POST-OSLO RECONSTRUCTION OF PALESTINE
1993-2000
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY

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ABSTRACT

This work concerns how post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding are linked, particularly in the Palestinian context after the-Oslo peace agreements (1993). It focuses on the problems faced in reconstructing human settlements, using case studies from the Gaza Strip.

Palestinians have suffered from prolonged Israeli occupation. For the last fifty years, 'shelter' along with many spheres of Palestinian life have deteriorated. Peace initiatives with Israel in the 1990s brought hope of change, including reconstruction of human settlements. Seven years of frustrating negotiations since have worn away aspirations. With this legacy, the author recognises that for the Palestinian people to build a national homeland there is a need to review and evaluate their short-lived reconstruction and peacebuilding activities.

Having introduced the context for the research, the author narrows down the scope to address the following question.

Considering the impact of Israeli Occupation and the ill-fated peace agreement how can Palestinians (the Authority and people) with the help of the international community, achieve successful reconstruction programmes and sustain the peace process?

The thesis starts by looking at the meaning and consequences of occupation, reviewing The Hague and the 4th Geneva Conventions that formulated the relationship between the occupier and occupied territories. Reacting to the recent Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative, the research looks at the link between peacebuilding and reconstruction. It reviews different options that claim to lead to the attainment of post-conflict reconstruction of human settlements.

To refine and contextualise the argument, the work examines two empirical case studies. First, the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP) planned and carried out by UNRWA the programme aimed to improve living conditions of Palestinian refugees. The second case study investigates the Elkarama neighbourhood as an example of the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) projects in the Gaza Strip.

The author summarises the study, isolating main points, identifying principles and issues, which could create a framework for reconstruction of human settlements in the Palestinian Territories. Responding to shortcomings of the peace agreements and effects of continuous Israeli punitive measures, the author suggests that a flexible reconstruction approach should be established. These research conclusions are translated into practical recommendations for the reconstruction of human settlements in Palestine.

Key Words: Peacebuilding, Reconstruction, Post-conflict, the Palestinian Territories, Housing, Human Settlements, Peace Implementation Programme, the Palestinian Housing Council, Elkarama Housing Project.
To those who lose their lives in research for peace. May they find real peace: the Palestinian Martyrs.
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When the author began his research, he along with millions of people around the world were led to hope that peace would prevail in the Middle East. Following the signing of the Oslo Agreements (1993-1994), it was expected that Israel would withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza within five years and that Palestinians would then be free to build their independent state. However, more than seven years have gone by and Israel continues to have direct security and overall administrative control of 61.2% of the West Bank and about 30% of the Gaza Strip. This control has enabled Israel to double the number of settlers and to seal an entire nation into restricted areas, imprisoned in a network of bypass roads used by Jews only.

Moreover, the mounting Palestinian frustration over the lack of progress in the peace process was further inflamed by a provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa mosque by Ariel Sharon on 28/9/2000. Sharon is remembered as the person responsible for the 1982 massacre of 2000 Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camps; Sabra and Shatila. The resulting demonstrations countered by heavy artillery, tanks and helicopter attacks; have been the bloodiest confrontation since the Oslo process began in 1993. Hundreds of Palestinians have been killed and injured on a daily basis. Years of reconstruction have been devastated.

It is worth noting that before his departure, the former American President Bill Clinton has worked to diffuse the Intifada by presenting the Palestinians with an offer, he thought they could not refuse. Expectedly, the offer demonstrated disrespect and denial of the Palestinian basic rights. While superficially more generous than anything ever promised under the Oslo framework, it remained a recipe for dispossession. It guaranteed Israel the control of areas amounting to 35 percent of the West Bank. The proposed Palestinian mini-state would amount to only 15 percent of Palestine as a whole. Most ironically, Clinton’s plan denied the right of return to the majority of millions of Palestinian refugees to their homes.

Pessimistically, the author feels compelled to conclude that the process, which began in Oslo seven years ago, has failed. The so-called peace process is dead, shot to pieces, like the young children, by Israeli helicopters and machine guns. However, reconstruction must continue for the sake of the Palestinian people. It can be part of a peacebuilding process as in other post-conflict situations if there is first of all a just peace to build on. Until justice prevails, peace and proper reconstruction will at most be only a distant prospect.
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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of York. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Ghassan Elkahlout
Monday 26 February 2001
INTRODUCTION

POST-OSLO RECONSTRUCTION OF PALESTINE
1993-2000
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY

1.1 THE RESEARCH DEFINED

This work mainly concerns how post conflict reconstruction and peace building are linked, particularly following the peace settlement in the Palestinian Territories. Research has given rise to three principal observations:

- Occupation in reality is a continuation of warfare, and the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories since 1967 is a typical example of how the long occupation can be as devastating as a full-scale war.

- In peacebuilding, the third party (the international community) can assist, but the legitimate rights of the occupied people need to be recognised no matter how much aid is supplied; justice is the cornerstone for sustainable peace.

- A successful reconstruction of human settlements is directly related to a sustainable peace process.

1.1.1 The Phenomenon of Occupation

Colonisation has largely disappeared in other parts of the world, however the Palestinian Territories remain under Israeli occupation, an internal colonisation. Since June of 1967, as a result of the armed conflict that erupted in the Middle East, Israeli military forces have occupied the remainder of the territory allocated to the Arab State under the partition plan outlined in UN resolution 181 (II) of 1947. Article 42 of the 4th Geneva Convention states: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”

Addressing the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the author claims that through occupation Israel has used punitive tactics to make the native Palestinians’ lives as difficult as possible in an attempt to force them to leave. It is widely believed that armed conflict seems worse than occupation, as the former usually leads to the destruction of
human settlements. Although no settlement destruction is taking place in the Palestinian territories, the author argues that Israel has exercised a policy, which has destructive results similar to those suffered in the long run through armed conflict. Israel has carried out its policy of De-development, through three components: expropriation and dispossession, integration and externalisation, and de-institutionalisation. The first term expresses how Palestinian people have been denied full use and benefits of their resources. Integration and externalisation have created dependence on Israel. Palestinians have been pressurised into relying on externally generated income sources, primarily from Israel. The third component is de-institutionalisation, achieved by direct and indirect restrictions placed on indigenous institutions that might have planned for sustainable development in Gaza (Roy, 1995; Saigh, 1988).

Furthermore Israeli strategy causes the deterioration of infrastructure, restricts land use, puts obstacles in the way of acquiring a permit for building development, abuses the legal system, expropriates local resources, and finally and crucially enacts policies that violates human rights undermining Palestinian identity and self-respect.

After decades of debilitating occupation, the last ten years have seen attempts to reach a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. The end of the Cold War, collapse of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (a major supporter of the Palestinian cause), the Gulf War, and Palestinian first uprising (Intifada) are all factors that came together and led to American-sponsored peace initiatives. Consequently, Israel traded being recognised as a legitimate state for recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Secret negotiations (Oslo 1993) ended with the signing of peace accords. However issues such as Palestinian sovereignty, the future of Jerusalem, the unwanted existence of Israeli settlements in the Territories, Israel’s borders, the sharing of water, security arrangements and the status of refugees: all of these were put off till a later date, a supposedly final status negotiation. From the Peace Accord (1994), Israeli troops were re-deployed away from populated areas and a Palestinian administration was established.

With the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the international community urgently committed resources to foster reconstruction activities with the aim of providing tangible benefits for the Palestinian population while laying the foundation for sustainable peace through long-term reconstruction.
I.1.2 Sustainable Peacebuilding

"Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process." (Doyle and Sambanis, 1999). This description is true once long-term peace is sought, as real peace requires more than an absence of violence. Martin Luther King expanded on this when he said, "Peace does not mean the absence of violence, but...the presence of justice".

Even the end of violence is not guaranteed in every peace agreement as "sometimes peace agreements contain the seeds of their own destruction" (Hampson 1996); lasting peace, must “…rise from recognition of the needs of the conflicting parties” (Ball and Hallevy, 1996:20). In support The World Bank (1998) stressed that “Peace agreements must reflect, or at least not conflict, with the history, tradition, cultures and values of the involved populations”, or in other words the needs of the conflicting parties.

In an Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992) defined four areas of actions to secure a long-lasting peace. These are:

- Preventive diplomacy, which is an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- Peacemaking, which is an action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Peacekeeping which is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace, and
- Peacebuilding, which is a post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

The former UN Secretary General recognised the relation between post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Adopting a similar position Barakat (1994) considered:

A proper development can not take place without lasting peace, peace can never be sustained without proper reconstruction and long term development. No matter how much effort is put into the three actions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is proper peace building that can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.
Kofi Annan (1998) also recognised the strong connection between peace-building, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. He extended the argument, urging “…the international community and national actors to consolidate a fragile peace and begin sustainable reconstruction.” Arguably, peace settlements enjoying high levels of assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and peace building process are more likely to succeed than those that do not (Hampson, 1996). Reconstruction after a settlement between the conflicting parties has been reached can be useful in supporting and cementing progress toward peace.

The author endorses the above propositions, but doubts that aid can replace the need for a just and comprehensive peace process.

I.1.3 Reconstruction of Human Settlements as A Tool to Consolidate Peacebuilding

Most peace accords during the 1990s have been accompanied with ambitious reconstruction schemes, addressing political, social and economic objectives. Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, believed that

Building a lasting peace requires a sustained and concerted effort to cope with the multiple legacies of conflict, the physical devastation brought about by war, the weakening or destruction of social and political institutions and, above all, the invisible scars that wars leave in the mind and hearts of people.

Rehabilitation activities and reconstruction of human settlements can strengthen peace agreements. It can play a role to revive communities. If approached in an appropriate manner, it can restore dignity, trust and faith in the future, as people together learn to cope with the past and regain control over the present and the future.

It is believed that embarking upon reconstruction activities without proper planning leads to a waste of resources and long term social problems within the community. Therefore, there is a need to formulate a comprehensive and appropriate reconstruction strategy. For a country emerging from prolonged conflict a reconstruction plan differs from one employed in normal, stable circumstances. The chosen strategy depends on the nature of the conflict itself and the extent of damage. It involves defining goals and objectives; setting priorities and targets, making plans and formulating polices for implementation. It must pay proper attention to the political and

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1 Human settlement according to the UNCHS (1987:5) referred: “To all those components of the physical environment with which an individual or a community comes into contact and which are used on a regular basis for the whole range of human activities: the individual dwelling and its related services the dwellings immediate surroundings, community facilities, transportation and communication networks, and so on.”
relational context in which they are applied. In post-conflict situations, a flexible strategy is preferred as Amirahmadi (1992) argued

In setting objectives, the government should be realistically modest and not utopian, accounting for resources, needs, perceptions, expectations, potentialities, and constraints. More importantly, there is a need to be realistic in terms of accounting for global trends as well as international and national constraints and opportunities.

Barakat (1993) and Stiefel (1998) recognised that no blueprints exist for post-conflict reconstruction. They noted transferring successful policies to a new situation is impossible, but learning from past successes and failures is feasible. This urges the author himself to survey the issue in different contexts. In this research, the author examines case studies of human settlement reconstruction in the Palestinian Territories, looking specifically at reconstruction’s interrelationship with the peace process.

1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES

Having introduced the major issues of this study, the research question for this thesis can be summarised as:

Considering the impact of Israeli Occupation and the ill-fated peace agreement can Palestinians (the Authority and people) with the help of the international community, achieve successful reconstruction programmes and sustain the peace process?

To answer this question certain objectives need to be pursued:

The **first is** to develop a theoretical understanding of occupation, by reviewing:

- International Humanitarian Law, specifically the Hague and the 4th Geneva Conventions, that has formulated the relationship between occupier and the occupied territories and the limits of the former’s assumed power.

- Secondary case studies to show why the phenomenon of occupation still exists.

- The main case study of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories since 1967 and its effects on Palestinian civilians.

The **second objective is** to comprehend the inseparable relationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction, through:

- Studying conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

- Recognising what conditions uphold peacebuilding activities.

- Seeing how third party intervention fosters reconstruction.
• Acknowledging national government and civil society and their joint role towards lasting peace and sustainable reconstruction.

**The third objective** is to put in place a procedure that makes post-conflict reconstruction of human settlement attainable. The author pursues this objective through

- Addressing reconstruction as a process that entails input and output faces obstacles and gives priority to very specific actions.
- Stressing the significance of human settlement revitalisation on the road to full recovery.
- Scrutinising previous policies adopted by post-war and developing countries in their efforts to reconstruct human settlements.

**The fourth is** to examine in detail the Palestinian context, highlighting how the issues identified above relate to this context, through

- Undertaking fieldwork in the Palestinian Territories.
- Analysing the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and its consequences over the last seven years.
- Selecting two representative case studies:
  - First, the peace implementation programme (PIP) planned and carried out by UNRWA to improve the living conditions of Palestinian refugees.
  - Second the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) and its shelter projects in the Gaza Strip, the Elkarama neighbourhood being the main example.

**Objective five** is to analyse the findings of the fieldwork with reference to the literature review and the main hypothesis.

**1.3 METHODOLOGY**

Having identified the scope and objectives of the study, it is necessary to follow an appropriate research methodology. The methodology has been chosen to suit the different aspects of the research question. The programme that has evolved contains a range of important elements.

**First: Literature Review**

A review has been carried out in order to broaden the author’s insights into relevant theoretical and practical issues. Significantly, he had the opportunity to look at unpublished material such as reports produced by the PNA, UNRWA, and other
organisations working in the Palestinian Territories. The literature review has informed the core argument for Chapter One to Three in the dissertation.

Second: Fieldwork

The author conducted fieldwork over two visits, investigating primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered from PHC, UNRWA and the Palestinian National Authority. Secondary data included project documents, reports of PHC, government documents, and international organisation reports. Structured and semi-structured questionnaires were instruments to gather information from beneficiaries, particularly residents of the case study. (See appendix 1)

A survey of official PHC and the PNA institutions was also carried out using semi-structured interview techniques. Discussions were held with Palestinian intellectuals showing concern for the study's subject matter who had not taken part in the case studies or belonged to an institution covered by the survey.

Third: Other learning Tools

Despite limited time the author participated in events, workshops, field visits, conferences and was able to attend MA Course of Post-war Recovery Studies at the University of York, contributing to his understanding of the many and interrelated issues faced in post-conflict milieus. (See Chapter Four)

1.4 RESEARCH OVERVIEW

This study starts by exploring the phenomenon of the Military occupation with Chapter One discussing the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. The chapter, divided into two sections, first identifies the legal framework governing the relationship between occupier and the occupied according to the International Humanitarian Law, then demonstrates different types and various causes of occupations in modern history. This is followed by an analysis of the Israeli occupation and its policies during the last thirty-three years, which amounts to an undeclared continuous war by the State of Israel against Palestinians.

The chapter concludes by questioning how Palestinians could achieve a lasting peace and sustainable reconstruction against such a background of continual occupation.

Chapter Two highlights particular issues that arise in post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction, concentrating on the process of peacebuilding and how to achieve
Setting the Scene

It argues that efforts must be coherent, comprehensive, integrated and aimed at addressing the root causes of conflicts.

The chapter discusses the factors that bring about success, debating whether international aid can or can not lay the foundation for durable peace and recovery by funding post-conflict reconstruction. Having outlined the relationship between peace-building and post settlement reconstruction, the author surveys in the chapter issues such as local capacity building, the role of state and the policy of donors, exploring how different authors or organisations present these issues.

In Chapter Three, the author reviews policies adopted for post-conflict reconstruction of human settlement, suggesting a framework for reconstruction, showing it as a process. Seeing the deficiencies evident in different theories, the chapter reviews the options that exist within a viable strategy. Various options are proposed, leading to an analysis of the priorities needed to guide workable policy.

Chapter Four explains the methodology employed during this research, offering a review of the author’s strategy. Experiences are outlined, describing objectives and difficulties, the various techniques and instruments used to collect data explained. How best to store, analyse and present findings, is discussed. The chapter notes the other methodological and learning tools employed by the author to develop his ideas over the last three years.

Chapter five presents the case studies; the author sets the scene describing the general situation in the Palestinian Territories in the aftermath of the peace agreements. The chapter discusses how the political process has moved forward with successive agreements under the Declaration of Principles, reviewing the main events, phases, and arrangements. Furthermore, the chapter claims that political uncertainties hinder efforts to achieve stable peace and quick recovery, demonstrating, in the Palestinian context, how the economy has deteriorated as a result of the Israeli policy of border-closure. Other characteristics of the present context are analysed. The chapter ends with a discussion of the shelter and human settlement situation, stressing the need for intervention to improve the Palestinian people’s living condition.

Chapter Six discusses the first case study, showing that the United Nation General Assembly - responding to the Palestinian Israeli peace process 1993 - has made
a decisive contribution in the attempt to ensure the occupied territories’ economic and social stability. UNRWA responded by initiating the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). Drawing on fieldwork findings, the chapter examines the project four components. Various issues are raised, in addition to measuring the impact of the project on the overall situation in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip.

Chapter Seven demonstrates how housing is considered as the most difficult problem, heading the priorities of the PNA. It shows that with international help the Palestinian Housing Council was established to provide new housing units to the Palestinian people. To evaluate the success-failure of the project, the author starts by describing the PHC and its activities then subsequently discusses the main findings of the field survey of the Elkarama Housing project. The chapter examines issues such as the characteristics of residents, public participation, process of allocation, satisfaction, perception of the project, refugees’ attitude and the impact of the peace agreement on the Council initiatives.

Chapter Eight presents a summary and conclusion of this research, proposing ways in which improvements in shelter prevision may be achieved.
Chapter One:
PROLONGING COLONISATION:
ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
PROLONGING COLONISATION: ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of colonisation has faded from other parts of the world. In the Palestinian Territories it remains, in the form of Israeli occupation, an internal colonisation. Since June 1967, the Israeli military forces have occupied the remainder of the territory allocated to the Palestinian State under the partition plan in UN resolution 181 (II) of 1947. This territory constitutes the remainder of Mandated Palestine comprising the West Bank, with East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Frontiers of these areas were in place by the Armistice Agreements of 1949 between Israel, Jordan and Egypt. The Israeli military forces also occupied the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights. (See attached figure 1.4)

In this case Israel is a belligerent occupant of those territories and should respect International Humanitarian Law with respect to the governance of these territories. Also the conduct of the occupying power should reflect the occupied people’s status as “protected persons.”

This chapter is divided into two sections. Firstly, the author identifies the legal framework (drawing on International Humanitarian Law) that governs the relationship between occupier and the occupied. The Hague Convention and the 4th Geneva Convention articles cite detailed description of how this relationship should be enacted to maintain the occupied civilians rights of ‘protected persons’. Identifying these responsibilities will help us assess the strategies and means adopted by the Israeli Occupation during the past 33-year period.

The second demonstrates different types of occupations comparable with Israeli occupation. Various causes can be noted when analysing cases of occupation. In the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, the aim of occupation was to support the communist regime in Kabul, while American presence in Panama was motivated by a conflict between

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1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Palestinian State and Jewish state. It was approved on November 29, 1947.
former allies. Other examples include Turkish occupation of North Cyprus, American occupation of Grenada, Indonesia’s actions in East Timor and the prolonged Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories.

The author proclaims that Israel’s occupation is an act of undeclared war launched against Palestinian civilians. The term of war is appropriate since Israel has and still refuses to adhere to the de jure applicability of the International Law specifically the 4th Geneva Convention. Instead of treating Palestinians as ‘protected persons’, from the outset Israel imposed countless repressive measures, such as administrative detention, deportation, home demolition and other forms of collective punishment, inflicting enormous suffering and harm on the occupied populace.

1.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCCUPATION

International Law can be dated back to the 1860s. At that time, two conferences were convened to establish treaties on specific aspects of war. The main goal was to “...institutionalise the rules of warfare” in order to eliminate any uncertainties as to scope and content. The inspiration behind such agreements was “...respect for humanity”, and the primary aim was to protect “...all victims of war without any discrimination”. The fundamental principles are:

...in any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. This type of law governs the relationship between the individual and the enemy, as opposed to that between the individual and his own State, which is governed by human rights law.

Emma Playfair (1992:5) valued the Hague Regulations of 1907 as an innovation protecting “...persons taking no active part in the hostilities” and “...who, at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” The Hague Convention deals with certain aspects related to the administration of occupied territories. On the other hand, the formulation of the 4th Geneva Convention is clear in its title: “...to provide for humanitarian treatment of civilian persons under occupation”. The convention

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2 The first conference on international humanitarian law was held in 1864 in Geneva, Switzerland on the fate of wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The second convened in St. Petersburg, Russia in 1868 to prohibit the use of explosive rifle bullets. These two conferences spawned two distinct, although not exclusive, trends in the law of armed conflict: each characterised by its particular perspective. The first such trend was known as the “law of Geneva”, which was concerned with the condition of war victims who had fallen into enemy hands, such as prisoners of war or interned civilians. The second was known as “the law of The Hague”, which related to the conduct of war proper, as well as its permissible means and methods
includes certain provisions for dealing with the specific rights of the Occupied population, referring to civilians’ right to protection.

1.2.1 Administration of the Occupied Territories

In The Hague Regulations, Article 42, states that “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” Initially, occupation was viewed as a by-product of military actions, and therefore was referred to in legal literature as belligerent occupation. Under international law, occupation is considered temporary in nature and involves no transfer of sovereignty. Occupation does not grant the occupying power ‘state authority’ over the population or over the occupied territory itself.

In the distant past, occupation was seen as an outcome of war. Events of the twentieth century has shown occupation could be the result of a threat to use force, when a pressurised government concedes effective control over its territory to avoid armed conflict. Also Mare (1998) posited that occupation could be established as part of an armistice agreement between enemies; it also could be the product of a peace agreement. In all these circumstances, International Law is applicable. The 4th Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations establish basic principles for all manner of occupation. In exercising its powers, the occupant must comply with two requirements or parameters: fulfilment of its military needs and respect for the interests of the inhabitants. International rules strike a careful balance between these two:

The occupying power must not exercise its authority in order to further its own interests or meet the needs of its own population. In no case can it exploit the inhabitants, the resources or other assets of the territory under its control for the benefit of its own territory or population. (Article 27 of Hague Convention)

Strict limitations are placed on the belligerent occupier and its interference in the activity of the territory under control. Benvenisti (1992:23) claimed that this interference made it necessary for the occupier to have certain powers in order to bring its administration into effect. He cited that:

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (Article 27 of Hague Convention)

The occupier is entitled to power to administer the occupied region for one reason only - restoration and maintenance of public order and safety. However, the Israeli lawyer E. Benvenisti argued that the term “public order and safety” could be given wide interpretation.
He explained it allowed the occupier to deny the population of occupied territory certain rights, of political and civil nature. Benvenisti built his argument on Article 27 of the Convention which states that the occupier can take measures such as “...denial of all or part of the features of political life and participation, altering pre-occupation administrative structures, amending legislation in force...and/or introducing new legislation”.

Benvenisti did not show that there were certain limitations. The occupier's powers in this respect are subject to the principle of necessity and proportionality, and to the limitations and guarantees provided by the Hague Regulations and 4th Geneva Convention. The Palestinian Mission at the United Nations (PMUN) argued that the above exceptions were made only for limited purposes to:

Meet it's [the occupier] own military or security needs; to cover expenses involved in the occupation; and to protect the interests and well-being of the inhabitants. Any interference with public or privately owned property of the occupied population can be taken only for one of these purposes.

The mission continued “This principle also establishes the general concept in international law that any alterations to property by the occupier (1) must not have a permanent effect and (2) must not be carried out to the detriment of the local population.”

Both conventions provide safeguards to prevent an abuse of “very extensive and complex” prescriptive powers of the occupier.

- As to the issue of sovereignty: occupying power is only empowered to administer the territory it occupies. Thus, any act of annexation is illegal under the provisions of the Convention. Further, the Occupying Power is prevented from integrating the administration of the occupied territory into that of its sovereign held territory. It is also prevented from transferring part or all of its population to the territory it occupies.

- Article 64 of the Convention states the penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.

- Articles 66 and 67...empower the occupier to establish military courts for the purpose of trying security-related offences, however, these courts shall act “in accordance with general principles of law, in particular the principle that the penalty shall be proportioned to the offence. They shall take into consideration the fact that the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power.”

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Article 49 (6) of the 4th Geneva Convention is intended as a corollary to the requirement of customary law whereby the occupant is not allowed to use the property of the occupied country, or of its inhabitants, to further its own economic or other interests.

Article 46 (2) reinforces the prohibition of the use of land for purposes other than military need, as set forth in the Hague Regulations. Similar principles also apply to water, which can constitute either public or private property. Under international law, water is generally considered immovable property and, if state owned, is highly restricted to military use only or for the needs of the occupied population. As such, the occupant is forbidden to use water to promote its own economy or to pump it to its national territory. (Hague Regulations of 1907, http://palestine-un.org/tenth/paper.htm)

The occupying power is thus prohibited from annexing the occupied territory or changing its political status and is bound to respect and maintain political and other institutions that exist in the territory. International law provides clear instructions concerning protecting people under military occupation.

1.2.2 Protected Persons under Occupation

The bulk of the 4th Geneva Convention was designed to protect the civilian population, individually and collectively. “At any given moment and in any manner whatsoever” and in “all cases of partial or total occupation” (Article 2)\(^5\). This contribution is significant because, it “…delineates a bill of rights for the occupied population, a set of internationally approved guidelines for the lawful administration of occupied territories.” The occupant is directed to treat the occupied people with standards similar to the ones employed for its nationals. Article 27, stipulates that

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Further, protected persons under no circumstances are to be deprived of the benefits relating to the institutions or government of the said territory. This also extends to agreements between authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power or any annexation by the occupying power of the whole or part of the occupied territory. The 4\(^{th}\) Geneva Convention makes it clear that the occupant is required to develop the economic, social and educational infrastructures and to respect the right of the occupied people to a decent life.

Examples of acts prohibited, in specific terms are provided for in articles 31 – 60. These articles prohibit coercion, ill-treatment and torture, settlement and transfer of population to

the occupied territory, deportation, reprisals against civilians, collective punishment, denial of the right to due process and fair trial, etc. Appendix (1) shows in detail articles of the convention relating to the Israeli occupation.

1.2.3 International Community and Occupation

While the UN has no formal role in adopting the Geneva or Hague Laws, it is the international body with powers to ensure respect for these laws. This is so, since any unilateral, or multilateral effort to enforce the Convention's provisions which involves use of force or application of sanctions would require authorisation from the Security Council. The role of the UN is derived from its powers in maintaining international peace, and guaranteeing respect for principles of the UN Charter, including the inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by force, and the necessity for international peace and the respect of human rights. However, in UN approaches to solve world different types of Occupation, one can detect double standards. For example, in the case of South Lebanon, actions taken by the Security Council have constantly fallen short of reaching a point at which Israel would have been forced to implement the Security Council 425. Thus, Israel has been allowed to continue its occupation of these territories for the past 22 years. In contrast, Mare, (1998:17) demonstrated how the United Nation and its various departments were able to take swift action against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990 even without giving the Iraq-Kuwait crisis a chance to be resolved through alternative means. The same approach was adopted in the case of the UN's non-intervention in the former Yugoslav republics. Mare attributed this malfunctioning to the Security Council's structure and the power of permanent members with their vested interests.

1.3 OCCUPATION IN MODERN HISTORY

Most aggressive occupiers do not recognise the applicability of International Law to their actions in foreign countries under their control. Benvenisti (1992:34) maintained this denial was "...an indirect outcome of their purported justification for employing this act". A recurrent supposed motive is that a state uses force to support another state, although actual control would be in the occupant's hands. Occupations in Afghanistan, Grenada, and Panama would seem to follow this pattern. Countries have given different reasons for

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6 Resolution 425 calls upon Israel to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. This resolution was adopted in the wake of the "Litany Operation" led by Israeli military forces in March 1978 in southern Lebanon with the purpose of destroying the positions of the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO) there. Since then, Resolution 425 has been constantly invoked internationally to demand the unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel withdrew under strong pressure of the Islamic resistance in May 2000.
committing this act. Many occupants in the previous five decades claimed that they were invited by the territories’ lawful government to assist it in quelling ‘illegal’ opposition forces. Some occupiers, such as Iraq (invading Kuwait) went further by claiming that the new established Kuwaiti government requested incorporation into the Iraqi State. Other belligerents insisted that their action helped establish new national entities such as in Bangladesh and Northern Cyprus. The third vindication for occupying another country has been to argue that the occupier was installing a government, and operated it under formal mandate. In this scenario, privileges were often secured in bilateral treaties with the local government.

**Assisting an Indigenous Government: The USSR Occupation of Afghanistan.**

On April 27, 1978 a coup brought to power a communist government in Afghanistan. A treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation was signed on December 5, 1978 formally tying Afghanistan with Moscow. In December 1979 after a failed attempt to remove the new Afghan president, Soviet forces entered the country to defend it from “…the imperialist enemies of the Afghan people” (Benvenisti, 1992:52). Moscow claimed that it was answering a request from the Afghan government to intervene. A new pro-soviet government was appointed. It issued a statement that it had asked the USSR for urgent political, moral and economic assistance, including military assistance. Accordingly, the Soviet Union argued that it was not interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. The Soviets claimed that the country was living under its own laws and norms, and its government alone was determining national polices, therefore trying to convince the world that they were acting within the perimeters of International Law.

Despite the formal policy of non-intervention, the Soviet Union with massive support, immense investments with its horde of advisors, implemented measures on all levels of government deemed necessary for the successful socialist transformation of Afghan society and to overcome any armed resistance. One policy meant that USSR disrupted the language system used before for intertribal communications by promoting the use of tribal languages in instruction in schools and universities (Benvenisti, 1992:52). This action aimed to break-up the Afghan national identity.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was widely denounced. The UN General Assembly condemned it in an emergency session. One hundred and four nations joined in condemning the USSR’s policy. In other forums third world countries also denounced the Soviet occupation. Significantly, the Afghan people themselves resisted in a military
manner the occupation. Despite the Soviet withdrawal in 1990, the consequences of their occupation still inflict damage on the Afghan nation, caught up in civil war.

Figure 1.1: Map of Afghanistan
Source: http://www.theodora.com/maps/afghanistan_map.html

Figure 1.2: Location of East Timor and Indonesia
Source: http://www.theodora.com/maps/new/indonesia_maps.html

Attempts to Annex Adjacent Regions. East Timor

East Timor, a tiny half-island a few hundred miles north of Australia, for 400 years, until 1974 was a Portuguese colony. Then a new Portuguese government stated that it would free the remaining scraps of its colonial empire including East Timor. In anticipation of independence, Indonesia, East Timor's powerful neighbour, made plans, directed by military leaders determined to control East Timor. Indonesian agents sabotaged the region's peaceful progress toward independence, claiming that intervention was necessary to restore peace and
security in East Timor. Intermittent military offensives against the Timorese have continued ever since, displacing large segments of the civilian population.

During the cold war, the International community seemed to be complicit in this occupation. The US has coddled Indonesia as a valuable ally in the war against communism and as a lucrative trading partner, providing Indonesia and its military with funding, training and weapons. After the cold war, in a dramatic policy, the Indonesian government opened East Timor to settlers, business-people, and tourists from other provinces of Indonesia, as well as to foreign tourists. From the Indonesian perspective, this new glasnost strategy was a disaster. For the East Timorese independence movement, it offered the opportunity to gain the attention of the world. The price of recognition, however, was dear.

In January 1999, Indonesia and Portugal formally agreed to allow the UN to conduct a referendum on Indonesia's autonomy proposal. The agreement included a commitment from Indonesia that, should autonomy be rejected, East Timor will be 'separated' from Indonesia. On August 30, 1999, the United Nations sponsored a referendum in which the East Timorese were asked to either accept or reject integration with Indonesia. After centuries of occupation, the East Timorese chose to become an independent state.

**Appointing a Preferable Regime: USA Occupation of Grenada and Panama**

Occupation of Grenada exemplified a seemingly straightforward military operation that led to deeper political consequences. On October 13, 1983, a coup was launched and military rule was established in the Caribbean's smallest independent country. The American administration saw the coup as a threat to USA's security in the region. The US claimed that a strong Cuban and the Soviet presence on the island had been established through the regime's decision to construct a large new airport on the island. American Administration feared Grenadian leaders might use the airport to land Soviet and Cuban planes carrying military cargo. Some 1,900 Marines and a small force provided by other Caribbean nations invaded the island. The American president Reagan told reporters that the Organisation of East Caribbean States had asked the United States to invade Grenada and restore peace and security in the area.

While Marines advanced, the Organisation of American States, of which the US is a member, denounced the invasion. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council "deeply deplored" the intervention. At home, the success at Grenada mitigated the nation's grief over the deaths of 241 Marines in Beirut, killed in Lebanon on October 23, when a bomb exploded in the Marines' headquarters.
By 1983, the effective ruler of Panama was Manuel Noriega, who according to Chomsky (1987) "...a criminal who had been a cohort of US intelligence." The US government knew that Noriega was involved in drug trafficking since at least 1972. Nevertheless, he stayed on the CIA payroll. In 1983, a US Senate committee concluded that Panama was a major centre for the laundering of drug funds and drug trafficking. The US government continued to value Noriega's services. By mid 1980s, among other things, Noriega seemed to have been dragging his feet about helping the US in the contra war. His independence also threatened the USA interests in the Panama Canal. Most of the administration of the Canal was due to go over to Panama in the year 2000; Washington imposed economic sanctions that virtually destroyed the economy. Next a military coup was tried, but failed. Then, in December 1989, the US invaded Panama outright, killing thousands of civilians. A new government was appointed to ensure a compliant government for the administration. No military occupation administration was established. The United States immediately recognised this government as the legal government of Panama. By deferring to this government, the US's troops rejected the applicability of the law of occupation to their presence in Panama. United States captured General Noriega and the troops began to pull out and return to their bases in Panama.

The USA occupation was internationally criticised. Southern and Central American government condemned the invasion, while the Organisation of American States and the UN
General Assembly "strongly deplored" the action and called for the immediate withdrawal of the occupation forces.

**Self-determination for Occupied Regions versus the Territorial integrity:** The Turkish Occupation of North Cyprus

In July 1974, a coup against Cyprus's president was organised. The president was following a policy of an independent and non-aligned Cyprus in which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would agree upon new constitutional arrangements. Turkey claimed that the coup was led by Greek mainland officers to overthrow the legitimate government. Alleging a right of unilateral military intervention as guarantor of the Constitution, five days later Turkey invaded Cyprus, declaring,

"The purpose of our peaceful action is to eliminate the danger directed against the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the rights of all Cypriots as a whole and to restore the independence, territorial integrity and security and the order established by the basic Articles of the Constitution."

Turkey extended her invasion to occupy 36.4% of Cyprus. Human right organisations report that the Turkish government has employed forcible mass displacement, deportation, expulsion, and forced evacuations of persons from their homes. The UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions deploring the Turkish occupation, demanding its immediate withdrawal, and deploring all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus or promote other faits accomplis. The Security Council declared the 1983 declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus legally invalid, and called upon all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the legitimate state. It also refused the Turkish demands for the recognition of the existence of two peoples in Cyprus and their respective rights to self-determination, and called for a single bi-communal republic as the solution to the crisis.

**1.4 THE PROLONGED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES**

Turbulent political conditions in Palestine from 1920 up to 1948 contributed to the creation of the State of Israel and its spread into mandated Palestine and the expulsion of approximately 750,000 Palestinians from their homes. In the wake of the 1948 war, the rest of Palestine was divided: Gaza Strip falling under Egyptian Military Administration and the West Bank being joined forcibly to the Kingdom of Jordan. The hostilities between the State
of Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries continued. In 1956, a war broke out followed by a further major conflict in 1967.

As a result of this war, Israeli occupation grew to encompass the rest of the historical Palestine including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. In addition, 360,000 Palestinians were expelled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to neighbouring Arab countries. The recurring cycle of conflict and consequence makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stand off one of the most vigorous in the world. The Palestinian Mission to the United Nations argues that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories and the policies and practices of the occupying Power in this regard represent a unique case for several reasons:

- The multiplicity and intensity of Israel’s grave breaches and serious violations of the 4th Geneva Convention and other acts contrary to its provisions, all of which have caused the immense suffering of the Palestinian population.

- Those breaches and other acts have continued for an extensive period of time, almost 33 years, in total disregard for the clear position of the international community and in blatant violation of many Security Council and other UN resolutions.

- The Israeli occupation has effectively transformed the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, from one of “normal” occupation to one of active expansion and annexation, i.e. colonisation, of the Palestinian land and has denied the legitimate national rights of an entire people.

1.4.1 The Israeli Occupation and International Law

Under basic rules of international law, the Israeli government is a “belligerent occupant” of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Jerusalem. The Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are considered “protected persons” and the areas in which they live are ‘occupied’ territories according to the provisions of Article 42 of the Hague Convention and Article 4 of the 4th Geneva Convention.

In the United Nations view, the 4th Geneva Convention is applicable to the Israeli Occupied Territories. The Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly have repeatedly reiterated this viewpoint ever since the Israeli occupation began. For example, the General Assembly reaffirmed in December 1978:

That the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, of 12 August 1949 is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 including Jerusalem.

It has been noted that the Israeli government has considered the Hague Convention of 1907 and the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 as irrelevant to the Palestinian area occupied since 1967. The Israeli opposition has been based on the assumption that the
applicability of international regulations governing military occupations is dependent on
the legitimacy of the sovereign rights of previous occupiers (Shehada, 1988:6).

Figure 1.4: Territories Occupied by the Jewish State since June 1967
Yehuda Blum, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations considered the Zionist conquest of Palestine in 1948 as a form of self-defence against aggression by Arab armies. He claimed that the Arab involvement was a violation of the international boundaries of Palestine (Aruri, 1989: 14). Moreover, Blum asserted that because Jordan and Egypt did not constitute a legitimate sovereign in the occupied territories, therefore the 4th Geneva Convention was inapplicable. Concerning Israel’s colonial settlement in these territories, he claimed that article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention bans forced transfers, not voluntary acts of individuals.

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers repudiated this interpretation of international law:

- Israel’s attempt to exempt itself from the international obligation as an occupant is negated by the provisions of the regulations concerning the laws and customs of War on Land of 1907 and by the Fourth Geneva Convention. They are applicable in all cases of occupation of all or part of the territory of a high contracting party, with no reference to the validity or otherwise of titles to ownership and no nice distinction between de facto and de jure requisition of territory.

- The Geneva Convention seeks to protect primarily the population and not as Israel claims the rights of the evicted states, irrespective of the legitimacy of their sovereign claims. As a high contracting party Israel’s obligation under the Geneva Convention is beyond contest. The United Nations bodies have confirmed this obligation. Moreover, Israel’s argument that the Jewish settlers are engaged in a voluntary as opposed to a forcible act holds no water, as the broad policy goal of the settlements is to make a temporary illegal occupation permanent.

- Israel is also in violation of international humanitarian law, which recognises wars of national liberation as a category of international armed conflict. The United Nations had already declared the Palestinian struggles as falling under that category. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, recognised by the United Nations, is considered an integral part of the norms of peremptory law (International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1984; Quoted in Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 1994)

Despite an international consensus that Israel’s control over the Occupied Territories since 1967 is illegal, the UN did not take effective measures necessary to protect Palestinian rights. On different occasions, the Security Council has condemned Israel’s actions in the areas of settlement building and expansion, wilful and extra-judicial killing of civilians, deportations, including mass deportations, and generally in relation to any violation of humanitarian law in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. But why is it that the UN is not acting in defence of several human rights cases, including the right to self-determination, despite the fact that world organisations have consistently categorised Palestinian rights as legitimate, and Israel’s actions against these rights were widely condemned?
In fact, several reasons may be advanced to these two questions, the most important of which relate to the way decisions are taken within the world organisation, and the differences in powers vested in both the UN's Security Council, and its General Assembly. The Security Council, being the main body empowered to take measures under the UN Charter to enforce the UN's decisions is a political organisation. As such, politics rather than law have proven to play major role in decision making at the level of the Security Council. The Veto power vested in the permanent members of the Security Council is another factor that makes these members of the Security Council under duty to ensuring respect for international law, peace and human rights, a duty that corresponds with their powers. A reading of the use of the Veto within the Security Council proves that it was used frequently by the US in relation to Palestine, in certain cases against the will of the rest of the international community, except for Israel and the US itself.

It is worth to note that the peace agreements, which have been signed in the last few years, deprived the territories of their international legal cover leaving the final decision to unilateral negotiations between the two parties.

1.4.2 Colonisation; Ideologies and Beliefs

Though Israeli society seems to be divided over the future of the Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), the ideologies of the successive Israeli governments consider the Strip as part of Israel (Government of Israeli Web Site, 2000). Literature proves that Israeli policy in the Gaza Strip is directly linked to Zionist ideology concerning Palestine. In The Jewish State, Theodor Herzl (1897) proposed to establish a Jewish state on the land of Eretz Israel. Said (1996:15) explained this term to include the whole land of Palestine and parts of Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. Sara Roy (1995:34) showed how the Zionist Movement planned to settle in Palestine. She quoted a Zionist settler who wrote in 1882:

"The final goal is...to gain control of Palestine and to restore to the Jewish people the political independence of which it has been deprived for 2000 years. This goal...would be accomplished both by agricultural and industrial development and by military means."

Said examined the motivation of the Zionist movement, tracing back to the late 1800s. He argued that nationalist ferment sweeping Europe in late nineteenth century influenced the Zionist movement. Its particular focus was adopted from the ancient Jewish ambition to return to Zion. The modern movement received impetus from the
increasingly intolerable conditions facing the large Jewish community in Russia. Said added, Zionism grew out of a general nationalist expansionism. He stated

Zionism was of European provenance: its institutions referred to and identified themselves as colonising undertaking in the manner of European colonisation of Africa and Asia. Its whole rhetoric and ideological language borrowed heavily not only from Jewish theology but also from the rhetoric and language of the British in Africa and India or the French in Algeria.

Supporting Said's argument, Ryan (1989:570) indicated that in 1861 the Twelfth Zionist Congress set up a colonisation department. Villages established in Palestine were called colonies. The term ‘Yishuv’ denoting the entire body of Jews in Palestine means also colonies.

In its explanation of the prolonged occupation, the Jewish State has claimed that there is an inseparable bond between Jewish people and the land of Israel, including the occupied territories (Shehada, 1988:4). Newman (1984:22) pointed out four other viewpoints to control the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, relating to a specific perspective within Zionist ideology. These are,

- The “strategic” argument emphasises maintaining secure and defensible boundaries for the State of Israel.
- The “historical” is based on the right to settle in the regions occupied by the Jewish Kingdom thousands of years ago.
- The “religious” claims possession of all the “land of Israel” due to the Davidic Promise given to the Jewish people.
- The argument for “negotiation” concludes peace with the Arabs can be obtained in return for territories captured in 1967.

Senan (1992:116) added through an ‘economic’ argument where Israel justified occupation of the Palestinian Territories because they present a market for its products and a source of raw materials including cheap labour.

To carry out its policy of colonisation, the Zionist movement ignored the very existence of the native Palestinian, declared that people are nothing, and proclaimed their land empty in accordance with the application of nineteenth century European techniques to the Asian and African continents (Ryan, 1989: 570). Today Palestinians are denied political rights to which they are entitled as a people or civil and religious rights promised by a former occupier (the British). Zionist ideology of the latest occupiers must preclude these rights. Consequently Palestinians become a people living on sufferance, merely tolerated within their own country.
1.4.3 Israel and Gaza Strip: After the Occupation

Following the occupation of Arab Territories in 1967, the Israeli government had to decide what to do with the regions and the desired type of colonisation. It decided using different means to eradicate the Palestinian identity. Senan (1992:121) mentioned two methods. Firstly, the Israelis tried to change Palestinian cultural identity through actions that affects people’s attitude towards their national rights. Secondly, they tried to change the physical characteristics of the region. To achieve the first goal, the occupier undertook actions such as closing schools, universities, non-government organisations, associations and theatres. Social class changes, demographic transformation, economic pressure have become methods. Also Senan (1992:121) stated in general terms that “…to achieve the purpose, the colonial power sometimes takes direct actions such as bulldozing mountains, cutting trees and building settlements or indirect actions such as planning policies, administrative systems and land expropriation.” He concluded that the Israeli aim has been to change the identity of the region and to control its inhabitants.

The next part of this chapter offers a review of the Israeli occupation policies over the last three decades.

1.5. ISRAELI POLICIES

Historically before the 1967 war, underdevelopment characterised the Strip. But since then, Israel has adopted a policy of de-development. To understand its objective Murray (1992:15) quoted Yitshak Rabin, the late Israel’s Prime Minster who said in 1985: “There will be no development in the territories initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the state of Israel.” Roy (1995:3) argued that this attitude constitutes a policy of De-development. She saw this emphasis at work through expropriation and dispossession, integration and externalisation, and de-institutionalisation. The first term expressed how Palestinian people have been denied full use and benefits of their resources. As a result their capacity for improvement has been constrained and weakened. This is evident in water and land issues. Dispossession of essential economic resources has deprived Gaza’s economy of vital production factors. This has imposed constraints on internal economic capacity and the economy’s ability to sustain the area’s population. Deprived of its resources, Gazan economy has been forced to rely on external resources.
Dependence on Israel was achieved by integration and externalisation. Roy recognised that Palestinians were encouraged to rely on externally generated income sources. Sayigh (1988:269) included measures to force labour away from indigenous jobs to intensive work outside Gaza, also to re-direct trade towards Israel. As a consequence Gaza’s internal productive base and capacity has been diminished, and de-development escalated.

Israel used a third component for economic de-development, de-institutionalisation. Roy referred to the direct or indirect restrictions placed on indigenous institutions that given the opportunity could have planned for sustainable development in Gaza. Abu Amr (1988:78) showed this policy working through restrictive attitudes. He gave examples of expenditure and investment patterns of the Israeli government in Gaza that offered little to promote institutional growth in economically critical sectors such as industry and agriculture. Israel's position extended to eroding Palestinian initiatives to build independent institutions. Hiltermann (1993:22) explained “Since the authorities have been singularly incapable of forestalling the emergence of a Palestinian civil society, they have singled out Palestinian institutions and popular organisations for specific repressive measures.”

Sayigh (1988:268) proposed that the Israeli dispossession policy has been practised systematically since the beginning as a continuous process rather than as a one-time act of vengefulness. Over the years of occupation, Palestinians have been deprived of a large part of their national, collective and individual political, social and cultural rights and freedom. The deprivation extended to control over a Palestinian future. To emphasise: dispossession in its broad sense has been a central, crucial and persistent objective of Zionist and subsequently Israeli state policy, from the first Zionist Congress in 1897, to the Israeli State and other Zionist fundamentalists today. From a historical perspective, the experience of the occupied territories, since 1967, has fallen within the continuum of long-term Zionist objectives and policies translated from one phase to another. Yet, while objectives and policies have never been secrets, their self-centred nature has not deterred Zionists, or those calling themselves Israelis, from claiming that they would be beneficial to the indigenous population. Overall, the crisis of shelter in Gaza strip has worsened through various Israeli measures as Al Agha (1997: 3) explained:

The Israeli authorities implemented a policy that sought to make Palestinians lives as difficult as possible in an attempt to force them to leave. This policy manifested itself in the housing sector by restricting new construction and making it difficult to maintain existing building. Consequently, many residential buildings were abandoned.
In the following section, the author reviews the Israeli measures, which targeted the Palestinian human settlements.

1.5.1 Deteriorating the Infrastructure

**Physical infrastructure:** Even in Gaza under Egyptian Administration, physical infrastructure received low priority. But Abed (1990:5) contended that it did not materially deteriorate during the period. Since 1967, the infrastructure and public utilities have declined steadily. During Occupation, virtually no upgrading, maintenance or expansion was carried out despite increased demand and pressure. Tuqan (1995:85) attributed these deficiencies to a lack of government support or effective local authority and investment. The infrastructure has generally deteriorated. Per capita, such facilities as paved roads, hospital beds and the surface area of schoolrooms have declined during the thirty-two years of occupation, though some improvements have been introduced to serve the occupier's interests. Benvenisti and Khayat (1984: 25) argued that “Physical infrastructure is primarily planned to accommodate Israeli interests especially settlement construction, Jewish agricultural development, and military needs”

In an UNCTAD report, Abu Eisheh (1994) documented the shortage of water supplies, and the generation of power. The report showed that Palestinians purchase power from the Israeli Electricity Company. The report’s author provided an analysis of consumption rates. In Israel, the total consumption per capita has been ten times more than that of Palestinians. The author noted that most towns, villages and refugee camps have been exposed to sudden disconnection of electric power, which lasted for many hours a day. This has been the result of a shortage of transformers and overloaded electricity lines.

**Sewerage Services.** Abu Eisheh (1994:13) reported that existing sewer collection systems are incapable of meeting increased demand. There were no comprehensive treatment systems in most towns though facilities for partial treatment existed. Management of the wastewater disposal system was limited and most of the time left to run freely in the Gaza Valley and into the Mediterranean Sea causing an environmental and health crisis. Refuse collection and disposal was another problem. Nothing appeared to have been done in this sector. No plans for development of garbage disposal or re-use schemes exist. Finally, the report argued that Israeli authorities controlled all policy decisions related to development of services and infrastructure.
Social infrastructure

Medical care has never been adequate. It has been used as a weapon against the Palestinian population. The occupier has failed to initiate a health system (Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1989:412). The Union described the situation under occupation:

There are people who need doctors and doctors who need work, but no bridge between them. The existing health apparatus is incapable of absorbing physicians and other health professionals.

Murray (1992:56) added that Israel has not built a single hospital in Gaza. The ratio between beds to population has been reduced to half of what it was in 1967. In early 1989 as a punitive measure, Murray mentioned that the Israeli government cancelled medical insurance for Palestinians, which has meant the withdrawal of treatment from patients including children and elderly people.

Educational Institutions. Education has suffered. In the Gaza Strip, the majority of institutions have been under the direction of the military government and UNRWA. The government has provided education to secondary school level and some vocational training. Roy (1995:176) described the government imposed restrictions on the kinds of textbook and curricula used, the number of schools and classrooms that could be built, the expansion of existing schools, the number of teachers that could be hired, the kinds of courses taught, the kinds of departments established. Murray added three quarters of these schools lack libraries and science labs and most have been overcrowded, some with 60 children in a class. Murray (1992:75) noted that some had double or three shifts.

Sayigh (1988:270) explained Israeli process of harassment was to disrupt the cultural heritage and institutions, involving censorship and control of teaching and reading material, especially in Arabic. On many occasions, harassment was taken the form of outright closure of educational institutions and newspapers, as well as detention of individuals for long periods, with or without trial. United Nation reported: “The Israeli authorities have erased from school syllabuses any material referring to Palestine, love of the country, Palestinian nationalism and the Palestinian people’s national identity” (UNRWA, 1991:12). Israel has made education a crime and heavy burden for those with little wealth. Despite all deficiencies, Palestinians have long taken pride in the high level of educational attainment.
Dependence on Israel was achieved by integration and externalisation. Roy (1988:268) recognised that Palestinians were encouraged to rely on externally generated income sources. Sayigh (1988:269) included measures to force labour away from indigenous jobs to intensive work outside Gaza, also to re-direct trade towards Israel. As a consequence Gaza's internal productive base and capacity has been diminished, and de-development escalated.

Israel used a third component for economic de-development, de-institutionalisation. Roy referred to the direct or indirect restrictions placed on indigenous institutions that given the opportunity could have planned for sustainable development in Gaza. Abu Ameen (1988:78) showed this policy working through restrictive attitudes. He gave examples of expenditure and investment patterns of the Israeli government in Gaza that offered little to promote institutional growth in economically critical sectors such as industry and agriculture. Israel's position extended to eroding Palestinian initiatives to build independent institutions. Hiltermann (1993:22) explained "Since the authorities have been singularly incapable of forestalling the emergence of a Palestinian civil society, they have singled out Palestinian institutions and popular organisations for specific repressive measures."

Sayigh (1988:268) proposed that the Israeli dispossession policy has been practised systematically since the beginning as a continuous process rather than as a one-time act of vengefulness. Over the years of occupation, Palestinians have been deprived of a large part of their national, collective and individual political, social and cultural rights and freedom. The deprivation extended to control over Palestinian as more than institutions and the opportunity could have planned for sustainable development in a future. To emphasise: dispossession in its broad sense has been a central, crucial and persistent objective of Zionist and subsequently Israeli state policy. From the first Zionist Congress in 1897, to the Israeli State and other Zionist fundam...
1.5.2 A Dire Shortage of Shelter

There is direct relationship between housing and development policies. When a country initiates progressive programmes, it often attempts to link housing strategies with overall development to achieve an improved spatial distribution of population and economic activities. A state's government normally aims to mobilise scarce resources to accommodate high rates of population growth and urbanisation. In the Palestinian territories, several authors have asserted that the Israeli occupation has considerably depressed the housing sector. Mohammed Shaded (1997) argued that the impact of the occupation accompanied by the absence of Palestinian sovereignty has resulted in no National agency being responsible for the planning, financing and development of housing. The absence of a Palestinian economic authority has led to an ad hoc growth in various sectors. At the same time, Israeli policies have directly served the Israeli interests, not the Palestinian. The Palestinian Reconstruction and Development Programme prepared by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (1992:220) posited that a total of $3,750 million is needed for expenditure on public projects. It estimated a total need of around 185,000 housing units during the period under study to accommodate the forecast population increase in the Palestinian Territories.

Other measures helped to deteriorate the physical infrastructure were employed. These include the following:

Planning Restrictions on Accessing the Palestinian Land

Coon (1992:35) demonstrated that the crucial feature of development policy in the Palestinian Territories was that there were no 'development areas'. “If a Palestinian asks...where in his village, or any other village, or anywhere outside the villages, development of any type is allowed, the answer he will be given is that no such development area exists.” Planning affects a society’s prospects, including investment in infrastructure, housing, commercial and industrial ventures, and transport, water and sewage systems. Planning and land use decisions influence social and economic development; determine if houses and offices can be built, and where. Senan (1992:120) claimed: “In the occupied Palestinian Territories it is different: for many hundreds of Palestinians the town planning system has been the means of deciding that homes they have built should be bulldozed to the ground.” The other side of the coin of planning and land use policies is Israel’s creation of a network of new settlements and roads specifically for, and used exclusively by Jewish settlers. Israeli planning policies

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effectively have stifled all Palestinian development, simultaneously and steadily they reduced the area over which Palestinians had rights and ownership. Planning has not been so much a means of mediating as an instrument for conducting the conflict.

Land use and planning policies become an important instrument as Israeli authorities exhausted legal means. They have focused on restricting legal condition for development and land use. Israeli law deemed that development could only take place where a detailed plan existed, and has been approved. The process in the Gaza Strip has evolved so that all Israeli planning authorities include representatives from settlers (Al-Haq, 1992:15). Palestinians have no part in the decision-making or consultative process as in Gaza Plan of 1986. Benvenisti and Khayat (1988:56) stressed: The interest and needs of the local Palestinians population were not only ignored, but ‘the physical planning process reflects Israel’s interests exclusively, while the needs and interests of the Palestinian population were viewed as a constraint to be overcome.”

Israel has acquired Arab land through dispossession, expropriation and confiscation. Before the occupation, the total area of the Gaza Strip, approximately 140 square miles, was under Palestinian use. Since 1967 government confiscation and the establishment of Jewish settlements has restricted land availability. In 1986, Benvenisti estimated that the government controlled over 34 percent of Gaza Strip land. Roy (1995) indicated that further increases have been noted between 1986 and 1995. She noted that “Most of the methods Israel uses to acquire Palestinian land are illegal under international law; those whose principles are not strictly illegal have, however, been violated by the Israeli authorities”

Land confiscation has been a subtle process. The registration system in Palestine was based the Ottoman Land Code, amended later under the British Mandate and Israeli Occupation. Under the Ottoman Code, there was no category of ‘State Land’. Abd Alhadi (1994:15) outlined that land was divided into the following categories:

- Waqf land used for religious purposes.
- Mulk land given by the Ottoman Sultan or Emir to local Muslim residents.
- Khuraj land given to non-Muslims.
- Miri, Matruke and Mawat land, which, although owned by the Ottoman Sultan, were handed over and used for public purposes under certain conditions. Matruke land could be used for road construction, cemeteries, etc. Mawat was unused, as the Ottoman Code stated it is further from the village than the human voice can carry.

The final category gave Israeli the opportunity to declare this land as ‘State Land’. None of this land has been used for Palestinian development. Furthermore, Palestinians were not allowed to stay in this land, all of which is classified by Israel as Israeli State Land.
whose sale or lease to non-Jews was prohibited for all time under the Basic Law of Israel (Coon, 1992: 55).

To enable the Israeli government to appropriate the property from Palestinian owners, legislation has been enforced:

- The regulation of 1943 concerning the expropriation of land in the public interest, promulgated by the British Mandate administration;

- The Defence (Emergency Regulations) promulgated by the British Mandate administration (1945), allowed the military to evict residents and confiscate land and real estate;

- The Emergency Regulation (Cultivation of Wastelands) of October 1948. Under this Act, the ministry of Agriculture could confiscate land of its choice, after its green patrol previously made it barren. This was carried out by spraying the crops with substances capable of transforming fertile land into barren land in a short period. After this, the ministry issued orders for confiscation to set up colonies.

- The law of Security Areas allowing land to be confiscated for security reasons, forcing residents to leave.

- The Absentees’ Property law of March 1950 to replace the Emergency Regulations on Absentees Property of December 1948.

- The law of Taking Action 1953 states that land not cultivated or used, the government has the right to repossess for defence and settlement needs. (Tuqan, 1995: 58)

Emma Playfair, (1989:101-176) argued in a blatant violation of the International Law, Israeli government amended these laws to: (1) Administer all lands registered as a State Land before 1967; (2) Seize privately owned land for military purposes; (3) Close areas for training purposes; (4) Repossess land belonging to Jews before 1948; (5) Expropriate land for public purposes and (6) Seize land by declaring it state land. By regulating land use practices in the Palestinian Territories, Israel has controlled land owned and used by Palestinians. Demant (1989: 230) listed methods to restrict land use:

- Construction prohibitions are imposed on Palestinian construction through military order 393.

- Combat Zones: Military order 271 effectively prohibits the use of approximately one million dunums, as it is too dangerous to use land located within a military firing zone,

- Nature reserves considered by the authorities as an integral part of their land seizure programme have provided a pretext under which hundreds of thousands of dunums of land have been confiscated without compensation.

- State land: Military order 59, 1976, allows a military commander to declare uncultivated and unregistered land as state land unless ownership can be proved to the satisfactorily of the Ministry of Civil Administration. According to the Israeli authorities, this method of
land acquisition is legal on the basis of the Ottoman Land Code of 1855 which declared that uncultivated or unregistered land belonged to the Sultan, therefore, could be classed as state land. Israel’s acquisition of “state land” has only been possible since Military Order 291 was issued. This military order halted the process of land registration. As a result, Palestinians have been unable to register their land since 1968.

- Closed Military Areas: in 1970, Military Order 378 gave commanders power to declare these areas.

**Building Permits**

The Israeli government has used building permits to stop any proposed development. Israeli planning authorities refuse building permits to Palestinian: when land is designated as ‘agricultural’ the prohibition on subsiding land, and the prohibition on more than one house on each plot of land; as well as the charge that prospective land is not properly registered. The “virtual absence of any development areas means…almost any development could be said to contravene the plans” (Coon, 1992:72). Very few appeals against demolition orders or refusals for building permits have been made, this as Coon portrayed, was because no one has ever appealed successfully.

**The Suppression of Financial Institutions**

Financial assistance is widely used to bring down the cost of borrowing to an affordable level. Although specialised institutions were established all over the world, the Palestinian Territories under occupation had no such facilities. Before the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, eight banks were operating in the West Bank and three in Gaza. One of the first military orders issued by the Israeli occupation forces was to close all working banks. Branches of Israeli banks were allowed to open. Despite the available chance to enjoy a complete monopoly, Sabri (1997) claimed that the Israeli Banks were not keen to provide a substantive banking services. It limited its services to attract deposits and facilitate trade with Israel. In reality, the territories have been left without a formal banking system.

