
A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Sheffield.

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December 2014
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Summary:

This thesis asks whether foundational principles exist, from which meaningful and just cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish international principles of conduct, interactions and law. It claims that this will offer a possible and viable response to the concerns surrounding the homogenising nature of universalism, and the often imperialist justifications underlying it in cases of international principle formation and application. This is achieved by postulating Kantian notions of internal self-law giving and external willkür as potential foundational principles. It then seeks to question the validity of these claims through an examination of African political theory. The purpose of this is to look at African political theory for ideas equal to, or similar in foundation to, notions of internal and external self-law giving.

The aim is to establish an analytical framework through which the principles of internal and external self-law giving can be operationalised for usage in the textual analysis; defining the analytical framework as including the concepts of freedom of choice versus domination, equality of individuals and self-mastery as representing the overarching principles of internal and external self-law giving. Following on from this Chapter 2 locates the thesis within the wider literature through a discussion of culture, universalism and relativism in both the Western liberal and African traditions. It establishes the role of this thesis in arguing that these foundations can form the basis for open and just cross-cultural dialogue. Finally the main body of the work focuses on a selection of schools of African political thought, or collection of thinkers, which have been grouped together based on similarities in their views or the individual’s claimed membership to a particular ideology or system of thought. Within the work of each group of thinkers the thesis seeks to locate the principles of internal and external self-law giving.

This thesis contributes to the ever growing literature surrounding the topic of comparative political theory. It supports a model of weak universalism premised on the understanding of foundational principles that can be approached and responded to in culturally specific ways: whilst also respecting individual autonomy and personhood. In concluding it is suggested that an argument can be made for the necessity for open, honest and fair cross-cultural dialogue that is justified by, and respectful of, these principles as existing at the centre of political discourse in both the Kantian model and the selection of African political theory examined by this project. It can therefore be argued that this thesis establishes an evidence base for the potential a priori nature of the principles of internal self-law giving.
and external willkür: understood as freedom of choice, self-mastery and equality of individuals. This thesis thus makes the recommendation that these principles should be recognised and respected as foundations of, and central to, just and fair cross-cultural dialogue.
Acknowledgements

My first thank you and act of acknowledgement has to go to my parents, without whom this would not have been possible. You have been a constant support to me both emotionally and financially, and just knowing that when times get tough or my confidence is waning I can always go home and be plied with copious amounts of tea and tiffin, has been a constant reassurance. Even when you have had no clue what I have been talking about you have been willing to listen and talk me down from the ever familiar ledges of carrying out a PhD, and for that I will be eternally grateful. This thesis would never have been completed without your help, especially in the final stages, most of which were written at home with the constant and reassuring trickle of tea. An extra thank you goes to my Mum whose proof reading has ensured the thesis is full of commas.

To Dan, over the last 2 years you have listened to me complain, celebrate, cry, panic and go through every possible emotion in between. At every stage you have been there to support me and make me laugh. Your constant and tireless reassurance has not only enabled me to complete the thesis but has also helped me to remember what it is that I love about academia and to remind me why it is that I want to do this. An extra thank you for agreeing to proof read the thesis and for putting up with my over-protective responses every time you altered a word. You have made even the hardest of days bearable and for that I will always be thankful.

To my friends and colleagues in the Politics department, of whom there are far too many to list. Throughout the last 4 years the debates that have ended in bitter mumblings, the Friday night drinks and the Christmas meals have brought the process alive. The community that we have formed and friendships and support networks we have developed will always remain with me. Special mention goes to a few people: Joe and Marc who have always been there to challenge and question everything I believe in and to remind me that everything is subjective, but who, at the same time, have always been willing to go that extra mile to support me both academically through proof reading and advice and through friendship. Clara, Alix, Nuray, Sara, Lucy, Dan B, Matt, Robbie, Irene, Louise, Xavier and Sam whose friendship, willingness to debate, and support over the years have made the process not only bearable, but also enjoyable and educational. I have learnt about topics that in no other situation would be possible and membership of the PhD community has enabled me to never stop learning.
To Rich, Jo, Christina, Chris, Dan W, Hannah, Mike and Fliss, who I am sure over the years I have convinced never to enter into an academic career. Thank you for listening to my woes, offering support and advice and constantly reminding me that the choice to embark on the last 4 years was mine and mine alone, and that I need to get on with it and finish it. Without your continued support and willingness to listen I am not sure I would have made it this far, and I am ever grateful for the reminder that it is about time I went out and got a 'real' job.

To my supervisory team, Graham Harrison and Garrett Brown, you have guided me through a process that has not always been easy or simple and for that I am grateful. Thank you for supporting me in the completion of the process and in developing my analytical style. To the Politics department in general thank you for creating and nurturing a strong academic community and for welcoming me into it. In particular, to Sarah Cooke whose support and guidance has been a constant comfort throughout the process and a calming influence at times of stress, thank you.

To my examiners, Professor Stephen Chan and Doctor Edward Hall, thank you for a challenging but fair viva and for all the excellent feedback and suggestions you gave me. The project has been endlessly improved by your feedback.

This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of my grandparents who, in their own individual ways, taught me the strengths and values needed to embark on such a lengthy and often soul destroying task. My Grandad: who taught me the values of hard work, grit and determination. My Grandma Linda, who was always willing to challenge and test my points of view, teaching me the value of a good argument and the need for evidence: her willingness to support me over the last eight years whilst I continued to carry on what seemed like a never ending path of education, is a large part of why I have been able to complete this journey, and will never be forgotten. Finally, my Grandma Bird, whose influence on my life is unparalleled. She taught me to believe in myself even when life is at its hardest and to never give up. Without her voice in the back of my head chivvying me on to believe that I can do anything I set my mind to, I would probably have given up. This thesis would not have been possible without the influence she has always had, and will always continue to have, on my life. It is thus right that this thesis be dedicated to her memory.
**Introduction:**

.1- Introduction and Overview:

The purpose of this thesis is to ask whether foundational principles exist, shared by us all, from which meaningful and just cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish international principles of conduct, interactions and law. The hope being that this will offer a possible and viable response to the concerns surrounding the homogenising nature of universalism, and the often imperialist justifications underlying it, in cases of international principle formation and application. Cross-cultural studies are often criticised for paying either too great or too little heed to issues of cultural difference; the intention of this piece of work is to suggest a shared foundational position from which these discussions can take place in a way that is respectful of difference whilst also recognising a shared humanity. The term foundation will be understood within this thesis as “some class of statements or propositions, which are favoured absolutely over others. To be foundational, this class of statements is regarded as ‘fundamental’ - ‘fundamental’ implying that its possessors cannot avoid deferring or referring back to it” (Vincent, 2007, p.3). The aim of this study is to find what that common factor might be from which we are able to see ourselves in one another. In line with Fred Dallmayr I see that the “point of comparative political theory (or cross-cultural studies)... is precisely to move in the direction of a more genuine universalism” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.15). Rather than imposing universal principles from above this study asks what shared traits exist prior to politics and society: a priori. It recognises that “shared meanings and practices - to the extent that this is possible - can only arise from the lateral interaction, negotiation, and contestation among different, historically grown cultural frameworks” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.7) and aims to provide foundational principles, or shared traits, on which this dialogue can be premised.

This is achieved by postulating Kantian notions of internal self-law giving and external willkür as potential foundational principles and then seeking to question the validity of these claims through an examination of African political theory. The purpose of this is to look within a range of African political theory for ideas equal to, or similar in foundation to, notions of internal and external self-law giving. This thesis will then either support or dispute the claim that these ideas act largely as universally shared foundational principles, which are equally valued by political theorists of different cultural backgrounds. This thesis does not imply that the two principles will be similarly substantiated within the different literatures, but rather that they are metaphysical points around which debates exist both
within different cultural groups and between cultures. To clarify using the example of individual choice (one understanding of external self-law giving): this thesis accepts that the concept of individual choice may be responded to in numerous ways by different groups, cultures or individuals. It also accepts that it is unlikely that in all examples the aim of achieving individual choice will be realised. However, it is the focus of this thesis to question whether, these factors being taken into account, the idea can be located at the centre of discourse within different cultural groups and thus can be viewed as existing a priori.

The division of the concept of self-law giving into its internal and external applications is dealt with in-depth in Chapter 1, in which the Kantian framework is fully explained. However, the central question of this thesis focuses on two factors. Firstly, whether there is an a priori assumption in the work of African political theorists that persons have an innate ability to be self-law giving on an individual level. Secondly, whether there is a drive in the writings of African political theorists and politicians towards establishing political structures that can provide the conditions for people to realise their innate ability to be self-law giving in the political realm. To summarise, the overall aim of this project is to use a Kantian approach to explore the degree to which universals might be found in certain African political discourses.

The following discussion details how the notions of internal and external self-law giving are being translated and operationalised for use in this project in relation to the analysis of African political theory carried out in Chapters 3-5. Furthermore, it briefly explains the methodology being adopted for the purpose of this research, whilst in Section 2 the choice to study African political theory is justified and explained in greater depth. These enquiries aim to justify a number of claims: firstly, and most obviously, that more research is required which looks at the published ideas of different cultures from all over the world in order to be able to claim true universality of these ideas as foundational principles of humanity. The scope of this project is limited to whether foundational principles exist in the range of African political theory selected for this study. Secondly, that even with the limited sources covered by this study, the presence of a foundational principle of this type has the potential to raise questions and problems regarding our current system of international principle formation. The argument follows that if the methods currently used when establishing international principles and laws do not abide by the requirements of self-law giving individuals then this would be problematic because it would disregard the
fundamental foundations of personhood owed to all individuals. Finally, that the existence of a shared a priori belief in the value to, and right of, persons to be self-law giving, and the corresponding duty not to interfere with others’ rights as self-mastering individuals has the potential to provide a basis for open, just, and fair cross-cultural dialogue. To summarise, the aim of this thesis is to question whether an argument can be made for the existence of Kantian concepts of internal self-law giving and willkür as foundational principles of humanity across different cultural perspectives; in particular, whether they exist in the selected works of African political philosophy. To elucidate, it is asked whether or not an a priori assumption exists in African political theory that individuals have the capacity to be self-law giving (as an internal, individual trait). It is then questioned whether in their writings theorists advocate for a system that translates this moral assumption of self-law giving (internal) into the necessary public model to enable individuals to be purposive moral law giver’s in community with others (willkür, external). This is achieved through a comparative study of African political theory which asks whether these ideas can be located in the work of various authors. This thesis concludes that an argument can be made for open, honest and fair cross-cultural dialogue that is justified by, and respectful of, these principles as existing at the centre of political discourse in both the Kantian model and the selection of African political theory examined by this project.

The methodology used in this thesis is borrowed from comparative political theory (as the analysis broadly falls into this field) and is a part of an ever growing field, the growth of which initially occurred “in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.7). It uses textual analysis of speeches, essays, philosophical articles and monographs to look for similarities that may exist between a Kantian theory of internal self-law giving and external willkür as rights and duties of all mankind, and what African political theory suggests are the rights and duties of all mankind. A priori and inductive approaches are combined to establish the concepts being looked at, followed by analysis of a selection of African political theory to suggest potential similarities. In referring to a priori and inductive approaches, it is being suggested that the concepts of external willkür and internal self-law giving exist a priori. Following on from this assumption, an inductive approach has been utilised to establish sub-themes that are used to represent these ideas in the works of either Kant himself or contemporary Kantians. A more detailed methodology for establishing the themes to be studied follows in the next paragraph. The approach being adopted borrows from a discussion of theme identification in Gery Ryan and Russell Bernard’s 2003 article that describes themes as: “Abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs that
link not only expressions found in text but also expressions found in images, sounds and objects" (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p.87). Whilst this particular piece of work focuses predominantly on published texts and speeches, it does provide a suitable framework for extending the study to other, less formal, oral traditions.

The first stage to Ryan and Bernard’s method is to establish an overarching, higher order category or metaphysics. This is often a more abstract idea but it can be broken down into themes and sub-themes that are clearer and easier to find represented in the chosen material: in this case African political theory. If themes can be found across the texts being studied then it is possible to suggest that a similarity exists, and that the concepts have relevance in both the areas selected for comparison.

In brief, the process of locating foundational principles will consist of two stages. The first involves introducing the higher order categories which it is being suggested could exist universally. These have been established as a priori concepts that, borrowing from Kant, this thesis suggests may be universally recognisable as not only a right of humans to be autonomous agents but also a duty to achieve this in common with all others. The justification for their a priori existence will be examined further in Chapter 1 as a part of the discussion of the wider Kantian framework of this project. The meta-themes or categories that lie at the centre of this project are the Kantian concepts of internal self-law giving and willkühr (the external formation of the concept of choice in pursuing one’s ends within a community of others). Justification for these categories can also be found in Chapter 1. The second stage is to operationalise these categories in a way that makes them useful as part of an analytical framework. At this stage the categories are broken down into a set of three themes, each of which has been adapted from a combination of both contemporary Kantian thought and the writing of Kant himself. The inclusion of each theme is explained and justified in detail. The themes are: freedom of choice versus domination, equality of individuals and self-mastery. The debates from which these themes derive, as well as the particular authors who make use of the terms, are listed and explained in Chapter 1.

Following the establishment of the concepts to be considered as existing a priori, and the terms that can be viewed as representing these in Chapter 1; and a literature review examining the role of culture on understandings of universal concepts, as well as the potential space for utilising an understanding of foundational principles in establishing fair and just cross-cultural interactions; the rest of this thesis is dedicated to testing the
hypothesis that these ideas can be located in African political theory. This is achieved in two stages. Firstly, the theorists selected for study are grouped together based on similarities in their ideas, their time of writing, or the body of literature with which they associate. The purpose of this is to facilitate more detailed comparison and to enable the drawing of stronger parallels between them. The method for grouping theorists together in this way is explained in greater detail in Section 2. Secondly, a detailed textual analysis is carried out which aims to locate ideas representative of the themes of willkür and self-law giving in the monographs, speeches, poems, essays and other academic works of the selected theorists. This analysis leads to the conclusion that it is possible to interpret the selected texts of African political theory as entering into debate around similar shared foundational principles to those presented by the Kantian model.

The usage of a methodology focusing on textual analysis is not uncontroversial. The question of whether we should even interpret historical and political texts, as well as concerns regarding how this should be achieved, are discussed widely in the literature: particularly amongst literary theorists in the 1960’s and 1970’s. It is to this debate that the discussion now turns. The methodology for this project is, as previously suggested, adapted from Ryan and Bernard’s approach. However, the justification for carrying out this research borrows from Quentin Skinner’s 1972 article “Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts”. Skinner’s article focuses on the ability of critics to interpret meaning from literary texts. However, this thesis adapts these views to relate to political theory. The premise being that Skinner’s approach offers validation for the choice to analyse and interpret the views of political thinkers based on a reading of their publications, as well as establishing the meanings that can be interpreted from their outputs. In the introductory passages of his article he makes a number of claims regarding the necessity of recognising that within the process of interpretation we cannot “ever hope to arrive at ‘the correct reading’ of a text, such that any rival readings can then be ruled out” (Skinner, 1972, p.393). This understanding is at the centre of this thesis’s ethos; the aim being to provide one interpretation of the texts but not to claim that this reading is either an exact exegetical account of the theorists’ aims, nor the only possible interpretation. In fact this thesis accepts that, whilst precautions have been taken to limit bias by attempting to achieve “critical distance from (my) own positions and preferences” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.10), there are elements of reader bias inherent in the process of interpretation itself. Skinner focuses on the limits entrenched in interpretive work in the early stages of his article. He then changes focus, intending to establish greater clarity around what meaning
it is possible to derive from interpretive readings of source material, and whether there is a value in doing so: the outcomes of his project are of particular importance to the methodology of this thesis. He concludes that the role of interpretation is in establishing the intentions of the author, or to phrase it differently, what the author meant to achieve when they elected to produce their text: “for example, to attack or defend a particular line of argument to criticise or contribute to a particular tradition or discourse, and so on” (Skinner, 1972, p.404). The aims of this thesis are to achieve very similar ends. Therefore, Skinner’s approach has been influential when considering the parameters and purpose of analysis; to gain understanding of the meaning, aims and foundations of the discourse produced by a selection of African political theorists. To clarify, whether the selected African political theorists focused their arguments around the central themes of willkühr and self-law giving, understood as choice versus domination, self-mastery, and equality. Having explained the justification for textual interpretation, and the purpose behind it, discussion now reverts to the categories and themes that are being used as a framework for carrying out the interpretive work.

The relationship between categories and themes can be seen in greater clarity in the following diagram:

**The relationship between categories and themes**

![Diagram showing the relationship between categories and themes]

Adapted from Strauss and Corbin 1990, cited in Ryan and Bernard 2003.
Before moving on to discuss and explain the selection of African political theory/philosophy chosen as the source material for this thesis, it is necessary to further delineate the underpinning methodology. The following section (Section 2), examines the methods used for choosing and narrowing down the selection of source material. However, it is the purpose of this current discussion to scrutinise how the Kantian framework (briefly discussed in this section but to be fully developed in Chapter 1) is used in carrying out the rest of this project.

The overall purpose of this thesis (to adopt a Kantian approach to explore the degree to which certain universals may be found in a selection of African political discourses) relies on being able to establish Kantian ideas as a lens through which it is possible to study non-Western sources. The argument below explains how that is possible and overcomes a number of the concerns associated with adopting a Western approach for the purpose of studying non-Western sources.

The first stage considers how Kantian ideas are being adapted and the extent to which this thesis remains faithful to an exegetical reading of Kant. In his discussion of Kantian cosmopolitanism, Garrett Brown makes reference to two different approaches often employed by theorists studying Kant’s views on the topic. He suggests that theorists often employ one, or a combination of both, methods in their analysis:

“The first approach is to employ strict exegesis in an attempt to understand Kant’s cosmopolitanism by directly analysing his use of words, logical structure and relationship between various aspects of philosophy...The other approach is to reconstruct aspects of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in order to establish a coherent and defensible argument for Kantian cosmopolitanism” (Brown, 2009, pp.20-21).

When discussing these ideas, Brown talks specifically about methods that are employed for defending Kantian cosmopolitanism. However, this thesis argues that both approaches have wider scope; they can be applied when making use of Kantian ideas more generally, and also be used as the basis for further study. The first method Brown mentions, in which researchers conform to a strict exegetical approach, enables a project to better clarify Kant’s work and to highlight, and often overcome, some of the inconsistencies. Doing this can provide the conditions for better defending the contemporary relevance of these ideas. This approach is relevant to the first stage of this thesis in which the concepts of willkür and
internal self-law giving are presented as initial starting points to form a lens through which the question of shared foundational principles can be considered. This method will be employed in Chapter 1, in which a strict exegetical study of Kant’s work is carried out. A number of points will be considered in this analysis: the roots of these ideas, how they link together and the implications they have according to Kant. This thesis asks whether these ideas are present in the work of a selection of discourses taken from African political theory; to achieve this it is necessary to unpick the terms and clearly understand their roots as they were presented by Kant. Consideration of whether these ideas exist in the African political theory source material requires a further stage: to operationalise the terms into a relevant framework for analysis. The second approach referred to by Brown is employed at this stage.

Usage of the second approach (adaptation of Kant’s work to contemporary projects whilst still recognising the importance of rooting developments in his original texts) is based on the assumption that “there is heuristic value in allowing for the redevelopment of Kant’s (views) when it is properly substantiated in relation to strong exegetical evidence” (Brown, 2009, p.21). The purpose, in relation to this project, is to build on the original Kantian texts, and to reinterpret and restructure the ideas in order to present a coherent framework in which the suggested foundational principles can be operationalised to enable a detailed textual analysis. It is important to make clear which of the two approaches is being utilised at each stage of the project, as simply blending the two can lead to ideas being attributed to either Kant or a Kantian approach without the necessary textual evidence; an approach which can lead to unnecessary bias. It is for this reason that Chapter 1 has been dedicated to comprehensively situating each of the concepts in the literature and highlighting ideas that are adopted either for the purpose of this project or from secondary sources such as the work of Mary Gregor, Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein. To make clear, the role of Chapter 1 is to present a detailed exegetical discussion of Kant’s work on willkür and self-law giving, to then explain how these ideas have been developed and restructured, and finally to clearly present the analytical framework that will be used as a method to discuss the potential existence of shared foundational principles within both the established Kantian framework and the writings of a selection of African political theorists.

Departing from a strict exegetical approach creates the opportunity to reformulate Kantian ideas in order to increase their relevance to contemporary issues and overcome some of the historical concerns associated with Kant. For example, Kant’s work is often criticised for
maintaining an inbuilt assumption of inequality between those individuals he sees as citizens and those he views merely as wards of the state; based on his construction of who he considers to be reasoned agents. Supporting exclusion along these lines has been used, both in the past and present, to justify political actions that are often abhorrent. For example, it was often argued by academics and politicians supporting the colonial movement, that their role was to civilise people, and that when this process was complete they may eventually be worthy of citizenship. Therefore, whilst the role of reason is maintained as a central facet of this project, it is assumed from the outset that when discussing reasoned, autonomous agents striving to have choice in the direction of their lives, discussion in fact refers to all human beings. This adaptation responds not only to the concern of inequality often directed at Kant, but also ensures the framework established in the thesis has greater contemporary relevance.

Discussion of the issues that arise when adapting the work of Kant leads to the second methodological concern referred to earlier in this section: how is it possible to overcome the criticism that this project is ethnocentric when taking a theory from within the metaphysical position of Western political thought and then using it to indicate the potential existence of shared universal ideas? In response, it must first be admitted that methodologies such as this one can be adopted as a method of imposing certain Western-specific views on external cultures. However, this is not the aim of this thesis; the purpose is not to advocate for the spreading of a belief in the importance of willkür and self-law giving, but instead to ask whether these views can be seen as already existing in the work of African political theorists. The Kantian framework is being used purely as a lens through which to examine the empirical material through detailed textual analysis; the role of this project is to question the existence of these views, not to advocate for their uptake. Concerns regarding ethnocentric practice, as well as methodologies for overcoming it, are discussed further in Chapter 2.

Having given a condensed overview of this thesis, the following section (Section .2) explains and justifies the choice of African political theory as the body of theory chosen for analysis. This section also sets the parameters of what has been selected for inclusion when reference is made to what could be seen as an infinite category of work. This is followed by Section .3 which explains how the research question translates into a contribution to the greater body of comparative political theory literature. Finally, Section .4 offers a
breakdown of the chapters of this thesis, explaining the focus of each one and the role it plays in developing the overall body of work.

.2- African Political Theory:

Following the establishment of the theoretical framework for this project in Chapter 1, and the literature review investigating the effect culture plays on the understanding of shared foundational principles in Chapter 2, the remainder of this thesis engages with questions of the existence of potentially foundational principles in the canon of literature selected for study. Before clarifying the process by which the African texts were selected, it is necessary to elucidate further the method of analysis used. Having established a framework in which the concepts of willkür and internal self-law giving can be represented by other terms (namely freedom of choice versus domination, equality of individuals, and self-mastery) an exegetical analysis of the selected texts is carried out in which the aim is to “elucidate their meanings and debate their significance” (Couldry, 2000, p.67). To achieve this thorough analysis of each of the texts is carried out in which two approaches are utilised. Both direct references to these terms are looked for, as well as discussions that demonstrate a similar underlying idea. In each case there is an honest analytical dialogue asking whether ideas are directly represented or being assumed from within the broader discourse, as well as use of detailed textual references to support the assumption being made. It is important to avoid the criticism that in analysing the source material the views being referred to are taken to mean more than they in fact do. For this reason, it is necessary to be clear that the views found in the source material represent the views of the authors themselves, no assumption is being made that they also represent the views of the wider community from which the author emanates. Having established how this work is carried out, the remainder of this section (Section .2) presents the method used for selecting the African sources.

Questioning whether Western conceptions of autonomy or rights exist in the writings of non-Western cultures is not rare. There have been a number of studies (Chan 1999, Chan 2002, Maududi 1976) that consider different variants of what it means to have autonomy or individual rights, and ask whether they exist externally to the West; this includes looking for both Kantian and non-Kantian ideas in non-Western cultures. For example, a number of studies have considered whether similar notions of what it means to have autonomy exist in the work of both Islamic and Confucian scholars. They have done this by examining either a historical sample: in the case of the analysis of Confucian thought, studies start with Confucius and progress through other theorists that write under the banner of
Confucianism. Or, a study of the religious materials associated with the religion in question: in the case of Islam, the Quran. Many of these studies share a common goal: to find commonalities between Western and non-Western theory that either suggest the contemporary relevance of these non-Western traditions, and/or allow the author to advocate for the existence of shared foundational principles. For example, Panikkar and Panikkar (1982) consider an “Indian reflection” (Panikkar and Panikkar, 1982, p.95) on shared cross-cultural principles.

The studies in question often also share a common model: they define what it is that they are referring to when they discuss autonomy and then break the category down into a number of elements before carrying out a textual analysis of the existence of said elements in their source material. For example, Chan’s 2002 article lists four elements that he sees as representing autonomy in the Western system, and argues for the existence of two of these in the work of Confucian authors. As discussed in Section 1.1, this study follows a similar model. What separates this thesis from the rest of these studies is the choice to consider African political theory as the selection of texts being studied. As a result, it is the selection of African political theory as the topic for study that provides the original contribution of this thesis to the broader literature. This is due to the fact that African political theory is often understudied and there have been few attempts to link key elements of the Kantian tradition to African literature on freedom of choice versus domination, equality of individuals and self-mastery, and to question whether these ideas form a central tenant of the debate between African authors.

Unlike the aforementioned areas of Confucianism and Islam, African political thought is not a neatly bounded ideology or set of political ideas. There is great divergence in cultural heritage, political persuasion, moral thought and philosophical positions. What constitutes African political thought or African philosophy is also a widely debated topic. Theorists such as John Mbiti have suggested that use of homogenising terminology such as “African philosophy” risks overlooking individual differences between cultural groups such as Akan, Yoruba and Ewe. However, emphasis on the folk philosophies of certain cultural or linguistic collectives (such as these) as being representational of the whole group is also problematic as it has, in the past, been viewed as a less academically rigorous form of investigation; a discussion which will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 5. The secondary point raised by theorists such as Mbiti is the importance of not allowing the
homogenising term of “African philosophy” to trivialise or silence the valuable contributions of individual philosophers as presenting their views.

In contrast, many of the statesmen, philosophers and activists writing in the early to mid-1900s, both on the continent and in the diaspora, believed that unification under one umbrella was in fact a positive step: Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K. Nyerere and Léopold Sédar Senghor to name a few prominent examples. Therefore, a major part of this project has been establishing what is being referenced by the terms “African political theory” and “African philosophy”, as well as grouping theorists together and setting the boundaries of the sources to be studied. That being said, it is fundamental to the success of this project to be explicit about selection choices and criteria, this is dealt with in detail in the following paragraphs; but firstly a brief response to the issues surrounding the grouping of work as being African is necessary.

In discussing this, reference will be made to the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye who argues that the term African should be used in the same way that Western is. When we suggest a philosophy emanates from the West we are not diminishing its association with an individual, for example Kant; or a country, like Germany; or a tradition, such as the Enlightenment. Instead, we are simply categorising the ideas as being written by theorists of Western origin concerning themselves with issues relevant to their individual or cultural experience. In a similar vein Gyekye defines what it means to classify philosophy as African: “It only needs to be the results of the reflective exertions of an African thinker, aimed at giving analytical attention to the intellectual foundations of African culture and experience” (Gyekye, 1987, p.211). These foundations are not required to be unique to Africa. In fact, as is suggested by the overall question of this thesis; it is being argued that certain foundational principles are common to many different philosophies, cultures and theorists. All that is required, according to Gyekye, is that they have relevance in an African context. This can include traditional philosophies, contemporary theorists discussing traditional ideas as well as contemporary theorists more generally. This approach to categorising philosophers works also overcomes a key concern presented by Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o of tribalising individuals, thus failing to recognise that their differences in opinion are those of an individual rather than caused by their biology, as has been a mistaken assumption in the past. He argues that, “no man or woman can choose their biological nationality. The conflicts between peoples cannot be explained in terms of that which is fixed (the invariables)” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.1) and as a result we shouldn’t assume that
individuals’ opinions are based on their place of origin. Rather, we should respect their views as being theirs and theirs alone. That being said, and in respect of both Gyekye and Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s approaches, reference to African political theory and philosophy is meant in the sense of individual philosophers, statesmen and activists (potentially but not necessarily) of African origin “reflecting on and giving analytical attention to” philosophical and foundational questions as individuals and presenting their individual views. To clarify, reference to African political theory and philosophy is discussed in terms of individual thinkers, potentially but not necessarily of African origin, giving analytical attention to the intellectual foundations of African culture and experience. By setting the boundaries in these terms it is possible to justify the inclusion of thinkers Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire, who, whilst not being born in Africa, discussed ideas that were relevant to African experience. In particular, when Fanon discussed the “Wretched of the Earth” (1965), it is African’s that he is referencing. That being said, it would be impossible to consider issues of colonialism, oppression and autonomy without including these views. The selection of texts and theorists chosen for study in this particular project is narrowed down in the following discussion, but for now it is important to understand that all theorists included for study in Chapters 3-5 of this thesis can be broadly understood as being African under this definition.

It is because the range of ideas and positions is so varied, that African political theory has been chosen for this study. However, it is necessary to be specific in explaining what it is that is being considered when this thesis is claiming to study “African political theory” and also what is not included. Because of this, this chapter now examines the question of why this makes it an ideal subject for study. It does this before then narrowing down the boundaries of the material to be analysed.

The vast array of political theory and philosophy emanating from Africa represents a microcosm of difference: different ideologies, philosophies, politics, traditions and histories. If, therefore, it can be concluded that a Kantian conception of autonomy (understood as a belief in an a priori right to be one’s own master) can be interpreted in any number of the theorists studied, then it is possible to conclude in favour of the principle as holding value across a number of different cultural backgrounds. This is not to suggest that autonomy will look the same in each of these examples, but rather that it is a concern at the centre of debate and discourse for theorists from a wide range of backgrounds. Unlike a study of Confucianism or Islam, this project has scope to consider a broader range of ideas associated with African diversity, and thus argue for wider applicability of the findings as
holding relevance across ideological, philosophical, political, traditional and historical contexts.

However, whilst the broad range of philosophies, cultures and political ideas makes for an interesting comparative study, they also cultivate a number of problems. For example, whilst the authors that can be defined as Confucian are widely accepted and can thus be viewed, at least for the purpose of study, collectively as part of the same tradition, what it means to be an African political theorist or philosopher is contested. As has previously been examined, what counts as philosophy in an African context is somewhat controversial. The selection of sources is of fundamental importance to the viability of this project. In order to provide a more exact rationale, the time period being considered briefly touches on work from the 1900s through to the present day, although the majority of sources range in date from the late 1950s through to present publications (the anti-colonial struggle and the post-independence era’s). The texts being considered are published in either English or (in rare cases) French. The importance of this period emanates from the historic influence of colonialism. Other than the states of Liberia and Ethiopia, which remained independent throughout the period, all of Africa suffered colonial rule: the pinnacle of which was the division of the continent amongst the colonial powers at the Berlin conference in 1885. For this reason, it is impossible to study concepts of autonomy and domination without taking into account the influence of such all-encompassing colonial policies, and it was on this basis that the time period was selected.

The period being studied includes discussions from the height of colonial influence, during the period of independence, and the post-colonial period; thus, it presents an interesting range of perspectives surrounding notions of autonomy, domination and self-mastery, with a central focus on the colonial movement and responses to it. Inclusion of pre-colonial texts was also considered for this project so as to enable analysis considering whether the routes of these ideas existed prior to Western influence. However, many of these texts are published in local languages or are verbal philosophies translated, and potentially altered, by Western missionaries. For these reasons, and with a hope of avoiding using translations that may, through the translation process, have been infused with Western ideas that may not have existed in the original texts, these sources will not be included for analysis in this project, but they would make interesting source material for future work in the area. Also considered for inclusion were texts from the diaspora, in particular the texts of authors that viewed themselves as members of the Harlem Renaissance project and Black Pride
movements in America. However, whilst these authors would make fascinating research material for future work it was decided that their focus, whilst looking at issues of oppression and mistreatment, were not directly focused on the colonial struggle and thus lay outside the boundaries of this particular research project due to the focus on colonialism when selecting the texts.

The choice to consider texts predominantly published in Western languages has a narrowing effect on the source material available for analysis. The majority of sources are divided into two; which is represented by the division of this thesis into two parts. This divide will be explained in Section 4. Texts analysed in the first part of the thesis (Part 1, including Chapters 3 and 4) are written by political figureheads, either activists or members of the political establishment, of an educated background. The contemporary texts included in Chapter 5 are written by professional philosophers working in academia, again from educated backgrounds. Therefore, the claim of this thesis is not that these views are representational of the whole of Africa, or even the people living in the countries in which these people live and work, but rather it asks whether a diverse range of individuals enter into debates regarding similar foundational principles or rights. It is questioned whether they argue, in one formation or another, that these principles may be owed to all of humanity; and as an extension to this, whether they recommend establishing political systems which enable individuals to realise these rights. That being said, the thesis is treating the influence of a Western education on included thinkers as distinct from discussions of inaccurate translations of traditional philosophies by Western anthropologists. It is suggested in Chapter 2 that cultures should not be viewed as closed off or static concepts, but rather fluid, ever changing, identities with multiple influences. Thus a Western education, may very well influence the identity of the included scholars but this is only one facet of their identities, whereas an incorrect translation would be an inaccurate portrayal of views and identity.

It is worth noting that the views of the theorists expressed in their monologues, speeches and articles have not always translated into realised political models and this thesis does recognise this concern which is also common in Western political thought. Similarly to approaches studying the theoretical ideas of Western scholars such as Marcus Aurelius and Benjamin Franklin their ideas and their political states will be treated separately, justification for which is given in more detail in Chapter 4. The question being raised is whether the language they use, and the ideas they espouse, indicate a belief in, or support
for, the a priori right and duty of individuals to be self-law giving, autonomous agents and whether the political discourse they engage in focuses around finding solutions relevant to these metaphysical points. In other words, it is not to defend them as political figureheads.

As already mentioned, other than the limits placed by language and timescale, the selection of texts is quite broad. This thesis is divided into two parts and the theorists then roughly divided into individual chapters: with similar thinkers grouped together accordingly. The chapters, as will be described in greater detail in Section 4, consist of: in Part 1, The Négritude movement and the African socialism movement; and in Part 2, Post-colonial discourse. The theorists covered in Part 1 (in the two chapters concentrating on Négritude and African socialism) are predominantly philosopher statesmen, activists and political figureheads. Whereas, the sources analysed in Part 2 (Chapter 5) are mainly the work of professional philosophers.

To ensure transparency it is important to be specific not only regarding which thinkers were included for analysis, but also regarding those which were specifically excluded. In the introduction to each of the chapters in Part 1 and Part 2 a more detailed introduction to the scholars is given, but the aim here is to detail the rationale behind the selection of schools of thought and thinkers. Négritude was expressly both a cultural and political movement that directly criticised and responded to the treatment of colonised peoples by colonial actors. It was a movement consisting of African scholars Léopold Sédar Senghor, Léon Damas, and Alioune Diop; as well as Carribean scholars Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon. It was felt that inclusion of both halves of the movement was important to understanding its foundations, as both were discussing topics of oppression, “giving analytical attention” to the problems resulting from colonialism that faced Africa. Chapter 4, with its focus on African socialism, posed a greater challenge when it came to selecting or excluding thinkers for study due to the volume of work in the area. Discussion of the choice to focus on socialist rather than capitalist values takes place in the chapter itself, but it is predominantly based on the more detailed philosophical account of original models promoted by these scholars. The scholars included are Julius K. Nyerere, a nationally and internationally dominant and influential post-colonial leader writing on issues of individual and national sovereignty; Kwame Nkrumah, whose influence in the pan-African movement, as well as his internal struggles with his changing views, make him a particularly interesting figure to discussions of foundational principles; and Samora Machel whose brand of socialism has been referred to as “the model for African Socialism” (O’Meara, 1991, p.82).
due to his influence as a key revolutionary figure in Southern African struggles. The selection of these thinkers did, however, lead to the exclusion of some other key scholars in the area, and it is necessary to discuss here why these selections were made. Amongst others, Milton Obote, Kenneth Kaunda and Thomas Sankara were each excluded from this chapter as it was felt that, whilst their writings and speeches are important to understanding the historical period, and revolutionary fervour, in question, the philosophies of the three included scholars are better defined as original models of thought than the workings of these other scholars. Additionally, it was felt that a number of the scholars would have played a similar role in the chapter than those already included. For example, as a revolutionary, analysis of Sankara’s views would have given very similar insights to analysis of Machel’s. This is not to suggest that Kaunda, Obote and Sankara will not be included in future work, but rather that at this stage they have been left aside.

Selection of thinkers for Chapter 5 is based on the prevalence of these scholars to contemporary discourse focussing on post-colonial debates. Kwame Gyekye, in particular, plays a fundamental role in understanding both the contemporary landscape and the narratives expressed by traditional philosophies. For reasons explained earlier, the main focus at this stage is on his personal views, but it is important to note for future work the utility of his other areas of expertise. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism played a fundamental role in guiding the questioning of this project and thus his views are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, particularly in relation to their underpinning foundations. The views of these thinkers, as well as Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji, Dismas Masolo, Immanuel Chukwudi Eze, Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o and Noah Dzobo are not being presented as an exhaustive list of contemporary African scholars. Rather, they are presented as being thinkers fundamental to debates surrounding autonomy in the post-colonial period: consideration of their views is thus vital to questioning the potentially universal existence of the foundational principles of self-law giving and willkür. Having discussed the selection of source material for study, the chapter now turns to discussions of the works contribution to the literature.

.3- Core Contributions:

As mentioned in Section .2, the core contribution this work makes to the comparative political theory literature emanates from the choice of source material, as well as the very specific Kantian claim that willkür and internal self-law giving represent potential foundational principles around which discourse exists both between cultures, as large social groups, and between the divergent range of groups that exist within a culture. There
have been numerous academics that have made claims regarding universal principles, not least in the language of human rights and justice: Jack Donnelly, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to name just three. Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is to suggest that the Kantian argument that our right to be masters of our own lives (expressed as autonomy) exists a priori and is thus shared by humanity in general and not affected by culture: although the response to these issues may be culturally specific. These principles are an overarching framework that is being suggested are both owed to human kind, and can be helpful in facilitating dialogue and understanding between cultures. The role of culture and the debates that exist around cultural relativism and universalism are dealt with in detail in Chapter 2. At this stage it is mentioned so as to highlight that this thesis is making the claim that foundational principles exist across cultures, and specifically in the cultures of the African political theorists studied in this project. This is achieved by utilising a comparative approach and analysing a selection of African political theory, a selection that has been chosen and defined by this author and is not specific to one tradition. Choosing to study African theory, and discussing the work in the climate of the controversies surrounding what the words African, or even political theory or philosophy, mean outside of Western academic circles, provides the original contribution of this work. Additionally, in carrying out this work, potential exists to demonstrate through detailed analysis not only that Kantian-based universal principles exist, but also that there is a drive to implement a political system in which they can be realised in common with others. As a result, this thesis claims that open and honest cross-cultural dialogue could be grounded on these foundations. It is in these potential outcomes, as well as the original choice of source material, that this thesis offers its contribution to the literature of comparative political theory.

4- Chapters:

The chapters within the main body of this thesis are divided into groups based on the theoretical approach adapted to the drive for self-determination in Africa. Each of the theorists being considered in this project writes in their work about the importance of African theorists establishing, or re-establishing, what it means to exist for an African individual. The overall question of this thesis, as previously examined, is to ask whether these ideas are similar to those ideas proposed by Kantian theorists. As referenced in Section 2, collating the selection of philosophy for study and organising it into schools of thought has been a major part of this project due to the lack of established groups of research in this area.
As the project has developed, it has become clear that African approaches to self-determination can be divided along a number of different lines. The first distinction that is often referred to is the difference between modern and traditional philosophical ideas. Traditional African thought is often associated with regional groups such as the Akan, Ewe or Essan people, and consists mainly of proverbs, myths and folk tales. Modern African philosophy, in contrast, is often associated with individuals and is the “philosophy that is being produced by contemporary African philosophers, but which reflects, or has a basis in African experience, thought categories, and cultural values” (Gyekye, 1987, p.32). The second distinction, and the one used to divide the theorists considered in this project into groups, is between the work of statesmen and activists (discussed in part 1 of this thesis) and professional philosophers (discussed in Part 2).

Having introduced the overall structure of this project and the justifications for this, the introduction concludes with a brief overview of the contents of each chapter and what this offers to the overall goals of this research.

The chapters are sequenced as follows:

**Introduction**

**Theoretical chapters:**

- Kantian Framework
- Literature review- The Elephant in the Room: Culture

**Part 1- Statesmen and activists:**

- Négritude
- The African socialism movement

**Part 2- Contemporary discourse:**

- Post-colonial philosophers

**Concluding Remarks**

The role of Chapter 1 is to enhance and develop the overview of the Kantian belief in internal and external self-law giving that has been briefly referenced within the confines of this Introduction. In Chapter 1 elements of Kantian ethics and politics are broken down to demonstrate not only how each link together, but also how Kantian ethical and political thought can be viewed as separate theories. This is followed by a discussion of debates that
exist within the secondary literature. Chapter 1 concludes by offering further detail on the choice to divide the analytical framework into 3 themes, as described in Section 1 of this Introduction: self-mastery, equality of individuals, and freedom of choice versus domination.

Chapter 2 is a literature review, the role of which is to discuss, question, and develop the explanatory role and (sometimes) glorified status often given to culture in discussions of Africa. In any discussion of universalism it is impossible to ignore the counter position in which cultural difference is viewed as fundamental. There is a strong Western tradition of viewing practices emanating from non-Western backgrounds as being cultural, but when turning the lens back on Western traditions viewing culture as playing a lesser role. Culture, in this sense, is very much the domain of The Other. At the same time, the work of many of the African authors studied in this project makes strong reference to the fundamental importance of culture to the achievement of self-mastery. Whilst notions of self-law giving are examined in this thesis, it is particularly interesting to see how often these more universal ideas come wrapped in culturally specific terms. Not only are there examples of culturally specific adaptations of universal ideas, observations can also be made in the work of certain theorists such as Leopold Sédar Senghor, of a belief in the necessity of culture in being able to realise one’s self-law giving abilities: autonomy through culture. Therefore, it is a necessary element of this project to consider where the boundaries of culture lie. This enables the thesis to better answer the question of whether universal foundational principles exist and whether or not this can help provide the space for open, equal, and just cross-cultural dialogue.

Chapters 3 to 5 take three different segments of African political theory or philosophy as their focus and then question whether it is possible to locate in the theorist’s work an a priori belief in the value of internal self-law giving and external willkür. The chapters then question whether the theorists use their writing to promote the uptake of structures, both political and social, that would provide the citizenry with a system which publicly embodies their rights to be self-law giving. Finally, Chapters 3 and 4 also question whether inconsistencies exist between the philosophical ideas presented by the theorists and the political systems they implement. The expectation is not to find language or concepts that are identical to a Kantian model, but rather, to locate patterns of similarity indicating a potential value to the notion of being a law unto oneself as not simply being a construct of Western, Kantian philosophy. To clarify, the aim is to locate potentially universal
foundational principles, respect for which could provide a space for just, equal and fair cross-cultural discourse. As previously mentioned, these three chapters are grouped into two parts of the thesis. Part 1 contains Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Part 2 contains Chapter 5.

The final chapter (Concluding Remarks) collates the outcomes of the theoretical analysis in the previous three chapters, investigating any patterns that have been found. Finally, it concludes that evidence exists to imply cross-cultural support for the principles of internal self-law giving and willk"ur as universally shared foundations on which open, honest and just cross-cultural dialogue could be founded.
**Chapter 1- Kantian Framework:**

“The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori” (Habermas, 1968, p.314).

The aim of this chapter is to explain the Kantian framework that is central to the work of this thesis whilst also clarifying the choice to select a Kantian model for the purposes of this research. At this stage the Kantian framework is analysed in depth. It is necessary to work through each stage logically so that a greater understanding can be achieved as to where the assumptions for this project originate. This is important as it aids the process of improving translucency and thus reducing bias. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to justify the choice to use a Kantian model; to outline the Kantian framework being put forward; and to better articulate the claims being made, to consider their routes, and to operationalise them in a way that allows for a detailed textual analysis of the selection of African political theory chosen for study. The aim being to further research into the question of whether these ideas exist in work that is culturally diverse outside of Western political thought; whether the themes detailed in this chapter exist in the selection of African political theory studied in the rest of this thesis. This chapter also plays a fundamental role in responding to the critique sometimes directed at work supporting the existence of shared foundational principles: the implication that such work is either ethnocentric or imperialist.

A further role of this chapter is to clearly present the concepts of willkür and internal self-law giving, and to define the methods used for operationalising them: establishing a framework with which to carry out the analysis detailed in Chapters 3-5. By logically examining each stage of the theoretical position being adapted for the study, the aim is to be as transparent as possible regarding how the initial concepts were established and how they were then operationalised. To clarify, the aim is to establish why the concepts of willkür and self-law giving are being presented as existing a priori and to follow this with a detailed explanation of how the existence of these concepts will be examined in African political theory. The purpose of including this chapter is thus to offer as translucent a framework as is possible and, whilst recognising that researcher bias will always exist in comparative political theory, to work to reduce it, with the aim of overcoming the concern that work which claims the existence of universal principles is imperialist. Having clarified these aims, the chapter turns now to a discussion of how Kantian ideas will be adapted for
the purpose of this project: to explore the degree to which these foundational principles can be located in certain African discourses at least to the extent that they are at the centre of the discourse and debate.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Initially there is a discussion of the broader Kantian framework which this work adopts; this is followed by a breakdown of the more specific adaptations of the ideas that are considered in carrying out the study of certain African political theories. Following a brief explanation of why the Western tradition of Kantian political theory was selected for this study, the initial task of this chapter is to provide an overview of what the terms willkühr and self-law giving are generally taken to mean and why they are being treated as separate. Included in this is a more detailed explanation of the two main elements of this project: asking whether there is a belief in an a priori right and duty of the individual to be self-law giving, and how these rights and duties translate to living in community with others whilst still maintaining a sense of self-mastery when existing within a political condition. Having established the two concepts, greater detail is offered as to the connection between the two and the difference between internal and external freedoms. This includes the role of the categorical imperative and public right and why it is that public right is not simply a derivation or extension of the categorical imperative: providing evidence for which is a further contribution of this thesis. This is followed by a discussion that seeks to answer the question of why Kant treats the concepts of internal self-law giving and willkühr as existing a priori. The third section considers the controversial debate surrounding the relationship between morality and politics within the Kantian model. With reference to Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein’s work on this topic, this thesis argues that there is a link between morality and politics according to Kant, but that it exists only in one direction; his morality dictates his republican form of government, but his republican form of government does not require his version of morality to justify it. In the final section of this chapter the framework is applied to the analytical element of this thesis; an explanation is given as to which concepts, ideas and terms are interpreted as indicating the existence of the foundational principles (willkühr and self-law giving) when carrying out the analysis. This section adds greater detail to the discussion of the concepts and themes touched on briefly in Section .1. There is also discussion of the authors that refer to these ideas as representing broader categories; and the relationship of each theme to the broader Kantian framework. It is the aim of this project to look not only for a suggestion that these ideas are a priori rights of individuals that should be adhered to, but also to look for examples in the African literature
that support a political structure in which the a priori right to be self-law giving individuals can be realised; suggesting both that the principles exists universally and that they could form the basis for peaceful coexistence and interactions. The question is raised whether, similarly to Kant’s work, these ideals are recognised by the African theorists as political goals to be strived for. This does not necessarily rely on them being successful in achieving these goals. To summarise, it is the normative reference to them, as much as the actual realisation of them, that the thesis considers as indicating support for these concepts as being a priori.

Before examining the terms self-law giving and willkür in greater depth it is necessary to discuss both the selection of a Kantian approach as a suitable framework for analysing texts from other cultures, and as representing a potentially universal metaphysics around which discourse can be established. Whilst this thesis accepts that Kantian political theory, as a whole doctrine, is only one theory amongst many (in both the liberal tradition and Western political thought more generally) the argument is being made that the underlying philosophical foundations of the theory may not be specific to Kantian approaches but may in fact underpin arguments from across ideological, ontological and cultural perspectives and, in fact, Kantian thought is just one example amongst many that debates the themes representative of internal and external self-law giving. This is not to suggest that a complete Kantian doctrine is universally relevant, but rather that the underlying foundations represent a universal understanding of what humanity in general shares. It is the aim of this research to demonstrate this argument in relation to the selection of African political theory. It is worth noting at this stage that the claim of this thesis is not that all theorists rely on a foundational approach. Rather, the burden of the argument is on demonstrating sufficient grounds to show that these foundations are assumed in the practice of African political theorists. The purpose of testing this theory results from the practical consequences such a discovery would have on contemporary political concerns such as human rights which are founded on a notion of universality. However, it can be questioned whether imposing such doctrines on vastly different cultures respects the autonomy of all individuals to maintain control over their purpose and choices in both the public and private spheres. Thus, if it is possible to show that the desire to maintain that level of purposiveness is universally held then there would be consequences for the role of individuals in understanding and developing international principles. To clarify, whilst the basic assumption is that these principles exist a priori, there is heuristic value in carrying out empirical research to question this assumption. It may reveal that the assumption of
the relevance of these principles is in fact correct, but without an evidence base it is difficult to recommend reform to international systems of principle formation. To clarify further, a priori does not mean fact in the Kantian case. Rather, it means it in the transcendental case (which is discussed in greater detail in Section 1.2), which is neither provable nor unprovable. Yet, what it is, a priori, is deeply embedded in the language and actions we insist upon in our everyday life. In this way, it cannot be proved as a matter of fact, but rather as a matter of logic. As Kant says, to suggest that someone should do something, we are also suggesting that they can do something (Kant, 2009); or rather that they have the capacity to do it. The capacity to do something is understood both as an a priori internal condition that would be required for A to do B, but also an external condition for A to carry out B. We cannot prove the first (autonomy / free will), it’s just assumed in our practice, but we can measure the second (external freedom) by demonstrating the capacity of the individual to carry out their act. It is this element that the thesis is exploring.

Whether the African scholars recommend a model of society that relies on an assumption of the value of self-law giving and willkǔr, but considering this relies, as a matter of logic on the assumption that the concepts themselves do indeed exist a priori. By demonstrating through a detailed textual analysis of African political theory that these principles have relevance across cultural boundaries it is possible to make a more convincing argument that to be just, cross cultural dialogue should be premised on respect for foundational principles.

The choice to utilise a Kantian approach as the lens through which to carry out this analysis is based on two factors: firstly, the unique strength of such an approach to considering both internal values and external conditions for realising these values: the distinction between self-law giving and willkǔr that will become apparent in the following section. In this sense the approach lends itself to the two-sided analysis being carried out by this project, asking firstly whether these ideas are fundamental underpinnings relating to individual concerns; and secondly whether African political theorists recognise the importance of creating public conditions for the protection of these principles. Secondly, the focus in Kant’s work on establishing a metaphysics that exists separate to experience: “Do we not think it a matter of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate to anthropology” (Kant, 2009, p. 57). The Kantian focus on the existence of a foundational philosophy prior to experience, and thus prior to culture, implies, as will become apparent in Section 1.3, that it is possible to consider the foundations of the theory as separate to
the influence of culture and experience. As previously suggested, this allows the thesis to treat the principles of willkür and self-law giving as separate from a full Kantian doctrine. Having grounded the choice to draw on a Kantian approach throughout this study this chapter now alters focus to establish the concepts of self-law giving and willkür.

1.1 - Self-Law Giving and Willkür:

i. Self-Law Giving

The condition referred to as self-law giving or being a law unto oneself is grounded most specifically in Kant’s moral philosophy found in “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten” (Kant, 1785) (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). As becomes clear throughout this discussion, what it means to be moral or right and what it means to be free are one and the same thing for Kant. This is represented in his formulation of both concepts. Morality and freedom are both derived from reason: “the idea of moral perfection (is that) which reason traces a priori and conjoins inseparably with the concept of free will” (Kant, 2009, p. 76). This also requires us to overcome our sensual desires (for food, pleasure etc), as adherence to these is, according to Kant, a form of slavery indicating a state in which we are no better than animals: “In actual fact we find that the more a cultivated reason concerns itself with the aim of engaging life and happiness, the farther does man get away from true contentment” (Kant, 2009, p.63). True autonomy is realised only by overcoming these desires and living a life directed by individual reason. Kant explicitly refers to the importance of overcoming our sensual drives in his essay “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784) (An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment?). He claimed in his introduction to this essay that “enlightenment is the human being’s emancipation from its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one’s intellect without direction of another” (Kant, 2006, p.17). Being enlightened, and by definition being free, therefore, requires us to realise our individual reason and to live our lives guided by our own purposiveness. Kant argued that each individual has this ability a priori, however he did not believe that all individuals had yet realised it. To further establish this point, reason is a specifically human trait of which, according to Kant, all agents have the potential to live by. Doing so, enables individuals to overcome their animalistic desires and to achieve true autonomy as they are unhindered by their desires and guided by reason alone. This was the purpose of his essay: to suggest that we are not yet all enlightened (in the sense of being self-legislators), but that this was an end point for which to strive. He argued that by striving for it (enlightenment) we could eventually realise an autonomous
state in which we would possess the duty and right to live by the laws we willed for ourselves (Kant, 2006). It is this belief in humanity as having the potential to be self-law giving, grounded in the human property of reason, which is the first overarching concept that this thesis posits as potentially existing a priori. As was discussed in the Introduction, the property of reason is assumed to be possessed by all humans and is not limited by the same factors given by Kant. Therefore, as discussed in Section .1 this is not an exegetical account of Kant’s approach, but rather an adaptation. The justification for Kant’s reliance on the concept of reason is discussed in Section 1.2 in relation to his usage of transcendental arguments.

The relationship between autonomy and morality is also important in discussions of external self-law giving (willkürlich) and this is examined in greater detail in the following subsection. The connection between morality and freedom refers in no small part to the categorical imperative, a thought experiment that allows for the creation and testing of maxims that secure our freedom and could be willed into universal law. Kant presents three related formulations of the categorical imperative, the third of which is considered in this project. The first requirement of the categorical imperative (“The Formula of Universal law”) is that we act only on maxims that it would be logically consistent for all others to act on simultaneously, or more specifically, that we can will to be universal law (Kant, 2009). The second (“The Formula of the End in Itself”) is that rational beings should be respected as having “absolute value as ends in themselves” (Becker, 1993, p.76). That “every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end” (Kant, 2009, p. 95). The third formulation, and the one being utilised in this thesis, is often referred to as “The Formula of Autonomy” and is founded on the value of self-legislation: “According to this principle one is only subject to the moral law that one has legislated for oneself” (Becker, 1993, p.77). This is “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law” (Kant, 2009, p.98). The role of the categorical imperative is limited to the personal sphere and deals not only with the actions themselves, but also with the justifications for the actions in question. To be more precise, it deals with whether an action is morally right or wrong, which, as has already been suggested, is dependent on whether the action respects an individual as being self-legislating and an end in themselves, whilst also being universalisable to the whole of humanity.
According to Kant, unlike many of his contemporaries, the establishment of an action as being either right or wrong is not based on its consequences, but rather on whether the maxim respects the individual “as an end in himself” (Kant, 2009, p.95). By “an end in himself” Kant requires that all individuals are treated by both themselves and others not merely as a means to achieving a further end but rather as an absolute end. It is immoral to use an individual in a way that fails to respect them as having ends of their own derived by their own reason, since doing so curtails their freedom as self-legislators. To clarify, Kant does not suggest that we cannot, in all circumstances, use people as a means to an end but simply that we must recognise that they, too, have ends towards which they are directing their own lives and we should not prevent their purposiveness in achieving those ends by utilising them for our own means: we must respect in all our actions that “rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end” (Kant, 2009, p.9). For example, if two individuals embark on a course of action in which both are acting based on their own choices, but simultaneously using the other as a means to realise their end, if this action respects the choices of both individuals it is not necessarily wrong; if, for example, their ends are aligned. This is because, as Arthur Ripstein explains, “you remain independent if nobody else gets to tell you what purposes to pursue with your means” (Ripstein, 2009, p.34) and in this example you are choosing your own purposes, it is merely that they coincide with the purposes of another, equally autonomous, individual. In establishing this point it is possible to interpret Kant as being less strict with the boundaries of “right” treatment than is often claimed by his critics.

