A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE OPPOSITION OF THE
RIFI CONFEDERATION LED BY MUHAMMAD BIN 'ABD AL-KARIM
AL-KHATTABI TO SPANISH COLONIAL EXPANSION IN NORTHERN MOROCCO
1920-1925, AND ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Volume II

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Leeds

Department of Semitic Studies

November, 1979
Chapter IX

THE ORGANISATION OF THE RİFİ STATE

The text of the bay'ā of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm read as follows:

"Praise be to God alone. May God's blessing be upon our Lord Muḥammad, his family and companions. Praise be to God who has set up the Caliphate to unite the religion and the world, who has raised its power above all other, so that it is of the highest rank, who has raised its sun above all things, illuminating all things with its light. He has made a friendship between the hearts of his servants, between those who are close to each other and those separated by a great distance. He has made the Caliphate a rampart against [the spilling of] blood, [protecting men's] fortunes and [safeguarding] against the accidents of fate. With the Caliphate He has bound the hands of tyrants, so that they may not achieve that evil which they intend. Through the Caliphate He has brought about morality and righteousness. Laws and limits and principles have been established. He has raised the minaret of the Caliphate as a banner by which [men] may be guided, calling them to the truth. In its long shadow both the powerful and the weak, the lowly and the high-born, seek refuge.

Praise be to Him who decides, and guides mankind. Man does not ask [for sustenance] in vain. But He has ordered [man] to do some things and has forbidden him others. He has warned mankind against following his desires and He has set upon him the performance of religious duties and good works. He is the most wise of the wise.

If it were not for some men who fought others, so that the world was degraded . . . [text unclear]. But God is possessed of mercy towards the inhabitants of the world, and through his mercy, kings (al-mulūk) have been set up, and He has shown roads along which men may travel and a conduct which they must follow. Otherwise man would sink into anarchy, some would devour others and the people of order would fall into factionalism and anarchy. If it were not for the Caliphate the roads would not be safe for us, the strong would prey upon the weak. . . . [illegible]
Praise be to God for him who was sent as a sign of God's complete mercy, the origin and foundation of all things, the height and greatest extent of perfection, the most holy of the saints, the leader of the pure, and for the family of him who has universal glory and the greatest power [i.e., the Prophet] and his Righteous Companions and the rightly-guided leaders, who set up the principles of the faith and arranged its foundations for those who would build upon it. They told what he [i.e., Muhammad] had done basing [the hadiths] on his authority, God's mercy and peace be upon him. He said: 'God has conferred this distinction upon a Qurashi, and God has settled on him, and God has bestowed his power on the man he wishes from amongst us.'

[The Prophet] said: 'A man who dies and has not made a bay'aa, has died in ignorance.'

According to the Sahih of Muslim he said, God's mercy and peace be upon him:

'He who wishes to break up the nature of this community, when it is one, cut off his head with a sword, whoever he may be.'

According to the Sahih of Muslim, he said, God's mercy and peace be upon him:

'If a man comes to you, when you are all agreed on one man [as amir] and he tries to break up your community, kill him.'

In the Sahih of al-Bukhari it is said, on the authority of Ibn 'Abbas—may God be pleased with him—that the Prophet of God, God's mercy and peace be upon him, said:

'If a man dislikes anything that his amir does, let him bear it in patience, for he who removes himself from the authority [of the Sultan] by even an inch will die the death of an ignorant man.'

Also in [the Sahih of al-Bukhari] it is reported on the authority of Abu Hurayra, may God be pleased with him, that the Prophet of God, God's mercy and peace be upon him, said: 'He who obeys me, obeys God, and he who disobeys me, disobeys God, and he who obeys my amir, obeys me, and he who disobeys my amir, disobeys me.'

The Commander of the Faithful, 'Umar bin al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, said to Ibn 'Uqba: 'Perhaps after today you will see [lit., meet] me no more. You must be strong in faith in God, may He be exalted, and listen to and obey the amir, be he a slave or an Abyssinian.'

The [first] community [of Islam] swore together that a single imam should be appointed over the Muslims, for it is one of the precepts of suitability in the eyes of God...[illegible] just as the organisation of the Caliphate is an obligation pointed out by the texts of the hadiths and the verses [of the Qur'an].
The poet said: 'It is not good that the people should live in anarchy with no authority over them, and there is no authority if the ignorant among them have control.'

Thus the tribes of the Rif and the tribes of the Jibāla, before the [events of the past] two years, lived in [a state of] extreme ferocity and disgrace, in great ignorance and tyranny and obduracy, and lived far apart from the rules of law (sharī'a), and crime grew among the believers to such an extent that resistance to him who held authority in the country became general, and they continued [to live] in factionalism, to kill and to rob people's goods. At the same time they had [to face] what the enemy [i.e., the Spanish] brought in the way of sedition and terror so that they had no place of refuge or even of habitation, except what they could bring about through great cooperation. And, when all this exhausted them and they knew no remedy, they sought someone who would take over their leadership, [a man] commissioned by them, and they came together to consider, and they entrusted their business, in its importance, both in heaven and on earth, to Him who is most praiseworthy in His deeds in all the length and breadth of the earth. A man responded to their wishes and took over their affairs and he ordered them first of all to follow the law (sharī'a) of the Prophet through which every expectation is achieved, after he had made them swear on the Holy Book (al-maṣḥaf) to keep their covenants and promises. He set up over them . . . . . . . [illegible] and then he organised them and he taught them the methods of war and defence of the fatherland (waṭan) and the way to attack the servants of the cross and [worshippers] of idols [i.e., the Christian Spanish]. They seized the opportunity of attacking their enemy at once. At once they came on him, victorious, caring nothing for the strange [methods?—illegible] which the Spaniards brought against them, neither were they stopped by their unfamiliar fortifications. And they went at once and became united . . . . Praise be to Him who has destroyed them [i.e., the Spanish] for in His power. he has every matter always [text very unclear here]. By following this their amīr, may God help him, they found happiness and by following his excellent orders they started [on the road] towards complete victory, and they achieved their ultimate [ends] in organising their country. And this is known both far and near, and no human being would deny it. The man who scorces [this achievement] is scorcing the light of day: for how could anything [be said to] be right in men's minds if the light of day is in need of proof?

Then, when they had gained security, both for themselves and their possessions, they multiplied and progressed, [they rejoiced] in great peace and success and well-being in accordance with their dearest wishes, and so the disruption caused by murder and robbery and the other kinds of misfortune to which they had
been accustomed in the past dwindled and faded. All the fires of revolt were put out and God dispelled their worries and spread out his mercy and removed their griefs, and their hearts became resolute where they had been miserable, and their faces smiling where they had been melancholy. And the evil and violence that came between them vanished and the standards of peace and well-being [came close]. God directed the armies of the Muslims to pleasing actions and inspired them to what is for the good of the world, and the faith and the soul, and the citizens.

Opinions concurred and the community joined together to proclaim him who has risen on the horizon of happiness whose full moon has appeared and risen in the heaven of knowledge. The man [in whose hands] the reins of the Imamate are joined, and the... to him have come the benefits of the Imamate [text unclear]. He is a man to whom the Caliphate came dragging its robe behind it, and he took it without wasting time. [The Caliphate] was appropriate only for him, and he was appropriate only for it. [He is a man] whom the hearts of all creatures were created to love, who has found a welcome throughout Islam because of his glory and great importance, the commander of the fighters for the faith. He is the man who puts his trust in God, the one singled out [for this task]. Our Lord Mūhammad, son of our learned and distinguished Lord ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī al-Waryāghlī al-Rifī. They have proclaimed him, may God fortify him and make him victorious, in accordance with the Qur'ān of God and the sunna of His Prophet to install justice which is the aim of all desires. A Proclamation (bay'ā), a duty in which [all men's] hearts and tongues are bound, towards which all men's feet and heads strive, obediently and humbly, [promising] never to set aside their obedience towards him and never to deviate from the road of the community, by which we pledge allegiance to our Lord the Prophet of God, God's mercy and peace be upon him, and the rightly-guided caliphs after him and the rightly-guided imāms. They will keep their promise to hear and obey his commands. Their eyes have seen it, and they have borne witness to it through the purity both of their secret desires and their public actions, and they have given their hands [as a seal to the promises] upon it, and they have signed their names to it, owing it [i.e., the Caliphate] their allegiance both in private and in public, in what is encouraging and what is hateful, in what is easy and what is difficult. They have borne witness to themselves aware of their secret thoughts and cognisant of all that is hidden, saying:

We have given you our bay'ā, and we have invested you with authority so that you may direct us with justice and kindness and in sincerity and that you should judge between us in truth just as God, may He be exalted, said to His Prophet: [illegible]

'Indeed we have created a Caliphate on earth, so
judge between men with justice.

He also said, may He be exalted, and His words are true: 'He who carries out what God has promised, him we shall reward greatly.'

He also said, may He be exalted: 'Be not used as an advocate by those who betray their trust.'

On this are agreed those who [bind] and loose, those who can speak on matters great and small, those who are characterised by knowledge and judgement, those who are allowed to reject and contract [lit. sign]. There was no argument between them [when they met] before any mosque, not from scribe nor legal expert [lit. possessors of the fatwa] who are asked and who reply, neither from those who persevere in their views--be they right or wrong--nor among those who are known for [their] religion and probity, no horsemen of war nor fighter, nor from men of responsibility in [affairs] or government, nor the a'yan, the noble sharifs, nor the important faqıths, nor from those of lesser power and position.

Those who were present witnessed this themselves in obedience. God be exalted, they did their duty by the law. God has made [the Caliphate] a mercy for creation, and through it He has set up on the earth justice and truth. He helps the man who meets [the Caliphate] with a welcome, with His aid and assistance, and with the success [He grants] and His guidance. Man is given life through the sunna, our Lord and Master, the Prophet, God's mercy, peace, glory and kindness be upon him.

Let our country be happy since its fetters have been cut away, let it [be given to] the man who undertakes its protection, who spares its blood, who suppresses its enemies, who defends it from destruction, makes the law triumphant, and who undertakes to build it.

May God make him triumphant, make him victorious. May he destroy heresies and errors through [this man], and the party of oppression and unbelief and depravity. May he make the Caliphate stay in this man's family until the day of resurrection.

Indeed, Oh our master, you are able to do this. You are indeed the Lord, the one who gives victory.

There is no power, no strength, except through God the high, the great. May the blessing and complete peace of God be on our Lord Muḥammad, his family and companions.

Finally we call out to praise God, Lord of the worlds.

On the day of the full moon 14 Jumāda II 1341.
With these words, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm was formally invested as the Rīfī leader. This was his bay'a. This document is, of course, of vital importance in understanding the nature of the Rīfī state, laying down as it does the political principles of the state, the need to maintain the sharī'a, and to defeat the Spanish, and giving the reasons why bin 'Abd al-Karīm was to be considered the most likely acceptable man to lead the Rīf, and above all, throwing light on the nature of his leadership. Thus the bay'a of 2 February 1923 was the legitimisation of a new, fully independent state in the Rīf, but one which, unlike traditional Berber chiefdoms, was based on an entirely new conception of the rôle of Islam in society, on the need for modern technique allied with religious reform.

The Bay'a

The bay'a of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm begins with direct references to the value of the institution, the Caliphate. It praises the Caliphate's advantages, promoting unity, order, morality, law, and its opposition to tyranny, and to factionalism. It emphasises the religious necessity of the Caliphate, the amīr, whoever he might be (and this of course is vitally important in the context of
of the Rif, since bin ‘Abd al-Karîm’s claims to descent from ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb were, to say the least, dubious). Thus the bay’a is talking about the necessity for a Caliphate.

Then the bay’a moves on to describe the anarchy, violence and disruption of Rifî and Jibali society which pertained before a man—who is not yet named—came to reorganise society and bring about order, and lead them to victory against the Christians. Now all was peaceful, and the "reins of the Imamate" were joined in this man’s hands. The Caliphate had come to him "dragging its long robe behind it." Then the man is named as "Muḥammad . . . b. ‘Abd al-Karîm al-Khaṭṭābî al-Waryaghî al-Rifî". So this man, according to his bay’a was a Caliph, God’s "shadow on earth", and he had been proclaimed, not because of his family connections, or his birth, but because of what he had already done to organise the Rif according to the shari’a and the necessities of war. It was, so to speak, a bay’a ex post facto, and in this very similar to those traditionally given to Moroccan Sultans in recognition of the authority that they already held. Like the Sultan’s bay’as, the final part of this one is directed at what bin ‘Abd al-Karîm was expected to do:

"We have given you our bay’a and we have invested you with authority so that you may direct us with justice and kindness . . .”

He is expected to protect his country, defeat its enemies, make the shari’a triumphant, and destroy heretical doctrines (bidâ’a). These were similar to the expectations placed in

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1 See above, p. 147.

2 MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 180, Proclamation of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karîm, dated 14 Jumâda II 1341/2 Feb. 1923X.
Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ in his bay'a from the 'ulamā' of Fez—the expulsion of the Christians, the reinforcement of Islamic practices, the establishment of a just rule of law.¹ The difference, of course, was that b. 'Abd al-Karīm already had carried out these aims, in part at least, so the bay'a was far more a confirmation of his authority than that given to 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ, which was more in the way of being a plan for his future government.

This bay'a appears, therefore, to be a document which confirms the Caliphate upon bin 'Abd al-Karīm, giving him wide personal power. However, this contradicts what a number of other sources say were his intentions. Nationalist writers like 'Allāl al-Fāssī, for instance, denied that bin 'Abd al-Karīm proposed himself as a Sultan. Writing from a Royalist-Moroccan-nationalist standpoint, he stated:

"It is fortunate that this movement for liberation, like its predecessor [i.e., that surrounding Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ] had a democratic orientation that aimed at improving the lot of the people, given the time in which it was happening, and at protecting the people's existence, and possessions. The foundation of the Republic [of the Rif] did not mark a deviation from a monarchist position in the thoughts of the leaders of the Rif, but in reality they were unable so speak in the name of the King of Morocco, whom force of circumstance had placed in the French zone. But they did not wish to fall into the error of al-Ḥiba and his father Mā' al-'Ainīn, who announced themselves to be kings when in the past they had been loyal to the throne [of Morocco] and had defended it. For this reason they found a compromise solution by setting up a temporary regime in which an administration could be organised and the people trained to govern themselves, and when the liberation of the rest of the country had been achieved, the liberated territory would be returned to the King."²

David Hart has agreed with this view, and has stated that bin 'Abd al-Karīm styled himself amīr al-mu'mīnīn and that "in

¹ See above, p. 34, and Laroui, Origines, p. 396.
² Al-Fāssī, op. cit., p. 121.
no way did 'Abd al-Krim think of himself as Sultan: there was only one Sultan in Morocco, Mulay Yussif . . . even though he may have been regarded as a tool in the hands of the French."¹

There is indeed, primary evidence that bin ‘Abd al-Karîm, at least formally, rejected the role of Sultan. The proclamation of bin ‘Abd al-Karîm--be it as amîr, President, Sultan, or whatever--was not a single event but a series of proclamations as different groups and tribes accepted his authority. The first proclamation of all had been in January 1923,² and the bay‘a reproduced at the beginning of this chapter is only a later proclamation of another group, whose members were relatively obscure people from the eastern Rif.

The original bay‘a of 18 January is not, however, preserved. But an account of the ceremony is given by Skîraj, who entitles it thus: "A description of the swearing of the bay‘a of the Amîr Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karîm, the agreement of the Muslims upon him, and the complete imposition of his command."³ (Certainly, the phrase "complete imposition of his command" is an accurate description of the tenor of the 2 February bay‘a.)

Present at this initial ceremony, held in the house of Sharrad b. ‘Amar al-Buqquî : (according to later Spanish reports),⁴ on Jabal Sijjum near Ajîdîr, were some of the important leaders of the Rif: the Faqîh ‘Alî Bû Laḥya, and the Faqîh Muḥammad al-Shargî, both from the Banû Tûzin

¹ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 377.
² See above, pp. 503-504.
³ Skîraj, op. cit., p. 80.
⁴ Cab. Reb. 1913-1927, pp. 32-34.
and later the executors of the sharī'a-isation policy of the government, 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥānd of the Banū Bū Ayyāsh clan of the Banū Waryaghal, and the Minister for War, and Aḥmad Bū Drā'ī of the Banū Yūsif clan of the Banū Waryaghal, 'Abd al-Salām's successor as Minister of War. Also present, since this was a local bāy'a for the Banū Waryaghal, were Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq, the powerful leader of the Banū Ḥadhīfa (once again b. Ṣadīq was cooperating with bin 'Abd al-Karīm) and representatives of the Imrabadhan and Aīth 'Abdallāh, along with men from other Rīfī tribes. From the Buqquya came 'Allūsh b. Ḥaddū, "Angitta" of the Izamuran clan1—another man whose loyalty to bin 'Abd al-Karīm had not been total in the past, for he was one of the group who had gone to visit Sīdī ʿAmīdu of Snāda in April 1921 to ask him to take over the leadership of the Rīf against the Spanish.2 From the Bānū Bū Frāḥ came al-Ḥājj Muḥammad b. Misaʿūd Shaʿrā of the Awlād Saʿīd clan,3 whose anti-Spanish credentials were unimpeachable. He was a rich man, one of the leaders of his tribe4 whom the Spanish in 1917 had described as an "old fanatic",5 and a man whom bin 'Abd al-Karīm had already appointed as qāʿid of his tribe.6 The fact that Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq was there shows the pressure that was put on local leaders by the supporters of bin 'Abd al-Karīm to go

1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 80.
2 See above, p. 295.
3 Skīraj, loc. cit.
4 SHM Melilla Leg 27, Información de Alhucemas, carpeta --archivo relativo a la oficina Peñón de Vélez, Relación de los moros más notables, en los poblados y kabilas que se expresan (Recopilación de datos de 1913 a 1921)--Oct. 1925.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Memorias, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de julio de 1917.
6 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 66.
along with them, for bin Ṣadiq was most unreliable in his loyalty himself.

The really significant thing, however, is who was not there. Si Maḥammad was in Paris, Azarqān and Si 'Abd al-Salām al-Khaṭṭābī were absent. Above all, bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself was absent.¹ To all appearances, at least, by accepting the bay'a he was only responding to the wishes of his people.

When he did accept, on 21 February 1923, his speech of agreement, according to Skīraj, made precisely this point. He told those present that his Amirate would not be like government by a king, and he would not allow them to treat him as one, for he was their collective voice.² The aim was to defeat the Spanish: "I served with them and I discovered that misfortune had come down on our land from above when they came into it. . . . Let us dedicate ourselves to rescuing ourselves, our people and our land."³ Thus, the Spanish were the main enemy but he was also concerned about any possible threat from the French:

"You must picture yourselves as a prey between the claws of a ferocious beast which is always ready to ravish you. So that I fear that if God gives us victory over it, there is another nation. . . . that will not allow us to enjoy our lands in peace and silence. For unbelief is one nation and they will inevitably interfere in our affairs."⁴

However, he felt that the French would not intervene at the moment, and he stressed his desire for peace. He also emphasised that the bay'a did not impinge on the sovereignty of

¹ Ibid., p. 80.
² Ibid., p. 81.
³ Ibid., pp. 81-82.
⁴ Ibid., p. 82.
Mrildy Yusif. 1 The real need was to fight the Spanish: "There is no doubt that jihād is a duty for us, to attack the enemy that [has come] upon us in our land. We shall defend our religion and our land." 2 This reference to jihād once again contradicts bin 'Abd al-Karīm's later, widely-quoted, claims to have laid aside jihād as a medieval practice no longer relevant to the modern world. 3

The tone of this declaration was not new in the history of the Maghreb. It is most instructive to compare this speech with that of the Algerian Amir 'Abd al-Qādir, after his acceptance of his bay'a in November 1832. He said:

"I accept this position of amir with reluctance, hoping it will be a vehicle for uniting the Muslims, for preventing strife and dissension among them, for assuring the safety of the roads, for terminating activities which are contrary to the pure Shari'a, for protecting the country from the enemy [i.e., the French], and for establishing law and justice for the powerful and feeble alike. . . . Know that my utmost goal is the unification of the Islamic community and the execution of Islamic practices . . . ." 4

In another proclamation at the same time, 'Abd al-Qādir had stressed the other role of the Caliphate, as the leader of jihād. 5

It is clear that the language of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's speech and of his bay'a are remarkably similar to that of 'Abd al-Qādir. In other words, the aspirations expressed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm and those of his bay'a were not particularly new or original.

The comparison between 'Abd al-Qādir and 'Abd al-Karīm throws a new light on what was meant in the latter's

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 83.
4 Danziger, op. cit., p. 72.
5 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
bay'a by the references to Caliphate. As Danziger has pointed out, the claim to be amir al-mu'minîn was in essence a claim to sovereignty. The use of the word Caliph had a similar purpose and implied here not the leadership of all Muslims but the sovereign right to put into effect the rôle of the Caliphate in creating a state independent of the control of unbelievers, in which the sharî'a was supreme. It had the effect of laying the basis for a "local Caliphate" when the larger Moroccan Caliphate had fallen into the control of the French. Thus the bay'a gave bin 'Abd al-Karîm supreme power, both secular and religious in the Rif.

"Democracy" versus "Dictatorship"

According to 'Allâl al-Fasl, the basis of the new Rifî state was democratic. Democratic structures had been organised following the victories of 1921 with a National Assembly (which he refers to as al-jam'îa al-waṭaniyya), composed of representatives of the tribes, shaykhs and military commanders, which drew up a constitution "based on popular sovereignty", but which did not "make a distinction between legal and executive authority as is the constitutional practice in democratic states," for both these authorities were invested in Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karîm himself, who alone was responsible to the National Assembly, while the members of his government were responsible to him: "This was in accordance with the traditions of the country which make the king personally responsible to the people," (a remark which seems to imply that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was;

1 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
2 Al-Fasl, Ḥarakât, pp. 121-122.
3 Ibid., p. 122.
after all, a king). This description of the government of the Rif is to say the least, both inaccurate and tendentious. Al-Fasi was, after all, interested to present the Rif government as part of the Salafiya-inspired "democratic" nationalist movement which he himself represented. But furthermore, the details are wrong. According to him, there were only four ministers: an assistant to the President, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of trade; "other government positions—such as Minister of the Interior and Minister of War—were left by the constitution in the hands of the President of the Republic." This, he asserts, was the form of government of the "Republic of the Rif".

In fact other government posts did exist—in profusion—and in particular the Ministries of the Interior and War were placed in other hands than those of bin 'Abd al-Karim. The "Ministry of Trade" does not appear in any other account.

Certainly there was a Parliament of sorts but it was called the majlis al-'umma (The Assembly of the People), not al-jam'ia al-wataniya. Hart describes this Assembly—which he refers to as "barlamân" (an Arabisation, or Berberisation, of "parliament")—as "little more than a full-scale tribal agrav of the Aith Arbalin [i.e., â'yân] under a new name."²

It was this majlis al-'umma which, after bin 'Abd al-Karim's acceptance of the bay'a on 21 January 1923, set about giving the proclamation an effective form. In its name

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¹ Ibid.
a number of Ministers were appointed. The head of the majlis, Shaykh Yazīd b. al-Ḥājj Ḫammū, was made Minister of the Interior. Yazīd came from the Banū ʿAlī clan of the Banū Waryaghal, was a man in his early forties, and had been one of the principal proponents of resistance to the Spanish at the beginning of the war, and had visited the markets to make propaganda in this cause.

Muḥammad Azargān, bin ʿAbd al-Karīm's brother-in-law, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ʿAbd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand of the Aith Bū ʿAyyāsh clan of the Banū Waryaghal was appointed Minister of War. The post of Minister of Justice (ʿadl) went to the Faqīḥ Muḥammad b. ʿAbī Abū Laḥya, the man who had led the expeditions to the Qal'aya in 1921 and later to the Ghumāra. He was not just a war leader, however—although he continued to be present at battles after his appointment to his Ministry. He was a man of some education, having studied in Fez, and was a very efficient propagandist, not only for the Rifī government, but also for the policy of imposition of the sharīʿa, a function he shared with the Qāḍī al-Shargī.

ʿAbd al-Salām al-Khāṭṭābī, bin ʿAbd al-Karīm's paternal uncle—who was only slightly older than he was—was appointed Minister of Finance, entrusted with the money raised by the ransom of the prisoners, and helped by Ahmad

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1 SkIraj, op. cit., p. 84.
2 Ibid., p. 89; and SHAT, Maroc E.24, "Note sur le Maghzen Riffain", Dec. 1925, p. 3 (henceforth referred to as "Maghzen Riffain").
3 SkIraj, op. cit., p. 84.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 90.
6 Ibid., p. 84.
Ugartadh, who was placed in charge of habus property.¹

In fact, these were the people who, by and large, had been occupying these jobs before the formal proclamation of the bay’a, and as bin ‘Abd al-Karīm told the majlis al-’umma, they were just the people he would have appointed, and he confirmed them,² an indication that, although the majlis might have been responsible in theory for their appointments, it was really bin ‘Abd al-Karīm who had the final word.

However, the majlis al-’umma could make it clear that there were some people of whom it did not approve in positions of responsibility. On 15 January 1923—three days before the first bay’a—it deliberated on the choice of a Minister of Justice, and made the following declaration:

"Praise be to God alone.

When the majlis al-’umma had examined and consulted and circulated the suggestion of the Sayyid Muḥammad b. ‘Alī, who is second in command, that the man who should take charge of justice is the faqīḥ and the erudite man Muḥammad al-Shams they all replied in the negative and refused to accept it, and they decreed that the undersigned should register their lack of agreement so that a statement of it may be placed before the great Amīr, may God prolong his power and give him victory. On the twenty seventh of Jumāda the First in the year one thousand three hundred and forty one.

The servant of his God

Sha’īb b. ʿAḥmad al-Ḥatlaṭī ... [illegible].³

Bū Ḭaṣṭa became Minister of Justice. Beneath him was a qādī guḍāt (chief qādī), Muḥammad bin al-Ṣāliḥ. This

² Skīraj, op. cit., p. 84.
³ MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 34. Sha’īb b. ʿAḥmad, announcement on behalf of the majlis al-’umma, 27 Jumāda I 1341/15 Jan. 1923 (Appendix, doc. 5). Hart, Aith Waryaghar, gives "Qādī sh-Shims" as the first Minister of Justice, but this is clearly incorrect in the light of this new evidence.
man did not himself have the power to appoint qādis but he could recommend suitable people for appointment. For example, in April 1924 he recommended that a certain ʿAbd al-Wajdiri of the Simsamān be appointed qādi of the clan of Rabaʿa al-Fawqānī in that tribe. The letter is addressed to "Sīdī", but as it ends "it is this that I have the honour to lay before your majesty (jalālatikum)", it seems clear that the recipient was bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Once again the final authority was the amīr.

The aim, in fact, seems to have been to appoint a qādi in all the tribes and in the major clans, to ensure the spread of the sharīʿa—as Muḥammad b. al-Ṣāliḥ's letter points out. There were other appointments to be made as well, of course—amīns were needed to oversee the financial affairs of the tribes, and qāṣids to administer them. In February 1924, another note was put out appointing an amīn. It was unsigned but came from the mahākma of al-Muzīma, the central command post. Again the central authorities were the final arbiters. It read as follows:

"Praise be to God alone. God's mercy be on our Lord Muḥammad, his companions and family.

The Maḥākma of al-Muzīma.

Let it be known from this our letter—may God elevate it and make it effective—that with the [help of] the power and might of God—we have appointed the excellent and distinguished Sayyid Muḥammad bin 'Umar al-'Umarānī to be our chief amīn in the Wargha. On being informed of this everyone should act in accordance with his [instructions] and not disobey them.

1 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 185, letter, Muḥammad b. al-Ṣāliḥ to (bin 'Abd al-Karīm), 23 Ramaqān 1342/28 Apr. 1924.
2 Ibid. See the text of the document in the Appendix (No. 6).
And peace.

On 2 Jumāda II 1342.\(^1\)

The appointment of qa'idās in tribes was a touchy business, as SI Muḥammad had discovered in Targīst in 1922.\(^2\) After the proclamation of his bay'a, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was still faced with this problem. In February 1924, the people of Burid in the Gaznaya tribe wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm in very fulsome terms asking that a certain Qa'id Muḥammad Amziyyān b. al-Ḥājj Ta'juntī should be their ḍāmil.\(^3\) Apparently bin 'Abd al-Karīm immediately acceded to their request, for on the same day a local bay'a, recognising Muḥammad Amziyyān, was issued, signed by many of the notables of Burid.\(^4\) Once again, although bin 'Abd al-Karīm asked for suggestions about the most suitable candidate to be appointed, it was the amīr's authority that confirmed the appointment and the local people were well aware of the fact.

**A Makhzan in the Rif?**

This organisation, a government with ministers, qa'idās and a qa'di quḍāt, amīns, and qa'idās, looks very like a Rifī version of the traditional form of a Moroccan makhzan. As David Hart has pointed out, all the titles given to those

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1 Ibid., p. 196, unsigned letter of appointment as ʿamīn al-ʿumāna of Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-ʿUmānī, 29 Jumāda II 1342/6 Feb. 1924. This document is reproduced in the Appendix (No. 7). Al-Muzimma, it will be recalled, was the name of the position at the mouth of the Wādī Nakūr which had been the port of Bādis in the Middle Ages (see above, p. 101). It is therefore likely that al-Bū Ḥayāshī is incorrect in putting it south of Ajdīr (op. cit., vol. II, p. 134).

2 See above, p. 499.

3 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 206, All the people of Burid to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm, Burid, 12 Rajab 1343/18 Feb. 1924.

Photograph IX : 1

Muḥammad Azargān, Rīfī Minister of Foreign Affairs

Source: Archives of the Servicio Histórico Militar, Madrid.
who held positions in the Rifī state were Arabic rather than Berber.¹ Even more significant were the large numbers of lesser positions which were filled, for the main ministries mentioned above were by no means the only posts. As Hart again remarks: "One of the most striking facts about the Moroccan political system in general ... is the over-abundance of legitimacy: there are ... far more claimants to office than there [are] jobs to go round."²

This was partly the result of the large proportion of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's family which was involved in the Rifī government. A glance at a family tree (Table 1) shows that, of his close relatives and their husbands, no less than 11 were at some point involved in the government. They ranged from important figures such as 'Abd al-Salām, his uncle, and Minister of Finance; his cousin (and brother-in-law), Aḥmad Bū Drā', later Minister of War; and his brother-in-law Muḥammad Azargān, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Photograph IX : 1), to the second or third-rank leaders such as Muḥammad b. al-Ḥāj jī Si Muḥammad, a brother-in-law of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, who was a secretary.

Of course, not all the members of the Rifī government were relatives of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, although the majority were from the Banū Waryaghal.³ However, the officials most concerned with the implementation of the sharī'a policy, Bū Laḥya, Qāḍī al-Shargī (both from the Banū Tūzīn), and a later Minister of Justice, Muḥammad b. 'Amar b. 'Abdallah of the Timsamān, and the Qāḍī Quḍāt Muḥammad b. Shalāh of the Timsamān, were not even from bin 'Abd

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¹ Hart, Aith Waryathar, p. 385.
² Ibid., p. 380.
TABLE IX: TO SHOW FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS OF MEMBERS OF THE RIFI GOVERNMENT
al-Karîm's tribe. In other words, for this function bin 'Abd al-Karîm preferred to rely on people with an ideological and religious commitment to the imposition of the shari'a rather than on people who were defined solely by their relationship to himself.

So, with all the outward appearances of a makhzan, was this in fact what existed in the Rif under bin 'Abd al-Karîm? Certainly the people of Burid in the Gaznaya referred to the government as such. They asked for the appointment of an 'âmil to serve as "an intermediary between us and the Makhzan," and in their letter of acceptance they repeated this formula. On the other hand, as might perhaps have been expected, the Spanish supporters and agents in the Rif occupied areas referred to the Spanish administration as the makhzan. Thus a man from the Banû Tûzín, Shaykh 'Allâl b. 'Allâl Ighârbî, wrote to the Spanish in February 1923 in these terms. So it appears that "the Makhzan" depended on who was speaking: Spanish agents saw the Spanish as the makhzan, and pro-Rifis saw the new government headed by bin 'Abd al-Karîm as the makhzan. The point is that while he acted as a Sultan, bin 'Abd al-Karîm presented himself as such by popular acclamation, and his makhzan (and that of the Spanish) gained authority in just the same way; the Rif government acted as a makhzan, and in increasingly powerful one. Despite the initial flurry of activity by the majlis al-'umma, that assembly's power was always limited:

1 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 206. All the people of Burid to Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karîm, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 1924.
2 Ibid., p. 53, Jamâ'a of Burid, accepting appointment of 'âmil, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 1924.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzin, Shaykh 'Allâl b. 'Allâl Ighârbî al-Tûzânî and Shaykh Muhammed b. 'Amar to Colonel, 2 Rajab 1341/18 Feb. 1923.
even when it agreed not to accept Qādi al-Shams as Minister of Justice it laid the whole matter in bin 'Abd al-Karīm's hands for a final decision. By 1924 the people of Burid were acknowledging the authority of the makhzan and trying to get bin 'Abd al-Karīm to appoint an 'āmil to be "the intermediary between us and the Makhzan", with no reference to the assembly at all. It was effectively a contractual arrangement between a Sultan and a local group in the traditional manner of Moroccan politics.

If bin 'Abd al-Karīm's government acted as a makhzan it was, however, no longer a matter of a distant Sultan in Fez confirming a powerful local figure in his position in order to gain his support—as Mūlāy 'Abd al-'Azīz, Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ, or Mūlāy Zain had done in the case of al-Ra'īsūlī, or even of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's father, but of a powerful central authority in Ajdīr, which certainly confirmed the wishes of local people as bin 'Abd al-Karīm had done in Burid, but also was quite capable, even before the bay'ā was proclaimed, of removing local qā'ids and substituting others. The immediacy of this authority is reflected in the curtness of the documents of appointment.

These officials, the local representatives of the central authority, gave bin 'Abd al-Karīm's administration a quite considerable power, which was backed up by a small but always growing bureaucracy. There were officials to administer the habūṣ property—one Ahmad Ū Gharradh, several secretaries, and a man, Si Muhammad b. Qashush, whose

1 See above, p. 145.
2 "Maghzen Riffain", p. 3. and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 378
3 Apart from Muhammad bin Si Muḥammadī these were al-Ḥājj b. Hitmī, Qā'īd Šadīq and an Algerian Si Hassan b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, "Maghzen Riffain", passim, Hart, op. cit., p. 380.
function was to keep records of taxation.\textsuperscript{1} In addition, the
two important ministries of Justice and War had a large number
of assistants, whose rôle will be discussed later.

However, from all this it should not be assumed
that all the members of the government spent all their time
on administrative matters, for many of them still saw their
most essential task as defeating the Spanish. The most not-
able example of this is Bû Laḥya the Minister for Justice,
who spent a considerable part of his time in military
expeditions. For example, in September 1923, he was sent
by bin 'Abd al-Karîm to the Ghumāra to raise troops,\textsuperscript{2} in
May 1924 he was sent to the Marnīsa for the same reason
because that tribe was refusing to provide a ḥarka,\textsuperscript{3} in May
of the same year he only succeeded in escaping capture
during the Ghumāra revolt.\textsuperscript{4} However, as will be seen, this
did not prevent him from putting the policy of enforcement
of the sharī'ā into effect with considerable vigour. In fact,
it is often difficult to distinguish between the military
activities and the civil activities of the Rifî administration,
a situation which, of course, resulted from the war. Thus
the qâ'īds whom bin 'Abd al-Karîm appointed in the tribes
were placed under the control of Pashas—the military com-
manders of the regions with their headquarters in military
command posts, referred to as maḥakmas.

The main maḥakma was at the military headquarters
at Ait Qamāra in the Imrabadhan clan of the Banû Waryathal

\textsuperscript{1} "Maghzen Riffain", p. 3.
\textsuperscript{2} SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Septiembre, Resumen
General de Confidencias, 9 Sept. 1923.
\textsuperscript{3} SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Marzo, Resumen General
23 Mar. 1924 and Resumen General 24 Mar. 1924.
\textsuperscript{4} SkIraj, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
Photograph IX: 2

A Rif field gun, captured from the Spanish or the French, photographed after the surrender of bin 'Abd al-Karîm in May 1926.

Source: The Illustrated London News, 15 June 1926, p.1012
in the mountains overlooking the Wādī Ghīs. This was where bin 'Abd al-Karīm kept his family, safe from Spanish bombing missions, and had one of his principal camps for prisoners of war.\(^1\) As we have seen, there was another māḥakma at al-Muzimma, at the mouth of the Wādī Ghīs. A third and vitally important māḥakma was at Akšāb Amghār, on the west bank of the Wādī Amqarān, between Dahar Abarrān and Anwāl in the tribe of Timsamān. This māḥakma covered the defence of the whole eastern front in the tribes of Timsamān, Banū Tūzīn, Banū Saʿīd, Banū Walishak, al-Maṭālsa, and the eastern part of the Gaznaya. In charge of this position for the first part of 1923 was the Minister of War, 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh clan of the Banū Waryaghāl.\(^2\) The western part of the Gaznaya tribe, and the tribes of Marnīsā, and those of the Sinḥāja Srair were placed under the māḥakma at Targīst, and that at Banū Bū Frāḥ covered the western front, and undertook political action in the Ghumāra and Jibāla.\(^3\) The force behind this organisation lay with the new Rīfī regular army.

The Foundation of the Regular Army

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had started to create a modern trained force even before the Anwāl victories, but the real impetus came when he had both equipment and money to carry out a complete reorganisation of the Rīfī forces. The equipment, of course, came from that captured by the Rīfīs from the Spanish, and although a fair amount was never recovered

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\(^1\) Al-Bū 'Ayyāshi, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 134, 144. For the position of this māḥakma see the discussion above on p. 531, n. 1.


by Ḥaddu b. Ḥammū and others, the quantities that they did take back to the Rif were enormous. The money mainly came from the ransoms of the Spanish prisoners of war. The four million pesetas was indeed used, as the Wargha tribes had predicted, "against you and us".¹

There were several men responsible for the new army. The first was Shaʿīb b. Ḥammādī al-Falāḥ, who had been one of the leaders in the abortive attack on the Ghumāra in 1921 and 1922.² Bin ʿAbd al-Karīm had met him at Anwāl and according to al-BūʿAyyāshī had decided that al-Falāḥ was a suitable person to take control of the training of the new army when he discovered that when al-Falāḥ was called away from repairing guns captured from the Spanish—a technique at which he was expert—he had hidden part of the trigger of the gun on which he was working, thereby disabling it so that it could not be sold back to the Spanish. This so impressed bin ʿAbd al-Karīm with his caution that he put al-Falāḥ in charge of the regular army.³

Al-Falāḥ took ʿAmar b. Muḥ b. Saʿīd of the Banū BūʿAyyāsh to the Monday market of the Banū BūʿAyyāsh, where they made an initial recruitment of 75 men, although the numbers soon reached 900 men, and were initially divided into 3 ṭabūrs, presumably of 300 men each.⁵

¹ See above, p. 501.
² His origins are disputed—al-BūʿAyyāshī (op. cit., vol. II, p. 176) says he came from the Timsāmān, Hart (Aith Waryaghār, p. 386) says he was a Waryaghli from the Banū ʿAlī.
³ Al-BūʿAyyāshī, op. cit., p. 176.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ However, estimates of the full complement of a ṭabūr in the Rifī army vary. Skiraj, op. cit., p. 93, puts it at 500, Goded, op. cit., p. 97, at 400, some of Hart's informants at 300, others at 500—Hart himself (Aith Waryaghār, p. 386) opts for 500. But the numbers and organisation of the ṭabūrs tended to fluctuate greatly anyway.
The first commanders of these tabūrs were al-Falāḥ, Muḥammad b. ‘Amar b. Hammīsh of the Banū Brāḥim sub-clan of the Banū Waryaghgal, and Muḥammad Buḥūt of the Qalʿaya. This last tabūr was apparently largely made up of artillery men, as was a fourth which was set up later.

The bases of these artillery tabūrs already existed. In late 1922, and possibly before, there had been definite groups of people who were described as "artillery-men" in the accounts of payments. They were a fairly defined group, mainly, though by no means entirely, made up of people from the Banū Waryaghgal. For instance, on 7 February 1922 there were four men at Tahlilāth in the Banū Walishak, of whom two were from the Banū al-Qādī of the Banū Waryaghgal clan of Murābiṭīn, eleven at Azragznāi in the same tribe, of whom three were from the Banū ‘Abdallāh clan of the Banū Waryaghgal, one from the Marnīsa and one from the Banū Walishak, seven at al-Naẓūr of the Banū Walishak, of whom three were Waryaghalis (one from Banū al-Qādī and two from Tamasind), six at Thasliqū in the Banū Walishak (three from the Banū Waryaghgal), eleven in the Tafarsit tribe, of whom three were from the Banū Qiyadhān sub-clan of the Banū Waryaghgal, and so on.

The significant thing, however, is the relatively

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2 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 386.
3 MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 81-82, Lists of payments to artillery-men, 15 Muḥarram 1341/7 Sept. 1922, and 3 Ẓafar 1341/25 Sept. 1922, and 6 Ẓafar 1341/28 Sept. 1922, and 7 Ẓafar 1341/29 Sept. 1922. The word used in these lists for "artillery-man" is تبجي (tabjiya). This is not an Arabic word but it is a Turkish one. The Ottoman word for "artillery-man" is طبيجي (topji), J.W. Redhouse, Redhouse's Turkish Dictionary, 2nd ed. revised by Charles Wells (London, 1880), p. 642. A typical list of payments is reproduced in the Appendix (No. 8).
small group at the centre of these artillery-men. There seems to have been a small group of men who were kept in the same area but moved around as they were needed. For instance, al-'Abbās b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammad of the Banū Qiyadhān sub-clan of the Banū Waryaghal was moved from Tudhītha near Tafarsīt on 7 September 1922 to Tawrīrt in the same tribe on 11 October. One of these men, ʿAbd al-Sūsī, who was certainly not a Rīfī, was at Wardāna on 28 September. He eventually became the qā'īd of the second artillery ʿṭābūr. Two of his deputies in that ʿṭābūr, a certain al-Maṭālī from the Gharb, and one al-Mufaḍḍal, apparently were not Rīfīs either. These non-Rīfīs were undoubtedly employed because of their European-taught military skills. The best example of this was Muḥammad Buhūt, a Qal'ayū who had been an officer in the Spanish Fuerzas Regulares before the outbreak of the war. However, he joined the Rīfīs very soon and quickly distinguished himself in their cause. In August 1921, he killed a shaykh from the Banū Bū Ifrūr whom he suspected of being pro-Spanish after a speech the shaykh had made, recommending negotiations with the Spanish. He later led those Rīfī forces which remained in the Qal'āya while the main body pulled back to the Banū Saʿīd.

At lower levels, there were qāʿīds over different

1 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 81, List of artillery-men, 15 Muḥarram 1341/7 Sept. 1922, no. 33.
2 Ibid., p. 80, List of soldiers and payments, 19 Ẓafar 1341/11 Oct. 1923, no. 7.
3 Ibid., p. 78, List of soldiers and pay, 6 Ẓafar 1341/28 Sept. 1922.
4 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 386.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, SI ʿAli al-Ḥīfī, 19 Aug. 1921
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Septiembre, SI ʿAli al-Ḥīfī, 26 Sept. 1921.
sized groups of men. Thus there was a gā'id miatain wa-
khamṣīn over each 250 men, a gā'id al-miā over each 100
men, a gā'id khamṣīn over each 50 men, a gā'id khamṣa
wa-‘ashrīn over each 25 men, a gā'id ithnā-‘ashar over each
12 men, and beneath them the ordinary soldiers. The rates
of pay vary according to the accounts given. The best way
to reproduce these various amounts in in the form of a table:

Table IX: 2

Pay of officers and men in the Riff regular army
according to various sources, in pesetas per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hart</th>
<th>al-Bū 'Ayyāshi</th>
<th>Skīraj</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā'id 12</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā'id 25</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā'id 50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā'id 100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā'id 250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā?id ṭabūr</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qā'id 1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These theoretical rates do not in fact compare with those
given in September 1922 to the artillery-men in the Banū
Walishak, who were paid 25 pts for the three weeks from
7 September to 28 September, a rate of 33 pts a month. 3

These troops had a wide variety of arms—guns they
had captured from the Spanish—such as the 1888-model Spanish

1 Hart, Aīth Waryaghar, p. 386, and Skīraj, op. cit., p. 93.
2 Al-Bū 'Ayyāshi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 177; Hart, Aīth
Waryaghar, p. 387; Skīraj, op. cit., p. 94.
3 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 82. Artillery-men and payments, 15
Muḥarram 1341/7 Sept. 1922, and 6 Ṣafar 1341/28 Sept. 1922,
e.g., nos. 5-8.
Mauser-guns they had obtained by purchase—mainly French Lebel 1886-model repeaters—or ones that they had before Anwāl, mainly old Moroccan-made Bu Ḫarfūra muskets. The heavy artillery was mainly captured Spanish equipment—Gabrielli estimated that at the end of 1924 the Rifis had about 200 Spanish field guns. Bombs were made by local technicians from unexploded bombs dropped by Spanish aeroplanes. Al-Bū 'Ayyāshī estimates that from one 200 kilo bomb they could make 470 hand-made bombs locally. The main arms dumps for this equipment were at Azghār in the Banū Waryaghal, Bu Ḣāim, also in the Banū Waryaghal, Bu Salāḥ, again in the Banū Waryaghal in the upper reaches of the Wāḍī Ghīs, and at the māḥakmas—especially that at Akshāb Amghār in the Timsāmān. The repair shops for these weapons were at Anwāl under the supervision of al-Mu'allim Muḥand, a Timsāmānī who had 25 men, many of them from the Banū Bu Frāḥ, working under him. Muḥand was a master armourer who had for long been opposed to Spanish intervention—in August 1919, when he was working at the Friday market in the Timsāmān, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, the amīr's father, had contacted him at the beginning of his efforts to foment an anti-Spanish coalition.

Not surprisingly, in a period of war, the army was perhaps the most closely administered section of the government's activity. There was an official to take care of

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3 Ibid., pp. 172-174.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Quincenales, Alhucemas, Memoria... segunda quincena de agosto de 1919.
Photograph IX 3

(Left) Muḥammad Bū Ḫibārī, muṭaṣarrīf
(Right) Maḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, brother of the amīr

Source: Illustrated London News, 20 September 1924, p. 519
Photograph IX : 4

A Rifi air-raid shelter, photographed in 1926

Source: Illustrated London News, 29 May 1926
supplies of food, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Hattāsh of Ajdār, one to deal with military supplies, Āḥmad Shammūrī1 and a pay-
master—mutaṣarrīf—SI Muḥammad bū Jibār, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's brother-in-law (see Photograph IX : 3).2 A careful record seems to have been kept, not only of payments, which have already been discussed, but also of the distribution of arms.3 Apparently, the soldiers were paid in accordance with a number stitched on the turban of each man.4 The turbans also indicated both rank and the military arm to which the soldiers belonged. Ordinary soldiers wore green turbans,5 while officers wore red turbans with green stripes indicating rank (three for a qā'id ṭābūr, two for a qā'id 100, one for a qā'id 50, a half stripe for a qā'id 25, and no stripe for a qā'id 12), machine gunners wore black turbans.6

In addition, soldiers had strict instructions on how to conduct themselves. A list of army regulations was found on the body of a dead soldier in 1926 and read as follows:

"Praise be to God alone.
   God bless our Lord Mohammed and his family.
Note of the military regulations 6 Șafar 1344
(26 August 1925)
I. All officers must obey each other according to rank.
II. All orders must be obeyed without question.
III. There can be no change or alteration in the position of a caīd once he has been appointed, and no one may have

1 "Maghzen Riffain", p. 6.
2 Ibid., p. 3.; Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 378.
3 MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 77 shows a number of slips giving the distribution of arms dated Sha'bān 1344/Feb.–Mar. 1926.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Información Alhucemas, 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Amar b. 'Abd al-Karīm (Banū Waryaghal), 29 Nov. 1925.
5 Ibid., and Goded, op. cit., p. 94.
6 Ibid.
rank reduced without the authorisation of the Emir.

IV. Each caïd must know by heart the names of all his soldiers, and keep on him at all times a list of their names on which he will write the day on which each one leaves his command either through death, absence or for any other reason.

V. Each officer must know the number of guns and cartridges held by his soldiers.

VI. The caïds in the front line must make an inspection with the officer of the post, and must make the latter responsible for everything concerned with arms and cartridges.

VII. Immediately they arrive at a position, the caïds must have trenches dug, build air-raid shelters [see photograph IX : 3] and remove all rubbish.

VIII. No one in any position may flee from the enemy if he attacks. Anyone who does so will be punished.

IX. No one may leave his post at the end of his tour of duty, before his relief arrives. If he does, he will be punished.

X. The fine for being late on arrival at a post will be half a rial a day, payable when the latecomer does arrive. The money so collected will be equally divided among those who were on time.

XI. Anyone who interrupts his time in the harka is equally liable to a fine of half a rial a day. The product of these fines will be divided among the caïds who remain on duty. The Pasha or his Khalifa, will receive one third and the other two thirds will be given to the caïd 100 and his subordinates.

XII. No caïd shall give leave to any of his men in exchange for money. If he does he will be liable to a prison sentence, according to his rank. This penalty will be applied to a caïd 25, or a caïd 50, or a caïd 100.

XIII. Anyone who wishes to impose a fine be it great or small, must first consult the minister of War—who will refer it to our Lord—God give him victory.

XIV. All those who carry an arm must take care that it is not damaged. He who through negligence breaks it or exchanges it etc, must repay the value. The same applies to a man who sells his arm, and he will be put in prison until he has repaid the value.

XV. The caïd 100, as all the other caïds must fight along with his own men and not mix them with those of another officer.

Peace.

Approved by the Minister of War the Caïd Ahmed ben Draa[sic]. God protect him."

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1 SHAT, Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine enclosed in letter Ministre Plenipotentiaire Resident Général du Maroc to Ministre de Guerre, Rabat, 10 Apr. 1926.
The orders lay down a strict hierarchy of command, through local qā'ids to pashas to the Minister of War, and finally to bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself. Through such a structure, the amīr's authority would be guaranteed by an army which owed its loyalty not to tribal leaders but to himself.

In addition to these orders and the identity patches on their turbans, the Rif soldiers were given yet another symbol of their organisation. They were issued with identity cards, reportedly with their photographs stuck to them.1

The Rif "Navy"

When it became necessary to set up some form of military control over sea transport, the first person to be put in charge of it was Ra'Is Misa'ūd b. 'Amar "Sibara", the Buqquyī who had a history of gun-running and smuggling along the coast, which went back to 1896. He had joined the Rif movement just before Abarrān, only after a great deal of pressure had been applied to him.2 Yet he seems to have been loyal to bin 'Abd al-Karīm thereafter and was rewarded with the title of "Inspector of Marine".3 In fact, this title was more imposing than realistic, for the Rif navy consisted of no more than a few rowing boats and two motor launches.4 Ra'Is Misa'ūd came to a violent end in November

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Abril 1924, nota, 6 Apr. 1924. If the detail about the photographs is correct, they may have been taken by Josef Klemms, a German deserter from the French Foreign Legion who had fled to the Rif where he became bin 'Abd al-Karīm's official photographer. Sheean, Adventures, p. 275.
2 See above, pp. 161-162, 300.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 378.
4 Goded, op. cit., p. 102.
1924, when he was murdered by a brother of Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū al-Kaḥal. Apparently the brother felt that Misaʿūd should sell him some land to which he felt himself entitled, and when Misaʿūd refused he shot him. The Spanish report on this affair described Sibara as "a native from Buqquy [sic] charged with carrying out contraband along the coast." This does, in fact, seem a fair description of the Rifi navy's function, for arms, ammunition and supplies were brought in from Tangier. The sea was clearly the quickest way of communicating with the Ghumāra, and when al-Raisūlī was captured in 1925, he was taken to Ajdīr in a boat from Wādī Lāw.

Sibara was replaced by Ḥaddū b. ʿAlī b. al-Muqaddam, an Ajdīrī, who bought one of the motor launches from an American in Tangier to make the sea route to the Ghumāra that much more reliable. Furthermore, considerable care was taken of the Rifi boats and they were stored under the cliffs at Alhucemas to protect them from Spanish air raids (see Photograph IX : 5).

The Irregular Army

The total strength of the regular army was never

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Noviembre, nota, 6 Nov. 1924.
2 Ibid., nota, 3 Nov. 1924. On the other hand, 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī; Sibara's brother-in-law told the French that he had been killed by a servant of Muḥammad Azargān, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (SHAT, Maroc Riff 14, Dossier III, Mars 1926, Renseignements donnés par ʿAbd el Krim el Hadj Ali el Boucougi, Tangier, Mar. 1926). However, both accounts are agreed that Sibara was murdered. Hart (Aith Waryaghhar, p. 378) says that Sibara defected to the Spanish, but this is clearly incorrect in the light of this new evidence.
5 Ibid.
Photograph IX : 5

The Rif boats stored under the cliffs near Alhucemas Bay; an oblique aerial photograph taken by a Spanish reconnaissance aeroplane. The large boat in the open enclosure is one of the motor launches.

high. Bin ‘Abd al-Karîm put it at 6,000-7000, but Hart and Goded give 3,000 and 2,000 respectively. Clearly these numbers were insufficient to defend the Rif against the Spanish troops, so harkas from the different tribes were raised in the old way, as well.

While Sha‘ib b. al-Falāḥ and others were recruiting for the regular army, bin ‘Abd al-Karîm wrote to the various shaykhs in the Banû Tūzîn. As a result, some of those shaykhs reported to the Spanish:

"We went to see him, and he spoke with us, and said to us 'Be on your guard against the Spanish and form an army under your authority and we will send the supplies', and we replied 'We shall consult among ourselves over what is best for all concerned'," a formula which gave them the opportunity to delay further. Clearly, however, bin ‘Abd al-Karîm was relying on local support under the authority of local leaders in tribal groups --just as he had done to form the original harkas.

In July 1923, another Tūzānî shaykh wrote to the Spanish to inform them that "The Muslims, that is the mujâhidîn, have called openly in the markets of the Banû Waryaghal for an attack against us." Ten days later the same man reported that this propaganda had been successful:

"The Banû Waryaghal [have formed] a harka for after the ‘Īd [‘Īd al-Kabîr which was less than one month away] which will come with. violence upon us and will attack you and us."

1 Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., p. 140.
2 Hart, Aith Waryaghîr, p. 385, and Goded, op. cit., p. 95.
4 Ibid., Shaykh ‘Allâl b. Muḥand to Captain, received 1 July, 1923.
5 Ibid., Shaykh ‘Allâl b. Muḥand to Colonel, received 11 July 1923.
Photograph IX : 6

Riff irregular troops on the way to the front

Source: Illustrated London News, 20 September 1924, p. 519
Photograph IX : 7

Rifirirregulars on the way to the front line; the son of a shaykh (on the right) much better dressed than the ordinary irregular troops.

Announcements in the markets were the traditional way of calling together a ḥarka, and in August 1923 bin 'Abd al-Karīm made it the responsibility of his qā'idīs to organise this form of recruitment, and in early September, Bu Lahya was sent to the Ghumāra to recruit a ḥarka there. Recruiting in the markets continued in 1924—for instance, in January of that year bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to recruit a ḥarka against 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu in the markets, and indeed throughout the war. (See Photographs IX: 6, 7, 8.)

The Building of Communications

A modern, centralised state such as the one which bin 'Abd al-Karīm proposed for the Rif needed rapid and efficient communications between the centre and the outlying areas. The two most efficient methods of communication were roads and telephones, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm did his best to ensure that both were constructed.

At the beginning of February 1923, as part of the general propaganda surrounding his proclamation, bin 'Abd al-Karīm sent letters to the Timsamān and other tribes giving them one month in which to submit to his authority. He also told them he was going to build a road and that European nations would be sending help. By November of 1923, he was building roads into the Gaznaya from Ajdīr to Hassi

2 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Septiembre, Resumen General de Confidencias, 9 Sept. 1923.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaciones Enero, Resumen General de Confidencias, 28 Jan. 1924.
Wazanga, and to ‘Ain Midayūna (see Map IX : 1). According to al-Bū ‘Ayyāshī, the man in overall charge of this programme of road building was a certain Muḥ Muzūr, who was illiterate. 2

The construction of these roads was by no means an easy process. One of the people in charge of the stretch of road being built in the Buqquya (presumably part of the Aḍīr to Targīst road) asked the mahākma of the tribe to write to Sī Maḥammad asking him to send measuring implements, shovels, and other equipment "because the road in the Buqquya is very difficult with many stones in it. Unless [we receive this] equipment it will be impossible to set the road to rights as quickly as our Lord [i.e., bin ‘Abd al-Karīm] has ordered." 3 At the same time, he asked for black and white paint for sign-writing on the walls of the mahakma in the Buqquya. 4

The main labour force for this work was drawn from the prisoners held by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. The list of Moroccan prisoners held at the main prison, Aḍīr, on 5 May, records that 37 were absent building the "earth motor road in Buqquya". In this case, all were captured supporters of ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu, although captured French and Spanish prisoners were also used. 6

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Noviembre, Muḥammad Muḥammad, 23 Nov. 1923.
3 MAEF, Maroc 520, Ṣadīq b. al-Shadīlī to Maḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm, 21 Ramaḍān 1342/28 April 1924. This letter is reproduced in the Appendix (No. 9).
4 Ibid.
5 MAEF, Maroc 519, List of prisoners at Aḍīr, 30 Ramaḍān 1342/5 May 1924, prisoners nos. 50-86.
MAP IX:1 THE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK OF THE RIF (ROADS AND TELEPHONES BUILT BY THE RIFIS 1923-1926)

SOURCES
1 see pages 556-561
2 SHM Ceuta leg.25 inform.dar drilush nota 3 Jan 1925
3 SHAT MAROC RIFF3 Interrog. des Indigènes évacués
4 THE TIMES report from TANGIER on 27 MAY 1926 p14

SCALE 1cm to 8kms 1:800,000

TRANSMISSIONS
ROADS
The main road that was completed was from Ajdir to Targist and parts of it are still in use today as a track running parallel to the main Alhucemas to Shāwin road. The road was good enough for Azargān to travel from Ajdir to Targist by car in 1924. All the roads centred on Ajdir, as was natural, and they eventually ran to Targist, to SI: 'Alī Bū 'Uqba via Arba'a Tawrīrt, to 'Ain Zuhra, and later to Sakka. (See Photograph IX: 9.)

The other main means of communication was by telephone. As the Rifī territory expanded after 1923, all the newly conquered areas were quickly linked by telephone lines with Ajdir. The telephone system was the responsibility of SI Maḥammad, who employed a number of small boys as operators who had been trained by a Spanish prisoner nicknamed "Antonio el Mecánico".

The main problem in the creation of a telephone system was the supply of equipment—particularly of posts and wire. Some was purchased from the French in Algeria. In September 1923, SI Maḥammad wrote to Azargān to tell him: "I have paid about 2,000 pesetas to Ṣaddu [i.e., bin Ṣammu al-Ḳaḥal] so that he may buy telephone apparatus."

Other equipment was simply stolen from the Spanish occupied zone. At the end of September 1923, the Spanish

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1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 126.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 387. Antonio's full name was Antonio Rojano, and he seems to have been a fairly enthusiastic renegade, for his signature appears at the foot of a design he drew of a "mechanical boat" for the Rifīs, conserved in MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 164.
4 MAEF Maroc 517, p. 139, Maḥammad al-Khaṭṭābī to Azargān, 18 Ṣafar 1342/30 Sept. 1923.
Photograph IX : 9

The Rif road between Ajdîr and Targîst today, seen from the present main road between Alhucemas and Shâwin in the western Banū Waryaghal territory.

Source: taken by author, September 1977
reported that many of the telephone posts between Tizzi 'Azzā and Tafarsit had been removed and sold to bin 'Abd al-Karīm at a price of 25 pts each, and in mid-October, bin 'Abd al-Karīm apparently offered to buy any wire that was stolen from the Spanish for his line from Tizzi 'Azzā to Sūq al-Thalāthā' of Azilāf. These thefts continued and the Spanish complained in December 1924 that telephone wire was being stolen in order to sell it to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Apparently the French also suffered from this new industry, for a rumour circulated at the same time that they had offered to sell the Rifī amīn at Sakka, in the Gaznaya, all the telephone wire that he needed provided that their wire was not stolen.

The lines connected Ajdīr with all the main Rifī positions—with Sūq al-Sabat of the Banū Walishak via Akshāb Amghār, with 'Ain Zuhra via Sī 'Alī Bū Rugba, with 'Azrū, with Banū Bū Frāḥ, with Sakka, with Aknāl, with Tawārda, with Shāwin via Targīst, and with al-Barābīr, and other lines were added when the Jibāla was occupied (Map IX:1).

Social Organisation: Health and Education in the Rif

Republic

In a society at war, like the Rif, there was

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Septiembre, Resumen General, 25 Sept. 1923.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Diciembre, nota. 15 Dec. 1924.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Abril, Resumen General, 7 Apr. 1924, and Resumen General, 10 Apr. 1924, and SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Junio, nota, 27 June 1924, and Información Marzo, Resumen General, 26 Mar. 1924.
5 Ladreit de Lacharrière, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
obviously a considerable problem with casualties. Yet medical services were practically non-existent. What there were, were administered by a negro pharmacist (from Tangier or Fez) named Mahbub, but he had no proper hospital nor medical supplies. To a certain extent, men injured in battle were cared for by their wives, who often followed them to the front. Mahbub apparently made some attempt to train these women by lecturing their husbands in the hope that they would pass the information on to their wives. 1

Strenuous efforts were made to attract outside help—a French medical mission did enter the Rif in 1923, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent tried to send help. 2 At least one British Red Cross worker, a Norwegian named Dr. Walter Hutyens, did get to the Rif to help, and was captured in 1926 by the Spanish. 3

Efforts were also made by Indian Muslims to send medical help to the Rifis—in March 1924, the French Consul-General in Calcutta complained to the government of India about the activities of one Mohammed ben Abdel Kader Hilali, who "has travelled the whole length of India for propaganda in favour of the Rifians." 4

1 Al-Bu 'Ayyashl, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 181, and personal information, Idris Khattab (bin 'Abd al-Karim's younger son), Sept. 1977. According to Idril al-Khattab, Mahbub died fairly recently in Tangier, where he had set up as a dentist.
4 FO 371/11081/240/W8609, Laronce (French Consul-General) to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Calcutta, 27 Mar. 1925.
Hilali apparently wished to set up a "sanitary formation" under Dr. Mohammed Naim. This mission was abandoned, but another call for medical aid came in an Indian paper, The Muslim Outlook on 7 May 1925. The article, entitled "What the Rifians need", revealed that they grew enough food, had plenty of men and arms, but they were desperate for trained surgeons and medicines. This help did not arrive either.

Another major preoccupation of the new state was education. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself designed a curriculum for the madrasa that was set up in Ajdīr, which included mathematics, science, and "military science". This school was put under the charge of Sayyid Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥaddū, a faqīḥ from Azghār. Another school was set up at the zawīya of Addūz in the Buqquya under a Ghumārī faqīḥ named Sīdī Muḥammad Mashabbal, and, when the Rifīs occupied Shāwin, a religious institution was started there under the Faqīḥ al-'Amārtī. Furthermore, bin 'Abd al-Karīm ordered that mathematics be taught in all the schools and also ordered the ṭālibūn to confine themselves to teaching their charges the necessary Qur'anic studies—with the implication that they should cease to supplement their income by having the boys stitch jīllābas. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm also prepared a group of 100 boys from each clan of the Banū Waryaghar to go to Constantinople to study subjects such as engineering.

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1 FO 371/11081/240/W8609, Parsons (Deputy Secretary, Foreign and Political Department) to Laronce, Delhi, 29 Apr. 1925.
2 FO 371/11081/240/W860(, Parsons to Laronce, Simla, 13 Aug. 1925, enclosing copy of article from The Muslim Outlook, 7 May 1925.
and medicine, but it never left.\(^1\)

Finally, in an effort to recruit teachers, bin 'Abd al-Karīm inserted an advertisement in the Algiers paper Lisān al-Dīn in 1922, calling for teachers. This advertisement received no replies.\(^2\)

### Taxation and Finance

Any state needs to ensure that it has enough money to cover its expenditure. Unfortunately detailed accounts of income and expenditure are not available. However, al-Bū 'Ayyāshī gives what he says was the expenditure for the first six months of 1923:

Table IX: 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>311,165.00 pts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay of officials</td>
<td>221,936.75 pts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>200.00 pts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>533,301.75 pts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to al-Bū 'Ayyāshī also, the total income for the whole year was 6 million pesetas, which leaves a very large surplus.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) SHM Melilla, Leg. 25, Información Confidentes, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī, 28 Feb. 1924, and personal information, Idrīs al-Khaṭṭābī, Sept. 1977. Idrīs al-Khaṭṭābī says that the intentions was to send the group, which included 'Abd al-Karīm Bū Drā, to Egypt rather than Constantinople.


\(^4\) Ibid., p. 154.
The main resources of the treasury were the ransom paid for the Spanish prisoners in 1923—4 million pesetas, fines imposed on recalcitrant tribes, such as those on the Akhmās in the Jībabā in 1924—20,000 pts, on the Banū Zarrūl in 1925—50,000 pts, and on the Ghumāra in 1923—30,000 pts, and in addition to these irregular, if extremely productive, sources of revenue there were two more consistent ones—taxation and customs duties. According to al-Bū ‘Ayyāshī again, the product of zakāt on income from harvests and from trade was 75,000 pesetas a year, while the revenue from customs duties or trade between the Rif and the French zone was relatively little.¹

These figures are possibly misleading for the imply an entirely monetary payment of taxation. In fact, the payment was often made in kind. In January 1924, the people of ‘Ain Zuhra were taxed at the rate of one animal from each 40 donkeys or goats and 2 pesetas on each box of sugar that was sold.² Taxes were also imposed at a flat rate for each individual in a particular area; for instance, in March 1924 bin ‘Abd al-Karīm ordered that each person in each tribe was to pay 10 pesetas in order to purchase aeroplanes.³ In January 1924, a Spanish agent in the Banū Bū Zarrū reported that the Rif commander in the district "imposed on them a tax of [15 pts] for each house and now he is ordering them to give one mudd of barley."⁴

¹ Ibid., pp. 152-153. Al-Bū ‘Ayyāshī says the customs duties were low, but then goes on to say that they amounted to 5,000 pts a day (over 180,000 pts a year), which is presumably a misprint.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batel, 1924, nota, 18 Jan. 1924.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Confidentes, Sīdī Idrīs b. al-Bashīr (Gaznaya), 26 Mar. 1924.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 21, Bajalato de Gumara, Khalīfa of Banū Bū Zarrū to Castro Girona, 14 Jan. 1924.
Such exactions did not of course please the Ghumarīs and the same informant wrote in February 1924 to complain that they "are in dire straits from the great amount of contributions they are forced to give, and from hunger and so on."\(^1\) A flat rate land-tax was imposed in the same way, at 5 pts a hectare, which would also be used for buying munitions, it was announced.\(^2\)

The taxes were paid in Spanish or Ḥassani or French currency, for despite the printing of a number of bank notes in a new Rifī currency (**rifiyat**) for a State bank of the Rif (Bank Ḥukūmat al-Rif), tied to French and English currency, they were never put into circulation and the State Bank was never set up.\(^3\) Several sources state that these notes were printed in the United Kingdom under the auspices of Captain Gardiner, who was involved in the supply of arms to the Rif and in making propaganda in Europe in the Rifī cause.\(^4\)

The Sharī‘a

The changes that have so far been described were designed to help in the organisation of the new Rifī state and to create a social and administrative system that would

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\(^1\) Ibid., Khalīfa of Banū Bū Zrā to Castro Girona, 1 Rajab 1342/7 Feb. 1924.  
\(^2\) SHM Melilla Leg. 24, *Información Abril*, Resumen General, 13 Apr. 1924.  
\(^4\) Ibid., and Goded, *op. cit.*, p. 93. However, the Spanish Minister in Constantinople in 1924 was concerned that these notes might have been printed in Turkey, MAEE/M.D.E. Antiguo Archivo Política, 2543, *Información Octubre*. Gardiner, a former officer in the British army, had a commercial interest in Morocco and set himself up as a roving ambassador for the Rifī state, based in London. See below, p. 807.
enable the state to oppose the Spanish. This was one of the objectives laid down by the bay'a given to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Connected with this organised system was the need to impose order in the Rif; however, the imposition of order, and the shari'ā also helped to fulfil one of the other objectives which the bay'a document had in mind. "May God destroy heresies and error through this man" it said, referring to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. This was his own desire as well.