**Restriction on Building Materials**

Understandably developing new building materials industries greatly assists efforts to provide the required infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of housing units, which are urgently needed. Regarding the potential for a Palestinian construction industry, it is assumed that it is able to produce building materials including, stone, marble, concrete, gravel, cement blocks, terrazzo floor tiles, plastics, PVC pipes, electrical control boards, steel
water tanks and solar heating equipment. However, the building materials industry in the Palestinian territories has failed to do so. It suffered from restrictions on expansion, from heavy taxation and from Israeli competition. In addition, the Israeli refusal to grant permits for major factories, e.g. cement, placed a heavy constraint on the sector and made it dependent on imports from and through Israel. According to Saraf (1997:717-718) the building materials industry in the West Bank and Gaza faced multiple, interrelated problems. It faced the following difficulties:

- Unequal competition with Israeli products, Israeli practices have aggravated the already existing difficulties inherent in competing with the relatively better quality and lower priced Israeli manufacturers, which benefit from unrestricted access to local Palestinian markets.

- Restrictive practices by Israeli authorities, including delay or obstacles in issuing building or operating permits for enterprises which are considered to compete with existing Israeli industries, and or which considered to compete with existing Israeli industries, and or with represent a basic industry such as cement.

- The Israeli domination of the Palestinian external trade sector.

- Factories and plants are subjected to tax rates and assessments, such taxes include value-added tax, production tax, customs tariff, import tariff and others.

- The lack of an adequate and efficient banking system. The absence of normal credit services represents a serious constraint for those aiming to expand successful operations, and deprives producers of the means to modernise production facilities.

- Raw materials and machinery required for the production process within the factories can only be imported by Israeli authorities.

- Palestinian manufacturers are prevented from building the infrastructure required for their plants, such as roads, electricity and water.

- A low level of technical expertise. All firms with sophisticated machinery suffer from a serious lack of qualified maintenance and repair technicians.

- The lack of an industrial data bank and of programmes for research and development, studies, and technical assistance.

1.5.3 Demolition of Palestinian Houses

Since the beginning of occupation, Israeli authorities have accelerated their house demolition operations. Benvenisti (1988:15) believed the occupation determined to use planning and demolition as instruments of punishment and reward for political and security purposes. In 1988, on planning grounds at least 255 houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were demolished. In 1989, this had increased to 331 (B’tselem, 1992). Al-Haq, a Palestinian Centre for Human Right estimated during the first two years of the Intifada at
least 400 homes were demolished on the pretext of security, though in only one percent of cases had the suspect been convicted prior to demolition. Nevertheless, the Israeli High Court has never overturned a demolition order (Al-Haq, 1992).

To punish Palestinians, engaging in resistance activities, Israel destroyed their living shelters. B’Tselem calculated Israeli authorities demolished at least 2,200 Palestinian houses and hundreds of other structures. It claimed more than 13,000 Palestinians have lost homes over the past ten years due to Israeli policy (B’Tselem, 1999). This has occurred in addition to deliberate policy to destroy large areas of refugee camps to support its operations. The financial costs of demolition are enormous. Al-Haq (1992) estimated during a two years of the Intifada it cost a total $12 million. In contrast, no buildings built by Israelis in the Palestinian Territories have been demolished, even if they lacked planning permission. Demolition has caused homelessness; forcing affected families to live in houses built without permits. Sayigh (1988:269) embraced such measures as a mean to“...social disruption, loss of roots and considerable anguish...economic destruction, and above all to the tangible degree of depopulation resulting”.

The legal basis of housing demolition policies are British Defence Emergency Regulations, allowing authorities to demolish sealed rooms or confiscate a house in the interests of security. The Emergency Defence Regulations restricted demolition to instances where the accused had been tried by a military court and found guilty (Shehada, 1988). According to Israeli Basic Law (1960) state land could only be used for Jewish benefit: a policy through which Israeli has presented “...its far reaching apartheid legislation as progressive social democracy” (Matter, 1989:195). Increasing numbers of Palestinians have
discovered that their land is state land and duly confiscated from them. In parallel to this policy, the building of the Jewish Colonies in the occupied territories has intensified.

1.5.4 Construction of Jewish Settlements

Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories have been the cornerstone of Israel’s colonising policy and have the most lasting consequences on Palestinian land. Settlements are not a few houses scattered on top of hills, some of them are real cities with all the necessary infrastructure, roads, industrial areas, and schools. Thousands of dunams of agricultural and grazing land have been confiscated from Palestinian farmers for their establishment; they have preferential and quasi-unlimited access to water resources. Senan (1992:115) quoted Mosheh Dayan -one of the founders of the Jewish State- who explained the idea behind the settlements in the territories.

The Jewish settlements in the occupied territories are important not because they keep security more than the army does but because the army without the settlements can not stay in the territories...without them the Israeli Army would be a foreign army who controls a strange nation.

The Israeli Labour Government started building settlements in 1971. With the right-wing Likud Party coming to power, the scale of construction increased. The signing of Camp David Accords in 1978 gave the settlements a new dimension (Matter, 1989:344). The agreements proposed autonomy for Gaza Strip, intensifying Israeli desire to prevent any future assumption of the Palestinian Territories claiming to be a sovereign state. Increasing absorption of land and the installation of Jewish settlement has had considerable effect on development. Land confiscation has removed valuable agriculture land from Palestinians. This practice has resulted in displaced people and resources, causing massive overcrowding in other areas. An ILO report (1993:49) outlined the consequences:

To establish a settlement in the Occupied Territories means: to use its land and water resources, to build expensive infrastructure (in particular access roads) and thus to modify the environment. Furthermore, these settlements are considered by the government as Israeli pockets and as such settlers benefit from the application of Israeli legislation and jurisdiction, as well as tax benefits.

Also to fill these settlements Israel transferred part of its population as well as scores of new immigrants to the Occupied Territories, in violation of the 4th Geneva Convention 8. Matter (1989:345) argued settlements also isolate Arab communities

8 Fourth Geneva Convention expressly forbids transfer of the Occupying Power’s population to the Occupied Territories in its article 49. Despite constant international pressure on successive Israeli governments, settlements expansion in the West Bank and Gaza has never been stopped or been reversed.
minimising the possibility of them building a political union. Benvenisti (1988) emphasised this point. Eighteen settlements were built between 1978 and 1985 and established between the largest population centres in four regional blocs along or near Gaza’s coastline. Israel granted the Jewish community use of at least 25 percent of Gazan land where Gaza’s Arab population had 224,500 dunums; its 4000 Jewish had 91,000 dunums. Therefore, every Jew in Gaza Strip has been allowed 23 dunums, whereas each Arab inhabitant possessed as little as 0.2.

Figure 1.6, 1.7, 1.8: The Israeli Settlements in the Palestinian Territories
Source: Foundation for Peace in the Middle East, http://www.fimep.org

The extraordinary population density in the Strip compared to the Israeli can be attributed to land confiscation and settlement policy. Roy (1995:120) alleged that “The
Israeli Military Occupation

land available for use by the Palestinian population was over 14 times greater in 1945 than it was in 1994”. Gaza Strip has one of the world’s highest densities: 5,929 people per square mile. By contrast, Jewish built-up areas have 282 people in 1997. Jewish settlers have 73 times more land to live on and 699 times more land per capita than each camp resident.

The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (1994) estimated 65% of land confiscated has been used for Settlements, the rest was turned into closed military areas. The Israeli Government attracts the settlers to live in Gaza Strip by offering incentives that amount to approximately two-thirds of housing and infrastructure costs. The centre elaborated “…it is 30-40 percent cheaper to buy houses in the territories than it is to buy a similar house in Israel. Loans are more convenient, infrastructure is provided free of charge, in addition to substantial tax discounts”.

Israeli Occupation has been a conscious and consistent expropriation of land from Gaza’s Palestinian sector and donated to Jewish settlers. Under these circumstances Gaza’s physical infrastructure has suffered marked deterioration. The deliberate confiscation of land and settlement policy is an illustration of economic de-development. It aimed to support the expansion of a Jewish settler community on Arab land to institutionalise Israeli State control and eclipse the chance of establishing Palestinian sovereignty. From another angle, Coon (1992: 103) observed that the building of settlements contributes to pollution and environmental damage. Untreated sewage was allowed to flow into Arab land and water resources. He also mentioned other practices such as poisoning water, burning forests, uprooting hundreds of thousands of trees causing serious damage to the Palestinian environment.

1.5.5 Expropriating Palestinian Natural Resources: Water as example

Since the beginning of the occupation, the state of Israel acted in violation of international law and launched a policy aimed at appropriating to itself the natural resources and the land of the protected population under the Geneva Convention, using military orders. Water is a more valuable commodity in the Middle East than oil (Murray, 1992:62). The scarcity of water is a serious issue in many countries in the Middle East, but the situation in Palestine is even more dramatic because of Israel’s use of water as a prime political tool and a weapon. Israel has succeeded in exploiting Palestinian water. Jewish settlers taking the best land have also literally drained precious water resources away from Palestinian farmers. Since occupation began, Palestinians have needed special permits to drill new wells for
drinking water and irrigation. Until the Israeli re-deployment from Gaza, not a single permit had been granted to Palestinians to dig deep wells for irrigation purposes (Roy, 1995:169).

The amount of water supplied has not changed though the Palestinian population has grown. Meanwhile, settlers use water at a quarter the cost paid by their Palestinian neighbours. According to Israeli estimates the settlers were using 19 times more water per capita than the densely crowded Palestinians. Further, deep settler wells in the sandy Gaza Strip have lowered the level of shallow Palestinian wells allowing sea-water penetration. Salinity has poisoned citrus trees (Benvenisti and Khayat, 1988:26).

Israel’s management has never aimed at sustainable development of water supplies 9. In contrast, Abu Eisheh (UNCTAD report) presented a thorough description of the infrastructure in the Occupied Territories. He started with the issue of water services. Abu Eisheh concluded that inefficiency and inadequacy of the existing utilities were mainly due to poor planning, limited exploitation of water resources, limited extent of services, high losses and leakage, lack of water tanks and the deteriorating quality of water. Further, Roy (1995: 168) illustrated the problem of a lack of a national plan:

Gaza City has fifteen useable municipal wells but needs approximately thirty to meet local demand. Khan Younis has only six wells supplying the majority of its water, five of which were built during Egyptian rule... total demand for water for residential use will more than double between 1986 and 2000, although there will be a 20 percent decline in usable drinking water during that time.

She also showed the inequality between Jews and Arabs regarding allocation of permits for well digging, affecting the absolute amount of water available for Palestinians. The Israeli Plan (1986) calculated average consumption of domestic water in the Gaza Strip is 35 cubic meters per person per year. Thus, consumption was 10 times higher than the lowest international level, 60 percent below acceptable standards, and 20 percent of the rate in Israel. Abu Eshieh argued the occupied territories suffer from bad water due to lack of treatment and quality control.

From the above, the author suggests Israel’s policy has been driven by political motives. Zionists declared water as a state-owned commodity. Water is part of the nation’s ideology - regarded as central to its practical application (Brown, 1989:371). Providing full supply has ideological relevance among social priorities in Israel. Water is the prerequisite symbol of its political goal representing the fulfilment of certain social values.

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9 Concerning water, military order 92 issued on the 15th of August 1967, military order 158, 11 November 1967, and military order 291, 19 December 1968, transferred all powers regarding the exploitation and administration of water resources in the West Bank to the Israeli military administration.
1.5.6 Targeting Human Capital

The Israeli Occupation has had a terrifying impact on the Palestinian people. A direct impact is the demographic change. Areas occupied by Israeli in June 1967 contained between 1.3 and 1.35 million Palestinians. This population represented over half of the estimated 2.65 million Palestinians in the world. In 1994, the number who remained in these zones was about 1.3 million or approximately the same as lived there twenty-seven years ago. But this similarity reveals a dramatic drop from 50 to less than 30 percent of the total Palestinian population. The drop implies a massive displacement of Palestinians from the region, though this was not the only effect. Abu Lughod (1989:120) summarised the changes as:

- Massive expulsion of residents sufficient to destabilise numbers, despite a natural increase rate that has averaged 3.5 percent per year.
- Distortion in normal characteristics of the residual population, due to the selectivity of expulsions and migrations.
- Transformation of the remaining population from a diversified independent society of peasants, businessmen, and professionals to a proletarianised and dependent reserve labour army at the mercy of Israeli political and economic interests.
- Encouraging migration to North and South American countries.

Since 1967 and afterwards, deliberately, the Israeli policy has reduced a diversified society to a labour army dependent on the Israeli economy. The opening of the Israeli labour market has increased the size of the working class. Meanwhile, a large number of individuals belonging to various segments of the petite bourgeoisie joined the working class, as a result of deterioration in economic conditions. Before the Intifada, PNA (1998) estimated the number of those working in Israel was about 45,900 workers, in addition to the almost ten to twenty thousand workers who were drawn to Israel through the black market. This number constitutes 50 percent of the overall labour force in the Strip. Some causes are: the confiscation of land and the deprivation of irrigating water, neglect of the institutions of technical training; repressive control of the building industry; incursion into the Palestinian tourist industry; exposing Palestinian handicrafts to stiff competition from cheap Israeli goods, and denying them government support. Another general factor is the harassment of economic enterprise through deterrent licensing requirement (Abu Amr, 1988).

Dependence of the working class on the Israeli labour market and the fluctuating Israeli economy has resulted in a state of uncertainty. Anxiety characterised the conditions of the working class, which expanded and contracted for reasons beyond its
control. Needs of the Israeli market direct certain trends. For instance, the need of construction workers in Israel increased the number of this type of employee within the working class. Construction workers comprised 45.1 percent of the total number of workers from the Strip employed in Israel (PCBS, 1997). Abu Amr (1989:320) noted that the dependence and frustration caused by the continued occupation fostered certain social moral trends. These include pronounced consumerist tendencies, deterioration of moral values, the use of drugs and frequent visits to brothels in Israel became common practice among an increasing number of workers. Abu Amr mentioned another social dilemma, the increasing number of women and children into the labour force. Many were to be found working in Israel. As for child workers, these were employed as agricultural labourers in settlements and on Israeli farms in the Strip and in Israel.

Abed (1990) surveyed the challenge confronting Palestinian middle class. He explained it has been attacked through an extensive ‘brain drain’ on human resources. This has occurred through not only emigration to Arab rich States, but also Israel’s thinning out the age and occupation structure of the remaining professional staff. Abed mentioned the fact that Palestinians abroad tend to be generally prominent in the medical sciences. However, he adds that the occupied areas did not have a single specialist in pathology, anaesthesiology, and bioengineering or in any number of other highly specialised occupations.

### 1.5.7 Violence Against and Ill-treatment of the Civilian Population

Zargar (1988:37) made the point: “Wars for the hearts and minds of people and nations are more insidious [than overt warfare] often causing greater suffering”. Barakat (1993:37) showed two groups of civilians after war, those that had near miss experiences of death and who had a remote miss. The first group develops severe fear reactions, as well as higher levels of psychiatric damage due to anxiety and emotional stress of later air raids. The second group shows diminished levels of fear and greater capacity to withstand the emotional stress of later air raids.

Barakat (1993:37) argued that “War as experience, with what it contains of confrontation with death, separation of family members, war time stress, general fear of invasion, bombardment, capture and occupation, often lead the victims to develop the syndrome known as post traumatic stress”. He concluded that the common reaction to those people can be summed up as unfortunate survivors and the consequences for them may range from fairly mild, transient irritants to profound psychological disturbance, culminating sooner or later in acts of self destruction either by suicide or spiritual annihilation.
Numerous forms of physical violence and ill treatment have been routinely and systematically used against the civilian population in Palestine. These include summary executions by special undercover units and indiscriminate shootings with live ammunition or rubber-coated bullets by the Israeli army and by armed Jewish settlers, resulting in scores of injuries and death. There have been numerous cases whereby the shootings by soldiers and settlers have resulted in massacres of Palestinian civilians, such as the massacre at Al-Haram Al-Sharif on 8 October 1990 and the massacre of 29 Palestinians in Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on 25 February 1994 by a settler.

Another extreme form of Israeli violence against the civilian population is the use of torture in prisons for both repressive and interrogative purposes. It would seem that Israel is the only nation in the world that has codified and legalised the use of torture in interrogation. The violence perpetrated against the Palestinian population also includes random and/or excessive beatings, physical harassment and the use of tear gas in confined places. Arbitrary arrests, humiliation, delays and even the obstruction and outright denial of access to medical treatment have been daily occurrences at checkpoints.

**Humiliation of the Palestinian People**

Sayigh (1988:265) mentioned another form of dispossession, the denial of respect to the Palestinians as human beings. In August 2000, the Rabbi Ovadia Joseph described Palestinians as snakes. He continued his public speech stating that since God created Arabs he has regretted his shameful mistake. It was not the first time for a highly placed Israeli to show disrespect to the Palestinians and the Arabs. Matthew Engel in the Guardian 14/9/2000 disclosed how Golda Meir the late Israeli Prime Minister used to deny the existence of the Palestinian people. Meir told a British parliamentary delegation: ‘But they [Palestinian people] are not human beings, they are not people, they are Arabs’. The latest incident, which proves the argument, occurred on 6/9/2000. A group of Israeli soldiers stopped three Palestinian workers as they were returning home from their work in Israel and, for no reason at all, subjected them to 40 minutes of torture. The San Francisco Chronicle reported on 19/9/2000 that the soldiers “…punched the three men, slammed their heads against a tone wall, forced them to swallow their own blood, and cursed their mothers and sisters.” (Marshall, 2000). Then, the soldiers took photographs of themselves with their victims, holding their heads by the hair like hunting trophies.

Palestinians in the Occupied Territories lack all citizen rights. Murray (1992:20) explained: “They are treated as ‘resident aliens’ who can be deprived of life”. She continued:
They are governed by almost 1,300 military orders in the West Bank and some 1,000 in the Gaza Strip which control every aspect of life, determining what Palestinians can read, where they can drive, whether they can whitewash their house or repair a window, plant tomato or pick wild thyme. Only a few of these orders have been translated to Arabic or made accessible to Palestinian lawyers.

1.5.8 Exhausting the Mental Health of the Palestinians under Occupation

El Sarraj et al. (1996:595) asserted physical violence, torture, collective punishment and other types of abuse, deployed in current national and political struggles as a form of state organised violence, aiming to inflict physical and mental suffering for political purposes. During the Israeli occupation, its army used measures to frighten and punish the population for resistance activities. These measures varied, with curfew, house demolition; and torture being some of those used.

The psychological effects of political violence is a matter of great concern; The Gaza Community for Mental Health Programme has conducted several studies focusing on emotional distress caused from exposure to traumatic events. Research showed that they produced long-term negative effects on cognitive performance. Problems with memory, concentration, learning, and intellectual impairment are common among Palestinians who have experienced Israeli treatment (Qouta et al. 1995:290). Below, surveys on mental health in the occupied territories are reviewed.

Torture Al-Haq (1988:21) reported that torture has been used in Israeli prisons and detention centres to obtain confessions and information. A study conducted by the Gaza Community for Mental Health Programme examined links between the torture and subsequent disorders: depression, anxiety, anti-social behaviour and non-specific physical complaints. El Saraj, et al. (1996:597) revealed:

Torture victims have the typical symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, which are re-experiencing of the traumatic event through recurrent and intrusive recollections, dreams, and flashbacks about the event; persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness through avoiding significant feeling, activities, and recall; resistant symptom increased arousal, such as sleeping difficulties, irritation, and concentration problems.

Torture affects children. Young Palestinians have been exposed to traumatic political experiences. A study, by the same programme, outlined the more the sample participated in the struggle against the occupier, the more they suffered from concentration, attention, and memory problems. It confirmed that traumatic experiences have increased the instances of depression and risk-taking among Palestinian children (Qouta et al. 1995: 301).
Another study concluded that exposure to traumatic conflict experiences interrupted intellectual development, resulting in poor academic performance. Furthermore, research disclosed that poor living conditions and other deprivations (that have worsened during the occupation) might lead to poor intellectual development (Raija, et al, 1997:1198).

Another investigation assessing impact of house demolition reported: “When a family witnesses the destruction of its own home by enemy soldiers, the psychological effect is immense”. It recorded that “Depression was high in the ‘loss group’, which may be interpreted as an indication of the specific effect of the loss of one’s home” (El Sarraj, et al., 1993: 198). Further researchers found that adults who had suffered from their house being demolished revealed a high level of anxiety, depression and paranoiac symptoms. Women suffered more than men did. An old Palestinian woman describing her experience, said:

When I returned to my home in the evening, I found it destroyed. The furniture was scattered and broken. I began to weep. At that moment, I began to remember the time when we were uprooted from our country, Palestine. We settled in the Khan Yunis camp for 35 years. Then we left the camp to live here in the El Ammal project until our home was destroyed. When the soldiers imposed the curfew, I did not expect them to demolish our home. Their motive was revenge. Whenever we achieve a step of progress, Israel forces us to go back (B’tselem, 1996:14).

As detachment from direct involvement does not guarantee security El Sarraj (1993) pointed out those who throw stones were not made of stones. They suffer like any human being facing violence and loss.

1.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we began by reviewing the provisions of International law as they applied to territories and their inhabitants under occupation. After examining several other cases of occupation by outside powers during the twentieth century, we studied in detail the Israeli occupations of the Palestinian Territories, concluding that the behaviour of the occupying power could be considered as an undeclared war.

Israeli authorities implemented a policy that sought to make Palestinians' lives as difficult as possible in an attempt to force them to leave. The chapter attributed the Israeli Occupation policy to various causes, including, history, economy, politics, strategy and religions. While Said traced it back to the early days of the establishment of the Zionist movement in the late 1800s when colonisation dominated European thought.
The thesis discussed the impact of Israeli occupation on the Gaza Strip explaining how Israel has commenced a policy of De-development through expropriation and dispossession, integration and externalisation, and de-institutionalisation. The first term expressed how Palestinian people have been denied full use and benefits of their resources. Integration and externalisation have created dependence. Palestinians have been pushed to rely on externally generated income sources, mainly Israel. The third component has been de-institutionalisation, achieved by direct and indirect restrictions placed on indigenous organisations that might have planned for sustainable development.

Though there is no settlement destruction in the Palestinian territories the author argues that Israeli occupation has had a similarly detrimental effect. Destructive Israeli strategies included: the deteriorating of infrastructure, restriction on land, difficulties to gain a permit for development, abuse of the legal system, expropriation of local resources, and finally and crucially through policies to undermine Palestinian identity, human rights and self-respect. Each Israeli practice has employed its methods and tricks. In this research, the author distinguishes occupation as undeclared war. In the table below it is outlined the similarities between the occupation as undeclared war and conventional war; differences are limited to the range of the destruction and the tool used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure and Physical Environment</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Occupation (undeclared war)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of infrastructure and residential areas with its network of services</td>
<td>Deterioration of Infrastructure. Acute housing crises. Lack of services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>Reduction in manpower due to mortality, disability both physical and mental and migration and lack of security.</td>
<td>Reduction in manpower due to mortality, disability both physical and mental and migration, and lack of security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Capacity</td>
<td>It differs from one party to other.</td>
<td>Weakness of the existing institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Lack of security would force local businesses and banks, etc. to operate outside the war zone, or even outside the country, thus causing a loss of investment; loss of crops and deterioration of agricultural land, in rural areas. People leaving their jobs and occupations in trade for survival and security for themselves and their families.</td>
<td>Lack of security would force local businesses and banks to leave the occupied country, thus causing a loss of investment; loss of crops and deterioration of agricultural land, in rural areas. People leaving their jobs and occupations in trade for survival and security for themselves and their families.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their families,
Lack of goods in the local markets
causing inflation and a black
market, making it very difficult for
families to get hold of food, etc.,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Impact</th>
<th>Social change</th>
<th>Social change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People are traumatised</td>
<td>People are traumatised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evolution of morals and culture</td>
<td>Evolution of morals and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(the war culture)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Similarities between Conventional War and the Military Occupation.
Source: The Author

In 1993, an agreement was signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation regarding the Gaza Strip and West Bank. From this Treaty, Israeli troops were re-deployed and a Palestinian authority with limited power was established. However, Israel’s policies and measures related to settlement building, destruction of the economic and social structure, have all increased substantially. The severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, often in the form of general closures, has become an issue of increasing concern during the past several years. In addition to violating international law, all of these policies and practices constitute direct violations of the existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements concluded within the Middle East peace process.

The next chapter studies the interrelationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction process.
Chapter Two:
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION AND
PEACEBUILDING
Chapter Two

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEBUILDING

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War raised hopes that a less polarised international community would give ‘peace dividends’ to speed up reconstruction and development in many impoverished and war-torn societies. The cold war’s conclusion failed to bring about peaceful relationships within or between all countries; ninety new conflicts – it is estimated – erupted between 1989 and 1996. However, the end of the cold war saw increasing demand for peacebuilding and reconstruction in the world (DAC, 1997). Consequently, the need to address conflict transformation has not diminished.

In fact, in the last few years extensive research has been undertaken in the field of conflict transformation, reconstruction and peacebuilding. Multilateral institutions and bilateral agencies have made efforts to understand better how to assist war-torn countries. There is a consensus that peacebuilding approaches must be coherent, comprehensive, integrated and consider conflicts’ root causes. Also it is acknowledged that intervention from the international community may be necessary.

Stiefel (1999) claimed that the last decade has witnessed the establishment of more effective and coherent frameworks of post-conflict reconstruction. In 1996/97 the World Bank produced a policy paper for its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and decided to establish a “Post-conflict Unit” to respond to the needs of its operators in conflict and post-conflict situations (World Bank, 1997). Different UN agencies have worked toward better policy for co-operation in conflict-prevention and post-conflict recovery. “These guidelines provide valuable indications on the latest, collective views and commitments of donor countries on ways in which the international community should address issues such as conflict prevention, peacebuilding and reconstruction” (UN, 1995).

The chapter is broken down into sections, each highlighting a different issue. The validity or otherwise of the phrase ‘post-conflict’ is analysed along with the use of the term
‘post settlement’ – the preferred term in this study. The author reviews how different scholars see peacebuilding, examining what is necessary to achieve sustainable progress, and discusses the notion if reconstruction can bring about long-term peace. Looking at the relationship between peacebuilding and post settlement reconstruction, the author explores issues such as local capacity building, the role of state and policy of donors, and how various authors or organisations ‘pitch’ these points.

2.2 POST CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

2.2.1 Conceptual Clarification

During the last decade, the term ‘post-conflict’ has become increasingly popular among relief organisations, development agencies, research centres, and international financial institutions. For example, surveying the entry “post conflict” on the World Wide Web the author found thousands of separate publications. The question is, does the term ‘post-conflict’ cover the case of the Palestinian territories. After reviewing documents and surveying a range of definitions, it could be argued that the term is vague in relation to on-the-ground cases. ‘Post-conflict’ does not adequately portray the problems, which continue to confront people from countries suffering from the effects of warfare. Macrae and Bradbury (1998:32) went so far to disclaim the term “post-conflict” as misleading. In their

1 The literature review focuses on the various aspects and dilemmas involved in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. This chapter draws on a collection of books, articles, reports, and Internet documents. In doing so the following list was consulted: Amirahmadi (1990), Anan (1998), (Anderson, 1996); (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989); (Ardon, 1998); (Ball, 1992); (Ball and Halsey, 1996); (Barakat, 1998, 1994, 1993); (Barakat and Cockburn, 1991, 1992); (Barakat, Halsan, and Strand, 1994); (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995); (Birgitte, 1998); (Borter, 1986); (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 1995), (Boyce and Pastor, 1997), (Brown, et al., 1992); (Brynen, 1995); (Burton, 1990); (Bush, 1995); (Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating Committee, 1998) (Cassen, 1986); (Clausewit, 1995); (Clement, 1994); (Colleta et al., 1996); (Collier, 1994); (Doyle, and Sambanis, 1999); (Dudley, 1993); (Duffield, 1996); (Ellwood, 1992); (Evans, 1993), (Fagen, 1995); (Feeney, 1998); (Fischer, 1995); (Fischer, et al, 1994); (Fisher, G, 1980); (Fisher, 1995); (FitzGerald, et al,1997) (Fornan and R. Parhad, 1998); (Galtung, 1995); (Galtung, 1996) (Hampson, 1996); (Hewitt: 1994); (Hill, 1996); (Hoffman, 1998); (Holsti, 1996); (Janssen, 1983); (King, 1997); (Kumar, 1997); (Kumar, et al., 1997); (Lake, 1990); (Lederach, 1997); (Little, 1983); (Macrae and Bradbury, 1998); (McCoy, and O. Ramsotham and T. Woodhouse , 1999); (Michael and Webb, 1992); (Minear, and Weiss, 1995); (Institute for international Conflict Research, 1998); (Obergs.,) (OECD ,1997), (Overseas Development Administration, 1997); (Parry, 1972), (Smilicic, 1999); (Stewart, 1993, 1998); (Stiefel, 1994, 1998) (Stiglitz, 1998); (The World Bank, 1997, 1998, 2000); (The World Bank Group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBWGV), 1994), (UNDP, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998); (UN, 1994-1996); (UNRISD, 1994), (Weiss, 1995), (WSP, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c), (Wusten, 1993); (Zahlan, 1997); (Zartmans,ed.), 1996).

2 Political conflict can be defined as the clashing of opposing interests or positional differences over national values and issues like independence, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power. Possible instruments used in the course of conflict are negotiation, authoritative decisions, threat, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war. (Institute for international Conflict Research, 1998). Carl Von Clausewitz (1995) suggested that war is an actual, intentional and widespread-armed conflict between political communities. He added that war is the continuation of policy by other means, which fits with his general definition of war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."

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view, the concept implies an absolute cessation. It is too broad, failing to differentiate between stable and unstable regions in the same territory. In the above authors' opinion, certain uses of the term underestimate structural problems related to a post-war environment. They claimed issues such as extreme poverty and authoritarian rule tend to be ignored in policies based on the concept of post-conflict. Further, Smillie (1999:6) pointed out 'post-conflict' was not very helpful as a planning tool in situations of protracted violence such as in Afghanistan, Sudan, Angola, Sri Lanka. At the same time a number of armed conflicts initiated during the cold war era and sustained by the bipolar state system, have been resolved. Wars and communal conflicts erupting in the early and mid-1990s have also been brought to some kind of conclusion. The author argues that conflicts have ended due to international military intervention (as in Bosnia and Kosovo) are likely to be unstable.

Jeff Crisp supported the doubts regarding the term 'post-conflict situation' to always fit the context as in examples cited above. He justified his position:

- First, the term is based on a misinterpretation of the notion of conflict. Much current discourse on development confuses conflict in the general sense with the more specific phenomenon of armed or violent aggression.

- Second, few states can be classified as post-conflict. In most countries where a ceasefire is in effect, it would be more accurate to call them transitional societies between war and peace.

- Finally the ideological and strategic implications of 'post-conflict' has been used to legitimate certain trends, that Crisp challenged:
  If donor states want to spend less on humanitarian relief; if they want to disengage from crisis-affected countries; if they want to suggest that the situation in those countries have 'normalised'; and if they want to impose the rigours of structural adjustment on the world's poorest and most devastated countries, then what better way than to suggest that such states have entered a 'post-conflict' phase?

Paradoxically, some countries' violence and instability have been described as taking place in post conflict zones. It is believed that the term - 'post-peaceful settlement' - is more flexible and might help to reduce misrepresentation. However, in this research the author still employs the term post-conflict as more familiar to researchers and readers.

2.2.2 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding

Doyle and Sambanis (1999) suggested that "Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process." Long-term peace or real peace requires more than an absence of violence. However, violence never gets completely eliminated. To define peace, Hoffman (1998:6)
suggested that peace has been defined in a number of ways including what is called "negative peace" and "positive peace". According to Hoffman, the term negative peace refers to peace as the absence of war, whereas positive peace involves more. Zia (2000) defined peace as "The existence of peaceful relationships, active association and planned cooperation among persons and groups for achieving greater aims such as justice, security, and constructive transformation of conflict". To move from conflict to sustainable peace, Ball and Hallevy (1996:22) recognised that movement from one to the next phase is not automatic. It has been possible to define a theoretical cycle consisting of peace – conflict – reconciliation, but it is difficult to isolate the moment at which peace or normality has been transformed into conflict (Clements, 1994). The dynamic nature of conflict makes it problematic to distinguish when and where violence ends and conditions for genuine peace have emerged (DAC, 1997). A clear progression from conditions of peace to heightened socio-political tensions culminating in violent conflict before receding back again to peace is the exception rather than the norm. Similarly, certain parts of a country may be at peace while conflict is flaring in other areas, characterising the nation as at peace and at war. Due to the complexity noted above, it is necessary to identify common characteristics of different phases of the conflict transformation.

Attempts have been made to identify, to the extent possible, the common characteristics of different phases of the peace process. The key connection among the levels of peace, Miall et al (1999:11) explained, has been the principle that conflict should be resolved, or managed, as close to its source as is feasible. John Burton (1990:6) distinguished between conflict resolution, management and settlement. Management is "...by alternative dispute resolution skills" and can confine or limit conflict; settlement is "...by authoritative and legal processes" and can be imposed by decision-makers. Burton suggested by contrast: "Conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or 'settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem."

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:35) detailed approaches to peace. He defined four possible areas of actions to nurture the peace process, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The circle from preventive to peacebuilding aims to lessen the chance of relapse into a violent conflict. Boutros-Ghali clarified preventive diplomacy as an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Gareth Evans (1993:7) explained that preventive diplomacy should include a full range of methods such as
negotiation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means when applied before a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict.

Peacemaking is an action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means. It can be understood as close to the preventive diplomacy involving the same range of methods, which includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means. But applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. Evans (1993:7) posited that initial peace making efforts must aim at the immediate goals of cessation of hostilities, and stabilisation of the situation on the ground. Subsequent efforts, which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, might be aimed at securing a durable political settlement.

Peacekeeping is the military intervention and peaceful resolution of violence in a conflict, by non-enforcement means. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

Peacebuilding is a post-conflict action to identify and support structures tending to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Galtung (1996:22) pointed out that peacebuilding should address the practical implementation of social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development. Doyle and Sambanis (1999) argued that peacebuilding should aim to build capacities for negotiation, civil society reconciliation, fair courts, and an electoral process. Boutros-Ghali (1992:36) saw peacebuilding as the creation of a new environment to forestall the recurrence of conflicts. He recognised the need for sustained co-operative efforts to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian causes and effects of conflict. Further he explained, the term should: (1) be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, (2) be undertaken on the basis of agreements ending conflicts, emphasising the need for measures to promote peace and co-operation, stressing the need for co-ordinated action and (3) complement efforts at peacemaking and at peace keeping.

Peacebuilding depends on the prior achievement of a minimum standard of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Evans (1993:11) stressed that peacekeeping is critical for better peacebuilding while the character of peacebuilding is interdependent with peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Doyle and Sambanis, 1999). Peacemaking negotiations create the mandate for post-conflict peacebuilding. Evans argued that peacekeeping outcomes define the political context within which peacemaking and building takes place. He added that good peacekeeping supports the norms and standards of acceptable behaviour.
that will lead to a convergence of the parties’ expectations about a feasible political settlement.

2.3. SUCCESS AND FAILURE

Given that lasting settlements are difficult to achieve, the question of what determines success in peace arrangements is critical. Some notable successes and some conspicuous failures mark recent history. The definition of a successful settlement is highly problematic in the conflict resolution literature. Hampson (1996:21) showed that the “Process must produce some set of arrangements that lasts for generations or stands some other test of time, demonstrating robustness and permanence.” He criticised the definition, arguing that it can not be concluded that a peace settlement has succeeded for all time. Mitchell and Webb (1996:57) argued:

The notion of success is inherently relative because some processes never manage to get the parties into dialogue let alone to agree to cessation of fighting. Others reach dialogue but fail to find possible agreement. Still others achieve agreement only to see it repudiated. Still others break down at the implementation stage and the process ends in recrimination and accusation of bad faith.

Hampson (1996:17) proposed that durability or success of the peace process is defined in terms of (1) whether violence came to an end (2) the extent to which the parties fulfilled their specific commitments and obligations. By these standards, no settlement has been a complete success, but some are more successful than others. The author of this thesis sees the difference as conditional.

2.3.1 Ripeness for Peace

Druckman (1986:41) stressed the need for a ripening process to foster the right moment. Zartmans (1996:18) argued only under certain conditions are conflicts ripe for negotiated settlement that go beyond a mutually hurting stalemate. Doyle and Sambanis (1999) believed that if conflict has lasted for long time, peacebuilding tended to be easier, since war-weariness reinforces the parties’ desire to keep the peace. This means that the parties share perspectives that continued confrontation is more burdensome than the cost and burden of settlement.

There are important differences in the way ripeness is defined. According to Zartmans (1996:19), there are four independent conditions (1) a hurting stalemate to the conflict, (2) looming catastrophe (3) valid representatives and (4) a way out of the conflict. Not all
conditions need be present, but some are prerequisites. These are based on “a shared perception of the desirability of an accord, willingness to reach compromise from formulas in which national interests are protected, and approaches or processes of dispute resolution acceptable to the parities” (Haass, 1999:25). Hampson (1996:17) suggested additional requirements for ripeness:

- The parties have refined their interests because of changes in leadership or constituency pressures, for example, and are no longer content with the status quo.
- Old norms and pattern of behaviour have been replaced with new norms facilitating the possibilities for compromise and the achievement of a durable settlement.
- The parties share perceptions about the desirability of an accord.
- The parties have agreed on a common bridging process to settle differences.

In Stedman’s viewpoint (1991:13) the hurting stalemate model put too much weight on the power relationship between the parties, and failed to take account of changes in the context which may also foster negotiation. Miall et al (1999:112) clarified that although it has been possible to point to cases of successful negotiations which have followed hurting stalemates, it has been also possible to point to hurting stalemate which did not lead to successful negotiations for example Cyprus. It may be argued in these cases that the stalemate was not hurting enough, but then there was no clear evidence from case studies as to how long a stalemate has to last or how much it has to hurt. There should be a distinction between ripeness for negotiations to start and ripeness for negotiations to succeed.

Miall et al (1999:112) indicated the need for “A model that sees conflicts moving from unripeness, through a ripe moment to resolution, is perhaps too coarse grained to take account of the many changes that come together over time and result in a settlement: redefinition of parties goals, changes in the parties constituencies, contextual changes, shifts in perceptions attitudes and behaviour patterns.” They concluded, “Ripeness is not sudden but rather a complex process of transformations as the situation shifts in public attitudes and new perceptions and vision among decision-makers.”

2.3.2 Negotiation and Agreement Provision

The settlement must contain basic principles and satisfy minimum needs. “Sometimes peace agreements contain the seeds of their own destruction” (Hampson, 1996:3). Holsti (1996:24) clarified that some agreements were badly designed, and this was the main source of their failure. The Versailles peace treaty that followed the First World War was a case in
The agreement included punitive terms that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s and the tragic events that accompanied his regime.

To achieve agreement success, negotiating delegations must have their people's full support, and be seen by other delegates as legitimate representatives. Without credibility, the resulting accord could end up 'shelved' in the best case or lead to more bloodshed in the worst. The Camp David Agreement (1978) is a case in point. Egyptian officials were representing the Palestinians. Negotiations yielded an agreement that lacked credibility; a fact resulted in the agreement's failure at the Palestinian level.

The World Bank (1998) proclaimed that "Peace agreements must reflect, or at least not conflict, with the history, tradition, cultures and values of the involved populations." Furthermore, Holsti (1996:26) attributed success to depend on ability to anticipate and devise means to cope with the issues of the future. Failure to do so may set the stage for future eras of conflict and war. The success or failure of peacemaking efforts in international politics is determined by whether or not a peace settlement fulfils a number of separate but interrelated functions. The World Bank (1998) stated that to minimise discontent, make progress, and reach the broadest possible consensus, the peace accords must be comprehensive, transparent and inclusive. Holsti (1996:26) explained the prerequisite:

- The provision of a system of governance that embodies certain norms of what constitutes acceptable behaviour.
- Legitimacy based on shared principles of justice that are incorporated into the peace settlement.
- Assimilation which demonstrates that the gains of living within the system...outweigh the potential advantage of seeking to destroy or dominate it.
- Conflict resolving procedures and institutions for identifying, monitoring, managing and resolving major conflict between members of the system, including the capacities to impose settlement terms where continuation of a conflict poses a threat to the system as a whole.
- Recognition that war is a fundamental problem so that the design of new orders develops and fosters explicit norms against the use of force.
- Procedures for peaceful change, including methods and procedures for reviewing settlement terms, for raising grievances in general for adjusting commitments and responsibility to new social, economic, demographic and diplomatic conditions, and
- Anticipation of future issues, that is a system of anticipating issues that are potential sources of new conflict and handling them before they erupt into violence.

Hampson (1996:18) suggested that Holsti’s criteria could help scrutinise the terms of a peace settlement in order to assess whether it is sufficiently comprehensive and durable to prevent, or otherwise deter, new challenges to the peaceful order that has just been created.

2.3.3 Tackling the Conflict’s Root Causes

Too much diplomacy or mediation while ignoring root causes in a situation of protracted conflict can be counterproductive. Hampson (1996:18) put it “Such activism no matter how well intentioned or politically useful as a demonstration of concern, can lead parties in a dispute to avoid facing reality and making tough, but necessary decisions.” Lederach (1997:17) emphasised peacebuilding requires analysis of the many contributory factors that interact in generating and transforming the conflict.

Hoffman (1998:5) proposes important directive. First, conflict and chaos that must be overcome. Second, to do this root causes of conflict must be identified. Third, they must also be addressed. Post agreement stages can be fragile and unstable. To avoid the potential for renewed conflict this requires an in-depth, comprehensive understanding of its background and root causes. There is a consensus in literature on the point that building a lasting peace, the process must have knowledge of the past and must satisfy the parties’ basic needs. Addressing root causes implies the need to look deeply in the anatomy of the conflict. Some conflicts are rooted in “…a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping tensions evolving from ethnicity, religions, nationalism, communal strife, socio-economic problems, regional grievances and so on.” These conflicts are marked by self-sustaining patterns of hostility and violence. They usually involve fierce competition among differing factions for access to and control of the states’ political institutions and or the search for national autonomy and self-determination. Doyle and Sambanis (1999) suggested that international capacities should always aim to assist self-determination as a way to promote long-term peace. However, self-determination for some must not come at the expense of others. In ethnic wars of secession, partitioning states along ethnic lines may be a suitable solution to end internal repression and violence. In this case of conflict, there is a need for a greater level of comprehensiveness of solution. Ball and Hallevy (1996:20) remarked

Future peace rises from recognition of needs of the conflicting parties. Both sides must make a deliberate effort to understand the other’s logic not in order to surrender, but to identify and proceed from existing points of agreement. Also isolating impasses is crucial so that resolution can be sought in the context of a shared vision.
2.3.4 Bottom-up Process

Peace plans are often conceived from the top down. This is only half of the process. Peace must also be built from the ground up. Stiefel (1999:14) stressed “Peace and solutions to the challenges of war-torn societies cannot not be brought from outside but must be achieved primarily by internal actors”. He (1999:23) argued that local, private and internal actors are the main forces for peacebuilding, adding that:

The imposition or achievement of a ‘negative’ peace which usually follows the ending of armed hostilities is not sufficient ... the challenge is to build a 'positive peace', peace that is sustainable because it can ensure social, political, economic and military security and stability and mitigate new tensions and conflicts.

Lederach (1995:19), addressing the principle of public engagement, suggested “…that peacebuilding must actively envision, include, respect and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involved a new set of ‘lenses’ through which it primarily saw the setting and the people as validating and building on the long-term goal of transformation. The World Bank (1999) emphasised “All aspects of the conflict - social, political and economic - must be addressed openly, allowing all interested members of society an equal opportunity to participate, including women’s associations, civil society”.

Öberg (2000) suggested in later stages of peacebuilding the need for projects to build people to people peace, giving examples of multi-national school programmes; youth-to-youth exchange programmes; village visitation programmes; joint police training; joint workshops for professionals and journalists, teachers, nurses, lawyers, farmers, and sports teams. These are designed to deal with common problems, identify and carry out reconstruction projects. Perhaps even make it a minimum condition for receiving money and the material. One can argue that people in war-torn societies need good experiences and see their hopes fulfilled. When people observe that peace pays, then life and normality can return.

2.3.5 An Effective Third Party Involvement

In the literature, there have been fierce discussions regarding the intervention of the third party. (Zartman. 1996; Mitchell and Webb. 1988; Lederach, 1995; Hampson, 1996. Miall et al. 1999) debate different issues of third party intervention. Mitchell and Webb (1988:19) pointed out that the third parties include international organisations, great and regional powers. Skilful and properly executed third party interventions could have important implications for long term management and resolution of the conflict. Third
parties could serve as a crucial catalyst in developing a supportive relationship between adversaries. They could establish the conditions that lead not only to conflict de-escalation but also a redefining of conflict as a problem to be solved, not a contest to be won. Miall et al (1999: 59) agreed that third parties are often essential,

They typically help the conflicting and confidence, setting agendas, clarifying issues and formulating agreements. They can facilitate meetings by arranging venues, reducing tensions, exploring the interests of the parties and sometimes guiding the parties to unrealised possibilities.

Hampson indicated that third party intervention could proffer carrots or wield sticks to ensure that the process does not become derailed. As Fisher (1981) observed, protracted conflicts contain a large number of different constituencies with different demands, it seems unreasonable to expect that a single intervention strategy could deal fully with all of them. It seems more useful to envision intervention as a co-ordinated series of concurrent and consecutive strategies direct towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict.

The third party can employ the 'carrot' of aid to pressure recipients into adopting more accommodating positions on the peace process. Such an effort was made during the American-Israel loan guarantee dispute of 1991-1992. It can be argued that United States pressure worked. The pressure contributed to election results in Israel that led to a change in Israel’s position toward settlement and toward the entire Middle East peace process. The intervention of an honest third party thus transforms a dynamic barraging system into a three or multi-cornered relationship in which the third party effectively becomes one of the negotiators in a now transformed multilateral negotiation system. The tasks of the third party can cover a wide range of functions throughout the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and implementation phases of the peace settlement process. The role that third parties play in the full range of activities associated with the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements is therefore possibly element in explaining why some peace settlements succeed and others fail (Hampson, 1996).

To sum up, strategies for peacebuilding must be sculpted to fit the case. Lederach (1997) wrote, "It entails, in a whole range of approaches, the interaction of national and international actors to create sustainable relationships between torn communities." Benign relationships can be difficult to realise in post war situations. Resistance to agreement can be motivated by prevalent ideologies. For instance, radical religious movements believe to make peace with an enemy violates divine law. In another context, resistant attitudes result from loyalty to a country acting as a proxy. Objections to peaceful relationships need to be
understood: essential even to start negotiations for a settlement. The peace should be planned to resolve a particular conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict and capacities for change; the war-related hostility; and the specific degree of international commitment available to assist change.

2.4 PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES

Hoffman (1998:5) posited that if the task is peacebuilding then we must consider the nature of peace, the goal toward which peacebuilding activity is directed, must consider that which must be rebuilt. Peacebuilding is a set of strategies, which aim to ensure that dispute, armed conflicts and other major crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do arise that they do not subsequently recur. According to Evans (1993:9), these strategies could be understood under two broad groups, international regimes and in country peacebuilding measures. He explained that

- International regimes are international laws, norms, agreements and arrangements, global, regional or bilateral in scope-designed to minimise threats to security, promote confidence and trust and create frameworks for dialogue and co-operation.

- ‘In country peacebuilding’ to national and international efforts which aim at economic development, institution building and more generally, the creation or restoration within countries of the conditions necessary to make them stable and viable states.

Expanding on Evan’s classification, Hampson (1996:45) stated that peace settlements that enjoy high levels of assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and peacebuilding process are arguably more likely to succeed than those that do not. Aid can play a role to reinforce politics. Whereas economic efforts can be useful in supporting and cementing progress toward peace, they will constitute enough of a force to pave a path from hostility to peace”. He added aid could be a valuable aspect of peace facilitation within the realistic parameters of their potential. However, aid can not substitute legitimate rights. It may help to provide a non-violence situation, but it can not secure a lasting peace. Moreover, aid can generate unexpected dilemmas. Some initiatives can actually be destructive, as they create unfulfilled expectations that then embitter the populace. Part of the reason for these unmet expectations is people sometimes get the impression that an initiative will make a quick difference, when in fact most initiatives take years to become fully effective. Not only is it important to avoid making unrealistic forecasts; it is equally vital to make every effort to follow through on commitments once they are made. Especially
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when the diplomatic atmosphere is problematic, initiatives require sustained efforts and dedication at the highest levels.

Due to the significance of the issue, in the following section, the author discusses the role of aid and international capacities in peacebuilding.

2.4.1 Aid and Peacebuilding

Aid policy in modern history began when Truman, the American president announced in the aftermath of the Second World War:

We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our advance and technical progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped countries.

Aid in war-exhausted countries can do much to lessen the human and economic costs of conflict even during the hostilities. When there are limited domestic financial and human capacities, foreign assistance plays a crucial role in helping war-torn countries in political, social, and economic rehabilitation. Colletta (1996) and Collier (1994) claimed that foreign aid is particularly important in the first phase of reconstruction to assist in the rehabilitation of vital social services and productive infrastructure as well as to finance reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and civil returnees. Pugh (1998) indicated the fact that funding mechanisms and donations can be used as political tools to lead peacebuilding.

In the current days aid becomes an important discipline of research, major international donors have come to recognise the dire need to study aid trends and to bring together efforts to reach and integrate a coherent and co-ordinated framework. Stiefel (1999:14) stressed the importance of

Defining an assistance policy and implementing it, requires clear analysis based on a holistic understanding of the post-war situation and the specific country context, the legacies of the war, the root causes of conflict, the different actors involved, and more generally the dynamics of peace and war. This is particularly important given the essentially political nature of rebuilding, which can turn the most trivial administrative task into a political act. The effectiveness of international assistance depends on the ability to understand the political context and to fit constructively into it.

Aid as the World Bank (1999:2) definition "...implies the idea of a gift of assistance rendered or a unilateral transfer a quid sine que". Dudley (1993:10) explained the wide range objective of aid is to "...help bring about change, whether in terms of how a seed is sown or to whose benefit political power is used. He argued that "In the case of poor and
conflict countries, external aid is often limited to balance-of-payments support, humanitarian assistance provided by foreign aid agencies and financial aid by international institutions.

Who are the Donors?

The World Bank (1999:6) demonstrated that aid could be categorised regarding the donor side to include official development assistance and official development finance. The Bank explained “The first is a subset of the second and comprises grants plus concessional loans that have at least a 25 percent grant component. Official development finance is all financing that flows from developed country governments and multilateral agencies to the developing world.”

Both types can be divided into multilateral and bilateral aid. Bilateral assistance is administrated by agencies of donor governments (such as the U.S. Agency for International Development or Japan’s Fund). Multilateral assistance is funded by contributions from wealthy countries and administered by agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

Each group has its own advantages and disadvantages. Some bilateral aid is tied as it must be used to procure goods and services from the donor country. This reduces the value of that assistance by about 25 per cent. Janssen, (1983:23) argued that

- National considerations tend to be less prominent in multilateral programme.
- Multilateral aid assists the proper co-ordination of the overall assistance flows and this reduces unproductive duplication.
- Aid flows from multilateral agencies fluctuate less than flows from bilateral agreements.

According to Stewart (1998) in the recent years, a number of donors have created functional units to design and deliver assistance for post-conflict recovery. He estimated that in 1998 there were around two dozen such entities in various multilateral and bilateral agencies, including several within the UN system. This heterogeneous group now holds semi-annual meetings to share information and resources, to establish common standards and principles, to collect “best practices” and “lessons to be learned” and to explore initiatives towards high-priority countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Bilateral</th>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations System</td>
<td>Canada: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Peacebuilding Unit; and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Peacebuilding and Human Security Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO, Special Relief Operations Service</td>
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<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>UNICEF, Office of Emergency Programs</td>
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<td>UNDP, Emergency Response Division</td>
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<td>UNHCHR, High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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Dudley (1993:17) categorised aid to include two types of aid: material and technical. He explained that Material aid involved large amounts of money and tended to attract more attention from donors and potential beneficiaries. More specifically, aid involves the donor countries in one of three types of financial expenditure:

- Capital (grants, and loans)
- Technical assistance.

- Grants: are gifts, they do not have to be repaid. Although, they may require local expenditure by the recipient governments, which would not otherwise have taken place e.g. the cost of a visiting expert.

- Technical assistance: is mainly where human skills and knowledge are transferred from industrialised countries of the developed world to the less developed countries of the Third World.

For some authors the neglect of technical aid has not been an oversight but a deliberate decision; they question whether technical aid is a valid aid strategy. Dudley (1993:17) mentioned critics regarding technical aid. It has been seen, from within the third world as a product of a patronising attitude on the part of an outsider who believe they are better able to say what is good for someone than that person can him or herself. The critics considered the attitude of technical aid workers to be both mistaken and racist.

According to Dudley (1993:18) “Material aid is inadequate and, for the foreseeable future, is likely to remain so”. He justified his stand by the changing nature of need in the developing world with an inadequate indigenous technical knowledge for the resulted problems such as changing aspirations and new social institutions. Clearly, in such circumstances there is a case for external expertise in the new technologies and in the
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processes of technical and institutional change commonly found in societies in transition. In the material aid approach, the donors understand what they are giving and despite some problems of tied aid and re-payment conditions, the beneficiaries understand what they are receiving. It seems according to Anderson (1996) that in recipient countries, the principal beneficiaries of material aid frequently appeared to be officials and consultants. the benefits taking the form of imported vehicles, salaries and fees.

The disparity between the material resources required and those, which are available, suggests that the standards of living of the majority will not be improved though materials aid alone. If there are to be significant, improvements in living conditions they will need to come about largely through better use of existing resources.

**Aid: Project or Programme**

In addition to the previous categorisation of aid, Cassen (1994) clarified that there are two main types of aid, project aid and programme aid. According to Cassen: the difference: “Project aid makes a specific capital asset or piece of technical assistance available often to specific beneficiaries”. While “Programme aid makes a cash sum available for the benefit of the entire recipient economy, or a sector of it, and is usually accompanied by policy discussions.”

Baun (1992) argued that “There was no attempt to provide an explicit definition of what comprises a project”. International organisations according to Baun (1992) have used the concept of project broadly to mean the use of resources for a specific. This results in projects, which can range in size from a multi-billion dollar project to training programme for primary school teachers.

The literature reflects both disadvantages and advantages in employing project as opposed to programme aid. For example, the World Bank (1999) argued that project has become the primary means of transferring financial resources for development policies in developing countries. There has been a changed emphasis in the types of projects funded by the aid agencies with an increasing stress on projects explicitly devoted to the alleviation of poverty in the third world. The World Bank (1999) argued that these projects must be:

Perceived to be manageable…They can be administrated through a well known and clearly defined set of procedures…they have clearly defined objectives and purposes and resources needed to achieve them.

A criticism laid against project aid is that donors and the aid agencies promote their favoured ventures with insufficient regard to the overall development needs of recipient countries. This study acknowledges the criticism by the different case studies used to obtain
evidence to support this opinion. Pugh (1998) criticised this approach on the ground that it would not help to build the local capacities and the institutional development. He stated:

Partners are funded to implement not to exist. Projects become the main conduit for funding. They offer a formalised process for allocating generally fixed sums for specific tasks to be completed during an agreed time frame and which can be audited in a particular way.

Stewart et al. (1997) argued that efforts are a waste of resources only if new projects are likely to be immediately destroyed. They concluded that development efforts should be continuous and sustainable. According to Pugh (1998): "Project aid reinforces a donor-centred, top-down approach". From reviewing different experiences in the World, he claimed "It is become clear that implementing partners generally write proposals for specific projects that they believe will fit in with the funding priorities of donors." Project evaluations are couched in terms of the original aims of the proposal and with keen regard for the priorities of the donor. Pugh added that ‘Projectism’ reinforced the bureaucratisation of peacebuilding processes. Since so many organisations are dependent for their survival on a more or less continuous and cyclical process of application and evaluation, they have to develop the bureaucratic mechanisms necessary to maintain this. This in turn limits the communication between donors and implementers to one of bureaucratic exchange. From the project implementers’ perspective, the importance of sustainability appears to be poorly understood in the donor community.

Pugh (1998) claimed that Projectism - an indication of short-termism- has been evident particularly in the funding and contract cycles that commonly last from 3 to 12 months. Short-term staff is always in fear of being dismissed and often untold until the very end of the contract whether or not they will be re-hired. Having recognised the different categories of donor assistance, it has become clear that aid is reinforced by a variety of motivations.

Aid Motivation

The issue of aid neutrality in the post-conflict rebuilding gives rise to lively debates. It is understood that politics has an important influence on project relevance and execution. Politics' motivates the international, national, sub national, organisational, consultancy and individual level. The political motivation of the client governmental aid agencies has implication for all stages of the funded programmes or projects. The literature explains how a rich country's assistance can not be isolated from its general policies. This was explained by Hewitt (1994:3)
The motive at the height of the Cold War was a strategic one. It used aid to strengthen friendly countries as a way of confronting the immediate danger from unfriendly ones.

The World Bank (1999) clarified that aid policies from its start had twin objectives:

- The first objective was to promote long-term growth and poverty reduction in developing countries; the underlying motivation of donors was a combination of altruism and a more self-interested concern that, in the long term, their economic and political security would benefit if poor countries were growing.

- The second objective was to promote the short-term political and strategic interests of donors. Aid went to regimes that were political allies of major Western powers. Thus the strategic and developmental objectives were potentially, but not necessarily in harmony.

Little gave an example of the biggest aid programme in the modern history. The Marshall plan founded and funded by the USA to help recovering Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. USA intervened to stop the expected spread of communism in the early days of the Cold War. Stiefel (1999:20) recognised that more often the imperatives of domestic politics in donor countries influence the attribution and form of external assistance, and often negatively affect the design and quality of external assistance. Joseph Stiglitz gave an example of motivated aid “In some cases food aid has been motivated by the desire to get rid of the mounting agricultural surpluses that result from the misguided and distortionary agricultural policies in many developed countries 4.”

Obviously, donors have a number of motivations in giving aid. This incentive to help the needy countries might be due to moral, altruistic, strategic, commercial, political and cultural reasons. But whatever the motive, a rich country assistance policy can not be isolated from its foreign and economic policy.

It could be argued that bilateral aid is less impersonal. However, commentators claim that in this sort of assistance donors like to be associated with their aid and gain credit for it. Most commentators would agree that the administration and distribution of multilateral aid are not ideal. Both bilateral and multilateral aid suffers from excessive bureaucratisation, which limits the level of achievement. Both concentrate on economic reform issues and ignore other needs. FitzGerald (1997:63) noted that the international financial institutions have been too narrowly focused on economic issues and have no consideration to the other needs of the wounded communities.

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1 Can Aid Facilitate Development? A New Vision for Development Co-operation in the 21st Century by Joseph Stiglitz Senior Vice President and Chief Economist The World Bank Tokyo, Japan, September 17, 1997
One can also add that there is a negative attitude of donor countries and an unsatisfactory arrangement under which the multilateral assistance functions. Specifically, donor countries were more prepared to give large sums of aid because they can direct it to those developing countries which they have special reasons for wanting to help and can avoid hostile countries. Further donors tend not to deal with government hostile to the donors' policies. The case of Iran is an example, as Amirahmadi (1992) explained how the United States and the Western countries did not help in the post-war reconstruction and development there despite the dire need for assistance. The strategic motives were significant in many aid programmes, which were to follow, and as evidence from the literature to have an influence on the character and distribution of aid. From another angle, Stiefel (1999:20) claimed that very often external assistance has been used to further the particular interests of the donor as part of a donor's strategy. The selfish intervenor can use the power of aid to manipulate events, such as trade deals to his advantage. One can claim that some rich countries put strict conditions on their aid criteria in order to hire their own experts or contract with native companies. In effect, the dominant intervention paradigms focus on creating stability rather than security; law and order rather than justice; and the ability of societies to participate in global capitalism rather than provide welfare.

