981) developed the concept of ‘Gayspeak’, which he describes as a language that is used by a particular social group (in this case gay men) and fulfils social functions. ‘Gayspeak’ encompasses ‘lexicon, usage, imagery, and rhetoric’. He distinguishes between three varieties of ‘Gayspeak’ that are used in three settings: the secret; the social; and the radical-activist. The data upon which this research is based comprises Hayes’ ‘observations of [his] own language and that of other gay people...talking in bars, clubs, meetings, and social gatherings, and to the voices of novelists and periodical writers’ (Hayes, 1981: 68). Research on lesbian and gay language has not only studied the construction and content of discourses or language use, but it has also investigated linguistic features (such as intonation and pitch) associated with the voices of lesbian and gay people (e.g., Gaudio, 1994; Lerman & Dansté, 1969; Moonwoman-Baird, 1997).

Although this approach is less popular with contemporary researchers, it retains its appeal for some (e.g., Leap, 1996, 1999; Morgan & Wood, 1995; Zwicky, 1997). For example, although Leap (1999) takes a more complex view from the previous gay language research, he still treats talk produced by (male) gay speakers as something that can unquestionably say something about the way (male) gay speakers use language. Similarly, Zwicky (1997) begins from the premise that it is both possible and useful to discuss differences in speech patterns, grammar, discourse, and so on between gay men and heterosexual men and between lesbian women and heterosexual women and any other permutation of gender and sexuality.

A major strength of this kind of research – such as Leap’s (1996) study of ‘gay men’s English’ – is that it served the pragmatic goal of putting lesbian and gay issues on the agenda in the study of language ‘at a time when linguistic research on sexual minorities was both scant and marginalized’ (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 477). However, there are two major problems with this kind of research. First, although this type of study often examines language use as it actually happens in ‘real life’ situations, researchers predominantly document speakers’ use of language via fieldwork observations rather than recorded data. Their work is
based, then, on an approximation of how language is actually used in practice. Analysis is bound up in the note taking process and it is impossible to capture details of language use when relying on recollection. Second, in seeking to identify lesbian and/or gay language, researchers unproblematically treat talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers as 'lesbian and/or gay talk'. That is, lesbian and gay people are always speaking as lesbian and gay people, which ignores the myriad of other categories to which they also (simultaneously) belong (I will develop and illustrate this argument in Chapter 5).

(c) Doing\textsuperscript{10} sexuality in language

A more significant shift has occurred in recent language and sexuality studies. Unlike previous research which treated lesbian and gay speakers as speaking a particular way because they are lesbian or gay, this new wave of research began – in line with the 'discursive turn' (Weatherall, 2002) or 'linguistic turn' (Cameron, 1998) – to examine how speakers produce themselves as lesbian or gay by deploying particular linguistic resources in interaction and how speakers do sexuality in language. It was in the wake of Judith Butler's (1990) influential book that researchers in sexuality and language studies (as in other socially-oriented studies of language) began to engage seriously with the ontological shift from treating language practices as the outcomes of particular identities/categories to treating language practices as a means by which the outcomes of particular identities/categories are achieved. This concept of speakers' production of themselves as particular category members through social action had been recognised earlier with sociological work and in particular ethnomethodological and symbolic interactionism research (see Bricknell, 2006 for a discussion).

This change in perspective has led to examination of how people are constructed as lesbian and gay (and other sexuality categories) through language practices

\textsuperscript{10} 'Doing' is an ethnomethodological concept, but I use it here to refer to all work that conceptualises identities as performances or accomplishments in interaction.
Chapter 1: Introduction

(Abe, 2004; Barrett, 1995, 1997; Harvey, 1998; Livia & Hall, 1997b; Podesva et al, 2002; Queen, 1997). Podesva et al (2002), in their study of the speech of a gay man on the radio, highlight how the same linguistic phenomena achieve various outcomes depending on the context of their use. They study styles (in the linguistic sense, e.g., patterns of intonation and pitch) of speaking and ‘assume that identity and style are co-constructed’ (p. 144) rather than treating style as only a means to construct identity. Abe’s (2004) ethnographic linguistic study of women in lesbian bars in Tokyo sought to explore the relationship between identity and language. She focused on ‘naming and identity construction in discourse’ and ‘linguistic behaviour and interaction at lesbian bars’ (p. 132) largely through observations and speakers’ reports of their language use.

Similarly, there has been a focus on the discursive practices used to construct heterosexuality, which may be referred to as ‘discourse[s] of heterosexuality’ (Kiesling, 2002: 118). Coupland (1996) explored the discursive construction of self-identities in mostly written but also verbal dating advertisements to study advertisers’ production of themselves via self-display. Their heterosexuality was not stated but rather indexed through their indexing of their own sex and the articulation of the person desired as different sex. Kiesling (2002) used a combination of observation and interviews to examine how young men in an American fraternity do heterosexuality. He found that doing heterosexuality was linked to doing dominance and frequently involved sexual narratives, which he called ‘fuck stories’ (or sometimes ‘drunk stories’). His research showed ‘how language is used by the men to reproduce hegemonic masculinity’ (p.129), which supports Cameron’s (1997) findings in a similar earlier study. And, unsurprisingly given Butler’s focus on gender transgression, this approach to research has been enthusiastically embraced by those interested in a broad spectrum of sexuality categories. For example, Barrett (1995) investigated the deployment of ‘standard white women’s language’ by African American drag queens as a means to mark gender and ethnicity.

This link between the doing of gender and the doing of sexuality has been explored in much contemporary research and, for many, it has become increasing
clear that it is not practical or useful to differentiate the two. Researchers have examined how the practices used to produce oneself as a member of a particular sexuality category serve simultaneously to produce oneself as appropriately gendered and vice versa (e.g., Eckert, 2005; Hurtado, 1989; Kiesling, 2002; McCarl Nielsen et al., 2000). In addition to gender, there have been explorations of how other social categories, such as ethnicity, cultural background, religion and disability intersect with sexuality categories in sexuality and language research, for example: studies of lesbian and gay communication in non-English speaking cultures (e.g., Abe, 2004; Ahearn, 2003; Long, 1996; Nakamura, 2006; Valentine, 1997); research on Jewish gay men’s speech (Sweet, 1997); and lesbian and gay men using sign language (Kleinfeld & Warner, 1997; Neumann, 1997; Rudner & Butowsky, 1981).

Over twenty-five years ago Penelope and Wolfe highlighted the deficiency of approaches that do not recognise variations within categories of people:

Any discussion involving the use of such phrases as ‘gay community’, ‘gay slang’, or ‘gayspeak’ is bound to be misleading, because two of its implications are false: first, that there is a homogeneous community composed of lesbians and gay males, that shares a common culture of values, goals, perceptions and experience; and second, that this gay community shares a common language (Penelope & Wolfe, 1979: 1, cited in Kulick, 2000: 251).

Therefore, recent work on sexuality and language has tended to avoid treating ‘lesbians’, ‘gay men’, ‘heterosexual women’, ‘heterosexual men’ and so on as homogeneous groups by incorporating notions of diversity into the pursuit of understanding the linguistic practices (e.g., Abe, 2004; Podesva et al., 2002). By ‘diversity’ I mean sub-categories within the broader categories, intersection with other social variables (e.g., Abe, 2004; Ahearn, 2003; Kleinfeld & Warner, 1997; Long, 1996; Nakamura, 2006; Neumann, 1997; Rudner & Butowsky, 1981; Sweet, 1997; Valentine, 1997) and variation dependent on situational and contextual factors. With this increasing recognition of diversity within a
particular category, researchers are less likely to treat it as possible or imperative for language practices associated with a category of people to have to be applicable to all members and restricted only to members of that group (i.e., a practice may be regarded as ‘lesbian’, for instance, even though not all lesbians use it and even though lesbians are not the only people who use it). For example, developing Lave and Wenger’s (1991) earlier use of the concept, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1999) sought to find ‘communities of practice’, which they define as ‘a group whose joint engagement in some activity or enterprise is sufficiently intensive to give rise over time to a repertoire of shared practices’ (p.185). Therefore, linguistic practices may be identified as pertaining to a particular group or community even though ‘they do not necessarily apply across the board’ (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1999: 190); rather these language features operate on an ideological level to index category membership11 (Wong et al, 2001). For example, for some it is acceptable to designate words as lesbian and/or gay even though they may not be known to all lesbian and gay people and even though they are known by some people who are not lesbian or gay (Conrad & More, 1976; Stanley, 1970). What is significant in these cases is that words are shown to index a particular group and this is achieved independently from the speaker’s actual category membership. Moreover, individual speakers use language differently as they move from one activity or context to another (Goodwin, 2002). Although studies of communities of practice have focused predominantly on gender (e.g., Ehrlich, 1999; Holmes & Meyerhoff, 1999; Paechter, 2003), the inescapable intersection of gender and sexuality (see Kitzinger, 2006b) means that some of this research has contributed to our understanding of sexuality and language. For example, Eckert (1996) draws on a ‘communities of practice’ approach to explore the emergence of particular linguistic styles in the development of a heterosexual marketplace among preadolescents. While the term ‘community of practice’ has not necessarily been used, the notion of recognising diversity while maintaining sufficient

11 Wong et al (2001) illustrate this point with reference to the use of ‘y’all’ as a second person plural reference form as a feature of the language associated with people from southern United States. The deployment of this reference form indexes southern speech even though it is not used by all southern people and it is also used by non-southern people (see Wong et al, 2001: 3).
commonalities for there to be practices that can be recognised as signifying the group has been used in language and sexuality research such as Barrett’s (1995) study of lesbian and gay speech communities. This approach allows for variation among members of a category. This is more consistent with an ethnomethodological perspective since it permits scope for agency. Participants are posited as active agents in interaction and as such it allows for counter-normative behaviour. An understanding of the social is preserved through accountability and repetition. Speakers are accountable for appropriate production and therefore may be judged for non-conformity (Cameron, 1999/2000; Fenstermaker & West, 2002). And, this is an ongoing process as the context is continually renewed: it is not sufficient for speakers to produce themselves as appropriate members of category only once, rather they must repeat such performances and this repetition reproduces our shared-in-common understandings and the regulation of gender, sexuality and so on (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004).

In the study of language and sexuality, this analytic separation of methods for indexing a particular sexuality category from actual category membership (i.e., the methods are not used by all incumbents and not only used by incumbents) means that researchers seek to identify linguistic practices for doing sexuality, such as that conceptualised as ‘Queerspeak’ (Livia & Hall, 1997), rather than searching for codes (Bulcholtz & Hall, 2004: 475). In formulations such as ‘Queerspeak’, practices become ‘typically lesbian or gay only if the hearer/reader understands that it was the speaker’s intent that it should be taken up that way’ (Livia & Hall, 1997: 14). Although, on the surface these types of studies look like close cousins of the earlier searches for gay language, these versions are more contextually related and variable: ‘when we speak of “lesbian and gay language” we are not postulating a distinct phonology, morphology or syntax of lesbian/gay linguistic products’ (Harvey, 2002: 1147). However, this raises

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12 Failure to repeat such performances may not result in category membership being undermined but rather failure to do so would be accountable and possibly result in sanctions (see Kessler & McKenna, 1978).
questions concerning how we can identify these resources and what warrant we
would have for this identification.

(d) Future directions

Despite their emphasis on the constitutive nature of language, many recent
studies, by treating the language of speakers who are already known to be
members of particular sexuality categories as a site for the identification of
markers or styles that index sexuality, implicitly treat speakers as such members
a priori. This results in a tautological argument (Stokoe & Weatherall, 2002): a
particular category of people is selected, the ways they speak are documented
and then these practices are identified as a method for doing membership in that
category. For example, despite many researchers emphasis on styles as
contextually-bound and variable (e.g., Podesva et al, 2002), they still seem to be
examining talk produced by gay men as a vehicle for the identifying 'gay styles'.
Likewise, Abe (2004) treated lesbian speakers as being able to shed light on the
issues of lesbian discourse simply by virtue of their membership in the category
'lesbian'.

This circularity will always be a problem for research that proceeds in this
fashion because '[t]here is no such thing as gay or lesbian language' (Kulick,
2000: 247) and therefore we need to move 'beyond the constraint of conceiving
of gay and lesbian language as being grounded in and exclusive to intentional
and self-proclaimed gay and lesbian identities' (Kulick, 2000: 271). In an
influential attempt to redirect sexuality and language research, Don Kulick points
out that the term 'sexuality' has overwhelmingly been used to index sexual
identities. He advocates a change of focus away from 'language and sexual
identity' and towards 'language and desire' (Kulick, 1999, 2000, 2003a;
Cameron & Kulick, 2003). Kulick’s vision of what this would entail involves a
focus on 'fantasy, desire, repression, pleasure, fear and the unconscious' (2000:
271).
Intriguing as this approach may be, there are (at least) two difficulties of implementing it. First, despite describing three studies as models of research that exemplify this approach – Channell (1997), Hall (1995), and Langford (1997) – the exact nature of Kulick’s proposed project remains vague (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004), even to one of the authors so described.

Second, Kulick’s understanding of ‘desire’ appears to be conceptualised within a psychoanalytic framework (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004) that seems to suggest that researchers can and should gain access to cognition and the sub-conscious; a conceptualisation that stands in contradiction to the prevailing themes of action-oriented approaches to language that treat language as constitutive rather than reflecting some inner state. If these problems were overcome with a more contextually located and participant defined understanding of desire, there is no reason in principle why this should not be a fruitful approach to the study of language and sexuality (see for example, Ahearn, 2003; Sanders & Reinsch, 1999; Valentine, 2003). However, while I wholeheartedly share Kulick’s concerns about the implicit problem of searching for any type of lesbian or gay language or style, I am not convinced by his solution. My apprehension is rooted in the suggestion that, in the study of language, research on desire should replace research on sexuality that refers to sexual categories (Kulick, 2003). This conflates sexuality with sexual desire/behaviour, and is wholly inadequate, since sexuality is not only about the erotic (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 506; Blumfeld & Raymond, 1993: 15) and the suggestion that lesbians and gay men are just like heterosexuals apart from who we have sex with (or who we find sexually attractive) has been widely critiqued (e.g., by feminists in particular such as Kitzinger, 1987), since the heteronormative organisation of society means that living a life in a way that counters heteronormativity results in sexuality extending far beyond the bedroom. Indeed, in the data fragments analysed in this thesis there are scant references to the erotic – in one fragment there is reference to sexual behaviour and in three fragments there are allusions to sexual desire – yet sexuality is relevant in all of the data analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, in most of the data presented in Chapter 4, and in some of the data fragments in Chapters 5 and 6. Therefore, sexuality categories (or identities) remain relevant to language and sexuality research (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004: 473) quite independently of
Chapter 1: Introduction

'desire'. Kulick's suggestion that language and sexuality research should focus on desire would result in an unwarranted restriction of research to a topic that is properly only a subset of the broader research area. My approach to navigating the problem of implicit essentialising in much research on lesbian and gay language, practices, or styles is not to treat talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers as lesbian and gay talk. It is not my objective to discover anything about lesbians' speech styles. Rather, I examine the talk for how issues pertaining to sexuality categories arise spontaneously and are demonstrably relevant for the participants (see Land, 2004a, 2004b; Land & Kitzinger, 2005, 2006; Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b).

Conversation analysis

Conversation analysis (CA) offers a distinctive 'paradigm' (ten Have, 1999) for the study of talk-in-interaction. Developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by Harvey Sacks in collaboration with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (Kitzinger, forthcoming), CA provides 'a bridge between linguistic analysis ... and the sociological investigation of sociality' (Drew, 1994: 749). This methodological approach treats talk-in-interaction as a site for social action and, through detailed analysis of this talk, conversation analysts seek to identify members' methods for producing social life. CA, which has its roots in ethnomethodology, is ideally suited to the study of mundane heterosexism, participants' understandings of sexuality, and the everyday relevance of sexuality in interaction (Kitzinger, 2000). In this section, I provide a brief introduction to ethnomethodology, outline some of the key features of conversation analysis and then consider some of the reservations expressed by conversation analysts and by critical and feminist researchers about the appropriation of CA for politically engaged research.
**Ethnomethodology**

A key ethnomethodological concern is to achieve an understanding of the ways in which members produce ongoing social reality by examining the practices employed and showing how they work (Benson & Hughes, 1983: 19). Social phenomena such as sexuality and gender have no objective import independent of our interpretation; rather it is in interaction that they acquire ‘rich layers of meanings’ (Bricknell, 2006: 93). Garfinkel argued that the ordinary, everyday, mundane world should be approached with the same kind of rigour that is usually applied to strange or extraordinary phenomena (Garfinkel, 1967). Early ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel broke with the mainstream structural sociological tradition by positing the social actor as an active agent who, through their agency, contributed to the creation of the social world. Ethnomethodology conceptualises power and oppression (as with other social facts) as accomplishments (Garfinkel, 1967). Therefore, it has been argued that ethnomethodology is especially suitable for appropriation for feminist purposes because of its concern with the study of everyday lives through a focus on participants’ sense making activities (Stanley & Wise, 1983: 138-9, also see Kitzinger, 2003; Speer, 2005a; Weatherall, 2002).

Garfinkel’s (1967) well-known case study of Agnes, who presented herself as female at nineteen but who had been raised male was the first application of this method to the study of gender. Garfinkel treated cultural ‘violations’ as a window that illuminated what is taken for granted in a culture and Agnes – since she breached normative conceptualisations of gender – represented as interesting case to study the routine production of gender. He studied the everyday resources and practices that allowed Agnes to be treated as a ‘natural female’ in a gendered society with two ‘natural’ sex categories (see Kitzinger, 2006b, for a discussion of this case study). What Agnes’s case made explicit was the ‘work’ that women do to produce themselves as female. This performance is usually hidden because the resources employed by women to produce themselves as appropriately gendered are naturalised (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; McIlvenny, 2002). Garfinkel’s study of Agnes did not have much impact on feminist research (Speer, 2005a) and it was not until over a decade later that feminists –
and, even then, only a few feminists—began to engage seriously with ethnomethodology. Feminist ethnomethodological research usually pertained to the study of gender (e.g., Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Stanley & Wise, 1983; West & Zimmerman, 1987\(^\text{13}\)) with the notable exception of Smith's (1978) ethnomethodological study of the process becoming labelled as mentally ill. There has been substantial interest in examining the ways in which gender is constructed through micro social action since then. For example, Kessler (1998) has examined the practices through which intersex infants become categorised as either male or female. Her work contributes to the body of research on the management of 'intersex' as a condition that illuminates the ways in which the notion of two naturally occurring sexes is constructed and policed. Other ethnomethodological feminist research includes, for instance, the study of the ways in which civility is constructed in public spaces as gendered so that everyday acts of violence against women become understood as part of the fabric of social life (Gardener, 1995).

Key features of conversation analysis

In the 1960s, with the advancement of audio recording technology, Sacks began to collect recordings of naturalistic data. While studying data from a suicide prevention line Sacks proposed that, rather than treating talk as reflecting the phenomena under investigation, talk should be regarded as an object of analysis in itself (Benson & Hughes, 1983: 155). Sacks focused on the action enacted through talk rather than merely treating it as a reflection of the social world (Sacks, 1995) therefore the talk becomes the phenomenon rather than a report of the phenomenon. These observations provided a platform from which CA developed.

Conversation analysis is more than merely a method; rather, it is 'a theoretically and methodologically distinctive approach to the study of social life' (Kitzinger,

\(^{13}\) Although this paper was published in 1987 it was written a decade earlier and circulated and cited in academic circles in the interim decade (Fenstermaker & West, 2002).
Chapter I. Introduction

A central tenet of this approach is an understanding of talk-in-interaction as a site of co-constituted social reality. CA uses naturally occurring talk to examine how turns-at-talk are designed and the action they are designed to do.

The aim of CA research is to investigate and uncover the socially organized practices through which people make themselves understood (Drew, 2003a: 147).

Recurrent patterns and normative discursive practices are identified and these ‘tools’ can be used to make sense of subsequent interactions. In an early and very influential article, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) produced a detailed explication of the normative practices for orderly turn taking. As a result of extensive, fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction, Sacks et al (1974) identified the practices employed by participants for the orderly transition of turns between speakers, thereby producing a set of ‘rules’ for turn-taking ‘which are context free... but which are applicable to the local circumstances of particular turns in particular conversations’ (Drew, 1994: 750-751). Turns and sequences are the basic units through which orderly talk-in-interaction is produced (Ford et al, 2002).

Sequences are the result of successive turns but the organisation of these turns is not random, rather, there are practices that speakers employ as a resource for producing recognisable, socially meaningful sequences. Central to understanding sequence development is the adjacency pair. These “are normative frameworks within which certain actions should be properly or accountably be done” (Drew, 2003a: 134). So, when one speaker issues a first pair part of an adjacency pair, such as an invitation or request, this shapes and constrains subsequent turns by making relevant one of just several possible next actions.

Through examination of turn-taking and therefore the sequential organisation of talk-in-interaction we can come to understand the situated achievement of intersubjectivity. This means when speakers produce a turn-at-talk they are
displaying their understanding of the previous speaker’s turn. The recipient of this turn is then able to analyse this to check it displays the understanding of the prior turn that was intended. This allows for this speaker to challenge the interpretation or continue with the course of action and, in so doing, they display their understanding of the prior turn. This process is continually renewed as turns and sequences are generated. Through this, meaningful social action is negotiated and produced by the participants (Drew, 2003a; ten Have, 1999; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998).

Through sustained investigation of talk-in-interaction, conversation analysts have contributed to a cumulative body of resources for analysing talk. In addition to those resources referred to above – that is, turn-taking (e.g., Sacks et al, 1974; Goodwin, 1979; Lerner, 1996) and sequence organisation (e.g., Schegloff, 1988b, 1999c) – other ‘tools’ that conversation analysts employ to understand interaction include: the operation of repair (e.g., Drew, 1997; Schegloff, 1992c) and correction (e.g., Jefferson, 1974, 1987) in interaction; the production of storytelling and its associated interactional activities (e.g., Jefferson, 1978; Mandelbaum, 1989); how speakers achieve reference to persons (e.g., Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 1996) and places (e.g., Schegloff, 1972); the organisation of preference (e.g., Sacks, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984); the achievement of categorisation (e.g., Sacks, 1972a, 1972b, 1979); and the formation of actions, such as complaints (e.g., Drew & Holt, 1988; Mandelbaum, 1991) and compliments (e.g., Pomerantz, 1978; Shaw & Kitzinger, frth.). This stock of knowledge is an ongoing work-in-progress.

Although traditionally CA has not been associated with politically engaged research, the compelling understanding of the social world that it offers means that it has great potential for studying power and oppression as it is manifested through talk. For example, because this approach ‘provides a powerful methodology for documenting how people position themselves relative to each other in their moment-by-moment conversation’ (Goodwin, 2002: 716), there is great scope for understanding oppression and power as they happen in their local context.
CA, along with action-oriented discourse analytic approaches, takes seriously the findings of psychological work that has shown that there are discrepancies between people's attitudes (e.g., what they say about a particular social group) and their behaviour toward that group (La Piere, 1934; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). So, just as CA focuses on participants' behaviour rather than their intentions, feelings, or beliefs, discursive psychology, for example, sees 'practices rather than cognition as primary' (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005: 598). That does not mean that other researchers do not take seriously the implications of such findings, but rather that they might take steps to reduce the impact of this phenomenon or they may seek to understand the nature of this discrepancy and therefore contemplate what effect this has had on the research so as to reduce the problem. Conversely, conversation analysts and action-oriented discourse analysts circumnavigate the problem by treating the talk (or other discourse) as topic and analysing the accomplishment of action through it.

Both CA and DA seek to understand the action being produced in talk. For conversation analysts this means more than just understanding the action in the particular interaction being analysed. One of the key features of CA research 'is to uncover the sociolinguistic competences which underly the production and interpretation of talk in social interaction' (Drew, 1994: 749). In so doing, conversation analysts contribute to a cumulative body of research findings that other conversation analysts borrow and add to in their subsequent research. Discourse analysts in general (and discursive psychologists in particular) have found CA 'attractive...because it offers a non-cognitivist methodology' (Kitzinger, 2006a: 68). However, discourse analysts have not developed the research 'tools' of their own to further a distinctive methodology. This may be because 'discourse analysis' refers to a wide variety of research approaches (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001) whereas CA 'is a relatively well-defined field' (Kitzinger, 2000: 165). Or, it may be due to the research objectives of some strands of DA, for example, discursive psychologists 'have as their central agenda an 'argument' with or 'respecification' of some pre-existing field of study' (Kitzinger, 2006a: 69).
CA and DA also often part company in relation to the source of data analysed. While some DA research uses naturally occurring interaction\textsuperscript{14}, CA specifically focuses on naturalistic talk - usually everyday, mundane conversation but also institutional talk - which provides access to real life interaction. Rather than analysing non-verbal forms of discourse or studying talk gathered from artificial settings such as experiments, interviews and focus groups, using naturalistic data allows us access to issues as they arise spontaneously in conversation. Coupled with the fact that it is not the topic of the conversation that is of intrinsic interest to conversation analysts rather it is the action facilitated through the talk, this makes CA a distinctive approach for studying the social world and as such it has significant impact on the findings yielded. For example, in Edley and Wetherell’s (2001) examination of talk in which they find competing repertoires for the way in which feminism and feminists are constructed, they examine the researcher-stimulated responses of men for the way in which feminism is constructed. In answering questions like “Give me an imaginary picture of a feminist” (Edley & Wetherell, 2001: 449) interviewees are likely to be showing their knowledge of stereotypes rather than the way they respond and orient to feminism and feminists in their everyday lives. It may well be that this is the way they conceptualise feminists but it is much more interesting and compelling to locate this treatment in the everyday than in these ‘created’ environments. So, although discourse analytical work – such as Edley and Wetherell’s – does not treat what participants say as an accurate report of their attitudes or beliefs but instead seeks to locate discourses or repertoires that are employed by speakers, they do not go far enough. We need to look at the way in which these descriptions are produced in situ (What are they responsive to? And, more importantly, what are they doing in this context?) and CA provides an excellent way to do this.

CA is predicated on ethnomethodological understandings of individuals as active agents who produce social order through action and practice contingent on participants’ interpretations. Recently there has been a flurry of arguments

\textsuperscript{14} There are many DA studies that do use naturalistic data and some discourse analysts now exclusively use naturally occurring interactions as a data source.
questioning the theoretical and methodological foundations of CA from non-conversation analysts (e.g., Ashmore & Reed, 2000; Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Hammersley, 2003; Wetherell, 1998), which has lead to conversation analysts responding to counter these criticisms (e.g., Schegloff, 1997, 1999a, 1999b; Kitzinger, 2000). Although Schegloff has engaged in these debates, he (along with the other early proponents of CA) places greater emphasis on the analysis of data than on theoretical debates, a position that is consonant with ethnomethodologists more generally. This positioning of the data as central is still an overriding concern today (see Schegloff, 1997). This data-driven examination of social reality as it happens is one of the greatest strengths of a CA approach. Through the application of thorough, detailed, rigorous analysis displayed in conjunction with the data, conversation analysts build a persuasive case for their analysis. So, rather than merely claiming that there are oppressive practices that disrupt the ongoing activity of our lives I want to see if my impression gained from my own experiences and those reported by others (in academic and non-academic sources) can be discovered and substantiated in the data.

Doing politically engaged CA

CA provides an excellent approach for achieving a detailed and compelling understanding of how social action and reality are produced in talk-in-interaction. The rigorous analytic insight that CA offers provides the opportunity to understand how subtle and insidious sexism and heterosexism is manifested in mundane interaction. For lesbians and gay men "[m]uch everyday interaction involves assumptions of heterosexuality and monitoring whether it is safe to make their sexuality known to others" (Bricknell, 2001: 213). One of the aims of the research in this thesis is to elucidate participants' practices for negotiating this dilemma.

Furthermore, this approach also allows exploration of the everyday hassles and stressors experienced by lesbian and gay people in their talk. CA offers lesbian and feminist researchers the opportunity to illuminate these interactional
difficulties and oppression by showing rather than merely claiming. However, using CA to do research on lesbian and feminist issues is contested and open to attack both from conversation analysts and from feminist and critical researchers. As I highlighted earlier, feminists begin with the basic premise that there is oppression — particularly, but not exclusively, oppression of women — in the world. Similarly, by definition, 'critical approaches claim to be critical of the present social order' (Billig, 2002). On the other hand, conversation analysts have actively discouraged approaching analysis with such predetermined views and maintain that researchers should be able to point to the data to substantiate such claims (e.g., Schegloff, 1995, 1997).

In this section I will outline some of the concerns expressed by those who are sceptical about the usefulness of CA for gender and sexuality research: CA's understanding of context is too narrow; adherence to participants' orientations is too restrictive; the focus on the micro social world ignores broader social influences; and CA's claim to neutrality is misleading. I will then highlight some of the main problems that have been raised by conversation analysts about the possibility of combining CA with political research: there is a propensity toward promiscuous citing of gender and sexuality; there is a tendency for researchers to impose their own ideologies on the data; and analysts have often been tempted to treat gender and sexuality categories as analytic categories a priori to the analysis.

(a) Feminists' and critical researchers' reservations

Feminist and critical researchers (e.g., Wetherell, Weatherall, Billig, Edley, Gough) argue that CA is too limited and its scope is too restrictive to be used to do politically engaged research. As there has been a move away from language per se to studying 'discourse' or language-in-use in what has been labelled the 'discursive turn' (see Speer, 2005a; Weatherall, 2002), the context in which talk is produced is seen as increasingly important. However, what counts as 'context' varies depending on the approach taken and, for feminists and critical researchers studying discourse, the definition of context employed by conversation analysts
is simply too narrow to allow research to be politically useful (e.g., Wetherell, 1998). These researchers employ a broad definition of 'context', for them context includes the relationship between speakers, their social identities and the institutional setting (Weatherall & Gallois, 2003). For conversation analysts this kind of ethnographic information is often regarded as undesirable since it tempts the analyst to stray from understanding the interaction on the participants’ own terms. Instead CA uses ‘context’ to mean the surrounding talk and local environment of the interaction that is the focus of the analysis. However, CA has been criticised for this stance since it “limits admissible context so severely that only the most blatant aspects of gendered discursive practice, such as the overt topicalizing of gender in conversation, are likely candidates for Schegloffian analysis” (Bucholtz, 2003: 52).

Similarly, CA’s insistence on adherence to participants’ orientations is also seen to limit the scope of its usefulness (Billig, 1999a; Erlich, 2002; Stokoe & Smithson, 2001). If it is only possible to define an instance of oppression as such because it is oriented to as this by the speakers then it restricts what can be said politically about the data. Also, this claim has been treated as erroneous by some researchers who argue that CA contradicts its own rule of examining interaction in the terms of the participants since it is jargon-ridden and as such the analysis is divorced from the speakers’ own understanding of the interaction (Billig, 1999a). Lakoff asks, “who is aware that a TRP ... is approaching as they speak?” and “Who realizes that they are producing a dispreferred second or a pre-sequence?” (Lakoff, 2003: 168-9). However, these criticisms seem to miss the point since CA shows precisely that participants – although they may not have the terminology – do orient to TRPs and their talk displays and reproduces the organisation of preference. If these features of talk were not important for speakers, then they would not be relevant to conversation analysts. But, Lakoff (2003) argues that participants are more likely to be aware of how gender informs and shapes their interactions. I will argue for the usefulness of using participants’ orientations as an analytic resource later in this chapter.

It has been argued CA’s focus on the micro social world has occurred at the expense of the broader social context. Researchers have pointed to the way in
which institutionalised sexism and heterosexism and tangible structures of power are beyond the remit of CA and therefore such an approach lacks what is necessary to understand oppression (Billig, 1999a). But this is also a criticism of other approaches that focus on micro interaction such as ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. Moreover, this focus on the micro allows us to explore how power and oppression are produced from a 'bottom-up' perspective.

CA’s appeal to neutrality has been met with suspicion by some feminist researchers (e.g., Lakoff, 2003; Wetherell, 1998). Through the detailed examination of talk conversation analysts believe that it is possible to uncover structures and linguistic units that are employed as resources by speakers to achieve an interactional end. These resources exist independently from the analyst’s interpretations of them. It is this kind of positivist claim that has come under particular attack from feminists and critical researchers. Although there has been a shift generally in disciplines such as sociology and psychology for researchers to be reflexive in their approach, disclose the way in which their own political commitments impact on the findings of their work, and concede that any analysis is inevitably only partial, CA continues to advise approaching the data with a 'clean gaze'.

(b) Conversation analysts’ reservations

On the other side, conversation analysts have also had their concerns about combining CA with a political agenda. Most of the leading researchers working in traditional CA (e.g., Drew, Lerner, Heritage) have generally not made these concerns public. Instead, it is apparent from their research that linking their analyses of the micro with broader social issues and structures has not been a main research objective. Instead, for these conversation analysts, their research is complete after analysis is done (Kitzinger, 2000). However, Schegloff has explicitly engaged with this debate. In ‘Whose text? Whose context?’ Schegloff (1997) sets out his position with regard to the possibility of combining the study of politics and formal analysis of interaction/discourse such as that prescribed by
conversation analysis. He does not argue that conversation is in principle incompatible with political research but that this can only be determined after analysis. Schegloff maintains that before attempting to relate cultural artefacts to their social, political and economic contexts the analyst should first undertake to understand the constitution of the cultural artefacts in themselves (Schegloff, 1997: 170). For him the political and the social may be part of the constitution but it should not be "a presupposition of analysis, as a definition of what analysis should be" (Schegloff, 1997: 170). He claims that researchers are often tempted to impose their own agendas on speakers' interactions leading to promiscuous citing of gender and sexuality in a way that is not salient for those speakers. Since speakers can be categorised in any number of ways it is insufficient to select any one of these to account for a particular behaviour since it may not be relevant for the speakers at that time in that interaction. This means that talk by a woman cannot be taken to be characteristic of 'women's talk' merely because it happens to be true that the speaker is a woman. Instead he stresses the importance of adhering to participants' orientations as a means of avoiding imposing the researcher's ideology. So, citing sexuality and gender requires that the researcher has adequate warrant in the data.

Despite scepticism about the usefulness and appropriateness of CA for doing politically engaged research, work is being produced that does just that. Although 'the partnership of CA and feminism is still in its infancy' (Tanaka & Fukushima, 2002: 752), there has been a recent surge of CA and CA-inspired feminist work which has predominantly addressed issues pertaining to gender in ordinary talk-in-interaction (e.g., Kitzinger and Frith, 1999; Tanio, 2003), institutional talk (e.g., Shaw & Kitzinger, 2004, fth.; Stokoe, 1998, 1999; Toerien, 2004a, 2004b), and in researcher-generated talk (e.g., Paoletti, 2002; Speer, 2002). If this body of work is in its 'infancy', then the harnessing of CA for research on sexuality - as is my objective in this research - is embryonic, with only a few significant exceptions to this scarcity (e.g., Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2003). So, rather than continue to argue over whether it theoretically can be done, the best way to challenge the doubts expressed by both sides of this debate is to do it. Only then, when there is tangible research to provide a concrete example, can researchers assess whether
it meets the criteria for CA and whether it satisfactorily contributes to gender and sexuality research. I have considered here the criticisms that have been levelled at 'feminist CA'. In my final chapter, after reporting my research findings, I will assess the extent to which I consider them merited.

**My approach to doing politically engaged CA in practice**

In the remainder of this chapter I will focus on what it means to do politically engaged CA given the reservations expressed above. Since this is a relatively new area of investigation, those who are using CA for this type of research are engaged in an exploration of how it can be done as they do it. Here then, I would like to focus on some features that I consider essential to the approach I take: using naturalistic data; avoiding essentialism; treating talk as constitutive of the social world and relationships; adhering to participants' observations; using CA with an explicitly political commitment and contributing to lesbian and gay studies, to sexuality and language research and to conversation analysis as a field.

**Data**

The first feature of my approach to doing politically engaged CA research is to use only naturalistic data. In this section I provide an overview of the data sets used in CA before describing my own data set and how I collected it.

**(a) CA's data**

Collecting (and analysing) the naturally occurring talk of non-heterosexual people is under-represented in sociolinguistics, psychology, sociology, and CA. Up until the 1970s, when language was studied within the social sciences, it was the language of white, heterosexual males. Of course it was not labelled as such,
but rather findings from these data were simply assumed to be representative of all language. But, in the 1970s, Robin Lakoff (1975) published *Language and Women's Place*, which sought to make gender relevant in language research. This paved the way for many feminist works critiquing the male bias of previous language research and sought to address this by explicitly focusing on the language used by women (e.g., Spender, 1980). Although this challenge to the established practice was groundbreaking in its time and it provided a solid foundation for current research, I would like to highlight two problems that were not addressed: (a) the heterosexual bias of the data; and (b) the use of anecdotal or researcher-generated data.

This feminist criticism of the male bias and exclusion of women in the data used in early language research cannot be fairly applied to the data being used by conversation analysts at that time, since in CA 'the classic data sets overwhelmingly involve talk between women' (Kitzinger, 2005b). However, there were few links between conversation analysis and the study of gender in the 1970's (although see below for examples of gender research that use the technical resources of CA), so it is unlikely that this feminist concern was directed toward or heard by the principle researchers in CA. In rectifying the problem of male bias in the data sets of language research more generally, it was frequently overlooked that the language was that of heterosexual men and that including heterosexual women still left gay men and lesbians excluded from the research. This is a criticism that can be – and has been (see Kitzinger, 2005b) – levelled at the data sets of CA: 'virtually all the talk upon which the classic findings of conversation analysis (CA) are based is produced by heterosexuals' (p. 222). Including data sets comprising talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers (and other non-heterosexuals) and bringing sexuality into CA and language research more broadly in a sustained way occurred even later (see earlier section 'Sexuality and Language').

The second problem that I highlight is the source of data that much of this work has been based on. Lakoff's (1975) evidence for her claims was largely anecdotal. This is not a criticism of her work in particular since other researchers, such as Goffman (e.g., 1961, 1983) for instance, were also
publishing work grounded in anecdotal evidence at around the same time. Others focused on data gained in experimental settings or gathered through interviews and focus groups and when researchers did examine ‘real life’ interaction they took notes on their observations rather than recording them (e.g., Hayes, 1981). Although researcher-generated data remains a valuable data source for many working today, my interest is in naturally occurring talk and there has been little research (until very recently) on language and sexuality that has used this as a data source. There were a few early studies of language and gender that that used naturally occurring interaction such as Zimmerman and West (1975) and Fishman (1978, 1980). These studies also employed the tools of conversation analysis. Zimmerman and West (1975) found that men interrupt more than women in cross-sex interaction and this is one of the ways men’s dominance in conversation is analysed. Similarly, Fishman (1978) found women also work harder in mixed-sex interaction to ensure the smooth running of the talk. For example, she found women issue more ‘tag questions’ than men and she uses this as an illustration of women’s conversational work. Aside from the problem that these types of studies rely on simplistic notions of conversational power as reducible to linguistic phenomena without sensitivity to their interactional context (see Crawford, 1995; Gal, 1995 for a discussion of why this is problematic), both of these studies treat ‘women’ and ‘men’ as pre-existing analytic categories without providing warrant for so doing.

To find a substantial body of work that is based on naturally occurring talk one needs to look toward CA research. It is no coincidence that the aforementioned notable exceptions borrow the tools of CA in their research. CA has prized naturally occurring, everyday conversation as the ideal source of data. Technological developments in the 1960s provided accessible equipment for recording interactions, which therefore allowed for repeated listening to data and for making copies of the data. Classic data sets recorded in the 1960s and 1970s include the Suicide Prevention Line data (SPL), Group Therapy Sessions (GTS), SBL, NB, Trio, Chicken Dinner, and Chinese Dinner. Sacks worked on virtually all of these as did (and do) Schegloff and Jefferson and they remain ‘active’ data sets in today’s research. Most of these are audio recordings only, with the exception of Chicken Dinner and Chinese Dinner, both of which were filmed. It
is now standard practice to video-record all co-present interactions - due to the significance of non-verbal components of interaction (see Goodwin, 2000; Lerner, 2002; Schegloff, 1984, 2000a; Wootton, 1991) - but some of these early co-present data (e.g., GTS and SN4) have only audio recording, in no small part due to the technology accessible at the time. More recently, in the 1980s as CA gained a hold in the UK, the Holt corpus was recorded by Holt, transcribed by Jefferson and widely used by conversation analysts (e.g., Holt, Drew, and Jefferson, as well as by conversation analysts based in the US such as Heritage, Raymond, and Schegloff). These data sets are widely known and cited within the CA community.

Almost all of the data sets mentioned above are recordings of everyday, mundane talk: telephone conversations between friends and family and co-present interactions often set around the dinner table. The exceptions to this are the SPL and GTS data. These arguably fall into the category of ‘institutional data sets’, which make up the remainder of data sets for CA research. However, I have included them with the ordinary conversation data, as they were not analysed in the first instance as ‘institutional talk’. CA research on institutional talk has focused on, courtroom interaction (Drew, 1992), medical interaction (Heath, 1992; Heritage & Sefi, 1992; Heritage & Lindstrom, 1998; Maynard, 1991, 1992; Peräkylä, 1999; Robinson, 2001), emergency calls (Zimmerman, 1992), and HIV/AIDS counselling (Silverman, 1997). Predominantly the data upon which the analyses presented here are based is ordinary talk, although there are some interactions (see Chapter 3 in particular) that are taken from an institutional context\(^\text{15}\) (for a good overview of research on institutional talk-in-interaction see Drew and Heritage, 1992).

\(^\text{15}\) However, in practice it appears that the distinction between ordinary and institutional talk is not always clearly defined. Classification of talk as either institutional talk or ordinary conversation is negotiated in the local interactional context of the talk rather that being a pre-existing feature of the context that necessarily shapes and constrains the interaction (Drew 2002; Drew & Heritage, 1992; Schegloff, 1992).
Although we do not know the sexualities of the speakers in the classic CA data sets there are frequent displays of and references to heterosexuality in much of the existing data (Kitzinger, 2005b). In telephone conversations between friends, there are references to opposite sex partners and much of the co-present data is organised around heterosexual units, such as mixed-sex couples or the heterosexual nuclear family. The researchers who recorded these data did not intend to collect ‘heterosexual’ data at the outset but, nonetheless, this was the result. Of course, these data sets are not referred to as ‘heterosexual data sets’. Generally these orientations to heterosexuality have been taken for granted and the participants are not deemed to be doing anything special. Where there are occasional references to possible lesbian and/or gay category membership in these data it is not the focus of the research and these references are very rare (e.g., Sacks (1995: 46) once in Suicide data and Silverman (e.g., Silverman, 1997; Silverman & Peräkylä, 1990) in HIV/AIDS work).

(b) My data: The Land corpus

The data upon which this thesis is based comprises recordings of the naturally occurring, incoming and outgoing telephone conversations of five lesbian households. The corpus consists of over 150 calls ranging in length from 10 seconds to nearly an hour (totalling approximately 18 hours). Most of the calls are ordinary conversations with friends, family, partners and so on, but there are some institutional calls too (i.e. calls to dentists, plumber, insurance companies, etc.). Calls in the Land data corpus are tagged with mnemonics identifying from which of the five households each is taken. Calls collected by Karen are tagged NE; Nicola, OC; Rebecca (and her partner Julie), SW; Chloe (and her partner Katy), YU; and Sylvia (and her partner, Janice), SC. Calls from each household were numbered consecutively – so, for example, SW21 refers to the twenty-first call on the tapes returned by Rebecca.

I aimed to recruit LGBT participants, by advertising in LGBT publications and locations (such as Diva magazine, LGBT social groups, and Libertas!)
bookshop$^{16}$. However, it so happened that all of the people who volunteered self-identified as lesbian. Since these lesbian volunteers made and received calls with a wide variety of people, there are, nonetheless, calls within the resulting data corpus involving speakers who are hearable as gay men or as heterosexuals and others whose sexuality is unknown. There is also talk about third parties who are referred to or hearable in context as gay men, heterosexuals, bisexuals, transgendered people and intersexuals. Additionally, it was apparent from the data that the lesbians who recorded calls for this research were all ‘out’ about their sexuality to their friends, family and colleagues (as far as it was possible to tell). In this way they might be seen as living lives ‘beyond the closet’ (Seidman, 2004) and it is unlikely that they are representative of lesbians in general (if there is such a thing). However, it was never my intention to treat the data I have collected as representative of the talk of a particular category of people$^{17}$. I do not treat these data as representative of lesbian experience or of some elusive ‘lesbian language’. Rather, I allow the relevance of speakers’ category memberships (in the category ‘lesbian’ or otherwise) to arise spontaneously in the talk, as is also the case with membership in other sexuality categories. Although I have referred to the data corpus on which this research is based as a ‘lesbian and gay data set’, the extent to which what has been collected is ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ talk and how it is (or is not ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ talk) is something that can only be established after analysis and not a pre-defined characteristic of the data set. As Darsey (1981) points out – and I demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6: ‘[a] study that uses gays as a source of data does not necessarily say much about gays’ (p. 78).

Ethical issues should be taken into consideration as part of the ongoing process of the research, rather than appended to the research (Humphries, 2000; Miller & Bell, 2002). In addition to the British Sociological Association’s Statement of

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$^{16}$ Libertas! was (closed in 2004) a women’s bookshop in York catering predominantly for lesbian, bisexual, and trans women (but also stocking resources for LGBT people more generally).

$^{17}$ For ethnomethodologists, data should be collected from wherever it is possible (Benson and Hughes, 1983).
Ethical Practice, my research had to adhere to the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct since my supervisor is a chartered psychologist. The significance of thorough ethical considerations is particularly pertinent in much qualitative research in which researchers may extensively delve into participants’ lives (British Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice, 2002, Article 27, p.4; J. Mason, 1996). Since participants were permitting me access to intimate aspects of their lives by allowing me to study recordings of their private interactions, I was especially sensitive to the need to preserve their privacy. This entailed being careful to use pseudonyms, not only for people, but also places, events, and any other information that may provide details of their identities and choosing not to play particular portions of the recordings (i.e., parts that are especially personal or include information that cannot be easily anonymised in the audio recording) in academic settings. Audio clips of [some of] the data displayed in this PhD were submitted for the examiners but have not been included with the PhD itself for this reason.

After prospective participants made initial contact with me, I provided further details about what participation would involve and stressed that if they did not want to proceed they were free to do so and thanked them for showing an interest in the research. Two people who enquired about participation decided not to proceed. To those who wanted to take part in the research I sent a recording package, which included: a consent form (or two consent forms in cases in which the participant’s co-resident partner wanted to take part in the research too); a tape recorder with spare batteries; a recording device; step-by-step instructions for setting up and operating the recording equipment; tapes; stamped self-addressed envelopes (for tapes to be returned to me); and an accompanying letter. The letter explained the purpose of the research, what their participation would entail, my contact details, my supervisor’s contact details, the legal requirement for them to seek oral permission from their co-conversationalist, assurance that identifying information would be pseudonymised and that the research would adhere to British Sociological Association and British Psychological Society ethical guidelines, and their control over the length of their participation. Explaining the nature and purpose of the research in ways that are meaningful to participants and making clear the limits of participation are
prerequisites for 'informed consent' (British Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice, 2002, Article 16; British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct, 2006, Article 1.3; Sin, 2005). In addition to providing information about my research, I fostered an environment of ‘trust and integrity.’ (British Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice, 2002, Article 14, pp. 1-2) in which participants were able to contact me freely if they had any questions or comments about the research (for example, one participant contacted me for further guidance about how to seek informed consent from her interlocutors and another required help to resolve a problem with the recording equipment).

Consent forms were completed by each of the people who volunteered to record their calls. The consent form allowed participants to specify the ways in which they were happy for the data to be used (see Appendix I). The form also reminded participants of the legal obligation to seek permission from their co-conversationalist to tape the calls (also explained in the accompanying letter). The co-conversationalists gave oral consent. The requesting and granting of consent to record the telephone calls often disrupted the talk, however, it did allow speakers (both the person who was recording and their co-conversationalist) to engage more actively with the data collecting process. For example, one participant reminded me to ‘edit’ the names of the people who she and her interlocutor had been talking about; another pair of speakers (having established consent previously), after talking about a delicate topic, engaged in a discussion about whether they were both happy for me to have the tapes; and others who routinely consented to having their calls recorded felt comfortable to ask for the recording to cease if they had something particularly personal to say.

The use of oral consent meant that speakers seemed to view the recorded conversation itself as a place in which they could raise issues relating to their participation as and when they arose.

In response to participants' initial enquiries, I emphasised that agreeing to participate did not involve a commitment to continue participation for any length of time and that they could terminate involvement at any time for any (or no) reason since it is important to '[e]nsure from the first contact that clients are
aware of their right to withdraw at any time...from research participation.' (British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct, 2006, Article 1.4, p.14, also see British Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice, 2002, Article 17, p.3). To those who wanted to proceed, I provided three tapes for participants to record their calls but I stressed in the letter and again in the instructions for recording that they were not obliged to fill all the tapes if they did not wish to, but also that I would be happy to provide more tapes if they wanted to continue participating. One household recorded three tapes of conversation, two recorded more than three tapes, and two recorded less than three tapes. Participants controlled the recording device and they were able to choose which of their calls they recorded and which they did not. They also had the opportunity to delete any calls they may subsequently have decided they did not want to include in the research before they mailed the tapes to me.

On receipt of the tapes, I made a copy of them and also digitised the data. I kept the original audiotapes in a locked desk draw at home and digital files on my home computer (password protected). I stored the copied tapes and CDs of the digital files in a locked filing cabinet in my office in the Department (I did not keep digital files of the data on my office computer since other people have access to it). I assigned a label to each call and logged details of each conversation recorded (I used pseudonyms in these records). Since it is necessary to '[r]ecord, process, and store confidential information in a fashion designed to avoid inadvertent disclosure' (British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct, 2006, Article 1.2(iv), p.11), I filed consent forms and correspondence with participants (i.e., material containing information about the identity of the participants) in a separate, secure location to the audio data, data log and transcripts.

I pseudonymised identifying information from the beginning of the transcribing process. This process involved producing a rough version of the talk, focusing on the words produced by each speaker and then continually revising the transcription and incorporating more detail about the production of the utterances. I transcribed the data according to the method used by conversation
Chapter 1: Introduction

analysts and developed by Gail Jefferson\(^{18}\). The transcription notation attempts to capture not only what is said but also how the speakers said it\(^{19}\) (see Appendix II for transcription key).

In sum, my data set is typical of CA sets in that it is naturalistic. It is atypical only insofar as I sought participants who defined themselves as members of particular social categories.

Avoiding essentialism

The second feature of my approach to doing politically engaged CA research is to avoid essentialism in my analyses. Many feminist researchers have sought to identify a ‘women’s language’. Inspired by sociological work on subcultures, the ‘difference’ model for understanding the existence of ‘women’s language’ treated such language as the outcome of different worlds or cultures inhabited by girls and boys and subsequently women and men. This position has been supported by Maltz and Borker (1998) and popularised by Tannen (1990, based on academic research such as Tannen, 1997, 1998). At the same time, the development of the ‘dominance’ model suggested that ‘language’ is ‘men’s language’ which reflects and reproduces their greater relative power (e.g., Fishman, 1978; Zimmerman & West, 1975; Spender, 1980; Thorne & Henley, 1975). Common to both approaches was the notion that talk produced by a woman is ‘women’s talk’. Similarly, as I outlined earlier (see ‘Sexuality and Language’ section) research on language and sexuality, although later and not so prolific, has often looked for evidence for the existence of a particular kind of language this is specific to different groups (e.g., Crew, 1978; Gaudio, 1994; Hayes, 1981; Leap, 1996; Moonwoman-Baird, 1997). As with much of the

\(^{18}\) For further information about a CA approach to transcription see Jefferson (2004).

\(^{19}\) The transcription notation is intended to capture some of the flavour of the talk as it is produced in the audio recording. It is not ‘that a transcript should (or ever could) be viewed as a literal representation of, or observationally adequate substitute for the data under analysis’ (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984: 12).
Chapter 1: Introduction

aforementioned work on gender and language, these investigations have focused on a search for a gay/lesbian/queer language that is reminiscent of Lakoff’s (1975) ‘women’s language’.

Significantly what these studies suggest is that our gender and sexuality are part of our essential beings and therefore are expressed through, and manifested in, our talk. Category memberships such as ‘lesbian’ and ‘woman’ are treated as known variables that can be mapped onto various linguistic styles and characteristics. However, the discursive turn in language research has resulted in a radical shift from essentialist approaches to gender and sexuality. The move toward the study of discourse as situated interaction and away from an abstract understanding of language has been accompanied by a shift to an understanding of sex and sexuality that is social constructed in interaction (Bricknell, 2006; Eckert, 1998; Speer, 2005a). For many contemporary gender and sexuality researchers (e.g., social constructionists, postmodernists, post-structuralists, queer theorists, etc.) sex and sexuality are not attributes that reside within individuals or fixed, stable identities: rather they are constructed and performed in interaction (Butler, 1990; Crawford, 1995; Fenstermaker & West, 2002; West & Zimmerman, 1987).

The theoretical shift of social constructionism/postmodernism has led to a radically different research approach. Instead of simply offering different answers to the questions posed by early (essentialist) work on language and gender/sexuality from a different angle, social constructionists and postmodernists have changed the questions. So, rather than asking how ‘men’s language’ is different from ‘women’s language’, or ‘lesbian and gay language’ is different from ‘heterosexual language’, or interrogating the characteristics associated with such talk, researchers from this kaleidoscope of positions investigate how genders and sexualities are produced and maintained in interaction (and other discourses). The usefulness of the study of ‘difference’ (whether between men and women or between heterosexual women and lesbians) has increasingly been questioned and there is significant feminist concern over the appropriateness of these types of studies for critical research (Kitzinger, 1994). The promise that sex difference research would liberate women from
restrictive and oppressive stereotypes had not been fulfilled. Studies of difference, even when presented as dispassionate and objective, are necessarily politically loaded (Crawford, 1995). So, instead of looking for patterns in ‘men’s talk’, ‘women’s talk’, ‘gay talk’, or ‘straight talk’ and how they differ from each other, we have seen a focus on how people ‘do’ gender or sexuality in their talk. However, some of the work that has attempted, for example, to examine how women do ‘being a woman’ have conceptualised ‘women’ as an analytic category. What women say and do is treated as a way of producing oneself as a woman, resulting in a tautological argument that has the effect of reifying stereotypes (Stokoe & Weatherall, 2002).

Through a CA approach, I can examine participants’ social category memberships from a social constructionist position and thereby avoid this kind of circular argument. Unlike work from other perspectives that borrow the tools of CA for analyses, the theoretical underpinnings of CA mean that research from the paradigm of CA cannot treat participants as category members a priori (Schegloff, 1997) and as such CA is not a suitable approach for essentialist research (Kitzinger, 2000: 174). Therefore, I do not treat speakers as always already occupying fixed social categories, which can be drawn upon to account for any given behaviour. For example, as I show in Chapters 5 and 6, in conversations involving lesbian and gay participants it is not always the speakers’ sexualities that are relevant in their talk but rather their memberships in categories such as ‘women’, ‘schizophrenics’, ‘students’, and so on.

So, rather than assuming a priori knowledge of the sexualities of speakers and judging their talk as illustrative of talk by people in that sexual category, I will examine conversation for the way in which these issues arise in and are produced by spontaneous interaction. In this way CA allows me to engage with issues of sexuality by providing a theoretical base and methodological approach that does not rest on essentialist understandings of sexuality and also avoids the tautology that is characteristic of some social constructionist work.
Talk as constitutive of the social world and relationships

The third feature of my approach to doing politically engaged CA research is to treat talk as constitutive of the social world and relationships. It is not only the relevance of social categories that are produced in conversation; talk-in-action provides an arena for the negotiation and reproduction of social reality. Rather than seeing language as a reflection of an external social reality, conversation analysts and other researchers who conceptualise discourse as action, treat the talk in their data as constructs employed by speakers to do things. There are two facets of this constitution that are the focus in this thesis: first, how talk (re)produces the social world (e.g., Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b); and, second, how talk (re)constitutes the relationship between the speakers (e.g., Mandelbaum, 2003). Approaches that treat language as constitutive such as CA and action-oriented discourse analysis conceptualise language as 'a site where meanings are created and changed' (Taylor, 2001: 6). Conversation is not the only arena for this; social life is also constituted through physical acts, violence and institutionalised privilege, for example. Conversation analysts' focus on talk-in-interaction is not so placed to achieve an understanding of language itself but language as a medium for understanding action in the social world since much action is achieved through talk (Kitzinger, 2003). This is not a characteristic that is exclusive to CA; rather many of the contemporary approaches to discourse treat language as a tool for the production of social life. So, while earlier work such as that produced under the dominance approach to gender and language often examined the way in which women's oppression was reflected in language, the new focus became the way in which oppression is constituted and reproduced in discourse. Therefore, it is not the topic of the talk that is deemed to be the focus of CA research but rather the action that the speakers are performing with their talk. Participants' accounts of their experiences, rather than being accurate records of events, attitudes and beliefs, are constructions which reveal how participants make sense of their world and uncover dominant discourses used by speakers to do this. For example, some discursive psychologists identify the linguistic and rhetorical resources that speakers use to construct their behaviour and indeed all social action as reasonable and rational (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This departs from traditional psychological approaches where language is
deemed to reflect some inner psychological state. In line with these changes it has been suggested that linguistic practices should be examined for what they reveal about the resources employed by speakers for a particular end (Cameron & Kulick, 2003).

Conceptualising discourse in this way posits speakers as dynamic participants who exercise agency in their choices in interaction. As a feminist, I initially approached this with some trepidation. If we are all co-constructors of social reality then, in any oppressive interaction that we experience, does it not follow that we had a constitutive role in the production of that oppression? It seems problematic that an interaction which, as a cultural member, I would want to label ‘sexual harassment’ or ‘homophobic bullying’ can be deemed to be constructed as such by both the perpetrator and the recipient of this violence. Surely such a description denies power inequalities? However, every time that I answer ‘have you got a boyfriend?’ with only a ‘no’, or let someone on the phone call me ‘Mrs Land’ without challenging them, or let go of my partner’s hand because it will draw unwanted attention, I am helping to build a world in which routine sexism and heterosexism is taken-for-granted. The reason I do these things varies: I might be concerned for my safety or too busy to take the time to explain or it might be that I simply cannot be bothered. On other occasions I do confront these assumptions and challenge them. However, in challenging such instances I am contributing to the event being labelled as ‘heterosexism’ and therefore I have an active role in the production of an occasion of heterosexism. The point is that taking an approach that treats interaction as constitutive allows speakers to make choices about if and when to challenge oppression. Ethnomethodology’s concern to avoid viewing social actors as ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967) who merely re-enact roles and are shaped by broader social structures and processes means there is scope to be more than just victims of oppression. This, then, is potentially liberating for feminist research since agency allows for resistance and social change through subversive behaviour and gender nonconformity (Maloney & Fenstermaker, 2002).

By treating interaction as constitutive it is possible to examine talk to see exactly how interlocutors, as active agents, co-construct or ‘bring off’ interactions as
'oppression' or 'harassment' or 'heterosexist'. Furthermore, it also allows for speakers to resist characterising the interaction in this way and as an analyst it is interesting to discover the resources available to participants to do this. Finally, as someone who is interested in contributing to our understanding of lesbian and gay lives, I can consider the circumstances in which heterosexist assumptions go unchallenged (and when they are confronted) for what they reveal about the social world. So, for example, on one particular occasion when I did not correct the woman on the other end of the telephone who called me 'Mrs Land' I did so in service of the activity of the interaction (complaining about the service provided by the telephone company): to have challenged the woman's assumption would have disrupted the ongoing activity and thereby inconvenienced me further.

Participants' orientations

The fourth feature of my approach to doing politically engaged CA research is an understanding of the importance of adhering to participants' observations. Many feminists have sought to make gender relevant in discourse analytic approaches by looking at language through a "gender lens" (Crawford, 1995: 132) or claiming that "[e]ach time we speak ...we are saying, 'I am a woman'" (Coates, 1998: 302). This means that researchers have often assumed that speakers are orienting to each other with reference to gender without evidence to warrant this. For example, Zimmerman and West (1975) found that men are more likely to interrupt women than the reverse. However, they allude to the possibility that gender is not always the overriding concern of the participants involved in the interaction in one of the episodes that they recorded for their research. This is the only episode in their collection in which they found a woman interrupted a man. In this case the woman was a teaching assistant and the man an undergraduate student. Zimmerman and West (1975) suggest that the teaching assistant's relative higher status to the man influenced the interaction. Although not made explicit, this implies that gender is not always the most relevant category and what constitutes a pertinent social category membership varies between contexts. Also, it was not demonstrably clear that these participants, in
Chapter 1: Introduction

This interaction, were orienting to each other as student and teacher either. Work that focuses on interruptions and gender differences has flourished since Zimmerman and West. Many have produced findings that are consistent with this early study, that is, men do interrupt women more than occurs vice versa. However, although Zimmerman and West recorded this as men’s conversational dominance, others had accounted for this phenomenon with reference to the different ways that boys and girls are socialised (Tannen, 1998). Therefore, men and women have different conversational styles. However, the majority of these studies have found little or no significant difference in the rate of interruption between men and women (James & Clarke, 1993; Aries; 1996). Anderson and Leaper (1998) explain this with reference to women’s liberation: “the performance of women and men has become more similar in these areas – perhaps the result of increased opportunities for women (p. 228). These later studies have often discerned between types of overlap and interruption. However, this coding often occurs before or in lieu of analysis and it is important to remember that phenomena that may appear to be the same prior to analysis may turn out to very different on closer inspection (Drew, 2003a). In doing this, these studies also often overlook the subtle and important differences between overlap and interruption. And, even if a turn is shown to be interruptive (i.e., in interjacent overlap), then it does not necessarily map onto ‘domination’ since starting a turn in overlap with another speaker’s turn-in-progress may be in service of a cooperative action (see Kitzinger, frth). Furthermore, a common criticism of this work (e.g., Tannen, 1998, West, 1979; Zimmerman & West, 1979) is that the researchers do not demonstrate that the participants orient to gender as accountable for these interruptions.

Many of the analytic approaches to discourse provide a solution to this through the claim to adhere to participant orientations. Using participants’ own orientations to guide analysis rather than importing the analyst’s own agenda or framework onto the analysis avoids imposing analyst preoccupations on the interaction in a way that was not relevant for the participants involved. It is not sufficient to select categories such as ‘woman’ or ‘lesbian’ to account for any particular behaviour merely because they are ‘true’, rather, it must be
demonstrably relevant to the participants that they attribute the behaviour to the person’s gender or sexuality (Schegloff, 1997).

Many contemporary researchers studying talk and discourse have emphasised the importance of understanding interaction in the participants’ own terms but what counts as participant orientations varies depending on the approach taken. This means there are differing understandings of what it means to show participants orienting to cultural and social concerns such as gender, sexuality, class or race. Many discourse analysts and researchers on speech communication allow extrapolation from the language used to build up an analysis of the participants’ observations. Hopper and LeBaron (1998) refer to ‘implicit indexing of gender’ (p.69) through reference to ‘a cultural stereotype’ (ibid.). Some feminists have managed adherence to members’ orientations to do politically insightful research by expanding the category ‘member’ to include the analyst. Although members’ orientations are usually restricted to only those engaged in the interaction under investigation, Stokoe and Smithson (2001) argue “that analysts are also members and display their own sense-making procedures in analysis” (p. 85). However, if we employ this argument then it is not clear how we can differentiate between ‘participant orientations’ and impositions of the researcher’s ideology.

Conversation analysts’ method of adhering to the participants’ orientations has come under significant criticism from feminists since it can be argued that this does not allow for a critical stance toward dominant (patriarchal and heterosexist) discourse. Some have maintained that the criteria for demonstrating relevance in CA are so severe that this leads to “abstract individualism” and ultimately seems to suggest that gender is never relevant (McElhinny, 2003: 35).

However, adhering to participants’ orientations provides insight into experiences of speakers in their own terms. Therefore, CA should be consistent with feminist goals (Kitzinger, 2002). CA, and indeed all approaches that focus on micro level interaction such as ethnomethodology, have been criticised for not attending sufficiently to the impact of the social structure and historical context in which interaction is produced. However, these approaches should be of interest to
feminists as they are concerned with the personal and the everyday. Concepts such as false consciousness have been criticised for imposing a white, middle class, heterosexual woman's understanding onto all women's experiences. So, rather than men claiming women cannot understand the social world, feminist theory has been criticised for similar impositions (Stanley & Wise, 1983; Kitzinger, 2003). By seeking to examine the social world in participants' own terms this kind of ideological authority can be avoided.

What counts as an 'orientation' to conversation analysts has been one of the concerns voiced by researchers who are sceptical about the appropriateness of CA to illuminate gender and sexuality in interaction (e.g., Lakoff, 2003). If only overt references to gender or sexuality or explicit challenges to heterosexist or sexist talk count as participants' orientations, then this would place significant constraints on what can be said about any piece of interaction. However, as politically engaged researchers, what is often most interesting about the language that we find 'sexist' or 'heterosexist' or 'racist' is that it is not topicalised or challenged at all (Kitzinger, 2002). If a case can be built for a turn containing, for example, a sexist implication and this is not oriented to but rather treated as routine and normative then we can comment on this. It is the very fact that this is not oriented to as sexist by the participants that contributes to the construction of a world in which such sexism forms part of the taken for granted way of seeing the world (Beach, 2000; Enfield, unpublished manuscript; Kitzinger, 2000). This is perhaps contentious because some conversation analysts might argue that this kind of analysis strays too far away from the speakers' own understandings.

CA's focus on showing relevance for the participants can be liberating rather than constraining insofar as it may avoid the pitfalls of many studies of sexuality and gender in language since it avoids seeing gender and sexuality everywhere and therefore merely reinforcing stereotypes. If we account for a particular characteristic of talk with reference to the sex of the speaker without any warrant for doing so, then when we see the behaviour again describe it as an occasion of 'doing gender' then we will only find what we already 'knew' to be gendered. By using participants' orientations as a key analytic resource I mean to examine
Chapter 1: Introduction

the talk for what speakers understand it to mean in their own terms but also to examine the assumptions that go unnoticed and are treated as unremarkable.

Using CA with an explicitly political commitment

What makes my work CA research is by now, I hope, obvious: using the technical tools of CA (turn-taking, sequence organisation, repairs, etc.) to understand social interaction; a focus on naturalistic data; treating talk as constitutive of social reality; avoiding essentialist understandings of identities; and using participants' orientations as a key analytic resource. My political alignments mean that I am committed to using CA to contribute to lesbian and gay research (both sexuality and language research and lesbian and gay studies more generally). CA has not traditionally been associated with this kind of research (although recently this has begun to change, e.g., Kitzinger & Frith, 1999; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). However, in doing this research I intend to contribute both to feminist/lesbian and gay work and to CA research.

First, how can a CA approach be employed to contribute to politically engaged fields of research (such as lesbian and gay studies and sexuality and language research)? With its fine-grained analysis and attention to the minute details of talk, CA provides a compelling analysis of the social world as it is constructed through talk-in-interaction. This focus on micro interaction gives access to the everyday hassles and stressors that present challenges to lesbian and gay people. These insidious and mundane instances of routine sexism and heterosexism (such as those personal experiences I recounted earlier) are illuminated in a way in which self-report data might miss if they are just treated as routine and therefore nothing to tell. Furthermore, it is possible to use the tools of CA to examine the effects of the negotiation of these hassles and stressors on the relationships of the speakers. Through the identification of gaps, overlapping talk, agreements, disagreements, collaborative completions, and so on claims can be made about how adversarial or supportive the interaction is. By looking at the effect of interactions necessitated by heterosexism and sexism it can be shown how the
broader social world impacts upon relationships as they are constructed through these micro interactions.

CA provides an exciting opportunity to show in the data 'real life' incidences of oppression, or orientation to gender or sexuality, or a heterosexist or sexist assumption being taken for granted. As Kitzinger (2003) highlights, this is a way in which we can posit speakers as exercising agency in the creation of social reality and, at the same time, avoids the problem of merely reproducing reports that have been interpreted with reference to heterocentric or patriarchal understandings.

Second, what can a politically engaged approach contribute to a CA analysis? I can bring to bear my own experiences and insight from feminist and sexuality literature on the analysis to locate it within its broader social context. That is, by having an understanding of the implications of interaction it is possible to show how these micro interactions are relevant as a part of the speakers' lives. For example, it is possible to use CA to identify the disruption caused by coming out in an ordinary mundane interaction. However, as a lesbian and a feminist this is not merely a 'disruption' rather, it is an instance of what lesbian and gay people experience as awkward or oppressive. We can also use our experiences to show that these instances form the backdrop of our lives.

