A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE OPPOSITION OF THE
RĪFĪ CONFEDERATION LED BY MUHAMMAD BIN 'AED AL-KARĪM
AL-KHATĪB TO SPANISH COLONIAL EXPANSION IN NORTHERN MOROCCO
1920-1925, AND ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Volume I

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the course and political action of the war in the Rif mountains in northern Morocco between 1921 and 1926.

After the declaration of a joint Franco-Spanish Protectorate over Morocco in 1912, the Spanish army attempted to impose its authority over the part of north Morocco which was included in its zone. After the end of the First World War the Spanish were opposed in their efforts by a slowly growing coalition of tribes in the central Rif mountains. After the emergence of Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī as leader of the coalition, it was able to inflict a series of military defeats on the Spanish in the summer of 1921, a success which led to the expansion of the coalition and, in 1923, to the announcement of an independent state in the Rif under the leadership of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm.

This state was able to defeat another Spanish army in 1924 and, in 1925, to inflict a series of defeats upon the French army in that country's zone of Protectorate, before an alliance between France and Spain crushed the new state in 1926.

Previous work has concentrated more on the military aspects of the conflict from a European point of view, and examination of the Moroccan side has dwelt almost exclusively on the personality of the Rifī leader, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. This thesis, however, is concerned with the political and social aspects of the war from the Moroccan point of view. While it recognises the importance of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, it tries to explain his rōle in terms of his political position in Rifī society as a whole. It examines his political, social and religious reforms, not only from the point of view of their importance in the overall movement for Islamic reform, but also from that of their practical necessity and effects.
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Arabic Transcription and Abbreviations

The system of Arabic transcription used in this thesis is as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{lā} & \text{ṭ} \\
\text{b} & \text{ẓ} \\
\text{t} & \text{ḍ} \\
\text{gh} & \text{gh} \\
\text{j} & \text{f} \\
\text{h} & \text{q} \\
\text{kh} & \text{k} \\
\text{d} & \text{l} \\
\text{dh} & \text{m} \\
\text{r} & \text{n} \\
\text{z} & \text{h} \\
\text{s} & \text{w \ or \ ū} \\
\text{sh} & \text{y \ or \ ī} \\
\text{ṣ} & \text{ṣ} \\
\text{ḍ} & \\
\end{array}
\]

The Moroccan Arabic letter  자리, which occurs frequently in place names is rendered گ in this thesis. Long vowels are represented by a stroke (') above the vowel letter concerned. Vocalisation is that of Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic edited by J. Milton Cowan, Wiesbaden and London, Otto Harrassowitz and George Allen and Unwin, third impression 1971. Moroccan place names frequently change their spelling according to the writer concerned. In these cases, where manuscript and other versions differ, the most sensible form has been adopted--usually that of  \( \text{Abū \ 'Ayyāshī} \) in his book  \( \text{Harb al-Rīf al-taḥrīrīya wa marāḥīl al-niḍāl} \), Tangier, Nashr  \( \text{'Abd al-Salām Gassūs} \), n.d.
Al Bū 'Ayyāshī's own name raises another question, that of the treatment of the Maghribi term Bū, which is derived from Abū, of course. It is rarely written, even by educated writers as Abū; however (al-Bū 'Ayyāshī writes his name بالعربي), and in order to preserve some sort of consistency the form Bū has been used throughout in the names of individuals, tribes, places, and all other occasions. Another problem is the use of familiar abbreviations for the names of individuals. Muḥammad, for instance, often appears as Muḥ and or even Muḥ. Unfortunately there is no consistency about this, and an individual may be referred to at one point as Muḥ and at another as Muḥand and so on. In these cases, the most frequent usage is adopted. On the other hand, the familiar Drīs for Idrīs, which seems to be less frequently written, although it is almost universal in spoken language, has not been adopted. For the sake of clarity a distinction has had to be made between the Rifī leader Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī and his brother Maḥammad, so the former is usually referred to as bin 'Abd al-Karīm and the latter as Si Maḥammad, following local usage.

This leaves the problem of European transcriptions of Arabic words. There are three problems here. Firstly this thesis used material from three different European countries--Spain, France, and Britain--and the systems of transliteration in each were quite different. Secondly these different systems were not themselves consistent. Thirdly these different and inconsistent systems were used sometimes for transliterating classical and sometimes colloquial Arabic versions of words. It would obviously be inconsistent to correct some of these versions and not others, and so, in
order to maintain the integrity of quotations, they have been left unchanged. In the more outlandish cases a "translation" of the transliteration has been provided.

Yet another problem is that of Berber words. In the names of tribes, the use of both Berber and Arabic versions exists. This thesis has confined itself entirely to the use of Arabic tribal names, with two provisos: firstly that in the case of quotations the integrity of the text is maintained, and secondly that in a number of place names, the Berber form Ait (for Banū) is preserved simply because this is the only common usage in both spoken and written forms.

The problem of the naming of large town in Morocco has been resolved in the following manner. Towns with a common European name related to the Arabic have been given in the European form. Thus Tangier for Tanja, Tetuan for Tiṭwān, Oujda for Wajda, Larache for al-ʿArāʾish, Alcazarquivir for al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr, Melilla for Malīlya, Ceuta for Sabta. The naming of the present town of al-Ḥusayma, and the Bay and Islands of the same name is resolved by referring to the town, which did not exist before the Spanish conquest, as al-Ḥusayma, not as Villa Sanjurjo, its "colonial" name. The Island and Bay have been referred to as Alhucemas, although the island was usually referred to in Arabic as Nakur. The other Spanish Island, the Peñon de Vélez has been referred to in that way, and not as Bādis.

Finally, in Morocco there is one usage to which the attention of the reader must be drawn. This is the use of the word ḥabūs for the religious endowments which are known in the Arab east as awqāf.
Abbreviations of Archival Sources

1. S.H.M., Servicio Histórico Militar, the Spanish Army Archive in Madrid. The citations of documents from this source are given as follows:

(a) S.H.M.
(b) the name of the military area under which the box is grouped, i.e., Melilla or Ceuta
(c) the number of the box (Legajo in Spanish) abbreviated to Leg. + number
(d) the title of the cardboard folder within the box. This is underlined.
(e) The precise nature of the manuscript, in the case of a letter of telegram giving, where possible, the sender, recipient, place of origin and date. In the case of the account of a verbal report given by a Spanish agent or confident, the name of the individual and date of report only are given.

Thus "SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaciones varias, Muḥ bin Idrīs, 20 Aug. 1921", refers to the report given by Muḥ bin Idrīs on 20 August 1921 to be found in the folder labelled "Informaciones Varias" in box 20 of the Melilla section of the S.H.M.

When a number of citations follow each other directly from the same folder, in the same box and section (and only in these circumstances) the abbreviation ibid. is used, followed by the reference to the particular sheet of paper concerned.

This system of references is of my own invention as the only other writer who has used these archives and whose
work I have seen is Shannon Fleming who uses a system based entirely on numerals, which is hard to understand as he does not explain how it works.

2. MAE/MDE--The archives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores) and its predecessor the Ministry of State (Ministerio de Estado) in Madrid. Two systems are in use here, System (a) refers to the series labelled "Antiguo Archivo" this is followed by a file number (say 2543) then the number of the file (carpeta in Spanish) thus Carpeta V.E. 438, for instance--then the title of the file--e.g., Sospechosos en Marruecos--which is underlined, and then a reference to the nature of the document, letter, etc. in the normal way. System (b) refers to a more recent classification in which the number of the box is given, e.g., Leg. R 966 then the number of the file (in this case called expediente)-- say Expte. 9--then the name of the file--Política, for instance--which is underlined, then a description of the document in the normal way.

3 BNES de A.--The Africa Section (Sección de Africa) of the Spanish National Library (Biblioteca Nacional de España).

4. MAEF--The archives of the French Foreign Ministry (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France) in Paris. References in this thesis are to the new series, which consists of a number of bound files referring to particular countries or areas of interest. The country, etc.--say Maroc--is given first then the number of the volume--e.g., 519--then the page number and finally the description of the document in the usual way.

5. SHAT--The archives of the French Army--the Service Historique de L'Armée de la Terre--giving first the name and number of the box--e.g., Maroc Rif 8--then the title of the file, which is underlined, then the description of the nature of the document in the usual way.

6. FO--The archives of the British Foreign Office in the Public Records Office at Kew near London. The initials FO are followed by the series number 171 and then the number, then the file number, say W 2345, then the number of the document, say 5432, the country code--28 in the case of Morocco, then the description of the document in the usual way.

7. TAHP--Times Archives Harris Papers, in The Times newspaper, London. The Papers of Walter B. Harris, contained in three boxes, the titles of which are underlined in the citations.


Other Abbreviations

B de R  Bulletin de Renseignements (Intelligence Bulletin)
Capt.  Captain or Capitán (Spanish)
C.M.T.  Confirmation de Message Téléphonique (confirmation of telephone message)
Cmte.  Comandante (Major, Spanish)
Cmte. Gral.  Comandante General (Commanding General--of Melilla, Cádiz, or Larache areas in Morocco)
Cmte. Mar.  Comandante Militar (Military Commander, Spanish)
Cor.  Coronel (Colonel, Spanish)
Gral.  General
Interv.(Mil.)  Intervención (Militar), ((Military) Intervention
Office--the Spanish administration in rural
areas)
OAI  Oficina de Asuntos Indígenas (Native Affairs
Office)
OCTAI  Oficina Central de Tropas y Asuntos Indígenas
(Central Office for Native Troops and Affairs)
P.I.  Policía Indígena (Native Police)
Pt(s)  Peseta(s) (Spanish currency)
Res de Conf.  Resumen de Confidencias (precis of agents'
reports)
S.M.I.  Servicio Militar de Intervención (Military
Intervention Service)
T.O.(C.)  Telegrama Oficial (Cifrado)((Coded) Official tel-
gram)
Abbreviated references to documents and other sources
Cab. Reb. 1913-1927--Zona de Protectorado Español en Marruecos,
Cabecillas Rebeldes de 1913 á 1927, typed MS
in B.N.E.S. de A.
Cab. Reb. Anyera--Ovicina Central de Tropas y Asuntos
Indígenas de Tetuán, Datos sobre los principales
cabecillas rebeldes de la cábile de Anyera,
typed MS in B.N.E.S. de A.
Cab. Reb. Hauz--Oficina Central de Intervención y tropas
Jalifianas de Tetuán, Datos sobre los principales
cabecillas rebeldes de la cábila del Hauz,
typed MS in B.N.E.S. de A.
Maghzen Riffain--SHAT Maroc E24, "Note Sur le Maghzen Riffain"
December 1925
P.P.  Parliamentary Papers
"Renseignements fournis sur le Riff"--SHAT Maroc, Fez 156,
Terretoire de Taza Cercle de Guercif, Annexe de Mahridja Bureau de Berkine, Service de Renseignements, "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff", Berkine, 8 Feb. 1925, Confidentiel.
Explanation of Moroccan Currency and Weights and Measures

The whole subject of Moroccan weights and measures is highly confusing. There are two measures which concern this thesis, the mudd, a measure of quantity used for grain and the qintel, a measure of weight, also used for grain. Unfortunately, these measures were not constant. As a general rule, the qintel weighed around 168 lbs, although this varied over different parts of the country. The mudd also varied in quantity, but in Tangier was generally reckoned at 1 17/60 bushels. This is not very helpful in understanding exact equivalents, so it may be said that 1 qintel of wheat was roughly equivalent to 2.1 mudds, and 1 qintel of barley 2.6 mudds. The Spanish records tend to round these figures out so that 1 qintel is equivalent to 2 mudds. Thus a mudd of wheat is 80 lbs or 36 kilos approximately.¹

Sugar was sold in conical blocks referred to in Spanish as pilones. This word has been translated as "loaves". The loaves from the French zone during the Rif war weighed about 2 kilos and were smaller than those imported through the Spanish zone which weighed about 2.25 kilos.²

The currency problem is even more complicated. There were three sorts of coinage circulating in Morocco before the Protectorate and during the Rif war: French, Spanish, and Moroccan. French coinage is, of course, referred to as francs, Spanish as pesetas, and Moroccan as pesetas

¹ The Statesman's Yearbook, Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1911 (London, 1911), and SHM Melilla Leg. 30, Oficina de Beni Walishak, 'Abd al-Salam b. 'Amar, 10 Apr. 1926.
Hassani (p.h.). The rates of exchange fluctuated wildly. However, at the height of the Rif war, in 1925

6.5 p.h. = 5 pts Spanish in the Rif itself¹
2 p.h. = 5 francs in the Rif²

Thus a rough equivalent may be made

1 p.h. = 2.5 francs
1.3 p.h. = 1 pta
1 pta = 3.25 francs

The matter is further complicated by the Spanish custom of referring to 5 pts as 1 duro. To avoid as much confusion as possible all prices and other monetary expressions have been converted into Spanish pesetas to the nearest ½ pta.

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, Información Mayo, nota 15 May 1925.
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In July 1921, there occurred in northern Morocco, in the region known as the Rif, one of the most serious defeats ever suffered by a colonial army in Africa. An entire Spanish army was lost in the space of a few days, and the casualties were estimated at anything between ten and thirty thousand men. This defeat, known as the Anwâl disaster, marked the beginning of a war between the Spanish and a rapidly organised coalition of Rif tribes that would last for five years, lead to the loss of another Spanish army in 1924, and the defeat of a French one in 1925, before the infant Rif state that had grown up to resist both countries collapsed in the face of a combined French and Spanish onslaught.

Not surprisingly, the war has been the subject of discussion not only among historians, who themselves vary in their point of view--some writing from the position of European colonialist administrators, like Robert Montagne, a Frenchman, others from that of Moroccan nationalists such as Abdallah Laroui or Germain Ayache--but also among political writers and leaders, including such major figures as ‘Allâl al-Fasî one of the founders of modern Moroccan nationalism. Their views are examined more fully later, but for the moment it is enough to say that the discussion has
so far centred either on the personality of the Rifis' leader, Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, or on the place of the war in a general theory of the nature of Moroccan nationalism, or on the effects of the war on the diplomatic and political history of western Europe. What the discussion has not dealt with, in general, is an explanation of the political situation in which the initial victories of the Rifis over the Spanish were won, nor of the conditions in which opposition was sustained for five years before it collapsed in 1926.

Such concerns are important, of course, and they will be examined in some detail in the course of this chapter. However, the purpose of this thesis is to try to strike a balance between conflicting theories of the history of Moroccan nationalism and to attempt to show the role played by local political situations, by economic and social conditions, and by local propaganda in determining the outcome of events. In the long run it was these factors which were important, for the fighting was carried out by local forces, which had to be rallied and organised, controlled, equipped and fed.

This is not to say that an attempt to put the Rif war into its context in Moroccan history is not important. Indeed it is vital. For this reason the first part of this introductory chapter is taken up with a discussion of the history, society and government of Morocco in the period immediately before the Rif war, while the second part is concerned to discuss the various interpretations which have been put on the war, before moving to a description of the origins of the conflict and the nature of the war itself in subsequent chapters.
A Mediaeval State?

Just as the theories surrounding the Rif war vary considerably, so do accounts of Morocco in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The variation is between a view of independent Morocco as a totally decadent, corrupt and inefficient state and a considerably more complex view of a country with a government which was certainly inefficient, but equally certainly not the mediaeval state portrayed by many European writers of the period.

To deal first with the view of a nation which was sunk in the depths of oriental despotism and inefficiency, it is possible to find a general statement, crude in the extreme, in the pages of European works of reference of the period. Thus Baedeker's guide to the Mediterranean described "the Morocco of today, whose institutions, manners and customs are quite mediaeval ...". Travel in this antique land, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1911, was "in general ... what it was a thousand years ago," for there were no made roads, few bridges, and vehicular traffic was impossible. As a result, Baedeker recommended that should a European intend even limited travel in the interior he should equip himself with everything from tents and camp-beds to food and water. Practically the only

3 Baedeker, op. cit., p. 97.
industry discernible to the foreign observers was the manufacture of carpets, rugs and other "curios" for export to Europe. ¹

The general opinion was that this economic and social backwardness was a symptom of something far more radically wrong with Morocco. What really engaged the attention of European writers was the disorder which they believed to be prevalent in Morocco. The Sultan's domains were, they said, divided into two areas: the bilād al-makhzan, the country of the government—in pre-Protectorate Morocco the word makhzan (literally treasury) was used to describe the government, since taxation was the basis of the Sultan's authority—and the bilād al-sība, the country of dissidence. In the bilād al-makhzan the Sultan ruled supreme, having both temporal and spiritual authority. In the bilād al-sība, on the other hand, only his spiritual authority was recognised, for the local tribes controlled their own territory.² The basis of this division was explained as being one between the town and the country, and between those who spoke Arabic and those, the majority, who spoke a Berber dialect. The Arabs, according to the Encyclopædia Britannica, lived in the towns and the plains, and were the descendants of Arab invaders who had arrived in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D. The Berbers lived in the mountains, and "Arabs are never found in the mountains, save as religious teachers or authorities."³

Clearly the picture given by such publications as

² Baedeker, op. cit., p. 96.
does provide in a condensed form an outline of the conven-
tional wisdom on Morocco of the Europe of the time. In more
developed forms these opinions were, and indeed still are in
a few cases, held by serious writers on Morocco. The idea
of a Morocco split into two parts, one largely independent
of central authority, a division paralleled by another
between spiritual and temporal authority, is central to a
great deal of historical writing about Morocco, notwithstand-
ing the difficulty of separating religious and temporal
authority in an Islamic state like Morocco. However, the
division real or otherwise does raise the question of the
nature of the Moroccan state.

The Sultan and the Makhzān

The most common contemporary view of the Sultan
was to portray him as some sort of an autocrat, ruling in a
manner varying between "absolute despotism . . . unrestricted
by any civil or religious laws,"¹ and a "limited autocracy"
in which, although theoretically possessed of absolute
power, the Sultan was "greatly circumscribed by religious
influences which largely support him and by the official
proletariat [sic] by which he is supported."²

The view that the Sultan's power was autocratic
was based on the observation that he was for ever moving
around the country enforcing order so as to ensure that
taxes were collected. The expeditions were certainly some-
times accompanied by repression and the idea has been put
forward even in fairly recent writing, that the Sultan's

¹ Statesman's Year Book 1911 (London, 1911) section on "Morocco" (pp. 1022-1027), p. 1022.
makhzan was a "stable system of continuous violence."¹

In this view the expression "bilād al-makhzan" becomes synonymous with the territory in which taxation was regularly imposed in the Sultan's name. But the view of a violent money-raising system has been widely challenged. More recently a thesis has been put forward that the Sultan's authority, and indeed the whole political system of Morocco rested more on consent than had been realised previously.

The ruling family—or dynasty—in Morocco, the 'Alāwīs, took power in the middle of the seventeenth century. Because of the excessive political fragmentation of the time, this was done with the use of relatively little military force.² According to Laroui, a modern nationalist historian, the first 'Alāwī sultan, al-Rashīd, and his immediate successors, then embarked on a course of action which aimed at removing local centres of power, basing their authority on a mixture of armed force and the prestige of their Sharifian ancestry. The main local centres of power were the religious brotherhoods (ṭarīqas) whose houses (zawiyas) were linked together to dominate different regions. This made a centrally imposed unity difficult. The 'Alāwī Sultans ordered them to remove their headquarters to Fez, where they would be more closely under the control of the makhzan. The zawiyas' prestige was further diminished when the new rulers were able to defeat the remaining European outposts on the Moroccan coast—a thing that the zawiyas themselves had tried and failed to do.³ The new Sultans' power relied on the strength

³ Ibid., pp. 273-274.
of a reorganised army recruited from slaves, in an attempt to avoid ties of loyalty between the army and any other social group, and was supported by heavy taxation, including new indirect taxes on foreign and internal trade—called the maks (pl. mukūs)—which were widely considered to be illegal, as they were not prescribed in Islamic religious law.

The economic and social consequences of this system were serious. The use of slaves for military purposes badly affected agriculture. Furthermore, the removal of social ties between the army and the rest of society meant that the army itself tended to serve those who paid it the most. At the same time, by destroying the ṭarīqas, the Sultans removed a possible focus for a wider territorial unity. The result, at the beginning of the eighteenth century was a series of disorders.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, it was clear that excessive centralisation was impossible. Muḥammad III (reigned 1757-1790 A.D.) concentrated more on his religious leadership, decentralising power to "local chiefs chosen or supported by the population," and replacing taxes on land by developing external trade to provide more customs dues. This brought him into contact with Europeans, and, as Laroui points out "the prosperity and indeed the very existence of the state thus became directly dependent on an activity dominated by foreigners."

In this way, the basic factors in any attempt to...

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., pp. 274-275.
3. Ibid., p. 275.
4. Ibid., p. 296.
control Morocco, including that made in the north by Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim, emerged—the relationship of the Sultan, the zawiyas, the army, and foreign powers.

Religion and Consent—a Constitutional Approach?

Clearly, then, for some time before the beginning of the nineteenth century, the power of the Sultan could not be said to be absolute. Despite the declarations of later European observers, his authority depended to some extent on consent, or on his own ability to control his potential opponents. The clearest proponent of this point of view is Mohamed Lahbabi.1 (It is well to remember, however, that Lahbabi is a former member of the leftist (Ben Barka) faction of the Istiqlal Party which sought a constitutional arrangement leading to a democratic monarchy in Morocco.)

In his view there were two limits on the Sultan's power. The first was Islamic law and tradition, which, at least in theory, regulated his temporal power, and, the second the institution of the bay'a (the declaration on a new Sultan's accession made by the 'ulamā' of the various parts of Morocco that, on certain conditions, they would recognise him as their Sultan).2 Both these elements were of course connected, for in Morocco the Sultan was also the Caliph, the religious leader of the community, "the person who replaces the Prophet in the double mission of defending the law and governing the world."3

1 Mohamed Labhabi, Le Gouvernement Marocain à l'aube du vingtième siècle (Casablanca, 1975). The Ben Barka faction of Istiqlal eventually became the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, later the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires.
2 Ibid., p. 22.
3 Ibid., p. 27.
So the Sultan was invested with his power provided that he carried out a mission. This meant that not everyone could be a Sultan—the theoretical conditions were that he should be just, able to understand the law, sane and fit, willing to defend the land of the community and engage in holy war, jihād. Another condition, disputed by some Islamic theorists, was that he should also be descended from the Prophet's tribe of the Quraysh.\(^1\) This at least was the theory of the Caliphate. It goes without saying that some, if not many, of the Sultans were not just, but the principal function of the Sultanate—the defence of the community against infidels—became, in the nineteenth century, the **sine qua non** of his authority.

In theory, again, if the Sultan was considered to fulfil these conditions he could be invested with authority. The instrument in doing this was the bay’a by which the community delegated to the Sultan the functions and authority of government: "The Caliph is not the holder of sovereignty but only an authority designated to carry out certain functions."\(^2\) The real holder of sovereignty, according to Islamic public law was the community, the 'umma.\(^3\)

The Sultan's power was therefore limited, in theory, to executive power, defence, and the administration of finance. According to Lahbabi he had no "legal" power to make laws, in that he had to seek consent for new regulations—particularly new taxes, to the 'ulamā'—the teachers of religion—who gave their opinions on statements of doctrine (fatwā). The Sultans' instructions, ḥāhirs, were therefore

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1 Ibid.  
2 Ibid., p. 30.  
3 Ibid.
no more than that, and were mostly if not entirely, measures of administration. The Sultan's obligations were reiterated in the declaration of the bay'a which recognised his temporal power, but reminded him that power was bounded by the rights of the community. Thus, in the bilād al-makhzan, the community delegated administrative power to the Sultan.

The mechanism seemed simple enough. On the death of the Sultan a letter was sent to the tribes and cities informing them of the situation, and there followed a period in which the new chief candidate emerged. When the principal 'ulamā' had agreed on his recognition, and the terms of his bay'a, it was then communicated to the rest of the country who could then affirm it ex post facto.

This at any rate is the theory of the Islamic caliphate. It is easy to see how this theory could be used by a man of Lahbabi's views to support a constitutional monarchy in post-Protectorate Morocco. It is of course only a theory of how things ought to have happened. In fact there were a number of limitations. Firstly, the choice was limited to members of the 'Alāwī family. Secondly, a member of this family did not become an acceptable "candidate" simply by being a member of the family and fulfilling the general conditions of legitimacy. The real test was one of force. By the time a man was recognised by the bay'a, he was generally the only possible candidate, for all others had, at least temporarily, been eliminated or neutralised. Thus, in 1894, when the Sultan Ḥassan I died while on an expedition in the Tadla region of the Middle Atlas, his

1 Ibid., pp. 37-38
2 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
3 Ibid., p. 53.
bājib (chamberlain)  al-Ahm b. Mūsā, concealed his death until the army had returned to Rabat, where, with the support, or pressure of the army, his son 'Abd al-'Azīz was proclaimed by the 'ulamā'. 'Abd al-'Azīz was still in his minority, and so b. Mūsā became regent, which was presumably his intention. Once the young Sultan had been declared, in Rabat, other potential claimants to the throne--Mūlāy Bīlgīth, the eldest son and Mūlāy Muḥammad another son of Ḥassan were crushed. Mūlāy Muḥammad was imprisoned in Meknes and his name was used to inspire a series of revolts thereafter.  

It is clear that the bay'a in fact meant very little as a document giving the new claimant to the throne the right to commence his reign. But it did express an expectation of what was required of him, and the theoretical possibility was always there that if a Sultan failed to carry out its conditions, it would provide a legal reason and a practical excuse for revolt against him. This is precisely what happened in 1908, when 'Abd al-'Azīz was replaced by his brother 'Abd al-Ḥafīz.  

The Sultan was also limited by his financial situation, hence his increasing reliance on trade, and the growth of European power and influence in Morocco.

The European Intervention in Morocco

The first commercial contacts with Europe came in the eighteenth century when Muḥammad III made a trade

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1 Edmund Burke III, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance 1860-1912 (Chicago and London, 1976), pp. 41-42 (referred to henceforth as "Burke, Prelude").
2 See below, p. 30.
treaty with Denmark in 1757. After this, the attractions of trade with the Europeans grew, for here was a way for the makhzan to raise money without provoking rebellion through the imposition of heavier and heavier taxation. As trade grew, so did European influence in Morocco, leading to penetration of Moroccan markets, of its territory, and of its government.

However, European penetration mainly developed after the French occupation of Algeria. In 1844 a Moroccan army which had been sent to help 'Abd al-Qādir in his resistance to the French was defeated at Isly (4 August 1844), and the Sultan was forced to recognise the French occupation of Algeria. After this, military pressure from France, and more immediately from Spain, increased. Spain had occupied various points on the northern Moroccan coast since the late Middle Ages. In 1848 Spain occupied another position on the Moroccan coast, the Chafarinas Islands, near the Algerian frontier. In 1859, by exaggerating an incident on the Ceuta border, the Spanish were able to declare war on Morocco and occupy Tetuan in 1860. They were eventually forced to withdraw under British pressure, but only after the Sultan promised to pay a huge indemnity.

In 1856, commercial contact with Europe increased through a treaty with Britain which ended restrictions on certain classes of exports, allowed the use of ports other than the eight already open to European traffic, and lowered customs charges. Spain used her victory in the Tetuan war

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1 Laroui, History, p. 276.
2 Ibid., pp. 301-317.
3 Ibid., p. 317. Spanish involvement in Morocco is described in detail in Chapter II.
to press for concessions herself, and France followed suit. Over the years between 1856 and 1902, the European powers became more and more embedded in the commercial life of Morocco. Restrictions were lifted on the export of wool (1861), grain (1875), cattle (1873), and minerals (1892). Freedom of movement was allowed in the interior, consulates were opened in Fez, and customs duties were further lowered in 1892.¹

Successive Sultans tried to limit this penetration, partly because of the economic problems that it might cause, and partly because they feared social tensions between Europeans and Muslims.² But they were largely unsuccessful, because the European commercial pressure was so strong. The attraction of Morocco was firstly as a supplier of raw materials, particularly minerals, and stories of massive deposits of iron and silver, especially in the north gained considerable currency,³ and secondly as a receiver of exports, especially cotton goods from England and Spain.

The Attempt at Military Reforms

This commercial penetration was supported by a diplomatic effort by the European powers, firstly to win openings for their industries to exploit the Moroccan market and to develop its potential sources of raw materials, and secondly to make sure that no one power succeeded in dominating Morocco at the others’ strategic or diplomatic expense. The initial aim of each of the Powers was to ensure the

¹ Abdallah Laroui, Les Origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain 1830-1912 (Paris, 1977), pp. 250-252 (Referred to henceforth as "Laroui, Origines").
² Ibid., pp. 252-253.
³ See below, Chapter II, for a discussion of this.
friendly independence of Morocco, and, if that failed, to try to corner the control of Morocco for itself. The first stage in this process was to press for reforms of the makhzan's system of administration.

There were people within the makhzan who realised the need to reform the makhzan, but the purposes and the methods of these reforms were often distinct from those recommended by the Europeans. After the defeat of the Moroccan army at the battle of Isly in 1844, the Sultan sent an increasing number of ambassadors to various European capitals, particularly Paris, London and Madrid, who, on their return, reported in some detail on what they had seen. Generally, European technical inventions impressed them greatly--railways, telegraphs, arms factories, libraries, printing and, later, telephones. Much of what they saw, however, they distrusted, because it was the fruit of a society of which, for religious reasons, they were suspicious, and although they appreciated the benefits of a bureaucracy that was organised and regularly paid, they generally failed either to understand the workings of European liberal and parliamentary systems or to feel that such systems had much relevance for Morocco.¹

What most interested the Moroccan observers, and their Sultans, were the European military achievements. While the defeat at Isly was by no means the beginning of the Sultans' interest in military reforms--for contact had been made with Muḥammad 'Alī in Egypt well before that date²--it certainly gave impetus to such concern. From 1850

¹ Laroui, Origines, pp. 216-218.
² Ibid., p. 272.
onwards a number of treatises were written advising the Sultan, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, and more particularly his son, Muḥammad, who was to succeed him, on the advisability of military reforms.¹

The war with Spain in the Tetuan region from 1859-1860 gave further proof of the need for military reorganisation. The Moroccan army virtually disintegrated in the course of this war, and only irregulars who arrived from the Rif really fought the Spanish troops effectively. Muḥammad IV, now Sultan, realising the need to train officers properly, decided to try to reorganise the army with the almost general support of the 'ulamāʾ of Fez, whose opinion he had asked. But Muḥammad IV was unable to carry out these reforms himself, partly because of the indemnity he was forced to pay after the Spanish war, which seriously limited the amount of money he had available, and partly because rural revolts left him little opportunity to carry out major reforms in his army.² Nevertheless, from 1870 onwards he sent officers to be trained in Gibraltar. This policy was continued by his son, Ḥassan I, who, from 1883 onwards started to send officers to Germany and Belgium and brought in French military instructors to assist in the training of the army.³

The belief that reform of the army was the answer to Morocco's problems eventually faded, for when the "new" army was tried out it dispersed in disorder as the old one had. Disenchantment set in. Nevertheless, at the beginning, Laroui points out, the very word nizām was almost credited

¹ Ibid., p. 274.
² Ibid., pp. 278-282.
³ Ibid.
with a magical significance,¹ and the belief in the benefits of an organised army in late nineteenth century Morocco was reflected during the Rif war with Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's efforts to create a regular army and administration.

Administrative Reforms

Accompanying the efforts at military reform there was a corresponding feeling that the administration of the makhzan needed reforming as well. Before discussing this it is necessary to look briefly at the system of government in pre-Protectorate Morocco.

Clearly the Sultan, despite his great, if limited, power, needed help in the administration of his country. He appointed men to do this, at a national level as wazīrs, at a provincial level as khalīfas, who represented the Sultan in his absence and were often his brothers or other members of his family, and at local level officers such as qā’īds and ‘āmils to carry out administrative functions.²

All these officials, from the wazīrs, high members of the makhzan, down to local qā’īds were administrative and executive officers. The wazīrs themselves theoretically had no powers of decision, for that was the function of the Sultan alone.³ But even in they carrying out of these modest functions they were severely limited:

"The servies, the bēniqas [offices of the wazīrs]: remained rudimentary in their organisation; the ministers, their secretaries, their counsellors, were far from having an administrative structure adequate for the times and circumstances; the bēniqas were no more than rooms lacking the very minimum necessary to

¹ Ibid., p. 284.
² Lahbabi, op. cit., pp. 74-77.
³ Ibid., pp. 131-134.
prepare documents, to order the archives, to provide any help in the daily work of the administrative staff."¹

Muḥammad IV tried to modernise the administration by setting up a school for makhzan officials which had a certain limited success.² But arrangements were still ramshackle, and ʿHasan I decided on further reforms. He gave each wāzīr a defined task. A chief wāzīr, the wāzīr al-adhām, was appointed to be in overall charge, and to concern himself with internal affairs, overseeing qāʿids and other officials. A wāzīr al-ḥarb was placed in charge of the army, a wāzīr al-mālīa (or wāzīr al-ʿumanāʾ) in charge of the financial administration, ports and customs, and a wāzīr al-baḥar was the "foreign minister". Finally a wāzīr al-shikāyāt was appointed, whose job seems to have been more nebulous—to report to the Sultan on abuses of power, supervise the religious endowments (ḥabūs) and advise the Sultan.³

As Lahbabi points out, this system was hardly a modern one, for it lacked important powers. There was no minister overseeing agriculture, for example, so that during the regular famines there was no machinery for distributing grain from the silos, nor any way of dealing with the frequent epidemics.⁴

Certainly efforts were made to train members of the makhzan in new techniques, just as there had been attempts to train officers of the army. Students were sent to study in Europe, but they were few in number, and on their return were employed mainly as military technicians. Hardly any

¹ Ibid., pp. 135-136.
² Ibid., p. 135.
³ Ibid., pp. 136-137.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 82-183.
occupied any administrative posts in the makhzan. The chief problem which stood in the way of reforms was one of finance. Taxation was difficult to raise in the countryside--of which more below--and the imposition of taxes on property was widely resisted and felt to be unlawful in terms of the sharī'a.

The Europeans Press for Reforms

At the end of Hassán I's reign, European observers were able to describe a Morocco which they considered to be chaotic. They saw a society with no legal structure, no police system, extreme punishments, the corruption of public officers, who were anyway unpaid. As far as the makhzan was concerned, "there was practically no administration, merely a machine for making money."\(^\text{2}\) The solution, at any rate in European eyes, was to adopt European methods. The whole administration would have to be reformed: officials should be paid, security of life and property established, providing an incentive for greater production. If the restrictions on commerce were lifted, trade would develop and customs revenue increase. This course was recommended particularly by Britain, in the person of its minister in Tangier, Sir John Drummond Hay, although privately he had reservations that such reforms were possible.\(^\text{3}\)

The finances of the makhzan were by no means sufficient to pay for such reforms. The loan from Britain to

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1 Laroui, Origines, pp. 285-288.
3 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
pay the indemnities to Spain after the 1859-1860 war was not fully repaid until 1883,¹ and European nations, if they wished to make rapid improvements were forced to take action for themselves--they took over the sanitary arrangements of Tangier for example.²

In fact, European techniques were studied (or, rather, half-studied) by Moroccan officials, but these contacts tended to increase the European penetration.³ This growing involvement of the Europeans in Moroccan life was regarded with distrust.⁴ Men like al-Nāṣirī, the author of a history of Morocco ending with the death of ʿUṣayn I, watched it with alarm. Writing of his worries about the European training of Moroccan officers in the army he said: "They want to learn about war in order to preserve their religion, yet they neglect their religion in the very process of learning."⁵

However, the main European penetration of Morocco was through trade. Trade with Europe depended on the ability of merchants, and their agents to carry out their business immune from arbitrary arrest and interference by local officials, and so they demanded and received, the same protections as consuls and their employees. In the mid-eighteenth century extra-territorial rights were extended to British merchants and their agents, and later to those of other nations.

¹ Ibid., p. 25.
³ Parsons, op. cit., p. 23.
⁴ Burke, Prelude, p. 38.
At first the system caused little trouble, but as the number of traders and their Moroccan agents grew, it began to get out of hand. The protection given to Moroccan agents of European consulates, excused them from Moroccan taxation, legal jurisdiction and military service. Clearly this was a most attractive prospect to the Moroccans concerned, and foreigners began to sell protection. By 1848, the practice was widespread, and it soon began to alarm the makhzan. Drummond Hay tried to limit it but this attempt failed—as others had done. To make matters worse, foreign nationals claimed indemnities from the makhzan for losses in robberies committed by Moroccan subjects.¹

Whether this situation was part of the causes of Moroccan decline, or merely a symptom of it, as Parsons argues,² it had the most serious consequences. It badly diminished the makhzan's revenues, and the payment of indemnities further diminished the money available. Local officials complained that they could no longer carry out their functions. The whole problem naturally became a diplomatic one. Hassan I tried to limit the situation with British help, for Drummond Hay had continued to be concerned about it, and finally a conference was arranged between the European nations and Morocco in 1880 in the hopes of settling the problem.³

In fact, nothing was resolved at Madrid, partly because of rivalry between the French and British;⁴ as a result the problem got worse. However, the conference had a wider significance because, for the first time, the internal

¹ Parsons, op. cit., pp. 63-66.
² Ibid., p. 68.
³ Ibid., pp. 70-78.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 70, 79, 86.
problems of Morocco were being discussed by the European Powers at a conference in a European country. It was yet another sign of Morocco's increasing inability to order her own affairs.

**European Rivalry for Control over Morocco**

In 1881, the French occupied Tunis. This worried the Spanish who were concerned lest the same thing should happen to Morocco, and so they looked to Germany for support. There was some sympathy felt in Berlin, but Bismark did not commit himself. ¹ For its part, the French government was unwilling to add the Moroccan question to its other diplomatic difficulties in Europe, ² but agreed, under pressure from the governor-general of Algeria to send instructors to help train the Moroccan army. On the other hand, the French in their turn were worried that the British might increase their influence in Morocco at the expense of their own. ³ A new French consul, Ordega, decided to take matters into his own hands in his determination to prevent what he saw as Hispano-British attempts to undermine French relations with the Sultan. ⁴ This determination led to a major crisis when he gave protégé status to the Sharīf of Wazzān in 1884. The result was disorder in the Wazzān area as whole villages repudiated the makhzan's authority. The Sultan appealed to Britain, Spain, Germany, Austria and Italy for support, although in the end it was only forthcoming from Madrid.

Ordega apparently saw the possibility of using the Sharīf's

support to bring about a revolution in Morocco, and to replace Hassan I by the Sharif. The situation eventually calmed down when the French government removed Ordega in 1885.¹

Such events had a weakening effect both on the Sultan and on Morocco as a whole, for despite Mūlay Hassan's attempts to control the country—he mounted numerous expeditions to various parts of the country, to the south in 1875, the Rif in 1889 and the High Atlas in 1883,² European intervention in Morocco meant that he could not longer maintain the country free of "infidel" influence. For this reason his attempts at reform of the army, and the administration—relying as they did on European techniques—actually weakened his position, for he was unable to carry out one of his principal functions under the bay'ā. During the nineteenth century, the Sultans' authority slipped unnoticed towards illegitimacy.³

Sība

The other side of the political equation, contrasted with the makhzan, was the concept of sība. The traditional theory of Moroccan society, described a

"basic division of the country into a plains area over which government authority held sway—the Bled al-Makhzen or 'Land of Government'—and a mountain area over which it had no control—the Bled es Sība or 'Land of Insolence'."⁴

¹ Ibid., pp. 111-133.
³ Laroui, Origines, p. 363.
If, then, the **bilād al-sība** was an area in which the Sultan was powerless, what kind of society existed there? The best example of the traditional view of the **bilād al-sība** is that of Robert Montagne, a French sociologist. He presents Berber society, for it is primarily a Berber-speaking society which is associated with the concept of **bilād al-sība**, as a rural grouping of independent "tribes" each one mainly fairly small, but large enough to "constitute an independent republic" for "love of their native soil encourages among the sedentary Berbers a predeliction for autonomy and self government. The mountain communities will offer untiring resistance to the assaults of the central power." This society was characterised by great local independence at all levels, and the great importance given to these different levels has led to it being described as a "segmented society". Each village was federated into clans--which Montagne describes as cantons--and these were themselves federated in tribes. At each level in this segmentation there was a council made up of the most senior --or powerful--members of the community which would decide on local affairs. Thus political and administrative authority was held locally, in groups, which at the level of the "clan" or "canton" (the Arabic term is **khums** or **rāba'ā**), formed an "autonomous state" with "precise boundaries".

Above the level of the clan was the tribe (**qabīla**), in Montagne's view a less defined federation than that of

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2 Ibid., p. 21.
3 Ibid., p. 29.
the clans, because each canton was independent of the other. According to him the links between the cantons forming a particular tribe were based on agreement over particular ideas of customary law, the possession of a common market or mosque, or on dislike of a neighbouring tribe. As a result the links were not always apparent, since most of the political authority lay in the councils of the clans which frequently were divided against each other. Higher up the levels of segmentation was a more nebulous federation still—an alliance of tribes, which, according to Montagne tended to operate only in a period of conflict with an outside intruder or when a single leader seized power for himself over the whole area.¹

In this way, within the bilād al-sība, there was, according to writers like Montagne a system of local "government" centred around the hierarchy of local councils in the villages, clans and tribes.² These councils, the jamā'as were the institutions which tried to ensure local order.

Such a system supposes a very great independence from the makhzan, and because it was necessarily unstable, it also gives rise to the idea that the normal form of political and social life in these areas was one of continuous warfare between the different groups. This, coupled with the fact that the language of these areas was largely Berber and not Arabic, is enough to give the basis for a division of Morocco into two parts; one where the Sultan had power and

¹ Ibid., pp. 32-33.
² Ibid., p. 37.
the other where he did not, but where his religious authority only was recognised. The theory was of great use to the French in their attempts to dominate Morocco, for it allowed them to propose a division of Morocco into two areas—Arab and Berber—for the purpose of ruling it more effectively and, they hoped, of dividing Morocco against itself. Montagne himself was a French military officer as well as a sociologist, and his theories became the basis of French administration in Morocco.

Not surprisingly the French view of Moroccan society has been challenged more recently, particularly by nationalist minded Moroccan historians. These historians do not deny the existence of a large measure of autonomy, nor of the system of councils which existed in the more remote areas. Where they disagree is in the nature of the autonomy, and in the forms of relationships between the Sultan and the people in the so-called bilād al-sība.

To deal with the first point first—that of "independence" from the makhzan—there are two points of challenge. Firstly that of Abdallah Laroui who holds that there were differences in the types of sība; there were revolts against local governors and qā'īds; there were movements led by mahdis, people claiming religious legitimacy against the Sultan; there were revolts led by great qā'īds to free themselves from greater makhzan control, all of which are of a temporary nature, and hardly of the same type as the theory of large areas which were permanently out of the Sultan's control. Laroui's last group is nearest to what is usually meant by sība—areas where there was a large measure
of autonomy because they were less productive or far away from the main centres of the makhzan, such as the Sūs in the far south, or the far east of Morocco.\(^1\) The level of autonomy could be seen in the method by which qā'īds were appointed. In some areas the Sultan appointed a qā'īd to control the area with some measure of agreement from the local population, who express this in a sort of miniature bay'a. Their job was to collect taxes and provide soldiers, and provided they did this the makhzan preferred to hear no more from the qā'īds. In the areas normally considered to be bilād al-sība, on the other hand, the local communities tended to appoint their own qā'īds, who might be confirmed by the Sultan. In other words the strength of the allegiance to the makhzan in any one area depended on the ability of the makhzan to impose its own choice of governor. In this way, local autonomy was always a possibility, and it was not to be wondered at, since allegiance to the makhzan meant taxation and military service, if local communities preferred an autonomy of sorts.\(^2\) However, if the makhzan was strong it implied greater control. Thus there were degrees of autonomy in these areas, a situation which is far away from the theory of sība as total independence from the makhzan. Certainly the makhzan did try to keep some sort of control over these autonomous areas, because they tended to adopt customary law rather than that of the shari'ā and it was the Sultan's function to uphold Islamic law.\(^3\)

To deal with the other point—that of the alleged instability of the sība areas—Germain Ayache has pointed out

\(^1\) Laroui, Origines, p. 158.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 158.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 165.
that while there was considerable autonomy in Berber speaking areas, this did not affect the makhzan's overall authority, for control was not vital. What was important was the support that the makhzan needed to oppose foreign intervention and to ensure that internal commerce continued. To do this the Sultan needed to be sure that he could depend on the internal organisations of the tribes to preserve order.¹

Local systems were in fact capable of preserving order on a local scale. Much has been written about the "anarchy" and "disorder" of life, in the Rif particularly, and especially of its violence. Even a prominent nationalist like Abderrahman Youssoufi² has claimed that "the insecurity was such that the men remained barricaded in their houses; only the women could go out and attend to the family business. The markets were frequented only by women."³ This description is clearly most unsatisfactory, if only because Youssoufi's arguments about women's markets are contradicted by facts, for men's markets continued to function alongside the women's. More seriously, it is based on a completely illogical vision of Rif society. Ayache, in another article, has pointed out that a society that was so steeped in violence, which demanded a life for a life in continuing blood-feuds, would eventually wipe itself out.⁴ Clearly

¹ Germain Ayache, "La Fonction d'arbitrage du Makhzan", in Actes de Durham recherches récentes sur le Maroc moderne (Rabat, 1978), pp. 5-21 passim (henceforth referred to as "Ayache, 'Fonction d'arbitrage'").
this did not happen, and it did not happen precisely because the Rifis, in common with other autonomous groups in Moroccan society had their own mechanisms for dealing with conflicts and violence.

The system used was that of the hagg-fine. The heads of families meeting in council would, in the case of murder, or of other sorts of crime, impose a fine on the perpetrator or on his family, or take some other action, such as burning his house or forcing his family into exile.¹

Nevertheless, when this system broke down—and it often did—local tribes could, and did, turn to the makhzan's representative for support and arbitration. For the makhzan did have its representatives in the supposed "bilād al-sība"—there were governors of the Rif for example,² and there were more local garrisons as well, and local officials were appointed in the tribes, such as gādis to administer the shari'a, and 'āmins to collect taxes.³

Apart from such direct penetration, the makhzan had a certain indirect influence on events in the Berber areas through the medium of the zawiyas, which provided a system of education through the faqīhs, a fact which helped what Laroui calls the "progressive fiqhisation" of the country.⁴ This meant that the influence of the shari'a was advanced and, as the maintenance of Islamic law was the basis of the Sultan's authority, a further penetration of the Berber lands was achieved. The zawiyas were also another

¹ David Montgomery Hart, The Aith-Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif, an Ethnography and History (Tuscon, 1976), p. 290 (hereafter referred to as "Hart, Aith Waryaghar").
² Ayache, "Société rifaine", p. 357.
³ For examples of such appointments in the Rif, see Chapter II below.
⁴ Laroui, Origines, p. 141.
source of arbitration in local disputes, and so again indirectly helped the makhzan's cause. Should the power of one of these zawiyas have grown so much as to challenge the power of the Sultan, then he was usually able to dominate it.¹

On the other hand, the makhzan was expected to provide certain benefits such as a source of arbitration, relief in times of famine, when people from the countryside flocked down into the towns of the coast seeking food and shelter, and above all leadership in military actions against Christian aggressors.² In particular, the Sultan was expected to lead a jihād.

The Failure of jihād

Despite the expectations of his subjects that the Sultan should lead Morocco in a holy war against the Christians, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards this became impossible. His army had been unable to stop the French in 1844 and the Spanish in 1859-1860, and with the failure to carry out the reforms, or rather the impossibility of so doing, it became yet weaker. The only people who had provided any effective resistance to the Spanish in the Tetuan war were irregular forces that arrived from the Rif, and not the regular Moroccan army, in so far as it existed. More and more, resistance to the European aggressors, especially the Spanish, became a local affair.

In 1893 more fighting started in the Melilla area, fighting to which Hassan I did not commit himself. However,

¹ Ibid., pp. 139-146.
he was forced to pay a large indemnity when it was over. This was not just local skirmishing, for it involved much of the Rif as well as local tribes around Melilla, and developed into a "small scale local holy war." The ability to organise jihād could now be seen to have left the hands of the Sultan, and fallen to local action. But the indemnities that the makhzan was forced to pay—such as the 20 million pesetas after the 1893 incidents, further weakened it. Jihād became a factor in diminishing the makhzan's authority both at home and in relation to the foreign powers. For if leadership of jihād was a condition of a Sultan's acceptance, his inability to carry it out meant that his position was all the more untenable.

Furthermore, if the Sultan became incapable of leading the jihād, other subversive agents were liable to present themselves as alternatives to his rule. Such was the case of Bū Ḫimāra, a pretender to the Moroccan throne whose rebellion started in 1902. He claimed, quite falsely, to be 'Abd al-'Azīz's brother, Mūlāy Muḥammad, who had been imprisoned in Meknes for a number of years and eventually set up a state centred on the old makhzan fort at Silwān near Melilla, a state which he said would prepare the way for the coming of a mahdī. In fact, his support collapsed when 'Abd al-'Azīz was replaced by his brother Ḥaflīz, who was widely felt to be capable of leading a jihād himself, and when Bū Ḫimāra lost much of his prestige when he came up against the problems of any real Moroccan Sultan, and was

2 For the religious propaganda of Bū Ḫimāra, see David Seddar, "Notes on 'Primitive Rebels' in the pre-Colonial Maghreb" in Maghreb Review, 1976, vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 18-20.
forced to negotiate with the Europeans over mineral rights. In this way, as a threat to the makhzan's relations with Europe and as a focus for local rebellion against the makhzan, jihād became subversive.

This is not to say that the makhzan's opponents always declared themselves to be leading a jihād or that such men were continuously and directly opposed to the makhzan. A man such as Aḥmad Raisūlī, of the Jibāla, near Tetuan region, turned from banditry to a legalised oppression of people in the area by defeating a makhzan army and using his advantage to demand for himself an important local position as Pasha of Āsīla on the western coast.¹

The Collapse of the makhzan

After the succession of 'Abd al-'Azīz as a minor, the real power remained in the hands of his father's ḥājib,  سبحانه b. Mūsā, the man who had arranged the succession in the first place. 'Abd al-'Azīz took over personally in 1900, but by then the country that he ruled was practically out of control and the Sultan's power was more and more limited by the Europeans. The contemporary Moroccan historian, al-Nāṣirī had summed up the situation on the death of his father in these terms:

"Know also that the power of these Europeans during recent years has increased to an abominable degree, and has made itself apparent to an unprecedented extent. The progress and improvement in their circumstances has rapidly increased, doubling and redoubling like grains of wheat in the squares of a chess board, so that the state has all but fallen into calamity. Knowledge of the results and the limits of all this belong to God, may he be exalted, who alone knows what is hidden.

'I have knowledge of the things of today,

¹ See below, p. 142.
and of yesterday before it,
But of those of tomorrow, I am blind.' \\

Since then the situation had got worse. The year before 'Abd al-'Azîz's full accession to power in 1900, the French occupied the oasis of Tuât and then, at the beginning of 1900 that of Iglî. Moroccan attempts to seek diplomatic support failed, and unable to do anything about the invasion the makhzan's credibility in the eyes of the Moroccans, and particularly the 'ulamâ' of Fez, was further undermined. 2 Local people organised their own resistance to the French in the south-east of the country and received support from other areas of the country, despite the makhzan's inability to take action itself. 3 However, the Sultans did make some effort to reverse this trend.

When he came of age, 'Abd al-'Azîz, with British encouragement, attempted reforms of the taxation system in order to cope with his rapidly approaching insolvency. He proposed a universal tax on agriculture, the tartîb, the old systems were abolished, but the new ones were opposed by an alliance of the 'ulamâ' and the privileged classes, who were about to be taxed for the first time. Virtually no revenue was collected for two years, and this, on top of yet more loans from the French, brought about the almost total collapse of the makhzan finances. It led to yet further European intervention in Morocco's internal affairs, for, in 1906, the French banks, as security for these and other loans, managed to put their own officials into Moroccan customs houses to ensure that their loans were repaid.

1 Al-Nâşîrî, op. cit., p. 208.
2 Burke, Prelude, p. 45.
3 Ibid., p. 46.
Germany, worried by this growing French influence, asked for, and obtained, an international conference on the Moroccan question, which was held at Algeciras in 1906. The final treaty, the famous Act of Algeciras, was a triumph for the French. It recognised the need for reforms, to be carried out under French auspices. A Moroccan State Bank was established, dominated by French interests, and a joint French and Spanish police force was set up in Tangier. These and other "reforms" further diminished the makhzan's authority.

In the wake of these events, there were protests in Morocco, some of which led to violence, and French troops moved into eastern Morocco in 1907, and occupied the town of Oujda, ostensibly to protect their citizens. In July 1907, the French moved into Casablanca on the west coast, after riots there against foreigners.\(^1\)

'Abd al-'Azîz's own conduct did not help matters either. His excessive concern with the baubles of western technology led to a further loss of confidence in his judgement.\(^2\) In such circumstances, a movement grew up to seek a replacement as Sultan.

The replacement was the Sultan's brother, 'Abd al-Ḥafîz, although as Larouï points out, "it goes without saying that 'A. Ḥafîdzh did not create the movement which brought him to power."\(^3\) It was the result of growing despair among those sectors of Moroccan society, particularly the

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1 This is a summary of these events based on that in Ross E. Dunn, Resistance in the Desert. Moroccan Responses to French Imperialism 1881-1912 (London and Wisconsin, 1977), pp. 14-25.
2 For a colourful contemporary account, see Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, The Passing of the Shereefian Empire (London, 1910), pp. 10-12.
3 Larouï, Origines, p. 373.
'ulamā' and those who were in fact resisting the Europeans, of 'Abd al-'Azīz's ability to control the situation.

Ḥāfīẓ, at this time, was governor of Marrakesh, and after the landing of French troops at Casablanca, he was proclaimed Sultan. He was quickly supported by the "big qā'īds" of the south, especially the Glāwī family, and in the north by al-Raisūlī.¹

'Abd al-'Azīz left Fez for the coast, and French protection, and the 'ulamā' of Fez followed the lead of their counterparts in Marrakesh and declared his brother Ḥāfīẓ Sultan in January 1908.²

The bay'a granted by the Fāsī 'ulamā' laid down exactly what they expected of 'Abd al-Ḥāfīẓ. He was to recover the occupied territories, liberate Casablanca and Oujda, refuse to permit foreign advisers into the country, abolish the illegal (in the eyes of the shari'ā) maks taxes on produce entering the cities, guarantee the shari'ā, and return the privileges of the Sharīfs.³ Clearly, from a practical point of view, this was impossible. Ḥāfīẓ could not liberate the occupied territories, for his army was too weak, he could not abolish the maks, because it would lead him to final bankruptcy, and he could not abolish protection for the European Powers would hardly allow that.

He did try to find advisers for his forces from the Ottoman Empire, and a group of Ottoman military officers arrived in autumn of 1909. They were soon sent home, however, after French pressure,⁴ but not before they had tried to set up a

¹ Ibid., pp. 391-392.
² Ibid., p. 395.
³ Ibid., p. 396.
⁴ Ibid., p. 401.
prototype Islam Pan-Islamic youth group in Morocco.¹

The debts continued to rise. Ḥāfīẓ inherited 206 million francs owed to various foreign concerns. In March 1910 he accepted a loan of 104 million francs from the French to cover his brother's debts. This threw him completely into the hands of the French.²

Clearly the terms of his bay'a from the Fasi 'ulamā' could not be kept. The only alternative was one proposed by the Tangier newspaper Lisān al-Maghrib, when in 1908 it published a proposed constitution for Morocco, along the lines of the Ottoman constitution, although one less laicising in its conception. The constitution called for a consultative assembly (majlis al-shūrā), compulsory education, and a control of protection.³ It was quite unsuitable for Morocco, as it assumed a greater degree of political development after the European model than Morocco in fact possessed. In any event Ḥāfīẓ took little notice of it.⁴

The options were fading fast for the makhzan. Reforms on European lines were impossible. Attempts to reform along the lines suggested by the Fasi 'ulamā', and partly inspired by the desire to return to Islamic orthodoxy

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² Laroui, Origines, p. 402.


⁴ Laroui, Origines, p. 405.
in order better to cope with the Christian threat, along the lines of the Salafiya Islamic modernist movement of Egypt had also failed. This was despite Ḥāfīz's desire to put them into effect.1 There was simply no time to carry out reforms.

The Destruction of Morocco's Independence

In 1909, Ḥāfīz was caught up in yet another local jihād in the Melilla area. Bū Himāra was ejected by combined RifI action when he attempted to extend his control over the central Rif, and lost the support of his followers in the Silwān area when he gave European companies permission to build railway lines from Melilla to mines in the area of Wiksān. Local tribesmen attacked the workings and Spanish troops were sent to the area. They advanced out of Melilla, amidst heavy opposition to take possession of Silwān and Naẓūr. 'Abd al-Ḥāfīz tried to keep out of the conflict, and fell into conflict with his nationalist supporters when he failed to give help to the Rifis. The Spanish occupied a large area around Melilla and stayed there.2

At the same time, with financial pressure growing on him, 'Abd al-Ḥāfīz asked the European Powers for recognition. This was granted to him on the understanding that he recognised the validity of the Act of Algeciras.3 Ḥāfīz's acceptance of this condition led to a further decline in his support, just as his brother's had vanished.

In 1911, the ill feeling over the question of

1 Burke, Prelude, p. 135.
2 Ibid., pp. 137-138. For a brief account of this war, see Chapter II below.
taxation erupted into violence in Fez, as tribesmen from the surrounding countryside rose and besieged the city. In April 1911, another brother of Ḥafiz, Mūlāy Zayn was proclaimed Sultan in Meknes, although he accepted the call somewhat reluctantly. For a moment it seemed that Fez might rebel as well. For the first time the Berber tribes in the surrounding countryside had combined to form a proto-state. Ḥafiz called for French support which arrived in May 1911, and for the moment he was saved.¹

The Spanish felt that their interests were threatened by the French occupation of Fez, and landed troops at Larache on the west coast in June 1911, and proceeded to expand the beach-head there. Germany, also concerned about the threat to her interests, was bought off with the secession of a large tract of land in the Congo, in return for an agreement to a French protectorate over Morocco.²

In March 1912, 'Abd al-Ḥafiz signed the Treaty of Fez giving France a protectorate over Morocco. In April the French attempted their own reforms of the makhzan army, along European lines. The troops revoluted, and the rebellion lasted two days during which many were killed.³ In May, the city came under attack again, from a combination of tribes to the north of the city and those to the south, partly led by the remnants of Mūlāy Zayn's organisation. On 25 May 1912, the day after the arrival of the new Resident General, Gen. Lyautey, the two groups attacked together, and were only repelled after considerable fighting.⁴

1 Burke, Prelude, pp. 159-163.
2 Ibid., pp. 171-172.
3 Ibid., pp. 185-87
Meanwhile, the French were preparing for 'Abd al-Ḥafīz's abdication, which was concluded in August 1912, when he was replaced by yet another brother, Yussif. As 'Abd al-Ḥafīz resigned, yet another pretender to the throne emerged, this time in the south, al-Ḥiba, the son of Ma‘ al-‘Ainin who had opposed the French in Mauriania. His support came first from the Sūs, and then from Marrakesh itself. Al-Ḥiba's approach was based on a millenarian attempt to overturn the whole system of the makhzan and return once again to a society modelled on that of the Prophet. He presented himself first as 'amīr al-mu’minīn and then taking advantage of the gap in time between 'Abd al-Ḥafīz's resignation and the proclamation of Yussif, had himself proclaimed Sultan when he arrived at Marrakesh. However, the activities of his supporters alienated many people in Marrakesh, and as his support wavered, he decided to advance to the north in an effort to regain it. He then met with a French column which destroyed his army and he fled back to the Sūs, in southern Morocco.1

In this way Morocco, at least formally, fell under European domination. The Sultan, although technically head of state, was now powerless to make laws. But resistance to the French continued in the Middle and High Atlas, and in the north, where the Spanish had succeeded in reserving a small portion of the French protectorate for themselves, were opposed in nearly every part of their zone.

The Salafiya movement in Morocco

These problems of dealing with the challenge

1 Ibid., pp. 199-207.
presented to Muslim society by European colonialism and technical and economic superiority were not faced by Morocco alone among the Muslim nations. Precisely the same challenges were thrown up against the traditional order in most other parts of the Muslim world.

In Egypt and the Levant, from the time of Napoleon's conquest of Egypt onwards, a new movement in Islam began to emerge. Faced with the challenge presented by Europe, Islamic thinkers began to look for ways of dealing with the need to reform Muslim societies while at the same time preserving the role of Islam in those societies. Under the influence of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-1897) in particular—a man who was not himself an Egyptian—the idea began to grow that Islamic society was not inherently weaker than the European society, although it had much to learn from Europe in the way of modern technical advancements, but that before it could regain its strength, the decay that had corrupted the Islamic world would have to be reversed. The decay could only be reversed by restoring the unity of the Islamic community, the 'umma, and by regenerating the force of the shari'a.

The only way to do this was to return to the original purity of Islam, when the Islamic world had been powerful both in a military and a cultural sense, and it was this idea, the return to the origins of Islam and the early 'umma of the salaf (literally "ancestors") which became the central teaching of one of al-Afghānī's principal pupils,

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2 Ibid., p. 114.
3 Ibid., p. 115.
Muḥammad ‘Abduh, while at the same time accepting the European sciences and using them to rebuild the strength of the Muslim states. This movement came to be known as the Salafiya.

Thus, reform of the religion was to be accompanied by reform of Islamic society, for the two were of course inseparable. Two aspects of this have particular relevance for this thesis. They are the attitudes to Sufi-oriented mysticism and the religious brotherhoods (ṭariqas) which grew up to express that mysticism on the one hand and the attitude towards the role of the ruler of an Islamic state on the other. Of the first attitude it may be said that people like ‘Abduh disapproved in general of the ṭariqas on the grounds that they diverted man's attention from God, invented liturgies that were out of step with the prescriptions of the sharī'a, and by placing the individual members of the orders in a position subservient to the will of their spiritual director, thereby weakened the will of the individual.

As regards the rulers of the Islamic world, the attention of ‘Abduh was directed principally against the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, who by demanding and imposing absolute obedience to their rule, had weakened the authority of the ‘ulamā', allowed the sharī'a to decay, and permitted the decline of rational enquiry.

The Salafiya movement as a whole is far too complex to be dealt with in detail here, but for the moment it is

4 Its relevance to the Rif war is discussed in detail in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
enough to say that the major preoccupations were the reform of religious practices, and the restructuring of Islamic society and the role of the ruler in that society.

In Morocco, attempts at religious reform date back a considerable time before the time of Muḥammad 'Abduh. In the late eighteenth century, the Sultan Muḥammad III (1757-1792) had attempted to revive concern for the sharī'a by returning to the original sources of the law.¹ Muḥammad's son Mūlay Sulaymān (1792-1822) attempted to deal with one of the other concerns of the reformist movements and led an attack on the tārīqas. However, both these Sultans were more precursors of the Salafiyya movement than a part of it.² It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Moroccan religious teachers returned from study in Egypt and from pilgrimages to Mecca that the ideas of 'Abduh and others started to reach Morocco. On his accession in 1908, Mūlay 'Abd al-Ḥaفيţ helped these reformists to restructure the teaching of the Qarawiyīn mosque in Fez, the most important religious centre in Morocco to include a course on the tafsīr, allowing for a reinterpretation of the Qur'ān and ḥadīth, an essential prerequisite for the reform of Islamic society.³

These attempts at reform were opposed by the tārīqas, and in particular by the Kitṭānīya order, whose leader, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Ḳabīr al-Kitṭānī was killed

² Ibid., pp. 94-95.
³ Ibid., p. 98.
on the instructions of Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥafīḍ. ¹ There was, however, another ground for the opposition between the ṭarīqās and the Salafiya movement. This was the way in which the orders had cooperated with the French in their occupation both of Algeria and Tunisia. After the French occupation of Morocco, the ṭarīqās continued this cooperation in that country. As Abun Nasr has pointed out, this "enabled the Salafis to combine their religious and political objectives; it also made it possible for them to attack the French with impunity by directing their diatribes against the Sufi orders, the recognised allies of the French."²

In short, then, the period leading up to the Protectorate saw a search in Moroccan governing intellectual circles for ways in which the country might be reorganised and its religious life restructured in order to present an effective response to the challenge presented by European commercial and colonial penetration. It took a number of directions, organisational and religious. It is against this background that the Rif war must be discussed.

Part Two: the Rif War

In this historical and intellectual environment, the Rif war must have a place. However, just as the theories about the nature of Moroccan society in the period before the Protectorate differ widely so the accounts of the Rif war differ as well. Clearly these accounts will tend to fall in with the particular vision of Moroccan society held by a

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid., p. 101.
particular author, and so some of them will be contradictory while others will be complimentary. Roughly speaking they can be divided into two groups, the traditionalist; European accounts, which lay great emphasis on the "barbarity" of Morocco and on the split between bilād al-sība and bilād al-makhzan, and the modernist accounts, stemming largely from a nationalist interpretation of Moroccan history.

The Traditionalist Explanations

Robert Montagne has proposed an account of Moroccan society which divides it into two areas, the country controlled by the makhzan, and the country which effectively was not. Not surprisingly he uses this theory to explain the Rif war. He sees it in terms of a single leader, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm, who was able to take over leadership first of his clan then of his tribe, and then of a Rīfī confederation:

"Under our eyes was forming, just as in the legendary time of the Almohades, a Berber confederation at the centre of a kingdom conquered by arms."²

In other words, for him this was a typical example of the working of sība as an attempt to resist the imposition of central authority. It also focuses on the leadership of a single individual, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm, in his words "the Berber hero [of] Riffian independence."³

This emphasis on the individual role of bin 'Abd al-Karīm is also shared by Spanish accounts contemporary with the war. Clemente Cerdeira, a Spanish commentator on the war, sees Bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his brother as treacherous

1 Montagne, Berbers, p. 10.
3 Montagne, Berbers, p. 10.
villains who misled their followers:

"Only in the fantastic imagination of the Aulad al-Jattabi [sic] confused by Machiavellian adventurers, is there any belief in the mad idea of forming an independent nation, when its components have neither religion nor even a rudimentary culture, and sunk in misery lacks even the basic necessities for the survival of its people . . . Ben Abdelcrim, clever and daring, well acquainted with the idiosyncrasies and mentality of his people, took advantage of our withdrawal of July 1921, and, great opportunist that he is, was able to appeal to the primitive feelings of his brothers . . ."¹

This is extreme language, and has little to recommend it, except as colourful propaganda. The description of the rout and slaughter of more than 10,000 Spanish troops in July 1921 as a "withdrawal" is alone enough to invalidate it. But it has its roots in the idea of Morocco as a totally primitive country which typified most European thought at the time, a society which could be taken over and led by a single individual acting only out of self interest.

These ideas, by concentrating on the role of an individual tend to ignore the reasons for his rise to power, and the social pressures upon him, and the reasons why a very large number of people followed him. They also omit completely the ideological aspects of the Rif war, which are what have attracted the attention of more recent writers.

Modern and Nationalist Explanations of the Rif War

It would be surprising if a war of resistance to the Spanish and French that was as successful as the one in the Rif were not claimed as the first campaign in the

¹ Clemente Cerdeira, *Apuntes para la historia del Rif* traducción y comentario por (Clemente Cerdeira) (Madrid and Ceuta, 1926), pp. 72-73. This book is partly a translation of a lecture originally given by E. Michaux-Bellaire along with a large number of comments by Cerdeira. Those reproduced here are Cerdeira's own remarks.
independence movement in Morocco. However, one of the most eminent nationalist Moroccan historians, Abdallah Laroui does not see it in this light. He places it within the framework of his analysis that as the Sultan's ability to carry out jihād against the Christians declined, so it became more and more to be the responsibility of local forces. The Rif war, then, was one of the last major attempts at primary resistance against the French and Spanish. Laroui describes as "illusory" the tendency of historians to point to the space of a single year between the end of the Rif war and the beginning of the urban nationalist movement in Morocco and from there to propose that they were in some way connected:

"For if we extend our perspective to the Maghrib as a whole, the war in the Rif recedes into the past and takes its place beside numerous rural and moun-
taineer revolts [the Rif had been in a state of revolt against the Spaniards since 1860], whereas the political phenomena [i.e., in urban Morocco] relate to the overall nationalist movement in the Maghrib and the orient. In reality initial resistance and political nationalism are separated by far more than the lapse of a year's time."[1]

Thus Laroui proposes a local jihād as the explanation of the Rif war. In some ways this is a curious point of view. Firstly the use of the word "revolt" to describe the resistance of the Rifīs to the Spanish is strange, since it implies that the Spanish were already the authority in the north of Morocco. It was in fact resistance, not a rebellion. Secondly Laroui ignores the very great amount of evidence that bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to organise the Rif along modern lines, following, to a very large extent, the ideas of the Salafiyya movement.

It is this attempt to apply the modern ideas of

Islamic nationalism that has caught the attention of many writers. An American writer, David Hart, in a long work on the history and ethnology of bin 'Abd al-Karîm's own tribe, the Banû Waryaghal, has entitled his chapter on the Rif war "The Reformer and the War on Two Fronts".\(^1\) Hart concentrates on the religious reformism of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, on his attempts to substitute the shari'â for customary law, to break the power of the sharifs and religious orders and to destroy tribal differences, side by side with his efforts to set up a strong centralised government in the Rif with a regular army, organised along modern lines.

An Israeli historian, Pessah Shinar, who has written a comparison of the ideas of bin 'Abd al-Karîm and those of the Algerian leader 'Abd al-Qâdir, has also concentrated on the Salafîya-inspired ideas of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, as well as his acquaintanceship with European methods, through his close contact with the Spanish in the early years of their Protectorate.\(^2\) Within Morocco, the single most important nationalist leader inspired by the Salafîya, 'Allâl al-Fasî has claimed the Rifî state as part of the modern, democratic nationalist movement: "It was fortunate that this liberation movement ... had a democratic organisation, which aimed at the improvement of the life of the people."\(^3\)

Abderrahman Youssoufi seems to take a similar position in describing the Rifî state. According to him, this was not a case of slîba as opposed to makhzan (or vice

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1 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 369-403.
3 Al-Fasî, op. cit., p. 121.
versa) but something quite new, at attempt at synthesis which used the popular resistance (siba) to the domination of the traditional makhzan to set up "a modern state structure which at once rejected the errors of the Makhzan and the negativism of the siba."\(^1\) So, he argues, bin 'Abd al-Karîm did not attempt to set up a new makhzan, because the makhzan had already been seen to have failed and become the vehicle of European colonialism.\(^2\)

It will be seen that there is a considerable divergence within these views, from Laroui's description of a movement of primary resistance, through Shinar's and Hart's emphasis on the religious reformism of bin 'Abd al-Karîm and 'Allâl al-Fasî's presentation of the Rifî "movement" as inspired by the Salafîya with modern democratic aspirations, to Youssoufi's ideas of a movement of popular resistance laying aside the structures and errors of the past. With the exception of Hart and Shinar, there are obvious connections in these analyses with the political aims of their authors within the framework of modern Moroccan politics. It is not the place of this thesis to examine the political motives of these individual writers, but it is well to remember that they exist. They also raise other questions, of which one of the most important is the scope of the Rif war—whether the intention was to create a state separate from that of Morocco as a whole, or whether it was intended to proceed from the defence of the Rif to the liberation of the whole of Morocco. This is of course a vital point, for it raises the question of why bin 'Abd al-Karîm carried what

1 Abderrahman Youssoufi, "Les institutions de la République du Rif" in Colloque, pp. 81-100.
2 Ibid., p. 81.
had undoubtedly started as a movement to resist the Spanish into an attack on the French as well, thereby uniting these two European states against the Rif and leading inevitably to defeat. 'Allāl al-Fasī is most insistent that bin 'Abd al-Karīm did not intend to separate the Rif from the rest of Morocco:

"The Amīr [i.e., bin 'Abd al-Karīm] has never hesitated on any suitable occasion from explaining that he wanted only to liberate his country and that he did not rise up against the Moroccan throne, nor would he do so, for his family had always been faithful to it."¹

According to him, the intention was to liberate the Rif and then, when the rest of Morocco had been similarly freed, to hand the Rif back to its legitimate rulers the 'Alāwī family.²

Hart takes a similar point of view when he writes that

"'Abd al-Krim fought for an ideal: the total independence of the Rif. If he had gained it, through force of arms, then he might have started to talk about the total independence of Morocco."³

In other words, both of these writers hold the view that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had limited objectives. On the other hand, it must be emphasised that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not alone either in Morocco or in the wider context of the Islamic world. It is certainly true that he was in touch with other Moroccan leaders of armed resistance to the Europeans, such as Marrabī Rabbuh, the brother of al-Ḥiba who carried on the struggle against the French in the south⁴ but it is difficult to go on from there to propose that they were

1 Al-Fasī, op. cit., p. 121.
2 Ibid.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 396.
coordinating their efforts, for such contacts may have been no more than mutual encouragement.

Equally true is the point made by Jacques Berque that at the time of the Rif war there were other attempts to set up new Islamic States in various parts of the Middle East and North Africa, in opposition to European colonialism. Such movements existed in Egypt in 1919, in Tripolitania (the "Republic of Misurata") from 1915 to 1921 and in Syria at Ragga from 1920-1921.1

Clearly the most obvious parallel is with Turkey, whose resistance to the Greeks in 1921 was as spectacularly successful as was the Rif resistance to the Spanish. The comparison was, of course, made at the time, and Ajdîr, the Rif capital was dubbed the "Angora of the West".2 In fact, comparisons with Turkey are not very helpful, firstly because bin 'Abd al-Karîm did not attempt to secularise the Rif, and secondly because, superficial resemblances aside, Turkey was a relatively modern state, whereas at the beginning of the Rif war there was no state at all in the Rif.

In fact, such comparisons are valuable only to show a widespread feeling in the Islamic world that colonialism had to be opposed both through reforms in Muslim society and by military opposition. There can be no question of coordination between these movements, but there was certainly fellow feeling, and Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karîm was well aware of what was happening in Turkey and admired

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1 Jacques Berque, "Poussée nationale et démocratie à la base dans la nation arabe" in Colloque, pp. 46-49.
Mustafa Kemal's organisational abilities.

This is not to say that armed resistance to the Europeans was a new thing in Moroccan history, and particularly not in the Rif. Aḥmad al-BūʿAyyāshī, himself a Rifī, and the author of the only large-scale account in Arabic of the Rifī war is most insistent on this point:

"It is worth mentioning the historical and heroic nature of this proud region, that was never willing to allow anyone to overrun it, throughout its long history; that is, since the Europeans started to concentrate on the domination of Morocco."

For him, then, the Rifī war was the continuation of a long historical struggle. He also presents the Rifī war, as being, in addition to this, an attempt to set up an ordered state.

Conclusion

These then are the major ideas surrounding the Rifī war. They raise a number of important questions—the role of Islam, the validity of an attempt to set up a modern state in the Rifī, and the relationship between that new state and the historical social structures of the region on the one hand, and the traditional Moroccan state on the other. On a wider plain it raises questions about the position of the Rifī state in the context of the movement for the reform of the Islamic world, which started with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and others.

However, it will also be seen that many of these accounts have particular political partialities of their own. Perhaps more serious than this is that they are incomplete. Details of the actual events, the basis on

which a historical analysis could be built are in fact lacking. There are several books which have been written about the Rif war, but, by and large they tend to have taken a European point of view. Thus there are a large number of books written by Spanish military officers about the war. These books, quite naturally, deal mainly with the military aspects of the war, and tend to concentrate more or less exclusively on the Spanish military effort. They are thus better described as Spanish history rather than Moroccan. This is not to say that some of them are not very useful indeed, for the military efforts of the Spanish in particular helped to shape the Rif response. Undoubtedly the finest of these military accounts is that written by General Goded which, however, only covers the final stages of the war. Another book in this category is that of Andres Sánchez Pérez, another military participant, which deals in great detail with the last two months of the war, immediately before the collapse of the Rif. The book by General Berenguer, the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco at the time of the initial defeat and rout of the Spanish forces in 1921, was written in self-defence to reply to criticisms of his conduct, and while it is useful from a chronological point of view has otherwise to be used with care. The semi-autobiographical and semi-historical account

1 Manuel Goded, Marruecos: Las etapas de la pacificación (Madrid, Barcelona and Buenos Aires, 1932).
2 Andres Sánchez Pérez, La acción decisiva contra Abd-el-Krim (Toledo, 1930) (Colección Bibliográfica Militar, Vol. XXVIII).
3 Dámaso Berenguer y Fuste, Campañas en el Rif y Yebalà Notas y documentos de mi diario de operaciones (Madrid, 1923).
written by Francisco Gómez-Jordana y Souza, another military participant, and the son of Berenguer's immediate predecessor as High Commissioner is excellent in its way, and provides a very useful insight into the problems of Spanish military thinking and the policies of successive governments in Madrid. It is, however, written from an exclusively Spanish point of view, and gives as the reason for the disaster of 1921 the weakness of will shown by Spanish politicians towards the war in Morocco, which, according to him, so weakened the military effort that they contributed to the defeat. No mention is made of corresponding efforts on the Rif side to organise and prepare to defeat the Spanish. Recently, an American scholar has written about the Rif war, with particular emphasis on the period after 1923. Shannon Fleming deals in some detail with the divergences in policy within the Spanish army and government, and with the military operations, but makes relatively little reference to social conditions, or to the political or military organisation within the Rif. Finally, another military historian, Carlos Martínez de Campos covers the whole period of the war from the point of view of the military operations. However, his book has been used with some care in this thesis, particularly because his transliterations of Moroccan names are not only inaccurate, but frankly misleading, and frequent misprints in dates lead to

1 Francisco Gómez-Jordana y Souza, Conde de Jordana, La Tramoya de nuestra acción en Marruecos (Madrid, 1976).
2 Ibid., p. 43.
4 Carlos Martínez de Campos España bélica el siglo XX Marruecos (Madrid, 1969).
some confusion.

All these books have been written from a specifically Spanish point of view, and, in comparison, published material on the Rif side of the conflict is hard to come by. The most notable exception to this is the work of David Hart, an American sociologist and historian, whose work on the Banū Waryaghal, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's own tribe is invaluable. However, his book, as far as this thesis is concerned, does suffer from two disadvantages. Firstly, it deals mainly with the Banū Waryaghal, and therefore does not discuss in any detail the military expansion of the Rif state into the west of the Spanish zone of the Protectorate. Secondly, Hart did not have access to some of the archival material on the Rif. As a result, a few of the details that he gives have since turned out to be inaccurate. This second point also applies to the work of Ahmad al-Bū 'Ayyāshī, the son of one of the military leaders on the Rif side. Much of his material is derived from already published European sources—particularly Spanish—but he also makes use of personally collected reminiscences of the participants. Again, much of his interest is taken up with the military aspects of the war. David Woolman, an American historian has written an important book on the Rif war, which makes good use of the published works on the subject. He does try to discuss both sides of the conflict, but because of the nature of the published work, inevitably tends to deal with the European side of the conflict.

1 Hart, Aith Waryaghar.
2 Al-Bū 'Ayyāshī, op. cit.
3 David Woolman, Rebels in the Rif, Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion (London and Stanford, 1969).
Mention must also be made of the proceedings of the conference held on the Rif war in Paris in 1973. Some of the papers given at this conference are most useful—particularly the ones dealing with the geography and social structure of the Rif. However, the paper dealing with the organisation of the Rif, by Abderrahman Youssoufi, while useful factually at times, is written from an extreme nationalist point of view. Moreover, much of the conference was taken up with discussions about the repercussions of the Rif war in Europe, a subject in itself worthy of a great deal more research, but one which does not directly concern this thesis.

Finally, a number of European journalists and adventurers visited the Rif during the war, and wrote about their experiences afterwards. By far the best accounts of this nature are the two written by an American journalist, Vincent Sheean, who visited the Rif twice during the war. The book by Walter Harris, correspondent of The Times in Morocco for a long period before the war and during it, is also informative about the military aspects of the war and the final peace negotiations. The war in fact attracted enormous journalistic attention. There would appear to be two reasons for this. Firstly, it was an extremely romantic campaign, with a relatively backward people fighting and often defeating two modern European Powers; in addition, the area where it was being fought also had been highly

1 All the papers given at this conference are published in Colloque.
2 Vincent Sheean, Adventures among the Rif (London, 1926) (henceforth referred to as "Sheean, Adventures"). This book has also been published under the title of An American among the Rif. Vincent Sheean, Personal History (New York, 1935) (henceforth referred to as "Sheean, Personal History").
3 Walter B. Harris, France Spain and the Rif (London, 1927).
romanticised in European accounts of Morocco in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a result, pictures like one of a Rif warrior (which appeared during the 1909 conflict around Melilla) captured the imaginations of readers of such publications as the Illustrated London News (Photograph I:1).

The other reason for this interest in the Rif war was concern of European officials and political experts that a Pan-Islamic movement threatened the authority of their empires in the Islamic world. In 1924 a Foreign Office official in London submitted a memorandum in which he suggested that in fact a Pan-Islamic movement controlled from a particular centre did not exist as such, but that the different movements were definitely in touch with each other. As such, the situation was deeply worrying for the European authorities, and so for the European press.

However, it must be stressed that the overall impression given by all these sources is lacking in coherence. No thorough picture of the political, social and organisational structures and plans of the Rif at war has yet been given. For this thesis it has been necessary to turn to archival sources in order to discuss these matters. By far the richest archives are those of the Military History Service of the Spanish army. These contain daily intelligence reports on the political and social conditions in the Rif both before and during the war. They are largely based on information collected by Spanish agents and spies, usually Rifis themselves. They are remarkably detailed, and the many reports which are dated on the same day are usually in

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1 FO 371/10067/E5421/5421/16 "Memorandum on the Political Situation in North Africa" by F. Rodd, 21 June 1924, confidential.
Photograph I:1

Artist's impression of 1909 of a typical Rif Warrior

Source: The Illustrated London News, 14 August 1909, p. 239
agreement, so that a fair measure of accuracy may be assumed. In addition, there is a large volume of Arabic correspondence in the archive relating to relations between individual tribal leaders and the Spanish which show how those relations developed. There is further material of great value in the Africa Section of the Spanish National Library in Madrid. This contains a mass of information in the form of reports on the social, political and economic situation in individual tribes, written by officers in the military administration after the war ended, but often dealing in some depth with the history of the war. Much of this collection was donated by Sr. Tomás García Figueras, who was one of those administrators. These are largely unpublished reports, written only for the benefit of other members of the administration, and are thus a primary source of great value. Also in Madrid, there is a small collection of documents relating to the Rif war in the archives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry. Much of this concerns the international repercussions of the Rif war, and is not greatly used in this thesis. The only Spanish Archive which would have been of the greatest use, was unfortunately not available for consultation when this thesis was being researched. This is the Archive of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, now housed among the Archives of the Presidency of the Government, in Alcalá de Henares outside Madrid. This archive has only very recently been opened to researchers, and without doubt contains material of the greatest value concerning the Rif war.

In France there are a large number of captured Rif documents preserved in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. These documents are of the greatest
possible use in any discussion of the organisation and religious reforms carried out by bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his supporters. Also in Paris are the French Military Archives at Vincennes. These mainly consist, for the Rif war, of a certain number of daily reports made by French military intelligence and other officers. They are most complete after the French entry into the war in 1925.

In London, the main archives are those of the Foreign Office. These provide an outside view of what was happening, but not necessarily an impartial one. They generally show an excessive bias against the policy pursued by the Spanish in Morocco—which does not mean that they consequently favoured the Rifis. There were certainly good grounds for major criticisms to be made of the Spanish, but some of the Consular reports show an active dislike of the Spanish, and they have to be used with some care. Walter Harris, whose papers are preserved in the archives of The Times newspaper in London, to some extent shared this low opinion of Spanish colonisation, nevertheless, his papers are very useful for the period covering the final stages of the war, just as his newspaper is an excellent source for checking dates.

In Morocco, the National Archives, which are not easy to use, contain one absolutely essential item. This is an account taken down by Ahmad Skīraj of the reminiscences of Muḥammad Azarqān, one of the major participants in the wartime government of the Rif. As such, it perhaps tends to concentrate rather heavily on Muḥammad Azarqān's own role in

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1 Ahmad Skīraj, "Al-ṣall al-warīf fī muḥābara al-rīf ṣām 1443-1924" unpublished MS in National Archives, Rabat.
the conflict—although it does give much information on other aspects of the war. Furthermore, much of its detail is corroborated by other sources.

This archival material which has not been used by earlier writers on the subject, makes it possible to look again at the Rif war. In the first place it exposes a number of chronological inaccuracies, which are of considerable importance in understanding the development of events and the policies adopted by the Rif leadership. One of the problems of much previous writing on the war has been that it ignores the process by which the Rif state developed from a grouping of a few tribes in 1921 to encompass practically the whole of the Spanish zone in northern Morocco as well as part of the French zone, in 1925. It is in order to explore the mechanism of this development that a largely chronological approach has been adopted for this thesis. In the second place, the archival material brings out the role played by other individuals and groups apart from that of the Rif leader, Muḥammad bin ʿAbd al-Karīm. In the past, very great attention has been paid to this one man. The intention of this thesis is not in any way to diminish the importance of bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, but to show the relationships between him and the people that he led as well as those who opposed him among his own people; its intention is also to show the economic and social forces that played an important role in shaping the course of the war and the nature of the Rif state, and to discuss the nature and the effects of the social and religious reforms which were carried out under the leadership of bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, and the relationship between his government and the ideas of Islamic reform.
Chapter II

THE SPANISH PROTECTORATE IN MOROCCO

"The semitic influence on our tongue, superimposed on its Latin base is African. 'Africa,' cries Alfonso the Warrior as he rises up on the coasts of our northern mountain; 'Africa,' sing the ballads of chivalry . . .; 'Africa,' says Isabel the Catholic Queen in her will; 'Africa,' proclaims Cisneros in Oran; 'Africa,' cries Charles V . . ."

Emilio Castelar, President of 1st Spanish Republic speaking of the Spanish interest in Africa in the nineteenth century.1

"The northern shore [of Morocco], especially on the western side, furrowed by mountains and numerous rivers, sheltered from the burning winds of the desert, freshened by sea breezes, with a light soil in the plains and its mountain sides covered by forests, is one of the most beautiful countries in the world."

A Spanish description, in the 1860s, of the landscape of the future Spanish Protectorate. 2

"[Berber tribes] had long been free of any of the inconveniences of government."

Herbert White, a British consul in Morocco between 1882 and 1921, on the bilād al-sība in Morocco. 3

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1 Quoted in Antonio García Pérez, Melilla (Después de la campaña de 1909), (Madrid, 1911), p. 4.
2 José Gómez de Arteche and Francisco Coello, Descripción y Mapas de Marruecos con algunas consideraciones sobre la importancia de la ocupación militar de una parte de este imperio (Madrid, 1859), p. 4.
3 Quoted in F.V. Parsons, "Late Nineteenth-Century Morocco through European Eyes" in Maghreb Review, Vol. 3, nos. 5-6, Jan.-Apr. 1978, p. 2.
This chapter examines firstly and briefly the history of Spanish involvement in Morocco, and then the geography and social and political structure with which it came into contact.

It would obviously be a mistake to see Spanish interest and involvement in Morocco as an unchanging force. The sentiments expressed by Castelar, reproduced above, were based on the centuries-old history of religious and national confrontations between Spain and Islam. By 1900 they had evolved into an appreciation, in some quarters at least, of the desirability of Spanish intervention in Morocco for the commercial, economic and political interests of a modern European state. On the other hand, the Rif was largely held, by European writers of the period, to be an unchanging and primitive society.

As the Introductory Chapter showed, Morocco, through the nineteenth century, was undergoing profound social and political changes. However, this was scarcely recognised by European observers when they talked about the political structures of the makhzan. When they talked of the bilād al-sība this change was not recognised at all. For them, the Rif was still sunk in the same barbarity in the 1860s, or in the first decade of the twentieth century, as it had been in the Middle Ages. No changes were observable, partly because no change was expected, and partly because the information on the Rif was so sketchy. In 1911 northern Morocco, which faced onto the Mediterranean and one of the great sea-routes of the world—as writers never ceased reminding their readers—was still largely terra incognita.

In fact, northern Morocco underwent very great
changes--both economic and political--during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the second part of this chapter will explore this evolution. It is, however, extremely difficult to plot these changes, as the information is very scarce. To begin with, most of the descriptions of Morocco in European languages present this unchanging picture of Rif society. In the second place, the overwhelming concern of these European writers was with the European presence in Morocco so that contemporary photographs tend to show pictures of European buildings rather than of the Moroccan landscape. However, before discussing these changes, the history of Spanish involvement in Morocco must be described.

Part One: Spain and Morocco
(the historical origins)

In describing Spanish interest in Morocco and northern Africa, it is difficult to know where to begin. Spain had been invaded by Muslim armies from Africa in the eighth century, and became part of the Islamic world. For the next seven hundred years some part of Spain was under Muslim rule, while Christian armies, beginning with the north of the Iberian peninsula, tried to re-take their lands. This reconquista (reconquest) was only completed with the fall of the Kingdom of Granada in 1492.

However, even before the reconquest was completed, Christian kings in the Iberian peninsula had tried to extend their authority into northern Africa. In 1449, John II of Castilla gave "permission" to the Duke of Medina Sidonia "to
conquer the west coast of Africa." In 1478, a fortified post was set up at a place known as Santa Cruz de la Mar Pequeña, whose position was subsequently forgotten, which gave rise to much discussion in the nineteenth century.

These were only isolated incidents, but once the reconquista was completed, Spanish attention turned to the invasion of northern Africa in earnest. In 1497, Melilla in eastern Morocco was occupied, but Queen Isabel, who with King Fernando had overseen the last stages of the reconquest of the peninsula, died in 1504 without Spain occupying any more positions on the north African coastline. However, in her will, Isabel—the "Catholic Queen" of the opening quotation—asked that the invasion of north Africa be continued:

"I request and command the Princess my daughter and the Prince her husband that they should be absolutely obedient to the commands of the Holy Mother Church, and protect and defend her as they are required to do: and that they should not cease in the conquest of Africa and fight for the faith against the infidels."

In the century and a half that followed, Spain took a number of positions on the north African coast including: the tiny islet of Peñón de Vélez de Gomera in 1508 (losing it in 1522 and re-taking it in 1564); Oran, in Algeria, in 1509; and

2 Ibid., p. 162.
3 Tomás García Figueras, La Acción de España en turno al 98 (1860-1912) (Madrid, 1968), vol. 1, p. 23. García Figueras, a former Spanish military administrator in Morocco, is regarded in Spain as the most senior Moroccan scholar in that country. Although his writing is very concerned with maintaining Spanish prestige, his books are extremely detailed and well documented.
two other Algerian towns, Bugie and Algiers, and Tripoli, in what is now Libya, in 1510. In 1580 Ceuta, which had been occupied by the Portuguese since 1415, was ceded to the Spanish, and in 1588 the Spanish took Asila, also a former Portuguese possession. Larache was taken in 1618, and the island of Alhucemas in 1673. Some of these positions were not held for very long—the Moroccans under Mūlāy Ismā'īl ejected the Spanish from Larache in 1689, and from Asila in 1690. The Spanish colonies in Algeria and Tripoli were abandoned or lost in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

After this, Spanish positions were reduced to Ceuta, the Peñón de Vélez, Alhucemas Island, and Melilla along the northern coast of Morocco. These garrisons—presidios—stagnated, and eventually became little more than military prisons. Spain's lack of interest in developing her empire in Africa was the result of her overriding concern with South and Central America. However, a treaty between Spain and Morocco, dealing with commerce, fishing and navigation, was signed in 1795, and there were various embassies between the two countries under the Spanish Kings Charles III and Charles IV. Spanish interest was re-awakened in the first half of the nineteenth century, after the French occupation of Algeria. In 1848 the Spanish pre-empted the French by occupying the Chafarinas Islands, close to what is

3 Ibid., p. 105.
4 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 345.
The boundaries of the Spanish Zone in 1912. These boundaries are different from those which resulted from the Rif war. In 1926, France remained in occupation of all the Banū Zarwal and Gazāwa tribes. As this is one of the few existing maps which shows the original boundaries it is reproduced here, at about one third the size of the original.

Source: Donoso-Cortés, *op. cit.*, bound at the end of the book.
DE LA ZONA ESPAÑOLA DEL NORTE DE MARRUECOS

SIgnos:

--- Línea de Oro de infantería.

--- Línea de Infantería.

--- Línea de Artillería.

--- Punto de protección y de enlace.

MAR MEDITERRÁNEO

Estrecho de Gibraltar

Océano Atlántico

Zona Española de Marruecos
Map II : 2

Northern Morocco—General map

Source: War Office Edition 1-GSGS
Sheets 420B (Fès) and 421A (Oran)
now the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. These islands, quite useless for anything else, provide "the only natural anchorage off the coast of Morocco suitable for all classes of vessels,"¹ and during the nineteenth century it became the centrepiece of various grandiose plans for a huge port complex.

The French were not the only threat to any desires Spain might have felt to increase her dominion in Morocco. The Moroccans themselves were opposed to any Spanish expansion. From the mid-1840s onwards one or other of the presidios was under siege. In 1847, it was Melilla that was threatened; in 1858, a Spanish ship was captured by pirates. It was at Ceuta, however, that the worst fighting occurred. Here the need for expansion was most urgent. The population only increased from 3002 (not including military and prisoners) in 1797 to 3,819 in 1860. The town was stagnating, because there was little prospect of making a living in a city that was cut off from its hinterland.² Therefore, it was necessary to enlarge that hinterland. The opportunity came in 1859, when a border struggle near Ceuta led to a full war between Spain and Morocco.

The "War of Africa", 1859-1860

In late 1859, Spanish troops who were trying to build a more secure frontier post on the borders of Ceuta were attacked by men of the 'Anjara tribe. Several were killed,

² Manuel Gordillo Osuna, Geografía Urbana de Ceuta (Madrid, 1972), p. 38. This book, as its title implies, is mainly on urban geography of present-day Ceuta; however, it does contain a section on the economic and geographical history of the town.
the Spanish flag defiled, and the new frontier post was demolished. The Spanish demanded that the Sultan's representative in Tangier punish the 'Anjara tribe severely. At first he refused, but when he showed signs of changing his mind the 'Anjara tribe appealed to the Sultan. At this moment the Sultan Mūlāy 'Abd al-Raḥmān died, and was succeeded by his son, Mūlāy Muḥammad. The new Sultan decided to protect the 'Anjara from the Spanish and war was declared. On 1 January 1860 the Spanish began their invasion of Morocco. They encountered considerable difficulty. Tetuan is 23 miles from Ceuta and it took a whole month for the Spanish army to reach its walls. They were opposed by a Moroccan army under Mūlāy al-'Abbās, the Sultan's brother, which was rather inefficient, and by local people from the 'Anjara, and volunteers from other parts of Morocco who fought a spirited guerrilla campaign against the Spanish troops.

At the beginning of February 1860, Spanish troops entered Tetuan. At first their rule seems to have been benign, and even welcomed by the citizens, for as the Spanish had advanced, the city had been looted by its populace. When he entered the town, on 6 February, O'Donnell, the Spanish general leading the army, restored order and appointed an administration. However, despite his attempts at a benign occupation of Tetuan, a number of his orders caused a certain degree of annoyance to the Muslim inhabitants.

1 Al-Naṣīrī, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 84.
2 Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 85.
3 Woolman, op. cit., p. 32.
4 For an account of the insufficiencies of the Moroccan army under al-'Abbās, see al-Naṣīrī, op. cit., Vol. IX, pp. 87-88.
5 Ibid., Vol. IX, pp. 90-91.
Perhaps his most noticeably offensive decision was to turn the important shrine of Sidi 'Abdallah al-Baqdqali into a church, and to store grain and rifles in two other mosques. On 11 February, a Sunday, High Mass was said for the first time in the shrine.

The initially good impression of Spanish occupation on the people of Tetuan soon wore off. Prices of food doubled, and O'Donnell started to re-plan the city. Those buildings which were not in accordance with his ideas were demolished.

However, Spanish occupation of Tetuan did not last long. On 26 April 1860, Spain and Morocco signed a peace treaty which provided for a Spanish withdrawal, in return for an indemnity of 100,000,000 pesetas, the right to enlarge Ceuta and Melilla, a commercial treaty with Morocco giving Spain similar rights to those held by Britain after the 1856 treaty, and the right to re-occupy Santa Cruz de la Mar Pequeña, which was now identified with Ifni on the south-west coast of Morocco.

Spain after the "War of Africa"

The Spanish public had been convinced of the need for the war by a concerted propaganda campaign based on the
will of Isabel I. An extremely chauvinist campaign was conducted by the Spanish press.\(^1\) As a result, when the war was over there was public rejoicing. Writing of this campaign, an English historian of Spain, Raymond Carr, has said:

"It was a classic example of a war of honour unsupported by economic interest, the reflex action of a nation that felt itself growing in prosperity and ripe for colonial responsibility in some abstract materialist sense."\(^2\)

However, Carr is wrong to say that there was no materialist interest in the war—the commercial treaty is enough to disprove that. But the war certainly did mark the beginnings of a real Spanish concern with Africa.

The "Africanista" movement developed slowly over the next few years. It only really gained momentum in 1876 with the foundation of the Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid, the interests of whose founders were encouraged by the discoveries of the explorers of other nations—such as the British Livingstone and Stanley—in Africa. In 1877 the Asociación Española para la Exploración de África was founded under the presidency of the King, Alfonso XII.\(^3\) The interesting point about this scholarly interest is that it was not confined to Morocco or northern Africa, but to Africa as a whole.

The scholarly interest in Africa was accompanied by a growing realisation of the advantages of commercial expansion in Africa. The first attention was directed towards Spain's colonies along the north coast of Morocco. In 1879, a Spanish geographer complained that none of the presidios, nor, for that matter, the Canary Islands, were used for

\(^1\) Woolman, op. cit., p. 32. Another example, in this case a book, of this campaign is the work of Gómez de Arteche and Coello, cited above, p. 60.


economic purposes; to begin with, he proposed a new port based on the Chafarinas Islands.¹

In 1882, a congress was held in Madrid to discuss the commercial rôle of Spain in Africa and America and Oceania. In the course of this congress, not only Morocco but the Gulf of Guinea and the Canaries were examined. Concerning Morocco, it decided to call for a new commercial treaty with Morocco, which would extend the rights of "protection" of Moroccan subjects by Spain, the construction of a new port in the Chafarinas, the expansion of Ceuta and Melilla as civil ports rather than military bases, and so on.²

What the Africanistas proposed for Morocco, at this stage, was a policy of peaceful penetration, by Spain, of the Moroccan market and, in effect, society. In 1844, a petition from the Sociedad Española de Africanistas y Colonialistas petitioned the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) to negotiate a new treaty with Morocco to allow an extension of protection, to set up schools and hospitals in the main cities, to allow them to train Moroccan soldiers, to set up an Arabic press in Ceuta, and so on.³ This idea of peaceful penetration was to remain the principle of Spanish interest in Morocco until about 1909; it continued after this date to form a major part of the policy-making of Spanish governments which hoped to use the technique of peaceful penetration to help reduce the military burden of the Spanish protectorate.

Certainly there was a growth in the population of the principal presidios—that of Ceuta grew at an average rate of 1.97 per cent a year between 1875 and 1897.⁴

⁴ Gordillo Osuna, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
However, this slow growth was not matched by greater commercial prosperity. The weekly paper *El África* of Ceuta complained in 1891 that "It is no exaggeration for us to describe Ceuta as moribund and decrepit," and stated that the city needed a proper customs post on the Moroccan frontier, bunkering facilities, and free trade with Morocco.\(^1\)

The campaign for economic expansion went on. However, any territorial expansion around the presidios, or an attempt at it, met with determined opposition from the local people. In 1893, fighting broke out in the Melilla area when Spanish troops were extending their fortifications south of the city. The fighting did not last long, and only one Spanish soldier—the commander, General Margallo—was killed in the skirmishing. Even so, Spain had had to put 25,000 troops into the field for the occasion.\(^2\)

The Spanish government could ill afford to mobilise this number of troops for Morocco. Spain was in the process of losing her empire in America. The final defeat in Cuba in 1898 caused a complete failure of confidence in Spain's future as an imperial power. By the end of 1898, "Africanism was practically dead."\(^3\)

**From "Africanism" to "Moroccanism"**

After 1898, the popularity among the Spanish public of any new colonial venture was extremely low. Nevertheless, with the removal of the American markets Spanish commercial enterprises did seek new outlets for their goods. With most of Africa already divided between other European

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2 Woolman, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.
Powers, only Morocco remained as a feasible alternative for Spanish commerce. Certainly any attempt at military intervention in Morocco was not at this stage widely considered. The growing commercial interest of Spain was recognised by an agreement between Spain and France signed in 1904. Spain's "sphere of influence" was defined in the agreement as stretching roughly from the W. Muluya in the east to the W. Lukkus in the west. This "sphere of influence" would entitle Spain to "act freely" in this area, if the needs of security of its presidios and the weakness of the Moroccan government made it necessary. It gave Spain rights to set up companies to exploit the mineral riches of Morocco, and the right to circulate Spanish money in her "sphere of influence".

Spain of course was not the only country that was interested in Morocco, and the Algeciras conference was an effort to sort out other difficulties. Meanwhile, Spanish commercial interest grew. From 1904 onwards, Centros Comerciales Hispano-Marroquies were set up in Madrid, Barcelona and Tangier, with the aim of encouraging commerce between Spain and Morocco. From 1907 onwards, a series of "African congresses" were held in Spain, to discuss industry, navigation, commerce, colonisation and finance in Morocco. Morales Lezcano has shown that the impetus for these congresses, and the main source of interest in Morocco, came from Barcelona and Cataluña, one of the main exporting and commercial centres of Spain.

1 See map above, p. 65.
3 See above, p. 34.
However, the real riches of Morocco were, or were thought to be, in mineral wealth. The content of the iron ore in the mountains south of Melilla was, for instance, considerably greater than that extracted in mines on the Spanish peninsula.\(^1\) In 1907, the first major mining company—La Compañía del Norte Africane—was set up. It was followed a year later by the Sociedad Española de Minas del Rif.\(^2\) The main sources of minerals lay in the mountains of the Banū Bū Ifrūr, around Wiksān and Sighanghan, over 20 kms from Melilla, and to reach it railways had to be built and capital equipment installed at the mines. Clearly no company could afford to risk large amounts of capital unless the security of their workers and equipment was assured. However, there were no such guarantees in north-west Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century.

From Peaceful Penetration to Military Action

From 1902 onwards, much of north-eastern Morocco had been under the control of the Pretender (al-Rughî) Bū Ḥimāra, based first at Tāzā then at Silwān, south of Melilla.\(^3\) He at least represented some sort of constituted authority, and give the Compañía Españole de Minas del Rif permission to start mining and to build a railway to Wiksān.\(^4\) This was quite illegal, of course, both in Morocco—for only the legitimate Sultan could grant mining concessions—and in

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1 Ibid., p. 73.
2 Ibid., p. 60.
3 See above, p. 30.
4 The zāhir of Bū Ḥimāra was dated 22 Rabī‘ al-Nabī (i.e., Rabī‘ I), 1326/28 April 1908, and is reproduced in Manuel Becerra Fernandez, Notas referentes a la tribu de Kelala (Rif) y al ferrocarril de Mililla a las minas de Beni-Buifrur (Madrid, 1909) (unnumbered page at end of pamphlet).
Spanish law—for Spain recognised only Mūlāy 'Abd al-'Azīz as the legitimate Sultan. The company hired an engineer to make a preliminary survey. However, the collapse of Abū Ḥimārah's authority at the end of 1908 led to a power vacuum in the area, and the military governor of Melilla was given permission by the Spanish government to take any necessary action to protect Spanish interests.  

During the first part of 1909, attacks on Spanish positions around Melilla increased. On 9 July the railway workings were attacked. Reservists were called up in Catalonia, and there was a week of rioting in Barcelona, as a result. War in Morocco was not popular among the working-class in Spain and the revolt was put down only after fierce fighting, accompanied by considerable violence on both sides. By November, Marina's forces had occupied much of the Qal'ayya peninsula and had reached as far south as Silwān (see map).  

Marina himself was unsure of the use to which the conquests would be put, for he was sure that the Spanish did not intend to colonise the land, but once the army had occupied this part of Morocco it could only continue to fight, for it was exposed on all sides to attacks by the unoccupied tribes. Fighting broke out again in 1911, led by Muḥammad Mizziān of the Banū Bū Ifrūr, and supported by

3 The course of the war is described in Ashmead-Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 368-503. Ashmead-Bartlett, a British war-correspondent, reported how Spanish troops blew up houses on the Naẓūr plain, an activity he considered a regrettable necessity of war: "... it is ... part of the price which barbarism pays for the blessing of civilization," ibid., p. 428.
4 The Times, 9 Nov. 1909.
contingents from many tribes of northern Morocco.\(^1\) Furthermore, as a result of the French occupation of Fez, Spanish troops landed at Larache on 8 June 1911.\(^2\) News of the Spanish landings was not well received in Spain itself, for the growing working-class movement resented being forced into yet another war in Morocco, when economic conditions were bad—themselves the result of the disastrous war to defend Spain's American colonies.

However, Spain was now committed to military intervention in Morocco. The announcement of her Protectorate in northern Morocco on 14 November 1912, as a sub-Protectorate of the French, put the seal on this commitment.

Part Two: The Spanish Protectorate in Morocco
(position, and extent)

The Protectorate which the Spanish were called upon to rule lay mainly in northern Morocco.\(^3\) This northern zone was limited on two sides by the sea—to the west the Atlantic Ocean, and to the north the Mediterranean. On the east the boundary was the Wād Muluya. The southern boundary was less well defined. It was approximately that set down by the 1904 Hispano-French treaty:

"The boundary starts at the mouth of the River Muluya, on the Mediterranean, and will run up the thalweg [sic; i.e., valley] of this river until it reaches the hills near the left bank of the River Inauen [sic]. From here, and without crossing the Muluya, the frontier

\(^1\) Martínez de Campos, op. cit., pp. 106-111.
\(^2\) See above, p. 37.
\(^3\) There was another, southern sector in the Tarfaya region, south of the French zone and bordering on the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro (now the western Sahara). However, this thesis is concerned exclusively with the northern zone.
will take the most direct route to the watershed separating the basins of the Rivers Muluya and Inauen from that of the W. Kert. It will then run westwards along the watershed between the basins of the Rivers Inauen and Sebu and those of the Rivers Kert and Onesga as far as the northern crest of Djebel Moulai Bou Shta [sic].

It will then go north, keeping a distance of at least 25 kilometres from the road from Fiz to Alcazarquivir [sic] via Uazan until it reaches the River Lucus... down the valley of which it will continue until a point 5 kilometres before this river is crossed by the said road from Kzar el Kebir [sic] to Uazan. From here it will take the most direct route to the Atlantic coast, north of the lagoon of Ez-zerga."

All to the north of this lay in the Spanish zone. 2 This sounds very precise. In fact, no European knew very much

1 Quoted in García Figueras, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 99-100. There were slight changes in the 1912 treaty, which were referred to as the 1904 treaty, viz:

"[The frontier] will start at the mouth of the Muluya and will continue up the valley of this river until it reaches a point 1 km. downstream from Mexera Klika [sic]. From this point the frontier, as far as Yebel Beni Hasen, will follow the route laid down [in the 1904 treaty].

In case the joint boundary commission set up in paragraph 4 should decide that the Marabut of Sidi Maaruf should belong to the southern clan of the Beni Buyagi [sic]. this portion will belong to the French zone. If not, the frontier, having included the said Marabut, will pass no more than one kilometre to the N[orth] nor two kilometres to the W[est] to rejoin the line of the previous agreement. From Yebel Beni Hasen the frontier will proceed towards the Uas Uarga, reaching it north of the Yemaa of the Cherfa of Tafraut, upstream from the curve in the river, and from there it will continue westwards along the line of hills on the right bank of the Uad Uarga to its junction with the North-South line defined in [the 1904 treaty]. From here it will proceed along the northern borders of those tribes which lie on the Uarga and along the southern borders of those tribes which do not. Then it will proceed northwards, keeping a distance of at least 25 kilometres east of the road from Frz to Alcazarquivir via Uazan as far as the Uad Luccus. It will continue down the valley of this river as far as the boundary between the tribes of Sarsar and Tilig. Here it will curve to take Yebel Gani [sic] into the Spanish zone... Finally it will join the 35°N. parallel between the aduar [i.e., village] of Mgaria [sic] and the Marya of Sidi Selama, and will follow the parallel to the sea."

Quoted in Ricardo Donoso-Cortés, Estudio Geográfico Político-Militar sobre las zonas Españolas del Norte y Sur de Marruecos (Madrid, 1913), pp. 59-60.

2 Except the area of the International Zone of Tangier.
about the countryside which the border traversed. A number of tribes were cut in two by the frontier. The area contained within these boundaries was about 20,000 square kilometres, roughly one-tenth of Morocco. It measured about 340 kilometres from east to west by, at its widest point, 100 kilometres from north to south. The population in 1912 is difficult to estimate as no census had ever been made. Various sources put it between 58,000 and 950,000. This population was divided between a number of regions differing in physical and social geography, and even in language. The main physical characteristic of this area is that it is extremely mountainous, and as this affects both the climate and the economy of the former Spanish zone, this must be examined first.

The Mountains

Apart from the Gharb plain, which is usually between 20 and 30 kms wide and, as its name suggests, runs down the west coast and on into the former French zone, most of the rest of the northern zone was made up of a range of mountains.

1 These tribes included the Banû Bû Yahyî, Khalut, al-Maţalsa, Gazawa, Gaznayya, and Banû Zarwal. The Spanish sections of the latter three tribes were transferred to French control after the Rif war.


3 Ibid.

4 In 1913 Donoso-Cortés (op. cit., pp. 182, 205) put the population at about 950,000. From then on the estimates lessened. Harris, writing at the end of the Rif war, estimated the population at 766,000 (Walter Harris, op. cit., p. 22). A Spanish military handbook of the mid-1930's put the population at 581,000 (Ministerio de la guerra, Para las instructores de la Mejasnía Armada (Ceuta, n.d. (c. 1936)) (henceforth referred to as "M. de Guerra, Instructores").
MAP II: 3 NORTHERN MOROCCO - PRINCIPAL TOWNS AND VILLAGES
This range runs from the shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, between Ceuta and Tangier, in a huge arc as far as a point about halfway between the Bay of Alhucemas and Melilla. There is another outcrop of mountains on the Qal'aya peninsula on which Melilla is situated, but the space between is mainly made up of level plains interspersed with isolated outcrops. Although the mountains can be divided geologically into three zones, they form a continuous chain about 200 kms long. These mountains are not in general very high, and only rarely rise above 2,000 metres. (The highest, Adrar Tidighin, is 2,456 metres high.) The belt of mountains is not particularly wide either--usually about 50-80 kms, before it reaches the lowlands north of Fez and the Tāzā gap which divides the Rif from the Middle Atlas mountains. Nevertheless, it is a very difficult obstacle to communications, for the chain is made up of a series of crests, and very deep gorges, which make the height of the mountains appear the greater. Furthermore, most of the northern coast is formed of cliffs or very steep shore-lines, making sea traffic difficult.

The belt of mountains running along the coast also causes great differences in the climate of the region. These climatic variations are of the utmost importance in determining the economy of the area.

Climate

As the mountains tend to be higher in the west and lower in the east it is not surprising that rainfall and

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2 Ibid., and Gerald Maurer, "L'environement géographique rifain", in *Colloque*, pp. 18-19.
Map II: 4

Northern Morocco: precipitation

Source: Mikesell, op. cit., p. 16.
other precipitation tends to be higher in the west, for the mountains form a barrier. Tangier receives 810 mm, Ceuta 560 mm, W. Lāw 460 mm, Jibha 315 mm, and Alhucemas 315 mm a year, on average. Inland, the rainfall in the highest areas is very high indeed. Mikesell estimates that on the highest peaks, about 2,000 mm a year is a reasonable figure. This precipitation mainly falls as rain, of course, but peaks over 2,000 metres are covered with snow for six months of the year. When this melts, an enormous quantity of water is released. However, east of Targist, as the mountains get lower, the rainfall decreases very rapidly. Targist itself receives 423 mm of precipitation; but Midar, 65 kms further east, only receives 281 mm. Melilla, on the coast, has 414 mm, but the highest for other places in the eastern plain is never more than 350 mm. These are average figures, of course, and represent a long period. Individual years vary very greatly. This annual fluctuation has very serious effects on the agriculture, as low rainfall can lead to crop failure, and at the beginning of this century that resulted in starvation on a huge scale. Temperatures are equally extreme. The coasts tend to be mild, but inland the summer can be very hot—especially on the eastern plains round the Wād Muluya. In the mountains, temperatures can reach 35°C on south facing slopes, even at heights of 1,000 metres. The winters are correspondingly cold. Again, Mikesell estimates regular temperatures of -10°C at heights of 2,000 metres.1

Perhaps surprisingly, there are relatively few rivers. This is because much of the rock is calcareous, and

therefore porous. The water drains underground. As a result, the rivers tend to flow round the edges of the mountains—the Wargha and Lukkus to the south, the Martil (the river of Tetuan) to the north, the Muluya to the east. In the mountains themselves, the only substantial rivers are the W. Lāw in the West, the W. Ghīs and W. Nakūr, which flow into the Bay of Alhucemas, and the W. Kāt, which flows into the Mediterranean west of the Qal'aya peninsula.\(^1\)

There are, however, numerous small streams which only flow in the rainy season (between September and April), and whose deep gorges further break up the coast, although they are not long.\(^2\)

The effects of this variation in rainfall are very obvious in the types of vegetation and the agriculture that is carried on in northern Morocco.

**Vegetation**

As a rough generalisation it is possible to say that while the west is green the east is not. In the Jibāla and Sinhāja regions, the heavy rainfall and high humidity ensure a very lush vegetation (Photograph II: 1a). Where it has not been disturbed, this vegetation takes the form of a thick forest of pines, cork, or evergreen oaks, or cedar. Where the forest has been cut a very thick undergrowth develops (Photograph II: 1b). This is the case west of a line from Targīst to W. Lāw—in other words, corresponding to the

\(^1\) **Ibid.**, p. 19.

\(^2\) For instance, the longest in the lands of the Buqqūya tribe is 20 kms—Anghelo Ghirelli, "Monografía de la kabila de Bokola", in Archivos del Instituto de Estudios Africanos de Madrid, Vol. VII, pt. 32, 1955, pp. 40-41 (Although this article was only published in 1955, it was written in 1920.\)
Photograph II : 1a

The countryside in the Jibāla near Bāb Barrad (summer)

Photograph II : 1b

The countryside in the northern Sinhāja near Kitāma in summer

Source: Both taken by author, September 1978
Map II : 5

Northern Morocco--distribution of forest and scrub

Source: Mikesell, op. cit., p. 24

Note: cedius atlantica--Atlantic cedar
quercus ilex--evergreen oak
quercus suber--cork oak
pinus halepensis-Allepo pine
area of heavy rainfall. East of Targist the landscape changes. Here, while there are isolated stands of Aleppo pines, the landscape is much less encumbered with undergrowth (Photograph II: 2a and 2b). The most common tree in this area is the *thuya* which, although in some protected sites it can reach a height of 10 metres, generally takes the form of a shrub. The *thuya* is immensely hardy, and sprouts vigorously if it is damaged by cutting, browsing by animals, or fire. As a result, scrub *thuya* is found in areas which have otherwise been deforested. Its wood forms a staple part of the economy of the region, being used in building, in furniture, and to make charcoal.¹

In the eastern plain, known as the Plain of Garat, the area is so dry that the main vegetation is thorny scrub. In fact the whole area has the appearance of a semi-desert region (Photograph II: 3). Finally, in the south, the valley of the Wargha river provides a huge fertile area with very rich agricultural potential.

This pattern of vegetation and fertility also dictates the shape of agriculture in northern Morocco. Once again, the pattern changes from west to east.

**Agriculture**

Just as the pattern of rainfall changes, so that of agriculture changes as well. The more humid parts in the west of the Spanish zone were richer agriculturally than the drier east, and this pattern of agriculture determined the pattern of habitation.

Despite the glowing accounts of Spanish writers of

Photograph II : 2a

The countryside in the western Banū Waryaghal (Rif) in summer

Photograph II : 2b

The countryside in the eastern Banū Waryaghal bordering on the Timsmān (summer)

Source: Both taken by author September 1978
Photograph II: 3

The Plain of Garat in summer

Source: Both taken by author September 1978
the beauties of the countryside in the Rif,\(^1\) and its agricultural possibilities, the agricultural production over the whole of the mountainous part of the Spanish Protectorate was very small. Maurer estimates that before the Rif war the average area of land under cultivation was between 10% and 25% of the land surface, rising to 50% in a few particularly favoured regions.\(^2\) These low percentages were the result of two factors: firstly the extremely steep mountain sides, and secondly, in the east the lack of water. Maurer again estimates that in the central and eastern Rif no more than 10% of the land was irrigated.\(^3\)

The crops which were grown were of three types—cereals, fruits, and garden plants. Of the cereals the most important was barley, which was grown in practically all parts of the Rif, Ghumāra, and Jibāla. Other grains which had a more regional distribution were wheat—mainly grown only in the eastern plains and around Melilla,\(^4\) and in the Jibāla—\(^5\) and rye, grown without irrigation on mountain slopes that had to be worked by hoe, because they were too steep for ploughing. Rye was therefore grown mainly in the high mountains of the Sinhāja and southern Rif. The fruit trees were and are numerous: pears, peaches, apricots, oranges,

\(^1\) See the opening quotation to this chapter for an example of such a description. Such descriptions were, of course, part of the campaign to encourage Spanish interest in colonial expansion in Morocco.

\(^2\) Maurer, op. cit., p. 22.

\(^3\) Ibid.


\(^5\) Intervención Militar de Larache, Kabila de Beni Aros. Memoria 1928 (Sidi Ali, 1928) (typed, bound manuscript in B.N.E.S. de A.), p. 14 (henceforth referred to as "Intervención Larache, Beni Aros").

almonds, apples, grapes and figs are grown in many parts of the Rif. The vegetables include maize, broad beans, lentils, tomatoes, turnips and peppers, grown in varying quantities in the Rif and Jibāla.¹

This list sounds impressive, but as Hart points out it is also misleading:² In the central and eastern Rif particularly, the quantities which are grown are very small, and the quality is very poor. Clearly this is not a new position—even in 1913, Donoso-Cortés was complaining that the quality of oranges, which had been exported from the Rif in large quantities, had declined because the trees were not properly cared for or pruned.³

It is important to remember that the country was very poor. Failure of the crops, because of lack of rain, was frequent. British Consular reports over the last part of the nineteenth century show a considerable frequency of crop failure. In 1867, the Vice-Consul in Tetuan reported a bad harvest and drought in the Rif.⁴ 1899 saw a good harvest,⁵ and so did 1901;⁶ but these were fortunate years, for in general the crops were bad. Even when they were good, in the Jibāla at least, a large part of the crops was liable to be confiscated by the local “Big Qā‘id” Ḥamād al-Raṣūl, as happened in 1910.⁷

¹ Ibid., pp. 45-47, and Hart, Aith Awarāghar, pp. 31-33.
² Ibid., p. 33.
³ Donoso-Cortés, op. cit., p. 235.
⁵ P.P. 1901, Vol. LXXXIII, Consular Report for Fez for 1899, Mr. Consul MacLeod, p. 624.
This latter problem did not exist in the Rif itself, because the different political structures of the area meant that in general oppressive conduct like that of al-Raisūli did not occur. Nevertheless, famine was frequent enough. If the rains did not come in time for ploughing and sowing of grain—which normally took place in January in the Rif—\(^1\) the crops would fail. This reliance on rainfall was eased slightly by irrigation, but this could only occur on a large scale where there were rivers big enough to support it. The largest irrigated area in the central Rif is in the plain of Swānī, on the shores of the Bay of Alhucemas, which was watered by the Ghūs and Nakūr rivers, and this was, as a result, one of the most productive agricultural areas.\(^2\)

If crops failed, then people were reduced to gathering wild foods: the acorns of evergreen oaks, the fruit of the strawberry tree, and the pods of the wild rose, for instance.\(^3\) In times of real famine, such as that of 1925, in the Ghumāra, the fruit of the lentisk tree—a sort of pistachio nut—was ground down to make a sort of flour for bread.\(^4\)

### Animals

The domestic animals kept include cows, sheep, goats and hens, as well as various animals for transport. According to Coon, in the late 1920s the most important domestic animals were cattle, and every family had at least

1 Coon, *Rif*, p. 49.
2 The irrigation system has been described in detail by Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, pp. 107-116.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 25, *Política enero*, Información del día, 6 Jan 1925 and 7 Jan 1925 (2nd report).
one, and used it for meat, milk, hides and traction. Goats were also widely distributed, particularly in the highland areas. Sheep, however, were kept mainly in lowlands of the eastern Rif, and on the plateaus of the southern Rif. They were rare in the Sinhāja and Ghumāra. The biggest herds of sheep of all were in the Banū Bū Yaḥyā and Awlād Siṭṭūt tribes,¹ where the land was so poor for agriculture that crops were not a practical proposition. Here, and only here, in northern Morocco was a semi-nomadic lifestyle adopted.

The main carriage animals were the horse—but only in the east, on the plains, for the mountains were too difficult terrain for horses—and mules, which are the main baggage and riding animals of the mountains.

During the nineteenth century northern Morocco began to export cattle through Tetuan to feed the British garrison in Gibraltar. There was also a growing trade in eggs.²

Fishing

Fishing was possible along the Mediterranean coasts for those tribes with a shore line. It was done either by netting from the shore—boats were used to take the net in a semi-circle, then the two ends of the net were hauled in—or by line and hooks in deeper water. This sort of activity was carried on along the Mediterranean coast.³ Some tribes relied heavily on fishing. The Buqquya, for instance,

¹ Coon, Rif, pp. 38-39.
possessed about 80 boats in 1920.¹ These boats were not only used for fishing, however, for the Buqquya were also notorious smugglers and pirates.

The sea provided another benefit to the inhabitants of the Rif, for, compared to inland routes, it provided relatively easy communications.

**Communications**

The advantages of sea routes were two: travellers were less likely to be attacked, and their goods stolen, and travel by sea was often easier and quicker than over difficult or almost impossible roads. It is true that the harbours on the Mediterranean coast were not good and were exposed to difficult winds and tides (Photograph II, 4a and 4b). Yet these routes were used. In 1866, the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan reported that quite a healthy small-scale trade was developing between Gibraltar and the "Riff", by which he presumably meant the Ghumaran coast as well. Rif. "galleys" brought wheat, barley, hides, timber, wax, honey and dried fruit, and "in exchange carry back British manufactures [i.e., cotton goods], guns, saltpetre, sulphur, etc."³

The routes inland were very difficult indeed. Mainly these routes were local tracks leading to the main markets and between the villages. Even near Melilla, a centre of European occupation for nearly four centuries, this pattern still existed. Roads branched out from the main Sunday Market, and from there tracks connected the main

¹ Gherelli, Bokoia, pp. 52-53.
² Mikesell, op. cit., p. 17.
Photograph II: 4a

The Coastline in the Banū Bū Frāḥ, looking east

Photograph II: 4b

The same part of the Banū Bū Frāḥ coastline looking west

Source: Both taken by author September 1978
villages. Everywhere in the mountains of the northern zone, tracks tended to be very difficult. The deep valleys made travel across the mountains extremely difficult, because although the mountains were relatively low, the valleys are so deep—often valley floors right in the heart of the mountains are only 300-500 metres above sea-level, that it makes the height of the mountains seem the greater. A glance at a contour map shows that the crests of the hills and the valleys are arranged generally along a north-south alignment. So travel from east to west was difficult. As a result, there was no wheeled travel in the Rif, and all burdens were carried on the backs of men or of animals such as mules, donkeys and, among the semi-nomadic tribes of the east, camels. Men, in the Rif at least, mainly travelled on foot, or occasionally mounted on a horse or mule.

This is not to say that main-trade routes did not cross the Rif. Particularly after 1900, Melilla became an important port through which the Rif was supplied, and large amounts of goods were moved by sea from Tetuan to Melilla for subsequent sale in the interior. However, these trade routes grew up, in conjunction with the ports, precisely because of the difficulties of movement within the mountains. These difficulties after 1902 were further compounded by the establishment of a government under Bū Ḥimāra in Tāzā and Silwān, in rivalry to that of the legitimate Sultan in

1 Policía Indígena de Melilla--Tercera Mía, Memoria geográfica histórica y estadística de la kabila de Beni Sicar (Madrid, 1913), p. 3 (henceforth referred to as "Policía Indígena, Beni Sicar").
2 Maurer, op. cit., p. 19.
3 Coon, Rif, pp. 42-44.
4 The principal goods moved this way were clothing—particularly cloth and slippers.
Fez. As a result, trade between Fez and the north-eastern part of Morocco was disrupted and prices in Fez went up.¹ This was by no means the only example of political disturbance upsetting trade routes. The same had happened in 1900 when fighting in the Jibāla around Šāwin prevented trade with Tetuan,² and in 1904 Tangier was cut off from trade with Fez for most of the year.³

In such circumstances much, but by no means all, of the trade in the Rif and Jibāla became local trade. This trade was mainly carried out in markets.

The Markets

The purpose of the markets was, of course, the distribution of goods. In a society where "shops" in the European sense did not exist in the countryside, a market was held nearly every day within travelling distance for most people. However, individual markets were generally held on the same site only on one day in each week, and were known by the day of the week (so Sūq al-Ąḥad was held on a Sunday, Sūq al-Ąrba'a on a Wednesday, and so on). Nearly every tribe had at least one market on at least one day a week. On other days people would visit the nearby market of a neighbouring tribe. Some of the larger tribes had several markets. The Banū Waryaghal, for example, had several, one on each day of the week before the Rif war.⁴ (Fogg's map, while it

¹ P.P. 1906, Vol. CXXVI, Consular report for Fez for 1903-4, Vice-Consul MacLeod, p. 792
⁴ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 72-77.
it is not entirely accurate—as he recognises—gives a good indication of the distribution of these markets.\(^1\)

The markets varied greatly in size. Some of them were quite small, and served only the immediate locality. Others were much larger and served several tribes. This was of course important for tribes which only had one market of their own. A case in point is the Banū Shikār which had only a Sunday market of its own, but people from this tribe also visited the Tuesday market of the Banū Bū Gafār and the Friday market of the Mazūja.\(^2\) The same applied to the Sunday market of al-Rawādī in the Buqquya, which was attended by people from the Banū Yīṭṭuṭt, Banū Bū Frāh, Targīst, and Zarqāt tribes, as well as by people from the host tribe.

There must have been considerable cross-trade between the tribes through these markets. For instance, in 1909, the Tuesday market in Mazūja, near Melilla, was doing a good trade in arms and ammunition amongst other things. These arms were originally smuggled in by the Buqquya,\(^3\) whose territory is some distance from that of the Mazūja, so it seems likely that other tribes acted as intermediaries in this trade.

Of course, the main purpose of the markets was to sell agricultural products and other foods... Even before the Spanish occupation, a certain amount of these foodstuffs was imported from Europe. An example is sugar—according to one

1 Walter Fogg, "A Tribal Market in the Spanish Zone of Morocco", in Africa, Vol. 11, 1938, pp. 428-458, 430. His map was based on the positions of markets in the 1930s, and the Spanish administration brought about a change in position of some markets.


3 Becerra, op. cit., p. 11.
estimate about 3,000 tons of sugar was imported from Marseille through Melilla in 1909.¹

As well as foodstuffs, merchants also sold locally manufactured goods in the markets. Industry was not highly developed, and was confined largely to metalwork and the manufacture of clothes. Metalwork was carried out by blacksmiths, who made farm implements, horseshoes, weapons (daggers, for instance) and other small tools, at portable forges set up in the markets. The metal came from the Banû Bû Ifrûr mountains near Melilla and from the Banû Sa'îd, where it was mined. Apparently the oldest tradition of this sort of smithying was in the Gaznayya tribe in the southern Rif, but the manufacture of weapons in that tribe was supplanted about the beginning of the twentieth century by smithies in the Taghzût tribe of the Sinhâja, which also became famous for the manufacture of firearms. Jewish men specialised in more ornate metalwork—brass trays, silver jewellery, and so on. They only lived in a few of the central Rifian tribes, on the coast, for they were generally ill treated until the Rif war, when bin 'Abd al-Karîm protected them and used their skills at intricate work in the delicate task of making hand-grenades.²

Leather, used in the manufacture of gunpowder scrits, belts and parts of ploughs, was concentrated, like gunsmithing, in the Taghzût tribe of the Sinhâja.³

Cloth, especially that used for the traditional male dress, the jîllâba, was woven on looms at home and sold in markets, along with other finer cloths imported from

¹ Ibid.
² Coon, Rif, pp. 64-66.
³ Ibid., p. 66.
Europe. Traditionally, the jillābas themselves were sewn in the schools by the pupils as they recited the Qur'an under the supervision of the faqīhs. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm banned this practice and told the faqīhs to keep to their function of teaching.

As well as things which were offered for sale, the markets also provided an outlet for people providing specialised services—tooth-pullers, the writing of contracts by faqīhs, barbers and blood-letters, writers of charms, and practitioners of traditional medicine. They also provided a political centre for the tribe, which will be discussed below.

Towns, Villages and Settlements

"Northern Morocco is primarily a rural country, as Mikesell points out. Indeed, it is an almost entirely rural community. Certainly there are towns, but they are either modern (like Alhucemas, which was built by the Spanish) or, with one exception, built around the edges of the mountains (like Tetuan, Tangier or Fez). The exception, before the Protectorate, was Shāwin, which is indeed in the heart of the Jibāla. For the rest, the inhabitants of the area lived in villages and hamlets. The villages, in the western part of the former Spanish Protectorate (the Jibāla, Ghumāra, and Sinhāja al-Srair), were generally made up of

1 Ibid., pp. 79-81.
3 See below, p. 563.
5 Mikesell, op. cit., p. 65.
between ten and fifty homes, as is still generally the case. These villages were generally inhabited by members of the same extended family. They are positioned either on ridges overlooking the cultivated land, as is the case in the Jibâla, or in the bottoms of valleys, near a supply of water, the preferred situation of villages in the Sinhâja. In either case, separated by valleys or ridges, the villages were fairly isolated from each other, and in Maurer's graphic phrase, "appeared like punctuation marks" in the landscape.

In the eastern Rif, the term "village" or even "hamlet", is inaccurate, for the houses are separated from each other by a considerable distance, even in the same community. According to a Rifî proverb, the houses are scattered "like stars in the sky". Hart suggests that this is partly because of jealousy for the women of the household, but it also had a defensive purpose, for homes were often surrounded by a thick cactus hedge and, before the Rif war, protected by a pill-box with loopholes through which the owner could fire in times of feud. The dividing line between these extensive "communities" and villages runs once again through Targîst, just as the boundary between wetter and drier areas, and areas of vegetation, does.

The houses are mainly of one storey--although two-storied houses are quite common in the Sinhâja, where timber is more plentiful. In the east the houses generally have flat roofs, and are built around an open courtyard.

1 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
2 Maurer, op. cit., p. 20.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghâr, p. 29.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., pp. 29, 38.
west, the houses have sloping roofs, and no courtyard. Once again the border between the two areas is at Targ lst. They are build either of adobe, or, sometimes in the Rif of masonry. 1

Certainly most of these villages or hamlets are fairly small. A few, however, because of economic, political or social factors, while they were never large, attained a position of some importance. Such a place was AjdIr, on the plain of Swani, next to the sea on the shore of Alhucemas Bay. It was never large, and never lost the characteristics of a scattered community, in the pattern of all the villages of the central Rif. However, it had enormous importance politically and economically.

AjdIr was the centre of the largest fertile and irrigated area in the central Rif, the plain of Swani. (Photograph II, 5a and 5b). Furthermore, it faced on to the sea. Historically this area was the centre of the kingdom of al-Nakur, founded in the eighth century A.D., whose capital, also called al-Nakur, lay some five miles from the coast on the west bank of the W. al-Nakur. Its port lay on the coast and was then called al-Muzimma, near to present-day AjdIr. It is not known when the kingdom of al-Nakur disappeared, but there is no mention of it after the mid-eleventh century. Al-Muzimma survived much longer, and is mentioned in 1740, although it had lost much of its importance. However, it remained as a military post after the Spanish occupation of the island of Alhucemas in 1673 2 (Photograph II, 6a and 6b).

1 Mikesell, op. cit., pp. 71-77.
2 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 344-345 and Coon, Rif, pp. 27-33.
Photograph II : 5a

The valley of the lower Wādī Nakūr in summer showing irrigated patches

Photograph II : 5b

The plain of Swānī looking east in summer

Source: Both taken by author September 1978
Photograph II : 6a

Alhucemas island from the shore

Photograph II : 6b

Alhucemas Bay looking east. The Spanish occupied island is in the middle distance.

Source: Both taken by author September 1978
After 1673, the proximity of the Spanish meant that the Banū Waryaghal felt it necessary to protect their coastline from any further attacks. On the site of al-Muzimma they built a fortress, hidden from the island by sand-dunes and named al-Burj al-Mujahidīn (Fort of the Fighters for the Faith). It consisted of a large building and a mosque, and was manned in rotation by 100 men from the Banū Waryaghal, who were relieved each month. They had, in the late nineteenth century, some one hundred ancient cannon, which they apparently could not fire. At this time the "village" of Ajdir was the largest in the Banū Waryaghal with, according to Moulièras, 1,000 families.

The presence of the Spanish, despite the enmity for them felt by the Rifis also led to a very limited trade, and Rifis went to the island to buy supplies—particularly of food. In the years following the establishment of the Protectorate, this trade developed into political penetration of the Banū Waryaghal.

A similar state of affairs existed near the other Spanish island presidio of Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera on the shores of the Banū Yiṭṭuft. Here there had also been a city—Bādis—which had become depopulated after the fall of the island to the Spanish in 1564. At the end of the nineteenth century the Island, like that of Alhucemas, provided a commercial centre of sorts for the local people, although they did not allow anything—supplies or even water—to be

2 Ibid., p. 101.
3 Ibid., p. 98.
4 See below, chs. III, IV and V.
sold to the Spanish in return. Indeed, again like Alhucemas, there was a Rīfī manned military post on the shore. After the destruction of the city of Bādis a new centre grew up at Snāda, inland from the coast in the Banū Yiṭṭuft, where a zawiya of some importance grew up, and a military post of the Moroccan makhzan was from time to time established. At the end of the nineteenth century, Snāda consisted of some 700-800 houses (Photograph II: 7a).

Snāda and Ajdīr were the most important places in the central Rīf in the period before the Rīf war. They were the only really large villages in the area. The other place of great importance was in the Jibāla, the city of Shāwin (Photograph II: 7b). Shāwin was founded in 1471, as a base for operations against the Portuguese, who were then trying to capture parts of Morocco, but it really grew as a city when large numbers of refugees from al-Andalus began to arrive in the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries. These refugees were mainly Muslim, of course, but they also included a small colony of Jews. The city became a religious centre, and hence a centre of education in the Jibāla. It also became a commercial and industrial focus, famed, among other things, for its carpets. However, despite this educational and economic activity, Shāwin was also a "secret city", for no European travellers were allowed to go there. Although a Frenchman, Charles de Foucauld, and two Englishmen, Walter Harris of The Times and William Moulièras, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 87-88 and Coon, Rif, p. 33.  
Ibid.  
Mikesell, op. cit., p.  
Donoso-Cortés, op. cit., p. 122.
Photograph II : 7a

The village of Snāda today

Photograph II : 7b

The city of Shāwin today

Source: Both taken by author September 1978
Summers, had visited it in disguise, it was only on its occupation by Spanish troops that it was opened to Europeans. As a result, it is difficult to determine its size before the Rif war, but the estimates are between 5,000 and 7,000.

Apart from these places there were a number of towns on the edges of the mountains. Melilla and Ceuta had been Spanish possessions since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In 1913, just after the beginning of the Protectorate, Melilla was a city of some 50,000 people, nearly all Spanish. Ceuta was somewhat smaller, only 20,000 inhabitants, again mainly Spanish. Tetuan, which was to become the capital city of the Spanish Protectorate, was quite a large city. On the eve of the Protectorate, in 1911, its estimated population was 30,450, including 6,000 Jews, 400 Spaniards, and 500 Algerian immigrants. It was a major manufacturing centre in the nineteenth century, with forges, hand-loom, shoemakers—who supplied one of nineteenth century Morocco's most important exports, slippers, which were sent to Egypt. It had important potteries, and minor industries such as brass-founding. As one of the "open" cities of Morocco, available to European traders, it became a centre for these traders, although its poor port on the Wādī...
have done. Tetuan was also an important cultural centre as well, with well-developed education facilities, including the mosque-"university" of Luqash, teaching traditional religious sciences to future gādis, and several European schools, including one founded by the French Alliance Israelite in the mid-nineteenth century.  

Apart from these more important places, most people lived in the smaller villages and extended communities. There were a great many of these, for the population of rural north Morocco was very high, much higher than the land could support. As a result, people looked outside the mountains for employment and living space. In short, they emigrated.

Emigration

This emigration was the result of two factors: firstly, the high density of population, and the insecurity of food supplies. The density of population has been put as high as 60 or more per square kilometre by Maurer, but he does not make it clear whether he is talking about density of population for the whole area.  

Even with this proviso it is possible to get some sort of idea of population density for the region from contemporary or near contemporary accounts. From Table 1 (below, p. 109) it is possible to see that, despite the discrepancies, population density was that much higher in the central Rif than in the Jibāla. Since the land was also less productive people started to look for work elsewhere, by emigrating. There were two possible areas to which they could go—firstly to other areas in northern


2 Maurer, op. cit., p. 23.
### TABLE 1

Population and density of 3 Jibālan tribes and 5 central Rif tribes

#### Jibāla

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Donoso-Cortés estimate 1913</th>
<th>Intervención figure 1928</th>
<th>Instructores figure c. 1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Aros</td>
<td>10,000 (19.12/km²)</td>
<td>9,468 (18.3/km²)</td>
<td>12,134 (23.2/km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Issef</td>
<td>5,000 (20.04/km²)</td>
<td>5,077 (20.34/km²)</td>
<td>5,494 (22.02/km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Sikar</td>
<td>2,305 (32.69/km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,296 (32.56/km²)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Central Rif

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Donoso-Cortés estimate 1913</th>
<th>1929 census (Hart)</th>
<th>Instructores figure c. 1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Waryaghal</td>
<td>45,000 (42.8/km²)</td>
<td>37,537 (35.7/km²)</td>
<td>45,163 (43.0/km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Tuzin</td>
<td>30,000 (49.1/km²)</td>
<td>21,204 (34.76/km²)</td>
<td>21,204 (34.76/km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timsaman</td>
<td>24,000 (63.8/km²)</td>
<td>24,729 (65.76/km²)</td>
<td>24,729 (65.76/km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugquya</td>
<td>25,000 (31.01/km²)</td>
<td>7,079 (19.7/km²)</td>
<td>12,763 (55.9/km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. 'Amart</td>
<td>10,000 (25.00/km²)</td>
<td>7,885 (19.7/km²)</td>
<td>7,908 (19.6/km²)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Morocco, such as Tetuan, Tangier or even Fez, or, once the French had occupied Algeria, to that country. The emigration was very seasonal. People tended to return for harvesting.

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1 Sources of this table: Donoso-Cortés, *op. cit.*, passim;
and sowing in the autumn and winter, and in general emigration took place between February and April. This form of seasonal migration dates back some time—certainly to the development of the plains behind Oran, and after the 1880s it seems to have really developed. However, there are much earlier references to emigration to Algeria by sea through Melilla in the 1850s.¹

It is difficult to determine the extent of this emigration before the Rif war.² There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the Spanish statistics are not complete where they are available, and secondly, the Spanish did not in fact control the emigration completely. There were two routes, one through Melilla by sea—the subject of a Spanish official report in 1856,³ the other overland through the territories of the Maṭalso and Banū Bū Yaḥyā tribes, across the Mulūya, through the French zone of Morocco north of Oujda and over the Algerian frontier.⁴ Obviously this was more difficult for the Spanish to control.

A very partial idea of the extent of this emigration is given by figures recorded by the Spanish army in July 1919. They reported that they had stopped 42 people on

¹ Hart, Aith Waryaghār, p. 89.
² There are, however, reasonably complete statistics for the 1930s in Louis Milliot and Robert Wender, "L'exode saisonnier des rifains vers l'Algérie", in Bulletin Economique du Maroc, Vol.-I, no. 5, July 1934, pp. 313-321, and no. 6, Oct. 1934, pp. 397-402, but with the enormous political changes in Morocco after the Rif war; with much easier and more regular passages to Algeria, these figures can only be misleading if applied to the period before the Rif war.
³ Hart, Aith Waryaghār.
⁴ Milliot and Wender, op. cit., p. 320.
one boat and found that between them they were bringing back 16,040 francs,\(^1\) roughly equivalent to 19,890 pesetas at that time.\(^2\) This averaged 473.5 pesetas each. As barley was then selling at 60 ptas a mudd in the Banū Waryaghal, and harvests had been bad so supplies were low, it will be seen that this sort of money was vital in keeping people from starvation.

Of course Algeria was not the only destination of emigrants from the Rif, for they moved to the larger cities in Morocco as well. In 1867, large numbers of Rifis travelled to Tetuan after a disastrous harvest caused by drought.\(^3\) Many of these Rifis settled in the small village of Madīq on the coast north of Tetuan, where they and their descendants became a threat—imagined rather than real—to the Spanish at the beginning of the Rif war.\(^4\) Another refuge was Tangier, where, according to Mikesell, most of the population was of Rifī origin in the 1950s.\(^5\)

Nor was hunger the only reason for emigration. Political reasons played their part as well. After the forces of the makhzan razed the territory of the Buqquya tribe in 1898\(^6\) much of the tribe fled for safety elsewhere. In the Banū Shikār tribe of the Qalʿaya there is a sub-clan called Buqquya, for example, and other groups of the same name in the al-Faḥs tribe near Tangier, and in the Banū Bū:

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1 SHM Melilla, Leg. 15, Represalías, Sección 3a Kert, nota, 6 July 1919.
2 This is only an approximate figure as exchange values varied greatly, see above, p. xix.
4 See below, p. 353.
5 Mikesell, op. cit., p. 67.
6 See below, pp. 134-135.
Ifrūr tribe near Melilla.¹

These links through emigration across northern Morocco served as one of the forces which helped to give the area a certain unified character. They were complemented by much stronger political, cultural and religious links, which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

The Society of Northern Morocco

Geographically, as we have seen, the Spanish Protectorate was divided into a number of zones—by climate, vegetation, economy, and so on. These physical divisions were reflected in social divisions—especially political. The main divisions are usually seen in terms of tribes grouped into six areas, which might or might not have been identified as political units by the members of their constituent tribes. These divisions—working from west to east—are the Gharb, an inaccurate description referring to the tribes of the western coastal plain; the Jibāla, an equally ill-defined area, consisting roughly of the Arabic speaking tribes of the western mountains; the Ghumāra, which on the other hand, refers to a defined area containing nine tribes;² the Sinhāja Srair, lying to the east of the Ghumāra and consisting of eight small tribes.³ To the east of these groups lies the main block of Rif tribes—itsel divided into three areas: the western tribes, an ill-defined

¹ Ghirelli, Bokoia, p. 82.
² The Banū Manṣūr, Banū Silmān, Banū Khālid, Banū Sijjil, Banū Ziyāt, Banū Būzrā, Banū Garīr, Banū Samīḥ, and Banū Razīn. Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 3.
group, acting as a bridge between the Ghumāra and Sinhāja tribes—the Buqquya, Banū Waryaghal, Gaznayya, Banū 'Ammārt, Banū Tūzīn and Timsāmān; to the east of these lie four tribes on the upper reaches of the Wād Kārṭ—the Tafarsīt, Banū Saʿīd, Banū Walishak, and al-Ḥaṭalsa. The fifth major group is the Qal'aya tribes, clustered around the peninsula which contains Melilla: the Banū Bū Ibrūr, Banū Sidal, Banū Shikār, Mazūja, and Banū Bū Gafār. This leaves three tribes, south and east of the peninsula, unaccounted for—the Kabdāna, Awlāt Siṭṭūt and Banū Bū Yaḥyī, of which the last two were semi-nomadic at the time of the Rif war.

The distinction between these tribes is partly linguistic. There are two languages used in northern Morocco, Arab and Berber. The main group of Berber speakers lives in the eastern part of the region between Targīst and Melilla. Most of these still speak Rīf Berber—called dhamazigth, which is considerably different from other varieties of Moroccan Berber.\(^2\) This language is gradually replaced by Arabic further west—the Banū Yiṭṭuf is now half-Arabised, and other tribes such as the Targīst are now almost entirely Arabised.\(^3\) In the Sinhāja Srair region, some tribes are Arabised and others speak their own form of Berber, which is largely unintelligible to Rīf speakers. In the Ghumāra, there is yet a third variety of Berber, which is still spoken in parts of two of the tribes—the Banū Ṭanṣūr and Banū Bū Zrā—but in all the others has been replaced by Arabic.\(^4\) In

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\(^1\) Targīst, Banū Yiṭṭuf, Banū Bū Frāḥ, Mastāsa, Matīwa al-Ṭaḥar, Banū Gamīl and Banū Mazdūī.


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 1.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 3.
the rest of the northern zone, the Jibāla and Ghārb, Arabic
is spoken. At the time of the Rif war, however, a Berber
dialect, apparently akin to Rifī Berber, was still spoken
in the 'Anjara tribe between Ceuta and Tangier.¹

However, the question of where Berber is or was
spoken obscures the fact that it is largely an unwritten
language—although Berber Qur'āns have been produced by
heterodox religious leaders.² Thus Arabic became, and
remained, the language of religion and government. Further-
more, as Rifī Berber was unintelligible to anyone outside
the Rif, Rifis who emigrated had to speak at least some
Arabic in order to be understood.³

Whether or not Berber of some description or Arabic
was spoken in a particular area, the territory of that area
was organised in similar ways. The basis of this organis-
ation was the tribe.

Tribes.

Maps of Morocco frequently show the names of tribes.⁴
A map of the "Tribes of Morocco" specifically has been
prepared.⁵ Books on Morocco often refer to particular tribes.
However, closer examination shows that some authors or maps
refer to a particular group as a tribe, others as a confed-
eration of a tribe, or even as a clan within a tribe. For
instance, Coon talks of the Qal‘aya around Melilla as a tribe,

¹ Coon, Rif., p. 5.
³ Ibid., pp. 341-342.
⁴ E.g., the map of Morocco at 1:500,000 published in Paris
in 1954.
⁵ It is included in Hoffman, op. cit.
while Hart and Jamous refer to it as a confederation. It therefore becomes difficult to know exactly what is meant by the word "tribe", which is usually the translation of the Arabic word qabila.

Qabila is not easily defined either, certainly in terms of size, for it can vary between less than one thousand members and more than two hundred thousand. In point of fact most of the tribes define themselves not in terms of size or purpose, but in terms of descent. The vast majority of the tribes are named in Arabic Banū Fulān/Awlād Fulān, the children of someone, or Ahl Fulān, the people of someone/somewhere/something. In other words, fulān in this context denotes either the name of a place—usually of origin, real or believed—or of a person, a common ancestor, whether or not there is a strict genealogical connection. It is true that the genealogical origins of a particular tribe are usually mythologised, but in the end this does not matter, for the members of a tribe accept their common descent and identify themselves from it. Occasionally there are tribes which are not prefixed by Banū, Awlād, or Ahl, and have just a single name—Targīst, for example. These names usually refer either to a very remote name, illustrious in the medieval Maghrib—such as Sinhāja—or as a description of the members of the tribe—a nickname. Finally the name may be quite inexplicable, even to the members of the tribe.

3 Ibid., p. 9.
4 Ibid.
Despite this, the tribes recognise themselves as units. This brings in the other element in tribal formation: the recognition of a common area. Although the tribe may be greatly sub-divided in itself, it nevertheless recognises its own borders and is in turn recognised by other tribes.

Within the tribe, the sub-divisions are divided by the land they occupy. Berque has pointed out, in writing about the High Atlas, that the distribution of water was done according to clan, not according to the position of the plot which was to be irrigated. Therefore the area held by each clan had to be accurately identified. So it was that the clans occupied defined areas (even where these areas were not contiguous, as was the case in the Banū Waryaghal of the Rif, although this was unusual).

These clans were also seen typically in terms of a common ancestor, a descendant of the original ancestor of the clan. In this way the "descent", mythical though it might be at the higher levels, was transmitted through clan, sub-clan, and so on. This means that both ownership of land, and descent, are defined from the highest to the lowest level, the phenomenon called segmentation; and although individuals might acquire land in another tribe, that tribe is careful to ensure that its land is not permanently alienated. In this way a gradation of segmentation is formed, from the level of the local community—the dashār—to the highest level, that of the tribe. This system also incorporates

1 Jacques Berque, Maghreb—Histoires et Sociétés (Gembloux and Algiers, 1974), p. 16.
2 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 251.
3 Ibid., pp. 244-245.
4 Ibid., p. 247.
groups which have come in from outside, as in the case of
the clan of Murābitīn in the Banū Waryaghāl, which claims
descent from the Prophet Muhammad through the line of the
Sultan Mūlāy Idrīs I of Morocco,¹ or in that of Buqquya
clans in other tribes. These clans come to recognise them-
selves as part of the tribe, and are recognised as part of
it. The tribe is thus "the sum of its parts."² This
segmentation lays the framework for, and to some extent
explains, the political organisation of the tribes.

Political Organisation

Segmentation, working up from the lowest level to
the highest, is the basis of the political organisation of
the tribes. At the lowest level are the lineages and
nuclear families. Above them there is what Hart calls a
sub-clan and Coon a "bone" (from the Berber work for this
level—ikhs—which also means "bone").³ This is the level
of the extended communities. Above this level is the "clan"
ruba'a (literally "fourth" in Arabic), above this the khums
(literally "fifth" in Arabic), and finally the level of the
tribe. (The terms "fourth" and "fifth" are misleading, for
they imply that the lower level is in fact greater than the
higher—which is not so.⁴ Therefore "sub-clan" and "clan"
are used in this discussion.) These different levels have
different functions in the government of the tribe.

Three of these levels are of great importance in
this government system: the local community (dashār), the

¹ Ibid., pp. 256–257 and Coon, Rif, p. 91.
³ Coon, Rif, p. 90 and Hart, Aith Waryaghār, p. 287.
⁴ Ibid., p. 278 and Coon, Rif, p. 91.
clan level (rubā'a), and the tribal level (gabila). At each of these levels there existed, before the Rif war, a council, known in Rifī Berber as the Aith arba'īn (meaning, roughly, "the representatives of the people"). The members of these councils were named imgharen (sing., amghar)--meaning "the big people", and the council meeting and its site were known as the agraw--meaning "assembly".¹

The imgharen were selected on the basis of power. The stronger a man was, the higher up the ladder of councils he could rise. Strength in this case meant not only his personal courage, but also the number of his relatives and allies, and the number of guns they could command, and his personal wealth. However, although an amghar was theoretically appointed for life, in reality his term of office could be short. These councils at the lowest levels did not extend to more than twelve or thirteen members as a rule,² and there were always more claimants to office than there were offices to hold. Many of the imgharen's life tenures were cut short by violent means.³ In this way only the strongest could reach the top.

The function of these councils was basically to keep the peace in the area under its authority, and to make decisions for the community. Because of the intense rivalry between individual imgharen, decisions were reached only after long discussion resulting in the agreement of all the imgharen. This meant that it was quite rare for an individual amghar to dominate the proceedings, although this did happen.⁴

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¹ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 283-284.
³ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 284.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 283-284.
Generally speaking, the responsibilities of the councils were divided according to their importance. Thus the council of the dashar would be concerned with minor thefts (for example, of eggs, maize, olives), petty vandalism (breaking the branches of fruit trees), the regulation of attendance at Friday prayer, the trespass of animals in cemeteries, and the repair of irrigation ditches. So its concerns were with both order and the cooperation of the community. To enforce its authority the council could impose fines—for example, the theft of poultry was punished with a fine of 150 ptas, and so on.¹

At an intermediate level, the council of the clan would concern itself with dealing with those who failed to pay a fine imposed by the council of a dashar, and with more serious crimes, such as the theft of livestock, fighting without weapons, shooting at someone and missing, speaking to women in a market, or entering a women's market, and the assessment, collection and payment of compensation to the victims of violence, or in case of death, to their families. This council normally met once a week in one of the main markets of the clan.²

The tribal council met only as required, usually in a central place in each tribe—in the case of the Banū Waryaghal this was the Sunday market of Tīsār. It concerned itself only with the most important matters: adultery that was caught in the act, wounding, and murder. These crimes were punished in two ways. In the first case, the aggrieved party had the right to take his own action. The husband of

² Ibid., pp. 102-103 and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 287.
an adulterous woman had the right, if he could do it, to kill both his wife and the man concerned. The tribal council would also take action and both burn the criminal's house and fine him heavily.¹ In the case of wounding, the perpetrator would give a sum of money to his victim—an example was 425 ptas received by a man in the Banū Waryaghal from another who had broken his teeth.² In the case of murder, if the family of the murdered man agreed, they were paid a sum in lieu of a continuance of a blood feud. However, at the same time, the tribal council tried to impose a penalty on the murderer. It would cut down his trees and burn his crops, and fine him heavily. However, the fine could only be collected provided that all the council was agreed. It often happened that a man would rely on his allies and members of his family in the council to protect him. The council would then split, and fighting between allies would break out in the tribe. Murder, then, could lead to firstly a blood feud between the family of the perpetrator and victim, and war between their respective allies.

Thus the function of the tribal council was a complement to personal action to prevent murder. On the one level a murderer (or any criminal) was deterred by the threat of retaliation by the offended party, on the other by the threat of punishment by the representatives of the community. Crime was both an offence against the individual and against the community.

The tribal council also worked outside its own tribe to try to prevent disorder in neighbouring tribes. If

² Ibid., p. 292.
internal fighting broke out in a tribe, the councils of neighbouring tribes joined together to impose a fine on the warring tribe. Often the tribe was loath to pay, in which case the alliance of neighbouring tribes was forced to fight to impose its will. The recalcitrant tribe would then patch up its differences and try to resist the invaders. If the alliance succeeded it imposed a fine on each clan of the tribe.¹

Thus, right from the lowest level and the least important crimes to the highest level and the most important, the fine was the method of dealing with disorder. These fines were, therefore, one of the most important aspects of the political situation in a tribe.

The Ḥagg-Fines

These fines are one of the essential features of order in Rif society. They were called Ḥagg in the central Rif—referring to the "right" of the members of the council to extract them, or insāf in the eastern Rif—from the Arabic "justice" or "equity".²

Hart implies that they were only extracted for murder committed on the way to, or in, a market³ but Ayache has convincingly argued against this.⁴ The fine itself was levied by the shaykhs of the tribe or of the clan. It was then shared out between the clans and then between the sub-clans, or, rather, between the individual imgharen.⁵

¹ Coon, Rif, p. 106.
² Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 294.
³ Ibid., p. 290.
⁵ Coon, Rif, pp. 106-107 and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 302. The whole subject of the distribution of Ḥagg-fines, which immensely complicated, is discussed for the Banū Waryaghal ibid., pp. 295-303.
The ḥaqq-fines were, it must be stressed, the only way of maintaining order and relative peace in the Rif, where the councils were operating. In this area other penalties were unknown. Prisons were unknown, except in areas like the Jibāla, where a powerful local leader, al-Raisūlī, dominated the political scene, with grudging backing for his authority from the Sultan. Al-Raisūlī certainly had prisons—and particularly horrible they were—but in the Rif they were unknown. The death sentence, as a penalty imposed by the council, was also not used, although the right to kill a murderer was allowed to the family of the victim: a situation that often led to renewed feuding. Attempts by bin 'Abd al-Karīm, which were successful, to introduce both these penalties for fighting, were at first resisted by the Rifis.

However, these fines, and the authority of the councils, were at best an extremely insecure method of maintaining peace, and if they could not be imposed feuding could easily break out. After the beginning of the Protectorate, the Spanish encouraged the breaking of the ḥaqq system in the tribes that were resisting them, in the hope that the resulting feuding would help to disunite the opposition to them.¹ If feuding did break out, the warring parties quickly called on the help of their allies. The formation and function of these alliances is therefore another pillar of political organisation.

The Liff Alliances

The word liff is derived from the classical Arabic

¹ See below, pp. 177-179.
root 1ff, and refers to wrapping up, binding together, and connecting. In the case of northern Morocco it was applied to a system of alliances between groups at various levels. The nature of these alliances was a hostility shared by the allies for an opposing group of roughly the same size. There were two types of 1iffs, which were not mutually exclusive. One was a relatively permanent alliance, operating at the higher levels of segmentation, and the other a more transitory arrangement usually functioning at lower levels of the tribe.

The permanent 1iffs are the one which have attracted the most attention in anthropological writing. It is not proposed to examine here the various representations of these "high-level", "permanent" alliances. Suffice it to say that Montagne saw them as part of an overall pattern of alliances which divided Morocco into two profoundly antagonistic groups—the Ghumāra and Sinhāja in which every tribe once participated on one side or the other, forming a chess-board pattern of alliances over the whole country. Hart rejects this pattern and proposes a far more localised system in which only the Rif tribes and those of the Sinhāja Srair participated, at the most. Within this system, the clans of a particular tribe were split into two more or less equal groups. If it happened, as in the case of the Banū Waryaghāl, that there was an odd number of clans, or if one of the 1iffs was stronger than the other, the numerically weaker side looked for support outside the tribe, and allied

3 Montagne, Berbers, p
itself with clans of neighbouring tribes. Thus in the Banū Waryaghil one upper-level liff consisted of seven clans from the tribe plus one from the Banū 'Amārt, and the other side of four clans from the tribe plus a clan from the Timsamān, one from the Banū Tūzin, one from the Buqquya, and one from the Banū Yiṭṭuṭ. This system was continued with other tribes, so that the result, according to Hart, was to produce a pattern which he likens to a series of interlocking circles. According to this pattern, although clans in one tribe might be allied with a clan in a second tribe, even if that second clan was allied with one in a third, the first and third clans were not necessarily allied, and were certainly not allied if they had no common border. Whether or not this is correct, Hart says that after 1898, when the forces of the Moroccan makhzan intervened in the area, these upper-level liffs fell into desuetude. There remained, however, lower-level liffs on a more temporary basis, operating within clans, sub-clans, local villages, and indeed within lineages. These could and did change very quickly—through marriage outside the group, thus bringing another group into alliance, or out of the needs of the moment. The principal use of these alliances was in time of blood feuding. At such times alliances could be formed in two ways. The first way was through a system of shame compulsion called ṭār in Morocco. A community which wanted to form an alliance for its protection would turn to a neighbouring community and its men, women and children would take a bull, or if none was available a goat or a cow, and slit its throat on the doorstep of the neighbouring community's mosque. By this method, the second community was coerced, through shame if it did not accede to the request, into helping its neighbours. This was the most
common system of 'ar compulsion, although others did exist.\(^1\)

The second method of asking for help is an alliance of equals who promise to give each other protection or to maintain mutual peace. It is usually taken either at the tomb of a saint, or in a mosque, and is taken on a copy of the Qur'ān, although it counts as a covenant or pact rather than an oath of friendship; the pact is called an 'ahd in Arabic. It was often used to bring about friendship between individuals, but was also used to put the seal on liff alliances.\(^2\)

Thus it may be seen that the tribes had quite complex political structures of their own. These political structures were emphasized by local regulations.

\'{Urf and Shari'ā

The local regulations which were required to administer the areas under the local councils were decided upon by those councils. They took the form of documents, referred to as qānūns, which dealt with specific decisions of the council—the agreement of a truce within the council's jurisdiction—for example between two lineages in a community, or a decision about the penalties for theft, or murder, or the establishment of a market, or the confirmation of an alliance between two tribes, or arrangements for irrigation.\(^3\) They were written in Arabic, by a faqīh of the tribe, and started with a conventional "al-ḥamdu li-llah" and were

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\(^1\) Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 305-308 and Coon, Rif, pp. 162-163.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 163-164 and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, pp. 308-309.

\(^3\) Examples of each of these types, and others, are given in David Hart, Emilio Blanco Izaga, Colonel in the Rif (New Haven, Conn., 1975) (two vols.), Vol. II, pp. 266-380.
witnessed by the imgharen and announced in the market.

The penalties set down for murder and theft have already been discussed: they took the form of fines. Of course the Quranic penalties for murder and theft were quite different. Indeed the penalty for theft in almost all Morocco by the beginning of the twentieth century was out of step with the prescription of the shari'a, for the cutting off of hands for theft had by then almost died out. That is not to say that mutilation was not carried out as a political gesture--al-Raisuli, for instance, cut off the hands of thieves as a political gesture, to demonstrate his power, but this cruelty was not general. The penalty was imprisonment--although the prisons were generally horrible. In the Rif, neither imprisonment nor mutilation was practised.

There were other divergences from Quranic practice, but in general these differences have been much exaggerated. Normally customary law appeared to complement shari'a law rather than run contrary to it. There were two exceptions. The first was the mass-oath, by which a man accused of murder could call upon his blood relatives to swear that he was not guilty, in the mosque, if there was no eye-witness to prove that he had. There was some protection against mass-perjury in this, for it was universally believed that anyone who knowingly swore what was not true would soon be

2 Rosita Forbes, El-Raisuni, Sultan of the Mountains (London, 1924), p. 76.
3 There is a long discussion of the Moroccan makhzan's prisons in Donald Mackenzie, The Khalifate of the West (London, 1911), pp. 109-147.
punished by God. The second was over whether daughters could inherit their fathers' property, which depended more on local divisions of land than on the rules of the shari'a which state that a woman inherited half the amount of a son.  

Indeed, the shari'a did have a role to play in the organisation of Rif society. The principal rôle of the religious law, however, was in "civil" rather than "criminal" cases—inheritance and contracts rather than theft and murder. In most clans this was carried out by a faqīh or 'ādī who settled quarrels over ownership of property, made out wills, and drew up contracts and marriage documents. Some tribes also had a qādī for the whole tribe, although this was less common. The first one in modern times was appointed in the Gaznayya, approximately in the 1870s. There were also qādīs in the Banū Tūzīn and Gaznayya tribes before the Protectorate, and in the Taghzūt tribe in the Sinhāja.  

These qādīs and faqīhs were usually local people who had received a better level of education than most. In the first place, this education allowed them to speak and write in Arabic—the language in which all documents, including the local qānūns, were prepared. Education consisted of a number of stages. To begin with, boys—for only boys were educated at all—were taught by a faqīh of the village mosque, who was appointed by the local council. He taught his pupils to recite the Qur'ān by heart; then they moved to the clan mosque, where they were taught to write properly and some of the principles of religion and grammar. After completing this stage, if a pupil ever did that, he might go...

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1 Ibid., pp. 211-212.
2 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
3 Coon, Rif, pp. 117-121.
on to study to become a qādi, either in the mosque of Sidi Bū Yaʿqūb in the Timsamān, or at the Luqash mosque in Tetuan, or at the Qarāwiyyin in Fez, by far the most prestigious of the three. In these mosque-universities he would study religious law, its sources, the hadīths, theology, grammar, and so on. At the end of his studies a student would be rewarded with an ijāza, a certificate giving him the right to give classes himself, and the status of a qādi.1

This was relatively rare in northern Morocco before the Rif war, for the general standard of literacy was not high, although it was not as low as some contemporary accounts put it.2

The existence of a body of men trained in the šariʿa, even though few in number, raises the question of the relationship of the tribes to the theoretical head of the Islamic legal system in Morocco, the Sultan.

Relations with the makhzan

Many writers on Morocco have categorised most of northern Morocco, and in particular the Rif, as bilād al-sība, where the Sultan's writ meant little or nothing. Even modern writers hold this opinion, possibly influenced by contemporary European authors on whom they relay.3 Without returning to the question of bilād al-sība and bilād al-makhzan, already discussed in the Introduction, it is possible to show that this picture of the Rif is largely incorrect.

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1 Ibid., pp. 113-116 and Hart, Aith Waryaghār, pp. 182-186.
2 E.g., Woolman, op. cit., p. 22.
3 So F.V. Parsons in "Nineteenth-Century Morocco", pp. 1-2, can say "In the Rif . . . rarely penetrated by the Sultan's entourage [there was not] much rule of any type."
In the first place, the bilād al-sība theory is partly based on the idea of Berber "anarchy". Clearly this is not so—for there were institutions—the councils—to ensure some sort of order. Nevertheless, it is true that the Rif was not exactly in the centre of Moroccan politics. It was, as Ayache points out, the "cul-de-sac of the Moroccan empire."\(^1\) Provided there were mechanisms for maintaining relative peace, that taxes were paid, and the Sultan received contingents of troops in times of battle, he was by and large satisfied to maintain only an indirect control; and these conditions were by and large fulfilled.

There were local institutions which did indeed preserve the peace—and when they did not, the Sultan could and did intervene through his representatives in the north. Such officials certainly existed, and there were governors of the Rif appointed at most times in the nineteenth century. These governors could and did intervene when local tribal institutions could not settle their differences. A case arose in 1847, for instance, in which neighbouring tribes in the Rif (Matīwa al-Baḥar) and Ghumāra (Bānū Gamīl) provinces were involved. The Sultan ordered his governors in the Rif and Ghumāra to settle the dispute.\(^2\)

Taxes were paid as well, if rather irregularly. The method of extracting taxes was complicated, sometimes involving a form of kidnapping of Rifī qā'ilids who were visiting Fez,\(^3\) but it was certainly cheap, and did not involve an enormous makhzan presence in the Rif, which would have been expensive.

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2. Ibid., p. 356.
3. Cerdeira, op. cit., pp. 54-56.
Military forces were contributed when needed to fight the Christians. For instance, a contingent came from the Rif and Sinhaja Srair to help defend Tetuan during the Hispano-Moroccan war of 1859-1-60. It arrived a day after the peace treaty was signed and had to be restrained from attacking the Spanish. Incidents such as this show the extent to which the loyalty of the Rif tribes was to the Sultan as leader of Islam and leader of *jihad*.

In point of fact the Sultan's presence in Morocco was not really very great. Ayache points out that:

"The Sultan was not rich enough to set up in each town and hamlet of his empire a tax collector, judge and policeman. But why should he do it anyway, if the tribes already had institutions which allowed them to organise justice and keep their own internal order."^2

This point is reasonable, even in spite of the objection that the Sultan did not appoint the majority of officials, for they bought their employment from him. The Rif was not a rich area, and any great effort on the part of the Sultan would probably not have been worth the expense.

Nevertheless, the Sultan did have a certain presence in the tribes. In the first place, where an individual did manage to dominate the tribal council, he might be elected *gā'id* by his colleagues. This choice, unstable though the position of the new *gā'id* might be, was frequently ratified by the Sultan afterwards. Such, for example, was the case in the Banū Yiṭṭuft, whose newly elected *gā'id* would travel to Fez to see the Sultan in person, and would return accompanied by makhzan troops to collect taxes.^3

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1 Hart, Aith Waryaghar.
2 Ayache, "La fonction d'arbitrage", p. 12.
though this "appointment" by the Sultan was a recognition of a de facto nomination by the tribe, the institutional legitimacy of the qā'id could only be confirmed by the Sultan.

The process worked the other way, too, for Sultans or aspiring Sultans would appoint powerful local figures as qā'ids, or pashas, in their areas, recognising their already consolidated local authority, in the hopes of winning their support. Thus Mūlāy ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz appointed al-Raisūlī a governor, and so did two pretenders—Bū Ḫimāra and Mūlāy al-Zīn. However, such documents also served as a recognition of al-Raisūlī's de facto power, for a mere nobody would hardly have been courted in this way.

In addition, the Sultan maintained military forces in qasbas in the Rif. Two of the most important of these were at Snāda in the Banū Yīṭṭuf and, after the 1893 war with Spain, at Silwān in the Qalʿāya (Photograph II : 8).

If this was not enough to maintain order, the Sultan could, and did, send military forces into the area to impose his will. The destruction of the Buqqūya tribe in 1890 is a case in point. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Buqquya, traditionally a centre of fishing, turned to piracy as a profitable sideline. Passing European ships—French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese—were attacked, and the Spanish, who suffered the most, complained to the Sultan. Mūlāy ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ordered the Buqquya to stop their activities five times, and was ignored. Finally a large group of soldiers, a mahalla, under the effective command of Bushta al-Baghdādī, was sent into the Rif, by way

1 See below, p. 142.
2 Cerdeira, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
Photograph II: 8

The interior of the makhzan gasba at Silwān after its capture by the Spanish in 1909

of Tafarsit, where it was joined by more contingents from the Rif. With the agreement of the Banū Waryaghal, the Buqquya was invaded, and severely punished—including those clans which had not taken part in the piracy. Four of the imgharen were executed, a huge fine of 100,000 pesetas was imposed, and 400 prisoners were sent to Fez. The effect was disastrous, for most of the Buqquys fled the area, and the land remained empty for three years until they began to return. The authority of the Sultan needed no clearer demonstration.

At the same time, the Sultan could count on a certain amount of support from the Rifis in his internal struggles, for by and large he left them in relative peace, provided reasonable order was maintained. When the pretender Bū Ḥimāra set up his base in Silwān, near Melilla, he tried to extend his power into the Rif by appointing qā'ids over each clan of each tribe. However, when he attempted to impose his authority fully in the region, the Banū Waryaghal combined to oppose him with the help of the Banū 'Amārt. In October 1908 the pretender's army, which had been sent to deal with the Banū Waryaghal, was defeated. This signalled the end of Bū Ḥimāra's rebellion, and his support ebbed away. He was finally defeated by the Sultan's army in August 1909. By acting in this way, the Banū Waryaghal had effectively put themselves on the side of the Sultan. They had also shown that, internal feuds notwithstanding, they could act in unity when threatened by outside forces.

In short, then, the authority of the Sultan might

1 Hart, Aith Warya har, pp. 395-396.
2 Ghirelli, Bokoia, p. 81.
3 Hart, Aith Warya har, pp. 361-367.
not have been particularly effective, in the sense that force was exerted in the area. However, the Sultan had representatives in the area, and they could and did intervene as arbitrators, or eventually militarily if required.

The Sultan was also the leader of Islam in Morocco, and so in the Rif.

Islam in Northern Morocco.

Morocco, including the northern part of the country, recognises the orthodox Mālikī interpretation of Islam.

Generally speaking, the people of the north of the country were reasonably pious Muslims before the Protectorate, in that they all observed the fasting of Ramadan. A few had gone on Pilgrimage to Mecca,¹ and it will be seen that the title Hajj was included in the names of some of the participants of the Rif war. On the other hand, regular prayer five times a day was not always carried out, and women did not generally perform it. Indeed, when bin 'Abd al-Karīm assumed control of the Rif he had to make it mandatory for men and women to pray, and imposed punishments on those who did not.²

There were heterodox features in the Muslim life of northern Morocco, however, differences of law—although these were not as great as has been suggested—in inheritance, and there were relatively few qādīs in the area. These aspects have already been discussed. There remains one vitally important factor—the position of the murābiṭūn.

¹ Ibid., pp. 177-178.
² Ibid., p. 389.
Murābīṭ (pl., murābīṭūn) has been roughly translated as "saint". In fact it is rather a catch-all word, referring to anyone who is possessed of certain religious prestige or power. There are two groups of people in Morocco to whom this description has been given. The first are the shurfā (sing., sharīf), those who can claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. In northern Morocco the majority of these people claim such a descent through the family of Idris I, and his son Idris II, the founder of the city of Fez (788-791 A.D.). The other group, somewhat confusingly, is referred to simply as murābīṭūn--and is made up of those whose reputation stems not from descent but through the performance of miracles and good works (although the shurfā also do these things).

Finally, the term murābīṭ is also frequently applied to the tomb in which such people are buried, of which there are a great many all over Morocco. According to Hart there are at least 60 such tombs in the Banū Waryaghal tribe alone.¹ Both the tombs of these murābīṭūn and the men themselves, and frequently their descendants, are credited with possessing baraka. Baraka literally means "blessing"² (i.e., from God), and this blessing is supposed to give its recipient certain powers to heal or to destroy in a supernatural way.³ The tombs of these saints might become a major centre of pilgrimage, in which case a mosque could grow up in conjunction with it. Parallel to these developments

¹ Ibíd., pp. 187-189.
² Wehr, op. cit., p. 54.
³ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 149. Laroui, Origines, pp. 133-134, emphasizes the Islamic roots of baraka as opposed to what he sees as a purely anthropological approach which sees baraka in terms of an "Islamisation" of older magical forms.
is the development of other religious centres in the countryside through the action of the religious orders.

TarIQa (pl., ṭurūq), the word used to describe these orders, refers to a specific "way" of living the faith. Membership is voluntary, and extends over tribal boundaries. The ṭurūq maintain a presence in certain parts by religious institutions known as zawiyas. The rôle of these zawiyas in the period before the Protectorate has been widely disputed. It is not proposed to deal with the zawiyas in detail, but Laroui has shown how they tended to grow up in times and places where the central power was weakest, and where they fulfilled the functions at first of providing a rallying-point for jihād, and later fulfilling the roles of a centre of healing, instruction, a secure meeting and lodging place, and the source of arbitration in disputes. In this way it became both a buffer against central authority and an agent of that central authority, recognised as such by the Sultan, who used the zawiyas to mediate between tribes. If they became too powerful then the Sultan was usually able to bring them under control. The wealth of the zawiyas—and this is crucial for the understanding of the later opposition between them and bin 'Abd al-Karīm—was based partly on the gifts given by those who made use of its services, by property willed to it as ḥabūs, and by property granted to it by the makhzan—called 'azīb.²

Such zawiyas were often centred on the tomb or descendants of a family of marābūts, who might then decide to join themselves to one of the tarIQas. In the case of

1 For an account of this dispute, see Laroui, Origines, pp. 131-154.
2 Ibid.
families of sharifs, the choice of ārīqā varied according to personal preference, which explains why members of a particular marabutic family might belong to different ārīqas. In other cases members or leaders of an order might set up a zawiya of their own.

One of the most influential and largest orders in the Rif before the Protectorate was the Dargāwīya, with its headquarters in the Banū Zarwāl tribe, south-west of the Sinhāja Srair, and with a strong presence in the Ghumāra, where there was an important Dargāwī zawiya at Tuzgān. It also dominated in the Banū Waryaghal. Another extremely important ārīqa was that of the Nāsirīya, whose major membership in the Rif was in the tribe of the Banū Tūzīn. The situation in this tribe provides an illustration of the way in which a family of marabūts—the Awlād Būjdayn—could change from one ārīqa to another. Originally members of the Nāsirīya order, they had turned their allegiance to the Tijāniya order. Another important family, the Akhamlīshīn, was centred in the Sinhāja Srair, and in Targīst. There were zawiyas which were the homes of members of this family in Targīst, at Snāda in the Banū Bū Frāḥ, in the Banū Bū Shibat, and at Tīzi Ifrī between the Banū 'Amārt and the Banū Bū Bashīr. Most of this family also belonged to the Nāsirīya, although Sīdī Ḥamīdu b. Ibrāhīm was a member of the Wazzānīya ārīqa.


The Wazzānīya ṭarīqa had zawiyas mainly in the Ghumāra, in the Banū Ziyyāt, the Banū Bu'Zrā, Banū Silmān and Banū Khālid. The Wazzānīya ṭarīqa was founded in the sixteenth century by a šarīf named Mūlāy 'Abdallah, who was born in 1597 at Tazarut in the Banū 'Arūs. He was himself descended from one of the most important murābiṭīn of Morocco, Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh, who was buried in the same tribe, the Banū 'Arūs, at a place which then took his name, Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām. These facts are essential in understanding the origins of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallah al-Raṣūlī, probably the greatest, and certainly the most powerful, single local leader in northern Morocco before the Protectorate.

Mūlāy Aḥmad al-Raṣūlī (Photograph II : 8)

Al-Raṣūlī, as he is generally known, was a descendant of Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām, in itself a not uncommon distinction since, on his own reckoning, there were some fifteen thousand of them living at the same time as he himself. Yet he belonged to an illustrious and powerful branch of the family, the al-Raṣūlīs, who had a long history of local power. To a certain extent his subsequent reputation depended on this lineage—to a far greater one, however, it depended on his personal reputation for ability as a military and bandit leader, and for great unscrupulousness. His career had started as a bandit during the reign of Mūlāy al-Ḥassan, during which he began to kidnap the residents of Tangier and hold them to ransom. He was finally captured and imprisoned

1 Drague (Spillman), op. cit., p. 248.
2 Ibid., p. 227.
3 Forbes, op. cit., p. 40.
Photograph II.,: 9

Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Rāsūlī in 1924

in terrible conditions in Mogador. When he was eventually released by Mūlāy 'Abd al-'Azīz, he returned to banditry and opposition to the central government when, according to him, the makhzan tried to confiscate his lands. He retired to the mountains of the Jībāla, basing himself at Tazarut in the Banū 'Arūs, where he rapidly began to cause the Sultan considerable embarrassment by kidnapping prominent Europeans in Tangier. The first was Walter Harris, The Times correspondent in Morocco, in 1903, and then in 1904 Ion Perdicaris, a man who (falsely) claimed American citizenship, an incident which caused a major diplomatic incident between the United States and Morocco. As the price for releasing Perdicaris, 'Abd al-'Azīz appointed him Pasha of Tangier in June 1904.\(^1\) Such appointments were necessary to buy al-Raṣūlī's support. Similar tactics had been adopted by Bū Ḫimāra the previous year.\(^2\) Al-Raṣūlī, again on his own admission, cooperated with the pretender for a time, in case he might win.\(^3\) Al-Raṣūlī's cruelty in Tangier was disliked by the Europeans, and they persuaded the Sultan to dismiss him, and al-Raṣūlī again fled into the mountains in December 1906. He was still a serious threat to the Government, defeated several attempts to capture him by the makhzan, and himself managed to capture the Scottish-born military adviser to the Sultan, "Qā'id" Harry Maclean. As an eventual result of this kidnapping, al-Raṣūlī was appointed Pasha of Asīla, on the Atlantic

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 50-74. In T.A.H.P. file Biography, correspondence etc. is the original of 'Abd al-'Azīz's ṣāḥir appointing al-Raṣūlī as Pasha of Tangier, dated 18 Rabi' I 1322 / 2 June 1904.

\(^2\) T.A.H.P. file Biography, correspondence etc. contains the original of the ṣāḥir as well—with the seal of "Muḥammad b. Ḥassan", the pretendee's fake identity, and dated 17 Safar 1321/11 May 1903.

\(^3\) Forbes, op. cit., p. 75.
coast south of Tangier, by Mūlāy Ḥafīẓ, who had just been proclaimed Sultan, in 1908. As Pasha of Asila he became acquainted with political developments in Europe, and recognising the future role of Spain in Morocco, cultivated contacts with that country through its Consul in Tangier. When Spanish troops landed in Larache in 1911 they were led by the then Colonel Manuel Fernández Silvestre, who was to play an important rôle in the opening stages of the Rif war. Silvestre rapidly came into conflict with al-Raisūlī, and, as neither side was prepared to compromise, they soon quarrelled. Al-Raisūlī wanted to continue to govern almost unfettered, under Spanish protection, Silvestre to undertake a military occupation of the country. When Mūlāy Ḥafīẓ signed the Protectorate treaty in 1912, the Spanish wanted to bring more troops into their zone, with al-Raisūlī's help. The Sharif temporised, and eventually he and Silvestre came into serious conflict, and al-Raisūlī left once again for the mountains of the Banū 'Arūs, at the beginning of 1913. He was replaced as Pasha of Asila by one Idrīs al-Rīfī, a man who had previously been one of his supporters, but had, in al-Raisūlī's opinion, sold himself to the Spanish.¹ This man would later appear as one of Spain's more important, if less competent, political agents in the Rif.

It has been necessary to give a fairly detailed account of al-Raisūlī's career up to 1913 because he was a figure of enormous importance. Various characteristics emerge even at this stage--firstly, that his overriding concern was to maintain his own power. He could do this only by coming to some arrangement with Spain, but not one that

¹ Ibid., pp. 76-162.
would weaken his prestige in the eyes of his followers. The contradictions between these two points are the basis for much of al-Raisūlī’s political actions subsequently. Secondly, his prestige partly depended on his sharifian descent. His later rival for the control of northern Morocco, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm, could claim no such descent, and al-Raisūlī despised him accordingly.

Nevertheless, in the end, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm emerged as the more effective leader, and it is the background of his family which is now important.

The al-Khaṭṭābī Family

The future leader of the Rif, while neither sharīf nor marābūt, came from one of the more important families of the Rif. The patrilineal line was centred in the Banū Waryaghāl. He was a member of the Banū Zara’ lineage of the Banū Ajdrī sub-clan of the Banū Yussif W-‘Alī clan of that tribe.1 Ajdrī, the community in which he lived, because of its economic and geographic importance, had already assured the leadership of the Banū Yussif W-‘Alī, and, when Bushtā al-Baghdādī invaded the Rif in 1898, he appointed as qā’id of the clan Sh Ziyyān al-Khaṭṭābī a great (?)-uncle of the future Rifī leader. However, his authority did not last long before he was murdered.2

This was by no means the first contact between the al-Khaṭṭābī family and the makhzan. Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm came from a line of men who were highly educated by the standards of the time and the area. His great-grandfather, grandfather and father all, according to Skīraj, bore the

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1 Hart, Aith Waryaghār, pp. 369-370.
2 Ibid., p. 357.
Photograph II: 10

Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm in 1925

Source: Illustrated London News, 7 Feb. 1926, p. 204
Certainly this was correct insofar as his father was concerned. In 1880, Mūlāy al-Ḥassan wrote to him confirming him as qādi of the Banū Waryaghal. This appointment was confirmed by subsequent Sultans—by Mūlāy ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz in 1906, who also appointed him ṣāḥib in 1907, and in effect by Mūlāy Ḥafīẓ in 1908. The letter from Ḥafīẓ is interesting, for it states that ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī was responsible for reading the letter of the new Sultan asking for the tribes' allegiance, to the people of "Marsa [i.e., port] al-Nakīrīl" (Ajdrīr) and persuading them to give their bayʿa to Ḥafīẓ. Furthermore, one of the future ʿamīr's uncles, Sī Muḥammad Manfusha, a brother of his much-appointed father, was a teacher at the Qarāwīyīn university in Fez.

As if this was not enough in itself to put the al-Khaṭṭābī family in an important position in the region, it was also connected by marriage to several of the more important families in the Banū Waryaghal and the neighbouring Buqquya tribe. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī had married the daughter of Sī Aḥmad b. al-Qāḍī, of the Banū al-Qāḍī sub-clan in the murābitūn clan of the Banū Waryaghal. There was also an old connection by marriage with the family of Azarqān, also inhabitants of Ajdrīr, which was reinforced when the future

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1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 85.
2 SHAT, Maroc 520, p. 24, zāhir of Mūlāy al-Ḥassan, dated last day of Jamāda II 1297/2 June 1880.
3 Ibid., p. 25, zāhir of Mūlāy ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, dated 29 Shawāl 1324/16 Dec. 1906.
5 Ibid., p. 98. Letter, Mūlāy Ḥafīẓ to ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, dated 22 Shahbān 1326/19 Sept. 1908. This was also mentioned by bin ʿAbd al-Karīm himself in Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., p. 58.
6 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 86.
7 Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
'amIr's sister married Muḥammad Azarqān, later his brother-in-law's Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹ Through the great(?)-uncle SI Ziyyān's branch of the family, the al-Khaṭṭābīs were connected by the marriage of Ḩaddū.bin Ziyyān to the sister of Raʾis Masaʾud, a Buqquyī noted for his activities as a pirate, and also later a member of the Rifī government.²

The al-Khaṭṭābī family was not, however, of sharifian descent, despite its importance, and despite later claims that it could claim a genealogy going back to 'Umar al-Khaṭṭāb, the orthodox Caliph and companion of the Prophet Muḥammad, which has been shown to be at least rather doubtful, by Hart.³ This partly explains al-Raʾisūlī's contempt for 'Abd al-Karīm. Nevertheless, the family was a rich one by Rifī standards.

The ownership of land in northern Morocco was theoretically vested in the Sultan.⁴ In fact, this was more of a legal fiction and three effective categories of land existed. These were private properties—mulk, collective land usually held by the local community for pasturage, and ḥabūs property (inalienable land assigned to a mosque or zawiyā, the Moroccan equivalent of waqf). Most of the mulk land had undergone a certain amount of sub-division as the result of inheritances shared between brothers.⁵ As a result, in those areas where mulk holdings existed—and this varied,

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¹ Coded, op. cit., p. 79.
³ Hart, Aīth Waryaghār, pp. 370-371. Hart's grounds for this assertion are, firstly, the existence of evidence that the al-Khaṭṭābī family was descended from a family of the Gaznayya tribe, and secondly, the undeniable fact that bin 'Abd al-Karīm never emphasized his supposed ancestry very strongly.
⁵ Hart, Aīth Waryaghār, pp. 97-98.
for especially in the semi-nomadic tribes such as the Ulăd Sittût it was rare—individual holdings were very small, and it was unusual for any to be much bigger than 4-5 hectares.2

Despite these generally small holdings, the al-Khaṭṭābī family seem to have been fairly well-off. By 1918, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī owned 5 houses in Ait Qamara in the territory of the murābiṭīn clan, 2 in the Trugut clan and the Timsamān, 2 between the W. Ghīs and W. Nakūr, and another in the Banū 'Abdallāh clan.3 Although his holdings had doubtless been increased since 1912 because of the money paid to him by the Spanish,4 this implies considerable wealth to start with. Certainly 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī was able to send his eldest son Muḥammad to study at the Qarāwīyyīn university in Fez in 1903, along with his younger brother (bin 'Abd al-Karīm's uncle), 'Abd al-Sallām.5

Having completed his education, the young Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm travelled to Melilla, where he came into close contact with the Spanish authorities. He became an Arabic interpreter in the Native Affairs Office (the Negociado Indígena, later the O.C.T.A.I.), and also editor of the Arabic language section of the local paper, El Telegrama del Rif, an activity which must have brought him into contact with the eastern Arabic press, and may, as Hart suggests,

1 David Seddon, "Le Conflit sur la Terre a Zaio (Rif Oriental)", in Actes de Durham Recherches Recentes sur le Maroc Moderne, p. 188. In these nomadic tribes, land tended to be collectively held.
2 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 98 and Maurer, op. cit., p. 23.
3 Comisión de Responsabilidades, Documentos relacionados con la información instruida por la llamada, "Comisión de Responsabilidades" acerca del desastre de Annual (Madrid, n.d.) (henceforth referred to as Responsabilidades), p. 276.
4 See below, chs. III, IV and V.
5 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 371.
explain his interest in the Salafiya movement. However, at least until the beginning of the Protectorate, both he and his father remained friendly towards the Spanish, and in January 1913 Muḥammad was awarded the distinction of "Knight of the Order of Isabela the Catholic Queen", a somewhat ironic honour, in view of the rôle Isabela's will had played in Africanista propaganda in Spain.

Conclusion: A Static Society?

It was against this historical, economic, social and political background that the events of the Rif war were to take place. The war, and the new political structures that grew up during it, would transform the Rif. However, this was a society that was, anyway, changing during the period before the Protectorate.

Some of these changes were less dramatic than others. The changes in agriculture during the nineteenth century were caused by new demands for exports of foodstuffs from Gibraltar. The opening of a new labour market in Algeria led to large-scale emigration, which had both economic and cultural effects, for it encouraged a slow spreading of the Arabic language among people who had previously spoken only Berber.

It was the political changes which were most noticeable, for politically the area was changing very rapidly. In the west, at the end of the nineteenth century, Aḥmad al-Raisūlī emerged as a local example of the "grand-caïds" so famous in the south of Morocco. In the Rif itself, the

1 Ibid., p. 272.
2 In the collection of Lt.-Col. Ramón Sánchez Díaz, in Madrid, is the paper bin ʿAbd al-Karīm signed on receiving this award. It is dated Melilla, 18 January 1912.
makhzan was obliged to intervene with force to deal with the pirates in the Buqquya. The effects of this were so serious that the traditional balances of the liff system in the Rif as a whole were changed, and feuding broke out in earnest. This feuding was not so severe, however, as to preclude the formation of a united front headed by the Banū Waryaghal to oppose the third major disruptive influence during this period—Bū Ḥimāra.

These were largely internal sources of disruption; however, in the last year of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth another disruptive influence was forcing itself onto Morocco as a whole. This was the interest various European nations were showing in the country. In the case of the northern part of Morocco, the European nation most concerned was Spain. Wars between Spain and Morocco in 1859–1860 and, as local campaigns, around Melilla in 1893 and 1909, showed two things—firstly that, political differences and feuding notwithstanding, the people of northern Morocco were quite capable of cooperating with each other to oppose the Spanish; and secondly that they would do this whether it was convenient for the makhzan that they should do so or not. Both these factors would play a significant part in the Rif war.

In fact, the Spanish managed to occupy small areas of the northern part of Morocco even before the Protectorate treaty was signed. By the end of 1911 they controlled areas on the west coast and in the east, around Melilla. However, when they did receive legal confirmation of their Protectorate in November 1912, there still remained a large area—the bulk of their zone, in fact—which they would have to conquer.
Chapter III

1912-1918, THE MAKING OF POLITICAL CHOICES

"Ever since the Guelaya was occupied, our task has been one of encouraging civilisation among the natives of the country to lead them out of a savagery which is the undeniable sister of fanaticism and always has been the principal cause of their antipathy to Christians"

From a Spanish report on the political action in Northern Morocco between 1912 and 1916.¹

"And know that words have no force without money-on the contrary money gives force to words"

Qā'id Muḥammad Bū Qaddur, appealing for funds from the Spanish.²

"The trouble is that so many Moors, to use an American phrase, persistently decline to 'stay bought'"

The British Ambassador in Madrid, commenting, in 1922, on Spanish political action in Morocco.³

The three opening quotations indicate the outlines of the political activity during the years immediately after the announcement of the Protectorate. In imposing their rule the Spanish faced a number of problems. The most immediate

¹ Commandancia General de Melilla, Oficina Central de Tropas y Asuntos Indígenas, Resumen de la gestión desarrollada por este centro bajo la inmediata dirección del excelentísimo Señor Comandante General desde su creación en enero de mil novocientos doce (Melilla, 1915) henceforth referred to as "O.C.T.A.I., Resumen"
² SHM Melilla Leg 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur to Colonel and Captain of Alhucemas, 27 Safar 1339/21 Nov. 1919.
³ FO 371/8342/W 8639/161/28, Howard to Curzon, Madrid, 13 October 1922, Confidential.
of these was the almost unceasing opposition of the Moroccans themselves. It was less than six months since one of the most important leaders of this opposition, Muḥammad Mizzyān of the Banū Bū Ifrūr had been killed, and the opposition continued without him, in the eastern part of the Protectorate. In the west, the powerful figure of Aḥmad al-Raisūlī had still to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, the Spanish had one very important factor in their favour; this was the general disunity of the opposition. No one individual was strong enough to lead the battle against the Spanish; indeed at this stage it was impossible for a single leader to emerge, because other locally powerful figures were unwilling to see their own prestige and authority diminished. As a result, much effort was expended on the Moroccan side in trying to keep as many political options open as possible. This is a confused period in which individuals looked for support in rapidly changing alliances both with other local leaders, and with a variety of outside sources. Much of this period fell during the First World War in Europe, which spilled over into Morocco as the Germans tried to win support among the tribes against the French. In this way there were at least three European powers--Spain, France and Germany--who were interested in winning support in the Spanish zone. The Moroccans took full advantage of these possibilities in an effort to secure their own positions. So a man like Muḥammad Bū Qaddur turned first to the Germans and then to the Spanish in an attempt to take full advantage of the European rivalries. The benefit that he and others like him were looking for was mainly financial.

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1 See above, p. 76.
Spanish attempts to "buy" support were one of the most important features of that country's policy. It was done by giving regular retainers to an increasingly large number of individuals in the area. To a large extent such a policy was dictated firstly by the ideas of peaceful penetration which had characterised Spanish involvement in Morocco during the late nineteenth century,¹ and partly by the demands of the Government in Madrid that as few troops as possible should be used in spreading the authority of the Protectorate administration. Unfortunately, the payment of large sums of money to supposed supporters did not necessarily guarantee those people's loyalty. The remark of the British Ambassador in Madrid would have been as relevant in this period as it was in 1922.

However, the Spanish did have another factor in their favour. Spain, at least compared with Morocco, was a modern European state which could offer her potential "subjects" in Morocco certain material advantages--education, health care, and so on. Above all, the Spanish could present themselves as the only authority which could guarantee order. Having made it their concern to ensure that the local methods of keeping order--the ḥāqq-fines--were disrupted so that the whole area dissolved into a chaos of feuding, the Spanish authorities proceeded to set themselves up as a potential administration which would end the feuding. In this way, the social structures already described began to fall into disorder, laying the basis for new ones to emerge. The development of this situation is the subject of this chapter.

¹ See above, p. 71.
The Administration of the Spanish Zone

Despite the desire of the Spanish government to limit the military cost of the Protectorate in Morocco, their forces had already been involved in limited military activity. At the beginning of the Protectorate Spanish troops were in control of an area around Larache in the west, which they had occupied in 1911, and another district around Melilla which they had taken during and after the 1909 conflict. Particularly in the east, the opposition to the Spanish was intense. Although Spanish troops had reached Jabal ‘Arawīt in January 1912, that is, before the formal announcement of the Protectorate, resistance had grown, not decreased. Almost ten years later, letters to and from the participants in this resistance were found on the bodies of men killed during the reconquest of the Qal‘aya area by the Spanish, after their defeats in 1921. These letters show that the people who were fighting the Spanish in 1911 and 1912 came not only from the immediate area of the fighting but from as far away as the Banū Waryaghal in the central Rif, and even from the Tetuan area. Even at this early stage the Banū Waryaghal tribe was involved in the resistance to the Spanish, although it was a very piecemeal involvement.

However, a few small areas in the far east and far west of their supposed Protectorate aside, the Spanish did not control any of their zone (see Map III : 1). The Rif and Ghumāra regions were largely opposed to any outside interference by the Spanish, and the Jibāla was largely under the control of al-Raisūlī, who, it will be seen, was torn in his

\[1\] SHM Melilla Leg 21, loose papers containing letters captured during September 1921.
attitude towards the Spanish between a desire to use their support to maintain his authority, and concern lest Spanish authority should diminish his own power and his prestige among the people of the Jibāla. He later told Rosita Forbes that in 1911 and 1912 (just before the announcement of the Protectorate, but when it was quite clear that Spain intended to play a controlling rôle in the affairs of northern Morocco) he had felt that "the Spaniards are strong enough to help us, but not so strong that they will oppress us."¹ By "us", without doubt, al-Raisūlī meant himself.

The Spanish, therefore, had a problem in the administration of their Protectorate. This was to impose their control on the area and thus carry out their mission as laid down by the treaty of 1912. They were in theory, however, only a protecting power upholding the authority of the Moroccan Sultan, and defending the existing government. In fact the system of the Moroccan makhzan was not all that was required of a modern system of administration. As a result, a whole new system of government had to be devised.

According to the Protectorate treaty of November 1912, the representative of the Sultan in the Spanish zone was a khalīfa with residence in Tetuan. He, at least in theory, was the power which the Spanish were protecting. In fact he was a Spanish nominee, "chosen" by the Sultan from a list prepared by the Spanish, just as the French, in their Protectorate had effectively appointed Mūlāy Yūsif as Sultan.² In theory at least, the Sultan in the French zone retained full sovereignty over his kingdom. Thus Lyautey, the first

¹ Forbes, op. cit., p. 113.
Resident-General ordered that the Sharifian anthem should be played on all important occasions and that the Moroccan flag should be flown over all public buildings. In fact, of course, such authority was only symbolic. The same applied in the Spanish zone. Even a Spanish administrative historian like Cordero Torres, who was almost a semi-official writer, admits that in fact the khalifa in Tetuan could do nothing that was against the wishes of the High Commissioner and so:

"there is no practical point in any discussion of whether the Jalifa is co-ordinate with or subordinate to the High Commissioner, since his every act presupposes the consent of [the High Commissioner] . . . ."²

Thus the real power lay with the High Commissioner, who was assisted by three delegates (delegados) to administer taxation, government administration and services (communications, public works, industry and so on), and native affairs. The delegate in charge of native affairs was also responsible for the Offices of Native Affairs, which will be discussed later.

In fact, the authority of the High Commissioner was not absolute, because it was limited by the decisions of the Spanish government in Madrid. He was responsible, in political matters to the Spanish Ministry of State (that is, the Foreign Ministry) and in military matters to the Ministry of War.³ In fact, it was impossible to distinguish between political and military action and policy, but the confusion caused by this division was reflected in the contradictions between the policies of peaceful penetration and military action which bedevilled the early years of the Protectorate.

¹ Bidwell, op. cit., p. 18.
² Cordero Torres, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 120.
As Cordero Torres points out, one "consequence of this rivalry was the continuous making and remaking of services (especially between 1916 and 1924) [and] the frustrated attempt at a civil protectorate in 1922."¹ This, in theory, was the legal basis of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. However, in order for it to be put into effect, the Spanish would have to physically control the area. When the Protectorate was set up, in 1912, they did not even occupy the future capital of the zone, Tetuan. This, then, was one of the most urgent priorities.

The Occupation of Tetuan and the Moroccan Reaction

Despite the urgency of the need to occupy Tetuan, it was only in February 1913 that the Spanish moved to take the city. Even then, the advance was only authorised provided that it could be carried out peacefully. In fact, there was no opposition to the occupation of Tetuan and on 19 February 1913 Spanish troops entered the city. A month and a half later, on 2 April, the officer who had commanded the operation, General Alfau, was appointed as the first High Commissioner in Morocco, and on 13 April, Mūlāy al-Maḥdī b. Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad was named as the first khalīfa.²

Perhaps surprisingly, there was little violent reaction from the Moroccans at first. Nevertheless, Alfau was concerned about the consequences of any agitation against the Spanish. The principal uncertainty was over the attitude of al-Raʾīsūlī. It was known that he had coveted the post of khalīfa for himself; instead, the Spanish tried to pacify him

¹ Ibid., vol. I, p. 118.
² Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 138.
with reinstatement as Pasha of Asila. However, the Spanish could not hope that this appointment would provide any peace for them, because al-Raisūlī was himself under pressure from the people of the Jibāla to take an active role in leading the resistance against the Spanish. It was in order to prepare for all eventualities that, during the summer of 1913, he sent supplies up to his old base at Tazarūt, in the Banū ‘Arūs. Here he was near to the zawiya of Sīdī Yusif al-Tilīdī, in the Akhmās tribe, where during Friday prayers, holy war was declared with al-Raisūlī as its leader. Further calls for jihād came from the Darqāwī zawiya of Tuzgān in the Ghumāran tribe of Banū Manṣūr, where a man named Sī Muḥammad b. al-Ghālī b. ‘Abd al-Mu’min al-Tuzgānī formed a ħarka (an irregular group of fighters) to attack the Spanish.

Although he had been declared leader of the jihād at Sīdī Yusif al-Tilīdī, al-Raisūlī was not strong enough to meet the Spanish in the open, and so concentrated on harrying their lines and communications. Attacks on Spanish positions increased from early June onwards. Nevertheless, the main force of the resistance was organised on a tribal basis. For instance, a former bandit, al-Twilab, who had become, by force, qā’id of the Hawz tribe led that tribe against the Spanish.

2 Ibid.
3 See above, p. 142, n. 1.
4 Forbes, op. cit., p. 173.
5 Fernando O. Capaz Montés, Cabecillas Rebeldes en Gomara desde 1913 a 1924, typed MS in B.N.E.S. de A, p. 4.
7 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 141.
8 Zona de Protectorado Español en Marruecos; Cabecillas Rebeldes de 1913 a 1927, typed MS in B.N.E.S. de A, p. 45 (henceforth referred to as "Cab Reb. 1913-1927").
and a Darqawi sharif, Sidi Tuhami b. Sidi 'Abdallah al-Wazzani, led part of the Banu Khaldi and, indeed, continued to do so until he was killed in 1921.¹

In the Rif, the Spanish occupation of Tetuan soon brought calls for resistance. However, they were not very effective at first. A man from the Buqiya tribe, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Amar b. 'Ali started to organise a harka. The Spanish managed to buy him off, and the harka collapsed at the end of July.² The incident demonstrated how vulnerable a disjointed resistance was to Spanish political initiatives. Similarly, on 10 July a meeting at the Tuesday market of the murabitin in the Banu Waryaghala agreed to send 150 men to the Tetuan area, and to send others to help the people defending the principal line of defence against the Spanish in the east. This was along the Wadi Karat between the Banu Sa'id and Banu Sidal. However, it was only a small force and was not accompanied by any of the major leaders of the tribe.³ The calls for a harka were more successful in other parts of the Rif, for less than a week later the Spanish commander at Alhucemas Island reported that 1,200 men had left the Rif to go and fight in the Tetuan zone, of whom only 120 came from the Banu Waryaghala and the Buqquya tribes combined.⁴ Apparently, the reason for the refusal of the Banu Waryaghala to take much notice of the

¹ Ibid., p. 70.
barka in the east, which towards the end of July had grouped at the market of Bû Irmâna in the Banû Sa'id, was that they "are disgusted with the Beni Sacar and other tribes which are joining it." Later this enmity between the Qal’aya tribes and the Banû Waryaghal would cause the collapse of the Rifî alliance in the east after the victories of 1921. Once again this shows the strains placed by tribal disunity on the effectiveness of the resistance to the Spanish.

Also in June 1913, the people of the Buqquya and Banû Waryaghal had other, more immediate concerns. The Spanish gunboat Concha had run aground on the Buqquya coast. Its crew was captured and later ransomed by the two tribes, and its guns were removed. One of these guns ended up in the house of Ra’îs Misa‘ûd b. ‘Amar of the Izzamûrân clan of the Buqquya.2 This man, nicknamed "Sibara", after a Spanish admiral named "Civera", was to play an important part in later events, and during the Rif war. He had first reached the notice of the Spanish in 1911, when he was arrested on their instructions by the Tangier police as a smuggler. The following year he was released in exchange for Spanish prisoners taken by the Rifîs during the fighting of 1911 in the eastern part of the future Spanish zone. At the same time as he was first arrested in Tangier, another Buqquyi was arrested with him. This was ‘Abd al-Karîm b. al-Ḥâjj ‘Alî Lûh. He later became Sibara's trading partner and agent in Tangier.3 He also married Sibara's sister. Another sister

2 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 117 (where the date 1913 is misprinted as 1915) and SHM Melilla Leg 2, Cte. Mar., Alhucemas to Cte. Gral., Melilla; Alhucemas, 21 July 1913. The Concha ran aground on 11 June 1913.
3 Ghirelli, "Bokoia", p. 82.
of Sibara was married to a cousin of Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm named Ḥaddu b. Ziyyān.1 Both Sibara and ‘Abd al-Karīm bin al-Ḥājj ‘Alī later played fairly important rôles in the government of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm.

As a whole then, while there was considerable opposition to the Spanish it was generally so disorganised and disunited that it was relatively ineffective. The Spanish determined to foster this state of affairs through their political policy. This policy, in the eastern part of the Protectorate was put into effect by the Offices of Native Affairs.

Spanish Political Policy and the Offices of Native Affairs

The Offices of Native Affairs (Oficinas de Asuntos Indígenas or O.A.I.s) were the fruit of a reorganisation of a body set up in 1909 to administer the territories newly occupied that year. In December 1912 this original organisation, the Negociado Indígena (Native Bureau) became the Central Office for Native Troops and Affairs (Oficina Central de Tropas y Asuntos Indígenas).2 As its title indicates, it had two functions, one of them military, to recruit "native" Moroccans into the Spanish forces, and the other administrative and political. Part of its task, as the opening quotation of this chapter indicates, was to provide the services of "civilisation" in order to win over the allegiance of the Moroccans.

In the dry, eastern zone, people's great need was for food. There had been a serious drought in the northern

1 See below, Ch. IX, for family tree.
zone during the winter of 1912/1913, and supplies were low.\(^1\)

One of General Jordana's first acts as Comandante General of Melilla was to distribute seeds as loans to those who needed them. In 1914 the loans were repaid in full, including an interest at five per cent. That year ten thousand Rifis who normally left for Algeria stayed in the Spanish occupied zone to help with the harvest.\(^2\) The policy was continued the following year. Attempts were made to improve irrigation in the Silwān area, and a farm school was set up to teach "modern agricultural methods".\(^3\) So, local farmers became more and more aware of the advantage of cooperating with the Spanish, and became more dependent upon them. The disadvantages of not cooperating were brought home as well. Houses and land that belonged to "rebels" or whose ownership was unknown because the proprietor had fled were expropriated by the makhzan,\(^4\) with the expressed intention of providing land for colonisation by Spanish farmers.\(^5\) However, similar tactics had been used by the Spanish during the 1859/1860 war of Tetuan to control the city, with no intention of colonisation.\(^6\)

The Spanish penetrated the economic life of the area in other ways. New markets were opened, and in the Banū Bū Yaḥyā, for instance, the Friday market was moved behind the Spanish lines to Ḫassī Quryāt, so that while it was under Spanish protection, people from unoccupied territory

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1 Ibid., p. 11.
2 Ibid and Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 23.
3 O.C.T.A.I., Resumen, p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 23.
6 Al-Nāsirī, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 94.
could visit it, and the O.C.T.A.I. predicted, "they will slowly form friendly relations with us."¹

The health of the local people was also considered to be important, and the Spanish set up dispensaries in villages and markets in areas that they controlled, and opened the dispensaries on Alhucemas Island and the Peñón de Vélez to Moroccans who needed medical help.² This was not entirely altruistic, for the opening of dispensaries, particularly on the islands was a fine way of attracting the local people, and the costs of these services were classified as "Political expenses."³

Similar attention was given to education. Even before the imposition of the Protectorate, the Spanish government had set up schools in places like Tetuan and Melilla. However, these only expanded very slowly during the early years of the Protectorate, and were often badly equipped.⁴ After 1912, smaller schools were set up in the Melilla area, and at some places in the Tetuan and Larache zones. However, the numbers of students were very small. By 1919 only 200 Moroccans were undergoing full time education in the Melilla area.⁵

Despite these small numbers, some of the pupils developed very interesting careers on leaving school. One of the former pupils at the school in Melilla was Ši Maḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm, brother of the future Rif leader,⁶ and

¹ O.C.T.A.I., Resumen, p. 13.
² Ibid.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Gastos Políticos-Sanidad.
⁵ Ibid., passim.
⁶ Ibid., p. 99.
another was Muḥammad b. Mizzyān, "the son of a shaykh always noted for his friendship to Spain," who continued his studies at the Infantry Academy in Toledo, and later joined the Spanish Regimiento de Ceriñola as a lieutenant. He rose high in the Spanish army, became Military Governor of the Canary Islands and later still, Chief of Staff in the Moroccan army after independence in 1956.

That these opportunities were made available more for political than educational reasons is shown by the Mizzyān case, and especially by that of Maḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm, who continued his studies at the prestigious Escuela de Minas in Madrid, which was notoriously difficult for Spaniards to enter, let alone Rifis. He needed official backing. In June 1918, the head of the University Residence where he was living in Madrid went to see the teachers of the school "to emphasise the importance that this young man should pass his exams."

There was a further advantage for the Spanish in having local boys study in Spain or the presidios. A report on the possible occupation of Alhucemas in 1918 stated that as a result "we have [hostages] against the principal leaders in Ajdir, since their sons or brothers are in Madrid, Tetuan or [Melilla] following various courses of study."

Of course, the main intention of Spanish political action was to extend the area that they controlled or influenced. All else, providing education, health services, encouraging

1 O.C.T.A.I., Resumen, p. 3.
2 Personal information, Cte. Cor. La Torre (SHM).
3 Responsibilidades, p. 53. The "young man" failed despite this intervention, and had to return to re-sit the examinations in September when he passed "with great brilliance".
4 Responsibilidades, p. 28P, quoting Informe dated 4 June 1918, Melilla.
agriculture and so on was secondary, and aimed at helping this primary end. The major part of the O.C.T.A.I.'s work was taken up with direct political intervention.

**Political Intervention**

The O.C.T.A.I. identified two groups towards whom their policies were to be directed: firstly, the leaders of the various local communities, and through them the *liff* alliances of which they were supposedly members; secondly, their followers, that is the ordinary people, to prevent them from attacking or bringing pressure to bear on their shaykhs for selling out to the Spanish. In those areas that they did not control, the intention of the Spanish authorities was to create political conditions in which they might occupy the land easily. In areas that they did control, they had to preserve their authority and to keep the local notables content and convinced that they had the ear of the Spanish authorities through the O.C.T.A.I. which itself defined part of its function as:

"to serve as an intermediary with the chiefs who wish to speak to Your Excellency [i.e., the Commanding General] listening and taking note of their declarations and desires, carefully preparing the minds of the person concerned for the refusal or postponement of his requests, flattering him with fine words and hopeful replies, so that, even if they do not see their desires realised, they will not leave dissatisfied."\(^1\)

Amongst the ordinary people, the O.C.T.A.I. organised police groups, "formed of the wildest elements in each tribe", who would try to stifle any opposition, inform the Spanish authorities of any trouble and build up the reputation of the pro-Spanish shaykhs when they became unpopular because

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of their support for the Spanish. These police groups were set up in tribes which the Spanish had not yet occupied with the intention of using them to form the basis of police units, known as *mas, when the tribe was finally occupied.

However, it was political relations with the unsubmitted tribes that took up most of the attention of the O.C.T.A.I., for the major aim of the Office was to expand the area under occupation. The essential idea was to penetrate so deeply into the political and economic structure of the unsubmitted tribes, that they could then be occupied with the minimum of opposition, and the least possible loss of troops. "Penetrating the political structures" largely meant manipulating existing *iff alliances and setting up new ones to bring the main groups over to the Spanish, or at least to neutralise them. An example of how this happened is the case of the Banū Bū Yaḥyī.

The Penetration of the Banū Bū Yaḥyī

The Banū Bū Yaḥyī was a mainly nomadic tribe which covered a large area, crossing the frontier of the French zone to the south, linking with the al-Maṭālsa in the east, and with the Banū Bū Ifrūr in the north, bringing it uncomfortably close to the mines at Jabal Wiksān. Clearly, both to protect the mines and to continue to advance westwards, the Spanish wanted to control the tribe (see Maps III: 2 and 3).

After they had occupied the Banū Bū Ifrūr, the Spanish "attracted" several powerful shaykhs in the bordering clans of the Banū Bū Yaḥyī, so as to use them to work with

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1 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
2 Ibid., p. 18.
MAP III:2 To show area of political action of the O.C.T.A.I.

In the east of the Spanish zone in 1916

The area within the rectangle is shown on a larger scale in map iii:3

1 banu shikar
2 mazuja
3 banu bu gafar
4 banu wali shak

scale 2cms to 15 kms approx
those further away from the Spanish lines. In this way they organised good relations with the Awlād Mūsā wa-Muḥand and the Awlād Fītḥūma. These clans lived in the neighbourhood of Ḫassī Bīrkān, an important watering-place in the area, and the key to the Harraig plain with the Spanish hoped to occupy later. These two clans therefore signed a pact with the Spanish and in the process brought into alliance with the Spanish one of the most prestigious shaykhs of the tribe (or so the Spanish regarded him), Shaykh al-Mukhtār al-Athmāl. This man was himself involved in a political alliance with another shaykh named Ḥaddūsh, of the Awlād Raḥū, and so this third clan was won over to Spain. At the same time, the Spanish attracted the sharpīs of the Darqāwī zawīya at Mūlāy Kārkār who, the O.C.T.A.I. felt, might have been a focus of resistance.¹

In the west, the Banū Bū Yaḥyā border with the lands of the al-Maṭālsa tribe, in whose territory is the important watering point of 'Ain Zuhra. Obviously the Spanish wanted to occupy this position, so their next step was to win over the western clans of the Banū Bū Yaḥyā. The difficulty was the Awlād 'Abd Dā'īm whom the O.C.T.A.I. described as "this turbulent clan, the most warlike and fierce in the tribe."² The tactic used here was to isolate the clan, to "deprive them of all hope of support and security, cutting them off by the attraction of the clans of [Awlād 'Alī] and [Awlād al-Samfa] the most southerly in our zone, which had social links with the [Awlād 'Abd Dā'īm]."³ These two clans

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¹ O.C.T.A.I., Resumen, p. 16.
² Ibid., pp. 16-17.
³ Ibid., p. 17.
were won over by a mixture of flattery and threats, including that of closing the markets to them, a tactic that was later used to drastic effect in the Ghumāra and Rif. These methods succeeded and the Awlād ‘Abd Dā’im ḥarka collapsed. This concluded the pacification of the Banū Bū YaḥyāI (see Maps III : 2, 3).

However, although these methods were successful with a tribe close to the Spanish occupied zone, they were quite the reverse when applied to powerful tribes in the central Rif. Such a tribe was the Banū Waryaghal.

The Banū Waryaghal

The long term aim of Spanish policy was to cope with the tribe which they considered to be the greatest single source of opposition to their conquest of northern Morocco—the Banū Waryaghal. Respect for this tribe was in fact quite reasonable for the Banū Waryaghal was the largest tribe in the area, had links with many of the surrounding tribes, and bordered onto all of the central Rif tribes. It had also the only coastline that was easily accessible, with a large fertile plain behind. The essence of the Spanish plan was to deal with the Banū Waryaghal in roughly the same way as they had dealt with the Banū Bû YaḥyāI, although on rather a larger scale. In the first place they planned to try to isolate it, by forming a cordon of other tribes, linked together in a "Gran Lef Oriental" (great eastern liff) bringing in the Banū Tûzîn, Timsamân, Banū Walishak, Gaznāya and Banū Sa‘îd. At the same time they would try to form a series of alliances in favour of the Spanish within the Banū.

Ibid., p. 17.
Waryaghal while ensuring that existing conflicts within the tribe worked in their favour.¹

In fact, it will be seen that these aims were largely contradictory, for they required that tribes should be simultaneously united and disunited. Furthermore, they implied a greater control and influence in the area than the Spanish in fact had. People could not be forced into alliance with the Spanish, since the Spanish army was not allowed to undertake direct military intervention. They therefore had to rely on other methods of persuasion—money, control over commerce, control over communications between the Rif and the world outside (particularly over those who left and entered the unoccupied area) and the creation of disorder within the area. The first and last of these levers are the most important, for the Spanish hoped that by judicious use of pensions paid to individuals within the Banû Waryaghal and by promoting the collapse of the system of hagg-fines, to promote themselves as the only providers of any form of income, and as the only possible answer to the disorder of life without an imposed authority. This they believed would so weaken the opposition, that it would prove impossible for any group to be organised to resist them.

Pensions

From the very beginning of the Protectorate, the Spanish authorities paid out large sums of money to local people who, they hoped, would help them in their penetration of the area. The first set of accounts for these pensions dates from 1913, for the Alhucemas area.² In this list there

1 Ibid., pp. 31-35.
2 SHM Melilla Leg.1, Comandancia General de Melilla, Oficina
are 152 people named as receiving between them 6,676 pesetas in regular monthly salaries paid from Alhucemas Island. The period of the accounts covers the very beginning of the Protectorate. It is clear even at this stage how much importance the Spanish attached to the Banū Waryaghal, for by far the largest percentage of pensions came from that tribe, followed, a long way behind, by the Buqquya, Timsamān and Banū Tūzīn.¹ Out of the Waryaghali pensioners, nearly half started in Spanish pay in the two to three months between the end of October 1912 and the beginning of January 1913.² So, the beginning of the Protectorate brought with it a real effort to make a significant inroad into the Banū Waryaghal. The average payment was 44.30 pts per pensioner, although some payments were very much larger—‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī received 250 pts a month. In fact, even at this early stage, many of the most important men in the coastal area were in Spanish pay. Among them was Sī Bū Bakar b. al-Ḥājj Ushshān of the Banū Yusif w-‘Alī, who had been appointed qā‘id of that clan and the Banū Turirth, Banū ‘Alī, and Timarzga by Bushta al-Baghdādī in 1898.³ He had later encouraged his tribe to resist Bū Ḫūmāra;⁴ This man received 150 pts a month. Other pensioners included most of the important Shiddī and Bū Drā families who played a vital part in the Spanish attempts at penetration of the area, and later in

Ibid. The Banū Waryaghal had 71% of the pensioners and received 71.52% of the money; the Buqquya had 15.93% of the pensioners and 12.88% of the money; the Timsamān had 25.17% of the pensioners and 9.88% of the money and the Banū Būzīn 1.66% of the pensioners and 5.24% of the money.

² Ibid. 53 out of 108 (49.07%).
³ Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 368.
⁴ Ibid., p. 366.
the Rif war as supporters of bin 'Abd al-Karîm.

The largest proportion of the Waryaghall pensioners came from Ajdîr, followed by the Banū 'Abdallâh, the Murâbiṭûn and the Banû Bû 'Ayyâsh clans, whose pensioners included Muḥammad b. Fûl who would later challenge bin 'Abd al-Karîm. At the beginning of the Rif war, the mountain clans were much less well represented, because of course they were further away from the coast. Thus the Banû Hadhîfa had only one pensioner, although he was an important one—Muḥammad b. Ġadîq, later to play both sides in the Rif war, in an effort to maintain his position. Of the other tribes, the Buqquya's pensioners included Ra'îs Mâsî'ûd b. 'Amar "Sibâra", who has already been mentioned. In addition, a final sheet of the 1912/1913 accounts gives a list of ex gratia payments to certain individuals—they included the nephew and son of Muḥammad al-Mîzîyân (500 pts each) Spain's old opponent in 1911 and Qâdîr b. 'Amar of the Banû Sa'îd who was later one of the most strongly anti-Spanish leaders of all, and became an ally of bin 'Abd al-Karîm.

By July 1913, payments to the Banû Waryaghall alone (in what appears to be only a partial list) had gone up to 8,385 pts a month, and now included Muḥammad b. Ġadîq's brother, 'Amar. The largest proportion was still from Ajdîr.

In the previous month the Comandancia General in Melilla had proposed to increase salaries in other tribes, adding a total of 195 pts a month onto the salaries of ten "chiefs of the

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 1, Comandancia General de Melilla etc., Relaciones de indígenas adictos—Alhucemas (n.d., mid-1913):Ajdîr, 38 out of 108 (35%); Banû 'Abdallâh, 27 out of 108 (25%); Murâbiṭûn, 16 out of 108 (14.8%); Banû Bû 'Ayyâsh, 11 out of 108 (10.18%); remaining clans 16 out of 108 (14.8%).
2 Ibid.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 1, Comandancia General de Melilla, Estado Mayor, Melilla, 12 de Julio de 1913 (89 out of 146—60.9%).
most respected families" in the Buqquya, Banū Bū Frāḥ, Mastāsa and Banū Gamīl, and in addition to give pensions for the first time for 33 other individuals from the Buqquya, 10 from the Banū Gamīl and 9 from the Banū Yīṭṭuṭ. This put an extra 1,800 pts onto the account of pensions. Later that month (June) they proposed another 40 new pensions, at a total value of 1,210 pts, to be given to people in the Banū Bū Frāḥ and Mastāsa tribes, to be paid from the Peñón de Vélez. By 1917 the average amount paid out from Alhucemas Island had gone up to 70 pts (compared with 44 pts in 1913) and the number of people to whom they were distributed had increased from 108 to 138. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī was now receiving 500 pts a month. In the Banū Hadḥifa, Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq's son, Ṣadīq, had joined his father and uncle as a pensioner, but they were still the only pensioners in the clan. In the Buqquya, Raʾīs b. Misaʿūd "Sibara" was now getting 200 pts a month.

The total of 10,655 pts distributed from Alhucemas in 1917 represents an enormous sum of money. Moreover, it was paid over a long period. In 1921, 5 years after the Spanish had reported that they had won over all the Banū Bū Yahyā, that tribe was still receiving a total of 8,290 pts a month, and the principal sharīfs of the zawiya of Kārkār were sharing three hundred pts a month between five people.

1 SHM Melilla Leg.1, Comandancia General de Melilla, Estado Mayor, Relación de los jefes y notables que perciben sueldos, Melilla, 16 de Junio de 1913.
2 SHM Melilla Leg.1, Comandancia General de Melilla, Estado Mayor, Relación de los moros de la Peñón que se proponen para sueldos, Melilla, 27 de Junio de 1913.
3 SHM Melilla Leg.1, Oficina de Asuntos Indígenas Alhucemas, Relación de Pagos 1917.
4 SHM Melilla Leg.1, Relación de pagos 1921.
What did the Spanish hope to receive in return for all this money? These sums might be seen as bribes, an attempt to buy support. This was not the view of Colonel Riquelme the man appointed as commander of the O.C.T.A.I. in 1916. He later told the enquiry into the Spanish defeat of 1921 that the pensions were payments for services rendered: "They were functionaries, temporary functionaries, and like permanent ones were paid for their services." Their temporary status was a problem for the pensioners, for they knew that when the Spanish finally had made use of their services to occupy their tribe, they might well lose their jobs. 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī, Sibara's brother-in-law, when he offered his services to Spain in 1916, put it clearly:

"Know also that those who take [lit. 'eat'] money from you and declare that they are the friends of Spain are not speaking the truth; they are evil and treacherous, for they know and have assured themselves that if the Spanish nation does not come down upon the Rif and settle its troops there, the monthly salary that they take now will no longer remain. And for this reason they never advise you truly--on the contrary they always deceive you." 3

Certainly 'Abd al-Karīm was, by these remarks, trying to win favour with the Spanish, but he was also making a valid point for it was in the interest of the people who received Spanish pensions to help the Spanish enough to ensure that they continued to pay them, but not enough for their help to be of any use. In this way they were protecting their own interests whether the Spanish did eventually arrive or whether they did not.

Certainly some of the pensioners did advise the

1 Responsibilidades, pp. 274-279.
2 Ibid., p. 115, Evidence of Riquelme.
3 SHM Melilla Leg.9, Cartas Arabes, 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī to Captain A.I. Alhucemas, 5 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1333 (1 Oct.1916).
Spanish, and give them information about the internal situation of the tribes. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, for example, proposed a detailed plan for a Spanish occupation of Alhucemas in 1918. The Spanish counted on his support to put this plan into operation along with that of 'Allāl al-Ŷājj Bū 'Azza of the Trugūth clan in the Timsamān, with whom 'Abd al-Karīm was allied, Muḥammad b. Šadīq in the Banū Hadhīfa, and "Sibara" in the Buqquya among others. The actual plan put forward by 'Abd al-Karīm was for the landing to take place on the Trugūth clan of the Timsamān, which as the Spanish pointed out would still leave the Banū Waryaghal independent, as well as leaving the pro-Spanish party in Ajdīr open to attack. For this reason they turned down the idea.1

This was very much an exceptional plan, and the ordinary work that the pensioners were expected to carry out was of a rather different order. In the first place there was ordinary intelligence gathering, and in the second, work to create the right political conditions for Spanish purposes. This last was probably the most important of all. As any opposition to the Spanish was dependent on the unity of the tribes, the first step was to keep them disunited and prevent the settlement of feuds by breaking the mechanism of the ḥaqq-fine.

The Tactics of Continuous War

Colonel Riquelme defined 'Abd al-Karīm's rôle as a Spanish pensioner as follows:

"His task was to prevent the Beni Uruguel harka from

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1 Responsibilidades, pp. 274-279.
joining those of tribes near our advance positions. To this end, the system was to ensure that the Beni Warriaguel was in a state of continuous war, suppressing to so-called 'tribal fine'. A man killed another, and the tribe demanded a fine, and made peace. His method was to prevent the fines from being paid, to break up the markets with fighting. Then came vengeance, blood debts, and a man from one village killed another and they could never join strength and swell the harka fighting us. Many years were passed in this way; they were in a state of continuous war and they never came to fight us."

The attempt to remove the hagg-fines was the major part of the Spanish tactics of political penetration. At the beginning, it was surprisingly successful. For example, at the end of May 1917, the pro-Spanish party in the Banū Waryaghal were reported to be trying to end the fine. By the beginning of June they had succeeded: "Now that the fine has been completely abolished in the Beni Uriaguel, as was to be expected, the internal struggles have given way to a savage bloodbath." The fighting continued for some time, to the satisfaction of the Spanish authorities:

"This disturbed situation, as well as distracting their attention from us, has the advantage that when they are themselves tired of it, they will desire some authority to put an end to it."

This is possibly where the Spanish analysis was at its weakest, for while it was true that the local people might seek an authority to make and keep the peace, there was no guarantee that it would be Spanish authority they would turn to. Nevertheless, it probably seemed to the Spanish to be a reasonable assumption for them to make at the time, for the

1 Ibid., p. 137.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Memorias, Comandancia General de Melilla, Memoria quincenal de los sucesos y situación política de la zona de influencia de España en Marruecos Segunda quincena de mayo de 1917.
3 Ibid., Memoria. primera quincena de Junio de 1917.
4 Ibid., Memoria. segunda quincena de Julio de 1917.
Riffis had shown no signs of any ability up till then to set up any other authority. At the same time, the policy could rebound on the Spanish, for blood-feuds could break out in a tribe like the Banū Bū YahyāI, which showed all the signs of being firmly pro-Spanish. When this did happen, in August 1917, the Spanish were extremely worried. ¹

On the other hand, the policy did appear to be reasonably successful for some time. The Riffis showed no signs of constituting their own authority, and, with no Moroccan makhzan to turn to as a mediator, local people had only two choices—that of a local zawiya or the Spanish. The prestige of the local zawiyas had declined somewhat by this time, probably due to their inability to sort out the quarrels that the Spanish had stirred up. In December 1917, serious feuding broke out in the Banū Yittuft. Sidi Ḫamīdu, the local and supposedly prestigious sharīf (and head of the Wazzānī zawiya at Snāda), tried to stop it, and failed, whereupon he moved out of his own tribe, and sought refuge in the Mastāsa. ² At the end of the month, the Sharif Bujdayn of the Banū Gamil also tried to intervene, with no success. ³

Since the local zawiyas could not be relied upon to sort out disputes, the Spanish, masquerading as the makhzan, were the only mediators people could turn to for help in their disputes. This situation occurred very early in the history of the Protectorate. In May 1914, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur and others from the Timsāmān clan of Trugūth hinted that they wanted Spanish help against the Banū Walishak:

¹ Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de agosto de 1917.
² Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de diciembre de 1917.
³ Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de diciembre de 1917.
"Trouble[?] broke out between us and the Banū Walishak and they asked us for peace and we were unable to give them peace. We want war with them and good relations with you."¹ In the event they did not get their support, because, in theory at least, the Spanish authorities' policy was to avoid getting involved and supporting one side or the other. (Riquelme later claimed that because the A.I. officer at Alhucemas did not abide by this policy the Spanish position was seriously weakened.)² But even if the Spanish were not prepared to take sides, local people still looked on them as potential mediators. In March 1918 "all the [clan of] Itsulīn, great and small" of the Buqquya, complained that the booty they had "found" in the sea, and valued at 210 duros, had been "intercepted" by a man from Ajdir who had "confiscated" 14 duros worth. They then asked that the Spanish should try to sort the matter out for them.³ The Spanish appear to have done nothing.

The Spanish refusal to get involved on one side or another did not mean that they could not be of use to the local people. Sīdī Ḥamīdū of Snāda had looked as though he was himself going over to the Spanish in May 1917, although up until then he had been a prominent anti-Spanish leader. At this time, however, he was under threat from a force sent by Sīdī Muḥammad al-Ākhamlīsh from Targīst with whom he was on very bad terms. The alleged reason for this quarrel was that Sīdī Ḥamīdū had punished people in the Banū Bū Frāḥ for

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Bū Qaddur and 7 others to Gov. Alhucemas, Jumāda II 1332 (May 1914, received 25 May 1914).
² Responsibilidades, p. 137, Evidence of Riquelme.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 9, Cartas Arabes, all clan of Itsulīn, Buqquya, to Colonel Alhucemas, 26 Jumada II 1336/8 Mar. 1918 (letter 8).
being friendly to Spain, and in the process got rid of several of his own personal enemies. However, under pressure Sidi Hamidu quickly changed sides. Clearly, to be able to claim friendship with the Spanish would be very useful to him, as he might hope for them to persuade al-Akhamlish to leave him alone. The Spanish were quite aware of this:

"This only shows that the friendship of the Sharif has no purpose other than to maintain his influence with the Peñón [de Vélez] and destroy that of Akhamlish, his secular enemy."¹

Such changeable behaviour was one of the greatest political problems which the Spanish faced in Morocco. It was at the centre of the whole question of the efficacy of pensions, and the loyalty of the people who were supposed to be Spain's agents. Despite the enormous amounts that they paid out, in reality the Spanish could not rely on more than a handful of their reputed supporters. The reasons are not difficult to find. The Spanish government would not allow its military commanders in Morocco to risk large numbers of troops to take advantage of any goodwill that existed, and so many Spanish agents were left exposed to attack by those who were opposed to the Spanish. While the state of "continuous war" existed in the Banū Waryaghbal, these agents were not at risk to any great extent however. More seriously, a large number of the Spanish pensioners seem to have seen the payments handed out by the Spanish as a way of increasing their own wealth and power at the expense of other people. The Spanish were useful allies for these men, but there were other sources of support open to them, and other political options which they could follow. It must be remembered that

¹ SHM Melilla Leg.12, Memorias, Memoria . . . primera quincena de Mayo de 1917.
this period fell during the First World War, and the opportuni- 
ties presented by the rivalries between the various 
European Powers involved—or, in the case of the Spanish, not 
involved—increased the options which were available.

The First World War in Morocco

During the First World War, northern Morocco, at 
least as far as western Europe was concerned, was very much 
a backwater of the conflict. Spain was neutral throughout 
the war, and the attention of France was mainly taken up with 
the Western Front. On the other hand, the Germans wanted to 
pin down as many French troops as they could in Morocco, and 
the Spanish zone seemed a useful base for operations. When 
a young German businessman, Albert Bartels, who had settled 
in Rabat in 1912, escaped from a French internment camp in 
Oran in October 1915¹ both he and his government decided he 
could be of most use in northern Morocco.² He soon made 
contact with ‘Abd al-Mālik Maḥā al-Dīn (the grandson of ‘Abd 
al-Qādir, the leader of the resistance to the French in 
Algeria). ‘Abd al-Mālik was now a man of some influence in 
northern Morocco, having served a variety of masters. He 
had helped Bū Ḫimāra, then ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, and after being 
imprisoned for a while by Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ, became chief 
of police in Tangier. But on the outbreak of war he left for 
the Rif to organise fighting against the French.³

Bartels eventually reached ‘Abd al-Mālik through 
Qāʿīd Bū Raḥayl of the al-Maṭālsa, a noted anti-Spanish leader,

¹ Albert Bartels, Fighting the French in Morocco, trans. 
² Ibid., p. 86. 
whom Bartels admired: "He was a bold, suspicious violent man, but of glowing patriotism, a genuine son of the Mountain."

His "patriotism" was expressed in a dislike of both French and Spanish, so the prospect of German help must have seemed welcome. At any rate, Bartels soon won him over to his cause.

'Abd al-Malik himself, though no friend of the Spanish at this stage, and a bitter enemy of the French, was not so easily convinced. Although Bartels's initial reception was friendly, it soon appeared that he was worried that a German victory would replace French colonisation with German. Bartels had the feeling all through the war that, as a result, 'Abd al-Malik was not a loyal ally of the Germans, and he tried several times to break off relations with him, although, each time he was ordered by Berlin to stay in close contact.

There is no need to go into the details of the various campaigns in which Bartels and 'Abd al-Malik were involved, for they were very much a hit-and-run series of skirmishes. However, Bartels's and 'Abd al-Malik's supporters played a great part in the later political battles of the Rif war. Much of the latter's support came from the Sinhaja Sair area—the closest to the French lines. But he also received a good deal of assistance from the Rif and Ghumara, and from the Banu Waryaghal in particular. In July 1916, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi sent 200 men to help him and in March 1917 he asked for men from his allies in the Timsamän to be sent to

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1 Bartels, op. cit., p. 97.
2 Ibid., p. 106.
3 Ibid., p. 108.
4 Ibid., p. 136.
5 Ibid., p. 175.
help 'Abd al-Malik. But 'Abd al-Karīm was already falling out with 'Abd al-Malik, who was, for some reason, turning against him; he "had it given out to the tribes that Abdel Krim was a Spaniard whose purpose it was to bring Spaniards into the country." At the end of March 1917, 'Abd al-Karīm's house was burned in an attack on "Christian" Ajdir by men from the mountain clans of the Banu Waryaghāl. In May 1917, 'Abd al-Karīm informed the Spanish that he had abandoned the German cause.

In this way, the war brought a further element into the political game of northern Morocco. People could now choose between Spain, France, and Germany in their search for support in the form of arms and money. The Germans did have another useful political card; although it was very definitely they who provided the material benefits, their alliance with the Ottoman Empire was carefully played upon for its propaganda value. There was in fact a small Ottoman presence in 'Abd al-Malik's camp in the persons of two Turkish advisers, who, according to Bartels, spent much of their time scheming against him.

A certain amount of propaganda was put out, directly referring to the Turkish Sultan. In June 1917, letters signed by Si Muḥammad al-Ḥajjāmī of the Banū Zarwāl, a sharif well known for his enmity towards the French, started to arrive in the Mulūya area in the east of the Spanish Protectorate. They

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Memorias, Memoria... primera quincena de marzo de 1917.
2 Bartels, op. cit., p. 189.
3 SHM Melilla, Leg. 12, Memorias, Memoria... segunda quincena de marzo de 1917.
4 Ibid., Memoria... primera quincena de mayo de 1917.
5 Bartels, op. cit., p. 140.
called for resistance to stop Christians from occupying Moroccan land, and alluded to the Sultan of Turkey as defender of Islam. Nevertheless, there was a considerable difference between invocations of Muslim solidarity (if they can even be described as that) and an actual desire to see an Ottoman presence in Morocco. As al-Raisūlī explained:

"Turkey is not popular in Morocco, though all men prayed publicly in the mosques that she might win the war, but her role is better than that of Europe, and Stamboul is far away."  

The Banū Zarwal was a battleground of this sort of propaganda. In August 1916, the French Consulate in Cairo had asked the British to ask Sharif Ḫusayn of Makka and Najd, who had recently written to Arab leaders in the Levant calling on them to attack the Ottoman Empire as a betrayer of Islam, to send copies of his letter to various people in the Maghreb and West Africa. In Morocco, apart from various officials and members of the Sultan's family in Rabat, Marrakesh and Tangier, the letters were sent to leaders of tariqas in Wazzān and Fez, and to 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Kattānī, the Kattānī shaykh in the Banū Zarwal, and 'Abd al-Ḥāmān b. al-Ṭayyib al-Darqāwī, the Darqāwī shaykh in the same tribe. The last named became extremely pro-French, and a bitter enemy of bin 'Abd al-Karīm during the Rif war, as did the Kattānīs.

The major method used by the Germans to win people over was the same as that used by the Spanish—the payment of large sums of money, and in addition the supply of arms.

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Memorias, Memoria ... primera quincena de junio de 1917. Al-Hajjānī was a long-standing leader of opposition to the French, Laroui, Origines, p. 425.
2 Forbes, op. cit., 182.
At the end of October 1916, the head of the Sûreté Générale in Oran reported that the Spanish in al-Naẓūr had stopped a convoy of 800,000 pesetas on its way to 'Abd al-Malik. In March 1917, a Darqāwī from the al-Maṭālsa and another man from the Kabdāna tribes were arrested with 1,088 silver duros, and two others from the al-Maṭālsa and Banū Bū Yaḥyāī with 1,260 duros, on the grounds that the money was believed to be on its way to 'Abd al-Malik. In April, they were released on the request of al-Ḥājj 'Amar al-Maṭālsī, another of Bartels's helpers.

Equally involved, in his own way, was Bū Raḥayl's son-in-law, 'Abd al-Qādir b. Sarga, who had also been arrested on suspicion of helping the Germans. He was released in June 1917 on Bū Raḥayl's request, on the understanding that Bū Raḥayl would then help the Spanish. This was a vain hope, but bin Sarga did not exactly help the Germans either. Bartels accused him of interfering with his mail to Germany and trying to set himself up on his own account as the principal German agent in the Rif. At the very end of the war he appeared in Ajdīr with money, which he said was from the Germans and Mūlāy Ḥafīẓ. He announced that the Germans would give more money than any other European nation, if they would form a ḥarka against the French. The Spanish, he added, were

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2 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Propaganda Alemana, Comandancia General de Melilla Intelligence report, Melilla, 9 July 1917.
3 Ibid., Comandante General, Melilla to Comandante en Jefe, Tetuán; Melilla, 22 Apr. 1917.
4 Ibid., Comandante General Melilla to Comandante en Jefe, Tetuán; Melilla, 14 June 1917, reporting interview with Ḥājj 'Amar and Bū Raḥayl.
5 Bartels, op. cit., p. 155.
not dangerous.\(^1\)

He then moved to the Timsamān, where he made
contact, among others, with Si‘Amār b. Masa‘ūd "Pantorillas", later a ḥarka leader in 1920 and 1921, and with members of
the Bū Drā family of the Banū Waryagher.\(^2\) This attempt
fizzled out, however.

Bin Sarga was clearly trying to use his supposed
German backing to carve for himself some sort of political
niche. However, his reference to Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥafīż is
interesting. By 1917, the ex-Sultan was strongly pro-German,
although stranded in Barcelona, he was unable to give more
than verbal, and occasional monetary support. One of his
agents at this time was one Ḥāmid b. Ka‘b al-Shargī, from
the Sharārga tribe near Fez, who also offers a fine example
of the tendency to bet-hedging and changing of sides. He
had successively worked for Bū Ḥimāra, Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥafīż,
and the French, until imprisoned by Bushta al-Baghdādī for
pretending to be a sharīf. On his release he went to see
Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥafīż in Barcelona, who gave him 18,000 duros,
18 gold watches and 18 letters to pass on to important
shaykhs in the Melilla area, to persuade them to work in the
German interest. Recipients included bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, then
a qādī in Melilla, Ismā‘īl Wuln al-Shadī (of the Mazūja tribe
and later an important ḥarka leader for bin ‘Abd al-Karīm),
and al-Ḥājj Amār al-Maṭālī, amongst others. He was arrested
on his way back through Tetuan, released on Mūlāy ‘Abd
al-Ḥafīż's request, and rearrested while running more money

\(^{1}\) SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Politica Gernánofila, Intelligence
report of al-Ḥājj Ḥādī Muḥ Ḥaddu of Ajdār, 7 Sept. 1918.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., unsigned intelligence report, 7 Sept. 1918.
from Barcelona to Hajj 'Amar's son, amongst others, so that the latter might visit Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥāfīz in Barcelona. This time he was released on the request of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and lived quietly in the Banū Bū Yaḥyā for the duration of the war. He later reappeared during the Rif war masquerading as Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥāfīz himself.

As a complement to all these efforts to use the name of Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥāfīz, the French, in 1917, decided to use the name of another ex-Sultan, and announced that Mūlāy 'Abd al-'Azīz, then living in Tangier, would take command of a holy war against 'Abd al-Mālik and the Germans.

The whole period is extremely complicated, partly because of the large numbers of interested European nations operating in the area, and partly because local people, of whom b. Ka'b is only a most extreme example, took advantage of this to change sides so frequently. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī himself changed sides in mid-war, as he needed help against his enemies in the Banū Waryaghāl and elsewhere. So, as has been seen, did Sīdī ʿAmīdu of Snāda. And so did Qā'id Mūḥammad Bū Qaddur of the Timsamānī clan of Raba'a al-Fawqānī. He was originally named as a qā'id by 'Abd al-'Azīz and confirmed by Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥāfīz. The Spanish made early attempts to "attract" him, and gave him a present of 250 pts and cartridges in 1912, but it was only in 1914 that he started to show any interest in the Spanish. Although

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informe A. Ghirelli, Report, 10 Sept. 1922.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Memoria, Memoria ... primera quincena de diciembre de 1917.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, unsigned intelligence report, 7 Feb. 1914.
4 SHM Melilla, Leg. 1, Pensiones, Comandancia General de Melilla Oficina Central de Asuntos Indígenas Estado Mayor Sección 3a (Política), Relaciones de Indígenas Adictos, 1913.
he told them he had received German propaganda, he assured
them he paid no attention to it.¹ Nevertheless, in June
1914 he was reported to have sold land on the Timsamān
cost to foreigners, presumably Germans, who were due to
land soon after.² Throughout the war he worked with the
Germans, so the Spanish were pleased when he re-opened
relations with them in August 1918. They put this down to
bet-hedging against 'Abd al-Mālik's probable failure.³ His
eventual aim was revealed in September 1918, when he told
the Spanish that he wanted to be qā'id of all the Timsamān,
a demand over which the Spanish prevaricated.⁴

This, then, was the situation in the Rif during the
First World War. The Spanish had to deal with a number of
factors—in the first place the extreme political disunity
of the area, which meant they could not take it over quickly
by attracting a few individuals, and in the second place with
the competition from other European Powers for clients in
the area. At the same time the local people were able to
take advantage of the variety of choices open to them,
simultaneously ensuring their own position.

The Jibāla

The policies that were adopted in the west of the
Spanish zone were very different. This reflected the different
political situation in the area, as well as differences

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, unsigned intelligence report, 7 Feb. 1914.
² Ibid., information of Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallah, 12 June 1914.
³ Ibid., two telegrams, Comandante militar Alhucemas to Comandante General Melilla, Alhucemas, 11 Aug. 1914.
⁴ Ibid., Comandante Military Alhucemas to Comandante General Melilla, 16 Sept. 1914.
in the Comandancias Generales of Ceuta and Melilla. For here, rather than a large number of relatively independent groups, the Spanish had to deal with the only near equivalent of a "Big Caid" that the northern zone had so far produced --Ähmad al-Raisüli. So the main problem and objective was to deal with him or to win him over to the Spanish side.

But, like the Rifis, al-Raisüli also had a series of choices open to him. After his failure to get himself made Khalifa of the Spanish Protectorate, he looked around for other sources of support. The obvious choice was again Germany. Despite his expressed coolness towards the Ottomans, he was in touch with the Germans, even before the war had begun, through their minister in Tangier.\(^1\) However, at this stage German support was not as important as the far greater support and power that he could rely on in the Jibāla itself.

In the face of Silvestre's "interference" as he saw it, he felt able to make a call for jihād in 1913, capitalising on anti-Christian sentiments to unite the people. As a result, the 'Anjara tribe near Ceuta rose against the Spanish.\(^2\) In the aftermath, al-Raisüli was declared Sultan in Shāwin, to replace Mūlāy Yusif, the prisoner of the French.\(^3\) His support was not necessarily as stable as it might seem, for if he was relying on tribes like the 'Anjara, who were by no means his enthusiastic followers, he was building on shifting sands. Nevertheless, al-Raisüli was the most powerful man in the area, and decided, from this position of relative strength, to negotiate with Marina, the new Spanish High Commissioner, for peace with the Spanish. But the proposed talks were lost

\(^1\) Forbes, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
in the confusion caused by heavy rains which disrupted the communications and by the internal feuding between pro-Spanish and anti-Spanish groups, in which, as Martínez de Campos points out, the enmities were more important than the alliances. The Spanish pushed on, and by the end of 1914 had occupied a line from Cuesta Colorado to Alcazarquivir along the west coast.

Negotiations with al-Raisūlī finally broke down in 1915 when one of his messengers, in possession of a safe-conduct signed by General Marina himself, was murdered by the Pasha of Asīla, allegedly on the instigation of General Silvestre, then the military commander in the Larache area. Marina demanded that Silvestre be sacked and then resigned himself.

This pushed al-Raisūlī further in the direction of the Germans. He was in touch with ‘Abd al-Mālik who wrote to him asking him to make terms with the Germans. Al-Raisūlī was not prepared to go quite that far, but he did agree to talk to them at least.

When Jordana was appointed to replace Marina, in 1915, al-Raisūlī was told that the Spanish were now concerned to make peace with him, and so for the moment he cooperated with them. The Spanish recognised that al-Raisūlī still had considerable power—he had at least 2,000 well-armed soldiers, paid for out of the "taxes" that he imposed, and so they
realised that it would be impossible to defeat him militarily. The only alternative was to make a serious effort to win him over, to ease their penetration of the area. Al-Raisūlī succeeded in pacifying the opposition to cooperation with the Spanish by reminding those who objected that "they had chosen me Sultan."¹ This cooperation led him to help the Spanish to occupy several positions around Tetuan: in the summer of 1915 they took Mararat, in the Banū 'Arūs, and part of the Wādī Ra's tribe.² This provoked more opposition to Al-Raisūlī's policies. This he answered with a show of force, combined with a massive distribution of food, although several of the Jibāla tribes, including the Banū 'Arūs, Sumāta and Banū Ḥassan attacked him.³

In 1915, Al-Raisūlī helped the Spanish to occupy the vital Fundūq of 'Ain al-Jadīda, by first of all occupying it himself, and then allowing the Spanish to bring 3,000 troops there (24 May 1915).⁴ This helped both parties, for the Spanish could send convoys through from Tangier to Tetuan safely for the first time, and Al-Raisūlī saw the Fundūq as a base from which to attack the 'Anjara tribe, who persistently refused to obey him.⁵

The desire of both the Spanish and Al-Raisūlī to deal with the 'Anjara led to a final act of cooperation. The Spanish were worried about persistent attacks on the road and railway between Ceuta and Tetuan, and Al-Raisūlī wanted to bring the tribe once and for all under his control.

¹ Ibid., p. 204.
⁵ Ibid., p. 229.
They therefore agreed to take al-Buyūt, the main centre of resistance in the 'Anjara. Using 27,000 troops, and after suffering heavy casualties, the Spanish did take the village. Al-Ra’sūlī’s ḥarka consisted of men from nearly all the Jibāla tribes, and the meeting of the two forces was colourful in the extreme. It was all rather pointless, for the al-Buyūt post was extremely exposed, and it did not in any way stop the attacks on the railway because, as al-Ra’sūlī later pointed out, to take a village meant no more than a few more men in the mountains.

The Jibāla was now mainly under al-Ra’sūlī’s control—although attacks on isolated Spanish positions continued, and al-Ra’sūlī, on his own admission never really cooperated with the Spanish. Unfettered by Spanish control, he could still if he wished choose the the German option, for ‘Abd al-Mālik continued to press him for support. In June 1916, al-Ra’sūlī was reported to be making German propaganda among the men of his troop, distributing documents supporting the German cause, and prophesying imminent defeat for the Allies. He continued to give the pro-German party in Morocco comfort right through the war, and in September 1918, was reported to be sending ‘Abd al-Mālik some men. After this, however, Spanish military action in the Jibāla marked time. They were unable to advance much further: there were strikes

2 Forbes, op. cit., p. 231.
3 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 171.
4 Forbes, op. cit., p. 246.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Política Germánofila, unsigned intelligence report, 6 Oct. 1918.
MAP III:4 THE GHUMARA

TO ILLUSTRATE POSITION OF TRIBES

scale 1cm to 6kms approx. 1:600,000

0 6 12 18 24 30kms
in Spain and a very unstable government in Madrid (five ministries between April 1917 and March 1918).  

The Ghumāra

The Ghumāra was a sort of half-way stage between the Rif and Jibāla. The people there could choose, to some extent the closeness of their relations with the Spanish or al-Raisūlī, or their own form of "independence". Two rough blocks emerged. In the west of the Ghumāra, the Banū Sijjil, Banū Bū Zrā, Banū Manşūr, Banū Silmān and Banū Ziyāyat, closest to the Jibāla were generally pro-Raisūlī. Here, al-Raisūlī could count on the support of men like the bin Yusif brothers of the Banū Bū Zrā and the Tuzgānī sharīfs in the Banū Manşūr. The only opposition came from the bin Marzūq family in the Banū Ziyāyat, an expression of their dislike for the bin Yusifs.

In the eastern Ghumāra was another grouping, generally more opposed to al-Raisūlī, partly because this was easier, since they were further away from the centre of his power. This block consisted of the Banū Garīr, Banū Samīḥ, Matīwa al-Baḥar, and Mastāsa and was led by the Banū Razīn. Its most important individual leaders were Ḥammu al-ʾAisāwī of the Matīwa, Ṣīdī Muḥammad b. Ṣalāḥ of the Banū Razīn, and an outside, Ṣī Ḥāmid Kuyas of the Kitāma who was allied to them. This grouping, nearer to the Rif was in close contact with the Rifī groupings against the Spanish, and played an important part in the organisation of the initial

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2 *Cabecillas Rebeldes 1913-1927*, p. 4.
attacks on the Spanish at the beginning of the Rif war.

As for the rest of the zone, the Banū Khālid and the Banū Aḥmad, sandwiched between the Jibāla, the Ghumāra and the Sinhāja were in an almost continuous state of feud, during which the Banū Khālid maintained good relations with the Banū Zarwāl, on the edge of the French zone. The Gazāwa, to the north-west of the Banū Zarwāl and to the south of the Jibāla, was divided. Generally it was both anti-French and anti-Spanish, although there was a pro-Raisūlī faction and what later became a pro-Rifi faction.

Conclusion

From 1917 onwards, in both the eastern and western parts of the Protectorate, the Spanish were forced to sit on the sidelines. They paid out huge amounts in pensions in the east, but advanced very little. By the end of the war they had reached the Wādī Karṭ in the east and controlled some of the west coast. But generally they did not occupy their Protectorate. Walter Harris, The Times correspondent in Tangier pointed out, at the beginning of 1919, that the area controlled by al-Raisūlī was larger than all that occupied by Spain. Spain physically held only one tenth of the area of her zone and only at two points did she occupy a position 20 miles from the coast, and none at more than 25 miles.

The reasons for this relative lack of success are not too difficult to find. On the Spanish side, their action was hampered by the Madrid Government. Even when they made

1 Ibid., p. 6.
2 Ibid.
3 T.A.H.P., Harris to Editor of The Times, Tangier, 30 Jan. 1919.
political gains, and won people over to supporting them, they were unable to follow up these successes as they were instructed by the Spanish government not to risk troops. So the area of the Banū Bū Yahyā "attracted" in 1916, remained unoccupied. The High Commissioners, especially Jordana, were ordered to maintain the status quo during the War. Jordana, moments before he died on 18 November 1918, completed a report on Spanish political action and commented on this instruction:

"[it] has paralysed our action during this period, which may be considered wasted, making pointless, for the most part, much of the political work carried out."¹

To bring about real pacification, he believed, he needed reinforcements and supplies and properly organised air support, which had impressed him so much in the French zone.² He was only too aware of the dichotomy between the civil and military arms of the Protectorate:

"There are, therefore, two policies headed by the same person [the High Commissioner] which must act independently. The war policy which opens the way to civilisation, using arms as a means to an end ... and the native policy which must be controlled by the civil organs of the Protectorate in the pacified zone."³

This was true, but also there was considerable opposition in the army to civil action. This occurred from the very beginning, and Colonel Riquelme, talking later of the strain between the old Negociado Indígena and the army in 1911, summed it up:

"Without doubt, it was believed that we were making war with little courage, that there was an excess of political work, of contact with the Moors ... The greater part of the officers and many of the civilian

¹ Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 132.
² Ibid., pp. 33-34.
³ Ibid., p. 34.
officials considered that we were involved in a regular war in a country in which everything that belonged to the other fellow was enemy property, without taking into account what we were really doing there."

In any case, what the Spanish provided to attract the locals was not really very much. A large amount of money, a few schools, a few roads, and a few hospitals. But it was nowhere near enough. Harris quoted a Spanish deputy, Lazaga, speaking in the Cortes:

"The reports of our maladministration of our zone fade before the reality. At the outbreak of war, Spain took over from the German company which was operating the port of Larache all their material, but nothing whatever has been done . . . In all our zone the insecurity is absolute." 2

The railways they had built, Harris went on, were one in the east, financed by a mining company, not by the Government, and one of 40 kms from Ceuta to Tetuan which "is so insecure that throughout its entire length it has to be permanently guarded by a strong force of troops;" 3 and as for sanitary services, he considered these insufficient as well: "a few hospitals and dispensaries have been built and are rendering excellent service in the alleviation of suffering, but their number is quite inadequate." 4 At the end of 1918, he reported that there were even rumours that the French were about to take over the Spanish zone, although rightly he considered this unlikely. 5

In his account of the responses to French colonialism in the far south-west of Morocco, Ross Dunn describes a

1 Responsibilidades, p. 114, Evidence of Riquelme.
2 T.A.H.P., Harris to Editor of The Times, Tangier, 30 Jan. 1919.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 T.A.H.P., telegram Harris to The Times, Tangier, 31 Dec. 1918.
situation where the political patterns were formed through an interaction of local decisions and bargains, with a number of variables, including the colonial policy of the European Power as no more than another variable:

". . . diverse, conflicting and critical local interests, together with the policies and actions of the French and Moroccan government, gave the crisis of conquest its kaleidoscopic, multicentred character."¹

The ambiguity of relations allowed people to protect and sometimes to enlarge their own resources and strengthen their own positions. This was as true in the north as it was in the south-east. Much of the political confusion, changing sides, and bet-hedging, was caused by this desire to maintain positions through ensuring the stability of individuals' own systems of alliances, or building up new ones to reinforce their position even further.

The period of the First World War was the opportunity to set about this. The variables were, of course, legion and the fact that the Spanish could not, or would not, effectively interfere left the field clear for individuals to choose. During this period, then, alliances were formed which had an important effect on the course of the Rif war. Ra'Is Misa'ūd and 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī were working together, and contact had been made with the al-Khaṭṭābīs, when b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī became connected to bin 'Abd al-Karīm by marriage. Another man in the Ajdār area, Muḥammad Azarqān, also joined the family, by marrying a Khāṭṭābī sister, and when, in May 1918, he was arrested by the Spanish, it was 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī who wrote to Colonel Civantos, the commander of Alhucemas Island, asking

¹ Dunn, op. cit., p. 20.
for his release. 1 Al-Khaṭṭābī's son, the ǧādi in Melilla, through the activities of German "agents" like bin Ka‘ab, had made contact with Ismā‘īl Wuld al-Shādī and 'Amar al-Maṭālīsī.

On the other side, the lines were being drawn as well. At the end of December 1918, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur, ‘Allāl Bū ‘Azza and eight other notables of the Raba‘a Fawqānī clan of the Timsāmān offered to submit to the Spanish, provided they did not have to work with ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, Spain's principal agent in the area, "for he is a man who walks with untruth." 2 More importantly, towards the end of the war, ‘Abd al-Mālik's ǧārka became demoralised, and began to sell its guns and arms in the markets. 3 With the war over, Bartels left the Rif and surrendered to the Spanish. His supporters were then handed over to the French. Bū Raḥayl, who on Bartels's advice had made his peace with the Spanish, broke off relations again. 4 But the Spanish alienated more than Bū Raḥayl: bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was worried that he might be handed over to the French as well, and although he was assured that this would not happen, he left for home in the Rif at the beginning of 1919. 5

As for ‘Abd al-Mālik, he fled to the Gāznaya where he stayed in the house of al-Ḥājj Bil-Qish. From there, at

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 9, Cartas Arabes, Si ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī to Cor. Civantos, 26 May 1918.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur etc., to Captain and Colonel, Alhucemas, 15 Rabī‘ I 1337 (21 Dec. 1918).
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Política Germánofila, Intelligence report, 7 Sept. 1918.
4 Bartels, op. cit., p. 250.
5 Hart, op. cit., p. 373.
the end of November, he sent out letters calling for continued resistance to the French in the name of Islam. However, he was thrown out by the Gaznaya, and he fled to the Banū 'Amārt, on his way to seek help from Sīdī Ḥamīdu in Snāda.¹

This connection between Bil-Qīsh, 'Abd al-Mālik and the Banū 'Amārt would re-emerge in the Rif war as a powerful counter-movement to that led by bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

Such was the political situation at the end of the First World War, the economy partly dependent on European money, but with a large number of sources to choose from. The ambiguities that this caused allowed people to act relatively independently as the Spanish were incapable of enforcing control. The area was certainly not peaceful and this was the Spanish authorities' best hope: that the disorder would lead to demands for them to take control. However, with the war over, the choices were to be limited for the Moroccans and the response was to look for another authority to bring some sort of peace to the areas, and oppose the now more active Spanish. The two and a half years between the end of the First World War and the Anwāl disaster, when the Spanish were forced to retreat in disorder right across the eastern zone, were taken up with this search.

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 12, Política Germánofila, Comandante Militar, Alhucemas to Comandante General, Melilla; Alhucemas, 26 Nov. 1918.
"If you can defeat an Arab in an argument, you have won him to your side, for the educated among us love words as your men love women"

Al-Raisūlī on Spanish propaganda.¹

"Raisūli was a mysterious figure, Raisūli was a man like Janus, with two faces, neither of them turned towards Spain"

Spanish Parliamentarian commenting on relations between al-Raisūlī and Spain, 1919.²

"We inform you that the tribes met in Tafarsit to determine their views on the harka and they differed on the courses of action and broke up, each tribe returning to its own lands, and each tribe did not show the same opinion as the others, for there are supporters of the Makhzan in our country."

Muḥammad Bū Qaddur on the political situation in the Rif in 1919.³

With the end of the First World War, the political situation in the Spanish Protectorate changed. The French had emerged on the winning side, which strengthened their hand in the southern zone. The Spanish felt that they were able to pursue a more active policy in their zone. And those Rifis who had wanted to resist both the Protectorates

¹ Forbes, op. cit., p. 232.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bū Kadur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur to Colonel/Captain, Alhucemas; 30 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1337/14 Sept. 1919.
found that they could no longer expect any German support—although some of them took some time to realise this—and discovered that they would have to find their own sources of strength by forming their own alliances. Otherwise they could only ally themselves with one or other of the Protectorate Powers. Their ranges of choice were thereby reduced. Gradually more and more chose the solution of forming their own alliance against both France and Spain, but this took a considerable time to organise, and a lot of false starts. 1919, for them, was a year of tentative alliances and regroupings, a year of preparation and confusion.

For the Spanish, new administrations—both in Tetuan and in Madrid—led to a more aggressive policy. In their view, the central object of their policy was, as always, al-Raisüli. But now, they decided, he had to be finally defeated militarily, and 1919 saw the beginnings of this attempt. For al-Raisüli, on the other hand, 1919 marked the beginning of his decline, although he survived the year still possessed of considerable power, even if it was somewhat diminished.

These developments—the end of the war in Europe, the new Spanish policy, and the decline of al-Raisüli were the dominating factors in the political situation in the Spanish Protectorate during 1919. It was a year in which nothing was definitely achieved, but during it political experiments were carried out from which developed, in 1920 and the first months of 1921, the political movement of opposition to the Spanish in the Rif, and the conditions in which that movement might be successful.
Spanish Changes of Policy

On the death of General Jordana, the Madrid government decided to reorganise the structure of the Protectorate. On 12 December 1918, the Gaceta de Madrid published a Royal Decree (dated the previous day) which the Minister of War, Berenguer, introduced with the words:

"The experience of our Protectorate in Morocco shows the need for an organisation of the military command in our zone which is in harmony with geographical necessities, making relations with the Ministry [of War] easier, and relieving the authority of the High Commissioner from intervention in the details of the command and administration of troops, which might distract his attention from political work and the administration of the Protectorate."  

To carry out this policy, a number of changes were made. The post of General en Jefe del Ejército de España en África, previously held by the High Commissioner, was abolished. The command of the army was split into two separate groups -- in the east and the west of the Spanish zone -- under the Comandancias Generales of Ceuta and Melilla and the Comandancia General of Larache was put under the authority of that of Ceuta with regard both to political and military affairs.

The relationship between the two Comandancias Generales and the High Commissioner was changed. They were placed directly under the control of Tetuan. "In everything referring to the Protectorate, receiving from his authority [i.e., the High Commissioner's] the instructions that are necessary for their political and administrative action, and for the carrying out of military operations and the maintenance of security in the region."

So the High Commissioner retained a general control over his commanders' military actions, and a specific control over:

1 Quoted in Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 280.
2 Ibid. (articles 1 and 2).
3 Ibid. (article 4).
political and administrative affairs.\(^1\)

Clearly, this new structure was designed to give a wide area of discretion in military matters to the respective military commanders, and was, as the Marqués de Lema\(^2\) pointed out in the debate in the Chamber of Deputies of the Cortes (Spanish parliament) on 19 February 1919, a prescription for a civilian Protectorate with a civilian as High Commissioner. This being so, the Marqués went on to remark, it was illogical for the Liberal Government, headed by Romanones, to appoint as the new High Commissioner, the former Minister of War, General Damaso Berenguer, who had himself proposed the new structure.\(^3\) And, in fact, despite the separation of the powers of the High Commissioner and the military commanders, the High Commission had never before intervened so much in the military command as it did under Berenguer.\(^4\) This illogicality was clearly recognised and in August of the same year another Royal Decree was issued, modifying the previous decree, and giving the High Commissioner greater control over the undertaking of military operations and over military budgets.\(^5\) In practice, this meant that Berenguer was free to supervise operations in the Ceuta Commandancia fairly closely, while leaving a large measure of freedom to the Melilla commander.

Berenguer used his freedom to intervene in the

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1 Ibid., p. 281 (article 5).
2 The Marqués de Lema was the Foreign Minister in the Conservative government led by Dato at the beginning of the First World War. Sir Charles Petrie, *King Alfonso XIII and His Age* (London, 1963).
4 Ibid., p. 38.
5 Cordero Torres, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
military operations to attack al-Raisūlī. His more aggressive policy towards the sharīf was confirmed in April 1919 when the Liberal Romanones Government was replaced by a Conservative one, led by Maura, which was far more willing to allow active military policies in Morocco, since it was generally more sympathetic towards expansion in Morocco.¹

The Spanish Attacks on al-Raisūlī

In Morocco, the effects of the changes in the structure of the Protectorate were quickly seen and Berenguer adopted an offensive policy towards al-Raisūlī. This had already been foreseen by the Romanones Government and by the Conservative opposition. During the Cortes debate on 19 February, the change in Spanish policy was summed up by the Marqués de Lema.

"'This evening we have learnt, through Your Excellency's declarations² which have made a considerable impression, that we are going to break off our relations with Raisuli.' (The President of the Council of Ministers: 'Not break off, no.') 'Well, at least we are going to draw aside from them to follow other paths, we are going to move away from him to some extent, since if our relations with Raisuli have been cordial up till now, they will henceforth be less cordial.' (Sr Saborit:³ 'We are going to give him less money')"⁴

Al-Raisūlī himself was rather slow to react to the move of Berenguer's appointment. He only wrote to him a month after his appointment, on 24 February 1919, in terms which, despite what he called Berenguer's "praiseworthy plans and intentions", left no doubt that he had no thought of

¹ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 185.
² Referring to the Conde de Romanones, Liberal President of the Council of Ministers (i.e., Prime Minister).
³ A left-wing deputy.
⁴ Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 305, quoting the text of the debate.
entering into the spirit of the Protectorate by submitting to the khalifa. But the High Commissioner's reply on 1 May 1919 left him in no doubt that this was indeed what was at issue:

"I wish that you should all be with me and contribute, through your influence and help, to ensuring the success of my plans and intentions in which there is no more than a desire for the peace of the conscience and the health of the body. You must help me, with your great prestige and renowned wisdom, for the good of the Kingdom, of our Lord Mulay al-Mehdi and the welfare of his subjects."¹

Despite the formal flattery, Berenguer was not, in fact, very concerned to appease al-Raisūlī and went against his wishes from the very beginning of his command. He released from prison Idrīs al-Rīfī who had been arrested for his part in the murder, in 1916, of a messenger of al-Raisūlī, allegedly with the connivance of Silvestre. Idrīs al-Rīfī was then made Pasha of Asīla, al-Raisūlī's old post, and all al-Raisūlī's property was confiscated.² Idrīs al-Rīfī, whose full name was Idrīs b. 'Abd al-Sallām al-Timsāmānī,³ became a firm supporter of the Spanish and later an important figure in the political action in the eastern part of the Spanish zone.

The issue was thus made clear to everyone, including al-Raisūlī. Although the Spanish talked about the need for him to submit to the khalifa, what this meant in practice was submission to them. While the French were introducing their rule in the far south of Morocco through the mediation of the "Great Caids", and allowing people like al-Glawī a certain latitude and freedom of action, the Spanish were unwilling

¹ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 54.
² Forbes, op. cit., p. 257.
³ MAEF, Maroc 517, pp. 264, 265.
to do the same thing in their zone. The "Great Caids" had become powerful, as had al-Raisūlī, because they were far from the control of the Sultan and his makhzan before the Protectorate. But now al-Raisūlī, unlike the "Great Caids", was no longer a powerful figure only on the edges of Le Maroc Utīl, but was in control of areas only a few miles from the very capital of the Spanish Protectorate. Traffic between Tetuan and Tangier through the Funduq of 'Ain al-Jadīda depended either on having al-Raisūlī's goodwill, always a very variable factor, or on crushing him. Berenguer decided to defeat him by force of arms.

Al-Raisūlī had two things in his favour. In the first place, Spanish policy in the past had been so inconsistent that they had lost much support among the Moroccans. Those who had previously supported the Spanish remembered that Jordana had been unable to protect them against al-Raisūlī in 1916, and were suspicious of making the same mistake again. Secondly, al-Raisūlī still had considerable supplies of arms given him by Jordana. As a proof of his strength, al-Raisūlī reoccupied the Funduq of 'Ain al-Jadīda. However, there were also large numbers of men ranged against him on the Spanish side. In February 1919, Berenguer had 22,000 men under his control in the western zone (of whom 10,000 were in reserve). Not surprisingly perhaps, al-Raisūlī did not undertake any further attacks on Spanish positions, although they expected such attacks.  

Spanish operations started in the 'Anjara, partly because of the threat from that tribe to the Tetuan-Ceuta  

1 Forbes, op. cit., p. 183.  
2 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 183.
MAP IV: To illustrate Spanish advances 1919

Scale 1 cm to 5 kms 1:500,000

Locations:
- al qasr al saghir
- ANJARA
- HAWZ
- TETUAN
- BANU HUZMAR
- SUQ AL ARBAA
- TAZARUT
- DAR ARQUBA
- ALCAZARQUIVIR
road, partly because it was the tribe which least supported al-Raisūlī, and partly because it was a base for further operations against al-Raisūlī's supporters in the Jibāla, and one which would help the Spanish to retake the Funduq. In March, Spanish troops occupied al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr in the 'Anjara (17th), and Ḥallīla (18th) and Banū Salāḥ (25th) in the Banū Ḥuzmār, among other positions. In April the Spanish set up posts at Ra's 'Agā'īlī (9th) and Wādī Lāw (12th) on the Mediterranean coast.

In the Larache Commandancia the advance was even easier. General Barerra, the Comandante General, inflicted a severe defeat on a maḥalla made up of men from the Banū Gurfīt, Banū 'Arūs and Banū 'Idīr at Quḍīa al-Makhzan on 21 April 1919.

In May 1919, Berenguer organised the move into the Ḥawz tribe, and decided, after occupying this area to turn on the Wādī Ra's. So far, al-Raisūlī had offered little resistance, but now his forces were increased when men led by Sīdī Ḥāmīdu of Snāda, who had up till then been fighting the French on the Warqa, around 'Ain Mīdīnā, moved northwards to come to the aid of al-Raisūlī. The Spanish were able, on this occasion, to use political pressure to force the ḥarka to disband, but Sīdī Ḥāmīdu's efforts continued. At the end of May he went to see al-Raisūlī with a delegation from three tribes of the western Rif—the Buqquya, Banū Yīṯṭūf, and Banū Bū Frāh. This did not develop any further either,

1 See map.
2 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 184.
3 Ibid., p. 184.
4 Ibid., p. 186.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Memorias Peñón, Memoria ... segunda quincena de mayo de 1919.
but the events of May showed that there was potential support in the Rif for help to be taken to the Jibāla.

June was Ramaḍān, and on the Moroccan side things were quiet. The Spanish used the lull to make preparations for their advance into the area around the Funduq of 'Ain al-Jadīda, and Sīdī Ḥamīdū took the opportunity to try to win support in the Ghumāra for offensive action against the Spanish. He visited al-Baqqālī Wuld al-Qurfa of the (western) Banū Sa‘īd in the hope of getting support from him. However, he was not well received.¹

On 9 July 1919, a meeting was held at the Wednesday market of Sīnāda attended by representatives from the Buqquya, Banū Yiṯtuft, Banū Bu̇ Frāḥ and the Banu Waryaghal clans of Banū Hadīfa, Banū ‘Abdallāh and Banū Bu‘Ayyāsh. They agreed to send help to al-Rāsūlī, although the Banū Waryaghal clans refused to go.² However, by the end of July the volunteers had not materialised.³ Clearly al-Rāsūlī was not held to be particularly worthy of active support by the Rifis.

However, al-Rāsūlī was by no means finished yet. In the same month of July 1919, the Spanish found that he still had considerable support among the Jibālis. The Spanish began their operation on the Wād Rā’s tribe by occupying positions on Jabal Zāmzām on 11 July while it was still dark. On two occasions before dawn, the Spanish forces

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de junio de 1919.
² Ibid., Información, report of Ḥaddū b. al-‘Arbi (Buqquya), Alhucemas, 9 July 1919.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de julio de 1919.
on Jabal Zâmzâm mistook their own groups for an enemy group and fired on their own men. In the evening the withdrawal was equally bungled. During the night, with the withdrawal still uncompleted, the Spanish troops were finally attacked by the Moroccans, and the attacks continued during 12 and 13 July. When the authorities in Tetuan, who were out of touch with their forces for most of the 11th and 12th realised what was happening, the High Commissioner ordered the Larache Commander to help. He arrived late on the evening of 13 July, by which time the Spanish were anyway back in control. But Spanish casualties over the three days had been heavy (7 officers killed and 19 wounded, 72 soldiers killed and 100 or more wounded). ¹

The Moroccan population was overjoyed. Al-Ra'i'sili described their reaction.

"After the battle in Wadi Ras the tribes gave praise to Allah and thought that shortly there would not be a Christian left in the country."²

But he himself was more realistic:

"It was useless that I said to them 'our success has signed the judgement against us' for I knew that Silvestre would crush Spain between his hands for men and money to destroy me."³

It was indeed Silvestre, one of Spain's most aggressive commanders in Morocco, who faced al-Ra'i'sili once again, for after the disaster in the Wâdi Ra's, he replaced the Comandante General of Ceuta, General Arraiz.⁴

As a result of his successes in the Wâdi Ra's, al-Ra'i'sili's popularity in the Jibâla grew, even though it

¹ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 192.
² Forbes, op. cit., p. 265.
³ Ibid., p. 265.
was low in the Rif. The Gazāwa, Banū Gurfit, Sumāta and some of the Ghumāra tribes called him to a meeting at the tomb of Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām in the Banū 'Arūs. When he arrived he found people from all over the Ghumāra, including, according to al-Raisūlī, some qā'īds that even he did not know. At the end of the meeting, the šaykh of the zawiya of Sīdī Yusif Tiidī, in the Akhmās, proclaimed al-Raisūlī as "Sultan of the Jihad", for the second time in his career. It will be remembered that he had been proclaimed at Tiidī itself in 1913.

Interestingly, al-Raisūlī's character seems to have undergone some changes after this proclamation. Al-Manābbi: his wazīr later told Rosita Forbes that the meeting at Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām had turned him into a strict Muslim. He fasted, refused all contact with Christians and Jews, and even refused to allow a packet of tea with a picture of a woman on the carton. Again, according to al-Manābbi, "before Abd al-Sallam he had no regard for a man's life but since that day he has killed no man except in war, or by the order of a tribunal." However, "killing" was fairly elastically interpreted--al-Raisūlī put a cousin of his, who had rebelled against him, into a closed pit for three months, "hoping that Allah would relieve him of his life." The man lived.

Despite al-Raisūlī's new piety, he still needed help from the Rif. In August, he told Sīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda that Rifis were needed on the Tetuan front, firstly to swell the numbers, and more importantly to raise morale. The problem

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1 Forbes, op. cit., pp. 266-270. The tomb of Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām, one of the "poles" of Moroccan Islam, is referred to above, p. 140.

2 Forbes, op. cit., p. 271.
in Sidi Ḥamīdu's way was the tribes of the eastern Ghumāra, who had little wish to help al-Raisūlī. Nevertheless, on 12 August 1919, the ḥarka set off. It reached the Wādi Waringha, the border between the Ghumāra and Matīwa al-Baḥar. Here, Sidi Ḥamīdu asked the Ghumārans for the right of passage. The traditionally anti-Raisūlist group of the eastern Ghumāra (Banū Razīn, Banū Samīḥ, Banū Garīr and Banū Khālid) were involved in internal feuding, and agreed, but the formerly pro-Raisūlī group of the western Ghumāra, now under a strong Spanish influence, refused, and the ḥarka was forced to take the longer route through the Banū Aḥmad and Akhmās. When, at the beginning of September 1919, the ḥarka finally reached Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salam they found that there was no money to pay them. Then, when Sidi Ḥamīdu asked the Rīfīs to swear that they were not in the pay of the Spanish, they objected. They agreed to swear, provided that he, Sidi Ḥamīdu, did so first. He complied, but was very angry that his word was doubted. His demand that they should swear is in itself an interesting indication of the extent to which Spanish pensions had penetrated the Rīf.

The money for pay never did arrive, and by 27 September the whole ḥarka, including Sidi Ḥamīdu, was back in the Rīf. This was unfortunate for the Jibālīs fighting the Spanish, because on the same day, 27 September, the Spanish started military operations again. On 5 October 1919, they succeeded in reoccupying the Funduq of 'Āin al-Jadīda. In

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria . . . Primera quincena de agosto do 1919.
2 Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de agosto de 1919.
3 Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de septiembre de 1919.
4 Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de septiembre de 1919.
this way the two Commandancias Generales of Ceuta and Larache were at last joined. Attention now shifted to the eastern zone.

The Eastern Zone

While the Spanish policy in the western zone had become more aggressive, the situation in the Melilla Comandancia had not changed much. The Spanish continued to pay out their pensions, and the numbers of recipients continued to rise, from 138 in 1917\(^1\) to 170 in 1919. However, while the numbers of pensioners rose by 44 per cent, the value of the average pension actually dropped, from 70 pts in 1917 to 63.6 pts in 1919, a fall of about 9 per cent. The majority of the pensions were still paid to people from Ajdîr and were distributed on behalf of the Spanish by five of the notables of the community—al-Ḥājj Shiddî, Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Mujāhid of the Banū Zarā, Muḥ Abuqquy, Sīdī Ḥāmid b. Sīdī Misaʿūd of the Murābiṭīn, and for a while Sī ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābî.\(^2\) In September 1919, 25 new pensioners were appointed in the Timsamān, including Muḥammad Bū Qaddūr.\(^3\) Yet, 1919 was the year when the policy of giving out pensions began to fail. However, the stirrings of unity were directed against the French rather than the Spanish.

Action against the French

In 1919, the groupings that had grown during the First World War developed in new ways although they remained

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1 See above, p. 175.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Pensiones, Relaciones de Pagos Año 1919.
3 Ibid.
substantially committed to the same purpose—to ensure the survival and independence of action of their leaders. The German option was now closed, although many refused to believe it: in January rumours circulated in the Ghumāra that Germany was not defeated and would shortly unite with Turkey to free them from foreign domination and, anyway, Spain had already left Tetuan. This mixture of rumours of outside help, coupled with others that the Spanish were about to leave Tetuan, occurred as a theme of wishful thinking throughout the Rif war. The rumours were encouraged by people who must have known the real situation and the impossibility of German support. In February 1919, the Policía Secreta reported that in the Banū Waryaghal, Banū Tuzīn, Tafarsīt, Banū Saʿīd and al-Maṭālsa, letters in Arabic, printed in Barcelona, had been distributed, telling all former German agents not to worry about the end of the war, for they would still be paid.

In March, some of the Banū Waryaghal wrote to the German "Ambassador" in Tangier asking for German protection. The Spanish did not regard this pro-German feeling as being of any particular importance to them "for the influence of Germany has been so great that notwithstanding the disaster that has occurred, there are still people who believe and trust in the hope of a Turkish-German protectorate."

Faced with the impossibility of the German option, one European country remained as an alternative. This country was France. As has been seen, there had been rumours at the

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de enero de 1919.
2 Ibid., Informaciones Politicas, report, 21 Feb. 1919.
3 Ibid., Memorias, memoria . . . segunda quincena de marzo de 1919.
end of the First World War that the French were considering taking over the Spanish zone. However unlikely this might have been in reality, the French certainly started propaganda to this effect among the tribes of the Spanish zone. In January 1919, the Spanish intelligence services reported a series of attempts by the French to win supporters in the Rif and other northern tribes. On 17 January 1919, a French agent was said to be working in the "unsubmitted area". He had gone to the zawiya of Mūlāy Kārkār in the Banū Bū Yaḥyā; -of which the Spanish had always been wary, as a potential focus of resistance to them. The nature of his propaganda is not stated in the report, but the agent apparently claimed to be a member of the Qādiriyā order. Three days later, an informant told the Spanish that there were French soldiers at the house of Ḥājj 'Amar of al-Maṭālsa, another of Spain's old enemies. Their intention was to pursue the remnants of 'Abd al-Malik's ḥarka. At the end of the month, on 29 January, there were reports that a Frenchman had been seen in the house of the Ṣarīf al-Būjdaynī of the Banū Tūzīn. This sharīf, head of the important zawiya of Būjdayn, became a prominent French supporter, and by June 1919 was one of the leaders of the French party in the Rif. The exact form of this propaganda is not made clear, but it is obvious that its intention was to diminish Spanish

1 See above, p. 198.
2 See above, p. 150.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Informaciones Políticas.
4 See above, p. 187.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Informaciones Políticas, Información del día 20 Jan. 1919.
6 Ibid., Información del día, 29 Jan. 1919.
7 Ibid., Información del día, 2 June 1919.
prestige in the Rif, and this sort of propaganda continued during the succeeding years. In 1922, the French were still trying to win supporters in the Sinhāja by abusing the Spanish.\(^1\) But the purpose of the French propaganda is obvious—they may not have wished to occupy the Spanish zone, but they dearly wanted clients in the area who would be able to prevent the formation of anti-French groups. It further seems likely that in the light of later developments during the Rif war, much of this activity may have been carried out on local initiatives, rather than on the direct instructions of Rabat. Certainly, during the Rif war, local French A.I. officials urged a settlement with bin 'Abd al-Karīm, while the rest of the army advocated his defeat.\(^2\) In the early stages of the Rif war, before the French were involved, some French officers would give bin 'Abd al-Karīm moral support.

The French propaganda in 1919 was not, however, very effective. 'Abd al-Mālik had been discredited anyway at the end of the First World War, and so was no longer the real problem for the French. After his expulsion from the Gaznaya, he had fled to the zawiya at Tuzgān, in the Banū Manṣūr, pursued by a contingent of 500 men from the Banū Waryāghal led by Shaykh Ḥāmid b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad of the Banū ʿAbdallah and Muḥammad b. Ṣādiq, Spain's principal agent in the Banū Ḥadhīfa.\(^3\) This did not mean, however, that the Banū Waryāghal were pro-French but rather that a section of

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\(^1\) SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes, "All the notables of the Wargha" to ʿAbd al-Sallām b. al-Ḥabīb al-Fannāsī, 10 Jumāda II 1341/28 Jan. 1923.


\(^3\) Skiraj, op. cit., p. 20.
them disliked ‘Abd al-Mālik. Parts of the Banū Waryaghal were still quite prepared to attack the French and when the Marnīsa tribe captured the French post at ‘Ain Midyūna in April 1919, the Spanish reported that the area of Jabal Ḥammām of the Banū Waryaghal had emptied of fighting men, for all had gone to join in the attack on the French. These new departures joined an already organised ḥarka against the French which had left in the previous month, March, and had drawn 50 men from the Banū Waryaghal and ten each from the Buqquya, Banū Bū Frāh, Targīst, Banū Masdūf and Banū Yiṭṭuft, four hundred from the Banū ‘Amārt, three hundred from the Banū Siddat, two hundred from the Banū Gamīl, and 150 from the Akhmās. These last three tribes had agreed to send more men because it was the first time they had fought the French. Casualties were high but the compensation—booty in the form of arms—was good, and new contingents were called in from all over the Rif. In April 1919, important figures such as Sīdī Ḥāmid Akhamlish of the Sinhāja joined in.

Faced with this threat, the French asked Bushta al-Baghdādī to write letters to the Rif tribes saying that they should not fight the French, who would never cross the Warshga, and that anyway they were not strong enough to stop France and Spain together. The implication, of course, was that they should continue to fight Spain. This suggestion, not surprisingly, was ignored. In July 1919, when the French occupied Ḥassī Wazangha in the southern part of the al-Maṭālsa

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Primera quincena de abril de 1919.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de marzo de 1919.
3 Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de abril de 1919.
4 Ibid., Memoria segunda quincena de abril de 1919.
territory, contingents were sent from a large number of tribes, including the (eastern) Banū Saʿīd.¹

That is not to say that the Rifis were unconcerned about the Spanish threat, but their ability to act against the Spanish forces was severely limited, because the economic situation was not satisfactory, and the Spanish to a large extent controlled their food supplies.

The Economy of the Rif, 1919-1920

Harvests had not been good during 1918, and rainfall that winter was low. Although there was a second attempt at sowing in the Ghumāra in February 1919,² by March it was clear to everyone that the harvest would be very bad, for all the crops sown the previous year were lost. Misery quickly spread, and by March there was no grain left in the granaries of the Banū Waryaghal. Prices were now very high: 60 Spanish pesetas for a quintal of barley and 80 pesetas for a quintal of wheat. When it is remembered that the average pension paid at Alhucemas that year was 63 pts a month, it is easy to visualise the poverty in the area. Furthermore, "important" people such as 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī were receiving as much as 500 pts a month, so the extent to which their political position was bolstered by the Spanish is easily appreciated. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī could buy out of his pension every month nearly eight times more barley than could the average recipient. Those who received no pensions at all were, therefore, in a precarious position. Faced with

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de julio de 1919.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria . . . primera quincena de febrero de 1919.
this situation, the Spanish predicted many would soon leave for Algeria, giving the Spanish a fine opportunity to undertake military operations.¹

However, those who did emigrate had to pass through the country of the al-Maṭālsa tribe on their way to Melilla or the Mulūya crossing, in order to reach Algeria. The al-Maṭālsa, led by al-Ḥājj ʿAmar took the opportunity to tax them at a rate of 5 pts a person, and this form of taxation later became an important source of income for the anti-Spanish forces. However, the emigration was a partial failure, for by the end of June people were returning from Algeria, sick and hungry. Some were more successful, however, for the Spanish searched 46 people who returned from Algeria through Melilla at the beginning of July and found that they had 16,040 francs between them.⁴

By October 1919 the economic situation was extremely serious. The Native Office at Alhucemas reported that there was a full scale famine in the Rif. The Spanish had shut off commerce with the island and the French had done the same in the south. Unable to provide their own food and unable to import it, the Rifīs found that their situation was impossible. The Office at Alhucemas insisted that they would have to reopen commerce or the people would starve to death.⁵ Apparently this was done, and the Banū Waryaghal did not join in the offensive operations of the Banū Tūzīn, Banū Walishak

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria... primera quincena de marzo de 1919.
² Ibid., Memoria... primera quincena de abril de 1919.
³ Ibid., Memoria... segunda quincena de junio de 1919.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Represalias, Sección 3a (Kert) Melilla, Nota, 6 July 1919.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria... primera quincena de octubre de 1919.
and Tafarsit in November 1919, because of the Spanish threat to shut the commerce off again.¹

As a result of the famine there was mass emigration from the western Rif and Ghumara to the occupied parts of the Tetuan area in an attempt to find work and food. In December 1919, many left the Buqquya as a result of an attempt to recruit labour for building roads and the railway between Tetuan and Ceuta. As the wages were 4.50 pts a day² that is, 135 pts a month, this compared favourably with the average pension, but was, presumably, far harder work.

The scarcity of money had other effects. In the Buqquya tribe, many people tried to sell their land but although prices fell to very low levels, there was still not enough money in circulation and few buyers were found.³ The price of grain went even higher. At the beginning of October 1919, an informant from the Banû Maryaghal told the Spanish authorities that at the Tuesday market of the Banû Bû 'Ayyāsh, grain was at a price they had never known before.⁴

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when a ḥarka was called, people thought favourably of joining it. At least they might have received some sort of regular pay. In February 1919 the rate was 30 pts for a few days in the Jabal Mawrû, in the Banû Sa'īd.⁵ Of course, the rates were highly variable--Sîdî Ḥamîdû's ḥarka to help al-Raisalî in

¹ Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de noviembre de 1919.
² Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de diciembre de 1919.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de octubre de 1919.
⁵ SHM Melilla, Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de febrero de 1919.
August 1919 was offered rates of 10 reales a day¹ (that is, 17.50 pts a week), and indeed, as we have seen, this amount was never paid.

However, there were hopes that things would improve. At the end of December 1919, the rains at last came and with hopes of a better harvest in 1920 people started to sow.²

The Growth of the Rif Coalition; the al-Khaṭṭābīs Change Sides

Against the political background of uncertainty and the serious economic conditions which prevailed, there slowly emerged the beginnings of a coalition which was opposed to the Spanish. The main factor leading to the formation of this coalition was a growing awareness that some form of unity was necessary if the Spanish were to be stopped and that this unity could only be achieved through the reintroduction of some sort of order, which involved the reimposition of the system of ḥagg-fines. The Spanish had always realised that the main focus of opposition to them, if it was to develop, would be in the Banū Waryaghal tribe and since the beginning of the Protectorate they had expended considerable effort in trying to buy support in that tribe, to weaken it by destroying the ḥagg system, and by trying to organise the leaders of other tribes into an alliance which would surround the Banū Waryaghal.³ These policies had always been somewhat ineffective in that they could not guarantee the loyalty of

¹ Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de agosto de 1919.
² Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de diciembre de 1919.
³ See above, p. 188.
any of their supposed supporters. Clear evidence was now given of this as the family upon which they had most closely relied, the al-Khaṭṭābīs', moved away from the Spanish, through neutrality to outright opposition.

There would appear to be a number of reasons for the desertion of the Spanish cause by the al-Khaṭṭābī family. From a practical point of view, it would appear to have been a rather perverse position to take up. The al-Khaṭṭābīs had prospered through their alliance with the Spanish. The father of the family, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, had received a large pension from them and his two sons had been rewarded in various ways; Muḥammad had become chief qāḍī (guḍat) in Melilla and Muḥammad had been educated at Spanish expense and then gone on to the prestigious Escuela de Minas in Madrid. Nevertheless, their relations with the Spanish were not always good. The first clash came in 1916, when the Native Affairs officer at Alhucemas had become directly involved in a dispute between the al-Khaṭṭābī family and another family named as "Sindi" in a Spanish version of the affair. Contrary to strict Spanish policy which forbade him to take sides, the Native Affairs officer concerned intervened against the al-Khaṭṭābīs, after listening to the case put by the other side. Believing "Sindi's" stories about bin 'Abd al-Karīm, the Native Affairs captain went to Melilla, interviewed Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm and accused him of being a "traitor" to Spain. The substance of this complaint was based on an alleged remark by bin 'Abd al-Karīm that one day Spain would leave Morocco, when the country had progressed sufficiently for that to be possible. (As this was precisely

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1 See above, p. 165.
what a Protectorate implies, the very accusation of treason is an interesting sidelight on the assumptions held by certain Spanish officers.) In any event, the matter reached higher authority, and much to his own embarrassment, Colonel Riquelme, the officer commanding the O.C.T.A.I., was ordered to arrest bin 'Abd al-Karīm. In fact, Riquelme, one of the most able of all the Spanish Army political officers in Morocco, sorted the matter out himself. At the trial of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, he pointed out the perfectly obvious fact that since Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not a Spanish citizen, he could hardly be accused of treachery to Spain. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was acquitted but remained in prison. It was not until the beginning of 1917, when Riquelme was planning the invasion of Alhucemas bay¹ for which he needed the cooperation of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's father, that the qāḍī was released. A little later the Native Affairs captain who was responsible for the whole business was dismissed and things settled down again.²

Nevertheless there was quite probably some justification for the suspicions of the Native Affairs officer at Alhucemas. After the Rif war, bin 'Abd al-Karīm told a French journalist that the whole affair had grown out of his contact with the Germans, whose agent in Melilla offered him money to start a campaign against the French. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm did not object to this plan, but suggested that he should also set up a guard of 4,000 Rifīs to protect their land against Spanish incursions. It was at this point that he was arrested and on the intervention of his father with Riquelme was released. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm returned to the

¹ See above, p. 177.
² Responsibilidades, pp. 117-119.
Rif for about a year, and then went back to Melilla.\(^1\) His return would thus be at about the beginning of 1918. It will be remembered that he spent the rest of the war in touch with German agents passing through Melilla on their way to and from between Mülây Ḥafīẓ in Barcelona and local leaders in the Rif.\(^2\) Such was his opposition to the French that he was most concerned lest he should suffer the same fate as many of the former supporters of Alfred Bartels (the German liaison officer with 'Abd al-Mālik) who were handed over to the French.\(^3\) Bin 'Abd al-Karīm visited the O.C.T.A.I. in Melilla and asked if the same would happen to him. Riquelme told him that there was absolutely no chance of this.\(^4\)

Meanwhile, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī's younger son, Maḥammad, had started his education at the Mining School in Madrid. It was here, in June 1918, that he failed his end of year examinations and had to resit them in September.\(^5\) This time, he passed easily, possibly because of government pressure on the school authorities.\(^6\)

The relations between the two sons and the Spanish are of the utmost importance. The younger was fairly well under their control at this stage, but the elder had already shown disturbing signs of independent thinking. He had proposed to the Germans to set up a force to resist the Spanish as well as the French. In other words he seems to have been moving towards an idea of the independence of Morocco from

\(^2\) See above, p. 100.
\(^3\) See above, p. 200.
\(^4\) *Responsibilidades*, p. 120.
\(^5\) See above, p. 165.
\(^6\) *Responsibilidades*, p. 53.
outside control, an idea that was doubtless reinforced by his imprisonment and trial for treason because he referred to the temporary nature of the Spanish Protectorate. It also seems quite likely, as David Hart has observed, that he came into contact with the ideas of the Salaffiya during his period of writing an Arabic news section for the Melilla paper, El Telegrama del Rif, and also, perhaps, through his position as gādi.

Matters reached a head at the beginning of 1919. In January, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm asked the Melillan authorities for permission to return home for a short period, which was granted. He never returned. At precisely the same time, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm asked permission of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior to leave Madrid for two weeks. This was also granted. He never returned either, and at the end of February wrote to the Ministry informing them that he did not intend to.

Clearly the al-Khaṭṭābīs were moving away from the Spanish. The Alhucemas authorities reacted quickly. In January, they cancelled all the pensions of 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, presumably in an effort to convince him that it was not in his economic interest to drop his friendship for Spain. Towards the end of February, when it had become clear that his sons were not going to return to Melilla and Madrid, Colonel Civantos, the officer in charge at Alhucemas, wrote to Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm:

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1 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 372.
2 Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., p. 65.
3 Responsibilidades, pp. 53-54.
"Really, I am most astonished at your attitude, and that of your family... Does it seem right to you that, after so long and after so much sacrifice by Spain and by you, everything should be lost?..."¹

He should, Civantos continued, take care not to affect his brother's studies, now that Muhammad was doing so well in Madrid.¹

The usual reasons for the desertion of the two brothers are the ones already given, mainly Muhammad's growing disillusion with Spain,² but it seems quite likely that there were others. Pressure was growing on their father to abandon his alliance with Spain. The fortnightly report (memoria) of the Office at Alhucemas for the end of February 1919 complained that 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi would not support the Spanish out of "cowardice" (not because he was anti-Spanish). 'Abd al-Karim himself confirmed this by telling the Spanish that his sub-clan of the Banu Khattab had asked him to call his sons home, because the Spanish might use them as hostages. The request was apparently accompanied by a threat to burn down his house unless he complied.³

There was clearly some truth in this, because both sons had asked to return home at approximately the same time. Moreover, it was certainly true that groups in the Banu Waryaghal who were opposed to the Spanish were growing in influence. They were even trying to spread their influence outside the tribe. In February 1919, letters arrived in the Peñón area where feuding had been going on for some time, in which nearly all the tribes of the western Rif were

¹ MAEF, Maroc 518, p. 50, Civantos to Mohammed ben Abdel Krim, Alhucemas, 20 Feb. 1919 (written in Spanish).
² E.g., Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 372 or Woolman, op. cit., p. 77.
³ SHM, Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria... segunda quincena de febrero de 1919.
involved, except the Banī Bū Frāḥ, exhausted by their feuding the previous year. Even Sīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda had failed to get peace. Not surprisingly, the Banū Waryaghgal's request for men for a ḥarka met with no success, and was ascribed by local people to their desire to impose ḥagg-fines in the area, and thus extend their authority, for those who could impose these fines could effectively control the area. The ḥarka was in fact called, according to the Banū Waryaghgal's letter, in response to a request for help from the Banū Saʿīd. This request was quite genuine and the Banū Waryaghgal had duly passed it on.

The western Rif tribes' suspicion that the Banū Waryaghgal was trying to impose ḥagg-fines was quite understandable, for in the Banū Waryaghgal itself, anti-Spanish groups were trying to reinstate the fines. Moreover, the fines had a definite political purpose. It was decided that a fine of 2,000 pesetas would be imposed on anyone who attacked the family or goods of a man who had joined the ḥarka, and one of 4,000 pesetas on anyone who actually killed a recruit. In the difficult economic circumstances this was a very serious penalty.

By March 1919, the pressure was very heavy on ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khattābī to change sides. He was still telling the Spanish that he wanted good relations with them but his prestige among his tribe was at stake. The pro-Spanish group was split and ʿAbd al-Karīm's withdrawal had emphasized this.

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2 Ibid., Memoria . . segunda quincena de febrero de 1919.
4 Ibid.
However, although he was not prepared to give support to the Spanish, he had not yet thrown his hand in with the anti-Spanish groups. Nevertheless, the Spanish felt that if he was attacked by the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal, from whom the impetus to oppose the Spanish was coming, he would have to use political methods to protect himself:

"His efforts at defence by persuasion must be prejudicial to us, since they will be based on showing himself to be opposed to Spanish penetration into the area."¹

The Spanish did have a few political levers that they could still use. They had imprisoned five hundred men from the Banū Waryaghal in Melilla and were holding them as hostages (the number itself is an indication of the scale on which people had left the Rif). This forced their relatives to plead for their release, which pleased the Spanish who felt that:

"Although we have little confidence in promises of submission, without a great number of guarantees, it is a good thing to let our power be felt in every possible way from time to time."²

In the latter part of March 1919, the Banū 'Amārt sent 900 men to fight the French. This expedition was financed by 5,000 pts given by a widow and another 10,000 pts they had collected in fines. This gives an idea of the importance of the ḥagg-fines for they not only imposed unity but also helped to provide resources for the ḥarkas. The anti-Spanish group acted in a similar way. At the same time (the last part of March), they proposed to fine Qā'id 'Allāl Bū 'Azza and Muḥammad Bū Qaddur of the Timsamān who had gone to meet general Berenguer on Alhucemas Island.³ They also

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¹ Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de marzo de 1919.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de marzo de 1919.
succeeded in re-establishing ḥagg-fines, not only for assaults, but for all crimes,\(^1\) as the result of an agreement at the Sunday market at Rūādī in the Buqquya. This agreement included the Buqquya, Banū Yiṭṭuft, and Banū Waryaghal and was made in the presence of Sīdī Ḫāmidū at the beginning of March 1919. The meeting also agreed to send 30 men from each tribe or large clan to help the Banū Sa‘īd, on the Wādī Karṭ front.\(^2\)

By the end of April the political effects of the reimposition of these fines could be seen. They certainly brought order and, to some extent, unity, but they were so heavy that the only tribe with any money left was the Buqquya --apart, that is, from the mountain clans of Banū Waryaghal who were the enforcers of the fines and were thus consolidating both their wealth and their leadership. This caused so much discontent that during a secret meeting at Azghār, near the coast at Alhucemas, one shaykh who had never been pro-Spanish in the past, was reported to have said that if the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal continued to be so severe, then the Spanish would have to be called in to help.\(^3\)

However, the fines continued. In May 1919 a man was fined 15,000 pesetas for stealing a little barley from Sīdī Ḫāmidū of Snāda; the fine was collected by confiscating his houses, gardens and flocks.\(^4\) It is clear that people like Sīdī Ḫāmidū were less affected by the fines, partly because he, for

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\(^1\) SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria ... segunda quincena de marzo de 1919.

\(^2\) Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de marzo de 1919.

\(^3\) Ibid., Memoria segunda quincena de abril de 1919. By "mountain clans" is meant the Banū Bū ’Ayyāsh, Banū Ḥadhīfa, and Banū ’Abdallah.

\(^4\) Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de mayo de 1919.
instance, was one of the enforcers of the fines, and one of
the leaders of the anti-Spanish party, and partly because
the richer and more powerful members of the tribes found it
easier to escape payment.

All this did not mean that any one person was
leading the Banū Waryaghāl dominated coalition against the
Spanish. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish any of the
leaders individually, apart from Sīdī Ḫāmidū. It is clear,
however, that the Banū Waryaghāl clans concerned were mainly
those inland from Ajdīr, in the mountains. Certainly 'Abd
al-Karīm al-Khattābī was not among the leaders at this stage,
for he was still largely distrusted by his own tribe.

According to a Spanish report, one of the anti-Spanish group
likened him to al-Raṣūlī in his "ambition, overbearing pride,
and the falseness of his actions."¹ On the other hand, the
pro-Spanish group which dominated Ajdīr, and therefore his
clan and lineage, did not trust him either. In June 1919,
the Banū Zarā' lineage of the Banū Yusif w-‘Ari chose
Sulaymān bin Muḥammad al-Mujāhid as its leader in preference
to any of the Khaṭṭābīs, members of the same lineage.

Sulaymān was a firm friend of Spain and pleased the authorities
at Alhucemas, especially when, although the final political
commitments of the al-Khaṭṭābīs were unclear, 'Abd al-Karīm
al-Khaṭṭābī and his eldest son were rumoured to be planning
to lead a contingent, presumably to the Banū Sa‘īd, at the
end of Ramaḍān. The Spanish still felt that this rumour was
dubious, because they did not believe that the al-Khaṭṭābīs
were yet disaffected enough to take the risk.²

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de febrero de 1919.
² Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de junio de 1919.
The pro-Spanish party was anyway still in a strong position. There was considerable disaffection in other tribes as the result of the dictatorial practices of the Banū Waryaghal, a severe economic situation, and there were still large numbers of Waryaghlis who were prisoners in Spanish hands. Above all, the Spanish successes in the Tetuan area were followed in the Melilla zone by a few advances along the Karṭ front. On 23 May 1919, Spanish forces occupied the Tuesday market of the Banū Bū Bakar in the al-Maṭālsa. Spanish advances in the Tetuan area had already given some hope to those in the Buqquya and Banū Bū Frāḥ, who had suffered at the hands of the Banū Waryaghal, that help from the Spanish was on the way and this doubtless confirmed their hopes.

In the Timsamān, the Spanish were helped by the influence of Muḥammad Bū Qadur, who, although his power was not quite as great as he made out to the Spanish, was still strong enough to be worrying to the anti-Spanish party in the Banū Waryaghal. In June 1919, he wrote to the Spanish to tell them that all the Timsamānī shaykhs he had spoken to in the Tuesday market had agreed to go to the island to see the Spanish. The reasons for their decision were not entirely of Bū Qadur's doing—a Spanish agent in the Timsamān reported that, as far as the Trugūt clan was concerned, the leaders had been bribed to go to the island by the families of those held by the Spanish in Melilla. The shaykhs of

1 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 229.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Peñón, Memoria ... primera quincena de mayo de 1919.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kadur, Muḥammad Bū Qadur to Governor, Alhucemas, 25 June 1919.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Información, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥammu "Akkebal" (Timsamān), 16 July 1919.
Timsamān told the Spanish in a letter of 24 July that they would go to the Island. In August 1919, these contacts with the Timsamān resulted in a pact signed between the Spanish and twelve representatives of the Trugūt, Banū Bū. Idhīr, Banū Marghānīn and Banū Ta'bān clans on behalf of the Timsamān as a whole. In this pact, they promised to stop any ḥarkas from leaving the tribe to fight either the French or the Spanish, to work faithfully with the Spanish, and, when the Spanish had occupied Tafarsīt, to allow the Spanish to put posts in the Timsamān to give their forces access to the sea. On the Spanish side, the authorities agreed to release all their Timsamānī prisoners, although their property would remain in Spanish hands until the Spanish were satisfied that the conditions had been carried out. It is easy to see that in practice this pact gave away relatively little in the way of firm action on the Timsamānī side, while the Spanish were to release the prisoners and thereby lose a useful bargaining counter. In fact the Timsamānīs, or some of them, did try to fulfil the bargain when the Spanish occupied Tafarsīt in 1920. One of the positions they subsequently offered the Spanish was Dahar. Abarrān. It was the Spanish attempt to occupy this position in 1921 which led to their first defeat at the hands of the Rifīs and marked the beginning of the Rif war.

The anti-Spanish group responded by trying to stop any political contact with the island and declared that they

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2 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Negociaciones (translation) and SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Información y política (Arabic original) treaty dated 1 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1337/27 Aug. 1919.
would impose heavy fines of 20,000 pts on anyone going to see the Spanish. This was announced in the markets of the Banū Waryaghal, Banū Tūzīn and Timsamān. However, the power of the anti-Spanish groups to collect these fines was weakening. In August 1919, although the ḥagg-fines were still in force, in the Banū Waryaghal at least, there was growing resistance to them, especially among the less affluent. The poor were always the most seriously affected by the fines, firstly because the amounts were so great, and secondly because powerful notables, such as Bū Qaddur, could use political pressure to avoid paying fines.

The anti-Spanish party now included much of the Banū Waryaghal, in particular the mountain clans. The biggest exception was among the people of Aīdīr who were the only ones who refused to send reinforcements to Sīdī Ḥamīdu. Sīdī Ḥamīdu himself tried, in August, to encourage 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī to join the resistance. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī seems to have decided, by mid-August, to cut all links with the Spanish. Alhucemas now believed he was working for the French. At this time he wrote to a sharīf of the Banū Idhīr in the Timsamān, Sīdī Muḥammad b. Sīdī 'Abdallāh al-Wazzānī, who had cooperated with the Spanish—he was one of the signatories of the pact signed in August—and told him that it was lamentable that a sharīf should be close to the enemies of his race and religion, and that anyway he, 'Abd al-Karīm, had tried to work with the Spanish and it had been useless. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī was also in touch with al-Mu'allim

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Información of Sīdī 'Allāl b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammād of the B. 'Agqī of the Banū Tūzīn, 11 July, 1919.
2 Ibid., Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de agosto de 1919.
3 Ibid.
Muḥand, a man from the Timsamān skilled in the working of arms and noted for his extreme anti-Spanish sentiments. This man was later an important figure in the Rif war as a manufacturer and repairer of guns for bin 'Abd al-Karīm.¹

'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī's explanation to the Spanish of his new political position was that he had been forced finally to abandon their side when a recent meeting in the Monday market of the Maṭālsa, attended by representatives of all the neighbouring tribes except the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh clan of the Banū Waryaghal, had agreed to attack all the friends of the "Christians". In accordance with the meeting's decision, Sīdī Ḥāmid Bujdayn, the most important French agent in the Banū Tūzīn, had been assassinated, and another notable of the Timsamān had been threatened.² In September the al-Maṭālsa carried out this decision when the Banū Bū Bakar and Fatūsha clans attacked a certain Qā'īd Shāmī because of his friendship for Spain.³

However strong the anti-Spanish feeling was in the al-Maṭālsa—and it had increased after the recent occupation of one of their principal markets in the Banū Bū Bakar—the Banū Waryaghal group lost ground during September. The ḥagg-fines collapsed when an attempt by the Banū Hadḥīfa and Banū 'Abdallāh to impose a fine on the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh failed in the face of opposition from the Murābiṭīn, Banū 'Alī and Banū Yusīf wa-'Alī, who had been "bought" by the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh.⁴

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¹ Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de agosto de 1919.
² Ibid.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur to Col/Capt. Alhucemas, 30 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1337/14 Sept. 1919.
fighting as well: the Gaznaya and the Marnīsa started a feud in mid-September 1919 for reasons that are not clear. The Gaznaya group was led by al-Ḥājj Bil-Qish and the Marnīsa by 'Amar Ḥamīdu. Both sides were armed with machine guns that had been captured from the French—the Gaznaya had bought theirs for 3,500 pesetas. The involvement of Bil-Qish and 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu is significant. Relations between these two, who had moved from alliance to enmity with startling rapidity, were to be of enormous consequence during the Rif war.

The ḥagg-fines were re-established in October 1919 and were fixed at 10,000 pesetas for murders committed on ordinary days and 20,000 pesetas for murders committed on market days, during meetings of the Aith Arba'īn, or whenever the murdered man was a member of a ḥarka. As this was at the height of the famine, this must have been a serious deterrent.

In November 1919, attacks on the Spanish started again; 300 men led by 'Allā Bū 'Azza of the Banū Idhīr in the Timsamān left for Jabal Mawrū in the Banū Sa'īd on 2 November, joining 200 from the Raba‘a al-Fawqānī who had left the previous day. A guard was put on Tafarsīt by the Banū Walīshak, Banū Tūzin and Tafarsīt tribes. Indeed the only people who kept out of these movements were the Banū Waryaghal themselves, who were terrified lest the Spanish should shut Alhucemas again and destroy local trade.

1 Ibid., of Ḥammush b. al-Ḥājj, "Belcristo".
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria segunda de noviembre de 1919.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Informaciones, teleg. Comandante Militar Alhucemas to Comandante General, Mēlilla; Alhucemas, 1 Nov. 1919.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria...
While, during the period from June to October 1919, the Rifis held the initiative the Spanish did have some successes. Bu Qaddur told them not to worry, because his tribe had not agreed unanimously to go to the aid of the Banū Sa'īd, and things were under control.1 This was presumably the work of Bu Qaddur and his allies, but the Spanish managed a few political strokes of their own. After their occupation of Sūq al-Thalāthā' of the al-Matālsa tribe, contact was made with the Hadria and Banū Tumayt clans of this tribe and this gave the Spanish respite from many Matālsa attacks during July and August.2 Above all, the political quiescence of the Banū Waryaghal during November 1919 meant that the haqq-fines in the Buqquya collapsed,3 and both tribes continued to be remarkably unaggressive towards the Spanish throughout December 1919.4

Despite the lack of activity from the Banū Waryaghal, other parts of the Rif continued to resist the Spanish. The Banū Tūzīn and Banū Walishak each sent 100 men to the al-Matālsa to help them against the Spanish, the Timsamān sent 400 to the Banū Sa'īd and the coast at Sīdī Dris, in the Timsamān, was guarded in the expectation of a Spanish landing there. Once again, rumours of outside help started to spread: again Germany was to be their saviour in a new war in Europe, this time supported not by

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bu Qaddur to Col/Capt, Alhucemas, 2 Nov. 1919.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Letter Silvestre to Berenguer, Melilla, 18 Dec. 1919.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 15, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de diciembre de 1919.
Turkey, but by the U.S.A.\textsuperscript{1} On the other hand, Bū Qaddur, always optimistic, told the Spanish that the powerful shaykh Muhammad Bū al-Kharīf of the Igharbiyyin clan of the Banū Tūzīn would be willing to help the Spanish provided that the prisoners were released.\textsuperscript{2}

Conclusion

1919 was a year in which the first stirrings of change were felt. During the First World War the political situation in the Rif had been characterised by its extraordinary fluidity. By and large there had been little threat to local "independence" from the Spanish, who stayed in the small areas that they held in the extreme east and west of their Protectorate, and local notables had generally succeeded in profiting from the European rivalries by playing one side against another, taking money from the Germans and the Spanish—especially the Spanish—and reinforcing their own positions. However, in 1919, the Spanish reorganised their Protectorate, and with a government in Madrid that was more sympathetic to military action in Morocco, the army began to advance.

The Moroccan response was to make preparations for resistance. They soon realised the urgent need for unity and order. Al-Raisūlī's efforts to resist the Spanish in the west showed that unless a large measure of unity was achieved quickly there would quite simply not be enough men joined together at any one time to oppose the Spanish with any chance of success. The first priority, then was to

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2} SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bū Kaddur, Interview with Bū Qaddur, 11 Dec. 1919.
impose some sort of order, for it was Spanish efforts to
destroy local order which had seriously weakened the
opposition to them in the Rif. That this might be achieved,
the ḥaqq-fines were reimposed. This immediately helped to
solve another problem. Sidi ʿHamīdu’s expeditions to support
al-Raisūlī had in the past collapsed because there was not
enough money to pay the men in the ḥarkas. Now the Banū
ʿAmārt, for instance, could rely on fines to provide some
money for pay.

In addition, the new unity forced several of the
principal pro-Spanish leaders to be rather more wary of their
position. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī was forced to draw back
from his friendship towards Spain, and to compromise more
and more with the pressure in his tribe to oppose them.
This coincided, to some extent, with the views of his eldest
son, Muḥammad who, for both political and personal reasons,
was also turning against the Spanish. Similarly Muḥammad
Bū Qaddur, while he did not abandon the Spanish cause as the
al-Khaṭṭābis did, also became rather more circumspect. Other
leaders, particularly Sidi Ḥamīdu of Snāda, needed no
encouragement to oppose the Spanish. Sidi Ḥamīdu continued
to send help to al-Raisūlī and generally remained as opposed
to the Spanish as ever. However, neither he, nor al-Raisūlī,
took over the leadership of the anti-Spanish group. In
al-Raisūlī’s case the explanation for this is fairly easy
to find, for he was disliked and mistrusted by most of the
Rifīs.

The reason why Sidi Ḥamīdu did not become the
leader is more obscure but it appears to be connected with
the fact that at this stage there was no overall leadership
of the opposition at all. The main centre of resistance to 
the Spanish came from the Banū Waryaghal and seems to have 
come about through the renewed peace imposed by the clan 
councils and their enforcement of the ḥagg-fines. It was, 
particularly, a movement centred on the mountain clans of 
the Banū Waryaghal and as such seems to have been resented 
by people in other tribes—and indeed in the lowland clans 
of the Banū Waryaghal itself—as an attempt at Waryaghli 
expansionism.

However, this newly imposed unity was extremely 
vulnerable, and towards the end of 1919 it collapsed as the 
ḥagg-fines were refused by powerful Waryaghli clans, and as 
the economic situation became worse. It is difficult to 
overestimate the importance of the economic conditions in 
the Rif at this time. The harvests had been disastrous 
and emigration a failure. Nevertheless, a certain level of 
united opposition to the Spanish had been achieved in the 
Banū Waryaghal. This unity was still at the mercy of the 
Spanish and when, at the end of 1919, they threatened to 
close down the commerce between the island and the mainland, 
this was another reason for the Banū Waryaghal to quieten down.

Nevertheless, much of the ground for the later 
events of the Rif war was prepared in 1919. Relationships 
of alliance and more importantly enmity started in earnest 
in this year. The murder of Si Ḥāmid Bujdayn of the Banū Tūzīn because he was too close to the French, had the effect 
of confirming the reliance of that family of sharīfs on the 
French. This was to have important consequences during the 
Rif war, when bin ʿAbd al-Karīm would find that the enmity 
of the Bujdaynīs and their alliance with the French did his
own cause considerable damage. The extraordinarily changeable relationship, varying from outright enmity to uneasy alliance, between 'Amar bin Ḫamīdu of the Marnīsa and al-Ḥājj Bil-Qīsh of the Gaznaya tribes would also cause bin 'Abd al-Karīm endless trouble during the whole of the war. A pattern was being established in which powerful individual leaders strove to maintain their positions against the background of an increasingly powerful alliance against the Spanish.

Above all else, perhaps, four vitally important things emerge from the political changes of 1919. The first is that people began to realise that to deal with the Spanish they would need a greater degree of unity and order than they had had before. The second is that this unity could no longer be dependent on the fragile authority of the existing structures, and that some sort of leadership must emerge. Thirdly, it was during this period that the decisive and, in the perception of the other tribes, expansionist, role of the Banū Waryaghal was made plain. Finally, nothing could be achieved until the economic conditions had improved. The eighteen months that were to follow would see the solution to the problem of leadership and of the economy, and the emergence of a wider unity under the leadership of the Banū Waryaghal.
Chapter V

THE BEGINNINGS OF ORGANISATION IN THE RİF

"I cannot help doubting the political wisdom in the long run—of the morality I do not speak—of dealing with the natives on the basis of forgery and murder varied by untimely concession and lack of continuity of any given policy rather than that of steadfastness of purpose and truth"

The British Vice-Consul in Tetuan commenting on Spanish political policies in Morocco, July 1921.¹

"Let it be known to you that the Christians have come upon us. They are here, in our village. You must come with two hundred men to take up positions against them on the road, and when they arrive cut them off from their rear . . . God help you, Amen."

Message from the anti-Spanish party in the Banū Mallūl clan of the Banū Tūzīn to notables of the Banū Yahyā and Banū Taʾbʾan, in the same tribe, April 1921.²

"The poor people find themselves in a state of ruination and neglect because of the little that they are given and the little that they can give to their children to eat . . . ."

The "poor people" of the Kabdāna tribe, complaining to the Spanish of the famine in the area, September 1920.³

In 1919, the problems which faced any attempt to

¹ FO 371/7076/W7788/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 1 July 1921.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Correspondencia, Shaykh Ḥaddū b. Aslāḥī, Shaykh ʿAlī b. al-Ḥājj Afniḥ and Shaykh Muḥammad b. Ḥammādī, on behalf of the Banū Yahyā subclan of the Banū Tasafth clan and the Banū Taʾbān clan of the Banū Tūzīn to Coronel Morales, 24 Rajab 1339/3 Apr. 1921.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Correspondencia, Unsigned letter from the poor people of the Kabdān tribe to General Silvestre, 15 Muḥarram 1339/29 Sept. 1920.
oppose the Spanish had been those of bringing about unity and order, and the economic situation in the Rif. In the eighteen months that followed, these problems began to be solved. The economy, although there was severe famine during 1920, improved rapidly after good crops in 1921. Unity, which had broken down with the collapse of the ḥagg-fines at the end of 1919 was restored, at first through the reimposition of those fines. However, in 1920 and 1921, the political movement in the Rif developed beyond a reliance on the fragile system of ḥagg-fines and moved towards a more permanent system with the beginnings of an organised state. It was not more than a beginning at this stage, but the proto-state developed the tiny basis of an organised army and administration and, above all, leadership. It was during this stage that Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī emerged as the leader of the anti-Spanish forces, after at least two other people had been canvassed or had tried to win this position. Under his leadership, the Rifis were able, in May 1921, to inflict their first major defeat on the Spanish at the hill of Abarrān in the Timsamān.

Abarrān was the site of the first important battle of the war because the Spanish army in the eastern zone, under the leadership of a new and aggressive Comandante General, Fernández Silvestre, had advanced very rapidly across the Garat plain between Melilla and the edge of the Rif. In doing this, Silvestre laid aside the methods of attraction and political persuasion of the tribes which had characterised Spanish action in the past and adopted purely military methods. Similar tactics were followed in the
east, where troops under General Berenguer, the High Commissioner, occupied the city of Shawin. These Spanish advances excited the local inhabitants to resist. The opposition was further encouraged by the nature of Spanish policies in both the occupied and unoccupied areas, for it was characterised by just the inconsistencies, inefficiency, and in some cases brutality to which the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan pointed.

The Economic Situation in Northern Morocco 1920

Although it had, at last, rained in December 1919, and people felt more confident of a better harvest the following year, the period before the harvest was bound to be a hard one. In fact their confidence was misplaced for the harvest in 1920 turned out to be an almost total failure.

By mid-February 1920, the Spanish in Alhucemas were reporting that there was great hunger in the region. At this point, sales of barley from Alhucemas Island to the people of the Ajdir area were interrupted. This caused great alarm in the Banū Waryaghal and Buqquya. The Spanish realised the power that they held:

"Now that the question has been settled and commerce [in barley] renewed, we are able to understand the importance, in these circumstances, of having an efficient method of imposing our will on the tribes by making conditional the supply of the basic necessities, such as [barley], to the natives."  

The control of the supplies of barley was, of course, a deliberate instrument of policy, and had serious effects,

1 See above, p. 223.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de febrero de 1920.
not only on the Banū Waryaghal, the object of the punishment, but also on the neighbouring tribes. The Trugūt clan of the Timsamān wrote to ask whether the Spanish were taking action against the Banū Waryaghal alone, or against their tribe as well. They then threatened to withdraw their support unless they received supplies.¹

The hunger had another result. Fines imposed on Spanish pensioners increased, presumably partly out of resentment and partly because they were the only people who had any money anyway. Ra'īs Misa'ūd "Sibara" was fined 10,000 pts in February 1920 because of his relationship with the Spanish, and they tried to protect him by using their economic power to threaten the closure of commerce.²

Towards the end of February, commerce was again interrupted, this time because a strong levante (easterly) wind made it difficult for more than a few boats to make the crossing between Alhucemas Island and Ajdīr. Despite the hardship, the Spanish were worried that the approaching harvest might be a good one, for they now realised that only their control of food supplies was holding the anti-Spanish groups in check.⁴ In fact, these worries were needless, for the crops were disastrous, and at the end of April, Alhucemas reported that they could be considered lost.⁵

This crop failure was general over the whole of

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Información y Política, Shaykh b. 'Ali al-Bū Dāūid and others from Trugūt to Governor, Alhucemas. Received 12 Feb. 1920.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de febrero de 1920.
³ Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de febrero de 1920.
⁴ Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de marzo de 1920.
⁵ Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de abril de 1920.
northern Morocco, and the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan, Mr. Atkinson, reported that it made matters considerably easier for the Spanish in their preparations to advance on Shāwin. The famine, together with the large amounts of money they paid out, helped the Spanish to weaken the opposition to their preliminary step, the occupation of Wādī Lāw\(^1\) on 21 April 1919.\(^2\)

By the end of May, people were reduced to eating roots,\(^3\) a situation that lasted for some time, for in December 1920, Mr. Atkinson reported that there had been several cases of poisoning as a result of eating unwholesome roots.\(^4\)

In an effort to take advantage of these economic conditions, the Spanish Ibanos company put forward a scheme to recruit 2,000 Moroccans to work on the land in the provinces of Córdoba, Granada, Sevilla, and Málaga in southern Spain. The wages would be 6 pts and one piece of bread a day for ten hours work, on a two months' contract. This, in the opinion of the Office at Alhucemas, would introduce the "native" to Spanish customs and would help to "civilise" him.\(^5\) Whether work on the land in the Andalucía of the 1920s would have in fact been a civilising influence seems doubtful; in any case the plan came to nothing.

Later on in the summer, the situation did temporarily improve. The August harvest was not quite as bad as expected,

\(^1\) FO 371/4525/A4069/2209/28, Kerr to Curzon, Tangier, 28 May 1920.
\(^2\) Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 206.
\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de mayo de 1920.
\(^5\) SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de mayo de 1920.
and grain prices actually fell slightly (barley down from 10 pts to 5.5 pts a mudd, and wheat from 25 pts to 18 pts a mudd), sheep and horses dropped in price by 15 per cent—but this may have been because they were difficult to feed. Guns and ammunition fell sharply in price as well (cartridges down from 175 pts a hundred to 50 pts a hundred). But the respite did not last long and the famine grew worse.

The hunger was not confined to the unoccupied areas alone, for the Spanish were unable to guarantee supplies even in areas that they had occupied for many years. In September, the Kabdāna tribe, whose lands lie east along the coast from the Melilla peninsula and which had been in Spanish hands since 1912, complained that they were starving. Two anonymous letters were sent, one to Genral Silvestre and the other to Morales, then the colonel in charge of the O.C.T.A.I. Both letters complained of hunger, but both also gave economic and political explanations of their plight. Silvestre was told that they were plagued by debtors and Morales that they were oppressed by the qā'ids whom the Spanish had appointed: "The tribe of Kabdāna has been hungry and the qā'ids that rule it tyrannise the poor people . . . .\"3

The weather was not the only reason for the rise in prices. Spanish advances helped to push them up further. After the occupation of Shāwin in October, 1920, the city became difficult to supply, and prices went up.4

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weather was probably the main factor, and after the crop failures of the summer the Spanish predicted that the coming winter would be even worse than the one before. There had already been large scale emigration because of the crop failures and with the prospect of a hard winter, this continued during the autumn. Some of these emigrants from the Rif went to Tetuan and some to the recently occupied Shāwin. Others, according to Mr. Atkinson, enrolled in the Spanish army.

When the rains did come, at last, in November 1920, few people in the Rif had any grain left to sow (or money to buy it). Those who had were receiving large amounts of money in exchange for loans of seed. Things did look slightly more hopeful, but life would still be difficult until, and if, the grain was successfully harvested.

In the meantime, the Spanish took full advantage of the hunger to advance. The Banū Walīshak and Banū Sa'id were so weakened by the famine (accompanied by the "purchase" of their leaders) that they did not resist the Spanish occupation of their territory. However, as Mr. Atkinson realised, this was no more than a temporary submission. Even the Banū Waryaghal, for a while, were brought under control. The "whole" of the tribe, which in practice meant

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de septiembre de 1920.
2 Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de octubre de 1920.
3 Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de noviembre de 1920.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de noviembre de 1920.
the a'yān of the coastal clans, wrote to Civantos, the governor of Alhucemas Island, from Sūq al-Arba'a, at the end of December, in reply to an earlier letter from him threatening a shelling if they did not cease to attack the island.¹

The Banū Waryaghal letter was very conciliatory: "The Sultan of the Muslims has accepted [to live] in peace with you and so we want to join in friendly relations."²

The winter, as expected, was very hard for the Rifīs. Looking back on it the following summer, Vice-Consul Atkinson commented that things in the occupied part of the eastern zone were even worse than they were in the western zone, which was bad enough. His explanation of this was that there were few "European" witnesses in the Melilla region to report what was happening:

"I understand that matters were especially hard during the famine last winter when Rifīans were dying of hunger in the streets of Milīlla [sic] and little or no attempt was made to feed them excepting by private enterprise in return for which the charitable individual required the female beneficiary to prostitute herself to him."³

Atkinson was no great admirer of Spanish colonialism in Morocco and there may have been some readiness on his part to believe exaggerated accounts of Spanish cruelties. But the fact that such stories could spread at all is an indication of the hatred that many felt for the Spanish. It is also probably true that matters were no worse than they had been during previous famines in the Qal'aya area,

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Confidencias Políticas, announcement by Colonel, Alhucemas to Banū Waryaghal, Arabic draft, 19 (December) 1920.
² Ibid., "all the Banū Waryaghal" to Governor Alhucemas, 11 Rabī' II 1339/23 Dec. 1920.
³ FO 371/7076/W9494/184/28, Report by Atkinson, undated, but received 5 Sept. 1921.
before the Spanish had occupied the area, when there was no one to whom the local people could look for effective help. Nevertheless, now that the Spanish were in occupation, people such as those of the Kabdāna tribe did look to them for help and generally this help was not forthcoming. Even in Tetuan, starving Rifis who had come into the city were mainly fed by "charitable Moors". With the considerable benefit of hindsight, Mr. Atkinson remarked, "It is not to be wondered on the whole that the Riffians took advantage of the first occasion to rise." ¹

The Strengthening of the Anti-Spanish Coalition

Mr. Atkinson's words might give the impression that the eventual Rifī rising was unplanned and was simply a case of people taking advantage of the situation to strike at the Spanish. In fact, this was not so. A period of eighteen months was necessary, after the appointment of Silvestre as Comandante General in Melilla, for the Riffis to organise sufficiently and to prepare themselves materially to oppose what became a full Spanish offensive against them.

Yet Silvestre's appointment as Comandante General was itself one of the major spurs to the anti-Spanish groups, for the policies that he adopted, of rapid advance and occupation of the lands bordering on the Rif Mountains themselves, galvanised the local people to resistance. Silvestre took command on 12 February 1919 and started operations very soon afterwards. His first objective was to occupy the Banū Sa'īd. This important tribe controlled the approach to the Rif from the east but it was much stronger than any tribe

¹ Ibid.
the Spanish had faced so far. They had spent "nine years thinking about the Beni Said and as many doing nothing about it."¹ Now, Col. Morales of the O.C.T.A.I. advised Silvestre that the submission of the Banū Saʿīd, as well as that of the Banū Walīshak, Timsamān and Banū Tūzīn could be effected once Tafarsīt was occupied. In order to take Tafarsīt it would be necessary to hold the upper Wādī Karṣ plain and the village of Dār Drīūsh.² On 7 April, the Spanish moved into the territory of the al-Maṭālsā³ and the following month took Dār Drīūsh (15 May 1920). Silvestre was well pleased, as the new position was considered an excellent centre for the political penetration of the surrounding tribes and the O.C.T.A.I. set up there "their principal laboratory of political action," as Berenguer later put it.⁴ Here Silvestre stayed until August.⁵

The Rifis did not react to any great extent, partly because these advances did not yet threaten the central Rif Mountains, partly because the economic situation still held them in check, and partly because the danger from the south, from the French, was still more immediate.

At the beginning of January 1920, 200 Waryaghlīs were reported to be in the territory of the Gaznaya, helping them against the French.⁶ From the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal, some men joined Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq al-Khamalīsh in the Matīwa al-Jabal, who was leading a ḥarka against the

¹ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 232.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 1.
⁵ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 232.
⁶ SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Información Política, 2 Jan. 1920, informant Tahar b. Tahar.
French and, what is more, paying 5 pts a day. Later in January, an estimated 800 more joined them.

However, some Timsamánís did join the Banū Sa‘íd ḥarka against the Spanish: about 250 were reported to have left to do so on 12 January 1920. This did not prevent Muhammad Bū Qaddur, ever anxious to reassure the Spanish, from informing them that there were no Timsmanís in any ḥarka. It is always difficult to be sure when to believe Bū Qaddur, but he claimed at the same time, that the anti-Spanish group in the Banū Waryaghal was so anxious to get rid of him that they had announced in the Monday market of the Banū Bū ‘Ayyāsh clan—which borders on the Timsamán—that anyone who killed Bū Qaddur would never have to pay fines again. Bū Qaddur said he was not worried by this as he had friends as well as enemies in the Banū Waryaghal. Once again it was the Banū Waryaghal group which was leading the action against the Spanish supporters.

Most of the Rif, however, was more concerned about French advance than the threat from the Spanish. The campaign against the French gathered more strength when its old leader, ‘Abd al-Mālik, emerged from exile in Tuzgān, in the Banū Manṣūr, where he had been sheltered when the Banū Waryaghal expelled him from the Rif. Now he decided to join the struggle against the French once again, and went to the Banū Darqūl clan of the Akhmās. Estimates of his following

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de enero de 1920.
3 Ibid.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, report on interview with Bū Qaddur, 29 Jan. 1920.
varied—an O.A.I. informant said that in mid-February he had 80 men, while Mr. Atkinson put it at 40 and added that, according to al-Raisüli, he had 40,000 pts which he had received from Tetuan.¹ He was reported to have some considerable support in the Ghumära and was sending letters to various tribes in an effort to increase it. The Spanish heard that moves were afoot to revive the old pro-German party there,² presumably as the basis of an alliance rather than in the hope of receiving any German support.

‘Abd al-Mālik's intentions were at first unclear to both the Spanish and the Moroccans. He sent five men to the market in Targīst in an effort to win support there, but local people were unsure of his motives. Many were now convinced that ‘Abd al-Mālik was pro-Spanish and that Tetuan was reserving an important job for him in the Protectorate government. This was reported by the Office at Alhucemas without comment, so if it was true, they certainly knew nothing about it.³ As yet, ‘Abd al-Mālik had undertaken no determined move against the French themselves. His plans, apparently, were still being made. During the whole of February 1920, the fighting against the French was led by Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq Akhamlīsh with support from the Timsamān, Banūr Waryaghal and Bugquya tribes.⁴

Meanwhile, the Spanish were preparing their advance. The opportunity to do this was given with the

² SHM Melilla Leg., '17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de febrero de 1920.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., Memoria ... segunda quincena de febrero de 1920.
start of feuding near Tafarsit between two factions of the Timsamān, one led by Bū al-Kharīf, which later became the pro-bin 'Abd al-Karīm faction in the tribe, and the other made up of the party formerly led by the Sharīf Būjdayn (pro-French). The Bū al-Kharīf faction won and Bū Qaddur said that there had been many deaths. The Alhucemas Office considered that this presented a fine opportunity to begin the advance towards Tafarsit, presumably because it lessened the chances of resistance and the O.C.T.A.I. recommended this to Silvestre.

At the end of February, however, 'Abd al-Mālik was still sending out letters calling for support—especially to the Gaznaya. He had moved into the territory of the Marnīsa tribe, where he already had contacts with 'Āmar Ḥamīdu. From there he went to the Brānis with the intention of attacking the French in the Wargha valley. Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq Akhamlish was now presumed to have made a secret pact with the French and in March, 'Abd al-Mālik asked to be made head of the harka in his place. He backed up this claim by asking people to attack b. Ṣadīq. This put the Banū Waryaghal in a difficult position for it effectively divided the tribe. Some supported 'Abd al-Mālik while others remained loyal to Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq. To avoid any trouble, the tribe agreed to recall all their members and threatened

1 Ibid., Memoria... primera quincena de febrero de 1920.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur to Col/Capt., Alhucemas, received 14 Feb. 1920.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria... segunda quincena de febrero de 1920.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria... primera quincena de marzo de 1920.
heavy fines on all who did not come home. Most of them returned. The removal of Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq was carried out by ʿAmar Ḥamdū.¹ This nicely expressed ʿAmar Ḥamdū's own equivocal position, for by this time he was generally considered to be pro-French.

The confusion caused by these conflicting interests and activities helped to keep the anti-Spanish groups reasonably quiet for the first few months of 1920 but they did occasionally stir. Even in February, when the hunger was very bad and internal feuding was dividing the Timsamān, the anti-Spanish groups of that tribe and of the Banū Waryaghal met at the Thursday market of Trugūt in the Timsamān to agree on an alliance and on the reimposition of ḥagg-fines at fixed amounts from the Wādī Kart to the Ghumāra.² These two tribes did not have the strength on their own to bring such a thing about and of course the meeting was unsuccessful, but it marks the beginning of the idea that it was possible to unify all the Rif and the Ghumāra under the wing of the Banū Waryaghal and their allies.

The following month, a serious attempt was made in the Buqquya to raise a harka for the Wādī Kart front against the Spanish. Again it failed, but the Spanish were now worried that only lack of food was keeping the Rifīs from attacking them.³

¹ Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de abril de 1920; and FO 371/4525/A3061/2209/28, Kerr to Curzon, Tangier, 30 April 1920.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de febrero de 1920.
³ Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de marzo de 1920.
In any event, the ḍagg-fines were slowly being reintroduced, a first step towards unity. In February, RaʾIs Misaʾūd "Sibara" was only protected from a large fine of 10,000 pts when the Spanish threatened to cut off barley supplies to the Buqquya.¹ The threat of a fine did not check his activities in favour of the Spanish, however, for in March he countersigned, along with others, an order forbidding the sale of barley to the Izaumān clan of the Banū Saʿīd, as part of a Spanish initiative against that tribe.²

April saw the height of the confusion caused by ʿAbd al-Mālik's attempt to seize control of the anti-French ḫarka. Matters were further complicated by French attempts to get support in the Spanish zone to counteract his activities. At the beginning of the month, they sent two agents from the Banū Isnassan (east of the Mulūya) into the Rif and the Banū Bū Yaḥyā.³ These were followed by letters to the Banū Saʿīd, Banū Walishak, and Timsamān, offering to double the pensions paid by the Spanish.⁴ Evidently they met with some success, for a Tūzanī Shaykh, ʿAllāl Muḥand ʿAlī was reported to have spent a week as a guest of the French at Tawrīrt, south of the Rif. He was in contact with Qaddur bin ʿAmar of the Banū Saʿīd and with Bū Raḥayl of the al-Maṭālsa, who formed what the Spanish described as a "pro-French party".⁵ The latter two were later to be keen

¹ Ibid., Memoria ... primera quincena de febrero de 1920.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias, Memoria ... segunda quincena de abril de 1920.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Información política, Policía secreta, Grupo de vigilancia, no. 1, 15 Apr. 1920.
supporters and allies of bin 'Abd al-Karīm against the Spanish, while 'Allāl Muḥand became a pro-Spanish informant.

With the Spanish advances in May, attention turned away from the French to the danger from the east. On 15 May, the Spanish took Dār Drīūsh, and immediately a ḥarka was called. Resistance to the Spanish was led by the pro-French party, although one member of it, 'Allāl Muḥand, soon showed signs of wavering. Later in May, the ḥarka consisted of 700 men including 100 from each of the Banū Waryaghal and the Timsamān, and 400 from the Banū Tūzin. 'Allāl Muḥand promised that he would try to have it dissolved. The Spanish sent planes to bomb the ḥarka. Most of the Banū Waryaghal in the ḥarka were from the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh, and they quickly returned home because of the high casualties. In the same month, the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh also sent 100 men to the Buqquya to enforce a ḥagg-fine imposed for a murder committed in the Tafansa sub-clan of that tribe. Clearly the mountain clans, particularly the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh, were once again the leaders in the anti-Spanish groups.

The focus of resistance was now moving away from the struggle against the French to the one against the Spanish. In May 1920, 'Abd al-Malik's ḥarka collapsed when he ran out of money to pay it. But the anti-Spanish groups still had problems—not least of them the opposition of powerful leaders such as Muḥammad Bū Qaddur and others who had remained friendly to Spain... But life was not easy for

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Información Alto Comisario, Silvestre to Berenguer, Melilla, 6 June 1920.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de mayo de 1920.
3 Ibid.
the pro-Spanish party now. Even Bu Qaddur was nervous. Despite his perpetual assurances that "all the Timsamān . . . great and small, are with you in good faith in accordance with the pact they made with you," he felt the need to write two letters to the Spanish on the same day (14 May 1920). In one he asked for the pensions which had not been paid in the Banū Sa'īd for "many months." In the other, after dark hints about things "which should not be said in this letter," he said that

"there has been much discussion in this tribe and people became greatly alarmed by it, and as a result rebellion has broken out in our tribe and we do not have the power to restore the peace . . . ." 3

In the following month, June 1920, Bu Qaddur felt it necessary to defend himself against what he considered to be a campaign of slander against him. For some months past he had been involved in an attempt to bring under control a man named 'Allāl Ḥammū of the Banū Walishak by confiscating his boat which was held in Melilla by the Spanish. In January 1920 he finally asked the Spanish to release the boat since he had received an assurance of good behaviour from the owner. 4 In June, the affair was still dragging on. People were saying now that Bu Qaddur had accepted a bribe from 'Allāl Ḥammū to ask the Spanish to release the boat, and he wrote a letter to the Spanish to assure them that this was not so. 5 It was a small incident,

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bu Qaddur to Col/Capt., Alhucemas, 14 May 1920 (1st letter).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., Muḥammad Bu Qaddur to Col/Capt., Alhucemas, 14 May 1920 (2nd letter).
5 Ibid., Muḥammad Bu Qaddur to Col/Capt., Alhucemas, 16 Ramaḍān 1338/3 June 1920.
but increased the pressure on the pro-Spanish party in a new way. Now their enemies could isolate them completely by blackening their reputation with the Spanish.

June was relatively quiet, partly because once again it fell during Ramaḍān, and partly because the actions of the Spanish during their sorties out of Dār Drūsh. They burned the houses of "rebels" in the Banū Walishak and Banū Tūzīn, which temporarily frightened the Timsamān into passivity, and their bombing raids on centres of resistance gave rise to exaggerated rumours of the powers of Spain.

Nevertheless, political activity, if not military opposition, continued. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī had now decided that the time had come for him to try in earnest to win the leadership of the Banū Waryaghal for himself. The report from Alhucemas for the end of June noted that "he wanted to impose himself onto all the clans and their leaders so as to become the Number One of his tribe." His campaign started in the Wednesday market of Sīdī Bū ‘Afīf, on the plain of Swānī, the market where resistance to Bū Ḥimāra had started twelve years before. He then moved to the Thursday market of the Murābitūn clan. However, he was not too successful, for he only recruited three men at the Thursday market. Nevertheless, he left for the Tafarsīt ḫarka, and some more did follow him.

At the same time, ‘Abd al-Mālik started to send out

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de junio de 1920.
2 Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de junio de 1920.
3 Ibid.
4 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 363.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . segunda quincenas de junio de 1920.
letters again, saying that he had more money now, and was organising a ḥarka against the French. Rumour spread that Albert Bartels, "Hermann", was with him, and although the Spanish were perfectly correct in ascribing this rumour to "Moorish fantasy", clearly the hint of outside help, especially from the Germans, could still excite some hope of deliverance.

The Spanish were not too worried by all this activity. Only a few people had accompanied 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī to Tafarsit, and in general, morale in the Banū Tūzin, Timsamān, Tafarsit, Banū Walishak, and Banū Saʿīd was low. People were saying that if the Banū Waryaghal did not help them, then they would have to submit to the Spanish. If there had been any doubt before that eventual success in the fight against the Spanish depended on help from the Banū Waryaghal, the eastern Rifī tribes had lost it now.

Unfortunately for the eastern tribes' chances of survival against the Spanish, the Banū Waryaghal was not yet united over resistance. The people of Ajdār were still dependent on Spanish goodwill, and threatened a fine of 3,000 pts on anyone who attacked communications with Alhucemas Island. Moreover, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī's efforts were remarkably ill-rewarded. Despite all his propaganda and the amounts of money that he distributed, he only managed to take 80 men from his tribe to the ḥarka in Tafarsit in July. As he was rumoured to have 20,000 pts to

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1 Ibid.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Información política, Telegram Comandante Militar, Alhucemas to Comandante General, Melilla; Alhucemas, 26 June 1920.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucema, Memoria ..., segunda quincena de junio de 1920.
spend on salaries, this was a miserable result. Even when he did reach Tafarsit, his bad luck continued. His principal lieutant, Muḥammad b. Śi Ḥāmid fell into a hole, seriously injured himself, and had to be carried home.¹

Possible the reason for the lack of success that 'Abd al-Karīm encountered partly lay in his own equivocal position, for he recommended the Rīfīs that they should seek protection from the French rather than from the Spanish—a suggestion that must have alienated him from all those who had recently been fighting the French.²

In any event, the ḥarka was a disaster. The Timsāmānī members, few enough in number anyway, quickly went home. Nevertheless, the Spanish were slightly worried, for they considered that if anyone from the Ajdīr area had actually tried to prevent 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī from going to Tarfarsit, they would have been attacked by the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal.³ The ḥarka finally collapsed when 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī himself left Tafarsit in mid-July, saying he was ill. He was accompanied by most of the remaining members of the Banū Waryaghal contingent, who had been given no food or money while they were there. This was at the height of the famine and they felt that they should fine 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī.⁴ This was a forlorn hope, for he was dying. The general opinion afterwards was that he had been poisoned, by one 'Abd al-Salām al-Tafarsatī, a man in the pay of the Spanish,⁵

¹ Ibid., Memoria . . . primera quincena de julio de 1920.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de julio de 1920.
who was made qā'id of Tafarsit after the Spanish occupied it later that year. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī died shortly afterwards, on either 6 or 7 August 1920,\(^1\) at approximately 63 years of age.\(^2\) The report from Alhucemas for the first part of August 1920 included a somewhat cynical obituary:

"We must say, without allowing ourselves to rejoice in anyone's death, since the principles of our religion would forbid it . . . that we are forced to recognise that the disappearance of such a mysterious and inconsistent factor in the political activities of the Beni Uriaguél must necessarily clear the ground and be a point in our favour."\(^3\)

The Alhucemas authorities were being optimistic in the extreme. The temporary, and self-appointed, leader of the resistance might have vanished, but that made no difference to the determination of the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal to resist the Spanish, no matter what the opinion of the Ajdīrīs might be. At the end of July there had been fighting in the Wednesday market at Sīdī Bū 'Affī, when a man from a mountain clan called one of the principal Spanish pensioners a "Spaniard". Eighteen people died as a result.\(^4\) In August, there was more fighting in the Buqquya between the family of a former Spanish agent of long standing --Ḥaddu al-'Arbī-- and that of Sīdī Dādī, an anti-Spanish leader, supposedly over a debt. This brought an anguished letter from Ḥaddu al-'Arbī's sons asking the Spanish for support, which never came.\(^5\) However, the Buqquya quarrel

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\(^1\) Skiraj, op. cit., p. 29, gives the date as 21 Dhū al-Qa'da 1338/6 Aug. 1920 and the Office at Alhucemas reported it as 7 Aug. 1920 (SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de agosto de 1920). Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 371, gives it as during Sept. 1920, but this is too late.

\(^2\) Skiraj, op. cit., p. 29.

\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de agosto de 1920.

\(^4\) Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de julio de 1920.

\(^5\) Ibid., and SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Información y Política, sons of Ḥaddu al-'Arbī to Col. Civantos, received 19 July 1920.
was eventually solved by the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal who had begun to take control of the area. They began by imposing heavy fines on the Banū 'Alī clan of the Banū Waryaghal because of fighting there, moved on to fine the Ajdir clans, where they took a 5,000 pts fine from Sulaymān b. al-Mujāhid, and finished by fining the various participants in the Bagguya dispute a total of 90,000 pts. There could have been no clearer illustration for the local population of the efficacy and superiority of locally imposed order over that proffered by the Spanish, but never shown to be effective.

Although they were successful in restoring a unity of sorts in their own tribe and in that of their clients the Bagguya, the anti-Spanish groups in the Banū Waryaghal were less successful elsewhere. 100 men went to Tafarsit, whence they were thrown out by the Tafarsitīs, who temporarily stopped fighting each other in order to do so. The fighting in the Tafarsit was largely the result of a long standing feud between the two clans of Itsulīn and Imjarān al-Sifīlī. The leader of the latter clan was 'Abd al-Sallām, the alleged murderer of 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī. The feud appears to have been exacerbated by a struggle over which group would be dominant in the tribe when the Spanish arrived. The feud greatly helped the Spanish who had resumed their advance towards Tafarsit. They took Ḫammūda, outside Tafarsit village, on 5 August and Tafarsit

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, *Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria .... primera quincena de agosto de 1920.
2 Ibid.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, *Correspondencia, "all the Imjarān al-Sifīlī" to "the Colonel" (Morales), 30 Dhū al-Qa’dā 1338/15 Aug. 1920.
itself on 7 August 1920. They then appointed 'Abd al-Salam as qā'id, a decision which the Isuliān, predictably, resented, and opposed with some violence. The Imjarān al-Siflī turned to the Spanish for help, and with their troops on the spot this was, of course, forthcoming. The Spanish imposed peace, for which the Imjarān profusely thanked them. On 12 August, the Spanish took 'Azīb Mīdār in the Banū Tūzīn.

These advances increased the vigour of the resistance. The advance on Tafarsit brought calls for a ḫarka in the Thursday market of the Timsamān on 6 August. All fit men were encouraged to go to Tafarsit to fight the Spanish. A few days later, agents in the Buqquya reported that every boat that left that part of the coastline to take eggs to sell in Ceuta returned with one or two rifles and ammunition. One boat allegedly arrived with 1,000 charges of dynamite which were presumed to have been stolen from the port works in Ceuta. On 17 August, there were reports that 400 men from the Banū Waryaghal had gone to the ḫarka at Tawarda in the Banū Walishak to forestall any further Spanish advances.

Even more seriously for the Spanish, a group of 900

1 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 232.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Correspondencia, "all the Imjarān al-Siflī" to "the Colonel" (Morales) 30 Dhū al-Qā'ida 1338/15 Aug. 1920.
3 Ibid., Jamā'ā of Imjarān al-Siflī to Morales, 21 Aug. 1338 (sic, i.e., 1920).
men from the Banū Turīrt and Timarza (Banū Yusif w-'Alī), and Banū 'Arūs (Banū Ḥadhīfa) subclan of the Banū Waryaghal joined up with men from the Targīst, Gaznaya, Banū 'Amart, Banū Yiṣṭaft, and even (surprisingly, perhaps, since it was the mountain clans of the Banū Waryaghal who were mainly involved) from the Buqquya. They were all led by Sīdī al-Ḥājj Masaʿūd and his son. 1 Sīdī al-Ḥājj Masaʿūd of the Banū Turīrt (Banū Waryaghal) was an important figure, a sharīf respected for the baraka that he held. 2 Also involved were a qādī from the Banū Tūzin, Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Alī, later known as Bū Laḥya, and a very important figure in bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's government and another qādī from the Banū ‘Alī of the Banū Waryaghal, Muḥammad bin Fuīt. 3 Bin Fuīt was a frequent changer of sides who in May 1920 had received a letter from Civantos thanking him for his efforts in trying to stop bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's participation in the Timsamān ḥarka. 4 He later became a source of considerable opposition to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm.

The Spanish bombed the ḥarka at its first meeting place, Azilāf in the Banū Tūzin. It regrouped at Sīdī Bū Khayyār, in the centre of Jabal Ḥammām, in the Banū Waryaghal. 5 On 26 August, representatives of the Banū Waryaghal, Targīst, Banū 'Amārt, Banū Yiṣṭuft and Buqquya.

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de agosto de 1920.
2 Hart, op. cit., pp. 190, 260.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de agosto de 1920.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Información y Política, Civantos to Muḥand bin Buīt of the Banū ‘Alī: "You have seen Sid Mohand Abd el Krim el-Jattabi in the mahalla of Timsaman and told him that he can deceive ignorant people but not men of intelligence like yourself." (Spanish version only available.)
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de agosto de 1920.
agreed to form a bigger ḡarka still with 200 men from each clan, about 2,000 to 3,000 men in all. They agreed to move by night, to escape the attentions of Spanish aeroplanes, move through the territory of the Banū Tūzin, attacking the latter if they resisted them, and finally to attack the Spanish at 'Azīb Miḍār. By the end of August, the ḡarka had received reinforcements from the Marnīsa—500 men led by 'Amar Ḥamīdu, and from the Banū 'Amārt, 500 men.

The composition and political complexion of this ḡarka are interesting. Rumour had it that it was pro-French and with 'Amar Ḥamīdu amongst its leaders this seems possible. However, the leaders of the ḡarka—especially bin Fūt and 'Amar Ḥamīdu—were not noted for their liking for bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and neither of the al-Khaṭṭābī brothers joined them. Also, the tribes that were involved did not include the Timsamān or the Banū Tūzin. The centre of the opposition had moved further into the Rif, and now included the Targīst, Marnīsa, and Banū 'Amārt as well as the coastal tribes of the central Rif. This was very much the same coalition—with the exception of the Marnīsa—as that which later formed the nucleus of the Rif state—the Timsamān, and Banū Tūzin with a much longer history of Spanish penetration were never as firm.

This is not to say that the central Rif tribes

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3 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ..., segunda quincena de agosto 1920.
were completely united. The Banū 'Amārt, for example, had a small pro-Spanish party, led by Shaykh Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib and others. In August 1920, this group wrote to the Spanish in Alhucemas asking for political help against the pressure of the Banū Waryaghal. At the same time, the Banū 'Amārt was split in another direction, for a group was also fighting alongside 'Abd al-Mālik.1

Still the resistance movement in the Rif was divided, and still it was without any single leader. But in the following month, September 1920, it entered a new stage when, for the first time, there was talk of a sultanate in the Rif and a unified resistance. Simultaneously, in the Tetuan zone, circumstances for the resistance changed dramatically for the worse, when the Spanish made a great push forward to occupy Shāwin.

The Occupation of Shāwin

Despite the theoretical separation of the powers of the High Commissioner from those of the military commanders, the operations in the western part of the Protectorate were effectively in the hands of Berenguer. His objective now was to capture Shāwin.

There were three routes the Spanish could follow to Shāwin. These were from the west, based at Alcazarquivir, moving up the valley of the Wāḍī Lukkus and crossing the territory of the Akhmās; from the north, based on Tetuan and passing through Dār. ibn Qurraysh and Dār 'Aqūba; and from the north-east, following the valley of the Wāḍī Lāw up to

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Confidencias políticas, Shaykh Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib and four others to Governor, Alhucemas, received 10 August 1920.
MAP V:2 To illustrate Spanish advance on Shawin 1920

- **Lines of advance**
- Scale 1cm to 5kms 1:500,000

Locations:
- Ceuta
- Tetuan
- Qudia
- Karikra
- Qudia Ramla
- Wadi Lau
- Suq Al Arbaa
- Tazarut
- Dar Arquba
- Jabal Qala a
- Shawin
- Alcazarquivir

- Taffar
- Suq At Qulla

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**Legend:**
- Black arrows indicate lines of advance.
- White arrows indicate additional movement or points of interest.
Sháwin from the coast. The Spanish decided to move along each of these routes simultaneously.2

First of all, the Spanish decided to weaken the strength of any opposing forces by blockading the Jibāla before they undertook any advance. They could, of course, easily close the coast to supplies and to some extent the access from Tetuan. But a blockade was less easily imposed on the western side of the Jibāla3 and quite impossible from the east. In point of fact, the supplies reaching the Jibāla from the Rif were not great, owing to the famine that prevailed there. However, Spanish efforts to control the area through political means were made more difficult by the personal animosities of their agents in the Chumāra and the rivalries of their own officers.

An illustration of these animosities and rivalries is the case of bin Marzūq and 'Ali bin Sulaymān. The Spanish had attracted bin Marzūq, of the Banū Ziyyāt--a man previously noted for his dislike of al-Raisūlī4--and he was now working as qā'id of his tribe with Colonel Paxtot, the Chief of Police in Tetuan, and Col. Cogolludo of the O.A.I. in Tetuan. Bin Marzūq was involved in a feud with the pro-Spanish qā'id of the Banū Bū Zrā, 'Ali b. Sulaymān. In March 1920 their rivalry turned into fighting between their followers and they asked the Spanish to intervene. The Spanish in their turn asked the Sharīf Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq al-Dargāwī to mediate.5 It seems likely that he was not

1 See map.
2 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 204.
3 Ibid.
4 See above, p. 195.
the best man for the job. Certainly he was well disposed towards the Spanish, for he had already been fairly success-
ful, in cooperation with Col. Castro Girona, who was now in charge of the Wādi Lāw garrison, in helping the Spanish to win over parts of the Ghumāra, but one of the parties in the dispute, bin Marzūq, was his protégé who, as we have seen, was now working for Paxtot and Cogolludo. Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq had fallen out with Castro Girona because the latter had caused "bad blood" between b. Ṣadīq's nominee as gā'īd in the Banū Sa'īd al-Gharb and b. Ṣadīq himself. To com-
plete the circle, Castro Girona was working with 'Alī b. Sulaymān in rivalry with Paxtot and Cogolludo. Mr. Atkinson, who reported this strange business, gave no reason for the rivalry between the Spanish officers, which was so clearly mirrored in the attitudes of the agents in the Ghumāra.