Kant’s work allows for some restrictions of freedom but also demands a deontological sub-floor that cannot be violated. It is the notion of a sub-floor that is central to the work of this project. When referencing a deontological sub-floor the following is implied: we cannot treat individuals in a way that fails to recognise that they, like us, have individual ends which they must be able to choose to direct their life towards: our actions must respect that they too have purposiveness, as they too are rational beings. Kant provides the following argument to justify this claim:

“If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and- so far as the human will is concerned- a categorical imperative, it must be such that from the idea of something which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself it forms an objective principle of the will and consequently can serve as a practical law. The ground of this principle is:
Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence: it is therefore so far a subjective principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is valid for me, hence it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will” (Kant, 2009, p.96).

It is the notion of an underlying deontological sub-floor, founded on our rational nature, which prevents us from violating certain individual freedoms. It is also this idea that leads to the conclusion that, from a Kantian perspective, there are certain foundational principles, shared by all of humanity, that place restrictions on how we can treat autonomous agents: both ourselves and others. On an individual level, it would be immoral to seek sensual pleasures simply to maximise one’s own happiness, for example. Doing this uses the self as a means to derive pleasure and is thus using the self as a means rather than an end. It is immoral because the individual is driven by sensual whims rather than reason.

According to Kant the justifications behind an action are as important as the action itself. When proposing a maxim as being either right or wrong, moral or immoral, this does not imply that the outcomes are either good or bad, rather the claim is being made that the maxim which led to the action was moral (right) and done for the correct (right) reasons. As Don Becker explains:

“Kant argues that acts do not have moral worth merely because they accord with duty, but only if they are done from (the motive of) duty. For example, if a shopkeeper gives a young child the correct change because they know that it is good for business, or even if someone helps another in need because they like to be helpful, although the acts accord with duty, they have no true moral worth” (Becker, 1993, p.78).

Hence, an action may have positive outcomes; it may even have the same outcomes as it would have had if it were carried out for the correct reasons. However, unless a maxim is carried out in accordance with duty, it is immoral:

“An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon; it depends therefore, not on the realization of the object of the
action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been performed” (Kant, 2009, pp. 67-68).

Therefore, if a person is abiding by moral laws that they did not will for themselves then they are being moved to act by an external influence and “obedience to the moral law would then be conditional on rational beings responding in certain ways to external influences” (Becker, 1993, p.78). In this case they would be abiding by moral laws not out of duty but out of some separate reason, utility maximisation maybe, and this, for Kant, means that neither the action is moral nor the individual free. This debate is fundamental to understanding the relationship between morality and politics, and is referred to in greater detail in Section 1.3. True moral freedom on the individual level, for Kant, comes from abiding by laws one sets for oneself in accordance with the restrictions set by the categorical imperative. The question is thus raised as to how this can translate into living in a community with others. How can individuals be self-legislators whilst also not infringing on the freedom of others to achieve the same? This external formulation of the concept constitutes the second category. Why this theme has been selected, as well as the method for operationalising it for the purpose of this study, is dealt with in Section 1.3. However, at this stage it is worth noting that there is a divide between ethics and law. The chapter turns now to a more detailed account of Kant’s approach to guaranteeing moral freedom in the public realm: the condition of public right. The state’s role in guaranteeing moral freedom is important to this thesis as a whole as it defines the second stage of questions being asked by the project: are there examples in the African political theory literature of individuals advocating for the implementation of political structures that provide the space for individuals to be self-law giving whilst also existing within a community? As previously mentioned, one of the justifications for relying on a Kantian lens for carrying out the analysis of this thesis was, in fact, the divide in his theory between internal and external conditions.

ii. Willkür and the Condition of “Right”

The following discussion is concerned with the external strand of self-law giving; how we are able to be self-legislators whilst living in common within a political society. The majority of Kant’s thoughts on this matter can be found in a handful of his works. Most prominently, “Die Metaphysik der Sitten” (1797) (The Metaphysics of Morals) but also the essays “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis”
(1793) (On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold in Practice) and “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (1784), as well as “Zum ewigen Frieden” (1795) (Towards Perpetual Peace). This discussion deals with the political circumstances established by Kant which provides the conditions for individuals to maintain their individual freedom whilst living in common with others: referred to as the condition of public right. His work was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau who believed that humanity has a right to live freely under a positive conception of freedom. This positive conception dictated a necessity for public structures to be put in place to guarantee individual autonomy within a community.

To open this discussion it is worth highlighting a single point in relation to Rousseau’s interpretation of freedom. It relates to the previous discussion of right and wrong and good and bad. According to Charles Taylor’s reading of Rousseau, “virtue and vice themselves are given a new interpretation in terms of freedom. For the key to vice is other-dependence, a failure to be determined by one’s own internal purpose; and virtue is nothing more than the recovery of this self-determination” (Taylor, 1985, p.319). As a brief aside, it is important to recognise that the terms “virtue and vice” are understood in a myriad of ways in political philosophy. Some of these understandings are grounded on concepts of good and bad, the community or human welfare to name a few. However, the focus of this section is on understanding their meaning according to a Kantian model and the consequences this has for this thesis; to then be able to delineate the differences from those of other approaches, such as those focusing on good and bad and human welfare.

Returning to the analysis of the above quote from Taylor, this once again highlights the distinction made by these theorists between right and wrong and good or bad that was first mentioned in Section 1.1i. The morally correct condition in which to find oneself is the one in which you are living by the laws you will for yourself, in common with others. At the same time it is wrong to live in a condition in which your freedom, understood as an ability to define the laws by which you live, is hindered by others. To clarify, the concepts of virtue and vice, as understood by their predecessors as good and bad or increasing or decreasing welfare and happiness have been completely redefined by firstly Rousseau and secondly Kant. Under this re-definition the rightful condition is dictated by an individual’s autonomy in directing his or her own life. Kant claimed that:

“If the doctrine of morals was merely the doctrine of happiness it would be absurd to seek a priori principles for it... Only experience can teach what
brings us joy...But it is different with the teachings of morality. They command for everyone without taking account of inclinations, merely because and insofar as he is free and has practical reason...reason commands how men are to act even though no example of this could be found, and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain, which only experience could teach us. For although reason allows us to seek our advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us, on the testimony of experience, that it will probably be more to our advantage on the whole to obey its commands than to transgress them, especially if obedience is accompanied with prudence, still the authority of its precepts as commands is not based on these considerations” (Kant, 1996, pp.9-10).

This point is clarified in Section 1.3, in which there is a discussion of the importance Kant places on the state not imposing a view of the good life on individuals. However, at this stage, the purpose is simply to highlight the distinction being made between right and good and to act as an introduction to what exactly a rightful condition is. As will become clear throughout this section, for a Kantian, entering a rightful condition is not simply a choice, it is a requirement of duty that will enable us to realise our freedom in a political condition; it is in fact the only condition under which this can be realised when individuals exist in communities. In the introduction to “The Metaphysics of Morals” Kant clarifies this point, explaining why it is he believes a metaphysics is necessary:

“If, therefore, a system of a priori cognition from concepts alone is called metaphysics, a practical philosophy, which has not nature but freedom of choice for its object, will presuppose and require a metaphysics of morals, that is, it is itself a duty to have such a metaphysics, and every human being also has it within himself, though in general only in an obscure way; for without a priori principles how could he believe that he has a giving of universal law within himself?” (Kant, 1996, p.10)

As will become clear, a metaphysics is in this sense a public condition in which individuals are able to realise their private freedom as self-law givers. A right, as already discussed, that Kant argues, must exist a priori because, if it were to not then how would individuals discover their individual abilities to will universal law. The metaphysics is thus, both a duty of society, but also an internal a priori principle that directs rational individuals towards a
condition of moral right. His transcendental assumption that every human being “also (have) it within himself” is a subject of discussion in the following section where transcendental arguments are discussed in greater detail. However, it relies on the premise that for a concept to exist (in this case an internal understanding of what it is to be self-law giving), the conditions of that concept must also exist. The role of this section is to establish how Kant achieves this, which is important to this thesis as it grounds and justifies the intention to locate these ideas in African texts.

The rightful condition according to Kant “is therefore the sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (Kant, 1996, p.24). Or, “a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them...so they may enjoy what is laid down as right” (Kant, 1996, p.89). To clarify, a rightful condition is one that accepts that people have to live in common with one another and creates the condition for individual freedom not to be hindered, whilst also taking the necessity of community into account. What it is to have freedom when living in community with others then, is “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (Kant, 1996, p.30). In the next few paragraphs the importance of choice to the rightful condition is dealt with in greater detail, as is the political structure Kant recommends to guarantee said freedom. However, firstly, it is important to clarify why Kant believed the construction of a political condition is important at all. As David Stern asks, “how is political obligation reconcilable with the autonomy of the individual?” (Stern, 1991, p.127); surely the existence of a state will curtail freedom. As was mentioned in the section dealing with self-law giving (Sub-Section 1.1i), Kant argues that “there is only one innate right” (Kant, cited in Ripstein, 2009, p.29) and that is the right to freedom: understood as each autonomous, reasoned agents right to self-mastery (to exist directed by their own purpose and not via the purposes of others). Therefore, the political condition “is (only) legitimate and enforceable because freedom requires it” (Ripstein, 2009, p.29). As previously mentioned, this is the only condition, according to Kant, under which the rights of individuals to express their own choice can be guaranteed in common with all others.

The innate right to freedom, established by Kant in the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” entails within it a duty to enter into a political condition in which this right can be guaranteed. Kant believed that guaranteeing the right of all individuals to freedom is the
only justification for the existence of a state. As already suggested, a state (similarly to a maxim on the individual level), according to Kant, cannot be justified as improving the welfare of the citizenry, nor as making them happier; the only true justification of a state is as a vehicle for guaranteeing the freedom of each equally up to the point in which it infringes on the freedom of others: “therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people can be legislative” (Kant, 1996, p. 91). The state is required to secure the ability of individuals to guide their individual lives in common with others, and to ensure the conditions in which reasoned individuals can all coexist. For “every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (Kant, 1991, p. 133). Therefore the role of the state is to ensure that these conditions occur and that the space exists for individuals to live under these laws unhindered by others who may not be fully reasonable. Freedom from the interference of others in this sense is often referred to by Kantians as external freedom. “A person’s external freedom is secure, then, in so far as others’ actions that would obstruct her own are themselves obstructed. The security of a person’s external freedom thus requires that the external freedom of others (to obstruct her external freedom) be constrained” (Pogge, 2012, p. 77). This condition in which the state protects the freedom of its citizenry is referred to by Kant as the universal principle of right, an ideal system which he believes is the only condition in which humanity’s freedom can be guaranteed. He does not suggest that all states abide by these norms, but rather that is it “the state in idea, as it ought to be in accordance with pure principles of right. This idea serves as a norm for every actual union into a commonwealth” (Kant, 1996, p. 90).

The role and composition of the state is now considered in greater detail. The purpose of including this discussion in this chapter is to provide the grounding for understanding the role of public right in securing individual willkür and the conditions to be looked for in the political practice of the African theorists analysed in Chapters 3-5: in particular the arguments on which they justify certain political conditions. As has previously been mentioned, Kant was of the opinion that not all individuals achieve reason, and similarly not all states are ideal. However, it is the ideal role of the state to step in to guarantee the freedom of those individuals that have achieved reason by hindering those who hinder them. An action that would not, in fact, reduce freedom, but rather increase it as the individual hindering the freedom of another and acting irrationally was by definition not free, as rationality precludes freedom. Ripstein refers to Kant’s “Principle of Publicity”:
“Coercion is objectionable where it is a hindrance to a person’s right to freedom, but legitimate when it takes the form of hindering a hindrance to freedom...force that restores freedom is just the restoration of the original right” (Ripstein, 2009, p.44). This is because “resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is consistent with it” (Kant, 1996, p.25).

The rightful condition is, according to Kant, an ideal for which to strive. He recognised, similarly, that not all individuals are rational; that all states do not realise the rightful condition. He did not however believe that this is reason to believe the rightful condition is wrong, but rather, to view it as an ideal humanity should strive towards. To summarise, for Kant, “right” is “the whole of the conditions under which the external freedom of any person can coexist with that of all others according to universal law of freedom” (Pogge, 2012, p.78); it is equality in the sense of having one’s freedom guaranteed. As has been previously mentioned, it is the intention of this project to question whether it is possible to locate these ideas in African texts and whether theorists actively advocate a political condition in which individual autonomy (understood as self-mastery) is a central focus. This takes place in Chapters 3-5 of this thesis. Having established the political condition under which freedom would be guaranteed this sub-section now turns to the definition of external freedom itself and the role of choice within this.

The concept of willkür is central to the aims of this thesis; it refers to the external notion of self-law giving within the confines of a rightful condition. It includes not only what an individual’s rights are when living in community with others, but also a person’s rational duties to establish and maintain a condition of right. Kant argues that this is necessary because “individual human beings, peoples, and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this”. He thus suggests the following solution:

So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right, the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in which each follows its own judgement, unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting), subject itself to a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into a condition in which what is to be recognised as belonging to it is determined by law...that is, it ought above all else to enter a civil condition” (Kant, 1996, p.90).
The internal notion of self-law giving and the conditions under which freedom can be delivered have been explained above. There now follows a more in-depth discussion of what that external freedom actually entails.

Willkür is translated by the majority of contemporary Kantians as having choice in the pursuit of one’s own ends. Don Becker, Mary Gregor, Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein, along with many other scholars, have concentrated on this definition in their discussion of what external freedom meant for Kant. The definitions provided by these scholars are referred to at this stage and will be relied upon for the work of this thesis. In his 2012 article, Pogge takes Gregor’s definition and adds further clarification. He states that, “first ‘choice’ must be understood not in the sense of a decision (as in she came to regret her choice) but in the sense of the domain of control as in this is her choice; for her to decide, not locally, as what is up to her on some occasion, but globally, as what is up to her over a lifetime” (Pogge, 2012, pp.77-78). This definition of choice makes reference to the ability of individuals to rationally set and pursue their own purposes and ends without this being prevented either by themselves or others. Ripstein makes a similar claim, suggesting that “the ability to choose in this sense doesn’t depend on the ability to stand outside the causal world, or even to abstract from your own purpose in making choices. Instead, it rests on the familiar observation that if you choose to do something, you must set about doing it” (Ripstein, 2009, p.40). This highlights the fact that, for Kantians, when they make reference to the concept of choice, they are not simply referring to choice in a casual sense. Choice is not whether you drink skimmed or full-fat milk in your tea, but rather the direction you intend to take for your life according to your own reason. A rightful condition, as already described in this section, is one in which this freedom is guaranteed for each individual, in common with all others; a condition under which, “the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (Kant, 1996, p.24). To clarify this point further reference is made to Becker’s definition of Kant’s views: “people necessarily view themselves as having a certain role to fulfil in the world, and that they can only perform this role successfully if their freedom to formulate and pursue their own ends is secured in the state” (Becker, 1993, p.83). The state, therefore, is the vehicle for guaranteeing an individual’s choice in the direction their lives take and the ends they choose to pursue.

If the condition described above is one in which individuals are seen as being treated justly then it is worth considering the reverse situation in which freedom is unjustly curtailed, in
order to better understand what is counted as limiting the choice of others. According to Ripstein, the opposite of having one’s willkür guaranteed is to be the subject of domination: “Wrongdoing takes the form of domination. It is not that somebody does something that causes something bad to happen to you; it is that somebody does something to you” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). Not only does this help to explain what is being referred to when defining willkür as choice, it also refers back to the discussion in Section 1.1i regarding the definition of actions as good or right, bad or wrong. For example, Ripstein refers to the example of someone sleeping and another person touching them. The person who is asleep may never find out that this happened to them and there may be no harm caused. A consequentialist would thus struggle to see this as problematic. However, for Kant, it is not wrong because something bad has been done to someone’s person, but it is wrong because something has been done at all. It is the fact that the sleeping person has been used purely to advance the purposes of the other, without the necessary respect being paid to them as an individual with purposes of their own. As Ripstein explains, “I draw you into my purposes and wrong you, even if, as it turns out, you never learn of my action” (Ripstein, 2009, p.22). To clarify, according to recent scholars, when discussing the appropriateness of maxims Kant was not concerned with empirical factors such as the levels of happiness of individuals but with the respect for their freedom only. Ripstein clearly sets out this definition as being based in the realisation of one’s freedom. He suggests that “an action is wrong if it hinders an action or ‘condition’ that is itself rightful, that is, one that can coexist with everyone’s freedom” (Ripstein, 2009, p.30). In summary, considering the factors that are relevant in deciding whether an action is morally right or wrong, it is not whether a factor leads to a good or bad life, or increases or decreases the happiness or well-being of the individual or the community, but only that the individual’s right to freedom, the only “innate right” (Kant, 1996), has not been infringed and nor has the freedom of others. Finally, that an individual’s purposiveness is maintained. Willkür is thus the condition of being able to realise rationally made choices for ones-self.

External freedom, then, is the opportunity to direct one’s actions towards one’s own ends in common with all others having the same opportunity. The rightful condition is one in which this is guaranteed by a state. The only justification for said state is to guarantee all reasoned individuals an innate, a priori right to freedom, and to enable them to fulfil their duty to realise this freedom.
1.2- The A Priori Right to Freedom and the Duty to Obtain it:

The aim of this section is to briefly reiterate some of the points that have already been mentioned regarding peoples’ a priori right to be self-law giving individuals and the duty to obtain that. Kant argued throughout his philosophical writings, in part as a response to David Hume, that for principles to have value as universal laws they cannot be based solely on empirics, but rather must be found external to experience. In fact, he suggested that it was a matter of the “utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical” (Kant, 2009, p.57). He made this point most explicitly in the introduction to the “The Metaphysics of Morals” where, by way of establishing the possibility of a priori principles he draws comparisons with the natural sciences. To achieve this, he states that “one must have a priori principles and that it is possible, indeed necessary, to prefix a system of these principles, called a metaphysical science of nature...Such principles must be derived from a priori grounds if they are to hold as universal in the strict sense” (Kant, 1996, p.9), but they can be justified by experience. Whereas in the case of moral laws, “they hold as laws only insofar as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to be necessary. Indeed, concepts and judgements about ourselves and our deeds and omissions signify nothing moral if what they obtain can be learned merely from experience” (Kant, 1996, p.9). Thus, for Kant, for something to be moral law it is a necessary condition that it exists a priori because if morality were to be subject to experience then morals would be subjective generalities and not universal laws. He claims that it would be the “grossest and most pernicious error” (Kant, 1996, p.9) to treat morality in such a way. He viewed the right of reasoned agents to be self-law giving free agents in the same sense; as being an a priori universal principle. The question though, is why he argued that the right of individuals to be self-law giving was a foundational principle of moral law?

There are two elements to these principles according to Kant (an internal and an external element). He argues that:

“A practical philosophy, which has not nature but freedom of choice for its object, will presuppose and require a metaphysics of morals, that is, it is itself a duty to have such a metaphysics, and every human being also has it within himself...for without a priori principles how could he believe that he has a giving of universal law within himself” (Kant, 1996, p.10).
Thus, these principles exist both as a priori internal concepts guiding humans in their understanding of moral duties, but also impose a duty upon us to establish an external metaphysical framework which can enable a community to live together whilst also respecting individuals as self-law giving moral agents. By way of establishing this Becker suggests that:

“(There are) two forms of a priori study that Kant employs...the analysis of concepts and transcendental arguments. According to the former, insofar as some concept applies, whatever is entailed in this concept is true. According to the latter, insofar as some concept applies, whatever is a necessary condition of its application is true” (Becker, 1993, pp.68-69).

Put simply, if morality applies then the factors implied in it must also be true, as must the factors that are necessary conditions of its existence. For example, on this argument, if the concepts exist in the writings of African political theorists, even by way of being debated rather than agreed with, then it logically follows that these principles themselves must exist, because otherwise discussion of them would be logically inconsistent. According to Kant, if we are free to have a rational discussion regarding what it means to be free reasoned beings, then by definition both free and reasoned beings must exist, and, we are both free and reasoned, simply by the fact that the discussion is taking place. He believed that the existence of these concepts in common language was enough to allow us to claim that they are in fact, transcendentally, a priori. As previously discussed, a priori does not refer to fact in the Kantian case, but rather he refers to it in the transcendental sense, which is neither provable nor unprovable. Yet what it is, a priori, is deeply embedded in the actions and language we insist upon in our everyday life. In this way, what is required is not that we can prove the existence of these principles as a matter of fact, but rather we can demonstrate their coherency as a matter of logic. If we are able to have reasoned discussions then reason must exist a priori; by suggesting that someone should do something (act from a position of reason), it is also being suggested that that it is in fact possible (that they have the capacity to reason). Reason is a facet of autonomy according to Kant, and thus, freedom to be self-law giving, reasoned beings must exist a priori because the existence of a concept also predisposes the existence of the necessary conditions of that concept. This is what it means to rely on a transcendental argument. This is not to suggest that it is enough for these concepts to simply exist in common language for it to be possible to claim their transcendental a priori existence. Rather, what sets these principles apart is that
individual’s act in a way that logically requires their existence. This sets them apart from words such as unicorns that do also exist in common language but are not subject to the same logical relationship with human behaviour. In contrast, discussion of the a priori nature of reason logically relies on individuals having the capacity to reason based on their actions (entering into a reasoned discussion about the a priori nature of reason). Thus whilst the existence of reason cannot be proven, it can be shown to exist transcendentally in that Kant argued that suggesting we act from a position of reason logically relies on this being possible to achieve.

To clarify this argument, and to consider a second facet of it, attention is now turned to an explanation from Ripstein who considers the role of proof, or lack thereof, in defining a priori arguments:

“If no proof is available, then a postulate is required to introduce the norms governing the concept of an embodied rational being, that is, one that both occupies space and falls under laws of freedom. Embodied persons have both duties and entitlements because they are rational beings; the form of duties and entitlements reflects the distinctive incompatibility relations between beings that occupy space. The synthetic a priori truth that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time is incorporated into the law of freedom that no person may invade the space occupied by another; if the postulate requires us to individuate persons spatially, then any potential incompatibility between the occupation of space by different persons becomes a moral incompatibility” (Ripstein, 2009, pp.370-371).

The claim being made by Ripstein is that it is impossible for two beings to exist in the same space without infringing on the personal space of one another. If to be free we are required to exist as individuals, then a moral law is required to ensure this because if we establish something as moral law we suggest that this is a way that individuals should behave. For Kantians, to make this claim also relies, as discussed in the previous paragraph, on individuals having the capacity to act on this behaviour; it is only when individuals have the capacity to act in a certain way that a law can be established that they should act in that way. Ripstein concludes this point:
“If moral persons are individuated spatially then the only way to have freedom under universal law is for each embodied rational being to have, in virtue of its humanity, a right to its own person- that is, to its own body. Such a right must be innate, because nothing could count as an affirmative act establishing it- the right applies to any rational being that occupies space, because its right is nothing more than the right it has to the space that it happens to occupy” (Ripstein, 2009, p.372).

Thus, to be able to exist in a community logically requires an a priori right to freedom for it to be possible. Hence, if we accept that Kant is correct concerning our a priori right to be internal self-law giving agents (the logic of which has been demonstrated through discussion of transcendental arguments), then it places a duty on us as individuals to realise this in the conditions in which we find ourselves: living in common with others. Therefore, it follows logically that we have a duty to enter into a state that can guarantee this right. As has previously been mentioned, this is what Kant believed offered the justification for the state: in fact, the only justification because, “a multitude of human beings...because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution, so they may enjoy what is laid down as right” (Kant, 1996, p.89). Thus we can demonstrate logically the existence of an a priori right to be self-law giving, reasoned beings, and originating from this point, an a priori duty to enter into a political condition in which we can realise this in common with others. These are the overarching categories which provide the basis for the analytical element of this project which takes place in Chapters 3-5 where discussion takes place regarding whether the logical progressions demonstrated in Kantian thought also follow in the work of African scholars. How these categories are being adapted into a framework for study is made clear in Section 1.4 of this chapter.

1.3- The Debate Surrounding the Divide between Morality and Politics:

Having discussed the ideals of internal and external self-law giving as a priori rights and duties, and the condition in which Kant believed this could be realised, attention now turns to consideration of the contemporary debate that exists regarding the connection between Kant’s ethics and his politics. In Sections 1.1i and 1.1ii it was implied that the Kantian political condition is the best, if not the only, condition for the realisation of Kantian ethics and morality. There is, however, a recent debate regarding the relationship between the ethical theory of the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” and the legal and political theory Kant developed in “The Metaphysics of Morals”. This section is concerned with
discussing the two elements of the debate but will conclude, in line with Thomas Pogge and Arthur Ripstein, that Kant’s belief in an innate right to freedom, as living by the laws one wills for oneself, is best realised within the Kantian condition of public right. However, also in line with Pogge, it is suggested that the embodiment of willkür in a rightful condition can be justified both as a political system for realising the innate right and duty to freedom as described by Kant, and as a sensible political system for individuals who do not share Kant’s view on ethics. This is an important debate for the overall aims of this thesis as it highlights the distinction between political legislation and moral or ethical justifications given for political choices; implying that regardless of the existence of individual or cultural difference, certain ideas maintain universal relevance around which political debate can (and does) focus. It is worth noting that Pogge and Ripstein’s position is debated in the literature, and this debate existing between these thinkers and Wolfgang Kersting is briefly touched upon in this section. That being said, the section concludes in favour of Pogge and Ripstein’s position and the thesis relies upon this interpretation when carrying out the research; justification for which is discussed in this section.

To begin this discussion it is worth recapping the distinction between the “right life” and the “good life”, as this holds greater importance in discussion of the potential divide that may exist between Kantian ethics and politics. A maxim is right or wrong based on its relationship with freedom, and takes into account the maxim itself rather than the ends that the maxim causes: Universal moral laws cannot, as such, be based on individual interests “for a will which is dependant in this way would itself require yet a further law in order to restrict the interest of self-love to the condition that this interest should itself be valid as universal law” (Kant, 2009, p.99). Kant justifies this position based on the subjectivity of individual interests. “Good and bad” unlike “right and wrong” are particular to individual interests and thus irrelevant to discussions of universal moral laws. To clarify, the notion of good and bad considers the consequences of a maxim and looks at ends beyond the individuals themselves, such as happiness, which is particular to individual experience and cannot be applied universally. This division takes on particular importance if consideration is given to the debate that exists when Kantians discuss the notion of living by one’s own choices, or living in a state of public right, as one that can be embedded in any number of ethical schematics. In fact Kant himself has been interpreted as having viewed his legal system to have value beyond his own construction of the state and morality. On this interpretation his doctrine of public right is a stand-alone theory that can be viewed not only in collaboration with his ethical philosophy, but also on its own
individual merits. This is a controversial element to contemporary Kantian debate, with recent publications from Arthur Ripstein (2009) and Thomas Pogge (2012) suggesting that evidence exists for this position from a re-interpretation of Kant’s work outside of an exegetical reading.

Pogge argues that Kant’s description (in “Towards Perpetual Peace”) of his system as being suitable for a society not only of angels but also of devils (Kant, 2006, p.90) makes it clear that “Kant wants his argument for Recht, and for a Republican instantiation thereof, to be independent from his morality” (Pogge, 2012, p.89). He sees the value of his own argument not only in delivering the morality that accompanies it but also in the logical consistency of choosing to live under a doctrine of public right. Whether individuals are angels or devils they can agree that a life in which they are constrained in their freedom only to the level in which all individuals can be guaranteed the same freedom, assures them a freer and more secure existence than the daily perils of a state of nature:

> “Hence reason can use the mechanism of nature, in the form of selfish inclinations, which by their nature oppose one another even externally, as a means to make room for reasons own end, legal regulation, and to thereby promote and secure, insofar as it is within the power of the state to do so, both internal and external peace” (Kant, 2006, p.91).

To borrow once again from Pogge in clarifying this point, Kant did not base his theory on a conception of the good “rather, he bases the establishment and maintenance of Recht (right) exclusively on persons’ fundamental a priori interest in external freedom” (Pogge, 2012, p.88). By doing so he is able to overcome claims of subjectivity and show transcendentally (as discussed in the previous section) the logical justification for arguing for the a priori existence of the concept of freedom. How Kant establishes this a priori right was discussed in Section 1.2. The “right” life for Kant would be one in which an individual’s moral freedom is guaranteed by a state in common with all others; or, on a larger scale, the freedom of states is guaranteed in the international arena. This condition would allow each individual to act only out of duty and to abide by the categorical imperative. However, he also recognises, Pogge suggests, that his political system could also be abided by, by people who are not acting out of duty but rather for the enhancement of their own self-interests. For example, I may keep my promise to help my neighbour because it is the right thing to do; but, I could also make the instrumental choice to keep my promise based on a hope for financial reward. Whilst one of these actions is morally correct, according to Kant, and one
is not, the outcome is the same: I keep my promise to help my neighbour. In the same way, I could choose to follow the laws of the state out of duty or because I have selfish reasons for wanting my freedom guaranteed. It is this that Kant referred to when he suggested that his political system was suitable for both angels and devils because it can inspire individuals to be “if not exactly a morally good person (they can) nonetheless be forced to be a good citizen” (Kant, 2006. P.90). It was also the reason that recent scholars have suggested that it is relevant to a broader community than simply those who follow Kantian ethics, as the principles of right and autonomy can be viewed as important to both, individuals who act from the perspective of duty and individuals who act to further their own selfish interests.

To discuss this point further it is necessary to reiterate once again the value Kant placed on ensuring that his state did not impose a view of what a good life would look like on people. It is the role of the state, according to Kant, to “command for everyone without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar as he is free and has practical reason” (Kant, 1996, p.10). It is possible to interpret this as justifying a neutral notion of universal law and politics that does not succumb to a relativist dilemma of having relevance to only some of the people some of the time if they hold the same view of what it means to live a morally “good” life. According to Michael Sandel, Kantian liberals:

“Draw a distinction between the ‘right’ and the ‘good’- between a framework of basic rights and liberties and the conceptions of the good that people may choose to pursue within the framework. It is one thing for the state to support a fair framework, they argue, something else to affirm some particular ends” (Sandel, 1998, p.110).

There are obvious connections here with Pogge’s analysis. Both theorists suggest that Kant, or in Sandel’s case contemporary Kantians, have the ability to support a system of ethics and promote a political system in which to realise these said ethics, whilst also suggesting that the political system has relevance outside of the ethical schematic. This has value as it allows the promotion of a Kantian state that is able to protect an individual’s freedom even in areas where the Kantian view of what it is to be moral may not be accepted. According to this view, the state has a duty to create a framework in which individuals can exist freely. Within this framework individuals can sculpt their view of the good life by willing the laws by which they live for themselves. The state does not have the right to dictate what this good life looks like, only to create the space for free individuals to find it for themselves. This is particularly important for the comparative analysis of this project; the expectation or
aim is not to find exact replicas of a particular model, but rather, support for the existence of the same fundamental foundational principles, or debate around the topic of how to guarantee them: to advocate for the existence of a global framework of principles, adherence to which will enable a plurality of cultures to interact justly. Similarly, the aim of this thesis is not to suggest that all thinkers support a particular normative framework of moral reasoning. Rather, it is to question whether underpinning debates regarding morality, utility and interests is a discussion of autonomy, the relevance of which cannot be proven or disproven, but which can be shown as being logically implied in further discussions that take place regarding right or good. Thus, the argument can be put forward that transcendental evidence exists to support an understanding of these principles as existing a priori as they act as foundations underpinning further discussions.

To return to the example utilised in the Introduction: the concept of what free choice entails, or how it can be realised, may differ between cultures and this thesis recognises and accepts this point. However, the argument that is being presented claims that the concept of choice itself is, nonetheless, a topic of debate in each of these examples and thus it can be claimed, through reliance on transcendental arguments, to exist a priori. If this is the case, the potential may then occur to claim this as a universally shared, foundationally grounded, principle. This does not, however, require all political and moral models respecting this principle to look the same, only for them to respect, or aim to further, this principle within the debates they undertake. In carrying out this project it is accepted that it is not possible to prove the existence of autonomy. What is possible, however, is to show that its existence is being assumed in the practice of the studied authors, and to then explore their views of how it should/ can be expressed within societies. This is why the division between ethics and politics, as expressed by Pogge, is valuable to this project. On this interpretation of Kant it is possible to accept that recognition of the value of self-law giving does not necessarily rely on individuals expressing this recognition from the Kantian position of duty. Rather it allows for a situation in which individuals from different perspectives can recognise the value of guaranteeing individual freedom based on their own experience.

Pogge makes a further claim regarding this reading of Kant. He suggests that when interpreting Kantian moral law as prescribing universal laws to all reasoned individuals, philosophers have often exaggerated what this claim actually means. Instead, Pogge makes the following statement:
“To ensure mutual consistency, such a law must apply to all persons, must specify precisely for each what she may, must, and must not do. But it need not treat all equally by making ultimately the same demands on each. I propose then to read the universal here in the weak sense of ‘applying to all’; not in the stronger sense that also entails equality of persons under law” (Pogge, 2012, p.78).

This implies the potential for a situation in which Kantian law can be accepted by all, but achieved in different ways dependent on the situations in which each individual resides. For example, each individual has external freedom up to the point in which it affects the external freedom of others and it is only at this point that it is curtailed. Before that point is reached, individuals can make use of their freedom in whichever way they rationally choose, and in that sense the law itself is universal but the way it affects individuals is relative. To clarify, I can live under the guideline that I am a free self-law giving agent in common with all others and still have a different approach to happiness than all other members of the state. This would not be wrong in this interpretation as I am still being treated equally in relation to the demands of universal law, but what this means for me is different to what it means for someone else. The notion of weak universalism is discussed in greater detail in relation to the concept of culture in Chapter 2, with specific reference being made to the work of Bhiku Parekh in this area. The concept of freedom here relies on willing the laws by which we live whilst respecting the limiting factor that we cannot impose on others’ equal freedom; not on this requiring us all to adhere to these laws in the same way. It is this sense of “weak universalism”, discussed by both Parekh and Pogge, which the thesis relies upon to establish the framework for questioning the potential existence of these principles in the African source material. Evidence can be found for this reading of Kant’s ideas by considering his own words in the Introduction to “The Metaphysics of Morals”:

“But just as there must be principles in a metaphysics of nature for applying those highest universal principles of a nature in general to objects of experience, a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of human beings, which is cognised only by experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles. But this will in no way detract from the purity of these principles or cast doubt on their
a priori source. – This is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon anthroplogy but can still be applied to it” (Kant, 1996, p.10).

On this reading of Kant’s work it is argued that the subjective element of his theory provided the space for people to better comprehend the principles of moral law and thus ensure its uptake. He claimed that the anthropological element he makes reference to, that is based on experience, must not be relied upon to define laws, the remit of reason alone, but rather to “deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles” (Kant, 1996, p.10). Such an argument is convincing as it not only recognises the effect of experience on subjective claims, such as interest, and discusses why this makes them less relevant in defining universal laws. It also recognises the role of subjective experience in shaping the lives of individuals, and does not presume it is possible to ignore this. Many previous readings of Kant have failed to recognise the value of subjectivity in understanding approaches to foundational principles and this is a further justification for why this project is relying on this interpretation.

Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge the existence of a second interpretation of Kant’s work which centres around the common argument that according to Kant the universal principle of right is derived from the categorical imperative and is thus contingent on it. This debate exists between Pogge, Ripstein, and Julius Ebbinghaus on the one side who believe that the two elements can be viewed separately, and Wolfgang Kersting and John Rawls on the other whom argue that, in fact, they are two parts of a complete doctrine and that “right” is contingent on the categorical imperative. Pogge sets out his argument as follows:

“I believe, that Kant wants his argument for Recht, and for a republican instantiation thereof, to be independent from his morality. This morality may well give its adherents moral reasons for supporting Recht and a republican constitution in particular. But it does not therefore have a special status with respect to Recht, because it is... just as true that selfishness gives its immoral adherents selfish reasons for supporting Recht and a republican constitution in particular” (Pogge, 2012, p.89).
This refers once again to Kant’s claim that his politics has relevance for both angels and devils (Kant, 2006, p.90), which is where Pogge finds evidence for this claim. Similarly Ripstein states that:

“Under the criteria set out in the Groundwork...as a rational being you could not will a universal law under which you could never set a purpose for yourself, or one under which you could only do so with leave of another. So once spatial forms of incompatibility are introduced, only the formal principle of outer freedom- the Universal Principle of Right- could govern the exercise of free but spatially individuated persons. Such an argument is not a derivation of the Universal Principle of Right from the Categorical Imperative; it only shows the former to be the logical extension of the latter” (Ripstein, 2009, pp.371-371).

This links back to the discussion in Section 1.2 regarding the a priori nature of the right to freedom and the duties this creates (in which Ripstein’s argument for individuated persons being unable to exist in the same physical space was discussed). The fact of individuated individual’s being unable to share space and thus relying on a framework to protect their freedom is true, according to a Kantian moral theory. However, it also maintains value separate to Kantian ideals. As Ripstein suggests, Kant’s political system follows on from his morality but, as discussed, it does not necessarily rely on his morality to justify it as a sensible political system. It is, in fact a system suitable for both angels (those who act according to duty) and devils (those who act according to self-interest) (Kant, 2006, p.90). This is an important distinction for this thesis as it supports a system in which respect for freedom of individuals can be achieved by different cultural groups, for culturally specific reasons, but grounded on shared foundational principles. To clarify, this thesis questions whether the principles are accepted in the narratives of the African thinkers, but it does not expect the justification for acceptance to necessarily be grounded in Kantian morality.

To counter these arguments for the separation between ethics and law in Kant’s work, theorists from similar perspectives to that of Kersting often make reference to the Introduction of “The Metaphysics of Morals” in which Kant states that “the supreme principle of the doctrine of morals is, therefore, act on a maxim which can also hold as universal law. Any maxim that does not so qualify is contrary to morals” (Kant, 1996, p.18). They argue that statements such as these imply an intrinsic link between Kantian morality and the theories of public right and universal law; a link that, they argue, cannot be broken.
because the universal principle of right is in fact derived from the categorical imperative: “As far as its structure and potential value as a criterion are concerned, the principle of right cannot be distinguished from the categorical imperative” (Kersting, 1992, p.344). They argue that the evidence for this reading exists in the similar construction of the two positions and the similar ways in which Kant words his descriptions of them. This, they suggest, indicates a logical progression from the categorical imperative to the universal principle of right. Failure to respond to this critique would be problematic to the overall aims of this thesis as it implies that the Kantian model of political thought is only relevant within the Western liberal tradition. In contrast, this thesis contends that a priori foundational principles, referred to by Kant, exist, separate to his theory, across political and philosophical boundaries but are responded to differently dependent on experience. As previously suggested, it is possible to contend that there is, in fact, a response to this argument; a response that admits that a relationship exists but that this implies a bond in only one direction. As Pogge puts it, Kant “aims to show that those who accept his moral philosophy must also accept his Rechtslehre (Doctrine of Right). But it does not follow from this that he also aims to show that anyone who accepts his Rechtslehre must also accept his moral philosophy” (Pogge, 2012, p.90).

Like Botterell in the following quote, this argument supports the fact that to guarantee internal individual freedom, according to Kant, his system of government is required:

“For Kant, genuine freedom consists in being independent of the choices of others. But such independence is possible only if there is in place a legal and political order that can determine and police the boundaries of such interactions. Absent such an order, my ability to set my own ends will always be subject to the purposes and choices of others, which is to say that I will not be sui juris, that is, I will not be my own master. Consequently, in Kant’s view genuine freedom is only possible against the backdrop of an effective legal order” (Botterell, 2011, p.457).

What is being disputed, however, is that his system of government can be justified only within a Kantian system of ethics. This, I agree with Pogge and Ripstein, is an over stretching of the argument and not necessarily required to support a Kantian system as being logically consistent; all that is required is to claim that a Kantian system of government, in which individuals have rights to hold autonomous control over their
personal sphere, can be viewed as a favourable condition both for Kantian ethicists and individuals from other ethical/non-ethical backgrounds. This is an important distinction for the purposes of this thesis as it implies a potential applicability of the model to none Kantian systems of thought as the notion of holding autonomy over the personal sphere can be supported by a range of different ethical/ non-ethical systems; this thesis questions whether this is the case in the work of a range of African scholars. Following on from this, there is an implied value to researching the existence of the said ideas amongst traditions external to the Kantian model and questioning whether individuals refer to the importance of creating a political condition that respects the rights of individuals to maintain autonomous control over the personal sphere. That being said, and as previously referenced, the thesis references Pogge and Ripstein’s definition of Kantian morality and politics when carrying out the research of this project.

The main purpose of this chapter so far has been to establish the Kantian belief that reasoned individuals have an a priori right to autonomy: understood as the ability to live by the laws that one wills for oneself. The secondary purpose has been to examine and explain the nature of this right when experienced in common with others: willkür. It has then been considered how this was to be understood as an equal right of all to choice in the purposes one sets for oneself. Following on from this the purpose has been to examine the political condition in which Kant believed that this right to autonomy could be realised. It was suggested that, according to Kant, all reasoned individuals have a duty to enter this condition in order to realise their a priori right to freedom. It was noted that this condition is an ideal for which to strive, rather than an empirical consideration of reality. This section has dealt with the contemporary debate between the traditional stance that suggests that Kantian morality and politics are intrinsically linked, and the position supported by Ripstein and Pogge which suggests that this link exists in only one direction. The final element of this section was dedicated to clearly presenting the Kantian position in order to create the space to make certain claims regarding its universality, and to operationalise it in a way that enables research into whether these ideas exist in the work of African political theory; which is, as previously claimed, the aim of this thesis. The final section of this chapter presents how this will be done, applying the framework to the African case.

1.4- Applying the Framework to the African Case:

The original contribution that this thesis makes is to raise, and attempt to answer, the question of whether the Kantian ideals of a right to be an internal self-law giving individual
and the ability to exercise one’s willkür when living in common with others are ideas that are valued universally, or more specifically for the remit of this thesis, within certain works of African political theory as laid out in the Introduction. As previously mentioned, the purpose of this chapter as a whole has been to establish why and how Kant justified these principles as being a priori and the political condition he believed was necessary for realising them. This, the final section, establishes the ways in which this framework is broken down into themes that are then sought in the African political theory literature as a method of asking whether these ideas are viewed to be of key philosophical importance by the chosen theorists. The analysis of the theorists work is twofold: firstly, it is asked whether their views, policies or philosophical suggestions can be viewed as implying an innate a priori value in treating individuals as autonomous individuals, understood as referring to self-law giving as reasoned individuals. Following this it is asked whether the political policies they advocate can be interpreted as intending to provide the space for individuals to be self-law giving and autonomous in common with all others. On interpreting the outcomes of the analysis it is suggested that a belief that human beings have a right to be free, self-law giving individuals exists. It is also suggested that there exists a corresponding belief in a right to have this guaranteed within a political structure, at least in the form of discursive debate across cultural distinctions. In particular this is the case in both the Western Enlightenment tradition and in the case of the African political theorists chosen for study by this thesis.

The categories of internal self-law giving and external willkür, as presented in the Introduction, are broken down into themes to better enable the enquiry into their existence in African political theory. As mentioned in the Introduction, these themes are as follows; equality of individuals, self-mastery and freedom of choice versus domination. Each of these is unpicked and developed in the following three sub-sections.

i. Equality of Individuals

The requirement of equality raises many questions in political theory: what does it mean to be equal? Is it the role of the state to artificially create equality of outcome or opportunity? Does support for universal laws require us to treat everyone exactly the same under those laws, or is there space for relativism and particularity? In the analysis of the selected African texts the concept of equality being looked for is specific to Kant. Equality is understood in this project as a moral position that posits acts of treating people as autonomous individuals who are equally deserving of the right to freedom under a
condition of mutually consistent public right. Policies that support the creation of an environment in which all individuals have equal opportunity to be self-law giving and pursue their own ends in common with all others will be considered as representing this idea. This form of equality is understood by Kantians to be “Juridical Equality”: “each person has the right to independence from each of the others. None is born either a master or a servant. Each enjoys this right to juridical equality innately, prior to any affirmative act to establish it” (Ripstein, 2009, p.17). Additionally, the notion of weak universalism advocated for by Pogge, and discussed in Section 1.3, will be interpreted as supporting a Kantian belief in the value of self-law giving as being owed to all equally, but that this does not necessarily look the same for all individuals. The concept of equality is interpreted as representing categories of both internal and external freedom as an a priori right. We are all, for example, equal in our right to be self-law giving individuals; but we also need to be equally restricted from infringing on the freedom of others to have the same choice in pursuing their own ends. The location of any of these interpretations within the African literature are taken as evidence for the potentially universal notion of these ideas; or at least the argument is made for the possibility of interpreting the presence of these views in African political theory as having strong correlations with the Kantian tradition as outlined above.

ii. Self-Mastery

The inclusion of self-mastery as a theme depicting internal self-law giving originates in the theory discussed in Kant’s “An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment?” This essay questions an individual’s ability to live guided by reason and to overcome sensual or base drives or passions. This is an internal notion of freedom based on the ability of individuals to reason maxims to guide their lives that could be willed into universal law. During analysis of the texts from a selection of African political theory it is asked whether an a priori assumption exists that individuals have this ability. This does not require theorists to believe that all individuals have achieved this, or that perfection of reason is possible, but rather that individuals are capable of moral improvement and greater approximations of self-mastery. An assumption that individuals may be capable of self-mastery, according to Kant, does not require us to believe that all have achieved this, or to build politics on that assumption. Rather it requires us to respect an individual’s right to have this level of freedom and to guide those that are yet to achieve it. This is one of the elements considered when carrying out the textual analysis. If examples of this idea can be found in the work of African political theorists then this lends credit to the postulation that this may
be a universal foundational principle which may exist across cultural boundaries, which may subsequently present the conditions for open and honest cross-cultural dialogue.

iii. Freedom of Choice versus Domination

The third theme that is looked for is divided into two contrasting sub-themes. These are the concepts of freedom of choice and the contradictory stance of domination. These are both external concepts and refer to freedom in a political condition, in common with others. As previously discussed, choice, from a Kantian perspective, is a translation of the external notion of freedom as understood by the conception of willkühr. It is having the space as an individual to set and pursue one’s own ends, unhindered by others, and to thus direct one’s own life guided by one’s own reason in common with all others. It dictates the need for a political system that either enhances the ability of individuals to be reasoned or provides them with the space to allow their reason to guide them. Each of these ideas is sought in the selection of African political theory chosen for this study.

The second half of this theme is domination, and it originates in Arthur Ripstein’s interpretation of willkür, previously discussed in Section 1.3. It suggests that preventing individuals from pursuing their own ends within the limits of the same freedom being awarded to others is an act of domination. When looking for this theme in the selected African political theory the aim is to find critiques of domination that are similar to those espoused by Kantians. The inclusion of the negative side of freedom of choice is an important element to the study due to the time period being studied. Many of the theorists being considered are responding to and critiquing the atrocities that occurred under colonialism. For this reason, it is important to ask the question of whether the critiques are based in the denial of the victims’ right to choose their own ends or pursue a life guided by the laws that they devise for themselves. If this is the case, this too will be interpreted as suggesting support for the value of willkür within a political system and the importance of guaranteeing the space for individuals to live freely guided by their own reason, viewing it as an a priori right.

1.5- Conclusion:

To conclude, the purpose of this chapter has been to describe and discuss the Kantian belief in an a priori right of all humanity to be autonomous, understood as being self-law giving, and the duty to enter into a condition in which this can be achieved in common with the rest of humanity. It is claimed that this a priori right may in fact be a foundational
principle of all of humanity, being of value to individuals regardless of cultural background. The aim of this chapter was to establish the foundation of this claim and to then breakdown the overarching category into a number of themes that can be looked for in a detailed textual analysis of the selection of African political theory chosen for study in the remainder of this thesis. The model being used for this is adapted from Strauss and Corbin and was presented in greater detail in the Introduction. In summary, the supposition of this thesis is that all individuals have a right to be treated as autonomous agents, (understood as the right to choose the direction and purposiveness of their own lives in relation to others) and that this should be taken into account in political and legal systems, agreeing with the model discussed in this chapter. The aim of the remainder of this thesis is to ask whether there is an indication that this principle may be a universally shared fundamental principle that exists regardless of cultural background, or whether it is specific to the Kantian tradition. The role and influence of culture is deliberated in the following chapter in which the concept of weak universalism, as presented in Section 1.3, is further discussed, along with a range of additional influences on the issues of universality. Following on from this, the results of the textual analysis are discussed in Chapters 3-5.
Chapter 2- The Elephant in the Room: Culture:

“Culture: The cry of men in face of their destiny” (Camus, 1978, p.36).

The term culture is described in the literature as having a myriad of meanings. It is referred to in relation to the outputs of musicians, artists and authors; to explain elements of dress or style that are at odds with those we understand personally; as fundamental to religious or minority groups; as defining who we are as people, nations or continents; and as representing the views, or obscuring the individuality, of autonomous agents. As the opening quote from Camus suggests, culture provides the space in which humanity can express and define itself, be that through membership of a group or nation, through artistic output, or through a claim to the value of a ritual, clothing style or language. Each of these ideas, standing alone, covers a plethora of concepts or behaviours, but when defined as a property, process, or outcome of culture the response can (in certain circumstances) be polarised: either, referring to culture stagnates any further questioning of a practice’s authenticity and it is simply accepted as being cultural (a relativist position); or, in contrast, mention of culture leads to automatic hostility towards said practice. Whilst clearly, these responses are polarised examples they do highlight an important academic concern. Often, when something is described as being a part of another individual’s culture the question regarding the authenticity of the behaviour draws to a halt and, outside of the school of anthropology, is rarely replaced with the fundamental query: what does that mean? In cases where the question is answered the responses are, as with all subjective topics, broadly ranging.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the body of writing on culture, cultural relativism and universalism, to provide the grounding for understanding what is meant when a practice is described as cultural, and to provide a basis for understanding the relationship between universalism and relativism and the effects of each position on this thesis. The reviewed literature emanates from, predominantly, the field of political theory but is also supplemented with work from cultural studies. Theorists discussed consider the problem of culture from a range of different ideological stand points, and are based both in Western and African locations. Due to the overall purposes of this thesis it was felt to be fundamental to this project to not only include Western scholars but also the thoughts and ideas of contemporary African scholars working on the definition and effects of culture. The theories of African thinkers are discussed again in greater depth in Chapter 5 in relation to their thoughts and opinions on the themes of this thesis; support for basic principles of
internal self-law giving and external willkūr. Their inclusion here is intended purely to advance understanding of the discourse surrounding the role of culture in the debate between universalism and relativism, and the potential existence of universally shared principles.

As previously referenced, the central aim of this thesis is to question the existence of such shared foundational principles. Thus, understanding the role of culture in advocating for these principles or diminishing their relevance is fundamental. As Fred Dallmayr suggests, comprehending “shared meanings and practises- to the extent that this is possible- can only arise from the lateral interaction, negotiation, and contestation among different, historically grown cultural frameworks” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.7), thus comprehension of the role of culture is essential to diligently carrying out this study. As discussed in Chapter 1, this research centres on the question of whether the two metaphysical claims (internal and external self-law giving) exist a priori. These claims have been translated into themes which are being utilised for the purposes of the textual analysis: self-mastery, freedom of choice versus domination and equality of individuals. When considering these concepts within different cultural and individual contexts it becomes clear that the rights of self-mastery and freedom of choice may not have been fully or even partially realised, or that the method of realisation differs greatly both within a culture (for example some groups preference the rights of males over the rights of females), and between cultures (Islamic and Christian groups, for example, approach style of dress differently). Thus, culture is at the centre of the debate. It plays a fundamental role in the understanding of what these principles mean to individuals, as well as to the realisation of them. That being said, the argument of this thesis is as follows: the principles of internal and external self-law giving, as well as the concepts of choice, self-mastery and equality act as the foundations of debate, both within a culture and across cultures. This is not to suggest that the outcomes of the debate will be recognisable between examples, nor that each individual has been able to realise their self-law giving abilities. Rather, that these principles are fixed metaphysical points around which debates about human well-being focus. Thus, it is fundamental to understanding the universality of this argument to investigate the role culture plays in both increasing and diminishing self-law giving abilities of individuals; as well as the role cultural practices, such as dress or language, play in developing individual self-definition.
Whilst this thesis initially looked for notions of self-law giving as a foundational principle being universally similar in approach, it became apparent throughout the analysis that the principles may indeed exist universally but the approach to achieving them was, in some cases, culturally specific. For example, Leopold Sedar Senghor (whose views are analysed in Chapter 3), indicated in his writing, a belief that autonomy is best realised through both a recognition of the value of community and the value of culture. This position is notably different from the Kantian approach set out in Chapter 1. However, as becomes clear in Chapter 3, similarities still exist in the underlying philosophical belief; in the value of autonomy to individuals. This substantiates the assumption that these principles exist as universal focal points for debate, but at the same time responses to these debates do indeed differ. It is for these reasons that clarifying the concepts of culture, relativism and universalism is fundamental to provide a basis for the research carried out in Chapters 3-5.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first (Section 2.1) considers definitions of culture presented by a cross-section of theorists from different regional and ideological backgrounds. The second section (Section 2.2) looks at the relationship between minority and majority cultures living within the same geographical space and the problems that arise balancing the rights and priorities of each. The third section (Section 2.3) is an extension of the second. This section analyses the Incommensurability Thesis and the role of relativism more generally; the aim being to overcome a number of concerns associated with this position that are problematic to a universalistic understanding of individuals, such as the one that is central to this thesis. This section also asks whether there are certain behaviours that should or should not be defended because they have cultural significance; an idea that Brian Barry deals with in a number of his articles on the topic. The fourth section (Section 2.4) looks at the role of common practices and language in defining a bounded group and the possible existence of a universally recognised human identity that supersedes the concept of culturally specific identity. Language plays a fundamental role in individual and cultural development and this section utilises the work of Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, amongst others, to further understand this central role. The fifth, and final, section (Section 2.5) considers why comparative analysis is an important approach for understanding universal and cultural identities, and concludes with a summary of the chapter and a more detailed explanation of its role within the rest of this thesis. In particular, this section builds on the justifications given in Chapter 1 for the uptake of a comparative approach to political theory.
2.1- Definitions of Culture:

Having explained the overall structure of this chapter, I now proceed with a discussion of how culture is defined by theorists from across regions, ideologies and philosophies. It is important to state at this stage that the chapter does not deal with ideas of popular culture or cultural output (such as music, film and television). Whilst reference will be made by some of the theorists covered to the effects of clothing, literature, dance and music on binding people together, a detailed analysis remains outside the scope of this thesis. It is however, important to highlight the value of reflecting on these elements to comparative studies and there is a vast literature that exists within the field covering these topics. For a summary see Nick Couldry’s 2000 text, “Inside Culture”.