Conversation analysts have often highlighted places in talk where the interaction is not running off smoothly such as overlapping talk (e.g., Jefferson, 1984a) and repair (e.g., Drew, 1997; Schegloff, 1992). By focusing on these 'problems' or 'interesting' phenomena in interaction, conversation analytic research has often overlooked what occurs when talk is being produced smoothly. However, by examining what participants produce unproblematically it is possible to highlight what is taken for granted in the worlds in which they co-construct: 'it is precisely the fact that sexist, heterosexist and racist assumptions are routinely incorporated into everyday conversations without anyone noticing or responding to them that way which is of interest' (Kitzinger, 2000: 171, emphasis in the original). It is also possible, through looking at what speakers take for granted, to examine the way in which social reality is reproduced through talk-in-
interaction. This reproduction of the heterosexist and sexist order is often overlooked by speakers — and is rarely the focus of analysis for conversation analysts. For example, as part of Paul Drew’s (1987) research on po-faced responses to teases he analyses several fragments of talk in which teases spontaneously arise in conversation. In one of these fragments Vic is telling a story about an occasion where he and a friend were almost caught by the police in a room with a prostitute (at the time and place of this occurrence it was apparently required that being caught ‘having relations’ would have meant that they would have to have married).

[Drew: 1987: 224]

01 Vic: So w(hh)e sst: sstuff her under the goddam bed rolled up in
02 the blanket and Royal Mounted Police comes in, says I heard
03 there was a complaint from landlord last night that some
04 women and some guy come through the window uh. hh any women
05 in here I says n:o sir. I’m in the Navy and I don’t mess
06 with you know (I’m(    )
07 Mik: [I don’t mess with women
08   eh heh ha [ha ha ha ha ah ah ah ah ah ah!=
09 Vic: [A(h)h (h)women, yeh.
10 Mik: [ ah! ah! ah! hh! hh! hh! hh! ]=
11 Joe: [If it were a ma:n, be all right.]=
12 Vic: [ Some shit like that, ]=
13 Vic: =Yeah.=
14 Car: =eh! .hh
15 Mik: hh! hh! [hh! .hhhh
16 Vic: [Some shit like that
17 Mik: [Just us two [fa(h)ggots=
18 Car: [eh!
19 Vic: =Yup, .hh=
20 Car: ={Victor,
21 Vic: ={That’s what I a:m man if I got to marry that shit you
22 know,

Drew’s analysis focuses on the “three teasing attributions to Vic of homosexuality” (Drew, 1987: 224) at lines 9, 11, and 17. In line with CA’s commitment to a focus on talk-in-interaction as a site of action Drew’s focus is on the actions performed in this extract: storytelling, teasing (one of the teases is produced via a collaborative completion at line 7), Vic’s agreement with the teases and his “jokey explanation for his fictional homosexuality”. As a lesbian
and a feminist, I do not want to challenge this analysis: it is not that doing politically engaged CA changes the action that the talk is analysed to be doing. Rather, in addition to the direct action that is the focus for these participants I want to look at the indirect action that occurs as a by-product of this activity. That is, in the course of Vic’s storytelling, Mike and Joe’s teases and Vic’s responses they are also producing a world in which the sexist and heterosexist social order is supported and reconstituted.

I want to draw attention to the line “That’s what I am man if I got to marry that shit you know” to illustrate one of the ways in which this is achieved. This is the line that Drew labelled “a jokey explanation for his fictional homosexuality”. It is indeed the case that this is jokey; we know this because the possibility of Vic being homosexual has been produced jokingly and it is uttered in an environment of joking and teasing. If it were not a joke but rather something serious then it would have produced being homosexual as bad but not as bad as having to marry a prostitute (apparently it is acceptable to these speakers to have sex with a prostitute just not to marry her – one of the ways in which the sexist social order is reified in this talk). However, because it is produced as a joke, Vic is building being homosexual as something that is much worse than marrying a prostitute and, at the same time, reasserting that he is not in fact homosexual. This also illustrates the usefulness of examining participants’ orientations even when they do not explicitly refer to, challenge, or mark something as sexist or heterosexist. It is precisely that they do not orient to these teases as such and their unproblematic treatment of them as jokes that reveals their shared understandings about the world. By doing this they invoke and reinforce sexism and heterosexism without this becoming the focus of the interaction.

Finally, the conversations that comprise my data set relate to many topics and there are many interactional phenomena within the corpus. As someone who is interested in sexuality research, those places where sexuality spontaneously comes to the fore are of immediate and obvious interest. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I examine these with the ‘tools’ that CA provides. Yet, as a conversation analyst, there are other features in the talk that are also analytically interesting. For me, being a conversation analyst with an interest in politically engaged research,
involves more than taking the resources contributed by others to investigate oppression, resistance, hassles and so on, but rather it also involves contributing to the cumulative conversation analytic project. I have tried to do this in Chapters 5 and 6.

Conclusion

In emphasising my dual concern both with CA and with the politically engaged field of lesbian and gay studies, I have explained how I intend simultaneously to fulfil the criteria for both pursuits. Primarily this has involved reflecting on what I consider to be the key elements of conversation analytic work (technical tools of CA, naturalistic data set, avoiding essentialism, talk as constitutive, and adhering to participants’ orientations) and consideration of how these can be successfully employed to carry out politically engaged research. By locating my work in some of the vast array of relevant literatures, I have sought to demonstrate the advantages of taking a CA approach over more traditional methodologies in pursing my political interests.

I have considered the reservations advanced both by conversation analysts and by feminist/critical researchers about the usefulness of CA for this type of research and I have laid down the foundations upon which I want to defend this pursuit. I will consider more fully the extent to which these reservations are merited in the final chapter of the thesis (after my analyses).

Although we are fortunate to live in a society that is ostensibly ‘tolerant’ and ‘liberal’, this does not mean there are no oppressive practices. Rather, this cultural shift means that oppression has become less visible and, as such, not so easily acknowledged and recognisable. It has become more insidious and more difficult to challenge. My focus on mundane heterosexism seeks to illuminate the hassles and stressors that are woven into – but frequently go undocumented in – our everyday lives.
Overview of the thesis

In Chapter 2, I will explore instances in which speakers – in their everyday conversations – *talk about* coming out. Unlike existing research that uses talk about coming out and passing as a resource for studying coming out as a phenomenon, I focus, not on the subject of the report as the topic of study, but rather the design and reception of the report itself. I will examine the difficulties that are produced and negotiated in the course of this talk and I will consider the implications of those difficulties (not just for lesbian and gay people, but also for their relations). I will demonstrate that hassles and stressors – which a large body of previous research has shown to accompany coming out – are not only restricted to the actual occurrence of this phenomenon. Rather, lesbians and gay men (and their family members) face renewed difficulties in talk about stressful incidents that extend into our interactions beyond the incident that is the subject of the report.

In Chapter 3, I analyse *actual* instances of coming out (or not coming out) as they occur spontaneously in the routine activities of life. I will show how heterosexist assumptions make it difficult for lesbians to negotiate their day-to-day lives in institutional settings. The pervasive heterosexist presumption means that making apparent our lesbianism – in the same way that heterosexuals make their heterosexuality known – is turned into an event of ‘coming out’ (a situation that is not mirrored in heterosexuals’ experiences).

In Chapter 4, I examine how sexuality can be made apparent in everyday conversation without it being an ‘issue’ or an instance of ‘coming out’. I provide evidence that we do live – to some extent – lives ‘beyond the closet’ (Seidman, 2004). However, I also show that there are recipient-design considerations dependent on such (non)treatment that are not mirrored in the experiences of heterosexuals. I also show that, due to laws, customs, and others’ expectations, it is more difficult for us to talk about our relationships without problems arising –
even in supportive environments. We may have begun the process of ‘normalisation’ (Seidman, 2004) but it is far from complete.

The focus of the PhD has been on how issues related to their sexuality are relevant for lesbians (and other non-heterosexuals) in talk-in-interaction. There is a history of this kind of research but in these studies there has been a strong tendency to treat talk produced by lesbians as ‘lesbians’ talk’. In Chapter 5, I will demonstrate that fallacy of such an approach. I will show that just because a speaker may be lesbian or gay that does not mean that she/he is always relevantly lesbian or gay. I show empirically that there is a problem with the assumption that it is useful or appropriate to treat ‘talk by lesbians’ (or ‘gay men’) as synonymous with ‘lesbian talk’ (or ‘gay men’s talk’).

In Chapter 6, I demonstrate how not treating social categories as relevant a priori and collecting data that is not artificially shaped for a predetermined topic (i.e., the features that I have described as necessary for politically engaged research to adequately fulfil the criteria of conversation analytic work) can lead to findings that contribute to CA’s stock of knowledge more generally. I explore participants’ use of person reference descriptors (normatively associated with third person reference) to do self-reference and self-categorisation as simultaneous activities in talk, and thereby contribute to the enterprise of basic CA.

In Chapter 7, I conclude my findings and I discuss the extent to which this research fulfils the criteria for conversation analytic work and the requirements of research that offers a politically insightful view of the world. I will discuss the contributions of this thesis to the areas of interdisciplinary lesbian and gay studies, sexuality and language research, and CA.
Chapter 2
Talking About Coming Out and Passing: Hassles, Interactional Difficulties, and Alignment

Introduction

[Land: YU24]
01 Chl: ...huh uhm Now an' another thing is did you see that
02 #uh# (0.2) programme Making Babies the Gay Way.
03 Mum: Oh God =I didn't see it.
//
56 Mum: ... But Oh:: all round the to:wn
57 Chl: (Yeah/Mm)
58 Mum: Everybody was talking about it.
59 Chl: (Yeah/Mm)
60 Mum: So I had to decide which ones to come out
61 t[o:]

Making Babies the Gay Way was a two-part documentary shown (to high viewing figures) on British national television in January 2004 and described by one reviewer as 'tawdry tiresome tabloid crap which reinforced stereotypes [...] cheap and nasty stuff of which Channel 4 should be ashamed' (Mclean, 2004). In the fragment of conversation reproduced above, Chloe (a twenty-something lesbian) is in conversation with her (heterosexual) mother, and she launches the topic of the programme (lines 1-2) in order – as we will see later – to complain about its 'bad representation' of lesbians and gay men. For Mum (who, as it happens, did not see the programme) its import is different: she reports that, because it was widely discussed, she found herself having to make decisions about whether, and to whom, to 'come out' (lines 56-61). Mum uses the phrase 'come out' (in line 60 and twice more during the course of this conversation) to mean letting people know that she has a lesbian daughter. For Mum – as we will see – this becomes relevant for her when other people, in the course of her interactions with them, make negative or judgemental statements about gay people – something which happened repeatedly after the airing of this
programme. As she says 'Nobody seems to think that gay people have parents' (line 148-9).

The phrase 'coming out' is more usually used – in my own data corpus as in the culture generally – to mean disclosure of one's own lesbianism (or other non-heterosexual category membership). Conversely, the term 'passing' is widely used to mean concealment of non-heterosexuality – sometimes with explicit lies, sometimes with silences or partial truths, and more generally by monitoring one's clothes, mannerisms, physical behaviour with a partner, pronouns, and involvement in any activities or locations that might be perceived by others as (possibly) indicating non-heterosexuality. The coming out dilemma (i.e., managing disclosure and concealment) is a recurrent event in lesbian and gay people's lives¹ – and, sometimes, in the lives of their families and friends who have 'courtesy stigmas' (Goffman, 1963) by virtue of their association with lesbian and gay people:

[F]amily members are likely to become aware that, even as heterosexuals, they are vulnerable to the homophobia and anti-gay sentiments that permeate the society ... Marginalization may cause the family member, like the gay or lesbian person, to wrestle with the issue of passing as normal versus coming out (Crosbie-Burnett, Forster, Murray, & Bowen, 1996: 399).

Mum reports (as we will see) that a bigoted comment from her hairdresser (to the effect that cutting her hair too short would result in her being seen as a lesbian) forces her either to say nothing (thereby colluding with the assumption that to be seen as lesbian is bad) or to come out as the supportive mother of a lesbian daughter.

¹ See Chapter 3.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

**Coming out and passing**

The significance of coming out (or not) in the lives of lesbian and gay people is reflected in the extensive self-help literature (e.g., Borhek, 1983; Eichberg, 1990; Owens, 1998; Signorile, 1996) and psychological research on coming out (Cass, 1979; Herek, Cogan, Gillis & Glunt, 1998; Markowe, 2002; Meyer, 2003; Fields, 2001; Morris, Waldo & Rothman, 2001; Stewart, 2002). Many of the books on coming out begin from the basic premise that the experience of coming out, generally to others (although they do also deal with coming out to oneself), is one that will be fraught with difficulties and will inevitably be painful (e.g. Eichberg, 1990; Signorile, 1996). Coming out is a risky business with people facing the possibility of being ostracised by their families or religious communities (Bowleg et al, 2003). However, those who are not out also suffer, we are reminded, ‘[h]iding takes its toll!’ (Powers & Ellis, 1996: 2), ‘[c]loseted gays pay a psychological price for passing’ (Cruikshank, 1992: 3) and ‘being “exposed” as homosexual against our will (Lewis, Derlega, Berndt, Morris & Rose, 2001: 85) is an ever-present risk, requiring constant vigilance so that there is a psychological cost in the continuous preoccupation with hiding one’s stigma (Smart & Wegner, 2000). Not coming out or passing is often treated as indicative of low self-esteem and can result in feelings of relative powerlessness. So, despite the pain of coming out, the authors of these self-help books urge closeted people to come out, as it will be the only way to long-term happiness (Fairchild & Hayward, 1979; Eichberg, 1990; Signorile, 1996).

No matter how others may respond to your homosexuality, you will always know that living in the closet is far more destructive than the trauma of coming out. For your own mental health and well being, you have decided that you are now ready to come out (Signorile, 1996: xii).

Whether lesbian and gay people come out or not we are faced with everyday hassles and stressors since these include hiding sexual orientation from others
and telling others about sexual orientation, not forgetting being exposed as homosexual against our will (Lewis et al., 2001). However, there is often additional pressure on lesbian and gay people to come out as it is treated as a duty (Eichberg, 1990). Every lesbian and gay person who is not out, it has been argued, is adding to the oppression of all lesbian and gay people by contributing to making non-heterosexuality invisible.

Beyond the personal reasons to come out, many gay men, lesbians, and bisexual men and women are also reaching the conclusion that they have a responsibility to a community of people, just as other groups – such as women, Blacks, and Jews – feel an allegiance to their communities (Signorile, 1996: xxiv)

There are numerous self-help guides to assist a person to come out (e.g. Borhek, 1983; Eichberg, 1990) and some have step-by-step programmes (e.g. Signorile, 1996). Many of these books support the idea that coming out should be a well-planned process and they ask readers to consider others’ reactions before carefully selecting the words that should be used. Suggestions about what to say include, ‘Dad and Mom, I’ve been wanting to share something with you for some time because it’s pretty important to me and because you two are pretty important to me’ (Borhek, 1983: 35) or ‘Remember when we had that big discussion about homosexuality? Were you aware that I was the one who brought it up?’ and then continue with something like, ‘The reason that I wanted to talk about homosexuality is that I’m very much interested in the subject. You see, I’m lesbian (gay)’ (Borhek, 1983: 35). There are even suggestions on what to wear when coming out, for example, nothing with ‘gay’ slogans and nothing too sexually provocative!
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Coming out as a recurrent activity

These decontextualised versions of coming out seem to imply that it is a one off event rather than an ongoing activity. Questions relating to whether a person is ‘out’ suggest that they are either in (the closet) or out, which fails to account for the variety of relationships and contexts in which people may be in or out. With this in mind, some researchers choose to refer to a ‘coming out process’ (McGregor et al, 2001; Whisman, 1996). The coming out process has two meanings. First, some have conceptualised this process as steps in a journey of coming out and have sought to identify specific stages (Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1982; Borhek, 1983). One of the earliest (and now classic) attempts to identify such phases in coming out was Cass’s six stage model. She suggests that lesbian and gay people begin with identity confusion, then move on to identity comparison, then identity tolerance, then identity acceptance, and then identity pride, before finally moving on to identity synthesis (Cass, 1979). Such models have been criticised, particularly by lesbian feminists since they locate the activist at an incomplete stage of development (Kitzinger, 1987), yet they remain sufficiently popular for subsequent work on the identification of stages of coming out to have been produced.

However, what these process models fail to take into consideration is that coming out is never complete since ‘the deadly elasticity of heterosexist presumption means that … people find new walls springing up around them even as they drowse’ (Sedgwick, 1993: 46). In contemporary Western society, everyone is assumed heterosexual until there are indications to suggest otherwise. This means that no one can be completely ‘out’ since social life requires that we have interactions with strangers and meet new people on an almost daily basis (see Chapter 3). The second understanding of coming out refers to the coming out or passing that is made relevant on an almost daily basis as we navigate the everyday social world, which entails meeting and interacting with strangers and acquaintances (e.g., Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). The relevance of this kind of coming out is continually renewed and never complete. It is this second type of coming out that I focus on here.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Retrospective accounts

The research on coming out and passing is almost exclusively based on retrospective accounts of people's experiences (Rothblum, 2000; Sandfort, 2000). Many researchers treat these accounts as representative of the experience being reported and, in so doing, they treat these accounts as a window through which it may be possible to uncover the 'truth' about what actually happened. As I highlighted in Chapter 1, there are many problems with treating reports of an event as a means for achieving an understanding of the event as it happened or even the speaker's perspective of what happened (see Kitzinger, 2003). Even if it were possible to be sure that the participants were telling the truth and accurately remembered what they reported, it would still be impossible for speakers to describe what happened with the level of detail comparable to that afforded by access to recordings of actual interactions. For example it would be impossible for speakers to remember exactly what words were used without even taking into consideration the emphasis or stress placed on individual words!

Problems that arise when using these retrospective accounts are further compounded by the 'highly ritualized' (Stein, 1997: 71) nature of these stories. Coming out stories tend to be told and retold and there is a culturally recognisable 'coming out story', which often provides a framework through which to interpret our experiences. This adds to the problems inherent in the use of reports as a method for understanding coming out. One of the solutions that researchers have employed to overcome this retrospective problem is to treat the accounts as the object of study rather than the events that they report. So, for instance, Plummer (1995) examined coming out stories (as one of several types of sexual stories) for what they reveal about how and why people construct coming out stories. He talks about 'the coming out story' and looks for common narratives and maps how they historically, socially and politically came into being. Use of narrative analysis, for instance, overcomes the problems of mapping the account directly onto the event that is being reported. Research that treats retrospective accounts in this way often looks for themes, narratives, or
rhetoric that are used by speakers as resources for producing recognisable and meaningful talk.

However, this often means that the participants’ perspectives are merely replaced by researchers’ interpretations. Furthermore, by treating these stories or reports as data it does not allow us to say anything about coming out as it actually happens. Instances where people come out, as we have seen, are significant events in the lives of lesbian and gay people and as researchers who are interested in lesbian/gay research we want to be able to examine how, when and why coming out occurs (i.e. the questions that traditional researchers have asked).

A more satisfactory solution to this retrospective problem is to use recordings of actual instances where speaker’s come out (or not). Kitzinger (2000) recommends that we should examine instances of coming out as they are occasioned in talk-in-interaction. There are a few notable exceptions that do not make use of these kinds of data to examine coming out (Kitzinger, 2000, also see Chapter 3 in this thesis) and not coming out (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). By examining coming out as it spontaneously arises in everyday interaction we are able to see how coming out is actually done, what occasions it and how recipient responses impact on it.

**Talk about coming out as a phenomenon**

However, as the fragment with which this chapter opens illustrates, people do not just ‘do’ coming out (or passing). They also find it important enough to talk about: they tell each other about what happened when they came out (or didn’t); they report what occasioned it; they discuss how they managed the situation; they describe how they felt about it; they report what the other people in the situation may or may not have made of the episode and so on. The data upon which the analyses in this chapter are based are instances of this kind of talk in which people are talking about coming out and passing. These episodes were selected
because they are explicit and extensive examples of naturally occurring talk about coming out (or not).

I do not treat these data as though they provide access to the event that is the topic of the talk. Rather, I view this talk as constituting social reality in its own right. That is, the talk constitutes social action in the local context in which it is produced. Therefore, the reports – and not the events that are reported – are the data. These three fragments of conversation depart from the talk used in most other research on coming out and passing since it is not produced in response to researchers' questions. Rather, these are examples of talk about coming out and passing that have arisen spontaneously between lesbian and gay speakers in conversation with friends, family, and lovers.

Therefore, we can examine the role of the recipient in co-constructing the talk about coming out and, through doing this, we can see how they negotiate a common understanding about what it means to come out. These data show that coming out is not something that occurs in isolated incidents but rather something that is talked about to do other actions. So, not only do lesbian and gay people come out but we also spend time and effort talking about it.

These three fragments demonstrate that coming out not only extends in time beyond the actual occasion of coming out, but it also extends in significance and importance. Out of all the things that these speakers could select to talk about they have chosen to talk about coming out and this produces coming out as significant since what we consider the most important events in our lives are selected to tell about over the more mundane experiences. These data also illustrate that coming out affects more than just the people who are participants in the interaction where the coming out has occurred or potentially could occur. In the first two fragments, it is Chloe who is now being involved in the coming outs even though she was not there in the original episodes. In the third fragment, it is Karen who occasions her involvement in the upcoming possible outing, an incident where she does not expect to be present.
Overview of the chapter

In this chapter I explore the continuing relevance of the coming out dilemma in the lives of lesbian and gay people through the analysis of naturalistic data in which lesbian and gay people (and their friends and family) talk about coming out and passing as an ordinary issue in the course of their everyday lives. I demonstrate how coming out and passing extend in time and significance beyond the actual occasion of disclosure or concealment. I show that and how the coming out dilemma affects not only the people who were participants in the actual (that is, the reported or projected) coming out episodes, but also those to whom they recount these experiences and with whom they negotiate their meanings and implications. These interactions in which coming out experiences are reported and discussed can – and often do – involve a whole new set of stressors and hassles in lesbian and gay lives. After providing an overview of the three fragments of data upon which the analyses in this chapter are based, I analyse this talk about coming out or passing that has spontaneously arisen and highlight the interactional difficulties that occur in the course of these interactions. Then, I explore the interactional alignments between speakers in the same three fragments and consider what kind of world they are orienting to and reconstituting through that alignment. Finally, I consider the implications of this talk about coming out, not coming out and passing in three ways: interactional difficulties that arise in this talk; the implications of these difficulties for the reconstitution of speakers’ relationships; and the reproduction of heterosexism in the talk.

Overview of the data fragments

The first fragment (‘Making babies the gay way’) is taken from a conversation between a lesbian woman and her heterosexual mother. About half an hour into their conversation, Chloe asks her mum if she saw a recent television programme, Making Babies the Gay Way, which was a documentary about lesbian and gay parenting. Although Mum did not see the programme, she has
heard about it and indicates that she has something to tell. However, Chloe begins to talk about the programme (she watched it) and her thoughts about it. After several unsuccessful attempts to tell, Mum gets the opportunity to report the incidents that she has experienced due to the television programme which has occasioned her having to decide whether to come out (or not) as the mother of a lesbian daughter. There are three incidents that Mum refers to: one where she did come out (to Ethel); one where it was not necessary because the other person (Ralph) already knew (but where she treats it as if it would have been relevant if he had not already known); and one where she did not come out (to the hairdresser). Mum explains how her hairdresser warned against a particular hairstyle on the grounds that according to the television programme looks like that 'label you' (as a lesbian). Mum reports that she did not come out as the mother of a lesbian daughter on this occasion. Given that Mum treats coming out as relevant but reports that she did not come out, this is potentially a difficult telling in a conversation with her lesbian daughter. She is presenting the hairdresser's perspective as inaccurate and prejudiced and – as someone who is the mother of a lesbian daughter – she is here treating not coming out as a possible failing on her part.

The second fragment ('Meeting the parents') is taken from a conversation between two friends, Paul (a gay man) and Chloe (a lesbian). They are talking about Paul's new partner, Ashraf, and Chloe asks where his parents live, which occasions a telling from Paul about having recently met Ashraf's parents. Paul's telling is about how, since Ashraf's father does not know his son is gay, Paul had to pass as Ashraf's friend rather than his partner. Paul describes how he met Ashraf's parents when he went to his house to collect him. He details the 'cover story' that Ashraf had told his father about who Paul is supposed to be and then continues to describe how the meeting unfolded. Chloe is an active and supportive recipient throughout most of the telling.

The third fragment ('The Feathers') is taken from a conversation between Karen and Lucy, who are a lesbian couple. This talk occurs about three and a half minutes into the telephone call and in the immediately prior talk they have been discussing whether or not Lucy will go out that evening. In the sequence that is
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Lucy mentions that Ben (a mutual friend) has passed on Karen’s warning that it is ‘YHA night in the Feathers’. The YHA is the Youth Hostel Association and the Feathers is a gay pub that both Lucy and Karen frequent. It turns out that Lucy (and Karen) have been YHA members (but are not anymore). However, they were apparently not out as lesbians in that context. The warning that it is YHA night in the Feathers (conveyed from Karen to Lucy via Ben) is prompted by Karen’s concern that Lucy might find her lesbianism inadvertently exposed to the YHA members should she decide to go to the Feathers that night. Lucy initiates the sequence by telling Karen that Ben has passed on her (Karen’s) message that it is YHA night in the Feathers. Karen receipts this, then they negotiate exactly where in the Feathers the YHA meeting is taking place, consider whether the members of the YHA group know that the Feathers is a gay pub, and what the Feathers is like (including comparing it with another real ale pub). They disagree about the likely reactions of the YHA members to knowingly being in a gay pub and then discuss the likelihood of Lucy being recognised.

Difficulties and hassles in talk about coming out and passing

Making babies the gay way

In Fragment 1, from which the fragment at the beginning of this chapter is taken, Chloe launches the topic of the programme *Making Babies the Gay Way* by asking Mum whether she watched it. Mum produces a reaction token (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006) in response (‘Oh God’, line 3) prior to reporting that she ‘didn’t see it’ (line 3), which indicates that she may have something to say about it despite not having watched it herself.

Fragment 1.1 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY

[Land:YU24]

01 Chl: hhh uhm Now an’ another thing is did you see that

02 #u# (0.2) programme Making Babies the Ga:y #Wa:y.#

03 Mum: O:h God. = I didn’t see it.

04 (0.2)
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

From the subsequent talk, we can see that Chloe has launched the topic in order to complain about the bad representation of lesbians in the programme. Mum’s tellable, on the other hand, is related to the personal experiences she has had as a consequence of the programme. Therefore, right from the outset there is some misalignment between the speakers with regard to the course of action to be pursued. Furthermore, Chloe has launched the topic so her telling is in first position and is well fitted to that launch. Mum, by contrast, is attempting to do her telling in second position; therefore, she must work to design her telling to fit to the launch that Chloe has offered.

Fragment 1.2 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY
[Land: YU24]

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Fragment 1.2 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY
[Land: YU24]
Mum’s telling focuses on the talk generated by the television programme, which necessitated her having to decide whether to come out or not as the mother of a lesbian daughter. She makes a bid to tell this with ‘But I was picking up the pieces all round the town’ (lines 15-16). This is unsuccessful as Chloe launches her telling about her thoughts regarding the programme’s content. After some discussion of the programme, Mum redoes this turn, ‘But oh all round the town’ (line 56). The use of the same words (‘all round the town’) shows this to be a bid to do the same telling that she had earlier proposed. Mum goes on to expand on this, ‘Everybody was talking about it’ (line 58) and then moves on to characterise her potential telling as one about having ‘to decide which ones to come out to’ (lines 60-61). The laughter that Mum produces (line 63) after the completion of her turn is indicative of the type of telling that she proposes, since laughter in this way is frequently associated with troubles-tellings (Jefferson, 1984b). However, Chloe continues with her discussion of the content of the programme and, in so doing, she cuts off Mum before she is able to proceed with her telling. It is not until line 105 – after Chloe’s talk about the programme – that Mum finally achieves the opportunity to tell. So, Mum has made several failed bids to tell
before she is successful, which means that when she gains that floor is has been somewhat hard won.

At the beginning of her telling, Mum describes the environment in which it was necessary to decide whether or not to come out (i.e., the talk about the programme). In response to Chloe’s question (line 115), Mum reports others’ negative views about the programme (lines 116-118) and her coming out in response (line 121). She then goes on to detail three incidents: one where she did come out to Ethel (lines 124-149); one where there was no need to come out since Ralph already knew (lines 154-156); and one in the hairdressers’ where Mum chose not to come out (lines 158-166).

Mum sets out to establish the conditions that made coming out relevant in the utterance that turns out to be her successful bid to tell (lines 105-107). In the course of this turn Mum upgrades the ‘tellability’ of her telling. She cuts off ‘I got loads of people telling m-’ and replaces ‘telling m(e)’ with ‘talking to me’. Whereas in the first version Mum is the recipient of others’ talk and therefore passive in the interaction, in the repaired version Mum plays a more interactive role.

Fragment 1.3 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY
[Land: YU24]
105 Mum: [W]ell I got lo:ts of people telling
106 m- talking to me about it and I- some people
107 I did come out to and some people I ;did;n’t
108 Chl: M[m ]
109 Mum: [huh] huh huh
110 Chl: So what did- who was- people you knew were
111 talking to you or not.
112 Mum: Yeah. Well e- everybody I came upon.
113 Chl: Ri:gh’
114 Mum: Uh:m
115 Chl: What were they saying then.
116 Mum: All sort’ov uhm saying “Did you see that
117 programme last night. #I# don’t think it’s
118 right” and all that [sort] of stuff
119 Chl: [Yeah]
120 Chl: Yeah
Chloe interrogates Mum’s person reference term ‘people’ by seeking to ascertain whether those people were known to Mum or not, thereby displaying an orientation to this as a possible factor in the coming out dilemma. Mum’s ‘yeah’ (line 112) is responsive to the first part of Chloe’s prior turn, that is, people Mum knows were talking to her. The addition ‘Well e- everybody I came upon’ expands this to include unknown people also. This extreme case formulation (see Pomerantz, 1986) serves to indicate just how widespread the talk about the programme was and, in so doing, Mum establishes the extent to which her having to decide whether or not to come out was relevant. After detailing the (anti-lesbian/gay) views expressed by the people she encountered (lines 116-118), Mum uses quoted speech (she does not use a quotative yet this is hearable as reported speech through the use of the third person reference term to refer to Chloe) to report that she came out as the mother of a lesbian daughter (line 121).

Chloe’s FPP, ‘what did they say’ (line 125) provides an interactional slot for Mum to do her telling about the responses of the people she came out to. Whereas prior to this Mum has talked about ‘lots of people’ (line 105) and ‘some people’ (lines 106 & 107), here Mum recounts concrete incidents with specific people, the first of which is Ethel.

Fragment 1.4 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY
[Land: YU24]

125 Chl: What did they say
126 Mum: Well Ethel was quite funny ‘cause (. ) she lives
127 at the bott’rm of the road the one at the very end
128 (who had a break in) uhm and uhm (. ) she said
129 “Oh well I do- I don’t think females should (j-)
130 y’know have children (in wha-)” I have to admit
131 that I haven’t seen the programme anyway
132 Chl: #Yeah#
133 Mum: But it was quite interesting ’cause (. )she’s just
134 had a new hip an’ she’s out walking I could see

84
Mum details Ethel’s anti-lesbian views with a quotative (lines 129-130) and reformulates how her telling should be understood: whereas earlier she has set this up as ‘funny’ (line 126), here she changes it to ‘quite interesting’ (line 133). Mum then goes back chronologically in her telling and reports how she and Ethel came to be talking, that is, it was a chance encounter and one in which Mum was doing Ethel a favour (lines 133-137). This randomness helps to illustrate that this programme really was a topic that everyone was talking about since it shows that even in a brief, chance encounter it came up (‘everybody I came upon’, line 112).

Mum leaps ahead chronologically to ‘at the end of it’ (line 137), which indexes that the duration of their conversation was substantial. This also omits what Mum said. What ‘it’ (line 137) references here is both obvious and unclear. It is obvious insofar as ‘it’ refers to their (Ethel and Mum’s) discussion of the programme. However, the exact details of the discussion have only been alluded to so the ‘it’ does not refer to anything explicit. So, at the end of their (Ethel and Mum’s) discussion Mum reports that Ethel invited her for coffee. The ‘but’ (line 137) that prefaces this TCU treats this invitation as possibly contrary to expectations. Mum’s phrasing of Ethel’s invitation produces the invitation for coffee not as a consequence of their discussion but rather as a signifier of a return
to the usual (i.e., Mum has not been invited because she came out as the mother of a lesbian daughter, but rather in spite of this). So, rather than an explicit invitation such as ‘would you like to come round for coffee’ she uses ‘are you gonna come round for coffee’ which suggests that this is a regular occurrence.

Mum’s reaction token, ‘Oh’ (line 139), indicates her treatment of Ethel’s invitation with surprise; it was unexpected given the prior discussion. This is confirmed by Mum with ‘Just the usual’ (line 139). The reaction that Mum reports here suggests that she harbours expectations that people will react badly to the news that she is the mother of a lesbian and she therefore anticipates being treated comparatively negatively when she comes out. Chloe does not challenge this position; rather, she simply receipts this with ‘yeah’ (line 140). Mum’s upshot formulation (line 141) effectively reiterates that for Ethel it ‘didn’t make any difference’ (i.e., it was business as usual).

Chloe’s ‘yeah’s (lines 140, 142, 145 & 147) do not challenge Mum’s telling, however, they do not reciprocate the surprise that Mum has presented in her reaction to Ethel’s response, therefore it is less than full alignment. This suggests that, for Mum, this is much more ‘tellable’ event as we can see from her reported reaction token (‘Oh’) and her re-doing of the end of her telling to reiterate that it ‘didn’t make any difference’ (line 141) and ‘it didn’t affect her’ (line 144). Also, her repeated attempts to do this telling throughout the conversation shows that, for Mum, this is a significant, surprising incident.

Mum moves on to report her experiences with a different person: Ralph. She introduces him with a recognitional reference (his name) and uses a conjunction (‘and’) to link this segment with the previous telling about Ethel (line 154).

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**Fragment 1.5 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY**

[Land: YU24]

154 Mum: An’ Ralph of course already knows anyway so it
155 didn’t come up with him. It would ’ave done if
156 (h) he (h) ha(huh)dn’t of (I thin(k) huh huh huh
157 Chl: [Yeah. Yeah

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Mum does not make explicit that she was discussing the programme with Ralph but the conjunction serves to present this as another example in response to Chloe’s question (‘what did they say’, line 125). Mum begins with ‘an’ Ralph of course already knows anyway’ (line 154). What Ralph ‘already knows’ is that Mum has a lesbian daughter. Since these are tellings about Mum having to decide whether to come out or not she can rely on Chloe knowing what Ralph already knows without having to make it explicit. The use of ‘of course’ suggests (and acknowledges) that Chloe already knows that Ralph knows that Mum has a lesbian daughter and allows Mum to make this statement even though Chloe already knows it. Mum presents the fact that Ralph already knows (line 154) as an account for why she did not have to decide whether or not to come out to him, but she orients towards the situation as one in which she would have had to come out if he had not already known.

Mum introduces the third incident (with the hairdresser) with a conjunction (‘But’, line 158), which is contrastive with the prior incidents. That is, in the first two she was out about her status as the mother of a lesbian daughter (in the first she came out and in the second she was already out), however, in the third incident Mum did not come out.

Fragment 1.6 MAKING BABIES THE GAY WAY

158 Mum: But in the hai:rdressers (. ) ( hair)
159 "Well you don’t want your hair too short ‘cause y’know that (. ) uh according to that programme
160 last night looks (like that) labels you” an’ I
162 thought [“( )”]
163 Chl: [hhh They did have shocking
164 stereotypical hair
165 Mum: An’ I thought “Oh I’m not going to get into the
166 (the whole)
167 Chl: But it’s true::: I mean the thing is that some
168 stereotypes are true.
169 (. )
170 Chl: Uhm (. ) the thing is is that when you agree
171 that y’know there’s lots of stereotypes about
172 (. ) it’s easy to think “Oh that’s really bad”
173 but it’s more likely that you just think the
Mum starts by introducing the setting: the hairdressers'. She uses reported speech, although it is unclear exactly how Mum introduces this since it is not audible on the tape recording, it is likely that Mum is reporting the hairdresser's speech. Mum begins by explaining that the hairdresser advised her (Mum) to avoid having her hair cut too short as she might be labelled (lines 159-161). Mum does not report that the hairdresser said that the label that she might attract would be 'lesbian' (or something similar) and neither does Mum make that explicit here. Instead, Mum performs an insertion repair (inserting 'according to that programme last night') to illustrate to Chloe that the label that Mum might attract is associated with the programme and it is left to Chloe to infer what that might be.

Mum continues after the reported speech and begins to relay her thoughts about what the hairdresser had said. Mum has clearly displayed that she is going to continue with the quotative projecting upcoming quoted thought ('an' I thought', line 161-162) yet Chloe produces an inbreath (line 163) indicating upcoming talk. Mum hears this inbreath as indicative of Chloe about to begin a turn and she (Mum) stops speaking. Although Mum's talk is not audible since it is produced in overlap with Chloe's inbreath, it is likely that it was incomplete since when she re-does this turn (lines 165-166) it is much longer. Therefore, it is probable that Mum has cut short her turn here (line 162) since Chloe's turn is produced interruptively. After Mum has reported what the hairdresser said, she moves the telling on to her response to the hairdresser's words.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

There are potentially many ways in which Chloe could have responded to the report of the hairdresser’s words. Mum has presented this as one of several occasions where she was confronted with the difficulty of having to decide whether or not to come out as a mother of a lesbian daughter and, therefore, this indicates the focus of the telling, which might be expected to influence Chloe’s response. For example, Chloe could have expressed some kind of appreciation of the position that Mum had found herself in and sympathised with her, or she could have reassured her that it was not necessary to come out. However, Chloe does not engage with this and, instead, she interrupts Mum with the assertion that ‘they did have shocking stereotypical hair’ (lines 163-164), which engages with the discussion that occurred between Mum and the hairdresser and not the telling that Mum is doing now, that is, an assessment of lesbians on the television programme and not a comment on Mum’s coming out dilemma. In so doing, Chloe returns the conversation to the television programme and, more importantly, challenges Mum’s presentation of the hairdresser’s position. Chloe’s turn is therefore not cooperative with the telling. The alternative course of action for Chloe would be for her to align with Mum and, in so doing, this would mean acknowledging and accepting the existence of the anti-lesbian views reported by Mum. Chloe’s lack of alignment, then, is potentially a strategy for enabling her to avoid having to confront such prejudice. Mum, however, is undeterred by Chloe’s confrontational response and continues (lines 165-166) with the talk that was previously underway, thereby sequentially deleting Chloe’s turn. Mum prefaces her talk with a repeat of ‘an I thought’ (line 165, repeat of lines 161-162) which marks this as a redone version of what came before. Mum uses reported thought to illustrate her response to the hairdresser’s talk: ‘Oh I’m not going to get into the (the whole)’ (lines 165-166). Mum’s turn displays that she did not come out to the hairdresser but she does not complete the TCU so it is not clear what she did not ‘get into’. By not completing her turn Mum avoids saying what she is claiming that she thought (but did not say) at the time. By not making this explicit, she relies on Chloe knowing what sort of thing she (Mum) might have said to challenge this.
Mum also conveys to Chloe, that even though she did not challenge the stereotypical views of the hairdresser, she does not endorse such views herself. Even though Mum’s disagreement with the hairdresser’s opinion is embedded in this turn Chloe responds to it by aligning with the hairdresser and therefore disagreeing with Mum. Although this turn (lines 167-168) is not the normative turn shape of a dispreferred turn (see Pomerantz, 1984), Chloe produces it as a contrast with the preface ‘But’. Chloe’s exclamation is unqualified: ‘But it’s true!’ (line 167). What Mum has displayed herself as knowing to be false (the implication that lesbians have short hair) is emphatically treated as true. She then generalises her claim, it is not just that this particular stereotype is true but that many stereotypes have factual basis. Again Chloe has failed to engage or align with the version of the telling that Mum is presenting. Instead, Chloe focuses on what Mum has presented as the hairdresser’s views. This unaligned response from Chloe could account for why there is no uptake from Mum (microgap on line 169) and Chloe certainly accounts for the gap this way as we can see from her subsequent expansion and upgrade (from ‘some stereotypes’, lines 167-168, to ‘lots of stereotypes’, line 171) and her displayed awareness that some people (e.g., Mum) are reluctant to express stereotypical views as they may be perceived as ‘really bad’ (line 172) but that these stereotypes are ‘true’ (line 175). With this turn (lines 170-175) Chloe usurps the authoritative role Mum had assumed for herself. In Mum’s telling, Mum is positioning herself as having more authority on the subject of lesbian stereotypes in relation to the hairdresser. As previous research has suggested ‘at the same time that their identities as straight parents of gay men and lesbian women jeopardize their moral standing, these identities also lend authority’ (Fields, 2001: 165) and Mum treats herself as having the knowledge and expertise (about lesbians) to challenge her hairdresser’s views. However, Chloe undermines this presentation by attempting to present herself as the authority on stereotypes in relation to Mum. After another microgap Mum responds to Chloe’s talk on stereotypes, thereby, abandoning her original presentation and aligning with Chloe’s position (line 177). By doing this Mum concedes authority to Chloe.
During the telling of this incident there is a struggle between Mum and Chloe over the direction of the talk. Mum is attempting to tell about what happened to her in the hairdressers, that is, an incident where her coming out as the mother of a lesbian daughter was relevant but where she decided not to do it. Mum allowed views that she disagreed with to go unchallenged and therefore this is likely to have been a difficult situation. Mum’s telling is premised upon her (Mum’s) disagreement with the stereotypical views she is attributing to the hairdresser (‘Oh I’m not going to get into the (the whole)’, lines 165-166), even though she is reporting that she did not come out to the hairdresser. Mum has positioned herself as more of an authority than the hairdresser (who has access only to stereotypes of what lesbians are like). The fact that the hairdresser is reported to hold such stereotypical and – from Mum’s point of view – inaccurate opinions is employed as a kind of justification for her decision not to come out. That is, should she have decided to come out to the hairdresser she would have had to undertake to re-educate the hairdresser about what lesbians are like and Mum did not want to ‘get into’ all that. Chloe, on the other hand, is challenging Mum’s version of the telling by aligning with the views attributed to the hairdresser. This confrontational approach undermines the judgements Mum made that were relevant to her deciding not to come out. By doing this Chloe seeks to re-define the events that Mum is presenting and thereby assert herself as the figure of authority. This interactional difficulty erupts in naturally occurring talk between a lesbian and her (supportive) mother.

Meeting the parents

In Fragment 2 (‘Meeting the Parents’), Paul is telling his friend Chloe about an instance in which the concealment of his sexuality has been pre-planned and his telling focuses on how successfully the plan was implemented. Chloe and Paul have been talking about Ashraf, Paul’s new partner. Chloe’s question ‘Where does his parents live’ (line 1) shifts the topic to Ashraf’s parents and occasions a telling by Paul about having recently met them.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Fragment 2.1 MEETING THE PARENTS

[Land: YU9]
01 Chl: Where does his (. ) parents live.
02 Pau: Northwood. 'North London'
03 Chl: Right=
04 Pau: =I got to meet them on- last Saturday 'cause I
05 I drove 'im to the airport> on Sunday morning<
06 Chl: [ But I thought ]
07 Pau: [Well that's the thing I-] huh
08 he wasn't- (. ) [ his dad didn't know ]
09 Pau: [Well that's the thing I-] huh
10 it was really funny 'cause .hmmm he like said
11 to me "well d'you-" 'cause I said "well I'll
12 drive you to the airport" I said "what I'll
13 do is pick you up Saturday evening uhm
14 [and ] and then c- you can stay at mine=
15 Chl: [Yeah]
16 Pau: '=cause it was- and then we'll get up at
17 half four to drive you to the airport in=
18 Chl: [Mmm. ]
19 Pau: = the morning" .hmmm uhm so he was like "okay"
20 an' he was like .hmm an' I said "y'know obviously
21 I can just wait for you outside an' an' he said
22 "no my mum wants you to come m- m- wants to
23 meet you anyway so we could like" an' I said
24 "well this is a way of n- not making it formal
25 uh[m: ]
26 Chl: [Yeah]

Chloe interrupts Paul with 'But I thought he wasn’t- his dad didn’t know' (lines 7-8) to ascertain the auspices under which Paul met Ashraf’s parents (thereby displaying this to be pertinent to her understanding of the telling). That is, Chloe is seeking to establish whether Paul has met his partner’s parents as their son’s partner. The ‘I thought’ preface (line 7) indicates that she had previously believed Ashraf was not out to his father but that the beginning of Paul’s report of meeting Ashraf’s parents has lead her to believe that this is no longer the case. She also specifies only one of his parents; in so doing she shifts the focus to Ashraf’s father which leaves open the possibility that he is out to his mother (which subsequently turns out to be the case and is here oriented to as something that Chloe possibly knows).
Paul begins his telling in his next turn (from line 9). He designs his talk to show this it is built off what Chloe has just said. The ‘that’ (line 9) refers back to Chloe’s turn while also leaving unsaid exactly what it references. This provides space for Paul to do his telling (i.e., the opportunity to unpack the ‘that’). Paul’s utterance ‘it was really funny’ (line 10) frames his telling by indicating how Chloe should understand it and respond to it.

Fragment 2.2 MEETING THE PARENTS
[Land: YU9]
27 Pau: “Got to pick you up anyway and obviously we can
28 just say to your dad I’m a friend of yours.”
29 Chl: Yeah
30 (.)
31 Pau: (So I said “Yeah that’s great”) He phoned me up
32 just before I arrived just when I’d left my house
33 so an’ he went “Look I told y- m-my dad that we’re
34 all going out for a meal toni: ght y- your- I’m
35 staying at yours and you’re picking up= we’re
36 gonna pick up some other people from East London
37 in the morning”
38 Chl: Yeah
39 Pau: U:hm
40 (0.2)
41 Pau: Uhm “an’ that’s all I’ve- y’know an’ that’s all
42 I’ve said to him an’ that you’re actually coming
43 to Florence and you’re a history of art student
44 as well”
45 Chl: Yeah
46 Pau: And I was like “fine” >he said< “But don’t worry
47 he won’t talk to you:” uhm “an’ you answer any
48 questions with “fine”“
49 Chl: Yea:::h? Huh huh huh
50 Pau: So I s[aid ( )]
51 Chl: [ Famous ] last words
52 Pau: Uhm and then we went upstairs to his room ’cause
53 he wanted to show me his room ’cause he’d done it
54 out in Ottoman Empire sort’v front room of an
55 Ottoma- It’s amazing anyway his bed- He’s got like
56 a four thousand pound (.) Persian carpet it’s
57 beautiful his parents bought for him. .hh[hh ]
58 Chl: [Go:d]
Paul details the extensive preparations that were necessary before he met Ashraf’s father: the couple agreed to tell Ashraf’s father that Paul was a friend rather than his partner (lines 27-28); they fabricated plans for the evening (lines 33-37); they worked out how Paul’s presence could be justified (i.e. they pretended that Paul was a student on the college trip that Ashraf was attending, lines 41-44); and they devised a plan to respond to any questions that Ashraf’s father may have asked (lines 46-48). Chloe does not challenge any of this and issues continuers throughout this part of his telling (lines 29, 38, & 45). She is, therefore, treating these complicated preparations as unproblematic which shows her understanding and acceptance of the necessity for Paul and Ashraf to conceal their relationship from Ashraf’s father.

Fragment 2.3 MEETING THE PARENTS

[Land: YU9]

59 Pau: And uhm an’ then we went back downstairs and he
60 was getting all his bags together and his mum’s
61 like (. ) ( ) talking to me and obviously his
62 mum knows who I a:m=
63 Chl: =Yeah=
64 Pau: =Uhm (. ) an’ she’s like “why don’t y-” “Don’t
65 stand in the hall come into the front room”
66 where his dad was sitting watching Tee Vee.=An’
67 I thought ‘‘Oh God’’
68 Chl: [ Yeah ]
69 Chl: Yeah=
70 Pau: =Well I went an’ sat down an’ then Ashraf’s like
71 “I’m just going to go to the loo”
72 [>an’ I thought< [‘‘Don’t leave me’’]
73 Chl: [ .h h h [ But also is ]
74 (.)
75 Chl: Is he screaming? ’Cause you are.
76 (0.8)
77 Pau: Pardon?
78 Chl: Is he screaming? Because you are. Like won’t yih
79 dad ’ave known.
80 (.)
81 Chl: Won’t his dad have known that you’re gay?
82 Pau: No. Well yeah well ( ) that’s what I always
83 thought.
84 (.)
85 Pau: Uhm
86 Chl: Huhuh huh huh .hhh
87 Pau: An' so but I think that when it's your own kids
     you can tell 'cause you're quite biased not
     [really [(
89 Chl: [Yea:: h. [But he'll have seen with] you wun 'e?
91 Pau: Yea:h. But
92 (.)
93 Pau: So an [('e's like)] "so are you this friend that
94 Chl: [ But yeah ]
95 Pau: lives in Stanstead"
96 Chl: Right?

Up until Paul gets to the point in the story where his partner, Ashraf, has left him alone with his (Ashraf's) father ('then Ashraf's like "I'm just going to the loo"', lines 70-71) Chloe is supportive of Paul's telling (receipts and continuers\(^2\), lines 15, 18, 26, 29, 38, 45, 63, 68 and 69, and appreciations\(^3\), lines 51 and 58). However, at this point Chloe interrupts to seek additional information about Paul's partner, Ashraf. She asks, 'Is he screaming? 'Cause you are' (line 75). This requires a response from Paul and distracts him, thereby temporarily derailing the progressivity of the telling. The 0.8 second gap (line 76) after Chloe's question is indicative of Paul finding it unexpected or inapposite in some way. It is obviously not fitted to the part of the telling Paul was delivering immediately prior to Chloe's question; it also may be difficult for Paul to work out exactly why this question is relevant at this point. Furthermore, it is possible that the choice of language employed by Chloe might be unfamiliar to Paul ('screaming' is sometimes applied to gay men who are readable as gay through their camp or effeminate mannerisms). Both of these factors may account for the 0.8 second gap (line 76) before Paul responds. With this question Chloe – who, it seems, has not met Ashraf – is seeking to ascertain how easy it might be to discern that Ashraf is gay merely from his appearance and mannerisms. She is also displaying her perception of Paul as someone who is readable as gay simply from meeting him. Paul's repair initiation (line 77) does not 'specify the nature of the difficulty' (Drew, 1997: 72) with the prior turn, which is left for Chloe to infer. In response, Chloe reissues the turn (line 78) thereby treating it as a

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\(^2\) See Gardner (1987) for further discussion of receipts and continuers.

\(^3\) See Drew (2003a, p143) for further examples of appreciations.
problem of hearing and then she adds ‘Like won’t yih dad ‘ave known’ (lines 78-79) which treats Paul’s problem as one of understanding (this addition is subsequently self-repaired to include the correct pronoun – ‘his dad’ and not ‘yih dad’ – and to make explicit what he would have known: ‘that you’re gay’, line 81). This addition works to unpack what she meant by her initial first pair part, which suggests that she has interpreted Paul’s difficulty in responding to her question as a problem with understanding the meaning of a term.

Chloe’s question presents a type of challenge to Paul’s telling. If Paul confirms that Ashraf’s appearance indicates to others that he is in fact gay, then the credibility of Paul’s telling is potentially undermined. The telling that Paul is doing concerns his experiences meeting his partner’s parents and more specifically his partner’s father who does not know that his son is gay and that Paul is being presented as his son’s friend and not his son’s lover. The ability for both the speaker (Paul) and his partner (Ashraf) to pass as heterosexual is the basic premise to the telling. The telling is built on the assumption that both, but specifically Paul, can pass as heterosexual with the correct preparation. The interest in the telling comes from whether Paul did or did not manage to successfully pass himself off as heterosexual in the company of Ashraf’s father. Therefore, if it was obvious that both Paul and Ashraf are gay merely from interacting with them then the point of the telling is lost. Moreover, if Paul believes himself able to pass as heterosexual (as is here implied), Chloe’s question undermines that belief and potentially challenges Paul’s sense of his own appearance and his personal safety in a heterosexist world.

Paul’s response to Chloe’s questioning seeks to assure her that Ashraf’s father would not know that they are gay from their appearance alone. Unsurprisingly given the point of the telling, he disagrees with Chloe’s suggestion that his father would have known (‘No’, line 82) but then mitigates this disagreement by conceding that this is what he would have thought but in this instance this is not the case (lines 82-83). It is clear from earlier in the call that Chloe has not met Ashraf so she is not in a position to make judgments about how easy it is to discern that he is gay merely by his appearance. However, Chloe is in a position to judge Paul as ‘screaming’ (which she does) since she knows him. This makes
it difficult for Paul to claim that no one would suspect that he is gay from his appearance and mannerisms alone. Paul avoids engaging with these issues by employing an account based on the bias that parents have about their children which makes them unlikely to suspect that their own children are gay (lines 87-89). Chloe agrees with this explanation (‘Yeah’, line 90) but then pursues her challenge by pointing out that this does not apply to Paul, as he is not Ashraf’s father’s son. Paul’s ‘Yea:h. But’ (line 91) acknowledges Chloe’s turn but it does not engage with (or resolve) the potential problem to the telling that Chloe has presented. Rather, Paul leaves this unresolved and continues with the course of his telling. In sum, this naturally arising talk between a lesbian and a gay man involves interactional difficulties and interpersonal hassles in relation to the extent to which Paul is able to conceal that he is gay. In Goffman’s (1963) terms, Paul is producing his homosexuality as discreditable and Chloe is disagreeing with this by claiming that it is discredited.

The Feathers

In Fragment 3, a lesbian couple (Karen and Lucy) is discussing the news (and its implications) that the local Youth Hostel Association (YHA) members are to hold a meeting in a gay pub (the Feathers) they frequent. Lucy introduces the topic by reporting that Ben has told her that ‘it’s YHA night in the Feathers’ (lines 1-2). In the next turn Karen does little more than acknowledge that she was the original source of the information (lines 3-4). She does not, for example, tell Lucy why she might have wanted her to have this information. This conversation is about the relevance of the YHA meeting for the exposure of Lucy’s lesbianism (to which both women are oriented). On the surface, this is a fairly ‘light-hearted’ and good-humoured conversation, but, underpinning it, there is a fundamental disagreement about the level of threat posed by the YHA meeting, the appropriateness of Karen’s warning, and their dissonant views of oppression in this world. For Karen the world is a more dangerous place than Lucy is prepared to acknowledge.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Fragment 3.1 THE FEATHERS
[Land: NE3]
01 Luc: Ben was saying that he thought it's the YHA:[.] nil:ght in the Feathers[s.]
02 Kar: [.h h h h [Y]eah I told 'im tuh mention it to you. hhh uhm >I d'kn<
03 Luc: [>]I thought they w- I thought they met upstairs in the little room. But d' they m- actually meet in the pub? = But (. ) d' they know it's a gay pub (huh) huh [huh ]
04 Luc: [Yeah] I kno:w. I-[Int'resting] =
05 Luc: [Really funny]-
06 Kar: ={(sniff)} [I don't know that they know it]-
07 Luc: Ou[t of all of the pubs] they pick that one!
08 Kar: Hm?
09 Luc: Out of all of the pubs that they pick that one. [ huh ]
10 Kar: [Well I] dunno if they know it tuh be honest.=
11 Kar: =hu[h huh huh huh huh mhm hm ]
12 Luc: [ hoh hoh hoh hoh hoh ]
13 Kar: Kay Pee p'raps picks up on stuff like that I always made me wonder about Kay Pee huh huh huh.hhh
14 Luc: Well yea:::h.
15 Kar: >I m- 'E does pick up on it I [think]
16 Luc: [ A b ]olutely.
17 (.)

Despite Karen's deliberately 'casual' reference to it as something she'd 'mention[ed]' (line 4), the status of this information as a warning, and the threat posed by the YHA meeting in Lucy's local gay pub, is clear. First they discuss the exact location of the meeting. If it is upstairs in the little room (lines 6-7) above the pub itself then they may not see Lucy, but if, as it in fact turns out to be the case, 'They end up down in the pub' (line 11) Lucy risks exposure to the YHA membership. This threat of exposure is not spelled out but underpins this conversation as an oriented-to-in-common concern. It is not clear to them
whether or not the YHA group knows that the Feathers is a gay pub (lines 12-13, 16 & 22) or whether individual members of the group have the capacity to ‘pick up on’ clues which may indicate a person is lesbian or gay (lines 25-31) but their discussion of this is oriented precisely to the possible threat of Lucy being ‘outed’ to this group.

Lucy has treated the YHA’s choice of venue for their meeting as a coincidence or puzzle (see lines 17–18 & 20-21). After jokingly speculating about KP’s sexuality as a possible explanation (lines 25-27 & 29), Karen offers ‘real ale’ as a possible factor in their choice of pub (lines 32-33). Lucy’s uptake (line 34), treats this explanation as a solution to her puzzle.

_Fragment 3.2 THE FEATHERS_
[Land: NE3]

29 Kar  >I m< 'E does pick up on it I [think]
30 Luc | A b ]solutely.
31 (. )
32 Kar But he just follows real ale. ((cough))
33 He just follows ['is nose 'n 'is taste] buds=
34 Luc [(o:::h YE:::::ah. ]

( (discussion about the Feathers as a real ale pub, including comparing it to another real ale pub))

50 Luc: Don’t care whe:re they go if th- if the real ale’s
51 there they’re not bo(h)th(huh)ered. huh huh
52 (0.5)
53 Luc: >C’d be<. hhhhh gay transgender(ed) pub they’d still be [(quite ’appy with the) ale w’ld’nt th(h)e:y=
54 Kar: [ HUH HUH HUH HUH ]
55 Luc: =[ H u h u h ] ((laughter while exhaling))
56 Kar: =[To be honest ac]tually if ’alf of them-
57 most of them knew it’d frighten th’crap outta
58 them I’m sure it woul[d. ]
59 Luc: [huh] huh [huh huh]
60 Kar: [hah hah] hhhhh (If
61 they knew they’d bin sat round)
62 (. )
After some discussion of the Feathers as a real ale pub including comparing it to another real ale pub they know, Lucy explicitly orients to the possible threat of her being outed to the YHA group in the course of her denying it. According to Lucy the YHA group ‘don’t care where they go if the real ale’s there they’re not bothered’ (lines 50-51). Lucy, therefore, is dismissing Karen’s warning as unnecessary. She can go to the Feathers and be seen by the YHA group when they emerge from the little room upstairs for their pints of real ale, and it will not matter. For Lucy then, Karen is being over-protective, excessively cautious, and seeing oppression where none exists.

The half-second silence that follows Lucy’s dismissal of Karen’s warning is dispreference implicative4 (line 52). Lucy hears this as indicating that Karen might be about to disagree with her and deals with the silence not by backing down, but by upgrading her claim. It is not just that the YHA are ‘not bothered’ (line 51) by being in a gay pub, even in a ‘transgender(ed) pub they’d still be quite ‘appy’ (lines 53-54) as long as the real ale is there! At line 57, Karen produces the disagreement that Lucy’s been expecting since that silence (line 52). Far from not ‘being bothered’ or being ‘quite happy’, Karen claims ‘it’d frighten th’crap outta them I’m sure it would’ (line 58-59). Karen assumes the YHA group do not know that it is a gay pub and that their meeting in the Feathers is evidence of this ignorance: the implication being that their prejudice would mean they would avoid it if they knew. Karen assumes high levels of prejudice from the YHA members, thereby justifying her warning to Lucy. Lucy, by contrast, treats them as more tolerant and open-minded; they can put up with being in a gay pub as long as the ale is good and if this is the case, Karen’s warning is unnecessary.

It is not until line 64 that Lucy explicitly orients to Karen’s reiterated concern of the threat to Lucy posed by the YHA meeting with ‘I don’t think that KP would recognise me’ (lines 64-66).

4 Silences after initiating actions (such as first assessments) often indicate that the action will not be forwarded by the next speaker. See Pomerantz (1984) for further details of the features of dispreferred second actions.
At the beginning of this conversation Lucy had suggested that the YHA meeting was not a threat, and would not effect her because the group meets upstairs in the little room, and then she claims that the YHA would not be bothered by her (or anyone else’s) deviant sexual orientations. Here she acknowledges the possibility that KP will be downstairs in the pub and might be bothered, but he would not recognise her. And, in any case, it has evidently been a while since Lucy was a YHA member and the membership is likely to have changed in the interim as Lucy points out, ‘th’must be a whole load of new people now’ (lines 70-71). Therefore the threat of being ‘outed’ is not as great as Karen might otherwise have perceived. Finally, even if KP (or any other person Lucy knows who might still be attending the YHA) is there, then they might not spot her since
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

'it's a big enough pub' (lines 77-78). In sum, Karen is displaying her judgement that there are potential detrimental consequences of being outed and that if Lucy is seen in the gay pub by the YHA members, then that would be sufficient to out her. Lucy, on the other hand, is challenging Karen by claiming, both that going to the Feathers may be insufficient to out her (the YHA group might not see her or none of the members might know her) and also by claiming that Karen has misjudged the level of hostility that she would encounter from the YHA group should she actually be outed. Here, then, a lesbian couple find themselves struggling to reconcile their discrepant views of the world.

Alignment and the reproduction of a shared reality

Despite the interactional difficulties experienced by the speakers, the participants in these interactions do align in their talk. For example, in Fragment 2, Chloe is supportive of Paul’s telling throughout most of his talk. Even in Fragment 3, which is perhaps the most adversarial, the speakers often align which we can see from what they do not challenge and, therefore, what they take for granted. By examining what the speakers treat as unproblematic it is possible to identify the speakers’ shared understandings of the world.

Reproducing the heterosexist presumption

In all three fragments, speakers treat being lesbian or gay as something that needs explaining or is accountable in a way that heterosexuality is not. In Fragment 3, both speakers treat the YHA’s presence in a gay pub as unusual. At first they attempt to account for it by reference to one of the group’s members, KP, who they intimate might be gay (lines 25-30). By singling out KP in this way they treat the other members of the group as heterosexual even though they do not state that they know anyone in the group is heterosexual. In doing this they assume that being lesbian or gay is salient for YHA members in a way that being heterosexual is not. The group’s heterosexuality is taken for granted and their
presence in a gay pub is treated as a puzzle that needs to be solved. Finding KP’s sexuality an unsatisfactory solution to this puzzle, Karen offers the Feathers as a ‘real ale’ pub (rather than a gay pub) as a possible explanation. There is much more uptake from Lucy to this suggestion. This takes for granted that Lucy’s presence in a gay pub needs explaining in a way that the YHA group’s presence in a ‘real ale’ pub does not, even though neither being homosexual nor real ale drinking are definitionally part of YHA membership.

Similarly, in Fragment 2, the basic premise to Paul’s telling is that not coming out will be sufficient for Paul to pass as heterosexual. It is this foundation that Chloe undermines by pointing out that Paul’s appearance and behaviour is sufficient to indicate or ‘give away’ that he is gay. However, their disagreement is focused on whether or not Paul and Ashraf do inadvertently display their gayness through their appearance, they still take for granted that as long as someone is not marked ‘gay’ it will be sufficient for them to be assumed heterosexual.

In these fragments then the speakers treat coming out as always necessary or relevant for lesbian and gay people in a way that it is not for heterosexuals. In the process of doing this they reproduce a world in which if there is no contrary indication it is acceptable and reasonable to assume that every person encountered is heterosexual. This thereby reifies heterosexuality as the unmarked norm or default and reproduces the heterosexist presumption.

*Shared understanding of ‘positive’ responses to coming out*

In these fragments the speakers negotiate the meaning of a positive response to coming out and actual or projected possible responses to coming out of the closet are never fully positive in these episodes. In Fragment 3, both speakers take for granted that Lucy’s presence in a gay pub could discredit her in the eyes of the YHA membership by outing her as a lesbian (it also makes apparent that she had previously passed as heterosexual to them).
Both participants assume that if the YHA members did see Lucy and work out that she is lesbian then is could be a bad thing, it is something that could have negative implications for Lucy, at best they would not be ‘bothered’ (line 51) and at worst it would ‘frighten th’crap outta them’ (line 58-59), there is no suggestion that Lucy’s lesbianism could be viewed positively.

In Chloe’s conversation with her mother (Fragment 1), Mum presents Ethel’s reaction to finding out that she (Mum) is the mother of a lesbian daughter as a positive one.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Mum quotes Ethel to present her (Ethel) as someone who holds anti-lesbian views, 'Oh well I- I don't think females should (j-) y'know have children' (lines 129-130). Clearly here 'females' is a euphemism for 'lesbians' or some similar term since it is unlikely that Ethel disagrees with all females having children! Despite the ostensible ambiguity of this reported speech within Mum's turn, by not completing it Mum is treating this as sufficient for Chloe to understand the point of view that Ethel expressed and in so doing she (Mum) treats this as a common opinion that does not need to be fully articulated to be understood. The next dialogue that Mum reports is introduced with 'But at the end of it she said' (line 137) this indicates that there was substantial discussion but treats Chloe as having sufficient knowledge of the type of things that Ethel said that it is unnecessary to detail them here. The way in which Mum presents the invitation and the acceptance denotes that her being invited 'round for coffee' (line 138) was not as a result of their discussion but rather signifies a return to the usual (perhaps in spite of their discussion!). In line 141 Mum expands by adding 'So it didn't make any difference'. It does not need to be articulated that the difference it could have made would have been a negative one, and neither speakers consider making a difference in a positive way as a possible reaction. Not 'mak[ing] any difference' and 'just the usual' are used here by Mum to present a good response to coming out. Chloe does not challenge this presentation and in so doing it is treated as understandable between the participants.

In both of these examples, a positive reaction to coming out is not considered as a possibility. All of the participants treat no reaction or indifference as a good response to coming out and the implication of this is that a negative reaction is what is expectable.
Reproducing heterosexuality as superior

There is evidence in this talk that it is better to be judged as heterosexual than lesbian or gay. In Fragment 1, when Mum is recounting her experiences at the hairdressers’ she reports that the hairdressers warned her not to have a particular style.

Mum presents the hairdresser as warning her against a particular hairstyle as it might attract the label ‘lesbian’ or similar. There is no need to explain that looking like a lesbian is a bad thing that must be avoided. Mum simply treats this as being understood without needing be spelled out explicitly. Neither Mum nor Chloe challenge this presentation. Mum’s problem with the hairdresser is that the views expressed are based on stereotypical misunderstandings about what lesbians are like. Chloe challenges Mum by engaging with the issue of whether the stereotypical images fairly represent lesbians (line 163-164 and lines 167-168). Why you would not want to look like a lesbian is just taken for granted as self-evident.

In this fragment the speakers show tacit understandings of the idea that displaying oneself as possibility gay is to be avoided. In contrast with passing as heterosexual, being readable as lesbian or gay is assumed to be a negative occurrence.
Management of lesbian and gay concealment and disclosure

All of these fragments relate to the management of being lesbian or gay (or being the mother of a lesbian daughter). In the first two fragments the speakers are reporting incidents in which they had managed coming out or passing and in the last excerpt the speakers are negotiating how a possible inadvertent disclosure of Lucy’s lesbianism might be managed. So, coming out is treated as something that has to be managed in a way that displaying heterosexuality does not. In Fragment 2, Paul is describing the extensive preparations that were necessary to conceal his relationship with his partner from his partner’s father. Chloe is aligned throughout most of this telling. They both treat the significant planning required and expectable (Chloe demonstrates that she is willing to challenge Paul’s story but she does not do so over this). In a subsequent part of Paul’s telling he engaged in complaining.