In order to carry out the policy of imposing order, the Ministry of Justice was fairly well organised. At its head, in theory, was the Fāqīh Bū Laḥya. However, he was frequently engaged in military operations of various sorts and a great deal of the daily administration fell to the Fāqīh al-Shargī of the Banū Tūzīn, and to Muḥammad b. 'Amar 'Abdallah al-Timsamānī. These three men were the main implementers of the policy of imposing the shari'ā. It is very difficult indeed to distinguish between which of them was in fact in charge of the Ministry at any one time—although Hart gives them control in the order al-Shargī, al-Timsamānī and Bū Laḥya. However, as will be shown, both al-Shargī and Bū Lahya were involved in ensuring order and bringing the shari'ā into force at the same time. A French report states that al-Shargī was more concerned with civil law, while 'Abdallah Bū Drā was a deputy minister for criminal affairs. Certainly, in the light of the prison records

3 Ibid.
4 "Maghzen Riffain", p. 4.
examined in the next section civil law would seem to have been al-Shargī's main area of concern.

Of course, the enforcement of order had a strong political reason as well as the religions one dictated by the shari'a, for, as we have seen, unity could only be maintained while there was peace. Thus there was a major attack on the system of blood feuds. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm declared the death sentence for murderers and this was frequently carried out. A case of murder in March 1926 was punished in this way and the written judgement sums up the attitude of the new state towards murderers. The case was one in which two men agreed with the wife of a third to murder her husband. Statements were taken from a number of witnesses and from those involved, and one of them was condemned to death:

"Praise be to God. of Āḥmad b. ‘Āli, the above-mentioned [i.e., in the statements from witnesses] has been proved. He is responsible for shedding the blood of his brother Muslim, who had emigrated in the cause of God [i.e., had left the French-occupied zone for the Rif], ‘Āmar b. Āḥmad al-Wanjilī, who was protected from the law of blood feud (ma'sūm) because God, may He be exalted, forbade the killing of a believer, a man who has made a covenant without reason. And he has ordained that a killer should be killed as a discouragement to killing, so that killing [a murderer] should be a punishment that reduces the number of murders . . . ."¹

There are two themes here; firstly, that God has forbidden murder and therefore it must be punished in order to uphold the law, and secondly that the execution of a murderer will discourage others from committing the same crime. Murderers had been liable to be shot before, of course, but now it

¹ MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 45, statements of witnesses in the case of Āḥmad b. ‘Āli; and on reverse his condemnation to death for murder, signatures illegible, 25 Sha‘bān 1344/10 Mar. 1926. This document is reproduced in the Appendix (No. 10).
no longer seen as a personal right to kill a murderer, for that duty had been taken over by the representatives of the state. In other words, a crime was no longer a crime against an individual but against the law of God, and its punishment was removed from the individual and taken over by the state. People had, of course, been punished by the community before the Rif Republic, but the penalties laid down were fines, collected by the amghār, and which depended to a large extent on a consensus of opinion, rather than the death penalty, which could only be imposed by a state system which was above the normal politics of the tribe. This was explicitly stated in the judgement of Aḥmad b. 'Ali which made it clear that "the pardon of the relatives of the dead man ... is not valid ... because the death penalty for [murder] is one of the laws of God which may not be set aside." Thus the authority of the state in this matter had the full support of the shari'a. The old forms of justice were specifically set aside.

This emphasis on the authority of the state is expressed in the legislation issued by bin 'Abd al-Karīm's administration. A decree signed by the gā'id mashawar (roughly Chancellor) in the Rif Government, 'Abd al-Karīm (bin Ḥaddū) b. Ziyān, in March 1926, laid down the fines to be paid by members of the harkas (not the regular army) who were absent without leave. It ended: "This is an order emanating from the fortunate Makhzan. May God protect it.

... By order of 'Abd al-Karīm b. Ziyān [sic]."

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1 See above, pp. 123-124.
3 Hart, Emilio Blanco, II, pp. 34-1342.
Another decree, giving a particular family exemption from taxation, in October 1922, was simply signed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself. This is a great contrast with the qānūns issued before the Rif Republic, signed and counter-signed by numerous shaykhs and amghārs.

The sharī'a, of course, had always tended to increase the power of the Sultan, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm was most concerned that the sharī'a should prevail in the Rif. He therefore attempted to remove most of the characteristics of customary law. He forbade the collective oath by which an accused man could call on his allies and family to swear with him that he had not committed the crime of which he was accused. Henceforth, only the accused man was allowed to swear and that in the mosque on the Qur'ān. As David Hart points out, this measure, like so many of those of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, had both a religious and a political effect. It at once reinforced the authority of the sharī'a and furthermore broke down family solidarity as a political force.

The attack on blood feuds also diminished the power of the liff system, which could so easily have united factions against his rule. This was vital, because although bin 'Abd al-Karīm had used his marriage to a woman from the Murābiṭīn to win the support of that clan of his own tribe, the new nation which he now ruled stretched far beyond the old boundaries of any liff system and took in the Ghumāra and Sinhāja regions as well.

Not all the penalties of the sharī'a were imposed,

1 Ibid., p. 342.
2 See above, p. 127.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghār, p. 382.
4 Ibid., pp. 382-383.
however. There was no mutilation for thieves, for example—they were fined. A decree for the Gaznaya in 1925 laid down that the theft of vegetables, nuts, fruits or grain would be punished with a fine of 6 pesetas or a week in prison. However, the Qur’anic punishment was threatened in certain circumstances.

Prisons were undoubtedly the greatest legal innovation in the Rif Republic, and they were used not only for ordinary criminal offences and for "crimes against the State" such as spying, but also for social crimes such as refusal to repay debts, to keep oaths, and for general bad conduct such as scandal-mongering. (The effects of this policy will be examined in the next section.)

Beyond these crimes, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm went even further into the realm of private conduct, making it mandatory for everyone, even the women, to pray five times a day. Penalties were fairly severe; men who did not pray were sent to the ḥarka on the front for between fifteen and twenty days, and women were fined a chicken.

It will be seen, however, that the term "law" went far beyond the limited ideas of the shari‘a. The shari‘a was primarily concerned with criminal and civil law—in short with questions of violence and the ownership of property, and there were whole areas of legal activity in a modern state which it did not touch—the ordered running of markets, for example, and above all, in the case of the Rif, the problems presented by the particular needs of the

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1 Ibid., p. 389.
2 See below, p. 729.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 389.
security of the state from spying and political subversion, on the one hand, and the need, which was felt in particular by Bū Laḥya and al-Shargī, to reform the general conduct of the people. It is therefore necessary to examine the workings of the Rifī legal system in some detail.

Arrests for Political Reasons

Throughout 1923 and 1924, people were arrested by bin 'Abd al-Karīm's representatives—qā'īds, the army guards, qādīs—and as a result of his own instructions. As we have seen, bin 'Abd al-Karīm, ever since the beginning of the war, had arrested individuals for political reasons—because they were too favourable towards the Spanish, or to ensure their loyalty. This continued after his proclamation: Qā'id Salaḥ of the Banū Walishak and his khalīfa, 'Allāl b. al-Ḥājj Qaddur were arrested for a short time at the beginning of February 1923.¹ This sort of political intimidation continued. During the efforts to take control of the Ghumāra in December 1923, thirty men were despatched from the Rifī base at Tandaman to arrest a certain SI Muḥammad b. Qaddur. Their quarry, however, escaped with his family to the mountains the night before the arrival of the soldiers, who, in place of arresting him, destroyed his house and took his goats—although he had managed to take his cows with him to the mountains.²

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Febrero, Información del día, 8 Feb. 1923.
Maḥammad was reported to be in the al-Marnīsa tribe, arresting everyone who went against his orders.\(^1\)

However, these political arrests were only part of the story. Many people were arrested for communication with the Spanish and spying, or on suspicion of such an offence. This, of course, is normal practice in any war.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was kept informed of possible Spanish spies by his own internal network of informants. For instance, on 11 February 1924, his brother, SI Maḥammad, received the following letter:

"Praise be to God alone. God's mercy and peace be upon our Lord Muḥammad, his family, and companions.

May God prolong the existence of our Lord, who has been made victorious by God, our Lord Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessing.

And to continue:

My Lord. Let it be known to you that Ḥidda Barka al-Timmīṭī who lives in Ushshān went out—and this is true—and went to Aḥmad bin Sīdī Ḥaddū and met him and Muḥammad bin 'Umar Ashshan, may God curse him, and he told him everything that happens in this area and told him of the aeroplane that our Lord has and described how it was white. He tells him about everything that goes on around here. In truth he is a spy. If anything happens to him it means that we are punished and not only him. This is what I have to tell our Lord.

And peace.

On 5 Rajab in the year 1342.

Qā'id Muḥammad b. Mīmūn al-Timmīṭī al-Sa'īdī, may God give him success."\(^2\)

It will be seen that such information may partly have been the result of fear of collective punishment. That at least

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\(^1\) SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaciones, Resumen General, 4 Jan. 1924.

\(^2\) MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 47, Muḥammad b. Mīmūn al-Tamaytī al-Sa'īdī to Maḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, 5 Rajab 1342/11 Feb. 1924. The letter is reproduced in the Appendix (No. 11). The Rifīfs succeeded in buying an aeroplane through the medium of Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū in Algeria. It was poliited by a European but only made one flight before Spanish aeroplanes destroyed it. Goded, op. cit., p. 102.
is the implication behind the final line which says that the writer fears that not only the informant would be punished.

The penalties for spying could be very heavy. There are numerous accounts of the death penalty being meted out to spies and other traitors. One of David Hart's Gaznayî informants described the penalty imposed on a man found carrying messages to the French after hostilities with their zone broke out in 1925. He was bound hand and foot, weighted with a large stone and thrown into the sea, where he allegedly stayed for fifteen days before dying.¹ A brother of Ḥaddu b. Ḥammû al-Kaḥal was discovered trying to free Spanish prisoners and was shot,² and six men from the Murâbiṭîn clan of the Banû Waryaghal, one possessed of baraka, were stoned to death in the Sunday market of Tisar on the orders of bin 'Abd al-Karîm.³

Other crimes also merited the death penalty. Faqîr Si Ḥaddu of the Banû Bû 'Ayyâsh had been amîn in Tafarsit in 1921 and responsible, like Ḥaddu b. Ḥammû al-Kaḥal in Dâr Drîûsh, for forwarding the supplies the Spanish had left there to the central Rif. Evidently he did not send all the supplies, for when his home was searched in July 1923, some 20 cases of ammunition were discovered. On bin 'Abd al-Karîm's instructions, he was shot.⁴

These executions for serious offences were complemented by terms of imprisonment for those who had committed

¹ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 388.
³ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 381.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Julio, Ḥamîd b. al-Ḥajj, 13 July 1923.
lesser offences or whose guilt was only suspected.

Imprisonment

Prisons were, of course, an innovation in the Rif, but they quickly became a part of every-day life. Large numbers of people were imprisoned—mostly for fairly short periods—during the Rif Republic, and the largest prison camp of all—at Takhrusit, between Ajdīr and what is now the town of al-Ŷusayma—was reserved, not for Spanish prisoners of war, but for Rifī prisoners.\(^1\) In September 1924, Spanish Military Intelligence estimated that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had 800 "native" prisoners in Ajdīr\(^2\)—although many of these may have been Spanish native troops captured in the Jībāla.

Fortunately, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's officials kept registers of the names of prisoners, their crimes, and the time for which they had been in the prison—not, it must be stressed, of the length of time for which they had been sentenced. Some of these registers, covering 1923 and 1924, have been preserved.\(^3\)

The first register that is available is for a prison at Tawrīrt in the southern Bānū Mawrāghal, dated 20 Rabi' II 1342/30 November 1923.\(^4\) Unfortunately this, the only register from Tawrīrt, is the least informative. However, a number of interesting things do emerge. The register would seem to have been made in rather a hurry—it is very

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\(^2\) SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Septiembre, nota 8 Sept. 1924.

\(^3\) A typical register is reproduced in the Appendix (No. 12).

\(^4\) MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 145, List of prisoners at Tawrīrt in the mahākma of Targīst, 20 Rabi' II 1340/30 Nov. 1923.
scrappily written and disorganised in comparison with the registers from Ajdir--and is really just a list of names. In all but a very few cases the offence for which the prisoners were arrested is not established. Whoever made the list confined himself to asking the prisoners themselves, and not surprisingly they nearly all claimed that they had no idea why they were imprisoned and they had been wronged. The claim that pasha or 'āmil or qā'id so-and-so "arrested me and wronged me" recurs many times. The exceptions to this are a group of 38 Sinhājis including a pasha, a qā'id 100, 2 qā'ids 50, and 2 qā'ids 25, arrested for the theft of military supplies, a man from the Banū Zarwāl who "killed a man he found with his sister," and a pasha and his khalīfa from the Fannāssa who explained their offence thus:

"When the enemy of God, Ahmad b. Maḥammad, stayed in his [the pasha's] house the khalīfa sent a note to the pasha telling him that an enemy of God was staying in his house and when the mujāhidīn heard that . . . the Qā'id Muḥammad Azdād al-Rifī arrested him [i.e., the pasha]."3

Finally, two men from the Matīwa al-Jabal explained that "our 'āmil arrested us . . . and he thought that we were opposed to him."4 In fact, the vast majority of the 132 prisoners were arrested by either the mujāhids or the 'āmils or by a pasha. This did not mean that holders of these positions were themselves immune from arrest, for the list includes among the prisoners 5 pashas, 2 qā'ids 100, 2 qā'ids 50 and 3 qā'ids 25. It seems quite likely, therefore, that since this was the period of the expansion into

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1 Ibid., note on prisoners nos. 1-38.
2 Ibid., prisoner no. 133.
3 Ibid., prisoners nos. 116 and 117.
4 Ibid., prisoners nos. 58 and 59.
the Sinhāja, most of those arrested were arrested for political offences. Certainly they were nearly all from the immediate area, as Table IX: 4 shows.

It will be seen that apart from the Sinhājis already mentioned, the other large group came from the Marnīsa, the result of the struggle against 'Amār b. Ūamīdū, for they are nearly all listed as being from the jurisdiction of 'Abd al-Salām al-Yādī who was bin 'Abd al-Karīm's gā'id in the area. Furthermore, most of them appear to have been very recent arrests—the length served by the Marnīsīs and Sinhājis is not given—but the rest, the majority, had been imprisoned for less than one month (see Table IX: 5).

The Ajdir Prison

The prisoners of the Ajdir prison are considerably better documented. There exist five registers dated 17 Jumāda I 1342/26 December 1923,2 17 Jumāda II 1342/25 January 1924,3 1 Rajab 1342/17 February 1924,4 27 Ramaḍān 1342/2 May 1924,5 and 30 Ramaḍān 1342/5 May 1924.6

During the period 26 December 1923 to 5 May 1924, that is, less than five months, a total of at least 281 individuals passed through the Adjīr prison. Certainly a number of these were, once again, people captured during the fighting with 'Amār b. Ūamīdū—which explains the high figures

1 Ibid., prisoners nos. 66-70, 80, 90-105.
3 Ibid., p. 142. Unfortunately, this document was not well photographed on microfilm, and is partially illegible. It has therefore been excluded from all numerical tables.
4 Ibid., pp. 134,139.
5 Ibid., p. 146.
6 Ibid., p. 147.
for the Marnisa, and those of the Banü Walid and Banü Wanjil, in February 1924 (see Table IX: 6).

What is interesting about these figures is the relatively low number of people from the Banü Waryaghal in comparison with those from other tribes, particularly the Banü Tüzin, when it is remembered that the prison of Ajdîr was situated within the territory of the Banü Waryaghal. For, although 31 prisoners seems high, the reason that this is so is that the Banü Waryaghal prisoners tended to stay in prison for only a short time. This is in fact true of nearly all the prisoners—there are only 14 out of the 241 prisoners whose names occur in the registers right through from December to May, and not one of them is from the Banü Waryaghal (see Table IX: 7)

A possible reason for this is indicated by the offences for which people were imprisoned. Of the 14 long-serving prisoners in Ajdîr in May 1924, no less than 7 were imprisoned because they were suspected of spying, 2 were former Spanish soldiers, and 2 were suspected of murder. (See Table IX: 8.) Those found guilty were often executed.

It is hardly surprising that suspected spying was most frequent among the tribes immediately bordering on the Spanish zones—in the Banü Sa'id, Banü Walishak, and the exiled Qal'ayîs in the east and the Ghumâran tribes and the Banü Sa'id al-Jabal in the west. The high incidence of violence—fighting and murder—in the Banü Waryaghal and Banü Tüzîn is also scarcely surprising, particularly in the case of the former tribe, with its reputation for feuding.

The most frequent crimes, according to the prison records, were ones of threatening the state's security, or
of violence (see Table IX: 9) but much the most interesting developments are the cases of social and "religious" crimes. Probably for the first time in the Rif, people were expected to behave in a responsible way with regard to the community and in accordance with the sharī'a, even in their personal affairs. The main proponent of this policy would appear to have been the Minister of Justice, the Faqīh al-Shargī and Bū Laḥya of the Banū Tūzīn. On a number of occasions, al-Shargī is reported to have sent people to prison "for reasons of the beloved sharir"—such was the case of two men from the Banū Walishak in December 1923, and a man from the Timsamān was sent by Bū Laḥya for the same reason at the same time. Unfortunately in these cases the actual offence is not stated. However, in February 1924 the offences of other miscreants are spelled out more clearly. Muhammad b. Sha'īb b. 'Umar of the Banū Waryaghal had spent nearly a month in prison, having been sent there by al-Shargī "because of a woman, the daughter of b. al-Tahir Aztūt, whom he promised to marry, without it being valid in the sharir." Qāḍī al-Shargī sent another Waryaghlī to prison because he had failed to pay a debt. By February this man had spent 3 months and 8 days in prison.

As well as offences which directly contravened the sharī'a, the judicial officers also intervened in matters of personal conduct. The records for January 1924 record the imprisonment of 'Allūsh al-Mashādi, arrested on the

1 Ibid., pp. 143-144, prisoners nos. 52 and 53.
2 Ibid., prisoner no. 14.
3 Ibid., pp. 138-139, prisoner no. 8.
4 Ibid., prisoner no. 10.
authorization of the Faqīh b. 'Ali [i.e., Bū Laḥya] because of the length of his tongue and the frequency with which he says ugly things."¹

They also interfered in people's domestic affairs. A man from the Banū Sa'īd (near Melilla) was sent to prison by Bū Laḥya because "he hit his wife and knocked a tooth out of her face."² Punishment by authority for wife beating was doubtless a new experience for the Rifīs. However, although the authorities do seem to have tried to some extent to help to protect women, they were also careful to protect the "honour" of their husbands, presumably partly to prevent fighting and feuding. In December 1923 a man from the Banū Mazdūf was imprisoned because "Sīdī al-Ḥassan b. al-Bū Nāṣirī suspected him of doing something with his wife,"³ and certainly it was possible to claim, as the Banū Zarwāf imprisoned at Tawrīrt had done, that he had killed a man he had found with his wife, as an excuse for his crime.

The government was not averse to imprisoning women either. In Tawrīrt, 6 women, with 10 children, were imprisoned, although they were not accorded the dignity of being numbered in the register. In May 1924 two women were imprisoned, one on suspicion of spying, the other on suspicion "of killing her husband" and her female companion by night.⁴

Violence was, of course, a major social problem in the new state. Thus, on 2 May 1924, a man was imprisoned

¹ Ibid., p. 142 (prisoners not numbered).
² Ibid., pp. 138-139, prisoner no. 77.
³ Ibid., pp. 143-144, prisoner no. 55.
⁴ Ibid., p. 146, prisoners nos. 129, 130.
for killing a man in the market. 1 Another, from the Banū Aḥmad, for killing a man in self-defence. 2 A shaykh from the al-Maṭālsa was arrested and "declared that he killed a woman and the bullet came out of her and hit a man, and he died." 3 An 'Amārtī had killed a man who was a guest in his house one night, 4 and so on. In February 1923, a man from the Banū Waryaghal was arrested on the word of a woman who said that she had let him into her house to kill her husband and his second wife. 4

There was, of course, the ever present possibility that these killings might develop into feuding, as in the case of three men from the al-Maṭālsa tribe who had spent some four months in prison by 26 December 1923 "for awakening the fire of disorder when the son of Aḥmad Aqūdād was killed." 6 For this reason, some of the murders for which people were detained went back some time. Sometime towards the beginning of November, for on 26 December he had been detained for nearly two months, one Ḥaddū b. Idrīs of the Banū Tūzīn was arrested "on suspicion of killing a man ... at night two years ago," 7 although it appears from later registers that this alleged offence was committed at the time of Anwāl. 8 The effect of imprisoning a murder suspect, as well as serving as a warning to others, and punishing him for his presumed crime, was of course to make the continuance

1 Ibid., prisoner no. 139.
2 Ibid., prisoner no. 137.
3 Ibid., prisoner no. 141.
4 Ibid., prisoner no. 143.
5 Ibid., pp. 138-139, prisoner no. 12.
6 Ibid., pp. 143-144, prisoners nos. 34, 35, 36.
7 Ibid., prisoner no. 23.
8 Ibid., p. 146, prisoner no. 26.
of a blood-feud quite impossible.

However, imprisonment was not the only penalty that was imposed. Fines were another possibility, and people were released in exchange for fines. For instance, in May 1924, a Timsamānī suspected of murder was released on payment of 200 riyals, \(^1\) and another Timsamānī who had gone to Melilla by night without permission was also released after payment of a fine. \(^2\) Similarly, people were imprisoned for not paying fines. Again, in May 1924, a Tūzānī, Yakhlinī b. Ḥammū al-‘Aqqīwī, and his friend Muḥ b. Muḥand Amziyyān, were fined 4,000 riyals because "they attended the killing of a man and a woman for adultery without the permission of the government." \(^3\) This is an affair which itself throws some light on relations between the population and the government, for assuming that it was the killing for adultery that was without the permission of the government (rather than attendance at the execution), it shows firstly that the government's aim was to limit such practices, and secondly that, on this occasion at least, it failed to do so.

The Market Inspector's Queries

There were, of course, lesser problems of order than those which ended in imprisonment. One of the objectives of the new ordered society that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was trying to bring about was to avoid arguments and disagreements getting out of hand. One of the areas in which he evidently hoped to do this was in the markets, and he

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\(^1\) Ibid., prisoner no. 55.

\(^2\) Ibid., prisoner no. 57.

\(^3\) Ibid., prisoner no. 30.
Table IX: 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinhāja (unspecified tribes)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fannāssa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Bashīr</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Silmān</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Zarwāl</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marnīsa</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matīwa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wazzānī Sharīf</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table IX: 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Prison Term</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 month</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 months</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 months and more</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of whom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 were from Marnīsa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 were from Sinhāja and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 were women and children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table IX: 6**

*Individuals arrested from each tribe in Ajdir*

*Prison 26 December 1923-5 May 1924*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banū Waryaghal</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timsamān</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Tūzīn</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafarsit</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū 'Amārt</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matīwa al-Bahar</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Sa‘īd al-Rif (i.e., near Melilla)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Walishak</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Yīṭṭufts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Maṭālsa</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buqquya</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Bu Fraḥ</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaznaya</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zargāt</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qal‘aya</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Aḥmad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Bu Slāma</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Wanjīl</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Walīd</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Sa‘īd al-Jabal (i.e., near Tetuan)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghumāra</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banū Mazdūl</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awlād Azain (?)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marnīsa</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrākīsh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>281</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 138-139, 143-144, 146-147.*
Table IX: 7

Numbers of prisoners held for entire period
26 December 1923 to 5 May 1924 expressed as percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Number of Prisoners</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All tribes</td>
<td>14 out of 281</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banû Tûzîn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghumâra</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matîwa al-Baḥar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafarsît</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Saʿîd al-Rîf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tîmsamân</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 138-139, 143-144, 146-147.

Table IX: 8

List of prisoners, and crimes, held for entire period 26 December 1923 to May 1924 and total length of imprisonment to 5 May 1924

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banû Tûzîn</td>
<td>Ḥaddu b. Idrîs al-Yaḥyî</td>
<td>suspicion of murder during Anwâl victory</td>
<td>7 m. 3 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Faqîr Salâm b. al-Ḥassan al-Miṣârî</td>
<td>arrested by mujâhîds</td>
<td>8 m. 18 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matîwa al-Rîf</td>
<td>Al-Mufâḍḍal b. Muḥ</td>
<td>suspicion communication with enemy</td>
<td>6 m. 8 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafarsît</td>
<td>al-Faqîr Ḥammâdî b. Ṣâdiq</td>
<td>&quot;the spy&quot;</td>
<td>12 m. 3 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banû Saʿîd</td>
<td>Al-Tâhir b. Ḥaddu</td>
<td>unclear</td>
<td>6 m. 27 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ḥammu b. Daddâm</td>
<td>captured in battle</td>
<td>22 m. 3 d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/cont'd
Timsamān
Ḥammādī b. Sha‘īb
- suspicion of spying
Shaykh Tuḥāmī Amghār
- suspicion of murder
Banū Bū Zrā
Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Īfīl
- suspicion of communciation with Spain
Aḥmad b. Sīdī Muḥammad
- says he's innocent
al-Ḥassan b. al-‘Arbi
- suspicion of communication with Spain
Banū Ziyāyat
al-Mufaḍḍal b. Zarnūn
- going to enemy zone
Unidentified tribe in Ghumāra
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-‘Ayyāshi
- ex-Spanish qā'id
Batū Manṣūr
Sīdī al-Ḥassan b. Aḥmad
- suspicion of communication with enemy
Prisoners not held in Ajdīr in December 1924, but in custody for more than 6 months in May 1924
Qal'aya
Sha‘īb b. Muḥ: - arrested on coast at Sīdī Misa'ūd
Muḥ ‘Abd al-Qādir
- arrested on coast at Sīdī Misa'ūd
Mimūn b. Muḥammad b. Ṭayyib
- arrested by mahalla

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 138-139, 143-144, 146-147.
Table IX: 9

Numbers of individuals imprisoned for named crimes on 26 December 1923, 17 February 1924, 2 May 1924 and 5 May 1924

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>26 Dec. 1923</th>
<th>17 Feb. 1924</th>
<th>2 May 1924</th>
<th>5 May 1924</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military offences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Refused service under gā'id/absent from ḥarka</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Captured in battle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Arrested by army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil and religious offences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Arrested by gā'ids etc.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ḥannāsh (e., general bad conduct)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criminal offences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Murder/suspicion of</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fighting/assault</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wartime offences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Suspicion of spying</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Visiting Spanish zone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Living in Spanish zone/former Spanish employee</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Suspected sabotage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hostage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Captured members of 'Amār b. Ḫamīdu's party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Unclear</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Other</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>96</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 138-139, 143-144, 146-147. The term ḥannāsh is derived from the term for a snake charmer and was used in the qānūns of the period before the Rif war to mean "evil doers", Hart, Emilio Blanco II, p. 289.
appointed mu'tasibs, market inspectors, to carry out this function. This was another relatively new idea in the Rif and itself posed problems for the officials concerned, for they were unsure of the extent of their duties. A scribbled note, preserved in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry, gives some indication of this. It it neither dated nor does it contain any hint as to the person to whom it was sent, but the significance is clear enough:

"Sir, the mu'tasib Sidi 'Amar al-Jalmu'si asks for a clarification of his duties.

They are: does he have jurisdiction in the matter of the collection of long-standing debts that are contracted in [his] market, or not, after the complainant has left the collection to him?

What is [his] jurisdiction in the case of two antagonists who challenge each other over a contentious matter in the market, if one of them refuses to meet him and then the complainant comes back to me? Do I have a free hand or should I send my helpers behind his back and refer it to the council of the shar'i? I have already referred the matter to the 'amil's and they refuse to take it under their jurisdiction. Also in the case of a man buying and selling animals and cattle who comes with the permission of his 'amil to buy and sell, is he free to do as he wishes in that matter, because of the permission of 'amil, or is he forbidden it all?"

Such questions imply a very detailed control of markets at least, and a strong centralisation of power. Such control is also to be seen in a later document, dating from June or July 1925 and issued in the Gaznayya tribe on the instructions of b. 'Abd al-Karim's pasha, setting a fine of 6 pts for anyone stealing nuts or grain or fruit, or anyone who allowed his cattle to graze upon the leaves of trees belonging to others. But whereas agreements on theft and illegal grazing existed before the Rif Republic, such institutions

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1 Ibid., p. 183, Note from Sidi 'Amar al-Jalmu'si, no date, no recipient named.
2 Quoted in Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 389-390.
as muhtasibs were entirely new.

The Changing Life-Style of the Rif

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm's reforms went far beyond legal penalties for wrongdoing. He was attempting, after all, to build a new unified state in the Rif, and everything that emphasised differences amongst his subjects he tried to suppress. Some of these differences might, at first sight, seem relatively minor. For example, before the Rif Republic men from each tribe had worn distinctive scalplocks, thus setting them apart from neighbouring tribes.¹ Bin 'Abd al-Karîm ordered that all men cut off their scalplocks, and although some re-grew them after the war, the practice has now died out completely.² In a further effort to abolish feuding, he ordered that all the watch-towers previously attached to Rifî houses, and useful for sniping at enemies, should be destroyed.³

Other legal reforms were purely social: bin ‘Abd al-Karîm abolished the smoking of hashish, forbade men to go barefoot,⁴ and limited the amount of money which was paid to the parents of a bride before a wedding to a maximum of 500 pesetas (it had previously reached 2,500 pesetas on occasion.)⁵

Conclusion

After the battle of Anwâl, bin ‘Abd al-Karîm

1 Coon, Tribes of the Rif, pp. 127-128.
2 Ibid., p. 128, and Hart, Aith Waryaghâr, p. 390.
3 Ibid., p. 38.
4 Ibid., p. 390.
5 Coon, Tribes of the Rif, p. 133.
had called a meeting in his house where he had spoken of the need to fight the Spanish. Some found it difficult to believe that he had changed sides, others, despite the flight of the Spanish, were still pessimistic about the possibility of final victory, and asked "How can you fight a country with a flag and a government?"  

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm's answer was to create his own government, with its own flag. The form of the flag, incidentally, is much disputed. However, the example preserved in the Army Museum in Madrid shows a red background in the centre of which is a white diamond with a green six-pointed star and crescent. Skîraj shows a slightly different arrangement (a white square and a battle flag with a smaller crescent and star and the words "La ilâ ilâ Allâh Muḥammad Rasûl Allâh" ("There is no god but God and Muḥammad is the messenger of God") in gold (see Photograph IX: 10). About the existence of his government there can be no doubt, however.

The bay'a of February 1923 had laid the obligation of the Caliphate upon bin 'Abd al-Karîm—these obligations were religious—the imposition of the sharī'a, and political—the winning of the war against the Spanish. To fulfil them, bin 'Abd al-Karîm carried out a thorough reorganisation of the Rif. This reorganisation was vital if he was to win the war against the Spanish, and thus the introduction of the sharī'a helped in the military struggle by ending blood feuds, bringing about unity, and strengthening the power of the makhzan. At the same time the battle...

2 Skîraj, op. cit., p. 145.
Photograph IX: 10

The flags of the Rif state: top, the flag flown at the mahakmas; bottom, the battle flag of the mujahidin.

Source: Drawing based on the flags drawn by Skiraj (op. cit., p. 145)

On following page: photograph of the only existing Rif flag.

Source: Photograph supplied by Museo del Ejército, Madrid
لا إله إلا الله
صلى وسلم الله
عليه وسلم
النبي محمد ﷺ
against the Spanish had to be won if the sharī'a was to be totally effected. The one depended upon the other.

So bin 'Abd al-Karīm formed a makhzan. It was in the traditional pattern of a local qā'id building up a miniature state in the sense that it was largely—though by no means entirely—made up of members of his own family and tribe, but was modern in the sense that in one vital area it looked beyond its leader's immediate family, for the people most immediately concerned with the imposition of the sharī'a—Bu Lahya, al-Shargī, and others—were not Waryaghlīs at all.

It was also modern in another way—the great power of the centre. For a state like the Rif, with relatively few educated people, and during a war, the amount of bureaucracy is extraordinary. Careful records were kept of the payment of troops, of those incarcerated in the prisons, of the issue of arms. Efforts were made to change the physical aspects of the Rif—roads and telephone lines were built, bringing the periphery closer to the centre.

The foundation of this new state meant that bin 'Abd al-Karīm's own position went far beyond that of a military leader of an alliance of tribes against an outside invader, or that of a tribal leader who was trying to set up a new dynasty. The bay'a put him firmly in the rōle of a Caliph, as the spiritual and political leader of the faithful in the Rif. The obligations traditionally placed on a Moroccan Sultan included the defence of the religion and the state. These obligations were also placed on bin 'Abd al-Karīm. He also formed a government on the model of the traditional Moroccan makhzan, with its own army, its own
flag, its own administration, and so on. At first sight, then, it looks as though this was an attempt to create a new Sultanate in the Rif.

However, bin 'Abd al-Karīm, both at the time and later, claimed that he did not wish to impinge on the authority of the Sultan of Morocco, that he was not a king, but the united voice of his people. To confuse matters further, the new state was known by two names: al-Dawla al-Jumhūriya al-Rifiya (literally "The Rifian Republican State"), and al-Jabha al-Rifiya ("The Rifian Front"). The first of these titles appeared on official notepaper,¹ and the second was its title in retrospect, as given by later informants.² These two expressions need some explanation.

The term jabha implies that the Rif was only one front in the campaign for the liberation of all Morocco, a factor that would become an issue of great importance in 1925. Jumhūriya, on the other hand, is a word coined from the Arabic word jumhūr (crowd, mass) in the late eighteenth century to describe a new concept of government, originating in Europe. Its import was not so much an emphasis on republicanism—which is what the word now means in Arabic—but a concern with the constitutional relationships between the monarch and the people. Of course, according to sunni jurists, the shari'a implied that theoretically the Islamic state should be headed by a non-hereditary elected sovereign, so some nineteenth and twentieth-century writers felt able

¹ Paper with this heading was found by Spanish troops at the end of May 1926 when they occupied bin 'Abd al-Karīm's last residence at the zawiya of Sidi 'Abdullah bin Yusif in the Banū al-Waryaghal, Sánchez-Pérez, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
to describe the doctrine of the Caliphate as "republican" as a result, in the sense of connoting popular and representative government rather than what is normally understood as "republican" in Europe. In fact, the term jumhūriyya came into practical use only during the First World War, to describe the short-lived "Republic" of Azerbaijan in May 1918, and the equally transitory Republic of Tripolitania in November 1918.¹ The comparison with Tripolitania is close, at first sight, for in that part of Africa, theoretically under the control of the Italians, who had failed to impose any form of permanent order, an independent proto-state, based on Misurata, had been set up in 1918 under Turko-German influence to resist the Italians. It was styled the Jumhūriyya al-Ṭrablūsīyya and was ruled by a "Committee of Reform" headed by Ramādān al-Shtāwi. This government was not, however, nearly so powerful as bin 'Abd al-Karīm's, and found it hard to maintain order, though it received considerable support from the European left.²

It must be said that the term jumhūriyya cannot in the case of the Rif at least, be translated simply by the English word "republic". There are two very good reasons for avoiding this translation. In the first place it is misleading because although the word ripublik was certainly known in the Rif and used in the colloquial dialect, it had a meaning quite different from the European word from which it was derived. As bin 'Abd al-Karīm explained to Vincent Sheean, for the Rifis the term ripublik meant "small local

groups, even smaller than tribes. We have several 'republics' in every grouping of Riffi infantry. In the second place, the term "republic" in European usage implies a state which is governed either by elected representatives or by a head of state who was not king. As we have seen, neither of these descriptions fits the Rif very well. Although bin 'Abd al-Karīm did consult his supporters over some matters, such consultation did not diminish his own personal power. Furthermore, by accepting the title of amīr al-mu'mīrin, and the responsibilities of a "local caliphate" he was going far beyond the usually accepted authority of a secular "president".

To explain jumhūriya, it is necessary first of all to look at its meaning in Arabic. Its origins in the word meaning "mass" or "crowd" are a clue. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm in accepting his bay'a, claimed to represent the collective voice of his people, and their desire to come together to defeat the Spanish, although as far as he was concerned, the collective voice's authority beyond that expressing desire was very limited. Thus jumhūriya represented a statement, at least in theory, of the popular basis of the Riffi movement and expressed a wider and more permanent movement than a mere tribal alliance. Probably even more important, the choice of the word jumhūriya was influenced by the fact that it had a certain contemporary currency in the Islamic world after the end of the First World War. It was, in fact, in vogue, and its use bore public witness to the modern aspect of the new Riffi government. Finally, the term was a statement that a new political entity had come into existence.

Sheean, Adventures, p. 179. See also Hart in Colloque, pp. 33-45, who makes the same point.
in the Rif—and not in Morocco—thereby emphasising not only its modernity but also its independence. To sum up, the word jumhūrīya, although it is very difficult to determine its exact meaning either to the citizens of the new state, or to its rulers, was an indication that the system of government, law and society in the Rif had changed. Out of an alliance behind the figure of Muḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, which had grown up among a few tribes before the war, a new state had emerged, dependent on bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, and strictly under his control. A control which gave him almost absolute power over the administration which he and his supporters set up, over the legal system which had replaced the old system of fines, and over the army which owed its allegiance to bin ʿAbd al-Karīm. It was to this power that Robert Montagne, in his remarks on the social and political transformation of the Rif, pointed:

"The authority of the new Sultan [sic] is harshly used . . . and it is held in the unlimited respect which force commands in this country. We are far now from the vague submission of old to the Sultan in Fez."¹

Of course, as Montagne himself pointed out in other works, a powerful figure had risen before among Berber tribes in Moroccan history, and started a new dynasty.² But this new state was not like that.

What distinguished this state from the Berber proto-states of the past was firstly the new modern organisation, the army and government, formed along European and Islamic reformist lines respectively, and secondly its

¹ R. Montagne, "Quelques aspects de la transformation politique du Rif 1898-1925" (Military Intelligence report in SHAT, Maroc, Fez, 156, Renseignement sur les chefs indigènes, p. 14).  
² Montagne, Berbers, passim.
effects on the ordinary citizen, which were quite unlike anything that had been seen before. In the space of three years every major part of Rifî life had been revolutionised. Feuding had effectively been abolished. Powerful shaykhs were held in check now, not by the strength or otherwise of their colleagues in the tribe, but by the centralised force of their new governor. A glance at the prison register is sufficient to show how many shaykhs did not realise this and were imprisoned, or worse, for their crimes.

Crime itself had been revolutionised. Now, an offence was no longer an offence against an individual or his family, or against the community in which a man might live, but against the wider community of the state. This change of emphasis also meant that the range of crimes was increased from concern with murder or theft to treachery against the new state, and because this was an attempt at an Islamic state, to offences against the sharî'a. For the first time, outside authority could, and did, intervene in what had hitherto been private or at most family or clan matters: the payment of debts, marital peace, were enforced not by a man's neighbours but by the state.

The social reforms of the new state went beyond simple criminal acts—they set new standards of behaviour, attendance at prayers, for example, even the wearing of shoes, were enjoined on the Rifis. The social differences which could so easily divide Rifî society—such as scalplocks—were removed.

In return for these reforms—or sacrifices—the Rifis received relative peace at home. It doubtless benefited them greatly in a material sense. In a political sense it
was even more vital, for peace and order at home meant that
the war against the Spanish and against 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu
could more easily be pursued.

In short, as Montagne wrote in 1925:

"The political and military events in the Rif, which
for the past five years have so often surprised Spain,
France and all Europe, have caused in this small cor-
ner of the Sherifian Empire, a profound change in
social and political attitudes, to the point at which
the face of the country is no longer recognisable,
and quite different from that in our own zone." ¹

¹ Montagne, "Quelques aspects . . .", p. 1.
Chapter X

THE RĪFĪ STATE ON THE OFFENSIVE

FEBRUARY 1923 TO SEPTEMBER 1923

"In the present circumstances it [i.e., Spanish success in Morocco] is impossible. Swarming as it [the Tetuan area] does with her lowest-class Andalusians is enough to convince me of that. Two things stand out clearly. Firstly not ten generations will make the Spaniards acceptable to the Moors, and not in ten generations, such as it is at present, will Spain convey any civilisation to Morocco."

British Vice-Consul Were, in Tetuan, commenting on the future of the Spanish in Morocco, August 1923. ¹

"It now appears that your friends are of no interest to you and Idrīs al-Rīfī treats them like Jews."

Letter from shaykhs of the Banū Tūzīn to Spanish High Commissioner, March 1923. ²

"What has happened that you betray the promise that you made me that we should work together? You knew of the struggle, the difficulties, the danger that I am in because I work with you, and yet you have forgotten me and compromised me among the tribes and given me no support . . . You have made me lose my goods, my men and my tribe."

Pro-Spanish qā'id complaining of lack of support, September 1923. ³

1 FO 371/9470/7048/44, Codrington to Curzon, Tangier, 30 Aug. 1923, enclosing report by Were.

2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bení Tuzin, All the shaykhs of the Banū Tūzīn without exception to the High Commissioner, 14 Rajab 1341/2 Mar. 1923.

The remarks quoted above all refer to rapidly declining political prestige of the Spanish authorities after the proclamation of bin 'Abd al-Karīm in January 1923. This declining prestige was mirrored by a rapid increase in the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm. There were a number of reasons for this, not all of them the result of Spanish insufficiencies, for the political and military power of the new Rifī government increased in its own right. On the Spanish side there were a number of factors that decreased Spanish influence. In the first place, the Spanish were unable to help their supporters behind the Rifī lines, in the second place, the contacts which the Spanish maintained with those supporters were maintained by their Pasha in Tafarsit--who became 'āmil of the Rif, in accordance with the Spanish policy of organising their protectorate through Moroccan representatives. The new 'āmil was Idrīs al-Rifī, who had already caused considerable disquiet in 1922. During 1923 his treatment of Spanish supporters resulted in yet more disillusion with Spanish policies. In addition, the military operations of the Spanish army were hampered by a weak government in Madrid, which was eventually replaced in a coup d'état in September 1923.

On the Rifī side, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's mounting authority was the result of his ability to impose his will through the use of force. In the period following his proclamation, he succeeded in defeating 'Amar b. Ḥāmīdu, extending his control into the Ghumāra and crushing an attempted revolt there. This control was not a mild affair, and involved the use of harsh tactics of repression, and the fact that he was able to overcome the resulting resistance showed the strength of the new state.
The Failure of the Spanish Civil Protectorate

In February 1923 a new civilian High Commissioner was appointed in Tetuan. This was Francisco Silvela, appointed to replace the Marqués de Villanueva, who had never taken office. He took up his post on 14 February 1923 and was at once faced with difficulties with the army, for only a week later, on 21 February, the Comandante General in Melilla, General Losada, resigned after expressing dissatisfaction over the lack of an offensive policy in Morocco and over the attacks made on the army in the Spanish press. He was replaced by General Vives. This distrust between the army and the government was to be a recurrent problem throughout 1923 and 1924.

There were even more immediate problems in the eastern zone, especially with Idris al-Rifi, the man expected to become the one who carried out the policy of allowing the "natives" to govern themselves. He had never been popular as Pasha of Tafarsit, but things got steadily worse. By the last week in February 1924, he had succeeded in alienating most of the important leaders in the tribes bordering on the Spanish-occupied zone in the east. The Banû Tûzîn were particularly incensed. A meeting was held of the Tûzânî clans of IgharbiIn, Banû ‘Aqqî, Banû Bil‘Aïz, and part of the Banû Tsaft, and the important zawiya of Bujdayn, which agreed not only to break off relations with Idris al-Rifi but to join the guard round Tizzî ‘Azzâ.

1 See above, pp. 491-492.
3 See above, pp. 482-484.
attack convoys to that position, fine anyone going to markets in the Spanish-occupied zone, and to attack the Spanish if they advanced. Those concerned were not, however, supporters of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm—the Bujdayn family in particular was quite definitely opposed to him even though SI Māḥammad was married to one of the women of the family. Yet, as the Spanish informant who reported this meeting pointed out, they were quite justified in making their point in this way, for while the Spanish occupation had been beneficial to them before the Pasha was appointed—as it had meant they received firewood, straw, work in the Spanish supply convoys, and so on—all these benefits were now distributed among Idrīs al-Rīfī’s friends, and they received none.

Not surprisingly, even if the shaykhs concerned were not his supporters, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm tried to take advantage of the situation to win them over. At the beginning of March he sent 30,000 pesetas down to the Tafarsit area to be distributed among the shaykhs who were opposed to Idrīs al-Rīfī. Another 15,000 pesetas were sent to the Banū Walishak.

In fact, most of the Spanish supporters in the Banū Tūzin remained favourably disposed to the Spanish, although their attacks on Idrīs al-Rīfī knew no bounds. Two

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1 See above, p. 534, Table IX : 1. The Bujdayn family were the main supporters of the French in the eastern Rif (see above, p.217). This had so annoyed the emerging anti-Spanish coalition in the Rif in 1919, that SI Ḥāmid Bujdayn was assassinated in August of that year (see above, p. 236).

2 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Febrero, Muḥammad b. ‘Amar b. Ḥaddush (Igharbiin, Banū Tūzin), 22 Fe. 1923.

shaykhs from the IgharbiIn wrote to the Spanish in March to say that five friends of the Pasha had been responsible for the destruction of bridges and the theft of telephone wire near Tafarsit.¹ There followed accusations that Idrīs treated people like Jews,² and even that he had deceived the Comandante General:

"We must tell you about the men to whom you were introduced by Idris al-RiIfi when you came to Tafarsit last Thursday and who were from the clan of Banū Bil-‘Aiz. Idris al-RiIfi told you 'These two are notables (a’yān) of the Banū Tǔzin.' It is not true that they are our notables. One of them is employed in the selling of eggs and chickens. The other sells lemons . . ."³

Another letter threatened to cut off relations with the Spanish unless Idrīs al-RiIfi was removed.⁴

The Spanish were faced with a spate of anonymous letters of this sort, all threatening to break off relations. Anonymous letters can mean two things, of course, either that the allegations are untrue and malicious, or that they are true, and are not signed in order to protect the writer. However, the suspicions of Spanish Military Intelligence were aroused, and a close watch kept on the Pasha's home, but without coming to any very clear conclusions as to what he was doing.⁵

Nevertheless, on 9 May 1923, in pursuance of the policy of local self-government, Idrīs al-RiIfi was installed

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Beni Tuzin, 'Allāl b. 'Allāl al-Maghrīnī and Muḥammad b. 'Amar to Colonel, 2 Sha'bān 1341/20 Mar. 1923.
² Ibid., Shaykhs of the Banū Tǔzin to High Commissioner, 14 Rajab 1341/2 Mar. 1923.
³ Ibid., The a'yān of the Banū Tǔzin to Comandante General, received 22 Mar. 1923.
⁴ Ibid., The a'yān of the Banū Tǔzin al-Jabal to Colonel, 2 Sha'bān 1341/20 Mar. 1923.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Abril, nota, 4a Mía (Vigilancia), 6 Apr. 1923.
as 'āmil of the Rif, thus re-establishing "the ancient Rif province". As Walter Harris pointed out, however, "The Pasha's chief work for some time will be to endeavour to take possession of his province." British Vice-Consul Were, in a typically pessimistic despatch, made the same point:

"No useful result is to be expected from this appointment. Dris er Riffi [sic], despite his name, is not a Riffian, and he enjoys no personal prestige in the Riff. It is, however, interesting as being a step in the direction of a semi-independent province approximating to the status demanded for it by Abd el-Krim."

In fact, of course, the new status of the Rif province was in no way comparable with the independence that bin 'Abd al-Karim sought, but it is an interesting development of the argument that the demand for independence should be met with an offer of internal autonomy, thereby saving Spanish troops and money.

A similar policy was being adopted in the western zone. The pact concluded with al-Raisūlī in September 1922 and confirmed by al-Raisūlī's semi-submission to the khālīfa in December still held, and the Jibāla was relatively peaceful. In May 1923, al-Raisūlī had returned to his former palace at Asīla, although he did not remain there long. Yet, as Walter Harris, who approved in principle of the introduction of a civil administration, pointed out, it would have been more successful had the adoption of that policy not been the result of the Anwāl disaster, and been taken from

1 The Times, 12 May 1923, p. 11. dated Tangier, 11 May 1923.
2 Ibid.
3 FO 371/9469/W4237/44/28, Were to Codrington, Tetuan, 19 May 1923.
4 See above, pp. 456-457.
5 The Times, 4 June 1923, p. 11, dated Madrid, 3 June 1923.
a position of strength.\(^1\)

However, no one was really satisfied by the political changes. Al-Raisülî, angered by attacks on him in the Spanish press, threatened to "retire" from politics.\(^2\) Spanish press attacks—all part of a general campaign by the opposition press in Spain to discredit their government's policy in Morocco—also upset Idrîs al-Rîfî and he apparently expressed a wish to resign. He was only prevented by "the earnest entreaties of the High Commissioner."\(^3\) His position was made worse when he lost a close friend of Idrîs b. Sa'îd, the man who had for so long carried on negotiations for the release of the prisoners, and thereby threatened to subvert the Rîfî state.\(^4\) Idrîs b. Sa'îd, who had also been attacked in the Spanish press, was shot while he, Idrîs al-Rîfî, and a group of Spanish officers were watching the construction of a blockhouse near Tafarsît.\(^5\) A number of rumours spread as to the reason for this murder. British Vice-Consul Were reported that it was done on the orders of Castro Girona because of the links between Idrîs b. Sa'îd and Echevarieta, the Basque millionaire who had negotiated the release of the prisoners.\(^6\) Unlikely as this may sound, a similar story, that the murder was carried out as the result of the feud between the army and the government over the policy of the civil protectorate, was reported to me by the son of bin 'Abd

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1 Ibid., 11 Apr. 1923, p. 12, dated Tangier.
2 Ibid., 19 June 1923, p. 14, dated Tangier, 18 June 1923.
3 FO 371/9496/W5598/44/28, Were to Codrington, Tetuan, 22 June 1923.
4 See above, pp. 472, 493.
6 FO 371/9496/W5598/44/28, Were to Codrington, Tetuan, 22 June 1923.
al-Karîm in 1977. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm himself was given
another story by the man who allegedly committed the murder,
one Wuld al-Ḥassan of Tafarsit, and bin 'Abd al-Karîm had
him arrested and imprisoned. In his defence Wuld al-Ḥassan
claimed that he shot Idrîs bin Sa'id because "he saw that the
Makhzan [i.e., Spain] was about to occupy a position on his
land, and also he did not know that the shots would hurt
Dris ben Said [sic]."  

Idrîs al-Rifî may not have been content, but the
Spanish army was not happy either. At the beginning of July
the Comandante General of Melilla was replaced yet again,
this time by General Severiano Martínez Anido, 3 who had
made his reputation during his office as Captain-General,
and later as Civil Governor, in Barcelona, where he earned
a reputation for brutality in his dealings with the syndi-
calist movement. 4

Such a man was unlikely to appreciate the
government's problems of financing the war in Morocco—which
was now costing 750,000,000 pesetas a year (the equivalent

1 Personal information, Idrîs al-Khaṭṭābî; Sept. 1977.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Julio, nota, 3 July 1923,
interestingly a certain "bin al-Ḥassan" was mentioned by
Ḥaddu b. Ḥammû in a report from Tafarsit in Oct. 1921 as
being noticeably anti-Rifî, MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 154, Ḥaddu b.
Ḥammû al-Buqquyl to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karîm, 25 Ṣafar 1340/
28 Oct. 1921.
3 The Times, 7 June 1923, dated Madrid, 6 June 1923.
4 His methods in Barcelona, according to Brennan, "were
neither legal ones; nor even those sanctioned by military
law such as arbitrary imprisonment and trial by court martial."
His Chief of Police armed a gang of gunmen "and gave them a
list of the Syndicalist leaders whom they were to shoot on
sight." Brennan quotes Miguel de Unamuno, the Spanish nov-
elist and philosopher, as saying of him, "The man is a pure
brute—he can't even talk, he can only roar and bray, though
his roars and brays always mean something." Gerald Brennan,
The Spanish Labyrinth, an Account of the Social and Political
Background of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1969), p. 73.
of £25,000,000 at that period) and he pressed for more troops in order to undertake a landing at Alhucemas. The military estimated that this would involve at least 6,000 casualties, so not surprisingly the government was most unwilling to allow it. On 14 August, his plan for the landing having been rejected, Martín Anido resigned and yet another Comandante General for Melilla was appointed, General Enrique Marzo.¹

Meanwhile, the Madrid government sent a commission of the General Staff headed by General Weyler to Morocco on a fact-finding expedition. On its return, it reported that the eastern line should be defended, that an all-volunteer army should be set up in Morocco, that political action among the unsubmitted tribes should be increased, and that further action should be taken against the Banū Waryaghal.²

This report, and the subsequent debate on the proposed landings at Alhucemas, brought about yet another government crisis. On 23 August 1923, troops embarking for Morocco at Málaga mutinied and shot their sergeant. A corporal who had led this mutiny was sentenced to death but then reprieved by the government, which also forbade any further troop movements to Morocco.³ The army was not pleased.

Even by its own lights the civil Protectorate policy was a failure. Under the previous army control the Protectorate authorities had spent 815,000 pesetas in

² Fleming, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
³ Payne, Politics and the Military, p. 196.
three months on education, and the development of trade and commerce. Under the new policy, over the same length of time, only 383,000 pesetas was expended on these things.¹ As The Times pointed out, "This can hardly be considered anything but a very poor demonstration of colonizing activity."²

The full details of Weyler's plans were released on 3 September. Three ministers resigned when the Foreign Minister, Alba, agreed to change the policy and accept the idea, expressed in the report, of carrying out landings at Alhucemas. The cabinet resigned, but re-formed, and the government limped along for a little while longer.³

However, the army had been plotting a coup for some time. The man chosen to lead it was Miguel Primo de Rivera. Primo de Rivera had in the past expressed firm views on the need to withdraw from Morocco to defensive positions on the coast⁴ so on the face of it he would appear to have been an unlikely candidate for the task of leading the Spanish army to greater glory in Morocco. However, he was one of the few high-ranking generals who had both taken no part in the arguments over the military defence Juntas,⁵ and who was untouched by the Anwäl scandal. Furthermore, he had made serious efforts during the preceding months to persuade his co-conspirators that he had moderated his views on Morocco, and no longer felt the need for a total withdrawal.⁶

² Ibid.
³ Payne, Politics and the Military, pp. 196-197.
⁴ See above, p. 393.
⁵ See above, pp. 476-477, for an explanation of the Juntas de Defensa.
On 13 September 1923, Primo de Rivera proclaimed martial law in Barcelona, where he was Captain-General, and announced a Military Directory. For a day or so success was uncertain, but on 15 September, with the King's tacit support, Primo arrived in Madrid and formed a government.  

The Moroccan problem was by no means the only factor which led to the coup—terrorism, corruption, and national security played their part as well. But many of the Moroccan commanders distrusted Primo's intentions in Morocco and he came into conflict with them very soon.

Meanwhile, in Morocco, there were other changes. Idris al-Riff was promoted to a position of authority in Tetuan so that he could gradually be eased out of direct contact with the local people. In July 1923, two a'yan of the Banu Tuzin wrote to the Spanish to express their satisfaction, and promised they would work with the Spanish more closely in the future. In September, another letter arrived from a shaykh of Azru, in the Gaznaya, saying that he would resume relations with the Spanish, which he had broken off because of Idris al-Riff.

**The Battle against 'Amr b. Hamidu**

At the very moment when bin 'Abd al-Karim was being proclaimed, 'Amar b. Hamidu, the old enemy of the Riff leader in the Sinhaja, was trying to gather forces to attack

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1 Ibid., pp. 198-201.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 1, Beni Tuzin, Qā'id 'Abd al-Salam b. Mizzyāz al-Miḍārī and al-'Abbās al-Bujdaynī to Colonel, 8 Dhu al-Hijja 1341/22 July 1923. Note that once again a member of the Bujdayn family was helping the Spanish.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Igzinnayen, Ahmad b. 'Amar to Colonel, received 5 Sept. 1923.
him again.

On 12 January, five days before the first proclamation, 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu was reported to have taken a column of 1,800 men from several tribes against the Rifī dominated Banū 'Amārt in support of the Wargha tribes, who had started fighting the Banū 'Amārt a few days before. Once again, bin Ḥamīdu's forces attacked the houses of Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's qāʿid in the Banū 'Amārt, who was still held by 'Abd al-Mālik as a prisoner. The houses were burned and the inhabitants fled to safety in the Banū Waryaghal.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's supporters in the Banū Waryaghal then attacked those of 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu in the Banū Ḥadhīfa clan of that tribe. Seven of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's men were killed in this attack.

'Amar b. Ḥamīdu had been joined by al-Ḥājj Bil-Qīsh of the Gaznaya. They both appealed to the Spanish for money at the beginning of February and tried to prevent bin 'Abd al-Karīm's declaration as Sultan in the Tuesday market at Azilaḥ. For the moment, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not very worried by the two southern leaders for he was much more concerned about the Spanish and he ordered his front line to be reinforced: in mid-February, over 1,000 men were sent to the eastern lines. The greater importance which bin 'Abd al-Karīm gave to the Spanish was the result of divisions.

1 See above, p. 481.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Enero, Ḥāmid b. 'Abd al-Salām b. Ḥāmid, 12 Jan. 1923.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Febrero, T.O.C., Comandante Intervención to Comandante General and Coronel de Policía (Tafarsit), 7 Feb. 1923, and Información del día, 8 Feb. 1923.
among his opponents in the Sinhdja and MarIsa. On 8 March, several MarnIsIs wrote to the Spanish to explain that they
had fallen out with 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu and had transferred
their allegiance to 'Abd al-Mālik.¹

Apparently the argument was over the release of
prisoners held by 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu. 200 men from the Banū Ḥamīd had appealed to Bil-Qiṣh in mid-February to ask
'Amar b. Ḥamīdu to release prisoners from their tribe and
others from the Banū Warghaḏl. Bin Ḥamīdu replied that
before he did so the petitioners would have to fight bin 'Abd
al-Karīm for two months, and that the Wargaghli prisoners
would have to pay a 250,000 pesetas fine each. (The amount
seems excessive to say the least.) Matters became worse
when 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu was held responsible for a murder com-
mitted in the Marnīsa, but refused to pay the fine of 20,000
pesetas that was demanded. This was yet another demon-
stration of the fact that unity, be it against the Spanish
or against bin 'Abd al-Karīm could not last long if it
depended solely on the fragile system of ḥagg-fines. The
other shaykhs of the Marnīsa wrote to the other Sinhdja
tribes to ask that their shaykhs should come to enforce the
fine. These shaykhs apparently put pressure on 'Abd al-Mālik,
who ensured that the prisoners were released—including, at
last, Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's former
gā'īd in the Banū 'Amārt.² Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's supporters

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Árabes 2, Marnisa y Wargha,
'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammad al-Yidrī, Mīsa'ūd b.
al-Jālālī, al-Ḥājj Muḥammad Butuba [sic], 'Alī b. [illegible],
and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammad al-Bashīrī to 'Abd al-Salām
al-Fannāsī, 20 Rajab 1341/8 Mar. 1923.
² Ibid. and SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información, Amar Hamido,
Información 4a Mía, 15 Feb. 1023, and Información 4a Mía,
8 Mar. 1923.
took the opportunity to burn down 'Amar 'Hāmīdū's house. So the Marnīsā and five other Sinhājan tribes—the Banū Wanjil, Awlād Bū Slāma, Fannāssa, Banū Walīd and Matīwa al-Jabal—agreed to work with 'Abd al-Mālik and the Spanish rather than with 'Amar b. Hāmīdū.¹

Not surprisingly, bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to use this split in the ranks of his opponents to divide them even further. With the help of Muḥammad bin 'Amar Akhiṭṭū, he managed to get some considerable support among the Gaznaya, in an attempt to cut off Bil-Qīsh from 'Amar b. Hāmīdū.² However, this was unsuccessful and Bil-Qīsh collected a very large number of men and moved into the Banū Waryaghal lands.³ At the same time, Rifī forces obliged 'Abd al-Mālik to leave his base at Sī 'Ali b. Daūd. But he took refuge with 'Amar b. Hāmīdū,⁴ a result which was the opposite of the one which had been intended.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm responded to the renewal of the alliance by trying to buy support. 50,000 pesetas were sent to the Banū Tūzin' at the beginning of April and later in April, 150,000 pesetas were sent to help form a ḥarka in the Matīwa al-Jabal.⁵ This tactic was as ineffective for him as it had been for the Spanish before the war, for the

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¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Marnīsa y Wargha, 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammad etc. to 'Abd al-Salām al-Fannāssi,' 20 Rajab 1341/8 Mar. 1923; and SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información, 'Amar Hamido, Información 4a Mía, 8 Mar. 1923.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Marzo, Sī Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Aghārbī; 11 Mar. 1923.
³ Ibid., Sī Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥammū ('Azīb Miḏār), 13 Mar. 1923.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información, 'Amar Hamido, 27 Mar. 1923.
⁵ Ibid., nota, 17 Apr., 1923, and SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Abril, T.O.C., Oficial encargado de Intervención to Cor. de Policía, 12 Apr. 1923.
response of the Banū Tūzīn was to ask for yet more money.
This was all part of a Spanish plan that they should ask
bin 'Abd al-Karīm for money so that "if he refuses, it will
be each for himself in his own land, and after that [the
rift] will become deeper and things more confused."¹

However, by the beginning of May, bin 'Abd
al-Karīm's forces had grown stronger and things began to
look difficult for his opponents. On 7 May the brother of
'Amar b. Ḥamīdu took two bulls to sacrifice to bin 'Abd
al-Karīm as a gesture of peace. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm fixed
the peace conditions at a fine of 50,000 pts and instructed
'Amar b. Ḥamīdu to stay in the Banū Waryaghal under his
command.²

It was also not long before Bil-Qīsh was also
brought under control and by 22 May he had been forced to
join the ḥarka at Azilāf in preparation for an attack on
'Azīb Miḍār.³ 'Abd al-Mālik fled to the Spanish zone where
at the beginning of July he was put in charge of a newly
created group of Moroccan irregulars, named the "Harca [sic]
de Abd el-Malek" in his honour. It was a rapidly assembled
collection of local recruits, men from the Gharb, and former
members of the Spanish native police, some 1,400 strong,
but with no more than a minimum of instruction⁴--an undis-
tinguished end to 'Abd al-Mālik's varied career.

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzin, Shaykh Ḥammu Wuld 'Amar al-Miḍārī to Colonel, 29 Sha'bān 1341/16 Apr. 1923.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Mayo, T. O. C. Alférez Martínez to Cor. de Policía, Tafarsit, 7 May 1923.
³ Ibid., TOC. Comandante Interventor to Cor. de Policía, Tafarsit; 22 May 1923 and T. O. C. Comandante Interventor to Cor. de Policía, 22 May 1923.
For the present, then, Bil-Qilsh and 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū were subdued and, indeed, had been forced to support bin 'Abd al-Karīm; 'Abd al-Mālik was otherwise engaged. The Rifīs could once again turn their attention to the Spanish and both defend their eastern lines and extend their power into the west and the Ghumārā.

The Campaign in the West

In 1922, a Rifī force under Sh. Maḥmūd had attempted to enforce some control over the Ghumārā. It had failed, and the Spanish, through the medium of al-Raisūlī, had succeeded in keeping the area relatively quiet.¹

At the beginning of January 1923, while preparations were being made in the Rif to proclaim b. 'Abd al-Karīm, the Rifīs tried again to take the Jībālā and Ghumārā. On 2 January, a small ḥarka, mainly formed from the Banū Silmān and Banū Khālid, but including about 15 Rifīs, was reported in Tandaman.² This was the precursor of a larger invasion. On 15 January, 300 Rifīs were reported in the Banū Khālid led by Sh. Tuḥāmī al-Wazzānī,³ a sharīf from the Banū Ḥassān whose subsequent changes of alliance were to prove a source of some difficulty to the Rifīs.

This force temporarily dominated the Banū Khālid, for on 8 January it had attacked the major pro-Spanish leader there, Shīdī Ḥamīdu b. 'Abd al-Wārīth,⁴ who also caused the

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¹ See above, p. 456.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Información 6a Mía—Enero de 1923, nota, 2 Jan. 1923.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Información 5a Mía—Enero de 1923, nota, 15 Jan. 1923.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Intervención Militar de Ajmás, Resumé of year 1923 (no date).
Rifis some difficulty later. The other tribes were less enthusiastic about the Rifis—the Akhmās, for instance, by far the most powerful tribe in the Jibāla, were still disposed toward al-Raisūlī. The local qā'ids loyal to the Spanish tried to stop the ḥarka before things went too far. The Banū Silmān, Banū Mansūr, and Banū Ziyāt each sent 50 men to fight the Rifis. Meanwhile, bin 'Abd al-Wārīth regrouped on the borders of the Banū Khālid and Akhmās at Izuqān.