As previously stated, culture is presented in academic and political circles, as well as common parlance, as having a multitude of meanings. In fact as Willie E. Abraham observes in his monograph “The Mind of Africa”, “the word culture has a variety of uses. At its most inclusive, it is used to cover every possible aspect, public and private, of the life of a people” (Abraham, 1962, p.12). This definition, like many others attempting to uncover what exactly is meant by culture, is vague in its formulation, and thus raises more questions than it answers. In particular, what is meant when Abraham refers to “a people”? A people, a community, a cultural group, a nation: each of these terms are commonly used to reference a collective of individuals who, it is suggested, have something in common, often referred to as their culture. Jeremy Waldron, for example, suggests that “a culture is a human community larger than a few families that is associated with ongoing ways of seeing, doing, and thinking about things” (Waldron, cited in, Gutmann, 1993, p.171). What is implied by both of these theorists, each considering the question from different academic perspectives, is that what is important about culture is that it is shared by a collective of individuals, each of which hold a common view on the correct ways to act in certain situations. On this understanding, culture can cover any group of people who exist within an imagined community based on shared understandings of how they should exist. For example, the methods they use to prepare food, educate their children, dress, practice religion, converse with other members of the community, establish a political system or interact with others who are alien to their group. For Abraham, culture is that part of communal life that exists “on the basis of common reactions, common actions, common interests, common attitudes, common values. It creates the basis of the formulation of a common destiny and cooperation in pursuing it” (Abraham, 1962, p.27). The main focus in each of the definitions covered so far is on commonality, be that in belief or actions.
However, whilst Abraham and Waldron focus on commonality, there is a further selection of authors, such as Charles Taylor (1994), Bhiku Parekh (2002) and Iris Marian Young (2011), who emphasise the internal differences within cultural groups such as age, gender, status and sexuality. They view shared practices as only one aspect of a cultural identity. The direct contrast in focus between the two sets of authors emphasises the subjective nature of the concept. Before discussing further definitions this section considers in greater detail those arguments that focus on difference.

Whilst Abraham focuses on culture as being a “source of solidarity, of the complex mechanisms, symbols, and ideologies of social integration and common belongingness” (Abraham, 1962, p.39) it has been suggested by some liberals that such an approach leads to dangerous attempts at homogenisation. Will Kymlicka argues that liberals responding to claims of cultural value are met with what he describes as the liberal dilemma; this dilemma divides liberal responses to cultural practices. He describes the liberal dilemma as: “the debate among liberals is about whether autonomy or tolerance is the fundamental value within liberal theory” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.154). Support for tolerance represents the idea that cultural difference is valuable and thus, should be respected whether or not individuals external to the group understand or agree with it (the cultural relativist position). In contrast, support for a position favouring autonomy places the individual at the centre of all discussion of fair and just treatment and suggests that the right way to treat an autonomous agent is universal; thus superseding respect for cultural difference (the universalist position). This broadly marks the lines of debate between universalism and relativism and is understood by Kymlicka to be the dilemma of contemporary liberals working in this area:

“Simply put, universalism holds that there is an underlying human unity which entitles all individuals, regardless of their cultural or regional antecedents, to certain basic rights... Cultural relativism is a theory which asserts that there is no meaningful way to judge different cultures because all judgements are ethnocentric” (Zechenter, 1997, pp. 320-323).

Debate between these two positions is at the centre of most contemporary discussion of culture and the need to either respect certain practices or to protect individuals from them. Within the recent literature there has been a move away from either extreme universalism or extreme relativism, but arguments for each will be considered throughout this chapter.
In considering the dichotomy between these two positions, Barry, in his 1998 article “The Limits of Cultural Practice” discussed the claim that theorists holding these positions, in fact, over emphasise the value or role of culture. He argued, to the contrary, that, “appeal to culture is less than conclusive. All too often, the appeal to culture is an attempt to legitimate either the oppression of one group by another, or the oppression of some members of a group by others within the group in the name of an internally inequalitarian and illiberal culture” (Barry, 1998, p.313). Barry’s concern is with the position of extreme relativism. By suggesting that certain behaviours are fundamental to the maintenance of a culture’s heritage, or to the ability of members of the group to recognise one another, relativists argue that a group should be able to protect these behaviours on the grounds of cultural value, regardless of the effects on the individuals involved. For example, discussions of cultural relativism frequently debate the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM): claiming either that it is universally abhorrent and should be banned, or that it is relevant to certain cultures, and that individuals external to those cultures cannot understand it and should not comment on it. Therefore, according to epistemological relativists (the term given to extreme relativist positions) such as Clifford Geertz (1997) and Ernest Gellner (1985), there is no ethical way to make judgements between cultures without being accused of ethnocentrism. In contrast, Barry critiques the claim that cultural practices should be protected regardless of their effects on individuals through reference to a number of prevalent examples. This response will be considered in depth in Section 2.3; however, it is raised at this stage to illustrate the contrasting positions of relativism and universalism.

Having briefly touched upon the debate between relativism and universalism, the chapter now returns to further discussion of definitions of the term culture and issues that arise around those definitions. A controversy that is referenced throughout the discourse on culture and universalism is the question of whether culture represents different groups’ attempts to respond to the same human questions or, whether instead, certain differences cannot be overcome: a dilemma which is a central tenant of this thesis. This dilemma not only relates to differences between cultural practices within a state (examples of which are considered in Sections 2.2 and 2.3), but also, cultural differences between sovereign states and differences that exist between two cultural groups that are not attached to a state. Difference, in this sense, refers to only sharing commonalities with other members of your cultural group rather than humanity in general. For example, being of the view that the commonalities between yourself, and an individual from outside of your cultural group, are
as insignificant as those that exist between a goldfish and a stone. The opposing (universalist) position suggests that whilst you may have more things in common with those within your group, you still, although potentially to a lesser extent, share understandings and experiences with the rest of humanity more generally. These positions rely on a static view of culture as being closed off and isolated. I take a more cosmopolitan perspective that recognises fluidity and the multitude of influences that can affect individual identity. That being said, the intervention I make to the debate between relativism and universalism is to suggest a groundwork on which interactions between cultures can take place justly. Of course, the consequences of the debates between relativists and universalists are of great importance to this thesis. They raise questions regarding the relevance and appropriateness of comparison between cultures. Proponents of the Incommensurability Thesis (discussed in Section 2.3) would argue that such comparison is neither relevant, nor productive, I respond to this concern throughout the thesis.

To achieve this, consideration of the literature turns now to a number of philosophers who approach culture from a position of basic understanding relying on a conception of humanity rooted in universalism. Thus, for these theorists, culture is defined as secondary to humanity; a way of coping with human concerns, which takes into account the local conditions in which groups find themselves. In the Western tradition, a seminal text dealing with objective humanity is Thomas Nagel’s somewhat controversial “The View from Nowhere” (1986) in which he claims, amongst other things, that there must be a common humanity between cultural groups to allow individuals to recognise one another as human. He suggests, our ability to reach agreement on certain ethical dilemmas indicates the existence of an objective human position from which we can approach these concerns. To clarify, he asserts that, “the fact people can to some extent reach agreement on answers which they regard as objective suggests that when they step outside of their particular individual perspectives, they call into action a common, evaluative faculty” (Nagel, 1986, p.148). This position he referred to as “The View from Nowhere”; a view that is not affected by regional, or cultural, existence but instead can, although this is not always the case, be the domain of all thinking humans. Nagel’s argument for how an individual can achieve a viewpoint that is not affected by cultural experience is controversial, and a number of critiques, as well as alternatives or adaptations, have been offered. One example is Marilyn Friedman’s work on deliberative and discursive approaches to democracy. She claims that, rather than trying to overcome issues of culture the intention
should, instead, be to understand the influence they have on individuals. She defines objectivity as follows: “Genuine objectivity requires ideal inter-subjective dialogue, dialogue which meets ideal conditions such as the absence of those power imbalances which privilege the voices of some participants over others” (Friedman, 1990, p.507). This thesis intends to offer one intervention regarding on what grounds this dialogue can be achieved. Not only does Friedman recognise the importance of difference, she also argues that it should be considered through a system of fair, and just, cross-cultural interactions, premised on ideal inter-subjective dialogue. This is particularly important when considering the purpose of this thesis. Firstly, the points Friedman raises regarding issues of power are ones that it is important to be aware of when carrying out textual analysis of source material from other cultures. In particular this relates to the necessity to achieve “critical distance” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.10) when analysing the views of both one’s own culture and the culture of others. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity to view the works of authors as their views alone, and not as being representational of a larger group; regardless of the claims they may make to be the educated voice of the people. Secondly, her work also begins to set parameters for the requirements of fair, and just, cross-cultural dialogue; in particular, establishing a system which avoids privileging the voices of the powerful.

Alternatively to Friedman’s view, Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye presents the role of culture as enabling individuals to respond to “human” questions. He too recognises the existence of cultural difference, but he believes that this relates only to the situations individuals find themselves in, and it does not represent a central facet of human existence. Like a number of other discussants of culture, such as Abraham and Waldron, he defines it in somewhat vague terms:

“An enactment of a community of people, created and fashioned in response to the whole gamut of problems or questions that arise in the context of a people’s particular situation. The problems or questions themselves are universal, even though the approaches to dealing with them may be particular or specific, and may differ from society to society” (Gyekye, 2004, p.28).

In Section 2.3, his views on both culturally specific and, what he describes as objective facts, are considered in greater detail. However, at this stage, reference to Gyekye is intended to highlight his support for a philosophical position that recognises culturally specific
approaches to questions he views as being relevant to all individuals regardless of cultural affiliation. On this argument, comparison between cultures is appropriate as it is of academic value to discover the ways in which different experiences and life situations enable an individual or group to respond to, what Gyekye describes as, “universal” problems. Additionally, according to this interpretation, culture is presented as enabling us to cope better with our experience of individual existence. Thus, as Abraham suggests, one “use of culture is to make events intelligible and significant” (Abraham, 1962, p.28), to enable us to understand them as they take place in our lives and to respond appropriately to them in common with those experiencing them from within the same geographical, political, national or religious situation.

George Crowder makes a further argument for why certain “values and concepts are universal. This must be true (he claims)... if we are to account for our capacity to understand and empathise with the goals and values of other cultures” (Crowder, 2006, p.407). There are notable similarities between Crowder’s position and Nagel’s (already discussed) in that both base their arguments on the concept of recognition between cultural groups of all being members of the same human race. In discussing the views of Abraham, Gyekye, Nagel and Crowder, each of whom emanates from a different academic background, a pattern emerges. Similar to Kant’s transcendental approach discussed in Chapter 1, it is possible to interpret each of these theorists as making a claim that individuals’ ability to enter into discourse regarding the definition or role of culture in their lives suggests that there is at least a basic shared understanding of what it means to be human. It is the argument of this thesis that this shared understanding emanates from the philosophical underpinnings of internal and external self-law giving and those cross-cultural, or inter-cultural, interactions, whilst they may differ, maintain a focus on responding to issues of self-mastery. As way of clarification, it is not controversial to claim that a multitude of responses exist to culture; the brief overview given in this chapter indicates that this is the case. However, the fact that academics from across a wide range of disciplines, locations and backgrounds each contribute to this debate suggests that there is, at the very least, a shared understanding of what culture involves or means and the role it plays in guiding the lives of human agents.

In summary, definitions of culture are often poorly defined: it is a topic that both engenders subjectivity and inspires debate. There are a number of areas in particular that highlight the vast differences that exist amongst discussants of culture. Firstly, the number
of people a group is required to contain to be considered a culture is often controversial. As discussed previously, Waldron claims that a culture is a “community larger than a few families”. However, culture has also been associated with national, religious or political identities of far larger groups as well as the extremist positions of very small groups. The requirements placed on individuals to be members of certain cultures, as well as what being cultural looks like are also controversial. For example, it is clear in the following section (Section 2.2) that theorists such as Will Kymlicka argue cultures are in no way neatly bounded groups and in fact, there can be much crossover between the different cultures to which an individual feels they have a claim to membership: be that a religion, a linguistic group or a nation. As is discussed in the following section, Kymlicka argues that it is possible to claim membership of a multitude of different cultures and that an individual can be a part of each of these cultures in different ways. To clarify, what it means for one individual to be a member of the French culture may be different to what it means for a second individual. As a specific example, Kwame Anthony Appiah refers to the concept of the nation as embodying an idea of culture: “A nation...is an imagined community of culture: or ancestry running beyond the scale of the face-to face and seeking political expression for itself” (Appiah, 1997, p.623). This is not to suggest that the nation is the only embodiment of culture, but rather that it is one unit of understanding among many. Similarly to Appiah’s mention of ancestry, Bhikhu Parekh refers to the influence of the past on an individual’s identity:

“Although the term identity is sometimes inflated to cover almost everything that characterises an individual or a group, most advocates of these movements use it to refer to those chosen or inherited characteristics that define them as certain kinds of persons or groups and form an integral part of their self-understanding” (Parekh, 2006, p.1).

Parekh claims that the influence of historical factors is thus an important part of culture. A focus on history leads to a further concern which is highlighted by discussion of Barry’s views in Section 2.2. He surmises that if a practice is deeply rooted in a group’s past, but viewed negatively by contemporary standards, this does not justify its protection as a practice adaptable to temporal and situational change. This concern will be discussed in the following section, but at this stage it is being raised to highlight further the range of definitions and responses that are invoked by the term “culture”.
However, having highlighted the divergent approaches to discussing, studying and understanding culture it is important to conclude this section by highlighting some of the similarities that have been referenced in each of the definitions included in this review of a range of perspectives from within political theory and cultural studies. The first is the idea that one’s chosen culture in some way enhances human experience; be that through providing greater local understanding of human concerns or through enabling the building of communities. The second is that for a practice to be cultural it must be experienced by a plurality of individuals. Whilst the number is debated it is widely accepted that a culture is a group greater than a few. Thirdly, as an extension to the second point, culture is rooted in shared ideals and approaches to human experience. Finally, that cultures have “myths and tales” (Gyekye, 2004, p.29) on which they are built and shared, that have meaning and value to their members. This is not to imply that cultures are homogenous groups that treat all members fairly or equally, but rather that there are shared stories and guidelines that each member may not favour or agree with but they will still recognise. Simultaneously, it is important to recognise that certain cultural practices negatively affect the human well-being of certain individuals within the group. The argument of this thesis is not intended to deny the negative aspects of culture, or to suggest that all cultures treat individuals in a way that respects their ability to be self-mastering individuals able to live guided by their own purposiveness. Rather, it is to suggest that in situations in which cultures do treat individuals negatively these principles (of self-law giving, purposiveness and choice) will be the foundations on which this discourse is built, around which debate centres, and on which the cultural group in question is criticised. Similarly, in situations in which cultures are praised for their treatment of individuals, the said praise will be built on the foundation that individuals’ rights to live guided by their own purposiveness have been realised or that the culture is one expression of this. In each of these cases, it is suggested that these principles represent the philosophical underpinnings of debate and discourse around which a plurality of cultures can be assessed. This review of literatures, from both cultural studies and political theory, has been included to demonstrate the relevance of these arguments to current debate, and to ground the study within the current literature. It is through the analysis carried out in Chapters 3-5 that this thesis is able to provide evidence for these arguments. Demonstrating that across a range of different cultural, political and ideological models the concerns of self-law giving, purposiveness and choice remain prominent human principles. They are at the centre of debates regarding the
appropriateness of certain cultures to individual development, and form the foundation of discussions of personhood and autonomy.

Having considered a number of definitions of culture within this section, and the foundations of the debate between relativism and universalism, the following section develops this discussion further focusing on the situation in which a multitude of cultural groups exist in the same geographical space.

2.2- The Relationship between Majority and Minority Cultures:

This section and the following section (Section 2.3), in which the Incommensurability Thesis is discussed, are intrinsically linked. The primary focus of this section is to consider the various solutions theorists offer to situations in which cultural groups come into contact with one another in a situation in which one has the numerical majority; thus allowing it the opportunity to potentially oppress the smaller group. The analysis will focus on Kymlicka’s work on group rights, as well as Parekh’s studies on religious clothing, and discuss their responses to issues of inequality. This section is included within the thesis as the authors discussed focus, in their research, on methods of understanding and overcoming clashing views that exist within a larger cultural or national group. In the two examples considered here this refers to religious groups within a nation. However, the issues that arise are also relevant to other minority groups, such as gay rights groups or political activists existing within different, potentially hostile, majority cultures. Within each of these examples the debate focuses around issues of self-determination and self-mastery, understood as the rights of individuals to express their cultural preferences. This can be interpreted as a desire to protect a personal culture, or alternatively to protect an individual from the homogenising force of a dominant culture. However, in each of these contradictory examples the debate remains focused around self-determination. This will become clear throughout the following discussion. This debate, existing within the liberal tradition rather than the African sample selected for study in this thesis, is included here to demonstrate the broad range of existing views, from a range of different ideological and cultural perspectives, that premise their arguments on the value of self-determination and personhood. By including these liberal theorists, the intention is to show that they, too, rely on similar foundational arguments to those that I am suggesting underpin the views of the African scholars. In so doing the intention is to provide further evidence for the potentially a priori nature of these arguments, and to argue for the need for further research in this area. To clarify, if it is possible to locate foundational principles within
liberal traditions it raises the question as to whether these are particular to that one tradition or whether they are potentially universal: the intention of this thesis is to begin the process of answering this concern through the analysis of a further sample of discourses. This section (Section 2.2) provides the grounding of this discussion by firstly locating these principles within the liberal tradition. The argument being that the two thinkers included in this section (Parekh and Kymlicka) approach the concern for minority cultures from different perspectives, offering different solutions to the debate, but nonetheless, each of their arguments centres around a concern for the rights of individuals to be (in some sense) self-law giving. Establishing the existence of these principles in both liberal and African traditions has a further value: it is the argument of this thesis that these foundations can form the basis for open and just cross-cultural dialogue, thus it is fundamental to the premise of the project to locate them in both the dominant liberal tradition and the perspectives of the African sample selected for study. This is to enable arguments to be made regarding their value in establishing the conditions for just discourse. It is the role of this section (and this chapter more broadly) to achieve the first of these two aims (locating these principles within the views of liberal thinkers) and the role of Chapters 3 to 5 to locate them in the work of the African scholars selected for study.

When considering the plight of minority groups Parekh refers to the Canadian example in which Sikhs serving in the police force have been criticised for advocating for the right to wear a turban whilst patrolling, rather than the traditional headwear associated with the force. They have argued that it is their religious right to represent themselves in such a way; whilst critics have suggested that individuals choosing to join the police force should be willing to wear the uniform representing their position. Both groups emphasise the value of being recognisable as members of the two groups: either the police force or the Sikh religion. Parekh also discusses a second example: the French case which was popularised by the media in the early 2000’s. A question was raised about the legitimacy of young girls wishing to wear religiously specific clothing, in particular the Hijab, to attend school in a system that prides itself on being secular (Parekh, 2002). Each of these examples asks whether a minority group should have the right to protect itself against homogenisation within larger groups. However, a second question is also raised: should individuals have the right to membership of a multiplicity of different cultural groups? It is a truism to assume that individual identity has many facets, the question raised by these examples, however, is how contradictory practices can peacefully coexist. At their core, each of these questions focuses on the individual’s right to purposiveness.
To summarise, each of these examples leads to the question: What does it mean to be a member of a cultural group associated with a nation, whilst simultaneously expressing individual choice to maintain further, in some examples contradictory, identities. Kymlicka’s solution is based on the ability of individuals to have multiple cultural allegiances. He is widely credited as one of the most famous voices amongst nationalist and multiculturalist circles and his arguments supporting multicultural forms of nationalism are well cited. He refers to the example of Muslims living in France as a demonstration of how cultures are not tightly bounded, finite groups that exist on separate planes. Individuals, he argues, can possess a multitude of cultural identities that exist in symbiosis, each identity being as important to them as the last. He focuses on a French Muslim asserting their right to wear a headscarf as not being a Muslim concern, but rather a French concern:

“When asserting their right to wear a headscarf, they are not saying they have this right as ‘Europeans’, or as ‘Parisians’, but precisely as French citizens. They argue that being Muslim is one way of being French...and of course they make these arguments in French to their French co-nationals” (Kymlicka, 2006, p.141).

For Kymlicka, being a member of a religious cultural group does not lessen your membership of the national cultural group, it is just another, equally valid, form of membership. Thus for him, wearing a turban as a Sikh member of the Canadian police force, or a Hijab to attend a French school, would not be problematic. They would simply be examples of Canadian and French individuals being Canadian or French in ways that are different, but equally valid, to other members of their national cultural group. Thus supporting a similar approach to the one discussed in Chapter 1, in which it was argued that it is possible to use different means to achieve a similar end. For Kymlicka, what it means to be French can differ for different individuals or groups.

He does, however, recognise that this entails the risk that the dominant culture will eventually homogenise the minority group. The solution, as he sees it, emanates from the state, whose role it is to prevent majority domination through the creation and policing of minority rights. This originates, in Kymlicka’s view, from the assumption that culture is fundamental to human experience and thus should be protected by state power. As Parekh observes a, “stable and historically continuous cultural community, is essential to human freedom and autonomy and hence is a primary good” (Parekh, 1997, p.56): it is therefore, the duty of the state to protect this. In his 1995 study of “Multicultural Citizenship”,

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Kymlicka, unlike many theorists who favour the protection of minority groups and the maintenance of culturally relative values, does not advocate against the existence of universal human rights. Instead, he claims that having only a universal system of rights is not enough. In addition to a set of human rights that offer a certain level of protection to all individuals, he believes that we should also have minority rights that allow small groups to protect themselves from the ever growing strength of assimilation politics. He argues that it is:

“legitimate, and indeed unavoidable, to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights. A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures... A liberal theory of rights, therefore, must explain how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.6).

Thus, according to this argument we can be a part of a nation, a continent, a village and a culture simultaneously, and each of these identities is valid. The ability to develop these identities should be enshrined in both national and international law through the uptake of a system of minority rights.

Parekh is critical of Kymlicka, suggesting that his support for culture through the uptake of a minority rights based approach is grounded in a belief in, and adherence to, a Western liberal approach, as well as in his understanding that:

“Human beings are ‘cultural creatures’...cultures are the necessary bases of their development as human beings...culture defines and structures their world, offers them spectacles through which to see themselves and others, helps them make intelligent judgements about what is valuable, suggests worthwhile roles, provides them with the meaningful options, guides their decisions concerning how to lead their lives, provides a secure background necessary for developing the capacity for choice, and is in general the inescapable context of their autonomy and choices...For him choice and autonomy are some of the central liberal values, and culture is
important primarily as a context of choice and a cradle of autonomy”
(Parekh, 1997, pp. 56-57).

As implied above, Parekh disagrees with Kymlicka that every society has a national culture which is of fundamental importance to them. Instead, he argues for a multicultural model rooted less in liberalism, which is able to recognise that not all societies are, or want to be, liberal. He argues that Kymlicka, “takes no account of this, and universalises and imposes the liberal understanding of culture on non-liberal cultures and defends them only after suitably liberalising them” (Parekh, 1997, p.59).

Parekh also questions how we can deliver both equal rights to citizens and at the same time recognise the value and importance of cultural difference. He suggests that “when we take legitimate cultural differences into account, as we should, equal treatment is likely to involve different or differential treatment, raising the question as to how we can ensure that the latter does not amount to discrimination or privilege” (Parekh, 2002, p.261).

Before considering the outcomes of such a response, it is necessary to raise the issue of Parekh’s use of the term “legitimate”. By making use of such terms, the implication is that he is making certain value judgements regarding what he does and doesn’t view as being valid cultural differences. According to his view, legitimate cultural positions are those that remain within the boundaries of respect for International Human Rights; outside of these boundaries he would not necessarily mount a defence for differentiated rights. Whereas within them, he suggests that all individuals should be guaranteed an equal set of rights regardless of which cultural groups they associate with. The assumption of legitimacy would be one that many relativists would take with as they would argue that no individual from outside of the culture in question is in a position to make a judgement regarding the legitimacy of the cultures practices. However, for Parekh, to enable respect of cultural difference a model that is able to adhere to universal rights in culturally specific and different ways is required. He uses the example of the right to religious freedom to illustrate this point:

“As a general rule it would seem that different treatments of individuals or groups are equal if they represent different ways of realising the same right, opportunity or in whatever other respect they are intended to be treated equally, and if as a result none of the parties is better-off or worse-off. The Sikh who is allowed to carry a Kirpan and a Christian who is not are treated differently but equally because they are both exercising the same right (the
right to religious freedom) in different ways and because the former does not secure an advantage over or at the expense of the latter” (Parekh, 2002, p.261).

As this quote suggests, Parekh, like Kymlicka, strongly advocates for a model of relative universalism that is able to guarantee the protection of cultural difference and the avoidance of homogenisation of minority groups by those in the majority, whilst also maintaining a system of universal protections for all individuals, independent of their cultural allegiances. However, his method for achieving this same outcome differs. Rather than creating a system of minority rights he prefers to have one set of universal protections, such as the UNDHR that can be realised differently. In relation to the example used at the start of this section: a Sikh would be able to wear a turban whilst serving in the Canadian police force, whilst a Christian would be required to wear the standard uniform but would be within their right to adorn it with a cross. The alterations they make to their uniforms may look different but their treatment remains equal in respect of the right to religious freedom. Parekh’s approach is of particular interest to the overall aims of this thesis in that it concludes in favour of respecting individuals’ rights to be self-law giving in common with others. However, this treatment, whilst equal will, like Parekh’s argument, look different across examples. On analysing Parekh’s work it is possible to draw similarities with the concept of “weak universalism” presented in Chapter 1 as being associated with the theoretical approach of Thomas Pogge. This thesis, in line with both theorists (Pogge and Parekh), argues for the value of a theory that is able to respect shared universal principles of humanity (a deontological subfloor), whilst also respecting and supporting a system which recognises different ways of being treated equally. For example, Parekh’s argument in which the same right to religious freedom is expressed differently by contrasting groups in varying circumstances. The existence of the expression of the same fundamental principle in different cultural situations will become clear throughout the analysis in Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis (Chapters 3-5). This concept will be further summarised in the final chapter: Concluding Remarks. Parekh’s (as well as Pogge’s) work has been a guiding influence in establishing the approach of this thesis.

Having considered the issues that exist around protecting minority cultures from assimilation under universal practices, and demonstrated that the foundations of these arguments are similar to those premised by this thesis (self-mastery, equality and choice or purposiveness), the chapter now progresses to a discussion of a counter position which
places the individual at the centre. This section raises the question: at what stage, if any, should we universally protect individuals from cultural practice rather than cultural practice from individuals? This will be considered in the following section (Section 2.3) which assesses the political theory literature surrounding the Incommensurability Thesis.

2.3- The Incommensurability Thesis:

The Incommensurability Thesis is a theory that is not specific to discussions of culture; however it has been adapted from its original format to enhance such discussion. The original Incommensurability Thesis claims that:

“Two theories are incommensurable...if they contain a basic common term whose meaning or use in one theory is incommensurable with its meaning or use in another, i.e., if at least one basic term used in both theories has a totally different meaning in each. Incommensurability renders it impossible to compare or contrast, relate or otherwise devise the content of the two theories” (Wisdom, 1973, p. 299).

In terms of culture the argument is presented as follows: there is no common standard or quality in virtue of which we can measure different cultures against one another. Cultures and moral values, according to this theory, are so vastly different that there is no common measure by which all could fairly be evaluated. According to this argument, the only option is to recognise the existence of substantial differences and to respect those differences, and not to criticise them. This argument, in line with relativism more generally, argues that there is no common standard of human well-being against which practices can be measured. That being said, the relativist argument is particularly problematic to the aims of this thesis and therefore one of the central tenants of this section is both to develop the thesis’s response to these concerns, but also to discuss, and draw on, the work of other theorists in this area. The concept of strong relativism or incommensurability is problematic for a number of reasons. This thesis is not premised on the idea that all cultures should, nor do, approach certain concerns in the same way, or that one culture is superior to another. Rather, that the potential exists to locate a priori universals that are prior to culture and relevant to all individuals regardless of their membership to, or affiliation with, a cultural group. That being said, it is necessary to tease out and overcome relativist arguments suggesting that the existence of universal principles is a falsehood, to enable this thesis to better establish the counter argument supporting a weak universalism. This is the purpose of the following discussion.
Appiah adapts the Incommensurability Thesis to relate to the individual. He argues that “part of what the equal dignity of all persons means for the liberal is that we respect people’s autonomous decisions for themselves, even when they are decisions we judge mistaken- or simply choices we would not make for ourselves” (Appiah, 1997, p. 621). This position is particularly important to this thesis, as similarly to Appiah’s cosmopolitan stance, this project agrees that individuals should maintain their right to direct their own lives. However, the limit placed on this right, both by this thesis and Appiah, is that it should not infringe on the same equal rights of all other autonomous agents. Thus, supporting this right does not place the same requirements on us as the Incommensurability Thesis. Rather, it supports a deontological sub-floor shared by all humans, regardless of their cultural group, that cannot be overwritten by cultural difference. It is by using this basis as a foundation that this thesis is able to overcome the concerns of relativism. This argument is developed in greater depth in the following paragraphs, initially considering the arguments of other academics, and then developing a response grounded on Arthur Ripstein’s theory of individuated persons first discussed in Section 1.2 of the previous chapter, as a response to the issues raised by relativism.

Before developing an argument based on the concept of spatially individuated individuals, this section considers three further responses: the first is associated with Ghanaian philosophers Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye and suggests that individuals must respect, and cannot criticise, those culturally specific practices that are not fundamental to human existence, but only to maintaining the existence of the culture itself. However, it is the duty of individuals external to a culture to criticise those practices that are damaging to human well-being. The second argument comes from Brian Barry and is an extension of ideas discussed in Section 2.1. He argues that certain practices are so abhorrent that their extinction will have no negative effect on the maintenance of the cultural group’s identity. The final approach analysed in this section is Amy Gutman’s deliberative response to cultural difference.

Gyekye focuses his argument around the central assumption that culture is, in fact, a human construct. Thus, as mentioned in discussion of his views in Section 2.1, our shared humanity takes precedence over our cultural differences. He makes the claim that:

“Culture, and we must always bear in mind this banal truth, is created by human beings to serve the purposes and interests of human beings. For this reason, the basic or ultimate criterion for evaluating cultures is human
well-being, the extent to which a particular culture is set to fulfil the conditions that make for human well-being” (Gyekye, 2004, p.38).

Additionally, according to Gyekye, cultural practices that have no influence on the overall well-being of the individual human should remain outside of the realms of cross-cultural debate. The question of who sets the parameters of what is and isn’t relevant for debate is somewhat unclear in his argument; however, he refers to elements such as style of dress or music as being harmless (Gyekye, 2004). Gyekye understands these practices to be harmless to the overall development of humanity; although, especially in relation to examples of dress, this position is somewhat controversial, in reference to examples such as foot binding. However, according to his argument they are deemed harmless. In contrast, in the case of practices that he deems as damaging to human well-being, he believes, humanity has a shared duty to condemn. According to his view the central purpose of culture is the advancement of human well-being. Thus, if a certain practice violates this purpose, it is a human duty to denounce it: “There are beliefs, practices, values, and institutions of a culture that clearly are obnoxious and destructive of human interests or welfare; these cannot be morally accommodated... A metaphysic that breeds a practice detrimental to human well-being ought to be repudiated” (Gyekye, 2004, p.38) in the sense of moral condemnation; in this form Gyekye’s argument is not an argument for criminalisation. Gyekye goes on to claim, in distinct contradistinction to the position of extreme relativism, that no two positions are incommensurable. He suggests that all positions “can be considered from the perspective of the common standard of human well-being or interest. In other words, the common ground or measure of human well-being makes the two different beliefs or practices commensurable” (Gyekye, 2004, p.39). In this sense, according to Gyekye, no culture is so distinct from the rest of humanity that an argument can be successfully established to justify ignoring practices that are damaging to the well-being of individuals. The way in which Gyekye distinguishes between what does, and does not count as harmless lacks analytical clarity and it is unclear from his description on what grounds judgement can be based regarding effects of human well-being. However, his argument for commensurability could be adapted to relate to a model such as the one proposed by this thesis; on which the argument would be made that debate should exist around practices that were in some way damaging to individuals rights and duties to be self-law giving in common with others.
American philosopher Thomas Scanlon makes a similar point based on the idea of individuals’ choosing or desiring greater protections for themselves against a majority culture:

“What matters, in deciding whether a principle can reasonably be rejected for application to a particular society, is whether, in that society, people in the positions that the principle describes have good reason to want a certain form of protection. The emphasis on the reasons people have differentiated the view I am defending from objectionable forms of relativism, which claim that it is permissible for people in other societies to be treated in ways that we would not accept because they do not value privacy, or individual liberty, or even life, in the way that we do. Claims about what ‘they’ actually think...are usually questionable” (Scanlon, 2000, p.340).

Scanlon recognises that external groups have a duty to get involved in the practices of cultures only when members of those cultures have a good reason to want them too. For example, in situations when their human well-being is put at risk he, like Gyekye, would support external interference. Scanlon’s argument focuses on the self-determination of individuals to dictate the level of interest they have in being protected, and not on the outsiders duty to judge cultures they have no experience of. Such a position combines both universalist and relativist assumptions; suggesting (from a universalist perspective) that intervention should be based on the people within a society and their individual right to determine their lives in relation to cultural practices, thus assuming that all individuals have that ability; and from a relativist perspective, that certain traditions or views of the world require inside knowledge, and as a result external judgements are problematic. Therefore, debate inspired by Scanlon’s position, similarly to the model advocated for in Section 2.1, focuses on the rights of individuals to live guided by their own purposiveness, and to make choices about cultural interactions as a result of this.

In contrast to Scanlon’s middle ground position, Wiredu focuses on commonly held facts of humanity as a response to the question of culture. He, like Gyekye, suggests that there are “two broad aspects of human culture” (Oladipo, 1995, p.30), those that are fundamental objective facts that are true for all of humanity, and those that are not essential to the overall well-being of humanity, and thus can be the domain of cultural difference without endangering the agents practicing them:
“Any culture has procedures, customs and usages that have no essential bearing on questions of either human well-being or truth or falsehood. Style of apparel or of address, for example, is frequently (though not invariably) of this nature. Adopting one style rather than another often makes no objective difference to human well-being or to one’s beliefs about the world. Specifically because of this there cannot be any compelling reason to change such elements of a culture in favour of foreign ones... Since it is not rational to give up such components in preference to foreign substitutes, to do so is a sure sign of the loss or diminution of cultural self-identity” (Wiredu, 1992, pp. 65-66).

Thus, similarly to Gyekye’s position, Wiredu argues that cultural difference should be respected and maintained in areas he views as being contingent to overall human existence. He argues that these factors are those that become necessary for the maintenance of a culture’s independent identity. Thus, they are the elements that a culture has a right to fight to protect, as they tend to be those elements that allow the members of a group to recognise one another. For example, referring back to Parekh’s example in the previous section (Section 2.2), a Sikh individual would have the right to defend his choice to carry a Kirpan or wear a turban as these elements are necessary to enable the maintenance of the cultural group but have no fundamental effect on overall human well-being. Thus, their legitimacy should not be debated by those individuals external to the cultural group. However, similarly to the concerns raised in relation to Gyekye’s argument he does not, within his prose, consider in any historical detail, examples in which items of apparel have led to concerns related to well-being and oppression, and this is a weakness with his position in relation to contingent factors. The second element to his argument asserts that there is also a second side to human culture, including:

“Such components of culture as philosophy and religion (which) on the other hand, are anchored to truth value. Philosophy necessarily involves claims about what things are or should be and about what relations hold between various objects of thought... religion and philosophy (as also other domain of thought in which truth is sought, such as science) are areas of human experience in which the effects of cultural difference could conceivably be eliminated through the peaceful give-and-take of dialogue among cultures... Any interaction among cultures, however, has to be on
the basis of equality; otherwise some cultures are compromised” (Wiredu, 1992, pp.65-66).

This side to human existence, Wiredu suggests, is not specific to individual cultures, but rather is relevant to humanity in general. He argues, for example, that if a scientist was able to prove unequivocally and unquestionably the existence of God, then this fact would be of relevance to all people regardless of their cultural or religious background. Once these findings were shared, then each culture would have to change their beliefs to recognise the newly discovered objective fact. This piece of information would not only be relevant to certain groups but to the human community in general. Whilst this example is far-fetched, he makes use of the point to highlight his belief in the distinction between factors of human existence that are relevant universally and thus require cross-cultural interaction, dialogue, and debate; and factors that are only relevant to certain groups and thus are, according to his position, outside of the jurisdiction of cross-cultural deliberation.

As previously mentioned in Section 2.1, similarly to Wiredu and Gyekye, Brian Barry balances a respect for cultural difference with a strong belief in the necessity for limiting certain harmful practices. He asserts that, “culture is no excuse. If there are sound reasons against doing something, these cannot be trumped by saying- even if it is true- that doing it is a part of your culture” (Barry, 2001, p.258). Referring back to the example of FGM established in Section 2.1: the primary justification given for this practice, in areas where it is supported, is that it is a fundamental element of female development for certain cultural groups. Arguments are always made along cultural grounds. In contrast, arguments presented by condemners of the practice tend to be based on concern for human well-being. For that reason, according to Barry, criticism and debate on the topic from those outside of the cultures should be welcomed. He further extends his opposition to practices that can be viewed as harmful to human well-being as follows: he suggests that those practices he judges to be abhorrent should be banned; a judgement that in and of itself has been criticised by proponents of relativism. According to his theory, the central tenant of the debate surrounds the question of what factors are integral to a group establishing and maintaining their identity. Thus on this argument, we must question what practices should be protected to allow cultural groups to be able to recognise one another as a distinct group with shared commonalities. The question is one that has been widely debated and a plethora of answers offered that either suggest the fundamental importance of maintaining certain, sometimes degrading and dangerous, practices in the name of identity,
or the converse position of excluding these practises from the mainstream for the protection of individuals that may have been coerced to take part in them.

Barry’s response, with which this thesis agrees, is as follows. He argues that we should not be using the notion of culture, and the need to protect it, as an excuse to carry out certain practises that may put the lives of others, be they human or animal, at risk. He claims that:

“Appeal to culture establishes nothing. Some cultures are admirable, others are vile. Reasons for doing things that can be advanced within the former will tend to be good, and reasons that can be advanced within the latter will tend to be bad. But in neither case is something being part of the culture itself a reason for doing anything” (Barry, 2001, p.258).

He uses the example of whaling to focus his point. He suggests that preventing a certain group from carrying out a practise that is both cruel, and endangers the existence of a species, does not damage the integrity of their culture. He claims that culture is far more than one single practise and any group that claim their culture is put at risk by the banning of one element of their social interactions fails to respect all the elements that make up a cultural group. He argues this, not only because he sees it as an absurd tautology, but also because he sees it as patronising to the cultures in question. By suggesting that a certain cultures identity is so fragile that it could disintegrate due to the loss of a singular practise, is, for Barry, offensive to the rationality of those individuals who engage and view themselves as members of said culture:

“The idea that aboriginal cultures are extraordinarily fragile is profoundly patronising. Charles Taylor insists...that we must recognise in all human beings an equal capacity for culture. I endorse that proposition and simply wish to add that we should also attribute to all human beings an equal capacity for cultural adaptation” (Barry, 2001, p.256).

Barry recognises the fundamental importance of communal practises but he also emphasises the necessity for adaptation and change to enable existence in the modern world. The development and alteration of a culture to realise contemporary moral standards does not, according to Barry, diminish its worth; rather it makes the practise more relevant to modern life. The length of time a practise has been established cannot justify its continuation if it is putting the lives of modern day humans or animals at risk. If it avoids these concerns, the practises ability to exist in the modern world and the important
role it may play in the self-definition of individuals do make it a worthwhile candidate for protection. Again, both sides of this debate can be viewed as centring around the question of an individual’s right to be self-law giving; whether that be their choice to maintain a cultural practice others view as abhorrent, or alternatively, their right to be protected from a cultural practice they deem to be detrimental to them.

Choosing to criticise bad practices that are external to our own personal cultural experience is regularly demonised, often fairly so, as being an act of ethnocentrism. Gyekye, agreeing with the points raised by Barry in the previous paragraph, explains his opinion on the distinction between an act of critique being fair and just cross-cultural debate and it being an act of ethnocentrism:

“Ethnocentrism is a cultural mind-set mentality that regards one’s own culture, just because it is one’s own culture, as superior to other cultures and, consequently, as a model for all cultures. The ethnocentric person regards the values, beliefs, practices, and institutions of one’s own culture as the most worthwhile, and is neither prepared to wean oneself from the imagined beauty and goodness of those values, nor able to look over the walls of one’s culture. One thus fails to see one’s culture as one- and only one- form of life among others” (Gyekye, 2004, p.62).

To clarify, cross-cultural debate and dialogue is not, according to Gyekye, problematic. In fact, it should be supported as enhancing human development. However, on entering into said dialogue it is important that all parties recognise not only the value of their own views but of those of others as well. As Michael Freeden and Andrew Vincent argue in their discussion of comparative political theory, “difficult as it may be, we need to seek critical distance from our own positions and preferences, not only from those of others” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.10). By cultivating awareness of this concern it is possible to reduce the ethnocentric assumptions that can occur when considering the perspectives of cultures other than the researchers own. This is an important factor when considering the aims of this thesis; to support and create the foundations for honest and just cross-cultural dialogue. An approach which is able to respect all individuals rights to be self-law giving agents, able to choose the path their lives follow, would, by definition, also support a system that is required, following detailed analysis, not to recognise the equal value of every culture, but is required to approach each culture equally from the outset. Thus enabling members of the culture to explain and defend their position in dialogue that is not
limited by unjust conditions and pre-emptive conclusions regarding inferiority. It is the argument of this thesis that equal respect for a shared human condition would create the building blocks on which to base just and equal cross-cultural dialogue.

Charles Taylor justifies comparison of cultural groups by suggesting that the fundamental justification for comparing cultures is not only to increase our understanding of the identities of others, but also of ourselves. Gutman describes his position as follows, “human identity is created, as Taylor puts it, dialogically, in response to our relations, including our actual dialogues, with others” (Gutman, 1992, p.7). Hence, for Taylor, cross-cultural dialogue is not only justified by our need to better understand others, but also ourselves. It enables us to establish our own identities through interactions with others which guide our understanding of how we act in certain situations. In committing to this idea individuals are better equipped to improve their own well-being as well as the well-being of others who undergo the same process, realising the same benefits. It is possible to draw parallels here with Gyekye’s claim (discussed in Section 2.3) that the purpose of culture is to develop individuals. For Taylor, “recognition forges identity” (Taylor, 1992, p.66) but this requires agents to approach each culture as having something to offer that is equal to their own. Like Gyekye, he feels strongly that a necessary condition of interaction is the initial assumption of equal worth and the avoidance of ethnocentrism: “It makes sense to demand as a matter of right that we approach the study of certain cultures with a presumption of their value... But it can’t make sense to demand as a matter of right that we come up with a final concluding judgement that their value is great, or equal to others” (Taylor 1992, pp. 66-69). His argument is not to suggest that all practices are equally valuable to human well-being, as he agrees with Barry that some are in fact problematic, but rather that when approaching cultural studies the basic assumption should not be that our personal culture is superior to that of others being studied, and that regardless of background, all individuals should be willing to enter into just discourse to develop greater cross-cultural understanding.

Amy Gutman agrees with Barry, Gyekye, Wiredu, and Appiah that cultures can and should be compared and debated, and that bad practices cannot be respected simply on the basis of culture. She argues that “some differences- racism and anti-Semitism are obvious examples- ought not to be respected, even if expressions of racist and anti-Semitic views must be tolerated” (Gutman, 1992, p.21). Her solution to the debate between universalism
and relativism is (similarly to the project of this thesis) to support the conditions for just cross-cultural dialogue. The approach she supports is a system of deliberative universalism:

“Deliberative universalism explicitly recognises that some conflicts over social justice cannot now (or perhaps ever) be resolved by a comprehensive, universally justifiable set of substantive standards. These conflicts are best addressed and provisionally resolved by actual deliberation, the give and take of argument that is respectful of reasonable differences” (Gutman, 1993, p.197).

Her argument is based on the assumption that a universal moral doctrine, supported by all cultures, enabling coexistence under conditions of peace, may never exist. However, she suggests that this is not necessarily problematic. The approach she supports is not one that leads to assimilation and homogenisation of difference, nor is it one that ignores practices simply because they are the domain of a different culture (as we saw at the start of this section, this would be the requirement of the Incommensurability Thesis) but rather, one that enables groups to recognise reasonable differences whilst also deliberating and overcoming issues that are harmful to human well-being, simultaneously learning from one another through commitment to just interactions.

To summarise, each of the theorists discussed in this section (emanating from different geographical, political, ideological and academic backgrounds) questions and denies the validity of ideas summarised by either the Incommensurability Thesis or relativism. Instead, they support a system that is able to criticise and condemn certain practices, not because they are strange or foreign to them, but because they are detrimental to human well-being. They agree that criticism should not be based on the engendered assumption that one’s own culture is superior, but rather, on support for equal human opportunities, and they do each of these things utilising a methodology that is specific to their ideology. As discussed in the opening to this section, this thesis recognises each of these aims and objectives whilst simultaneously building on Ripstein’s spatially individuated individuals model (first discussed in Chapter 1) as a response to relativism. To recap Ripstein’s argument:

“If moral persons are individuated spatially then the only way to have freedom under universal law is for each embodied rational being to have, in virtue of its humanity, a right to its own person- that is, to its own body. Such a right must be innate, because nothing could count as an affirmative
act establishing it- the right applies to any rational being that occupies space, because its right is nothing more than the right it has to the space that it happens to occupy” (Ripstein, 2009, p.372).

In adapting this argument to respond to cultural relativism, the following is relevant: if each individual has, on account of being spatially individuated, a right to their own person, then each individual has a right to make choices (in line with Scanlon’s argument) as to whether they wish to be involved in certain cultural practices; or alternatively, whether they require protection from them. This argument, also similarly to Scanlon’s, is a model of relative universalism based on the assumption that cross-cultural discourse and debate centres around fixed universal a priori metaphysical principles of internal and external self-law giving, which may lead to different outcomes in different examples. It is on this basis, whilst also being influenced by the authors considered in this section, that this thesis responds to the concerns of the Incommensurability Thesis specifically, and relativism more generally.

Having discussed a range of theorist’s responses to practices that fail to further human well-being and the right to criticise them, the following section (Section 2.4) turns to a discussion of the value of common practices and language and the important role they play in the maintenance of cultural groups.

2.4- Common Language and Practice:

A plethora of studies exist that consider the role and value of shared language. Simultaneously, anthropologists learn and study languages that are only associated with small cultural groups to enable them to extend their studies and interact directly in local languages, gaining greater understanding of less well known practices: enabling them to translate certain ideas and metaphors into more widely spoken languages. A number of questions are raised by each of these academic pursuits. The first is the role of language in producing and developing cultures, and subsequently the use of language in silencing or dominating certain cultures. To elucidate, in the colonial period the colonial powers condemned the use of local languages as a part of their methodology for destroying local cultural heritage. The second is the relativist argument of whether common understanding across vastly different languages is in fact possible? Or, whether certain ideas can only be explained within their own linguistic framework? Both of these examples are of relevance to this thesis. The first (the role of language in identity formation) is of particular importance as the prevention of this within the colonial period can be understood to be a form of domination (in the Kantian sense), and it is questioned whether critiques are made
on this premise. The second refers once again to the debate between relativism and universalism and, as suggested in the previous section, it is important for the aims of this thesis to be able to overcome relativist arguments to be able to support a weak universalism grounded on the existence of shared foundational principles.

The first question is based on the assumption that the act of sharing a language has value beyond that of communication. In his final text written in the English language (“Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of African Literature” (1986)), Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o explains his decision to publish in only his mother tongue in his future literary and academic pursuits. He justifies this choice based on the value he places on language and the relationship it has with culture, community and individual self-definition. He argues, not only that “the choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.4), but also that, “in my view language was the most important vehicle through which that power fascinated and held the soul prisoner. The bullet was the means of physical subjugation. Language was the means of spiritual subjugation” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.9). Thus for Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, language can not only be both a tool of self-definition but also one of oppression; it plays a fundamental role in self-definition and cultural expression and can (and was in the colonial example to which he refers) be a dangerous instrument in the hands of oppressors. Culture and language, are for him, synonymous with one another:

“Language as communication and as culture are then products of each other. Communication creates culture: culture is a means of communication. Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world. How people perceive themselves affects how they look at their culture, at their politics and at social production of wealth, at their entire relationship to nature and to other beings. Language is thus inseparable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a specific form and character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, pp. 15-16).

His argument suggests that in the cases of both language and culture the concepts themselves are universal, but differences exist between each that enables individuals living
within these groups to set the parameters of their own existence. This argument is important to the overall project of this thesis, not only because it suggests the value of language and culture in guiding and defining individuals’ self-definition and purposiveness, but also as a methodological tool. Throughout his book Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o suggests that the choice of authors to engage with their audience through different languages or forms of expression, enables the reader to infer certain information regarding their cultural and individual values, an area of analysis which is built into the methodological approach utilised in Chapters 3-5.

To extend the discussion of the value of language beyond its role in communication and as a way of turning the attention of the remainder of this section to the second question, I now turn to Appiah’s argument:

“To share a language is to participate in a complex set of mutual expectations and understandings, but in such a society it is not only linguistic behaviour that is coordinated through universally known expectations and understandings. People will share an understanding of many practices- marriages, funerals, other rites of passage- and will largely share their views about the general workings not only of the social but also of the natural world” (Appiah, 1997, p.626).

For Appiah, the role of culture is to enhance community through shared understanding of the fundamental elements that guide individuals through life. It is possible to draw parallels here with Gyekye’s views discussed in Section 2.3. Each of the rites of passage mentioned by Appiah in the above quote is understood across cultural boundaries: the terms “marriage” or “funeral” are not, in and of themselves, culturally specific. To put this differently: “social conventions overlap and often have complex family resemblance” (Vincent, 2007, p. 142). The approach taken to these ceremonies often differs, but nonetheless, the underlying social conventions do indeed overlap; even among the numerous denominations of the Christian Church the attitude to each ceremony alters. When discussing the value of shared cultural understanding and language it is these ideas that are being referenced. A group understanding allows communities to come together and celebrate human rites of passage in a way that is relevant to their local experience, and it is in that way that common language and practice can be viewed as being of value to individuals within a community. In relation to the overall purpose of this thesis, this approach presents a valuable lesson: the importance of recognising both universal ideas as
well as their local translations. To be more specific, as this thesis demonstrates the existence of ideas of internal self-law giving and external willkür in different cultural and ideological stand points, it also recognises that these ideas are presented in culturally specific guises that relate to the local experiences of each author referenced. The general idea may indeed be universally relevant but the approach to recognising and supporting these ideas differs from location to location, culture to culture, or ideology to ideology.

Parekh further emphasises this point. He stresses throughout his work the existence of a distinction between “cultural” and “human” identifiers:

“Human beings are at once both natural and cultural beings, sharing a common human identity but in a culturally mediated manner. They are similar and different, their similarities and differences do not passively coexist but interpenetrate, and neither is ontologically prior or morally more important. We cannot ground equality in human uniformity because the latter is inseparable from and ontologically no more important than human difference” (Parekh, 2002, p.243).

Thus, for Parekh, it is equally important for us to recognise both universal and culturally relative practices of identity formation. In relation to this thesis: it is equally important to consider not only whether theorists value the potentially human desire to be self-law giving, but also how they achieve this within culturally specific environments. Parekh’s discussion of the relationship between both human and cultural identities responds to this concern; it is suggested that it is possible to accept the existence of a number of shared universals whilst also recognising differences in approach to these for different cultural groups. As discussed in Section 2.2 Parekh refers to culturally specific ways of realising the universal right to religious freedom.

On debating questions of shared identity, critics often claim that anthropological observations have found that individuals existing within a cultural group do not always support and undergo the same rites of passage as the culture dictates. To take an example from British culture: legally Britain is a Christian state, and Christianity commands recognition of the value of marriage. It also implies a sense of value of individuals undergoing the ceremony of marriage before cohabiting. However, an ever increasing number of British people cohabit prior to marriage, even denouncing the necessity of marriage more generally; thus implying that they are not being influenced in this way by
the Christian culture. This situation inspires two responses: the first, that culture is fluid and adaptable, and as discussion of Barry’s views suggested in Section 2.3, capable of change, to be more relevant to the modern world. The second response is adapted from Appiah:

“It may well be that some people, even some groups, do not share the values that are enunciated in public and taught to children. But, once more, the standard values are universally known, and even those who do not share them know what it would be to act in conformity with them and probably do so much of the time” (Appiah, 1997, p.626).

He argues that, the fact that all members of a cultural group may not share the values and aims of that group, does not suggest that those values are not widely understood. In the majority of cases even those individuals who do not involve themselves in the practices, will at the very least know of their existence and may passively be a part of them from time to time. For example, a British person who does not see the value of a Christian wedding will still have been taught about it at school and may attend a wedding as a guest at some point in their lives. To summarise, according to both Appiah and Parekh, and in support of the views of Gyekye already discussed in the previous section (Section 2.3), culture can be viewed as a locally specific lens for understanding the complexities of individual human existence. It provides the tools required to respond to issues that are universally relevant. Culture is not however, simply a way of being human; both local and universal experiences have value in and of themselves and dictate the ways in which individuals live their lives. Thus, according to these arguments, shared language and identity are important factors in understanding the makeup of individual experience; they are not simply parts of human existence that can be annexed without just cause.

In the preceding sections discussion has dealt with definitions of culture; fears surrounding certain practices that are detrimental to overall human well-being; and the value of shared identities to overall human experience. The final section of this literature review asks the direct question: Why do we compare cultures? It also questions the existence of universal foundational principles. Its purpose is to summarise the body of literature considered in the preceding four sections and to provide the justification for the overall project of this thesis: asking whether the notions of internal self-law giving and external willkür are foundational principles of personhood shared by human communities from different cultural, ideological,
and geographical backgrounds. To summarise: whether they are universal principles rather than culturally specific values.

2.5- Conclusion: A Comparative Approach to Culture:

This section will go into greater detail regarding the thesis’s approach to comparative work before explaining the placement of this chapter in the remainder of the thesis, and the work this chapter does in the thesis. It also further reiterates the potential original contribution the thesis can offer to the body of literature covered by cultural studies and political theory, as previously referred to in the Introduction.

To progress this discussion further, attention now turns to the academic study of culture. Geert Hofstede argues that the study of culture is often divided along the lines of searching for either similarities or differences between groups. To clarify, when engaging in comparative analysis academics approach the study from a base assumption that they are looking for either similarities or differences between cultures:

“The comparison of cultures presupposes that there is something to be compared- that each culture is not so unique that any parallel with another culture is meaningless. Throughout the history of the study of culture there has been a dispute between those stressing the unique aspects and those stressing the comparable aspects” (Hofstede, 2001, p.24).

He suggests that the two positions, a “difference based approach” and a “similarities based approach” cover the majority of comparative studies of culture. As the names imply, the first approach is based on the assumption that when undertaking a comparative study of two or more cultures, the point of academic interest is elements in which the groups differ. The latter approach, however, suggests that interest lies in discovering and understanding similarities that may exist between the cultural groups. This thesis falls into the second category; whilst recognising that differences between cultures are both normatively and empirically interesting, the question of the project is to ask whether the concepts of internal self-law giving and external willkür are valued across cultural boundaries as shared foundational principles of humanity, and thus what is being looked for between cultures can be categorised as similarities.

Cultural engagement is, as has become clear throughout this chapter, a widely debated topic. Arguments have been considered both for and against comparison of ideas from different cultures; justifications for both criticising and ignoring practices external to our
cultural understanding, and concerns regarding the ethnocentrism of those embarking on cross-cultural studies, have been discussed. The review of the literature has covered a wide variety of discussion of approaches to the study and understanding of culture, as well as the question of whether diverse cultural groups should and can speak to one another. However, very little research exists in the political theory and cultural studies canons in which the conditions are established or debated for these cultures to interact through fair and just cross-cultural dialogue. Although Taylor, Friedman and Gyekye do discuss certain factors they see as necessary; assuming the culture in question has something to offer, and not approaching studies of other cultures from a position already tainted by ethnocentrism. They do not discuss what it is about humanity that enables individuals to recognise themselves in one another and thus makes them want to engage in cross-cultural dialogue.