Fragment 2.4 MEETING THE PARENTS
[Land: YU9]
134 Pau: An’ so Ashraf was like “what’s he ask you?” >I
135 said< do- an’ I I’d like had a panic attack for
136 like about an hour afterwards.—I [was] like
137 Chl: [Mm ]
138 Pau: “You left me on m(h) y o(h) w n” . hhh “how da(h) re
139 y(h)”
140 Chl: Ye(h) ah
141 Pau: So
142 (0.4)
143 Pau: The thing is if I’d known that he was gon- y’know
144 ’cause I didn’t think I’d be left alone[an’] I was
145 Chl: [Mm ]
146 Pau: just like that’s (wha- one-) h-he didn’t tell me
147 that he’d said to his dad that I lived near
148 Monkshead otherwise I would have looked on the map
149 and checked all the towns ( ) theory.
150 Chl: ["Mm"]
151 Pau: . hhhhh But it was just the fact that I didn’t know
152 an’ I was just like “Oh God”
153 Chl: Oh: ma:n
Paul reports that he complained to Ashraf about being left alone with his (Ashraf's) father (lines 138-139). In this interaction Paul is using this quote to complain to Chloe about Ashraf. The laughter tokens in his turn indicate that this is light-hearted, nonetheless it is presented as something that he wished Ashraf had done differently. Paul unpacks his complaint by explaining how he would have preferred Ashraf to have prepared him (lines 143-144, 146-149, & 151-152). Paul is presenting this as a 'funny' telling. The amusement comes from the fact that this was a difficult experience that could have ended in disaster but as it happened it turned out all right. The difficulty that Paul experienced he is now complaining about to Chloe, this complaint is directed at Ashraf for not preparing him more thoroughly and not at the awfulness of the situation that forced him to have to lie and deny his relationship with his partner.

In these fragments, then, I have shown that despite the interactional hassles that resonate throughout these episodes of talk about coming out and passing, participants are aligned about features of the heterosexist world they share in common. It is one in which the coming out dilemma has continuing significance for lesbian and gay people (and their family members).

**Implications of talk about coming out and passing**

In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss three of the implications of this talk about coming out and passing: interactional difficulties that arise in this talk; the implications of these difficulties for the reconstitution of speakers' relationships; and the reproduction of heterosexism in the talk.
Chapter 2: Talking about coming out and passing

Interactional difficulties

For lesbian and gay people (and their families), when the coming out dilemma arises, there are various factors that they take into consideration. Individuals make decisions about, for example, whether it is relevant, whether it is necessary, whether it is safe and so on. If we choose to come out we may do so based on the judgement that an interactional slot has opened up in which coming out is relevant. We may be sensitive to accusations of 'flaunting' our sexualities so it may be important to us that it is in fact relevant. If we choose not to come out then it may be because of our judgement that its relevancy never arose. When we do come out we are displaying our assumption that we had previously passed as heterosexual. We may not want to reify that notion that it is acceptable to assume that everyone is heterosexual until there is any evidence to the contrary. We are also assuming that it is not possible to discern our sexuality from our other behaviours. It is also important to remember that there are prevailing negative attitudes towards non-heterosexuality and then we have to consider the consequences that might follow our coming out. We may perceive a potential threat of hostility or even violence as too great so that it outweighs any benefits of coming out. On the other hand, we may feel that not coming out, even if we fear hostility or negative consequences, is colluding in our oppression. Clearly there is a plethora of judgements that are involved in making the decision whether or not to come out. Therefore, it is unsurprising that there are hassles and stressors associated with coming out (Lewis et al, 2001).

When talking about coming out the speakers' talk is premised on these judgements. In Fragment 1, one of Mum's concerns is to establish the conditions that made the coming out dilemma relevant. It is not within the remit of this research to comment on whether or not coming out was relevant in the incidents that Mum is reporting. Rather, what is interesting here is how Mum is oriented to conveying this relevancy to Chloe. In each of the three episodes in Mum's telling she presents coming out as relevant. Interestingly, in the third part of her telling Mum reports that she did not come out to the hairdresser but displays her judgement that it was relevant. These judgements are conveyed throughout these fragments of talk about coming out. For example, in Fragment 2 Paul is
displaying his judgement that he passes for heterosexual until he explicitly comes out insofar as his telling is premised on this. In the third fragment Karen treats being ‘outed’ to the YHA group as a risk that Lucy will take if she goes to the Feathers and she is judging the consequences of this as something that will be negative to Lucy, hence the warning.

Since recipients are active participants in the construction of the telling both interlocutors are involved in negotiating the appropriateness of these judgements. This means that there is potential for disagreement and interactional difficulties that are built into talk about coming out. In Fragment 1, Chloe challenges Mum’s claim that it was relevant for her to come out to the hairdresser by taking the hairdresser’s side. Since Mum has presented the hairdresser as someone who holds heterosexist stereotypical and inaccurate understandings of what lesbians look like she cites this as something that should be challenged. Mum is displaying her judgement that this view is wrong and treating it as something that made coming out as the mother of a lesbian relevant even though she did not do so in this instance. Chloe, on the other hand, is treating the hairdresser’s views as reasonable and accurate. In so doing, Chloe is undermining the judgement that Mum is presenting as a justification for making coming out relevant (even though she did not come out) in the instance that she is reporting.

In Fragment 2, Paul’s telling is premised on his judgement that he successfully passes as heterosexual until he explicitly comes out. This is precisely the judgement that Chloe seeks to challenge by claiming that he is ‘screaming’, that is, that he is readable as gay merely by meeting him. Chloe’s challenge temporarily derails Paul’s telling as they negotiate to what extent Paul’s (and to a lesser extent Ashraf’s) membership in the category ‘gay’ is available from his appearance alone. Paul has difficulty dealing with Chloe’s challenge, which he leaves partially unresolved to the detriment of the point of the telling.

In Fragment 3, Karen is displaying her judgement that it is unsafe for Lucy to go to the gay pub where the YHA are meeting since her presence there would be sufficient for her to beouted. Lucy, on the other hand, is challenging Karen by claiming both that going to the Feathers may be insufficient to out her (the YHA
group might not see her or none of the members might know her) and also by claiming that she has misjudged the level of hostility that she would encounter from the YHA group should she actually be ‘outed’.

It is an ongoing concern for all speakers when they are doing a telling that their recipient(s) understands the telling in the way that the teller is presenting it. Research on story and telling prefaces shows that speakers often use items such as ‘it was really funny’ or ‘something awful happened to me today’, for example, to indicate how recipient should appreciate and respond to the telling (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). It is not always the case that recipients do respond to the telling or the story in the way that it is presented. For example, Mandelbaum (1989) analyses a storytelling where the recipients rescue the ‘butt’ of a story. She shows how ‘a round of recipient elicitation of the storytelling shifts teller’s focus’ (Mandelbaum, 1989: 119). Therefore, this is a generic concern for storytellers.

However, as we have seen, coming out (in relation to ones sexuality) is a distinctly non-heterosexual activity. Therefore, when we talk about our experiences, the interactional difficulties that arise as a consequence of the presentation of our judgements in our talk about coming out is an experience that is specific to non-heterosexuals (and those close to us, as we have seen in Fragment 1).

Reconstituting relationships

These kinds of interactional issues are personally costly. These interactional difficulties cause hassles and stressors that damage our interactions with our lovers, friends, and family since it is, in part, through talk that our relationships with others is defined and reconstituted.

Mum has presented her telling as one where she is in a difficult position: having to decide who to come out to and who not to come out to. She positions herself in an oppressed group, as the mother of a lesbian, ‘nobody seemed to think gay
people have parents' (lines 148-149). We can see that Chloe displays some difficulty in responding to this turn due to her laughter immediately after Mum’s talk. Perhaps this is because she is the lesbian daughter whose very existence puts Mum in this position. Later in the interaction, Chloe’s response to Mum’s telling about the hairdresser’s comments is a challenge to Mum’s perspective. Mum positions herself as the expert in relation to the hairdresser in her telling, by presenting the hairdresser’s beliefs as inaccurate. Chloe aligns with the views Mum has attributed to the hairdresser and thereby vies for the position of authority Mum has positioned herself in. This challenge is sufficient to derail Mum’s telling.

In Fragment 2, Chloe’s interjection, ‘Is he screaming? ‘Cause you are’ (line 75), is a direct challenge to the telling that Paul is trying to do. Although this disrupts the telling he does manage to regain the floor to continue with his telling (unlike Mum in Fragment 1). However, Chloe’s challenge results in the progressivity of Paul’s telling being substantially disrupted (lines 73-92 are occupied with this disruption).

Fragment 3 is perhaps the most difficult interaction for the participants. Although, on the surface, this conversation appears jokey and light-hearted, the two women are disagreeing. They have different perspectives: their perceptions of the threat posed by the YHA meeting in a gay pub where Lucy might also be a customer and their management of the warning are different. Karen is much more willing to confront the potential difficulties that this causes and she is also willing to orient to this as a warning more explicitly. Lucy, on the other hand, manages the threat by denying its relevance, and – when Karen pursues – Lucy downplays the need for such a warning. We have seen in lines 50-51 and 53-54, Lucy’s attempt to ‘laugh off’ the warning and Karen withholding of alignment or agreement with this in favour of a delayed – and upgraded – disagreement. The two different ways of managing the warning represent alternative strategies for dealing with – and resisting – oppression. But the outcome of these different approaches is disagreement. Also, it is important to remember that Karen has gone out of her way to ensure that Lucy received the warning as she went to the trouble of asking Ben to pass on the message. But, instead of thanking her, Lucy
is claiming that it was unnecessary. However, from Lucy’s point of view Karen is ‘forcing’ her to confront this potential threat by continuing to treat it as a threat even after Lucy has displayed that this is not how she has interpreted it, or at least this is not the way that she is treating it.

It is through our interactions with others that our relationships are built and reflected. Therefore, we can see that these interactional difficulties do not occur in a social vacuum or even in an interview room. Rather, they occur in the everyday interactions with those we are close to and therefore impact on our personal relationships.

*Reproducing heterosexism*

Because these episodes have arisen spontaneously in the everyday conversations of these participants rather than in researcher-generated data, we can see these speakers are orienting to these incidents as significant and newsworthy incidents in their lives. Previous research has pointed to the way in which coming out as lesbian or gay is an event in itself. This is unlike making heterosexuality available to interlocutors (see Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b). Nowhere in the classic CA data sets are there any comparable data in which making available one’s heterosexuality is treated as an event or a tellable in itself (Kitzinger, 2005b). Rather than treating coming out as an event a priori and imposing this on the participants talk, here we can see coming out being built as an event through the participants treating it newsworthy and important.

We can also see that for these participants being lesbian or gay is not treated as equivalent to being heterosexual. Rather, for these speakers being lesbian or gay needs explaining whereas being heterosexual does not. We can see in Fragment 3 that being gay or lesbian is treated as significant for YHA members whereas being heterosexual or even real ale drinkers is not. Similarly, as was demonstrated by Fragment 2, not coming out is treated as sufficient to pass as heterosexual. This serves to legitimise heterosexist assumptions and inadvertently reifies heterosexuality as the normal, natural, default way to be.
The speakers negotiate what a positive response to coming out is. In this talk we can see that a good response is when it is treated indifferently, or something that does not make any difference. This implicitly positions being non-heterosexual as worse than being heterosexual and a response that does not acknowledge this difference is treated as a good response. By contrast then a negative response is implicitly treated as reasonable and expectable.

Being lesbian or gay is treated as something that has to be managed in a way that being heterosexual does not. These speakers take for granted that preparations have to be made regarding revealing or concealing their sexuality. This is consonant with research that has demonstrated that only a small minority of lesbian and gay people never take any precautions to monitor their outness for the sake of their safety (Stonewall, 1996). There is some resistance to this from Lucy in Fragment 3. Lucy initially refuses to orient to Karen’s warning as a warning. However, ultimately she accepts Karen’s presentation by offering reasons for why the warning is unnecessary.

These points outlined above that relate to speakers’ alignments reiterate a notion of heterosexual superiority. In so doing, these speakers are inadvertently rebuilding heterosexism in their talk with their family, friends and lovers.

**Conclusion**

Like nearly all the research on coming out and passing, this chapter has focused on talk about coming out and passing as a data source. Previous research highlights the difficulties associated with coming out and passing and the talk here describes events that are consistent with that research. But the focus here is not on the subject of the report, but rather the report itself. Moreover, this is talk that has been spontaneously produced in the course of these speakers’ everyday lives, rather than in response to researcher questions. Through this use of naturalistic data, I have contributed to our understanding of coming out and
passing by demonstrating that these phenomena extend beyond actual incidents in which these decisions are taken and executed. And, just as research highlights the hassles associated with coming out and passing, I have shown – through fine-grained CA analysis and attention to participants’ orientations to interactional difficulties – that there are secondary hassles in talk about these incidents.

Through adherence to participants’ orientations, I have examined speakers’ alignments to show what they take for granted. By highlighting what is treated unproblematically and where interactions progress smoothly, the reflection and reproduction of shared-in-common understandings of the social world are made available. I have demonstrated how speakers reinscribe the heterosexist presumption and reify the notion of heterosexual superiority. And, I showed how speakers take for granted that concealment and disclosure are features of lesbian and gay lives (and the lives of our family members) that require ongoing management.

Finally, I considered the effect of these interactional difficulties in talk about coming out and passing (i.e., talk about a distinctly non-heterosexual activity) on the participants’ relationships, since talk-in-interaction is one of the major sites of the reconstitution of our personal relationships. In the analyses of these data, I have shown that even though the speakers in these data are apparently open about their sexuality in many contexts, the coming out dilemma continues to exert an influence over their lives.

In the next chapter, I will further explore issues relating to coming out and passing. But, unlike in this chapter, I will study coming out and passing as a phenomenon, rather than talk about it. And, to do this, I will analyse actual instances of coming out and not coming out as they occur spontaneously in talk-in-interaction.
Chapter 3
Colliding with Heterosexism:
To Come Out or Not to Come Out?

Introduction

We live in a society in which heterosexuality is deemed the only acceptable expression of sexuality. This cultural heterosexism 'is reflected through societal customs and institutions’ (Cogan, 1996: 221). The cultural scripts that predominate regarding sexual expression are very specific. They specify how romantic love is to be played out: between two people of different sex; with love and passion at the core of the relationship; proceeding monogamously from dating to marriage; and producing offspring within this acceptable family unit (Rose, 2000). Embedded within these scripts is an 'ideology of heterosexism’ (Rose, 2000: 316). Despite statistical evidence to suggest the decline of such traditional arrangements for living it remains the model for organising romantic life. All around us images of heterosexuality resonate. Newspapers, books, magazines, television programmes and films are created by and reflect heterosexual society (Markowe, 2002). Of course, this preponderance of heterosexuality is not labelled as such, rather being heterosexual is just treated as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ (Markowe, 2002: 71) or ‘the default way to be’ (Kitzinger, 2005b: 224).

Confronting heterosexism and coming out

One of the consequences of a heterosexist world means that everyone is assumed heterosexual unless there are any indications to suggest otherwise. Sometimes individuals might make available their non-heterosexuality through non-verbal signs such as rainbow flags or black/pink triangles or particular styles of dress or certain mannerisms, for example (Chirrey, 2003). These signs rely on the observers’ ability to interpret them in order to discern that the wearer is lesbian...
or gay. Perhaps more usually, lesbian and gay disclosure is achieved through verbal (or sometimes written) communication. For example, these verbal items might be explicit declarations such as ‘I’m gay’ or references by a woman to ‘my partner ... she’ (or vice versa) (Chirrey, 2003). When individuals do make available to others that they are not heterosexual then they ‘come out’.

In most environments, coming out (in relation to one’s sexuality) is an activity that only people who are not heterosexual can do. Since everyone is already assumed to be heterosexual then there is no equivalent such as ‘coming out as straight’. Even though heterosexuals make available their sexuality all the time both in their talk (e.g., reference to an opposite sex partner) and through symbols (e.g., wearing a wedding ring in societies where only opposite-sex couples are permitted to marry) this is not an activity in itself. Rather, it tends to be something that occurs in the course of some other action (see Kitzinger, 2005b). Because of this asymmetry, it is perhaps unsurprising that lesbian and gay people are often accused of ‘flaunting’ their sexuality when they reference their sexuality in ostensibly the same way that heterosexuals do (Peel, 2002; Gough, 2002) and this is an additional problem to which non-heterosexuals have to be sensitive.

Coming out, then, represents a challenge to the otherwise unquestioned routine heterosexual assumptions. We alter reality by bringing a new identity into being (Chirrey, 2003). By making the invisible visible we are changing reality for both us, as speakers, and recipients by challenging heterosexist assumptions. Coming out is both a significant personal act and a deeply political one.

This significance was highlighted in the previous chapter (Chapter 2). There is evidence for the centrality of coming out for lesbian and gay people within academia and beyond in the plethora of self-help books (e.g., Borhek, 1983; Eichberg, 1990; Signorile, 1996) and compilations of coming out stories (Matrix, 2000; Stanley & Wolfe, 1980; Jay & Young, 1975). Coming out stories are often treated as a common bond between members of an otherwise disparate community.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, research on coming out relies almost exclusively on retrospective accounts gathered through self-reports (Rothblum, 2000; Sandfort, 2000). For example, Chirrey (2003) explored ‘[r]eminiscences about experiences of coming out ... to illustrate how conversational participants evaluate their intentions in coming out and how they perceive the consequences of that act’ (p.26). She recognises that what is told is not a ‘true’ window to what actually happened but she argues that it is unnecessary to have an accurate recounting since ‘the teller of the story will provide a version of the coming out that recasts it in terms of meanings that the narrator ascribes to what happened and in terms of the resulting consequences’ (ibid.). In the previous chapter, I used tellings about coming out and passing as a data source but, unlike most other coming out research, I used those reports as the topic and not the coming out episodes that they described. In this chapter, I explore coming out as an interactional phenomenon but I use ‘real life’ instances of interactions in which coming out becomes relevant. By so doing, the data provide analytic access to how coming out (or not coming out) actually occurs in interaction.

Coming out is sometimes treated as a one-off event, as in the question ‘are you out?’ However, because there are always new people to meet then coming out can never be complete. Coming out is ‘an ongoing never ending process’ (Rhoads, 1994: 86) and ‘in every new situation where there are people that do not know we are lesbian, the closet is reproduced and we must come out again’ (Maher & Pusch 1995: 27).

There has also been a greater emphasis on instances of coming out where this has been the primary focus of the interaction. There is less work on coming out as it is occasioned in everyday interaction but work that does deal with this tends to also rely on retrospective accounts. There are a few notable exceptions that do use recordings of actual instances of coming out (Kitzinger, 2000) and not coming out (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003) as they happen in the course of some other everyday activity. These data that I will be focusing on here are recordings of real live interactions where this relevancy has arisen spontaneously in the course of other activities. This allows us to trace how coming out is actually done, what occasions it, and how recipient response impacts on it.
**Liberalism**

Despite the prevailing culture of heterosexist assumptions there has been some progress for the recognition of diverse sexualities, for example, ‘[i]n recent years, there have been increasing media presence with lesbian characters appearing in UK soap operas and programmes’ (Markowe, 2002: 68). However, there has been some concern that this increased visibility is not so much a manifestation of lesbian power but rather the commodification of lesbianism packaged for the heterosexual male gaze (Cottingham, 1996). As I highlighted in Chapter 1, we have seen the repeal of Section 28 in UK schools, the ordaining of openly gay clergy and, despite the fact that the Civil Partnership Bill is an inadequate attempted solution to the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage, it does indicate that the rights of lesbian and gay people are on the political agenda. When Peel (2002) conducted her study of lesbian and gay awareness training she found that trainers reported that it is extremely rare to encounter trainees who have no experience of lesbian and gay people (either in the media or real life) because of this increasing visibility. Being lesbian or gay, it has been argued by some, has become increasingly ‘normalized’ and ‘routinized’ (Seidman, 2004; Seidman et al, 2002).

There has also been a move towards liberalism in society more generally which means that ‘extreme expressions of prejudice’ (Peel, 2001: 544) have become no longer acceptable. For example, considerable effort has been put into ensuring equal opportunities in the workplace. However, the effort that has been put into ensuring equality varies across different types of discrimination. For example, there is legislation in the UK to ensure that workplaces provide equal opportunities based on disability, gender and race but no such legal obligation exists for sexuality (Peel, 2002).

However, as liberalism becomes the dominant ideology the most explicit forms of prejudice and oppression give way to more subtle and insidious forms (Bricknell, 2001; Burridge, 2004; Peel, 2001; van Dijk, 1991). There has
developed a preponderance of arguments based on 'tolerance'. These arguments are premised on heterosexual superiority yet they are dressed up to be pro-gay. Moreover, these arguments 'are far subtler than outright condemnation and therefore more difficult to combat' (Burridge, 2004: 331).

Although the increase in lesbian and gay visibility is generally recognised as positive, there are also negative implications. As lesbian and gay culture has become recognisable more widely this has also been accompanied by 'a powerful homophobic backlash' (Gough, 2002: 220) since this has produced a more visible target. This backlash has consisted of an increase in hate crimes (Cogan, 1996) and a renewed emphasis on traditional family values at the expense of diversity (Gough, 2002).

Despite this backlash, the pervasiveness of liberalism means that lesbian and gay people are less likely to expect overt hostility when they come out. However, what has replaced this obvious hostility is a more insidious and subtle form of oppression, something that Peel labels 'mundane heterosexism' (Peel, 2001). She argues, 'only by focusing on this level of heterosexism can it (potentially) be undermined' (Peel, 2001).

**Fluid sexual boundaries**

We have also seen a breakdown of the rigid boundaries of sexual categories. In the academy, queer theory developed and then boomed in the late 1980s and 1990s (Jeffreys, 2003; Kirsch, 2000). Drawing on post-structuralist understandings of identity as constantly shifting, queer theory rejects the notion of fixed gender and sexuality categories.

It is not simply that queer has yet to solidify and take on a more consistent profile, but rather that its definitional indeterminacy, its elasticity is one of its constituent characteristics (Jagose, 1996: 1)
Although queer theory is most associated with lesbian and gay issues, some definitions also include transvestitism, intersex, gender ambiguity and gender-modifying surgery (Jagose, 1996). Others express concerns that ‘queer’ often includes paedophiles and sadomasochists (Jeffreys, 2003). Of course not all definitions are this inclusive (Jeffreys, 2003). However, this means that it is possible to be both ‘heterosexual’ and ‘queer’ at the same time. Feminists have expressed concerns with this diluting of ‘lesbian’ to such an extent that it becomes subsumed under the (patriarchal) discourses of queer theory and destroys lesbian collective identity (Jeffreys, 2003; Wolfe & Penelope, 1993). Despite these serious criticisms of queer theory it does suggest the breakdown of fixed categories and we might reasonably anticipate that this has some bearing on what it means to come out.

More widely (i.e., beyond academic theorising) there has been increasing uneasiness among people about embracing fixed category labels, leading them to favour more fluid, changing understandings of identity (Kirsch, 2000). Recently, ‘research has shown that there are many men who sleep with men but do not categorize themselves as either gay or bisexual; there are many women who are lesbians for a time but initiate stable relationships with men; there are self-identified lesbians who sleep with men, or who are married [to men]’ (Kirsch, 2000: 7). This is not new; evidence of the inconsistency between sexual behaviours and claimed sexual identities has been available at least since Kinsey’s classic studies in the 1940s and 1950s (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin & Gebhard, 1953). However, what is new is the wider public recognition of shifting and indeterminate sexual category membership – a phenomenon not restricted to those whose behaviour is counter-(hetero)normative: even some of those who arrange their lives consistently with heterosexual norms are also reluctant to accept the label ‘heterosexual’ (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1993). There has also been a shift such that there are less clearly distinguishable boundaries between categories. For example, there has been an increase in the visibility of lesbians who conform to stereotypes of heterosexually defined images of femininity (Cottingham, 1996).
However, it is not these complex definitions of sexuality that are regularly discussed with or disclosed to strangers. It may seem odd that sexuality is relevant in interactions with strangers at all. Our lived experience of the impact of our sexuality on our interactions with strangers is only relevant because society is organised around heterosexual social units. Sexuality is not just about whom we choose to have sex with, but rather it is also about our domestic, social and legal arrangements. The traditional nuclear family remains the normative model. Indeed, the UK government reports it motive in introducing Civil Partnerships for same-sex couples (and only for same-sex couples) was to reinforce heterosexual marriage since its policy is that ‘marriage is the best framework for stable family relationships for opposite-sex couples’ (Smith, 2004). Throughout the West, the heterosexual couple remains the supported unit and the proper place to rear children.

According to the European Court of Human Rights, same-sex couples do not have the right to respect for our family lives, since we are not deemed to have a ‘family life’. Most countries do not recognise same-sex marriages and there is often control on who is treated as appropriate parents with restrictions on access to donor insemination and laws preventing non-heterosexual couples qua couples from adopting (Elman, 2000). In this sense then, sexuality structures ‘not only sexual life, but also domestic and extra-domestic division of labour and resources’ (Jackson, 2006: 107). Moreover, culturally these heterosexual units remain the framework that people use to make sense of the relationships that they encounter in their everyday lives (Kitzinger, 2005a). Therefore, regardless of the way in which people theoretically classify their sexuality, if they are currently living in a unit that is consistent with the heterosexual norm (e.g., a woman in a different-sex marriage or couple, whether she personally identifies as heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual, or queer) then they have the resources that allow them to be recognised by others in such a way. Those people who do not organise their lives and relationships in such a way that is consistent with the heterosexual norm are likely to experience problems. Since the world is set up for heterosexual units then coming out often becomes relevant in everyday interaction as non-heterosexuals confront heterosexism in our everyday lives.
Overview of the chapter

In this chapter, I focus on the interface between lesbian speakers and a heterosexist world, as it is manifest in the routine institutional contexts of everyday life. First, I will describe the data analysed in this chapter. I will explore how the heterosexist presumption becomes visible in these interactions and how this makes relevant coming out. When this occurs, speakers may choose to pass the opportunity to correct the presumption and therefore ‘not come out’ or they may correct the presumption and therefore ‘come out’. I will examine fragments of data in which speakers elect not to correct (and therefore not to come out), and then data in which speakers do correct. If they do choose to come out, then they may produce an exposed correction (which temporarily derails the business at hand) or they may opt to do so with an embedded correction (which is a discreet method and which is designed not to disrupt the ongoing activity of the talk). I will also analyse a single data fragment in which a speaker elects to come out without there being a clear prior manifestation of the heterosexist presumption. I will show how coming out (or not) impacts on the subsequent interaction. Finally, I will consider the implications of these analyses in terms of: how coming out is done; why speakers invoke couple relationships; the consequences of mundane heterosexism; and how these are instances of coming out.

Data

The data analysed in this chapter are fragments of naturally occurring talk from the Land corpus in which a speaker happens to make available a hearing of themselves as non-heterosexual or where an interactional slot opens up in which coming out might be deemed relevant but does not occur. Each of these episodes of coming out or not coming out happen to occur in an institutional context, although it is important to note that simply because it is an institutional setting it does not follow that it is ‘institutional talk’. That is, the context does not pre-empt classification of the talk (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Schegloff, 1992a).
These interactions are fragments of everyday lives, such as seeking a dentist or requesting a car insurance quotation. In none of the calls is the topic of the talk or the purpose of the call related to issues of sexuality or coming out. In each of the instances referred to in this chapter coming out occurs as a secondary activity to the ongoing institutional activity that forms the purpose of each interaction.

Colliding with heterosexism: Not coming out

In most of the institutional calls in my data corpus (i.e., in conversations with a stranger where the sexuality of the speaker is not known), lesbian speakers do not come out. However, this is not a relevant absence. Just as they do not reveal other information about themselves because it is not relevant to the activity in hand, their sexuality is also irrelevant. Therefore, even though they are not coming out, they are not doing 'not coming out'. But, sometimes coming out does become interactionally relevant. This occurs when callers collide with the heterosexual presumption. That is, the co-interactants presume heterosexuality and therefore a correctable matter has been brought into the conversation.

When lesbian and gay speakers collide with the heterosexist presumption coming out is made relevant, yet we may – for many reasons – elect not to come out. In this situation 'not coming out' is a relevant absence. Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2003) were the first to identify and analyse an actual instance of 'not coming out'. They captured a single occurrence of this phenomenon in an interaction in which a speaker makes the first step toward coming out and then retracts. The result is that she is not coming out in an interactional slot in which it has become analysably relevant. That interaction is reproduced below.

*Fragment 1 FOCUS GROUP*

(taken from Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003)

01 Eve: mean he ain't sex-mad my 'usband but [I mean]a::ll
02 Jil: [No:::] [No:::
03 Eve: me::n: (0.2) like boobs don't they?
04 (0.5) [No:::
05 Sue: ['I believe so°]
Chapter 3: Colliding with heterosexism

In this fragment Sue, a psychologist, is facilitating a focus group with women who have breast cancer. At the beginning of this fragment Eve is discussing her husband's response to her having a mastectomy (line 1) and inviting others in the group to align with her statement, 'all men like boobs' (lines 1 & 3). After some reluctance on the part of the group to align with this statement Sue proffers 'I believe so' (line 5) as a weak affiliation with Eve's turn, but one that rejects Eve's presumption that all of her recipients have direct experience of men's sexual desires by denying any direct epistemic knowledge about men's liking for breast. Eve hears Sue's turn as disaffiliating from her statement and interrupts her own turn to question Sue's lack of agreement and offers 'not being married' as a possible reason for her lack of affiliation. This makes explicit what is implicit in Eve's first turn, that is, she is treating all of her recipients as heterosexual (in addition to treating all men as heterosexual). The most proximate presumption is that Sue is married, but this of course is premised on an understanding of Sue as heterosexual. As it turns out Sue was not married at the time of the interaction and is not heterosexual. The 0.5 second gap that opens up after Eve's question (line 8) is indicative of the problem that Sue has in answering the question since the questions is designed to deal with Eve's presumption that Sue is married and does not deal with the underlying assumption that Sue is heterosexual. The response that Sue finally offers ('divorced', line 10) is 'truthful' yet it does not engage with the problem that Eve has displayed. We may see Sue's turn at line 5 as a first step towards coming out and then her retracting this in line 10. As I will show later in this chapter in fragments in which speakers do come out, correcting the heterosexist
presumption and thereby coming out may have disruptive consequences for the subsequent interaction. Sue, as the facilitator, is responsible for the smooth running of the focus group. Therefore, we can see this as an example of the competing pressures on lesbian and gay people to do their job and to come out. For a fuller analysis of this fragment see Kitzinger and Wilkinson (2003).

(a) Car Insurance

In Fragment 2, Janice has called an insurance company for a car insurance quotation for herself and her wife. Until recently marriage was restricted to different-sex couples only. In most countries this is still the case, but in Canada (where Sylvia and Janice married) a recent change to the law means that same-sex couples can also marry (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2005). Fragment 2 is taken from a conversation in the UK, where the institution of marriage is not open to same-sex couples¹, but where there are same-sex couples who have married abroad. Fragment 2 opens with one of a list of questions asked by the call-taker in service of providing an insurance quotation. The call-taker’s agenda involves pursuit of a generic list of questions that the insurance company requires potential customers to answer in order to arrive at a quotation. The enquiry regarding whether Janice ‘will be the main driver’ (line 1) provides an opportunity for Janice to incorporate a specific request which she does by confirming that she will be the main driver but also that she ‘want[s] self and spouse insurance’ (lines 2-3). Spouse is a gender-neutral term, which may account for Janice’s selection of it². The call-taker acknowledges Janice’s request, but does not explore the details of this further. Rather, he continues with the questions on his agenda. These questions pertain only to Janice and it is not

¹ The UK now has Civil Partnerships for same-sex couples which are an expressively separate institution from marriage, but at the time of this call’s recording Civil Partnerships were not available either.

² Although, ‘spouse’ is also the term used by the insurance company in the information it provides about its services.
until he gets to the two ‘legally binding’ questions (lines 32-33) that the call-taker seeks information about the Janice and her spouse.

Fragment 2 CAR INSURANCE

[Land: SC02]
01 Clt: Okay. And will you be the main driver
02 Jan: >.hh< Yes I will but #I:# uhm want self
03 and spouse insurance. Please.=
04 Clt: =Yeah of course yeah. .hhh 'kay.=Uhm
05 'Ave you been driving for longer than
06 three years.
07 Jan: Yes I have;
08 Clt: Was your licence issued in the U-K;
09 Jan: Yes it was.
10 Clt: And are you a permanent resident?
11 Jan: Yes I am.
12 Clt: #Oka:y.#
13 (1.5)
14 Clt: And your occupation is
15 //
16 {((17 lines dealing with Janice’s occupation,
17 employer, part-time work etc omitted))
31 Clt: 'Kay.=Wuh .hhh I’ve got two questions
32 for yih. These questions are legally
33 binding.
34 Jan: Mm hm
35 Clt: (So I need to finish them) fully before
36 you give me your answer.
37 Jan: Mm hm
38 Clt: And they’re applying to yourself and your
39 husband.= Okay?
40 Jan: Okay.
41 Clt: .hhh The first question is have either of
42 you had any motoring convictions fixed
43 penalty endorsements including l:ice
44 disqualifications.hh in the last five
45 years.
46 (0.2)
47 Jan: N:o.
48 (0.8)
50 Clt: .hh The second question (0.2) have either
51 of you had any accidents claims or losses
52 in the three years regardless of fault.
53 Jan: R:i:ght. Yes: I have.
54 //
55 {((Two minutes omitted here during which
56 Janice deals with questions about a prior
claim for the theft of her car. The sequence is protracted as she is unable to remember – or to find – the date on which the theft occurred. There is a clearly audible off-line consultation with her (hearably female) spouse, Sylvia, about the date of the theft – and it is she who eventually produces a letter verifying the date.)

108 Jan: [The theft date was the] twenty eighth of August
109 two thousand and three:
110 Clt: Okay that’s fine.
111 Jan: And the claim was settled in November finally.
112 Clt: Yeah that’s fine. hhhh Okay uhm (. ) are
113 you going to be using the car for social
114 domestic and pleasure and to commute to one
115 permanent place of work.

Although Janice used the (gender-neutral) term ‘spouse’ (line 3), the call-taker uses the (gender-specific) term ‘husband’ (line 39) to refer to Janice’s spouse. The selection of ‘husband’ is recipient-designed for Janice as someone who sounds female and who has given a name that is recognisable as a name given to females in this culture. Additionally, ‘husband’ here could be seen as an embedded correction of ‘spouse’ (see Jefferson, 1987) which offers a more colloquial reference form. ‘Spouse’ is not routinely used in ordinary colloquial British-English, rather speakers tend to use the gender-specific terms ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ (see Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b). This alternative reference term shows an expectation that Janice’s spouse is male and therefore displays that the call-taker has mobilised the heterosexist presumption in recipient-designing the turn for Janice. Given that same-sex couples are not permitted to marry in the UK, the heterosexist presumption – as displayed through the call-taker’s choice of reference form – is perhaps unsurprising.

However, the production of the (incorrect) heterosexist presumption makes relevant Janice’s coming out (i.e., it makes relevant Janice’s correction of the

1 In the omitted talk there is no reference to the second person to be insured (either by Janice or by the call-taker).
inaccuracy of the call-taker's reference form). Speakers normatively attend to repair close to the trouble source and the next turn is the canonical place for other-initiated repair (Schatzki, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977), yet Janice does not correct the call-taker's error in the next turn. Rather, she attends to the action of the call-taker's turn by confirming that she has understood that the questions apply to both people to be insured ('Okay', line 40). In so doing, she allows the heterosexist presumption to pass unchallenged.

The sequential position in which the call-taker has displayed his assumption that Janice's spouse is male is likely to have exerted a strong pressure on Janice's decision not to challenge the heterosexist presumption and, therefore, not to come out. At lines 31-32 the call-taker issued a pre-pre indicating that he has 'two questions' (line 31) to ask, such that the immediately subsequent talk (lines 32-39) – that is, the talk containing the heterosexist presumption – is hearable as preliminary to the projected two questions (see Schegloff, 1980). Therefore, the local interactional environment creates a counter pressure against correction since so doing would disrupt not only the immediate adjacency pair but also the larger unit that was mobilised by the pre-pre.

Once Janice has confirmed that she has understood the auspices under which the questions are to be asked (that is, her 'okay', line 40), the 'two questions' are then relevant. In declining the opportunity to initiate repair, and providing only confirmation of her understanding of the preliminary material, Janice is treating 'husband' as an adequate reference term (at least for the immediate business) for the other person to be insured, and displaying her presumption that her spouse's gender, and the couple's sexuality, are irrelevant for the practical purposes (of taking out car insurance) being pursued here. If it should turn out to be relevant, 'there is, after all, always a next-turn position after the larger unit has been brought to possible completion' (Schegloff, 2000b: 214) – i.e., after the 'two questions' have been asked and answered.

The first question concerns motoring convictions, penalty endorsements, and driving disqualifications (lines 41-46) and this is answered with a simple 'no' (line 48), but the second question (lines 50-52) is considerably more complicated
and results in Janice having to search for documents relating to her car being stolen. By the time Janice has answered this question (lines 108-9 and 111) and the call-taker has receipted her response (lines 110 and 112), a significant length of time has elapsed since the trouble source (on line 39). Since the sex of Janice’s spouse is not relevant to the answers to the two questions, correcting the heterosexist presumption at this point – that is, the end of the sequence (line 112) – would be possibly hearable as an unwarranted or unnecessary assertion of her lesbianism. By not initiating repair Janice displays her understanding that the sex of her spouse is not relevant to the matters of licence disqualifications, or accident claims and losses, with which the call-taker’s questions have been concerned.

(b) Removals

Unlike Canada, where marriage between members of the same sex is legal, in the UK ‘Mrs’ is used to refer to women who are currently or who have been married to men. Of course this does mean that it is possible to use the title ‘Mrs’ and be living as a lesbian but nonetheless being seen as married (via the title ‘Mrs’ or otherwise) is readable as being heterosexual. In Fragment 3, which was recorded in the UK, the person being called displays some problem with the title with which she is being addressed.

Fragment 3 REMOVALS
[Land:SW80]
01 Reb: hhh Hello:hh
02 RCR: Mrs Boast?
03 (0.5)
04 Reb: Ye:s?
05 RCR: Harrison Faraday Removals it is.
06 Reb: Oh hi:!
heterosexual. Rebecca normatively uses the courtesy title ‘Miss’ and she is neither married nor heterosexual; rather, she is lesbian and lives with her female partner. The half-second silence that opens up after the RCR’s turn is indicative of Rebecca finding it problematic.

The action that the RCR is implementing in this turn is to check that the person who has answered the telephone is the person to whom he has called to speak. Rebecca is the only member of her household with the surname ‘Boast’ so she must be fairly certain that she is the intended recipient. So, the surname is correct but the title is not. This provides further evidence that it is the ‘Mrs’ that is problematic. However, Rebecca does not challenge the title explicitly, which would have corrected the assumption regarding her marital status but not the heterosexist presumption embedded within the RCR’s title selection. However, her response is delayed and has slight upward intonation, which appears to do more than just passing. To engage in the business of correcting would disrupt the action that the caller is trying to implement, which, moreover, is an action that is in Rebecca’s interest, that is, confirmation of the removals van that she is

4 Here are instances in which Rebecca uses the courtesy title ‘Miss’ to refer to herself.

WATER BOARD
[Land: SW21]
01 Clt: Could you confirm thee name and address:
02 [plea:se.]
03 Reb: [ It’s: ] Miss Rebecca Boast, nine seven
04 six Fairmead Avenue, Newtown R-T seventeen
05 eight L-K:.
06 Clt: Fi:ne I’ve got that Miss Boast.=Could I
07 take a telephone number please.
08 Reb: .hh Yeah it’s ((continues))

TELEPHONE COMPANY
[Land: SW26]
01 Clt: Ri:ght. First of a:ll (. ) can you:: (. )
02 confirm thee name and postcode on the
03 account please.
04 Reb: Yeah it’s Miss R Bo:a[st]
05 Clt: [Ye]ah
trying to organise. In making decisions about what to challenge we have to weigh up the costs and benefits of doing so.

In three very different ways, then, the speakers in these three fragments collide with the heterosexist presumption, which makes coming out relevant. As they (Sue (1), Janice (2), and Rebecca (3)) are the only ones who know the error has occurred they are the only ones who are in a position to do the correction. However, in each of these fragments, instead of correcting, they do the relevant next action. There are internal and external pressures for non-correction. Internal pressures include preference structures and sequential considerations. Given there is a general preference for progressivity, disrupting the sequence to do correcting is a dispreferred activity and errors in talk are sometimes left uncorrected for this reason alone (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977; Jefferson, 1988). Additionally, in some instances there are further structural pressures such as the sequential position of the error. For example, in Fragment 2, the heterosexist presumption occurred in a larger unit of talk that had been projected by a pre-pre. External pressures include achieving some broader objective. Speakers are pursuing pragmatic goals such as running a focus group (Fragment 1), obtaining an insurance quotation (Fragment 2), and organising the hire of a removals van (Fragment 3) and correction and coming out may hinder these activities.

Colliding with heterosexism: Coming out

In the following fragments speakers collide with the heterosexist presumption but they do not let it pass; rather they correct it, and in so doing, they come out. The first fragment – the only instance in the corpus – is an instance of a speaker doing an exposed correction, which makes the correction an episode of interactional business in its own right. In the next subsection there are three fragments in which speakers perform embedded corrections of the heterosexist presumptions, which are designed to prevent the activity of correcting rising to the
conversational surface (although recipients may subsequently expose the correction with an exposed acknowledgement).

Exposed correction of the heterosexist presumption

(a) Second car insurance

Fragment 4 is taken from a call to a second car insurance company, in which Janice is again seeking a quotation for car insurance for 'self and spouse' (line 3). In the talk prior to Fragment 4 the call-taker has asked a series of questions about Janice and her car. After each of Janice’s responses there has been a short gap (presumably while the call-taker inputs the details Janice has given). However, immediately prior to Janice’s request in lines 2-3 there was a 10.5 second gap (considerably longer than the previous silences) and this is likely to provide an account for why Janice produces this request at this interactional point.

Fragment 4 SECOND CAR INSURANCE
[Land: SC03]

01 (10.5)
02 Jan: .hhh I'm wanting insurance fo:r uhm: (.),
03 two named drivers self and spous:e .=
04 Clt: =>Yeah< 'v cou:rs.e.
05 (13.0)
06 Clt: (Right) I've got you down as a doctor. Do
07 you have the use of any other vehicle
08 within the househo:ld.
09 Jan: Yes I do.
10 (0.8)
11 Clt: An: (. ) you said you'd like to insure your
12 husband to drive the car.
13 Jan: mcht Uh:::m It's not my husband it's my
14 wi:fe and yes I would l[ike t- ]
15 Clt: [Oh I do] beg your
16 pardon.
17 Jan: I would like to insure her.
18 Clt: Yep >thank you<
19 (11.5)
Janice articulates what she is requesting ('I'm wanting insurance', line 2) unproblematically but then she displays some trouble when she reaches the point in the TCU in which articulation of the reference to the potential customers is relevant. The stretch on 'for', the 'uhm', and the micropause (line 2) are indicative of some problem. Janice first offers 'two named drivers' (line 3) and then unpacks this collective term by specifying whom the 'two named drivers' are, that is, 'self and spouse' (line 3). The call-taker immediately accedes to this request with 'yeah' (line 4) and then 'v course' (line 4) which treats the request as entirely routine\(^5\). The call-taker's response treats 'self and spouse' as an appropriate referent unit to be insured. This unproblematic response is subsequently retrospectively treatable as a display of a heterosexist presumption (but this is not evident here at the point of its production). There is no indication of this at the point of the turn's production, however, after an intervening question completing the collection of Janice's details, the call-taker returns to Janice's request and here the prior heterosexist presumption is made apparent.

After Janice's request, the call-taker returns to the business that was underway prior to the request, that is, collecting Janice's details (lines 6-9). It is likely that the call-taker has a pre-arranged list of questions and therefore Janice's request is 'out of sequence'. When the collection of Janice's details is complete the call-taker moves on to others who may require insurance to drive the car. He prefices the turn with 'An' (line 11) which in institutional contexts is often done to mark the question as one of a sequence of questions such that it provides an orientation to the agenda of the business of the interaction (Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994). However, he recipient-designs the question by linking it to Janice's prior request (lines 2-3) by prefacing it with 'you said' (line 11) and producing it as an report of Janice's earlier talk ('you said you'd like to insure your husband to

\(^5\) It might seem that it is reasonable to expect this response since it is entirely routine for insurance companies to be called for insurance. But, rather than seeing the institutional context as an account for the response, it is the response that reproduces the context as an institutional arena in which the provision of insurance is the central focus.
drive the car', lines 11-12). With this turn he displays not only that he has interpreted 'spouse' as 'husband' but that this is the only possible interpretation, thereby treating 'self [Janice] and spouse' as synonymous with 'you [Janice] and husband'. Janice is analysable by the call-taker as female by the quality of her voice and because she has provided her name which is culturally recognisable as a name given to females. As was the case in Fragment 2, as far as the call-taker is concerned marriage is the preserve of different-sex couples.

With Janice's repair initiation ('mcht uhm It's not my husband it's my wife', lines 13-14) the sequence of questions and answers about drivers and cars is temporarily suspended and the sequence becomes occupied instead with the doing and receiving of correction. The call-taker's question (done in the form of a confirmation check) is designed as prefatory to launching a series of questions (eventually launched at line 20) about the second driver to be covered by the insurance: a simple 'yes' answer would have worked as a go-ahead to forward that activity. Instead, Janice begins with a turn-initial delay ('mcht uhm' line 13), thereby displaying some problem with the prior turn, followed by an other-initiated repair naming the repairable ('husband') and provides the repair solution by correcting it with the co-class member 'wife' (line 14). Without stopping even for a beat, Janice continues to answer the now corrected question (i.e., the relevant next action). By through producing this turn and beginning a full confirmation ('yes I would like t-', line 14) rather than only a 'yes', Janice attempts to diminish the exposure of the correction and lessen the opportunity for further topicalisation of the correction (i.e., it reduces the possibility of response from the call-taker by minimising the interactional slot where this would be relevant). However, the call-taker produces his error as sufficiently serious to require an acknowledgement of his mistake and an apology for it. By starting in interjacent overlap with Janice's SPP, the call-taker displays his understanding that Janice has designed her talk to avoid eliciting a response to her correction but, despite this, he treats the error as warranting an apology (lines 15-16). Far from contesting Janice's use of the term 'spouse', this call-taker goes beyond the requirements of the sequence to take responsibility for the error. And, he adopts the term 'wife' (line 20) on the next occasion when he is required to refer to Janice's spouse. This locally initial reference form in locally subsequent position
(i.e., not normative subsequent reference, see Schegloff, 1996) is designed to show recognition of their marriage. In Fragment 4, then, the call-taker's deployment of the heterosexist presumption leads to an error that if left uncorrected is likely to become apparent later in the call (i.e., when Janice provides her spouse's details) – as we shall see in the following fragment. Both interlocutors attend to the correction explicitly; they suspend the otherwise ongoing action to deal with correcting the heterosexist presumption (Janice) and apologising for it (the call-taker).

*Embedded correction of the heterosexist presumption*

(a) *Car insurance continued*

Fragment 5, is taken from later in the conversation from which Fragment 2 was taken. If we recall from Fragment 2, Janice used the term 'spouse' to refer to the person who (in addition to herself) required car insurance cover, the call-taker subsequently used the term 'husband' to refer to Janice's spouse, which was incorrect since Janice has a wife and not a husband (see Fragment 4), the sequential position (within talk marked as preliminary by a pre-pre) of the (incorrect) heterosexist presumption discouraged correction, and by the time the sequence was complete an inordinate length of time had elapsed since the trouble source. Janice did not correct the error and the heterosexist presumption passed unchallenged. However, in Fragment 5 the relevance of this issue resurfaces.

In this fragment (Fragment 5) the call-taker (and not Janice) performs a self-correction on his own prior term. Nearly three minutes after the interaction reproduced as Fragment 2, and after a further series of questions and answers dealing with the type of insurance cover required, the call-taker, who had used the term 'husband' to refer to the person Janice had referred to as her 'spouse',

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6 In the intervening talk there is no reference to the second person to be insured. Within the omitted data there was a protracted off-line discussion between Janice and Sylvia about the detail of a previous car theft (this talk is reproduced in footnote 7).
selects Janice’s initial term (and not his own prior term) in formulating a next question:

**Fragment 5 CAR INSURANCE, CONTINUED**

[Land: SC02]

500 Clt: Has your spouse got the same surname as yourself
501 Jan: Uh: no.
503 Jan: Yeah. Her surname is Andersen. A-N-D-E-R-
504 S-E-N
505 Clt: Yeah. And the first name?
506 Jan: Sylvia = S-Y-L-V-I-A.
507 Clt: O-kay.= An’ how old’s Sylvia.
508 Jan: She: i:s (0.5) f:orty three.
509 Clt: O-kay. An’ has Sylvia been driving for longer than three years
510 Jan: Yes:.
511 Clt: ‘Kay.= Was the licence issued in the UK
512 Jan: Yes.
513 Clt: An’ is she a permanent resident
514 Jan: Yes she is.
515
516

When the call-taker uses the term ‘spouse’ (line 500) it is the third in a series of consecutive person reference terms deployed to index the same person: Janice initially used ‘spouse’ (line 3, Fragment 2), the call-taker subsequently used ‘husband’ (line 39, Fragment 2), and then here the call-taker reverts to Janice’s original selection (‘spouse’, line 500, Fragment 5). This is not an exposed correction (and therefore it is not an instance of repair – unlike Janice’s correction in Fragment 4), but rather the call-taker embeds the correction in the next sequentially relevant action as he pursues the business of collecting information required for him to provide an insurance quotation. In selecting the (gender-neutral) term ‘spouse’ as an alternative to his own prior (gendered-masculine) ‘husband’ – a slightly odd, non-colloquial, lexical choice at this point in the call – the call-taker is displaying an orientation to a possible problem with ‘husband’ (although Janice has not displayed any problem) and is correcting his own previous talk. This correction is endorsed by Janice’s subsequent use of a female pronoun (line 504), which is the first definite evidence in this call that her
spouse is female. This confirms the call-taker’s previous error and it makes explicit the earlier incident of passing.

Only Janice knew that there was a problem – and the nature of that problem – with the call-taker’s use of ‘husband’ at the time of its deployment and yet, even though there was no indication of the error from Janice, the call-taker subsequently orients to his reference form as problematic. It is possible that the impetus for the call-taker’s self-correction comes from the audible off-line discussion between Janice and Sylvia about the theft date of Janice’s car7. It seems that because Janice consults with a person who is hearable as an adult and female (and therefore not the husband the call-taker has invoked), who has knowledge of Janice’s correspondence about insurance claims, who is in her home and who has not been accounted for with an alternative reference form (e.g., ‘daughter’ or ‘mother’), it is sufficient for the call-taker to retract the heterosexist presumption. So ‘husband’ is treated as possibly wrong, and Janice’s alternate form, ‘spouse’ deployed in its place, such that ‘husband’ is treated as possibly correct while also allowing for other unspecified possibilities. Only in a thoroughly non-heterosexist culture could ‘wife’ have been deployed

7 Fragment 17-b CAR INSURANCE
{(Off-line conversation in italics)}
67 Jan: SYLVIA:: DO YOU KNOW WHEN THE CLAIM WAS:
68 (. ) F:OR THE MICRA:.
69 (3.0)
//
{(On-line discussion between Janice and call-taker as to whether the exact date is actually necessary; it is and Janice undertakes to locate it)}
90 ((24 secs))
91 Syl: Here you are. ’We are now ready to settle your claim.: What’s the date on that.
93 Jan: The twentieth of November. Oh! So it was [later.
94 Syl: Well uh (.) the claim was settled in November so [the theft would’ve been] earlier than that.=
96 Jan: [ R i : : g h t . ]
97 Jan: Okay I’ll see: if ((interference as handset is picked up))
99 Jan: Hi:. I’ve got a letter saying the claim was settled in November.
here without the risk of offending a heterosexual recipient (see previous chapter (2) for participants’ orientations to being presumed heterosexual as better than being presumed non-heterosexual).

(b) NHS Direct

In Fragment 6 – like Fragment 4 – a speaker comes out in response to a recipient’s heterosexist presumption. However, unlike Janice in Fragment 4, Nicola (in Fragment 6) does so with an embedded correction and therefore keeps the business of correcting off the interactional surface.

Nicola has called NHS direct which is a medical advice line for the UK. A call-taker usually answers and takes some preliminary details and then says that a Health Information Advisor (HIA) will call back as soon as one is available. Nicola has told the initial call-taker that she is looking for dentists for her and her partner and has told the call-taker the areas in which they live. In the call from which Fragment 6 is taken the HIA is returning Nicola’s call and providing information about dentists who are currently registering new patients.

Fragment 6.1 NHS DIRECT
[Land:OC2]
01 HIA: Hello there. = My name’s Carla. = I’m a health
02 information advisor with NHS direct. .hh () I
03 understand you’re looking for a dentist in
04 your area:.
05 Nic: Yes I am p[lea:se.]
06 HIA: ['Yeah’ ]
07 HIA: Uhm:: At the moment there are no dentists in Kirk
08 itse:lf.
09 Nic: M[mhm
10 HIA: [Uhm: unfortunately the neares:ts probably
11 Pippergate Canterbury Tenton areas. .hh
12 Nic: [U: .hhh
13 HIA: [I note in the notes that it also says you’re looking
14 in the Westnorton area as we:ll]
15 Nic: [.hhh ] Yeah that’s for
16 my partner [hhh
Chapter 3: Colliding with heterosexism

The HIA checks that she has the correct details ‘I understand you’re looking for a dentist in your area’ (lines 2-4). Nicola confirms and then, after the HIA tells her that there are no dentists currently registering new patients in her area at the moment (lines 7-8), she lists some of the nearby areas that are most likely to have dental practices that are accepting new patients (lines 10-11). The HIA mentions, ‘I note in the notes that it also says you’re looking in the Westnorton area as well’ (lines 13-14). Nicola confirms that this is the case and then orients to this as accountable with, ‘Yeah that’s for my partner’ (lines 15-16). Since it is usual practice to register with only one dental practice then looking for more than one is accountable, and we see evidence of this here (Nicola treats it as accountable and the HIA is oriented to this by the use of ‘also’ (line 13) and ‘as well’ (line 14) in her prior turn). In her account, Nicola explains that the second dentist is for someone else, her partner. However, because the other person is her partner is not an adequate explanation for why she chooses that reference (e.g., Kitzinger, 2000; Schegloff, 1997; Speer, 2005a; Stokoe, 2005; Zimmerman, 2005). There are numerous reference terms that she could have chosen, including simply ‘someone else’. By selecting ‘partner’ she conveys additional information. Kitzinger (2005a), in her examination of out-of-hours medical calls, found that when referring to persons using non-recognitional forms of reference, speakers in these medical calls frequently opted for reference forms that described their relationship to the person being referred to. She also found that using references from the category ‘family’ was a resource for communicating entitlement to be making that call on behalf of the other person since speakers did not treat their calling as accountable when they had described the other person as a close relation compared to those who did not claim such a relationship. Although ‘partner’ is not included in what Kitzinger found to count

8 I demonstrate this point in Chapter 5.
as kin (that is, related by blood or marriage), given the increasing numbers of couples who choose not to or are unable to marry it may be that ‘partner’ does claim some kind of kin-type relationship. Indeed, in this case Nicola treats ‘that’s for my partner’ as sufficient to account for her calling and does not treat it as necessary to provide any further information for why she is calling on behalf of her partner. The HIA responds to this unproblematically with ‘yeah’ (line 17).

The HIA’s question ‘Was it just for purely registration you’re ringing today or is there any emergency dental problems’ (lines 26-28) is oriented to the two possible reasons for visiting a dentist: treatment for a dental problem or a routine check-up when there is no apparent problem (thereby suggesting her assistance in locating a dentist may vary depending on which of these two situations is the case). This question makes relevant one of two responses: either that there are no emergency problems and that it is only registration that is required or there are problems so treatment is required quickly. However, it turns out that both responses are somewhat relevant.

Fragment 6.2 NHS Direct
[Land:OC2]
24 Nic: [.hhhh That’d be brilliant.=] [ Please ]
25 HIA: [See if they’ve got any]
26 availability. [.hhhh Was it just for purely]
27 registration you’re ringing today or is there
28 any emerg[ency] dental prob[lems]=
29 Nic: [.hhh ] [. hhh ]
30 =Well (0.2) it is: (. ) not for me but for
31 my partner. hhh
32 (.)
33 Nic: Whose tooth’s: (0.2) come ou:t:. h
34 HIA: 0[h
35 Nic: [Front tooth
36 HIA: Ri::ght.
37 (0.8)
38 HIA: ('Let me see')
39 Nic: But I need to make a- (0.2)
40 HIA: [mm]
41 Nic: [to] find a dentist as well just fer
42 (. ) routine.
43 (0.8)
The ‘Well’ (line 30) in turn initial position in Nicola’s next turn is oriented to the problem posed by the HIA’s prior question. It transpires that Nicola has no emergency dental problems but her partner does. Nicola explains that her partner has a dental problem (lines 30-31) and she treats it as necessary to outline the nature of the problem: ‘whose tooth’s come out’ (line 33). By producing this information in an increment to her prior turn (lines 30-31), Nicola avoids the use of a pronoun, which would index gender. For example, she could have said ‘Her tooth’s come out’, which may be the more usual formulation.

The HIA reports that there are likely to be difficulties in trying to locate a dental practice in the area that is currently registering patients and is likely to be able to offer an appointment quickly.

Fragment 6.3 NHS Direct
[Land:OC2]
44 HIA: Righ’ Well I’ve put Westnorton in
45 [an’ ] nothing is coming up at a:ll.=
46 Nic: [Mm hm]
47 HIA: =Uh: m that’ s regist’ ring. .hhhh There’ s
48 only o:ne dentist there that says they:
49 offer occasional treatment to non registered
50 patients but that would only be on
51 avai:lability. .hhhh Uhm: (1.0) is ’e in
52 pai:n.
53 Nic: Mcht uhm hhhhh (0.2) .hh (.) she’ s: (.)
54 lost (0.2) th- the front tooth an[d in ]=
55 HIA: [Right.]
56 Nic: quite considerable pai:n.
57 (.)
58 HIA: Righ’ .hhh Uhm: I just know there are
59 eme:rgency dentists: available but they
60 usually deal with people in pain and only
61 do temporary work = I’ m just wondering
62 what they can do:=uhm (0.8) And the
63 tooth’s actually come ou:t.
64 (0.2)
65 Nic: mcht Comple:te:ly.= [ Yeah ]
66 HIA: ["yeah"] Right.
67 (2.0)
68 HIA: Just bea:r with me a moment I’ ll see ’f
69 there are- .hhh (1.0) what's available fer
70 thee uh: Westnorton area.
71 (11.5)
//
((6 lines of HIA considering different
areas that Westnorton could be in omitted))
78 HIA: tcht It's: - I'm just wonderin' (.) what
79 about Frimberly. I know they don't have a
80 problem with dentists. Is that easily
81 accessible "for 'er".
82 Nic: How far is it. hhhh

After indicating the probable difficulty in locating a suitable dental practice and a pause, the HIA asks 'Is he in pain' (line 51-52), which displays the heterosexist presumption. She has access to Nicola's name from the outset of the conversation and 'Nicola' is a name that is usually given to females. Speakers also attribute sex to people based on the sound of their voice so presumably the HIA found the voice consistent with the sex that she had inferred from her name. Therefore, the HIA is likely to have had little difficulty identifying 'Nicola' as female. Nicola does not specify the sex of her partner and there is even some evidence that this is problematic (the gender-neutral 'whose' (line 33) and the immediately prior silence). Despite this, the HIA does not treat it as necessary to seek information about the sex of the partner since as far as she is concerned she already knows nor does she orient to the use of 'whose' as indicative as a problem with specifying the sex of the partner. When she hears 'my partner' she uses the heterosexist presumption as a resource for inferring that the partner must be male. However, this is not the activity that the HIA is preoccupied with, that is, her selection of 'he' as a subsequent reference is not designed to topicalise the sex of Nicola's partner in any way. It is normative practice after using locally initial reference form to introduce a person in talk (such as a person's name or as a member of some category) to use locally subsequent reference form (such as a pronoun). In English this means that when referring to a singular third party it is generally necessary to attribute sex to them since 'he' and 'she' does this (although sometimes people do circumvent this problem by using 'they'). Therefore, what the HIA does is consistent with the normative practice for referring to others in talk and recipient-designed for Nicola.
As mentioned above, the activity that the HIA is engaged in is not asserting the sex of Nicola's partner; rather, the HIA is seeking to ascertain how much of an emergency this dental problem is. So, when she asks 'is he in pain' (lines 51-52) she is simply pursuing the course of action that is her job, that is, finding the most appropriate treatment for someone who has a dental problem. This turn is fitted for someone who has a different-sex partner and for them this assumption would contribute to the smoothness of the interaction since it moves the course of action on. So, in this one short turn we can see one of the ways in which the heterosexist presumption operates to make life easier and more straightforward for those people whose lives are consistent with heterosexual expectations.

As it turns out, Nicola's partner is not male. This presents a problem that Nicola now has to deal with. That is, she has to attend to the assumption that is embedded in the HIA's question and thereby topicalise something that has been implicitly introduced into the talk. At the same time, Nicola's concern (as is the concern of the HIA) is to locate a dentist, and therefore, Nicola is also preoccupied with answering the HIA's question as this is furthering the action of finding the dentist.

The 'mcht uhm' (line 53) at the outset of Nicola's turn is indicative of the problem that she has in answering the HIA's question. The silence of a whole second that follows this 'mcht uhm' is further evidence of the difficulty that Nicola has in designing this turn. She deals with the (incorrect) heterosexist presumption first by replacing 'he' with 'she' (line 53). This is done as an embedded correction since the first speaker uses one term (the HIA's 'he') and the next speaker uses a different term from the same class to refer to the same referent (Nicola's 'she') (Jefferson, 1987). As with all embedded corrections, Nicola performs the correction without suspending the ongoing activity of the business at hand. Although there are hitches in the production of this turn that are likely to be attributable to the correction, there are no elements of the turn that pertain to only correction and therefore the progress of the sequence is not disrupted. The correction does not displace or defer Nicola's response to the HIA's question and therefore this is not repair.
The HIA does not acknowledge the correction, which is common when corrections are embedded (see Jefferson, 1987), but it is clear that she has heard it as a correction since, the next reference to the patient is performed by the HIA and she uses the pronoun ‘her’ (line 81). After the correction there is a micropause (line 53) before she continues by restating, with some hesitancy, that the front tooth has been lost and then finally answering the HIA’s question with ‘and in quite considerable pain’. The HIA, possibly projecting the word after ‘in’ to be ‘pain’, comes in early and in overlap to receipt the information that Nicola’s partner is in pain. It is quite clear from the preceding turns that Nicola has already conveyed details of the situation in such a way that the HIA has understood that her partner’s front tooth has fallen out and that the HIA has made clear to Nicola that she has understood this. However, the HIA’s question is seeking to ascertain how much of an emergency this is and here the insistence on the significance of a missing front tooth (first mentioned at line 35) communicates that this is a cosmetic emergency in addition to her being in pain since could have done the embedded correction and answered the question much more simply with ‘she’s in pain’. The hitches in this turn can be seen as indicative of the dual problems of establishing the urgency of the problem and dealing with the heterosexism displayed in the HIA’s prior turn.

In Fragment 6, then, Nicola comes out as a result of her colliding with the heterosexist presumption displayed by the call-taker. However, Nicola corrects the presumption in an embedded way, which keeps sexuality off the surface of the conversation. Similarly, the HIA incorporates the correction into her subsequent talk which displays that she has understood the correction but without topicalising it.

In Fragments 5 and 6 the speakers collaborate to avoid correcting becoming an interactional activity in its own right. In so doing, the call-takers’ presumption of heterosexuality and the callers’ actual implied sexuality is treated discreetly. Since ‘embedded correction can be a way of doing correction-and-only-correction’ (Jefferson, 1987: 100) it is a method for ‘keeping such issues as incompetence and/or impropriety off the conversational surface’ (ibid.). The interlocutors work together to maintain a situation of ‘nothing unusual is
happening’ (Emerson, 1970). However, that the presumption was made in the first instance displays that same-sex relationships are not usual or normative. This tactic exemplifies what Sacks (1984) refers to as ‘doing being ordinary’: ‘people take on the job of keeping everything utterly mundane; that no matter what happens, pretty much everybody is engaged in finding only how it is that what is going on is usual, with every effort possible’ (p. 419).

In the next fragment (Fragment 7), the call-taker again displays the heterosexist presumption and in response the caller produces an embedded correction. However, in this instance the call-taker does not collaborate in keeping her error off the interactional surface.

(c) Dentist

The conversation from which Fragment 6 is taken results in the HIA producing a list of telephone numbers of dental practices that might be currently registering patients in a town nearby the places in which Nicola and her partner (separately) live. After making unsuccessful calls to practices that turn out not to have any vacancies Nicola telephones ‘Johnson, Oliver and Tilsley’. It is from this conversation that Fragment 7 is extracted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragment 7.1 DENTIST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Land:OC4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Rec:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Tilsley?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Nic:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
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<td>07 Rec:</td>
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<td>10 Nic:</td>
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<td>11 Rec:</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Nic:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Rec:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3: Colliding with heterosexism

Nicola seeks to ascertain whether there are any vacancies at the practice by asking whether she could register as a new patient (lines 4-6). Only when the receptionist states that there are places available and proceeds to begin taking patient details does Nicola tell her the projected new patient is someone other than herself. As in Fragment 6, Nicola introduces the person on whose behalf she is calling as her ‘partner’ (line 13). The receptionist treats this as unproblematic and receipts it simply with ‘right’ (line 14). Neither speaker orients to this as accountable. The conversation is interrupted as the receptionist talks off phone to a patient in the practice (lines 18-20). The receptionist then resumes the talk with Nicola by asking for ‘the name’ (line 20). Nicola treats this as problematic: she first referred to herself and then her partner and now she is being asked for ‘the’ name. Therefore, the repair initiator (line 22) is checking whose name the receptionist is seeking. The receptionist provides the repair solution (line 23) and in so doing displays her understanding that when someone to whom she is talking who is hearably analysably female refers to a ‘partner’ that partner must be male. In the same way that the HIA is following the practice of using locally subsequent reference form in locally subsequent position so too is the receptionist. And, like the HIA, the receptionist is drawing on the
heterosexual presumption as a resource that enables her to select a pronoun to be used in this position.

Nicola's 'oh' (line 24) receipts the repair solution, which shows the version she offered in the repair initiator (line 22) to have been incorrect. The 'uhm' (line 24) is indicative of the problem with the question posed by the receptionist. Nicola then uses 'it's' (line 18) to introduce her partner's name. This form is more fitted to the receptionist's repairable question ('the name') than the subsequent question presented in the repair solution 'What was his name' which would have been consistent with a 'his name is' prefaced response. But, by doing this Nicola also avoids using a pronoun and therefore directly correcting the receptionist's use of 'he' albeit in an embedded form. Rather, Nicola treats giving a first name ('Laura'), which is culturally recognisable as a name given to females as sufficient to do the embedded correction. The 0.5 second silence that opens up after Nicola has provided the name of her partner could be indicative of some problem. However, this is not conclusive since other activities may by competing for the receptionist's attention and we can see there are interruptions to the interaction (lines 16-20 & 30-33) as the receptionist carries out other duties in her job. She treats this second disruption as accountable when she returns to the call (lines 33-37).

Fragment 7.2 DENTIST
[Land:OC4]
30 Rec: Ye- Just hold the line a second.
31 Nic: >Okay< Thank you.
32 (10.5)
33 Rec: Sorry about that.= We've got (.) dentists
34 swapped surgeries 'n' hh one's come
35 downstairs and one's gone upstairs an' the
36 patients don't know whether they're
37 co(h)ming [or go(h)ing.
38 Nic: [Huhuh huh huh
39 (No)(h) prob(h)lem don't [worry about it

9 Although 'Laura' has been used as a pseudonym to preserve anonymity, 'Laura' has been selected since it is clearly recognisable as a name given to females in this culture, which also applies to the actual name used in the audio data.
The receptionist resumes the activity underway by checking the name that Nicola has given her. She displays sufficient grasp of the surname to be able to repeat it for confirmation, which she does first (lines 40-41). This appears to cause no problem. The receptionist then checks the first name with ‘An’ the Christian name’ (line 44), which – unlike the surname – is not designed to show any recollection or grasp of the name Nicola gave earlier in the call. Nicola responds to this unproblematically with ‘It’s Laura’ (line 45). The 0.5 second gap that follows (line 46) this response is indicative of the receptionist finding the prior turn problematic. She makes clear exactly what it is that is problematic in her next turn. That is, she has heard the name given as one belonging to a woman and she has also analysed the sound of her voice she is hearing to be that of a woman. There is further evidence that the receptionist has analysed the voice she
is hearing to be that of a woman since she has no problem reconciling the culturally-known-to-be-female name with the person whose voice she is hearing. This is obviously confusing for the receptionist: she understands that the person with whom she is speaking is female, and that she is making an appointment for her partner but the name that she has given is a female’s name. But, rather than consider the possibility that the woman that she is speaking to is in a same-sex relationship the receptionist tries to solve the puzzle by supposing that the woman has given her own details and not her partner’s – even though she has already shown herself to have understood that Nicola is registering her partner (line 23). The possibility that Nicola has a same-sex partner is apparently unavailable to the receptionist. This is displayed in her turn here ‘is it for him or for you?’ (line 47). This gives Nicola two responses to choose from and neither of them is correct. Instead, she opts for ‘it’s for her’ (line 48) which is an embedded correction of the heterosexist presumption. This correction appears more exposed than the embedded corrections in the previous two fragments (Fragments 5 & 6) because there is emphasis on the ‘her’ and this embedded correction occurs within a repair sequence. However, the turn (‘it’s for her’) provides the next sequentially relevant action (i.e., the solution to the receptionist’s prior question) and there is no part of the turn that is occupied with correcting only the heterosexist presumption so that this is an embedded correction.