Izuqān was burned on 18 January, and when b. 'Abd al-Wārīth retired to Wadyān the next day, they attacked him there as well. At this point, one of the clans of the Banū Silmān changed sides, and attacked b. 'Abd al-Wārīth from the rear. A pro-Spanish ḥarka sent from the Spanish position at Amṭār in the Banū Garīr was surrounded by anti-Spanish forces, several were killed, and the khalīfa of the Banū Sijjil, one of the ḥarka leaders, bought his own life for 15,000 pesetas. If he had not, he would have been shot, as some of the other prisoners were.. The anti-Spanish ḥarka grew, in the expectation of booty, and the Banū Khālid clans of the Banū Zarwīl and Banū Anbāth sacrificed to al-Tuhāmī for peace.

At some point during this fighting, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's most important supporter in the west, Si Muḥammad b. Ṣādiq al-Akhāmlīsh of Targīst, joined the anti-Spanish forces. The Akhamālīshīn, an important family of marābūṭs from Zarqāt, whose influence prevailed over much of the Sinhāja, had already played a rôle of some importance in the Rif war.

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1 Ibid.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg.19, Informadores, nota, 18 Jan. 1923.
3 Ibid., nota, 25 Jan. 1923.
in support of bin 'Abd al-Karîm. Sî Muḥammad's son Aḥmad had been murdered by 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu after a battle with the French at 'Ain Mīdīyūna in 1919; his other sons and his grandson became commanders on various fronts against the French and Spanish during the war.¹ His nephews, the sons of his brother Sî 'All, were less reliable in the Rīfī cause, as will be seen. Now, Sî Muḥammad went to Banû Dargūl in the Akhmās with the intention of trying to secure for the Rīfīs a free run in Shāwin. He left behind him a ḥarka of 2,000 men in the Banû Khālid, who were ready to attack the Akhmās if they did not cooperate.²

Meanwhile, in the wake of al-Akhamlishi, Rīfī tax-collectors moved into the area, backed by armed force, making all protests useless.³ In February, a Rīfī force was reported to be in the Banû Sijjil with the intention of making a base at J. Qal'a overlooking Shāwin and moving on into the Banû Ḥassan.⁴ But such objectives were still beyond the limited forces at the disposal of the Rīfīs.

The real effort came in March 1923. On 2 March, news came from the Banû Waryaghal that 500 Rīfīs were on the way to Amṭār in the Banû Garir.⁵

Likewise, in the Banû Mastāra, in the unoccupied part of the French zone, Mūlāy Aḥmad al-Baqar, al-Raisūlī's

¹ Sî Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq had a history of opposition to the French and Spanish, see above, p. 363; "Maghzen Riffain", p. 14.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Información 7a Mía--Enero de 1923, nota, 22 Jan. 1923.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Información 6a Mía, nota, 28 Jan. 1923.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Intervención Militar de Ajmás, Resumen of year 1923.
⁵ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Mía no. 3--Marzo de 1923, nota, 2 Mar. 1923.
old enemy, 1 was forming a ḥarka with which to oppose the sharīf in the Ghazāwa—in this he was cooperating with the Rifīs. 2 Evidently Rifī strength was growing, for the qā'id of Qal'a in the Banū Sijjil said that unless he received protection from the Spanish he would be forced to join the Rifīs, 3 and leave the way to Shāwin open. The Ghumārīs agreed to give 1,500 pesetas from each tribe towards the maintenance of the Rifī ḥarka, and on 12 March they attacked Talambūt, the Spanish position protecting the road from Shāwin to Wādī Lāw. 4 On 29 March, another 500 Rifīs under Qā'id Kuyās of the Zargat tribe arrived in the Banū Silmān, and were joined by 60 men from the Akhmās under 'Amar Zarḥūnī of the clan of Saba'a Qabail, "influenced by the events that are unfolding in the Ghumāra," as the Spanish report put it. 5 Among the other leaders of this group which was equipped with 2 machine guns and 4 cannons—was SI 'Abd al-Karīm b. 'Ali al-Ḥattāsh of the Banū Waryaghāl, who became one of the more important figures in the crushing of the Ghumāra revolt in 1924. 6

The overwhelming impression of this period is one of confusion and lack of coordination. Most of it was taken up with guerilla-type attacks on villages supporting the Spanish—such as Amaghūs near Wādī Lāw on 23 April. 7

1 See above, pp. 363-364.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Mia no. 5—Marzo de 1923, nota, 4 Mar. 1923.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Mia no. 7—Marzo de 1923, nota, 6 Mar. 1923.
4 Ibid., nota, 9 Mar. 1923 and nota, 12 Mar. 1923.
5 Ibid., nota, 29 Mar. 1923.
6 Ibid., nota, 6--Marzo de 1923, nota, 13 Mar. 1923.
7 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Mia no. 3—Información abril, nota, 23 Apr. 1923.
surprisingly such attacks weakened the prestige of the Spanish, for people felt that they were being abandoned to the Rifis. Some of the Banū Sijjil expressed this feeling at the end of April, as did the Banū Sa‘īd at the beginning of May.¹

On 20 May, a meeting was held at the Rifī base camp at Tandaman to discuss the effort to invade the Banū Sijjil and then to turn on the Spanish positions, starting with Amṭār. Si Tuhāmī al-Wazzānī was appointed top gā'id in the Ghumāra and the plans were agreed.²

Rifī strength was growing rapidly now: they had been joined by the Banū Silmān, Banū Ziyyāt, Banū Bu Zrā and Banū Mansūr.³ They had forces in the Banū Mansūr,⁴ and the Banū Sa‘īd felt so threatened that they had asked the Spanish for arms with which to defend themselves.⁵

The Rifīs had also made political advances. The gādī of the Banū Sijjil, Sī Muḥammad b. Abīmad b. al-‘Arbi Ḥanīs was arrested by the Spanish in Wādī Lāw because of the threat he posed. He had helped the ḥarka in the attack on Talambūt, and had then sent a nephew, Sī ‘Al-‘Arbi, to the Rif to see bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, and he returned with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's nomination as gā'id of the Banū Sijjil. Sī Muḥammad had then wrecked Spanish political action in the

¹ Ibid., nota, 30 Apr. 1923, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, 6a Mía —Información Mayo, nota, 1 May 1923.
³ Ibid., T.O.C. Teniente de Interv. to Cor. Tropas de Policía, Tassa, 24 May 1923, Urgentissimo.
⁴ Ibid., T.O.C. Tte. Comandante 7a Mía to Cor. de Policía, Shawīn, 25 May 1923, Urgente.
Banū Lait tribe by persuading the principal Spanish contact in that tribe, the Faqīh Sī al-Ḥājj Muḥammad "Budagia" [sic] not to work with the Spanish. The Spanish, fearing that he would raise the whole of the Banū Sijjil against them, cutting the Wādi Lāw to Shāwin road, arrested him and made arrangements for him to be transferred to the Hacho Prison in Ceuta.¹ In addition, some of the Akhmās went over to the Rīfī cause at the end of May, for al-Raisūlī's authority there was declining and the people round Shāwin threatened to kill anyone entering or leaving the city.²

By the beginning of June, there was a harka of about 400. at Tandaman, mainly made up of men from the western Ghumāra; the Banū Sīlman, Banū Khālid and Banū Manṣūr had also sent contingents—along with a small one from the Rīf—to attack Talambūt; and Muhammad Aḥmad al-Baqārī and the son of Tuhāmi al-Wazzānī had joined together for a planned attack on Shāwin.³ It is quite clear from this that the main force of the operations against the Spanish in the Ghumāra came from the Ghumāris themselves. They were certainly supplied and encouraged—and taxed—by the Rīfīs, but it was local people who supplied the main force, and much of the leadership—Wuld Sī. Tuhāmi came from the Banū Ḥassan and Mūlāy Aḥmad from the Banū 'Arūs.

However, a firmer control by the Rīfīs was about

² SHM Ceuta. Leg. 20, Información 7a Mfa—Mayo de 1923, nota, 28 May 1923, and nota, 29 May 1923.
to begin. On 25 June 1923, SI Maḥammad returned to Ajdīr from Paris, where he had been for some months trying to negotiate with the French. He was soon on his way to the Ghumāra to take command in the west.

SI Maḥammad in the Ghumāra

A month after his return to Ajdīr, it was announced that SI Maḥammad would go to the Ghumāra to take charge. The reason was a revolt among the Ghumarīs. It was only a minor affair, nothing like on the scale of the one in the same area in 1924, but it could have been dangerous. Once again the quarrel was over taxation. On 5 July, representatives of the Ghumāra tribes loyal to the Rifīs went to the Sunday market of Banū Darqūl in the Akhmās, and there made the sacrifice of a bull, in the hopes of receiving help from that quarter. The Akhmās refused. A week later, Mūlāy Aḥmad al-Baqār and Wuld SI Tuhāmī al-Wazzānī went to the same market with the same intention. They seem to have been equally unsuccessful.

These failures must have comforted those Ghumarīs who were opposed to the Rifīs. Certainly the Akhmās, while opposed to the Spanish were not keen to provide physical help to the Rifīs. Bin Šabd al-Karīm, clearly worried by these developments, moved to the mahakma of Banū Bū Frāh, the command centre for the Ghumāra front. He first of all

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1 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 101.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Julio de 1923, nota. 28 July 1923.
3 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 102.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Julio 1923, nota. 6 July, and nota, 8 July, 1923.
5 Ibid., nota, 12 July 1923.
tried to calm the situation by lessening the tax burden and then by preparing a force of 1,000 men under 'Abd al-Karîm al-Ḥattâsh, with its ġâ'idās 100 drawn exclusively from the Banū Waryaghâl and the Buqquya.¹ On 19 July, the Rifîs appointed a new ġâ'id in the Banū Manṣûr,² and when rumours spread that the ġâ'id of the Banū Silmān was about to go over to the Spanish he was arrested by the Rifîs and taken to Ajdîr, where more rumours stated he was executed.³

As the Rifî forces under al-Ḥattâsh moved into the Ghumārâ, they encountered considerable resistance. At the beginning of August, their only sure support was in the Banū Silmān, around Tandaman in the Banū Bû Zrā, and in part of the Banū Ziyyāt. However, the Rifîs quickly stopped the revolt. As they regained control, they appointed new ġâ'idās in each tribe, not necessarily from the tribe itself. For instance, on 6 August Āḥmad al-Baqrār from the Banū 'Arūs was appointed over the Banū Ziyyāt.⁴ Several Ghumārī notables were arrested and taken to prison in Ajdîr, and fines were imposed, as the Spanish noted, with no care for local feelings.⁵ On 9 August, al-Baqrār ordered the Banū Ziyyāt to prepare straw for the animals of a Rifî army that was about to arrive. The Spanish Intelligence Service reckoned that this was no more than attempt to frighten his charges.⁶ It was probably not necessary, for the

¹ Skîraj, op. cit, pp. 102-103.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Julio de 1923, nota, 19 July 1923.
³ Ibid., nota, 23 July 1923, and 27 July 1923, and Skîraj, op. cit., p. 103.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Agosto de 1923, nota, 6 Aug. 1923, and Skîraj, op. cit., p. 103.
⁵ Ibid., nota, 9 Aug. 1923.
Ghumāris seem to have been sufficiently cowed by this time anyway. When the Banū Mansūr and Banū Bū Zrā complained about two Rifīs whom they had caught red-handed with two local women, and demanded that they be executed "as happens in the Rif if a Gomari commits a crime [of this nature]," they were practically ignored, for the Rifīs escaped with a beating. The Ghumarīs had to contain themselves, for the forces against them were overwhelming. For instance, Si Tuhāmī al-Wazzānī had 600 men from his own tribe at his disposal, under the watchful eyes of two Rifīs and 30 men from the Rifī regular army. Spanish Intelligence described these two men as "interventores", drawing a parallel between them and the Spanish officers appointed to oversee the work of local qā'īds in the occupied tribes.

At this time the Rifīs were collecting support in a number of other tribes. Groups in the Raḥūna, a tribe to the west of the Ghazāwa, and the Maziyyat, sent contingents of 100 men from each tribe to bin-'Abd al-Karīm for service on the eastern front. At the risk of being slightly anachronistic, it is worth looking at the case of the Maziyyat a little more carefully. This is a small tribe, centred on Tawnāt in what was undeniably part of the French zone, although it was not yet occupied. In November 1923 some of the a'yān (who typically described themselves as "all the a'yān") wrote to the Spanish to explain their relations with the Rifīs:

"We inform your excellency that we have opened relations with Wuld al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Karīm because of our fear

1 Ibid., nota, 13 Aug. 1923.
2 Ibid., and nota, 14 Aug. 1923.
3 Ibid., nota, 18 Aug. 1923.
of the French who are getting close to our lands and we have written to him, proclaiming him . . . [We swear] by God alone that our tribe and that of the Sinhāja [i.e., presumably, the Sinhāja Misbūḥ, a neighbouring tribe] want only your government and we are opposed to Wuld al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Karīm, whom we do not want in our country . . .”¹

This initial impression of favouring the Spanish is, however, rather spoilt by a subsequent appeal to release a member of their tribe whom the Spanish had imprisoned.² However, it seems quite likely that the Maziyyat had decided to join the Rifis in the hope that they would escape the attentions of the French, for a while at least.

Far more importantly for the Rifī cause, they gained an ally in Āḥmad b. Muḥammad Isbū of the Banū Huzmār, more commonly known by the name of Akhrīrū.³ He had been a principal supporter of al-Raissūlī and one of his more trusted leaders. However, in August 1923 he quarrelled with al-Raissūlī; for reasons that are unclear.⁴ Following this

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Cartas Arabes, All the ayyān of Maziyyat to Governor of Shāwīn, II Rabi‘ II 1342/20 Nov. 1923.
² Ibid.
³ The spelling of this name has a number of different versions. The one used here is that of al-Bū ‘Ayyāshi.’ (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 212), who gives the vocalisation of the name in some detail. It is often written Khariru, or even Kheriro, Jeriro, or Heriro, etc.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Agosto 1923, nota, 24 Aug. 1923. The date at least is clear—this report was confirmed by the British Acting Vice-Consul in Tetuan, who gives the Spanish version of the reason. According to this, when the Spanish handed back part of the lands they had confiscated from al-Raissūlī, Akhrīrū claimed that he owned some of it. The Spanish refused to back him, so "Gueriro [sic] seeing the hopelessness of obtaining justice, openly rebelled against Raissulī and the Spanish authorities." (FO 371/9470/W7244/44/28, Morillo to Codrington, Tetuan, 30 Aug. 1923). Rupert Furneaux, Abdel Krim, Emīr of the Rif (London, 1967), p. 113, has another version. According to him, Akhrīrū and al-Raissūlī quarrelled over the sharing of booty after a raid. This is quite obviously nonsense (Furneaux is very frequently wrong over details) since he places it after the coup d’état in Spain in mid-September 1923, and states that al-Raissūlī was trying to take advantage of the confusion caused by the coup, whereas in reality he
quarrel Akhrirū went back to the Banū Huzmār and made contact with al-'Abī "Sinwana" (sic) of the 'Anjara tribe, north of the Tangier to Tetuan road, and Wuld al-Āsba‘īa of the Hawz. The links with these tribes were to prove of great use later. On 22 August, Akhrirū, together with a group of supporters, carried out a daring night-time raid into Tetuan itself, penetrating to the very centre of the city. At the end of August, he brought two leaders of the Banū Abmad, one of them a sharīf of the zawīya of al-‘Arab, into alliance with the Rifīs.

By the beginning of September, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's authority was almost secure in the Ghumāra. The Rifīs were able to call upon it as a reserve for troops, and Bū Laḥya was sent there for the purpose of recruitment. However, when Bū Laḥya moved into the Akhmās in mid-September, he was expelled after a few days.

At the end of September 1923, therefore, the Rifīs could count on controlling some of the Sinhāja and most of the Ghumāra—with the exception of the Spanish posts on the coasts and in the Wādī Lāw valley. This political and was desperately anxious for the support of the new government. Al-Bū 'Ayyāshī (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 212) rightly dismisses this, but then goes on to claim that it was (a) after the coup itself and (b) the result of a raid carried out by Akhrirū on Tetuan, for which he was pursued by al-Ra‘īsūlī's nephew 'Alī, thus showing up the "treachery" of the al-Ra‘īsūlī family towards the resistance to the Spanish.

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Agosto de 1923, nota, 24 Aug. 1923.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Oficina Central, Agosto de 1923, nota, 30 Aug. 1923.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Septiembre, Resumen General de Confidencias, 9 Sept. 1923.
5 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Resumen Política de Larache, 15 de Agosto a 15 de Septiembre de 1923, nota, 13 Sept. 1923, and nota, 16 Sept. 1923.
military advantage was the result of local opposition to the Spanish, of the Rifis’ use of force, and of fear of the French. It made up for the relative failure of the action against the Spanish in the east.

The Campaign in the East

After the temporary subjection of ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu and Bil-Qīsh in May 1923 and the retirement of ‘Abd al-Mālik to the Spanish zone to take charge of his new ḥarka there, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was able to devote his energies to the Spanish on the eastern front. In fact, things did not work out quite as he wanted.

The first attack came at the beginning of June. ‘Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand, who had been appointed the first Minister of War in the new Rifī government, had decided on a full attack on the Spanish forward position at Tizzī ‘Āzzā. In the first day’s fighting, the Spanish suffered heavy casualties—two officers were killed, seven wounded, and there were 100 casualties among the other ranks—mostly Moroccan Regulares. In the days that followed, the Rifis made great efforts to take the position. They succeeded in cutting off the supply route to the Spanish position and in denying it access to water. The Spanish replied with gas bombs dropped by their aeroplanes, but the garrison at Tizzī ‘Āzzā remained under siege and in a desperate situation. Idrīs b. Sa‘īd tried to organise negotiations through Ḥazargān, at the same time as trying to persuade a Rifī to poison bin ‘Abd al-Karīm in exchange for

1 See above, p. 523.
2 Skīrāj, op. cit., p. 95.
3 The Times, 2 June 1923, p. 11, dated Madrid, 1 June 1923.
a "bucket of money". This was Idrīs b. Saʿīd's last important action, for he was shot a fortnight later. In the event, it was unnecessary, for on 5 June Spanish forces, despite more "heavy losses", broke through to Tizza[Aẓzā] with supplies. 2

This attack proved to be the undoing of ʿAbd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand as well. He made the mistake of involving himself in political affairs beyond his brief and gave people who had pro-Spanish inclinations permission to visit Idrīs al-Rīfī in Tafarsit. Two of these people were genuine spies. They were executed and ʿAbd al-Salām was removed from office for his indiscretion, although bin ʿAbd al-Karīm apparently recognised that there was no bad intention behind his actions. 2 Possibly this would not on its own have been enough to end his career, but he had also failed to take Tizza[Aẓzā], and this doubtless sealed his fate. 4 Other qāʿīds were arrested at the same time, including Ḥaddū b. Muḥ Amziyyan, from the same clan as ʿAbd al-Salām, the Banū Bū ʿAyyāsh. In all, bin ʿAbd al-Karīm was reported to have replaced 42 qāʿīds of varying degrees of authority because of their military inadequacies. 5

However, the strength of the ḥarka on the eastern front did not decline. The ḥarka regrouped at Amzāwrū—a thousand men were there on 22 June, along with 500 in Jabal Yuddiea. Three days later, these had been dispersed between various positions and been joined by more: and over 3,000

1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 95.
2 The Times, 7 June 1923; dated Madrid, 5 June 1923.
3 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 91.
4 Cab. Reb. 1913-1927, p. 32.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Julio, Resumen, 3 July, 1923.
men were distributed at various points on the eastern front.  

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm called for more volunteers at the end of June, by which time, as a result of the measures he had taken against inefficient and corrupt gā'īds, morale was considerably higher. Nevertheless, the purge continued. 'Amar b. Ṣadīq, of the Banū Ḥadhīfa, a man who for long had had links with the Spanish, was arrested along with others, and Bil-Qīsh was apparently worried that the same would happen to him.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm spent most of the month trying to organise the ḥarka against the Spanish. The intention seems to have been to hold the operations at the same time as those in the Ghumāra, possibly in the hope of repeating the victories of July 1921, just two years before. However, there were some difficulties. 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu had involved himself in a feud with 'Abd al-Salām Uld al-Yidrī, and Bū Lahya was sent to the Marnīsa to sort out that problem. Then the 'Īd al-Kabīr came at the end of July and Bin 'Abd al-Karīm put off all operations until ten days after the festival to give the more distant tribes time to regroup and to provide 500 men each. Next the al-Maṭālsa

2 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Julio, Samuel Benhammu, 1 July 1923.
3 Ibid., Resumen, 3 July 1923.
4 See above, p. 174.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Julio, Información Batil, 5 July 1923.
6 Ibid., Elias Benhammu, 9 July 1923.
7 Ibid., Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī and Muhammad b. al-Ḥajj Ighārbi, 14 July 1923.
8 Ibid., 'Abd al-Salām al-Fannāsī, 18 July 1923.
started feuding and a representative had to be sent to sort out that quarrel. ¹

At the end of August bin 'Abd al-Karīm was showing signs of losing patience with local leaderships. He replaced most of the military commanders he had dismissed at the beginning of the month with people he could trust. Significantly, all these replacements were men from the central Rif, with the exception of Idrīs b. Mīmūn Khūjja of the Banū Bū Ifrūr and Muḥammad b. Taḥār of the Banū Shikār. Even some of the tribal qā'īds were replaced, and Ṣī 'Amar Bū 'Azza of the Banū Waryaghāl was appointed over the remaining part of the Banū Saʿīd that was not under Spanish domination.²

To accompany the reorganisation of the military command, bin 'Abd al-Karīm decided to impose a tighter control on recruitment. In mid-August, he gave up calling for ḥarkas in the markets and instructed his qā'īds to organise them through conscription at once.³ The adoption of a policy of compulsion was immediately successful, troops were raised and the offensive began again on 19 August.

There were heavy attacks on Afrāw on the first day and then even more serious action against the Spanish position at Tifarwīn, a few miles to the south-west.⁴ A large Rifī ḥarka arrived on 21 August,⁵ but it was too late to

¹ Ibid., Información Batil, 30 July 1923.
² Ibid., 'Abd al-Qādir Wuld Sāḥīmī, 30 July 1923.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Agosto, 'Abd al-Qādir Wuld Sāḥīmī, 22 Aug. 1923.
help in action, for TifarwIn was relieved on 22 August with the loss of 800 Spanish casualties.\(^1\) Despite the failure of the attack more Rif\(i\) forces moved into the area. By the end of the month there were at least 2,500 men in the Ban\(\dot{u}\) Walishak and Ban\(\dot{u}\) Tüzîn, alone.\(^2\)

Certainly the campaign had failed, but the Spanish had only just saved their positions. As a result of the purges of inefficient and corrupt ḫarka leaders and qā'ids, and the far greater level of mobilisation achieved during the campaign, the eastern front was made firm at a time when the campaign for the Ghumāra was about to begin.

Conclusion

The period between the proclamation of bin 'Abd al-Karîm in January 1923 and September of the same year was spent, on the Rif\(i\) side, in strengthening his authority in the Rif and in enforcing it in the Ghumāra. In the Rif, 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu and Bil-Qîsh were defeated and forced to join the Rif\(i\) forces. It is important to realise just what happened here. From the point of view of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu and Bil-Qîsh were rebels who refused to recognise his authority in the Rif; from their own point of view they were not, for, until they were forced to, they did not recognise the validity of the state at all. They chose to opt out of the new state, to remain independent of the Rif\(i\)s and rely on Spanish support for their autonomy. However, in choosing to opt out of the Rif\(i\) state, 'Amar

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bin Ḥamīdū, Bil-Qīsh and others were forced to rely for their strength on local alliances, and because they did not control the security of the area where the ḥagg-fines still obtained, they were vulnerable to the unified authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm. This was not, therefore, a civil war between two contenders for power within the Rifī state, but a war of expansion carried out by the central Rifī tribes at the expense of the Marīsa and Gāznaya. The same is true of the Ghumāra, where the situation was even clearer. Although the Rifīs were joined by powerful supporters—Tuhāmī al-Wazzānī in the Banū Khālid and Akhrīrū, a renegade from al-Raisūlī—the main effort was made through bringing Rifī troops into the area in July and August, crushing the revolt against Rifī taxation. By the end of September, the Rifīs held the Ghumāra, with the exception of scattered Spanish posts, principally along the coast. This was done by force, just as the defeat of 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū had been achieved. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm relied on force more and more, for it was the only way to take control—efforts at buying support were as ineffective for him as they had been for the Spanish. As a result, the Rifīs began to act as an army of occupation in the Ghumāra, burning houses and raping women. They did not, by and large, control the Jibāla, which was largely still under the waning control of al-Raisūlī or of the Spanish but the Rifīs could control the northern Sinhājan tribes through their alliance with the Akhamlīshīn, although they had not yet expanded into the southern Sinhāja, nor into the large Banū Zarwāl tribe to the south-west. As the eastern line proved to be unassailable, this was obviously the direction for one of the next moves of expansion and conquest.
The other direction was towards the Jibāla, where the Spanish were largely on the defensive. Here there were two opponents—the Spanish, and some of the Jibālis themselves, who, encouraged by al-Raʾīsūlī, would oppose them.

The fact remains that bin ʿAbd al-Karīm was quite clearly on the offensive. He was more and more self-confident, and his propaganda reflected this. In mid-July he sent a letter of encouragement to the Akhamlushīn in Zargāt and Targīst, and to Qāʿid Kuyās of the Zargāt, telling them to call a meeting with Sinhāja tribes of Taghzūt and Kitāma. This was done, and a letter from him was read. Bin ʿAbd al-Karīm laid great emphasis on the support he said he was receiving from the Turks. He had rejected four Spanish peace offers on Turkish instructions. The Turks had sent him money and, significantly, a flag. Turkish boats were coming in two months to unload supplies on the coasts of the Buqguya and Banū bū Frāḥ. To prove his point, he sent Turkish coins with the letter. This, he said, was a war to protect Islām, but there followed a piece of secular nationalism. They should learn from history, he said. Spain had thrown them out of the Iberian peninsula, robbed them of great works of art and literature; "vexed" their women, and sacked their homes; now "Spain has come to Morocco with the same intentions, and a few years after they have occupied all the tribes, it will do the same things." It is doubtful whether his audience knew very much of art or literature, but that is not the point. The lost treasures of al-Andalus had been used in the past as a symbol of traditional enmity with Spain, and they were so used here.

1 Ibid., ʿAbd al-Salām al-Fannāṣī, 18 July 1923.
The self-confidence was well justified, for bin 'Abd al-Karîm's personal authority was growing stronger all the time. He had been proclaimed as 'amîr al-mu'minîn in January and February 1923 and by August of the same year his authority was almost unchallengeable in the Rif. From now on, the rôle of bin 'Abd al-Karîm as an individual became more and more distinct. It was he who gave instructions to the gâ'ïds to raise conscripted troops and he, on his personal initiative, who replaced a large proportion of those gâ'ïds, and other officials, with people he trusted. An example of this is the removal of 'Abd al-Salam bin al-Ŷâjj Muḥand as Minister of War. 'Abd al-Salam was one of the few members of the top level of the government who was not in some way related to the amîr. He was replaced by a brother-in-law, and cousin of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, Si Aḥmad Bû Drâ'. There was a perfectly good reason for this change of command—the political errors of 'Abd al-Salam; nevertheless, it had the result of further centering authority onto the amîr and his immediate family. The Rifî movement had already moved far away from an alliance of tribes against the Spanish towards a government controlled from above by the members of one important family, aided by certain individuals from outside. It was another example of the progress towards the formation of a government in the style of the makhzan in the Rif, and one which depended greatly on the use of coercion, rather than agreement.

In the months that followed, this coercive power would be turned against the Jibâla and the people of that region would be obliged to join the Rifî state. There would be no way of resisting the coercive pressure of the Rifîs because
the Spanish forces in the Jibāla would themselves be ejected from the area under the attack of a superior Rīfī army.
"I exerted myself to the utmost to free my land from the influence of the shaykhs of the orders who are an obstacle in the way of any sort of freedom and independence. . . . [they] were the bitterest enemies both of myself and of the progress of my country. They omitted nothing in their efforts to frustrate my policy . . . ."

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm speaking in 1927 of his quarrel with the tariqas.¹

"As for the people of the Ghumâra, they are greatly afflicted by the taxes which they have to give, by hunger and so on . . . ."

The economic conditions in the Ghumâra under Rifi: occupation, described by the pro-Spanish khalîfa of the Banû Bû Zrâ, February 1924.²

"The tribe of the Banû Warrayn, who have emigrated in the cause of God, earnestly desire to be under your command, and to join you, to seek refuge with you from the enemies of God, the French, under your rule which is based on the pure sharî'a . . . ."

Five of the leaders of the Banû Warrayn confederacy in the Middle Atlas, south of Taza writing to bin 'Abd al-Karîm in April 1924.³

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² SHM Ceuta Leg. 22, Bajalato del Gomara, khalîfa of the Banû Bû Zrâ to Castro Girona, 1 Rajab 1342/7 Feb. 1924.
The economic situation described by the khalīfa of the Banū Bū Zrā applied not only in the Ghumāra but also in much of the rest of the Rif. As a result, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was obliged to look for ways of expanding into areas that he did not yet control and which offered supplies of agricultural products. Such an area was the land of Banū Zarwāl; but the attempt to annex this tribe brought bin 'Abd al-Karīm into contact with the powerful leader of the Darqāwiya ṭařīqa 'Abd al-Raḥmān. The resulting battles led to a full-scale revolt in the Ghumāra, but one which the Rifī forces were quite able to contain and then put down with considerable ferocity. In the Jibāla, from where the Spanish forces withdrew in late 1924, another rebellion started, encouraged by another religious leader, al-Raṣūlī. These moves to resist the expanding Rifī state explain bin 'Abd al-Karīm's dislike of the ṭařīgas. However, although both sides attacked each other using religious language, it was not really religion but power which was at issue. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's increasing authority threatened the power and prestige of leaders both religious and secular. Al-Raṣūlī and 'Abd al-Raḥmān were not the only people to oppose bin 'Abd al-Karīm, for others, like 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu tried to do so as well. With the exception of 'Abd al-Raḥmān—-and even his success was only temporary—they all failed, because bin 'Abd al-Karīm was so powerful that there was little or no chance of success.

In fact, bin 'Abd al-Karīm appeared so strong that the new state attracted the attention of people fighting the French in their zone of Morocco. These people looked towards bin 'Abd al-Karīm for help. However, apart from a few minor
brushes with French troops, bin 'Abd al-Karîm did nothing to help them for the moment, and concentrated on pushing the remaining Spanish troops out of the Jibilâ.

However, all was not entirely easy for the Rifîs. Their military problems, caused by 'Abd al-Ra'îmân and al-Raisîlî amongst others, were aggravated by the economic situation in the Rif. So, before discussing the military events, it is necessary to survey the economic conditions.

The Economic Situation--The Climatic Background

As we have seen, the economy of the Rif was based on agriculture, and this was dependent on the vagaries of the climate. Rainfall, which had been the determining factor on the harvests and consequently the level of resistance before the war, seems to have been good during the 1922-1924 period. Of course, rainfall statistics were not kept by bin 'Abd al-Karîm's government, still less were they published in meteorological journals. However, an overall impression may be gained by examining the returns of the nearest meteorological stations to the Rif: at Melilla and Tetuan.

Between 1921 and 1924, the rains came with the expected regularity and with little fluctuation between the rainy seasons--although there was, of course, wild fluctuation during each year. The important rainfall, which had to be maintained, was that between October and March each year. In comparison with the rainfall during these months in the years before the Rif war, the years 1923 and 1924 fared well (see table XI: 1 and 2).
Table XI: 1

Rainfall at Melilla, 1 October to 31 March

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rainfall (mm)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td>300.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>407.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>335.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>223.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>19819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>291.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>404.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
<td>408.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>503.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>318.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>313.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average over 11 years, 336.75 mm
Average for Melilla, 1 October to 31 March over years 1923-34 and 1943-55: 304.7 mm. ²

The same pattern may be seen in the Tetuan returns:

Table XI: 2

Rainfall at Tetuan, 1 October to 31 March

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rainfall (mm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>391.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-19-20</td>
<td>(record incomplete)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>422.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>450.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
<td>574.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>645.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>682.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>848.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average over 8 recorded years, 569.4 mm.

¹ Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico y Catastral, Resumen de las observaciones efectuadas en las estaciones del Servicio Meteorológico Español durante el año (Madrid, 1915-26) (Annual publication) (henceforth referred to as "Resumen de la observaciones").


³ Resumen de las observaciones, passim.
These figures, incomplete though they are, show that rainfall increased during the winters of the first three years of the Rif state from 1921-1922 to 1923-1924 and then dropped off slightly in the eastern Rif in 1924-1925, and further in 1925-1926, while they increased in the Jibala and the west. In neither 1923 nor 1924 was there any rain while the grain was ripening, so, with these favourable weather conditions it might have been thought that the harvests in both 1923 and 1924 would have been good. This was indeed the case in 1923—but definitely not in 1924. Since the weather was favourable, other explanations for the collapse of the 1924 harvest must be found.

The Lost Harvest

As might have been expected, given the weather pattern over the previous winter, the harvest of early summer 1923 was excellent. The Banū Waryaghal were reported to be trying to collect in their crops before any of the other tribes, and before the price of grain dropped as a result of it being so plentiful. The price of grain at this stage was put at 10 pts. the mudd. Although bin 'Abd al-Karīm followed the example of the traditional Moroccan makhzans and never appointed a wazīr to take charge of agriculture, he did make efforts to ensure that the grain was properly used. In July 1923, he gave orders that the mills in the Timsamān which had fallen into disrepair during the fighting should now be put into order ready for use. It seems

1 The Times, 2 May 1923, p. 13, dated Tangier, 1 May 1923.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información Julio, information of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj 'Amar (Banū Sidal), 24 July 1923.
likely that he gave similar instructions elsewhere. Despite the generally excellent harvest, bin 'Abd al-Karîm also tried to stockpile as much grain as possible, and in June, he wrote to people in the Spanish-occupied zone offering to buy their harvest as well.¹

That autumn, however, was not a good one for agriculture, for there were too many other tasks which also needed to be carried out. The eastern front had to be reinforced, from just over 1,000 men in September 1924² to over 3,500 by December.³ These figures may not be exact but they do indicate an enormous mobilisation of troops. At the same time, there was road building to organise—and although some of this was done by bin 'Abd al-Karîm's prisoners, they could hardly do all of it, and there were defence works to be dug, and so on. Above all, there was the regular army to be formed and trained. These were all reasons why the Rifis found it difficult to make time for sowing. The Spanish disrupted things even further. The frequency of air attacks added to the Rifis' difficulties.

Spanish bombing raids, in fact, seriously damaged the economy of the Rif. Market sites were moved—in the Banû Walishak, for instance, all the daily markets were shifted to Ait ‘Abd al-‘Azîz in January 1924 and were held on Friday and Monday only.⁴ In the Banû Tûzîn, in an effort

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información Junio, Oficina de Intervención, Beni Bu Yahy, Capt. Interventor to Coronel Jefe de Intervención, 4 June 1923.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información Septembre, Resumen General de Confidencias, 14 Sept. 1922.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información Diciembre, Sîdî Idrîs b. al-Bashîr, 3 Dec. 1922.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaciones Enero, Resumen General de Confidencias, 21 Jan. 1924.
to avoid this disruption from air raids, the important market at Azilāf was held at night, as was the lesser Friday market of Ihababan. However, the bombs certainly did not stop the Rifis from attacking the Spanish in the west, or anywhere else for that matter. Nor did they break the will of the Rifis to carry on fighting, for in addition to inaccuracies of the Spanish pilots, the Rifis had long learned to cope with Spanish bombs. As early as February 1922, some enterprising people in the Banū Sa'īd at Bū Irānānā, Talat and other places had turned the air-raids to good profit by digging air-raid shelters and then charging 50 cts to anyone who used their shelter to take refuge from the aeroplanes. It became a "new industry" for a short while.

However, while the Rifis were not too concerned about conventional bombs, the Spanish poison gas bombs, which they began to put into use at the end of May, terrified them. Fleming quotes a Spanish operations report on one raid (which I did not see) as follows:

"As a consequence it is known that 15 indigenous were left partially blind, some of these have remained completely blind, and other indigenous, who were close to the site of the explosion, suffered burns, accompanied by nausea which lasted three hours. Other tribesmen who reached the bombed areas some hours later could still feel the burning effects of the gas. The post-bomb reaction is one of panic and fear that the bombing will be repeated."
Political decisions also seem to have made economic life in the Rif difficult. In February 1923, as part of his moves for greater independence after his proclamation, bin 'Abd al-Karîm declared that henceforth no Spanish money was to be used in the Rif. Only French or "Moroccan" (i.e., Ḥassanni) money was to be tendered.¹ In fact, this decree seems to have been widely ignored: people did not stop trading with the Spanish zone—which was presumably the intention—as a result. But there was a shift in the emigration patterns anyway. It had become even more profitable to work in the French zone of Morocco or Algeria because of the disruption caused by the war in the north, and large numbers left both the Spanish and Rif zones despite bin 'Abd al-Karîm's best efforts to stop them. In September 1923, 22 men from the Banû Walishak were reported to have been arrested in the Rif controlled zone on their return from Algeria.² This is only an example, for overall figures are not available. They must have been large; however, for on 30 January 1924 alone, some 20,000 French francs were changed in the Spanish controlled market of Sûq al-Arba‘a of Harrayg in the Banû Bû Yahyî.³ Bin 'Abd al-Karîm tried, again, to stop the emigration in April 1924, and threatened severe punishments for anyone who went to the French zone to work on the land.⁴ Nevertheless, many Maṭâlsîs left for the Gharb plain in the west to work the following month.⁵

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información Febbrero, SI Muḥammad al-Fâbî and Muḥammad Agharbî, 15 Feb. 1923.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Enero, Muḥ Qaddur Tahar, 21 Jan. 1924.
³ Ibid., Resumen General, 31 Jan. 1924.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Abril, Resumen General, 6 Apr. 1924.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Confidentes, A‘Isa b. al-Ḥâjj, 24 May, 1924.
Bin 'Abd al-Karīm attempted to prevent not only people from leaving the Rif, but foodstuffs as well. In February 1924, he forbade the export of eggs and chickens to the Spanish occupied zone. In an effort to ensure that food supplies to the troops were maintained, he expropriated 50 baggage animals from the Timsamān and 40 from the Banū Walishak and ordered that they be kept to take supplies to the harkas—especially of bread. In a further attempt to assure his supplies, he reopened commercial relations with the French as soon as the skirmishing with their zone was over in June 1924, and forbade any further attacks on the French zone in order to keep commerce open. The caravans from the French zone were of some importance—and indeed were encouraged by Gabrielli, the French Controlleur-civil at Tawriat, as a way of collecting information about the Rif. Nevertheless, these measures did not help the Rifian economy. The harvest of 1924 was poor. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to stockpile as much as he could, and as it was harvested, it was moved up into the Banū Waryaghal. It was needed for the army, of course, and this meant that there was even less available for the rest of the population. By September 1924, barley was becoming expensive. By October 1924, prices were

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Febrero, Resumen General, 21 Feb. 1924.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Confidentes, nota, 9 May 1924.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaciones Junio, Resumen General, 29 June 1924.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaciones Julio, Resumen General, 9 July, 1924.
5 Gabrielli, op. cit., p. 4.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batel, nota, 8 July 1924.
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Septiembre, nota, 16 Sept. 1924.
very high. Exact comparisons are difficult, because at this stage of the war Spanish Intelligence reports only occasionally mentioned prices. However, a pattern is visible. Barley and wheat cost 12 pts a mudd and 25 pts a mudd respectively, as against 10 pts a mudd for barley in May 1923, a 20% rise in barley over one year which is high but not excessive. Sugar rose from 2.50 pts a pilón in April 1922, when the Spanish lines had been finally stabilised, to 4 pts a pilón in October 1924, a 60% rise. However, compared with the period at the height of the Rif successes in August 1921, the inflation was enormous. Then, in August 1921, eggs were valued at 2 pts a hundred. Now, in October 1924, they were 13 pts a hundred, a rise of 550%, an overall average of 169% a year.

By October 1924, because of bombing, bad harvests and economic disruption, there was considerable hardship in the Rif. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm made an attempt at rationing barley by ordering that it was only to be sold to those authorised by him, thereby incidentally increasing the degree of centralisation in the Rif. But the needs of the war came before agriculture. In December 1924, bin 'Abd al-Karîm

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batel, nota, 26 Oct. 1924.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mia, Abril 1922, Información, Där Driûsh, 3 Apr. 1922.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batel, nota, 26 Oct. 1924.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Sultan, 9 Aug. 1921.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batel, nota, 26 Oct. 1924.
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Octubre, nota, 22 Oct. 1924.
ordered that there be no further sowing, because all the men were needed for the ḥarka. This was despite the refusal of many Rifis, at the end of November, to send ḥarkas to the Jibāla because of the misery in their own tribes. Indeed, rather than join the victorious ḥarkas for the west, or garrison the eastern front, by the beginning of December 1924, people were again emigrating to find work, precisely so that they could avoid service in the ḥarkas.

However, it was during this bleak economic period that the Rif state achieved its most rapid period of growth, attacking first of all the lands of the Banū Zarwāl, then the Jibāla. While the expansion was not altogether successful in the case of the Banū Zarwāl, it was quite the reverse in the Jibāla. Here, the Spanish were forced to evacuate all their troops and bin 'Abd al-Karīm imposed his authority, crushing first of all a revolt in the Ghumāra and then one in the Akhmās in the process, notwithstanding the tension caused by the economic situation. Partly this was the result of Spanish weakness but it was also the product of the growing Rif strength pointed to in the last chapter.

The Spanish Directory and Morocco

When he gained power in September 1023, Primo de Rivera set up a "Military Directory" to take over the government of Spain; staffed by "advisers"--army officers who were

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Diciembre, nota, 9 Dec. 1924.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Noviembre, nota, 27 Nov. 1924.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Diciembre, nota, 6 Dec. 1924.
inferior to himself in rank—rather than ministers, originally for a maximum period of ninety days. In fact, the dictatorship lasted much longer, until 1930.1 In one of his first announcements he promised to find a "swift, worthy, and sensible" solution to the Moroccan war.2

On taking power, he at once replaced the civilian High Commissioner, Luis Silvela, with a general Luis Aizpuru y Mondejar, who had considerable experience of Morocco—he had been Comandante General of Melilla from 1915 to 1919—and who had been Minister of War in the García Prieto government which the coup had overthrown. However, despite the ending of the civil Protectorate in Morocco, Primo neither sought nor wanted a great military expansion in Morocco. On 16 December, he said:

"The military character of the movement excites the suspicion ... that everything there [i.e., in Morocco] will be done by military action, giving way to an era of permanent war. This suspicion is both reasonable and logical, although it is quite incorrect."3

Morocco, he said, needed two things: "A plan, and silence."4 His plan was to try to cut down on the amount of money being spent in Morocco and to withdraw as many of the conscripted troops as possible. This was done—29,000 troops were sent home in December 1923 before their term of conscription had expired.5

In an effort to maintain control in the Jibāla, Primo at first looked to al-Raisūlī. Al-Raisūlī was equally anxious to make a deal with the Spanish. His authority had

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1 Payne, Politics and the Military, pp. 202-204.
2 Ibid., p. 208.
3 Quoted in Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 55.
4 Ibid., p. 56.
5 Payne, Politics and the Military, p. 209.
been much eroded by the Rifī gains in the Ghumāra, and he was anyway a sick man—his body was so bloated with dropsy that he had difficulty in moving. He was caught in a vicious political circle, his prestige was evaporating in the eyes of the Jībālīs because of his dealings with Spain, and yet he could only hope to maintain his power now with Spanish support. Not surprisingly he made rapid efforts to show himself friendly towards the new dictator. On 17 September he wrote to Primo offering his unconditional friendship and help in fighting the Rifīs. A conference between the two was arranged in October, but this reached no definite agreement. Al-Raisūlī really hoped that he would be made khalīfa of the Spanish zone when Mūlāy al-Maḥdī, who was sick, died, and indeed when the Mūlāy al-Maḥdī did die, on 24 October 1923, he considered that his chance had come. It was impossible, however—the French were decidedly against it, for one thing, and for another, al-Raisūlī’s prestige had sunk too low for it to be worthwhile.

Primo also attempted to negotiate with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. Through Echevarrieta, the Basque millionaire who had negotiated the return of the prisoners in January 1923, and the Tunisian Shaykh al-Tījānī, he offered bin ‘Abd al-Karīm the office of "Amir of the Rif", with a salary and internal self-government, in return for an exchange of prisoners and a surrender of arms. The offer had been made before, after the battle at Abarrān and now Primo was negotiating from a position of even greater weakness and bin.

3 See above, 318.
'Abd al-Karîm knew it, and refused.

In January 1924, therefore, Primo proceeded to a reorganisation of the Protectorate. In the Melilla Comandancia he created a "vanguard zone" protected by the forward positions which were, somewhat ironically, named the "Silvestre Line", with prepared defences to which troops could safely fall back if necessary.

The administration was reorganised as well. A new government department, the Moroccan Office, was set up to take over all responsibility for Morocco, and the High Commissioner was made Commander-in-Chief of the army in the Protectorate once again, reversing the trend towards a civil Protectorate.¹

The military problems were still daunting, for while it was feasible to build a line along the eastern foothills of the Rif to protect the occupied plains behind, such a policy was more difficult in the Jibâla, a much more irregular and mountainous area altogether. Here the Spanish forces occupied hundreds of small blockhouses and positions which were difficult to protect once the surrounding tribes had risen. Primo realised this and wanted to initiate a policy of semi-abandonment, by which Spanish forces would retreat to secure lines. Behind these lines the inhabitants would be disarmed and protected and the peace and security in the occupied area would serve as a focus of attraction for the unoccupied tribes. A similar plan, on a smaller scale, was proposed for the eastern zone.²

Such a plan, understandably, was not welcomed by

¹ Fleming, op. cit., pp. 120-122
² Ibid.
the leaders of the African army. The Africanistas (supporters of an aggressive policy in Morocco) argued in the press against withdrawal, particularly in the Revista de Tropas Coloniales, where Generals Quiepo de Llano, Lt. Col. Millán Astray, founder of the Foreign Legion, and Lt. Col. Francisco Franco, future dictator of Spain, all argued in critical and sometimes emotional terms against any withdrawal. The Revista was eventually curbed, but resistance from the army, and particularly from the commanders of the eastern zone, continued. As a result, Primo agreed to withdraw troops only in the western zone.\(^1\) In such circumstances, it was hardly surprising that bin 'Abd al-Karīm and the Rifis decided to take as much advantage of Spanish weakness as they could. The easiest area into which they could expand was that formed by the southern Sinḥaja, the Wargha and Banū Zarwāl tribes. Here there were no Spanish posts at all. All that had to be done was to defeat any local opposition. This was, however, more difficult than it seemed.

The Expansion into the South-West

The Banū Zarwāl is a large tribe south-west of the Sinḥaja Srair tribes (see map XI: 1). Its territory was, and is, immensely fertile and rich in agricultural products--olives, grapes, figs, oranges, and in the lowlands corn, barley, wheat, beans, and so on. So rich was it, that the "ancients", according to one writer, named it "jabal al-zabīb", the "mountain of raisins".\(^2\) Thus it was an attractive prize

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 150-160.
MAP XI: The expansion into the south west and the Ghumara revolt 1924
in the straitened economic circumstances. But it was also a desirable political objective because the Banū Zarwāl was the headquarters of the Dargāwyā ṭarīqa, with its principal centre at Amjūṭ in the west of the tribe.

In order to collect this prize, however, the Rifīs would have to control all the lands between the Banū Zarwāl and the Rif, which would mean securing absolutely their power in the Marnīsa. This was bound to cause yet more problems with 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu. Secondly, the Rifīs would have to secure either the cooperation or the obedience of 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. al-Ṭayyib al-Dargāwī, the leader of the ṭarīqa. This would not be an easy task, for 'Abd al-Raḥmān since the First World War had had close links with the French.1

Thirdly, they would have to compete with the French since the supposed boundary of the French and Spanish Prosectorates cut the Banū Zarwāl in two.

At the beginning of September, therefore, bin 'Abd al-Karīm sent two representatives off to the Banū Zarwāl. They were Idrīs b. Mimūn Khujja, one of the few Qal'ayīs whom he still trusted,2 and a certain Faqīh Bū Sha'mīr.3 The Banū Zarwāl do not seem to have been very impressed with these emissaries, for a month later some of them wrote to the Spanish "Governor" of Shāwin, Captain Costello, saying that they wanted to be in the Spanish sphere of influence because they were worried about the threat posed by the approaching French armies.4 A similar letter came, at the

1 See above, p. 185.
2 See above, p. 629.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 1, Bani Tuzin, Shaykh 'Allāl b. Muḥand 'Ali to Col. of O.A.I., received 9 Sept. 1923.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Cartas Arabes, Qā'id Maḥammad al-Murābiṭ, Sayyid 'Abd al-Salām al-Zarbūḥ, and Shaykh.
same time, from another Zarwālī leader, also rejecting any dealings with the French,\(^1\) sentiments similar to those expressed, in November, by the Mazziyyat tribe, which have already been discussed.\(^2\)

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm clearly had to move with some speed if he was to do anything effective in the Banū Zarwāl. At the beginning of November 1923, he prepared a ḥarka, reportedly of 600 men, with which to overawe the tribes on his route—the Marnīsa and Upper Wargha tribes in particular—and tried to "enchant us with money and other things so that there should be a brotherhood between us and them," as some of the Wargha's pro-Spanish inhabitants put it in a letter to the Spanish.\(^3\)

At the same time, bin 'Abd al-Karīm strengthened his links with 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu. He already had a telephone line from Ait Qamāra to bin Ḥamīdu's house in the Marnīsa,\(^4\) and had just started to build a road through the Marnīsa to 'Ain Midyūna as well.\(^5\) In mid-November, he appointed 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu as Pasha of the Wargha, giving him the authority to appoint qā'ids in the region.\(^6\) The normal accompaniments of an extension of Rīfī authority—telephones, roads and administration were being introduced into the Marnīsa and al-Ḥassan of the jamā'a of Tazghadra and "all their brothers who are with them" to Capt. governing Shāwin, 10 Oct. 1923.\(^1\) \(Ibid.,\) Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj al-Zarwālī to Capt. Costello, governor of Shāwin, 27 Ṣafar 1942/9 Oct. 1923.

\(^2\) SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Cartas Arabes, All the a'yān of Mazziyyat to Governor of Shāwin, 11 Rābi' I 1342/20 Nov. 1923. See above, p. 624.

\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 2, Marnisa y Wargha, unsigned letter to Col. Coronel, received 5 Nov. 1923.

\(^4\) SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Noviembre, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Fāḥṣī, 16 Nov. 1923.

\(^5\) \(Ibid.,\) Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj 'Ali Agharbī, 17 Nov. 1923.

Upper Wargha tribes.

**Rebellion in the Gaznaya and Wargha**

Certainly 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu was cooperating fully with bin 'Abd al-Karīm at this stage. At the beginning of September, the amīr called for contingents from the Matīwa al-Baḥar and Banū 'Amārt to go to join him in the Marnīṣa, and then move into the territory of the Banū Wanjil in order to subjugate that tribe. However, 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu encountered some opposition from his erstwhile supporters. Ten men were killed in the Wargha in fighting which started when 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu tried to confiscate ḥabūṣ property for use in the war effort. The confiscating of the ḥabūṣ, not surprisingly, excited the opposition of 'Abd al-Ra'yāmī al-Darqāwī in Amjūṭ, who joined the resistance to the Rifīs. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm sent 200 more men to help 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu. Despite the 300 who were already there under Bū Lāḥya, these reinforcements were not enough, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm told Akhamlisī and Kuyās in the Targīst and Zargāt tribes to organise yet more help to go to the Marnīṣa.

At the same time, the first wave of arrests began in the Marnīṣa and Upper Wargha tribes. Qā'id Buḥūt paid a quick visit at the end of November and arrested 17 people, who were taken to the Banū Waryaghal, and the Bū Lāḥya column arrested 11 in the tribe of Sinhāja Ghiddu, and two in the Marnīṣa.

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Diciembre, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj al-Muqaddam, 2 Dec. 1923.
3 Ibid., Muḥammad Muḥammādi, 7 Dec. 1923, and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammādi, 7 Dec. 1923.
'Amar b. Ḥanīdū was still working for bin 'Abd al-Karīm and he imposed a heavy fine, allegedly of 80,000 pesetas on the Sinhāja tribes because of the fighting that had taken place when 'Abd al-Mālik was in the area.¹ As 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū had at that time been an ally of 'Abd al-Mālik's, this was an outrageous example of double standards, and the Marnīsīs, not surprisingly, refused to pay.

'Amar bin Ḥamīdū may have been cooperating with bin 'Abd al-Karīm, but his former ally, Bil-Qīsh of the Gaznaya, was not. There had been a certain amount of dissent in both the Gaznaya and Banū Tūzin during September and October which increased after Idrīs al-Rīfī left the scene. For example, at the beginning of September, Shaykh Ahmad b. 'Amar of 'Azrū wrote to the Spanish offering to reopen relations;² and Muḥammad Bū Qaddur of the Timsamān continued to write promising to submit when the Spanish advanced,³ although he had done this so many times over the previous five years⁴ that it seems doubtful whether the Spanish paid him much attention. It was in the Gaznaya, and to a lesser extent, the Banū Tūzin, that the trouble for bin 'Abd al-Karīm lay. It came, as usual, from Bil-Qīsh.

In mid-October a quarrel broke out between Muḥammad b. 'Amar Akhiṭṭu, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's main supporter in the Gaznaya, and his opponents, apparently the result of opposition to the gā'īds appointed by 'Abd al-Karīm.⁵ This

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Diciembre, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj 'Ali Agharbi, 20 dec. 1923.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 1. Igzinnayen, 'Aḥmad b. 'Amar of 'Azrū to Col. and Gen., "1341", Rec'd. 5 Sept.1923.
³ Ibid., Timsaman, Muḥammad bū Qaddur to Colonel, 14 Šafar 1342/26 Sept. 1923.
⁴ See above, pp. 187-189, 417, for example.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 23, Información Octubre, Resumen General de Confidencias, 10 Oct. 1923.
quarrel ran in parallel with another one in the Banū Waryaghal itself. It had started in mid-September in the clan of Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh and was led by 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand, the Bū 'Ayyāshi. This struggle, in which the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh received the help of the Banū 'Aqqī clan of the Banū Tūzīn, resulted in a number of deaths—bin 'Abd al-Karīm had two Bū 'Ayyāshi men shot in mid-October, and on 20 October there was a pitched battle at Arba'a Tawrīrt, in which two men were killed and three wounded.

Bil-Qīsh, who saw his power being slowly eaten away by the loss of his allies and the increasing power of the Rifī state, took as much advantage of the situation as he could. He refused to help in the ḥarka at Miḍār, and started to plot with various shaykhs of the Wargha tribes against his former ally 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu. At the end of November, he started to fight Akḥīṭṭu and later, at the beginning of December, continued his campaign against bin Ḥamīdu. Later in December, other clans of the Gaznaya decided to submit to the French in the hope of preventing bin 'Abd al-Karīm's power from increasing further, and asked that the extremely

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2 See above, p. 627.
pro-French Qā'id Midbuḥ should rule them.¹ Like the Banū Zarwāl, the Gaznaya was divided by the zonal boundary between the French and the Spanish,² so once again bin 'Abd al-Karīm was brought up against the French.

Not all the Gaznaya were opposed to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, however. In mid-December there were still about 4,000 Gaznayīs on the eastern front.³ For the moment, 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu was cooperating with bin 'Abd al-Karīm but this situation did not last.

On 16 January 1924 it was reported that Muḥammad Buḥūt, who had been collecting a ḥarka in the Jibāla, had been ordered by bin 'Abd al-Karīm to arrest 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu. The reasons for this order are unclear, but the attempt was singularly unsuccessful, for 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu arrested Buḥūt instead, and troops had to be detached from the eastern front to deal with the situation.⁴ Consequently, 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu changed sides again, and renewed his pact with Bil-Qish. They were joined by Midbuḥ in mid-January and by most of the rest of the Gaznaya. But Bil-Qish was wary of committing himself too far, for he remembered how 'Amar bin Ḫamīdu had betrayed him.⁵

Bil-Qish was justified in his caution, for bin 'Abd al-Karīm made immediate moves to crush the rebellion. His forces in the Marnīsa arrested a large number of Marnīsīs

² See above, p. 78.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Informaciones, Ḥaddu b. al-Ḥājj Ḫāmid, 1 Jan. 1924, and Resumen General, 16 Jan. 1924.
and Warghis. These joined a large number of people who had been imprisoned on 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu's request at the beginning of January, a graphic illustration of how the Marnisi qā'id had changes sides.  

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm took considerable numbers of troops from the eastern front to deal with the situation, a price of 15,000 pesetas was put on 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu's head, and by promising to release all the shaykhs that he held prisoner from the Banū Tūzīn, he succeeded in persuading that tribe to send contingents against 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu as well. Under this pressure Bil-Qīsh collapsed, and made his peace with bin 'Abd al-Karīm on 26 or 27 January. At the end of the month, the Rifī leader sent another 700 men after 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, despite an attempt by 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand to start yet another rebellion against him. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was now reported to have massive forces in the Banū 'Amārt, ready to move into the Marnīsa—one estimate put it as high as 8,000 which was doubtless an exaggeration. But these were pursuit parties, for 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu was already beaten, and fled to the French zone on 28 January. There could have been no clearer demonstration of how bin 'Abd al-Karīm's power had grown. In 1922, he had been defeated

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1 Ibid., Resumen General, 17 Jan. 1924, and Muḥand Qaddur Tahār, 21 Jan. 1924.
2 MAEF, Maroc. 519, pp. 139-140, prisoners nos. 79-96.
5 Ibid., Resumen General, 27 Jan. 1924.
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Febrero, Ampliación al Resumen General, 6 Feb. 1924.
by 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū. Now he could expel him from the Rif.

The mopping-up operations were severe, and gave Bil-Qīsh, who joined in, the opportunity to revenge himself on 'Amar bin Ḥamīdū's previous treachery. With the help of Muḥammad b. Ṭayyib of the Banū 'Amār --who also bore 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū no friendship, having been imprisoned by him and 'Abd al-Mālik in the past-- and Akhiṭṭu and Bū Raḥayl of the Maṭālsa, the houses of 'Amar bin Ḥamīdū's supporters were burned, 85 Marnīsīs were taken prisoner, and heavy fines were imposed. 1 On 10 February, bin 'Abd al-Karīm felt able, quite without foundation, to declare 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū dead. 2

On 18 January, the people of Burid, in Bil-Qīsh's own clan of Banū 'Assim, petitioned bin 'Abd al-Karīm to accept one of their number-- but not Bil-Qīsh-- as "intermediary between us and the Makhzan", and this was accepted by bin 'Abd al-Karīm, 4 and immediately after the flight of 'Amar b. Ḥamīdū, new officials were appointed in the Wargha -- for instance, Muḥammad b. 'Amar al-'Amarānī was named as amīn al-ūmānā' by the maḥākma of al-Mazīma. 5

With these appointments, the whole area came under Rifī control and the troops were moved back to the eastern front. In the Tafarsit sector, the Spanish estimated there

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1 See above, pp. 481, 610.
3 Ibid., Resumen General, 10 Feb. 1924. In fact, he escaped to the Branīs and thence to Taza, where the French kept a close watch on him--ibid., Resumen General, 27 Feb. 1924.
4 MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 206, People of Burid to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 1924, and p. 53, Jamā'a of Burid-- bay'a of new qā'īd, 12 Rajab 1342/18 Feb. 1924.
were 1,300 men of different tribes and a small number from the Banū Waryaghal "which has the function of controlling the others, making them obey any orders given by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, and imposing sanctions on any who do not carry them out." Once again, by relying on the strength of the Banū Waryaghal, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was in complete control and he could turn his attention to the Banū Zarwāl.

The Second Attack on the Banū Zarwāl

Towards the end of March, there was renewed fighting between pro-Rifī forces and the Banū Wanjil and Matīwa al-Jabal tribes of the Upper Wargha, who, supported by ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Dargāwī in the Banū Zarwāl, were refusing to supply men for the ħarkas. Bū Laḥya was dealing with the Marnīsa at the same time for precisely the same reason.

The Banū Zarwāl were too disruptive to Rifī political influence to be ignored. At the beginning of April, Tuḥāmī al-Wazzānī of the Banū Khālid, one of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm’s main supporters in the Ghumāra, was sent to the Banū Zarwāl to make propaganda for the Rifīs. Towards the end of the month, a ħarka was organised in Targīst under the leadership of Muḥammad ‘Aqqūh of the Banū Gamīl and Muḥammad Kūyas of Zargāt, with instructions to go to the Banū Zarwāl to "force them to join their Muslim brothers in defence of the Rif." The immediate reason for this attack was that

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Marzo, Resumen General, 12 March 1924.
2 Ibid., Resumen General, 23 Mar. 1924, and Resumen General, 24 Mar. 1924.
3 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 124, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central, Abril 1924, nota, 6 Apr. 1924.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 24, Información Abril, Resumen General, 22 April 1924.
'Abd al-Rahmān had killed another Zarwāli, one Wuld al-Murābit Ḫāmid, whom bin 'Abd al-Karīm had appointed gā'id of the tribe.¹ Making its way through the Taghzūt tribe, between the Banū Aḥmad and Kitāma tribes of the Sinhāja Srair, the forces of the Rifīs met those of 'Abd al-Rahmān at the end of April. In this first encounter, the Rifīs lost 16 dead and 'Abd al-Rahmān only 7, so more Rifī troops were sent led by Muḥammad Buḥūt and Bū Lāḥya, but the Rifī ḥarka continued to come off the worst in the fighting.²

After about a week the fighting stopped, while attempts were made to find some grounds for an agreement with 'Abd al-Rahmān. Kūyas went on alone into the Banū Zarwāl in an effort to contact him. He left the ḥarka without appointing a temporary commander, and while he was away, 'Abd al-Rahmān ordered his forces to attack the ḥarka. Fighting started again on 20 May, and, on Bū Drā's instructions, transmitted by telephone from Ajdīr, 'Aqquh took over command of the ḥarka and withdrew it to the border between the Matīwa al-Jabal and Banū Zarwāl. Meanwhile, 'Abd al-Rahmān moved into the Mazzyat tribe³ (to the south of the Matīwa al-Jabal), which had, perhaps unwillingly, joined the Rifīs in November 1923. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm also ordered that Kūyas be arrested but he fled back to his tribe, the Zargāt, and started a rebellion there.⁴

¹ Ibid., Resumen General, 24 April 1924.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaciones Mayo, Resumen General, 2 May 1924, and Resumen General, 3 May 1924, and Resumen General, 4 May 1924, and Resumen General, 5 May 1924.
³ Ibid., Resumen General, 9 May 1924, and Resumen General, 18 May 1924, and Resumen General, 19 May 1924, and Resumen General, 29 May 1924, and Resumen General, 22 May 1924, and Skiraj, op. cit., p. 125.
⁴ Ibid.
'Abd al-Raḥmān was now posing a serious threat to the security of the Rifī state. He had strong support in the Banū Siddat, Zarqāt and even the Banū Mazdūī and Banū 'Amārt tribes on the borders of the Banū Waryaghāl, based largely on his religious prestige. Potentially even more serious was his growing alliance with the Bujdayn family, sharīfs of the Nāsirīya ṭarīqā in the Banū Tūzīn. This family had in the past been a centre of pro-French propaganda in their tribe. On 22 May 1924, one of Sī Aḥmad's sons was reported to be accompanying 'Abd al-Raḥmān in his struggle against bin 'Abd al-Karīm. The Rifī leader was apparently furious with the two sharīfs, who were attacking him in their propaganda on the grounds of his lack of religious prestige. This alliance laid the ground for bin 'Abd al-Karīm's attacks on the religious orders because the resistance of 'Abd al-Raḥmān had sparked off, or incorporated, a general rebellion among the Ghumārā tribes, who used the opportunity to attack the Rifī forces in their lands.

Rebellion in the Ghumārā

After control of the countryside in the Ghumāra had been secured by the Rifīs, earlier in 1923, the area remained relatively quiet for some time. Individual Spanish positions were from time to time besieged—for instance, 200 men from the Banū Silmān surrounded the position at Taza, south-east

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Informaciones Mayo, Resumen General, 23 May 1924.
2 Drague, op. cit., p. 206.
3 See above, pp. 217, 236.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Confidentes, Sharīf al-ḥajj al-Fādil b. Muḥammad al-Nāsirī, 22 May 1924. It is ironic that this particular informant should himself by a Nāsirī sharīf.
of TighIsas, in mid-October 1923—but the succeeding months were spent mainly in strengthening Rif authority in the area. The remaining tribes to the east, in the Sinhaja Srair, which had not fully submitted to the Rifis yet, were incorporated into the state. The qâ'id of the tiny tribe of Taghzût, Sî Aḥmad b. Sa'id, received a letter from the Ghumâra announcing the imminent arrival of Rif forces at the beginning of October. 2 Taghzût lay on the way to the Matīwa al-jabal and the Banū Zarwâl, and would be used as the line of approach for the attack in March 1924, 3 so its strategic importance was obvious.

In mid-October 1923, the Spanish authorities banned all commerce with the Ghumâra through the coastal positions but this only made the Ghumâris dislike the Spanish even more and did not prevent cheap food from being smuggled in from Shāwin through the Akhmās. 4 In any case, the Rifis had already banned commerce with the Spanish themselves—presumably in the hope of hindering Spanish intelligence-gathering and political work. On 10 October, the market at Amţâr was deserted, a fact which worried the Spanish considerably for it showed the extent of Rif control. 5

At the end of September or beginning of October, the Spanish began to receive a series of complaints about the way in which the Rifis were behaving in the Ghumâra. There was forced conscription; for example, one qâ'id recently.

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Central Octubre de 1923, nota, 14 Oct. 1923.
2 Ibid., nota, 5 Oct. 1923.
3 See above, p. 660.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 20, Información Central Octubre de 1923, nota, 14 October 1923.
5 Ibid., nota, 10 October 1923.
back from a visit to the Rif, announced that he wanted half of all the men to join the ḫarka; and there was a heavy burden of taxation.¹

Things got worse for the Ghumāris', not better. Sīdī Muḥammad b. Qaddur, whom the new authorities wished to arrest, escaped to the "mountains" in the face of an expedition sent from the Rifī headquarters at Tandamān to take him. Finding no one at his house, it was destroyed, along with his property. At the same time a tax of 15 pesetas was imposed on each house.² People were forced to submit to Rifī authority because:

"The whole Ghumāra is like this, we have no . . . power, no news or information, no leaders of prestige or experience. No goods come in or out, buying and selling has been cut; and we have already told you of the lack of salt and so on . . . ."³

In January 1924 another collection of taxes was imposed. After the 15 pesetas a house levied in December, a tax of one mudd of barley was collected from each house, in order to buy food for Akhrīrū's forces.⁴ Nothing much could be done about this situation, however, for the Rifīs held many of the commanding positions. Each post was manned, on average, by 25 Rifī regulars and these forces were reinforced with local levies. Thus the Ghumāris' had no hope of receiving any help because the Spanish were incapable, and al-Raisūlī was even more distasteful to them.⁵ It will be

⁴ Ibid., Khalīfah of Banū Bū Zrā to Castro Girona, 14 Jan. 1924.
⁵ Ibid.
remembered that there were discussions at this stage over the possibility of al-Raisūlī becoming khalīfa— but the very suggestion inspired opposition to the Spanish to an even greater extent.  