It is the aim of this thesis to offer a potential solution to this dilemma. Similarly to Barry, Gyekye, Wiredu, Parekh, Taylor and Gutman, this thesis disagrees with the logic of the Incommensurability Thesis and extreme relativism. Instead, it argues that cross-cultural dialogue is both desirable, and necessary for a number of reasons. This project offers one suggestion as to why different cultures can, as Nagel suggested, recognise one another as sharing and possessing common values as members of the same species; there is an a priori philosophical underpinning in which a common trait of personhood is a desire to be masters of one’s own destiny, a principle that is not specific to one cultural group, but rather, a metaphysical point around which debates take place between different cultural groups (both large groups such as states or nations, or smaller minorities at risk of being homogenised by a dominant culture) claiming this right in response to oppression, or simply as a form of self-determination. Each of these groups may respond differently to the question of internal and external self-law giving, and view the effects of human well-being through different ideological lenses, but, nonetheless, these two metaphysical points act as foundations around which these debates take place, as being universally important factors of individual personhood for spatially individuated persons.

To conclude, this thesis, like many of the theorists discussed in this chapter, accepts culture to be man-made: created by humanity as a method of responding to the universal questions facing individuals, based on the environmental and temporal conditions in which humans find themselves. Therefore, the overarching purpose of culture can be defined as advancing human well-being. It is a commonly held belief that human well-being is the central purpose of cultures, some of which are more, or less, equipped to deliver on this. We can therefore enter into discussion and critique of cultures based on whether they
increase or decrease overall human well-being. It is the argument of this thesis that human well-being is entrenched in the understanding of a human right of reasoned persons to define the laws by which they exist in common with all others. To enable recognition of this right, individuals require conditions for just and fair cross-cultural dialogue in which cultures can interact equally without facing assumptions regarding their value as being lesser or greater than others: the foundations for which can be grounded on the understanding that respect for self-mastery, as a right, is central to the uptake of cross-cultural dialogue.
Chapter 3- Négritude:

“I should like to show that this poetry- which seems racial at first- is actually a hymn by everyone for everyone” (Sartre, 1964, p.16).

As was discussed in Chapter 1, according to Kant the only way for autonomous agents to realise their individual personhood is through the free expression of their individual reason, within a system that respects them as being self-law giving agents that should be able to live directed by their own purposiveness. Freedom is not something that can be given but only something that individuals can realise for themselves through a process of “enlightenment” (Kant, 1784). For contemporary Kantians, all individuals have the capacity to be reasoned self-law givers, and a right to be treated as such. Simultaneously, it is the duty of each individual to overcome their natural passions and to be guided by reason, to enable them to truly realise their freedom as autonomous agents; whilst also recognising the importance of respecting the same freedom in others, and avoiding dominating or interfering with them. It is the role of the state to ensure a condition of public right, in which individuals can realise their freedom and express their personal choice in the direction their lives take, without the fear of domination by either the state or other individuals. The State should, according to Kantians, guarantee this level of freedom equally for all citizens. This is the sole purpose and justification for the state.

What follows in the ensuing three chapters is a discussion of the views of African theorists divided into two sections. The first part (Part 1) including two chapters, the second part (Part 2) consisting of one chapter. The postulate at the centre of each of these chapters is to ask whether these Kantian ideas (summarised in the previous paragraph) are replicated or implied in the writings of the individuals studied, or whether the debates they enter into within their writings, responding to issues of oppression, focus around these metaphysical points. The aim being to answer the research question of this thesis: can these ideas (internal self-law giving and external willkūr) be found in the work of this selection of African theorists, thus enabling the claim to be made that they may be foundational principles of humanity on which we could premise a framework for just and fair cross-cultural dialogue?

Throughout, it is assumed that the views of the discussed authors are those of themselves alone. Regardless of the claims they make to speak for Africans as a collective, this thesis recognises the views as being theirs alone, and not the opinion of Africans more generally.
In fact, this criticism will be dealt with throughout the following chapters as successive theorists make claims to speak for Africa in general. This is a particular concern with the work of Léopold Sédar Senghor, analysed in this chapter.

When carrying out this research, no presumptions were made regarding the methods that would be advocated for, or the language in which these would be expressed. In particular, it was not assumed that the language used would replicate that of Kantian theorists. As was suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, this thesis recognises that advocating for a position suggesting a human commitment to be self-law giving does not require that in each cultural situation principles are represented in the same way. In contrast, this thesis argues that the methods for recognising this right are specific to different cultural and ideological situations, but, that they share an a priori assumption in the value of being self-law giving and self-mastering on the individual level. Therefore, the following chapters use the framework presented in Chapter 1 as a lens through which to look for similar ideas to self-law giving: not assuming that these will be identically expressed, in the work of three groups of theorists. It is argued, that each group may recognise, through different forms of expression, a right of all autonomous agents to be self-law giving, and a corresponding duty of states to create a public sphere in which this right can be realised equally by all autonomous agents. It is the argument of this thesis that this claim strongly resonates with Kantian ideas and that there exists between these theorists, and the Kantian framework established in Chapter 1, a basic philosophical connection sharing a key foundational belief which it is possible to postulate, exists a priori.

Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the articles, monographs, speeches and in some cases novels and poems of activists and statesmen philosophers writing in the period towards the end, and directly following, colonialism (late 1940’s- 1970’s). Each chapter also considers the secondary literature surrounding these theorists’ ideas. What ties these two chapters together is their focus on the views of activists and philosopher statesmen in that aforementioned time period. This sets them apart from Chapter 5, which focuses instead, on the views and arguments of contemporary philosophers and scholars.

Besides the primary focus on the views of statesmen and activists, there is a second theme that is common to the first two chapters, and is the basis for their coupling. Theorists that advocated for both the philosophical concept of Négritude (Chapter 3), and an African form of socialism (Chapter 4), were to a lesser or greater extent also associated with the Pan-Africanism movement, a movement that still exists today. The movement originated in the
late 1890’s, early 1900’s, in the diaspora. However, it became particularly popular in the 1920’s when it was associated with the academic writings of W.E.B DuBois, and the activism of Edward Blyden and Marcus Garvey. The movement was grounded in feelings of oppression, alienation and loss of dignity. Thus, to “regain dignity is the mainspring of all their actions… the intellectual superstructure of Pan-Africanism has meaning only if one constantly reminds oneself that at its roots lie these deep feelings of dispossession, oppression, persecution and rejection” (Legum, 1965, p.15). The second strand of the pan-African movement consisted of African political figures; it will be these that this thesis will focus on as the interesting debates and movements taking place in the diaspora are outside the remit of this project.

The second strand of the Pan-African movement was, like the first, rooted in three key themes: alienation, the necessity to reassert dignity and a shared sense of unity between all African people. For the political class however, this constituted more than a philosophical goal. It also established the conditions to progress towards the federalisation of the African continent. In the late 1950’s, as a greater number of African states began to gain their independence, there was a political move from figures such as Léopold Sédar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, to name a few, to federate (to a greater or lesser extent) to create a collective movement that was not pro-West, pro-communism, pro-nationalism, but was instead “pro-African” (Legum, 1965, p.13). Leaders from across the political and ideological spectrum, supporting national states grounded in democracy, one-party politics, socialism and capitalism, were willing to set aside differences in the name of a Pan-African state. However, the underlying differences in leadership put a strain on this relationship. Whilst there was a shared belief in the unity of all Africans, the movement was riddled with issues of political contestation between the various leaders of the newly independent states. As just one example of the problems that existed at the heart of the movement: the open borders policy between socialist Tanzania and capitalist Kenya were founded on fundamental differences, and short lived: “Between 1975 and 1985 the East African Community folded, the border between Tanzania and Kenya was closed and Tanzania went to war with Uganda” (Smyth and Seftel, 1998, p.246) to remove Idi Amin from power and reinstate Milton Obote.

Not only were there these issues arising between the states, regarding their abilities to work collectively, there was also a question of what exactly each state wanted the outcomes of a unified Africa to be. Was it a political ideal? Or was the goal of collaboration
only for the purposes of economic security? Why should the leaders that had fought so hard in the anti-colonial struggles, give up the sovereignty they had just won? Who would lead a federalised continent? For these reasons the various charters detailing the plans for a unified continent (Casablanca, Sanniquellie, and Monrovia) fell through, and the Pan-African dream was never realised. However, the underlying philosophical grounding of all Pan-African movements (a response to alienation and the necessity to reassert a human right to dignity) make them particularly interesting to this thesis’s research. Unfortunately, it is outside the remit of this thesis to cover all movements and theorists espousing Pan-African views. Instead, the two movements selected (Négritude and African socialism) are associated with the anti-colonial struggle and, in the case of the Négritude movement, support a narrative of “return” approach to the study and application of political progress in Africa.

A “return” approach emphasises the valuable lessons that can be learnt from an often excessively glorified past, and recommends a political model for the future focusing on a return to traditional values and approaches. In her discussion of this approach, Susan Ireland refers to a “variety of forms, including nostalgic evocations of childhood memories, undesired departures, and the symbolic return to cultural traditions associated with the past” (Ireland, 2004, p.24). The focus of this discussion will be on the third of those definitions; symbolic returns to past cultural traditions. This concept is of particular interest to this thesis due to its focus on the past, and the re-establishment of traditional ideas. Thus, inclusion in this thesis not only allows for the analysis of the theorists views of how a future Africa should look, but also their approach to understanding the historic (pre-colonial) approaches to understanding personhood. This is not to suggest that their interpretation is a factually accurate account of the past, but rather that their interpretation itself is interesting for the purposes of analysis as it enables the thesis to question what values they felt should be constant.

With the exception of Frantz Fanon (who is somewhat of an anomaly in his approach, and is discussed in the final section of this chapter), each of the individuals included in this chapter have been associated, at one point or another, with the concept of a narrative of “return”; in which they recommend a return to the, often imagined, glorious African past. As previously stated, a narrative of “return” is a philosophical practice which looks to “history as a moral force from which societies drink deep in order to reconstruct their consciousness and their identity, a moral reincarnation that precedes their regaining
control of their future” (Jewsiewicki, 1992, p.96). In doing this, not only did they recommend a return to a glorious past, but also one which is shared by all individuals of African heritage. They, “claim that people of African descent, wherever they live, have and should rediscover common socio-cultural traditions derived from their shared origins” (Howe, 1999, p.25). Abiola Irele referred to the approach, as an “instinctive falling back on tradition in the face of political domination...especially among educated Africans” (Irele, 1965, p.324), such as those considered in this chapter: Léopold Sédar Senghor, Alioune Diop, Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas. Ireland makes reference to, “a discourse of desire, a desire to recuperate, repair, and return” (Ireland, 2004, p.24). She suggests that these ideas do not only relate to a notion of looking backwards, but rather use this approach to rebuild and repair for the future. In the cases of the authors considered in this chapter, the notion of repairing and rebuilding for the future through a backward looking lens is very much central to their approach, and will be discussed in detail as the chapter progresses: especially in relation to Senghor. As will become clear throughout the chapter, a number of these “return” narratives justify their approach on the grounds of their value in delivering self-determination to the African people. The groundings of this debate will be analysed within the body of the chapter to assess the similarities with the Kantian approach posed by this thesis.

In contrast to the concepts of Pan-Africanism and “return” narratives, the theorists analysed in Chapter 5 are professional philosophers examining contemporary issues that affect African societies. The focus of this chapter is to ask whether the debates they enter into have a similar foundational focus to those discussed by this thesis. The selection of theorists approaching the topics from different standpoints (philosopher statesmen and activists in Part 1, and professional scholars in Part 2) creates the conditions for comparison between the two halves of this thesis. As suggested in the Introduction, by demonstrating the existence of an underlying philosophical grounding in works associated with different backgrounds and purposes, greater evidence can be proffered for the existence of these principles as existing a priori. The individuals whose work is analysed in Chapter 5 are philosophers and political theorists, emanating from an academic tradition, writing in the period between 1980 and the current day. Again, these ideas will be supplemented with secondary literature, often coming from their contemporaries, and debates surrounding their interpretations. The theorists studied will include, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Paulin J. Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, to mention a few. The purpose of each of these chapters is to question whether it is possible to interpret notions of internal self-law
giving and external willkür in these African thinkers, and in the way they deal with the colonial and post-colonial periods. In each case, the conclusion has been drawn that it is possible to interpret the existence of the Kantian themes, presented in Chapter 1, as existing in the work of the theorists analysed in the following three chapters. In each example studied, these ideas are presented differently, based on their individual and cultural differences, but similarities still exist with the foundational principles of internal self-law giving and external willkür. To clarify, this thesis locates the presence of these ideas in theories that are external to the Western Enlightenment tradition, and argues that their existence within these schools of thought provides the evidence to imply their potentially universal relevance.

Having introduced the structure of the following three chapters, focus now turns to the topic of this current chapter: Négritude. The focus of this chapter is on analysing the speeches, poems, and political monographs of the politicians, philosophers and poets of the Négritude movement. The Négritude movement originated amongst the educated elite emanating from the African and Caribbean colonies and studying in Paris in the late 1930’s-1940’s. It was a poetic, literary, philosophical, cultural and political response to the colonial situation. The focus of this chapter is on analysing the works of predominantly members of the African movement with the notable exception of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon. The primary source materials for this chapter are the writings (scholarly, fictional and poetic) and speeches of Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Alioune Diop and Frantz Fanon.

A comprehensive introduction to each of these theorists, as well as the overall movement, is detailed in Section 3.1. This chapter is presented in the following six sections: Section 3.1 is an introduction to Négritude, including a discussion of why this movement was selected for analysis, more detailed information regarding its origins and key publications and an historical account of the key authors. Section 3.2 considers the artistic and cultural turn, and the role of poetry in establishing a response to oppression, as well as the value and role of culture in directing the purpose of politics and shaping political goals. Section 3.3 reflects on the concept of Otherness as it is presented by these theorists and the role and affects it had on their experience of independence and freedom. The penultimate section (Section 3.4) analyses the concept of the Universal Civilisation as it is presented by Senghor, Diop, and to a lesser extent Césaire, as well as the role and influence of key publication “Présence Africaine”. The final substantive section (Section 3.5) discusses criticisms of the
movement, considering critiques both from contemporary authors, as well as issues raised by Frantz Fanon. Section 3.6 summarises and concludes the chapter, reiterating the parallels that have been drawn with the Kantian framework across the previous five sections. As previously suggested, the primary focus of this chapter is to respond to the question of whether the theorists studied demonstrate a belief in the equal value and right of all individuals to be self-law giving, and able to live in a political condition under which they are able to express their purposiveness, as expressed in Chapter 1. A secondary question is also raised querying whether the theorists demonstrate a belief, or active political attempt, to create a political system in which these conditions can be guaranteed.

3.1- Introduction: What is Négritude:

This section first answers the question of why Négritude was selected as a relevant school of thought for analysis in this thesis, followed by a brief factual account of the lives of each of the theorists selected as representing the movement. The purpose of which is to examine the historical and individual contexts under which they were writing which may have influenced their views. Included within this discussion is an introductory account of the works of Frantz Fanon and an explanation of his inclusion in this chapter. The introduction to the theorists precedes a detailed account of the movement itself and the role it played in the lives of the people involved.

i. Why Négritude

It is necessary to first establish why this movement was selected as a relevant topic for analysis within this thesis. As suggested in the Introduction, the selection of texts for study was a major element of this piece of work, and a particular focus was placed on selecting philosophers and political figures from a diverse range of cultural and ideological perspectives. However, it was also deemed fundamental to analyse reactionary and revolutionary philosophies as one of the key elements of this thesis, both as a result of the time period being studied (colonial and post-colonial eras), and the comparative focus of this thesis on issues of autonomy, personhood, and self-mastery. Négritude, whilst its interpretation differs between theorists, can be understood to be, at some level, either a reactionary or a revolutionary theory. Therefore, if within an approach that places such an emphasis on reacting and responding to issues of oppression and domination it is impossible to discover underlying principles similar to those advanced by a Kantian model, it would then be problematic to declare the existence of these principles as potentially a priori universals. Additionally, the movement, as will become clear throughout this chapter,
was explicitly both a cultural and political project, that aimed to build on both elements as a way of inspiring and entering into discourse with their audience. The combination of both elements adds a further level of interest for this thesis, as it provides the material for analysis of questions of the relationship between political norms and culture, and the interactions between them. It is for these reasons that the Négritude movement was selected as being of interest to the overall hypothesis of this thesis.

Whilst carrying out the research for this project, it became clear that the authors of the Négritude movement did emphasise in their poems, speeches and academic works the importance for individuals to be self-mastering, equal, and autonomous. It is the role of this chapter to share this analysis and to indicate the difference in approaches recommended for realising these principles because, as stated in Chapter 1, their expression is not always found to be in Kantian terms. It is only in carrying out detailed interpretive textual analysis that it is possible to locate the existence of culturally relative examples of similar ideas.

Selection of the authors to be included as primary source material was based on research into which thinkers are commonly understood to be representational of the movement. What it means for them to be representational relates to a number of factors. Firstly included are those associated with founding the movement; secondly, those authors associated with predominant publications focusing on Négritude; and finally, those involved in key debates regarding the value of Négritude as a movement. A brief introduction to each of these authors (Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Alioune Diop, and Frantz Fanon), is included in the following paragraphs, as way of introduction to the historical situations in which they lived, and were influenced by.

**ii. Key Figures and Texts**

Léopold Sédar Senghor was the first president of independent Senegal, from the year of independence in 1960 until his retirement in 1980. Before taking the presidency he had favoured a system of federalisation of the ex-French colonies, and the formation of a French commonwealth. However, due to the unpopularity of this model amongst his contemporaries, he attempted to form the Mali Federation with Modibo Keita; a system of cooperation between Senegal and the French Sudan (present day Mali), of which he was president until its failure in 1960 and his accession to President of Senegal. Throughout his presidency, Senegal remained a socialist state with strong ties to France. However, following his resignation in 1980 the state moved towards a mixed party system as his adamant support for a socialist model was no longer present. From an academic
perspective, Senghor was the first African scholar to be admitted to the French Academy. He published the majority of his work in French, and remained until his death (in 2001) a strong advocate of the Francophone. Much of his early work, founding the Négritude movement and authoring texts discussing its value, took place in Paris, where he gained his formal education and met the other members of the early movement, including Aimé Césaire.

Aimé Césaire was born on the Caribbean island of Martinique in 1913 and (like Senghor) was educated in Paris where he started the paper “L’Étudiant Noir” (The Black Student), with Senghor and Damas. He published a vast collection of poetry, plays, non-fiction articles and books through the paper, as well as independently, and with the support of the journal “Présence Africaine”. He returned to Martinique in 1937, taking a teaching role where he met and taught Frantz Fanon. As an adamant socialist he remained committed throughout his writings to left wing ideals and in 1945 he successfully ran for Mayor of Fort-de-France on the communist ticket. However, based on a disagreement with the French Communist Party’s treatment of former colonies he, in line with his political beliefs in the value of individuals, publicly resigned from the party, denouncing their treatment of colonised peoples, in 1956.

Léon Damas, born in French Guiana, is viewed by many as the third of the three father figures of Négritude (alongside Senghor and Césaire). His most famous publication, and the one included for analysis in this chapter, is the poetry anthology “Pigments” (1937). He had a brief foray into politics in 1948 when he was elected to the French National Assembly; however he retired this role in 1951, and moved into a career in teaching until his death in 1978. He was selected for study in this thesis due to his role in founding the cultural side of the movement, as well as the evocative imagery and strong political stance grounding his poetry. It is through his work that the relationship between the cultural and the political becomes particularly clear, as he makes use of artistic and cultural forms of expression to respond to explicitly political debates surrounding oppression and autonomy. Analysis of this takes place in Section 3.2.

Alioune Diop was born in Senegal in 1910, a writer and poet and the founder of the journal “Présence Africaine”. The journal was one of the key publications of the movement, with many of the texts published either in the magazine itself or through the associated publishing house. He also went on to run a publishing house of the same name. His main role in the movement was in promoting the values and strengths of Black culture, and in
doing so he formed the Society of African Culture in 1956. He also worked with other members of the movement to organise the first celebratory conference of Black culture in Paris in 1956. The conference and his work more generally, played an influential role in bringing together thinkers, poets, authors and artists and on raising awareness of the cultural side of the movement.

The final theorist considered in this chapter is Frantz Fanon. Born in Martinique in 1925 and educated there under Césaire he became a famous revolutionary, and an active member of the Algerian revolution. The year 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of both Fanon’s death and the publication of his final text “Les Damnés de la Terre” (1961) (The Wretched of the Earth). His revolutionary work has been divisive, gaining both adamant supporters and firm critics. His placement in an academic movement has also been somewhat problematic. His work crosses the boundaries of psychiatry, political theory and revolutionary propaganda, and is both highly critical of movements such as Négritude, whilst at the same time being associated with them. He, as an author, has been counted amongst the movement’s members within much of the secondary literature. Thus, locating Fanon’s work amongst his contemporaries is incredibly challenging, and it is for this reason he is being dealt with somewhat separately, as both a critic of the Négritude movement, but also a member, in Section 3.5. In the last five years there has been a notable resurgence in publications discussing his work, as a result of the 50th anniversary. A number of journals chose to celebrate with special issues discussing his life works and experiences. “Theory, Culture and Society’s” December 2010 issue was titled “Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth 50 Years On” and included a variety of articles both supporting, utilising and condemning Fanon’s work; endeavouring to “asses how this study reads 50 years on” (Bell, 2010, p.7). As a supporter of the colonial struggle and the emancipatory value of violence (which is discussed in Section 3.5), as well as a direct dissenter of the worth of French rule in Algeria, his work has at times been near silenced in Western circles. That is, until this recent celebration in which his work has received mainstream approval and academic respect. As suggested, in recent history (the past 5 years) Fanon’s work has become the focus of theorists working in postcolonial studies, African studies, and political theory, with a number of articles, such as Achille Mbembe’s 2012 publication “Metamorphic Thought: The Works of Frantz Fanon”, suggesting that the writings of this great activist remain relevant to political and psychological debate today. Similarly, Hart and Negri (2009) chose to adopt a Fanonian model for their discussion of the Commonwealth, further signifying the embodiment of his views in contemporary academic parlance. As a result of this recent interest in Fanon’s
work, it was decided that it would be remiss to exclude him from this thesis, and that a
discussion of his work through a Kantian lens would offer interesting insights to the
potential foundational similarities between Kantian ideas and revolutionary discourse, and
further the current academic debate in this area.

The role of all the theorists covered in this chapter as philosophers, poets, literary figures
and in certain cases political figureheads, makes them particularly interesting for the
purposes of this research. There is scope to analyse, not only whether they posit a belief in
the right of individuals to be self-law giving in an internal sense (within the private domain),
but also whether (in the case of the political figureheads Senghor and Césaire), they argue
for a state duty to implement a political condition under which this right can be met for all
autonomous agents (a condition similar to that of the Kantian notion of public right).
Furthermore, the opportunity exists to analyse their actual political influence, and to
question whether they were successful in implementing the favourable political conditions
they made claims to support. Thus, there are three elements to the analysis of the thinkers
covered in this chapter: questioning whether the theorists advocate for, or enter into,
debates surrounding the value of internal self-law giving as a right and duty of humanity,
questioning whether through their writing, both political and cultural, they support a
political condition in which these rights can be realised, and finally analysing whether, in
the case of political figures, the thinkers implemented a political system under which the
individual rights of the citizenry, to self-mastery and choice, were recognised and
supported.

The majority of works published under the Négritude banner (both cultural and political)
were associated with the newspaper “L’Étudiant Noir”; political journal “Présence
Africaine”, “the journal founded in 1947 by the Senegalese intellectual Alioune Diop”
(Macey, 2010, p.39); and the anthology, edited by Léopold Sédar Senghor, “Anthologie de
la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Francaise” (Anthology of New Black
Poetry In the French Language) (1948). The first publication of “L’Étudiant Noir”, in 1935,
was the work of Damas, Senghor, and Césaire, achieved whilst they were studying together
in Paris. It is widely referred to in the literature as the origin of the movement. The first
published use of the actual word Négritude was in the third issue of the paper, in an article
written by Césaire. It was declared at the time that it represented a personal understanding
of an individual’s Blackness, a notion of consciously coming to terms with one’s colour, and
an expression of pride in said colour. The direct English translation of Négritude is
Blackness, and it is often associated with a racialized response to being a member of a human community. That being said, it is important at this stage to clarify the usage of the terms Black and Blackness as they will be used throughout this chapter. The terms are referred to as a form of self-defined identity couched in racial terms, as they are presented by the authors, and they are treated as such throughout this thesis. For this reason, I have selected to capitalise their usage to recognise them as terms of self-identification.

Throughout the different essays, poems and speeches the central theme that becomes apparent on reading the various literature is a sense of pride in what is presented by the authors as a shared identity, enforced by a (as they portray it) Blackness, or for Senghor, a sense of shared African-ness. Not only what it means to be a member of a Black community, but also the social, political, cultural and individual repercussions of being a member of a community that has been consistently devalued, degraded and silenced over a long period of time: their views, and forms of expression criticised, or worse, ignored. Négritude, as it was first formulated in Paris, was a response to these acts of silencing and condemnation.

As previously suggested, a number of texts and conferences were viewed as the primary cultural and political outputs of the movement. The “Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Francaise” resulted from two conferences held in Paris (1956) and Rome (1959), which famously brought together for the first time Black artists, poets and literary figureheads to show each other, and the world, that Black culture was valuable and should be recognised as such: not because it was exotic, but because these individuals had valuable contributions to make to the cultural outputs of humanity. The 1956 conference was convened by Alioune Diop, and was the first of a number of cultural projects he established to raise awareness of the value and quality of the arts, literature and culture, emanating from this group. Diop was also the editor in chief of “Présence Africaine”, the role and value of which will be discussed in detail in Section 3.4. Damas, Senghor and Césaire also published individual monographs, poetry collections and works of fiction focused on the topic of the freedom of the colonised. Senghor’s five volume masterpiece, “Liberté” (Liberty), discussed the topics of socialism (1983), dialogue between cultures (1993), The Universal Civilisation and Négritude (1977), and Humanism and Négritude (1964). This chapter will analyse translations and extracts from Volumes 1 and 3 “Négritude and Humanism” and “Négritude and the Universal Civilisation”, through a Kantian lens. It will also focus on the poetic, and non-fiction works, of Césaire, Diop, Damas and a number of further articles and speeches from Senghor.
Aimé Césaire’s “Discours sur le colonialisme” (Discourse on Colonialism) (1955) was viewed as a seminal text of the movement. It was described by Robin Kelley as being “full of flares, full of anger, full of humour. It is not a solution or a strategy or a manual or a little red book with pithy quotes. It is a dancing flame in a bonfire” (Kelley, 2000, p.10). The text focuses throughout on an assumed pride in realising one’s Blackness, whilst also expressing a sense of animosity towards Europe: an element of the literature that has become synonymous with the movement, in particular work emanating from the Caribbean. Throughout the text, Césaire draws similarities between the treatment of the colonies by Europe and the violence and despair caused by the Nazi party in the 1930s and 40s. In contrast to Senghor’s work, the text is sceptical of future collaborations with Europe. “Discourse on Colonialism” is one of the key texts being analysed in this chapter, and the question is raised as to whether it shares similar philosophical underpinnings with the Kantian concepts of internal and external self-law giving.

Similarly to the anti-colonial undertones associated with Césaire’s work, Damas’s poetry deals with the pain and fear associated with the colonial experience. His first published collection, “Pigments” (1937), in particular, focused on the treatment of colonised people by their oppressors and the damaging effect this has had on their existence. The poems often placed specific focus on issues of domination and oppression, and the efforts of the colonisers to define an identity for the colonised that failed to take into account their individual autonomy and purpose. In contrast to the critical element of his work, it was also viewed as a central part of the recovery of African self-esteem. For that reason, analysing these poems is critical to understanding the emancipatory value of this movement. By drawing comparisons with the analytical framework of this thesis, it is possible to understand on what grounds emancipatory claims are being made. A number of the poems from the “Pigments” anthology, as well as some of Césaire’s work, are analysed in Section 3.2 which focuses on the cultural side of the movement: both the poetry, prose and plays of some of the authors, as well as the role that cultural elements were seen as playing amongst Négritude scholars are discussed in this section, and analysed in relation to the themes of self-mastery, equality and choice.

As previously discussed, the movement predominantly consisted of educated members of the African elite and, as with many of these movements; it was broadly questioned by critics how representative these views were of the general populace. This critique (amongst others) will be discussed, in depth in Section 3.5. However, it is raised here as fundamental
to understanding the movement itself. In relation to both the cultural and political sides of the movement, the majority of work was published in French rather than the vast number of local African languages spoken conversationally by the majority of people. In choosing to publish in the language of the colonisers, this not only reduced the number of theorists involved in the movement but also the accessibility of the work to individuals unable to speak the formal language of the colonial experience. Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o made similar criticisms of poets and literary figures choosing to publish in English, suggesting that this choice further established the colonisers power as “the domination of a people’s language by the languages of the colonising nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonised” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.16). It was his opinion (one that is considered in Chapter 5), that selection of a none local language played a fundamental role in the systematic domination of a class of people, as being less worthy than their French, English or Portuguese speaking counterparts. On this argument Négritude, whilst intended to be an emancipatory cultural and political project, was only achieving this role for the educated classes and not for those individuals worst affected by the systematic domination.

In contrast to the views of Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, Abiola Irele claimed that it was the role of the educated elites to represent the views of those that, he deemed, unable to represent themselves. Thus according to his interpretation: “Négritude has a popular precedent in Africa; it can be seen as an articulation by an educated elite of sentiments that were felt and confusedly expressed by humbler folk” (Irele, 1965, p.32). Whilst on the surface this view can be read as the elites representing the views of the people, it can also be seen as a patronising view of the general populace that fails to take into account their autonomy to represent themselves. This concern remains at the centre of the analysis, not only in this chapter but in relation to all the thinkers analysed in this thesis. For that reason (as mentioned in Chapter 1), when analysing their arguments in relation to the value of practices of self-law giving, it will be assumed that the authors represent their views alone, and no assumptions will be made regarding the extent to which the citizenry is represented. This will be the assumption throughout the next three chapters, although it is particularly relevant here as the thinkers regularly insinuated that their views were representative of “the people”.

**iii. The Movement Itself**

Having introduced the authors’ historical backgrounds, the focus of this section now turns to a more detailed discussion of Négritude itself. Négritude, as a political, artistic and
cultural movement, originated amongst the diaspora communities in Paris in the late 1930’s, amongst the West-African and Caribbean elite. It maintained its reactionary spirit, as an ideological damnation of the political and moral domination of the Western colonial enterprise until the start of the 1960’s. At this time the anti-colonial movement changed direction, placing greater focus on a political rather than a philosophical and cultural form of Pan-African response, or reaction, to colonialism. Unlike other anti-colonial movements, the response of Négritude to Europe was ideologically divided; many of the African theorists (unlike their counterparts in the Caribbean) working on the theory of Négritude, were less inclined to fully disassociate with the colonisers, and advocated instead for a peaceful retreat of colonial powers. They, in fact, supported the maintenance of relationships with the ex-powers and welcomed their support in the foundation of the new governments. This was particularly true for Senghor who, on becoming the first president of independent Senegal, maintained a strong political and academic relationship with France. He argued for a system of development supported by, and in collaboration with, Europe: “We must build our own development plan, based on European, socialist contributions and also on the best of Negro African civilisation” (Senghor, 1962, p. 60). He also suggested that having successfully re-built both individual states, and a federal state of Africa (his model and justifications for which are discussed in Section 3.4), they should remain “freely associated with France in a Confederation” (Senghor, 1962, p.15). In contrast, Caribbean authors such as Fanon and Césaire, were less supportive of a collaborative model. In fact, they condemned Europe as, “morally, spiritually indefensible” (Césaire, 2000, p.32). David Macey, in his account of the movement, recognised this divide as existing “between the négritude of Léopold Sédar Senghor- the movements major African spokesman- and his vision of an eternal Africa, and that of the Caribbean writers associated with it, who are much more influenced by both Marxism and surrealism” (Macey 2010, p.39). He suggested that not only was there a noticeable divide in the responses to Europe between the two groups, but also in the ideologies they were influenced by. It is on these grounds that the division between the two approaches begins to be seen. The ideological differences between the authors, and the idea of what Négritude, or a response to the colonial situation more generally, meant to them, as individuals, is discussed throughout the chapter, as each theorist is discussed not only as a part of a movement but also as an individual.

As previously discussed, Négritude consisted of artists, poets and political figureheads and was very much a two sided movement: the first being poetic and literary, the second
political and philosophical. It was understood to be an explicitly cultural-political project, in which both sides of the movement were valued both as valid expressions of thoughts and emotions, but also as reactions to the oppressive and degrading treatment of the colonisers: under which both political and artistic expression of Black people had been devalued or silenced. Césaire, when discussing the movement in terms of the political and social groundings was adamant that both himself and Senghor, “refused to see the Black question as simply a social question” (Césaire, 2000, p. 94). Rather, viewing it as encompassing culture, emotion, feeling, political fervour as well as a more individualised, emotional response. However, as suggested, beyond this basic understanding of a cultural-political project, what Négritude meant for each individual thinker differed, and it is to discussion of these differences that this sub-section now turns.

Senghor believed that the strength of the movement was in guiding Black people to recognise the value of their Blackness, and to use this to contribute to the future of not just Africa, but the world more generally. In defining this mission, he suggested that it was the role of Africans not only to shape their own future but rather to create a model suitable not only to fit “Africa and the twentieth century, but first of all to fit man” (Senghor, 1962, p.17). To reiterate, he claimed that it was the role of the Black man to “bring, like a leaven, his message to the world to help build a universal civilisation” (Senghor, 1962, p.85). On addressing these ideas it is possible to suggest that, for Senghor, the role of Négritude, as an expressly cultural-political movement, was intrinsically linked with his international political aims, to shape the wider global community. As is discussed in Section 3.4, he believed that it was Africa’s time to contribute to what he referred to as the Universal Civilisation. However, he believed, that to be able to achieve this, colonised groups not only needed to be granted their freedom by external forces, but also to come to terms with their own worth. It was this that he claimed was the role of Négritude: not only to define what it meant to be Black, but also to establish a sense of self-belief amongst Black individuals to enable them to share their knowledge and experience internationally. As commentator Barrend van Dyk Van Niekerk observed, for Senghor: Négritude is “the explanation and interpretation by the black man of his own position in the universe” (Barrend van Dyk Van Niekerk, 1970, p.100). It was viewed as an act of self-discovery that enabled individuals to position themselves in the world. In discussing Senghor’s approach as being one akin to an act of self-definition, parallels can be drawn between the philosophical underpinnings of the debates surrounding Senghorian Négritude, as a force for emancipation, and those proposed by this thesis as potentially a priori foundations. It is
clear from Senghor’s imagery, “bring like a leaven”, that the movement is an act of self-definition, and self-mastery. It is a personal act to bring, rather than to be given, one’s freedom, and this was at the heart of Senghor’s understanding of the movement he had helped to create. Similarly, at the heart of a Kantian framework is the value of choice and purposiveness. It is understood to be the right of all individuals to live, guided by the laws they establish for themselves, and a condition of “right” to be one under which “the external freedom of any person can coexist with that of all others according to universal law of freedom” (Pogge, 2012, p.78). Therefore, it is possible to draw parallels between Senghor’s argument for the creation of a Universal Civilisation defined by the autonomous rights of the people to define themselves, and the condition of public right under which this condition is guaranteed in common.

Césaire’s “Discourse on Colonialism” is a colourful discussion of the relationship between the colonised and the colonisers. It is not however only a discussion of the past, but also of the future and the requirements placed on both the colonised, and the colonisers, to move forward. According to Tsenay Serequeberhan’s interpretation of Césaire, he viewed Négritude as being inspirational to colonised people. He viewed it as a “coming to consciousness”, a method of “positively appropriating the term négre and overcoming the negativity imposed on it” (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.23). In advocating for political change, Césaire argued that the concept of “négre” had in the past often been associated (by the colonisers) with a sense of backwardness and a requirement to be socialised. However, at the point of writing, in the mid-1950’s, he argued that it was not the colonised but the coloniser that was in fact holding back progress:

“it is the indigenous peoples of Africa and Asia who are demanding schools, and colonialist Europe which refuses them; that it is the African who is asking for ports and roads, and colonialist Europe which is niggardly on this score; that it is the colonised man who wants to move forward, and the coloniser who holds things back” (Césaire, 2000, p.46).

Césaire made the following argument: colonised peoples were not in fact backwards, rather they were attempting to expedite progress, but they were limited in achieving this by those who maintained power over them. That being said, it was a matter of not only overcoming this limitation but also, as Serequeberhan observed, changing the understanding of both the colonised people themselves, and the outside world, of what it meant to be black. Césaire, and Senghor like him, felt that the Négritude movement had
the power to achieve that, to reaffirm self-belief and self-awareness amongst the oppressed Black people and to foster a process, of what could be called, enlightenment. Similarly to the Kantian understanding of the term, the thinkers argued that all Black individuals had the capacity to realise their self-value, but that this had been silenced within them. Thus, like the Kantian reliance on reason to achieve enlightenment, Césaire and Senghor relied on Négritude to reassert their sense of self-mastery and autonomy.

Césaire described Négritude as being both an individual feeling, and a public political act. In an interview with René Depestre, he discusses both elements. He suggested in the interview that the construction of Négritude, as relating to a feeling, was linked to its reference to an individual’s Blackness. Césaire argued that, an individual “either felt black or did not feel black” (Césaire, 2000, p.94) and, from an individualist perspective, that dictated what Négritude meant to them. To clarify, whether they felt they had an affinity with, or a need to be a part of, the movement. However, politically he saw the movement as both emancipatory and partisan: “Négritude was, after all, part of the left. I never thought for a moment that our emancipation could come from the right- that’s impossible...We both felt, Senghor and I, that our liberation placed us on the left” (Césaire, 2000, p.94). As an aside, it is worth noting that the relationship with the left is one that is shared not only between Senghor and Césaire but also with the theorists analysed in Chapter 4, who utilise a socialist approach to politics. This is further justification for their grouping together in Part 1 of this thesis. Throughout this chapter, the observation of Négritude as combining both internal and external factors, as being both political and cultural, is discussed in depth. However, it is raised at this stage to highlight the multifaceted nature of the movement, and the depth of its meaning beyond the boundaries of the definition of Blackness. The division between the individual understanding of a feeling and a “coming to consciousness”, contrasting with the external political bringing of self-belief to the world, is philosophically similar to the distinction between internal and external self-law giving. The inclusion of both an internal and an external element to the theory suggests that the philosophical underpinnings of the Négritude movement may share similarities with those of the Kantian framework discussed in this thesis. Uncovering these similarities is a key element of the remainder of this chapter, but at this stage it is merely raised to reiterate Césaire’s insistence on the value of Négritude as being multi-faceted.
In a discussion of the multiple layers of the movement, and its role as a form of expression, Duncan Bell makes the following observation of the situation of colonialism to which the movement was responding: “colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves repeatedly ‘in reality, who am I’” (Bell, 2010, p.7). Négritude, it is suggested, offers one response. It was a response by a group of individuals who claimed that who they were was largely dictated by their experiences as Black people, in a world that failed to respect them because of that fact. The response was intended to support the history and culture of Black people as valuable not only to themselves, but to the world as a whole. Whilst at the same time it was directed towards enhancing the self-belief of individuals and making political claims. It was in that sense an “abstract coming to consciousness” (Césaire, 2000, p.91). Césaire made the claim in “Discourse on Colonialism” that, “Negro heritage was worthy of respect and that this heritage was not relegated to the past. That its values were values that could still make an important contribution to the world” (Césaire, 2000, p.92). Thus, a fundamental element to the movement was, according to Césaire, the celebration and support of history and culture (an element discussed in greater depth in Section 3.2). As Stephen Howe commented, Négritude was, for the people involved in it as an active political movement, a “claim that people of African descent, wherever they live, have and should rediscover common socio-cultural traditions derived from their shared origins” (Howe, 1999, p.25). This commonality was, according to Césaire, grounded on a feeling for people who “felt black” and then became a cultural-political project shared by those individuals, intended to enable them to share their heritage and value with the world, in both a cultural and political sense.

Similarly to the claim made by Césaire that Négritude is to be understood as a feeling of what it means to be Black, Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk make the following observation: “Négritude, as a cultural concept is indefinable” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.98), in the sense that what it actually means to individuals differs greatly, and therefore it is impossible to properly define each individuals experience of what it feels like to come into consciousness as a Black person. Whilst there is a general agreement regarding its reference to the value and strength of individual Blackness, interpretations differ in analysis of what these values and strengths are, as well as in what it means to be Black. There are a number of areas in which the theorists demonstrate similarities in the views they present, not least, the assumption that it is a reactionary movement. As Irele observed in his discussion of the movements reactionary focus: “its literature and ideology afford an insight into the intimate process of the black reaction to the West (Irele, 1965, p.348). In
making this claim Irele’s article implies that the Négritude movement could not, and would not, have existed if it were not for the oppressive conditions imposed on colonised countries by the colonisers. This is not to suggest that the movement is of Western origins, but rather that its purpose was grounded on a need to react to colonialism, rather than an unprompted coming to consciousness. Having established the various meanings and aims of the movement, through the views of Senghor, Césaire and a range of secondary sources, the remainder of this section focuses on both the movements differing relationships with Europe, and briefly refers to a critique that will be fully expanded on in Section 3.5.

The critique is as follows. As with many approaches that appeal to a narrative of “return”, there is an unsubstantiated assumption amongst the primary sources that is highlighted by discussants such as Howe; an assumption that all Africans shared a sense of Blackness emanating from their shared history. It was this commonality which was, according to Senghor and Césaire, their Négritude. To clarify, each of these authors understood Négritude as having a core value to people of Black descent: as speaking to them in some way. For this reason, Négritude was criticised by figures such as Frantz Fanon (discussion of said criticism is located in Section 3.5) for limiting the potential of individuals to express choice in the shaping of their lives, as it presented an image of what it meant to be Black and expected people of all different backgrounds and experience to recognise something in that image. As a result of this, a number of splinter movements such as Creolite and Antillanite formed, which instead chose to focus on particularisms to their specific cultural experience, rather than shared universal Blackness. Antillanite, for example, focused on what it was that was special and valuable about the Caribbean experience.

Thus, as a revolutionary tool Négritude was both celebrated for its emancipatory fervour by Senghor and Césaire, and condemned by Frantz Fanon for enslaving Black people within the shackles of an already defined image, (a discussion which is the focus of Section 3.5). Unlike Fanon, the notion of a symbiosis between a people was viewed by supporters of the movement as a celebration. Although many supporters of Négritude identified that there was a failure to recognise the important differences that existed between the many groups of people, across countries and continents, who supposedly shared this underlying identity, they felt that the movement still possessed value. It was described by one commentator as:

“a blanket celebration of black culture regardless of the fact that many differences existed among peoples of different nations and continents. It was a whole movement devoted to the demonstration of an African
identity. Against the European’s sense of superiority and scepticism, there had to be self-assertion, equal and opposite” (July, 1987, pg. 216).

What is of particular interest from this quote is the circumstance in which both arguments, for and against Négritude, centred on the fact that individuals and groups had suffered at the hands of oppressors. Their response to oppression, whilst realised through opposing methodologies, do, however, share a philosophical foundation: that individuals had a right to live in a political condition free from oppression, guided by their own choice and expression. For Senghor and Césaire, this was achieved by recognising and celebrating both the feeling of Négritude, on an individual level, and the political movement on a public level; whilst for critics of the movement (such as Fanon) reference to a shared Blackness actually stunted freedom. Fanon felt (as is discussed in Section 3.5), that true freedom could only be achieved outside of a shared understanding of Blackness because he viewed that as being both an individual and personal experience. The similar foundations shared between both sides of the debate, as well as with the framework set out in Chapter 1, are apparent once it is accepted that approaches to realising foundational principles can differ dramatically. This is an important analytical point for this thesis, as it suggests that even in the case of contradictory perspectives, the pinnacle of debate remains fixed around shared foundations. This is a common theme that occurs throughout the following three chapters, and is thus discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 (Concluding Remarks).

Discussion in this section now concludes by considering the relationship of the Négritude movement to the European colonisers, and the differences between the position of African authors and those of the authors emanating from a Caribbean heritage.

**iii. Relationship with the Colonisers**

The next few paragraphs consider the differences that exist between the African and the Caribbean arms of the movement, in reference to their desired relationship with the colonial powers. The reference to the revolutionary movement of the Caribbean can be claimed to juxtapose the African position on collaboration with the French ex-colonisers. Both Senghor and Diop, suggested that it would be wrong of the African community to distance themselves entirely from the colonial powers, instead supporting a system of partnership: an African, French commonwealth. In “Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism”, Senghor was clear about his interpretation of the Western role in Africa’s position at the time: “Let us stop denouncing colonialism and Europe and attributing all our ills to them. Besides not being entirely fair, this is a negative approach, which reveals our
inferiority complex” (Senghor, 1962, p.104). Thus for him, the purpose of the Négritude movement was not to accuse Europe of mistreatment, nor to draw attention to the ills of the continent. Rather, he foresaw a system of collaboration and co-operation. However, as is discussed in Section 3.4, he believed that a system built on co-operation first required the colonised people to re-affirm and re-assert their self-belief, to enable them to approach Europe as equals. This was the role he envisioned Négritude as playing in the delivery of emancipation, as “true independence is that of the spirit” (Senghor, 1964, p.8) and thus cannot be given to a people, only claimed. The concept of independence as being a feature of the spirit emphasises the individual’s role in achieving autonomy (as the carrier of the spirit). Such an argument shares similar philosophical groundings to those of the Kantian framework, in that both arguments place the individual at the centre of the understanding of autonomy, and advocate for a political system under which the individual is able to realise their own autonomy.

In contrast to Senghor, the rhetoric Césaire employed was less welcoming of the support and guidance of the ex-colonisers. Juxtaposing Senghor’s collaborative approach, he compared the practices of the colonisers to those employed by the Nazi party, and was reluctant not only to collaborate with them in the future, but also to heed Senghor’s caution when it came to blaming Europe for the ills of the colonised people. He, in “Discourse on Colonialism” critiqued Europe, suggesting that “what is serious is that Europe is morally, spiritually indefensible” (Césaire, 2000, p.32). He went on to claim that, only when the horrors of oppression and imperialism were directed back towards European shores, were Europeans prepared to respond and condemn such treatment. In contrast, when similar atrocities were carried out in the colonies, he argued, Europeans were prepared to turn a blind eye (Césaire, 2000, pp. 34-38). For him, a movement such as Négritude enabled the colonised to realise that these double standards were unfair and unjust. He argued that this was the problem at the core of “pseudo-humanism: that for too long it has diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been-and still is- narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, sordidly racist” (Césaire 2000, p.37). It is apparent when reading these arguments that Césaire was in favour of an alternate humanist model. One in which, the rights of all individuals were recognised equally. For this, he believed it was necessary to condemn Europe’s current model. He criticised European humanism on its failure to properly recognise equality. He argued that, it supported the equality and value of what it viewed as the “right” people and not, as he believed was fundamental, “all” people. The value of equality to the Négritude
movement is further debated as the chapter develops. However, at this stage it is raised to introduce a key theme that was central to the movement, between which it is also possible to draw similarities with one of the themes set out in Chapter 1: equality of individuals. Similarly to the Kantian approach, that “each person has the right to independence from each of the others. None is born either a master or a servant” (Ripstein, 2009, p.17), Césaire emphasises the importance of a humanism that does not favour certain groups within a hierarchy, but rather treats all humans as equal.

In concluding the introduction to the movement, it is important to reiterate the definitions as they have been presented through a focus on the works of Senghor and Césaire and a number of secondary sources. At the centre of the definition there is a difficult interplay that exists between the highly racialized notion of a theory built on a feeling of Blackness, as it is presented by both theorists, and their understanding of the role of Négritude internationally; Césaire’s discussion of humanism, and Senghor’s insistence on the role of Africans in developing a fairer and more just Universal Civilisation (discussed in Section 3.4). These definitions are at the heart of what Négritude is, and the division can be seen between its role as an internally focused movement (a personal feeling of Blackness, self-belief and a re-assertion of the individual value of “négre”) (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.23) and an externally focused movement, to re-establish the value of Black culture and politics to share with the world. As suggested, it was intended to have both an internal focus, speaking to Black people and ingraining self-belief; and an external focus, exclaiming to the world that oppression must come to an end, and that the time of colonisation was over. Different theorists placed greater or lesser emphasis on different elements of this description, but overall this can be viewed as the summary of the combined aims of the Négritude movement.

According to commentator Abiola Irele, Négritude “has developed far beyond the concept of the ‘African personality’, which has remained more or less a catch-word, or a simple ideological slogan; whereas Négritude has tended more towards a philosophy” (Irele, 1965, p.321), or overarching theory of what Blackness meant for the group of individuals writing and working together in France, with the aims of representing and serving the colonised world, and reinstating their self-belief and autonomy. The Négritude movement also placed specific emphasis on the value of both a cultural and political movement in establishing and delivering the aims listed above. This is a key emphasis in the rest of this chapter, as it emphasises the argument made in Chapter 2; culturally specific approaches and techniques
can be drawn on by way of understanding and achieving similar foundations. For example, the journal “Présence Africaine” (discussed in Section 3.4) was viewed as a vehicle for the views of the authors and their acts of self-belief. The role of the journal was in fact to share these, otherwise often silenced, perspectives. As Hassan observed, “Présence Africaine is at the centre of a dialogue between Africa and Europe” (Hassan, 1999, p.169) and was the vehicle through which many of these ideas were shared. To reiterate, it was at the centre of active cross-cultural dialogue premised on the equal value of each participant.

Before progressing to a discussion of the cultural element of the movement, where the focus will split between Senghor and Césaire (previously discussed), but also Diop and Damas whose ideas are yet to be fully investigated, it is important to discuss in passing the involvement in the movement of Western existentialist Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre was a central figure in developing the existential foundations of Négritude, working closely with a number of the key figures. Many of the authors, especially those emanating from a Caribbean heritage such as Césaire and Fanon, share his existentialist ontology, and he penned a number of forwards and introductions. These include, but are not limited to, a number of Fanon’s works, and the most famous of the Négritude anthologies; “Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Francaise”, in which he wrote an article describing what he believed Négritude meant to the people he had met. It was titled “Orphée Noir” (Black Orpheus). In “Black Orpheus” Sartre draws many parallels between the oppression experienced by the European proletariat at the hands of the bourgeoisie, and the oppression experienced by the colonised at the hands of the colonisers. Sartre suggested that Négritude was “a shimmer of being and of needing to be; it makes you and you make it: both oath and passion” (Sartre, 1964, p.48). However, Sartre’s relationship with the movement was somewhat controversial. Not least because of his heritage as a privileged, European, white man, but also as his relationship with key thinkers (in particular Fanon) became strained. It was decided that due to the boundaries set for the selection of texts and authors by this thesis, that his inclusion as a primary source was inappropriate as it is fundamental for the aims of this thesis that discussion centres around the views of the individuals involved in the movement and their experiences of colonialism and oppression rather than those of a European commentator. Parts of his work are, however, included in secondary discussions.

Having answered the question of why Négritude was selected for analysis in this thesis, introduced the key authors and texts, discussed the theory itself and the relationship with
the West, the chapter now progresses to a discussion of the explicitly cultural element of the political-cultural movement, as well as a discussion of the relationship between culture and politics as expressed by the authors.

3.2 - The Artistic and Cultural Turn:

The poetry and prose produced as a part of the Négritude movement were the outputs of predominantly diaspora communities, working and publishing through the Paris based journal Présence Africaine, and they often symbolise the symbiosis between the political and cultural elements of the movement. Both Césaire and Damas have produced a plethora of work drawing on intense imagery and rhetoric to detail their displeasure with the colonial situation, calling on the colonised people to realise their strength and respond. Their work is in every sense a cultural response to a political concern, and many of the ideas Césaire fictionalises correspond with the views presented in his political texts. This section includes analysis of Damas’s poetry from his most famous collection “Pigments” (1937), as well as a selection of Césaire’s fictional work. The most famous of which “Une Tempête” (A Tempest) (1969), retells Shakespeare’s famous play from the perspective of the “natives” (Césaire, 1969), and acts as a critique of the domination of the colonial movement. Due to the nature of this project, and its political focus, reference to the cultural outputs of the movement are made in relation to their political imagery, and underlying themes. A detailed analysis of the form and structure of the pieces is not included. That being said, this section utilises the primary and secondary literature to assess common themes within a small selection of the vast collection of works produced, questioning their philosophical foundations and attempting to draw similarities with the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1. The second half of this section analyses the role of culture as a political tool according to the authors of the movement. It assesses the relationship between the two elements, because of the fact that it was declared by the authors to be explicitly both a cultural and a political project. Senghor in particular, emphasised the value and role of culture in the co-production of politics and political spaces. Parallels are thus drawn in this section between his views and those of the authors discussed in Chapter 2. As well as with the claims of this thesis more generally, that the existence of underlying foundational principles does not inhibit the practice of culturally relevant methods for realising them.

A number of discussants have collated the poetic and literary works of the movement, and emphasised their role as a response to oppression and imperialism. Robin Kelley, for
example, in his analysis of Césaire, stressed the value of poetry in enhancing the revolutionary fervour of the movement. He argued that, “while it might appear that the poet and politician operated in separate spheres, Césaire’s life and work demonstrate that poetry can be the motor of political imagination, a potent weapon in any movement that claims freedom as its primary goal” (Kelley, 1992, p. vii). This citation evidences the relationship between culture and politics as it is presented by both the Négritude theorists, commentators and supporters. Kelley actually went further in his analysis than to simply support a symbiosis between the cultural and political sides of the argument, suggesting that in the case of Césaire it was his poetry that provided the greatest tool: “the weapon of poetry may be Césaire’s greatest gift to a modern world still searching for freedom” (Kelley, 1992, p.vii). It is for this reason that discussion of both elements of the movement is included in this chapter. With the aim of considering the rhetoric at the heart of the poetry, and to ask whether it suggests the existence of notions of willkürlich and self-law giving as foundational principles on which these arguments are built. However, as previously mentioned a detailed literary analysis of the poetry lies outside of the analytical boundaries of this thesis. For a more in depth discussion of these elements of the poetic side of the movement see the works of James Arnold (1990) and Jerome Rothenberg and Pierre Joris (1995), who have anthologised the poetry, drawing out the common themes for analysis.

As mentioned in the previous section, it was widely accepted that the movement originated in its turbulent relationship with the West. This is true of both the political, and cultural, projects. By way of discussion, reference is made to a number of the movements most prominent discussants. Irele claimed that, “its literature and its ideology afford an insight into the intimate process of the black reaction to the West” (Irele, 1965, p.348), whilst Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk argued that Négritude “originated as a reaction” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.31). At its core, the poetry, novels and plays associated with the concept of Négritude drew on linguistic techniques to vocalise the desire of the authors to overcome the conditions of domination, dictated by colonialism, and to inspire the people of Africa to realise their freedom. It is not possible, based on the analysis of the poetry and prose, to make assumptions regarding an alternative political system that these authors would have favoured. However, it is possible to locate in the poems themselves, and amongst the secondary discussants, a critique of the state of domination imposed by the colonisers that is similarly founded to the Kantian concept of domination.
By way of substantiating this claim, this section firstly considers the poetry of Léon Damas, followed by discussion of Césaire’s poetry. Damas produced a broad collection of poetry and fiction around the general themes associated with Négritude, and the condemnation of colonial treatment of Black people. Probably his most famous collection, “Pigments”, contains within it his most widely quoted poem. Written for his friend, and editor of “Présence Africaine”, Alioune Diop, “Whitewashed” denoted the anger Damas felt in being presented to the world through a lens over which he had limited control. One of the fundamental themes at the heart of the “Pigments” collection was a condemnation of the treatment of the évolué by the European powers as successfully overcoming their Black heritage, and the suggestion that this was in some way a success of the Europeanised education they underwent.