The receptionist receiptsthe correction (‘Oh for her, line 50). As she produces the repetition of the female pronoun that Nicola has just given, she cuts off to display that she understands the implication of Nicola’s embedded correction, that is, it is for her same-sex partner. This understanding is displayed by the receptionist’s second prosodically marked ‘oh’ and her subsequent apology (line 50). Her apology takes responsibility for her own prior understanding problem, thereby acknowledging that it was her ordinary cultural assumptions (that is, the heterosexist presumption) that led to her understanding problems in the first place. Laughter frequently occurs in environments that are embarrassing (Billig, 2001; Glenn, 2003; Goffman, 1967). The laughter tokens that are produced in the receptionist’s apology serve to indicate her embarrassment and the awkwardness of the situation. Nicola receiptsthe apology with an acceptance
The receptionist’s laughter tokens develop into a full laugh (line 53) with which Nicola declines to reciprocate before the receptionist resumes the course of action with a check on Nicola’s partner’s first name (line 53).

Unlike the embedded corrections in the prior two fragments, in this instance the recipient does not collaborate in keeping the error off the conversational surface. Although speakers often receipt the correction in the form in which it was done, this is not always the case (Jefferson, 1987). In this instance the recipient moves the correction into exposed form rather than colluding in the embedded form that Nicola initiated. Since embedded corrections allow for correction without drawing attention to any failings on the part of the speaker who produced the correctable matter, the receptionist’s exposed acceptance treats the error (i.e., the heterosexist presumption) as sufficiently serious to warrant explicit recognition. Therefore, by doing an exposed receipt with an apology, the receptionist treats herself as accountable for the error.

The receptionist’s apology for and embarrassment about the errors displays her treatment of herself as at fault for pursuing her heterosexist line of questioning. This shows that the receptionist is aware that there are couples that comprise two people of the same sex so had she been asked what constitutes a ‘couple’ it is likely that she would have included two women as one of her answers. However, here we can see that this is not the frame of reference that she employs to understand ‘partner’ in her everyday interactions. The receptionist does not respond overtly negatively to Nicola’s coming out (e.g., she does not say ‘that’s disgusting’ or something similar). Rather, she recognises the interactional difficulties that result from the misunderstanding as a result of her own heterosexist assumptions (we can see this from her apology, line 41). This is an example of mundane heterosexism in action.
Mundane heterosexism in action

In these data fragments (1-7), there is evidence of the heterosexist presumption. In these extracts of 'real life' we can see how heterosexism is manifest in the everyday interactions of people going about their lives. When these speakers collide with the heterosexist presumption, an error is produced in the interaction. Correcting that error usually means coming out is made relevant.

Sexuality does not become relevant in these fragments as an issue per se, rather it becomes relevant because of presumptions pertaining to how people organise their lives. When speakers use a gender-neutral term to refer to the person with whom they share a 'couple' relationship (such as 'partner' or 'spouse') then it is presumed that this person is different-sex to the speaker (e.g., Fragments 2, 4, 6, & 7). However, even when speakers do not index their membership in a couple, recipients may orient to a possible partner, for example, Eve's question 'aren't you married', lines 6-7 in Fragment 1 and the RCR's displayed orientation to a possible husband with his choice of courtesy title, Fragment 3).

For speakers who choose to correct the presumption and therefore come out, the most common method deployed to achieve this is an embedded correction (Fragments 5, 6, & 7). Performing an embedded correction does not make relevant a response to the correction by the recipient (although recipients may provide one, see Fragment 7) and therefore prevents the business of correcting from becoming an interactional activity in its own right, thereby disrupting the primary action of the sequence. Fragment 4 is the only exception to this and, in this instance, Janice displayed her orientation to managing this to minimise interactional disruption, but disruption occurred nonetheless.

Similarly, Kitzinger (2000) found that the instances of coming out in her data were embedded within complex turn structures and done in the course of other activities such as providing examples for the teaching underway. These coming outs then impart new information but do not do the activity of news announcing. She suggests that this may, in part, be due to speakers being sensitive to
criticisms that lesbian and gay people when referring to their sexuality are 'flaunting it'. The idea that gay people flaunt their sexuality is widespread among heterosexuals: in one study more than a third of respondents spontaneously volunteered some concern about 'flaunting' (Howard-Hassmann, 2001). She also suggested that this coming out as a by product of some other activity may be a way of making sexuality known without reifying that there is a need to come out. Therefore, this technique for coming out can be seen as resistance to the notion that it is acceptable to assume everyone is heterosexual until told otherwise.

Another reason for these coming outs to be done without them being topicalised is to avoid disruption to the ongoing activity. These fragments were all recorded in institutional contexts where there was some specific business at the centre of the interaction: obtaining a quotation for car insurance (Fragment 5); locating a dental practice (Fragments 6); and making a dental appointment (Fragments 7). Therefore, doing other activities, such as coming out (as an activity in its own right), would result in hindering the primary focus of the interaction.

However, despite these attempts to avoid topicalising sexuality in these instances we can trace subsequent disruption to the progressivity of the talk to these turns in which speaker make available their lesbianism to their recipients. Most strikingly this occurs in Fragment 7 where sexuality does become topicalised. The correction has been initiated in embedded form, yet the recipient exposed the correction with an explicit acknowledgement and apology. We can see that 'Laura' (line 53) is the confirmation – or post-expansion first pair part – that is fitted to 'It's Laura' (line 45), so the whole of the intervening talk – the insert sequence – is concerned with dealing with the problem caused by Nicola's partner not being a man and therefore not consonant with the receptionist's assumptions. If Nicola's partner had been a man then this disruption would not have occurred.
'Voluntary’ coming out

(a) Cancelled bankcard

There is only one instance in this corpus in which a speaker makes apparent that she is part of a same-sex couple without there being a clearly displayed prior presumption of heterosexuality. Fragment 8 is taken from a conversation between Sylvia (Janice’s wife, see Fragments 2, 4, & 5) and two bank personnel to try to resolve the problem of a cancelled bankcard. This conversation took place in Canada, where Janice is currently living. Sylvia is resident in the UK but they have a joint bank account in Canada. Sylvia’s bankcard has been refused therefore she is calling the bank to find out what has happened and to resolve the problem.

Fragment 8.1 BANKCARD

[Land: SC1]

01 CT1: Welcome to ABC Card Services. David speaking.
02 How can I help you.
03 Syl: Oh hello:. I’ve just had my: Visa card refused’n
04 I wonder if you could look in to why that is:
05 please.

// ((CT1 takes Sylvia’s card number))

13 CT1: Okay- Your name.
14 Syl: Sylvia Ann\textsuperscript{10} Lettinger.
15 (11.0) ((sounds of computer keys being punched)

// ((CT2 requests further details about the account))

24 CT1: Okay and your home phone number Missus Lettinger.
25 Syl: It’s six oh four (. ) seven five three: (.)
26 seven eight two fi:ve.=
27 CT1: Okay >just one moment I’ll get a line to s’mb’dy
28 who can help you it won’t be long.

\textsuperscript{10} Similar to the selection of ‘Laura’ in Fragment 7, ‘Sylvia’ and ‘Ann’ have been chosen as pseudonyms as they (like the actual names used) are easily recognisable as names given to female in this culture.
Chapter 3: Colliding with heterosexism

29 Syl: Thank you.
30 (57.00)
31 CT1: Yes Missus Lettinger;
32 Syl: Hello[: ]
33 CT1: [Th]ank you for your patience I'm referring you to Helena who'll be able to assist you.
34 Syl: Okay thanks.
35 (0.8)
36

The call is received by an initial call-taker (CT1) who takes some preliminary details. When Sylvia is asked for her name (line 13) she gives her full name but no title (line 14). Yet, on the two subsequent occasions that CT1 addresses Sylvia by name he inserts the title ‘Mrs’ (lines 24 and 31). Sylvia and Janice were not married at the time they opened the account and, besides, Sylvia does not use the title ‘Mrs’ or ‘Miss’ so CT1 could not have selected ‘Mrs’ on the basis of what was on file. Unlike Fragment 3, which was recorded in the UK where ‘Mrs’ is the preserve of women who are married to men, there is less of a case for treating this choice of title as evidence for heterosexism in Canada (where same-sex marriage is legal11). However, as we shall see later in this interaction, there is evidence in this call that same-sex marriage is not treated as routinely as different-sex marriage. After this brief exchange, CT1 redirects Sylvia to a second call-taker (CT2), who is able to deal with her problem.

Fragment 8.2 BANKCARD
[Land: SC1]
37 CT2: Hello M'am;
38 Syl: Hello:.  
39 CT2: Hi how are you.
40 Syl: Fine thank you.
41 CT2: Perfect. I'm gonna need to need to ask you a few questions to identify you oka:y;
42 Syl: Oka:y.
43 CT2: May I have your address on file please.
44 Syl: Yeahp it's two: five five nine seven .hhh
45 West eleventh avenue: Toronto oh en: one three

11 Same-sex marriage was very newly legal at the time that this call was recorded (equal access to marriage was granted to same-sex couples first in Ontario in 2003, and then through most of the remaining provinces, then finally ratified at federal level in 2005).
are one tee three,
(0.2)
CT2: And your date of birth?
Syl: I: s uhm thee eighteenth: of November nineteen fifty: nine.
CT2: Miss Lettinger is this a joint or single account.
Syl: [I ]t’s a joint account with my wife.
(0.2) ((computer noises))
CT2: And are you the primary or co-applicant.
Syl: I’m the co-applicant.
(0.2)
Syl: Her name is Janice Stevenson.
(0.8)
CT2: May I have her date of birth please.
Syl: Sh: e’s eleventh of July: nineteen fifty eight.
(0.2)

CT2 tells Sylvia that she is going to need to ask her some questions for identification purposes (lines 41-42) which shows that she (CT2) already has access to the answers. So, when CT2 asks, ‘Mrs Lettinger is this a joint or single account’ (line 52) this is a known answer question. This question makes relevant one of two responses, either that it is a joint account or that it is a single account. Sylvia replies with ‘it’s a joint account with my wife’ (line 54) which provides the relevant next action and makes apparent Sylvia’s sexuality. Similar to Fragments 4, 5, 6, and 7, Sylvia does not make any explicit declarations about her sexuality. Rather, she refers to her spouse with the term ‘wife’ and allows the recipient to infer her lesbianism from this. We can see that, even before Sylvia has spoken, CT2 already has a conception of her (Sylvia’s) gender as is illustrated by her use of ‘Ma’am’ (line 37). Sylvia does not challenge this and therefore CT2’s understanding of Sylvia as female is supported. Sylvia gives further evidence that she is female when she gives her first and middle names (‘Sylvia’ and ‘Ann’, line 14), both of which are recognisable as names given to females in this culture. At line 52 CT2 uses ‘Miss’ which indexes gender. So, when Sylvia uses ‘wife’ she makes clear she is referring to a female spouse. Unlike ‘partner’ (which was used in Fragments 6 and 7) ‘wife’ already indexes gender so it is sufficient to convey that she is talking about a same-sex
relationship (given that CT2 has already displayed her understanding that Sylvia is female).

Sylvia could have answered CT2’s question (line 52) without lying and without coming out by simply saying, ‘it’s a joint account’ so it was not necessary to come out, yet the question offers the opportunity to come out. Unlike the instances of coming out in Fragments 4-7, in Fragment 8 there had been no clear error stemming from the heterosexist presumption. Sylvia’s coming out in this interactional space also performs an embedded correction on ‘Miss’ used by CT2 in her prior turn (line 52) since ‘Miss’ presumes unmarried status. As we shall see, CT2’s subsequent problem with selecting a title provides evidence that she understands Sylvia’s reference to her ‘wife’ as an embedded correction.

Unlike Fragments 4 and 7 (and to some extent Fragment 6), the coming out did not impact on the immediate sequential environment (i.e. the next turn). Although there is a 0.2 second gap that immediately follows the turn in which Sylvia comes out this is not clearly attributable to that action since CT2 is likely to be engaged in other duties beyond the interaction, such as inputting Sylvia’s responses into the computer. There is evidence for this in the computer noises that are audible immediately after the turn and the regularity of these gaps after turns in which Sylvia has provided answers to CT2’s questions (see lines 48, 58, 60 & 64 for example). So, in this instance, the coming out appears not to have ‘ruffled’ the interaction in the same way that coming out did in Fragments 4 and 7 (possibly in part due to the fact coming out occurred simultaneously with error correction in these latter fragments, but that is not the case here).

Fragment 8.3 BANKCARD

[Land: SC1]

70 CT2: And you: (. ) pay an annual fee to have this
71         credit card with the Golden Bank Mis:::-
72 Syl: U:::..h I’m not sure whether it’s annual or
73     whether it’s: (. ) it’s more regular than that.
74     (5.0)
75 CT2: Okay.
However, there is some evidence that Sylvia's coming out does impact on the subsequent interaction. At line 71, CT2 addresses Sylvia again, she begins 'Mis' but then stretches the sound and cuts off. The root of the problem could, of course, be because Sylvia does not use 'Miss' or 'Mrs' so it would not have been specified in the information that CT2 has access to. But, we can see that prior to Sylvia's coming out CT2 has not found this problematic since she had addressed Sylvia as 'Miss' (line 52). CT2 cuts off on the word 'Mis' just before it is possible to discern whether it was going to be 'Miss' or 'Mrs' and therefore indicates that this choice is the problem. There is a further instance in this conversation where CT2 displays some problem with title selection. As the conversation is approaching closing CT2 apologises ('I apologise for the inconvenience Miss-s: Lettinger', lines 118-119). This ambiguous production avoids having to explicitly make a choice between 'Miss' and 'Mrs'.

Sylvia makes no attempt to repair either title used by the call-takers (before or after she comes out). Yet, for CT2 the title does become problematic after Sylvia comes out. On the two occasions that CT2 used the title after Sylvia came out there was disfluency in her talk. We can only speculate about this being a problem that is specific to a same-sex marriage since we cannot know what would have happened if Sylvia had referred to her opposite sex spouse. However, this problematic use of title post-coming out does provide some tentative evidence that lesbian marriage is not responded to as straightforwardly as heterosexual marriage (even in Canada).
Chapter 3: Colliding with heterosexism

Fragment 8.4 BANKCARD

[Land: SC1]

100 CT2: (Any automatic charges that come off the
101 account every month advise the companies that
102 the card is cancelled and a new card is on the
103 way.
104 Syl: Okay—And will that be a new card for both of
105 us. =
106 CT2: No. You both have bo—You both have a different
107 card number, hhh y—th’ee: your wife was not
108 affected by it?
109 CT2: Right,

After CT2 has told Sylvia that her card has been cancelled and a replacement has been sent to her Sylvia issues the first pair part, ‘And will that be a new card for both of us?’ (lines 104-105). CT2 gives the dispreferred SPP, ‘No’ (line 106), and accounts for this, that is, they both have different card numbers (lines 106-107). She then continues with ‘y—th’ee your wife was not affected by it’ (lines 107-108). The cut off on ‘y—’ suggests that CT2 was heading for something like the version that she does produce in the end, yet this cut off signals some problem with it. Instead, CT2 begins again with ‘th’ee’ (line 107). It is likely that this would have been headed for ‘th’ee other cardholder’ or something similar. Yet again there is a repair initiation, but with a sound stretch this time, and the utterance is abandoned. Apparently CT2 returns to the version that she was about to produce with the ‘y’ that she cuts off (line 107). These repairs are indicative of CT2 having problems with a choice of reference for Sylvia’s wife/the other cardholder. Even though both descriptions are true, they are not equivalent. Of course, the choice of person reference that is most salient is different for each of the participants. CT2 is likely to be aware that Sylvia is much more likely to see Janice as her wife before Janice as the person she shares an account with. There is evidence for this in Sylvia’s turn where she identifies that ‘it’s a joint account with my wife’ (line 54). For CT2, whose relationship with both Janice and Sylvia is as customers of the bank for which she works, it is Janice as the other account holder for a shared account that is most salient (for example, CT2 refers to ‘the primary or co-applicant’, line 56). This problem of reference, as displayed in CT2’s turn containing multiple repairs, could then be a
result of the difference of perspective that each of the interlocutors has. CT2 begins by referring to Janice from Sylvia’s point of view, then repaired it by changing it to her own perspective, and then changed it back to Sylvia’s perspective. These repairs indicate some problem with selecting a person reference term. This is only one instance so it is not possible to say anything definitive about this as an example of a problem arising due to reference to a same-sex spouse. However, we can speculate, when coupled with the difficulty CT2 has in selecting a title that reflects marital status, that she finds it somewhat problematic to understand how to talk about a same-sex spouse. Further, there is evidence from other sources that this problem of reference is not evident in calls where people are talking about their opposite-sex spouses (see Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b).

How is coming out done?

The speakers in these fragments who came out did so by reference to same-sex partners using person reference terms that invoke a ‘couple’ relationship. In doing this, the speakers are not making statements about their sexuality per se but rather invoking relationships using terms that denote sexual partnerships (i.e. ‘partner’, ‘spouse’ and ‘wife’). This, then, makes available the resources necessary for interlocutors to infer speakers’ sexualities. In doing this, the speakers assume that recipients are able to discern their gender either just from the sound of her voice (Fragment 7) or from a name in addition to voice sound (Fragments 2/5, 4, 6 & 8). Because ‘wife’ indexes gender this is sufficient to do coming out (see Fragment 8). However, using ‘partner’ or ‘spouse’ alone is insufficient to do coming out (since they are gender-neutral), rather, this requires additional work to convey a same-sex relationship (e.g., pronoun use or ‘female’ name).12

12 Although the speakers in these fragments are indexing female same-sex relationships there is no reason to suggest that these findings would not apply equally to the invocation of male same-sex relationships.
Why invoke ‘couple’ relationships?

In each of the fragments in which speakers refer to a partner/spouse (Fragments 2 & 4-8), the speaker is making the institutional call on the behalf of someone else (Fragments 6 & 7) or the situation makes relevant reference to someone else (Fragment 2, 4, 5, & 8). And, in each case, it is the caller (the one whose coming out is subsequently relevant) who introduces the other person into the conversation and to do this they have to use a person reference term. Research has shown that, when referring to third parties, if possible, people choose to use a recognitional reference, and the most common of these is a person’s name (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 1996). However, when a speaker is referring to a person who they presume is not known to the recipient then they use a non-recognitional reference, which often involves producing that person as a member of a category. In the fragments presented above speakers used ‘spouse’ (Fragments 2/5 & 4), ‘partner’ (Fragments 6 & 7) and ‘wife’ (Fragment 8) to do person reference. However, simply the accuracy of these terms is not sufficient to justify their use, since they could also be described by any number of different but equally accurate terms (Schegloff, 1997). In these interactional contexts other person reference terms that may have been used include: ‘the other person to be insured’ or ‘the second driver’ (Fragments 2/5 & 4); ‘the patient’ (Fragments 6 & 7); and ‘the other account holder’ (Fragment 8). Additionally, any of these speakers could have selected a prototypical simple non-recognitional (see Schegloff, 1996) such as ‘someone else’.

The mobilisation of the heterosexist presumption occurred after speakers had introduced the third person with a term that invoked their (the speaker and the third person’s) co-membership in the same ‘couple’ and this produced the relevancy of coming out (which as we have seen may be disruptive to the pragmatic goals of the interaction). Presumably, then, this could have been avoided by the use of an alternative person reference form such as those suggested above. Given the potential for interactional difficulties that accompany coming out in these institutional contexts, it is reasonable to consider
why speakers chose to invoke their couple relationship in their selection of person reference term, given the array of alternatives available.

Research shows that when speakers refer to third persons with a non-recognitional they frequently do so by stating their relationship to them (Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b; Rendle-Short, 2005), as the following fragments show:

**Fragment 9 BROTHER**
[LC:EMS:2]
01 CT: Nine one one what is yur emergency?
02 (0.3)
03 C: → It's my brother he had a bomb an' it blew up
04 in=hand=hh hh hh
05 CT: Wh[at's] the addre:ss?

**Fragment 10 WIFE**
[WC:EMS:1:JW]
01 CT: Nine one one what is yur emerg- ((cut off by transmit static))
02 (0.2)
03 C: → GO::D MY WIFE JUST SHOT HERSELF (0.3) TWENTY
05 TWO SIXTY EIGHT (GRANT) AVENUE HURRY U:::;F

In Fragment 9, the caller uses the person reference ‘my brother’ (line 3) and in so doing invokes their fraternal relationship. And, in Fragment 10, the caller uses the person reference ‘my wife’ (line 4) and in so doing he invokes their marital relationship (in addition to making apparent a hearing of him as heterosexual). So, the way in which Janice refers to Sylvia (Fragments 2/5 & 4), Nicola refers to Laura (Fragments 6 & 7) and Sylvia refers to Janice (in Fragment 8) can be considered congruent with one of the normative ways of doing non-recognitional person reference.

Moreover, stating a close relationship seems to give the caller some kind of privilege in relation to the third person. For example, Kitzinger (2005a) found that naming the third person as a spouse or close blood relative provides a warrant for calling on their behalf. So, in Fragments 6 and 7, the caller is calling on behalf of her partner and she does indeed treat her doing this on her partner’s
Chapter 3: Colliding with heterosexism

behalf as something that is not accountable. We can see in Fragment 6 that the HIA treats looking for two dentists as something out of the ordinary. When Nicola informs her that one is for her partner then the HIA does not display any problem with her (Nicola) doing this on behalf of her partner. Of course, it may be that it would have been satisfactory just to say that she is doing it on behalf of 'someone else'. However, Kitzinger (2005a) found that speakers often offered additional accountings when calling on behalf of someone that was not a spouse or close relation. This is illustrated in Fragment 11. Rebecca is organising her cousin’s (Lorraine) finances while Lorraine is on holiday. Rebecca refers to her relationship with the person on whose behalf she is calling (lines 3-4) and then, in her next turn, she treats making the call on her cousin’s behalf as accountable (lines 7-8).

Fragment 11 LORRAINE’S COUSIN
[Land:SW25]
01 Tom: Hello.
02 Reb: Hello=Is that Tom Deeley?
03 Tom: Speaking.
04 Reb: Hello yeah. = I’m phonin- It’s uhm Lorraine Woodward’s cousin here.
05 Tom: Yeah.
06 Reb: [.hh ] I’m dealing with all her finances and everything while she’s away. = Uhm she said a cheque was due to come. .hhh uhm but it hasn’t arri:ved?

In Fragments 6 and 7 neither callers nor call-takers orient to calling on behalf of a partner as accountable, which suggests that naming the relationship is a sufficient warrant to be making the call. In addition, Kitzinger (2005a) also found that describing the third party as a close relation encouraged the doctors in the calls she was studying to treat the caller as someone who had access to information about the person who is being called about and this aided the progressivity of the action underway (organising medical treatment) and thereby contributed to the smooth running of the interaction.

The call-takers in these interactions treat the callers as being able to answer questions about their spouses/partners. In Fragment 8, the call-taker presumes
Sylvia will know her wife’s date of birth (line 61) and in Fragment 5 the call-taker unproblematically asks Janice a series of questions about her spouse. In Fragment 6, it is apparent that the HIA treats Nicola as someone who is able to answer questions about how degree of pain her partner is suffering (lines 51-52). In Fragment 7, the receptionist asks for Nicola’s partner’s details in such a way as to show her assumption that Nicola is qualified to answer the questions. Although a ‘partner’ is different from a spouse or close blood relation, it does make some claim to a spouse-type relationship. Nicola, then, in referring to Laura as her partner may be seen as attempting to claim some of these privileges (i.e., not having to provide an account for calling, being treated as an appropriate caller, being treated as someone who is knowledgeable about the person on whose behalf she is calling).

There also may be obvious tangible benefits to invoking a ‘couple’ relationship. For instance, some insurance companies offer discounts for (married) couples that are not available to any pair of people. Therefore, Janice’s invocation of her spousal relationship with the other person to be insured may be oriented to precisely this possibility (Fragments 2/5 & 4).

In addition to these privileges, using the resources that are routinely deployed by people with heterosexual living arrangements may be seen both as an attempt not to flaunt it and as a challenge to heterosexism since it puts the onus on the recipient not to make a heterosexist presumption.

Consequences of mundane heterosexism

The heterosexist presumption provides a framework for recipients to interpret and understand speakers’ use of gender-neutral partnership person reference terms. This framework allows call-takers to infer from a reference to a partner/spouse by a speaker who is analysably female that the person indexed is male. This means that a recipient of a turn in which a (female) speaker refers to her partner/spouse is able to uses the male pronoun ‘he’ for subsequent reference.
(i.e., as a normative locally subsequent reference form). It is reasonable to infer from this that this practice would be equally applicable if an analysable male speaker referred to a partner/spouse (i.e., subsequent reference would be recipient-designed as 'she'). If there is no subsequent reference to the partner/spouse in the turn in which the initial person reference term was deployed, recipients may use the heterosexist presumption to select a recipient-designed gendered partnership term at the next point of reference (e.g., the call-taker's use of 'husband' in Fragment 4).

If it turns out that the speaker is referring to a different-sex partner then the heterosexist presumption contributes to the smoothness of the interaction. If, as it turns out is the case in Fragments 2/5, 4, 6 and 7, the speaker is referring to a same-sex partner then this presumption hinders the progressivity of the activity underway in the interaction. In this way, then, we can see the presumption invoked by the call-takers in Fragments 2/5, 4, 6, and 7 as examples of heterosexism in action and how this benefits people who are living in heterosexual social units while hindering those of us who are not.

**What makes these instances of 'coming out'?**

Speakers regularly refer to their different-sex partners/spouses in everyday ordinary and institutional talk (Kitzinger, 2005b) and when they do so it is not 'coming out'. In the previous chapter (Chapter 2), speakers oriented to the coming out dilemma as significant, yet in this chapter it is not clear that this is the case. I have labelled the turn in which speakers make apparent their membership in a same-sex couple as ‘coming out’ yet it may seem that this is not the speakers’ displayed interpretations. Indeed, in some fragments (e.g., Fragment 5 & 6) speakers work to prevent any particular inference that a distinct activity is occurring. It is appropriate to ask then, how it is that when heterosexuals refer to their partners/spouses, it does not seem that ‘coming out’ is being done. I suggest that speakers are ‘coming out’ in referring to their same-sex partners/spouses.
We know from other research (e.g., Chirrey, 2003) that this kind of routine making-apparent of counter-(hetero)normative sexuality is experienced as coming out. However, there is also evidence in the data that this is the case. Similar to the way in which speakers make available a hearing of themselves as heterosexual in the course of other entirely unrelated actions, so too do the speakers in these fragments (2/5, 4, 6, 7, & 8). Yet we have seen that there is a difference. In the data presented in this chapter, I have shown that making apparent that the partner/spouse that has been invoked is a same-sex partner/spouse is dissonant with the heterosexist presumption. By correcting the heterosexist presumption, speakers bring to the surface of the talk the previous unacknowledged and unarticulated belief and, in so doing, it makes visible what is invisible in the conversations in which heterosexuals do it. Therefore, this is a different phenomenon to that produced by speakers who invoke their different-sex partner/spouse which makes available a hearing of them as heterosexual (even though they are ostensibly similar practices).

In talk where the heterosexist presumption is not so clearly manifest (e.g., Fragment 8) we can see there is evidence in the subsequent talk that coming out has changed the way in which the call-taker uses titles – something she did not have difficulty with prior to Sylvia making available her lesbianism – which suggests that the same phenomenon has occurred.

If a speaker issues a turn that has the format of an invitation (as we know from elsewhere the normative ways in which invitations are structured, Drew, 1984) but the recipient does not orient to it as an invitation, rather they treat it as some other action (such as offering or suggesting), then we can still point to the ‘invitation’ as such and examine how it is managed as a different action (e.g., analyse the interactional contingencies for such a production). Similarly, here we can examine instances of ‘coming out’ and consider how they are managed as ‘nothing unusual is happening’ (Emerson, 1970).
Conclusion display an

In this chapter, I have shown actual instances of coming out (or not coming, as it occurs spontaneously in the routine activities of life. In so doing, I have demonstrated that and how coming out is a recurrent activity. Coming out to strangers in institutional settings in interaction unrelated to issues of sexuality is made relevant due to the manifestation of the heterosexist presumption. Everyone is presumed to be heterosexual and participants display their understanding that social life is organised around heterosexual units.

Contrary to the research that suggests understandings of sexuality categories have become more fluid and recognition of diversity of relationships and families has become more widespread, these data demonstrate that this is not the mundane framework participants use to inform their understandings in everyday interactions. In this talk speakers do not label their sexual category membership. Rather, the invocation of their membership in a same-sex couple implies counter-(hetero)normativity, which makes available a hearing of them as lesbian, regardless of actual sexuality (e.g., they may actually be bisexual or they may identify as ‘heterosexual’ despite having a same-sex relationship).

I have shown that when speakers opt to come out – by correcting the heterosexist presumption or otherwise – this may be disruptive to the interaction and therefore derail the ongoing primary activity of the interaction. Speakers are oriented to this possibility through their design of the talk to minimise topicalising coming out. Coming out is often the result of correcting the heterosexist presumption of the recipient and, since correcting is a dispreferred activity (Jefferson, 1987; Schegloff et al, 1977), difficulties in the interaction are often compounded. Speakers minimise topicalisation of the correction and therefore the coming out either through an exposed correction that is embedded within a turn that is also engaged with another action (e.g., Fragment 4) or by performing an embedded correction thereby avoiding correcting becoming an interactional activity in its own right (e.g., Fragments 2/5, 6, & 7). Despite these practices, recipients may elect to topicalise the coming out (e.g., Fragments 4 & 7) causing further
disruption to the progressivity of the talk. In any case, speakers display an orientation to their lesbianism as requiring managing in these calls.

In this talk we can see heterosexist culture being oriented to and reproduced such as the organisation of individuals into (hetero)normative couples. For people whose lives are not organised in accordance with these normative arrangements, using the resources that people in different-sex relationships take for granted can jeopardise the progressivity and smoothness of interactions. And, since invocation of couple relationships may confer interactional and/or tangible privileges, opting not to do this – to avoid potential disruption – may result in disadvantage.

The decision to come out when relevant means assessing the costs and benefits. If people choose not to take the risks associated with coming out then they may feel guilt for colluding with (and thus perpetuating) heterosexist oppression. It may mean lying or omitting details. It may also mean that privileges and benefits that are afforded to heterosexual couples are denied and this may hinder the interaction or have some tangible disadvantage above and beyond the interaction. To navigate the social world as those who have the resources to produce themselves as heterosexual do means, for lesbian and gay people, that there are obstacles that are frequently encountered.

In this chapter I have analysed how speakers make apparent hearings of themselves as lesbian in such a way as to ‘come out’. In the next chapter, I will explore the ways in which non-heterosexuality is made apparent in ordinary talk-in-interaction without these episodes being instances of ‘coming out’.
Chapter 4

Indexing Sexuality Beyond Coming Out

Introduction

In the previous chapter I showed that and how sexuality is made relevant in institutional talk with strangers in business that is completely unrelated to sexuality. I argued that society is set up for heterosexual units such that lesbians (and by implication, anyone else who organises their life in a counter-(hetero)normative manner) going about the business of their lives collide with heterosexist presumptions, which render their sexuality relevant. I argued that what is relevant is not how people define themselves (i.e., whether they label themselves lesbian, gay, or any other sexuality category), but rather how they organise their lives. I showed how, in making their sexuality apparent, speakers engaged in coming out in their everyday interactions. In this chapter, I explore how people index their sexuality without coming out.

The literature that most explicitly engages with how people make apparent their sexuality is that which focuses on coming out and outing (see previous two chapters). That is, how speakers make available their own (and others’) non-heterosexuality to recipients who (tacitly) believe or presume that the speaker (or the person spoken about) is heterosexual. As the preceding two chapters demonstrate empirically, LGBT people do not come out just once, but rather, the ‘deadly elasticity of heterosexist presumption’ (Sedgwick, 1993: 46) means that coming out is a recurrent practice in the lives of LGBT people.

Beyond coming out

But what happens after LGBT people have come out? As I showed in the previous chapter, coming out unsettles the heterosexist presumption such that subsequent references that index the same-sex partnerships are doing the action
of coming out again. Therefore, not all instances in which LGBT people make apparent their sexuality are instances of coming out (or ‘outing’ with reference to third persons). In situations in which LGBT people are interacting with others who already know or expect them not to be heterosexual then making apparent an LGBT identity is not coming out.

Kitzinger (2005b) points to the way in which speakers make available a hearing of themselves and others as heterosexual without this being an action in its own right. Rather, their heterosexuality is the unnoticed backdrop to other activities in talk. The taken-for-granted nature of heterosexuality is a resource that allows speakers to invoke their own (and others’) heterosexuality in the course or service of another – often unrelated – interactional project without causing disruption or derailment of the primary business and through this heteronormativity is reconstituted. What is central here is that this is not ‘coming out’ because it is consistent with the prevailing belief (i.e., the heterosexist presumption)\(^1\).

Therefore, we might expect that once the heterosexist presumption has been unsettled (i.e., post-coming out), indexing counter-(hetero)normative sexuality would be no different to the practices Kitzinger (2005b) identified. However, research suggests that this is not the case, either for lesbian and gay people or for their heterosexual interlocutors. For example, previous literature highlighted the difficulties heterosexuals have interacting with lesbian and gay family members and friends who make references to their same-sex partners even when they already know that they are lesbian or gay (e.g., Fairchild & Hayward, 1979). But, more recently lesbian and gay sexuality has become subject to increasing ‘normalisation’ and ‘routinisation’ (Seidman et al., 1999) and therefore it may be suggested that this is no longer the case (at least not to the same extent).

However, the stream of publications providing advice to parents and other family members of LGBT people on how to cope with their relative’s sexuality

\(^1\) Heterosexuals can ‘come out’ as such only when they are in an environment in which non-heterosexuality is normative.
continues to flow (Bernstein, 2003; Griffin et al., 1997; Jennings & Shapiro, 2003; McDougall, 1998), which would seem to suggest that this is a still-present issue for lesbian and gay people. Additionally, research continues to show that many lesbian, gay, and bisexual people experience difficulties due to less-than-supportive or even homophobic family members (Hart & Heimberg, 2001). The level of support received from families of origin has a significant effect on the lives of lesbian and gay people (Rostosky et al., 2004).

On the other side of the coin, the research suggests, lesbian and gay people also experience difficulties indexing their sexuality as a matter of routine (i.e., just as heterosexuals do). Even though they are ‘out’ to the people they are interacting with, lesbians and gay men may ‘nonetheless take great pains to keep their homosexuality from looming large’ (Troiden, 1988: 275). This is known as ‘covering’. Individuals with any feature that may be viewed as ‘discreditable’ may make attempts to minimise the obtrusiveness of that characteristic even though their interactants know about this feature. In interaction, speakers with such a characteristic may seek to ‘reduce tension’ (Goffman, 1963: 125) by making it easier for ‘others to withdraw attention from the stigma’ (ibid.). Research suggests that, for lesbian and gay people, there are four types of covering that are routinely employed: monitoring appearance so as not to look obviously lesbian or gay; affiliation with the mainstream by not making reference to lesbian and gay culture; avoiding being seen as an activist or as militant about lesbian and gay rights; and avoiding references to same-sex partners and public displays of affection with members of the same-sex (Yoshino, 2006).

Overview of the chapter

Both the research that suggests the increasing integration of lesbian and gay sexuality into the mainstream (e.g. Seidman et al., 1999) and the research that claims a lack of support from heterosexual family members and friends is a continuing problem for lesbian and gay people (e.g., Hart & Heimberg, 2001;
Rostosky et al., 2004) are based self-report data. Lesbian and gay people inform researchers about the support (or lack of support) they receive. In this chapter I show empirically how references to sexuality are deployed and managed in everyday interactions and therefore how supportive and challenging environments are constituted. Additionally, part of what shows the integration of counter normative sexuality is the way in which participants can deploy references to it without it being necessarily oriented to as related to sexuality, therefore, such instances make be likely to go unreported.

In the first part of this chapter, I will examine empirically that and how speakers makes apparent their own (and others') non-heterosexuality in the course of interactions in which the heterosexist presumption does not prevail. Just as Kitzinger (2005b) found that making available a hearing of speakers or people spoken about as heterosexual is ‘not usually oriented to as such by speakers or recipients’ but which illuminates ‘the production of normative heterosexuality as an ongoing, situated, practical accomplishment’ (p. 224), this chapter will highlight how LGBT speakers – in certain circumstances – can bring about the production of non-heterosexist contexts, that is, without it being oriented to as related to sexuality.

In the second part of this chapter, I focus on the repercussions of the most common method of indexing sexuality (that is, reference to partners and families). In talk in which speakers make apparent their heterosexuality through invocation of their different-sex partners and spouses and nuclear family members the meaning of the family is reproduced (Kitzinger, 2005a). In the talk in which lesbian and gay people make available a hearing of themselves as lesbian or gay through references to their same-sex partners and families they are active participants in the construction of understandings of familial relationships. In this second part, I explore the problems that arise in the talk and consider how far these problems are attributable to the sexuality of the speaker or the spoken about. I also consider what this reveals about the meaning of counter-(hetero)normative relationships.
Indexing LGBT sexuality

In the first part of this chapter, I will examine how sexuality is made apparent in the everyday conversations with people who are usually knowing and supportive of their sexuality. I identify and explore three different ways that speakers do this: (1) indexing partners and families; (2) referring to participation in LGBT events; and (3) applying a label. Although there are visual ways in which sexuality is indexed (e.g. G. Mason, 1996), I am limiting scope here to verbal methods for making apparent sexuality (since I have only telephone data).

Talking about relationships

In talk in which the sexualities of the participants and the people they talk about are already known (or anticipatable) then lesbian and gay people can index their sexuality or the sexuality of other lesbian and gay people can be indexed using almost all of the same resources that heterosexuals use to make apparent their heterosexuality.

There is one significant method that heterosexuals frequently deploy to make apparent their sexuality that is unavailable to lesbian and gay people in the same way. The law in the UK discriminates against lesbian and gay people by denying same-sex couples access to the institution of civil marriage. Instead, from December 2005 the British government have offered same-sex couples ‘civil partnerships’, which confer almost all the same rights and obligations as marriage. However, there remains a legal, social and symbolic difference (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2005). Some people who have entered into civil partnerships choose to refer to their partnership as a ‘marriage’ and some may call their partners ‘wives’ or ‘husbands’, but legally these labels are not supported. British same-sex couples may legally marry in those countries that do permit it, but these marriages are automatically deemed to be civil partnerships in the UK. The data referred to in this chapter was collected some months prior to
the introduction of civil partnerships, but this legal change was on the horizon and access to marriage was already available in other countries.

This means that same-sex couples in the UK do not routinely use the person reference terms ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ or refer to their partner’s relatives as ‘in-laws’, which provide one of the main methods heterosexuals use to make apparent their heterosexuality. Also, in heterosexual marriage it is traditional for a woman to adopt her husband’s surname when they marry such that it allows married couples to be referred to as a collectives: such as ‘the Havershams’ or ‘the Browns’ (Kitzinger, 2005b: 245). Unlike heterosexuals, however, same-sex couples do not usually\(^2\) have the same surname and so they cannot be referred to in this way. With this exception, lesbian and gay people make available hearings of themselves and others as lesbian or gay in similar ways to those in which heterosexuals make available hearings of themselves as heterosexuals. Kitzinger (2005b) analysed methods that speakers deploy to make available a hearing of themselves or the people they talked about as heterosexual. Here I explore how those methods are utilised to display lesbian and gay relationships.

\[(a)\] Explicit sexual references, joking and innuendo

In the classic CA data corpora, the clearest examples of heterosexuality being made apparent occur in talk about heterosexual sexual activity. This may include jokes or banter about sex, reports of sexual activity, talk about sexual desire, and innuendo (see Kitzinger, 2005b). Nowhere in the classic CA data corpora are there instances of speakers telling about same-sex sexual activity in a similar fashion. However, there are two such instances in my data corpus. The first of these also includes reference to heterosexual sexual activity.

\(^2\) Some same-sex couples do legally change their names to achieve this affect. For example, Julie and Hillary Goodridge, who were the lead plaintiffs in the landmark lawsuit which achieved the right to marry for same-sex couples in Massachusetts, USA, changed their surnames in this way (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2005).

174
In Fragment 1, Janet and Julie are mid-discussion of Janet's health problems. Julie is seeking details of Janet's symptoms in order to search the internet for a possible diagnosis. Immediately prior to the fragment Janet has mentioned that she has got bruises on her legs.

Fragment 1 RAMPANT STAGE
[Land: SW15]
01 Jul: You haven't got 'em anywhere else
02 Jan: Well I 'aven't checked my boobs
03 [or nothing] but Rick had a good feel-
04 Jul: [((sniff)) ]
05 Jan: = last night an' 'e didn't no(h)tice
06 an(h)ythi(h)ng.
07 Jul: No well- Yeah we 'ad a good rampant
08 stage thee other night as well.

Julie seeks to ascertain whether Janet has got these bruises 'anywhere else' (line 1). Janet (who Julie knows to be heterosexual) proffers one area of her body that does not appear affected and in so doing she alludes to sexual activity with her male partner, Rick (lines 2-3 & 5-6). Julie's initial response treats Janet's prior turn as primarily a report of lack of symptoms with 'No well' (line 7), but she cuts off and uses Janet's sexual insinuation to launch a telling about her own sexual activities. Julie's use of 'as well' (line 8) displays her understanding that Janet is talking about having sex and not only about a health check. Julie does not spell out that her sexual partner is female. However, Janet knows Julie is lesbian and lives with her female partner, so the locally initial 'we' is clearly hearable as a reference to same-sex sexual activity. This is verified later in the sequence when Julie's partner, Rebecca, joins in with the telling from off phone.

In Fragment 2, Karen is engaged in a long telling to Ben about others' reactions to her new hairstyle.

Fragment 2 KNOCKING KNEES
[Land: NE06]
01 Kar: .hhh an' uh sh(h)e sa(h)id she's ever so
02 wry .hhh she sez she sez she can't wait to
03 see what kind of reaction I get tonight
04 meaning huh how many people are going to
Karen and Ben are intending to go out together that evening to an LGBT social event. In Fragment 2, Karen is reporting an exchange between herself and her friend, Veronica, in which she describes Veronica’s prediction that ‘many people are going to come onto [Karen]’ (lines 4-5) at the upcoming social event. Karen (who Ben knows has only recently become a lesbian) reports her response to Veronica (lines 6-8), which alludes to her (lesbian) sexual inexperience.

In both of these fragments, potential or actual sexual activity is the topic of the talk. Although both examples refer to lesbian sex it is not talked about as lesbian sex.

(b) Topic talk (about ‘couple’ relationships)

Kitzinger (2005b) showed that, in the classic CA data sets, one of the most frequent ways in which speakers make apparent their own or others’ heterosexuality is through topic talk about heterosexual relationships. Usually this talk focuses on marriage and marriage related topics such as engagements, weddings, marital troubles, divorces, and so on. Heterosexuality per se is not oriented to as relevant; rather, this is taken-for-granted.

In the data corpus analysed for this thesis, speakers often make apparent their own or others’ sexuality in the course of talk about ‘couple’ relationships. This included many references to heterosexual couples, such as Dad’s dramatic announcement to his daughter, Rebecca, that he is ‘gettin’ married on September the nineteenth’ to his long-term female partner (see Fragment 23 in this chapter) and Mum’s discussion (also with Rebecca) of the social services implications of her second marriage to an Austrian man (see Fragment 6 in Chapter 6). The lesbian (and gay) speakers also make apparent the heterosexuality of third parties.
as when Chloe and her gay friend Paul discuss his sister’s pregnancy and its implications in relation to her forthcoming wedding to Martin (‘she’ll be preggers in her dress!’, YU9) or when Chloe complains to her brother, Tom, about their father’s extra-marital affair when she was eight years old (‘I think that Dad and Pam don’t realise we know they had an affair...’, YU25). However, unlike the classic CA data sets, there are also many references to lesbian and gay partnerships.

In Fragment 3, Karen and Cheryl are talking about the intertwined love lives of three of their friends (Mel, Jan, and Barbara).

In Fragment 3, Karen is engaged in topic talk about how Mel and Jan had ‘been an item years back’ (line 2) and that subsequently Mel and Barbara had been a couple (lines 6-7) but that had not worked out because Mel still had feelings for Jan (lines 12-13). This talk makes available a hearing of Mel, Jan, and Barbara as lesbian but this is not the focus of the interaction. Their lesbianism is not done as news, received as news, or treated as a point in its own right. Rather, their lesbianism is something that provides the backdrop to the topic – that is, their relationships with one another – and as such their lesbianism is taken-for-granted.
(c) Person reference forms

Just as heterosexuality can be indexed by the selection of particular person reference terms (Kitzinger, 2005b), lesbian and gay sexuality can be made apparent through the production of same-sex couples. For example, a speaker may make apparent a third person’s lesbianism through referring to her as the partner or ex-partner of a recognisably female person.

Fragment 4 JENNY’S VAL

[Land: NE24]

01 Che: The only time Val ever comes out is
02 when [it’s: bloody {}
03 Kar: [hhhh .hhh [O:H ] THA:T VA:L!
04 (0.2)
05 Che: Jenny’s Val.
06 Kar: [OH:: RI::ight. hhhh]
//
09 ((4 lines omitted))
10 Kar: I get yer now. It’s uh- It’s uh Val-
11 .hhh Val ex partner’v Jenny’s.

In Fragment 4, Karen is displaying some difficulty recognising Val. Cheryl refers to Val with her name (line 1), which is the most preferred recognitional person reference form (Schegloff, 1996). Cheryl deploys this unproblematically and continues with her turn such that she displays her understanding that Karen will recognise Val from her first name alone. Karen’s subsequent claim (line 3) to recognise Val – produced in interjacent overlap with Cheryl’s turn – retrospectively displays some problem with the reference turn. Cheryl seeks to clarify to whom she is referring by offering an alternative person reference form for Val with ‘Jenny’s Val’ (line 5). This locates Val with reference to Jenny, who subsequently turns out to be ‘Val ex partner’s ‘v Jenny’ (line 11) when Karen displays having recognised Val (lines 10-11) by explicating how Val is Jenny’s Val (i.e., her ex-partner). This formulation of Val with reference to her relationship to Jenny makes apparent Val (and Jenny’s) lesbianism but without this ever being the topic of conversation. Rather, this information is made available in service of achieving a successful recognitional reference.
In Fragment 5, Cheryl is telling Karen about an incident in which she failed to remember Karen’s (recently ex-) partner’s name.

Fragment 5 OTHER HALF

[Land:NE:4]

01 Che: That’s funny ’cause Jane’s just rang me up tonight. = She goes “what do they call Karen’s other ‘alf.” [An’ I couldn’t ( )] =
02 Kar: [Oh no:
03 Che: wracking us bleeding brains out]
04 Kar: [That means it’s gonna be on all t’Christmas cards then.]
05 Che: (Oh aye/Well)
06 Kar: Oh dear

Cheryl reports Jane’s enquiry about the name of Karen’s partner using reported speech (lines 2-3). In so doing she produces the person reference descriptor used by Jane as ‘Karen’s other ‘alf’ (line 3). Cheryl’s telling is about being unable to locate the name ‘Lucy’ in response to Jane’s question (lines 3 & 5). However, Karen comes in immediately after the report of Cheryl’s question and treats the telling as indicative of future trouble. That is, people sending her Christmas cards will address them to Karen and her now ex-partner. Since both Karen and Cheryl know Karen’s ‘other half’ is Lucy (that is, a woman), in referring to ‘Karen’s other ‘alf’ (line 3) in her telling, Cheryl invokes (what both participants know to be) the same-sex relationship and thereby she makes apparent her recipient’s lesbianism. However, this is not oriented to by either participant. Rather, Cheryl is concerned with her forgetfulness and Karen is displaying having just realised one of the implications of breaking up with a partner so close to Christmas.

Just as two co-joined different-sex names serve to index a heterosexual couple (Kitzinger, 2005b), two same-sex names can be joined to produce a lesbian or gay couple. In Fragment 6, Cheryl is reporting her response to a friend’s question about who will be attending an upcoming lesbian social event. Cheryl produces four people but she does so in two pairs to produce two couples: ‘Lisa and Kate’ (line 3) and ‘Rachel and Mel’ (lines 3-4).
Chapter 4. Indexing sexuality beyond coming out

Fragment 6 RACHEL & MEL
[Land: NE04]
01 Che: She's saying who's going so I'm telling
02 her who I know who's going. I said "well
03 Lisa and Kate's going. This Rachel and
04 Mel who I know. So I've
05 explained [ ]
06 Kar: [Rachel and Mel? [Oh- ]
07 Che: [Rachel
08 and Melinda from Women Only (Walk)]

Cheryl continues after producing the couplets of names; however, it turns out that Karen has difficulty recognising the people Cheryl has referred to. Karen begins in overlap with Cheryl's ongoing talk, which is likely to be because repairs are preferably and most easily executed when they occur close to the trouble source (Schegloff et al., 1977; Schegloff, 2000b). Karen initiates repair by repeating one of the couples (line 6), thereby orienting to the pair as a unit and reproducing them as such in her repeat.

In Fragment 7, Karen is talking to a different friend, Becky, about another social event.

Fragment 7 COUPLES
[Land: NE21]
01 Kar: Anyway Jane- Jane an- Jane an' Shell's
02 going tomorrow night. Uh they live in
03 Potherington actually
04 Bec: Oh right
///
05 Kar: So I'm going with three bloody couples

Karen is detailing who will be attending and she refers to 'Jane and Shell' (line 1). To lesbians, Becky and Karen, who already know Jane and Shell to be a couple this reference does not serve to make lesbianism relevant to the interaction, rather, Jane and Shell's lesbianism is made apparent in the course of a telling about an upcoming evening out. Karen production of them as a couple later serves as a resource for her complaint that she will be 'going with three bloody couples' (line 5). The relationships between the attendees is only
relevant insofar as they are ‘couples’, it is not relevant that they happen to be lesbian couples (although this is apparent).

In Fragment 8, Paul is telling Chloe about a ‘little party’ (line 2) that his sister is going to be hosting at Christmas.

Fragment 8 LITTLE PARTY
[Land: YU9]
01 Pau: [So sh]e’s- (0.2) having- gonna have a like
02 little party just uhm Tim an’ Dave
03 Chl: Yeah.

The co-joining of culturally known to be names given to males, ‘Tim an’ Dave’ (line 2), produces them as a gay couple.

In these three fragments (6-8), speakers produce pairs of same-sex people such that they are hearable as lesbian or gay couples. They are produced in contexts – such as living together and sharing social events – that contribute to them being hearable as couples. Also, and probably most significantly, they are produced in environments in which same-sex names are expected or taken-for-granted.

*(d) The use of a locally initial ‘we’*

Just as speakers can invoke their different-sex partners with locally subsequent reference forms, such as ‘we’ and ‘us’, in locally initial position (Kitzinger, 2005b), speakers can also refer to their same-sex partnership with these forms.

In Fragment 9, Chloe has called Mum for some cooking advice. Since Mum already knows her daughter to be living with her female partner, it is almost certain that she hears the locally initial ‘we’ (line 5) to refer to the lesbian couple.

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3 This fragment is contextualised in the surrounding talk and analysed more fully as Fragment 21 later in this chapter.
Chapter 4: Indexing sexuality beyond coming out

Fragment 9 GAMMON
[Land: YU02]
01 -ring, ring-ring
02 Mum: Hello;
03 Chl: Hello.
04 Mum: [Hi!]
05 Chl: [Ju-] just a quickie. .hhh uhm we’re
06 doing- >a- an’ then we’ll call you back
07 later about the spirit guide< uhm .hhh
08 “huh” We’re doing some gammon, (.) would
09 you: put a glaze on it or not;
10 Mum: I- It doesn’t matter either way. Really.

In Fragment 10, when Rebecca launches a telling about what she has been doing that day she does so with a locally initial ‘we’ (line 11). Dad already knows Rebecca lives with her female partner, so he surely hears this a reference to the couple.

Fragment 10 POTTERING
[Land: SW05]
01 ring-ring
02 Reb: Hello; hh
03 Dad: Hello[:.
04 Reb: [Hello Dad.
05 Dad: Now how are you:.
06 Reb: Alright yeah.
07 (0.5)
08 Dad: ’re you su:re?
09 Reb: Yeah I’m alright. Yeah. .hhh Yeah I’m fine.
10 Dad: ( ) that’s good.
11 Reb: hhhh Yeah it’s- we’ve just ’ad a .hhhh well
12 we’ve- (.) been potterin’ around today an’
13 I:’m (.) feelin’ a li’l bit better toda:y.
14 Dad: Ye:s.
15 Reb: So uh:: (.) you: alright?
16 Dad: Yeah I’m okay yeah.

In Fragment 11, Cheryl is reporting a conversation with Jane (the Jane of ‘Jane and Shell’ in Fragment 6) about difficulties getting a child to go to bed. She describes how Jane asked her if she had similar problems with her children (lines 1-2) and recounts her response in which she tells how daughter, Allison, would
climb into ‘our flaming bed’ (lines 6 & 8). Karen knows Cheryl to be a lesbian who lives with and has raised children with her partner, therefore she surely hears the locally initial ‘our’ (line 6) to refer to the bed of the lesbian couple.

**Fragment 11 OUR FLAMING BED**

[Land: NE041]

01 Che: An’ uh >of course< Jane’s saying “did you
02 have that with your kids” I said “oh God
03 Allison was terrible”.
04 Kar: Mmm=
05 Che: =I said “right from being able to climb out of the
06 co[t she’d climb out of her cot and into our fl]aming =
07 Kar: [Huh huh huh huh huh huh huh ]
08 Che: = bed”.
09 Kar: Urrr “oh dear”

In Fragment 12, Mum initiates a sequence at the beginning of a call to her daughter, Chloe, by asking about Chloe’s recent holiday with her partner, Katy. Chloe treats the ‘you’ in Mum’s question (‘Did you have a nice time?’ line 1) as a plural by replying that they did (‘we did’, line 2). Mum (who knows the couple holidayed together) displays no problem with the deployment of the locally initial ‘we’ (she receipts with ‘righ’, line 3) and certainly understands this to refer to the couple.

**Fragment 12 HOLIDAY**

[Land: YUl]

01 Mum: Did you have a nice time?
02 Chl: Yea:h we did. Yeah [it was really good. Yeah.
03 Mum: ['Righ’
04 Chl: Yea:h it was good.

In Fragment 1 and 9-12, speakers deploy a locally initial collective pronoun to refer to themselves and some unspecified other. In each instance the recipient knows the speaker to be lesbian and living with her female partner such that the collective is surely heard to index the lesbian couple (a resource that presumably would be also available to gay men). The types of activities that the couple indexed by the ‘we’ is reportedly engaged is likely to contribute to a hearing of the ‘we’ as a couple: engaging in sexual activity (Fragment 1); cooking together
(Fragment 9); ‘pottering’ (Fragment 10); having a shared bed and raising children together (Fragment 11); and holidaying together (Fragment 12). This is consistent with Kitzinger’s (2005b) finding regarding the use of a locally initial ‘we’ by speakers to index themselves and their different-sex spouses.

The combination of an unspecified ‘we’ engaged in activities culturally understood as ‘the sorts of things couples do together’ makes available — indeed, may in some circumstances mandate - the hearing of ‘we’ as ‘the couple of which I am a part’ (Kitzinger, 2005b: 247).

However, while heterosexuals appear to be able to use a locally initial proterm to index themselves and their partners as a perennial resource, for lesbian and gay speakers its successful deployment is likely to be more rigidly constrained by recipient design considerations. In each of the fragments (1 & 9-12) above in which speakers used a locally initial ‘we’ to index their partnership the recipients all knew a priori that the speaker was part of a same-sex couple. For people in couples with different-sex partners no such recipient design consideration is likely to be relevant. Speakers in same-sex couples using a locally subsequent reference form in locally initial position to index their coupledom to strangers are likely to be heard as referring to themselves and a different-sex partner (see Land & Kitzinger, 2005).

The practices for making apparent heterosexuality that Kitzinger (2005b) identified are shown here to be paralleled for indexing lesbian or gay sexuality. When speakers are talking to people who are already aware of their sexuality or the sexuality of those spoken about, it is possible for lesbian and gay sexuality to be indexed unproblematically and without it being the focus of the interaction. Also, these are not instances of coming out or outing someone else. Speakers are not engaged in talk about sexuality; rather, it is just ‘given off’. Although lesbian and gay sexuality is made apparent in the course of recounting a guest list or describing a child’s difficulty staying in bed, sexuality is not oriented to by the participants — just as heterosexuals index their heterosexuality in the course of other entirely unrelated actions without it being foregrounded. However, unlike
heterosexuals, this appears to be dependent on knowing and supportive recipients (or where lesbian and/or gay sexuality is anticipated). In contrast, consider the disruption caused by indexing lesbianism through reference to a same-sex partner in the course of doing other actions in the previous chapter.

All of the practices for indexing sexuality that have been explored in the data above rely on references to partners (or prospective partners as in Fragment 2). This means these resources are most easily available to lesbian and gay speakers who are part of a same-sex couple. For single lesbian and gay speakers, references to past or potential future partners would allow for the deployment of these practices. There are no direct references to sexuality (no speaker in the fragments above uses terms such as ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘queer’, and so on). Instead, speakers treat sex as stable and known for both members of the couple indexed and as such recognisable as a same-sex couple. From this, recipients infer that the speakers or people spoken about are lesbian (if the couple comprises two females) or gay (if the couple comprises two males). This also applies to the use of these practices to index heterosexuality: sex is treated as stable and known and therefore the couple is recognisable as composed of different-sex people and from this recipients infer that the speaker or people spoken about are heterosexual. There are two relevant features (sex and composition of the couple) that combine to give only four possible permutations (lesbian woman, gay man, heterosexual woman, and heterosexual man). Therefore, this is a resource that seems to be usable only for lesbian, gay and heterosexual people. These practices would not be available in the same way for a speaker to index their bisexuality. A bisexual speaker with a same-sex partner is likely to be heard as lesbian or gay, whereas a bisexual speaker with different-sex partner is likely to be heard as heterosexual. Perhaps invocation of male and female partners might achieve this affect. But, if these are serially monogamous partnerships it may make hearable a shift between lesbian/gay sexuality and heterosexuality, rather than making apparent bisexuality. I do not have the data to explore this possibility but clearly it would be likely to operate in a different way. Similarly, speakers could not use these practices to make apparent that they are transgender, intersexual, and so on.
Although the most common way in which lesbian and gay people index their own (and others’) sexuality is, like heterosexuals, through reference to same-sex partners, there are two other ways that speakers make apparent their own (and others’) sexuality in this data corpus. And, unlike those referred to above, the following practices are equally usable for referring to all LGBT people.

**Talk about participation in LGBT events**

There are events and groups organised for and usually by LGBT people, the purpose of which is to provide environments for LGBT people to socialise with one another and/or organise politically around issues of oppression and heterosexism, for example. One way in which LGBT people can make apparent their own and others’ sexuality, then, is through reference to their participation in LGBT groups and events.

In Fragment 13, Karen is telling her uncle Alfred that she has been recently appointed as a member of the LGBT committee. She spells this out in the first instance (lines 2-4) and then produces the initialisation (lines 6-7), which treats Alfred as not likely to be familiar with the initialisation. Alfred already knows Karen to be lesbian so she is not coming out here but simply making her lesbianism relevant or invoking it in the service of the action in which she is otherwise engaged (requesting). Had her lesbianism been unknown to her recipient, this telling would have made apparent Karen’s membership in the category ‘LGBT people’ but without specifying ‘lesbian’ in particular.

*Fragment 13 LGBT COMMITTEE*

[Land: NE5b]

01 Kar: =.hhh Well uh I’ve just been (.).
02 nominated onto thei:r uh (. ) committee
03 uh which is for the lesbian gay bisexual
04 and transgendered students[:.
05 Alf: [Yeah.
06 Kar: So it’s what they call the Ell Gee Bee
07 Tee committee.
08 Alf: Ye[ : s.
Here, then, a speaker indexes her lesbianism but without coming out. In Fragment 14, Rebecca announces to Dad that she has entered a 'gay talent contest' (line 1). Rebecca’s eligibility for participation in the talent contest relies on her membership in the category ‘gay’. Therefore, her telling makes apparent her lesbianism but, since Dad already knows Rebecca to be lesbian, this is not an instance of coming out. In this fragment then, a speaker indexes her lesbianism is the service of some other action, that is, making a news announcement or doing an informing about her proposed participation in a talent contest.

Fragment 14 TALENT CONTEST
[Land:SW34]
01 Reb: I’ve entered a gay talent contest!
02 Dad: (Oh) have yih?
03 Reb: Yeah. I’m gonna go do some tap dancing
04 Dad: Oh bloody ‘ell

In Fragment 13 and 14 speakers index their own sexuality through reference to a group or event that they label as ‘LGBT’ (Fragment 13) or ‘gay’ (Fragment 14). In the next extract, Fragment 15, the speaker uses the same resource to make apparent a third party’s sexuality. In topic talk about Tracey, Ben reports that Lucy informed him that ‘Tracey might join bi group’ (lines 1-2), thereby making available a hearing of Tracey as bisexual.

Fragment 15 BI GROUP
[Land:NE1]
01 Ben: What Lucy ‘as told me is that uhm Tracey might join bi group but
02 Kar: Mm

In the previous three fragments (13-15) speakers report their own or another’s participation in an LGBT event and, given the auspices under which they are members or attendees of these events, in so doing they ‘give off’ their sexuality. However, in the following fragment Karen orients to membership in an LGBT group as sufficient to make her visible as an LGBT person. In Fragment 16, reminds Cheryl about her recent appointment to the LGBT committee (lines 6-8)
in service of a telling about how she (Karen), as a committee member, is able to gain admission to 'Zenith' free of charge (lines 8-10).

Cheryl subsequently asks whether it costs anything to become a member of the committee (line 24). Karen responds to the question seriously in the first instance ('Well no', line 27), which treats 'cost' (line 24) as a reference to financial expenditure. She then orients to the more general definition of 'cost' as a negative aspect of membership in order to joke that it may cost 'a lynching ...in wrong 'ands' (lines 26-27). Here we can see that it is not just us as analysts that orient to reference to membership and attendance at LGBT events as making apparent sexuality, here Karen displays her understanding that being a member of the LGBT committee makes her visibly LGBT and, therefore, a potential target for violence.

4 'Zenith' is an LGBT event organised in association with the university where Karen is a student.
This practice for making apparent sexuality is not restricted to those who are (or were or will be) in couple relationships, however, it is only usable by those people who are actively engaged in some kind of ‘LGBT community’. Like the method identified in the preceding section, speakers do not locate themselves or others as members of a sexuality category directly (e.g., ‘I’m lesbian’ or ‘She’s bisexual’). Rather, speakers state an association with an LGBT group, for example, and it is presumed that their recipients will infer that the speaker (or the spoken about) is, therefore, LGBT.

However, unlike referring to or indexing couple relationships that rely on binary understandings of sex, referring to LGBT groups allows for a broader spectrum of sexuality categories to be made apparent. Individuals may be members of ‘bisexual’, ‘lesbian’, or ‘transgender’ groups, which specify a particular sexuality category, or they may participate in ‘LGBT’ or ‘queer’ groups, which indicates counter-normative sexuality but without denoting any specific sexuality category.

Reference to participation in these groups and events makes available a hearing of the speaker (or the spoken about) as non-heterosexual and therefore as counter-normative in heterosexist environments. Consequently, in interactions with unknowing recipients reference to being a member of an LGBT group, for instance, is likely to produce the effect of ‘coming out’ and as such potential disruption to the ongoing business. Therefore, the deployment of these references to participation in LGBT groups in the service of other actions – without risking sexuality becoming an activity it its own right and thereby disrupting the primary action – is reliant on recipient-design considerations. This method for indexing LGBT sexuality is not paralleled for indexing heterosexuality since there are no heterosexual equivalents to the ‘LGBT group’. This makes apparent – and reproduces – LGBT sexuality as other.
Labelling speakers as members of sexuality categories

A third way that the speakers in this data set make apparent their own and others’ sexualities is through naming of the category label. This may take the form of dedicating talk to categorising such as ‘I’m an X’ or speakers may use person reference forms that incorporate categories (these two methods for categorising will be explored more fully in chapters 5 and 6 respectively), however, speakers in Fragments 17-19 employ the former method.

Fragment 17 is taken from a conversation between Chloe and her brother, Tom. In the talk preceding the fragment produced below, Chloe has made several complaints ranging from her father’s behaviour to her ‘temper tantrum’ with a washing machine to her landlord who she ‘hates’.

Fragment 17 ANGRY LESBIAN

[Land: YU25]

01 Tom: You’re quite angry (faced) aren’t you
02 Chl: I am right now yeah yeah
03 Tom: [Yeah
04 Chl: Yeah. You’re not feeling the love. I’m such
05 an angry lesbian today Tom.
06 Tom: Rea(h)lly?
07 Chl: Yeah

Tom responds to all of Chloe’s complaints with ‘you’re quite angry (faced) today aren’t you’ (line 1), thereby accounting for the complaints with reference to Chloe’s emotional state rather than the incidents being justifiable complaints. Chloe’s SPP aligns with Tom’s assessment but specifies it as temporally relevant with ‘right now’ (line 2). Chloe shows herself to understand Tom’s perspective (‘you’re not feeling the love’, line 4) and accounts for it by labelling herself as ‘an angry lesbian’ (line 11). Chloe’s use of ‘today’ targets ‘angry’ and not ‘lesbian’ since it is not only today that she is lesbian but it is only today she is angry. Tom’s ritualised disbelief (line 12) also targets the ‘angry’ and does not engage with the ‘lesbian’. Nonetheless, by labelling herself in this way, Chloe makes apparent her lesbianism. Tom already knows Chloe to be lesbian so this
is not coming out. Had it not already been known, a quite different interactional import would have been expected.

In Fragment 18, Karen and Becky are discussing their university tutor, Peter, and why 'some people are quite down on him'. In the talk prior to this fragment, Karen and Becky have stated that they have found him 'helpful' (Karen) and 'really really nice' (Becky).

Karen introduces a third person ('Paula', line 4) who has a good experience of Peter's teaching. Then, using the pronoun 'we' to reference the three of them (Karen, Becky and Paula), Karen labels their shared membership in the category 'queer' (line 6). This is produced as a possible explanation for why it is that they find Peter good to work with. However, it also clearly makes apparent Karen's (and Becky's and Paula's) 'queer' sexuality. Karen treats Becky as already knowing Paula to be lesbian and they both know each other (and of course themselves) to be lesbian, therefore, this is not coming out or outing.

In Fragment 19, Karen and Ben are discussing a television programme they have recently watched.

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5 For a full analysis of this instance of categorisation see Fragment 3 in the following chapter (Chapter 5).
6 For a full analysis of this instance of categorisation see Fragment 6 in the following chapter (Chapter 5).
Chapter 4: Indexing sexuality beyond coming out

Karen categorises her recipient as a ‘gay male’ (line 1) – which, of course, he already knows himself to be – in the course of asking him for his opinion from a particular perspective.

In each of these fragments speakers label themselves (Fragments 17 & 18), their recipients (Fragments 18 & 19), or third persons (Fragments 18) as a member of a category by naming the category. Unlike the other two methods this one does not rely on recipients inferring sexuality from talk but, rather, the relevant sexuality category is spelled out. Additionally, it is not tied to constraints of having a partner or involvement in an LGBT community. Therefore, unlike the other two practices in which sexuality is ‘given off in the course of what may be completely unrelated activity, using this method to index sexuality foregrounds it – even though it may be in service of some other action.