**Sustainable Peacebuilding and Aid**

Sustainable recovery and peacebuilding requires laying new foundations for social peace, political stability, and economic growth in the war-torn countries. Shepard Forman *et al* (1998) suggested to move from conflict-to-peace and to advance political, and socio-economic transitions, donors must support an array of essential activities. This array should include drafting and implementing peace accords, planning and monitoring disarmament, demobilising and reintegrating combatants, training local police, and restoring human security. It supports moves to build the national institutions, improve local governance, and monitor human rights. Furthermore, it provides essential services, restore transportation and communication links, rebuild social capital, repair infrastructure, jump-start industrial and agricultural production, reconstitute financial institutions, and revive commercial activity.

Post-conflict countries suffer enormously in their ability to manage and absorb foreign assistance. Due to prolonged and extensive violence, recipients may lack the human, technical, and administrative capacities required to make use of large quantities of aid or to co-ordinate the multiple donors and NGOs that arrive to assist their recovery. The donor community should design interventions that enable recipients to acquire these capacities as quickly as possible. Efforts to build state capacity ought to be measurable, with clear
benchmarks to gauge progress in different spheres of activity. In order to avoid the preceding pitfalls, Lake (1990:23-27) called for strategies to improve aid effects. It was proposed the creation of a reconstruction fund to be administered by multilateral institutions rather than bilateral ones. The World Bank published a series of working papers tackling the role of the donor countries in the current post-conflict situation. Also, the War-torn Societies Project has produced an important series of publications tackling the issue of external assistance claiming that it required major efforts primarily at the international level. WSP explored these issues with senior managers from bilateral and multilateral agencies in a workshop held in Bossey, Geneva, in June 1998. On the basis of WSP’s and the participants’ experience, they concluded that

The quality of external assistance to war-torn societies can and must be dramatically improved if it is to contribute effectively to rebuilding. This requires major reform and explicit political commitment. Both the approach and the operational practice of aid need to change.

To avoid doing harm through unplanned intervention, Forman et al (1998); DAC (1997); Stiefel (1999); the World Bank (1999; 2000) proposed that donors could nurture recipient capacities in several ways if they:

**Adopt Flexible Time Frame:** Time is very important when donor countries decide to intervene. In view of the formidable challenges, donors need to be realistic about the length of their engagement. Understandably, where donors confront an essentially settled conflict, they may wish to negotiate an explicit timetable with the government. This timetable must be flexible. In cases where the ‘peace’ is more of an uncertain truce, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon setting firm withdrawal deadlines may be impractical. DAC (1997) recognised that planning, programming and disbursement procedures must allow for timely responses to changing circumstances and take account of the exceptional conditions facing post-conflict communities. DAC suggested flexibility with regard to the areas and activities eligible for support, in line with the special needs and priorities of countries in crisis or recovery, is also essential in order to strike a balance between immediate humanitarian needs and the requirements of rehabilitation, long-term reconstruction and peace-building. Timely fulfilment of pledges for resources is also critical.

**Ensure Accountable Promises:** Peace accords, and the aid commitments that accompany them, generate tremendous expectations within societies torn by conflict. By promising to launch ambitious reconstruction programmes, it is believed that pledges of aid can help
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consolidate fragile peace agreements. Forman et al (1998) claimed that much of the aid pledged by the international community arrives only after considerable delays, or never at all. Donors make pledges, but there is typically a lag before these are translated into commitments, and still further into disbursements. Unsustainable and unpredictable disbursements can wreak havoc on reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts and shatter local expectations. Stiefel (1999) stressed the importance of regularity of assistance. He believed that it "...is often more important than the quantity". Small but stable commitments are more useful to governments of war-torn countries than large but erratic assistance on which they can not count. At the other hand, he argued that "Irregular assistance greatly limits the capacity of national actors to plan rebuilding strategies and has a debilitating impact."

**Track Aid Delivery:** To ensure the efficacy and legitimacy of its efforts, the donor community must improve its capacities to monitor the delivery and implementation of post-conflict assistance. Donors urgently need a standardised accounting system for reporting aid flows, one that can be applied in every circumstance. Such a comprehensive database, broken down by pledges, commitments, and disbursements, should be updated quarterly and be readily accessible to all stakeholders and interested observers.

**Assess the Impact of Aid:** Sometimes societies emerging from conflict may receive aid that is redundant, harmful or squandered. By injecting large amounts of assistance into post-conflict countries, donors unwittingly but inevitably distort local systems of production and exchange. DAC (1997) pointed out that "...long-term assistance can lead to aid dependency". It indicated that aid could lead to corruption within countries emerging from conflict. For these reasons Forman et al. (1998) suggested, "The international community needs to develop tools to evaluate [aid] impact". While Stiefel argued that long-term commitments and partnerships require periodic reassessment of orientations, programmes, plans and terms of collaboration.

**Delegate a Central Role for the Domestic Actors:** The international donors tend to deliver assistance as quickly as possible and announce their desire to rely on local capacities to shape, supervise, and implement reconstruction efforts. At a rhetorical level. donors concede that donor-driven aid must yield to true partnership and local ownership. In practice, donors preoccupied with speed frequently surrender to the temptation to design recovery programs with little recipient input — and to deliver aid through their own implementing agencies and service providers rather than through local actors who alone can ensure the sustainability of
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the effort. DAC (1997) insisted that peacebuilding activities must be enhanced by initiatives targeted to the grass-root level. On the other hand, Forman et al (1998) stressed the importance of engagement of local government in broad consultation of the recovery efforts. Stiefel (1999) warned donors from delegating to external NGOs as interlocutors and counterparts fearing this would weaken the emerging government and local capacity buildings.

**Foster Reconstruction Activities:** Hill (1996:80) posited "...to put a society on the road of peacebuilding, reconstruction needs to start immediately." Hill made the point "Post-conflict societies need reconstruction because most people do not have the means to make their own living and must depend on relief from the outside." This is the crux of reconstruction. Each peacebuilding activity should do double or treble duty, humanitarian relief is needed, it should be provided so as to rehabilitate roads, dig irrigation ditches, or assist health care. That, too, should lead naturally and by plan into sustainable development. Employment should be the focus of relief strategies in order to promote training and leave behind capacities that could be nurtured by the local inhabitants.

Reconstruction and peacebuilding are strongly connected, unstability can frustrate reconstruction, and reconstruction is necessary to achieve and sustain peace. This has been recognised by Barakat (1994:1), who emphasised

> A proper development can not take place without lasting peace, peace can never be sustained without proper reconstruction and long term development. No matter how much effort is put into the three actions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is proper peacebuilding that can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations (1998) argued that "International community and national actors have to work together to consolidate a fragile peace and begin sustainable reconstruction." DAC (1997) observed that there has been a problematic ad-hocness toward peacebuilding and reconstruction. Therefore, it recommended a discussion of aims, expectations and strategies of the issue. In the following section, the author discusses the post-conflict reconstruction as a tool for peacebuilding.

**2.5 PEACEBUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION**

Kofi Annan (1999) the Secretary General of the United Nations believed that

Building a lasting peace requires a sustained and concerted effort to cope with the multiple legacies of conflict: the physical devastation brought about by war, the weakening or destruction of social and political institutions and, above all, the invisible scars that wars leave in the mind and hearts of people.
In Annan’s statement, he noted the interrelationship between reconstruction and peacebuilding. Since the end of the Second World War, the US’s initiative to assist the Europeans’ recovery had led to the concepts of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Now, “Post-conflict society quickly begins to search for a ‘peace dividend’ usually in the form of improved standards of living” (The World: 1999). Post-conflict reconstruction is a major element of peace building. In fact, most of the peace accords ending internal conflicts during the 1990s have been accompanied by ambitious reconstruction schemes addressing multiple political, social, and economic objectives. “In the time after reaching a settlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities have become paramount” (Annan, 1999). The aim of reconstruction is “…to rehabilitate societies to accept peace as the ideal option for life” (Stiefel, 1999). Reconstruction is needed to help prevent crises. Therefore, reconstruction needs to be incorporated into peace scenarios and to be more assertive in curative efforts. It can no longer wait for conditions congenial to serious, long-term efforts but must help bring them about in order to achieve the wished peace. Barakat (1998:15) noted how a physical reconstruction programme has been used by Habitat to enforce peacebuilding in the Afghan capital. He narrated:

West of Kabul City, a small river separates Qualaie-Wahid, an area occupied by Pushtuns and Tajiks and Qualiai-e-Nazir, occupied and controlled by the Hisbe-Wahdat faction. A pedestrian bridge, which once spanned the river and provided access for the Hazaras to reach medical clinics and the Tajiks and Pushtuns to reach the market, was destroyed. Acting as mediators, UNCHS staff identified elders in both communities to convince the Mujahideen commanders to lay down their arms and to participate in rebuilding the bridge... Gradually, people began to venture across the bridge and the traffic between the two sides increased, bringing with it trade and co-operation and the reduction if not the removal of the tension.

Reconstruction of post-conflict society is no simple project. Reconstruction is usually understood less exclusively as a technical matter - isolated from other conditions and events in societies. Reconstruct as a verb suggests that something destroyed can be re-created. This may apply to buildings or some other physical structures, but not so easily to social, psychological and mental structures. Of course, building peace requires sound foundations of righting wrongs and social justice. Clements (1994) illustrated that reconstructing war-torn society means, reconstructing of human beings, souls and bodies, social structure, culture, environment, and a peace culture of reconciliation, repentance, forgiveness, respect, healing of collectively and individually acting out the sorrow, learning to live with it and simultaneously moving toward a vision of peaceful existence. Also Zahlan (1997:147) added that the process encompasses “…many and diverse elements: community life, work
and employment, financial policies, the construction industry, infrastructure. It must meet the social, psychological, spiritual and cultural needs of the beneficiaries, building with them to promote self-reliance. Stiefel (1999:16) drew the attention to the need to understand the major actors’ role in the recovery process. UNRISD (1994) claimed that there has been confusion at both national and international levels about responsibilities and mandates: who does what, and why in war-torn countries. Absence of any of these actors could result in programme failure, long delays in responding to urgent needs, waste of scarce resources and significantly could result in renewed conflict. Understandably, the input of these three actors needs to be balanced. Stiefel (1999:16) claimed that

The real importance of actors in rebuilding processes does not seem to correspond to the importance and weight given to them by the international community or by the media, the importance and role of some actors, internal actors generally, the local people, the private sector, women is greatly underestimated. In contrast, the importance and role of other actors, external actors generally, the United Nations and other multinational institutions, bilateral aid agencies and to a lesser extent, the state and public sector is overestimated.

Having understood the role of the international community in peacebuilding and reconstruction, below the author surveys the social, economy, institution reconstruction and the expected role of national and local actors, challenges they face and the nature of relationships between them.

2.5.1 Social Reconstruction

The World Bank (1998) defined the civil society as “…All the non-state actors that make up a free society.” “The main sources that allow society to rebuild after a war lie undoubtedly in the people themselves, their resilience, creativity, pragmatism and capacity to adapt” Stiefel (1999:16) recognised. However, Anderson (1996) indicated that violence disrupts the normal healthy relationships that existed between the full range of groups in society. The disruption is exacerbated by the breakdown of communication channels between groups and the corrosion of trust often encouraged by opportunistic political leaders. Further, it appears in the psycho-social trauma for those who suffered the impact of the conflict. People have lived through intensely painful experience such as: the loss of human life and of material possessions, constant and widespread violence, torture, repression, rape, abuse, and discrimination. Therefore. The WSP (1998) stressed that social reconstruction is the primary challenge of post-war societies. The project suggested that relations must be mended between the present, the past and the future to prevent bitter
memories of the past from poisoning visions of the future. Smilli (1999:25) considered the challenges to be a difficult, he argues: "Building the social rather than physical infrastructure is, and always has been, the most difficult challenge of development."

For a community to recover from a conflict and its impact Barakat and Hoffman (1995:85) suggested three stages, which need to be passed through:

- **Hope**: Hope finds its expression in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. Concrete initiatives even during protracted conflicts when peace appears an elusive goal must be undertaken and executed so that people respect each other and enjoy participating in their communities.

- **Healing**: Considering the destructive impact of war, healing is a significant step on the way to recovery. Healing is realised through long-term, comprehensive multifaceted strategies to end violence, rehabilitate communities, including those individuals and groups with a vested interest in waging wars.

- **Reconciliation**: The authors state "Until a post war society is built up in which citizens can live in harmony, all other reconstruction is of limited value. Post conflict recovery projects should aim to reconcile groups in society as well as supply physical and material benefits."

WSP publications viewed reconstruction through socio-economic regeneration programme: "Reconciliation, the healing of bitter memories, the mending of relations and the restoration of trust is an infinitely complex and delicate exercise and may take a generation or more." Barakat and Hoffman (1995) stressed the need for "Mechanisms to address trauma and practical conflict resolution: skills required to work toward mutually acceptable future outcomes must accompany structural measures and reconstruction initiatives." Stiefel (1999:16) elaborated the process:

The challenge of rebuilding itself, if approached as a common task, can heal relations and restore dignity, trust and faith in the future as people learn to cope together with the past and regain control over the present. The situation can be healed through appropriately designed rebuilding strategies that pay attention to the political and relational context in which they are applied. Development or humanitarian rebuilding strategies should be designed and applied in such a way that they not only address primary objectives but at the same time improve and build trust in the peace benefits. If poorly designed they can fuel tensions, leading to new conflict.

The vast majority of literature describes social reconstruction in terms of local empowerment and capacity building. Public participation in decision making can greatly enhance social reconstruction. As Lederach (1997:25) argued, local empowerment, capacity building and accountability have the potential to transform societies. Participation has long been acknowledged as a requirement in the work of tackling the issue of post war rebuilding.
International organisations have recognised the importance of public participation in recovery programmes. WSP in its publications has highlighted that local involvement is necessary to diffuse local conflicts, to mend relations and solve problems. Rebuilding the country and restoring governmental legitimacy requires redefining relations between the centre and provinces, regions and local authorities. Agenda 21 of the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development emphasised the value of a people-centred approach. Subsequently the Secretary General endorsed the position

In order to fulfil their potential, people must participate actively in formulating their own goals, and their voices must be heard in decision-making bodies as they seek to pursue their own most appropriate path to development.

It could be argued that the strengthening of local coping mechanisms plays a crucial role in the process of igniting a social recovery. All dynamics of a society possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities, therefore the aim should be to strengthen these capacities while taking precautions against vulnerabilities. It is because of this that recovery efforts should incorporate the participation of local partners in planning and implementation. The WSP investigates how the public participation functions in its studies; its analysis explores ways to involve local communities in its reports. The World Bank now includes participation criteria (i.e. public debates with popular, gender and NGO involvement) in its lending policy, mainly for small-scale social development projects.

Parry (1972) defined participation as “…taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation of public policies”. More precision is required in describing the nature of participation in a particular context, identifying who takes part in what, when and how, and with what results. Lederach (1997:49) pointed out, capacity building is a process not an outcome, and communities can be encouraged not only to realise immediate survival goals but to envisage change, and to consider whether projects contribute to that change. Borter (1986) stated that “Participation facilitates in the political realm the pre-eminence of human development and self-determination, both committed to the ideals of freedom and equality”.

Anderson (1996) stressed that people can achieve recovery through putting in place “appropriate structures of decision making”. People must participate fully in the planning and implementation of development strategies. Pugh argued: “Communities have a right to ownership of the transformation of their societies. Without active participation people can not become ‘stakeholders’ in ventures and enterprises ostensibly generated to assist them. If local participation is lacking political ownership of the rehabilitation process remains in the hands of external agencies.”
Local participation has been considered very significant in reconstruction's official documents. Amirahmadi (1990:247) stated that a reconstruction strategy is founded on the capabilities of people in conflict-torn areas and stressed the importance of observing the cultural, traditional, and psychological characteristics of the people in each area. Barakat and Hoffman (1995:89) suggested

The local community is the primary resource for reconstruction. It is crucial to work with the community and not for it. People need to be helped to help themselves. Programmes have to be geared up to the REAL NEEDS and PRIORITIES of the community. This requires major changes in attitude and methods of working with the community. The community must have the sense of ownership and responsibility towards the projects, as the only way of ensuring true sustainability and initial self-reliance. One way of fostering this is by the community contributing to the project, material resources, labour, cash, etc.

The two authors completed their argument, stressing it is crucial to involve the community in planning, design and implementation of reconstruction. They warned the “...community should never be exploited, ignored, bypassed or helped to develop false expectation”. Participation as active, broad-based local involvement in political decision making, an end in itself; can be distinguished from participation as a means to make decisions appropriate and enhance the impact of public expenditures on efficiency, equity, private initiative and so on.

Pugh (1998) cited the Overseas Development Institute’s identification of five levels of public participation:

- Information disclosure: people are merely informed about matters that affect them.
- People are given a voice about issues where external actors have defined problems and processes, control analysis and have no obligation to take people's views into account.
- People are encouraged to engage in achieving project goals to reduce its costs and comply with procedural requirements.
- People participate with external actors from an early stage in project design, implementation and assessment.
- People take initiatives independently of external actors who in turn facilitate the achievement of goals defined by local communities.

Public involvement varies according to the project's nature as the ODI pointed out “There is considerable divergence between the levels of participation in social development programmes and in major infrastructure projects”. In infrastructure projects, participation is extraneous to the project. In contrast, Pugh continued. in “social development, public
participation is often integral to the project at the level of procedural participation and above.”

Pugh (1998:11) argued, though the need is greater, participation seems to have obstacles that slow its pace in war-torn societies. Stiefel (1999:17) claimed that “It may not be easy for governments and external actors to know about positive local initiatives and projects”. Pugh predicted that transforming society by tackling social, educational and attitudinal barriers to peace will confront social classes. New corrupt classes may establish themselves as essential to people’s existence, creating a counterfeit legitimacy by providing the means for ordinary people to ‘get by’ in an economy distorted by grave shortages. Stiefel (1999:17) emphasised that if people do not trust each other and lack trust and confidence in government and in the rebuilding process in general, then the best rebuilding strategies are likely to fail.

In the general sense, there is a tendency to see entire peoples who were recently at conflict with each other either as traumatised victims who lack the ability to make decisions about the future or as unable to participate. Pugh (1998:10) explained that misperceptions on the part of external actors about the general and particular social capital, which they arrive to support, are liable to inhibit participation. Supporting the argument, Stiefel (1999:19) claimed that governments and international actors do not build sufficiently on local forces, dynamics and initiatives. He justified his attitude: “Local people are often seen more as a liability than an asset”. Moreover, Pugh (1998) expected that the conditionality adopted by external actors to manipulate participation by creating or empowering only local institutions that demonstrate a commitment to externally determined goals may be a strategy resulting in social exclusion.

Finally, the argument that without social rebuilding, no real recovery can be achieved can sum up this discussion. Physical building without communal reconstruction results in chaos and disorder. Amirahmadi (1992) pointed out:

Reconstruction is essential therapy for a wounded society. Social therapy centres on people rebuilding their communities, both physically and emotionally, and this process can succeed only if there is a national commitment to healing. Long-term habitability must become a priority and the guiding goal of the reconstruction.

2.5.2 National Institutional Rebuilding

Stiglitz (1998) mentioned the need to pay particular attention to the state role. He argued that the government is expected to manage both its own affairs and manage the affairs of others. The key question is to identify the role of the government - both what the
government should do and how it should do it. And the question should not be whether a particular activity should be carried on in the state or community, but how the two can best complement each other, acting as partners in the reconstruction effort. Related issues include what tasks should be undertaken at what level of government, and how governments can most effectively interact with civil society, donors creating the conditions that are most conducive to the sustainable reconstruction. WSP (1998) argued that rebuilding requires a collective effort in which the state plays an essential role.

Conflicts tend to seriously undermine the capacity of the state to govern, as well as its political autonomy and administrative ability to promote a broadly based reconstruction programme. However, Carbonnier (1998) indicated that except in cases of overall state collapse, governments are supposed to design and implement overall policies. The absence of policies other than those strictly dictated by the conflict efforts may actually be one policy option that reflects a deliberate attempt to withhold public services and supplies from parts of the country to weaken the rebel. Stewart (1993) stressed that strong government structures with sufficient revenue to support the provision of essential social services are crucial to avoiding the large numbers of indirect deaths associated with war. Supporting Stewart's argument, Stiefel (1999:17) mentioned that the United Nations has recognised that the central problem of Somalia and Afghanistan has been one of governance. Without some kind of formula for the restoration of public administration, it would be impossible to find ways to provide social services, regulate economic activity, protect the environment, and promote reconciliation. Stiefel (1999:18) clarified the consequences of weak states in the aftermath of conflict as governments that are narrowly based, resource poor and unwilling or unable to meet the needs of their populations.

The World Bank Group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGWG) (1998:1) argued that the institutional capacity of government depends largely upon such factors as the quality and quantity of staff engaged in government. There must be a sufficient degree of skills, training and management at the local level to carry out the relevant tasks, and enough funds to finance local priorities.

Post-conflict governments are inevitably required to overcome enormous challenges. WBGWG (1998:1) pointed out that post-conflict government is required to create new administrative and political organisations. Understandably, a post conflict government is required to absorb enormous amounts of physical capital quickly. In the early stages of reconstruction, the needs for roads, schools, energy, telecommunications, and other elements of the infrastructure are huge. WSP (1994) diagnosed that one of the problems facing the conflict government is the absence of mature and functioning democratic systems, which
implies that imperfect mixtures of authoritarianism and pluralism must be accepted. The WSP added that in this case, a formal democratic process is likely to be imposed artificially from outside. Stiglitz (1998) explained that beyond the political tensions involved, there often arise significant problems related to the nature of the bureaucracy – the government structure, technical competence and resource base. There may be basic problems with respect to personnel needs, attitudes and training in local government. He added significant practical problems could inhibit the implementation of government efforts. Due to lack of co-ordination, accountability, and weak administrative capacity political central decision makers are likely to resist any diminution of their powers. For example, a Minister of Finance may oppose the transfer of revenue sources to fund projects, which is called for by the Cabinet. In fact, reliance on state funding can mean chronic delays, revenue shortfalls and reduced local autonomy.

2.5.3 Economic Reconstruction and the Responsibility of the State

Carbonnier (1998) argued that post-conflict governments, are critically short of expertise in macro-economic management, and have to wrestle with the competing demands of economic stabilisation and peacebuilding requirements. He explained the plight by saying “While the former requires drastic cuts in government expenditure, the latter implies increased public spending to cope with the pressing requirements of the peace agenda.” In addition, Birgitte (1998) stated that countries emerging from conflict must revise the existing constitution to reflect the new political reality, changes in power relationships, and ideological objectives. Though the phenomenon is not of course confined to war-torn societies, problems of accountability do arise at the local level. The World Bank stated that malfeasance (at any level of government) is a waste of resources. Corruption has been found to be a serious problem pervading national administration in a number of post conflict countries. This of course will lead to “Broken trust and relationships between social groups and authorities”. WSP (1998) explained that “Problems of relationships between people and institutions are compounded by the lack of neutral spaces in which they can meet and talk.” Stiefel (1999:19) attributed the limitation of neutral space to

The authoritarian tendencies of many post-war governments are not conducive to constructive communication and genuine open dialogue, often governments simply do not see the need to bring civil society in its widest sense into the policy debate, instead they work on the basis that the urgency of the rebuilding task diminishes the need to take time for dialogue, and that civil society accepts this. External actors, particularly those involved in security related and relief
operations tend to support such an approach and sacrifice participation in the name of urgency of needs.

Facing these formidable tasks, the state is required to make an effective intervention, and to find appropriate ingredients to carry out its responsibilities. Stiglitz (1997) claimed “The hard part of capacity building is the institutional building. The state is required to create institutions, which have the capacity to make key decisions concerning reconstruction. Many complex factors will affect the state contribution in the reconstruction, as Stiefel (1999:20) explained these factors to include;

The political climate, the socio-economic environment; the extent to which community are willing to participate effectively, which facilitates or restricts the free expression of popular feeling; and the functional responsibilities and financial resources available, or the extent to which local representatives are able to make decisions relating to the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects and programmes.

State responsibilities include creating an environment, which enables new knowledge to be absorbed, adapted to the circumstances of the country, and put to use for the civil society. In addition, government is required to strengthen the capabilities of the services, including the development of an effective civil service and a restructuring of the public sector, to make more effective use of incentives and of market and market-like mechanisms. The World Bank (1999) argued that creating enabling environment for the private sector, which includes markets and the legal infrastructure that is necessary for markets to function well- is an important role of the state. Based on the World Development Report, Stiglitz (1997) argued that Central ingredients to the involvement of government are:

- A legal infrastructure, providing (and enforcing) competition laws.
- The government provision of infrastructure, where private infrastructure does not occur
- A regulatory framework which encourages the private provision of infrastructure where possible, which maximises the extent of feasible competition, and which ensures that where competition is not possible, there is not abuse of market power
- A stable macroeconomic framework
- A stable and effective financial system, which requires a regulatory framework that not only ensures safety and soundness, but also enhances competition, protects depositors, creates confidence that there is a "level playing field" in securities markets by protecting investors from abuses, and identifies undeserved groups within society
- An adjustment strategy, a strategy for the elimination of those distortions in the economy that interfere with the efficient deployment of resources.

Different authors suggest decentralisation to improve the operations of government. Stiefel (1999) stated that the decentralisation of the state and issues related to it are more important than is generally acknowledged. He claimed that the centre could not rebuild by
itself. It requires the active participation of provincial and local authorities. WSP (1994) asserted that decentralisation brings decision making closer to the people, accompanied by established mechanisms of local accountability. Decentralisation of government functions must include the devolution of authority and resources. WSP (1994) explained: “Decentralisation of the state does not necessarily imply federalism, but it does raise the potentially divisive question of the future form the state will take, and this will eventually have to be dealt with.”

The World Bank (1998) argued that decentralisation contributes to support the proposition that the accountability is improved, and malfeasance is becoming correspondingly less likely, when decisions are made at the local level. Stiglitz argued that corruption would be less likely under a decentralised system where at least some of the following conditions are met: (1) active participation in, and discussion of, local government decision making by the local population; (2) open, clear and simple routine accounting procedures and reports; and (3) some means by which corruption can be sanctioned - through, for example, the electoral process and the access of local people to cheap and effective systems to ensure due process and public accountability.

However, Barakat (1993:103) debated the possibility of total decentralisation in cases of post conflict countries. He argued “It is vital to have communal planning authorities to implement the measures which other centralised units consider necessary. Barakat quoted Amirahmadi (1989) who argued that “Controlled decentralisation is seen as a half way solution that could meet the needs of the centre and to some extent those of the people.”

2.5.4 Physical Reconstruction

Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating Committee (1998) pointed out that housing and community services are essential to peacebuilding in a variety of specific contexts. The committee gave examples of Bosnia after the Civil war, Russia after the demobilisation of its forces in the aftermath of the Cold War. According to the committee, principal facets of the issue include:

The urgent need for a ‘roof over the head’ of people left displaced and homeless by civil strife, for reasons of health, morale, community sanitation, and a return to civil society.

The highly political and the emotionally-charged nature of housing and community services projects after conflict has taken place, given that neighbours

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5 Working Group on Housing and Community Services as Peacebuilding tool [http://www.epcc.ottawa.on.ca/shehousing-e.html](http://www.epcc.ottawa.on.ca/shehousing-e.html)
may have been engaged in destroying each other's homes and families, and that who is served first is a matter of great symbolic as well as practical import;

The economic potential of housing and community services construction as a source of renewal, given the many local enterprises, which can become involved.

The potential for housing and community services construction and renovation projects to act as a catalyst for reconciliation and co-operative action on other practical questions which can serve to rebuild trust.

The potential for the specific solutions to current and future housing and community services needs to overcome problems of the past, whether economic, environmental, design, social, etc., and for innovations to leap over previous technologies and processes.

In the next chapter, the author studies the reconstruction of the human settlement in more details.

2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The above discussion provided a review of different issues of post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Research in this field with its concomitant writing has expanded rapidly through the last decade of the twentieth century to the present. The proliferation of material suggested the difficulties of supplying a comprehensive review. The great amount of documents or reports did not preclude debate about what is an appropriate theory and practice for post-war reconstruction. The chapter argued for the dire need for an accepted model designed both to be flexible enough to embrace different situations and focused enough to demand the respect of key actors.

Despite the evident complications the author specifies and endorses certain priorities in post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction

- Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process. However, no peace is perfect. Violence can not be completely eradicated.

- Conflict resolution means ending conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or 'settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem.

- The ingredients of lasting peace process include ripeness for peace, third party intervention, just agreement provision and fostering post-settlement recovery.
• The peacebuilding and reconstruction relationship is a symbiotic one. A proper development can not take place without lasting peace, peace can never be sustained without proper reconstruction and long term development.

• Post conflict reconstruction calls for a special approach emphasising integrative strategies, political development and rapid and flexible action. It must be dealt with as a long-term development challenge, planned and implemented in a manner to encourage the peace building.

• In ensuring co-ordination amongst a diverse spectrum of internal and external actors, the confidence and peacebuilding efforts will be further strengthened.

• The local community is the primary resource for reconstruction. It is crucial to work with the community and not for it. People need to be helped to help themselves. Programmes have to be geared up to the REAL NEEDS and PRIORITIES of the community. This requires major changes in attitudes and methods of working with the community. The community must have the sense of ownership and responsibility towards the projects, as the only way of ensuring true sustainability and initial self-reliance. One way of fostering this is by the community contributing to the project. (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995:89)

• A united government together with local actors is fully in charge of making policies and setting national priorities that can lead to a sound reconstruction and development strategy with minimum interference but maximum support from the international community. (Fischer, 1995:58)

• The support and assistance external actors give to societies emerging from conflict is important, though not determinant, and present forms of assistance are often ineffective, inappropriate, and can be harmful (Stiefel, 1999:19). The main donors’ task is to enhance the local capacities. The quality of post conflict assistance is more important than its quantity.

• International community must avoiding doing harm by employing measures to ensure that aid is helping to sustain peace. The chapter reviews measures to include: timing, tracking the aid delivery, assessing the impact of aid and delegating responsibilities to domestic actors.

It has been suggested that a framework of a successful post conflict reconstruction process is seen as a triangle with three major elements a physical, economic and social rebuilding. The next chapter highlights issues of post conflict reconstruction of human settlement.
Chapter Three
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION

The first chapter explained how the Israeli occupation has caused deterioration of the Palestinian human settlements. The second provided an understanding of how reconstruction alongside other factors could be a tool to achieve sustainable peace. It showed the strong interrelationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction. In this chapter, the author continues the literature survey. He reviews policies for post-conflict reconstruction of human settlement. This includes studying a framework of reconstruction. It presents reconstruction as process, receiving input, producing outputs, facing challenges and building on available opportunities. In the second part of the chapter, the author addresses the issue of human settlement construction.

The case of many urban communities in the Third World reveals urgency to the struggle for adequate shelter. UNCHS (1995:6) reported that challenges facing the developing world include the growth of sub-standard housing, inadequate employment opportunities and infrastructure, mounting poverty and a widening gap between rich and poor. Half of the world's population lives in slums of some kind, one hundred million are utterly homeless, between thirty and fifty per cent lack access to basic drinking water and sanitation facilities (Devas and Rakodi, 1993:11).

1 In this chapter, the author narrows the literature to tackle the issue of reconstruction of human settlement. A list of books, articles and Internet documents was consulted. These include (Abrams, 1964), (Acioly, 1995), (Al-Zubaidi, 1989), (Amirahmadi, 1992); (Arinah, 1997), (Awotona et al., 1995); (Barakat, 1993); (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995); (Barcello, 1998); (Beard, 1991); (Brown et al., 1992), (Burgess, 1994); (Mathey, 1994); (Burgess et al., 1982); (Carbonnier, 1998); (Chambers, 1993); (Cobett, 1999); (Davis, 1989); (Davies, 1994); (Devas and Rakodi, 1993); (Devas and Rakodi (eds.), 1993); (Dobson, 1997); (UNCHS, 1995); (Hamdi, 1997, 1995, 1995a), (Harroday, ); (Hundsalz, 1994), (King, 1997); (Kumar, 1997); (Lake et al., 1990); (Lim, 1983); (Logan, 1998), (Lybe, 1992), (Mathey, 1992), (MIT web site, 2000); (Olsenberg, 2000) (OECD, 1997:11), (Koengisberger, 1964, 1986); (Overseas Development Institute, 1997); (Patricia, 1997); (Pugh, 1998); (Rakodi and Devas (eds.), 1993); (Rondinelli, 1986); (Saebi, 1991); (Schaffer, 1982); (Shengs, 1995); (Stiefel, 1998); (UNCHS, 1995); (USAID, 1996); (The World Bank, 1993), (1998); (Tipple, 1994); (Turner, 1986); (UNCHS, 1987, 1989, 1996, 1995, 1997); (UNCHS-ILO, 1995); (UNRISD, 1994); (Warah, 2000); (Whyte (ed.), 1995); (WSP, 1994, 1997)
Beginning by claiming a ground for the emergence of diverse theories, the author explores established reasons for the significance of the human settlement issues and assessing their impact on the socio-economic and socio-cultural situations. This introductory analysis is followed by the recognition that since the Second World War two major schools of thought providing solutions for human settlements' problems could be distinguished. First, a so-called Orthodox approach held sway. Second, after about 1970 an Alternative method became popular, also termed a Support Strategy. Broadly, the Orthodox school stressed state intervention to solve the massive shelter crisis that followed World War Two. Then after notable failures (particularly in the context of the developing world) a subsequent approach gained credence. The first section concludes with an evaluation of the two methods. The author generally claims that neither approach has been always successful.

Seeing the deficiencies apparent in each school of thought and perhaps in any theoretical bias, the second part of the chapter commences with a review of what policy options could exist within formulating a viable strategy. Options such as urban upgrading and local involvement to meet housing needs are proposed at this point, leading on to an analysis of what priorities need to underpin policy. Therefore, the next section undertakes a rigorous exploration of the priorities in any meaningful shelter strategy. In turn the relevance of different conditions are assessed in the search for a workable and flexible policy. The issue of moving a country from relief to reconstruction is worth starting with.

3.2 FROM RELIEF TO RECONSTRUCTION

Reviewing recovery literature shows the term 'transition' is both a common expression and carries a range of meanings. Since several disciplines are involved, varying interpretations have emerged. Much of the language of development treats the process as a sequence in the case of countries, from poorest to developing to developed; in the case of communities, from dependency to sustainability; in the case of agencies, from relief to reconstruction to development.

The World Bank's document on reconstruction (1998:3) referred to 'post-conflict' situations as "...transitions from war to peace." The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (1996) defined the concept of 'transition' as "...a rapid change from relief operations to reconstruction and sustainable development". Transition is more than the passage of time between war and peace. It implies retraining individuals in activities detached from the war, making society as a whole aware of the suffering of its members. Activities include attending to the specific needs of ex-combatants, of women and of children" (Smillie, 1999:7). Stages might not be chronological or mutually exclusive. They
Reconstruction of Human Settlements

vary with the scale of damage, level and the size of reconstruction, and the relevant society’s ability to cope with the responsibilities and to formulate strategies.

The first stage of recovery is emergency relief, which as OECD (1997:11) explained, involves immediate and short-term survival assistance for victims of violent conflict. The stage’s goal is to cope with the situation meeting people’s requirements. Overlapping with emergency is the restoration or recovery stage. The author of this thesis also makes the point that urgency precludes real planning; it must be prepared beforehand. The replacement stage’s goal is to return the community to a pre-conflict state: building permanent housing, resettling displaced persons, resuming public services, reviving industries and creating jobs. To achieve this work substantial comprehensive planning and massive resources are required. This is followed or accompanied by a fourth stage, developmental reconstruction, advancing the community beyond a pre-conflict level. This stage is very difficult in conflict-torn societies. Conflicts do not only destroy part of what exists; they prevent society from making new investments, from utilising production capacity and resources, and from developing skills and technical capabilities.

Smillie (1999:5) speculated how the random movement from one stage to another may undermine the whole process of recovery. Overseas Development Institute (1997:10) admitted, “The premature phasing out of relief rations before compensating development opportunities are provided” happen as a result of misunderstanding. Pugh (1998) alluded to Bosnia, describing it as in “...limbo because it is not part of the development issue - it is not a developing country. It is in transition from aid to something else.”

Linking Stages

Pugh (1998) observed that the international community has set out principles and guidelines for best practices to overcome contradictions and integrate stages in a coherent strategy. Several commentators pointed out that stages of recovery should be linked. A plan to connect these stages might reduce mismanagement. The author finds that the standard approach of a linear link between relief and development dominates the literature with both seen as distinct and sequential types of actions. See Figure (3.1)

Stiefel (1994:17) explained transition to imply a linear progression from acute conflict to peace, to post-conflict rehabilitation and long-term development. The concept is based on the notion that at each distinct stage, a specialised body or organisation would tackle the job and then pass on responsibility through a discrete and phased programming. As an image of a continuum, it offers a simple organising shape for chronic emergencies. It fails however;
to provide any understanding of how relief and development agencies should act or interact. Commenting on the approach Smillie (1999:13) illustrated that the concept was discredited for positing a linear progression from one stage to another. At each of the stages, there were supposedly specialist agencies that would take and then pass on responsibility for those in need of assistance, as though they were on a conveyer belt that would move them from one operation to the next. This approach, in fact, had long been standard practice in the response to natural disasters: emergency, reconstruction, then back to normal.

Complex rebuilding cannot be the responsibility of one body. UNDP (1995) acknowledged the fact that "No single organisation can aspire to deal on its own with the social and economic devastation of a country... multilateral and bilateral agencies, governmental and non-governmental, all have a role to play and all bring their specific contributions to the whole [but] it is only in the aggregate that full logic of a country’s situation can be addressed."

It could be argued that that continuum is the concept moving from relief to rehabilitation, a development increasingly questionable as a method for analysis. Stieffel (1994:17) argued that the concept in the case of conflict is "...inappropriate and operationally misleading." Carbonnier (1998) claimed "...many contemporary conflicts do not follow any set chronological pattern." The literature contains studies highlighting that relief, development, economic and politico-military actions are often simultaneous processes. Formal peace agreements do not ensure a gradual return to normality as a fragile peace can be disrupted by recurrent violence. King (1997:19-23) pointed out that there is little agreement on the point at which conflict definitely ends. Smillie (1999:6) insisted the
dividing line between pre-conflict, war and post-conflict situations is ambiguous and should not serve as a criterion.

In searching for alternatives, other phrases have become popular. USAID (1996) developed principles and operating guidelines, stressing the need to identify and address the root causes of vulnerabilities, to build on local capacities and to support rather than displace indigenous attempts to recover. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) studies (1997) suggested that the idea of a ‘continuum’ should perhaps be replaced by ‘contiguity’ to reflect the dynamic aspects of relief and development. The word ‘contiguity’ still suggests adjacent rather than integrated approaches.

Integrating various activities to build a sustainable development appears a logical approach. Smillie (1999:10) argued that integrated frameworks should make it easier to define optimal policy responses (representing optimal policy mixes) for challenges faced in the rebuilding process. But policy mixes are not easily replaced, as they are situation- and context- specific. He added that the integration of activities happens more naturally and becomes more realistic and do-able the closer decisions are to the field. Local actors, for example, tend to integrate relief and development activities more naturally than national actors, who in turn do so more easily and naturally than external actors do. The World Bank (1998:3) acknowledged these facts “Since the Bank does not normally work in areas of violent conflict, the distinction between one ‘phase’ and another is important. Linkages can and must be made for sustained reconstruction and development to avoid recurrent relief.”

Contiguity has come to play a prominent role in linking recovery stages. The notion of combining the two terms into ‘developmental relief’, though often restricted to small-scale examples, is not new as the literature shows. There is a close relationship between physical recovery and economic regeneration programmes that should not only present quantitative objectives, but other goals such as building confidence and trust between warring factions. The concept ‘recovery’ is often limited to a technical perspective. A wide range of issues from political to social, cultural and financial should be considered to ensure success. Interaction sustains benefits gained though physical and economic programmes.

3.3. RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES

Barakat (1993); Stiefel (1999) and WSP (1994) recognised that no blueprints exist for post-conflict reconstruction. WSP stated:

While objectives, ‘technical’ challenges and problems are similar in post-conflict situations, the political context and configuration of actors, quality and nature of relations between actors and institutions are unique...guidelines relating to priorities and methods of approach can be formulated.
Stiefel (1999:15) accepted that different societies face similar problems when emerging from conflict. He (1999:4) noted transferring successful policies to a new situation is impossible, but learning from past successes and failures is feasible. Amirahmadi (1992) posited that formulating an overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy gives rise to fierce debate, as such a strategy must satisfy and cut across ideologies, social groups, time periods and cultures. He assumed that the chosen strategy depends on the nature of the conflict itself and the extent of damage. Thus, Amirahmadi claimed that each nation must fashion its own national reconstruction strategy. Barakat (1993) defined a generic reconstruction strategy as:

That body of knowledge which helps determine the most important tasks that have to be implemented at each stage of reconstruction, the type and amount of resources needs, and the location of reconstruction projects. A strategy involves defining goals and objectives; setting priorities and targets making plans or facilitating market mechanisms and formulating polices for implementation.

For a country emerging from prolonged conflict a reconstruction plan differs from one employed in normal, stable circumstances. Amirahmadi (1992) pointed out: “A reconstruction and development plan is distinguished... by its mode of formulation which would require greater use of rapid techniques of project and damages appraisal and analysis, best statistical techniques”.

A strategy, UN (1995) indicated, helps a country’s resources to be managed in a consistent and succinct manner; the best way to estimate available resources (human, financial and other) necessary to attain objectives. The same document held that a plan acts as a ‘kick-start’ for long-term rebuilding: an operational instrument for organising and presenting development-related programmes and projects within a coherent planning and national framework. For instance, The World Bank (1993:4) emergency assistance programme for the Palestinian Territories, was designed to:

Emphasise short gestation, rehabilitation and maintenance activities that make better use of existing infrastructure; support temporary works programmes to help alleviate immediate poverty and unemployment measures; concentrate efforts where living standards are especially low as it would be necessary to supplement local capacity, make use of local capacity for programme implementation, including the UN system, non governmental organisation, universities and research institutions, institute mechanisms for efficient and transparent procurement, accounting, monitoring and reporting to ensure effective use of funds, ensure sufficient flexibility to incorporate changes dictated by the unfolding peace negotiations, actual experience with implementation, and the results of the various feasibility studies, and technical analysis.
In contrast, the literature contains material disputing the value of strategic planning. Some authors allege countries emerging from prolonged conflict are incapable of producing a manageable plan. They indicate that post conflict countries usually suffer from unbearable poverty and limitation of resources especially human. Under such circumstances, a strategic plan has little hope of success. These states often lack the tools and means for implementation. Critics of the strategic plan cite examples of failure in communist countries over the last century. However, the author is convinced in all cases, countries need a vision to manage their development and reconstruction activities. Reacting to opponents who claim a plan is too rigid, Amirahmadi (1992) emphasised that a strategy must be versatile and flexible, broad enough to be used by different sectors and levels of political administration; able to accommodate the changing mix of problems arising. Arguably, a plan is most necessary for a country embarking on the formidable task of reconstruction.

DDSMS (1995:100) showed the need for planning, claiming it is essential for post-conflict countries because:

- It provides basic elements for formalising a vision of the future.
- Opportunities for rapid assessment of the post-conflict situation and the possible options.
- A step to strengthen direction and control by government, lost through the enormity of immediate problems, destruction of essential institutions.
- Gives a clearer vision of the future for government and donor community through a strategic statement of purpose.
- It is a tool for co-ordination of interventions from international community organisations. Without this mechanism there is a potential for duplication of effort and contradictory support and advice. With a plan the chance of confusion is reduced.

Amirahmadi (1992) in support argued that it must meet the needs of each socio-economic group, focusing resources on urgent problems. The strategy must also strike a balance between competing demands for the immediate relief and the need to invest in activities that will eventually restore the country's long-term economic base. In the post-conflict atmosphere of economic austerity, many forces compete for scarce resources, and governments can be drawn into wasteful social projects that are attractive on political grounds. Therefore, Stiefel (1999:19) stressed that the state's role is to set priorities and drawing on rebuilding goals, objectives and visions. Even if complete success can not be attained, this is just what a strategic plan can offer: a target and an inspiration.
3.3.1 Priorities

Amirahmadi (1992) contended: “Defining priorities for reconstruction [has] became a fulcrum for partisan debate and political contest”. After hostilities, setting an agenda is most important and difficult. A multiplicity of problems and challenges requires urgent action. Problems are interrelated, and challenges and mandates may call for actions that clash with the efforts of other agents or with the longer-term objectives of development. A prioritised and phased programme is the viable option. The immediate basic needs must be distinguished from the less immediate or medium term and longer term requirements. From this perspective, DDSMS (1995:97) commented that priorities must be based on ‘weighing’ challenges and problems, assessing their potential to reinforce conflict or advance the peace process. War-affected governments must agree on priorities, each reflected in the strategic plan, implying that it can be regularly redesigned, pliant enough to respond to changing circumstances. Acceptance of a strategic plan can depend on whether or not it is amenable to change.

Amirahmadi (1992) concluded a strategy for reconstruction should contain a prioritised action programme, to address all critical physical, human, and institutional factors. Presenting an example, Brown et al. (1992:195) argued that priority should be given to restoring the state sector's technocratic capacities. The public sector should be supported to enhance its capacity to intervene in the provision of services as well as in the strengthening and regulating of markets. Ball and Hallevy (1996:35) asserted preference should be given to (1) rehabilitate the state apparatus, security system and public services - education and health; (2) restore physical infrastructure and productive assets; (3) reintegrate refugees and returnees; and (4) clear mines. Other analysts claim political stability should be favoured over other objectives, as economic rebuilding efforts would be automatically impaired if war re-started. It is essential to assess how standard economic recipes apply to post conflict settings, evaluating their interaction with peace-building and reconstruction agendas.

The author recognises how priorities tend to follow the ruling party’s ideology. The Iranian context, in the wake of the Iraqi Iranian war, demonstrates ideological influence on a strategic plan. Amirahmadi (1992) described that under the conservative government, different political groups sought to highlight their social and economic agendas. Debate centred on four issues: (1) rebuilding the military; (2) reinvigorating the national economy; (3) promoting the economic well being of the poor. and (4) reconstructing conflict-damaged areas. The Iranian author claims “Only the most radical faction of the government was concerned with equity and social justice”. Conservative and pragmatist factions believed
that economic growth and efficiency should guide reconstruction, and these views came to dominate official policy.

3.3.2 Challenges

Stiefel (1998:12) recognised the fact that the challenges of post-conflict rebuilding are infinitely more difficult and complex than generally known. Case studies reveal that the reconstruction process faces obstacles. Lack of knowledge and understanding of the process, time, financial resources and political situation: each can represent a stumbling block. Planners need to address how to overcome these obstacles.
Knowledge and Information

Literature shows that understanding, coherence and balance is required virtually in every element of reconstruction and development. USAID (1996) acknowledged that lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context of the country might undermine the effectiveness of the intervention. The legacy of conflict means large proportions of the population lack the skills to build a nation. Pugh (1998) realised that conflict disrupts or destroys existing social patterns of decision-making. He added this to other impacts, such as injury, psychological disorientation and displacement that diminishes the capacity of communities to participate in rehabilitation and deprive people, temporarily perhaps, of an organised voice. As Ball and Hallevy (1996:25) put it: “Conflict drains communities of leadership and human resources and inhibits the resistance of individuals to the pull of suspicion, division, and chauvinism.”

The result, Smillie (1999:37) claimed, would be that “…inappropriate management, career incentives and a lack of meaningful evaluation all work to impede reconstruction”.

Whyte (1995:169) claimed there is no quick and easy solution. He set out how the process could take years, if not decades, to achieve a reasonable solution for the problem. Another major challenge in this regard is the very few who happen to be educated or professionals are not attracted to work in the public service. This is sometimes due to the weakness of the financial incentive. Others do not wish to be in public life on the government’s side. Whyte mentioned South Africa where his investigations revealed it suffered from a scarcity of trained human resources. No qualified cadres are available from the black majority. He noted that the few-trained people gravitate to the private sector. Training and education systems need overhauling to provide required talents and bolster local skills, leaving the less needy to rely on outsiders.

Smillie (1999:30) clarified; knowledge is not the same as information. While both may be in short supply, much greater emphasis has been placed on the latter consequently leading to formulaic applications of irrelevant data. Information is an important factor bearing upon the question of efficiency. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (1994:5) stressed: “Effective rebuilding can only occur on the basis of adequate information both about the causes and effects of war, and about existing local capacities.” When there is insufficient or asymmetrical information, it is difficult for government decision-makers to predict the consequences of their decisions, and serious efficiency losses can follow. Disparities between a decision maker’s ideas about effects and the actual impact of a decision are likely to be much greater in post conflict countries. Discrepancies may be reduced to some extent by having decision makers closer to where
the action is', through the creation of (at least partially) autonomous centres of decision making functioning independently of central authority. Schaffer (1982) saw local participation in planning and decision making as a way to counteract lack of information.

Knowledge and information are intimately connected; but in post conflict situations, little time is available for learning. Not knowing when to act can lead to paralysis, as there are no previous examples known to draw on for inspiration. Therefore, time is a very crucial factor.

**Timing and Speed**

WSP (1994) stated that the advent of peace brings high public expectations, sharply contrasting with the government's capacity to deliver in a short time. Smillie (1999:41) recognised that the long-term schedule needed to achieve recovery programmes represents a considerable obstacle. Extensive time is required to rebuild institutions, revive the rule of law, and good governance; even more to break through the authoritarian and unforgiving nature of some regimes. He stressed: “Getting the timing right knowing when to start recovery, when to modify the approach, and when to move from one stage to another is essential for conflict resolution, reconstruction, and development”. It is important to know when, and how to move from basic relief to activities with developmental objectives.

Amirahmadi (1990: 268) refined the argument asserting reconstruction should be defined, planned, and implemented in stages. Further, he argued that fast reconstruction is seen as vital in capturing political will and public enthusiasm - critical for the allocation of decreasing resources. He continued, it is necessary for reconstruction to keep pace with the speed of people returning to their settlements. Barakat (1993:105) quoted Beard (1991:83) who stated “Every day that passes without sharp decision makes the task of ... planning more difficult”. However, Barakat and Hoffman (1995) argued gradual reconstruction allows more space for local people to participate and most importantly, it helps in developing much needed local skills. UNRISD (1994) emphasised that it is better to take the time needed to plan properly in order to avoid projects that are duplicative, unnecessary, or counterproductive. Often availability of finance is key in decisions about time-scale, whether to hurry or delay recovery. Moving with inappropriate haste from one phase to the next, within continuum programmes, can cause delays later.
Finance and Funding

Barakat (1993:83) argued that one of the challenges is the intensification and acceleration of economic tendencies operative during the conflict. Barakat explained these tendencies to include the government's approach to provide people with direct contributions in cash and food, etc. Stewart et al (1997) pointed out the problem is more aggravated where tax collection capacity is lost (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia). Government expenditure on the other hand tends to rise as a proportion of GDP chiefly through the drain of the war effort. Consequently, as Carbonnier (1998) claimed budget deficit increases, as reported for all countries where data is available. Collapse of public and private institutions aggravate the deficit accompanied by the dispersal of skilled labour, either mobilised for the war or fleeing abroad.

Barakat and Hoffman (1995:83) pointed out that the state of post-conflict economy is dependent on a number of factors (1) pre-conflict economic conditions; (2) the extent of damage to economic installation and the degree of opportunity and productivity losses; (3) the potential for revival of the economy; (4) the availability of national and international resources; (5) the degree of adaptation needed as a result of population displacement; mortality and occupation of territories. It is believed that a peace settlement reduces military expenditure, but increases spending for urgent reconstruction requirements and the restoration of health and education services. There is thus a pressing need to both raise funds and contain budget deficit. Barakat (1993:84) argued that the economic challenges could be overcome over two stages: (1) bottleneck removing stage; and (2) capacity utilisation stage.
Amirahmadi indicated that the first bottlenecks needing to be removed are shortage of foreign exchange and shortage of skilled labour force.

Stewart et al (1997:10) revealed that in several countries, governments could maintain their capacity to spend on the basic social services such as the education and the health. The share of investment in total public expenditure tends to fall in countries at conflict. This happens to a greater extent than in other developing countries implementing expenditure-cutting measures under stabilisation policies. As far as the allocation of government resources is concerned, empirical surveys of war economies show that, as expected, the share of military expenditure tends to increase (Barakat, 1993)

Literature shows efforts to set guidelines to overcome the problem. FitzGerald (1997:54) argued governments may increasingly resort to indirect taxation (e.g. taxes on gasoline and/or electricity, import duty on non-essential consumer goods) and user fees for public goods and services (e.g. transportation and health services). Carbonnier (1998) stressed that this option must be assessed on a case-by-case basis that are often politically costly for the government, and may revive inflation. Besides, indirect taxation may lead to a more regressive tax system and widen gaps between the rich and poor. However, he argued that sometimes it represents the only short-term solution as increasing direct tax collection in the short run might not be realistic in post-conflict countries often accustomed to major tax evasion and lacking efficient tax administration.

Based on various arguments, Barakat (1993) suggested the activation of building material industry exercises a central role in the economy. "This helps to generate income, stimulate people to improve their own environments and encourage the young people to enter technical vocation". Politics contributes to overcoming or duplicating the challenge of the economy.

**Politics and Ideology**

Positively or negatively politics affects post conflict reconstruction. WSP (1997) recognised the fact that "Post-war societies tend to be unstable, politically volatile and politicised. Amirahmadi (1992) noted that even recovery "...tends to become politicised". Barakat (1993:75) argued that during conflict as well as in its direct aftermath, politics tends to take precedence over decision making. Actors affect the structure and balance of power. Politics plays a crucial role in understanding the rationale and behaviour of capital and investors, consumers, etc. Simultaneously peace both places demands on resources and increases public expectations. Shortages that occur generate societal tension and intensify pressure on the state to implement immediate corrective measures.
Barakat and Hoffman (1995:82) described the interaction between reconstruction and politics as follows: first, politics is affected by the conflict between raised expectation on behalf of the affected communities and inability of the state to deliver. Second, it is shaped by delays in taking political decisions that are crucial for reconstruction and are closely connected to economic and military restructuring. Third, reinforcement of the ideology and politics of the ruling party characterises the political dimension. As Stiefel (1999) pointed out “In such a context no problem, solution or policy can ever be purely technical, inevitably they will have an impact or be perceived in terms of relationships and power.” In different war-torn countries, the ruling party tends to undertake a programme of physical reconstruction aiming to promote the party’s interests alienating other groups. In Hanoi’s case after the American-Vietnamese war, according to Logan (1998), socialist ideology contributed to poor standards of reconstruction. Almost thirty years after the war’s end, the Vietnamese Government still struggles to balance its ideology in terms of economics and urban development with a relatively open minded search for best value and practice. A holistic approach is needed; Lake et al. (1990) and Kumar (1997) stressed the importance of a coherent and integrated approach between politics, recovery and the peace process.

General agreement exists about the need to resolve prevailing crises, but political chaos can prevent specific measures from being implemented. Logan (1998) indicated that a planning vision is a prerequisite, yet inevitably it is linked with the political context in which reconstruction is occurring. He cited the work in Hanoi that represented an example of political, social and ideological reconstruction. He concluded that a narrow approach based on a rigid universalised ideology is best avoided.

3.3.3 Input

The literature shows that resource mobilisation is a principal step. “This is a decisive element in formulating a reconstruction strategy”. Barakat and Hoffman (1995:76) argued. They contend resources should be mobilised based on studies and plans; unskilful mobilisation has often led to delays. Amirahmadi (1992) described resources as the input to the reconstruction machine. He identified input resources as human, material, financial and technical. To Barakat (1993), these evolve through three stages: identification, mobilisation and utilisation. He added resources have to be recognised in terms of inter-institutional quality, co-operation and co-ordination, skilled workforce, training institutes, dynamic and modern sectors and their amount and to what degree each is available.

Anderson (1998) revealed the importance of mobilising local capacities and indigenous resources to establish a healthy society capable of coping with the heavy
developmental process. Existing and potential resources for reconstruction and cleanups must be quickly identified and mobilised. Indigenous resources must be distinguished from external ones; the latter weighed in terms of their potential to cause dependence, unwanted control of, or uneven, development. After specifying and analysing, resources are mobilised. Anderson (1998) argued that mobilisation depends on government action, but is augmented through utilisation of grass root organisations: self-help projects, women's groups, cooperatives for training people and providing materials for rebuilding. Once more, we may see the value of an overall vision or aim which appeals to the community as a whole, a strategy which goes beyond the involvement of just one sector of society.

3.3.4 Output

In addition to principles of prioritisation, a reconstruction strategy should incorporate explicit short and long-term output. To ensure success, goals must be translated into well-thought-out objectives that realistically consider society's resources, expectations, constraints and capabilities. After assessment, a hierarchy of goals must be formed, based on a set of national priorities. Kumar (1997:33) argued that rebuilding efforts must end with: (1) restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, basic social services and government functions; (2) structural reform in political, economic, social, and security sectors; (3) institution-building. A UN report illustrates there is a need for a consensus on the recovery outputs that should encompass, restoration of human habitability, reconstruction of the economy, rebuilding of national defence and the correction of social imbalances caused by conflict.

The World Bank (1998:6) stated: “Post-conflict reconstruction has two overall objectives”, first to facilitate transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased; second to support economic and social development. To a large extent, reconstruction relies on the success of this transition, on rebuilding of domestic economy and restoring of access to external resources. The Bank (1998:12) listed objectives necessary for a country to leave the transitional period’s chaos behind and move forward on to the development track. The World Bank assumes the following as output of a recovery process:

- Jump-starting the economy through investment in essential productive sectors; creating conditions for resumption of trade, savings and domestic and foreign investment, and promoting macro-economic stabilisation, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and restoring a legal and regulatory framework.

- Re-establishing governance by strengthening state institutions, restoring law and order, enabling organisations of civil society to work effectively.
Rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, financing education and health.

Targeting assistance to those affected by war through reintegration of displaced populations, de-mobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, revitalisation of the local communities most disrupted through such means as credit lines to subsistence agriculture and micro-enterprises, and support for vulnerable groups such as female headed households.

Supporting de-mining programmes (producing mining surveys), where relevant; de-mining the infrastructure as part of comprehensive development strategies for supporting a return to normal life in mine-polluted areas.

Normalising financial arrangements, planning a ‘workout’ of arrears, debt rescheduling, and longer-term path to financial stability.

Having reviewed approaches to post-conflict reconstruction, the author chooses to focus on the case of human settlement reconstruction due to its comprehensiveness and multi-faceted nature. Rebuilding of human settlements involve social, cultural, economic and political recovery.

3.4 RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT

Shelter becomes defined as more than just the structure in which people live, as living conditions encompass more than the conditions in the shelter itself. UNCHS (1987:5) referred the term

To all those components of the physical environment with which an individual or a community comes into contact and which are used on a regular basis for the whole range of human activities, the individual dwelling and its related services, the dwellings’ immediate surroundings, community facilities, transportation and communication networks, and so on.

UNCHS (1997:6) defined ‘adequate shelter’ as “Physical shelter plus related services and infrastructure, including inputs (land, finance, etc.) required to produce and maintain it”.