Damas argued consistently throughout this collection, against this form of domination, criticising it as oppressing his freedom to self-define, and as trivialising and condemning his roots in favour of his Europeanised form. The poem “Whitewashed” focuses particular attention on this concern. The following line from the poem emphasises his discomfort with the term and its connotations: “Can it be that they dare, call me whitewashed” (Damas, 2011, p.51). Like a number of his fellow évolué Damas responded to the French accusation of his education being a sign of his “civilising” and “whiteness” by adamantly declaring his Blackness. Similarly in the poem “For Sure” he discusses “everything that pisses me off”, making reference to “colonisation, civilisation, assimilation, and the rest” (Damas, 2011, p.45). He claims that the factors that anger him are those that impose an identity on him that is neither personal to him, nor that he is comfortable with. Parallels exist, here, between the concept of domination, as it is understood in the Kantian sense, and the views expressed by Damas in these two poems. Kantian domination understands wrongdoing not as the choice for someone to do something bad to you, but instead, “it is that somebody does something to you” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). In reference to Damas’s claims, it is not necessarily that treating him as a civilised intellectual is itself bad. Rather, imposing an identity on him at all, subsequently defining his purpose and diminishing his autonomous choice, is where the problems lie. In this sense, it is clear that underpinning both positions (Damasian and Kantian) is a foundational belief in the right of individuals to have purposeful choice in the formation of their own identities. To reiterate, it is clear throughout Damas’s poetry that he violently opposes any forms of oppression, and similarities can be drawn between this position and a belief in a right of all individuals to an autonomous existence, in which the choice to direct one’s own life is guaranteed. Each of
these poems makes reference to both an internal and external factor, as delineated in the previous section. Implying not only Damas’s discomfort with the treatment he received from the colonisers, but also his desire to define his own identity moving forward.

Similarly to Damas, Césaire’s poetry was inspired by images of oppression and control. He combined an approach that is both “nostalgic and combative” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p.23). In “Afrique” he opened with images of violence and mistreatment, silencing and oppression: “they muzzled your voice, which was speaking in the silence of shadows” (Césaire, 1983, p.347). Through the imagery of the poem it was suggested the act of silencing itself was at the centre of the issue. Curtailing the voice, or freedom, of an individual is presented as an act of violence. This is similar to the Kantian argument, discussed above, that curtailing individual purposiveness is unjust. The conclusion to the poem is filled with messages of hope and potential salvation, somewhat paralleling his technique in his political text “Discourse on Colonialism” (discussed in Section 3.1), of being both critical of the past and inspirational in his advice for the future. The poem concludes: “hidden things will again climb the slope of dormant musics” (Césaire, 1992, p.23); implying that there is hope for the future, and we can surmise, that Négritude is fundamental to the process of delivering it.

“A Tempest” reworks the story of The Tempest to focus on the lives and experiences of the “natives”. Throughout the play Césaire focuses on the stories of Ariel and Caliban who are critical of the role in which they are cast, expected to obey their colonial masters: “I obeyed you-but, well why not come out with it?- I did so most unwillingly” (Césaire, 1985, p.9). The play, like his other works, focuses on the horrors of the colonial movement, condemning the unequal treatment of the colonised people and the creation of a hierarchy between “masters and slaves” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). Hence, it is possible to see within Césaire’s poetry and fiction, and his political works, an emphasis on the fundamental importance of equality amongst individuals and overcoming dominance. That being said, it can be suggested that these views, similar to those underlying the framework of this thesis, underpin much of his political thinking and, subsequently, his views of personhood.

In a controversial discussion of the purpose of the Négritude poetry, Sartre in “Black Orpheus” (1948) emphasised its role as an external force, enabling Europe to “gain access to the world of jet” (Sartre, 1964, p.16). He implied that the use of poetry and rhyme enabled individuals first to “come into consciousness”, and then to share with, or make it comprehensible to, the West. He claimed that, through “a poetic experience...the black
man, in his present condition, must first become conscious of himself” (Sartre, 1964, p.16). Once again, there is a clear divide between the internal and external roles of the movement. Additionally, Sartre refers to, what he views as, the emancipation of engaging with poetic and cultural forms of expression. However, Sartre was critiqued, predominantly by Frantz Fanon, for his assumption that the poems of a few were representational of the views of all Black individuals. Not only this, but also for the assumption that all Black people required artistic and poetic forms of expression, rather than rigorous analytical thought, to share their views; a theme that is also condemned in Chapter 5 in discussion of ethnophilosophy. To reiterate, according to Sartre, the role of the poetic and literary movements that feature in this section were to enable the poets and authors to undergo a process of self-realisation, through the therapeutic nature of writing; to then share this process of self-realisation, and utilise it to support others undergoing similar processes. In making these claims, he is also making assumptions regarding the ability of individuals to rely on formal forms of expression to share their views; suggesting, rather, that they should use non-formal approaches. He claimed that “black poetry is evangelic, it announces good news: Blackness has been rediscovered” (Sartre, 1964, p.20), and presented it to humanity for celebration. As suggested in the previous section, his views are being treated as those of a commentator rather than as primary source material representing the movement, as “Black Orpheus” sometimes is.

Discussant Tsenay Serequeberhan, like Kelley, emphasises the role of poetry in the political expression of Négritude. He observed that: “It is aimed at regaining concretely a black ‘existential spatiality’ . For it is the negation of this lived space- the historical existence- that constitutes the experience of enslavement” (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.18). Similarly to Irele, he suggested that the artistic strand of the movement was fundamental in criticising the existence of a political condition in which a community was controlled by an external force, and unable to exist (referring to Ripstein’s wording) spatially individuated. According to Ripstein’s model, and the ideas being adapted by this thesis, the realisation of autonomy is grounded, for Kant, on the concept that individuals can freely pursue their own purposiveness on the understanding that no two individuals can co-exist in the same space. Thus for Kantians, control over an individual’s space is a form of domination. Similarly, Serequeberhan argued, the role of Négritude was in overcoming the metaphorically evocative condition of enslavement to which he referred. Whilst critique of such a condition is widely associated with a number of approaches, including Marxism, and a wide range of liberal positions, the underling philosophical foundations can be viewed as similar
to the Kantian argument of spatiality: that domination and enslavement constitute the limit of another’s space and purpose and are thus wrong, regardless of the consequences of this limiting.

Having briefly covered the role of the artistic movement and its grounding, this section now focusses on a discussion of the role of culture in the formal political setting. This is followed by discussion of the relationship between the two elements according to the Négritude movement, which, as previously mentioned, were defined by the authors as an expressly political-cultural project. As a result of this understanding, it is necessary to unpick in further detail what that entails, and why the relationship between the two was deemed as fundamental. Senghor in particular, focused much of his political discourse on the value of understanding cultures influence on political spaces and decisions. This was a recurrent theme throughout "Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism". He argued that it was a failing of “African politicians (that) have a tendency to neglect culture, to make it an appendage to politics” (Senghor, 1962, p.67), and in contrast his project would expressly value and recognise the influence of cultural membership on individuals lives. He argued that in reality, the “two areas (politics and culture), are certainly closely connected, reacting each on the other” (Senghor, 1962, p.67). He supported this form of interaction because, “if one stops to reflect, culture is at once the basis and the ultimate aim of politics... culture is the very texture of society” (Senghor, 1962, p.67). Such an approach is ingrained into the model of this thesis, which recognises the relevance of culture in realising and valuing foundational principles (as discussed in Chapter 2). Senghor maintained this emphasis on the role and value of culture throughout his work: “contrary to the notion of numerous African politicians, culture is not an appendage of politics that one can lop off without damage. It is not even a simple political means: culture is the precondition and goal of any policy worthy of the name” (Senghor, 1962, p.103). For him, culture was at the centre of establishing politics, it was the medium through which debates occurred and were deliberated. Simultaneously, he argued that it was the role of politics to enable the full development of culture, viewing them as symbiotic. The strength of the relationship between the political and the cultural was, for Senghor, and his contemporaries, fundamental to the understanding of Négritude as a movement. This was not to suggest that he did not advocate for a form of politics that recognised the universal. Rather, it was to suggest that, he, like this thesis, recognised the value of a cultural approach to understanding fundamental questions, such as those relating to autonomy and personhood.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of culture is somewhat fluid, which inspires the question, of what Senghor believed was involved in a political condition centred on respect for culture. Whilst he does not specifically limit the notion of culture to his idea of a shared Négritude, it is implied, on reading his works, that for him a Black culture, or as Césaire refers to it a “feeling”, exists that is shared by all Black people. This feeling, then, influences the political. However, the notion of a shared Black culture, as mentioned in Section 3.1, raises a number of concerns regarding its effect on individual autonomy. July described Senghor’s approach to culture as, a “blanket celebration of black culture” (July, 1987, p.216), in contrast to a recognition of the importance of individualism and specificity. Although it is important to reiterate that, as defined in Section 3.1iii, there was more to Négritude than simply a shared feeling of Blackness. It must also be emphasised that this was a somewhat divisive approach, with a noticeable divide between theorists that both support and condemn the project of homogenisation for political reasons. As referenced in Section 3.1, Fanon, as well as contemporary scholars, such as Hountondji and Wiredu (studied in Chapter 5), highlight the flaws in an approach that ignored individual difference in favour of an all-encompassing Black culture. Nigel Gibson, in an analysis of Fanon’s work, discussed “the objective Négritudist’s search for a Black soul (suggesting that it) could end in an empty celebration of the exotic. By appealing to people of colour solely on the basis of race, Négritude ignores the specificity and distinguishing character of people’s experience” (Gibson, 2003, pp.81-82). Thus, Gibson’s concern, similar to that of other critics, is that Négritude, rather than enhancing individual freedoms, actually curtailed them.

In contrast, Alioune Diop implied that cultural groups or definitions should be able to be fluid, and responsive to temporal and geographical change. Thus, in the case of defining one’s Blackness he would argue that it can mean different things for different people, therefore overcoming Gibson’s critique. For example, evidence for this arises in the simple fact that what Négritude meant for one author was vastly different to what it meant for another: the contrast between Senghor and Césaire would be a case in point. Diop suggested that:

“I’Cultures do not live in isolation, cut off from their roots, their support system and the source of their own vitality, that is to say cut off from their institutions and plans for civilisation. Each living civilisation can assume its own history, make use of its own maturity, and give expression to its own
modernity, based upon its own experiences, the inspiration of its own environment, the talents specific to its own genius” (Diop, 1992, p. xv).

As previously suggested, for him, culture was something that changed and flourished in response to new and developing inspirations, and in that sense it was possible to view it as responsive to change and difference. To clarify, Diop supports the truism that a culture does not exist in “isolation” but rather adapts and changes based on “history, maturity, experiences and environment”, arguing that this is fundamental to the understanding of politics. On this understanding, Négritude was able to overcome the concern that it curtails individual freedom. Instead it could be interpreted as a collaborative project of individuals.

In considering the debate between the two perspectives a pattern emerges in which, as mentioned in the previous section, authors that are both for and against the Négritude movement base their claims on the value of individual or group culture, as well as the positive effects on the global civilisation of providing the opportunities for them to be expressed. In arguing for this, they make their claims based on whether the realisation of Négritude either enhances or reduces individual freedom. Thus, leading to the hypothesis that, these arguments share a similar normative underpinning on which they are premised. Whilst it is true that the philosophical base is realised differently, leading to different conclusions, it is possible to argue that underlying both arguments are claims for the value of autonomy and personhood. Throughout the following two chapters a pattern emerges in which opposing claims responding to the colonial and post-colonial movements share a philosophical foundation: further similarities occur not only between the arguments themselves but also with the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1, thus providing support for the hypothesis of this thesis, that shared foundational principles exist a priori.

Having discussed the relationship between culture and politics, as it is expressed by the Négritude movement, as well as the cultural outputs, the chapter now proceeds with a more detailed analysis of the concepts of Blackness and Otherness and the perceived relationship with the concepts of independence and autonomy (understood in a Kantian sense).

3.3- Blackness, Otherness and Independence:

The purpose of this section is to consider the ways in which the Négritude movement responded to the concepts of Otherness and Blackness. The term Other is often associated with the colonial movement. It was used as a method of referring to non-Western cultures
that were in some way alien to the understanding of the colonial administrators. However, at the centre of a number of the reactionary responses to colonialism lay a desire to positively reclaim the concepts of Otherness and Blackness. The aim being to express their position that, “we’re black and have a history, a history that contains certain cultural elements of great value; and that Negroes were not, as you put it, born yesterday...Negro heritage was worthy of respect...its values were values that could still make an important contribution to the world” (Césaire, 2000, pp. 91-92). This section (Section 3.3) asks how the theorists achieved this. How they questioned coloniser policies? What methodologies they utilised to re-establish the concepts of Blackness and Otherness in a positive light? It then focuses on the relationship between the re-appropriation of these terms and the goal of establishing independence. It concludes by questioning what independence and autonomy would look like according to these authors.

As previously indicated the two forms of Négritude, emanating from Africa and the Caribbean, differed considerably. In particular, differences existed in their understanding, and valuing, of violence and revolution. Whilst the African approach (associated with Senghor and Diop) spoke predominantly of the glorious kingdoms of the past, and establishing Africa’s place in the global community; the approach associated with Césaire, and to some extent Fanon, focused predominantly on recognising and responding to the horrors of colonialism. Their approaches often avoided the critique of exoticism often directed at Senghor, as less claims were made by the Caribbean authors regarding a glorious and unestablished pre-colonial condition. Whilst focus was placed on the lessons that could be taken from the past, their approach was predominantly grounded in a coming to consciousness, or even a coming to terms, with their current condition. This section analyses these approaches in relation to individual identity.

Lewis Gordon, a contemporary discussant of the movement, described it as “a literary theoretical response to anti-black racism which posited a unique black soul that was a source and function of a unique black reality of intrinsically black values” (Gordon, 1995, p.31). The concept of “uniqueness” refers to what it is that is special and important about Blackness and established, according to Gordon and other commentators, the foundation of the movement. By focusing on what was special or different about being African or Black, the theorists were able to present an alternate response to Otherness than that posited by Western anthropologists. The assumption of a unique identity, that should be both re-discovered and shared as a response to the belittling approach of the West to
understanding the culture of colonised people, implies an underlying philosophical grounding to the Négritude movement. This underlying philosophy is based on the right of individuals to undergo a process of self-discovery, in which they come to understand and associate with a sense of individual and group culture, through which it is then possible to establish their purposiveness. Each of these claims is based on the assumption (first discussed in Chapter 2) that all human cultures should initially, before their merits have been deliberated, be approached from a neutral standpoint; making no assumptions regarding their merit. The purpose of the Négritude movement, on this level, was to share the value of what the thinkers perceived as Black culture, with both one another and the world more generally on the understanding that it had value.

Valentin Mudimbe argued, as previously suggested, that “Présence Africaine” provided an outlet through which the Négritude movement could make these claims. He argued that, “what Diop’s project represents is a questioning, not of the French culture per se but of the imperial ambition of the Western Civilisation… It wishes to bring in the very centre of the French power and culture what was being negated in colonies, that is, the dignity of otherness” (Mudimbe, 1992, p.xvii). Such an approach, whilst not couched in Kantian terms, shares a philosophical foundation that recognises and respects the rights and duties of mankind to treat one another in such a way that respects individual choice and the value of persons, and is able to defend against the domination of one group at the hands of another.

To further reiterate this point, Marc Rombaut, in his article “The Politics of Othering” discussed the role of Négritude on the generation following Diop, Senghor and Césaire. He implied that in time “the new generations had to break with the myth of négritude in order to invent themselves and to endow themselves with a specific identity and legitimacy” (Rombaut, 1992, p.414). Similarly, Senghor admitted that the role of Négritude was not indefinite, but that it had a finite relevance to the struggle. This “breaking with the myth”, as Rombaut presents it, was a secondary stage built on the success of Senghor, Diop and Césaire in rousing the next generation to realise themselves and to find their independence. According to Rombaut, what Négritude meant to his predecessors was the ability to overcome being “insulted (and) enslaved”. It was a way of readdressing themselves: “he accepts the word ‘Negro’ which is hurled at him as stone, and he asserts himself, in pride, as a black in the face of the white- we understood them well beyond their significance, by reinterpreting them as closely as possible to our own problematics” (Rombaut, 1992, p.410). Again, the strength of the argument is based on the value of reclaiming a word that
had in the past been used as an insult, as a method of reasserting, not only a positive identity, but the ability to define one’s own identity. Identity formation, is thus at the core of this element of Négritude, and obvious parallels can be drawn with the Kantian concepts of self-mastery and equality; in particular, respecting individuals as having the capacity to overcome their “un-civilised” desires, and having the ability to be guided by reason when embarking on the process of identity formation. It enabled them to fight against a condition they found themselves in, in which they were “deprived of ways of thinking correctly about the modern world, based on sufficient information and exchanges, we let strangers construct our future and impose on us ideas that we have not created from personal experience of history and action in the world” (Diop, cited in Jules-Rosette, 1992, p.26). This damnation, by Diop, of strangers imposing a world view and dictating a group’s future, as well as an insistence of the value of personal history and experience, suggests that the foundations underpinning Diop’s worldview, whilst presented through different ideologically and culturally specific terminologies, have similar foundations to the Kantian arguments of choice and domination.

The first half of this section has focused on methods employed by the theorists to re-establish the identities of Black or Other; their aim being not only to prescribe them with positive definitions, but also to utilise them as a method for realising individual value, identity, and subsequently freedom. This discussion raises a further question: what does that freedom look like according to the Négritude theorists? According to Senghor:

“True independence is that of the spirit. A people is not really independent when, after its accession to nominal independence, its leaders import, without modification, institutions- political, economic, social, cultural... I do not deny that every institution, every moral or technical value is related to man....Nevertheless, it must be adapted to the realities of the native soil, by retaining the spirit rather than the form” (Senghor, 1962, p.16).

Independence, or autonomy, is not something that can be given to an individual, group, nation or continent, instead it needs to be realised or taken by the individual themselves. In Kantian terms: freedom comes from realising one’s “enlightenment” and living by the laws you define for yourself. The state, or in the example Senghor referred to, the ex-colonial power, can provide the conditions for enlightenment, but, the realisation must be driven by the individual. Thus, at its foundation this element of the Négritude movement was a claim about overcoming domination, and realising the conditions for personal choice and self-
mastery in defining the identity and direction of personal existence. However, what distinguishes it from a Kantian model was that it was presented in terms of colour and race, which as previously suggested was one of the inconsistencies within the movement. Once again, it is possible to interpret in this movement a distinction between the universally relevant philosophical foundations and the ideologically and culturally specific aims and applications. The claim was made on the basis that all individuals had an equal right to be freely formulate their own identity, and the colonial condition had obstructed this right. The foundations of the arguments made by Senghor, Diop and even Césaire, were not racially motivated. Rather, they implied that the role of Négritude was to enable the victims of colonisation to realise their own freedom, and their value to the Universal Civilisation; to enable them to enter into dialogue with the West and to contribute to the future of the global community. Nonetheless, this was achieved through an enhanced value of racial imagery, and thus a clear distinction is present between the racialized methods, and the universal foundations of the movement.

The concept of the Universal Civilisation and the journal “Présence Africaine” are the focus of the following section (Section 3.4).

3.4- The Universal Civilisation and Présence Africaine:

The concept of the “Civilisation de l’Universal” is predominantly associated with the work of Senghor and Diop. As previously discussed, both theorists along with Jacques Rabemananjara, promoted their journal “Présence Africaine” as an appropriate vehicle for establishing the conditions to facilitate effective dialogue between cultures: specifically between the colonised and the coloniser. It was assumed by all three, that for dialogue to be effective it must exist between individuals embarking on fair and just cross-cultural interactions, grounded in a notion of equality. It was important therefore for Africans (and other colonial communities), to establish their culture as being of equal value to that of the ex-colonial powers; so as to facilitate just dialogue and future interactions. It was the initial manifesto of “Présence Africaine” to showcase Négritude or Black culture as being of interest, or value, not simply as a result of its exoticism, but because of its intrinsic value. Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk argued in 1970 that in relation to the arts community this attempt had been successful and that, “black artists and their art are now accepted on equal terms by the world, not because they are black but because they are good” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.72). Thus, that the movement had at least been successful in creating the conditions under which artists, could interact justly as equals. The purpose was
to emphasise the value of Black culture as having worth not only for Africans, but also in establishing and developing the Universal Civilisation. This section focuses on discussion of the concept of the Universal Civilisation, as presented by the theorists; and on “Présence Africaine’s” role in contributing to the establishment of Négritude as possessing innate value to a global civilisation. It also questions whether the philosophical grounding underlying support for the Universal Civilisation, as it was presented by Senghor, Diop and Rabermananjara, shared similar underpinnings to those expressed by the Kantian literature set out in Chapter 1: summarised by the terms self-law giving and willkür.

It was Senghor’s philosophy that the achievement of African emancipation, as a result of a re-established sense of pride in both individual and collective Négritude, was not the ultimate end of the movement: “unlike so many of his political counterparts elsewhere in Africa, the politics of Senghor does not constitute an end in itself but is geared to the more encompassing aim of cultural liberalisation” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.29). Alternatively, he viewed this as a fundamental first step in the creation of a new Universal Civilisation that would benefit, not only colonised people, but also Western cultures on which the notion of universality was, he argued, founded. It was his opinion that accepting Western culture as the foundation of a Universal Civilisation was a mistake. The concept of civilisation, as it is presented by Senghor, is somewhat vague. However, based on the assertions made regarding its potential universality, it can be assumed that Senghor viewed it as a shared human condition under which different conceptions competed. It is possible to draw similarities with the concept of a “clash of civilisations” as presented by Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1993). In contrast to Huntington, Senghor’s argument was not that different religious, or cultural, groups should compete until one was deemed superior, but rather that the hierarchical condition should be reversed and a Human, or Universal, Civilisation should be created based on the best elements of all cultures. He viewed Négritude as setting the parameters for just-cross-cultural dialogue between civilisations. Seeing it as enabling individuals to firstly recognise their own worth, and then draw on this to enable them to interact with other cultural groups as equals. His arguments for this will become clear in the following discussion.

In his 1962 monograph “Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism”, Senghor argued that, “Europeans claimed to be the only ones who have envisaged culture in its universal dimensions” but that this was, in fact, not the case. Rather, “we had little difficulty in demonstrating that each exotic civilisation had also thought in terms of universality, that
the only merit of Europe in this regard had been to diffuse her civilisation throughout the world, thanks to her conquests” (Senghor, 1962, pp.90-91). Senghor argued that it was power, rather than the non-existence of a valuable alternative, that had dictated the parameters of the Universal Civilisation as it existed at that time. The alternative he proposed was a universal political condition that enabled the existence of a shared Universal Civilisation. A Civilisation that blended the best that European and African cultures, to name his two examples, had to offer. It was his argument that a universal system that was able to take into account the strengths of both European and Western culture, as well as traditional African values, would be of great benefit to the human community.

To further analyse the concept of cross-cultural blending, it is necessary to refer in greater detail to Senghor’s vision in the 1960’s when the majority of his publications focused on this topic. It is Senghor’s commitment to a system grounded partly on traditional African values that has led to the argument that he, in certain elements of his discourse, relies on a narrative of “return”. He, like Jacques Howlett, suggested that the inclusion of non-Western voices would not only create a fairer and more equal global political condition, but it would also be of noticeable benefit to cultural development. Howlett recommended, a “universalist humanism, enriched and authenticated by the values of the excluded peoples, different in fact from the abstract universalism as thought of by the West” (Howlett, 1969, p. 42). Senghor presents his position in poetic and embellished language, intended to represent his beliefs of how African culture and knowledge is formed, in contrast to the analytical and formal approach of the West:

“Negro-African speech does not mould the object, without touching it, in rigid categories and concepts; it brushes things up to restore their original colour, with their texture, sound and perfume; it perforates them with its luminous rays to reach the essential sur-reality in its innate humidity...European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilisation; Negro-African reasoning is intuitive by participation” (Senghor, 1962, p.97).

He implies throughout his publications that the African’s relationship with nature is somewhat different to that of the European’s. That the actions of both groups are dictated by reason, a property he sees as universal, but that their approaches to reason are different: “Negro-African reason is traditionally dialectical, transcending the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle” (Senghor, 1962, p.98), whereas he
sees European reason as being “analytical and discursive”. Therefore, he argues that a blend of the two positions would favour humanity. However, throughout his discussion the focus remains on why such an approach would be of value and it is unclear how this would be achieved in reality. It can be assumed that his emphasis on the maintenance of strong relationships with France, and a collaborative political system, would be at the heart of this approach, but, again, it is unclear how this would work in reality. The emphasis on the universal notion of reason is of particular interest to this thesis. Similarly to the arguments presented in Chapter 2, Senghor suggested (as shown in the above citations), that the concept of reason is universal, but the approaches to reasoning differ between the two cultures. On that basis similarities can be drawn between the Kantian suggestion that reason is the foundation, not only of political discourse, but also of autonomy, and Senghor’s reliance on similar assertions, as well as with the underlying assumption set out in Chapter 2 that universal foundational principles can be accessed and achieved via culturally specific means.

To investigate this argument further, discussion turns now to Senghor’s claim that “we must assure a cultural base for the future nation, by defining the essential characteristics of traditional Negro African civilisation which, blending with European and French contributions, will undergo a renaissance” (Senghor, 1962, p.33). In making this claim he was suggesting not only that the Universal Civilisation would benefit from the blending of cultures, but also that his own country of Senegal would find advantage in drawing not only on their own heritage, but also on the French practices that had been established in the colonial period. In this sense, it is obvious that for Senghor, human existence and culture were based on an adaptive process in which the best elements of different human experiences were blended for the benefit of all. At least as a national approach, this argument relied on maintaining the elements of French infrastructure and culture that Senghor deemed to be valuable in the time period following independence. It was important for his political model that elements that were of value were not simply jettisoned because of their links to the colonial past. In making these recommendations Senghor, and Howlett, unlike their more revolutionary counterparts discussed in Section 3.5, were not recommending an overthrowing (either violent or non-violent) of Western values. Rather, they were advocating for a condition under which cultures were able to develop simultaneously, and for the benefit of one another, via a system of cross-cultural discourse and collaboration. As has been suggested in the previous paragraphs, it was Senghor’s claim that different cultures could learn from one another, but the specifics of
how this process would take place are unclear. What follows is a discussion of how the theorists believed that this could be achieved.

In discussing the prospect of cross-cultural dialogue capable of creating the basis of a Universal Civilisation, Diop referred to the necessity of such dialogue taking place between “complete and living civilisations” (Diop, 1992, p.xv). To clarify, it was important to Diop that the process involved contemporary cultures and this process, whilst potentially inspired by traditional values, was not based on an unjustified glorification of the past. Hassan observed that, “Diop promotes the idea of a universal synthesis in which Africans join Europeans in the production of modern human civilisation” (Hassan, 1999, p.207). He goes on to quote Diop as claiming that, “this culture, of a truly universal vocation, only takes shape through the free intervention of particular cultures” (Diop, translated in Hassan, 1999, p.204). To clarify, Diop, like Senghor, proposed the fundamentality of this condition based on his assumption that “we all need the West. We also need it to master and discipline an all too powerful appetite on its part for domination- so that we may live harmoniously and in peace with the other human civilisations” (Diop, 1992, p. xvi). To summarise, they were clear throughout their publications that it would not benefit Africa, or what Diop referred to as Black civilisation, to ostracise themselves from the West. Instead, they advocated for a system of both political and cultural collaboration in which non-Western cultures, firstly had the opportunity establish and develop as equals, and secondly then enter into discourse based on that foundation. It was argued that achieving this was a two stage plan. Firstly, Africans needed to realise their own worth so that when they entered into discourse with other groups they were able to do so viewing themselves as equals. Diop and Senghor suggested that the Négritude movement was a solution to this first problem. Secondly, Western governments needed to overcome their imperialist assumptions regarding the value of their cultural and political attitudes, and to enter into dialogue with other cultures grounded on an assumption of equal value and worth. The importance of equality in cross-cultural dialogue is a value that is shared not only by the Négritude theorists, but also by contemporary scholars discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, as well as the Kantian model central to this thesis. The emergence of this focus across different academic traditions is further indication of the shared value placed on the importance of equality between both individuals and cultural groups; one of the themes expressed by this thesis as representing internal and external self-law giving as potential foundations of cross-cultural discourse and debate. The concept of equality, in each of these cases, relies on the assumptions that all humans have equal worth and rights over
the choices affecting their lives, thus interactions with them should be premised on respecting these principles.

The assumption of a hierarchy of cultures by European thinkers and political leaders was, for Diop and Senghor, a hindrance to the successful development of a Universal Civilisation. However, they were also concerned with certain post-independence leaders who supported the complete reversal of colonial political structures and developments. They argued that such a process would only serve to harm the continent. In fact, Senghor claimed that, “we should impoverish ourselves and probably despair of reducing our millenary backwardness as compared with Europe, if, on the pretext of anti-colonialist struggle, we refused Europe’s contributions” (Senghor, 1962, p.16). For them, the value of cross-cultural collaboration was threefold. Firstly, Western advances in science and technology would serve to benefit the people of Africa, especially as they were entering into a process of state building in the post-independence era. Secondly, there were certain elements of European culture that were of benefit to humans universally, as there were elements from other cultures that could be similarly beneficial to humanity in general. Thirdly, Africa had the potential to make valuable contributions to the Universal Civilisation, to both the benefit of Africans and non-Africans alike. Commentator Richard Bjornson summarises this argument, claiming that, “according to Senghor, for example, Africans could contribute to the disalienation of the West by sharing with it the humanising perspectives of their own culture, and they themselves could overcome alienation by recognising their rootedness in this culture” (Bjornson, 1992, p.147). Thus, in proposing a universal approach to understanding culture, it can be surmised from these arguments that both Diop and Senghor understood there to be universally relevant questions for mankind. Answering these problems, they argued, required a collaborative human solution, and achieving this should be premised on fair and just cross-cultural interactions and collaborations: a system they referred to as a Universal Civilisation.

The concept of a Universal Civilisation was not (similarly to the philosophy of Négritude more generally), simply a philosophical and cultural project. It was also, especially in the case of Senghor, an explicitly political project. In the 1955 edition of “Présence Africaine” a claim was made regarding the value of achieving political freedom. Unlike much of the Négritude literature the argument was not based on the importance of individuals realising their freedom, but rather on the need for the instruments of the state to be free and capable of serving the people. In his editorial Niam N’goura stated that “there can be no
cultural production or initiative without self-assurance and lucidity, without that remembrance of our personality which free political institutions alone can guarantee” (N’goura, translated in Hassan, 1999, p.214). Thus, for N’goura, the value of the movement was not only in talking to individuals, but also in establishing political conditions under which individuals could flourish. The term “personality” is in no way uncontroversial and what it means to different groups, individuals or ideologies differs greatly. However, in this instance the point raised by N’goura does not require the pinning down of a definition. Rather, it highlights the importance for him of free individuals working within free institutions, if cultural production is to be achieved and protected. Thus, as with the movement more generally, N’goura recognised the ingrained relationship between the cultural and the political and the need to consider each element simultaneously, especially in relation to issues of freedom.

Manthia Diawara suggests that the value of freedom and emancipation was not just expressed and experienced by scholars and politicians, but also Africans more generally recognised the value of Négritude as supporting freedom movements not just for Black people, but for all oppressed peoples: implying that the movement had universal potential. Diawara expresses her feeling “that Négritude was bigger even than Africa, that we were part of an international movement which held the promise of universal emancipation that our destiny coincided with the universal freedom of workers and colonised people worldwide” (Diawara, 1998, pp. 6-7). For her, the movement was one example of a wider concern: the value of freedom and emancipation to all individuals who had experienced oppression, regardless of geo-political location or local experience. According to this interpretation, a dislike of oppression, and support for freedom of choice was a universally shared foundation of humanity.

The purpose of this section has been to highlight the role the Négritude movement played “in the awakening of Black consciousness throughout the world” (Bjornson, 1992, p. 147), and questioning the role this played in advancing the Universal Civilisation. It has also been the intention of this section to indicate the emphasis theorists have placed on rooting these ideas in the concepts of autonomy and freedom. In summarising this discussion it is also important to highlight a potential paradox in Senghor’s work. Whilst he supports the concept of a Universal Civilisation, and establishing politics combining both the past and present; he also supports a “return” narrative, glorifying pre-colonial Africa, and, in this sense it is possible to see a paradox. In recognising this dilemma, this thesis argues that
whilst inconsistencies do indeed exist in his work, these are in the practice rather than in the foundations. In fact, both of his positions are grounded on arguments for the necessity of establishing positions that foster self-mastery. Either in the sense of recognising and celebrating traditions that are important to the people, or, in creating the conditions under which individuals can better develop.

This section concludes with a summary of “Présence Africaine’s” role in delivering these goals, as well as the role of the journal in responding to the changing nature of emancipatory movements away from Négritude and towards other Pan-African models. The final element of the argument is a criticism of the notion of a Universal Civilisation, this leads into Section 3.5 which focuses on criticism of the Négritude movement more generally.

According to Valentin- Yves Mudimbe in his introduction to the “The Surreptitious Speech” (a text dedicated to celebrating forty years of “Présence Africaine”), the role of the journal as the editor’s viewed it, was to “incarnate the voice of a silenced Africa” (Mudimbe, 1992, p. xviii). In realising that goal, it “was both a source of cultural innovation and a vehicle of social and political mobility” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p. 14). The aim was to overcome a situation in which “the Black man existed only to be an object of jeers and gibes; he existed only in humiliation and obliteration”. To achieve this, “the existence of the Black man had to be reinvented; he had to be thrown resolutely, and without complexes into the common path of the human species” (Rabemananjara, 1992, p.376). For Rabemananjara, one of the original editors of the journal, “that was and still remains the objective of “Présence Africaine”: to be present in the world in the same way as others” (Rabemananjara, 1992, p.376). Thus the journal, like the Négritude movement more generally, maintained a core focus to overthrow the shackles of oppression, and reassert what it meant to be Black, both in, and to, the world. As can be seen in the above statements, many of the authors focused on acts of freedom: the freedom to achieve “political mobility”, as Jules-Rosette states, or to provide a space in which the silenced could speak, as Mudimbe proffers. Each of these aims and goals, whilst they differ, are philosophically underpinned by the value of realising individual freedom, be that the freedom to express individual views, the freedom to play an active role in politics or the freedom from certain violent acts of domination under which a racial group is targeted or bullied.

As a journal that far outlived the Négritude movement as a vehicle for realising freedom from oppression, the methods “Présence Africaine” supported changed over time. As it
became apparent that Europe was still failing to treat Africa as an equal, and as having something to offer to a Universal Civilisation, and “as liberal humanism came under increasing attack, Diop and a diminishing group of other intellectuals associated with the journal still tried to persuade black intellectuals and African nationalists that European culture was the basis of an imperfect universal civilisation” (Hassan, 1999, p.203). However, in time it became apparent that support for humanism was diminishing the journal’s popularity amongst their readership, and Diop was forced to give up the strong humanistic feel of the journal in favour of critiquing Eurocentric ideas and supporting Pan-African movements that avoided, rather than supported, interactions with Europe or universal notions of culture. This need for a change of approach resulted from increasingly vocal critics claiming that, “to expect the colonised to open his mind to the world and be a humanist and internationalist would seem to be a ludicrous thoughtlessness (when) he is still regaining possession of himself, still examining himself with astonishment, passionately demanding the return of his language” (Memmi, 2003, p. 179). The development of a different Pan-African approach is considered in Chapter 4: The African socialism movement.

3.5- Frantz Fanon and a Critique of the Négritude Movement:

Section 3.5 focuses on the critics of the Négritude movement, and questions whether the criticisms they make are rooted in similar philosophical foundations to those of the movement they criticise. The purpose being to analyse whether similar philosophical foundations form the basis of arguments from across the political, cultural and ideological spectrum. This section begins with a general critique of the Négritude movement as presented by contemporary discussants, and concludes with a focused discussion of the writings of Frantz Fanon.

i. General Critique

This section relies heavily on the views and interpretations of both contemporary critics, and those writing in the period directly following the movements prevalence. As contemporary discussants Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, Benetta Jules-Rosette, and Manthia Diawara were clear in their critique of Négritude, that they felt that the movement had value within its own time period but that this value was not sustainable. Both Jules-Rosette and Frantz Fanon made the argument that what it meant to discover ones Négritude or Blackness, or in fact to be African, was never fully uncovered by the Négritude scholars, and nor could it have been. Fanon in particular, felt that the notion of a fixed, shared identity was in fact damaging to the cause. As discussed in the following sub-section,
he is adamant throughout his work that his identity is not something that is universally shared, or a fixed consciousness waiting for him to awake to its presence, but rather: “I am not a potentiality of something, I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal” (Fanon, 1968, p.134). His assertion of the notion of individuality was a response to the assumption (discussed throughout this chapter) that existed across the work of the authors of the movement of a shared understanding of what it meant to be Black, which critics argued, they failed to fully establish. Whilst “Africa provides a historical source for the significance of the writers’ present challenges...what is intended by the term ‘Africa’ is neither uniform nor obvious” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p.20). An assumption of a shared African identity lies at the centre of the Négritude movement but it is also at the heart of its critique. Africa is a continent consisting of many distinct cultures, religions, races, identities, individuals and nations. Critics, such as Jules-Rosette, condemn the assumption that each of these groups shares the same understanding of what it means to be African, and in doing so premise their argument on the values of autonomy and purposiveness to individuals.

In further support of the argument that Négritude failed in its attempt to be representative of the people it claimed to characterise, Gibson suggested that, instead, the Négritude movement was nothing more than a “response by a section of the Black évolués in French society to their sense of alienation” (Gibson, 2003, p.62). Alienation from both the French citizenry amongst whom they were living at the time, and from their own people. He argued that the poetry, in particular, was a response to a feeling of homelessness and a desire to get back in touch with their African roots, with the hope of discovering and developing their individual “African identity”. It was not, according to Gibson, a representation of the views of the people they claimed to represent and understand. Fanon made similar claims regarding the notion of a shared Black identity, arguing that “there will never be such a thing as black culture” (Fanon, 1965, p.189). Similarly, Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk discusses Senghor’s claims to understand and be a part of an exotic African past:

“Whatever he might proclaim in his poetry, an African man of letter will hardly seriously maintain that he himself is imbued with this awareness of an all-encompassing unity of man and thing, life and death etc. Senghor has played up this theme- especially in regard to the continued existence and living reality of his ancestors- throughout his poetry, but has still to
convince me that it represents more than just a literary prose” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.102).

Fanon made a similar claim about Senghor’s position as a member of the educated elite: “we must understand that African unity can only be achieved through the upward thrust of the people, and under the leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie” (Fanon, 1965, p.133). As the quotes suggest, it has been argued by a range of critics that the movement failed to gain traction, in both making claims for a shared identity and representing the views of people outside of their own group. In this sense, critics argue, the movement failed. The unestablished shared identity and the controversial response to such an argument has been viewed by contemporary discussants as a primary explanation of the brevity of the movements influence.

The second element to this thesis asks whether the authors studied advocated for political conditions in which the rights of individuals to be self-law giving are guaranteed. Similarly to discussions of individual, internal freedom, the assumption is not that these ideas will be couched in Kantian terminology, but rather, to assess whether similar demands are being made. It was suggested in Section 3.4 that theorists advocated for a philosophical claim for the necessity of free institutions able to recognise and guarantee the freedom of individuals. However, like a number of other theorists considered in this thesis, Senghor was not only a poet and scholar but also an active political figure. Therefore it is important to question his political success in guaranteeing freedom to the people of Senegal. Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk discusses Senghor the politician, in contrast to Senghor the poet and philosopher:

“The great apostle of the black man’s rights, the defender of the socialist faith in Africa, the ardent protagonist of humanistic ideals, the great seeker for unity, has not entirely been able to free the independent observer from the nagging doubt that he could have done more to let true democracy and true freedom take root in his own country” (Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk, 1970, p.68).

Based on Barrend van Dyk van Niekerk’s observations, and through consideration of the political situation in Senegal under his rule (a detailed analysis of which is outside of the analytical boundaries of this thesis), it can be argued that whilst Senghor advocated for the right and value of autonomy and choice from a philosophical perspective, he was
unsuccessful in delivering this when it came to actively constructing a political state. Therefore, as Diawara observes, Senghorian Négritude can be criticised “for marginalising the majority of our populations, and for not basing its theories on economic, cultural, and social realities in Africa. Négritude was too philosophical and had too little material basis” (Diawara, 1992, p.384). This critique is established on two levels. Firstly, similarly to the authors discussed in the previous paragraph, Diawara concentrates on the failure of Senghor and his contemporaries to represent the views of the people, focusing instead on his own feelings of oppression and isolation. Secondly, he suggests that the philosophical focus of the movement led to its failure politically, as it was not properly grounded in reality. Gibson makes a similar claim: “Négritude was useful in shaking everything up, but finally its reliance on unconscious rather than conscious action, and the importance it placed on the irrational, meant that it was unable to articulate a positive conception of change” (Gibson, 2003, pp.80-81). Thus, it can be argued that as a philosophical movement Négritude was successful in raising questions and debates, but as a political reality the lack of empirical grounding resulted in its limited existence as a movement.

The validity of the critiques regarding the concept of a universal Black identity, the people the movement represents and the excessively cultural and philosophical, rather than political focus raises a number of questions regarding the movement’s placement in this thesis. If the claims made by the movement can be disregarded via a number of successful critiques the question is asked as to whether the analysis of this chapter can be maintained. However, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the views of individual theorists from a range of different ideological and cultural perspectives, and to question whether their views share a philosophical foundation, established on premises similar to those of internal self-law giving and external willkür, it is not to defend the political models they established. As is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter (Chapter 4), theorists’ philosophical ideas and their political decisions are being treated separately in this thesis. Whilst the critiques discussed in this section do indeed raise fundamental questions about the success of Négritude, both in achieving its aims and as being representative, they do not question the philosophical groundings of the arguments being made. A number of the criticisms discussed both in the previous paragraphs, and in the following discussion of Fanon, in fact share similar foundational beliefs, focusing on the movement’s failure to guarantee political freedoms and to respect the identity of individuals.
Before concluding the section with a discussion of Fanon it is opportune to refer to Irele’s observation of Senghor: “I don’t want to give the impression that Senghor’s négritude was an ideology of aggression; in fact, one of the main objections levelled against it by its radical critics is that it was, in fact, a form of collaboration and accommodation with colonialism” (Irele, 1992, p.208). Irele’s point provides a link between the two halves of this section, as one of Fanon’s critiques of the Négritude movement is grounded on its lack of violent revolutionary spirit. For Fanon, and those like him, it was this lack of revolutionary fervour created by Senghor and Diop that was its true downfall. For them, it was not enough to philosophise on the topic of oppression. Instead, what was required as a response to the violence committed by the colonial movement was further violence. Fanon supported a response to colonialism grounded in the restorative nature of a certain type of violence: a form he referred to as cleansing violence. It was only through a systematic violent response that he believed emancipation could be achieved. For him, freedom could not be given, but rather it had to be taken violently. It was not acceptable for France to retreat from Senegal and for Senghor to collaborate with them. Under these parameters Senegal was not free. Rather, what was needed was a violent uprising against the oppressors. The value of which is explained in the remainder of this chapter, along with Fanon’s more general critique (previously referenced) of theories such as Négritude and Pan-Africanism, that rely on a shared image of what it means to be Black or African.

ii. Frantz Fanon

This sub-section first focuses on the views of Frantz Fanon on violence, and secondly on his critique of the concept of a Black personality. According to Fanon and his commentators, the colonisers “goal was not only to void the colonial subject of any substance, but also to foreclose the future” (Mbembe, 2012, p.22); the purpose being to diminish their individual choice. For Fanon, this level of interference constituted violence. By considering violence as a form of interference, realistic parallels can be drawn between Fanon’s views and those of the Kantian concept of dominance as it was presented in Chapter 1: “that somebody does something to you” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42). For Kantian’s, the consequences of interference do not dictate whether it violates an individual’s rights. It is the fact that the act of interference was committed at all that is the criteria for viewing it as domination. Fanon made similar claims. He made the uncontroversial claim that both colonial violence and notions of imposed identity, such as those supported by Césaire and Senghor, interfered with individual freedom. To clarify, his argument was not that Senghor and Césaire’s view of what it meant to be Black or African was necessarily bad or wrong, but rather that
imposing a predefined understanding of either concept on individuals violated their rights to define their own identity as individuals living in Africa. Whilst a less severe crime than that of colonial violence, Fanon suggested that both were rooted in the same problematic assumption that the African people should be helped towards, or given, their freedom. For him, such an approach did not constitute real freedom. What sets his views apart from the majority of authors who would share this observation, was his belief in violence as the methodology for overcoming oppression. This argument is considered in detail in the following paragraphs, after first discussing his problems with the notion of establishing a fixed identity into which individuals were supposed to “fit”.

His first critique that this sub-section will consider is founded on his understating of the meaning of Négritude itself. The term, as mentioned in Section 3.1, can be understood in English as Blackness. The implication, on reading Senghor, Damas, Diop, Césaire, and even Sartre, is that this Black consciousness is an abstract property that exists a priori to individuals: a feature that people will come to realise through the emancipatory politics of the Négritude movement. For Fanon, this imposed view of what it meant to be Black was indeed problematic, and in fact an act of domination or violence. It is on this point that a further example of both the Négritude scholars and their critics making claims grounded in similar philosophical foundations can be observed; both Fanon and the Négritude theorists discuss a Black personality in terms of Africans realising their autonomy.

For Fanon, his being Black is not a fixed identity which he must come to understand and inhabit, rather it is an “identity, always in process, that constitutes itself in confronting domination” (Serequeberhan, 2000, p.19); it is an individual rather than a shared construct. What it means to be Black for one individual will differ to what it means for another. He is particularly critical of Jean-Paul Sartre’s interpretation of his understanding of Black culture in “Black Orpheus”:

“The black consciousness is held out as an absolute destiny, as filled with itself, a stage preceding any invasion, any abolition of the ego by desire. Jean-Paul Sartre, in this work, has destroyed black zeal...Still in terms of consciousness, black consciousness is imminent in its own eyes. I am not a potentiality of something; I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal. No probability has any place inside me. My Negro consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. It is. It is its own follower” (Fanon, 1968, pp134-135).
As is clear in the preceding quote, the individual is central to Fanon’s philosophy. He did not believe in the existence of an a priori, universal understanding of what it meant to be Black, which he, as an individual, must live up to. Rather, he felt that what was important to him was not to be “typically Negro” (Fanon, 1968, p.132), but instead to be typically him. It is on these arguments that similarities can be observed with the Kantian notion of autonomy. For both Kant and Fanon, autonomy over the self is fundamental. In Kantian terms, a Fanonian critique of Négritude would be that the imposition of a Black consciousness is a form of domination. It is not that there were necessarily bad intentions attached, but rather the act of domination itself that Fanon saw as problematic. In this sense, there are notable similarities between his views, and the proposed foundational principles discussed in Chapter 1.

His views on identities defined by race and colour, it can be argued, resulted from much of the treatment he received when travelling and studying outside of Martinique. Especially during his time studying in Lyon, where Fanon was subject to mistreatment grounded purely on the colour of his skin. The role of his personal experience becomes clearer when considering that, in contrast to his views on racial identity, in a number of his publications he is comfortable with drawing identity distinctions based on both psychoanalytical classifiers and notions of class: “bourgeoisie” (Fanon, 1965, p.133). He made a number of arguments based on his distrust for the bourgeoisie, failing to recognise that in drawing these distinctions, grounded in ideas of class, he too was making arguments based on imposed identity. To elucidate, in the quote previously discussed in Sub-Section 3.5i, he accused the Négritude movement of being a bourgeois movement. Suggesting that what was needed to respond to colonialism was instead a system that was, “under the leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie” (Fanon, 1965, p.133). This distinction highlights a contradiction within his position, between not pre-forming racial identities on the one hand, and subsequently choosing to do so on the basis of class on the other. In relation to the project of this thesis, this contradiction has a number of consequences. As will become clear in the following narrative, analysis of Fanon’s views allows for parallels to be drawn between the philosophical groundings he establishes for both, his support of “cleansing violence”, and his displeasure with pre-formed racial identities, and the Kantian arguments focusing on equality, autonomy and self-mastery. However, based on the above observations regarding his views on class and psychoanalytical identifiers it is not possible to argue that these views necessarily underpin all of his beliefs; although many of his discussions of class are
grounded on a belief in the self-mastery of the people overcoming the oppression of the bourgeoisie so it is still possible to draw comparisons. Due to the focus of this thesis on the post-colonial period, and the cultural and political responses to oppression occurring within it, Fanon’s psychoanalytic work has been omitted from this thesis. What can be argued, regarding the philosophical underpinnings of his views, is that his views on colonialism and violence share similar foundations to those of willkür and self-law giving: a critique of oppression, support for notions of self-mastery, and the fundamental importance of equality. Each of these is discussed in further detail in the remainder of this section.

The concept of violence is fundamental to understanding Fanon’s position and it is to this discussion that this section now turns. There was, for Fanon, a distinction to be made between the violence of the coloniser, and the form of violent response of the colonised that he advocated for. He viewed the violence of the colonised as having positive attributes which could enable the people to form community bonds, and find strength in one another to respond to colonialism. This, unlike the views of Senghor and Diop, was the only way Fanon believed freedom could be attained. He suggested that:

“For the colonised people this violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the settlers violence in the beginning” (Fanon, 1965, p.73).

The importance of equality amongst the people is clear from the above quote, as is Fanon’s reliance on violence in achieving this. However, it is the role he sees for violence as constituting work, and the self-discovery and belief attached to this, that is particularly interesting to this thesis. It suggests that Fanon believed that creating the conditions for individuals to “positively and creatively” direct their actions was at the foundation of autonomy. Discourse and debate in such an area thus focuses around notions similar to those attributed to the Kantian theme of self-mastery. This is not to suggest that only a Kantian approach focuses on the value of individuals positively directing their own existence, but rather that this is a foundational concept that is present in a number of thought systems (Fanon’s being one), and thus it can be suggested that it may indeed be relevant universally. A similar argument is being made for the value of equality as it is also established by Fanon.
According to Achille Mbembe, Fanon presented three goals that he believed could be achieved through the uptake of colonial violence. The somewhat lengthy quote is included here as Mbembe’s observations are valuable to understanding Fanon’s views on violence qua autonomy rather than violence qua violence:

“First it served as a call to a people caught in the grip of history and placed in an untenable situation to exercise freedom, to take charge, to name themselves, to spring to life...They were forced to make a choice, to risk their lives, to expose themselves... (second) Fanon’s theory only makes sense within the context of a more general theory, that of the rise of humanity. The colonised has to propel himself, by his own force, to a lever above the one to which he has been consigned as a result of racism or subjugation... in this way he restores the possibility for him personally and for humanity as a whole, starting with his executioners, of new and open dialogue between two equal human subjects where, previously, there had been opposition between a man (the colonialist) and his object (the colonised)” (Mbembe, 2012, p.24).

The two goals mentioned in the above quote are then concluded with a third: dialogue between equals. As previously mentioned, the theme of cultures of individuals interacting as equals is common across the chapters of this thesis. As already mentioned in Section 3.4, it was a theme commonly associated with the journal “Présence Africaine”, as well as contemporary scholars Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. However, there is a notable difference in Fanon’s interpretation of how equality should be achieved. He argued, as suggested in the earlier quote referencing the “great chain of violence”, that equality could be realised through the uptake of a cleansing form of violence, a method in which the colonised were able to “propel himself, by his own force”. In fact, “by choosing violence rather than being subjected to it, the colonised subject is able to restore the self...he redefines himself and learns to value his life and the shape of his presence in relation to his body, his speech, to the Other and to the world” (Mbembe, 2012, p.21). The violence he supported was different to that of the colonisers which in contrast, he claimed, reduced equality. He argued in “The Wretched of the Earth” (1965) that, “we have said that the natives violence unifies the people. By its very structure, colonialism is separatist and regionalist” (Fanon, 1965, p. 73). Thus, it is clear on reading Fanon that he argued for a distinction between the two forms of violence. Firstly, the oppressive violence
of the colonisers which de-humanised the colonised, creating a hierarchical system under which the colonisers were seen as people, and the colonised were seen as objects. Secondly, the cleansing violence of the colonised, which enabled them to redefine themselves not as objects, but as persons, with rights to autonomy, self-definition and choice. The notion of “choosing violence”, discussed by Mbemebe, is also fundamental to distinguishing between the two positions. It is the distinction between actively choosing and demonstrating purposiveness, and the act of having violence imposed upon you. This thesis is not suggesting that the concept of violence, as it is usually understood, is necessarily philosophically grounded in notions of autonomy and self-law giving, as understood by Kantians. However, the claim is being made that the concept of “cleansing violence”, as it is discussed by Fanon, was indeed grounded on these principles. This is not to suggest that the act of violence, in and of itself, does not destroy the autonomy and self-law giving capacities of its victims, nor is it to support the acts that Fanon advocated for. Similarly, the argument is not being made to suggest that Fanon’s approach recognised the value of individual humans universally, it is accepted that this is an argument for revolution and violence as a method of establishing the autonomy of only one group of people. Rather, the aim of this discussion has been to locate the centrality of the concepts of self-law giving, self-mastery, equality and freedom of choice within the debates and discourse of Fanon’s model of cleansing violence. The claims being made recognise the limiting factors of Fanon’s model to only a certain group of people, and that the similarities with the Kantian model are made based on Fanon’s claims for that group of people. The argument is not that Fanon was a universalist, but rather that even under a very different ideological model, similarities can be drawn with the philosophical foundations of what both Kantians, and Fanon believed was owed to individuals: autonomy and choice. Without violence, Fanon believed, the colonised would be unable to be truly free: “It is precisely at the moment he realises his humanity that he begins to sharpen the weapons with which he will secure its victory” (Fanon, 1965, p.35). Like Kant, he believed in the philosophical foundational argument that freedom originates in the self, and cannot be gifted by an external force. It was his position that violence was the only method through which colonised people could achieve their freedom. This reliance on a violent revolution was the basis on which his criticism of Négritude was built. He felt that the Négritude of Senghor, in particular, failed to truly understand the psychological need to break the bonds of servitude.

From the previous discussion Fanon’s emphasis on autonomy for colonial people and his view that “cleansing violence” is the best method for appropriating this has been
demonstrated. However, Vikki Bell argued in her 2010 editorial of the “Theory, Culture and Society” special issue that these views also translated into a political system based on similar groundings: “For his part, Fanon argued that the government to come should be one that is the direct expression of the masses and that no leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will” (Bell, 2010, p. 9). According to Bell, Fanon believed in a system that placed the views and autonomy of the citizenry at its centre. Whilst it is clear that the approach he advocated for achieving this is very different to the condition of public right promoted by Kant, there is an apparent similarity in the underlying premise justifying his notion of government: government is justified when it protects the freedom of individuals. Thus, as with the other scholars considered throughout this chapter, it is clear that the ideas Fanon promoted were not couched in Kantian terms. However, what has become clear throughout this chapter is the existence of an underlying philosophical grounding, which is shared by theorists of disparate views, that looks similar to the Kantian concepts presented in Chapter 1.

3.6- Conclusion:

In concluding this chapter the aim is to summarise the fundamental arguments of the Négritude movement, and to reiterate the areas in which it is possible to locate similarities between the views of this collection of African theorists and the values of self-law giving and willkür as they are presented in Chapter 1. At its core Négritude was a movement dedicated to disputing the conditions imposed on the colonised people by European colonial powers and to reaffirm the value and strength of Blackness as a response. It was a response to the cultural marginalisation imposed by the West, and a desire to readdress the balance of non-Western contributions to a universal cultural and political civilisation. This became particularly clear in Section 3.4, in which the role of the journal “Présence Africaine” was the central focus. Benetta Jules-Rosette observed that the journal “was born out of protest against the colonisation and assimilation produced by ‘Latin culture’. Diop frames the goals of “Présence Africaine” as, a liberating search for African identity and values in art and culture” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, pp.17-18). In doing so he made it clear from the first issue in 1947 that the journal, and similarly the significance of Négritude, was grounded in a desire to present to the world a culture that was of equal value and worth to that of European culture. The secondary focus was on establishing the conditions for cross-cultural discourse which would, they believed, better serve a Universal Civilisation. It was, according to Bernard Mouralis, “a discourse on Africa and a discourse by Africans” (Mouralis, 1992, p.5), aimed at reasserting themselves against oppression. At the centre of
each of these definitions is a belief in an underlying equality that existed, and still exists, between Europe and Africa, or the coloniser and the colonised. At the heart of the Négritude movement, therefore, was a belief in a human condition in which each culture, and each individual, is valuable. Simultaneously, this notion of equal value of individuals also stood at the centre of the arguments of Négritude’s greatest critic, Frantz Fanon (although as previously discussed this notion of equality was internal to the colonial movement and his views on the colonisers were less in line with humanist values).