By the first week of February the economic situation in the Ghumarā had grown even worse. One of the Spanish agents in the area suggested that the Spanish should take advantage of this and bring the area to a state of starvation by preventing any foodstuffs from being moved out of Shāwin, completing the blockade. As it was, the Rifūs were still stronger and were clearly intent on staying permanently in the Ghumarā. The telephone line from Banū Bū Frāḥ was being extended along the coast. On 8 February, it had reached a point near Am ī r in the Banū Garīr. Nearby, at Targhāssā, Saʿīd Wuld Siʿ Abīd Afailāl, the owner of a mill, was obliged to grind 70 mudds of barley each night to make bread for the troops. The Rifūs further announced that they wanted a command post next to the former house of ʿAlī bin Sulaymān, and one near Galdat. Interestingly, these command posts were referred to as fisīna, an Arabisation of the Spanish oficina, a vivid reminder of how, in the eyes of the Ghumarīs, the nature of Rifī occupation was very similar to that of the Spanish.

By the end of February, houses were being built for Rifī troops in the Banū Ziyyat, Banū Silmān and Banū Bū Zrā.  

1 Ibid., Khalīfa of Banū Bū Zrā to Castro Girona, 1 Rajab 1342/7 Feb. 1924.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., Khalīfa of Banū Bū Zrā to Castro Girona, 2 Rajab 1342/8 Feb. 1924.  
At the beginning of March, groups assembled at Tigisás, Amţār, Qā'. Assrās, and Tirinas with the intention of occupying the Banū Siţjil and Akhmās as part of a general attack on the Spanish positions. Akhrīrū, who had large forces near Amţār, composed of his own band and men from the Banū Mansūr, Banū Razīn, Banū Samīh, Matīwa al-Baḥār, and Banū Khalīd, was supposed to attack Amţār, Tighīsas, and Magān, and then move on to Tetuan (see Map XI: 2). On 4 or 5 March, Sī Maḥammad brought 200 Rifīs for the attacks on Amţār and Tighīsas; a few days later, two more cannon were sent from the Rīf into the Ghumāra, and 200 more men from the Banū Gamīl arrived at Amţār. By 10 March, the Spanish estimated that there were 2,000 men mobilised on the Ghumāra front.¹

Yet, despite heavy fighting at Amţār on 11 March,² the general offensive never materialised. There are two reasons. Firstly, bin 'Abd al-Karīm wanted to concentrate on defeating 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu's revolt, and secondly there was a minor revolt in the Ghumāra itself.

The Ghumāra, as has been shown, was deeply upset by the heavy taxation and demands for troops. Prices had also reached new heights. In parts of the Ghumāra, people were paying one peseta for one of the tiny cups used for drinking tea, filled with salt.³ Some of the tribes took the opportunity offered by 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu's revolt to rise as well—the eastern Ghumāra tribes of the Matīwa al-Baḥār, Banū:

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Marzo de 1924, nota, 2 Mar. 1924, and nota 5 Mar. 1924, and nota, 8 Mar. 1924, and nota, 9 Mar. 1924, and nota, 10 Mar. 1924, and Skīraj, op. cit., p. 123.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Marzo de 1924, nota, 11 Mar. 1924.
³ Ibid., nota, 7 Mar. 1924.
Razīn, Banū Samīḥ, Banū Garīr, and Banū Manṣūr started to fight the Rifīs. But the western Ghumāra remained loyal and the rebellion died down.¹

But food remained scarce in the Ghumāra, and at the end of March the Spanish army in Morocco was hopeful that it would soon be able to invade the Ghumāra, for the defenders had no salt or barley, and cartridges were expensive.² This really was misplaced optimism, because no matter how weak the Ghumāris were from hunger, Primo de Rivera was unlikely to grant permission for such an operation. Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm took precautions. He made sure that his positions facing the Spanish were well manned—on 21 April there were reported to be 1,400 at Tighīsas and 300 at Amṭār, and on 9 May, 825 at Talambūt.³

Also, a plan was announced in mid-April to disarm the Ghumāris—except those in the ḥarkas, of course. At the beginning of May, al-Ḥattāsh was sent from the Rif to carry out this policy.⁴ This was not a new idea—bin 'Abd al-Karīm had talked about doing the same thing in the Rif—but it infuriated even his supporters in the Ghumāra. Wuld Tuhāmī: al-Wazzānī, the pro-Rifī qā'id in the Banū Khālid, immediately disbanded his ḥarka and went home, giving as a reason, as though one were needed, that he was worried about the threat from the Banū Zarwāl, where fighting between the

¹ Ibid., nota, 19-Mar. 1924.
² Ibid., nota, 26 Mar. 1924, and nota, 30 Mar. 1924.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Abril 1924, nota, 21 Apr. 1924, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 9 May 1924.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Abril 1924, nota, 10 Apr. 1924, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 10 May 1924.
forces of 'Abd al-Rahmān and the Rifīs was now in earnest.  

Indeed, the fighting in the Banū Zarwāl gave new hopes to the Ghumārī dissidents, particularly after Kūyas rebelled against bin 'Abd al-Karīm. A meeting was held at Jibba, attended by people from the Banū Garīr, Banū Khālid, Zarqāt, Banū Gamīl and parts of the Banū Razīn and Matīwa al-Baḥar, presided over by Sī al-Ḥassān b. Sāliḥ, a sharīf from the Banū Razīn. The rebels appointed Kūyas as their military leader and decided to start by attacks on Targīst and to cut the telephone lines between Targīst and Thalāthā', Kitāma, and between Jibba and Tighīsas (where they had reached in April). It seems quite likely that at this stage, the rebels did not "represent" their tribes as such, for the different tribes rose one by one, and at different times, during the following days, as the dissident leaders returned home.

On 13 or 14 May, telephone lines between the Rif and Ghumāra were cut. Those responsible then proceeded to mock this particular symbol of Rifī power. They took a sizeable length of the severed wire and tried to shout down it to someone "listening" at the other end. Not surprisingly, he could hear nothing, whereupon they announced that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was lying and that the telephone lines were a trick. Others said that telephone lines were unnatural, the work of Satan, and should be destroyed. This sort of behaviour can be explained, as al-Bū 'Ayyāshī does, as "foolishness or a

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 10 May 1924, and nota, 11 May 1924, and nota 14 May 1924.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 14 May 1924.
pretence at foolishness," but the telephone lines, primitive though the system might be, were a physical symbol of the technological and organisational superiority of the Rifis, and of their political authority. It is not surprising that their opponents in the Ghumara hated the telephone wires, and took great pleasure in destroying them—quite apart from the tactical necessity of doing so in order to isolate the Rifis in the west from Ajdir.

Once again, it was the eastern Rifis who had risen first—the Matiwa al-Bahar, Banu Razin and Banu Samih. They attacked the ḫarka besieging Amtar, and Sha‘ib b. al-Falāḥ was obliged to bring forces of the regular army from Tisias to oppose them, reducing the numbers on that front. On 15 May, 30 Rifis were killed, and Rif forces in the western Ghumara were cut off from support from the Rif by the rising in the eastern Ghumara, although the Banu Ziyāt, Banu Bū Zrā and Banu Silmān remained loyal to the Rifis. Akhrīrū was cut off in the Banū Sijjil. The rebels nearly caught Bū Laḥya as well, who was in the Kitāma tribe on his way to the Banū Zarwāl. When he found he could not get through because of the rebellion, he returned as quickly as possible to Targīst, hotly pursued by rebels who tried to capture him. They also failed to capture the Rif pasha of the Banū Khalid, and Qā‘id Aḥmad b. ‘Amar al-Buqquyī, an important Rifī military leader in the tribe. The failure to take important

2 Ibid., and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 16 May 1924.
3 Sha‘ib b. al-Falāḥ commanded one of the ṭabūrs of the Rifī regular army (Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 386).
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 22 May 1924.
5 Ibid., nota, 21 May 1924.
leaders caused the downfall of the rebels, for when Bū Lāḥya got back to Ajdīr he brought back the first certain news of the rebellion. Preparations were at once made to crush it. Bū Drā went to the eastern front, to Akhshāb Amghār to ensure that rebellion did not spread there, where it might have been fanned by the Bujdayn family, and Azarqān set off by car for the maḥakma of Banū Bū Frāḥ accompanied by two Waryaghli qā'ids, 'Amar b. 'Allūsh and 'Abd al-Hādī b. 'Azzūz, and followed by 50 men from bin 'Abd al-Karīm's own bodyguard. At Banū Bū Frāḥ he met Sī Maḥammad, who had returned there from Targīst, on his brother's instructions, again transmitted by telephone. 

Meanwhile, the tribes of Targīst, Banū Mazdūf, Zargāt and Banū Gamīl had risen, around 23 or 24 May, taking the rebellion even closer to the Rif itself, and making common cause with the Wargha tribes which had risen in alliance with 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Darqawī. The rising in the Targīst and Zargāt is partly explained by the activities of Kuyas, and partly by those of Sī Maḥammad b. 'Alī 'Slīṭṭayn', a nephew of the leader of the Awlād Akhalmīsh, Sī Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq (who remained loyal to the Rifīs). "Slīṭṭayn" had been present at the Jibḥa meeting, and now he was joined by his younger brother 'Alī, who was only 19 years old. 

1 Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 21 May 1924.
3 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 125, and "Maghzen Riffain", p. 14. Muḥammad b. 'Alī was about 31 years old at the time, and after the revolt was protected by his father, Sī 'Alī, until he received bin 'Abd al-Karīm's pardon. Nevertheless, during 1925 he started corresponding with the French. 'Alī, his younger brother, fled to Tangier in Dec. 1924, where he was received by Primo de Rivera. On the younger 'Alī's return to the Rif, bin 'Abd al-Karīm imprisoned him until Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq, his uncle, obtained his release ("Maghzen Riffain", p. 14).
21 May, the inland part of the Banū Samīḥ joined the revolt, while the lowlands near the coast remained loyal to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. But the Rifīs had already started to put down the revolt. When Azarqān advanced into the Mastās, immediately west of the maḥakma at Banū Bū Frāḥ—repairing the telephone lines on the way—he arrested the qāʿīd of the tribe, and sent him back to Banū Bū Frāḥ as a prisoner. Fifty more men arrived to help him from the eastern front, and in one engagement the Sharīf al-Ḥassan b. Sāliḥ al-Rażīnī was wounded and the main rebel force was split up. Kuyas fled to Fez, and ‘Alī, the brother of Slīṭāyyn, was arrested. ‘Abd al-Karīm b. ‘Alī al-Ḥattāsh then wrote to Akhrīrū telling him to come to join them, and at Azarqān’s request they proceeded to "punish" the rebels.

The punishment was very harsh. On 26 or 27 May, Rifī forces, led by al-Ḥattāsh and Akhrīrū, attacked the Banū Garīr and Banū Samīḥ. Houses in the territory of both tribes were burned. The Banū Garīr quickly made peace and sacrificed a bull to the Rifīs, and Wuld Sī Tuhāmī, aware now that the Rifīs would win, quickly joined them again. This change of heart, at the end of May, was quite possibly hastened by a group of 600 troops, some of them from the Rifī regular army and some irregulars (mujāhidīn) led by al-Ḥattāsh, who after dealing with the Banū Samīḥ and Banū Garīr moved into the Banū Khālid to attack a ḫarka led by a paternal cousin of ‘Abd al-Ḥamān al-Darqāwī, named ‘Abd al-Karīm. Al-Ḥattāsh was joined by 200 more men from the

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 27 May 1924.
2 Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 127-128.
3 Ibid., p. 128, and SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 27 May 1924.
Rif—again led by two Waryaghlis, 'Abd al-Ḥādī and 'Amar b. 'Allūsh—with instructions from bin 'Abd al-Karīm to deal with the Banū Khālid and Banū Zarwāl ḥarka very firmly indeed. 'Abd al-Rahmān's cousin only just got back to the Banū Zarwāl in time to escape capture,¹ but for the moment Rifī forces did not attempt to follow him into that tribe.

By 3 May the Rifīs had regained control and those responsible—particularly the Banū Garīr—had been heavily punished. Any further opposition in the Banū Khālid and Akhmās was allayed by a reported 250,000 pesetas sent by bin 'Abd al-Karīm to buy support in that quarter.²

Other tribes were dealt with even more severely. In the Banū Razīn, the houses and lands of the southern clan of Banū Qāsim near the Kitāma were burned out. Once the obedience of the Banū Khālid had been secured, the borders of the Akhmās were attacked, and 20 villages in that tribe were burned.³

By the end of the first week in June, the rebellion had been completely crushed and the Rifīs were back in force on the Wādī Lāw front; 100 Rifīs arrived at Tandāmān on 6 June.⁴ The action had been taken with considerable ferocity, and crops and houses were burned. But now, when all was quiet, bin 'Abd al-Karīm ordered that the telephone lines be repaired,⁵ and SI Maḥammad himself arrived in Targhāssa with a reported 15,000 men.⁶

¹ Skīraj, op. cit., p. 128.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, Información Oficina Central Junio 1924, nota, 3 June 1924.
³ Ibid., nota, 4 June 1924, and nota, 6 June 1924.
⁴ Ibid., nota, 6 June 1924, and nota, 8 June 1924.
⁵ Skīraj, op. cit., p. 129.
The continued threat from 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Dargāwī in the Banū Zarwāl was also removed for the moment. On 5 June a truce was arranged between him and b. 'Abd al-Karīm, and on 12 June the Rifī troops began to withdraw from the Banū Zarwāl. ¹

The rebellion was the last effective challenge to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's power in the Ghumāra. It had expressed fury over taxation, the lack of food and the disruption caused by the Rifī presence, and had been directed against the physical manifestations of the power—the telephone wires, for example. Furthermore, as specific evidence of the position of the Banū Waryaghāl within the new state, the anger of the Ghumāris had been particularly directed against that tribe. At the height of the fighting, the rebels had told the Buqquyi contingents in the Rifī ḥarka that they could return home in peace, for their quarrel was with the Banū Waryaghāl. ² However, although they may have felt that the threat came from the Banū Waryaghāl, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had enough allies in the area—and in particular the support of Akhrīrū—to ensure his final victory.

Conflict with the French

In October 1923, the French forces had entered the territory of the Banū Mazgilda. This worried the Banū Zarwāl and they wrote to the Spanish asking them to come into the tribe. ³ In November 1923, the Mazziyat tribe in the northern

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Junio, nota, 5 June 1924, and nota, 12 June 1924.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 23, Información Oficina Central Mayo 1924, nota, 25 May 1924.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 19, Cartas Arabes, Qā'id Muḥammad al-Murābiṭ, Sayyid 'Abd al-Salām al-Zarbūh, and Shaykh al-Ḥassan of the jamā'a of Tazghadra and all their brothers who are with them, to Captain governing Shāwin, 10 Oct. 1923, and Muḥammad b.
Wargha valley, equally concerned about French advances, had written to the Spanish explaining that they had joined the Rifis because of those advances, but expressed a similar desire to work with the Spanish instead. Clearly, further French advances in the Wargha area would eventually conflict with the Rifis' own expansionist plans. Not surprisingly, those most at risk, the unoccupied tribes in the French zone, bordering on the Rif, looked towards bin 'Abd al-Karîm for help. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm seems to have wanted to avoid any trouble with the French and tried to play down their offers to submit to him, and to ignore their appeals for help.

Skîraj, who does not give a date (but from the context it would seem to have been in the late autumn of 1923), relates what happened when representatives of the Banû Aḥmad and the Mastâra tribes went to see bin 'Abd al-Karîm to offer him their bay'ā. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm agreed to appoint qā'ids for the Banû Aḥmad, but told the Mastâra representatives:

"You are not included in this zone and at this time we have no desire to interfere in the affairs of the French zone in which you are included. For this reason we cannot appoint a qā'id over you at this time, although we greatly rejoice that you have come into the sphere of the Muslims who are vigilant in defence of the land of their brothers, and you will be well rewarded by God."

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm's reluctance to become involved against the French is understandable because he would have wished to avoid a southern front as well, but other factors would inevitably force him to fight them.

In the past, the French had worked through 'Abd al-Ḥājj al-Zarwâlî to Capt. Costello, governor of Shāwin, 27 Ṣafar 1342/9 Oct. 1923. See above, p. 625.

1 Ibid., All the a'yān of Mazziyat to Governor of Shāwin, 11 Rabi' II 1342/20 Nov. 1923. See above,

2 Skîraj, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
al-Raḥmān al-Darāwī in the Banū Zarwāl, and since this alliance put them objectively with him against bin 'Abd al-Karīm's expansion into the Wargha, that was another possible point of friction. Finally, the Rīfīs' success against the Spanish and the subsequent declaration of an independent Muslim state in the Rīf, made it a rallying-point for tribes in the French zone who were still fighting the French but who had no territorial link with the Rīf at all. So, on 11 April 1924, the leaders of the Banū Warrayn confederacy in the northern part of the Middle Atlas, south of Tāza—the famous "Tache de Taza"—wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. They described him as:

"... the man whose ancestry is good and pure, going back to the Caliph [of the Prophet], God have mercy upon him and grant him peace, 'Umar al-Khaṭṭāb, may God be pleased with him ... Sīdī ... Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Rīfī, the man who governs in the name of God, may He be exalted, God's peace crown all your works ... "

They announced that they had "emigrated in the cause of God" and that they wished to submit to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's orders, because his rule was founded on the principles of the shari'a.2

They they told him that the French had surrounded them in their mountains and they were suffering greatly from the cold and the attacks of the French aeroplanes. They only saw their wives and children at night, they said, because by day they were hidden:

"Indeed we are like an island in the middle of the sea. . . So have pity on our state because of our weakness before God, may He be exalted, and his Prophet,

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1 MAEF, Maroc 517, Muḥammad bin Muḥammad al-‘Alāwī al-Warraynī al-Tijānī; Sīdī Raḥū, Sīdī 'Alī, Sha‘īb b. Muḥand, and Aḥmad Tamast to Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm, 6 Ramaḍān 1342/11 Apr. 1924.

2 Ibid.
God have mercy upon him and give him peace. You must come to our country from your own with your armies or however it seems best to you. You know what must be done [to help] us."¹

With these three factors combined, it is clear that even if bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself felt no desire to invade the French zone, he would eventually be drawn into conflict with the French.

However, until now bin 'Abd al-Karīm had been generally believed to be in league with the French. 'Abd al-Mālik had used this against him, and in June 1924, purely for its propaganda value; 'Abd al-Raḥmād al-Dargāwī did the same. On 15 June, after the agreement with Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had been concluded and the Rifī forces were withdrawn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān wrote to his opponent. He said that he would fight the French if they came to the Banū Zarwāl, just as he would fight the Spanish, for both were Christians. He could not, he said, understand why bin 'Abd al-Karīm was friendly towards the French.² The implication, of course, was that he was a better Muslim than bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not particularly concerned about such allegations, and at a meeting of the a'īyān and gā'ids of the Rif and Sinhāja, held, after the conclusion of the temporary peace with 'Abd al-Raḥmān, at the Sunday market of Ruādī in the Buqquya, he told his audience that the whole rising had been organised by the murābiṭīn of the Dargāwīya order, and that those "traitors" were in league with the French, who were advancing into the Sinhāja. He also told them that he suspected that the French would attack the Rif and that everyone must be ready to defend his country.³

¹ Ibid.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batīl, nota, 15 June 1924.
³ Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
On 16 June, presumably to give the lie to 'Abd al-Rahmān's insinuations, bin 'Abd al-Karīm wrote a letter to the French authorities in which he claimed they had betrayed him, and that as a result he would have to seek a peace with the Spanish. It was absolutely necessary for bin 'Abd al-Karīm to make this sort of propaganda, because when the French had occupied positions around 'Ain Midyuna at the beginning of June, the Rifīs had not opposed them. Indeed, Rifī representatives had met the French and negotiated with them. This had caused an extremely bad impression among the tribes bordering on the French zone, and people began to say that although he fought the Spanish, bin 'Abd al-Karīm helped the French to occupy the tribes. 2

So, on his return to Ajdīr from Sūg al-Āḥad Ruādī, bin 'Abd al-Karīm called all his ministers and senior qā'īds together to discuss the problem of the French who were advancing through the Banū Mizzyat and Matīwa al-Jabal to the edge of the Banū Zarwāl, and so to the edge of the territory which bin 'Abd al-Karīm claimed for the Rif. On bin 'Abd al-Karīm's instructions, the Minister of War, Bū Drā, sent 500 men under 'Allūsh b. Ṣadīq al-Waryaghli to take up position on the border of the Sinhāja Srair and Matīwa al-Jabal, which were to be considered "the borders of the amīr's authority." 3 These troops were to remain there and to guard the border, but were to take no further action, unless the French attacked them, despite a general feeling among the troops that they wanted to attack the French. 4

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batil, nota, 16 June 1924.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Junio, nota, 6 June 1924.
4 Ibid., p. 181.
Thus bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to limit his action against the French.

However, for a short time, bin 'Abd al-Karīm forbade any dealings with the French, and some of his supporters actually engaged the French in battle. In operations in the Sinhja Ghaddu and Banū Wanjil tribes in mid-June, 13 men from Miḍār were wounded. When the French advanced into the southern part of the Marnīsa on 20 June, the Rīfī ḫarka joined the Marnīsīs and Gaznayis in the resistance. However, hostilities ceased when the French advance stopped, and commercial relations between the French zone and the Rīf reopened.

Nevertheless, the Rīfīs had acquitted themselves well against the French. Fighting alongside local people, they had stopped the French advance and forced it back, winning for themselves some useful booty in the process. There were supplies of ammunition and some guns, and some livestock was also captured—or expropriated. Bū Raḥayl returned home with 25 cows. 700 Rīfīs who remained on the French front, mainly in the Banū Walīd and Matīwa al-Jabal, were forbidden to undertake any further action against the French, since bin 'Abd al-Karīm was concerned to keep the commercial routes to the French zone open. However, at the end of July, the French complained that Rīfī forces had twice

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Junio, nota, 15 June 1924, and nota, 29 June 1924.
2 Ibid., nota, 15 June 1924, and nota, 18 June 1924.
3 Ibid., nota, 21 June 1924.
4 Ibid., nota, 29 June 1924.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batil, 'Abd al-Salām al-Fannāssī, 1 July 1924.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Julio, nota, 9 July 1924.
attacked them in strength in the upper valley of the Wargha. On 25 July, they said, an organised raid involving 1,200 Rifis was driven off their newly occupied positions. These attacks continued into August. On 7 August, groups of Rifis were reported to be fighting the French in the Hawara area between Taza and Garsif.

Apparently what had happened was that Qā'id 'Allūsh b. Ṣadīq, who had been sent out to watch over the French frontier, had been asked by a group of the Hawara to come into their lands to help them against the French, in return for which they promised to give their bay'a to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. 'Allūsh, without consulting anyone, agreed and moved into the tribe, and as he did so wrote to Bū Drā to tell him what he was doing. Both Bū Drā and bin 'Abd al-Karīm were deeply concerned by what 'Allūsh was doing, and that his unauthorised invasion of the French zone would cause trouble, just at the point when things were going well in the Jibāla and Ghumāra. Therefore, they telephoned their orders for the Rifis to withdraw at once, and when this was done 'Allūsh was arrested.

Sporadic hostilities continued for a while but bin 'Abd al-Karīm had more immediate concerns than the French, for the attack in the the Ghumāra and Jibāla was reaching its pitch. Idrīs b. Mīmūn Khūjja was transferred to the Shāwin front and bin 'Abd al-Karīm forbade any further attacks on the French.

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1 The Times, 1 Aug. 1924, p. 11, dated Tanjier, 31 July 1924.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Agosto, nota, 7 Aug. 1924.
3 Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Batil, nota, 22 Sept. 1924.
5 Ibid., nota, 25 Sept. 1925.
The first attacks on the French were unplanned and, by bin 'Abd al-Karīm at least, seemingly undesired. However, the underlying strains remained and would reappear: rivalry over the control of the Upper Wargha, and the interests of the tribes in the French zone, who were still fighting. For the moment, however, the Rifīs had more concern for the Ghumāra and Jibāla.

The Spanish Withdraw

In July 1924, Primo de Rivera made it clear that he wanted to pull back the Spanish forces in the Jibāla and Ghumāra to secure lines of defence. However, he issued no time-table for the withdrawal.

In fact, the timing of the withdrawal was dictated by events, for at the beginning of July 1924 the Rifīs began a major offensive in the Ghumāra. Events turned out very much as Primo de Rivera had foreseen and the Rifīs attacked in turn each of the isolated Spanish blockhouses scattered along the Ghumāra coast and up the Wādī Lāw valley. After the Ajdīr conference in which the problem of the French had been discussed, Si Maḥammad had gone to Targa to join the army commanded by al-Ḥattāsh and other Waryaghli and Buqquyi leaders, along with a few Ghumāris, including Si Muḥammad Muhrūsh of the Banū Silmān, and the important Sharīf Si al-Makki al-Wazzānī, of the zawiya of Bu Aḥmad near Tighīsas, who later became the Rifī Pasha of the Ghumāra. Si Maḥammad told them to begin the attacks on Spanish positions, under the overall command of Azarqān.¹

On 1 July, Spanish Military Intelligence reported

¹ Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 131-132.
that a ḥarka of 800 men was being prepared in the Rif, to join in the attack on communications between Tetuan and Shāwin.¹

Azargān's plan was to attack all positions between Talambūṭ and al-Qubā’ Darsa—Skīrāj says there were about 18 of them—and at the same time Akhrīrū was sent with 200 men to the Banū Ḥassan to attack the road from Tetuan to Shāwin, al-Ḥattāsh and Si al-Makki al-Wazzānī were sent to attack the coastal positions near Wāḍī Lāw, 700 men (200 of them from the regular army) to Adghūs, and the same number to attack positions between Wāḍī Lāw and Talambūṭ.² Clearly the Rifīs had large numbers of troops available (see Map XI: 2 above, p. 666).

The attack began on 27 June. The first posts to be besieged were at Khūj and al-Qubā’ Darsa in the Wāḍī Lāw valley. They were cut off for several days before they were relieved on 6 July.³

Although the Rifīs' military activity quietened down once these two garrisons were relieved, the two Spanish columns which had been sent into the Wāḍī Lāw valley, one from each end, did not finally meet until 23 July,⁴ and there were isolated attacks on other Spanish positions, for instance, on the Tetuan to Shāwin road at Sūq al-Arba’a of the Banū Ḥassan on 26 July.⁵

The semi-calm gave time for the Rifīs to group

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Julio, nota, 1 July 1924.
2 Skīrāj, op. cit., pp. 132-133.
5 Ibid., 29 July, p.11, dated Tangier, 27 July 1924.
more forces locally and to move up others from the Rif to 
attack the Spanish. Al-Ḥattāsh ordered the Banū Manṣūr,
Banū Silmān, Banū Khālid and Matīwa al-Ḍāhar to raise 365 
men for Akhrīrū on 26 July. On 27 July, a reported 1,000 
Rīfīs under Ṣī Maḥāmmad arrived at Sūq al-Ḍāḥad of the Banū 
Ziyyāt, ready to move on the Wāḍī Lāw positions. On 4 
August, 200 men grouped at Agalal ready to move on Qala‘a 
overlooking Shāwin. On 8 August, Rīfī forces arrived at 
Māʿlā on the western side of the mountains dividing the Banū 
Sijjil from the Banū Ziyyāt.

At the end of the second week of August more 
attacks began. On 12 August, 70 men led by Akhrīrū attacked 
the Tangier to Tetuan road in the Wāḍī Ra‘s tribe, and a 
general attack was started on Spanish positions between Wāḍī 
Lāw and Ifartān. Telephone lines between Dār ‘Aqūba and 
Sharūta were cut, and the civilian inhabitants of Sharūta 
were evacuated. On 13 August, 150 men were sent to the Ḥawz 
to persuade that tribe to rise.

On 17 August, the Banū Ḥassan joined the Rīfīs 
and rose against the Spanish. Some of the Akhmās were now

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1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, Levantamiento de Cábilas, Gomara, T.O.C. 
Tte, enc. desp. to Cor. S.M.I. Wāḍī Lāw, 26 July 1924.
2 Ibid., Telefonema Capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor. S.M.I., 
27 July 1924.
3 Ibid., Akhmas, T.M. Tte Interv. Akhmas to Cor. S.M.I., 
Shāwin, 4 Aug. 1924.
4 Ibid., Gomara, T.O.O.C. Capt. Interv. Gomara to Cor. S.M.I., 
Wāḍī Lāw, 11 Aug. 1924.
5 Ibid., Wad Ras, T.O. Grl. Jefe to Cor. S.M.I., Tetuan, 
12 Aug. 1924.
7 SHM Ceuta Leg. 24, Levantamiento de Cábilas, Gomara, T.O.C. 
8 The Times, 18 Aug. 1924, p. 9, dated Madrid, 17 Aug. 1924, 
and Skiraj, op. cit., p. 134.
also becoming committed to the rising as well, and 500 men from the Gazāwa, Akhmās, and Banū Ḫuzmār were grouped in the tribe.¹ On the eastern side of Shāwin, the pro-Rifī forces were also approaching. Mūlāy ʿAbdallāh al-Baqārī was reported in Igarmān in the Banū Sijjil with 800 men, on 19 August.²

Although the Spanish managed to relieve some of their positions—others, such as Khūj, remained cut off. Worse still, Spanish positions actually started to fall to the enemy. Tassa fell on 25 August and 45 Moroccan Regulares and one Spanish Lieutenant were taken prisoner.³

On 2 September, the Rifīs prepared to lay siege to Tagsūt and Talāʿat Adgūz, on either side of the Wādī Talambūt, a tributary of the Wādī Lāw.⁴ The position at Wādī Lāw itself had been cut off on 28 August both by besieging forces and gales at sea. The Banū ʿIdhīr and Wādī Raʾs tribes joined the rising.⁵ At the end of August the attacks had spread to the Larache zone, and the postal service between Tetuan and Tangier was suspended, so dangerous had the road become.⁶

On 4 September, The Times reported that the tribes in the North-west of the Spanish zone were joining the

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⁴ Ibid., T.O. Tte. Interv. Akhmas to Cor. S.M.I., Shāwin, 2 Sept. 1924, Urgentíssimo.
⁵ The Times, 29 Aug. 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier, 28 Aug. 1924.
⁶ Ibid., 1 Sept. 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier, 31 Aug. 1924.
rebellion. The pro-Rifī movement had been gathering force in the area for some time. Its initiator was the Sharīf Sīdī al-Ṭayyīb al-Ḥadāwī, head of the Nāsirīyya zawīya at al-Ramla in the Banū Masawar. Before joining the Rifīs he asked permission of the head of the Nāsirīyya in Marrakesh. This permission was given, but he was recommended to find out more about the leadership of the Rifī movement. To this end he made contact with the Rifī representative in Tangier, Sī 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī Luḥ, the brother-in-law of Raʿīs Misaʿūd "Sibara", who answered him that it was "an Islamic national revolution against the conquering foreigner." 2

This assurance was apparently sufficient and when al-Ḥadāwī had smuggled in enough supplies from Tangier he started operations. He was joined by 120 men from the Banū Ḥassan, and then by a group under Sī al-ʿArīb b. Ḥāmīma of the Banū Ḫidhir. The Spanish position at Sūq al-Thalathā of Banū Ḫidhir was surrounded, as was Adrū just over the border in the Banū 'Arūs. 3 On 4 September Adrū fell. 4 The next target, as the Spanish foresaw, was their large garrison at Bū Kharraysh in the Banū Ḫidhir, which was surrounded on 5 September. 5 Bū Kharraysh ran out of water by 13 September. 6

In the face of these attacks, Primo decided to make a final effort to carry out the planned withdrawal which had

1 Ibid., 5 Sept. 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier, 4 Sept. 1924.
3 Ibid., p. 245.
been put off in August precisely because of the Rif offensive. Under the successive attacks of the Rifis and their supporters, willing or unwilling, the operation was now even more difficult than it would have been then.

The extent of the problem was enormous. Nearly all the Spanish positions were under siege. The Spanish were unable even to set up a protective position at Banū Salāḥ, only two miles from the Protectorate capital of Tetuan, which did not augur well for the establishment of the protective line from Tetuan to Tangier, protecting the road between the two cities, behind which Primo intended to retire. The road itself was still closed. Even Shāwin was cut off. The Spanish army, therefore, had two objectives: firstly to relieve and withdraw the besieged positions, and secondly to open the Tangier to Tetuan road. On 7 September, the post of Tagsūt in the Wādī Lāw valley was evacuated,¹ on 8 September, that at Amtār on the coast was withdrawn as well.² At the same time the rising against the Spanish was spreading. The sharīfs of the Wādī Ra’s tribe agreed to join it on 8 September,³ and on 9 September representatives of the Akhmās met a Rifī group in Bāb Tāza and agreed on an immediate attack on all the Spanish positions, and to attack the supply convoys between Shāwin and Drā‘ al-Asaf. They were joined by men from the Banū Aḥmad, Gazāwa and Banū Sa‘īd al-Gharb.⁴ On 13 September, Qā‘id bin Ṭayyīb of the Banū Sijjīl left Shāwin to join the Rifīs. Two days later,

¹ The Times, 8 Sept. 1924, p. 12, dated Tangier, 7 Sept. 1924.
² Ibid., 9 Sept. 1924, p. 12, dated Tangier, 8 Sept. 1924.
Tighisas, al-2ubā', Darsa, Tisgarīn and Sharūda (the last three in the lower Wādī Lāw valley) were abandoned.¹

The road to Shāwin was cleared on 12 September,² but the revolt against the Spanish was spreading to the 'Anjara, behind the Spanish defence line, and preparations were made to attack the Spanish position at al-Qaṣr al-Saghīr on the coast.³

Meanwhile, Sūl Maḥammad had moved his headquarters to Talambūṭ, followed by an extension of the telephone lines, and Rifī forces continued to arrive in the western Jibāla and Ghumāra. Large numbers of Rifīs were reported in Qala‘a and Imharshān behind Shāwin on 16 September, and 500 more men arrived on 22 September.⁴

The Spanish now attempted to send a column through to Shāwin. On 19 September, The Times reported, 40,000 troops were moving up from Tetuan to relieve the 3,000 troops in Shāwin itself, and the others in the vicinity of Shāwin.⁵ They also tried to persuade al-Raisūlī to leave Tazarūt, as once they had gone they would be unable to protect him, but this was quite unsuccessful.⁶

Al-Raisūlī himself was the object of a fairly consistent campaign to join the Rifīs. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had

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¹ Ibid., T.O.C. Capt. Interv. Ajmas to Cor. S.M.I., Shāwin, 13 Sept. 1924.
² Fleming, op. cit., p. 179.
⁵ The Times, 20 Sept. 1924, p. 10, dated Tangier, 19 Sept. 1924.
written several times to the sharif at Tazarut, asking for his cooperation, requests which al-Raisulli refused. Bin'Abd al-Karim turned to threats. If al-Raisulli did not join the struggle against the Spanish the Rifis would turn on him in Tazarut before they dealt with the "Christians". In a piece of bitter, but highly apposite, irony bin 'Abd al-Karim referred to Tazarut as "the Madrid of the Jibala". To these threats al-Raisulli replied:

"Close your eyes, take stock and you will see that this is an ocean which you may not cross, for this is no way to make war. To make war in accordance with the law, you must first respect your brothers, then you must respect the law, respect the habus, in that way you can make war on the Christian, and God the merciful will help you. Moreover the image fades, and only reality remains. Our only desire is peace and to avoid the shedding of blood which is today quite useless."

Al-Raisulli retaliated to bin 'Abd al-Karim's claim to represent the sharifa by stating quite categorically that he was not, because he had illegally "nationalised" the habus properties. Bin 'Abd al-Karim replied by saying that al-Raisulli's treachery to his religion was the greater. He might respect the habus properties—which after all was in al-Raisulli's interest—but he had committed the much worse offence of cooperating with the Christians:

"You should know, O Sharif, that we are quite aware of what you are. You aspire only to personal [greatness], scattering over your brothers the filthy mud of the Christians. Your love for them is public knowledge. Your rejection of your Islamic faith is also public and notorious. Those Muslims who believed that you were like them, you have thrown into the sea of iniquity. As a result of this, soon, very soon, we will come upon you and those who would defend you. This is our last letter to you."

1 Intervención Larache, Beni Aros, p. 47. The quoted passage is translated from a Spanish translation of the original.
2 Ibid.
Once again, despite bin 'Abd al-Karīm's later disclaimers of jihad, the propaganda war between the Rifī leader and al-Raisūlī was expressed in terms of religion. But there was a difference. Al-Raisūlī saw religious principle in terms of what had been the custom in Morocco for centuries, the importance of the sharīfs and their economic and religious prestige. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm, on the other hand, presented a new approach to Islām, that the resources of Islām should be used to strengthen and defend the Islamic state. This was Islamic nationalism in a modern manifestation and the different attitudes of the two concepts are most clearly expressed in these letters. Walter Harris also realised the difference between this new Islamic nationalism and the old concept of jihad, although he expressed it in a rather simplified form:

"There is no 'Holy War' at all, though they imagine they are carrying on one. It is purely the nationalist desire to clear the Spaniard out—and he is going in fact, anyhow out of the Rif and Jibala districts."1

The Spanish were indeed leaving the Jibāla with increasing speed, but first they had to relieve Shāwin. Spanish troops finally reached the city at just after midday on 30 September, ten days after they had set out.2 The Spanish casualties in the previous two weeks (from 18 September to 1 October) over the whole zone had been between 4,000 and 5,000 killed and wounded,3 and the Spanish had still to fight their way back from Shāwin.

1 T.A.H.P. file, "The Times Correspondence, 1894-1933", Harris to Williams (Foreign Editor of The Times), Tangier, 4 Oct. 1924.
all of them intact. Bu Kharraysh in the Banū Idhīr, which had been besieged since the beginning of September, surrendered on 11 October. The 400-strong garrison was allowed to withdraw to Tetuan unmolested, but they left behind all their supplies, including about 1,000 rifles and over 400,000 rounds of ammunition, which were impounded by a local Waryaghli "interventor".¹

By this time, the morale of the pro-Riff forces was reaching a very high pitch. As early as 10 September, Walter Harris was reporting that he had great difficulty in dissuading Moroccans that the Riff state did not have the support of the British government,² which would have set the seal of international approval on Riff independence. At the beginning of October, Harris was writing to the Foreign Editor of The Times that he had been visited by several "more or less important rebels and they seem intoxicated with their successes."³

The raised morale was carefully fostered by the Riff government. In the Rif, a total ban was imposed on any discussion of the casualties in the western zone, which were very heavy. Indeed, in order to counteract the wild rumours about the huge numbers of casualties, bin 'Abd al-Karīm decided to make use of the great propaganda value of the continuing Spanish withdrawal, by ordering the tālib in the tribes to pray and to recite suitable verses from the Qur'ān in thanks for the victories over Spain in the west and "for

³ T.A.H.P. file, "The Times Correspondence, 1894-1933", Harris to Williams, Tangier, 4 Oct. 1924.
the proximity of the Muslim liberation.\(^1\)

The "Muslim liberation" was brought even closer by the threat from behind the Spanish defence line from Tangier to Tetuan. The 'Anjarat tribe was on the point of rising again. A Spanish convoy was attacked on the border of the international zone on 21 October. On 25 October, telephone lines to Spanish positions were cut.

The principal instigators in this movement in the 'Anjarat were two men, 'Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad Kanya, known as Qādur Kanya, and Sī 'Abd al-Salām Bū Ganayn, known as Janāna. Both had turbulent histories and as they will reappear it is suitable to recount these now. Qādur Kanya came from an important family in the 'Aanjar. His father Muḥammad had been an extremely tough qā'id of the tribe in the time of Mūlāy Ḥassan, until he was murdered. In 1916, Qādur, and his brother 'Alī, had joined the strong anti-al-Raisūlī party in the 'Anjarat, until in the course of factional fighting 'Alī was killed, whereupon Qādur joined the al-Raisūlī party. He remained loyal to al-Raisūlī after the latter's break with the Spanish in 1918, but later fell out with the Raisūlist qā'id of the tribe, who held him prisoner for some time. His resultant opposition to al-Raisūlī attracted the attention of Rifī agents in the 'Anjarat, and they persuaded him to join them. He joined AkhrIrū, who gave him some men, with whom he returned to his tribe, raised more recruits, many of them former members of the Fuerzas Regulares, and returned to help in the siege of Bū Kharraysh. His companion in these campaigns in the

\(^1\) SHM Melilla Leg. 25, Información Octubre, nota, 4 Oct. 1924, and nota, 13 Oct. 1924.
'Anjara, Janāna, was from a lesser family altogether, a man who had gained his prestige as a robber, specialising in attacking the convoys from Tetuan to Shāwin.¹

On 29 October, these two men attended a meeting in one of the zawiyas in the 'Anjara, which reached no very firm decision on whether to call a general rising in the tribe.² Of course this did not satisfy the two agitators, and on 2 November, Janāna was reported to have met bin Ḥalīma of the Banū Ḥdīr to ask him for help.³ This was evidently forthcoming, for on 8 November it was reported that 600 Rifīs were on the way and that bin Ḥalīma was ready to send 600 more men to the 'Anjara, Wādī Ra's and Ḥawz tribes.⁴ However, the 'Anjara as a whole still showed themselves rather reluctant to enter the war definitely, and on 10 November, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was reported to have written to them, insulting them and calling them "Jews", and ordering them to join him.⁵

However, if the Rifīs were not yet succeeding with the 'Anjara, they were doing well in the organisation of other Jibālān tribes. Akhrīrū imposed control on the Banū Ḥassān, for example, by instructing his deputy in that tribe to ensure that a qā'id and a mugaddām were appointed, and to collect up all the arms, which were to be distributed only

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¹ Oficina Central de Intervención y Tropas Indígenas de Tetuán, Datos sobre los principales cabecillas rebeldes de la cabila de Anyera, n.d. in BNES de A, pp. 1 and 13-14 (henceforth referred to as "Cab. Reb. Anyara").
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Octubre 1924, Información del día, 29 Oct. 1924.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Noviembre 1924, Información del día, 2 Nov. 1924.
⁴ Ibid., Información del día, 8 Nov. 1924.
⁵ Ibid., Información del día, 10 Nov. 1924.
when men went out to fight. The gāʿid who was appointed, one SI al-Mati (sic) of Bastu, had considerable difficulty in carrying out this instruction but he managed it in the end. In other tribes a similar measure of control was being imposed. Bin Ḥalīma, in the Banū Idhīr, ordered that no one was to go to the market in Tetuan, and threatened to confiscate the property of anyone who did. The same rule applied in the Wādī Raʾs, where the penalty was a fine and 500 lashes. This was completely effective, for on 12 November, the Spanish reported that "Today no one from the Wad Ras has been seen in the market."2

The Spanish withdrawal went on. Wādī Lāw was evacuated by sea on 15 November and the evacuation of Shāwin started on the same day. The troops were unmolested while they withdrew from the city.3 There was a simple reason for this. On 15 November, as the Spanish started to leave the city (a process that took two days in itself), a deputation went to the 700 Akhmās, Rīfīs and others waiting nearby, to ask them that they should not attack the city itself. This was agreed and the pro-Rīfī leaders promised not to attack until the Spanish had reached Dār 'Aqūba.4 (see Photograph XI: 1).

The attack duly materialised at Dār 'Aqūba. Sharūta was also attacked, and there were very heavy losses. However, the forces managed to retreat as far as Sūq al-Arbaʿa of

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2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Noviembre de 1924, Información del día, 3 Nov. 1924, and Información del día, 12 Nov. 1924.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Noviembre de 1924, Información del día, 15 Nov. 1924.
Photograph XI: 1

The centre of Shāwin before its evacuation by Spanish troops

Banū Ḫassan, where they regrouped on 25 November. Fighting continued until 13 December, when the last Spanish troops entered Tetuan. The losses had been enormous. The withdrawal from Shāwin, according to Harris—who gives a relatively low estimate compared with others—had cost 800 officers dead and 17,000 men. Behind them they left a huge amount of supplies, military buildings, and even a hospital in Shāwin. "It will be curious," the Madrid correspondent of The Times remarked, "to see what use the Moors will make of these elements of civilisation." In fact the "Moors" preserved Shāwin intact, as they had promised its inhabitants and the hospital was preserved for use. As soon as the Spanish had left the city, it was occupied for the Rifīs by Sī Ṣḥāʾib b. Muḥammad Awqiriḥ, who appointed Muḥammad Bainainu, "who was the foremost among the Muslims [i.e., pro-Rifīs] of his hometown of Shawin," as Pasha of the city. Sī Maḥammad confirmed Binainu's appointment, and himself showed exaggerated respect for the city, when he entered it on 14 December. Reportedly, he took his shoes off before passing through its gates. But after a speech of welcome in

1 Harris, op. cit., p. 147. Other estimates of casualties ranged from the Conde de Romananes' information of 16,000 casualties, Hernández Mir's estimate of 18,000 casualties, and General Lopéz de Ochoa's claim of 16,000 Spanish troops alone, that is excluding the Moroccan casualties in the Fuerzas Regulares. Fleming, working on daily military reports in the S.H.M., estimates a much lower figure, about 2,000 Spanish lives. The whole question is discussed at length in Fleming, op. cit., pp. 193-195. In any case, the important point from the Moroccan point of view was not the number of Spanish casualties, but the fact that all the Spanish forces withdrew from the Jibāła.


3 Sheean, Adventures, pp. 250-251. According to Sheean, it was in the care of a "Danish surgeon from Tangier." It is possible that he made a mistake and that the surgeon was the Norwegian Hutyens. See above, p. 562.

4 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 135.
which he congratulated the "good Muslims" who were prepared to fight for independence; Si Maḥammad himself quickly left the city, on his brother's instructions, for fear of Spanish air raids. He retired to Talambūt, and then to Tagsūt, the main Rifī headquarters in the Jibāla. Here he remained, in the company of Bū Lahya and Aḥmad Bū Drā, with whom he had come from the Rif--partly by boat--to take charge in the Ghumāra.

The usual consequence of Rifī domination quickly followed: a road was started between Talambūt and Shāwin; gā'idīs were appointed--a Shaykh Bukhūt in the Jabal Ḥabīb, and al-Ḥāshim b. Ḥamīma in the Banū Īdhrī, who would soon rebel against the Rifīs. In the Banū Ḥassan, Aḥmad b. Sa'īd al-Ḥassanī was made gā'id. The choice for the Banū Sa'īd is interesting, for it was Muḥammad al-Baqqālī Wuld al-Qurfa, who was the principal anti-Raisūlī gā'id in 1920. In the Banū Aḥmad, there was another interesting appointment, the Ṭālib Muḥammad al-Shawnī, who originated from the Sumāta. He had hated al-Raisūlī ever since the sharīf had ordered the blinding of his cousin. He swore vengeance against al-Raisūlī, but was arrested and imprisoned by him, and after that gave out that he had forgotten his enmity, and even succeeded in becoming a shaykh after al-Raisūlī made his peace with the Spanish in 1922. When the opportunity came,

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2 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 138.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Diciembre, Información del día, 23 Dec. 1924.
4 Ibid., Información del día, 28 Dec. 1924.
however, he switched sides again and joined AkhrIrū.¹

The Rifis took economic control as well. On 27 December it was reported that they were confiscating the property of everyone who had supported the Spanish and were impounding ḥabūs property. In the Akhmās, for instance, a large supply of olive oil which had been stored in a mosque was confiscated.² On the other hand, bin 'Abd al-Karīm agreed to extend credit to the Jibālis—he ordered the Ghumāran and Jibālan tribes to send pack animals to AjdIr to collect wheat, sugar, candles and cloth, which was to be repaid later.³

Meanwhile the 'Anjara tribe behind the Spanish defence line had finally risen completely. The rebellion in this tribe had been fermenting for some time. There had been an attempt in October, instigated by Qadur Kanya and Janāna. Since then, they had been joined by a number of other leaders in the tribe. Friendship with AkhrIrū brought into the alliance al-‘Arbi b. al-Khādir, who returned home to help the rising. He had joined the Rifis much earlier in 1924, in June, when he had left the tribe and gone to help Si Maḥammad in the attacks on the Wādī Lāw positions.⁴ Since then he had been absent from the tribe. Another 'Anjārī who had behaved in a similar manner was Si Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Mujāhīd, a tālib who had been muqaddam of the tribe, but had joined the Rifis at the beginning on 1924 after a dispute with the Spanish appointed gā'id of the tribe, bin 'Ali.

¹ Ibid., p. 139, and Jefes Rebeldes en 1925-1927, El Talib Mohammed Chauni, typescript 1925, and Intervención Militar de Larache, Kabila de Sumata (Zaora, 1928).
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Diciembre, Información del día, 27 Dec. 1924.
³ Ibid., Información del día, 31 Dec. 1924.
After joining the Rifis, he had been given money for the purpose of propaganda in his tribe, becoming, in the words of a Spanish report, "the soul of all the movements in favour of the Rifis' cause which arose in the tribe." The movement was also joined by SI Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Gamīs al-Ḥasnawi, a former Spanish makhzanī, and khallīfa of part of the Barqūqīyān clan. In 1918, he quarrelled with al-Raisūlī when the sharīf broke with Spain. After al-Raisūlī's agreement with Spain in 1923, he tried to get reinstated, in an attempt that, despite Spanish support, failed, for al-Raisūlī did not lay aside his grudges with ease. At this point, al-Ḥasnawi gave up all hopes of advancement through the Spanish-al-Raisūlī alliance and joined al-'Arbi b. Ḥalīma of the Banū Ḥadhīr in the siege of Bū Kharraysh. When that position fell on 15 October, he returned to his tribe, ready for a final rising.

It was these men, some through disaffection, some through deep dislike of the Spanish, who organised the rising in the 'Anjar. On 5 December 1924, Qadur Kanya attacked a Spanish convoy at Sharūta and then moved on to lay siege to the Spanish position at Sūq al-Thalathā'. This was an extremely profitable enterprise on his part, for his share of the 102,000 pesetas which the Spanish paid for the peaceful evacuation of the position was no less than 20,000 pesetas.

Meanwhile, SI Muḥammad al-Mujāhid was helping in the attack on the Spanish position at al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr on the coast. This operation was also successful and the

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3 Ibid., p. 22.
4 Ibid., p. 18.
position fell on 12 December.\(^1\) At the same time, the neigh-
bouring tribe, the Hawz, had risen as well. The main
instigator here was Muḥammad b. Suḥḥaddu, known as Kurṭīṭū.
He had been a soldier in the Spanish mīa in the Hawz for
3 years, but in 1919 had joined the forces fighting the
Spanish at Dār bin Qurraysh. He had already fallen out with
al-Raṣūlī, for reasons that are not clear. When he robbed
property from a friend of Ḥamīdu Sukkān, al-Raṣūlī's import-
ant supporter who was killed in the Spanish offensive against
Tazarūt in 1921, he fled to the Rif, where he was at the time
of the Spanish defeats. He became a trusted lieutenant of
bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and was sent to the Jibāla and the Hawz
to organise the resistance there.\(^2\) It will be seen that the
majority of these leaders in the past had fallen out with
al-Raṣūlī and they had now joined his principal enemy.

Not surprisingly, the Spanish were deeply con-
cerned by these developments, for the rising in the 'Anjara
and Hawz threatened not only the road from Tangier to Tetuan,
but also the vital railway from Tetuan to Ceuta. An attempt
to recapture al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr failed on 19 December.\(^3\)

By the end of December 1924, the Spanish forces
had retreated behind their defence line—with the 'Anjara and
Hawz in revolt and cooperating with the Rifis behind those
lines. It would seem, at first sight, a complete Rifī:
victory. In fact, however, Rifī domination of the Jibāla
was by no means complete. The local people were perfectly

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\(^2\) Oficina Central de Intervención y Tropas Jalifianas de Tetuan, Datos sobre los principales cabecillas rebeldes de la cabila del Hauz, n.d. in ENES de A.

\(^3\) The Times, 20 Dec. 1924, dated Madrid, 19 Dec. 1924.
prepared to cooperate with the Rifis to expel the Spanish, but they were less keen to have Spanish domination replaced by a Rifi one. The Akhmās in particular, who had provided many of the men for the assault on Spanish positions, were particularly opposed to Rifi methods of government—especially the expropriation of ḥabūs properties and the domination of their tribe. And while al-Raisūlī remained in the Jibāla, sick and fallen in prestige though he was, he was still able to provide a focus for resistance to Rifi domination.

The Akhmās Revolt

One of the first problems the Rifis had to face in the Jibāla was what to do about al-Raisūlī. On 18 December, Si Maḥammad and Akhrīrū went to Tazarūt to see al-Raisūlī to tell him that "he could no longer remain on the mountain [i.e., Jabal ‘Alam] and that if he did not leave the area he would be taken to Ajdīr with his wives and children."¹ This had no effect whatever, so on 22 December Si Maḥammad called a meeting of all the main pro-Rifi leaders in Taghzūt, at which it was decided to summon al-Raisūlī to a meeting at Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Salām within three days so that he could agree to join the Rifi alliance.² It is doubtful that even if he had agreed to go to the meeting, al-Raisūlī would have been able to do so, so sick was he with dropsy. In any event he did not even answer the letter. Bū Lahya went to Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Salām himself with a group from the Taghzūt ḥarka and made a speech attacking al-Raisūlī:

¹ SHM Ceuta-Leg. 25, Política Diciembre 1924, Información del día, 22 Dec. 1924.
² Ibid., and Intervención Larache, Beni Aros, p. 48, and Skīrāj, op. cit., p. 138.
and he and those who were with him swore to attack Tazarūt within a short while and to eliminate "the greatest Christian", as Bū Laḥya described al-Raṣūlī. They then returned to Taghzūṭ.¹

However, a more urgent problem had arisen in the Akhmās. The Rifīs had begun to expropriate the ḥabūs prop-erty, which itself sufficiently infuriated the local people; other grievances were felt as well. At the beginning of January 1925, reports started to circulate that Rifī soldiers were raping women in the Akhmās,² precisely the same stories as those which spread in the Ghumāra in 1923.³ Whether or not they were true—and it is, of course, impossible to dis-cover this now—they contributed to stirring up hatred for the Rifīs. The Akhmāsīs had other objections as well—they resented the Rifīs' control. They told Akhrīrū, who was furious about lack of cooperation from the tribe, that they resented not having been invited to attend the meeting at Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām; that they objected to the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, indeed they had never heard of a Sultan from the Rif before, and felt that "now each tribe should rule itself as it wished"; and they complained that they had suffered many casualties in the attacks on the Spanish, and that in return they had been treated with contempt—Si: Maḥammad had even forbidden them to enter the city of Shāwin carrying their arms.⁴

¹ Intervención Larache, Beni Aros, pp. 48-49.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Enero 1925, Información del día, 1 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
³ See above, p. 623.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Enero 1925, Información del día, 1 Jan. 1925, 2nd report.
St Mabammad had ordered the tribes to be disarmed and imposed a tax of 5 pts a week on each household, in all the villages.¹ Not surprisingly these measures led to resistance. The Akhmās made the traditional 'ar sacrifice of a bull to the Gazāwa to ask them for aid,² and at a meeting of some of the notables of the Banū Ḥassan, Banū Lait, Banū Ḩdīr, Banū Ḥüzmar and, above all, the Akhmās, at Dārdāra in the southern Akhmās, they agreed that "they could not allow a Rīfī foreigner to come to rule over them, making himself rich at their expense and prejudicing their interests."³ They challenged St Mabammad to come and disarm them, probably hoping, as Spanish Military Intelligence guessed, that if he did so they would be able to capture him. As both St Mabammad and the Spanish realised, the real instigator of all this was al-Raṣūlī.⁴

Matters got worse for the Rīfīs. On 5 January 1925 the Akhmās, Banū Aḥmad and Gazāwa refused to supply men to the Rīfī ḥarka. On 8 January, the Rīfī appointed gā'id in the Banū Ḩdīr, Sī Ḥashāmī b. Ḥalīma, told the Rīfīs that so many men were not needed for the ḥarka and they would not supply any more. He also ejected the 150 Rīfīs who were in the tribe, saying there was not enough to feed them.⁵ Hunger in the Jibāla had already reached an appalling degree: in the Banū Ḥüzmar, the Spanish reported, people were reduced to making bread from "flour" made from the fruit of mastic trees (lentiscos), dried and ground. The people of Tetuan

¹ Ibid., Información del día, 3 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
² Ibid., Información del día, 1 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
³ Ibid., Información del día, 3 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., Información del día, 8 Jan. 1925.
attempted to help them by throwing food over the walls of Tetuan at night.¹

On 9 January, Binainu, the Rīfīs' Pasha in Shāwin, tried to impose his authority. Supported by 80 men, he moved north from Shāwin to Imahārshān, on the way to Dār 'Aqūba and the Banū Ḥassan, presumably with the intention of stopping the revolt from spreading any further.² The Banū Ḥassan, taken by surprise, surrendered and sacrificed to Binainu on 10 January.³ If the rebellion against the Rīfīs was forestalled in the Banū Ḥassan, in the Akhmaṣī it was just beginning. On the same day as the surrender of the Banū Ḥassan, 10 January, there was a struggle at the gates of Shāwin. The Rīfī and Ghumārī guards placed there to stop people from taking guns into the city tried to disarm an Akhmaṣī. In the resulting struggle, a Ghumārī guard was killed. The Akhmaṣī responsible was sentenced to death and despite local appeals for clemency, SI Maḥammad confirmed the sentence.⁴

About this, and about the prices of essential commodities, the Akhmaṣīs complained to al-Raṣūlī. Prices were certainly high: wheat, for example was 50 pts a mudd. The sharīf said he quite agreed with them, and that it was the fault of the Rīfīs, which had led to the markets in Tetuan, Tangier and Asīla being closed to the Jībalīs. He then gave the Akhmaṣīs arms with which to fight the Rīfīs.⁵

¹ Ibid., Información del día, 6 Jan. 1925, and Información del día, 7 Jan. 1925, 2nd report.
³ SHM Ceuta. Leg. 25, Política Enero 1925, Información del día, 10 Jan. 1925, 2nd report.
⁴ Ibid., Información del día, 10 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
⁵ Ibid., Información del día, 11 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
The Akhmāsīs made good use of the weapons, for on 13 January they captured Binainu in the Jabal Khaza'in, where he had gone to try to reason with the Akhmāsī a'yān. He was held by the Akhmāsīs for a few days and then was handed over to al-Raisūlī who, according to García Figueras, imprisoned him in "the most horrible cell in his prison." The rest of his ḥarka was killed, the bodies mutilated and their heads exhibited in the villages.

The Akhmāsīs surrounded another Waryaghli qāid, one "al-'Ayyāshi", in the middle of their tribe, but he managed to get word to SI Maḥammad, who was in Tighīsas at the time. SI Maḥammad ordered all the Ghumarīs to join in the attack on the Akhmās; and on 14 January a ḥarka, made up of Rifīs and led by Akhrīrū, started to attack the rebels. According to Skīraj, the ḥarka consisted of 500 men and was quickly joined by another under al-Baqqālī Wulāl al-Qūrfa. Late on 14 January, Akhrīrū ordered the burning of Amajrī, Banū Zid and al-Khazāna, south-east of Shāwin. On 18 January, Imahārshān, north of Shāwin was burned. The inhabitants of the village sacrificed to SI Maḥammad, who was not inclined to be merciful and took most

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2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Enero de 1925, Información del día, 18 Jan. 1925, 1st report, and Tomás García Figueras, Del Marruecos Feudal (Episodios de la vida del Cherif Raisuni) (Madrid, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, 1930), p. 209 (henceforth referred to as García Figueras, Marruecos Feudal), and Skīraj, op. cit., p. 138.
3 Ibid.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Enero 1925, Información del día, 14 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
5 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 138.
of the inhabitants prisoner. The next day Si Maḥammad wrote
to the inhabitants of the Akhmās saying that they should not
fight Muslims, but Christians. To this the Akhmās replied
that "What you have done in three months the Spanish did not
do in three years,"¹ a reference to the social, political
and, above all, economic effects of Rifī rule.

On 21 January, Spanish Intelligence reported that
the Rifīs had "cut off many heads, and taken many women and
children as prisoners to the Riff [sic]."² Nevertheless,
al-Hashāmī b. Ḫalīma of the Banū İdhīr told his tribe that
bin 'Abd al-Karīm was in touch with another Christian nation
who would take over the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, and
that they were better off under the Spanish.³

On 25 January, a huge ḥarka of 800 men arrived from
the Rif. Akhrūrū took 300 of them to Dār 'Agūba to attack
the Banū Jabāra clan of the western Akhmās; the rest of
the force went with Si Yazīd b. Salāh, the qā'id of the
Banū Razīn, to the area south-west from Šāwin. Within three
days a large part of the tribe's dwellings had been burned.⁴
By 29 January, most of the Akhmās had submitted.⁵

The repression continued into the first part of
February 1925. On 4 February, Akhrūrū was reported to have
ordered the burning of villages in the Banū Jabāra clan of
the Akhmās. More houses in al-Khazāna were burned as well.⁶

¹ Ibid., Información del día, 19 Jan. 1925, 2nd report.
² Ibid., Información del día, 21 Jan. 1925.
³ Ibid., Información del día, 23 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
⁴ Hernández Mir, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 355, and Skīraj,
op. cit., pp. 138-139.
⁵ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Enero 1925, Información del
daía, 29 Jan. 1925, 1st report.
⁶ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Febrero 1925, Información del
daía, 4 Feb. 1925, 2nd report.
The fires of the burning villages of the southern Akhmās could be seen as far away as Wazzān in the French zone, to which many fugitives from Rif vengeance had fled.¹ The Akhmās revolt was over, for the Rifis had crushed it. As a final punishment, a fine of 250,000 pesetas was levied on the tribe.² All that remained was to deal with the instigator of much of the trouble, Mūlāy Ahmad al-Ra‘īsūlī.

The Capture of al-Ra‘īsūlī

On 1 February 1925, Rif forces moved up from the Banū Issāf, to the south of the Banū ‘Arūs, towards Tazarūt. Many of the sharīfs of the Banū ‘Arūs went to Tazarūt to explain the danger to al-Ra‘īsūlī. He is reported to have replied to their anxieties with the enigmatic phrase, "The sky is far above the barking of dogs."³ Such misplaced optimism did not allay their fears, and they took much of their property to the zawiya of ‘Abd al-Salām in the hopes that there at least it would be respected. They asked al-Ra‘īsūlī to distribute arms, but the sharīf clearly knew he was defeated and replied, speaking of the forces that were massing against him: "They cannot take away my dreams: who are they to do so?"⁴

But Tazarūt was surrounded, and the night before the attack, al-Ra‘īsūlī was warned that it would come at dawn. To this he replied: "Thanks be to God the All-Powerful, now

¹ SHAT, Maroc Fez 157, Quotidiens Politiques 1925, Report from Captain Giacomoni, Cercle de Ouezzan, Telegram No. 20, 20 Jan. 1925. I am indebted to Mr. George Joffe for this reference.
³ Intervención Larache, Beni Aros, p. 49.
⁴ Ibid.
I am able to see who are Jews and the sons of Jews . . ."  
He then distributed arms in a last attempt to hold off the attack, despite the appeals of many of the inhabitants of Tazarūt village, who appealed to him to surrender, a request which the sharīf met with the taunt that "only Jews ask for mercy."  

Tazarūt was attacked in the morning of 8 February 1924, and after Rif reinforcements arrived in the evening, al-Raisūlī’s supporters deserted him (see Photograph XI: 2). He then surrendered to the pro-Rif forces. By this time, practically all the principal pro-Rif leaders in the Jībāl and Ghumāra had joined the attack, including Akhrūrū, Mūlāy Ahmad al-Baqqālī, Wulūd al-Qūrfa of the Banū Saʿīd, Bu Lahya and others of lesser importance. Binainu was released and demanded the immediate execution of his prison guard. The other supporters of al-Raisūlī were told that they were traitors to Islam, and were ordered to bury their enemies’ dead. Al-Raisūlī’s supporters were left unburied, "to be eaten by the dogs and crows."  

Al-Raisūlī himself was transported on a specially made litter—for he could not walk or ride on account of his illness—to Shāwin, then to Tagsūt, where he was seen by Vincent Sheean, the American journalist who had managed to enter the Rif. Finally, he was moved down to the coast and taken by boat to the Rif, where he was imprisoned in Tamasind in the Banū Waryaghāl. The rest of his family were lodged

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1 Intervención Larache, Beni Aros, p. 50.  
2 García Figueras, Marruecos Feudal, p. 214.  
Photograph XI: 2

Al-Raisūli's supporters before their defeat by Rifi troops

Source: The Illustrated London News, 7 February 1925, p. 204
Al-Raisūlī, unrepentant to the last, accused bin 'Abd al-Karīm of behaving with greater cruelty than the Spanish. To this bin 'Abd al-Karīm again replied that al-Raisūlī had betrayed Morocco to the Christians. Nevertheless, despite the decision of a meeting of the 'ulamā' of the Rifī tribes that al-Raisūlī be put to death for his treachery to Islam, this was vetoed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

The booty that was taken from Tazarūt was enormous. 75,000 Spanish pesetas and 40 cases of ammunition figured among the principal items. They were not, however, shared out among the victorious Rifīs and their supporters, but were impounded by Šī al-‘Arbī b. Ḫalīma, who was instructed to take charge of them—yet another sign of the centralising authority of the Rifī state.

Since October, the Spanish had been completely ejected from the Jibāla, the revolt of the Akhmās had been crushed, and the major figure of resistance had been defeated. The Rifī state stretched from the Timsamān to the walls of Tetuan, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm had reached the height of his power.

Conclusion

The events of the latter part of 1923, 1924, and the beginning of 1925 were confusing. This is not to be wondered at, for the Rifī state was facing, fighting, and, most important of all, defeating a number of enemies, and

1 Skīrāj, op. cit., p. 139.
2 Intervención Larache, Beni Aros, pp. 54-55.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Febrero 1925, Información del día, 10 Feb. 1925.
strangely enough the least important and least dangerous of these enemies were the Spanish. This may seem paradoxical, for the RifI state had been formed out of the need to oppose the advancing Spanish armies in 1921. However, the very existence of that new state so changed the political and social structure of the area that it was the threat from internal enemies which was the most serious. From these conflicts—which took the form of revolts against the RifIs—a number of themes emerge.

The first theme is the nature of RifI authority. As RifI dominion extended over a new area, a number of things happened. In the first place they collected taxes. This was resented by the local people, not simply because they disliked paying taxes—for contributions had been exacted from them in various ways by qā'ids before—but because they were so heavy and because the ability to collect taxes was the symbol of an outside authority which was governing them. There were other symbols as well—the RifI telephone lines, emphasising the technical superiority of their new masters, the building of RifI maḥakmas and command posts. Significantly, at least some of the Ghumārīs referred to the latter as "fisIna", recalling the practice of the other power in the area which was competing for the control of the Ghumāra—the Spanish. Furthermore, as the territories of the different tribes were occupied by the Rifis, the new authorities attempted to disarm them, just as the Spanish had attempted to do or would like to have done. In fact, this was just as much a "foreign domination" as the Spanish had been. The Ghumārīs recognised this when they told the Buqquya they could leave during the rebellion of May and June 1924; their quarrel wis with the
Banū Maryaghal. The Akhmās expressed the same view when they said that they had never heard of a Rifī Sultan, nor would they permit "foreigners" to prejudice their standards of living.

The second theme, inextricably linked with this, is why local people initially supported the Rifīs. In the case of certain individuals the reasons are clear enough. Some were implacably opposed to the Spanish. Such men were Qadur Kunya of the 'Anjāra, and above all Aḥmad Akhrīrū: of the Banū Ḫuzmār. Akhrīrū's hatred for the Christians is clearly expressed in a letter he wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm in April 1924. After the customary greetings he went on:

"We were, before this, among the maḥalla [armed groups] of the enemies of God and his Prophet in the tribes of Banū Ḫazmār, in the Banū Maʿdān [a clan of the Banū Ḫuzmār] and the Banū Saʿīd, and we kindled the war in all the tribes around the city of Tetuan—may God return it to the Dār al-Īslām . . . We started fighting [in the neighbourhood of Tetuan] with five men from the Police [i.e., the Spanish P.I.]—may God annihilate them . . . Then the Infidels from Tetuan arrested our brother Muslims from the Banū Maʿdān and Banū Ḫuzmār . . . Then we went to the city of Tetuan and with the help of God and his Prophet we carried off six infidels—three adults and three children. The three adults, they were people who are held among them in honour as wise and respected—may God annihilate them."

He continued in such terms at some length.¹

Others, like Kurṭīṭū, who worked for the Spanish in the past, joined the Rifīs because they had fallen out with the Spanish and al-Raisūlī so that the Rifīs were their only hope of safety.

Others joined out of opportunism or out of a desire to drive out the Spanish, but not to be dominated by the Rifīs afterwards. Such a one was al-Ḥashāmī b. Ḥalīma, whom the Rifīs made gāʿid of his tribe, the Banū ʿIdhīr, but who turned against them at the time of the Akhmās revolt.

¹ MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 193, Aḥmad Akhrīrū to Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm, 14 Ramaḍān 1342/19 April 1924.
Others, still, never joined the Rifis—particularly al-Raisûlî, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dargāwî, and the Bujdayn family of the Timsamān. They also happened to be sharîfs, connected with powerful religious orders.

This battle between bin 'Abd al-Karîm and the tariqas is a third theme of the chapter. The conflict was expressed in religious terms. The religious reforms of bin 'Abd al-Karîm were anathema to the tariqas: he expropriated habus property for the war effort, and disapproved of their practices and rituals. Above all, he expected obedience. To a man like al-Raisûlî, such an expectation was, to put it mildly, an impertinence. He, al-Raisûlî, was a sharîf, a descendant of the Prophet, while bin 'Abd al-Karîm was a nobody, and al-Raisûlî contemptuously dismissed him as "the son of a faqîh". There was a political objection on bin 'Abd al-Karîm's part to the tariqas, for he could not, if his centralised authority was to remain unchallenged, allow powerful groups within the state. Directly on the border was 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dargāwî, the head of the most extensive order in the Rif, the Darqāwîya. Since he would not join him, and it must be remembered that bin 'Abd al-Karîm tried to persuade him to do so, he had to be defeated. This attempt was not successful in the case of 'Abd al-Raḥmān, but it was in that of al-Raisûlî—again after many attempts to persuade him to join the Rifis. What was really at stake was power. The tariqas and the sharîfs could combine against bin 'Abd al-Karîm, and did so, and therefore they had to be defeated.

The importance of these local power struggles can be seen in the case of 'Amar b. Ḫamîdu and Bil-Qīsh as well. Their objectives were to maintain their own positions in their
tribes, and they failed, just as the religious leaders had failed, because of the necessity, for the Rifī state, of limiting their power. Their other ally, 'Abd al-Mālik, was forced to flee to the Spanish to organise his harka. He was killed in a skirmish on the eastern front on 7 August 1924.1

On the other hand, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was quite content to leave in peace those sharifs and tariqa leaders who agreed to place themselves under his authority. This was particularly true of the Akhamīshīn family, who were given positions of authority in the tribes. Sī Maḥammad b. Ṣadīq of the chief Akhamīshī zawiya of Bū Ghilab practically ruled the Sinhāja for bin 'Abd al-Karīm; Sī Maḥammad b. 'Allī al-Ḥākim, head of the Akhamīshī zawiya of Agūnī b. Barī, was made Pasha of the Banū 'Āḥmad; Sī 'Abd al-Jaddī of the Akhamīshī zawiya of al-Tāffāḥ was made Pasha of the Banū 'Āmrāt; and outside the Akhamīshī family, Sī 'Allū b. al-Ḥāṣimī b. al-Ḥāssan of the zawiya of Afghāl was made qā'īd of the Banū Samīḥ.2

It was not even a question of all of a particular family or a particular order being for or against the Rifī. Clearly 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dargāwī was opposed to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, but the sharifs of the Darāwīya zawiya at Tuzğān in the Ghumāra cooperated with the Rifīs. They had been doing so at least since 1922, for Skīraj describes an incident when a messenger came from the titular head of the zawiya, Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq, who was living in Tangier, and tried to intervene in the negotiations over the ransom of the Spanish

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1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 175, and SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, Beni Tuzin, 'Allāl b. Muḥammad to Colonel, 8 Muḥarram 1343/9 Aug. 1924.
2 Drague/Spillman, op. cit., p. 109.
prisoners. In his letter, Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq also asked that the zawiyā be respected. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm replied that the zawiyā was safe and its faqīḥs were acting as good Muslims, and that if Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq was as good a Muslim he would come to join them. However, on 1926, Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq was still living in Tangier. Also, as this chapter has described, the Nasirīyīn were similarly divided. Al-Hadawī of al-Ramla near Tangier supported the Rifīs while the Bujdayn family in the Timsamānī were opposed. Even the Akhamīshīn had produced two supporters of the Ghumāra revolt in 1924.

It must be repeated that the question came down to power. Those families of marābūts or sharīfs, those zawiyās which were prepared to cooperate with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm in the new order, were left in peace. Those that tried to protect themselves by allying themselves with the French or Spanish might claim that bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, by taking over ḥabūs property, and by forcing them to accept his authority, was acting in a way opposed to their religious prestige, but they were unsuccessful. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm described them as traitors to Islam and tried—and in most cases succeeded—in crushing them. There was no place for tarīqas in the salāfiya interpretation of the shari‘a, but neither was there a place for them in the political structure of the Rifī state, if they tried to assert an independent existence.

The final theme to emerge during the year 1924 was the possibility of conflict with the French. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm may have been brought in against his will, but if his enemies in the Rif, Sinhāja and Jibāla sought backing from the

1 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 73, and Cerdeira, op. cit., p. 66, n. 1.
French, and if the French insisted on occupying territory which it was both politically and economically necessary that he should control, conflict was inevitable. The fighting stopped in 1924, but the threat of its renewal remained, and it was conflict with the French that would eventually destroy the Riff state.
Chapter XII

THE RİFİ STATE AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS POWER--THE
INVASION OF THE FRENCH ZONE JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 1925

After the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Shāwin to the defensive line from Tetuan to Alcazarquivir, and the abandonment of most of the Jibāla to the Spanish, the Rİfİ state reached the peak of its power. It now stretched from the eastern edge of the Rİf (where the Spanish "Silvestre line" had held throughout the withdrawals in the east) almost as far as Tetuan and beyond it to the west into the Banū Masawar, only a short distance from Tangier. Behind the Spanish defence lines, the Hawz and 'Anjara tribes had risen, threatening the vital Tangier to Tetuan road and the equally vital Ceuta to Tetuan railway. Within the Rİfİ dominated area, most of those leaders who had in the past opposed bin 'Abd al-Karîm had been silenced. Al-Raisûlî had been captured and taken to the central Rİf where, close to death, he was imprisoned at Tamasind in the Banū Waryaghal. 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu had fled to the French zone, although he would re-emerge to help the French in their invasion of the Rİf later in 1925. 'Abd al-Mâlik was dead, and bin 'Abd al-Karîm had defeated any possible threat from Bil-Qîsh. Organised opposition to the Rİfİs in the Jibāla had been severely dealt with during January and February 1925. The
only remaining focus of opposition was that provided by 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Dargāwī in the Banū Zarwāl. For this reason it was vital for the Rifīs to take the Banū Zarwāl and the other tribes on the north bank of the Wādī Wargha. There were other reasons as well, of course, principally that the Rif relied on the food resources of the Wargha valley. However, action in that area would undoubtedly bring the Rifīs into conflict with the French once again.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was therefore very careful about his preparations for an attack which would lead to war with the French. He first had to make absolutely sure of his control of the territory that he already held, and undertook the consolidation of the Jibāla, building roads and setting up command posts and ṭūlaqūt in the tribes—all connected by telephone, of course—and strengthening even further his political control of the area. However, the economic conditions in the Rif and Jibāla were getting steadily worse, so the urgency of securing the upper Wargha valley was great.

Initially, the Rifī attacks on the Wargha and the French posts north of that river were extremely successful. They were so successful, in fact, that Rifī troops crossed the river, and after advances on other sectors of the front, for a short time threatened Fez itself. However, this led to a hasty alliance between the French and Spanish forces in Morocco, which resulted in a Spanish landing at Alhucemas in September 1925.

The military aspects of the campaign against the French zone will not be discussed in this chapter at great length, for it was the economic difficulties and the political situation in the Rif and Jibāla which led to the attack
on the French zone, and which also caused stirrings of political opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karīm within the Rifī state.

The Economy of the Jibāla, February to April 1925

The Jibāla that the Rifīs took over in December 1924 and January 1925 fell rapidly into economic chaos. Al-Raisūlī had been able to point to the defeat of the Spanish and the closure of markets in the Jibāla as one of the reasons why the Akhmāsīs should oppose the Rifīs.¹ He certainly had a strong argument, for, in the month between 12 December 1924 (when prices had already been reported as rising) and 11 January 1925, the price of sugar went up from 8 pts to 10 pts (a rise of 25%) and candles from 3 pts to 5 pts a packet (a 66% rise).²

At first, the Rifīs were able to smuggle in large amounts of supplies from Tangier, going through the Spanish defence line at night.³ In February 1924, Vincent Sheean, the American newspaper correspondent, met a group of more than one hundred Spanish soldiers who had been taken prisoner in the 'Anjara in December, behind the Spanish lines, and who, in February, were escorted by night through the defence lines to captivity in the Rif without a shot being fired; Sheean himself crossed the Spanish lines from al-Ramla in the Banū Masawar by night, along with some four hundred men,

1 See above, p. 704.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Diciembre, nota, 12 Dec. 1924, and Política Enero, nota, 11 Jan. 1925. The prices for December are given in the report in Ḥassanī pesetas and those for January in Spanish pesetas. The December figures have therefore been converted into Spanish pesetas. For an account of exchange rates, see above, p. xix.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Febrero, nota, 19 Feb. 1925
women and children, "with their mules, donkeys, goats and
chickens", on their way to the Thursday market in the
International Zone, and although the Spanish posts fired on
the convoy, they did it very little damage.1

The worst hunger was in Rif controlled areas
behind the Spanish defence lines--in the 'Anjara, Hawz and
Wadi Ra's tribes. Towards the end of February, the notables
of the 'Anjara and Wadi Ra's wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karîm
telling him that unless he helped them they would have to
take action on their own account, because of the very great
misery in the tribe.2 This was quite clearly a veiled
threat that they would submit to the Spanish. What they
needed was military support, for starting from 4 January,
Spanish troops led by Francisco Franco (then still a Colonel)
had begun to move up the border between the International
Zone and the 'Anjara lands, and after considerable fighting
they reached the coast at the end of January.3 The Spanish,
however, were unable to fight their way along the coast to
al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghîr, which was only reoccupied in a sea-borne
landing at the end of March.4

This Spanish advance between the 'Anjara and the
International Zone of course made the tribes' supply problem
that much more difficult. The Rifis sent 300 men to the
'Anjar and Hawz in mid-March, although Spanish Intelligence
estimated that this was to keep them loyal to the Rifis and
prevent them from submitting to the Spanish rather than to

1 Sheean, Adventures, pp. 324-325, 337-343.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 125, Política Febrero, nota, 22 Feb. 1925,
1st Report.
3 The Times, 5 Jan. 1925, p. 12, dated Madrid, 4 Jan. 1925,
Meanwhile, the scarcity of food in these two tribes got worse. At the beginning of March they were reported to have no grain at all. An indication of how serious the position was came the following month when a Spanish intelligence report of 2 April stated that a man from the Hawz, one 'Abd al-Qādir, had sold his rifle to get money to buy food. On 6 April, when Spanish troops had reoccupied parts of the 'Anjara tribe around al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr, they found that the local people were eager to eat the leftovers of the rations of Spanish troops, and the bits of bread dropped by those troops. In the rest of 'Anjara, the parts not occupied by the Spanish, persistent bombing by Spanish aeroplanes meant that the markets could not be held.

Matters were not much better in the Jibāla in front of the Spanish lines. "Great misery" was reported in the Banū Masawar, and many Jibālis left to seek work, or at least food, in Tangier, or the Spanish occupied towns of Asīla, Larache, and Alcazarquivir. The Akhmās and Banū Ājmad were equally afflicted, and when AkhrIrū asked for their help to "punish" the 'Anjara for their threats to submit to the Spanish, they refused, saying that that tribe was too far away, and that anyway they were too hungry to move. The situation was not helped by the actions of the Rifis themselves, who

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1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Marzo, nota, 13 Mar. 1925, 2nd report.
2 Ibid., 6 Mar. 1925, 2nd report.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política April, nota, 2 Apr. 1925.
4 Ibid., nota, 6 Apr. 1925.
5 Ibid., nota, 14 Apr. 1925, 2nd report.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., nota, 15 Apr. 1925.
were reported to be taking food supplies—peas and beans—from Shāwīn to Ajdīr as "war booty".  

The refugees pouring into Tangier to find food became a matter of international concern, and in April, Prince 'Umar Tussūn', a cousin of the King of Egypt, issued an appeal to the Muslim world for help for the "Rīfī" homeless, and started the fund with a personal gift of five hundred Egyptian pounds.  

Not surprisingly, these conditions caused considerable ill-will towards the Rīfīs in the Jibāla, but there was little that the local people could do about it, for Rīfī control of the area was too strong.

The Rīfī Administration of the Jibāla

After the burning of the Akhmās and the capture of al-Raisūlī, the ḥarka that had supported al-Raisūlī in Tazarūt disintegrated. Now the Rīfīs could set about organising the Jibāla in accordance with their wishes.

Their first step, at the end of February, was to call the notables of the Jibāla to a meeting in Ajdīr. At this meeting, gā'īds and other officials were appointed. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm told his audience that they should defend their country (waṭan) against anyone who tried to take it:  

"Spain is the bitter enemy of [our] religion, and has no other intention than the abolition of Islam in the Rif, and in any other tribes she occupies, and she will spare no effort to eliminate it in

1 Ibid., nota, 9 Apr. 1925.  
2 The Times, 29 Apr. 1925, p. 15.  
3 Ibid., 27 May, 1925, p. 15.  
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Febrero, nota, 19 Feb. 1925.  
5 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 139.
This was presumably in the cause of a general encouragement, for bin 'Abd al-Karīm then moved on to more practical aspects of administration. He appointed Si Ḫaddu b. ‘Alī al-Muqaddim, of Ajdīr (Ra‘īs Misa‘ūd "Sibara’s" successor as Minister of Marine) as a temporary inspector, based at Shāwīn, to set up telephone lines and an organisation, and to coordinate attacks on Ceuta and Tetuan (see Photograph XII:1). They were then told that each tribe should choose a place to put a mahakma suitable for the administrator of the tribe and his helper, that they should make a census of all the arms in the tribe and store them at the mahakma so that when an idāla left to join the ḥarka, all its members would be armed. This last instruction apparently infuriated the Jibālīs as they considered, quite correctly, that it was an attempt to disarm the tribe.

When Akhrīrū returned from Ajdīr and, on 27 February, announced these decisions at Taghzhūt, the local people were angry, and told him that they would not hand over their arms, that they would not allow the appointment of administrators, and that they would prefer to submit to the Spanish or the French. Once again the belief that by ejecting the Spanish the Jibālīs could return to living as autonomous tribes and clans, as they had before the Spanish arrived, was being expressed. They had seen the Rifīs as liberators, but only now realised that they had been forcibly incorporated into the new state. They may not have liked

1 Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 139-140.
2 Ibid., p. 140.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Politica Marzo, nota, 2 Mar. 1925.
4 Ibid., nota, 5 Mar. 1925.
Photograph XII: 1

A European traveller's drawing of a meeting of Rif officials in a house in the Wādī Lāw area in late 1924 or early 1925. Notice the man in the right foreground speaking into a telephone mouthpiece.

this, but there was very little they could do about it, for
the Rifís were quite definitely in control. At the begin-
ning of March, bin 'Abd al-Karím ordered the Banû Idhír to
pay a fine of (reportedly) 50,000 pesetas, an enormous sum
in the straitened economic difficulties of the tribe, because
of five Rifís who had been killed in the tribe. When they
refused, a large harka was sent from the Hawz, and arrived
on 4 March, in order to enforce payment.¹

Generally speaking, the attitude of the Jibálís
seems to have been a begrudging acquiescence to Riffi:
domination. Sheean, on his journey out of the Rif through
the Jibála in February 1925, noted that when he spent a
night in a village of the Banû 'Arús:

"I could see what had never appeared before in the
whole journey across northern Morocco: a latent
hostility, or at best an unwilling friendship, for
the Sultan Mohammed ben Abd al-Krim . . . They
were not unfriendly [towards Sheean and his Riffi:
companion], but they smiled slightly each time
Mohammed and I referred to the Riffi leader as
the 'Sultan'."²

Some people did feel able to protest about some aspects of
Riffi rule. A meeting at Múlây 'Abd al-Salâm in the second
week of March agreed to wage total war against the Christians,
but also to write to bin 'Abd al-Karím complaining about the
behaviour of the Riffi troops.³ It will be remembered that
stories, true or otherwise, about Riffís' abusing Jibálí:
women, had spread before the Akhmás uprising in January. One
man, a former gádi in Tetuan, and well-disposed towards the
Spanish, made his own individual protest. When Riff soldiers
started drilling in the main square of Sháwin, he nailed up

¹ ibid.
² Sheean, Adventures, pp. 320-321.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Marzo, nota, 13 Mar. 1925,
1st report.
all the windows of his house looking over the square. For this insolence he was fined 5,000 pesetas.¹

In fact, those Jibālis who disliked the Rifis could only content themselves with such gestures, for they could take no effective action at all. On 28 March, Spanish Intelligence reported that the Akhmās had been completely disarmed,² and on 4 April, it reported that all the Ghumāran tribes had been disarmed as well. Qā'id Wuld al-Qurfa then proceeded to deal with the Banū Sa'īd al-Gharb in the same way.³ At the end of April, information came from the Larache Comandancia that Rifi agents were counting up arms in the Banū Sikkar.⁴

Once again, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's policies were serving a variety of ends at once. By disarming the tribes he could claim, firstly, that it prevented feuding, and secondly, that it ensured that the barkas were adequately armed. It also ensured his own continued dominance over the Jibāla.

In fact, the only place where that dominance was even slightly questioned was in the 'Anjara. Cut off from direct Rifi control, behind the Spanish lines, and hungry as well, the people of the 'Anjara showed a marked tendency to submit to the Spanish. However, the presence of sympathetic tribes behind the Spanish defence lines was obviously of great strategic importance for the Rifis; and a concerted propaganda effort was made to keep the 'Anjara opposed to the Spanish. One letter, sent by a Rifi agent in mid-March

¹ Ibid., nota, 27 Mar. 1925, 1st report.
² Ibid., nota, 28 Mar. 1925.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Abril, nota, 4 Apr. 1925.
⁴ Ibid., nota, 24 Apr. 1925.
1925 to four people in the valley of the Wādī al-Mārsā, in the eastern 'Anjara, not far from Ceuta, ran as follows:

(After the traditional greetings) "Know that all the Muslims of the zone, from the Muluya as far as your country, are agreed and united under a lord sent by God, an excellent person, who has great powers and facilities to fight and expel our enemies. We shall rejoice that you listen to the voice of God and come to join the rest of your brothers. From them you will hear the plans for the triumphs of the Muyahidin [sic]. If you do not heed the call you will suffer the same fate as the Xerif Raisuni [sic] who lost everything: freedom, goods and money which has fallen into the coffers of our Mahzen [sic], and his children have been arrested. Be as quick as you can and at once decide to join your brothers."¹

This is a fairly primitive bit of propaganda—a mixture of appeal for jihād and threats, but it contains a passing reference to the new character of the Rif state, pointing to the facilities which the "lord sent by God" enjoyed in his battle against the Spanish. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was also quite willing to try to carry out the threats implicit in his agent's letter, for on 23 March he wrote to the 'Anjara that there were people in the village of 'Aṣīb bin al-'Aishīsh in the far west of the tribe, near the border with the International Zone, who were disloyal. They were to be arrested and sent to Ajdīr.²

Whether these people were in fact arrested and sent to Ajdīr is not known but it does not seem to have stopped people in the 'Anjara from submitting to the Spanish. On 5 April, ten villages in the east of the tribe submitted to the Spanish, partly in their desperation to get food.³

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Marzo, nota, 20 Mar. 1925, 1st report, containing letter (translated into Spanish) of letter from Mohamed Ben Mohamed el Muyahed Mesrandi to Sidi Enfed-del Cheraid, Taleb Sidi Enfed-del el-Kamel, Sidi el Hach Mohamed Kanya y Sidi el-Hossain Ben Yiaa, dated 1343.
² Ibid., nota, 23 Mar. 1925, 1st report.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Política Abril, nota, 6 Apr. 1925.
The 'Anjara apart, bin 'Abd al-Karîm's control of the main part of the Jibâla was absolute. There were guard posts in all the tribes and at places like the zawiya of Sîdî Yusîf of Tilîdî.\(^1\) In each village, according to Spanish Intelligence, five men and five women were paid by the Rîfîs to report anyone who spoke ill of the Rîfîs or of bin 'Abd al-Karîm—or indeed spoke of him at all, for a rumour had spread that no one had seen him for four months, with the implication that he was dead. Anyone who was unwise enough to comment on this rumour was liable to suffer the death penalty, the market-criers announced.\(^2\)

The same penalty—death—was announced for anyone who discussed the death of al-Râisüllî,\(^3\) who had died at Tamasind on 3 Apr. 1925.\(^4\) The same prohibition applied in the Rîf as well—only there the penalty was a very heavy fine.\(^5\) It is an extraordinarily vivid illustration of the extent to which bin 'Abd al-Karîm controlled the Rîf and the Jibâla, that the first rumours of al-Râisüllî's death did not reach Tangier until 17 April,\(^6\) and that even on 26 April, the Spanish authorities at Alhucemas Island could not decide whether the rumour was true.\(^7\)

Certainly bin 'Abd al-Karîm held the Rîf under the same tight control as he did the Jibâla. There is an account of a visit by a Moroccan agent of the French in January and February 1925 which shows this very clearly.

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1. Ibid., nota, 20 Apr. 1925.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., nota, 23 Apr. 1925.
5. SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información Matalsa, nota, 26 Apr. 1925.
7. SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información Matalsa, nota, 26 Apr. 1925.
The Visit of 'Ali al-Majawi b. Mukhtar to the Rif

On 8 February 1925, 'Ali al-Majawi b. al-Mukhtar, a man from one of the unsubmitted tribes of the Banu Warrayn, came voluntarily to the French post at Berkine in the foothills of the Middle Atlas (on the edge of the Banu Warrayn confederation) to offer information about a trip he had just made into the Rif.¹ His aim in providing this information, according to the French, was firstly to earn a little money, and secondly to obtain a pardon for various unspecified crimes that he had committed between 1920 and 1923. The French considered him a reliable informant.

In order to enter the Rif, he was able to use a safe-conduct pass signed by bin 'Abd al-Karim which he had obtained in 1923 when he had acted as a messenger between bin 'Abd al-Karim and leaders of the Banu Warrayn. On this occasion, armed with his old safe-conduct documents, he went to the Rif with the excuse of looking for a Warraynî leader who had gone to the Rif on a visit and not yet returned.

He entered the Rif from the south, crossing the Fez-Taza railway line near Masün on 13 January. The following day he reached the first Rifî outpost at Bû Ma'wiyat near Sakka. There he found a Waryaghli qâ'id, another Waryaghli "notable", and five members of the Rifî regular army. They also had a telephone, connecting their position with SI 'Ali Bû 'Uqba and, eventually, Ajdir. The qâ'id explained that the purpose of the mahakma at Sakka was principally to keep a watch on the French, and to open

¹ SHAT Maroc Fez 156, Territoire de Taza, Cercle de Guercif, Annexe de Mahiridga, Bureau de Berkine. Services de Renseignements, no. 21. "Renseignements fournis sur le Rif", Berkine, 8 Feb. 1925, Confidentiel (henceforward referred to as "Renseignements fournis sur le Rif").
negotiations with people in the French half of the Banū Bū Yaḥyī, who were encouraged to come to markets in the Rif and were welcomed by the Rifīs. 'Ali al-Majāwī was also informed that while bin 'Abd al-Karīm had made it quite clear that at that point, in January 1925, he did not want war with the French, he was making preparations for an attack on the French zone with the assistance of a certain Sī Khalīl b. Mūlāy Mūḥammad, a man who claimed, somewhat curiously, to be the son of Bū Ḫimāra (the pretender to the Moroccan throne between 1902 and 1903, who had been based for some time at Silwān, near Melilla). Sī Khalīl had taken part in the first conflicts with the French in the Banū Warrayn in 1922, and had joined the Rifīs in 1923, for whom he had undertaken to organise all the refugees from the French zone. 'Ali al-Majāwī picked up the rumour that Khalīl expected to receive Rifī help for an attack on the French zone in March or April 1925—a rumour of some significance in view of the Rifī attack on the French zone in April. The Sakka front was protected by a group of some 400 Rifī regulars, who spent their days training, and building air raid shelters.

On 16 January, 'Ali al-Majāwī visited the Friday market at 'Ain Zuhra, and noted the political calls made by the local Maṭālṣī gā'īds for the Banū Bū Yaḥyī of the French zone to come to the Rif for trade—presumably part of the political campaign to "attract" that tribe. It is interesting to note that in making use of the markets, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was adopting precisely the same methods of "attracting" to his cause the French part of the Banū Bū :
Yaŷî as the Spanish had used in 1916 for the part of the same tribe that fell inside their zone.¹

‘Ali al-Majâwi visited a number of markets during his rather leisurely approach to Ajdîr, and at each he noted propaganda being made and calls for ḥarkas against the French and the Spanish. It is difficult to say whether or not it was a coincidence, but in the markets close to the "Christian lines" at Sî ‘Ali Bû ‘Uqba, and Sûq al-Ithnayn of the Banû Tûzîn, the market announcements that he reported were concerned with the organisation of ḥarkas, and it was not until he reached Sûq al-Arba‘a of the Banû Waryaghâl that he reported religious and social propaganda. Here, on 21 January, he heard Sî Yazîd b. Ḥammu, the Minister of the Interior, who:

"... told the natives to observe the religious laws scrupulously, so that they would always have God's protection; that Ould Abd al-Krim required everyone to live in peace and that he forbade any disorder; that he would be very severe towards anyone who committed an offence, that those who killed would be killed, that anyone who stole would have his right hand cut off."²

This last announcement is of particular interest, for it is the only mention of such a penalty being enforced. If it is correct—and there seems no reason why ‘Ali al-Majâwi should make it up—it shows yet another advance of the shari‘a into Rifî society and one, moreover, in a form which had largely died out in Morocco before 1900.³

The following day he went to a Thursday market near Ajdîr, at which ‘Ahmad Bû Drâ, the Minister of War, made a speech announcing the capture of Tazarût, and giving the

¹ See above, pp. 163-164.
² "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff".
³ See above, p. 128.
credit for this to Akhřū. The very fact that he emphasised Akhřū’s part in al-Raisūlī’s capture is significant, for it points to a concern to bring home the unity of the Rif and the Jibālā to his audience.

Next, ‘Alī al-Majāwī went to Ajdīr. He found that bin ‘Abd al-Karīm had moved his headquarters to Azghār, about a kilometre from Ajdīr, and the māḥakma of Ajdīr had largely been taken over by SI Khalīl b. Mūlāy Muḥammad and his group of supporters from the French zone. In order to stay in Ajdīr, he had to obtain written permission from the māḥakma, since anyone who did not have this authorisation was expelled from the area. Again, this implies a considerable level of social and bureaucratic control. This is not to say that the māḥakma itself was particularly opulent, for it was no more than a house of the traditional type for the area (see Photograph XII: 2).

‘Alī al-Majawī received his permission easily enough on production of his safe-conduct pass, and spent the week-end of 24-26 January in Ajdīr, making frequent visits to Azghār. The level of activity in the area seems quite remarkable. Some of the Spanish prisoners (between 80 and 100 of them) were employed in digging trenches and air raid shelters; others were employed in making cartridges; yet others in making leather gas-masks. Numerous Jews were employed in making hand-grenades out of old fruit tins, and other Europeans were involved in maintaining the telephone service.

On Tuesday 27 January, ‘Alī entered the māḥakma of Azghār to ask for an interview with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. He saw the office, with a telephone, of Aḥmad Bū Drā, and that of
Photograph XII: 2

The mahākma of Ajḍīr, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's former house, after its capture by the Spanish in the autumn of 1925.

SI Aḥmad Shiddī, who he describes as mutaṣarrafī in charge of making payments to the army and recording taxes and fines. Both these offices, and that of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, were furnished simply, in the European manner. 'Alī al-Majāwī was then interrogated by Aḥmad Bu Drā, in the presence of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, about the political situation in the Banū Warrayn, and his replies were carefully noted down by a secretary. He was then dismissed and told to wait for a further interview.

That interview never came, although he was interrogated again by SI Khalīl about the political position in the Banū Warrayn. After a week, 'Alī al-Majāwī decided to leave Ajdīr: "I was fed up because life is expensive there and nobody gives you anything." However, to do so, he had to get another permit, this time to leave Ajdīr. He applied on the morning of 2 February to the maḥākma of Azghār, and in true Moroccan fashion was told to come back in the afternoon. Finally, Aḥmad Bu Drā gave him permission to return home and he set off at once, along the Shāwin road, and through the Ghumāra. However, by this time he had run out of money and decided to return home without visiting Shāwin, as he had intended. He went through the Banū 'Amārt, and the Gaznaya, where he saw extensive defence works being carried out on the French front. There were large numbers of Rifi troops—about 1,400 near Kiffān, ready to attack the French zone. The local commanders were apparently most anxious to do this, but bin 'Abd al-Karīm had forbidden any

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1 "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff". According to Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 378-379, Shiddī was only an assistant to SI Muḥammad Bu Jībar, who was chief mutaṣarrafī.

2 "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff".
such attack because "the hour had not yet struck". Eventually he regained the French lines and made his report.

Four things stand out clearly in this report. Firstly, the very great level of organisation that 'Ali al-Majawi describes. He makes numerous references to the telephone system, to the bureaucracy, and social control in Ajdir. Secondly, he gives considerable insight into the authority of the Rif state. His safe-conduct pass was valid everywhere. Quite clearly, also, bin 'Abd al-Karim was in full control of his officers and officials on the French front, despite their desires to invade the zone at once. Thirdly, he gives proof that bin 'Abd al-Karim was under political pressure to attack the French and was preparing for eventual war against them. Finally, he comments upon the economic difficulties in Ajdir, and indeed on the French front, where the troops seemed to him "to be very underfed."

He sums up his own opinions thus:

"From the conversations I had, I received the impression that Abd el-Krim [sic] has considerably increased his prestige since my trip in 1923, but that the necessities of life are very difficult to find. Many of the tribes are tired of sending contingents, but no one dares to protest out loud. Ould Abd el-Krim says that he does not want to attack the French because he cannot wage war on two fronts, but he is fundamentally hostile to the French, and I believe that he is ready to encourage Si el-Khellil Ould Moulay M'Ahmed [sic] in his enterprise."

The attack on the French zone, the next major stage of the Rif war, did not come until April 1925 but it was to be well planned and prepared in advance.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
Military preparations for the attack on the French zone were well under way at the beginning of February 1925. In fact, despite the defeats of the summer of 1924, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had never given up his intention of dealing with 'Abd al-Rahmân al-Darqâwî. After the conference at which he had announced the arrangements for administering the Jibâla, held in Ajdîr at the end of January, bin 'Abd al-Karîm called another meeting of his qâ'ids with representatives from the Ghumâra and Sinhâja and announced that apart from the necessity of dealing with Spain, and ejecting her from Ceuta and Tetuan; he also intended to defeat 'Abd al-Rahmân "because he has caused trouble between us and the rulers of the French zone." 'Abd al-Rahmân, he said, clearly wanted the French to take over the Banû Zarwâl, and it would therefore be better if the Rîfîs invaded that tribe first. Not surprisingly, everyone agreed with this view.¹

It is interesting that at this stage bin 'Abd al-Karîm continued to imply that he did not intend to attack the French zone as such, but only to occupy those parts of the "Rîf" that still did not obey him. Nevertheless, he himself must have been well aware that such moves would lead to war with the French and he made his preparations accordingly.

His military command² was also aware of it and

¹ Skîraj, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
² This consisted of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, his brother SI Maḥammad, 'Abd al-Salâm al-Khaṭṭâbî, Aḥmad Bû Drâ, Yazîd b. al-Ḥâjj Ḥammû, Muḥammad Bû Jâbir, Bû Laḥya, Ḥammâdî al-Shams, and SI 'Umar b. Muḥammadî (of the Banû 'Abdallah). According to al-Bû 'Ayyâshî, it also included the latter's father 'Abd al-Salâm b. al-Ḥâjj Muḥand who seems to have reverted to obedience to bin 'Abd al-Karîm in July and August 1925. Al-Bû 'Ayyâshî, op. cit., vol. II, p. 348.
it agreed to undertake military action against the French. A special General Staff was formed for the occasion, under Si Mahammad al-KhattabI, consisting mainly of people from the Spanish occupied territories in the eastern zone. It included Idris b. Mimun Khujja, a QalayI who had served with bin 'Abd al-Karim since 1921, Qa'id Bû Ra'ayl of the al-Ma'talSa, Qa'id 'Amar b. Bû 'Azzâ of the Spanish occupied part of the Banû Sa'id al-Rif, a qâ'id from the Banû Bû. YâhyI, a Sidî al-Hassan al-Qadirî al-Tilimsâni from Algeria, who was secretary to the General Staff, and three Rifis: 'Allal b. al-Yâjj bû 'Azzâ of the Timsamân, Muhammed Sharrat of Ajdir, who was to be chef de cabinet, and Ahmed b. Si Sha'ib Aqi'ân who was to be paymaster. Together these men moved to TargIst to begin plans for the operations. 1

As 'Ali al-Majawî showed, part of the preparations for the advance consisted of constructing a defensive barrier on the southern side of the Rif, behind which the Rifis could retire if necessary. But all the troops were not finally mobilised until the beginning of March 1925 in order to preserve secrecy, and even then it was done with considerable care. The attack was scheduled to begin at the beginning of April, just as al-Majawî had predicted, with a group of Rifî regular army moving into the Banû Zarwâl through the Kitâma tribe, while irregular harkas attacked the French posts in the upper Wargha valley. 2

Troops were to be moved to all positions covering the front— to the Ghafsai area, to the Wazzân region, to the Brânis, to the Marnîs and Gznaya, and to near Tawnât. The qâ'ids involved included most of the Rifis and numerous

1 Ibid., pp. 348-349.
2 Ibid., p. 359.
Ghumārī commanders—Wuld al-Qurfa, Muḥammad bin Ṣadīq of the Banū Ṣadhīfa clan of the Banū Waryaghāl, even Kuyas of the Kītāma, despite the past record of untrustworthiness of the latter two. The Banū Waryaghāl tribe of the northern Wargha was ordered to prepare supplies for the Rifīs. On 5 March, all the Rifī staff, including Si Maḥammad, moved from Tarqist to the zawīya of Sīdī Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq al-Akhamlishī in the Zargāt, partly in order to use his religious authority to help the attack, according to al-Bū ‘Ayyāshī.2

Eventually the whole command arrived at Tarbarrant where the troops were harangued by an aged mugaddam from the Banū Walishak, reputedly over 100 years old, who called them to "jihād in the way of God" and warned them not to kill prisoners, and to take all the captured prisoners to the command posts.3

The date of the first attack on the French zone varies according to the different accounts of the war, although all are agreed that the first attacks were on the Banū Zarwāl. According to the most trustworthy source, that of the Banū Zarwāl themselves, the attacks came on April 12.4 They said that on 11 April the clans of the Banū Zarwāl received letters inviting them to submit, and the following day, before they had time to reply, they were

1 Ibid., p. 360.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., pp. 361–362.
invaded. The invasion forces in this area were at first composed mainly of men from the Jibāla. RifIs only appeared when the fighting was almost over. One ḥarka, composed of men from the Banū Mastāra, moved into the centre of the tribe, and another, commanded by Muḥammad b.‘Amar Ḥammaysh, moved directly on ‘Amjūṭ with the aim of taking ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, however, fled with his family to Fez and stayed there, under French protection, until the tribe was reoccupied by the French. The zawiya at ‘Amjūṭ was then burned.

After only a day’s fighting, the parts of the Banū Zarwāl which were not under French occupation submitted to the RifIs. The head of each ḥarka then called a meeting of the notables of the clans:

"He explained that Holy War had been proclaimed by Abd el-Krim, the true Sultan of Morocco, to throw out the infidels, and particularly the French, in the name of the greater glory of regenerated Islam. He declared that the occupation of all Morocco by the RifIs was no more than a question of days, and invited the notables to tell him what positions they wanted to occupy in the tribes and towns. A secretary wrote each man’s wishes in a large register. The posts offered were all those of makhzan officials, Pachas, Caids, Cadis, Nadirs, Oumanas, Mohtassebs [sic], etc. The posts most in demand were those of Pacha, Caids and Oumanas. The registers were sent to Abd el-Krim to decide, immediately after the ceremony." Then the RifIs took 400 hostages and sent them to Ajdīr, to force the Banū Zarwāl to supply troops and to pay a fine of 200,000 livestock which was imposed. As the fines were paid

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1 SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine, Fez, B. de R., Amjot, 16 Sept. 1925.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., and Skiraj, op. cit., p. 140.
4 Al-Fihri, op. cit., p. 48.
5 SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine, Fez, B. de R., Amjot, 16 Sept. 1925.
the hostages were released. All the ḥabūs property in the tribe was confiscated by the Rifis.¹

The speeches by the ḥarqa leaders are interesting, for they refer to bin 'Abd al-Karīm as Sultan, not only of the Rif but of all of Morocco. He was Sultan not because of his birth but because he was the man who would lead Morocco to expel the infidels. Whether or nor bin 'Abd al-Karīm had specifically approved this designation is uncertain, but it seems quite clear that in the eyes of his followers, if not of the defeated Banū Zarwāl, he was Sultan.

The attack on the French positions in the Banū Zarwāl began at once. Bibān and Banū Darqūl, two important French positions, were besieged.² Rifī forces also struck at Kiffān from the Gaznaya,³ a position on the Wādī Laban, at others near Tissa,⁴ and near Tawnāt.⁵ At first the French managed to repulse the Rifī attacks, but they soon came into contact with the previously prepared Rifī trench system, and their counter-attack came to a halt.⁶

There is not space here to describe in detail the course of the battles, in which some posts were taken and retaken several times.⁷ But at the end of May the French announced that they would evacuate most of the posts north of the Wargha,⁸ and all civilian Europeans were evacuated from Wazzān.⁹

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
³ The Times, 2 May 1925, p.11, dated Paris, 1 May 1925.
⁵ Ibid., 8 May 1925, p. 14, dated Tangier, 7 May 1925.
⁷ For a fuller account see Woolman, op. cit., pp. 177-179.
⁹ Woolman, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
Bibān, "the gateway to Fez", fell on 5 June,\(^1\) and although the Rifis got within 40 kilometres of the city, they did not succeed in entering it as they had promised.\(^2\)

Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to win support from the 'ulamā' of Fez for his cause. On 21 June, he sent a letter to Sī Aḥmad b. Jīlālī, head of the Qarāwīyīn University in Fez, to pass on to other 'ulamā'—Mūlāy 'Abd al-Malik al-Bashīr, 'Abdallāh al-BagrawĪ, Sī Ḥāmid Būmānī, Sī Tahāmī Gannūn, Sī al-Muḥdī al-Wazzānī and Sī Aḥmad bīn al-Khiyyāt.\(^3\)

The letter began:

"We tell you and your colleagues the Imams, who are men of good faith and have no relations with hypocrites and infidels, of the state of servitude into which the disunited nation of Morocco is sunk."\(^4\)

The reason for this situation, said the letter, was that the religious leaders were incapable hypocrites, all of them, from sharīf to ṭālib. There were sharīfs who were friendly towards the infidels, there was a qādī who gave money to help French orphans. Mūlāy Yūsif and his "perfidious entourage" had been corrupted by Christian gifts.

However, it was not just Mūlāy Yūsif who was guilty of such acts:

"We have exposed . . . the perfidy of the entourage of the Sultan Mūlāy El Hassan [sic] from the beginning to the end of his reign. We have pointed out each traitor by name, and made known their actions. We have also exposed the perfidy of the entourage

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 179.
\(^2\) Hart, A'ith Waryaghar, pp. 395-396.
\(^3\) SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine, Lyautey to Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Rabat, 24 Aug. 1925, enclosing letter of bin 'Abd al-Karīm to Aḥmad b. Jīlālī, dated 8 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1343/30 June 1925. (My translation is of the French version of the original, henceforth referred to as: SHAT Maroc E24, b. 'Abd al-Karīm to al-Jīlālī.)
\(^4\) Ibid.
of Sultan Moulay [sic] Abd el-Aziz and pointed out each swindler individually, including those who destroyed [Moroccan] sovereignty, such as El Menebhi and others.¹

The Rughī, Bū Ḫimāra, Jīllālī Zarhūnī, who had claimed the throne as Sī Maḥammad in 1909, was dismissed as "one of the sorcerers without religion", and al-Raʾisūlī as a schismatic. Even Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ was attacked and described as:

"... a heretic, and liar, a leader of holy war at Marrakesh, where sorcerers built for him imposing minarets, although he belonged to a family of base origins, and who, having seized great wealth, and sought refuge in Spain..."²

Morocco had been taken over by France, which herself had been devastated in the Great War and was now in debt to the Americans.

Mūlāy Yūsif had refused to cooperate with the Rifīs so there remained only one alternative: "Power should belong to him who has the people with him in accordance with the Book of God and the Mahommedan [sic] law."³ Once again the emphasis is laid on the claim of Muḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Karīm to the Sultanate as the true leader of jihād.

The leaders of Morocco had sacrificed the jihād to their personal ambition and greed, the letter continued, but this would eventually lead to their impoverishment:

"Know, oh Oulama, that if the reign of the unbelievers continues, ten Moroccans will be valued [by the Christians] at the price of one donkey, and not one will keep possession of a single dirham or dinar; nor of a forest or garden, a plot of land to sow his seed, nor a shop nor a house."⁴

There follows a series of quotations from verses of the Qurʾān, stating the necessity of jihād. It was vital that

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
no one should help the Christians for once they had over-
powered Morocco completely, they would steal all its riches
and destroy its leaders.¹

Once again, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was speaking the
language of jihâd, justifying his claim to the Sultanate
because he was the only leader of Islam against the Christians.
It was in many ways a traditional appeal. On the other hand,
Rifî propaganda in Tangier at the same period emphasised the
technological superiority which bin 'Abd al-Karîm had
achieved, mainly, according to his propagandists, with
German help. Germany was sending him soldiers, supplies by
submarine, and "extraordinary machines to make French aero-
planes fall from the sky." Even without this help, however,
he had already taken Fez—which of course was untrue—had
defeated the French army completely, and had amassed war
supplies with which he could carry on fighting for another
two years.²

These two sorts of propaganda compensated each
other, one emphasising the Islamic necessity of supporting
bin 'Abd al-Karîm, the other declaring his power as leader
of a modern state and army, with support from the great
powers. In fact, despite the optimism of the propaganda,
bin 'Abd al-Karîm had not taken Fez. Indeed, by the end of
June, the French had stopped the Rifîs along most of the
southern front, although there were still isolated Rifî
groups operating behind French lines. The French certainly
could not begin to push the Rifîs back yet.

¹ Ibid.
² SHAT Maroc E24, Relations du Rif avec l’étranger, Etat-
Majeur de l’armée 2ème Bureau Section de Renseigements,
Maroc--Propagande Riffaine à Tangier", Tunisie, 1 July 1925,
Secret.
However, the Rifī advance on Fez had shown the French the necessity of cooperating with the Spanish to defeat what was now their common enemy.

The Franco-Spanish Agreement

In mid-May 1925, as the Rifī attack on the French built up, the French Prime Minister, Painlevé, sent a personal representative to Madrid to talk to the Spanish government. At first the Spanish government denied that his visit had anything to do with Morocco but on 1 June, Primo announced that French and Spanish representatives would meet later that month to try to come to an agreement over Morocco.¹

The conference began on 17 June and, one after the other, six agreements were signed. The first was on a joint patrol of coastal waters to prevent the importation of arms, the second to prevent smuggling of arms by land, and the return of "rebels" wanted by either side. The third laid down terms for a peace treaty with the Rifīs. The Rifīs would be granted autonomy "compatible with international treaties". In return, they would withdraw from the French zone and the Spanish would occupy Alhucemas Bay. All prisoners would be exchanged, an amnesty would be granted for all the Rifīs who had "rebelled" after 1921, and a native police force would be set up to control arms and munitions.²

Primo de Rivera was desperate for this to be accepted—and be put into effect as quickly as possible, for he apparently feared that if Alhucemas was not occupied by the Spanish the French would seize on the opportunity to

² Ibid., p. 252.
annex the whole of Morocco. Horacio Echevarrietta, the Basque millionaire who had negotiated with bin 'Abd al-Karîm many times before, was sent to Ajdîr to communicate these terms on behalf of the Spanish. As he himself expected, he got nowhere.

Gabrielli, the French controlleur at Tawrîrt, also visited bin 'Abd al-Karîm at the end of June 1925. Despite bin 'Abd al-Karîm's protestations that he wanted nothing but peace with France, there was only one way to achieve this, "that France should recognise the independence of the Rif." In return, France would keep authority in her zone. This was in direct contrast to his own propaganda to the Fassi 'ulamâ'. It seems that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was trying to get what he could behind secure and recognised frontiers. Gabrielli returned home, ostensibly to report to his superior officers on bin 'Abd al-Karîm's position. In fact, the discussions had ended and another attempt at finding a peaceful solution had failed.

Meanwhile, the conference in Madrid continued, with an agreement on the International Zone of Tangier, one on the boundary between the Protectorates, and finally, and in the end most importantly, one on the military cooperation between the two countries. The two high commands would be autonomous, but the agreement allowed the temporary occupation by one party of territory in the other's Protectorate for a

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1 Ibid., p. 259.
2 Ibid. The meeting took place on 21 June 1925.
3 Gabrielli, op. cit., p. 88. This meeting took place on June 1925.
4 Ibid., p. 89.
5 Ibid., p. 99.
limited period. The conference ended on 25 July 1925. Meanwhile, in the Rif itself the burden of the new front was adding to the economic and political difficulties of the government.

The Economic Situation in the Rif, June to August 1925

By the third week of June 1925, the almost total mobilisation was causing a serious dislocation of society in the central Rif. There are frequent references in the reports of Spanish agents to how few men were to be seen in the countryside. For instance, the Spanish Intelligence reports from Dar Mizyan in the Banū Walishak noted on 22 June 1925 that there were no men to be seen, for they were all in the ḥarka. There were only women and children to be found anywhere. On 24 June, a Moroccan informant told them that in the Timsamān, "all" the men had gone to join the ḥarka in the French zone, where three-quarters of them had been killed and the rest had been wounded. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was so desperately in need of troops that he had released many of the Rifī prisoners, given them guns, and sent them to fight.

This situation did not improve, indeed it spread to the newly occupied territories of the Banū Zarwāl and Jībāla. At the beginning of July, French Intelligence in the Wazzān region reported that in that area there was no labour force to bring in the harvest, and crops were being

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1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 253.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, nota, 22 June 1925.
3 Ibid., Sha'ib b. Muḥammad al-Marnīṣī, 24 June 1925.
4 Ibid., nota, 11 June 1925.
being cut as they were needed, on a day-to-day basis. At the end of the month, they reported that the Banū Zarwāl had lost 1,000 men since the beginning of the fighting. The harvests had not been gathered in, for there was no one to do it. All the men had been forced to join the ḥarkas, and anyone who did not was fined about 40 pesetas. Deserters had their goods confiscated; "An enormous feeling of tiredness is felt in all parts of the tribe, but people dare not complain because any sign of weakness is punished very heavily." The same "tiredness" was also felt in the Mazziyāt tribe. The economic effects of all this were quickly felt.

A graph of the prices of essential commodities such as barley, sugar and tea shows a wild fluctuation in prices (see Table XII; 1). Thus the price of tea could very

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1 SHAT Maroc 156, 2ème Bureau Renseignements sur Abd el-Krim, B. des R., Reddouane, 5 July 1925.
2 SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Groupement de Fez, Mai-Juin 1925, B. des R., Ain Aicha, 26 July 1925.
3 ibid.
4 The graph is based on information contained in reports in the SHM Archives. The relevant reports are in SHM Melilla, Leg. 28:
(a) Información y confidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, Muḥammad b. Salma, 11 June 1925;
(b) Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 15 June 1925.
(c) Información y confidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, Ḥāmid b. Muḥammad Ḫu Yaʻqūbī, 18 June 1925;
(d) Ibid., nota, 25 June 1925;
(e) Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 2 July 1925;
(f) Información y confidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, Ḥāmid b. Muḥammad Ḫu Yaʻqūbī, 12 July 1925;
(g) Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 16 July 1925;
(h) Hojas Diarias, Beni Walishak, hoja diaria, 21 July 1925;
(i) Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, Salāḥ b. Muḥammad, 22 July 1925.
(j) Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Said, hoja diaria, 31 July 1925;
(k) Información y confidencias de Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, Muḥammad b. ‘Allāl Muḥand, 6 Aug. 1925;
(l) Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Said, hoja diaria, 9 Aug. 1925;
(m) Hojas Diarias, Beni Walishak, hoja diaria, 10 Aug. 1925;
(n) Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, Muqqādam b. ‘Amar, 7 Sept. 1925;
Table XII:1.
Graph showing change in prices of tea, sugar, and barley 10 June 1925 - 12 September 1925.
between 50 pts a kilo on 9 August\textsuperscript{1} and 3 pts a kilo at the beginning of September.\textsuperscript{2} But these are extremes—in general, prices of everything showed a steady climb over these three months, and the differences in price between the summer of 1925 and the autumn of the previous year show an even more marked increase. Barley, 10 pts a kilo in October 1924, remained nearly constant, but other commodities increased in price greatly: soap from 2.25 pts a bar in October 1924 to 6 pts a bar in August 1925 (up 140%); candles from 50 ctos each in October 1924 to 1 pta each in August 1925 (up 100%); tea from 10 pts a kilo in October 1924 to 30 pts a kilo at the beginning of September 1925 (a 200% rise).\textsuperscript{3}

It is scarcely surprising that at the end of July, the Banū Sa'id office reported "life is becoming impossible [in the Rifī zone],"\textsuperscript{4} and on 9 August talked of "fabulous prices" there.\textsuperscript{5}

To a large extent the prices depended on the success of the smuggling operations from the French and Spanish zones. In June, those were still feasible, although many of

\textsuperscript{1} SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Said, hoja diaria, 9 Aug. 1925.

\textsuperscript{2} SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, Muqaddam b. 'Amar, 7 Sept. 1925.

\textsuperscript{3} The October figures are from SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Informacion Batil, nota, 28 Oct. 1924, the 1925 figures from the sources already mentioned above, p. 748, n. 4.

\textsuperscript{4} SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Said, hoja diaria, 31 July 1925.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., hoja diaria, 9 Aug. 1925.
the smugglers were stopped by the Spanish. On 11 June, one such convoy was stopped in the Banū Walishak, and the Spanish recovered 30 loaves of sugar (worth about 120 pts at that date),¹ but in June contraband came in more easily through the French zone anyway.² However, as the war with the French went on, this supply route became more and more difficult. By the end of August, the Spanish were being told that there was no wheat or barley in the Rif at all.³ While this may have been an exaggeration, there can certainly have been very little, for bin ʿAbd al-Karīm took steps to prevent any extravagance, and banned the celebration of weddings, what the Spanish describe as "baptisms", and other festivities.⁴

Not surprisingly these difficult economic conditions caused great political tension in the Rif itself. There were renewed, though muted, calls for an end to the war, and in some cases, attempts at rebellion.

The Political Control of the Rif

The combination of demands on manpower and economic difficulties caused considerable political problems within the Rif.

The demands on manpower were enormous. At the beginning of June there were reportedly 800 men from the Banū Waryaghal and Gaznaya tribes in the Gaznaya, facing the French, 500 Timsamānis, Tuzānis, and Waryaghlīs at 'Ain

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diarias, Beni Walishak, hoja diaria, 12 June 1925.
² Ibid., hoja diaria, 25 June 1925.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y confidencias, Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, nota, 26 Aug. 1925.
⁴ Ibid., Khalīfa of Muḥammad b. 'Allāl Muḥand, 31 Aug. 1925.
Midyūna, 1,400 Jibālīs under Akhrīrū in the Wazzān region, and the Banū Warrayn tribes wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm asking him to send them help to cut the Tāza to Ujda railway; and this was by no means the full complement of Rīfī troops in the field. This meant that the positions on the eastern front were reduced in numbers—there were only 40 men from the Banū Waryaghāl and Gaznaya at Miṣār. 1 There was still a threat from the Spanish on the eastern front, and on 9 June it was reported that that area had been reinforced. 100 Waryaghālis were sent to Sīdī Idrīs along with 50 Timsamānīs; 100 Tūzānīs to Sūq al-Sabat of Banū Walishak; 100 Timsamānīs to Sūq al-Jamā'a of the same tribe; and 50 Timsamānīs to Sīdī Misa‘ūd. 2

The mobilisation was strict. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had even sent his prisoners to fight; then he threatened that all deserters were to be shot. He carried out this threat with a certain Qā'id Sha‘īb who had abandoned a position on the French front when wounded, allowing the French to recapture it. 3

More troops were sent to the Tetuan front, where there was heavy fighting around Dār bin Qurraysh. 4 650 men from the Banū Walishak, Timsamān, Banū Tūzīn and Banū Waryaghāl were sent on 21 or 22 June. 5 In addition, on the eastern front he ordered that if a shot was heard, everyone was to go to the spot. Anyone who did not would be fined. 6

1 Ibid., 'Abd al-Rāḥmān b. Ḥāmid Ghāzi, 1 June 1925.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizzian, nota, 9 June 1925.
3 Ibid., nota, 13 June 1925.
4 The Times, 18 June 1925, p. 16, dated Tangier, 17 June 1925.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizzian, Muḥammad b. Bil 'Azzā, 22 June 1925.
6 Ibid.
More troops were sent to the eastern front. 400 were reported on the beach in the Timsámán on 25 June, and on 28 and 29 June, 600 Rifís arrived at Súq al-Sabat of the Banû Walishak. Sí 'Abd al-Salâm b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand was sent to Jabal Yuddia on 25 June, and many other positions were reinforced as well.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was now engaged heavily on all three fronts—against the French in the south, where he had by the end of June been forced to a halt, and against the Spanish on the Tetuan and eastern fronts. Of the 76 forward positions on the eastern front, 41 were attacked, and there was fighting on 21 days in June alone.

Not surprisingly, the people were exhausted by all this activity. Many of the people who had fled from the Spanish occupation of the eastern part of the Banû Walishak now told the Spanish they would like to return home, but they could not leave their families in the Rif, and could not get past the Rifí guards. But bin 'Abd al-Karīm took no chances. Several Timsámánís, including many of the notables of the Trugût clan, were arrested in mid-June for suspected contact with the Spanish. The amīr himself was reportedly escorted everywhere by "500 men in front of him and 500 behind" for fear of assassination.

1 Ibid., nota, 24 June 1925.
2 Ibid., nota, 29 June 1925.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y confidencias, Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, nota, 25 June 1925.
4 Fleming, op. cit., p. 256.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, nota, 16 June 1925.
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, nota, 13 June 1925.
Bin 'Abd al-Karīm also stepped up the propaganda campaign in the Rif. He reverted to the old promises of European support, saying that France and Spain had been told to stop fighting the Rifīs or the rest of Europe would attack them. This was at the same time that his propagandists were making announcements of German support in Tangier. He also threatened that if those who had fled to the Spanish zone did not return, their property would be sold.

Nevertheless, many of his subjects were unimpressed. They had heard of the Spanish and French conference at Madrid and complained to him that "it was not the same thing to fight with one nation as it was to fight with two." To this bin 'Abd al-Karīm replied that they nevertheless had to fight to the death. Anyone who did not would be shot.

Clearly it was only a matter of time before the will to fight the Spanish gave way. The first glimmerings of a revolt appeared in the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh clan of the Banū Waryaghāl at the end of June, but bin 'Abd al-Karīm took swift action to crush it. On 2 July, two 'Ayyāshi military gā'idst—'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand, the former Minister of War, and Muḥammad Zāmī—were sacked along with Muḥ Azarqān, the gā'id of the clan. This may have been prompt action but it was most unwise, for the first two soon became overtly opposed to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and in 1926:

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Beni Walishak, Hojas de Confidentes, Muḥammad Bū 'Azzā, 22 June 1925.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Informaciones, Oficina de Kadia, Beni Said, Salām Akudūd, 26 June 1925.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diarias, Oficina de Beni Said, nota, 28 June 1925.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias Dar Mizian, Ḥammu 'Allāl Amziyyān, 30 June 1925.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Muḥ Sha'īb, 2 July 1925.
led a revolt against him.

The revolt might have been crushed for the moment, but the undercurrent of discontent flowed on. In the front line tribes of Banū Walishak and Timsamān there were now many who wanted to submit. At the beginning of June, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur, probably one of the most consistent bet-hedgers of them all, again offered to change sides to the Spanish if and when they re-took Anwāl. In the Banū Walishak, the notables of the Banū Jabal (a sub-clan of the Banū Sabar clan) and the Banū ‘Abd al-Nūr (a sub-clan of the Imazirān clan) promised to attack the Rifī positions if the Spanish advanced, provided that the Spanish confirmed them in their positions when they had reoccupied the tribe.¹

To prevent any possible defection, the positions on the eastern front and along the coast were again reinforced. On 12 July, one Spanish informant, who made no reference to the Banū Walishak, and scarcely any to the Banū Tūzin, reported 1,200 troops in the Banū Waryaghal (on the coast) and Timsamān.² In addition, bin ‘Abd al-Karīn increased his personal control of government. In mid-July he announced that in future the qāʿids were not to have

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, nota, 1 July, 1925.
² They were distributed at Dahar Sijjum, near Ajdir (100 Tūzanīs), on the mouth of the W. Ghīs (100 Tūzanīs), on the mouth of the W. Nakur (100 Tūzanīs), near Sīdi Bū Da‘ud in the Timsamān (100 Tūzanīs), at Sīdi Sha‘īb in the Timsamān (100 Tūzanīs), near Raš Ţarf in the Timsamān (100 Timsamānīs), at Sīdi Idrīs in the Timsamān (200 Waryaghlīs), and 200 in the Miṣār area (all Waryaghlīs and Gazzānil). It is significant that those positions in the Ban-Tūzin that are mentioned were staffed by outsiders, and Tūzanī forces were used in the Banū Waryaghal. Evidently bin ‘Abd al-Karīm did not trust the Tūzanīs and preferred their troops to be under his eye in the Banū Waryaghal while their tribe was guarded by Waryaghlīs. SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y confidencias, Tafarsit y Beni Tuzin, Ḩāmid al-Bū Ya‘quībī, 12 July 1925.
responsibility for decisions over "justice", and all complaints from the people in their charge were to go straight to him.\(^1\) This meant that the qā'īds were removed from direct administration of the tribes, and their duties would be limited to the raising of harkas and the enforcement of military discipline. This was in fact the declaration of a state of martial law.

From now on, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's grip became even tighter. All talk of casualties was again forbidden.\(^2\) The cordon between the Spanish and Rif zones was strengthened and on 24 July the Spanish reported that no people from the "unsubmitted zone" had been seen at the Matālsa market.\(^3\)

With his efforts to control possible defections and rebellions, which bin 'Abd al-Karīm succeeded in doing with ease, the eastern front itself was relatively quiet during July. Only 18 of the 76 front line Spanish positions were attacked, and there was fighting on only 11 days.\(^4\)

However, in August the campaign on the eastern front was stepped up. On 2 August, there was a meeting at Sūq al-Khamīs of the Timsamān, at which bin 'Abd al-Karīm presided, and it agreed to attack the Spanish in the Banū Sa'īd and Miḍār sectors. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm said that he had sent money to the Spanish zone to win support behind the Spanish lines.\(^5\) However, in order to do this, he had

\(^1\) SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Muḥammad Bū 'Azzā, 14 July 1925.
\(^2\) SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, A'īsha b. 'Amar Akarrūsh, 21 July 1925.
\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 24 July 1925.
\(^4\) Fleming, op. cit., p. 256.
\(^5\) SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Muḥ b. Sha'īb al-Mārnīsī, 2 Aug. 1925.
to cut back on the number of troops he sent against the French, and when Bû Raḥayl of the Maṭālsa asked him for 500 men with which to attack the French as Masun, the request was refused. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm explained that he needed the men for the attack on 'Azīb Miḏār.¹

On 13 August, the Spanish were told that Bû Laḥya had been put in charge of 1,500 to 2,000 men in the Miḏār area. Apparently, many of the members of the ḥarka were unwilling recruits, which infuriated Bû Laḥya, who called them "cowards."² On 14 August, 200 Timsamanīs and Walishakīs were grouped at Anwāl, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm announced the imminent arrival of a column of Jibālīs under Akhrīrū on the eastern front.³

However, the Rīfī troops were vastly overstretched. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm, having built up forces on the eastern front, was forced to send reinforcements back to the south, where he felt the French were about to advance.⁴ On 18 August, 1,000 men, many from the Banū Walishak and Banū Tūzīn, were sent to the Gharb to fight the French.⁵ Yet in other parts of the southern front, Rīfī troops were withdrawn. On 21 August, ʻIbū Maḥammad was reported in Banū Barbar, where he had gone to reassure people that they were not being abandoned.⁶ On 26 August, bin 'Abd al-Karīm arranged a large

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⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y confidencias de Tafsūsit y Beni Tuzīn, Muḥammad b. 'Allāl Muḥand, 14 Aug. 1925.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Muḥand Bū 'Azzā, 18 Aug. 1925.
By now, the demands for troops to defend the Rif were so overwhelming that, when the Banū Waryaghal āhrakah departed to the Gharb, bin 'Abd al-Karīm told the people of Ajdir that henceforward "the old men and wounded" would have to be responsible for its defence. 2 A week or so before this, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had repeated his order that anyone who heard gunfire was to go to the place immediately. This time, however, the penalty for failing to do so was not a fine, but the death penalty. 3

However, despite these difficulties, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was still in full control of the situation. He even managed to increase the attacks on Spanish positions on the eastern front in August: 42 of the 76 front line positions were attacked during this month and there was fighting on 20 days—a considerable increase over the figures for July (18 positions and 11 days). 4 Moreover, he proceeded to the disarmament of the Banū Tūzīn. On 25 August he ordered that all this tribe's arms should be taken to Ajdir. 5 He stopped rumours about the death of Akhrīrū—which anyway were quite untrue—by threatening to cut out the tongue of anyone who spoke of it. 6 On 31 August came the order forbidding any further celebration of weddings and other festivities.

2 Ibid.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Confidencias, Dar Mizian, Muḥand Bū 'Azzā', 18 Aug. 1925.
4 Fleming, op. cit., p. 256.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsa, hoja diaria, 25 Aug. 1925.
The Rif was moving towards total mobilisation. On 30 August, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm ordered all the men over 15 years old of the al-Maṭālsa to meet at the site of the Tuesday market of Banū Bū Bakar to form a ḥarka. On 1 September it was reported that he had ordered his Pashas to recruit men for the ḥarkas. Qā‘īd Bū Hūt was sent to the Brānis area with a large ḥarka. On 2 September, French sources reported that a general mobilisation had been ordered throughout the Rif. By 7 February a huge number of men had been mobilised. One Spanish informant put the number on the eastern front at 1,500 (on the coast at Sīdī Idrīs and Sīdī Ḥussayn and in the Miṭār districts alone, which again leaves out many other positions). Other informants reported 8,500 on the Fez front, and another 3,000 in the Brānis, nearly all from the Jibāla. However, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was concerned most of all for the defence of the coast, where a Spanish landing was expected at any moment. There were reported to be 3,000 troops at Alhucemas and another 1,100 at Wādī Lāw in the Jibāla, under Akhrīrū. 

Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was not wrong in his assessment of the danger to the coasts; the French and Spanish had been planning a landing for some time.

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsal, hoja diaria, 30 Aug. 1925.
2 Ibid., hoja diaria, 1 Sept. 1925.
3 SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Groupement de Fez, Mai-Juin 1925, B. des R., 2 Sept. 1925.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de confidentes, Matalsa, Salāḥ b. Muḥammad Ḥammūsh, 5 Sept. 1925.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsal, hoja diaria, 6 Sept. 1925.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes, Matalsa, Salāḥ b. Muḥammad Ḥammūsh, 5 Sept. 1925.
The Preparation for the Landing at Alhucemas

After the failures of Gabrielli and Echevarrieta, both sides made one more attempt to negotiate with the Rifis. Echevarrieta visited Alhucemas once more, in mid-August. Details of his negotiations are unclear, as are those of French negotiators, who also apparently arrived at the same time. Apparently both the European powers had been trying for some time to arrange a separate peace with the Rifis, for on 4 August Harris telegraphed privately to his newspaper: "Situation delightful stop both France and Spain been trying to make separate peace--Harris." However, this renewed attempt at peace apparently convinced bin 'Abd al-Karim that he was still "the master of the situation and in these circumstances it was for him to impose his conditions and not for his adversaries." To show his contempt for his enemies he proceeded to order the bombardment of Alhucemas Island, on 20 August. Alhucemas, for most of the war, had been immune from this sort of attack because it remained an "open" port, for continuing trade with the mainland. It was an anomalous position, certainly, but the Spanish wanted to keep its island fairly peaceful, because it relied on water supplies from the mainland, for which privilege they paid a large "bribe" to the Rifis, while the Rifis depended on it as a source of food supplies. After the failure of these

1 The Times, 17 Aug. 1925, p. 10.
2 TAHP, The Times, Correspondence, 1894-1933, Telegram, Harris to The Times, Tangier, 4 Aug. 1925, "Not for Publication--very confidential."
5 Fleming, op. cit., p. 272.
negotiations the Spanish began to move towards making the final preparation for a landing in Alhucemas Bay.

Primo began to make plans for an invasion at Alhucemas Bay in April 1925. He was doubtless encouraged by the success of the disembarkation at al-Qaṣr al-Śaghīr in the ‘Anjara on 30 March, which The Times correspondent in Madrid believed to have been "a practice run for the disembarkation at Alhucemas." 

Primo's new plans involved the Air Force and Navy fully in a bombardment of the coastline and only Moroccan Regulares and regular Spanish troops—not conscripts—would be involved. The dictator received approval from the King and on 11 May he told his Chief of Staff of the plan and instructed him to make preparations for late June. However, when the French agreed to cooperate with the Spanish at the Madrid conference, the invasion plans were put back to late August or early September 1925, in order to allow for the incorporation of a token French naval force.

Not surprisingly, in spite of the secrecy in which the plans were made, news inevitably leaked out to the Rifīs; this explains bin 'Abd al-Karīm's concern with the coasts in July and August and his attempts to juggle with his over-stretched troops. The bombardment of Alhucemas, on 20 August, was an act of open defiance, for the guns of Alhucemas were to be used in the attack.

Nevertheless, the final preparations continued. On

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1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 263.
4 Ibid., p. 272.
1 September the operational commanders were given their "General Instructions for the Disembarking Operation in Alhucemas Bay".¹

On 8 September, after simulated landings at Wādī Lāw in the west and Sīdī Idrīs in the Timsāmān, Spanish troops disembarked in Alhucemas Bay. The invasion of the Rif had begun.

Conclusion

The general view is that the Rifī invasion of the French zone was a mistake. Fleming, for instance, claims that:

"The vague nationalist ideology that motivated the top leaders of the Rīfī Rebellion [sic] was given in almost every case precedence over hard military considerations. And this was especially true when Abd el-Krim ordered the invasion of the French Protectorate in April 1925."²

David Hart, who is much more sympathetic to the Rīfīs than Fleming, also considered the invasion a "hopeless" undertaking.³ Why then did the Rīfī leadership undertake such an apparently foolhardy enterprise?

Fleming offers a useful basis for discussion⁴ by putting forward four possible explanations for the invasion of the French zone. The first is based on the fact that bin 'Abd al-Karīm nearly reached Fez, where, had he entered the city, he might have been able to claim the Sultanate. His aims, according to this theory, were to liberate all of Morocco. There is, at first sight, a certain credibility in this position. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's own propaganda seems

¹ Ibid., p. 276.
² Ibid., p. 239.
³ Hart, Aīth Waryaghār, p. 396.
⁴ Fleming, op. cit., pp. 236-239.
to suggest it: his letter to the Fāssi 'ulamā' contains a call for jihād, and for the religious leaders of Morocco to cooperate with the only true leader of the holy war. However, if bin 'Abd al-Karīm was as able a leader as he clearly was, he must have realised that he could hardly hope to conquer the whole of Morocco. The most he could expect was for the rest of Morocco to rise with him, and eject the French from their zone.

Another possible explanation is that invasion was an attempt to pre-empt a French attack on the Rif, for the very existence of the Rifī state challenged that of the Protectorate. If the Rifis could cause enough damage to the French, the latter might be willing to recognise his leadership.

A third possible explanation is that bin 'Abd al-Karīm wished only to eject the French from the Wargha valley in order to safeguard his supplies of food. There is a considerable amount of truth in this, but it provides no reason for the advance on Fez, which is not in the Wargha valley.

A fourth possible explanation, to which Fleming gives some credit is that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was encouraged to invade the French zone by his "European advisers", by which is meant presumably the French Communist Party who assured him of the opposition of the French people to the war, and the "Riff Committee" in London, and by his cabinet who wanted to continue the war to the south, and in no way acted as a brake upon their leader.  

1 See below, ch. XIII for a discussion of the rôle of the Riff Committee.  
2 Fleming, op. cit., pp. 236-239.
All these theories ignore both the sequence of events and bin 'Abd al-Karîm's own stated opposition to the invasion of the French zone.\(^1\) Certainly, throughout 1924 and 1925 he tried to restrain the attacks on the French zone. According to him, his only aim was to ensure his grain supplies.\(^2\)

However, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was well aware that an attack on the French positions in the Wargha valley was tantamount to a declaration of war. He was also aware that such an attack would lead to spontaneous action by the tribes of the French zone. He therefore planned his invasion with great care.

Nothing was done until the absolute obedience of the Jibâla tribes had been secured, and it is here that the sequence of events becomes important. Control of the Jibâla was vital because the majority of the troops which were used in the attack on the Banû Zarwâl were not Rifîs but Jibâlis. He appointed administrators and qâ'îds, erected telephone lines and built roads and fortifications. Above all, he secured the area politically to such an extent that no one dared to oppose him. Certainly the new close control of every aspect of life did not appeal to many of the people of the Jibâla but they could do little to oppose bin 'Abd al-Karîm because his position in the Rif itself was unassailable. It is instructive to compare Shéean's account of his meeting with the 'Arûsî shaykhîs who were less than enthusiastic about the new Sultan, as he seems to have been

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\(^1\) E.g., in Roger-Matheiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-140, bin 'Abd al-Karîm claims that he was dragged into an invasion by a spontaneous rising in the French zone.

commonly called, to the same writer's meeting with the qā'ids of the al-Maṭālsa tribe a few weeks earlier when he was given a colourful and highly exaggerated account of the Anwāl victories and of the power of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm:

"And the Riffi killed and killed and killed, until there were one hundred and sixty-four thousand million Spaniards dead upon the field... And General Barro [sic., i.e., General Navarro in Riff mispronunciation] and all the coroneles and tenientes and many thousands and thousands of men worked for the sultan, on the roads and as slaves. The sultan is very great; the sultan is the Lord of Islam. The sultan can defeat all enemies in battle. The sultan has many millions of fighting men who will sweep the French and English and all the Christians out of the Arab's country. When the sultan has driven the Spanish into the sea, he will go to Spain and drive them out of there too. Spain is Arab country. The Riffi will kill until he is tired, and he will take all the rest prisoners."  

Admittedly the whole performance was put on for a visiting European journalist, and in those circumstances the exaggerations are understandable. Nevertheless, they are exaggerations born of a real feeling of confidence that under the amīr's leadership jihād would lead to the liberation not only of the Rif, but also of the rest of Morocco. Once this is understood, Fleming's remarks about the "vague nationalist ideology that motivated the top leaders of the Riff Rebellion" may be seen to be incorrect. The real heat of nationalist feeling came from below, from the qā'ids in the tribes, and from the ordinary people who were convinced of the efficacy of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's leadership, and who believed that their "Sultan" would go on to eject all the "Christians" from Morocco. Whether bin 'Abd al-Karīm wanted to invade the French zone or not, the pressure put on him from below, from people like Sheean's Maṭālsī qā'īd or the people described by 'Alī al-Majāwī on the French front who

1 Sheean, Adventures, p. 47. See above p. 722 for the 'Arūsī shaykhs.
were eager to attack, was such that he would eventually be obliged to take some sort of action against the French.

In any event, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was already committed to a limited engagement against the French positions in the Wargha valley. He knew that such an attack would bring him into conflict with the French anyway, and this, combined with the feeling which seems to have been widespread, in the Rif at least, for an attack on the French made the general attack inevitable. It was this sequence of events, the completion of the war against the Spanish in the west, the attack on the Banū Zarwāl, and the imposition of a state of martial law over most of the Rif which brought about the attack, not the support of "foreign advisers"—as will be shown, Canning, one of the principal members of the Rif Committee, did his best, after the Spanish landings in Alhucemas to bring about a negotiated settlement to the war—and certainly not nationalist ideology overriding military considerations among the leadership.

What was prepared then, was an attack on the French positions with the dual objectives firstly of satisfying the demands of the Rifī public, and secondly of wresting back control of the grain supplies in the Wargha valley. Notwithstanding the millenarist propaganda in Fez, it was to be a limited campaign, as the careful preparation of defensive positions on which Rifī forces could retire clearly shows.

Nevertheless, even an attack limited in its objectives raised insurmountable problems. Quite simply, the Rifīs, even with the assistance of the Jībālīs, did not have

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1 See below, pp. 806-809.
enough men. The economic costs of the mobilisation were enormous, and prices shot up (and occasionally down) in a most disruptive way. Despite the discontent this caused, bin 'Abd al-Karīm never lost control, for his authority reached down to all sectors of the Rif and Jibāla. In each village he had his secret policemen and women. His officers had authority over who could stay in a particular place--such as Ajdīr--and who could leave it. There was a well developed bureaucracy. Everything that 'Alī al-Majāwi said, or the Banū Zarwāl notables said, was written down. The political and social control of the Rif that the government machine exercised was quite clearly very great.

However, the authority largely--though by now not entirely--rested upon bin 'Abd al-Karīm's ability to lead the war against the Christians. This is reflected in his propaganda. The Fasī 'ulamā' were called upon to recognise him as the legitimate leader of the jihād, the people of the Banū Zarwāl were encouraged to support him in the name of a "regenerated Islam", the people of Tangier were told that he had the support of Germany, which would allow him to continue the war.

So bin 'Abd al-Karīm was forced to enter the French zone, because of popular demand and the economic and political need to dominate the Wargha. He could not accept the various French and Spanish offers of "autonomy" under their overall authority, because to do so would have been to deny the basis of his leadership, and his support would have ebbed away.

The invasion of the French zone was necessary for these reasons but inevitably it brought the seeds of defeat.
The French and Spanish combined were too much for the Rifis' and the landing at Alhucemas began the final stages of the conflict.
Chapter XIII

THE COLLAPSE OF THE RIFI STATE

"You can sleep on the road in the Rif, which you can do neither in the French nor the Spanish zone."

Alexander Langlet, a Swedish journalist, writing of the social conditions of the Rif in March and April 1926.¹

"We have not lost hope that you will know all about our victories and those which the glorious army of God must achieve [in the future]."

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm, trying to encourage a qā'id fighting for the Spanish to change sides, in February 1926.²

"I pray to God that times like those will never return."

Idris Mimûn Khujja, a prominent Rifî military qā'id, speaking after the war of the final days of the collapse of Rifî resistance.³

The Rifî invasion of the French zone had been taken from a position of relative strength, although it was itself the cause of an alliance between the French and the Spanish which led to the eventual destruction of the Rif. However, because the Rifî forces were strong when the French and Spanish counter-attacks began, the two European armies were not able to defeat the Rifîs immediately. Because of the determination of the resistance and the difficulties

² Spanish translation of a letter from bin 'Abd al-Karîm to Qâ'id Si al-Mallâli in B.N.A. in Miscelenea Garcia Figueras, Vol. XLII (no page number).
caused by the winter weather, the advances stopped in October, and operations remained largely dormant during the next few months. As a result, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was able to reinforce his political position even after the landings at Alhucemas. The system of government did not break down until the last month of the war, public order was maintained, and the bureaucracy continued to function. Langlet wrote that the countryside was safer in the Rif than in the areas controlled by the French or Spanish. To complement this political stability, bin 'Abd al-Karīm conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign, not only within the Rif itself, but among the Moroccan members of the opposing armies, and even further afield, far behind the French lines in southern Morocco, hoping to bring about a rising there.

Nevertheless, in the end the French and Spanish combined forces were bound to prove too much for the Rifīs. Matters were made worse by the great hardship caused by the collapse of food supplies and of the economy in general. Eventually, bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to negotiate a settlement but this proved impossible. For their part, the French and Spanish made another attempt at negotiations and a conference was held at Oujda in the French zone but this also failed. By the beginning of May the conditions within the Rif were so bad that when the French and Spanish attacked, organised resistance collapsed.

However, the fighting did not completely stop, but continued for several months in the Jibāla and Sinhāja. This fighting was highly localised, and based on the old forms of resistance that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had tried to replace---
small-scale leaders, acting independently and in disunity, who were bound to fail. It was the collapse of the Central Rif which led to the full victory of the European allies and for this reason this chapter is focused largely on that area.

The Spanish Invasion

The Spanish had undertaken much preparation for the attack on the Rif so it is not surprising that the force that was used for the invasion was suitably impressive. It consisted of some 16,300 men, some of whom were support troops,\(^1\) transported to the landing-place in a fleet of sixty-three civilian ships borrowed from a civil shipping line, thirty three from the Spanish Navy, and eight from the French Navy. They were also supported by eighty eight land-based aeroplanes and twelve seaplanes.\(^2\) Facing this force on the Rif coast were some 5,000 men.\(^3\)

The operation began, on the morning of 8 September, with an artillery bombardment of the shores of Alhucemas Bay. In mid-morning the disembarkation began, but not in the Bay itself. The chosen spot was a beach north-west of the Bay, west of Ra's 'Abīd, which the Spanish called "Playa Cebadilla", and the Rifis "Taḥjarūt".\(^4\)

Possibly this choice of landing-place took the defenders by surprise, but with such a long coastline to defend, and with the balance of forces firmly in favour of

\(^1\) Goded, op. cit., pp. 150-151. The total number, however, was nearly 21,000. Fleming, op. cit., p. 264.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 149, and Woolman, op. cit., p. 149.
\(^3\) Fleming, op. cit., p. 298.
the Spanish, it is not surprising that the Spanish succeeded in disembarking with relatively little difficulty. By nightfall the Spanish forces, led by the then Colonel Francisco Franco, had taken position between Cebadilla and the rocky point south of Ra's al-'Abid known as "Morro Viejo" (see Map XIII: 1). Although the landing of further troops was prevented by high winds on the following day, it continued on 10 September. By the end of that day 9,000 men had disembarked.1

Once they had disembarked, however, matters became more difficult. The terrain south of Ra's al-'Abid is very irregular, with many valleys and coves and caves in the sides of the hills. The resistance was fierce and the Spanish took a long time to fight their way forward. More troops were landed on 13 September,2 but it was not until 23 September that Goded succeeded in fighting his way onto the beach of Cala Quemada,3 which is now the beach of al-Husayma town, while Franco took Jabal Malmūsī. By that evening the Spanish line had reached the point of Morro Viejo, south of Cala Quemada.4

The next few days were reasonably quiet, until on 30 September the advance began again. Spanish forces reached Jabal Bü Jibār, on the coast, and Jabal Hammam on their right flank, that evening.5 On the following days they advanced still further, crossing the Wādī Islī and taking Jabal Sijjum on 1 October. On 2 October, Spanish forces entered

2 Ibid., p. 312.
3 Woolman, op. cit., p. 192.
5 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 317.
Ajdîr itself, which was then burned. Here, on Primo's instructions, the advance stopped. The Spanish dictator was nervous of over-extending his troops before they had a secure base from which to advance, and decided to spend some time constructing stronger defences and ensuring control of the area that the Spanish already held.

Meanwhile, the French in the south had begun their offensive on 10 September. They started with a push to the north in the Wargha valley and in the Kiffân area. Their advance was extremely rapid. In the first two days they moved forward over a 36-mile front to re-take most of the Banû Zarwâl, including Amjuţ, the former headquarters of the Darqâwiya order. However, 'Abd al-Rahmân al-Darqâwi did not return until the war was quite over. By 16 September, Jabal Bibân was cleared of Rifîs, and 1,200 families from the Banû Zarwâl and 450 from the Banû Masgilda had submitted to the French.

At the end of September, French forces moved along the valley of the upper Wâdi Masûn and Wâdi Wizârît from Kiffân in the direction of the Wâdi Kart. By 2 October they were positioned on the southern borders of the al-Maṭâlsa tribe. On 4 October an advance was started in the Tawnât

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5 Al-Fihrl, op. cit., p. 48.
sector of the front, up the valley of the Wādī Laban towards the Sinhāja Srair tribes. Spanish and French troops finally met at Siyāḥ, near Sūq al-Thalathā' of Banū Bū Bakar on 6 October, for a Spanish force had moved down from Dār Drīush. French forces occupied Jabal Naẓūr, some 15-20 miles north of Kifān, on 7 October, and 'Ain Zuhra on 8 October. On 13 October French operations were suspended for the winter, in order to give time to prepare before the snow and bad weather began. In fact snow started falling on the southern front on 16 November.

In this way the Rif was completely surrounded by a ring of French and Spanish forces on a front stretching from Afraw in the east, through 'Azīb Miḏār, Siyāḥ, Jabal 'Azrū, Fazzāra, Bāḥ Tāza, then into the Wargha valley through Sakkar, Bibān, to Wazzān, and then through the foothills of the western Jibāla by the Fundūg of 'Ain al-Jadīda to Tetuan. In addition, the Spanish had a small front around Alhucemas Bay, and had the still unsubmitted 'Anjara tribe surrounded. It certainly looked a bleak picture for the Rifis. However, there still remained a very large area—the majority of the Spanish Protectorate—which was by no means defeated. Conditions in this area were difficult, certainly, but the Rif was still quite able to resist.

6 Map in Maroc Rif 12 dossier 3, "Croquis Schématique du Nord Marocain".
The Rifi Response

News of the Spanish landings spread fairly quickly, particularly in areas bordering on to the Spanish lines. On 8 September, the day of the landings, the Spanish announced the news to the Banū Walishak. In the areas which were already occupied by the Spanish, it was greeted, Military Intelligence reported, with some pleasure. It is difficult to know what reliance to place on this for to show disappointment might have led to speedy detention by the Military authorities. On the Rifi side of the front lines the news spread less quickly. On the day following the landings, 9 September, the Spanish Military Office in Sūq al-Thalathāʾ of Banū Bū Bakar in the al-Maṭālsa reported that the people in the Rifi controlled area of the tribe had not yet heard of the landings. The Spanish doubtless told them fairly soon, but the fact that the news had not travelled quickly, despite the telephone service, which passed on information very rapidly, indicates that the Rifi authorities' control of information was as tight as ever.

In fact, bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried very hard to limit the spread of the bad news. He quickly prohibited the use of the telephone, and announced that all communications were to be carried out by letter—presumably to make it easier to censor news. On 12 September he banned any discussion of the landings in public.

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas Diarias Beni Walishak, Hoja diaria, 8 Sept. 1925.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes Matalsa, nota, 9 Sept. 1925.
3 Ibid., Salāḥ b. Muḥammad, 11 Sept. 1925.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Oficina de Matalsa, Hoja diaria, 12 Sept. 1925.
Apart from the immediate "blanket" which he placed on the landings, bin 'Abd al-Karīm also took positive propagandising steps of his own. He gave further promises of outside help from a European nation—without specifying which one—which would soon come to the aid of the Rif.¹ He also engaged in black propaganda against the Spanish, and caused it to be announced in the markets that people who had made contact with Spain had been deceived by Spanish money, that Spain would never forgive the Rifis for the defeats of 1921, and if they succeeded in occupying the Rif they would kill the Rifis and their families. A good Muslim, he said, should die defending his land, and not live "like a dog". For his part, bin 'Abd al-Karīm said, he would rather kill himself than fall into Christian hands.² Such propaganda was given some substance by the real behaviour of the Spanish forces. Repeated stories of atrocities committed by Spanish troops were reported by Walter Harris, The Times correspondent in Tangier, in private communications to his paper. On 30 September he wrote to his Foreign Editor, Harold Williams, that a British Consular agent in Tetuan, Mr. Todd, had told him that of a group of 140 Rifis recently captured at Alhucemas, "15 were kept alive to give information. The rest were killed by the troops."³ Two weeks later Harris wrote again:

"The Spanish are impossible to work with—they are jealous, mean, and untruthful and cruel, and carry out reprisals on every possible occasion. The frontier tribes refuse to submit to them, but

¹ SHM Melilla, Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes Matalsa, Muqaddam b. 'Amar, 16 Sept. 1925.
² Ibid., Salāḥ b. Muḥammad Ḥammish, 17 Sept. 1925.
³ TAHP file, The Times Correspondence, Harris to Williams, Tangier, 30 Sept. 1925.
express their readiness to do so to the French."  

On 26 October he telegraphed: "British officers arriving from Alhucemas report Spaniards continue to kill decapitate prisoners."  

The decapitation of prisoners was probably the most shocking aspect of this behaviour. Harris even obtained a photograph of members of the Foreign Legion holding up the severed heads of Moroccans killed during action around the post of Qudia Tahar on the Tetuan front, a photograph which Primo de Revera—who was apparently angry about the atrocities and tried to stop them—admitted was quite genuine.

This behaviour was not, of course, the official policy of the Spanish army, and the military leadership made strenuous efforts to prevent it. Those responsible seem to have been mainly members of the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan Regulares of the Spanish army. Nevertheless, it could only encourage the Rifis and their supporters to further resistance.

The resistance was indeed fierce, and it took the Spanish troops a month to occupy a fairly small beachhead in Alhucemas. They were opposed, initially, by the 5,000 men in the Alhucemas area. This figure was soon increased. A few days after the landings, bin 'Abd al-Karim ordered "everyone" on the French front to defend the northern coast. The Banü TüzIn reportedly sent 500 men to defend Sidi Idris in the Timsamän, and 1,000 to the Ajdir region, the Gaznaya at least 500 to Ajdir, and the Marnisa 1,200 to the same.

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1 Ibid., Harris to Williams, Tangier, 13 Oct. 1925.  
2 Ibid., Telegram, Harris to Times, 26 Oct. 1925, Confidential.  
3 Ibid., Telegram, Harris to Times, 17 Sept. 1925.  
4 Ibid., Harris to Williams, 15 Nov. 1925, Confidential.
At the same time all men over the age of 15 were ordered to join the ġarka, while the women and children were sent to the interior. All camels, mules and donkeys were requisitioned. Furthermore, bin 'Abd al-Karīm released all the prisoners held in the Banū Waryaghhal lands, and ordered them to fight. Even al-Ḥājj bil-Qīsh was released from detention in late September, on the condition that he went home to the Gaznaya to form a ġarka. His son, however, was kept behind in the Banū Waryaghhal as a hostage. In the Banū Waryaghhal itself, it was announced that anyone who joined the new ġarka would be paid 2,000 pesetas, and at Sūq al-Ḥad of Rūūḍī in the Buqquya tribe all the men attending the market were drafted into the ġarka—there were 3,000 of them, of whom 1,000 were unarmed.

This does not mean that there was not opposition to the formation of yet more ġarkas, but such opposition was confined to areas close to the French front, and on the eastern front where political contacts with the Spanish had existed ever since the reoccupation of the forward positions in 1922. Here the effects of the bad behaviour of Spanish troops was not felt, because by and large there was relatively little fighting in the area, even during the Alhucemas operation. Thus only a few days after the landings, the Banū Tūzīn refused any further ġarkas and did not attend the markets in order to avoid being conscripted by members of

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Hojas de Confidentes Matalsa, Faqīh 'Abdallah b. Ḥāmid, 13 Sept. 1925.
2 Ibid., Muḥammad b. 'Amar, 14 Sept. 1925.
3 Ibid., Salāḥ b. Muḥammad, 11 Sept. 1925.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y Confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥammū, 27 Sept. 1925.
5 Ibid., Qā'īd Zaghud (of Bū Ḥafūra), 17 Sept. 1925.
the Rifī regular army.\textsuperscript{1} The Banū Tūzin were still refusing men on 17 September and the Timsamānis also showed signs of being most unwilling to provide them.\textsuperscript{2}

At the beginning of October the first real trouble started in the Rifī dominated area of the Tafarsit tribe, which refused to obey bin 'Abd al-Karīm's orders to attack the Spanish. A regular army group which was sent to restore order was ejected from the tribe. The rebels were apparently led by Wulūd al-Ḥassan,\textsuperscript{3} the Tafarsitī who, in June 1923, had shot Idrīs b. Saʿīd, the Moroccan from Salé who had negotiated the release of Spanish prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{4} On 5 October the Rifī gāʿīd in the Tafarsit fled to the mountains because the local people wanted to hand him over to the Spanish.\textsuperscript{5} On the same day a similar rebellion broke out in the Gaznaya tribe.\textsuperscript{6} Bil-Qīsh apparently promised to put the rebellion down, although, as the Spanish realised, bin 'Abd al-Karīm could hardly take his old antagonist's promise very seriously.\textsuperscript{7} The Gaznaya were by now beginning to submit to the French in considerable numbers. What happened next is unclear. Hart—who puts the dates somewhat too late—says that Bil-Qīsh was poisoned on bin 'Abd al-Karīm's instructions, while his son was "quietly disposed of" in the Wednesday market of Tawrīrt in the Banū Waryaghal.\textsuperscript{8} A Spanish informant

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq b. ‘Abd al-Ush (sic) (Tafarsit), 13 Sept. 1925.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., ‘Amarūsh b. Ḥaddu b. al-Muqaddam, 17 Sept. 1925.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., ‘Amarūsh, 2 Oct. 1925.
\textsuperscript{4} See above, p. 605
\textsuperscript{5} SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y Confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin, ‘Amarūsh, 5 Oct. 1925.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., Zaghdud, 5 Oct. 1925.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Īmmu, 11 Oct. 1925.
\textsuperscript{8} Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 399. He puts the date as early 1926, but this is clearly too late in the light of this new evidence.
on 19 October reported that Bil-Qish was killed by a bomb, with no reference to bin 'Abd al-Karîm's involvement. ¹ Whatever the method used, and whether or not the murder of Bil-Qish was carried out on the direct instructions of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karîm, his death was extremely useful for the Rif leader, for the rebellion in the Gaznaya quickly died down.

Both the Tafarsit and the Gaznaya were in border areas of the Rif, and as such more likely to fall prey to French and Spanish influence. The Spanish were less successful in their attempts to carry out a similar policy in the Banū Waryaghal, after their occupation of part of that tribe, but because the contacts they made during the autumn of 1925 were of importance later, a brief account of them is now given.

Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī and the Political Action in the Banū Waryaghal

When, in the period immediately before the Rif war, in May 1921, General Berenguer had undertaken a tour of inspection of the Rif coast, a number of Waryaghalīs had gone to Alhucemas Island to see him. One of these was Sulaymān b. al-Mujāhid of the Banū Zarā'ī sub-clan of the Banū Yūsif W-'Alī in the Banū Waryaghal, a distant cousin of bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had tried to fine all those who visited the island, and all except Sulaymān paid up. Sulaymān fled to Alhucemas Island, where he remained throughout the war. ²

² See above, pp. 293-294.
On the Spanish occupation of Ajdîr, Sulaymān b. al-Mujāhid al-Khaṭṭābī was at once reinstated in his property in the village,¹ and became the chief Rīfī representative of the Spanish military authorities. His job was to make political contacts in the Buqquya and Banū Waryaghal tribes, to collect information and encourage submission to the Spanish. In this latter function he was not very successful. The Spanish occupied only a very small part of the territory of the two tribes, and even those people who were inclined to submit felt that it was too dangerous to do so.² On 3 October Sulaymān wrote a letter to be distributed to the Banū Waryaghal, Buqquya, Timsamān and Banū Tūzin. Part of this letter ran as follows:

"Spain is a mother to all those who are friendly towards her and the proof of this is that those who live under her protection want for nothing, neither do they suffer in any way. I tell you that Spain only wants peace and well-being for you. Take no notice of those who say that Spain punishes and mistreats Muslims, for they are ignorant people, and seek only evil and misfortune for you and your children, and perhaps your ruin."³

Few people took much notice, with one very important exception, Muḥammad Azarqān of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh. (This man should not be confused with Muḥammad Azarqān, the Rīfī Minister for Foreign Affairs.) This Muḥammad Azarqān had been appointed as qā'id of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh in 1922 by bin 'Abd al-Karīm.⁴ He had never been particularly distinguished for his loyalty, however.

In the period immediately following the proclamation of bin

³ Ibid., Letter from Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī to the Tribes of Beni Uraiguel, Bokola, Temsamam and Benu Tuzin, Alhucemas, 3 Oct. 1925 (Spanish version only available).
⁴ See above, p. 498.
'Abd al-Karīm in January 1923, he was one of the signatories of a letter to the Spanish promising to help them if they advanced.¹ While the Rifis had little to fear from the Spanish, bin 'Abd al-Karīm, who was well aware of the propensity of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh to rebel, contented himself with keeping the situation under control. For the time being Muḥ Azarqān was tolerated, presumably in order not to cause more trouble with his clan. However, when the situation got dangerous, in the summer of 1925, Muḥ Azarqān was dismissed, along with three other Bū 'Ayyāshī qā'ids.²

When Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī became the Spanish representative in Ajdīr, Muḥ Azarqān quickly made contact and, encouraged by Sulaymān, sent a party which included his son, 'Amar and a Tūzānī, to Melilla on his behalf. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm decided finally to deal with Muḥ Azarqān and arrested him and his son.³ This was by no means the end of the story, for Muḥ Azarqān caused a good deal of trouble for bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the final stages of the Rif war, in the spring of 1926. For the moment, however, the incipient plot had been crushed.

In fact, despite the Spanish landings, the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm was still indisputable. The command chain and organs of government still functioned, and the political and social control of the Rif continued.

² See above, p. 754.
The Operation of the Rif Government after the Landings

The government structure set up by bin 'Abd al-Karīm after his proclamation in 1923 had had among its aims the abolition of violence and feuding in the Rif, and the imposition of a central authority. Both these aims continued to be carried out during the period after the landings.

Firstly, the central control became if anything closer and more centralised. In the months preceding the landings bin 'Abd al-Karīm had concentrated more and more power in his hands and those of his immediate family and supporters. This tendency continued after the landings. The policy of disarming the tribes continued. In the second week of October the Banū Yiṭṭuṭt tribe was disarmed. A deserter from the Rif regular army—a Waryaghī from the Banū 'Abdallah—reported that members of the regular army were disarmed before they went on leave. This may have been partly to ensure that as many rifles as possible were available for use, but the evidence of another informant shows that this was not by any means the only or even the major reason. In the period just before the landings, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had set up "guards" (maḥakmas) in each tribe and announced that as there were no Christians in the area and he was responsible for order, it was not necessary for individuals to own guns, and, therefore, they should all hand them in at the maḥakmas. The implication was that bin 'Abd

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2 Ibid., 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Amar b. 'Abd al-Karīm, 29 Nov. 1925.
al-Karīm saw the private possession of arms as a direct assault on his own authority.¹

The disarmament was certainly one aspect of the campaign to maintain order. The other aspect was the general knowledge that murderers would be punished. The execution of murderers also continued, at least into the first months of 1926. In March, a man from the Banū Bū Sīlmān was condemned to death—he had admitted to the murder of another man from the Banū Wanjil, in order to marry the dead man's wife. The evidence of witnesses was taken, and sentence was passed on him in order to deter others, as the judgement explained.²

By and large these policies—disarmament and capital punishment—kept the peace in the Rif very adequately even after the Spanish landings and resultant blow to morale. There were exceptions, however, including a particularly violent blood feud which broke out in the Banū Tūzīn and Banū Waryaghal in October and November, in which at least 14 people were killed. This was, as Spanish Military Intelligence pointed out with some glee, the first feud since bin 'Abd al-Karīm took control in the Rif.³ It seems to have died out—or more likely was suppressed, although there is no confirmation of this—fairly quickly, for there are no further mentions of feuding in Spanish files until the final days of the war and the collapse of the Rifī state.

Evidence of the strength of the rule of law in

¹ Ibid.
² MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 45. Declaration in the case of ʿAḥmad b. 'Alī b. ʿAḥmad b. ʿUmar, and on reverse his condemnation to death for murder, signatures illegible, 25 Shaʿbān 1344/10 mar. 1926.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y Confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ṣammū (Igharbiīn, Banū Tūzīn), 8 Nov. 1925.
the Rif, even as late as March and April 1926, is provided by a Swedish newspaper correspondent, Alexander Langlet, who visited the Rif during those months for the Manchester Guardian. Langlet wrote:

"Abdel Krim's authority seemed to be absolute, and his laws—for example, against tribal and family feuds—seem to be kept. You can sleep on the road in the Rif, which you can do neither in the French nor in the Spanish zone." 2

Certainly bin 'Abd al-Karīm does not appear to have lost his own self-confidence in the days after the Spanish landing. Vincent Sheean, the American correspondent who had visited the Rif in 1924, returned again in 1925, at the height of the battle for Ajdīr in late September. According to him, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had in fact gained in self-confidence since their previous meeting. He was less formal, and totally unconcerned of the danger from the Spanish aeroplanes. He expounded his demand for the absolute independence of the Rif while standing in the mouth of a cave, firing a rifle at low flying Spanish bombers. 3 On 23 September, Sheean wrote in his diary:

"His courage is magnificent. His ideas have not changed, have even been reinforced by the present danger. From what I saw of him today I know that I had no idea of him before. He has a grandeur, added to by the circumstances of horror and great danger. But in spite of this he is humorous, funny: makes me laugh, especially when he assumes a school-masterish air and corrects my Spanish." 4

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1 Furneaux (op. cit., p. 220) states that Langlet visited the Rif from Dec. 1925 to Feb. 1926. He is without doubt incorrect. Furneaux is frequently at error both in detail and in general. On this occasion he gives Langlet's name as "Langret" and appears to ignore Langlet's own assertion that "I have just reached London after two months with the Riffs". in the Manchester Guardian, 29 Apr. 1926, p. 9.

2 Ibid.

3 Sheean, Personal History, pp. 149-151.

4 Ibid., p. 152.
That is not to say that bin 'Abd al-Karîm underestimated the problems that faced the Rif state, and the importance of maintaining the confidence of the Rifis themselves. To this end, from mid-October onwards he conducted an intense propaganda campaign, in an attempt to encourage his people.

**Propaganda**

The propaganda campaign in the Rif had three main aspects—promises of outside help, promises that France and Spain would soon withdraw from the Rif because of pressure within their own countries, and a return to a call for jihād.

Promises of outside help were not new in the propaganda of the Rif war. Once again, the main focus of hope was the old First World War alliance of Germany and Turkey against France—a hope which might be expected to have a greater chance of realisation after the victories of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. In mid-October, bin 'Abd al-Karîm paraded four men, whom he described as "Germans" who had come to help him, on the Ajdir front. The rumour quickly spread that very soon German troops would disembark at Sidi Idrîs (in the Timsamān) or elsewhere, to help fight the Spanish.1 Bin 'Abd al-Karîm followed this rumour with another one to the effect that Germany and Turkey had both declared war on France.2 In November, this theme was varied slightly. It was announced in the sūqs that the French were unable to advance because they owed money to the British government, which had to be paid immediately, or the British

2 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Información de Alhucemas, nota, 21 Oct. 1925.
would refuse any more credit for further advances. Furthermore, if the loan was not repaid the British would take over the city of Oran in Algeria as payment.¹ This was a remarkably complex piece of propaganda, and shows some awareness of the intricacies of European politics—even if it was quite untrue.

Indeed, the internal pressures on the European allies, France and Spain, for an end to the war were quite well known to the Rif government, and accordingly were used in propaganda. At the end of December a letter from bin 'Abd al-Karīm was read in the markets of the Jibālā, referring to:

"... the financial difficulties in which France finds herself because of the need to repay America, the hostility of the [French] people to the campaigns in Morocco and against the Druzes [in Syria], and the probable refusal of credits to continue the war."²

The opposition of France to the war in Morocco came, naturally, from the Left, and was indeed severe enough. In the Parliament the Prime Minister, Painlevé, was attacked, in October, for the heavy costs and loss of life in Morocco.³ Outside Parliament, Communist militants carried on a fierce campaign against the war.⁴ Other stories which appeared in the French press in Morocco, to the effect that the British government wanted an independent Rif state, were bemoaned by Walter.

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y Confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin, Zaghdūd, 8 Nov. 1925.
³ The losses up till 15 October were 2,178 killed and 8,297 wounded. 158,000 men were involved in military operations at a total cost of some 1,350,000,000 francs. Paul Isoart, "La guerre du Rif et le Parlement Français", in Colloque, pp. 303-204.
⁴ In November 1925, 125 members of the French Communist Party had been imprisoned and 263 were wanted in connection with offences committed while opposing the war. Robert Charvin, "Le Parti Communiste français face à la guerre du Rif", in Colloque, p. 226.
Harris, The Times correspondent: "... they merely encourage futile hopes among the RifIs', and 'Abd-el-Krim himself uses the French newspaper articles as propaganda among his tribesmen."¹ The third aspect of this propaganda was a call for jihād. This seems mainly to have been directed against those Moroccans who were fighting for the Spanish. For instance, in February 1926 a certain Qā'id al-Mallālī, who may have been a member of the important pro-Spanish Mallālī family of Alcazarquivir, received the following letter from bin 'Abd al-Karīm:

"Praise be to God. Alone--God's blessing be on our Lord Muhammad and his family.

To the Kaid Sid El-Mellali, God's peace and blessing be upon you. And then:

We know that you love and believe in your religion and that you hate the enemy. This is not remarkable, for it is the duty of every Muslim, for the world is a dream and its products... [sic].

Do you know what God has ordained for those who are treacherous or work under the authority of the enemy? The Corān [sic] said 'Oh! Believers, you shall not ally yourselves with Jews or Christians nor take them for protectors unless you are physically weak.' The tradition of the Prophet says 'Those who live under the protection of unbelievers will be separated from me.'

We are astonished to see you allied with the enemy and under his authority. Do you not know that he is now broken and powerless and seeks your help? Why does he use you in the front lines against the Muslims? So that you should die outside your religion. He keeps his people in the rear lines and you are deceived by it... .

What answer do you have to what we have done to the [enemy's] armies when they occupied our land? We have done what is required by our religion and the defence of our own ideas and customs. What prevents you from refusing him [i.e., the enemy] the harkas which you now give him to fight against your brothers? Do you believe that his forces are greater than ours?

I swear by the one God that his forces are inferior to ours! What is happening that you should sacrifice

your lives and souls outside the Muslim religion? There is no greater disgrace nor more infamous vice! Is there none amongst you who walks the straight path of truth? How will you excuse yourself before God? What will you reply on the day of resurrection?

We advise and demand the unity which God laid down to defend the holy religion and in this cause we offer our fortunes and our lives. Who will answer that he will come over to our side to fight against the enemy and will help us?

For our part we are willing to provide everything that is necessary once you begin the task. Let us throw the enemy from our land. Let us carry the worthy standard of victory and the shield of glory and freedom which can be won but not given.

[Even] if you close your ears so that you do not hear our voices and that which God has laid down, and you do the contrary setting aside prestige, we will [still] have carried out God's command by showing you the path of the Merciful, who is our witness.

You know, having been told it, that our warriors have taken much of the riches of the enemy as booty in great battles. We have not lost hope that you will know all about our victories and those which the glorious army of God must achieve [in the future].

I repeat my appeal to you that you should brush away the dust that clouds your judgement. Unsheath your arms against our enemies; do not fear his now-exhausted strength, do not listen to his lies and deceits, which serve only to confuse you that you should not know the truth. They have said that they have occupied Ajdir, whereas in fact they occupied only a few stones on its outskirts.

When we saw them arrive there we rejoiced and were happy, for we knew that all would then belong to us. We rejoice each time they advance, because their losses increase in killed and wounded.

Those who are experienced in war know that the enemy is overstretching his forces on land and sea, and will have to retreat with terrible consequences for him.

Believe in victory and the glory of God which are inseparable from him who fights [for the faith].

God is our protector, our help against the enemy who wishes to expel us from our houses and dishonour our mosques!

You should know that the believers are daily in greater harmony and their situation gets better despite the forces the enemy sends by land and sea. The Coran—the sacred word—says 'the believers promised and accepted the word in sincerity, some of them are dead and some still to come, etc.'

And so, it is necessary to annihilate the enemy and make him submit to the truth, and respect our rights, by whatever method.
Do you want us to live without rights or to die in agony?
God give you good judgement. And Peace.
Mohamed Ben Ab-el-Krim [sic] el-Jatabi.

This letter marks a return to traditionalist propaganda. Here there is no reference to the advantages of an ordered, Islamic state, it simply repeats the vague promises that the Spanish would have to withdraw, and concentrates on the religious nature of the struggle, berating Mallâlî for his treachery to his faith and not to his wātan. Even more distinct calls for jihād in the old style were made in letters sent by Sî Maḥammad to the Anti-Atlas region south of Marrakesh in the south of Morocco, where Marrâbi Rabûh, a son of Mā'al-ʿAinîn, was carrying on the war against the French. The recipients of these letters, all dated 5 Jumâda I 1344/21 November 1925, were ten of the most important leaders in the area, including Marrâbi Rabûh himself, his brother Muḥammad b. Mā' al-ʿAinîn, and Madâni bin al-Ṭâlib ʿĀmmâd al-Aksâssî, qa'id of the Akhsas tribe, and one of Rabûh's most powerful supporters. The letter to al-Akhsâssî is

1 Spanish translation of a letter from bin 'Abd al-Karîm to Qā'id Sî al-Mallâlî, in B.N.E.S. de A., Miscellanea García Fiqueras, Vol. XLII (no page numbers). The translation only is given, with a clearly erroneous date—"Aydir 13-2-25" (sic). As the letter refers to the Spanish having already occupied part of Ajdir, which they had not done in Feb. 1925, it seems reasonable from the context to infer that this was a misprint (the translation is typed) for 13-2-26.

2 Other recipients were the Faqîh Sîdî al-Ḥājj al-Abâd, the main propagandist against the French in the south, Qā'id Mubârak al-Bîn Irâmî, an ally of Madâni al-Akhsâssî; Muḥammad b. alpBashîr, son of a leader of the tribe of Sabulâ (in the Aît Bâ 'Amrân), Sa'id b. ʿĀmmâd al-Kardûssî of the Ida U Baqîl tribe, and Qâ'id Nujîm al-Akhsâssî. Translations of all these letters were forwarded, along with a covering letter, in SHAT Maroc E24, Propagande Riffain, Blanc. (Delegate of Resident-General in Morocco) to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Rabat, 24 D3c. 1925. The Aît Bâ 'Amrân confederacy was centred around the Spanish-claimed colony of Ifni, assigned to Spain in the 1860 treaty on the supposed site of Santa Cruz.
typical:

"Try as hard as possible to fight the unbelievers, so that the word of God may triumph and so as to help your friends, although we are far apart . . . . The moment has come when the warriors for the faith must show themselves, and throw light on their deeds . . . . Know that our purpose is to throw out the unbelievers and purify the Muslim lands of their presence, so as to set up a free Islamic government in Morocco. Then it will be possible to revive the precepts of our religion in a perfect way . . . ."

All these letters, and that to al-Mallālī, appeal to their recipients to wage holy war, although the letters sent to the Moroccan south-west are the more explicit. Clearly bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his brother felt the need to try to weaken their enemies, France and Spain, by encouraging defection and renewed attacks on them in other quarters. The propaganda vehicle they used was the one most suited to the occasion, a call to fulfil religious duties which might be conceived as more effective than, say, vague promises of German support, which Mallālī could have known were untrue, and which to Marrābī Rabūh might have less appeal than Islamic solidarity.

The reason for this desire to put pressure on the European allies in other directions is not hard to see. Although bin 'Abd al-Karīm maintained control in the Rif, the economic and military problems were getting worse. Similar forms of propaganda were used within the Rif itself. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself later described how, after the Spanish landing at Alhucemas, he had used a story—which

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1. Maḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm to Qā'id Madanī al-Akhsāsī, 13 Nov. 1925, contained in package mentioned above in p. 792, n. 2.

de Mar Pequeña (see above, p. 69), so these recipients could be said to be in a position similar to that of the Rifīs, in that they faced a threat both from French and Spanish colonialism.
according to him was that the Spanish had turned a mosque in Alhucemas into a stable, as a tactic which "doubled the bravery of the fighters, and increased their devotion to myself and my cause." \(^1\)

**The Economic Situation**

The essence of the economic problems of the Rif after the Spanish landing at Alhucemas, and the French advance in the south, is very simple: in short, the Rif ran out of food. The reasons are not hard to find. Firstly the intensified blockade of the coast and eastern front, and the French occupation of the southern Rif, cut off food supplies from outside. Secondly, the harvests failed.

To deal with this latter part first, a graph of rainfall in 1925 and 1926 shows that between January and March 1926, when the growing crops needed water, the rainfall was very low indeed (Table XIII: 1). \(^2\) In the autumn of 1925, grain had been relatively cheap. A detailed picture is not available, because the figures are lacking, but there are pointers. At the beginning of October barley was only 2 pts a mudd, \(^3\) a low figure indeed, compared with the prices of a year before—12 pts a mudd in October 1924. \(^4\) In November the prices did creep back to their 1924 levels—12 pts a mudd—\(^5\)—but it was not until the beginning of January that

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\(^1\) Article in al-Manār, p. 632.

\(^2\) Table XIII:1 is derived from Resumen de las Observaciones, 1924-1926.

\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 28, Información y Confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin, 2 Oct. 1925.

\(^4\) See above, p. 644.

\(^5\) SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Información de Alhucemas, 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Amar b. 'Abd al-Karīm b. 'Abdallāh (Banū Waryaghal), 29 Nov. 1925.
Table XIII: 1
Rainfall at Melilla 1924 to 1926.
prices began to rise sharply. There were two factors responsible for this: firstly the lack of rain, and secondly the disruption caused by Spanish and French bombing attacks, which prevented the Rifis from cultivating their lands. Because of the aeroplanes, people tried to spend as much time as possible in shelters below ground and came out only at night. By January much of the land was uncultivated and, according to French army prisoners who escaped from the Rifis, famine had overcome the region. Barley, which remained fairly low (15-18 pts a mudd) until the last week in February, more than doubled in price between 24 and 28 February. Although it came down thereafter, it never fell much below 30 pts a mudd (Table XIII: 2). It is interesting to compare these prices with those in the Kabdâna and Aвлâd Siṭṭût tribes in a Spanish occupied zone. Here the prices showed much less variation, and although they remained very much the same as the prices in the Rif during January and February, and even peaked slightly in late February, just as those in the Rif did, they did not undergo the same


2 Table 2 is derived from:
(a) Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, ʿḤāmid b. al-Bashir ʿAllāl, 18 Jan. 1926.
(b) Ibid., ʿḤāmid b. al-Bashir ʿAllāl, 24 Feb. 1926.
(c) Ibid., Muḥammad b. Abarīāq, 28 Feb. 1926.
(d) SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafarsit, Khalīfā ʿAmarūsh, 3-Mar. 1926.
(e) SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Drius, Muḥammad b. al-Mukhtār, 15 Mar. 1926.
(f) Ibid., Muḥammad b. ʿAmar, 29 Mar. 1926.
(g) Ibid., Muḥammad b. ʿAmar, 30 Mar. 1926.

The details are not of course complete and concern a number of markets. There were doubtless local variations. Nevertheless, there is considerable consistency and the general trend is quite clear.
Table VIII: Prices of wheat and barley in Riff Zone January-March 1926

January 1926

February 1926

March 1926
enormous increases in March (Table XIII: 3). This is a clear indication of the growing effectiveness of the blockade. By April and May prices in the Rif zone were running consistently at about 50% higher on average than those in the Spanish-occupied zone (Table XIII: 4).

The worst problem of all was to find enough salt. As the French advanced into the Gaznaya, they cut off the supplies which had previously come from that tribe. Bin 'Abd al-Karim tried to encourage smuggling of salt from the Spanish zone, which could be sent to a central point for distribution. As the spring drew on salt got more and more expensive and finally, after the end of April, disappeared altogether. In fact, food in general had run out by this time. On 30 April a Spanish informant reported that people were going three or four days without food. Others had no clothes.

Not surprisingly, these terrible economic conditions affected the will of many of the Rifis to fight. Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karim did not finally lose control.

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2 Table 4 is derived from:
(a) SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Beni Walishak, Ḥāmid b. al-Bashīr, 'Allāl, 4 Apr. 1926.
(b) Ibid., 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Amar, 10 Apr. 1926.
(c) Ibid., 'Amar b. al-Muqaddam, 10 Apr. 1926.
(d) SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Khemis de Beni Bu Ifrur.
(e) SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Intervención de Beni Ulischek, Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Salām, 11 May 1926.

3 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, Ḥāmid b. al-Bashīr 'Allāl, 30 Jan. 1926.

4 SHAT Maroc Riff, 3 I, Interrogatoires des Indigènes évadés du Rif, Capt. Clerget, Taza, 29 May 1926.

5 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, Mimún b. Zaghdu, 30 Apr. 1926.
until French and Spanish forces actually penetrated right into the heart of the Rif. He maintained his authority by the use of more and more violent dictatorial methods.

**The Effort to Keep Control**

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm faced two problems in late 1925 and early 1926: to prevent tribes on the front lines against the French and Spanish from submitting to the Allies and to prevent subversion within the Rif.

On the French front his principal enemy was his old opponent 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, who was now working with the French at the head of irregular Moroccan forces. 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu's centre of operations naturally was his old power base in the Marnīsa and Sinhāja Sair tribes. At the beginning of September, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was reported to have shot 100 hostages from the Marnīsa, bin Ḥamīdu's tribe, in an effort to so terrorise that tribe that it would not join him. On the eastern front, bin 'Abd al-Karīm promised a reward of 50 pts for anyone who reported another for visiting the Spanish zone. In the Sinhāja a man was shot on the orders of the commander at Banū Barbar for encouraging defections to the French.

Such repression was clearly not enough, and in the Sinhāja and Matīwa al-Jabal tribes large numbers of people began to submit to 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu. The Awlād Bū al-Ḥāḍī clan of the Matīwa al-Jabal joined him in the last week of

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3 SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Groupement de Fez, 15 Novembre 1925 à 13 Juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 10 Dec. 1925.
December^1 and then at once proceeded to pursue a blood feud with members of a neighbouring clan. 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu took the opportunity provided by the confusion to move into the Fannāssa.^2

At the beginning of January, bin 'Abd al-Karīm executed all his remaining hostages from the Marnīsa—the exact number is not given—except one.\(^3\) In the Mastāra, the entire population of a village fled to avoid punishment for not sending reinforcements.\(^4\) Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm could not for long hold the line against defections. Towards the end of January, the Banū Waryajal tribe in the Sinhāja also started to submit to the French. There were problems in the Jibāla as well, where bin 'Abd al-Karīm ordered the replacement of Ṭālib al-Shawī, the man who had originally been appointed as qā'id of the Banū Ahmad after the Riffi capture of Shawīn, and later as qā'id of the western Jibālan tribes of Ahl Sharīf, Banū Sikkār, Banū Issaf and Sumāta. The Sumāta, his tribe, were furious and rose against the Riffis. In the northern Jibāla, Akhrīrū was forced to deal with the Banū Masawar who were attacking the vital Tangier convoys. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Jibāla—Banū Ḥassan, Banū 'Arūs and Akhmās—were still loyal to the Riffis and provided Akhrīrū with men.\(^5\) However, the slow trickling away of support on the southern front continued, despite bin

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\(^1\) Ibid., C.M.T. Fez, 21 Dec. 1925, and C.M.T. Fez, 26 Dec. 1925.

\(^2\) MAEF, Maroc 520, 'Ali b. Ḥamma al-Naẓūfī al-Mātīfī (Pasha of Matīfa for bin 'Abd al-Karīm) to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, 13 Jumāda II 1344/29 Dec. 1925.

\(^3\) SHAT Maroc-Riff 8, Groupement de Fez, Novembre 1925-Juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 5 Jan. 1926.

\(^4\) Ibid., C.M.T. Fez, 6 Jan. 1926.

\(^5\) Ibid., C.M.T. Fez, 25 Jan. 1926. For details of al-Ṭālib al-Shawīnī's career, see above, pp. 695-696.
'Abd al-Karīm's efforts. His qā'īd in the Jaya tribe surrendered on 30 January. On 1 February the Rīfī qā'īds in the Matīwa al-Jabal fled because that tribe was no longer secure, but did not dare to return to the Rīf for fear of punishment. At the same time the Sumāta tribe started to arrest members of the Rīfī regular army in their territory. However, the Rīfī command was still quite able to fight back, and Bū Lahya arrived in the Jibāla in mid-February with around 1,000 men to deal with the rebellion in the Banū Sikkar and Banūr Gurfit. By 14 February he was in control and started to disarm the tribes. By the end of February the western Jibāla was quite definitely back under Rīfī control. Meanwhile the northern Sīnāja was largely kept loyal through the power and influence of the Akhamīshīn.

Matters were rather different in the Rīf. Here the absolute control of Bīn 'Abd al-Karīm was undisputed, and the government functioned normally. In an effort to deal with the food shortages, grain was stored at central points—for instance at Sī 'Alī Bū 'Uqba—and guards were put on the silos. In order to replenish his army's depleted stocks of ammunition, Bīn 'Abd al-Karīm announced that he

2 Ibid., C.M.T. Fez, 1 Feb. 1926.
4 Ibid., C.M.T. Fez, 14 Feb. 1926.
5 Ibid., C.T.O. Fez, 26 Feb. 1926.
6 Ibid., C.T.O. Fez, 23 Feb. 1926.
7 SHAT Maroc Riff 14, Dossier III Mars 1926, Renseignments donnés par Abd el-Krim el Hadj Ali el Boucoyri, Tangier, 4 March 1926 (henceforth referred to as "Renseignements, Abd el-Krim el Hadj Ali").
8 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Drius, 'Aisa b. 'Amar Akarrūsh, 4 Jan. 1926.
would pay for any unexploded bombs brought to him to be made into grenades. Work continued on the road system; at the beginning of February a Spanish informant reported that a road was being built between Anwāl and Sūq al-Sabat of Banū Walishak.

The administration also continued to work. The front line commanders continued to send regular reports to Ajdār. A typical one was sent from Tawārdā at the beginning of January, and concerned movements of the Spanish Foreign Legion in the al-Maṭālsa, bombing raids by Spanish aeroplanes, and the crash of two of those aeroplanes near ‘Azīb Miḍār, an argument over the possession of a rifle, the shelling of Spanish positions by Rifī guns, and so on.

Strict records of the distribution of weapons were still kept. On 7 February, according to one slip preserved in the French Archives, there were 50 Khamsiya rifles handed out in the Zarqāt tribe, and 18 in the Tisūl, and so on. This implies that the bureaucracy, at least, was still working. However, there were other problems.

One of the worst of these problems was that of finance, for money was slowly running out. The shortage of money was seen to be serious in December, when the regular army had its pay cut. The salary of machine gunners, for instance, went down from 60-80 pts to 40 pts a month. In

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1 Ibid., ‘Aisa b. ‘Amar Akarrūsh, 12 Jan. 1926.
4 Ibid., p. 77, List of arms distributed to tribe, 24 Sha‘bān 1347/7 Feb. 1926.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 27, Información de Alhucemas, Ḥāmid b. Mūsā b. ‘Alī (a native of Tripolitania captured by the Rifīs), 1 Dec. 1925.
mid-January a Spanish informant reported that the troops were not being paid at all. The troops were not the only employees of the Rifî government who were not paid. On 20 January 1926 one Sa‘îd b. al-Qa‘îd al-Sharîf wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karîm to complain that his mother who worked in "the bakery of the noble (al-sharîf) Makhzan" had not been paid for three months.

By the beginning of March the situation was getting desperate both economically and politically. Prices of grain had increased greatly over a short period, and there was even no grass to feed the flocks, because the rains had not come. At the end of the first week of March, when people went to bin 'Abd al-Karîm to ask for money with which to buy cartridges, he replied that all the money given to him by Spain (in exchange for the prisoners) was now finished. There was no money left. At the same time, at the beginning of March, the Rifî cause suffered its first defection from the governing group itself. Si ' Abd al-Karîm b. al-‘Ajjj 'Allî of the Bujuyya, a relative of Ra‘îs Misa‘ûd "Sibara" by marriage, and hence of bin 'Abd al-Karîm himself, and the Rifî spokesman in Tangier, went to the French representative in that city and told them that he was willing to work for them. He explained that since the death of his brother-in-law "Sibara", who was, according to him, killed by a servant

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, Muḥammad b. Si Muḥand b. al-‘Ajjj Qaddur, 18 Jan. 1926.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, Muḥammad ‘Allîl Muḥand, 8 Mar. 1926.
4 Ibid., 'Amarush, 9 Mar. 1926.
5 For details of the career of ‘ Abd al-Karîm b. al-‘Ajjj 'Allî, see above, pp. 161-162, 176.
of Muḥammad Azargān, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, his position in the Rif had become impossible, and his only safety lay in "the friendship of Si M'hammed ben Abd el Krim who has always protected me."¹ So he decided to leave the Rif and take refuge in Tangier. Knowing that he would not be allowed to stay in the International Zone without the permission of the Spanish and French, he had decided to cooperate with the latter. He confirmed that the Rif government no longer had any money to maintain the troops, and revealed that bin 'Abd al-Karīm’s car could no longer be used because there was no petrol in the Rif.²

‘Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj ‘Ali also said that the al-Khaṭṭābī brothers and their uncle ‘Abd al-Salām were determined to continue the war to the very end.³ However, by this time rumours were already circulating in the Rif that bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was trying to negotiate a peace. Indeed he had already tried in January and February.

The Search for Peace

The effort in January and February for a negotiated peace to the conflict initially came from a rather unlikely quarter: Captain Robert Gordon Canning, one of the principal members of the Rif Committee in London.⁴ Canning was

¹ SHAT Maroc Rif 14, Dossier III Mars 1926, Renseignements, Abd el-Krim el Hadj Ali, Tangier, 4 Mar. 1926.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ The Rif Committee was set up in 1925 in London, and was composed of a number of Englishmen who expressed sympathies for the cause of Islamic Nationalism. Prominent among its members were Arthur Field, Captain Canning, and a Captain Gardiner. Field was a member of the British Communist Party and Secretary of the Anglo-Ottoman Society. He had been in contact with John Arnall, a pro-Rif English resident in Tangier, when the latter visited the Rif in 1922 (see above, p. 510).
encouraged by remarks about autonomy for the Rif made by the French Prime Minister, Painlevé, in October 1925,¹ and having confirmed with Painlevé and his Foreign Minister Briand, and with Steeg, the French Resident-General in Rabat, that this meant internal self-government, he set out to try to convince bin 'Abd al-Karîm of the possibility of negotiation. It must be said that there were considerable differences of opinion between the French and Spanish leadership over this matter. The French were much more interested in negotiations than were the Spanish. The civilian Steeg had replaced General Lyautey as Resident-General on 28 September 1925 as a result of this desire. Steeg was a former Professor of Philosophy and a Radical-Socialist Canning had been an officer in the British army during the First World War, and was later connected with the Red Crescent in London (al-Bû 'Ayyâshi, op. cit., vol. II, p. 442). He later appeared in Palestine in November 1929 during the troubles between Jews and Arabs and proceeded to support the Arabs (Sheean, Personal History, pp. 411-412). Gardiner had set himself up in London in 1923 as "Minister-plenipotentiary from the Government of the Rif", from an office in the Strand. From here he wrote letters to a number of governments, inviting them to recognise the Rif government and set up diplomatic representation in Aödûr. Recipients included the governments of Mexico and Rumania, who were understandably puzzled (MAEE, Antiguo Archivo 2543, carpeta VE 438, Marruecos Noticias sobre guerra, Letter, Gardiner to Government of Mexico, London, 29 Aug. 1923, and T.C. Amalfi (Sp. Minister, Bucarest) to Alba, Bucarest, 22 Sept. 1923). Gardiner's interest in the Rif was originally financial, and in June 1923 he signed a contract—which the Rif government later denied—to provide a loan of £300,000 sterling in exchange for considerable commercial rights in the Rif. He would be allowed to set up a Bank, to develop mining, forestry, telephone and communications and a postal system, to build ports, schools and technical colleges, railways and tramways, and even theatres, cinemas and opera houses --FO 371/W9218/783/28, Clive to Ramsay MacDonald, Tangier, 10 Oct. 1924, and FO 371/W9483/783/28, Clive to MacDonald, Tangier, 27 Oct. 1924. Such plans were clearly pure fantasy, whether the document itself was genuine or not. In June 1926, after the fall of the Rif, Gardiner turned his attention to the Sûs, where he supplied arms to Madâni al-Akhûsî (see above, p. 793), landing them from his yacht, the Silver Crescent (MAEE, Leg. R966, expediente 13, Sospechosos en Marruecos, Fr. Ambassador to Spain, to. Minister of State, San Sebastián, 29 July 1926).

¹ Fleming, op. cit., p. 309.
Deputy, and he wished for a peaceful settlement although he quite properly emphasised that all negotiations had to be a joint French and Spanish undertaking.\(^1\) The Spanish, and particularly Primo de Rivera, after the success of the landings at Alhucemas, were less inclined to negotiate with bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Both publicly and in private, Primo rejected any attempt at a pact with the Rifīs.\(^2\) In fact, Primo's opinions had changed from a desire to work for a negotiated settlement with the Rifī authorities, to a total refusal of any sort of negotiation, since he now realised that outright victory was within his grasp.\(^3\)

Canning reached Targist sometime in January 1926, and after considerable discussion with Sī Māḥammad, Azargān, and later bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself, succeeded in working out a series of Rifī terms for a peace settlement. These terms included agreement that the Rif should have internal autonomy, but not independence, under the nominal authority of the Sultan, that there would be an open-door policy to European trade in the Rif, that the Rifī government would be responsible for internal order, but that it would not enter into relations with any foreign country; that the head of the government would be called the "Amīr"; that its capital would be Tetuan, but that Spain would be allowed to keep Ceuta, Melilla and Larache, although the Wargha tribes and some of the Jībālā tribes (i.e., in the French zone) should fall within the Rifī.

Not surprisingly, neither France nor Spain was

\(^1\) Ibid., and Gabrielli, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

\(^2\) Fleming, op. cit., pp. 311-312.

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 313-314.

willing to give up such large parts of their Protectorates in this way, and when Canning reached Tangier at the end of January 1926, he was attacked by the French and Spanish press, and there were a series of complaints about him by Spanish and French officials to the international governing body of the city.¹ At the beginning of February, on the advice of British Consul-General Clive, Canning left Tangier.²

However, despite the failure of these plans for peace, some sort of an end to the war was desperately needed by the Rifis. The French and Spanish were quite prepared to carry on to a final defeat of the Rif. Primo, although determined to reduce the burden of the war on Spain, and to bring back some 36,000 men, mainly conscripts, from Morocco, kept an army of some 98,000 men—Spanish Foreign Legion, Spanish regular troops, and Moroccan Regulares—in the Protectorate.³ With these men he would pursue the war to the end.

On 4 February 1926, a French military delegation, including Pétain, the army commander in Morocco, arrived in Madrid to plan a spring campaign in the Rif. The French and Spanish decided on a series of operations, starting with a French advance on 15 April, and followed by Spanish offensives on the Adjdir and eastern fronts. Each side would guarantee to have at least 25,000 men ready for the operation.⁴

The Rif government was quite aware of these preparations, and some of its members began to feel great

² Ibid., 5 Feb. 1926, p. 16.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 331-332.
apprehension about the coming offensive. They split into two groups, one--including Si Maḥammad, Muḥammad Bu Drā, Aḥmad Bu Drā, and Bu Lahya--in favour of continuing the war, the other--including bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself, Si 'Abd al-Salām, Azarqān, and Muḥammad Bu Miḍār, the paymaster--in favour of peace.  

At the end of February, through the offices of Ḫaddu b. Ḫammu, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's former agent on the eastern front in 1921, and later his unofficial "ambassador" to the French zone, Gabrielli, the French controlleur-civil in Tawrīt, again made contact with the Rifīs. Acting on Resident-General Steeg's instructions, he told Ḫaddu b. Ḫammu that negotiations could only begin on the understanding that they would involve both France and Spain.

On 18 March the French, having consulted the Spanish government, told Gabrielli of terms on which they would agree to a peace: submission to the Sultan, exile of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, the disarmament of the tribes, and the return of all prisoners. He passed these terms on to Azarqān on 24 March. Azarqān returned with these conditions to bin 'Abd al-Karīm and on 1 April Ḫaddu returned with letters from Azarqān and bin 'Abd al-Karīm agreeing to negotiations on these terms, announcing an armistice on all fronts, and stating that the Rifī delegates to the peace conference would be Azarqān, Si Muḥammad Hitmi and Si Aḥmad Shiddī, two minor figures in the Rifī makḥzan.

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1 Gabrielli, op. cit., p. 178; and Skīraj, op. cit., p. 147.
2 For Ḫaddu b. Ḫammu, see above, pp. 386-388.
4 Ibid., p. 185.
5 Ibid., pp. 191-194; Shiddī was "Minister of Property", Hart, Aith Waryaghanār, p. 387.
On 9 April an official communiqué was issued in Paris announcing that the conference would begin on 15 April in Oujda, a town on the eastern border of Morocco with Algeria. However, the conference was delayed. When the Rifī delegates, now including Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū, who had replaced al-Ḥitmī because of the latter's illness, arrived at Tarīrīt, they were first taken to the French post at Camp Berteaux, where they were told, on 10 April, that no conference could take place until all the prisoners were released, and the French and Spanish had been permitted a preliminary advance of several kilometres along parts of the front, in order to guarantee their "strategic security". As these terms, which the Rifīs had expected to discuss at the conference, were made pre-conditions for the conference being held at all, the Rifīs refused to agree to them without the permission of bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū returned to the Rifīs, and returned on 20 April with bin 'Abd al-Karīm's refusal.

Faced with the possibility of a breakdown of the conference, the French and Spanish agreed, on 26 April, to drop their demands. Behind this decision lay considerable pressure by the French upon the Spanish authorities, who were still much less anxious for a negotiated settlement. The talks finally began on 27 April. However, these negotiations also ran into trouble over the questions of who should carry out the disarmament of the tribes, and the

1 Harris, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
2 Ibid., p. 279.
3 Ibid., pp. 285-287.
nature of local autonomy. This latter question raised the issue of whether the tribes' qā'īds, after the peace treaty, should be confirmed by the Sultan alone—as the Rifīs wanted—or by the khalīfa (in other words, the Spanish) in Tetuan—as the Spanish wanted. On 1 May the conference broke down when the French and Spanish again demanded the release of all prisoners. Azarqān and Ḫammū were taken by sea to Alhucemas and thence to Targīst to inform bin 'Abd al-Karīm that the French and Spanish were unwilling to continue the Oujda conference until all the prisoners were released—not just women, children, and the severely ill, as the Rifīs proposed.\(^1\) Officially the Rifīs were given a week to reply to this demand, but when Azarqān and Ḫaddū b. Ḫammū returned to Alhucemas for the journey back to Oujda on 26 May, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's refusal to these terms was already known.\(^2\)

The Oujda conference had failed, despite bin 'Abd al-Karīm's desire for a negotiated settlement. Harris, who covered the conference for *The Times*, later wrote:

"... it was clear from the beginning that Abdel Krim's instructions to his representatives left but little chance of a successful issue."\(^3\) In fact, both sides as the conference disagreed on nearly all the issues under discussion. As Harris pointed out, any form of autonomy for the Rif could only be granted in accordance with the powers delegated to them by the Sultan in the Protectorate treaty, and in accordance with the terms of the 1904 treaty, which distinguished between French and Spanish zones of influence.\(^4\) Accordingly

4. For the 1904 treaty, see above, pp. 76-77.
the Rif government would have to recognise the validity of these and other treaties. This they quite refused to do.\footnote{Harris, op. cit., p. 301.}

To accept them would in effect have led to European control over the Rif, which was precisely what the Rifis had been fighting against for nearly five years.

The other point of issue was the release of the prisoners. Harris's explanation of their refusal is quite simple: that "most of the prisoners were dead, and Abdel Krim dared not disclose the fact!"\footnote{Ibid., p. 296.} Accounts of Rifis mistreatment of prisoners abound.\footnote{E.g., ibid., pp. 297-299. Coon, Caravan, p. 381, and Andrés Sánchez-Pérez, "Abd el-Krim", in Selección de conferencias y trabajos realizados por la Academia de Interventores durante el curso de 1949-50 (Tetuan, 1950), p. 62.} Hart claims that these accounts are exaggerated, and both he and Harris counterpose accounts of Spanish barbarities towards prisoners.\footnote{Hart, Aith Waryaghan, p. 399, and Harris, op. cit., p. 299.}

Certainly a great many prisoners did die in captivity in the Rif—even though their numbers and the cause of their deaths are not certain—but at least 283 French and Spanish prisoners were released on 26 May at the end of the war, some of them in an appalling condition.\footnote{Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 329.} Whatever the truth of the allegation of brutality, there is another possible explanation of the refusal to release the prisoners before the end of the negotiations. To have done so would have deprived the Rifis of their strongest point of negotiation with the Allies, and so they could only refuse. In any event, the Oujda conference failed, and Spanish and French operations began again in accordance with the plans made in February.
Once they had begun, the final defeat of the Rif could not be long delayed, for the authority of the government was breaking up under the military, economic and political pressure.

The Rif during the Peace Negotiations

During March and April bin 'Abd al-Karîm was faced with considerable problems of keeping enough troops in position on the eastern front. By mid-March the numbers had fallen considerably. There were only 30 at Jabal Yuddia, one of the principal front line positions, 15 at Sûq al-Jum'a of Banû Walishak, 50 at Sîdî Sha'îb, and 30 at Sîdî b. Daûd (both on the Timsamân coast), 15 at Bû Ghâzî in the Banû Tûzîn, 30 at Imajarân in the Banû Sa'îd, and some 600 in other positions. 1 By 22 March there was no one in Jabal Yuddia at all. 2 Certainly bin 'Abd al-Karîm made a strong effort to reinforce the eastern line: 100 men were sent to Issan Lassan and 300 to the Tafarsit area, 3 200 arrived at Jabal Yuddia, and another 100 at Sûq al-Sabat of Banû Walishak. 4 Yet bin 'Abd al-Karîm seems to have felt less and less able to rely on anyone except people from the Banû Waryaghâl, and it was men from this tribe who now practically monopolised all the positions as qâ'idîs on the front. 5

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm seems to have made one final effort to reorganise the tribes. A great number of qâ'idîs,

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, 'Amarûsh, 14 Mar. 1926.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, Muḩ. b. Ḥaddû, 22 Mar. 1926.
5 Ibid., Salâh b. Muḩammad, 23 Mar. 1926.
both military and tribal, were sacked, including Ŧāimid b. Muḥammad, the qā'id of the Banū Walīshak (which was half-occupied by the Spanish anyway). He was replaced by 'Amar Bū 'Azzā, the qā'id of the tiny part of Banū Sa'id which was still unoccupied, who kept his old job and was given authority over the Timsamān as well. A group of faqīhs from the Banū Waryaghāl was sent into the Timsamān to make a census of all the able-bodied men, and some 1,400 of them were distributed on the eastern front. However, when bin 'Abd al-Karīm called a meeting in Akhšāb Amghār in the Timsamān, to be attended by all the qā'īds of the eastern front tribes, apparently to explain his new organisation, it was widely interpreted by most of the people as something quite different: A rumour circulated that he was going to imprison all the qā'īds.

As a result of the negotiations with the French, other rumours spread. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm encouraged the idea that he was making a unilateral truce with the French, and pointed to the renewed presence of French supplies in the markets. His aim seems to have been to encourage people by implying that they would then only have to fight the Spanish. Another rumour, less useful to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's cause, was that he had packed up all his property and sent it off to an unknown destination.

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, Ŧāimid b. al-Bašīr 'Allāl, 2 Apr. 1926, and Qaddur Azugaj, 3 Apr. 1926.
2 Ibid., Ŧāimid b. al-Bašīr 'Allāl, 7 Apr. 1926 and SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, 5 Apr. 1926.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Drius, 'Amar Akarrūsh b. 'Aisā, 6 Apr. 1926.
More seriously, political trouble was growing in the Banū Waryaghal itself, where Muḥ Azarqān of the Banū Bū Ayyāsh, 'Amar b. Šadīq of the Banū Ḥadhīfa, and 'Amar b. Muḥammad of the Banū 'Abdallāh tribes were preparing to rebel. On 20 March, bin 'Abd al-Karīm arrested two of Muḥ Azarqān's contacts with the Spanish, Muḥ 'Amar and Ḫāmid al-Darrī (both from the Timsamān). It seems likely that he arrested Muḥ Azarqān himself at the same time: an inference drawn from a report by a Spanish informant that on 22 March he was released "almost immediately" after his arrest on the request of the other qā'īds of the Banū Waryaghal. Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm did announce that he had confiscated his property. Whether such pronouncements any longer held any validity was growing increasingly uncertain. If bin 'Abd al-Karīm was unable to arrest, let alone execute, one of his principal opponents without being forced to back

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1 Muḥ Azarqān needs no reintroduction, having been discussed already in this chapter. 'Amar b. Šadīq was the brother of Muḥammad b. Šadīq, the qā'īd of the clan. Both he and his brother were of doubtful loyalty (see above, pp. 174, 304), had manoeuvred against b. 'Abd al-Karīm even at the time of the greatest Rif victories in August 1921 and had been contacted by Idrīs b. Saʿīd and the Spanish over the release of the prisoners in October 1922 (above, p. 472). 'Amar b. Šadīq was nevertheless a man of importance in his clan and was appointed as a military qā'īd by bin 'Abd al-Karīm in late 1922, at the same time as Muḥ Azarqān was appointed over the Banū Bū Ayyāsh (above, p. 499). 'Amar b. Šadīq was arrested in July 1923 as part of a purge of disloyal, inefficient and corrupt qā'īds (above, p. 628). Bin Šadīq's alliance with the third member of the group, 'Amar b. Muḥammad of the Banū 'Abdallāh, dated back at least to December 1922 when they wrote to a Spanish agent complaining about lack of Spanish support. They had helped to organise resistance to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's attempts to impose taxes—unsuccessfully—and were in contact with 'Amar b. Ḫāmid (above, p. 490).

2 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, SI 'Abd al-Salām Muḥammad (Banū Bū Ayyāsh) and 'Abd al-Wahīd b. 'Amar (Banū 'Abdallāh), 11 Apr. 1926.

3 Ibid., 'Amarūsh, 20 Mar. 1926.

4 Ibid., Zaghūdh, 22 Mar. 1926.
down by members of his own tribe, then his power was waning fast. Indeed, bin 'Abd al-Karīm seems to have been in fear of his life. He was keeping his whereabouts secret, and avoided sleeping in the same house on successive nights.¹

Nevertheless, he still had a considerable amount of authority as a military leader and, despite the truce that accompanied the Oujda conference, he ordered the front lines to be reinforced, although he issued orders for the cease-fire to all commanders.² Defence preparations, which had begun with the construction of a telephone line to Iharrushān in the first week of April,³ continued with a stockpiling of material at Anwāl, and a general reinforcement of the front lines. 350 men from the Banū Waryaghāl arrived at Sūq al-Sabāt of Banū Walishak, and 50 at Bū Ghāzī, with a machine gun, on 17 April.⁴ 200 were sent to Sūq al-Thalāthā of Azilāf, and 300 to Miḏār.⁵ By 20 April the eastern front was reasonably well garrisoned: 600 men near Afrāw, 200 at Sūq al-Sabāt (Banū Walishak), 100 at Sīdī Mīsāfūd in the Banū Saʿīd, 200 in Jabel Yuddia, and another 1,200 in various other positions.⁶ Bin 'Abd al-Karīm started drilling and training ḫarkas on the front.⁷

All this time, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was making

¹ Ibid., Zaghdūd, 19 Mar. 1926.
³ SHM Melilla Leg., 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, Ḥāmid b. al-Bashīr 'Allāl, 12 Apr. 1926.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg., 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, 'Amarūsh, 17 Apr. 1926.
considerable propaganda with the peace negotiations in Oujda. His presentation of what was happening differed considerably from reality. He told people that the peace negotiations were aimed at a truce with France but not Spain. He also misrepresented the terms offered at Oujda, saying that there were three points: the disarmament of the tribes, the establishment of five "European" military posts in each tribe, and that he would be a "delegate" of the Sultan. There was no mention of the release of the prisoners. In his letter to the tribes setting out these "terms" he also detailed his reply. To the first—the disarmament—he said he refused. To the second—the establishment of military positions—he said that these should be run by local people. To the third—his own position—in a startlingly irrelevant evasion of the point, he told them not to worry, that he would protect them with the support of the United States and United Kingdom. This is a curious explanation of the position. The omission of all reference to the prisoners seems to be explicable only in terms of their use as a bargaining point—bin 'Abd al-KarIm's control of the prisoners was of vital importance in his negotiations with the French and Spanish, but also marks a return to the position in the aftermath of the victories of August 1921, when the holding of prisoners gave bin 'Abd al-KarIm a certain authority among the Rifis. Clearly to admit now that he was negotiating for their release would have been a mistake. The disarmament of the tribes was one of the principal stumbling-blocks at Oujda, but there the argument was over who should

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, Zaghdüd, 25 Apr. 1926.
2 Ibid., Zaghdüd, 26 Apr. 1926.
do it rather than whether it should be done at all. The same applies to the position of bin 'Abd al-Karîm and the relations with the Sultan. At Oujda the Rifî delegates were offering to submit to the Sultan alone, but not to the khalîfa in Tetuan, in a form of local autonomy. In this letter bin 'Abd al-Karîm seems to be calling still for total independence. The Rifî leader was clearly telling his supporters one thing and the Spanish something completely different.

Despite bin 'Abd al-Karîm's attempt to play a double game, and to imply that he was working only for a peace with France, the general feeling in the Rif was now for complete peace. Economic conditions were so bad and the political unity of the Rifî state was breaking up so fast, that this was probably the only practical course anyway. Certainly when, on 30 April, bin 'Abd al-Karîm called a meeting of the faqîhs of the Central Rif and asked them to choose between peace with France, Spain, or with both countries, they said they wanted peace with both. However, by this time bin 'Abd al-Karîm must have known that the conference at Oujda was failing, and he made preparations for the final resistance.

He had re-arrested Muḥ Azaraqân on the Banî Bû 'Ayyâsh on 26 April and this time he stayed in prison—while rumours circulated that he had been shot. A number of other Waryaghli qâ'idas were arrested as well, along with 25 men from the Banû Tûzin, and were imprisoned in a store room 20

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Drius, Ḥammû 'Allâl, Mizzyân, 30 Apr. 1926.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, Ḥammû Darri, 4 May 1926.
metres square. A qā'id of 25 from Tafarsit was shot for having relations with the Spanish.

Attempts were made to reinforce the front against the Spanish and French, but Fleming's figure of some 16,500 and Sánchez Pérez's of 20,000, as an estimate of the number of Rifis prepared for the final battle, must be viewed with some reserve. Certainly there were large groups--1,000 at Tamasind who arrived from the Ghumāra, 360 in the Banū Walishak, 150 near Miḍār, 50 at Jabal al-Mā' in the Banū Tūzīn, and so on. However, there seem to have been fairly few people to act as further reinforcements. The guard at Sīdī Muḥand Jīlālī in the Timsāmān was reinforced with 9 men, bringing the total up to 29, and those men that were there were not well armed. Of the 400 on guard in the Banū Walishak, one informant estimated that at least 210 had old Mauser and Remington rifles, which had been badly maintained and were consequently in bad condition. Indeed, the total number of rifles collected up after the surrender of the Central Rif tribes was only 14,500. It seems likely that Woolman's estimate of 12,000 men is somewhere nearer to

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Drius, Ḥammu 'Allāl Mizyān, 30 Apr. 1926.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām, 28 Apr. 1926.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, Ḥāmid b. al-Bashīr 'Allāl, 1 May 1926, and 4 May 1926.
6 Ibid., Ḥāmid b. Ḥādū b. Qaddur, 9 May 1926.
7 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 332.
the truth.¹

In addition, the control of the Rifis on the western zone was failing rapidly. For some time people from the Central Rif had been returning home from the Jibâla, Sinhâja, and to a lesser extent the Ghumâra. On 7 April, the Spanish were told that most Rifis had left the Tetuan area.² By mid-April most of the Rifis had left the Sinhâja as well.³ As a result, bin 'Abd al-Karîm told the local people in the Sinhâja to prepare their own defence.⁴ The situation had returned to each tribe looking after itself.

Clearly, when once the French and Spanish attack came, the resistance would crumble quickly. When the announcement of the peace negotiations was made on 6 May, it took only two days for the attack to begin.

The Final Invasion of the Rif

In fact, by the time the attack came, on 8 May, bin 'Abd al-Karîm seems to have realised that he, and the Rif, were inevitably going to be defeated. Ranged against him, on the Spanish fronts, were 28,000 in the Ajdir sector, 12,000 men in the Banû Tûzîn and al-Maṭâlsa, 3,000 in the Banû Sa‘îd, and, on the French fronts, 40,000 in the Gaznaya and Marnîsa, and another 40,000 in the Sinhâja and Banû Zarwâl — a total of 123,000 men, together with 150 French and Spanish aeroplanes.⁵

¹ Woolman, op. cit., p. 204.
² SHM Melilla, Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Drius, Muḥammad b. Ḥammūsh, 7 Apr. 1927.
³ SHAT Maroc Rif 8, Fez, Groupement de Fès, Novembre 1925 – Juillet 1926, C.M.T. 17 Apr. 1926.
⁴ Ibid.
The plan agreed in Madrid in February was for a three-pronged attack by the Spanish: from Ajdïr up the Wâdi Ghïs and Wâdi Nakûr valleys towards the centre of Jabal Hamâm; from 'Azîb Miqâr through the Banû Tûzîn towards Sûq al-Thalâthâ' of Azîlîf; and an attack from the Banû Saîd towards the Timsaman. The French forces would also undertake a three-pronged attack: from Bâb Sultân in the Gaznaya towards Timârza; from al-Nasîr of the Gaznaya into the Banû 'Amâr; and through the Marnîs towards Targîst (see Map XIII: 3). The intention was to break the opposition of the Central Rif, and only after that had been achieved to clear all the "rebels" from the Jibâla and Sinhâja regions.¹

The plan was followed almost to the letter.

The attack began on the morning of 8 May. It is not proposed here to describe the advance in detail, but a summary may be useful. The initial attack on the Ajdïr was heavily resisted from the Rîfî trenches, helped by their cannons, but Asghâr was reached on the first day, at a cost of 629 Spanish casualties and 80 Rîfîs.²

On the eastern front, the Spanish were able to advance from Miqâr with relative ease, the Rîfîs falling back, under the command of Idrîs b. Mîmûn Khujja, in the face of Spanish tanks.³ When they reached Sûq al-Thalâthâ' of Azîlîf on 9 May, there was considerable resistance, however, and the Spanish lost 86 men.⁴ Meanwhile the French moved up from the south and met the Spanish near Thalâthâ' Azîlîf on 8 May.⁵

² Ibid., pp. 46-47.
³ Ibid., pp. 36-38.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 51-52.
⁵ Ibid., pp. 48-49.
MAP XII: THE FINAL FRANCO-SPANISH ASSAULT ON THE RIF, MAY 1926
By 15 May the Spanish had moved down to Tamasind and on 20 May met with the French forces moving up from the south. Meanwhile Spanish troops advanced in the northern part of the eastern front. 'Amar Bū 'Azza, the qā'id of the small part of the Banū Sa'īd that had remained unoccupied since 1922, surrendered on 15 May, and this was followed by the submission of the Banū Marghanin clan of the Timsamān, and the western part of the Banū Walishak. Anwāl was reoccupied on 18 May, and on 20 May Spanish troops pushed to link up with the Ajdīr front.

On the southern front French troops moved through the Banū Zarwāl, the Jaya, Matīwa al-Jabal and Banū Waryajal who submitted on 17 May. On 19 May French troops moved into the Banū 'Amārt with little opposition, and to the west 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu occupied Jabal 'Uqba. By 23 May the French had cut the Banū Waryaghal in half.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's reaction to these advances was to move further away from the Spanish forces; his personal will to resist seems to have collapsed. On the opening day of the attack he moved to the zawiya of Šī 'Abdallah b. Ȳusif near Kammūn in the Banū Waryaghal. The prisoners were transferred to the Banū Bū Frāh. His personal safety secured for the moment, he announced that it was the responsibility of each tribe to defend its own territory. As an

1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 347.
2 Sánchez-Pérez, Acción, pp. 93-94.
3 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, Mūlāy ʻAbd al-Salām b. ʻArābayl, 8 May 1926, and Skīraj, op. cit., p. 151.
5 Ibid., Šammū Darrī, 8 May 1926.
6 Ibid., Ḥammū Darrī, 8 May 1926.
Indication of his own frame of mind at this stage, Idrīs b. Mimūn Khujja later told the Spanish that he and a number of other commanders visited bin 'Abd al-Karīm in Si 'Abdallah b. Yūsif, and when, on the following morning, he saw them eating their breakfast and drinking tea he asked:

"'How can you be so calm, eating and drinking, with all that is happening to us?' We replied that we were men and had to eat and drink, but that we would also die if necessary. Then he said to us 'For God's sake, I have no desire to eat. I want to know what to do!'"

In fact, the remaining fighting was being carried out, almost independently of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, by such as Idrīs b. Mimūn Khujja and 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand, until the latter was seriously wounded. On the eastern front, 'Amar Bū 'Azzā of the Banū Sa'īd carried on the resistance, arresting those who were in contact with the Spanish, until he himself surrendered on 15 May, when all the Banū Waryaghal on the eastern front went home to protect their own homes. Skīraj says that this was on the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself, but by this time he had little authority left. The people simply left.

Meanwhile, in the Jibāla, Akhrīrū and Ḥmad Bū Drā made an attempt at a diversionary operation near Tetuan. On 10 May about 1,000 Jibālīs and Ghumārīs attacked Spanish positions near the Wāḍī Martil. At first they were quite successful and on 17 May the High Commissioner, Sanjurjo, returned to Tetuan from Alhucemas to oversee the relief

1 Sánchez-Pérez, Acción, p. 108.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Tafersit, 'Abd al-Salām, b. Sha‘īb, 12 May 1926.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Información de Dar Mizian, Ḥāmid b. al-Bashīr al-Baghdādī, 15 May 1926.
4 Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 141-152.
operations. On 19 May the positions were relieved. This was the last offensive action against the Spanish. From now on it was a question of the Spanish and French clearing up the last Rifī resistance.

The Surrender of bin 'Abd al-Karīm

Faced with a situation in which the Spanish and French were pushing forward into the Rif from the east and south, a number of choices seem to have occurred to him. Firstly he thought briefly that he could continue to lead the resistance in the Rif, with support from the Jībālā. However, when he asked for troops from the Ghāzāwā, Rahūnā, Banū Sikkar, Banū Issaf, Sumātā and Jabal Ḥabīb tribes, his request was refused. Another alternative that suggested itself was that he should himself cross into the Jībālā to lead the resistance personally. This turned out to be physically impossible, for the French were already moving up through Sūq al-Ithnayn of the Banū 'Amārt towards Tarjist, on 21 May, cutting the road to the Jībālā. The road along the coast was impractical anyway for his large party. The other alternative was to surrender.

The usual explanation of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's decision to surrender to the French is that he was frightened that the Spanish would execute him. In any event bin 'Abd

1 Fleming, op. cit., pp. 348-349.
2 SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de Fès; Novembre 1925-Juillet 1926, C.M.T., Fez, 21 May 1926.
3 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 152.
5 Woolman, op. cit., p. 206, and Fleming, op. cit., p. 349 (quoting Sanjurjo--letter to Primo de Rivera, 2 June 1926), and Hart, Aith Waryaghan, p. 401.
al-Karîm did surrender to the French. The intermediary was Sidi Ḥamīdu in Snāda. On 21 May, still thinking of fleeing to the west, he had asked Sidi Ḥamīdu for animals to take his property and equipment from Targīst into the Ghumāra.¹ At the same time he sent a letter to Sanjurjo and Resident-General Steeg in Rabat, suggesting a cease-fire. The letter was carried out by Pierre Parent, head of a French medical team which was visiting the French prisoners. Parent crossed the Spanish lines on 23 May, handed his letter to Sanjurjo and was flown to Rabat to hand the other to Steeg.² There was, however, no time for such a cease-fire to be arranged.

On 23 May, French irregular troops under bin 'Abd al-Karîm's old enemy, 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, occupied Targīst.³ The following morning the Banū Yiṭṭūf, Banū Gamīl and Banū Bū Frāḥ tribes offered to submit to the French. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm his escape route to the west finally cut off, turned to the only sanctuary left for him—the zawiya of Sidi Ḥamīdu in Snāda.

That same afternoon, after his arrival in Snāda, al-Raisūlī's son and Sidi Ḥamīdu's nephew arrived at Targīst and told the French that bin 'Abd al-Karîm could be easily captured by only a few men. The French officer in command at Targīst, Colonel Corap "did not believe he should give any encouragement to this plan, which appeared to him to serve the personal ambitions of the two people concerned."⁴ On the morning of 25 April, Sidi Ḥamīdu himself arrived in Targīst to submit to the

¹ SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de Fès, Novembre-1925-Juillet 1926, C.M.T.; Fez, 21 May 1926.
² Fleming, op. cit., p. 350.
³ Sánchez-Pérez, Acción, p. 115.
⁴ SHAT Maroc Riff 8 (no file), Commandement Supérieur des Troupes du Maroc—Rapport du General Boichut sur les circonstances de la reddition d'Abd el Krim, Rabat, 9 June 1926, Secret.
French. Corap sent a letter back to bin 'Abd al-Karīm with Sīdī Hamīdu, along with three French officers who, after a long discussion, persuaded bin 'Abd al-Karīm to surrender. At 11 p.m. on 25 May, bin 'Abd al-Karīm ordered the prisoners to be released and himself surrendered. The following morning the surviving prisoners were escorted to the French lines. On 27 March bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself arrived in Targīst where he was courteously received by Corap, and then escorted out of the Rif (see Photograph XIII: 1). With his surrender the Rifī state was formally at an end, although fighting continued for a few more months.

The Final Operations

With bin 'Abd al-Karīm's surrender to the French, the leadership of the Rifī resistance—for that was what it had become—was removed. Fighting continued, but it was very fragmented.

In the Rif, the Spanish forces moved to occupy the Buqquya and the rest of the Banū Waryaghal. On 28 May one

1 Ibid.
2 Harris, op. cit., p. 317.
3 Ibid., p. 318. The chronology of the surrender is confused by the different authors. Fleming (op. cit., p. 349) has bin 'Abd al-Karīm's flight to Snāda as early as 16 May, Wooman (op. cit., p. 23) says that on 23 May bin 'Abd al-Karīm had "already" fled to Snāda. Neither of these writers used the SHAT archives, and the official French account is certainly the most reliable. This account also makes the significant point that right up till 24 May bin 'Abd al-Karīm was still indecisively wondering whether he could flee to the Ghumāra and continue the struggle.
4 Bin 'Abd al-Karīm, his brother and other members of his family were taken by the French to the island of Réunion where they remained until 1947 (Hart, Aith Waryyaghār, p. 401). Other members of the Cabinet remained in Morocco. Indeed, two of them, Muḥammad Bū Drā and Muḥammad Azargān formed a political party, the Ḥizb al-Āhar, of a distinctly conservative hue in the 1930s. Great Britain, Morocco, Vol. II, p. 191.
Photograph XIII: 1

Muḥammad bin. ʿAbd al-Karīm (mounted left) riding into captivity with the French

Source: Illustrated London News, 16 June 1926, p. 1013
group of Spanish forces moved into the Buqquya while another occupied Si 'Abdallah b. Yūsif without difficulty. There, in a house next door to the mosque, they found what had been bin 'Abd al-Karīm's residence during the final stages of the war. Apart from a huge quantity of personal effects, the Spanish discovered a vast number of papers and books which they took into their custody, and a flag of the Rifī state.¹

On 29 May Spanish troops moved towards Sūq al-Abād of Tiṣār in the centre of the Banū Waryaghal. Here they were attacked with considerable vigour. Fighting lasted all day, and the Spanish suffered over 600 casualties.² It was, as David Hart says, "the final stand of the Aith Waryaghar."³

With the defeat of the Banū Waryaghal and the occupation of the Rif, fighting continued in the Jibāla, Sinhāja and Ghumāra. As soon as bin 'Abd al-Karīm surrendered, the French Air Force dropped leaflets on the Banū Zarwāl informing them of the fact, and calling on them to submit.⁴ However, the rest of the Jibāla either did not know of the surrender, or refused to believe it. A French memorandum of 31 May reported:

"The most varied rumours circulate in the mountains about the fate of Abd el Krim and as a general rule

¹ Sánchez-Pérez, Acción, pp. 121-125. The flag was later handed over to the Museo de Infantería (now the Museo del Ejército) in Madrid. The destination of the papers is uncertain. It seems quite likely that they were taken to Tetuan, and they may now be in the archives of the Moroccan Protectorate, housed at present in the Archivos de la Presidencia del Gobierno in Alcalá de Menares near Madrid. Unfortunately these archives were not available for consultation when the research for this thesis was carried out. Very recently they have been opened, and it would be most interesting to examine them.

² Ibid., pp. 128-133.

³ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 401.

⁴ The Times, 29 May 1926, p. 12, dated Paris, 28 May 1926."
people refuse to believe that he has surrendered. His former Lieutenants in the Djeballa continue to speak in his name and are still talking of the rapid arrival of reinforcements. 1

For a short while those "lieutenants" held on to their positions of authority. On 2 June al-Baqgali Wul'd al-Qurfa, one of bin 'Abd al-Karim's most trusted commanders in the west, remained in charge of Shāwin, and tried to organise the resistance. He ordered the Ghazāwa and Raḥūna not to attack the French but to send reinforcements to the Banū Idhīr against the Spanish. 2 However, his authority did not last long. On 2 June a previously insignificant gā'id named Wul'd al-Far decided to take control in the Jibāla. He sent 50 men to al-Raisūlī's old home in Tazarūt to arrest the Rifī gā'id there and a few members of the former Rifī regular army, and announced he would take over in Shāwin and remove Wul'd al-Qurfa. 3 He was helped in this by a general wish for revenge on the representatives of the Rifī domination which was sweeping the Jibāla. The Banū Issaf and Akhmās combined to send a force to the Banū Sikkar to "execute" the Qā'id al-Ḥattāsh, who had been instrumental in crushing the first revolt in the Ghamāra in July 1923, 4 although he succeeded in escaping to the Rif. 5

The revenge against the Rifīs was widespread. A former Rifī official in the Akhmās was executed, as were several in the Ghamāra. 6 On 9 June Wul'd al-Far occupied

1 SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de Fès, Novembre 1925-Juillet 1926, C. M. T., Fes, 21 May 1926.
2 Ibid., C. M. T., Fes, 2 June 1926.
3 Ibid., C. M. T., Fes, 8 June 1926. The few accounts of Wul'd al-Far that exist are unclear even about his origins.
4 Ibid., for al-Ḥattāsh, see above, pp. 622, 671.
5 Ibid., C. M. T., Fes, 9 June 1926. Presumably he then surrendered, for there is no further mention of him.
6 Ibid.
Shāwin, and executed Wulūd al-Qūrfa. On 13 June, prominent pro-Rifī gā'īds in the Ghazāwa were attacked and their houses burned.

Meanwhile a Spanish force under Lt. Colonel Capaz set out, on 12 June, from the Bugguya along the coast through the Masāsa and Matīwa. On 25 June he reached Amṭār. Then he struck inland into the Banū Ḫassān before reaching Wādī Lāw on 10 July.

This is not to say that by now all the resistance to the Spanish was completely overcome. There were still a number of important pro-Rifī leaders in the Ghumāra at large, and they tried, in a rather fragmented way, to organise resistance. The most prominent of these was Akhrīrū, who joined up with al-Ṭālib al-Shawīnī and Mūlāy Āḥmad al-Baqār to try to take control in the Jibāla. Al-Baqār took over Shāwin and proclaimed himself Sultan, signing himself Ibn al-ʿAbbās b. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAlamī. As his full name was Mūlāy Āḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-ʿArbī ʿal-Baqār" this choice is not easily explicable, except that by emphasising his connection with Jabal ʿĀlam and therefore descent from Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Salām b. Mashīsh, the "pole" of Islam in Morocco, he was reverting to the traditional practices of leadership by

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1 Ibid., and C.M.T. Fez, 10 June 1926.
2 Ibid., C.M.T. Fez, 13 June 1926.
3 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 335.
4 SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de Fès, Novembre 1925-Juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 28 June 1926. Mūlāy Āḥmad al-Baqār was a long-standing enemy of Spain, and of al-Raisūlī (see above, p. 363), who had helped al-Akhāmilsh in the initial Riffi sortie into the Jibāla in Oct. 1921 (above, p. 432), and had taken part in the final assault on al-Raisūlī's base at Tazarrūt in Feb. 1925 (above, p. 706). Al-Shawīnī has already been discussed in this chapter, p. 802.
5 Intervención de Larache, Beni Aros, pp. 38-39.
important religious families, an idea which bin 'Abd al-Karīm had rejected.

His was not a successful reign, however, nor a very long one for by and large the majority of people wanted to stop fighting. When he ordered the Banū Issaf to assemble and form a ḩarka he was largely ignored, although he did undertake an invasion of the Banū Zarwāl at the end of June, which was unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, in the Sinhāja, Muḥammad al-Akhamīsh tried to reimpose his authority, and sent out letters calling for resistance. The Sinhāja held out for some time, while Spanish forces under Capaz moved up from the Wādī Lāw to take Shāwin on 10 August, in a very rapid operation later named the "Capaz Raid".

Akhrīrū was killed in a skirmish in the Banū Idhīr in the Jabāla on 3 November, but parts of the Sinhāja held out until the beginning of 1927. The final operations in the Jibāla took place in June 1927, with the occupation of Jabel 'Alām on 14 June 1927. Two days before this operation started, al-Baqar was killed by a bomb, and finally, with the occupation of the remaining parts of the Akhmās which had not submitted, the last resistance ceased.

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1 SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de Fès, Novembre 1925-Juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 29 June 1926.
2 The Times, 1 July 1925, p. 16, dated Paris, 30 June 1926.
3 SHAT Maroc Riff 8, Groupement de Fès, Novembre 1925-Juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 3 July 1926.
4 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 335.
6 Intervención de Larache, Beni Aros, p. 39.
Conclusion

The months between September 1925 and July 1926 saw the collapse of the Rif state. However, it was not an immediate collapse, for when the Spanish landed on the coast near Alhucemas the Rifis were well organised, and they resisted the invading forces with considerable determination. For all the huge numbers of Spanish troops involved, they were only able to advance a few miles around Alhucemas Bay. The French advance was also resisted, and on the southern front the Rifis were able to stop the invaders on the edges of the Rif. In the west they were not forced to retire at all.

Nevertheless, the landings in the heart of the Rif did shake bin 'Abd al-Karim's authority. His problem over the next few months was to maintain control of the Rif. From the social point of view, internal order and discipline were maintained, at least until the peace conference at Ujda was over. Feuding, which broke out for a brief period, was quickly stopped; murderers continued to be severely punished. In April, Alexander Langlet was able to claim that it was possible to sleep in the open in the Rif. This may have been an exaggeration, but it implies a high level of order.

From a political point of view, bin 'Abd al-Karim remained in a strong position. Just before the Spanish landings he had further centralised power in his own hands. This bore fruit in the months after the Spanish landings. Those who were suspected of dealing with the enemy were  

1 Ibid., p. 356.
severely dealt with. Even as late as March 1926, a woman from the Banū Tūzīn who was suspected of spying for the Spanish in Tafarsit was sent to prison in the Central Rif.¹

However, a great deal of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's authority had rested on his reputation for success. Once the Spanish had landed in Alhucemas, the propaganda by success worked in reverse. It became increasingly difficult to recruit people into ḥarkas to fight a losing battle when the harvests had failed and the economic situation was so difficult. Furthermore, these economic difficulties made it increasingly more difficult to pay those who were fighting.

In these circumstances, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was forced to rely more and more on severely dictatorial practices. However, these tactics were only with difficulty applied to his more important opponents. To have been too severe with important local qā'īds might very well have caused yet more trouble. This is possibly why Muḥ Azarqān was only arrested—and that for short periods at a time—and not executed. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was forced to try to keep a precarious political balance between antagonising potential opponents and allowing latitude to his actual opponents. That he managed to do so for so long in difficult economic and political circumstances says a great deal for his ability.

To help him maintain this political balance, he conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign. It took a number of directions. Firstly he emphasised the possible oppression that Spanish rule would bring. In this he was helped by the unsavoury activities of troops in Spanish employ. Secondly

¹ MAEP, Maroc 519, Qā'īd Muḥammad b. (illegible) to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, 4 Ramaḍān 1344/18 Mar. 1926, committing Mizzyāna b. Ḥaddū Ḥamḥami al-Tūzānī to prison for spying.
he tried to encourage people outside the Rif to help him by appealing to their religious and nationalist sentiments, calling in effect for a jihad. Thirdly he made frequent promises of outside help for the Rif—from Germany and Turkey, recalling those countries' help against the French during the First World War, and making use of the prestige of Turkey after the victories of Atatürk. Finally, he made considerable play of the pressures on Spain and France, and particularly France, from their own people, to end the war. This last approach gave rise to hopes of a negotiated peace with France, which might have left him free to attack Spain; hopes of which bin 'Abd al-Karīm made considerable use in his propaganda.

This raises the question of the aims of the peace negotiations and the terms on which 'Abd al-Karīm and his principal supporters were willing to agree to an end to the war. During these nine months bin 'Abd al-Karīm told a number of different people different things about the terms which were acceptable. He told Vincent Sheean that the only terms were the "total independence of the Rif". Gardiner was told that he would accept a position as a delegate of the Sultan, with autonomy but not independence, but with his capital at Tetuan. By implication, at the conference of Oujda, bin 'Abd al-Karīm conceded the question of Tetuan, agreed over the disarmament of the tribes, but still refused to act as anything less than a direct delegate of the Sultan. Yet he told his own people at the same time that he would refuse the disarmament and, again by implication, that he would not be a delegate of the Sultan. All this brings into question the validity of the peace
negotiations at all. In fact, it seems quite likely that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was trying to get the best possible arrangement that he could, provided that his formal autonomy from the Spanish was maintained. This was a minimum demand, which he could not afford to drop, for it would have invalidated all the developments of the previous five years. This desire to get the best possible arrangements also explains why he would not release the Spanish and French prisoners of war, for they were both a vital bargaining counter with the Allies, and also a symbol of his own authority in the Rif.

The period of negotiation also gave the Rifîs time to prepare their defences against the final assault, and during April and early May a great effort was made to reinforce the front and to train the troops. It is certainly true, as al-Bû 'Ayyâshi says, that the Rifîs did not use the period between October 1925 and May 1926, when there was little fighting, to prepare themselves for the coming battle as much as did the Spanish, or the French, for that matter. However, the Rifîs' resources were far too few and their defences were too stretched to prepare themselves adequately anyway.

When the attack came the Rif collapsed. It should be noted here that it was the core of the state, the Central Rif which was attacked, and the core which collapsed. As pressure grew on the Rif, those Rifîs who were elsewhere, in the Jibâla or on the French front in the Sinhâja went home to help in the fight. At the same time, bin 'Abd al-Karîm's own morale grew steadily worse. A man, who on Sheean's account had been extremely optimistic in September

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1925, immediately after the landings, changed to one who, on his own admission, found it difficult to eat for worry.

On his surrender, the Jibāla and Sinhāja fought on for a while. Such was the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm that for a short while his supporters in the Jibāla were able to pretend that he had not surrendered. Harris says:

"It is a curious fact that though the Jibāla tribes had been slow to adhere to Abdel Krim's campaign, and had awaited the downfall of Raisuli before doing so, they were the last to abandon their fallen chief."¹

This is not true. Once the Jibāla tribes realised that the state into which they had been forcibly incorporated by invasion had been destroyed, they rose against its representatives. All pretence at unity collapsed. Those who wished to carry on fighting resorted to the traditional, highly localised methods of resistance, either through guerrilla warfare, or attempts to set themselves up as "Sultans", basing their authority on religious prestige.

Clearly this disunited resistance could not last. As bin 'Abd al-Karīm had proved, the only effective opponent of two states was another state. Once the Rifī state was defeated the remaining pockets of resistance were quickly cleared away.

¹ Harris, op. cit., p. 326.
Chapter XIV

CONCLUSION

The Rif war was a remarkable period in Moroccan history. For some five years, the Spanish and then the French were held back by an ill-fed, relatively untrained and hastily assembled army of men from what was generally agreed to be one of the most backward areas of a backward country. It is clear, from the evidence examined in this thesis, that the explanations that have so far been given for the success--and for the ultimate failure--of the Rif state are woefully inadequate. It will be remembered from the introductory chapter that these explanations varied between the theories of men like Robert Montagne, who saw the war as an attempt to build a new state in the Rif on the pattern of the great Berber empires of the Middle Ages, the views of a modern nationalist writer like Laroui who described the Rif war as the last outburst of rural resistance, bearing no relation to modern urban Moroccan nationalism, and the ideas of 'Allāl al-Fasī, another modern political theorist and nationalist, who describes a modern democratic, movement in the Rif. All these views also concentrate on the personality of the Rifī leader, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Thus, by trying to fit the war into a neat category, and by seeing it as entirely the work of a single man, these commentators both diminish the achievement
of the Rifī movement, and oversimplify its significance so that its real place in Moroccan history is lost. They explain neither why the Rifī movement grew up, nor the position within it of Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, nor the way in which circumstances and ideology determined its growth, nor the reasons for its final failure.

To be fair, the one person who could have explained some of these aspects of the Rif war, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm himself, did not do so. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's only personal account of the war takes the form of a really very short article in the Egyptian journal al-Manār in 1927.1 Al-Manār was then edited by Muḥammad ‘Abduh, one of the most important religious reformists of the time, and the article referred to here bears considerable relevance to the ideology of the Salafiya movement. The article must be seen in this light, not as a sociological or even a historical analysis, but as an ideological attempt to explain to an Arab public in Egypt and the Levant the "patriotic" aspects of a failed struggle.

An ideological explanation, from the principal leader of the Rifīs at war, is, of course a document of great importance, raising as it does some of the fundamental issues of the struggle. As such it is reproduced here:

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1 Anonymous article "Jahl zu’amā’ al-Muslimīn wa-mafāsid ahl al-ṭuruq wal-shurafā’ wa Kawnhum sababan li-fashl za’Im al-Rif al-Maghribi" in al-Manār, pt. 8, Voo. 27, 1344-5/1926-27, pp. 630-634. The text of the article appeared in the Egyptian weekly al-Shūra, according to al-Manār, Shinar (op. cit., p. 173, note 1958) says that is was also reprinted in al-Minhāj, Muharram/Safar, pp. 96 ff. Shinar's article reproduces about two thirds of the article in translation, but omits the important opening paragraphs which were not completely relevant to his examination of the religious thought of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. For reasons of convenience, the whole article is reproduced below.
"An interview with Mūhammad ‘Abd al-Karīm [sic].

I wanted to make the Rif an independent country like France and Spain, and to set up there a free state with full sovereignty and not an Amirate, subject to the regulations and ordinances of the Protectorate. From the first I tried to make my people understand that they could not survive unless they were as closely joined together as are the bricks of a building, and unless they worked with sincerity and loyalty to form a national unity from tribes with different inclinations and aspirations. In other words I wanted my people to know that they had a nation (waṭān) as well as a religion (dīn).

I have been greatly criticised by some people because, in the Oujda negotiations I asked with some insistence for a definition of the meaning of independence; this definition was very necessary, because our aim was real independence, unmarked by any blemish. By independence we meant that which would guarantee our complete freedom to determine our development and the independent direction of our affairs, the right to make treaties and to form alliances that we considered to be suitable. I and my brother gave our country the name of the 'Republic of the Rif' (al-Jumhūrīya al-Rifīya) as a sign that we were a state composed of independent tribes in an alliance, and not a representative state with an elected parliament. In fact, in our opinion, the title of 'Republic' (jumhūrīya) could not take on its true meaning for some time, because all peoples need a period in which they can form themselves into a state with a resolute government, firm sovereignty, and a strong national organisation.

But unfortunately I was understood by only a few individuals who could be counted on the fingers of both hands. On the contrary, even my most faithful supporters, and those of the greatest knowledge and intelligence believed that after the victory had been won I would allow each tribe to return to complete freedom despite their realisation that this would return the country to the worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism.

Religious fanaticism was the greatest cause of my failure even if I do not say that it was the only cause. This is because the shaykhs of the orders have greater influence in the Rif than in Morocco as a whole or in the rest of the countries of the Islamic world. I was incapable of acting without them and was obliged to ask their aid at every turn. At first I tried to win over the masses to my point of view by argument and demonstration, but I met with great opposition from the great families with powerful influence—with the exception of the family of 'Khamlāsha' [sic] whose head was an old friend of my father's. The rest were all my enemies, especially after I spent money from the awqāf to buy supplies for the war. They did not understand that this money could not be spent on a
more worthy object than that of the independence of the country.

I do not deny that sometimes I was obliged to make use of religious sensibility in [an attempt] to win political support. Thus, I said that after the Spanish had occupied Ajjdir they compelled the evacuation of a part of the village in which there was a mosque, which they did not respect and they made into a stable. When I heard this I ordered three of the qā'īds who were famous for their piety and their bravery to verify the matter for themselves. This tactic of mine doubled the bravery of the fighters, and increased their devotion to myself and my cause.

The truth is that Islam is the enemy of fanaticism and superstitions (khurâṣāt). What I know of its fundamentals is enough to make me declare publicly that Islam as I know it in Morocco and Algeria is very far removed from the Islam brought by the great Prophet.

Those who truly or falsely claimed that they were descendants of that pure stock [i.e., that of the Prophet] turned their whole attention to gaining the sympathy of the people for their transitory selves, and set themselves up as idols to be served by the ignorant, and established religious brotherhoods which were transformed into a powerful army to serve their personal ends. But Islam is as far removed as may be from sanctifying individuals because it ordains brotherhood and unity in the face of the enemy and encourages self-sacrifice [lit. 'death'] in the case of freedom and independence. However, the shaykhs of the orders and the leaders of religion tinkered with the Book of God and the sunna of His Prophet in order to satisfy their own longings and to gratify their greed. They took no part in the revolution under the pretext that fighting for the fatherland (watan) had no meaning for them and that they would only fight in the cause of the Faith.

I exerted myself to the utmost to free my land from the influence of the shaykhs of the orders who are an obstacle in the way of any sort of freedom and independence. The policy of Turkey pleased me greatly because I knew that the Islamic countries could not be independent unless they freed themselves from religious fanaticism and emulated the people of Europe. But the Riffas did not understand me—which was my misfortune as well as theirs. Thus the shaykhs shook with anger at me when I appeared one day in the uniform of an officer, although I did not do such a thing again.

The shaykhs of the orders were the bitterest enemies both of myself and my country as it advanced. They omitted nothing in their efforts to frustrate my policy, even spreading through the length and breadth of the land that I wanted to follow the example of Turkey, and that that would inevitably lead to giving freedom to women so that they could go around in
The machinations of these ignorant fanatics convinced me that progress is impossible in any country where they have a strong influence unless it is brought about slowly and through the use of force and violence.

I must declare here and now that I did not find in the Rif the least support for my efforts at reform and that [only] a small group of people in Fez and Algiers understood me, helped me and agreed with my policy because they are in touch with foreigners and know where lies the true good of my country.

In short I came before my time to carry out this work, but I am convinced that my desires will all be realised sooner or later through the force of events and the reversals of time."

The Ideological Explanations of the War

The al-Manār article is an ideological self defence, but that is not the major objection to the picture that it paints. Far more serious is the fact that it is only a very partial account. It makes no mention of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's most important supporters, gives no explanations of how he emerged as the leader or why, does not explain the economic factors of the war and ignores the place of the new state in relation to the long history of Moroccan government, and of Moroccan Sultans' attempts to oppose European interference. Above all, it is a necessarily personal account, presenting bin 'Abd al-Karīm not only as the central figure, but as the only actor on the stage.

What it does do, however, is to raise the essential constitutional and ideological issue which is fundamental to an understanding of the course of the Rif war: the position of Islam within the new state. It was this question which helped determine the relationship of tribes and local groups in the unity of the whole of the Rif and Jibāla. It defined in religious terms the rôle of the new leader, Muḥammad bin
'Abd al-Karīm, and set down the ideological terms of reference of the conflict with the ṭarīqas and of the war itself—for this war could be seen either as one of national liberation or as a jihād against the Christians.

The difference between what is omitted from the al-Manār article and what is commented upon is the essence of the tension between the practicalities of power and the calls of Islamic ideology, which so characterised the course of the war. This was a question which had exercised the minds of Islamic thinkers from the beginning of the nineteenth century, for the relationship between power and religion, and the rôle of Islam in a modern state, is at the heart of the whole movement of reform from Taḥtāwī onwards, and is specifically a concern of the teachings of 'Abduh and Rida.

This relation between religion and state is clearly expressed in the al-Manār article, when bin 'Abd al-Karīm says: "I wanted my people to know that they had a fatherland as well as a religion (la-hum waṭan an kama 'la-hum 'ālīman)."

In other words, bin 'Abd al-Karīm is saying, the novelty of the movement which he led was that it provided a frame of reference which included not only the religious community—the 'ummah—but also a loyalty to a defined area—the waṭan. The idea of "waṭan" was the product of the reform movement in Egypt, dating back to Taḥtāwī, although he formulated it to apply to Egypt in order to take account of that country's history as a nation before the Islamic conquest, and of the non-Muslim peoples who lived within its borders.¹

Neither of these two considerations applied to the Rif of course, where there had been no previous history of statehood.

¹ Hourani, op. cit., pp. 78-80.
and where there were few non-Muslims.

Wataniya had other implications for Tahtawi, however, concerned with the duties of citizens towards their country—sacrifice, submission to the law, and unity.\(^1\) It is these last two aspects of wataniya, submission to the law and unity, that were the most important to bin 'Abd al-Karim. However, it will be apparent from this thesis that "unity" changed its meaning in the course of the war. At the beginning of the war it referred to an attempt to form an alliance against the Spanish from a number of disparate tribes; later it became a unity that was imposed from above by a single leader, MuHAMMAD b. 'Abd al-Karim. This process is mirrored in the al-Manar article, where bin 'Abd al-Karim makes two apparently contradictory statements: he talks first of the need to "work with sincerity and loyalty to form a national unity from tribes with different inclinations and expectations." This implies that the identity of the tribes would be absorbed into that of the new state. On the other hand, he goes on to describe the state as "composed of independent tribes in an alliance", which means the opposite, that the identity of the tribes as separate units was maintained and that each was an acquiescent partner in an alliance. In fact, the majority of tribes were incorporated by force and their continued "alliance" was maintained through the use of coercion. This is recognised by bin 'Abd al-Karim when he says that even his "most faithful supporters" were wrong to believe "that after the victory had been won, I could allow each tribe to return to complete freedom despite their realisation that this would return the country to the

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 78.
worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism." By using the pronoun "I" in this context, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was emphasising the personal control which he reserved to himself as the only person able to make political decisions within the new state.

The basis of this unity under his authority was supposed to be religious. Although he made passing references, at the beginning of the war, to the need for local unity based on language—as, for example, when he told the Gaznaya tribe to free John Arnall in 1922 on the grounds that they were Rifī by language and therefore had to obey him—the majority of his propaganda was religious, and the state was supposed to be based on the unity of the Muslims within it. By doing this, he was in line with the modern thinking of people like 'Abdūh and Rādā who rejected the ideas of traditional solidarity based on blood relationship, that had, for example, characterised the tribes of the Sahara in the Middle Ages, who had set up the state of the al-Muwaḥḥidūn and al-Murābiṭūn. This secular solidarity, 'asabiyya, was disliked by Rādā, for instance, who believed that it perverted the shari'ā.1 Bin 'Abd al-Karīm does not mention the idea of unity through secular bonds in the al-Manār article, instead he talks of the need for unity among tribes who were not connected by any ties of blood, and of Islam which "ordains brotherhood and unity in the face of the enemy . . ." In short, bin 'Abd al-Karīm wanted a new state in the Rif, led exclusively by him, but united by the authority of Islam.

The "authority of Islam" meant the imposition or restoration, of the shari'ā. This was the central theme of all the ideas of Islamic reformists. It was one of the main

1 Ibid., p. 299.
demands upon Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ when he was given his bay'a, and in the larger Islamic world beyond the borders of Morocco, the reimposition of the sharī'ā was the concern of men like Khayr al-Dīn in Tunis, who looked back to the times when the Islamic state was strong and civilised, and accounted for this by pointing to its strict adherence to the law. However, this was a law which was supposedly reinterpreted in the light of modern conditions and which as many (including Rāḍā) pointed out, would have to be accompanied by a change in the institutions of Islamic society, particularly those of government and education. Thus when he talked of the idea of unity in al-Manār, and implied that he looked for the return of the sharī'ā, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was in line with the tradition of reformist thinking in Islam.

However, as he complains in the al-Manār article, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was opposed in his attempt by local religious leaders. He alleges that the shaykhs of the orders "omitted nothing in their efforts to obstruct my policy." He says that the reason for this opposition was the religious fanaticism of the ṭarīqas. Again, in his attacks on the ṭarīqas he is at one with people like Rāḍā, who dismissed the brotherhoods as making their religion "a joke and a plaything". Even bin 'Abd al-Karīm's language in al-Manār adopts a similar tone; he refers to the shaykhs who "tinkered with the Book of God". There is, however, another aspect to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's attack on the orders, in al-Manār; he says that the brotherhoods were "transformed into a powerful

1 Ibid., p. 89.
2 Ibid., p. 151.
3 Ibid., p. 225.
army to serve their [the shaykhs'] personal ends," that they were his enemies "especially after I spent money from the awqāf to buy supplies for the war." Bin 'Abd al-Karīm does not spell it out, but what he is describing here is a power struggle and a conflict over resources.

The amīr's justification for taking over the resources of the awqāf, or to be exact the justification which he gives in al-Manār, was that they "could not be spent on a more worthwhile object than the defence of the country." However, as we have seen, the country to which he referred was the new Rifī state ruled over by him, and claiming the obedience of everyone under his authority. It was precisely this waṭan that the shaykhs of the orders rejected: "They took no part in the revolution under the pretext that fighting for the waṭan had no meaning for them and they would only fight in the cause of faith." There is a clear statement here of the difference between bin 'Abd al-Karīm's conception of the new state which he wanted to see in the Rif, a waṭan, behind defined frontiers and with a defined population, and the 'umma—a far vaguer and more disparate entity which was the only political form, which according to him, the tarīqas would recognise.

The very idea of the new state was thus revolutionary in the context of the Rif. The state to which bin 'Abd al-Karīm referred was not to be the old style of decentralised Moroccan government but one comparable to France and Spain, which ironically were its principal enemies. In other words, his conception of statehood was an idea that was based on his experience of European political structures. It is thus not surprising that this new idea was not understood in the Rif
itself; significantly, bin 'Abd al-Karîm explains that only "a small group of people in Fez and Algiers understood me, helped me and agreed with my policy because they were in touch with foreigners." This was unlikely to appeal to the traditional conservative thinkers in Moroccan society, even to those who were opposed to European intervention in their country. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, al-Nâsîrî, while bemoaning the growing power of the Europeans, had complained that those who wished to emulate their military and technical achievements in order to protect Morocco ran the risk of betraying their faith: "They want to learn about war in order to protect their religion, yet they neglect their religion in the very process of learning."¹ Thus when bin 'Abd al-Karîm claimed that the state would be characterised by its Islamic nature, one that would allow efficient European methods to be used to preserve its independence, he was not answering the paradox which al-Nâsîrî had outlined over twenty years before.

However, the use of new political systems and of European methods in the Rif was obviously of the utmost importance. In fact it was the only practical option that was open to bin 'Abd al-Karîm, since the old structures were clearly quite incapable of sustaining independence. Powerful local leaders, such as al-Raisûlî, had shown themselves willing to cooperate with the colonialists in order to preserve as much of the old political structure—and therefore their own autonomy as possible; even where they, or the orders, had fought the Europeans—as the Sanûsiya had done in Libya—they had shown themselves quite unable to hold back the

¹ Al-Nâsîrî, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 106.
invaders. The only other alternative was a complete secularisation of the Rif, as Atatürk attempted in Turkey. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm did not, however, share Atatürk's secularising zeal—he was after all a qādī rather than a soldier—although he admired the Turks' efficiency in expelling their enemies—an admiration he shared with Rida, who equally rejected the secularising policies of the Turks.¹ For these reasons the policies proposed by the Salafiya movement were not only desirable from a religious point of view, but necessary for their practical aspects, representing as they did Islam as a force for unity, legitimising the dislike of the tarīgās and stating the need to create an Islamic nation-state—a watan. Thus the language in which bin 'Abd al-Karīm spoke in the al-Manār article was couched in these terms. However, ideology alone is insufficient to explain the course of the Rif war, although it provides a very important basis for discussion. The reason for this is quite simple. Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not a theorist but an activist. Certainly he had an interest in the movement of reform in Islam and in the theory of government of an Islamic state. His prime concern, however, was to ensure that the war against the Spanish was continued and that he remained as the leader of the Rifīs. Thus the practical problems as well as the theoretical positions are of vital importance. In fact, the practicalities of power—the imposition of unity, the formation of a state administration, the spreading of the shari'a, the role of bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself in relation to his followers—were in the end more important than the ideas of Islamic reform. Furthermore, a concentration on

this aspect of the Rif war shows the extent to which previous commentators have failed to grasp the essential point that it was the daily problems of the war which shaped its course rather than the ideologies behind it.

Unity

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's first remarks in the al-Manār article are directed to the problem of unity. They are an echo of the ideas expressed in his bay'a, which refer to the religious necessity of the unity of the Muslims: "He who wishes to break up the nature of this community, when it is one, cut off his head with a sword, whoever he may be." As we have seen in chapters III and IV, there were overriding political reasons for bringing about unity—quite apart from any belief in its religious desirability. The long history of resistance to the Europeans, from the war of 1859-1860 onwards, had been characterised by its very disparate nature which had led to the ultimate ineffectiveness of all Moroccan action. Even after the imposition of the Protectorate, resistance in northern Morocco had floundered largely because local leaders, al-Raisūlī for example, had been unable to bring enough troops into the field at any one time.

The basis of any sort of unity and resistance in the Rif was, of course, the existence of a stable peace. Provided that the area was divided against itself in internal feuding, the Spanish could rely on there being little opposition. The Spanish policy, therefore, was to undermine stability by trying to prevent the imposition and

1 MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 180. Bay'a of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm.
collection of ḥagg-fines. In this they were extremely successful and they were able to create great rifts in Rif society. Certainly there were attempts to form a wider front against the Spanish but by 1919 they had been remarkably unsuccessful.

The movement for unity was hampered by the lack of a suitable leader, since the major figure in the north, al-Raisūlī, was unacceptable to the majority of the Rifis and the only alternative candidate, ‘Abd al-Mālik was more concerned with fighting the French than the Spanish. Nevertheless, the idea of unity did exist, and a local alliance slowly emerged in the Banū Waryaghāl founded on the reimplementation of the ḥagg-fines. Once these fines had been restored in 1920, they solved not only the problem of order but also provided money to pay for the ḥarkas, a problem which had overcome both al-Raisūlī and ‘Abd al-Mālik.

By August 1920 a sizeable coalition had emerged in the Rif formed of elements from five central Rif tribes, who brought together a considerable ḥarka. However, the problem of leadership still eluded them. Based as the coalition was, on an alliance, and supported by the ḥagg-fines which were always liable to break down, the movement was extremely vulnerable. In such situations "alliances are fragile because the commitment of member groups is always tentative and contingent."

So the search for a leader began. The first candidate was a man calling himself the Sharīf al-Idrīsī who, in September 1920, tried to set himself up

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as a "Sultan of the Rif". He did not last long, but his appearance was the first mention of the possibility of a new state in the Rif, and after his removal from the scene, the anti-Spanish groups continued to talk of a government in the Rif, free from foreign influence and locally administered.

The existence of the movement for unity, and the currency of the idea of an autonomous political unit—it cannot be called a "state" at this stage—in the Rif, is enough to show the inadequacy of a number of common conceptions of the Rif war. In the first place, these ideas of unity were not initiated by Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm, for his involvement came after these first efforts. This being so, both the "patriotic" Spanish explanation as advanced by Cerdeira, that the idea of an independent nation existed "only in the fantastic imagination of the Aulad al-Jattabi",¹ or Montagne's rather more coherent idea that the Rif coalition and state was the result of a powerful local individual using the mechanisms of tribal politics to take over first his clan, then his tribe, and then neighbouring tribes in a recreation of the Berber movements of the Middle Ages,² may be seen to be inaccurate. Both the movement for unity, and the coalition, existed before bin 'Abd al-Karīm emerged upon the scene.

However, the fact that it was Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm and not anyone else who came to lead the Rif through five years of war must be explained.

¹ Cerdeira, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
² Montagne, Révolution, p. 119.
The Eclipse of the Traditional Leadership

Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm was by no means the obvious candidate for leadership of the anti-Spanish forces. He possessed no religious legitimacy—he was not a sharīf or marabut—his family, while it had a limited local importance in parts of his own tribe, was not powerful. True, his father had been appointed to the position of qādī by several Sultans, and his grandfather had also possessed the same title, but real political authority at that time had rested with the local councils of the a'yān. Above all, his father was seriously compromised by his service with the Spanish as one of their best-rewarded pensioners.

Nevertheless, he had several attributes which were in his favour. In the first place, his father, partly as the result of his friendship with the Spanish, was a rich man. After heavy local pressure by the anti-Spanish alliance had obliged him to change sides, he would naturally occupy a position of some importance in the alliance. When he, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, died or was murdered, his eldest son inherited that position. In fact, however, simple wealth had not given his father a commanding position on the anti-Spanish side, and it did not give it to his son. What Muḥammad had, and his father had lacked, was a far more informed conception of the way in which the Spanish might be defeated, and a grounding in the ideology of the Salafiya movement which aimed at ensuring the preservation of Muslim independence through the radical application of the sharī'a, and the fostering of Islamic unity. He had a knowledge of European methods and techniques of war, through his contacts with the Spanish army in Melilla and his brother had a technical education.
in mining. Above all, perhaps, he was an outsider in the sense that his family was not one which had been traditionally powerful in the central Rif. Ross Dunn, writing of the political responses to French colonialism in south-eastern Morocco, has pointed out that:

"Coordinated mass resistance in segmentary lineage societies depended on the emergence of extra-tribal leaders, organisation and ideology persuasive enough to heal over, at least for a time, the natural fissiparousness of political action."\(^1\)

In south-eastern Morocco this mass movement never really developed fully. In the Rif it did, and the reason for this was that a suitable leader was found.

This is not to say that bin 'Abd al-Karîm's leadership went unchallenged, for it did not. Significantly, the import of the challenge was that the new leader was not a sharîf. Thus, for example, at the very beginning of his command, a group from his own tribe asked Sîdî Ħamîdu to assume the leadership on the grounds that bin 'Abd al-Karîm lacked these traditionally respected origins. Later, al-Raisûlî also would attack the āmîr on precisely these grounds. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm's, or his supports, made an ideological response to this attack on his origins by invoking Islamic precedent: his bay'a quoted a hadîth concerning 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb saying on his death bed, "You must be strong in faith in God, and listen to and obey the āmîr, be he a slave or an Abyssinian."\(^2\)

However, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had far more convincing answers to criticism of his unsuitability as leader than this religious or ideological response... In the first place he had

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1 Dunn, op. cit., p. 268.
2 MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 180, Bay'a of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karîm.
led the Muslims to victory over the Spanish, and in the second place he had the undeniable power to impose his will, whether his critics liked it or not.

The Organisation of the Rif and the Formation of a Makhzan

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's ability to impose his will and to defeat the Spanish depended on his grasp of the organs of political power in the Rif. He could not do this alone, and was aided by an ever-growing administration. Indeed, part of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's preliminary political campaign to win the leadership of the alliance rested on his promise to bring about a radical reorganisation of Rif society. Even before Anwāl, he had taken steps to create the nucleus of a regularly paid army, and had carried out a preliminary census of the tribes. In May 1921 he announced that the country would have a "government and a flag", the symbolic representations of the watan which bin 'Abd al-Karīm wished to bring into existence to complement the religion of his people. As an emphatic confirmation that the movement against the Spanish was not longer dependent on a tribal alliance but was a centralised opposition led by a single man, aided by powerful supporters, the fragile system of haqq-fines was abolished and replaced by a concentration of justice in the hands of a constituted authority.

All this happened before the defeats of the Spanish in July and August 1921, and at this stage it was admittedly on a very small scale. Nevertheless, when the attack on the Spanish did come it was immediately victorious. However, this success was achieved not only as the result of the growing organisation of the Rif, but because of a
simultaneous rising behind the Spanish lines. This rising had been agreed upon in advance, certainly, but that did not imply that the people of the eastern tribes were willing to place themselves under the authority of the new Rif leader. As a result, when the Spanish had been pushed back as far as Melilla, bin 'Abd al-Karîm lost control, yet another pointer that the opposition to the Spanish was not the result of the efforts of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karîm, but was merely used, channelled, and organised by him.

Thus we may see that there were two aspects to the Rif movement—the need to defeat the Spanish and the need to create an organisation in the Rif capable of sustaining the opposition. Returning again to Ross Dunn's account of the Moroccan south-east, that author says:

"Under conditions of extreme economic uncertainty, in which no lineage, class, or faction could accumulate sufficient power to control the distribution of resources, competition for them stimulated a profusion of more or less temporary groupings of leaders and followers which coalesced to pursue specific short-run objectives."¹

In northern Morocco, this situation, as we have seen, certainly existed before the formation of a more permanent alliance under bin 'Abd al-Karîm. It did not apply after the victories of the summer of 1921. This was because the Rif leader and his close supporters had enormous reserves of Spanish military supplies which had fallen into their hands, and, after the ransom of the prisoners, a considerable financial superiority over every other individual and group in the area. The short-term objectives were surpassed and the coalition moved into a new stage.

It was in this position of overwhelming strength

¹ Dunn, op. cit., p. 265.
that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was proclaimed as amīr, and was able to proceed with a detailed organisation of government in the Rif. He formed a regular army, placed under the command of people who were trained, or at least experienced, in their particular specialities. He set up an administrative system, both to service the army and ensure that it was paid, and to keep order in the countryside, where qa'ids and mahākmas were set up, and backed by a prison system to punish lesser trouble-makers. This system bore such a close resemblance to that used by the Spanish to dominate the areas that had been forced to submit to their military occupation, that the Ghumārīs referred to the Rifī mahākmas as "fīsīnas, an expression derived from Spanish. In fact, Rifī concerns were remarkably similar to those of the Spanish, to dominate and control areas that did not particularly wish to be either dominated or controlled.

In an effort to gain legitimacy, by using traditional Moroccan political terms, bin 'Abd al-Karīm described his government as a makhzan. The makhzan was the model of the Moroccan government and one which everyone understood. The Spanish, in their colonisation of northern Morocco, used the same expression to describe their authority. However, the term was not only a terminological convenience but also an accurate description of the new government for like any makhzan it had its ministers and its qa'ids in the tribes. The ministers, many of them members of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's own family, were given specific areas of responsibility, were supported by a developed bureaucracy, and protected by a strong army.

The administrative reforms, the regular army, the
taxation which the administration and army combined were able to levy, despite the complaints of those who were taxed, the whole apparatus of nizām which was brought into being in the Rif, were precisely the ends towards which Moroccan Sultans had striven from Muhammad IV after the Hispano-Moroccan war of 1859-1860, to 'Abd al-'Azīz and 'Abd al-Hafīz at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with Abdallah Laroui that the Rif war was simply one of "numerous rural and mountaineer revolts" which bore no relation to the political phenomenon of nationalism in urban Morocco. And it is quite impossible to agree with Abderrahman Youssoufi when he says that bin 'Abd al-Karim did not try to set up a makhzan in the Rif, and that the idea of the makhzan had already been discredited in the eyes of the people on account of its past failures, and because of its genesis into the vehicle of European colonialism.

However, in Moroccan history, the setting up of a makhzan was accompanied by the claim by an individual to the Sultanate of Morocco. This did not happen in the Rif, and Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm made no very serious attempt--beyond the immediate demands of propaganda to claim that position. The explanation of this lies in the objectives of the Rifī state and his position within it.

Caliphate and Shari'ā: the Nature of the Rifī State

The bay'a of bin 'Abd al-Karīm which he was given in January 1923 started with a specific reference to the advantages of the Caliphate: unity, order, morality, the

1 Laroui, History, p. 350.
2 Youssoufi in Colloque, p. 82.
maintenance of the sharī'a, and the Caliphate's opposition
to tyranny, and to the rule of non-Muslims. There was nothing
new about these ideas. Traditional sunni Muslim doctrine saw
the Caliph as the man who:

"should lead the community in peace and war, collect
the canonical taxes and supervise the application
of the law. He was also the imam, the leader in
prayer, and he 'should himself be learned in the
law and competent to exercise the power of
interpretation.' It was only in this limited
sense that he was successor of the Prophet . . .
but even in this sense he was indispensable to the
community, ruler by divine right, and .ruler, in
principle, over the whole community: for most,
although not all, jurists held that the unity of the
umma implied a unity of political authority. 'He
who dies without having known the imam of his time
is as one who has died in the age of paganism.'

As will be remembered from the discussion in the intro-
ductive chapter, the figure of the Caliph in Morocco was
combined with that of the Sultan, and the same doctrinal
characteristics applied. Thus reference to the Caliphate
at the beginning of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's bay'a indicates
that what is coming after is the declaration of a Caliph.
And indeed this is precisely what the bay'a says: the
Caliphate has come to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and he was expected
to make the sharī'a triumphant, to destroy heretical doctrines
and to defeat the Christian enemy.

Was bin 'Abd al-Karīm to be a Caliph then? If
Caliph means the ruler of all Muslims then the answer is
clearly that he was not. The term must be understood within
the context of the war and of the bay'a itself, which makes
clear reference only to "The tribes of the Rif and the tribes

1 Hourani, op. cit., p. 5. It will be noted that virtually
the same phrase as that quoted by Hourani here was used in
the bay'a of bin 'abd al-Karīm, i.e, "A man who dies and has
not made a bay'a dies in ignorance" MAEF, Maroc, 517, p. 180.
2 As Lahbabi has shown (op. cit., p. 27).
of the Jibāla". What Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm stood for was the freedom of the Muslims, the purity of the sharī'a, the opposition to the Christians, in that area—the Rif and the Jibāla (in which the Ghumāra and Sinhāja were assumed to be included) and that area alone. As such he was amīr al-mu'minīn, commander of the faithful, but only of the faithful whom he in fact led. Thus he could quite easily claim that his sovereignty did not impinge on that of the Sultan in Morocco because he was only the effective leader of the faithful in the north, although the Sultan to the south was under the control of the French. In other words, the intention of the bay'a was to organise in the Rif the conditions of a Caliphate, where the sharī'a might be preserved and strengthened, beyond the control of the European armies, but on a local level and within defined frontiers. As Magali Morsy has put it, "Where in 1922 was the Dār el-Islām if it was not in the Rif?" for the rest of Morocco (as well as most of the rest of the Islamic world) had by then fallen victim to European expansion.

It is obvious that it is impossible to separate the independence of the Islamic state from the maintenance of the sharī'a. This is as true of the Rif as anywhere else. The sharī'a could only be maintained if independence was maintained, and that could only be done if unity was ensured. The key to unity was the sharī'a, the only way to supersede the fragile system of ḥagg-fines, and the symbol of the unity of the 'umma and the waṭan. Again we see the way in

1 MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 180, Bay'a of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

2 Magali Morsy, "Actualité d'Abd el-Krim" in Colloque, p. 394.
which ideological desires and practical needs were interdependent.

So, the maintenance of the leadership of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm depended upon his ability to control the legal structure of the Rif. His claim to legitimacy as amīr was based on the enforcement of the shari'a, and that enforcement was a political necessity just as much as it was his own personal desire. That is not to say that concern with the shari'a was purely the result of political opportunism. The principal agents in the campaign to create a "moral society" in the Rif, Bū Labya and al-Shargī, wanted to enforce the shari'a in every area of social activity, and not just for socially disruptive crimes of violence and theft. Thus, for example, as shown in chapter IX, a man was imprisoned for not paying his debts, another for promising to marry a woman when that was forbidden by the shari'a, another for assaulting his wife, and yet another for spreading malicious gossip. At the same time the creation of just such a "moral society" increased the influence of the state authority and its power over the lives of every individual in the country.

The maintenance of political power and authority in the Rif was, of course, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's prime concern. Quite apart from the desire of most rulers to remain in power, without that authority his other objectives, defeating the Spanish and maintaining the law, could not be achieved. Indeed, the vast majority of the people who were imprisoned were punished because in some way--by spying or treachery--they had infringed, or acted against, the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Now the inseparability of the
shari'a from the authority of the amīr becomes clear. If bin 'Abd al-Karīm was fighting the war against the Spanish to protect the shari'a and to preserve the independence of a Muslim state, then any opposition to him was irreligious. It was precisely in these terms that he attacked 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu and al-Raisūlī. The authority for his claim, in legal terms at least, was the bay'a which had given him the position and duties of the Caliphate within the area of the Rīfī state.

Thus it may be seen that bin 'Abd al-Karīm saw his rôle as that of amīr al-mu'mīnīn. His relationship with the "faithful", who in theory had bestowed that position upon him by their bay'as, is therefore of the utmost importance.

Ruler and People

According to the theory of the Caliphate, or Sultanate, in Morocco, the ruler's position was the result of his recognition by the 'ulamā'. In fact, of course, the bay'a of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, like that of any sovereign was more the recognition of a fait accompli, the already existing power of the ruler, rather than his nomination to office. Once in power, again according to traditional Islamic theory, the ruler should in some way consult the leaders of the community—a process known as shūrā—and be advised by them. However, as Hourani points out, "there was no clear idea who exactly should be consulted . . . and how far the ruler should be bound by what they said."¹ As we have seen from the discussion of Moroccan political life in the Introduction, these ideas of consultation and "election" have been used by

¹ Hourani, op. cit., p. 6.
more recent Moroccan political writers such as Lahbabi to justify the idea of a democratic monarchy in that country.\footnote{Lahbabi’s book (already cited) is one of the most cogent examples of this in Moroccan political writing. It is, of course, a fairly standard interpretation of “shūra” as a whole, and reformist thinking as developed by ‘Abduh and others whereby shūra gradually came to mean parliamentary democracy. C.f. Hourani, op. cit., p. 144, and Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 43, 101.} Arguing along the same lines as Lahbabi, ‘Allāl al-Fasī has stated that in the Rifī state there existed democratic structures through which the ruler was directly responsible to the people.\footnote{Al-Fasī, op. cit., pp. 121-122.} On the other hand, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm himself, in the article in al-Manār, put the opposite view quite bluntly saying that the Rifī was “not a representative state with an elected parliament.”\footnote{Al-Manār, cited article.} These are two descriptions of what was allegedly the same system, and they are contradictory. The truth, as ever, lies between them.

‘Allāl al-Fasī is quite correct to say that there was an assembly of sorts in the Rif; he is wrong to assert that it had any authority over the amīr. As the discussion of the rôle of the majlis al-‘umma in chapter IX has shown, its function was advisory. It could refer things to the amīr but like all the other organs of state, and their officials—ministers, military leaders, qā’ids, and local meetings of the a’yān of tribes, it could only offer him suggestions.

Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm would seem by nature to be an autocrat. As we have seen in chapter V, even before Anwāl, when he was criticised in the mosque, he immediately silenced his opponent. In any event, if he was not an autocrat by nature, he soon became one through force of...
circumstance. If the Rifī alliance was to hold together and be formed into something more durable, then it would have to be he who made the decisions, and he who maintained unity. As he himself explained in the al-Manār interview, he experienced considerable difficulty in convincing even his supporters that "I would allow each tribe to return to complete freedom despite their realisation that this would return the country to the worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism."¹

The responsibility for avoiding the return to anarchy was bin 'Ābd al-Karīm's alone, at least in his own eyes. Certainly the al-Manār article deals solely with what he thought was the correct course of action, and how he as an individual was opposed in his plans by powerful and irreligious vested interests.

The same view of the individual rôle of the amīr was held by his supporters in the Rifī. The al-Māṭālīf shaykhs encountered by Vincent Sheean in 1924 saw the whole war in terms of the victory of "our lord", who was the "Sultan of Islam".² The title itself is significant for it is an echo of the claim to be the leader of the faithful. This puts into perspective bin 'Ābd al-Karīm's own remarks on accepting his bay'a, that he was not a king but (something much more powerful) "the collective voice of everyone"—the popularly chosen leader of the faithful whose position depended on his religious legitimacy, the upholding of the shari'ā, and on general approval. Thus not only was any opponent disobeying a leader with religious authority but the representative of society at large.

¹ Ibid.
² Sheean, Adventures, p. 47.
³ Skīrāj, op. cit., p. 81.
This is not to say that bin 'Abd al-Karîm's autocracy was necessarily heavy handed, for although he was not obliged either in theory, or in fact, to take anyone's advice he frequently did so. The people of Burid in the Gaznaya, as we have seen in chapter IX, did in fact receive the qâ'îd whom they wanted, and after the majlis al-'umma objected to Qâdî al-Shims, someone else was appointed. It was often easier for bin 'Abd al-Karîm to get his way by consent rather than by force. Nevertheless, his authority went very deep into the lives of his people, and the agents of his state were able to intervene in personal matters, between husband and wife for example.

It may be seen then, that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was not a tyrant ruling by force alone, rather an able politician acting in a highly autocratic manner, but sensitive to at least some of the aspirations of his people. Furthermore, it was a position which was widely affirmed by those people who saw in him an effective leader who would bring them to victory and ensure a stable society. This more complicated picture of the amîr, explains the enigmatic character of a rule who was forever trying to balance the political and military demands of the moment, with the more long-term need to remain in power, to keep control over his subjects, while at the same time trying not to alienate their support too much, through the demands he made on them for service, taxation and obedience. It explains also the swiftly changing nature of his propaganda, from his claims to represent Islamic unity and the wishes of his people, to the need to undertake "negative" propaganda—the use of terror, arrest, imprisonment and execution.
However, it must be said that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was not a single figure ruling over a united country. Like all rulers he relied to a very large extent on individual supporters, and was opposed by other individuals and groups. Too great a concentration on the personality of the amîr tends to lessen the attention given to the motives of his supporters, and above all, those of his opponents.

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm, the Orders and Locally Powerful Leaders

The main objection to an exclusive concentration on the rôle of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karîm is that it gives the impression that he was supreme in the state and that everyone else was subordinated to him and to his organisation. This was a goal that could not possibly have been achieved. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm was faced with the same problems that had confronted previous Moroccan Sultans who attempted to enforce their control in areas where it had previously been weak.

Edmund Burke has pointed to the obstacles placed in the way of the Moroccan Sultan in his attempts to create a stronger unity in the country, under his leadership:

"... the centralizing drive of the makhzan antagonized the provincial notables and incurred the opposition of the religious brotherhoods and zawiyas, whose interests were threatened by salafiyya-inspired reforms."¹

It is clear that bin 'Abd al-Karîm's state was opposed precisely by those same orders and individuals. It is equally clear from the material put forward in this thesis that bin 'Abd al-Karîm's opponents were motivated not so much by "religious fanaticism", as the amîr himself claims in the

¹ Burke, Prelude, p. 215.
al-Manâr article, but by considerations of power and influence. It is simply untrue to state that it was only the shaykhs of the orders who opposed him, or that they all opposed him with the exception of the one family of the Akhamlishin.

In the first place, the Rifî movement was supported by a large number of shaykhs from religious brotherhoods who were appointed as qâ'ids and pashas in the Rifî administration, and one of them, a Nâsirî sharîf from the region near Tangier, was one of the main leaders of the expansion of the war into the north-west. There were others, such as Sîdî Hamîdu of Snâda, for example, who, while they did not actively support bin 'Abd al-Karîm's authority, did not oppose it. Certainly Sîdî Hamîdu, with a consistent record of fighting both the French and the Spanish before the Rif war, and of helping the movement at the very beginning, could not be described as a traitor to Islam, and despite his withdrawal from overt political and military activity, his very neutrality allowed him to perform useful service to bin 'Abd al-Karîm as a mediator.

In the second place, some of the most ferocious and determined opposition came from an alliance of three locally powerful individuals, 'Amar bin Hamîdu, al-Ḥâjj Bil-Qîsh, and 'Abd al-Mâlik, of whom only the last had even the most tenuous claim to religious prestige, through his grandfather, the Algerian 'Abd al-Qâdir. The others were secular leaders trying to protect their own local authority and prestige. If this meant cooperating with the Spanish or the French in order to win for themselves a measure of local autonomy and importance, then, in the manner of
al-Raisūlī, they were quite prepared to do so. What they did not want was to be forced into a position of subordination to a powerful centralised state like the Rif.

Two prominent religious figures, al-Raisūlī and 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Darqāwī, did oppose bin 'Abd al-Karīm and their incorporation into the Rifī state. Their objection, as bin 'Abd al-Karīm says in the al-Manār article, was to the use of "their" ḥabūs property for the purposes of the state. However, since they were religious figures, and since the basis of the Rifī state, as laid down in the bay'ā of its amīr, was also religious—to protect Islam, and to maintain the sharī'a—the propaganda which accompanied the clash between the two sides was expressed in religious terms. Thus Bin 'Abd al-Karīm attacked al-Raisūlī as the man who had allowed the Spanish into the Jībālā, and al-Raisūlī attacked bin 'Abd al-Karīm as irreligious because he made war on his brother Muslims.

This is not to say that the attacks on the tarīqas were entirely the result of a conflict over power. Clearly, in the Salafīya interpretation of Islam, the orders were irreligious, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm objected to them on this ground as well. But it is always important to realise, in discussing the events of the Rif war, that the concern for the sharī'a, though quite genuine in itself, had the additional advantage that if it were brought into effect it would further strengthen the political position of bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

The confusion over religious motives vanishes in the case of 'Amar bin Ḥamīdū and Bil-Qīsh. Here, the extent of the play for power is absolutely plain. The only terms
of reference of these two local leaders were to their own personal advantage. Even their alliance was subject to this, and when it suited him, 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu betrayed his former ally Bil-Qīš to cooperate for a short time with bin 'Abd al-Karīm. The same tactics were used by a lesser figure, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur, who tried to ensure his position by simultaneously backing both the Rifī state and the Spanish. Once again, the preservation of the power of an individual was a matter of overriding concern.

This is not to pass judgement on these individuals. By acting in this way they were protecting not only their own power but also the livelihood of their families and the local groups to which they belonged. After all, the penalty for making a mistake, and aligning themselves too closely with a losing party, either in the conflict between the Rifīs and the Spanish, or between the Rifī state and 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, could be disastrous. Houses and crops would be burned and animals confiscated or destroyed. Thus we may see that Ross Dunn's point about south-eastern Morocco applied equally in the Rif:

"... individuals, local communities, and alliances defended themselves, not only against Europeans, but also against the pressures and importunings of kings, ... saints, prophets, and other meddlers who would corner them into taking risks and making sacrifices dangerously incompatible with the urgent imperatives of protecting land, water, crops, and herds."¹

Such people had to be coerced into cooperation with the Rifīs, and so the Rifī state became an aggressive and expansionist force.

¹ Dunn, op. cit., p. 32.
Rifī "Imperialism"?

As we have seen, the efforts to form an anti-Spanish movement in the Rif preceded the rise of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Karīm to lead it. Equally, the people of the Jībāla and the Ghumāra did not feel the need to depend on the Rifīs for leadership.

There had been a history of opposition to the Spanish in the Jībāla, which grew after the occupation of Shāwin in 1920. This opposition, while fierce, was spasmodic in nature and centred on the Akhmās tribe. Although they received help from Rifī harkas even before the rise of bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, they never put themselves under any obligation to the Rifīs, and such cooperation never inhibited local freedom of action.

This same feeling still existed when the Spanish were expelled from the Jībāla in 1924. However, times had changed. Now the tribes were not allowed to revert to their previous conditions of independence and "anarchy". For Muḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Karīm expanded the Rifī state into the area. The Rifīs set up maḥakmas and telephone lines, built roads, imposed taxes and confiscated the ḥabūs property. When the Akhmās protested, their rebellion was put down with great ferocity. In fact, the Rifī army behaved as an army of occupation, and their methods as we have seen were remarkably similar to those of the Spanish.

The Jībālīs had to endure this situation but they were never happy about the occupation, and when bin ʿAbd al-Karīm surrendered, and the Rifī state collapsed, they drove out or killed all the Rifī officials they could find.
The reasons for this aggressive expansionism are not hard to find. The presence of the Spanish in the west meant that they were a threat to the Rifis' rear. Once they had been driven out, however, bin 'Abd al-Karim could not tolerate the presence of disorder on the edge of the state which he ruled, for it allowed a base for those who were opposed to him and his supporters, and provided the manpower for an alliance to resist the Rifis. In addition, a reversion to the old political system of the tribes, in the newly "liberated" territory, would have negated the whole concept of order and shari'a on which the Rif state was based.

Thus by 1925, the term "Rifi state" was in one sense a misnomer, since it included an area far larger than the Rif itself. On the other hand it was a Rif state in the sense that it was a territory which had largely been occupied by the Rif government, with backing from Rifi troops. It was far beyond the stage when bin 'Abd al-Karim, in 1922, could appeal to the Gaznayis to obey his orders because they were Rif by language. It may be seen, therefore, that the Rif state was held together, not by secular asabiya based on a common Berber tradition, but on a mixture of force and religious propaganda, the most prominent characteristic of all the political action of the Rif war. Similarly it may be seen that this was an attempt to go beyond the limiting factors of tribal unity to create a far wider unity over the whole of northern Morocco, supported by a technical superiority and an administration the like of which had not been seen before in the area.

However, this unity brought with it new dangers,
because it was eventually bound to come into conflict with the French and to impinge on their zone.

The War with the French and the Relations with the Sultan

Involvement with the French was, according to bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself, a step which he wished to avoid. However, as we saw in chapter XII, he had great difficulty in preventing it. There were a number of reasons for the eventual expansion to the south.

The first reason, and the simplest to explain, was a question of economics. By occupying the Wargha the French cut the Rif off from a vital source of grain supplies. Thus, in order to maintain the economy of the Rif, there was bound to be at least a limited involvement with the French.

More complex reasons exist, however. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's government and the movement which it led was a prisoner both of its own propaganda and of its very success. In the pro-Rifī propaganda, in the posters on the walls of the mosques in Tetuan, for example, and in the bāy'a given to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, there were calls to protect Islam, and to promote the peace and well being of the Muslims. Again in the posters in Tetuan, and in the propaganda circulating in the Rif, great emphasis was laid on the economic aspects of colonialism—the loss of land and property, as well as the threat to Islam as a religion. As a result, Islam came to represent, not only a religious system of government, but also a symbol of economic and cultural independence to complement political and religious freedom. However, if this claim was to be made for freedom from Spanish rule, it was

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1 Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., pp. 133-140.
logically, and from the point of view of the consistency of the propaganda, difficult to avoid it being made for independence from French rule. And since many of the people living on the southern boundaries of the Rif state were far more at risk from the French than from the Spanish, they were liable to make strong efforts to fight the other colonialist nation to the south.

In addition, a great deal of the legitimacy of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's rule depended on his success. His following among Sheean's acquaintances in the al-Maṭālsa tribe, for example, depended very largely on his prestige as a war leader. If it could be seen that he was completely unwilling to defend people against the French, then that prestige would thereby be diminished.

For these reasons, it was inevitable that the Rif state would be drawn into conflict with the French. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was well aware of this, and said as much when he accepted his bay'a. He was not keen to bring about this involvement, however, but pressure on him grew. By the time the Spanish had been expelled from the Jibāla, he had no more excuses to avoid an invasion of the south. As we saw in chapter XII the enthusiasm of his local commanders for military action against the French was overwhelming.

However, before the attack took place it was planned with great care, and a strong defence line was prepared for Rif forces to fall back upon. In other words it was intended to be a limited campaign, aimed at ensuring the continued support of the Rif commanders and troops, and at taking over vital economic areas south of the Rif, but
also a campaign which would allow the Rifis to withdraw to previously prepared defence lines. It was not the result of the "vague nationalist ideology" of the Rif leadership as Fleming puts it, but of the strong nationalist feelings of the main body of the Rif army. To this extent, the Rif state was based on popular consent in the sense that its leadership was the prisoner of the desire of the people to undertake the invasion of the French zone. Once it is seen in this way, the virulent propaganda campaigns in Fez may be understood in a different light. The letter to the 'ulamā' of the Qarawiyin laid great emphasis on the superiority of the Rif leader, Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim compared with the succession of past Sultans and Pretenders to the Moroccan throne. He, bin 'Abd al-Karim, claimed the authority of the Caliphate, an authority that had already been claimed for him before, in his bay'a. What he said in the letters was not that he wished to be Sultan over all Morocco, but that the people of Fez should cooperate with him out of Islamic solidarity to ensure that the limited Dār al-Islām that existed in the Rif was not destroyed. He alone had been able to carry out the duties in which past Sultans had failed. It is for this reason that the attacks on the Sultanate were limited only to the period of the attack on the French zone --there are no examples of them in the Rif itself--and they were for the limited purposes of the moment.

However, the idea of war of limited extent against the French or one whose main aim was to defeat the Spanish alone raises fundamental questions about whether or not this war may accurately be described as a jihad.

1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 239.
Jihād or a War of Independence?

Traditionally, jihād implied a war against non-Muslims, to extend the area of the Dār al-Islām. However, by the nineteenth century this had become a practical impossibility, at least as far as conflict with the Europeans was concerned. War "in the cause of God" became an attempt to protect the already existing boundaries of the Muslim world, rather than to extend them. This revised doctrine of jihād, the product of circumstance, was adopted on an ideological level by the theorists of the Salafīya movement. Rida, for example defined jihād as being lawful only to protect Islam, but that any attempt to compel Christians to become Muslims would infringe the principle of toleration of the "people of the Book".¹

Thus jihād was limited both in theory and in practice. The Rif war was also limited in its scope by the practicalities of the situation. This does not mean that the Rif war was therefore simply a jihād with a limited scope. Indeed, bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself denied that it was a jihād at all. He wrote to Gabrielli, the French organiser of the Oujda conference:

"I wish to state, since I am accused of leading a holy war, that this is incorrect to say the least. We no longer live in the Middle Ages, nor at the times of the Crusades. Quite simply we wish to be independent and to be governed only by God."²

By saying this bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not just referring to the impracticality of the idea of a war to expand Islam. He was also talking of two other considerations; firstly, the limited nature of the war itself, and secondly its

¹ Hourani, op. cit., p. 237.
² Gabrielli, op. cit., p. 85.
objectives. This war was not only concerned with Islam but also with nationalism. As he himself put it in al-Manār, "waṭan" as well as "dīn". That, however, was a concept not easily grasped by the traditional leaders of Moroccan society. The orders refused to help, according to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, "under the pretext that fighting for the fatherland had no meaning for them and that they would only fight in the cause of the Faith."¹

The concept of nationalism was not only foreign to the ideas of the amīr's opponents. Many of his followers had the same difficulties of understanding. The shaykhs whom Vincent Sheean met among the al-Maṭālsa tribe, talked of driving all the Christians from Morocco, and then reconquering Spain as well.² For them jihād was hardly a war of defence. Akhrīrū, as his letter referred to in chapter XII shows, was motivated by a strong feeling of hate for the Spanish because they were Christians. Nevertheless, the people's feelings had much in common with those of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. Like him they wished to protect their land and their religion from an enemy that both threatened to destroy their economy and society, and to dominate their religious freedom. However, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's vision went beyond this, and looked forward to the creation of a strong, centralised and modern state founded on the precepts of Islamic law. For both these differing points of view there existed the double edged problem of what was desirable and what was possible. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm wished to create a modern Salafiya-inspired state, but this, given the political and social conditions

¹ Al-Manār, cited article.
² Sheean, Adventures, p. 47.
in the Rif and northern Morocco was a goal that was impossible to achieve since the majority of his followers neither understood nor accepted it. On the other hand many, perhaps the bulk, of those followers wanted to attack the "Christians" wherever they might be on Moroccan soil, but this was also impossible given the overwhelming strength of the European armies. It is this tension between the desirable and the possible, on the part of both ruler and people, which gives the Rif war its multi-faceted and confused appearance. Events, policies and ideas had relevance on different levels. Reform of the law was desirable from both a religious and a political point of view: it guaranteed both the functioning of the shari'ā and a centralised unity. The call to attack the Spanish, was the response to that country's immediate threat to the independence of the Rif and also a response to the deep-rooted dislike felt by many Rifis for the Christians. Unity itself, the fundamental pivot of all the political activity of the Rif war was both an organisational necessity and a desirable thing from the religious point of view. In the end, the Rif attempt to secure independence failed, and yet it was marked by considerable political, military and social achievements.

"I came before my time"

We have seen a number of reasons why the war was lost by the Rifis: the economy, the vastly superior might of the Spanish and French armies, the internal opposition to bin 'ABd al-Karīm, all these played their part.

These are not the reasons which al-Manār gives for
the failure however. Basing his remarks on the interview with bin 'Abd al-Karīm, the commentator in that journal notes the amīr's criticism of the "religious fanaticism" of his opponents and his complaints that he was not understood. The al-Manār writer accepts without question the underlying assumption of the article that the whole of the Rif war was entirely the work of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and then proceeds to attack him for his personal failure. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's reliance on European methods to defeat the Spanish, it is argued,

"weakened the great bravery of his people. He was so infatuated with the appearance of European civilisation that he wished to introduce them [European methods] in a way which weakened the spiritual strength of his people . . ."1

The author goes on to castigate bin 'Abd al-Karīm for the purely imaginary crime of wishing to emulate Atatürk, abolish the Caliphate and set up a secular state. Al-Manār was of course opposed to the very idea of such developments; but so, as we have seen, was bin 'Abd al-Karīm, for his efforts were directed towards the imposition of the sharī'a and the strengthening of Islam in the Rif. The ill-informed comments of al-Manār would not be very important in understanding the Rif war if it were not for the fact that they underline one of its most important aspects: the conflict between political desires and practical necessities. For instance, al-Manār dismisses bin 'Abd al-Karīm's remarks about religious fanaticism in the following manner:

"What Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm calls 'religious fanaticism' and what he criticises and found no way to suppress, except to copy the Kamalist Turks, is not fanaticism of religion, but ignorance which

1 Al-Manār, cited article; remarks of an unnamed commentator.
is cured not by bridling its strength, but by spreading knowledge."

This analysis completely fails to recognise that the real problem of the Rif state and of its leader was the question of time. With the Spanish on the edge of the Rif, there simply was not enough time to undertake an educational programme of the type recommended by al-Manār. It is for this reason that the Rif war does not entirely lend itself to analysis in the light of Salafiyya theory alone. Certainly the theories of that movement had some relevance to the war but there were other, more pressing, factors as well. The people had to be organised rapidly and order imposed by force, if necessary, in order to carry out the first objective, the defeat of the Spanish.

Thus it is the achievement of unity and order under a centralised authority, the creation of a state in the Rif, which becomes the outstanding achievement of the war. There can be no doubt that a state was formed in the Rif. Danziger, writing of 'Abd al-Qādir's resistance to the French in Algeria quotes a definition of "state" which applies equally to the entity headed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm:

"A body of people permanently occupying a defined territory and politically organized under a sovereign government almost entirely free from external control and possessing coercive power to maintain order in the community."\[2\]

The Rif state fulfilled all these conditions; its territory was defined, by conquest; it was politically organised with detailed administration; neither the Spanish nor any other outsider had control over its policies; its government could

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1 Ibid.
2 Webster's Third International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1971, quoted in Danziger, op. cit., p. 204.
and did use its coercive power to maintain order.

Yet what happened in the Rif between 1921 and 1926 was a new event in Moroccan history only in so far as it was a successful attempt to carry out policies which had been tried before, but which had failed. Successive Sultans had attempted to change the nature of Moroccan society and to impose the shari'a, to organise a trained and regular army, to reform the administration and to increase the authority of the central government. Only in the Rif were these objectives achieved. Thus Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and the Rifī state which he led, was a new and successful phase in a continuing process.

We are thus drawn back to the amīr's statement that "I came before my time to carry out this work but I am convinced that my desires will all be realised sooner or later, through the force of events and the reversals of time."¹ What bin 'Abd al-Karīm was trying to do was to ensure the independence of a part of Morocco. It was not a large part of that country, but all his other hopes for religious reform, social change, and development were dependent on the fulfilment of that aim. His was an aim larger than that of many, perhaps the majority of his followers, who simply aimed at independence. Nevertheless, both he and they came nearer to achieving their desires than the inhabitants of any part of Morocco, or any Moroccan leader, had done since the European threat to that country's independence had begun in the middle of the previous century. Certainly they were bound to fail at that time, for the forces of two modern European states were ranged against them. But the five years

¹ Al-Manār, cited article.
which they did survive showed how much further they had advanced down the path of organisation and unity than all the attempts that had been made before. No movement of rural resistance this; the Rif war no less than an attempt to put into effect the ideas of Islamic unity, to give practical shape to the attempted reforms of four generations of Moroccan Sultans.
Archival Material

Servicio Histórico Nacional, Madrid

Archives of the Ponencia de Africa. Contains the papers, intelligence reports, and military operations reports of the Spanish Army in Morocco. Divided into three sections representing the affairs of the Comandancias Generales of Melilla, Ceuta, and Larache. The first two have been used very extensively for this thesis, the last section --Larache--is less interesting and of less relevance.

Archives of the Ministerio de Asunto Exteriores, Madrid, Spain. Very little on the Rif war, but a certain amount on its diplomatic repercussions, scattered through many different series.

Archives of the Sección de Africa, Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, Spain. Contains the valuable collection of private papers amassed by Tomás García Figueras, a Spanish military administrator in Morocco. Many unpublished sociological and historical descriptions of individual tribes, official documents, otherwise unobtainable published material, and a large collection of newspaper cuttings.
Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris France

Maroc Nouvelle Série. Documents pertaining to the Rif war, file numbers 517-520 contain a very large selection of captured Rif documents; extremely valuable. Also files relating to "Zone Espagnole" and the files of "Afrique série K: Affaires Musulmanes"

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The Times Archives, The Times newspaper, London, United Kingdom

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Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid, Madrid, Spain. The municipal newspaper library of Madrid. In some respects rather better than the national one.

Hemeroteca Municipal de Ceuta, Ceuta, North Africa, contains an incomplete selection of the Spanish newspapers of that city and the Jibāla.

Biblioteca Municipal de Melilla, Melilla, North Africa contains the full collection of El Telegrama del Rif.

Other libraries used were the Bibliothèque Nationale du Maroc, Rabat, Morocco; The Archives Nationales du Maroc, Rabat, Morocco; the British Library, London and Boston Spa, Yorkshire, United Kingdom; and the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, United Kingdom.

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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cab Reb 1913-1927</td>
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<td>Intervención Militar de Larache</td>
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Maps

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The documents reproduced here are a selection of some of the more interesting letters and records referred to in this thesis. It was impossible to reproduce every Arabic document referred to, so the selection is only an illustration of the range of documentation that was available. A number of internal Rif documents—prison registers, payment sheets and bureaucratic communications are included, as specimens of their types. Each document is transcribed—in so far as they are legible, with the exception of lists of names which are just reproduced in photocopies. Where a translation does not appear in the text, one is attached here.

In dealing with these documents it must be born in mind that they were written not by highly educated faqīhs, but for the most part by semi-educated people. The writing and the grammar are consequently not all that might be desired. In some cases they are quite unreadable, even to Moroccan Arabs from the area. Mr. Muḥammad al-Manṣūr, from the Jibāla, has given me great assistance in this matter, but even he found certain expressions impossible to decipher.

Furthermore, the writers had a tendency to abbreviate certain words, particularly titles: thus تاک (qā'īd) is rendered ٌ, and الحجاج (al-ḥajj) is rendered ٌ. The original has been transcribed as accurately as possible. In the case of wild mis-spellings which might lead to confusion, the correct version has been added in brackets.
Document 1

The mahalla of Tisutṭin to 'Abd al-Qādir bin al-Ḥājj al-Ṭayyib and the tribe of Banū Shikār, translated by Spanish Army 27 July 1921.

Source: SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Julio

See above, p. 327.

Transcription

الحمد لله رحمة...

وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد واله...

كانت إخوئنا بين مكار الشعراء عبد القادر طيب...

والشيخ محمد إبراهيم و كذلك إخوئنا (...). كبير وصغير اسلام على...

الله تعالى برزته عن تيد وارتاء إجده وذكره و بعد خوئنا تجهم...

كونوا على بال وتنظروا وقوف الجد والإجتهاد الآن ساحة...

السلمين ولا نظروا بالآخرية لأن ذات واحد وحجكم إخوئنا...

كونوا على بال وانتهاء في باب الجهاد كما قال الله العظيم...

وهدوا بموالك وانفسكم الى بالأية واما إخوئنا السلمين...

فلا تزروا احد شبه واقتراح شهم وثبت شمل اقتملهم...

واحدهم ولا تناوا عليهم حتى نقطع اثرهم وعلم نظروا في بابنا...

برق الله ورسوله ملتئما ان شاء الله مدينة مليلة وكونوا ذاتا...

وأحدها وهذا ما نعمله على صحيم والسلام نحن قاطنين بجلتنا...

السيدة في نزوطون...

من أذن إخوئنا الذين قبيلة...

بني ورجل ومن بعده من القبائل اسم الله...

إِيَٰبِسُ
Translation

Praise be to God alone and God's blessing be on our lord Muhammed and his family.

To all of our brothers in the Banū Shikār including the Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir Wuld al-Ḥājj al-Ṭayyib and the Shaykh Muḥammad Azamānī and all your brothers great and small. Peace be upon you and the mercy and blessing of God may he be exalted. [This letter is written] upon the stipulation of our Lord may God help him and make him victorious.

To continue:

Oh our brothers! Be on your guard, be ready to make your stand upright with firmness and diligence for the hour of happiness has arrived for the Muslims. Do not imagine any other path [is open to you] because [Muslims should be] as one person. We wish that you, oh our brothers, should be attentive and passionate in carrying out the jihād. As the great God has said, "Make holy war with your possessions and your bodies and so on." As for your brother Muslims, do not harm a single one of them, but the unbelievers, may God destroy them and scatter them, them you should kill, them you should flatten into the ground. Do not [hold back from] them until you have removed every trace of them. We know and think in our hearts that, with the agreement of God and his Prophet we shall meet [you], God willing, in the city of Melilla and that you will be as one body. This is what we have to tell you and your companions. And peace.

We are staying in the fortunate mahalla in
Tizṭūṭin [sic].

On the order of your brothers the mujāhidīn of the tribe of Banū Waryaghal and those who follow them from the other tribes May God protect them. Amen.

On the reverse:

To the Sayyid ‘Abd al-Qādir bin al-Ḥājj al-Ṭayyīb al-Shukrī. May God protect him.
عالی، همکاری مازاد فاکتورهای مختلفی را برای مطالعه و بررسی ارژنیها و تاثیرات آنها در کاهش آب‌های زمین و تغییرات آب‌های آتشفشانی و در اثراتی که بر روی محیط زیست و بهبود اقتصادی و اجتماعی کشور می‌گذارد، بهره‌برداری می‌کنیم.

بعتید، اهمیت منابع طبیعی و محیط زیست در حفظ خانواده شاخص و بهبود اقتصادی کشور می‌باشد. این منابع شامل آب‌های سطحی و زیرزمینی، اقلیم و اقلام موجود در محیط زیست، نیروگاه‌ها و ارگانیسم‌های موجود در محیط زیست می‌باشد. بهبود اقتصاد و اجتماع کشور می‌تواند به‌وسیله همکاری و همکاری در علم و علوم، به‌وسیله تغییرات اقتصادی و اجتماعی در محیط زیست و به‌وسیله بهبود اقتصاد و اجتماع کشور می‌باشد.
Document 2

14 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1339/19 August 1921.
Source: MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 250.

See above, p. 365.
الحمد لله رحمه / صلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وسلم تسليماً

أحياناً في الله والجاهدين في سبيل الله السيد محمد بن السيد عبد
الكريم امك كرمان وسلام عليهم ورحمة الله

وكراته وعند كتكا لكر في هذا ولم يظهر الجواب ولا الخفي الذي
ذهب بالكتاب وكنا في انتظار جواكم /

وأما أنه ارسل لنا بعض أعيان ورقة الكتاب التي تتكلم نسخة منه

طية فكان الكتاب حققة /

وكتباكم ولا نظين ذلك نكم فما كان هذا إجازة نكم بعد وقنا /

هذه العدة الطويلة في /

باب الجهاد، وإن كان ليس بتكدم بل هوي ضرور أعلمنا بذلك لتعلمنا

الذي ارسله لنا لينال /

العنتية الازمة له لاجل توزيره على لسان المجاهدين مثل هذا الكتاب وإعلانا إنه لم

يعلم كتاب نحن لا إله إلا الله طلبتنا من ورقة وكنا نظن أننا وافقتين إمام العدو /

ساعين في جمع القبائل والتاليف بينهم لكون من القائدة إذا هاجم العدو هذه البلاد /

في يوم من الأيام وإن علنا هذا يعجب كل سلم عامي والوا في نحن ان

الأمر على خلاف ذلك /

وقد تمكن أصحاب الفرنسيين من نشر دسائسهم وتضليل القبائل للعصابون

وتفريق هذه /

العملية الإسلامية كما يفعل ولد الدرازلي وغيره وأنا لله وانا اليه راجعين

وقد عيبت /

من معاناة أمو القبائل الذين لا يغزوا بين الشر والنزعة والحسن وليست ولو /

وتجد أن تكون مغزلاً عن هذا الأمر كليها لما كرهت في ذلك وكون

الراحلة ليست ولن

هو مشاغل في س ر من جبالة أو من الزيف ويظهر لي حينئذ ان

اربط في الريف / أو في جبالة أو غير ذلك نسأ الله أن يغزها /

وعن جميع المسلمين كل الحرب والسلام في 14 (؟) ذي /

حجة الحرام عام 1339

عبد الملك بن الإمام

عبد القادر الشيخ الدين

ابن الله
Translation

Praise be to God alone. God's blessing be on our Lord Muḥammad his family and companions and his complete peace.

To our beloved in God, the fighters for his faith and the Faqih Muḥammad bin al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Karīm may God protect you and keep you. Peace be upon you and the Mercy of God and his blessing.

And to continue:

We have written to you before and have received no reply, nor has the makhzānī (i.e., soldier) whom we sent with the letter returned. We have been waiting for your reply. Meanwhile some of the ā'yān of the Wargha sent a letter to us, a copy of which we enclose. If this letter is in truth from you—and we do not think that you would do such a thing—then we are not well rewarded by you for the great length of time in which we have carried out holy war. If the letter is not from you then you must tell us, so that we may inform you about who sent it and he may thus receive his necessary punishment for his forgery of the (true) voice of the mujāhidīn of which this letter is an example.

You should know that we have never received any letter from you calling on us to form a ḥarka in the Wargha or for any other reason. We thought we would hold ourselves ready against the enemy, attempting to join the tribes together and to unit them so that they would be of use on the day when the enemy attacked this area. What we have done in this matter has impressed every right-thinking
Muslim, so you should let us know at once if you think we should have done anything different. The supporters of the French have been able to spread their deceptions and arouse the tribes' longing for disobedience, and to break this Islamic federation. One who has done this is the son of al-Darqāwī and others. We (on the other hand) belong to God and to him we shall return. I came to my wits' end [(trying to) sort out tribes when they are unable to distinguish between what is and what is not to their advantage, and between what is good and bad. If you think that I should give up all these affairs, because I find it distasteful, (that is) I or anyone else who is active either in the Rif or Jibāla, tell me at once so that I may go to live in the Rif or Jibāla or somewhere else.

We ask God that he may set us and all Muslims free from all war.

And peace.

On 14 (?) Dhū al-Ḥijja al-Ḥarām in the year 1339.

ʿAbd al-Mālik bin al-Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir Maḥŷī al-Dīn, may God protect him.
Document 3

Letter "all the a'yan of the Wargha" to 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ḥabīb al-Fannāsī, 10 Jumāḍa II 1341/28 January 1923.

Source: SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, 2, Marnisa y Wargha.

The translation of this document appears above, p. 488.

Transcription

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله عليه سيدنا محمد وآله
حضرت أختنا عبد السلام بن الحبل الناسى عليه السلام والرحمة الربكة على
الدرء وبكر الله فيه على الخديمة الذي نعلمه مع قبائل ورغة من
الكتب والفجوع كانوا عند هم فيه النية الكبيرة وكتب نقل عضبا
أحسن من جميع الأئناس ونذكر الله نحن لا معرفة لنا بها وهي كذلك أيضا
عرفنا حتى سمعت الناس معرفتنا جرث في جميع البلاد ودليلنا للسلام
والخوات مع الريف وحبنا في اصبعي وأئنت عنا الفنان ووقع القتال
ودخلنا في بلد بني وبيغ الشبع الساجين اصبعي وقضت الفتاة والبيع رفع
عبد الكريم صاحب وصديق وحبيني اصبعي حيث فعل السباب في اصبعي حتى سمعه
البدو ونحن نحن نحن نحن مجمع جزء بالفضحة وضح القيادة ونادي لنا الفرنسيين
يعيننا ويتقبل لنا هذا الدولة تعني بها البيع جزءا ولد الكريم بلا

موال بسبب اصبعي علنا على حبيب وولد عبد الكريم وحزنا فيشل ورغة
بذل الله أهواه هذا حقنا على اصبعي خيرنا عمل لنا هذا وقبل هذا ضكروا
(ذكر يا لنا الفرنسي)

بين تركه الدولة المعظمه ..! اصبعي دولة اليوحن ذلك اليم عزنا كلبم
نماحة لنا وكذلكل ككلم احمابك كذب لنا هذا جزءا وذلك لعلم بك
لا قدرة لك في هذه الساحة والسلام في عشرة من جماي الاعلم واحد واربعين
كلاثأة والف

كافة اعيان ورغة

ابنهم الله
لا يوجد نص طبيعي يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
The bay'a of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm dated 14 Jumādā II 1341/2 February 1923.


The translation of this document appears on pp. 514-518.

Unfortunately, this document is too large to be reproduced as a photograph and remain legible, and would not photocopy because it is of very uneven quality.

Transcription

الحمد لله وصللي الله على سيدنا محمد وصليح الحمد لله الذي نظم بالخليفة شمل الدين والدنيا اوعلى قدرها على كل قدر كانت لها الدرجة العليا وأشرقت ضمها في العالم وانار بئره

العالم وأصلح بها أمر المعاش المعاد والفاتح بين قلوب العباد من الحاضر العباد وجعلها صنعا للدماء والأموال والأعراض وقل بها ادي الجبايرة

فلنصل إلى فساعد الاغشية

فقام بها امر الخلق والاستناج. وثبت الشرائع والحدود والإحكام. ونصب مارها علما هاديا. وإقامة الحق دايا. فأوار انظمة الريف.

النفي والضعيف الصقف والترف. فسجد / من قر نهدى ولم يرئ الإنسان سدي. بل امر بهما وتجربة من اتباع هواه. ووطّه القمي بالنفل والفرض. وهو الحكم الحكيم. ولولا دفع الناس بعضهم ببعض قدست الأرض ولاك الله ذو نفل على العالمين.

ومن رحتم نصب الملك وسبت الطريق للسير والسلام ولتوتر الانفراد. لأكل بعضهم بعضًا. وإذ الامر الحزاب النفا. لولا الخلافة لم توبن لنا سبيل وكل

والصلاة والسلام على اليم بعد رحمة الله تأم الوجود وبيتاه وماك كالمان وستهاء. رضد الاوليا. وقاد الأشياء.

على الله أولى الجد العليم والقدر الغني. وأصها. 

به الرشدين. الهدى المهدرين. شدرا أركان الدين وهمدوا قراءه للشديد. واحيرا عنهما واستروا عليه صلى الله عليه وسلم. إنه قال:

ان الله اختيس هذا الأمر خشية

وإنزل الله عليه وأبوه يبني ملك من بنيأ. القائل من مات وليس في عنه بيعة

مابه جاهلية. وفي صحيح مسلم عنه صلى الله عليه وسلم قال من أراد

ان يفرق أمر هذه امة.

وهو جميع نافرونا عنه بالسيف. كنا من كان. وفي صحيح مسلم عنه صلى الله عليه وسلم قال من أراد

وهذين نافرونا عنه بالسيف كنا من كان. وفي صحيح مسلم عنه صلى الله عليه وسلم قال من أراد
وفي صحيح البخاري عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنه قال: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم من كره من أمره شيئاً فليس بالله من يخرج عن السلطان شرًا. ميتة جاهلة، وفيه أيضًا.

وعن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه قال: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم من أطاع الله، ومن أطاعه أطاع الله، ومن عصى الله، فقد عصى صاعًة.

قال أمير الموت اليوم، على الخطاب رضي الله عنه، لا يعقل على ولاية أمير عبد الحجيرة.

واعتق الإبة الدين على أن نصب الأمام، واحتد على المسلمين، وأن كان من فرض الكتابة كما أن القيام بذلك من الواجبات مما دل عليهنصوص الإحاديث والآثار.

وقال الشاعر، لما يبلغ الناس فرضي لا سرأ لهم، لا سرأ إذا جعلهم سادوا، ولا كان يبالي في وجه الجبال قبل هذا يعذب في غاية من العروض والعبء.

وكلمة الجهيل والطغيان والعدوان، ونبر الشريعة في غاية الانحراف والإبعاد.

وعظم الظلم بين العباد، حتى تعززت المعاشرة من كان ذا الشركة في البلاد.

واجتاز على العصب.

والقتل والسلب على ما عذبهم من عظيم الفتق والاهزاء، حيًا لا يلبغ.

ولا مترك لهم إلا ما يتهمهم من قبل أن يكون أو لا يفعلون دراهم وطبلة من يقدر يبادرهم على سبيل استيابة. فاجمعوا راهب واسندوا أمرهم بالله.

الله السما والارض، إلى من أحد فخار في البيضة طلبة والعرض. فاجتمعوا، لم órgão وقاص. وحشوا ولا على متابعة شريعة الرسول. الذي بروها كل ملول. بعدما أخذ عليهم في المصفح الممكت ورخصة المواقف والمهجر.

فأمس

عليها 1000 000 بمقتملاً، ثم نظمهم وظلمهم كيفية الحرب والدفاع.

من الوطن وحدهم الحجم على عيان الأسباب والثواب. فاستمروا، بالحرفة في عدوهم في حين تاصروا في وقعتهم على ظهيرهم ولد يografía بما جاء بهم واتهم به من 000 العجز، ولا ضعفهم ما تحسن به من الشكل.

(end of line missing)

ذيل كل وصاروا من جملة قول كان مسجد من باد ذلك وهو في ملك كل يمر في نبات فتجاعيد أمرهم هذا ابن الله عشروا على السعادة. وامتثال العباه.

الصرد

اخذوا في الانحراف الراية، وفي تهديدات بلداؤهم حصنوا على الغابة. وما علم ذلك عن العلمي والداني، ولم يجدوه وحد من جنس الإنسان، ومستكبه مستكفاً.

لنير النهار، كيف يبج في الإدكش، إذا اجتاز النهار إلىدل.

ثم لا حمل لهم الأمان في النفوس ولا الايماء. كأنها في غاية نور والمزيد.

وأنا العزاب والنجاة والهنا، على احسن المراد، و (000) وتلاهى ما ما كان معتاداً بينهم في عابر الأزمان من النفس، من القتال والسلب ضروب.

الحن واحد في افظاعهم.
جميع تياران الفتن • ونفس الله عن الكريات • ونشرحته وأزعج لغته • وصارت القلوب دامعة بعد بوسها والوجه ضاحكة بعد عوضه والدور والتن • بينهم قد أدرت • وأعلام الأمل والعافية قد ابتلت • فوجه الله جيوش المسلمين للإيام المرتفعة • والبه من لام يلاح الدنيا والدين الزاغ والروحية فاقتضى • النظور وأتعتقد الأتباع ببيعة • ففي أفق السعادة قد طلعت • وظهرت ساء المعارف • هدير والزغ • الذي القت الله الأمة زعما • وقدت الاشتد للمثل • الأمة • من جاء له الخلافة تجذب أيا • واخذوا دون أضا • (اضاع) زمانه • ولم تكد • (تعد) تخلى الله لم يكن يملح ألا • بمن جديت كلب الخلق • على محبته • والقي اللقب في الإسلام •

لحده ولولوته أمير الجهادين • الوافد به المعين • سيدنا محمد بن العالم الفاضل سيدنا عبد الكريم الخطابي الرسولي الرفيق • فباعوا مع الله ونصره • على كتاب الله وسنة النزول • واقعة الخدال الذي هوجاعة الحاجم • بيئة التزمنة الأقل والاتس • سعت اليها الاقدام والرسو خاضعة مدعية • لا يخرجون •

لم الطاعة ولا يخرجون •

عن مبع الجماعة على ما بيعت به مولانا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم والخلاف • الرافدين من بعده • وعلى سمع والطاعة • نزرت بها نواضهم • وشهدت بذلك على • صنف بواطنهم ضراهم • واطحوا بها سلطة إبداعهم وأيضواها بينها في السر والمجر والمشتر • وكبر وفاسع عليهم • وأعمالهم عليهم •凱لاني ما بيعت وخلدنا تلسلنا • بالعدل والمسيرة • والرفقة والصدق • وتحكم بيننا بالحق كما قال تعالى لنبيه في حكم •

وجيه •

جوبل خليفة في الأرض ناك • بين الناس بالحق • وقال تعالى ووقت الحق • ومن أوى بما • عهد عليه الله في نزوله جرará غضبا • وقال تعالى لا تكون للخانين خصا • أجمع عليه •

العقل /

والفق • وأصحاب الكلام فيما قال ول جول • ومن يوصف بعلم وفنا • ومن يرجب إليه في رد وأضا • ولم يخفف فيهم اسم مجد ولا خطيب ولا ذر التي يعلم • لا من •

بجعيد /

في رأي فيضتي • وصبي • لا يعرف بدين وصالح • ولا فرسان حرب وتفاح • ولا ولاء الأمو والحكام • ولا من السادات الأشراف • ولا غيرها • من الخفاف •

قدرو من أن •

شهد بذلك الجامع على انفسهم طوا • وإذوا اللهم تعلى موابجه عليهم شرعا • وجعلها الله رحمته على الخلق • واقام بها في البيضاء العدل والحق وأيد بعده •

والقياس /

ولا تقويءه وتبديده /

من تلقاها الناس • وأحيا له سنة سيدنا وولانا الرسول صلى الله وسلم شرف كرم • فبهما لا ينتج • وأذونا من الله • ألي من يحب حلا • وحق دما • ويبت /

عذا • ويدفع ردًا • ونصر الشيعة بشيد مبنا • نصر الله ونصره وأمات البعد • والضلالية نسر • ودره شيعة الجهر والغير والفساد • وأبي الخلافة •

في بيته إلى يوم التقاد الألك • رأوا أولًا بذلك تقدير • وانت تم البالي زمن •
النصير، ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي الكبير، وعلى الله وعلى سيدينا محمد وصلى الله عليه وسلم طيبلاً واعظاً

بينما أتاني الحد للرب العلمين كتبه في كتاب بدأ 4 جمادي الثاني 1341

عبد ربه محمد بن علي الخماري الرافي رفعت الله
عبد ربه علي بن الحاج محمد الحزباري رفعت الله
بلقاسم بن عبد الغادر النجحي الحسني الله ولله
عبد ربه بن الحاج عبد الرحمن اليعضوي
محمد بن الحاج الملاح وفق الله
شحيب بن ميمون ابن علال الوزاني الوصفي
محمد بن محمديين النسباني

٢٢٤٤٤٤
٢٢٤٤٤٤
٢٢٤٤٤٤
Document 5

Announcement of majlis al-'umma not to accept nomination of Minister of Justice, 27 Jumāda II 1341/15 January 1923.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 34.

This document is translated in chapter IX, p. 529.

Transcription

الحمد لله وحده لا شريك له ووعت الظاهرة والمشاركة في مجلس الامة راجمة
للسيد محمد بن علي الذي هو رئيس الثاني قائلًا هن الذي يتولى الظاهرة
العدلية هو الشهيد العالم سيد محمد أحمد الحسن فاجيا كله. بعدم
قبول وتحري على الواضح ضرفه بالاشتراك في عدم قبوله لتولي
شهادتي عالم الامير الأعظم أباد الله عزه ونصره في سبعة وثرين
من جمادى الأولى عام واحد وأربعين وثلاثين وألف وعشر
شعب بن احمد
الحططي
أمين
الدروس ومراكز فنية ومتحف ومركز للثقافة وعلماء في العالم: 

السياحة: ما هو المكان؟ كيف يمكن للدولة أن تتحول مراكز السياحة 

بالفعلية: فلنا المفاهيم العليا للسياحة والمصالح، ولكن هناك الكثير من أوائل الأماكن بعيدًا عن فوغل ومريام للاستفادة من هذه الأماكن في عهد فوغل الذين ينشؤون فيها شعوبًا للسياحة في العالم. بمثابة إضافة لاعบาท للسياحة، وشريحة من السياح وشريحة من السياح...
Letter of nomination of Aḥmad al-Wajdīrī as qādī of Rabāʿa al-Fawqānī, signed by Muḥammad bin al-Ṣāliḥ.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 185

See above, p. 530.

Transcription

Translation

My Lord,

In accordance with the duty to maintain the laws, and in consideration of the importance of the department of justice in this country, the Minister of Justice whose signature appears below, considers it fitting that the excellent Faqīḥ Sīdī Aḥmad al-Wajdīrī al-Timsamānī should be appointed qādī in the Rabāʿ al-Fawqānī in Timsamān. It is this that I have the honour to lay before your highness. And peace.

23 Ramaḍān 1934

Muḥammad bin al-Ṣāliḥ, may God be kind to him.
بيان الأدلة الجبهية الحربية في الخمسون و_Action_، النزاعات الأخيرة في إسطبل الإعداد
بحضرته العيد. نزلت إعترافات الدلائل الكبار، إسهامًا بريئًا في
الإجابة على جميع الاتهامات بلا إلحاح. تسلمت من هزايم أخرى
أمام هزايم很难 أن نفهم مع طي عين كلاً من
والد عام 25 رمضان عام 1342 شمس رمضان

ن倒霉

قرار في عام الفضيلة محاكمة،
صالح النموذج في أحمد المريد، يسر
حلته بتحديداً في لواء قاعري، الشعري
تهامان

23 رمضان 1342
1942 (14 شباط 1942)
Document 7

Unsigned letter of appointment issued by the mahakma of al-Muzimma dated 29 Jumada II 1342/6 February 1924.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 196.

The translation appears in Chapter IX, pp. 530-531.

Transcription

الحمد لله ورحمة

تحية النبية

يعلم أن كتبنا هذا اسماء الله وعز أميرنا، انا بحول الله ورغبة عينا

الماضي الأمجد مجد بن عمر العبداني اسنا من امانتنا برغبة

والواقع عليه يعمل بمقتضا ولا يتحدا والسلام في 29 جانفي 1342
فيفار ولا م escapتة وة اكتراها سماشة انتداب المياه و انتداب جنوب الروافد، عينت
البلاط 1148، جلب غير النثرات لأعيان يديه، مرتبة من انتداباً لبورغن
والرفاع عليه بيد مختصة، ولا بسعلا، والسكاكين، ولا العمل عام 1342.
Document 8

List of artillerymen and payments:
15 Muḥarram 1341/7 September 1922
3 Šafar 1341/25 September 1922
6 Šafar 1341/28 September 1922
7 Šafar 1341/29 September 1922

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 81-82.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>نشانه</th>
<th>توضیحات</th>
<th>مقدار</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>هزینه ساخت ایستگاه برق</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>هزینه برق</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>هزینه توزیع برق</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>هزینه پاسخگویی به شرایط فیزیکی</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>هزینه تعمیرات و سیستم‌های جانبی</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>هزینه مرمت و درمان</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>هزینه مصرف برق</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>هزینه سواک</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**خلاصه:**

بنابراین، هزینه کل ایستگاه برق 150,000 تومان می‌باشد.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>آماره‌های مربوط به صنعت پنبه در سال 1341</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ملیه‌تیم ملکیت پنبه در سال</td>
<td>18.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. علی‌الله سراجی</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. علی‌الله سراجی</td>
<td>26.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. علی‌الله سراجی</td>
<td>27.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. علی‌الله سراجی</td>
<td>28.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. علی‌الله سراجی</td>
<td>29.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**اجمله:**

به هر حال، مکاتبات مربوط به عفاف و نیک‌کاری توانسته‌اند مسعود رحمان را به درستی معرفی کنند.
Document 9

Sadīq b. al-Shadli to Maḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Karīm,
21 Ramaḍān 1342/28 April 1924.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 520, p. 109
See above, p. 557.

Transcription

الحمد لله وحده وسل الله على سيدنا مجد وله/جلالة سيدنا الخليفة الامام البر يـالصالح الامير/الإسلامية، والدائرن عن الوطن البطل المغوار سيد محمد/بن سيد محمد الكرم رفع الله تدركم وأبد معدكم ومجلكم وسلام على/جناكم الرفيق ورحة الله عن خير مولانا الود بالله وبعد/وصل عمدا للمحكمة محمد بن الكيف الروانى وطلبتها الكتابة/لجلالكم لأجل البشر صالح الطريق الكفيف بها وعدو/ريد البشر (العنتر) والميزي، وستة مطقات (؟) وشرين من اليداء/وشرى من الآيات زيادة على ما تحته ريد حراج الخبز/الشريف لان الطريق في بقية سمعة (؟) فيها كن الـ اجر وولما/الحركات الذكرى فلا يمكن التعلم بالطريق كالمزمون صيدنا/وأضا ريد البتروبة البيضاء اول الكحلا ريد اني كتب/بحرف كبيرة على كل ادارة كتاب محكمة النوبة وإدارة/سيدنا و velitه ادارة ناظر الاحرية الى اوخر الحاصل (؟) والاحصل)/لا بد من تقنين ما ذكرناه لجلالكم على نامه ودمم/بخير والسلام في 21 وفان عام 1342/سدى بن الشدلى اسم الله.

and written lengthways on the left side:

ونجوا من جلالكم ان تعلموا يوم تأسيس/محكمة النوبة يعني تاريخها/جناكم الرفيق ورحة الله عن خير مولانا الود بالله بعده.

There are a number of dialect words or words of uncertain origin which need to be explained. For some reason the writer seems to have used ْمِرَة (a ruler). This makes it probable that the word ْمِرَة is in fact a Moroccanisation (in the plural) of the French word "pelle" meaning "shovel". The same process has happened with the Spanish word "pintura" (paint) which is rendered ْبِنَطُورَة ْمِرَة here.
Translation

Praise be to God alone and God's mercy be on our Lord Muḥammad and his family.

His majesty our Lord the khalīfa the most fortunate, the man who devotes himself to the affairs of the Muslims, who directs (our) heroic and audacious country, Sīdī Maḥammad bin Sīdī 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī may God increase his power and make eternal his happiness and glory. Peace be upon your exalted person and the mercy of God be upon our worthy lord the beloved of God.

And to continue.

Muḥammad bin al-Makkī al-Wazzānī came to us in the maḥākma and asked us to write to your majesty about matters (connected with) the repair of roads for which he is responsible. He wants a ruler and a set of scales and six (explosive charges?——illegible) and twenty shovels and twenty machines (——illegible) in addition to the tools belonging to the noble makhzān which he already has, because the road in the Buqquya is very difficult with many stones in it. Unless he receives the above mentioned equipment it will be impossible to set the road to rights quickly as our lord has ordered. Also, he wants paint, both black and white. He wants to write in big letters on (the door of) each office like the door of the maḥākma of al-Muzīmma and the office of our lord and his khalīfa and the office of the Minister for War, etc. In short, you must supply everything that we have mentioned. May you stay well.

And peace.

21 Ramaḍān 1342, Ṣadīq b. al-Shadlī, may God protect him.
(written on left hand side)

We ask your majesty to inform us of the exact day on which the mahakma of al-Muzimma is set up, that is to say, the date.
ملاحظه: این نسخه به‌طور کامل نمایش نمی‌دهد و فقط برخی از متن‌ها را نشان می‌دهد. برای مشاهده متن کامل، لطفاً کپی و پasting این نسخه را انجام دهید.
الحمد لله ائتمر واعترف وأشهد على نفسه أحمد بن علي بن عمر السبع المشروان

السلامة لدى شهدته اتبعه هو رؤية أحمد بن حم مفتاح العال البشيت

ورقة بشت أحمد بن عمر الحجر الزنجل على تكل زوجها عبر بن أحمد بن عمر الحجر

الزنجل ابنهم دخلوا عليه لداره إذ يضاء الأرث أحمد وزوجته رقية المذكرة قضت معه

بدية اللحن محمد وهو واقف في الباب وزكوه ميتا لا ريح فيه ولا . من غير

شهبة بينهما ولا من حظام الدنيا ولا غيرها انذاذًا لا يأخذ زوجته المذكرة في

سمع الاعتراف المذكور طائع لا يكره قد بذلك شهادتهما سؤلت منه في خمس عشر

من شعبان الابراك عام أربعة وأربعين وثلاثمائة واله عبد ربه ...

(Reverse)

الحمد لله وحده حيث ائتمر أحمد بن عليل المذكور حوله سفك دم أخيه

السلم المهاجر في سبيل الله

اعمار بن أحمد المزجلي وهو مصم الدنيا فان الدنيا تعالوا حتى تكل الموت والمعاده

بغير الحق فإن القتل أبطال القصر قد لم يوجد وترك القاتل زوجا عن القتل

ينتك في القتل تماما تقليل التكل وهو من تكل طال ينكل في القصاص حيزة

يا لولي الباب .... لعلكم تقوي وترفع الكثير الحلم لان في قتله

رغم ضرعن المسلمين وعليه ثبت ان القتل على كان سوءات

والوحي عليكم الندم فلا ام يتقين من قال صاحب النفاية.

우의 보기에는 숫자가 포함되어 있습니다.

또한, 이 문서는 영문으로 작성되어 있지만, 이는 인공지능의 오류로 인해 발생할 수 있습니다.
Translation

Praise be to God.

Ahmad bin 'Ali bin 'Umar al-Saba'i al-Mashrawani of the (Banu) Bū Salāma declared and admitted and bore witness against himself in front of two witnesses that he made an agreement with his companion Muḥammad bin Ḥammu Muftāḥ al-‘Ayyāshi al-Bashbatī and Ruqiyā bint Ahmad bin ‘Amar al-Ḥajar al- Wanjalī to kill her husband ‘Amar bin Ahmad bin ‘Amar al-Ḥajar al-Wanjali. They entered his house and the first man Ahmad and the wife Ruqiyā already mentioned stabbed him. He was caught with the knife of the second man, Muḥammad, in his possession. The latter was standing at the door. They left him (i.e., the husband) with no breath or life in him. There can be no doubt about their responsibility. The crime was not done for the trappings of this world or for any other reason except that he should take his said wife. Those who heard the said declaration (affirm that it was given) willingly and not through coercion. Their testimony to this effect was recorded without it being demanded from them. On 15 of blessed Sha‘ban in the year 1344. The servant of his God (two illegible signatures follow).
Below

Praise be to God. The second man mentioned above, Muḥammad bin Ḫaḍhum al-Baṣḥatī denied that he intended anything except to do something with the wife which was unpleasing to God and his Prophet. As for the murder he knew nothing, nor did he know anything about the knife with which he was stabbed. But it was his (knife). The above mentioned wife said and herself bore witness that he (the murderer) came in and captured her and he gagged her mouth at night and she screamed and cried. And those who heard what each of them said recorded what they had said on the date given above.

The servant of his God (two illegible signatures follow).

On the reverse of the sheet

Praise be to God alone. The declaration of Aḥmad bin ‘All the above mentioned has been proved. He is responsible for shedding the blood of his brother Muslim who has emigrated in the cause of God, ‘Amar bin Aḥmad al-Wanjallī who was protected from the law of blood feud because God, may He be exalted, forbade the killing of a man who has made a covenant, a believer without cause. Indeed killing is the ruination of what was intended to be the aim of creation, and He ordained that the killer should be killed, as a discouragement to murder, so that killing (a murderer) should be a punishment that reduces (the number) of murders. He forbade it saying, may He be exalted, You will find life through this punishment, Oh keeper of the gate . . . (illegible) perhaps you will be strong. He ordained the killing of unbelievers who were fighting (Muslims) because killing them is the removal of a threat to the Muslims.
Traces of the murder were found on him in that his outer garment and shirt had blood on it. The Imām must therefore punish him. The author of the Tufḥa says a murder (may be proved) by finding the culprit with the marks of the killing clearly upon him, and also by his own declaration. And he said "I killed him so that I might take his wife and go with her to the city of unbelievers and marry her." Knowing this there can be no pardon for the killing, because he assassinated his brother Muslim (literally, "exile in God's cause"). It was announced that the pardon of the relatives of the dead man, all of them or some of them, is not valid or of any use valid in a case of assassination and fighting because the death penalty for it is one of the laws of God which may not be set aside. Al-Jazūlī said "the definition of assassination is that it should be treacherous and be done for money or a wife." Al-Zarqānī said "It is killing by subterfuge." He said in his Risāla, There is no pardon for assassination. Al-Jazūlī said "It [i.e., pardon] is not a matter for the man who has been attacked nor for the saints, nor for the Imām, but is the prerogative of God, may he be exalted.

That is enough of this enumeration. And God, may he be exalted, is wiser and more just than anyone else.

We have written this in disturbed circumstances and without being able to consult (legal) sources because of the difficulty of obtaining books.

Muḥammad b. ʿAmar al-Miḍārī May God protect him.

Amen.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
Document 11

Letter from Muḥammad b. Minūn al-Timmītī al-Saʿīdī to Maḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm, 5 Rajab 1342/11 February 1924.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 47.

The translation of this document appears in Chapter IX, p. 573.

Transcription

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله علیه وسلم وسلاطنا ووالانا محد واللحم缺点

الحمد لله ورحمة وبركاته وحده ومحمد بن عبد الكريم / الخطايب السلام عليك ورحمة الله وبركاته بما بعد سيدي / لملك ابن حد برك التميمي القاطن بإشانة فانه اخرج / بالتحقيق فانه يقدم ابن حد سيدي بعد ولياقته مع تحديد / في غرائين لن بركة الله وخبره بجميع احوال هذه الناحية / وقد اخبره بالطياره الوجود عند سيدنا ووصفها له كزينا / بيضا وخبره بجميع احوال هذه النواحي فانه جاسوس / بالتحقيق فانه اصابته في على رتبته واحده / وظف الاعلام لجنب سيدنا وسلم في 5 رجب الفرد عام 1342 / فان محمد بن سليمان التميمي السعيدي وفتوالله
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Document 12

List of prisoners held at AjdIr on 27 Ramadān 1342/4 May 1924.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 146.
Document 13

Sa'id bin al-Qa'id al-Sharif to Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim, 6 Rajab 1344/20 January 1926.

Source: MAEF, Maroc 519, p. 134.

See above, p. 805.

Transcription

الحمد لله وحده وصلى على سيدنا محمد وآله 
في 6 من رجب عام 1344 
جلالة سيدنا محمد بن سيدى عبد الكريم دام علاه وحده ونخره وناموره 
السلام عليك ورحمة تعمك وفضل جانبيك وأحسن بينه وكره رضوعك 
وعدل فلا علام ليديناء 

ام تخدم في مخز الكنزين الشريف 
وطلب اجرتها ما وجب لها في 

ثالثة أشهر والسلام 
خدم الكنزين السعيد 
بن تآ الشريف

Translation

Praise be to God alone and God's blessing bon on our lord Muhammad and his family.

6 Rajab 1344

To His majesty our lord Muhammad ibn Sidi 'Abd al-Karim.

May his rank and glory and honour and authority be prolonged.

Peace be upon you and (God's) mercy embrace you and cover your person, and may he make the meadows of your pastures fertile with his blessing and generosity.

To continue: This is to inform our Lord of the following.

My mother has worked in the bakery of the honourable makhzan (following word unclear) and she requests the pay that is owing to her for three months.

And peace.

The servant of the makhzan, Sa'id bin al-Qa'id al-Sharif.
لا يوجد نص قابل للقراءة من الصورة المقدمة.