He did comment, however, that the two feuding gā'īds were "yet sufficiently at one to refuse to countenance a Spanish landing in 'Ghumara the Pacified'." Quite clearly, the Spanish penetration of the Ghumāra was more of a mirage than a reality, as their agents were more inclined to use their Spanish protectors to help in their struggles to win and conserve their own power than to assist the Spanish to occupy the territory.

However, the Spanish did have some successes. Wuld al-Qurfa, the gā'id of the Banū Sa'īd al-Gharb, whom Girona had won over, was more loyal and really did hold the tribe ready for Spanish occupation... On 20 April 1920, Castro bin Ṣadīq al-Darqāwī was a relative of the Tuzgān sharīfs with whom 'Abd al-Mālik had been staying.

1 Al-Bū 'Ayyāshi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 32.
2 FO 371/4525/A2209/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, 26 and 27 Mar. 1920.
Girona, with his help, occupied Wādī Lāw, on the border between the Banū Sa'id and the Ghumāra, an operation made easier, in Mr. Atkinson's opinion, by the great hunger in the area.¹

Spanish advances in the west had similar consequences to those in the east. Resistance stiffened. On 27 May, representatives of the Banū Razīn, Banū Samīḥ, Mastāsa, and Targīst met at Targhassa in the Banū Samīḥ and agreed to fight the Spanish when Ramaḍān was over. They asked for help from Sīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda who told them that he would do nothing until the autumn—in other words, after the harvest had been gathered.² This group represented the eastern Ghumāran faction which had always looked more towards the Rif for support than towards al-Raisūlī in the Jībāla.³ At the same time, Spanish negotiations with the Banū Ḥassan broke down because, according to Vice-Consul Atkinson, the a'yān were worried about what "younger elements" might do if they reached an agreement.⁴

Even the areas that the Spanish had occupied were not entirely happy. One qā'id complained to Mr. Atkinson about the forced labour on the roads that the Spanish obliged the people in the area round the Funduq of 'Ain al-Jadīda to perform.⁵ (Forced labour was also common practice in the French zone where each man owed a certain number of days' work

¹ FO 371/4525/A4069/2209/28, Kerr to Curzon, Tangier, 28 May 1920; and Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 206.
² FO 371/4525/A4279/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 8 June 1920.
³ See above, p. 198.
⁴ FO 371/4525/A4279/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 8 June 1920.
⁵ Ibid.
More seriously, the Spanish showed that they were incapable of stopping raiding. Al-Raisūlī raided an estimated 1,300 sheep from the Jabal Ḫabīb tribe (possibly an exaggerated loss), and the owners were not compensated. Indeed, Colonel Cogolludo told Mr. Atkinson that natives in the "pacified areas" who lost stock to raiders were not compensated as a "matter of principle". The Spanish held local people responsible for protecting the occupied lands and on one occasion "natives" were allegedly given 400 lashes for not stopping the raiders from stealing other people's goats.

Despite these political difficulties, the Spanish moves on Shāwīn gathered momentum. On 26 June their troops occupied Dār bin Qurraysh outside Tetuan. Two months later they took the two hills of Quḍīat Karikra and Quḍīat Ramla (23 August), standing on either side of the road to Shāwīn. At the beginning of September, their troops were poised to advance on Shāwīn itself. One group was at Wādī Lāw, another had moved up the road from Tetuan, and a third, from Larache, had advanced up the Wādī Lukkus as far as the lands of the Banū Issaf.

But Spanish efforts to reinforce these positions by occupying further positions on the Ghumāra coast were unsuccessful. An attempt at simulating a landing at Tārga in the Banū Bū Zrā in August 1920, showed that the local people were unwilling to allow any such thing.

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1 Bidwell, op. cit., p. 187.
2 FO 371/4525/A4279/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 8 June 1921.
3 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 207.
month, September, however, the gā'id of the Banū Bū Zrā, 'Alī b. Sulaymān, indicated that he had sorted the problem out and that the tribe was after all willing to submit to the Spanish. ¹

By now, however, the Spanish were content to leave the occupation of small villages on the coast until after they had taken Shāwin. By the beginning of September, they had prepared two banderas (companies) of the Legion in Wāḍī Lāw, 6,000 men who had moved up from Alcazarquivir to Taffar, to the south-west of Shāwin, and 9,000 men ready in Dār ibn Qurraysh. The advance began on 20 September 1920 from Dār ibn Qurraysh, and troops occupied Quḍiat Zārqa and the Wednesday market of the Banū Ḥassan on 27 September. The Larache forces reached Sūq al-Qulla on 30 September. In the face of increasing resistance from the Akhmās, the Spanish pushed on hurriedly, before the opposition should grow even worse. They took Dār 'Aqūba on 4 October but progress was slow for the Spanish troops were now 70 kilometres from their supply base in Tetuan and roads were bad. ² Nevertheless, they were only 15 kilometres from Shāwin and the advance continued. On 14 October, Spanish troops surrounded Shāwin. Apparently Castro Girona then persuaded the notables of the town to surrender, ³ and Berenguer entered the town on 15 October 1920. ⁴

They were fairly well received. Indeed, Colonel Baird, the British Military Attaché in Madrid, who visited

¹ FO 371/4526/A7115/2209/28, Kerr to Curzon, Tangier, 26 Sept. 1920.
⁴ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 214.
the Spanish zone in late October reported that the Spanish had entered to great rejoicing, especially from the Jews. He remarked on the exemplary conduct of the Spanish troops—a marked contrast to his observations in Tetuan.¹

But the good feeling did not last. Sha'win was surrounded on all sides by hostile forces. The town was difficult to supply for rain had made the road to Dar ibn Qurraysh impassable.² Moroccans complained to Mr. Atkinson that Spanish troops, who were presumably very cold, had cut down many of the olive and orange groves around Sha'win to provide firewood.³ Prices also went up. Bread was expensive and charcoal also had increased to 20 pts a sack by the end of October.⁴ Unfortunately, Mr. Atkinson does not give the former prices but by January 1921, charcoal cost 50 pts a sack—a rise of 150 per cent.⁵

The Spanish may have been welcomed into the town of Sha'win itself but outside its walls the response was to resist the invaders. The leaders of the resistance were the Akhmās tribe, in whose territory Sha'win lies, who conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign among the neighbouring tribes. In November, Vice-Consul Atkinson reported that this had taken an unusual turn. For the first time, the women of the Akhmās were involved: "They have gone to the markets of the neighbouring tribes themselves and sacrificed

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² FO 371/4527/A8463/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 15 Nov. 1920.
to the women thereof to urge them to make their menfolk go to the aid of the Khmas.¹ This had some effect among the Banū Sijjil, who had allowed Spanish troops to occupy Jabal Qala‘a, overlooking Shāwin, immediately before the town fell to the invaders.² Several leaders of the tribe, who had been bought by the Spanish, were quickly executed along with four members of the Akhmās tribe itself. Help came from the Banū Yaḥmad who reportedly sent 500 men, and 600 were said to be on their way from the Ghumarīs after a meeting at the Sunday market of the Banū Ziyyāt. This meeting was attended by bin Marzūq, Paxtota’s agent in the Banū Ziyyāt, and other erstwhile supporters of the Spanish. Forces also arrived from the Rif, and the Akhmās asked them to stay to protect their families while they, the Akhmās, were away fighting the Spanish.³ That the Rifis were asked to do guard duty is not as surprising as Mr. Atkinson seems to have thought. The Akhmās did not entirely trust the Ghumarīs to their rear. They gave further evidence of this mistrust in January 1921 when the Akhmās themselves put a "guard" on the Ghumarīs' villages in order to guarantee their loyalty.⁴ With the Spanish in Shāwin and the potentially unsteady Ghumarīs to their rear, the Akhmās doubtless found the Rifī support most welcome.

The Ghumarīs were certainly volatile. In the

¹ FO 371/4527/A8463/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 15 Nov. 1920; and FO 371/4527/A9106/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 14 Dec. 1920.
² Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 214.
second week of November, the former Raisūlist gā'īd of the Banū Bū Zrāʾ, Wuld al-Yussif, shot at the Spanish backed gā'īd, 'Alī bin Sulaymān, and was himself shot dead by bin Sulaymān's supporters. The rest of the tribe then demanded a ḥagq-fine of 60,000 pts from bin Sulaymān, less 30,000 pts in respect of his own wounds. Bin Sulaymān refused and fled to Tetuan.¹

Although the main attention during these months of autumn was naturally fixed on the events in Shāwin, and the main efforts at resistance were centred there, this did not mean that the Rif was completely quiet—they sent support, but the Banū Waryaghāl, in particular, carried on with their own preparations to oppose the Spanish.

Spanish Advances in the East; the Rifī Coalition Gains Strength

While the Spanish forces in the west were preparing and carrying out the occupation of Shāwin, Silvestre undertook no advances in the eastern zone. This did not, of course, prevent the Banū Waryaghāl and their allies from planning further ḥarkas, although they failed in their attempts to attack the villages in the Banū Tūzīn that had submitted to the Spanish. Since the death of 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, the coalition still lacked a leader, even a self-appointed one. His eldest son, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm was rumoured in September to be about to join the ḥarka but by the middle of the month he still had not done so.²

¹ FO 371/4527/A9106/2209/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan; 14 Dec. 1920.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de septiembre de 1920.
The Spanish believed that the bárka was on the point of collapse, when in late September a new leader came on to the scene. This was a man who described himself as a Turk possessed of supernatural powers. He announced that he would shortly declare himself as Sultan of the Rif, call for jihād, and using his powers to bring down Spanish aeroplanes, would rout the Spanish army and enter Melilla at the head of his own victorious army. At first the Spanish were not too concerned: "We have here either a lunatic or a fool," the Office at Alhucemas reported. He was also greeted with some suspicion by the Rifíes, firstly because there were no seals on the letters which he sent out and secondly because word had now finally reached everyone that Turkey had been beaten in the First World War, and people were not confident of help from that nation. There was great confusion on all sides about his real identity. He himself called himself "al-Sharīf al-Idrīsī". One Spanish Officer, Major Villar, was informed that he was from the Gharb and was accompanied by another man who was perhaps not a Muslim at all. Other reports said that his name was al-Ḥājj Muḥammad Tūnsī or Muḥammad b. Idrīs Tūsī, that he came from Turkey, or from Taza, or that he had disembarked in the Bay of Alhucemas. Yet others named his companions as ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Sūsī, and bin Sa‘īd, an Algerian. Some said he had been sent by the Sultan Mūlāy Yusif, and others that he was in touch with a Mūlāy Muṣṭafā who was then in Melilla. He set up his camp at Tawārd in

1 Ibid., Memoria . . . segunda quincena de septiembre de 1920.
2 Ibid.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Información política, Silvestre to Berenguer, Melilla, 11 Oct. 1920. The identity of this Mūlāy Muṣṭafā is not known.
the Banū Walishak, where people from all over the Rif had been rallying ever since the beginning of September to form a ḫarka against the Spanish—notwithstanding Bū Qaddur's efforts to prevent this.¹ Here he made contact with representatives of the Banū Sa'īd, Banū Walishak, Banū Tūzin, Tīmsamān and Banū Waryaghal—the latter included Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his brother Sīdī Maḥammad.² Sīdī .Idrīs was initially fairly successful—by October the Spanish reckoned that he had about 300 men, but his power quickly evaporated when Bū Raḥayl, who had supported him at first, declared that he was imposter. The Banū Waryaghal turned against him—the Murābīṭīn forbade anyone to speak in his favour at their Thursday market, and the same happened at the Wednesday Market of Sīdī Bū 'Afīf. The al-Khaṭṭābī brothers were prevented from propagandising in his name.³

After this, Sīdī .Idrīs faded out. His reign as "Sultan of the Rif" had been very short. But the incident had some importance, not so much in itself but as a marking post in the Rifī resistance. This was the last time that a leader of a traditional type—claiming to be a miracle-working sharīf—would gain any real audience in the Rif. However, it was the first time that the concept of a "Sultanate of the Rif" had been spread abroad and this idea quickly gained ground, although the theories of how this was to be brought about soon came to favour the idea of a

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur to Col/Capt., Alhucemas, 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1338/31 Aug. 1926.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de octubre de 1920; and SHM Melilla Leg. 5, Política Bu Kaddur, Muḥammad Bū Qaddur to Col. Cívantas, 1 Safar 1339/18 Oct. 1920.
³ SHM Melilla, Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de octubre de 1920.
state based on modern European lines. At the end of October, the Spanish at Alhucemas reported that an informant had told them, speaking of the anti-Spanish group:

"They look for a Government of the Rif without foreign interference; they want to be subjected to no protectorate, and are opposed to the introduction into their villages, exercising the power of justice and command, of any police force that is not entirely made up of 'natives'. In short they dream of a government in their lands completely independent of our Protectorate."¹

While the people in the central Rif were dreaming of setting up their own state and were determined to stop the Spanish from advancing any further, the people in territories already occupied by the Spanish were also dissatisfied. The famine was causing problems in the Kabdāna,² and there was trouble brewing in the Qal'aya. In August, Mr. Atkinson reported that he had heard that a former Spanish agent, one M'hasmani (sic) of the Qal'aya was in contact with leaders of the Banū Sa'Id and planned to organise a simultaneous attack on the Spanish front lines by the Banū Sa'Id and a rising in the Qal'aya to their rear:

"His reason is the contemptuous treatment he receives from the Spaniards who no longer need his services not that the Qal'aya is in their hands."³

This seems to bear out the predictions of 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī to the Spanish in 1916, that people would not be so willing to work for them if they thought the Spanish really would occupy their lands, as this would result in the loss of their pensions.⁴

¹ Ibid.
² See above, p. 248.
³ FO 371/4526/A6177/2209/28, Kerr to Curzon, Tangier, 20 August 1920.
⁴ See above, p. 176.
The affair of the "Sultan of the Rif" froze the Spanish advances during September and October. In November, with the "Sultan's" power almost non-existent, Bū Raḥayl decided to submit to the Spanish. For the Spanish this was a tremendous success, for he had led the resistance to them for many years. Berenguer gave Silvestre permission to advance and on 5 December 1920 Spanish forces occupied Bin Ṭayyib in the Banū Walishak. On 6 December they occupied al-Naẓūr and Ḥalwāt, also in the Banū Walishak, without loss. More positions, this time in the Banū Saʿīd—Ishligān, Taguntz and Ajdir Asūs fell to the Spanish on 7 December and the leader of the resistance in the Banū Saʿīd, Qaddūr bin ʿAmar, submitted to the Spanish. On 9 December, Tīzzī Inurān and Dar Qabdānī, all in the Banū Saʿīd, were occupied and the whole tribe was in Spanish hands.

Silvestre now had two objectives. He telegraphed Berenguer:

"I beseech you to give me the means I consider both vital and urgent so that the Rifis may begin as soon as possible to receive the benefits of the Government's money payment for convoys. This would save our resources and lives, and release money to undertake the construction of roads for which the inhabitants have already asked."

In addition to the funds for public works, Silvestre wanted to advance. Parts of the Timsamān had offered to submit—carrying out the terms of the pact of August 1919—when the Spanish moved into the Banū Walishak and Banū Saʿīd. On

1 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 2.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . segunda quincena de noviembre de 1920.
3 Berenguer, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
4 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 233.
5 Ibid., p. 234; and Berenguer, op. cit., p. 6.
6 Ibid., p. 5.
6 January 1921, Berenguer gave Silvestre permission to advance into friendly areas, provided that he did not expose himself to risk. To prepare for this, mias of the Native Police were set up, made up of men from the Timsamān and Banū Tūzīn. On 11 January 1921, Spanish forces occupied Azrū in the Banū Tūzīn, on 12 January Sīdī Ḫusayn on the coast of the Banū Saʿīd, on 15 January Anwāl on the Banū Walishak boundary with the Timsamān, and then Issumār (21 January) and Jabal Yuddia (27 January) both also in the Banū Walishak. The front line now stretched from the sea at Sīdī Ḫusayn to Anwāl, Tafarsit, Azrū and 'Azīb Miḏār.

These advances put the seal on Silvestre's success. In less than a year he had doubled the area occupied by the Spanish. It was no small achievement. But it did not break the mainstay of the Rifī resistance; indeed it encouraged it. Atkinson reported that:

"A tribal confederation composed of the Beni Ouriaguel, Bogqoya, Beni Oufrah [sic, i.e., Banū Frāḥ], Beni Itfeft, Zargats, and Taqrist proposes to come to the aid of their brethren, but I think the present food shortage will militate strongly against action." \(^3\)

Food shortage or not, since the beginning of January 1921, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had been trying to organise a ḥarka in the Banū Waryaghal. \(^4\) On 3 January it was announced in the Monday market of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh that no fines would be imposed on anyone who killed a Spanish pensioner, that the Timsamān should put a guard on the house of 'Allāl Bū 'Azza.

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\(^1\) Ibid., p. 9; and Martínez de Campos, *op. cit.* p. 235.

\(^2\) See Map.

\(^3\) FO 371/7066/WL417/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 12 Jan. 1921.

\(^4\) SHM Melilla Leg. 18, *Información y Confidencias de Política enero a mayo de 1921 Alhucemas, 1 Jan. 1921, Qā'id 'Allāl (Bū 'Azza).*
a notoriously pro-Spanish qā'id of the Timsamān; that the
Buqquya should put a guard on the coast, and that everyone
should buy guns with which to fight the Spanish "who want
to take away their lands." As an added inducement, it was
also declared that the French were withdrawing from their
forward positions and were returning to Fez and to Tāza.
This last was quite untrue but served the dual purpose of
encouragement and of distracting people's attention from
the French to concentrate on the threat from the Spanish.
The ringleaders in this propaganda were bin 'Abd al-Karīm
and Muḥand SI Ḥāmid (the man who had fallen into a hole in
Tafarsit). 1

At the same market the following week it was
announced that in future no Spanish pensioner would be
allowed to attend the market or any meeting of the tribe.
This time the leaders were Maḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm and
SI 'Abdallāh Bū Drā. 2 On 17 January, for the third suc-
cessive week at the Monday market of the Bānū Bū 'Ayyāsh,
the propaganda continued, with a call for a ḥarka of 50 men
from each clan. 400 men joined it. This time the prop-
agandists were bin 'Abd al-Karīm again, and al-Ḥājj Ḥammūsh
of Ajdīr, Sīdī 'Alī b. Sī 'Amar 'Ashābār and Ḥammādī b.
SI Muḥammādī (who had all three been among the Bānū
Waryaghal representatives at the "court" of the "Sultan of
the Rif" at Tawārda in the Bānū Walishak the previous
October). 3 The call for a ḥarka was accompanied by a rel-
gious exhortation when it was repeated at the Friday market

1 Ibid., Sultan and Muḥand Qaddur, 4 Jan. 1921.
2 Ibid., report Alhucemas, 11 Jan. 1921.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de octubre de 1920.
of the Timsamān: "Anyone who is a Moroccan and brother in religion should form a harka and come together to fight against Spain." The harka then moved to the Timsamān where it encountered some opposition. The only clan in that tribe that was firmly with the Banū Waryaghal was the Trugūt, a long time participant in the liff-alliances of the Banū Waryaghal.

At the end of January, the Monday market was still in ferment. It was announced that anyone returning from the harka before 15 days were up, was liable to a fine of 250 pts. The leader of the harka was Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

During January, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had taken a lead in organising the harka and in propaganda in the markets. At the beginning of February he became the definite leader of his tribe—although by no means the undisputed leader, as will appear. On 7 February 1921, two Waryaghli agents told the Spanish that "the whole tribe of Beni Uriaguel had appointed Sid Muḥand Uld Sid Abd el Krim as chief, and on his orders taxes have been collected." In the Monday market of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh, bin 'Abd al-Karīm announced that anyone who did not go to the harka when it was his turn to do so would be heavily fined. The harka would be changed every eight days. However, people were still extremely hungry, and probably for fear that the Spanish would close down commerce, he did not put a "customs post" on the beach.

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información y Confidencias de política, enero a mayo de 1921 Alhucemas, Sultan 13 Feb. 1921.
2 Ibid., Ḥaddu b. Misaʿūd b. Sallām, 1 Feb. 1921.
3 Ibid., Sultan, Ḥaddu b. Misaʿūd b. Sallām, and Muḥand Qaddūr, 8 Feb. 1921.
Within a few days a small party had been sent to Shāwin to tell the people fighting there that "the Beni Urgauel [sic] are ready to continue to defend themselves to the death and they should do the same." Soon afterwards, a specific call was put out in the markets for someone to kill Ra'īs Misa'ūd "Sibara". They were followed by other calls to kill Muḥammad Abuqqy of Banū Yusif w-'Alī, and 'Amār Shiddī. A price of 250pts was put on both their heads.

By the end of February there were rumours that the Banū Sa'īd and the Banū Walishak had written to the ḥarka agreeing that if the ḥarka launched a big attack on the Spanish forces, they would rise as well and attack them from the rear:

"For they say that the Government treats them very badly and they are very discontented because the police commit many excesses with their women and goods, and they regret having allowed the troops into their territory."

This offer followed other attempts by the Banū Sa'īd to coordinate resistance with the Qal'aya tribes earlier in the month. Letters from SI Ḫāmid Akshīsh of the Banū Sa'īd were reported in the Banū Shikār on 5 February 1921; they asked for help to form a ḥarka.

However, the Banū Waryaghal was not completely united either in opposition or behind bin 'Abd al-Karīm.
In mid-February, Muḥ Abarghash of the Banū 'Abdallāh wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm to say that he could not agree to support him "since Si Mohand wants to make himself Sultan of the Rif and here everyone is a Sultan or no one is."¹ This is the first record of anyone even considering bin 'Abd al-Karīm as a Sultan, even to reject such a notion.

Constitutional questions apart, there were more serious problems immediately facing the Rifīs—not least the economic difficulties. The great hardship in the Rif made it difficult to break off relations with the Spanish completely. Nevertheless, at the end of February the question of stopping contact with the Spanish was raised again. In what seems to have been a rather stormy meeting at the Friday market of the Timsamān, Shaykh Ḫammu b. 'Alī suggested that in future no boats should be allowed to cross to Alhucemas Island. His intention was to cut off contact between the Spanish and Qā'id 'Allāl Bū 'Azza. Muḥand 'Amar b. al-Ḥājj Sa'id of Swānī then pointed out that to do this would mean closing off the entire coast from Raʾs al-'Abīd to Raʾs Ṭarf, in other words from the Buqquya to the Timsamān. Some people's reaction to this was not too enthusiastic as they needed the food that was imported from the island. Muḥand 'Amar bin al-Ḥājj Sa'id dismissed this objection by replying that in any case the food only went to "Christians"—in other words the pro-Spanish.² There was doubtless some truth in this, for by this time they were probably the only people who had money to buy grain.

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información y Confidencias de política, enero a mayo de 1921 Alhucemas, Sultan 13 0 1921.
² Ibid., Sultan, 26 Feb. 1921.
Many of the Timsamān were anyway none too enthusiastic about the ḫarka and neither were some of the Banū Tūzin. On 24 February, Morales received a letter from the clan of Banū Bil-'Aiz in the Banū Tūzin, asking the Spanish to occupy their territory: "You are aware of our situation and of what we need."¹ By this they meant the advantages of Spanish occupation, particularly food and employment.

By the end of February, then, the Banū Waryaghal had a leader and some idea, shared by most of them, that they wanted to free themselves from Spanish control through the benefits of unity and order. They were stronger than they had ever been and better organised. However, there was still some opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karīm within his own tribe, and even stronger feelings against him outside it where dissent could be much more openly expressed than it could in the Banū Waryaghal, where the anti-Spanish party exercised a strong control.

The Limits of the Spanish Advance

The Spanish were now on the edge of the Rif. From their own point of view they had been remarkably successful in their advances. In February Col. Morales of the O.C.T.A.I. wrote a report expressing satisfaction with the situation so far. He estimated that the Timsamān were on the point of submission, and believed that Anwāl could be used as an advance post in order to take Sīdī Idrīs on the coast. But he also knew that this was as far as they would go for some time—he warned Silvestre that once the Spanish had occupied

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Correspondencia,"A'yān of Banū Bil 'Aiz" to Cor. Morales, received 24 Feb. 1921.
Sidī Idrīs they would have arrived "at the limit of one
elasticity of the forces at Your Excellency's disposal."

If Sidī Idrīs was to serve as a base for any further advance
to the Wādi Nakūr, Morales continued, it would have to be
well fortified, so all further advances would have to be
suspended for the time being. The left flank, to the south,
was still open and the Spanish would have to occupy the
Banū Tūzīn in order to protect it:

"There is no need to point out that, before May,
we can do nothing except carry out a few police
actions. Even supposing that in both [i.e., the
Timsamān and Banū Tūzīn], our political work met
such success that we had to overcome no resistance,
the occupation alone of these two tribes would take
all summer. . . . Supposing that these operations
were effected with the same ease as those we carried
out in the Benī Said and Benī Ualishak (which, as I
have said, is not likely), we should not complete
them before July or August at the earliest. And at
this point we would come into contact with the Benī-
Urriaguel. Could we then go on to cross the Nakur?
The undersigned officer does not think so."  

Morales was particularly concerned about political
preparations for the advance, for during the advance of 1920
into the Benī Sa'īd there had been inadequate political
work. In his evidence to the Commission of enquiry into
the Anwāl disaster, Morales's colleague, Riquelme, stated:

"'The occupation of the Benī Said under Gen. Silvestre
was a purely military operation.'

Sr. Prieto: 'Was it not prepared politically with
a great deal of support being given to the inhabitants?
Sr. Riquelme: 'That came later, at least two months
after the operation.'"

As has been seen, the Banī Sa'īd became quickly rather dis-
satisfied with Spanish rule. At the same time, in the

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2 Ibid.
3 A Socialist Party leader and Deputy.
4 Responsibilidades, p. 185.
unoccupied territories, the pro-Spanish groups were themselves divided as individuals were concerned to make sure that if the Spanish did occupy their lands, then they received positions of authority from the Spanish while their rivals did not. Thus on 11 March 1921, several members of the Banū 'Akkī and Banū Bil-'Aiz clans of the Banū Tūzīn, wrote to the Spanish to make sure that they were consulted in the choice of qādī—or, in other words, that the qādī should be one of their allies.¹

However, Silvestre decided to advance, despite the misgivings of his A.I. officers and the lack of political unity among the Spanish supporters in front of his lines. At first, however, he confined his operations to Morales's recommendations. Bū Majān, 4 kms west of Anwāl was occupied on 21 February and on 12 March 1921, Sīdī Ḫāris on the Timsamān coast was taken. This pleased Qā'īd 'Allāl Bū 'Azza, one of the principal pro-Spanish qā'īds of the Timsamān who, feeling that relief was at last on the way, sent messages welcoming the Spanish.² He must have been very satisfied by the turn of events, for two weeks earlier he had been playing unwilling host to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, Muḥammad Tāḥīr and others from the Banū Waryaghal who had insisted on directing the activities of the ḥarka from his house, and he had been frightened into joining them.³

On the other hand, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was definitely

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¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Cartas, Muḥammad b. Ḫaddū and others from the Banū 'Akkī and Banū Bil-'Aiz (Banū Tūzīn) to Silvestre, 1 Rajab 1339/11 Mar. 1921.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información y Confidencias de política enero a mayo de 1921 Alhucemas, Belcristo 15 Mar. 1921.
³ Ibid., Moreno and Pincherias, 1 Mar. 1921.
displeased by the news of the capture of Sidi Idris and began to organise a ḥarka.¹ Within days there were reports, which Alhucemas passed on to Silvestre immediately, that 100 men were ready to attack Sidi Idris.²

The capture of Sidi Idris was the event that finally put the anti-Spanish groups into a commanding political position in the Rif, for it happened just at the time when it became obvious that the harvest would be a good one. At the end of April, Vice-Consul Atkinson reported that the Rifis were reckoning on the best harvest for 14 years:

"If once the Riffians get enough to eat for present and future needs, the Spaniards will I think have to fight if they are to penetrate any further into the Riff territory."³

He further reported that he had been given information that the MatIwa al-BAṣar had garrisoned 2,200 men (a figure he considered exaggerated) at Jibha, on the Wādi Waringa, to prevent any landing there.⁴

The centre of the political action against the Spanish was, of course, in the eastern Rif—the Timsamān and Banū Tūzīn, where in April, pressure on the pro-Spanish party reached an extent at which few people could resist it. The ḥarka grew to an unprecedented size.⁵

At the beginning of April, bin 'Abd al-Karīm further demonstrated his authority. On 28 March 1921, the High

¹ Ibid., Sultan, 15 Mar. 1921.
² Ibid., Telegram Comandante Militar, Alhucemas to Comandante General Melilla, Alhucemas, 17 Mar. 1921, "Urgente, personal y reservado".
³ FO 371/7066/W5260/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 29 Apr. 1921.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Operaciones, Telegrama Oficial Comandante Militar, Alhucemas to Comandante General Melilla; Alhucemas, 4 Apr. 1920.
Commissioner, Berenguer started a journey of inspection along the Ghumāra and Rif coasts, in the course of which he met representatives of the Ghumāra tribes at the Peñón de Vélez, including Ḥammū al-‘Aisāwi, the principal leader of the Matīwa al-Baḥar and the Sharīf Bū Ghāba of the Banū Samīḥ, who made a good impression on him with their "fine promises". However, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was determined that no one from the Banū Waryaghal should similarly meet Berenguer on Alhucemas Island. Most people obeyed him but a few, some of those who had most interest in stopping bin 'Abd al-Karīm's rise to power, did not. These were Muḥammad Abuqquy, Qāʾid Sī Bū Bakar bin al-Ḥājj Ushshān, Sulaymān b. al-Mujāhid (the head of the Banū Zarāʾ lineage) and 'Amar bin Ḥaddū, all from Ajdīr, and Raʾīs Misaʿūd b. 'Amar "Sibara" of the Būqquya.

When they arrived at the island, they discovered that Berenguer had been delayed by rough seas. Silvestre was there and told them that Berenguer would soon arrive by land. Such an assertion implied that the Spanish controlled the land approaches to Ajdīr and would seem to have been a calculated provocation.

On their return to the mainland, all the Ajdīris were fined by bin 'Abd al-Karīm and all except Sulaymān paid up. The fine was fixed at 5,000 pts and men were sent to ensure that it was paid. Sulaymān fled to the

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1. Berenguer, op. cit., p. 16.
2. Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 32-34.
5. Ibid.
Buqquya to get help from Sibara.\(^1\) The Banū Waryaghāl sent a mahalla after them, with the intention of then going on to seek help from Sīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda.\(^2\) As a result, Sibera changed sides and Sulaymān fled to the Spanish on Alhucemas Island and stayed with them thereafter. On his arrival he suggested to them that they shell the Wednesday market at Tafrast, while the pro-Spanish party attacked bin 'Abd al-Karīm.\(^3\) Muḥammad Azargān of Ajdr, according to his own account, tried to mediate and failed when Silvestre turned down his help.\(^4\) Even at this stage, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs of the independent Rifī state saw himself in the role of peacemaker and diplomat. In any event, the bombardment went ahead and bin 'Abd al-Karīm's house was destroyed, although the pro-Spanish rising never came about.\(^5\) However, despite their agreement to pay the fine, Muḥ Abuqqy, Bū Bakar. bin al-Ḥājj Ushshān, and the others did not join the ḥarka.\(^6\)

As a result of the growing pressure, groups in the Banū Tūzīn joined the resistance and called for help against the Spanish. People from the Banū Mallūl and Banū Bū Yari subclans of the Igharbiyīn asked the Banū Yaḥyā subclan of the Tasfath and the Banū Ta'bān for help. They required some 200 men to ambush the Spanish.\(^7\) Among the incentives they

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Operaciones, Telegram Comandante Military, Alhucemas to Comandante General, Melilla, 7 Apr. 1920.  
2 Ibid., Telegram Comandante Militar to Comandante General, Alhucemas, 7 Apr. 1920 (2nd telegram of day).  
3 Skiraj, op. cit., pp. 32-34.  
4 Ibid.  
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Operaciones, O de A.I. Alhucemās, 13 Apr. 1920, Resumen de noticias del día.  
6 Ibid.  
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Correspondencia, Shaykh Ḥaddū b.  
Aslāḥī and others to Col. Morales 24 Rajab 1339/3 Apr. 1921.
offered was booty:

"They say to us: be on the alert for the enemy wants to advance into your territory. Be men with valiant hearts. Then if we see them [i.e., the Spanish] broken and defeated ... we will come upon him and cut off his rear and we will loot what he has."¹

However, this increasing mood of resistance did not mean that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was completely secure in his leadership. On 23 April, a group of men from the Banû Waryaghan went to Sîdî Ḥamîdu in Snâda to offer him the leadership of the tribe because bin 'Abd al-Karîm "cannot be anything more than a faqih for he has never been the head of a tribe." Sîdî Ḥamîdu, for undisclosed reasons, turned the offer down.²

The people involved in this attempt to transfer their allegiance to Sîdî Ḥamîdu—Sid 'Amar Pantorillas of Ajdîr, and 'Allûsh Angitta of the Buqquya—were relatively minor figures but there does seem to have been a more general reaction against bin 'Abd al-Karîm at the end of April. In the ḥarka, several of his supporters, including Sî Muḥand bin Sî Ḥamîd, and Sî 'Amar Budra', later his War Minister, were refused the right to speak on the grounds that they were "pensioners" of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, so they left. The point at issue seems to have been bin 'Abd al-Karîm's past—many people said that all his money had come from the Spanish and they believed that he was self-seeking.³

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm countered this opposition by stressing the need for organisation against the Spanish.

He said that the Rifîs needed something similar to the

¹ Ibid., Ḥaddu b. al-Aslāḥî and others to Col/Capt., Alhucemas, 6 Shābân 1339/16 Apr. 1921.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Operaciones, Chato Bonoya, 25 Apr. 1921.
³ Ibid.
Spanish Native Police, with officers and a salary. Accordingly it was announced at the Monday market of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh on 24 April 1921 that bin 'Abd al-Karīm would pay 2 pts a day as a regular salary to all who joined the ḥarka. To equip it, he sent a message to Sīdī Ḥamīdu in Snāda asking for the cannon which he had, which originally had come from the Spanish gunboat Concha. He proposed to set these cannon up on Jabal Sijjum opposite Alhucemas Island. To increase preparedness against any Spanish attack, bin 'Abd al-Karīm organised the digging of trenches in the Timsamān.

By the beginning of May, the ḥarka had increased in strength remarkably. An informant from the Banū Tūzīn told the Spanish that there were 800 from the Banū Waryaghal at Jabal Qāma in the Timsamān and 500, mainly from the Banū Waryaghal and Timsamān, at the Tuesday market of Azilāf in the Banū Tūzīn. At the same time, the movement spread westwards. On 5 May, a Timsamān informant reported that the ḥarka had divided and one part had been sent to protect the Banū Bū Frāḥ and Mastāṣa. My mid-May, the ḥarka had moved yet further to the west and Jibha was garrisoned by men led by Ḥammu al-'Aisāwī, who had seemed so friendly to Berenguer the previous month. 'Aisāwī was reported to be in contact with another of Berenguer's "friendly" qāʾids, Bū Ghāba of the Banū Samīḥ, on the other bank of the Wādī:

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., Belcristo, 26 Apr. 1921.
3 Ibid., Resumen del día, 22 Apr. 1921.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, Muḥammad Ḥammādī: Ḥammu (Banū Bil-'Aiz), 3 May 1921.
5 Ibid., Tuḥāmī Amghār (Banū Bū Idhīr), 5 May 1921.
Waringa, who promised support as soon as the harvest was gathered. It was now certain to be a good harvest and Mr. Atkinsons predicted that "once their food supplies are assured, the attitude of the tribesmen will certainly stiffen."¹

At the same time, a census was carried out in the tribes that were part of the coalition—which did not include the Timsamān nor the Banū Tūzīn—and Atkinson reported that the figures that had reached him were of 42,740 men from eight tribes who were capable of bearing arms.² These figures are very high—certainly much more than those given by Azargān to Skirāj who puts the number of men available from the same tribes as 19,600.³

Accurate or not, a census implies a fairly high degree of organisation. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was trying to organise the Rif forces as best he could and to supply them with modern equipment. He tried to buy cannon (of French origin) from Sī Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq Akhamlīṣ in the Zargāt tribe,⁴ and acquired another cannon and 300 cartridges, again of French origin, and a machine gun from another unnamed source.⁵ On 22 May he was reported to be writing to the French to ask them to sell him arms directly.⁶ A customs post was set up at Azīlāf, and the money raised was used to pay 20 men to dig trenches there. They received

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¹ FO 371/7066/W6162/184/28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 14 May 1921.
² Ibid.
³ Skiraj, op. cit., p. 4.
⁴ SHM Melilla, Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, Militar Peñón to Comandante General, Melilla, Peñón, 9 May 1921.
⁵ Ibid., T. O., Comandante General Melilla to High Commissioner, Melilla, 10 May 1921.
⁶ Ibid., 'Amar b. Ḥammu (Bugquya), 22 May 1921.
2.5 pts a day. As well as Azilāf, other positions were guarded: Ra's al-'Abīd on the western end of the Bay of Alhucemas, at the beginning of May, and the zawīya of Mūlāy Ya‘qūb in the Tīmsāmān towards the end of the month.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's attempts to organise a regular army continued. He proposed that, at the end of Ramaḍān, a ḥarka of 1,000 men should be organised by the Banū Waryaghall, Buqquya, and the Trugūt clan of the Tīmsāmān, and be drilled by former members of the Spanish Policía Indígena and Fuerzas Regulares (the Moroccan section of the Spanish army). On 27 or 28 May he appointed his first field commander—the Faqīḥ Muḥammad b. 'Alī, called "Bū Lahya", the qāḍī of the Banū Tūzīn was to be second in command, under Bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself, of the ḥarka at Jabal Qāma in the Tīmsāmān.

On 31 May, the Spanish were informed that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had called a meeting of all the leaders of the Banū Waryaghall to announce that within a few days he would have arms and clothes for the troops. He went on to say that he had "the object of carrying on to train troops, appoint governors, construct roads and organise the exploitation of mines with engineers." No indication was given of the origin of these engineers, if indeed they existed yet, but within a few days he announced that he was writing to the

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1 Ibid., 'Aisā b. al-Ḥājj Aḥmad (information), 25 May 1921.
2 Ibid., T.O., Comandante Militar, Peñón to Comandante General, Melilla; Peñón, 9 May 1921.
3 Ibid., T.O. Lt. of 15th Mía to Cor. Policía Indígena, Anual 25, May 1922; and Ḥaddū b. Daḥṣāmān, 27 May 1921.
5 Ibid., Telegram, Comandante Military, Alhucemas to Comandante General Mililla; Alhucemas, 31 May 1921.
Dutch Consul in Tangier asking for Dutch intervention and offering them mineral rights.¹

Clearly, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was now proposing the skeleton of an organised state, based on a modern and effective military force which would enable him to beat the Spanish, and then would be able to offer to the Rîfîs just those benefits of "civilisation" that the Spanish were expected to provide—roads, mineral workings, and order.

Order was, of course, a prerequisite to unity, as the struggle to impose the hagg-fines had shown in 1919 and 1920. But fines were no longer applicable to an organised state—a much more permanent system of punishment was needed to deter murderers because the hagg-fines were too fragile in that they depended on the agreement of everyone concerned. In a determined effort to stop feuding, bin 'Abd al-Karîm announced that in future anyone who murdered another man would himself be put to death "on the orders of the tribe."²

In fact, despite his reference to the will of the tribe, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was taking personal control more and more. At the beginning of May 1921, Azarqân reported to the Spanish that during a meeting in the mosque in Ajdir, bin 'Abd al-Karîm, as qâdi, dealt with questions of land dealings. However, when the discussion turned to politics, bin 'Abd al-Karîm "did not allow anyone to speak. When Si Abd Alah [sic] Budra tried to say that the Island should be closed off, Si Mohand told him to be silent at once."³ Despite

¹ Ibid., SI Muḥand bin 'Abd al-Qâdir, 25 May 1921.
² Ibid.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información y Confidencias de política enero a mayo de 1921 Alhucemas, Muḥammad bin Muḥammad Azarqân (Pajarito), 2 May 1921.
this tightening control, or perhaps because of it, there were still some people who refused to recognise bin 'Abd al-Karīm's authority as leader. The Qādi Muḥammad b. Fūl of the Banū 'Alī, who had long been a Spanish Agent, declared that there was no basis in the sharī'ā for shooting a murderer and announced his intention to attack bin 'Abd al-Karīm. When bin 'Abd al-Karīm called together the faqīhs of the tribe asking them to sign a declaration giving him the authority as their leader, b. Fūl refused. However, another main source of opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karīm and the anti-Spanish group was no longer a problem. Raʾīs Misaʿūd b. 'Amar "Sibara" had decided to fall in with the prevailing mood and sent bin 'Abd al-Karīm 2,000 cartridges in mid-May.

The Spanish Occupy Abarrān

The Spanish were quite well aware of what was going on in the Rif, and Silvestre wrote to Berenguer on 29 May:

"In these circumstances we must think carefully before undertaking any advance. For this reason I have ordered Comandante Villar in Bumeyan [i.e. Bū Majān] to contact the leaders of the Timsmān, and if we receive the guarantee of their complete and definite support I will undertake operations in this area. If we do not, I will think again, because otherwise we would be faced with a series of bloody battles quite unlike any that we have so far encountered in the area."

However, at this moment a group of Timsmānīs came to Silvestre and asked him to put troops across the Wādī Amqarān, promising their support. On 1 June, the Spanish

1 Ibid., "Simona", "Quijote", "Moreno" Muḥand Buzār, Rashāl b. Muḥand Shaʿīb, Sīd Ḥāmmūsh, Muḥand al-ʿArbi. 5 May 1921.
2 Ibid., Muḥand b. Muḥammad Sultan 17 May 1921.
3 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 33.
did this and a force occupied the hill of Dahar Abarrān. They arrived during the night, and took up their positions without trouble. Silvestre informed Berenguer that all was well. What happened next is not clear. Martínez de Campos gives two alternatives--either the attack by the Rifis was very severe, or the Moroccan harca amiga that accompanied the Spanish mutinied. Berenguer says the barka mutinied. In fact, both things seem to have happened. According to al-Bū 'Ayyāshī, Bū Lahya, in charge of the barka during bin 'Abd al-Karīm's absence in Ajdīr, waited until dawn of the next day before attacking. This gave him the opportunity to move as many men to the area as he could. On 2 June, Berenguer was informed that the position was under attack. Atkinson was afterwards told that when the Timsamānis in the pro-Spanish barka saw the way things were turning out, they made common cause with the attackers. In any event, the Spanish lost the position and 179 men were killed. They lost 4 mountain cannon, an ammunition dump, and about 250 rifles. On the same day, the post of Sīdī Idrīs, on the coast, was attacked and only saved by the Spanish marines who were put ashore from the gun-boat Laura.

1 The numbers given vary wildly; Berenguer, op. cit., p. 36 has 250 men, Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 242 has 1,500 to occupy the position and 200 left behind to hold it, al-Bū 'Ayyāshī, op. cit., Vol II, p. 71, has 500 men.
2 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 36.
4 Woolman, op. cit., p. 88.
5 Al-Bū 'Ayyāshī, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 73.
6 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 36.
7 FO 371/7067/W6905/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 16 June 1921.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
The Consequences of Abarrân

Abarrân was the climax of two and a half years of preparation. Although at the time the Spanish minimised its importance, for the Rifis it was a landmark. For the first time for many years they had been able to defeat the Spanish and force them to withdraw. Until 1926, girls sang ballads (izrân) about it.¹

The Spanish, however, were not too perturbed. When Berenguer arrived in Sidi Idris on 4 June 1921, Silvestre told him that the haraka had been disbanded.² On 5 June, Berenguer telegraphed the Madrid government:

"Comandante General considers situation reestablished on Tinsaman front though somewhat disturbed in Beni Taaban and Tafersit . . . but this is not presently worrying . . . In the tribes of the interior the defeat seems to have passed unnoticed . . . In short the situation as a whole is delicate and we should take precautions and proceed with care . . . For my part I can see nothing alarming in the situation at present."³

Even with the benefit of hindsight, Berenguer did not consider Abarrân to have been important:

"Abarran was a painful episode, a misfortune of colonial war. But such a thing is a common occurrence in these wars and generally without consequences. Abarran was a surprise, an excess of self-confidence, the confirmation of the rebellious attitude, imprudently ignored, of the tansman and beniurriughel [sic]."⁴

Berenguer may have considered that Abarrân was a minor military defeat but this view ignores its position as the culmination of the anti-Spanish group's efforts. In reality it was the result of the almost total breakdown of the

¹ Hart, Aith Waryaghgar, p. 375.
³ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 40.
⁴ Ibid., p. 34.
Spanish army's political control over the Rif. The Spanish had set great store by this penetration in the past. But Silvestre's advances in 1920 and 1921 had shown how unreliable the promised assistance really was. As the Spanish advanced the resistance increased, rather than decreased. The reasons for this lay in the changing economic situation, on the fact that the Spanish were unable to protect their agents from the pressures of the anti-Spanish coalition, on the growing effectiveness of that coalition. In these circumstances the Spanish could do little else but continue to pay the pensions.

All through 1920, the Spanish paid out the monthly "salaries" to people in the Banū Waryaghål and other tribes, and this continued into 1921—a monthly statement of account was produced in March of that year. The figures for 1920 do not seem to add up correctly, but at the most the Office in Alhucemas paid out 13,180 pts to 193 people, an average of 68.2 pts every month.¹ This was a slight rise over 1919.² In 1921, the number of recipients fell quite markedly, to 125, and the average amount also went down as more and more of the important figures were obliged to join the ḥarka, or joined it willingly.³ Nevertheless, some important people stuck with the Spanish. All the people who went to Alhucemas Island to see Berenguer in April 1921 and fell foul of bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the process, were among the people who received the most in the way of pensions from the Spanish. Sī Bū Bakar b. al-Ḥājj Ushshān was paid 150 ts a month in both years, Muḥammad Abuqquy's pension was increased from

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Pensiones.
² See above, p. 215.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Pensiones.
165 pts in 1920 to 195 pts a month in 1921, Sulaymān b. al-Mujāhid and Raʾīs Misaʿūd "Sibara" were receiving 200 pts a month in 1920, and Sibera was still being paid his pension in March 1921. ‘Amar bin Ṣadīq of the Banū Hadhīfa, who was later to play both sides during the Rif war, and his brother Muḥammad were both paid 125 pts a month.¹

Yet the Spanish were becoming more and more sceptical of the value of the pensions to them. Even if their agents were loyal, the Spanish could not back them up and these agents were practically powerless to prevent other people from joining the harka. As the strength of the anti-Spanish party increased, the agents were themselves forced to join the harka or at least to acquiesce in acknowledging the authority of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. In June 1920, the Office at Alhucemas reported that in their opinion the pensions were useful only to maintain the status quo. They might have been useful if the Spanish were on the point of entering the Banū Waryaghal (which they were not), but the Spanish realised that the recipients in no way felt obliged by their pensions; on the other hand, to stop paying out would cause trouble.² There were certainly grounds for the latter assumption, for the files of the Servicio Histórico Militar are filled with letters from people complaining that they had not received their pensions. One written by the Murābiṭūn clan of the Banū Waryaghal is typical in its threat to withdraw support from the Spanish unless they were paid: "If you are going to do anything

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 17, Pensiones and SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Pensiones.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 16, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de julio de 1919.
with your friends then [pay] the monthly salary which we have not received for six months." The Spanish were caught in a cleft stick. To carry on paying the pensions was useless, but to stop paying them would have made matters worse.

Conclusion

After the battle of Abarrān it was quite clear that the Spanish no longer held the initiative in the Rif. In fact, the political situation had for some time been out of their control. It is quite possible that by continuing his advance against the advice of his intelligence officers and the instructions of his superior officers, Silvestre had over-reached himself. But there were other, far more important reasons for the Spanish loss of control.

In the first place, the good harvests of 1921 had given the anti-Spanish coalition the freedom to act. However, this was not in itself enough to lay the seeds for Spanish defeat. The essential point about the eighteen months before the battle of Abarrān is that in this time new political forms had grown up in the Rif. The search for unity which had led to the reimposition of the ḫagg-fines in the Banū Waryaghal in February 1920 had developed into new directions. People had begun to realise that if the opposition to the Spanish was to be maintained, they would have to set up a more permanent and less vulnerable structure in the Rif than the old one which depended on the idea of ḫagg-fines. The false Sīdī Ḥāfīṣ, ineffective though he had been, marked a new stage in the political development

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1 SHM-Melilla Leg. 17, Confidencias Políticas, "all the Murābitūn clan of the Banū Waryaghal to Colonel and Captain of Alhucemas, received 17 Dec. 1920."
of the Rif. For the first time someone had mentioned the possibility of a "Sultanate of the Rif", in other words the formation of a new state. Even when he vanished from the scene, after an extremely short "reign", people continued to talk in these terms.

It should be noted that the originator of this idea seems not to have been Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm, even though he was close to Sidi Idrīs. Indeed, his leadership of the Rif took some considerable time to emerge. He was resisted in some quarters, and the leadership was offered to Sidi Ḥamīdu on the grounds that he was a sharīf, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm was not. The fact that in spite of this prejudice against his birth bin 'Abd al-Karīm still became the leader of the central Rif only emphasises the novelty of what was happening. For the first time, a leader had come forward who was qualified for the position not by birth but by his grasp of modern methods.

It was the use of modern methods that bin 'Abd al-Karīm proposed and promised from the start: roads, the extraction of minerals and modern government and order. By doing this he was competing with the Spanish on the basis of what they said they could offer the Rif. At the same time, he was challenging the social organisation that had existed up until then. He changed the basis of law by announcing that he would impose capital penalties on anyone who committed murder. Order was dependent no longer on a fragile agreement on hagg-fines but by a system of control from above.

In fact, of course, the area of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's authority was as yet very small, just the Banū Waryaghal and
Buqquya and parts of the neighbouring tribes of Banū Tūzīn and Timsamān. Nevertheless, he had alliances with people further afield, in the western Rif and the Targīst area, in particular, and these alliances were brought about by propaganda which emphasised the unity of Islam. He was also strong enough to enforce the payment of taxes in a limited area. Above all, perhaps, he had taken on a certain personal charisma among his own people. Even one of Spain's most reliable informants in the Banū Waryaghal, a man opposed to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, was able to describe him to the Spanish in almost heroic terms:

"People say that Si Mohand is very brave and is the most powerful leader in the Beni Uriaguel . . . He goes about like a man from the mountains, completely bronzed by the sun, covered in sweat, for he has no time to care for himself nor to rest."\(^1\)

In the months that followed Abarrān, bin 'Abd al-Karīm would reach a pinnacle of his prestige, as forces nominally under his authority routed the entire Spanish army in the eastern zone. Abarrān gave him the authority to carry on to organise a wider movement still and the power to further extend his command.

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\(^1\) SHM. Melilla Leg. 18, Informaciones y Confidencias de política enera a mayo Alhucemas, Muḥammad bin Muḥammad "Sultan", 17 May 1921.
Chapter VI

FROM ABARRĀN TO MELILLA JUNE TO AUGUST 1921

"Oh brothers be on your guard, be ready to make your stand with firmness and diligence, for the hour of happiness has arrived for the Muslims... 'Make holy war with your possessions and your bodies.' As for your brother Muslims, do not hurt a single one of them; but the Unbelievers, may God destroy them and scatter them, then you should flatten into the ground."

Letter from the mujāhidīn of the Banū Waryaghāl to the tribe of Banū Shikār during the Spanish retreat on Melilla at the end of July 1921.¹

"For the first time in two years men walked through the mountains, not fearing an enemy..."

Al-Raisūlí describing the effects of the Spanish defeats on the people of the Jibālā.²

"This movement of attack on the front lines and the resulting rebellion behind them, was organised, planned, prepared and carried out with a tenacity and intelligence never before seen in the history of our action in Africa, nor in that of the colonial wars of other nations."

The Spanish Office of Native Affairs at Alhucemas commenting on their defeat at the end of July 1921.³

The defeat of the Spanish at Abarrān was the first victory of the new Rifī coalition. Yet an isolated success

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Julio, the mujāhidīn of the Banū Baryaghāl and the other tribes with them to the tribe of Banū Shikār, especially Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir bin al-Ḥājj Ṭayyīb, Tistutīn', received 27 July 1921.
² Forbes, op. cit., p. 300.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria... segunda quincena de julio de 1921.
of this nature was hardly enough to stop the Spanish on its own. The first victory would have to be followed by others if the threat to the Rif was to be removed. In the event, it was followed nearly two months later by the complete rout of all the Spanish troops in the eastern part of their Protectorate. Such a victory was only possible after a great deal of organisation and planning. In the areas still unoccupied by Spanish troops, Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm continued the work that he had started in providing an organised basis for the central Rifī tribes. His campaign to keep order was renewed and the beginnings of the regularly paid army grew slightly. Nevertheless, the scope of his command was still very small. The real political advances during this apparent calm that prevailed after Abarrān were in making contacts with people behind the Spanish lines with whom it was agreed that they would rise in collaboration with the Rifīs. However, because these people were his allies and not under bin 'Abd al-Karīm's control, when the victories began and the Spanish army collapsed, bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his lieutenants had considerable difficulty in imposing their authority. As a result, in the confusion of the Spanish retreat, there was considerable disorder. People were quite prepared to cooperate with bin 'Abd al-Karīm in order to defeat the Spanish but they were less than enthusiastic about submission to his authority.

However, defeat of the Spanish in the east did not bring about a corresponding rising in the west. Spanish forces were about to deal the final blow to al-Raisūlī when the news from the east arrived and operations were suspended. The Rifī victories certainly raised morale in the Jibāla but there was no move to join the Rifīs.
To a large extent, bin 'Abd al-Karīm depended on his very success for his authority. There was a good deal of propaganda based on the actual fact that he had defeated the Spanish and he made good use of this to proclaim his new ideas of order and centralised government. However, not everyone appreciated this form of propaganda and other sorts, particularly calls for jihād against the Christians were used as well.

These three themes, propaganda, the attempt by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm to win control and then to keep it, and the effects that the victories over the Spanish had in the western zone form the subject of this chapter.

After Abarrān: an Apparent Calm

Before the battle of Abarrān, few Spanish soldiers had been killed in Morocco: between 1916 and January 1921, only 1,870 soldiers lost their lives in the Protectorate.¹ In comparison, in the months that were to follow, at least 10,000 Spanish troops were to die. However, the fighting at Abarrān was not followed by any further victories for nearly two months. The intervening period was spent in preparation.

While the Rifīs were attacking the Spanish position at Abarrān, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm had been in Ajdir.² But he quickly made his way to the scene of the battle. He arrived on 2 June and at once announced that he would pay for all the Spanish equipment that was handed in. And, in an effort to

² See above, p. 301.
prevent too much bloodshed he also announced that anyone who killed or wounded prisoners, or "profaned" the bodies of the Spanish dead, would be severely punished. Two days later, Sidi Hamidu of Snada arrived at Abarran with reinforcements and made similar attempts to prevent attacks on prisoners.¹

Both the reinforcements and the warnings against cruelty were needed. It was quite clear that the Spanish would soon counter-attack and a story spread through the Rif that a few days after Abarran, General Silvestre had sent a letter to the Rif leaders, saying that he would be coming to wreak vengeance:

"He would deprive the men of all reasonable expectation of becoming fathers. While, as regards the women on the other hand, he would exert himself to ensure that they became mothers."²

Mr Atkinson, who believed this story to be true, had heard it both from his own Rifin informants and from the Belgian consul in Tetuan, an Arabic-speaking Jew. True or not, the fact that the story spread at all showed how high Rifin feelings were running, a situation which might have led to the conduct which bin 'Abd al-Karim and Sidi Hamidu both feared.

A week after Abarran, the Rifis had moved three of the guns they had captured there to Jabal Sijjum, on the shore opposite Alhucemas Island and made ready to shell it. At the same time, more reinforcements arrived in Ajdir, this time led by Sidi Muhammad Akhamlish, who reportedly brought 600 men with him from the Targist area.³ With the excitement in the Rif growing daily, Silvestre decided to advance. On

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de junio de 1921.
² FO 371/7068/W9494/184/28, report by Atkinson, not dated but received 5 Sept. 1921.
7 June 1921 Spanish forces occupied Igharibān (see Photograph VI:1 and Map V:3 above). This position, some 6 kms from Anwāl on the border between the Banū Tūẓīn and the Timsamān was occupied in the hope that it would help to control the road between Anwāl and Bin Ṭayyib.1

Not surprisingly, this advance encouraged those who wanted to resist still further. The ḥarka, now grouping at Azilāf, grew still more, there were other attempts to raise a ḥarka in the Gaznaya and the Maṭālsa, and further contacts between the Banū Waryaghal, Banū Saʿīd, and Banū Walishak behind the Spanish lines.2 On 10 June it was reported that 500 men from the Banū ʿAmārt would join the ḥarka, with the encouragement of Sīdī Ḥāmīdu of Snāda. The Spanish estimated that there were now 3,000 men in the ḥarka, and that it would soon grow to 6,000 strong.3

More letters followed from bin ʿAbd al-Karīm to the leaders of the Banū Walishak, Banū Saʿīd and Tafarsit tribes telling them to be ready to defend their country when the moment came. The leaders of these tribes, especially those lying behind the Spanish lines were by now confident of being able to defeat the Spanish and made plans to cooperate with bin ʿAbd al-Karīm. A meeting was held in the house of Qāʿid ʿAbd al-Salām, the Spanish appointed qāʿid of the Tafarsit and alleged poisoner of bin ʿAbd al-Karīm’s father. It was attended by Salāḥ Zaganunt, Muḥ Awrāg, and Muḥ Qaddur of the Banū Walishak, by Qaddur bin ʿAmar, the

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1 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 43, Martínez de Campos, op. cit., pp. 242-243. Payne, Politics, p. 166, says the date was 8 June 1921.
3 Ibid., T.O. Cmte Mar., Alhucemas to Cmte. Gral., Melilla; Alhucemas, 10 June 1921.
Photograph VI : 1

The village of Anwāl', and in the distance Jabal Igharibān, c. 1926.

Source: Photograph in the archives of the Servicio Histórico Militar, Madrid.
major leader of the Banū Sa‘īd and others from his tribe including the Qā‘id Salāḥ. They all agreed that "if the government [i.e., the Spanish] did not disarm them [i.e., the Sa‘īdīs] they will betray us [the Spanish] as Si Mohand [bin ‘Abd al-Karīm] has proposed." These reports were passed on to Berenguer in Tetuan but he did not believe them and told Silvestre so. However, he had already been informed on 10 June that Rifī forces were building up around Tizzi ‘Azzā.

In these circumstances, ‘Abd al-Mal‘ik, always ready to seize the moment to extend his power, started to organise his own harka in his old base in the Marnīṣa and Banū Walīd in the Sinhāja. In the process, he came to an agreement with Sīdī Ḫāmīdū to cooperate with him.

Superficially, however, everything appeared quiet. There were no armed attacks on the Spanish. But negotiations between the tribes lying behind the Spanish lines and the Banū Waryaghal continued. The Banū Sa‘īd wrote asking the Waryaghalīs not to attack the pro-Spanish harka made up of members of their tribe because the Banū Sa‘īd had been forced into joining it. They promised that at the first opportunity the Banū Sa‘īd would rise against the Spanish. This letter was neither signed nor sealed but the Spanish had information that it was probably sent by three of the main anti-Spanish leaders in the Banū Sa‘īd—Qaddur bin ‘Amār, ‘Allāl al-Qaddur Buftīlā, and ‘Allāl bin al-Ḥājj al-Mārinī, all of whom were

1 Ibid., information of Agente secreto No. 1, 11 June 1921.
2 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 44.
3 Ibid.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Correspondencia, Shaykh Ḫaddū al-Shalḥī and Shaykh Muḥammad b. Ḫaddū Tafālsī (of Tafarsit) to Cor. Gestoso, received 13 June 1921.
to play a major rôle in the months that followed.  

The ḫarka continued to grow. On 14 June 1921, Ḥamīdu, the leader of the Marnīsa, ally of 'Abd al-Mālik, and a man who was noted then, and especially later, for his personal opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, arrived to join it, allegedly with over 600 men. The ḫarka now consisted of an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 men from the Banū: Waryaghal, Banū Tūzīn, Timsamān, Banū 'Amārt, Targīst, Banū: Yiṭṭuft, Banū Bū Frāḥ, Banū Gamīl, and Buqquya who were camped with bin 'Abd al-Karīm at Amzawrū. On the other side of the river Amqarān, his uncle 'Abd al-Salām al-Khaṭṭābī led a second group of men from the Banū Waryaghal and the Timsamān. On 18 June they were reinforced by men from the Mastāsa, Banū Siddat, Banū Māṣdūl, Banū Bū Frāḥ, and Banū Gamīl tribes led by Ṣīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda and by others from the Zarqat, Banū 'Amārt, Marnīsa and Targīst tribes and the Timarzga subclan of the Banū Waryaghal, led by Ṣīdī Muḥammad al-Akhamlish.

So far there had been no fighting. The first two weeks of June, after Abarrān, had been spent gathering forces and strengthening the coalition in the Rif and ensuring the support of the tribes behind the Spanish lines. This endeavour had been remarkably successful. For the first time, all of the main leaders of the Rif, bin 'Abd al-Karīm, Ṣīdī Ḥamīdu and al-Akhamlish, who might be expected to support bin 'Abd al-Karīm because of past contacts and relationships

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1 SHK Melilla, Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, Ḥaddu 'All of Banū Tamart (Banū Sa‘īd), 14 June 1921.
2 Ibid., Muḥammad Uld 'Allāl Miḥand, 14 June 1921.
4 Ibid., Ṣīdī Muḥammad Zawāl, Banū Tūzīn, 18 June 1921.
with him, and even 'Amar Ḫamīdu of the Marnīṣa, who was by no means committed to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, had been swept together into one ḥarka. But the political action could not go on indefinitely, for some military action had to be taken.

A Moment's Fighting

The calm was briefly broken on 15 June 1921. For some time the Spanish had been sending 50 men each day to the peak of Sīdī Ibrāhīm which overlooked the ḥarka's base at Amzawrū, withdrawing them at nightfall. This was done regularly and without trouble, so the Spanish may have grown careless. On 15 June, however, the Spanish position at Sīdī Ibrāhīm was attacked. The Rīfī forces were led by the Qā'id 'Abd al-Salām bin al-Ḥājj Muḥammad of the Aith Bū 'Ayyāsh who was to become the first Minister of War in bin 'Abd al-Karīm's government. The Spanish were ambushed and reinforcements were sent from Anwāl to relieve the position which they succeeded in doing. Nevertheless, there was considerable opposition from the Rīfīs who were themselves reinforced from Ajdīr, so Spanish losses were heavy.¹

After this brief action there was apparent peace again. A new attempt was made to open negotiations between the Spanish and bin 'Abd al-Karīm.² The intermediary in these contacts was Idrīs bin Sa'id al-Salāwī,³ a man who would later play an important part in the negotiations over the Spanish prisoners taken in the retreat from Anwāl. Idrīs bin Sa'id was a former classmate of bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the

2 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 49.
Qarawiyyin university of Fez. He had been working as a secretary in the office of the Spanish High Commissioner in Tetuan when Silvestre sent for him. He went with Antonio Cont, the representative of the Echevarría company in the Spanish zone, to Sidi Idris and from there sent a letter to bin 'Abd al-Karim asking him to allow Bu Muhammad Azargan, the RifI leader's brother-in-law, to go to see the Spanish. Azargan went, saw Idris b. Saïd, Cont and Coronel Morales of the O.C.T.A.I and was offered terms similar to those offered to al-Raisuli in the west: if bin 'Abd al-Karim would stop the resistance and allow the Spanish to occupy certain positions in the Rif, he would be allowed to administer the area himself under Spanish guidance. This offer was refused—in any case it is doubtful that bin 'Abd al-Karim could have carried out the conditions. He was leader of the Rifis because he offered leadership for the resistance, but any attempt to make peace with the Spanish would probably have led to his rejection.

News of the growing RifI strength and the recent defeat of the Spanish at Sidi Ibrâhim was now spreading behind the Spanish lines. On 21 June, anti-Spanish propaganda was reported in Bâtil in the Banû Bû Yaḥyâ. The Matâlis around 'Ain Zuhra, in the south of the Spanish zone, also agreed to join the movement when the moment came. Bin 'Abd al-Karim continued his preparations by protecting his rear to the west. He sent Sidi Ḥamîdu of Snâda to the Matîwa al-Bâhar to organise a ḥarka on the Wâdi Waringa, at Jibhâ.

1 Kenneth Brown, "Resistance et Nationalisme". in Colloque, p. 473.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Harkas, Información a Alto Comissario, 27 June 1921.
However, Sidi Hamidu was disappointed when he wrote to the eastern harka at the end of June 1921 asking for 50 men from each clan to help to garrison Jibha, for he was sent only ten from each.\(^1\)

Provided that the west was protected in some way, bin `Abd al-Karim was less worried. In fact, by sending Sidi Hamidu to Jibha, bin `Abd al-Karim was able to organise the main body of the harka and the central Rifi tribes without interference from the sharif although whether this was his intention is not clear. At any rate, he started to try to collect taxes in order to pay for the organisation of his police. On 30 June, it was announced in the market of Amzawru:

"If you are truly Muslims, hear us. To those present from the Beni Said, Beni Ulichak, M'talsa, Taferset, and Guelaia: if you join us we will be as one. We will defeat the Christians with your help or without it. Any member of the [Spanish] police who comes over to join us will be well received ..."\(^3\)

It was at last decided to build a customs post—with 100 Rifi makhzanis to man it—on the beach at Ajdir. They could now afford to do this for it was obvious that the harvest was plentiful. At the same time, bin `Abd al-Karim carried on with his attempts to maintain order. In the harka, a sharif from the Murabitin clan of the Banu Waryaghal was accused of killing another man from the Banu `Ali. Bin `Abd al-Karim found him guilty and had him shot.\(^4\)

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Confidencias Mayo, Muhammed b. Muhammed b. `Allush (Banu Bub Idhir, Timsaman), 30 June 1921.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de junio de 1921.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, Muhammed b. `Allush (Banu Bub Idhir, Timsaman), 30 June 1921.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de junio de 1921. Responsibilidades, p. 144.
At the beginning of July 1921, the movement spread wider. The Gaznaya, who were equally worried by the French threat from the direction of 'Ain Zuhra, announced in their markets that everyone should buy a gun and members of the tribe were sent to join the Rifī ḥarka in Azilāf. 1 A few days later, the Banū Waryaghal were sent yet another letter from the Banū Saʿīd (signed by Qaddur binʿAmar, Qāʾid 'Allāl Qaddur Butfīla, and 'Allāl bin al-Ṯājj al-Mārinī; who had all sent a similar letter in June), the Banū Walishak, and Bū Raḥayl of the Maṭālsa, reiterating their promise to rise when the Banū Waryaghal came to their territory. 2

In the Rif itself, there were more calls for people to join the ḥarka which were repeated on 4, 8, and 12 July. 3 Yet the Spanish were not unduly worried—their greatest estimate of the strength of the Rifī ḥarka was about 3,000 men at the beginning of July, 4 and this figure had fallen to an estimated 1,000 men a few days later. 5 On the other hand, there were, according to official records, 25,790 Spanish troops in the eastern zone alone, and it was felt that they could hold their own. 6 But these troops were scattered in larger or smaller garrisons right across the zone—17 posts in the Anwāl sector, 10 in the Dār Drīṣh, 5 in Bāṭil, 22 in Dār Kābdānī, 12 in Talāta (in the Qalʿaya) and so on. 7

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, 3 July 1921.
2 Ibid., information of Sīdi ʿIdīš Bū Tahar (al-Maṭālsa), 6 July 1921.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . primera quincena de julio de 1921.
4 Ibid.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, ʿĀbbās al-Bujdaynī (Banū Tūzin), 5 July 1921.
6 Payne, Politics, p. 166.
7 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 251.
8 July 1921, Berenguer reported to the War Ministry in Madrid that Melilla was adequately protected.¹

The apparent calm had returned and there were few Rif movements at the beginning of July. There were two reasons for this. Firstly bin 'Abd al-Karīm needed time to organise the Rif forces. By mid-July his "police" consisted of only 20 men forming a sort of bodyguard for bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself. They were paid 2.5 pts a day.²

The second factor was once again economic. The Rifis were unwilling to move until the harvest was completely gathered in and they were waiting for this to be done. A Spanish agent informed the military intelligence that the Rifis were planning to organise an "expedition" in the form of a dash across the Banū Sa‘īd and Banū Walishak into the lands of the Qal'aya once the harvest was over.³

All these preparations did not, of course, affect everyone. People still continued their traditional patterns of emigration from the Rif to Algeria or the Melilla area. Despite arrangements that had been made in the Rif and Qal'aya for a general rising, at the beginning of July 1921, a man from the Banū Sa‘īd wrote to his brother in Tetuan that the family would shortly leave for the east (that is, Algeria) or the Qal'aya even though the harvests in the Rif had been good.⁴ And these were not the only people who made

¹ Payne, Politics, p. 166.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... primera quincena de julio de 1921.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, Muḥand Tahar (Banū Bu Yaḥyā), 6 July 1921.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Cartas Arabes, al-Ṭālib Qaddur b. Muḥammad b. Qaddur and his brother to Mukhtār b. Qaddur b. al-Mukhtār al-Sa‘īdī al-Ramadānī, 27 Shawwal 1339/4 July 1921. This letter was taken off a Rifī arrested in the Tetuan zone in November 1921.
plans on the assumption that nothing would happen to halt the slow advance of the Spanish. At the end of June, a man from the Timsamān wrote to Coronel Morales and informed him that he had sent his family to the zawiya of al-Rabāṭ, and had built grain stores (matāmīr) to hold his grain while the Spanish advanced.¹

The End of the Calm

The apparent calm in the eastern zone finally broke at the end of the second week of July 1921. With the harvest gathered, the ḡarka leaders decided that the Spanish position on Jabal Igharibān should be taken, and letters were sent to the interior of the Rif asking for more men. The Rifī guard near Tīzzī 'Azzā was strengthened and preparations were made to cut the Spanish supply route between Sīdī Idrīs and Anwāl. On 16 July, supply columns to Igharibān were cut off, and a column from Anwāl was unable to break through to the position.³ That evening, bonfires were lit in the Timsamān to attract more people to the ḡarka in Amāzawrū.⁴ A supply column did succeed in fighting its way through to Igharibān, but those were the last supplies that Igharibān received.⁵ However, despite the growing difficulty, Silvestre assured Berenguer on 17 July that he would soon be able to counterattack.⁶

² SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Mayo, al-Ḥājj Ḥaddu al-Bū 'Azzā, 14 July 1921.
³ Payne, Politics, p. 166.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria ... segunda quincena de julio de 1921.
⁵ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 243.
⁶ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 69.
MAP VI:1 TO ILLUSTRATE SPANISH RETREAT July - August 1921 occupation at end of August

stippled area shows extent of Spanish occupation at end of August
On 18 July, the Rifī ḥarka attacked the Spanish position at Tizzī 'Azzā, and its garrison fled to Anwāl. On 18 July, the Rifī ḥarka attacked the Spanish position at Tizzī 'Azzā, and its garrison fled to Anwāl.1

Igharībān was still in contact with the main Spanish base by heliograph, but on 19 and 20 July, Spanish troops again failed to break through.2 Once again bin 'Abd al-Karīm sent a message to the Moroccans in the Spanish forces asking them to come over and join the Rifī ḥarka.3 On 20 July, the water supply in Igharībān ran out. That evening Silvestre left Melilla for Anwāl to take command in person. He arrived the next day when a final attempt to break through to Igharībān was made, an attempt which like the others failed. Silvestre instructed Benítez, who was in charge at Igharībān, to withdraw. Of the 300 soldiers in the garrison, only a few survived the retreat.4

On the night of 21 July 1921, there were 4,000 troops in Anwāl, but the Rifīs were firing down into the camp from the surrounding hills. The Spanish officers advised Silvestre to order a retreat.5 On the morning of 22 July he did this and telegraphed to Berenguer:

"After consulting the officers, and with the arrival of numerous enemy columns, which are growing all the time, and with only 100 cartridges for each man, I have ordered a retreat on Izummar and Ben Tīb, and will do all in my power to arrive there."6

On the same morning, 22 July, General Navarro, the second-in-command of the Melilla zone, telegraphed Berenguer from

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1 SHM Melilla, Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria. .. segunda quincena de julio de 1921.
2 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 243.
5 Ibid., p. 167.
6 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 80.
Dār Drīūsh that the Miḫār and Tafarsit positions could not be held either.\(^1\)

The retreat rapidly developed into a rout, although the details are unclear. Even the fate of Silvestre is uncertain. Common opinion is that he committed suicide at Anwāl.\(^2\) However, both the Moroccan accounts deny this. According to Skīraj, Silvestre was killed while trying to reach Dār Drīūsh in a car.\(^3\) Al-Bū ‘Ayyāshī, on the other hand, states that he was shot in the shade of an olive tree during the retreat.\(^4\) In any event, his body was never found.

The attack on the retreating Spanish forces spread across the eastern zone. Again the details are unclear. Only the dates of the attacks on the various Spanish positions are certain. Those who managed to reach Dār Drīūsh on 22 July rested for a few hours and then they and the garrison there moved on towards Bāṭīl.\(^5\) On the way they were attacked by the local people, including the women, who joined in, according to Skīraj "because of what the Spanish soldiers used to do."\(^6\)

Although Qabdānī had been under attack since 23 July,\(^8\) on 25 July Navarro tried to make a stand along a front that included that position, Kandūssī, Dār Drīūsh and Sūq al-Thalāthā' of Banū Bū Bakar but the lack of discipline of

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1 Ibid., p. 87.
2 Ibid., p. 80, Payne, Politics, p. 167.
3 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 40.
5 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 84.
7 Ibid.
8 SHM Mellila, Confidencias Julio, Resumen de Confidencias, 26 July 1921 (henceforth "Res. de Conf."),
the retreating troops made this impossible.¹ Navarro stayed in Dar Drifush until 29 July, cut off from the command in Melilla,² while the eastern zone was falling apart around him. On 24 July the Kabdana tribe, east of Melilla, rose and the Office at Zaiû was burned. Civilians started to leave al-Nazûr on the same day to seek safety in Melilla.

Berenguer, who had by this time arrived in the eastern zone, tried to reassure the population of Melilla by having the band of the Spanish Foreign Legion march through the city.³ The Legion had arrived on 24 July from the western zone.⁴ Nevertheless, the rout went on outside the city. On 25 July, the Policía Indígena in the Banû Bû Gafar tribe of the Qal'aya rebelled and the Moroccan sergeant at Sammar handed over their arms to the local people so that they could attack the Spanish.⁵ The following day, 4 Spanish Officers and 20 soldiers were being held prisoner in the Banû Bû Gafar.⁶

On 26 July, the Spanish reported: "From Nador to Segangan people are spending their time in looting, and out of fear of our reprisals they have sought help from the Rifis and asked them to send a harka."⁷ At this point, the rising in the Qal'aya seems to have been an opportunistic attack on the Spanish retreat. In no way was the relatively well trained and organised harka of bin 'Abd al-Karîm responsible. The harka was still in the eastern Rif with the prisoners

¹ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 249.
² Ibid., p. 250.
³ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 91.
⁴ Payne, Politics, p. 168.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Julio, Res. de Conf. 25 July 1921.
⁶ Ibid., O.C.A.I. Nota, 26 July 1925.
⁷ Ibid., Res. de Conf., 26 July 1921.
they had taken in Anwāl. Other prisoners from the garrison at Kabdānī were held in the Banū Sa‘īd by Qaddur bin ‘Amar.1

On 27 July, the Spanish positions in Bāṭīl, Mūlāy Karkar, and Tistutīn were still being defended, although there was heavy pressure on all of them.2 The ḥarka around Tistutīn was growing and it now included a few people from the Banū Waryaghal. They sent a letter to the leaders of the Banū Shikār, whose qa‘īd, ‘Abd al-Qādir bin al-Ḥājj Ṭayyīb (himself from the Banū Bū Gafār), was holding the tribe loyal to Spain, telling them that the hour for jihād had arrived. The enemy were described not as Spaniards, but as Christians, and the Rifīs declared that their aim was to take Melilla.3

Although there were men from the Banū Waryaghal in the maḥalla around Tistutīn, they were not expected to enter the Qal’āya proper before the end of the month.4 Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm already had more immediate worries—the large number of Spanish prisoners scattered across the eastern zone. According to the representative that Qaddur bin ‘Amar sent to the Spanish, he alone had 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 4 captains, and 5 other officers in his house in the Banū Sa‘īd on 28 July. Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Karīm demanded that they should be turned over to him, but Qaddur bin ‘Amar was most unwilling to do this, as he wanted to deal directly with the Spanish himself.5

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1 Ibid., Muḥammad Amziyān al-Waryāshi, 27 July 1921.
2 Ibid., Res. de Conf., 27 July 1921.
3 Ibid., Maḥalla of Tistutīn to Banū Shikār, received 27 July 1921. See Appendix, Document 1.
5 Ibid., Muḥ Ḥaddu (Banū Sa‘īd), 28 July 1921.
they could negotiate with the Spanish themselves and so weaken his overall control. This is not to say that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was unconcerned about the prisoners' safety, for when the garrison at Sūq al-Thalāthā' of the Banū Bū Bakar in the al-Maţālsa was overrun, and several members of the Policía Indígena who were of little value as hostages for ransom were shot when they surrendered, bin 'Abd al-Karīm punished those responsible.¹

Although the Policía Indígena at Sūq al-Thalāthā had remained loyal to the Spanish, other members of the P.I. and the Fuerzas Regulares joined the Rifīs. On 27 July an officer of the second class, named Maţjūb, took 30 men with him when he deserted to join the insurgents in the Qa‘āya on 27 July.² In the area around al-Naţūr, a former officer in the Fuerzas Regulares named "al-Ghūl" became one of the principal anti-Spanish leaders.³ And at "Yast al-Basha" Moroccan troops killed their officers and joined the insurgents.⁴

The Siege of Jabal 'Arrāwīt

On 29 July, Navarro decided to retreat from Dār Drīush and retired to Jabal 'Arrāwīt. There he regained contact with Melilla through Silwān. But his troops were exhausted and had lost much of their armament. He informed Berenguer that he would be unable to evacuate his men to al-Naţūr and Melilla. In 'Arrāwīt he was besieged.⁵

¹ Ibid., 'All b. al-Vajj (Sgt. in a LAM, 28 July 1921.
² Ibid., Res. de Conf., 27 July 1921.
³ Ibid., 'Abd al-Salam, Waddu 'Amarl, 28 July 1921.
⁴ Woolman, op. cit., p. 92.
⁵ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 250.
base itself there were no medical supplies and between 29 July and 9 August, when 'Arrāwīt fell to the Rifis, 167 men died of gangrene alone.\(^1\) Although the Spanish still held the garrisons at Silwān and al-NAẓūr, reinforcements could not be sent through to relieve Jabal 'Arrāwīt because the insurgents controlled the countryside. On 31 July, Berenguer sent a message to Navarro by heliograph: "Tribal rising is general. Impossible to organise relief column with forces arrived to date."\(^2\)

Despite this "general rising" the Rifis were unsure of themselves. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was still trying to get as much help as he could to strengthen his forces. He was reported to be in contact with 'Abd al-Mālik as well as with Sīdī Yamīdu of Snāda, both of whom he had asked for men.\(^3\) He also wrote to the sharīfs of Saghanghan asking them to organise mahāllas made up of 200 men from each of the clans of the Qal'āya tribes and he would then send arms and ammunition.\(^4\) It is significant that he did not offer to send men, for despite rumours in the Qal'āya that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was on his way with a huge ḥarka,\(^5\) by the end of July there were still no Rifis in the Qal'āya proper. In fact, the Rifis showed themselves most unwilling to provide men for the eastern tribes. Bin 'Abd al Karīm told some of the leaders of the Qal'āya that if he were to send them a ḥarka they would have to send their families into the "safety of the

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\(^1\) Woolman, op. cit., p. 94.
\(^2\) Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 250.
\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Julio, Antonio Sánchez, a Spanish interpreter who escaped from the Rifis 29 July 1921.
\(^4\) Ibid., Res. de Conf., 29 July 1921.
\(^5\) Ibid.
Rif, or in other words, to provide hostages.

The ḥarka also sent word to other Qal'ayis that the Rifis were fighting to protect their lands, which ended at Jabal Mawrū in the Banū Sa'īd and they would only help the Qal'ayis under the same conditions—that they sent hostages to the Rif. ²

By 31 July, the people in the Qal'aya were worried about the possibility of Spanish reprisals in the absence of Rif support. At a meeting in the market of 'Ain Bin Raḥāl, representatives of some clans of the Qal'aya tribes and parts of the Awlād Siṭṭūt and the Kabdāna agreed not to form a ḥarka for this reason. ³ Nevertheless, the pressure on the Spanish was still heavy. The Banū Bū Gafār, Banū Bū Sidal, and Banū Bū Ifrūr were totally opposed to the Spanish. The only tribe that could certainly be relied upon was the Banū Shikār under 'Abd al-Qādir bin al-Ḥājj Ṭayyib. Pressure was growing among the rest of the Qal'aya to take Melilla itself. ⁴ 'Abd al-Karīm tried his best to prevent this, and sent letters to the Qal'aya telling people not to attack the city because the presence of foreign consuls there might create problems that would do no service to their cause. ⁵ Later, bin 'Abd al-Karīm told Roger-Mathieu that there was another reason for his attempt to stop the city being taken:

"My organisation was still embryonic. Prudence was necessary." ⁶

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¹ Ibid., Res. de Conf., 30 July 1921 and Responsibilidades, p. 153 quoting the information of a Spanish officer who escaped from the Banū Bū Gafār.

² SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Julio, information of Sh Mubammad b. al-ʿUṣayn al-ʿAnjari, 30 July 1921.

³ Responsibilidades, p. 154.

⁴ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 95.

⁵ Responsibilidades, p. 153.

⁶ Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., p. 104.
By this he seems to have meant that he was not confident either that the Qal'ayīs would not run amok in the city and turn the victory into "primitive savagery", in al-Bū 'Ayyāshī's phrase, or that they would in fact be victorious. Melilla was not Anwāl or 'Arrāwīt. It was well fortified and by 1 August 1921, Berenguer had managed to assemble 14,000 men in Melilla, even though many were not regular troops. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was worried that if they did attempt an attack, the Qal'ayīs might be slaughtered. So, whether the attack failed or succeeded, its results would have been most unhelpful to bin 'Abd al-Karīm and the Rifī movement.

Both the possible reasons for the restraints that bin 'Abd al-Karīm put on the attack on Melilla were themselves significant of something else. The people involved at this point in the struggle in the Qal'aya were not the relatively organised Rifīs, but Qal'ayīs who had risen in sympathy or out of opportunism and who now looked to bin 'Abd al-Karīm for his support but not for his rule. There were certainly men from the Rif—from the Banū Sa'id and Banū Walishak—near Nazūr under 'Allāl Miḥand of the Banū Tūzīn. However, according to Spanish informants, most of the people there were more interested in "robbery and piracy," for of the 1,500 people in the town only 400 were properly armed and disciplined. And few if any of them were from the Banū Waryaghal. Even Jabal 'Arrāwīt was surrounded by a ḥarka whose 3,000 members came from the Banū Sa'id,

4 SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Información Agosto, 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Fannāsī, 1 Aug. 1921.
Banū Walishak, and Banū Tūzīn.¹ Nowhere in the Qal'aya were groups from the Banū Waryaghal reported. The other tribes were accordingly none too impressed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm's assumption of control. Men from the Banū Walishak, Banū Sa'īd and Banū Tūzīn refused to hand over the arms they had captured from the Spanish, despite bin 'Abd al-Karīm's instructions to do so. They announced that "the Beni Uriaguel do not form a nation but are a tribe like all the others, and for this reason they [i.e., the Banū Sa'īd, etc.] do not have to hand over what fate has placed in their hands."²

People also refused to accept the paper money that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was trying to circulate, stamped with his seal "for they say that they do not recognise in him any constituted authority."³

The Rifis Try to Take Control

Naẓūr was evacuated by train on 2 August and on 3 August 1921, Silwān fell, having run out of water. Many of the Spanish prisoners were then killed.⁴ On the same day, a large force of Rifis, estimated at 800 strong, arrived at Naẓūr. There were rumours that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was among them, but this turned out to be false. However, there was an immediate attempt to restore order. It was announced that everyone should hand in his surplus arms to the dār al-makhzan housed in the former church, to be used to form a proper

¹ Ibid., Res. de Conf., 1 Aug. 1921.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Muḥammad b. Maimūn (Banī Shikār), 3 Aug. 1921.
³ Ibid., Shaykh Sh Sa'īd al-Halaffī, 3 Aug. 1921.
⁴ Ibid., Rafael Sequejo Sastre (of the Regulares), 4 Aug. 1921.
Photograph VI: 2

Spanish troops being evacuated from Nazar by train, 2 August 1921

mahalla. This order was not well received. There were considerable differences of opinion about what should be done with the arms. The Banū Sidal agreed that all the arms should be gathered up, while the Mazūja and Banū Bū Ifrūr wanted a general share out. In the end, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's views prevailed. He wrote to the leaders of all the tribes that they should hand over all the booty "so as to set up a proper government." The Banū Walishak agreed to hand over a part of their arms and it was expected that other tribes would do likewise.

On 4 August some men from the Banū Waryaghal and Buqquya did arrive at Naẓūr. Estimates of their number varied between 200 and 600. They were led by Sī Muḥammad b. 'Alī: "Bū Laḥya" of the Banū Tūzin, whom bin 'Abd al-Karīm had appointed his khalīfa in Naẓūr. The following day it was announced in the Naẓūr market that he was bin 'Abd al-Karīm's personal representative and was to be obeyed. He seems to have established control fairly rapidly. By 6 August everyone in al-Naẓūr had handed in his rifle. In an effort to protect prisoners, it was announced that anyone who killed a prisoner would himself be executed. Al-Naẓūr itself was the main centre for prisoners--23 survivors of Silwān were taken there--but they were also scattered all over the eastern zone. One lieutenant was reported to be held in

Tafarsit, another in Mazazût near Silwân, and another, and a sergeant, in the Kabdâna. With these prisoners isolated from the main centres of command and held in a number of places, it was difficult to prevent local leaders from negotiating with the Spanish for themselves. Bin Shillâl, the man who had allegedly been responsible for the massacre of the Spanish at Silwân, now attempted to do just this, and told Melilla that he would try to get the prisoners handed over.¹

Meanwhile Navarro was cut off in Jabal Arrâwît. On 6 August 1921, Berenguer attempted to make contact with the harka besieging the position, using bin Shillâl as an intermediary.² Bin Shillâl had told a Spanish agent, SI 'Alî al-Ḥiḥî, that he was in contact with bin 'Abd al-Karîm's agent and with leaders of the Mazûja and Banû Bû İfrîr, that they had all spoken to Navarro on 6 August, but that everything had to be finally decided in Naẓûr.³ On 7 August Idrîs bin Sa'îd who had been sent by the Spanish to organise the negotiations for the prisoners, sent a message to Berenguer to say that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was sending a mission to the 'Arrâwît harka, but was not confident that it could do anything to negotiate a withdrawal.⁴

The difficulty was that the 1,200 Spanish troops who had been surrounded in Jabal 'Arrâwît were besieged by 5,000 Moroccans of whom only 900 were Rîfîs, mainly Banû Waryaghîls.⁵ Bin 'Abd al-Karîm himself was still in the

¹ Ibid., SI 'Alî al-Ḥiḥî.
² Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 100
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, SI 'Alî al-Ḥiḥî, 8 Aug. 1921.
⁴ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 100.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Muḥammad b. 'Amar b. Ṭayyīb, 8 Aug. 1921.
Banî Sa'id, at the market of Bû Irmâna near Jabal Mawrû, with 1,000 men from the Banû Tûzîn, Banû Walishak, Buqqûya, Timsamân, Banû Sa'id and the Banû Waryaghal itself. He still had problems of control over the Qal'aya who wanted to attack Melilla and on 4 August fined the Banû Bû Gafâr for firing on the Spanish positions when he had forbidden it.¹ So it was unlikely, as the people surrounding 'Arrâwît were not completely under his control, and since he was not there personally, that he could do much. However, his representative, Bû Lahya did try and went with bin Shillâl to negotiate with the harka in an effort to prevent a bloodbath but apparently found that there was a strong feeling in favour of taking revenge on the Spanish for local casualties.²

Nevertheless, on 9 August, b. Shillâl, Bû Lahya and a SI. 'Abdallah (the last two both representing bin 'Abd al-Karîm) and 'Abd al-Qâdir bin al-Ŷâjj Tayyib, the Spanish qâ'id of the Banû Shikár negotiated the surrender of Jabal 'Arrâwît. The Spanish were to hand over their guns and they would be allowed to return to Melilla.³ What happened then is unclear. Al-Bû 'Ayyâshi says that someone let off a rifle accidentally, the Moroccans thought that the Spanish were trying to trick them and started to attack their prisoners.⁴ Martínez de Campos, providing the official Spanish version, says that Navarro and the senior officers were led away to safety and the rest were slaughtered.⁵ Certainly, for

¹ Ibid., Muḥammad b. Mimûn al-Saghawi (Banû Shikár), 9 Aug. 1921.
² Ibid., SI. 'Allâl Tahar SI Muḥand (Banû Shikár), 10 Aug. 1921.
³ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 250.
whatever reason, a massacre occurred. Al-Bū ‘Ayyāshī says that of the 1,200 men in ‘Arrāwīt only 400 were taken to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. However, once they had arrived, a Spanish agent reported two days later, they were well treated.

Other prisoners were still scattered across the eastern zone. Qaddur bin ‘Amar of the Banū Sa‘īd was reported to have 86 of them, including 18 officers. He and bin ‘Abd al-Karīm fell out over these prisoners for bin ‘Abd al-Karīm wanted all the prisoners brought together and Qaddur refused. They eventually stopped speaking to each other. This situation went on for some days—on 11 August a Spanish agent reported that for the third time bin ‘Abd al-Karīm had refused to speak to Qaddur in the Bū Irmāna market. However, the situation was eventually resolved when on 14 August, Qaddur bin ‘Amar agreed to hand over his prisoners to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, and they were sent back to the Rif where there were already 300 prisoners housed at Anwāl. A considerable amount was at stake over these prisoners for they were useful bargaining counters. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm needed them to reinforce his authority, using the prisoners to wring concessions from the Spanish. One of the principal worries among the Rifis and Qal‘ayīs was the fate of members of their families who were held as prisoners by the Spanish in Melilla and Ceuta. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm tried to secure their release and fixed a rate of exchange of 5 Moroccan prisoners against each full

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3 Ibid., Jacob Zarashi (a Melillan Jew), 12 Aug. 1921.
4 Ibid., Muḥammad bin Mimūn al-Saghawi, 11 Aug. 1921.
6 Ibid., Jacob Zarashi, 12 Aug. 1921.
colonel, 3 for each lieutenant-colonel, 2 for each major and one for each other officer and soldier.  \(^1\)

On the other hand, the officers who were in the hands of bin Shillāl gave him a remarkable opportunity to deal with the Spanish on his own account. He had been asked by bin 'Abd al-Karīm to house Navarro and eight other senior officers until they were sent for. \(^2\) Meanwhile, bin Shillāl entered into negotiations with the Spanish, telling them that it would be possible to collect the officers from his house which was near the sea. \(^3\) In order to distract attention from his plans, he offered to marry Bū Lāḥya, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's commander in the area, to his widowed daughter—whose previous husband had been Bū Ḫimāra. \(^4\) (Bin Shillāl, in 1909, had led Bū Ḫimāra's cavalry in their abortive attack on the central Rif.) \(^5\)

However, in mid-August, bin 'Abd al-Karīm intercepted a letter from bin Shillāl to the Spanish, proposing that they should evacuate the officers and himself from the sea-lake of Sabkha Bū Aghrag near Melilla (known to the Spanish as the Mar Chica). He ordered all the officers to be brought at once to Anwāl \(^6\) and sent Shaykh Yazīd b. al-Ŷājj Ūammū (of the Banū 'Alī clan of the Banū Maryaghahal) to ensure that this was done. \(^7\) Shaykh Yazīd later became an important

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\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid., Muḥ al-Ma‘allim, 14 Aug. 1921.
\(^3\) Skīraj, op. cit., p. 44.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 45.
\(^5\) Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 366. For Bū Ḫimāra see above, p. 135, n. 3.
\(^6\) SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, 'Abd al-Qādir b. 'Allāl, 26 Aug. 1921.
\(^7\) Skīraj, op. cit., p. 45.
member of bin 'Abd al-Karîm's government. ¹

The Qal'ayîs Ask for Rîfî Help

After the fall of 'Arrâwît, the Qal'ayîs' demands for military help—though not control—grew stronger. On 17 August 1921 the Banû Bû Gafîr were at last promised Rîfî contingents, and they were led to believe that these forces would consist of at least 200 men from each clan of each Rîfî tribe. This would have been a great help to the mere 200 people who were garrisoned at Sîdi Misa'ûd by day, a figure that fell to 50 by night, whose aim was to hold the frontier between their tribe and that of the Spanish controlled Banû Shikâr. ²

On 18 August there were reported to be 1,000 men in the hårka at Naẓûr, of whom 600 were Rîfîs, and bin 'Abd al-Karîm was reported to be about to send 25,000 more. ³ The wild exaggeration of the number of troops on the way gives a clue to the state of mind of the Qal'ayîs, particularly the belief that the Rîfîs could be relied upon to provide them with all the forces necessary for the ultimate victory. The reality was less dramatic. On 17 August, Sîdi Ahmâd al-Akhamlîsh from Targîst arrived with 550 men in the Banû Bû Gafîr, his aim being to attack the "Christian" tribe of the Banû Shikâr. ⁴

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm was in fact very wary of committing himself too far in the Qal'aya. A deputation of

¹ Hart, Aîth Waryaghîr, p. 378.
² SHM Melilla, Leg. 18, Información Agosto, 'Amar Ŧâddu "Komboa" (sic) (Banû Shikîr), 17 Aug. 1921.
³ Ibid., ‘Allâl Tahâr (Banû Shikîr), 18 Aug. 1921.
⁴ Ibid.
eleven men from the area was sent to him in Bu Irmâna, in the Banû Sa‘îd, taking presents and an appeal to send troops. He returned the gift, saying he had no authority in the Qal'aya, but gave them each a gift of 100 pts, presumably to sweeten the blow. He told them that he had sent representatives to their tribes but their advice had been ignored. It was therefore up to the Qal'ayîs themselves to decide what to do about the Spanish, although he added that he was quite capable of dealing with the Spanish if they came near the Rif.  

This information was given to a large meeting of the Banû Bu Ifrûr, Awlād Siţût and other Qal'ayî tribes at a meeting on 17 August at Silwan. Having heard it, the meeting proceeded to discuss what to do with the prisoners they still held. They agreed on a ransom of 50,000 pts, the release of all the Moroccan prisoners, and a promise that the Spanish troops would stay in Melilla, in return for their release. One of the more realistic leaders, Shaykh Muḥammad Hammû al-Ḥādî of the Banû Bu Ifrûr commented that the Spanish would never accept these terms, and was then himself attacked as a pro-Spanish agent. Later that afternoon he was killed by a former officer in the Spanish Regulares, Muḥammad Bûhût, who later became an important commander in the Rifî regular army.

As a result of this killing the Banû Bu Ifrûr left the al-Naẓûr ħarka, and most of them went home. Fighting was also reported in the Banû Sidal, though the cause is not certain. Clearly the unity of the Qal'ayîs was breaking up.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
On 20 August a guard was posted on the Wednesday Market at Rastingha at the southern end of the Mar Chica in an effort to prevent the Spanish from corresponding with the by now largely pro-Spanish Kabdānā tribe.¹ Then, only a few days after his arrival, Sī Aḥmad al-Akhamliṣh said he would go home again unless the Banū Bū Gafār and Banū Sidāl tribes obeyed him.²

Not surprisingly, the Rifīs were unwilling to trust in their own safety if they came to the area. They were worried that the Qal‘ayis might actually betray them and said so several times.³ Nevertheless, there were repeated claims in the Qal‘aya that large forces were on their way from the Rif, their size varying between 3,000 and 25,000.⁴ Forces from the Rif did eventually arrive, though in nothing like the numbers expected. At most 300 Rifīs arrived at Naẓūr on 25 August,⁵ but the al-Naẓūr harka was still mainly made up of local people: an estimated 600 from the Qal‘aya and a further 100 from those Banū Bū Yahyā who had remained.⁶ Much of the local organisation, although theoretically the responsibility of Bū Lahyā and of Shaykh al-Yazīd, who had stayed behind after the bin Shillāl affair,⁷ was in fact under local control. Ismā‘īl Wuld al-Shaddī (of the Mazūja) was in charge of the distribution of guard posts for example.⁸

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¹ Ibid., unsigned report, 20 Aug. 1921.
² Ibid., ‘Amar Ṣaddū (Banū Shikār), 21 Aug. 1921.
³ E.g.; ibid., Muḥammad b. al-Ma‘allīm, 20 Aug. 1921.
⁷ Skīrāj, op. cit., p. 45.
⁸ SHM Melilla: Leg. 18, Información Agosto Capt. 2a. Mfa, 27 Aug. 1921. It will be remembered that Wuld al-Shaddī was one of the members of the pro-German Group in 1918. Se above, p. 100.
But the Qal'ayîs were in no position to undertake a serious defence against the Spanish. In the first place bin 'Abd al-Karîm had once again told them that he was not going to send a ḥarka to the Qal'aya, although he would not prevent individuals from going there. ¹ He went further than this, for when the Banû Bû Gafâr, worried about the Spanish troops that were now grouping in Melilla, asked for asylum in the Rif, he refused it and told them it was their duty to defend their own lands. ² Others from the Banû Bû Yaḥyâî, similarly concerned about Spanish reprisals went to the French posts on the border between the two zones and asked them to take over the tribes in the Spanish zone. The French refused, saying that international treaties forbade it. ³

By the end of the month, there were relatively few Rifî forces in the Qal'aya and those that were there were carrying out specific tasks. However, on 28 August an estimated 400 Rifîs arrived in Naẓûr, partly to escort the prisoners back to the Rif ⁴ and partly in response to a final appeal from the notables of the Qal'aya and al-Maṭâlsa who had visited bin 'Abd al-Karîm in the Tuesday market of the Banû 'Ayyâš in the Banû Waryaghâl. They had asked for reinforcements again and this time bin 'Abd al-Karîm agreed. As commander of the ḥarka he sent his old opponent Qâdî Śî Muḥammad bin Fuît (who had joined bin 'Abd al-Karîm at the very end of May 1921) ⁵ whom he ordered to instal himself at Jabal Tâb

¹ Ibid., Muḥammad al-Ma‘allîm, 28 Aug. 1921.
³ Ibid., al-Shârif al-Nâṣîrî, 28 Aug. 1921.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 19, Memorias Alhucemas, Memoria . . . Segunda quincena de mayo de 1921.
al-Ḥājj in the Banū Sīdal so that he would "administer justice, be the tribes' representatives in all things, listen to complaints, recruit police, solve disputes with other tribes, and watch [the Spanish] movements." Clearly he was to be seen as the representative of a makhzan in the Qal'aya.

Meanwhile, the Spanish were massing troops in Melilla. By the end of August they had 36,000 men in the city, including 25 battalions of the Spanish army, 2 banderas (companies) of the Foreign Legion, 2 tabores (battalions) of the (Moroccan) Regulares from Ceuta, 5 regiments of cavalry and 17 companies of engineers. In addition they still held a small area of the hinterland of Melilla, stretching down the Sabkha Bū Aghrag (Mar Chica) as far as Atalayon and westwards into Jabal Gūrūgū to their main position in the Banū Shikār, at Sūq al-Āḥad. They did not hold the rest of the Banū Shikār but, under the leadership of 'Abd al-Qādir bin al-Ḥājj Ṭayyib, it was still neutral. However, although the Banū Shikār were under some pressure to join the resistance, by the end of the month they were able to tell the rebels that unless something was achieved in three days they would definitely join the Spanish.

The Economic and Social Effects of the Rising on the Qal'aya

Despite the good harvests in the Rif during the summer of 1921, the economic effects of the victories over the Spanish were not good, particularly in the Qal'aya. In

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Informaciones Alhucemas, Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Mujāhid and others, 30 Aug. 1921.
2 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 108.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Muḥammad Amziyyān al-Waryāšī, 21 Aug. 1921.
the first place the collapse of the mining industry at Jabal Widsān and other places in the Banū Bū Ifrūr ended the possibilities of employment there after the first attacks on the Wiksān mines on 24 July.\(^1\) The effects on the mining industry were most of all felt by the Spanish mining companies, of course, and the exports of iron and lead through Melilla which had in general shown a steady increase since 1914 were reduced from 410,060,345 kilos of iron and 687,000 kilos of lead in 1920 to 83,563,350 kilos of iron and 92,805 kilos of lead in 1921.\(^2\) Clearly the effects on employment were serious as well, although there are no figures to show its extent.

But there were still more serious effects of the fighting, for prices were forced up, partly due to the lack of supplies from Spain that were normally imported through Melilla. On 6 August, in the market in Naẓūr, which because of the presence of the ḥarka was now held daily, sugar was sold at 4.5 pts a kilo and salt at 2.5 pts a kilo, both apparently excessive prices. Oil was in short supply.\(^3\) On 10 August, oil was quoted at 5 pts a litre and the only sugar available was still being brought from Melilla. The Spanish agent who gave this information recommended that the Spanish should try to stop this smuggling.\(^4\) They evidently tried to do so, for on 13 August it was reported that after they had closed down the commerce, sugar in the Farkhāna was costing

\(^1\) Ibid., Antonio Ruiz Cruz (Cuerpo de E.M. Regulares) 6 Aug. 1921.
\(^2\) Juan de España (pseudonym), La Actuación de España en Marruecos, apuntes de historia y estados sobre la política y situación actual del problema hispano-marrueco (Madrid, 1926), p. 207.
\(^3\) SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Capt. Justo Jiménez Ortoneda, 6 Aug. 1921.
\(^4\) Ibid., SI 'Allāl Tahar SI Muḥand (Banū Shikār), 10 Aug. 1921.
3.5 pts a kilo compared with 2.1 pts in the markets still held by the Spanish. The Farkhāna is a clan of the Mazūja tribe very close to Melilla and prices were higher further away. In the Rif itself, the Banū Waryaghal complained to bin 'Abd al-Karīm on 9 August of the price of sugar (5 pts a kilo), eggs (2 pts a hundred) and candles (1.5 pts a box). Economic difficulties were worsened by the restrictions placed on commerce by the anti-Spanish groups. At the beginning of August a customs post was set up between the Mazūja and the pro-Spanish Banū Shikār. The duty was fixed at 1 pt for each sheep, 5 pts for each head of cattle and 25 pts for each quintal of tobacco. At the end of the same month, with the arrival of Qādī Muḥammad bin Fuīt at Jabal Tāb al-Ḥājj, another customs post was established there.

The greatest effect of the victories over the Spanish was a psychological one. During August, with the Islamic year 1339 drawing to its close, a general feeling spread through the Qal'āya that an even more eventful year was about to begin. On 16 August the Spanish were informed that a prophecy of doom was being spread in the Farkhāna clan of the Mazūja:

"In the land of the Guelaya there will unfold events of such magnitude that they will lead to the extermination of its inhabitants. Some will be forced to flee to far-away lands, others will be drowned and a third part will also perish by violent means. The forests and villages will become fields of flames and all will be destroyed so that no vestige will remain of what existed. The River Silwān will overflow...

1 Ibid., comentario general, 13 Aug. 1921.
2 Ibid., Sultan, 9 Aug. 1921.
3 Ibid., Muḥammad al-Ma'allim, 8 Aug. 1921.
5 The new year 1340 began on 4 Sept. 1921.
with the blood of the Guelayas .. . .^1

This catastrophe, according to the prophecy, would come about because a new market would be set up in which a Muslim would strike a Christian and the slaughter would begin. The prophecy was widely believed and people began to spend only a short time in the markets. 2

The impression made by the slaughter clearly went deep. In the prevailing religious ferment of the Qal'aya, where just before the rising the 'Alawîyya sect had begun a campaign to make many converts, this impression took a religious and mystical form. By the end of August the prophecy had spread to many of the other markets of the Qal'aya, and two informants (one of them a woman) reported it on the same day, 29 August. 3 But if it was a religiously mystical impression that was made in the Qal'aya, it was quite different in the west of the Spanish zone.

The Situation in the West

The month before Abarrân the Spanish had relieved Shāwin. Troops were prepared to move up the Wādī Lāw to remove the Akhmās forces besieging the city from their positions on Jabal Qal'â. 4 The Spanish sent one group up the river valley and another down from Dār 'Aqūba to meet it. The columns met on 1 May 1921, and the following day took Jabal Qal'â. 5 Then the Spanish brought as many troops as

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, SI 'Ali al-Ḥījī, 16 Aug. 1921.
2 Ibid.
4 FO 371/7066/W5260/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 29 April 1921.
5 Ibid., Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 3 May 1921; Berenguer, op. cit., p. 27.
MAPVI:2 To illustrate Spanish advance on Tazarut, 1921.

Map showing the Spanish advance on Tazarut with various labeled locations and the scale 1 cm to 5 km (1:500,000).
possible into Shawin itself and tried to extend as far as possible the area they occupied around the city. In the course of this they succeeded in taking one of the main Akhmās centres as Mishkrilla.¹

Once Shawin had been relieved, the Spanish turned their attention to al-Raisūli, who was encouraging resistance in the Ahl Sharīf, Banī Gurfit and other tribes in the western Jibāla from his base in the Banū 'Arūs.² On 10 May, operations against the Banū Gurfit began. Between 4,000 and 5,000 troops were involved and although they suffered heavy casualties they were relatively successful in taking large areas of the Banū Gurfit. But the nucleus of the opposition in the Banū 'Arūs, al-Raisūli's base, remained untouched.³

Berenguer was faced with a serious political problem. He was concerned than an invasion of the sanctuary of Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām might cause a general rising across the whole of northern Morocco.⁴ Nevertheless, stores were brought up for the beginning of an operation against the Banū 'Arūs that was scheduled to begin on 7 June. Then news of the retreat from Abarrān reached Tetuan and the operation was delayed.⁵

On 21 June, with all apparently quiet again in the Rif, Berenguer gave orders to begin. On 25 June, columns moved into the Banū Lait with the intention of advancing into the richest part of the Banū 'Arūs, the area from which

¹ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 223.
² Berenguer, op. cit., p. 30.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 51-52.
⁵ FO 371/7067/W6965/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 16 June 1921.
al-Raisüli received his supplies. On 27 June, Spanish forces took up position on the border between the two tribes. Meanwhile, Spanish attempts to win over al-Raisüli's principal supporters prospered. The commander on the western side of the Jibâla, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj al-Mujāhid of the Banū 'Arūs, a man noted in the past for his opposition to the Spanish as well as for his "licentious and libertine life," indicated that he was willing to "sell himself" to the Spanish. However, the other important leader, al-Kharrāz, whom the Spanish had been trying to win over for many years now, was still rejecting Spanish contacts. Indeed, he now planned to replace al-Raisüli as leader of the Jibāla resistance to the Spanish. Nevertheless, at the beginning of July 1921, Col. Cogolludo made yet another futile attempt to win him over, this time by forging a letter, purporting to come from the important British protégé in Tetuan, Si 'Abd al-Qādir al-Razīnī, which offered al-Kharrāz a safe conduct to Tetuan. Al-Kharrāz discovered the forgery and ignored the letter.

Al-Raisüli himself was most perturbed by the Spanish advances, and attempted to recommend to his supporters that they should surrender on the grounds that this would preserve the sanctity of Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām, which the Spanish then would not need to enter. Predictably, this recommendation was rejected. Opponents of surrender argued that the Spanish had broken pacts with them in the past and

1 Berenguer, op. cit., pp. 54-56.
2 Ibid, p. 58.
3 Intervención Larache, Beni Aros.
4 FO 371/7067/W7300/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 21 June 1921.
5 FO 371/7067/W7788/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 4 July 1921.
even pointed back into history to Spanish treachery during the reconquest of al-Andalus.¹

On 11 July, the Spanish advanced into the Banū 'Arūs and came within sight of Tazrūt. On 16 July the plain around Sūq al-Khamīs was occupied, cutting off Jabal 'Alam, and Mūlāy 'Abd al-Sallām from the rest of the tribe.²

Al-Raisūlī was now practically surrounded and there was a serious shortage of food: "Disease spread in the villages, for the cattle were unburied in the pastures ... men had ceased to tighten their belts, and their eyes were like wolves".³

Then news came from the Rif of the victories over the Spanish. According to al-Raisūlī, his remaining supporters came to him and asked how it would affect them: "I listened to them for a little and then I said: 'Allah has sent this thing to save us. Praise be to him, for it is just in time'".⁴

The Rifī Victories and the Jibāla and Ghumāra

News of the Rifī victories first reached Berenguer on 20 July 1921. Two days later he left Tetuan for Melilla by sea and operations in the Banū 'Arūs were suspended, "cut short in their moment of triumph".⁵

On the other side, the Rifīs lost no time in letting the Jibālans and Ghumāris know what had happened. On 21 July

¹ FO 371/7067/W7789/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 1 July 1921.
² Berenguer, op. cit., pp. 61-63.
³ Forbes, op. cit., p. 283.
⁴ Ibid., p. 300.
⁵ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 64.
they sent a letter to a meeting of the Matīwa al-Bahar, Banū Razīn, Banū Samīḥ, Banū Khālid and Banū Garīr, informing them of what had happened. The following day, another meeting which had been planned the previous week was held at the zawiya of Aghal in the Banū Samīḥ which was attended by Rifī delegates. They read letters announcing a jihad against the Christians and those notables who were "pro-Christian". Local Spanish supporters such as Bū Ghāba of the Banū Garīr put guards on their homes. Many Ghumāris started to buy arms.

On 24 July, a former Spanish-appointed mujaddam of the Wād Ra's tribe wrote to his brothers and two other relatives or acquaintances about his problems with the Spanish, against whom all four appear to have been conspiring. The letter ended:

"I inform you that this enemy has been punished by God [and] our lord Mulay Abd al-Sallam, may God give them no help amen. The mujahids of the Rif went to them and inflicted a great disaster upon them. I inform you that of the troops that they had here, in our territory, only a few guard posts remain, and the greater part of them have been taken to Melilla, for the machines have come to take them day and night. At midnight the train was loading up with soldiers. The land is empty. Bear this in mind."

The transfer of troops from the Ceuta Commandancia involved 4,500 men—including two banderas (companies) of

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones Varias, report 25 July 1921.
2 Ibid., report 15 July 1921.
3 Ibid., report 25 July 1921.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informaciones Intervenciones julio de 1921, T.O. Teniente, Malallen to Cor. Jefe de Policia, Tetuan, 23 July 1921.
the Legion and two tabores (battalions) of the Regulares—under the command of González Tablas and Francisco Franco.\(^1\) This should have given the resistance in the west its opportunity. Yet, while it took the pressure off al-Raisūlī, the Jibāla did not explode into violence. On 25 July, Cogolludo received a letter from the Spanish agent in the Banū Aḥmad, the Sharīf Mūlāy Aḥmad b. Sayyid Muḥammad b. Mūlāy al-‘Arba wuld Mūlāy ʿAbd Allah b. Ḥussayn, that he had all the tribe under his control, except for a small part, and that the group that was being organised against the Spanish had been abandoned.\(^2\) On 16 August, the captain of the 2nd Mīa of the Policía Indígena based on Wād Ra’s reported that all was quiet in his tribe, despite the plotting of al-Muqaddam al-Wād Ra’sī and his friends. And, on 30 July, a meeting at Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Salām was subdued and a call for jihād met only with an agreement to meet again.\(^3\)

Despite this apparent calm, and despite the lack of actual military action against the Spanish in the west, the events of July 1921 in the east were the subject of much approving comment in the Jibāla. There was, of course, a large Rifī community in parts of the Jibāla and there were several efforts made by their compatriots in the Rif to persuade them to return home. Understandably, the Spanish authorities were worried about possible subversion in the

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\(^1\) Payne, Politics, p. 168.  
\(^2\) SHM Ceuta Leg. 15, Cartas Árabes Beni Ahmad, Mūlāy Aḥmad b. Sayyid Muḥammad b. Mūlāy al-‘Arbi wuld Mūlāy ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥussayn to Coronel (Cogolludo) and Sayyid ʿAbd al-Sallām b. al-ʿAmīn (?) received 25 July 1921.  
\(^3\) SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones Varias, 2a Mīa, 26 July 1921.
Tetuan area, and on 25 July the Comandante General in Ceuta telegraphed Cogolludo: "I ask your Excellency to organise the arrest of all natives of the Bani-Urraguel and Rif found in this territory or those who may travel to it." Five days later, Mr. Atkinson reported that the prisons in Tetuan were filled with Rifis, an action he considered senseless, for they were mostly poor labourers, unable, in his opinion to do any harm.

In fact, the Spanish decision to imprison everybody, while extreme, was more reasonable than Atkinson believed. The large Riff community at Midiq, between Ceuta and Tetuan received letters on 27 July recalling them to the Rif. In the same area, although it is not stated whether both those involved were Rifis or not, an incident occurred on the evening train from Tetuan to Ceuta on 29 July. Two of the passengers, one a soldier in the Regulares, the other a Moroccan civilian from Melilla started to "explain" the Riff successes to the other passengers. They were promptly arrested.

Far more importantly than this, almost at the same time as the military campaign opened in the east, the propaganda campaign started in Tetuan itself. Two manifestos were posted, one on the wall of the principal mosque, the other on the wall of the Dargāwīya zawiya.

The Posters in Tetuan

The poster on the wall of the principal mosque

2 FO 371/7067/W8710/184/28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 30 July 1921.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones varias, 3a Mfa, 27 July, 1921.
4 Ibid., 3a Mfa, 30 July 1921.
"In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful: God has purchased of the believers their persons and their goods. For theirs, in return, is the Garden of Paradise. They fight in his cause, slay and are slain, as a promise binding on Him in truth, made in the Turah, the Gospel and the Qura'an. And who is more faithful in his promise than God,' Oh Muslims, the Spanish have drowned us in every calamity. They have soiled our honour, killed our children, possessed themselves of our goods, ruined our religion. They have committed every evil which would have frightened you if you could see them. You would have lost your joy in the best things, you would no longer wear silken garments, you would no longer be able to live well. Could you have been happy in the face of this shame, oh our brothers? No, by God, death is preferable.

If you could see your brothers on the fields of battle, some dead, some wounded, you would cry tears of blood, you would not hesitate to come to their aid. We see the Spanish help one another, and they are infidels and unjust people, but we see no one come to our aid, who have the true faith. Do we not make war in the cause of God? Is not our conduct in conformity with the precepts of Islam? Are not our dignity and your dignity one, as our shame and your shame are one? Where are your 'ulema? Oh, 'ulema are you not the descendents of the prophets? What are you thinking of? Is there any doubt about God?

How will you excuse yourself tomorrow in front of God, if you are among those who through fear neglect war in the cause of God? The ignorant have no responsibility. Return oh 'ulema to the ranks of the Muslims, do what you wish to do. Leave to one side what is forbidden, and victory is ours.

Are there any who wish to win Paradise by their personal cooperation? Are there any who wish to gain it by the gift of their goods? Are there any men of knowledge who would gain it by their exhortations? This world is perishable. It will not last for anyone, but what a difference there is between those who die bathed in blood, and those who die in their bed. Reply:

'Put yourself in the shelter of death if you are true. Do not believe that those who have died fighting in God's cause are dead: they live close to God and are fed by him. Full of joy for the benefits that God has heaped upon them, they rejoice that those who follow in their tracks, who have not yet reached them, will be sheltered against terrors and agonies.'

If it is difficult for you to come to our aid, oh

1 Qur'ān, sūra IX, v. 111.
2 Ibid., sūra XIV, v. 10.
Muslims, address yourselves to the leader of the faithful, our lord Yussif, that he should give you the provisions necessary to accomplish our task. Let him apply the laws that he wills, through the intermediary of any country that he wills, except Spain, and let him pray to God for his subjects. Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessing.

15 Qa'da al-Haram, 1339 [i.e., 21 July 1921].

The Muslim Muhammad assembly of the Rif.

(in the margin) Whoever suppresses this letter or prevents its circulation, let God curse him and may he not die a Muslim.

The letter affixed to the outer wall of the Darqawiya zawiya in the Dār al-Burūd quarter of Tetuan, read as follows:

"Praise be to God.

I look to God for a shelter against Satan the stoned, in the name of God the compassionate, the merciful. Truth has come, falsehood has disappeared. Indeed falsehood is bound to disappear. Praise be to God, Lord of the universe. Glory is in God, victory is near, tell the believers.

Oh believers, be patient, have recourse to patience and unite with each other against the enemy. Fear God, perhaps you will be successful. Unite yourselves through the link of faith and do not separate. The Prophet has said 'Divine aid is with those who are united.' He also says 'He who fights in God's cause is the same as he who fasts and prays continually, until the day when he returns home.'

Oh Muslims what is wrong with you? You do nothing except eat and drink and your brother Muslims fight in the cause of the king of kings. The pleasures of this life are nothing compared with those of the next world. Is not your religion the same for everyone? Is not our country of Morocco a single country? Where is your care for your religion and your country? Do they not suffer as much as we, while we have hopes that they have not? Where are your wise men? Friday preachers, incite your brothers with your brilliant quotations from the hadiths. Rich men, aid your brother mujahids with your wealth. This is the moment to give, oh you who make no difference between charity and

1 FO 371/7067/W8710/184/28, White to Curzon, Tangier, 6 Aug. 1921, confidential. Both this manifesto and the other on the Darqawiya zawiya were translated into French for FO files.

2 This recalls Muhammad's words in the Ka'ba in Mecca—see Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present (London, 1970), 10th ed. p. 118.
egoism. Oh you who are the torches of the Dargawa, where are your words of action, that you propagate to be shining and powerful?

You, who are full of illusions, do you believe that the two nations, France and Spain have come to Morocco to restore it? On the contrary, they have come only to ruin it and to scatter its leaders. So have you not learned from history, what Spain did in Andalusia? Did they not massacre the children who were at their mothers' breasts. Did they not disembowel the women? You forget that Andalusia was a country of criminals. What has become of the mosques of Cordoba and the knowledge that was taught there? What has become of the schools of Seville and their teachers. What has become of the books of the Muslims? The mihrabs have become places dedicated to the worship of idols, and the schools centres for the education of infidels.

Look at Algeria and Tunisia. Where are the Ulema and the shaykhs? Where are the rich men of these countries and their fortunes? The call of the faithful to prayer is no longer heard from the minarets, women and girls are no longer respected. 

Awake from your indolence, oh Muslims. The hour is coming the moon is divided in two. The half moon of Islam has risen and shines. Stop the rush of the two nations who move against us in our country, and who wish to scatter our people and to destroy our religion. They have forgotten what happened to the Portuguese nation, which conquered Morocco and believed that there was no more opposition. Do they not have enough territory in their own lands? They do not follow the example of the great powers, England, Germany and America who have had important commercial relations with us for years which have been very profitable. They have never shown any desire to interfere with our religion. After taking the precaution of asking for advice and listening to it carefully, they remained at home and kept only commercial links. Peace is good and treachery is evil. Oh believers, obey the words of God who helps those who rely on Him.

Oh believers fight against those infidels who make you perish. They will find in you a harsh resistance. Know that God is with the pious.

We have made enquiries, which a large amount of information has confirmed, and we have found that since the war there has remained only one notable for twenty Muslims because of the misfortunes that befell them since your country was invaded. The witness of the eyes is preferable to verbal declarations. Call on God for help. He will help you and make firm your path. Demand, each of you, justice and patience. Do not be frightened of cannons, for these things will fall into your hands. Look what we have done in a

1 Qur'ān, sūra IX, v. 123.
single morning. We have taken cannons, shells, cartridges and large amounts of money. The booty is still mounting up, and men embrace the religion in crowds. The armed men are without number, they come from every side so that we do not know where they come from. Join the struggle, oh Muslims. The wise men of the great powers are happy about this great victory. Pray to God to help us, for the prayer of Muslims is answered. Praise be to God, the Lord of the universe.

Done on 28 Qa'da in the year of the stupendous war and the victorious miracle.

This notice is one of several which will be distributed in the east and the west. May God destroy the parents and the — — [sic] of he who destroys this call, may He make his death painful, and dedicated to disgrace. I have charged people that you know not to watch that no one touches this letter. God, may he be praised, gives us aid as he helped the prophet Soloman. May blessings be upon him and on our Prophet."

The timing, the authorship and the contents of these proclamations raise important questions. The dates on which they were supposedly written are most interesting, for while the Darqawlya notice is dated 3 August 1921, when the Spanish army was in the final stages of its retreat, the manifesto on the wall of the principle mosque is dated 21 July 1921, when the Spanish had not yet evacuated Anwäl. If this date is correct, it implies that there must have been some contact with Tetuan, rather after the fashion of the contacts with the people of the Banū Sa‘īd and Banū Walishak in the eastern zone, for if there had not been, the people in Tetuan simply could not have known about it. Even the Spanish High Commissioner, General Berenguer, was unaware of the situation until 22 July, when Silvestre telegraphed him that he was evacuating Anwäl, and the news of the Rif victories which arrived in the Jibāla after this seems to have been a complete surprise for al-Raisūlī and his supporters.

1 FO 371/7067/W8710/184/28, White to Curzon, Tangier, 6 Aug. 1921, Confidential. 28 Qa’dâ is 3 Aug. 1921.
The origin of the notices is also important. The earlier one, that on the mosque wall and dated before the evacuation of Anwāl is signed, according to its French translation "The Muslim Muhammadan Confederation of the Rif". Clearly the translation is at fault here, for it seems most unlikely that the word "Muḥammadan" would be used at all. Leaving the objection to this word aside, the interesting thing is that the expression also includes a reference to the Rif. As a matter of speculation, it does seem possible that the authors of the 21 July proclamation were Rifis living in Tetuan. The authorship of the second notice is even more shadowy, for it is not signed at all, but there are enough differences in the content and style of the two proclamations to suggest that they may have been written by different people.

This is not to say that there are not similarities as well. Both manifestos rely heavily on sūra IX (Tawba) of the Qur’ān, a sūra concerned with the protection of the new Islamic state founded by Muḥammad from attack by the Byzantine Empire, and the necessity to do so by jihād. Quoting verse 111 of that sūra, the notice on the wall of the mosque calls on the Tetuanis to fulfil their obligation to carry out holy war. The Darqāwīya letter starts with another reference to the beginnings of an Islamic state by repeating Muḥammad's words on his entry to Mecca. Both letters turn on the 'ulamā' who had given no support, implying, through the use of Qur'ānic quotations, that the religious leaders had fallen into unbelief.

The mosque letter ends with a call to the people

to pressure Mūlāy Yusif to take action against the Spanish. Yusif was the Sultan who by rights should have been leading the resistance. So the war is presented as a popular Islamic movement, and above all, a Moroccan one, going outside the Rif for support, firstly to Tetuan, and then, through Mūlāy Yusif to the whole of Morocco. However, the Sultan was in French hands, a fact that the authors of the letter recognised by saying that if he needed any intermediary, then any European nation would be better than the Spanish.

Some of these themes are echoed in the Darqāwīya letter—the unity of Morocco, the distrust of Spain, the attack on the 'ulamā' and religious leaders. The stress on the unity of Morocco comes at the beginning of the second letter: "The Prophet has said 'Divine aid is with the united'," and the letter continues by proclaiming the unity of Morocco. There follows an attack on the Darqāwīya leaders who have failed to use their influence with their followers to persuade them to come the aid of the mujahids. But the tone is considerably stronger than that of the mosque letter.

Then the letter turns to history. Reference is made to the Christian reconquest of al-Andalus, and the devastation that caused to Muslim culture. Then, after looking back to the disastrous consequences of defeat by the Spanish in the past, the letter goes on to attack not only that nation, but also the French who had invaded Algeria and Tunisia in the recent past and destroyed both religion and society there. There is no repetition here of the idea that the French were an acceptable alternative to the Spanish. On the other hand, America and Germany are praised for their refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of Morocco, as
is England, conveniently ignoring that country's involvement in Egypt. Clearly what is important is Islamic Morocco, not other Islamic countries.

Material considerations pay a large part in the reasoning of the Dargāwīya letter. Attention is drawn to the economic effects of the colonisation in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Against this it offers material gains of booty if the readers join the Rifīs. Nevertheless, the religious aspect of the conflict is not ignored although there is mixed with it a strong sense of Islamic millenarianism: "Awake from your indolence, oh Muslims, there is no time to lose. The hour is coming. The moon is divided in two. The half moon of Islam has risen and shines.". This clearly fits into the context of previous calls for resistance to the Europeans in early twentieth century Morocco, for the way to be prepared for the coming of a mahdī and places this propaganda in the tradition of Bū Ḫīmāra, for example.  

Clearly there are considerable differences between the two documents. Although both appeared on the same day, one, that on the wall of the great Mosque, was dated before the Spanish flight from Anwāl, the other, on the zawiya, afterwards. Hence the difference in approach. Where the first letter appeals on a religious basis, the second concentrates more on the economic facts of Spanish domination and the possibilities of economic success for those who joined the jihād. In the Dargāwīya letter there is a clear call for a belief in the millenium that was just around the corner,  

1 See above, p. 95.
a call to oppose all colonialists. The mosque letter makes no such calls, either to usher in a mahdi, or to oppose anyone except the Spanish. The mosque letter would therefore appear to be closer to the current thinking in the Rif which later showed a tendency to look to France for support, although it seems likely that neither document was produced directly under bin 'Abd al-Karim's control. The reason for this assumption is that bin 'Abd al-Karim, in his propaganda in the Rif, had been relying upon the order and organisation of a new state that would be able to offer the people the same advantages as the Spanish, but in independence and an Islamic system: no mention is made of this in either of these documents. On the other hand, he tended to refrain from presenting the Rif movement as paving the way for a mahdi—as may be seen in his propaganda against al-Raisuli.

**Armed Action in the Ghumara and Jibala**

At the beginning of August, al-Raisuli received a letter from the Rif blaming all European intervention on "agitators" like himself and Bu Hímara. After all the arms and support that had been sent to him from the Rif in the past, he had little to show for it and the Rifis demanded that he should at last make up his mind to fight the Spanish properly. If he did not, they would treat him in the same way as they had treated the Spanish. Al-Raisuli played for time. He called a meeting of the a'yan of the Akhmäs who, however, voted for immediate union with the Rifis. Al-Raisuli, as usual, procrastinated, and asked for time to consider: "They answered that he had wasted too much time in considering and the meeting broke up."¹

¹ FO 371/7067/W8710/184/28, White to Curzon, Tangier, 6 Aug. 1921, confidential.
Bin 'Abd al-Karīm, in an effort to encourage resistance to the Spanish also wrote to various Ghumārī leaders, at the beginning of August 1921, offering guns that had been captured from the Spanish. By 10 August 1921, 600 Rifī men were reported in the Banū Samīḥ, the easternmost Ghumāran tribe, in the house of Bū Hālī, now the effective leader of that tribe, in place of Bū Ghāba who was considered to be pro-Spanish.

With their forces on the edge of the Ghumāra, the Rifīs extended their propaganda to the central Jibāla. They wrote to the Akhmās telling them about the booty taken from the Spanish. On 11 or 12 August, the Akhmās met at Dārdāra and agreed to cooperate with the Rifīs, and sent 10–12 mule-loads of oil to the Rifī in exchange for guns with which to attack Shāwin. By mid-August, this cooperation with the Rifīs had possibly extended to the provision of troops. The British consul at Tangier, Mr. White, reported a rumour that Rifī contingents had arrived to help in the attack on Shāwin. He went on to say that he was not absolutely sure of the accuracy of this report but was of the opinion that if the Jibālīs were able to defeat the Spanish at Shāwin, there was a fair possibility that the whole Jibāla might rise as the Rifī had done. This was undoubtedly what was at stake, and it clearly worried the Spanish also, for they withdrew all their recently occupied posts in the Ghumāra, except for Qā' Assrās and Tigīsas. Reports spread that the Peñón de Vélez had also been abandoned. This was, of course, quite untrue, but in the euphoria created by the Rifī successes it was believed.

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones Varías, 7a Mia, 8 Aug. 1921.
2 Ibid., 7a Mia, 10 Aug. 1921.
The Ghumārīs must certainly have seemed threatening to the Spanish. On 21 August, the Banū Manṣūr had defected and joined the growing ḥarka in the Ghumāra. On 22 August, the Rifīs called Ghumārī delegates—four from each village—to a meeting in the Banū Yīṭṭuṭ. On 23 August, 1,000 men sent by Aḥmad al-Akhamlish of Targīst arrived in the Sinhāja and Akhmāsī concentrations were reported in Dārdāra and Mishkrilla. The Akhmāsīs were now acting independently of al-Raʾisūlī.

The Rifī aim was to take pressure off the eastern zone. Sīdī Muḥammad al-Akhamlish, the head of that family, wrote to Mūlāy Aḥmad al-Baqār proposing that they fight the Spanish in the western zone to this end. Mūlāy Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-ʿArbī al-Baqār had a long history of "banditry" and fighting in the Jibāla. He was a member of a family of sharīfs of the Banū ʿArūs and had started his life of banditry in that tribe. His power grew and he fell out successively with al-Raʾisūlī, who was nervous of the threat he posed, and with al-Kharrāz, one of al-Raʾisūlī's principle allies, with whom he started a blood-feud. He moved to the 'Anjara and started to attack the Spanish there. When al-Raʾisūlī made peace with the Spanish in 1916, al-Baqār started to fight him as well, but with Spanish help al-Raʾisūlī was able to force him into exile in the Banū Mistāra where for some years he led an exemplary life. However, in

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informaciones, Interventiones julio de 1922, T.O. unsigned (probably Cogolludo) to Also Comisario, 21 Aug. 1921.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones Varaisas, 3a Mfa, 23 Aug. 1921.
3 Ibid., 7a Mfa, 23 Aug. 1921.
4 Ibid., 3a Mfa, 23 Aug. 1921.
5 Ibid.
6 Intervención Larache, Beni Aros.
February 1921 he again quarrelled with al-Raisūli since al-Raisūli had raided his stock.¹ Now the Rifis were asking him for help and al-Raisūli was more and more being left behind.

On 1 September 1921, the new British Vice-Consul in Tetuan, Mr. Fox-Stangeways reported that of the tribes in the Tetuan area, the Banū Silmān, Banū Mansūr, Banū Ziyāt, Banū Khālid, Banū Sijjil, Katāma, the Sinhāja tribes of Banū Khammūs, Banū Siddāt, and Taghzūt, and the Banū Razīn and Banū Samīḥ had also revolted. The Banū Yūsif, in the southwestern Jibāla had captured 75 Spanish troops and three heavy guns, and a Rif force was on its way to the ‘Anjara who had been restless for some time.² Yet Fox-Strangeways estimates that there was no danger to Tetuan itself, for the Rifis had failed to take Shawin (which might have brought about a rising in the west).³ Al-Raisūli's temporising had meant that the Jibāla and Ghumāra did not rise as a block:

"Raisūli seems to have been the villain of the piece from the Moorish point of view, and his tergiversations have resulted in much valuable time being lost by Abdel Krim."⁴

The attempt to raise the Jibāla and Ghumāra had failed, and it would be two years before the chance came again. In the meantime the Rifis would attempt to extend their control by military action over the Ghumāra and the Sinhāja.

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información Septiembre, 3a Mfa, 26 Feb. 1921.
² FO 371/7068/W9720/184/28, Fox-Strangeways to White, Tetuan, 1 Sept. 1921, secret.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
'Abd al-Malik

If al-Raisuli could not be persuaded to join the Rifis, 'Abd al-Malik might have been. He had made efforts to form a ḥarka in the month after Abarrān, basing himself in his old haunts of the Marnīsa and Banū Walīd. In the aftermath of Anwāl, he tried unsuccessfully to graft himself onto the Rif movement. The indications are that he wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, who ignored him. Then he wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm complaining that the Rif leader had, without consulting him, made a direct appeal to 'Abd al-Malik's power base in the Sinhāja and Wargha tribes. 'Abd al-Malik continued by complaining that he had received no calls from bin 'Abd al-Karīm to join in the jihād himself, and reiterated the importance of being on guard against the French, his old enemies, who, according to him, were using 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Darqāwī to penetrate the Banū Zarwāl and the Wargha tribes.

This was 'Abd al-Malik's version of the affair, as expressed in a letter to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. It does not agree with Spanish intelligence sources. The Spanish agent in the Banū Ḥassan, Mūlāy Ḥāmid bin ʿAlī, reported in mid-July that 'Abd al-Malik had tried to forestall French advances into the Banū Zarwāl, by moving into the area himself, where he received the support of the Banū Mallūl clan and about half the rest of the tribe. At the end of July,

1 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Darqāwī was one of the recipients of the letter of Ḥussayn of Mecca to French North African leaders, see above, p. 185 n.3.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 15, Cartas Benī Ahmad, Mūlāy Ḥāmid b. SiʿAlī al-Ḥassani to Cor (Cogolludo), received 25 July 1921.
Spanish sources reported that the sharifs of the Banū Waryaghal had written to him to ask him to fight Spain and to bring a ḥarka. ‘Abd al-Mālik had refused because, he said, the French would attack. To this the Banū Waryaghal replied that the French had given their assurance that they would not attack while the Rifis were fighting the Spanish. This was an assertion, which even had it been true, would not have endeared the Rifis to ‘Abd al-Mālik, implying as it did that they had French support. In any case he again refused to join them.¹ It is anyway doubtful how much use ‘Abd al-Mālik would have been by this stage. By the time he wrote his letter to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, his influence had decreased to such an extent that only a few tribesmen from the Sinhāja went to pay their respects to him on the occasion of the ‘Īd al-Kabīr.² Like al-Raisūlī, his refusal to join the Rifis meant that ‘Abd al-Mālik was left behind by events.

Conclusion

In the two months after Abarrān, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm managed to build up the organisation of the proto-state that was emerging in the Rif and he was able to launch an initial attack on the Spanish which developed, because of his agreements with people in the tribes lying behind the Spanish lines, into a complete rout of the invading forces. His organisation in the Banū Waryaghal and other tribes was good enough to ensure his success. Even the Spanish recognised his overwhelming position of authority in the central Rif, when, before

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informaciones Intervenciones julio de 1922, T.O.C., Cogolludo to Alto Comissario, Tetuan, 30 July 1921, "Muy Reservado".
Anwal they offered him the chance of limited autonomy under Spanish protection. However, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was both too strong and too weak to agree to this. The Spanish were certainly not able to enforce their control over the Rif, so he had no need to take much notice of their offer; on the other hand, his position as leader depended on his opposition to the Spanish and any attempt to compromise with them would almost certainly have led to his removal. Furthermore, his authority before Anwal did not stretch much beyond his own tribe and those of neighbouring tribes, so he would have had considerable difficulty in taking advantage of his autonomous status.

The important thing about the period after Anwal, in the wake of the Spanish defeats, was that bin 'Abd al-Karîm's authority still did not extend much beyond the area of the central Rif. In the Qal'aya, while many people in the tribes were quite willing to rise in alliance with the Rifis, and to take advantage of the retreat of the Spanish troops, they did not expect or want that they should, as a result, fall under the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karîm. As a result, when he tried to restore order, he faced considerable opposition from locally powerful men like Qaddur b. 'Amar. The same situation applied in the west, where the Jibālis, who were under pressure from the Spanish, rejoiced at the Rifî victories, but again showed no sign of wishing to place themselves under bin 'Abd al-Karîm's authority. Even when the Akhmās agreed to cooperate with the Rifis, they saw it as an alliance and no more. They sent food supplies to the Rif in the expectation of being supplied with guns in return—a contract between partners rather than
a recognition of sovereignty. In fact, many people saw the whole issue in terms not of a Rifl state but in terms of the expansionism of the Banū Waryaghāl; in the east several tribes announced that they would not recognise the authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm because he was no more than the leader of a tribe, and would not accept his paper money because he was not a constituted authority.

This did not reflect on the personal charisma of bin 'Abd al-Karīm himself. By the end of August 1921, he was credited with enormous prestige, and was believed to have extraordinary numbers of men in his service. He had certainly overtaken both al-Raisūlī and 'Abd al-Mālik as the only potential leader of the Spanish zone. This was very largely due to the victories that had taken place under his command, but was also the result of the way both al-Raisūlī and 'Abd al-Mālik delayed joining him in an effort to preserve their own independent power, thereby alienating those people who wanted to fight the Spanish.

The eclipse of al-Raisūlī, which began in this period, but was to continue for some years yet, was emphasised by the way bin 'Abd al-Karīm treated him. The Rifl leader bracketed him with Bū Ḥimāra as an agitator, rather than a fighter. Both these leaders had claimed, truly or falsely, descent from the Prophet. By rejecting them, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was emphasising his own character as a non-traditional leader, able to offer more in terms of organisation and method, than a mere "agitator". The propaganda of the time reflects this, for while he emphasised the ideas of organisation and unity, more traditional propaganda among the tribes themselves was still presented in terms of jihād. The harka at Tistutīn
wrote to the Banū Shikār in precisely these terms.

It seems, therefore, that people had not yet generally grasped the point that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was trying to make, and still thought in traditional terms about resistance to the Spanish. Many of the tribes were only very unwilling to put themselves under his authority. In the months that were to follow, they would discover how much the political and social structure of the area had changed, as in the face of a slow Spanish advance, bin 'Abd al-Karīm consolidated the unity of the tribes under his control.
"There are sixty-two tribes in the territory of the Spanish zone. Most of them used to pay tribute to the Makhzen. These tribes therefore should pay to Spain what they used to pay to the Sultan and in this way liquidate the expenses of the Protectorate. . . . The development of taxes and their increase are the best way of regulating colonial work and are the most reliable indicator of progress. Their payment is also the post positive evidence of sovereignty."

The British Ambassador in Madrid commenting, in March 1922, on the progress of the Spanish Protectorate.¹

"The news of your advance has filled us with joy and happiness."

Al-Raisūlī to Maḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karīm welcoming him to the Jibāla, October 1921.²

"The land will swim in enemy blood, we will be victorious and he who dies in holy war will die in God's cause and will go to Paradise. Swear with your heart and voice to follow his flag and give your bodies no peace until the Christian is defeated."

From a letter to the Awlād Siṭṭūt, al-Maṭālsa, and Banū Issnassān tribes from bin 'Abd al-Karīm at the end of August 1921.³

³ Diario Universal, 20 Sept. 1921, p. 1. This is an English translation of the Spanish version of a letter which was read to these tribes in late August and was released by the Spanish army.
The remarks by the British Ambassador to Spain were equally applicable to the progress of the Rifî state that was growing up, for here as well the ability of Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karîm to ensure the collection of taxes was equally an indication of the extent of his authority. It was also as important for him to receive a regular income from the tribes as it was for the Spanish—if not more so, since unlike them he was entirely dependent on local resources to continue the resistance. However, people never like paying taxes and bin 'Abd al-Karîm's attempt to collect them was bound to cause opposition. Nevertheless, he was sufficiently strong, in the Rifî at least, to overcome this opposition and to continue his efforts at organising and ordering society.

He was not so successful in the Qal'aya, and in the year that followed the victories of July and August 1921, nearly all the territory which had been evacuated by the Spanish troops was reoccupied once again.

As a result of the loss of the eastern part of the area to the Spanish, the new Rifî "state" began to take on a more coherent appearance. Its boundaries were fixed, in the east, by the extent of Spanish occupation and behind those boundaries Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Karîm was able to lay down the foundations of a formal administration.

However, there were no such boundaries in the west. Here, in the Jibāla, the Spanish continued their action against al-Raisūlî and were opposed by a disunited movement of resistance based in the Akhmās tribe. Spanish advances there presented bin 'Abd al-Karîm with a major political problem. In the first place, he had become the leader of the Rifî tribes in order to fight the Spanish; it was
therefore both politically impossible for him not to try to
fight them in the west and, even more importantly, militarily
impossible, for if he allowed the Spanish to occupy the
Jibāla, it would leave his rear exposed to their further
advance. On the other hand there was relatively little
evidence that the people of the Jibāla, especially the Akhmās,
actually wanted to be ruled by bin 'Abd al-Karīm and incor-
porated into the Rifī state. Yet this was what any attempt
to deal with the Spanish in the west would have amounted to,
for the experience of the Qal'ayā had shown that a loose
alliance led to disorder and, in the end, defeat. So, after
August 1921, the Rifīs began their, at first, rather unsuccessful
attempt to extend their control into the Jibāla.

To some extent, the continued success of the Rifī
movement was hindered by two factors. The first was economic,
for the fighting during the summer of 1921 had disrupted the
agricultural life of the Rif and the harvest the following
year was poor as a result. The second factor was the oppos-
iton of various local leaders who were frightened that their
own authority would be weakened by the growing power of the
Rifī state and of its leader. They fought to maintain their
position and did great damage to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's cause.
Such opposition was eventually overcome for the time being
through the use of force, the help of other local leaders
who were sympathetic to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and through
propaganda. Just as had happened during the period of the
Spanish rout, bin 'Abd al-Karīm while emphasising the benefits
of order and unity, and using coercion to achieve them, con-
tinued to make use of the more traditional language of jihād
in his propaganda.
The Spanish Advance

At the end of August the Rifis were still unbeaten. Their propaganda was confident and even that signed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm had a strong millenarian and religious tone. A letter from the Rif leader was read to the Awlād Siṭṭūt, al-Maṭālsa, and Banū Issnassān (in the French zone) at the end of the month. It went as follows:

"There is no God but God. From he who implores the aid of the most just, most strong, the munificent, Mohamed Abd el-Karim, to his brothers the notables and people of Saf-Saf and Beni. Snassen, M'Talza and Ulad Setut. God protect you and keep you from all harm.

Mujahidin! Through God's will we have declared war on the Christian Spaniard, and have thrown him out of our beloved land, blessed by the Prophet. Our victory must be completed with the total expulsion of the Christians; to that end Jihad has been called throughout the Rif. You must not make war, sons of Mohamed, like bandits. We must go to battle in an orderly fashion, and beneath a flag. We have the equipment. Each man will receive a Spanish duro in payment as well as food and ammunition. Each will have his part and role in the battle.

We must make war as the Prophet commanded. Kill the enemy under arms, leave the old, the irresponsible, the children, the women. God gives you the right to booty and the enslavement of the defeated, but obliges you to forswear useless cruelty ..."

The letter is very confident in tone; it relies not only on exciting the religious sensibilities of its hearers, but on propagating the new ideas which bin 'Abd al-Karīm was proposing: the benefits of organisation and discipline. It is a mixture of a call for jihād and a call to end the forms of improvised jihād which, up until then, had been the normal way of fighting the Spanish. It is both uncompromising—demanding the total expulsion of the Christians—and yet recommends that the war should be directed only at soldiers and not women and children. Clearly the

1 Ibid.
traditional ideas of *jihād*--a disorganised attack on any "Christian"--have been set aside for a disciplined military operation with modern equipment. Even more clearly, this is a call for a *jihād* against the Spanish and not the French, thereby limiting its scope and extent. This is despite the fact that the Banū Issnassān was a tribe of the French zone (to the west of the Kabdāna). The implication of this is that bin 'Abd al-Karīm identified the Banū Issnassān as belonging logically to the tribes of his sphere of influence. The extent of the war and the involvement of the Rifīs in the Jibāla and later with the French were to become major questions from now on.

However, the optimism of the letter was not to be borne out. The east would not cooperate in the war and submit to disciplined leadership and as a result the Spanish were able to begin their slow march back across the eastern plain. On 31 August 1921, a new Spanish Comandante General, the Marqués de Cavalcanti, arrived in Melilla. In the city, 25,000 of the 36,000 troops there had been grouped in preparation for an advance, with the intention of retaking all the territory that had been lost.¹ Nevertheless, the Rifīs were still on the offensive; on 31 August they attacked the blockhouse called Mezquita outside Melilla.² There were strong rumours that on the following day, 1 September, they would begin a major attack on Melilla itself. The Rifī forces were estimated at anything between 25,000 and 60,000 although Vice-Consul Fox-Strangways in Tetuan considered

² *Diario Universal*, 1 Sept. 1921, p.1; Berenguer, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
that, allowing for forces that had been sent to the Ghumāra, the lower figure was the more likely. This attack, however, never materialised. Meanwhile, the High Commissioner, General Berenguer, was elaborating his plans for an advance across the Qal'āya towards the Rif. His first objective was to secure the hinterland of Melilla, up to the Cape of Ra's Wārk, along a line from Ishmuart near the west coast of the Peninsula through Sūq al-Hād on the Banū Shikār to Atalayon on Sabkha Bū Aghrag. Then a column would be sent down the spit of land on the eastern side of the Sabkha through Restinga, and Sūq al-Arba'a and up the coast of the Sabkha from the south through Bi'r Awgrāz to meet the other column coming down the coast through al-Naṣūr towards Silwān. Other columns would surround Jabal Gurugu from the north and south-east, move on into the Banūr Bū Iфрūr, the Banū Bū Gafar and on to the Wād Kart where they would wait while the Kabdāna and Awlād Siṭṭūt tribes were overrun. This plan was carried out, almost to the letter.

The Rifis, aware that a Spanish advance was planned, tried to reinforce the Kabdāna tribe, whose loyalty they justifiably distrusted. Small groups of Rifis were brought to Sūq al-Arba'a at the south-eastern end of the Sabkha. Cannon were moved up around Melilla for a counterattack. Yazīd b. Hammū, who already had 500 Waryaghlis in Sīdī Muḥandū Yaḥyā wrote to bin 'Abd al-Karīm asking for reinforcements.

1 FO 371/7068/W9720/184/28, Fox-Strangeways to White, Tetuan, 1 Sept. 1921, Secret.
3 See Map VII: 1.
4 SHM Melilla, Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Resumen General, 2 Sept. 1921.
5 Ibid., Ḥamīd b. 'Amar Mimūn (Mazūja), 2 Sept. 1921.
MAP VII: Melilla area September-October 1921
Even more reinforcements were expected and the ḥarka at Sūq al-Arba'a was told to wait until they arrived before attacking.¹

The following day, Friday 2 September, the market at al-Naẓūr broke up in confusion when women started shouting that the "Christians" were coming.² 400 more Rifīs arrived at Sūq al-Arba'a,³ and on 3 September, 1,000 more were reported in Dār al-Ḥājj Sa'īd (south-west of Sūq al-Aḥad of Banū Shikār).⁴

On 4 September, 6,000 men were reported in the al-Naẓūr ḥarka.⁵ On that day, 900 more Rifīs were reported to have arrived in the Qal'aya from all the central Rifī tribes.⁶ They started to build trenches in Bi'r Awgrāz.⁷

Yet, despite their efforts, the Rifīs' support in the Qal'aya was diminishing. Notwithstanding a heavy concentration of Rifīs around Sūq al-Aḥad in the Banū Shikār, 'Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Ṭayyib, who had remained loyal to the Spanish, was able to prevent the tribe he administered from going over to the Rifīs completely and received Spanish troops to help him do so.⁸

Finally, on 12 September, with the Banū Shikār secured so that their rear was protected, Spanish troops

¹ Ibid., information of Muḥammad b. Sha'īf b. Ḥāmid, 2 Sept. 1921.
² Ibid., information of Captain 2a Mia, 3 Sept. 1921.
³ Ibid., Muḥammad al-Mu'allim, 3 Sept. 1921.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., Resumen General.
⁶ Ibid., Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥammu, 6 Sept. 1921.
⁷ Ibid., information of Muḥammad b. Ḍuduh (Banū Shikār), 6 Sept. 1921.
began their advance. Following Berenguer's plan, Sūq al-Arba'a was occupied. The Rifis were still shelling Melilla with captured Spanish guns but this soon ceased. Rif casualties in the Sūq al-Arba'a battle were heavy. Informants reckoned that 75 men were killed on the first day and a general suspicion developed among local people that no more reinforcements would come from the Rif.

The following day, such was the demoralisation of the Rifis, that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was threatening severe punishments for anyone who mentioned Rif losses in the markets. Nevertheless, the harkas continued to decrease in all the major Rif positions--Sīdī Misa'ūd in the Banū Bū Gafar, Dār al-Ḥājj Sa'īd, and so on.

On 15 September, the Rifis did reinforce some positions. A usually reliable informant, Sī 'Allāl b. Sī Tahar (Banū Shikār), put the total harka at 5,400 of whom only 1,500 were Rifis' however. The next day, 16 September, the forces in Naẓūr withdrew in the face of the Spanish advance from Atalayon. On 17 September, Spanish forces occupied al-Naẓūr with relative ease. Acting with considerable speed, they opened the railhead to Melilla within four hours of entering the town.

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1 FO 371/7068/W10341/184/28, White to Curzon, Tangier, 18 Sept. 1921.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, information of Sī 'Allāl b. Sī Tahar (Banū Shikār), 12 Sept. 1921.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Resumen General, 14 Sept. 1921.
5 Ibid., information of Sī 'Allāl b. Sī Tahar, 15 Sept. 1921.
6 Ibid., Sī 'Allāl al-Ḥīḥī, 16 Sept. 1921. He gives the garrison at Sīdī Misa'ūd as 600 men; Dār al-Ḥājj Sa'īd, 2,000; Ḫardūf, 1,250; al-Naẓūr, 1,000; Silwān, 600. Most of the Rifis were in Ḫardūf.
7 The Times, 21 Sept. 1921, p. 9, dated Madrid, 19 Sept. 1921.
On 19 September, two Spanish informants reported independently of each other that the Rifis were leaving the ḥarka and going home. The Qal‘ayIs in the ḥarka decreased as well and by 20 September the group at Ḥardūf was down to 200 men. There were a few Rifis left in Jabal Gurugu under the Faqīḥ Bū Lahya of the Banū Tūzīn, and they had set up a customs point and were taxing those going past.

On 23 September, Spanish forces from al-Naẓūr advanced down the railway to Silwān as far as Tawīma station, and the Sūq al-Arba‘a column reached Bi‘r Awgrāz. The following day people from the Kabdāna tribe began to submit to the Spanish.

Now even Bū Lahya, one of the most dedicated of the anti-Spanish leaders, decided to withdraw. He was reported to be on the way home on 26 September. The only major Rifī force in the area now was a group of 600 men who were on their way to the Banū Bū Gafar to collect abandoned Spanish war material. As for the Qal‘ayIs, their main groups were in Saghanghān, Sīdī Misa‘ūd and Dār al-Ḥājj Sa‘īd, but their total forces did not exceed about 2,000 men. Other Qal‘ayIs, especially people from the Banū Bū Ifrūr tribe, were moving back into the Banū Bū Yaḥyā in the face of the Spanish.

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5 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Sī ‘Alī al-Ḥīḥī, 26 Sept. 1921.
6 Ibid., Muḥ al-Mu‘allim, 23 Sept. 1921.
7 Ibid., Muḥ al-Mu‘allim, 26 Sept. 1921 and Sī ‘Alī al-Ḥīḥī, 26 Sept. 1921.
To encourage those who remained to fight the Spanish, a rumour was spread that soldiers in the Foreign Legion and Fuerzas Regulares were being paid 10 pesetas for each enemy head they cut off. The Moroccan informant, who believed the story, advised that such a practice was counter-productive. It was, in fact, untrue. By the end of the month, the Rifís had all but evacuated the Qal'aya and Ismā'īl Wulad al-Shadrī, bīn 'Abd al-Karīm's most important local supporter, had left to see his master in Jabal Mawrū in the Banū Sā'id, having said that he would not organise any further resistance until he had orders to do so from bīn 'Abd al-Karīm.3

The Spanish advance was not completely unresisted, however, and there was fierce fighting at Sabat before they were able to occupy it on 2 October. Nevertheless, most of the Rifís left Silwān on 3 October for Jabal 'Arawīt, leaving only a small contingent behind, although bīn 'Abd al-Karīm and a reported 400 supporters arrived in Tanūt al-Rahmān in Banū Sīdāl to set up a headquarters there, and to try to take charge.

On 5 September, Spanish forces occupied the zawiyya of Saghanghān, the home of Muḥammad Amziyyan who had led the

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1 Ibid., Muḥ al-Mu'allim, 23 Sept. 1921.
2 Ibid., SI 'Alī al-Ḥīḥī, 26 Sept. 1921.
3 Ibid., Bū Ziyār Muḥammad (Banū Shikār), 30 Sept. 1921.
resistance until 1912,¹ and Atlatan in the Banū Bū Ivrūr.² Jabal Gurugu was now almost surrounded and Spanish forces cleared it of all opposition on 10 October.³

On the Moroccan side, the Banū Bū Ivrūr continued their flight into the interior. A Spanish informant reported that by 6 October, the tribal lands were almost empty.⁴ 250 more determined men, including Bū Raḥāyil of the al-Maṭālsa, remained to garrison Silwān,⁵ but Dār al-Ḥājj Sa'id was abandoned.⁶ Many of the Qal'ayīs left with bin 'Abd al-Karīm and the rest of the Rīfī ḥarka for the Banū Sa'id, where a shaykh named Bū Fatīla, who later died in a pro-Spanish ḥarka, tried to incite his tribe to capture the ḥarka and to kill them.⁷ Another of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's opponents in the Banū Sa'id was Qaddur b. 'Amar, who was still acting on his own account. He attempted an independent piece of military activity by coming to Sīdi Mīsa'ūd, on the borders of the Banū Shikār and Banū Bū Gafar, accompanied by several hundred men, with the aim of encouraging resistance. However, Sīdi Mīsa'ūd was deserted and none of the local inhabitants came.⁸ But he also helped to destroy the ḥarka in Banū Sa'id by refusing to allow it any food.⁹ His ambivalence may partly

¹ The Times, 6 Oct. 1921, p. 9, dated Madrid, 5 Oct. 1921. For Muḥammad Mizzian, see above, p. 76.
² Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 260.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Octubre, SI 'Alī al-Ḥīḥī, 6 Oct. 1921.
⁵ Ibid., al-Ḥājj 'Amar b. Mimūn, 6 Oct. 1921.
⁶ Ibid., Muḥammad al-Mu'allim, 7 Oct. 1921.
⁷ Ibid., SI 'Alī al-Ḥīḥī, 10 Oct. 1921, and Skīraj, op. cit., p. 49.
⁸ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Octubre, Muḥammad al-Mu'allim, 11 Oct. 1921.
be explained by the fact that he was once again receiving a salary from the Spanish mining company of which he was an agent. ¹

About this time b. ‘Abd al-Karīm seems to have finally fixed the eastern frontiers of the "Rīf" at the Wādi Karṣ. ² This did not mean that he was not prepared to make the Spanish fight for their advances. Accordingly, several hundred Rīfīs were garrisoned in the Banū Sīdal and in Sīlwān, led by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm (who had returned to the front), Bū Lahyā, and Yazīd b. Ǧammu. ³ More Rīfīs reached the coast of the Qal‘aya in the days that followed, but the Banū Bū Gafar, for their part, refused them food. Qaddur b. ‘Amar seems to have been once more working with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm and he went back to Sīlī Mīṣāʿūd which was then fortified. ⁴

More Rīfīs moved into the northern part of the Qal‘aya—around Tizza and Sīdī Mīṣāʿūd, ⁵ but the Spanish continued their advance to the south and, on 14 October 1921, Sīlwān was reoccupied. ⁶ As the Spanish advanced, the price of rifles fell, for people realised that the Spanish would confiscate them. ⁷

By 18 October, there were only an estimated 1,050 Rīfīs in the Qal‘aya, mainly from the Banū Waryaghāl, Timsamān,

¹ Ibid., and Responsibilidades, p. 186. The latter source states that the company concerned was the Compañía Hispano Africano.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Octubre, Resumen General, 12 Oct. 1921.
³ Ibid., Resumen General, 12 Oct. 1921.
⁵ Ibid., ‘Amar Ḥamīdu "Kumbua" (Banū Shikār), 14 Oct. 1921.
and Gaze. Few Qal'ayıs remained in the ḥarka. The main Rifi forward positions were Tannūt al-Raḥmān, Hiyanan, and Talat, but their forces were beginning to claim that they could not carry on because they had no food (see Map VII : 2). Bin 'Abd al-Karīm sent word to the Qal'ayıs that they should feed the ḥarka but they replied that they could not. The war had disrupted the economy of the region, firstly because nearly all the Qal'ayī families had fled across the Wād Karţ in the face of the Spanish advance, and secondly because the turmoil in July and August had meant that the harvest was not fully gathered and it had now practically all been lost.

As a reaction to the demoralisation among the Rifiıs, two encouraging rumours spread. The first was that bin 'Abd al-Karīm's forces had captured a Spanish princess and the second that the Rifiıs had retaken al-Naẓūr. Neither was true but the ḥarka doubtless needed some cheering up. The Spanish had 100,000 men in Morocco by now, and more were reported to be on the way. In addition, things were becoming even more difficult in the Qal'aya as more and more people wanted to submit to the Spanish—the Banū Shikār was now almost entirely under the control of 'Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Tayyib, their pro-Spanish qā'id who was receiving offers of submission from some of the Banū Bū Ifrūr. The Banū Sidāl was also believed to wish to surrender but was only prevented from doing so by the Rifi ḥarka, and by 22 October nearly all

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1 Ibid., Resumen General, 18 Oct. 1921.
2 Ibid., Grupo de Vigilancia, 16 Oct. 1921, based on enquiries in the market of Reina Regente in Melilla.
of the Kabdāna tribe had submitted. This feeling of hopelessness must have been encouraged by the occupation of Jabal ‘ArawIt by the Spanish on 24 October 1921.

The ḥarka numbers fluctuated slightly as efforts were made to hold the Sidi Misa‘ūd-Talat-Tannūt al-Rahman line. Twice a day roll-calls were held for the Banū Sidal and those who did not attend were fined 500 pts. But the guard at Wiksan in the Banū Bū Ifrūr was withdrawn to Tistūṭīn leaving only a few men behind.

Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm’s main concern now was to withdraw in reasonable order, saving as much as he could of the captured Spanish war material and holding on to as many of the Spanish prisoners as possible as well. At the same time he had both to maintain his own prestige as a leader and strengthen his own authority. As al-Bū ‘Ayyāshi points out, by the end of October 1921 it was clear that the very nature of the war had changed. No longer could the Rifīs take the initiative against the Spanish and, relying on the element of surprise, hope to defeat them. It was now obvious that the war would not be over quickly; on the contrary it would probably continue for a long time yet. So bin ‘Abd al-Karīm decided to redouble his efforts to create a more regular, organised and centralised authority.

2 Martínez ce Campos, op. cit., p. 260; Berenguer, op. cit., p. 134.
Centralisation

The attempt at centralisation can be seen in detail in a letter sent by Ḥaddu b. Ḥammu al-Buqquyī ("al-Kaḥal") to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. At some point in October, Ḥaddu was sent to Dār Drīush to collect equipment that had been left there, particularly cars and guns. On 27 October, writing from Tafarsit, Ḥaddu reported on his success so far. This report makes interesting reading, for as well as showing his principal concerns, it also gives an insight into just how much one of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's principal agents relied on his master's leadership and how much he felt able to act on his own initiative.

As for recovering supplies, he had some success. The Shaykh Bū Raḥayl of Tafarsit, who up till then had refused to hand over a cannon and 1,000 shells, finally gave way. Ḥaddu took field guns and machine guns from Dār Drīush and apparently needed all the men he could get to gather the abandoned guns and other weapons "and take them far away from the enemy." With the prisoners he had less success. The three European gunners who were in Bū Raḥayl's hands had not been handed over and Bū Raḥayl said they had fled. The same thing happened with two who were held by a Muḥammad b. Bū Midyān, so:

"We have announced in the markets that all those who have any Christian captives, should bring them to us in Dār Drīush, and anyone who conceals one will have to be punished."

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1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 49. Ḥaddu b. Ḥammu was born in the Buqquya tribe but left when very young after the destruction of the Buqquya by Bushṭā al-Baghdādī (see above, p. 135). His family moved to Algeria to the colony set up at Port-Say on the Moroccan frontier where Ḥaddu was educated, ibid.

Haddu, in fact, encountered some opposition. Certain Tafarsitî shaykhs had tried to start feuding again, in the hope of weakening the anti-Spanish side, and refused either to join the ḥarka or to give the "required mūna" (i.e., supplies for the ḥarka). This group included Haddu al-Muqaddam who was later imprisoned by bin 'Abd al-Karîm and, in 1923, was a strongly pro-Spanish leader in the Tafarsit. On the other hand, one shaykh was strongly pro-Rifî:

"The Qā'id Muḥammad b. Zaghdud, may God increase the number of such men among the Muslims, has given great support to the holy war, and the interests of the Muslims, and is always at our side."

But in general, the Tafarsitîs were unenthusiastic about the fight against the Spanish, and Haddu considered forming an "army" composed of men from the al-Maṭālsa, Banû Tûzîn, and Banû Walishak and fining those who were responsible for the troubles. But he did not want to do anything without bin 'Abd al-Karîm's permission: "But I look to you in this business, so tell us what you want, for we are waiting for your word." This is a sentiment that is repeated several times in the letter, particularly with reference to the eventual destination of the arms he had gathered up. However, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had delegated a certain amount of military as well as administrative authority. His commander on the eastern front at this stage was 'Abd al-Salâm b. al-Ḥājj Muḥand of the Banû Bû 'Ayyâsh clan of the Banû Waryaghal, who was effectively the first "Minister of War" in the new Rifî government that was slowly forming, and Haddu was

1 Ibid.
3 Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 378.
uncertain whether to send him the arms, or whether to send them to bin 'Abd al-Karīm.¹

At first, this organisation was mainly military in character, and reflected on the need to organise supplies and military actions. Even at this early stage in the war, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was aware of the benefits of effective air cover and Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū had started preliminary negotiations for the purchase of aeroplanes.²

Apart from these arrangements, more detailed organisation of government was left for a while. The real organisation of the tribes and the appointment of qā'īds was to come in mid-1922, although one Mizzyān b. Ḥāmid b. 'Allāl was appointed qā'īd of the Spanish-occupied Mazūja tribe at the end of October 1921, presumably to lead the rump of those members who had fled to the west. Other branches of government only seem to have been fully organised when bin 'Abd al-Karīm was finally proclaimed in 1923. At the end of October 1921 the priority was still a military one.

Further Spanish Advances in the East

On 2 November 1921, Spanish forces occupied positions on the edge of the Tazūda plateau.⁴ Discontent was rising against bin 'Abd al-Karīm's leadership and severe punishments were announced for those who tried to take refuge in the neutral sanctuary at Mūlāy Kārkār. These punishments took

² Ibid.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Confidencias Octubre, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj 'Ayād (Banū Shikār), 29 Oct. 1921.
⁴ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 141; Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 261.
the form of confiscating the miscreants' grain supplies. 1

Guards were put on all the roads leading to the Spanish-occupied area and 500 Banū Sa‘īdīs were stationed at Sīdī Misa‘ūd. 2 Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm organised a meeting at Tānūt al-Raḥmānī for all the Qal‘ayīs remaining in the ḥarka, at which he read a letter which he claimed had been sent by Mūlāy Yusif, the French-appointed Sultan of Morocco. In this letter, Mūlāy Yusif said that he would shortly be coming to the Rif with General Lyautey, and that they should prepare to meet him and declare him Sultan of Morocco. The letter, as an added incentive, promised that the French would be more generous to their supporters than the Spanish. 3

Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was also under pressure in the Banū Tūzinī, where two qā‘īds refused to visit when called upon to do so and the troops sent to reinforce the invitation were thrown out by the shaykhs' supporters. 4

These were political problems but there were other, physical, ones. An unexplained epidemic illness whose initial symptoms were sickness and headaches was causing many deaths especially in areas where troops were concentrated. 5 With the coming of the rains in mid-November this sickness started to affect the Spanish troops as well. 6 On top of this was the ever-present shortage of food.

There was also trouble developing behind the Rif: lines. One of those responsible was ‘Abd al-Mālik b. ‘Abd

1 SHM Melilla Leg., Información Noviembre, Resumen General, 2 Nov. 1921.
2 Ibid., Resumen General, 4 Nov. 1921.
3 Ibid., Resumen General, 5 Oct. 1921 (for 5 Nov.).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., Resumen General, 6 Nov. 1921.
6 The Times, 17 Nov. 1921, p. 9, dated Madrid, 16 Nov. 1921.
al-Qādir. After a final appeal to bin 'Abd al-Karīm in mid-September for troops to support him, rather than "letters and sermons . . . which are no use in these parts," which appears to have been as ignored as was his appeal in August, 2 'Abd al-Mālik seems to have despaired of carving a position for himself in the Rifī ranks. He therefore determined to oppose bin 'Abd al-Karīm, a determination that held until his death in 1924. At the beginning of November, he was reported to have arrived at Sūq al-Thalāthā ' of Azīlāf on the Banū Waryaghal-Gaznaya border with a large ḥarka composed of men from the Marnīsa and Gaznaya tribes. 3 This particular attempt to stir up trouble seems to have been unsuccessful. Certainly no more reports arrived in Melilla concerning 'Abd al-Mālik's activities until 1922. But it was the opening shot in his campaign against bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

For the moment, however, 'Abd al-Mālik was the least of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's worries. He was still concerned to hold the eastern line as long as possible. The Banū: Walishak members of the ḥarka were fined 5,000 pesetas on 7 November because they had allegedly not fought hard enough during the Spanish occupation of Tazūda five days before. The Banū Walishak contingent then left the ḥarka in disgust. 4 Other Rifīs left on the same day accompanying bin 'Abd al-Karīm back to Anwāl. 5 On 12 November, two Spanish

2 See above, p. 365.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Noviembre, 'Abd al-Qādir Tahīmī, 6 Nov. 1921.
4 Ibid., Resumen General, 8 Nov. 1921.
5 Ibid., Resumen General, 9 Nov. 1921.
agents reported that all the RIfis had left the Qal’aya. In addition, the Spanish had attacked Sidi Misa‘ud and taken it by surprise from the few Banū Bū Gafar who were there, and then carried on to take Tifasur on 11 November. A few RIfis did remain, apparently, in Wiksān, and were making efforts to fortify it. But the Bugquya and Banū Yūtuf tribes refused to send any reinforcements to the eastern front and declared that they would only defend the borders of their own tribes.

The RIfis’ main bases were now in Tafarsit, Jabal Mawrū (in the Banū Sa‘īd) and Dār Drūsh, although there were attempts to garrison Tannūt al-Raḥmān properly. But Wiksān fell on 18 November and Ra’s Madūa on 21 November, and Hiānan and Tawriat Ḥamīd on 30 November 1921. These advances were accompanied by very strong air-support.

Berenguer told correspondents in Madrid that in the attack on Ra’s Madūa alone, 244 bombs were dropped in addition to the shells fired by "thirteen batteries of artillery".

In the course of these operations, the shaky loyalty of the Banū Sīdal collapsed, despite the confiscation by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm agents of the property of pro-Spanish leaders and later their arrest and imprisonment in Anwāl.

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1 Ibid., Muḥammad al-Mu‘allim, 12 Nov. 1921.  
2 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 261.  
4 Ibid., O.I. Sección 3a (Kert), 14 Nov. 1921.  
5 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 151.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 The Times, 23 Nov. 1921, p. 9, dated Madrid, 22 Nov. 1921.  
9 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Noviembre, Resumen General, 19 Nov. 1921.  
10 Ibid., Muḥammad al-Mu‘allim, 22 Nov. 1921.
The Banū Bū Gafār was practically evacuated by its inhabitants,¹ and on 29 November the contingent from the Banū Bū Yāḥyā in Tistūṭīn finally went home.²

The Spanish army had cause to feel well satisfied with their progress during November. But new policies were being discussed in Madrid, and on 22 November, General Berenguer went to the Spanish capital to report.³

The Beginnings of a New Spanish Policy

Despite the Spanish advances in the east and a successful military campaign, the Maura government in Madrid was beginning to have its doubts about continued military action. It was very expensive and there was continued opposition from some sections of the Spanish working-class. On 11 November, Maura had outlined his government's aims in Morocco. The first objective was still an "exemplary chastisement of the Moors", but he foresaw a rapid end to military action, the garrisoning of posts on the coast, keeping clear of the interior, and the repatriation of Spanish troops.⁴

Not surprisingly, this plan which would depend on local cooperation to maintain order was not in line with military thinking. One of Cavalcanti's first acts as Comandante General of Melilla had been to cancel all pensions except those of people who were definitely still pro-Spanish.⁵

With increasing talk of curbs on military operations, Berenguer

¹ Ibid., Resumen General, 23 Nov. 1921.
² Ibid., SI 'Ali al-Ḥāfi:, 29 Nov. 1921.
³ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 148.
⁴ The Times, 12 Nov. 1921, p. 9, dated Madrid, 11 Nov. 1921.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Agosto, Comandancia General de Melilla, O.C.A.I. to Cmte. Mar., Alhucemas; Melilla, 8 Oct. 1921.
went to Madrid on 22 November to tell the government of his plans for the next stage of the reconquest. He intended to advance through al-Bāṭil towards Dār Drīsh, and to Tikarmīn, across to Wādī Karṣ to protect the Banū Sīdal from the Banū Sa‘īd. The eventual aim would be to use Dār Drīsh as a base for the political action in the Matālsa, Banū Tūzin, Tafarsīt and Banū Sa‘īd tribes. This advance would be accompanied by resolute action against al-Raisūlī in the west, and plans would be made to occupy the coast at Alhucemas. Along the rest of the coast he would occupy posts from the Banū Sa‘īd to the Matīwa al-Baḥar to ensure that Spanish political influence spread.¹ Berenguer returned to Tetuan on 27 November but not before his plan had been openly criticised by General Primo de Rivera, then Captain-General of Madrid. Primo, later dictator of Spain from 1923 onwards, proposed a complete withdrawal to the Moroccan coast, a suggestion for which he was rewarded by being relieved of his command.² However, as Spanish head of state, he would later put this policy partially into operation.

The Spanish Cross the Wādī Karṣ:

Berenguer continued to put his plan into operation. Ṣarsha, in the Banū Bū Iṣfūr, was occupied on 1 December, Sūq al-Khamīs of the Banū Bū Iṣfūr on 2 December, and Mūlāy Rashīd and Zaiū in the Awlād Siṭṭīt on 5 December.³ In an attempt to contain the increasing defections to the Spanish, guards were put on the Banū Sa‘īd bank of the Wādī Karṣ and

¹ Berenguer, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
² The Times, 28 Nov. 1921, p. 9, dated Madrid, 26 Mar. 1921 and 27 March 1921.
³ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 151.
the Banū Bū Gafar who had fled across the Kart were not allowed to return home. But the Banū Sa'id itself was shaky in its loyalty to the resistance and the Banū Sidal was all but lost. As a result of the Spanish advance, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was losing a considerable amount of prestige and calls for a ḥarka only received slight support.

Meanwhile Ḥaddu b. Ḥammu was still collecting equipment in Dār Driūsh. He sent another progress report to bin 'Abd al-Karīm on 6 December 1921. He had recently sent 26 field guns from Dār Driūsh as far as Dār Muḥammad b. Ḥaddu b. Ṭayyib in the Banū Walishak to wait for motorised transport to Anwāl. The first part of the journey had been undertaken using the labour of Spanish prisoners but bin 'Abd al-Karīm had sent word that they should all be taken to Anwāl as well and not be used for these tasks. This put Ḥaddu in a difficult situation for he now had no way of moving equipment, except by requisitioning baggage animals from the neighbouring tribes—which might have alienated them further.

There were still large quantities of stores that had not been gathered up—eight guns and their ammunition were being held in 'Azīb Miḏār, in the Banū Tūzin, and there were four more in the Banū Bū Bakar clan of the al-Maṭālsa:

"As for the two cannons that are on the road in the Banū Walishak, I have ordered Sayyid Ḥammush to take them from there, but he has disobeyed me, and

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Diciembre, Resumen General, 2 Dec. 1921.
2 Ibid., Resumen General, 4 Dec. 1921.
3 Ibid., Resumen General, 10 Dec. 1921.
they are still there, and the shepherds are playing with them and breaking them."

The latter remark shows quite clearly the psychological distance between the relatively technocratic Rifī leadership and many of the local people. The area of land that was Ḫaddū's responsibility was clearly enormous—he talked of setting up a customs post between the Rifīs and the French far to the south-east of the Banū Bū Yaḥyā at Ramila, near Ziyyash on the Mulūya, south of the Spanish zone border. For this he said he would need 50 men, two large tents, four horses and two mules, as well as an 'āmīn to take charge.

By and large, however, the Banū Bū Yaḥyā were moving closer to submitting to the Spanish, although the Banū Saʿīd seem to have rallied against them slightly, and were talking of setting up more customs posts on the Kart. The Rifī forward positions in mid-December were now only just east of the Kart—at Izamūrān, and Sammar in the Banū Bū Gafar and Tawmiyyat al-Shamāl and Tawmiyyat al-Junūb in the Banū Sida‘l, with their headquarters at Bū Irmānā in the Banū Saʿīd.

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to reinforce the eastern front by recruiting more men in the Rif. He sent a Ghumārī faqīh named 'Azība to raise men for Dār Kabdānī, and Raʾīs Misaʿūd "Sibara" was reported to be recruiting men in the Ghumārā. However, the garrison at Tistūtīn was withdrawn

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 18, Información Diciembre, Resumen General, 11 Dec. 1921.
5 Ibid., Resumen General, 16 Dec. 1921.
6 Ibid., Resumen General, 18 Dec. 1921.
7 Ibid., Resumen General, 20 Dec. 1921.
and bin Shillāl, the local commander who was camped nearby, indicated that he would submit when the Spanish occupied that position.¹

The Rifī reinforcements arrived in Bū Irmana around 2 December 1921 and tightened up on security considerably.² Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had had three men from the Banū Tūzin shot a day or so previously for contact with the Spanish.³ But the Banū Sa‘īd were still restless. They complained that the Rifī ḥarka was causing considerable damage.⁴ On 26 December, the Rifī guard at Sammar in the Banū Bū Gafar was withdrawn.⁵ By now there were almost no Rifī forces east of the Karṭ. The Spanish, on the other hand, had crossed the Karṭ further south, and taken Tikarmīn in the Banū Sidal on 22 December 1921.⁶

The Rifīs made serious efforts to prevent any more defections. On 1 January 1922 it was announced at Bū Irmana that any Qal‘ayīs who attempted to return home from the Banū Sa‘īd would be executed if they were caught.⁷ Kandūssī and Sabūsh Sabāsh were fortified with trenches, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm was reported to be on the way with very substantial reinforcements.⁸ But these precautions did not avail them.

On 9 January 1922 Spanish troops reoccupied Dār Drūsh.⁹

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¹ Ibid., Resumen General, 22 Dec. 1921.
² Ibid., Resumen General, 24 Dec. 1921.
³ Ibid., Resumen General, 23 Dec. 1921.
⁴ Ibid., Resumen General, 25 Dec. 1921.
⁵ Ibid., telephone message from Iaznān (Banū Bū Gafar), 26 Dec. 1921.
⁷ SMH Melilla Leg. 20, Información Enero, Resumen de Confidencias, 1 Jan. 1922.
⁸ Ibid., Minuta para información de hoy, 4 Jan. 1922.
⁹ The Times, 13 Jan. 1922, p.9, dated Madrid, 10 Jan. 1922.
Vaddu b. Šammu had been unable to evacuate all the war material there—for they found 15 lorries still intact.\(^1\)

In almost exactly four months they had recovered most of the easily-occupied plateau region, but they were still held up by the mountains. As *The Times* correspondent pointed out, "The Spaniards have made a great effort but the end is still far off."\(^2\)

*The Intimidation Begins*

It was clear that the Spanish would only be able to move forward with the consent of the local inhabitants. Their next objective, of course, was the Banū Sa'īd, for the Spanish front lines bordered on that tribe on two sides. This tribe, in particular, was by no means entirely reliable in the Rifī cause.

The most important leader of the Banū Sa'īd, Qaddur b. 'Amar, made contact with the Spanish after the occupation of Dār Drīūsh.\(^3\) He was not alone in his lukewarm feelings for further resistance. There was a meeting of many demoralised representatives of the tribe at Talat, which expressed a strong view that they should stop fighting Spain. On the same day, 10 or 11 January 1922, another meeting at Bū Irmāna, which was attended by Qaddur b. 'Amar, came to the same conclusion.\(^4\)

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to stop the growing demoralisation by tightening control. He had appointed ḍā'īds in

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1. Ibid.
Banū Sa'id and Banū Walishak just before the fall of Dār Drūsh. Now he appointed more qā'idās to take charge of those who had fled beyond the Karṭ in the face of the Spanish. The men concerned had been among his firmest supporters in the Qal'aya—Ismā'īl Wuld al-Shadīl for the Mazūja tribe and Idrīs Mīmūn Ḫujja for the Banū Bū Iffūr. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to prevent any lessening of the resistance from the Banū Sa'id by writing to the ḥarka in Bū Irmāna appealing for it to remain where it was. This was unsuccessful, for the Banū Sa'dīs wanted to go home.

On 16 January, it was reported that the death penalty would be imposed on any Banū Sa'idīs who attempted to cross to the Spanish occupied zone. On the same day, bin 'Abd al-Karīm set out for a meeting at Anwāl with shaykhs of the Banū Tūzīn, Timsamān, Banū Walishak and the Banū Sa'id with the aim of organising a ḥarka to garrison Miḍār and Tafarsit. This so frightened the muqaddam of Tafarsit, Shaykh Ḥaddu, that he fled for safety to 'Azīb Miḍār in the Banū Tūzīn "for fear of b. 'Abd al-Karīm's punishment."

The basis of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's strength was the support of the Banū Waryaghāl. Spanish intelligence sources indicated that he could mobilise 10,000 men from his own tribe.

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1 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 7 Jan. 1922.
2 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 13 Jan. 1922.
3 It will be remembered that Wuld al-Shadīl had been one of the group who, with bin 'Abd al-Karīm and others, had been contacted by bin Ka'ab on behalf of Mūlāy Hafīẓ in 1918, see above, p. 188.
4 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 14 Jan. 1922.
5 Ibid., Capt. Gávila, 16 Jan. 1922.
7 Ibid., T.O.C. Coronel Tropas Policía to Capitán Dār Drūsh, Melilla, 18 January 1922, URGENTE.
The implied threat that treachery would be severely punished was ignored by Qaddur b. 'Amar. He offered to group all the Qal'ayis in the Banū Sa'īd together so that they could all surrender at the same time when the Spanish advanced. Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm started to fulfil his threats. A few days later he arrested a Matālsī and three Tūzānis who had visited the Spanish in Dār Drīush.

The death penalty was again announced for anyone who left his post, and finally Qaddur b. 'Amar was himself arrested. Qaddur was too powerful to be imprisoned for long, however, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to buy his allegiance by offering him the pose of qā'id in the Banū Sa'īd, which he refused.

Meanwhile, more forces were moved into the area—about 2,000 came from the central Rif tribes of the Buqquya, Banū Yiṭṭuft, Banū Bū Frāhī and Banū 'Amārt, with the main contingent from the Banū Waryaghal, and were sent to besiege Dār Drīush. Another 1,800, mainly Banū Walishak and Banū Waryaghal were reported in the Banū Walishak. 300 Gaznaya (under al-Ḥājj Bil-Qīsh), 300 Banū Tūzīn and 100 Waryaghalls arrived in Miḍār, another 1,800 were reported in Tafarsit drawn from the Banū Waryaghal (under Yazīd b. Ḥammu), the Timsamān (under Muḥammad Bū Qaddur), and the Banū Tūzīn, and 800 Waryaghalls and Walishakīs were reported in the

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Enero, Minuta par la información de hoy, 19 Jan. 1922.
2 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 21 Jan. 1922
3 Ibid., Capitán Gávila, 22 Jan. 1922.
4 Skiraj, op. cit., p. 59.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Enero, Capitán Gávila, 28 Jan. 1922
6 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 20 Jan. 1922.
7 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 22 Jan. 1922.
zawiya of Sidi 'Abdallah in the Banu Walishak. ¹

However, the Spanish attack did not come at once, for they were trying to use the dissatisfaction of the Banu Sa'id with the Rifis to prepare the ground for their advance politically, and trying to persuade people from the tribes of the Qal'aya to return home. ² This took time and there were no advances towards the central Rif in February at all. The Spanish were fairly successful in persuading members of the Banu Sidal to return. During February, 386 heads of family came back— as opposed to 80 in January 1922—and handed in 117 Mausers and 22 other firearms in the process. ³ Markets were held normally both in the Banu Sidal and the Banu Bu Ya'hyi, although there was none in the Banu Bu Gafar. ⁴ The only military operations in the whole of the eastern zone were towards the south. In an attempt to counteract strong French propaganda aimed at attracting people to their zone, ⁵ Spanish forces moved down to Hassi Birkân on the borders of the Ulad Sittut and Banu Bu Ya'hyi on 14 February and Sūq al-Arba'a of Harrayg on 17 February 1922. ⁶

But although they did not advance, the Spanish continued to bomb Rif positions, particularly in the Banu Sa'id, who became still more demoralised as a result. ⁷ It

¹ Ibid., Capt. 8a Mía to Coronel Tropas de Policia, Dār Druush, 26 Jan. 1922.
² Berenguer, op. cit., p. 179.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Memorias, Memoria de la 6a Mía, Beni Sidel, Febrero de 1922.
⁴ Ibid., and Memoria de la 9a Mía, Beni Bu Gafar, Febrero de 1922, and Memoria de la 7a Mía, Beni Bu Hayi, Febrero de 1922.
⁵ Ibid., Memoria de la 5a Mía, Ulad Sittut; Febrero de 1922.
⁷ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Febrero, Minuta para la información de hoy, 1 Feb. 1922.
was becoming more and more important for b. 'Abd al-Karîm to seem to do something about Spanish air raids, and he started to say that his own aeroplanes—seven of them—would soon arrive to deal with the Spanish. In order to pay for them, or perhaps simply to raise money, he tried to impose a tax of 5 pts a head "to buy 'planes". The Banû Sa'id, unimpressed by this, refused at first, and when he did succeed in taxing some of the tribe, a few days later, he only retained 200 pts for himself and left the rest to be shared out among the notables of the tribe.

The Banû Sa'id was not the only tribe that was insecure, of course. Some of the al-Mata. had been willing to submit to the Spanish since mid-January because they needed to reopen their markets to the Spanish and French-occupied tribes. Towards the end of January, three leaders of the Kalalsha sub-clan of the Ulâd Sâlim clan around Sûq al-Thalâthâ had submitted, and many more might have done if they had not been frightened of Rifî reprisals. At the beginning of February, presumably in order to ensure his control over the Mataísis, bin 'Abd al-Karîm tried to disarm them, but they refused to hand over their guns. In mid-February they refused to take part in any harkas, despite threats; the only serious opposition to the Spanish in the tribe came from their old opponent Bû Raḥayl.

1 Ibid., Capt. Gavila, 9 Feb. 1922.
2 Ibid., Capt. Longoria, 6 Feb. 1922.
3 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 10 Feb. 1922.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía, T. O. C. Capitán Dâr Drûsh to Coronel Policía, Dâr Drûsh, 18 Jan. 1922.
5 Ibid., Información Drûsh, 26 Jan. 1922.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Febrero, Minuta para la información de hoy, 6 Feb. 1922.
7 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mía--Febrero, Información Dâr Drûsh, 13 Feb. and 18 Feb. 1922.
Other tribes showed signs of weakening as well—the Rif tribes of Banū 'Amārt, Targīst, Banū Gamīl and the Banū Mazdūf and Zarkāt in the Sinhāja all refused a ḥarka for Anwāl, saying they preferred to fight the French. ¹ People from the Banū Walishak came or wrote to the Spanish in Dār Drūsh offering friendship, so did Tūzānīs from Miḏār, and shaykhs from Tafarsit—including Ḥaddu b. al-Muqaddam, the man who had given so much trouble to Ḥaddu al-Kaḥal in October of the previous year.²

Although bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to prevent treachery by further arrests—several men from the Banū Saʿīd were arrested on 26 February for their relations with the Spanish³—the local opposition to him was too strong. This opposition was given a considerable stimulus by bin 'Abd al-Karīm’s efforts to tax the tribes.

The First Taxation

For the first time, bin 'Abd al-Karīm attempted to tax the tribes at a fixed rate. It caused uproar, partly because of the amount, and partly because of the way in which it was collected. Initially, the tax, supposedly to buy aeroplanes, was fixed at 5 pts per head.⁴ However, it was raised through the qāʿids that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was now appointing in the eastern Rif. The Banū Saʿīd and Banū

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Enero, Minuta para la información de hoy, 8 Feb. 1922.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mía--Febrero, T.O.C. Capitan Policía to Coronel de Policía, Dār Drūsh, 7 Feb. 1922; and T.O.C. Capitán de Oficina to Coronel de Policía, Dār Drūsh, 12 Feb. 1922; and Información Dār Drūsh, 15 Feb. 1922.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Febrero, Minuta para la información de hoy, 27 Feb. 1922.
⁴ Ibid., Capt. Longoria, 6 Feb. 1922.
Walishak in particular took great exception to this, as, in traditional Moroccan fashion, the actual tax levied was up to two times the nominal amount, with the excess kept by the gā'ids.¹ Not surprisingly, the pro-Spanish party in the Banū Sa'īd attempted to use this in their subversion of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's gā'ids.² In the Banū Tūzīn, the Qā'id Muḥammad b. Ḥaddu b. 'Alī caused much unrest because of his "exactions" but, as a Spanish intelligence report put it, "as people have no [outside] help, they have to resign themselves, and put up with these abuses, without showing their feelings openly for fear of reprisals and punishments."³ Bin 'Abd al-Karīm apparently also wanted to appoint a gā'īd in the Gaznaya tribe, but with the example of the Banū Tūzīn on their borders, there was considerable feeling against this, and many Gaznayīs left the harka and returned home.⁴ In addition to the quarrel with the Gaznaya as a whole, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had already fallen out over prisoners with the most important gā'īd of that tribe, Bil-Qīsh,⁵ who had tried to raise the Banū Tūzīn in revolt against bin 'Abd al-Karīm and failed.⁶

At the end of February, bin 'Abd al-Karīm backed down and reduced the taxation to 2.5 pts per head. Nevertheless, the produce of the tax was still large—he estimated it at 10,000 pesetas per tribe,⁷ although this could not have

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mía--Febrero, Información Dár Dārūsh, 2 Feb. 1922.
² Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 16 Feb. 1922.
³ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 20 Feb. 1922.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 18 Feb. 1922.
⁶ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 16 Feb. 1922.
⁷ Ibid., Información Dár Dārūsh, 6 Feb. 1922.
been nearly enough.

It could not have been sufficient because the numbers of troops that had to be supported was still very large. The ḥarka in the Banū Walishak was growing, as was that in 'Azīb Miṣār—estimated at 1,800 on 26 February, mainly made up of Tūzānīs and Gaznayīs, once again led by Bil-Qīsh, who seems to have temporarily patched up his quarrel with bin 'Abd al-Karīm.¹

More Conflict in the Riff Camp

If the truce with Bil-Qīsh held for the moment, the general feeling of discontent persisted. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm tried to win some support by lessening the rigours of his rule, firstly by releasing some of the Qal'ayĪ leaders he was holding prisoner,² and secondly by reducing somewhat the restrictions on commerce with the Spanish-occupied tribes. Even the latter concession had a fiscal intention to it: for all merchandise moving between the zones was to be taxed, and security was not relaxed, for all those who made the journey would be searched for documents on their return.³

The concessions had some effect and relations with the Banū Sa‘īd began to ease⁴ to the extent that the ḥarka in the tribe increased to 1,000 men of whom only 100 were from the Banū Waryaghal.⁵ The ḥarkas grew elsewhere as well

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¹ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 25 Feb. 1922.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Marzo, Mía de vigilancia, 6 Mar. 1922.
³ Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 1 Mar. 1922: the tax was set at 2 pts/100 eggs, 25 cts/chicken, 15 pts/cow.
⁴ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 2 Mar. 1922.
⁵ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 7 Mar. 1922.
--900 were reported in Tafarsit, 500 in Mi’dar in the Banū Tūzin, and 900 more spread around the Banū Walishak, where defence works--trenches and blocked roads--were finished at the beginning of the month, and guards placed at Dār Mizzyān, Sūq al-‘Arba’ā and al-Naẓūr.

This growth in the ḥarka was accompanied by a propaganda campaign, based on two major themes--the promise of outside help and the possibility of buying aeroplanes to fight the Spanish.

The Spanish, probably because of pressure from Madrid for a less active policy, had lessened the number of bombing raids on the Rīf concentrations. This was explained in the Rīf in the form of a rumour that the "Powers" had prohibited Spain from bombing them. By mid-March, bin ʿAbd al-Karīm was claiming that the "civilised nations" had recognised the Rīf as an independent state. This piece of propaganda was in some sense ironic, for it proclaimed the independence of the Rīf from one European state, Spain, because other European nations recognised it.

At the same time, bin ʿAbd al-Karīm gave out that, since he had collected 10,000 pts from the gāʿid of each tribe, he would soon be able to buy three aeroplanes. Genuine proof of his forces' growing technical superiority was given on 19 March by sinking the Spanish gunboat Juan de Juanés in Alhucemas Bay with guns they had captured off the

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1 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 11 Mar. 1922.
2 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 6 Mar. 1922.
3 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 12 Mar. 1922.
4 Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 15 Mar. 1922.
5 Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, evidence of a Jewish informant from the Banū Saʿīd, 13 Mar. 1922.
6 Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 15 Mar. 1922.
Spanish during the summer.¹

However, these efforts did not entirely quieten all opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karîm. The Banû Sa'îd was split into two parties. The first, in the area west of Kabdânî, hostile to the Spanish, and the second, east of Kabdânî, less hostile²—possibly because they were nearer the Spanish front lines. Qaddur b. 'Amar, as usual, tried to play along with both sides. In mid-March he finally agreed to take a position of responsibility under bin 'Abd al-Karîm as an amîn of all the qâ'idîs of the different tribes.³ This did not prevent him from making contact with the Spanish a few days after accepting the appointment, although it appeared he was still too frightened of bin 'Abd al-Karîm to help the Spanish in any concrete way.⁴ Nor did these contacts with Spain prevent him from encouraging resistance to them by telling people that if the Spanish did occupy the Banû Sa'îd, they would mete out severe punishments for the Anwâl defeats.⁵ Finally, on 21 March, conflicting reports arrived that Qaddur b. 'Amar was both calling for war against the Spanish,⁶ and telling people not to fight the Spanish.⁷ Clearly Qaddur b. 'Amar was not to be relied upon by anyone, for his one care was for the security of his own position, and by playing both sides he hoped to emerge on top in the end.

² SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Marzo, 'Allâl al-Daḥû, 18 Mar. 1922.
³ Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 15 Mar. 1922.
⁴ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 17 Mar. 1922.
⁵ Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 20 Mar. 1922.
⁶ Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 21 Mar. 1922.
⁷ Ibid., Capt. Gávila, 21 Mar. 1922.
But the fickleness of the Sa‘Idi leader was by no means bin ‘Abd al-Karîm's worst problem. For he still had other, more faithful allies in the tribe, including his qa‘ids in the tribe, especially Salah, a long-standing supporter. He felt anyway that he could control the situation in the Banû Sa‘Id by intimidation—at the end of March he called all the leaders of the Banû Sa‘Id to see him, apparently in the hope of holding them hostage against the continued resistance of their tribe to the Spanish. There were other equally serious problems—subversion in his own base, the Banû Waryaghal, and a renewal of operations by the Spanish.

In the Banû Waryaghal, he arrested 4 shaykhs—unfortunately they are not named—around 7 March. On 25 March it was reported that there was no food in Ajdîr and the inhabitants were forced to agree to reopen commercial relations with the island, and to refrain from attacking it. This happened at the end of a month in which the island itself was shelled—on 18 March—and a Spanish gunboat had been sunk.

The renewed military activities of the Spanish were of course even more dangerous, not only from a military but from a psychological point of view, for they effectively contradicted bin ‘Abd al-Karîm's propaganda that the European powers were preventing Spain from advancing.

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1 Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 21 Mar. 1922. Salah was one of the Sa‘Idis with whom bin ‘Abd al-Karîm had been in contact in June 1921, before the Spanish retreat, see above, pp. 312–314.
2 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 30 Mar. 1922.
3 Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, Melilla, 7 Mar. 1922.
4 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 25 Mar. 1922
The Spanish Advance Begins Again

From Mid-January to mid-March the Spanish had not advanced appreciably. This was the result partly of a desire to prepare the ground politically and partly of uncertainty about the policy of the Madrid government.

The Maura cabinet was divided in its attitude to the Moroccan war. Opinions ranged between withdrawing to the coastal strip only, withdrawing to the coastal strip and occupying Alhucemas Bay to take out the centre of the "rebellion", and an all-out effort against bin 'Abd al-Karīm and al-Raisūlī.¹

These views were eventually discussed at a conference in the Spanish province of Málaga from 4 to 6 February 1922. Various members of the government and several military chiefs were there—including Berenguer. The conference decided to work for the defeat of al-Raisūlī, the formation of an advanced line in the east, and the occupation of Alhucemas. This was to be done by relying on native troops--while the bulk of Spanish troops were brought home--and the establishment of a "true" Protectorate.² The latter was a policy of considerable vagueness and seems to have meant the use of indirect rule through local qā'īds and "native" officials. As such, it was the heir to the policy of peaceful penetration, a policy which ill accorded with the demands for military victory. This contradiction was symptomatic of Spanish policy of the time.

² Ibid., p. 74.
These policies were never put into effect, for the Liberal Party brought the Spanish coalition government down and it was replaced by an all-Conservative government headed this time by José Sánchez-Guerra, who cancelled the Alhucemas landing, thereby once again provoking Berenger's resignation. This resignation was refused.¹

But although the new government was unwilling to see major operations in Morocco, Sánchez-Guerra's final objective was the eventual occupation of all the Spanish zone. Operations, in a small way, began again on 7 March.² On 14 and 15 March, the first operations using armoured cars in Morocco took place, as Spanish forces moved north-east from Dār Drīṣh into the Banū Sa‘İd and occupied the Ambār and Tugūntz areas.³ Rifī casualties were reported to be heavy—an estimated 260 on 15 March alone.⁴ These were the first operations under a new Comandante General in Melilla—José Sanjurjo,⁵ and he continued the action against the Banū Sa‘İd.

At the beginning of April, Spanish troops occupied Shammurra in the eastern part of the Banū Sa‘İd,⁶ on 8 April, Dār Kabdānī in the centre of the tribe,⁷ where they reportedly found 1,400 Spanish corpses unburied since the retreat of July 1921.⁸ Three days later, Timajast, between

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¹ Ibid., pp. 74-75.
² Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 263.
³ Ibid.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Marzo, Mía de vigilancia, 17 Mar. 1922.
⁵ Fleming, op. cit., p. 76.
⁶ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 263.
⁷ Berenguerr, op. cit., p. 193.
⁸ FO 371/8434/W3351/171/28, Melville to Howard, Madrid, 14 Apr. 1922.
Kabdâni and the sea, was occupied, thus surrounding the Rif concentration in Jabal Mawrû. By April, most of this concentration had surrendered, and Berenguer decided that the Banû Sa'îd campaign was over.

At this point Sanjurjo was recalled from Melilla to take command of operations in the Jibâla and was replaced by General Julio Ardanaz. This caused some confusion in the military command in the eastern zone, but before he left, Sanjurjo supervised the advance into the al-Matâlsa (Shaif was taken on 19 April) and the remaining portion of the Banû Bû Yaḥyâ, taking Afsu on 27 April.

The Riffis Fight Back

However, the Spanish did not make their advances without opposition. Guns were plentiful for the Riffis and ammunition was cheap—cartridges were priced at 18 pts a hundred at the beginning of April. However, cannon shells were not reaching the eastern front. They were being used elsewhere. On 3 April, an attack began on the Peñón de Vélez which lasted several days. Riffi forces captured a small islet which had previously been linked to the Spanish rock by a wooden bridge which had recently collapsed and, under covering fire from the islet and from heavy guns on shore, they attempted to capture the Peñón itself. They

1 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 193.
2 Ibid.
3 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 263.
4 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 198.
5 Ibid.
6 SHM Melilla, Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mía—Abril, Información, Dây Drûsh, 3 Apr. 1922.
failed in this attempt, but did succeed in getting within the walls before they were repulsed.\textsuperscript{1} The Spanish response was to bomb many places on the coasts—the open-air markets in particular provided excellent targets.\textsuperscript{2}

Despite the attacks on markets, they were well stocked. Sugar, smuggled in from the French zone, sold at 2.50–3.00 pts a loaf and oil from the western plains, 2.00–2.75 pts a litre; in addition, a great deal of contraband was getting in through the Qal‘aya and Banū Bū Yaḥyi.\textsuperscript{3}

Several places were strongly guarded—on 13 April, there were reported to be about 200 in ‘Azīb Miḍār, about 400 in Tafarsit, and at least 400 in the Banū Walishak,\textsuperscript{4} although the numbers tended to fall at the end of the month.\textsuperscript{5} Many of the people who were not yet occupied by the Spanish were showing strong pro-Spanish feelings, particularly in the al-Maṭālsa.\textsuperscript{6} These were kept in check by the presence of the ḥarka,\textsuperscript{7} although it was difficult to get the Maṭālsīs to form a ḥarka of their own.\textsuperscript{8} The rump of the Banū Sa‘īd was now opposed to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm and his new qā'id guwwād, Qaddur b. ‘Amar. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm countered the defections with a mixture of propaganda and repression. In the first week of April, 14 Shaykhs—Sa‘īds and exiled Qal‘ayīs—were arrested and told that if they did not fight, their goods

\textsuperscript{1} The Times, 12 Apr. 1922, p. 11, dated Madrid, 10 Apr. 1922, and 17 Apr. 1922, p. 9, dated Madrid, 156 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 13 Apr. 1922, p. 11. dated Madrid, 11 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{3} SHM. Melilla Leg. 201, Información de la Semana—Abril, Información, Dār Drūsh, 3 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 13 Apr. 1922
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 20 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 4 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 22 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 18 Apr. 1922.
would be confiscated.\textsuperscript{1} Towards the end of the month, three Sa‘Idīs and a Qal‘ayī were ordered to be beaten for communicating with Ḥab al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Ṭayyīb, the former shaykh of the Banū Shikār, now working for the Native Affairs Office.\textsuperscript{2} On 30 April, a family from the Banū Sidal which had fled from the Spanish came to Dār Drūsh and submitted. The head of the family, one ‘Amar Altal b. Misāʿūd, told a horrific story of his treatment as a suspected "friend of Spain". Bin Ḥab al-Karīm had him arrested and taken to Ajdir along with his son. Here they were both imprisoned, chained by the feet and neck. They were freed on payment of 5,000 pesetas but bin Ḥab al-Karīm also confiscated 200 sheep, 144 goats, 10 cows, 2 mules, 2 asses and a horse, all his furniture and 60 quintals of barley.\textsuperscript{3} The quantities were probably extremely exaggerated (the 236 families who returned to his neighbouring tribe of Banū Bu Gafar in April only brought back 119 cows, 183 goats and 306 sheep between them),\textsuperscript{4} but clearly the intimidation (and, possibly, the severity of the treatment) was real enough. Towards the end of April, bin Ḥab al-Karīm tried to use the propaganda benefits of foreign support. If Spanish reports are to be believed, the Rif at this time was remarkably full of Frenchmen. Two were first reported in Shaif (al-Matālsa) on 11 April, only a week before that position’s capture by the Spanish, carrying out "topographical work",\textsuperscript{5} but were then

\textsuperscript{1} SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 4a Mía, Informe, 6 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{2} SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía—Abril, Información, Dār Drūsh, 22 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 30 Apr. 1922.
\textsuperscript{4} SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Memorias, Memoria de la 9a Mía—Beni Bu Gafar, Abril—April 1922.
\textsuperscript{5} SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía—Abril, T.O.C. Captain 8a Mía—Coronel Tropas Policía, Dār Drūsh, 11 Apr. 1922.
reported to be negotiating the supply of aeroplanes under
the aegis of Ḥaddu b. Ḥammu. On 11 April, three more
Frenchmen were reported, and a few days later, an apparently
different group of French were supposed to be negotiating
mineral rights in the Banū Waryaghal and other central Rif tribes. Clearly with the Spanish advancing, bin ʿAbd
al-Karīm needed another secure entry for supplies and this
could only be through the French zone.

Contact with the French

With the Spanish advance getting closer to the
central Rif, bin ʿAbd al-Karīm was desperately anxious to
look for an alternative source of support. With a severe
shortage of food, the French zone was an obvious source of
supplies. Clearly it was in the Rifis' interest to keep in
contact with the French, for they were the only possible
nation towards which they could look for support—the German
option had by now finally receded (although the Turks were
to have a considerable attraction later in 1922 when the
extent of Mustapha Kemal's victories over the Greeks became
apparent).

Effective contacts with the French began in mid-
March 1922. Spanish informants reported that bin ʿAbd
al-Karīm had written to the French authorities at Tāza that
the eastern and central Rif tribes would help the French to
occupy the Rif if they landed at Sidi Idrīs in the Timsamān.

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1 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 12 Apr. 1922.
2 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 18 Apr. 1922.
3 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 21 Apr. 1922.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Marzo, Minuta para la
información de hoy, 12 Mar. 1922.
Another informant at the same time said that the plan was that four notables of each tribe would go to the French and submit to them.\(^1\) Clearly this plan would not have met with universal approval—certainly those tribes of the western Rif and Sinhaja that were actively fighting the French in preference to the Spanish\(^2\) would not have been pleased, and in the Rif itself the report was linked with a rumour that bin "Abd al-Karîm wanted to end the war and leave the Rif.\(^3\) Obviously this last allegation was unfounded, for it was just at the stage when bin "Abd al-Karîm was encouraging resistance by promising aeroplanes and larger barkas, but it did show a certain level of disillusion—and, perhaps, a feeling that, by contact with the French, bin "Abd al-Karîm was becoming too close to the Christians.

During April, the main contact with the French was with individuals representing mining companies, but the promise of French support re-emerged in May. With the Spanish practically in the Rif, the Timsamân asked what they should do—bin "Abd al-Karîm replied that shortly "another nation will come to govern them, and the Spanish will go away."\(^4\)

The Pro-Spanish Party Gains Strength

Despite his propaganda, and promises of outside help, bin "Abd al-Karîm's support continued to crumble. The centres of opposition to him were the al-Matûlsa, Gaznaya

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1 Ibid., Mía de vigilancia, 13 Mar. 1922.
2 See above, p. 402.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Marzo, Mía de vigilancia, 13 Mar. 1922.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de Mayo—8a Mía, Información, Dâr Drûsh, 24 May 1922.
and the rump of the Banū Saʿīd.

At the beginning of May, the Spanish were convinced that the al-Maṭālsa were about to submit to them. They believed that contacts with shaykhs in the Awlād Bū Bakar clan around Sūq al-Thalathā' would bring that clan over, that there was strong support for the Spanish in the Awlād ʿIdra, and that the Fatāsha clan was all pro-Spanish, so they should be able to take Sūq al-Thalathā', even though a ḏarka might be expected to move against them, made up of the Gaznaya and Banū Tūzīn and the Awlād Idrīs clan of the al-Maṭālsa.1

Nevertheless, there were still large Rīfī concentrations in the Tafarsit (estimated at 900), Miḍār, Sīdī Misaʿūd (in the unoccupied part of the Banū Saʿīd) and in the Banū Walishak, totalling in all about 2,500 men.2 On the other hand, there were offers of help for the Spanish from Miḍār3 and Tafarsit,4 and yet more from the al-Maṭālsa.5

Even those who wanted to fight the Spanish were disheartened and when, on 9 or 10 May, bin-ʿAbd al-Karīm called a meeting in Ajḍīr for representatives of the tribes to meet some French representatives, the few that did turn

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1 Ibid., report: "Situación política de la Kábila de Metalsa para la ocupación de Zoko el Telatza de Ulad Bu Becquer", 3 May 1922.
2 Ibid., T.O.C. Capt. 8a Mia to Cor. Policía, Dār Drūsh, 3 May 1922; and Información, Dār Drūsh, 7 May 1922; and T.O.C. Capt. 8a Mia to Cor. Policía, 9 May 1922. The principal Rīfī position was Miḍār (about 700), Tafarsit (c. 900), Banū Walishak (about 900) and Sīdī Misaʿūd (Banū Saʿīd) (between 150 and 300). The garrisons were mainly formed of men from the central Rīf tribes—Banū Waryaghah, Timsamān, Banū Tūzīn, and Gaznaya.
3 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 7 May 1922.
4 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 10 May 1922.
5 Ibid., T.O.C., Capt. 8a Mia to Cor. Policía, Dār Drūsh, 10 May 1922.
up showed their discouragement and
"... told him that the tribes are disgusted to see
that there is no progress, that they have payed out
a great deal [in taxes] and have seen no sign of
either guns nor aeroplanes, and for this reason it
is difficult to form harkas."

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's response to this was to make vague
promises that the Spanish would be thrown out when Ramaḍān
was over, and that when the "mines" were opened there would
be "untold benefits" for them all.

There were yet more defections from the Rīfī
cause from the Gaznaya and al-Maṭālsa, and the Banū Tūzīn.
In particular, groups in the Gaznaya offered to
help the Spanish. 'Abd al-Karīm decided to resort to more
drastic methods than propaganda in an effort to ensure that
disloyalty did not continue. Qaddur b. Amār was imprisoned
again, along with other leaders of the Banū Saʿīd and
Bū Raḥayl, the Rīfī leader's strongest supporter in the
al-Maṭālsa attempted to stop commerce between the Spanish
in Dār Drūsh and his own tribe, but was told by other shaykhs
of the al-Maṭālsa that if he did not stop bothering them he
would be banned from the tribe's markets. At attempt to
help Bū Raḥayl by banning the Maṭālsīs from other markets in
the Rīf failed when the people of 'Azīb Miḍār refused to
enforce the rule. Finally, bin 'Abd al-Karīm brought more
troops into the front line areas—a reported 2,000 arrived

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1 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 10 May 1922.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 12 May 1922; and
Información, Dār Drūsh, 13 May 1922; and T.O.C. Capt. 8a
Mía to Cor. Tropas de Policía, Dār Drūsh, 20 May 1922.
4 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 24 May 1922; and
Información, Dār Drūsh, 25 May 1922.
5 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 22 May 1922.
on 25-26 May, and more dissenters were arrested. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm's tactics were partly conciliatory and partly aggressive—when the Banû Walishak refused to accept his qa'id, he appointed new, more agreeable ones, and arrested several more shaykhs of the tribe.

Some of the prisoners were quickly released—including Qaddur b. 'Amar and Muḥammad Bû Qaddur of the Timsamân who had also been arrested briefly—provided that they led the harka against the Spanish. Their families and stock were kept as hostages against their cooperation.

Finally, bin 'Abd al-Karîm announced that everyone must join the harka or heavy penalties—ranging from death, according to one account, to a fine, according to another—would be imposed. Certainly some people were executed for contact with the Spanish—two Qallayîs were shot for this at the end of May, for by writing to the Spanish they could have been spying. This did not stop the tide of offers of submission to the Spanish. Six Gaznayîs came to Dâr Drîush

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1 Ibid., T.O.C. Capt. 8a Mía to Cor. Policía, 20 May 1922. The main Rifî positions were 'Azîb Miḍâr (about 500), Tafarsit (about 800), Ajîdîr (border of Banû Sa'id and Banû Walishak) (about 800), and Dâr Mizzyân (Banû Walishak) (about 200).

2 Ibid., T.O.C. Capt. 8a Mía to Cor. Policía, Dâr Drîush, 27 May 1922.

3 Ibid., Información, Dâr Drîush, 28 May 1922. This report mentions another 300 Timsamânis in the zawiya of S. Ghaib (Wardâna, Banû Walishak).

4 Ibid. Bû Qaddur, it will be remembered, was qa'id of the Rabâ'a Fawqânî clan of the Timsamân. His effort to maintain that position had led him to cultivate first German and then Spanish support, and when bin 'Abd al-Karîm took over in the Rif, formed an uneasy alliance with him. See above, pp. 188-189.

5 Ibid., and SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Mayo, Resumen General de Confidencias, 27 May 1922.

6 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Duro, Información, Dâr Drîush, 2 June 1922.
on 5 June, there was fighting between Bū Raḥayl and other Maṭālisīs, and by mid-June the numbers garrisoning many of the positions were falling—especially in 'Azīb Miḍār, although Tafarsit and the Banū Walishak were reinforced. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm did try to take measures against the Gaznaya who were opposed to him, and started to organise a harka against them. However, even more serious problems were arising in the west. These were mainly caused by 'Abd al-Mālik in alliance with the principal leader of the Marnīsa, 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu.

'Abd al-Mālik and 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu Oppose bin 'Abd al-Karīm

After his refusal to help 'Abd al-Karīm against the Spanish, 'Abd al-Mālik had been preparing to resist him for some time. His base was once again in the Sinḥāja Srair. He had found a powerful ally in the person of 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu of the neighbouring tribe of Marnīsa. The basis of their alliance would appear to be mutual self-interest; 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu saw his position threatened by the growing authority of bin 'Abd al-Karīm, and 'Abd al-Mālik was worried by bin 'Abd al-Karīm's apparent goodwill towards the French, his own enemies. The other principal participant in the political quadrilateral which included 'Abd al-Mālik, 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu and bin 'Abd al-Karīm was al-Ḥājj Bil-Qish of the

1 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 5 June 1922.
2 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 4 June 1922; and ibid., Resumen General, 27 June 1922—when the Riff positions were 'Azīb Miḍār (very small), 'Azrū, and in the Banū Walishak: Taward (c. 400), Inuwatan (c. 30), Dār Mizzyān (c. 50), Naḡūr (c. 50).
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informaciones 4a Mía Amar Hamido, Información, 4a Mía, 1 July 1922 (No. 2).
4 Ibid., Información 4a Mía (No. 1), 1 July 1922.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mía Julio de 1922, Información Dār Drūsh, 1 July 1922.
Gaznaya. The various alliances between these four men—for, with the exception of 'Abd al-Mālik they all changed sides frequently and with extreme rapidity—were to play a major part in the political and military struggles of the Rif War. They show to an extraordinary extent the lengths to which individuals were prepared to go in order to maintain their own local power and authority and the nature of the problems which bin 'Abd al-Karīm encountered in imposing unity, under his control, in the Rif. As a result of the existence of powerful local leaders on the edge of the Rif, who were prepared to cooperate with anybody, even the Spanish and later the French, in the hope of maintaining their own positions, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was drawn into a series of wars of expansion, in which the new Rifī state slowly conquered areas far beyond its original linguistic or political borders.

In July 1922, bin 'Abd al-Karīm felt that he could rely on the assistance of al-Ḥājj Bil-Qiš, and he told him to try to persuade 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu, whose tribe the Mārsīṣa controlled the approaches to the Sinhāja, to submit to the Rifī leader. As an added inducement he took a large ḥarka (reportedly 1,800 men) into the Mārsīṣa. When they arrived they were met by 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, another Mārṣīṣa leader named 'Abd al-Sallām al-Yīdrī, and, ominously, 'Abd al-Mālik. In an attempt to secure the support of 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, bin 'Abd al-Karīm appointed him qā'id of the Mārsīṣa, and then convinced of his good faith, decided to move on, towards the Banū Zarwāl, in an attempt to convince the leader of the Darqāwīya tarīqa, 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Darqāwī to join him so as to make use of his considerable prestige in the Sinhāja.¹

¹ Ibid., Información Dār Drīš, 1 July 1922.
² Sīraj, op. cit., pp. 69-70. It will be remembered that
It will be noted, in the light of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's later battles with 'Abd al-Raḥmān that from the first he tried to win him over and to avoid an armed struggle. This pattern of trying to contact individual leaders to persuade them to join the Rifī coalition was typical of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's political activity, as was the response of people like 'Abd al-Raḥmān and 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu who generally refused to put themselves under his command. As a result, bin 'Abd al-Karīm, time and time again, was obliged to use force to compel submission.

On this occasion, however, bin 'Abd al-Karīm never had time to reach the Banū Zarwāl and make contact with 'Abd al-Raḥmān. Despite warnings from his companions that 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu was not to be trusted and should be made to accompany him, bin 'Abd al-Karīm left the Marnīṣī gā'id behind. This was a serious error of judgement, as it turned out, for as soon as bin 'Abd al-Karīm had left, 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu started to "disturb the peace", as Skīraj puts it. ¹

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm returned to the Marnīṣa to try to sort things out, but 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu attacked him and defeated him. ² Bin 'Abd al-Karīm then wrote to his

¹ Skīraj, op. cit., p. 70.
² Ibid.; and SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Harcas, A.I. 3a Melilla, nota, 2 July 1922.
brother Sī Maḥammad, and Muḥammad Azargān and told them to go to Tawriat in the Gāznayā to see al-Ḥājj Bil-Qīsh, who now showed signs of joining the "rebels", and to attack those Gāznayīs who were actually supporting ‘Abd al-Malīk. This was fairly successful, for on 4 July it was reported that bin Ḥamīdu had made a temporary peace with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm and that part of the Gāznayā had surrendered. The peace did not last long, however, for ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu called more people to support him, arresting shaykhs of the Banū ‘Amārt in order to ensure that tribe's support. The temporary peace had been arranged by Sīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda who for his part, however, appears to have favoured ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu, and the Spanish estimated that he was secretly encouraging the opposition to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm.

During the uneasy peace, the war of words went on. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm remained in the Marnīsa, almost surrounded by hostile forces. He was attacked again in the second week of July, and suffered some losses. But for the moment, the major conflict was one of propaganda. One of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's more important supporters, who was dubious about the propriety of fighting another Muslim when the Christians were on the borders of the Rif, was told by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm that ‘Amar Ḥamīdu was no Muslim but an "unbeliever", a remark of great significance, for it

1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 70.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mia--Julio 1922, Información, Dár Drīsh, 4 July 1922.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 4a Mia Amar Hamido, Información, 4a Mia, 7 July 1922.
4 Ibid.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaciones Julio de 1922, Minuta de información, 15 July 1922.
categorised all those who were opposed to bin 'Abd al-Karlm as enemies of Islam and laid the basis for *jihād*, in effect, to be waged against Muslims. On 18-19 July, the fighting started again in earnest, and bin 'Abd al-Karlm was once again defeated—he lost a reported 25 dead and 56 wounded, along with a large supply of munitions. The French seized the opportunity to move their forces to the edge of the Marnīsa and this was interpreted locally as a gesture of encouragement for bin 'Abd al-Karlm.¹

Real help was on the way from the Rif as well. Bū Lahya, probably bin 'Abd al-Karlm's ablest commander at this stage of the war, had originally intended to meet him in the Banū Zarwāl. Now, having heard what had happened, he went into the Marnīsa, joined up with bin 'Abd al-Karlm,² and with the help of forces led by one of the Akhāmilshī sharifs of Tarqist succeeded in defeating 'Amar b. Ḫāmidū and Bil-Qīsh who had now definitely again joined the "rebels". Both the rebel leaders begged bin 'Abd al-Karlm's pardon,³ and another uneasy peace ensued.

Once again, the peace did not last long. By 24 July, the fighting had started again. 'Amar Ḫāmidū had now had offers of help from sections of the Banū Tūzīn, and bin 'Abd al-Karlm's efforts to quieten that tribe failed when his emissary was thrown out of Sūq al-Thalathā' of Azīlāf.⁴ But Bil-Qīsh had withdrawn from the struggle under intense pressure from the Banū Waryaghal, although he remained in

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información—Julio de 1922, Minuta de información, 19 July 1922.
² Skiraj, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información—Julio de 1922, Información del Capt. Alonso, 21 July 1922.
favour of 'Amar bin Ḩamīdu. However, despite a meeting which was called in Azilāf to discuss the fighting, at which there seems to have been strong support for 'Amar b. Ḩamīdu, nothing was done.

The fighting died down again but on 28 July, both bin 'Abd al-Karīm and 'Amar b. Ḩamīdu tried to recruit ḥarkas. 'Amar b. Ḩamīdu wrote to the Banū Tūzīn, the al-Maṭālsa, and the Qal'ayī exiles asking them to support him. Only the al-Maṭālsa with, of course, the exception of Bū Raḥayl, agreed but in the end they did nothing either. However, the Marnīsa itself was once again united behind 'Amar b. Ḩamīdu, and Bil-Qīsh and 'Abd al-Mālik between them were giving him considerable support.

This time, the peace lasted for some weeks, helped by the coming of ʿĪd al-Kabīr in the first few days of August 1922 and the intervention of mediators from the zawiya at Tīgīsas in the Ghumāra, who persuaded 'Amar b. Ḩamīdu to allow 'Abd al-Karīm to withdraw. Bin Ḩamīdu agreed provided bin 'Abd al-Karīm left him alone, "and each should command his own tribe." This was, in effect, a demand for a return to the old system of the highest effective unit being the tribe, in which there was a perpetual struggle for

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaciones--Julio de 1922, Minuta de información, 26 July 1922.
2 Ibid.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información de la 8a Mía--Julio 1922, T.O. Teniente 8a Mía to Cor. Tropas de Policía, Dār Drūsh, 29 July 1922.
4 Ibid., T.O. Teniente 8a Mía to Cor. Tropas de Policía, Dār Drūsh, 31 July 1922.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 4a Mía Amar Hamido, Información, 4a Mía, 24 July 1922.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía de Agosto de 1922, Información, Dār Drūsh, 1 Aug. 1922.
7 Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 2 Aug. 1922.
power. This was precisely the state of affairs which bin 'Abd al-Karīm had to transcend in order to fight the Spanish. For the moment, however, he was powerless to enforce his will and he agreed to withdraw. Of the 25 prisoners held by 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, 23 were released at the beginning of August and two were shot, despite the efforts of Bil-Qīsh and 'Abd al-Mālik to prevent any more bloodletting. But 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, Bil-Qīsh and 'Abd al-Mālik remained on their guard, and a ḥarka was formed in Azilāf.

For the moment this secondary war had subsided into an armed, and very wary, truce. It had caused immense damage to bin 'Abd al-Karīm's prestige. Not only had he failed to make progress in the Sinhāja but he had also been defeated by a powerful local leader; this had allowed opposition to appear in just the tribes where he most needed support. By the end of the month, 'Abd al-Mālik, who was the moving force behind both 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu and Bil-Qīsh, had increased his prestige in the al-Maṭālsa, Gaznaya, Marnīsa and Sinhāja. These had been his old territories during World War I.

Opposition had also emerged in the central Rif itself. There had already, in mid-June, been signs of opposition in the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh clan of the Banū Waryaghhal. Now, in the third week of July, even the usually docile

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 4a Mía Amar Hamido, Información, 4a Mía, 1 Aug. 1922.
2 Ibid., Información, 4a Mía, 3 Aug. 1922.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaciones 8a Mía--Julio de 1922, "La Kabila de Gueznaya--su situación general", Dār Driūsh, 31 July 1922.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información--Junio, Resumen General de Confidencias, 13 June 1922.
Buqquya were beginning to show signs of restiveness. The Banū Tūzīn around 'Azīb Miqār were beginning to feel less willing to fight the Spanish because of continued taxes and fines imposed by bin 'Abd al-Karīm. The same applied in Tafarsit which was held in check by bin 'Abd al-Karīm's qā'id Wuld 'Abd al-Salām, the son of his father's murderer. The Banū Walishak were similarly war-weary and some shaykhs had offered to allow the Spanish to occupy Ajdīr.

The situation within the Rif had changed dramatically since the first defeats of September 1921. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm was now on the defensive in his own territory. Even his other major campaign, in the Ghumāra and Jibāla, by the beginning of August 1922, could be seen to have failed.

The Sortie into the Ghumāra and Jibāla

Although the attempt to raise the Jibāla and Ghumāra with the Rif had failed in August 1921, the Rif leadership still felt there was a possibility of undertaking some action in the area. After the beginning of September 1921, when the Spanish advance started, the need for some diversionary action became more apparent, both in order to distract the Spanish and to provide some victories to maintain morale, and even more importantly to prevent the Spanish from entering the Rif from the west.

During August 1921, a group of Ghumāris had arrived in Ajdīr to ask bin 'Abd al-Karīm for his assistance

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1. SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía de Julio de 1922, Información, Dār Drūsh, 21 July 1922.
2. SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía de Julio de 1922, "Kabila de Bani Tuzin--su situación general", "tafarsit--su situación general", "Beni Ulichec--su situación general", Dār Drūsh, 31 July 1922.
against the Spanish. They arrived in high spirits, singing battle songs, and were given a good welcome by bin 'Abd al-Karîm. They complained of "anarchy" in their tribes and asked that Sî Maḥammad be sent to help them. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm told them to go home and prepare the ground for his brother, while troops were gathered to accompany him.¹

The gathering of troops took up all September. Meanwhile, the Jibâla and Ghâmâra seethed with anti-Spanish feeling. On 1 September 1921, the London Times reported that "anarchy" was increasing, despite Spanish denials that this was so. A position near Alcazarquivir had been captured by Moroccan "dissidents" and then evacuated with the loss of 100 Spanish lives—although The Times estimated that the real figures were at least twice the official ones.² A week later, the Spanish, worried about increasing agitation, used some of their remaining troops in the Jibâla to reinforce their positions in the ‘Anjara,³ after local propaganda campaigns by al-Raisûlî and others, encouraging people against the Spanish with descriptions of the Rif successes in August.⁴

By mid-September the only Ghumâran tribe that was still pro-Spanish was the Banû Zijjil, and 200 men from the other tribes were preparing to move into its territory to help its leaders to change their minds.⁵

² The Times, 1 Sept. 1921, p. 10, and 3 Sept. 1921, p. 7.
³ FO 371/7068/WL0066/184/28, Fox-Strangeways to White, Tetuan, 6 Sept. 1921, Secret.
⁴ SHM Ceuta, Leg. 12, Informaciones Centrales—Junio y Julio, Informe 5a Mía, 7 Sept. 1921.
⁵ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Política Comandancia General, unsigned, to Gen. Álvarez de Manzano, Tetuan, 15 Sept. 1921.
Ghumāra were beginning to cooperate as well. On 17 September, a meeting was reported between the Akhmās and some Ghumāris at the zawiya of Sīdī Muḥammad b. Saʿāda, to discuss future action.  

By 21 September, Spanish intelligence was reporting significant ḥarkas in the Banū Silmān, and in the Akhmās at Sīdī Yusif, Tilīdī, and Sīq al-Ḥād. On 26 September, the main Akhmāsī ḥarka was concentrated at Dārdāra, and in the areas that they did control, the Spanish were having to work hard to contain local subversion. Four men from the Banū Bū Idhīr were arrested in Tetuan on suspicion of being in contact with the "rebels". On 30 September, four men originating in the Bugguya, one from the Banū Bū Frāḥ, and one from the Banū Waryaghūl were arrested in Midīq for expressing sympathies favourable to the Rifīs.

The pattern seems to have been repeated in many Spanish-occupied areas, and caused some ill-feeling, for at the beginning of October, the Pasha of Tetuan complained that the Guardia Civil (the Spanish police force) were unjustly attacking Moroccans.

These events were more threats than actual action against the Spanish. Attacks on Spanish positions only began in earnest when Sī Maḥammad arrived in the Ghumāra in October.

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones Centrales--Junio y Julio, Informe 7a Mía, 17 Sept. 1921.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información--Septiembre, 1a Mía--Ceuta, 21 Sept. 1921.
3 Ibid., 1a Mía--Ceuta, 26 Sept. 1921.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Política Comandancia General, unsigned, to Gen. Álvarez de Manzano, Tetuan, 20 Sept. 1921.
5 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Información--Junio y Julio, 3a Mía, 30 Sept. 1921.
6 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Política Comandancia General, unsigned, to Gen. Álvarez de Manzano, Tetuan, 3 Oct. 1922.
SI Mahmammad in the Ghumāra

SI Mahmammad set out from Ajdir at the beginning of October. He was accompanied by between 600\(^1\) and 1,000 men,\(^2\) including SI Aḥmad Bū Drā\(^3\) and Sha‘īb al-Fallāḥ of the Banū Waryaghal.\(^4\) He went by way of the Banū Yiṭṭuft, the Banū Bū Fraḥ,\(^5\) where he arrived on 4 October,\(^6\) the Mastāsa and the Matīwa al-Balār,\(^7\) where he arrived on 9 October, along with his field gun and machine guns.\(^8\) Then the Rifis moved through the Ghumāra tribes of the Banū Razīn, Banū Garīr and Banū Bū Zrā, until they reached Sūq al-Abād of the Banū Ziyyat, on 19 October, apparently undecided on whether to carry on to attack Shāwin through the Akhmās or to deal with the Spanish posts on the coast first.\(^9\)

The choice was a real one, for there was already another, smaller group of Rifis moving towards Shāwin. Led, it was eventually revealed, by Muḥammad al-Akhamīsh,\(^10\) it was reported in the Banū Khālid on 12 October\(^11\) and on 14

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3. Ibid.
6. SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informaciones intervenciones--Julio de 1921, T.O.C. Teniente gral de zona (sic) to unnamed, Tetuan, 7 Oct. 1921, Urgente.
7. Skīraj, op. cit., p. 55.
8. SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Política Comandancia General, unsigned, to Gen. Álvarez de Manzano, Tetuan, 9 Oct. 1921.
9. Skīraj, op. cit., p. 55; and SHM Ceuta Leg 13, Información --Octubre, T.O.C. Capt. 6a Mía (Banū Sa‘īd) to unnamed, 19 Oct. 1922.
11. SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Política Comandancia General, unsigned, to Gen. Álvarez de Manzano, Tetuan, 12 Oct. 1921.
October in the Akhmās.\(^1\)

The threat was enough to bring Berenguer back to Tetuan from the Melilla zone. He saw that the Banū Zijjil would remain loyal to the Spanish provided that the road from Shāwin to Wād Lāw was kept open, and sent a column along it to ensure that this was done.\(^2\) This was probably one influence on the decision of SI Maḥammad to turn on the coast positions.

The other influence on his decision was the advice of al-Raisūlī. When he heard of the Barka's intentions, al-Raisūlī welcomed the Rifīs whole-heartedly, although strictly as auxiliaries to his own efforts, and the local knowledge which he had carefully stressed in the letter:

"As for your request that we make strenuous efforts to encourage the tribes, that is something we have been doing for a long time--may God accept our efforts--and it is still our intention... You ask us for advice about the military and political plan you must follow. Certainly the only way to an effective and far-reaching advantage that occurs to us, which lights our conscience, which our understanding has settled on, and which is based on our knowledge of the customs of the people of our country--as it was said 'the people of Makka know best their own ravines'..."\(^3\)

The advice, when he finally gave it at the end of this long preamble, was to avoid the Akhmās and attack Tigīsas and Qa‘ Asras, and then move on Wādī Lāw, to follow the

1 Ibid., unsigned to Gen. Álvarez de Manzano, Tetuan, 14 Oct. 1921.
2 Berenguer, op. cit. p. 133.

3 MAEF, Maroc 517, pp. 166-167, Muḥammad al-Raisūlī to Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, 14 Safar 1340/17 Oct. 1921. There is a slight confusion here, for the signature of the letter is Muḥammad al-Raisūlī, whereas the sharīf’s first name was Aḥmad. However, his eldest son was named Muhammad and it seems likely that the letter was written on his father’s behalf. It certainly would not have been written without his father’s knowledge or approval as Muḥammad was still young—as a photograph of him in 1923 shows—see Forbes, op. cit., facing p. 34.
Spanish road up to Qal'a in the Banū Zijjil behind Shāwin where al-Raisūlī could meet them, and from where, as both he and Berenguer had realised, they could dominate the city.

Al-Raisūlī's reasons for this plan were that he did not trust the Ghumārīs, and so neither should Si Maḥammad: "... the tribe of Ghamara is a nest of depravity and all its educated men and 'ulamā' are addicted to treachery in negotiation, to rebellion and to what is of benefit to the enemy." Only the Banū Khālid and Banū Silmān could be fully trusted. He therefore recommended the course of action that he did, not because the Spanish positions were important in themselves but because they would enable Si Maḥammad to dominate the Ghamāra. Once this had been achieved, the Banū Sa'id and Banū Hassān, through whose territory the Wādī Lāw-Shāwin road passed in part, would follow suit and attack Spanish positions in their tribe, thereby blockading Shāwin. The rising of these two tribes would bring in the Banū Huzmār, thus beginning a blockade of Tetuan, which, al-Raisūlī promised, would be joined by all the other tribes.

The Spanish were so worried by all this, al-Raisūlī reported, that they had paid out large sums of money to all those they could get to support them. British consul, Mr. Fox-Strangeways, who reported that the Spanish had reverted to "their original tactics of wholesale bribery and corruption of chiefs and of 'harkas'" attributed the policy to pressure from Madrid to save involving too many troops, and said that it disgusted the senior military officers.
The Spanish policy was in the end effective, although at first the Rifis seemed to be winning. They first attacked Tligas, which was surrounded on 21 October, with guns placed to the east at Tandaman under Sha'ib al-Fallāb and at Galdat to the west. Magan was attacked on 22 October and then Qa' Asras was besieged. Several villages around the latter position were occupied, although the position itself did not give way. Another party was sent off to attack Wād Lāw, but very few Ghumaris joined either them, or the main Rifī forces, and after a week's fighting the Rifīs lost heart. They were hungry, for the Ghumarīs refused them food, and many of them decided to return to the Rif.4

Those who remained, including SI Maḥammad and Aḥmad Bū Drā', were then threatened by Ghumarīs in Spanish pay who wanted to take them prisoner.5 SI Maḥammad extricated himself from his difficulties by forging a letter, which purported to come from the Akhmās, saying that that tribe was coming to help him. He managed to get to the border of the Banū Khālid, Banū Silmān and Akhmās, from where, with the help of some real Akhmāsīs he found there, he reached Bāb Barrād, on the borders of the Banū Khālid and Akhmās. After a short struggle with Ghumari opponents there, he reached Tāla Ḥassan in the Banū Samīh, where he stayed for a while.6

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1 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 266.
3 Berenguer, op. cit., pp. 133-134.
5 Skirāj, op. cit., p. 56.
6 Al-Bū 'Ayyāshī, op. cit., Vol. II, 188.
Meanwhile, the other harka, under al-Akhamlish was in the Shāwin area. It took some time for them to build up enough guns and men to threaten Shāwin, but on 24 October they were reported to be ready to attack the city. However, this attack never came about, although more men from the Katāma, Zarqat, Marnīsa and Banū Samīḥ were sent to al-Akhamlish at the beginning of November.

On 13 November, al-Akhamlish was reported to be in Dārdāra with a harka of 300 men. On 19 November he was joined by some 500 men under the leadership of Mūlāy al-Baqar. However, the rest of the western zone was quiet apart from the two tribes of Banū Idhīr and Banū 'Arūs, which were strongly opposed to the Spanish. Then the harka started to break up. First of all al-Baqar quarrelled with the Akhmās and left for the Gazāwa, and then al-Akhamlish fell out with his hosts and, accompanied by his fifty remaining supporters, left for Mūlāy 'Abd al-Salām. From there, on 26 or 27 November, he asked al-Raisūlī to write to the Akhmās telling them to join the harka or they would be punished. This request went unheeded and the harka finally disintegrated in confusion.

1 The Times, 24 Oct. 1921, p. 9, Tangier, no date.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Política Comandancia General, nota, 3 Nov. 1921.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones varias, información 13 Nov. 1921.
4 Ibid., O.C. de A.I. Tetuan, Información, 19 Nov. 1921. Mūlāy Ahmad al-Baqar, it will be remembered, was the old adversary of al-Raisūlī who had been recruited for the Riffis by SI Muḥammad al-Akhamlish in August, 1921, see above, p. 363.
5 Ibid., Información, 24 Nov. 1921.
6 Ibid., Información, 27 Nov. 1921.
Meanwhile, SI Maḥammad had left the Banū Samīḥ for Jibba, where Ḥammu al-‘Aisāwī, the leader of the Jibba ḥarka in the period before the battle of Abarrān, had agreed with the Spanish to betray the Rifis. The attack failed and some months later Ḥammu himself was murdered. But SI Maḥammad left for the Mastāsa, on his way back to the Rif.

The second Rifī sortie into the Jibāla and Ghumāra was over. Its failure only showed once again that the Jibālis did not care for outside leadership, and that unless leadership was imposed, any form of unity was impossible. The lack of coordination only helped the Spanish, for a disorganized rabble was no match for even a moderately well-equipped European army.

The Spanish Offensive in the Jibāla

On 22 November, Berenguer arrived in Madrid to discuss events in Morocco. While he was there, in addition to agreeing to further advances in the eastern zone, it was decided to continue the action against al-Raisūlī that had been interrupted in July and to occupy the Banū ‘Arūs and Akhmās tribes. The eventual aim was to set up a fortified line from the Wādī Lukkūs to Shawīn, but the first steps were less dramatic.

On 19 December, operations started with an advance

1 Skīra, op. cit., p. 56. For al-‘Aisāwī’s part in the Jibbah ḥarka, see above, p. 296. However, before this, in March 1921, al-‘Aisāwī had been very friendly towards Berenguer during the General’s visit to coastal positions, see above, p. 293.
2 Cabecillas Rebeldes 1913-1927, p. 86.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 12, Informaciones varias, O.C. de A.I. Tetuán, Información, 19 Nov. 1922.
4 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 149.
5 Ibid., p. 173.
across the Banū Lait, to take positions in the Banū 'Arūs, with the help of forces from Larache. Spanish troops continued their advance until 22 December when bad weather made further advances impossible.¹

By the end of the month, the whole Jibāla was reported to be quiet. The only signs of resistance were to be seen at Tazarūt.² It was in order to take advantage of this situation that between 6 and 10 January 1922, Spanish forces moved in from Taffar and Shāwin through the southern part of the Banū Akhmās, cutting off the French from the Spanish zones. The Jibāla and Tazarūt were surrounded,³ but once again the rain prevented any further action for the moment.⁴

The Spanish advance paralysed the Akhmās, and the remnants of the ḥarka dissolved. Tribes such as the Banū Aḥmad almost completely deserted the ḥarka, and even refused to recognise the Akhmāsis' sacrifice of a bull which was intended to bring them to the aid of their former allies.⁵

The Akhmās were not the only people trying to get help from the Banū Aḥmad. The Rifis', or rather "Wuld 'Abd al-Karīm, the man who is in the Rif," has sent them "messages after messages", which were treated in the same way as the Akhmāsis' gestures. They were ignored.

¹ Martínez de Campos, op. cit., pp. 268-269.
² Ibid., p. 269.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Cartas Arabes Beni Ahmed, Faqī Sī Ibrāhīm and all the village of Adwār to Cogolludo, 20 Jumāda I 1340/19 Jan. 1922.
Bin 'Abd al-Karīm had more immediate problems to worry about--especially that of securing his control over the western Rif. Jibḥa had now become the main base in the west. His brother, Si Maḥammad, was still there, building houses and trying to impose order. The imposition of order here was not only an end in itself but part of the propaganda campaign: bin 'Abd al-Karīm wrote to a man who had committed a crime in the Banū Bu Ṣrā rebuking him, and telling him that crimes gave people a reason to submit to the Spanish. Si Maḥammad was also trying to raise a ḥarka in the Ghumāra, composed of 50 men from each tribe, allegedly paid 25 pts a month. However, the Banū Bu Ṣrā had refused when they were asked for men, and for the moment Jibḥa remained the western outpost of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's authority. It should be noted here that even at this relatively early stage in the war, the development of Rifī control in a new area had already adopted a form that was to become the normal pattern of expansion later in the war. Not only did Rifī officials impose order, but they also set about giving their rule a physical presence, building maḥakmas and houses for troops.

Above all, the Rif commanders did not lack tenacity. They had been ejected from the Akhmās and the Ghumāra, but they had two considerable advantages over the fissiparous western tribes--an organized base from which to operate, and the moral superiority given by their defence of Islam. As a result, they were soon able to move back into the Ghumāra.

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información 6a Mfa, nota, 16 Jan. 1922.
The Rifis Return to the West

The biggest obstacle of all to the Spanish in the Jibāla was still, of course, al-Raisūlī. He was prepared to surrender but, of course, only on terms that were unacceptable to the Spanish—namely that he should be governor of all the western tribes and that all his property be restored. Therefore, he had to be militarily defeated.

But much had to be done before he could finally be dealt with, and, in particular, troops had to be gathered. Meanwhile, the Rifis stayed in Jibha and brought in some of their most effective commanders. At the beginning of February, Bū Lahya arrived in Jibha and called on Sīdī Ḥamīdu of Snāda to sort out the dispute between the Matīwa al-Baḥḍar and Banū Waryaghal caused by Ḥammu al-'Aisūwī's treachery. The ḥarka grew, bin 'Abd al-Karīm appointed nominal qā'id in the Banū Bū Zrā, and started to correspond with al-Raisūlī.

Bū Lahya, who was now emerging as a man of considerable importance and value to the Rifī cause, wrote to a man in the Banū Khālid calling on him to prepare the ground politically for him. He signed himself "al-Faqīh Bū Lahya Khalīfa nāʿib-dawla al-Islamiyya [sic] al-faqīh Sayyid Muḥammad b. Sayyid ‘Abd al-Karīm b. al-Khaṭṭābī al-Waryaghī."

This is one of the first mentions by a member of the leading

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1 The Times, 15 Feb. 1922, p. 9, dated Gibraltar, 12 Feb. 1922.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mfa de Frontera, Afeilal, 7 Feb. 1922.
group of the Rif coalition of the fact that the Rif now formed a state—and an Islamic state at that.

In mid-February, bin 'Abd al-Karīm attempted to harness the energies of the refugee "bandits" by writing to those who had fled from the Banū 'Arūs and telling them that in future, if they needed help, it would be better to turn to him than to al-Raisūlī or Ḥamīdu Sukkān. They had some need of his help, for the people of Banū 'Arūs were very hungry and were having to increase their activities as robbers to survive.

Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm did not want to do anything until he was strong enough. He told the Akhmās not to attack Spanish positions at Mishkrilla until reinforcements came, but was ignored. Nevertheless, even Bū Lahya could not persuade the Banū Samīḥ to join a ḥarka, and the Banū Khālid ejected him at the end of February.

The only glimmer of real support at this period was in the Akhmās, who sacrificed 5 bulls to the Rīfīs to get help, and agreed on a tax to feed the promised 4,000 men when they came. Throughout February 1922 the Jībāla remained quiet while both sides prepared their forces.

In March, the Rīfī propaganda increased. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm's hold over the Matīwa was obviously increasing.

At the beginning of March, the qā'īds of the Matīwa al-Daḥar

1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informaciones—Febrero y Marzo Mía 1, nota, 12 Feb. 1922.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mía 5a Beni Hassan—Febrero y Marzo.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mía 7a—Febrero y Marzo, nota, 9 Feb. 1922 and 11 Feb. 1922.
5 SHM Ceuta Leg 13, Información la Mía—Febrero y Marzo, nota, 23 Feb. 1922.
were summoned to Ajdir to receive orders covering the formation of a new ħarka and the collection of taxes.¹

Meanwhile, Bā Lāhya was making propaganda in the Jibāla. He was reported in the Banū Aḥmad on 2 March, where he called a meeting of the Banū Aḥmad, Banū Khālid, Akhmās, Gazāwa, and Banū Zarwāl in the hope of stopping the fighting that had broken out between the Banū Aḥmad, Gazāwa and Banū Zarwāl.³ He then moved on into the Akhmās to rally them to the Rifīs' cause and was reported in the Banū Darqūl clan on 16 March.³ From there he called another meeting of the Katama and Sinhāja tribes to his camp at the Sunday market.⁴

In the Ghumāra, the Rifīs were regaining some of their lost ground. At a meeting in Amtār on 8 March, all the Ghumārī tribes agreed to provide 100 men each for a ħarka⁵ and by 21 March they had garrisoned Amtār (c. 400 men) and Tandamān.⁶ 500 more arrived at Amtār on 23 March, so the eastern Ghumārī tribes agreed on an increased ħarka of 150 men from each tribe.⁷ On 26 March, 200 Rifīs were reported in Sūq al-Āḥad in the Banū Ziyāt.⁸

The intentions of all this activity were to distract the Spanish from the eastern zone. That much was openly admitted. A Spanish agent reported that:

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaciones de la 8a Mfa—Mayo 1922, T.O.C. Capt. 8a Mfa to Cor. Policía, Dār Drīsh, 5 Mar. 1922.
² SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Varios Informaciones, Afeilal, 2 Mar. 1922; and al-Faqīh al-‘Alawī, 6 Mar. 1922.
³ SHM Ceuta Leg 13, 7a Mfa (Akhmas alto), nota, 10 mar. 1921.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Varios Informaciones, al-Faqīh al-‘Alawī, 21 Mar. 1922.
⁵ Ibid., Afeilal, 13 Mar. 1921.
⁶ Ibid., Afeilal, 21 Mar. 1921.
⁷ Ibid., Afeilal, 23 Mar. 1921.
⁸ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mia 6a Gomara, nota, 28 Mar. 1922.
"Those who were in the Rif returned to their homes on Tuesday and brought with them word from [Māhammad] bin 'Abd al-Karīm that they should attack Shāwin, because the Spanish are coming with their soldiers into the Rif."¹

The one person who was quite left out of all this activity was al-Raṣūlī. He was still in Tazarūt but was much weakened. The British Vice-Consul estimated that he only had 3,000 followers now, as compared with the 22,000 who were under arms in the Akhmās.² While the difference in strength may have been exaggerated, he was certainly in no position to defend himself for very long against the Spanish. He finally appealed to Britain to intervene to save him, but this request was, of course, refused.³

The Spanish Action against al-Raṣūlī:

Desperate to encourage some support among his own people, al-Raṣūlī made use of the change of government in Spain (March 1922) to claim that troops would soon be withdrawn, as Spain could not afford to have so many men in the field.⁴ This was nearly the truth, but the Spanish were determined not to end their campaign in the Jibāla until he had been defeated. Nevertheless, al-Raṣūlī maintained an outward air of confidence. He announced that he would stay in Tazarūt because with the Rifis moving into the Jibāla, he had nothing to fear.⁵

² FO 371/8341/W2639/171/28, Fox-Strangeways to Robertson, Tetuan, 23 Mar. 1922.
³ FO 371/8341/W2232/171/28, Robertson to Curzon, Tangier, 23 Mar. 1922.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mía 7a Información—Abril/Mayo, nota, 3 Apr. 1922.
⁵ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mía 3a Información—Abril/Mayo, nota, 5 Apr. 1922.
The Rifis were, in fact, still increasing their influence in the area. Sa'īd b. Marzūq, the Spanish appointed qā'id of the Banū Ziyyāt, announced that they could count on him and his tribe to attack Spain. On 4 April, Bu Laḥya arrived in the tribe, accompanied by at least 600 men from the Rif and the Jibālan tribes of Akhmās, Banū Aḥmad and Banū Zarwāl. By 10 April, he was completely in control, and anyone who disobeyed him was sent to the Rif as a prisoner.

Although the Spanish took action against concentrations of Moroccans—they destroyed all the houses in the Sīdī Yusif Tilīlī by bombing—the Moroccans managed to surround the Spanish position at Mishkrilla and tried to move up field guns to shell Shāwin. But with Bu Laḥya in control of nearly all operations in the Spanish zone, a far more ordered and disciplined movement was to be expected. He called for everyone who was available to come to the ḥarka. If they did they would be paid 35 pts a month, but under no circumstances would they be allowed to practise robbery to support themselves as well. Those who disagreed with him in any way were arrested and sent back to the Rif. He gave strict instructions about the use of cartridges—they were only to be distributed immediately before a battle, and all money raised through fines was to be used to buy more cartridges.

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1 Ibid., nota, 4 Apr. 1922.
2 Ibid., nota, 10 Apr. 1922.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mfā 5a—Abril/Mayo, nota, 12 Apr. 1922.
4 Ibid., nota 6 Apr. 1922.
5 Ibid., nota, 15 Apr. 1922.
6 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mfā 3a—Abril/Mayo 1922, nota, 21 Apr. 1922.
7 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Cartas Arabes Beni Ahmad, (Muḥammad) b. 'Ali (Bu Lahya) to ḥarka at Mishkrilla, 29 Shā'bān 1340/27 Apr. 1922.
By the end of April, there seems to have been a state approaching complete mobilisation in those parts of the western Jibāla which the Spanish did not occupy. Even women were involved actively and a Spanish captain complained:

"The most dangerous and prejudicial espionage in this tribe [the Hawz] which the rebels can count on is that carried out by the women, for, confident that the Makhzan, because they are women, will not suspect them nor punish them, these women . . . are involved in activities which are highly prejudicial and should be punished." ¹

On 27 April, the Spanish finally moved against al-Raisūlī. On 2 May, they occupied Dār Bārda in the Banū ʿArūs, and on 7 May surrounded Tazarūt. Al-Raisūlī managed to escape in a hurry to Jabal Bū ʿAbd al-Ḥāshim on 10 May, and Spanish troops entered Tazarūt on 12 May ² (see photograph VII: 1). Most of the Banū ʿArūs territory was now in Spanish hands, and Berenguer appointed as his agent there one of Spain's longest-serving followers, Idrīs b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Rīfī, al-Raisūlī's old enemy and the man who would later be named as ʿāmil of the Rīf and cause considerable confusion in that post.³

Although they had done little to help him before his defeat, the Rīfīs sent a few hundred men to the Akhmās to help al-Raisūlī on 16 May.⁴ But al-Raisūlī's fall diminished the Rīfīs' appeal as well. The Rīfl guards fell in numbers, and many went home complaining they had not been paid.⁵ By the end of the first week in June, only a few

¹ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Mía 3a--Abril/Mayo, 21 Apr. 1921.
³ Berenguer, op. cit., p. 202. Idrīs b. ʿAbd al-Salām had long been an enemy of al-Raisūlī and had replaced him as Pasha of Asīla in 1913, see above, p. 143.
⁴ SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información 3a Mía--April/Mayo, nota, 10 May, 1922.
⁵ Ibid., nota, 22 May 1922.
Photograph VII : 1

Al-Raisūlī's residence at Tazarūt after its capture by Spanish troops in May 1922

Source: Archives of the Servicio Histórico Militar in Madrid
Riffis were left in Jibha, and two principal leaders of the Matiwa al-Bahar, Hammu al-'Aisawi and the Shaykh SI 'Abd al-Salam al-Buhaki were counted as being pro-Spanish.1 On 12 June, Spanish intelligence reported that there were 50 Riffis and 50 Ghumaris in Tandaman, 50 Riffis and 100 Ghumaris in Amtar, and 25 Riffis and 40 Ghumaris in Jibha.2

All this time, al-Raisuli was in Jabal Bu Hashim.3 On 15 June, in a final outburst of optimism, he proposed that bin 'Abd al-Karim and he split the Spanish zone between them, with al-Raisuli keeping everything west of Jabal Bu Hashim.4 This proposal was quite obviously unrealistic and was ignored. Instead, bin 'Abd al-Karim sent out letters calling for a general rising when the harvest had been collected in the west zone.5 This was equally unlikely in its success, for the Spanish were now strong in the Jibala --they occupied Sidif Yusif Tilidi on 18 June 1922.6 In any event, bin 'Abd al-Karim was preparing his disastrous expedition against 'Amar b. Hamidu.

At the beginning of July 1922, the Banu Bu Zra expelled the Waryaghlis who were in their tribe.7 But the eastern Rif from the Matiwa al-Bahar to the Banu SamiB remained loyal to bin 'Abd al-Karim, as did parts of the

1 Ibid.; and SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informacion 3a Mia--Junio/Julio, nota, 8 June 1922.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informaciones varias--Junio/Julio, Afeilal, 12 June 1922.
3 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informacion 5a Mia--Junio/Julio, nota, 10 June 1922.
4 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informacion 3a Mia--Junio/Julio, nota, 15 June 1922.
5 Ibid., nota, 18 June 1922.
6 Berenguer, op. cit., p. 220.
7 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Informacion 6a Mia--Junio/Julio, nota, 3 July 1922.
Banū Silmān and Banū Khālid and the Banū Dargūl and Banū Salah clans of the Akhmās, although with the battle against 'Amar Ḫamīdu to deal with, the Rifīs could take little offensive action against the Spanish.

The New Spanish Administration

Although Berenguer had overseen the reconquest of much of the territory lost in Morocco in 1921, feelings against him ran high. From the Spring of 1922 onwards, he was more and more criticised in the Madrid newspapers. In March, he offered his resignation when the Maura government fell. Although the offer was refused, his continued authority was in doubt. This insecurity in his office was partly the result of criticisms of his actions in the period leading up to and immediately after the disastrous defeats of July and August 1921. It was also partly the result of the desire of the Spanish government to limit expenditure in Morocco, which was rising fast. The cost of the army budget for Morocco alone rose from 143,162,550 pts in 1919-1920 to 173,032,431 pts in 1920-1921, and was expected to be even greater in 1921-1922.

On 29 March, Berenguer went to Madrid to consult the government. He returned with a new policy, based on a lessening of military operations, the development of a volunteer Moroccan army, and the need "to invite the Moors to

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1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información 5a Mía-Junio/Julio, nota, 3 July 1922.
2 The Times, 13 Mar. 1922, p. 17, dated Tangier, 12 Mar.1922.
3 Fleming, op. cit., p. 75.
4 The Times, 7 Mar. 1922, p. 22.
cooperate more feely in the administration of the territory."\(^1\) as The Times put it.

However, the problems remained, along with Berenguer's growing misgivings about the press campaign against him. On 18 May, he complained to Sánchez Guerra, the Prime Minister, that:

"My position here is becoming daily more difficult and it may be that it will soon become inappropriate in the circumstances. These press campaigns, which have been joined by some politicians, although they are directed exclusively against my own person, are quite clearly harmful to the task we have to carry out, not only because of the feeling of inferiority suffered by the High Command with respect to its subordinates and the lack of confidence suffered by the latter, but also because it seriously damages the morale of the army ... "\(^2\)

Appeals to the government did not help matters and the criticism in the press continued, with the participation of very senior officers of the Spanish army such as Gen. Valeriano Weyler, the most senior Captain-General of them all.\(^3\)

On 1 July 1922, the Supreme Military Court started its prosecution of 37 officers, including Berenguer. On 9 July, Berenguer offered his resignation again,\(^4\) and this time it was accepted—on 14 July.\(^5\)

The new High Commissioner, despite the calls for a "civil" Protectorate, was General Burguete whom Martínez- de Campos dismisses as a man "whose prestige rested on a decoration [gained in Cuba] and a few books on military science which had recently appeared, written in a pleasant

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\(^1\) Ibid., 5 Apr. 1922, p. 11, dated Madrid, 4 Apr. 1922.

\(^2\) Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 43.

\(^3\) Fleming, op. cit., pp. 75-76. (Weyler had a "reputation for efficiency and ruthlessness" which had been reinforced by his organisation of concentration camps in Cuba during the Cuban War of Independence in 1894-1896, Payne, Politics, pp. 72-74).

\(^4\) Fleming, op. cit., p. 76.

and original style."¹ This description certainly undervalues Burguete's worth, for he was also a man of some political experience² who might be expected to work within the demands of the Madrid government.

These demands were to work to strengthen the authority of the (Spanish) makhzan and local authorities; to ensure "the implantation of the Protectorate regime in all its purity"; to negotiate with al-Raisūlī so as to penetrate the Jībālā; to cut down expenses and repatriate conscripts by forming a volunteer army; to rescue Spanish prisoners and pacify the Rīf; and to bring about "the maximum development of the moral and material interests of the subdued zone by civil intervention."³

Conclusion

The beginning of August 1921 marked a number of turning-points in the war. In the previous eleven months, bin 'Abd al-Karīm's supporters, and those who had taken advantage of his successes in the east, had been beaten back almost to the limits that were occupied by the Spanish in June 1921. The military defeats were not in themselves, however, the most serious obstacle to his continued leadership. Far more important were the political challenges to his authority within the Rīf.

The continued uncertainties in the allegiance of the eastern Rīfī tribes, the Banū Sa‘īd, Banū Walishak and Banū Tūızīn, in particular, had weakened his political and

³ Ibid., pp. 76-77.
military standing. In an effort to control the situation, he had resorted to intimidation of his opponents on the one hand, and an attempt to expand his dominions to the west on the other. Both these methods had failed. In the eastern Rif, there were simply too many people who wanted to submit to the Spanish once again for bin 'Abd al-Karîm to be able to intimidate them all, and a number of important local leaders--such as Qaddur b. 'Amar of the Banû Sa‘îd--were not amenable to intimidation for more than a short time anyway. People like Qaddur b. 'Amar were able to make a choice between two options--the Spanish, or bin 'Abd al-Karîm. So long as they did not commit themselves too much to either side and they could keep those options open for as long as possible, it must have appeared to them that they had a better chance of emerging unscathed from the conflict. So they were willing to be very anti-Spanish providing the Spanish were not advancing, but as soon as the Spanish did advance, these local leaders were quick to quieten down. Such equivocation, of course, helped the Spanish and hindered bin 'Abd al-Karîm.

In the course of the Spanish advance, the sharîfs of the various zawiyas were no less concerned than any other local leader to conserve their power. They equivocated, temporised, and finally surrendered with very little fuss as the Spanish moved forward. Even the sharîfs of the central Rif were not entirely secure. Sîdî Ḥamîdu of Snâdâ in particular seems to have played an almost independent rôle as a power broker between the various factions. It was he, for instance, who was called in to settle the battle with 'Amar Ḥamîdu, which he did, almost as an outside
arbitrator might have done. An extraordinary example of Sidi Ḥamīdu's independence of operation in relation to bin 'Abd al-Karīm, almost that of a state within a state, is described by Skīraj.

After the return of the troops from the first expedition to the Ghumāra, fighting broke out in the Banū Bū Prāḥ. Men from the Banū Yiṭṭuft went to deal with it and in the meantime their womenfolk took refuge in the sanctuary of Snāda under Sidi Ḥamīdu's protection. Sidi Ḥamīdu, who seems to have taken a strictly proper moral stance on the issue, then refused to allow conjugal visits by the husbands on their brief visits to their tribe. The husbands, not surprisingly, complained to Sī Maḥammad, who, on Azarqān's insistence, left the whole matter to Azarqān. Sidi Ḥamīdu explained to Azarqān that to allow the men to visit the women would violate the hurm of the sanctuary and Azarqān, aware that he could not win this particular argument, pretended to agree and returned to Ajdīr.¹

Sidi Ḥamīdu remained on the margins of the conflict. When bin 'Abd al-Karīm came to nominate gā'ids in all the central Riff tribes, he insisted that he should be the ḍā'id of the Banū Yiṭṭuft. However, when he was ordered to form a ḣarka he replied that it was not the job of a sharīf to form a ḣarka, and was replaced.²

Some of the Akhamlīsh family at least had no such scruples about the rôle of the sharīfs and proceeded to help bin 'Abd al-Karīm against the Spanish in the Jibāla. But their support was not enough. If bin 'Abd al-Karīm was to

¹ Skīraj, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
² Ibid., p. 60.
have any chance of success he felt he had to have the support of the French.

French support was necessary both for military and political reasons. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm desperately needed aeroplanes to use against the Spanish, whose command of the air was a decisive factor in their favour. These could only be obtained easily through his contacts with the French through Ḥaddu b. Ḥamma al-Kaḥal. Furthermore, he had promised that his new state would provide the same advantages as European rule, but with independence from the Christians as well. He therefore encouraged French mineral experts to survey the Rif, and in return received unofficial encouragement from local French officials over the border in the French zone. In particular, this unofficial encouragement came from the Chief of the French Office Indigène at Tawriat, a Captain France. This captain, who seems to have been guided in his encouragement of bin 'Abd al-Karîm by the need to defeat a common enemy, ‘Abd al-Mālik, wrote two very friendly letters at the beginning of July 1922:

"What we have heard of your advance and your victory over your enemy [i.e., 'Abd al-Mālik] has made us very happy as have your relations with those who are your friends, such as France and others. This is what a man like you should do . . . We ask you to tell us what 'Abd al-Mālik is doing . . ."

The French interest in bin 'Abd al-Karîm appears to have been principally the result of his struggle with 'Abd al-Mālik and the benefits to bin 'Abd al-Karîm were relatively small. A certain amount of badly-needed food came in from the south but this was by no means the only source. On the

1 MAEP, Maroc 520, Captain France to Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karîm, Tawriat, Dhū al-Qa‘da, 1922 [sic], July 1922.
other hand his battles with 'Abd al-Malik, brought bin 'Abd al-Karîm discredit and loss of prestige.

The conflict with 'Abd al-Malik was, however, unavoidable, for bin 'Abd al-Karîm's authority finally rested on his ability to control the Rif and its surrounding areas. The surrounding areas were of vital importance because, in the situation which had grown up since the defeat of the Spanish in 1921, they represented a political vacuum. To the south of the Rif, the French were slowly extending their authority, to the east, the Spanish had reached a frontier of sorts on the edge of the Rif, and to the west, in the Jibâla, Spanish forces were increasing the area which they held. In the Rif itself, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was laying down the basis of an organised state. Unless he could control the tribes which fell outside the immediate area of his authority, then either the French or the Spanish would do so. As a result, the Rif had to expand if it was to survive.

Expansion brought with it new dangers, for the fighting with 'Amar bin Ḥamîdu encouraged dissent within the Rif itself. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm used his new sovereignty to impose taxes, which were vital to his rule, but which caused considerable problems among the people he was taxing. Nevertheless, he was able to carry out taxation of sorts and to deal with the attempted resistance that followed. By mid-1922, although his prestige was considerably diminished by his relative failures against 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu, and the difficulties he had encountered in the Jibâla, he had passed the critical period of the beginning of his rule. His authority stretched from the edge of the Rif in the east to
Jibha in the west, and to the edges of the Gaznaya and Marnisa tribes in the south. It was not a huge area, but it was relatively secure. From this basis his rule could be extended, and the period that follows saw the beginning of a formal government in the Rif.
Chapter VIII

PREPARATIONS FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF MUHAMMAD BIN 'ABD AL-KARIM, AUGUST 1922 TO JANUARY 1923

"The Banū Waryaghhal would kill their fathers out of greed."

Two Waryaghli̇s writing to a Spanish agent in December 1922.¹

"Know, therefore, that you may not come into our lands at this time."

The a'yan of the Wargha tribes, breaking off relations with the Spanish in February 1923.²

"Spanish Official: Do you think that Morocco will, like Egypt or Turkey, arise and drive out the Christians? Raisuli: No, Morocco has not had the educational facilities which have fallen to the lot of the countries you mention. Later, when she has had such facilities, yes, this may occur."

Reported conversation between al-Raisūlī and a Spanish official, August 1922.³

The months before July 1922 had seen the growth of divisions in the Rifī camp. The Spanish had taken advantage of those divisions to advance across the eastern plains, and 'Amar bin Ḥamīdu had allied with 'Abd al-Mālik to oppose

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Bani Waryaghhal, 'Amar b. Muḥammad al-'Abdallāhi and 'Amar b. Ṣadiq al-Ahdhāfī to Qā'id Muḥammad b. 'Amar, received 8 December, 1922.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Marnisa y Warqha, "All the a'yan of the Wargha" to 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Fannāṣī, 10 Jumāda II 1341/28 Jan. 1923.
³ FO 371/8342/W7656/171/28, Robertson to Curzon, Tangier, 2 Sept. 1922, Confidential.
bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the Sinḥāja and Marnīsa. Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had survived and had succeeded in consolidating his authority in his own tribe of the Banū Waryaghal and to a certain extent in neighbouring tribes in the Rif.

From August 1922, circumstances were much more favourable to bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Spanish political policy in the eastern zone collapsed as the result of pressure from Madrid to rely more and more on local Moroccan officials. These officials were not necessarily very helpful to the Spanish and because of their own rivalries succeeded in alienating many former Spanish supporters in the area. The "a'yān of the Wargha" were not the only group to react against the Spanish, for a similar situation came to pass in the front line tribes of the eastern zone.

In the western part of the Spanish Protectorate, al-Raisūlī finally submitted to the Spanish and retired from the resistance. A major obstacle to bin 'Abd al-Karīm as the only effective leader of opposition to the Spanish had disappeared. Al-Raisūlī was probably in the end more realistic about the chances of finally defeating the Spanish when he said that Morocco did not have the educational background to oppose the Europeans, but bin 'Abd al-Karīm was undeterred by this. In the last six months of 1922, he increased his political control and carried on the social and political changes that he believed were needed. At the same time, the Spanish official's question was very apposite, for the Turkish victories over the Greeks increased the Rifīs self-confidence.

In his efforts, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was helped by the almost--but not entirely--unanimous support of his own
tribe the Banū Waryaghāl and the assistance of convinced followers from other tribes, such as Bū Lāhya of the Banū Tūzīn. As a result of these political factors, bin 'Abd al-Karīm emerged with considerable strength at the end of 1922, so that he was able to be proclaimed as leader of the Rif in January of the following year, thus setting a formal seal on his achievement.

The New Spanish Policy

These successes for bin 'Abd al-Karīm came at the end of 1922, however. In August, the political and military initiative was still with the Spanish.

The new High Commissioner, Burguete, had somewhat conflicting instructions; firstly he was not to risk Spanish troops, secondly he was to bring about a greater reliance on Moroccan administrators and Moroccan volunteer troops in prosecuting the war, yet at the same time he was to defeat bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his supporters. So, one of the first things he did, on his arrival in Morocco, was to try to win local affection for the Spanish. He visited Shāwin on 27 July, twelve days after his appointment, and ordered the release of 60 Moroccans imprisoned for criminal offices, to demonstrate Spanish "goodwill." In an effort to try to obtain peace, he visited Mūlāy 'Abd al-Ḥafīz, who was by now living in Málaga, and asked him to mediate with bin 'Abd al-Karīm for peace and for the return of Spanish prisoners. However, this plan came to nothing. On the other hand, with greater chances of success, he reopened negotiations with

1 See above, Chapter VII.
2 The Times, 28 July 1922, p. 9, dated Madrid, 27 July 1922.
al-Raisūlī.

Al-Raisūlī met the new Chief of Staff in Morocco, Gen. Castro Girona, on 6 August. The discussion concerned al-Raisūlī's possible submission and that of the tribes that had followed him to the "makḥzan", and al-Raisūlī's personal position after his surrender. Negotiations carried on for some time and for their duration al-Raisūlī was given the sum of 50,000 pts "wherewith to pacify his followers in that region and prevent them from molesting the Spanish troops for one month, a kind of armistice to cover the period of negotiations with Raisūlī."¹ Al-Raisūlī was completely discouraged. He told a Spanish official who visited him when the money was handed over, that although he had at first cooperated with Spain because he believed that it was a "poor and weak power" (and would therefore be unable to control Morocco completely), he now hated it, since he had discovered "what the Spanish were, and what thieves the Spanish officers are." Nevertheless, he believed that Morocco did not have the technical ability to carry out an effective resistance against the "Christians".²

Certainly al-Raisūlī seems to have been able to hold off most of the attacks against the Spanish during August and September and the western zone was fairly quiet during those months. This peacefulness was in large part helped by the sudden illness of Bū Laḥya, the principal Rīfī propagandist in the west, who returned to the Rīf in a hurry, leaving behind a few of his supporters, who "feared for their lives because the Banū Aḥmad thwarted their plans."³

¹ FO 371/8342/W7656/171/28, Robertson to Curzon, Tangier, 2 Sept. 122, Confidential—referring to events 3 weeks before.
² Ibid. Compare his remarks to Rosita Forbes made the following year, and quoted above, p. 156.
There were, of course, outbreaks of fighting between the tribes themselves—clans of the Banū ʿĀḥmad fighting with the Banū Ṣarwāl and Gāzāwa and internal feuding within the Banū Khālid. But this was not directed against the Spanish.  

At the end of September, al-Raisūlī was reported to have submitted. The Times headline describing this event was "The 'Wild Boar' tamed?" He was not tamed, however, for the arrangement was more of a pact than a submission, al-Raisūlī was allowed to stay in Tazarūt, and was not obliged to submit in person to the khalīfa. He was to be allowed a ḥarka of 4,000 men, paid and equipped by Spain, and if, after a year, he had proved his ability to keep the Jibāla peaceful he would be reinstated as Pasha of Asīla. Mr. Fox-Strangeways was of the opinion that: "It seems therefore that the Moors are wrong in regarding Raisulī's sun as definitely set; possibly their antipathy to the Sharif may be greatly due to jealousy." Certainly it seemed that al-Raisūlī was observing the terms of the pact for throughout October and November there were very few incidents in the western zone.

al-Ḥijja 1340/14 Aug. 1922. It will be remembered that Bū Lahya styled himself the representative of the "dawla Islāmiya". See above, p. 432.

1 Ibid. This feuding went back a considerable time, see above, p. 196.

2 The Times, 30 Sept. 122, p. 9, dated Madrid, 29 Sept. 1922.

3 Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 45.


5 FO 371/8384/W8678/171/28, Fox-Strangeways to Codrington, Tetuan, 7 October 1922, Confidential.

6 FO 371/8342/W9843/171/28, Were to Robertson, Tetuan, 19 Nov. 1922 and FO 371/8342/W10121/171/28, Were to Robertson, Tetuan, 30 Nov. 1922.
At the beginning of December, al-Raisuli's representatives—though not himself nor his son—submitted to the Spanish. This was accepted by the Protectorate authorities who had failed to persuade al-Raisuli to attend in person, as a permissible substitute. The 400 men who came were led by a nephew of al-Raisuli and although the Spanish originally had wanted only 100 people to attend, for reasons of economy,¹ they were received in style and referred to by the Spanish as "distinguished chiefs" although, as The Times correspondent pointed out, the "have often figured in the news columns of the Tangier Press as highway robbers on the roads from Tangier to Alcazar."²

In the eastern zone, similar policies were adopted. Burguete sent a commission of Moroccans and Europeans which offered to deal with the "unsubmitted tribes",³ and in a proclamation announced:

"Hear my words, oh noble Moroccans. You who desire good must know that on the day when there is complete security in all the territories of Larache, Arcila, Ceuta, Xefxaun [i.e., Shāwin], Tetuan and all the highlands and mountains in the Spanish zone of influence, all those who are of pure heart will know the true significance of the Protectorate and of submission to Sid el Jalifa Muley el Mehdi, who is most honourable, and who is aided by Spain which is putting its Protectorate into effect, inspired by the civilisation which it hopes to bring about.

You, important people (the most important in Morocco), should raise your flags of peace as a sign of the favour which Spain has shown to you, the country which has helped you and held you dear, and acceded to all the requests of your Majzen, so as to benefit you in the hope that you will enjoy the fruits of your land and the tranquility of your domains. Spain will open a way to trade, will level the land to lay the tracks of a railway which will bring you benefits unknown

¹ FO 371/8342/W10121/171/28, Were to Robertson, Tetuan, 3 Dec. 1922 and FO 371/8342/W10254/171/28, Were to Robertson, Tetuan, 6 Dec. 1922.
² The Times, 5 Dec. 1922, p.11, dated Madrid, 4 Dec. 1922.
³ Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 45.
before. On the day when this is done a state of tranquility will be reached in due order.

Know also that in a short time the Protectorate will be cemented into place.

Families of the Rif! An 'amal [sic] will govern you. He will come from a good family and you will live in complete security and happiness. Your religion and customs, as well as your laws, will all be respected.

Our mission is because we are your brothers from across the Strait of Gibraltar, and we want that the enmity between us should end. We seek to join with you so that we might both share the benefits.

As for the agitators and dissidents who do not wish to keep to the conditions which were laid down on the exercise of the Protectorate, because they do not recognise its advantage, I will have no dealings with them. I will use arms against them."

The proclamation marked the beginning of a real attempt in the eastern zone to convince the local people of the reality of the Spanish Protectorate, as opposed to Spanish colonisation. It stressed the rôle of the khalifa, and the economic and social advantages of the Protectorate, advantages which, it implied, only the Spanish could bring. However, it also threatened military action against those who chose not to accept those advantages.

Military action had, in fact, already started, and the advance towards the central Rif resumed. On 24 August, Burguete issued a "General Order" in which he announced that "by persuasion or force he would re-take the prisoners in 'Abd el-Krim's hands... [and] the rapid implantation of the Spanish Protectorate depended on the valour of all."

On 25 August, 'Azīb Miṣār in the Banū Tūzīn was reoccupied and Ajdīr was bombed. On 29 August, 'Azrī, Issan Lassan and Tawriat Ushshān, also in the Banū Tūzīn, were taken as well (see Map VIII: 1).
Map VIII:1 To illustrate military operations - 1922

- Scale 1cm. to 2 kms approx

-轮廓区域显示主地图的面积

-各部落
  - 班努·伊德
  - 班努·萨伊德
  - 班努·阿奇

-山地
-河流

-王国边界

-城镇
-地点

-注释

-说明
The Madrid government, still worried about any further military advances, put pressure on Burguete to desist. This he did and at the end of August went to Madrid to discuss policy. On 31 August, it was announced that there was no disagreement between him and the government but as though to disprove this, General Ardanaz, the Comandante General of Melilla, resigned, according to The Times, because he disagreed with the way the recent operations had been conducted.

Burguete returned to Morocco, satisfied with the discretion he had been given in Madrid to order minor military operations, and proceeded to carry out the new political policies. On 7 September, amid great pomp and ceremony, the new Spanish Protectorate in Morocco was officially inaugurated in Melilla, in the presence of the khalifa, Mūlāy al-Maḥdī, and the Spanish authorities. At the same time, several qā'īds were appointed by the khalifa.

By the beginning of October, Burguete's policies seemed to be having some success, particularly in the west which, with al-Raisūlī under control, was quite peaceful. Mr. Fox-Strangeways, in one of his last reports as British Vice-Consul in Tetuan, stated that Burguete:

"... has really succeeded, where his predecessors had signally failed, in establishing some sort of contact with the Tribes, both those who had previously made some sort of submission to the Makhzen and those who had always proved irreductible."

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1 Ibid.
3 The Times, 9 Sept. 1922, p. 7, dated Madrid, 8 Sept. 1922.
4 FO 371/8342/W8878/181/28, Fox-Strangeways to Codrington, Tetuan, 7 Oct. 1922, Confidential.
'Amar b. Hamīdu again

While Burquete was able to solve some of his problems through political action, bin 'Abd al-Karīm found that this was not so easy. The economic position in the Rif was very serious. The June harvest was bad, both in the Ghumāra and the Rif, for sowing the previous year had been disrupted by the campaigns. Many people left the Rif at the end of June to find work in Tetuan: but significantly they were more often women than men, for the men were at home, ready to fight. In the Timsamān no barley was harvested at all, Spanish intelligence reported, and the price of that grain went up steeply. Between the end of April 1922 and the end of May barley had increased from 3 pts a mudd to 10 pts a mudd in the Rif. Now, in August, the price was put at 54 pts a quintal in the Timsamān.

The food problem was bad enough on its own, but bin 'Abd al-Karīm faced an even more difficult problem, for the truce with 'Amar b. Hamīdu soon broke down. Even when the peace between the two had seemed to be confirmed at the beginning of August, 'Abd al-Mālik, who had often been 'Amar Hamīdu's ally in the past, was trying to raise a harka against b. 'Abd al-Karīm. By 9 August, he had found some

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1 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información 3a Mfa. Junio y Julio, nota, 14 June 1922, and Información 6a Mfa, Junio y Julio, nota, 15 July 1922.
2 SHM Ceuta Leg. 13, Información 6a Mfa, Junio y Julio, nota, 20 June 1922.
3 SHM Leg. 21, Información 4a Mfa, Amar Hamido, Información 4a Mfa, 17 Aug. 1922.
4 SHM Melilla, leg. 18, Información Alhucemas, nota, 29 May, 1922.
5 SHM Melilla, Leg. 20, Información 8a Mfa, de Agosto de 1922, Información Dar Drušh, 2 Aug. 1922. For an explanation of these weights see above, p. xviii.
support in the Banū Tūzīn and al-Maṭālsa tribes, and ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu himself was collecting a ḥarka. The French attempted to forestall the attack of their enemy ‘Abd al-Mālik by organising a ḥarka under the Qā'id Miḍbuḥ of the southern Gaznaya against him, but were too late to be very effective. ¹

It now seemed that ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu was definitely on the side of the Spanish. Around 13 July, he told five or six shaykhs from the Banū Tūzīn that all the problems in their tribe had been caused by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm who "is neither sharīf nor sultan," and the only people who could keep real order were the Spanish.² Once again, attention was being called to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's birth, thereby emphasising how different he was to previous leaders. The other part of bin Ḥamīdu's argument, that of the benefits of Spanish order, was already being disproved by bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's own ability to maintain order. Yet his attacks on bin ‘Abd al-Karīm did not at this stage go beyond propaganda. He seems to have encouraged resistance to taxation in the Banū Hadhiba clan of the Banū Waryaghall although he did not get involved himself.³ Even though he started to form a ḥarka of men from the Gaznaya and Marnīsa,⁴ his major efforts were spent in encouraging conspiracies against bin ‘Abd al-Karīm. His political strength was increased by the emergence of his frequent ally Bil-Qīsh as the only real power in the Gaznaya. Shaykh Si Ahmad Ū Birkān, of the Banū Uzra, who had been Bil-Qīsh's only rival, had died of

¹ Ibid., Información Dār Drīsh, 9 Aug. 1922.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 4a Mía, Amar Hamido, Información 4a Mía, 13 Aug. 1922.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 4a Mía, de Agosto de 1922, Información 13 Aug. 1922 and Información, 17 Aug. 1922.
⁴ Ibid., Información Dār Drīsh, 18 Aug. 1922.
illness and Bil-Qišš was now the sole effective leader of the northern Gaznaya. On 22 August, he held a meeting with several representatives of the Banū Tūzīn, including bin 'Abd al-Karīm's qā'idīs in the Igharbi īn (Muhand SI 'Alī), the Banū Ta'bān (Akyīd) and others from the Banū 'Aqqī and Banū Bil'aiz clans of that tribe. This meeting agreed that they would defend both tribes against all outsiders, French, Spanish and Banū Waryaghal.¹

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm finally decided to take some action of his own. He announced that he would take a ḥarka to force 'Amar b. Ḥāmidū to agree with him or to fight him. The Captain of the 4a Mfa was of the opinion that he did not have the power to do this and that the announcement was purely a propaganda exercise. 'Amar b. Ḥāmidū, with Bil-Qišš's support, ignored it and announced in the Gaznaya, Marnīsa and Sinhāja that he would punish anyone who did not recognise his authority.²

The Fight Against the Spanish

One of the reasons for bin 'Abd al-Karīm's inability to deal with 'Amar b. Ḥāmidū was the threat caused by the Spanish advances of late August 1922 and the consequent series of defections to the Spanish.

At the beginning of August, there had been several defections from the Tafarsīt ḥarka, including the qā'id Muḥammad b. Zagdūd who was leading the Tafarsīt tribe while its regular qā'id, Ḥaddū b. al-Muqaddam al-Yusūfī was under

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes A. Ghirelli, Informe, 24 Aug. 1922.
arrest in Ajdār for his pro-Spanish views.

The Tafarsit ḥarka was anyway very weak and was almost entirely made up of people from the Banū Waryaghal and Banū Tūzīn—only 300 were in position at Bū Ḥafūra to the west of Tafarsit village. The ‘Azīb Miḍār ḥarka in the Banū Tūzīn was even weaker—40 Waryaghalīs and 80 Tūzanīs. ¹

Everywhere, in fact, the ḥarkas’ numbers were low and made up mainly of men from the Banū Waryaghal, some of them in the Tawārda, 75 more in the zawiyah of Sīdī Sa‘īd and 160 in Tugunt in the Banū Sa‘īd. But many of the Walishakī shaykhs from Tawārda, al-Naṣrūr, and the Banū Ikhalāf had sent letters to the Spanish offering assistance, and Muḥammad Bū Qaddur of the Timsamān once again promised his submission when the Spanish eventually took Anwāl. ²

Bū Qaddur, of course, was as changeable as ever and his offer to the Spanish did not prevent him from going along with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm as well. On 17 August 1922, he was reported to have led 450 men from the Timsamān to reinforce the Banū Walishak. Furthermore, in response to growing pressure from the Banū Tūzīn, allies of the Tafarsit, for the release of Muḥammad b. al-Muqaddam, ³ bin ‘Abd al-Karīm finally agreed. ⁴ This had the effect of quietening somewhat the opposition in the Banū Tūzīn, and that tribe at last agreed to send 200-300 men to the Tafarsit ḥarka to try to stop the Spanish advance. By the end of August, when the Spanish had occupied ‘Azīb, Miḍār, ‘Azrū, Tawriat Ushshān, and Issan Lassan,

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¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 8a Mía, de Agosto de 1922, Información Dār Drūsh, 9 Aug. 1922.
² Ibid., Información Dār Drūsh, 13 Aug. 1922.
³ Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 17 Aug. 1922.
⁴ Ibid., Información, Dār Drūsh, 20 Aug. 1922.
thereby outflanking the ḥarka to the south, the Tafarsit ḥarka reportedly consisted of 1,200 men, of whom 500 were from the Banū Waryaghal.¹

As a result of the Spanish advances, those people in the eastern Rif who were still determined to oppose the Spanish put more pressure on bin ʿAbd al-Karīm for help. A group of shaykhūn from the Banū Walishak, Timsamān and exiled Banū Saʿīdīs wrote to him at the end of August: "telling him of the obligation that he had to come with a harka to fight the Spanish."²

Despite this appeal and the men that bin ʿAbd al-Karīm sent to help, the ḥarka in the Banū Walishak slowly disintegrated throughout September 1922. One reason for this was a severe lack of food.³ Most of those who remained were from the Banū Waryaghal—bin ʿAbd al-Karīm brought in about 1,500 men from his own tribe in mid-September to the Tafarsit ḥarka.⁴ But by the end of the month there were only about 270 men left in the Banū Walishak,⁵ and other positions were similarly low.

On 9 September, Muḥammad b. al-Muqaddam of Tafarsit took the opportunity to press the Spanish to advance on Buḥafūra, west of Tafarsit,⁶ thus isolating the ḥarka. Bin ʿAbd

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¹ Ibid., Información Dár Drūṣḥ, 30 Aug. 1922.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información, Agosto, Información 4a Mía, 30 Aug. 1922.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información, Septiembre, Resumen General de Confidencias, 1 Sept. 1922, Resumen General de Confidencias, 2 Sept. 1922.
⁴ Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 13 Sept. 1922, and SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 8a Mía, Septiembre, T.O.C. Jefe de Policía to Cor. De Policía, Mīdār, 12 Sept. 1922.
⁵ Ibid., Información Dár Drūṣḥ, 27 Sept. 1922.
⁶ Ibid., T.O.C. Comandante Jefe Kert to Jefe Tropas de Policía, Dár Drūṣḥ, 9 Sept. 1922.
al-Karīm tried to stop this family's persistent contacts with the Spanish by arresting b. al-Muqaddam's son, who, however, escaped within a few days.2

Bin 'Abd al-Karīm seems to have been well-informed of all contacts with the Spanish. Anghelo Ghirelli, one of the Spanish intelligence experts, reported on 9 September that many people were very nervous of contacting the Spanish because bin 'Abd al-Karīm always found out, for his information was working even in Melilla and Tetuan.3 This intelligence service was one of his weapons in helping to control the defections to the Spanish and also shows the high level of political and social control which he had already achieved.

Another weapon was a fairly active propaganda campaign. At the beginning of September this was based on two claims: firstly that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had gained European recognition for the Rif, and that the Europeans would oblige the Spanish to stop their conquest; and secondly that if the Spanish did advance the results would be disastrous --the Spanish, he announced, were "avid seekers after Moroccan women," and would "use any means to satisfy their desires."4

This black propaganda campaign was explicable enough; less easily understood was a brief return, in September 1922, to the old style politics of the emergence of a Pretender, claiming to be a member of the 'Alāwī family.

1 Ibid., T. Mil., Teniente Policía to Comandante Policía and Capt. 8a Mia, Miqār, 10 Sept. 1922.
2 Ibid., T. Mil., Teniente Policía to Comandante Jefe actual, Dār Drifūsh, 14 Sept. 1922.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes A. Ghirelli, Informe, 9 Sept. 1922.
4 Ibid.
"Mūlāy Muḥammad" and "Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥaflfż"

The first person to seize on the idea of making use of a pretender was not, in fact, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm but ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdū. On 2 September 1922, a man was reported to be in b. Ḥamīdū’s house, who said that he was Mūlāy Muḥammad—yet another use of that famous identity—that he wanted to be proclaimed Sultan, and that he would buy a horse and distribute cartridges to form a ġarka.1 This "pretender" does not seem to have helped ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdū at all and he either faded out or changed his fake identity and reappeared on the opposing side.

On 10 September, a man calling himself Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥaflfż was reported in the Gaznaya. The Banū Waryaghāl, Timsamān, Banū Tūzīn and Banū Walishak each sent four representatives to find out who he was.2 They quickly discovered that he was opposed to the Spanish3 but it was only after a meeting at Sūq al-Jama’a of the Gaznaya on 15 September 19224 that the Gaznayī and Tūzānī šaykhs decided he was not Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥaflfż and expelled him from the tribe.5 By 25 September the fake Mūlāy ‘Abd al-Ḥaflfż had disappeared.6 He was later reported to have been captured and imprisoned at the zawiya of Sīdī ‘Ali Bū ’Uqba in the Gaznaya in the custody of Bil-Qiš and Ḥamīd ‘Amar of that

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía, 2 Sept. 1922.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes A. Ghirelli, Informe, 9 Sept. 1922.
3 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información Septiembre, Resumen General de Confidencias, 13 Sept. 1922.
4 Ibid., Minuta de Información, 15 Sept. 1922.
5 Ibid., Minuta de Información, 17 Sept. 1922.
6 Ibid., Telephone message from Dār Kabdānī, 25 Sept. 1922.
tribe. By now, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was trying to ransom him.¹

The whole incident would be rather unimportant if it were not for two things: firstly the interest of bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the pretender, and secondly his identity. The Gaznaya, Banū Tūzīn and other tribes may have had some difficulty in deciding who he was, but Anghelo Ghirelli, one of the Spanish army’s intelligence experts, had no such problems. He identified him fairly soon as ʻAbd b. Ka‘b al-Shargī, who, it will be remembered, had last appeared in the Rif during the First World War as an agent for (the real) Mūlāy ʻAbd al-Ḥafīz, who was then working for the Germans. On that occasion he had taken messages and gifts from ʻAbd al-Ḥafīz to a number of Rifī and Qal‘ayī leaders, including b. ʻAbd al-Karīm and Ismā‘īl Wuld al-Shaddī of the Mazūja (who had been one of bin ʻAbd al-Karīm’s principal supporters in the Qal‘aya in the autumn of 1921). He had eventually been imprisoned by the Spanish and was released on bin ‘Abd al-Karīm’s request.² He had spent the period since the end of the war in Algeria, after changing sides yet again.³

Ghirelli was quite convinced that b. Ka‘b was now working for the French,⁴ with whom, of course, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was trying to keep on good terms. This seems slightly far-fetched, and another Spanish writer of the period, Hernández-Mir, provides a more reasonable explanation of bin ‘Abd al-Karīm’s interest in bin Ka‘b. According to him, Mūlāy ʻAbd al-Ḥafīz, who was now living in Málaga, was at this time

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía, Septiembre, Información, Dār Drūsh, 27 Sept. 1922.
² See above, pp. 187-188.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes A. Ghirelli, Informe, 10 Sept. 1922.
⁴ Ibid.
hoping for a "consolation Sultanate" in the Rif. However, the Spanish authorities had forbidden him from crossing the Straits of Gibraltar. Nevertheless, when the false Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ appeared in the Gaznaya, the Spanish were concerned, for bin Kaʿb bore a certain similarity of appearance to the deposed Sultan, and was only positively identified as someone else because he had a blackened tooth which ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ did not have. When this became apparent, bin Kaʿb apparently told the Gaznayis that he was the personal representative of Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥamīẓ. In the end, he was rejected when the Spanish obliged ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ to write to the tribes denying his "agent's" authority.  

Bin Kaʿb's rôle as a representative of Mūlāy Ḥafīẓ seems quite likely in view of his work for the former Sultan during the First World War. It also seems likely that Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ had told him to give support to bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, again because of their past connections. From bin ʿAbd al-Karīm's point of view, the intervention of the pretender offered considerable advantages, for he arrived in the Gaznaya, one of the most important centres of opposition to bin ʿAbd al-Karīm, and told them to stop their enmity for the Rifī leader. As he claimed to be Mūlāy ʿAbd al-Ḥafīẓ, the Sultan whose reputation was built on his desperate attempts to maintain the independence of Morocco, his interference might have been expected to quieten the support for bin ʿAbd al-Karīm's enemies in that tribe.

In the end, the deception was discovered, as it was bound to be, and although bin ʿAbd al-Karīm did his best

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2 Ibid., p. 36.
to help bin Ka‘b, and gave him money to escape from the Rif; the affair had certainly not benefited him. Bil-Qīsh and ‘Amar bin Ḫamīdu continued to gather support and their opposition now became a clear question of force, rather than just a propaganda campaign. The fact that this opposition followed directly on the exposure of bin Ka‘b is an indication of the fact that when bin ‘Abd al-Karīm tried to use traditional methods of rallying forces to his side, he was less successful than when he applied new methods of propaganda and control.

Rebellion and Subversion

‘Amar b. Ḫamīdu had been in touch with certain members of the Banū Ḫadhīfa in August to encourage their resistance to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm’s endeavours to raise taxes in that clan. At the beginning of October 1922 the Banū Ḫadhīfa rebelled against bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, and were joined by the Banū ‘Abdallah. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm, who had been in the Banū Walishak, left at once for Ajdir to deal with the situation. Before he left, he appointed Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān as gā’īd in his absence—apparently to the fury of the Banū Walishak. Meanwhile, Bil-Qīsh had gathered 200 Gaznayīs and 100 Tūzānīs at Sūq al-Thalāthā of Azilāf. Agitation against bin ‘Abd al-Karīm was clearly growing and he reverted to arresting shaykhs in the Banū Walishak and Timsamān. Much of this agitation, as bin ‘Abd al-Karīm

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1 SHM Melilla Leg., 20, Información 8a Mía, Octubre a Diciembre de 1922, T.O. Capt. 9a Mía to Coronel de Policía, 8 Oct. 1922.
2 Ibid., Nota, 3a Sección, O.C.A.I., Melilla, 2 Oct. 1922.
3 SHM Melilla Leg., 20, Información Octubre, Resumen General de Información, 7 Oct. 1922.
realised, was being deliberately orchestrated by the Spanish.¹ Their agent for this purpose was Idrīs b. ‘Abdallah b. Sa‘īd of Salé, the man who had taken over negotiations with bin ‘Abd al-Karīm for the return of the Spanish prisoners.

Idrīs b. Sa‘īd certainly negotiated for the return of the prisoners—he wrote a letter to ‘Amar b. Ṣadīq and his brother Muḥammad b. Ṣadīq of the Banū Ḥadhīfa, concerning the arrangements for the return of the prisoners, on 19 October 1922, in which he explained that the delay in the negotiations was due to repeated Rīfī attacks on the islands of Alhucemas and Peñón de Vélez. However, he did not waste the opportunity to subvert bin ‘Abd al-Karīm’s supporters. He suggested that the two brothers should put pressure on bin ‘Abd al-Karīm to return the prisoners. If they did this they would be treated favourably:

"What is past is past, and the Makhzan will appoint a qā‘īd among you, either you or your brother, and will give you money and a māḥalla and supplies will be sent by land and sea."²

Idrīs b. Sa‘īd went on to suggest that if bin ‘Abd al-Karīm refused to give way over the prisoners, then the bin Ṣadīqs should call the tribes together and take possession of the prisoners themselves.³

On the same day, 19 October, Idrīs b. Sa‘īd wrote a similar letter to the Sharīf Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallah al-Wazzānī of the Banū Ḥūṣīr clan of the Timsāmān. In this letter,

¹ Ibid.
² MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 215. Muḥammad Idrīs b. Sa‘īd to ‘Amar al-Ṣadīq and Muḥammad al-Ṣadīq, 27 Ṣafar 1341/19 Oct. 1922. (The Bin Ṣadīq brothers had been Spanish pensioners from 1912 and had been joined by Muḥammad’s son in 1917. See above, pp. 174-175).
³ Ibid.
Idris b. Sa'id laid claims to past family friendship, reminding the shari'f of past favours, of how he had prevented the Spanish from bombarding his zawiya from the sea. Then he came to the point: "The moment has come to tell you that the time has come for you to join with the Makhzan before all others." There followed instructions on how he was to meet Idris b. Sa'id in secret to discuss the liberation of the prisoners, forcing the "faqih", bin 'Abd al-Karim, to release them, "for there is no reason why his opinion alone should be of importance in this matter." This was, of course, a direct appeal to split the Rifis among themselves and was followed by an offer of Spanish help:

"If you have need of a Makhzan mahalla composed of Muslims in order to free you from tyranny, ask for it, after you have discussed it with the notables (kubara) of the tribe—it will be sent to you by land or sea."

Clearly Idris b. Sa'id's negotiations for the return of the prisoners were becoming a serious political threat to bin 'Abd al-Karim. The bin Sadig brothers, who wielded great influence in their clan of Banu Nadif, would from now on use the same political tactics as Bu Qaddur of the Timsamân in an effort to keep contact both with the Spanish and bin 'Abd al-Karim and so preserve their own power.

Idris b. Sa'id was also in contact with Bil-Qish. On 24 October, the Gaznayi leader was reported to be in the Igharbil clan of the Banu Tuzin with a large escort. The Spanish were unsure of his intentions, but he had just met

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Idrīs b. Sa'īd in 'Aznū. Two days later, Bil-Qīsh told a meeting of Tūzānīs that he was pro-Spanish and proposed that they make common cause with the Gaznaya, Marnīsā and Wargha tribes. These were of course 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu's home tribes. As a result, at the end of October, fighting started once again between bin 'Abd al-Karīm's supporters in the Gaznaya and those of 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu. Once again, locally powerful leaders, jealous of their position, were trying to oppose bin 'Abd al-Karīm.

This time, however, the initiative was taken by bin 'Abd al-Karīm's supporters. The clan of Awlād Muḥand and parts of the Awlād Yūnis were encouraged with presents of money to attack the other clans in the tribe.

In fact, the opposition to bin 'Abd al-Karīm was less than it had seemed at first. For all their discussions with 'Amar b. Ḫamīdu and Bil-Qīsh, the Banū Tūzīn did not attack bin 'Abd al-Karīm. On the contrary, his supporters attacked pro-Spanish groups in the 'Azīb Miḍār area and in the Banū Mallūl clan of that tribe and bin 'Abd al-Karīm was able to reinforce his positions against the Spanish with men from the Banū Tūzīn, as well as the Timsamān and Banū Waryaghāl, on 22 or 23 October. He could even count on 100 Qal'ayī exiles who had still not returned to their Spanish occupied homes.

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Informaciones 8a Mía, Octubre-Diciembre, T.O.C., Capt. 8a Mía to Cor. Policía, Dār Dribašh, 24 Oct. 1922.
2 SHM Melilla, Leg. 20, Información Octubre, Minuta para la información de hoy, 26 Oct. 1922.
3 Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 31 Oct. 1922.
4 Ibid.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía, Octubre-Diciembre, T.M., Capt. 8a Mía to Cor. Policía; Dār Dribašh, 23 Nov. 1922.
This reinforcement was necessary, for Spanish forces had begun their advances once again.

The Last Stage of the Spanish Advance

At the end of October 1922, the Spanish advance in the eastern zone began again, but these were to be the last large-scale troop movements on that front for several years.

On 26 October, the Spanish advanced along the front stretching from Dār Kabdānī in the Banū Sa‘īd to ‘Aznū in the Banū Tūzīn, while Spanish naval vessels shelled coastal villages between Sīdī Idrīs and Afrāw. On the first day, Bū Hafūra in the Tafarsit and al-Nāzūr in the Banū Walishak were occupied, and on the next day Sīdī Mīṣā‘ūd, on the borders of the Banū Sa‘īd and Banū Walishak, was taken as well. On 28 October, Tīzzī ‘Azzā on the borders of the Tafarsit and Banū Tūzīn lands was occupied. Burguete considered that this position would be an excellent base camp for an advance on Alhucemas. Here the advance to the west stopped (see Map VIII : 1, p. 460 above). The new Spanish position was heavily besieged by the Rifīs. An attempt to set up a new post slightly to the west of Tīzzī ‘Azzā failed when it was attacked by Rifīs from the southern flank. Spanish casualties were heavy. According to a Secretary in the British Embassy in Madrid this advance was unauthorised. All the previous advances had been achieved with the agreement of the war-weary shaykhs in the Banū Sa‘īd and Banū Walishak, but this one caused difficulties with those shaykhs:

"It is said that the political commission of Tafarsit has only with great difficulty persuaded the Chiefs

1 Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 277.
of their tribe that the independent action of this column does not in reality constitute a breach of faith on the part of the High Command since it had acted without orders from the latter."

On 1 and 2 November, the position at Tizzi 'Azzā was itself attacked. On those two days the Spanish forces lost almost 2,000 men and any further advances to the west ceased. A few more positions to the east were occupied at the beginning of November—Afraw on the coast and Issumār on 6 November, and Anwāl on 7 November, to even out the salient around Tizzi 'Azzā, but these were absolutely the final advances.

The Spanish forces had reached the rough line of the Spanish advance achieved by Silvestre before the disasters of July 1921. They had taken just over a year to do this, a tremendous achievement. But they were now on the very edge of the central Rif and the Madrid government was unwilling to allow any further advances. The Spanish army too, victorious though it was, was divided. There had been a corruption scandal in the Larache Comandancia which had come to light in September 1922, and the active regiments in Morocco had come into conflict with those in Spain. Faced with low rates of pay, officers on the mainland had formed Juntas de Defensa—Military Defence Councils, almost a military trade union—to press for better pay and to oppose the tendency for officers in Morocco to be promoted more rapidly than they were. This led to conflict between the Juntas and the African army, which came to a head when

1 FO 371/8342/W9388/171/28, Wingfield to Curzon, Madrid, 12 Nov. 1922, enclosing report by Houston Boswell, Third Secretary in Madrid.


4 The Times, 8 Nov. 1922, p. 11, dated Madrid, 7 Nov. 1922.
Colonel Millan Astray, the founder of the Foreign Legion, resigned his commission in November 1922. This quickly led to the abolition of the Juntas by law, but the combination of political pressure, arguments within the army, and, above all, the still strong position of the Rifis, determined the ending of further troop movements.

Burguete had decided to blockade the Rif and to this end had 30,000 men on the eastern front. But the Rifis were still strong. The advance had taken place with little opposition—Tizzi 'Azzā had been occupied with only 8 dead and 18 wounded among the Spanish, and Anwāl had been occupied without a shot being fired. As the British Embassy in Madrid pointed out, this meant that the Rif forces had been able to withdraw almost intact. So they had been able to make their attack on Tizzi 'Azzā in force, inflicting huge losses on the Spanish. There were still large numbers of Rifis protecting the eastern front. Spanish intelligence reported 1,800 men from the Banū Waryaghal and Banū Tūzin on the east bank of the Wādī Amqarān, facing Tizzi 'Azzā, and more in the Banū Bū Yari in the Banū Tūzin, near Bū Hafūrā, and Issān Lassān, with a reserve in Sūq al-Thalāthā of Azīlāf. To the north, in the Timsamān, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was reported to have 600 men from the Banū Waryaghal and 250 Timsamānis in his main base at Jabal Qāma, almost in the centre of the tribe.

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2 Ibid., p. 110.
4 The Times, 8 Nov. 1922, p. 11, dated Madrid, 7 Nov. 1922.
5 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información Noviembre, Minuta para la información de hoy, 5 Nov. 1922.
6 Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 10 Nov. 1922.
All these positions were reinforced between 11 and 15 November. On 18 November it was reported that b. 'Abd al-Karîm had 3,200 men in Sūq al-Thalāṯā' of Azilāf ready for an attack on the Spanish positions in the Banū Walishak. When the rains began on 20 November the ḥarka did go down slightly, but the Rifī positions in and facing the Banū Walishak, at Jabal Yuddīa and in the Banū Tūzīn clans of Banū Marghanīn and Igharblīn remained garrisoned. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm wanted a general attack on all the Spanish forward positions, and to this end he ordered that no one should leave the ḥarka and return home to sow—despite the food shortage. The attack on Tafarsit never developed, but Afraw was besieged by between 800 and 2,000 Rifīs from 21 November onwards. The attacking forces asked for cannon to help them in their efforts and were only beaten off with great difficulty.

Bin 'Abd al-Karîm's plan, according to those who were involved and then informed the Spanish, was to divide the ḥarka into three sections: one based on the very edge of the Banū Walishak, at Ait 'Abd al-'Azīz, consisting of 1,200 men under Bū Lahya; another at Bū Maḏḏur in the Banū Tūzīn to guard the rear at Tīzī 'Aẓzā; under three

1 Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 11 Nov. 1922 and Resumen General de Confidencias, 15 Nov. 1922.
2 Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 16 Nov. 1922.
3 Ibid., Minuta para la información de hoy, 21 Nov. 1922.
4 Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 20 Nov. 1922.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., Resumen General de Confidencias, 24 Nov. 1922.
7 FO 371/8342/W10121/171/28. Were to Robertson, Tetuan, 30 Nov. 1922.
8 Ibid.; and SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Harcas, O.A.I. 3a, nota, 24 Nov. 1922.
Waryaghli's—'Amar b. 'Abdallah (of the Banū 'Abdallah) who was the Spanish informant on this occasion, 'Amar b. Ṣādiq of the Banū Ḥadhīfa, and Muḥ Abarqān, and consisting of 1,500 men; and 1,000 men to the south of Tizzī 'Azzā: "with the aim of stopping convoys to the forward Spanish positions."¹

More Subversion in the Rif

Despite these heavy concentrations on the Spanish front, bin 'Abd al-Karīm faced mounting opposition at home. Two of his commanders on the front—'Amar b. Ṣādiq of the Banū Ḥadhīfa and 'Amar b. 'Abdallah of the Banū 'Abdallah clans of the Banū Waryaghli—were in touch with the Spanish, through both Idrīs b. Saʿīd and through 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu. A Spanish informant reported on 22 November 1922 that seven shaykhs of the Murābiṭīn clan of the Banū Waryaghli, 'Amar b. Ṣādiq of the Banū Ḥadhīfa, and two others from the Banū 'Abdallah were in favour of the Spanish, and the Banū 'Abdallah and Banū Ḥadhīfa shaykhs were cooperating with 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu. One of the shaykhs of the Murābiṭīn who was involved was Sha'īb b. al-Ḥājj Tuḥamī,² who put his friendliness towards Spain into effect in early December, by trying to help Spanish officers held prisoner by the Rifīs to escape, and was shot for his efforts.³

These executions caused a considerable amount of opposition in the Banū Waryaghli. In mid-December Shaykh

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Harcas, Comandante Jefe del Sector Norte to Coronel de Tropas Indígenas, 23 Nov. 1922.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informaciones de Confidentes, Noviembre y Diciembre de 1922, nota, 13 Dec. 1922.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información Diciembre 1922, Resumen General de Confidencias, 9 Dec. 1922.
al-Yazīd al-Waryaghī! wrote to the Spanish that the "Faqih... is now quarrelling with the Banū Waryaghīl because of the shaykhs whom he killed for being in contact with you," and this, as al-Yazīd pointed out, gave the Spanish an opportunity for action. However, the Spanish authorities' best hopes for action against bin 'Abd al-Karīm and his supporters lay through 'Amar b. Ḥāmidū. Bin 'Abd al-Karīm could not prevent the Mānīsī leader from being in contact with the Spanish. At the end of October, Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū "al-Kaḥal" had written to bin 'Abd al-Karīm from Port Say in Algeria to point out the danger 'Amar b. Ḥāmidū posed to the Rifīs:

"They said 'Amar and the Spaniards are clearly working together with the intention that the door through which you are in contact with the French nation should be shut and that there should be no commerce between you. If they are successful in that you will be powerless." The "door" to which Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū referred was the route between the central Rif, through the Gaznaya and Banū 'Amārt, to the French zone. 'Amar bin Ḥāmidū made an effort to close this "door" when, at the beginning of December, he attacked bin 'Abd al-Karīm's supporters in the Banū 'Amārt, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm was obliged to send reinforcements, organised by Bū Lāhya.

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Banū Waryaghīl, Yazīd al-Waryaghīl to Cor. Policía, received 9 Dec. 1922.
2 Ibid.
3 MAEF, Maroc 517, pp. 196-199. Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū al-Buqquyl to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm, Port Say, 23 Oct. 1922. Ḥaddū b. Ḥammū, it will be remembered, was the man sent in Sept. and Oct. 1921 to collect the arms abandoned by the Spanish in Dar Drijūsh (see above, p. 386-388). He had now returned to his adopted hom of Port Say where he came to act as a sort of unofficial ambassador for bin 'Abd al-Karīm to the French. This letter is written in printed notepaper headed: "Haddou Ben Hammou, Tissus, Céréales, Embarkements, Debarkements."
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Información 8a Mía, Octubre-
The reinforcements did not succeed in preventing the Marnisís from occupying the Banū 'Amārt, and bin 'Abd al-Karīm found himself repeating the Spanish tactics of buying support. A Spanish informant in the Gaznaya, Mūlāy Qaddūr b. Yaḥyā, reported on 19 December that "The Banū Waryaghal are occupied in [sending] money to the Banū 'Amārt so that they should rebel against the Marnīsa."¹

This, according to Qaddūr, was unlikely to succeed, because 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu had captured bin 'Abd al-Karīm's qā'id in the Banū 'Amārt, Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib.² Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib, it will be remembered, had written to the Spanish in August 1920, asking for their help in his tribe,³ but since the Rīfī victories had allied himself with bin 'Abd al-Karīm. Now, he and other 'Amārtī leaders were held in 'Abd al-Mālik's prison, and 'Abd al-Mālik, 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, Bil-Qīsh and the Shaykh Muḥammad b. Mūsā of Burīd had sworn to keep them prisoners for ever.⁴

From his supporters in the Banū Waryaghal, 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu received news of bin 'Abd al-Karīm's movements and offers of help. A letter sent from a certain al-Mu'allim al-Fāḍil al-Aḥyānī of the Banū Waryaghal reported to him that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had tried unsuccessfully to raise a contingent against 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu, promising his tribe that

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¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Gueznayya, Mūlāy Qaddūr b. Yaḥyā of Burīd to Colonel, 29 Rabi' I 1341/19 Dec. 1922.
² Ibid.
³ See above, p. 268.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Gueznayya, Mūlāy Qaddūr b. Yaḥyā of Burīd to Colonel, 23 Rabi' I 1341/19 Dec. 1922.
they had nothing to fear from the Marnîsâ.¹

Clearly, however, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had a great deal to fear from the Marnîsâ, and 'Amar b. Ḥamîdû, now that he had once again joined up with Bîl-Qîsh and 'Abd al-Mâlik. The Spanish could have used this political advantage to great effect had they been able to obtain firm support in the Banû Tûzîn and Tîmsamân in the east of the Rif, and in the Wargha tribes to the west. They did not, because of two serious political errors, themselves the result of a too-hasty application of the new policy of government through local representatives.

The Idrîs al-Rîfî Affair

The Spanish Proclamation to the unsubmitted tribes of the eastern zone at the end of August 1922 had promised them an ’âmil to rule over them.² The man eventually chosen for this post was Idrîs b. 'Abd al-Salâm, the man Berenguer had appointed as his political agent in the Banû Ḥarûs after the capture of Tazrût in April 1922. He had begun as a replacement for al-Raisûlî in Asîla, then in Tazrût,³ now he was about to become the principal Spanish agent in the east.

Luis Silvela, the civilian who was appointed High Commissioner in February 1923, later told the Commission of Enquiry into the Anwâl disaster and its aftermath, that although Burguete had created the post of ’âmil on paper, it was he, Silvela, who had appointed Idrîs al-Rîfî; as Idrîs

² See above, p. 459.
³ See above p. 445.
b. 'Abd al-Salam was generally known, as 'Amil, the makhzan representative.¹

This was true enough, but Idris al-Rifi was appointed as Pasha of Tafarsit soon after the Spanish reoccupation of that village in October 1922. On 13 November 1922, a certain bin al-Ḥājj wrote to the important Qā'id 'Allāl b. al-Ḥājj Bū 'Azẓā asking him why he alone among the ʿayān of the Banū Waryaghal, Gaznaya, Banū Tūzin, and Timsamān had not written to the new Pasha. Had he forgotten?²

Obviously there was some exaggeration—for the purpose of political propaganda—in bin al-Ḥājj's assertion that all the ʿayān of the eastern Rifī tribes had been in contact with Idris al-Rifi, but the new Pasha quickly made a real impression on the tribes.

The Spanish put considerable facilities at Idris al-Rifi's disposal. The officers in charge of the mías were instructed that the qāʿids of the tribes they administered were to be allowed to telephone the Pasha whenever they needed to do so.³ Idris al-Rifi thus became the effective intermediary between the Spanish and the tribes.

However, this did not please the pro-Spanish ʿayān in the unsubmitted tribes. On 13 December 1922, seven shaykhs of the Rabaʿa al-Fawqānī clan of the Timsamān told the captain in charge of the 10th Mía that they would deal with the Colonel of the Native Police but not with Idris al-Rifi.⁴

¹ Responsibilidades, pp. 337-350.
² MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 264, b. al-Ḥājj to 'Allāl b. al-Ḥājj Abū 'Azẓā, 23 Rabī'. I 1341/13 Nov. 1922.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 20, Conferencia, Coman. encargado despacho to Capt. 3a Mía, Tte Comandante 5a Mía, Capt. 10a, Tte Comandante 9a Mía, 7 Dec. 1922.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Información 10a Mía, 1921-1922, nota, 13 Dec. 1922.
Throughout December a series of letters was sent to the Colonel of Native Police, objecting to Idrīs al-Rīfi. Yazīd al-Waryaghī informed them that "communication with you is preferable to that with the Pasha of Muslim affairs," but gave no explanation for this preference. Mūlāy Qaddūr b. Yāḥyā of the Gaznayā, on the other hand, was more explicit on this point:

"I saw Señor [i.e., Captain] Alonso and gave him the good news that some people want to meet him, that is, Alonso, and he ordered me to see the Pasha Sayyīd Idrīs in Tafarsit, and when I met him I found that he does not fulfil the word of the Makhzan and there is no benefit in meeting him, and he is no use ..." 

This campaign against Idrīs al-Rīfi was to continue into 1923, increasing in vehemence, and expressing more detailed accusations against him. But for the moment, the Spanish seem to have ignored the complaints, although their choice of a man who aroused such opposition in a relatively short time was clearly a political error.

Political Failure in the Wargha

Another political error, again the result of giving too much leeway to Moroccan agents, was made with the Sinḥāja tribes of the upper Wādī Wargha valley. These tribes were, of course, the old base of 'Abd al-MAlik and had been strongly under his influence and that of Ṭāmīr b. Ḥāmīdu. It might have been expected that these tribes would therefore follow Ṭāmīr b. Ḥāmīdu and 'Abd al-MAlik into a close relationship with the Spanish. This did not in fact happen, partly because

1 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arábes 2, Bani Waryaghal, Shaykh al-Yazīd al-Waryaghī to Col. Police, received 9 Dec. 1922.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arábes 2, Gueznayyya, Mūlāy Qaddūr b. Yāḥyā of Burid Gaznayā to Colonel, 29 Rabī' II 1341/19 Dec. 1922.
of the internal quarrelling between the various Spanish agents in the eastern zone.

The main characters in this particular chronicle of political failure were 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Fannāṣṣī, a Spanish agent originating from the Sinhāja tribe of Fannāṣṣa, 'Abd al-Mālik, Idrīs b. Saʿīd, the Spanish agent who was using the issue of the prisoners to try to break the Rīfī coalition and, once again, Idrīs al-Rīfī, who was by now a friend of Idrīs b. Saʿīd. Also involved, to a lesser degree, was ‘Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Ṭayyib, the man who as qāʿīd of the Banū Shikār had prevented that tribe from joining the attack on the Spanish in July and August 1921. There was considerable rivalry between ‘Abd al-Qādir, who was now also working for Spanish Intelligence, and Idrīs al-Rīfī. Asked to explain this rivalry, General Burguete told the Commission of Enquiry into the Anwāl disaster in July 1923 that each had his own job to do, though there was a certain rivalry between them, a rather circular argument, as may be appreciated. He did not elaborate on this but the rivalry seems to have been, as usual, over power. Idrīs al-Rīfī was still Pasha of Tafarsit, not yet ‘Āmil, and still in Burguete’s words, “a Moorish instrument that I had there.” Clearly, however, by December 1922 he was claiming jurisdiction over ‘Abd al-Qādir, who rejected this fairly firmly.

Idrīs al-Rīfī, therefore, wanted to extend his

2 Ibid.
influence into the Wargha tribes, in order to find some power base. However, in doing this he was "poaching" on the territory of 'Abd al-Salam al-Fannasi and 'Abd al-Malik.

These attempts to attain power bases under Spanish protection considerably annoyed the Wargha tribes who complained to the Comandante General in Ceuta and to the Colonel of the Native Police in these terms:

"May the help of God preserve the Governor-General and the Colonel and all the officers of Melilla great and small. On you be peace.

To continue: What is happening? We heard that Spain was pure [as gold], unadulterated with copper. Today we are astonished at what you are doing. Relations have been damaged by the huge number of Moroccans involved . . ."¹

The letter went on to complain that other letters had gone without sufficient payment to the carrier, and that good relations would only continue if there was direct contact with the Spanish. The real complaint seems to have been that the Spanish authorities were working through outsiders, people from "the cities"—that is, Tetuan.² It will be remembered that Idris b. Sa'id had worked in the High Commission in Tetuan, and Idris al-Rifi had been Pasha of Asila and later occupied political appointments in the Jibala.

The letter, interestingly, was signed by 'Abd al-Salam b. al-'Affj Muhammad al-Yidri of the Marnisa and "all the 'ayyan of the Wargha". Al-Yidri was one of the men who had met bin 'Abd al-Karim on his first expedition into the Marnisa in July 1922, and had helped 'Abd al-Malik to attack bin 'Abd al-Karim from the rear.³

¹ Ibid., 'Abd al-Salam b. al-'Affj Muhammad al-Yidri al-Marnisi and all the notables of the Wargha to General and Colonel, 28 Rabī' I 1341/18 Nov. 1922.
² Ibid.
³ See above, p. 419.
However, the warnings went unheeded and Idrīs al-Rīfī, aided by Idrīs b. Sa‘īd, was not prevented from continuing his efforts to penetrate the Wargha on his own account. Whether this was done with the knowledge or consent of the Spanish authorities is unclear, but ‘Abd al-Salām al-Fannāṣṣī knew about it and warned ‘Abd al-Mālik. According to al-Fannāṣṣī, two agents of Idrīs al-Rīfī came to him and asked him to accompany them to see the "shaykhs of the Wargha". Al-Fannāṣṣī was apparently suspicious, and through a little secret investigation of his own discovered that Idrīs al-Rīfī, Idrīs b. Sa‘īd and another friend of theirs, bin Nūna, a wazīr in the Khalīfa’s administration in Tetuán, had given the two agents 5,000 pts to hand to certain leaders of the Wargha tribes to encourage them to write to the "Makhzān", asking that Idrīs al-Rīfī should be the intermediary between the Wargha tribes and the Spanish. Al-Fannāṣṣī's explanation of this behaviour was that since Idrīs al-Rīfī had been expelled by al-Rāṣūlī as the Pasha of Asīla (the result of al-Rāṣūlī's "submission") and rejected by ‘Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Ṭayyib, he was looking for somewhere else that he might control. Al-Fannāṣṣī advised ‘Abd al-Mālik to keep Idrīs al-Rīfī's agents under close watch, to arrest them if they came near and to let ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu know what was happening.¹

All these manoeuverings upset the Wargha tribes even more, and at the end of January 1923 another letter was sent to al-Fannāṣṣī in the name of "all the a’yān of the Wargha" complaining about his conduct. This letter is such

a strong statement of their disillusion with him and with the Spanish that it deserves to be reproduced in full:

"Praise be to God Alone--May God bless our Lord Muḥammad and his Family.

To his excellency our brother 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Fannāṣṣī. On you be peace and mercy and blessing for ever.

To continue: May God bless you for your service to the tribes of the Wargha in the way of lying and iniquity. They had great trust in you, when you said that Spain was the best of all nations. We did not know anything about it, but you told us it was so to such an extent that people listened and our recognition [of the Spanish] spread throughout the land and we went back on Islam and our brotherhood with the Rif, and we tied ourselves to Spain and to unbelief and went into rebellion [against Islam]. The battle came and we entered the territory of the Banū Waryaghūl on account of the Spanish prisoners and the capture of women. Today, Wuld 'Abd al-Karīm who was a friend, companion and beloved of the Spanish has changed sides, so that he makes sība against the Spanish to such an extent that even the Indians have heard of him, while we have taken our protection with them [i.e., the Spanish] and our reward has been disgrace and the tribes have laughed at us. The French have called to us, abusing us, saying 'Look today at the nation for which you toiled!' Wuld 'Abd al-Karīm has been given money, to win him back for Spain, and has been treated better than we, while the tribes of the Wargha have been rewarded with humiliation and disgrace. This is our reward from Spain. Before this France befriended us and told us to exchange Spain, a nation of disgrace, for a powerful nation. Today we know that their words were sincere, while yours and those of your friends were false. This is how they have rewarded us.

So know that you may not come [into our lands] at this time.

And Peace. On the tenth of the last [month] of Jumāda, thirteen forty-one.

All the a'yān of the Wargha, may God protect them.”

The language of this letter is extremely significant. On one level it expresses normal emotions of disillusion over what was felt to be a betrayal of trust, the result of Spanish

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1 Ibid., All the a'yān of the Wargha to 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Fannāṣṣī, 10 Jumāda II 1341/28 Jan. 1923. The Arabic text is reproduced in the Appendix, Document 3.
inability to help their supporters; on another, it shows a tension between the desire to cooperate with a powerful European nation—as they had supposed Spain to be—and their loyalty to their region and to other Muslims. The phrase "our brotherhood with the Rif" expresses that feeling of solidarity which the people of the upper Wādī Wargha tribes were prepared to set aside, provided that they received adequate protection and compensation. Nevertheless, the feeling of some sort of ties of solidarity existed. The reference to India is also significant, for in 1923 and 1924, the Islamic nationalist movement in India began to collect money to send to the Rif.\(^1\) Also of some interest is the use of the term sība to describe bin 'Abd al-Karīm's resistance. The term is, of course, normally used to denote a state of anarchy and refusal to obey the administrative orders of the Moroccan Sultan.\(^2\) The fact that what was happening in the Rif could by no means be described as anarchy, involving as it did the restoration of order and the gradual impartion of a centralised administration, was quite irrelevant to the writer of the letter. It is only a further example that what was sība from one point of view was law and government from another.

\(^1\) The efforts of the Khilafat Committee in the Punjab to send money to the Rif through the Imperial Bank of India were foiled when that bank found there was no way of remitting the money as there was no bank in the Rif. Nevertheless, the failure led in India to accusations of interference by the British government, see I.O. L/P & S/11/259/2500, no. 760, Dunnet (Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab) to Deputy Secretary, Government of India, Lahore, 12 Jan. 1926. This had been going on for some time—in December 1924 the French Consul in Calcutta complained of the activities of propagandists for the Rifis in India, FO 371/11081/240/H8609, Laronce (French Consul General, Calcutta) to Sec. to Government of India, Calcutta, 27 Mar. 1924 referring to letter of 24 Dec.

\(^2\) See above, pp. 23-39.
The Failure of Spanish Political Support

The letter from the a'yān of the Wargha, while it was most severely expressed, was by no means the only letter which reached the Spanish criticising the lack of help and support that they gave to their friends in the areas which were under bin 'Abd al-Karīm's control. Other Spanish supporters in the Banū Waryaghal, such as 'Amar b. Muḥammad al-'Abdallāḥī of the Banū 'Abdallāḥ and 'Amar b. Ṣādiq of the Banū Ḥādhīfa, who would emerge in an open alliance against bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the closing stages of the war, who had also been in contact with 'Amar b. Ḥamīdu and were opposing bin 'Abd al-Karīm's attempts at tax-collecting, were equally disgusted with Spanish behaviour.

In a letter which the Spanish received at the beginning of December, they complained that the Banū 'Amar Ẓū Sa'id (a sub-clan of the Banū Ḥādhīfa) had been burned out by anti-Spanish groups. It was time the Spanish kept their word, or everyone would go home and relations would be at an end.¹

On the same day, the Spanish received another letter on the same theme, this time from Ḥamīdu b. al-Muqaddam the qā'id of Tafarsit, who had himself been imprisoned by 'Abd al-Karīm and only recently released.² He started by complaining that "We are shown respect neither by the Makhzan nor by the Muslims." The Spanish had given them no seed, and the mujāhidīn had stolen all that they had. Now

² See above, p. 467, n. 2. His father had fled to 'Azīb Miḍār and Spanish protection in January 1922, see above, p. 398.
he appealed for aid.  

Part of the problem for the Spanish authorities in Morocco was the continuing uncertainty about the political future of their masters in Madrid. In November, after the insistence of the Cortes, the preliminary reports of the Picasso committee investigating the Anwāl disaster were presented to the Cortes. Sánchez Guerra, the Prime Minister, tried to end the whole issue by supporting a call for the accusation, in front of the Cortes, of the whole of the Allendesalazar government which had been in power at the time of Anwāl. This led to the resignation of two of his ministers who had also been members of the Allendesalazar administration. When the President of the Congress (the lower house of the Cortes), who had also been a minister at the time of Anwāl, also tried to resign, Sánchez Guerra refused to accept his offer and called a vote of confidence which, on 5 December 1922, he lost.

The new government, appointed on 7 December and led by Manuel García Prieto, was a Liberal-Reformist coalition of the Centre-Left. On 25 December, it announced its intention to further a "Protectorate system" in Morocco, without explaining too well what was meant by this. Clearly, however, it meant a civil Protectorate, for on 26 December a new civilian High Commissioner was appointed—the Marqués de Vaillanueva. He, however, was ill and never took office. This situation continued until 17 February 1923 when a second

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Tafarsit, Ahmad b. al-Muqaddam and his brothers to Colonel, translated 8 Dec. 1922.  
3 Fleming, op. cit., p. 81.
civilian High Commissioner, Luis Silvela, was appointed. In the meantime, there was an Acting High Commissioner in the person of Don Luciano López Ferrer, Spain's Consul-General in Tetuan and Secretary-General of the Protectorate.  

The new Minister of State in charge of Moroccan affairs was Santiago Alba, relatively a left-winger, and he pushed for an extension of the civil protectorate and local administration, and above all for the return of the prisoners.

The Ransom of the Prisoners

The fate of the Spanish soldiers and officers held prisoner by the Rifis was a matter of great concern in Spain. Berenguer's removal from office had partly been the result of an interview with General Weyler, the highest ranking Captain-General in the Spanish army, and a man with a reputation for toughness, published in the newspaper El Imparcial on 27 June, in which General Weyler said that "So long as General Berenguer remains High Commissioner, there is no real possibility of making an effort to rescue our prisoners."  

Under Burguete, as has been shown, Idris al-Rifi tried to rescue the prisoners and attempted to break off sections of the Rifí alliance in the process. This plan failed but it did produce a number of attempts to liberate the prisoners, which caused bin 'Abdí al-Karím a certain amount of worry. A brother of Ḥaddu b. Ḥammú, the Rifí representative with the French, living in Algeria, negotiated with the Spanish for the release of the prisoners at the very expensive rate of 35,000 pts a head. Bin 'Abdí al-Karím, however, discovered

1 Gómez-Jordana y Souza, op. cit., p. 49; Woolman, op. cit., p. 112.
2 Fleming, op. cit., p. 76.
the plot and he and his associates were arrested by Muḥammad Azarqān and tried by Bū Ḭabīyā in his capacity as "faqīh of the revolution". The sobriquet is al-Bū 'Ayyāshi's, but the significance of Bū Ḭabīyā's role as a judicial officer would emerge in 1923 with his nomination as Minister for Justice in bin 'Abd al-Karīm's government.

Clearly, as long as the prisoners were kept in the Rif they would be an attraction for subversive elements. So, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was just as anxious to get rid of them as the Spanish were to have them home. In addition to the possibilities they offered for subversion, they were troublesome to feed. According to al-Bū 'Ayyāshi, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm had stopped the supplies for the prisoners that had been sent from Alhucemas Island because they allowed messages to be passed as well. So the Rifīs had to feed the prisoners themselves. This caused political problems as well—several faqīhs quoting precedents from the hadīths declared that it was not permissible for Muslim women to prepare food for infidels. A certain Si 'Amar Agshūt held this opinion and said so at a meeting in Ajdīr. Bin ‘Abd al-Karīm replied saying that this was theoretically correct but the original prohibition had applied to the preparation of food for infidel masters in the times of the wars of the emergent Islamic state against the Persians and Romans. Now the Christians were prisoners of the Rifīs and they had to eat something.

There was therefore a considerable will on both sides to solve the issue of the prisoners. Idrīs b. Sa'id

1 Al-Bū 'Ayyāshi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 150.
2 Ibid., p. 148.
had received permission from López Ferrer to negotiate directly with the Rifis, as an intermediary between bin 'Abd al-Karîm and Horacio Echevarrieta, a Basque millionaire who had considerable mining interests in the Rif, and who had offered to negotiate privately for the prisoners' release. Idrîs b. Sa'îd and Echevarrieta arrived on 24 January on Alhucemas Island.\(^1\) At once, Idrîs b. Sa'îd wrote to Azarqân to ask him to start negotiations and inviting him to the island. Bin 'Abd al-Karîm advised him not to go as Idrîs b. Sa'îd had been helping the Spanish with their propaganda. However, 'Abd al-Sâllâm al-Khaṭṭābî, bin 'Abd al-Karîm's uncle, eventually persuaded him to change his mind and Azarqân wrote to Idrîs b. Sa'îd and a meeting was arranged between bin 'Abd al-Karîm and Echevarrieta. At this meeting, on the shore at Ajdîr, they agreed on an exchange of all the Spaniards held prisoner by the Rifis for all the Rifis held prisoner by the Spanish, and a ransom of 4,000,000 pesetas to be paid to bin 'Abd al-Karîm.\(^2\)

On 28 January 1923, the prisoners and the ransom were exchanged.\(^3\)

The Organisation of the Riffi State

The ransom of 4,000,000 pesetas was the first real

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2. Skîrâj, op. cit., pp. 75-77.

The number of prisoners concerned varies according to the account—Martínez de Campos says that 230 Spanish prisoners were ransomed (Martínez de Campos, op. cit., p. 28), while Skîrâj puts the number at 250 against 160 Moroccans released by the Spanish (Skîrâj, op. cit., p. 77). Al-Bû 'Ayyâshî (op. cit., vol. II, p. 151) gives 350 Spanish prisoners. All these sources agree on the ransom of 4,000,000 pts except The Times (29 Jan. 1923, p. 9, dated Madrid, 28 Jan. 1923) which gives "twenty tons of silver douros (about £160,000)."
large-scale income for bin 'Abd al-Karîm's administration. He consulted the ā'yān who were with him and agreed that the funds should be handed over for safe keeping to bin 'Abd al-Karîm's uncle, 'Abd al-Salām b. Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭābî, who would be helped in his task by a number of amīns including Shīb b. Yazīd, Shī Muḥammad Asrīḥ al-Yusuff (who came from the Banū 'Alī clan of the Banū Waryaghhal), and Shī Ahmad Agrud al-Tīmsānī. In this way, 'Abd al-Salām b. Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭābî became "Minister" for Finance and the first steps towards forming a regular government were made.

Others among the Rifî leaders had already won for themselves special areas of responsibility: Muḥammad Azargān, through his dealings with the Spanish over the prisoners, and with the French through Ḥaddu b. Ḥammū, came to be regarded as "Minister" for Foreign Affairs, and Bū Labya, the "faqīh of the revolution" and certainly one of the most fanatical in his opposition to the Spanish, eventually became "Minister" of Justice.

The real effect of these areas of responsibility came to be felt after bin 'Abd al-Karîm's appointment as amīr. However, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had already tried to give some strength to his control over the tribes by appointing qā'īds in each, and qā'īds in each clan.

Burguete was appointed High Commissioner in July 1922 and some time later—Skīraj's approximate date is the only one available—bin 'Abd al-Karîm, in an effort to avoid trouble among the tribes which might have resulted from allowing them too great an independence, decided to

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1 Skīraj, op. cit., p. 78.
"speed up" the selection of qā'ids in the Banū Waryaghal and other central Rifī tribes. In theory, each clan and tribe chose its own qā'id. In practice, as will be shown, these choices were controlled by bin 'Abd al-Karīm who tried to ensure that the man chosen firstly was capable and secondly was not antagonistic to many of his "constituents".

The first phase of these choices would seem to have been over by the first week in September 1922, when Anghelo Ghirelli reported on the appointments. The most immediately important appointments were those on the eastern front and in the Banū Waryaghal itself. In the latter tribe, a qā'id was appointed—or chosen—in each clan. The Banū Yusif w-'Arī had Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj 'Amar Israjān of the Aith Buham sub-clan of that clan. This is the only clan on which all the sources agree on the name. Over most of the other clans of the Banū Waryaghal, the sources differ—but the first appointments may not have lasted long. The Aith Abū 'Ayyāsh clan had Muḥammad Azarqān, who is not to be confused with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who lasted a considerable time—until he was sacked in 1925. (SkIraj has two qā'ids—Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Muḥammad al-Abū Qiyyāḏī and Ḥaddu Kawaru (sic).) The Banū Ḥadhīfa had 'Amar bin Ṣadiq (or Muḥammad b. Sha'īb,

1 Ibid., p. 64.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes, A. Ghirelli, Informe No. 1, 9 Sept. 1922.
3 Ibid., and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 384; and SkIraj op. cit., p. 64.
4 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes, A. Ghirelli, Informe No. 1, 9 Sept. 1922, and Hart, op. cit., p. 384.
5 SkIraj, op. cit., p. 65.
6 SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes, A. Ghirelli, Informe NO. 1, 9 Sept. 1922, and Hart, op. cit., p. 384.
according to Skiraj,¹ the Banū 'Abdallah had, according to both Skiraj and Hart, 'Abdallah b. Sa'id,² and according to Ghirelli, one Muḥand Taberkash (sic).³ In the Imrabadhan there were two qa'idṣ, one for the upper Imrabadhan, 'Allūsh b. al-Murābiṭ of the Aith 'Azīz, and Hammādī b. al-Ḥājj Sa'id for the lower Imrabadhan⁴ (or only one, according to Skiraj--Sha'īb b. al-Ḥājj Tuhāmī).⁵

The discrepancy between the details given by Skiraj and those given by Hart and Ghirelli might be explained by the fact that the first appointments were more tentative. The same may be true for the Buqquya--'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ḥājj 'Alī (who anyway soon left for France and England) according to Ghirelli,⁶ or 'Allāl b. al-Ḥājj Tuhāmī according to Skiraj.⁷

There is not space here to list all the names of all the qa'idṣ--particularly since they were often changed--but some of the appointments give evidence of the particular political problems that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had to face.

The first problem was that bin 'Abd al-Karīm could not entirely trust those whom he appointed. Thus 'Amar b. Ṣādiq of the Banū Ḥadhīfa was clearly the most important man in that clan. But he had never been very

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¹ Skiraj, op. cit., p. 65.
² Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 384; and Skiraj, op. cit., p. 65.
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes, A. Ghirelli, Informe No. 1, 9 Sept. 1922.
⁴ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes, A. Ghirelli, Informe No. 1, 9 Sept. 1922; and Hart, op. cit., p. 384.
⁵ Skiraj, op. cit., p. 65.
⁶ SHM Melilla Leg. 21, Informes, A. Ghirelli, Informe No. 1, 9 Sept. 1922.
⁷ Skiraj, op. cit., p. 66.
secure in his allegiance to bin ‘Abd al-Karīm; nevertheless, he was appointed. Neither, it was to become apparent later, was Muḥammad Azarqān, of the Aith. Bū ‘Ayyāsh, trustworthy but he was appointed as well.

In the Banū ‘Amārt, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's choice was for Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Tayyib, of the Yinn Saʿīd Ikhrīf clan, who, it will be remembered, had been attacked and captured by ‘Amar Ḥāmidū and Bil-Qīsh. However, it was later to prove that bin al-Ḥājj Tayyib, who had worked with the Spanish in the past, again became one of their agents, and he was replaced.

It also happened that the most obvious candidate was also the most unsuitable--and not necessarily because he was treacherous. Sīdī Ḥāmidū of Snāda was clearly the front candidate to become gāʿīd of the Banū Yiṣṭuṭf, but when, on his own insistence, he was appointed, he announced that it was not the job of a sharīf to organise a ḥarka. This was not an opinion he had shown any sign of holding before, when, for instance, he led a ḥarka to help al-Raisūlī in 1919. It would seem possible that his objection was more to acting as bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's subordinate, and thus prejudicing his neutrality.

In the tribe of Targīst, Sī Maḥammad came up against another problem--that of a tribe that was so divided internally that the different groups would not accept the same gāʿīd. On 24 August 1922, Sī Maḥammad wrote an

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Información Abril, Información de la Oficina, 23 Apr. 1923; and Hart, Aith Waryaghar, p. 384.
2 Ibid.
exasperated letter to his brother:

"You know all about the differences among the people of Targist over qā'idīs. At first we reconciled them and divided them according to the wishes of the people who wished to be under one qā'id or another. Now the dispute has broken out again over the jamā'as of Tawriat and Ansa'adiyya. Opinions have changed [original very unclear here] and among the jamā'as of Tawriat there are people who want the Qā'id Abmad and refuse to serve under the Qā'id 'Allūsh, while there are people who do want Qā'id 'Allūsh, and refuse to serve under the Qā'id Aḥmad. The same has happened in Ansa'adiyya and when I saw that the quarrel had started I wrote to them [telling them] to keep the peace that I made for them the first time, and if they would not do this then everyone who wanted Qā'id Aḥmad should serve under him and he who wanted the Qā'id ['Allūsh] should do likewise... God did not allow them to agree on this... The people of Ansa'adiyya reject what we said to them. They have [brought] disgrace upon us..."

In despair, therefore, he turned to his brother for advice.

It is not certain what solution bin 'Abd al-Karlm proposed for this situation, but in other cases—in the Banū Tūzīn for example—he caused clans to be split so that old liff-antagonists were not forced to live under one qā'id. Once again, limitations were placed on political development by the traditional political system.

Where bin 'Abd al-Karlm did allow a clan to choose its own qā'id and where that qā'id was unsuitable, bin 'Abd al-Karlm was able to have him removed. This happened in the case of the Banū 'Aqūf clan of the Banū Tūzīn who chose a certain Muḥammad b. Dādī b. Muḥand, whom bin 'Abd al-Karlm later removed because of his incompetence.

By the end of 1922, then, bin 'Abd al-Karlm had local representatives to administer the tribes, although some of them—'Amar b. Ṣadīq, for example—were not

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1 MAEP, Maroc 519, p. 177. Maḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karlm to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karlm, 1 Muḥarram 1341/24 Aug. 1922.
2 Hart, Alīh Waryaghār, p. 385.
3 Ibid.
necessarily very reliable. The functions of these qā'īds will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Proclamation

By January 1923, bin 'Abd al-Karīm had considerable power in the Rif, with representatives in each clan. His political position was also strong, as dissatisfaction with Spanish policies increased among their agents. The distrust of Spanish policy was centred around intense dislike of Idrīs al-Rīfī and their inability to help the Wargha tribes who considered they had been abandoned. The eastern Rīfī tribes continued their letters of complaint about the new Pasha of Tafarsit. Qā'id Salāḥ al-Ḥaddādī of the Banū Walishak wrote to 'Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Tayyib to tell him that they would not serve under Idrīs al-Rīfī, nor any successor of his, because they preferred him, 'Abd al-Qādir. This, of course, may have been part of 'Abd al-Qādir's own campaign to discredit Idrīs al-Rīfī. But Muḥammad b. 'Amar Akhīṭṭu of the Gaznaya also wrote--this time to the Colonel of Native Police--complaining that when he had written to Idrīs al-Rīfī he had received no reply, and that the a'yān of the Gaznaya had decided to write to the Comandante General in Melilla to ask for another intermediary.

Akhīṭṭu, however, was yet another example of the phenomenon of a man who wished to play both sides, for, on

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Walishak, Qā'id Salāḥ al-Ḥaddādī to 'Abd al-Qādir b. al-Ḥājj Tayyib, 16 Jumāda I 1341/5 Jan. 1923.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Gueznayya, Muḥammad b. 'Amar Akhīṭṭu and those of the a'yān of the Gaznayya who are in his party, to Colonel of the Muslims, 14 Jumāda I 1341/2 Jan. 1923.
11 January, just over a week after his letter, the important Spanish agent Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī of the Banū Tūzīn wrote to the Spanish to tell them that in the Gaznaya, "They [i.e., the pro-Rifî party] are trying to cure the disorder that is going on among them, and impose fines, and the principal person involved is Muḥammad b. ‘Amar Akhiṣṭu of the Banū Yūnis." ¹

From the Wargha, a letter was sent on 29 January in the name of the tribes of Matīwa al-Jabal, Banū Wālīd, Fannāṣṣa, Awlād Bū Salāma, Banū Wanjīl, and Marnīṣa, complaining once again about their treatment. The Spanish had asked them to prepare landing-strips for aeroplanes, which they had done; they had worked for the Spanish advance and now they had been abandoned:

"Today you have abandoned ten tribes with their weapons and their men and given up [the chance] of entering their land without difficulty, and have been captured by the views of bin Nūna the Tetuānī and his followers . . ." ²

But their most scathing and ironic criticism was directed against the Spanish ransom of four million pesetas: "You have given more importance to your beloved friend Wuld ‘Abd al-Karīm--may God curse him and all his works--four million! That money will all be used against you and us." ³ This is not to say that bin ‘Abd al-Karīm had things entirely under

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzin, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī to Colonel of Police, 11 Jan. 1932 (sic) i.e., 1923.
² SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Marnisa y Wargha, the tribes of Matīwa, Banū Wālīd, Fannāṣṣa, Awlād Bū Salāma, Banū Wanjīl and Marnīṣa to "The august nation of Spain and the governors of Melilla and Tetuan . . .", 11 Jumāda II 1341/29 Jan. 1923. The sum of 15,000 francs had been sent via a former German agent named "Mohor" to pay for the construction of the airfield, presumably for later use by Spanish aeroplanes (Hernández Mir, op. cit., vol. III, p. 37).
³ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Marnisa y Wargha, loc. cit.
control. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī, in his letter of 11 January, reported that there was some discontent in the Timsamān, where the shaykhs who had gone to see b. ‘Abd al-Karīm in the Banū Waryaghal and to stop the fighting in the Banū Ḥadhīfa had returned rather disillusioned. Many of these shaykhs were now ready to submit to the Spanish, he reported, because the presence of the Banū Waryaghal in their tribe and the frequent fighting had put them in serious economic difficulties.

Economic difficulties were also stressed by Ḥaddu b. al-Muqaddam of Tafarsit, on 17 January, 1923. He appealed to the Spanish authorities for supplies: "We ask God and you that those items that are needed in our land then should be sent to us--such as firewood, meat and so forth, for our brothers are suffering."

The other problem that bin ‘Abd al-Karīm had to face was, of course, ‘Amar b. Ḥamīdu and ‘Abd al-Mālik. On 11 January, 1923, some aʿyān of the Marnīsa and Gaznaya tribes and a few from the Banū Waryaghal swore a pact at the sanctuary of Sīdī ‘Alī b. ʿAbdū to recognise ‘Abd al-Mālik as their leader and to help him in all fighting.

The point must be made, however, that all this opposition was very piecemeal, and in general, bin ‘Abd al-Karīm's position was very strong. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī, one of the Spanish army's most loyal agents, reported that in the Banū Tūzīn, ḥarkas were still

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1 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzin, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī to Colonel of Police, 11 Jan. 1932 (sic), i.e., 1923.
2 SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Tafarsit, Shaykh Ḥaddu b. al-Muqaddam and his brothers to Comandante (Heredia), received 17 January 1923.
being formed and trenches were being dug to hold a gun with which to shell Tizzi 'Azzā in order to attack that position. The Igharibiīn, Banū Bil-'Aiz and Banū 'Aqqī clans of the Banū Tūzin had recently acted swiftly to contain an outbreak of feuding and imposed fines. In the Timsamān, there was a ḥarka from the Banū Waryaghal which was joined by a hundred local men during the daytime.¹

It was in this position of momentary strength, between the middle and end of January 1923, that Mūḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm was proclaimed as leader of the Rif.

There is considerable disagreement both about the nature of the declaration and the date. Hart gives the date as 1 February 1923,² while Hernández Mir gives it as 18 January 1923.³ What in fact seems to have happened is that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was proclaimed, as were the Sultans of Morocco when they received their bay'as, first in one place and then another. The first report of any declaration was on 18 January 1923, in the house of Sharrad b. 'Amar Buqquyī on Jabal Sidjum, the small hillock near Ajdīr which overlooks the Bay and Island of Alhucemas.⁴ On 22 January 1923, two Waryaghīs wrote to the Spanish to inform them that:

"'Abd al-Karīm Wuld al-Faqīh al-Khaṭṭābī has been proclaimed by all the tribe of Banū Waryaghal except for two shaykhs who do not follow them in the proclamation. They are the Shaykhs Ḫaddū b. Amziyyān al-Waryaghī and the Qā'id Mūḥ Azargān. They do not follow them in that matter."⁵

¹ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzīn, Mūḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Faḥṣī to Colonel of Police, 11 Jan. 1932 (sic), i.e., 1923.
⁴ Cab. Reb. 1913-1927, pp. 31-32.
⁵ SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Bani Waryaghāl,
Muḥammad Azarqān, the gā'id of the Banū Bū 'Ayyāsh clan, would cause bin 'Abd al-Karīm considerable trouble in the closing stages of the war. Even at this early stage when bin 'Abd al-Karīm was being proclaimed he was laying the basis for his future rebellion.

On 21 January, an informant in the Banū 'Aqqī clan of the Banū Tūzīn informed the Spanish that bin 'Abd al-Karīm had ordered it to be announced in the Sūq al-Abād of the Banū Bil-'Aīz that he had been proclaimed "Sultan", although the letter containing this order had been torn up and the clan had agreed to attack the Banū Waryaghāl.¹

This letter raises the question of the nature of the Proclamation. As what had bin 'Abd al-Karīm been proclaimed? The full text of the declaration of 1 February 1923 does not make this clear and its text will be examined in the next chapter.

For the moment, it is sufficient to say that bin 'Abd al-Karīm was undisputed leader of the Rīf by the end of January 1923.

The World Outside

The years 1922 and 1923 were ones of success for Muslims in their struggle against Europeans, and not only in Morocco. The greatest Islamic revolution of them all took place in Turkey.

The Ottoman Empire had lost most of its territory as a result of the First World War. In effect, all that was

¹ SHM MelillaLEG. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzin, Qā'id Muḥammad b. Muḥammedi al-'Aqqīfī to Col. Las Heras, 21 Jan. 1923.
left to the Sultan-Caliph by 1919 was the Turkish-speaking area. Even parts of Anatolia were occupied—the British held Istanbul and "protected" the Caliph, and the French occupied Cilicia. The Greeks, who had occupied Izmir in 1919, proceeded to advance into the interior of Turkey. The Sultan was quite incapable of dealing with them, but in April 1920, military leaders centered around the person of Mustafa Kemal set up a resistance movement with its capital not in Istanbul, but in Ankara. This movement, while it paid a certain amount of lip-service to the Sultan, rejected his authority because he was in the hands of the European Allies, and proceeded to organise to hold off the Greek advance.

The Greeks undertook new advances in March and June 1921 but their efforts slackened because of increasing difficulties of supply. Nevertheless they nearly reached Ankara which was only saved by Mustaf Kemal's attack on Greek forces in September 1921.

The new Turkish army was not yet strong enough to follow up this initial victory. But after several months of preparation throughout the first half of 1922, Turkish forces attacked the Greek positions on 26 August 1922. The Greeks were rapidly defeated. Izmir was taken on 8 September and on 18 September 1922, Mustafa Kemal announced that the Greek army had been completely defeated. On 3 October 1922, armistice negotiations began at Mudyana.¹

The effect of these events right across the Islamic world was dramatic. The French diplomatic agent in Tangier, ¹

M. Larbonnel, reported on 16 September 1922:

"The Ottoman [sic] victories have produced a sense of great satisfaction in Tangier. The best informed are well aware that France and England do not share the same sympathies, and congratulate the French on the success of their policies, and the failure of the English. But the foremost emotion is happiness that a Muslim people have defeated non-Muslims. This is a repetition of what happened after the disaster of Anoual, when the Muslims did not hide their admiration for the success of their co-religionaries."

There were no physical manifestations of these victories in the shape of demonstrations, in the French zone. However, the Rifis were most encouraged by the events. They clearly expected the Turks to arrive to help them at any moment, once the Greeks had been defeated.

A curious manifestation of this belief that the Turks were on the way—a belief that, of course, dated back to the First World War, but now had a rather greater specious attractiveness—occurred in Ceuta in July 1922. A Turkish merchant, Jamal-al-Din Mejdali, normally a resident of Tangier, arrived in Ceuta on business where, apparently by accident, he met some of the Rif propagandists in the Jibāla, who immediately "took him for a Turkish officer" and escorted him to a house where they gave him details of their plot, and made him accompany them to Gibraltar to buy arms. He later reported the whole business to the Spanish.

Such mistakes are no doubt explicable by the heat of the moment. On a more serious note, bin 'Abd al-Karīm

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2 Ibid.
3 SHM Ceuta, Leg. 16, Información y Confidencias, Alta Comisaría de España en Marruecos, Gabinete Militar, 1 Aug. 1922.
was kept closely informed by Ḫaddu b. Ḫammu from Port Say of the progress of the Turkish War of Independence. Sometime in September 1922—the date is apparent from the context of the letter—Ḫaddu reported:

"You should know that on the eighth of the present month the Pasha of the Turks, who is aged about 26, attacked the Greek troops who are protected by the English. There were many battles between them, and the Pasha took from the said troops 6,000 officers, including a General-in-chief, and 16,000 soldiers and many supplies . . ."\(^1\)

Ḵaddu had therefore telegraphed the Turkish (Ottoman) Ambassador in Paris to congratulate him and he replied encouraging the Rifis against the Spanish.\(^2\) On 23 October 1922, Ḫaddu again reported on the war in Turkey: "As for the Turks, they continue to be victorious over the Greeks.\(^3\)

These Turkish victories were certainly used by bin Ḳabd al-Karîm in his propaganda. In their letter announcing bin Ḳabd al-Karîm's proclamation on 22 January 1923, the two dissenting Waryaghlis, Ḫaddu b. Muḥ Amziyyan and Muḥ Azargān, reported: "We [also] inform you that the brother of b. Ḳabd al-Karîm sent him news from the East (mashriq) that the Christians had left that area.\(^4\) The men in the east were also said to be sending supplies of money and 8 frigates, which news, the Waryaghlis assured the Spanish, was quite untrue.\(^5\)

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1 MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 203, Ḫaddu b. Ḫammu to b. Ḳabd al-Karîm, Port Say, the date is presumably on missing second page, but September 1922.
2 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
Neither were the people of the Rif unaware of their own importance in the Islamic world beyond Morocco's borders. As we have seen, the people in the Wargha complained about the fact that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was so powerful that his fame had reached India.

Conclusion

In July 1922, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had been very nearly routed by 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu and 'Abd al-Mâlik. On 1 February 1923 he was proclaimed as leader of the Rif. Although neither 'Abd al-Mâlik nor 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu had been decisively defeated, and although the Spanish had made further advances to the very edge of the Rif, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was nevertheless in a stronger position on 1 February 1923 than he had been before. How had this come to pass?

One theme emerges from an examination of the letters of local people—in the Banû Tûzîn, Tafarsît, the Wargha tribes, the Timsamân and the Banû Waryaghâl—whether they were writing to the Spanish, to Spanish agents, to 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu or to bin 'Abd al-Karîm's supporters. This theme is the growth of the personal power of bin 'Abd al-Karîm, sustained, it would seem, almost entirely by the Banû Waryaghâl.

To the Wargha tribes it was bin 'Abd al-Karîm who wanted to control their lands: "You have heard what happened to us with Wuld 'Abd al-Karîm whose ambition is to rule our country," and the most sarcastic remarks were made by these same...
tribes on bin 'Abd al-Karîm when the Spanish gave him the money for the ransom of their soldiers. However, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was still seen, by supporters and opponents alike, as the leader not of a united Rif but as the leader of a very powerful tribe, the Banû Waryaghil.

A Gaznayî, Mûlây Qaddur b. Yayhâ, saw the fighting over the Banû 'Amârt as a battle between the Banû Waryaghil and the Marnîsa, not between bin 'Abd al-Karîm and 'Amar b. Ḫamîdu.\(^1\) Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Faḥshî described the situation in Timsámân, where the ḥarka at Amzâwru was made up of Waryaghilis who were joined by day by small numbers of locals.\(^2\) Evidently the presence of the "foreign" troops on the lands of, particularly, the Banû Tûzîn and the Timsámân caused great resentment—and as has been shown on a number of occasions, people complained that they could not support them.

Thus, in the eyes of many people in other tribes, the Banû Waryaghil appeared as conquerors and oppressors. This was not, of course, how the Banû Waryaghil, or more specifically the anti-Spanish leadership saw themselves. In their eyes, the situation was quite simple: the feeling of solidarity hinted at by the "a'yân of the Wargha" was an obligation on all the Riffs. An incident in early 1922 provides an interesting example of the clash of this point of view with the desire of other individuals and groups to maintain their independence. The incident is centred around

\(^1\) SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 2, Gueznaya, Mûlây Qaddur b. Yaḥyā to Colonel, 29 Rabi' II 1341/19 Dec. 1922.
\(^2\) SHM Melilla Leg. 22, Cartas Arabes 1, Bani Tuzîn, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Faḥshî to Colonel, 11 Jan. 1932 (sic), for 1923.
the person of John Arnall, an Englishman, a trader of sorts, living in Tangier. Arnall, apparently, had some hopes of carrying out trading activities with the Rif in timber and horses, and also had a certain ideological inclination for the Rif cause. Harris, The Times correspondent in Tangier described thus:

"he is a socialist, says a lot of foolish things, but is a respectable man, living with his wife and invalid daughter... he is a crank but there is nothing against his character."1

In the Spring of 1922, he decided to visit the Rif, ostensibly to increase his trade with the Rif and to consult bin 'Abd al-Karīm about future mineral rights.2 Fortunately for us, because of his socialist connections, his letters to England were intercepted and read by the British Special Branch, and thus provide a personal account of his journey into the Rif.

Arnall tried to enter the Rif through the French zone from the south. On his way he was captured by people opposed to bin 'Abd al-Karīm in the Gaznaya, presumably Bil-Qīsh or allies of his. When bin 'Abd al-Karīm heard of his capture, he ordered his release on the grounds that "the Sznaia [sic] was Rifī by language and must not go against these decisions."3 The Gaznayīs' reply was that "they were not under his [i.e., bin 'Abd al-Karīm's] authority and would do as they pleased. They were in the French zone and not to be ordered by him or the Rif."4

1 TAHP, The Times Correspondence 1894-1933, Harris to Foreign Editor, The Times, Tangier, 7 June 1922, Confidential.
2 Ibid.
3 FO 371/8354/W4882/4882/28, Miller (Special Branch, Scotland Yard) to Villiers, London, 10 June 1922, Confidential, enclosing copy of letter (intercepted by Special Branch), John Arnall to Arthur Field, Tangier, 29 May 1922. Field was a Communist and Secretary of the Anglo-Turkish Society.
al-Karîm's response to this was to send a ḥarka to ensure his release.\footnote{Ibid.}

This little exchange shows the difference in attitude between bin 'Abd al-Karîm and the Gaznayîs concerned. It is interesting that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was emphasising the links of language and culture between the Rifî tribes, rather than those of religion. In other words, he was relying for his propaganda on the idea of solidarity of the Rif under his control. Not unnaturally, the Gaznayîs took a different view. For them, the question was one of independence, for as they considered that bin 'Abd al-Karîm was trying to oppose the Spanish, he therefore had no claims on them, for they were not included within the Spanish zone. Nevertheless, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was able to show, by sending a ḥarka to release Arnall, that he was able to enforce solidarity.

On the other hand, bin 'Abd al-Karîm was not all-powerful. He still faced considerable opposition from powerful local leaders such as 'Amar b. Ḥamîdu and 'Abd al-Malîk. With these people he could cope. Clearly, the eventual solution would have to involve the use of military force, but, at the end of 1922, bin Ḥamîdu had been temporarily defeated, and although he was trying to renew his alliances against bin 'Abd al-Karîm, he was not a threat for the moment. Similarly, the dissenting forces within the central Rif--Muḥ Azarqân of the Banû 'Abdallah and Muḥammad and 'Amar bin Ṣadîq of the Banû Ḥadhîfa clans of the Banû Waryaghâl, for example--were not a real threat at this time. Certainly they were in contact with the Spanish, and it
seems quite likely that bin 'Abd al-Karîm with his efficient, and generally feared, security service knew this. Yet he also knew that to do anything drastic against these important local leaders would probably cause more trouble than it was worth—which did not stop him from dealing severely with less prominent dissenters. On the other hand, it would be simplistic in the extreme to categorise people like the bin Ṣadîq brothers as "traitors", for they owed no allegiance to anyone except themselves and their allies, and by seeming to cooperate with both bin 'Abd al-Karîm and the Spanish at the same time, they were only trying to ensure that they emerged as supporters of whichever side eventually won the war. So, at the same time as they wrote expressing friendship for the Spanish, the bin Ṣadîqs led ḥarkas against them.

In the same way, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had to make a political choice to balance between encouraging his potential enemies to fight him openly because he repressed them too severely, and allowing them too great a latitude of action, and thereby seeming weak. In fact, he managed to strike roughly the right balance and so secured his power more firmly.

By the end of 1922, then, with the political situation under control in the Rif, with 'Amar bin Ḥamîdu temporarily weakened, al-Raisûlî entirely under Spanish control, and Spanish political policies in disarray, bin 'Abd al-Karîm had reached a position of great prestige and power. With this position secured, he could go on to consolidate the new state even further, and set about organising it on a more permanent basis.

Now, indeed, it is possible to speak of a "state"
in the Rif, for with the appointment of an administration and with a well provided treasury at his disposal, bin 'Abd al-Karīm was able to proceed with a thorough organisation of government in the Rif. The expression of this was his bay‘a of January 1923.