Throughout this chapter it has become apparent that both supporters and critics of the Négritude movement enter into debates, though in linguistically different ways, that rely on the assumption of the universality of notions of equality, self-mastery and freedom of choice as fundamental principles at the heart of what is owed to individual persons. To conclude, the Négritude movement was an explicitly cultural-political project that responded to the colonial situation, and called for an alternative that was grounded in a belief in the equality of humanity and the autonomy of African and Caribbean peoples. It was criticised for its lack of revolutionary fervour, as well as its imposing of a Black personality or consciousness on a diverse group of individuals, but it was at least successful “in shaking everything up” (Gibson, 2003, p.80).

As the concept of liberal humanism lost its popularity in Africa so did Négritude: being associated with a central aim of contributing to a Universal Civilisation. The result was a rise in different Pan-African movements, which advocated for a closed and revolutionary Africa; although still broadly grounded in a theory of shared African identity. The successes and failures of one of these movements (African socialism) are the focus of the following chapter (Chapter 4). As with this chapter, the central focus will be on asking whether the philosophical underpinnings of the arguments for, and debates surrounding, African socialism share similarities with the Kantian framework which is central to this thesis.
Chapter 4- African Socialism:

“Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win” (Marx & Engels, 1992, p.39).

As with Chapters 3 and 5, this chapter firstly outlines the theory being considered: African socialism in the time period just following independence. It then, introduces the theorists chosen to represent this position, and justifies the choice to select these particular figures: the three philosopher statesmen Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K Nyerere, and Samora Machel. Finally, the chapter debates the question of this thesis in relation to these thinkers: is it possible to locate the existence of appeals to shared foundational principles regarding what it means to be a person in the speeches and writings of Nkrumah, Machel and Nyerere. Do they suggest that it is a right of all autonomous agents to be self-law giving, and a duty of states to create the necessary conditions under which this will be possible? Due to Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Machel’s positions as political figureheads this chapter also queries the realities of the political conditions they established, and asks whether their rhetoric and their realities coincided. To clarify, a crucial element of analysis to the overall thesis is to consider both the theorists’ discussions of the internal value of being self-law giving, and their belief in the external notion of willk"ur, understood as choice and freedom from domination. However, in situations in which the theorists were also political figureheads (the case in this chapter), a further question is raised: whether the political conditions they established constitutionally respected the rights of individuals to be self-law giving and provided the necessary conditions to achieve this. The question will also be raised, as with the study of Négritude, as to whether the motivations given for choosing socialism as the relevant model for each of their countries (Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique), was grounded in this same philosophical understanding of what persons are owed, and a belief that an African form of socialism was the best method for delivering this.

This chapter is divided into the following four sections: The first (Section 4.1) is an introduction covering the issues of why African socialism is being included in this thesis, the choices behind the inclusion and exclusion of certain theorists, an introduction to the three theorists selected, and finally a brief discussion of the existence of explicitly, rather than implicitly, Kantian ideas underpinning many of the claims being made (although this will then be dealt with in greater detail in a later section). Section 4.2 is a brief discussion of Nyerere and Nkrumah’s prevalent role in the Pan-African movement, the justifications
given for its value and importance, and whether any of these debates centred on foundational beliefs in the rights of individuals to exercise choice in dictating the direction of their lives, and the failure to successfully implement it. Section 4.3 is a detailed account of the existence of explicitly Kantian language in the writings and speeches of the three politicians. Included within this are sub-sections looking specifically at content dealing with the concepts of self-mastery, external freedom of choice and autonomy, equality and the political goals of avoiding dominance and oppression; understood in the Kantian sense set out in Chapter 1. Also included in this section is discussion of the implied philosophical groundings of Nyerere and Machel’s villagisation projects, as well as a more in depth discussion of the question of whether the theorists are utilising socialism to deliver foundational principles or whether the choice to follow a socialist path was alternatively grounded. Section 4.4 considers the failings of the three models of African socialism. This section is predominantly based on the political states of Nkrumah and Nyerere. Due to Machel’s untimely death it is harder to analyse what the outcomes in Mozambique would have been were he to continue as president, although predictions can be made as a personality cult had already started to form around the President and he had begun to implement the necessary conditions for a one-party state. This section also considers the failings of the three theorists to create the political conditions necessary to respect the individual autonomy of the citizenry. The conclusion (Section 4.5) ties each of these themes together and summarises the overall arguments of this chapter.

4.1 Introduction: Why African Socialism?

Similarly to the theorists studied in the previous chapter (Chapter 3) those covered here have a mixed background between political theory and active political statesmanship. Each was involved in the struggle for independence, before taking active political office in the post-colonial period, with some publishing philosophical doctrines as part of their leadership. Similarly, again to the theorists discussed in the Négritude chapter, each individual was involved to a greater or lesser extent in the Pan-African movement described in the introduction to Chapter 3 (and covered in slightly greater depth in Section 4.2), and believed that a system of either unification or federalisation, grounded on the claim of a shared African identity, would be beneficial to the future of the continent. Each of these themes is analysed and unpicked within the body of this chapter and the consequences discussed. As mentioned in the Introduction, a further similarity that exists between this and the previous chapter is Nkrumah and Nyerere’s relationship with traditional ideas. This is not to suggest that they advocated for the exoticisation or
romanticisation of the past, in fact Julius K. Nyerere, one of the theorists included in the following analysis, explicitly denounced said practice: “we are not trying to go backwards into the traditional past; we are trying to retain the traditional values of human equality and dignity while taking advantage of modern knowledge” (Nyerere, 1968, p.7). Kwame Nkrumah also warned against the risk of making “a fetish of the communal African society” (Nkrumah, 1966, p.202). However, they both also recognised that “in our own past there is very much which is useful for our future” (Nyerere, 1967, p.316), and as a result advocated for a position that does not look to the past simply for the sake of glorifying it, but rather as a method for guiding the future.

As way of introduction to the subject of African socialism the primary concern to be problematized and responded to is why the choice was made to include the post-colonial model of African socialism and not the alternative model popular in Africa at the time: capitalism. Following on from this, the selection of the theorists (Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Machel) as iconic figures of this ideology is discussed.

In the period following independence in Africa, beginning with Libya in 1951 and ending with Zimbabwe (formally Rhodesia) in 1980, the political path the countries chose was often both divisive and controversial. Political decisions were often directed or dictated by a combination of both internal and, often persuasive, external forces. Be that as a response to the ex-coloniser, or a need to develop trade and aid relationships with an influential power (normally falling into one of two power blocs: East or West). Influential post-independence leaders who chose to take a Western influenced capitalist path included Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea. Whilst leaders who implemented a socialist model included, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Machel, as well as Leopold Sedar Senghor and Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. There were a number of reasons offered by both sides as to their choices. Nyerere claimed an affinity with the Chinese model of socialism, whilst “Nkrumah of Ghana asserted that capitalism was ‘too complicated a system for a newly independent nation’” (Nkrumah, cited in Napier, 2010, p.369). Alternatively, Machel argued for a system of socialism, uninfluenced by Russia or China, but particular to Mozambique. Neither ideological choice was without its problems; both types of states struggled for different reasons in the post-independence era. Discussions of why, as well as which of the two alternatives (although each state chose to adapt both models greatly in their methods of rule so the notion of capitalist and socialist
ideologies are used loosely here) was selected, though interesting, are outside of the academic parameters of this thesis’s project. The important question for this discussion is why the overarching umbrella of African socialism was selected as a topic of interest.

As referenced in the Introduction, isolating the groups of theorists to be analysed for the project, and grouping them appropriately, was a fundamental part of the research process. African socialism was selected for a number of reasons. The theorists adopting this model were strongly involved either in the Pan-African movement (Nyerere and Nkrumah) or in the struggle of other African states to realise their freedom in the post-independence era; Machel played a pivotal role in the fight against Apartheid in South Africa up until the time of his death. What makes this element of their political thought particularly interesting to the project of this thesis is the reliance and emphasis on African values, both within their own political states, and as a foundation for the arguments they made for a collaborative African project. For example, Machel was forceful in his assertions that the aim was not to adopt another continents socialist ideology, but rather, to develop an African system of socialism for Africans. As mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, this is not to imply they underwent a process of fetishizing the past, but rather that “the use of historical analysis in order to reach some goals as he (Nyerere) retained vital for an African society immersed into an order that was both new, larger, and more complex than the traditional one” (Masolo, 1981, p.12). Unlike Senghor and Césaire’s Négritude, there was a far greater emphasis placed on creating a forward looking theory, grounded in traditional values, rather than the re-establishment of traditional values within a political system, which is an interesting point of contrast.

As an aside, it is made clear throughout this thesis, touched on briefly in the Introduction and drawn out in greater depth in the final chapter (Concluding Remarks), that there is a noticeable progression in the schools of thought selected for analysis. Whilst both Chapter 3 and the current chapter (which make up Part 1) analyse arguments that can both loosely be described as utilising traditional African ideas, there is a progression in the way traditional views are considered and used by the different theorists. African Négritude, at least in its infancy, was very much focused on the notion of a glorified pre-colonial condition shared by Africa as a whole (as was discussed in Chapter 3), whereas the statesmen studied in this chapter place a greater focus on adapting the past to create new political systems that are relevant to particularly African problems. As Dismas Masolo
observes, “the common characteristic in African versions of socialism is what has been described as reconstructed traditionalism or the tendency to claim that modern socialist planning is no more than a redefinition of the communaucratic basis of traditional African social organisation” (Masolo, 1981, p.21). This is particularly relevant to understanding Nyerere’s Tanzania. Many of his policies, especially his villagisation project, focused on re-establishing certain traditional African values of community and kinship at the core of the policies. At their centre the influences were presented as being very much African (although as suggested in the Introduction, the concept of Africanness is somewhat vague and confused between different groups). This stands in contrast to Part 2 of this thesis, in which the philosophers studied actively critique reliance on traditional values as foundations to political and philosophical policies, and advocate instead for a more future focused system that is willing to take the best parts of all African experience, including recognising the value of ideas and structures imposed by the colonisers.

At this stage it is sensible to return to the choice to include African socialism in the study, rather than the alternative capitalist post-independence model. As implied in the previous two paragraphs, certain elements of African socialism, similarly to Négritude, had roots in traditional African ideals and it can be viewed as being more heavily routed in philosophy. This makes it an interesting, suitably different, philosophy to Western Enlightenment Kantian political thought. Thus the argument follows, if a similar philosophical grounding can be viewed to exist between these two, quite different, philosophies then this creates a stronger basis for implying the a priori existence of notions of self-law giving as foundational philosophical principles of humanity, at the centre of discourse and debate across, and between, different cultural groups. Additionally, the belief systems in Part 1 of this thesis are different to those in Part 2, with philosophers considered in Part 2, in fact, very critical of Négritude and African socialism. Once again, if similarities can be drawn both between the philosophies being analysed here, and with the Kantian ideas central to the argument of this thesis, then further argument can be made for the a priori nature of the principles existence.

Having established the choice to consider African socialism as an important philosophical movement in the post-colonial period, it is important to recap the choice to select these particular theorists as representational of the movement. As mentioned previously, Nkrumah, Machel and Nyerere were selected based on their outward looking approach in
relation to the wider continent of Africa. When founding their ideologies they were looking beyond their own borders. They believed that freedom was a right, not only of their country folk, but of African’s, and humanity more widely. For that reason it is both interesting and insightful to consider the foundational principles that ground this belief in freedom, and to consider the similarities and differences that exist both in principles, and approaches to deliver them, between the ideas of the African scholars and the Kantian framework proposed by this thesis. To highlight this point, one that will be developed in greater detail in Section 4.3, parallels can be drawn between a Kantian perspective and Kwame Nkrumah’s claims in his 1973 monograph, “The Revolutionary Path”:

“We know that the traditional African society was founded on principles of egalitarianism. In its actual workings, however, it had various shortcomings. Its humanist impulse, nevertheless, is something that continues to urge us towards our all-African socialist reconstruction. We postulate each man to be an end in himself, not merely a means; and we accept the necessity of guaranteeing each man equal opportunities for his development...Any meaningful humanism must begin from egalitarianism and must lead to objectively chosen policies for safeguarding and sustaining egalitarianism” (Nkrumah, 1973, p.441).

Throughout “The Revolutionary Path”, Nkrumah explicitly states that his interpretation of traditional African society is of a society that was rooted in a sense of humanism, that supported a view of man as having a right “to be an end in himself, not merely a means”. He suggested in the above passage, that the notion that traditional African societies were egalitarian was uncontroversial. However, as with descriptions of what it means to be African (discussed in the Introduction), this is not the case. By failing to recognise the subjectivity of this claim, a situation is created in which his argument is lacking in evidence to support his assertion that traditional African societies were, indeed, egalitarian. However, that being said, the lack of evidence offered for the existence of traditional values does not take away from his argument that future political conditions should respect an egalitarian model, nor does it prevent comparisons from being drawn with similar Kantian ideals. What it does highlight is a concern present in much of his political theory: that he failed to justify many of his arguments.
A further concern present within the above passage, but also in Nkrumah’s work more widely, is his insistence on the usage of masculine pronouns throughout his arguments. For example, reference to an individual as an “end in himself”, or the necessity of “guaranteeing each man equal opportunities” within a political system. Failure to recognise women as individuals, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is an incredibly problematic element to his argument. However, in his writings he is not explicit about his choice to exclude females. It is thus possible to suggest that the ingrained misogyny is with the, no less difficult, choice of wording, rather than a belief that females are less deserving of egalitarian treatment. That being said, it is thus possible to argue that his position, whilst poorly defined, is intended to be universally applicable. Therefore, it is still possible to draw comparisons with the Kantian model established in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Nonetheless, it remains important to take into account, and not overlook, the underlying sexism in his writings.

The above passage also indicates Nkrumah’s claim that egalitarianism should remain at the heart of African politics, and particularly in the model of socialism that he advocated for. Claims such as these highlight the overt similarities that exist between these theorists and Kantian ideals. This will be further discussed in Section 4.3. It is apparent throughout the progression of this chapter that these claims are more explicitly, rather than implicitly, framed in similar philosophical foundations to those of a Kantian approach than those being made by the Négritude theorists: which also explains why the chapters are presented differently. Before moving on to a brief discussion of the Pan-African movement, it is important to conclude this introductory section with a brief factual introduction to the theorists Julius K. Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, and Samora Machel.

Julius K. Nyerere was the first president of independent Tanganyika from the day of Independence on the 8th December 1961, through the unification of Zanzibar and Tanganyika to create Tanzania, until his retirement in 1985. He is often referred to as “The Father of the Nation” or Mwalimu (which translates from Swahili to mean teacher), which was both his original profession and a sign of respect of the high esteem he was (and still is) held in by the people of Tanzania. It is important to note that both of these colloquialisms present an idea of leadership, implying a hierarchy within the state under which Nyerere was leading the people, rather than a political condition under which individuals were able to live via their own purposiveness. As becomes clear throughout the discourse of the chapter, and specifically in the concluding section, there is a noticeable contradiction...
between the policies Nyerere claims to support (many of which share foundations with the Kantian approach), and his position in society and methods utilised for implementing them. That being said, he enjoyed great popularity in Tanzania, and whilst many of his political choices were deemed unsuccessful and controversial, he remains an icon of Tanzanian history.

Throughout his speeches and writings, there existed a central theme expressing his belief in the fundamental need to value and respect individuals. Many of his more explicitly Kantian views will be considered in Section 4.3, but by way of introduction, reference is made to a speech entitled “Individual Human Rights”, in which Nyerere argued adamantly for the centrality of individual rights to his political practise. He declared, “when we say we want to establish the rights of individuals in our countries, irrespective of race, we mean it” (Nyerere, 1967, p.70). Similarly one of the central creeds of his political party TANU, as set out in the Arusha Declaration (in which the villagisation project, Ujamaa, which was essential to Nyerere’s political aims, was laid out: discussed in Section 4.3), declared that it was the central and fundamental role of government “to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Nyerere, 1968, p.232). Thus, as is made clear throughout this chapter, and as a common denominator amongst all three of the theorists, the rhetoric, if not the reality of Nyerere’s position, was very much based in respect for the individual as directing their own path.

Although, it is important to recognise that usage of such language is a popular political technique, and is not necessarily representative of the thinker’s actions. Unlike a strictly Kantian approach, however, Nyerere relied on a communalistic method for delivering individual freedom. He argued that freedom was best achieved through involvement in a community that worked and lived together and enjoyed a process of deliberative decision making. Masolo emphasises this point. He suggests that for Nyerere “although man is fundamentally free, his freedom is realisable through and dependent upon his collective identity; (and) that this collective conditioning is the basis of his knowledge, autonomy and well-being” (Masolo, 1995, pp.120-121). On reading Nyerere on this topic, it becomes clear that he believed a strong community also provided the conditions for avoiding and overcoming exploitation, an issue considered in greater detail in Sub-Section 4.3.iii.

Nyerere claimed that, “in our traditional African society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men” (Nyerere, 1962, p.5). Similarly with the discussion of Nkrumah earlier in this section, Nyerere is unclear regarding what a
traditional African society involved, and in that sense it can be suggested that he fails to
abide by his own rules of avoiding exoticism. However, it can be assumed from his
discourse that he believed traditional societies, and as such future societies, should be
grounded in a strong sense of community, rather than individualism. As suggested in
Chapters 1 and 2, the existence of reference to similar core principles, such as the
importance of recognising the individual freedom of citizens, does not imply support for
the same political methods for achieving them. Similarly, suggesting that these principles
are foundations shared across cultural perspectives does not require them to be realised
through the same political methods. Thus, Masolo’s observation that Nyerere intended to
achieve individual freedom through the community does not necessarily imply that he
supports the sanctity of individual freedom less than, for example, a Kantian who suggests
the individual takes priority over the community. This concept of individual freedom as
being achieved via the community is discussed again in Chapter 5 with reference to the
views of Kwame Gyekeye and Kwasi Wiredu, and is a theme that emerges throughout the
analysis of the different chapters. It is thus further discussed in the Concluding Remarks to
this thesis. To conclude the summary of Nyerere’s life and views: following twenty-four
years in power Julius K. Nyerere retired the presidency in 1985, dying in London in 1999
and remaining a national hero in Tanzania.

Kwame Nkrumah was the first president of Independent Ghana (previously the Gold Coast
under British rule), taking the presidency on March 5th 1957, and establishing a Marxist
inspired socialist state. He played a particularly prevalent role in the Pan-African movement
(which is discussed in Section 4.2), and advocated for a programme of federalisation which
he believed would strengthen Africa’s global position. However, Nkrumah’s determination
to create a political block rather than a purely economic and cultural block was unpopular
amongst his fellow African leaders:

“Political union is an idea of which Dr. Nkrumah has become the leading
and, indeed, virtually the only prominent exponent in Africa...To all the
disturbing problems in Africa-poverty, neo-colonialism, balkanisation,
disunity, cultural and language differences-Dr. Nkrumah offers one recipe:
‘strong political unity’ and ‘the African race united under one federal
government’ ” (Legum, 1965, p.57).
As his determination to create a federal state developed, so did his unpopularity amongst his contemporaries. In the early stages of the movement Manning Marable (1987) suggested Nkrumah was viewed positively and his views taken into account. However, as he became more adamant in his support for federalisation, concern grew that his support for Pan-Africanism lay firmly in a desire to lead the continent, and his popularity dwindled. Similarly, by the start of the 1960’s, his popularity amongst his own party in Ghana (the CPP) was being called into question. He ruled in an ever more authoritarian manner, until an eventual coup in 1966 leading to his exile to Guinea. As his style of rule became less participatory he began to employ foreign advisors. He was thus able to ignore party members and to pick and choose the advice he felt would be most beneficial to his rule, dismissing those who contradicted his views. Marable observes that:

“The Ghanaian state was no longer simply an authoritarian statist regime, dominated by a deformed, populist-social democratic style party. By severing all meaningful ties with its traditional class constituencies, eliminating virtually all elements of democratic discourse and destroying its original leaders, the state had become ‘Bonapartist’ (Marable, 1987, p.137).

Simultaneously to his project of one man rule as the 1960’s continued his numbers of publications presenting his political thoughts dramatically increased, and in some cases he re-wrote history to put himself at the centre of Ghana’s successful liberation: devaluing the role of prominent party members such as Komla Gbedemah. The 1963 version of “Africa Must Unite” suggests that he, and he alone, was responsible for the movement. Whereas an earlier version recognises the value and strength of other party members, and the pivotal role they played in continuing the parties work in the period Nkrumah spent in prison. Between 1950 and 1951 Nkrumah was imprisoned on political charges and Gbedemah took control of the day to day running of the party. This was until Nkrumah’s release was agreed to enable him to take leadership of the CPP after its success in free elections.

In the early years of his rule, Nkrumah advocated for a system of collaboration with the British, similarly to Senghor’s approach to France, as a method of moving past the colonial history. This was instead of an armed struggle, for which there was support amongst the people. This led to Ghana’s membership of the Commonwealth. However, whilst in exile he re-wrote a number of his key works in which he both recognised his failings as a leader, and moved towards a Fanonian position regarding the value and usage of violence. Marable,
and Paulin Hountondji refer to this change in Nkrumah’s approach: “in his early works Nkrumah advocated what he called positive action, meaning all methods of resistance that are legal and non-violent...The latest works, however, assert that the only effective method of resistance is armed struggle” (Hountondji, 1983, p.135). Hountondji is supported in this reading by Marable, who asserts that with the benefit of hindsight, “Nkrumah condemned as ‘sham independence’ the achievement of political self-rule, as in Ghana in 1957, and advocated ‘genuine independence, the product of mass political movement or an armed liberation struggle’” (Marable, 1987, p.148). His views moved more in line with those of Fanon as he began to claim that freedom cannot be given, it can only be taken. Thus, true freedom is achieved through independent, violent revolt against a countries oppressor.

Whilst Nkrumah became a dictatorial political figure, the philosophical underpinnings of his system of thought were in fact rooted in an egalitarian approach, and it is in this area that the similarities with the Kantian framework become apparent; although, as emphasised in a later section of the chapter, not with the political realities he established. On his reading of Nkrumah’s monograph, “Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation” (1970), Hountondji described Nkrumah’s philosophy as one that, “professes an egalitarian and humanistic ethic strongly marked by the influence of Kant. Politically, it adopts the central demand of nationalist ideology by reaffirming the right of self-determination for all people on the one hand and calls for the construction of socialism in a liberated Africa on the other” (Hountondji, 1983, p.153). Whilst discussion of explicitly Kantian language in the theorists thought is reserved for Section 4.3, as with Nyerere, this element to Nkrumah’s theorising has been included here to indicate the existence of secondary sources recognising the existence of similar fundamental principles in the writings of African statesmen. It is also used to highlight once again the different approaches advocated for achieving them; in Nkrumah’s case, a socialist political state subsumed into a Pan-African federation. Following the coup in 1966, Kwama Nkrumah lived in exile in Guinea authoring further political texts until his death in 1972.

Samora Machel was, and still is, recognised as a “man who helped change the face of Southern Africa” (Christie, 1989, p. viii), not only in his own nation of Mozambique, but also as a central voice in the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa. Unlike Nyerere and Nkrumah, Machel was an active revolutionary in the Mozambique independence struggle, making him a popular figure amongst the people he fought alongside, and leading to his ascension to the role of the first president of independent Mozambique in 1975. On
becoming president Machel set the country on a socialist path, intending to deliver tangible results:

“In 1980, Mozambique was regarded throughout Africa as the embodiment of ‘real’ socialism on the continent, as the model for African socialists. The attempt to transform economic and social relations and culture along socialist lines was by far the more far-reaching and serious of the many varieties of ‘socialism’ in Africa” (O’Meara, 1991, p. 82).

Based on the intrinsic role he played in developing such an influential model, it was deemed fundamental to include the views of Samora Machel in this thesis in a discussion of African forms of socialism in the post-independence period. However, it is also important to understand that, like Nyerere and Nkrumah, Machel’s leadership changed as it progressed towards the abrupt end of his presidency and his death in a suspicious plane crash on the 19th October 1986. Discussion of said crash is outside of the analytical parameters of this thesis but an interesting dialogue considering it exists in letters between Winnie Mandela and Graça Machel. In the infancy of Machel’s presidency, he, like his counterparts, made claims regarding the value and importance of respecting individuals’ right to engage in the creation of their own life paths. In his speech at Mozambique’s independence ceremony he set out the following aims for the future: “a people’s democratic state, in which all patriotic strata under the leadership of peasants and workers engage themselves in the struggle to destroy the vestiges of colonialism and imperialist dependence, to eliminate the system of exploitation of man by man” (Machel, 1989, p. 91).

Similarly with discussion of Nkrumah, the usage of male specific pronouns is a problematic element to his discourse. However, in regards to the analysis of this thesis, it will be treated through the same lens as discussed in regards to Nkrumah. It is clear from Machel’s usage of language that his views are broadly Leninist, based on an approach utilising a dominant state. Whilst it can be argued that such an approach does not traditionally share ideological roots with a Kantian model, this is not the purpose of this thesis. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate the underlying philosophical similarities underpinning the choices to select a Leninist approach to, for example, realising self-mastery, and to ask whether that underlying foundation is similar. Thus, the fact that Machel’s arguments are often couched in Marxist language is not reason to suggest that the underlying foundational principles of the arguments or the debates being responded to are not focused around the themes central to the hypothesis of this thesis. For example, the condemnation of exploitation, as
well as the apparent commitment to the creation of a political condition rooted in the engagement of the people, enables parallels to be drawn with the themes set out in Chapter 1 as representing the Kantian concept of willkür: freedom of choice and freedom from domination. Throughout this chapter a number of Machel’s earlier speeches are discussed. Throughout this discussion it becomes clear that he believed that it was a responsibility of the government to ensure that the ability of individuals to be self-law giving was recognised; simultaneously, that the justification for the existence of government existed on similar grounds.

However as is a common theme amongst the three theorists, as his rule continued, a personality cult began to form around Machel and he altered the constitution to establish, and maintain, greater power in the hands of the executive (himself). The focus of his rule became more hierarchical and less egalitarian. In a famous speech made in 1979 (“The Hospital Speech”), Machel set out two directives that highlighted the change in his style of rule. O’Meara explains this change in governing from the egalitarian people focused model in Machel’s earlier years of rule, towards the more authoritarian, hierarchical style, in his 1991 evaluation of Machel’s rule:

“First of all the term comrade was no longer to be used amongst Mozambicans except between party members in party meetings. This was a severe, and at the time shocking, attack on a strong culture of egalitarianism. He directed, secondly, that the role of managers was to manage…and the role of workers was to work and to obey the managers. This undermined the fragile but important embryonic structures of collective decision-making” (O’Meara, 1991, p.94).

The notable differences between the political rhetoric of the statesmen and the realities they were able to deliver will be dealt with in greater depth in Section 4.4. However, the point is raised at this stage to support the suggestion that failure to realise fundamental ideals does not suggest that belief in them did not exist in the aims and policies as initially set out. There is a point of contention throughout this chapter between the levels of success in delivering on the political conditions that were claimed as valuable by Machel, Nkrumah, and Nyerere. However, each form of rule originated in similar principles to those at the core of this thesis, the expression of which implies the potentially a priori nature of these principles as being present prior to politics. It was only once politics, and the reality of creating conditions to respect these said principles was involved, that they became less
prevalent. However, this does not suggest that they were not still fundamental, but rather that adherence to a model that is able to guarantee them is politically challenging. Each of these issues is discussed in greater depth as the chapter progresses. The following section briefly considers the role of the statesmen in the Pan-African movement and questions the roots of said movement.

4.2- The Pan-African Presidents:

The Pan-African movement, as mentioned in Chapter 3, originated as a philosophical programme in the 1920’s in the writings of African-American writer W.E.B. DuBois. However, as an African political undertaking it gained real momentum through the determination and steerage of Nkrumah and Nyerere in the 1950’s and 1960’s, as well as Senghor and African American Marcus Garvey. The purpose behind unification was, for Nkrumah, based on the improved opportunities it had the potential to create for Africans interacting with the rest of the world. He claimed that, “a union of African states will project more effectively the African personality. It will command respect from a world that has regard only for size and influence” (Nkrumah, 1961, p. xii). The concept of an “African personality”, like similar language discussed by the theorists studied in this thesis, is unclear in its definition, and often utilised to cover a multitude of ideas. However, in this case, Nkrumah, whilst unclear regarding what this includes, takes the concept to refer to all factors he views as specific to, and special about, what it means to live, work and exist within the African continent. He takes this to be a shared concept, specific not to one country, area or cultural group but to the continent as a whole which can form the foundations of Pan-Africanism. The hope behind Pan-Africanism was that it would provide the conditions for Africa to reassert itself in global politics. He supported an African system of government founded on traditional African thought systems, run and dictated by Africans (rather than external colonial rulers), for the benefit of Africa. He suggested that it was clear that the solution to African problems needed to come from Africa, because “divided we are weak; unified, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world” (Nkrumah, 1961, p.xi).

Nyerere made similar claims regarding the purpose of unity. A divided continent was, for him, one of the greatest risks facing a newly independent Africa. He strongly believed that squabbling within the continent would weaken the relative position of every nation as well as the continent in its entirety. In his speech “Africa must not fight Africa”, Nyerere defended his belief that “the weakness of Africa is a constant invitation and a constant
encouragement to the exploiters of Africa to suck Africa with impunity. Only a strong Africa can stop this. But there can be no strong Africa and no salvation for Africa except in unity” (Nyerere, 1968, p.219). It was his belief that this issue was rooted in Africa’s constant economic race to the bottom as a method for encouraging investment, as well as the continents choice to politically imitate and court the West or East to encourage aid. Nyerere, similarly to Nkrumah, supported a system of unification, although unlike Nkrumah he supported a project of collaboration rather than federalisation, as the only solution to these problems. However the question remained, on what grounds Africa could overcome political, economic and cultural differences, and unify. At the root of Nyerere and Nkrumah’s solution was what they referred to as a “sentiment of ‘African-ness’, a feeling of mutual involvement, which pervades all the cultural and political life. There is, in other words, an emotional unity which finds expression in, among other things, concepts such as ‘African personality’” (Nyerere, 1967, p.188). It was on the controversial grounds of a shared meaning of what it meant to be African, that it was claimed unification could be possible. Unlike the concept of Négritude described in Chapter 3, however, the “African-ness” referred to here by Nyerere placed less emphasis on a glorified past and greater emphasis on community and mutual involvement, which it was believed were grounds on which political differences between states could potentially be overcome. However, similarly to the views expressed in Chapter 3, Nyerere and Nkrumah were arguing that a single African underlying philosophy did exist. It is on this fundamental point that many of the theorists studied in Part 2 of this thesis take hubris. Paulin Hountondji summarises this concern as problematic in its “basic assumption that Africa needs a collective philosophy” (Hountondji, 1983, p.149). This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

Nyerere’s argument was not grounded in a denial of difference; he did in fact recognise that Africa was a continent made up of diverse political and cultural situations. However, it was his argument that these, rather than being seen as barriers to unification, should in fact be included in a Pan-African model:

“It is no use waiting for differences of approach, or of political belief, to disappear before we think of working for unity in Africa. They will not disappear. If we are ever to unite, the differences must be accommodated within our growing unity, and our growing unity must be shaped in a manner which allows for the existing differences” (Nyerere, 1973, p.13).
On consideration of these claims a further question is raised: If Nyerere recognised the differences that existed between the various political conditions of the African continent, on what grounds did he believe collaboration could be based? Although he did not directly make this claim, it is possible to assert that, in appealing to the possibility of a Pan-African state, he was making an assumption based on shared human principles existing a priori to political conditions, which would allow divergent political ideologies to find common grounds for collaboration. This thesis is not intending to imply that in this instance these claims are rooted in the same Kantian language that has been referenced elsewhere, but rather that it is possible to interpret in this statement, a recognition of a shared foundation from which unification could be established. Whether this is only a shared African foundation, or indeed a shared human foundation is unclear, but nonetheless it is possible to interpret Nyerere’s enthusiasm for a collaborative African project as recognising a shared foundation on which the said project can be built: one that exists prior to politics and culture (a priori). Further examination of the philosophical underpinning of similar ideas will be discussed in Section 4.3. However, the point is raised here to highlight the possible existence of support for cross-cultural dialogue grounded in foundational principles, with a desired political goal that is not just relevant at a local and national level but also at a pan-national level. The implication being that for dialogue to be effective it requires some form of grounding. The question is also raised as to whether he was correct in his belief that African unity was the correct model for the future of the continent, but the purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate this system, but rather to analyse its philosophical underpinnings, and thus this question will be left to one side.

As a political movement, Pan-Africanism in the post-independence era faced a number of problems. One such problem was the question of leadership in a federalised system. It became apparent that as the Pan-African movement moved towards a political ideal in the 1960’s there was a noticeable rise in personality politics in which, as already suggested, Nkrumah in particular advocated for a federalised continent in which he was able to play a dominant role. Many of those advocating for a system of collaboration, as with the majority of power politics, saw their own model as superior, and themselves at the centre. As the West African Pilot observed in the early 1960’s: “in Africa a struggle for leadership has already developed. Until recently it was a tournament between Nasser and Nkrumah but Africa today contains many stars and meteorites, all of them seeking positions of eminence” (The West African Pilot, cited in, Legum, 1965, p.55). As the movement
increased in popularity, questions were also raised as to what a Pan-African state should look like. Nkrumah argued for a “United States of Africa”, whilst Nyerere supported regionalised blocks, and numerous other leaders such as Ahmed Sékou Touré and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt had yet further ideas. Not only did this lead to problems of leadership, but also of vision, and eventually the Pan-African movement of that time period began to break down. It does still exist in other forms today, but this is outside of the parameters for this section which will instead focus exclusively on the post-independence movement and the visions of Julius K Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah.

In the 1960’s and early 1970’s Nyerere worked with his counterparts in Kenya and Uganda to form an East African federation. However, as their political differences took hold the relationship became problematic and the system of unification broke down. In particular, the schism between Kenyatta’s capitalist model and Nyerere’s socialism grew deeper and harder to overcome. Between 1975 and 1985 “Julius broke off the East African Community and made it impossible even to send a letter between Kenya and Tanzania, and so it lasted for nearly 10 years” (Bailey, 1998, p. vi). At a similar time period, Tanzania went to war with Uganda and the dream of a federation of East Africa was lost (at least in the time period in which Nyerere remained in power). Thus, it becomes apparent that the political and ideological differences, as well as the power struggles, were at the core of the failings of the post-independence Pan-African dream, as the leaders involved failed to create the correct political conditions for realising it.

The Pan-African movement was thus unsuccessful in establishing a unified post-independence political solution, due to, amongst other factors, fractions within the continent. Discussion of unification and collaboration on different levels do still exist, with figures such as Muammar Gadaffi attached to the movement in the last 10 years. However, as previously mentioned, this lies outside the remit of this thesis. What makes post-independence Pan-African thought interesting to this thesis is the question of how the statesmen believed that collaboration could have been grounded, how they argued cross-cultural dialogue could have been achieved, and whether it was implied that a common factor needed to exist between the states, groups, or individuals for collaboration to be possible.

As has become clear throughout the discussion of the views of Nyerere and Nkrumah, both believed in an underlying foundation on which collaboration could be built. For them it was
a sense of African-ness, which Colin Legum translates as being racial: “undoubtedly the
dominant theme in Pan-Africanism: the race-consciousness born of colour” (Legum, 1965,
p.17). However, this is a controversial reading of the views of Nyerere and Nkrumah, when
taking into account the fact that in many of their speeches the statesmen argued that
support for unification was not being drawn along race based lines. The suggestion of a
racial foundation for political collaboration clearly does not relate to the principles set out
in Chapter 1 of this thesis. However, what it does suggest, as referenced in relation to
Nyerere’s arguments about collaboration across ideologies, is that there is recognition
amongst theorists that certain foundational principles do exist, that enable cross-cultural
discourse to take place. Whether that is simply race based, or whether there is emphasis
on other factors such as autonomy and personhood, are the questions at the centre of the
remainder of this chapter. To clarify, similarly to discussion of the Négritude movement, it
can be argued that there is an observable reliance on an underlying foundation on which
political and cultural dialogue can be built. Thus, it can be suggested that this is an
approach that has been prevalent throughout the African political theory of the 1940’s to
the 1980’s. The argument follows, if this is the case then it is logical to postulate the
recognition of similar foundations for humanity more generally, and as the chapter
develops it becomes clearer in what elements of the three theorists thoughts these exist.
The following section focuses on the question of whether the Kantian themes set out in
Chapter 1 are present in the outputs of Machel, Nkrumah and Nyerere. The argument is
thus being made that a pattern emerges in which the underlying philosophical groundings
of the arguments of the three statesmen share a common foundation with not only one
another, but also the Kantian framework.

4.3- Kantian Undertones:

This section raises, and answers, the question of whether there exists explicitly Kantian
language in the writings and speeches of the three politicians. As suggested in Section 4.1,
a number of commentators, such as Paulin Hountondji, have suggested that there was a
Kantian undercurrent in the thinking of Kwame Nkrumah. This section asks not only if this is
a realistic interpretation, but also whether similar ideas are present in the works of Machel
and Nyerere. This section is divided into the following sub-sections: self-mastery; external
freedom of choice, autonomy and equality; and domination and oppression. Each being
under stood in the Kantian sense set out in Chapter 1. The final sub-section is a discussion
of the implied philosophical groundings of Nyerere and Machel’s villagisation projects, as
well as a more in depth discussion of the question of whether the theorists are utilising
socialism to deliver foundational principles, or whether other justifications were given for the choice to follow a socialist path. Throughout the speeches and monographs of the three thinkers it is possible to recognise common themes of dignity, freedom from exploitation and oppression, choice, respect, liberation and the value of self-rule. Each of these concepts are drawn out and discussed in relation to the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1 throughout this section.

i. Self-Mastery

The concepts of self-mastery, freedom of choice and autonomy, whilst not always presented in linguistically identical forms, are common themes amongst revolutionary and oppressed peoples. It is often suggested that the reasoning for this is based in the tendency of oppressive regimes to restrict these rights to groups they fail to recognise as appropriate recipients. For that reason, it is unsurprising that each of the theorists studied in this chapter (each living through and affected by colonialism) made reference to them in one form or another in their speeches and texts. They do so, not only in reference to the individual rights of the people, but also in presenting their parties political goals. As previously suggested, this is not to argue that they were successful in delivering these political conditions, or that their time in power didn’t corrupt their aims (both of which will be discussed in Section 4.4), but it is rather to imply that the philosophical underpinnings of their arguments express these ideas.

Samora Machel, in particular, couched much of his political rhetoric in terms of the value and necessity of recognising, utilising and supporting “people’s power”. He made a number of claims indicating this, particularly in his earlier speeches. For example, in laying out the political strategy for post-independence he clearly stated that “in the People’s Republic of Mozambique we want respect for the people, respect for the freedom of the citizen, respect for people’s lives and property” (Machel, 1981, p.187). He also used this idea to set his government apart from its predecessors, claiming that; “our power is different in form and content from anything that has previously existed in our country. Our power belongs to the people and is exercised by its genuine representatives to serve the interests of the people” (Machel, 1974, p.13) and that “people’s power in its essence is about people first seizing and then determining their own destiny in an organised way” (Munslow, 1985, p. xxxvi). In discussing Machel’s presidency, Barry Munslow also suggested that respect for the people was at the centre of his politics. He argued that Machel based his system on
“the power of human agency” (Munslow, 1985, p. xxii) and endeavoured to build this into his political system. The focus on a collaborative, people centric approach coincides with Machel’s time as a revolutionary, fighting alongside a range of different individuals and coming to understand the strengths and passions of the people. His focus on the necessary involvement of the people in establishing a just political system can be viewed through a Kantian lens in relation to the model of public right Kant sets out in “The Metaphysics of Morals”. Kant states that the legislative authority of a just state “can belong only to the united will of the people” (Kant, 1996, p.91). This claim shares a similar underpinning to the view of government set out by Machel as belonging to the people, the power of which can only be exercised at the will of the people. In drawing these parallels between the recommended political models of both Machel’s system, and a Kantian system, it is possible to recognise shared philosophical foundations relying on the significance and necessity of respecting the values of self-mastery and purposiveness of a state’s citizenry when establishing systems of government.

Similarly, David Ottaway, when describing the habits of the political party Frelimo, claimed that they “allowed a great deal of local autonomy and decentralisation in the Northern regions” (Ottaway, 1988, p.214). The apparent value placed on understanding and representing the people, and creating a system of rule that was able to recognise and support their autonomy, as well as advocating for the protection of their freedom of person and property, was grounded on an inherently liberal understanding of humanity and politics. For example, many of Machel’s speeches implied an underlying trust for the peoples’ ability to govern themselves. This implied a faith in the citizenry as being capable of a role in governing their lives, as well as the lives of the rest of the state and their fellow citizens. Whilst Kant argued that the right to be self-law giving individuals, and the need for the state to recognise this, was based on reason; Machel seemed to imply that the right was not restricted by individual capabilities, but rather a right of all individuals. However, similarly to Kant, he made the argument that legitimate state power should, and does, come from the people, and that it is the role of the state not to serve its own ends but to serve “the interests of the people”. As will become clear as the chapter progresses, there is a contradiction between the statements Machel made in support of the strength and value of the people, and the need to treat them as ends in themselves with their own purpose. Post 1977 Frelimo’s model for the state focused less on the self-determination of the people and more on justifying excessive state power. One particular example is the contradiction between the justification for the villagisation project, and the actual
treatment of the citizens involved. Thus, as is a common theme across the three statesmen, the models they support and the models they deliver do not always correspond: this disconnect is the focus of Section 4.4.

To summarise, when considering the arguments Machel made for the role and justification of government and state power (although not necessarily the political reality), it is possible to interpret a basic philosophical argument which shares similarities with the Kantian argument for a condition of public right set out in Chapter 1. However, as his presidency progressed, the reality of the political situation he ruled over adhered to this philosophy less and less as the views of the people became less central to the political decision making process. Thus, this thesis makes the claim that the philosophy behind Machel’s model shares similarities with the Kantian framework, but the political reality was less successful in delivering this philosophy: this is a common factor across all three political leaders.

In his early struggles against the colonial movement, as well as in the founding of his political party (the CPP), Nkrumah relied on the slogan “self-government now”. He published this idea along with future party member Komla Gbedemah in the first edition of their paper the “Accra Evening News” in September 1948. The uncompromisingly anti-colonialist newspaper carried the slogan: “We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity...we have the right to govern ourselves” (Gbedemah and Nkrumah, 1948, cited in Marable, 1987, p.99). It was a strong message that they carried through from their activism days to their role in the political infrastructure. In fact, the party was founded on the same message: “The specific policy goals of the CPP, ratified at the Party’s second annual conference in August 1951, seemed clear. On national matters, the CPP called for ‘self-government now’, the removal of ‘all forms of oppression’ and ‘the establishment of a democratic socialist society’ (Marable, 1987, p. 113). The concept of “self-government now”, it can be assumed, referred to two factors. The first, and most pressing in that time period, was the removal of a colonial government and the establishment of an African system of rule or “self-government” implemented by Africans, for Africans. However, a second reading of Nkrumah’s claim for the value of “self-government now” can be established in Kantian terms. As discussed in Section 4.1, Hountondji claims that there exists in Nkrumah’s writing and speeches a Kantian influence (“he professes an egalitarian and humanistic ethic strongly marked by the influence of Kant” (Hountondji, 1983, p.153)), and thus the term “self-government” takes on a secondary meaning. In reference to the above quote from the 1951 party conference, this reading is particularly interesting. The
conference notes referred to the removal of not only colonial rule, but “all forms of oppression”. Additionally the Accra Evening News article (also quoted above) referred to a preference for the dangers of self-government over a tranquil servitude. Thus, it is possible to argue that for Nkrumah, at least in this time period, the concern was not with the outcomes of oppression (he accepted it was possible to experience a tranquil existence whilst living under an oppressive regime), but with the act of oppression itself. In a similar way, Kantians argue that the problem with domination is not based on the consequences of the act (be they good, bad, or indifferent), but with the undergoing of the act itself. Thus, in comparing the two positions a similarity emerges in the underlying philosophy at the heart of the justification for why “self-government now” was important. It was important for Nkrumah, and similarly for Kantians, because it is the only system that does not lead to oppression. This is not to suggest that the consequences would be either better or worse than under an oppressive state, but rather to suggest that this is not an important consideration in making the claim. The only important consideration, in both the discussed cases, was that self-rule is a philosophically grounded right, regardless of its subsequent consequences.

To conclude this section, and before moving on to a discussion of the statesmen’s views of the value of freedom of choice, it is important to reflect on the value Machel, in particular, placed on not only the abstract right of self-law giving or self-rule, but also the active political commitments he made to realise these. At the start of his rule he was adamant about the importance of democracy in delivering these aims: “Our decisions must always be democratic in both content and form. Democratic in content means that they must reflect the real interests of the broad masses. Democratic in form means that the broad masses must take part in reaching a decision, feeling that it is theirs and not something imposed from above” (Machel, 1974, p.15). On reading this, parallels can be drawn with the Kantian concept of willkür (as it is presented in Chapter 1), which emphasised the expectation on the political system to guarantee the necessary conditions to enable individuals to be self-law giving in common with all others. This quote from Machel suggested, not only that he supported such a situation, but also that he intended to create the political conditions in which he was able to deliver on these goals for the people of Mozambique. As mentioned elsewhere, he was not successful in achieving this reality. However, this does not diminish the argument that his speeches demonstrate the presence of belief in common human grounding on which these political choices could have been justified.
ii. External Freedom of Choice, Autonomy, and Equality

As discussed in Chapter 1, Kant justified his thoughts on the problematic nature of domination by extolling his support for the rights of individuals as autonomous agents. He argued in “An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment?” that enlightenment is a state all individuals should strive for, but not necessarily all will achieve. It is a state, according to Kant, in which individuals are able to overcome their base drives and instead be guided by reason; to have freedom of choice over the direction of their lives. It is not only a matter of making choices, but rather it concerns making the “right” choices, whilst freely following your own path unhindered by others. According to Leander Schneider, Julius Nyerere made a similar claim about the importance of choosing rightly:

“Nyerere seems to suggest that being able to recognise, as well as “freely” taking, the right course of action... was an important part of what qualified people as genuinely ‘developed’. Insofar as true development then implied such a state of higher consciousness, freely choosing a course of action in development was desirable since freely choosing ‘authenticated’ such a state of consciousness” (Schneider, 2004, p.360).

Thus, it can be argued that what Schneider interprets in Nyerere is a belief not only in the right of individuals to express their free choice in directing the laws by which they live, but also the duty to make the right free choice. Thus, similarly to a Kantian model, the concept of free choice, be it in methods of development or forms of self-government, is not necessarily a blanket right, but rather a right dependent on making the correct choices: a right defined by a duty to realise it appropriately. For Kant, that is choices directed by reason. Whilst for Nyerere, this extract suggests, it is based on individuals making the correct choices to enable development. It is, however, unclear from this reading what the concept of “correct development” would look like, and what its philosophical foundations were.

Masolo, in reference to Nyerere’s view of man, also emphasised the value placed on freedom by him: “A few characteristics summarise Nyerere’s view of man. Man is a fundamentally free being; he can realise his freedom from external conditionings and domination only if he is self-reliant, and this depends on his work which is in turn only effective if realised collectively or in society” (Masolo, 1981, pp.28-290). Thus, according to Masolo, Nyerere believed that freedom is not a solitary goal, but rather, that autonomy is achieved through working for, and with, the community. Thus for him, membership of a
socialist society is a fundamental element in achieving freedom. Therefore, as implied in Section 4.1, autonomy existed as, for Nyerere, a fundamental right. Thus, similarly to a Kantian approach, there is concentrated emphasis on achieving it, but the methods used for realising this autonomy were different. This can be viewed as an example of the phenomena presented in Chapter 2, in which the philosophical grounding of a foundational principle may be the same (the importance of respecting human freedom and autonomy), but the methods for achieving them are culturally or individually specific to either a theorist or a group. For Nyerere, an African form of socialism presented the most appropriate political methodology for protecting the rights of man to be “fundamentally free beings” able to overcome domination and be truly self-reliant: as true self-reliance was grounded on active participation within a community. However, freedom still remained a property and experience of the individual.

Throughout his speeches and writings, Nyerere not only focused on freedom but also on a second Kantian foundation: equality. Similarly to the previous point concerning the role of socialism in delivering freedom, Nyerere also claimed that the ideology of socialism played an essential role in achieving equality amongst the people. According to a speech he made in 1967 “the essence of socialism is the practical acceptance of human equality. That is to say, every man’s equal right to a decent life before any individual has a surplus above his needs; his equal right to participate in Government; and his equal responsibility to work and contribute to the society” (Nyerere, 1967, pp. 324-325). Thus, for Nyerere (at least in the public speeches he made, although as is discussed in Section 4.4, he was less successful in delivering it as a political reality), similarly to the Kantian view, all autonomous individuals had a right to be treated as such: to have freedom of choice; to involve themselves in governing; to be recognised as a member of society; and to have each of these fundamental principles, equally. The central focus on equality was also apparent in a number of the TANU declarations. In discussing the party line, Nyerere claimed that “for in our constitution we say TANU believes a) that all human beings are equal; b) that every individual has a right to dignity and respect” (Nyerere, 1967, p.261). Furthermore, it was stated in the Arusha Declaration, which, as previously mentioned, set out the political aims and beliefs of the TANU party: participation in decision making is a vital part of realising equality, and that this equality is a fundamental right of humanity, “and must be realised as such. Unless every person plays an effective role in their own government, rather than being the recipient of decisions made by others, there can be no equality in human dignity and status. Nor is there likely to be very much progress in economic equality” (Nyerere,
It is also possible to interpret, in the final sentence of this quote, a pattern emerging with previously quoted elements of Nyerere's speeches: the centrality of development and economic improvement in Nyerere's goals. In the first paragraph of this section, Schneider's quote highlighted Nyerere's focus on “correct development” as a necessary result of the socialist movement and, here again, is a focus on achieving economic development through participation. Both of these discussions focus on the achievement of freedom and equality through development, be that economic or otherwise, and thus similarly to his treatment of socialism, development can be interpreted as a means for achieving further goals (freedom and equality) rather than as an end in itself.

Samora Machel indicated a similar emphasis in his speeches and political rhetoric on the role of equality, collective decision making and governance. He claimed that, “political democracy is based on a collective discussion, on a collective solution of our problems. Each and every one of us is expected to express his views” (Machel, 1974, p.16). Thus for him (again, at least in the ideal politics he presented rather than the reality he achieved), governing was not a top down system in which rules were imposed on the citizenry. Rather, it was a system in which people had a right, as well as a duty, to play an active role in governance. He did not suggest that people “could” express their views, but in fact that they were “expected” to. Thus, in these comments it is possible to interpret an underlying belief in the value and importance of self-law giving, to not only the individual, but also to the political condition: as a right and a duty.

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Kwame Nkrumah has been associated in the secondary literature with explicitly Kantian views and language. His discussion of the importance of treating humans as ends in themselves is a clear example of this: “We postulate each man to be an end in himself, not merely a means; and we accept the necessity of guaranteeing each man equal opportunities for his development” (Nkrumah, 1966, p.204). Similarly to Nyerere, Nkrumah focused on the rights of development and equality in achieving a system in which people could be respected as ends in themselves, rather than means to a further end. However, what is of particular interest is the explicitly Kantian philosophical basis he posits for his political ideology. Once again, at least in his presentation of his ideal theory, he presents socialism as the best political model for recognising the rights of individuals to be treated as ends in themselves, which he, similarly to Kant, implied was the fundamental underpinning and purpose of the political condition. Thus, at least in the view Nkrumah presented outwardly, it is possible to interpret ideas of
both the value and importance of internal self-law giving, and the need to create an external political condition that respects individuals’ free choice and willkühr. Such a condition, that may not look like a Kantian political system of public right (as it would instead be a socialist state), does still demonstrate similar philosophical foundations and aims. In this sense, as suggested in the earlier discussion of Nyerere, it is possible to imply that the model for realising the foundations grounding political choices may differ in different cultural, political and temporal settings, but similarities can still be drawn between the foundations of the ideas themselves, and the debates and issues that are at the centre of state building: freedom of choice.

iii. Domination and Oppression

Two of the key themes set out in Chapter 1 as representing a Kantian model of willkühr and self-law giving is a vehement discrediting of systems of oppression and domination. As suggested throughout this thesis, questioning the presence of these ideas in the work of anti-colonial and post-colonial theorists and statesmen is particularly important as the colonial model placed a strong emphasis on oppressing freedom and dominating choice. Thus, if there was not an underlying theme across the post-colonial authors work critiquing models of domination, it would suggest that these are in fact not underlying philosophical principles common across humanity, existing prior to culture and politics (a priori). However, as is apparent in this sub-section, it is possible to see explicit criticism of both domination and oppression in the writings of both Nyerere and Machel, as well as in Nkrumah’s argument for “self-government now” (Nkrumah, cited in Marable, 1987, p. 113), previously discussed in Sub-Section 4.3i and thus excluded from discussion here.

Condemning exploitation is a theme common across a number of Machel’s speeches, and he in fact argued that it was the first issue that must be overcome before a truly independent state could be established. For him, establishing a new political order meant establishing a system based on the power and will of the people, as such, a system could not be established under exploitative conditions in which the people were not free to express their thoughts on the system of government. He claimed that when an individual decided to be a part of the anti-colonial struggle, “what is at stake is the establishment of a people’s power that asserts our independence and identity, and destroys exploitation. This entails destroying the power of those who foster exploitation” (Machel, 1974, p.2). Thus, for Machel, similarly to the Kantian model expressed in Chapter 1, it was not simply a matter of overcoming exploitation and implementing a different system of government,
but it was also important that the new government was grounded on the correct foundations. To elucidate, a system which involved, for example, a benevolent dictator who provided the citizenry with all that they required to live a happy and fulfilled life, would not be justifiable for either Machel or Kant, even if the consequences were favourable. Regardless of the consequences the system itself would fail as it would not be a political model founded on the respect for the choice of the people, and thus it would be an act of domination. In this sense, we can draw similarities between Machel’s view on good government and the problems of oppression and domination set out in Chapter 1.

Further evidence exists for the argument that a Machelian and a Kantian position share similar philosophical groundings in two more of Machel’s speeches. The first discusses the choice to take up arms and participate in a violent revolution, the justification for doing so, and the new system they hoped to replace it with: “When we took up arms to overthrow the old order, we felt the need to create a strong, healthy and prosperous new society in which men, free from exploitation, would co-operate for the progress of all” (Machel, 1974, p.60). The second explains Mozambique’s post-independence party’s (Frelimo), choice to embark on a socialist path dictated by them, and not influenced by either the Russians or the Chinese: “Nobody will change the geographical standpoint of the Mozambican people. Nobody will overthrow the independence of Mozambique. We have chosen socialism and we shall build socialism. Nobody will come from outside to build it for us” (Machel, 1980, p.90). The argument Machel raised was not that an external system imposed on the people of Mozambique would be bad necessarily, but rather that its being imposed at all was the issue of contestation. He preferred instead, even if it failed at first, a system created by the people of Mozambique for the people of Mozambique, and as previously suggested, this assertion inspired other socialist models in Africa. Again, it is possible to interpret in this assertion similarities with a Kantian critique of domination: the claim that external forces imposing themselves on individuals (regardless of whether the intended outcome is positive or negative) will never be a rightful condition.