The above definitions show the comprehensiveness and holistic nature of the topic. Significance of the human settlement issue was further underlined when convening parties in the Habitat conference (1996) report that the human settlement activities contribute to generate economic development and social, cultural spiritual and scientific advancement. A holistic approach to human settlement development and management has emerged: an approach not limited to technical issues. Shelters in both urban and rural communities are essential to rebuilding societies and trust in country institutions. Since the Habitat Declaration (1976 in the Vancouver Conference), human settlement reconstruction has been perceived as bound up with wider issues. Human settlement policy ‘...can only be effective..."
when it is integrated into a wider development policy framework, which can ensure coherence between different levels, sectors and instruments”\textsuperscript{2}. Policy-makers link issues of human settlement to economic, social policy, culture and the less tangible considerations of urban living such as safety and tolerance (UNDP: 1996)\textsuperscript{3}.

As shown above, reconstruction is supposed to contribute to macroeconomics objectives. It is argued that reconstruction is an appropriate kick-start that could lead to all other aspects of post-conflict recovery. Reconstruction of human settlements contributes much to well-being, confidence and security; the ways in which reconstruction is approached have an impact over development goals. Shelter construction can influence environmental sustainability and the mitigation of expected natural and man-made disasters. The design of shelter projects both reflects and protects something important about culture and religious beliefs. UNCHS (1996b: 7) claims, through improving productivity and transport networks, construction of human settlements adds to the nation’s wealth. Reversing the emphasis, UNCHS-ILO (1995) saw construction as a prime productive asset and store of wealth. It can expand job opportunities and incomes, if encouraged by a policy framework.

From social policy’s viewpoint, decisions over human settlement reconstruction can have far-reaching impact on wider goals such as equal access to social services for deprived groups (UNCHS: 1995). The World Bank (1993) mentioned that relationships are reciprocal where inadequate shelter and unequal access reinforce discrimination based on social characteristics. On the hand, by providing services (maintenance and financing of basic services: health, education, water, and sanitation) the state meets different needs, ensuring no group is denied affordable access. In dispute, settlements that are characterised by misery are potentials for violence, insecurity and alienation. In the case of post-conflict communities, this raises the probability of peacebuilding failure. Such conflicting views highlight the importance of the phrase ‘adequate shelter’ in the chapter’s subsequent argument.

As shown in the last chapter, reconstruction can play a role to revive communities. By adopting a right policy, this contributes to the ability of different groups to play a full part in the rebuilding process and to ensure that their distinctive needs are met. Commentators point out that a policy must include all the community groups, particularly deprived groups, and must ensure that special measures are taken to promote their participation in the fruits of the peace-buildings activities.

\textsuperscript{2} UNCHS http://www.unchs.org/unchs/english/shelter.html
Confirming the issue's significance, debates on human rights generate claims that securing adequate shelter is imperative. A community's contextual details must not be dismissed. Nevertheless, often a far-reaching moral and political vision breaks down barriers to action and change. Without this, policy tends to have little chance of success.

Culture and human security goals (such as safety, good technical design, provision of various facilities) must be taken in consideration when adopting a policy. A policy must tolerate diversity and respect the cultures of the ruined communities. If these dimensions are not integrated into settlement planning and management, success in one sphere of urban living could result in failure in others.

3.4.1 Human Settlements Policies

A country emerging from prolonged conflict has to prioritise actions to meet the population need for adequate shelter. Despite a notable increased awareness of the issue of post-conflict housing, it is believed that there is a paucity of materials, which can give absolute solutions. The author finds it imperative to examine the issues in different context but with common circumstances. This ensures understanding of which model works properly, which sectors can lead the process, to name two contingencies. Western, Second World War policies favoured heavy intervention by central authorities in development planning (Koenigsberger, 1987). Hamdi (1997:405) stated that later inappropriate application of these Western-planning methods is a key factor underlying the poor performance of the policies in the developing world. Not surprisingly, at present some built environment professionals warn against the uncritical adoption of a further set of generalised models and approaches to urban challenges, this time developed primarily by international agencies working in the Third World.

Wakely (1987:25) indicated that by the time developing countries realised that the post-war solution - large-scale government construction programmes - was unfeasible, they had no resources left for shelter needs. After that policy had proved a failure, a dramatic shift away from the post-war approach occurred. Nowadays, the swing toward a new synthesis of public sector, private sector, and NGOs and Community Based Organisations recognises the limitations of both centralised state planning and neo-liberal economics (Burgess, 1992:76). Burgess advocated a policy combining settlement approaches and development paradigms. UNCHS (1996) argued that policies have “… moved from blueprint or top-down to process or bottom-up approaches to planning and management, which focus on learning by doing and which prioritise greater participation by a broader range of social groups in decision
making and the processes of governance. Effective governance is now acknowledged to be the central issue in development planning and management."

Hamdi (1997:406) in support asserted that thoughts on human settlement have polarised into two schools, indicating changes in development theory. He named the two schools, providers and supporters. The first, the Orthodox School, promotes government as effective principal providers of shelter. The second, Alternative School, recognises NGOs and small informal private enterprises in shelter production. Under Hamdi’s category, one can adopt UNCHS phases for describing the shift in human settlement policy. UNCHS (1995) mentioned four phases to mark development over the last five decades.

- Phase one started in the aftermath of the Second World War and lasted during the 1960s and early 1970s. It was dominated by physical planning concern with little attention to social, economic and environmental links. Large-scale investment in public housing by governments was the norm, producing shelter such as tower blocks that few people wanted to live in: the most expensive and least efficient use of scarce resources.

- Phase two: from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s saw the beginnings of a more market-oriented approach to human settlements with greater attention paid to popular participation, self-help models on a project by project basis. This was much more successful than phase one, but was unsustainable and far too limited in reach and scale.

- Phase three: prevailed from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s refocusing again on creating a supportive legal, financial and regulatory framework for the development of human settlements with a greater role for the private sector and poor people themselves, with close ties to macroeconomics policy.

- Phase four (the present day) continues the emphasis on enabling strategies but places sustainable development, human security and urban governance at the centre of planning and management.

Below different categorisations are surveyed to isolate common characters of these policies.

3.4.2 The Providers School

Koenigsberger (1987:15) specified, by the end of the Second World War, politicians and experts were impressed by dramatic reduction in the cost of motorcars through mass manufacturing methods. It was obvious: model mass production of needed shelters on a similar principle. The method was tried successfully in the United Kingdom for producing emergency shelters immediately after the war. Reduction of construction time was more important than cost reductions. This formula was misapplied in less developed countries where mass production and prefabrication methods were tried out with little success. Western prefabrication methods had been designed to save labour and they did this
successfully. In the third world, labour was cheap. Reducing construction time would prove to be an inadequate reason for investment in the new methods.

The provider school was apparent in the public housing (Wakely, 1987). Wakely gave an imaginary picture of the approach by describing it as ministries staffed by engineers, architects, accountants and managers seeing their responsibility as designing and producing permanent dwellings. These designers and producers saw little need to contact directly the users of their products. Wakely continued to say: it represents a careful balance of technical feasibility, building and planning regulations to enable supply, quality and costs to be controlled. Priorities are set by the professional staff who may have recourse to some sample surveys of consumer demand but usually rely on their own beliefs of what people need or ought to have. Any real attempt at understanding immediate demands or longer term aspirations of households and communities, of classes or cultures different from their own, is very infrequent.

Claiming failure of the provider paradigm, Hamdi (1997:412) attributed the failure to the adherence to high standards of space, construction and utilities and thus prohibitively high costs of production. He argued that these policies direct resources away from other sector production, such as industry, making resources difficult to maintain and administer over the long term.

The government and its representatives usually can not complete the building process which lead as Hamdi claimed to their willingness to exercise controls and constraints on building activities of others in an attempt to achieve the same ends. However, in the case of completing projects with the required standards, UNCHS (1989:11) alleged that official housing standards placed resulting houses beyond the affordability of low-income target groups. Awotona et al (1995:3) argued that this kind of production falls largely into the range of middle income families who can afford to meet the expenses. Also Hamdi argued it demands large plant, sophisticated organisation, and large amounts of up-front capital and large markets to guarantee economies of scale. None of that is available in developing countries. Furthermore, a professional elite of international consultants, architects, planners and engineers dominate these processes whose livelihood is dependent on a flourishing housing industry.

Despite the failure of this approach in the eyes of the above commentators, it has been used and has worked reasonably well. Singapore as a third world country has been able to implement successful human settlement policies. It has been able to deliver a successful housing programme and is admired for producing low-cost, affordable housing en masse.
The Housing and Development Board built more than half a million units of public housing from 1960 to 1990. 85% of Singaporeans now live in public housing estates. An UNDP’s report (2000) acknowledged that “The contribution of the public housing programme to the well being of Singaporeans has been met. The quality of housing and living environment in Singapore has been favourably compared to the situation in other urban centres in Asia and beyond the region.”

The public housing sector is a substantial and dynamic contributor to the dynamics and growth of the national economy. The UNDP report mentions that this massive housing programme generated much-needed employment and economic activity during the early 1960s. The public housing programme has made a noticeable contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, and has provided employment to those in the construction industry as well as to those in related industries. For the average Singaporean, ownership of high-quality affordable public housing has probably been the single most palpable material benefit of the country’s rapid economic growth.

All public housing built is in the form of high-rise flats. There has been much criticism locally and internationally concerning the necessity and desirability of living in high-rise buildings (Lim, 1983). This generated criticism centres on the possible long-term psychological and social effects of high-rise living and the safety factors of congested and high-rise structures. UNDP attributes this shortcoming to the acute land shortage on the island and the need to maximise land utilisation. The author of the UNDP report concludes that in order to provide quality living conditions with as large a dwelling space as can be afforded, and given the high population density of Singapore, the housing units had to be high-rise.

To sum up, the UNDP report lists the key elements of the Singapore shelter policy. These include: a strong political commitment to public policy; financial commitment which comes in the form of loans and subsidies; legislative support which allows the government to acquire land cheaply and quickly and to exercise legal authority on matters related to public housing development and administration; and finally supportive government policies.

3.4.3 The Enablers School

Wally N'Dow, Assistant Secretary General of UNCHS contended: “If the United Nations is to be relevant in the new global society of the 21st century, it needs the active involvement of civil society. the very society that, in the final analysis, it was set up to

\[ UNDP (2000) \text{The Provision of Public Housing in Singapore} \]

http://www.undp.org/tedc/bestprac/socialcases/02-publichousing.htm
serve”. It is generally recognised that governments alone cannot bear the responsibility of providing housing, infrastructure and other basic services (Warah, 2000). In post-conflict countries, scarce public funds and traumatised populations are stretching capacity to deal with multifaceted human settlement problems. Warah held that the enablement provides a mechanism for resolving the ‘needs/demand gap’ in provision of basic services between what people need and can afford and what the market can provide. It also enables different sectors to gain access to each other’s skills and resources, providing a means for sharing risks and maximising returns on investment.

Hundsalz (1994:4) emphasised the importance of establishing a partnership as a key tool for the Support paradigm. While Awotona et al (1995:8) pointed out that through building partnerships between individuals and communities, local government, non-governmental organisations and community-based organisation, the private sector builds complementary and co-operative relationships. Generally partnerships require government or another agency to play a strong role in bringing parties together, and in facilitating the exploration of common ground and the scope for combined action. Hamdi (1997:413) cautioned that governments’ strategic interventions should be directed to improve the means by which hundreds gain access to land, eventual building materials, cheap credit, better utilities, larger markets and easier transportation.

Government invests to provide components rather than whole assemblies (Turner, 1987). “This is done by providing roads and transportation to open up land for settlement or by draining land, providing a water supply, an electricity supply or complementary social and community services and schools. Projects and programmes of these kinds cost less per capita served and generate usually far more investment. Governments’ and local authorities’ role is to support the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based groups” (Warah, 2000).

Outlining benefits Hamdi (1997:414) compared the two schools. He indicated that small building enterprises, collective rather than individual effort, user control and economic self-sufficiency…a fragmented rather than consolidated, building industry is better equipped to respond to market demands and more resilient to fluctuations in building activity as has been thought in the past. Instead of controlling quality’s standards, or normalising production processes, the more diversity built into the system in quality and cost, the greater likelihood that needs and budgets are met. Small builders with low overheads and very little physical plant can carry diverse workloads, more than usually at affordable costs.
Enablement Options:

Two influential options are site and services projects, and urban renewal and upgrading schemes. Sites and Services: Koenigsberger (1987:17) traced this approach back to the late 1960s considering the thought a major breakthrough. Sites and services projects represent a change in emphasis from either providers or supporters. The enabler approach is coupled with various self-help and ‘aided self-help’ programmes. It introduces a different vision of roles and costs involving people producing their own housing.

Government and international donors’ investments focus on delivering land services utilities and housing loans (Hamdi,1997:415). The public sector undertook to provide building plots, access roads, water and sewerage etc. and private building plots with access roads, water and construction of houses. In money terms, it was hoped public sector construction could be as low as one tenth of total expenditure. The limited public sector funds could thus produce up to 9 or 10 times more housing units than in cases of unilateral public sector housing projects. With self-help, construction methods assisted in providing an efficient impact (Hamdi, 1997:414). Projects’ effect on housing stock has been generally greater than anticipated, largely affordable and accessible to target populations. Socio-economically speaking, the schemes show a general record of success.

Nevertheless, projects encounter problems and produce unexpected results. Criticism has grown as site and service projects are completed and their impact measured. Most have experienced delays in implementation, materials and loan compensations not as successful as expected (Burgess, 1992:383). Support packages for small businesses have had problems. Two early projects encountered cost recovery difficulties. Architects and planners were worried by the emphasis on technically rational design and the use of coefficients as sole determinants. These projects lacked artistic sensibility.

Family labour has been less involved in the construction process than anticipated. These projects tend to fail to reach those most in need, unless governments continue to offer heavy subsidies for land and infrastructure: an unsustainable service. Programmes require high investment to create infrastructure. Demand lending agencies place a burden on government to recover their costs. The desire to see sites consolidated with permanent materials with standards set by municipal authorities also raises expenditure. Otto Koenigsberger (1987:30) noted

Site and service projects were not quite as successful as their sponsors had hoped. However large, they remained one-off projects and did not become part of a repeatable and repeated nation-wide policy. Because they were numerically insufficient, they did not radically affect the housing market. As long as there is
a severe housing shortage, not only among the poor, but also among middle income groups, many of cheap subsidised plots of the Site and Services projects did not reach the poor for whom they were intended and ended up in a financially stronger middle class market.

Urban Upgrading and Maximising the Local Involvement: Sites and service programmes differ from settlement upgrading projects and programmes (Turner, 1987). The latter deals with existing population, usually with some form of self-organisation and often with more than one claiming to represent the community. At the present time upgrading and local involvement have become the recognised priorities of housing policy. Over the last two decades many international organisations and national governments have analysed the limited successes of the project-oriented approaches of 1970s and 80s, particularly their cost recovery and reliability. Emphasis altered toward upgrading and local participation.

In recognition of these changes, agencies such as the World Bank and UNDP changed their lending policies. Instead of making large transfers of financial resources to project building, the World Bank directed its funds more toward the reform of policies and institutions, to public administration, to local banks and to providing technical assistance. It is more on the basis of effective user demand and less on [that of] preconceived notions of adequate housing. (Hamdi, 1997: 418).

The most recent stage is characterised by providing public and private housing finance, financial and regulatory reform to encourage private sector involvement. The World Bank funds and authorises the idea of upgrading. “It was agreed to use the underprivileged people's goodwill and managerial gifts to improve their houses and neighbourhoods” (Koenigsberger: 1986). In return, they were to be given security of tenure and a certain amount of public sector help with infrastructure construction. UNCHS and ILO (1995:132) look at upgrading in two ways:

- Upgrading of infrastructure in a settlement through government or other initiatives with house improvement schemes;

- Upgrading of the housing stock independent of service plans or projects distinguished from maintenance by the scale and likelihood of including extensions or even complete rebuilding of units.

‘Urban upgrading project’ as Massachusetts Institute of Technology website (2000) described in urban communities can mean many things 5. The upgrading at its simplest has come to mean a package of basic services. It customarily provides a package of improvements in streets, footpaths and drainage as well. Solid waste collection is frequently

included with its positive impact on health, along with streetlights for security and night activity. However, it is agreed that physical improvement is only the beginning. Upgrading programmes should address health issues need by providing clinics and health education programs, school facilities and teacher training are needed to attack the lack of basic education, and lastly programs are offered to increase income earning opportunities and the general economic health of a community.

Various authors review the advantages of this school. For example:

- Planning is reliant on local knowledge and skills in preparation and implementation “With preference for activities which are administration sparing rather than administration-intensive” (Chambers, 1993)

- The benefits are simply that people obtain an improved, healthy and secure living environment without being displaced. The investments they have already made to their properties remain and are enhanced. (MIT, 2000)

- Programmes are gradually enhanced through a series of small-scale additional projects coupled with strategic interventions. Appropriate technologies and local enterprises are promoted: enterprises that do not offer only materials, services and utilities from formal outlets, but supply themselves. Therefore, links are built up between large producers, small manufactures and between different kinds of technologies. (Hamdi, 1997)

- Turner (1987) attributed the approach’s success to the fact that the land and people are already there and the community usually has some form of organisation with which authorities can negotiate. As improvements are generally limited to public and community needs which the great majority of residents see as high priorities, projects gain more support and tend to be simpler and therefore, faster to implement and more cost effective. Work follows the acquisition of land and the organisation of the people, wherever the initiative originated.

- Costs of the upgrading projects can range from very low - affordable by all families - to very high requiring outside financing. In some areas the community took the initiative and provided free labour, which lowered the costs appreciably for both community and the city. (MIT: 2000).

- At the beginning rather than the end: meaning interventions rather than projects. Policy makers and consultants adopt a strategic role and act as catalysts, introducing the necessary methods and techniques, bringing experience from elsewhere, identifying further opportunities and possible courses of action, disseminating principles and removing barriers that hinder progress.

- Urban upgrading is dependent on building coalitions and fostering co-operation between government and non-government groups, agreement between often competing government departments, between expatriate or outside experts and local professional counterparts, and between community groups with sometimes differing vested interests, particularly early on in the programme preparation. (Hamdi, 1997)
Authors such as Hundsalz (1994: 6-8), Shengs (1995:3) and Tipple (1994:4-13) criticised the paradigm. The value of the approach in terms of its policy impact on the situation of disadvantaged people is disputed (Sheng, 1995:3). When governments liberalise policies without including safeguards to ensure shelter for the poor, their options do not improve substantially. They might end up being excluded from access to essential inputs, especially land and finance (Hundsalz, 1995:3). Sheng (1995:6-7) argued the private sector provides shelter for those able to afford it, where financially beneficial to the sector. It does not provide a viable solution for poor citizens.

The problem is greater than facilitating the sector through removing the obstacles (Sheng, 1994). The poorer social group’s lack of purchasing power remains an undeniable challenge. Acoily (1994:1) considered the approach successful in theory, but in practice, confronted by certain situations, the strategy becomes unrealistic or difficult to operate. He referred to the lack of local government capacity, scarcity of financial resources, outdated legislation, and institutional stagnation. Support strategies reduce the maximum use of resources (Tipple, 1994:4-13). National resources could be more effectively directed towards actors, than the sector’s developing the delivery capacity, Tipple added.

3.5 PILLARS OF A SUCCESSFUL POLICY

Radically, the author argues that no strategy has proven to be the perfect solution as its advocates had hoped it would. However, there is a consensus that to alleviate poor human settlement conditions, major important areas for action have been recognised. First in post-conflict situations the situation quickly reveals the importance of housing and community services to the work of short-term peacebuilding and longer-term reconstruction. To achieve this aim, a number of objectives should be employed such as more serviced land must be made available. Flow of finance needs to be improved and expanded. Facilitating the production of affordable housing by stimulating the construction sector is required, reforming standards, norms and regulations. Also there is an urgent need for action to generate employment and protect the most vulnerable and poorest members of society. Each priority in turn is examined below.

3.5.1 Adequate Infrastructure

It could be claimed that water, sewerage, electricity, roads, clinics and schools in post-conflict countries are in a dilapidated condition. The quality of physical and social infrastructure is a significant element of the overall quality of human settlements and an
important determinant of a population's living condition. Furnishing neighbourhoods with a basic level of infrastructure services is an important task.

In this sphere, agreement exists that government intervention is required to secure basic services, adequate investment in infrastructure networks crucial to meet shelter needs (UNCHS and ILO, 1995:182). Also The World Bank (1993) elaborated the services should contain housing upgrading, hygiene; water; provision of toilets; their maintenance and disposal of sewerage; storm water drainage and mosquito eradication; garbage disposal and fly control; family health care, bathing and clothes washing facilities.

Different programmes have been initiated and yet done very little to raise the low quality of life. This can be attributed to the trend of the planning and implementing agencies to see the solution as providing better infrastructure and constructing new houses and treating the problem of the provision of services as objectives in themselves, rather than elements of a package that bring about improvements in community. Also authorities do not respond to the community's priorities either in components or method of implementation. Rigid projects are developed, assuming incorrectly that the needs and priorities for each community are the same. The responsible agency should therefore, act as facilitator of community needs and not implementers of preconceived proposals.

In order to maintain the programme, ILO (1995:70) quoted five conditions necessary for successful infrastructure projects:

- Communities must be involved in all stages, not simply as unpaid labour. The World Bank agreed that existing communities should be encouraged to participate in the process of planning and building of infrastructure projects, to ensure accountability and smooth implementation.

- Stakeholders' roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined at the outset and both parties prepared to fulfil obligations.

- The facilitator agency must act as a supporter of the community, not as the owner or manager of the programme.

- The contact between the community and the facilitator agency should be through staff whose primary skills are in organising and motivating communities rather than in technical matters.

- Government agencies need to fulfil the limited but vital tasks of motivation, facilitation, training, and technical assistance.

3.5.2 Sustainable and Affordable Finance System

After long periods of neglect during the conflict, settlements face infrastructure problems and severe shortage of resources. An adequate supply of affordable funds for land,
infrastructure, housing, building materials and business-development is critical if the real demand is to be met. The case is repeated in most of the Third World countries as Arimah (1997) claimed: "Usually the responsible authorities for human settlements suffer from a weak financial position with a major problem being poor revenue collection records." He added that countries' implementation of plans is poor mainly since most national authorities lack financial resources, which, he argues, are crucial for service provision and infrastructure operation. Barcello (1998) stated that obstacles include: the lack of responsible authorities power to raise adequate revenue together with their poor revenue collection procedures, inability to make decisions, and the confused legislative basis for the performance of local government functions.

The World Bank (1993: 41) acknowledged the need for a financial system. It indicated that a system has to reconcile three objectives: affordability to beneficiaries, viability to developers, and resources’ mobilisation for the process as a whole. An UNDP report (1996) indicated that affordable systems may not be viable, at least on a large scale while viable systems may not be accessible to the target groups and the poor among them. Commentators contend that to attain the expected result access to credit must be provided on a much bigger scale. Given the scarcity of resources available it is vital attempts to assist the poorest members of the population, using subsidies, are carefully targeted. There can be no excuse for thinking that poor people can not take part successfully in credit programmes.

The literature demonstrates guidelines to initiate and help decision-makers planning for financial policy. Key priorities in securing a stable and sustainable flow of financial resources for human settlements development are:

- Stimulating national and local economies to attract public and private resources and investment, generate employment and increase revenues.

- Strengthening fiscal and financial management capacity, developing taxation, pricing mechanisms and other sources of revenue.

- Enhancing public revenue with fiscal instruments conducive to equity and sustainable development.

- Strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks to enable financial markets to work, draw in resources and encourage partnerships.

- Promoting increased and equitable access to credit for all people.

- Adopting timely, transparent, predictable and performance-based mechanisms for transferring funds between different levels of government.
• Targeting subsidies to those not served by markets, and promoting credit and other mechanisms appropriate to their needs.

3.5.3 Land Management

In 1964, Charles Abraham claimed that wherever he travelled, land issues in one form or another loomed large. He added no country was without a land problem of some sort. Inadequate supplies of land have been the areas of greatest failure in shelter strategies. It is considered as the most important factor underlying the poor performance of many shelter projects, infrastructure development, and transport planning. Barakat (1993) recognised that land issues such as ownership and speculation often are obstacles facing reconstruction. In developing countries the problem is identified by the following basic issues, which influence any policy for shelter

Land Ownership: Abraham (1964:26) recognised that land ownership in many developing countries is the major source of wealth. He explained that the title of land often gives prestige. In law, land includes all structures that may be developed on it. So far, most community landlords inherit ownership from their relatives. An inherited piece of land is an obstacle in the development process. Since, land is divided between extended family members, a small land plot cannot be viable for large-scale development. Many of these families can not sell their land due to cultural obligations. In addition, they fail to make maximum use of it. On the other hand, for the less prosperous ownership of land is still a primary aspiration though a distant hope. This in turn affects the availability of land for public development.

Cost of Land: Land cost is expected to be affordable, sustainable and cost effective thus unless free or very cheap land can be provided, cost may affect the success of human settlement policy. In countries offering few alternatives for investment of cash, land increment is as profitable a reward as any competing investment can offer. Sometimes, rising land costs simply correspond to the political situation. Land cost has soared not because there is a dearth of land or solely because of land hoarding or the increased demand for urban land per se. The reasons for rising land prices also include:

• Failure to provide easier access to nearby sites.

• Freedom from land taxation, installation of public utilities and roads that have enhanced value without equivalent assessment for benefits.

• Excessive concentration of ownership in some places and such excessive fragmentation of ownership in governing land titles or lack of adequate compulsory purchase procedures that could bring more land into use.
High land cost may not be the only obstacle. There are other problems such as land speculation. Rondinelli (1983) identified speculation as a major factor controlling costs. He explained speculation: “It is driving the price of housing and urban services out of the range of an increasing proportion of the population every year”. Abraham (1964) illustrated that in many countries income is so low that land at any price is beyond the family means.

A number of methods have been adopted to curb rising prices. Zoning, price control, subdivision controls, and other devices have been imported by developing countries. UNCHS and ILO (1995) argued that situations can be improved by making decisions about land use, density and location of government uses in a way which increases the efficiency of urban and land use, rather than simply through sectional preference. Barakat (1993) proposed that price control legislation, along with a proper compensation procedure, to make available to public authorities an adequate proportion of low cost land, would help bring to fruition the hoped-for reconstruction and redevelopment plan.

**Land Regulation & Acquisition** Cobbett (1999) argued that in many instances, proper government policy might remove such obstacles. Governments have the power to guide the use of land, curb misuse, prevent abuse, non-use or disuse and direct its re-use. According to UNCHS (1995) governments must manage supply, insisting on vacant land within built up areas being used efficiently, penalising speculators, and ensuring new land on the urban periphery is developed conservatively. The report exemplifies “that valuable agricultural land is preserved by guiding development along public transport corridors provided with essential infrastructure.

A large number of devices for regulating land use are now in operation. The devices include: price or rent controls, zoning, restriction on the sale price of land; subdivision controls and building regulations; purchase or regulation of development rights. Others entail: public reserve lands; tax levies to control use or bring land into use, or to discourage its use, land, building, or rent subsidisation in various forms, excess condemnation, public purchase of more land than needed.

Barakat (1993:125) mentions the fact that land acquisition by city councils has been a common practice all over Europe during and immediately after the war. Hill (1998) alludes to the German experience in land readjustment. It was in the late 1800s that comprehensive land readjustment was tried for the first time in modern Europe. According to Hill, it is also practised today in cultures as far-flung from one another as Scandinavia and Malaysia. He explained that this policy involves expropriation under conditions of scarce resources and then re-percolation or redistribution of property rights based on land values to guarantee land is put to the highest and best use.
Other methods have been employed in the world. One is municipal ownership, a form through which German cities derived large sums from ground rents to control the distribution of the population. Another method employed in German cities, Beard writes, is compulsory purchase. Some 400 acres were expropriated. Immediately afterwards, the National Board of High Commissioners for Reconstruction was established. The Board was empowered to issue acquisition directives to the Burgomasters. Next, the reconstruction registry was set up. The registry recorded compensation claims for lost premises, to be paid later when a new building was erected in its place. A commission of experts determined the value of the expropriated site and land values. Compensation was not paid at the time, though owners had the right to acquire another piece of land of the same value.

However, UNCHS (1996) doubted the viability to implement the complex array of controls and regulations. It is seen as costly to administer and usually ineffective, sometimes adding to bottlenecks in land market, and the pressure for holding land vacant for speculative gain.

3.5.4 Generating Job Opportunities

In countries suffering from conflict, unemployment is common. Reconstruction could be the solution. According to UNCHS and ILO (1995:141), shelter could be a major factor in income both for citizens and their countries. Furthermore, the construction industry is a significant source of employment for unskilled poor. UNCHS publications stated that income-earning and generation opportunities should not simply be an optional extra but a major consideration in the development of the most suitable approach to shelter delivery.

Lybe (1992:83) distinguished major and minor works as:

- Major works include roads, drains, sewerage, electricity etc., which belong to the public domain proper.

- Minor works comprise local storm-water drainage in flood prone areas, small scale paving of access streets and footpaths, on site sanitation, community buildings, and locally based waste disposal systems. All these are items of direct interest to inhabitants and tend to recur as high priorities in local surveys.

Absorbing labour is not an end in itself. There is no place in the new era for making work for its own sake (Hamdi. 1997:417). UNCHS and ILO (1995:142) emphasised that paying unemployed people to dig countless holes only to pay others to fill them in again may have seemed like a good idea once but in these days, it make no sense under hardship conditions of economics. Increasing the use of local labourers in shelter work programmes
should be carried out on the understanding that they provide better productivity than other methods when the multiplied effect is accounted for.

MIT website (2000) mentioned that settlements upgrading projects provide opportunities for labour-intensive growth via official encouragement to small-scale entrepreneurs in the construction sector, the use of dwellings for small businesses, and public investment in infrastructure. The World Bank (1993:15) suggested to support the creation of job opportunities, requirements must be supplied through vocational training for men and women, formation and management of co-operatives, loans for small businesses and land and buildings on rental or hire purchase basis for small industries. The Bank elaborates that these elements need to be linked to demands for skills from employers and marketing and demand for manufactured products. Programmes, in which training is seen as an end in itself, can disillusion participants when there are no follow-on jobs, or when products lie unsold because there is no demand for them.

3.5.5 Stimulate Building Industry

Construction is involved in all human activity. Building materials and construction industries are basic means for the erecting, expansion, improvement and maintenance of human settlements. Understandably, to attain reconstruction objectives and the development of physical infrastructure, the building-material industry should gain attention. According to UNCHS “Construction activities can account for 80 per cent of total capital assets, and building investments yield large benefits over the long term.” However, the World Bank (1993:138) reported that in the developing world the construction industry is often poorly organised and building materials are very costly, especially if needing to be imported. The Bank claimed mismanagement is a common problem. It is manifested in underproduction of necessary material, lack of variety, inefficiencies in production, and a lack of distribution networks resulting in chronic shortages for residential and infrastructure construction. UNCHS (1995:12) exemplified the problem, stating, most developing countries are endowed with abundant natural resources that could meet the demand for basic building materials using largely indigenous inputs, but local production of building materials in a large number of countries falls short of demand. Nordberg (2000) posited that the scarcity of building materials has also affected development plans in other sectors, including agriculture, health and education. Regarding locally produced building materials, such as aggregates, bricks, tiles; limestone, in some countries where a monopoly operates. shortages have been created deliberately to force up the price. The resulting steep rises in land costs and building materials effectively removes decent housing from the reach of low-and medium income
groups. When this happens in poor settlements the poor are forced to use inappropriate
building materials. He added that a number of factors, such as inadequate infrastructure,
poor transportation, lack of capital and low level of skills recur as problems in developing
countries.

The World Bank (1993:18) stated that the key to creating a well-functioning building
materials industry is the elimination of monopolistic practice, the breaking down of artificial
barriers to competition through strong antitrust legislation and the entry of small firms into
the sector in all phases of production. The Bank also mentions that governments should
encourage the building industry by reducing import controls and by facilitating licensing
requirements for small producers, contractors, and developers. UNCHS (1987) called for
policies that enable small industry to provide building materials and job opportunities. Small
and local building material industries have a number of strengths, including:

- They use a variety of local materials and a minimum of imported inputs.

- They have the knowledge of local conditions, special requirement neighbourhoods and
can offer a service based on customers’ special requirements.

- They can develop on a very small scale, often in the home, and can give employment to
local skilled, unskilled and unemployed labour.

The World Bank (1993:19) espoused the importance of establishing building research
institutions, which can instruct the development and use of local materials and building
technologies.

3.5.6 Legal and Regulatory Framework

In post-conflict context, policy-makers are required to produce a legal framework for
the reconstruction activities. Good policy means balancing issues to ensure that the legal and
regulatory framework is neither pedantic nor easily abused. This can be achieved by
removing regulations that cause ‘bottlenecks’ in the delivery of shelter. As the World Bank
(1993) reported: “The goal here is to secure a framework that is ‘light but firm’ in which a
small number of rules and regulations are implemented rigorously; rather than a heavy but
loose system in which large numbers of norms and sanctions are unused, or are used
selectively according to political patronage or financial interests.”

UNCHS and ILO (1995:153) stated that the imposition of rules and regulations based
on a blueprint of ‘how life should be’ rather than a response to ‘how life is’ has tended to be
the norm in the past. Shelter solutions resulting in this prescribed ‘top-down’ process reflect
official interpretations of demand and can drain away residents’ incomes without giving
them what they need. UNCHS (1987) held that inappropriate buildings codes favour imported construction materials, which despite their high cost or scarcity, are often imposed as the only choice available. UNCHS (1996:298-300) emphasised that planning control and zoning systems should be ‘permissive’ and flexible, devolved to the lowest level possible, and integrated into one responsible department or agency.

Deficiencies in the legal system cause too many human settlement projects to fail. The shortcomings of human settlement policies are rooted in “Remote bureaucratic decisions and delays and poor execution of projects and programmes by specialised bodies”. The author attributed poor results to ineffective local institutions and staff, lack of a co-ordination framework in planning. He argued that “Over-concentration of development responsibilities and decision making powers in national ministries and other central bodies do not lead to efficient implementation of national development policies”. While on the other hand local institutions are neglected, heavy handed and cumbersome central ministerial bureaucracies thwart local initiatives in the pursuit of development opportunities, he adds. Below the author reviews why projects fail to achieve their stated objectives:

### Lack of Institutional Co-ordination

Ambiguities in the relationship between stockholders such as international organisations state ministries and local agencies and authorities is the result. It leads to bureaucratic enforcement procedures, handicapping rapid implementation of projects. The dilemma is the lack of experienced people down the line, fluctuation of scruples in public service and the suddenness with which new countries have had to adapt to these parameters. Institutional co-ordination problems arise between different ministries in the same cabinet. Problems rise about the allocation of open space and its abuse by developers who violate planning regulations.

According to Abraham (1964) other reasons exist for the institutional lack of co-ordination. Traditions of good public service are less matured. Authors such as Abraham, UNCHS, and Awotona et al. mentioned corruption as a reason for chaos. They argued that very often civil servants rely on other sources of income to maintain decent living standards. Opportunists among them may see public service as a short bridge to affluence. Abraham pointed out that business looks on graft as essential oil to lubricate officials when administrative delays and frustrations seem endless. Where permits are required for building or importing, there is an open black market in some countries. Those who need contraband manage to get it.
Delays are common and represent a physical constraint on human settlement projects. Where construction projects are implemented, the cost is often higher than anticipated, and this represents a financial constraint on successful implementation. This is due to various factors such as poor estimates, variations by the client, inappropriate technology and design, inappropriate tendering and contractual procedures, inefficient on-site supervision and construction management. Habitat Debate (1998) listed further reasons, such as inadequate capacity for the planning and design of projects, difficulty in obtaining tenders for small projects in which international contractors are not interested or for projects which are too large for local contractors to handle, inefficiency in planning, design and construction, and difficulties in obtaining materials and other crucial inputs.

Political Interference and Lack of Political Will

In a post-conflict context, it would be unfair to view political corruption outside the new conditions accompanying the transitional stage. Countries in transition face new types of political organisations where the ethics of government service have not been developed. Herculean and unfamiliar duties, the phlegmatic state of public opinion and the press, the dearth of civic organisations, as well as other political pressures can all combine to hinder progress. Abraham (1964) claimed: “Projects have failed due to the legal, administrative and political weaknesses. This results in inadequacy of support for the pursuit of the objective and aims of the human settlement policy.” Abraham stated that public works and housing programmes, in particular have provided vast opportunities for politicians to exercise their power through construction contracts, purchase of materials, loans to the worthy and low rent dwellings to those who vote right. Excessive politicisation has interfered with professional conduct in technical issues and has, in turn interfered with the legitimate sources and lines of authority.

Political interference in the law and control system has limited the ability of the implementing authority to fully control events, regulate and control development. Abraham claimed that powerful government officials have been known to enforce approvals of projects that do not meet stipulated requirements. High demand for space has led authorities to overlook the standards required for various uses and abuse of development controls especially in relation to open spaces.

Politicians interfere in the implementation of court judgements. This in turn leads to fear of court interventions to enforce law and regulations. In the case, there is court intervention, political interference can over-rule it for political considerations. For similar reasons, central
government can not take corrupted figures to court when the latter violates regulations and vice versa.

**Beneficiaries Non-compliance with the Legal Framework**

Different studies show that beneficiaries of projects in the third world countries tend not to comply with regulations and their signed commitments. Declining economic conditions, the high percentage of unemployment, too much expectation and too few achievements, each of these can encourage people to challenge the law and regulations. Poor enforcement machinery is another reason.

In addition, the inability of the implementers to employ adequate qualified work force affects the beneficiaries' attitudes. This situation may arise from inadequate finance, equipment, or from political interference in the responsible authority's activities. Arimah (1997) explained that no-compliance is often the result of inadequate penalties. He added this may happen if the fines levied on offenders are low and affordable hence do not deter them, when compared to gains they make from inefficient mode of production.

People's lack of knowledge of regulation and the lack of responsibility of the civil society in building the nation contribute to this apathy. Arimah (1997) examined the degree of compliance with regulations. The extent to which people are aware of their existence is important because it partly determines how many people comply. He noted that the level of awareness is very low.

### 3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Having understood the relationship between reconstruction and peacebuilding in the previous chapter, the author devoted this chapter to analyse the issue of post-conflict reconstruction of human settlements, starting by tackling the post-conflict reconstruction at the policy level, explaining how to approach the process. It showed reconstruction as a process has input, output, challenges and priorities. The chapter narrowed its scope to focus on human settlement reconstruction and implementation. It defines human settlements to cover physical shelter plus related services and infrastructure, including inputs such as land, finance, etc. required to produce and maintain it. Also it has shown how the issue is a significant one and worth research and analytical studies.

The chapter presented the fact that the shelter problem is not only confined to post-conflict countries. In almost all Third World countries, adequate shelter in suitable conditions is an uphill battle. The rapid pace of urbanisation, the weak rate of economic growth, the availability of land for housing and public services, the increase in land prices
and inappropriate strategies for urban planning and land appropriation all directly contribute to this problem.

Shelter strategies in most Third World countries are often at odds with policies to improve the lives and living conditions of its residents. Two schools of thought have been discussed in this chapter. The Orthodox paradigm emerged to meet the shortage of shelter supply in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Alternative paradigm emerged in response to the repeated failure of the first school. Both schools have their opponents and advocates. After reviewing the conflicting opinions regarding each school, the author argued that there is no school can offer a perfect solution, since each country has its own challenges and opportunities.

However, the adoption of an alternative and effective shelter strategy is only possible with a basic restructuring of the priorities and development directions. Commitment to social development is necessary to ensure that the required resources are channelled for the benefit of the underprivileged and provide them with adequate and decent living conditions. Another issue is the cultural suitability. Governments in developing countries tend, failing to meet the problem of human settlements, to import solutions from more advanced nations. UNCHS Agenda disputed if any policy can be imposed on a global level. Policies must be determined together with the people concerned.

It is also important that sufficient land in suitable locations is allocated for housing and public services. Without positive intervention, land becomes increasingly scarce, as population in most Third World countries is on the increase. This priority should come before other concerns if resources are limited.

The chapter showed the need for adequate infrastructure and provision of essential services, giving rise to the related issues of how to get right the framework of land management and put into place an appropriate and affordable financial system to bring properties in reach of all citizens. The egalitarian issues are somewhat offset by the further needs of stimulating the construction sector. The problem that some priorities could conflict with other prerequisites the author addresses, principally in the conclusion. For a strategy to be successful, the whole population needs to be catered for, involving economic stimuli and special provisions to supplement the poorest members of society who cannot compete for various reasons in a solely market-led economy. The chapter presented the need for getting right the legal and regulatory framework.

The chapter emphasised the results of failing to address these issues; firstly examining the failure of policy through the vagaries of the legal system which could contain antiquated statutes hindering the smooth implementation of up-to-date methods for housing provision.
Restrictive regulations are investigated as another side of the same legal constraints that might be encountered. Since strong institutions are essential in delivering an efficient housing policy to the public, the lack of institutional co-ordination is given attention as a recurrent cause of failure. Deficient institutions could result from the broader issue of political inference or lack of a political will to facilitate an effective shelter policy. Most governments have usually met with failure or only limited success. Efforts to improve quality of life are also often negated by the rapidly deteriorating housing conditions in the slum and squatter areas. The lack of appropriate planning and land policies hinders any attempts to shelter the poor effectively. This review with a of the causes of behind the failure of shelter policies in so many countries can be taken to imply a series of measures which may need to be taken to bring better success in the future.

Building on the gathered information from the first three chapters, the author goes on to describe, interpret and assess the methods used in conducting his fieldwork in Gaza Strip. Chapter four reviews generic research activities and methodologies adopted and modified to carry out work in the field, determining priorities in the face of changing circumstances. The discussion of methodology leads to three subsequent chapters that cover ongoing reconstruction activities in the Gaza Strip.
Chapter Four: RESEARCH AND FIELDWORK
METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION

A methodology defines how a phenomenon is studied, while methods are specific research techniques. These include quantitative techniques, such as statistical correlation, as well as qualitative techniques like observation, interviewing and audio recording. No one can claim that the information gained from various research methods is false. Data are more or less useful, depending on their relevance to theories and methodologies used and the hypothesis tested and or the research topic selected. This attitude toward a methodology leads to a discursive style in how material is expressed in a chapter. The author writes this chapter while keeping in mind that it needs to be lively, interesting, and informative. It should avoid listing the information in a way as Silverman (2000:7) described it “Because we’re here, because we’re here, because we’re here”. The chapter consists of three main sections:

First: it offers a theoretical review of the research strategy, which includes understanding the evaluation of case studies. After elaborating its aim, the author discusses components of and criteria for evaluation.

Second: the experience of this research is addressed, describing objectives and difficulties. Various techniques and instruments used to collect data are explained. The means of collecting, analysing and presenting are discussed.

Third: the chapter introduces other methodological and learning tools which were employed by the author to develop his ideas over the last three years.

4.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY

To answer the main research question (see the introduction) and building on the conceptual literature review, two case studies have been selected for this thesis. The first case study is the Elkarama Housing Project; initiated and completed by the Palestinian
Housing Council (PHC). The second is the Peace Implementation Programme, initiated and implemented by UNRWA. Evaluation of the two case studies helped the author bring greater comprehension of specific problems and produce data and lessons to learn. It is intended to judge the value or worth of both experiences. Evaluation is a learning tool to assess the value of what has already taken place to improve future work. Measuring, analysing and interpreting change helped determine how the objectives of the two case studies have been achieved and whether the initial assumptions were right, and to make judgements about the efficiency; effectiveness; impact and suitability of the work.

Rubin (1995:5) argued that sometimes evaluations are expected to show clearly whether a project has been successful. He posited that “It is often very difficult to reveal clear evidence of success, because this may depend on so many factors, some of which are beyond the control of the project.” In addition, it is often easier to indicate failure where different groups of people will have different perceptions about what constitutes failure and success. The time scale can also be a factor: A project may be deemed a failure at one stage, but several years later it may become clear that there were some positive effects. In order to make it clearer for the researcher, evaluation criteria have been developed by different international organisations and research institutes.

4.2.1 Evaluation Components

Evaluating a development project examines the relationship between the general aim, the objectives, the inputs and outputs of the project. Below is an explanation of what these terms mean,

Aim: is the overall objective that the project is meant to contribute to in the long run.

Objectives: The operational reasons for a project. The fruit which the project is expected to achieve within a reasonable time.

Outputs: The results that can be guaranteed by the project as a result of its activities.

Input: All those things, which are necessary in a project to carry out the activities planned and achieve the intended outputs. It may include funds, personnel, material, etc.

In this regard, Rubin (1995:6) distinguished five indicators related to the evaluation criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability.
Efficiency: What is the cost of achieving the project's objectives?

It is the measure of output of the project (qualitative and quantitative) in relation to total resource input. Efficiency aims to make the best use of resources available, by producing maximum output whilst minimising input and waste. A project may be very effective in working towards its objectives, but it may do so at very high cost both socially and economically, which is neither reasonable nor sustainable. There may be ways of achieving the same output more cheaply. Adjustment may involve looking at how things are organised, what type of technology is employed as well as the way finances are managed. Efficient projects aim at short-term objectives and may be ineffective in relation to longer time scale goals or inequitable in terms of whose resources are used.

Efficiency: how the results stand in relation to the efforts expended. How economically inputs are converted into outputs. Whether the same results could have been achieved in another, better way.

![Efficiency Diagram](image1)

Figure 4.1: Efficiency as a Relation between the Input and the Outputs of a Development Project.
Source: (NORAD, 1993:31) Adopted by the Author.

Effectiveness: The extent to which the project's objectives have been achieved: whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs of the project.

![Effectiveness Diagram](image2)

Figure 4.2: Effectiveness as a Relation between the Outputs and the Objectives of a Development Project.
Source: (NORAD, 1993:31) Adopted by the Author.
Effectiveness gauges how far the project or programme goes toward achieving its objectives.

NORAD (1993:30) explained it is a measure of whether the purpose has been or is likely to be fulfilled. This category grades how much certain output contributes to realising the intended purpose. The term thus also indicates something about the content of the project and whether it contributes to development in an expected manner. Devas and Rodkodi (1993) demonstrated that effectiveness requires that clear lines of responsibility be established for tasks and processes of management and accountability whilst at the same time linking policy formulation with implementation.

The Impact: What are effects of the project?

NORAD (1993:30) illustrated that the impact of the project has both foreseen and unforeseen consequences for a society. Impact can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, immediate or long-term. Its effect can be recorded on the micro and macro-level. Sometimes, a distinction is made between shorter-term results as outcomes and longer-term results as impact. In this research, impact of projects covers the social, economic, technical environmental and other effects on individual beneficiaries.

Impact: The changes and effects positive and negative, planned and unforeseen of the project, seen in relation to target groups and others who are affected.

Relevance: Is the project relevant?

A project may or may not prove to be appropriate to the needs of the beneficiaries it is designed to help. There might be other problems that should take priority. NORAD (1993) showed that the overall approach and strategy of the project should be consistent with the problem and intended effects. Relevance means an overall assessment of whether the project is in keeping with the overall goal, the donor and recipient policy, as well as with local need and priorities. The target group, (prime beneficiaries of a project) should be the most important stakeholders. There is increasing evidence that the more people are enabled to
Research and Fieldwork Methodology

participate in decisions about development activities, which affect them, the more successful and sustainable those activities become. The most important questions for the target group are:

- Did the project tackle their real needs?
- Are the results significant?
- Are the results worth the efforts?

**Relevance:** The degree to which the project can still be justified in relation to local and national development priorities.

![Figure 4.4: Relevance as a Relation Between the aim, the objectives, and the Outputs of a Development Project.](NORAD, 1993: 31) Adopted by the Author.

**Sustainability:** An assessment of the extent to which the positive effects of the project will still continue after external assistance has been concluded.

![Figure 4.5: Sustainability as a Relation between the all the Project Elements.](NORAD, 1993: 31) Adopted by the Author.

**Sustainability** is the final test of the success of a project. The term addresses the question: “Will project activities and benefits continue after external support is withdrawn?” Sustainability represents an “overall assessment of the extent to which the positive change achieved as a result of the project can be expected to last also after the project has been terminated.” (NORAD, 1993:30). It evaluates the relation between necessary local resources and how recipients view specific projects. Further issues of how far beneficiaries have been involved and have taken charge of finding the necessary resources are explored. In addition, sustainability refers to how successful has the project been in combining long-term economic, social, political development with environmental concerns.
4.3 METHODS AND TOOLS FOR INVESTIGATION

In this section, research methods selected for collecting research information are examined. The nature of data, the degree of required accuracy, and the availability of resources determined the methods used. The combination of these factors decided to a large extent the research methods chosen. The author, conducting fieldwork, did not start with a prescribed model, but has adjusted focus as his grasp of the situation developed. In such a case, it was necessary to be equipped with an orientation that enabled him to focus on issues and evidence deserving most attention. To achieve this outcome a combination of methods needed to be practised. These included: close-ended questionnaires with a few open-ended questions, interviews and observations, focusing on group interviews (Aldiwan) and investigating the life histories of residents and recording their physical environment. Employing these techniques could help indicate the degree of the project’s success.

4.3.1 Review of Existing knowledge (Literature Review)

In a preliminary stage, a literature review was essential to give insight into the existing knowledge on the research’s case studies. Specifically, to conduct research a consistent reference-point or aim must be defined and adhered to. This focus served as an inchoate basis for observing and gathering data about the topic and then for describing and understanding its implications. Researchers develop concepts, formulate hypotheses, and test their ideas. Investigators carry out these activities in various sequences, combinations, employing a broad scope of methods to realise their objective of bringing new information to the discipline, addressing and proposing remedies to the recognised problem. This complex activity represents the process of research. In this research, a comprehensive literature search was conducted over the last few years. It included an understanding of the previous work and research carried out concerning the topic. It aimed at development of a conceptual framework covering the main features, aspects, dimensions, factors and variables of the reconstruction of human settlements. Library research is the first step in doing a literature survey. In addition, the following web sites provided an up-to-date information:

- Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
  http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/polisci/faculty/rexb/pblinks.htm
- The War-torn Societies Project (WSP): http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/talk.htm
- The World Bank Unit of Post-conflict Reconstruction:
  http://wbIn0018.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/Post-Conflict/home
- Journal of Human Assistance Review: http://www.jha.ac/
- The Palestinian Refugee Info-net at the Macgill University:
The literature review focused on the various aspects and dilemmas involved in the process post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. This drew on a collection of books, articles, reports, and Internet documents. The list below is a sample of the consulted materials.

**Military and Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories:** (Abed, 1990); (Aruri, 1989); (B'tselem, 1992). (Barakat, 1993:37); (Benvenisti, 1988:15); (Benvenisti. 1992); (Coon, 1992); (Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949); (Hague Regulations of 1907, http://palestine-un.org/tenth/paper.html); (International Labour Office, 1992); (Mission at the United Nation, PMUN web site, http://palestine-un.org/); (Murray, 1991); (Chomsky, 1987); (Palestinian Liberation Organisation 1992); (Roy, 1995); (Roy, 1989); (Said 1994); (Sayiegh, 1989); (Senan, 1992); (Tuqan, 1995:85).

**Post Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding:** (Amirahmadi, 1990); (Annan, 1998); (Ball and Halevy, 1996), (Barakat 1998; 1994; 1993); (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995), (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), (Doyle, and N. Sambanis, 1999); (Duffield, 1996); (Evans, 1993); (Forman and Parhad, 1998); (Galtung, 1995); (Galtung, 1996); (Hampson, 1996); (Hill, 1996), (Holsti, 1996), (King, 1997); (Kumar, et al., 1997); (Lake, 1990); (Lederach, 1997); (Macrae and Bradbury, 1998); (Miall, et al., 1999); (Minear, and Weiss, 1995): (OECD ,1997), (Smillie, 1999); (Stiefel, 1994; 1998); (The World Bank, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). (WSP, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c); (Zartmans, 1996).

**Reconstruction of Human Settlements:** (Abrams, 1964); (Acoily, 1995); (Awotona et al, 1995); (Azimi-Bolourian, 1986); (Barakat, 1993); (Barcello, 1998); (Burgess, 1994); (Burgess, 1982); (Carbonnier, 1998); (Chambers, 1993); (Cobbett, 1999); (Davis, 1989); (Hamdi, 1997, 1995, 1995a), (Hundsalz, 1994); (King, 1997); (Kumar, 1997); (Lyce, 1992), (Mathey, 1992), (MIT web site, 2000); (Nordberg, 2000); (Koenigsberger. 1964, 1986); (Pugh, 1998), (Rakodi and Devas (eds.), 1993); (Rondinelli, 1986), (Shengs, 1995), (UNDP, 1998), (USAID, 1996); (The World Bank, 1993) (Tipple, 1994), (Turner, 1986); (UNCHS, 1987, 1989, 1976, 1996, 1995, 1997); (UNCHS-ILO, 1995); ( Wakely, 1986); (Warah, 2000)

**4.3.2 Preliminary Field-visit:**

There is a need to discover the area of research by conducting a pre-study visit. It is useful to enable the researcher to fully understand the situation. Barakat and Ellis (1996:149-156) stated that pre-fieldwork preparation gives the researcher as much information as possible about the situation. He continued that through pre-fieldwork survey, the researcher gains a better understanding of the conflict and analysis of collected data. Results of the pre-study should be available before the fieldwork starts. The author of this thesis prepared a checklist to examine the situation in the Palestinian Territories, building on the findings of the War-torn Societies project (1999). A literature survey was carried out before leaving to Gaza in order to prepare the ground for the field visit. Further, a visit to...
Gaza in January 1999 was conducted to answer the researcher's inquiry regarding the situation. The issues covered include:

- The conflict and reconciliation.
- Root causes of the conflict (the Israeli Occupation).
  - Impact of the conflict.
  - Moving towards reconciliation.
  - Analysis of the peace process.
  - Consequences of the peace agreements.
- Major actors in the rebuilding process: internal and external, individual and institutional
- Rebuilding process: politically, economically, and socially.
- Challenges and opportunities for the reconstruction of Palestine.
- The answers for these questions are distributed over this research. It serves to provide a background for the fieldwork and the two case studies.

4.3.3 Interview with Key Figures

This is the method most widely used in evaluation work. Its main advantage is that it provides a reasonable and efficient means of gaining deeper insights into concrete questions and issues. Interviews broaden the scope of investigation, identifying relevant links between the author's theoretical background and the 'on the ground' situation. The interviewer may take up a variety of problem areas through the choice of informants and through questions that can yield insight on matters outside the planning framework as such concerning unforeseen impacts of a project.

NORAD (1993:42) stressed the importance of the selection of key research informants. It distinguished them to be those "...individuals who, through their position or role, know a lot about the subject under study."

In this thesis the interviewees have been selected on the basis of the author's own knowledge. He has practised a snowball method, in which selection is carried out through recommendation from others. With each-passed on recommendation, the 'pool' of interviewees has grown. Through this method, a wide-ranging group of policy makers have been met, in the Palestinian National Authority, PHC and UNRWA. In Appendix (5), the author presents a list of interviewees, their names and occupations.

In his second fieldwork, the author managed to meet officials working in the Palestinian Housing Council. This gave a prompt start to the research. The head of the Council Mr. Usama Elsa'dawy showed enthusiasm and understanding of the research topic. He offered unlimited help. provided information and asked his employees to do the same.
The interviews with other council employees lasted three days and covered the various themes regarding the PHC projects in Gaza Strip.

In Gaza, UNRWA’s field office, the official in charge of public relations was reluctant to allow the researcher to enter into the organisation’s offices. He offered little help, only provided the author with descriptions of UNRWA’s mandate and press releases. After discussion, the UNRWA’s official co-operated, justifying his initial attitude by the political sensitivity of the subject under study. He asked the author to submit a letter to the chief of the field office to approve the proposed meeting. At last, five of UNRWA’s field office directors were met. Those are responsible for Shelter Programme, Education, Health, Project Management and Development Planning Programmes. In UNRWA’s headquarters, the author met a British employee whose assistance was limited to offering available relevant documents and some promises to answer questions via the electronic email that never worked. Before going to interviews, the author prepared checklist in advance. This preparation helped the interviewer focus on the subject and to save time afterward during the analysis stage.

The interviews were structured to encourage respondents to express themselves, allowing them flexibility to air their own agenda. Generally, at the same time, this semi-structured style helps an interviewer hold the exchange within a specific ambit of discussion. Also, the interviewer followed up ideas, expanded on motives and sensed feelings more effectively.

4.3.4 Questionnaire

Using questionnaires is noted as a universal method for collecting information: its purpose to generate information in a systematic fashion by presenting all informants with questions in a similar form and recording responses in a methodical way. It exemplifies the scientific approach to data gathering. Separate authors argue questionnaires make the information received more reliable by eliminating differences in the way questions are asked and presented. Specifically in this study, the author was convinced of using this method. He put in place a set of questions that have enabled him to explore the level of satisfaction with the project, measuring the residents’ general opinion of the Elkarama type of approach to housing provision. Data from PHC was necessary to conduct this survey.

The questionnaire was divided into sections:

- To identify individual characteristics.
- To grasp the resident’s perception of the project and services.
- To measure their satisfaction with the performance of major actors.
- To identify possibilities for public participation.
To gain insights into the refugees’ attitude toward resettlement schemes.

The questionnaire was five pages long with eighty questions, some of which were open-ended allowing as many households as possible to respond.

In this process, a pilot survey was essential. Editing followed, clarifying questions, introducing others and cancelling those considered irrelevant. Another benefit was that the pilot revealed the value of personal contact with respondents to acquire higher returns in a short period. Questionnaires were distributed without aid from any one except a resident and Jom’a a gatekeeper who introduced the author to other gatekeepers who in turn helped meet family households.

**Sampling**

Since it would be untenable to meet every programme-user, researchers have to take a sample of people, places, and/or events to reveal information about the larger group. Ziesel (1997) argued that “generalising always entails some errors, …researchers may generalise too much, too little or in the wrong way”. To avoid this shortfall the researcher needs to ensure that the sample is representative. No commentator should depend on their own judgement of whom to include in the sample, as Hall and Hall (1996:29) pointed out an individual’s assessment can introduce all kinds of unsuspected biases. A large sample size is no solution. If chosen prejudicially, a more extensive sample would still result in some being under-represented. The author’s survey of reports clarified that the best means of ensuring a representative example of the population concerned is to use random methods in the selection process. Hall and Hall (1996:30) validated this mode of research arguing that chance can better provide an unbiased sample than rigid selection procedure. In their view, utilising chance as a determinant means that everyone in the population has the same possibility of being selected. The choice of the sample group is made impersonal and objective through the technique of random selection.

In an attempt to carry out this principle in practice, the author asked the PHC for a list of all those living in the Elkarama project. Unfortunately, the official in charge claimed that they had no up-dated list. Thus, another way was needed to delineate a representative sample group. First, I isolated local areas in terms of blocks and floors, and then specifying a group, used random numbers to select a sample of houses. An abstract of 10% was taken from 416 units in the Elkarama project. In total, 39 answered questionnaires were received from three residents per block (13 blocks altogether).
Questionnaire Results: The Data Matrix

Hall and Hall (1996:32) publicised data matrix as an elementary way to organise great amounts of information. They purported the need to use a matrix, as “with all surveys the answers need to be collected to allow comparisons between different groups and categories”. It has been proposed that this matrix rests at the heart of the questionnaire method. In the present research, the author collected close-ended answers in a data matrix: a configuration of rows and columns running horizontally and vertically. Columns represented the respondents’ answers as rows designated each different question, topic or variable. Visualisation helped the researcher absorb the process of data analysis.

After preparing the matrix, the author began analysing the questionnaire. The data was sieved using Excel 95 software and through simple average counts and percentages. Subsequently, processed data has been tabulated and presented in chapter Seven.

4.3.5 Observing

In the case of the Palestinian Housing Council, after data collection had been completed through a questionnaire, a major pitfall was recognised. The data lacked sharp observation and communal relevance, failing to reflect the liveliness of the evidence about the Elkarama project. A method was needed that did not detract from the resident’s significance or the meaningfulness of the data collection.

In his fieldwork the author could speak the residents’ language, share their tradition, culture and religion. Using his Palestinian background, he adopted a Direct Observation approach. It is the least structured method described, valuable for mapping any unforeseen impacts on individuals or the local community, and for expanding the perspectives drawn up (NORAD, 1993:46). The shift in approach heightened the study of the impact of the Elkarama scheme, and how the residents perceived it. This approach made possible an investigation of housing from the ‘inside’. Consequently, the author had the scope to more effectively interpret the lives and conditions of the residents. To achieve the best outcome, it was necessary to build up a rapport with informants and interview them on as many occasions as time allowed. Thus, it could be argued, informal interviewing and unstructured observation play a vital role in research practices, depending on the circumstances.

The technique has a negative side; its very time-consuming. Personal opinions and failure to understand what is happening can lead to major errors. Personal characteristics of the observer such as gender and age frequently influence what information is considered relevant and made accessible.
With experiences gained from the first case study, the author realised this approach would enable him to carry out his last fieldwork in refugee camps in Gaza Strip. In addition, the residence of the author’s family in a refugee camp had an impact, assisting the task of data gathering. Other university friends helped the author understand conditions in other refugee camps such as the Al Shati and Al Nuseirat Camp. However, being a closed society, it was undesirable and suspicious to be seen walking through the narrow alleys observing and taking photographs. The local people asked various questions; what are you doing here? Are you looking for someone? On another occasion, the residents thought the author was a representative of a humanitarian organisation. A considerable time was spent listening to complaints. However, this might give useful extra information.

The method was found most suitable for the following reasons:

- To gain deeper insight into socio-cultural conditions, processes and patterns of behaviour, when there is a need for background knowledge to enable interpretation of existing data gathered by other methods.

- To study unforeseen effects and processes not taken into consideration when the project was formulated.

- To avoid the actual collection of data influence on the quality of information gathered.

Figure 4.6: Group Interview (Aldiwan)

4.3.6 Group Interview (Aldiwan)

The effective researcher needs to grasp the culture and customs in the studied community. The author realised that Aldiwan could be an opportunity to attend meetings where street members come together and discuss daily life problems, identifying needs and possible solutions. The meetings helped elicit information on the impact both foreseen and
unforeseen of a project. This approach was time-effective and provided direct contact with beneficiaries involved. In such a group setting, participants stimulated each other; more was achieved in a few hours than by conducting lengthy individual interviews.

Discussion's points needed to be presented so they were clearly understood. Everyone wishing to say something was given the chance to express his opinion freely without showing either deference or disrespect. A further advantage was that participants tend to correct and corroborate each other, improving the data’s validity. Another benefit was direct contact with respondents in the form of both verbal and non-verbal responses, which gave insights into their views, attitudes, priorities and reactions.

A pitfall of the approach was that a few could dominate. In addition, discussions could be misleading especially for a researcher from a different background. Attendees in debates may not reveal information on attitudes and behaviours if feeling vulnerable or protective. The author with his brother’s help was able to attend meetings that broadened his knowledge, providing fresh vital information. In addition, he attended regularly meetings of his family’s Diwan.

To sum up, it possible to claim that a combination of research methods produces more complete and richer information than can be obtained by using each method on its own.

4.3.7 Difficulties in Conducting the Fieldwork

When doing her fieldwork in Gaza Strip, Roy (1995:10) realised that “There are many methodological difficulties in conducting research in the Palestinian Territories”. Although the author’s background has helped him to write from the heart of the events, it also exposed him to the following dilemmas:

- It limited field visits since the author is carrying a Palestinian passport; it is much more difficult to move within the Palestinian Territories for native Palestinians. The author’s attempt to gather information from the West Bank was time-consuming. To travel from Gaza to Ben Ziet University, it took about five hours due to various Israeli obstacles and checkpoints. On the other hand, due to the author’s nationality, he could not go on a field-visit (1998-1999) with MA students to Lebanon.

- The author, with neither relatives in the PNA nor with a declared political opinion supporting their position, had problems conducting fieldwork in Gaza Strip. It took three or four weeks to gain permission to visit the West Bank that others obtain in a few days or hours. The permission is issued by an Israeli –Palestinian liaison office.

- Weak institutional infrastructure restricts research opportunities. Studies are difficult to obtain. The author visited the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation for available information about refugees. Having persisted the author finally received a photocopy of two tables from a Norwegian report. Officials justified the delay: “it is a
confidential report”. The whole report had been published in 1993 and was available online.

- A problem of inaccessibility of data was made worse through friction between international, foreign agencies and non-governmental organisations. No culture of cooperation exists; instead, they are extremely guarded, reluctant to release information. The author found extensive duplication. Studies had been conducted by different organisations on the same subject, repeating each other, in some cases by the same local researchers.

- A fourth problem is data interpretation. It could be claimed that in a conflict subject such as the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, research always follows the author’s bias.

- Fieldwork offers an ‘on the ground’ example of the need for special skills. For instance, access to Elkarama was more problematic than anticipated. The first meeting in Elkarama was an appointment with the head of the local committees. He, a well-known police officer, asked the author to begin distributing the questionnaire in the evening when more likely to meet male households. The author was obliged to follow his direction. The first meeting was unpleasant. The author was confronted by suspicion, reluctance, and even insults from residents in block 13. I had to ‘plead’ that this survey was part of an academic research and not for political use. One resident asked to show him a security-pass. Eventually when accustomed to seeing the author in the project’s precinct, they started to treat him in a more humane manner.

- The above obstacles do not compare with problems encountered when the author went through Erez checkpoint on his way to Tel Aviv Airport. As a Palestinian he was required to pass a security check, enforced by a Russian teenager (a Jew newly immigrated Israel) who could not speak Arabic, or English and hardly spoke Hebrew. The soldier seized CDs, damaged the author’s computer with its documents. As a result, 280 digital photographs and other items were lost. However, the experience served the author to give testimony how the Israeli soldiers have become used to humiliating the Palestinian workers every morning.

### 4.3.8 Reflections from the Fieldwork

A case study’s quality depends to a great extent on the investigator’s quality (Robson, 1993). It is believed that one can not be a good researcher just by reading associated texts. Research is more than just reading which can be haphazard or just solving problems, which can remain merely pragmatic. Building on the above statements the author further endorses Zeisel’s description (1997:31): research is “a creative endeavour requiring a subtle blend of personal skill and impersonal order”. Balancing this relationship between personal conviction and dispassionate, scientific practice is essential in achieving meaningful results from fieldwork. Experience in the field provided essential practical skills. Fieldwork has had a pronounced influence on the author’s vision as a researcher and fieldwork surveyor. Difficulties, encounters and the gradual mollifying of hardened attitudes have brought home a range of lessons, such as: the need to use plain language when addressing residents and not
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asking questions they may fail to understand, or refuse to answer. Establish a social base to break through small talk and cliché answers, until resistance dissolves and real opportunities emerge for the researcher to see more than the semblance of truth. Reflections include:

- As a researcher, you must approach people recognising the knowledge they have acquired is more than an outsider or even a local surveyor.

- You should try to find contacts to facilitate your work: the gatekeeper Jom’a was a case in point. You must be humble interviewing less educated people, listen to their narratives while reading their eyes’ expression. You can learn more from non-verbal communications.

- Another lesson was appearance. In Gaza, it is a fact that appearance is important. When interviewing an essential informant or official, it is preferred the researcher wear formal clothes and behave in a formal manner. When meeting people, try to match in your demeanour to the class and background of those being interviewed.

- Be adaptive and flexible. Interviews may need to be postponed. This happened with appointments with architects, planners, and PNA officials. On different occasions, after long waiting in some cases, the author was told that the interviewee could not see him that day. Such uncertainties make having a contingency or alternative plan a good idea.

- The time scale and constant interruptions suggest the researcher should grasp any opportunity. Where facilities are weak, all opportunities to support your work should be seized: public lectures, watching TV interviews, and listening while riding a taxi, etc.

- The author’s bias: a detached and unbiased attitude may be preferable, but this ideal can not always be sustained, especially when the researcher is of the same culture as the group of interviewees and may understand certain unspoken aspirations and assumptions. In this context, the interviewee may be disinclined to explain the everyday course of life to someone deemed an insider who should know it already. This can lead to residents perhaps withholding significant information. Studying his society, a researcher can be at a disadvantage. However, his immediacy can provide the study with a sense of personal feeling, giving it character that it would otherwise not possess.

4.4 OTHER LEARNING TOOLS

Research is a long process requiring different techniques to formulate the hypothesis and questions. The first year of this research included activities with MA students introducing the author to post-conflict recovery as an academic topic. The following section demonstrates briefly the context and impact of a variety of learning tools in chronological order.
4.4.1 The Author's Participation in the Masters' Course of Post-war Recovery Studies (October 1997-February 1998) ²

Attending the MA of Post-war Recovery Studies modules helped the author understand and articulate the multifaceted issues of post conflict reconstruction. The four are, understanding conflict and international response, practical skills of working with communities in conflict, strategic planning and project evaluation and managerial, organisational and training skills. The course aims to:

- Analyse and understand the nature of conflict, the impact of war and its demands on local, national and international actors.

- Understand the recovery process through an exploration of the dynamics of rebuilding social, economic, psychological, political and physical frameworks of war-torn societies.

- Impart international principles and ethics of conflict resolution and peace building in relation to reconstruction and development.

- Provide technical, organisational and managerial training, designing intervention programmes, working with communities, project monitoring and evaluation.

4.4.2 Field visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan December 1997

Afghanistan has suffered from armed conflict for the last two decades. Since the Soviet invasion (1979-1989), the country has been afflicted, exasperated by civil war after the Soviet withdrawal. The crisis has attracted international organisations and NGOs. These circumstances validated a field visit that aimed to: “Investigate relief and reconstruction programmes, and achieve a better understanding of the peacebuilding framework in an Afghan context.”

The group examined the Urban Rehabilitation Programme, established by UNCHS Habitat, the project of Friendship Bridge, Madera a French NGO and its project Food for Work. The group attended Shuras and Jergas, traditional methods for consultation. In addition, the group went to a refugee camp in Jalalabad meeting with Taliban members.

The visit made the author aware of various and new concepts in post-conflict reconstruction. These thoughts include,

- The project of Friendship Bridge stresses that reconstruction can be used as a therapy and tool for peacebuilding.

- Habitat concept of “Small project, big impact.”

- Duplication, inefficiencies, multiplicity of agencies working in Afghanistan can lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

² Following the successful completion of the MA, the author transferred to prepare an MPhil-DPhil degree.
• When planning for post conflict reconstruction, a holistic reconstruction scale is required.

• Such schemes must create and protect livelihoods, and plan for the future. It aims to create a programme to give coherence and cohesion in relief and development efforts.

• The visit showed the benefit of the involvement of the community, offering a greater chance for self-sufficiency and bringing together people through physical activities.

4.4.3 Indigenous Recovery and Peacebuilding Workshop in Pakistan (11-13 December 1997)

During the field-visit in Afghanistan, a three days workshop was organised jointly by the PRDU and the Norwegian Church Aid in Pakistan. The workshop discussed issues of indigenous recovery and peacebuilding. Three themes under the focus were perceived as critical for recovery: first, the relief to development continuum and its role in peacebuilding; second, approaches to enhancing communities’ coping mechanisms; and third the cultural heritage and its relation to recovery. The workshop was enhanced by the participation of thirty representatives from local and international NGOs and UN agencies working in Afghanistan. The fifteen MA students started with a short presentation before each theme was discussed. The author expressed his feelings about cultural heritage and the need to preserve it in times of conflict. The event contributed to clarifying more concepts in the author’s mind and to support his own field-visit findings. The workshops helped to:

• Explore different aspects of recovery and peace building.

• Highlight strategic issues for the role of aid in Afghanistan.

• Inform strategies of concerned actors both local and international.

• Document the experience of participants, through a report for the benefit of a wider audience in the Aid Community for Afghanistan. (Ozerderm, 1998: 242)

4.4.4 From Rhetoric to Reality the Role of Aid in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan Workshop held in York 12-15 January 1998

In January 1998, the University of York hosted more than 60 participants from Afghan and international NGOs, donor communities, UN organisations and academic circles. The three days conference debated the move from rhetoric to the reality of how to build peace. In the workshops, the exponents of rhetoric were challenged to set workable, achievable goals for Afghan groups. Lessons from this important event

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include:

- There is interrelationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction activities.

- There is no need to invent new jargon in the language of recovery and peace building. These terms are only used in new project funding proposals, for example in the transforming the relief community into the new ‘commanders of poverty’ (Strand, 1998).

- It was feared that the relief agencies were taking on the much-criticised habits of Afghan commanders – not listening to people, and using relief funding for their own benefits.

- Aid could no longer be considered as welfare but should attempt to address underlying problems causing the conflict.

- Stress on Human Rights, adding there is ‘no solution without justice’ in a stable society.

- A process remote from the political and economic reality of the conflict country cannot achieve Peace.

4.4.5. Training at the Housing and Urban Development Corporation. March and April 1998

Jordan has been the country most affected by the Palestinian Israeli wars. The author received training in the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), the Jordanian government agency responsible for the housing and urban sector. In the aftermath of the 1948, 1967 wars a massive influx of Palestinians took refuge in Jordan. Nowadays, Palestinians exceed two million. Some have been integrated in the community and hold Jordanian passports, but a considerable number live in ten miserable refugee camps in Jordan. Other Palestinians squat on the outskirts of the capital Amman, indicating the unresolved shelter situation. The HUDC’s tasks can be described as: study, formulate and implement policies affecting the shelter sector, provide direct provision of housing units, upgrade under-serviced urban pockets, undertake projects jointly with/on behalf of the private sector to build-up the private sector’s performance/capability for the low-income target groups, help and encourage communities/local governments to participate in house production, provide housing for civil servants and military employees, and upgrade under-serviced areas on behalf of local governments and infrastructure authorities.

The author gave one of the corporations’ projects a particular concern, the urban upgrading of East Wehdat, which had been implemented in the 1980s. The project aimed to improve living conditions of about 400 families informally settled on an extremely undeveloped site. The corporation sought to enable these beneficiaries to secure land tenure and provide them with basic infrastructure, shelter and communal facilities. HUDC has received two international awards for the project success.
The author has gained a great deal of experience, staying forty days in HUDC. The East Wehdat provided an example of good practice from which much could be learned:

- The need for a specialised body to look after shelter crisis. This implies the existence of a policy to tackle crises.

- The project through physical and community development contributed to a better healthy and clean environment with acceptable standards of infrastructure services ensuring clean water delivery, waste collection, sewage disposal accompanied by medical care and a communal spirit raised through community facilities. It offered job opportunities through a project and training centre.

- Success was based on preserving and enhancing informal settlements, creating a satisfactory environment with amenities, good visual appearance, shelter quality and essential community services.

- Community participation in different stages of the project was a necessity. Social acceptance was achieved through:
  - Continuous communication with residents via socio-economic surveys, visits to families and through community centre activities.
  - Designing residential units according to their desire. The corporation architect had revised the proposed design at the beneficiaries’ request.
  - Being flexible in plot allocation, giving plots near roads to those having cars and allowing relatives to have adjacent plots.

- To ensure sustainability of a project,
  - The project set an example of achieving affordable solutions for housing by employing an incremental building concept, applying minimum acceptable standards, and providing low interest building loans.
  - Introducing new building regulations and planning criteria.
  - Creating awareness through training campaigns.
  - The project facilitated the self-help improvement of houses.
  - The corporation delivered tasks and partial responsibilities to local NGOs to foster the development programme.

The HUDC staff’s help in gathering experience and information has influenced positively the development of the author’s research and opened a new spectrum for his thinking.

4.4.6 Researching on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas Conference York
May 2000

The conference was organised jointly by PRDU and Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Over three days the participants discussed topics related to research in conflict areas. The Conference covered four themes: ethics of conducting research in conflict-affected areas, reflexivity to local circumstance: security, physical environment and cultural sensitivity, epistemological concerns for researching in conflict areas, and
appropriate research methods and data gathering techniques. From the conference recommendations, the author finds the following are the most relevant to this research:

- The way researchers interact with local communities is crucial to the success of the research process.
- There is no need for methodological tools to be reinvented but there is a huge need for sharing experiences and learning from each other; different researchers utilise research tools in many innovative ways.
- There is no need for formalised guidelines, which can be used in planning and implementing research in conflict areas.

The conference showed the need for such event to cover issues such as: confidentiality in the collection and dissemination of information, emotional issues during research in conflict area, dilemmas and challenges in the interpretation of data, who interprets it, and how, and issues of culture and respect for different cultures.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter addressed the research and fieldwork methodologies employed over the last three years. It introduced the research strategy, methods and the author’s gained experience through the course of this research.

The coming three chapters (5,6 and 7) present the fieldwork carried out in the Palestinian Territories
Chapter Five:
RECONSTRUCTION UNDER ADVERSITY, THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 1993-2000
5.1 INTRODUCTION

With the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in September 1993, there were high expectations for a quick recovery of the Middle East region. Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) agreed to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, to recognise mutual legitimate political rights and to strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity. By any measure, the changes worked out between the two parties in the Declaration of Principles (DoP) and the subsequent agreements have been historic. Consequently, Israel has re-deployed its military forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and from a number of population centres in the West Bank, with the exception of East Jerusalem. However, sensitive issues were left unresolved. Several subsequent agreements have been signed but only a few have been implemented. The international community showed its commitment to support the peace process by providing financial and technical assistance to foster the post-settlement recovery. The aim of this assistance was to provide tangible benefits to the Palestinian population quickly, equitably, and efficiently while laying the foundation for sustainable development over the long term (The World Bank, 1993:2). The uncertainties of the political situation and the slow implementation of the peace agreements have hindered Palestinian efforts to achieve their aims.

In this chapter, the author aims to portray the general situation in the Palestinian Territories in the aftermath of the peace agreements. The chapter discusses how the political process has moved forward with successive agreements as envisioned under the Declaration of Principles, reviewing the main events, phases, and arrangements. Further, the chapter examines the determinant factors of peace success such as: parties ripeness, third party intervention, and the provision of agreements.

Despite expectations that the last seven years would witness advancement in the quality of life for the Palestinian people, the chapter demonstrates how the economy has deteriorated due to the continuous Israeli policy of border-closure. Other factors such as emergence of monopolies and corruption, the decline of public morale, the increase of
unemployment, are discussed. The author ends the chapter by examining the situation of shelter in the Palestinian Territories.

5.2 THE ISRAELI PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

More than seven years have passed since Israel and the PLO concluded secret negotiations at Oslo that led to the extension of formal mutual recognition and the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on interim self-government arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. After the historic handshake between the Israeli Prime Minister (Yitzhak Rabin) and the PLO leader (Yassir Arafat) on the White House lawn on 13/9/1993, the road toward a just and durable peace has produced a mixture of significant accomplishments and disappointing failures. Despite the promising implementation at the early stage of the Oslo agreement, serious violations continued to confront the peace process. In November 1995, an Israeli extremist opposed to the agreements assassinated Prime Minster Rabin, a major counterpart in the process. Further in May 1996, a new government under the right wing in Israel was elected followed by a government led by a military General.

The scope of the Palestinian Israeli agreements was initially perceived as an asset. Nevertheless, the slow implementation has fed the mistrust between the two sides, as political relations deteriorated. The past four years have witnessed tremendous difficulties and obstacles that complicated the implementation of agreements signed and, therefore, reduced the expected benefits to the Palestinian side.

In the following pages, the author analyses the different factors, which have contributed to the success or failure of the process: Were the PLO and Israel ready to enter direct negotiations? What roles did third parties, Norway, and the United States in particular, play in the process that produced the Oslo accords? What are the main provisions of the agreements? Did the accords address the conflict root causes? What accounts for the breakdown of the peace process?

5.2.1 Ripeness for Peace

Chapter two of this research showed that peace could be difficult to achieve if both parties were not in a state of ripeness. Makovsky (1996:15) identified several factors that impelled Israel to enter direct negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. By late 1992 and early 1993, it became apparent to the Israeli government that the PLO had been severely weakened by the end of the Cold War and by the aftermath of the Gulf War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the PLO was deprived of a historically important source of diplomatic support and military training. In addition, the PLO’s annual budget was
cut by one half after Kuwait and Saudi Arabia stopped their contributions in retaliation for the PLO's alignment with Iraq in the Gulf War. Therefore, the PLO was forced to shut down several institutions and to curtail many of its activities in the occupied territories. In the Israeli viewpoint, a politically and financially weaker PLO not only posed a reduced threat to Israel but also made it a potentially more malleable and receptive negotiating partner. Furthermore, Savir (1998:10) indicated that the Israeli government came to realise those previous efforts to create a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza that would exclude the PLO's leadership, had failed 1. The Israeli leadership therefore sought to exploit the Oslo channel as a secret forum to reach compromises on issues that seemed to impede progress.

According to Makovsky (1996:17), Israeli leadership expected to reap three important benefits for Israel as a result of the direct negotiations with the PLO,

- First, a deal with the PLO would reduce the incidence of resistance and bomb suicides and thereby enhance the personal security of the citizens of the Israeli State.

- Second, striking a bargain with Israel would give the PLO added incentive to combat radical Islamic groups committed to the destruction of the Jewish State, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

- Lastly, reaching agreement with the PLO would enhance prospects for resolving long-standing disputes between Israel and neighbouring Arab states.

**Motivations for the PLO**

While the Jewish State sought to negotiate directly with the PLO due to security considerations, the PLO's participation in the Oslo channel represented the culmination of the organisation's long-standing quest for Israeli and USA recognition and eventual creation of an independent Palestinian state. Mahmoud Abbas (1995:39) noted that beginning with the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in March 1974, the PLO sought on numerous occasions to establish contacts with peace-oriented Israeli individuals and organisations 2. According to Abbas, dozens of such meetings were held focusing on the establishment of a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

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1 As Director-General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir was his country's chief negotiator with the PLO between 1993 and 1996.

2 Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen), a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO and head of the PLO's Department for National and International Relations, served as a key adviser to Yasser Arafat during the negotiations.
The PLO continued to seek a channel with the Israeli government. Such a secret channel, Abbas noted, would allow negotiations to take place with a minimum of formalities in a setting that would enable everyone to talk freely and probe matters without inhibition. The PLO’s determination was further reinforced by the heavy toll inflicted on the Palestinians by harsh Israeli policies and by the rapidly deteriorating economic and social conditions in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, Makovsky (1996:22) pointed out that PLO leaders entered the Oslo process believing that their compliance with an interim agreement for the territories would inexorably result in Palestinian statehood. Abbas (1995:45) confirmed this view by noting that “The mechanism by which the terms of the Oslo Accord will be implemented will eventually give rise to the emergence and crystallisation of many features of sovereignty, and this process will go on until complete national sovereignty is realised.”

5.2.2 Third Parties: Norway and the US

Miall et al (1999) demonstrated that establishing a secret and unofficial Israeli-PLO back-channel was the idea of Terje Larsen, a Norwegian sociologist who, along with Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland and his Israeli counterpart Yossi Beilin, helped to set up several rounds of exploratory discussions in Oslo beginning January 1993. Held under the cover of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, the initial talks involved two Israeli academics, and three PLO officials. Makovsky (1996:17) and Savir (1998:19) provided ample evidence that after the talks were elevated to an official level in late May 1993, Larsen, Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst, played critical roles in advancing the talks. In addition, he provided liaison between Oslo, PLO and Israel. The three Norwegians offered their good offices and on more than one occasion managed to bridge gaps between the parties. Foreign Minister Holst was instrumental in extracting mutual concessions that led to agreement on several difficult issues in the DoP, and he played an essential role in proposing acceptable wording regarding mutual recognition. Abbas (1995:61) emphasised that in addition to assuring utmost secrecy and providing a congenial atmosphere for the talks, Holst’s integrity in relaying ideas and choosing subjects for discussion with both sides was critically important for cementing mutual trust among the interlocutors.

On the other hand, Makovsky (1996:22) confirmed that the US had been aware of the Oslo channel when it was informed by the Norwegians of the secret negotiations. Several factors may have accounted for the American orientation toward Oslo and the mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. To the present day, US remains the sole and only
mediator. With suspicion, Edward Said (2000) wrote “US mediation has been dominated by Israeli lobby officials and a president whose ideas about the Middle East were those of a Christian fundamentalist Zionist.” Said (1998) argued that American Zionism has a very active role during the period of the ‘peace process’. It seems that mediation in United State policy is another thing far from bringing the two parties together to grasp every available opportunity to make peace. Murray (1995) indicated how US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had developed quite a strange way of describing what the role of ‘honest mediator’ means in practice. According to Albright the Israeli and Palestinian leaders were like trapeze artists who had to jump and reach for each other in mid air. She commented “What the US tries to do is to help the jumpers to understand the moment, so they can all synchronise their jump and catch each other. If for some reason they do not catch each other, we are the safety net. But the leaders themselves have to be jumpers.” As a matter of fact, Phill Reeves in the Independent, 10/9/2000 reported that “America's credibility as mediator had long been questioned by Palestinians, and with reason.” He quoted an Israeli source that said, “The Palestinians always complain that we know the details of every proposal from the Americans before they do”. The source continued “There is good reason for that: we write them.” Said (1998) commented on the United States’ biased position as a mediator stating that

The United States has been a terrible ‘sponsor’ of the peace process. It has succumbed to Israeli pressure on everything, abandoning the principle of land for peace …pushing the lifeless Palestinian leadership into deeper and deeper holes to suit …[the Israelis’] preposterous demands.

Having reviewed the two parties’ motivations for the peace and the third party mediation, it has become clear that the PLO was not negotiating from a position of maximum strength, but of maximum weakness. The Israelis knew that PLO was in a weakened position and it was ready for a revolutionary change while on the other hand Palestinian side had no power. This of course affected the process and produced fragile agreements.

5.2.3 Agreement Provision: Postponing the Root Causes

On September 28, 1995 the Israeli and Palestinian sides reached the transitional agreement. They agreed to establish a Palestinian Authority through free and direct general elections of a Palestinian Legislative Council representing the people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Palestinians of Jerusalem. Since then, the Council has assumed its limited legislation and power in the Palestinian Territories. PNA is the first national authority established on Palestinian land in modern history.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date Signed</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Key provisions and target Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1991</td>
<td>Madrid Peace Conference</td>
<td>Inaugurated two separate yet Parallel tracks of negotiations to achieve just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Ten rounds of negotiations follow from 1991-1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 29, 1994</td>
<td>Protocol on Economic Relations</td>
<td>Codified economic relations between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israel for the interim period in monetary fiscal and trade relations.</td>
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<td>May 4, 1994</td>
<td>Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo agreement, Gaza-Jericho agreement)</td>
<td>Established framework for transfer of power and responsibilities to PNA. Agreed on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho. PNA to assume authority in Gaza Strip and Jericho in all spheres except those related to final status issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 1994</td>
<td>Agreement on preparatory Transfer of powers and responsibilities (Early Empowerment Agreement)</td>
<td>Israel transferred authority in the West Bank to PNA in education and culture, health social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and vat on local production in December 1994. Parties to explore possible expansion of transfer of powers to other spheres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 1995</td>
<td>Protocol of further transfer of powers and responsibilities</td>
<td>Israel transferred authority in the West Bank in agriculture, census and statistics, energy, insurance, labour, local government, postal services, and trade and industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 1996</td>
<td>Amendment of PLO Charter</td>
<td>Palestinian National Council voted to amend charter and delete clauses that contradict the agreements signed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reconstruction under Adversity


Oct. 23, 1998 Wye River Memorandum Facilitation of implementation of the Interim Agreement. Further re-deployment from the West Bank Operation of Gaza international airport The safe passage to be opened between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip


Sept. 13, 1999 Permanent status talks resume (Erez, Sept 13, 1999)

July 2000 Permanent status negotiation Camp David (USA) Nothing has been achieved

October 2000 Regional Summit, Egypt Commitments to resume talks as soon as the violence ceases.

Table 5.1: The Palestinian Israeli Agreements and their Key Provisions

Source: Byrnen (1999:29) Adopted by the Author.

Also the lengthy and detailed agreements confirmed the process of expanding the territorial and functional control of the PNA. It contained a number of articles related to re-deployment, transfer of jurisdictional and functional control, governance, water rights, taxation, and co-ordinating mechanisms. The agreement detailed the composition of an elected Palestinian Legislative Council and its executive authority, including a directly and popularly elected president. After the initial re-deployment of Israeli forces, Palestinian elections were to be held under international supervision through the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The president and Palestinian Legislative Council were to hold office for an initial period of up to five years.

Though the agreement could be seen as a historical breakthrough, it has failed to meet the Palestinian people’s aspiration for a just peace. The European Union (2000) doubted the justice of it, stating the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation produced vulnerable peace accords which:

- Offered no interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, therefore no guiding principles on which to base the talks. Each party therefore interpreted them differently as regards territory.
Reconstruction under Adversity

- Provided legitimacy for direct negotiations between the parties, which inhibited outside powers from playing a role to ensure fair play.

- Never defined the end goal, but left the controversial questions of Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders, and security to negotiations in a second phase. It has been assumed that these issues would be discussed at later date.

Regarding the last point, the two parties have left crucial and sensitive issues to later final negotiations, which was considered as a potential threat for renewed confrontations with the Israeli army in the West Bank and Gaza. They started negotiating these issues in September 1999; however, no sign of success has been reported. In the following a brief review is offered to highlight how these issues affect the ongoing reconstruction and development in the Palestinian Territories:

**Land and Sovereignty**

The Palestinians officials have been outspoken about their insistence upon Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as their capital. However, an accurate reading of the many agreements shows the main feature of these is the division of the West Bank and Gaza into three zones each with a different mix of Palestinian and Israeli responsibility. According to Byrnen (1999:33), it includes,

- Area A, which comprises the major cities in the West Bank. In area A, the Palestinian Authority has complete authority for civilian security.

- Area B comprises all other Palestinian population centres except some refugee camps and totals 27 percent of the West Bank

- Area C comprising 72 percent of the West Bank including all Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, military bases and areas some on private Palestinian land and state lands. Israel retains sole security authority, which covers most of the territory including agricultural land, the Jordan valley in the West Bank and the coastal zone in Gaza nature reserves, areas with lower population density, Israeli settlements, and designated military areas were assigned to zone c.

It was agreed that “In order to maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, and to promote their economic growth and the demographic and geographical links between them, the parties would protect the normal and smooth movement of people vehicles and goods within the West Bank and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” The agreement did not address territorial control of Jerusalem, as that issue was reserved for final status negotiation.
Under the right-wing government 1996-1999, the two parties reached an understanding memorandum called Wye River. The Wye River Memorandum was supposed to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the other related agreements. The main provision of the memorandum was a further re-deployment of 13 percent from area C: 1 percent to Area A and 12 percent to Area B and 14.2 from Area B to Area A.

According to Aronson (1997:25), the Oslo agreement secured the critical recognition by the Palestinians of the legal rights of Israel related to Government and Absentee land located in areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian territories. This was a crucial concession on the part of the Palestinians since by the time the original DoP was signed Israel already had classified substantial portions of the West Bank as State land. Aronson estimated that from just under 50 to just 70 percent of the total land area fell under this category. The agreement also established a precedent for the continuation of settlements and their expansion even in the case of their transfer to nominal Palestinian control (Aronson, 1997:36).

The agreements granted new land confiscation under two pretexts: for infrastructure, such as water and sewers; and to enable the construction of bypass roads between settlements and around Palestinian population centres (Aronson, 1997:36).

Due to the above, PNA has faced many obstacles and challenges to any prospective recovery. Among the most significant problems and complexities are the following,

- The fact that Israel is still an occupier.

- The differences in the level of its jurisdiction levels in Zone A, B and C distract PNA’s efforts. For example; Palestinian official institutions and NGOs enjoy more freedom in Zone A, and in specific sectors, but have limited powers in zones B and C especially in areas such as zoning water, and security.

- The current overlap between the PNA jurisdictions in the various Palestinian zones and those of the occupation authority causes different and sometimes contradictory Palestinian priorities in the three zones. Such as overlap causes differences in approach concerning the best means to achieve an integrated Palestinian development plan.
Figure 5.1: A, B and C Zones in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (2000)
Source: Foundation for the Middle East Peace, http://www.finep.org
Reconstruction under Adversity

The Israeli Settlements

The Oslo agreement secured a protection for the Israeli settlements and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the interim period. The protections include:

- No settlement would be evacuated during the 5-year interim period scheduled to end in May 1999.

- Exclusion of settlements, settlers, vital arteries, main roads, water pipelines, electrical and telephone lines, and water resources from any Palestinian jurisdiction, interference, or control.

- The creation of blocks of settlements, where the territorial continuity between them has been assured.

- Extensive and complex arrangements for security co-operation between Israeli and Palestinian military, police, and internal security forces.

- Limitation on the size armaments and jurisdiction of Palestinian security forces.

- Continuing Israeli supervision over the use and registration of all lands.

- Limitations on Palestinian land use near settlement areas and continuing Israeli control over Palestinians' zoning and land use decisions (Aronson, 1997:38).

The agreement does not give the Palestinians the right to exercise any kind of authority over the settlements and the settlers. It cited that

Settlers and Israelis in the autonomous areas would under no circumstances be placed under Palestinian authority, even in criminal matters. Thus, Palestinian legislation can not deal with a security issue, which falls under Israeli responsibility, or seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests protected by this agreement.

These settlements and the Israeli Defence Forces have been locked in a symbiotic embrace. Settlements require the army to protect them and limit the power that Israel can cede to the PNA. The Israeli Army which still wants to control the occupied territories after a final settlement, requires the mission of protecting settlements if it is not to become simply an army of occupation. It has become clearer than ever that Israel does not intend to remove more than a small ratio of settlers and settlements as part of a negotiated end of the Israeli Palestinian conflict.
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The Palestinian Refugees

The Palestinian refugee problem originates from the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948. In the course of this conflict, and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War, some three-quarters of a million Palestinians were expelled from the land occupied by the State of Israel. The refugees settled in many areas: the Jordanian-Controlled West Bank, the Egyptian-Controlled Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon and further afield. Later, a further three hundred thousand Palestinians were displaced after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in June 1967. Within the parameters of international law, it is understood that a displaced person has the right to return to his/her home according to his/her willingness. These parameters are applicable to the Palestinian refugees. The right of their return to their home has been recognised by the international community and expressed through the UN resolution (194), which declared:

Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible.

According to Zuriek (1997:3), Palestinian refugees and their descendants means any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period from 1 June 1946 to
Reconstruction under Adversity

15 May 1948 and who lost both their home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. Since the displacement issue remains unresolved, the refugee population has grown. In February 2000, although some 3,677,882 refugees were registered with UNRWA in its various operations, it should be noted that this number represents only about half of all Palestinians world-wide.

**The Refugee Issue and the Peace Process**

So far, the peace agreements have failed to produce a solution for the Palestinian refugees issue. The peace process has based its scope on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 without any reference to the primary Resolution 194 embodying the Palestinian’s right to return. Resolutions 244 and 338 call for “...a just settlement of the problem of the refugees”. This formulation does not exceed what was contained in the preface of the agreements “That the permanent status negotiation will lead to the implementation of both resolution 242 and 338” (Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 1994). The negotiation arrangements have been in harmony with Israeli strategy of not facing the refugee issue since it has not been a priority for the Palestinian negotiator. This trend has confirmed Israeli policy of treating the refugees as a demographic concern. It anticipated a solution based on the formula of rehabilitation and resettlement, having invalidated the right to return.

These uncertainties toward major issues laid the burden on the Palestinian policy makers. Despite the fact that the peace negotiation produced unsatisfactory agreements, Palestinians complain that Israel has never honoured its signature. The Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2000) summarised the violations:

- Delay in re-deployment of Israeli forces from Palestinian territories: based on the peace agreement signed as shown in different places and time. Re-deployment from 90% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip should have been implemented, although in reality there has only been re-deployment from less than 10% of the total area.
- Delay of implementation of the safe passage for Palestinians: creating a safe passage for the free movement of Palestinians and goods between the West Bank and Gaza Strip has still to be implemented.

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This definition does not include all the Palestinian refugee categories such as:

- Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War who settled in other places other than UNRWA areas of operation, for example, Egypt, North African countries, Iraq, and the Gulf States.
- Residents from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and their descendants who were displaced for the first time in the 1967 war.
- Palestinians who became refugees in 1948 but their pride prevented them from accepting UNRWA registration.
• Opposition to the operation of the airport and seaport; allowing Palestinians to operate a seaport has still to be implemented.

• Continuation of settlement activity: there has been continued activity in building new settlements and the expansion of existing settlements, in addition to the confiscation of Palestinian lands, although these activities were to have ceased.

• Enforcement of closure policies: there has been a continued policy to close the West Bank and Gaza Strip off from one another creating segregation and economic hardship: this is in addition to inaccessibility to Israel.

• Continued arrests and collective punishment: these antagonistic activities based on policies of occupation were to cease.

• Blockage of development projects and economic growth: the obstruction of infrastructure projects and economic projects such as industrial estates are clear violations of the rights awarded the Palestinians in the peace agreements. This includes the right to import and export freely, which is also being blocked.

• The withholding of tax revenues: Israel has been withholding funds due to the Palestinians.

• The reports claimed that these violations in addition to others committed by the Israeli government lead to feelings of mistrust and insecurity, social instability and create a hostile environment inappropriate for healthy reconstruction and development.

5.3 PEACEBUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION

With the emergence of peace in the Middle East, the International community showed commitment to provide a lifeline to the peace process by fostering reconstruction activities. The World Bank (1993) explained that such assistance aimed to provide tangible benefits to the Palestinian population quickly, equitably, and efficiently while laying the foundation for sustainable development over the long-term reconstruction. Khader (1999:112) noted that groups of donor countries have been established, such as (1) United Nations Special Coordination Office which had a mandate to co-ordinate UN agencies and facilitate processes on the ground, (2) Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC): an international committee, chaired by Norway, including key donors (EU, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and US) (3) Local Aid Coordination Committee: LACC was established by AHLC to accelerate the development efforts in the Palestinian Territories.

Such assistance would open the way to build the inceptive state and its economy. Despite many challenges. The World Bank (1993), the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (1993) and different Israeli politicians promised to achieve a long-term recovery taking into account the capabilities and potentials of the Palestinian society. The parties stressed of the following main opportunities that constitute the main pillars of such thinking.
5.3.1 Opportunities

The Palestinian Human Resources According to the World Bank (1993:2) the Palestinian community was noted to be blessed with a high-quality human resource base with a large percentage of its population with degrees in higher education. Despite the significant interruption caused by the Israeli occupation, there has been no shortage of either enlightened talent or professional skills. Joseph Stiglitz the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of World Bank (1999:5) argued that the Palestinians community was blessed with excellent people. Its general development indicators including life expectancy, literacy, and child mortality rates have been among the best in the Middle East and North Africa region. The Palestinian human resources must represent the first pillar on which a Palestinian reconstruction strategy should be based. In this context, the Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) considered human resources as the principal driving force for the realisation of reconstruction and development of the Palestinian State. The Plan attributed the argument to the following facts

- The Palestinian work force has enjoyed a relatively high standard of education. It was characterised by diverse and top-level skills acquired in numerous fields.
- There was the unique trait that distinguished the Palestinian people: resilience and resourcefulness, in the face of impediments and under difficult conditions.
- The Palestinian private sector has been highly active and resourceful on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip with a demonstrated ability to operate under challenging conditions. The removal of constraints, establishing support institutions, and infrastructure would consolidate the role of the private sector generating economic development. This would assist in creating job opportunities for the Palestinian community and alleviate their difficult circumstances.

Diwan and Sha’ban (1999) added that successful Palestinian entrepreneurs in Europe and the United States could help the Palestinian economy through networks and capital.

World Sympathy it was believed that the continuous Israeli victimisation of Palestinians could motivate more international assistance to help the Palestinians overcome their financial and technical obstacles. The World Bank (1993a: 12) added that the strategic location of the Palestinian Territories is a good prospect for attracting international official assistance to help overcome infrastructure bottlenecks and deficiencies. The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (1996:9) mentioned the fact “There is an unprecedented international interest in the region that has emerged as a direct result of the peace process.
Reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis has fundamental support reflected in the generous aid committed to the Palestinian people. The Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) assumed that such aid would continue to flow over the next years. The Plan presumed that all of the money pledged by donors in the different Conferences to support Middle East peace and development would be disbursed over time to finance most of the vital investment projects especially the physical and social infrastructure sectors. The Plan also assumed that such international financial support would be accompanied by an increasing international political support in order to relieve the situation in the Palestinian Territories and to help advance the peace process so as to get the region out of the current state of instability and volatility.

**Location and Cultural Asset** There was a prospect that the strategic location of the Middle East and particularly Palestine could be an opportunity. It has a distinct location with a wide collection of potential resources to attract both capital and tourists. According to the Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) the availability of rich archaeological, religious and tourist attractions, and consequently, the possibility of promoting and marketing the West Bank and Gaza Strip as international commercial, financial and tourist centres represented an opportunity. Under peaceful and stable conditions, and through regional projects, Palestine could play a central role in strengthening economic ties within all neighbouring countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) and throughout the region. There were centres of attraction for believers throughout the world owing to the historic, religious and holy status they enjoy in Islam and Christianity. In addition, it was assumed that the distinct location of the Gaza Strip might be utilised as a connecting link between East and West in the fields of commerce and finance at both the regional and international levels. The Gaza Strip beaches could be exploited to attract part of the tourist activities coming to the Middle East from the rest of the world.

**Right time for a Newcomer** The World Bank (1993:4) indicated that the time for emergence of the Palestinian identity was a real opportunity. The Bank argued that unlike most other developing countries, Palestine did not have to deal with the burden of the crushing external debt. Therefore, there was no need to undertake structural reform measures similar to those taken in a number of developing countries. This in itself was an advantage that should make the starting point less complicated. The Palestinian Development Programme (1998-2001) cited another advantage of the current time for reconstruction, that Palestinian policy makers did not need to follow old-fashioned policies.
According to Diwan and Sha’ban (1999) the Palestinians were newcomers to the world of development. they could learn from the mistakes and successes of others in policy formulation and implementation. This meant that the PNA must adopt successful theories. According to the Palestinian Development Programme (1998-2001), the Palestinian Authority tends to adopt a market mechanism in allocating resources. This implied entrusting the private sector with a leading role in the economic activity, and establishment of a genuine partnership between the private and the public sectors where the latter acts to prepare the administrative, organisational and institutional framework effectively and efficiently; and calls for integration with the world economy in order to benefit from the opportunities offered by such integration.

**Developmental Culture** Development schemes were assumed to be facilitated through the strong ties among the Palestinian community. Due to cultural and religious incentives, Palestine has historically been characterised by a high degree of popular participation in developing responses to emerging circumstances. Before the 1948 war, Palestinians shared each other’s resources to build houses for the poor, participated annually in harvesting crops. These communal habits still exist, having been passed onto the present generation. Diwan and Sha’ban (1999:9) stressed the fact that “There is a vibrant and well-organised civil society. Many institutions were formed during occupation to deliver public services, which were not adequately provided by the Israeli occupation.” The Palestinian Human Development Report (1998) mentioned that the first few years of the Intifada witnessed large-scale participation by a wide spectrum of social and political parties. The report showed a public opinion survey, which indicated that 24% of the population took a direct role in political social and economic activities in support of the Intifada. This has established maturity within the Palestinian community, through the many development programmes initiated during the last three decades.

Considering these structural potentials, Palestinian planners and policy-makers had real opportunities for success. This would be facilitated by experience gained of several Palestinian attempts, which have been made over the last twenty years to produce a survival strategy sometimes, and development strategy in others. In the following, the author reviews briefly the most serious endeavours.

**First: Local Palestinian Initiative**

The development experience of Palestinian society under Israeli occupation was unique in terms of its thought, content, and objectives, especially given the absence of a
Palestinian State. The formulation of strategy was in reality a reaction to a way of life imposed by the Israeli occupation. In the early 1980s, the slogan development in service of steadfastness was adopted. A conference, which was convened in 1983 to examine this concept, lasted several months, concluding with recommendations from many local institutions and individual leaders. In 1986, another conference was held on financing the development process including sources of financing, the location of those sources and foreign development plans. These and other conferences and seminars gradually became nation-wide activities. According to the Palestinian Human Development Report (1998:17) the Palestinian experience of development took different forms in order to cope with the weakening of the social economic and political structures and with the concepts and cultural patterns which emerged under the occupation. In addition, Palestinians had to initiate mechanisms to resist the occupation and protect steadfastness.

In the absence of a state, local institutions, various NGOs, charitable societies, and political parties held part of the responsibility. Despite the inadequate structures and visions of some of these institutions, and in spite of the disruption of the role played by previous traditional institutions, they made a crucial contribution to the general performance, cohesion and continuity of Palestinian society.

In the light of a variety of challenges, local initiatives played a central role in the establishment of institutions and cushioned the effects of the transitions to Israeli occupation. Palestinian NGOs, political parties, and organisations began to bond the societies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip together, thus promoting a single unified identity. In addition, NGOs expanded the capacity of local people and provided services.


In the wake of the Declaration of a Palestinian government in exile in November 1988, it was agreed to set up a Palestinian Plan. The PLO Department of Economic and Planning Affairs began to prepare a general programme to develop a Palestinian national economy for the years 1994-2000. This programme was published in July 1993. The cost of the plan's activities was estimated to be $11.6 billion at the year of its publication (1993). The Programme was designed on a number of important assumptions, rectifying the deficiencies originating from the occupation, creating job opportunities, developing infrastructure, encouraging the export sector, and constructing houses. According to a Palestinian official, the programme was not appropriate to the Palestinian situation where it assumed that full

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control and sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would exist. Further, it assumed the availability of funds for reconstruction activities, which have never been sufficient. However, the programme provided a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the Palestinian Territories where it still represents an important resource for researchers, planners and programmers in Palestine.

**Third: The World Bank and the Donor Countries Plan**

Another plan was formulated by the World Bank and was named the Emergency Assistance Programme for the Occupied Territories (EAP). The overall objective of the EAP is to provide tangible benefits to the Palestinian population quickly, equitably, and efficiently while laying the foundation for sustainable development over the long term (World Bank, 1994: 1). The programme considered four assumptions,

- The Occupied Territories were inheriting very weak and fragmented institutions with little capacities for preparing and implementing development programmes.
- Further, it was expected that the Palestinian administration would be slow and complicated.
- Large uncertainties about a number of issues critical to development there. These uncertainties include, the political settlement, the economic future of the region and the speed of creating Palestinian institutions.
- An urgent need to show the people the fruit of peace. This meant investments in public infrastructure, supporting private sector, poverty alleviation and employment creation programmes. The programme addressed two objectives: to maximise Palestinian inputs, and to promote speedy implementation capacity.

The EAP plan commenced with the highest priority tasks and reconstruction needs in the first three years of PNA. The programme focused on ‘quickly removing bottlenecks’ which included rehabilitating and upgrading public facilities and services in key sectors such as economy, transport: water supply and wastewater, solid waste management; power; municipal roads and facilities; housing; telecommunications; and agriculture. (The World Bank, 1994: 3). The World Bank co-ordinated with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and with the donor groups to,

- Launch rehabilitation and maintenance activities that make better use of existing infrastructure.
- Support a temporary work plan to help alleviate immediate poverty and unemployment pressures.
• Concentrate efforts on areas where living standards are especially low as in Gaza.

• Support investments that will help correct existing imbalances in access to services, particularly in rural areas.

• Maximise the use of local inputs, particularly skilled labour. Where necessary, however, outside expertise should be tapped selectively to supplement local capacity.

• Make use of all locally available capacity for programme implementation, including the Palestinian NGOs, universities, and research centres.

• Emphasise training and institution building particularly for the management of development programmes.

• Initiate feasibility studies and technical analyses to provide the basis for longer-term investments.

• Institute mechanisms for efficient and transparent procurement, accounting monitoring and reporting to ensure effective use of funds.

• Ensure sufficient flexibility to permit ready incorporation of changes dictated by the unfolding peace negotiations, actual experience with implementation and the results of the various feasibility studies and technical analyses.

There is no doubt that the programme helped the PNA to lay the foundation for its institutional building. After two years of its establishment, the PNA was able to produce its first Development and Reconstruction Plan. In 1997, the PNA introduced its first three years programme.

Fourth: The Palestinian National Authority Development Plan

According to the Palestinian National Authority Development Programme (1999:2001) the plan aimed at policies, which must be followed on the national and local levels, as well as on the levels of the different ministries, institutions and units. The Plan identified priorities to be adopted in the plan’s three years in order to surmount the pressing obstacles and face the challenges standing in the way of development. In view of the difficulties and constraints, the PNA aspired to realise the following four major goals during the time span of this development Plan. These goals were (1) economic growth and employment generation, (2) rural revival and development, (3) improving social conditions/human resources development and (4) development of financial institutions. The PNA claimed that it sought policies to achieve balance and integration among various sectors of the economy to ensure the realisation of comprehensive and well-rounded development. These policies included support for basic infrastructure projects, ensuring adequate access to
basic public services such as telecommunication, roads, transportation, and health and educational facilities. They also included policies targeted towards the agriculture sector such as credit institutions and co-operative societies, as well as extension services and scientific research. Policies encouraging the private sector to invest in export industries and establish promotion and marketing centres and institutions which contribute to the generation of new employment opportunities to absorb the surplus manpower and solve the unemployment problem to the level which the economy can sustain. Examples of these policies are Rehabilitating and Developing Physical Infrastructure and enhancing the role of public institutions.

The ambitious plan has been facing numerous obstacles. These have been related to the nature of the transitional stage in the peace process.

5.3.2 Challenges

Since its establishment, the PNA has been charged with a new kind of challenge. Continuing to encounter the negative impact of the occupation, the PNA has become responsible for the task of spearheading the reconstruction process. Below the author surveys the obstacles facing the reconstruction in Palestine.

Weak Performance of the Palestinian National Authority

Said (2000) guessed that Palestinian frustration and anger changed to be directed at the Palestinian leadership. Said claimed that the leadership has led its people astray with false promises, and maintained a battery of corrupt officials holding down commercial monopolies even as they negotiate incompetently and weakly on the people’s behalf. The Palestinian Human Development report (2000:6) admitted the fact that after six years of the establishment of the PNA, there has been an absence of unified recovery visions. This led to confusion and conflict within its institutions, and presented it with challenges. This situation hindered the PNA from assuming its leading role in development. Each ministry and public institution continued to formulate its own development policies according to a limited vision and without referring to a comprehensive nationally embraced one.

A report prepared jointly by the World Bank and Japan (2000) blamed what it called the ‘disappointing’ level of PNA’s activity since 1993 on a complex legal system and weak judicial system, increasing reports of public sector corruption, and the murky operations of PNA linked commercial enterprises. Roy (1998) argued that the PNA was increasingly seen as corrupt, dysfunctional and lacking credibility. Political power was divided far less along faction, ideological and nationalist lines than along positional lines -for or against PNA.

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example- with direct correlation to social class. According to a survey conducted by the Development Studies Programme in Ber Ziet University (1998), a significant number of government institution employees believed that there were no clear policies or plan for their institutions. A large percentage of those employees did not feel that they had job security and did not find their work conditions adequate. The majority maintained that they did not participate, while the Palestinian Development Programme admitted that most PNA institutions did not have clear administrative procedure nor an organisational structure, which led to the overlap of responsibilities between them. Officially authorised comprehensive guidelines containing the laws, regulations and procedures for managing the organising between the various sectors and authorities and developing the capacity of the ministries and institutions, have not been formulated as yet. This has led to a poor level of productive co-ordination between ministries and institutions. The Palestinian Human Development report (2000:9) noted that:

- The role of the Ministerial Cabinet vacillated between that of an executive body and a political one. This vacillation made it difficult to evaluate its development performance, especially in the absence of a development vision that directed its work although there was a written statement about the work plans and policies of the ministerial cabinet.

- The ministerial cabinet had not established clear structures for ministries and public institutions.

- There were increased numbers of employees in the governmental sector.

- There was the phenomenon of power centres within institutions and ministries, along with duplication, conflict and overlapping of authority; laws also differed between the West Bank and the Gaza strip.

- The absence of laws, regulations and instructions that govern work in Ministries and public institutions sometimes results in misspending of public funds and in misuse of official positions. This could be seen in practices such as exceeding the general budget and the participation of some officials as investors or board members in private companies.

- There were no laws that regulate the work and specify the specialisation of the existing nine security bodies. Therefore, there was much overlapping and duplication in their work and the number of people belonging.

**Donor Policies**

Diwan (1999:5) claimed that at the time of the ‘Declaration of Principles’ donors were caught by surprise and had little time to prepare projects and their approach to aid. He explained that despite initial delay, by mid 1995 appropriate mechanisms to share information and to a lesser extent, to formulate development policy and prioritise investment...
were in place to permit a smoother flow of assistance. At the October 1993 Conference to *Support Middle East Peace*, the international community committed itself to jump-start the Palestinian economy and pledged $2.4 billion over the ensuing five years. Additional pledges contributed by 38 countries and several international organisations raised the total pledged to $3.4 billion. About three-quarters of the assistance pledge was on grant terms, the remainder consists of loans, mostly on concessional terms.

![Figure 5.3: Aid Fluctuation between 1994 and 1999. Source: The World Bank-Japan Report (2000)](image)

The inflow of aid coincided with the establishment of PNA ministries to address donors directly. The donors had managed to achieve disbursement levels successfully and established institutions for channelling assistance. Unlike the experience in many developing countries, according to the joint World Bank-Japanese report (2000), donor countries had disbursed more than $2.7 billion since the first donors’ conference in Washington in 1993. It pointed out that donor aid has helped to build and sustain a Palestinian administration to provide a broad range of services to its population, as well as offset economic decline and put in place the infrastructure for future economic growth and social development. Aid declined in recent years as donor countries had shifted from supporting emergency government expenditure and recurrent costs to financing only infrastructure projects. However, the aid amount to infrastructure did not increase in absolute terms. The report clarified that donor aid had declined from 18 per cent of the GDP in 1994 to 11 per cent in 1999. According to figures supplied by the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation, donor aid had declined over the years. While commitments in 1994 have reached $819 million, disbursements did not exceed $515 million. In the
following year, 1995, commitments dropped to $638 million and disbursements also dropped to $417 million. With the difficult year of 1996 that witnessed many closure days and restriction on movement, commitments increased to $789 million to offset the difficulties caused by Israeli policies. However, disbursements stopped at $512 million. In 1997, commitments dropped again to $622 million and disbursements remained at $513 million. However, in the following year, 1998, while commitments reached $666 million, only $409 million was disbursed, and in 1999, commitments dropped to $547 million and only $417 million were disbursed. The World Bank-Japanese Report (2000) claimed that

Decline in donor assistance is worrisome, not only because fewer resources are available to support peacebuilding and economic development, but it also hampers PNA economic planning and erodes donor credibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab Fund</td>
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<td>149</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>122</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3439</strong></td>
<td><strong>2799</strong></td>
<td><strong>1514</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Aid Flows to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Millions of Dollars).
Source: Financial Times (June 1997)

Dr Dina Assaf, the Director of the Development Planning Unit at the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation, commenting on the donor policies, mentioned the discrepancy in the direct benefit received by Palestinians. Also she pointed out how donor countries placed conditions to use their expertise and companies and purchase their equipment, and how this had led to delays in implementation and the loss of benefit to local Palestinian companies from a large portion of the committed aid. She stated that the donor countries have their own agendas. “We prepared a Palestinian development plan as a shopping list and then according to their policy the donors choose which project is suitable to pursue, to be frank, it is a puzzle!” she said.


- Delays in fulfilling pledges and commitments diminished the PNA’s ability to finance necessary investments and to plan for the future.
• It created a sense of dependency of the PNA of its expectations of future donor assistance.

• PNA would be required to assume a larger share of capital expenditures and maintenance costs. Public investment has been almost entirely donor-financed.

• PNA needed to develop effective procedures for setting national priorities for donor assistance and especially for borrowing, in order to insure that future borrowing would be integrated into a broader strategy of social and economic development.

• As donor disbursements declined, the PNA must shift toward greater use of loan-based assistance, which may have important fiscal implications.

**Deterioration of the Economic Situation**

The peace agreements were accompanied by promises to develop the economic situation in the region, which motivated Middle Eastern countries to accept the process. The Palestinian economy is small and poorly endowed with natural resources, especially in light of the separation of the economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has experienced negative consequences from the Israeli application of a permanent system of restrictions that caused great difficulties and disruptions to the daily economic activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This policy, in effect since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, restricted the movement of individuals, goods, and factors of production between the Palestinian territories and Israel, between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and between the Palestinian territories and the outside world. Airtight and comprehensive closures represented the highest and strongest application of this system where movements of goods and people come to a nearly complete stop.

The restrictions also complicated the implementation of the economic agreement signed between the PLO and the Israeli Government to regulate the economic relations between both sides during the interim period. The articles of this agreement granted the Palestinian side free movement of individuals and goods to and from the PNA territories. But the Palestinian side was not permitted to establish direct geographical relations with the Arab neighbouring countries, and to import and export some commodities through international non-Israeli crossing points. Because of these restrictions and constraints, the Palestinian side found itself unable to freely reach international markets and take full advantage of the free trade agreements they have signed with other countries.

A small percentage of the community reported a positive change in their economic conditions while the majority either reported a negative change or did not see any change. The degree of change positive or negative reported was greater in Gaza than in the West Bank.
Border-Closure Policy

In 1993, Israel imposed its first general closure over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since that time, permits to enter Israel (including East Jerusalem) have been required by all Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On several occasions, this general closure has been heightened by completely shutting off all access into Israel, cancelling all previous permits of work and issuing far fewer. Israeli closure policies have been increasingly enforced since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and have created obstacles and challenges to the progress of the peace process and Palestinian development and reconstruction.

The Gaza Strip's industrial and manufacturing sector has been in deep crisis due to the repeated closure measures. Israeli restrictions on the export of industrial products and the import of essential raw materials have shut down at least 157 local factories in the Gaza Strip. On the construction sector, the impact had been severe: the Gaza Strip, for example, required an average of 3,000 tons of cement daily but received only 300 tons under the closure situation, bringing the construction sector to a virtual halt and making at least 16,000 workers idle (Roy: 1998). During the repeated closure, nearly half the necessary volume of cement entered Gaza. Other materials such as gravel, plaster, and iron were also in very short supply.

Other sectors of economy have also suffered. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture (1997:5), agriculture depends upon the export of 70 percent of its products, including citrus, fruits, vegetables and flowers. Due to the closure, citrus exports had dropped to $440,000 compared to $4 million at its usual level. No citrus products from the Gaza Strip were allowed to enter Israel or the West Bank. The closure has resulted in a direct daily loss to citrus producers of $1.05 million. The agricultural sector, moreover, employs between 15,000 and 30,000 persons depending upon the season, many of whom had no work for almost the entire period of closure.

Gaza has also experienced a shortage in its basic food supply since all such foodstuffs were imported from Israel. In 1996, the author experienced a flour shortage crisis. The Palestinian Ministry of Economics estimated that the Gaza Strip requires a daily average of 275 tons of flour. In the closure, only 3,114 tons were permitted to enter Gaza or 111 tons daily (40 percent of the total requirement). It was proposed that the Palestinian Authority must impose a ration system forcing Palestinians to wait daily for hours, sometimes overnight, to obtain their share. Similar shortfalls also occurred in the supplies of sugar, rice, butter, oil, salt and tea.
Attempts have been made to gauge the loss to the Palestinian economy due to the border-closure. The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), for example, has estimated the cost of closure policy to the Palestinian economy at about USD 2.8 billion annually. While the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (1999:13) measured the economic cost to the Palestinian economy of the application of the system of restrictions between 1993-1998, at about $7 billion.

Monopolies and the Peace-lords

The Palestinian Legislative Council on a number of occasions has voiced its dissatisfaction with the existence and malpractice of monopolies. (Alquds newspaper, 1998) Monopoly is another contributing factor to the deteriorating situation of the Palestinian Territories. A Palestinian businessman told the author “You should know that every revolution has its fighters, thinkers and profiteers. Our fighters have been killed, our thinkers assassinated, and all we have left are the profiteers. These don’t think even primarily of the cause, they don’t think about it at all.” According to Roy (1998) there are at least 13 known monopolies under the control of no more than five individuals. These individuals have total control over the import of such commodities as flour, sugar, vegetable oil, frozen meats, live animals, concrete, gravel, steel, wood, tobacco and petroleum. The existence of these PNA-controlled monopolies has precluded fair competition by introducing market-distorting mechanisms. The result was a price-fixing, which had artificially inflated prices, particularly for basic food commodities, building materials making it even more difficult for people.

These monopolies demonstrated how the Palestinian Authority was taking advantage of a deteriorating situation. An example, a local contractor narrated that Gazan importers of gravel were anxious to increase their stock and it was through Sufa cross point that these importers had been able to avoid the gravel monopoly established at Erez, the main entrance into the Gaza Strip. However, since those individuals in charge of the gravel monopoly at Erez had no control over the Sufa crossing, the Palestinian Authority kept Sufa closed for an additional two weeks until monopolistic control could be imposed there as well. The price of gravel has doubled in a few months. Roy mentioned that monopolies generated considerable revenue. Profits were believed to be between $100-$400 million per year. Moneys from the monopolies were deposited in banks to pay the salaries of police and other agencies, which donors were reluctant to finance. Roy concluded, “If monopoly revenues are indeed paying these salaries, the monopolies are generating considerable profit”.

The Al-Bahr Company is a case in point. Five years ago, the al-Bahr company existed. Al-Bahr means ‘sea’. But Gazans called it Almuheet ‘the ocean’, because, they said.
“it is swallowing everything”. According to a Palestinian civil servant “It is not being officially registered, it should not be operating at all. It even uses the Authority’s letterheads.” Gazans believed that the company incorporate different business activities such as real estate, entertainment, computers, advertising, medicine and insurance. According to Gazan businessman ‘Only the most powerful Gazan businessmen can resist its power. These are pressed into ‘partnership’ with Al-Bahr.’ It complements already existing monopolies. for the import of such basic commodities as cement, petrol or flour.” The businessman said that he was thinking seriously of migration.

Monopolistic control over basic commodities also creates a strong disincentive to foreign investors, and undermines activity in the private sector, the domain with the greatest potential for initiating economic development. Gaza’s (housing) construction and contracting sector the only indicator of economic growth over the last few years is now in a state of decline since the monopolies and the closure have made the costs of doing business prohibitively high. Some local contractors operate at a loss while others have completely shut down.

**The Increase in Unemployment**

Unemployment has been considered one of the most critical economic and social problems facing the Palestinians. Despite the growth in the employment capacity of the Palestinian economy, created after the establishment of the PNA, there has been difficulty in absorbing the obvious rise in unemployment due to the closure of Israeli and Arab markets to the Palestinian work force. It is believed the most devastating effect of the heightened closure has been a dramatic rise in unemployment levels in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Because the closure restricted the movement of all people (and goods) in and out of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, as well as movement within the West Bank itself, workers from these territories have been unable to reach their places of employment. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Labour (1998: 7), unemployment in Gaza increased from 50 percent to 74 percent (and from 30 percent to 50 percent in the West Bank). Before the heightened closure, 22,000 Gazans (down from 80,000 in 1987) and 26,000 West Bankers had permits to work in Israel. Almost all of these 22,000 Gazans were now unemployed.

The United Nation Special Co-ordinator in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (UNSCO) (1998:13) reported that losses from unemployment amounted to $1.04 million daily for the Gaza Strip alone--$750,000 from lost wages in Israel and $290,000 from lost wages in local sectors. At present, some Gazans hold permits to work in Israel, part of whom work in the **Erez** industrial zone inside Gaza. Permits have been restricted to men 45 years of age and
The possession of a work permit, however, did not guarantee work. Given that each worker supports an average of seven people, at least 600,000 people in Gaza have been in desperate need of income. This increase of unemployment has contributed to heighten the tension between the social classes in Gaza Strip.

**Social Unrest and Deterioration of Public Morale**

The Palestinian Human Development Report (2000:22) admitted that political and economic deterioration has generated considerable rage among the local population and there has been some protest. According to Roy (1998), the widening gap between the Gaza Strip's classes suggested three problems: the existence of an increasingly repressive regime opposed to dissent, a population too debilitated to challenge this regime, and a separation of national issues from their economic and social counterparts. When he first came to Gaza, President Arafat said he would turn Gaza into a Singapore of the Middle East. However, he could not achieve any of his aspirations but saw more suffering come to the population. Nowadays, Palestinians are frustrated, faced with the great task of the daily confrontation with the Israelis. Along with the pressure, they have started to lose their belief in the PNA and in the current peace process. It seems more like a false dawn that, to them, is just increasing their suffering. Roy (1998) described the dilemma: “The struggle is no longer against Israel or even the Israeli occupation; it is now against hunger and humiliation.”

Further aggressive behaviour from Palestinian security forces against the local community has threatened the social fabric of one of the remaining traditional Arab communities. Some Palestinians residents' feeling of being second class citizens, especially after the PLO returnees from exile have become established, could weaken national unity.

Various commentators have noticed the gap in the Palestinian Territories. Gaza Strip is the most conservative of Palestinian communities. During the days of Intifada, wearing the scarf was an obligation for every woman in accordance with Islam regulations. Gazans set fire to the sole cinema in the city and other such places. However, the Palestinian Authority and its upper officials have never considered this fact. Tunis was the headquarters of the PLO and ‘the Tunisians’ was a nickname which David Herst claimed that Gazans gave to those, officially known as ‘returnees’, who came with the peace to Gaza, following the Oslo Accords. David Herst, the Guardian correspondent described in the Guardian Weekly, 27/4/97 that there are about 10,000 of them, bureaucrats who run the Palestinian Authority, former fighters who dominate the enormous security apparatus of the PNA. The Tunisians as Herst reported come home to the soil of Palestine itself, but the irony is that they are not merely strangers in their own land, they are for the most part disliked, despised.
even hated. Challenging the tradition, they introduced places such as Zahra al-Mada'in night-club in Gaza City which provoked much anger in the strip. “Because they are Palestinians, and came as ‘liberators’, the shock is even worse.” Herst claimed. In Gaza, those former fighters have been leading the collaboration with the Israeli foe. It is hard for Palestinians to be arrested and punished by other former fighters.

The criticism extended to the accountability of the PNA’s high strata. Herst claimed that they could attract money in the form of international aid to the poorest Palestinian communities. Nevertheless, they took at least as much away from it. A Palestinian civil servant told the author that those knew that they were just transients here, and, they think only of profiting from being in the Palestinian Territories while they could.

In fact, the injustice has been clear. The district of Rimal is less than two kilometres from the Al Shati camp. Rimal means, “sand”, and in this district, there are luxurious villas. It is considered as the most up-market neighbourhood of Gaza. Herst explained that in Rimal “it is mainly here that ‘the Tunisians’ have taken root, with their amazing array of ‘ministries’, ‘authorities’ and special ‘agencies’, police stations and posts, choice rooftop apartments, villas and places of entertainment.” For contrast with Rimal, just a walk to the end of the main street Omar Almukhtar, one is shocked by the reality of the awful and open sewers of the Al shati refugee camp where a UN survey describes that “…some refugees no longer think it a shame to send their children out to beg.” Roy (1998) pointed at the emergence of child labour in Gaza. Today, children work as roadside peddlers well into the late evening. Some people have been seen selling televisions and VCRs. Others have returned medicines to local pharmacies to get money to buy food. This happened while part of the community enjoyed high life standards. Those were working in high official positions in the PNA. Herst argued that “Those know that there is a point beyond which even they can not go without risking their people’s wrath. They know, better than anyone, that the peace process, and all they get out of it, is built on nothing more solid than the fine white powdery sands of Rimal.”

The lack of Natural Resources

According to the Palestinian Development Plan (1998-2001) there is a scarcity of natural resources needed for productive sectors and development in the Palestinian Territories. The Palestinian National Authority controls a small portion of the Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while Israel still controls the remainder of the land.

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5 It ended with burning one of these premises in the latest events.
Reconstruction under Adversity

Israel controls 80-85% of the Palestinian water resources and does not allow the Palestinians to utilise their share for agriculture, although the percentage is declining due to encroachment and the need of land for built areas.

The Deteriorated State of Infrastructure

The poor state of infrastructure is considered the principal obstacle to development in Palestine. The lack of infrastructure in the form of water, electricity, telecommunications, and roads correlates to a large extent to the reluctance of investors to invest in Palestinian territories, therefore, leading to a slowdown in economic growth and a decline in social conditions. This is in addition to the acute shortage of adequate shelter.

Having described the situation in the Palestinian Territories, it is imperative to examine if reconstruction programmes can achieve success under the above circumstances. Due to the significance of the human settlement issue, the author selects two case studies to be examined in the following two chapters. Before doing so, a review of the characteristics of human settlements in Gaza Strip is offered:

5.4 SHELTER CRISIS IN GAZA STRIP

The inadequacy of decent shelter in the Palestinian Territories is not only derived from the size of the task and natural constraints, but also as we reviewed in chapter one, from the Israeli policies. These assigned little value to the needs of the population and less value when conflicting with the Israeli State’s aims. The acute shelter crisis arose through the Israeli government’s deliberate failure to facilitate the sector, restriction on private construction, and control of municipal zoning and urban planning. These factors, aggravated by the policy of land confiscation, have left Gazans with little space to build in. The government of Israel has taken no measure to alleviate crises, resettlement of refugees being the only step undertaken towards resolving the problem of housing provision in the Palestinian Territories.

To understand the characteristics of the shelter, Tuqan (1997:541) explained that the Palestinian community has lived in four settlement patterns:

- **Urban communities**: These have definite urban characteristics with centres that perform administrative, commercial and social functions. For example, Gaza city.

- **Semi-Urban communities**: These include a number of rural towns and villages, which acquired urban characteristics as a result of their location, increased population, changed functions and economic activities. For example Jabalya.
• Rural communities: These include all communities predominantly active in agriculture with no significant administrative commercial or service functions. The author believes that these communities are going to vanish in the Strip.

• Refugee camps: These include Palestinians who lost their homes in historical Palestine after the creation of the State of Israel. Most camps are located near or within urban centres.

A survey, conducted by a team of Norwegian and Palestinian researchers, concluded that while Gaza comprises less than 6 per cent of the total area of the Palestinian Territories, it holds 37 per cent of the population (Heirberg, 1993). Heirberg showed that three out of five persons live in urban areas. The survey indicated that in the Gaza Strip the percentage was higher with four out of five persons living in urban districts. The trend to urbanisation can be attributed to the massive influx of refugees in 1948. Data showed that there was an urgent need for 200,000 housing units in urban and rural area since no substantial housing projects has been initiated under the occupation. Another estimation came from the PLO; the Programme for the Development of the Palestinian National Economy for the period 1994-2000 estimated that:

A total of 185,000 housing units for an average household of six persons are needed between 1994 and 2000 in order to absorb the natural rate of increase in population and replace poorly built unsafe and overcrowded housing including those in the refugee camps for an expected 500,000 returnees.

In addition to the acute crisis in cities like Gaza, the real problem appears in the refugee camps either in the Gaza Strip or in the West Bank. In Gaza, Ziara (1997:13)
claimed that two-thirds of the 1,200,000 were living in the eight overcrowded refugee camps. He emphasised that the refugees' need for housing has been greater than in any other sector.

5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Almost seven years have passed since the historic handshake between the late Israeli Prime Minster and the Palestinian leader on the White House lawn. Israel and the PLO concluded secret negotiations at Oslo that led to the extension of formal mutual recognition and the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on interim self-government arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the weak position of the PLO and the unlimited support of United States to the Jewish State, the two parties concluded unjust and fragile agreements. The agreements have offered no interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, therefore no guiding principles on which to base the talks. In addition, the agreements provided legitimacy for direct negotiations between the parties, which inhibited outside powers from playing a role to ensure fair play. Furthermore, the agreement never defined the end goal, but left the controversial questions of Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders and security arrangements to negotiations in a second phase. Murray (1995) commented on the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements,

It is difficult to image the maps, as well as the 450 page text, in which 'opt out' clauses for Israel are buried in mountains of detail giving Palestinians their marching orders, being translated into a workable action plan in the congested West Bank, where thousands of settlers are determined to destroy it...[the agreements] contain no restraints on settlement expansion, no brake on the closures that are killing the Palestinian economy, no guarantee that the timetable will be adhered to and no indication of light in the shape of Palestinian self-determination at the end of the long tunnel. Palestinians remain on probation, with re-deployment dependent on their good behaviour.

The international community in an attempt to support the peace process has established a mechanism to help the Palestinians, financially and technically. Politicians have raised expectations that the New Palestinian State would have the potential to be Singapore of the Middle East. Contrary to initial expectations, economic conditions for most of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza have deteriorated as well, the unemployment rate has risen, and the per capita income has dropped by 20 percent. Furthermore, one-fifth of all Palestinians in the occupied territories live under poverty and that the current unemployment rate among Palestinians is approximately 30 percent. It has been demonstrated that the situation in the Palestinian Territories is more complicated due to the Palestinian governing system, which is fluctuating between institutionalisation and the
attempts to establish sound principles amid rumours of corruption and self-seeking. To sum up, Said (2000) argued that

So much has been written and proclaimed about the new era of peace, the benefits of peace, the economy of peace, etc., that with seven years of non-peace, people are understandably disaffected, fed up with lies, fed up with Israeli arrogance, fed up, above all, with their own sense of powerlessness and failure.

This raises the question

Can Palestinians launch successful rehabilitation programmes under unsatisfactory agreements in deeply restrictive circumstances?

To examine this question, the author focuses on two initiatives aimed to enhance the peace process in Gaza through alleviating the shelter conditions. The next chapter discusses the Peace Implementation Programme.
Chapter Six: (Case Study 1)
CONTROVERSIAL RECOVERY: THE PEACE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME
Chapter Six

CONTROVERSIAL RECOVERY: THE PEACE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In Gaza, refugee camps are the most explicit sign of continuous suffering of the Palestinian people. The camp residents face a combination of rising socio-economic hardship and substandard living conditions, which in turn negatively affect human health and creativity. The housing in the camps is deemed the most important and complicated issue facing refugees. The importance of this issue is shown in the serious and clearly visible dilapidation of dwellings in the camps. Its complicated aspect is exposed in the dilemma that possible solutions could be interpreted as a conspiracy targeting the refugee, feeding fear of ‘resettlement’.

Since its establishment, the refugee camps in all fields of UNRWA operations have faced a housing crisis, the problem worsening under the general housing shortage in the Palestinian controlled areas. Housing is only one problem of many facing residents. UNRWA (1992:6) described the situation:

It was disconcerting to see...most of the refugees...continued to live in extreme poverty. many families were still deprived of that basic element of life and adequate shelter to provide defence against the heat, the cold, the rain. It was sad to witness that under the pressure of demographic growth and worsening political, social, and economic factors, the standards of living were gradually being eroded even further.

To support the peace process in the Middle East, and to show Palestinians tangible benefits, the United Nations General Assembly have called for UNRWA to make a contribution towards giving a fresh impetus to the economic and social stability of the occupied territories. UNRWA responded by the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). After the signing of the Declaration of Principles, UNRWA identified projects that could be undertaken to improve living conditions in the refugee camps. Pursuing primary objectives, PIP was to effect the following changes: (1) rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) providing better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and (4) supporting the needy and hardship cases.
The author through fieldwork conducted in November 1999 and May 2000 examined the agency’s rhetoric, comparing the situation on the ground with what had been documented in published and unpublished reports. A variety of post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction issues have been surveyed. Responding to allegations that this programme was designed to help UNRWA terminate its services, the chapter discusses these accusations, explaining the impact of politics on the international community’s efforts to fund this project.

6.1.1 Why UNRWA and Peace Implementation Programme

The author selected UNRWA and the Peace Implementation Programme for different reasons: (1) PIP is an example of the interrelationship between reconstruction and peacebuilding. The aim of the project was to support peace in the Middle East. (2) The target group of the programme represents nearly two-thirds of the population in the Gaza Strip. (3) PIP is the biggest recovery programme implemented in the Palestinian Territories in the last six years. (4) PIP illustrates different issues of post-war reconstruction. These include: challenges facing the rehabilitation process, actors and co-ordination, local involvement and building local capacities, politics and donor involvement, etc. (5) UNRWA is a unique organisation. It runs several activities and services in various spheres, including shelter, health, education and income-generation projects.

6.2. SETTING THE SCENE
6.2.1 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

During the first years, after the 1948 war, refugees who had lost all their property depended on the supply of basic goods, shelter and services from external actors to prevent starvation and epidemic diseases. In response, organisations such as the International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) and the American Friends Service Committee began refugee aid programmes. Similarly, United Nations (UN) responded with the establishment of the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR) in November 1948. UNRPR was set up to co-ordinate humanitarian and emergency programmes conducted by various voluntary agencies.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian in the Near East (UNRWA) was formed to replace UNRPR on 8 December 1949 and began operations on 1 May 1950. UNRWA was instituted by the General Assembly in Resolution 302 IV. Thus, UNRWA is formally responsible to the General Assembly alone. In addition, it collaborates
with host governments, exercising humanitarian responsibilities in five regions: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. UNRWA provides a variety of services including provision of education and health care, helping hardship cases and upgrading both the social and physical structure of the community (UNRWA, 1997). Its mandate is renewed periodically for three-year periods. The current mandate, issued in 1999, expires in 2002; thus, the agency is expected to continue its work until that date at least.

UNRWA’s work is associated with another important institution in the international setting: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR has the mission of looking after refugees world-wide but the UN’s special refugee agreement (1951) put the policy of Palestinian refugees outside UNHCR. The agreement relieving UNHCR from supervisory responsibility left UNRWA as sole provider of the refugee population with their basic needs. This structural arrangement implied firstly, a positive value ensuring that the Palestinian issue would not be ignored or marginalised. UNRWA’s mandate legitimated the Palestinian refugees’ inclusion in the implementation of UN Resolution 194, which granted their ‘right of return’. Nevertheless, this imposed distinction portrayed the possible loss of international protection if for any reason the Agency was dismantled.

<table>
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Table 6.1: Palestinian Refugee Camps in Gaza Strip
6.2.2 The Magnitude of the Problem

Initially, in 1948, Palestinian refugees took shelter wherever they could, although they preserved a communal identity by travelling as neighbourhood groups. UNRWA’s first annual report (1950-1951) described the situation as follows:

The refugees took refuge in temporary camps; some in caves; the majority found shelter in towns and villages, in mosques, churches, monasteries, schools, and abandoned buildings. Two thirds, of the total number of refugees, were housed in improvised quarters suited only for temporary use, but under the circumstances were the only ones available. Some of the buildings had no hanging space in family quarters, with each family whatever its size with its clothing, cooking utensils etc. occupying the limited floor space of its single cubicle. Births, deaths, wedding celebrations and all phases of ordinary life were carried out in these confined spaces.

United Nation Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) started to provide shelter for the refugees. Sites were located and several camps were established on government lands or on lands rented by UNRWA from local residents. Each camp, divided by a main road, had sub-roads to facilitate the movement of UNRWA’s cars while providing services to refugees on both sides of the roads. The size of the housing units allocated to refugees correlated with
the size of the family. The ‘Za’mout’ tent with one post, was allocated to small size families i.e. less than five members while the relatively big size families were given the ‘Jamloun’ tent with three posts. UNRWA clustered tents into straight rows with a divider space of several meters between them. UNRWA’s installations were also housed in big size tents situated in one designated area opposite to the refugees’ tents.

Afterwards, UNRWA offered to replace tents with housing units. Slowly the building of concrete shelters progressed. By 1953 all tents had been removed from Gaza. In 1959, UNRWA’s Director claimed that huts had replaced all tents. The size of shelters varied from one camp to another. The area of land on which a hut was constructed did not exceed usually 80-100 square metres. The construction of these units was as follows:

- **A units-** space 3 X 3 meters housing 1-5 member families,
- **B units-** space 4 X 3.75 meters housing 6-9 member families,
- **C units-** space 4X4.45 meters housing 9-11 member families.
- **AA unit ‘container 6x3 meters’** includes two rooms connected with an inside corridor housing 11-12 member families.
- **BB units ‘container 8 x 4 meters’** including two rooms with an inside corridor housing more than 12 members families.

On this land, occupants were permitted to grow vegetables or erect additional rooms as the family expanded through birth and marriage. During the same period, UNRWA's installations were also constructed i.e. schools, clinics, distribution centres and offices of the camp service officers, and public latrines. Communal water points were established so those refugees could be provided with their needs of water during the morning hours. Tents were employed as shelters and as classes for schooling. These primitive conditions had a severe effect on the refugee community, especially during bad winter weather.

In 1950s and 1960s, there were large spaces of land and wide alleys inside the refugee camps. There was no housing crisis; all families had shelter despite the extremely dense population. This is attributed to the fact that the housing units were composed of one or two rooms with simple utilities. The refugees, due to their hard economic situation, were unable to construct better housing units. Refugees refrained from doing so because of their belief that living in camps was a temporary solution, until they would return to their original homes. The rural background of the refugees let them to establish households where the extended family (grandparents, children and grandchildren) could live as well. By the turn of 1967, the number of refugees had increased dramatically, giving the first warning of the upcoming housing crisis. By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the refugees started to improve their housing conditions by constructing additional rooms next to their units.
UNRWA provided tents for the Palestinian refugees (1948)

By 1953, UNRWA replaced tents with concrete houses.

In 1960s, refugees started to improve their shelters.

Figure 6.2, 6.3, 6.4: Development of the Refugee Camps since its Establishment in 1948. Source: The Courtesy of UNRWA.
Supported by UNRWA, they built their own units and gave up using the communal latrines. With the improving economic conditions of the refugees, due to the availability of job opportunities in Israeli industrial and agricultural sectors, they expanded their shelters using vacant land they had previously occupied. At the beginning, refugee families took over as much as possible of adjacent plots of land and established a wall to preserve their entitlement. By the turn of the 1980s, most of the housing units became stabilised in terms of space. In the present conditions, 80 percent of the houses are cement brick shelters with asbestos roofs. Some houses built of concrete have two or three floors. Reflecting the financial progress of 1970s and 1980s extensions to the original plans were built, but despite ameliorative efforts, ‘hardship conditions’ persist. Walls still lack proper insulation and the timber roofs, tiles, doors, and windows can be seen to be in deplorable state. Roy (1995:165) described the prevailing conditions:

Most of these same physical creatures remain in place although they have long since lost their political anchor. All sense of the temporality has vanished, leaving people to contend with the objectives and prosaic difficulties of the present. As families grew, any space between them diminished. The original UNRWA’s units remain largely unchanged; after more than fifty years, most are in extremely poor condition. On average, three to four people live in each room. A typical room in a refugee shelter is between 9 and 12 square meters of inhabitable area. Per occupant, the inhabitable area can be as little as 2 square meters or as much as 20.

This description is still relevant enough in 2001. The housing crisis becomes more apparent and acute in the camps. The large increase in the number of the population and the fixed area of the refugee camps since their establishment have aggravated the problem. It is anticipated that the natural population growth and the returns of refugee with the PNA had aggravated the problem in the last few years. The number of refugees since the 1950s has steadily risen. According to UNRWA’s figures, the number in the West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camps at that time stood at 215,026. This increased to reach 555,542 refugees in 2000, living on an area of 20,678 dunums (total area of the West Bank and Gaza refugee camps). Thus, the density of the population is estimated at 37.35 square meters per individual. The situation is worsened due to other factors attributed to the proximity of the workplaces of refugees to the camps and the exorbitant house-rents in the cities, which in turn compel refugees to maintain their shelters in the camp. Living in refugee camps has created special features of behaviour for those who find it difficult to assimilate into the non-refugee communities.
6.2.3 UNRWA’s Contribution to the Construction Activities: Peace Implementation Programme (PIP)

For almost 50 years, when no solution to the refugee question was in sight, UNRWA’s role has been to provide services to the scattered Palestinian refugee population, curtailing social and political upheavals. Since 1993 successive General Assembly resolutions have called for UNRWA to make “a decisive contribution towards giving a fresh impetus to the economic and social stability of the occupied territories” (UNRWA, 2000:1). UNRWA responded through the initiation of the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). PIP was introduced after the signing of the Israeli Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993, to support the peace process in the occupied territories. The Secretary General of the United Nations established a task force on economic and social development of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The task force made a number of recommendations in its report entitled Supporting the Transition: an immediate response of the United Nations to the Interim Period in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to UNRWA (1999), the programme was intended to act as a link between the organisations’ traditional programmes and a new envisaged role. Two main recommendations were adopted,

- First, that UNRWA’s traditional programmes and services should be preserved and enhanced.
- Second, new investments to be made in securing better life through providing basic physical and social infrastructure, improving public services and creating jobs.

PIP objectives were pursued mainly in spheres where UNRWA already has a role, such as in education and vocational training, health care and environmental sanitation, income generation activities, relief assistance and social services (UNRWA, 1994:45). Nevertheless, pressure has been put on these spheres of social well being since the relatively high levels of extra-budgetary funding for PIP coincided with continuing shortfalls in funding for UNRWA’s regular programmes. UNRWA claimed that under the intended reduction in financing the regular programme by the donor countries, PIP allowed the agency to meet urgent needs that it might have been unable to meet and to prevent qualitative deterioration in many aspects of its programmes.

PIP was worked over two stages. According to UNRWA sources, the first PIP was concluded in September 1994. The source emphasises that PIPII was developed in conjunction with the relevant departments of the Palestinian Authority, as well as the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) with the goal of complementing projects undertaken by the PNA. PIP has remained active until 1999.
6.2.4 Funds for the Project

All funding received under PIP was earmarked by donors for specific projects to be undertaken by UNRWA. UNRWA (1999:3) clarified that in November 1998 total pledges and contributions received, amounted to $221.3 million, of which $90.4 was under the first PIP and $130.9 million under the second PIP. The total number of projects funded under PIP was 124 financed under the first PIP and 210 under the second PIP.

Using geography as a measure of allocation, the Gaza Strip accounted for the largest share of PIP pledges and contributions: $122.4 million or 56 per cent of the total. The West Bank, with the second largest share, was allocated $50.4 million (23 per cent). The unequal distribution of the PIP budget has given rise to frequent criticism. It is seen as unjust that PIP programmes benefit only refugees in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, subjects of the current peace process, while neglecting Palestinian refugees in other regions, especially those in Lebanon who have greater need of help in facing the restrictions imposed by the Lebanese State.

On the other hand, education related projects absorbed the largest portion of PIP pledges and contributions: $90 million. Initiatives in the health sector, including environmental health received $58.4 million.

6.3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF FIELDWORK MAY 2000

In chapter three of this research, we saw that improving living conditions has come to mean securing an adequate standard of living. A good policy includes adequate shelter for all, adequate social and physical infrastructure, enforcement of legal framework, setting up a land system, creating job opportunities, supporting local capacities and enhancing the relationship between authority and people. A programme to alleviate the living conditions customarily indicates a package of improvements in streets, footpaths and drainage as well. Solid waste collection is included with its positive impact on health, along with streetlights for security and night activity. Programmes should address health issues by providing clinics and health education programmes, school facilities and teacher training are needed to attack

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1 The fieldwork was conducted over two periods, the first in November 1999 and the second in May and June 2000 in the following camps.

- Jabalya Refugee Camp: Located in the north of Gaza Strip, this camp was named after an adjacent village. At present, 96,737 refugees live in Jabalya Camp over an area of 1.4 square kilometres, which, is one of the most densely populated areas in the world.
- Al-Shati Refugee Camp: It lies on Gaza Beach, north of Gaza City. Today the camp holds 72,888 residents on 747 dunums, less than one square kilometre.
- Nuseirat Refugee Camp: Located 8 kilometres south of Gaza City. The camp took its name from a Bedouin tribe from the area. Most of the camp (now home for 58,269 refugees) is located on the two sides of the main road in Nuseirat. The poorest section is known as the new camp on the north-western side.
the lack of basic education, and lastly programmes are offered to increase income earning opportunities and the general economic health of a community.

According to UNRWA reports (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) the primary goal of PIP was to demonstrate to Palestine refugees the tangible benefits of the peace process by improving their living condition. Pursuing that outcome, the main objectives of PIP were to effect the following changes in refugee communities: (1) Rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) providing better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and (4) support the needy and hardship cases. UNRWA (1999:4) claimed that after years of implementation, PIP largely succeeded in meeting objectives. The document stated:

Infrastructure has been developed through the construction or expansion of facilities to an adequate standard, and enhancements to camp infrastructure. Living conditions have been improved through shelter rehabilitation schemes, upgrading environmental health systems, enhancing facilities refugees access on a daily basis, and maintaining the qualitative level of certain key UNRWA services. Employment opportunities have been created through use of local contractors for construction projects, provision of loans to small scale and micro enterprises, and targeted job creation initiatives.

The discussion with UNRWA officials extended to cover various issues regarding the PIP. In different meeting with local committees and camp residents, the author could detect points of success as well as major shortcomings of the project.

6.3.1 The Shelter Rehabilitation Programme

Responding to the appalling shelter situation, UNRWA identified the need for a programme of shelter rehabilitation. UNRWA officials claimed austerity measures within the agency have reduced the capacity of the ambitious programme to reconstruct or simply maintain the homes of the families registered as special hardship cases (SHC). More cases were added to the list of SHC because of the natural growth rate and the poor economic conditions. The housing problems of the Special Hardship Cases range from substandard to often-hazardous conditions, in particular, structurally unstable walls, inadequate ventilation or limited space. An UNRWA report (1994) revealed that

The objective of the PIP Shelter Rehabilitation Programme was two-fold: to ensure that dwellings meet the minimum requirements of space, health conditions and the needs of the family and to generate employment in refugee communities.

In 1993, UNRWA started to construct shelters for the families whose original shelters had been demolished or had become dilapidated. The quality of the shelters constructed by the Agency under this programme is better than those constructed in 1950s. 2050 shelters have been repaired and 2380 reconstructed as a result of PIP. In human terms, approximately
22,095 persons have benefited in Gaza. As UNRWA's documents showed, many more refugees have been employed from the construction industries through the work of the Shelter Rehabilitation Programme.

In various visits to several of those shelters rehabilitated under the PIP programme, the author interviewed beneficiaries asking how they felt about their new dwellings. They clarified that UNRWA hired a local contractor to build concrete new house for them under the supervision of the Agency engineering staff. It is worth noting that the beneficiaries' involvement was limited to the use of the new built house. The standard shelter rehabilitation project provides one living room and sanitation facilities, at an average cost of $5,000. In addition, many shelters have been fitted with a connection to the sewerage system in the camp if available.

Though the programme seems to have improved the lives of a number of Palestinian refugees, the rest are enraged at the deteriorating situation of their dwellings. They insisted that the PIP projects and Shelter Rehabilitation Programme in particular brought no benefits to them. An example of the adverse comments came from a teacher at an UNRWA school. He explained how the ratio between those helped and those receiving no help remains severely unbalanced:

It is true that houses have been constructed and others have been repaired and that they are important. However, while twenty out of a thousand of houses were improved many people fell out of the Special Hardship Cases programmes.

A refugee invited the author to have a look in his house, describing the hard life he experienced. He asserted that he applied to the UNRWA Shelter Rehabilitation Programme but because he was not registered in the SHC, he discovered he was ineligible. His problem was aggravated due to the infrastructure deterioration. The small shelter was not connected to a sewerage network, forcing him to use a small pit in his bedroom for collecting waste. Surveying the shelter, the author also found that the kitchen was adjacent to the WC. Cooking spaces were limited with kerosene burners placed in open family areas, in turn increasing the risk of injury to the inhabitants. The refugee continued, reporting that his application was refused because his son was an unmarried adult. However, the Agency's assessment seems misguided since his son was not working anywhere and therefore a dependant, not an income-provider.

Other comments by refugees were made such as the programme criteria's unfairness, and the very limited numbers who have been assisted. An example of challenging comments by a refugee was "The Agency constructed shelter for him comprised of 3 x 3 (2.5 meters height) room". He claimed that many families have transformed these shelters...
into warehouses and sought houses in other areas. Another point regarding the design of the shelter units, as a beneficiary reported, was that the Agency failed to take into account the extremely high temperature in the summer. This requires the installation of ceiling fans, a need completely ignored.

Contradicting what the refugees said, Manna’ the Director of the Projects Department at Gaza Field Office, and other beneficiaries emphasised that the process was clear and easy to monitor. When determining a need for shelter rehabilitation, the agency’s social workers examined the circumstances of the family, the physical condition of the shelter and eligibility criteria.

![Figure 6.5: Shelter Rehabilitation Programme in One of the Refugee Camps. Source: The Courtesy of UNRWA.](image)

Problems existed as one refugee’s complaint attested: “It took me two years to be chosen from the long queue”. Another refugee alleged that his neighbour succeeded in winning improvement on two houses, by registering under two different names. The complainant added he might have a relative working as social surveyor. Manna’ claimed that he never heard such criticism and emphasised again that fair selection was implemented according to the overall criteria”. Abu Ouda, an UNRWA official working in the Public Information Office supported his colleague’s claims “Despite my position, my sister’s case took two years to be chosen.”

At various meetings with local committee members, and public gathering such as Aldiwan, many people doubted the project relevance to their real needs. The author recognised refugees’ demands regarding the housing crisis in the camps. These claims can assist UNRWA to formulate a policy for intervention in other projects, spheres ignored in PIP.
Land Ownership and Houses Prices

All land in camps is either owned or rented by UNRWA from Palestinians originally from Gaza Strip. Over the years, the vast majority of people have built and upgraded their shelters incrementally. In addition, refugees tend to buy and sell their shelters to each other. As a refugee explained “Due to the displacement in the wake of 1967 war and early 1970s, UNRWA approved at the time the practice of registering more than one housing unit under the same individual. This resulted in a situation where certain refugees own extensive areas of land inside the camps, while others hardly satisfied their housing needs.” This in turn caused the shelter-rent phenomenon or prices of shelters to be exaggerated: this is not only limited to shelters but also applies to commercial premises. On the other hand, due to the cramped living spaces and units and the increasing needs of the population, the demand on housing units and plots of land subsequently increased. The prices of housing units and land in the camps reached unimaginable rates. For example, during the authors last visit on May 2000, the price of one square meter was anywhere between $20-30; in the main streets, the price reached $100 to $150. A refugee said that he bought his house from another refugee who moved to a larger house in the same camp. He paid fifteen thousand dollars for his new shelter.

Refugees treat shelters as their property. However, Hossam Manna’ explained “UNRWA considers the refugees as tenants and not as owners even if the refugee incurs building expenses.” This statement is verified by documents signed by refugees when receiving shelters. The Agency is entitled to repossess the shelter at any time. The author believes that there is an absence of regulations. It is not clear if there are controls on any of these practices. Moreover, if there are, who provides and enforces them?

The Absence of a Law Enforcement Body

The absence of law enforcement to supervise the rules of construction in the camps has led to a particular type of problem. When the old cramped rooms became unfit to absorb the increasing numbers of family members, refugees started to demolish their shelters and constructed new ones using iron bars and cement. UNRWA has failed to technically supervise the construction, leaving it to the discretion of owners and the contractors. Consequently, refugees started to build vertically. The Agency seems never to object to two-storey shelters though it did not supervise the foundations and concrete on which the first floor originally was established. Further, refugees started to construct three and four stories on top of their shelters. It was observed that these added floors are composed of rooms built on top of each other.
With the lack of regulations, some Palestinians working in the Security apparatus and the PNA encroached upon privately owned lands situated in the camps, causing pathways to become further narrowed. As one refugee reported “During funerals, the deceased are moved from one shelter to the other through the windows so as to reach the main street to be placed in the coffin.” Consequently, the traditional view of the camps became totally different. The green trees and house-gardens that the refugees used to maintain in order to mimic the environment of their original homes gradually has vanished.

Considering that the original foundations of the shelters in the camp were not designed to hold multi-storeyed shelters, one can note that there are prospects of a future catastrophe. He wonders what will happen if the residents decide to increase the stories on already existing multi-storey shelters. The author himself suffered from this problem during his stay in Jabalya refugee camp between 1995-1997. Both adjacent neighbours decided to build two and three stories respectively. Thus, the author’s house, located between the two high dwellings, was deprived of natural light and ventilation in addition to privacy. The proximity of the housing units to each other and the non-compliance to technical regulations has caused problems among neighbours. Due to cultural customs, the author’s family was unable to complain in the above case.

In another problem noted, a refugee merchant abused the privilege of the camps being tax-free areas, and the availability of cheap labour. He constructed a warehouse for building materials in the centre of a neighbourhood that resulted in an environmental hazard. None of the refugees complained, either due to the cultural tradition or since the man is supported by the PNA.

Refugees are objecting, because UNRWA had stopped registering housing units and transferring property from one refugee to another. This has compelled the refugees to resort to individual contracts, though UNRWA does not recognise the validity of these. As Abu Faiz a local leader in Jabalya Camp anticipated “This will cause ownership and property disputes among the refugee population in the future.” Abu Faiz justified the chaos: “The refugees pay no attention to the position of the Agency or the Palestinian Authority due to their pressing need for housing, and the absence of a an executive body to enforce laws and regulations.”

The author asked UNRWA sources why they ignored these problems. No answers were offered, as was the case when the author investigated PNA circles. The author understands that during the Israeli occupation, the Israelis tended to seize power from UNRWA. Therefore, UNRWA did not enjoy authority over its owned and rented land in the camps. The Israeli authorities employed various policies to suppress any Palestinian military
resistance such as widening the street, and demolishing houses without any consideration of UNRWA and its mandate as representative of the international community. Israel launched a policy of presenting the reality in the camps as the only acceptable solution to the refugee problem. In the last seven years, neither UNRWA nor the PNA has re-assumed legal power in refugee camps. Lax regulations have resulted in many complicated social and physical problems. It is also clear that the sensitivity of the refugees’ issue in the ongoing peace process has limited the role of different stakeholders in order to avoid criticism on political grounds.

Figure 6.6: Environmental Hazards in Jablaya Refugee Camp
Source: The Author (May 2000)

Abu Faiz demanded that UNRWA should “Establish an urgent and executive body to organise and technically supervise construction activities”. He proposed that this body should be responsible for supervising refugees who wish to construct multi-storey houses.
and make them pay attention to technical rules and regulations and to take into account public safety requirements.

- Expanding the boundaries of those expandable camps, particularly those bounded by public lands.

- Resuming the policy of registration of housing units under the names of refugees, i.e. transfer of property from one name to another. In this regard, UNRWA should transfer the registration of housing units for refugees living outside refugee camps to those who live in camps and suffer from housing crisis.

- Establishing new camps to absorb the increasing number of refugees. These camps, however, should fall under UNRWA's responsibility so as not to be interpreted as an attempt to resettle refugees.

- Establishing improved infrastructure in the refugee camps (e.g. sewer system, roads, and water supplies), and to establish public squares and playgrounds.

Responding to refugees' recommendations Manna' said, "The other components of the PIP programme meet their needs of adequate infrastructure. The project aimed to improve the physical as well as the social services.

6.3.2 Adequate Infrastructure

Isam Miqdadi, Chief of the Special Environmental Health Programme (SEHP), stated that his department initiated a component of the PIP package to provide adequate infrastructure. The work included carrying out feasibility studies for sewerage, storm water drainage and solid waste management. He mentioned that the total cost of the project was $1,549,000 and more than $15 million invested in environmental health projects. UNRWA (1999) claimed that PIP contributions had a very positive impact on the quality of life for many refugee camps. It contributed to the improvement of the environmental health of refugees. Better quality of water, sound sewage network and regular solid waste disposal reduced the frequency of communicable disease and exposure to bacteria.

Through field observation and refugees' comments, the author examined the impact and effectiveness of this component of PIP. Below evidence is presented to portray the conditions of what the author recorded in November 1999 and May 2000.

**Water:** A refugee from Jabalya Camp described the drinking water situation, pointing out some anomalies:

Yes, all shelters in the camps have some form of piped water supply. In many cases, however, services are intermittent, resulting in as little as a half-hour's supply per day. Although most shelters have roof tanks in some cases water
may be unavailable for a long time. In the summer, the roof tanks are not enough.

The quantity of water is insufficient for average family needs. This must be considered unsatisfactory. As one refugee reported: “It is much better to have sufficient water of acceptable quality than to have small amounts of water of superior quality”. The author visited a local well and surprisingly observed how the water was dirty and full of nitrates. According to Emteer, the Municipality’s engineer: “This high salinity level exceeds the World Health Organisation recommended upper limit.” He further commented it also has an unpleasant taste. High quantities of nitrate can be dangerous causing disease.

Figure 6.8: Sewerage Plant in Refugee Camp
Source: The author (May 2000)

**Wastewater Collection:** Although all houses in the camps are connected to the water supply systems, the handling of wastewater has received limited attention with only 47% of shelters provided with conventional piped sewer systems (UNRWA, 1999:13). Pits of variable size and construction serve all other houses, which are supposed to collect the water from kitchens, bathing and washing. Therefore, the pits have to be emptied from time to time. Environmental health conditions worsen during the winter, when sewage in the gullies mixes with storm-water. In addition, flooding is common in that season due to the poor drainage facilities, a situation creating further health hazards for the population. Due to the overcrowding in refugee camps and the proximity of shelters to each other, the foundations of these shelters are liable to be affected by the leakage of wastewater and there is a real risk that drinking water may be contaminated. In addition, the existence of thousands of pits could be the potential for a disaster if that area were subjected to an earthquake irrespective of its magnitude, a refugee claimed.
The problem is complicated due to the quality of roads, which are seldom paved. Only the major routes have asphalt layers and even in these cases, the surface is irregular. The majority of roads and all footpaths consist of loose fine sand without any sort of treatment for creating cohesion with the top layer. The loose sand on most roads and footpaths creates problems during heavy rainfall, when the sand is washed away, particularly from sloping streets, into the few existing rainwater gullies and wastewater sewers causing extensive blockages.

Another problem faces the refugees in the rain water disposal. The problem is rendered more serious due to the height of the houses, which lack guttering. All storm-water runs straight off from roofs and spreads out across unpaved streets and pathways; there are only a few empty lots and other unpaved areas to accommodate overflow. During intensive rainfall, the streets and alleys quickly become conduits for excess run-off. As a result, especially in low areas and depressions within the camps, serious flooding occurs.

Solid Waste: UNRWA operates garbage sweeping and collection services for the streets and pathways. Yet, solid waste can still be seen in many areas. Inevitably, depositories over flow, resulting in the accumulation of piles of garbage that, in the summer, rapidly provide breeding grounds for flies and other insects. Although there is little accumulation of solid waste in and around the dwellings themselves, indiscriminate dumping can be observed on access routes. The environmental conditions that arise from uncontrolled dumping are well known, including support of disease, risks from direct human contact with the waste, and the danger of contaminating surface water and groundwater supplies.
Social Infrastructure

The most important social services are education, health and recreation, each essential for the development of Palestinian life.

Education: When UNRWA began its programme in 1950, schools were accommodated in tents or rented premises. Gradually temporary structures were replaced with a comprehensive network of educational facilities. It is evident that during the past fifty years, UNRWA has provided Palestine refugee children and youth with basic education services, vocational and technical education and teacher training. According to the Deputy Director of the Education Programme in Gaza field office: “The Peace Implementation Programme mobilised funds to mitigate the shortage of schools classroom space and specialised facilities”. Mrs Mohysen added: “Funds from PIP have built 68 schools, upgraded 165 schools, built and furnished 187 classrooms and 46 specialised rooms and allowed comprehensive maintenance of 64 schools. These projects have boosted the education programme’s capacity to deliver services.”

An UNRWA official document claimed that the PIP programme stabilised the classroom occupancy rate as well as the student teacher ratio. Further, related to the issue of class space, PIP projects have also avoided additional double shifting and the possibility of triple shifting.

Accessibility to improved facilities has improved the capacity of UNRWA schools to promote extra-curricular activities, educational resources such as libraries, laboratories, computer rooms and multipurpose rooms and to tailor technical training courses to the demands of the local labour market.
In May 2000, Mr Mohram, a headmaster of refugee school in Jabalya Camp, saw the education problems, which still exist, as “…an acute shortage of classroom space, lack of facilities, equipment and dilapidated structures”. He argued that UNRWA schools have witnessed an almost 4 to 6 percent annual increase in enrolment or some 10,500 additional pupils per year and the educational facilities have not been able to match this rate of increase for many years. The UNRWA school infrastructure simply could not accommodate the existing cohort of students. The high class room occupancy rate threatened to compromise UNRWA standards and schools were frequently double shifted. Double shifting of schools has the effect of reducing class items and accessibility to specialised facilities and extra curricular activities. Given the expanding student population and austerity measures, double shift is one of the problems facing the agency. Often when student enrolment exceeded school capacity UNRWA has been obliged to accommodate students in unsuitable rented buildings.

The headmaster continued “In addition, rented buildings have not been designed for educational purposes and they lack adequate class space, specialised rooms and suitable health standards, a number of schools have deteriorated to such as extent that it has been no longer safe to conduct classes in the building. There has been an acute shortage of specialised science laboratories, computer facilities, vocation workshops and library; lack of external works, physical activity facilities, water reservoirs and latrines”.

With these limitations, it is debatable if the UNRWA’s programme can achieve any distinction or play a meaningful role in the life of refugees. The headmaster’s comments show that despite spending on such a scale, UNRWA has not improved the situation, but just stopped it getting worse. It shows the enormous problems facing UNRWA and the PNA.
Health Services

UNRWA identified primary health care facilities as a major target for infrastructure improvement under PIP. An UNRWA report (1999:14) claimed that the following objectives have been achieved:

The refugees have improved access to medical consultations, dental consultations and basic medical care dressings and injections; as a measure of increased UNRWA capacity to deliver medical care additional primary health care.

The fieldwork findings reveal conflicting facts. UNRWA has 17 health centres and sub-centres making up its health infrastructure, with a health centre in each refugee camp. For example, Jabalya Camp (largest camp in Gaza) is served by only one health centre. It undertakes outpatient care, concentrating on a broad spectrum of services: re-hydration and nutrition, obstetrics care, health education and paediatrics care. Dental services are provided on a very limited scale. No hospitalisation service exists within UNRWA’s system and patients are transferred to PNA hospitals, which have been partially upgraded but still lack vital equipment. Patients in need of specialised treatment usually are transferred to Israeli, Jordanian, or Egyptian hospitals, but not all Palestinian have access to these services due to the high expenses involved and the corrupted health care structure that is said to favour certain patients - perhaps with PNA connections over others.

The total number of people registered at UNRWA clinics in 1999 was 746,050, while doctors working in UNRWA health centres did not exceed 200 (UN, 1999), an average of one doctor per 3,730.25 patients. UNRWA clinics are cleaner and better-staffed facilities than those under PNA supervision. However, they suffer from a severe lack of equipment, staff, and physical space. Furthermore, UNRWA operates laboratories (located in its health centres) though limited in the tests that can be performed, they are still able to serve the basic needs of the centres.

Recreation Facilities

Unfortunately, there is an apparent lack of recreation places for both adults and children. UNRWA operates only eight youth centres spread throughout the camps. Nevertheless, these centres introduce a variety of activities; for instance, sport and social services. Simultaneously, youth centres contribute by improving the community’s level of knowledge through running computer courses, as well as being sites where public meetings are convened, or conferences and lectures held. Further affecting the provision of recreational spaces, controversially, in order to cope with the large number of children in
school, UNRWA has built new classrooms in the form of so-called “school playgrounds and gardens.” These measures could be seen as retrogressive as they deprive children of a basic right: places to play. To alleviate the conflict, since 1995 the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) has co-operated with the Norwegian government to provide Gaza Strip’s children with playgrounds. Despite the resulting increase, there are insufficient places to accommodate the high number of children in the population, as demographic facts. A refugee pointed out how limited and gender-specific recreation opportunities are:

Here in the camp the only social centre or place of organised entertainment is the UNRWA club, and it only caters for adolescents and young men. I am happy that they have somewhere to go where they can play sport, sit, and discuss things, but what is there for the women, the children and older people like me? There are no cinemas or theatres, libraries, garden or restaurants, if I want to go somewhere for entertainment I will not find. You can say there is no playgrounds for the children either, so they spend their time playing in the piles of rubbish that never disappear or damming the sewage with sand in the alleyways.

Figure 6.12: A Closed Public Garden in Jabalya Camp
Source: The Author (May 2000)

6.3.3 Creating Job Opportunities

UNRWA launched its Income Generation Programme in the Gaza Strip in response to the region’s quickly deteriorating economic conditions, marked by high unemployment and spreading poverty following the outbreak of the Intifada and the Gulf War. Alex Bolloe, Chief Director of the Development and Planning Unit in Gaza Field Office, explained that the programme was organised around three revolving loan funds making credit to small-scale enterprises.
The three programmes were the Solidarity Group Lending, the Small Business and the Micro-Enterprise Credit. Bolloc elaborated that the three loan funds helped promote small business development opportunities, create new and safeguard old jobs. The loans reinforced businesses ranging in size from micro vending employing one or two to small industries employing up to 28. He further outlined that the funds’ clients represented distinct groups of borrowers, so that the Income Generation Programme met a variety of needs. It provided working capital and investment funds to industries and services firms and also contributed to alleviate poverty and generating incomes among owners of smaller enterprises. Nasser Jabber, official in charge for the loans, argued that the project facilitated the funding of 313 projects amounting to $6,350,400 in Gaza. He praised the initiative, calculating: “PIP loans were instrumental in creating 1,129 new jobs and maintaining 809 jobs in the recipient business”.

Jabber contended: “We are the only Programme, which empowers the local community through involving poor women in our work. Through the Solidarity Group-Lending (SGL) programme we make credit available to women working in micro enterprises.” These women number among the most needy in the population. The programme helped to ensure that women gained a fairer share of the value of the sale for their products.

SGL clients were organised into solidarity groups that serve as a guarantee mechanism as long as each member is current in her repayments. All members were eligible for additional loans. Until clients established reliable credit, an individual loan was limited to $300 and repayment period set as six months. The peer-lending model was successful in repayment rates with 100 percent of all loans repaid. The SGL programme received moneys to fund 2,249 individual loans to women in 386 groups in Gaza:

- As each woman has 9 dependants on average, the loans benefited approximately 22,490 people including the borrowers.
- The programme encouraged women to save, in order to repay their loans enabling them increase income.
- The programme promoted co-operation and the exchange of information among different group members. It also provided opportunities for them to participate in group-decision-making and fostered social relationships.

The programme achieved reasonable success as its employees claimed. However, an economist commented that this programme despite the apparent benefits had disadvantaged the local economy. Reflecting the peace agreement limitations. PNA has been unable to
enforce legislation in the Palestinian Territories. It was possible to import commodities from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and China at a lower price than the Palestinian value. Beneficiaries’ women used to travel to Egypt and return with smuggled commodities, selling them in Gazan markets under-cutting local suppliers. This practice helped to diminish the small business industry in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to the same economist, in the last year at least, 500 small textile workshops have closed down due to the unfair competition from Chinese products and the like.

Another complaint from refugees was the difficulties they experienced in trying to qualify for the loan programme. According to unofficial information provided by UNRWA staff, who would-be businessmen/women needed to present feasibility studies, which many could only provide if they were able to pay for expert services. If the loan application was denied, resources invested for the feasibility study were lost.

The same economist further disputed the value of the Income Generation Programme, arguing that the programme had a short-term budget. It allowed UNRWA to employ 2,700 persons for a period of no more than five months, far short of meeting the needs of refugees in the Gaza Strip. Jobs created in this framework were mainly simple public services (especially street cleaning) with few alternatives for the qualified unemployed. Camp Improvement Programmes were introduced in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The economist wondered if cleaning the streets amounted to a successful income generation programme.
6.3.4 Promoting Participation and Building Local Capacities

The community in human settlement projects plays an essential role. Popular participation in the decision-making process concerns the setting up of projects and determining goals, components and priorities. This participation extends through all stages of a project’s life: from planning to completion.

In PIP, it has been noted that refugees had no weight or influence in the decision-making process. Adopting a top-to-bottom strategy, decisions were made without any involvement from beneficiaries. In the meantime, huge sums of money have been spent without consideration for building local capacities and thus creating more dependence on the Agency. Another point is the excluding of local staff in decision making in programmes such as PIP. The local staff of UNRWA has no influence over the Agency policy as one member illustrated:

We among the UNRWA staff have very little control over policy, which is usually decided by offices in the headquarters or even there in New York. We just carry out their policy. Occasionally a Palestinian initiative is accepted but if the key people are against the idea, they can just say that there is not money enough in the budget for it.

In support of the author’s observation, the British Department for International Development (DFID) has funded a programme to provide the Al-Shati Camp with a sewerage system. UNRWA implemented the project under the PIP budget. According to Save the Children Federation (SCF) employee Sahar Abu Samara, “DFID was not satisfied with UNRWA’s performance in the project due to lack of public participation and many technical shortcomings”. DFID has mandated SCF to evaluate the project in the Al-Shati Camp. An Evaluation Report, prepared by Save the Children Federation in Gaza Strip, supported the above observation. The report indicated the inadequacies of the sewage project disclosing that community leaders disapproved the infrastructure design and construction. The Save the Children report mentioned that UNRWA did not take into consideration public awareness, essential for the sustainability of the project. The committee found that “Many house connections have been broken directly into the sewer mains, and house sewer lines connected directly into the storm water conduits.” It has been observed that the beneficiaries due to lack of awareness have misused the system in different ways. For example they use toilets as garbage bins; sweeping dirt from the floors of houses into the floor drains; putting garbage down sink drains; opening manholes to let storm water and sand into the sewers: and workers leaving manholes open and unattended.

Miqdadi rejected the SCF report’s findings. He said that the report is unfair, biased and lacks accuracy and does not differentiate between observation, facts and opinions.
Despite his objections, one can argue that the report indicated many facts and by using the methodology of Rapid Participatory Appraisal, SCF has listened to the real beneficiaries, drawing lessons from their points of view. The evaluation report ended by setting a guideline for future UNRWA involvement in environmental health programmes. These included technical, environmental, economic, financial, institutional and social recommendations. In summary, according to the SCF report, projects should not be conceived and service levels set without close examination of existing cultural habits, incomes and hopes and aspirations of the community. Without the full participation and understanding of beneficiaries, the project can not be expected to have a successful outcome.

The author inquired about the limited level of public involvement in UNRWA project. Alqura UNRWA Public Relation official questioned “What is the need for public involvement in these projects?” He continued to say “Do you think that refugees in the camps know more than us. We usually prepare a list of projects and send it the donor countries. This is a simple process, which has worked in every programme in the Palestinian Territories”. Alqura’s questions regarding public participation was answered by a Palestinian refugee who managed to bring people to participate in public activities. ‘Maher’ described his voluntary committee’s work, its successes and the problems it faced:

Once, we decided to establish a voluntary work committee in the camp. Our aim was to deal with the problem of lack of adequate services in the camps. Our plan was to recruit and channel some of the youths to offer their services to the people and so on.

Maher and his friends started work; cleaning roads and generally helping people victimised by the camp’s conditions and occupation. He reported: “Things were not easy at first. We had no material resources for our activities because it was forbidden by laws to collect money. Sometimes, after we had cleaned the sand away from the roads, we had returned later to find that it had all blown back. We also had to overcome the suspicion of some people in the camp.

Maher’s experience relied on the ground that his work was not a new phenomenon among the Palestinian community. The concept of helping each other in difficult times has always existed. Maher explained that it was important for his group to establish good relations with the community. They started to organise a series of lectures to explain their aims and plans. After this, they felt that the committee’s activities would spread their message through contacts with committees in other refugee camps.

He continued to outline “We broadened our activities to renting a space in the centre of the refugee camp. We arranged to have a public library, computer room, and classrooms
built”. Unfortunately, Maher contacted UNRWA to help him sustain and develop his successful scheme, but he received no response. The author went to the UNRWA field office to enquire their reluctance to help this group. The answer was “It is not our job to empower communities”. Maher expressed his frustration with UNRWA, and greatly motivated, he presented his viewpoint:

Our activities expanded, and now it is quite varied depending on what we can organise at any given time. It may involve disposing of rubbish in the streets, arranging medical trips, bringing a specialist volunteer doctor to visit the camp’s kindergartens or organising extra classes for students

Maher argued that the youths ‘find themselves’ when they become involved in the voluntary work. They discover their potential to give, they learn about themselves and each other. This group’s commitment has proposed a way for the younger generation to become aware of their cause and the refugee community’s potential to build a new state.

In the past, political consideration, technocratic modes of planning and paternalistic attitudes towards refugees have distorted policy-making and lessened the value given to the refugees’ viewpoint. The experience of Maher shows that the involvement of intended beneficiaries in planning, management and service provision is vital for the success of a specific project. Accordingly, the Palestinian refugees must be consulted in relation to their needs, priorities and be involved. They represent the party, which is well aware of its conditions and problems and is most capable of prioritising and addressing them in accordance with their own needs. Refugee participation must be meaningful at every stage, not only planning, but also during implementation and evaluation when there should be an explicit comparison made between actual and projected results. To reinforce this process, beneficiaries need to be trained to equip themselves with necessary skills to achieve project objectives. It will also be necessary for UNRWA staff to understand this, and to change their attitudes.

6.3.5 Institutional Co-ordination and Supporting Local Authorities

When UNRWA identified the projects that could be undertaken to improve living conditions in the refugee camps, consultations were carried out with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation leadership in order to secure political support for the project. (UNRWA, 1999:2). In addition, the UNRWA document showed that consultation was undertaken with the major donor countries to reach a common understanding of the agency’s role. Following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, UNRWA showed its
keenness to co-operate in several joint ventures. The existence of UNRWA-PNA projects, usually called ‘projects of co-operation’, was affirmed by Issa Alqura. This applies to the European Hospital near Rafah: being built within the framework of a special UNRWA project financed by the European Community. UNRWA delivered the responsibility to the PNA to take over the hospital’s administration. Clearly large-scale infrastructure projects, e.g. sewage systems, financed by foreign donors through UNRWA or the PNA, require the co-operation of the two bodies. Declining standards in UNRWA health and education provisions because of the crisis in the regular budget has compelled an increasing number of refugees to seek PNA’s public services. Hossam Manna gave examples for co-operation between the two parties: “The PNA asked UNRWA to build schools in certain locations and we did.” He added that UNRWA helped to build houses for the returnee and police forces. Miqdadi mentioned how UNRWA combined with the Palestinian Authority and worked to transfer experience to the new Palestinian institutions by organising joint workshops and courses. He stressed “Co-operation with the authority is inevitable”. It is not possible to build the infrastructure of refugee camps without integrating it in the national plan. Nevertheless, no explanation has been offered for the lack of co-ordination with municipalities to provide services for the refugees i.e. clean water. Findings of this research reveal that co-ordination is weak between local councils and UNRWA. The water provision in Jabalya Camp is an example. The Municipality of Jabalya’s engineer claimed that he has been ready to solve the water dilemma for a long time. But he alleged “We have offered UNRWA several ways to provide the refugees with better quality and quantity of water, but unfortunately they insisted on a ‘take it all or leave it all’ approach”. He understood it as an UNRWA ploy to cancel its services in the camps. “Our people in the camps are the victims”, he argued.

Also refugees showed concern about the lack of co-ordination between PNA and UNRWA. A refugee and UNRWA officer in the camps complained about disappearing money in the process of implementation of projects carried out in co-operation with the PNA. He attributed this to the lack of co-ordination, corruption, high administrative expenses, and mismanagement within UNRWA. Frequently, projects must be re-planned after discovering that the original plans do not meet the conditions found during implementation. This wasted large sums of money not visible in the final programme result. UNRWA sources clarified that aid was often re-programmed, delayed, or re-channelled for many reasons, frequently associated with the donor’s priorities. Donors delay and re-channel their funds, and have the habit of announcing a single contribution on more than one
occasion creating the impression that they were contributing more, but in fact, no matter the occasions, the money was paid once and often with long delays.

6.3.6. The Peace Process and its Consequences

In the author’s first visit to UNRWA office in Gaza, the Department of Public Relations was reluctant to assist in carrying out the research investigations. A little help was offered providing the author with descriptions of UNRWA’s mandate and press releases. After several attempts they co-operated, justifying the initial attitude to the political sensitivity of the subject under study. Was it coincidence that Hossam Manna attributed the limitation of PIP activities to political sensitivity? He argued “It is not expected that UNRWA go and carry out a large-scale upgrading programme in the refugee camps because Palestinian public opinion would understand the step as a trick to terminate UNRWA services and liquidate the refugees question.”

Understandably, the Palestinian refugees are the backbone of the Palestinian question. Their fundamental concern is the right of return to their homes and properties. The Israeli-Palestinian agreements failed to guarantee or promise this basic right. The Oslo Accords left the refugee issue to the so-called final status negotiation. Over time, the feeling has spread among Palestinians that improving the living conditions in the camps might imply the termination of UNRWA services and solving the issue by resettling the refugees. This has raised suspicion among the refugees as well as the intellectual and academic Palestinians towards PIP.

Rabah (1997:35) doubted that PIP involved a political not technical and humanitarian agenda. He argued that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the PNA had become a test case for the transfer of UNRWA services. If it proved feasible -taking into account the political acceptance among the local refugee community- the organisation and its counterparts would likely be more proactive in working toward similar results in other host countries. The author discussed this issue with PNA, UNRWA official and local refugees.

In general, PNA officials reiterated that the PNA does not wish to take over UNRWA’s tasks. The Director for Co-operation with NGOs in the PNA Ministry of NGOs emphasised that UNRWA should remain until a final solution to the refugee problem is achieved. He would like to see UNRWA an active participant in the search for a solution, which must include all refugees. At the same time, he stressed that no official PNA position towards a hand-over of UNRWA tasks exists.

Statements by UNRWA officials reflected a similar attitude. On several occasions, UNRWA’s political mandate has been emphasised. Asked if UNRWA favoured refugee
integration by means of the hand-over of services, Gaza Public Relation Director Issa Alqura replied: “The agency promotes return or compensation. UNRWA wants to keep the refugee issue alive”. On the other hand, he was cautious when asked whether the current decrease of UNRWA services could end in a de-facto hand-over. “This has to be discussed when the situation is clearer” he responded. Asked if this was not just wishful thinking, as a voluntary take-over of UNRWA’s services seemed unlikely, he referred to the uncertain conditions, that the final negotiations about refugee issues remains to be controversial, and that clear answers are still missing.

On the other hand, the refugee community, who daily experience the reality of decreasing traditional services in the Palestinian Territories, expresses their suspicion that PIP is a move against their rights. A Palestinian refugee believed that UNRWA’s existence from the very beginning was a Western conspiracy, stating:

UNRWA is giving us morphine injections; its creation was a conspiracy of the world, if we had been left also we would never have accepted being transported. But we were pacified by the meagre of two kilos of oil, two kilos of rice and the blankets, which the entire world had used before us, they have made beggars out of us. Now they repeat the ploy.

Against this, one refugee told the author: “If UNRWA finishes its work, the refugee problem will be finished”, “It is very easy, if UNRWA hands over we will lose every thing because we will lose our identity”. An interviewed UNRWA official, himself a refugee said: “We need a Palestinian Authority and not strangers to rule us, but I oppose any hand-over to the PNA. If this takes place I will retire from my job; the people will even start another Intifada against the PNA, if they take over the services.” Another UNRWA employee rejected this polemic, arguing, “I know some people say that UNRWA pacifies, making us less likely to resist. This is not true. It was UNRWA that created the idea of resistance, they have not been able to stop it nor have they wanted to. The PLO has good relation with UNRWA, there is no conflict of interest in UNRWA providing services and not leadership”.

The author attributes Palestinian suspicion toward the project (PIP) to several reasons.

- Refugees fear that this project is the last UNRWA service. In addition, the fear exists that standard of services will further decline, if the PNA take over.

- Refugees doubt that the PNA would actually be granted the same amount of funds UNRWA currently receives.
Refugees say that they are aware of the corruption and nepotism prevailing in PNA’s institutions. They argue that political affiliation of the applicant might become the major criteria for access to services.

UNRWA services and employment opportunities are indispensable for the refugee communities.

Finally, refugees fear that a hand-over of UNRWA responsibilities to the PNA would result in the loss of their special, internationally protected refugee status. The issue would be dropped from the agenda of the international community, and they would forfeit their chance to benefit from the enactment of UN resolutions on the refugee question.

6.3.7 PIP and Aid Policies

A refugee working in UNRWA headquarters claimed that the reason behind the generosity towards PIP was that donor countries preferred to stop financing UNRWA’s regular service re-directing their funds to special projects. He continued “When the Oslo Accord was signed, it was widely believed that peace and stability would soon emerge in the Middle East with Palestinian statehood the inevitable outcome.” At that time, Tamari (1996:76) claimed that Western governments seemed determined to dissolve UNRWA as early as possible. From this perspective, PIP and other projects for improvement of living conditions in refugee camps were presented to the Multilateral Refugees Working Group (RWG) in which Western governments’ research claimed that “UNRWA regular aid was wasteful and not meeting the requirements of the new period”

Despite the growing consensus of the unlikeness of the dissolution of UNRWA, there are fears of a de facto dismantling through continuous cuts of the regular budget. Donor’s policy of responding generously to special UNRWA projects (mainly PIP) meant neglecting the requirements of regular programmes. According to Rabah (1997:37), UNRWA would soon be unable to provide adequate services. Then it would be forced to relinquish the responsibility of vital services, which will need to be provided by the PNA. During the last six years, financial problems have severely affected the Agency’s regular programmes, restricting the expansion and improvement of services. The health services are a case in point.

According to UNRWA’s health centre personnel, budget retrenchment is a common situation. During 1998, budget cuts reached 20% of the total budget. In the same year, UNRWA introduced a cost-sharing system at its contract hospitals, which required patients to contribute 40% of the costs for their treatment (Special Hardship Cases exempted). The requirement suggested that UNRWA health care system could not keep pace with the exigencies of the expanding refugee population; similarly, overcrowded health care centres
generate impossible working conditions for their physicians. These circumstances do not encourage careful diagnosis and as result, treatment can be reduced to handing out medicine. Frequently, the required medicine is not available; shortages occur especially in expensive drugs. A nutrition programme, designed for the newly born to 12 years old, has been curtailed until only children four years or under are considered. The programme has been relocated from special nutrition centres to general UNRWA health clinics; the author, speaking to medical workers, observed that these new arrangements demand additional effort from already overtaxed physicians. In addition, family planning courses, the treatment of diabetes and hypertension have been added to the duties of general health centres. With UNRWA’s extreme problems in maintaining adequate supplies often, the medicine’s use-by date has expired before the full demand is met. Medicine is delivered to UNRWA clinics once every three months and must be distributed in portions of one-third per month. Often supplies are exhausted before the 30-day period is completed, forcing residents to obtain medication at private clinic rates. Control and limitation in practices has given rise to mounting criticism (Author’s interview, 1998). Other austerity measures could be noted in all UNRWA regular services.

UNRWA (1999) demonstrated that USA is the biggest contributor to PIP. Refugees often express concern about what they believe to be US policy: “The US and Israel would like to see UNRWA disappear.” They describe the strategy as consisting of reducing US contributions to UNRWA’s regular budget, while pumping money into PIP and other projects. It is understood that USA has a strong interest in a de-facto solution for the refugee issue. USA has been interested in UNRWA services for a refugee population that would have been otherwise Israel’s responsibility. This can explain the United State’s attitude and aid policy toward UNRWA and its project. Dr Sadeq a teacher at the Al Azhar University in Gaza explained “The United States is the major UNRWA donor and as such a powerful policy maker, its policy towards the agency could be viewed in the light of American interest which gives its major ally, Israel, an influential position. Perhaps, because of Israel’s ally status, the USA has been informed of, and provided support for, such programmes.” The commentator made the point that the American policy following the Oslo Accords refrained from exerting pressure for a more flexible Israeli position on the refugee question, and has supported the Israeli argument that international resolutions on Palestinian refugees - including Resolution 194 are subject to bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Moreover, since 1993, the USA has abstained from voting for Resolution 194 in several UN bodies, most recently in May 1999 on the renewal of UNRWA’s mandate by the UN General
Assembly. This attitude will serve to diminish the scope of Israeli and international responsibility for Palestinian refugees. Arguably, outstanding issues will then be dealt with as national problems of the individual countries.

Commentators consider the launching of PIP expressed a political optimism that this project will be the final investment initiative undertaken by the Agency. At the same time, UNRWA proposed to donor countries a five-year financial and planning scheme for guaranteeing refugees the provision of services until the end of its current mandate, and then proceed with the already agreed transfer of service provision to the PNA. Seemingly, the early optimism has vanished, especially within UNRWA. UNRWA’s General-Commissioner emphasised this common feeling in his speech to the fiftieth anniversary of UNRWA in Gaza: UNRWA will continue its work until the refugee problem is solved [but] hardly anyone believes that a solution will be reached in a short time (Hansen, 2000).

Refugees’ disappointment is directed against both the donor countries and UNRWA. Dr. Sadeq, justified the refugees’ expectation, arguing: “UNRWA is expected to encounter donor strategies and to defend refugee rights by means of innovative ideas”. Other refugees argued it is the role of the Arab rich countries to face these policies and support the UNRWA programmes against what is called by refugees ‘the western conspiracy’. Abu Iyad as an administrator for over thirty years in UNRWA is aware of the limitations imposed on the agency. He reserved the thrust of his criticism for Arab donor countries. In his opinion, they could solve the deficit problem easily, but they lack the political will. “Their principle is that the Western Countries are to be blamed for creating and maintaining Israel, so the West should bear the responsibility of the services that UNRWA now provides”. He continued to claim that it is a conspiracy to avoid finding a real solution, if the Saudis increased their contribution then the deficit would just be bigger next year until the Western powers ended up paying nothing.

6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, a number of issues of post-conflict reconstruction of human settlements have been addressed by studying the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). Responding to the deteriorated living condition in the refugee camps, UNRWA introduced its programme in 1993. PIP aimed to demonstrate to Palestine refugees the tangible benefits of the peace process. Pursuing that outcome, the main objectives of PIP were to effect the

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1 The American president Bill Clinton in a speech to the Institute of Israel studies January 2001 expressed his attitude regarding the Palestinian refugees. He denied them the right of return.
following changes in refugee communities: (1) Rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) providing better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and (4) support the needy and hardship cases.

UNRWA after years of implementation claimed that the programme has largely succeeded. It argued: living conditions have been improved through shelter rehabilitation schemes. Infrastructure has been developed through the reconstruction or expansion of facilities to an adequate standard, and enhancements to camp infrastructure, upgrading environmental health systems, enhancing facilities refugees access on a daily basis, and maintaining the qualitative level of certain key UNRWA services. Employment opportunities have been created through use of local contractors for construction projects, provision of loans to small scale and micro-enterprises, and targeted job creation initiatives. Based on the literature survey (Chapter two, three, four) the author analysed PIP as a post conflict reconstruction exercise. The following issues have been addressed:

- **The timing of action was right**
  The impact of the Gulf war and the Israeli policy of border-closure were severe on the local Palestinian economy. At the same time with the onset of the peace process, UNRWA launched its programme to alleviate the living condition in the refugee camps.

- **Comprehensive approach for meeting objectives:**
  The case study showed that UNRWA employed a comprehensive approach when tackling the problem in the refugee camps. While it worked to provide better infrastructure, it also addressed the issue of unemployment. More job opportunities were offered. In addition, the hardship cases were helped to attain better and upgraded shelter. Nevertheless, the programme did not address the root causes of the refugee problem. It seems that the problem is beyond the organisation’s capacity.

- **Efficiency or discrepancy:** the former means achieving your goals in the short time and with fewer resources. In this programme, it appears that there is a discrepancy between stated objectives and outcomes. The following are some of the programme’s failures:

  - Shelter Rehabilitation Programme: The proportion (0.002 %) of houses constructed and those repaired, is only twenty out of every thousand dwellings in the camps. Their excluded householders complain. As a commentator describes the criteria for the programme, “Who shouts loudest get the improvements.”

  - Providing infrastructure: While UNRWA documents claimed that the programme has largely succeeded, the author’s findings prove that the refugees still suffer from a lack of adequate services, including education, health, and physical infrastructure.

  - Job Opportunities: the programme aimed to help the community and the micro-economy projects. Despite noted success, the complaint was that the programme contributes to undermining the local and small business industry.
• **Public participation and building local capacities:**
  After prolonged occupation, it is assumed that recovery programmes should give much weight to the development of local capacities. Public participation has become respected as a tool to maximise the use of local resources. However, the survey shows that no participation by Palestinian refugees occurred in any programme stage. One of UNRWA's officials reply "What is the need for public involvement in these projects… do you think that refugees in the camps know more than us."

• **Co-ordination with the PNA:** The chapter shows that co-operation has taken place between organisations and the Palestinian National Authority in different spheres. UNRWA has worked with the PNA to transfer experience to newly formed Palestinian institutions by organising joint workshops and courses.

• **Consequence of the peace process:**
The programme was initiated in response to the peaceful environment that began to emerge during 1993 in the Middle East reflected in the Oslo Accords of the same year between PLO and the State of Israel. However, the last chapter pointed out that the refugee question was postponed with other crucial issues until the so-called final status negotiations. The ambiguity regarding the refugee’s position has reduced the project’s effectiveness. For example, a suspicion has grown among Palestinians particularly refugees that this programme is a new conspiracy against them. "The programme is a political tool to achieve a hidden agenda". This is an allegation that has been repeated since the very beginning of the project. It alleged that the programme is designed to defend *status quo* as a permanent solution to the refugee question. However, UNRWA officials on different occasions have rejected this accusation, pointing out that the organisation will exist until a final and lasting remedy to the refugees problem is found. This theory could explain why USA and other Western governments were unexpectedly generous to fund the programme activities while they do not donate to the organisation regular programmes. It seems that donors predicted that PIP would be UNRWA’s final investment initiative in the refugee camps.

Finally, in present context, it is difficult to propose one concrete solution for the shelter crisis in the Palestinian refugee camps. The root answer to this problem and others facing refugees is directly connected to the political dimension of the postponed refugee question. Then, only under a situation where they exercise their right of return to their previous homes can a viable solution exist. Nevertheless, this should not hinder improving living conditions. It is their right as human beings to have an acceptable standard of living, since it is evident that no contradiction exists between improving living conditions in refugee camps and adherence to the right of return. At the time that it is difficult to solve the problems facing refugees, it is possible to alleviate certain disadvantages and prevent their aggravation. Therefore, efforts should be concentrated on improving the living conditions in refugee camps. To put it briefly,

As the peace process has failed to tackle the refugee question in an appropriate manner, and since the Palestinian refugees issue was excluded from the Oslo process, no recovery programme targeting refugees can finally succeed.
The subsequent chapter discusses another project in the Palestinian Territories. In addition to the main issues, the author examines the refugees' attitude towards improving their living conditions, and the influence on the refugee population.
Chapter Seven: (Case Study 2)

A PALESTINIAN HOUSING COUNCIL PROJECT IN THE GAZA STRIP (ELKARAMA NEIGHBOURHOOD)
Chapter Seven

A PALESTINIAN HOUSING COUNCIL PROJECT
IN THE GAZA STRIP (ELKARAMA NEIGHBOURHOOD)

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Housing is a historical dilemma. No one can claim that there is a community without housing problems. Koenigsberger (1987) pointed out the longevity of the dilemma:

A healthy, growing society will always have a housing problem. If I ever met a society that claimed to have solved all its housing problems, I would look at it with great suspicion and conclude that it must be in a worrying state of decline.

Housing shortage is not only a Palestinian or Third World problem. Despite available resources the developed countries face continual housing crises. Hamdi (1995:7) noted that "Millions are homeless in the United States and Britain...millions of people are sheltered in temporary accommodations". He added that local authorities in England put up large numbers of people in temporary bed and breakfast accommodations. In the Palestinian Territories, Al-Agha (1997:3) reckoned housing to be the most difficult problem topping the list of priorities for the PNA. The predicament is worsened by the political situation. Crises are exaggerated by Israeli settlements occupying extensive areas in the Gaza Strip, the large size of Palestinian families, the deteriorated economic situation, and the lack of national banks operating in the field of housing. The continuity of occupation and its implication, which can be noted in the demolition of houses either as a punishment or for the failure to produce a license and the confiscation of Palestinian land, altogether represents an added severe obstacle. Thus, the housing problem has become acute. It has further deteriorated because of the existence of the Palestinian refugee camps and the high rate of Palestinian population growth. According to different authors (Shaded, 1997; Abd Alhadi, 1994; Ziara, 1997) there is an urgent need for constructing 120,000 to 180,000 housing units. Palestinian policy makers seeking solutions would need to construct thousands of housing units annually.

The institution of the Palestinian Housing Council in 1992 was established to carry out responsibilities of planning and implementing housing policy in the occupied territories. It
succeeded in providing 1200 housing units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, for the last four years, news of the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) has largely occupied the Palestinian media. Trials, quarrels, arguments and heated professional discussions have taken place on this issue. In this chapter, the author investigates the evidence behind the current disputes between the Council and beneficiaries of its projects. The chapter starts by a short description of the Palestinian Housing Council and its activities subsequently are offered. In his fieldwork, the author distributed questionnaire. The questionnaire was five pages long with eighty questions, some of which were open-ended allowing as many households as possible to respond. (See 4.3.4, page 124). In this chapter, the author discusses the main findings of the field survey of Elkarama Housing project through examining the answers of the project’s beneficiaries and the Council officials. Issues such as the socio-economic characteristics of residents, public participation, process of allocation, satisfaction, perception of the project and refugee’s attitude are discussed. Finally, the author in open dialogue with the Director of the Palestinian Housing Council diagnoses the shortcomings of the project.

7.2 THE PALESTINIAN HOUSING COUNCIL

7.2.1 Background

In 1996 the Council published an information bulletin (named *Adwa*) detailing a variety of facts about the Council’s work. The bulletin was distributed to beneficiaries. Below, the author summarises its important points, comparing the document’s rhetoric with the reality experienced by the Council in its short life. To counterbalance his argument the author uses other sources of documentation such as interviews with PHC officials, articles in Palestinian Newspapers and proceedings from conference workshops.

In 1992 Ibraheem Sha’ban the Director of the Council (1992-1996) remarked that the idea for the formation of the Council emerged soon after the declaration of the Palestinian Government in Algeria in 1988 and its invitation to build Palestinian institutions such as PHC. Palestinians realised the necessity of a housing strategy in light of population growth, changes in Palestinian society and the absence of an existing strategy. He further pointed out that lack of funds and the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987 put these plans on hold. Not until 1991 did Palestinians revive the idea of a housing Council. Following extensive co-ordination and dialogue, the Palestinian Housing Council was established as a non-profit and non-governmental organisation based in Jerusalem. The Council was endorsed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole body responsible for planning and implementing housing policy in the
occupied territories. It was also recognised by governments and international bodies as the national Palestinian institution in charge of housing. This made the PHC the first national Palestinian institution entrusted with carrying out housing projects for middle and low income Palestinians.

Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, gradually administration of the West Bank and Gaza was transferred from Israel to the Palestinian National Authority from which arose the Palestinian Ministry of Housing. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Housing Council continued to perform its task, and in agreement with the ministry, fulfilled the role of implementor of future housing plans.

### 7.2.2 Management and Organisation

The PHC is administrated by West Bank and Gazan personalities, and was instituted to lay down general policies and solve the housing problem. Three dimensions were considered at the founding of the Council with a governing Board: geographic, political and professional. As Sha'ban suggested the latter became the most significant along with other unconsidered influences. The bulletin indicated the Board draws together policies and oversees implementation of the projects. Also 70 employees of various professions such as engineering, finance, are sited in Jerusalem with another four branch officers located in Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, and in the Gaza District. Management includes a Director General assisted by directors from departments of administration, finance, technical and planning.

Directors meet once every two weeks or whenever necessary to discuss the Council’s operations and make relevant decisions. Further, the Board delegates authority to four different sub-committees to follow up the Council’s various functions. These are classified as finance, technical, public relations, and planning and research.

The bulletin cited that the Council is run on a daily basis by a professional staff. The staff is divided into five departments, administration, finance, technical, planning and marketing. The technical contingent is noted as the backbone of the Council, taking responsibility for the beginning of construction with the on-going task of appraising plans until completion. Management of the units after completion is handled by the administration.

### 7.2.3 Goals and Objectives

In 1992 Sha’ban spoke at a conference organised by the Arab Forum in Jerusalem, outlining the overall strategy of the Council in the following terms. The main aim is:
Securing appropriate housing for those with limited income. The economic factor will be prevalent in building and trying to reduce the cost of housing units. It should deliver the desired services and should also be compatible with the spirit of the age and be consistent with the cultural legacy and environment of the Palestinian people.

This statement gave an early inference of subsequent dilemmas the Council has encountered. Possibly, too many objectives have been stressed for all of them to be carried out. The document tried to narrow the scope by stating, “Perhaps the main objective of the Council is to find practical solutions to the housing problem in Palestine through the construction of low-cost housing and drawing up plans towards that end.” To reach this goal the Council has set up the following utopian list of objectives to:

- Study the housing problem and propose ideas and a mechanism to provide a solution.
- Participate in drawing up a national housing strategy.
- Utilise modern planning and construction techniques in low cost construction without compromising the social structure and values in Palestine.
- Build low cost housing for families of limited income and sell the units under an easy long-term payment plan.
- Be partners in home improvement plans and upgrading of residential areas through loan programmes and technical assistance.
- Market housing units to low and middle income groups.
- Encourage the establishment of local housing co-operatives.
- Join in establishing and running a Palestinian housing bank.
- Lobby the international community to fund low-cost housing projects on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.
- Develop and encourage the private housing sector.
- Inspire co-operation between Palestinians and international businesses in the housing field.

Despite this ambitious plan Sha'ban at the 1992 conference expected various obstacles would block the way of implementation. The author also disputes if the newly born Council with very limited experience could succeed in carrying out such a broad range of varied activities. Understandably, these listed objectives represent the strategy of a Ministry of Housing in a sovereign state, with mechanisms in place to manage its resources, personnel and plans. In the opposite case where the Israeli occupier has controlled every single step, arguably it could have been a better strategy to highlight a small range of manageable and perhaps achievable goals.

7.2.4 International Aid

PHC’s documents indicated that not long after its establishment, the European Commission representative of the European Union signed an agreement with the PHC granting the Palestinian people 29 million Echo as a revolving fund for the construction of
housing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Soon after, the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, endorsed a similar agreement with the PHC for the construction of housing units in Gaza worth over 7 million dollars. This amount was part of an overall 25.5 million dollars. The Japanese government also contributed another 10 million dollars for the construction of housing units in Gaza for the benefit of the Palestinian police. The United Nations Development Programme supervised the implementation of the project in co-operation with the Council.

7.2.5 Construction

The Council official in charge claimed that soon after it received the international aid, funds started to be allocated for the various housing projects being undertaken on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The land was purchased for that purpose as state land due to Israeli policies, was unavailable for Palestinian use. When land was acquired, plans were set in place for initiating the projects. The Council invited architectural design offices to submit design ideas for the projects. The best work, selected by a committee of professionals, was adopted as the design of the building or set of buildings, which would be constructed. However, a close look at the architectural drawings, illustrates the lack of experience at that time. Free hand drawing, poor models, old-fashioned designs reveal the limited quality of different offices' architectural experience. Participant architects were mostly graduates from Egyptian or local universities in 1970s and 1980s. It has to be acknowledged that they lacked the experience of handling this kind of professional work. This opinion was reinforced by the fact that referees of the committee recommended to competitors they should revise their drawings and re-submit at a later date.

After that, pre-qualified contracting companies were invited to submit bids for the housing projects. The most qualified contractors or group of contractors with the best price were then authorised to undertake the construction and started on the project immediately. The PHC technical staff supervised the construction process along with the contractor's engineers until the work was completed. Then management of the project was taken over by the Council. An interview with a contractor disclosed that the Council was highly respected for their managing of the bidding process, with no deal being completed behind closed doors. Every measure was honestly and openly presented to competing contractors. Although apparently satisfied, the contractor had a problem with the Council when a misunderstanding about who should pay VAT (Value Added Tax) to the Israeli Civil Administration, occurred. The Council expected contractors to pay VAT on building materials. Contractors had reckoned the value-
added tax when proposing their bids. Nevertheless, they appealed to the court and the jury took their side in the dispute meaning the Council carried the extra expense and passed it on to prospective residents.

7.2.6 Allocation of Housing Units

The Council set up criteria for applicants to the flats. It specified five conditions for eligibility for a housing unit or a loan. The applicant should be:

- Residents living on the West Bank including East Jerusalem, or in the Gaza Strip.
- Of limited income yet able to make the required down payment; in the case of buying a housing unit, the following monthly payments for the mortgage period.
- Financially unable to build a standard-sized home.
- Unable, or any of the applicant's family members, to own a housing unit.
- Have not received, or any of the applicant's immediate family members (dependent children), a housing loan from any party.

As soon as the Council was ready to receive applications, it advertised its intention accompanied with conditions in daily Palestinian newspapers. Every applicant paid 20 NIS, which equals £3. Sha'ban (1992:4) stated that 5,600 Palestinians applied to the Council. Contrary to the Council assumptions, few applications were received from Gaza Strip. In all the number did not exceed 1,500 applicants. The author attributes this low turnout to the resident's mistrust in any top-down project. Having applied to the Council, the applicant was exposed to a social survey to check the given data in his or her application.

The Council established committees from local residents. Every committee was composed of 7-9 members. In an interview, Alaa' Yaghi, the Loans & Marketing Manager explained that every member must be a respected citizen in the Strip, and exhibit a desire to work for the public good. Further, the member was required to have experience in building co-operative relationships with other economic, social, medical, educational institutions in Gaza. The commentator added that conditions included that members must have a strong knowledge of the living circumstances of residents, especially the applicants. One of the varied roles of the local committee was to recommend which individuals and families deserve to have housing units in the Council projects.

Sha'ban (1992:4) maintained there would not be any compromising on the flats' prices. They would be based on a long-term loan. A down payment of between 10 to 15% of the overall cost would be required. He continued, that there were two incentives implicit in this attitude: the first, to diminish the free-recipient mentality, which he isolated as the reason for the failure of many national projects during the Israeli occupation time. The second, he claimed, was to ensure that residents realised that
receiving without paying would weaken the solidarity between the Palestinian people. He asked and expected applicants to make the effort and pay for a flat in the Council project. He concluded that the housing units would be affordable for low-income people emphasising that the monthly payment would be $100, equal to $1,200 annually. Over 15 years the overall outlay would amount to $18,000.

To test these declarations the author conducted a fieldwork including the distribution of questionnaires to the residents, interviews with key figures and participating in the daily life of in particular the beneficiaries of the Elkarama project. The following offers a compilation of his work.

![Image of locations of PHC's Housing Projects in the Gaza Strip]

Figure 7.1: Locations of the PHC’s Housing Projects in the Gaza Strip

7.3 FIELDWORK FINDING

7.3.1 Who are the Beneficiaries?

Residents’ socio-economic characteristics are seen as a main indicator for planners, managers and policy makers. Practitioners consider the kind of beneficiaries with whom they are dealing to draw up a programme that relates to their actual requirements, abilities and circumstances. This should include recognising how much or little change the respondent group can accommodate in their established, often traditional, life patterns. In short, by recognising the socio-economic characteristics of a

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1 The fieldwork was conducted between 1/10/1999 and 30/11/1999.
project's beneficiaries, one can judge if the project reached its intended target group or failed to do so. An assessment of recent projects discloses a discrepancy between programmes undertaken and the target group's actual needs. In the Elkarama project under study, findings reveal that the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries stand in conflict with the project's design expectations. (See 7.2.6 Allocation of Housing Units)

Age, Marital Status and Education

Researching different target groups' socio-economic features illustrate the importance of certain variables, such as age, marital status and education, in planning and developing policies. For example, in the Elkarama project, the figure shows family household ages ranged from about 20 to over 50: the main age for households between 20 - 30 and 30 - 40. The sample's mean age was 33.3 with a standard deviation of 6.1 with the minimum and maximum age 22 and 58 years respectively. Based on these statistics it could be argued that the age distribution is natural, especially acknowledging that residents between 20 and 40 tend to be those most in need of housing provision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.1): Gender Distribution in the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-over</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.2): Age Distribution in the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Marital Status within the Sample

In the Elkarama project, the vast majority, some 85%, were married with families. As small a percentage as 5% were single, with 5% divorced and 5% widowed. The
average family had six members. The smallest grouping was composed of two; in contrast, there were two family households containing as many as 11 persons.

Figure 7.2: A Multi-storey Residential Building, Gaza Strip
Source: The Author (May 1996)

Another important, proven variable is the spread of gender. In the above example, without previous arrangement, the author met 6 women, five of whom were acknowledged as heads of their respective households. The other 33 respondents were male. Another critical feature of residents was their educational background. Research showed that the residents' primarily were from upper secondary school and university level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Secondary School</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Students</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master or Doctorate Degree</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Education level in Elkarama Housing Project

This high degree of education equates with the residents' relatively high economic status, therefore the table betrays a contradiction. The Palestinian Statistic Bureau consensus (1997)
showed that low-income households are mostly engaged in small scale enterprises or working in Gaza in humble jobs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Job</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs In Gaza</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Israel</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA Institutions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Institutions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately work</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA Police</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA Civil</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.5): Employment in Elkarama Housing Project

Employment and Household Income

From various backgrounds, residents of Elkarama were found to be professionals mainly employed within the economy's formal sector as teachers, civil servants, engineers and vets to name some. The socio-economic characteristics of these residents contradict the announced policy of the PHC: to dedicate Elkarama houses to low-income people living in Gaza.

This survey indicated that households in the Elkarama scheme were employed in both public and private sectors with a small percentage engaged in earning a living through self-employment. Among the residents interviewed 82% were found to have jobs. 78% of the interviewees said they worked in Gaza, in PNA institutions 72%, while others such as UNRWA and NGOs made up 16% of the workforce. Only 3% admitted to having a private source of income. These were in trade, in a small video club or were brokers. Of those employed in PNA ministries, 28% were shown to be members of one or the other of the Authority's police forces.

Unemployed residents had worked in either Gaza or Israel, before being laid off for a variety of reasons. For example, one labourer had been denied permission to return to his workplace in Israel. Another had resigned from his job in Gaza and was seeking a new appointment. A further interviewee had lost his leg while working in Israel, and now expected the arrival of a large sum of money in insurance compensation. The survey also revealed that another man who lost his job in Israel due to health troubles - now classed as unemployable - depends totally on his wife's temporary employment with a Palestinian NGO.
Salary | Number | Percentage
--- | --- | ---
Under 1000 NIS | 1 | 4%
From 1000-1500 NIS | 7 | 24%
From 1500-2000 NIS | 7 | 24%
From 2000-2500 NIS | 5 | 17%
From 3000-4000 NIS | 6 | 21%
4000 - over | 3 | 10%

Table 7.6: Monthly Salaries.

An assessment of incomes during the field survey detected that 32 residents have jobs. The survey indicated that about 3% of residents earned less than 1000 New Israel Shekel ($100 equal 420 New Israeli Shekel). The author found that 24% earned from 1000 to 1499 NIS, another 24% 1500 to 1999 NIS. These figures compare with the income of a physician working in PNA hospitals; at the time of the field study taking home 1,900 NIS per month and reckoned to be one of the highest salaries in Gaza. But the research statistics uncovered that 17% earned more, between 2000 to 2499 NIS, and 21% received as much as 3000 to 4000 and a small number, 10% reached an income level of over 4000 NIS.

**Household Expenditure**

In the carrying out of most housing programmes, income is used as a determinant of the proposed client's ability to afford the housing. In this study, different households maintained that they ended up spending all their salaries and incomes on household expenditure. Respondents spent all their resources before paying a monthly instalment to the PHC. Household expenditure ranged across low, moderate and high levels of earning. The below table reflects a population group of relatively stable conditions in which about 69% expend between 1000 NIS to 1999 NIS. 10% fall below the 1000 NIS benchmark. This represents a very low expenditure while 21% spend over 2000 NIS - an extremely high outlay in relation to the conditions in Gaza Strip.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 1000 NIS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1000-1499 NIS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1500-1999 NIS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2000-2499 NIS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500 NIS over</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7: Monthly Expenditure

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2 The author did not face a considerable problem to know the household income. It could be attributed to the local culture, where the poor is willing to complain, and the better off is willing to show God's reward.
As explained earlier Ibaraheem Sha'ban, former chairman of the PHC, described the main aim of the Council as extending housing services to beneficiaries from the low-income bracket and working classes (Sha'ban, 1992:44). However, after the implementation of these projects, the former chairman of the PHC Shaded (1996:11) adjusted the principal aim of the Council to meeting the actual needs for housing among the low to middle-income groups. The inclusion of the latter group still can not be reconciled with the outcome of the project that seems to have provided housing for a very small minority. As above data suggests the Elkarama scheme has created a residential area of relatively high stability in relation to the rest of the Palestinian population. Decisively the gathered evidence shows that different (higher) income groups have been catered for, in the programme, far beyond the means of those the original project document targeted.

Usama Elsa'dway, currently Director of the Palestinian Housing Council in Gaza, admitted that the Council has not managed to accommodate the publicised target group. He explained that original plan was to build houses to match the socio-economic conditions of low-income people. However, severe constraints such as the cost of land and the Israeli border closure policy, resulted in delays in the project's implementation which in turn inflated the cost. He further acknowledged that the lack of experience in the Palestinian community affected detrimentally the progress of the programme. On the other hand, one resident alleged that a member of the Council Board bought the land from a Palestinian absentee and then sold it back to the Council at a higher price. This statement implies that something worse than inexperience was at work in elevating the cost. Elsa’dway claimed that the lack of experience included a shortage of practical skills on the part of contractors, workers and engineers. On various occasions, during implementation, contractors sought advice from the Council on such technical matters as how to fix an elevator. The deficiency extended to engineers who since the Israeli Occupation had little or no experience of working on large construction projects. Labourers were the only group who had gained enough experience from similar initiatives in Israel. Elsa’dway insisted all these factors contributed to the unexpected rise in prices that led to the exclusion of the initially proposed target group.

Meeting Yaghi, he justified why the project failed to reach its publicised aim. Yaghi conceded that the Council was mainly instituted to meet the needs of those in the low-income class that were deprived members of the community. Nevertheless, he defended the project's outcome, asserting that the original group was hesitant in coming and paying the required deposit before the handing over of their flats. In 1996, at the
close of the project implementation, the Council published a notice in the national newspapers that beneficiaries had to come and pay $10,000. However, only a small percentage met their obligation and paid the deposit. The Council found itself obliged to put these flats on the market for other client groups to purchase, believing that this step also would serve the Palestinian community.

Having listened to these arguments, the author decided to ask members of the original target group to explain why they had been slow in taking up the offer of the Elkarama flats? The unanimous answer was cost. Members of the original target group complained that the Council had not honoured its promise to produce affordable flats, as it stated in 1992. One interviewed resident claimed that the Council promised the flat would cost between $25,000 to $30,000 with a monthly payment of between $50 to $70, over 25 years without interest. Despite these official declarations, Palestinian households have been expected to give $10,000 as a first payment followed by monthly instalments of $226. Understandably, low-income beneficiaries refused and were unable to pay the requested sum.

7.3.2 Delivery of Units: Was it a Fair Process?

Generally, it is admitted that for most Gazans home ownership can only be the final stage of a time-consuming process. Nevertheless, 5% of those interviewed, had houses in other areas of the Strip, a situation that Council requirements attempted to avoid during allocation. It was stipulated that no applicant should own any other house in the Gaza Strip. If the original plan had come to fruition and the target beneficiaries drawn from the most needy, the problem of multiple ownership would have rarely been a concern. An assessment of the houses an individual owned before taking up places in the Elkarama project discloses that 55% were residents in refugee camps and 25% returnees.

In the sample of respondents interviewed, a significant percentage was shown not to be first-time buyers. This evidence illustrates the rate that publicly funded housing, aimed at low-income groups, changes hands. A short report, prepared by the PHC in 1999, also profiles how plots changed hands during the project. It can be verified that this outcome has many precedents in developing countries. For example, in different countries, housing units, designed for low-income groups, were seen to be changing occupants immediately after allocation. In the Elkarama project, an owner of two flats explained: “In addition to my two flats here I own three houses in Gaza City, Jabalya Camp and Tal Elza’tar Neighbourhood.” He continued that he bought the first flat from the Council, but the other property from another buyer.
As noted, home ownership is advocated as a means to solve the housing problems of low-income groups. In contrast, the findings of this study expose that the process is tedious and expensive for the households of low wage earners. Among residents, in the project, the process was found to include a number of issues relating to the administrative and financial as well as recognition of the self-sacrifices required, before a person finally occupied their house. Before the allocation or buying of the units, beneficiaries had to engage with a number of procedures and investigations.

Asking to point out some of the administrative difficulties they faced when confronting Council bureaucracy, a significant percentage of inhabitants said they had no problems. The second largest percentage alleged they had experienced some problems, such as difficulty in obtaining application forms, short time allotted for raising the deposit and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures.

The Council looked across the entire original target group. Yaghi proudly reported every case had been separately examined. A social survey was conducted to choose the beneficiaries according to drawn-up criteria. The applicants were asked to fill-in a coded questionnaire. Questions included their ability to pay, their social and economic condition, and if they have a martyred family member or someone who has been imprisoned for a long time. These factors were scrutinised. In addition, a local committee was asked to recommend applicants as a further safeguard against missing the original target grouping. However, some residents criticise the surveyors' performance. Abu Saleh objected because the surveyor came to his workplace at the same time the applicant was on his annual leave. Thus, the surveyor falsely concluded that Abu Saleh was out of work. "It took me a long time to convince members of the Council that I had a job, only proved finally by letters from my employer," Abu Saleh said. Another case was refused, but by using his own methods he was able to occupy a flat in the project. Salah, a Palestinian returnee, applied, but his condition did not meet the Council's criteria. He asked the help of the Palestinian Chief of Staff; since Salah was working as one of his personal guards. "Then, everything went as smooth as I wanted. I paid less than other applicants did. I paid $3000 while others had to make a financial outlay of $8,000 - 10,000." Significantly, some residents avoided all procedures. These purchased flats from the Council after the original beneficiaries had shown reluctance, or from other buyers.

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3 Abu Saleh is a resident of Elkarama Housing Project. The author interviewed him in October 1999.
Did you get any help of any kind to have your flat?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.8: Help to Get a Flat.

Finance was the main problem facing the vast majority of residents. Different studies express concern about how members of the target group are to access resources, and if they can not, how can the programme be affordable? Doubt is raised about the feasibility of developing an effective and accessible financial system with proper intermediaries. Reviewing different experiences from many countries, Mutallah (1993:214) concluded it was acutely difficult to solve these three needs of finance: affordability for households, viability for financial institutions and resource mobilisation for the expansion of the sector at national level. She also emphasised, in developing countries; housing finance has been left largely to market forces, co-operatives and informal networks.

These models are repeated in the current study where most respondents acquired financial support in form of loans either from banks or from their relatives. Abu Rami remarked that he found himself obliged to sell his wife's jewellery. Ibraheem described how he secured help through his brother, who, he related, is one of the Fatah leaders in Gaza North. Nemer Illian reported that he sold his old car, borrowed from his brother, and sold his wife's precious jewels to obtain the necessary capital to pay the deposit, leading to other dilemmas that these 'marginal' residents are unable to meet the monthly instalments 4. How can one pay $220 monthly while at the same time is required to repay the bank, a relative or even his wife?

7.3.3 The Project and the Local Culture

Planners designed Elkarama hoping that it would provide a good dwelling for occupiers to reside in. This admirable intention has gained a mixed reception from the respondents. Fewer households claim they prefer to live within the project boundaries, whilst 65% would rather live eventually outside of it. The main reason for this preference to leave the project flats is a traditional desire to have one's own house when the householder has accumulated sufficient capital. In Elkarama, as Elsa'dway held that every Palestinian seeks to live in an isolated private house, which means that one third of residents treat this

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4 Fatah is the main faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
project as only providing temporary accommodation. This attitude could influence the degree to which a resident adjudges the project a success or a failure.

Investigating the preferred methods residents would use for their own houses, 78% of respondents answered they would like to have access to land which could be developed according to his/her needs. 20% were satisfied to live in flats ready for occupancy as in the Elkarama project. One householder described this approach as more 'civilised', given Gaza’s 'modernised' circumstances. Another resident, a returnee rationalised this option, declaring that since they had lived in exile in flats for more than twenty-five years what is the difference now! Others seem more pragmatic in their answer: Abu Saleh represented this view:

It is my dream to have the money to build my own house on my own land, but do you think this is realistic? I see by my low-income, and the limited area of land in Gaza Strip, that my dream is impossible to achieve.

He understood that affording at least $50,000 to buy land and another $50,000 to build a house is beyond his dream.

A further enquiry, what respondents consider when looking for a house, revealed that a combination of factors was normal. Reasons included: the house's affordability and level of security, quality of the neighbourhood and the good attitude of neighbours, as well as a high standard of the infrastructure services available. Interviewees suggested that a good housing unit within a fine environment combine all these elements.

The layout of Elkarama project is dominated by multi-storey housing of eight floors clustered around open paved squares with small green areas. Flats were designed from two models: the first consisting of two bedrooms and the second with three. The flat contains a living room, guest-room, kitchen, toilet and bathroom. The project did not allow for open spaces that had once been prominent around the residents' original houses or even shelters. The designer produced these standardised flat models believing in the concept of efficiency, minimum costs and rapid installation. In fact, the proportions of the flat suggest that the designer has had no real experience in living with a large family in a compressed space. There is no recognition of the critical functions that a house fulfils through accommodating an extended family, or facilitating the special needs of large families. Shortcomings in the design are excused as the consequences of financial constraints. But observation confirms that user needs receive the lowest priority from the Council whose main goals seem to be recouping the cost, allocation procedures and approval of alterations in the dwellings.

Mohi Ed-deen Alfara, the designer of Elkarama project, defended himself. He insisted that he followed the PHC specifications in the project. The architect elaborated...
that in a meeting with Dr Abed Ar-rahman Hamad, Deputy Chairman of PHC, he explained to the competing architects that the Council was seeking uniformity, a standardised product and spaces that conform to the international standards for low-income houses. Alfara added local variations in physical and socio-economic conditions have been overlooked.

No programming before or post-occupancy evaluation was undertaken when they were considered essential. One can justify the low standards in the belief that higher standards than these provided in Elkarama housing would have encouraged the higher socio-economic group to try to take possession of the houses. However, these lower standards, as findings revealed, did not ensure that the project would reach its target group. If the Council provided more spaces, the cost would rise, consequently the low-income and the poor would not be able to afford the flats. But we need to ask how a family of ten could be expected to live in a two-or three bedroom flat? The discrepancy resulted from families' differing ability to pay. But it can be argued even in low-income housing, there is a certain threshold below which the quality and size of the shelter should not be allowed to fall. A 3.30 by 3.30 metres room, as in Elkarama housing, meets the requirements of only a minimal shelter with no provision for privacy and varied activities that make up the structure of everyday life in a household.

Enquiring into the impact of design on the social relationship between residents divulged a range of complaints. Very often government and development agencies assume they know what is in the best interest of the people and consequently, projects are identified, designed and implemented for them rather with them Seventy Four per cent of residents found that no social problem has resulted from architectural design. However, by repeating the question in another form, residents objected to the small rooms, lack of privacy, the limited washing and drying areas, absence of garden, playground, and the insufficient car parking space and complained about the misuse of elevators. Others opposed this type of project, because they observed how social relationships between residents were given a low priority. Every resident is busy and isolated in his own life: therefore, little time seems available for socialising with others. This situation allowed the existence of four flats being utilised as brothels in the projects, a circumstance totally unfamiliar in the traditional Palestinian community.

Returning to construction issues, a lady from the project accused the designer of not knowing that a Palestinian woman spends her whole day in the kitchen, as those in the flats are too small to be practical. In addition, she disapproved of there being no space provided for drying wet clothes. further suggesting the designer assumed every
household had a washing machine and a dryer. While another resident thought the complaints about wet clothes potentially could cause daily problems between the project’s women. In an interview with another lady, she subtly expressed her concern about the flats’ lack of privacy. Privacy is a fundamental concept in the Muslim and Arab culture and architecture. However, the design under study did not consider this fact. A lady, the author interviewed, pointed out that the limited space between the buildings meant that to preserve decency she had to cover her body and hair every-time she opened a window in her flat. “My neighbours have a clear view of my bedroom.”

Also checking the plans, one discovers that the designer ignored Palestinian tradition when he put a small toilette to serve guests and strangers too close to the bedroom, and very far from the flat’s door. Dissatisfaction has been noted as well regarding social diversity as different backgrounds have been collected together in this project. This gives rise to tension between residents. Respondents with Gazan backgrounds seemed accustomed to blame returnees for all pitfalls that have happened in the projects and visa versa. The Council’s architect, Hossam Koraz, endorsed the above critique attributing this pitfall to the donor’s intervention. He accused residents that they had misused the project’s properties. He reported that on different occasions women have used the motion of the elevator as a way to pacify their children. Others have used fire exits as storage areas for flour, sugar and garlic. Arguably, this is not the fault of residents, as the design of the flats failed to include appropriate storage space for these household needs. Koraz held that the Council established a unit for community development. This unit’s duty was to introduce residents to the modern flat, helping them adapt to their new accommodations. However, the unit failed to perform this function.

Surprisingly, and contrary to assumptions that Palestinians like living with relatives, as they had for generations until their expulsion in 1948, the author found that 56% of residents preferred living far from their relatives. The author wonders if this opinion resulted from the cultural changes that may have taken place as residents accept certain spatial restraints after living in the project for a period. Another reason could be anticipated that living together in refugee camps for over the last fifty years have caused tendency to change. While 10% felt indifferent, 33% still claimed they would rather live with their relatives.
Table 7.9: Residents who prefer to live with Relatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Difference</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.3: Typical Floor Plan of Elkarama Housing Project
Source: The Palestinian Housing Council (1996:54)
Those who answered ‘yes’ explained that they felt more secure when their relatives lived with them. They found more Izwa, in English translated as ‘solidarity and support’, through sharing the same tradition and even dialect. To sum up this discussion, it could be argued that the project lacked sensitivity towards people's
cultural and traditional need for interior space to accommodate a large family group and for privacy from neighbours.

7.3.4 Beneficiaries' Satisfaction

It could be posited that the length of residents' stay in a neighbourhood is a measure of his/her satisfaction, related to the ability of a household to sustain the cost of living in this project. In Elkarama, vacant flats were observed. This implies that the assumed beneficiaries have bought the flat for commercially expedient reasons. These are usually the wrong target group who were able to speculate and afford paying the down payment. They intend to wait for the best financial opportunity to sell the flat to another beneficiary. Elsa'dawy conceded that the Council knew that the price of a flat on the project site has reached the almost unattainable figure of $18,000.

Provision & Management of Services

Next to land, provision of essential infrastructure services to settlements is the most important obstacle in meeting the shelter-demands of all income groups. Due to pressing economic conditions, most public institutions have had problems in supplying adequate and efficient services.

Although infrastructure services are deemed as crucial in the operation of a successful human settlement, residents of Elkarama said that the project offered below average or unsatisfactory provisions. The range of comments on the level of services delivered is recorded by percentage below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Below average</th>
<th>Bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Park</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green areas</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children Playgrounds</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7:10: The Residents' Comment on Service Provision in Elkarama Housing Project

While a large portion of residents appreciated the security, water services, a considerable number remonstrated about the low level of services, especially in the provision of refuse collection and removal, health facilities and schools. On the other
hand, the author asked respondents to give their opinion of the overall habitability experienced in the neighbourhood. Their answers were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.11: The Residents' Comments on the Habitability of the Project

The above table shows that to some extent residents were satisfied with the location, management, and surrounding neighbourhood. This can be attributed to the fact that the Elkarama dwellings were built on a site in one of the best areas to be found in the Gaza Strip. The design is much better than in other areas of the Strip mainly occupied by refugee camps, or in Gaza City's poor neighbourhoods.

**Community Participation and Provision of Services**

The author asked residents to assess the performance of the PNA, PHC, and Municipality of Jabalya, NGOs and the local committees. Regarding the PNA 8% claimed they were excellent, 8% satisfactory, 14% acceptable while 70% thought PNA practices were unsatisfactory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Committees</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.12: Performance of the Major Actors

The inhabitants attributed PNA's poor performance to its incapability, often being characterised as corrupt. Some residents justified the authority's low level of performance on the basis of its heavy responsibilities, and the obstacles facing the administrators. While others judged that PNA should take a greater role in the residents' daily life and more directly try to solve their problems with the Council.

The Council was not in a better position in the eyes of residents. Only 3% appreciated and were grateful for its activities, calling its work excellent. Findings showed that 15% considered the Council's performance satisfactory, 31% acceptable, and 51% felt it was disappointing. Arguably, these views are subjective. Problems between the Council and
residents could hinder the latter from objectively assessing the Council's strengths. Naturally, they stressed its shortcomings.

The municipality of Jabalya was given a reasonable level of approval: 15% thought it excellent, 18% satisfactory, 33% acceptable, and 33% found the involvement of the municipality unacceptable. Conversely, NGOs did not receive the same level of appreciation from residents. 70% of the sample thought its performance was deficient. Residents of Elkarama showed their sympathy for the local committees: whereas 59% presented its performance as acceptable while another 13% were satisfied. Not surprisingly, a larger percent of interviewees could not recognise the term NGOs, therefore they did not comment on its performance, which highlights the poor performance of the former. This raises doubts about the feasibility of numerous NGOs working in the Palestinian Territories consuming large amounts of donations to tackle issues unrelated to immediate Palestinian concerns, such as gender equality issues, and human rights violation.

It is understood that the aim of public participation in any project is to engage beneficiaries and to focus on their needs from the beginning. This was not accomplished at Elkarama. Residents expressed the opinion that they did not participate at any stage. Though officials can blame non-involvement in the early projects on the varied restrictions of the Occupation, they did not take the opportunity to adopt a participatory approach when local conditions improved. Officials have countered by saying they were aware of the beneficiary's demands and problems via the work of local committees or by the questionnaire and social survey.

The author investigated the level of residents' belief in a bottom-up approach, by asking them what do they think about residents' role. 59% believed that residents must participate in the management of their life: 33% answered in the negative. 8% gave no answer. The author supported this view by enquiry into residents' conviction in the Popular Committee approach that they experienced during the Intifada (1987-1994). The Popular Committees had managed different aspects of the Palestinian daily life. During the first four years of Intifada, their activities varied from civil to quasi-military. They provided education and health services, refuse removal, social welfare, and traffic organisation. As well, they organised the struggle by dedicating days for confrontation, days for public strikes, distributing Intifada announcements, and events timetable. In addition, they protected the community by punishing drug-dealers and porno-videotape sellers, also interrogating Israeli collaborators and executing numbers of them.
Despite these facts, 46% of residents disapproved of a popular-committee-approach in their everyday life. This answer emerged from a range of reasons: for one, by the end of Intifada era the performance of the Popular Committee seemed ineffectual or haphazard. Notably, the apparent spread of corruption, injustice and chaos undermined the Committees' work as Salah remembered:

In 1992, they came to my home asking my brother to go with them. We did not intervene because we knew that they would punish us. Then it would have been easy for them to condemn us as collaborators. They lead my brother to an isolated site close to sea, interrogated him and then shot him in the leg. Everybody knows that my brother has been a loyal nationalist, more than any of them. He has committed himself to the Palestinian cause since secondary school. He left his faction when he discovered a theft among his group, deciding to become an individual activist for the cause.

The author heard several stories regarding the misbehaviour of committee members to discredit all reports. Abu Rami has witnessed how this tactical approach could lead to disorder and injustice. He narrated his experiences:

During the Intifada, I, as much as any other Palestinian, took part in daily confrontations with the Israeli army. But I did not belong to any faction. I disliked divisions within our community. Hamas, leftist, nationalist, communist and Islamic Jihad were working and had their popular committees. Anyhow, every committee used to provide its followers with food, money, and basic supplies especially during the curfew. By God! In seven years of Intifada, I did not receive anything even a beef can.

Returning to the present case study, the author feels the lack of effective community participation in Elkarama could be overcome. This could have been through initiating programmes using the popular committee approach in a carefully regulated manner. Such committees might correct some of the clumsiness of the more centralised administration, as in the following example. A resident narrated how he had agreed with a group of neighbours to build a small mosque during the project. Generously, another resident provided the raw materials. But no institution would financially underpin the building project. The involved resident, when interviewed, stressed that the Council had prevented them from letting their small project to be realised. He was very disappointed. He decided not to participate in community activities.

Refugees' Attitude

In the last chapter, the author discussed the betterment in refugee life and its impact on their political status. It was showed that that improving living condition amounts to abandoning the rights of Palestinian refugees. This is not exclusively an
academic view since politicians have adopted the same platform from the outset of the refugees’ plight. In Elkarama, in the project’s early stages, refugees living in camps looked unfavourably toward the project. The attitude was reflected in the low number of applications received from them. (Sha’ban, 1994). However, research showed that 74% of the residents were refugees; 72% of them coming from camps, while the rest moved from cities, villages in the Gaza Strip or were returnees from exile with the PNA.

Investigating whether refugees think that improving their living conditions could deter from their national and political rights or not, 15% said ‘no’ while the great majority ‘yes’. Asking those who answered ‘yes’ why they had moved to this project if it might affect their national rights, most replied they had moved under pressure to relieve the very poor living conditions they suffered in the transit camps. Though answering ‘yes’ Abu Nemmer related:

I believe this kind of project will affect our national cause. The PNA’s plan is to initiate projects to re-house refugees from camps. After 10 years, they will be able to declare that there is no refugee problem any more. But I moved here because the two-room shelter in El-shati camp was not adequate for my large family. It was bearable until my brother came from Iraq after the Gulf war, from then he resided in our home. 19 souls were living in two small rooms.

Newly weds wanted to start their family life independently so they decided to leave the larger extended families and buy or rent a flat away from their previous crowded accommodation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that your movement to this project will affect your rights?</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you aware of the current development of the Palestinian refugee’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>issue in the peace process?</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the negotiation will achieve a fair solution for the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees’ issue?</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the peace process had resulted in improving the living</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condition in The refugee camps?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that UNRWA should terminate its services?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.13: Refugees Attitude

The above table shows that 67% of refugees were aware of the Palestinian Israeli negotiations, whereas 16% believed that the negotiations would achieve a just and fair
solution. Refugees did not believe that the peace process would have a favourable impact on their living conditions, while 20% returned it would. There have been improvements exemplified in the sphere of security, infrastructure, and sewage projects. The questionnaire included a query about UNRWA and its future. All refugees expressed the same point of view. They argued that UNRWA should continue its services until a final and just solution has been achieved.

The findings showed that the project did not achieve its expected success. It missed the targeted group and experienced extreme financial problems with both the community’s beneficiaries and the international donors. It has become clear that the wide-ranging goals of the PHC’s programme could not be accomplished. This shortfall was the overall consequence of different factors, which are analysed in the next section.

7.4 SUCCESS OR FAILURE: WHY?

In chapter Three, we mentioned the key elements of the Singapore shelter policy. These include a strong political commitment to public policy; financial system; legislative support which allows the government to acquire land cheaply and quickly and to exercise legal authority on matters related to public housing development and administration; and finally supportive government policies. None of these components has been available in the Palestinian experience. Below the author sets out what he sees as the shortcomings of the Palestinian experience.

7.4.1 Weak Performance of the Palestinian Authority

As seen in Chapter Five, the peace agreement did not produce a strong Palestinian authority, able to plan and implement developmental projects. While the Palestinian Authority has been busy negotiating endlessly details of the details with the Israeli counterpart delegations, it was incapable of intervening to solve the Housing Council problems. Problems such as lack of legislation, enforcement of law, corruption were clear in the Council’s short life experience.

Sha’ban (1997) posited that in Palestine, the legal system is complex and difficult to comprehend. An element in this condition, is the manner in which laws accumulated when the Ottomans introduced changes at the end of the nineteenth century. Since this date through the political upheavals the region has suffered various and contradictory legal systems have successively governed the country. As part of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was subject to all its applicable systems until that Empire collapsed. However, in
practice, some Ottoman laws survived and at present are still applied in Palestine. It was a surprise for the author to discover that land law in Gaza is based on Ottoman legislation. Politically in Palestine, the British succeeded the Ottoman Empire. This era witnessed the establishment of a new legal system and the introduction of British precepts. The mandate authorities established a system of courts and judicial institutions. Notably the British code covering planning, land registration and the transfer of immovable properties represented a significant advancement on the previous arrangements at that time. But other alterations in the law occurred as the twentieth century progressed, including those imposed by Israel after the mandate ended in 1947. After the Arab-Israeli war, an Egyptian Military Government administered Gaza. During the Egyptian era, a legislative Council was established in 1962. New laws replaced old fixtures. These measures are still in use. Subsequently, an effect of the Israeli occupation has been the prevalence of legal distortions. Shehada (1988) stated that “The Israeli Military Governor issued more than 1300 military orders, which amended or abolished most of the previous laws, in questions related to land-reviving as a first priority”.

The Oslo agreements introduced a new and even more complex legislative environment, since the treaties permitted laws to be promulgated to a limited extent. But amendments have been slow in reality as large parts of the Gaza and the West Bank are still under occupation. The Agreements, Shehada (1996) argued, have prevented the authority from exercising legislative power except with the approval of the Israelis. He added that that concordat paradoxically has given legitimacy to the military orders existing on the eve of the signing of the Cairo Agreement. Consequently, in the Palestinian Housing Council’s short experience one can argue that the legal system in the territories has been the main obstacle to achieve success. Sha’ban (1997) claimed that compulsion is a fundamental element of law; without this, it would become only advice or a recommendation. It makes no difference whether the law is ratified by a legislative authority or by the executive authority. It should be noted that judicial authority does not establish law, it just interprets and applies laws. The lack of legal support and lawful authority has deprived the Council of substantial powers when facing opponents.

According to a PHC officer, the law is not a problem. The old canon could work as a tool to enforce it. He contended that the Council appealed in the court. He said, “We have enough documents to convince any judge”. However, strong political inclinations prevented the judge from carrying out his duties. He noted that even after we have a judge on our side, the Minister of Justice asked his officials not to implement the jury’s decision. The PHC manager further alleged that the Palestinian people have inherited a weak and complicated
network of institutions with limited co-ordination, which contributes to lack of speedy action.

On the other hand, Palestinian people have come to appreciate disobedience of the law as honourable gesture when acting against the Israeli Occupation. Field findings disclose that residents emphasise the idleness of the Palestinian law authority. A wide range of residents expressed an attitude of dissidence towards the legal system. In some cases, the author felt that residents take it as culturally acceptable to disobey law. Their fixed point of view can be traced back to the way residents used to obstruct Israeli Authorities during the occupation. Their recalcitrance has been closely linked to the incapacity of the housing Council to impose a code of regulations. A resident said that we are sure that they can not evict any resident from here “This authority can not eject the Jewish from their settlements in Gaza, therefore they will not be able to do this against Palestinians either.” Evidently, residents have learnt that PHC can not enforce its regulations, or even charge an occupant in the court with those signed contracts.

One wonders what is the role of the PNA as the sole authority in Gaza Strip. The PNA is supposed to legislate on many issues, but so far, it has failed to enact new laws due to the agreement limitations. How can new principles be put into effect in the absence of the legislative power and political stabilisation? It could be argued there are many laws that must be amended, others must be implemented and in some cases, new laws should be developed along with relevant regulations and decrees. None of this will be of use, however, if the government can not act as a sovereign power because of the agreement limitation and if the laws can not be fairly enforced.

7.4.2 Lack of Expertise and Managerial Skills

The issue of housing is multifaceted and needs financial, architectural, social and administrative solutions. As Naser (1997) put it, “The real problem is that none of the agencies in the Palestinian Territories has expertise or previous experience in the field of housing. Elsa’ďway, the Director of the Gaza branch of the PHC commented that when the Council was established it faced a critical shortage of skills in planning and implementation for large housing project. He added, “Until this moment there is no national code of standards and specifications for building in the Palestinian territories”. Admittedly, the absence of a national administration augmented the inability to enact such a code.

Elsa’ďway asked the author to see the drawing of the first phase of the project and to compare it to the current situation. He asserted that “We contributed to improve the engineers’ performance in Gaza Strip and the West Bank”.

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It is a fact that Palestinian professionals in construction have graduated from universities all over the world. The wide range of institutions, which trained them, has increased the lack of uniformity in methods and structures. Further the limited nature of the market during the 1970s, 1980s did not provide these professionals with opportunities to practice what they had learned. Together with the shortage of coherent national plans and codes, the situation was bleak. A few large projects were implemented in Gaza before the PNA was instituted. For example, Gaza El Shifa Hospital was designed entirely by an Israeli firm. Elsa’’dway recognised that one problem confronting the Council was only a few engineering and contracting firms were equipped to produce overall plans and designs for large-scale construction projects. From another perspective, the Director said that we decided to rely entirely on local capacities, causing a rise in building costs due to contractors' lack of experience.

The political uncertainties and the vague agreements prevented the Council from hiring Palestinian professionals working in the Gulf States, Europe and North America. On one hand, it is difficult to obtain permission from the Israeli authorities to let these professionals enter the territories. At the other hand, Palestinian expatriates are reluctant to sacrifice their jobs, and livelihood abroad to return under ambiguous and highly problematic situations.

7.4.3 Finance and Affordability

Hamdi (1997:417) noted that “Public housing, with its policy of building directly for the poor, has failed to provide adequate numbers of houses for all sorts of reasons, including high costs. Even when it did, the housing fell largely into the hands of middle income families who can afford to pay for it…there are also examples of empty public housing, too expensive for the poor to afford but undesirable for those who might afford them”.

Having reviewed the PHC experience, it seems no analysis of factors contributing to the total cost of construction, was made before the project started. In different interviews with PHC officials, contractors, engineers the author discussed the issue of housing cost in Gaza. Several different factors that inflicted the discrepancy between the estimated prices and the real cost. These include, land, building materials, labour, infrastructure, design and management costs. These components should be accounted for when seeking potential reductions in the cost of dwellings. In the following, the author calculates the impact of these causes on the Palestinian Housing Council project.
Land

Land is reckoned to be the most important factor to indicate success or failure. Its cost constitutes the largest share. In some cases, it may reach 50 per cent of the total cost for the dwelling. Turner (1980) affirmed that unless land is available through public ownership in a city, the acquisition of land becomes a major problem. In addition, the cost is likely to be high near commercial or industrial places of work. Consequently, as usual, poorer communities who would suffer more. Abed Elhadey (1994) indicated that land prices and their rate of charge differ in various parts of occupied Palestinian Territories. They are influenced by a number of factors: zoning, distance from urban centres, availability of infrastructure and services and the general economic conditions prevailing at any given time.

Mukhtar (1997) demonstrated diverse methods to reduce land prices, that could be controlled by buying large areas of peripheral land at low cost and strategically scheduling development in relation to demand. He continued that a government could depress land prices by taking steps within its power to prevent increases on ground designated for public use and housing development. In contrast, the Palestinian Housing Council had no control over the situation in Gaza and West Bank. Therefore, the Council was obliged to buy land to build its projects. As the above table points out to pay for land required a great deal of money from the Council which was passed on to the buyers. In a meeting with residents of Elkarama, a few of them stressed that corruption was apparent in the process through which the Council obtained land for the project. They claimed that a Council Board member had bought land from an absentee, then sold it to the Council at a considerable profit. The vast majority of residents were conscious of the exaggerated price of land in the case of the Elkarama project.
Construction Materials

Habitat (1995:12) exemplified the problem, stating, most developing countries are endowed with abundant natural resources that could meet the demand for basic building materials using largely indigenous inputs, but local production of building materials in a large number of countries falls short of demand. A contractor involved in the PHC project construction maintained that most of the materials used in projects had been imported from Israel or other foreign markets, either through Israeli agents or, in a few instances, directly by local traders. He justified these arrangements on the grounds that no local substitutes existed for materials such as cement, wood, steel, glass and aluminium. However, some imported supplies, such as tiles, marble and some plastic products, have local substitutes. He went on to say that some items are imported in basic forms and then processed for local usage. Elsa’dway remarked that the Council encouraged local industry as much as possible, however, there could be no compromise in quality specifications. On different occasions, the Council accepted local material if a specialised lab approved and could reassure members that the product met quality specifications.

Time and again, the Occupation appeared to impose restrictions on industrial development. Sabri (1997) suggested that Israelis prevented new construction and have curtailed the building of new construction material industries or the upgrading or existing plants. A publicised case is the opposition raised against building a cement factory in the Hebron area. Further projects that met resistance include; steel pipe factories, electrical cable, wire factories and others. These constraints, coupled with excessive limitations on direct imports of construction material by local traders, have inflated the cost of materials. A Gazan contractor commented on the cost of construction material rejecting, any responsibility for price rises. He said, “The price of construction materials, whether imported or manufactured locally, is generally subject to fluctuations. These fluctuations depend on local and international markets and the exchange rates between the three most commonly used currencies the Israeli Shekel, the Jordanian Dinar, and the American Dollar.

Labour

The workforce is another factor that tends to ‘pump-up’ housing costs. Obviously, a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers and the need to pay increased wages often forces up the cost of dwelling units. As stressed earlier in this research, the last three decades have witnessed the proletarianisation of a large section of the Palestinian community. The new proletarians have frequently had little option but to enter the Israeli labour-pool, which operates like the ‘slave-market’. Though construction workers can be categorised as: skilled,
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semi-skilled and unskilled, wages in all sectors of the economy have been deflated through the trend of Palestinians working in Israel and other Arab nations in the Middle East. The wages of skilled construction workers has increased, due to Israel's high demand for these workers over the years. The Gazan contractor stated that a construction labourer in Israel earns a rate of about 200 NIS daily. In Gaza, contractors have never been able to afford this amount. The prevailing political situation, which influences the mobility of construction workers within the occupied territory and between it and Israel, also determines the degree of exchange in the labour market. However, it is not always clear whether the increase in the number of workers in a certain location is owing to expanded activity in that area, to decreased activity in Israel, or to restrictions that are frequently imposed on travel to work in that country.

To summarise, the author understands that the labour wages in Gaza is a determining factor in the cost of house building. This is due to competition with the greater appeal of the Israeli market, offering higher wages to Palestinian skilled and semi-skilled workers.

Infrastructure:

Infrastructure also affects housing costs. Mokhtar (1997) pointed out that the most required services to facilitate a housing project include: access and circulation such as roads and footpaths, storm water drainage, water supply, sewerage, gas and electricity, street lighting and refuse collection. At the same time, installing these services inflates cost and reduces the affordability of individual dwellings for low-income groups. Outlay also depends on location and type of land required. Elsa'dway complained that in the projects the PHC bore overall cost of providing infrastructure, which he argued had been presumed to be the responsibility of other institutions not the PHC's. In the Elkarama project, the Council further thought that Jabalya municipality would supply the basic infrastructure. But the municipality refused to do so, justifying their position by stating there were no available funds for this expenditure. While the municipality refused to supply the project with the required infrastructure, the Council generously paid some hundred thousand dollars to the municipality in licence fees. This conflict represents another example of the lack of applicable legislation and weak coordination between different Palestinian institutions.

Delays in Implementation

It is agreed that delays are common and represent a constraint on human settlement projects. This is due to various factors such as poor estimates, variations by the client,
inappropriate technology and design, inappropriate tendering and contractual procedures, inefficient on-site supervision and construction management. Chapter Three of this research showed the reasons causing delay as including inadequate capacity for the planning and design of projects, projects which are too large for local contractors to handle, inefficiency in planning, design and construction, and difficulties in obtaining materials and other crucial inputs. The author claims that all these factors are present in the Palestinian Housing Council projects. Inshasi (1997) pointed out that project was behind schedule. He added to the above reasons allegations of the Israeli policy of border closures. These closures constituted a severe problem for local contractors, preventing them from purchasing from Israel the materials required for executing the projects. Postponements were often caused by poor or confusing designs and by the slow issuing of drawings and instructions. Slowness in awarding of contracts was another reason for delay.

A related problem stemmed from the fact that a large number of project managers in Gaza were too inexperienced to manage projects effectively. There were a number of further problems holding up the project, the most common being an inadequate formulation of the scheme, lack of proper implementation and poor management practices.

Finally, it can be concluded from the last discussion that varying factors have contributed to the flats' high costs. Some of these determinants are external and others internal. However, inexperience in such projects might be the chief factor for the failure of the Palestinian Housing Council to carry out the implementation of this task.

7.4.4 Lack of Institutional Co-ordination

Ambiguities in the relationship between stockholders such as international organisations, state ministries and local agencies and authorities is a factor leading to human settlements’ project failure. Institutional co-ordination problems arise between different ministries in the same cabinet. In the Palestinian Housing Council, it is clear how resources were wasted as a result of the lack of the institutional co-ordination. Every stage of the project has been marked by this pitfall.

- In the stage of planning and preparation, there was no co-ordination between the Council and the Land Directory in the Israeli Civil Administration. If this co-operation occurred, it would be cheaper option to acquire State land for a public project instead of spending millions to buy private land.

- In the stage of implementation: The Council paid nearly $100,000 as licence fees to the Municipality of Jabalya. It was expected that in return the Municipality must provide infrastructure service. The Municipality refused to do its part.
Collecting Agencies and executing authority: the Council has been unable to co-ordinate with the legal and executive authorities in order to collect its due payment.

The Council failed to co-ordinate properly with the project donors. This led to reluctance of these countries to continue funding the Council’s proposed projects.

### 7.4.5 Irresponsible Aid

Hamdi (1991:5) pointed out that international aid targets developing countries according to the political influence and commercial interests of the donor, not according to the beneficiaries’ need. It seems the PHC experience correlates to Hamdi’s statement. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the finance for the Council projects was entirely funded by European Union (EU), USAID and Japan. This fund coincided in 1990s with the blossoming peace process in the region. However, the question rises, did the donors influence the different stages of the Palestinian initiative?

The author has noted that there is a general unawareness of ‘donor management’ in official Palestinian circles. Separate donors with different approaches have taken part in the story of the Elkarama project. The European Union entrusted the Council with the work and little supervision was provided. Elsa’dway extended the argument: the European Union used to disburse its money in instalments. Now, in another case, the Council can not build the sewage infrastructure of El-Nuseirat project due to the European refusal to pay the due payments. It must be added that this refusal is based on the Council’s failure to initiate a mechanism to collect money from residents. The EU evaluated the Council’s performance in September 1999 and decided on the above action. When the author visited the Council in October 1999, it seemed that Council officials were disturbed by the approach the evaluators had taken. They had been willing to put Palestinians in caves not flats, as Elsa’dway commented. Having received such condemning snippets on the European performance, the author found different reports in national newspapers that reinforced Elsa’dway’s contentions. A series of officials of the Council asserted that imposed conditions from the donor aggravated the current crises.

The *Sunday Times* 29/11/1998 published a report based on a European Union evaluation report. It claimed that “British aid earmarked for poor Palestinians has been used by the European Union to finance luxury flats -with Italian granite- fitted designer kitchens- for rich supporters of the Palestinian leadership”. The paper continued “In effect, $20 million has been spent without any economic controls and is not recoverable”. The money had been targeted for cheap housing. Each apartment is more than 100 square metres in size, with three bedrooms, a kitchen fitted with polished wooden cupboards and granite work-
surfaces, and a bathroom complete with a large bath and shower area, decorated with either pink or blue ceramic tiles. Satellite television dishes sprout from the walls, the paper reported.

The report stated that most of the apartments have been given to Arafat’s political cronies: “90% of the EU flats had been given to ‘returnees’-loyalists who had been in exile with Arafat and now serve in his administration”

The author supports the PHC Director’s claims. The European Union report is quite exaggerated and misleading. The British newspaper reported fabricated information, which contradict the real situation.

Contrary to the European attitude, Japan is a major donor for reconstruction activities in the Palestinian Territories, but it has never delegated full responsibility to a local institution. In the Council’s case, Japan agreed with United Nation Development Programme to supervise their funded project. The Council’s contribution was to prepare the project drawing, sharing as a partner in fieldwork supervision. One Council official said, ironically, it is the only project that has no trouble with beneficiaries.

The third donor USAID appointed American consultants to oversee its funded projects in the Gaza Strip. Two million dollars were allocated to the American firm, expenditure that now the project’s residents are required to bear. Nothing innovative was discovered in these projects, despite the noted pride of residents that their flats were supervised by Americans while neighbouring blocks only by Palestinians. Hamdi (1991:178-179) argued that the consultant firm “Inevitably…will be working under the auspices of their employers, who will often have a very different agenda”. He continued

If consultants have been appointed, they will usually come as part of the funding package and will be under pressure to ensure that the demands set by the agency are implemented. They will be inclined to define or even invent problems to fit client’s intentions. At best, they will cut off pieces of the problem that do not fit their general schema.

Hamdi’s argument offered an explanation to the niggling question of why PHC has had more troubles than achievements in its short life.

7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have reviewed the experience of the Palestinian Housing Council and its project Elkarama. At its establishment in 1992, the PHC was faced with a drastic need for housing units, which was a result of neglect of the Israeli occupier of the housing sector. The first part of this chapter reviewed the Council history, ambitions, objectives.
programmes and plans. It offered information regarding the administration and supports received by the Council to fund its few housing schemes.

Based on comments of residents, interviews with the Council’s key informants and questionnaire, the author built his judgement. It was shown that the project has the following pitfalls:

**A Strategy Unable to meet the Need in the Palestinian Territories**

- It is clear that the Council did not wait for any change to occur especially in the light of the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

- The scope was limited. The Council put a finger in a small hole at one end of a dike that is caving in at the other end. While providing a very limited number of housing units, the Council failed to introduce a national housing strategy relying on the local resources.

- The construction of Elkarama housing project is an example of centrally controlled projects. Top-down approaches were adopted. The Council upper officials made planning decisions, sometimes under a pressure of the Palestinian Leadership in Tunis to grasp political gains.

- No consultation has been made with the target group in any of the initial steps of the project. The Council strategy built on the basis that the beneficiaries are nothing but clients for the investment project.

**The Architectural Design has failed in providing a Cultural Identity for the Palestinian Community**

- The project is dominated by multi-storey housing of eight floors clustered around open paved squares with very small green areas. The flat contains a living room, guest-room, kitchen, toilet and bathroom. The project did not allow for open spaces. Also complaints were reported regarding the area of the spaces.

- Lack of privacy. The design under study did not consider the Palestinians need for privacy. The limited space between the buildings meant neighbours have a clear view of each other’s bedroom.

- Residents complain that social relationships between residents were given a low priority. Every resident is busy and isolated in his own life; therefore, little time seems available for socialising with others. This allowed the existence of brothels in the projects, a circumstance totally unfamiliar in the traditional Palestinian community.

**The Council has failed to achieve its Promises to provide Affordable Housing Units.**

The chapter showed that the PHC has failed to a proper create financial mechanism. This causes the major problem with the beneficiaries. It could be summarised in the following:
While the Council’s early documents showed that the project was designed to target the low-income groups, there is agreement that the project missed its original purpose.

Residents complain that the required payments are not affordable in relation to their income. Having paid the first instalment and occupied their dwellings, they refused to pay the monthly payment at the due time.

The Council officials indicate that the cost has risen due to variety of reasons, these include, the cost of land, labour, building materials and the Israeli policy of closure which caused delays in implementation.

**The Council has been unable to collect its Due Payments:**

Over the last years, the conflict between the Council and the beneficiaries proved to be unresolved. The Council has been unable to collect its due money from residents. This caused the slow implementation of the final stages, and the cancellation of other proposed projects. The Council disability can be attributed to the following:

- Worsening economic and political situation resulted in beneficiaries’ non-compliance with their commitment.
- Lack of co-ordination between the different PNA institutions.
- Weakness of the legal system, and the executive authority.
- Political interference in the decision making where a considerable percentage of the beneficiaries are working as police officers in the PNA.

**The Peace Agreements and the Project Failure:**

The author claims that political uncertainties in the Palestinian Territories have contributed to large extent to the project failure. The pitfalls of the peace agreement made it difficult for the Palestinian policy makers to solve the Council problem. For example,

- The PNA has been unable to legislate on many issues. So far, it has failed to enact new laws due to the agreement limitations. The lack of legal support and lawful authority has deprived the Council of substantial powers when facing opponents.
- The Council was obliged to buy land for the project due to the Israeli control of State Land.
- The Israeli policy of border closures. These closures constituted a severe problem for local contractors, preventing them from purchasing from Israel the materials required for executing the projects. Postponements were often caused by poor or confusing designs and by the slow issuing of drawings and instructions. Slowness in awarding of contracts is another reason for delay.
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The continuation of the Israeli settlement activities in Gaza has been used as a pretext for the beneficiaries’ reluctance to pay their due instalments. A resident said “This authority cannot eject the Jewish from their settlements in Gaza, therefore they will not be able to do this against Palestinians either”.

Israel attracted skilled construction workers to work with higher wages. Therefore, the Gazan workers demanded higher earning.

Due to the prevailing conditions, the council could not hire Palestinian professionals working abroad. Obtaining permission from the Israeli authorities is difficult and there was no strong incentive encouraging expatriates to leave their jobs and return under problematic situations.

In addition to the above illustration of the problem, the chapter addressed two major issues in relation to the reconstruction process in the Palestinian Territories. Responding to inquiry from the last chapter, the author investigated refugee residents’ attitudes regarding improving their living conditions. Despite their clear suspicion towards these projects, they showed willingness to see a genuine betterment of their life. The second issue was the role of the donor countries to help the Council to revise its policies. Nothing has been done form their side except blaming the Council for its inability to collect the money and a decision to stop final disbursements. The subsequent chapter highlights the significant issues that have arisen in all of the research.
Chapter Eight:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Chapter Eight

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This research mainly concerned how post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding are linked particularly following the peace settlement in the Palestinian Territories. It has given rise to three principal observations that:

- Occupation in reality is a continuation of warfare, and the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories since 1967 is a typical example of how the long occupation can be as devastating as a full-scale war.

- In peacebuilding, the third party (the international community) can assist, but the legitimate rights of the occupied people need to be recognised no matter how much aid is supplied; justice is the cornerstone of sustainable peace.

- A successful reconstruction of the human settlement is directly related to a sustainable peace process.

Having established a theoretical understanding of the main issues of the research, employing several learning methodologies to analyse case studies in the Palestinian Territories, in this chapter the author concludes by concentrating on interrelated points. The first section discusses the summaries that have emerged. It aims to identify principles and issues to guide reconstruction of human settlements in the Palestinian Territories. The second part translates these conclusions and issues into practical recommendations or guidelines for the reconstruction of human settlement in Palestine. Responding to the political situation and to continuous Israeli punitive measures, the author suggests that a flexible reconstruction approach would be most effective. This is followed by a set of recommendations to solve the Palestinian Housing Council’s troubles and the refugees’ shelter problems respectively. The author suggests further areas for research.

8.2 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study started by exploring the phenomenon of military occupation. Chapter one considered the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories as an internal colonisation. The chapter stressed that according to international law, Israel has been a belligerent
occupant of the Palestinian Territories since 1967 and should respect the Law regarding the governance of these territories. The conduct of the occupying power should reflect the occupied people’s status as ‘protected persons.’

The author proclaimed that the Israeli occupation has been an act of undeclared war launched against Palestinian civilians. The term of war is appropriate since Israel has and still refuses to adhere to the de jure applicability of the International Law specifically the 4th Geneva Convention. Instead of treating Palestinians as ‘protected persons’, from the outset, Israel imposed countless repressive measures. Palestinians were ill-treated throughout the prolonged occupation. As Ibish (2000) puts it, the Israeli occupation

is to come home from school eager to play, only to find your home reduced to rubble; to be a father carted off in the middle of the night into the oblivion of Israeli detention; to be a child watching your parents be beaten; to be denied education; to be imprisoned in your home for weeks or months unable to walk out of your front door for any reason day in and day out until your master lifts the ‘curfew’; to be a mother who must beg to leave her home in order to get medication or bread for her family; to have a coloured ID card that permits you to roam only within a few square miles; to have a coloured license plate that guarantees you will be stopped and questioned at every ‘checkpoint’. stealing hours out of each day; to go without enough water to drink while your Jewish neighbours lounge on green lawns and swim in private swimming pools; to live without honour; to have your history stolen and your dignity smashed.

The Israeli military occupation has had destructive impact on various spheres including human capital, the country’s resources, the economy, social fabric and institutional building.

Destruction of settlements probably best portrays the horror of war. Though there has been no settlement destruction in the Palestinian territories, the author argued that Israel has exercised a similarly detrimental policy. Components include: the deteriorating of infrastructure, restriction on land, difficulties in gaining a permit for development, abuse of the legal system, expropriation of local resources, and finally and crucially through policies to undermine Palestinian identity, human rights and self-respect. Each Israeli practice has employed its methods and tricks. The chapter concluded by questioning how Palestinians can achieve a lasting peace and sustainable reconstruction against a background of continual occupation, living under uninhibited Israeli control that affords them no dignity and no mercy.

Chapter Two provided a review of different issues of post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. It was claimed that research in this field with its concomitant writing has expanded rapidly through the last decade of the twentieth century to the present. The author reviewed how different scholars, examined what is necessary to achieve a sustainable peace
process. Issues such as ripeness for peace, third party intervention, considering root causes, and targeting the combatants were discussed. The chapter examined the notion if reconstruction can bring about long-term peace, arguing in doing so, efforts must be coherent, comprehensive, integrated and addressing the root causes of conflicts. Having outlined the relationship between peacebuilding and post settlement reconstruction, the author surveyed issues such as local capacity building, the role of state and the policy of donors, exploring how different authors or organisations present these issues. The following specifies the main points in chapter two,

- Peace is best thought of not as a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or violent conflict, but instead as a complex and variable process. However, no peace is perfect.

- The relationship between peacebuilding and reconstruction is symbiotic. Proper development can not take place without lasting peace: peace can never be sustained without proper reconstruction and long term development.

- Post conflict reconstruction calls for a special approach emphasising integrative strategies, political development and rapid and flexible action. It must be dealt with as a long-term development challenge, planned and implemented in a manner to encourage peacebuilding.

- With co-ordination between internal and external actors, confidence and peacebuilding efforts will be further strengthened.

- The local community is the primary resource for reconstruction. It is crucial to work with and not for the community. The community must have a sense of ownership and responsibility towards reconstruction projects.

- The support and assistance external actors give to societies emerging from conflict is important, though not determinant, and present forms of assistance are often ineffective, inappropriate, and can be harmful. The main donors’ task is to enhance the local capacities. The quality of post conflict assistance is more important than its quantity.

The Chapter concluded by recognising that physical reconstruction is a critical tool to achieve peace.

In Chapter three, the author reviewed policies adopted for post-conflict reconstruction of human settlements, suggesting a framework for reconstruction, showing it as a process. Seeing the deficiencies evident in different theories, the chapter reviewed the options that exist within a viable strategy. The author studied issues that must be considered when formulating a reconstruction strategy and highlighted how undesirable outcomes can be avoided. Issues such as features of the transitional stage were reviewed; along with post conflict reconstruction challenges and the approaches and involvement of actors.
The chapter revealed that the problem of shelter is not confined to post-conflict countries. Instead, the problem exists in almost all Third World countries. Adequate shelter even in suitable conditions is an uphill battle. The rapid pace of urbanisation, the weakening rate of economic growth, the unavailability of land for housing and public services, the increase in land prices and inappropriate strategies for urban planning and land appropriation all directly contribute to the shelter dilemma.

The chapter asserted the need for adequate infrastructure and provision of essential services. This statement gave rise to the related issues of how to 'get right' the framework of land management and put into place an appropriate and affordable financial system to bring properties within reach of all citizens. Another major component of this strategy is that the construction sector must be stimulated. However, for it to be successful, the whole population needs to be catered for, involving economic stimuli and special provisions to supplement the poorest members of society.

In conclusion, the author proposed why policies fail to achieve their expected success. Various causes were detected such as, vagaries of the legal system, restrictive regulations, lack of institutional co-ordination, the issue of political interference or lack of political will and finally the beneficiaries' non-compliance with the legal framework to facilitate an effective shelter policy.

Chapter Four reviewed the methodology of fieldwork in addition to other adopted methods. It offered a theoretical review of the research strategy with an evaluation of the chosen case studies. Experiences in fieldwork were outlined, describing objectives and difficulties, the various techniques and instruments used to collect data were explained and how best to store, analyse and present findings, was discussed.

Chapter Five presented the case studies, with the author describing the general situation in the Palestinian Territories in the aftermath of the peace agreements. Issues such as the conflicting parties' motivation for peace, intervention of a third party and the agreement provisions were examined. The chapter demonstrated how the agreements have fallen short of tackling the crucial issues, which include the Israeli settlements, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, Palestinian sovereignty and the future of Jerusalem.

The author clarified how in an attempt to support the peace process; the international community had established a mechanism to help Palestinians financially and technically. Thus, politicians have raised expectations that a new Palestinian State would be established
soon. Contrary to initial hopes, economic conditions for most of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza have deteriorated. The unemployment rate has risen and the per capita income has dropped by 20 percent. It has been estimated that one-fifth of all Palestinians in the occupied territories live in poverty. International reports have shown mounting evidence proving that the Jewish State has never lived up to its obligations under the Oslo Accords. The Israel Journalist, Amira Hass (2000) reported,

For Palestinians in the streets, events after the ceremony on the White House lawn in 1993 showed that Oslo was part of the problem and not part of the solution. Under Oslo, Israel continued to expand settlements, confiscate more Palestinian land, demolish Palestinian homes, build bypass roads, keep thousands of political dissidents in jail, and tighten the economic strangulation of the Palestinian population centres.

The chapter enquired: “Can Palestinians launch successful rehabilitation programmes under unsatisfactory agreements in deeply restrictive circumstances?”

Having presented background information. Chapters Six and Seven analysed the findings of the field research. Chapter Six discussed the first case study, showing that the United Nation General Assembly - responding to the Palestinian Israeli peace process 1993 - has made a decisive contribution in the attempt to ensure the occupied territories’ economic and social stability. UNRWA responded by initiating the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP). The main objectives of PIP were to effect the following changes in refugee communities: (1) Rehabilitation of existing houses, (2) providing better social and physical infrastructure, (3) creating employment opportunities and (4) support the needy and hardship cases.

UNRWA claimed that the programme has largely succeeded in meeting objectives. However, the findings of this research disclosed various pitfalls. The Agency has failed to address important issues such as building regulations and providing adequate shelter for refugees. Lack of local participation and co-ordination between the agency and the PNA has been reported.

The chapter showed how the inadequacies of the peace agreements have limited the objectives of the Peace Implementation Programme. The status of refugees has remained ambiguous, reducing this project’s success. To some, this programme was suspected to be a conspiracy. It was alleged “The programme is a political tool to achieve a hidden agenda” to keep the status quo as a permanent solution to the question of what status Palestinian refugees should hold.
The author concluded that under current circumstances it is difficult to stress one concrete solution for the shelter crisis in Palestinian refugee camps. To put it briefly:

As the peace process has failed to tackle the refugee question in an appropriate manner, and since the Palestinian refugees issue was excluded from the Oslo process, no recovery programme targeting refugees can succeed.

**Chapter Seven** mentioned how housing has been the problem heading the priorities of the PNA. The predicament has been worsened by Israeli settlements occupying extensive areas in the Gaza Strip. Other reasons are the tendency toward large Palestinian families, the deteriorating economic situation and the lack of national banks in the field of housing. In addition, the demolition of houses either as punishment or as the result of the failure to produce a license and the confiscation of Palestinian land represent severe obstacles.

With international help, the Palestinian Housing Council was established to provide houses for the Palestinian people. The chapter described the PHC and its activities. The author discussed the main findings of the field survey of the Elkarama Housing project through examining issues such as the characteristics of residents, the level of public participation, process of allocation, perception of the project and refugee’s attitude toward it. He showed that the project has the following disadvantages:

- The strategy was unable to meet the need of the Palestinian territories. The Council put a finger in a small hole at one end of a dike that is caving in at the other end. While providing a very limited number of housing units, the Council failed to introduce a national strategy.

- No consultation was undertaken with the target group in any of the initial steps of the project. The Council perceived the beneficiaries as nothing more than clients.

- The architectural design has failed to reflect the cultural identity of the Palestinian community.

- The Council fell short of its promise to provide affordable housing units.

Finally, the author claimed that political uncertainties contributed largely to the project’s failure. Shortfalls of the peace agreements made it difficult for PNA policy makers to find a remedy to the PHC’s managerial problems.

- Due to limitations resulting from the peace agreements, the PNA has not been able to legislate on various issues or enact new laws. The lack of legal support and lawful authority has deprived the PHC of enough power when facing opponents.

- Disastrously, the Council needed to waste resources on buying expensive land because Israel still controls a large proportion of the Strip’s Land.
Israeli border closures presented an undeniable problem for local contractors, preventing them from importing essential building materials.

Indirectly, on-going Israeli settlement activity (implying the weakness of the PNA government) has given the beneficiaries a pretext for showing dissidence, for example, not paying their due instalments. “This authority [PNA] can not eject the Jewish from their settlements in Gaza, therefore they will not be able to do this against Palestinians either.”

The PHC could not attract Palestinian professionals working abroad, and obtaining permission for their return from the Israeli authorities was very difficult. Both factors have deprived the PHC of needed expertise.

8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

From the summary and findings of the fieldwork, a set of recommendations is proposed for reconstruction of Human Settlements in the Palestinian Territories, translating the above conclusions into a set of actions. All recommendations aim to generate real progress toward the improvement of living conditions of the Palestinian people, by being realistic and manageable and by taking into account the limitations and interests of all participants involved in the reconstruction process. The recommendations are a response to the research question identified in the introduction of this study.

Considering the impact of Israeli Occupation and the ill-fated peace agreement can Palestinians (the Authority and people) with the help of the international community, achieve successful reconstruction programmes and sustain the peace process?

In answer, the author offers the following thoughts and suggestions.

Peacebuilding in the Palestinian Territories

- No substantial peace is expected to be reached through signing agreements, or even by implementing them. If peace agreements do not address the root causes of the Palestinian Israeli conflict or fail to gain the people’s acceptance; then there is a strong potential for renewed conflict.

- The ‘negative’ peace, which usually follows the signing of peace agreements, is not sufficient. The challenge is to build a ‘positive peace’ that is sustainable because it can ensure social, political, economic and military security and stability and mitigate new tensions and conflicts.

- Justice is an essential element in conflict prevention. Without justice, there is little chance of post-conflict reconciliation. For a lasting peace to take root there must be perception of and tangible evidence that justice has been served.

- In the Palestinian case, this can be achieved if a fair solution to the crucial issues is reached; issues such as the fate of Palestinian refugees, future of the Israeli settlements, the sovereignty over Eastern Jerusalem etc.
Summary and Conclusion

To reach this agreement, the author expects that the international community must play a prominent and honest role and acknowledge the legitimacy of Palestinian demands in accordance with International law and United Nations resolutions.

The international community should support peacebuilding by fostering reconstruction activities.

Reconstruction supports peacebuilding. Nevertheless, it can not be a substitute for the recognition of the Palestinian people’s legitimate rights. The recent past has shown that the flush of aid and various reconstruction programmes in the Palestinian Territories could not sustain unsatisfactory peace agreements. The eruption of the new popular uprising (Intifada) on 28/9/2000 proved that without addressing the root causes of the conflict no peace can be maintained.

Inventing a new Approach to Reconstruction in the Palestinian Territories:

It has become obvious that Palestinians live and operate in an unstable, volatile, risky and politicised environment. Due to the Israeli punitive policies, it is quite unrealistic to anticipate that Palestinians (authority and people) would attain quick results through their reconstruction programmes. At the same time, the author believes that a special approach to reconstruction - tailored to the requirements of the Palestinian people - must be developed. There is an urgent need for operational reform to make rules and practices conducive to effective policies.

Reconstruction, approached in an appropriate manner, can help in the peacebuilding process. It can restore dignity, trust and faith in the future, as people together learn to cope with the past and regain control over the present and the future. On the other hand, embarking upon reconstruction activities without proper planning leads to a waste of resources and long term social problems within the community. Rebuilding strategies must pay proper attention to the political and relational context in which they are applied. Reconstruction methods should be designed and applied in such a way that they not only address their primary objective but also improve relations and build trust. If poorly designed, they can fuel tensions and lead to new conflict.

In setting objectives, the government should be realistically modest and not utopian, accounting for resources, needs, perceptions, expectations, potentialities, and constraints. More importantly, there is a need to be realistic in terms of accounting for global trends as well as international and national constraints and opportunities.

A strategy has to be supported at the highest political level while being formulated at regional and local planning levels.

It must be properly and efficiently managed. The Palestinian Authority must assume ultimate responsibility for management.
• A strategy needs to be based on a holistic and in-depth understanding of problems and the way they relate to each other, an understanding of actors and their respective agendas.

• It considers internal actors as the main forces for rebuilding and they must be harnessed in a collective effort in which the authority plays a key role.

• It understands and accepts that the politicised and highly volatile nature of the Palestinian Territories increases the tendency toward conflict. The PNA must manage this risk efficiently.

• It recognises that reconstruction is a development exercise that must be based on a long-term perspective.

• It must be able to accommodate both the need for urgent action in response to immediate problems, and the need for patience and the ability to wait for solutions to mature.

• It needs to have adequate flexibility, room for pragmatic ad hoc solutions and decision-making and possibly suggest a downward transference of authority, from PNA to the Palestinian people.

• The strategy must be monitored, and show an awareness of the secondary and tertiary impact of policy measures in different fields.

• The strategy must be redefined on the basis of periodic reassessment of problems, resources and priorities. This should be based on a participatory consensus of local and national actors.

• Reconstruction plans should not be built on anticipated external help. Outside agencies can help, but only if they have a clear idea of what is needed by the indigenous community.

Identifying and Mobilising Existing and Potential Resources for Reconstruction

• Existing and potential resources must be identified and mobilised. Resources must be identified in relation to their type, quality, amount, distribution, costs, function, ease of use, and impact.

• Indigenous resources need to be distinguished from external ones, and these must be weighed in terms of their tendency to cause dependence, unwanted control over development and/or uneven development. After resources are identified and analysed, they must be mobilised.

• Mobilisation will depend largely on the Authority’s action, but can be effectively augmented through the utilisation of grass-roots organisations.

Capitalise on the Social Coping Mechanism:

• Prolonged Israeli occupation has motivated the Palestinians to show a high degree of self-reliance in providing relief and shelter through different social mechanisms (savings, social networks, and grass-root organisations).
Summary and Conclusion

During reconstruction, the community must play a powerful role if provided with appropriate incentive and suitable means for mobilisation.

The variety of human resources (architects, engineers, teachers, doctors, etc.) needs to be capitalised on as reconstruction proceeds.

Attracting Diasporic Palestinians Back to Support Reconstruction Activities

Palestinians who made fortunes abroad need incentives if they are to return to the territories to contribute in building the State. As important, businesses, banks, insurance companies, small industries, etc. need to be attracted. More investment in infrastructure, financial and physical security as well as social and political stability would be attractive to institutes and individuals and could stimulate a movement of return to Palestine.

Careful Consideration of Local Culture and Conditions

People are the principal factor in recovery and reconstruction not objects to be arranged. They are lifetimes, dreams, customs and hopes, there are pasts, presents and futures. Therefore, reconstruction should respect people’s culture: norms, tradition, customs, and ways of life, social pattern and economic means.

It should pay detailed attention to physical aspects of the settlement: layouts, climate, topography, natural resources, etc.

Reconstruction should conserve the positive traditional elements and incorporate modern requirements.

Reconstruction programmes should carefully consider the various conflicting forces emerging in the community.

Enhance Social Reconstruction and Prevent Potential Conflicts

Co-operation and mutual aid are embodied characteristics in the culture of the Palestinian community.

Reconstruction should encourage positive characteristics. In this respect, projects can be used to advance social justice; up to now a missed opportunity because of misguided policies.

Just reconstruction requires fair and equal access to resources and decision-making mechanisms for all members. Therefore, no direct subsidy is needed, given the community’s socio-economic conditions, but support should be provided through soft loans and professional advice.

Clear Allocation of Actors’ Roles

Rebuilding requires a collective initiative in which the state plays an essential role, guiding the combined efforts and resources of local people, private actors and new social forces. Communal consensus and participation are crucial for optimal mobilisation.
define a common vision, and concrete policies if they are to be applicable and sustainable. What counts is working out politically realistic approaches supported by all the actors involved.

**Improving External Assistance**

Work in the Palestinian Territories calls for a great degree of flexibility and capacity in adapting to a volatile and rapidly changing context. This implies far-reaching changes in the way assistance programmes are formulated, funded and implemented. Efforts to rebuild trust among civil society and other institutions can be thwarted if not matched by strong political will. The peace process had great momentum in the beginning. In September 1993 aid organisations agreed on a blueprint for the development of infrastructure and social rebuilding and acted in co-operation toward this end. Yet, little has been accomplished, as it was assumed that the development process could proceed separately from the political process. Donors and development agencies presumed that politicians would successfully continue along the track toward peace and that this process did need not to be directly linked to the efficacy of development intervention.

The author is convinced that the quality of external assistance must be improved if that assistance is to encourage peacebuilding and reconstruction. To achieve this requires major reform and explicit political commitment. The aid provision must be reformed to:

- Recognise that peace and solutions to fateful issues can not be imposed from outside,
- Identify positive local initiatives and dynamics that contribute to rebuilding, and attempt to build on these and strengthen them.
- It must be careful not to weaken the Palestinian Authority by using external NGOs as interlocutors and counterparts.
- Give particular attention to basic principles of reconstruction and development such as participation, self-reliance and local or national ownership.
- Set priorities with the aim to face the magnitude of demands but also to promote long-term and stable commitments. Regularity of assistance is often more important than quantity: small but stable commitments are more useful than large and erratic assistance on which Palestinians can not depend. Irregular assistance greatly limits the capacity of national actors to plan rebuilding strategies and has a debilitating impact.
- It must recognise that long-term assistance can lead to aid dependency, for this reason long-term commitment and partnerships require periodic reassessment of orientations, programmes, plans, and terms of collaboration.
- It must accept that the legitimate and useful space for external assistance should be periodically redefined through regular consultation between external and internal actors.
A timetable of joint assessment of problems, resources and priorities should be prioritised.

- Long term assistance needs to share effectively information and knowledge with local and national actors,

- Promote local or national ownership going beyond participation. It implies transferring technology from donors to recipients and accepting how local actors could redefine objectives that lead to a 'nationalisation' of the project.

Providing Adequate Shelter for all:

Shelter is both a basic need and natural right. Adequate shelter that provides protection from adverse climate and access to social and technical infrastructure is an important prerequisite for an individual’s health, productivity and participation in society’s political and social life. It also makes important contributions in creating income to increase the country’s wealth. Further, adequate shelter helps secure political stability and social peace. Al masri (1992:320) recognised the multifaceted nature of the housing issue

A reconstruction of housing programme...requires a broad understanding of housing, not simply in terms of the buildings, but as a process, consisting of a blend of labour, skills, capital, financing, settlement patterns, culture, status, environmental protection and tradition.

From the analysis of this research’s fieldwork, adequate shelter is a major problem facing the Palestinian people. This situation must be improved by providing essential services. Understandably, this is not a simple task because there is a lack of technical expertise, lack of regulations, political interference, etc. Below, the author proposes measures that should be taken:

Proposed Role of the Palestinian Authority

The weakness of the Palestinian Authority has been a major problem in relation to the Palestinian Housing Council projects. PNA has failed to have clear, well co-ordinated policies. It must work to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the Palestinian Housing Council by taking measures such as to:

- Promote stronger co-operation between the Authority’s institutions and the Council.

- Empower the Council to act with a greater measure of independence in relation to formulation of housing policies and implementation.

- Encourage the reform of laws, by-laws, regulations and procedures, and development of instruments for a socially oriented housing market.

- Assist the Palestinian Housing Council in recovering loans in order to channel such funds into new housing schemes.
• Enforce the implementation of the existing court’s decisions regarding the problem between the residents and the Council.

• Provide the Council with the required land with competitive prices to initiate new schemes.

• Support local initiatives to establish a Palestinian building-industry.

• Conceive new ideas to solve the problem of housing in Gaza, since traditional approaches are not expected to succeed.

• These ideas must be based on both private and public enterprise, with the active participation of NGOs working in the area of the shelter.

The Palestinian Housing Council:

The Council must review its efforts on housing policy and its relation with the Authority, the beneficiaries as well as with the international donors. There are a number of policy moves the PHC needs to undertake to facilitate its future work. The Council should:

• Concentrate its efforts around the goal of low-income housing and mobilise the relevant local and external resources required to implement such schemes, building on the experience they have already obtained.

• Involve the target groups in the different stages of future schemes recognising that they are actors and not merely target beneficiaries.

• Generate resources locally, starting with the council's existing housing stock and funds generated from down payments of housing projects, such as Elkarama.

• Plan and design appropriate funding methods for supplying low-income housing.

• Assist in designing appropriate methods for implementation of low-income settlements.

• By co-operating with other institutions, the Council should be able to manage the future development of its projects.

UNRWA, Refugees and Improving their Living Conditions:

Under current circumstances, it is difficult to isolate one group of concrete solutions for the housing crisis in the Palestinian refugee camps. The solution for this problem and other problems facing refugees is directly connected to the political dimension of the question of their status. In consequence, the only tangible remedy to the problem is that the refugees exercise their right of return. However, this should not impede improving their living conditions; therefore, efforts should be focused on improving camp conditions. Regarding the housing crisis, UNRWA should establish an executive body to organise and technically supervise the construction activities in the camps. This body should
• Supervise refugees who wish to construct multi-storey dwellings and advise them in technical rules and regulations and to take into account public safety requirements.

• Increase the boundaries of those expandable camps, particularly when adjacent to public land.

• Establish new camps to absorb the increasing number of refugees. These camps, however, should fall under UNRWA's responsibility so as not to be interpreted as an attempt to resettle refugees.

• Improve infrastructure in the refugee camps (sewer system, roads, and water supplies), and to construct public squares and playgrounds.

• Continue running and refining successful programmes such as the income generation scheme.

8.4 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH

Issues of post-conflict reconstruction are wide and varied. Therefore, this study does not claim to have exhausted the issues entailed in the reconstruction of the Palestinian State and related policies. Some lay beyond the scope of this study and require further investigation in order to formulate a complete and detailed policy. Topics for further full-length studies could include:

• Evaluation of reconstruction policies of the Palestinian National Authority since its inception. Further case studies must be examined.

• Shelter policies in the Palestinian Territories. This study must entail an examination of the issues of land use and tenure, regulatory framework, and look in detail at alternatives for housing and finance.

• Donors' intervention, and the management of external assistance.

• A study that points out how dependency on international aid and the Israeli economy can be minimised.

• How the fate of the Palestinian refugees and the possible influx of returnees will affect plans for reconstruction?

To conclude, the author believes that reconstructing the Palestinian State was never going to be easy, even with the best intentions of all parties involved. In the present climate of suspicion, cynicism, ill-will and the outright violence, the task is far harder and will take much longer or might even seen impossible. In the meantime, the Palestinian people still urgently need decent shelter. The author has examined past shortcomings and proposed ways to improve performance. He feels that the initiative must be made without delay. The Palestinian people, who have endured hardship and struggled against injustice over the last fifty years, deserve nothing less.
Appendix (1)

International Humanitarian Law: Some Articles Relevant to Israel’s Belligerent Occupation of the Palestinian Territory

The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12, 1949:

Article 1- Respect for the Convention

"The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."

Article 2- Application of the Convention

"...The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them.

The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations..."

Article 4- Definition of protected persons

"Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals..."

Article 6- Beginning and End of Application

"The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2.

In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.

In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143..."
Article 7- Special Agreements
"...No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them ..."

Article 8- Non-renunciation of rights
"Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be."

Article 11- Substitutes for Protecting Powers
"The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organisation which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by virtue of the present Convention ..."

Article 27- Treatment I. General Observations
"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity..."

Article 29- III. Responsibilities
"The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred."

Article 31- Prohibition of coercion
"No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties."

Article 32- Prohibition of corporal punishment, torture, etc.
"The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture.
corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by
the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality
whether applied by civilian or military agents."

**Article 33- Individual responsibility, collective penalties, pillage, and reprisals**
"No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally
committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are
prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited."  

**Article 46- Cancellation of restrictive measures**
"In so far as they have not been previously withdrawn, restrictive measures taken regarding
protected persons shall be cancelled as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.
Restrictive measures affecting their property shall be cancelled, in accordance with the law
of the Detaining Power, as soon as possible after the close of hostilities."

**Section III: Occupied Territories**

**Article 47- Inviolability of Rights**
"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as
the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the
occupied territory."

**Article 49- Deportations, transfers, evacuations**
"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive..."
"...The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into
the territory it occupies."
Article 52- Protection of workers

"No contract, agreement or regulation shall impair the right of any worker, whether voluntary or not and wherever he may be, to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Power in order to request the said Power's intervention.

All measures aiming at creating unemployment or at restricting the opportunities offered to workers in an occupied territory, in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power, are prohibited."

Article 53- Prohibited destruction

"Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or co-operative organisations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."

Article 64- Penal legislation. I. General observations

"The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention..."

Article 146- Penal Sanctions I. General observations

"The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article..."

Article 147- II. Grave breaches

"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."
Article 148- III. Responsibilities of the Contracting Parties

"No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article."
CHECKLIST FOR PROGRAMME’S EVALUATION

- What is the underlying perception of the situation before the onset of the programme?
- How does the project fit into the broader development context?
- What are the underlying interests of the stakeholders?
- At what stage and level should participation occur?
- Is the level of intervention appropriate catalyst to get things started or more intense supporting implementing efforts?
- What type of project is appropriate upgrade in place, clear and redevelops, clear and relocate?
- What are the scope and objectives? Project or programme basic services, economic development, social, education, and health improvement?
- How to relate user demands and services?

- Did the programme fit into comprehensive development plan?
- Does it consider issues of sustainability?
- Is it sensitive to political factors?
- Is it sensitive to cultural factors?
- Does the organisational structure include sufficient co-ordination and political support?
- Is it financially viable? Are there sufficient financial resources to carry the programme?
- Is the scope/ scale affordable to the families and has willingness to pay been assessed?
- Will lows and regulation need to be modified?
- Is there any tenure problems?
- Is the location appropriate to upgrade?

- Does it support local initiatives?
- How to assure continuity of staff and community representatives?
- What is your role during the project life?
- What role does you delegate to the NGOs during implementation?

- How are lessons being captured?
- How are lessons being incorporated?
- What impact has the programme done on the improvement of the living conditions?
CHECKLIST: QUESTIONS FOR BENEFICIARIES IN THE REFUGEES CAMPS
IN GAZA STRIP
UNRWA POLICY TO IMPROVE THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS

INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT
1. Name ..................
2. Sex ..................
3. Age ..................
4. How many persons stay with you in this house? .................
5. In total how many people normally stay in this house? ........

HOUSE INFORMATION
6. How many rooms in your shelter?
7. Could you please indicate the function and the area of the architectural spaces in your house

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dimensions &amp; Area</th>
<th>Comment by the surveyor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kitchen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guest room</td>
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<tr>
<td>Living room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backyard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bathroom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Do you have any other house elsewhere? Yes No
9. If yes, where?  Refugee camp ........ City .......... Village ........
10. Why do you keep living in the refugee camp while you have another place to live in?

Living Condition and Service Provision:
11. Could you please comment on the level of provision of services after the peace agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse removal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, specify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Are you aware of any development occurred in this camp since the peace agreements?  Yes .......
No......
If yes, could you please elaborate
Checklist: Refugees’ Questions

13. Could you please assess the performance of each institution of the following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs, specify.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Do you think that the UNRWA is playing an important role to achieve better life? Yes ...... No.......... 

15. Please explain your answer

16. Do you think the Authority has played any role in improving the living condition in the refugee camps?
   Yes ...... No........

17. If yes, what role did they play?

18. Do you think that there is any chance to improve the living condition in the refugee camps? Yes ....... No

19. If yes, could you please list in order of importance the type of assistance which could improve such type of human settlement.

20. Do you think that the ‘Popular Committees’ approach can be used now to improve the living condition?
   Yes ............ No........

21. If yes, elaborate your answer

22. Which of the following option will you choose to improve the living condition?
   - Obtain land and personal development ‘the Israeli Model’
   - A flat in one of the housing ministry schemes ‘the Palestinian Model’
   - Improvement of the living condition in the same site of the refugee camps

23. Would you please explain why did you choose this option.

24. Have you ever experience any social problem?
   Yes ...... No........

25. If yes, please elaborate the nature of the problem.

26. Are you aware of the development in the refugees issue in the peace negotiation between PNA and Israel?
   Yes ...... No........

27. Do you think that the peace process resulted in improving the living condition in the Refugees camps?

28. Do you think that they will achieve a fair settlement for this issue? Yes ........ No...........

29. If yes please elaborate what do you think is fair to be solution of the problem?

30. Do you think that UNRWA should terminate its services? Yes .......... No............

31. If yes, please elaborate your answer.

32. Do you support the opinion that PNA should assume full responsibility for everything in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip?
   Yes ............ No.............

If yes, could you please justify
QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Ghassan Elkahlout. I am studying for PhD degree in Architecture- Post-war Reconstruction and Development-at the University of York. My research concern is the human settlement reconstruction in the Gaza Strip. I would like to ask some questions aiming at identifying and understanding the problems of human settlement in Gaza Strip. Also, to find out whether previous projects have been successful or not. All information given remains confidential and will be used in my PhD research. I greatly appreciate your time and co-operation and I would be most grateful to have your comments on my questions.

Yours Faithfully,

Ghassan Elkahlout

University of York
The King’s Manor, York YO1 7EP
Tel: 0044 1904 43380
Fax: 0044 1904 433949
E-mail: gek100@york.ac.uk

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN ELKARAM HOUSING SCHEME.

Sample No .............
Plot No ...... Flat No..........

INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT

1. Name: ...........................................
2. Sex: ...........................................
3. Age: ...........................................
5. If you are married, do you have any children? Yes.......... No ......... .
6. If yes, how many? ......... .
7. How many stay with you in this house? ......... .
8. Education level? ..........
11. Which type of work do you have? ........ .
13. Do you have another sources for income? Yes.......... No........ .
14. If yes please specify, ............................................................
    ............................................................
15. If you are not employed, could you please explain how you satisfy your basic needs?
    ............................................................
17. If yes, what type of work do they do? ........................................
19. If yes, roughly how much do they give you per month? ........ .

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20. Do you get any other assistance from anybody: wife/ husband .... relative .... friend .......... welfare from PNA ....... welfare from UNRWA ....... relatives working abroad ....... political organisation .........

21. If yes, please indicate the type of assistance ..........

22. Could you please indicate how much you spend per month on the following item:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Israeli shekel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family Subsistence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependants Transport</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dependants Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
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<td>Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, Specify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HOUSE INFORMATION**

23. How many rooms in this unit? ........

24. Do you own this house or you are renting it? Owning ........ Renting ........

25. Do you have any other house elsewhere? Yes .......... No ........

26. If yes, where? Refugee camp ........ City ........ Village ........

27. Could you please assess the overall habitability of the project using the variables listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Services and management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services and management</td>
<td>Dwelling unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling unit</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Could you please clarify the function, area, numbers of every architectural space in your flat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dimension &amp; Area</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Living room</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bathroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitchen</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water closet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. Could you please comment on the level of provision of services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Below Average</th>
<th>Bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30. Could you please mention your origin? ............

31. Do you prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited overwhelmingly by your relatives? Yes ......... No .........

32. Please elaborate your answer. ...................... .................... .................... .................... .................... ....................

33. Have you ever experienced any problem with any of your neighbour? Yes No

34. If yes, please elaborate the nature of the problem.

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

35. If you have the opportunity to design, what type of a house would you prefer to live in and why
- Having a land and building for yourself ..............
- A flat in the current housing projects ..............
- Upgrading your shelter in the refugee camp (This question is to refugees only) ..............

36. Why do you choose this option.

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

FINANCIAL PROBLEM

37. When did you move here? .............

38. Please indicate how you acquired this house.

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

39. Did you get any help of anyone to be here? Yes ...... No ............

40. What type of help did you get? ..............

41. Did you face any difficulties to get your flat? Yes ...... No ............

42. If yes, how did you manage to overcome these difficulties?

........................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

43. What is the total cost of your flat? ..............

44. Did you pay deposit? Yes ...... No ............

45. If yes how much did you pay? .............

46. How much do you pay monthly to the administration? ..............

47. Do you think what you paid is a reasonable for your flat? Yes ...... No ............

48. If no, Could you suggest what you think would be fair payment for this flat? ..............

49. Do you have any problems of paying the monthly payment? Yes ...... No ............

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50. If yes, could you please the causes and suggest possible solutions.

51. Apart form this problem, do you have any other problems? Yes........ No........

52. If yes, please elaborate

53. Has any development of the neighbourhood been undertaken since you occupied it? Yes........ No........

54. If yes, please specify

55. Would you please comment on the performance of the following bodies according to their service in this project?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHC</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. Who do you think should be responsible for the general management of this neighbourhood?
UNRWA........ resident committees........ PNA........ Municipality........

57. Do the local committees play any role in solving problem you face in your life? Yes........ No........

58. If yes, please elaborate,

59. Do you think that UNRWA still plays a role in providing the Palestinian refugees in this scheme with the basic services? Yes........ No........

60. If yes, please elaborate your answer

61. Do you think the Authority has any role to play? Yes........ No........

62. If no please elaborate why?

63. What should PNA do toward solving Elkarama problem?

64. Do you believe that residents have any role to solve this problem? Yes...... No......

65. If yes, please explain how would this happen?
66. So you think that the popular committees approach during the Intifada is appropriate to provide the residents with their needs? Yes ...... No......

67. Please elaborate your answer

The next questions are to the Palestinian Refugees who moved here from refugee camps

68. Do you think that your movement to this project will affect your rights, which were approved by the International community? Yes...... No......

69. If yes, why did you move here?

70. Are you aware of the current development of the Palestinian refugees in the peace process? Yes...... No......

71. Do you think that the negotiation will achieve a fair solution for the refugee issue? Yes ...... No......

72. Do you think that the peace process had resulted in improving the living condition in the refugee camps?
   Yes......... No........

73. What is the fair solution from your point of view? ..............................................................

74. Do you think that UNRWA should terminate its services? Yes...... No......

75. Could you please explain your answer?

Recommendations

76. Do you think that this project has solved part of the housing problem in the Gaza strip? Yes ...... No. ......

77. Please explain your answer

78. Do you think that the PHC should repeat its experience? Yes...... No......

79. Could you please explain your answer?

80. What do you advise the PHC to avoid in his next projects?
Appendix (5): What did Palestinian Newspapers say regarding the Palestinian Housing Council problems?

PHC Official Tells (Al-Ayaam Newspaper): The Rest of the Council Infrastructure Project will be completed when Beneficiaries Pay Their Dues.

What did Papers Say?

Appendix (5): What did Palestinian Newspapers say regarding the Palestinian Housing Council problems?

PHC Official Tells (Al-Ayaam Newspaper): The Rest of the Council Infrastructure Project will be completed when Beneficiaries Pay Their Dues.
Residents of the Council Project Demand New Terms for their Contract.

What did Papers Say?

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Beneficiaries of the Housing Projects escalate their Protests.

What did Papers Say?

The beneficiaries of the housing projects escalate their protests.

The report mentioned that the beneficiaries demand an increase in the rent due to the increase in housing prices. They also expressed their dissatisfaction with the housing projects' delays.

A meeting was held to discuss the beneficiaries' demands. The chairman of the housing committee promised to address the concerns and provide solutions.

The report highlighted the need for urgent action to resolve the housing crisis and improve the living conditions of the beneficiaries.
PHC Aims to Reduce the Price of Flats

What did Papers Say?

PHC Aims to Reduce the Price of Flats

توجه لدى مجلس الإسكان
لتخفيف أسعار الشقة
غزة. وفا. أعلن مسؤول في
مجلس الإسكان أمس أنه هناك
توجه لتحفيز أسعار الشقق
التي ينفدها المجلس في قطاع غزة
بحوالى 5 آلاف دولار.

وقال سعيد زعرب مدير فرع
غزة أن مشروع النصيقات
سيخفض فيه سعر الشقة من 38
الف دولار إلى 32 ألفًا، ومشروع
الكرامة يخفض فيه سعر الشقة
من 50 الف دولار إلى 45 ألفًا، أما
في خانيونس فسيخفض السعر
من 39 ألف دولار إلى 34 الف
دولار.

وكان المجلس الفلسطيني
للأسكان قد أعلن في وقت سابق
عن تخفيض سعر الفائدة على تلك
الشقق من 9% إلى 7%.
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Abu Iyad: Refugee working in UNRWA Field Office.
Abu Faiz: Leader of Local Committee in Jabalya Camp
Alaa’ Yaghi: Manager, The Palestinian Housing Council
Alex Bolloc: Director of Development and Planning Unit, UNRWA
Ayop Al Alem: Director of the Health Programme UNRWA, Gaza Field Office
Dina Assaf: Director of the Planning and Development Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation
Dr Sadiq: University Lecturer
Hamdi Emteer: Municipality Engineer
Hossam Abu Ouda: Public Relations Officer, UNRWA Headquarters.
Hossam Koraz: Architect, The Palestinian Housing Council
Hossam Manna’: Director of the Projects Department, UNRWA, Gaza Field Office
Ibraheem Abu Hmeed: Director General of the Ministry of Housing, Gaza
Issa Alqura: Public Relations Officer, UNRWA Field Office, Gaza.
Issam Miqdadi: Chief of the Special Environmental Health Programme, UNRWA, Gaza Field Office
Mahaseen Mohysen: Deputy Director of the Education Programme, UNRWA, Gaza Field Office
Mohi Ed-deen Alfara: Architect, Designer of Elkarama Housing Project.
Mustafa Al-Hayk: Planner, Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation.
Nasser Jabber: UNRWA Official of Charge of Loans
Refugees in Jabalya, Al Nuseirat and Al Shati Camp
Residents of Elkarama Housing Project
Sahar Abu Samra: Save the Children, Gaza Office.
Staff of the Planning and Development Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation
Usama Elsa’dway: Director of Gaza Office, The Palestinian Housing Council
Yusri Mohram: Headmaster of Refugees’ Schools.
ABBREVIATION

DAC: Development Assistant Committee.
DFID: British Department for International Development.
DoP: Declaration of Principles.
EAP: The Emergency Assistance Programme for the Occupied Territories.
ECHO: The European Community Humanitarian Office
EPA: Expanded Programme for Assistance
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
HUDC: Housing and Urban Development Corporation
ICRC: International Committee Red Cross
ILO: International Labour Organisation.
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations
NORAD: Norwegian Aid
ODI: Overseas Development Institute
OECD: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development.
PECDAR: Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction.
PHC: Palestinian Housing Council
PIP: Peace Implementation Programme
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PMUN: The Palestinian Mission at the United Nation
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PNC: Palestine National Council
PRDU: Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit
RWG: Refugees Working Group
SCF: Save the Children Federation.
SEHP: Special Environmental Health Programme.
SGL: Solidarity Group-Lending.
SHC: Special Hardship Cases
UN: United Nations
Abbreviation

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees
UNOSCO: United Nations Office of the Special Co-ordinator in the Occupied Territories
UNRISD: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNRPR: The United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees.
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WBGWG: The World Bank Group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
WSP: War-torn Societies Project.
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