Also, this labelling seems to reinscribe the non-normativity of LGBT sexuality since it is not a practice routinely applied to heterosexuals. Kitzinger (2005b) found that ‘[n]owhere in the data sets on which CA is founded does anyone announce that they (or anyone else they know) is ‘heterosexual’’(p. 222)7.

7 There are, however, occasional instances of this in my data corpus, although these are labelled for the express purpose of drawing attention to their heterosexuality. Note also that these are produced in environments in which LGBT sexuality is more expected and that it is this very labelling that helps to produce it as a non-heterosexist context. Finally, it is also relevant to point out that both instances are repaired to include the term ‘heterosexual’ (line 11 in Fragment A and line 7 in Fragment B) such that it is indicative of this being a counter-normative practice.
Displaying and reproducing understandings of LGBT lives

In the talk analysed above, speakers make available a hearing of themselves and others as non-heterosexual. The first two practices for so doing achieve this without it being the primary purpose of the talk and without the recipient foregrounding it. Frequently, this indexing is done in the service of some other, often unrelated, activity. The third method for making apparent sexuality is one that does foreground it but this may still serve some other interactional purpose, such as providing a reason for getting on with someone (Fragment 18) or soliciting a particular perspective (Fragment 19). In the data presented above that use these methods (Fragments 1-19) speakers are invoking already known sexualities. However, in these data, speakers are not only making apparent sexuality, they are also orienting to and reproducing understandings of the social world as they do it. In her study of how heterosexuals index their sexuality, Kitzinger (2005b) analysed talk to “interrogate it for what it shows us about the local production of a culture” (p. 224).

Fragment B
[Land: NE21]
01 Bec: [I think it becomes so much
02 a part’v life yih forgerr about it.
03 (.)
04 Kar: Yeah.
05 Bec: D’yih(h)h know wha’ I mean;
06 Kar: Yeah but I- I bet there’s something’s in
07 that. = I bet pe- heterosexual people who’ve
08 got this very safe comfortable world. .hhh
By applying labels that use sexuality categories or referring to participation in groups that utilise sexuality categories for all people other than heterosexuals, speakers reproduce the normative, routine understandings of pervasive heterosexuality that contributes to the persistence of heterosexist presumptions such as that identified in Chapter 3.

Unlike reference to LGBT category memberships or LGBT groups, referring to relationships that make apparent the speaker (or spoken about) is lesbian or gay is also available – and, indeed, the most commonly used method – for indexing heterosexuality (Kitzinger, 2005b). In addition, talk in which heterosexuality is so indexed provides a site for shared-in-common understandings of the (hetero)normative couple and family to surface. In the remaining part of this chapter, I will explore the implications of talk about LGBT relationships for the production of shared and contested meanings of LGBT couples and families.

**Shared understandings and problems in talk about LGBT relationships**

The most common way that lesbian and gay people ‘give off’ their sexuality in knowing (or anticipatable) contexts appears to be through reference to partners. However, in this talk it is not only that they are lesbian or gay – or more specifically that they are in a same-sex couple-type relationship – but, rather, these fragments also display the constitution of lesbian and gay couples and families. Kitzinger (2005b) showed:

how categorical references to ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ are deployed with reference to culturally-understood inferences (which they thereby reproduce) of the intimacy, care, co-residence, and single economic unit constituted by the married couple; and the activities in which they are understood to be jointly engaged
Similarly, in the fragments presented in section one above, speakers constitute lesbian/gay couples and families. For example, this includes producing a couple as: a) sexually active (Fragments 1 & 2); b) serially monogamous (Fragment 3); c) identifiable units (Fragments 4-8); d) socialising together (Fragments 6-8); e) cooking together (Fragment 9); f) ‘pottering’ together (Fragment 10); g) sleeping in a shared bed and raising children together (Fragment 11); and h) holidaying together (Fragment 12). There appears to be striking similarities between the constitution of heterosexual couples and the constitution of lesbian/gay couples. Moreover, in the data fragments presented in Fragments 1-12, these appear to be shared understandings between participants.

This openness between lesbian/gay people and heterosexual friends and family members is a world away from the furtive secrecy treated as routine just a generation or so ago (Goffman, 1963; Lee, 1977; Potter & Darty, 1981, Pillard, 1982). The integration of a same-sex partner into their partner’s family of origin is becoming increasingly usual. Notice, for example, Rebecca’s unproblematic invocation of her same-sex partnership in conversation with her father (Fragment 10) and Chloe’s indexing of her same-sex partnership in conversation with her mother (Fragment 12).

In the recent past ostracism from families of origin was a significant threat to lesbian and gay people as a direct result of coming out (although this remains a threat today but to perhaps a lesser extent). In response, lesbian and gay people adopted and adapted the kinship terms normatively employed for reference to normative heterosexual nuclear families to construct ‘families we choose’ (Weston, 1991) or ‘families of choice’ (Weeks et al., 2001) and have often comprised ‘friends as family’ (Nardi, 1992) or friends in addition to lovers and children (Weston, 1991). As in other political movements, fellow activists were referred to as ‘sisters’ and ‘brothers’ (Nestle & Preston, 1995) and long before the introduction of legal same-sex marriage, some same-sex couples referred to each other as ‘husband’ or ‘wife’ (Harvey, 1997b). In those situations in which
heterosexual members of a lesbian or gay person’s family of origin is supportive. They have coined terms such as ‘daughter-out-of-law’ (Kitzinger, 2005b), ‘son-in-love’ (Stewart, 2002) or ‘brother-if-there-were-a-law’ (MacLean, 1995) to locate their lesbian and gay relatives within the context of the conventional heterosexual family framework. This construction of alternative families has been seen as attractive since it introduces agency into decisions about who is and is not family (Weston, 1991), which may be particularly appealing to those who have had no choice about leaving their family of origin.

However, with the increasing ‘normalization’ and ‘routinization’ of non-heterosexuality (Seidman et al., 1999), the previously austere familial conditions experienced by lesbian and gay people are declining. Homosexuality is no longer (officially) a barrier to securing custody of children from a previous (heterosexual) relationship, adoption is becoming more of a real option for same-sex couples and there are increasing numbers of lesbians using donor-insemination. This means that there are more children being raised in families with lesbian or gay co-parents. These family units are often located with the context of extended families including partners’ families of origin. Concurrently, there has been a decline of the traditional heterosexual nuclear family (Rose, 2002) and research has suggested that there is “a more expansive conception of what constitutes a family” (Rose, 2002: 236).

With the advent of same-sex marriage (in some countries) and civil partnerships (in others, including Britain) and with the increasing availability of adoption and fertility services for same-sex couples, lesbian and gay families are increasingly staking our claim to kinship terminology. The language used to describe the members of lesbian and gay families is often the very terminology used to define the relationships with the conventional heterosexual family. This is likely to be motivated in part by a desire to have our families recognised and validated by

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8 In this chapter I am using ‘lesbian and gay families’ to refer to families initiated by lesbian and gay people. There are limitations with this definition (not least because this means heterosexuals are included in lesbian and gay families and vice versa) but space and focus precludes a more thorough discussion (see Allen & Demo, 1995; Riggs, 2006).
wider society. However, it is likely also to be the result of the lack of alternative terminology available to express family relationships beyond those employed by members of heterosexual families.

The situation for lesbian and gay people and our partnerships and families appears to have been 'normalized' (Seidman et al., 1999) to such an extent that integration is the norm. That the speakers in this corpus appear to be able to refer to their own (or others') partnerships and families in ways that make apparent their sexuality without it becoming foregrounded in the interaction points to this trend (of course, these speakers cannot be considered representative of all lesbian and gay people). However, problems do persist. In the remainder of this section I will explore how family terminology is used to refer to lesbian and gay relationships. I will examine the difficulties that arise in this talk and consider what this reveals about our understandings of our families and the obstacles we may encounter in talking about our familial relationships.

Marriage and partnerships

Fragment 20, is taken from a conversation between a lesbian daughter, Sylvia, and her heterosexual mother (who fully supports Sylvia's same-sex marriage to Janice). As the fragment opens, Mother is telling how her second cousin (in her eighties) called her just prior to Christmas and asked questions about family marriages as part of her research on the family tree.

Fragment 20 SLEEPLESS CHRISTMAS

[Land:SC17]

01 Mth: I'd quite a lot of explaining to do when
02 she wanted to know who'd married who in
03 our family:.
04 Syl: Oh! How did our marriage go down.
05 Mth: Wi- with: (. ) uh-disbelie: f at first.
06 "Who did you say: " (. ) "Jan" "Jan?" Yea-
07 k! and- and so on. You know. ((sniff)) hm.
08 Syl: A:h. Had she not (. ) realized that
09 [same-sex- ]
10 Mth: [I'm afraid] I've given 'er a sleepless
In her telling about the questions about ‘who’d married who’ (line 2) asked by her second cousin, Mother alludes to some possible problem with answering them. That is, she had ‘quite a lot of explaining to do’ (line 1). This is a pre-telling insofar as it presents a tellable but does not explicate it. Mother presents this as a telling about her experiences of doing the ‘explaining’. After displaying registration of the news (‘Oh’, line 4), Sylvia forwards the telling by asking explicitly about the second cousin’s reaction to her own marriage, thereby requesting the point of view of the second cousin (and not Mother’s). In so doing, Sylvia provides a go-ahead to Mother’s telling. This go-head targets a particular aspect of the possible telling for further explication rather than the generic go-ahead. By singling out her own marriage for further questioning, Sylvia displays her interpretation of Mother’s allusion to a problem. That is, if explanation was required then it must be because her own (same-sex) marriage is the one that is hearably problematic. Mother then describes the initial ‘disbelief’ (line 5) with which her report of Sylvia’s marriage was received and she fits her response to Sylvia’s prior enquiry. She uses reported speech to underscore the particular aspect of this marriage that was unbelievable. That is, it is not that Sylvia had married that is problematic but, rather, that her spouse is a ‘Jan’. It could have been that the elderly relative had a particular grievance with Jan as an individual but (aside from having ethnographic information that the second cousin and Jan were unknown to one another) we can see from the subsequent interaction that this is not the case. Equally possible, it could have been that ‘Jan’ is an unusual name such that it is not immediately recognisable as a name and therefore it is reported as being subject to a clarification check. However, names are often marked such that they allow recipients to infer categorical information about the referred to person (age, sex, nationality, religion, and social class, for example) and therefore this might provide grounds for the relative’s objection. Giving a name that is recognisably female (‘Jan’, line 6) is

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9 See Fragment 3 in Chapter 6 for an instance of a name being produced as unusual through the request to be reminded of its pronunciation. Note also that the name is not a traditional English name and therefore allows inferences to be made about the referenced person.
reported as sufficient to index Sylvia’s spouse’s sex. And, it is this that is the 
source of the problem. How do we know this? First, in place of a full 
explanation about why the name was problematic, Mother uses a generalised list 
completer ‘and so on’ (line 7) and then indicates directly that she expects Sylvia 
to be able to work out why it was problematic with ‘you know’ (line 7). This 
produces the problem as one that Sylvia will be able to discern without a detailed 
explanation. Second, Sylvia displays her understanding of the second cousin’s 
problem with her marriage to ‘Jan’ as being concerned with the fact that it is a 
‘same-sex [marriage]’ (line 9). By not challenging this suggestion, Mother 
endorses Sylvia’s understanding as the correct explanation.

There is also some misalignment regarding the understanding for the second 
cousin’s reaction. Sylvia treats the reaction as responsive to a lack of knowledge 
about same-sex marriage (lines 8-9), which would mean that once that was 
rectified the disbelief would be resolved. However, Mother’s analysis of the 
second cousin’s response (lines 10-11) suggests a continuing treatment of the 
marriage as problematic.

In Fragment 20, we can trace how the participants negotiate the report. First, 
Mother alludes to a problem without explication, which suggests that she 
assumes that Sylvia is able to work out precisely what is the problem. Second, 
Sylvia successfully identifies her own marriage as the source of the need for 
‘quite a lot of explaining’ (line 1). And third, Mother displays her understanding 
that it is extraneous to requirements to give an account for why this might be 
problematic. So, despite Mother’s support and endorsement of her daughter’s 
marrige, both participants are oriented to the marriage as routinely contestable 
precisely because it is a same-sex marriage (a situation that heterosexuals would 
not experience).

In Fragment 21, Paul and Chloe are talking about an upcoming ‘little party’ 
hosted by Paul’s sister and in particular the guests who will be attending. This 
touches off talk about Tim and Dave (clearly already known by both participants 
to be a gay couple). The use of conjoined first names indexing two same-sex 
persons (‘Tim and Dave’, line 2) as amongst the guests invited to a ‘little party’
is (in non-heterosexist contexts, as in this conversation between a gay man and a
lesbian) hearable as possibly indexing a couple, just as conjoined different-sex
first names in heterosexual contexts routinely do (Kitzinger, 2005b). The topic
here is not Tim and Dave’s homosexuality – which is simply taken for granted –
but the couple’s plans for their relationship.

Fragment 21 REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP
[Land:YU09]
01 Chl: .hhh So- so what were you saying ‘Cause
02 that’s how come you: (. ) were mentioning the
03 pregnancy was you were saying (. ) W:hat’s
04 your sister doing at Christmas
05 Pau: [Oh I was
06 trying tuh work- ho:w I got to that.
07 Chl: $Yeah=
08 Pau: =Uhm yeah no ‘cause- so- ‘cause normally we
09 go out in Bromley. Like a big group of
10 Philip’s friends and Rebecca’s friends an’
11 y’know we all go out together. .hhh An’
12 obviously Becca’s not gonna wanna do
13 it this year. =
14 Chl: [Yeah ]
15 Pau: [So sh]e’s- (0.2) having- gonna have a like
16 little party just uhm Tim an’ Dave
17 Chl: Yeah.
18 Pau: Uh y’know Martin’s brother [Rick]
19 Chl: [.hhh] How are
20 they? = Are they getting married?
21 (0.5)
22 Pau: Who.
23 Chl: Tim an’ Dave.
24 Pau: They’ve bought a house together now.
25 Chl: Oh right.
26 Pau: Uh:m but I don’t know what else they’re
27 gonna do. I think they wanna get their
28 thing legali:se[ed. ]
29 Chl: [‘Caus]e you were saying (. )
30 y’know that they were (gonna) register their
31 partnership or summ[in’].
32 Pau: [Yeah.]

After a long discussion of the news that Paul’s sister is pregnant, Chloe marks a
return to the topic of the conversation before this interlude: that is, Paul’s sister’s
plans for Christmas (line 1-4). Paul details the usual arrangements for the Christmas social event but explains that she is ‘obviously’ (line 12) not going to want to do that this year. This alludes to the just-discussed news of Rebecca’s pregnancy as an account for her not wanting to participate in the usual social event. Instead, Paul explains that she intends to have a ‘little party’ (line 16) and continues to inform Chloe of the proposed attendees.

Chloe’s enquiry (‘How are they?’ lines 19-20) is designed to elicit further information about Tim and Dave (although who is being referenced here subsequently turns out to be problematic) and she immediately continues (see latching on line 20) with a second FPP which specifies what about Tim and Dave she is interested in (‘Are they getting married?’, line 20). At the time that this conversation occurred there was no legal recognition for same-sex couples, same-sex couples were (and are still) excluded from the civil institution of marriage in the UK, but with effect from December 2005 (some months into the future for these co-conversationalists), same-sex couples have been allocated a separate category of legal relationship recognition (conferring rights and responsibilities virtually identical to those of marriage) labelled ‘civil partnership’ – a name deliberately selected because it lacks many of the social and symbolic connotations of marriage. This new category is still an unfamiliar one and the (social, legal, symbolic) distinction between ‘marriage’ and ‘civil partnership’ is unclear to many people (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2005). In designing her question, Chloe treats civil partnership as ‘marriage’ (‘Are they getting married’, line 20).

The 0.5 second gap (line 21) is indicative of some problem with Chloe’s FPP, which is shown to be a problem with establishing who is being referred to with Paul’s repair initiation (‘Who’, line 22). Chloe’s use of ‘they’ in her enquiry (‘How are they?’ lines 19-20) is indexically linked to some prior reference but there has been a further person reference in the intervening talk since Paul’s initial reference to Tim and Dave. It may be that Paul hears the ‘they’ as possibly targeting Rick (line 18) and a partner. Chloe had receipted Paul’s production of the couple with only a ‘yeah’, but this would have been the most appropriate place for an enquiry about Tim and Dave. It may be that Chloe
anticipated further talk from Paul about the couple and therefore it only became apparent that this was not going to be produced when Paul continued to the next of the attendees (‘Martin’s brother Rick’, line 18). The production of this next reference marks the ideal interactional opportunity for discussion of the couple to have passed.

When Chloe’s repair solution makes apparent that her question indeed targets the gay couple, Paul answers her with a ‘nonconforming response’ (see Raymond, 2003), that is, neither with a ‘yes’ (which would accept her term, ‘marriage’, as accurate) nor with a ‘no’ (which would perhaps imply Tim and Dave’s lack of commitment to one another), but with a piece of information about Tim and Dave which, while not addressing the issue of a putative ‘marriage’, is nonetheless an indication of the kind of commitment marriage is commonly understood to involve.

He follows this up with the information that Tim and Dave ‘wanna get their thing legalized’: thereby recognizably addressing a second feature of what Chloe had formulated as ‘marriage’ – legal recognition of a relationship – while still treating it as not marriage itself. His repetition of Chloe’s verb ‘get’ (‘get their thing legalized’, line 27-28 echoes her ‘get married’, line 20, where some alternative such as ‘legalize their relationship’ was possible) displays it as an alternative formulation of what Tim and Dave might do. In selecting cohabitation and (possible future) legal recognition as two of the features of Tim and Dave’s relationship appropriate to responding to a question about their possible plans to be ‘married’, Paul shows us what he understands the relevant attributes of marriage to be. Although Tim and Dave may cohabit and seek legal recognition they are not, for Paul (as for the British government) ‘married’. Chloe subsequently accounts (lines 29-32) for her interest in the future of Tim and Dave’s relationship using the formulation ‘register their partnership or summin’ (rather than ‘marry’) thereby showing herself to have heard Paul’s embedded correction of ‘married’ – though (as terms like ‘thing’ and ‘or summin’ display) neither of them is able confidently to formulate a satisfactory alternative (‘are they getting civilly partnered?’ is not in common use). Unequal marriage legislation means, then, that even between a lesbian and gay male
speaker, topic talk about same-sex couples may not run off as smoothly and unproblematically as topic talk about different-sex couples does for heterosexuals.

In this talk about marriage and partnerships, speakers are not only making available a hearing of themselves or the people spoken about as lesbian or gay. Rather, they are also displaying understandings of and reconstituting the nature of these relationships. Fragment 20 shows that people in same-sex marriages and those who are supportive of them are constantly vigilant to the possible challenge to their relationship – a situation that does not appear to be mirrored in heterosexuals’ experiences. Fragment 21 shows that even in discussions between lesbian and gay people there may be problems talking about legalising same-sex relationships. There is confusion about the terms that apply and uncertainty about how to define the legalities of a relationship.

Families of origin

When heterosexual couples are formed the individuals that comprise them normatively become part of their partner’s family of origin. In Fragment 20, Mother’s support of her daughter’s marriage to Janice demonstrates a situation akin to that experienced by many heterosexuals\(^\text{10}\). However, this is not the case for all same-sex couples.

Fragment 22 is taken from a conversation between Rebecca and her father. Dad knows that Rebecca is lesbian (see Fragment 14) and Rebecca can index her same-sex partnership unproblematically in interactions with her father (see Fragment 10). Additionally, from elsewhere in the data corpus there is evidence

\(^{10}\) Clearly this is not the experience of all heterosexual couples. Along with individual clashes, there are also systematic problems for couples whose constitution is non-normative. This may be because the couple are same-sex as is relevant here, but it also could be because the members of a couple are from different races, social classes, religions or ages. Therefore, this phenomenon is not restricted to the experiences of same-sex couples.
that Dad is supportive of Rebecca’s relationship with Julie\(^{11}\). However, in Fragment 22, Dad marks Julie’s allusion (on some previous occasion) to an in-law type relationship with him as somewhat inappropriate. Although many members of married heterosexual couples address their father-in-law by some kind of kinship term, Julie’s reported use of the address term ‘Pops’ is here treated – by Dad – as rather surprising or remarkable. Her reported use of this term claims a familial relationship with Rebecca’s father and this is potentially being contested (albeit jokingly) by the person whom she is claiming as family.

**Fragment 22 POPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Dad: Julie alright?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Reb: ^Yeah Julie’s fine? Yeah. Yeah. She’s alright. She’s ‘ere sitting with me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Dad: Calling me ‘Pops’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Reb: Huh huh huh huh [huh huh huh huh huh huh =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Dad: [Hah hah hah hah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Reb: =huh huh We:(h)ll that’s what you are tuh ‘er. .hh(h)hh huh huh huh huh .hh(h)hh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dad: ( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reb: Alright then Dad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dad’s personal state enquiry on behalf of his daughter’s partner (line 1) displays recognition of their relationship (he does not ask about Rebecca’s friends or anyone else in her life). But, at line 5, Dad teasingly chastises the inappropriateness of the term ‘Pops’ apparently used by Julie on a previous occasion to address him. Julie’s use of the term ‘Pops’ underscores her familial connection to him (via her lover). It makes (tongue-in-cheek) comparisons with the family links accrued by heterosexuals through the institution of marriage. Of course, it could be that Dad would have also treated it as inappropriate if Rebecca had a male partner who called him ‘Pops’ – perhaps due to the semi-archaic practice in general or the word in particular. However, according to Weston (1991: 195) ‘the relative absence of institutionalization or rituals

\(^{11}\) For example, Dad often asks about Julie in conversations with Rebecca, he talks with Julie on the telephone (e.g., SW33), and he plans and pays for a holiday for the couple (Rebecca and Julie) with him and his partner (SW55 and SW69).
associated with these emergent gay families sometimes raises problems of definition and mutuality' such that Julie's use of 'Pops' is possibly particularly out-of-place. Rebecca's turn at lines 8-9 displays a possible analysis of Dad's complaint or tease (line 5) as not simply a problem of terminology; rather, she is reasserting the familial connection. The actual reason for Dad's displayed interpretation of the use of the address term as inappropriate is not discernable - either to us as analyst or, more importantly to Rebecca as the recipient. But, what is available is a potential hearing of this chastisement as a challenge to Julie's claim to have an in-law type relationship with her partner's father. In this short fragment it seems that Dad may be simultaneously recognising Julie and Rebecca as a couple while also possibly making apparent his exclusion of Julie from what he considers to be his family.

By comparison the following fragment is taken from a different conversation between the same father and daughter. In Fragment 23, Dad has called Rebecca to announce the news that he's getting married.

**Fragment 23 NEW MUM**

[Land: SW74]

01 Dad: The reason I'm phoning you: is I'm gettin'
02 married o:n September the nineteenth.
03 Reb: Oh wow!
04 Dad: 'Yeah'

// (in the omitted talk Rebecca relays the news to her partner off-phone and Dad and Rebecca discuss details of the wedding)

26 Reb: >Ooh< I've got a new mum.

Dad prefaces his news to inform Rebecca that this is the express purpose of his call ('The reason I'm phoning you is...', line 1) and also to mark the news as significant (significant enough to warrant the call). After the production of the news of his imminent marriage, Rebecca affiliates with this as important and surprising news (how Dad had designed his announcement to be received) with the production of the reaction token 'Oh wow!' (line 3) (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006). Rebecca immediately conveys the news to her partner and then there is some cursory discussion of the plans for the wedding (in the omitted
Chapter 4: Indexing sexuality beyond coming out

talk). Rebecca then orients to the implication for the upcoming marriage for her family: that is, she will have 'a new mum' (line 26).

Here, then, the difference between Rebecca's treatment of her father's partner with regards to her understanding of 'family' and Dad's treatment of Rebecca's partner with respect to his conception of 'family' is evident. It is not certain that this difference is attributable to the different-sex couple/same-sex couple distinctions; however, it is certainly a likely potential hearing.

**Having children**

In Fragment 24 Chloe is telling her mother about a television programme she watched recently (her mother did not see the programme). The programme was called 'Making Babies the Gay Way' and it was a documentary following the lives of lesbian and gay people as they pursued their plans to have children.

**Fragment 24 THIS WOMAN AND THIS MAN**

[Land: YU241 (audio - 29:00)]

01 Chl: =Yeah .huh an' I think one of them was probably
02 actually depressed.
03 (.)
04 Chl: Which might be because being pregnant. =
05 'Or not'. = I don't know bu[t .huh th]ere was=
06 Mum: [ Well I ]
07 Chl: =this couple. This (. ) woman and this gu: y
08 who were both gay who were having a baby together
09 but .huh he was (. ) really upset when she wasn't
10 pregnant straightaway.

At lines 1-3 Chloe refers to one member of a lesbian couple featured in the programme and accounts for her behaviour with reference to her probable depression (line 2). At line 5, she moves on to others featured in the documentary. She begins by introducing these people as 'this couple' (line 6). Although 'couple' is usually hearable as indexing a different-sex pair of people (Kitzinger, 2005b), as indicated above the production of 'couple' in an environment in which the invocation of same-sex couples is expected (such as a
telling about a documentary focusing on lesbian and gay people having children) then it is likely to be heard as indexing a same-sex couple. Therefore, it is likely that Mum will understand this to refer either to a couple of men or to a couple of women. Attentive to this probable hearing, Chloe provides an alternative characterisation of these people that repairs her first formulation and displays her analysis that Mum may have been susceptible to having heard ‘couple’ as indexing a same-sex pair. Chloe begins this subsequent person reference with ‘this guy and this woman’ (line 7), which explicitly attends to the problem of ‘couple’ being hearable as referring to two people of the same sex. She then encounters a further problem since she has presented the programme as one about lesbian and gay people having babies and now she has produced a woman and a man as a couple embarking on parenthood together. She displays her analysis of this as potentially problematic by continuing with ‘who were both gay’ (line 8). However, there is one further potential confusing detail: if these are two different-sex people who are gay, how can they be a couple (according to our culturally-known-in-common understanding of what constitutes a couple)? Chloe deals with this by continuing with ‘who were having a baby together’. For these two people being gay is a relevant category here as it is under these auspices that they were featured in the documentary.

The trouble source, ‘couple’, is problematic because here it is used to index two people, however, this term also carries connotations about the nature of the relationship between the two people indexed. Chloe is alert to the possibility of ‘couple’ being heard as the latter type and her repair displays that analysis. By bringing to the forefront the protagonists’ membership in the category ‘gay’, Chloe produces a very different relational arrangement than might have been the case had she not have done this. That is, a woman and a man having a baby together (who have previously been referred to as a ‘couple’) are most likely to be heard as heterosexual, Chloe counters this by explicitly referring to their non-heterosexuality.

There are several difficulties encountered in Chloe’s talk. First, ‘couple’ is likely to be heard as indexing two people of the same-sex. Second, this makes relevant referring to the people in terms of their gender as this is counter-normative
(given the local environment is one in which the production of same-sex couples is anticipated). Third, this raises the problem that they are now likely to be heard as a different-sex couple in the sense of traditional heterosexually coupledom. However, as this is not the case their sexuality becomes relevant. Fourth, this then raises the problem of the way in which this different-sex pair are a couple given that they are both gay. This is dealt with by reference to their joint endeavour in becoming parents.

These problems arise because of being a couple, having a sexual relationship, and having children together are normatively done together. But, in this report, these aspects are teased apart. They are a couple insofar as they constitute two people sharing a commitment with one another. However, they do not have a sexual relationship. And, despite the linking of sexual relationship and the production and raising of children, they are planning to have children together.

In Fragment 25, a lesbian’s reported claim to have children is undermined. Two lesbian friends, Cheryl and Karen, are talking about a couple they know in common, Jane and Shell. Shell has a two-year-old son and the issue of the extent of Jane’s ‘experience around kids’ (lines 1-2) has arisen in the context of a discussion of Shell’s recurrent and distressing problems with getting this child to go to bed.

Fragment 25 KIDS

[Land: NE4]

01 Kar 'Cause uh Jane- Jane’s had plen’y of experience
02 around kids ['an’t she ]
03 Che [Oh I know.] Jane’s had loads of
04 experience an’ she’s act- uwhuh w- what
05 Jane calls her kids is they’re Annie’s kids.
06 =They’re Danni and Dean.
07 Kar Mmm
08 Che An’ she’s yihknow been ‘round them since they
09 were very very young. .hhhh An’ she said “look
10 Shell it’s no:rmal”

Karen invites Cheryl to confirm her assessment that ‘Jane’s had plenty of experience around kids’ (lines 1-2) with the tag question, “‘an’t she” (line 2).
Karen produces this as a first assessment – indeed by cutting off and restarting her TCU (line1), Karen explicitly designs this to be recognizable as in first position. First assessments 'carry primary rights to evaluate the matter assessed' (Heritage & Raymond, 2005: 16), however, the production of the tag question counteracts this implication as these tend to display deference to epistemic privilege of the recipient (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). The onset of Cheryl’s ‘Oh I know’ occurs concurrently with the onset of Karen’s tag question resulting in overlap. The onset of her turn displays that Cheryl had projected the completion of Karen’s turn after ‘kids’ (line 2). The deployment of ‘oh’ (line 3) before her agreement serves to claim that she had separate access to knowledge about Jane’s experience with kids and that she had independently already arrived at that conclusion (Heritage, 2002).

Cheryl provides an upgraded second assessment (‘Jane’s had loads of experience’, lines 3-4), which does agreement with Karen’s prior (Pomerantz, 1984). However, Cheryl’s use of Jane’s name at line 3 is a locally initial reference form in locally subsequent position (Schegloff, 1996), which indicates disagreement with Karen’s claim to greater knowledge of Jane.

Cheryl continues with ‘an she’s act-' (line 4) and, given what occurs later in Cheryl’s turn, it is likely that this was heading towards ‘and she’s actually got two kids’ or something similar. The cut off on what is hearable as the beginning of ‘actually’ indicates that Cheryl treats this as new information for Karen and counter to what Karen might expect (Clift, 1999). However, Cheryl’s cut off indicates some problem with this projected formulation and in the repaired version Cheryl prefices ‘her kids’ (line 5) with ‘what Jane calls’ (lines 4-5). With the reference form ‘what Jane calls her kids’, Cheryl simultaneously displays her understanding that Jane claims to be a mother but that she (Cheryl) does not endorse Jane’s claim to motherhood. Instead the kids that Jane reportedly claims as her own are reassigned as ‘Annie’s kids’ (Annie is Jane’s ex-partner). In addition to undermining Jane’s claim to motherhood, the participants in this talk are drawing on and reproducing normative understandings of familial life (i.e., that children have only one mother) and what it means to be a mother (i.e., to have given birth to those children).
Karen and Cheryl's focus on Jane’s extensive ‘experience’ (lines 1 & 4) with children, and Cheryl’s report that Jane has ‘been round them since they were very very young’ gives less credit than that of a mother. Although sometimes one member of a lesbian couple may have a child without the other opting to take a co-parenting role (Saffron, 1994), this is not the case here: Cheryl displays an awareness of Jane’s claim to motherhood. Despite this, Cheryl explicitly rejects Jane’s definition of herself as a parent to Danni and Dean, re-characterising the children as ‘Annie’s kids’ (line 5).

A lesbian’s reported claim to be a mother is recognised and denied. This is particularly disconcerting because the speaker who does this is a lesbian who has raised children with her same-sex partner (see Fragment 11).

Conclusions

In this chapter I showed – contrary to research on covering – that the participants in this study at least do routinely make apparent their own (and others’) counter-(hetero)normative sexuality in talk with family and friends. I demonstrated that speakers can index their own (and others’) LGBT sexuality without it (necessarily) being oriented to or foregrounded. In contrast to the notion that LGBT people are ‘flaunting’ our sexuality when we make it apparent, I have showed that this is not always the case. I also demonstrate that and how speakers can ‘give off’ LGBT sexuality without it being ‘coming out’. I have identified three methods for doing this: (1) indexing partners and families; (2) referring to LGBT events; and (3) applying a label. However, it is not that these practices are designated to the use of indexing counter-(hetero-)normative sexuality without coming out: indeed, all of these methods can be employed as resources to do coming out. Rather, it is the context in which they are deployed which allows for sexuality to be indexed without causing disruption or coming out. That is, recipient-design considerations are integral to the possibility of such practices being deployed without doing anything special. Recipients must
already know about the counter-(hetero)normative sexuality of the speaker or the spoken about (or it must be anticipatable) for this type of deployment to be usable and unremarkable.

The three practices for making available a hearing of an individual as non-heterosexual I have identified in this chapter are not an exhaustive list. In addition to non-verbal methods, there are likely to be other verbal practices (such as indexing category bound attributes perhaps). These methods are not universally available to all LGBT speakers and there are systematic differences in this availability.

The most common way in which speakers make available a hearing of themselves or others as heterosexuals (i.e., reference to heterosexual relationships, Kitzinger, 2005b) is also a practice by which speakers index their own and others' lesbian and gay sexuality. This method does not involve direct reference to sexuality categories, but rather by referring to partners (potential, current, past or future) recipients are able to infer the sexuality of the speaker or spoken about. As a consequence of this, it is likely that this practice is deployed more frequently by speakers with current partners (although not exclusively so). Additionally, and more significantly, this method relies upon and reproduces a binary understanding of sex such that it may be only available to lesbian, gay, and heterosexual individuals. A hearing of someone as bisexual may be possible if the recipient already knows that person to be bisexual (otherwise it is likely to make hearable the individual as lesbian/gay or heterosexual) but I do not have access to data to support such a supposition. Because, transgender, transsexual, and intersexual individuals disrupt this binary understanding of sex, this method is not usable to indicate such sexualities.

The second practice for making apparent sexuality is not restricted to those who are (or were or will be) in couple relationships, however, it is only usable by those people who are participants in or associates of LGBT (or variants there of) groups or events. By referring to an association with such an event or group, a speaker provides a hearing of themselves or the spoken about as LGBT by relying on recipients inferences. This practice may make available a hearing of
an individual as a member of a specific sexuality category (e.g., if it is a ‘transgender group’ or ‘lesbian night’) or it may index counter-(hetero)normative sexuality generically (e.g., ‘LGBT committee’ or ‘queer group’). Although, the latter case might still make hearable a specific sexuality providing the recipient already knows the individual to be a member of a particular sexual category (see Fragment 13).

The third practice examined in this chapter involves labelling individuals (either first, second, or third persons) with a sexuality category. This practice does not rely on recipients' inferences, but rather sexuality is spelled out. In so doing sexuality is, to a greater extent that the former two practices, foregrounded. However, categorisation often may not be the only action embodied in this labelling (see Chapters 5 & 6). This method allows a broad array of sexuality categories to be made apparent and it is not restricted by constraints such as having a partner or involvement in an LGBT community.

This talk that makes apparent LGBT sexuality without topicalising it or without it disrupting the ongoing business of the interaction empirically shows that for these speakers being LGBT is to some extent normalised. But this is strictly tied to recipient-design considerations, which is not the case for heterosexuals. Furthermore, these speakers cannot be taken as representative of all LGBT people.

In this talk, sexuality is not only being made apparent, rather, speakers are also drawing on taken-for-granted understandings of the relevance and nature of sexuality categories and their members. These resources are also implicated in the cultural reproduction of shared-in-common meanings. For example, there is asymmetrical labelling of sexuality such that speakers do not routinely label their own and others' heterosexuality, whereas – as Fragments 13-19 show – this is not the case for those who are not heterosexual. This displays that participants orient to non-heterosexuality as marked or the LGBT person as other and, by implication, this produces and reconstitutes heterosexuality as normative.
Similarly, talk in which sexuality is made apparent through reference to relationships displays and reproduces culturally normative understandings of such relationships. In Fragments 1-12 speakers invoke same-sex couple relationships and the smooth running of the talk is not disrupted, thereby producing a context in which this is ‘routine’ and ‘normalized’ (Seidman et al., 1999). Additionally, in these fragments (1-12) speakers and recipients appear to have shared and taken-for-granted understandings about what it means to be a couple. But, this is not always the case. In the talk in Fragments 20-22 and 24-25 participants share positive understandings of official recognition for same-sex relationships. However, they also show that there is an ongoing awareness of same-sex marriage as potentially problematic (Fragment 20) and that enquiries pertaining to official recognition of same-sex couple relationships can be problematic and confusing (Fragment 21). In Fragments 22 and 23 there is a difference between Rebecca’s treatment of her father’s partner with regards to her understanding of ‘family’ and Dad’s treatment of Rebecca’s partner with respect to his conception of ‘family’. It is not certain that this difference is attributable to the different-sex couple/same-sex couple distinctions; however, it is certainly a potential hearing. In talk about having children, problems arise when methods of parenting deviate from the (heterosexual) norm. This may be through raising children outside the shared culturally understanding of a ‘couple’ such as a social and sexual unit in which children are produced (Fragment 24) or by relying on and reproducing shared-in-common notions that children have only one mother and she is the woman who gave birth to those children (Fragment 25). So, in each of these fragments of naturalistic interaction, a kinship relationship (a marriage, motherhood, in-law status) based on a lesbian or gay couple is claimed by one party and rejected by another. The rejections are not hostile or aggressive: they are based on apparent incredulity (Fragment 20), a lesbian’s reassessment of her friend’s relationship (Fragment 25) and a parental tease (Fragment 22). Yet, collectively, these repeated and routine challenges to kinship terminology based on same-sex couples function to deny lesbians’ own definitions of our kinship relations, and to exclude us from social understandings of ‘family’.
In this chapter, as in the previous two chapters, I have explored how sexuality categories and other issues relating to sexuality can be explored in talk-in-interaction. I have shown how speakers orient to and make apparent their membership in sexuality categories in their everyday lives. In the next chapter, I show that sexuality is not always relevant by demonstrating that the talk in the Land corpus is not ‘lesbian and gay talk’ simply by virtue of having been produced by lesbians and gay men.
Chapter 5
When is a Lesbian Not a Lesbian?
Categorisation in Talk-in-Interaction

Introduction

In this chapter, I will focus on the ways in which speakers orient to their own and their recipients’ category memberships. Both membership categorisation analysis (MCA) and conversation analysis (CA) grew out of ethnomethodology. Although they initially followed different lines of development (Hester & Eglin, 1997a), more recently researchers have begun to draw on the analytic insight of both in understanding the ways in which categorisation as an action – and also as an unintended by-product of other action – is achieved in talk-in-interaction (e.g., Stokoe, 2004; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). It has been argued that analysis of sequence and analysis of categorization are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Watson, 1997: 73). In this chapter, I will draw on the insights from both fields of study.

Traditionally, research within the interdisciplinary field of lesbian and gay studies has analysed talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers (such as my data set) for what it reveals about lesbian and gay talk. For example, Morgan and Wood (1995) maintain ‘[w]hen lesbians get together, we talk; we listen to and share the details of our lives... to create a conversational space that is uniquely lesbian’ (p. 235). For them, conversation between lesbian speakers on topics ranging from umbrellas used in childhood to the ingredients used to prepare packed lunches are lesbian topics by virtue of their shared membership in the category ‘lesbian’ (p.248). They claim that co-narration and collusion in the talk on these topics build unity that ‘strengthen[s] our identity as lesbians’ (ibid.). Therefore, every conversation between lesbian speakers is a lesbian conversation by virtue of the speakers’ pre-existing lesbianism and, as such, membership in
the category ‘lesbian’ is implicated simply because they are members of this category.

But, it is also the case that each of the speakers in the conversation analysed by Morgan and Wood were women. So, it is equally logical and plausible that another researcher could use the same conversation as an example of women’s conversation, through which the speakers build unity as women. Furthermore, there are likely to be many more categories shared in common between the speakers, such that these could also be used as a basis for analytical investigation. Since every individual can be described as a member of more than one category, how can we select one over another? Sacks (1972a) noted the multiple category memberships of speakers in the course of explicating how people come to be categorised in particular ways. However, it was not until Schegloff (1997) highlighted the analytical implications of this in his well-known article, ‘Whose text? Whose context?’, that there has been a concerted effort to address this problem. Since then several analysts have seriously attended to this as a problem and undertaken to provide a warrant for describing participants as members of any particular category given that any one person can be reasonably described under a range of categories (e.g. Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Kitzinger, 2000; Speer, 2005a; Stokoe, 2005; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003; Zimmerman, 2005).

Participants’ orientations to category membership

As analysts, we may have an interest in selecting one category membership as the most salient. The recruitment of volunteers from specific social categories to record their calls for this research indicate a preoccupation with studying talk for what it reveals about sexuality and issues pertaining to lesbian and gay lives. However, it is inadequate to characterise these speakers as relevantly lesbian or gay all of the time when that is simply not the case for the individuals. Therefore, in line with Sacks’ (1972a) and Schegloff’s (1997) recommendations, I characterise speakers according to how the participants orient to their category
memberships. Many researchers examining categorisation – researchers from MCA to CA to discourse analysis (DA) – have argued for the importance of adhering to participants’ orientations since speakers can be categorised in multiple different ways. In this chapter I will demonstrate that it is not just that people can be situated as members of various categories but that they are categorised as such in everyday talk-in-interaction.

In most of the research on categorisation the focus is on the way in which non-present third parties are categorised. Sacks’ well-known paper (1972b) analysing ‘The baby cried. The mommy picked it up’ focuses on the achievement of categorisation through the use of person reference forms. From this early work to more recent categorisation work in CA, MCA and DA (e.g., Edwards, 1998; Stokoe, 2004; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003), investigation into the categorisation of third persons not present in the interaction has been the focus. Furthermore, the method for doing this categorisation has predominantly been achieved through the use of person reference forms. By contrast, although I will also examine this type of categorising (in Chapter 6), in this chapter I will focus on the ways in which speakers locate themselves and their recipients as members of particular categories in the course of talk-in-interaction.

Although there has been less sustained investigation into the ways in which speakers categorise themselves and their interlocutors some researchers have done this. Berard (2005) examined how category memberships were invoked and made relevant between two participants in a televised interview. The analysis focuses on the talk of Mary Daly and Jack Dunn in an interview with Katie Couric. Daly, a feminist professor, was justifying her decision to exclude male students from her women’s studies classes, and Dunn, representing Boston College, was challenging her position. Berard showed that these speakers

1 It is not entirely clear whether Daly’s invocation of Dunn’s categorical memberships (and Dunn’s of Daly) were really cases of other-categorising since it is not always transparent whether their talk was directed to each other or the interviewer or the audience. It is nonetheless included here because the other person being categorised is co-present and, therefore, always an overhearing party, such that it is consequential for the ongoing interactional episode in which both speakers are participants.
categorised themselves and each other in the multiple categories of sex, class, and age in the pursuit of their argumentative ends. West and Fenstermaker (2002) examined instances of self-categorisation and other-categorisation in a University of California Board of Regents meeting on the possibility of ending affirmative action programmes. They found that 'participants' self-categorizations invoke those normative conceptions to which "someone like me" should be held accountable, and their other-categorizations invoked those to which "someone like you" should be held accountable' (West & Fenstermaker, 2002: 164). Therefore, speakers in the meeting labelled their membership in race and sex categories such that their subsequent talk was accountable as the talk of a person who was representative of the category that they had claimed membership. These two studies are similar insofar as they use data taken from institutional settings in which debates are taking place about categories of people. This does not mean that the speakers' social category memberships are therefore inherently relevant to the proceedings. Indeed, West and Fenstermaker refer to many instances in which speakers did not invoke categorical memberships and as such they deemed it inappropriate to judge them in terms of any perceived category. But, the topic of the talk in the data used in these two studies is likely to create an environment where categories are potentially more likely to be treated as relevant.

However, participants' category memberships are also invoked in environments in which the topic is not associated with social categories. In the course of investigating the production of culture through talk, Kitzinger (2006a) shows how a caller to a homebirth help line produces herself variously as someone who is 'British' and someone with an 'Indian background' and how, through the negotiation of the caller and the call taker, inferences about the call taker's cultural category membership can be made (both by the caller and the analyst). Although this is also an institutional context, it is not one in which categories are the topic of the talk. Rather, these categorisations take place in the course of a help line conversation in which the caller's upcoming planned homebirth is being discussed. The invocation of category memberships in environments in which there is no presupposition of the relevance of categories potentially provides the most fertile ground for exploring the use of categorisations as it arises in the
course of achieving some other local interactional goal. It is this type of spontaneous categorisation of speaker or recipient that I will be exploring in this chapter.

**Methods of categorising**

It is important not only to demonstrate *that* categorisation is done but also to show *how* it is done (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). There are potentially many different methods participants can use to invoke their own or their recipients’ categorical memberships. For example, speakers may do so through allusion, or through the use of titles or address terms, or by invoking category-bound attributes or predicates. Categories may be indexed with or without naming the category (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). Psathas (1999) examined institutional talk for how it was constituted as institutional talk. He found that “[m]embership categorization is shown to be a process ongoingly produced and oriented to by the parties and not necessarily an explicit naming or describing of oneself, or the other, with the name of a category from some collection’ (p.156). However, in this chapter I will focus on occasions in which speakers name the category (such as ‘woman’ ‘student’ and ‘gay male’) and in most of the examples the speakers dedicate talk specifically to the action of locating themselves and/or their recipient in those categories (such as ‘I’m a schizophrenic’ and ‘We’re all queer’).

I am, however, not suggesting that the only way in which speakers orient to their own and their recipient’s membership in particular categories as salient is through labelling their membership using the category name (see Kitzinger 2005b; Land & Kitzinger, 2005, for analyses of talk in which sexuality categories are produced as relevant without naming the category). This would be far too limiting and would miss the more delicate aspects of the art of categorising in talk-in-interaction. The reason that I am limiting this investigation to such overt examples is because the focus of the chapter is to look at the way in which
different categories are oriented to in different interactional contexts and these blatant examples illustrate that point most clearly.

**Data used in existing categorisation research**

Research focusing on the meaning and application of categories related to sexuality in talk has overwhelming relied on reports gathered predominantly from interviews or focus groups. Mills and White (1997) who examined, for example, what it means to be located in the categories ‘lesbian’ or ‘heterosexual’ and the meaning related to being a visible incumbent of that category. Their findings suggested a known-in-common ‘lesbian prototype’ (Mills & White, 1997: 231), which includes attributes such as ‘butch’ (p.231) and ‘radical’ (p.232) but these abstract characteristics do not necessary map onto instances in which individuals are actually located in the category ‘lesbian’). Such research does not contribute to understanding how these terms are used in situ, neither does it reveal the meanings imbued in the terms in actual use.

Other researchers have shown a greater sensitivity to the local context in which these categorisations are produced and are less likely to treat the interviewees’ or focus group participants’ words as a reflection of their actual beliefs or understandings of categorical applications, but, rather, as an interactional achievement or resource for performing actions in talk. Watson and Weinberg (1982) used interview data to investigate how the production of their male participants in the categories ‘homosexual’ and ‘bisexual’ occurred over the course of interviews with a ‘straight’ interviewer. However, they showed

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2 Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2003) also analysed focus group talk in their study of positioning. They showed how membership in categories ‘heterosexual’ and ‘lesbian’ became interactionally relevant for the participants. However, unlike the research presented above the theme of the focus group was not organised with reference to sexual category membership. Rather, the relevance of these categories emerged spontaneously in the course of talk focused on the experiences of women who had breast cancer. Furthermore, the data were not collected in order to study positioning. Instead, this was a phenomenon that was not contrived and arose by chance. This, then, offers the opportunity to examine categorisation in a naturalistic sense.
recognition of CA concerns such as turn-taking and understood the interview setting invoked particular rules of application similar to those observed in CA research that examines institutional talk. Widdicome (1998) examined how people who are potentially visibly analysable as members of specific youth subcultures come to categorise – or not – their category membership in response to interviewers’ questions. Similarly, Speer (2005b) used pictorial prompts of people engaged in leisure activities conventionally not associated with their gender ‘as a resource to provoke and facilitate discussion of gender issues’ (p.70).

Although these studies are influenced by MCA and CA, the data that they use is – to a greater or lesser extent – manipulated by the researcher by the use of questions or prompts. The use of naturalistic data provides a much more insightful means of investigating the way in which categorisation is achieved in the everyday social world. Eglin and Hester (1999) aimed to analyse the actual speech of the terrorist who carried out the Montreal Massacre. However, they had to rely on reported versions of what the terrorist said which does not provide a reliable source of the content of the talk and cannot possibly begin to retain the features of the production of that talk.

**Categorising as a local interactional activity**

I am not suggesting that alternative categorical membership ceases to be when speakers are foregrounding another category. The people being categorised in the interactional episodes I explore in this chapter continue to be lesbian or gay even when membership in some other category is relevant. I will look at how evidence of their sexual categories is woven into interaction where an alternative category is taking centre stage and vice versa.

Research on categorisation originating in ethnomethodological or social constructionist work has conceptualised the production of category membership as part of the local interaction, that is, produced in the talk rather than pre-
existing social categories that can map directly onto the speakers a priori. Hester and Eglin suggest that:

Contrary, then, to the decontextualized conception of membership categorization as pre-existing structures or 'devices', ethnomethodology stresses that membership categorization is an activity carried out in particular local circumstances. Membership categorization devices or collections are therefore to be regarded as in situ achievements of members' practical actions and practical reasoning (Hester & Eglin, 1997a: 21).

However, as I highlighted in Chapter 1, research has frequently fallen into the trap of assuming that we can see the way in which doing being a woman or doing being a lesbian, for example, is accomplished by examining the talk of women or lesbians. In this way a circular argument is reached whereby the researchers start out 'knowing' the category of the speaker and then everything that they produce is treated as an example of the production of that categorical membership. For example, in her study of a conversation between two lovers Channell (1997) asks 'apart from the obvious references to sex and love, what other features does the conversation have which mark it out as being the talk of two people who are in a close, loving and sexual relationship' (p. 145). This work examines how the category 'lover' or something similar is produced or enacted in the talk but it starts out 'knowing' that they are lovers and then finding evidence for this in the talk.

I also want to examine the way in which categories do not remain static such that participants can be said to 'have' certain category memberships which they carry around with them that can be drawn upon, by them or their interlocutors at any given moment. Rather, identities are worked up in interaction and this means that the same speaker may treat participants as members of two mutually exclusive categories as the interaction unfolds. Indeed, actually being a member of a category is not a prerequisite to being treated as a member of that category.
For example, Schegloff (2002) demonstrated the application of the category 'bartender' to a participant who was not actually a member of that category in pursuit of a request for that participant to perform behaviour associated with bartenders (i.e., passing a beer). Similarly, effeminate, heterosexual men are frequently categorised as 'gay' – and face prejudice associated with the category – since they display characteristics that are commonly associated with gay men (Bergling, 2001).

**Invoking attributes**

Sacks (1972b) identified category-bound activities. He 'notice[d] that many activities are taken by members to be done by some particular or several particular categories of members' (p.335). Work on these activities has been prominent in MCA but less thoroughly explored in CA research. Schegloff suggests that Sacks' abandonment of category-bound activities in his later work was due to 'an incipient 'promiscuous' use of them' (Schegloff, 1995a: xlii). The notion of category-bound activities has been extended to include category-bound predicates, which are the rights, expectations and obligations that are associated with incumbents of a given category (Watson, 1978). All of these characteristics associated with a category are often referred to as category-bound attributes.

Drawing on MCA, researchers sometimes impute understandings that are external to the data in defining category-bound activities (e.g., Wowk, 1984: 76-77, refers to 'the activities and attributes we 'normally' associate with a female'). Similarly, Stokoe maintains 'the category 'postman' infers 'driving a red van' and 'delivering mail' (Stokoe, 2004: 10), but these attributes are analyst-inferred in relation to an abstract category and this is not necessarily applicable in actual instances of the deployment of the category (for example, these attributes are not likely to be – or may not be – relevant when a postman states his occupation on a mortgage application). Likewise, Berard supposes 'public relations professional'
invokes ‘manipulative’ or ‘biased’ (Berard, 2005: 71), and Edwards speculates about the attributes associated with ‘woman’ and ‘girl’ (Edwards, 1998).

From a CA perspective, the meanings of categories are indexically derived. I will show that participants are oriented to the fact that invocation of a category membership is often not sufficient to convey the appropriate category-bound attributes they are seeking to make relevant. By examining one example I will show how speakers modify what they are saying to make clear what it is about the category they are drawing attention to. Moreover, the attributes associated with categories are not static; when speakers use categories they are continually refreshing and reproducing the attributes associated with that category. In this way we can see that culture is produced through the talk (Hester & Eglin, 1997c; Kitzinger, 2005b).

**Overview of the chapter**

In this chapter I will treat participants’ orientations to category membership as central and examine categories in their interactional context. By doing this, I will demonstrate that it is not just that people can be situated as members of various categories but that they are categorised as such in everyday talk-in-interaction. I will show that just because this is data produced by lesbian and gay speakers that does not mean that it is produced by them as lesbian and gay speakers. Rather, I will show that sometimes they are relevantly lesbian or gay and sometimes they are not. In the first section I will examine instances in which speakers label themselves as members of different categories. I will analyse the actions the participants achieve by doing this categorisation. I will show that speakers do not necessarily cease to be members of categories just because some other category is being oriented to as the most salient in that interaction. That is, membership in alternative categories other than the one being foregrounded are often evident in the talk.
In the second section I will show a speaker categorising her recipient as member to two different categories in the same interactional episode. In this section I will also examine how speakers come to be categorised as a member of two different categories that are often considered mutually exclusive.

Finally, I will briefly consider how category-bound attributes are being produced and reproduced in these interactional episodes. I will also examine the way in which speakers do not necessarily treat invocation of a category membership as sufficient to convey the appropriate category-bound attributes they are seeking to make relevant. In so doing, I will show how speakers modify what they are saying to make clear what it is about the category they are drawing attention to.

**Self categorising**

Rebecca: ‘Schizophrenic’ and ‘Woman’

The following two data fragments involve the same speaker, Rebecca. In the first, she produces herself as a schizophrenic and, in the second, she produces herself as a woman. Rebecca is a member of the category ‘lesbian’ and her membership in this category is elsewhere in the corpus interactionally relevant (e.g., Rebecca’s lesbianism is apparent in Fragment 14 in Chapter 4). Yet, in neither of the fragments below, if the participants’ orientations are to guide understanding of the interaction, is her lesbianism the most salient category.

In Fragment 1, Rebecca has telephoned the Benefit Enquiry Line to request information to help her make a claim for Disability Living Allowance (DLA). Since FPPs doing offers are often preferred over those that do requesting, speakers frequently describe circumstances that may elicit an offer from their recipient to avoid having to produce a request (Schegloff, 1999c). Therefore,

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3 An information help line provided for people wishing to make enquiries about which government benefits (if any) they may be entitled to receive.

4 A government allowance paid to people with disabilities in the UK.
although Rebecca is telephoning to request information she does not do this directly. Rather, Rebecca’s descriptions of her problems (lines 5-20) are consistent with an elicitation of an offer, which is forthcoming from the call taker at lines 32-3. In the course of this call her membership in the category ‘schizophrenics’ becomes relevant. Mental illness labels, such as schizophrenia, have been disproportionately and improperly applied to women as a form of social control. Feminist concerns have been twofold: first, how mental illnesses are socially constructed such that women have been disproportionately labelled and how this is a form of social control; and, second, the stigmatising effects and powerlessness of being categorised as a person with a mental illness. Dorothy Smith (1978), in her well-known study, describes the process through which ‘K’ comes to be categorised as mentally ill. She explains how the techniques employed by K’s friends in their talk in interviews about K’s behaviour serve to construct her (K’s) behaviour such that the only logical conclusion for speakers and listeners is that K is mentally ill. Chesler (1972) argued that being labelled as suffering from a mental illness such as schizophrenia could be the result of behaviour deemed inappropriate for women and therefore this categorisation is one form of social control exercised over women. Significantly, these studies have investigated how people have become categorised as mentally ill, yet in Fragment 1 Rebecca adopts that label in relation to herself and for purposes that serve her pragmatic objective of the interaction.

Fragment 1 REBECCA: SCHIZOPRENIC
[Land: SW53]
01 ring, ring-ring
02 Ctr: Good afternoon. = Benefit enquiry line. = My
03 name is James. = How can [I help
04 Reb: [.hnh (Oh/Hello) yeah
05 uhm: I’m not actually sure what I’m entitled to.=
06 Uhm .hh I’m uhm uhm tcht off work now. I have
07 been off work since November. .hh A:nd (.)
08 they’ve signed me off uhm on indefinite
09 sick until uhm (. ) October the twenty
10 ninth two thousand and fou:r. .hnh I’m only
11 getting income suppor:rt. And my- I’ve been to
12 my psychologist today and I see a
13 psychiatrist. .hh But the thing is I
14 can’t go out alone. = I have to get taxis
Chapter 5: When is a lesbian not a lesbian?

everywhere and I'm finding it very hard
.hhhhh to live. On the money. hh And they-
they('ve) said that I should be entitled to
disability living allowance? = But I (.)
y'know I don't know what I'm entitled
to.

Ctr: >Oh okay yeah.< Disability living
allowance is paid to people who 'ave
problems either wi:th >y'know< mobility
getting about or their personal care needs.

Reb: Yeah=

Ctr: =(An' it) it can be paid to people who
have uh y'know mental health prob[lems
[Well
that's it. = I'm a schizophrenic.

Reb: 'Yeah'

Ctr: (.)

Reb: So I- D'you want me to send the forms out for
you?

Reb: Yes ple:a:se

After her initial claim to be unsure what she is entitled to (line 5), she explains the individual circumstances that have led to her wanting to make a claim (lines 16-8) and then re-does her claim not to know what she is entitled to (lines 18-20). This formulation of her problems and stated lack of knowledge about her eligibility conveys to the call taker her reason for calling the help line. The call taker receipts this and then, rather than addressing her particular situation, he explains who is eligible to receive DLA by providing categories of people who are eligible. The first category produced as eligible is 'people with problems either with mobility getting about or their personal care needs' (lines 21-4). The unpacking of 'mobility' (line 23) as 'getting about' (lines 23-4) is attentive to possibility that this word may be ambiguous to Rebecca. By clarifying this term, the call taker treats 'getting about' as something that is not routinely included in the definition of mobility (possibly orienting to a more usual understanding of 'mobility' as the ability to walk and movement of the body more generally), however, in this instance it is interpreted more broadly. This is recipient-designed for the problem Rebecca has presented to the call taker. In her description of her situation at the beginning of the call she has described not being able to 'go out alone' (line 14) and the necessity of her 'hav[ing] to get
taxis’ (line 14). The call taker’s unpacking of ‘mobility’ then is attentive to Rebecca’s specific situation. The words the call taker selects (‘getting about’, line 24) also echo those used by Rebecca previously (‘go out alone’ and ‘have to get taxis’, line 14), which provides further evidence for the call taker’s attentiveness to Rebecca’s problem presentation.

Given that the two problems that comprise the eligibility criteria are mobility difficulties and problems with personal care needs, the call taker’s orientation to the criteria under which Rebecca is likely to be entitled to receive DLA (given the presentation of her situation) is displayed in this unpacking of the term ‘mobility’. Rebecca receipts the call taker’s turn with a minimal response (line 25). The call taker continues by producing a second category of people who may be eligible to receive DLA, ‘people who have...mental health problems’ (lines 26-7). These people are a subset of the first category. In the first instance the call taker informed Rebecca who ‘is paid’ (line 22) DLA. In the second instance she explains who ‘can be paid’ (line 26). This second category of people can receive DLA but only if they also fit the category in the first instance. However, the addition of the category is attentive to recipient design concerns since this category provides a much closer ‘fit’ to the situation Rebecca has described at the outset (e.g., psychologist and psychiatrist). Rebecca begins in overlap with the end of the call taker’s turn (line 28) and this early onset is evidence that Rebecca treats herself as a member of this category much more easily than the initial category produced by the call taker. She labels herself as ‘a schizophrenic’ (line 29). By positioning herself as a member of a category included under the umbrella category of ‘people who have...mental health problems’ (lines 26-7) she makes a bid to forward the action she is pursuing (i.e. being accepted as someone who is entitled to make a claim for DLA). Rebecca’s production of herself as a member of the category ‘schizophrenics’ displays her understanding that it is under these auspices that she is eligible to make a claim. Even though it is not the illness but rather the effects of the illness that are taken into account in paying the benefit the call taker treats this as sufficient and then continues with the process of attaining the necessary resources from Rebecca to enable her to make a claim.
It has been argued that ‘[t]he danger of the insanity ascription for the would-be rational actor is that it removes the agency from the actor’s acts’ (Eglin and Hester, 1999: 259). Yet, here, Rebecca claims this mental illness category for herself and by so doing she does not remove agency, but rather forwards the action towards her interactional goal.

Rebecca and the call taker are unknown to one another prior to the call so when Rebecca labels herself as ‘a schizophrenic’ this is new information and the only definite category membership that is available to the call taker. However, speakers also label themselves as members of categories when speaking to recipients for whom this membership is not news. This is the case in Fragment 2, in which Rebecca is doing a news telling. The sequence opens at line 1 in which Rebecca begins telling her mother about her proposal for her new business.

Fragment 2  REBECCA: WOMAN
[Land:SW76]
01 Reb: .huh An’ names- uh (na-/m-) Steve has already
02 named my company
03 (0.5)
04 Mum: ’As ’e?
05 Reb: Ye:s.
06 (.)
07 Mum: [ (Wh-)]
08 Reb: [For me.]
09 Mum: Who?
10 Reb: Steve.= My psychologis[t.
11 Mum:                [Yeah what’s he named
12 Reb: BOAST ABOUT YOUR HOUSE
13 (1.2)
14 Mum: ’Boast about your house.’
15 Reb: Yeah. B’cause I’ll be doing painting an’
16 decorat[ing won’t I?]
17 Mum:                     [Of cou:urse y]eah. That’s right. Yeah
18 Reb: That’s (a) good one i’n’t it?
19 Mum: Yeah that is a good. O[ne.
20 Reb:                   [Yeah.
21 Mum: Yea[h. Mm (right)
22 Reb: (((sniff))) ((cough)))So that’s what I’m gonna
23 call it
Mum: Good. Oh well that's-
Reb: [ Make little cards up and
Mum: [ Yeah. Yeah. That's right
Reb: Specially for like elderly women because they might rather
Mum: I Yes yes [ That's true
Reb: [ Mm I
Mum: Oh well that's good then.
Reb: [ Do it cheap if they
Mum: [ Yeah
Reb: Yeah. That's right love. Yeah oh well
Reb: So yeah no other news. I'm going to do
Lorraine's housework today ((continues))

This sequence focuses on Rebecca's announcement regarding a possible name for her proposed painting and decorating business. This telling is produced as one of a string of items under the heading 'news'. Rebecca initiates the sequence with a pre-announcement that identifies what is to be announced and who made the suggestion (lines 1-2). Mum’s ritualised surprise (‘Has he?’ line 4) marks the newsworthiness of Rebecca’s turn (Drew, 2003b) and forwards the sequence by providing what is analysably a go-ahead. Rebecca provides confirmation (line 5) and then adds an increment to her initial turn (line 8). Rebecca's opening turn embodies the assumptions that Rebecca’s proposed ‘company’ (line 2) is not news to Mum and that Mum knows who Dave is (since this is a recognitional reference form). As it turns out, despite Mum's forwarding action in line 3 (thereby claiming recognition of ‘Dave’), Mum cannot identify the person who Rebecca has referred to as is evidenced by her repair initiation (line 9). Rebecca reproduces the same reference term (‘Dave’, line 10) and then an alternative characterisation (‘My psychologist’, line 10). Mum's confirmation, ‘Yeah’ (line 11), does not claim that this is new information rather it displays her to have already known this despite the repair initiation. It may be that Mum’s initial problem with recognising the person to whom Rebecca has referred is because, despite knowing that Dave is Rebecca’s psychologist, it initially seemed
implausible to her that he would have named Rebecca’s business. If this were the case, then here Mum would be treating ‘naming a client’s company’ as not a category-bound attribute associated with ‘psychologists’.

Mum finally produces what is hearable as the beginning of a go-ahead to Rebecca’s pre-announcement (‘what’s he named’, line 11). Before Mum completes her turn, Rebecca produces the announcement (‘Boast about your house’). This name incorporates a pun since Rebecca’s surname is ‘Boast’ (pseudonized to retain some of the flavour of the original) and her proposed business involves painting and decorating. After a gap of over a second (line 13), Mum quietly repeats Rebecca’s announcement. Rebecca displays her analysis that Mum has not understood the announcement and why she has not understood. That is, Rebecca treats Mum as not having remembered what kind of business she has previously proposed. We can see this because she unpacks the announcement (lines 15-16). Rebecca does not explain the choice of the word ‘Boast’ thereby displaying her understanding that Mum will have understood why this term was chosen (it is not clear whether or not Mum did understand this). They then progress to topic talk about Rebecca’s proposed business.

It is in the course of this topic talk that Rebecca makes relevant her categorical membership as a woman. In this instance, she does not claim membership in the category with ‘I’m a woman’ or something similar. Rather, she makes a claim about another category of people: ‘elderly women’ (line 29). She claims that elderly women ‘might rather have a woman doing … their houses up’ (lines 29-30). In addition to the characteristics she is attributing to elderly women, Rebecca is also saying something about the category ‘women’ (i.e., that women are preferred over men by elderly women when choosing someone to decorate their houses). Unlike in Fragment 1 where Rebecca overtly labels herself (‘I’m a schizophrenic’, line 29), in this extract her self-categorisation is more subtle – a form comparable to that used in Fragment 1 would be ‘I’m a woman’ – but it is not attended to as troublesome by either speaker or recipient. It is the interactional context and the attention to recipient design that contribute towards this being heard unproblematically as indexing Rebecca’s membership in the
category 'women'. This understanding is dependent on the participants’ shared taken-for-granted knowledge that Rebecca is a woman. This method for categorising requires a recipient to hear a statement about a category (or categories) of people and then work out that the speaker is invoking her membership in that category. So, when Rebecca says ‘specially for like elderly women because they might rather have a woman doing...their houses up’ (lines 28-30) she is requiring Mum to achieve the logical conclusion, that is, ‘Rebecca is a woman’ therefore ‘elderly women might rather have Rebecca (rather than a man) doing their houses up’.

Mum de-genders and therefore broadens the category to include all elderly people (suggesting it is their age that is salient to preferring a woman decorator and not their gender). Mum, however, does not contest the relevance of Rebecca’s production of herself as a woman.

Since Mum already knows why Rebecca meets with a psychologist, when Rebecca mentions her psychologist in the course of this sequence (lines 1 & 10) she refreshes this information and thereby makes available her membership in the category ‘schizophrenics’. However, even though there is evidence of this in the talk, Rebecca is not oriented to her membership in this category as relevant here. Foregrounding her as a person with schizophrenia (as she does in other interactions, such as Fragment 1) would not achieve the same interactional outcome in this talk as her production of herself as a woman does. Although the suggested business name is built off Rebecca’s surname and it was she who invoked her membership in the category ‘women’ (rather than it being incorporated into the name), her psychologist could have suggested ‘Mad about your house’ as an alternative name for her painting and decorating business. In this case, the emphasis would have been on her mental illness. Having a woman about the house is built as a promotional point for a painting and decorating business – particularly one that is aimed at the elderly. It is perhaps unlikely that having a schizophrenic around the house (even though this would also be the case – Rebecca does not stop being ‘a schizophrenic’ just because some other category is made salient) would be produced as a selling point. The invocation of this category membership in this interaction would have been potentially
detrimental to the business underway — that is, promoting her business to her mother.

Karen: ‘Queer’, ‘Committee Member’, and ‘Student’

In the following three data fragments the same speaker, Karen, categorises herself in three different ways: ‘queer’; ‘a committee member’; and ‘a student’. However, as these alternative category memberships are foregrounded in these different interactional contexts, it does not mean that the others cease to exist. As Fragment 2 illustrates, there is often evidence of these alternative category memberships in talk where an alternative category membership is being made relevant.

In the talk immediately prior to that reproduced as Fragment 3 Becky has told Karen she has started reading in preparation for the new term of their university course. This prompts Becky to tell Karen about a particularly good book she has been reading for the course. Karen displays recognition of the book Becky has recommended by checking the name (Peter) of the author. This prompts talk about the Peter’s work. As Fragment 3 opens it becomes apparent that Peter is known to them both personally. It turns out that Peter is also their personal tutor for the university course that they are both taking. In this sequence, Karen is telling Becky about the way in which other students on the course perceive Peter.

**Fragment 3 KAREN: QUEER**

[Land: NE21]

01 Kar: Some people 'ave- I mean some people are
02 quite down on 'im. = Some thee other day
03 were really pissed off abou' 'im. =
04 I thou- I thought I ca- I don't get
05 this at all 'cause 'e's only ever
06 been 'elpful wi' me.
07 Bec: I think 'e's lovely.
08 Kar: Mm.
09 Bec: 'E's really really ni:ce.
10 Kar: 'I do' = I- <To be honest [y'know I-]
11 Bec: [{ } per]sonal

233
Prior to this extract Karen and Becky have been talking about Peter’s work. Here, however, Karen begins a telling about how he is perceived by others personally. She reports some people do not like Peter (‘some people are quite
down on him', lines 1-2). She then refers to a specific occasion on which these people were 'really pissed off about him' (line 3). This upgrades her initial claim from 'quite down on 'im' (line 2) to 'really pissed off abou' 'im' (line 3). So far, those who are produced as not getting on with Peter are produced only in the most general category 'some people' (line 1). Peter is referred to with the locally subsequent reference form\(^5\) 'him', which produces this talk as linked with the prior where they have produced his name. 'Some people' (line 1), while not indexing specific individuals, does refer to people other than the speaker (i.e., Karen). We can see this articulated more clearly in the subsequent TCU in which she claims incomprehension about these people being 'pissed off' (line 3) with him and produces her own experiences with Peter as contrary to those she has described previously. For Karen, Peter has 'only ever been helpful' (lines 5-6).

Karen's assessment of Peter is marked as based on her experiences with him (lines 5-6). This assessment does not necessarily invalidate the opinions of those Karen has described as complaining about him. Becky's assessment, on the other hand, makes a claim about Peter's personality ('I think he's lovely', line 7) that extends beyond her own experience with him. Therefore, Becky aligns with Karen's position but upgrades her assessment by making a claim about Peter's characterological traits. Karen's weak agreement (line 8) is not heard as doing agreeing. Therefore, Becky upgrades her position with 'really really nice' (line 9), which elicits a fuller agreement from Karen ('I do', line 10).

At lines 11-12 Becky seeks confirmation that Peter is Karen's personal tutor, which perhaps refers to a closer relationship with him than other tutors on the course (therefore, giving greater weight to her knowledge about him than other students who may not have Peter as a personal tutor). Becky's question is produced partly in overlap with Karen's talk such that the subject of the question is obscured by the overlap. This provides an account for Karen checking who is being referred to with 'mine?' (line 13) although she proceeds to answer the

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\(^5\) See Sacks & Schegloff (1979) for an account of locally subsequent and locally initial reference forms.
question without providing opportunity for Becky's response. After Becky's acknowledgement (line 14), Karen reciprocates by seeking confirmation that Peter is also Becky's personal tutor. However, Becky provides this information simultaneously so that it is produced in overlap with Karen's FPP (line 15). This displays both speakers orienting to this information as relevant. Karen provides the name of a third party, Paula (line 17). By prefacing Paula's name with 'an' and adding a possessive 's' to her name, Karen produces Paula as someone who also has Peter as a personal tutor without having to articulate this fully.

Becky's laughter at line 20 displays a stance towards what they have been speaking about. It is not evident (to Karen or us as analysts) in the laughter here, but from what transpires next it is very likely that Becky is here orienting to their sexuality in common. Karen does not align with Becky by reciprocating her laughter; instead she issues a pre-telling FPP (line 21). However, Becky is still pursuing the prior talk - perhaps in response to Karen's lack of alignment or due to having analysed Karen's turn (line 21) as a bid to change topic and therefore as the last opportunity to make this point - and she does this in overlap with the end of Karen's turn. Becky's turn (lines 22-3) is only partially audible, but it appears that she is providing some explanation for her laughter (the laughter continues through this turn) and alluding to something that the three of them (Becky, Karen and Paula) share in common such that their all being Peter's students may have been arranged 'on purpose' (lines 22-3).

Karen reissues the pre-telling but adds 'with him' to the end of her talk (line 24). This makes unambiguous the link between Karen's proposed upcoming talk and the talk immediately prior. Becky responds to Karen's turn as a pre by producing a go-ahead to do the telling (line 25) and Karen prefaces her turn with 'well if you think about it' (line 26). This flags up the proposed upcoming telling as not news in the sense that it is something that Becky does not know; rather, Karen suggests with this, that the telling she has proposed is one that concerns a new perspective or connection based on information that is already mutually known. She is showing recognition that Becky has the necessary pre-existing knowledge to draw this connection herself. The utterance 'well if yih think about
it' (line 26) also marks the subsequent talk such that it is hearable as preliminary to the telling.

Karen’s subsequent units of talk work to unpack this initial TCU insofar as she articulates part of what it is that needs to be thought about to reach the conclusion to which she is gradually building. She restates that Becky ‘ged[s] on wi’ ‘im’ (line 27) and ‘so does Paula’ (line 29). She does not reiterate her liking for Peter but she includes herself in the connection she produces between them: ‘well we’re all queer’ (lines 30 & 32). Although this is not an unambiguously complete telling, Becky treats it as such. The inference is that membership in the category ‘queer’ is the solution to the puzzle regarding why some people get on with him and others do not even though Karen has not articulated it in these terms. She has identified some of the people she knows like him and then uses this category as a way of partitioning those people from those who do not like him.

Becky’s response at line 32 treats Karen’s telling/announcement as complete and responds to it. It is not (of course!) new information to Becky that she, Karen and Paula are queer. There is no news marker in Becky’s next turn. However, this cannot be accounted for merely by reference to this not being new information as Becky could have receipted Karen’s telling as ‘new’ because it produces a new connection. However, she does not do this. Rather, Becky confirms Karen’s connection and in doing so she aligns with Karen about the relevance of the category ‘queer’ on this occasion. Becky’s ‘yeah’ (line 32) is interspersed with laughter and she continues laughter after the completion of the turn. This laughter links with Becky’s earlier laughter (line 20) and retrospectively claims she made this connection.

Karen reciprocates Becky’s laughter and then continues with her telling by spelling out precisely what it would take for their sexuality to effectively partition those who like Peter from those who do not. That is, Karen speculates about the sexuality of those who have complained about him, suggesting that they may be straight. If this were the case then sexuality would effectively partition those who like him from those who do not. There is partitioning
constancy here – Karen, Becky, and Paula are all ‘queer’ but they also all have Peter as a personal tutor. When Karen selects a shared-in-common category membership that they all have that could account for why they get on with Peter she could therefore have selected ‘people who have Peter as a personal tutor’ and then she could have speculated about the possibility that the people who have a problem with him may not have him as a personal tutor (this would also seem the most consistent category to select given the just previous topic of the conversation). However, Karen selects membership in the category ‘queer’ as a possible explanation for why they get on with Peter and therefore speculates about the sexualities of the people who do not get on with him. Given that this is a possible instance of partitioning constancy, then, it is particularly interesting to see that Karen selects ‘queer’ as there could have been a (perhaps more obvious) choice of category to partition the three from the others. However, it is their sexuality that Karen identifies and in doing so she produces their sexuality as a relevant category for understanding their behaviour. But, the ‘coincidence’ of three ‘queers’ having been assigned the same personal tutor has already been remarked on by Becky (lines 22-23).

Karen’s ‘well’ (line 33) echoes the ‘well’ on line 29 and also builds the subsequent talk at the next step in her telling. The repeat of ‘yihknow what I wonder’ (line 34) links this turn to the pre-sequence FPP in line 24. By reinvoking in this way Karen claims that this is a continuation of the talk she projected at line 24 and thereby retrospectively treats what Becky has responded to as the end of the telling as incomplete. Given that Karen’s telling is analysably complete here, Becky’s response to it is relevantly absent in the 0.2 second gap that follows it. This lack of affiliation on Becky’s part could account for Karen’s subsequent back down in the next turn. Karen highlights that it is not a ‘straight/gay thing’ (lines 40-1), which is potentially hearable as a back down. Rather, she points to some aspect of the category that is relevant in this instance. It is not the case that all of the characteristics and attributes associated with being
'queer/gay' or 'straight' are relevant here. Karen is not suggesting that there is a quality inherent in queer/gay people that makes it more likely that they will get on with Peter. Rather, there is some connection with the way in which 'queer/gay' people are and the way in which Peter is. What Karen suggests is that one of the characteristics associated with Peter (i.e., understanding feminist practices and so on) and one of the characteristics shared by many of the people who are members of the category 'queer/gay' (i.e., 'if you're gay you're already facing them issues in your life all the fucking time anyway', lines 62 & 64-5) are compatible so that they result in a similar perspective on the world.

An abstract understanding of the category collection from which the category 'queer/gay' is taken would likely include other categories such as 'lesbian', 'heterosexual', 'transgender', 'bisexual' and so on. However, the collection that Karen invokes through her use of the category 'queer' does not comprise sexuality categories but, rather, she produces a collection with reference to how people come to view the world. This is an example of how a collection is always a locally accomplished, contextually embedded and reflexively constituted phenomenon' (Hester & Eglin, 1997b: 25).

In Fragment 3, Karen positioned herself as a member of the category 'queer/gay' by labelling her membership and naming the category. It is this category membership that is being interactionally worked up as a possible account for getting on with Peter. However, throughout the talk there is evidence of Karen's membership in the category 'student' since the relationship she has with Peter is 'student-personal tutor'.

In Fragment 4, Karen labels herself as a student. This fragment is extracted from 45 minutes into a call between Karen and another friend, Cheryl. Karen launches a new sequence with a bid to close the call (line 1) and an account for the proposed action (lines 1-3). The sequence analysed here is a repair sequence that

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6 Although many people might object to the collapsing of 'gay' and 'queer' into a single category, I have done so here because the participant (Karen) treats these category labels as interchangeable ('queer', line 31; 'gay' lines 40 & 62).
Chapter 5: When is a lesbian not a lesbian?

follows. Karen’s turn explaining the reason for her wanting to close the conversation – that is, she was reprimanded by the telephone company (BT) for being on the telephone too long – contains the trouble source.

Fragment 4 KAREN: STUDENT
[Land: NE4]
01 Kar: Anyway I better get off me 'cause I got told off by Bee Tee t'other day. = Being on t'phone.
02 Che: By Bee Tee?
03 Kar: hhh Well I've got one of them limit things=
04 Y'know well 'cause of being a student I mean it- it's sometime it's just bloody 'ard to pay
05 Che: =What you on w[free after six o'clock one
06 Kar: ( )
07 Kar: No: I 'aven't got onto that yet

Cheryl’s repair initiator (line 4) repeats the name of the telephone company (‘Bee Tee’) pre-framed with ‘by’, thereby, marking ‘by Bee Tee’ as a trouble source in Karen’s prior turn. Implicitly Cheryl is treating being on the telephone for a long time as something that might warrant reprimand but the source of the reproach as unusual or problematic. Karen treats it this way too since she does not merely confirm that it was BT but, rather, she explains why the telephone company is in a position to reprimand her about the length of time that she spends making telephone calls. That is, she has arranged a limit with the company to prevent her bill from being too expensive. She immediately continues with an account for why she has arranged a limit on her telephone bill: that is, ‘being a student’ makes it ‘bloody ‘ard to pay your phone bill’ (lines 7-8). In this talk Karen invokes her membership in the category ‘student’ to account for her financial position such that she often has difficulty paying her telephone bill. Research on the economic position of lesbians vis-à-vis gay men and heterosexual men and women suggests that, because of the gender gap in wages

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7 ‘BT’ is a UK telephone company (previously known as British Telecom).
8 BT provide a service for their customers who may experience difficulty paying their telephone bill by allowing them to set a limit on the cost of each bill. Before customers reach their arranged limit, BT telephone them with a warning that the limit has almost been reached.
(Fawcett Society, 2005) and discrimination in the workplace (Lee Badgett & King, 1997) lesbians have a relatively poor economic position compared with these other groups. Here, then, it could be argued that Karen’s lesbianism is a relevant factor in her difficult financial position: however, this is not what she is orienting to and making interactionally relevant in her account. This is not to suggest that Karen is able to provide the definitive explanation for her economic situation, but by the same token it should not be assumed that the external observer should be allowed to specify what category from the many of which Karen is a member is relevant here. The concern is not what the ‘actual’ cause of Karen’s economic position is, rather, it is relevant that in this interaction being a student is treated as a reasonable and understandable account for being poor. It is this category membership that Karen is producing as relevant in the ongoing interaction. Nonetheless, Karen does not cease to be lesbian simply because she is not orienting to it.

In the next extract, Fragment 5, Karen has phoned Alfred to make a request for him to give a presentation to the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) students at the university where Karen is a student. She is asking him to talk to the LGBT students about what it was like to be gay when Alfred was younger (apparently many years ago). Fragment 5 is taken from the beginning of this call.

Fragment 5 KAREN: COMMITTEE MEMBER
[Land: NE5b]
01 Alf: ( )
02 Kar: Alright. Right I’ve just turned it on anyway. So That’s [all been explained.
03 Alf: [Yeah.
04 Kar: hhhh Wh- what I’m ringing abou: t actually mainly hh is uhm y’know at Greentown Uni again.
05 Alf: Yes.=
06 Kar: =.hhh Wh- what I’m ringing about:
07 actually mainly .hh is uhm y’know at Greentown Uni again.
08 Alf: Yes.=
09 Kar: =.hhh Well uh I’ve just been (.)
10 nominated onto thei:r uh (. ) committee
11 uh which is for the lesbian gay bisexual
12 and transgendered ______ students[:.
13 Alf: [Yeah.
14 Kar: So it’s what they call the Ell Gee Bee
Chapter 5: When is a lesbian not a lesbian?

This is a request sequence. At the outset Karen marks the main business of the call with 'what I'm ringing about actually mainly is...' (lines 5-6), although she does not produce the request until much later. Karen announces she has 'just been nominated onto their committee which is for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered students' (lines 9-12). Her concern is to ensure Albert is aware of what the LGBT committee is and she also explains what the committee does (lines 17-21, 23, & 25-7) and reports her attendance at these events (lines 27-8). Although Karen has already announced her new role on the LGBT committee earlier in the interaction (lines 9-10), she positions herself as 'a committee member' (lines 30-1) and therefore this is not news to Alfred at this interactional
point. Karen’s preface ‘as I say’ (line 30) marks her following categorisation as a repeat of prior information. By restating the same news Karen brackets the intervening talk as background and this turn (lines 30-1) marks a return to the business of the call.

The categorisation of herself as ‘a committee member’ (line 30-1) comes just after Karen has reported that she has attended many of the events organised by the LGBT committee (lines 27-8). Karen’s production of ‘now’ after she describes herself as a committee member highlights her new role. This is an important distinction for Karen in this interaction since she is now in a position where she is required to organise events. The categorisation of herself as a committee member is relevant in this interaction since this indicates that it is under these auspices that she is asking Alfred to come to the university to give a talk. Therefore, it is her role on the committee – rather than her role as an attendee – that is relevant on this occasion.

Although it is only in Fragment 4 where Karen has labelled herself as a member of the category ‘student’, in Fragments 3 and 5 her membership of this category is evident. In Fragment 3 she is talking about people who are students who do and do not get on with Peter (a university tutor) and in Fragment 5 Karen is a committee member on the committee for LGBT students – being a student is a prerequisite for being a committee member. Even though Karen is not always interactionally oriented to her membership in the category ‘student’, she does not cease being a student just because she is invoking some other category.

Similarly, Karen’s lesbianism is available since, in the same way that being a committee member (of the university’s LGBT committee) is predicated on her being a student, it also requires her to be self-identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. It is known from elsewhere in the data that Alfred is aware of Karen’s lesbianism and here this information is ‘refreshed’ in the talk. However, although it is available and necessary for her to be a member of the category she is producing herself as (‘a committee member’) this is not sufficient for her lesbianism to be the most relevant category membership in the interaction (just as
in Fragment 2 Rebecca’s schizophrenia was available in the talk without it being the most relevant category).

In Fragments 1-5, speakers invoke their membership in some category by naming the category and positioning themselves as a member of that group. Speakers orient to different category memberships as relevant on different interactional occasions depending on the action being pursued in the local context. So, it is not only that speakers can be categorised in multiple ways, but also they are categorised in multiple ways. The sexualities of these speakers are not always relevant; therefore, it is insufficient to treat these speakers as lesbian speakers across all contexts as they are not continually relevantly lesbian. In addition, evidence of category memberships can frequently be found in talk in which an alternative category is being oriented to as salient. For example, in Fragment 2, Rebecca’s schizophrenia is available through her reference to her psychiatrist (to a knowing recipient such as Mum), and in Fragment 5, there is evidence of Karen’s lesbianism in her claim to be ‘a committee member’ (of the LGBT committee). The implication of this is that evidence of a category membership is not always sufficient to claim its relevance for the participants (see Kitzinger (2005b) for examples of instances in which evidence of heterosexuality is available in talk but not oriented to as significant for the participants).

Categorising a recipient

In the data presented above the speakers label themselves as members of various categories. But, in the next extract the speaker labels her recipient rather than herself. Furthermore, each data extract (1-5) illustrates one category being used. However, the following extract illustrates multiple categories being invoked to describe the same recipient. Moreover, this data fragment also illustrates the deployment of apparently mutually exclusive category references seemingly unproblematically for the participants.
In Fragment 6, Ben and Karen are discussing a television programme, *The Spartans*, they both watched (but not together) the night before. The programme depicted ‘the rise and fall of one of the most extreme civilisations the world has ever witnessed’ (Channel 4 online, 2003). In the talk immediately prior to Fragment 6, Karen reports that she watched the documentary with her partner Lucy who had ‘massive reactions to that woman who did it’ (presented it). Karen agrees with Lucy’s reported primary concern that this historical programme about women warriors was designed for the (heterosexual) male sexual gaze. She argues that ‘girl-on-girl sex’, women’s semi-naked bodies, the presenter’s dress and manner, and the camera angles used were designed to appeal to a heterosexual male audience. She is concerned about how the women were represented and how the subject matter was ‘coming across to the public’ and Karen reports that she and Lucy were unhappy about the way in which they were ‘portrayed on that screen’. Karen presents her views as aligning with Lucy’s since she explains Lucy approached it ‘from a real woman’s point of view’.

Ben, on the other hand, argues that, even though the programme may have had the agenda Karen is complaining about, the presenter was ‘enthusiastic’ and she had ‘still got an interesting perspective’. He highlights the way in which the documentary suggested Sparta was ‘more of a gay than a straight society’ which he maintains he found ‘profound’. He also argues the programme was interesting, erotic and offered a perspective he has not heard before.

Fragment 6 is taken from several minutes into the protracted disagreement about the programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragment 6 BEN: GAY MALE/BI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Land:NE1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Kar: What you’re not listening to me on is that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 .hh there was things done deliberately in that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 programme last night around the narrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Ben: I agree.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5: When is a lesbian not a lesbian?

At lines 1-3 Karen restates her position in the argument. By prefacing her turn with ‘what you’re not listening to me on’ she makes clear this is a claim she has stated previously. This formulation also functions to suggest that Ben is not conceding to her perspective because he has not understood or listened to her argument. She draws particular attention to the role of the narrator in the way in which the programme was designed. Ben’s SPP (line 4) claims agreement with Karen’s position. The half-second gap (line 5) that follows Ben’s turn is
indicative of trouble with this turn, which is unsurprising given the lengthy disagreements that have preceded this talk. Karen refers to those disagreements in her next turn (line 6). Ben simply reissues the same turn (line 8), which does not engage with Karen’s issue, that is, how is it that he now agrees with her when he has disagreed with her through most of the discussion. Rather than offering an account for this modification of his views Ben backs down from his agreement by adding the increment ‘basically’ (line 10). His next TCU (‘I’m not agreeing wholesale’, line 10) unpacks the increment and backs down further by offering a mitigated agreement. By ‘not agreeing wholesale’ Ben claims some agreement with Karen but also acknowledges and accounts for the prior disagreements. Ben’s turn (line 10) is produced in overlap with Karen’s laughter (line 11), so, when Karen initiates repair (line 13) on Ben’s talk (line 10), it is unsurprising that he treats it as a problem of hearing by repeating the same turn – the mitigated agreement (line 14). Although the initial TCU seems to suggest he is treating it as a problem of hearing, he continues and his subsequent talk attends to the repair initiation as displaying some further problem, which he addresses by offering an account for why he cannot agree wholesale, that is, he ‘is not a woman’ (line 14). Ben invokes an external factor to account for their disagreement. As Ben produces himself as ‘not a woman’ (and therefore a man in our two sexed culture) he simultaneously produces Karen and Lucy as women and uses this to partition them in line with their views about the programme. This exonerates Ben from having to reach an agreement with Karen as the determining factor in their opinions has now been positioned outside of their control. Ben makes his case for disagreement stronger by adding ‘he can’t’ agree (line 15). So, rather than Ben being unwilling to appreciate or agree with Karen’s assessments of the programme, Ben claims he is unable. The selection of gender as a relevant category membership in determining their differing views is consistent with the way in which Karen has presented her argument. She has already claimed that she is approaching it from a ‘real woman’s point of view’ (earlier in the conversation) and she has invoked gender as a relevant category for the makers of the programme. Furthermore, the programme was about women warriors and therefore Ben is not a member of the gender category that was represented. This could provide a possible explanation for Ben’s selection of ‘I’m not a woman’ rather than ‘I’m a man’. Gender categories have been
invoked and made relevant frequently in the course of their disagreement however it is only here that there is an overt orientation to their gender category memberships.

Karen's contrastive claim '(I'm) not a man' (line 18) acknowledges the category that Ben has deployed but undermines this as a reason to prevent his agreement. Ben does not respond to Karen's turn directly but rather continues to expand his explanation for him being unable to agree (lines 19-21). He cuts off on 'ac-', which appears to be heading for 'accept', and repairs it to 'own' (line 19). This serves to personalise the perspectives they are disagreeing over and ties their opinions to their category memberships. Ben further explicates how he partially agrees with Karen (and Lucy) by invoking unspecified 'principles' (line 21) that he agrees with. However, his attempt to close the disagreement by dividing them by gender is unsuccessful when Karen uses the same technique to pursue further discussion of the programme. She recasts him as a 'gay male' (line 23) and asks for his perspective as a member of this category. Similar to the way in which Karen had used gender categories in her assessment of the programme Ben had commented on how the documentary presented Sparta as 'more of a gay than a straight society' (taken from the talk prior to that shown in Fragment 6). So, just as membership to gender categories might influence how the programme is assessed it is also consistent with their previous discussion that sexuality categories might also affect their opinions. By positioning Ben as a gay male Karen produces him as a member of a category that was represented in the programme and also this is a category that they have in common. However, Karen's use of gay male also acknowledges the gender difference between them (although the selection of 'male' rather than 'man' avoids drawing a direct contrast with Ben's use of 'woman', line 14) that Ben has already invoked and thereby neutralises this as a resource for exonerating him from continuing their discussion. Whereas Ben attempted to partition the three of them (Ben, Karen, and Lucy) by using sex categories (thus positioning himself apart from Karen and Lucy), Karen re-partitions them by using sexuality categories (thereby positioning the three of them in the same group). Karen makes relevant Ben's sexual category membership here then in an attempt to pursue the discussion about the television programme.
This tactic appears successful for Karen as Ben does finally give his perspective on the programme (an opinion he produces as a redone version of his earlier arguments). Ben’s reference to ‘female’ (line 28) and ‘male’ (line 30) Spartans actually works to make the sex of the Spartans less relevant in his assessment of them (whereas previously they have been primarily talking about the representation of women in the programme). His claim that both sexes were represented erotically, produced under the auspices of a gay male’s perspective, works to build this as potentially hearable as more objective than merely his own sexual proclivities.

Karen’s assessments of Ben’s perspective (‘very interesting’ on lines 29 and 30) are non-committal insofar as she does not display an overt stance towards his opinion. She continues and makes it more explicit with ‘I think thy ar- definitely (are/art) bi Ben’ (lines 31-2). This does not engage with the content of Ben’s displayed opinion rather it takes to task his perspective as the perspective of a gay male. Given the sequential context of Ben’s assessment (i.e., as a SPP to the FPP in which Karen has produced him as a gay male), Ben is then accountable for producing the perspective of a gay male. Karen’s primary criticism of the documentary has been the sexualisation of the women presented in the programme, so when Ben claims to have found both the portrayal of men and the portrayal of women in the programme erotic (lines 27-8 & 30) he is disagreeing with Karen. Karen does not engage with the content of Ben’s argument; rather, she challenges him by assessing his opinion as not that of a gay male but rather the views of a ‘bi[sexual]’ (line 32). This reclassification of Ben’s sexual category membership achieves the local interactional goal of challenging Ben without having to disagree with what he has said.

In the first instance Karen casts Ben as a gay male to pursue the action underway, that is, his continued participation in the discussion. The method she uses to do this (i.e. categorising him as a gay male) is designed to overcome the barrier Ben has erected in line 14 (‘I’m not a woman’) to him having to be accountable for their lack of agreement. Karen’s subsequent labelling of him as a member of the category ‘bi’ (line 32) serves to undermine Ben’s position while enabling her to
avoid engaging with the content of his opinion. This challenge may make relevant an expansion of his position without Karen’s stance being subject to challenge as she has not presented a counter-argument at that point. This gives Karen the upper hand in the discussion.

Categories are used to do the interactional business at hand. They are not used because someone actually is a member (or is thought of as a member) of that category (Edwards, 1998: 30). In Fragment 6, Ben is categorised as a member of what is definitionally understood to be two mutually exclusive categories. However, these are applied unproblematically and treated as such because they are understood to do different interactional work in the places they are used.

**Category-Bound Attributes**

In the data fragments presented above the speakers do not simply use a category such that a pre-existing set of attributes statically attached to that category are automatically conveyed to the recipient. Rather, in each of these extracts the category-bound attributes are being produced and reproduced in the course of the categories being deployed. In Fragment 1, Rebecca is tying the attribute ‘having difficulty getting about’ to the category ‘schizophrenics’. Official descriptions refer to profound cognitive and emotional disruption and psychotic manifestations including hearing internal voices as key features of schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Yet, in this instance, these characteristics of the mental illness are not relevant for either speaker or recipient for the interactional business at hand. In Fragment 4, Karen treats having financial difficulties as characteristic of the category ‘students’. Although Karen’s recipient, Cheryl, challenges Karen through the use of a repair initiator (line 4), she is not challenging Karen’s association between being a student and not having very much money. In Fragment 5, Karen’s invocation of her membership in the category LGBT committee members produces the action she is doing (i.e., inviting Albert to give a talk on his experiences of being gay several decades ago) as characteristic of committee members. In this extract,
Karen assumes Albert has no prior knowledge of LGBT committees (evidenced by her explanation of what the committee is). Therefore, when she does her request as a committee member she is not relying on what Albert already knows about the attributes of LGBT committee members, rather, she is producing this as a feature of the category live in the interaction (although Albert is likely to be aware of some of the work that committee members in general do and this would shape his understanding too). In these three Fragments (1, 4, & 5) the speakers who are categorising themselves link their selected category with particular attributes and in doing so culture is produced and reproduced. Speakers then are active agents in the production of which activities are associated with particular categories. This may seem as though I am suggesting that speakers have ultimate power to define categories and their associated attributes but this is not the case. In each of these three examples, the recipients do not challenge the association between attributes and categories but there is always potential for so doing.

In Fragment 2, Rebecca associates the category 'women' with the attribute 'being preferred as decorators by elderly women'. However, in the course of agreeing with Rebecca, Mum replaces ‘elderly women’ with ‘pensioners and people like that’. In doing this, Mum changes the attribute Rebecca has assigned to the category ‘women’ to ‘being preferred as decorators by elderly people’ (thereby removing the relevance of gender). Rebecca’s (albeit weak) agreement, ‘Mm’ (line 34), shows some acceptance of this alteration of the attribute she has produced as tied to the category ‘women’. In Fragment 6, Karen has asked for Ben’s perspective as a gay male. He is bound, then, to give an opinion that is appropriately attributable to a member of the category ‘gay males’. His actual stated view is that the representations of men and women in the television programme were erotic. It is the association of this opinion with the category ‘gay male’ that Karen challenges when she re-categorises Ben as ‘bi’. For Karen, experiencing the portrayal of men and women as erotic is not an attribute that can be tied with the category ‘gay male’.

Even on occasions in which there is no challenge from the interlocutor regarding the appropriateness of the attribute that is tied to a particular category the initial speaker may subsequently modify or specify what is relevant about that category.
In Fragment 3, the talk provides evidence that invoking a category is not always treated as sufficient to locate exactly what it is about the category that is relevant for the interactional business at hand. Karen has associated ‘getting on with Peter’ with the category ‘queer/gay’. Yet, not all of the characteristics associated with ‘queer/gay’ are relevant here. She specifies that it is the life experiences of ‘queer/gay people’ that are relevant (‘if you’re gay you’re already facing them issues in your life all the fucking time anyway’, lines 62 & 64-5) to ‘getting on with Peter’ because of his understanding of ‘feminist practices’ (lines 43-4).

Across these data fragments, then, it is possible to identify category-bound attributes being produced, negotiated, and reproduced. It is not simply the case that deployment of categories is sufficient to convey cultural information. Participants challenge, modify, and specify what qualities are relevant in the local context. To abstract categories from their occasioned use and to speculate about the attributes associated with them, does not offer us, as analysts, insight into the situated meanings of particular categories.

**Conclusion**

Across the data fragments presented in this chapter, there is evidence that it is not just that people can be described according to multiple category memberships but that they are categorised as such. It is not only analysts that are oriented to the potential relevance of one of many possibly relevant category memberships. Rather, participants are also oriented their diverse categorisations. As we have seen the same speakers produce different category memberships as relevant in different interactional situations. Also, speakers orient to being heard as speaking as a representative of one of multiple possible categories as they invoke category memberships that are already known to the recipient. This informs the recipient to hear what is being said as the perspective of a person from this category. It shows the speaker being oriented to the possibility of being heard as a member of a different (or no) category.
When speakers invoke some categorical membership of their own or apply one to their interlocutor (or to a third party), they are making available a host of inferences. However, the particular attributes that are being invoked are not specified and this is precisely the job that categorisation does since it allows attributes to be conveyed but in a vague way which leaves open the possibility of subsequent modification by the speaker or by the recipient. The deployment of categories also has a constitutive role in the reproduction of the characteristics that are associated with a particular category.

This chapter demonstrates that we can do politically informed research and be sensitive to participants' orientations. We can see here that participants do orient to category membership in their talk and this provides a justifiable warrant for us to represent them in these terms. Touched off by this study of categorisation, in the next chapter I explore one method used by members for doing self-categorisation: using person reference descriptors to do self-categorisation. This next chapter is a demonstration of how talk produced by lesbians and gay men can be analysed without the study of sexuality being a main research objective.
**Chapter 6**

**Self-Categorising with Person Reference Terms**

**Introduction**

When speakers refer to persons in talk they use *person references*. Person references comprise one word or several words combined as a single unit that represent a person or a group of people. For speaker and recipient there are the dedicated terms 'I/me' and 'you' respectively, although – as I will show in this chapter – speakers sometimes use terms other than these. Normatively reference to third persons is achieved with third person pronouns (e.g., 'he', 'she', 'they', etc.), names\(^1\) (first names, full names, nicknames, etc.), prototypical simple non-recognitionals\(^2\), (e.g., 'this person', 'somebody', 'some people', etc.) and person reference descriptors\(^3\) (descriptions that operate as person references). Person reference descriptors may comprise a single category or a combination of two or more categories\(^4\). They may also comprise categories, names, or prototypical simple non-recognitionals combined with additional information (which may or may not contain categorical terms)\(^5\). Person reference descriptors, which include

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\(^1\) Examples taken from data displaying in preceding chapters: ‘Ashraf’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 2.3, line 70); ‘Rick’ (Chapter 4, Fragment 1, line 3); ‘Paula’ (Chapter 5, Fragment 3, line 17); ‘Miss Boon’ (Chapter 3, Fragment 2.1, line 6) and ‘KP’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 3.1, line 25).

\(^2\) Examples taken from data displayed in the preceding chapters: ‘everybody’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 1, line 58); ‘lots of people’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 1,line 105); ‘some people’ (Chapter 5, Fragment 3, line 1).

\(^3\) ‘Prototypical simple non-recognitionals’ and ‘person reference descriptors’ are terms coined by Schegloff (1996).

\(^4\) Examples taken from data displayed in the preceding chapters: ‘the narrator’ (Chapter 5, Fragment 6, line 3); ‘his parents’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 2.1, line 1); ‘my partner’ (Chapter 3, Fragment 1.1, line 21); ‘the patients’ (Chapter 3, Fragment 2.2, line 31); ‘the lesbian gay bisexual and transgendered students’ (Chapter 5, Fragment 5, lines 11-12); and ‘elderly women’ (Chapter 5, Fragment 2, line 29).

\(^5\) Examples taken from data displayed in the preceding chapters: Examples taken from the data presented in the preceding chapter include: ‘Martin’s brother Rick’ (Chapter 4, Fragment 21, line
categorical terms, make available – either designedly or unintentionally – categorical information. Categories are locally constituted and, therefore, person reference descriptors that do not include categorical terms may still index categories. Not all person reference descriptors make relevant categorical memberships. However, even when categories are not relevant, the content of the information included in the person reference descriptor may allow inferences to be made about characteristics of the person(s) referenced.

Research on categorisation in talk and discourse more generally has tended to focus on how third parties are categorised (i.e., not how speaker and recipient are categorised). This work on the categorisation of third parties often explores the use of gendered pronouns or person reference descriptors as resources for examining how persons are categorised, and usually in researcher-generated talk (see Speer, 2005b; Edwards & Stokoe, 2004) or talk in institutional settings (see Berard, 2005; Edwards, 1998; Stokoe, 2004; Wowk, 1984). For example, Speer (2005b) examined participants’ understandings of gender in photographs of individuals through their use of pronouns to do reference (p.71) and Berard (2005) analysed speakers’ orientations to categorical memberships in a television interview by identifying speakers’ use of person reference descriptors such as ‘one discriminating professor’ (p.70). This work has generally been concerned with contributing to the understanding of categorisation but it has not engaged with these descriptors as terms that achieve reference to persons and therefore it does not seek to contribute to knowledge about person reference per se.

The focus of this chapter departs from the research above in two significant ways. First, I will explore the meaning of these descriptors as they are deployed to do categorisation and person reference. Second, I will examine how self-reference is achieved with person reference descriptors.

18); ‘Rachel and Melinda from women only walk’ (Chapter 4, Fragment 6, lines 7-8); ‘new people’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 3.3, line 71); ‘someone who’s transsexual’ (Chapter 6, Fragment 9, lines 1-2); ‘people whose relationship’s really unstable’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 1.1, lines 21-22); ‘two women who were having babies’ (Chapter 2, Fragment 1.2, line 66); and ‘the students who’ve been coming to the meetings’ (Chapter 5, Fragment 5, lines 40 & 41).
Two papers that have been hugely influential to more recent categorisation research are 'An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology' (Sacks, 1972a) and 'On the Analyzability of Stories by Children' (Sacks, 1972b). Yet, although these two works engage with the use of descriptors to invoke categorical membership and how these descriptors are implicated in the achievement of reference to persons, subsequent categorization work has not tended to engage with the issue of person reference. The most significant exception to this is Wilkinson and Kitzinger's (2003) study of how speakers produce (mainly) third parties as category members. They directly engage with person reference and argue that it 'offers the most obvious purchase' (p.159) on how categorical memberships become invoked. They also draw a distinction between invocation of a category membership and person reference, arguing that equating the two is 'too simplistic' (p.159). Rather, person references are just one of several ways that a person can come to be categorised. However, they include items such as 'speaking as a woman' and 'as a woman you' as examples of person references for speaker and recipient respectively that do categorising. In contrast, I regard these as formats that achieve categorisation (through labelling a category) independently from person reference (in the first example person reference is projected and in the second it is achieved with 'you').

Other notable exceptions include research on how a speaker's membership in the category 'heterosexual' is made apparent through the choice of particular person references selected for third parties (Kitzinger, 2005b; Rendle-Short, 2005). For instance, 'one obvious way in which sexuality is directly indexed is via reference to non-present persons (husbands, wives, girlfriends or boyfriends)' (Rendle-Short, 2005: 561). Also, Kitzinger (2005a) examined the use of family reference terms to refer to third parties in out-of-hours doctors' calls. These

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6 In addition to the gendered nature of the terms 'husband' and 'wife', the data used in this study was collection from a country in which same-sex marriage is not legal so these terms automatically index heterosexuality (whether or not the person using them is actually heterosexual).
studies show either that inferences can be made about a speaker – by the recipient in the first instance, and by us as analysts in the second instance – from the choice of person reference descriptor selected by the speaker to refer to third parties, or that inferences can be made about a third person on the basis of the descriptor deployed. By contrast, in this chapter, I will explore speakers’ use of person reference descriptors to do self-reference and self-categorisation.

The production of person reference descriptors to do self-reference is fundamentally different from their use to do reference to third parties. Perhaps the most significant difference occurs because of the pervasive availability of default person reference forms for doing self-reference, whereas – as I will explain later – this is not the case for reference to third parties. After all, if speakers always have dedicated terms to do self-reference then why would they use anything else? However, the data presented in this chapter show that speakers do not always use non-default forms, in the particular excerpts analysed here they use person reference descriptors. When referring to third parties, names are preferred over descriptors: descriptors are – usually – used when names are unavailable (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). Given then the enduring availability of default self-reference terms, the aim of this chapter is to explore speakers’ use of person reference descriptors to do self-reference as an alternative choice to those default forms.

In this chapter, I will consider what is meant by default person reference for self-(and recipient-) reference, discuss the difference between self-reference and reference to third parties, and then consider how this form of self-categorising differs from that explored in the previous chapter. I will explore the use of person reference descriptors as they are actually used to do self-reference in instances of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. Finally, I shall tentatively consider the possibility that even default reference terms may be deployed to do more than only referring.
**Default self-reference**

In spoken English, ‘I’ (and its variants: ‘me’, ‘mine’, etc.) is the most frequently used method for doing self-reference. However, it is not just the numerically most common way of referring to the self, but it is also normative insofar as when speakers use it they are simply doing referring and recipients orient to it as nothing special is happening. Default person reference – or reference *simpliciter* – means doing ‘referring and nothing else’ (Schegloff, 1996: 440).

The unmarked forms which do simple reference are “I/me” for speaker, and “you” for addressed recipient” (Schegloff, 1996: 449)

Almost without exception, ‘I/me’ are dedicated terms (Schegloff, 1996: 442). However, one environment in which this is not the case is when these terms are used in reported speech. When quoting someone else’s talk, speakers’ use of first person pronouns is hearable as indexing the person being quoted. But, speakers usually employ specific techniques, for example a shift in intonation, to make their utterance hearable as reported speech (Holt, 1996). They also often use quotatives such as ‘she said’ or ‘she goes’ to mark upcoming quoted speech (Johnstone, 1987). Therefore, given that ‘I/me’ are generally dedicated terms (the default referent for ‘I/me’ is the self) speakers have to engage in supplementary activities to make first person pronouns analysable as doing something other than self-reference. In addition to doing clear, unambiguous, dedicated self-reference, ‘I/me’ are devoid of any additional connotations with respect to the referent. In English, first person pronouns are ‘opaque with respect to all the usual categorical dimensions – age, gender, status, etc.’ (Schegloff, frth.: 2).

First person pronouns are not universally default unmarked ways of doing self-reference. Pronouns are routinely not included in many languages in which verbs are marked for referent, such as Italian (Fasulo & Zucchermaglio, 2002) and Hebrew (Hacohen & Schegloff, frth.); therefore, when they are included they
may be doing non-default self-reference. In other languages, such as Japanese, first person pronouns may be marked for gender or status. Additionally, the use of ‘I/me’ as default self-reference may be specific to spoken English in everyday talk-in-interaction. For example, in written press releases indexicals tend to be avoided and, therefore, third person reference forms are the normative method for doing self-reference so that statements retain their meaning when lifted out of context (Jacobs, 1999). And, in organisational talk in institutional settings, it may be that ‘we’ is routinely deployed for doing reference simpliciter (see Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990) such that when ‘I/me’ is used it could be to do something special (Schegloff, 1996). Therefore, the claim that first person pronouns are used as default, unmarked ways of doing self-reference applies – for this chapter at least – specifically to the English language as it is spoken in ordinary talk-in-interaction.

In the following four fragments speakers accomplish default self-reference with the terms ‘me’ and ‘I’.

**Fragment 1 BOOKING HOSTEL**

[Land: NE2]

01 Kar: A-are you: gonna book it up then?
02 (0.2)
03 Ben: Yeah I can do,
04 Kar: Do you wanna book me in.
05 Ben: Yeah yeah can do.

In Fragment 1, Karen asks Ben to book her a place in the youth hostel at the same time that he books his own place (line 4), although her request is formatted as an offer. In Ben’s confirmation that he can make a booking with the hostel (line 3) he refers to himself with ‘I’, which does nothing more than self-reference. And, the use of the term ‘me’ in Karen’s request does nothing more than reference her, the speaker, as the person for whom a place is to be booked.

**Fragment 2 RING ME EARLIER**

[Land: NE4]

01 Che: Did you try an’ ring me earlier by any chance=
02 Kar: =No I ‘an’t no hhh
Fragment 2 is taken from early in a call in which Karen has phoned Cheryl. Cheryl’s turn at line 1 provides a way into a telling about who she (Cheryl) was speaking to on the telephone earlier because, whether or not Karen did try to call earlier, Cheryl can explain why Karen could not contact her or why Karen would not have been able to contact her had she tried. Cheryl’s ‘me’ (line 1) and Karen’s ‘I’ (line 2) seem to do only self-reference.

Fragment 3

BOYFRIEND’S NAME

[Land: YU9]
01 Chl: hhh So do you think y- w- Sorry can you remind
02 me: of how you say your boyfriend’s name.
03 Pau: Ashraf.
04 Chl: Ashraf.
05 Pau: Yeah.

In Fragment 3, Chloe begins a new sequence but then cuts off (line 1). She then asks Paul to remind her how to pronounce his boyfriend’s name (lines 1-2). The phrasing of her FPP, suggests that it is not that she does not know his name, but, rather, that she cannot remember how to ‘say’ (line 2) it. It turns out, that in the subsequent talk, Chloe enquires about Ashraf’s plans for Christmas so Chloe’s request for information here is designed to provide her with the resources to be able to refer to him in the most preferred way (i.e., by name). Paul provides the SPP by producing Ashraf’s name (line 3). Chloe’s post-expansion repeat seeks to check that she has grasped how to pronounce the name (line 4) and Paul’s ‘yeah’ (line 5) confirms this. The use of ‘me’ here does simple referring by serving to identify the person who requires reminding of Ashraf’s name as Chloe but it does not invoke any information about her.

Fragment 4

DEATH ROW

[Land: YU8]
01 Dad: His book’s about (0.2) people serving life sentences
02 for murder. = It’s brilliant.= (   )- Have you
03 ever read that.
04 Chl: ↑Oh! I got- I got (0.4) I think you maybe lent me
05 one about twelve people on death row.
In Fragment 4, Chloe uses ‘I’ and ‘me’ to index herself as the possible recipient of a book that Dad may have loaned her (lines 4-5). She uses ‘I’ and ‘me’ simply to refer to herself and not to invoke any particular aspect of herself.

The deployment of ‘me’ in all four fragments above is performed by the speakers to refer to themselves. These pronouns index the speakers without invoking any characteristics associated with them. Speakers and recipients do not orient to the use of this person reference form as doing anything special. This is consistent with the prevailing work on reference *simpliciter*.

**Self-reference v. reference to third parties**

When speakers refer to themselves (or to their recipients) they *always* have the option of using ‘I/me’ (or ‘you’). But, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, speakers do not always use these forms to do self-reference. My focus here is on instances in which speakers use person reference descriptors to do self-reference. Schegloff (1996) identifies other forms that are used to do self-reference such as speakers using their own names to do self-reference (particularly ‘public figures’) and parents doing self-reference with the kinship names their children use to refer to them (in their children’s presence).

This omnipresent availability of default terms for self-reference is not mirrored by the terms that are available to do reference to third parties. This means that there is an important contrast between third person reference and self-reference. Third person (singular) pronouns do not function in the same way that first (or second) pronouns do. First, they are marked for gender. This is not a universal phenomenon since in languages such as Finnish, Hungarian, and Estonian (Dasinger, 1997: 15) there are gender-neutral third person singular pronouns.

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7 For reference to recipients there is a default way of doing person reference (i.e., with ‘you’) so it would seem likely that this case would be akin to the way in which I am proposing self-reference occurs. However, space precludes a more thorough investigation of reference to recipient but this may form the basis of future research.
however, in English third person singular pronouns are gendered. Second, ‘she/her’ and ‘he/him’ are locally subsequent reference forms and, therefore, they are normatively preceded by some other reference form\(^8\) (Schegloff, 1996: 450). ‘I/me’ (and ‘you’) are insensitive to concerns of local or subsequent position.

When referring to non-addressed others (i.e. third parties) in locally initial form, speakers generally convey information about that person (or group of people) through the selection of the reference term. The use of a name is a basic form of recognitional reference (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979: 17) so this might be the closest to an unmarked reference form when deploying a recognitional reference form, although this too may convey information (e.g., names are usually marked for gender, a title may be used, using only a first name conveys information about the relationship, and so on). An unmarked non-recognitional reference form might be ‘someone/somebody’\(^9\) or ‘this person’; however, this may also convey information (given that using a recognitional is preferable, using a non-recognitional claims the unavailability of a recognitional or a recipient may infer that the speaker is hiding who is being referred to, and so on). Even if the problems with these ‘unmarked’ ways of referring to non-present others are overlooked, they are still not always usable since they might be unavailable (e.g., a speaker may not know a name or may suppose that the recipient does not know the name) or they may be impractical (e.g., when referring to several people using non-recognitionals there would be no way to differentiate them). Therefore, in many cases some form of person reference descriptor must be used and in so doing it is unavoidable that categories become invoked. In these cases it may be that these forms are ‘almost’ default (see Kitzinger, unpublished manuscript). I am suggesting here that the use of these forms to do self-reference is a distinctly different phenomenon.

\(^8\) If locally subsequent reference forms are deployed in locally initial position, then they are so used to achieve particular interactional ends and therefore they are not doing simple reference (see Schegloff, 1996).

\(^9\) Although ‘somebody’ may not always be default (Lerner, pers. comm.).
Although references to speaker and recipient can use third person reference forms, there are always alternatives available. By contrast, speakers referring to non-addressed third parties may have no choice but to use person reference descriptors. This results in an 'unavoidable' categorising of third parties in a way that is not mirrored by the resources that are available for referring to speaker and to recipient.

So, while descriptors used to refer to non-present others convey categorical information it need not necessarily have been so designed. On the other hand, when speakers use descriptors to refer to themselves the references are designed specifically to draw attention to the features of the person that are captured in that descriptor. This is because 'I' or 'me' could have been used. These references are specifically designed to do categorising.

**Self-reference with person reference descriptors**

In the data displayed in the previous chapter, categorising was predominantly achieved by reference to the speakers or recipient with a pronoun followed by the verb 'to be' and the naming of the category:

- 'I’m a schizophrenic'
- 'We’re all queer'
- 'I’m also a committee member now'
- 'I’m not a woman'
- 'thy ar- definitely (are/art) bi'

Here the person reference is ‘I’, ‘we’, or ‘thy’ (a local dialect for ‘you’) and the category (‘schizophrenic’, ‘queer’, ‘committee member’, ‘woman’, and ‘bi’) is produced separately from the person reference. A less common variation was the use of an implied pronoun with variations of the same verb (i.e., ‘to be’) such as ‘being’ (as the present participle) or ‘as’ (which can function in place of ‘being’):


- ‘being a student’
- ‘as a gay male’

In each of the instances above, the speaker produces the person or people referred to as a member of a category by using a category term. Reference to the self (or recipient) is achieved independently of the production of categorical information. Furthermore, in each of these turns, talk is being specifically dedicated to locating the speaker/recipient in the category. In each of the examples above taken from Chapter 5, the category (‘schizophrenic’; ‘queer’; ‘committee member’; ‘not a woman’; ‘bi[sexual]’; ‘student’; and ‘gay male’) is not a person reference.

There was only one exception to this amongst the data analysed in the previous chapter (i.e., ‘WOMAN’). In this fragment, Rebecca categorises herself with the use of a person reference descriptor. Rebecca uses ‘woman’ simultaneously to refer to herself and to categorise herself. It is this fragment that provides the impetus for this chapter. It is reproduced (in part) here as Fragment 5 with analyses that focus on how the deployment of ‘woman’ is used to achieve self-reference and self-categorisation.

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**Fragment 5 WOMAN**

[Land: SW761]

01 Reb: [ Make li]ttle cards up and
02 
03 Mum: [ Yeah. [That’s right]
04 Reb: [.h h h ]’Specially
05 for like elderly women because they might rather
06 have a woman [doing hh] [doing their hou:]ses up=
07 Mum: [ Yes yes [ That’s ‘true’ ]
08 Mum: =Yeah that’s true yeah pensioners and
09 [people] like that
10 Reb: [ Mm ]

Rebecca’s use of ‘woman’ (line 6) achieves two actions. First, the categorical information about her that is relevant to the interaction underway is conveyed

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10 See preceding chapter for a fuller analysis of this data fragment.
and, second, she has achieved self-reference. This is unlike the other examples in the previous chapter, in which the reference is achieved with the pronoun and the categorising is achieved with the naming of a category (e.g., 'I'm a schizophrenic'). Furthermore, when Rebecca refers to herself as 'a woman' she does so in the course of an explanation for why that category is relevant. That is, she spells out why being a woman is relevant in this particular instance; because "elderly women...might rather have a woman...doing their houses up" (lines 5-6). Conversely, when speakers categorise themselves using the format 'I'm an X', the recipient is responsible for working out from the context of the talk why that particular category is relevant in the interaction.

Therefore, using person reference descriptors to refer to the self appears to be an economical and interactionally useful way of doing categorising. It is economical because the single descriptor simultaneously achieves referencing and categorising. And, it is interactionally useful because the reason for the relevance of that particular category for that particular interaction is made explicit. However, there is one potential problem for the effectiveness of this way of categorising the self in interaction: how can participants be sure that their recipient(s) hears the person reference descriptor as referring to them (i.e., the speaker)? Given there are dedicated terms for self-reference, it may be that recipients are primed to hear other forms of reference as referring to someone other than the speaker – at least in the first instance.

In the talk prior to that presented in Fragment 5 Rebecca has been telling Mum about the painting and decorating business she is proposing to set up for which she is planning to 'make little cards up' (line 1). So, when she suggests that "elderly women...might rather have a woman doing...their houses up" (lines 5-6) it would be odd if she did not mean herself, given the preceding talk. Therefore, the local background provides for a hearing of 'woman' as referring to Rebecca (i.e., a self-reference). In this way the context provides the information for the recipient to deduce who is being referred to with the person reference descriptor.
Additionally, in this case, Mum already knows that Rebecca is a woman. Given the pervasive consideration of recipient-design, speakers may be more likely to select this way of doing categorisation if she/he supposes that the recipient already knows that she/he (the speaker) is a member of the category being deployed in the person reference descriptor. It may be that speakers suppose that they are more likely to be heard as referring to themselves if this is the case.

Therefore, in Fragment 5, it is likely that Rebecca is relying on the context provided by the surrounding talk and on recipient design considerations for ensuring ‘woman’ is heard as a self-reference. In any case, this deployment appears to be unproblematic for Mum, as she displays no difficulty understanding who is being referred to.

I will now examine other instances of self-reference using categories. In the following data fragments speakers do self-reference as ‘an English woman’ (Fragment 6), ‘a nutter’ (Fragment 7), and ‘other kid’ (Fragment 8). In Fragments 5-8 person reference descriptors are used by speakers to refer to themselves. In each case ‘me’ could have been used in place of the descriptors. But, by deploying descriptors, the speakers produce particular categorical memberships as interactionally relevant. Unlike the way in which categorising was achieved in the previous chapter (e.g., ‘I’m an …’), by using a descriptor speakers do not use a whole TCU (or at least a designated segment of talk) to do this categorising. This means categorising is not the main business of the TCU. Rather, categorisation is embedded within a turn that is principally treatable as engaged in some other action. Whereas in the instances in the previous chapter, categorising is the primary action (but it is done in service of other ongoing activities), in the fragments analysed here (Fragments 5-8) this is not the case. Instead, categorising is done in the course of or in the service of some other action.
English woman

In the following data fragment (Fragment 6) a speaker refers to herself using a person reference descriptor: ‘an English woman’ (line 25) does reference to the self and produces the speaker as a member of the category ‘English women’. Fragment 6 is taken from another conversation between Rebecca and her mother who is English and currently living in Spain. Prior to the talk reproduced in Fragment 6 they have been talking about Mum’s upcoming plans to return to the UK to live. Her Austrian husband, Sven, will be moving with her. Mum has informed Rebecca that prior to their move back she may be making a trip to the UK for a week or two to gather information about their possible entitlement to benefits and to seek housing or the prospect of housing for the two of them. In the talk immediately before Fragment 6 opens, they have been discussing what Mum hopes to achieve during her trip to the UK prior to the move back. The target line is ‘he’s married to an English woman’ (lines 24-5).

Fragment 6 ENGLISH WOMAN
[Land: SW39]
01 Reb: When are you thinking of coming?
02 Mum: Well I don’t know yet. = We’ve only just spoke
03 about it toda:y and he seems to be in agreement
04 with it. = Because I said “Look” I said “I can’t
05 see a doctor here ‘cause we can’t afford med-
06 . hhh pri:vate an’ we’re not on (. ) we’re not
07 signed in here or anything.” = I said “at least
08 if we’re in England we can go to a doctor.
09 (.)
10 Mum: Y’know and we haven’t got to pa:y.
11 (.)
12 Mum: Or we might have to pay as we haven’t been in the
13 country for the fir:st couple a months or
14 something.= If we need to see a doctor”. B|ut
15 Reb: [You
don’t have to pay it’s all national health
17 love.=
18 Mum: =Well I know that but foreigners
19 (.)
20 Mum: [I don’t
21 Reb: [H-he’s not- M- Mum all the fucking Pakis.
22 They don’t fucking pay fer-= Y- you
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

23  [on't pay to see your doctor here]
24 Mum:  [ (An' yih see) because he's
25  married to an English woman anyway y'know?=
26 Reb:  =Y'know that's it.=
27 Mum:  =But I- I said to 'im [I ( ] I said uhm
28 Reb:  [[[cough]]]
29 Mum:  y'know "the medical I can see: And the dentists
30  we can see:" I said "And plus we will have help if we
31  can't manage."
32 .
33 Mum:  They've got to help me 'cause I'm English. = If we
34  can't manage y'know.
35 .

Analysis will focus on Mum's self-reference ('an English woman') on line 25, but to understand how and why Mum refers to herself using this form it is necessary to examine the sequential context in which it is produced. Rebecca's question “when are you thinking of coming?” (line 1) marks a move from what Mum will be doing to when she will be doing it. Mum states that she is unable to answer the question ('Well I don't know yet', line 2) and then provides an account for why she is unable. That is, the trip is contingent on Sven's agreement and they (Mum and Sven) have only spoken about it that day, therefore, no fixed date has been arranged yet.

In lieu of an approximate date for her trip, Mum begins a telling about a conversation between her and Sven in which she explained a problem with living in Spain that will be resolved when they move to England: that is, in Spain they are unable to access medical care but when they are resident in England they will be able to go to a doctor. Mum begins a report of her explanation – to Sven – for why she cannot see a doctor in Spain with ‘cause we can’t afford med-’ (line 5). It is likely that this was heading for ‘medical care’ or ‘medical treatment’ but the cut-off on ‘medical’ suggests this is somehow problematic. Mum replaces it with ‘private [medical care]’ (line 6). As a UK national Mum is entitled to state medical care in Spain since the UK is a member of the EEU. However, her subsequent explanation ‘we’re not signed in here or anything’ (lines 6-7) provides an account for why she cannot access state care in Spain and therefore why she would have to use private medical care – which they cannot afford.
Mum completes her turn with ‘doctor’ (line 8) so she treats the ensuing silence (line 9) as a place in which Rebecca’s talk is relevantly absent. It may be that Rebecca is waiting for an approximate indication regarding when Mum is proposing to make her visit (i.e., a properly fitted SPP). However, Mum treats the silence as a possible problem of clarity regarding her claim that once they are in England they ‘can go to a doctor’ (line 8). It is not that they are prohibited from going to a doctor in Spain but, rather, that they have to pay to do this, whereas in England they ‘haven’t got to pay’ (line 10). But, there is still no uptake from Rebecca (see the microgap on line 11). Mum treats this silence as indicative of a possible upcoming disagreement with her claim that she and her husband will be entitled to free medical treatment once they are back in England as we can see from her subsequent backdown. She modifies her claim to suggest that they may have to pay, at least for a short time once they have moved back (lines 12-14). Although Mum’s talk is in second position and therefore does not make talk relevant from Rebecca in the same way that a FPP would, Mum displays an analysis of the silences on lines 9 and 11 as interactional places where receipts or continuers (i.e., Rebecca’s acknowledgement of Mum’s talk) are relevantly absent and, as such, dispreference implicative.

However, it turns out that Rebecca does not disagree with Mum’s initial position; rather, she defends that claim by disagreeing with Mum’s subsequent backdown (lines 15-17). Rebecca argues that ‘You don’t have to pay it’s all national health love’ (lines 15-17). This ‘you’ is hearable as a generic ‘you’ that includes everyone. This suggests that anyone – irrespective of nationality or anything else – is entitled to medical care free of charge. But, rather than reverting to her initial position, Mum now argues a case for why Sven might not be entitled to free medical care in England (an argument that implicitly shows that Mum does expect she will be able to access medical treatment for herself without payment in the UK). After a token agreement (‘Well I know that’, line 18), Mum pursues the disagreement with ‘but foreigners’ (line 18). Mum’s production of the category ‘foreigners’ challenges who is referred to by Rebecca’s ‘you’ (line 15). Mum selects the category ‘foreigners’ as a category of people that is designed to

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11 Mum does in fact provide this but not until much later in the call.
include her husband, Sven, but not herself. This reference is recipient-designed since it requires Rebecca to be able to work out who is and who is not included in that category.

Rebecca displays her understanding that it is Sven and not Mum that is being included in the category ‘foreigners’ by extracting him from the collective and referring to him as an individual (‘he’, line 21). Rebecca’s first attempt to produce a counterclaim to Mum’s begins with what is projectably a denial of Sven’s membership in the category ‘foreigner’. However, given that Sven is Austrian, Rebecca’s denial of his inclusion in the category ‘foreigner’ would be potentially subject to challenge from Mum since it is arguable that Sven is in fact a foreigner in England. This provides a probable explanation for why Rebecca cuts off just two words into this TCU.

However, given that Rebecca began to produce a denial of Sven’s membership in the category ‘foreigner’, this suggests there may be some grounds for him to be not included in this group – at least according to Rebecca. After her abandoned TCU (‘H-he’s not’), Rebecca restarts her turn and invokes a further category of people: ‘fucking Pakis’ (line 21). This is produced as a subgroup of ‘foreigners’, but it is a subgroup that does not include Sven as a member. This category is produced as more foreign than the general category ‘foreigner’ that includes Sven. This also provides probable indication for why Rebecca initially began to deny Sven’s membership in the category ‘foreigner’. For Rebecca, it seems, there are varying degrees of ‘foreignness’, with ‘Pakis’ being more foreign than Sven. That is, although he is not a British national he is less foreign than ‘Pakis’. It may be that Sven – although not a British national – is less foreign by virtue of him being a European. This argument is produced as a left-dislocation: ‘all the fucking Pakis’ (line 21) is produced as a discourse-new entity (Gregory & Michaelis, 2004) – that is, as a new item – and then re-referenced with ‘they’ (line 22) when Rebecca reports that ‘they don’t pay fer’ (line 22). Although she cuts off before the TCU is complete, where it was heading can be projected as a denial that ‘Pakis’ have to pay to see doctors in the UK.
However, in addition to doing referring, the label ‘fucking Pakis’ is also displaying a stance towards those being referenced. Rebecca’s deployment of ‘fucking’ marks the subsequent category disparagingly and in so doing she indicates disapproval of the situation in which ‘Pakis’ are permitted access to NHS services without payment. Furthermore, Rebecca’s use of ‘all’ to preface the category ‘the fucking Pakis’ works to suggest that there are hoards of foreigners invading the country to exploit the NHS. Additionally, the tone she takes when she produces this turn (lines 21-23) is one of outright indignation that this should be allowed.

The term ‘Paki’ is widely known to be an offensive and racist term. In 2003 - the year in which this conversation was recorded – a man became the first individual in Britain to be banned from using the term (Carter, 2003) and in 2002 there was strong criticism when President Bush used the word in a speech (Engel, 2002). Yet, here it is deployed unproblematically and the recipient does not orient to it as offensive or something that would warrant challenge. Although, as analysts, it might be tempting to see this as a racist orientation, it is difficult to sustain the argument that Rebecca (and Mum through her lack of challenge) is engaged in the activity of ‘doing being racist’. Neither participant orients to this word or the turn in which it occurs as racist. But, by reproducing a term that is potentially hearable as racist in this routine way, racism is reproduced – through the participants – as part of the ordinary taken-for-granted world (cf. Kitzinger, 2005b).

After cutting off prior to completion, Rebecca redoes her claim but now with a generic ‘you’ rather than reference to a particular category of people (‘You don’t pay to see your doctor here’, lines 22-23). This moves the talk away from a focus on particular groups of people and their entitlement to NHS care as members of those categories – which is potentially more susceptible to challenge – to the more salient issue, that is, that free medical care is available to everyone regardless of factors such as nationality.

So far, the disagreement has focused on whether or not ‘foreigners’ are entitled to visit doctors in England without having to pay. At this point, Mum changes
the focus in a bid to resolve the disagreement. She leaves aside the issue of the ambiguity of the category ‘foreigner’ and Sven’s arguable membership in it and the disagreement about foreigners’ entitlement to access medical services through the NHS free of charge. Instead, Mum argues for Sven’s entitlement via her, that is, as the husband of someone who is unambiguously not a foreigner. She presents this as an additional way in which Sven is entitled with ‘An’ yih see’ (line 24) rather than as a challenge in the previous ongoing disagreement. Although, her use of this argument displays a disagreement with Rebecca’s prior turn since, if Mum agreed with Rebecca, then Sven would be entitled in his own right and who he is married to would be irrelevant. Also, the use of ‘anyway’ (line 25) contributes to this being hearable as Mum sidestepping their preceding disagreement.

Mum claims that because ‘he’s married to an English woman’ (lines 24-25) he will not have to pay. The English woman he is married to is, of course, Mum, the speaker. Therefore, she is using this person reference descriptor (most usually used to refer to non-present third parties) to refer to herself. However, this term is not only doing referring, rather, it draws on Mum’s membership in the category that is relevant for the interactional business underway. Unlike the way in which categorisation was achieved in the previous chapter (e.g., ‘I’m a …’), the primary action of Mum’s TCU is not occupied with locating Mum within the category. Instead, the action Mum is performing with this TCU is offering a solution to their disagreement that sidesteps the issue that has caused their prior disagreement.

For this method for invoking a categorical membership to be successful as a self-reference, the recipient – in this case Rebecca – is required to be able to identify that Mum is a member of this category and it is Mum (from all the people who are members of the category) who is being referred to in this instance. In this instance, Rebecca already knows that Mum is an ‘English woman’, but, the context of the talk also provides information that allows recognition of the person

12 Although space precludes a full discussion here, it is interesting to note that Mum invokes her heterosexual privilege unproblematically and without orienting to it as such.
reference descriptor as a self-reference. Additionally, in a culture where there can be only two people in a marriage and Rebecca knows Mum to be married to Sven, it can only be Mum that is being referred to with this descriptor. Therefore, the design of this descriptor to do referring and invoking categorical information simultaneously is effective as the categorical membership is named and the interactional circumstances and recipient design considerations mean that it would be very unlikely for the recipient to fail to recognise who is being referenced. Unlike the method of categorising that was explored in the previous chapter (e.g., ‘I’m a …’), invoking categorical information about oneself using a person reference descriptor to do self-reference means that the speaker provides an explanation for the relevance of the category at that interactional point. For example, if Mum had said ‘because I’m an English woman’ in place of her actual turn at lines 24-25, then it would have required Rebecca to work out why that category is relevant. The recipient is required to have both of these pieces of information: that the person being indexed is a member of a given category and why that particular category is relevant. However, “[p]eople do not talk in logical syllogisms” (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003: 176), they appear to select one of the two and the other is left unarticulated.

Rebecca does not display any difficulty understanding who is being referenced. She aligns with the argument that Sven will be entitled to free medical treatment through his marriage to Mum (line 26) and they are able to resolve their disagreement without having to find a resolution to whether or not Sven – as a (possible) foreigner – would be entitled to see a doctor in England without having to pay.

Later in the talk, Mum invokes a categorical membership again (line 33). On this occasion it is just the category ‘English’ that is made relevant and she does so in order to provide an account for why she will be entitled to ‘[medical] help’ in the UK. However, in this instance, she does not use a person reference descriptor to do categorisation: rather, Mum references herself with ‘I’ and explicitly locates herself in the category (‘English’), which she separately produces.
In this fragment – as in Fragment 5 – self-reference with a person reference descriptor results in categorisation being achieved as part of the ongoing progressivity of the sequence underway. In the following fragment (Fragment 7) self-categorisation with a person reference descriptor appears to add no more information to the conversation other than invocation of the relevant category.

*Nutter*

In the following data fragment (Fragment 7) a speaker refers to herself using a person reference descriptor: ‘a nutter’ (line 7) does reference to the self and produces the speaker as a member the category ‘nutters’. In Fragment 7, Rebecca is talking to her partner, Julie. Julie has called Rebecca from her workplace (a taxi office) to tell her she will be working Monday night this week but then she will be no longer working Monday nights as a new person (May) has been hired who will be working these shifts. After the business of the call has been dealt with Rebecca begins the first of several tellings about her day so far. Fragment 7 is taken from one of these later tellings.

Fragment 7 NUTTER
[Land: SW9]

01 Jul: An’ she was sat outside this morning.= I gave ‘er a tickle an’ she (di’nt mind) an’ then she went running off towards the la:ne(s) so I left ‘er.=
04 Reb: =Yea:h. Tcht oh: #love ‘er.# .hhhh I sent Lorraine an email back. hh
06 Jul: [Didju?]
07 Reb: → [.hhhh ] From one nutter to another.= An’ I- I might be a schizo but at least I’m an organised schizo. .hh huhuh .hh huh huh [huh huh
10 Jul: [Yeah well she’s just disorganised [fchaos? isn’t sh[e]
12 Reb: [.h h h [I] know.
13 She is organised chaos that girl. So I wrote-
14 I said “I won- Is the baby cute” y’know “how y-” y’know “give my love to all the family an’ what ‘ave you” so uh: .hhhh An’ then I’m gonna write a letter back to Michael then. hhhhh
18 Jul: Oh well. Rach- Do you know the reason Rachel
Rebecca initiates a telling about an email she has sent to Lorraine\textsuperscript{13} (‘I sent Lorraine an email back’, lines 4-5). Rebecca refers to herself with the default ‘I’ (line 4) and Lorraine by her first name (line 5). Rebecca’s references to herself and to Lorraine, then, do not appear to be doing anything extraordinary. By remarking that it is an email ‘back’ (line 5), Rebecca displays her presumption that Julie already knows Lorraine had sent her (Rebecca) an email previously and links this telling to that. Julie’s ritualised disbelief (‘Didju?’ line 6) receipts Rebecca’s turn as new but it does not take a stance towards the prior telling; rather, it allows space for Rebecca to elaborate.

Although Julie has made available space for Rebecca to elaborate about the email (‘didju’, line 6), this is not what Rebecca does in her next turn. For example, she could have taken the opportunity to include details of the content of her email to Lorraine but she does not. Rather, she topicalises a particular feature that she and the recipient share in common: that is, their membership in the category ‘nutter’. Rebecca’s next TCU (‘From one nutter to another’, line 7) adds no

\textsuperscript{13} From elsewhere in the corpus it is apparent that Lorraine is Rebecca’s cousin. She (Lorraine) has gone to South Africa for six weeks to visit her mother who lives there. Lorraine has had problems with drugs in the past but she has recently been allocated a council flat (which Rebecca and Julie are decorating for her), she has a job, and she is going to go back to college to finish a ‘networking course.’ She has put her old lifestyle behind her. Rebecca is proud to have helped ‘a person who was going down the pan.’
new information to the telling other than the invocation of the category. Instead, she partially reformulates her prior turn and in so doing she situates herself and Lorraine in terms of categories rather than individuals. She is retelling the sending of the email but she is not repairing her prior turn. Rebecca does not refer to the email in this TCU. Instead, she includes only 'from one nutter to another' and allows the context to provide meaning regarding to what this refers. Whereas in the first version (lines 4-5) Rebecca referred to herself using the first person pronoun 'I' (line 4) in the second version (line 7) she uses the categorical person reference descriptor 'nutter'. This places Rebecca and Lorraine in the same category and marks what they have in common. This TCU is ostensibly designed to require no response, that is, Rebecca begins her next TCU latched to this previous unit of talk which would suggest that she had not designed her talk to be finished after 'another' (line 7).

\[\text{Land: SW9}\]

01 Reb: Yeah I put your vodka in the fri:dge.
02 Jul: Yeah I know.= I noticed this morning. = 'Cause
03 I was gonna 'ave it before I come to work
04 believe it or not
05 Reb: Oh n(h)o:. Nutter.
06 Jul: Huh huh huh huh
07 Reb: Nutter. .hhh Well (no/now) I've just got the
08 cat's going ma:d here because of her

\[\text{Land: SW9}\]

14 It is interesting to note that half a minute earlier in the conversation Rebecca had referred to Julie as a 'nutter' in response to Julie's suggestion that she had been going to drink the leftover vodka from the previous evening before she went to work that morning. Rebecca treats this suggestion as a joke and calls Julie a 'nutter' twice (lines 5 & 7 in the fragment below) in the course of her response. Julie has presented her contemplation about drinking the vodka as implausible or unbelievable ('believe it or not', line 4). It is only after Rebecca's treatment of Julie's suggestion as a joke that Julie orients to it as a laughable (line 6). Julie did not initially produce as amusing. At lines 7-8 in the fragment below Rebecca begins her telling about the cat (referred to with 'her' in line 8 below) and the conclusion of this telling is included at the beginning of Fragment 9. Rebecca's choice of the term 'nutter' to refer to herself in Fragment 9 is likely to have been influenced by her selection of the same term for Julie (this influence is sustained despite the intervening unrelated topic).
This TCU foregrounds Rebecca’s mental health status in addition to making relevant characteristics associated with Lorraine. Rebecca has positioned herself as a ‘nutter’ with the person reference descriptor. However, it may be that she is also relevantly a person with schizophrenia, given Julie’s pre-existing knowledge about Rebecca. That is, Julie knows that auspices under which Rebecca may be considered eligible as a member of the category ‘nutters’.

Rebecca begins a new TCU with ‘An’ I’ (line 7), which is hearable as a bid to move forward in the conversation. However, she cuts off and restarts with talk that relates back to her previous TCU. While the prior (‘From one nutter to another’, line 7) had located the two of them in the same category and, therefore, produced what they shared in common as relevant, this next TCU differentiates between them. Rebecca has been officially diagnosed with schizophrenia and here she refers to herself as a schizo (shortened version of ‘schizophrenic’) using the method explored in the previous chapter (‘I might be a schizo’, lines 7-8). Her use of the pronoun ‘I’ (line 7) extracts her (Rebecca) from the collective ‘nutters’ and thereby indicates that Lorraine is not being treated as a member of the category ‘schizo’. After claiming membership in the category ‘schizo’ for herself, Rebecca continues with ‘but at least I’m an organised schizo’ (lines 8-9).

There are several implications of this turn. First, Rebecca orients to ‘schizo’ as a negative category. Second, she mitigates her mental illness by invoking a positive feature of herself (that is, she is ‘organised’, line 8). And, third, by labelling only herself as a ‘schizo’, Rebecca produces Lorraine as someone who is not a ‘schizo’ but she is ‘disorganised’. Furthermore, it is under the auspices of this disorganisation that she is to be considered eligible for inclusion in the initial category ‘nutter’. So, while Rebecca had previously focused on their similarity through shared membership of the category ‘nutter’, in this subsequent unit of talk Rebecca differentiates between them by referring to how they are differently qualified to be eligible for inclusion.¹⁵

¹⁵ The term ‘nutter’ is usually used to refer to people whose behaviour deviates from what is considered normative. In particular, ‘nutter’ may be (derogatorily) applied to people who have been diagnosed with a mental illness by the medical profession. Alternatively, the term may be also used jokingly to refer to people whose behaviour is odd in some way (see footnote 14).
Given the manifold implications of Rebecca’s turn (lines 7-9), Julie’s response to it displays which of those she is orienting to. It turns out that Julie treats it as an assessment of Lorraine (she could, for example, have responded to it as an opportunity to topicalise Rebecca’s mental illness but she does not), which is most likely given that the topic that underpins it is the email sent to Lorraine. An interpretation of Rebecca’s turn as an assessment of Lorraine as disorganised makes relevant a second assessment from Julie. Julie produces an agreement but she adds a tag question to her turn. A second assessment with a tag question ‘serve[s] to upgrade the epistemic rights claimed by a speaker; in second position, this format invites renewed agreement to a position that has already been taken by the first speaker, thus pre-empting ‘first position’ in the sequence’ (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). Therefore, even though Julie is agreeing with Rebecca she is doing so in a way that claims epistemic authority and in so doing she attempts to claim first position.

Rebecca’s turn (line 7-9) is not oriented to as a laughable during its production (i.e., there are no laughter tokens in the talk and Rebecca does not even use a ‘smile voice’). However, after the completion of her turn she begins to laugh, which retrospectively claims her prior talk to be amusing. This laughter is not reciprocated by Julie. She does not treat being schizophrenic as something that is funny. When she produces her assessment of Lorraine it is only when she gets to the word that is used in place of the word ‘nutter’ (that is ‘chaos’, line 11), that she begins to use a ‘smile voice’. The selection of this particular word (‘chaos’) is interesting because it captures the essence of Lorraine in a way that is similar to that used by Rebecca but it avoids the connotation of mental illness.

Since Julie has claimed first position for herself, she makes relevant a subsequent assessment by Rebecca (despite her earlier assessment). She produces this but she does so in such a way that she does not collude with Julie’s claim. That is, rather than using an agreement token such as ‘yeah’ or ‘yes’, she offers ‘I know’

What Rebecca seems to be doing here is to draw a distinction between these two uses: she positions herself as the former and Lorraine as the latter.
which claims independent knowledge. She then uses a word that is antonymic to that used by Julie – ‘organised’ (line 13) rather than Julie’s ‘disorganised’ (line 11) – to do agreement (this works because the notion of disorganisation is already built into the meaning of ‘chaos’). So, despite this being a preferred next action (that is, an agreement), Rebecca produces it with many of the features of a dispreferred disagreement. Finally, Rebecca does a right-dislocation (‘that girl’) which seems to mark this out as new.

Rebecca’s TCU in which she and Lorraine are produced as ‘nutters’ shapes the direction of the talk away from the email in particular to a discussion of Lorraine. In the immediately following talk (lines 7-13) the topic of the conversation is focused on Lorraine and how she is eligible to be included in the category ‘nutter’. After this discussion, Rebecca does provide details of what she wrote in her email. This is likely to have been displaced from line 7 precisely because of Rebecca’s reference to them both as nutters.

Having told about the sending of the email, Rebecca moves on to announce that she is ‘gonna write a letter back to Michael’ (lines 16-17). Julie produces a minimal response to it (‘Oh well’, line 18). She does not – as she did when Rebecca mentioned the email to Lorraine – encourage any further discussion of the letter. Rather, this ‘oh well’ serves to close down talk about the topic. Julie begins a new topic instead of pursuing discussion of the letter to Michael. Julie’s begins her telling with ‘Rach’ (line 18), however, she cuts off and reformulates not as a telling (as her initial beginning projects) but as a pre-telling (lines 18-19). She performs this repair to enable her to do a pre-telling. Rebecca’s SPP, a go-ahead, provides space and consent for Julie to do her projected telling.

The reason why Julie had called Rebecca was to tell her which hours she (Julie) will be working. This was the first topic of the conversation and during this informing Julie mentioned that her employers had employed a new person (May)

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16 It is known – to Rebecca, to Julie, and to us as analysts from elsewhere in the corpus – that Michael is one of Rebecca’s relations who is part of the British Armed Forces. At the time of this call, he was serving in Iraq.
to work the hours that Julie will no longer be working. Julie's pre-telling here (lines 18-19) topicalises the information she originally introduced in service of the business of the call at the outset of the conversation. In her telling, Julie reports that the reason Rachel (her employer) has employed another worker is because 'with (Re)becca and everything the way it is [Julie] never know[s] what [she's] doing one day to the next' (lines 22-24). The employment of May is also presented as something with negative consequences for Rachel (lines 25-26). Although she is ostensibly engaged in a telling about what Rachel said to her, Julie implicitly topicalises Rebecca's mental illness by making evident the consequences of her schizophrenia for Julie and for those in Julie's workplace.

Julie topicalises Rebecca's mental illness at the next opportunity she gets (i.e. she declines to engage in discussion about the proposed letter to Michael and launches this sequences at the next available moment. However, unlike Rebecca who has treated her own inclusion in the category 'nutter' as a laughable, Julie does not orient to Rebecca's mental health status as amusing. Rather, for Julie the consequences of living with a partner with schizophrenia are treated as something that requires ongoing compassionate arrangements to be made to deal with it. Indication of this stance is available earlier in the conversation. Indication of this stance is available earlier in the conversation.  

At several points in this conversation Rebecca's mental health status surfaces as a relevant category for the interaction. Rebecca's selection of the person reference descriptor 'nutter' to do self-reference is one such occasion. The choice of the term 'nutter' displays a particular stance, that is, it is a jokey reference to Rebecca's mental illness. This position is subsequently supported by her mitigation and her treatment of is as a laughable. In contrast, Julie's position in this conversation treats Rebecca's mental illness as having serious - and often detrimental - consequences for their lives and the lives of those around them. Rebecca's selection of the term 'nutter' to refer to herself presumes Julie will recognise that Rebecca is a member of this category and that she is the particular member of the category that is being indexed by the person reference

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17 See footnote 14 in which Julie reported that she contemplated drinking vodka before going to work.
descriptor. These are prerequisites to the successful deployment of the term as a self-reference. Although Julie does not align with the stance taken by Rebecca and therefore she does not display an endorsement of the category that Rebecca has used, Julie does not orient to the category as problematic as a self-reference.

Julie’s prior knowledge of Rebecca is likely to contribute to not only recognition of Rebecca as a member of the category ‘nutter’ but also how she is eligible for such a membership. Additionally, the echoing of her prior turn but with ‘one nutter’ and ‘another’ in place of the initial (default) reference forms provides the context in which ‘one nutter’ is designed to be heard as a self-reference. This retelling represents a departure from the use of person reference descriptors to do self-reference in the previous two fragments (5 & 6). Unlike these two examples, in Fragment 7 the turn in which the person reference descriptor is deployed does not appear to add further information to the interaction other than invocation of the shared-in-common category membership. If it is the case that in the previous two fragments the categorisation was done in an embedded form that did not draw attention to the category in a way that might make relevant some kind of response to it, then it may be that Rebecca is utilising this method as a format for doing categorisation but in an embedded or subtle way. This might be an orientation to the possibility that Julie may not collude with the category.

Other kid

In the following data fragment (Fragment 8) a speaker refers to herself using a person reference descriptor: ‘other kid’ (line 5) does reference to the self and produces the speaker as a member the category ‘Mum’s kids’. In the preceding three fragments (5-7) the person reference descriptors used to do self-reference are produced in places in which first person pronouns would have been the only option to do default self-reference. In the next fragment this may not be the case. Fragment 8 is taken from early in a call between Chloe and her mother. The transcription opens at the beginning of the recording. Unfortunately, the opening of this call was not recorded.
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

Fragment 8 OTHER KID
[Land: YU24]

01 Chl: > How are you? <
02 Mum: I'm fine. = I thought it was Thomas.
03 Chl: Oh :::
04 ( )
05 Chl: Sorry. No. Other kid.
06 Mum: Huh huh huh N(h)0: I jus’ (. ) I'd had a
07 guess on it.
08 Chl: Oh ri[ght. = Okay. We'll you lost.
09 Mum: [I found my scho-
10 Mum: I found my school repo:rts toda:y.

After the SPP (‘I’m fine’, line 2) to Chloe’s ‘how are you?’ (line 1), Mum reports that she expected it to be Thomas (Mum’s son and Chloe’s brother) when she answered the telephone. The use of ‘thought’ shows that she knows it is not in fact Thomas to whom she is speaking. It also claims – although it does not display – that she knows to whom she is speaking. Chloe’s ‘oh’ (line 3) receipts this information and her ‘sorry’ (line 5) treats Mum’s prior turn as a complaint that it is not Thomas. The ‘no’ confirms that it is not Thomas and then Chloe self identifies using ‘other kid’ (line 5).

Identification issues relating to whom a called person is speaking often arise at the beginning of telephone calls. This is one environment in which speakers often refer to themselves with their name. However, speakers do sometimes refer to themselves with ‘me’ at this interactional juncture. In so doing, it seems to be an ‘instance of a person reference that conveys no new information’ but ‘[p]erhaps it could be said to add some information – it provides an expanded voice sample as well as taking up the stance that the caller is someone who can invite recognition via “it’s me;” it is a claim of entitlement’ (Schegloff, frth: 16).

It is likely that one of the ways in which speakers produce themselves as someone who is close or familiar to their recipient is to use ‘me’ to self-identify, so in this fragment Chloe could have produced ‘me’ instead of her actual
utterance, 'other kid' (line 5)\(^\text{18}\). By choosing to use 'other kid' to refer to herself, Chloe selects this as the relevant category. Of all the ways in which Thomas and Chloe could be categorised it is as the offspring of Mum that calling her is treated as relevant both to Chloe and to Thomas according to Chloe. Coming after the 'sorry' which ostensibly treats Mum's remark as a complaint by apologising for the disappointment caused. The use of this category here implies Thomas is the preferred child – the one who Mum really wanted to speak to.

Mum's laughter displays a hearing of Chloe's turn as doing this and treats the implication as a joke. Mum's 'N(h)o' (line 6) marks a return to seriousness (Schegloff, 2001) and performs a third position repair (Schegloff, 1987b) which is continued with her claim that her reported expectation that it would be Thomas was a guess and not a complaint (lines 6-7). The action that Chloe is performing in this TCU is that of self-identification (despite the fact that it seems apparent that both speakers already know who they are speaking to). The context in which this self-reference is deployed strongly contributes to this being heard as doing self-reference: it is in a place provided for self-identification. Also, Mum, having mentioned Thomas, knows that the 'other kid' must be her other – and only other – child. Therefore, Mum's prior knowledge contributes to this descriptor being successful.

\(^{18}\) This is a transcript of the opening of another call Chloe has made to Mum. Mum does not identify her daughter from the voice sample at line 3 and at line 6 Chloe self-identifies with 'me'.

| Land: YU1 |
|---|---|
| 01 | Ring-ring |
| 02 | Mum: Hello?=
| 03 | Chl: =.hh Hiya |
| 04 | (.) |
| 05 | Mum: Hi?= |
| 06 | Chl: → =Alright.= It's me. |
| 07 | Mum: How y' doing? |
| 08 | Chl: I'm alright |
Descriptors as self-reference terms

In Fragments 5-8, then, speakers use person reference descriptors to do self-reference. This makes categorical memberships interactionally relevant, which would not have been the case had they used default self-reference terms. Unlike the data presented in the previous chapter in which doing categorisation was a vehicle for doing some other action, here the speakers are not doing categorisation but, rather, categorisation is embedded within a turn that is principally treatable as engaged in some other action. By embedding the categorisation in this way, the relevance of the category can be provided for since the turn explains 'why that category now'. Furthermore, it is an economical way of doing categorisation, since it is achieved as part of the ongoing sequence. The preference for minimization means that one reference form is referentially adequate and preferred. Conversation analytic research more generally suggests that when speakers do more than is necessary to do an action they are doing something special. So, it may be that this fulfils some of the criteria set by those preferences: that is, if it can be done in less, then do so.

Problems with simultaneous self-reference and self-categorisation

With the deployment of a person reference descriptor to do self-reference, speakers draw attention to a categorical membership this is relevant for that interactional context. Simultaneously, they are referring to themselves, but for this to be successful the descriptor must be heard as a self-reference by their recipients. In Fragments 5-8 the descriptor was situated in contexts that contributed to it being heard as such. Additionally, all the recipients had a priori knowledge about the speakers’ memberships in the categories used. However, the possibility of misidentification of the referent means that speakers are vulnerable to not being heard as doing self-reference, and – as I will now show – sometimes display an orientation to exactly this problem.
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

Someone who's been brought up in a very homophobic world

In the following data fragment (Fragment 9) a speaker refers to herself using a person reference descriptor: 'someone who's been brought up in a very homophobic world' (line 25) does reference to the self and produces the speaker as a member the category 'people who’ve been brought up in a very homophobic world'. The speaker displays some uncertainty as to whether her recipient will be able to discern that she (the speaker) is being referred to with the person reference descriptor used.

Fragment 9 is taken from a conversation between Karen and Ben. In an environment in which the topic of the talk is about meeting new people, Karen begins to tell about meeting Selina, which subsequently occasions a story involving Selina19. She initially introduces her (Selina) with the descriptor 'someone who’s transsexual' (lines 1-2), her next reference to her (other than with pronouns) is with 'this woman on the course' (line 11), which is immediately followed by her name ('Selina', line 11). Fragment 9 opens just prior to the first mention of Selina. The target lines are 33-34, in which Karen refers to herself with the person reference descriptor 'someone who’s been brought up in a very homophobic world'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragment 9 HOMOPHOBIC WORLD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Land:NE2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Kar: I also met someone who’s uhm (a-a-/uh uh) someone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 who’s transsexual .hhh on a workshop that’s related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 to my placement I did.=Uh a week or so back. .hh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 ‘n’ An absolutely fascinating per:son.=An’ uhm (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Itwz very strange ’cause uhm (0.2) d’ylhknow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Lucy must have told you about Rachel who was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 [int]ersexual that she used to care for=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Ben: [Mm ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Ben: =Mm=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Kar: =Do- be a careworker to. .hhh Well I- when I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 met this woman on the course Selina I just got-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 I mean (. ) first off when I heard her talking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 on t’course I thought “uh-oh (one of these) women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 See Jefferson (1978) for discussion of stories as locally occasioned.
who're just so seriously radical that they get
right up your- (.) tits wi' it all" yihknow but .hhh
Actually when (.) I got talking to her a bit
later and then I talked to her when t'course
finished we were sat chatting for ages an'
it was just so easy conversation.= It were
a wonderful conversation.
.hhh An' an' I just thought well yeah obviously
ser- serious problems and difficulties in life
obviously wi' transgender stuff that .hhh
um are quite politicised but she has- she's
become quite political about it.= She's been
quite an activist over years in all kinds
of gay stuff. .hhhh Gay issues.= But uhm .hhh
so it's fascinating on that hhh that level
yihknow about all the gay issues an' (.) work
she('d/)'s done and that: = And also the- the-
transsexual bit. = I mean she- she's really okay
talking about that: .hhhh So that's: uh
→ yihknow for someone who's .hhh been >brought
→ up in a very homophobic world< for me I
felt- it felt wonderful to be able to
talk to somebody like that. = An' an' have
a really (. ) balanced conversation as well.
.hhh 'nd uhm (0.2) Anyway uhm as I say I just
got this feeling I thought "she must know
Lucy >(or) know of her< or vice versa." .hh And that
was the meeting point. = 'Cause uhm we- uh I was
going into t'caf6 after this workshop ( )
I'd arranged to meet Lucy for a coffee. .hhh
An' I s:- I asked Selina if she wanted to
join us. So we all: (.) three of us ended
up having a right good chat.
(. )
Kar: And they didn't know each other but then
it turned out: (.) that Rachel who Lucy had
work[ed for] was a good friend of Selina's.
Ben: [Oh aye]
Kar: And she'd never actually met (.) Selina
through Rachel.
(0.8)
Kar: So it wz quite- quite interesting really. <So
the whole transgender transsexual intersexual
stuff it was going .hhhh yihknow it was all
right out there.
Karen begins by telling Ben that she met 'someone who's transsexual on a workshop that's related to [her] placement' (lines 1-3). She continues by re-characterising the person she met as 'an absolutely fascinating person' (line 4). There is no uptake from Ben. Undeterred, Karen begins the story proper with 'Itwz very strange' (line 5). An initial characterisation of the proposed story is one of the practices that can be used as a story preface (Sacks, 1974). This preface allows Ben to listen for something 'strange' and hear that as the story.

It is evident from later in the conversation (lines 48-50 & 52-53) that Karen’s story is designed to be about meeting this woman (Selina) whom she subsequently invites to have a coffee with her and her partner, Lucy, and it turns out that Rachel (who Lucy used to care for) is also a ‘good friend’ of Selina’s (that is, the woman Karen met at the workshop). Karen’s story, then, is – at least in the first instance – about a coincidence and, in particular, the type of occurrence that often gives rise to comments about it being a ‘small world’.

After her story preface, Karen displays some problem with the direction of her telling (with the hesitation ‘uhm’ and the 0.2 second pause, line 5). The most likely source of this problem – as we can see from what follows – is that Karen is in a position of telling a story about people whom her recipient may not know or, more accurately, people whom Karen may suppose he will not recognise. Therefore, before Karen can get to the point of her story she needs to ensure that
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

the characters involved are known to Ben. Aside from Karen, there are three other people featured in the story: Lucy, Rachel, and Selina. Lucy is Karen’s partner and a good friend of Ben’s (they have also referred to her frequently in the earlier part of the conversation) so there is no need to introduce her here.

For the second character, Rachel, Karen displays a supposition that she may be known to Ben, by attempting a recognitional reference. Furthermore, she upgrades her supposition by changing her turn from a questioning format, ‘d’yihknow’ on line 5, to a statement which suggests greater certainty, ‘Lucy must have told you’ (line 6). The deployment of the story preface means that Karen is able to introduce information and not have it heard as a telling in its own right but, rather, make it hearable as being produced in service of the ongoing story. Therefore, when Karen produces ‘d’yihknow Lucy must have told you about Rachel who was intersexual that she used to care for’, Ben does not treat it as a story in its own right but rather his minimal responses (lines 8 and 9) display his interpretation that a larger unit of talk is underway. This reference to Rachel is designed not only to achieve recognition of who she is, but also for purposes of the subsequent story. For, if it had been designed for recognition alone, then that would have been achieved at the point at which Ben claims recognition (i.e., with his first ‘Mm’, line 8). Karen’s repair to ‘be a careworker to’ (line 10) is oriented to the potential ambiguity of her previous ‘care for’ precisely because the connection between Lucy and Rachel has implications later in the story.

Having established recognition of Rachel and her relationship to Lucy, Karen moves on to introduce the final character in the story she is poised to tell (i.e., Selina). Although Selina was unknown to Ben prior to this conversation, Karen is able to introduce her here with a recognitional reference form that invites Ben to recognise the person being invoked with ‘this woman on the course’ (line 11) is the same person Karen referred to with the non-recognitional form, ‘someone

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20 This repair may also displays an orientation differentiating the relationship that Karen has with Lucy (in which ‘caring’ may be part of their partnership as lovers) and the relationship between Lucy and Rachel (in which ‘caring’ is paid for in a professional exchange).
who’s … transsexual’ (lines 1-2). Karen does a non-minimal reference here by continuing to produce her name, ‘Selina’ (line 11). Sacks and Schegloff found that ‘names are not only heavily used when known: they may be introduced for subsequent use when not already known to recipient, thereby arming him [sic] with the resources he [sic] may thereafter be supposed to have’ (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979: 17). Despite the preference for minimization, production of two references provides for future reference to Selina with her name, that is, the most preferred recognitional form.

Karen proceeds to report their meeting with ‘I just got’ (line 11) but cuts off to provide parenthetical information about her negative first impressions of Selina (lines 12-15). A resumption of the prior talk is marked with ‘actually’ (line 16), which projects talk about their meeting as contrary to Karen’s description of her expectations. The talk is resumed with a repeat of ‘I’ and ‘got’ (line 16 from line 11). The information in the parenthetical provides an explanation for the omission of ‘just’ (line 11): it was not simply that Karen just got talking to Selina but, rather, they began conversing with one another despite Karen’s negative first impressions and expectations of Selina.

Karen continues to report her subsequent positive experience of talking to Selina and she describes her thoughts about their conversation at length. Because of the use of a story preface and because of the introduction of information without explanation for so doing (i.e., mention of Lucy and Rachel), Karen is able to get this talk about Selina to be heard as background to and in the service of the projected story. The projection of something ‘strange’ (line 5) and then the production of talk not fitted to that description contributes to this being hearable as background to the story proper.

Karen presents Selina as a politicised person as a result of the difficulties that she has encountered because she is transsexual/transgender. Karen describes the conversation she had with Selina as ‘easy’ (line 19), ‘wonderful’ (line 20) and

21 Karen seems to use ‘transsexual’ (line 29) and ‘transgender’ (line 23) interchangeably and later in the conversation she explains her uncertainty about the difference between the terms.
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

‘fascinating’ (line 28). She presents Selina as someone who is ‘quite political’ (line 25), ‘an activist...in all kinds of...gay issues’ (lines 26-27) and ‘really okay talking about that’ (line 31-2). It is not simply that Selina is this type of person and they (Karen and Selina) had a wonderful conversation. But, rather, they had a wonderful conversation because Selina is this kind of person.

Karen produces ‘So that’s’ (line 32) which indicates that she might be headed towards some kind of upshot of the information that she has provided about Selina before a resumption of the story as it was projected at the outset. She continues with ‘uh yihknow for’ (lines 32-33) and then deploys a person reference descriptor: ‘someone who’s been brought up in a very homophobic world’ (lines 33-34). However, immediately after the production of this person reference descriptor, Karen repairs the descriptor to ‘me’ (line 32). Although there is a preference for minimization22 (i.e., the use of only one reference) speakers do sometimes employ more than one (i.e., a non-minimal person reference)23. However, in this instance this is not a non-minimal person reference but, rather, a repair. The repeat of ‘for’ (line 34) operates to pre-frame the reformulation that replaces the original reference form and, therefore, marks this as an instance of repair. This repair occurs in the same TCU as the repairable and without any indication from the recipient that this reference form may be problematic. This TCU is an upshot of the prior telling about Selina: ‘it felt wonderful to be able to talk to somebody like that’ (lines 35-6). In addition to doing a self-reference with a person reference descriptor (‘someone who’s been brought up in a very homophobic world’, lines 33-34), Karen also refers to Selina with a further (i.e., different to the two previous descriptors) person reference descriptor (‘somebody like that’, line 36). ‘Somebody like that’ (line 36) is indexically linked to Karen’s prior description of Selina and therefore, in using this descriptor, Karen refreshes the relevance of that information here. The upshot of the telling-so-far is that Karen thought ‘it felt wonderful to be able to

22 ‘On occasions when reference is to be done, it should preferably be done with a single reference form’ (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979: 16).

23 See ‘this woman on the course Selina’ (line 11) as an example of a non-minimal person reference.
talk to [Selina]'. However, by referring to both of them with person reference descriptors (rather than using default forms that would do only referring), Karen is able to build into her talk an account for why it was wonderful without having to do it as an account. Despite Karen's repair to 'me' to reference herself, the repairable reference form 'leaks' into the subsequent talk such that it is still hearable as a relevant description of Karen. Therefore, it is because Karen has 'been brought up in a very homophobic world' and because Selina is 'quite political' and 'an activist ... in ... gay issues' and so on, that provides an account for the positive presentation of their conversation. These characterisations of herself and Selina also constitute an account for the not-yet-reported action: Karen's inviting Selina to join Lucy and her for a coffee (lines 44-45). The talk about Selina then is not only designed to introduce her so that Karen can tell a story in which she (Selina) features, but, rather, it also serves to provide an explanation for the events that are part of the story.

The use of 'anyway' (line 38) serves retrospectively to reinforce the talk about Selina as background to the projected story. Karen marks her next talk as a repeat with 'as I say' (line 38), despite the fact that she has not previously said what follows this preface. Nonetheless, this preface marks the upcoming talk as a re-invocation of her story start and therefore makes it hearable as a resumption of the story proper.

Karen builds her way to the point of her story by reporting events step-by-step: the feeling that Selina and Lucy must know (of) each other (lines 38-40); the prior arrangement that Karen had made to meet Lucy in a café after the workshop (line 41-43); inviting Selina to join them (lines 44-45); and the immediate outcome (i.e., they had a 'right good chat', line 46). Karen then gets to the climax of her story, that is, even though both Lucy and Selina had connections to Rachel they had never previously met. Although Karen is not obviously integral to the story the way that she built the telling implicates her at every step. She produces this as a story in which – despite not being one of the people involved in the coincidence – she is the instigator or catalyst in the meeting: without her it would not have happened.
Although potentially hearable as a 'strange' event and therefore as a possible conclusion to the story, there is no uptake from Ben. After a 0.8 second gap (line 54) Karen recompletes her story such that an alternative feature of the telling is produced as the point of the story. That is, Karen focuses on how the conversation between Lucy, Selina, and herself was 'quite interesting really' (line 55) due to the relevance of multiple sexual identities: 'the whole transgender transsexual intersexual stuff...was all right out there' (lines 56-58). Because of the way in which she introduced Selina and the way she had reported her experience of their initial meeting, Karen is able to reinvoke this by making the topic of the conversation between Lucy, Selina, and herself the focus of the story.

However, there is still no response from Ben. After another 0.8 second of silence has elapsed (in which Ben’s talk is again relevantly absent), Karen talks again in which she describes the upshot or outcome of the meeting. This is not an alternative recompletion of the story but, rather, how she may have concluded the sequence had Ben produced a story response. Ben does finally produce talk that topicalises a character in Karen’s story. However, by asking a question about Selina that is not obviously relevant to the telling, he avoids engaging with the story.

The way in which Karen has presented Selina when she described the meeting between the two of them is relevant for later in the story despite its parenthetical quality. The turn in which Karen refers to each of them with person reference descriptors marks the outcome of their meeting by drawing attention to their contrastive positions in relation to issues of sexuality. These characterisations are usable as a resource for recompleting her story when the projected story is unsuccessful. Additionally, by referring to them with these descriptors, Karen is producing herself as someone who is part of this new exciting world and this is also implicated in the subsequent recompletion.

Like the person reference descriptors deployed in Fragments 5-8, ‘someone who’s been brought up in a very homophobic world’ (line 31-32) is a self-reference. However, in this instance – unlike in the previous four fragments –
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

the speaker subsequently orients to it as inadequate as a self-reference or anticipates that it may be problematic such that she is proactive in remedying this potential problem. What is it about this self-reference that makes it vulnerable to being not heard as referring to the speaker (to the speaker at least)? Two factors appear to be potentially relevant in the previous four fragments that have contributed to the self-reference being heard as referring to the speaker: context and recipient-design considerations. By considering these two aspects of the person reference descriptor deployed in Fragment 9 the reason why Karen treats ‘someone who’s been brought up in a very homophobic world’ as insufficient to secure self-reference can be explored.

The context here lends itself to a hearing of this descriptor as referring to Selina. Selina has been referred to frequently with ‘she/her’ (line 12, line 16, line 17, twice on line 24, line 25, line 30, and twice on line 31) in the talk leading up to the problematic descriptor. Also, there have been two different person reference descriptors used to refer to Selina in the talk preceding this self-reference: ‘someone who’s transsexual’ (lines 1-2) and ‘this woman on the course’ (line 11). The talk up until this point has primarily focused on characteristics associated with Selina and things that she has done. Perhaps the most salient part of the context is Karen’s report that Selina has had ‘serious problems and difficulties in life obviously wi’ transgender stuff’ (lines 22-23). These features provide two facets of the context that are relevant to whom this person reference descriptor is likely to be heard as indexing. First, Selina has been the principal actor in the talk leading up to the descriptor and, second, the topic of the talk lends itself to an understanding of Selina who has experienced difficulties in her life because of her sexuality.

Another feature that might be relevant to judging these descriptors as hearable as doing self-reference depends on what the recipient already knows about the speaker and what the speaker supposes the recipient knows about her/him (the speaker). That is, that the recipient already knows the speaker to be a member of the category that is being deployed in the descriptor and that the speaker supposes that the recipient knows this. In Fragments 5-8 there can be a reasonable level of certainty that the recipients know the speakers to be members
of the categories that are used in the self-references. However, in Fragment 9 this is less clear. This is because who is or is not included in the category of ‘people who have been brought up in a very homophobic world’ is less clear and subject for more debate about its members. Who is included in the category is much more to do with how the participants locate the boundaries of the category than who belongs to different ‘worlds’.

So, given the problems associated with this person reference descriptor as an adequate self-reference, why would Karen opt to use it? Using person reference descriptors to do self-reference is a method by which Karen is able to achieve the invocation of categorical information about herself (and indeed also invoke information about the protagonist of her telling) economically. That is, she does not have to use a separate TCU such as ‘I’m a...’ like those analysed in the previous chapter. Additionally, the TCU in which the person reference descriptor is deployed serves to close the talk about the conversation Karen had with Selina before a resumption of the story as it was projected at the outset by providing an ostensible summary of the prior telling. However, by using the person reference descriptors Karen incorporates an account for the why meeting Selina was a positive experience without topicalising it.

The repair of ‘for someone who’s been brought up in a very homophobic world’ to ‘for me’ operates to solve the potential problem of misidentification of the referent in this particular interaction. However, the repair in the deployment of this descriptor to do self-reference illuminates something about this phenomenon more generally. That is, it can be supposed that when speakers use this format they are likely to be sensitive to the possibility that they may not get heard as doing self-reference but, rather, that they are indeed referring to a third person. Therefore, when speakers use descriptors to do self-reference in a smooth manner it can be supposed that speakers have assessed the features of the current interaction for how it lends itself to making the descriptor recognisable as a self-reference.

In Fragments 5-9 the descriptor could have been replaced with ‘me’ (and in Fragment 9 this was what actually happened). Conversely, this also
demonstrates that in places where 'me' is actually used person reference descriptors could have been selected in their place. However, to do this would be to do more that simple referencing. If we imagine replacing the instances of 'me' in Fragments 1-4 with descriptors then the character of the turns would change significantly. So, on occasions in which speakers seek to do self-reference and nothing but reference, then 'me' has to be used. Using a dedicated term for self-reference solves the potential problem of misidentification but it is hearable as doing reference simpliciter and, as shown above (Fragments 5-9), speakers sometimes seek to design their self-references to do more than just referring. In the following fragment the speaker is attentive to this problem.

The kinda female I am

In the following data fragment (Fragment 10) a speaker refers to herself using a person reference descriptor: 'the kinda female I am' (line 36-37) does reference to the self and produces the speaker as a member of the (ambiguous) category 'females like me'. Fragment 10 opens in an environment of possible closing. Karen has a new hairstyle and she jokes that Ben might not recognise her at their planned upcoming meeting. This touches off talk in which Karen topicalises the haircut by doing a telling about her previous experiences with hairdressers and the effect of her new hairstyle on how she feels.

Fragment 10 THE KINDA FEMALE I AM
[Land: NE61
01 Kar: Anyway .hhh alright then.=Well I'll see you
02 in Zenith then.=You might not recognise me
03 straight away huh huh huh
04 Ben: What wi' [ your ] new uhm style:
05 Kar: [>'Cause o' me<]
06 Kar: (In th-) It is:- That is the right word not just
07 haircut it is style.=I look a tot- I look a com-
08 I look like me. The me [ I've ] felt like for=
09 Ben: [(Yeah)]
10 Kar: =long enough. .hh[hh But uhm
11 Ben: ["Well I'll recognise you."]
12 Kar: No. It'll be totally different from what you-
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

Mind you you have seen me wi' me short 'air.=
Not this short .hh huh huh huh huh huh It's really
sho(h)rt. It's fantas(h)tic .hhhh I keep c- keep
rubbing back of me 'ead. huhuh huh huh huh huh
Feeling it thinking "my God that's my 'air" I
think "well actually it's quite (. ) strong
'air an' all."
Ben: Sort of- Yeah I 'ave seen you wi' short 'air
twenty (. ) something [years ago ] but not-
Ben: this isn’t kinda like you- you’ve never 'ad it
this short is what you’re telling me I guess:
Kar: Uhm .hhhh if y- I had it- I think >well you said
I< had it short when I first met you. = But uhm
Ben: But it weren’t that short it was just sho:rt
y’know
Ben: Sh[ort (sort’v) eighties sho(h)rt
Kar: [Yeah
Kar: Yeah. An’ it weren’t really (. ) st:yled that
well.="Cause this is my feeling you see.= I am
convinced 'Cause I know for a fact every
bloody 'airdresser I’ve ebber been in .hh 'as
never been able to work with me:. I don’t mean
me an’ how I talk but me an’ the kinda uh
female I am.
Ben: (Mm/Yes)
Kar: An’ I-I-I know now I found thuh-
there 'airdresser's.
Kar: But also I- I can’t explain it but I think
there’s a there’s a gender thing in there.
Kar: Uh an’ actually looked quite nice but now
realises there’s even deeper gender issues in
there.=An’ this style I’ve got now really
brings all that out in me.
Ben: [{ }
Kar: So I think probably some people .hhhh (. ) just
couldn’t understand it. = Didn’t know an’ also they
wouldn’t ’ave fully- perhaps fully read me I don’t
know because y’know I was a bit confused meself I
suppose.

Karen makes an ostensible bid to close the conversation with ‘Anyway alright
then (line 1), which closes down the prior talk, and then she produces an
invocation of future interaction: ‘Well I’ll see you in Zenith’ (lines 1-2). She immediately continues (see latching, line 2) with the suggestion that Ben might not recognise her. Karen’s laughter (line 3) marks the suggestion as a joke and communicates to Ben that it should not be taken literally. Ben does not reciprocate Karen’s laughter but, rather, he initiates repair on Karen’s suggestion with an understanding check (line 4). Karen orients to the potential opaqueness of her turn by beginning an explication of it in overlap with Ben’s understanding check, however, she drops out. Karen begins her response to Ben’s repair initiation but cuts off and restarts her turn to topicalise the word that Ben has used. Karen focuses on ‘style’ (line 7) as an accurate description and by naming what it is not (i.e. a negative observation), that is, it is not ‘just [a] haircut’ (lines 6-7) Karen displays how she initially had planned to design her turn (that is, with the word ‘haircut’). She continues by expanding on the topic of the new hairstyle. She uses the opportunity provided by the topicalisation of the word ‘style’ to describe the consequence of the style. She begins with a TCU in which it appears she was headed towards ‘totally’ as the beginning of a description of herself as something like a ‘totally different person’. This is then cut off in favour of a second attempt of a self-description beginning with ‘completely’ and probably headed towards something like ‘completely different person’. However, this is cut off on the first syllable of ‘completely’ (line 7). These two formulations would have worked to suggest that Karen now looks like – and this may imply ‘is’ – a different person to the person she looked like prior to her new hairstyle. The implication of this would have been that the hairstyle has changed her. However, the version Karen finally produces is ‘I look like me’ (line 8). Unlike the two prior repairable utterances, this formulation is designed precisely to communicate that she has not changed. Although her appearance is dramatically different such that she looks like a changed person, she is not a different person. Rather, her new hairstyle reflects the person she is – and the person she has always been – and it was her old style that was not fitted to her as a person. Karen orients to this comparison of the self to the self (‘I look like

24 ‘Zenith’ is an LGBT event organised in association with the university where Karen is a student.
25 See Schegloff (1988a) for discussion of ’negative observations’.

297
me’, line 8) as potentially problematic by disambiguating the ‘me’. That is, she looks like ‘the me I’ve felt like for long enough’ (lines 4 & 6). This is the first of two instances of ‘me’ in this fragment that the speaker orients to as potentially ambiguous. Karen draws on the distinction between two possible understandings of the self: the bodily or physical self and an identity or ‘inner’ self pertaining to the mind, thoughts, beliefs, and so on. Her disambiguation displays her orientation to these different understandings by retrospectively making clear that her prior ‘me’ (the first one on line 8) refers to the latter.

Although Karen has marked her suggestion that Ben may be unable to recognise her as a joke, Ben’s SPP (line 11) treats her suggestion as serious. Ben’s claim that he will recognise her also ignores the topicalisation of the new hairstyle as a reflection of who Karen is. Rather, it treats Karen’s prior turn as simply the repair solution to his understanding check. In so doing Ben treats the sequence as possibly complete.

Karen, on the other hand, issues a turn initial ‘no’ that is characteristic of third turn repairs (Schegloff, 1992c). This treats Ben’s SPP as an inappropriate response to her repair solution. She is claiming that whether or not he will actually recognise her is not the issue. Rather, the issue is that she looks so different to the way she did when she last saw Ben (line 12). The ‘totally different’ that was cut off in line 7 surfaces (see Schegloff, 2003) here (line 12). In the course of emphasising how different she now looks compared to prior to her new hairstyle she cuts off to display that she remembers Ben has seen her with short hair before but to claim that it was not as short as it is now (lines 13-14). In so doing, Karen pre-empt s a potential challenge that Ben could have made to Karen’s telling. Having neutralised this would-be challenge, Karen continues to describe her new hairstyle (lines 14-19).

Ben then reproduces a version of Karen’s turn (lines 20-21 & 23-24) and by so doing he displays his understanding of Karen’s talk. That is, he treats Karen as being predominantly concerned with establishing the difference between her new short hairstyle and the short style she wore years ago. But, he does not engage with the discussion of the new hairstyle and therefore he does not encourage
further talk on the topic. Karen re-invokes the previous hairstyle (lines 25-26) and Ben displays having understood the differentiation Karen had been making (lines 27-29). This understanding is confirmed with Karen’s sequence closing thirds (lines 30 & 31).

At line 31, Karen provides further elaboration relating to the difference: her telling is predicated on the fact that this style is totally new and this notion is reinforced here by drawing a contrast between her new hairstyle and the short style she wore many years ago. That is, her new cut is a hairstyle, whereas on the previous occasion when she had short hair ‘it weren’t really styled that well’ (lines 31-32). Karen displays an understanding that this distinction has been established, by rushing to produce another TCU: ‘’Cause this is my feeling you see’ (line 32). In this instance ‘this’ (line 32) is a prospective indexical, which projects more talk to come (i.e., an explanation regarding to what ‘this’ refers).

Karen begins her explanation with ‘I am convinced’ (lines 32-33) but she stops and restarts with ‘’Cause I know for a fact’ (line 33). This repair operates to upgrade her claim: if she had been ‘convinced’ then there is a possibility that she could be wrong whereas by presenting it as something she ‘know[s] for a fact’ there leaves no room for negotiation. She continues to produce what it is that she knows for a fact. That is, ‘every bloody airdresser I’ve ebber been in has never been able to work with me’ (lines 33-35). The implication of this turn is that her new hairdresser has been able to achieve this, unlike all his predecessors. There is emphasis on the ‘me’, which could suggest to the recipient that it is not being used to do only referring. Given that ‘me’ is a default way of doing referring while not doing anything special, it is surprising that Karen orients to it as ambiguous, yet she does. She does this by producing a transition space repair on ‘me’. She names the repairable and displays orientation to a possible hearing of ‘me’ that she treats as inaccurate. That is, she claims that she did not intend ‘me’ to refer to ‘me an’ how I talk’ (line 36). By naming the repairable as something that was not articulated she displays an understanding or a possible interpretation Ben may have made. She claims that the ‘me’ (line 35) was intended to index ‘me an’ the kinda female I am’ (lines 36-37). This repair demonstrates that Karen treated the initial ‘me’ (line 35) as sufficient to invoke characteristics
about her. Her repair is oriented to ensuring that the 'incorrect' (unspecified) categorical information about her has not been inferred by Ben.

This is an example of an almost dedicated term (i.e., me) being treated as ambiguous. It is not that it is ambiguous insofar as it is treated as insufficient to achieve an adequate self-reference (as is the case in Fragment 9). But, rather, it is ambiguous with respect to what aspect of the person being referenced (i.e., the speaker) is interactionally relevant at that moment. It is also an example of a speaker retrospectively claiming that a default self-reference term was deployed to do more that just referring. Maybe this 'me' is used to invoke unspecified characteristics precisely because defining what category is relevant is in itself problematic. Later in the conversation, Karen explains why previous hairdressers have been unable to work with her. That is, 'there's a gender thing in there' (line 50), there were 'even deeper gender issues in there' (lines 63-64) and 'they [previous hairdressers] wouldn't 'ave fully- perhaps fully read me...because y'know I was a bit confused myself' (lines 68-70). It may be that Karen herself is unsure precisely what categorical information is relevant.

**Invoking attributes with 'me'**

The repair on 'me' in Fragment 10 raises an interesting possibility: what if some occurrences of 'me' are doing more than just referring and indeed are doing invocation of particular attributes or categorical information about the speaker? In the fragments that follow, I will tentatively explore the possibility that speakers are doing just that.

**Heterosexual women and me**

The following fragment is taken from a conversation between partners, Karen and Lucy. Prior to the talk reproduced as Fragment 11, Lucy has been talking to Karen about her future employment plans. She reports that she does not want to
work in an office and she is only working in her current voluntary position for a reference for future employment. Fragment 11 opens just at Lucy begins a telling about one of her colleagues.

Lucy’s initial telling beginning (‘but I-I’ve realised that I’, line 1) is abandoned in favour of producing a preface to the telling (‘It’s funny’, line 2). Lucy restarts her telling (but she does not repeat her initial telling beginning), however, she cuts of yet again to produce a second preface (‘It’s really weird this’, line 2). Lucy begins yet again but she uses a new opening. She introduces the protagonist of the telling with the person reference descriptor ‘one woman who works there’ (line 3). She then recycles the first opening of her telling with ‘I’ve realised’ (line 3 as a redone version of line 1). She reports that this woman does not like her (lines 3-4). Lucy contrasts this with the ‘blokes’ (line 6) that work
there who she does 'get on really well with' (lines 8-9). The repeat of 'I get on' (line 8 is a redone version of line 2) indicates that Lucy's second opening of the telling was headed towards a report of this element. Therefore, Lucy's faltered start to her telling was a result of uncertainty about which element of her story she was going to introduce first. Lucy then extracts one 'bloke' (line 9) from the group of 'blokes' (line 6) to which she initially referred by naming 'Nigel' (line 10) as a particular person who she gets on really well with. She refers to herself with the pronouns 'I' (10 times) and 'me' (3 times) up to and including line 12. These forms of reference are default ways of doing self-reference (Schegloff, 1996).

After reporting the difficulties she is having with getting on with her colleague, Lucy offers possible explanations for this problem. First, she suggests it may be 'an individual clash thing' (line 13) and, second, she suggests that it may be 'about heterosexual women and me' (lines 14-15). This 'me' (line 15), although it is also the default way of doing self-reference, makes relevant categorical information about Lucy. After the first possible explanation offered for this problematic relationship ('an individual clash thing', line 13), Lucy continues with 'or whether it's to do with' (lines 13-14). This continuation alerts the recipient to upcoming invocation of categories since if it is not related to differences between them (Lucy and her colleague) as individuals then it must be related to differences between them as particular types of people. Therefore, Karen is primed to hear Lucy as relevantly a member of some category. Furthermore, the way in which 'me' is contrasted with 'heterosexual women' makes relevant Lucy's membership in a category that is recognisably oppositional to 'heterosexual women'. If this category is abstracted then there are two possible contrastive groups: 'women who are not heterosexuals' (e.g. lesbians or bisexual women) or 'heterosexuals who are not women' (in our two sex culture this would be heterosexual men). However, in context it can be only the former contrast that is hearably relevant. This is partly due to the previous use of gendered categories without them being topicalised as such, and partly because of Karen's pre-existing knowledge that Lucy is a member of the category 'women'. However, Lucy is not only relevantly not heterosexual, but rather she produces herself specifically as a member of the category 'lesbian'. A
hearing of this contrast as an invocation of Lucy as a lesbian relies on recipient design considerations. Karen’s a priori knowledge about Lucy’s membership in the category ‘lesbian’ contributes towards this ‘me’ being heard as invoking this membership.

**Brain injury**

In Fragment 12, Katy is talking to her partner’s (Chloe’s) mother (Mum) on the telephone. Chloe is in the same room as Katy (she has just handed the phone over to her). Chloe’s talk is hearable in the background and it is responsive to Katy’s talk. Chloe has just reported Katy’s dilemma to Mum. She reported that Katy has been offered a job as a support worker which would involve working with ‘learning disabled adults’, however, she has also been invited to an interview for a job working with people who have brain injuries (she would prefer the latter option). Katy’s dilemma concerns whether she should take the job that she has been offered (the less preferred but definite option) or whether she should turn down the first job and hope that she will be offered the second (the most preferred but not certain option). Katy has reported that she is planning to study occupational therapy in the future, so she is also considering how these jobs would be beneficial to her application to study. Having explained Katy’s dilemma to Mum, Chloe hands the phone to Katy. Fragment 11 is taken from approximately two minutes into a prolonged discussion of the relative merits of each job. Mum invited Katy to do a telling about her dilemma, Katy took up the invitation and Mum produced a response to it. However, Katy then continued with the telling and Mum provided a second response. Fragment 11 begins with Katy continuing her telling further, immediately after Mum’s second response.

**Fragment 12 BRAIN INJURY**

[Land: YU1]

01 Kat: [ h h h ] ’Cause I think (. ) the brain injury
02 one uhm mcht (. ) uhm forgotten what I was gonna
03 say now. .hhh I can’t remember at [all
04 Mum: [I think
05 that’d be really use[ful
06 Kat: [Oh! I think that it would be a
Katy begins her turn in line 1 with '[be]cause'. This marks her utterance as a continuation of the telling that she had been doing prior to Mum's response rather than being responsive to Mum's talk. Katy begins to put forward a further feature associated with the job working with people with brain injuries ('brain injury one', line 2) but she does not complete the TCU. Rather, she provides an explanation for this incompleteness, that is, a claim to have forgotten ('forgotten what I was gonna say now', lines 2-3). This claim of forgetfulness is subsequently redone although not as a repeat ('I can't remember at all', line 3). These two claims of forgetfulness are designed to hold the turn while she searches for the words it would take to complete her TCU.

Mum times the onset of her turn to begin at the end of Katy's second claim to be unable to remember (Katy's second claim of forgetfulness is projectably complete after 'remember' but she continues with 'at all', line 3). Despite Katy's incomplete prior turn, Mum treats it as though is had been completed. Mum displays her understanding that Katy was heading for a positive feature by proffering a merit of the job that involves working with people with brain injuries. Mum's turn does not include reference to the particular job and in not doing so she displays this as responsive to Katy's prior – unfinished – turn. Mum proposes 'really useful' (line 5) as a suggestion or substitute for the feature of the job that Katy has been unable to provide. Mum's selection of 'useful'
relates to one of the criteria by which Katy is assessing the jobs: how valuable the experience would be for her future application to study occupational therapy.

Katy's 'oh' (line 6) is a change-of-state token\(^{26}\) which claims remembering of what she had forgotten in the previous turn before she provides just what that is. That is, the job that would entail working with people who have brain injuries 'would be a bit more challenging for [her]' (lines 6-7). This sequentially deletes Mum's turn (lines 4-5) by failing to acknowledge it and continuing with what was underway previously (lines 1-3). Whereas Mum suggested 'really useful', Katy offers 'a bit more challenging' (lines 6-7). However, Katy continues by adding 'for me' (line 7) even though her turn could have been grammatically and semantically complete after 'challenging'.

Given that they have been talking about only Katy applying for the job (i.e., neither Mum, Chloe, or anyone else they know are applying for it) then it only can be challenging for Katy. In this sense the 'for me' is somewhat redundant. But in providing this additional unit, Katy draws attention to the particular relevance of the challenging nature of the job for her. It is not that it is intrinsically challenging and, therefore, it would be experienced as challenging by anyone who may undertake this. Rather, its reason for being challenging is specific to Katy and features associated with her. The deployment of 'me' makes clear that Katy is referring to herself but it does not articulate which of her characteristics are particularly relevant at this interactional moment. Earlier in the conversation (before the talk that is reproduced in Fragment 11), Katy mentioned that she had 'worked with learning disabled [people] before' and that she would prefer to 'work with a different client group' (the implication is that

\(^{26}\) 'Here then the "oh::" [line 17] displays a successful outcome of the search previously displayed as being in progress' (Heritage, 1984a: 300).

305
she has not worked with people with brain injuries previously). It is probable that this is the sense in which this position would represent more of a challenge to her than the other. However, this is not articulated and left for the recipient to infer. As analysts, we cannot be sure that this is the feature of herself that Katy is drawing to attention in particular. But, this situation of uncertainty is one that is shared with Katy’s recipient. One of the features of this way of invoking information about oneself appears to be that it is designedly vague and open to interpretation by the recipient.

After the completion of Katy’s turn (lines 6-7) there is the onset of laughter audible in the background produced by Chloe. Katy begins a turn-at-talk in overlap with this laughter. Chloe’s laughter is sustained through Katy’s talk such that Katy ceases production and joins in the laughter. Chloe’s laughter is produced prior to her explanation for laughing so, by reciprocating the laughter, Katy claims to understand the source of Chloe’s amusement without displaying that this is the case. Chloe then produces a turn that provides an explanation for her laughter: ‘because you have got one’ (line 10). That is, Chloe jokes that the job would be challenging for Katy since she (Katy) also has a brain injury. This explicates what was left unsaid with the ‘for me’. Chloe provides a possible interpretation of the features of Katy that she (Katy) was invoking with her reference to herself. The laughter demonstrates that Chloe recognises that her interpretation is not the one that Katy had intended. But, the fact that Chloe was able to make this joke provides evidence that participants orient to the inclusion of ‘for me’ as doing work to invoke attributes or characteristics about the speaker. Chloe displays her understanding that the ‘me’ is designed to make relevant particular features of Katy (and therefore Katy knows this) and she treats Mum as understanding that this is the case. However, as the characteristics that are pertinent are designedly vague, this allows Chloe the opportunity to explicate what is relevant. And, because her explication is done unproblematically without explicit connection being drawn between the explanation and the source (i.e., ‘me’), Chloe displays her orientation to this phenomenon as a regular practice for speakers to invoke characteristics about themselves. It is the non-specificity of this type of invocation method that is used as a resource by Chloe to invoke an alternative ‘jokey’ meaning of the ‘me’ for interactional ends.
Katy produces further laughter (line 10) after Chloe’s explanation and Mum joins in (line 11). Katy’s inbreath and ‘so uhm yeah’ (line 13) marks a return to seriousness before she proceeds with the topic that was underway prior to Chloe’s interjection. The potential joke in Katy’s utterance about ‘short term memory loss’ (line 13) given her earlier inability to remember what it would take to complete the turn she had started (lines 1-3), appears to be oriented to by Chloe through the laughter she produces at line 15. However, Katy and Mum do not attend to this as funny and it is not pursued by Chloe so it fails to develop into a joke.

Chloe’s interpretation of Katy’s ‘me’ (jokily) treats Katy as someone who has a brain injury and for whom that is interactionally relevant at that point. However, given the context of the talk, the most probable implication embodied in Katy’s usage of ‘me’ is that she is relevantly someone who has not worked with this client group before. Katy could have said ‘I think that would be a bit more challenging for someone who has not worked with this client group before’ in place of her actual utterance on lines 6-7. This would be similar to the self-references analysed in Fragments 5-9. Although this would spell out precisely what it is about Katy that is relevant at this particular interactional juncture, it would require Mum to work out that it was indeed a self-reference.

The fact that Katy could have used a person reference descriptor to bring particular features of herself to the surface of the talk, makes relevant investigation into why she selected ‘me’. Given that the information about Katy that is likely to be relevant here is rendered understandable because it has already been produced earlier in the conversation, then it could be that Katy treats the context as sufficient for her recipient to work out just what is relevant.

It is also possible that the production of intimacy is implicated in the use of this type of self-reference. Just as speakers might self-identify with ‘me’ at the outset of a call (see Fragment 8) in a bid to produce themselves as an intimate of the called person, the use of ‘me’ in these instances may be employed by a speaker
to convey their supposition that the recipient knows them sufficiently well to discern what is relevant at that point.

If using a person reference descriptor to do self-reference is an economical way of invoking information about the speaker (i.e., it is built into the progressivity of the sequence), then using ‘me’ to achieve the same action is even more efficient. Additionally, a feature of this method of invoking speaker characteristics is that it can be used when there is difficulty defining or reluctance to articulate precisely what is relevant (as was the case in Fragment 10). It is likely that the suggested interpretation of Katy’s ‘me’ in Fragment 12 (i.e. something like ‘someone who has not worked with this client group before’) is not exactly what Katy had designed it to imply. Rather, it is probable that the implication is more nebulous or complex. It could also be because the turn is designed to be ambiguous and this is a resource for conveying information without being explicit about what is being exactly referenced. This makes challenging it difficult, and, if it is challenged, it provides the speaker of the ‘me’ with the opportunity to disagree with the recipient’s interpretation without having to contradict their initial claim. Fragments 13 and 14 offer possible examples of such uses.

To me

In Fragment 12 Katy’s ‘for me’ was not integral or ‘necessary’ for the turn to be understandable\(^{27}\). Furthermore, participants oriented to this ‘additional’ me as doing work to invoke characteristics or attributes of the referent. This means that it is possible that in other instances in which additional units that reference the speaker are incorporated into a turn there is some orientation to the relevance of particular features of the speaker. Below is a brief consideration of two examples in which a speaker includes ‘to me’ into a turn in which the speaker is already implicated so there is no need for reference to be established. Fragments 13 and 14 are taken from the same conversation in which Ben and Karen are

\(^{27}\) It may be ‘unnecessary’ but that does not mean it is redundant (see Hacohen & Schegloff, frth.)
disagreeing about their assessments of a recent television programme, *The Spartans*, they watched (but not together)\textsuperscript{28}.

**Fragment 13 MALE POINT OF VIEW**

[Land: NE1]

01 Kar: But uhm (0.5) it was a particular kinda female like they thought they saw a particular
02 kinda male an' that. hhh But it we- but that to
03 me is typical through the male point of view. =
04 It's got bugger all to do wi' women. Y'know
05 an' [when I've looked at them images I don't=
06 relate to any of it whatsoever. = They look
07 Ben: {{
08 Kar: = really (. ) gormless an' stupid.

In Fragment 13, Karen produces a statement about the programme as something that is applicable to the programme independently from anyone's particular perception of it. That is, "it was a particular kinda female like they thought they saw a particular kinda male an' that" (lines 1-3). However, in her next TCU she makes another point about her understanding of the television programme but in this instance she produces the point as specific to her understanding. Furthermore, she repairs her turn to achieve this. She begins with "but it we-" (line 3) which is hearable as a cut off on the word that would have been 'were', which would have introduced her point as a general statement (similar to that produced in lines 1-3). However, she repairs this specifically to include the reference 'to me' (lines 3-4)\textsuperscript{29}. This serves to make the claim she is about to make as supportable by virtue of some aspect of her.

**Fragment 14 NARRATOR**

[Land: NE1]

01 Kar: So she was- Everything about 'er was med to
02 stand ou[:t.
03 Ben: [Mm.
04 Kar: =.hh Yet to me she was nowhere like one of the

\textsuperscript{28} Fragment 6 in the previous chapter is also taken from this discussion and prior to the production of that fragment there is an overview of Karen and Ben's disagreement.

\textsuperscript{29} She has also changed the indexical (from 'it' to 'that') and the tense (from past to present) in the repaired version.
Similarly, in Fragment 14 Karen produces a point in her argument that she directly links to herself with 'to me' (line 4). As in Fragment 13, Karen does not 'need' to deploy a self-reference to render her turn understandable and she does produce other elements of her argument without doing this (see lines 1-2 & 8-11).

Fragments 13 and 14 are taken from a disagreeing sequence, therefore it might be expected that there would be instances of mitigation. By linking the disagreement to herself explicitly with 'to me', Karen mitigates her disagreement. This works to diminish the difference between their respective positions by suggesting that Karen supports the point that she is making because of something that is specific to her. Therefore, Ben – who of course is not Karen – is provided with a resource for not agreeing. However, crucially this use of 'me' also works to plant a future resource for Karen to employ to circumvent Ben’s potential counterargument. That is, even if Ben produces an alternative point, he cannot do so as Karen, and therefore Karen’s argument is not necessarily challenged.

Given that a similar use of 'me' in Fragment 12 (BRAIN INJURY) is treated as indexing particular characteristics of the speaker, then it may be supposed that there is potential for this to be relevant in Fragments 13 and 14 too. And, similarly, there is no indication which features in particular are relevant; rather, this is left for the recipient to infer.

Here, then, Karen ties her argument to some aspect of herself with the use of an ‘additional’ me. Invoking unspecified features of herself in this way is a
resource for doing disagreement. In the previous chapter, Ben produced something similar to do disagreement. He made relevant his membership in the category ‘man’ (through ‘I’m not a woman’) as a resource for producing himself as unable to agree with Karen\textsuperscript{30}. In this instance, Karen challenged the categorisation that Ben had treated as relevant by re-categorising him as a ‘gay male’ in the pursuit of the argument. In Fragments 13 and 14 this is not an option because Karen has not named the relevant category, which makes it difficult for Ben to challenge.

**Default forms doing more than default?**

These data suggest that in some instances ‘me’ may be doing more than just referring\textsuperscript{31}. In Fragment 10 Karen retrospectively orientst to her deployment of ‘me’ as doing more than simple referring. She treats the ‘me’ as possibly ambiguous and hearable as indexing particular characteristics of her. Given this, in Fragments 11-14 it is possible that ‘me’ is being deployed for similar

\textsuperscript{30} See below for a partial reproduction of Fragment 6 from the previous chapter.

14 Ben: \(\rightarrow\)I’m not agreeing wholesale.\(=\) I’m not a woman.
15 Y’know I can’t
16 Kar: hhh
17 Ben: [()
18 Kar: [(I’m) not a] man. Exactly!
19 Ben: I can’t ac- own everything (. ) what Lucy
20 and yihself ’ave said.= I mean
21 [ I- I’m ] agreeing wi’ principles that=
22 Kar: [Huh huh .hhh]
23 Kar: \(\rightarrow\)Anyway as a gay male I want to know your
24 perspective on it was then. Huh huh huh huh

\textsuperscript{31} In other examples speakers clearly orient to ‘me’ as a default reference form. For instance, in Fragment 6, Mum argues that ‘They’ve got to help me ‘cause I’m English’ (line 33). By continuing with ‘’cause I’m English’, Mum treats the ‘me’ as doing only referring and therefore being insufficient to make relevant her membership in the category ‘English’.
purposes, even though it is not explicated in the same way as Karen did in Fragment 10. There are two different uses explored here.

First, ‘me’ is used to invoke categorical information through contrast as in Fragment 11. Although the relevant category is not spelled out, using this method constrains the possibilities of what the category could be, since what is relevant is produced as an opposition to a named category.

Second, ‘me’ is incorporated into a turn even though it is not integral for the turn to be semantically and grammatically complete (as in Fragments 12-14\(^{32}\)). These are instances of an ‘additional me’ being used to invoke characteristics associated with the speaker,\(^{33}\) but the attributes they make relevant are less specified than those invoked by contrasting a default self-reference term with a named category. In languages in which the verb is marked for the referent, such as Japanese, the reference to a person may be dropped such that the inclusion of a person reference such as a pronoun is doing something special. It may be that in English the use of ‘me’ when it may otherwise be dispensable performs a similar action, that is, it is doing more than reference *simpliciter*.

These are only two possibilities that may use default reference forms to do more than just referring, there are probably others. They appear to be two different

\(^{32}\) Also, Karen’s reference to herself in Fragment 9 is another example of a self-reference that is not ‘necessary’ for the turn to be understandable. The repair from ‘I felt’ (lines 34-35) to ‘it felt’ (line 35) deletes the requirement of a subject.

\(^{33}\) It is not always the case that ‘for me’ is doing invocation of attributes. For example, it may be that ‘for me’ also serves to provide a reason for requesting particular actions (such as mitigating requests). This may be common to (although not restricted to) institutional settings, for example, a doctor might ask a patient to “…for me” or a beauty therapist might ask “…for me” (see line 3 below).

[Toerien: HRS3: Eyebrow Thread]

01 Bth: And with your other hand:

02 Cli: Mhm,

03 Bth: Pull your fore:head for ‘me’

(With thanks to Merran Toerien for allowing me access to the above data fragment)
ways of making speaker attributes relevant with default self-reference terms. These are only tentative possibilities rather than findings but this may form the basis of future research.

Conclusion

Despite the omnipresent availability of dedicated terms for self-reference, speakers do employ alternative methods for referring to themselves. This chapter has focused on speakers' uses of person reference descriptors to refer to themselves. These descriptors are more usually associated with reference to third parties. But, the use of them to do self-reference is fundamentally different to their deployment to refer to third parties. When used by speakers to refer to themselves they are designedly doing categorisation.

There are different ways in which speakers can make their categorical memberships relevant in talk-in-interaction. In the previous chapter (Chapter 5), speakers specifically dedicated talk to locating themselves (or their recipients) in named categories. In this chapter, speakers' deployment of person reference descriptors to do self-reference performs the concurrent action of categorisation. Unlike the phenomenon in the previous chapter, this latter method means that there is no talk dedicated to categorising alone. Furthermore, categorisation is not the primary action of the TCU (or partial TCU). Rather, the categorisation is embedded in the turn that is part of the ongoing progressivity of the talk.

This has structural implications for the subsequent talk since it means that the next action is responsive to the action in the turn and not the categorisation per se. Although the category membership could be challenged (either the 'truth' of the category or its relevance) when speakers use these descriptors for self-reference, structural constraints mean responding to the main action done in these turns is the most pressing relevant next action. Although, when speakers employ the formula 'I'm an X' they are also so doing in service of some other activity
Chapter 6: Self-categorising with person reference terms

(see preceding chapter). However, the categorisation is more exposed and therefore it is possibly more likely to be subject to challenge.

This method of categorisation is economical. That is, reference to the self and invocation of categorical information is achieved in a single unit. There is generally a preference for not overbuilding actions in talk (for example, the preference for minimization, Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). Additionally, using a person reference descriptor to do self-reference means that the reason for the relevance of the category used in the person reference descriptor is provided for by the surrounding talk.

However, one major problem of using this method for simultaneously doing self-categorising and doing self-reference is that it is vulnerable to being heard as something other than a self-reference. Given that default forms are always available for referring to the self, it may be that recipients initially orient to person reference descriptors as references to third parties. Speakers are likely to take into consideration what their recipient already knows about them. So, for example, when speakers use a descriptor to do self-reference they are likely to consider whether the recipient already knows them to be a member of that category or whether the recipient is likely to be able to work this out from the context alone. Although it is possible that a speaker could use this resource to invoke category memberships that are not known a priori by the recipient, to do so would not be to do it as if it were new information (i.e., it would not be ‘doing news telling’).

This chapter has also tentatively suggested that speakers may be doing more than simple referring when they use the dedicated reference simpliciter terms (in this case ‘me’) to do self-reference. The speaker’s repair of ‘me’ in Fragment 10 displays an orientation to the possible ambiguity of this term that is almost dedicated for self-reference. She treats the ‘me’ as having possibly made relevant information about her by repairing her recipient’s potential inference. Two alternative ways in which default self-reference terms may be used by

[34] This type of invocation of a category could provide a discreet way of coming out.
speakers to make relevant characteristics associated with them have been identified: using 'me' as part of a contrast and using 'me' in some turns in which it is not integral to rendering the talk understandable.

There is no difference in terms of the production of the 'me' in Fragments 1-4 compared to those in Fragments 10-14. Whether such a default term is doing simple referring or invoking information pertinent to the speaker is the source of potential ambiguity. This issue is negotiated and resolved locally in interaction. However, on some occasions this potential problem may be a resource for speakers.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

Overview of the chapter

In this concluding chapter, I first summarise the key findings of each of the analytic chapters I have presented in this thesis (Chapters 2-6) and then outline the key contributions of these findings to the three fields of research that I provided overviews of in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1): interdisciplinary lesbian and gay studies; sexuality and language research; and conversation analysis. I show, for each of these three fields, that I have made substantial contributions both in terms of topic (e.g. coming out; sexuality in talk; person reference) and in terms of theoretical development (e.g. of the relationship between different sexual categories; of conceptual problems associated with a 'lesbian or gay language'; of CA as a methodology for politically engaged research). In the third section of this chapter I briefly assess the strengths and limitations of my research, and finally I conclude with some ideas for directions for future research.

Overview of the findings of each analytic chapter

In Chapter 2, Talking about coming out and passing: hassles, interactional difficulties, and alignment, I examined instances of naturally occurring talk about coming out and passing. Unlike existing research that uses talk about coming out and passing as a resource for studying coming out as a phenomenon, I focused, not on the subject of the report as the topic of study, but rather the design and reception of the report itself. This chapter produced three key findings: (1) I found participants orient to coming out and passing as ‘events’ and that coming out and passing extend in time and significance beyond the actual incidents in which the coming out dilemma is of immediate relevance; (2) just as research highlights the hassles associated with coming out and passing, I found – through fine-grained CA analysis and attention to participants’ orientations to
interactional difficulties - that there are secondary hassles in talk about these incidents; and (3) through analysis of participants' orientations as displayed in talk, I found that speakers make available their taken-for-granted tacit understandings of the social world and, in so doing, they regularly reproduce mundane heterosexism, i.e., they reinforce the heterosexist presumption, treat less-than-positive reactions to coming out as positive responses, reify notions of the superiority of heterosexuality, and reproduce the view that concealment and disclosure are features of lesbian and gay life that require ongoing management.

In Chapter 3, Colliding with Heterosexism: To Come Out or Not to Come Out?, I analysed actual instances of coming out (or not coming out) as they occurred spontaneously in the routine activities of life. This chapter produced seven key findings: (1) I found that coming out is a recurrent activity in the everyday lives of people with counter-(hetero)normative sexualities; (2) I found that coming out becomes relevant predominantly because speakers collide with the heterosexist presumption of their co-interlocutors; (3) despite the recent suggestion that researchers should focus on desire in the study of sexuality and language rather than sexuality categories (Cameron & Kulick, 2003; Kulick, 1999, 2000, 2003a), I have found that it is not sexual practice or sexual desire that renders coming out relevant, (at least, not in my data set) but how speakers organise their lives (e.g. living with or partnered with a same-sex partner and therefore not consistent with heteronormative units, see Jackson, 2006). Of course these living arrangements are very likely underpinned by sexual practice/desire but it is not the sex itself that renders coming out relevant¹; (4) despite the recent suggestion that sexuality categories have become less rigid and more variable (Jagose, 1996; Kirsch, 2000), I found that, in practice, participants deploy commonsense heteronormative interpretations in their everyday interactions; (5) I found that when speakers opt to come out – either by correcting the heterosexist

¹ I am not suggesting sexual practice/desire would never make coming out relevant, but it is probable that these instances would be less likely to occur in telephone conversations and more likely to occur in face-to-face interaction. For example, a same-sex couple kissing in a park and other public displays of affection or a mother walking in on her son in bed with his male partner could be interactions in which sexual desire is salient in making coming out relevant.
presumption or otherwise – this is frequently disruptive to the interaction and therefore derails the ongoing primary activity of the interaction; (6) I found that speakers design their coming out to minimise topicalising it as an activity in its own right (i.e., it is managed discreetly); and (7) I found that lesbian and gay speakers talk about themselves and their relationships in ways that parallel the way heterosexuals talk about themselves and their relationships. For lesbian and gay speakers, these ways of talking often result in making ‘coming out’ relevant whereas when heterosexuals make manifest their heterosexuality they do not ‘come out’² (see Kitzinger, 2005b). This provides empirical evidence of the way in which ‘coming out’ is a consequence and manifestation of heteronormativity.

In Chapter 4, Indexing Sexuality Beyond Coming Out, I explored speakers’ routine invocations of information that allows recipients to make inferences about the speakers’ (or persons spoken about) memberships in particular sexuality categories. This chapter produced six key findings: (1) I found that LGBT people are not always attentive to issues of covering and in so doing I provide evidence for the increasing ‘normalization’ (Seidman, 2004) of LGBT sexuality (for some individuals in some situations); (2) I found non-heterosexuality can be made apparent in everyday conversation without it being an ‘event’ or an instance of ‘coming out’, but this is constrained by recipient-design considerations that do not appear relevant for heterosexuals (see Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b); (3) I identified three members’ methods for making available non-heterosexuality: indexing partners and families, referring to participation in LGBT events, and deploying a sexuality category label; (4) I found that these three members’ methods for making available membership in a sexuality category are not universally available to all LGBT speakers and I explored the systematic differences in this availability; (5) I showed, through examination of what goes unchallenged, how references to same-sex couples and to lesbian and gay families reconstitute shared-in-common understandings; and (6) I found that interactional problems erupt due to difficulties in talk about lesbian and gay families and that these repeated and routine challenges to kinship

² Although this may make coming out relevant for heterosexuals if they are in a context in which non-heterosexuality is expected (e.g., an LGBT meeting).
terminology based on same-sex couples function to deny lesbian and gay people's own definitions of our kinship relations, and to exclude us from social understandings of 'family'.

In Chapter 5, *When is a Lesbian not a Lesbian? Categorisation in Talk-in-Interaction*, I explored speakers' production of themselves as members of categories other than sexuality categories. Whereas the first three analytic chapters (Chapters 2-4) focused on how issues related to counter-(hetero)normative sexuality become relevant in talk-in-interaction, in this chapter I examined how sexuality is *not* omni-relevant in talk-in-interaction produced by lesbian and gay speakers by examining speakers' orientations to alternative category memberships as relevant for the ongoing local interaction. This chapter produced four key findings: (1) I provided evidence that it is not just that people can be accorded multiple category memberships but that they *are* categorised with multiple category memberships; (2) I found that it is not only analysts who are oriented to the potential relevance of one of many possibly relevant category memberships, but also that participants are oriented to their possibly variable categorisations; (3) I found that evidence of some category membership in an episode of talk is insufficient to claim that this is the most salient category for the participants in that local context; and (4) I showed that participants reveal and reproduce their understandings of category-bound attributes locally in interaction.

In Chapter 6, *Self-Categorising with Person Reference Terms*, I demonstrated how politically engaged conversation analytic research can lead to findings that contribute to CA’s cumulative stock of knowledge more generally. Disattending the relevance of sexuality categories in advance of analysis allowed for the spontaneous production of the relevance of those categories (Chapters 2-4), and also produced findings pertaining to features of the interaction unrelated to sexuality. In this chapter, I focused on one such feature: participants' deployment of person reference descriptors to do self-reference and self-categorisation as simultaneous activities in talk. I argued that self-reference (and recipient-reference) is a fundamentally different phenomenon to reference to *third parties*. This chapter produced five key findings: (1) I found that – despite
the omnipresent availability of dedicated terms for self-reference – speakers do employ alternative methods for referring to themselves; (2) I found that these are designed to do categorisation (in a way that may not be the case for third party reference); (3) I showed that this practice embeds categorisation in the ongoing talk by not dedicating talk to categorisation alone (i.e., unlike the method for categorisation explore in Chapter 5); (4) I found that there are problems with the deployment of these terms to do self-reference (i.e., they may not be hearable as self-references) and speakers are attentive to this potential problem; and (5) I also tentatively suggested that the deployment of ‘default’ self-reference terms may sometimes be doing more than simply default reference.

**Contributions**

The research in this thesis contributes to three fields of study: (1) interdisciplinary lesbian and gay studies; (2) language and sexuality research; and (3) conversation analysis. In this section, I summarise my contributions to each area.

**Contributions to lesbian and gay studies**

I have contributed to interdisciplinary lesbian and gay studies in four main ways: I have furthered our understanding of coming out, not coming out, passing, and covering; as an outcome of the analysis, I have shown that there are differences (in addition to similarities) between sexuality categories and therefore highlighted the need to treat amalgamations of various sexuality categories with caution; I have contributed to our understanding of the operation and production of mundane heterosexism; and I have developed our knowledge of how sexuality is routinely constructed in the lives of lesbian and gay people navigating the social world.
(a) Coming out, not coming out, passing, and covering

I have contributed to our understanding of coming out by: showing how coming out extends beyond actual incidents in which the coming out dilemma is relevant (Chapter 2); highlighting the interactional difficulties and hassles associated with talking about coming out (Chapter 2); showing actual instances of how coming out (and not coming out) is managed in ‘real life’ interactions (Chapter 3). The existing research on coming out and passing is almost exclusively based on retrospective accounts of people’s experiences (Rothblum, 2000; Sandfort, 2000). In contrast, I have analysed recordings of actual instances in which participants manage decisions about whether to come out or not to come out ‘live’ in their everyday interactions (Chapter 3). I have also demonstrated how sexuality is made apparent without involving ‘coming out’, thereby showing that participants are not always attentive to ‘covering’ (Chapter 4). However, a speaker’s freedom to make available membership in a counter-(hetero)normative sexuality category in service of some other action and without disrupting that ongoing action depends upon their interactional co-participant not displaying the heterosexist presumption. Given that – as I showed in Chapter 3 – the heterosexist presumption appears to be routinely displayed by ‘unknowing’ participants in interaction with non-heterosexual people (and, presumably between heterosexuals too) the non-heterosexual person’s ability to invoke membership in a non-heterosexual sexuality category without being heard to be ‘coming out’ is heavily dependent on recipient design considerations. Since speakers in my data set are relatively ‘out’ about their sexuality generally, they cannot be taken as representative of all lesbian and gay people. Moreover, just because they are not always attentive to covering, this does not mean that they never cover. Within this data set I have also shown that the resources that speakers use to make apparent their sexuality without coming out are the same resources that speakers deploy to do coming out. That is, the methods deployed by speakers who came out in Chapter 3 are not designated ‘coming out’ practices. Rather, what this research suggests is that we need to be sensitive to the local interactional contingencies which lesbian and gay people use these resources and are treated by their co-participants.
The effects of coming out, not coming out and passing have often been considered in terms of the significant consequences (e.g., rejection from families of origin, Bowleg et al, 2003, and/or depression and other negative mental health implications, Cruikshank, 1992; Powers & Ellis, 1996; Smart & Wegner, 2000). In contrast, I have shown (Chapter 3) that we also need to examine the local interactional impact of coming out and the research presented in this thesis offers a model for how this might be done.

I have shown that coming out extends beyond the actual incident in which the coming out dilemma occurs and that this has implications for the way in which we conceptualise the nature of other social phenomena. That is, social phenomena do not necessarily occur in discreet units but rather we should consider how the consequences reverberate in the lives of participants beyond their central occurrence.

(b) Similarities and differences between sexuality categories

As an outcome of the analysis, I have contributed to our understanding of the similarities and differences between memberships in various sexuality categories. For instance, although there has been some opposition to treating ‘lesbian and gay people’ as a coherent category since it erases the gender difference between lesbian women and gay men, I have shown that this omission of gender is not always a relevant absence. For example, in Chapter 3, I showed how speakers manage collision with the heterosexist presumption when they do not have the resources to bring themselves off as heterosexual. As it turned out all of these speakers happened to be lesbian women. However, although the speakers in these fragments indexed female same-sex relationships, there is no reason to suggest that these findings would not apply equally to the invocation of male same-sex relationships. Similarly, the production of same-sex couples by co-joining pairs of recognisably female or male names operates in the same way irrespective of whether a female same-sex couple is being invoked (see Fragments 6 & 7 in Chapter 4) or a male-sex couple is being indexed (see Fragment 8 in Chapter 4).
I have also demonstrated that there are differences between sexuality categories. In particular, I have suggested that there may be differences in the ways in which the categories that comprise umbrella terms such as ‘LGBT’ can be made apparent to co-conversationalists. The speakers in the data fragments (Fragments 4-7) in Chapter 3 who came out did so by reference to same-sex partners using person reference terms that invoke a ‘couple’ relationship which subsequently led to manifestation of the heterosexist presumption from their recipient which they then corrected. In doing this, the speakers are not making statements about their sexuality per se but rather invoking relationships using terms that denote sexual partnerships (i.e. ‘partner’, ‘spouse’ and ‘wife’). Similarly, in Chapter 4, I showed that speakers routinely make apparent their membership in lesbian and gay categories with reference to same-sex partners. This then is a resource that is limited to people whose sexuality category membership is consonant with the displayed organisation of their relationships (i.e., a bisexual speaker with a same-sex partner is likely to be heard as lesbian or gay, whereas a bisexual speaker with different-sex partner is likely to be heard as heterosexual). Also, since – as I have shown in Chapters 3 and 4 – membership in a sexuality category frequently becomes relevant as a result of invocation of couple relationships rather than sexual practices, there are systematic differences for non-heterosexuals who have partners and those who do not. For example, in Fragments 1-12 in Chapter 4 all of the practices for indexing sexuality rely on references to partners (or prospective partners as in Fragment 2). This means that these resources are most easily available to lesbian and gay speakers who are part of a same-sex couple. For single lesbian and gay speakers, references to past or potential future partners would allow for the deployment of these practices. So, although all non-heterosexuals have to confront the same set of heterosexist presumptions into which we differentially do not fit, there are differences in how it becomes apparent and how it is dealt with. Nonetheless, these pose at least some of the same problems for all of us.

I have also highlighted one of the ways in which management of membership in a counter- (hetero)normative sexuality category is distinct from membership in other ‘stigmatised’ categories. In developing a sociology of ‘stigma’/‘deviance’/
'otherness', researchers have often tried to theorise these terms in all-embracing ways. For example, Goffman (1963) refers to the management of stigmatised identities, which, for him, include blind people, deaf people, prostitutes, homosexuals, blacks, Jews, people with mental illnesses, dwarfs and others within the broad category of people with stigmatised identities. He differentiates between them only in terms of whether they are readily apparent to others ('discredited' identities) or not ('discreditable' identities). The implications of the research presented in this thesis is that, in addition to the theoretical benefits of understanding 'stigma management' across categories, we need to be attentive to the specificities and differences between groups in considering the interactional management of oppressed identities.

(c) Mundane heterosexism

This thesis contributes to our understanding of mundane heterosexism by showing the operation of heterosexism in action. Unlike research that uses scales to measure participants' heterosexist beliefs (e.g., Herek, 1994) and self-report data more generally, I have shown the situated occasioning of heterosexism in talk-in-interaction. Moreover, this talk did not occur in a researcher-generated context (such as interviews or focus groups), but in ordinary interactions, making it possible to see how heterosexism manifests itself in the everyday lives of lesbian and gay people. Bricknell (2001) argues that 'assumptions of heterosexuality' (p.213) are embedded in 'everyday interaction' (ibid.) such that lesbian and gay speakers have to make decisions about whether 'to make their sexuality known to others' (ibid.). I have shown how these assumptions are entrenched in the ordinary interactions of lesbian and gay lives: from collision with the heterosexist presumption in our interactions with strangers (see Chapter 3) to the routine reproductions of the assumption of universal heterosexuality in our talk about sexuality (see Chapter 2).

In Chapter 2, I showed how lesbian and gay speakers (and a thoroughly supportive mother) inadvertently produce and reproduce heterosexism through
their alignment on what they take for granted. These speakers were not ‘doing heterosexism’, rather, they were simply displaying and deploying their ordinary commonsense cultural knowledge to interpret and reconstitute social reality (Garfinkel, 1967). Methods that rely on participants to report heterosexist values and attitudes (e.g. on scales, in interviews or in focus groups) would be unlikely to access these understandings. It is only through examining what participants are not orienting to that we are able to develop an understanding of this. In Chapter 3, then, I contributed to our understanding of the routine operation of the heterosexist presumption as we carry out the everyday tasks of our lives.

The findings in this thesis that contribute to our understanding of mundane heterosexism have implications for our current understandings and awareness of sexuality in this culture. While research (based on analyses of self-report data and of cultural developments such as civil partnerships and representations of lesbians and gays in the media and more generally) suggests society has become more inclusive in terms of embracing non-heterosexual sexualities, it appears from my research that members’ methods for organising social reality in their everyday lives is still predominantly based on heterosexist understandings.

Sexuality is not constructed only on the basis of who we have sex with (or the sex of the people we sexually desire). It is also constructed in the routine activities of our everyday lives. Because participants display heteronormative assumptions in the context of a society set up for heterosexual units sexuality becomes continually relevant in everyday interaction. We construct ourselves as members of sexuality categories through the ways in which we make apparent information about the organisation of our lives, thereby making available inferences about our sexuality.

I have shown that heterosexism is not a problem that only affects non-heterosexuals. This research demonstrates that the distinction between lesbian and gay people (and other non-heterosexuals) who suffer the detrimental consequences of heterosexism and heterosexuals who cause heterosexism cannot be sustained. For example, I have demonstrated that the heterosexual family members of lesbian and gay people also face detrimental consequences as a
result of the impact of heterosexism (Fragment 1, Chapter 2). In the calls analysed in Chapter 3 some of the participants who made the heterosexist presumption (of course, we don’t know the actual sexuality of these speakers but their invocation of the heterosexist presumption makes available a possible hearing of them as heterosexual) then ended up having to deal with the negative consequences of their talk (e.g., Fragments 4 & 7). It is, in part, through interaction that the relationships between participants is produced and reconstituted (Mandelbaum, 2003) and therefore the interactional difficulties that arise are more than mere technical glitches to the sequence.

(d) Navigating the ordinary social world

One of the key features of conversation analytic research is to uncover participants’ use of ‘shared methods...to produce and recognize their own and other people’s conduct’ (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997: 69). Understanding one another’s behaviour is central to orderly social conduct. In his well-known paper, Sacks (1984) described how participants are attentive to ‘doing “being ordinary”’ and outlined possible sanctions for not displaying oneself as ordinary.

In the research presented in this thesis I have shown that being lesbian or gay is routinely treated as not ordinary and this has implications for how lesbian and gay people (and other non-heterosexuals) navigate the everyday social world. Since displaying oneself as, and presuming others to be, heterosexual is part of the taken-for-granted understanding deployed in everyday interaction (see Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b), we should consider how people who do not have the resources for displaying their sexuality as normative manage interaction.

I have shown that non-heterosexuals may appropriate the resources that are available to heterosexuals to display themselves as a version of ‘ordinary’. When the heterosexist presumption has already been made apparent in the interaction doing this displays very clearly that non-heterosexuality is not ordinary. In the data analysed in Chapter 3 in which participants made apparent counter-(hetero)normative sexuality, they frequently did so in a way that was
designed to convey ‘nothing unusual is happening’ (Emerson, 1970). This then enables recipients to locate lesbian and gay people within the normative framework and thereby facilitate our movement through the social world. Doing this subtly challenges the normative heterosexist structure but it also works to assimilate lesbian and gay experience into heterosexual experience. Producing oneself as other than heterosexual can be disruptive in the first instance and therefore this is a barrier that has to be overcome, but once this is achieved ordinary heterosexist understanding is (at least temporary) unsettled and recipients treat lesbian and gay people in a manner akin to heterosexuals (see Chapter 3).

In Chapter 4, I have demonstrated that heterosexist understandings can be undermined such that lesbian and gay people can deploy the resources that are normatively associated with heterosexuals without doing anything special. But, achieving this is heavily reliant on recipient-design considerations (i.e., it requires the recipient to treat it this way and, as we have seen, this is unlikely to occur with ‘unknowing’ recipients, see Chapter 3). We can see how non-heterosexist contexts are constituted through these non-problematic deployments. These features produce an environment as heterosexist or non-heterosexist rather than this being a pre-existing feature of the context or situation. I have contributed to our understanding of the way in which lesbian and gay people navigate the social world (and heterosexuals in interaction with lesbian and gay people) by showing how a heterosexist context is produced.

By deploying the resources that heterosexuals do lesbian and gay people can make a claim to the benefits that this affords (e.g., being able to answer questions on a partner’s behalf or being treated as an appropriate person to be calling on behalf of a partner). But, so doing – as I have shown – may mean that interactional difficulties have to be overcome before it is possible to access the benefits potentially afforded by this strategy. Therefore, lesbian and gay people may opt to circumnavigate the dilemma altogether by choosing an alternative way of displaying the relationships in their lives.
In sum, then, this research contributes to our knowledge about how heterosexist and non-heterosexist contexts are constructed and how participants orient to the production of themselves as ordinary even when the context displays that this is not the case. More broadly, this opens up the possibility of studying how people do ‘being ordinary’ when they do not have the resources for doing so across a range of contexts. In so doing, I have developed sociological analysis of how people with a stigmatised identity manage their stigma by developing strategies to bring themselves off as ‘normal’: a process Goffman (1963) termed ‘normification’ (p. 44). However, unlike Goffman, who relied on self-report data (e.g., anecdotes, novels, newspapers, reports, etc.), my own contributions are based on analysis of empirical data in which participants are managing a counter-normative category membership, while doing ‘being ordinary’.

Contributions to sexuality and language research

In this section I draw on the recent overviews of language and sexuality research by two of the leading researchers in the field Deborah Cameron and Don Kulick (Cameron and Kulick, 2003, 2006; Kulick 2000) to identify the ways in which the contribution made by research in this thesis extends and develops existing knowledge in the field. In their introduction to their new edited reader, Cameron and Kulick (2006) refer to the ‘gaps and biases in the [language and sexuality] literature’ and highlight that ‘perhaps the most striking [is] the underrepresentation of lesbians relative to gay men’ (p. 11). In addition to remedying this lack of representation (since my five key volunteers are all lesbian participants and consequently the majority of my recorded interactions involve at least one lesbian participant), I have made four key contributions to language and sexuality research:
- I have demonstrated the relevance of sexuality in *mundane* interaction
- I have shown that and how talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers is not ‘lesbian and gay language’ simply by virtue of having been produced by people who are lesbian or gay
- I have analysed how sexuality becomes relevant through the actions accomplished in talk (rather than, as is more usually claimed, through linguistic features such as pitch, tone, or lexical choice);
- I have advanced our understanding of the methodologies that are appropriate for language and sexuality research by demonstrating the viability of CA for language and sexuality research

(a) Sexuality in mundane interaction

According to Cameron and Kulick (2003) ‘[m]ost studies of gay or queer language-use are studies of single speakers...highly stylized and deliberate performances of queerness...fictional representations of the speech of queers...or textual devices used in queer writing’ (p.135). As they point out, there is virtually no research that addresses how an individual’s sexuality category ‘is or is not made relevant across a range of situations, from the rituals in which it is most likely to be salient...to the most mundane encounters of everyday life’ (Cameron & Kulick, 2003: 135, my emphasis). My research fills this gap. I have contributed to the development of the study of sexuality and language by exploring a context that is not pre-defined as a ‘lesbian or gay environment’ and by showing the analytic insight that we can gain from these mundane interactions (e.g., chatting to a friend or calling an insurance company for a car insurance quotation). I have demonstrated not only *that* speakers’ sexuality category memberships become relevant in the everyday activities of their lives, but also *how* they become relevant (see Chapters 2-5).
According to Cameron and Kulick (2006: 3) in their introduction to their edited book "the question that has been asked most consistently [in the study of language and sexuality] is along the lines of: 'how does the language of homosexuals differ from that of heterosexuals?' As I outlined in Chapter 1, this has been a research objective for many of the early studies of sexuality and language (e.g., Cory, 1951; Crew, 1978; Farrell, 1972; Hayes, 1981; Leap, 1996; Legman, 1941; Max, 1988; Rodgers, 1972; Spears, 1981; Strait, 1961). Departing from this, language and sexuality research has become focused on the more shifting understanding of the relevance of sexuality in language and Cameron and Kulick (2003) report 'sexuality is not only made relevant in language-use as a matter of the speaker's identity' (p. 11). The implication of this shift is that talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers does not automatically or necessarily tell us anything about lesbian and gay people (Darsey, 1981). Moreover, Kulick (2000) maintains that '[t]here is no such thing as gay or lesbian language' (p. 247) due to the diversity within categories such as 'lesbian' or 'gay'. Cameron and Kulick (2003) suggest that in order to recognise this diversity and therefore enable proper study of language-use, researchers need to provide more 'detailed sociological or ethnographic description of the particular community whose language-use is the object of study' (p. 134). However, the research presented in this thesis suggests that it is not more ethnographic information that is required for analysts to understand the relevance of sexuality category membership in language use but adequate analysis of the talk itself. I have shown that instead of seeking to understand an interaction with reference to information from outside the data (or by adopting essentialist understandings of the speakers' social category memberships), we can locate our analysis in the displayed features of the interaction itself (i.e., the details that are available and oriented to by the participants). Moreover, in Chapters 5 and 6, I have demonstrated empirically that talk produced by lesbian and gay speakers is not necessarily 'lesbian and gay talk'.

(b) Not 'lesbian and gay language'
Cameron and Kulick (2003) suggest we need to move beyond the study of sexuality categories if we are ‘going to be able to account for the ways in which sexuality is materialized and conveyed through language’ (p.133). However, I have demonstrated (see Chapter 3, for instance) how sexuality category membership does materialise as relevant in interaction. The research presented in this thesis contributes to our understanding of how sexuality category membership and issues relating to sexuality become relevant in talk. For example, in Chapter 3, membership in a sexuality category becomes interactionally relevant because of the heterosexist presumption being mobilised in the talk, which thereby introduces a correctable matter into the interaction.

There is no evidence in the research presented in this thesis that sexuality becomes relevant through context-free linguistic features of talk, such as particular lexical items, tone, pitch or linguistic styles. In her conversation analytic study of interruption, Kitzinger (fifth) concludes that, ‘[m]ale power (as well as heterosexual power, white power, etc.) is certainly done through talk and if not through interruption then how is a worthy research topic’ (p.26, emphasis in the original). Similarly, in my research it is not through any specific linguistic or interactional feature that membership in a sexuality category or issues relating to sexuality become relevant. Rather, it is via the action that the speakers are implementing that brings sexuality to the fore in these interactions.

This is not to preclude the possibility that sexuality could become relevant through lexical items, pitch etc., for example instances in which gay men ‘camp it up’ (although I happen not to have captured this in my data set). However, even in those cases it would be unlikely that these features could be shown to index sexuality regardless of the specific interactional context of their production since we need to understand the particular action in the particular context to ensure that seemingly ‘same’ objects are actually the same (Drew, 2003a; Kitzinger, fifth; Schegloff, 1997).
Kulick (2000) argued that research within the field of language and sexuality would benefit from a more thorough engagement with ‘well-established linguistic disciplines and methods of analysis, such as Conversation Analysis, discourse analysis, and pragmatics’ (pp.246-7). I have, then, contributed to the study of sexuality and language by exploring how a conversation analytic approach may be fruitfully applied to this area of inquiry. Moreover, I have shown not only that CA is a useful methodological approach for politically engaged research, but also how some of the features of CA of which politically engaged researchers have been critical can be reconciled with such an approach. In Chapter 1, I outlined some of the major concerns that feminist and critical researchers have highlighted with the use of CA to do politically engaged research. Here, I will – in light of the study presented in this thesis – assess the extent to which those concerns (i.e., CA’s understanding of context is too narrow; adherence to participants’ orientations are too restrictive; the focus on the micro social world ignores broader social influences; and CA’s claim to neutrality is misleading) are sustainable.

I have demonstrated that CA’s understanding of context is not too narrow to allow for politically engaged research. The issue of ‘context’ in CA has been attacked from two sides: first, some argue that the scope of permissible context is so limited that it is not useful for politically engaged research and, second, others argue that CA’s context is not as limited as it appears since it ‘may be taking such background for granted’ (Billig, 1999a: 554). I will address each of these concerns of context in turn.

First, the meaning of context in CA is derived from the analysis: ‘talk is where analysts seek an identification of context’ (Tracy, 1998: 3), rather than context bearing down on the talk (also see Drew & Heritage, 1992). Therefore, what is taken as permissible context is intricately interwoven with participants’ observations. That I have contributed to lesbian and gay studies and sexuality and language research while adhering to participants’ observations shows that
CA's understanding of context is not so narrow that is precludes the possibility of doing politically engaged research. I will examine the extent to which adherence to participants' observations are compatible with sexuality and language research (and lesbian and gay studies research) below.

Second, it has been suggested that understandings of context may be incorporated into conversation analytic research without acknowledgement. There may indeed be a case for this in some CA research. For example, in a recent publication, Schegloff (2005), in his description of a dinner scene, explains 'Mom is at the head of the table – whether because the paterfamilias is on duty, or dead, or separated we do not know' (p.458). The lack of a father is only a lack for Schegloff: there is no empirical warrant in the data to suggest that this is a relevant absence for the participants. Through negative observations such as this we can see how conversation analysts do sometimes bring their own taken-for-granted normative cultural knowledge to their analysis and therefore invoke context from beyond the scope of the data. However, this is not a reason to abandon the tenet of treating context as locally constituted and rooted in the interaction. Rather, this offers an exciting opportunity to illuminate the structures that are available to allow us to explore the taken-for-grantedness. If we are positioned outside of the normative structures then we are more easily able to see where normativity is being taken for granted: '[w]hen we think differently to the defaults (as, say, an egalitarian in hierarchical society, or a lesbian in straight society), even for a moment, the otherwise default becomes marked' (Enfield, unpublished manuscript: 19). It is entirely within in the remit of conversation analysis for us to explore these taken-for-granted phenomena and, as analysts, we 'would be crazy to ignore it' (ibid.).

CA's insistence on adherence to participants' orientations has also been identified as a factor in limiting its usefulness for politically engaged research (Billig, 1999; Erlich, 2002; Stokoe & Smithson, 2001). I have contributed to the development of a politically engaged CA approach to studying sexuality and language by showing how attention to details that are shown to be relevant to participants can further our understanding of how sexuality categories and issues relating to sexuality become relevant for participants.
Reliance on participants’ orientations has – at times – been frustrating. There were episodes of talk in which, as a cultural member, I ‘knew’ sexuality was implicated, but I could not substantiate these assertions with reference to the data. Occasionally, this resulted in omission of these data. However, on other occasions adherence to participants’ observations provided a barrier from rash and unwarranted claims. For instance, in Fragment 22 in Chapter 4 (‘POPS’), I cannot be sure that sexuality is the deciding factor Dad’s lack of uptake/challenge as it is not clear that the participants are clearly oriented to this as a relevant factor. Therefore, I have been cautious in my claims and it has tempered the strength of the claims pertaining to that interaction.

However, on the other hand, adherence to participants’ orientations is not only a limitation it is also an analytic resource that allows for identification of what participants take for granted and therefore we can see culture being invoked and reproduced by analysing those things to which participants do not orient. For example, in Chapters 2 and 4 in particular I have been able to show the reproduction of heterosexism in the everyday talk of these speakers by analysing what they do not orient to as something special happening.

I have shown that adhering to the key features of CA (i.e., the use of naturalistic data; avoiding essentialism; understanding talk as constitutive of the social world and relationships; and being faithful to participants’ orientations) does not preclude a politically engaged research agenda. I have demonstrated that CA’s focus on the minutiae of interaction need not result in ignoring broader social influences. Indeed, I have shown that it is by attending to the production of social reality in that level of detail that allows access to how culture is constituted. Finally, I have contributed to the development of politically engaged CA by showing how CA’s claim to neutrality can be reconciled with the (LGBT-activist or feminist) study of sexuality and language.
Contributions to conversation analysis

At the most general level, the research reported in this thesis is a contribution to conversation analytic work on mundane, everyday conversations and to politically engaged CA. Within the field of CA, ordinary conversation is widely regarded as 'the central domain of data' (Heritage, 1984b: 238) and 'the fundamental form of talk-in-interaction' (Schegloff, 1987a: 101) such that it 'has a “bedrock” status in relation to other institutionalized forms of interpersonal conduct' (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984: 12). This centrality of ordinary interaction can be explained due to the way in which researchers have shown that institutional talk to a greater or lesser extent involves deviations from the model employed by speakers in everyday, mundane conversations (Heritage, 1984b; Sacks et al, 1974). With the exception of Chapter 3, almost all the data analysed in the remaining four analytic chapters (Chapters 2 & 4-6) of this thesis are drawn from ordinary conversations (this contrasts with the recent surge in politically-motivated CA and CA-influenced research that has also generally used institutional talk as a source of data, e.g., Shaw & Kitzinger, 2004, frth.; Stokoe, 1998, 1999; Toerien, 2004a, 2004b). The research presented in this thesis also provides an exemplar for how politically engaged research can make use of CA’s most central data source, and also contribute to basic understandings of the organisation of ordinary conversation. I have shown how a politically engaged approach can be fruitfully combined with conversation analysis.

In particular, I have contributed to conversation analytic research in four ways:

- The research contributes to understandings of categorisation in talk-in-interaction
- This study develops our knowledge about the local constitution of category-bound attributes
- I have contributed to our cumulative knowledge of person reference
- I have furthered our understanding of correction (especially embedded correction and its receipt)
(a) Categorisation

The research presented in this thesis contributes to CA and MCA research on categorisation. Across the chapters there is work that adds to our understanding of the routine categorising in conversation since this research is largely concerned with achieving an understanding of how sexuality categories (specifically) and issues pertaining to sexuality (more generally) become relevant in talk-in-interaction.

Researchers have argued that it is insufficient to attribute a participant’s behaviour to membership in a given social category without warrant since it is also the case that they are members of a whole host of other categories (e.g., Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Kitzinger, 2000; Schegloff, 1997; Speer, 2005a; Stokoe, 2005; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003; Zimmerman, 2005). I furthered this argument by demonstrating empirically that participants do in fact treat themselves and each other as relevantly members of a range of different categories (Chapter 5 is explicitly concerned with this, but Chapter 6 also illustrates this point). I have shown that it is not only analysts who are concerned with establishing category memberships as relevant for an interaction, but that participants are too. For example, in Chapters 4-6, I present many fragments of data in which a speaker produces him/herself as a member of a category (e.g., with a category label or a person reference term) of which their recipient already knows them to be a member (e.g. a ‘woman’, Fragment 5 in Chapter 6, or ‘queer’, Fragment 3 in Chapter 5). In these fragments, we can see participants designing their talk to display that they are relevantly members of those particular categories in those local interactional environments.

I have also developed our understanding of the situated practices of doing categorisation, since we should be concerned to demonstrate not only that categorisation is done but also to show how it is done (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2003). Across the thesis I have explicated members’ methods for doing categorisation (see Chapters 5 & 6 and Fragments 17-19 in Chapter 4) and for doing other actions that make relevant categorisation (see Chapters 3 & 4). And,
by making distinctions between different methods for categorising (i.e., through person reference, through partner-talk that allows for recipient inferences about category membership, or through labelling a participants’ category membership explicitly), I have contributed to our understanding of how categorisation is done itself.

I have added to our understanding of what constitutes a warrant to claim some category is relevant. Some researchers (e.g., Lakoff, 2003) have been critical of conversation analysts’ injunctions to demonstrate a warrant on the grounds that what constitutes a warrant has not been articulated clearly. While I cannot claim to have shown definitively what is (and, perhaps more importantly, what is not) an adequate warrant to demonstrate categorical relevance, the current study does add to this debate by showing that evidence of a social category is not synonymous with relevance of a social category (see Chapter 4, especially Fragments 1-12).

The research presented in this thesis overall is offered as an exemplar for how research on sexuality categories can be successfully and fruitfully implemented without relying on the kind of tautological arguments critiqued by Stokoe and Weatherall (2002).

(b) Category-bound activities

In addition to developing work on categorisation more generally, the research in this thesis contributes to our understanding of category-bound attributes. Research that draws on MCA has been developed from Sacks’ (1972b) proposition that collections of activities are associated with particular membership categories. However, in much of this research, analysts stipulate attributes associated with particular categories without showing that these attributes are so associated in the data under analysis (e.g., Bernard, 2005; Edwards, 1998; Stokoe, 2004; Wowk, 1984). Conversation analysts have often been wary of investigations of category-bound attributes for this reason (e.g., Schegloff, 1995a).
The research presented in this thesis provides insights for a way forward for the study of category-bound attributes that is faithful to the conversation analytic commitments to grounding analysis in participant orientations and to avoiding essentialist understandings of social categories. Especially in Chapter 5, I have shown how category attributes can be grounded in and indexically derived from their local interactional context. Moreover, I showed that the attributes associated with particular categories are not fixed or static; that is, when speakers use categories they are continually (re)constituting and (re)producing the attributes associated with that category. Speakers do not simply use a category such that a pre-existing set of attributes statically attached to that category are automatically conveyed to the recipient. Rather, they actively produce particular attributes as bound to the category in question (see especially, for example, Fragment 3 in Chapter 5). Recipients, as I have shown (see Fragment 2 in Chapter 5), may opt not to challenge that association, which thereby reifies the ‘boundedness’ of that attribute (or attributes) to that particular category, or they may challenge or modify the attributes. In this way, we can see participants negotiating the features or characteristics associated with a specific category ‘live’ in interaction. This focus on participants’ orientations to the relevance of particular qualities pertinent to the category invoked, then, offers a path for conversation analysts to contribute to our understandings of category-bound attributes while still adhering to the key principles of CA.

Just as analysts are (or should properly be) unsure, in advance of contextual analysis, about what attributes a speaker means to invoke in indexing a category so too are recipients. I showed that participants are oriented to the fact that invocation of a category membership is often not sufficient to convey the appropriate category-bound attributes they are seeking to make relevant and I

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3 Compare with Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2003) who show how a speaker ‘does not rely on the category “handicapped people” being sufficient for [her recipient] to invoke the (allegedly category-typical) attributes of her linguistics teacher. Instead...she uses the reported speech of a professional with experience to warrant the category/attribute relationship, and actively to construct the attributes of “handicapped people”’ (p.116)
demonstrated that speakers are oriented to this possibility by showing how a speaker sought to explicate which aspects of a category are relevant at that particular interactional juncture (see Fragment 3, Chapter 5).

(c) Person reference

This study contributes to our understanding of the practice of person reference in talk-in-interaction. In particular, this research joins a small pocket of research (e.g., Kitzinger, 2005a, 2005b; Rendle-Short, 2005) that examines how sexuality is made available to interlocutors through the deployment of person reference terms to reference third parties.

In Chapter 6, I have shown that speakers deploy person reference terms more usually associated with reference to third parties when doing self-reference to do simultaneous self-categorisation. I have also highlighted the fundamental differences between the practice of self-reference (and recipient-reference) and the practice of third party reference. Dedicated terms are always available for the former whereas this is not the case for the latter. This means that when speakers do self-reference using person reference terms that include categorical references then they are designedly doing categorisation. This may not be the case for reference to third parties that use similar person reference terms (although categorical information is nonetheless available in the talk). This means that when we explore the intersection of categorisation and person reference we need to take seriously whether the categorised is the speaker, the recipient, or a third party. It is important to remember that '[w]hatever a person says, they have to say it in some way' (Enfield, unpublished manuscript), however, as I have shown it is crucial to take into consideration the differential number of alternatives available in each case.

I have also provided tentative evidence to suggest that 'default' self-reference terms may not always be doing default reference (see Fragments 10-14 in Chapter 6). This has implications for how we understand what we count as
unmarked, default or 'opaque with respect to all the usual categorical dimensions' (Schegloff, frth.: 2). These preliminary findings suggest that we might need a more contextually bound understanding of what we mean by default reference terms. So, rather than treating particular words as 'default terms' independent of context, we must seek to establish whether something actually is default in the place in which it is uttered.

(d) Correction

As an outcome of the analysis, rather than as an a priori goal, this research has contributed to our understanding of the operation of doing actions discreetly in conversation. Jefferson (1987) demonstrated that one way a speaker can do correction discreetly is by embedding it in the ongoing talk so that there is no interactional position provided for "'accountings", which specifically address lapses in competence and/or conduct' (p.95). She suggested that initiating a correction in embedded form incorporates 'an implicit account' (p.100) that the correction is something to be 'discrete about' (ibid.) and that should a recipient of such a correction opt to expose the correction by acknowledging it then they are rejecting that implicit account. She had no instance to illustrate this possibility, but here I have shown an instance of such an occurrence (Fragment 7, Chapter 3) and, in so doing, I have contributed to our understanding of the interactional contingencies that impact on the production and management of delicacy and accountability in talk. I have also shown that doing discreet correction is not only the preserve of embedded correction. Just as Kitzinger (2000) analysed instances of coming out and found they were frequently embedded within complex turns such that the relevance of a response was minimised, I showed (Fragment 4, Chapter 3) that correction of the heterosexist presumption, even though done in exposed form, may still be embedded within turn to the effect that the relevance of acknowledgement of that correction is suppressed. This suggests that doing correction obviously v. doing correction discreetly is not synonymous with the distinction between doing exposed correction v. doing embedded correction. Rather, I suggest that there may be varying levels of doing discretion that participants manage in interaction.
Finally, the thesis as a whole contributes to the ongoing debate pertaining to the application of CA for sexuality research. In so doing, I hope that I have allayed the concerns of conversation analysts who are uncertain about the appropriation of a conversation analysis for politically engaged research. In Chapter 1, I outlined some of these apprehensions: that politically engaged researchers tend toward promiscuous citing of gender and sexuality (and other) categories; to impose their own ideologies on the data; and are often tempted to treat gender and sexuality (and other) categories as analytic categories a priori to the analysis.

Throughout the thesis, I have been careful to not cite sexuality as a relevant category unless I have adequate warrant for so doing. Indeed, in Chapter 4, I showed that evidence of category membership in talk is insufficient to claim that participants' are oriented to it as relevant. Just as Kitzinger (2005b) showed that heterosexuals can invoke their heterosexuality without it being treated as a relevant by the participants, in Chapter 4 I showed that (in environments in which heterosexuality is not presumed) so too can lesbian and gay speakers. Similarly, in Chapter 5, I highlighted the way in which membership in a variety of categories can be available in the talk without it being salient to the speakers.

I have shown that lesbian and gay CA research does not – or does not definitionally - involve the imposition of a particular pre-defined ideology on the data. Since CA is data-led, even a politically engaged conversation analysis can explore the relevance of sexuality categories only as and when they arise in talk and claims that they do must be sustained with empirical evidence. As we have seen, sexuality is not always relevant (see Chapters 5 & 6). Nonetheless, the politically engaged researcher does, however, tend to be interested in some kind of analyses rather than others. Since there are many different analytic directions that could have been taken in this research, my selection of particular fragments of talk from the many hours of conversation that I had at my disposal was led by my political concerns. The selection of data extracts to focus on and analytic directions to pursue is a necessary feature of all CA research: for researchers who are not aiming to do politically engaged analyses there must be some other
Chapter 7: Conclusion

criteria used for data selection (e.g., an interest in particular actions such as apologies or disagreements). Therefore, the selection of particular data extracts or analytic foci over other possible extracts of foci does not in itself preclude the possibility of reconciling a political agenda with analyses that adhere to the key principles of CA.

This study shows that lesbian and gay CA research does not involve treating sexuality categories as analytic categories a priori to the analysis. I have provided evidence that it is not only that people can be described according to multiple category memberships but also that they are categorised as such. Moreover, I have shown that it is not only analysts that are oriented to the potential relevance of one of many possibly relevant category memberships, but that participants also are oriented their possibly variable categorisations (e.g., Fragment 6 in Chapter 5). Doing lesbian and gay CA research often does involve an interest in and engagement with sexuality categories (and maybe other social categories) as they are produced and negotiated in talk.

This thesis, then, contributes to the ongoing discussion of the suitability of CA for politically engaged research (e.g., Kitzinger, 2000; 2003; Stokoe, 2000). It achieves this, first, by demonstrating how CA can be fruitfully appropriated for lesbian and gay research while still adhering to the core principles of CA (i.e., the use of naturalistic data; avoiding essentialism; understanding talk as constitutive of the social world; treating participants’ orientations as a key analytic resource; and drawing on and contributing to the cumulative conversation analytic stock of knowledge in domains such as turn-taking, sequence organisation, repair etc.).

**Strengths and limitations**

In this section, I describe the strengths of the research presented in this thesis and I consider some of the limitations of the study that have become apparent as a consequence of the research process.
Strengths of the research

A key strength of the research presented in this thesis is the successful application of a CA approach for politically engaged research. Moreover, while existing research that achieves this has overwhelmingly focused on how gender is managed, implicated, and oriented to in talk-in-interaction (Paoletti, 2002; Speer, 2002; Stokoe, 1998, 1999; Tanio, 2003), this study is a sustained investigation into the way in which sexuality is managed, implicated, and oriented to in talk.

A further strength of this research is born out of the adherence to the principles of CA. The requirement for conversation analysts to be led by the data has enabled the project to contribute to the cumulative conversation analytic project. Rather, than treating this contribution as distinct from the research on sexuality that is the focus of the first chapters in this thesis, it is better to see this as two prongs of the same research objective. If we borrow the tools of CA to understand episodes of talk in a way that contributes to our political agenda, we can also generate new tools that provide resources for future politically engaged research and basic CA analyses. This thesis demonstrates a way forward for conversation analysts with a political agenda.

The use of naturalistic data is a strong asset of the study. When I began collecting data for this research, one of my concerns was that there would be no talk in which sexuality was relevant. My own experiences and those reported to me by others I knew suggested that sexuality did become relevant in talk with some regularity. But, since I could not shape the content of the talk that participants were recording for me, I was powerless to ensure that sexuality did become relevant and it may have been the case that it would not. There is no a priori guarantee that calls between lesbians and their mothers, siblings, and service providers such as insurance salespeople and dentist receptionists would necessarily result in data that lends itself to an analysis highlighting sexuality.
However, the resulting data corpus did – as I have shown – include talk in which sexuality spontaneously erupted in the talk.

There were two main ways in which sexuality became relevant: first, as a topic of the talk, and, second, speakers’ (and others’) membership in sexuality categories were oriented to as relevant by the participants in the interaction (although there is overlap between the two, e.g., talk about how a speaker managed disclosure of her membership in the category ‘lesbian’). The latter way in which sexuality was made relevant offered the most interesting analytic purchase and it is this phenomenon that I have explored most thoroughly in this research (see Chapters 3 & 4, in particular). That the relevance of speakers’, recipients’ and others’ membership in sexuality categories did arise spontaneously is a significant strength of the data and therefore the analyses and findings based on these data. The spontaneity of the relevance of sexuality in this naturalistic data demonstrates that these phenomena (e.g., coming out to a dentist receptionist, telling a story about the difficulties passing as heterosexual in the company of a partner’s father, or achieving person reference by referring to a same-sex partner) really are a regular part of lesbian and gay lives and not only a researcher concern.

I will highlight in the following section the limitations of having data only from participants who were apparently ‘out’ in most areas of their lives; but here I describe why this is also an advantage that comprises a positive feature of my research. These speakers exemplify the prevalent contemporary view – both within academia (Seidman, 2004; Seidman et al, 2002) and in wider society (Jivani, 1997) – that being lesbian or gay is no longer as significant as it was several decades ago since society is more inclusive of people of all sexualities. However, the fact that heterosexism, the coming out dilemma, difficulties in talking about lesbian and gay families, and other issues pertaining to their membership in counter-(hetero)normative sexuality categories are relevant even to these speakers, indicates the extent to which all lesbian and gay people continue to face prejudice and difficulties as a result of non-normative sexuality since it can be expected that oppression is exacerbated for those who are compelled to continue to hide their sexuality.
Limitations of the research

Here I outline three limitations of the research presented in this thesis: first, I consider some of the limitations of the sample; second, I describe some of the difficulties due to omission of areas of study; and, third, I highlight some of the unanswered questions the research generated.

(a) Sample

Conversation analysts are generally not preoccupied with obtaining a 'representative' sample, since such a venture would imply the relevance of particular social variables in advance of analysis (i.e., without providing a warrant for or demonstrating the relevance of those variables). Therefore, I did not set out to recruit a sample that was representative of some particular predefined group nor do I claim that the findings presented in this thesis speak for all lesbian and gay people. However, as a consequence of the analysis in this research, I have noted two ways in which the sample used in this study is limited.

First, it turned out that issues relating to disclosure and being out were relevant recurrently in the interactions (see Chapters 2-4), and the participants who volunteered to take part in this research were apparently 'out' in most areas of their lives. The method of the sample selection (i.e., advertising for volunteers) and the nature of the data collection process meant that the sample must have been skewed towards those who were reasonably open about their sexuality. Indeed, one person who enquired about participation and subsequently decided not to proceed did so on the basis that obtaining consent from her interlocutors would entail explaining about the purpose of the research and, in so doing, it would make apparent her lesbianism to her co-conversationalists. It is likely that the management of sexuality in talk produced by speakers who are not as 'out' as the participants whose talk is analysed here would have produced interesting and
insightful observations, which would have allowed for a more thorough understanding of the relevance of the coming out dilemma, for instance.

Second, only lesbians volunteered (although gay men’s talk and heterosexuals’ talk was included on an ad hoc basis when they happened to be co-conversationalists with the lesbian volunteers). I do not regard the restriction of the sample to lesbian women such that gay men were excluded as a problem per se since, in addition to the fact that gay men are speakers in some of the data analysed here, in many of the analyses there is no warrant provided for suggesting that sex of the speaker is an organising characteristic oriented to by participants as relevant in the talk (e.g., the heterosexist presumption shows that ‘unknowing’ recipients of talk in which speakers invoke a partner/spouse subsequently display their understanding of that person as different-sex to the speaker and there is no reason to suggest that a man calling on behalf of a partner is not likely to be treated as having a different-sex partner). However, the analyses have suggested that there are systematic differences between the resources available to lesbian and gay people (and heterosexuals) and those available to members of other sexuality categories such as bisexuals, intersexuals, transgendered people, and transsexuals (see Chapter 4). Moreover, each of the participants had a partner/spouse (and only one partner/spouse). Since the participants’ membership in sexuality categories often became relevant through invocation of a partner/spouse (see Chapters 3 & 4), it would have been interesting to explore how (and if) this relevance was produced in interactions with lesbians (and gay men) who do not have partners/spouses. For the same reason, it would have also been interesting to analyse talk produced by speakers who have multiple partners, such as polyamorous people⁴. It is likely that that, for example, a lesbian speaker who has more than one partner may have to come out twice (as lesbian and as having multiple partners), however, this is an intuitive suggestion since I do not have the data to explore this empirically.

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⁴ Polyamory refers to ‘a relationship orientation that assumes that it is possible to love many people and maintain multiple intimate and sexual relationships’ (Uriel, Haritaworn, Lin, & Klesse, 2003: 126, also see Easton & Liszt, 1997).
(b) Topical restrictions

As a result of the methodological approach of this research, there were necessary topical omissions. Doing a conversation analytic study involves repeated listening to the data, ongoing revisions of a detailed transcript of the talk, and fine-grained analysis. This is a very labour intensive and time-consuming process and – unlike research that does not attend to the minutiae of talk at the same level, such as thematic analysis or narrative analysis – writing CA analyses entails inclusion of extensive detail. As a consequence, the range of data analysed is necessarily constrained. Moreover, because of the data-led nature of a conversation analytic approach, phenomena that were not the initial focus of a data fragment would often become apparent. This, then, generated new research interests and highlighted possible alternative or additional avenues for researching the topic under investigation, which – given the remit of the thesis and time and space constraints – could not be followed up. In the section below (‘Suggestions for future research’), I outline some of the research possibilities that were opened up but could not have been explored in this thesis.

(c) Unanswered questions

Each ‘discovery’ seemed to lead to a new set of questions and dilemmas. Therefore, I have not been able to answer all of the questions raised by the analyses. For example, as a result of highlighting the distinction between making sexuality apparent that is ‘coming out’ (e.g., Chapter 3) (or ‘outing’ with reference to others) and making sexuality apparent that is not ‘coming out’ (or ‘outing’ with reference to others) (Chapter 4) a boundary is necessarily erected between the two phenomena. This then led to the identification of cases that could not be easily assigned to one of the two categories. I did not have the time or space to explore such possibilities.
Some directions for future research

The analyses I have done on the current data set are just a subset of a wide variety of other possible analyses, some of which I am interested in pursuing after completing this PhD. I have already indicated, in earlier chapters, some of the ways in which I would like to develop my analyses and I bring those together in the first section below to indicate some of the publications I intend to develop as a direct consequence of the work presented in earlier chapters. I have also made a number of observations about my data that have suggest future productive analytic possibilities, and I will discuss one of these in more detail in the second subsection below.

Developing research themes

(a) Categorisation and person reference terms

My search for fragments of data in which categorisation is done (see Chapters 5 & 6) generated a collection of over 200 fragments. One of my key observations from this collection is that the practice of categorising is much more varied than I had previously thought. Existing CA and CA-inspired research on categorisation in talk and discourse more generally has tended to focus on showing that categorising is relevant and exploring the interactional import of this categorisation, and usually in researcher-generated talk (see Speer, 2005a; Edwards & Stokoe, 2004) or talk in institutional settings (see Berard, 2005; Edwards, 1998; Stokoe, 2004; Wowk, 1984). These features are, obviously, centrally relevant for CA research on categorisation, but what is frequently overlooked in this research is examination of the format used to do categorisation and the interactional implications for selecting a particular method. I have shown in this thesis that ‘I’m an X’ (or ‘you’re an X’ or ‘she/he’s an X’) is an interactionally different item to person reference terms that are used to do categorisation (at least in terms of speaker/recipient categorisation).
While existing research that contributes to our understanding of categorisation has often focused on the use of person reference descriptors as a means of categorising third parties, it has generally not engaged with these descriptors as terms that achieve reference to persons and therefore it does not seek to contribute to knowledge about person reference per se. Moreover, since – as I have explained above – doing politically engaged CA research often involves examining how membership in various social categories come to be interactionally relevant for participants, then developing our understanding of members’ methods for doing categorising and the interactional import of different categorisation formats is likely to proffer insights that are useful for doing politically engaged CA in particular in addition to CA more generally.

(b) Default person reference

I would like to explore further the possibility that default person reference terms are sometimes doing more than only default reference. In Chapter 6, the first data fragments that I presented were instances of unmarked, default references to the self (see Fragments 1-4) to illustrate the practice of default self-reference. This was a task that I believed would be very easy since the person reference literature (e.g., Schegloff, 1996) indicated that these are ‘dedicated terms’ (Schegloff, 1996: 442) that are designed to do ‘referring and nothing else’ (Schegloff, 1996: 440). However, several hours later and still struggling to find four clear examples of default self-reference, I became less convinced that this was always the case. The difficulties that I experienced finding instances of ‘me’ or ‘I’ that were clearly doing self-reference and only self-reference (i.e., the default) led me to speculate that these terms may be doing something in addition to reference simpliciter. The last section of Chapter 6 (‘Invoking attributes with “me”’) represents the beginning of what I would like to turn into a more sustained and indepth investigation into this possibility. I have already collected further examples (from my data corpus and beyond) of instances in which ‘I/me’ appear to be doing more than only simple self-reference and also some fragments in which ‘you’ seems to operate similarly.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Being able to identify what is default is important for two reasons. First, only if we know which are the ordinary, unmarked, default references can we recognise when something special is happening in interaction, which offers an interactional location to 'go to work'. Second, identification of the default does not mean that we can simply discount those instances as not worthy of investigation. Rather, there has been a recent interest in examining default practices (e.g., Enfield, unpublished manuscript; Kitzinger, 2005b) since they provide analytic purchase on what is ordinary or taken-for-granted in a culture.

(c) Constructing gender

I would have liked to examine the construction of gender in this talk. Throughout the thesis I have presented data in which speakers used gendered terms to refer to third parties (e.g., Fragment 1.4 in Chapter 2, Fragment 11 in Chapter 6, Fragment 7 in Chapter 6, Fragment 14 in Chapter 6) or themselves (e.g., Fragment 2 in Chapter 5, Fragment 6 in Chapter 6), or they locate themselves or their recipient in gender categories (e.g., Fragment 6 in Chapter 5), or they refer to themselves and others as 'particular types of males/females' (Fragments 10 & 13 in Chapter 6). However, I have not developed a sustained analysis of how gender comes to be relevant and the interactional import of the displayed salience of these gender orientations. Moreover, in my collection of over 200 instances of categorisation by far the most common instances are references to gender.

The frequency of these instances in which gender is indexed suggests that gender is an important organising feature of the way in which participants view the social world and as such it is of analytic interest. However, from preliminary analysis of these data it often seems difficult to understand precisely why gender in relevant in some of the interaction in which gendered terms are used. Coupled with the fact that participants very rarely use gender-neutral terms such as 'person' or 'people', this opens up the possibility that using gendered terms may not be designedly doing gendering. The implications of such a finding would
contribute to interdisciplinary gender studies by exploring the routine reproduction of understandings of gendered practices in everyday talk-in-interaction. A book chapter with Celia Kitzinger is in preparation that explores this possibility. We analyse data in which gender is available in the talk to explore not only how participants are (or are not) oriented to gender but also investigate when and how gender is produced as relevant and the local interactional goal of the participants in so doing. By doing this, we show the routine gendering of the social world.

**New research directions**

In addition to developing themes that have arisen in the course of the research presented in this thesis, there are some issues I would like to explore that are not touched on in this Ph.D. I explore one of these possible areas for future research below.

(a) **Negotiating the move into and out of ‘institutional talk’ and its relationship with ‘ordinary conversation’**

Most of the calls in the Land Corpus are easily slotted into one of the two categories conventionally used in describing CA data of ‘institutional talk’ or ‘ordinary conversations’, where ‘institutional talk’ is the term used to refer to naturally occurring interaction ‘in a range of specialized or institutional interactional settings’ (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984: 13) and ‘ordinary conversation’ is used to refer to naturally occurring ‘everyday, mundane conversations’ (Heritage, 1984b: 238) that take place ‘between peers in everyday contexts’ (Drew & Heritage, 1992: 4). Researchers have observed that this is not a rigid classification, and that ‘ordinary conversation’ may often take place in ‘institutional’ contexts (and vice versa).

Just as people in a workplace may talk together about matters unconnected with their work, so too places not usually
considered “institutional,” for example a private home, may become the settings for work-related interactions. Thus the institutionality of an interaction is not determined by its setting. Rather, interaction is institutional insofar as participants’ institutional or professional identities are somehow made relevant to the work activities in which they are engaged (Drew & Heritage, 1992: 3-4).

For example, participants in interaction with an institutional goal may engage in ‘everyday conversation’ before or after the ‘business’ of the call, or while the ‘institutional’ work is being undertaken by means other than talk (e.g. see Toerien, 2004b, for examples of episodes of ‘ordinary conversation’ about holidays, shopping trips etc. while the institutional business of depilation is being done). A different but related phenomenon occurs when speakers who have a primarily personal relationship and are engaged in business that is consonant with that personal relationship but they conduct the interaction in an institutional setting which then may have a bearing on how the participants orient to context (e.g., see Drew, 2002, for an analysis of the difficulties that arise when a wife calls her husband at work for reasons associated with their domestic life).

I would like to explore data that seems to straddle the boundary between institutional talk and ordinary conversation to examine how participants orient to and manage this shifting understanding of context. This research would contribute to conversation analytic work that highlights how classification of talk as either institutional talk or ordinary conversation is negotiated in the local interactional context of the talk rather than being a pre-existing context that bears down on the interaction (e.g., Drew, 2002; Drew & Heritage, 1992; Schegloff, 1992b).

In the Land Corpus (and, I suspect, elsewhere) there are calls in which the co-interactants have both an ‘institutional’ and an ‘ordinary’ relationship to one another, and in which the one relationship underpins the other rather than being separate from it. It seems that in these calls there is not a ‘switch’ from ‘ordinary’ to ‘institutional’ talk (or vice versa), but rather a performance of
"institutional" business that is underwritten by or infused with the personal relationship of the participants. These calls defy classification as either "institutional" or "personal," nor is it clearly the case that some parts of the call represent one kind of talk and others the other.

For example, when Karen calls Albert (see Fragment 5, Chapter 5) to request he give a talk to her university's LGBT committee about his experiences of being gay as a young man many decades ago, she does so under the auspices of her new position as a committee member ("What I'm ringing about actually mainly is...Well uh I've just been nominated onto their uh committee uh which is for the lesbian gay bisexual and transgendered students", lines 5-6 & 9-12). However, Albert is also Karen's uncle and, after the asking and granting of this request, their talk turns to other topics such as Albert checking that he has Karen's correct address so that he can send her a Christmas card. Moreover, it is not that there is a distinct division between the parts of the interaction that are "institutional" and the parts that are 'ordinary conversation', rather, the two contexts are interwoven. Karen is counting on her non-institutional relationship with him as underwriting her request. For example, in the following fragment which is taken from this conversation, Karen is drawing on their uncle-niece relationship in service of the request.

[Land: NE5b]
01 Kar: Uhm (.) but because they're younger
02 y'know it just struck me y'know t'stuff
03 I've talked to you (0.2) wi' me coming
04 out this year.
05 Alf: Yes
06 Kar: [An' y'know partic'ly about older
07 Greentown.
08 (.)
09 Alf: Yeah.
10 Kar: [(Is/'Cause) sometimes when I've been in
11 conversation wi' 'em >there's this<
12 there's this li:ke .hhh uh missing
13 piece I think of their- their knowledge
14 of Green- gay Greentown.
15 Alf: Yeah =
16 Kar: As it was before. = An' I find it really
At lines 3-4, Karen refers to a past conversation between them (i.e., an interaction that invokes their non-institutional relationship) that she invokes as an account for her request in the current interaction (i.e., an interaction that makes relevant an institutional relationship between them). This co-relevance of an institutional relationship and non-institutional relationship is brought to the surface of the conversation again later in the interaction when Karen makes arrangements about a suitable time for him to give his talk to the LGBT group and transport arrangements to and from the venue in which she draws on and displays her personal knowledge of him (as her uncle rather than merely as an invited guest speaker).

Another example occurs in a call between Rebecca and a care worker. However, this episode is the inverse of the previous example (i.e., between Karen and Albert). While Karen and Albert have first and foremost a personal familial relationship that precedes the institutional (such that the institutional is worked up and built off the personal), Rebecca and the care worker have first and foremost an institutional relationship. That is, whereas Karen was born the niece of her uncle and has a relationship with him on that basis, Rebecca and the care worker must have been assigned to each other by psychiatric social services and their institutional relationship precedes their personal relationship. In this example the personal is worked up and built off their initial institutional relationship with one another.

It is apparent in the talk that they have an ongoing relationship (i.e., unlike the co-conversationalist in the institutional data presented in Chapter 3, for example). The call has many of the features associated with ordinary conversations such as in the opening of the call they establish identification of one another with only first names (although Rebecca does initially display some problem with recognising the caller).
After the initial, 'familiar' opening to the interaction (lines 1-7), they are soon into the main business of the call, which relates to the institutional relationship between them. Carly has been asked by the Department of Works and Pensions to complete a form about the impact of Rebecca’s mental health problem on various aspects of her life. Throughout the call Carly displays knowledge about Rebecca’s particular personal circumstances. Moreover, Carly and Rebecca appear to draw a distinction between their relationship as something more-than-only-institutional on one side and their institutional relationship only with the people who will be receiving the completed form at the Department of Work and Pensions. For example, later in this interaction Rebecca’s partner is referred to by her first name only (i.e., a recognitional person reference), but when Carly explains what she is going to include on the form she refers to her as '[the patient’s] partner' (i.e., a non-recognitional person reference).

Through examination of the infusion of the institutional and the personal in these calls that appear to defy classification as either one or the other, I would like to explore how multiple relevant categories are intertwined. That is, how do participants display, manage, and negotiate who they are to one another at any given interactional juncture? Analysis of data that is straddling the boundary of contexts in this way could contribute both to our understanding of institutional and ordinary talk and to our understanding of human interaction more generally. The issue of whether and how to bring the ‘personal’ to bear on the institutional is a live ethical issue in many institutional contexts as is the extent to which
personal contacts and relationships can legitimately be exploited for institutional ends.

**Final comment**

As I said in my introductory chapter, the initial impetus for this research was driven by my experiences of heterosexism and my desire to explore and analyse such instances within the research. Conversation analysis has been an invaluable tool in allowing me to illuminate these experiences and it has been exciting to uncover in the data – in instances of recordings of real interactions – episodes that reflect my own experiences (such as those I referred to in Chapter 1). One of my goals for the future is to develop my research in order to present my work in a form and a forum that is accessible to lesbian and gay people beyond academia. When I talk to lesbian and gay people outside of academe about my work they are often excited that there is a name for ordinary life. Equally so, my work has been received enthusiastically by heterosexuals. For example, my sister, Jane, – who is happy to be named here – has been hugely excited by my research findings and says it has made her more sensitive to (and determined not to contribute to) the routine heterosexism of the everyday world around her.

At the time at which I began the PhD, I very much saw myself as someone who was embarking on a research project on sexuality and to do this I would be using CA. However, over the years – and without really being aware of it – I have become a conversation analyst who (sometimes) wants to contribute to our understanding sexuality and other large-scale organising features of the social world. At the beginning of the four years, I dedicated hours to understanding the tiniest details of talk and I thought I did so in service of sexuality research. The rationale for doing this was clear: I accounted for this up-close study of the minutiae of talk because I was going to use it as a tool for analysing data in such a way as to be able to say something about sexuality (and I have done this). However, at some point the minutiae of the talk became intrinsically interesting in their own right. And, when I read through the chapters presented in this thesis,
I see quite clearly this development as I move from the earlier chapters to the later chapters. I attribute this change to the expertise and enthusiasm of those who have provided me with CA training at York and from the organisers and participants at the conversation analysis summer schools I have attended. I am excited by the possibilities that await me in applying my conversation analytic skills in the future, both to further politically engaged research and to uncovering the basic structures of human interaction.
Appendix I

Researcher name: Victoria Land (University of York)

LETTER OF CONSENT

AUDIO RECORDS RELEASE CONSENT FORM

As part of this research you have made audio recording of some of your telephone conversations. We would like you to indicate below what uses of these records you are willing to consent to. This is completely up to you. We will only use the records in ways that you agree to. All names and identifying information will be changed in any written or verbal communications based on the records.

1. The records can be studied by the research team for use in the research project.

2. The records can be used for scientific publications.

3. The records can be used by other researchers.

4. The records can be shown at meetings of scientists interested in the study of conversation analysis, sexuality and/or gender.

5. The written transcript can be kept in an archive for other researchers.
Appendices

6. The records can be played in classrooms to students.

7. The records can be shown in public presentations to non-scientific groups.

I understand that the recording of telephone conversations without obtaining consent from the person I am speaking to is illegal. I will ensure that the other speaker has consented and I will only send tapes that both of us are happy for you to use in your research.

I have read the above description and give my consent for the use of the records as indicated above.

Date _____________________________

Signature __________________________

Name _____________________________
Appendix II

Transcription Notation

. A full stop indicates the utterance has been produced with closing intonation (does not necessarily indicate the end of a sentence)

, A comma indicates the utterance has been produced with continuing intonation

? A question mark indicates the utterance has been produced with rising intonation (it may not be a question)

? A question mark indicates the utterance has been produced with rising intonation (but not as great a rise as those marked with a question mark)

↑ An upward arrow indicates that there is a rise in pitch immediately after the arrow

↓ A downward arrow indicates that there is a fall in pitch immediately after the arrow

! An exclamation mark indicates the utterance has been produced with animated expression.

.hhh ‘h’s preceded by a full stop indicates an audible inbreath (the number of ‘h’s indicate the length of the inbreath)

hhh ‘h’s without a preceding full stop indicate an audible outbreath (the number of ‘h’s indicate the length of the outbreath)
Underlining indicates that a word or word particle is produced with emphasis.

Square brackets are used to illustrate overlapping talk between two or more speakers.

This indicates that there is no discernable gap between turns.

Numbers in round brackets represent the length of intervals within or between turns (the number within the brackets is the length of the gap in seconds).

A full stop in round brackets represents a discernable gap or pause (i.e., a microgap or micropause) that is too short to measure (i.e. less than a tenth of a second).

Colons indicate there is a stretch on the preceding sound (the number of colons used represents the relative length of the sound stretch).

These are all used to represent laughter.

An ‘h’ within round brackets indicates there are laughter particles in a speaker’s turn but less that a full laugh.

This is used to represent a ‘smile voice’.

This is used to represent a ‘creaky voice’.

Talk that appears within degree symbols is quieter than the surrounding talk.
Appendices

**CAPITALS**
Capital letters are used to indicate talk that is louder than the surrounding talk.

>  <
Talk within these symbols is faster than the surrounding talk.

<  >
Talk within these symbols is slower than the surrounding talk.

-
A hyphen after a word or word particle indicates an abrupt cut off on the immediately prior sound.

<word
This indicates rapid onset of the following talk.

“ ”
Quotation marks indicate reported speech.

(word)
‘Empty’ round brackets indicates talk inaudible to the transcriber.

(word)
A word (or several words) within round brackets indicates a possible hearing.

(word 1/word 2)
Indicates two (or more) alternative hearings.

(( ))
Transcribers may provide additional information or sounds within double round brackets.

//
Indicates omitted lines in the transcript.


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