Nyerere made similar claims regarding the problematic nature of issues of oppression. He couched these arguments in terms of the role of government and individuals in political authority. He stated publically that, “leaders too often forget that the purpose of government and party and of all the laws and regulations... is to serve people. And when we say ‘serve the people’ we do not just mean ‘the masses’ as an abstraction; we mean the people in large groups, and small groups, and as individuals” (Nyerere, 1998, p. 272). His
claim, similar to the Kantian approach presented in Chapter 1, was that government cannot be justified on grounds other than those related to the people. The sole role of government, as Nyerere declared it, was to serve the people and deliver the conditions the people wanted, and needed, for a better life. Similarly, Kant argued in “The Metaphysics of Morals”, that the only justification of government was on the grounds that it provided the space for autonomous agents to live, according to the laws they reasoned for themselves, in common with others. On neither argument can government be justified for a purpose separate to delivering conditions in which individuals’ rights can be realised. As with many of these arguments, the type of government recommended by Nyerere was different to the Kantian model, but the debates regarding what good government looked like, in both situations, was founded on similar principles. This is further evidence for the argument which is a recurring theme throughout this thesis, that the a priori principles regarding what is owed to humans are similar, but the methods for realising these are culturally, politically and ideologically sensitive, and alter between individuals, ideologies, cultures and political models.

A further argument made by Nyerere was that the political structure needed changing to “abolish this division of people between masters and servants, and to make every person a master- not a master who oppresses others, but one who serves himself” (Nyerere, 1966, p.139). Not only does this indicate his dislike for political structures in which dominance and oppression are inherent, it also highlights the value he placed on the necessity for individuals to live in a condition in which they were able to achieve self-mastery. This is a similar claim to the one discussed in Sub-Section 4.3ii in which his emphasis on development and creating the conditions for the right kind of free choice were discussed. For Nyerere, similar to Kantians, being the master of one’s self and one’s own decision making was a fundamental right that he suggested underpinned the political structures he created.

Respect for the value of self-mastery extended beyond his speeches into the written documents for the policies he implemented, in particular the Ujamaa villagisation project which, as will become clear in the following sub-section (Sub-Section 4.3iii), was justified, by Nyerere, as creating the conditions for villagers to have complete control over the villages in which they lived. His initial aim, on founding the project, was to allow them to run the villages on a policy of self-rule, with very little central government control. However, the programme was unsuccessful in delivering these conditions, and the model
became a system of compulsory re-location. That being said, the point is raised here to indicate Nyerere’s respect for the value of self-mastery, both on an internal level and in the drafting of political policies. Thus, it is possible to suggest that both elements of the Kantian model presented in Chapter 1 (internal self-law giving and external willkür) can be interpreted as grounding Nyerere’s thought. His speeches and texts indicate a belief in the value of self-mastery for individuals and his political policies demonstrate his commitment to creating the political conditions in which choice, autonomy and self-mastery can be achieved for the Tanzanian citizens. The following sub-section considers, in greater detail, in what ways the policy of Ujamaa Vijinni can be said to be grounded in the principle of creating the conditions for individuals and communities to become self-mastering, and the failings in the policies implementation.

iii. Ujamaa Vijinni

This sub-section predominantly focuses on the villagisation programme implemented by the Tanu government of Tanzania under the leadership of Julius K Nyerere. The argument being made is that on analysing the origins of this policy, similarities can be drawn between the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1, and the philosophical groundings of the Ujamma Vijinni project as presented by Nyerere. Following a discussion of the aims and groundings of the project, the sub-section turns to the critiques of the implementation of the project and an analysis of its failings. To conclude the debate surrounding villagisation, a second and less famous, project will be considered, that of Machel’s Frelimo government in Mozambique. Both villagisation projects failed to achieve their aims of providing citizens with the space to direct their own lives. Critique of the models exists in the conclusion to this section, but the initial aim is to consider the philosophical underpinnings for the projects as they were presented by the theorists. In reality they became a system directed by the state, and in some cases systems of forced production utilising the citizenry as a means to achieving the states’ economic gains. However, when the policies were first devised the opposite was presented and the focus was on treating individuals as ends in themselves, and it is to this discussion that the chapter first turns.

Ujamaa, or family hood, was the embodiment of the political reality of Nyerere’s philosophical socialist goals. It was a policy that was set forth in the Arusha Declaration of the 29th January 1967 which formally announced that Tanzania’s economic and political goals to follow a socialist path. The policy involved the (what became forced) relocation of Tanzania’s rural population into socialist communities or Ujamaa villages, in which they
could work together to provide for the needs of the community, whilst also defining the rules by which the village, and its people, lived and worked. The model relied on villagers being responsible for all decision making in the villages, as well as food production both for the village and to sell (although as the state became more heavily involved production became directed toward state aims). It was their decision how much of this was achieved through communal farming and how much remained in private hands. Schneider observed that the role of the Arusha Declaration was to “set out the broad parameters of this new approach. It famously elevated ‘ujamaa’, which translates literally as family hood and is generally rendered as denoting Nyerere’s particular version of ‘African socialism’, to be the guiding principle behind Tanzania’s new approach to development” (Schneider, 2004, p.348).

As already discussed, the programme embodied Nyerere’s belief that the goal of government was to deliver development to the people, but his views on what that development would look like are expanded on by his detailed breakdown of how the Ujamaa programme should work. For him, the central point at the heart of the programme, at least as he originally envisioned it, was that it was a programme directed by, and delivered by, the people. He saw no role for external experts in setting up the villages, or developing the necessary farming techniques. In fact, he claimed that the fundamental goal was that “the people will have begun to develop themselves as dignified and confident human beings, in a way which is impossible if they simply take orders from someone else” (Nyerere, 1973, p.60). For that reason, he claimed that the involvement of experts was impossible as it would undermine the fundamental principle, which was to allow individuals to master their own development. He further claimed that “the fact that the orders of an "expert" may have led to greater output of a crop if they were fully carried out, does not affect this issue. By debating this matter and then deciding for themselves, the people will be doing real development of themselves” (Nyerere, 1973, p.60). Similarities can be drawn here with the discussion in Sub-Section 4.3iii on the irrelevance of outcomes. Unlike a consequentialist account, Nyerere at least initially, argued for a system of development that respected the rights of the community to direct their own lives, regardless of the effect this had on the villages’ productivity and economic output. For example, expert advice and training on farming methods could have improved the standard of living and the agricultural output of the village. However, Nyerere argued that domination in this form would negatively affect the human development, which he saw as the fundamental goal of the project and the government. Therefore, consequences were superfluous in deciding
the policy. He argued that this deontological view was based on his understanding of what was important when considering development. Nyerere was explicit and detailed in his account of the justification behind, and structuring of, the villagisation programme. Therefore, it is of value to quote this somewhat lengthy passage in full:

“People can only develop themselves...Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organisations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from the outside, nor governed from outside. No one can be forced into an ujamaa village, and no official- at any level- can go and tell the members of an ujamaa village what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as individual farmers. No official of the Government or Party can go to an ujamaa village and tell the members what they must grow. No non-member of the village can go and tell the members to use a tractor, or not to use a tractor. For if these things happen- that is, if an outsider gives such instructions and enforces them- then it will no longer be an ujamaa village! An ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for their common good” (Nyerere, 1973, p.67).

To summarise, development for Nyerere was a human project rather than an economic one. For him, this meant enabling individuals and communities to develop themselves, and to realise a situation in which they were the masters of their own future. When discussing the previous statement, Schneider made similar observations about the president’s view of development. He proposes that “several of Nyerere's pronouncements suggest that people’s initiative, active control over their own affairs, and voluntary participation were also essential parts of what ‘development of people, not things’ meant” (Schneider, 2004, p.354). The human focus of the project was partially grounded on the idea that the villages were based on an African cultural project: focusing on small, traditional communities, living and working together collaboratively, rather than on individual, economic development. The villages were an exclusively African cultural project.

As previously mentioned, regardless of the promises, and determination in the language in which the idea was presented to the people, the practical implementation of the Ujamaa Vijijini project failed to deliver the conditions promised by the Arusha Declaration. This is not to suggest that Nyerere’s belief in the need to provide certain conditions for his people
was falsified, but rather, that the method he employed to recognise these basic human principles was unsuccessful. As the project developed it became clear that many of the rural population were uncomfortable with being uprooted from their family homes and moved into artificially created villages. In one interview Nyerere even admitted to “decent modern houses that had been bulldozed flat because they were not sited in the ujamaa village” (Bailey, 1998, p. v). It became clear in these cases that the realisation of the ideology was taking precedence over the delivery of a stable system inspired by the people and implemented for the people. Commentators spoke of situations in which “the President...condoned, and apparently even prompted, the use of certain "mildly" coercive measures (usually in the form of restricting famine relief (only) to residents of ujamaa villages)” (Scheider, 2004, p.369). Furthermore, “different degrees of persuasion and coercion (were used) by administrative and political officials... (for example) material rewards in the form of expanded services or direct support from the government” (Boesen, Moody and Madsen, 1977, p.15) were given to those villagers producing the crops required by the state. These policies led to a situation in which the policy altered completely from a “voluntary movement to a highly coercive system” (Seftel & Smyth, 1998, p.131), in which the villagers were treated by the state as means to a further end: productivity. The high levels of coercion led, according to Schneider, to:

“The historical end-result of the policy of ujamaa vijijini (which) was the compulsory settlement of the majority of Tanzania's rural population into approximately seven thousand villages, which began in 1968, was greatly accelerated in 1973, and declared largely completed by late 1975. The basic modus operandi of villagisation was coercive and top-down, and it is generally agreed that it did not improve the majority of rural Tanzanians' lot, as had been hoped (Schneider, 2004, pp.345-346).

Thus, whilst at its foundations the policy was intended to create the political conditions under which individuals and communities would be able to take control of their own lives, what it became was a system supported by coercion, directed by the blind following of ideology, and the failure to prioritise fundamental human interests and abandon the policies failing to guarantee them.

Mozambique also attempted a programme of villagisation which made the Frelimo party unpopular with some strands of the peasant population. Their approach involved “forcing rural families to live in collective villages...It saw the emergence of forced labour emerging
under the rubric of voluntary labour” (O’Meara, 1991, p.91), again viewing the villagers as a means to achieving further, state wide, economic goals. On defending this policy, Machel argued that what had been created was a system based on equality that would put an end to exploitation of the people by the bourgeoisie class. He claimed that what had been created were “agricultural co-operatives in which the fruits of collective labour are shared out in proportion to the amount of work put in; individual fields, but farmed on the principle of mutual help and non-exploitation of another’s labour” (Machel, 1974, p.58). Furthermore, that “the communal villages are founded in the form of socialist property (and) the co-operative administers the communal village” (Machel, 1979, p.128). However, in his analysis of the policy Dan O’Meara came to a different conclusion:

“When coupled with the drain on resources to the state farms, the forced villagisation of most areas, the lack of availability of the most basic supplies in the rural areas, and the widespread coercion of peasants into ‘voluntary seasonal labour’ on the state farms, it had the effect by 1981 of deeply alienating wide sectors of FRELIMO’s original class base (the labouring class)” (O’Meara, 1991, p.92).

To summarise this sub-section, both Nyerere and Machel presented their policies on the basis of improving development for the people, creating conditions in which exploitation would be eradicated and opportunities would be created for individuals and communities to play an active role in government, thus realising their ability to develop into self-mastering individuals. In that sense, it is possible to draw out (as has been done above) the similarities with a Kantian approach. However, when these policies proved to be unpopular with large numbers of rural civilians, rather than ending them and continuing the policy of government by the people, a system of coercion was implemented by both governments to enable these policies to be realised. Therefore, the parallels with the Kantian approach are limited in regard to actual governing practice, as the justification for government as defined by the people was ignored by both Machel and Nyerere as their villagisation projects proved to be unsuccessful.

Furthermore, it is possible to claim that as theorists considering individual freedoms, Machel and Nyerere recognise fundamental principles similar to those presented by the Kantian theory of internal self-law giving. Beyond that it is also possible to suggest that in designing their political policies they intended to create conditions under which these basic human principles could be realised: conditions similar to those espoused by the Kantian
theory of willkür. However, as previously demonstrated, as statesmen they were unsuccessful in implementing these policies and creating the necessary political conditions to enable the community to live under a political situation in which the people had a certain level of governing control. Thus, on a Kantian argument, their governments could not have been justified as they were grounded in a concern for ideology, rather than focusing on the rights and needs of the people. Thus, it is possible to see in the work of these two theorists, and as will become clear in the final section (Section 4.4) Nkrumah as well, a disconnect between the claims they made, and the political realities over which they governed. The claims they made regarding the purpose of government and the rights of the people, share, as has been analysed throughout the previous three sub-sections, many similarities with Kantian claims for the importance of reasoned persons living in conditions that enable them to be equal, self-law giving and free individuals. However, as their political states developed it became clear that they were going to fail to recognise these principles, and by the end of each of their rules, each state had become systematically centralised: placing less emphasis on the power of the people, and greater emphasis on the implementation of oppressive, centralised policies. The failings of each of these states are briefly discussed in the following section.

4.4- The Failings of the African Socialist Projects of Nyerere, Nkrumah, and Machel:

On analysing the secondary literature a number of key concerns come to the fore regarding the three political states of Mozambique, Ghana and Tanzania, and their immediate post-colonial leadership. Various criticisms exist of all three leaders. However, the focus of this section will be on the patterns that exist between critiques of all three. Objections commonly laid at all three leaders are as follows: implementation of a system leading to the centralisation of power, thus leading to the advancement of personality cults around the leaders; corruption amongst high ranking party members; the adoption of (and continued commitment to) the wrong ideology for delivering a stable, people driven, political condition. Many of these concerns have been covered in the previous section dealing with the Ujamaa Vijijini projects, but they are further extended here for the purposes of clarity. Predominantly, objections to the practices of the statesmen deal with their external political projects, rather than their philosophical beliefs or internal claims regarding individual treatment of citizens. Thus, it is the argument of this thesis, that these critiques are relevant to failings of the external political model, and do not undermine the
analysis throughout the rest of this chapter which has drawn similarities between the philosophical groundings of the work of Nyerere, Nkrumah and Machel in relation to what all humans are owed, and the Kantian position of this project. In regards to this methodological choice, this thesis suggests that a precedent exists in political theory, in particular Western political theory, to distinguish between the theoretical models of statesmen and the political realities over which they ruled, and to critique or support each separately. To name just two examples of this phenomenon: Marcus Aurelius and Benjamin Franklin. In both cases their political theories are often treated separately to their more troubling realities. On this justification it is argued that the choice to treat the two roles of Nyerere, Machel and Nkrumah, as well as Senghor in the previous chapter, (as both theorists and statesmen) separately can be justified on both theoretical and precedential grounds.

As discussed in the previous section, Nyerere focused in a number of his speeches and publications on the value of ideas similar to the Kantian concept of self-mastery, portraying it as a necessary strand of human development that should be respected by governments. However, in the post-independence era his party presented mixed messages to the people: “on the one hand they were urged to embrace mass democracy, common ownership of land, and the sharing of wealth. On the other, the party and the government were becoming ever more centralised and authoritarian, while the nation’s wealth was still enjoyed by only a small number” (Smyth & Seftel, 1998, p. 79). Centralisation of governmental practices was also associated with increased powers for the executive, a theme, along with corruption of party officials, which was common across all three theorists.

Nkrumah’s party (the CPP), was most widely associated with corruption. It was suggested early on in his rule that the officials around him were more interested in personal, material wealth than in the protection and development of the people. Marable (referencing Makonnen) concluded that “the rhetoric of the CPP was socialist. But watching the evolution of the regime from 1957 to 1966...virtually none of the CPP leadership was really interested in defending the material interests of workers and peasants” (Marable, 1987, p.93) and, in fact, the ideology was being used, not to deliver favourable political conditions to the people, but rather to enhance the material wealth of high ranking party officials. Discussion of the failings of each of the leaders and their regimes is included to highlight the distinction between theory and practice. In the case of Nkrumah, his failure to
utilise his socialist model to deliver the correct political conditions under which the citizens could realise a condition of equality and self-law giving.

Issues of corruption and authoritarianism were prevalent throughout the regimes. In fact, as they became more established in their presidential roles, each statesman implemented policies that prevented their power from being challenged. This included making it illegal for opposition parties to stand in elections (in the case of Nkrumah), and eventually all three became one party states.

Simultaneously, personality cults began to form around the leaders, a fact which Marable argued both reinforced, and was reinforced by, “corruption and bureaucratization” (Marable, 1987, p.126). It has been observed that the formation of cults centred on viewing the figures as saviours from the colonial movement. This enabled them to have freer rein in establishing political policies. Nkrumah, in particular, was guilty of viewing himself in this way. As mentioned in Section 4.1, before falling victim to an eventual coup he had embarked on a process of re-writing history to exaggerate the role he played in freeing Ghana from British colonial rule. The sense of cultism surrounding Nkrumah became ever stronger as dissenters were removed from the party and greater focus was placed on him as the saviour of the nation. In 1961, party member and long-time confidant of Nkrumah, Adamafio, published a pamphlet extolling his virtues. He described Nkrumah’s name: “a breath of hope and (it) means freedom, brotherhood and racial equality... Kwame Nkrumah is our father, teacher, our brother, our friend, indeed our lives...is greater even than the air we breathe, for he made us as surely as he made Ghana” (Marable, 1987, p. 134). At the same time, as the party elite were extolling his virtues, Marable observed, the party was losing popularity with its class bases (the working class): resulting from the ever growing wage gap between the people and the party members. There was an increase in strikes and the values of socialism were no longer recognisable as the government was becoming ever more authoritarian. It became apparent as Nkrumah’s government went on, that the focus on the role, and value, of the people diminished. He was unable to create a political condition in which the views and autonomy of the people were either central, or fundamental, and as such many of the claims he made in his early days in government were reversed. Thus, as suggested in the introduction to this section, similarly to other philosopher statesmen who were active at this time, such as Ahmed Sekou Toure, it is possible to interpret in his speeches and publications both a philosophical underpinning that respects and advocates for the autonomy and value of individuals, or an idea similar to
the value of internal self-law giving, and that the debates into which he enters regarding these issues centre around these foundations, even when the language itself is not Kantian, the ideas are central to the debates. However, he failed to translate this to his external political practice and in this sense failed to create a condition that enabled the people to realise the rights he had previously claimed were common to all individuals.

O’Meara argued that, prior to his death, Samora Machel’s government was moving towards a similar situation, in which a cult of adoration was forming around the leader; a situation which was negatively affecting the political direction of the country. He references a time in the early eighties (1983), in which Frelimo, whilst moving towards becoming a centralised, Machel focused, party remained active and responsive to the people. In this sense, he argued, it was still possible to interpret, at this time, a belief in the necessity to create a political condition that responds to and respects the autonomy of the body politic:

“FRELIMO was a highly contradictory political movement. On the one hand, it was extremely centralised and commandist, moving slowly towards a personality cult around Samora Machel. On the other hand, it was at that stage still highly responsive to all kinds of mass pressures, and indeed organised wide-ranging consultative processes at all levels of society” (O’Meara, 1991, p.97).

However, in an interview he conducted after Machel’s death, John Saul was told by a Frelimo party veteran, that for the country, the choice to focus so strongly on Machel as the dominant image the party presented to the public was a mistake: “we were wrong, all of us at the top, in fostering a cult of personality around Samora” (quoted in Saul, 1991, p.107). The party member insinuated that a more citizen centric message would have better served the people of Mozambique. As a result “Frelimo never succeeded in creating the political and economic system it aimed for” (Ottaway, 1988, p.213).

Similarly, many of Nyerere’s policies, in particular the villagisation programme, were reversed following his retirement in 1985: Tanzania is no longer described by its leadership as a socialist state. However, he remains (even posthumously), a vastly popular figurehead. Likewise, many of Nkrumah’s political choices were changed following the coup that removed him from the presidency in 1966, and he himself, reversed many of his opinions in several of the works he wrote in exile. Thus, it was argued by commentators speaking
about all three of the statesmen, that the cults that formed around them, and the corruption that this inspired, resulted in one of the fundamental reasons that they were unable to deliver successful socialist policies, able to protect and enhance the lives of their citizens, whilst also respecting the autonomy they claimed to uphold.

4.5- Conclusion:

In concluding, this final section reiterates the essential points drawn out by this chapter, making final remarks regarding the contrasts and comparisons between the three statesmen and a Kantian model, and finally, summarising the overall conclusions drawn by Part 1 of this thesis.

This chapter has drawn out a number of key similarities between the philosophical groundings and justifications for the implementation of an African socialist model (as understood by Machel, Nkrumah and Nyerere), and a Kantian approach to the rights and duties owed to individuals, as well as the justifications for creating a state or system of government. As was suggested in Section 4.3, each theorist believed that governments should not be founded on a system of oppression, but rather, on the views and voice of the people. However, when translated into a political condition, none of the three were able to create a system that achieved this. Furthermore, each theorist claimed that socialism was the correct model to deliver human development and self-rule in their countries, although none of them were successful in implementing a robust socialist state. Therefore, as suggested in Section 4.4, it is the argument of this chapter that Machel, Nyerere and Nkrumah represent in their writings and speeches a belief in an underlying shared foundational principle of humanity to be self-mastering, self-law giving individuals. It is also the argument of this chapter, that in the early years of their rule they presented publicly an intention to create the political conditions in which these shared human principles could be realised: thus drawing similarities with a Kantian model of willkür (as presented in Chapter 1). However, it is also the observation of this chapter that, as their presidencies developed, they were unsuccessful in delivering these conditions, and in fact created political situations that violated the philosophical principles they had originally claimed to uphold. Many of these failures occurred, as suggested in Section 4.4, as the models of government became more open to corruption and oppression and lost many of their socialist traits. It is thus impossible to make claims regarding the success of African socialism in delivering the conditions by which the principles of self-law giving, autonomy and freedom of choice can
be realised, as many of the socialist elements of each government were lacking by the end of each regime.

A theme that is noticeable across not only this chapter, but also Chapters 2 and 5, is the value placed on using culturally specific methods to recognise foundational principles. For example in this chapter, Nyerere’s claims for realising individual autonomy through the community have been discussed. These ideas were also expressed in the analysis of Chapter 2, and are further debated in Chapter 5 in relation to the views of Kwame Gyekye. Extending from this point, support existed in the views of all three statesmen for systems of cross-cultural interactions and dialogue (both amongst the Pan-African community and with the Eastern and Western blocs). Support for such dialogue implies a belief on the part of the statesmen in a human foundation on which said interactions could be based, and built, which is a notable similarity with the claims made by this thesis.

Finally, Part 1 of this thesis has summarised and analysed the views of two groups of philosopher statesmen. A noticeable progression exists from the beliefs of those authors discussing Négritude, who argued for a return to a glorified past; to those building models of African socialism around tradition, but choosing not to develop a sense of exoticism in relation to the past. However, in both cases there is a focus on traditional values in policy formation; for example, Nyerere’s insistence on the communal, African basis for the Ujamaa project. Across both of these chapters, which have covered the work of political statesmen and activists who have suffered a turbulent relationship with the West, the presence of ideas associated with the Kantian Western Enlightenment tradition have been observed. Across the cases the language used has differed, and the methods appropriated for realising basic human foundations varied. However, in each case it has been possible to locate similar philosophical foundations for political and philosophical arguments and structures to those presented in Chapter 1 as representing a Kantian perspective. In areas where these foundations have been recognised, it has often been the case that these ideas are central to debates and discussions of how political conditions should be created. To clarify, this thesis is not claiming that each theorist was able to implement a political model under which individual’s right to their own purposiveness was successfully guaranteed. Rather, that the question of how it could be, or whether it should be, was a focus across theorists. The argument is simply that these ideas underpin debates, not that respect for them has been successfully implemented. What follows in Part 2 of this thesis is a further chapter questioning the existence of these ideas in the debates of contemporary
philosophers. It is the argument of this thesis that regardless of the differences between the two groups of theorists, and the fundamental qualms one set has with the work of the other, it will still be possible to locate in both, shared philosophical underpinnings grounding their understanding of personhood.
Chapter 5 - Post-Colonial Philosophers:

“Africa actually enriches Europe: but Africa is made to believe that it needs Europe to rescue it from poverty” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.28).

As with Chapters 3 and 4, the central aim of this chapter is to introduce the theorists selected for study, outline their views in relation to the topic of this thesis, and finally, to debate whether, in the writings of these key thinkers, appeals are made to similar foundational principles regarding what it means to be a person. This question is analysed in relation to similarities that may exist between the theorists themselves, and also within the Kantian framework central to the overall hypothesis of this thesis. However, the methodological distinction between this chapter and the previous two is that the authors selected for study are not members of a distinct philosophical, ideological or political group. Rather, they are professional contemporary scholars debating questions of interest to philosophy today.

This chapter is divided into five sections. As with the previous two chapters, the first section (Section 5.1) introduces the authors, explains their selection for analysis, touches upon the choice to separate this chapter from the previous two, and briefly elucidates the decision to include post-colonial philosophers as a group for analysis in this thesis. The second section (Section 5.2), is a discussion of the contemporary scholars views on both a narrative of “return” approach to considering and understanding the political condition in Africa (in the case of Senghor), and traditional groundings more generally, in the case of thinkers such as Nyerere, Nkrumah and Machel. The section discusses the critiques they make of each of these positions: “return” narratives and traditionalism more generally. This section also briefly considers the concept of ethnophilosophy as it is defined by authors such as Paulin Hountondji, and the critiques presented against it by both Hountondji and other contemporary scholars discussed in this Chapter. Section 5.3 further develops the debate in Chapter 2 regarding specific African philosophers’ views on culture, and the methods for comprehending it when considering human questions of potentially universal interest or foundation. The section also questions whether the philosophers arguments refer to foundational principles of humanity, and in doing so, whether they advocate for a culturally relativist approach to delivering them. Section 5.4, similarly to the previous chapter, questions the existence of explicitly, or implicitly, Kantian ideas in the writings of these academics. This is not to imply that they are themselves Kantian, although it can be argued in the case of Kwame Anthony Appiah that his form of Cosmopolitanism is rooted in
similar ideals; but rather to analyse whether philosophers from diverse backgrounds ground their understanding of issues of personhood and autonomy in similar ways, and whether debates occurring from different ideological perspectives focus around these central principles. As suggested in the Introduction, the inclusion of authors from non-Kantian backgrounds actually provides greater evidence for the argument of this thesis than a specific focus on the work of academics that are openly sympathetic to Kantian views. The final section (Section 5.3) concludes the chapter and reiterates common themes that occur throughout the analysis.

5.1- Introduction to the Post-Colonial Philosophers:

This section first explains the choice to include a secondary part to this thesis (Part 2), and then the decision for it to be based around the analysis of contemporary philosophers working today. Finally, it introduces the philosophers selected for analysis.

As suggested in the Introduction, the theorists studied in this chapter are being presented as separate to those discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, in line with the selection process outlined in the earlier chapter. Whilst the individuals considered in the previous two chapters were either philosopher statesmen, literary figures or activists reacting to colonialism, or affirming their leadership in the early post-colonial period, the theorists analysed in this chapter are professional philosophers and academics writing predominantly between the 1980s and the present day. As discussed in the Introduction, an important element to selecting the texts for study was ensuring a divergent range of views from within African political theory: to enable stronger claims to be made regarding similarities of foundational principles coming from culturally, and academically, disparate positions. As was the focus of previous chapters, the statesmen and activists discussed in Part 1, implied that there were lessons to be learnt and value to be gained, from focusing on the structures and values of pre-colonial Africa as a model for inspiring the post-colonial condition. This was not to suggest a complete disregard of progress but was sometimes grounded in a glorification of the past. In contrast, the academics investigated in this chapter focus predominantly on the rights and duties of African academics, such as themselves, to discover and develop an African form of philosophy and politics, which will then, they argue, enable them to respond to human questions from an African perspective: adding valuable insight to the global field of philosophy. Additionally, a number of them, such as Paulin Hountondji, are also explicitly critical of a backward looking approach to the establishment of an African philosophical or political condition, thus providing interesting
points of contention with some of the theorists considered in the previous two chapters. Although, it is important to highlight that this is in no way a universally accepted response, nor does it reflect a condemnation for the study of traditional ideas. Many contemporary philosophers (such as Kwame Gyekye), in fact, advocate for a greater emphasis to be placed on studying the philosophical thought of traditional groups. However, in contrast to philosopher statesmen such as Senghor, this philosophical focus on the study of traditional ideas is not intended as a political exercise. Rather, as a method of gaining greater understanding of these groups and discovering what lessons can be learnt from their past experiences: Gyekye focuses in his work on the Akan people of Ghana. The intention of Gyekye and his contemporaries working in this area is primarily to enhance understanding of tradition. This is not necessarily to directly implement those traditions within political endeavours, but rather it is a historical project intended to garner deeper understanding. This is what separates their approach from some of those studied in the previous two chapters.

There is a strong emphasis amongst the contemporary philosophers considered in this chapter on questioning the opposing roles of cultural difference and universalism in dictating our understanding of, and interaction with, philosophical ideas; a topic which is debated in greater depth in Section 5.3. As referenced in Chapter 2, Gyekye and Wiredu focus considerable attention on interrogating the difference between practices that are specific to a culture (such as dress, music and culinary styles) and those that they view as being relevant to humanity in general (such as issues of human well-being and agreed facts of science). For them, respect for the former provides the conditions for the continued existence of the cultural group and are thus outside the remit of external debate. Whereas the latter, they argue, are concerns of humanity in general and should thus be treated as such; they argue that a practice that is harmful to human well-being cannot be protected on cultural grounds. This chapter extends the analysis of Chapter 2 and questions on what philosophical grounds these ideas are based. It then asks whether an understanding of culturally relative concepts limits acceptance of the existence of universally relevant foundations. In the case of Gyekye and Wiredu, they argue for a symbiosis of the two positions in which both culture and universal human concerns are respected. Their jointly edited collection, “Person and Community” (1992), is one of the key texts analysed in relation to this element of the chapter’s research. The purpose of this chapter is to further extend the discussion of the effect culture has on universal foundational principles. Section
5.3 considers the views of not only Gyekye and Wiredu, but also Kwame Anthony Appiah and Dismas Masolo.

Additionally, there is common focus amongst African philosophers of investigating the question of identity. Many of the theorists, Appiah and Masolo, to name just two, respond to questions of identity posed by earlier thinkers (Leopold Sedar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and Kwame Nkrumah), and question the notion of pre-defined identities of being African associated with these thinkers. Appiah’s seminal publication, “In My Father’s House” (1992), is a pivotal text in this discussion of identity and is widely cited in other texts. As such, it is heavily referenced in this chapter. Masolo’s article, “African Philosophy and the Postcolonial: Some Misleading Abstractions About Identity” (1997), also offers interesting insights into the question of identity and the foundation of human personhood. This text is also a central element of discussions in Section 5.4 in the analysis of the relationship between imposed identities and dominance. This chapter asks whether the focus on identity, and the assumption of its value for individuals by these theorists, shares similar philosophical groundings to the Kantian framework at the centre of this thesis: whether they ground their insistence on the importance of the individual defining and understanding their identity on the philosophical understanding of humans as having a right to be self-law giving agents, able to rely on their individual purposiveness to direct the choices of their existence, and the formation of their identity as they understand it.

Professional African philosophers are an ever growing, but small and recently founded, community, and many of the debates and discussions occur amongst a well cited group; with many of the publications speaking to one another. For this reason much of the discussion in this chapter surrounds debates taking place between these philosophers: for example, a number of the articles in “Person and Community” (1992) debate back and forth around a central topic, and are further referenced in other texts. Thus, selection of the theorists for analysis was fundamental. In doing so, it was essential to cover a range of perspectives, whilst also maintaining a focus on topics specifically relevant to this thesis. In particular, a number of influential African scholars concentrate on broadening understanding of the folk philosophies of traditional groups, such as the Akan, Yoruba or Ewe people. Whilst these discussions are related to topics of personhood, and would make for an interesting future project for analysis; it was decided that they did not fit the remit of this thesis. Thus, a number of enlightening and engaging works by Gyekye, Wiredu and Immanuel Chukwudi Eze have been set aside. That being so, the decision was made to
exclude a number of important African figures and texts from this study; whilst an interesting insight to the philosophy of the region, if they are not relevant to discussions of personhood, autonomy, self-mastery, dominance and self-law giving, or if they present their interpretation of the views of another group (such as the Yoruba) rather than their own perspective, they have been excluded from this project. The secondary element of the study (whether states people were able to implement the political conditions they claimed to support) is a less prominent focus in this chapter than in the previous two. This is due to the nature of the individuals being studied: professional philosophers rather than political states people. This is not to imply that any discussion of ideal political states in their texts was excluded, but rather that analysis of their abilities to implement them cannot be carried out in the same way as in previous chapters.

That being said, the following group of philosophers, from a wide range of ideological backgrounds, and discussing issues of culture, personhood, self-mastery, autonomy and political theory more generally, have been selected as being of relevance to the analysis of this thesis. This is not to suggest that this list is exhaustive, as due to the limiting parameters of this study (as set out in the Introduction) a number had to be excluded, and will thus be included in further study. This chapter in particular, focuses on a less well defined group, coming from a range of backgrounds rather than one in particular. As previously mentioned, this is advantageous for questioning if theorists from different backgrounds imply in their publications a belief in certain a priori foundations, but it is also more challenging when selecting texts and authors to be analysed. However, a selection of texts from the following authors is included in this chapter: Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Paulin Hountondji, Dismas Masolo, Immanuel Chukwudi Eze, Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o and Noah Dzobo. These are the authors selected as primary sources. However, there are further academics included as secondary discussants, as well as analysis of the debate that takes place between the philosophers mentioned above.

Having detailed the selection process for the primary sources, briefly introduced the topics which are central to the debate of this chapter, as well as introduced the theorists and a number of the primary texts, this chapter proceeds to the first point of analysis: a critique of narratives of “return”, emphasis on traditional models and ethnophilosophy.
5.2- A Critique of Narratives of “Return”, Traditional Values and Ethnophilosophy:

This section is divided into two halves. Both halves consider a number of critiques posed by contemporary philosophers regarding previous streams of thought, either emanating from Africa, or colonial discussions of traditional African views and values. The first half discusses their criticisms of narratives of “return”, asking whether these criticisms are grounded on principles of concern for foundational principles similar to those delineated in Chapter 1, or whether the debates between the two streams of thought (contemporary critiques and the narratives of “return” literature) focus on the same foundational principles. To clarify, whether, similarly to discussions taking place in Chapter 3 between the Négritude movement and its critics, the arguments being made by both groups are premised on the value of respecting the same foundational principles, but the point of contention surrounds how these principles should be recognised. The second half of this section analyses similar questions in relation to the school of thought of ethnophilosophy. Ethnophilosophy originated in South East Africa with the publication of Belgian missionary Placide Tempel’s “La Philosophie Bantoue” (Bantu Philosophy), published in French in 1945 with an English translation following in 1959. It refers to a belief, held by a number of missionaries in the time period, that the rigorous analytical requirements placed on Western philosophy were not appropriate standards by which to judge African thought systems. Rather, it was the role of visiting missionaries to translate and interpret these thought systems and to apply philosophical standards. Tempel’s supported the position that African groups did have a philosophy but that it was confined to oral traditions and lacking a rigorous methodology. This somewhat patronising approach to studying other cultures has been widely condemned by contemporary African scholars and their critiques will be the main focus of the second half of this section.

There is a fundamental distinction between the analytical approaches of contemporary philosophers to studying and learning from the past, and that of a historical “return” narrative associated with Senghor and Césaire: one concentrates on studying and understanding the past, whilst the other glorifies and mythologises it with the hope of emanating it in future political conditions. Masolo delineates this distinction in his discussion of the role the colonial period played in shaping the conditions of the postcolonial: “The postcolonial defines itself in the shadow of the colonial, from which it is inseparable. Remember, however, that saying that the postcolonial condition is determined by its preceding opposite is not the same as saying that the precedent
condition was good” (Masolo, 1997, p.285). It is his argument that the fact that the present is influenced by the past does not suggest that the past was either right or good, nor that lessons taken from the past shouldn’t be changed or adapted for future usage. This is often recognised in discussions such as these that focus on the colonial period, in which the colonisers are condemned for their mistreatment of the colonised. However, contemporary African philosophers argue that a number of their predecessors have been mistaken in their treatment of the pre-colonial period. It is suggested by a number of theorists, in particular Hountondji, that simply because the pre-colonial condition formed the foundations of African communities, and could be described as organically African, (unlike the colonial forms of government which had alien origins) is not, they argue, reason to support overthrowing valuable colonial input in favour of a return to supposed African roots. Rather, they support a system of progression in politics that utilises input from a range of sources. Eze further emphasises this point: “political practices in Africa today are a more flexible and often highly eclectic or syncretic melange of the African and the Western, the old and the new, the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial, and so forth” (Eze, 1997, p.314). On investigation of both of these arguments it is clear that both Eze and Masolo place less emphasis on a need to eradicate colonial influence, as was suggested by theorists such as Césaire, Fanon and later Nkrumah. Nor do they focus on glorifying the pre-colonial condition as the solution to Africa’s contemporary problems (like Senghor), but rather they concentrate on combining the lessons from a number of different time periods to develop a synthesised system to best suit contemporary Africa. Such an approach raises the question: on what grounds this approach is justified. Such a question is of particular interest to this thesis as it enables comparisons to be drawn between, not only the foundations of the arguments being made for a synthesising approach and one of the more traditional models discussed in the previous two chapters, but also between these approaches and the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1. The argument being, if each contrasting approach is grounded on the value of self-law giving to individuals, then further evidence exists to support the argument that it is an a priori value prior to political or cultural difference. This enquiry underpins the following discussion and justifies its placement in this thesis.

Wiredu suggests that a “return” approach is methodologically flawed. He constructs this argument on the basis of a comparison with a desire to return to our childhood as a method of better developing our adulthood:
“There are problems of principle with this mode of self-definition. It is obviously not true in general that what we ought to be is what we used to be. We were children to start with, but that hardly supports nostalgia for infantilism. The concept of self-improvement implies that we ought to become something other than what we are currently or were in the past. Thus, unless we make the strange assumption that culture is not open to improvement, the premise under discussion must be acknowledged to be faulty” (Wiredu, 1992, p.60).

His argument, therefore, is grounded on an understanding that human identity, both in the individual and cultural sense, is fluid and changeable. This also implies that it can be enhanced by the experience of new and different things. This assumption implies that human identity is not fixed, but rather something that develops and changes over time. He also makes reference to the concept of self-improvement; implying that development in this sense relies on a philosophical approach that is not grounded on a narrative of “return”. In drawing similarities between the foundations of Wiredu’s understanding of identity (as being fluid and changeable, or developing over time), and a Kantian model, it can be suggested that his argument shares similar foundations to those in “An Answer to the Question: what is Enlightenment” (1784). These similarities can be recognised with Kant’s argument that reaching enlightenment was a process of development and change. The concept of an ever changing identity driven towards the achievement of autonomy or freedom (understood to be different on a Kantian and Wireduian model, but nonetheless, still an overarching process), suggests a shared understanding of the changing process through which individual autonomy can be realised. Wiredu argues that what individuals ought to be is not necessarily what they currently are, nor what they were in the past, but rather it is something that develops and grows. Whilst the arguments for this may differ (Wiredu places less emphasis on living guided by reason) they are nonetheless similar in assuming that individuals develop and grow over time. Thus, a static approach to understanding identity fails to recognise the complexities of personhood, as individuals react to changes in experience.

Gyekye criticises Wiredu, suggesting that he fails, in his analysis, to recognise the value of understanding, and learning from, traditions. As previously suggested, this is not to argue that Gyekye supports a “return” approach to identity formation, but rather that he feels
that there are lessons that can be learnt from academic study of traditions. He responds to Wiredu as such:

“Wiredu, for instance, has said that ‘...traditional conceptions of things just cannot provide an adequate basis for contemporary philosophy.’ This kind of judgement, even if it may contain some truth, is, in my view, too sweeping and premature. For the ‘traditional conceptions’ of things have not been given adequate philosophical formulation, articulation, and analysis by modern African philosophers, and therefore we do not know to what extent they can and cannot be accommodated by the ethos of contemporary culture, and to what extent and how they should be modified” (Gyekye, 1987, p.41).

The purpose of his essay is not to defend traditional folk philosophies, nor to suggest that study of them will prove valuable to understanding best political and philosophical practice for future projects. Rather, he argues that traditional conceptions should be viewed as material for contemporary philosophical analysis. Following on from this analysis a decision can be made as to the utility of the ideas for enhancing future development. This is because the primary focus for contemporary African philosophy, according to Gyekye, should be “to provide conceptual responses to the problems confronting the contemporary African situation” (Gyekye, 1987, p.40). This position is in many ways a middle ground between the extremes of a “return” approach popular in the 1940’s, and the approach supported by Wiredu that focuses on change and development. The primary focus is on developing models of philosophical thought that are of benefit to contemporary communities, but to achieve this he advocates for a system that refers to traditional ideas that may be useful in guiding and developing the situation. Despite their differences in approach discussed here, an area on which they agree is that questions of contemporary philosophy in Africa should be the domain of contemporary African scholars, and not the remit of post-colonial European scholarship. On making this claim they do not argue that there are not universal questions of philosophy (as discussed in Chapter 2 both authors support the argument that there are). Rather, that it is important for African philosophers to develop a response to these questions grounded on their knowledge and experience and not simply to adopt unreservedly, models originating from experiences and cultures that are alien to their particular circumstances.
Alternatively, Mudimbe argued in the 1980’s, that the African situation at the time was almost entirely a product of Western influences and that the continents political and philosophical approaches were shaped either by adopting Western ideas, or by reacting against them:

“Modern African thought seems somehow to be basically a product of the West... When prominent leaders such as Senghor or Nyerere propose to synthesise liberalism and socialism, idealism and materialism, they know that they are transplanting Western intellectual Manicheism. The conceptual framework of African thinking has been both a mirror and a consequence of the experience of European hegemony” (Mudimbe, 1988, p.185).

Underlying this critique is the suggestion that schematics of thought, identity or personhood, should not be influenced by external agents. In contrast to a system of African thought or political ideology dictated either by the influence of the West or by a desire to oppose European ideas; instead, models of thought should be defined by African governments, state officials or academics, with the African people themselves as the sole concern when dictating policies. When considering the philosophical grounding for such an argument, it is possible to imply certain similarities with the Kantian argument for the value of self-law giving. Mudimbe’s criticism is based on what he interprets as the choice of Nyerere and Senghor to imitate certain Western ideas as an alternative to implementing an African system responsive to African needs. This critique is somewhat controversial however, as both authors contended that this was not what they were doing (that they were in fact implementing an organically African system). However, for the purposes of this analysis Mudimbe’s critique will be accepted on face value; the purpose here is not to defend or support it, but rather to question whether the philosophical groundings underpinning the claim compare favourably with the framework of analysis set out in Chapter 1. It is the argument of this thesis that the claims he makes, whilst not presented in Kantian language, are based on his argument favouring a system of thought or government that is not adopted from elsewhere, but that is alternatively constructed by Africans, for Africans: a system similar to the creation of a model of public right, supportive of individual self-law giving. By making the observations cited above, he enters into a debate about the value to individuals or groups of creating their own systems of thought.
and political models, and in that sense the principles at the centre of these debates are those discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis: choice, self-mastery and domination.

Having discussed the shared underlying values grounding contemporary critiques of narratives of “return”, this section now turns to a discussion of the contemporary critique of the system of thought of ethnophilosophy.

Ethnophilosophy is a term that originated as a critique aimed at those authors who engage in descriptive, rather than analytical, philosophical work. By this it is meant to be a pre-reflective form of research that views African belief systems as static and unchanging. To illustrate, ethnophilosophy looks at individuals as groups of people and claims that the group as a whole has a shared philosophy. For example, they present the views of individuals that have been studied or interacted with as being the views of the group as a whole: the Maasai people, the Igbo people. It was a school of thought originating with Placide Tempel’s and his attempt to philosophise the traditional thought system of the linguistic family of the Bantu. He implied in his work that it was the role of European anthropologists and missionaries to study what he referred to as “native peoples” and to come to understand their methods for understanding life. To achieve this he asked not only whether they had a system of philosophy that enabled them to better understand certain questions, but also what this system included. Until this point, it had been the argument of the colonisers that indigenous peoples were not endowed with the ability to understand philosophical questions, such as the meaning of life or the existence of God. However, Tempel’s suggested in “Bantu philosophy” (1945) that the elders in traditional African groups were, in fact, responding to similar questions to those of traditional philosophical enquiry, but that they were doing so orally and in a way that required translation by Western anthropologists. These practices, as well as the practices of Tempel’s followers, implied that traditional African groups all shared the same understanding of certain philosophical questions, and that the questions they were responding to were African rather than human. The studies of Tempel’s and his contemporaries thus failed to take into account the role of the individual philosopher amongst the group they were studying, instead assuming that this was the view of the collective: the Bantu, the Akan, the Yoruba, or even Africa as a whole. In discussing Tempel’s work, Mudimbe makes a similar observation, suggesting that throughout his work he fails to fairly discriminate between the individual, the small community, the larger group or even the continent as a whole:
“In effect, throughout his book Tempels indistinctly uses the terms African, Bantu, primitives, natives, and savages, clearly indicating that although he is presenting the ‘philosophy’ of a small community in the Belgian Congo, his conclusions could be valid for all non-Western societies. At least twice he expresses this ambition” (Mudimbe, 1988, p.139).

Reverend Placide Tempel’s “Bantu Philosophy” was originally published in the African journal, “Présence Africaine”. Like similar studies, Tempel’s is criticised for viewing Bantu thought processes as pre logical, separate from rationality, and requiring interpretation by the Western academic to make sense to the world. He was often praised for demonstrating to the world that African’s did have something that looked like philosophy, but his critics have argued that his study was both patronising and lacking in understanding of the multiplicity of views that existed amongst the Bantu linguistic family. In short, the aim of his work had value, but the methodology failed to respect the philosophies he studied as holding equal value and analytical rigour to Western philosophy. Ethnophilo

The first usage of the term ethnophilosophy is associated with Paulin Hountondji, who made use of it in 1970 to “characterise the work of people like Placide Tempels, Alexis Kagame, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Marcel Griaule and Germain Dieterlen” (Hallen 1995, p.382). Hountondji believed that these theorists were guilty of supporting a double-standard in which philosophy emanating from Africa was required to meet a lower standard than that emanating from the West. It was not required to meet the necessary standards of reflectivity, rationality and scientific rigour that were normally expected of Western philosophy. In defence of these authors Hallen suggested that “in their own intellectual circles they believed they were doing something revolutionary, something genuinely radical and progressive, by daring to link the word philosophy directly to African
systems of thought” (Hallen, 1995, p.384). However, it is widely accepted in contemporary circles that the value of the ethnosophical approach was outweighed by the assumptions it made regarding the existence of group philosophies rather than individual scholars, and the failure to recognise individual and cultural differences amongst large groups. A vast literature exists discussing these ideas. However, due to the scholarly aims of this thesis the focus of the remainder of this section is comparing the philosophical underpinnings of the contemporary philosophical critiques of ethnosophy.

Masolo cites the concept of a cohesive, jointly possessed, African personality as being at the heart of what he views to be at fault with an ethnosophical approach. It is the failure to recognise the vast cultural and individual differences that exist amongst African individuals and groups that he views as being of particular issue:

“The cohesion of African societies has given false impressions of a subjectless unity, suggesting to Western scholarship the unanimity and sameness of all Africans...I wish to argue that this generalisation of an African identity, like most universals, is not real because it does not reflect the social experiences of single subjects; that is not only misleading, but also part of the politics of re-presenting” (Masolo, 1997, p.291).

This citation offers an interesting insight into two interlinked arguments this thesis is making in relation to the approaches of post-colonial academics. Firstly, it is critical of the establishment of concepts such as “African personality” which, as has been discussed in Part 1 of this thesis, were common between the 1940’s and 1970’s as a method of re-establishing what is viewed by certain groups to be an African response to concerns of oppression and domination imposed by the colonisation movement. This leads to the second observation, whilst there is a distinguishable difference between the approaches of contemporary African academics and those philosopher statesmen and activists from the middle of the last century, the work of whom they criticise, there is a shared philosophical underpinning dictating the purpose of all the aforementioned individuals work. This is a theme that is apparent across the chapters of this thesis. Both, those individuals supporting the concept of an “African personality”, and those critiquing it, do so for a number of reasons. On investigation, one which is common across theorists is the right of Africans not to suffer domination from external forces, such as colonial and post-colonial forces. Domination, here, is understood in the Kantian sense presented in Chapter 1, as wrongdoing based on the premise “not that somebody does something that causes
something bad to happen to you; it is that somebody does something to you” (Ripstein, 2009, p.42) at all. For example, in the above quote Masolo refers to the right of individuals not to be “re-presented” in a way that does not respect the choices of the individual or community. By re-presenting them in such a way, the rights of individuals or communities to dictate their own identity are curtailed. This is not to suggest that the unified identity is necessarily bad or offensive, but rather that the act of imposing an external view of another’s identity fails to recognise them as a self-mastering individual with their own choice and purposiveness. This is, in and of itself, an act of domination. In contrast, theorists such as Senghor and Césaire (cited in Chapter 3) argued that the rhetorical tool of a shared African identity provided a platform on which future generations could build a response to oppression and that rather than being viewed as a tool of domination, it should instead be viewed as a response to oppression able to provide a condition under which individuals could develop as persons. Thus, it can be argued that the debate between the two groups (those supporting and those condemning reliance on unifying identities to strengthen personhood) does not question the foundations of personhood, but rather, the methods that are suitable for creating the correct conditions to develop it. Regarding the value of the metaphysical foundations of choice, purposiveness, oppression and self-mastery themselves, this thesis suggests that the two sets of theorists find agreement, and that this agreement relies on an understanding of self-mastery as being a foundational principle of personhood.

When establishing a critique of ethnophilosophy, a further focus that is shared by most contemporary scholars is on the assumption that African’s are not responding to philosophical questions in the sense that Western philosophy does. Rather, they are responding to African specific questions with lower expectations placed on the quality of output. It is not assumed by ethnophilosophy that reason is a universal trait, nor that African’s possess it. Thus, reason is not viewed as fundamental to philosophical enquiry emanating from Africa; whereas it is viewed as being central to traditional European philosophical investigation. Appiah discusses the views of both Hountondji and Wiredu on this matter and concludes by agreeing with their analysis that, “uncritical ethnophilosophy fails, in the end, as I have argued, to face the truly urgent questions that would be faced by a critical tradition” (Appiah, 1992, p.103). He suggests that this conclusion results from the lack of focus on rigorous and critical philosophical enquiry. Appiah’s central argument focuses on the question of what makes a particular philosophy or theory African:
“As a believer in the universality of reason, Wiredu holds the relevance of his being African to his philosophy to be both, in one sense, more global and, in another, more local; more local in that...he speaks as a Ghanaian from an African culture, more global in that he asks what it is that the particularity of his Ghanaian experience can offer to the philosophical community outside Africa. For Wiredu there are no African truths, only truths-some of them about Africa... His (Hountondji’s) prescription is that we should think of African philosophy as being African not (as the ethnophilosophers claim) because it is about African concepts or problems, but because (and here he agrees with Wiredu) it is that part of the universal discourse of philosophy that is carried out by Africans” (Appiah, 1992, p.106).

This brief discussion of the critiques of ethnophilosophy made by contemporary scholars demonstrates that, for them, it is fundamental for the philosophical community outside of Africa to understand that, similarly to the rest of the world, the work they are doing is in pursuing answers to universally relevant questions. It is their opinion that these questions relate to everyday human existence and have been the topic of debate amongst philosophers from time immemorial. To name just a few examples of these questions: What is human nature? Why do we need politics? What does it mean to be an individual? What is freedom? Is there a deity? In their view, what separates them from Western philosophers or Asian philosophers is their experience growing up in, and contributing to, a range of different African cultures, and the ways in which these experiences have shaped their approach to study and thought. They argue that what they are able to offer to the global philosophical community is an African approach to responding to these universal questions. On establishing these claims an assumption is made, similar to that at the core of this thesis: that there are shared universal questions that are relevant to humanity in general and not dictated by cultural experience, and that these questions and debates are underpinned by certain a priori principles. This thesis has argued that these underpinning principles are those set out in the Kantian framework discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

The thinkers discussed in this chapter, like this thesis, suggest that responses to said questions are culturally dependant, but that the questions themselves are nonetheless universally relevant. This has been seen, in particular, in this section in discussion of the foundational underpinnings of arguments both for and against narratives of “return”, as well as the debate surrounding the existence of a homogenous “African personality”. It has
been shown that both those advocating for, and against, these positions do so on the understanding of a basic notion of self-law giving in the sense of condemning domination and supporting the values of self-mastery in identity formation. Therefore, this section has argued that it is possible to draw parallels not only between the foundations of the contradictory positions, but also between those positions and the Kantian framework being utilised for the analysis of this thesis.

Having discussed the concerns of a selection of contemporary African philosophers with ethnophilosophy, excessive focus on traditional values and narratives of “return”, and the philosophical ideas underpinning these concerns, the following section (Section 5.3) focuses on a discussion of the concept of culture in relation to universal principles.

5.3- Universal Principles and the Role of Culture:

The role of this section within the thesis is to expand on the discussion of the views of Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu that were included in Chapter 2 regarding the role of culture in understanding, and responding to, the hypothesised concept of a priori foundational principles. There are a number of similarities between this section, and both the debate that took place in Chapter 2 and issues of specifically African concepts of philosophy discussed in the previous section (Section 5.2). The purpose of this section however, is not to repeat this previous analysis, but rather to develop and expand on the arguments that have been made elsewhere.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the debate that takes place between universalism and relativism is both complex and extensive. Polycarp Ikuenobe argues that this deliberation has extended, in recent history, into a specifically African debate on either side of which, he argues, exist Universalists and Particularists:

“The former camp, represented by the works of Bondunrin, Wiredu, Appiah, and Hountondji, among others, argues that the concept of ‘philosophy’, in terms of the methodology and subject matter of the discipline, should be the same in both Western and African senses. The latter camp, as seen in the works of Ayoade, Gyekye, Sodipo, and Onwuanibe, among others, argues that different cultures have different ways of explaining reality; hence Africans must have a philosophy that is essentially different from other philosophies” (Ikuenobe, 1997, p.189).
Ikuenobe thus summarises the debate that was raised in the previous section and suggests that, even amongst contemporary scholars, the question of what it means to be a philosopher in Africa is widely contested. That being said, neither side of this debate suggests that reality itself is not experienced universally, nor that there are not certain fundamentally shared elements of humanity that enable individuals from different cultural groups to recognise one another as being of the same species. However, what is contested is the approach to understanding these facts of existence. Ikuenobe concludes that:

“There are both universalist and particularist elements in African philosophy. In other words, although there are culturally determined philosophical ways of constructing meaning, these ways are not incommensurable. As such, we can use the ‘known’ universal (?) philosophical concepts and methods of one ‘culture’ to analyse and make understandable the philosophical beliefs and worldviews of another culture” (Ikuenobe, 1997, p.190).

Thus, for Ikuenobe, similarly to the argument of this thesis, the existence of a wide range of cultural groups and experiences does not prevent cross-cultural collaboration and discourse, in fact the wide range of perspectives and experiences provides a basis for growth: as cultures can learn from one another’s philosophical methods and experiences. To be able to achieve this level of discourse, it can be argued, relies on the existence of certain human traits or foundations that enable cultures to recognise themselves in other groups, and thus to see the value in learning from one another. Kant argues in “Toward Perpetual Peace” that even in times of war it is necessary to maintain “some degree of trust in the enemy’s manner of thinking” (Kant, 2006, p.70) and to respect them as persons. Thus, it is implied by both Kant and Ikuenobe, that even in times of complete and fundamental disagreement between groups, it is still possible to recognise one another as persons and to garner understanding of a different set of philosophical beliefs. Thus, it is suggested that a universal trait of shared personhood must be the basis for this recognition. For Kant, this is the right of reasoned individuals to live only by the laws they will for themselves and to do “that which they themselves find necessary to undertake” (Kant, 2006, p.21) in advancement of ends directed by their own purposiveness; limited only when the advancement of those ends conflicts with the rights of others to achieve the same. Parallels can be drawn between the Kantian position (that universal laws exist governing all persons, but within this framework individual’s possess complete autonomy
up to the point that they encroach on another’s autonomy), and Ikuenobe’s position that there are certain universal concepts relevant across cultures but that these are supplemented by individually and culturally specific concepts and methods.

The distinction between Particularist and Universalist approaches to understanding existence raises a further interesting question: What are the consequences of these approaches? Josiah Cobbah argues, similarly to Senghor’s concept of a Universal Civilisation discussed in Chapter 3, that accepting the existence of different culturally specific approaches to human existence can, in fact, be of value not only to the group that may have been silenced in the past, but also to humanity in general. The concept of learning from other cultures is one that has been discussed throughout this thesis, in particular in relation to African cultures. The argument that is being put forward by these theorists is not that previously silenced groups may necessarily be approaching questions of philosophical interest in a different or original way, but rather that the different cultural experiences they have may, in certain cases, lead to different and valuable insights to universally relevant issues. Cobbah raises this point in discussion of the issue of human dignity, and what it means for different cultural groups. He suggests that “it should be helpful for Westerners to look to other cultures in order to re-establish the fact that our rights as individuals and as a society should eventually relate to our dignity as human beings” (Cobbah, 1987, p.319). He goes on in his article to relate this to the question of universal human nature, suggesting that when comparing cultural groups it is important to understand that “homeomorphism is not the same as equivalence and strive to discover peculiar functional equivalence in different cultures” (Cobbah, 1987, p.329). This is not to imply that certain facts of humanity are not universally relevant. In fact, he admits in his 1987 article that “there may indeed be a universal human nature” (Cobbah, 1987, p.328). However, he does not believe that this is an argument for homogenising cultural or human difference. In particular, he focuses on discussion of human rights. As suggested in the above quote, he argues that such an approach could actually be detrimental to human dignity. He implies that what it means to have dignity may differ between groups and the rights we have should reflect this. He advocates for a model similar to that of Will Kymlicka’s discussed in Chapter 2 that takes cultural difference into account when defining certain rights. Thus, Cobbah suggests that whilst what it means to different groups or individuals may alter, the concept of dignity itself is a human concern. Thus, similarly to arguments previously raised by a number of the theorists considered in both this chapter and Chapter 3, it can be implied from reading Cobbah’s article that he advocates for the
value of protecting culturally different approaches that are utilised for the achievement of
the same philosophical end point; an argument that is not only supported by this thesis but
that is also a common thread in the analysis of thinkers from across cultural and ideological
backgrounds. It is not clear from reading his article what dignity means according to
Cobbah, but it is nonetheless implied that it is of value to humans in general. Resulting
from the acceptance of certain universal concerns by a large number of the thinkers
analysed in this thesis, it can be assumed that such an assumption is held by a number of
thinkers.

Further to the discussion in Chapter 2, reference is made here to Gyekye’s work on the
topic. He is very clear in his argument that there are certain universal ideas that define
human understanding in general and that it is not the cultural uniqueness of a philosophy
that defines its value. He uses the example of comparison between the belief systems of
multiple traditional African cultures to provide evidence for this argument:

“A painstaking comparative study of African cultures leaves one in no
doubt that despite the undoubted cultural diversity arising from Africa’s
ethnic pluralism, threads of underlying affinity do run through the beliefs,
customs, value systems and socio-political institutions and practices of the
various African societies” (Gyekye, 1987, p.192).

In making this claim he refers to community as being central to the understanding of the
individual and in the creation of political structures. Beyond this, a number of his more
general articles can be critiqued for not offering a detailed account of the similarities;
although much of his work focuses on a more specific account of each ethnic group, and
therefore, this information can be gleaned from these studies. However, as previously
stated, this element of Gyekye’s work is not considered in detail within this chapter. That
being said, his argument, as quoted above, is of interest to the overall debate of this thesis.
It emphasises Gyekye’s support for approaching philosophical study on the basis that
certain shared belief systems and values remain relevant regardless of other cultural
differences and affiliations. He not only argues that this is the case when comparing
traditional African groups, but also implies that certain similarities would exist if, say,
comparison was carried out between the views of the Akan people and the views of a
geographically diverse group such as the English:
“If my remarks regarding the possibility of doctrinal affinities in world philosophies are reasonable, then we cannot maintain that the philosophical system of one people must necessarily be different in all respects from another people... on some philosophical questions the answers of the Akan thinkers may well be similar to those of thinkers of the West or the East, but on others they may be different” (Gyekye, 1987, p.21).

It can be argued that Gyekye recognises the existence of certain foundational principles as being a priori. Further evidence for interpreting his views in such a way exists in referencing the following quote taken from Gyekye and Wiredu’s collection of essays “Person and Community” (1987):

“African philosophical systems will not be unique. The important thing is to see how the ideas of being, causation, the nature of a person, destiny, evil, morality, the nature of human society and social relationships, etc., are comprehended and analysed by African thinkers on the basis of African cultural and intellectual experience. African perspectives on these ideas may be similar to those of others; nevertheless, they are worth examining within the African conceptual crucible” (Gyekye, 1987, p.211).

On analysing this quote, it is clear that he does not suggest that the existence of certain shared concepts should lead to the silencing of one culture by another; rather he argues that the different (culturally specific), analytical approaches will be positive for human understanding as this will enhance the shared pool of human knowledge. He is supported in this approach, as previously mentioned, by a number of other thinkers. Masolo, for example, utilises logic to explain difference in this sense. He suggests that, “The fact that P is the negation of –P is not a sufficiently good reason for inferring that all claims involving P can be resolved in one way at all times by everybody” (Masolo, 1997, p.294). Appiah makes a similar claim grounded on a transcendental argument:

“Now, no doubt, not all cultures have exactly these concepts, but all of them will probably have concepts that bear a family resemblance to them...No one could have social norms without concepts at least something like good, evil, right, and wrong, and a society without norms could hardly exist- not simply because the concept of a society is
connected with the idea of shared norms but because without common norms it is difficult to conceive of any collective action... There is, then, in every culture a folk philosophy, and implicit in that folk philosophy are all (or many) of the concepts that academic philosophers have made central to their study in the West” (Appiah, 1992, p. 87).

To elucidate, he argues similarly to Kant, that because societies are built on social norms and understandings that enable individuals to interact in some meaningful sense, and debate on such topics as right and wrong and good and evil, that these concepts must be understood across cultural boundaries. Furthermore, that each cultural group must have some form of philosophy that enables them to understand what these terms mean in their specific situation. For a Kantian this constitutes the ability to reason about fundamental questions and to then define the relevant laws by which one lives because “reason commands how men are to act even though no example of this could be found, and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain, which only experience could teach us” (Kant, 1996, p.9). Thus for Kantians moral laws and norms “command for everyone” (Kant, 1996, p.9) and are established a priori and accessed via reason. They would therefore be unaffected by cultural difference and all autonomous agents would reason the same universal laws. Parallels can be drawn here between the Kantian position and Appiah’s argument for the existence of shared norms, as both suggest that there are certain human issues that are universally relevant principles which are relevant to all and thus form the basis of collective decision making or state craft. This is not to suggest that these concepts will look the same, or be treated the same in each different setting, but rather that a priori principles underpin the founding of these social norms which allow for them to be referred to similarly, and for members of different groups to be able to recognise collectively shared social norms.

The purpose of this debate so far has been to suggest that a commonly shared theme amongst the theorists considered is to support, to a greater or lesser extent, the existence of certain universals which transcend cultural dimensions. It is then the purpose of the next section (Section 5.4) to analyse whether the shared universals the theorists refer to resemble the themes defined in Chapter 1 as representing the Kantian foundational principles of internal self-law giving and external willkür.

Having discussed a selection of African philosophers’ beliefs in the distinction between Particularist and Universalist accounts for grounding and understanding philosophy, and
the repeated theme of utilising a local approach to human issues, the secondary focus of this section is on the role they see culture as playing in this experience. According to Gyekye, the cultural community in which individuals exist dictates certain elements of their life. For example, community provides, for Gyekye, the conditions for individuals to make their own choices and define their own paths:

“The cultural community constitutes the context or medium, in which the individual person works out and chooses his goals and life plans, and, through these activities, ultimately becomes what he wants to be— the sort of status he wants to acquire— the cultural community must be held as prior to the individual” (Gyekye, 1992, p.106).

Thus for him, as suggested in Chapter 2, community plays a fundamental role in defining individual identity and also in creating the necessary conditions for autonomous choice and purposiveness. In raising the individual, the community defines the conditions by which freedom is possible. This, similarly with discussion of the views of Nyerere and Machel in Chapter 4, is not to suggest that individual freedom is not fundamental to the existence of the individual, but rather that they rely on a different method of achieving this freedom. He discusses these ideas in debate with Ifeanyi Menkiti, in which the two theorists discuss the role of community in African political thought systems. Gyekye defines his view as being a form of “restricted communitarianism”, in which he views the community as important but also recognises the value of the individual at the centre of his theorising. In contrast, he argues that Menkiti’s views (and additionally, he claims, those of previous African leaders such as Nkrumah and Nyerere), are examples of radical or excessive communitarianism. It is his opinion that his model represents a balance between extreme individualism and extreme communitarianism, recognising both the importance and the necessity of both the community and the individual. He thus argues for a:

“Moderated or restricted version of communitarianism that... It is not clear which of the two versions, if any, is espoused in African cultural traditions. But the position I have taken generally appears to run counter to that of the African political leaders whose writings in the period following the attainment of political independence unmistakably suggest a radical or extreme type of communitarianism traced by them to African cultural traditions” (Gyekye, 1992, p.121).
When analysing the similarities in philosophical foundation that exist between the works of Gyekye and those of the Kantian framework of foundational principles, it is necessary to recognise his focus on the role, rather than the position, of the community. To clarify, for Gyekye, unlike extreme versions of communitarianism, the community does not exist as an end in itself. Rather, its function is defined as improving the well-being of the individuals. Within that setting “a communal being (is) an autonomous, self-determining, self-assertive being with a capacity for evaluation and choice” (Gyekye, 1992, p. 113). Thus, not only is the role of the community defined by the individual, in a similar way to the Kantian concept of public right, there are also similarities between what the two models view as ideal forms of individual attainment. Thaddeus Metz argues that this equates, not only in the case of Gyekye, but also Wiredu, to a particular focus for their forms of African philosophy. He argues that they conceive the role of African morality as being a “function of improving people’s quality of life” (Metz, 2007, p.330). It can be implied on analysing the previous citation of Gyekye’s views that what constitutes quality of life for him is similarly focused to the underlying Kantian principles, and that this is potential evidence for their a priori existence. He makes reference to the values of autonomy, self-assertion and choice as being central to the development of the individual. These values will be discussed in greater detail in relation to the views of contemporary African philosophers in the following section (Section 5.4).

Similarly to Gyekye’s suggestion that the community creates the conditions on which individuals can develop their autonomy and choice, Noah Dzobo implies that community is, in fact, fundamental to the process of realising the individual right to be self-governing: “We as self-governing people need a framework of ideas, guiding principles and clear values that will help us define and determine our collective will as well as individual destiny, and retrieve and maintain our self-respect as a people” (Dzobo, 1992, p.224). Thus, for Dzobo, the community provides the guidelines by which concepts of individual autonomy can be understood and realised. Such a model can be compared favourably with a Kantian system of public right: “a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution, so that they may enjoy what is laid down as right” (Kant, 1996, p.89). Such a system, like Dzobo’s, relies on the state, or community, to put in place a framework of guidelines, established by the people, that protects the autonomy of the individual to act dictated by their own purposiveness. Thus, within Dzobo’s model, similarly to Kantian thought, we can view the community as a tool
for creating the conditions for individuals to realise their foundational rights to be self-law giving persons. It has become clear throughout the analysis of this thesis that a common theme exists across the studied theorists. They utilise different methodologies, ideologies and approaches to realise similar foundational principles; in Dzobo’s case, like the Kantian system of public right, this was the community. In particular there is a shared focus on the ability of individuals to be self-governing, and their right to be autonomous. However, as expected, there is vast variation in the methods utilised for realising these principles, especially when this translates (as in the previous chapters) into the creation of suitable political conditions.

As an extension to the discussion of the role of communal practices to understanding identity formation Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o discusses, in his final English language publication “Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of African Literature” (1986), the role of language in understanding individual and communal identities. It is his argument that language was a pivotal element of British colonial rule in Kenya; a system under which school children were punished for usage of local languages and rewarded for fluency in English regardless of other academic skills: “English became more than a language: it was the language, and all others had to bow before it in deference” (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.11). He argued that, in silencing local languages the colonisers were not only silencing a form of communication, but also a culture (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.13), and that in achieving this form of silencing they were also controlling individual’s tools of self-definition (Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, 1986, p.16). As language and culture, simultaneously, according to Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, are necessary tools for individuals to achieve self-definition. In response to this condition, he argues that it is the responsibility of contemporary scholars to publish their thoughts in local languages, and to potentially have them translated for wider audiences, but nonetheless to share their views with the people to whom they relate. He argues that this would not only be of value to those regions and communities, but also foster better understanding of the links between different cultural groups:

“Writers in African languages should reconnect themselves to the revolutionary traditions of an organised peasantry and working class in Africa to defeat imperialism and create a higher system of democracy and socialism in alliance with all other peoples of the world. Unity in that struggle would ensure unity in our multi-lingual diversity. It would also reveal the real links that bind the people of Africa to the peoples of Asia,
This socialist idea suggests not only Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s belief in the value of local languages, but also his understanding of shared identities that exist across cultures: in this case a united socialist peasantry who, he suggests, will see similarities in their experiences of oppression and domination. Thus, similarly to the other theorists discussed in this section, Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o argues both for the necessity and value of cultural attributes to achieving self-definition within the identity formation process, as well as the existence of shared attributes existing across cultural groups. Whilst he makes reference specifically to socialist ideals, he does not suggest that these are the limits of shared expression. The focus on the value and importance of self-definition suggests that these factors, also, are central to his understanding of universally shared philosophical underpinnings to personhood.

Having discussed the role of culture and community on the understanding of personhood of a selection of contemporary African philosophers, as well as the philosophical principles underlying their views, the penultimate section of this chapter (Section 5.4) deliberates the potential existence of either implicitly or explicitly Kantian language in the work of these theorists.

5.4- Kantianism and Contemporary African Philosophy:

Analysis in this section is divided into two sub-sections. The first questions similarities between the African thinkers and the Kantian model in relation to rights and duties of internal concerns of self-law giving. The second sub-section focuses on the philosophers’ suggestions for the role of the state in delivering these conditions, the type of political condition they would view as ideal, and the necessary limits they argue need to be placed on individuals to ensure their equal right to realise their willkür. To clarify, whether the political condition they recommend to enable this is similar to the Kantian condition of public right. In contrast to the analysis in Part 1 of this thesis (and due to their roles as professional philosophers rather than statesmen), the analysis in this section does not extend to consider their ability to deliver said conditions. Rather, it will be based purely on the philosophical justifications they proffer and the methods they advise for delivering on them.
i. Rights and Duties of the Individual to be Autonomous

As a Cosmopolitan, many of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s justifications share similarities with a Kantian model. Whilst he has published a wide selection of articles and books on the topics of ethics, morality and cosmopolitan ideals, the focus of the analysis in this section is on his widely cited seminal text on African philosophy, “In My Father’s House” (1992): predominantly on his discussion of identity in relation to autonomy.

His method for embarking on this discussion is as a response to previously held concepts of pre-formed African identity. Similarly to the authors in the previous section, he accepts that individual understanding of what it means to be African is often somewhat dictated by the surroundings and conditions in which the individual exists. However, he argues in line with Chinua Achebe, that those said conditions can, and should, be altered by the individual if they contradict with their autonomy:

“Being African already has a ‘certain context and certain meaning’. But, as Achebe suggests, that meaning is not always one we can be happy with, and that identity is one we must continue to reshape. And in thinking about how we are to reshape it, we would do well to remember that the African identity is, for its bearers, only one among many” (Appiah, 1992, p.177).

To emphasise this point he refers to the example of the Igbo people in Nigeria and the Shona people in Zimbabwe. He claims that “the Igbo identity is real because Nigerians believe in it, the Shona identity because Zimbabweans have given it meaning” (Appiah, 1992, p.178), and thus context or culture are not fixed identities that exist a priori to the individual. In fact, the opposite is true; group identities such as these are defined and formed by individuals for their individual purposes and advancement. Resulting from his support for such an approach he has a somewhat fluid perception of identity, viewing it as something that is both changeable and fluid in response to individuals. On analysis of such an approach it is possible, not only to imply that his method places the individual rather than the shared identity at its centre, but also to draw comparisons with Brian Barry’s approach discussed in Chapter 2. Barry argued for an understanding of culture that was fluid and responsive to temporal and situational change. Appiah makes similar claims, with a greater focus on the individual. It is his argument that shared norms and identities are valuable (in the sense that they inspire community and interaction), but that they are secondary to the individual and thus should not be seen as limiting an individual’s freedom.
For him, therefore, the concept of individual choice is central. He refers, in this example, to specifically African identity which he views as being one amongst many. He asserts that, “race and history and metaphysics do not enforce an identity... we can choose, within broad limits set by ecological, political, and economic realities what it will mean to be African in the coming years” (Appiah, 1992, p.176).

To clarify, his purpose is not to imply that shared identities, such as African, Nigerian or Ghanaian do not exist, but rather, to assert that such identities are properties of an individual and should be utilised to ensure that individuals are able to realise certain fundamental rights; or as Mudimbe suggests, “as a means for establishing themselves as ‘subjects’ of their own destiny, taking responsibility for the ‘invention’ of their past as well as of the conditions for modernising their societies” (Mudimbe, 1988, p.167). Therefore, it can be argued that each of these authors focuses in their philosophies on the rights of individuals to have purposiveness over their lives qua individuals. As will become apparent in the final sub-section, this for Appiah at least, translates into a re-establishment of what a Pan-African identity or community would look like. However, before considering the views of other thinkers on the internal rights and duties of individuals, it is of value to summarise Appiah’s view of the multiplicity of identities an individual can utilise for their own ends by quoting his example of an Akan proverb:

“'The crocodile does not die under the water so that we can call the monkey to celebrate its funeral'. Each of us, the proverb can be used to say, belongs to a group with its own customs. To accept that Africa can be in these ways a usable identity is not to forget that all of us belong to multifarious communities with their local customs” (Appiah, 1992, p.180).

Thus, identity is not only a fluid concept, nor is it for Appiah a singular entity. Instead, each individual embodies many different identities dictated by their individuality.

William Abraham makes similar claims regarding the individual’s capacity to assimilate different cultural values as a method of emancipation. He argues that:

“The anticipated result of the acculturation will be the re-invigoration of sub-Saharan African cultures, enriched by the colonial, the Islamic, and the Christian experience in a manner and to an extent which are beneficial to the peoples of the areas. The goal is the evolution of cultures within which transformation from disrupted, diseased, untechnical and largely illiterate
post-colonial societies into harmonious, literate, technical, industrial, prosperous and thoroughly emancipated ones can be assured” (Abraham, 1992, p.29).

For him, the underlying foundation of such a process is the need for individuals to achieve emancipation. Thus, whilst his methods for achieving this condition may not share commonalities with the Kantian framework central to this thesis, the underlying philosophical justifications (the emancipation of individuals in Africa) are indeed similar. Abraham’s recommendations are such that they can be compared with the Kantian concept of enlightenment. For Kant, enlightenment was both a process, and a choice on the parts of individuals to take up this process, and in this sense it can be viewed as both a right and a duty. On becoming enlightened individuals became, on this argument, “gradually more capable of freedom of action” (Kant, 2006, p.23) or what could be viewed as “emancipation”. Thus it is possible to draw out similarities between the philosophical underpinnings of both arguments, each which understand freedom or emancipation to be enhanced and achieved via development or enlightenment, and both which view this as a right of persons to achieve. Abraham’s recommendations for achieving the condition are discussed in the following sub-section (Sub-Section 5.4ii).

Discussion of identity, what it means to be African or where this identity originates, is, as has become apparent throughout this chapter, a question that is at the centre of contemporary African philosophy. However, to understand the philosophical foundations of this enquiry it is necessary to ask, why? It is in asking this question that similarities appear with the philosophy of such an approach and the foundations of Kantian political thought. Kwasi Wiredu claims that enquiries into the role and foundation of identity emanate from the oppressive treatment of Africans in the colonial period. He suggests that such a prevalent focus on identity is reactionary. He raises and answers the following question: “But why is there a problem of identity in the first place? Individuals, let alone nations and whole continents, do not start wondering whether they are what they ought to be if everything seems to be going well. It is when things go wrong that critical self-analysis tends to begin” (Wiredu, 1992, p.59). He interprets the response of anti-colonial nationalism to be as follows: “because we became what we are now, not of our own free will, but rather through a colonial imposition” (Wiredu, 1992, p.60). Thus, the identity crisis he refers to is viewed as being a response to a situation in which individuals purposiveness in defining their own identity was restricted. He argues that the solution to concerns over
identity is the proper usage of reason. To elucidate this point, he refers to the example of an individual who views themselves as having multiple personalities, one of which originates from an external source:

“No African Christian can lay much of a claim to authentic African identity if he adheres to an unexamined jumble of Euro-Christian and African cosmological conceptions. On the other hand, if, on due reflection, a modern African concludes that Euro-Christian cosmology or conceptual framework, more generally, is preferable, this need not compromise his African authenticity” (Wiredu, 1992, p.65).

Thus, for Wiredu, it is only via reason (an attribute he believes to be universally attainable), that individuals come to understand and delineate their views on identity. To recapitulate this point, it is only when an individual undergoes a rational decision making process regarding their direction of life that their choices are free from oppression. In this sense, it is possible to draw similarities with a Kantian focus on the centrality of reason in understanding and realising individual freedom and Wiredu’s assumptions. To clarify, the Kantian framework being utilised by this thesis, like Wiredu in the above citation, postulates reason to be the common factor shared by all humans which dictates their rights and duties to be self-law giving autonomous beings.

Having referred to internal arguments made by a number of philosophers, both for the value of individual autonomy in identity formation, and the role of reason in achieving this; the final sub-section of this chapter analyses the recommended external conditions for establishing the internal philosophical principles discussed so far.

ii. Guaranteeing Willkür within a Condition of Public Right

The purpose of this sub-section is to examine the suggested political conditions of a number of the theorists discussed in the previous sub-section. The purpose being to analyse whether the political states they recommend are in line with guaranteeing the foundational principles they suggest are intrinsic to personhood. Abraham argues that emancipation is a fundamental right of individuals. Further to this, he argues that democratic process provides the conditions for guaranteeing this right:

“The pursuit of democratic aims and practices all the way down to regional and local assemblies holds the best promise for arousing the faith of people in their destiny, for galvanising their energies, and for fostering the
To summarise, not only is it apparent from the above quote that Abraham supports a system of democratic process as a possible solution to ensuring individual freedom, the quote also offers further support for the claim of this thesis that he supports internal notions of individual self-law giving and self-realisation. Whilst his approach to realising these conditions differs somewhat from a Kantian condition of public right, preferring instead a direct participatory approach to politics, this does not lessen the implication that his arguments are grounded on similar philosophical foundations: the rights of individuals to be self-mastering. That being said, this is further evidence for the pattern emerging throughout the analysis; theorists and statesmen recognise the value of self-law giving as a foundational principle of humanity, in addition they support the uptake of political conditions that they argue will enable individuals to realise this principle. However, the political models they recommend for achieving this differ (as do the success rates of the models), between cultural, ideological and individual perspectives.

Gyekye argues for similar foundations, but as previously suggested, he does this on the assumption of the value of a different property at the centre of the political condition he supports. He argues that one of the conditions for establishing and maintaining society and community should be a commitment to continued re-evaluation. This, he believes, will provide the space for individuals to maintain their autonomy within a communal setting:

The possibility of re-evaluation means, surely, that the person cannot be absorbed by the communal or cultural apparatus...it means, also, that the communal structure cannot foreclose the meaningfulness and reality of the quality of self-assertiveness which the person can demonstrate in his actions. The development of human, communal culture results from the exercise by persons of this capacity for self-assertion; it is this capacity which makes possible the intelligibility of autonomous individual choice of goals and life plans” (Gyekye, 1992, p.112).

To summarise, as previously suggested, it is the notion of human autonomy and “self-assertiveness” that, for Gyekye, exists a priori. The concept of culture is both established by, and secondary to, individual self-assertion. Thus, he asserts that a political condition is needed that recognises this ordering and allows for the constant re-evaluation of the value
of certain cultural practices in relation to the individual. Therefore, it can be asserted that cultural practices that were detrimental to individuals purposiveness “or individual choice of goals and life plans” would be condemned by Gyekye. Thus it can be argued, similarly to the analysis of Abraham, that there is an underlying assumption grounding Gyekye’s philosophy in the value of individuals being self-mastering, self-law giving agents. Additionally, that he supports the establishment of political and societal conditions that are able to respect these principles. This is not to suggest that said political or societal condition would resemble a Kantian model of public right, but rather, that the justifications for the condition would be similar to those utilised to justify a Kantian model.

5.5- Conclusion:

Throughout the ever growing canon of contemporary African political theory and African philosophy there exists further examples of a similar phenomenon to that which has become a common theme of this chapter: shared philosophical assumptions regarding the value of autonomy to personhood being associated with different recommendations for political and societal models intended to realise these foundations. Due to the analytical boundaries of this thesis, it has focused on only a small selection; however, there is a common thread of support across the canon for the value of such concepts (at least within the debates) as self-assertion, self-mastery, freedom, autonomy, choice and self-government. The roots of this support, it has been argued, arise as a result of the oppressive tendencies of the colonial movement. To clarify, it has been argued that such philosophies would not exist if it were not for the atrocities committed by the colonial movement. However, throughout this chapter it has been suggested that whilst colonialism was an influential factor, it was in fact secondary: that many of these philosophies, whilst influenced by oppression, were grounded on foundational principles that are prior to experience, that in fact, exist a priori. Thus it may have been a consequence of the colonial movement to draw further attention to the desire of individuals to realise these principles once they had been prevented from doing so, but nevertheless, the foundations themselves do not result from colonialism.

The principles of equality and self-mastery in particular, are common across the canon. For example, Wiredu and Gyekye focus on the importance of equality when different cultures enter into dialogue; whilst Abraham and Appiah emphasise the importance of self-assertion and self-mastery in relation to identity formation and the fundamental value of the individual in relation to culture. To summarise, the chapter has discussed the
philosophical writings of a number of key thinkers, and has argued throughout that in their work appeals are made to similar foundational principles regarding what it means to be a person. Similarities have been drawn both between the theorists themselves and with the Kantian framework central to the overall hypothesis of this thesis: that it is a right of all autonomous agents to be self-law giving and the duty of the state to create the necessary conditions to enable this. At no point has it been suggested that these ideas were couched in specifically Kantian terms, but rather that underlying similarities exist in the foundational principles on which they ground their arguments.

The final chapter (Concluding Remarks) draws out similarities that have become apparent across all three chapters, and makes a number of suggestions for the implications of the thesis’s findings.
Concluding Remarks:

This project originally grew out of a concern regarding the universality of Human Rights and the way in which they were inter-culturally formed and implemented. This was then narrowed down to consider issues of cross-cultural interactions, leading to an interest in the question of what it was that all human beings had in common, and whether there were universal rights and duties that were not man-made, but rather, that existed a priori. It was the opinion of this author, in line with the work of Immanuel Kant and contemporary Kantians, that individuals may share, regardless of cultural or ideological affinities, both a right and a duty to be self-law giving, and that this, could be viewed as a foundational condition when entering into just cross-cultural dialogue. It was through problematizing this assumption that this thesis sought to test whether, underpinning the understanding of what it means to be a person or individual, is an assumption in the value of self-law giving (as both an internal and external condition), and that this assumption constitutes foundational principles grounding what it means to be a person. To test this hypothesis, this thesis then questioned the existence of these ideas in a selection of debates responding to issues of oppression and colonialism within the canon of African political theory.

The choice to test this particular question originated in an analysis of the academic literature surrounding issues of personhood, universalism and culture. The analysis culminated in the assessment that this body of literature had failed to fully address the question of foundational principles, and on what basis just cross-cultural interactions could, and do, occur. Through the use of a Kantian framework, this thesis has thus explored on what grounds individuals from different cultural, ideological or political groups recognise one another as persons and what, if anything, they are owed as a result of their shared personhood. The purpose of this was to indicate the potential existence of universally relevant, shared, a priori principles that underpinned the human understanding of personhood and autonomy, and to suggest that these principles form the foundations of, and should be respected when participating in, just cross-cultural dialogue. The concern being, in line with Dallmayr’s justification for comparative political theory, to strive for “a more genuine universalism” (Dallmayr, 2010, p.15), grounded on the understanding of the existence of shared philosophical underpinnings and what these may be. A universalism that does not homogenise difference, but rather that is respectful of it as a function of self-law giving individuals.
The resulting study involved a comparative analysis of the philosophical foundations and presuppositions of a range of African political theory, enquiring whether the philosophy on which the various arguments were built shared a common foundation, focusing on the rights and duties of individuals. Through a focus on a Kantian model, as the lens through which to address this concern, this thesis has been able to explore the concepts of internal and external self-law giving (willkūr), and to question their value and importance to individuals and groups external to the Western Enlightenment tradition. Through carrying out a detailed textual analysis, focusing on a range of African political theory, this thesis is able to claim that within these sources the values of internal and external self-law giving can be located. The results do not imply a belief amongst the authors studied of the value of a Kantian model for establishing political, moral and philosophical beliefs and codes, nor do they represent support for a Kantian model of republican government. Rather, the implication is only that the authors studied in Chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis suggest in their writing, and through the debates they enter into, that the concepts of choice, equality and self-mastery (as defined in Chapter 1 as themes representational of internal and external notions of self-law giving) are central tenants of personhood. That these tenants form the focus of debates that exist between cultural groups: debates surrounding issues of individual or cultural identity formation, or in acts of activism and protest. As such, they may represent foundations which are advocated for as being of value to all individuals universally.

Having demonstrated that these concepts underpin African arguments, it is the claim of this thesis that these principles thus underpin discussions of the rights and duties of personhood, both across and between cultures. As such, it is argued that the narrow case study of African political theory establishes the evidence to potentially view them as universal foundations existing a priori, and to establish a justification for carrying out further research considering the foundational underpinnings of other cultural groups in relation to questions of identity, personhood and self-law giving. In making these concluding remarks, the aim is to summarise the analysis of each chapter, and to indicate textual support that has been highlighted throughout the analysis as supporting this argument. Having summarised these arguments, the conclusion then considers a number of objections that could be made relating to the analysis and assumptions of this thesis, and any critiques and paradoxes arising from the study. This is then followed by an attempt to respond to, and overcome, these concerns and to defend this thesis’s position methodologically, ideologically and normatively. Finally, this thesis will end with a brief
consideration of possible future research, and the areas into which this project could next develop.

6.1- Summary:

Each of the analytical chapters (Chapters 3 to 5) has taken as its theme a selected school of thought, or collection of thinkers, which have been grouped together based on similarities in their views, or the individual’s claimed membership to a particular ideology or system of thought; the method for allocating thinkers to certain groups, and for selecting the thinkers more generally, is discussed both in the Introduction in reference to the overall methodology for selection, and at the start of each individual chapter in relation to selecting (and omitting) thinkers as representational of that particular set of views. The purpose of this brief summary is to further draw out and reiterate the areas in which the analysis of each chapter provided support for the research question of the overall project.

Chapter 3 focused on an in depth analysis of the authors and publications of the Négritude movement, originating in the work of an educated African and Caribbean elite living and working in Paris in the 1930s and 1940s. The movement was recognised to be explicitly both cultural and political, and was thus selected as being of interest to this thesis with its focus on both issues of cultural particularity and universalism, and understanding the role of philosophical foundations in different political conditions. The majority of the work published by the movement was a response to issues of oppression and domination under colonialism. The analysis found that none of the authors supported in their work specifically Kantian ideals, nor did they advocate for a Kantian model of politics. However, throughout the research it became clear that a number of the arguments they made, and debates they presented, centred on similar ideas. In particular, their advocacy for individual choice and purposiveness and the value of treating individuals from different cultural or geographical backgrounds as equally valid. This manifested itself in a number of ways, a selection of which are considered in the following paragraphs.

A particular theme that was found to be central to the movement was a dislike for assimilation politics and the goals of the colonisers to homogenise cultural and linguistic differences. It was observed by Jules-Rosette, that the movement itself “was born out of protest against the colonisation and assimilation produced by ‘Latin’ culture” (Jules-Rosette, 1992, p.17). In particular there was a focus amongst the thinkers on the value of Black identity and its strength as both a revolutionary tool, and to understanding what Senghor referred to as the “Civilisation de l’Universal”. Both of these factors enabled
similarities to be drawn with the themes at the centre of this thesis. Firstly, in the sense that individual identity and purposiveness were clearly valued by the movement, especially in opposition to the models espoused by the colonisers; and secondly, the suggested existence of a Universal Civilisation implies, as evidenced in the chapter, an understanding of humanity couched in terms of universals.

In concluding Chapter 3, focus turned to the work of Frantz Fanon whose views were in places critical of what he viewed as the assimilative nature of Négritude itself. It was his argument that advocacy for a shared Black identity, combined with a political approach that worked with the ex-colonisers, failed to provide the newly independent states with real freedom. Whilst this led to his criticism of Négritude, Chapter 3 argued that the claims he was making were grounded on similar philosophical foundations to those of the movement itself: the right to express ones individual identity without coercion from external parties, and to maintain a sense of purposiveness in doing so. Thus, throughout the chapter it was argued, not that any of the thinkers analysed were themselves Kantian, but that the political and cultural arguments they were making, implicitly centred around, or were grounded in, discussion of issues of self-mastery, choice and equality. That being said, the chapter concluded in support of the hypothesis, that many of the arguments expressed by the Négritude thinkers focused on ideas similar to those of internal and external self-law giving. Thus, the chapter provided support for the overall claim of this thesis: that these principles are foundational to discussions of individuals, identity and personhood, and that these foundations underwrite key presuppositions in these African thinkers.

Chapter 4 extended this analysis to consider the foundations of a second area of historical political discourse emanating from Africa. It concentrated on the topic of African socialism in the post-independence era from 1950 to 1980. Three theorists were selected for analysis, each of whom was associated not only with socialist political ideals but also with responses to colonialism within the wider continent: Julius K. Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah with the Pan-African movement and Samora Machel with independence and anti-oppression movements across Southern Africa. As discussed within the chapter, unlike the philosopher-statesmen of the Négritude movement, discussants of Kwame Nkrumah did recognise in his publications a Kantian influence. Hountondji observed that, particularly within “Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation” (1970) Nkrumah “professes an egalitarian and humanistic ethic strongly marked by the influence of Kant”
(Hountondji, 1983, p.153). That being said, this chapter focused not only on the philosophical thought of the theorists, but also on their ability to deliver on these ideals. Throughout the chapter (particularly in Section 4.3), the existence of explicitly Kantian ideals was questioned in the cases of not just Nkrumah, but all three thinkers. This was not to imply that these thinkers were each explicitly Kantian in their views and ideals. Rather, it was to suggest that their positions shared with both one another, and the Kantian framework set out in Chapter 1, similar philosophical foundations. It was concluded that the ability to locate these principles thus supported the argument that these foundations may exist a priori.

Much of their work focused on the re-building of their state, the political conditions they intended to create, and on what grounds they justified their decisions. Analysis of a combination of the thinkers’ articles, monographs and speeches, alongside the work of secondary discussants, thus provided the necessary material for this thesis to draw similarities between the philosophical underpinnings of their arguments and the concepts of both internal self-law giving, and willkür within a political condition. The chapter focused on the three areas of self-mastery, equality of individuals and freedom of choice versus domination. By dividing the section in such a way it was possible to draw specific similarities rather than relying on more general comments, thus providing in-depth analysis of the philosophical foundations of the thinkers views; an approach that was less appropriate in the previous chapter due to the less explicitly expressed views in the material being studied. It became apparent throughout the chapter that a number of themes were emerging across the thinkers. For example, each statesman placed a strong emphasis on “people’s power that asserts our independence and identity” (Machel, 1974, p.2), and the right of the people to “govern ourselves” (Gbedemah and Nkrumah, cited in Marable, 1987, p.99).

This concept of self-government even manifested in two villagisation projects (in Tanzania and Mozambique), which were initially founded on the premise of implementing policies of self-government. As was discussed at length in the chapter, both of these projects failed to abide by these ideals and eventually became models for forced villagisation of rural communities. However, this thesis considered the expressed views of the thinkers at the outset of the project as well as the critiques as they began to fail. This enabled the thesis to consider the justifications initially given for the villagisation model, and the philosophical ideas underpinning these justifications, as well as the reasons for failure. In doing so, it
became clear that the philosophical premises on which these models were built, “organisations created by the people and governed by those who live and work in them” (Nyerere, 193, p. 67), “the co-operative administers the communal village” (Machel, 1979, p.128), were similar to those expressed by the themes of individual choice and self-mastery: focusing on the purposiveness of the individuals and the communities, and not necessarily on the needs and wants of the states. Whilst these projects may not have been realised in reality, it does allow the chapter to make claims regarding the centrality of notions of self-mastery and purposiveness to these systems of thought, and in doing so to imply the potential universality of these principles as common to all persons. Throughout the analysis it became clear that a disconnect existed between the philosophical norms posited by the politicians, and the political realities they were able to achieve. Whilst this calls in to question the “follow through” of their speeches and publications, it is less problematic for the aims of this thesis. As has been discussed throughout, the purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate that questions of self-law giving, as both internal and external concepts, are foundational principles to discussions of personhood and autonomy and thus can be viewed as fundamental rights when entering in to political organisations. It has not been the aim of this thesis to defend either political figures, or their models, as appropriate for achieving this, but rather to suggest that their views are premised on, or underpinned philosophically by, an understanding of self-law giving as a core facet of individuals. Throughout Chapter 4 it was possible to make these claims and to thus argue that analysis of Nyerere, Machel and Nkrumah supports the hypothesis of this thesis.

The final analytical chapter (Chapter 5) focused on the publications of contemporary professional philosophers. This stood in contrast to the previous two chapters which concentrated on the work of philosopher statesmen and activists. Thus, the inclusion of the three chapters provided diverse cases for study. In particular, many of the contemporary scholars included in the final chapter were highly critical of the approaches of their predecessors and condemned their choice of focus. Thus, by selecting theorists that approached issues of identity, personhood and oppression from divergent stances, this thesis was able to make more substantiated claims regarding the universal nature of the underlying principles; if theorists from a range of backgrounds, arguing for contrasting perspectives, made reference to the same underlying principles then this increases the argument for supporting an understanding of these foundations as being universal. The works of the theorists included all dated from the 1980’s to the present and were published in edited books, monographs or articles. Unlike the previous two chapters, this
Chapter avoided less formal texts such as speeches and letters, focusing instead on purely academic publications.

As suggested, the role of the fifth chapter was to enhance the evidence base for this thesis by considering the views of professional philosophers from a range of ideological backgrounds, including scholars such as Kwame Anthony Appiah whose Cosmopolitanism is openly entrenched within Kantian theory, and those such as Kwasi Wiredu and Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o who approach philosophical enquiry from a different ontological and ideological starting point. Through detailed analysis of a range of publications the chapter was able to show, not that contemporary African philosophy is largely Kantian, but rather that in discussions of personhood, identity, culture and individuality; the principles of choice, self-mastery, domination and equality make up much of the dialogue, and that this dialogue was often premised on a notion of personhood that strongly reflected, Kantian like, a priori presuppositions. Section 5.3 opened with analysis of Polycarp Ikuenobe’s discussion of the relationship between culture and universalism in African political thought, and his view, similar to that of this thesis, that “there are both universalist and particularist elements in African philosophy. In other words, although there are culturally determined philosophical ways of constructing meaning, these ways are not incommensurable” (Ikuenobe, 1997, p.190). Thus, unlike the Incommensurability Thesis, which was questioned in Chapter 2, Ikuenobe suggests that a balance can be achieved between a culturally specific, and a universalist approach.

This assumption is one of the fundamental conclusions also drawn by this thesis: that the existence of universal principles regarding personhood and autonomy does not necessarily imply that the methods for achieving these principles are not guided by cultural, ideological or political influences. This was not only suggested in Chapter 5, but throughout this thesis. For example, this thesis has argued, and provided evidence for, the suggested usage of a Black identity by the Négritude movement for re-establishing what it meant to be a person for a community condemned and belittled by colonialism. In Section 3.6, Frantz Fanon’s views, that real freedom and autonomy can only be achieved through the restorative nature of “cleansing violence” were discussed: “by choosing violence rather than being subjected to it, the colonised subject is able to restore the self...he redefines himself and learns to value his life and the shape of his presence in relation to his body, his speech, to the Other and to the world” (Mbembe, 2012, p.21). Similarly, it was suggested, in Chapter 4, that forms of African socialism, or support for Marxist values, were drawn upon to
achieve a sense of individual self-law giving and autonomy and a political condition able to recognise this. As Nyerere stated when justifying his choice to favour and adopt a socialist model: "socialism is good because it is an organisation of society by all the people of the society, and for their common benefit" (Nyerere, 1968, p.46). In the case of Nyerere’s political views Masolo commented that what was fundamental to understanding man was freedom, but to achieve this freedom a communitarian model of work and community was required: “Man is a fundamentally free being; he can realise his freedom from external conditionings and domination only if he is self-reliant, and this depends on his work which is in turn only effective if realised collectively or in society” (Masolo, 1981, pp.28-290).

Whilst in Chapter 5 Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o’s views on the roles of language and communication in understanding, defining, and oppressing autonomous identity, were discussed. It is his argument that language is at the heart of understanding individual identity, and thus was at the heart of procedures for colonial control. Whilst his focus on language differs greatly from that of Fanon on violence; or Nyerere on collective work, the foundation around which these debates hang are nonetheless similar: that persons have a right to autonomous personhood, to a sense of purposiveness in directing their lives, and that they have this equally. In short, individuals, have a right to be self-law giving on an individual level, and to live in a political condition under which this is possible. It is in providing evidence for these claims, whilst recognising that cultural and ideological differences do not imply that foundational principles cannot exist, that this thesis has been able to contribute to the literature of both comparative political theory and cultural studies, and advance the knowledge in these areas.

6.2- Objections and Responses:

As with all projects, a number of tensions can be found within the work and it is at this stage that these will be addressed. A number of common concerns occur with projects such as this one that take for their inspiration a system of thought strongly entrenched in a Western tradition and then utilise this as a lens for analysing traditions external to the individual experience of the author: in particular, the argument that this constitutes an act of violence or ethnocentric oppression. This thesis was born out of a concern for the value and relevance of the categories of internal self-law giving and willkür, expressed through themes of self-mastery, equality and freedom of choice or purposiveness. That being said, it is possible to critique the project as being somewhat paradoxical, in that it takes as its source material publications (sometimes translated) from a different cultural, political and experiential background and formulates arguments based on interpretive textual analysis.
Furthermore, this thesis has explicitly selected for analysis sources that, in certain cases, are explicitly aligned with non-Kantian traditions. For example, Samora Machel (discussed in Chapter 4) has been widely recognised as grounding his political thought in Marxist Leninist values. Thus, the question is raised as to whether the process of comparative analysis being undertaken by this project is, in fact, a process of stretching the ideas contained within the texts to fit the required outputs. The following discussion undertakes the procedure of responding to both of these concerns: firstly the anxieties surrounding the concerns of ethnocentrism, and secondly the critique of stretching.

The worry of ethnocentrism is one that is often levied at projects that analyse the thought systems of cultures the author is not a member of. In particular, an issue that has been historically problematic in the analysis of African political thought is the assumption that the ideas presented by individuals are representative of an entire cultural or linguistic group, rather than simply the views of the individual sharing them. This is a concern with schools of thought such as Négritude, where the authors themselves make claims to be representative of larger groups. By way of overcoming this issue it has been made clear throughout this thesis that the views discussed are being treated as representing the authors’ views alone, and not the people living within the political, cultural or linguistic groups discussed. Furthermore, this thesis has avoided using source material specifically produced to represent the views of others. As discussed both in the Introduction, and again in Chapter 5, a conscious decision was made to exclude texts focusing on the interpretation of traditional oral philosophies by third parties. Thus, the work of missionaries such as The Reverend Placide Tempels, as well as contemporary African scholars such as Gyekye and Wiredu’s discussion of Akan thought, have been excluded from the textual analysis. Tempel’s “Bantu Philosophy” was briefly discussed in Chapter 5. However, this was intended to provide the setting for the critiques made by contemporary African scholars of ethnosophical texts and not for the purpose of detailed textual analysis of his claims. This element was incorporated within the methodology as it was felt that including these texts would build in a layer of bias to the project, as it is unclear which elements of their discourse are directly taken from discussion and study of the oral traditions, and which elements are influenced by either their own interpretation, or challenges arising from translation.

It must also be made clear that the process of textual analysis relies on certain levels of interpretation on the part of the analyst regardless of their grounding in a particular
cultural, ideological or geographical experience, and all scholars face these problems when assessing the work of other cultures. However, in answer to this concern, this piece of work has intended to be as reflective as possible and every effort has been made to overcome these issues in the ways detailed below. It is important to recognise that this is an issue, and reflecting on these concerns has thus been a fundamental element of the analysis. Whilst it is impossible to completely avoid this, it was consciously reflected upon throughout the analysis and a number of methods put in place to avoid it. Firstly, a wide range of sources, both primary and secondary, were included to verify and triangulate certain ideas in different source material. Secondly, the project utilised both formal, and informal, texts to substantiate certain assumptions. This included analysis of formal scholarly texts as well as the inclusion of letters, speeches and interviews to authenticate certain claims. In future projects it would be valuable to research further non-scholarly texts to include, for example, analysis of diaries, meeting notes and a larger selection of letters and interviews. Additionally, it would be of interest to carry out interviews with the scholars studied in Chapter 5 to discuss, in greater detail, their explicit views on the philosophical foundations underpinning their work.

A factor that has been central to the process of reflectivity has been to approach the study of texts from other cultures in the spirit of this thesis itself: on the assumption that this is an act of cross-cultural dialogue and thus the conditions for achieving this should respect the right of these theorists as self-law giving individuals. In reality, this translated into a methodology inspired by Kwame Gyekye’s work on ethnocentrism first discussed in Chapter 2. The approach views the particularities of the personal culture of the author “as one- and only one- form of life among others” (Gyekye, 2004, p.62), and is thus able to approach work from other cultures on a similar premise. This is not to suggest that all cultures, when studied in detail, will present equally valuable models, but rather that when approaching the work of different cultures this should be done, as much as possible, from a position that does not favour your own perspective and is interested to take lessons from other cultural perspectives. By making this a central premise of this thesis’s research process, it was possible to reflect on the most suitable framework for recognising and attempting to overcome ethnocentric tendencies.

In answer to the second concern, the stretching of ideas that have been classically associated with one ideological position to be understood through the analytical lens of another, the following points are raised. As discussed throughout, the central aim of this
research was not to support the existence of either political or ethical Kantian models as being universal. Rather, it was to imply that certain fundamental principles present within the Kantian framework could also be located in the work of different cultural, political or moral perspectives. Hence, it is possible to suggest that these foundational principles may, in fact, be a priori, but, at the very least, they can be located in the works analysed by this thesis. Therefore, the purpose of this research was not to suggest that views associated with, for example, Marxist or Leninist perspectives were in fact Kantian, but rather to suggest that both positions may share similar philosophical foundations and presuppositions when considering issues of autonomy; the argument extending to suggest that these philosophical underpinnings may be common to all human understanding prior to political or cultural influence. As Freedden and Vincent suggest in their 2013 discussion of comparative political theory, when utilising a comparative approach it is vital to avoid “papering over differences in interpretation in the hope of establishing firm commonalities in another... (instead we should) encourage and preserve the form of ideo-diversity on our planet” (Freedden & Vincent, 2013, p.7). In answer to this concern, this thesis argues not for a Kantian understanding of politics, but for culturally diverse understandings underpinned by the same philosophical foundations. Thus, this thesis does not aim to silence difference, but rather, it advocates for a set of conditions on which cultures can enter into discourse fairly and openly. It suggests that one method for achieving this is to locate, and then respect, the existence of universal foundations that enable different cultural groups to recognise in one another shared traits of personhood. Thus, it is possible to argue that rather than being an act of stretching, the research that has been carried out is simply an act of comparison: questioning on what grounds certain claims are made, whether similarities exist, and thus whether these foundations can be used to establish the basis for just and open dialogue between groups.

Having described the concerns that affect scholarship, focusing on the work of other cultures, and by way of concluding this section, discussion now turns to the value of undertaking comparative political theory at all. As discussed in the Introduction, comparative political theory as a formalised methodology is a relatively recent phenomenon, gaining popularity “in the late 1990’s and early 2000s” (Freedden & Vincent, 2013, p.4). However, scholarly interest in other cultural groups, and the act of comparative analysis, has existed throughout human history. There is a long tradition of investigating the similarities and differences that exist between groups of people and debating the most suitable methods for encouraging discourse between these groups. This thesis contributes
to the historical debate in this area by offering one solution to understanding the grounding for cross-cultural dialogue. This is not to suggest that this is the only solution, but rather, that this piece of work is one further intervention into the debate surrounding comparative political scholarship. Based on the argument that, “comparison offers a basis of assessment and evaluation, and political theory rightly is a tool for promoting or testing ideas through which different outcomes may be attained” (Freeden & Vincent, 2013, p.7), it is argued that this thesis finds its utility in offering a favourable solution to the debate surrounding the foundations of just cross-cultural dialogue, based on the evidence gleaned from the textual analysis.

6.3- Future Works and New Directions:

Whilst it has been argued throughout this concluding chapter that this thesis has been successful in providing evidence for its claims, and for illustrating the potential universality of the principles of self-law giving and willkür as being central to the human condition (at least as it relates to key African philosophy), it has also raised further questions of interest to be explored in future projects. Within the boundaries of this thesis, it has only been possible to consider a small selection of African political thought systems, and to consider them in depth, in order to question the philosophical foundations on which they were premised. That being said, it is not possible at this stage, to claim the actual universality of these principles, but rather to state that evidence exists, as presented by this project, that these principles can be located in, not only work emanating from the Western Enlightenment tradition, but also amongst African scholars, political figures and activists from a wide range of political, cultural and ideological backgrounds, who focus in their work on Négritude, African socialism and contemporary philosophical discourse. Therefore, scope exists to propel this project into a number of new directions, both utilising the same methodological model and through a range of different approaches.

As suggested in the previous section, a natural extension of the project as it stands would be to acquire a wider range of informal documents such as letters, diaries and notes to offer further verification for the claims being made regarding the theorists covered within this analysis. This would not only provide further clarification for understanding a thinker’s understanding of the individual, but also in answering the questions surrounding the disconnect between individual belief and political practice. To clarify, throughout this thesis it has become apparent, and widely discussed, that the position advocated for by theorists, in both their publications and their speeches, were often different to those achieved by
those individuals that were also political figureheads. This issue was a particular focus of both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4; with Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah and Machel making claims regarding the value of individual self-law giving, and the necessity to recognise this within political conditions. However, the reality of the political conditions they presided over then failed to recognise the value of individuals and, in fact, in some cases, led to forms of domination and oppression as understood in the Kantian sense of limiting purposiveness or choice. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, there is a strong tradition in Western political thought to study the ideas of thinkers such as Marcus Aurelius, despite the fact that they ruled differently to them. Thus, it is argued in that chapter, that the difference between a theorist’s ideas, and their ruling approaches, are not a reason to avoid studying the normative claims of philosopher states people. Nonetheless, further investigation into the justifications for the differences between their theories and their rule would make for an interesting extension to the project.

In addition to extending the study in relation to the theorists and movements currently studied in this project, claims of universality could be better supported through the extension of the study to a wider range of cultural perspectives: initially from within the African continent, and in time, considering a range of other thought systems based on both historical and contemporary sources. Whilst this approach could continue to contribute to the comparative political theory literature, the space also exists to expand the project into a qualitative study of remote groups living separately to Western influence. Whilst this would be an ambitious extension to the project, it would enable greater claims to be made about the a priori nature of these principles.

Finally, the research of this thesis also establishes two further potential areas for investigation. Firstly, it raises questions surrounding identity and citizenship; in particular the role of racial, national and even continental identities, in establishing individual personhood and overcoming homogenisation and domination. Thus, consideration of this relationship will be a further area of interest for future study. Likewise, investigation into the practical utility of recognising the value of foundational principles, and the creation of a framework for dialogue based on this premise, will be a long-term ambition for future areas of work.

6.4- Closing Remarks:

At the heart of this project has been a focus on understanding the age old question of political theory: is there a universal understanding of what it means to be an individual
person; to raise the question of whether foundational principles exist, shared by us all, from which meaningful and just cross-cultural dialogue can take place to establish international principles of conduct, interactions and law. As a result, this study has presented one possible intervention into the debate concerning the homogenising nature of universalism, and the often imperialist, justifications underlying it in cases of international principle formation and application. In this sense, parallels can be drawn between the work of this thesis and a form of moral Cosmopolitanism which views the philosophical underpinnings of personhood to be premised on an understanding of individuals as having equal and intrinsic moral worth. However, what distinguishes this project from Cosmopolitan values, is an understanding of cultures that recognises and accepts the existence of difference and boundaries, and rather than viewing the differences between groups as irrelevant, this project supports a system premised on motivating and providing the foundations for cross-cultural dialogue that is able to recognise both a weak sense of universalism (set out in Chapter 1), and the existence of cultural difference, within it.

Throughout this thesis it has been suggested that these principles (of self-mastery, equality and freedom of choice or purposiveness) do indeed exist within the selected source material, and that it is possible to recommend further research to establish the universal relevance of the concepts of willkür and self-law giving. Through the establishment of themes representing these concepts, this thesis has been able to carry out detailed textual analysis which supports the hypothesis that foundational to debates of autonomy, identity and personhood are claims for the value of self-mastery, choice, equality and freedom from domination. This thesis makes these claims, not by ignoring the significant impact of culture on individuals, but rather by suggesting that cultural and political factors are instrumental to individuals achieving these foundations. To reiterate, individuals and communities may rely on the uptake of vastly different political ideologies and cultural approaches, and in the majority of cases studied by this thesis it has become clear that they do; but underpinning each of these is a human assumption that all reasoned individuals, share both an a priori right and duty to be self-law giving and should be able to achieve this within a rightful condition. The existence of these principles places a requirement on the human community to think creatively about our political situations and to enter into cross-cultural dialogue based on just principles: respect for all individuals (and their freely associated groups) as having a right and duty to be self-law giving, and to live within a political condition that is respectful of this right.
This thesis contributes to the ever growing literature surrounding the topic of comparative political theory. It supports a model of weak universalism premised on the understanding of foundational principles that can be approached and responded to in culturally specific ways: whilst also respecting individual autonomy and personhood. In conclusion, this thesis has been able to show that an argument can be made for the necessity for open, honest and fair cross-cultural dialogue that is justified by, and respectful of, the principles of internal and external self-law giving, as existing at the centre of political discourse in both the Kantian model and the selection of African political theory examined by this project. It has therefore established an evidence base for the claim that the principles of internal self-law giving and external willkür can be located within the selection of African political theorists studied and, may, in fact, exist a priori. On this basis, this thesis recommends that these principles should be recognised and respected as foundations of, and applied to, just and fair cross-cultural dialogue.
Bibliography:


