SUMMARY

England and Normandy, 1204-1259

by Wendy B. Stevenson

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In 1204, Normandy submitted to King Philip Augustus of France but the kings of England refused to acknowledge the loss of the duchy, or of the other Angevin possessions conquered by the French kings, until the Treaty of Paris of 1259. Apart from King John's grandiose attempt of 1214 to recover all the conquered provinces, no serious attempt was made by an English king between 1204 and 1259 to recover the duchy. Consequently, most modern historians tend to speak of the "loss of Normandy" in 1204 and the "formal" surrender of all English claims thereto in 1259 as if the events of the former date had effectively severed England and Normandy for ever. It is generally felt that on the whole the links with England were very soon forgotten and that after 1204 the duchy settled down quite happily under her new French masters who adopted a conciliatory policy towards her.

This thesis questions the current orthodoxy as summarized above. It examines Anglo-Norman relations between 1204 and 1259 and reveals that strong ecclesiastical, economic and tenurial links continued to exist between England and Normandy throughout the period. Consideration is also given to the relations of the various sectors of Norman society with their new Capetian rulers and it is suggested that these were not as harmonious as previously supposed. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the political significance of these two factors as far as Anglo-French relations were concerned.
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C.Ch.R. = Calendar of the Charter Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office. Henry III, H.M.S.O., 1903-


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C.I.N. = Cartulaire des Iles Normandes, La Société Jersiaise, Jersey, 1924.

C.I.P.M. = Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, I, H.M.S.O., 1904.


C.I.R. = Close Rolls of the reign of Henry III preserved in the Public Record Office, H.M.S.O., 1902-

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Q.N. = Querimoniae Normannorum de 1247, Rec. des hist., XXIV(i), 2-73.

R.A. 1309 = Rolls of the Assizes held in the Channel Islands in the Second Year of the Reign of King Edward II, A.D. 1309, La Société Jersiaise, Jersey, 1903.

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Rigaud = Registrum Visitationum Archiepiscopi Rothomagensis.

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Rot.Chart. = Rotuli Chartarum in Turri Londinensi asservati,

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Rot.Lit.Pat. = Rotuli litterarum patentium in Turri Londinensi

Rot.Orig. = Rotulorum originalium in Curia Scaccarii

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INTRODUCTION

In 1204 Normandy submitted to King Philip Augustus of France but the kings of England refused to acknowledge the loss of the duchy, or of the other Angevin possessions conquered by the French kings, until the Treaty of Paris of 1259. Apart from King John's grandiose attempt of 1214 to recover all the conquered provinces, no serious attempt was made by an English king between 1204 and 1259 to recover the duchy. Consequently, most modern historians tend to speak of the "loss of Normandy"\(^1\) in 1204 and the "formal" surrender of all English claims thereto in 1259\(^2\) as if the events of the former date had effectively severed England and Normandy for ever.

This view seemed to be worth questioning for a number of reasons. Before 1204, Normandy was bound to England by far closer ties than any of the other Angevin possessions on the continent. She shared with England an Anglo-Norman baronage, many of whose members held lands in both the duchy and the kingdom. She also shared with England an Anglo-Norman clergy, while all her cathedral chapters and many of her abbeys and convents held lands, churches and revenues in England as well as in Normandy. In addition, her merchants


enjoyed particularly close economic ties with England from which both sides benefited considerably. Most writers who deal with Normandy's position after 1204 seem to feel that on the whole the links with England were very soon forgotten and that the duchy settled down quite happily under her new French rulers who deliberately adopted a conciliatory policy towards her. Among leading historians of the thirteenth century who take this view are Petit-Dutaillis (1) and Sir Maurice Powicke (2). Yet even in their works there are observations which run counter to their general conclusions and suggest that the various links between England and Normandy were by no means completely severed.

Although it is always acknowledged that Norman religious institutions with possessions in England were mostly allowed to retain these possessions after 1204, virtually nothing is said by modern writers about the high degree of contact between the kingdom and the duchy which this continuing ecclesiastical link must have involved. Even Matthew in his book on The Norman Monasteries and their English Possessions is more concerned with the effects of the events of 1204 on the number and value of the English possessions of the Norman Church than with their effect on the degree of contact between England and the duchy. However, he does indicate in passing some of the ways in which contact was maintained after 1204. For example,


(2) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, pp. 277-79.
he mentions that the newly appointed heads of Norman religious houses still had to come to England to do homage to the king for their English lands(1). He also implies that right up to the time of their dissolution or denizisation the Norman alien priories were generally in the care of priors sent from the mother house in the duchy(2). Examples such as these suggested that a full consideration of the whole subject might prove an interesting and worthwhile undertaking.

Although Petit-Dutaillis refers to the "difficult break in the commercial relations with England"(3), it is clear from the work of other writers that trade between Normandy and England continued after 1204. Even Powicke who says that "Rapidly and imperceptibly the burgesses ... lost any interest they had in the old English connection"(4) admits that after the loss of Normandy, "John had been careful to encourage trade between English and Norman ports, and Henry III was equally anxious, notwithstanding the measures which the government took against French merchants, to maintain the goodwill of Norman traders"(5). It is Berger, however, who presents the fullest details of the continuing economic links between England and Normandy after 1204 and he cites record evidence

(2) Ibid., p.94.
(3) C. Petit-Dutaillis, op.cit., p.322.
(4) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.279.
(5) Ibid., p.269.
in support of all his examples (1).

There seems to be general agreement among historians that most Anglo-Norman lords who held estates in both England and the duchy lost their property on one side of the Channel or the other when forced to choose between the English and French allegiances in 1204. For example, Powicke, like other writers (2), draws attention to the fact that William Marshal was specially favoured in this respect but says "... the number of those who served two masters was few. Philip proceeded with his policy of confiscation and the society of the two countries was severed. In 1244 Saint Louis put to an end the slight connection which still survived" (3).

Powicke, of course, has done more work on this particular subject than any other historian and his findings are immensely valuable and interesting, especially his appendix on "The Division of the Norman Baronage" in 1204 (4). For this appendix he selected a group of families for investigation by taking "the chief fiefs of 1172 as a basis" and adding "the fiefs of some important officials" (5). The results of his studies reveal only a small number of cases of the "survival of double tenancy in England and Normandy after 1204" (6) and would

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(2) e.g. A. L. Poole, op. cit., pp. 431-2.
(3) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p. 297.
(4) Ibid., pp. 328-58.
(5) Ibid., p. 329.
(6) Ibid., p. 328.
therefore seem to justify his claim that "the number of those who served two masters was few" (1). Nevertheless, the matter seemed worth further investigation. In the first place, as Powicke himself points out (2), Bracton, in his De Legibus et Consuetudines Angliae states that William Marshall was not alone in retaining estates in both England and Normandy after 1204 but that "alii plures" shared his position (3). In the second place, the fact that Louis IX felt it necessary to decree in 1244 that lords still holding lands in both England and Normandy must choose between the English and French allegiances, suggests that there were still a number of cases of double tenure at that time.

If a detailed study of the continuing ecclesiastical, economic and tenurial links between England and Normandy after 1204 were to show that they were much stronger than has previously been supposed, it would be necessary to examine more closely the indications found in certain modern works on the period that some elements within Normandy were unhappy with Capetian rule.

In the case of the clergy there seem to be fewer positive indications of discontent than there are in the case of other sectors of Norman society. Nevertheless, there are grounds

(1) Ibid., p.297.
(2) Ibid., pp.295-6.
(3) Henrici de Bracton de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. Sir Travers Twiss, VI (Rolls Series, 1883), p.374.
for questioning how far the clergy were happy with their new French kings. Most writers take the view that Philip Augustus, Louis VIII and Saint Louis all heaped gifts and favours on the Norman Church in an attempt to consolidate their rule(1). Naturally, in view of the extensive possessions of the Norman Church in England, the Norman clergy would wish to remain on good terms with the English king and it therefore seems logical that the Capetians should make determined efforts to establish good relations between the Norman clergy and themselves. However, those historians who speak in terms of a conciliatory policy on the part of the French kings cite very little evidence in support of their claims which suggests that they might not stand up to close examination. If it is found that the Capetians were not as generous as has been suggested(2), might not the Norman Church feel cheated of the conciliatory policy it no doubt expected in the circumstances? On the other hand, if it becomes clear that as late as the period of Saint Louis' personal rule the Capetians were still having to conciliate the Norman clergy with lavish gifts and favours, perhaps a long-standing, deep-rooted discontent would be implied? In either case, of course,


(2) For this view, see J.W. Baldwin, "Philip Augustus and the Norman Church", French Historical Studies, VI (1), (1969), 1-30.
it would be necessary to find further positive evidence of discontent to supplement the few examples cited by modern writers (1).

Most historians acknowledge that the Norman towns and merchant classes found it difficult to adjust to post-conquest conditions. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion seems to be that the initial difficulties were soon overcome and losses on some fronts were made up by gains on others. Again it is suggested that Philip Augustus, Louis VIII and Saint Louis all adopted a generous conciliatory policy but again such suggestions seem to be supported by very little evidence (2). Moreover, there are references in some modern works to specific examples of urban opposition to the French king (3) and to positive assistance by Norman mariners for both John and Henry III. According to Powicke, some men of Dieppe sailed with John to Poitou in 1206 (4) and according to Berger Henry III received assistance from the mariners of a number of Norman ports for his continental expedition of 1230 (5).

As far as the Norman lay lords are concerned, it would

(1) E. Lavisse, ed., op.cit. III(i), 141; Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.277; C. Petit-Dutaillis, Etude sur Ta vie et le règne de Louis VIII, p.409.


(3) C. Petit-Dutaillis, "Querimoniae Normannorum", Essays in Medieval History presented to Thomas Frederick Tout, p.103; E. Lavisse, ed., op.cit., III(i), 141.

(4) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.264.

(5) E. Berger, Histoire de Blanche de Castile, reine de France, p.176.
hardly be surprising if there was some dissatisfaction with post-conquest conditions for many of these men lost estates in England and were not apparently compensated by grants from the confiscated Norman property of lords who chose the English allegiance\(^{(1)}\). However, there seem to be two schools of thought on how happily the Norman nobility accepted Capetian rule. For example, Petit-Dutaillis, in his article on the Querimoniae Normannorum of 1247 feels that on the whole "la noblesse locale, traitée avec bienveillance, se plia aux obligations féodales et fournit à la royauté, avec plus au moins de bonne humeur, les guerriers qu'elle demandait"\(^{(2)}\). No doubt Petit-Dutaillis would partly explain the docility of the Norman nobility by the fact that in his view the Querimoniae Normannorum showed that "l'administration capétienne a été en somme honnête, équitable et douce en Normandie"\(^{(3)}\). Then, as the same writer says in another work, the Norman nobility had been weakened by the loss of its English revenues and the fact that "les terres appartenant à des seigneurs anglais furent ... souvent données à des familles de serviteurs loyaux qui furent introduits dans le pays"\(^{(4)}\). According to Strayer, these loyal Capetian servants were for nearly a century after 1204 given most of

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\(^{(2)}\) C. Petit-Dutaillis, "Querimoniae Normannorum", Essays in Medieval History presented to Thomas Frederick Tout, p.103.

\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., p.114

\(^{(4)}\) G. Glotz, ed., op.cit., IV(ii), 257.
the important posts in the Norman administration and were "practically all from the old royal domain"(1). Powicke claims that Philip Augustus also "tried to break down the barrier between Normans and Frenchmen ... by encouraging inter-marriage between the great barons of Normandy and the Île de France"(2).

On the other hand, some of these measures taken to weaken the Norman nobility may only have succeeded in arousing their opposition to Capetian rule. Not all writers agree with Petit-Dutaillis' statement that "l'administration capétienne a été en somme honnête, équitable et douce en Normandie"(3). Luchaire says of the period shortly after 1204 that "la domination française n'était pas si douce, à entendre certains chroniqueurs d'Angleterre et de Normandie"(4). Berger, too, feels that Normandy was "très durement traitée après la conquête de Philippe Auguste"(5) and also claims that "pendant la minorité de saint Louis la Normandie n'a guère été heureuse"(6). Of course, the nature of the administration of Normandy as a

(2) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.275.
(3) C. Petit-Dutaillis, "Querimoniae Normannorum", Essays in Medieval History presented to Thomas Frederick Tout, p. 114.
(4) E. Lavisse, ed., op.cit., III(i), 141.
(5) E. Berger, op.cit., p.289.
(6) Ibid., p.290.
whole would affect the attitude of other sectors of society to Capetian rule as well as the attitude of the nobility. Clearly the subject was worth further examination.

As regards the lay lords, the work of Berger is the most fruitful source for specific instances of discontent. For example, he states that at Christmas 1228, representatives of the Norman nobility visited Henry III at Oxford and tried to persuade him to attempt the recovery of the conquered provinces\(^1\). He also claims that in 1230 a Norman noble called Fulk Paynel, together with his brother William and about sixty knights, approached Henry in Brittany and begged him to attempt the reconquest of Normandy. When Henry refused, they asked him for two hundred knights "avec lesquels ils se faisaient forts de mettre les gens du roi de France hors de leur pays"\(^2\). Again, however, their request was refused.

It was clear, then, from a reading of modern works alone that a detailed study of the continuing links between England and Normandy after 1204 might well yield interesting results. A quick sampling of the most important record sources soon confirmed this impression. In the pages which follow, the first three chapters are concerned with the continuing ecclesiastical, economic and tenurial links, respectively. The fourth chapter is devoted to the Channel Islands which have not so far been mentioned. As the only part of the duchy of Normandy which remained in English hands after 1204, the Islands seemed to deserve separate treatment. In the

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\(^1\) Ibid., p.123.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.172.
first place, it is obviously necessary to consider why the Islands were not lost to France with the rest of the duchy and such a consideration would not fit easily into the framework of the first three chapters. In the second place, because the Islands had been an integral part of Normandy before 1204, the continuing links which undoubtedly existed between the Islands and the duchy after that date differed in some respects from the continuing links between England and the duchy. In the concluding chapter an attempt is made to draw together the various aspects of the continuing relationship between England and Normandy which have previously been dealt with separately and to consider what in the long run they amounted to.

Although reference has been made above to "writers who deal with Normandy's position after 1204" and relevant comments have been quoted from the works of eminent thirteenth century specialists such as Powicke, Petit-Dutaillis and Berger, it must be pointed out that none of these writers has undertaken a detailed study of the effects of the events of 1204 on the very close relationship between England and Normandy. Sir Maurice Powicke in his book The Loss of Normandy, 1189-1204 was more concerned with events which led up to Philip's conquest of the duchy and the actual process of the conquest than with its results. It is true that he looks briefly at some of the consequences of the separation of England and

(1) See, for example, J.H. Le Patourel, The Medieval Administration of the Channel Islands, 1199-1399 (Oxford, 1937); G.F.B. De Gruchy, Medieval Land Tenures in Jersey (Jersey, 1957); T. Williams, "The Importance of the Channel Islands in British relations with the Continent during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries; a study in Historical Geography", La Société Jersiaise, Bulletin Annuel, XI (1928), 1-89.
Normandy in his last two chapters but he looks chiefly at the immediate results and confines himself to fairly general statements. Other writers who have referred to Anglo-Norman relations after 1204, or to the French king's treatment of Normandy after the same date, have merely touched on these matters in an incidental fashion in general works on the history of England or France.

There are perhaps three main reasons why a detailed study of Anglo-Norman relations after 1204 has not so far been made. Firstly, Powicke's generation of English historians tended to think that England was better off without her continental entanglements and were therefore inclined to stress the breaking of links between the kingdom and the duchy in 1204 rather than to look for continuing connections. Similarly, French historians have tended to see Philip Augustus' conquest of 1204 as a crucially important stage in the steady territorial expansion of the Capetian monarchy and have not therefore sought to minimize Philip's achievement by seeking out evidence that the old bonds between England and Normandy were not completely broken. Finally, both English and French writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were influenced by the contemporary attitude towards King John. On the whole they felt that even if Normandy was sometimes harshly treated by French royal officials, Capetian

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rule must have been an improvement on the rule of King John. This again meant that they had little reason to consider in detail just how firmly Normandy was attached to her new French rulers after 1204. All things considered, there seems to be room for a re-appraisal of the accepted view of the effects of 1204 on Anglo-Norman relations.

The number of sources available for an enquiry so broad in scope as the one proposed presents the researcher with a considerable problem. However, it seems sound policy in the first instance to aim at interim conclusions by studying those sources which are most likely to supply relevant information on a worthwhile scale and are easily accessible. This study is therefore based primarily on the printed central government records of England and France, although other printed sources have also been consulted. The need for selectivity means, of course, that many details have no doubt been missed. For example, it is possible that some of the family histories contained in Appendices IV and V could have been filled out further by reference to local collections of documents, both printed and unprinted. The volumes of *Early Yorkshire Charters* (1) show what is possible in this sphere in this country. However, to pursue exhaustive enquiries into all the families, and for that matter for all the religious houses, mentioned in this thesis was out of the question at this stage - the time involved would have been out of all proportion to the small yield of detailed information likely to result. Although the conclusions reached in this thesis have to be presented as

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as interim conclusions, it is felt that they are sufficiently well substantiated to modify the conclusions at present holding the field. Even so, interpretation often turns on the exact wording of a medieval document. It is for this reason that there are probably more direct quotations in what follows than is usual in a thesis.

On the English side, the most helpful sources over a wide range of matters are the Chancery rolls known as Charter (1), Patent (2), Close (3), Fine (4) and Liberate Rolls (5), all of which begin during John's reign, the Pipe Rolls of the Exchequer which survive in a continuous series from 2 Henry II (6), and the Curia Regis Rolls which date from 5 Richard I (7). This group

(1) Published as follows: transcript in full, 1-18 John, Rot.Chart; calendar 11 Henry III - 8 Henry VIII, C.Ch.R.

(2) Published as follows: transcript in full, 3-18 John, Rot.Lit.Pat., 1-16 Henry III, Pat.R.; calendar, 17 Henry III - 14 Elizabeth I, C.P.R.

(3) Published as follows: transcript in full, 6 John - 11 Henry III, Rot.Lit.Cl., 12 Henry III - 57 Henry III, C.R.

(4) Published as follows: transcript in full, 1-18 John, Rot.de Ob.et Fin.; selections, 1 - 57 Henry III, Ex e Rot.Fin.

(5) Published as follows: transcript in full, 2-5 John, Rotuli de Liberate ac de Misis et Praestitis, ed. T.D. Hardy, Rec.Com., 1844; fragments for 2 John identified since 1844, Pipe Roll Society, N.S. 21, 1943, pp.88-97; calendar 11-57 Henry III, C.L.R.


(7) Published as follows: transcript of some of the rolls for the period 6 Richard I - 1 John, Rotuli Curiae Regis, 2 vols., Rec.Com., 1835; transcript of other rolls for Richard I, Pipe Roll Society, XIV, 1891; XXIV, 1900; XXXI, 1957; transcript (excluding essoins and certain marginalia and the rolls transcribed elsewhere), 7 Richard I - 21 Henry III C.R.
of central government records taken together provides the chief source of information about the relations of the English kings with the clergy, nobility and merchants of Normandy after 1204. It also provides a great deal of incidental but important information for the family histories in Appendix IV.

Part of the value of the records just mentioned lies in their continuity, and an element of continuity is found in two other records of the central government which proved invaluable for this study, the Red Book of the Exchequer (1) and the Book of Fees (2). Both of these are Exchequer compilations containing collections of miscellaneous documents. In the case of the Book of Fees, all these documents relate to feudal tenures, while a substantial proportion of those in the Red Book of the Exchequer do likewise. The Red Book contains the earlier material - most of the relevant documents were produced at intervals between 1155 and 1217. The documents comprising the Book of Fees were produced at intervals between 1198 and 1293. Both these sources are crucial for the study of Anglo-Norman families and their land-holdings before and after 1204.

Much information about the Norman priories in England is to be found in the records of the central government but for some purposes, especially the survey of the possessions of these priories, it was necessary to turn to other sources. Particularly valuable were W. Dugdale's Monasticon Anglicanum (3)

and the Calendar of Documents preserved in France, illustrative of the History of Great Britain and Ireland, 918-1206 edited by J.H. Round\(^{(1)}\). The Monasticon includes in its great collection of English monastic charters many which relate to the English possessions of the Norman Church. Round's compilation, based on transcripts from the French departmental archives made for the Public Record Office, consists chiefly of charters in favour of Norman religious establishments.

Reference is made to Channel Island affairs in the records of the English central government which have been mentioned already, but the information provided by such references was inadequate for the purposes of this study. Fortunately a number of inquisitions were held in the Islands in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in order to provide the English government with information on a wide variety of matters. The surviving records of some of these inquests are immensely valuable, both for the relations of the Channel Islanders with the English kings and for relations between the Islanders and Normandy. The records of the two earliest inquisitions, those made into the customs of Guernsey in 1247 and 1248, are in fact to be found in the printed records of the English central government\(^{(2)}\). The other inquisitions, or extents as they are sometimes called, which have left their mark on the records all took place after 1259 but some of them nevertheless shed considerable light on the period with which

\(^{(1)}\) H.M.S.O., 1899.

\(^{(2)}\) C.I.R. 1242-7, pp. 546-7; C.I. Misc., I, 15-18. The record of the 1248 inquisition has also been printed by La Société Guernesiaise in Ext.G. 1248.
this study is concerned. Those whose records were found useful were those made in Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark in 1274, and in Jersey and Guernsey in 1331. The records of the former are to be found in the Chancery Miscellanea, bundle 10, nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 and the records of the latter in Exchequer Accounts (Various), bundle 89, no. 15. All these documents have been printed by La Société Jersiaise (1) and La Société Guernesiaise (2) between them. A further post-1259 source which provided very useful information for the period before 1259 was the Roll of the Eyre of 1309 in Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark, which has also been printed by La Société Jersiaise (3). Invaluable for the whole period under consideration, as well as for the periods preceding and succeeding it, was the Cartulaire des îles Normandes (4), a miscellaneous collection of charters from French and English sources, relating to Channel Island affairs.

As far as the French records are concerned, what was chiefly required was information on Normandy, although occasionally a comparative look at what was going on elsewhere in France was necessary. Again, it was the records of the central government which proved most useful, although these are far less full than their English counterparts for this period. The French kings' administration had not yet become departmentalized with each department keeping a continuous record of its own activities and all that survives in the

(1) Ext. 1274; Ext. J. 1331.
(2) Ext. G. 1331.
(3) R.A. 1309.
(4) La Société Jersiaise, Jersey, 1924.
French national archives is the haphazard collection of miscellaneous documents preserved in the French kings' chancery. This means that although it is possible to piece together some information about the French kings' relations with the clergy, nobility and merchants of Normandy, the picture thus obtained is far less clear than the picture of the English kings' relations with the same groups of men which the more prolific and sophisticated English government records provide. The disparity between both the quality and the quantity of the French and English government records also means that any picture of Anglo-Norman relations during the period under consideration is inevitably coloured by the fact that only the English version of events is recorded in any detail. For example, almost all the information in Chapter II about Anglo-Norman trade between 1204 and 1259 comes from the English records.

As in the case of the main English central government records, the main French central government records have appeared in print. Very conveniently the charters of Philip Augustus, Louis VIII and Saint Louis relating to Normandy have been brought together in the Cartulaire normand edited by the nineteenth century French scholar, L. Delisle (1). There are also editions of all the surviving acts of Philip Augustus (2),


Louis VIII\(^{(1)}\) and Saint Louis\(^{(2)}\). A number of miscellaneous additional items from the records of the central government have been printed in volumes XXI-XXIII of the Recueil des historiens des Gauls et de la France. Of these, the only item which proved important was the *Scripta de Feodis ad Regem Spectantibus ... e Philippi Augusti Regestis Excerpta*\(^{(3)}\). This contains lists of knights' fees in Normandy drawn up at various times during the reign of Philip Augustus and it proved invaluable in the construction of the family histories in Appendix IV.

Two specifically Norman sources which proved very valuable were the *Recueil de Jugements de l'Échiquier de Normandie, au 13\textsuperscript{e} siècle, 1207-1270*\(^{(4)}\) and the *Querimoniae Normannorum de 1247*\(^{(5)}\). The former work is a modern compilation based largely on earlier compilations made from records which no longer survive\(^{(6)}\). The *Querimoniae Normannorum* are the records of the complaints against royal officials heard by Saint Louis' enquêteurs in Normandy in 1247. Both these sources contain a great deal of incidental information which proved as useful as the information they were intended to give.

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\(^{(1)}\) See the appendix to C. Petit-Dutaillis, *Étude sur la vie et le règne de Louis VIII (1187-1226)*, Paris, 1894.


\(^{(3)}\) *Rec.des hist.*, XXIII, 605-723.

\(^{(4)}\) Ed. L. Delisle, Paris, 1864.

\(^{(5)}\) *Rec.des hist.*, XXIV(i), 2-73. (Abbrev. to Q.N. in this thesis).

Much information on the Norman Church is contained in the French and specifically Norman sources just mentioned, but this was supplemented by reference to ecclesiastical sources, most notably the *Registrum Visitationum Archiepiscopi Rothomagensis*. Journal des visites pastorales d'Eude Rigaud... 1248-69 (1) and volume XI of *Gallia Christiana in Provincia Ecclesiastica distributa* (2). The last mentioned volume is an eighteenth century French compilation listing every see, monastery and nunnery in the diocese of Rouen, which virtually coincides territorially with the duchy of Normandy. It also gives some details of the history of these institutions, lists all their known heads and prints a valuable collection of relevant charters.

The narrative sources proved on the whole disappointing in spite of their profusion. Only Matthew Paris' *Chronica Majora* (3) and the narrative poem entitled *Wistasse le Moine* (4) had important contributions to make and the value of these contributions is considered at the appropriate points in the chapters which follow. Otherwise, all that the narrative sources supply is a few comments, by both French and English writers, on the French king's treatment of Normandy after 1204 and on the Treaty of Paris of 1259, together with biographical details for two or three of the men with whom this enquiry is specially concerned.

(1) Ed. T. Bonin, Rouen, 1852.
(2) Paris, 1894.
CHAPTER I. THE ECCLESIASTICAL CONNECTION

(i) The situation in 1204

The effects of the Norman Conquest on the English Church are too well known to need detailed recapitulation here (1). In brief, English bishops and abbots were gradually replaced by Normans, Norman discipline, observances and culture were introduced into English ecclesiastical life and many Norman monasteries and all the Norman cathedral chapters received endowments in the kingdom. William's motives for the Normanization of the English Church were partly political and partly religious. Since the leading clerics of England were henceforward to be feudal as well as spiritual lords, it was important that they should be sympathetic to the new régime. Moreover, the replacement of English bishops and abbots by Normans would facilitate the reform of the English Church along Norman lines. The introduction of Norman discipline, observances and culture into the English Church was probably inspired by genuine reforming zeal, for the Norman Church at the time of the Conquest was still very much in the throes of a remarkable ecclesiastical and cultural revival. At the same time, of course, such reform would certainly assist in the process of imposing Norman rule upon England. The state of the Anglo-Saxon Church on the eve of the Conquest has been the subject of considerable academic debate, but whatever its exact condition, there can be little doubt that it appeared

to the Normans to be cut off from the mainstream of eleventh century ecclesiastical life. The endowment of Norman houses with possessions in England probably resulted from a mixture of motives. Many of the donors were no doubt expressing their thanks to the Almighty for their newly acquired English lands; others were probably just following the fashion and vying with their neighbours to see who could endow his family monastery most magnificently.

Professor Knowles regards the period of what he calls "the Norman plantation" as lasting about seventy years. After this time, important outside influences began to affect the Anglo-Norman church, the chief among them being the emergence of the regular canons and the Cistercian monks and the gradual flowering of the twelfth century Renaissance. Nevertheless, the Norman Church and the English Church were still inextricably bound together in 1204. The leading clerics of both countries still came from Anglo-Norman families with interests on both sides of the Channel. In Normandy, for example, the families of du Hommet and de Tournebu produced Jordan, bishop of Lisieux (1202-1218) and William, bishop of Coutances (1183-1202). Ralph d'Argences, abbot of Fécamp (1190-1219) seems to have been a member of the important family of the same name and Matilda, abbess of Saint-Amand, Rouen (1196-1204) is described as "matertera Roberti d'Esneval" and thus represents yet another leading

(1) G.C. XI, col. 781.
(2) Ibid., col. 876.
Anglo-Norman family (1). In England, Giles, bishop of Hereford (1200-15) was the son of William de Briouze (2) and Henry, bishop of Exeter (1194-1206) was the brother of William Marshal (3). The Longchamp family produced William, bishop of Ely (1189-97) who was also Richard I's chancellor (4). William's brother Henry became abbot of Croyland (1191-1236) (5) and his brother Robert became abbot of St Mary, York (6).

It was not unusual for a cleric to move from an appointment on one side of the channel to a new appointment on the other side. Henry, bishop of Bayeux (1164-1205) had previously been dean of Salisbury (7) and William, bishop of Avranches (1196-7) had previously been archdeacon of Richmond (8). On the other hand, Hugh de Nonant, bishop of Coventry (1188-98) had previously been archdeacon of Lisieux (9) and William Longchamp was an official of the archdeacon of Rouen before he became bishop of Ely in 1189 (10). Indeed, ecclesiastical appointments

(1) G.C. XI., col.287.
(2) D.N.B., VI, 230.
(3) C.P., X, Appendix G, 95.
(4) D.N.B., XXXIV, 111.
(6) Ibid., III, 538.
(7) G.C. XI., col.364.
(8) Ibid., col.483.
(10) D.N.B., XXXIV, 112.
on both sides of the Channel were sometimes held simultaneously. When Ralph de Warneville was appointed Chancellor of England in 1173, he was described as "sacrist of Rouen and treasurer of York"(1), and when Geoffrey Plantagenet, the later archbishop of York, succeeded him as chancellor about 1182, he received "amongst other gifts.... the archdeaconries of Lincoln and Rouen, and the treasurership of York"(2). John de Coutances, bishop of Worcester (1196-8), had previously occupied simultaneously the posts of treasurer of Lisieux and archdeacon of Oxford(3).

Whether he was in Normandy or England, the king-duke's immediate entourage often included clerics of both countries. This is clear from witness lists to royal charters. For example, the bishop of Bayeux and the archdeacon of Worcester both witnessed a charter granted at Caen in May 1200(4) while the bishops of Évreux, Durham and Winchester together witnessed a grant made at Westminster in November, 1189(5). Similarly, clerics from both countries occupied official positions in the royal government. For example, at one stage in the chancellorship of William Longchamp, bishop of Ely, King Richard's vice-chancellor was John d'Alençon, archdeacon of

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(2) C.T. Clay, loc.cit., 24-5.
(3) Rec.Henri II, IV, 394.
(5) C.D.F., no.53.
Lisieux.

The possessions of the Norman Church in England constituted a further important link between the duchy and the kingdom. The majority of the English dependencies date from the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth century but gifts to Norman houses continued to be fairly frequent until at least the middle of Henry II's reign while a few were made even later. The granting of cross-Channel revenues was not, it seems, an entirely one way process. The English priories of St Mary, Bradenstoke (Wiltshire), St Mary Bruton (Somerset), Merton (Surrey) and Lewes (Sussex) are known to have had interests in Normandy. However, there seem no grounds for thinking that these English houses maintained dependencies in Normandy. In fact, very little is known about the history of their Norman possessions.

It is true that even those historians who otherwise maintain that all links between England and Normandy were severed in 1204 have acknowledged that ecclesiastical links remained because of the continued existence of the alien priories. However, those writers who have devoted themselves

(1) C.D.F., passim (e.g. nos 55-6, 58, 269).

(2) Ibid., no. 179.

(3) Ibid., nos. 174-81.


to studies of the alien priories(1) have dealt only superficially
with the period which we are considering. They have been
primarily concerned with the foundation of the alien priories
well before the beginning of this period and their dissolution
well beyond its end. As regards the events of 1204, their
chief concern has been with the effects of the loss of Normandy
on the number and value of the English possessions of the
Norman Church. The main concern of this study, on the other
hand, is to indicate the nature and extent of the contact
between Normandy and England which the continued existence
of the alien priories involved. Special attention will be
paid to relations between the Norman clergy and the English
king, and the attitude of the French king towards this
continued relationship, as far as it is ascertainable.

In order to appreciate the full extent of the continuing
ecclesiastical links between England and Normandy, it would
be helpful to have some sort of quantitative assessment of
the Norman Church's stake in England in 1204. No such
assessment has as yet been attempted. C.W. New(2) claims
to list in an appendix all the alien priories of England
and Wales but his definition of a priory is a severe one and
precludes mention of some of the Norman estates which were
administered on purely secular lines. Moreover, his list
gives no indication of the extent of the interests of those
priories which he does include. For example, St Neots, a
priory in Huntingdonshire belonging to the abbey of Bec, had

(1) See especially C.W. New, History of the Alien Priories
in England to the Confiscation of Henry V (Wisconsin, 1916); D. Matthew, op.cit.

(2) See note 1 above.
revenues not only in Huntingdonshire itself, but also in the counties of Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland, Suffolk and Wiltshire (1). Matthew indicates the number of Norman houses which to his knowledge had English interests (2) and mentions in passing many but by no means all of the holdings of individual houses. It is clear from such works as M. Morgan's The English Lands of the Abbey of Bec (3) that the difficulties in the way of the compilation of anything like a complete list of the Norman Church's possessions in England in 1204 are virtually insurmountable: certainly the results would not justify the amount of work involved (4). Although dealing with the English possessions of but a single Norman house, Miss Morgan has attempted a detailed description of the English revenues of only one of its seven priories and bailiwicks (5). Even then, she has found only isolated fourteenth century references to two of the properties so that it cannot be established when they were acquired (6). Moreover, she has been unable to identify four places mentioned in charters and deeds (7).

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(1) Mon.Ang., III, 463.
(2) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.29.
(4) Ibid., p.2
(6) i.e. Charlton, Berks, p.139; Blissmore Hall, Weyhill, Hants, p.149.
(7) Ibid., p.150.
In spite of the difficulties involved, however, it was still felt worthwhile to offer a tentative indication of the extent of the Norman Church's stake in England at the time of the loss of Normandy. A list of its possessions has therefore been compiled from the main printed collections of pre-1204 documents. This list is given in Appendix I. It does not attempt to describe each interest in detail as Miss Morgan has done for the interests of her single bailiwick, but merely indicates the counties in which each Norman monastery or cathedral chapter had revenues. In some cases an entry refers to a single church (1) while in others it refers to a considerable number of interests within a county (2).

The list could probably have been extended by resort to additional source material but not, it is thought, to any appreciable extent. It could certainly have been extended a little by adding post-1204 references to English interests (3), but this has not generally been done in case such references relate to post-1204 exchanges or acquisitions. However, at the end of the list have been added the names of two houses which had interests in England between 1204 and 1259, although no pre-1204 evidence of English possessions has been found. This has been done because it seems unlikely that houses which had no interests in England by 1204 would acquire

(1) e.g. Plessis-Grimoult (C.D.F., no.565).

(2) e.g. Bernay (Suffolk: R.R.A-N.(2), no.1436); Longueville (Bucks: C.D.F., nos.219-225).

them after that date. To this extent, therefore, the list indicates the minimum extent of the Norman possessions in England in 1204. On the other hand, it is known that a few sales and exchanges took place before 1204: where such sales or exchanges have come to light, details have been given in a footnote but there is, of course, the possibility that other transactions have left no trace in the records which have been consulted. In view, however, of the prevailing contemporary attitude to such transactions (1), one would not expect to find many more examples.

Altogether the list of Norman establishments with interests in England includes the names of sixty-six monasteries (2) or priories and all seven Norman cathedrals. Bec had interests in at least twenty-three counties and Saint-Evroul in at least fifteen. Another five houses (3) had interests in ten or more counties and a further twelve houses (4) had interests in over five.

The prevailing opinion among modern historians seems to be that in spite of the many links binding together the Church

(1) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.98; M.M. Morgan, op.cit., p.10.

(2) Compare Matthew's total of not more than fifty-five monasteries (D. Matthew, op.cit., p.29).

(3) Saint-Etienne, Caen; Grestain; Lyre; Saint-Sever; Saint-Martin, Seéz.

(4) Bernay; La Trinité, Caen; Conches; Cormeilles; Fécamp; Longueville; Mont-Saint-Michel; Saint-Pierre, Préaux; Saint-Pierre-sur-Dive; Saint-Wandrille; Savigny; Troarn.
in Normandy and the Church in England, the Norman clergy had no qualms about switching their allegiance from John to Philip Augustus. Moreover, it has been suggested that as well as the general reasons responsible for the Norman laity's submission to the French king, there were specifically ecclesiastical reasons which caused the Norman Church to feel that there was no good reason why she should exert herself on John's behalf and perhaps even to welcome her new temporal lord.

F.M. Powicke and S.R. Packard have both written in this vein and their starting point is the general deterioration in relations between the spiritual and secular powers in Normandy in the last few years of Angevin rule. Their case, very briefly, is as follows.

At the time of William the Conqueror, the Norman Church was a truly "national" Church. Although subject to a high degree of ducal control, it was at the same time a highly privileged institution. As long as the king-dukes were reasonably statesmanlike in their approach to the Church and papal influence in the duchy was negligible, the Norman Church tolerated the restrictions imposed upon her freedom and Church and state worked together with a fair degree of harmony. The most serious restriction on the freedom of the Church was royal interference in elections to high ecclesiastical office. The canonical right of free election existed in theory only in Normandy; in practice, the king could almost always

secure the appointment of his own nominee. By the end of
the twelfth century, however, the whole situation had changed.
The Norman Church was becoming less of a national Church and
more of a part of European Christendom. There was now an
effective authority outside the duchy to which it could turn,
and increasingly did turn, for encouragement and support in
ecclesiastical matters of all kinds. The papacy in the person
of Innocent III had achieved unprecedented heights of influence
and power and was particularly concerned to restore to the
Church the right of free election. Moreover, King John's
attitude towards the Norman Church was not particularly
statesmanlike. He was less careful than his predecessor
to uphold her established privileges, he abused his own rights
and was extremely heavy handed in his attempts to influence
clerical elections. The Norman Church's disenchantment with
King John would, of course, be increased by the hardships which
the war with Philip Augustus must inevitably have caused.
Powicke implies that as a result of all this, the Norman clergy
were not undisposed to change their allegiance. Packard goes
further for he states "One can assert with confidence that the
Norman Church was an important factor in the complex situation
which made the loss of Normandy inevitable, at the very least
the Norman Church willingly permitted that event to take
place"(1). His use of the modifying phrase "at the very
least", reflect Packard's belief that the Norman Church
probably welcomed its new temporal lord: "There is no
evidence that the clergy of Normandy looked to Philip Augustus
as a protector, but they could hardly fail to see that his

(1) S.R. Packard, _loc.cit._, 31.
professed attitude towards the church was infinitely superior to that taken by John''(1).

However, conclusions such as these have not been based on a close examination of the available evidence. It is suggested that both writers were influenced by the then contemporary view of King John as a thoroughly bad character who was generally antagonistic towards the Church and that they merely seized upon isolated pieces of evidence which upheld this view (2). One cannot, of course, dispute the statement that relations between the secular and spiritual powers in Normandy were deteriorating and that papal intervention in the ecclesiastical affairs of the duchy was increasing. However, it should be borne in mind that this state of affairs was not confined to Normandy: a similar situation existed in England, France and elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, papal intervention was very often in connection


(2) To be fair to Powicke it must be pointed out that the article being criticized was published in 1906 and the views expressed therein are not fully incorporated in the same author's The Loss of Normandy, 1189-1204. Studies in the history of the Angevin Empire which was first published in 1913. Here he has very little to say about John's relations with the Norman Church. The impression given is that although he has not really modified his views, he realises that he cannot produce sufficient evidence to support them. For example, after a reference to the Sééz dispute, he says "The ecclesiastical disputes which occurred in the early years of John's reign lie beyond the scope of this volume. So far as they concerned Norman churches, they must have embarrassed his political position" (p.168, note 249 in 2nd ed. 1963). On another occasion, after a reference to the tallage imposed on ecclesiastical property in 1202, he expresses the belief that "doubtless a closer scrutiny of the rolls would reveal other instances of John's anti-ecclesiastical tendencies" (ibid., p.276).
with disputes between two ecclesiastical parties. Other statements are, however, unsubstantiated or misleading. Quoted below is a paragraph from Powicke, which follows a discussion on the dispute over the manor of Andeli which had involved the archbishop of Rouen in negotiations with Philip Augustus as well as King Richard: "When John succeeded his brother, the primate was prepared by past experience to act as a third power and, as the royal blunders increased, the other bishops sent appeal after appeal to Rome. The pope who wished to support John in his political troubles was forced to take notice of his quarrel with the clergy, especially with the chapter of Sééz. The Norman Church had become so alienated from its political and ecclesiastical traditions that the bishops combined to take the advice of the pope when the time came to choose between John and Philip."^2^

Powicke does not indicate his evidence for the increasing number of "royal blunders" or for the many episcopal appeals to Rome arising from these blunders, and a study of the main sources has not produced the missing references. The references which Powicke does supply are not altogether satisfactory. In support of his reference to John's "quarrel with the clergy, especially with the chapter of Sééz", he cites two papal letters^3^ and three entries in the Patent Rolls^4^.

(3) For the full story of the Sééz dispute, see S.R. Packard, loc.cit., 20-4; Patrologiae, CCXIV, 1175; CCXV, 61.
(4) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, pp.6 b, 8 a, 16 a.
The first of these papal letters is dated 20th February, 1203 and deals with a number of grievances of which only two relate specifically to Normandy. The pope chastizes John for his intransigence in the Seez affair and warns him that: "Quid etiam feceris Constantiensi ecclesiae nullantenus ignoramus, licet forsan id credas ad nostram notitiam non venisse". From the remarks preceding this reference to the church of Coutances it seemed likely that John's offence was to delay the election of a new bishop. Unfortunately, however, there is some doubt about the date of the death of bishop William de Tournebu, so this hypothesis cannot be substantiated. The second papal letter relates to John's treatment of the archbishop of Dublin and the Patent Roll entries all relate to the Seez affair again.

Powicke's claim that "the bishops combined to take the advice of the pope when the time came to choose between John and Philip" is misleading on two counts. In the first place the papal letter to which reference is made (1) is dated in March 1205 and it is quite clear that an effective change of allegiance must have taken place several months previously, probably after the fall of Rouen in June 1204. This papal letter of March 1205 was in response to an enquiry from the bishops of Normandy as to whether it was in order for them to make to Philip Augustus the oath of allegiance which he was now demanding from laity and clergy alike. Secondly, the pope does not specifically recommend the bishops to make

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(1) Patrologiae, CCXV, 564.
the oath although there can be no doubt that he was tacitly accepting what was in fact a fait accompli. What he actually says is: "Quia vero, nec de jure, nec de consuetudine nobis constat, utpote qui causam, modum et ordinem, aliasque circumstantias ignoramus, id circa, super re dubia vobis non possumus certum dare responsum, nisi, quod vos, qui rei veritatem potestis plenius indagare, illud prudenter agatis, quod secundum Deum de jure, vel consuetudinem faciendum."

Packard's examination of John's relations with the Norman clergy is equally superficial. He says of John: "At times generous enough, he usually looked upon the clergy as a part of the royal demesne, capable of almost unlimited exploitation upon need. He enriched himself from the revenues of vacant sees, and abused his rights of hospitality in the monastic houses. Frankly contemptuous of the most sacred religious rites, he set the key-note of his reign by scoffing at the ceremonies of his investiture; he habitually absented himself from mass. Innocent III, his patience exhausted by insult heaped upon injury, wrote him a letter fairly bristling with indignation; its contents warrant the belief that John had gone out of his way to humiliate and disgrace the clergy". (1)

It is significant that Packard quotes more references in support of John's generosity towards the Norman church than in support of his hostility towards it. Moreover, some of his unfavourable references are of doubtful value. He complains that John enriched himself from the revenues of vacant sees, but the right to the temporalities of a see during a vacancy was an established right challenged by no-one.

(1) S.R. Packard, _loc.cit._, 20.
Only when vacancies were deliberately extended did an element of abuse arise. The two cases referred to by Packard are the vacancies of the sees of Coutances and Lisieux. As we have already seen, it cannot be established whether or not the Coutances vacancy was deliberately extended because there is some doubt about the date of the death of William de Tournebu.

On the other hand, William de Rupière, bishop of Lisieux, died on 19th October 1201 and Jordan du Hommet succeeded him on 10th January 1202 which means that the see was vacant for just under twelve weeks. In support of his statement that John abused his rights of hospitality in monastic houses, Packard cites R.N. Sauvage's *L'abbaye de Saint-Martin de Troarn*. However, all that Sauvage says is "John séjourna plus d'une fois à Troarn, non, sans doute, pour le plus grand avantage de l'abbaye". Packard's reference to the solitary piece of evidence for John's tallage of ecclesiastical property in 1202 is presumably meant to illustrate John's "unlimited exploitation" of the Norman Church. The papal letter of chastisement to which he refers is the same letter to which Powicke refers, but so anxious is he to make his case against John that he allows inaccuracy to creep into his discussion of it.

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(3) P.B. Gams, *op.cit.*, I, 566.
(5) R.N., p.65.
(6) *Patrologiae*, CCXIV, 1175.
In a footnote he summarizes one of the offences to which the letter relates as "preventing papal legates from travelling in Normandy" whereas the relevant part of the letter actually reads as follows: "quod publice inhibere curasti, ut nullus de regno tuo legatum, vel nuntium sedis apostolicae, per totum regnum, praesertim per Angliam, recipere attentaret."

Clearly what is required is a more systematic examination of the evidence for John's relations with the Norman clergy between his accession in 1199 and the loss of the duchy in 1204. If one approaches such evidence as there is with an open mind, then one is forced to admit that it fails to bear out the view that John was particularly harsh in his treatment of the Norman Church. The largest single group of references which one finds are probably the references to grants and confirmations make by John to various ecclesiastical parties. Nor can there be any suggestion that his gifts\(^{(1)}\) were made for primarily political reasons. If this had been the case they would presumably have been made to the most important foundations and concentrated in periods when support was especially needed. In fact, a number of John's gifts were made to small, relatively unimportant houses, and in times of truce between himself and Philip Augustus. Nor was his behaviour always impious, as Packard implies. He may, as the biographer of Saint Hugh of Lincoln maintains, have adopted an unfortunate attitude at the ceremony of his investiture with the duchy\(^{(2)}\), but the Norman

\(^{(1)}\) R.N., pp.15(bis), 86; Rot.Chart., 1199-1216, pp.1,17,32b, 57,69,114; C.D.F., pp.65,86,139.

Rolls reveal that on another occasion he ordered a generous payment to be made to some clerks who sang at his second coronation (1). The same Rolls reveal that, on one occasion at least, he ordered that a hundred and fifty paupers should be fed for a day at his expense (2). Moreover, not only did he himself promise a very generous donation towards the rebuilding of Rouen cathedral (3), but on two separate occasions he took the trouble to make general appeals for gifts for the same cause (4).

On a number of occasions King John can be seen dealing with the Church in a perfectly acceptable and even considerate manner. For example, in March 1203 the Exchequer barons were instructed not to proceed with a certain demand against the archbishop of Rouen until it was established whether the sum due had been remitted by the king as the archbishop claimed (5). Similarly, when disagreement arose between John and the bishop of Lisieux over royal rights in the city of Lisieux, John ordered an enquiry involving local men to establish the truth (6).

A grant made to Guerin de Glapion in November 1202 was made "salvi monialibus Cadomensibus et allis redditibus quos inde

(1) R.N., p.34.
(2) Ibid., p.49.
(3) Ibid., p.86.
(5) R.N., p.81.
percipere consueverunt" (1). Likewise, when land held of the abbot of Saint-Ouen, Rouen, was transferred from one tenant to another, it was still to be held "per servicium quod terra debet" (2). Even when an interdict was being at least partially enforced in Normandy as a result of John's intransigence in the Séez dispute, he was concerned to see that the abbot of Blanchelande did not suffer material loss: the seneschal and bailiffs of Normandy were instructed "quod non permittatis impedimentum fieri Abbati de Blanchelande quo minus ipse possit redditus suos juste perquirere quamdiu interdictum duraverit" (3). These instructions, it is true, were issued by one or more of John's officials and do not necessarily reflect his personal intervention in individual cases. Nevertheless, they can presumably be regarded as reflecting the king's general attitude towards the Norman church.

There is very little evidence for the effects of the war on ecclesiastical property in Normandy. However, we know that lay property was ravaged (4) and there is no reason to suppose that ecclesiastical property escaped entirely. Mont-Saint-Michel was virtually destroyed by a Breton army in 1203 (5) but as it had previously been turned by John into

(1) R.N., p.64.
(2) Ibid., p.51.
(3) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.35.
a royal fortress \(^{(1)}\), we probably should not regard it as ecclesiastical property in this connection. After the outbreak of war in 1202, a number of letters of protection were issued by King John to various abbots and bishops but it is difficult to know what significance to ascribe to them. Were these particular houses so harassed by the king's officials or mercenaries that they applied in desperation for letters of protection or, did the king issue the letters to ensure as far as possible that such harassment never took place? If the latter solution applies, was the king's motive a genuine desire to ensure that the favoured houses suffered no harm or was he concerned to retain their support in his political difficulties? The available evidence does not offer a definite solution to these questions but it is interesting to note that of the eleven sets of letters which have been noticed in the Patent Rolls, five were issued to houses which although still in the ecclesiastical province of Rouen, were in areas ceded to Philip Augustus by the treaty of Le Goulet in May 1200 \(^{(2)}\). In these cases, at least, there was presumably no political motive. The six remaining sets of letters were issued to Bonport \(^{(3)}\), Lyre \(^{(4)}\), Fécamp \(^{(5)}\), Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge \(^{(6)}\),

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\(^{(1)}\) e.g. R.N., pp.117,120.
\(^{(2)}\) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, pp.12b (La Noe), 13 (L’Estreee), 25b (Le Breuil-Benoit; Saint-Taurin,Evreux), 25b,26,27 (bishop of Evreux).
\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., 1201-16, p.15b.
\(^{(6)}\) Ibid., 1201-16, p.24b.
Saint-Martin, Seex(1) and Grandmont's priory at Beaumont-le-
Roger(2). Of these houses, it seems that Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge,
at least, had suffered losses at the hands of John's mercenaries
before receiving letters of protection for the Patent Roll entry
reads as follows: "Prior et canonici Sancte Barbe habent
litteras domini regis patentes Johanni Maresc' et Lupescar' de
protectione: et quod si quid de suo captum sit, id eis reddi
faciant."(3) The situation is further confused by the fact
that letters of protection were issued to the abbot and monks
of Saint-Etienne, Caen in July 1200(4), a time of truce between
John and Philip Augustus.

A comparison of the surviving part of the 1203 Norman
Exchequer roll with the full roll of 1198 suggests that the
king or his officials tried to ensure that as far as possible
the Norman clergy received in full all the payments from
royal revenues to which they were entitled. This is clear
from the accounts of the bailiwick of the Cotentin which
have survived for 1198 and 1203. For example, payments
made to the religious from the new farm of the prepositura
of Barfleur(5), the farms of the vicecomitatus of the Cotentin(6)

(1) Ibid. 1201-16, p.30b.
(2) Ibid. 1201-16, p.26b.
(3) Ibid. 1201-16, p.24b.
(6) Ibid. 11, 472 (1198), 506 (1203).
and of Saint-Marcouf (1), the bernagium of the Cotentin (2) and the revenues of the forest of Bernavast (3) are all exactly the same in 1203 as they were in 1198. In each case the 1202 return for these revenues and payments is made in the 1203 roll, which may or may not indicate a delay in collection and disbursement, but again the amounts are the same. On the other hand, a comparison of the payments made from the farm of Cherbourg in the three years 1198 (4), 1202 and 1203 (5) reveals some omissions in the two later years. On the whole, however, the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of a continuation of the customary payments in full in spite of the upheaval of the war.

When we begin to look for positive indications of strained relations between John and the Norman clergy, the sources are less forthcoming. It is true that we see John exercising his right to episcopal (6) and abbatial (7) revenues during vacancies but this was a right enjoyed by all his predecessors. As already noted, an element of abuse arose only when the king deliberately extended vacancies in order to prolong his enjoyment of his regalian right. In the papal letter of

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(1) Ibid., I, 472 (1198), 506 (1203).
(2) Ibid., I, 473 (1198), 508 (1203).
(3) Ibid., I, 473 (1198), 508 (1203).
(4) Ibid., I, 471 (1198).
(5) Ibid., I, 572 (1202 and 1203).
(6) R.N., p.35 (Lisieux); Mag.Rot.Scac.Norm. II, 547 bis (Coutances).
(7) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.27 (Troarn).
20th February, 1203 (1) referred to by both Powicke and Packard, Innocent III accused John of this offence but in general terms and not with specific reference to the duchy. We have already seen that John did not offend in this way in the case of the Lisieux vacancy and that conflicting evidence prevents us from reaching a definite conclusion in the case of Coutances. John's regalian right in the see of Evreux was ceded to Philip Augustus under the terms of the treaty of Le Goulet of May 1200 before a vacancy arose (2) and the sees of Avranches (3), Bayeux (4) and Rouen (5) remained continuously occupied between John's accession and the loss of the duchy. The see of Seez was, of course, vacant for a considerable length of time and John certainly benefited financially, but the prime motive for his interference was not a financial one. Less is known about abbatial elections than about episcopal elections but no instance of John deliberately extending a vacancy has so far come to light (6).

Such evidence as has been discovered of strained relations between John and the Norman clergy is dominated by references to the Seez dispute which no doubt accounts for the prominence given to this affair by modern historians. Apart from this,

(1) *Patrologiae*, CCXIV, col.1176.
(3) G.C. XI, col.483.
(6) e.g. *Ibid.*, passim.
however, one cannot find anything very definite. It has not been possible to discover the nature of the unspecified offence against the church of Coutances to which Innocent's letter of 20th February 1203 refers (1). In the same letter the pope complains that "cum in regno tuo causas ecclesiasticas committimis cognoscendas, tu prohibes delegatis, ne in earum cognitione procedant, jurisdictionem nostram impediens," but if the term "regnum tuum" is to be interpreted as referring to all John's dominions, no justification has been found for the pope's complaint in the case of Normandy. Both Powicke and Packard have drawn attention to an entry on the Norman Rolls which seems to indicate that in or before 1202, John imposed a tallage on ecclesiastical property held in free alms. This entry is a record of an order sent by the king to his Exchequer barons at Caen and reads as follows:

"Monstravit nobis Gwarinus de Glapion' quod occasione tallagii positi super elemosinas Normanniae, Ricardus Serle et Ricardus de Ros homines ipsius Gwarini talliatuni fuerunt de X.libris Andegavenibus de feodo quod idem Gwarinus tenet de Episcopo Lexoviensi. Et ideo vobis mandamus quod de illis X.libris quieti sint." (2) However, this is the only reference to such a tallage which has been found and one cannot help wondering whether a clerical error was made in the king's chancery. It is true that the argument from silence is not generally a valid one for the medieval historian because of the nature of his sources but one cannot help feeling that such a flagrant contravention of

(1) Patrologiae, CCXIV, col.1176.
(2) R.N., p.65.
the agreement reached between King Richard and the Norman clergy on the question of tallages\(^{(1)}\) would have left more impression on our records.

King John had a list of grievances against the archbishop of Rouen at the beginning of the year 1200 which no doubt caused relations between them to be strained for a time but at the prelate's request John postponed a hearing at which these grievances were to be discussed. The fact that the archbishop was prepared to pay fifteen hundred pounds Anjou to secure this respite suggests that the king had genuine cause for complaint\(^{(2)}\). Presumably matters were satisfactorily settled before 7th June 1200 when John confirmed to the archbishop the exchange made by King Richard for the manor of Andeli and gave up to Walter the disputed points in a number of minor differences between them, although retaining for himself a number of judicial rights\(^{(3)}\).

At this point it must be made clear that it is not being suggested that relations between John and the Norman clergy were completely harmonious. It is merely being pointed out that we have insufficient evidence to enable us to come to a definite conclusion one way or the other. Certainly there is no justification in the sources for some of Packard's more sweeping statements. On one occasion he says: "The essential viciousness of John, the stubborn resistance of the local clergy,

\(^{(1)}\) Coutumiers de Normandie, I (i) Le très ancien coutumier de Normandie, ed. E.J. Tardif (Rouen, 1881), p.69.


\(^{(3)}\) Ibid. 1199-1216, p.69b.
the reliance of the provincial church upon the strong arm of the pope, all were clearly revealed time and again in the struggle, but they were displayed most forcibly in the disputed election of Séez 1202-3, an event which was at once closely connected with the loss of Normandy and a vivid illustration of the spirit of the Norman clergy which made that event possible.\(^{(1)}\) Admittedly the story of the Séez dispute is a dramatic one but it should not be allowed to colour our whole impression of relations between John and the Norman clergy.

Moreover, in his account of the dispute\(^{(2)}\), Packard has been less than fair to John. After all, John was claiming nothing new when he nominated the dean of Lisieux as the new bishop of Séez: he was merely exercising what he believed to be his customary right\(^{(3)}\). Moreover, when the canons rejected the dean of Lisieux, John proposed a very reasonable alternative: he suggested that the chapter should nominate six men, three of whom were to be outside the ranks of the clergy of Séez, from whom he would select the new bishop. It was only when the canons rejected this compromise\(^{(4)}\) that John began to treat them so badly.

Nor is there any evidence that John's later intransigence alienated the majority of the Norman clergy from him. Certainly

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\(^{(1)}\) S.R. Packard, _loc.cit._, 20.
\(^{(3)}\) See the statement which he made on this subject when the see of Lisieux fell vacant (Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.99).
a number of them continued to co-operate with him on day to
day matters during the later stages of the dispute\(^{(1)}\). The
abbot of Ardennes and the archdeacon of Lisieux acted on his
behalf in the Seez dispute itself\(^{(2)}\). One is inclined to
suspect that the whole affair remained very much a matter
between John, the Pope and the canons of Seez. After all,
which of the other Norman prelates were in a position to
oppose John on this issue? Henry, bishop of Bayeux\(^{(3)}\),
and Walter of Coutances, archbishop of Rouen\(^{(4)}\), both owed
their appointments to Henry II and Jordan, bishop of Lisieux
was presumably John's nominee for we have a record of his
express determination to appoint his own candidate in this
case\(^{(5)}\). Little is known about the appointment of Vivian,
bishop of Coutances (1202-8) but presumably he was John's
choice or another dispute would have arisen. Whether the
canos of Avranches elected William II (1198-1210) as their
bishop on King Richard's instructions is not known but as
William was a clerk of the seneschal of Normandy at the time
of his election which was at first disputed by the Pope
on the grounds that he was not a fit person, it seems likely

\(^{(1)}\) e.g. R.N., pp.68,75,101,103.
\(^{(3)}\) S.E. Gleason, An Ecclesiastical Barony of the Middle Ages:
The Bishopric of Bayeux, 1066-1204 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936),
p.32.
\(^{(4)}\) D.N.B., XII, 351.
that he was, in fact, a royal nominee\(^{(1)}\).

Another point which has not previously been made sufficiently clear is that the ill-feeling between John and the Pope over the Séez dispute did not affect Innocent's attitude towards John's political difficulties. Even after he had threatened John with an interdict if he did not accept Sylvester as bishop within a month\(^{(2)}\), he was still clearly on John's side in his struggle with Philip Augustus. On the very next day he wrote to Philip urging him to make a peace or truce with John\(^{(3)}\). Indeed, he took John's part until the last\(^{(4)}\). Thus, if the Norman clergy looked to Innocent III for guidance, their duty was clear.

We must next consider Packard's suggestion that the Norman clergy may have welcomed Philip Augustus as their new temporal lord because "his professed attitude towards the Church was infinitely superior to that taken by John"\(^{(5)}\). He does not cite his evidence for Philip's professed attitude, nor does he indicate in what way he considers it an improvement on John's. A detailed study of the French king's relations with his clergy prior to 1204 has not been attempted, but anyone who reads briefly through a collection of the acts of Philip Augustus is bound to agree with Luchaire that, "il intendait être le maitre de ses évêques et de ses abbés, aussi bien que

\(^{(1)}\) G.C. XI, col.483.
\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., I, no.1921 (26 May 1203).
\(^{(4)}\) e.g. Ibid., I, no.2181.
de ses barons", (1) which meant that his ecclesiastical policy "ne fut le plus souvent qu'une politique de conflits" (2). The only respect in which his treatment of the clergy seems to have been consistently better than John's was that he acknowledged the canonical right of cathedral and monastic chapters to a free election (3). However, the fact that Philip did not generally interfere in clerical elections opened the way for papal interference which was presumably as unwelcome to the rightful electors as royal interference (4). In any case, as already indicated, several of the Norman bishops had reason to be thankful for the Angevins' custom of nominating their prelates.

There is not a great deal of evidence for the activities of Norman bishops and abbots during the course of the war with Philip Augustus. Nevertheless, it is significant that although no reference has been found to opposition or lack of co-operation on the part of the Norman clergy, there are a number of entries in the Chancery Rolls which make it clear that some clerics at least were actively assisting King John at a fairly late stage in the struggle. For example, Samson, abbot of Saint-Etienne, Caen, acted in the capacity of an Exchequer baron from before the outbreak of the war (5) until at least 11th February 1203 (6).

(1) E. Lavisse, ed.; Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution (Paris, 1900-11), III(i), 214.

(2) Ibid., III(i), 214.

(3) Ibid., III(i), 214. See also Rec. Ph. Aug. (2), nos. 791. (Langres), 793 (Arras), 708 (Mâcon).

(4) E. Lavisse, ed; op. cit., III(i), 214.


(6) Ibid., pp. 1, 75. For the intervening period, see, for example, Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 55, 65, 66, 68.
On 29th November 1203 the king ordered that he should be reimbursed for expenditure incurred in connection with the royal dogs\(^{(1)}\), and although it is not clear whether he was still an Exchequer baron, he was obviously still in the king's service at this date. Similarly, the archdeacon of Lisieux can be seen at work on the king's behalf on 9th and 22nd August, 1203\(^{(2)}\). The abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel was providing troops for the king at least as late as 1st May, 1204, when his tenants were ordered "quod sine occasione et dilatatione faciatis domino vestro abbatis de Monte rationabile auxilium ad tenendum milites et servientes in servicio nostro apud Montem et ad warnesturam quendam in servicio nostro contra inimicos nostros"\(^{(3)}\). It does not seem that these three clerics at least "willingly permitted"\(^{(4)}\) the conquest of Normandy to take place. That other clerics were still at least nominally on John's side as late as November 1203 just before he left Normandy on 5th December, 1203, can be established from witness lists to his charters\(^{(5)}\).

However, an effective change of allegiance must have taken place long before 7th March, 1205, when the Pope wrote to the Norman bishops on the subject\(^{(6)}\). Such evidence as we have

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., p.116.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., pp.101,103.
\(^{(6)}\) Patrologiae. CCXV, p.564.
suggests that the clergy submitted in May and June 1204 as Philip swept triumphantly across Normandy. For example, the town of Falaise submitted to the French king in May, and at the same time as he confirmed the town's privileges, he granted a fair to the lazard house there. The abbot and monks of Bec, who had fined with King John for a fair on their English manor of Swyncombe, Oxfordshire, as recently as 22nd March 1204, had presumably submitted to Philip Augustus by 1st June when he ordered his baillis to respect the liberties which they had enjoyed under Henry II. The churches of Rouen no doubt submitted with the city on 24th June 1204.

Lest this consideration of John's relations with the Norman church prior to 1204 should seem disproportionately long in a thesis ostensibly concerned with the years 1204 to 1259, some justification must be offered for its length. If one is going to examine relations between the Norman clergy and the French and English kings after 1204, it is obviously necessary to have some idea of the relationship between them before 1204. If this matter had been dealt with satisfactorily by historians of pre-1204 Normandy, then it would have been sufficient to refer to their work as an introduction to this study. However, it soon became clear from an examination of the sources that some of the pronouncements already made on the subject are not based on

(1) C.N., no.1070.
(2) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.117.
(3) C.N., no.83.
a detailed study of the admittedly limited amount of evidence and are, in fact, open to question. In the first place it has been shown that the evidence does not uphold the view that relations between John and the Norman clergy were at breaking point: there was admittedly some friction between John and individual clerics or groups of clerics but some friction between the temporal and spiritual power was a normal feature of medieval life and was by no means confined to the duchy. Such friction may have been more common in Normandy than elsewhere but, if this was so, much of the evidence has been lost. Secondly, it has been pointed out that the claim that Philip Augustus's attitude towards the Church was far better than John's is open to question. In most matters he was as anxious as any Angevin to show that he was master of the Church and he was certainly on worse terms than John with the Pope. Not only did Innocent III support John in his struggle with Philip Augustus, but he was constantly chastizing the French king for his treatment of his wife Ingeborg (1). It seems that the only point in Philip's favour was that he acknowledged the right of cathedral and monastic chapters to free election and the importance of this is difficult to assess. Even if one could clearly demonstrate that relations between John and the Norman clergy were extremely bad, and that Philip's relations with the Church in his dominions were infinitely better, one would still have to be careful about assuming too much for the Church was a naturally conservative body.

(1) e.g. Reg.Pont.Rom., I, nos.1713,1954,2036.
Even in England where there is more evidence for the suffering of the Church, there was no mass desertion of John by the clergy in the civil war at the end of his reign. Stephen Langton himself supported the royal cause in spite of John's long refusal to accept him as archbishop of Canterbury. All things considered, it seems that we have to admit that the situation in 1204 cannot be fully established.

(ii) Relations between the English kings and the Norman clergy, 1204-59

We must now consider the effects of the loss of Normandy on the possessions of the Norman Church in England. It is clear that the lands of the Normans taken into the king's hands in 1204 included a considerable amount of property belonging to Norman monasteries and cathedral chapters. In some cases the seizure is described in the records as having taken place "occasione generalis precepti quod fecimus de terris Normannorum saisandis"(1) but there may have been a separate order in respect of ecclesiastical property. This is suggested by references to "generale preceptum nostrum quod fecimus de viris religiosis de ultra mare dissaisiandis"(2). Other evidence can be found in favour of a separate order: among the religious houses which suffered seizure were a number of ultramarine but non-Norman houses such as Cluny(3) and Saint-Denis, Paris(4).

(1) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.60b.
(2) Ibid. 1204-24, p.66. See also Rot.de Ob.et Fin. p.339.
(3) R.N., p.136.
(4) P.R. 6 John, p.150.
King John's intention was presumably that the English property of all foreign houses should be taken into his hands. The abbey of Fécamp seems to have been allowed to retain its possessions for a time, probably inadvertently, for on 30th September 1204 a specific order for their confiscation was issued\(^{(1)}\). However, our records of the 1204 seizure are far from complete. Certain evidence of confiscation has been found for only twenty five Norman houses. A list of these houses is given in Appendix II.

The king had no intention, however, of depriving foreign houses of their English possessions for ever. Most houses were allowed to recover their property within a year or so of the seizure in return for payment of a fine and agreement to certain conditions. These conditions, which are known to us through a few cases only, make clear the reasons for the seizure. The main reason seems to have been the desire to stop the export from England of revenues which might aid John's enemy, Philip Augustus, against him. This is made quite explicit in arrangements agreed with Bec\(^{(2)}\), Grestain\(^{(3)}\), La Trinite, Rouen\(^{(4)}\), Savigny\(^{(5)}\), Fécamp\(^{(6)}\), Loders priory\(^{(7)}\), Mont-Saint-Michel\(^{(8)}\), Rouen

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\(^{(1)}\) *Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24*, p.9b.

\(^{(2)}\) *Rot.de Ob.et Fin.*, p.314.

\(^{(3)}\) *Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24*, p.16.

\(^{(4)}\) *Ibid. 1204-24*, p.66.

\(^{(5)}\) *Ibid. 1204-24*, p.77.

\(^{(6)}\) *Rot.de Ob.et Fin.*, p.319.


cathedra(1), and Saint-Denis, Paris(2). The lands of Bec, for example, were returned to the prior of Ogbourne after "idem prior fecit securum dominum regem quod de exitibus inde provenientibus nihil mittet ultra mare nisi per dominum regem"(3). Similar provisions are made in the other cases. The revenues accruing from the English possessions of these houses were to be paid to the king instead of to the mother houses(4). In only two of these cases is a deduction explicitly allowed for the maintenance of the representatives of the mother house in England(5), but it was nevertheless probably normal procedure to make such an allowance. Two canons of Seez were to be allowed a reasonable amount for their maintenance while their property was still in the king's hands(6).

Although the fines and revenues which he acquired in this way were no doubt a useful additional source of income to King John, there can be no doubt that he was far more concerned with stopping money from going abroad to the possible advantage of Philip Augustus than with systematically exploiting the foreign monks in England. In the first place the amounts of

(1) Ibid., p.335.
(2) P.R. 6 John, p.150.
(3) Rot.de Ob.et Fin; p.314.
(4) In some cases the whole revenue of the priory was to be paid to the king, and in others merely the nominal sum remitted to the mother house annually as a token of subjection.
(5) Rot.de Ob.et Fin, p.319 (Fécamp); Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.16 (Grestain).
(6) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.23.
the fines which he imposed were clearly fixed in an arbitrary fashion. The fines which are known to us (1) are all expressed in convenient round figures, whether in terms of pounds, marks or palfreys. A palfrey was apparently worth five marks at this time, and two of the three houses which promised palfreys actually paid in marks when the moment of reckoning came (2). Moreover, the fines bear no apparent relation to the value of the English property of the Norman houses concerned. The prior of Ogbourne paid £100 for the lands of Bec, which were located in at least twenty-three counties (3) whereas the abbot of Saint-Wandrille gave the same sum for a pension of 20 marks from the church of Ecclesfield in Yorkshire and land worth 110 shillings in Northamptonshire (4). The prior of Loders, on the other hand, was fined only two palfreys for the return of property valued in the sixth year of John's reign at £33 (5).

(1) Frampton (Saint-Etienne, Caen) 100m Rot.de Ob.et Fin., p.199.
Ogbourne (Bec) £100 Ibid., p.314.
Cogges (Fécamp) 100m Ibid., p.319.
Loders (Montebourg) 2 palfreys Ibid., p.313.
Otterton (Mont-Saint-Michel) 10m Ibid., p.328.
Saint-Léger, Préaux 1 palfrey Ibid., p.339.
Patrixbourne (Beaulieu) 30m and 1 palfrey Ibid., p.374.
Saint-Wandrille £100 Ibid., p.400.
Panfield (Saint-Etienne, Caen) 50m and 2 palfreys P.R. 6 John, p.33.

There seems to have been a lack of liaison between the English priors of Saint-Etienne, Caen. The priors of Frampton and Panfield both negotiated fines in 1204 but the latter's was later remitted because the former's covered all the English property of the mother house (P.R. 8 John, p.232).

(2) P.R. 8 John, pp.133,189; Ibid. 9 John, p.60. Compare Ibid. 9 John, p.36; Ibid. 10 John, p.99; Ibid. 11 John, p.12.

(3) Rot.de Ob.et Fin., p.314. See Appendix I for the English lands of the abbey of Bec.

(4) Rot.de Ob.et Fin., p.400.

There are three other indications that John's primary aim was not to persecute the foreign monks financially. Firstly, there seems to have been no abnormal pressure on them to pay their fines promptly. The prior of Cogges, for example, is noted in the Pipe Roll for 1205 as owing a hundred marks, his first payment of forty marks is recorded in the Pipe Roll for 1206, and the final payment of sixty marks in that for 1207. Nor was payment by installment limited to the larger fines: the prior of Loders paid the price of one of the two palfreys he owed in the financial year ending Michaelmas 1206 but delayed payment for the other until the following year. Secondly, in one case at least, a Norman prior was allowed to have "rationabile auxilium de liberetentibus suis ... ad predictum finem acquitandum". Thirdly, as we have already seen, the foreign monks seem to have been allowed a reasonable amount for their maintenance, both before and after recovering the custody of their property.

We do not know exactly when King John's ban on the export of revenues from England was lifted but it seems highly probable that it was in October 1206, when a truce was at last arranged with Philip Augustus. The ban was clearly still in

(1) P.R. 7 John, p.110.
(2) Ibid. 8 John, p.62.
(3) Ibid. 9 John, p.39.
(4) Ibid. 8 John, p.133.
(5) Ibid. 9 John, p.6.
(6) Rot.de Ob.et Fin., p.314 (prior of Ogbourne).
force on 13th April 1206 when special dispensations were
granted permitting the abbots of Foucarmont and Beaubec to
export a limited amount of grain from England to Normandy(1).
However, it would seem to have been lifted by April 1207,
when the king granted, among other things, to the abbot of
Saint-Etienne, Caen, that "monachi qui res ejusdem abbatie
custodiunt in Anglia, liberam habeant dispositionem omnium
rerum ad custodiam suam pertinentium et respondebunt eidem
abbatie de firmis et exitibus illarum sicut respondere
solebant"(2). There is, of course, the possibility that
this, too, was a special concession in which case we have
to turn to the records for April 1208 for an indication
that the ban was no longer in existence. This is provided
by references to the return of property seized again on the
occasion of the interdict. When property is returned to
alien priors from Normandy, no mention is made of any
restrictions on their enjoyment of the property even in
cases where such restrictions are definitely known to have
been made after the 1204 seizure(3).

Most Norman houses appear to have recovered their English
possessions within a year or two of the seizure(4). The only
exceptions which have come to my notice are Beaulieu and Saint-
Wandrille where the fines were agreed upon some time between

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(2) Ibid., 1201-16, p.70b.
(3) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, pp.110b (Frampton), 111b (Ogbourne
and Cogges).
(4) All but one of the fines mentioned on p.56, note 1, were
promised to the king in the years 1204-6.
May and September 1207\(^{(1)}\). It is explicitly stated in the latter agreement that the property to be restored had been seized by the king "occasione terrarum Normannorum". A few other references can be found to property being in the king's hands after the truce of 1206\(^{(2)}\), but it cannot be assumed that these cases are connected with the 1204 seizure unless this is specifically stated. References dated after March 1208 are more likely to refer to the seizure on the occasion of the interdict, while there may well be other special reasons in individual cases\(^{(3)}\). Beaulieu, Saint-Wandrille and any other houses which made late arrangements with the king may have been waiting to see whether there was any possibility of their lands being returned without the payment of a fine, or their English priors may have been awaiting instructions from their mother house at a time when communications were apparently difficult\(^{(4)}\).

\(^{(1)}\) In both cases the promise to pay was made in 9 John (Rot.de Ob.et Fin., pp.374,400). In the latter case the first instalment was promised by Michaelmas 1207 (Ibid., p.400) although the first payment was not made until the year ending Michaelmas 1208 (P.R. 9 John, p.74; Ibid. 10 John, p.154). In the former case part-payment had been made by Michaelmas 1207 (P.R. 9 John, p.36).

\(^{(2)}\) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, pp.77 (Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte: January, 1207), 100 (Rouen cathedral: January, 1208).

\(^{(3)}\) For example, the property of Saint-Etienne, Caen, was in the king's hands again on 1st April, 1207, because of some unspecified disagreement between King John and Abbot Samson (Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.70).

\(^{(4)}\) We have already seen (page 56, note 1) how it took at least one year, and possibly almost two, for the discovery to be made that the priors of Panfield and Frampton had both offered fines for the recovery of the English possessions of Saint-Etienne, Caen.
At least two houses, Montivilliers\(^{(1)}\) and Seez cathedral\(^{(2)}\), were not to be allowed to recover their English property until they restored property which they were holding in Normandy and which rightfully belonged to men now in England.

This temporary seizure of 1204 was never again repeated in the period under review, even on occasions when war once more broke out between England and France. Presumably the original seizure was intended to serve as a reminder to the Norman and other French clerics that for their English possessions they owed allegiance to the English king and the penalty for disloyalty was confiscation. In later periods of war, the Norman monks' enjoyment of their English possessions was restricted only by the general prohibitions on travel between England and France and on the export of money and goods.

Even then, individual houses could sometimes obtain special concessions. For example, on 13th April 1206\(^{(3)}\), the abbots of Foucarmont and Beaubec were each granted permission to take a given quantity of corn from England to Normandy within a specified period\(^{(4)}\). On 2nd June, 1216,

\(^{(1)}\) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.67b.
\(^{(2)}\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.40b.
\(^{(3)}\) A truce was not agreed upon until 26 October 1206. (Foedera, I(i), 95).
while Prince Louis was on English soil, a safe-conduct valid until 1st November, 1216, was granted to two servants of the Archbishop of Rouen so they could come to England to collect the English revenues of the dean and chapter of Rouen (1). During the war of 1224-7, the bailiffs of Shoreham were instructed that despite the king's ban on sea crossings, three monks of Bec returning to their mother-house were to be permitted to sail in a small boat (2). During the same war, the bailiffs of Southampton were ordered to allow the prior of Ogbourne to send one monk and one servant to the abbey of Bec with cheeses, hides, cloth and other necessities (3). During the war of 1242-3, the bailiffs of Dover were instructed to permit the abbot of Cherbourg and twelve of his men to set sail (4). No similar instructions relating to the war of 1229-31 have been encountered but probably the issue of such instructions was unnecessary on this occasion. There was a great deal of coming and going of merchants between England and Normandy during this war (5), and if the Norman clergy themselves were not free to travel, then presumably they were able to transact their business through agents. Indeed, in a letter dated about 1230, the farmer of the dean and chapter of Rouen at Kilham in Yorkshire requested them to send him

(1) Ibid., 1201-16, p.185b.
(2) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1224-7, p.33b.
(3) Ibid., 1204-24, p.624b.
(5) See Chapter II below.
"aliquem mercatorem qui recipiat denarios vestros. Timeo enim multum eos deferre vel mittere propter terrarum et maris pericula" (1).

Apart from these wartime restrictions, the English king's attitude towards the English possessions of the Norman clergy was unchanged after 1204. After all, the situation whereby some clerics owed allegiance for their continental possessions to the French king and for their English possessions to the English king was not a new one and was perfectly acceptable to contemporary opinion (2). Moreover, King John expected the separation of England and Normandy to be but a temporary state of affairs and cannot have been unaware of the political advantages of a continuing link between the two countries in the meantime. Indeed, we have positive evidence that he exploited this link as early as April 1205. An entry in the Pipe Roll for the year ended Michaelmas 1205 records that 25 shillings was spent on the passage to Normandy of Ralph, sub-prior of Plessis-Grimoult and a canon of Merton. (3)
The Norman priory of Plessis-Grimoult had property in England (4) and the English priory of Merton had property in Normandy (5) so Ralph and his companion could merely have been

(2) For example, Saint-Denis, Paris (Mon. Ang. VI, 1077) and Saint-Rémy, Reims (Mon. Ang. VI, 1099) had both held property in England before the Norman Conquest.
(3) P.R. 7 John, p.131.
(4) e.g. C.D.F., nos.540,564-5.
(5) e.g. D. Matthew, op.cit., p.102, note 5.
on the business of their respective houses. However, the fact that their passage was paid for by the king suggests that they were acting on his behalf and that a letter of credence dated 14th April 1205, which was addressed generally, was in fact intended for Norman readers. Presumably Ralph's business was not unconnected with John's plans for an expedition to the continent in May 1205. On 13th July 1204, the sheriff of Devon was ordered to provide a ship to take the abbot of Silly and his companions to La Rochelle. As La Rochelle was still in English hands, it looks as though this Norman cleric, too, was acting on the English king's behalf.

On the whole, the Norman clergy in England continued to be accorded much the same sort of treatment as their English brethren. They bore their share of the burdens of the English Church, which became increasingly heavy as time progressed, but there is no real evidence of unfavourable discrimination against them. Even in times of war with France, payments due to Norman houses from the royal revenues continued to be made to their representatives in England. For example, the following payments are shown in the Pipe Roll for the year ended Michaelmas 1203, the last complete financial year before the loss of Normandy:

(3) These included the provision of livings (e.g. Cl.R. 1237-42, p.132) and pensions (e.g. C.P.R. 1247-58, p.360) for royal clerks, or corrodies for retired royal servants (e.g. ibid. 1247-58, p.386) and confiscation of property during the Interdict (e.g. Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, pp.108b, 110b).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bec</td>
<td>£12. Os. Od.</td>
<td>p. 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berks</td>
<td>£3. Os. Od.</td>
<td>p. 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincs</td>
<td>£1.10s. Od.</td>
<td>p. 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>£2. Os. Od.</td>
<td>p. 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glouce</td>
<td>£18. Os. Od.</td>
<td>p. 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>£3.15s. Od.</td>
<td>p. 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcs.</td>
<td>£10. Os. Od.</td>
<td>p. 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archbishop of Rouen</td>
<td>£40. Os. Od.</td>
<td>p. 198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The amount paid to Bec from the farm of Berkshire is only half the normal annual amount but only half the year's farm of this county is accounted for. Although Normandy fell to Philip Augustus in the summer of 1204 and a truce was not signed until 26th October 1206, the Pipe Roll for the year ended Michaelmas 1204 shows that all payments were made in full in that year (1). The Pipe Roll for the year ended Michaelmas 1205 shows that with two possible exceptions, all payments were again made in full. Although Cormeilles and Lyre may in fact have received the full payments due to them from the farm of Herefordshire, we only have evidence for half

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(1) P.R. 6 John: Bec (pp.60,62,233); Cormeilles (pp.145,16,125,88); Lyre (pp.16,125,88); Noyon (p.56); archbishop of Rouen (p.192); Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge (p.145); canons of Seez (p.106).
the annual amount because only half the year's farm of that county is accounted for (1). An examination of the Pipe Roll for the year ended Michaelmas 1230, another year of war, shows that Bec, Noyon, the archbishop of Rouen and the canons of Seez once again received the full payments due to them. As the Roll for that year has no entries for Gloucestershire we cannot know whether or not Cormeilles and Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge received the payments due to them from the farm of the county (2). There is no record of a payment being made to Lyre from the revenues of the county of Worcestershire but if in fact the money was never received, it was not for political reasons for the names of English houses which normally received payments in Worcestershire are also missing from this Pipe Roll (3).

At all times, too, the Norman clergy seem to have been confident of obtaining justice in the royal courts. In times of war no less than in times of peace, they felt it worthwhile to defend cases brought against them by others. For example, even before the truce of 26th October 1206, the

(1) P.R. 7 John: Bec (pp.78,196-7,240-1); Cormeilles (pp.93, 271,131,265); Lyre (pp.271,131,265); Noyon (p.75); archbishop of Rouen (p.40); Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge (p.93); canons of Séez (p.146).

(2) P.R. 14 Henry III: Cormeilles, however, received the payments due to her from Herefordshire, Southampton and Worcester (pp.216,201,66). It will be noticed that in this year, instead of a joint entry of £18 for Cormeilles and Lyre, the return for Southampton shows two separate entries: £8.15.0. for Cormeilles and £9.5.0. for Lyre (p.201); Bec (pp.165,292-3,237); Noyon (p.164); archbishop of Rouen (p.266); canons of Séez (p.245).

(3) The chapel of Worcester received £1.10.5 and the monks of Gloucester £1.0.0 in the years 1203-5 (P.R. 5 John, p.52; ibid. 6 John, p.88; ibid. 7 John, p.265) but these payments are not recorded in P.R. 14 Henry III.
The abbot of Aumale was prepared to defend his right to the advowson of a church in Suffolk. It appears that he came in person to the hearing held in the Michaelmas term of 1204. For the record of the hearing says that the abbot "venit per atornatum suum" but the last three words have been cancelled and the defendant is thereafter described as the "abbas" (1). In October 1225, the abbot of Croix-Saint-Leufroi named two attorneys to defend his right to a carucate of land in Esher, Surrey (2) while in September 1229 four justices were appointed to hold an assize of novel disseisin in which the defendant was the prior of Tutbury (3). The abbot of Cormeilles was even prepared to defend his right to the advowson of a church in Herefordshire against a counter claim made by the king himself (4). More significant still is the fact that Norman clerics often felt it worthwhile to initiate proceedings themselves against other subjects of the king. For example, cases initiated by the abbots of Saint-Wandrille, Saint-Sever and Fécamp appear in the Curia Regis rolls for Michaelmas 1204, Hilary 1226, and Trinity 1231 respectively (5). The outcome of the case brought by the abbot of Fécamp is not known, but Saint-

(1) C.R.R., III, 199.
(2) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.82b.
(4) C.R.R., XI, no.803: Michaelmas term, 1223.
(5) C.R.R., III, 197; ibid., XII, no.1928; ibid., XIV, no.1953.
Wandrille and Saint-Sever prosecuted their cases successfully. Nor were proceedings initiated against only the mean and insignificant. Such important personages as Alice, countess of Eu, Nicholas de Stuteville and John de Briouze were called upon to defend themselves in the curia regis (1). The outcome of the case brought against John de Briouze by the abbot of Fécamp is not recorded but the countess of Eu and Nicholas de Stuteville both failed to appear in court and therefore lost the cases brought against them by their default. Cases were also brought against important English clerics such as the abbot of Thorney (2) and the bishop of Chichester (3).

If there had been any fear of discrimination against them, Norman clerics would presumably have taken particular care not to break the law or reject customary obligations. Yet, as early as 1208, the prior of Ogbourne had risked the king's displeasure by refusing hospitality to Robert Lupus, a royal agent (4). His property was immediately seized by the king but was returned on payment of a fine of ten marks (5). When one considers that the same prior had paid £100 to recover his property after the 1204 seizure (6) and that he had saved himself

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(2) C.R.R., IV, 97.
(3) C./R. 1247-51, p.220.
(4) P.R. 10 John, p.XIV.
(5) Ibid., 10 John, p.198.
(6) Rot.de Ob.et Fin., p.314.
the no doubt considerable expense of entertaining Robert Lupus, then ten marks seems a very reasonable fine. Certainly the king cannot have been seeking excuses to victimize the Norman clergy. Another offence which was apparently worth the risk, was infringement of the forest laws (1).

Often, too, it was not necessary for the Norman clergy to seek justice in the royal courts when their rights were challenged. On numerous occasions, the king intervened directly with his officials or with others to ensure that the rights of Norman houses were upheld. For example, in 1228, the king persuaded a canon of York to withdraw a case he was bringing in the Church courts against the dean and chapter of Rouen by confirming that the tithes in question had been granted by one of his predecessors and confirmed by himself (2). In 1234 he instructed his custodian of the lands of the late Gilbert de L'Aigle to pay the abbot of Grestain certain revenues in money and kind which he used to receive annually in Gilbert's time but which had been withheld by Peter de Rivaux while he was custodian of Gilbert's estates (3). In 1236 he ordered his Exchequer barons to withdraw a demand for tallage from the dean and chapter of Rouen in respect of one of their manors because an inquisition had shown that they had always been exempt from tallage on that particular property (4). In 1250 the sheriff of Gloucestershire was

(1) e.g. Cl.R. 1242-7, pp.314,325,469; ibid. 1254-6, p.197.
(3) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.496.
(4) Ibid. 1234-7, p.383.
instructed to ensure that the debtors of a former bailiff of the abbot of Fécamp paid him what they owed him(1).

Nor was it just that there was no royal discrimination against the Norman clergy and that the king was prepared to uphold their existing rights; even after 1204, and especially after Henry III attained his majority, Norman clerics were the recipients of new royal gifts and concessions. These grants fall roughly into three categories. The first of these consists of non-recurring favours of an indirect kind. Such favours include the postponement of lawsuits in which Norman houses or their priories were involved(2), the right to withdraw from a lawsuit altogether(3), and the grant of exemption from the common summons before the itinerant justices, either on a specific occasion or for a specified length of time(4). Sometimes fines were paid for such grants(5), but if a house was prepared to pay a fine, it obviously expected to receive a measure of benefit beyond the amount of the fine. The second category consists of non-recurring grants of a direct kind and includes actual cash payments(6), the repeal of fines already imposed(7).

(1) Ibid. 1247-51, p.370.
(2) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.52; Cl.R. 1234-7, p.221; ibid. 1237-42, p.148.
(3) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.200b.
(4) e.g. C.P.R. 1232-47, p.455; Cl.R. 1247-51, p.558; ibid. 1254-6, p.437.
(5) e.g. Cl.R. 1254-6, p.66.
(6) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.494; Cl.R. 1242-7, p.540; C.L.R. 1245-51, p.367.
(7) e.g. Cl.R. 1237-42, p.370; ibid. 1242-7, p.167; ibid. 1247-51, p.52.
the custody of their own or another's property when the king was entitled to that custody (1), the right to take an aid or tallage from their own men (2) and a variety of gifts in kind of which the most common were grants of timber (3) or deer (4) from the king's forests. The third category consists of grants of lands (5) or rights in perpetuity and the rights granted include the right to hold markets and fairs (6) and the right of free warren (7).

A detailed study has been made of all the various grants which came to light in an attempt to discover whether any definite policy lay behind them. The two aspects of the grants which were of particular interest were, of course, their timing and the importance of their recipients. With regard to the timing of the gifts two possibilities were considered. In the first place it was possible that there might have been a concentration of grants in the periods when the king was preparing for war with his French enemy. The second possibility was that grants might have been made more or less as a matter of

(1) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.239; Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.199; Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.340 (for evidence that Drogo de Trubleville was a canon of Rouen, see ibid. 1224-7, p.217); Cl.R. 1256-9, p.414.
(2) Pat.R. 1216-25, p.363; ibid. 1225-32, p.130; Cl.R. 1242-7, p.484.
(3) Cl.R. 1227-31, p.12; ibid. 1247-51, p.318.
(4) Ibid. 1242-7, p.206; ibid. 1256-9, p.179.
(7) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, pp.391,403,408.
course to newly elected abbots and bishops when they came over to do homage for their English property, so that good relations were established immediately. However, on both counts a blank was drawn. The majority of the grants examined were made after Henry III attained his majority but thereafter they are fairly evenly spread. Indeed, over half the grants were made after the failure of Henry's 1242 expedition to Poitou when he seems to have reconciled himself to the loss of the conquered provinces.

An analysis of the houses which were the major beneficiaries proved no more fruitful. The prominence of such important clerics as the archbishop of Rouen and the abbots of Bec and Fécamp amongst the recipients of the more substantial favours cannot be regarded as politically significant when the timing of the gifts is also considered. Moreover, Henry's gifts were not entirely restricted to the most important Norman houses while even the priories of French houses such as Saint-Denis of Paris did not go entirely unnoticed. It seems that the explanation of the prominence of some of the most important Norman clerics amongst the beneficiaries is that most of the more substantial grants were made to the tenants-in-chief of the king and were merely the sort of favours which tenants-in-chief might reasonably expect from their lord from time to time.

One less important Norman house whose English priory seems to have found special favour with Henry III was the abbey of Cérisy-la-Forêt. In the late 1240's and throughout the 1250's, Cérisy's priory of Monk Sherborne, which was apparently being

(1) e.g. Cl.R. 1251-4, p.370; Pat.R. 1225-32, p.332.
extended at the time (1), received a considerable number of small gifts in kind from the English king. These included gifts of timber (2), wine (3), grain (4), ecclesiastical vestments (5) and precious vessels for use in the priory's chapel (6). On at least three occasions gifts of money were made (7), but on two of these occasions the money was to be used for a specified purpose. In October 1251, the king gave the monks fifty shillings "to buy a censer" (8), and in January 1257 he gave them four marks "to make three altars" (9).

All things considered, it must be concluded that the favours granted to Norman houses between 1204 and 1259 had no particular political significance but were merely further evidence that the events of 1204 did not affect the English king's attitude towards the Norman clergy in any material way.

(1) C.L.R. 1251-60, p.349.
(2) C.L.R. 1247-51, pp.164,453; ibid. 1251-3, p.385; ibid. 1254-6, pp.249,307; ibid. 1256-9, pp.6,72,233,367,383, 395,404.
(3) C.L.R. 1247-51, p.21; ibid. 1251-3, p.49; ibid. 1254-6, p.262; C.L.R. 1251-60, p.421.
(4) C.L.R. 1240-5, p.228.
(6) Ibid. 1247-51, p.481.
(7) C.L.R. 1245-51, pp.367,380; ibid. 1251-60, p.349.
(8) Ibid. 1245-51, p.380.
(9) Ibid. 1251-60, p.349.
At this stage of affairs, the Norman clergy were not yet regarded as aliens or as a potential threat to the security of the realm. In royal mandates which make reference to Norman and other French clergy, they are called "viri religiosi de ultra mare"(1), "viri religiosi transmarini"(2), or "viri religiosi de partibus transmarinis"(3). It is not until the outbreak of war between Edward I and Philip IV of France in 1294 that these men begin to be called "religiosi alienigene"(4) and to be regarded as potentially dangerous. Even when French troops were on English soil during the civil war of 1215-17, the king did not automatically regard the Norman clergy as his enemies. For example, on 1st June 1216, John ordered the bailiffs of Southampton to pay the alms due to the monks of Lyre(5). The following day he issued a safe-conduct enabling two servants of the archbishop of Rouen to come to this country to collect the English revenues of the dean and chapter of Rouen(6). On 25th November 1215, the prior of Stogursey was given custody of some land belonging to Warin fitz Gerold, one of the rebels(7) and on 12th July 1216 the same prior was entrusted with the

(1) e.g. Rot. Lit. Cl. 1204-24, p.66.
(2) e.g. Rot. Orig., I, 8.
(3) e.g. Cl.R. 1242-7, p.351.
(4) Rot. Orig., I, 90.
(7) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1204-24, p.239.
destruction of the castle of Stogursey. On 10th September 1216, the prior of Wareham was granted the custody of Shaftesbury Abbey during a vacancy and he was still enjoying this privilege on 15th October of the same year.

The prior of Stogursey was not the only prior of a Norman dependency to be entrusted with the king's business between 1204 and 1259. For example, the prior of Blyth was enjoined on at least four occasions to prevent a tournament being held at Blyth. In 1253, the prior of Frampton was named with two others to "enquire what liberties and customs as well as having estover and pasture as of other easements belonged to the church of the manor of Uphusseburn before it became a prebend of the cathedral church of Salisbury, when it was in the hands of the king's predecessors: and to send the inquisition to the king". Elerius, prior of Cogges, was particularly active on the king's behalf. In 1250 he was appointed with one other "to approve and let to farm all the lands late of Henry de Hastinges to the king's best advantage". In the same year a writ de intendendo was addressed to "all citizens, burgesses, bailiffs and tenants in the king's cities, boroughs and manors throughout England, in favour of brother Elerius, bailiff of Fecamp, Gerard la Grue and Richard le Rus,

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(2) Ibid. 1201-16, p.197.
(3) Ibid. 1201-16, p.199.
(4) C.P.R. 1232-47, pp.57,131,148; Cl.R. 1254-6, p.156.
(5) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.229.
(6) Ibid. 1247-58, p.77.
whom the king is sending there to enquire by juries touching the concealment of the king's rights, and all manner of alienations, and to approve the said cities and boroughs" (1).

On 8th March of the following year the same prior was appointed in the company of a layman "to provide and order how the town of Winchelsea can be saved and defended from the sea to the protection and security of the adjacent county" (2). It seems that Elerius was well rewarded for his services for we know that on 19th March 1251, the royal assent was given to his election as abbot of Pershore (3). Although there is no evidence that the election was made at the king's request, it seems highly likely that this was so. As abbot of Pershore, Elerius continued to act as a royal agent. For example, a few months after his election he was appointed as escheator south of the Trent (4).

Elerius was not the only prior of a Norman dependency to be elected to high office in the English Church either at the king's instigation or with his assent. As early as 1207 King John tried to secure the election of the prior of Frampton as abbot of Ramsey. The Ramsey chronicle tells us that when abbot Robert resigned in 1207 "Rex Johannes tenuit abbatiam in manu sua per vij. annos, pro eo quod monachi Ramesienses ad preceptum suum noluerunt eligere in

(1) Ibid. 1247-58, p.71: the enquiry seems to have been postponed until the following year.
(2) Ibid. 1247-58, p.90.
(3) Ibid. 1247-58, p.90.
(4) Ibid. 1247-58, p.104.
abbatem priorem de Frontona\textsuperscript{(1)}. However, on 4th May 1214, he was appointed abbot of Westminster by the papal nuncio, presumably at John's instigation\textsuperscript{(2)}. In September of the same year he was one of the commissioners sent to negotiate a peace treaty with Philip Augustus\textsuperscript{(3)}. Obviously the king must have felt that he could trust him implicitly. Also in 1214, the prior of Monk Sherborne was elected abbot of Burton\textsuperscript{(4)}; in 1219 the prior of Goldcliff was elected bishop of Llandaff\textsuperscript{(5)}, and in 1220 the prior of Otterton was elected abbot of Tavistock\textsuperscript{(6)}. In all three cases we have a record of the king's assent to the election. The Llandaff and Tavistock elections were probably free elections by the respective chapters for Goldcliff priory was in Llandaff diocese and Otterton priory and Tavistock Abbey were both in the diocese of Exeter: hence each prior was probably well known to the chapter which elected him. It is likely, however, that the prior of Monk Sherborne was the royal choice for the abbey of Burton, for Monk Sherborne is in Hampshire while Burton is in Staffordshire. Moreover, this election was made at the time of Nicholas of Tusculum's visit to England and the pope had instructed his legate "to have appointments made to

\textsuperscript{(1)} Chronicon Abbatiae Ramesiensis, ed. W. Dunn Macray (Rolls Series, 1886), p.342.
\textsuperscript{(2)} Mon.Ang. I, 270.
\textsuperscript{(3)} Ibid. I, 270; Foedera, I(i), 124.
\textsuperscript{(5)} Pat.R. 1216-25, p.196; Ann.Mon., IV, 411.
\textsuperscript{(6)} Rot.Lit.Ci. 1204-24, p.412b.
sees and abbeys now vacant in England, by the election or canonical postulation, on your recommendation, of suitable clergy, who should be men not only distinguished for their life and learning, but also loyal to the king, profitable to the kingdom, and capable of giving counsel and help—the king's assent having been requested "(1). Although we have no evidence that the above-mentioned priors of Norman dependencies were of Norman origin, it seems likely that they were (2). In any case, whatever their place of origin, they were the agents of Norman mother houses whose interests they were bound to serve. If the king had been disposed to mistrust and ignore the priors of Norman dependencies, it is unlikely that he would have differentiated between those of Norman origin and those of English origin.

In connection with the claim that there were Norman clerics in England who seem to have enjoyed the complete trust of the king, it must be mentioned that Matthew feels that neither John nor Henry III completely trusted the abbot of Fécamp. In connection with the 1204 seizure, he states: "Not all the Normans recovered their own quickly, however.... As late as 1211 John collected a hundred marks, a palfrey and two tuns of wine from the abbot of Fécamp for the restoration of the abbot's lands and confirmation of his privileges. In this case John's distrust was perhaps justified by the abbot's dominant position on the south coast" (3). However, the prior


(2) See pp.100-101 below.

(3) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.74.
of Cogges had fined a hundred marks for the recovery of Fécamp's property after the 1204 seizure as early as the year ended Michaelmas 1205\(^{(1)}\). Moreover, the Pipe Roll entry which Matthew cites as a reference clearly relates to a further seizure "occasione malivolentie quam Rex habuit erga barones de Quinque portubus"\(^{(2)}\). It has not been possible to discover the nature of the implied offence but the other Cinque Port barons were obviously involved.

On another occasion Matthew states that after the failure of his expedition to Poitou in 1242, Henry "forced the abbot of Fécamp to accept the manors of Cheltenham and Slaughter with their hundreds in Gloucestershire and the manor or Navenby in Lincolnshire and to surrender most of his property in Rye, because in the king's view the abbot could no longer fortify the towns of Rye and Winchelsea as befitted their importance: clearly a reference to the abbot's foreign allegiance, not to his ecclesiastical dignity, for the abbot had been an effective castellan under Richard I. The king's entry into Rye had been planned twenty years before under Hubert de Burgh.... but nothing came of this move and Henry III actually confirmed the abbot's position in 1238\(^{(3)}\).

However, it seems more likely that the king's action was primarily a reference to the abbot's ecclesiastical dignity and not to his foreign allegiance. If the king doubted the abbot

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\(^{(1)}\) *Rot.de Ob.et Fin.*, p.319; *P.R.* 7 John, p.110.

\(^{(2)}\) *P.R.* 11 John, p.4.

\(^{(3)}\) D. Matthew, *op.cit.*, p.76.
of Fécamp's loyalty in February 1226, when the exchange was first suggested (1), it is surely inconceivable that he should merely "request" the surrender and, moreover, offer a fair exchange. Nor is it likely that he would have abandoned his request for two decades, especially when one remembers that in February 1226, England was actually still at war with France and that before the exchange was finally negotiated, there were two more periods of war. The abbot may have been an effective castellan under Richard I, but after 1204 the English king had no influence on Norman ecclesiastical elections and the two abbots who ruled Fécamp from 1222 until 1260 hardly sound suitable barons of the Cinque Ports. According to the authors of Gallia Christiana, Richard Morin who was elected in 1222 was "vir valde simplex" who was compelled to resign after five years (2), while William Vaspail (1227-60) was nominated by a papal legate after some disagreement in the chapter and is described as "vir apprime literatus" (3). It is no doubt true, as Matthew states, that Henry's "change of policy towards the Norman monks in the Cinque Ports reflects the altered approach to foreign affairs after Taillebourg" (4). However, this need not necessarily mean that having reconciled himself to the loss of the conquered provinces, Henry ceased to trust the abbot of Fécamp. It seems more likely that having reconciled himself to the idea that the southern shores of the Channel were likely to remain under the control of the

(2) G.C. XI, col.209.
(3) Ibid., col.209.
(4) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.76.
French king, he realised that this increased the importance of the Cinque Port barons as defenders of the realm and meant that a cleric was no longer a suitable person to be amongst their number, especially when he had no control over the appointment. If Henry had really begun to doubt the loyalty of Norman clerics, he surely would have taken measures against the numerous other houses which had property on the vulnerable south coast of England, as Edward I was to do five decades later.

Another point which must be mentioned before we leave the subject of the king's attitude towards Norman clerics between 1204 and 1259, is that New claims that in 1245 "comes a record of what seems to have been another seizure... Our sole reference is to the effect that the sheriff of Northamptonshire is commanded to seize into the king's hands all lands and their appurtenances within his jurisdiction which belong to the abbots, priors and other religious men 'across the sea' (1). The reference he quotes is an entry in an Originalia Roll and what it actually says is:

"Mandatum est vicecomiti quod cedentibus vel decendentibus abbatibus prioribus et aliis viris religiosis transmarinis terras in balliva sua habentibus statim omnes terras eorum in omnibus pertinenciis in manum Regis capiat et salvo custodiat donec, etc." (2). Thus, what the king is ordering is not a general seizure of the English property of overseas houses as New implies. Nor, incidentally, is this our only

(1) C.W. New, op.cit., p.46.
(2) Rot.Orig., I, 8.
reference to the measure\textsuperscript{(1)}. Matthew discovered at least one of the other references, and it led him to remark that "Henry III had not hesitated to arrest the goods of all French monks *cedentibus vel decedentibus* in 1245\textsuperscript{(2)}. As this order was made in the year following Henry's general seizure of the lands of Norman and other French laymen in England, Matthew's remark is rather misleading, especially as he offers no translation of the words "*cedentibus vel decedentibus*" which taken out of context have no very precise meaning. In fact, it is clear from other occasions when the same words are used that they mean "resigning or dying". For example, in November 1245, the sheriff of Devon is ordered "*quod omnes terras prioris de Ontrinton* quas cepit in manum regis occasione mortis abbatis de Monte Sancti Michaelis, qui nondum mortuus est, prefato priori reddi, et siquid occasione predicta de eadem terra cepit, id ei reddi faciat, et si decetero audierit quod aliquas abbas vel prior de partibus transmarinis de balliva sua cessit vel decessit, terras ipsorum capiat in manum regis, et custodiat donec aliiud habuerit in precepto"\textsuperscript{(3)}. If further proof is needed that the measure was not intended as a general seizure, one has only to consider Henry's reaction when the sheriff of Cambridge and Huntingdon, like New, misinterpreted his instructions: this sheriff apparently seized the property of the prior of St Neots and certain other unnamed overseas clerics whereupon the king informed him that "*fines ejusdem mandati nostri excessisti*" and ordered him to appear before

\textsuperscript{(1)} See also Cl.R. 1242-7, pp.337,351,369.

\textsuperscript{(2)} D. Matthew, op.cit., p.81.

\textsuperscript{(3)} Cl.R. 1242-7, p.369.
the curia regis "ad ostendendum quo warranto ipsum prioratum cepisti in manum nostram et terras quorundam aliorum"(1).

Thus, the measure under discussion clearly does not represent an ecclesiastical parallel to the 1244 seizure of the English property of Norman and other French laymen. It is rather to be seen as one more example of the numerous measures taken by Henry III to ensure that he enjoyed all the rights to which he was entitled(2). As Matthew himself has noted in a different connection, the king's claims to various privileges during ecclesiastical vacancies were not always very clearly defined and were not infrequently challenged(3). It seems that the measure of 1245 was an attempt to clarify the situation. By seizing the property of all foreign houses when a vacancy occurred the king was putting the onus on the other side to prove that he was not entitled to do so. We have definite evidence that he was prepared to consider individual objections: in 1259, for example, the prior of Cogges claimed that because he was a perpetual prior, the king was not entitled to the revenues of his priory during an abbatial vacancy at Fécamp, whereupon the king ordered that the revenues should be restored to him "donec plenius sciatur utrum exitus predicti ad regem vel ad dictum priorem debeant pertinere"(4). Clearly this was not a discriminatory

(1) Ibid. 1242-7, p.351.
(3) D. Matthew, *op.cit.*, p.77-80.
(4) *Cl.R. 1256-9*, p.396.
measure against the alien priories, it was just that their status was more often in doubt than that of English priories\(^{(1)}\).

As the editor of the Book of Fees, but neither New nor Matthew has noted, the English property of overseas houses did not entirely escape the attention of the king in 1244. When Henry ordered on 20th January 1244 that sheriffs throughout England should seize in his name "omnes terras illorum qui sunt de potestate regis Francorum quicunque sint illi", he added the qualifying clause "exceptis viris religiosis\(^{(2)}\)". On 22nd March in the same year, however, an enquiry was ordered into the lands of the "religiosi transmarini" which were to be listed and valued, with and without stock\(^{(3)}\). The instructions for this enquiry explicitly warned each sheriff "provisurus quod predicti archiepiscopi, episcopi et viri religiosi transmarini nec alii de regno nostro disseisientur vel aliquod dampnum incurrant de hujusmodi terris vel rebus suis occasione harum inquisitionem vel hujusmodi extente\(^{(4)}\). Presumably this was just another of the many administrative enquiries of the reign because it was hardly a necessary preparatory measure to the measure of 1245 and it was not followed by any change of policy which it has been possible to discover\(^{(5)}\).

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\(^{(2)}\) B. of F., p.1142.

\(^{(3)}\) Cl.R. 1242-7, pp.239-40.

\(^{(4)}\) Ibid. 1242-7, p.240.

\(^{(5)}\) Compare the enquiry of 1237 into the lands of the Normans and others which was not connected with any change of policy as regards these lands (B. of F., p.611).
It is more difficult to establish the attitude of the king's subjects, lay and ecclesiastical, towards Norman clerics after 1204 but it seems unlikely that it was any different from that of their royal master. We have already seen that Norman houses were constantly having to defend their rights in the royal courts, but this was an age when few men of property escaped being involved in litigation at some time in their lives (1). Moreover, there was nothing new in this situation: Norman houses had been involved in disputes in England long before 1204. For example, at some time between 1165 and 1177, the abbey of La Trinité, Caen, became involved in a dispute with the abbey of Tewkesbury over the church of Avening in Gloucestershire. An amicable settlement was eventually reached whereby the nuns of La Trinité paid the chapter of Tewkesbury "twenty marks by way of compromise to induce them to withdraw wholly from the suit" (2). In 1130-31 a charter of Henry I's proclaimed that "he and the abbot of Fécamp and Henry count of Eu have made a fine and concord concerning the claim of toll for stalls and the pontage of Winchelsea, which the count claimed against the abbot as follows: He (the king) and the count will have half the toll for stalls and the pontage and the abbot the other half" (3). We have also seen that the king was sometimes obliged to intervene with his officials and others


(2) C.D.F., no.431.

(3) Ibid., no.123.
on behalf of Norman clerics but there is no evidence to suggest that royal intervention was necessary more frequently on behalf of Normans than on behalf of other subjects of the king.

Certainly there was no general feeling in this period that the Norman clerics were enjoying revenues to which they were no longer entitled. On the other hand, many complaints were made about the number of Italian clerics who secured English revenues by means of papal provisions. A letter sent to the pope from England in 1245 indicates the main reason why the Italians were grudged their revenues and the Normans were not. It complains that "Italici, quorum est jam numerus infinitus... fructus tantum percipiunt, extra regnum asportantes, regnum non mediocriter depauperando, et redditus occupando, quibus fratres, nepotes, consanguinei nostri, et caeteri bene meriti de regno predicto beneficiari tenerentur" (1). In the period under review, the Normans were still "fratres, nepotes, consanguinei" and the revenues which they received had, in any case, been specifically donated for their enjoyment.

Moreover, Norman houses and their English priories continued to receive gifts and concessions from English ecclesiastics and laymen even after 1204. For example, in December 1204, after the loss of the duchy and while England and France were still at war, Henry, bishop of Exeter, granted to the abbot and convent of Montebourg "exemption from payment of tithes of their demesne of

(1) M. Paris., Chron. Maj., IV, 442.
Axemue; also two thirds of the tithe-sheaves of that parish and 
a third of the small tithes arising from that parish in alms for ever11
(1). In 1233, Margaret de Quincy, countess of 
Winchester, granted to the abbey of Saint-Evroul a small rent 
in Ware, Hertfordshire(2) and her death shortly afterwards 
was noted in the necrology of the abbey(3). As late as 1246 
John de Gatesden gave a carucate of land to the prior and 
convent of Boxgrove, a priory of Lessay(4). On the whole, 
it seems that the clergy and people of England shared their 
royal master's attitude towards the Norman clergy in the 
period under review.

As Matthew has stated, "the changed conditions of Anglo-
Norman relations after 1204 did not apparently cause the monks 
to reconsider their position in England. At first the French 
annexation did not look irreversible, and until Henry III 
came of age and attempted to recover his patrimony the monks 
provided a spiritual link between members of families sundered 
by political allegiance. There was only one alternative to 
holding their own in England, and that was to leave altogether. 
They were not only reluctant to do this; they thought it a 
sin to change the dispositions of their founders, who had 
given them property in England in perpetuity to have their 
name preserved in the monks' memories. Very few monasteries 
did sell their property"(5).

(1) C.D.F. no. 908.
(2) Orne, Série H,1, no.H.935.
(3) C.P., XII, 750, note j.
(4) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.293.
Such sales and exchanges of property as did take place between 1204 and 1259 were on the whole part of a process of rationalisation rather than a result of the events of 1204. This is suggested not only by the nature of the cases in which sales or exchanges were made\(^1\) but also by the facts that similar sales and exchanges had taken place before 1204\(^2\), while Norman houses continued to seek and value new acquisitions in England long after that date\(^3\).

It should be noted that some of Matthew's remarks in connection with sales are either inaccurate or misleading. He says that "the nuns of Montivilliers sold their single English manor, Waddon in Dorset, probably because they lost effective control of it in John's reign. The cathedral canons of Lisieux and Evreux also disposed of their slight English assets before the middle of the thirteenth century\(^4\). It is true that in October 1206 the king had ordered Geoffrey fitz Peter "quod faciatis habere Willelmo de Witfeld terram Abbatissae Mutervileriensis, scilicet Waddon, quae est in manu

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\(^1\) Sales tended to be made, for example, by Norman chapters or abbots who had only small English interests and maintained no English priory (e.g. Evreux: C.P.R. 1247-58, p.46; Croix-Saint-Leufroi: C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.251). Similarly, houses tended to sell properties which lay outside the area of their main holdings (e.g. Hambye, whose interests were mainly in Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire, disposed of the church of Great Massingham in Buckinghamshire in 1232: D. Matthew, op.cit., p.13).


\(^3\) See, for example, M.M. Morgan, The English Lands of the Abbey of Bec, pp.84-5 for the numerous purchases made by Bec in the period under review.

\(^4\) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.98.
nostra, tenendum quamdiu eadem Abbatissa tenuerit terram ipsius Willelmi in Normannia\(^1\), and that William was still in possession in 1212\(^2\). However, the abbess must have recovered her property before 29th May 1235 when the following instructions were issued "Quia rex audivit quod abbatissa de Mustervilers adhuc superstes est, cujus redditum Ricardus de la Lade cepit in manum regis in Bradewaddon\(^3\), eo quod dicitur ipsamesse mortuam; mandatum est eadem Ricardo quod eadem abatissade predicto reddituplenam seisinam habere faciat"\(^4\). In October 1242, the king confirmed the "gift" of Waddon by Abbess Margaret to Netley abbey\(^5\). Moreover, Waddon had not been the abbey's only English interest: between Michaelmas 1228 and Michaelmas 1230 it was involved in legal proceedings over property at Arrington, Cambridgeshire\(^6\). The reference quoted by Matthew in support of his statement that the canons of Lisieux "disposed" of their English property is an entry in the Calendar of Patent Rolls dated 18th June 1245 which reads as follows: "Protestation that whereas the dean and chapter of Lisieux, at the king's petition, have leased to James Hoese the manor of Deverel, county Wiltshire for his life, the heirs of the said James shall have no right in the said manor whereby they may prevent the dean and chapter

\(^{(1)}\) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.67b.

\(^{(2)}\) B. of F., p.93.

\(^{(3)}\) C.R. 1234-7, p.96.

\(^{(4)}\) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.333.

\(^{(5)}\) C.R.R., XIII, nos. 1009,1160,1250,2365,2369; ibid., XIV, nos.635,673.
from putting themselves in seisin thereof after his death” (1).

However, the case of Evreux seems to be a satisfactory example of the disposal of a small English asset which it was probably not economic to retain (2).

Matthew also makes the point that "the confiscation of the counts of Eu’s English property in 1244, willynilly disposed of Foucarmont’s English revenues, completely derived from the tithes of the property, and for which the monks presumably received no compensation from Netley, the gainers" (3). However, the evidence does not necessarily support his conclusions; in fact, two alternative interpretations of the two Close roll entries which Matthew cites are possible. Since the two entries refer respectively to the lands which the abbot of Netley "tenet de abbate de Focardi Monte" (4) and "habet de abbate de Focardi Monte" (5) it is possible that the English abbot merely held the lands at farm from the Norman house in which case the abbot of Foucarmont would presumably receive a rent. Alternatively the abbot of Foucarmont may have sold his land before 1244. In a charter dated 15th March 1240, the king confirmed the grant to Netley Abbey of several properties purchased by Peter, bishop of Winchester, and given to the abbot and convent (6). Included

(1) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.455.
(2) Ibid. 1247-58, p.46.
(3) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.98.
(4) C.I.R. 1242-7, p.183.
(5) Ibid. 1242-7, p.190.
(6) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.251.
in the list of properties mentioned in this charter was property bought from the abbot and convent of Croix-Saint-Leufroi and the bishops of Angers and Le Mans as well as property bought from English clerics and laymen. It is possible that the English property of Foucarmont had been acquired by Netley in a similar way. Whatever the exact circumstances of the acquisition, there seems no reason to accept Matthew's view that it was as a result of the seizure of the countess of Eu's lands in 1244. If Foucarmont's English interests had still consisted of the tithe of all the countess's property in England(1), then there might have been some possible justification for discontinuing payment when that property was taken into the king's hands. However, as Matthew has himself pointed out elsewhere, the tithes had been replaced by land grants well before 1244(2). Moreover, Norman houses were not normally allowed to suffer as a result of the seizure of the terrae Normannorum. We know, for example, that the abbot of Grestain continued to receive revenues due from the lands of Gilbert de L'Aigle when these were seized after Gilbert's death because his heir was a subject of the King of France(3).

Although there is no real evidence that the situation became more difficult for the Norman houses with possessions in England after 1204, we do nevertheless come across one or two complaints about the situation and these ought to be

(1) C.D.F., no. 186.
(2) D. Matthew, op.cit., p.105, note A.
(3) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.496.
examined. For example, a letter to the king from the abbot and convent of Bec in January 1242, states that: "As it frequently happens that they are fraudulently drawn into a plea before the king or the king's justices or other bailiffs touching lands and possessions in England, in order that by their default, the possessions or lands sued against them may be more easily recovered, or money extorted from them, because, partly by the dangers of the ways, weakness of body, short summons, or lacking the special licence of the king of France, which in these times can be obtained scarcely or only with great difficulty, to defend their lands or sue their rights against others, they are not able to get to England, they have appointed William, their monk, the bearer, as their proctor."(1) It is true that after 1204 as before, the Channel was a physical hindrance to communications, but our sources suggest that in other respects the abbot was very much over-stating his case.

In the first place, this letter suggests that the need for a proctor had only recently arisen whereas we know that the abbey of Bec had a proctor in England in the time of King Richard(2). Secondly, in nearly all the cases in which the abbey of Bec was involved between 1204 and the time of this letter, either the abbot was represented by a proctor

(1) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.291.
(2) C.R.R., XIV, no.1557.
or attorney\(^{1}\), or the abbey's English priors pleaded in their own right\(^{2}\). Thirdly, not a single case can be found in the Curia Regis rolls which have appeared in print\(^{3}\) where the abbot of Bec lost a case by default. On the other hand, one finds references to occasions when cases were postponed because the abbot did not appear on the appointed day\(^{4}\). On other occasions, the king instructed the sheriff beforehand to delay a case involving the abbot of Bec "qui est in partibus transmarinis"\(^{5}\). In October 1225, a case involving the abbot was postponed "quia generalis procurator ipsius abbatis in Anglia mortuus est"\(^{6}\). Doubtless the abbot never intended his reasons for appointing a proctor to be taken too literally and they certainly do not stand examination. Possibly he hoped that if he presented his case in this way, the king might take a smaller fine for recognizing his new representative\(^{7}\).

Odo Rigaud, archbishop of Rouen, complains on four occasions before 1259 that certain Norman houses have not received their

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(1) e.g. C.R.R., X, 186; ibid., XI, no.1247; ibid., XII, no.2345; ibid., XIII, no.799.

(2) C.R.R., III, 279, (St Neots), 285 (Stoke by Clare); ibid., IV, 206 (Ogbourne); ibid., VII, 333 (Cowick); ibid., IX, 322 (Wilsford).

(3) The Curia Regis rolls have only been printed up to 1237 which means that 33 of the 38 years from 1204 to the abbot's complaint in 1242 have been reviewed. The work of reading through five years' original rolls would not be justified by the results.

(4) e.g. C.R.R., XIV, no.1328; ibid., VII, 173.

(5) e.g. Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.52; C.R. 1231-4, p.61.

(6) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.67b.

(7) For examples of fines being paid for the acceptance of a proctor, see C.P.R. 1258-66, p.61; P.R. 7 John, p.73.
English revenues sometimes for several years (1). This led L. Delisle to a somewhat drastic conclusion: "Quand Philippe-Auguste eut réuni la Normandie à la couronne de France, les religieux ne purent guère surveiller l'exploitation de ces domaines. De plus, dès qu'une guerre éclatait entre les deux royaumes, le roi d'Angleterre ne manquait pas de se'questrer ces biens. Par là nos abbayes se trouvaient frustrées d'une notable partie de leur revenu. Cependant, il leur fallait toujours acquitter leurs charges: le seul moyen qui leur fût offert pour sortir d'embarras consistait dans l'emprunt..." (2). Delisle cites no other evidence for his statement and has clearly not examined the English sources. Even on Rigaud's evidence alone, Delisle's conclusions are suspect. In the first place, Rigaud makes only four complaints about the non-receipt of English revenues in the period between 1248, when his register begins, and 1259, when the period under review ends. Moreover, these complaints relate to only three out of the nearly thirty houses in the diocese of Rouen which had property in England. In the second place, Odo himself does not state why the English revenues were not received in these particular cases and one ought not to assume that the reasons were necessarily political. Indeed, we have seen that except in the brief periods of war (3), the Norman monks were able to carry on as before 1204. On the other hand, it is an indisputable fact that many English houses were at this time in serious financial difficulties for a variety of reasons (4). When important

(1) Rigaud, pp.192,224,301,351.
(2) L. Delisle, "Le clergé normand au treizième siècle," B.E.C., III (1846), 488.
(3) Rigaud's complaints do not, of course, relate to periods of war.
(4) R.H. Snape, English Monastic Finances in the later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1926) Chapter V.
English abbeys such as Evesham, Bury St Edmund's, Bolton, Fountains and Peterborough all went through periods of grave difficulty between the end of the twelfth century and the end of the thirteenth century, it would be hardly surprising if some of the small alien priories found themselves without any money to send to their mother houses in Normandy. Moreover, a number of Norman houses were in debt by an amount greater than that of their English revenues\(^{(1)}\). Hence, in the light of other evidence, Odo's complaints do not affect our conclusion that the events of 1204 had in themselves no significant effect on the enjoyment of their English revenues by Norman houses.

Some of the ways in which the continued possession of English revenues by Norman monasteries involved continuing contact between the kingdom and the duchy have already been mentioned in passing, but a more systematic examination is now necessary.

Most of the Norman houses with revenues in England maintained representatives in this country to administer their property to their best possible advantage. Sometimes a conventual priory was established but more often the agents of the mother house merely established a "dative" priory or administrative centre. The question as to which priories were conventual and which were not has been the subject of considerable academic debate\(^{(2)}\) but need not concern us here as the exact nature of the English establishment does not

\(^{(1)}\) e.g. Rigaud, pp.69,192,236,326.

\(^{(2)}\) See, for example, D. Matthew, op.cit., chapter II and C.W. New, op.cit., chapter II.
affect the degree of communication between England and the duchy in any significant way.

In their *Medieval Religious Houses: England and Wales* (1), Knowles and Hadcock list a large number of alien priories or cells belonging to Norman ecclesiastical bodies. Unfortunately, we cannot be certain that all the priories which they list did in fact have a resident prior in the period under review. Where Knowles and Hadcock refer to a prior or other residents of a priory, their information is almost always post-1259 and we cannot necessarily assume that the same conditions applied before 1259. Morgan has shown that in the case of Bec, the tendency during the thirteenth century was towards a reduction in the number of cells which were maintained in England (2), so that priories in existence after 1259 were certainly already in existence before 1204. However, this was not necessarily a general tendency. It may well be that houses with less extensive properties than those held by Bec found it more difficult to collect their revenues after 1204 and therefore maintained a monk in this country when they had not done so before. Bec had a number of substantial English priories and it was therefore easy and rational to abolish her smaller cells. However, a house which before 1204 had no priory, might well have found it necessary after that date to maintain a permanent representative to protect its interests. Similarly, a house with only one or two priories and widely distributed estates

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(2) M.M. Morgan, *op.cit.*, pp.20-1.
may have felt the need to establish a further cell. Consequently, although all the priories of Norman ecclesiastical establishments which are mentioned by Knowles and Hadcock\(^1\) have been listed in Appendix III, it has been indicated in each case whether or not any reference has been found to the existence of a prior in the period under review. It has been assumed that the term "prior" was only applied to a resident representative and only one reference has been given in each appropriate case although a number of references could have been cited for many of the priories. Where a reference has been found only to monks, canons or nuns, this has been cited but the nature of the reference has been indicated in brackets since such a reference does not necessarily imply a permanent resident representative. It will be noted that 55 of the 94 priories listed seem to have had a resident prior at some time during the period under review. Since Knowles and Hadcock do not systematically consider which priories were conventual and which were merely dative\(^2\), those which New claimed were conventual in his thesis on the History of the Alien Priories in England to the Confiscation of Henry V\(^3\) have been indicated by the letter "C".

Very little is known about the number of monks attached to each of these priories in the period under review. Matthew

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\(1\) The cells of Great Blakenham, Hooe, Lessingham, Povington, and Weedon Beck were probably already being administered by the prior of Ogbourne in the period under consideration (see M.M. Morgan, op.cit., pp.20-4; D. Knowles and R.N. Hadcock, op.cit., pp.88 bis, 89,91,94) and have not therefore been listed. Certainly no reference has been found to a prior or monk at any of these places between 1204 and 1259.

\(2\) D. Knowles and R.N. Hadcock, op.cit., p.6.

\(3\) C.W. New, op.cit., pp.87-90.
suggests that the majority of the non-convventual priories were "run by single monks or bailiffs with or without the companion which they were canonically required to keep. There are lone monks recorded in Domesday and judging from the large number of single monks who applied to leave the country in 1378 the majority of monasteries maintained agencies in England staffed with one monk. In the thirteenth century Archbishop Rigaud of Rouen tried to put an end to abuses of this kind when he heard that monks from Aumale, Bocherville, Noyon, La Trinité of Rouen, and Valmont were alone in England"(1).

Although Matthew does not make this point, it seems that Rigaud had at least a measure of success. Aumale had two English priories(2) and only one monk in England in June, 1250, and only two in September, 1251, and November, 1255(3). However, in July 1259, and again in December, 1260, there were three monks from the mother house in England(4) so at least one of the priories had the canonical minimum of two monks in residence. Bocherville also had two English priories(5) and apparently only one monk in England in November, 1254(6). However, by December, 1259, there were four monks from Bocherville in England(7), presumably two in each priory.

(2) Burstall, Yorks, and Withernsea, Yorks.
(3) Rigaud, pp.76,118,229.
(4) Ibid., pp.339,381.
(5) Avebury, Wilts, and Edith Weston, Rutland.
(6) Rigaud, p.191.
(7) Ibid., p.352.
Rigaud's register also records that Saint-Victor-en-Caux, which had only one English priory\(^1\), had two monks in England on three separate occasions during the period under review\(^2\), while Giraldus Cambrensis (? 1146-c.1220) refers in one of his later works to "prior cellae cujusdam duorum monachorum vel trium Langenith nuncupatae"\(^3\).

Numbers in conventional priories were, of course, higher, but again we have very little evidence for the period from 1204-1259. If we turn to earlier records, we find that provision was made for thirteen monks at both St Michael's Mount\(^4\) and Goldcliff\(^5\) at the time of their foundation in the reigns of William I and Henry I respectively. At the time of Boxgrove's foundation, also in the reign of Henry I, provision was made for three monks but numbers steadily increased and reached thirteen by the time of the founder's grandsons\(^6\) and nineteen by 1230\(^7\). Just prior to the fall of Rouen in June, 1204, reference is found in two separate papal letters to "the prior and monks" of Folkestone and "the prior and monks" of Storgursey\(^8\), which suggests

\(^1\) Clatford, Wilts.
\(^2\) Rigaud, pp.145,175,317.
\(^4\) C.D.F., no.729.
\(^5\) Mon.Ang., VI, 1021.
\(^6\) Ibid., IV, 646.
\(^7\) D. Knowles and R.N. Hadcock, op.cit., p.60.
\(^8\) C.P.L., I, 17, bis.
that there were at least three monks at each priory.

If one is prepared to consider figures dating from after 1259 as a guide, one is not short of evidence. The following table gives figures extracted from Knowles and Hadcock\(^1\) which relate to priories in Appendix III. Only priories with more than two residents and only thirteenth and fourteenth century figures have been included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priory</th>
<th>Number of monks, canons or nuns</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Page number in Knowles and Hadcock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boxgrove</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>p.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carisbrooke</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>p.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horsham</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>p.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Faith</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1324-5</td>
<td>p.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lymminster</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>p.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrixbourne</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>p.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael's Mount</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1362</td>
<td>p.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke by Clare</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>p.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stogursey</td>
<td>over 3</td>
<td>1270</td>
<td>p.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutbury</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1377</td>
<td>p.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most cases, however, these figures are unlikely to be a reliable guide to the situation in the same priories in the period 1204-1259. As Knowles and Hadcock themselves point out,

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\(^1\) D. Knowles and R.N. Hadcock, \textit{op.cit.}
numbers tended to decrease during the French wars\(^{(1)}\). We have just noted that provision was made for thirteen monks when the priory of St Michael's Mount was founded, and yet the above table shows that there were only three monks there in 1362 and one in 1381. Clearly, we cannot assume that there were never more than three monks in residence at the priory.

In his book, *The Norman Monasteries and their English Possessions*, Matthew lists the names of certain Norman monks who obtained permission to leave England in 1378 and certain other monks who obtained permission to remain in England after that date\(^{(2)}\). Sometimes we know only the mother house to which a monk belonged, but sometimes we are given the name of his priory too. In several cases, therefore, we can calculate the minimum number of monks which a priory must have had in 1378. For example, St Neots had at least seven monks, for three obtained permission to leave England and another four obtained permission to stay\(^{(3)}\). Similarly, it can be calculated that Stoke by Clare and Eye each had at least eight monks in the same year\(^{(4)}\). Again, however, these figures are not necessarily a guide to the numbers resident in the same priories in the period 1204-1259.

The dative priors and their companions presumably always came from the mother house in Normandy. We know, for example, that in the period under consideration, "Nicholas, monk of

\(^{(1)}\) e.g. Ibid., p.48.


Saint-Sever" was prior of Haugham in Lincolnshire, while "Philip, monk of Séez" was prior of Winghale in the same county\(^{(1)}\). In 1227, the abbot of Saint-Pierre, Préaux, returned home from a visit to England "et cum eo Adam monachus Pratellensis qui fuerat prior de Anglia"\(^{(2)}\). Conventual priors, too, seem generally to have come from the duchy as far as one can tell. In May, 1246, John de Quisse, "monk of Séez" was appointed prior of Pembroke\(^{(3)}\) and other similar examples can be found\(^{(4)}\). Virtually nothing is known about the place of origin of other monks in the conventual priories but it seems likely that they, too, were mostly from Normandy. Certainly a considerable number of monks from Norman priories obtained permission to leave England in February, 1378\(^{(5)}\).

The Norman priors in England came into contact with what we may now call English society at all levels in the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies. On their appointment, those whose mother houses held in chief of the king, performed their homage to the king himself\(^{(6)}\), while others performed homage to important English magnates\(^{(7)}\). As we have already seen, many met the king on subsequent occasions through involvement

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\(^{(1)}\) Rot.Hugonis de Welles, III, 158,132-3.
\(^{(2)}\) Eure, Serie H, no.H711, f.63v.
\(^{(3)}\) Cl.R. 1242-7, p.426.
\(^{(4)}\) P.R. 11 John, p.105; Mon.Ang., I, 270.
\(^{(5)}\) D. Matthew, op.cit., pp.153-5.
\(^{(6)}\) Cl.R. 1247-51, p.414.
\(^{(7)}\) Ibid., 1242-7, p.426.
in lawsuits tried in the *curia regis* while some actually became trusted royal agents. Relations with lay patrons, too, were often fairly close. For example, in April, 1248, the prior of Stoke by Clare was given letters of protection while he was "on pilgrimage...beyond seas" with Richard de Clare, earl of Gloucester (1). On the other hand, priors sometimes became involved in property disputes with their lay patrons (2). We have already noticed that even after 1204, Norman houses received further gifts from the king and from certain of his lay subjects, and sometimes these grants were made direct to the English priory which must have involved communication between the grantor and the grantee (3). During the course of the day to day administration of their estates, the Norman priors were in constant communication with their English tenants and with a variety of royal officials including such important personages as sheriffs and itinerant justices.

Just as the Norman priors and their monks were inevitably involved in communication with representatives of the whole spectrum of English lay society, so they were involved in communication with English ecclesiastics of all ranks. For example, on their appointment, Norman priors had to show letters of presentation to the bishops of the English dioceses in which their priories were situated (4) and most priories were subject

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(1) C.P.R., 1247-58, p.12.
(2) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.156.
(3) For examples of gifts from the king, see C.R. 1234-7, p.129 (Boxgrove); C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.408 (Frampton); for an example of a gift from a layman, see C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.193 (St Neots).
(4) C.D.F., no.929.
to episcopal visitation. Norman priors did not always have the right of advowson to all the churches on their various manors and hence were bound to come into contact with English incumbents presented by English patrons.

Even from this very brief description of some of the activities of the Norman priors and their monks, it should be clear that the Norman priories in England were not merely isolated outposts in a foreign land but that their occupants were an integral part of English society after 1204 as before. As we have seen, some Norman priors were such an accepted part of the English scene that they eventually became abbots of English abbeys or bishops of English sees. We know also that one of Bec's procurators general chose to remain in England when the time came for him to retire. However, these men were probably exceptions; others certainly returned to Normandy. As we saw in another connection, the cartulary of Saint-Pierre, Préaux, records that in 1227, "abbas Bernardus venit de Anglia et cum eo Adam, monachus Pratellensis qui fuerat prior de Anglia". In the same year, William, prior of Hough in England, returned to his mother house of Notre-Dame-du-Voeu, Cherbourg, as her newly appointed abbot. Other priors visited Normandy during their period of office in England. In March, 1257, the archbishop of Rouen discovered on a visit to Aumale that "prior Anglie venerat de Anglia sine

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(1) e.g. Manche, Série H,III, no.H.4685. See C.P.R. 1258-66, p.28 on Steyning's exemption.
(2) M.M. Morgan, op.cit., p.43; Cl.R. 1256-9, p.345.
(3) Eure, Série H, no.H.711, f.63v.
licencia" (1). The priors of Bec's English dependencies had to attend the triennial meetings of the chapter of the order of Bec (2).

We must now turn from those Norman clerics temporarily resident in England to those who merely paid brief visits to this country. Not all the Norman houses which held English property maintained permanent representatives to administer it. For example, no evidence has been found that the chapters of Séez or Evreux maintained residential agents in England between 1204 and 1259 but we know that they had agents in England from time to time (3). Amongst the monasteries which do not seem to have established priories in England were Croix-Saint-Leufroi and Saint-Lô, Rouen. However, on at least two occasions, the abbot of Croix-Saint-Leufroi had to send two of his monks to England as his attorneys (4) while the canons of Saint-Lô, Rouen must have arranged for someone to collect the annual rent payable to them at the fair of Boston (5).

A more important group of visitors, however, were the abbots and bishops of all the Norman religious establishments which possessed English revenues. Each newly appointed bishop

(1) Rigaud, p.300.

(2) M.M. Morgan, op.cit., p.28; G.C.XI, col.232.

(3) e.g. Evreux: Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, p.560b, ibid. 1224-7, p.52b; Séez: Ibid. 1204-24, p.23, Cl.R. 1227-31, p.578.

(4) Rot.Lit.C1. 1224-7, p.82b; Cl.R. 1227-31, p.252.

(5) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.248.
and abbot had to come to England to perform homage for his English property before he was allowed to succeed to it. Where any of this property was held of the king, then homage was due to the king himself. There are twenty-three entries on the Close and Patent Rolls for the period under review which record the performance of homage by a Norman bishop or abbot to the king himself but obviously these entries do not constitute anything like a complete list of the homages actually performed. The number of new appointments made over a period of fifty-five years to establishments which held in chief of the king must have been considerably higher than this. We know, for example, that there were six new appointments to the archbishopric of Rouen during this period (1) yet the only homages of which we have a record are those performed by Peter II in December 1236 (2) and by Odo Rigaud in April 1249 (3). Similarly, at least four new abbots of Mont-Saint-Michel were appointed in the same period (4) but we have positive evidence of the performance of homage on one occasion only (5). Nevertheless, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the records which we do have.

In the first place, it is clear that with very few exceptions, the English king insisted that the bishop or abbot concerned did homage in person before he succeeded to his English property. Of the twenty-three newly appointed abbots

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(2) Cl.R. 1234-7, p.402 (performed by a proxy).
(3) Cl.R. 1247-51, p.154.
(4) G.C.XI, cols.521-3.
(5) Cl.R. 1227-31, p.74.
and bishops whose homages are recorded, only Peter II, archbishop of Rouen, was allowed to do homage by proxy. Moreover, the king made it clear that this was a special concession and explicitly informed the archbishop and his chapter that after future vacancies he would not take homage from anyone other than the man who owed it\(^{(1)}\). That this warning was no mere formality is clear from the king's treatment of Peter's successors. In September 1245, his immediate successor Odo Clement wrote to the king stating that: "As he cannot come in person to the king's presence on account of the legate's council which is imminent, as also on account of his bodily weakness and for many other causes which Master John de Flayvilla, the bearer will explain, he is sending the said master to court to receive from the king the regalities which he has in the realm, and to take the oath of fealty to the king in place of the archbishop, for which the archbishop has given him full power; wherefore he begs the king to receive the said master, and to expedite the business for which he is sent"\(^{(2)}\). It is not clear exactly what happened in the meantime but in December 1245 the king granted Odo seisin of his English lands until the following April. At the time of the grant these English lands were in the king's hands because the archbishop had not come to England to do the homage which he owed for them\(^{(3)}\). Henry III was prepared to grant a respite but not, apparently, to accept the archbishop's proxy. Odo Clement's successor Odo Rigaud was consecrated in

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., 1234-7, p.403.

\(^{(2)}\) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.490.

\(^{(3)}\) Cl.R. 1242-7, p.373.
1247 but for reasons not known to us did not come to England to perform the homage due from him until April 1249\(^1\). In the meantime, the see's English lands were in the king's hands.\(^2\)

In the second place, it is clear that the Norman abbots and bishops were expected to perform the homage due to the English king even when France and England were at war. Of the twenty-three recorded homages, six\(^3\) were performed during periods of war. In June 1230, the king ordered that the abbess of La Trinité, Caen, was to be allowed until Michaelmas to perform her homage "propter guerram inter ipsum dominum regem et regem Francorum" and was to have the enjoyment of her English revenues in the meantime\(^4\). However, the abbess had performed her homage by 16th September\(^5\) which means that she must have been in the king's presence while he was on the continent and at war with the French king.

The only other example of a respite being granted is found in the year 1248 and this time no reason for the concession is stated. In November 1248 the king granted that the abbot of Saint-Ouen, Rouen should be allowed until the following Easter to perform the homage due from him and that the prior of West Mersea should have possession of the abbey's English

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\(^{(1)}\) Ibid. 1247-51, p.154.

\(^{(2)}\) Ibid. 1247-51, p.155.

\(^{(3)}\) Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, p.627 (Bernay); ibid. 1224-7, p.102b (Bernay); ibid. 1224-7, p.139 (Saint-Léger, Préaux); ibid. 1224-7, p.187 (Cherbourg); C1.R. 1227-31, p.299 (Grestain); ibid. 1227-31, p.436 (La Trinité, Caen).

\(^{(4)}\) C1.R. 1227-31, p.415.

\(^{(5)}\) Ibid. 1227-31, p.436.
property in the meantime (1).

Although there is very little evidence for the performance of homage to English magnates, this, too, must have been a fairly frequent occurrence. In August 1245, for example, William count of Aumale had informed the king "quod abbas de novo creatus est apud Albermarliam, et quod idem abbas, qui omnes terras quas habet in Anglia tenet de eodem comiti, venit personaliter in Angliam et de terris ipsis fidelitatem fecit eidem comiti tamquam domino feodi" (2).

In many cases, the visit made by a Norman bishop or abbot to perform the homage due for his English property was not the only visit made to England during his period of office. Although, as we have seen, the heads of the mother establishments were often represented by attorneys in legal proceedings in England, they sometimes appeared in person. For example, during the Michaelmas term of 1204, the abbess of La Trinité, Caen, sought and obtained "licentiam veniendi ad curiam" to present her case against the count of Aumale (3), while the prior of Saint-Lo, Rouen, attended in person during the Easter term of 1229 (4).

A considerable number of other visits by Norman bishops and abbots have left their mark on the records, although the exact reason for the visit is not always stated. For example, the authors of Gallia Christiana say that abbot Reginald of

(1) Ibid. 1247-51, p.128.
(2) Ibid. 1242-7, p.337.
(3) C.R.R., III, 213.
(4) Ibid., XIII, no.1854.
Saint-Wandrille died in England in 1207\(^{(1)}\). Reginald had been elected abbot in 1194 so his 1207 visit was obviously for some other reason than the performance of the homage due for Saint-Wandrille's English property\(^{(2)}\). When Rigaud visited Saint-Wandrille in December 1258, he noted that the abbot was then in England with three of his monks\(^{(3)}\). As this abbot had been appointed three years previously\(^{(4)}\), it is likely that, again, this was at least his second visit to England. An entry on the Pipe Roll for 1209 records that the abbot of Saint-Martin, Séez, had reached an agreement with the king that when there was a vacancy at Lancaster priory, he could nominate two monks as prospective priors and the king would choose between them. It was also recorded that the abbot owed 30 marks "pro licencia transfretandi"\(^{(5)}\). Presumably the abbot had felt that negotiations would be facilitated by his presence in England. Since he had been abbot since at least 1185\(^{(6)}\), he had presumably performed his homage for his English lands many years previously.

Nor was the cross-Channel traffic resulting from the continuing ecclesiastical links between England and Normandy all one way. Although very little is known about the property of English houses in Normandy, one or two English clerics

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\(^{(1)}\) G.C. XI, col.181.  
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., col.181.  
\(^{(3)}\) Rigaud, p.325.  
\(^{(4)}\) G.C.XI, col.181.  
\(^{(5)}\) P.R. 11 John, p.105.  
\(^{(6)}\) G.C.XI, col.721.
certainly visited the duchy in the period under review. A canon of Merton crossed the Channel in the year ended Michaelmas 1205\(^1\) and the prior of Lewes may have had a representative in Normandy in May 1251 when Rigaud stated that "apud Sanctum Salvatorem in Puseya.... presentatus nobis fuit ex parte prioris Levyensis de Anglia quidam clericus ad ecclesiam de Stabulis"\(^2\). In March 1257, Rigaud visited the Norman abbey of Mortemer and reported that "Ibi sunt duo monachi Anglici de Leways"\(^3\).

Moreover, it may not have been only English clerics who visited Normandy. In 1210, an English layman accused of taking twenty marks to certain of the king's enemies in Normandy, "scilicet ad Willelmum de Humaz et ad fratres", maintained in his own defence that "ipse transfretavit per licenciam domini G. filii Petri, cujus literas profert, que hoc testantur, ad faciendum homagium domino suo abbati [Saint-Pierre-sur-Dive] de terra quam pater suus de eo tenuit"\(^4\). Whatever the truth of the matter in this particular case, the fact that the accused offered this excuse for his visit to Normandy in the curia regis itself suggests that it was not altogether unknown for English laymen to go to Normandy to perform homage due to Norman ecclesiastics.

As well as those Norman clerics who had interests in

\(^{1}P.R.\ 7\ John, \ p.131.\)
\(^{2}Rigaud, \ p.109.\)
\(^{3}Ibid., \ p.300.\)
\(^{4}C.R.R., \ VI, \ 85-6.\)
England through the religious establishment to which they belonged, there were those who had family interests in England. The pre-1204 Anglo-Norman baronage had, as we have seen, provided clerics for religious establishments on both sides of the Channel. Hence, when the majority of families were forced to choose between John and Philip Augustus in 1204, it was inevitable that some clerics should find themselves henceforth on opposite sides of the Channel from their families. However, friendly relations appear to have been maintained in some cases at least.

Drogo de Trubleville, canon of Rouen, was the brother of Henry de Trubleville (1), who was an active servant of Henry III. Drogo seems to have been in England on a number of occasions and to have received favours at the hand of the king as well as at the hand of his brother. For example, in April 1230, the king excused Drogo the farm which he owed for the previous Easter term in respect of the English property of the archbishopric of Rouen which had been in his custody on the king's instructions (2). In May 1227, his brother Henry granted Drogo the custody of all his lands and property in England "quamdiu eidem Henrico placuerit" (3) which was presumably as long as he was on the king's service in Gascony (4).

(1) Cl.R. 1227-31, p.217.
(2) Ibid., 1227-31, p.340. The archbishopric of Rouen was vacant 1229-31 (G.C.XI, cols.61-2).
(3) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.123.
(4) Ibid., 1225-32, p.129.
John Payne, who was archdeacon of Coutances in 1239 when he made a grant to Hambye Abbey (1), was the brother of Fulk Paynel III who changed his allegiance on more than one occasion, and a second cousin of Hugh Paynel II who remained permanently in England after 1204 and was living until 1244 (2). In 1208, William, archdeacon of Rouen and "heres Rogerii filii Reinfridi", came before the curia regis in England and quitclaimed to his brother Ralph all the rights and property which he should have inherited from his father in England (3). William's reasons are not stated but we know of at least one Norman cleric who continued to receive an income from family lands in England after 1204 so we cannot assume that he was compelled to make the quitclaim. In 1227, Richard Boistard, archdeacon of Bayeux, came to England to confirm a charter by which he granted half a hide of land in Garford, Berkshire, to Peter de Abbendon for a term of twenty years at an annual rent of two marks. The grant had been made with the agreement of Richard's brother, Warin (4).

Having established that the continuing ecclesiastical links between England and Normandy after 1204 meant a great deal of friendly intercourse between Normans and Englishmen, it is necessary to consider the political significance of this state of affairs. There is, in fact, very little evidence that the situation was exploited by the English king. Indeed, he could not exploit it directly if for no

(2) E.Y.C., VI, family tree of Paynel family facing page 1.
(3) C.R.R., V, 189.
(4) Ibid., XIII, no.286.
other reason than that the Norman clergy held more of the French king than they held of the English king. On the other hand, it kept him in touch with some of the most important Norman churchmen with whom, on the whole, he seems to have enjoyed friendly relations. Although the Channel remained something of a physical barrier to communications after 1204 as before, the king must have been better informed on the situation within Normandy than if the ecclesiastical link had also been severed. Then, too, the continuing contact between England and Normandy must have helped to remind the people of both areas of their common heritage, so that the claims of John and Henry III to be the rightful dukes of Normandy did not become completely meaningless as one generation succeeded another. Certainly, the continuing ecclesiastical links seem to have been a source of concern to the duchy's new Capetian masters. In order to show this, it is necessary to examine the relations between the Norman Church and the French kings.

(iii) Relations of the Norman Church with Philip Augustus, Louis VIII and Louis IX

As long ago as 1922, S.R. Packard stated that "the whole question of relations between Philip and the Norman clergy in the year of conquest and in the years immediately following needs further investigation"(1). When the first draft of this chapter was written, Packard's challenge had still not been taken up and Philip's relations with the Norman Church were still being dismissed by writers on the

period in a paragraph or two. Powicke, for example, devotes just three paragraphs to this question in the second edition of *The Loss of Normandy* (1). His conclusion seems to be that relations between the Norman clergy and the French king were on the whole good and certainly better than relations between the Norman clergy and King John. He does not, however, go as far as to suggest that Philip adopted a deliberately conciliatory policy after 1204. Luchaire, on the other hand, when speaking of Philip's relations with the Church in France, said "il ne prodigua ni son argent, ni sa terre; il a surtout confirmé les donations de ses prédécesseurs. Il ne s'est montré généreux que pour les églises situées hors de l'ancien patrimoine capétien, celles de la Normandie, de l'Aquitaine, du Languedoc. Il fallait bien se concilier le Clergé dans les provinces conquises" (2).

It was, of course, a reasonable assumption that Philip should wish to attach the Norman clergy more firmly to his cause by a conciliatory policy. After all, the English king did not surrender his claim to the duchy in 1204, and the Norman clergy maintained close links with England after that date. However, a reading of the available evidence did not support this assumption. The same broad conclusion was reached by J.W. Baldwin in an article on "Philip Augustus and the Norman Church" which appeared in the spring of 1969 (3),

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(2) E. Lavisse, ed. *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution*, III (i), 211.
just after the first draft of this chapter had been written. Since his article is easily available, it is not proposed to cover the same ground here. Instead, his summary of his conclusions will be quoted, comments will be made on one or two points which seem open to question, and some additional points will be made.

In the final paragraph of his article, Baldwin sums up his findings as follows: "Before the military conquest was complete, Philip was eager to show a beneficial side to the clergy. The acquisition of Evreux in 1200 provided him opportunity to lavish charities and to proclaim a new policy of free elections. Because of the lack of documentation we cannot know whether he extended his munificence to other Norman dioceses after the conquest, but it is evident that he kept his promise of free elections at least to cathedral chapters. This policy alone would have contributed to winning the goodwill of the Norman church. After Philip took over the duchy, however, he appears less inclined to pamper the clergy. His inquest of 1205 and his reforms throughout the remainder of his reign restored royal rights and customs to a level comparable to the most advanced claims of the Plantagenets. If a beguiling seducer, Philip Augustus became a stern master."

If we look first at Baldwin's claim that "before the military conquest was complete, Philip was eager to show a beneficial side to the clergy", we find that he is rather over-stating his case. If we consider the period between

the outbreak of war on 30th April 1202(1) and the capitulation of Rouen on 24th June, 1204(2), which is surely a crucial period, we find only two surviving charters issued in favour of Norman ecclesiastical bodies outside the diocese of Evreux.

The first of these was issued in May 1204, and granted an annual fair to the leper house at Falaise (3). The second was issued on 1st June 1204 and was merely an instruction to Philip's friends and baillis to ensure that the monks of Bec enjoyed the liberties that they had enjoyed in the time of Henry II (4). These two acts hardly suggest that the French king was making a serious attempt to win over the Norman Church by parading his generosity.

When we turn to Baldwin's claim that Philip Augustus was particularly lavish with gifts to ecclesiastical bodies in the Evrecin after May, 1200, again we find some degree of exaggeration in his summing up. As he himself stated at an earlier point in his article, it is difficult to compare the annual sums disbursed in alms by the Angevins and Capetians as "we cannot be sure of the completeness or comparability" of the surviving financial accounts (5). Moreover, although Baldwin states that in 1200, Philip "began issuing acts in favour of the chapter of Evreux and the abbeys of St Taurin and Lire" (5), this statement is based on only four surviving charters (6).

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(1) A.L. Poole, *From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087-1216*, p.381.
(3) C.N., no.1070.
(4) Ibid., no.83.
(6) Baldwin cites five charters but the fifth (C.N., no.1204) has obviously been cited in error. It is in fact a grant made by Saint Louis to "Galtero de Vernone, serviente nostro" in February 1259.
of which two relate to the same grant. In 1201, Philip granted the canons of Evreux permission to build a mill and his charter and a charter of the dean and chapter publicizing the grant have both survived\(^{(1)}\). The only surviving charter in favour of Saint-Taurin is also dated 1201 and relates to the grant of a fixed rent from the mill near the tower of Evreux. However, this grant was not an outright gift but was made in exchange for the tithe of the mill at Fevres\(^{(2)}\). The charter in favour of the abbey of Lyre which Baldwin cites turns out to be merely an instruction to the prévôt of Paci to pay to the monks the revenues due to them from his charge\(^{(3)}\). The only other surviving charter in favour of an ecclesiastical body in the diocese of Evreux contains a declaration by Philip Augustus in October, 1200, that he has taken under his protection the abbey of Bonport, its monks and their possessions\(^{(4)}\). Such, then, is the surviving evidence for Philip's generosity to the diocese of Evreux after May 1200, and before the fall of Rouen.

Although Baldwin states that we cannot assess Philip's generosity to the other Norman dioceses after 1204 "Because of the lack of documentation"\(^{(5)}\), the question cannot be dismissed as easily as that, especially in view of Luchaire's opinion quoted above. In fact, Delisle's Cartulaire normand contains

\(^{(1)}\) C.N., nos 60, 61.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., no. 62.
\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., no. 65.
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid., no. 1067.
\(^{(5)}\) J.W. Baldwin, loc. cit., 30.
almost ninety entries relating to Philip's relations with the Norman Church but a close examination shows that only about a dozen of these relate to outright gifts to Norman ecclesiastical bodies (1). It is interesting to note that the Norman Church had received considerably more grants from the last two Angevin dukes (2). Unless a great many charters have been lost or destroyed, Philip's gifts were insufficient to merit his being described as generous and clearly do not reflect a calculated attempt to conciliate the Norman Church. While it is probable that records of some grants have not survived, it is surely significant that such a low proportion of the surviving evidence for Philip's relations with the Norman Church should support Luchaire's contention.

While Baldwin's statement that Philip "kept his promise of free elections at least to cathedral chapters" seems justified, his claim that "this policy alone would have contributed to winning the goodwill of the Norman Church" is open to question. The fact that Philip did not generally interfere in episcopal elections opened the way for papal intervention which was presumably as unwelcome to the rightful electors as royal intervention (3). Another point which must be borne in mind in this connection is that several of the Norman bishops of the conquest period had reason to be thankful for the Angevin's custom of nominating their prelates (3).

(2) C.D.F., passim.
(3) See above, p. 49.
Baldwin's statement that Philip's "inquest of 1205 and his reforms throughout the remainder of his reign restored royal rights and customs to a level comparable to the most advanced claims of the Plantagenets" is rather more favourable to Philip than the section of the article which it is meant to summarize. In fact, Baldwin's comparison of the rights claimed by Henry II and Richard vis-à-vis the Norman Church and those claimed by Philip Augustus, prompted him to observe that "only in two areas... did Philip introduce innovations advantageous to churchmen", while "by comparison to clerical gains, many more innovations were introduced on behalf of the king and the laity.... Moreover, two privileges won by the Norman clergy in 1190 were abrogated in 1205" (1). Indeed, as Baldwin points out, "with the exception of elections the position of the Norman Church did not improve and in some cases declined from the time of King Richard" (2).

Although his article is very much to the point, Baldwin has primarily concerned himself with the legal rights of Church and State vis-à-vis one another. If one is going to consider "the whole question of the relations between Philip and the Norman clergy in the year of conquest and the years immediately following", as Packard suggested, then one has to take other factors into account, also.

In the first place, the Norman Church suffered a number of losses as a result of the king's confiscation of the Norman lands of those laymen who chose to remain with King John in 1204. It seems from a number of complaints in the "Querimoniae Normannorum" of 1247 that Norman clerics often lost the revenues

(1) J.W. Baldwin, loc.cit., 29.
which had been payable to them from the confiscated estates (1).

If Philip Augustus wished to attach the Norman clergy firmly to his cause, this was not a very good way to begin. His attitude seems even more unfavourable when we consider that King John seems to have ensured that Norman ecclesiastical bodies continued to receive their revenues from the terrae Normannorum in England (2).

Although only four ecclesiastical complaints against the royal administration between 1204 and 1223 have been found in the "Querimoniae Normannorum" (3), it would be dangerous to assume that after 1204 Philip's baillis adopted a more favourable attitude towards the Norman clerics than towards their lay brethren. We know, for example, that on a number of occasions Philip wrote to various baillis instructing them to uphold the rights of particular religious establishments (4) and this suggests that on occasions at least, some of the royal baillis were over-zealous in the execution of their duties. Moreover, the pope must have been receiving complaints from the duchy for in December 1211 he wrote to the French king warning him to restrain his justices and other royal officials in Normandy "qui praetextu criminis usurarum bona pro salute animarum decedentium in eleemosynam ab ipsis donata fisco regio in iuris ecclesiasticci detrimentum applicare contendunt" (5).

(1) e.g. Q.N., nos. 76, 79, 273, 326, 404, 441.
(2) See above, p. 90.
(3) Q.N., nos. 14, 244, 377, 521.
(4) e.g. C.N., nos. 131, 149, 180, 222, 1084, 1127.
In April 1214, he wrote again requesting Philip "ut nec impediat nec faciat impediri, quominus in suo regno ecclesiastica jurisdictio possit exerceri"(1). There is no reason to suppose that Normandy had been treated differently from the rest of the kingdom in this respect.

The loss of revenues suffered by the Norman Church in 1204 must have been more than the complaints recorded by the "Querimoniae Normannorum" suggest for we know that Philip Augustus upheld rights and liberties enjoyed by the Norman Church "temporibus Henrici et Ricardi, quondam regum Angliae"(2) only. After 1204 the Norman courts were not allowed to recognize deeds issued by John's Chancery which meant that the Church would at least lose the gifts made to it by King John himself which, as we have seen, were not inconsiderable. Presumably this was the background to the case of the lepers of Bernay who complained in 1247 that immediately after the conquest of Normandy, Philip's bailiff "Cadulcus" had deprived them of certain fairs which they had been granted by King John three years previously(3).

As well as suffering material losses in 1204, the Norman clergy appear to have suffered a loss in secular power and prestige(4). Throughout the Angevin period leading Norman Churchmen had played an important part in the secular affairs of England and Normandy but they do not seem to have enjoyed

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(1) Ibid., I, no.4922.
(2) C.N., no.1074. See also nos.131,222.
(3) Q.N., no.316. "Cadulcus" is probably the notorious Cadoc (Powicke, Loss of Normandy, pp.231,273).
comparable importance in the secular affairs of France after 1204. Indeed, even the part they played in the administration of the duchy itself appears to have been reduced. This is not the place to describe in detail the extent to which Norman clerics were involved in the secular affairs of England and Normandy before 1204 and the evidence for the Norman Church's lack of influence at the French court and even within the duchy itself after 1204 is primarily of a negative nature. However, a brief perusal of the entries in *Gallia Christiana* for the last bishops of the Angevin period and the first bishops of the Capetian period will go a considerable way towards substantiating the above claim. Although there is no direct evidence that the loss of secular power and prestige alienated the Norman clergy from Philip Augustus, it is bound to have caused dissatisfaction.

Since Walter of Coutances, archbishop of Rouen, had been particularly prominent in the secular affairs of England and the duchy before 1204 (1) this seems an appropriate point at which to examine Powicke's claim that Philip "continued... to remain on friendly terms with archbishop Walter". It is true that one can find examples of cooperation between the king and the archbishop on ecclesiastical matters (2) but on one occasion at least, relations between them were badly strained. On 24 March 1207, Walter issued a charter in which he "reconnait que Philippe-Auguste veut bien, pour le temps que Gautier

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(1) See, for example, *G.C.XI*, cols.51-7; *D.N.B.*, XII,351-4.
(2) e.g. *C.N.*, no.146.
occupera le siège de Rouen, laisser en suspens la question du fouage dans les terres données en échange d’Andeli. Le roi pardonne un vol commis dans sa pêcherie de Dieppe, la violence faite par la commune de Dieppe aux officiers qui avaient arrêté le voleur, et la forfeiture des hommes de cette ville qui étaient allés en Poitou au secours de Jean Sans-Terre; il ne donnera pas suite à l’inquête faite par Cadoc et ses compagnons, ni à l’affaire du sergent de Jean de Garlande, clerc qui avait occasionné la mort d’une femme. En reconnaissance de ces grâces, l’archevêque donne quatre cents livres tournois au roi (1).

Nor were relations between Philip Augustus and Walter’s successor always entirely friendly. A letter issued by Archbishop Robert on 27th March 1218 (2) reveals that there had been disagreement between himself and the king on at least six issues. On four of these issues, it is the archbishop who yields to Philip. His most significant concession was that "ob amorem domini Regis, quamdiu nobis placuerit, nos vel officialis noster non excommunicabimus capitales ballivos domini Regis, domino Rege super hoc irrequito, dantes eisdem xv. dies de respectu, nisi idem ballivi teneant clericum tonsuram habentem vel catalla ejus que reddere nollent nobis vel officiali nostro". This suggests that there had been a background of friction between the Norman clergy and the king’s baillis who

(1) C.A.Ph.Aug., no.1018.

(2) C.N. no.251. Delisle attributes this letter to archbishop Theobald but this is clearly an error as Theobald did not become archbishop until 1222 (P.B.Gams, Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae, I, 614; G.C.XI, col.60). The authors of G.C.XI attribute it to Robert (Ibid., col.60).
were now mainly from the old French royal domain\(^{(1)}\).

Clearly, then, these enquiries not only confirm Baldwin's conclusions but add further weight to them. It is no longer possible to suggest that Philip adopted the conciliatory policy towards the Norman Church which it might well have expected in 1204. Furthermore, although it is impossible to establish how the Norman clergy felt about French rule, it has been shown that at least some of them had grounds for resenting the new régime. An anonymous chronicler complained that after Philip's conquest of the duchy, "Monasteria thesauros dederunt Regi Francorum, unumquodque quantum ab eo extorqueri potuit, et expoliata est terra honoribus et divitiis, quia munera multa data sunt Francis"\(^{(2)}\). Perhaps, after all, we ought not to dismiss his complaint as lightly as Powicke does in *The Loss of Normandy*\(^{(3)}\).

Louis VIII's relations with the Norman clergy seem to have been much the same as his father's. In his biography of Louis VIII, Petit-Dutaillis concludes that "ce fut seulement avec l'épiscopat normand que Louis VIII eut des démêlés"\(^{(4)}\) and cites two occasions when friction arose. However, he obviously feels that these were fortuitous incidents of no general significance. This is clear from his other references


\(^{(2)}\) Anonymi Continuatio Appendiciis Roberti de Monte, *Rec.des hist.*, XVIII, 342.


to Louis' relations with the Norman clergy. For example, he points out that "on vit des abbayes normandes lui fournir en 1224, pas pure grâce, des ressources pour aller guerroyer en Poitou" (1). When speaking of Louis' relations with the French Church as a whole he says "Presque tous les archevêques et évêques du nord, de l'est et du centre du royaume... apparaissent dans les conseils du roi, exécutent les missions qu'il leur confie...." (2) without making any sort of qualification about the Norman episcopate. When discussing the policies followed by Louis to facilitate the assimilation of the conquered provinces he says, "Il s'applique particulièrement à s'attacher le clergé. Ainsi en 1225 il confirme les privilèges accordés par Richard Coeur de Lion aux Hospitaliers de Jerusalem établis en Normandie, en Anjou, dans le Maine, en Touraine, en Poitou et en Berri. En Normandie surtout, où la vie monastique était si développée, Louis multiplie les donations pieuses." (3)

Admittedly there is not a great deal of evidence for Louis VIII's relations with the Norman clergy but it is nevertheless suggested that the picture presented by Petit-Dutaillis is unduly favourable. In the first place, such evidence as there is does not substantiate his claim that Louis made a deliberate attempt to attach the Norman clergy to his cause by means of generous gifts. Of the acts of Louis VIII known to Delisle, about twenty-six relate to his relations with the Norman Church and only three of these

(1) Ibid., p.406.
(2) Ibid., p.407.
(3) Ibid., p.370.
relate to outright gifts\(^{(1)}\). On the other hand, another three\(^{(2)}\) record occasions when Louis instructed his baillis to uphold the rights of particular Norman monasteries. The necessity for such instructions seems to imply that the baillis concerned had been over-zealous in the execution of their duties.

Petit-Dutaillis cites the fact that in 1224 the abbeys of Bec and Jumièges supplied Louis' army with horses which they had no obligation to provide as evidence of good relations between these two houses and the French king\(^{(3)}\). However, this is not the only possible interpretation of the action of these two important Norman houses. It is possible that feeling uncertain of the loyalty of their abbots, the French king had put pressure on them to provide additional military aid as evidence of their good faith. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the abbots of Bec and Jumièges would risk losing their extensive English lands by voluntarily exceeding their obligations to Louis in a war against the English king.

The withdrawal of the bishops of Coutances, Avranches and Lisieux from the army raised at Tours in 1224\(^{(4)}\) is regarded by Petit-Dutaillis as merely as illustration of the fact that "le service d'ost était pénible aux prélats"\(^{(5)}\) and probably

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\(^{(1)}\) C.N., nos.333,339,1139.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., nos.315,347,359.
\(^{(4)}\) C.N., no.331.
\(^{(5)}\) C. Petit-Dutaillis, \textit{op.cit.}, p.409.
one ought not to attach political significance to their action. Nevertheless, whatever the outcome of the enquiry which Louis ordered to be held to ascertain whether or not the three bishops did owe military service in person, relations between the opposing parties were bound to be strained.

A few months earlier, relations had been strained between Louis VIII and the archbishop of Rouen. In January, 1224, at an assembly at Gisors, Archbishop Theobald was compelled to agree "quod tenebit et observabit jura et libertates ducatus Normannie" (1). Moreover, an entry in Louis VIII's register lists "Articuli quidam de quibus archiepiscopus Rothomagensis debet regi respondere" on 4th February 1224 (2). The details of the issues involved need not detain us here. Since the king took the initiative in the matter and makes constant reference to "usus et consuetudines Normannie" it seems likely that right was on his side. However, the archbishop was bound to feel a sense of grievance over what amounted to a public reprimand and Louis must have been concerned that his relations with the primate of Normandy were bad at a time when he was planning a campaign against the English king in Poitou.

As far as one can tell, Louis VIII seems to have continued to allow Norman chapters the canonical right of free election. In 1223, for example, the chapter of Saint-Taurin, Evreux, requested the king's assent to the election of "dominum W. abbatem nostrum, ... divina provisione et jure canonum nobis prelatum" (3).

(1) C.N., no.1129.
(2) Ibid., no.1130.
(3) Ibid., no.1131.
On the other hand, Petit-Dutaillis would have found it difficult to produce evidence that Louis employed Norman clerics in the secular affairs of the kingdom. It seems that Louis VIII trusted the Norman clergy no further than his father had done.

Modern historians of the reign of Louis IX have dealt with his relations with the Church in general but not with the Norman Church in particular, although disputes between Blanche de Castile and two successive archbishops of Rouen are generally noted in passing. Presumably this reflects a view that there was nothing of special interest in Louis' relations with the Norman clergy. However, as we shall see, there are indications in the sources that neither the Regent nor her son entirely trusted the leading Norman churchmen of their day.

Like his father and grandfather before him, Saint Louis seems to have made no deliberate attempt to attach the Norman clergy to his cause in spite of the fact that Henry III persisted in his refusal to accept the loss of the duchy and was in continuous communication with its leading magnates, both lay and ecclesiastical. In the first place, it is clear from a number of complaints in the "Querimoniae Normannorum(1) that like their lay brethren, the Norman clergy suffered at the hands of Louis' over-zealous royal officials. Nor can the difficulties of the minority serve as an excuse for the French Crown, for more of these complaints relate to the period after Louis had attained his majority than to the period of the regency. The impression given by the "Querimoniae Normannorum"

(1) e.g. Q.N., nos. 2, 45, 68, 111, 135, 237, 312, 465, 481, 489, 540, 545.
is reinforced by other evidence. For example, Les Olim record under the year 1258 an "Inquesta Facta....super infrascriptis peticionibus prelatorum Normannie factis domino Regi"(1). The bishops complained about infringements by the king's officials of seven of their established rights. It would seem that these infringements were a recent development because in one case the bishops refer to a right which they had enjoyed from time immemorial "usque ad paucos annos citra" and in another case they refer to a right which they had enjoyed "usque nunc"(2). Berger has said that "il importe de répéter que, selon toute vraisemblance, Blanche de Castille et son fils sont souvent été mal renseignés sur les injustices qui se commettaient en leur nom, et qu'ils s'offorciaient de les réparer quand ils venaient à passer par le pays"(3). He cites a secular example to illustrate his point but could equally well have cited cases where the king compensated Norman clergy for wrongs they had suffered(4). Nevertheless, Louis was responsible for the activities of his agents and presumably the resentment of those whose wrongs were not righted would be directed against the king himself. On the other hand, it seems that the Norman clergy were able to obtain their rights against their fellow-Normans if their case was heard at the

(2) Ibid., I, 59-60.
(4) e.g. C.N., nos.386,463 (See the note on this act given between nos.1176 and 1177), 465,561.
Exchequer: many more judgements were given in their favour than against them (1). On at least two occasions, they were given judgement against the king himself (2).

Both contemporary and modern writers have stressed Saint Louis' generosity towards the Church in general and we know from Delisle's *Cartulaire Normand* that the Norman Church received her share of royal gifts. However, it is abundantly clear from a study of the timing of the gifts and the names of the recipients, that Louis' gifts have no political significance. In the first place, only a relatively small proportion of the gifts and concessions granted between Louis' accession and 1259 belong to the period before 1244 when a conciliatory policy was most needed. In the second place, very few grants were made to Norman bishops or the old-established Benedictine and Cistercian houses whose abbots were the most influential in Normandy. The majority of Louis' grants were made to the Franciscan (3) and Dominican (4) Friars, hospitals for sick paupers (5) or post-1204 foundations such as Le Trésor (6) and Royal Pré (7). The timing of these gifts more or less

(1) Rec. de Jugements, passim.
(2) Ibid., nos.522,793.
(3) e.g. C.N., nos.392,524,559,576,577,633.
(4) e.g. C.N., nos.450,563.
(5) e.g. C.N., nos.454,546,551,552,568,570,581,582,590,609,534.
(6) e.g. C.N., nos.467,1164,1166,1167,1182,1183,1184. Le Trésor was founded in 1227 by Raoul de Bus but endowed largely by Saint Louis (Beaunier. Recueil historique des archevêches, abbayes et prieures de France, Archives de la France Monastique, VII, Province Eclesiastique de Rouen ed. J.M. Besse (Paris, 1914), 67.
(7) e.g. C.N., nos.529,586. Royal Pré was founded by Saint Louis in 1255 (Beaunier, op.cit., VII, 204.
precludes the possibility that Louis was trying to build up new centres of ecclesiastical support within the duchy and one is forced to conclude that his motives were primarily religious.

Not a great deal is known about Louis' relations with individual bishops or abbots although most accounts of the regency refer to Blanche's disputes with both Thibaud, archbishop of Rouen (1), and Maurice, his successor (2). The details of these disputes need not detain us here. It is sufficient to note that both disputes were exceedingly bitter and occurred at times (3) when Henry III was actively involved in relations with the French Crown's enemies. Whether Blanche was in the right or not, she must have felt extremely uneasy at being on such bad terms with the primates of Normandy in such politically uncertain times.

There is not a great deal of direct evidence that Blanche and her son did not trust the Norman clergy. We know that in 1227, the dean and two canons of Rouen were allowed to cross to England on the affairs of their church only "après prestation de serment de ne rien faire contre le Roi, ni contre le royaume" (4). However, the taking of such an oath may well have been the usual practice on both sides of the Channel during periods of war between England and France. In 1242 the abbot of Bec complained that "lacking the special licence of the king of France, which

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(1) e.g. E. Berger, op.cit., pp.101-2.
(2) e.g. Ibid., pp.279-80.
(3) 1228 and 1232-3 respectively.
in these times can be obtained scarcely or only with great difficulty", he was often unable to travel to England to defend his property there (1). It is possible that it was difficult to obtain a licence to cross to England during times of war, but it is just as possible that the abbot was merely fabricating an excuse. On the other hand, it seems that Louis did not include any of the higher Norman clerics among his chief advisers or entrust them with his business (2). More significantly, from about 1244 onwards we find Frenchmen being appointed to certain Norman sees. As we have already seen, Philip Augustus and Louis VIII appear to have allowed Norman chapters the canonical right of free elections. As a result, the majority of bishops and abbots appear to have come from within the duchy itself. Since it was a natural tendency for chapters to elect one of their own number to vacant sees or abbeys, the appointment of Frenchmen suggests that Saint Louis began to exert some sort of influence over Norman elections. Unfortunately, we do not have as many details of Norman elections as we would like, but a brief survey of the information supplied by Gallia Christiana on all episcopal appointments after Louis began to rule in his own right will nevertheless prove instructive.

The see of Rouen became vacant in 1235 with the death of Archbishop Maurice. There was a disputed election but "nova....electione a pontifice concessa, electus est....anno

(1) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.291.

(2) The evidence is, of course, primarily of a negative nature. However, the same conclusion was reached by Langlois (E. Lavisse, ed., op.cit., III (ii), 49).
1236, Petrus de Colle-medio, sic dictus a vico ejusdem nominis in Campania, ut fertur, aut Brio posito unde oriundus erat(1). However, although he was not a Norman, Peter may in fact have been a papal nominee as he was a chaplain of Gregory IX and had also served Gregory's predecessor, Honorius III in the same capacity(2). Peter's successor in 1245 was Odo I, previously abbot of Saint-Denis, Paris "ex qua assumtus est ab Innocentia IV ad regendam Rotomagensem ecclesiam" after a disputed election in which he had been the candidate of one section of the chapter(3). The authors of Gallia Christiana give no details about the election of Odo II Rigaud who was consecrated in 1248, although they do mention that he was a Franciscan(4). However, it has been established by his biographers that he was a Frenchman born about twenty miles from Paris, that he studied in the French capital for some years and that in 1246 he was appointed superior of the new church of St Mark the Evangelist at Rouen(5). He enjoyed a considerable reputation as a preacher so it is likely that he was known to the chapter at Rouen and yet he was not apparently elected on the chapter's own initiative. The chronicler Salimbene de Adam says of him, "Amicus fuit regis Francie Ludovici, qui etiam laboravit pro eo, ut archiepiscopatum Rotomagensem haberet"(6).

(1) G.C.XI, col.63.
(2) Ibid., col.63
(3) Ibid., col.65.
(4) Ibid., col.66.
Gallia Christiana provides no personal details about Ralph II who was elected bishop of Evreux in 1236 but he had previously been a canon and archdeacon of Evreux so it is likely that he was a Norman (1). However, his successor John II de la Cour d'Aubergenville (1244-56) was very much a Frenchman who had even held the office of chancellor of France (2).

John's successor, Ralph III de Grosparmi (1259-63) was of Norman origin but had later held ecclesiastical office outside the duchy, "necnon Franciae cancellarius 1253, 1258 et 1260" (3). It seems likely that he was the royal choice for there had been a disputed election but Ralph d'Aubusson, a canon of Evreux and the other candidate "nec regi, nec summo pontifici gratus, post triennium, quo sedes idcirco vacavit, juri suo cessit in gratiam Radulfi Grosparmi" (4).

Unfortunately we have insufficient information about the bishops of Avranches, Coutances and Lisieux during this period to know whether Frenchmen were being elected to these sees or not. Moreover, we know nothing about Guy, bishop of Bayeux (1241-60), but we do know that his successor Odo (1263-74) was one of Saint Louis' chaplains (5).

Our knowledge of the origins of the occupants of at least the two most important sees in Normandy must necessarily affect the importance we attach to a certain incident related by

(1) G.C.XI, col.585.
(2) Ibid., col.586.
(3) Ibid., col.587.
(4) Ibid., col.587.
(5) Ibid., col.368.
Matthew Paris under the year 1247. In that year Saint Louis expressed a desire to restore to everyone his rights before he departed upon his crusade, whereupon Henry III promptly demanded the return of the conquered provinces. According to Matthew Paris, Louis consulted the French nobles on the matter but they, of course, advised him not to yield to the demand. Louis then referred the matter to the bishops of Normandy who replied "quod credebant veraciter, quod majus jus habuit rex Francorum in Normannia quam rex Angliae" (1). Even if all seven bishops had been Normans, it is doubtful whether they would have answered otherwise. In the first place, the fact that Saint Louis was preparing for his departure on crusade must have won him the sympathy of most churchmen whatever their place of origin - few can have been disposed to do anything that would delay his departure on so worthy a venture. In the second place, the French nobility had already rejected the English king's demand and once Louis had left France could make things difficult for any incumbent of a Norman see who did not uphold their decision. When one considers that at least the archbishop of Rouen and the bishop of Evreux were Frenchmen, the attitude adopted by the Norman episcopate is even less surprising. All things considered, the bishops' verdict of 1247 can hardly be regarded as "emphatically" recognizing the right of the French kings in Normandy as Powicke has claimed (2). Hence, Matthew Paris' story need not affect our conclusion that the French kings were unable to trust the Norman clergy because of their...

(1) M. Paris...Chron.Maj., IV, 646.

(2) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.276.
close continuing links with England. Whether or not the Norman clergy felt that they were worse off under their new French masters than under Angevin rule must remain an open question. However, the possibility is at least worth considering for we can find no evidence of a deliberately conciliatory policy on the part of the French kings and we know that the Norman Church was definitely worse off in some respects after 1204.
(i) The position of the Norman towns and merchant classes in 1204

There is general agreement in the case of England that on the whole the merchant classes regarded their Angevin kings with favour. Richard and John, especially, encouraged trade by the ready sale of privileges to towns and many urban communities acquired their charters of incorporation in this period. Although these two monarchs frequently exacted heavy tallages from the towns, this arbitrary taxation did not weigh too heavily upon a section of the community whose incomes were expanding rapidly (1).

Much the same sort of situation existed in Normandy. In the introduction to his Cartulaire normand, Delisle lists seventeen Norman towns which are known to have acquired communal status before 1204 (2): in at least seven cases (3), and possibly nine (4), this status was acquired during the reign of John. Other towns were granted valuable commercial privileges in the same period. For example, in July 1199.

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(2) C.N., pp. XV-XVIII, XL.


the men of Breteuil were granted the right to trade throughout the whole of the Angevin Empire "per easdem libertates quas burgenses nostri de Vernolio habent" (1). In May 1200, the men of Andeli were granted "omnes et easdem libertates et liberas consuetudines quas homines nostri de Rothom' in terris et aquis et mari citra mare et ultra mare per omnes terras nostras habent" (2).

On the other hand, the Norman towns were heavily tallaged by the Angevins. Unfortunately we have only isolated scraps of information about John's tallages. For example, the single extant fragment of the Great Roll of the Norman Exchequer for the period from 6th June, 1200 to 6th November, 1201, records that Guérin de Glapion accounted for £200 from the burgesses of Eu and £300 from the mayor of Rouen in respect of tallages imposed on their respective towns (3). Whether these sums constituted the full amounts due or merely instalments is not made clear. The Norman Liberate Roll for the fourth year of John's reign records that in September 1202, Hugh de Montfort was granted £200 Angevin of the tallage paid by the men of Pont-l'Éveque (4). For Richard's reign, the records are fuller. The Great Roll of the Norman Exchequer for the year 1198 reveals the amounts demanded from a large number of towns:

(1) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.5 b.
(2) Ibid. 1199-1216, p.65 b.
(4) R.N., p.63.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caen</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouen</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falaise</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayeux</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisieux</td>
<td>400 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Lo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seez</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alençon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domfront</td>
<td>300 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Pierre-sur-Dive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coutances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontorson</td>
<td>200 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troarn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vire</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goron</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cormeilles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periers-en-Cotentin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Leonard</td>
<td>100 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Pair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrieres</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gavrai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pont-l’Eveque</td>
<td>50 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aufai</td>
<td>29.19.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nor were tallages the only sums which the towns had to find over and above their normal farms. Both Richard and John resorted to loans, free or forced, in order to meet the heavy costs of war and individual merchants were no more successful in escaping this burden than the lay and ecclesiastical magnates or the Jews of the duchy. In 1198, for example, the men of Caen, Lisieux and Rouen, who had already been tallaged to the extent of £4000, £400 and £2000 respectively, apparently lent King Richard the sums of £2500, £60 and £2666.13.4 respectively. In John's reign, the men of Pont-Audemer and the mayor and several prominent citizens of Rouen, were among those obliged to advance money to the king.

The fact that the towns could find sums of such magnitude in addition to their farms is itself a testimony to their flourishing condition in the last few years of Angevin rule. It would appear that they could well afford the royal exactions for, as Powicke has pointed out, "the towns clung more closely to the fortunes of their dukes than

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(5) For example, Jean Luc and Raoul Grognard (*Rot.Lit.Pat.* 1201-16, p.15 b) and Mathieu le Gros (*Ibid.* 1201-16, p.30). These three men were all past or future mayors of Rouen. (A. Chéruel, *Histoire de Rouen pendant l'époque communale, 1150-1382* (Rouen, 1843), I, 360-61).
either the barons or the clergy, and several of them, which had long been accustomed to resist French armies in the uplands of the Caux or along the March, were only persuaded to surrender when all doubt of John's desertion had become impossible"(1). The commercial classes were, of course, entirely governed by self-interest and, as Poole has noted, "the towns and merchants of Normandy were bound to England by mutual commercial interests and privileges"(2). Powicke underestimates the value of these economic links between England and the duchy. After acknowledging that some towns resisted Philip Augustus to the bitter end, he says: "On the other hand, the maintenance of their liberties was too great a boon, and indeed so essential to their prosperity that the towns could not long withstand the generous terms of the tactful Philip. Several communes, such as Eu, had copied the constitutions of towns in Picardy and Ponthieu, and all depended upon their trade with the rest of France and adjacent countries. There were no places, except the important and wealthy Dieppe, which relied especially upon relations with England. Indeed, the only other favourite port of passage, Barfleur, was rather a private landing and arsenal for the English kings than a centre of independent activity"(3). It is true that Philip's policy towards the towns was on the whole a favourable one but this could not compensate entirely for the loss of trading privileges in England. Powicke ought

(2) A.L. Poole, op.cit., p.383.
(3) Sir Maurice Powicke, loc.cit., 641.
at least to have mentioned that Rouen had a great deal to lose from the severance of England and Normandy for this has been clearly demonstrated by a number of French historians\(^1\). Other towns too, lost valuable privileges north of the Channel\(^2\).

Before looking at the effects of the French king's conquest on Norman towns and merchants, it is necessary to look at their relations with England before 1204. Unfortunately, the source material for a study of this kind is extremely limited except in the case of Rouen.

The men of Rouen had been trading regularly with England since long before the Norman Conquest and had received grants of privileges from both Ethelred the Unready and Edward the Confessor\(^3\). Between the end of 1150 and the beginning of September 1151, they obtained from their new duke, Henry Plantagenet, a confirmation of their privileges of all kinds\(^4\). Four clauses of this charter relate to trade with the lands which Henry claimed north of the Channel:

\begin{enumerate}
\item "No ship shall go to Ireland from anywhere in Normandy but Rouen, except one only, which may go once a year from Cherbourg; and every ship coming from Ireland shall, after passing the headland of Guernsey come to Rouen. From each
\end{enumerate}

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item Notably A. Chéruel, \textit{op.cit.} and E. De Fréville, \textit{Mémoire sur le commerce maritime de Rouen depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à la fin du XVIe siècle} (Rouen, 1857).
\item This matter is discussed later in the chapter.
\item E. De Fréville, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.90,98.
\item The English version which is quoted is printed in C.D.F., no. 109. For the Latin text see \textit{Rec.Henri II}, I, no.XIV.
\end{enumerate}
such ship he [i.e. Henry] is to have a tymbrium of marten skins, or £10 of money of Rouen if the merchants of that ship can swear they have no marten skins and are not defrauding the Duke of Normandy of his dues; and the vicomte of Rouen shall have 20 shillings of Rouen from each ship, and the chamberlain a hawk or 16 shillings of Rouen. No stranger shall buy the merchandise in these ships or in any others from beyond the sea except through the men of Rouen; and should anyone do this, half of the merchandise shall be forfeited to the duke, and half to the men of Rouen.

(2) The men of Rouen who are of the merchant gild shall be quit of all dues at London save for wine and porpoise. They shall also be free to go through all the markets of England, saving the king's lawful dues.

(3) And the citizens of Rouen shall have at London, the port of Duugate as they have had from the time of King Edward [i.e. Edward the Confessor] with the right that if they find in that port a ship, whencesoever it be, they may order it to be removed and shall then wait a flood and an ebb, and if the ship be not removed, the citizens of Rouen may, if they will, cut the ropes of that ship and send her out, without liability to claim or penalty; and if that ship be endangered by their action, they shall be responsible to no-one.

(4) No merchant shall pass through Rouen with merchandise, by the Seine, up or down stream, except he be a citizen of Rouen."

Since the lower Seine was the natural outlet for the wines of the Ile-de-France and Burgundy, this last clause effectively
gave Rouen the monopoly of the very important trade in these products (1). When, between August 1174, and April 1175, Henry confirmed and extended these privileges, it was specifically stated "nor shall anyone pass through Rouen taking wine to England, except he dwell at Rouen". In the same charter, Henry conceded to the men of Rouen "freedom throughout his dominions, on both sides of the sea, from all his dues by sea and by land" (2). All these privileges were confirmed by Richard and John in turn (3).

Other Norman towns known to have been freed from all dues throughout the Angevin Empire are Andeli (4), Breteuil (5), Domfront (6) and Verneuil (7). Although no reference has been found to merchants from these four towns visiting England before 1204, merchants from the first two are certainly found there after this date (8). Except in the case of Rouen, the records provide us with virtually no concrete evidence of trade between England and the duchy in the period immediately preceding Philip's conquest. In fact, the only such evidence which has come to light is a single reference to the goods of

(1) E. De Fréville, op.cit., p.108.
(2) The English version which is quoted is printed in C.D.F., no.110. For the Latin text see Rec.Henri II, II, no.DXXVI.
(3) C.D.F., nos.111,112.
(5) Ibid., 1199-1216, p.5 b.
(6) Rec.Henri II, I, no.XCVII.
(7) Ibid., I, no.CCCCIII.
Gilbert fitz Adam, a burgess of Eu, being found at Lincoln and elsewhere in England in June 1202. On the other hand, the existence of trade links between England and Normandy is implied by the granting to certain English towns of commercial privileges in the duchy. For example, in March 1200, John confirmed to the citizens of York, "gildam suam mercariam et hansas suas in Anglia et Normannia". In January 1201, he confirmed to the men of Dover their freedom from a number of dues throughout England and the duchy. In some cases, no doubt, these trade links involved the presence in Normandy of merchants domiciled in England. In other cases, however, the business of English merchants in Normandy was doubtless transacted by merchants domiciled in the duchy; certainly this happened after 1204 and it is a commonplace of English economic history of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that "the overseas trade was largely in the hands of foreign merchants. English shipping was chiefly confined....to the coastal trade".

Although it is clear that the men of Barfleur were kept busy transporting the king's messengers, prisoners,

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(2) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.40 b.
(3) Ibid. 1199-1216, p.83.
(4) Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, p.135; C.P.R. 1247-58, p.27.
(7) Ibid., p.60.
treasure (1), horses (2), dogs (3) and other goods (4) between England and Normandy, one should be wary of dismissing this port as "rather a private landing and arsenal for the English kings than a centre of independent activity" (5). Although no reference has been found to trade between Barfleur and England prior to 1204, the following instruction issued to the bailiffs of Poitou and Gascony in February 1200, suggests that the ships of Barfleur were used for commercial enterprises in the intervals between royal commissions: "Precipimus vobis quod non impediatis vel ab aliquo in balliis vestris impediri permittatis navem Rogeri Wascelin' de Barbeflet' pro eo quod non tenuit conventionem quandam quibusdam hominibus de Wascon' super nave sua illis locanda quoniam illam ad transfretationem nostram in Angliam retinuimus" (6).

If there is very little evidence of trade between England and Normandy prior to the loss of the duchy, there is, as we shall see, considerable evidence of a flourishing trade after that date and it would be unreasonable to suppose that this state of affairs developed suddenly in the year 1204. It is significant, of course, that a great deal of our later evidence of a flourishing trade comes from the Patent and Close Rolls, records which only begin in 1201 and 1204 respectively. In

(1) Ibid., p.58.
(2) Ibid., p.63.
(3) Ibid., p.76.
(4) Ibid., p.115.
(6) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.60.
addition to Rouen, the towns of Barfleur, Dieppe and Caen stand out as enjoying regular commercial intercourse with England after the loss of Normandy.

(ii) The Norman towns and merchant classes under Capetian rule, 1204-59

The lack of sufficient pre-1204 evidence makes it impossible to assess the relative value of their English trade to the Norman towns involved, and hence it is impossible to draw any definite conclusions as to whether Angevin rule was likely to be preferable to Capetian rule. It seems, however, that Rouen and Barfleur, at least, had much to lose from a change in government. Cheruel states the case for Rouen: "Capitale du duché de Normandie, en possession exclusive de la navigation de la Basse-Seine et du commerce avec Angleterre, jouissant de privilèges que lui enviaient les autres villes, Rouen devait craindre de perdre tant de puissance et d'indépendance en passant sous la domination des rois de France. Elle se trouvait à quelques journées de Paris, sur le même fleuve: que deviendrait son monopole commercial, lorsqu'elle obéirait au même maître que la capitale de la France? Du premier rang elle tomberait au second."(1) As for Barfleur, it follows from what has already been said that the men of that port would inevitably suffer a loss of income when the king of England ceased to be duke of Normandy.

The actions of the burgesses of a number of towns during and after the war of 1202-1204, strongly suggest that they

(1) A. Chéruel, op.cit., I, 77-8.
viewed the prospect of a Capetian overlord with disfavour. Although Philip played his cards carefully and confirmed the privileges of towns such as Falaise which surrendered without putting up much of a fight, other towns resisted him until the bitter end. Since by this stage of events there can have been no feeling of loyalty left towards John, it can only have been self-interest which made towns like Arques and Verneuil hang on until Rouen herself was forced to surrender. A military commander put in by John could not have held out without the support of the commercial classes found in a commune like Verneuil or a great administrative centre such as Arques. When Philip Augustus treated with the men of Rouen, he treated with two distinct groups, the knights and the burgesses, and not the former alone. The men of Rouen had prepared for a great siege and only submitted to Philip Augustus when it became quite clear that no help was going to be forthcoming from John. The armistice concluded between the inhabitants of Rouen and the French king on 1st June 1204, reveals that certain burgesses of Eu, Aumale and Drincourt had taken refuge in the Norman capital after their own towns had fallen to Philip. Clearly these men must have felt that even if the French king confirmed their existing privileges so far as he was able, they would be worse off under Capetian rule.

(1) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.261; C.N., no.75.
(3) Rec.Ph.Aug.(2), no.803, pp.380 (line 21) to 381 (line 5).
Two interesting documents survive which show that the men of Dieppe refused to reconcile themselves to French rule for some time after 1204. The first of these is the record of an inquest made about 1208 into John de Rouvrai's administration of the bailiwick of Arques. The relevant sections of this inquisition read as follows:— "Quando Rex Philippus conquisivit Normanniam tradidit ballivam Archiarum Johanni de Roboreto...Johannes de Roboreto posuit servientes domini Regis apud Deppam; et ibi cepit Rogerum de Mortuo Mari, de quo rex habuit M.marcas et de quodam suo milite L.marcas et de nave que eum opportavit XXXV.marcas, et Guillelmus de Wisca qui eum adduxerat ab fugit, et Johannes de Roboreto cepit uxorem illius et redemit eam II libras, quas rex habuit Philippus...Postea fecit capi quendam piscatorem qui piscabatur in aqua Deppe, qui tota est Regis usque ad mare. Burgenses Deppe rescusserunt eum servientibus dicti Johannis, qui fecit appellari per vadia duelli XXIII burgenses Deppe de ditioribus, et qui noluerunt se justiciare per eundum Johannem, fecit poni bonos custodes ad puteum Deppe, ita quod aquam recentem habere non poterant, et tantum eos distринxit quod burgenses fecerunt regi emendam III librarum"(1).

The fact of Roger Mortemer's imprisonment in Normandy is confirmed by the English records; an entry in the Close Rolls reveals that on 18th August, 1205, Isabella Mortemer was granted a loan of 200 marks towards the ransom of her husband Roger(2). The second document is a charter of

(1) C.N., no.167.
(2) Rot.Lit.CI. 1204-24, p.466.
Walter of Coutances, Archbishop of Rouen, dated 24th March, 1207, in which he lists a number of concessions which Philip has made to him in return for the payment of a large fine. Dieppe had been granted to the Archbishop of Rouen by King Richard as part of the Andeli exchange of 1197(1) and one of the concessions which Philip makes is that "quitat...hominis de Deppa de forisfacto illo quad eidem Regi fecerunt eundo cum Rege Anglie in Pictavia et eidem Regi Anglie contra Regem Francie auxilium ferendo"(2). John's Poitou expedition to which reference is made is, of course, the expedition of the summer of 1206(3).

The prevailing view among historians seems to be that, on the whole, Norman towns and merchants were little affected by the change to Capetian rule. When discussing the effects of Philip's conquest of Normandy, Powicke says, "Philip...defined or enlarged the privileges of the towns. Communes of the type of Rouen or Mantes and other French towns spread throughout the duchy. The men of Rouen even came to an agreement with the men of Paris about the commerce of the Seine. Rapidly and imperceptibly the burgesses...lost any interest they had in the old English connection"(4). On the other hand, the work of some French historians, especially the two historians of Rouen whom Powicke cites in his bibliography,(5)

(2) C.N., no.132.
(3) A.L. Poole, op.cit., p.442.
(4) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.279.
shows that there were some adverse effects for the capital at least. At this point it is only fair to say that on another occasion Powicke does mention that some of the communes created by John were not confirmed by Philip Augustus, but he relegates this information to a footnote and offers no comment upon it (1).

Although Luchaire acknowledges that in matters concerning trade, "au total, Philippe se montra toujours plus favorable à ses anciens sujets qu'aux nouveaux" (2) and Delisle suggests that it was "à cause de ces bienfaits et de leurs rapports commerciaux avec l'Angleterre que les bourgeois de Dieppe acceptèrent avec répugnance la domination de Philippe-Auguste" (3), no one seems to have made a detailed investigation into the effects of the conquest on Norman towns and merchants; if the French historians have noted isolated ill-effects, the general impression which they convey is much the same as that conveyed by Powicke. In the case of towns and merchants, however, no one explicitly claims, as in the case of the Church (4), that Philip and his successors adopted a definite policy of conciliation. Indeed, Strayer remarks that "on the whole there is no evidence that the French kings of the thirteenth century tried to promote commerce or protect the towns, at least in Normandy. If towns throve and commerce increased

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(3) *C.N.*, p.XVII.
(4) E. Lavissee, ed. *op.cit.*, III (i), 211.
it was because the Capetians gave Normandy a century of peace and orderly government and if the third estate sided with the kings, it was in gratitude for these general benefits, and not for specific favours.'

If no one explicitly states that Philip and his successors adopted a definite policy of conciliation towards the Norman towns, Powicke's statements that "Philip... defined or enlarged the privileges of the towns" and that "Communes of the type of Rouen or of Mantes and other French towns spread throughout the duchy" more or less imply it. In support of these statements, Powicke cites Delisle's section on the Norman communes in his introduction to the Cartulaire normand and a number of charters in the Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste. These two sources do in fact provide most of the evidence which has survived for grants of town privileges made by King Philip, but they hardly support Powicke's claims, explicit or implied.

In all, charters survive for grants made by Philip to eight towns only. Four of these grants were made while the French king was still in the process of overrunning Normandy and before he was effectively master of the whole duchy. In May 1204, Philip confirmed the right of the men of Falaise to a commune of the type of Rouen. In addition he granted them exemption from all customs throughout his realm, except at


(2) Compare C. Petit-Dutaillis, "Querimoniae Normannorum", Essays in Medieval History presented to Thomas Frederick Trout, ed. A.G. Little and F.M. Powicke (Manchester, 1925), 100.

Mantes, and undertook not to arrest any burgess for usury "nisi denarium pro denario alicui commodaverit"\(^{(1)}\). As Giry says 'la confirmation...de sa constitution par Philippe-Auguste, lorsqu'il arriva devant la ville, contribua sans doute à en hâter la prompte reddition''\(^{(2)}\). The men of Caen and Pont-Audemer obtained charters from Philip in similar circumstances. The charters were both issued after the 1st June but before the capitulation of Rouen on the 24th of that month. The men of Caen obtained a confirmation of their commune while Philip undertook, as in the case of Falaise, not to arrest any burgess for usury. Philip also exempted the burgesses from any bad customs levied by King John which had not been levied in the time of Henry II and promised not to force their widows or heirs to marry against their will\(^{(3)}\). The men of Pont-Audemer obtained just a confirmation of their commune\(^{(4)}\).

When on the 1st June, terms were agreed upon for the capitulation of Rouen if help was not received from John within thirty days, Philip promised to respect the commercial privileges of the burgesses of the Norman capital\(^{(5)}\). It seems to have been 1207, however, before the men of Rouen received a full charter of privileges from the French king\(^{(6)}\). Since Giry has presented a detailed analysis of this charter in his *Les*

\(^{(2)}\) A. Giry, *op.cit.*, I, 48.
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid., no.809.
\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., no.803, pp.381-2.
Établissements de Rouen(1), there is no need to repeat the exercise here. It is sufficient for present purposes to record just the general characteristics of the new grant. Nineteen of the charter's twenty-seven clauses relate to privileges enjoyed before 1204 although they "n'en reproduisent pas cependant la teneur exacte; il semble que le rédacteur ait voulu éclaircir et expliquer ces divers privilèges et empêcher qu'ils pussent prêter à aucune équivoque"(2).

Adjustments were also necessary to take into account the changed circumstances after 1204. For example, where the first clause of John's charter of 1200 had granted certain privileges "per totam terram nostram"(3), which included his lands north of the Channel, Philip could only grant the same privileges throughout such of the former Angevin possessions on the continent as he now possessed(4). Similarly - a point which Giry does not make - whole clauses had to be omitted for the same reason. For example, the fourteenth clause of John's charter of 1200 in which he confirmed to the citizens of Rouen their port of Dowgate in London(5), was no longer relevant after 1204. On the other hand, the eight remaining clauses of Philip's charter all grant new concessions. Since it is impossible to assess the relative value of the privileges lost and the privileges gained, it is impossible to know whether their new charter left the men of Rouen better or worse off than they had been in 1204.

(1) A Giry, op.cit., I, 32-3; II, 56-63.
(2) Ibid., I, 32.
(3) A. Chéruel, op.cit., I, 250.
(4) A. Giry, op.cit., II, 56.
(5) A. Chéruel, op.cit., I, 253.
Within less than a year from the conquest, four more towns had obtained charters from the French king. The men of Verneuil were granted freedom from all customs payable to the king in certain named areas, and were promised that under certain specified conditions the king would not extract anything from them on the death of a usurer. The burgesses, on their part, promised Philip that they would not provide refuge in their commune for men or women of the royal demesne, or the demesne of Robert de Courtenay. The use of the term "sua communia" implies its confirmation (1). The men of Breteuil were exempted from three specified customs dues in the areas named in the grant to the men of Verneuil. This grant was made to the "burgesses" of Breteuil, which again means that implicitly, at least, Philip was confirming their commune (2). The men of Nonancourt and Andeli were also granted communes, apparently for the first time. The former obtained a commune on the model of that of Verneuil and were also granted the same customs exemptions as the men of Breteuil (3). The latter were granted a commune of the type formerly granted by Louis VII to the men of Mantes (4).

Although no charters of confirmation survive, we know from other evidence that Montivilliers, Fécamp, Dieppe and Eu all remained communes after Philip's conquest of the duchy (5).

(2) Ibid., no. 876.
(3) Ibid., no. 877.
(4) Ibid., no. 782.
(5) C.N., pp. XVII-XVIII; A. Giry, op.cit., I, 52.
Such, then, is the evidence for Philip's policy towards the Norman towns during and shortly after the conquest of 1204. The first question which we must now consider is how far this evidence supports Powicke's statement that Philip "defined or enlarged the privileges of the towns". Presumably confirmation is one aspect of definition and we find that ten towns had their communes confirmed, either explicitly (1) or implicitly (2). However, we ought not to look at the positive evidence only. It must also be noted that at least five towns did not retain their communal status after 1204. The towns concerned are Alençon, Aunai, Bayeux, Domfront and Harfleur (3). It is true that all these towns except Bayeux had been granted their communes as recently as John's reign (4), but whatever historians may make of this fact, it is unlikely to have made the towns concerned view the cancellation of their communal privileges with complete equanimity. A number of historians take the view that the Norman communes created by John were created for military reasons only, although Packard believes that John's primary motive was financial. The detailed arguments of the controversy are reviewed in Packard's article "The Norman Communes under Richard and John, 1189-1204" (5) and need not concern us here. Whichever view one supports, one is

(1) Caen, Falaise, Pont-Audemer and Rouen.

(2) Breteuil, Dieppe, Eu, Fécamp, Montivilliers and Verneuil.

(3) C.N., pp.XV-XVIII.

(4) Ibid., pp.XV-XVIII.

bound to agree with Packard that "a feudal society could not produce communities over night suitable for such grants...Such groups must in the very nature of things have evolved slowly. They could not have been constructed deliberately at any time for military or for other reasons. John could hardly have altered more than a legal status; he could have created little" (1). Communities which felt themselves qualified for communal status and which had enjoyed it for however short a time, were bound to look with disfavour upon those who subsequently deprived them of it. Such discontent would not necessarily make its mark on the records but that is not to say that it did not exist.

Another aspect of "definition" is presumably the re-statement of former privileges to accord with the changed circumstances after 1204. Although by the juxtaposition of the words "defined" and "enlarged", Powicke implies that the results of the process of definition were favourable, we have already seen that in the case of Rouen, the reverse could in fact be true. If we look more closely at the charters granted to Falaise, Breteuil and Verneuil, we find that in each case a clause which appears to be granting a new concession - exemption from certain customs dues - is actually a re-statement of a former privilege; in two out of the three cases the results are definitely unfavourable. On 11th August, 1203, John had granted the men of Falaise freedom from all customs throughout his dominions, except at London (2). As we have seen, in May

(1) S.R. Packard, loc. cit., 235.
(2) A. Giry, op. cit., 1, 48 and note 3.
1204, Philip granted them freedom from all customs through his dominions, except at Mantes\(^{(1)}\). It is entirely a matter of conjecture whether the new concessions within France matched, exceeded or failed to reach the value of the lost concessions north of the Channel and in Aquitaine. At least, however, Philip was offering some sort of compensation for the privileges lost in 1204. Breteuil and Verneuil were not as fortunate as Falaise. On 24th July, 1199, King John had granted the men of Breteuil "ut emant et vendant per totam terram nostram per easdem libertates quas burgenses nostri de Vernolio habent"\(^{(2)}\). An examination of the grants made to Breteuil and Verneuil shortly after the conquest shows that henceforth the men of both towns were only to enjoy their liberties in the former Angevin possessions now held by the French king; they were not given any rights in France to compensate for their losses elsewhere\(^{(3)}\).

If we turn to an examination of Powicke's statement that Philip "enlarged the privileges of the towns", we soon find that he is only presenting one side of the coin. It is true that some towns gained privileges after 1204, but it is equally true that others lost privileges. We have already seen that a number of towns apparently lost their communal status, after the conquest of the duchy. We have seen, too, that Rouen gained some new privileges but lost others. Two

\(^{(2)}\) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.5 b.
more towns which seem to have lost privileges are Andeli and Domfront. On 30th May, 1200, John granted the men of Andeli "omnes et easdem libertates et liberas consuetudines quas homines nostri de Rothom' in terris et aquis et mari, citra mare et ultra mare, per omnes terras nostras habent ...
Concessimus etiam...quod non eant aliqua de causa in aliquam expeditionem sive chevalcheam quod non possint redire ad hospitia sua eadem die qua decesserunt sicut carta Regis Ricardi fratri nostri quam habent rationabiliter testatur"(1). The first of these concessions would, of course, have required modification after 1204 but neither of the two concessions appears in any form in the charter granted by Philip shortly after the conquest(2). Domfront had enjoyed freedom from all dues throughout the Angevin empire since at least 1159(3), but no indication has been found that she retained this privilege, even in its inevitably modified form, after 1204: it seems likely that it went the way of her commune. On the other hand, other towns apart from Rouen may have received additional privileges. The concessions to Falaise, Caen and Verneuil concerning usurers appear to have been new concessions(4).

Powicke's claim that "communes of the type of Rouen or of Mantes and other French towns spread throughout the duchy"

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(1) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.65 b.
(3) Rec.Henri II, 1, no.XCVII.
(4) See above, pp.152-155. Nonancourt and Andeli are dealt with separately below because they obtained communes, apparently for the first time.
is not borne out by the evidence available to us. As we have seen, the only new communes indicated by the surviving evidence are those of Nonancourt and Andeli. Neither of these cases can really be regarded as substantiating Powicke's comment even if the grant of two communes could be regarded as justifying the use of the word "spread". In the first place, Nonancourt, whose commune was modelled on that of Verneuil, had been ceded to Philip in 1195-6(1) and was not therefore a part of his conquests of 1202-1204. In the second place, the commune modelled on that of Mantes which Philip granted to Andeli either never came into existence or was very short-lived. The record of its issue has been cancelled in one of the Registers of Philip Augustus; it is not recorded in his other Registers and there seem to be no later references to a commune at Andeli(2). Not only is Powicke's remark unsubstantiated by the evidence but it seems that the position of Normandy as regards the creation of new communes compares unfavourably with that of Philip's other recently acquired territories(3).

In the context in which he sets it, Powicke's observation that "the men of Rouen even came to an agreement with the men of Paris about the commerce of the Seine" more or less implies that with this matter settled, the Norman towns continued

(2) C.N., p.XV.
(3) E. Lavisse, ed. op.cit., III, (i), 230.
trading as before. However, the French historians of Rouen (1) have shown that this was not true of the capital at least. As Chéruel and Fréville have dealt at some length with the immediate effects of the conquest on the commerce of Rouen, it is only necessary here to summarize their remarks and indicate where they may be applied to other towns as well.

There seems to be general agreement that the worst consequence for Rouen of the events of 1204 was the suspension of her flourishing commercial relations with England and Ireland. Although these relations were renewed when a truce was agreed upon in October 1206, the Rouennais lost for ever the special privileges which they had enjoyed in England before Philip's conquest. Moreover, trade was again impeded every time the war between England and France was renewed. Although it is impossible to assess the relative importance of Rouen's trade with England in her economy as a whole, it is clear from the English records of the period that the volume of trade was considerable. Three other towns stand out as enjoying regular commercial relations with England after 1204; they are Caen, Dieppe and Barfleur. These towns, too, must have suffered considerably from the separation of England and Normandy (2).

It was not only trade with England which was affected, but also trade with the Angevin possessions on the continent which King John managed to retain. An entry in the earliest

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(1) Notably A. Chéruel, op.cit. and E. De Fréville, op.cit.
(2) The question of Anglo-Norman trade after 1204 will be dealt with at greater length later in this chapter.
of Philip’s Registers reads: "Hec est prohibitio quod nulla navis possit afferre vina in Normanniam nec de Pictavia nec de Gasconia, nec de Andegavia, et si venerit, ad opus regis retineatur. Sed in quadrigis potest afferri de Oblanc et de Bituresio et de Andegavia; et de Francia et de Burgundia possunt afferre per aquam" (1). This entry follows immediately after the terms for the capitulation of Rouen and consequently Delisle in his Catalogue des actes de Philippe-Auguste (1856) (2) and the editors of the Recueil des Actes de Philippe-Auguste, II (1943) (3) have ascribed to it the date "vers 1204". However, in his Cartulaire normand (1852) Delisle entered the measure under the date "vers 1210" (4). Freville accepts this later date (5) and consequently describes the measure as "un coup funeste au commerce maritime de Rouen" (6) which, indeed, it would have been if it had been issued in 1210 and intended as a permanent measure. However, apart from its position in Philip’s Register, there are other factors which suggest that the measure dates from the year 1204. In the first place, it was usual in the thirteenth century for trade between enemy territories to be temporarily suspended during times of war (7).

(2) C.A.Ph.Aug., no.889.
(4) C.N., no.186.
(5) Although he actually cites Ordonnances des Roys de France de la Troisième Race (Paris, 1723-1849), XI, 317, where no date is given.
(7) For example, H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, p.92.
but when peace was re-established, trade was normally resumed; from the summer of 1204, Gascony and Poitou were enemy territory as far as Normandy’s new master was concerned but by 1210 a state of truce existed between the French king and King John. Secondly, the measure does not seem to have remained in force, which again suggests that it was a war-time measure only. Michel shows, in his *Histoire du commerce et de la navigation à Bordeaux*, that wine from Gascony was imported into Normandy throughout the thirteenth century\(^1\), while the English records show that Norman merchants also brought wine from Poitou and Gascony into this country\(^2\). Thus, the measure was not as harmful as Fréville suggests. Nevertheless, it presumably remained in force until the truce of 1206 and must have contributed to Rouen’s dissatisfaction with the changed conditions brought about by Philip’s conquest. Presumably, too, it would be enforced on each subsequent occasion when England and France were at war. Fréville was naturally only concerned with the effects of this measure on the city whose history he was recording; it should be noted, however, that the measure applied to the whole of Normandy and not just to the men of Rouen. Merchants from other towns, notably Caen\(^3\), Dieppe\(^4\) and Barfleur\(^5\), are known to have traded in the wines of Aquitaine, and they, too, would be adversely affected by the measure.

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\(^{1}\) F. Michel, *Histoire du commerce et de la navigation à Bordeaux principalement sous l’administration anglaise* (Bordeaux, 1867), 1, 130-31.

\(^{2}\) e.g. Pat.R. 1225-32, p.380.

\(^{3}\) e.g. Pat.R. 1225-32, p.59.

\(^{4}\) e.g. Cl.R. 1227-31, p.418.

\(^{5}\) e.g. C.P.R. 1232-47, p.396.
Not only were the men of Rouen unlikely to find any real compensation within Philip's dominions for their losses elsewhere, but they were faced with the commercial rivalry of the men of Paris, especially with regard to rights of navigation on the Seine (1). Before the conquest of Normandy, the navigation rights of the men of both cities had been clearly defined. The men of Paris had the exclusive right of navigation from Paris as far as Mantes, while the men of Rouen had the monopoly from Mantes to the sea. After Philip's conquest, however, the men of Paris began to challenge the rights of the men of Rouen (2). The agreement between the men of both cities to which Powicke refers was a reciprocal agreement revealed by a charter of the year 1210. This charter is actually Philip's confirmation of an agreement "super contencione sacramenti de societate mercature que erat inter burgenses nostros Parisienses et burgenses Rothomagenses" but it reveals in passing the existence of an agreement whereby the burgesses of each town enjoyed the privileges of the burgesses of the other (3). One should not assume, however, that because this agreement was reciprocal, it was necessarily mutually beneficial. While it is impossible to prove who benefited most without the possession of detailed trade statistics, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the men of Paris gained more than the men of Rouen. Certainly, we know of at least one way in which Philip treated the men of Rouen less favourably than the men of the French capital. Prior to Philip's conquest of

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(2) E. De Fréville, op.cit., p.213; A. Chéruel, op.cit., I, 112.
Normandy, the men of Rouen had been granted the privilege of accounting for the revenues which the king possessed in their town; this spared them exploitation at the hands of a royal prévôt, or viscount of the water as the equivalent official in Rouen had been called (1). However, as Fréville has noted, after the conquest Philip, "qui voulait affaiblir Rouen au profit de sa capitale" (2), resumed the ancient practice of appointing a viscount of the water and restored to this official many of his former functions. This policy was "tout le contraire de ce que ses prédécesseurs et lui-même avaient fait à Paris" (3).

It seems then, that far from adopting a deliberate policy of conciliation, Philip Augustus did little to compensate Norman towns and merchants for the losses which they inevitably incurred as a result of the events of 1204, and in a few cases provided grounds for discontent by his own actions. If we search the French records for manifestations of discontent, these are not entirely lacking even in the small amount of source material which survives. We have already noted Dieppe's disaffection in the years 1204-1206. If we look more closely at the circumstances in which Rouen obtained her charter of privileges in 1207, the evidence suggests that in the capital itself there may have been a resurgance of opposition to the French king after the city's formal capitulation on 24th June 1204. The author of the Chronicon Sanctae Katherinae records

(1) L. Delisle, "Des revenues publics en Normandie au douzième siècle" B.E.C., X (1848-9), 283.
(2) E. De Fréville, op.cit., p.183.
under the year 1207 that "Rex Francorum, Philippus, mense maio, manu armata, quamvis nemo resisteret, Rothomagum primo intravit, et a civibus ejusdem urbis pecuniam multam et multa donaria suscepit"(1). Resistance to the French king was, of course, impossible, because the city's defences had been destroyed at the time of her submission in 1204(2). If Philip's visit had not in fact been provoked by manifestations of hostility towards himself, his extortions on the occasion of his visit must have aroused such hostility. Certainly Philip seems to have felt it expedient to grant Rouen a charter of privileges later in 1207(3).

According to the extant evidence, no further material concessions were made to the Norman towns by Philip Augustus between 1207 and November 1220(4). Then in November, 1220, he surrendered in favour of the burgesses of Caen certain rights which he had previously claimed in connection with deceased usurers and the marriage of burgesses' daughters(5). In February 1221, the same concessions were granted to the burgesses of Falaise(6). Meanwhile, in December 1220, he had granted the burgesses of Rouen the fee which the Count of Leicester had held in Rouen and its neighbourhood(7). Although

(1) Quoted by A. Chéruel, op.cit., I, 101.
(2) Ibid., I, 100.
(4) Although in 1218, at the request of the archbishop of Rouen, he instructed all his bailiffs in Normandy to bring to justice the usurers in their bailiwicks "sicut consuevistis" (C.N., no.253).
(5) C.N., no.290.
(6) Ibid., no.292.
(7) Ibid., no.291.
the truce between England and France had been prolonged for four years in March 1220 (1), it is nevertheless interesting that Philip should suddenly make new concessions to the three most important towns in Normandy; one cannot help wondering whether they had shown some restlessness during the negotiations for the new truce and Philip had felt it expedient, once matters were settled, to make a gesture of goodwill towards them. After his grant to Falaise, Philip does not seem to have made any further grants to Norman towns before his death.

In the "Catalogue des actes de Louis VIII" compiled by Petit-Dutaillis, only eight entries out of a total of four hundred and sixty, relate to Louis' relations with the Norman towns. Moreover, four of these eight entries relate to Rouen. At some time in 1224, Louis confirmed the charter of privileges granted to the men of Rouen by his father in 1207 (2); in January of the same year he promised to make those men owing money to the inhabitants of Rouen come to the city to discharge their debts (3) and in the following May he granted the burgesses of the city "les arrière-fossés de la ville, et, moyennant 20 livres tournois de rente, la terre de Roumare; il leur cède aussi la partie du vieux château de Rouen située du côté du pont; les bourgeois pourront agrandir les quais, sous certaines conditions" (4). On the other hand, however, it is recorded

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(1) Foedera, I (i), 158.
(2) C. Petit-Dutaillis, Étude sur la vie et le règne de Louis VIII (1187-1226) (Paris, 1894), Catalogue des Actes de Louis VIII, no.64.
(3) Ibid., no.62.
(4) Ibid., no.113.
that at some time during his reign, "Louis VIII reconnait devoir à la ville de Rouen 500 livres tournois"\(^1\); it seems that it was not only the Angevins who extracted large loans from the Norman towns. In January 1224, Louis authorized the burgesses of Pont-Audemer to build new market halls, in return for an annual rent of fifteen pounds tournois\(^2\) and in the following May, he confirmed their commune\(^3\). The two remaining entries record charters of confirmation for the burgesses of Verneuil and Breteuil in respect of their freedom from certain dues within Normandy\(^4\). Thus, the surviving evidence does not suggest that Louis VIII's policy towards the Norman towns differed in any material way from that of his father. Only four charters survive as evidence of Louis IX's policy towards the Norman towns between his accession and the Treaty of Paris in 1259. The earliest of these is a confirmation of the charters granted to Rouen by his father and grandfather\(^5\); the other three are merely royal confirmations of agreements reached between the burgesses of Rouen and some third party\(^6\).

Although some of their number certainly incurred losses as a result of Philip's conquest, the burgesses and merchants of Normandy seem to have suffered less at the hands of the king's administrative officials than any other section of

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\(^1\) Ibid., no.454.
\(^2\) Ibid., no.61.
\(^3\) Ibid., no.114.
\(^4\) Ibid., nos.85-6; Compare Rec.Ph.Aug.(2), nos.879-80,876.
\(^5\) C.N., no.356.
\(^6\) Ibid., nos.569,1187,1189.
the community. For example, there are in the Querimoniae Normannorum only ten instances of complaints being made by men described as burgesses, merchants or representatives "pro tota villa"(1). From two of these complaints we learn that in times of peace, at least, merchants were usually specially privileged as far as visits to England were concerned.

Nicholas de Quillebouef of Pont-Audemer complained that the king had confiscated his father's lands "pro eo quod pater istius, nec miles, nec nobilis existens, sed mercator, cum pro mercimonio suo ivisset in Angliam, ibidem est defunctus"(2). A similar complaint by Richard le Brun states that the trip to England by his relative had been made "tempore pacis"(3). In one of the cases of complaint, an individual merchant had suffered because the king had upheld the judicial rights of the town of Verneuil as well as the royal rights(4). If the Querimoniae Normannorum reveal a few complaints against the king or his agents, they also reveal in passing at least one gift granted to a town which would not otherwise have been known to us; Matthew de Beaumont claimed that he had suffered losses because the king had given the burgesses of Alençon twenty acres of forest adjoining the area where he had the right to sell wood and men who had previously bought from him now bought from the men of Alençon(5). On another occasion, a

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(1) Q.N. nos.70,224,236,250,253,256,347,353,479,519.
(2) Ibid., no.70.
(3) Ibid., no.353.
(4) Ibid., no.256.
(5) Ibid., no.524.
complaint was made against a burgess who held royal lands at farm: nine men from four parishes in the neighbourhood of Falaise claimed that twenty five years previously when Peter de Ponte de Oilleio, burgess of Falaise, had held at farm the royal lands in their parishes, he had exacted from them double their usual rents (1).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how Powicke reached the conclusion that "rapidly and imperceptibly the burgesses...lost any interest they had in the old English connection"(2). Indeed, a close examination of the available source material provides a considerable amount of contrary evidence. We have already seen that the French sources reveal that Dieppe was disaffected in 1205-6 while Rouen seems to have offended Philip in some way early in 1207. But for the evidence of the English records, one could perhaps have discounted these incidents as part of the process of adjustment in the period immediately following the conquest of the duchy. However, the English records reveal that economic links between England and Normandy remained strong after 1204, and that on more than one occasion the English king received positive assistance from Norman burgesses and merchants in his struggle against the Capetians.

(iii) Anglo-Norman commercial relations, 1204-1259

Before looking at the commercial relations of England and Normandy on a chronological basis, it will be useful

(1) Ibid., no.384.
(2) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.279.
to make a few generalisations about the nature and extent of Anglo-Norman trade. However, these generalisations must be preceded by a warning about the nature of the evidence. In the first place, almost all the evidence concerning trade between England and Normandy comes from the English records (1). In the second place, the bulk of the references to Anglo-Norman trade occur in times of war between England and France when it was necessary to distinguish between merchants of the French king's dominions and merchants from elsewhere. Consequently, therefore, we must beware of thinking that the evidence provides anything like a full picture of the economic links between England and the duchy after 1204.

As far as one can tell, Anglo-Norman trade seems to have been rather one-sided in that Norman merchants came to England far more frequently than English merchants went to Normandy. Although this trend is probably exaggerated by our sources, which are primarily English, it is generally recognised that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries England's overseas trade was largely in the hands of foreign merchants (2).

More often than not, references to merchants involved in Anglo-Norman trade give no indication of the nature of their goods (3). We have, however, sufficient evidence to give us a fairly clear picture of the main commodities exchanged. Clearly wine was the chief export from Normandy into England. This wine had

(1) See above, pp.17-18.


(3) e.g. *Rot.Lit.Pat.* 1201-16, pp.49 b, 52, 97 b.
previously been imported into Normandy from Anjou (1), Aquitaine (2), the Ile-de-France (3) and Burgundy (4). A variety of other goods were taken from the duchy to England but references to all of them are relatively few; they include Caen stone (5), arms and armour (6), woad (7), clothing and furs (8) and on at least one occasion, a ship (9). The chief commodities taken from England to Normandy seem to have been wool (10), hides (11), salt (12), grain (13), herrings (14) and tin (15).

Although we have a considerable amount of information about the English ports which Norman merchants frequented, we know much less about the inland markets at which they bought and sold their goods. Hardly surprisingly, the ports most frequented were those on the south coast of England, ranging from Plympton (16) in the west to Sandwich (17) in the east and

(1) e.g. Pat.R. 1225-32, p.12.
(2) e.g.. Ibid., 1225-32, p.386.
(3) e.g. Ibid., 1225-32, p.15.
(4) e.g. Ibid., 1225-32, p.15.
(6) Cl.R. 1234-47, pp.45,63.
(7) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.217 b; Cl.R. 1242-7, p.98.
(8) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, pp.50 b,55.
(10) Cl.R. 1237-42, pp.27,474.
(14) Cl.R. 1237-42, pp.461,466.
(16) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.514.
including Dartmouth (1), Southampton (2), Portsmouth (3), Shoreham (4), Seaford (5), Winchelsea (6) and Dover (7). Of these, Southampton, Portsmouth, Shoreham and Sandwich were particularly well patronised. On the east coast of England, the Normans visited London (8), Ipswich (9) and Dunwich (10) in Suffolk; Yarmouth (11) and Lynn (12) in Norfolk; Boston (13), Lincolnshire, and Scarborough (14), Yorkshire; on the West coast they visited Bristol (15). The only inland towns which have made their mark on the records as having enjoyed visits from Norman merchants are York (16), Northampton (17) and St Ives in Huntingdonshire (18).

Sometimes merchants from the duchy are merely described in the records as "mercatores de Normannia" without any further

(1) Cl.R. 1234-7, p.72.
(2) Ibid., 1237-42, p.474.
(3) Ibid., 1253-4, p.126.
(4) Ibid., 1227-31, p.363.
(6) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.2.
(7) Ibid., 1237-42, p.467.
(8) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.304.
(10) Cl.R. 1227-31, p.457.
(11) Ibid., 1227-31, p.291.
(12) Ibid., 1227-31, p.203.
(13) Ibid., 1227-31, p.358.
(15) Ibid., 1204-24, p.81.
(17) Cl.R. 1242-7, p.98.
identification; more often, however, the merchant's name is given in full together with the name of the town from which he came. It is possible, therefore, to see which towns and individual merchants enjoyed particularly close economic links with England after 1204. Four towns stand out well above the rest as enjoying frequent commercial intercourse with England. As one would expect from the pre-1204 evidence already examined, Rouen seems to top the table: Dieppe and Barfleur, probably in that order, lie second and third with Caen a relatively poor fourth. Towns whose names occur in the records rather less frequently include Andeli, Breteuil, Vire, Leure, Ouistreham, Tréport and Varville.

Compared with the references to Norman merchants who visited England, the references to English merchants who visited the duchy are relatively very few. Sometimes the destination

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(1) Ibid., 1224-7, pp.112 b, 191 b; Cl.R. 1234-7, p.63.
(2) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, pp.49 b (Caen), 52 (Rouen), 97 b (Dieppe).
(5) Ibid., 1204-24, p.81.
(7) Ibid., 1225-32, p.375.
(8) Ibid., 1225-32, p.375.
(9) Ibid., 1225-32, p.115.
(10) Ibid., 1225-32, p.45.
of English visitors is merely given as Normandy (1), but in a few cases more detailed information is given; among the towns which receive visits from English merchants are Rouen (2), Caen (3), Pont-Audemer (4) and Dieppe (5). Nor is the point of departure in England always specified. Alexander of Wareham (6) and Laurence of London (7) may have taken their surnames from the towns to which they belonged but this is not necessarily so. On the other hand, we know that Godfrey fitz Henry who went to Normandy to buy a boat came from the port of Winchelsea (8). Evidence can also be found for visits to Normandy by merchants of Lynn (9), Yarmouth (9) and Bristol (10).

It seems that English merchants sometimes employed Normans to bring goods from the duchy on their behalf. In June, 1213, for example, the king instructed the bailiffs of Lynn to release "Ricardum Lameress", Normannum, hominem Radulfi Pigat' de London'" whom they had arrested in accordance with his order for the arrest of all Normans (11). Similarly, in September

(2) Cl.R. 1234-7, p. 89.
(3) Cl.R. 1234-7, p. 89.
(4) Cl.R. 1234-7, p. 89.
(5) Ibid., 1237-42, pp. 466, 474; Ibid., 1242-7, p. 72.
(7) Ibid., 1201-16, p. 57 b.
(9) Cl.R. 1234-7, p. 89.
(10) Ibid., 1242-7, p. 72.
1248, Henry III granted "to Walter le Buffle of London that William de Horslavill' of Dieppe may bring his ship with merchandise of the said Walter to London for this time and thence return to his own parts"(1).

It was not only through their commercial relations with England that the merchants of Normandy came into contact with John and Henry III. There was also a flourishing trade, after 1204 as before, between Normandy and England's remaining continental possessions; Norman merchants visited Poitou(2) and Gascony(3) and merchants from these areas visited the duchy(4). The basis of the commercial relations between the two areas was the importation into Normandy of the wines of Aquitaine(5).

In his Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, Pirenne notes that "In time of war, the enemy merchants were arrested, their goods confiscated and their vessels siezed. The prohibition of trade was a common means of coercion"(6). At first, however, John had a more sophisticated way of dealing with the merchants of his enemy. As early as July 1202, he had imposed on merchants of the French king's dominions a customs duty amounting to one fifteenth of all goods imported and exported(7).

(1) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.27.
(2) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.45.
(3) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.396.
(6) H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, p.92.
The full details of this scheme are not known in its early stages but on 4th June, 1204, John issued detailed regulations for its operation\(^{(1)}\). These regulations tell us that as well as collecting the customs duties, the bailiffs of the fifteenth had to ensure that no arms or foodstuffs were exported from England. This system had obvious advantages over a total ban on foreign merchants. Firstly, the English king increased his revenues; secondly, English merchants could still sell most goods to foreign merchants and hence were not deprived of an important market, and thirdly, England still received imports which she needed. On the other hand, the amount of money going from England to France was reduced, and the French could not obtain vital foodstuffs or arms from England. By 1204, the fifteenth was being collected from all foreign merchants and the Normans now came into this category. Early in 1205, however, John seems to have changed his tactics, probably because England herself was now under threat of invasion by the French king. In February 1205, he ordered that henceforward no ship of any kind was to enter or leave an English port without a royal licence\(^{(2)}\). This order seems to have remained in force until the truce of October 1206. Until then, Norman merchants who came to this country without royal letters of protection were liable to have their goods seized. In May 1205, for example, King John informed the bailiffs of Ipswich that he was lending the men of that town twenty marks of silver which they had seized from men from Rouen and Caen\(^{(3)}\).

\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., 1201-16, p.50.
\(^{(3)}\) Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, p.33 b.
However, individual merchants on both sides of the Channel were granted special concessions at various times during the war. The terms of these special licences vary from one grant to another. Sometimes a licence applied to a single specified cargo only, and sometimes a time limit was imposed. For example, on 12th January 1206, Alexander of Wareham obtained a licence which permitted him to take one shipload of salt and hides from England to Normandy without any mention of a time limit (1). However, eight days earlier when Laurence of London had obtained a licence permitting him to take a shipload of grain to Normandy or Flanders, it was specifically stated that the licence would only last until Easter 1206 (2). Sometimes, however, licences were couched in more general terms. When a licence was granted to Laurence du Donjon, a citizen of Rouen (3), not only was no time limit imposed but the only restriction relating to his cargo was the provision "quod nullius res vel merchandisas advocet praeter res et merchandisas suas proprias" (4). When Richard le Petit of Ouistreham was granted permission to come to England "cum vinis et aliis mercendas suis", the King specified that this concession should last "quamdui nobis placuerit" (5). During this period only one case has been found where it is recorded that a Norman merchant obtained a special licence through the intercession of a third party.

(2) Ibid., 1201-16, p.57 b.
(3) For evidence that Laurence was a citizen of Rouen, see Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, pp.86,105 b and index.
(5) Ibid., 1201-16, p.62 b.
In April, 1205, King John granted letters of safe-conduct to Ralph Ainiot of Rouen "pro amore Roberti de Vetriponte" (1). If this is the Robert de Vieuxpont who chose the English allegiance in 1204 and lost his Norman lands (2), then this is an early illustration of the maintenance of a personal connection in spite of geographical and political separation. It is interesting to note that the king himself engaged in commercial transactions with Norman merchants. In September, 1205, John issued instructions for the payment of certain sums of money to William Anglicus of Rouen, including "xij. marcas pro penulis quas de eo emimus" (3). It is possible, of course, that the king was merely honouring debts incurred before the loss of the duchy. However, in October, 1205, he ordered Reginald de Cornhill "quod de sabelinis quas Willelmus Anglicus de Rothom' vobis ostendet, ematis tres ad opus nostrum si bone fuerint ita quod non sint meliores in Anglia" (4).

It was not only when they entered English ports without special licence from King John that Norman merchants were liable to come to harm. By the year 1205 the English king had obtained the services of the notorious Channel pirate, Eustace the Monk (5), who played an active part against his enemies (6). After his

(1) Ibid., 1201-16, p.52.
(2) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.357.
(3) Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, p.50 b.
(4) Ibid., 1204-24, p.55.
capture of the Channel Islands in 1205\(^{(1)}\), he used them as a base from which to launch attacks on Channel shipping and the Norman coast. It is probably about this time that his celebrated encounter with Cadoc took place. The Norman ports of Harfleur, Pont-Audemer and Barfleur all received visits from Eustace and from the latter he extracted a tribute of thirty silver marks\(^{(2)}\).

Although some concessions were made to individual Norman merchants, there can be no doubt that Norman merchants in general were treated as his enemies by the English king. Those merchants who were not specially favoured must have incurred considerable losses during the two years or more when normal trading relations between England and the duchy were suspended. Since these losses were directly connected with the change of government, it is hardly surprising that some sections of the merchant classes showed hostility towards their new Capetian king\(^{(3)}\).

After the truce of October 1206, normal trading relations were resumed. One of the provisions of the truce was that there should be free trade between the realms of England and France which meant, of course, that the English king had to

\(^{(1)}\) Chapter IV of this thesis, pp. 242-3.


\(^{(3)}\) For example, the men of Dieppe, as seen above.
abandon the fifteenth(1). Until 1212, when John planned to launch another continental expedition(2) and it was necessary once more to distinguish between English and foreign merchants, the records bear very few references indeed to trade between England and Normandy. From the spring of 1212, not only were Norman ships seized if they visited English ports(3), but they were also attacked and captured off the coast of the duchy(4) and even in their home ports(5). This suspension of normal trade relations continued into 1213(6), when England was under threat of invasion by Philip Augustus, and 1214(7) when King John finally launched his long-planned continental expedition. In this period, as in previous periods of hostilities, individual Norman merchants were granted special concessions. Laurence du Donjon of Rouen again benefited from the king's goodwill; in November, 1213, he was granted permission to send one ship laden with wines and other merchandise from Normandy to England and back, before the middle of Lent(8). Merchants from Dieppe seem to have been particularly favoured(9). Again, too, we see a Norman benefiting from the intervention of

(1) S. Painter, The Reign of King John, p.139; Foedera, I (i), 95.
(2) A.L. Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087-1216, p.455.
(4) Ibid., 1204-24, p.120.
(6) Ibid., 1204-24, pp.133,134 b.
(8) Ibid., 1201-16, p.105 b.
(9) Ibid., 1201-16, pp.97 b,111 b,112.
someone domiciled in England; in June 1213, the bailiffs of Lynn were ordered to release Richard Lameress, "Normannum, hominem Radulfi Pigot de London" because Ralph had undertaken that Richard would cause no harm to the king or his kingdom (1).

We have very little information concerning trade relations between England and Normandy in the period 1215-17 when Prince Louis was supporting the rebellious English barons. However, it seems that the situation was a complicated one because theoretically Prince Louis was acting on his own initiative and a state of truce still existed between the English king and Philip Augustus. Although the first French knights did not arrive in England until December 1215, the English rebels had been negotiating with Prince Louis since September or October (2). Nevertheless, French merchants seem to have been allowed to trade in England until December, 1215. In November, 1215, for example, Earl Warenne was instructed to return to a group of Norman merchants the goods which his men had taken from them (3). It would appear that after December, 1215, however, French merchants were no longer allowed to come to this country. At least, this is the implication of King John's reminder of March 1216, that "salvum conductum nostrum dedimus mercatoribus de terra Regis Francorum qui London' venerunt cum mercandisis suis antequam milites Ludovici filii Regis Francorum illuc venissent ad eundum in partes suas" (4). On the other hand,

(1) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.135.
(2) S. Painter, op.cit., p.367.
(3) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.234.
however, in May 1218, Philip Augustus approached Henry III for redress for some burgesses of Rouen who had complained to him "quod infra treugam nostram, multa sunt eis ablata in Anglia, licet ipsi de guerra...Ludovici nullatenus se intromitterent" (1). This suggests that trade continued but the onus was on Norman merchants to prove that they were bona fide traders and not adherents of Prince Louis. Naturally there would be some miscarriages of justice in a time of civil war. Some merchants took the precaution of obtaining a royal licence before embarking for England; in February, 1216, for example, Fulk de Sancto Martino, a merchant of Rouen, obtained letters of safe-conduct authorizing him to go as far as York to sell his wines (2).

Very little is known about the commercial relations of England and Normandy during the period from the Treaty of Kingston in September 1217 to the outbreak of war in May, 1224. However, the activities of merchants involved in Anglo-Norman trade have left a considerable mark on the records for the period from May 1224 until the new truce of July, 1227. War between England and France was declared on 5th May, 1224 (3) and about the same time Henry III ordered the arrest of all ships then in English ports (4). This was in spite of the fact that while negotiations had been under way with King Louis for a renewal of the truce which expired at Easter, 1224 (5), the two kings had reached a reciprocal agreement, whereby the

(1) Pat.R. 1216-25, p.150.
(4) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.599 b.
merchants of each kingdom could trade freely with the other until 8th July, 1224\(^{(1)}\). However, Henry did not ignore this agreement entirely. On 22nd May, for example, he ordered that the goods of some merchants of Rouen which had been seized at Shoreham should be released although the ship in which they were found was to be retained\(^{(2)}\). On 2nd June, he modified his original instruction for the arrest of all French ships and ordered that henceforth all large French ships were to be retained for his service but French merchants were to be allowed to trade freely with small ships until 8th July\(^{(3)}\). From then until the end of the war, only those Normans in possession of special safe-conducts were allowed to come to England to trade. It seems, however, that unauthorized merchants sometimes slipped through the net for Henry was obliged on a number of occasions to instruct individual officials to arrest merchants from Normandy or France who did not hold safe-conducts\(^{(4)}\). The fact that merchants were prepared to risk arrest suggests, of course, that their profits were considerable. After the truce of July 1227\(^{(5)}\), normal commercial relations were again resumed: when the sheriff of York was instructed to release a Norman merchant arrested after the negotiation of the truce, he was warned that "nullum...faciat impedimentum aut gravamen mercatoribus predicti Regis Francorum...donec aliud inde preceptum habuerit"\(^{(6)}\).

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\(^{(1)}\) Pat. R. 1216-25, p. 443.  
\(^{(2)}\) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1204-24, p. 600.  
\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., 1204-24, p. 603.  
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid., 1204-24, p. 632 b bis; Ibid., 1224-7, pp. 102 b, 159.  
\(^{(6)}\) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1224-7, p. 191.
Except that the records for this period are very much fuller than those for previous periods of war, the general picture which they give is much the same. As regards Anglo-Norman trade, the most notable feature is the large number of safe-conducts which were issued by Henry III to Norman merchants\(^{(1)}\). Among the recipients of such safe-conducts, the men of Rouen, Dieppe and Barfleur predominate. On the whole, safe-conducts were granted to individual merchants or groups of named merchants. There is, however, the interesting case of the men of Dieppe; on 18th July, 1224, Henry III informed the mayor and good men of that town that their ships could come safely to England to trade, provided that they did not take anything back from England to Normandy without royal consent. This safe-conduct was to last until 2nd February, 1225\(^{(2)}\). On 18th April, 1225, the same men were granted further letters of safe-conduct in which the clause "secure veniant in Angliam" was replaced by the clause "secure veniant in potestatem nostram"\(^{(3)}\). This, of course, meant that they could trade with Gascony as well as with England. Sometimes royal officials were overzealous and arrested Norman merchants who were in possession of letters of safe-conduct; in October, 1224, for example, the bailiffs of Southampton had to be instructed to release the ships of some men of Dieppe, who, with other men of that

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\(^{(1)}\) e.g. Pat.R. 1216-25, pp.443-557 passim; ibid. 1225-32, pp.4-122 passim.

\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., 1216-25, p.454.

\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., 1216-25, p.520; see also Ibid., 1225-32, p.113.
town, had letters of safe-conduct valid until 2nd February, 1225 (1). On other occasions, orders were given for the release of arrested Norman merchants without it being specifically stated that they were in possession of letters of safe-conduct (2). No doubt some of these men were in possession of such letters while others negotiated for Henry's favour while imprisoned in England.

As in previous periods of war, a number of Norman merchants received royal letters of safe-conduct through the intercession of a third party. Sometimes this third party was an English magnate such as the Earl of Chester (3), or Earl Warenne (4) and sometimes he was an important royal official such as Martin de Pateshull (5) or Henry de Trublevill (6). On other occasions, however, he was someone who still had interests on both sides of the Channel such as Richard Marshal (7) or the Abbot of Fécamp (8).

It was not only trade between England and Normandy which was interrupted during periods of war, but also trade between Gascony and the duchy. Again, however, individual merchants were able to obtain special licences permitting them to trade

(2) Ibid., 1224-7, pp.24 b,27.
(3) Pat.R. 1216-25, p.525.
(4) Ibid., 1216-25, p.527.
(5) Ibid., 1225-32, p.18.
(6) Ibid., 1216-25, p.493.
(7) Ibid., 1216-25, p.520.
(8) Ibid., 1225-32, p.16.
with the English king's remaining continental possessions\(^1\).

If the ships of Norman merchants were liable to be attacked in the ports of England and Gascony, the ships of Henry III's subjects were equally likely to be attacked by Normans. In December 1225, for example, a group of English merchants complained of being robbed at Caen\(^2\) while in April, 1227, two merchants of Bordeaux complained of similar treatment at Harfleur\(^3\).

It is clear from the large number of safe-conducts granted to Norman merchants in this period, that Henry III enjoyed good relations with a considerable section of the Norman merchant classes. So confident was he that the prosperity of these men depended upon his continuing favour that in the spring of 1226, he felt in a position to make a general appeal to the "magistri navium de Normannia" to come to his service\(^4\). The occasion of this appeal was his proposed expedition to the continent at a time when Louis VIII was safely engaged in beseiging Avignon. Henry's plans in fact came to nothing because the Pope intervened on behalf of the crusading French king\(^5\); nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a number of Norman vessels responded to his appeal and, although their services were not required, they were rewarded with licences to trade in England. Amongst those granted licences

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(1) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.113; Pat.R. 1216-25, p.520.
(2) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.88.
(3) Ibid., 1224-7, p.181 b.
(4) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.44.
"quia promt i fuerunt apud Portesmue ad eundum in servicio domini regis" were men from Barfleur, Caen and Varaville (1). The situation during the war of 1229-31 was much the same as the situation in previous periods of war and therefore need not detain us long. One new feature, however, is that on at least two occasions when Norman ships were released, their masters were first forced to promise that they would return to England to join the king on his proposed continental expedition (2). This expedition was first planned for the autumn of 1229 but was in fact postponed until the spring of 1230. In October 1229 and again in February 1230, Henry approached the men of Dieppe and Barfleur for assistance. The two writs of 4th October 1229, were addressed to "magistris navium et marinellis" of the ports of Dieppe and Barfleur respectively, and Henry "commanded" them to come to his service at Portsmouth (3). The two writs of 1st February, 1230, were couched in more persuasive terms. The king began by informing the addressees of his plans and then "requested" the mayor and good men of each town "quod, sub spe condigne remunerationis, si aliquo tempore pro eis aliquid facere possit, omnes naves quod poterunt de portu suo mittant et venire faciant usque Portesmue, ita quod sint ibi ad Pascha Floridum proximo venturum, parate ire in serviciium regis cum corpore suo" (4). In May, 1230,

(2) Cl.R. 1227-31, pp.203,291.
(3) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.270.
a number of Normans who had reported for service at Portsmouth and subsequently crossed the Channel in the king's company were granted licences to trade anywhere in Henry's dominions. The majority of those who received such licences were from Dieppe and Barfleur but others came from Caen, Ouistreham and Leure (1).

The truce made in July 1231 (2), expired on 24th June 1234 (3). Three days before its expiry, Henry III announced that he had given all merchants from the French king's dominions permission to trade freely in England until Whitsunday, 1235 (4). In spite of this concession some Norman merchants were arrested by royal officials who were presumably unaware of the king's instructions. However, Henry intervened to secure their release (5). Until December 1234, the French king was presumably allowing English merchants to trade in his lands but in that month Henry withdrew his concession to French merchants "eo quod rex Francie facit arestari in terra sua mercatores de potestate regis" (6). Presumably this action precipitated further negotiations between the two kings on the subject of trade relations for when, in February 1235, Henry announced that all merchants could now come in safety to England to trade (7), he specifically

(1) Ibid., 1225-32, pp.369,370,374-5.
(2) E. Berger, op.cit., p.198.
(4) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.455.
(5) Ibid., 1231-4, p.514; C.P.R. 1232-47, p.62 bis.
(7) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.95.
included French merchants\(^{(1)}\). At some time unknown to us, however, this concession was apparently withdrawn in the case of French merchants on the same grounds as before: in August 1235 when a new truce was negotiated between England and France, Henry ordered the bailiffs of Lynn to release "omnes naves de potestate regis Francie, tam de Normannia quam aliunde, quas arestaverunt in portu suo...occasione aliarum navium de potestate domini regis, que prius arestate in Normannia"\(^{(2)}\).

In May, 1242, Henry set sail for Poitou and on 8th June he denounced the truce with King Louis on the grounds of breaches made by the French\(^{(3)}\). On the very day war was declared he instructed the barons of the Cinque Ports "ad... regem Franci gravandum in costera Britannie, Normandie et Bolon', per incendia et alia gravamina que poteritis, tam per mare quam per terram"\(^{(4)}\). Similar instructions were given on the same day to Drew de Barentin, Warden of the Channel Islands although in his writ only the coast of Normandy was mentioned\(^{(5)}\). On 7th July the archbishop of York and William de Cantilupe were instructed to send the royal galleys kept at Bristol to the coasts of Brittany, Normandy and Boulogne if they felt that they could cause further trouble for the French king. The justiciar of Ireland was ordered to send the royal galleys under his

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., 1232-47, p.96.

\(^{(2)}\) C1.R. 1234-7, p.192.

\(^{(3)}\) Sir Maurice Powicke, *op.cit.*, p.102.

\(^{(4)}\) C1.R. 1237-42, p.496.

control on the same mission, which the men of Dublin and Waterford were also enjoined to support\(^{(1)}\). Clearly, these moves were dictated by the necessity of keeping control in the Channel so that the expedition in Poitou could maintain effective links with England.

Trade between England and the lands of the French king was, of course, interrupted\(^{(2)}\), although as usual, a number of Norman merchants managed to obtain letters of safe-conduct from the English king\(^{(3)}\). The most interesting feature of conditions during this period of war is the short-lived reciprocal agreement between Henry III and the men of Dieppe. On 10th September 1242, the bailiffs of Yarmouth were instructed to release a merchant of Dieppe "quia mercatores regis Anglie salvo et secure venire possunt usque Dep' et inde recedere"\(^{(4)}\). On 20th October following, the bailiffs of Southampton were instructed to release another merchant of Dieppe on the same grounds\(^{(5)}\). It seems, however, that the men of Dieppe had been acting on their own initiative and against the wishes of the French king for, on 29th October, 1242, Henry III instructed the bailiffs of Southampton to seize the goods of all merchants of Dieppe until further notice because the bailiffs of Dieppe had seized the goods of two merchants from Bristol\(^{(6)}\). Dieppe was in the bailiwick of Caux\(^{(7)}\) and the baili of Caux at this time was Thibaud de

\(^{(1)}\) **C1.R. 1237-42**, p.529.

\(^{(2)}\) e.g. **C.P.R. 1232-47**, pp.272,300.


\(^{(4)}\) **C1.R. 1237-42**, p.466.

\(^{(5)}\) **Ibid.**, 1237-42, p.474.

\(^{(6)}\) **Ibid.**, 1242-47, p.72.

\(^{(7)}\) Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, p.68.
la Chapelle. Thibaud's family came from Orleans and he was one of the many French baillis imposed upon the duchy by her new Capetian rulers.

A state of truce was maintained between England and France from 7th April 1243 to the Treaty of Paris in December, 1259, and consequently the records do not contain a great deal of information about Anglo-Norman trade. We see the king having to intervene occasionally to protect the interests of Norman merchants who have had their goods stolen in this country but there is nothing to suggest that Norman merchants were more likely to be the victims of English thieves than their English counterparts. Certainly, the royal attitude towards Norman merchants was still favourable. In September, 1243, for example, William le Wynnun, a burgess of Barfleur, was granted a confirmation of the concessions which he enjoyed in Gascony. In May 1249, Clement de Snoht, a citizen of Rouen, was in possession of a licence which entitled him "whether the truce made with France until Midsummer is broken or not...to carry away the merchandise which he has in England whither he will by sea or land until Michaelmas".

It seems, too, that the English king still depended upon assistance from the mariners of Barfleur when he wished to

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(1) J.R. Strayer, The Administration of Normandy under Saint Louis, p.110.
(2) Ibid., p.95; Rec.des hist., XXIV (i), 110-12.
(3) E. Berger, op.cit., p.351.
(5) Cl.R. 1242-7, pp.103-4; ibid., 1247-51, p.476; ibid., 1253-4, p.17.
(6) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.396.
(7) Ibid., 1247-58, p.53.
transport himself or members of his family to the continent. On 28th March 1254, the bailiffs of Portsmouth were instructed to allow the masters of the ships "Sainte-Marie" and "La Rosette" of Barfleur to sail wherever they wished provided that each man first gave security "quod erit ad passagium regine" (1). On 28th May, 1254, Queen Eleanor gave orders for the payment to Henry de Pont-Audemer of Barfleur of a hundred shillings "pro quibusdam dampnis que incurrit occasione servicii regis" (2). The occasion of these writs was, of course, the king's expedition to Gascony. Henry had left England in August 1253 (3), and the Queen and Prince Edward joined him on the continent in June, 1254 (4).

The main question which arises from this account of Anglo-Norman commercial relations in the period 1204-1259 is why some Norman merchants were granted special favours in times of war while others were not. Before we consider this question, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that Norman merchants were not the only merchants "de potestate Regis Francorum" to whom special concessions were granted.

Other merchants who received preferential treatment from the English king fall into two main classes. In the first class are merchants from areas which acknowledged French overlordship but had counts of their own and were outside the

(2) Ibid., 1253-4, p.70.
(4) Ibid., p.118.
French royal domain. Their counts often exercised a considerable degree of independence and treated directly with the kings of England. After the disaster at Bouvines where Count Ferrand of Flanders had fought against King Philip of France, Flanders was very much under French influence. Nevertheless, after 1214, as before, the merchants of Flanders were generally exempted from restrictions imposed upon merchants "de potestate Regis Francorum". Her economic links with Flanders were so important to England that as long as her king could come to a reciprocal agreement with the count, he was prepared to ignore the fact that Flanders was a French fief. The position of Flanders vis-à-vis England and France is clearly stated in the terms of a "safe-conduct for ever" granted by Henry III to the merchants of Flanders and Hainault in December 1236: "If it happens that the count or countess should do their service due to the king of France in any war against the king, the peace between the king and them shall not be thereby violated, unless they move war with their lands against the land of England principally; and the count and countess shall not be able to infringe the peace or safe-conduct granted to the king and his men by them, unless the king wage war against their land of Flanders and Hainault with his land of England". The merchants of Brittany and

(2) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, pp.21,620 b; Pat.R. 1225-32, p.334; C.P.R. 1232-47, p.300.
(3) Ibid., 1232-47, p.170.
(4) e.g. Pat.R. 1225-32, pp.58,107,120,369,376 bis,377; C.P.R. 1232-47, pp.330,348.
Toulouse\(^{(1)}\) on the other hand, seem to have enjoyed special concessions only when their counts were actively allied with the English king against the king of France.

The second class of merchants "de potestate Regis Francorum" who were allowed special concessions in times of war with England is comprised of merchants domiciled in areas which at the time of the concessions were part of the French royal domain. This class should, of course, include the Normans who have been dealt with separately so far merely for the purposes of this thesis. There are two main features to be noted in connection with the grant of special concessions to merchants in this class. In the first place, all the recipients seem to belong to areas which have been annexed to the royal domain relatively recently and in the second place, they are made to specified individuals or towns only, and not to all the men of the area. Although merchants from Normandy are favoured far more frequently than merchants from elsewhere, concessions were also granted on occasions to merchants from such places as Gisors\(^{(2)}\) in the Norman Vexin, Nesle\(^{(3)}\) and Amiens\(^{(4)}\) in the county of Vermandois and Arras\(^{(5)}\) and St. Omer\(^{(6)}\) in the county of Artois. Although it is not claimed that an exhaustive search was undertaken, it is interesting that no example was found of a war-time concession.

\(^{(2)}\) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.274.
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid., 1225-32, p.369.
\(^{(5)}\) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.52.
\(^{(6)}\) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.16.
being made to merchants from the old French domain inherited by Philip Augustus. We known, for example, that in times of truce England enjoyed commercial relations with the men of Sens\(^1\) but no evidence has been found that merchants from this town were granted special concessions in times of war.

It is tempting to assume in the case of Normandy that the English kings were generous with special concessions for political reasons but two factors which we have already noted rule out this possibility. In the first place, concessions were granted to named individuals or towns only and not to all Norman merchants\(^2\) and in the second place concessions were also granted to named individuals or towns in regions to which the kings of England laid no claim. If we seek an explanation for these apparently haphazard favours, the only answer which suggests itself is that the recipients enjoyed a continuing personal relationship with the king himself or with someone who was willing to intercede with the king on their behalf. In Normandy, for example, Roger Wascelin of Barfleur\(^3\) and Laurence du Donjon of Rouen\(^4\) are among the individuals who were especially favoured by the English king in times of war. It seems likely that both men were benefiting from the personal favour of the king for both their families had played an important part in Norman affairs before the loss of the duchy.

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., 1225-32, pp.466,515.
\(^{(2)}\) Compare Flanders.
Roger Wascelin was prévôt of Barfleur in 1203(1) and had succeeded his father Samson in this post(2). Laurence du Donjon had acted on the king's behalf on more than one occasion(3) and was doubtless related to the Luce du Donjon who was mayor of Rouen in 1189 and 1194(4). A later prévôt of Barfleur, William le Wynnun also received many favours from the English king(5) and seems to have held property in this country for, in September 1239, Henry III granted "protection to William le Wynn of Barbelet, his lands, men and possessions; grant also that the said William and his heirs shall be quit by sea and land of all custom belonging to the king; and that they should not be put in plea of any holding save before the king or his chief justices"(6). In many cases, however, the writ granting a concession specifically stated that it was being granted at the request of a third party. As we have already seen, this third party was generally an English magnate, merchant or royal official, but was occasionally someone who still had interests on both sides of the Channel. Presumably those merchants who were unable to obtain special favours were those who had no particular connections in England but merely came here to sell their goods on the open market.

Although one cannot postulate a primarily political motive behind the favours granted by the kings of England to

(2) Ibid., II, clxxix.
(3) R.N. pp.25,59.
so many Norman merchants, John and Henry III no doubt felt the wisdom of maintaining friendly relations with an important section of the Norman community in view of their hopes of recovering the duchy. The fact that concessions were occasionally granted to other merchants of the French royal domain is an interesting testimony to the importance of personal relationships in an age when political frontiers had far less significance than they do today. Whatever the motives of John and Henry III, it must have been a cause of serious concern to the French kings to know that the kings of England were on such good terms with yet another section of the population of Normandy. However, there are no signs that Philip Augustus, Louis VIII or Saint Louis sought to attach the Norman merchant classes more firmly to themselves by means of a deliberately conciliatory policy.
As Powicke has shown, most of the men who held lands in both England and Normandy were effectively forced to choose between the English and French allegiances after the loss of the duchy in 1204\(^1\). The only exception seems to have been William Marshal, Earl of Pembroke who, with King John's permission, did homage "citra mare" to Philip Augustus for the continued possession of his Norman lands\(^2\). Although Bracton stated that the Marshal's position was shared by many others\(^3\), Powicke's study of the situation led him to conclude that "the number of those who served two masters was few. Philip proceeded with his policy of confiscation, and the society of the two countries was severed. In 1244 Saint Louis put an end to the slight connection which still survived"\(^4\).

However, as Powicke himself admits, his enquiry was somewhat restricted in extent; he took as his starting point only the chief fiefs of 1172 with the addition of the fiefs of a few important officials. Moreover, his main concern was to

\(^2\) Ibid., p.294; C.N., no.285.
\(^3\) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, pp.295-6; Henrici de Bracton de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. Sir Travers Twiss, VI (Rolls Series, 1883), p.374.
\(^4\) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.297. This reference to Saint Louis' decision of 1244 is apparently a reference to a passage in M. Paris ..., Chron. Maj., IV, 288. Paris claims that Henry III's seizure in that year of the English lands of all French subjects (see B. of F., pp.1142-3) was, in fact, a response to a corresponding move already made by Saint Louis. This version of events does not seem to be recorded elsewhere but, as we shall see later, there are strong grounds for accepting Paris' account on this particular occasion.
show whether the holders of the selected fiefs chose the French or English allegiance in 1204\(^{(1)}\). In a few cases he followed up the family's history after this date and as a result discovered several instances of the subsequent recovery of forfeited estates\(^{(2)}\). This might have suggested the potential value of further investigation in other cases, but presumably he felt that a book entitled *The Loss of Normandy* was not the place for a full examination of the situation after 1204. Perhaps a more valid criticism of Powicke's work is that in a number of cases he either failed to notice or failed to record that a family had in fact held lands in England as well as in Normandy prior to 1204\(^{(3)}\).

A detailed re-examination of some of Powicke's cases revealed further instances of double tenure after 1204 and also a whole host of cross-Channel relationships of various degrees. In fact, it soon became clear that the situation which existed after 1204 was far more complex than historians have previously supposed; it seemed that the severance of the two societies which took place in that year was neither as complete nor as permanent as appears at first glance. A sample check of the main sources for our period soon confirmed this impression. Indeed, the problem quickly changed from one of finding sufficient evidence to the opposite one of how best to exploit an almost embarrassing amount of material.


\(^{(3)}\) See, for example, Appendix IV, section C, nos.48,55,61.
In the end it was decided that the best approach would again be to take the 1172 statement of Norman tenants-in-chief as a starting point but with the difference that all the families represented in that list would be examined, instead of just a selection of them. Although this list was drawn up just over thirty years before the loss of the duchy, its use has certain definite advantages over the use of any other collection of names. In the first place, it purports to be a list of all the tenants-in-chief of 1172, so that it gives a quantitative basis to our conclusions: we can say that a certain proportion of all the tenants-in-chief of 1172 held lands on both sides of the Channel; that their families divided between the French and English allegiances in a given ratio; that a certain proportion of them subsequently recovered their lost lands, and so on. Any other list of names would have had to be compiled on a purely arbitrary basis and would not therefore have had this advantage. Secondly, and fairly obviously,

(1) R.B., pp.624-45. This list was also copied into the Register of Philip Augustus (Register A), with later additions, shortly after the conquest. This version is printed in Rec.des. hist., XXIII,693-98. On the purpose and nature of the list see F.M. Powicke, "The Honour of Mortain in the Norman Infeudationes Militum of 1172", English Historical Review, XXVI (1911), 89-93 and J. Boussard, "L'enquête de 1172 sur les services de chevalier en Normandie", Recueil de travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel par ses amis, collègues et élèves, 1, Société de L'Ecole des Chartes, (Paris, 1955), 193-208.

(2) In the early stages of the enquiry a card index was compiled of all references encountered in the sources for the period 1204-59 to persons who (a) had obviously once held land on both sides of the Channel, or (b) still held lands on both sides of the Channel, or (c) had relatives on the opposite side of the Channel. This index eventually comprised nearly four hundred names and there was the possibility of selecting a proportion of these names to follow up more closely.
the tenants-in-chief of a ruler generally numbered amongst them the most important men of his land and hence a study of the English kings' relations after 1204 with men who were tenants-in-chief in Normandy will give us the best possible insight into the potential political effects of the continuing cross-Channel links after that date.

The 1172 list contains the names of 199 tenants-in-chief and satisfactory evidence has been found that at least 107 of these men - or their heirs - held lands in England as well as in Normandy in 1204. Once the number of cases of double tenure had been established, the next task was to find out which allegiance each man chose in 1204. The history of the lands which he forfeited was then followed up in an attempt to discover whether he or his heirs subsequently recovered them. During these investigations, relevant information about other members of the family sometimes came to light and was also recorded.

Once the enquiry was completed, there was the problem of how best to present the results. Eventually, it was decided that the only effective way of presenting the results of an investigation of this nature, was in the form of an Appendix. In the first place, if one is going to speak in any sort of quantitative terms, then it is clearly desirable to make available the full evidence for one's figures. In the second place, the enquiry produced such an infinite variety of family histories, that it was virtually impossible to select representative cases; moreover, no set of general conclusions can be drawn from them which adequately reflects the fluidity of the situation after 1204. In the third place, any attempt to present just such generalisations as are possible, would
have made necessary a set of long and unwieldy footnotes which would have made backward reference and comparison between cases a difficult and frustrating business.

Hence, the results are presented in full in Appendix IV, which has been divided into three sections. Section A includes all those cases where the 1204 tenant chose the Norman allegiance and no evidence has been found of cross-Channel relationships, a change of allegiance, or the renewal of the cross-Channel tenancy after that date. Section B includes similar cases where the allegiance closed in 1204 was the English allegiance. Section C includes all other cases. Within each section the results are presented in the form of a summarized family history, in alphabetical order under the name of the 1172 tenant (1).

A subdivision of Section C was originally contemplated but when it came to the point this was found to be an unworkable proposition. For example, it was considered having one subsection for all those cases where brothers chose opposite allegiances in 1204 and another for all those cases where lands forfeited on one side of the Channel in that year were subsequently recovered. However, while some cases would have fitted easily into one or other of these categories, others exhibited both these features and others besides (2). The case histories in Section C make it abundantly clear that the severance of the two societies was neither as complete nor as permanent as historians have previously supposed.

(1) As the name appears in R.B., pp.624-645.
(2) See, for example, Appendix IV, section C; nos.47,73,88.
In the first place, it is clear that forcing men to choose between the English and French allegiances did not effect the division of the complex Anglo-Norman society of 1204 into two entirely separate societies: members of the same family often chose opposite allegiances and a whole network of cross-Channel relationships remained to remind men of the former state of affairs. In at least eight families, brothers chose opposite allegiances in the period 1204-5 and in one important family, that of the Constable of Normandy, adult male cousins did likewise. These cases are indicated in Section C by the letter (a) after the name of the 1172 tenant. In 31 cases there seems to have been a cross-Channel relationship of some other degree either in 1204-5, or later. These cases are indicated by the letter (b). It will be observed that four cases fall into both categories which means that the total number of cases exhibiting a cross-Channel relationship of any kind is only 36. There must, of course, have been many other cross-Channel relationships which have not come to light, both among families named in Section C, and among those named in Sections A and B. The relationships indicated by the letter (b) include father and son (1), father and daughter (2), widowed mother and son (3), brother and sister (4), uncle and nephew (5), grandparents and grandson (6), two sisters (7) and two

(1) Appendix IV, section C, no.73.
(2) Ibid., no.70.
(3) Ibid., no.93.
(4) Ibid., no.62.
(5) Ibid., no.81.
(6) Ibid., no.76.
(7) Ibid., no.56.
cousins\(^{(1)}\).

It is not clear how far relatives on opposite sides of the Channel managed to keep in touch with one another but contact was no doubt maintained. Although it seems to have been made difficult for members of the land-holding class to cross the Channel without losing their estates on the side from which they departed\(^{(2)}\), other means of communication were certainly available. As we have already seen, merchants and ecclesiastics frequently travelled between England and the duchy, so contact could be maintained through them at least.

In the second place, the enquiry shows that the allegiance chosen in the summer of 1204 was not always the final choice. Several men belonging to the families under consideration changed from the Norman to the English allegiance at a later date, while at least one instance of the reverse process can be cited\(^{(3)}\). Most of the persons who changed their allegiance did so before the opening months of 1206 but other changes seem to have been connected with the continental expeditions of the English kings. Peter of Préaux\(^{(4)}\) was restored to King John's favour during his expedition to Poitou in 1206, while the Count of Eu\(^{(5)}\) and Fulk Paynel\(^{(6)}\) both joined the same monarch during

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., no.106.


\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., no.56.

\(^{(4)}\) Ibid., no.88.

\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., no.51.

\(^{(6)}\) Ibid., no.82.
his expedition of 1214. Fulk had returned to his Norman allegiance by June 1217, but joined Henry III for a short time when the latter was in Brittany in 1230. All these cases, early and late, must have been a cause of grave concern to the kings of France. They are indicated by a letter (c) in Appendix I, Section C.

By far the most interesting result of the enquiry, however, was the discovery of the existence of further cases of double tenure between 1204 and 1259. In at least twenty five of the cases reviewed, someone in the family subsequently recovered lands which had been forfeited in 1204-5. In another nine cases we know that a member of the family recovered lands in England which had originally been forfeited and we suspect, but cannot prove, that he or she retained his or her Norman lands as well. If the cases in this second category are not, in fact, cases of double tenure, they would, of course, be cases of changed allegiance after 1204. Cases of proven and probable double tenure are indicated in Appendix I, Section C, by the letters (d) and (e) respectively. The total number of cases reviewed which fall into either category is thirty and not thirty four because four cases fall into both categories. However, the total number of individuals concerned is somewhat higher for in some families the privilege of enjoying double tenure passed from father to son, or brother to brother, while

(1) i.e. in addition to those discovered by Powicke - see Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.328.

(2) This figure excludes William Marshal who retained his lands on both sides of the Channel in 1204-5 (Appendix IV, section C, no.66).
in others two persons in the same family held lands on both sides of the Channel simultaneously.

An analysis of these cases of double tenure leads to some interesting conclusions but also gives rise to a number of questions.

It seems that with the certain exception of William Marshal (1) and the possible exception of Thomas de Saint-Valéry (2), all males were forced in 1204 to choose between their English and Norman estates. However, women who were already widows at this time may have been spared the obligation of doing likewise. Leonia d'Estouteville (3) had been granted her dower on both sides of the Channel after the death of her husband in 1185, and subsequently made over her English lands to her son Henry. In 1203 King John seized Henry's lands because he had joined the King of France, but in 1204 Leonia fined for their recovery and held them in conjunction with her Norman estates until her death in 1215-16. Similarly, Gundreda, the widow of Matthew de Feritate (4), seems to have retained her interest in Bellou-en-Oulne until her death in 1216, although her second husband chose the English allegiance and had seisin of her lands in Devon. Helouis de Esneval (5) was also a widow in 1204 and we know that she was in possession of lands in England in 1233. Although there is no reference to her in

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(1) Appendix IV, section C, no.66.
(2) Ibid., no.92.
(3) Ibid., nos.95-7.
(4) Ibid., no.63.
(5) Ibid., no.61.
the Norman records after 1204 or in the English records between 1204 and 1233, it is possible in the light of the other two cases that she, too, remained in continuous possession on both sides of the Channel.

Since it was the French king who initiated the move to sever the two societies, it is somewhat surprising to find him facilitating the revival of a number of cases of double tenure after 1204. However, all the cases of double tenure which came into existence because of grants by the French king fall into two definite categories. In the first place, a number of women who were widowed after 1204 were allowed to recover the lands to which they were entitled in Normandy. In the case of Lauretta de Auffai (1), all we know is that her husband was dead by 1235 and in 1236 she was in possession of lands in Normandy. Agatha Trussebut's (2) husband died in 1236 and in January 1237 she was granted a licence "to go beyond seas and sue her rights which are being detained from her in the power of the King of France". However, it was not until 1241 that she finally recovered her dower in Normandy, and unfortunately we do not know the reasons for the delay, nor do we have any details of her negotiations with the French king. On the other hand, however, we know that the widow of Jordan de Campo Arnulfì (3) was granted her dower in Normandy in accordance with a judgement of the Norman Exchequer in 1221, while the widow

(1) Ibid., no.50.
(2) Ibid., no.104.
(3) Ibid., no.58.
of William de Cahagnes (1) was granted her dower in accordance with a similar judgement made in 1223. Although the records do not reveal the date of Jordan's death, we do know that William was living until the end of February, 1222. All this suggests that the French kings felt legally bound to allow such widows their dowers, provided they could establish their title to them at the Norman Exchequer. It is true that the countess of Eu (2) had to make certain concessions to Philip Augustus in order to recover the county of Eu but her case is rather different because she was recovering not merely her dower, but lands which her late husband had held in her right in the first place. Moreover, Ralph had behaved in a particularly treacherous fashion; he had chosen the French allegiance in 1204 but in 1214 changed sides and joined King John, losing his Norman lands as a result.

The discovery of only five cases where widows whose husbands died in England were granted their dowers in Normandy, probably has a two-fold explanation. In the first place, the Norman records are far less full than the English records, so it is quite likely that other similar cases existed which will never come to light. In the second place, it was probably not an economic proposition for many widows to seek their rights in Normandy, especially if they had to go to the expense of crossing the Channel and pleading their cases at the Norman Exchequer. If the husband's estate had been a small one to

(1) Ibid., no.57.
(2) Ibid., no.51.
start with, a third share of it might bring in virtually nothing once someone had been paid to administer it. Even where an estate was likely to show a small profit, it might take a number of years to pay off the sum expended to recover it; older widows might well have felt that they would not live to benefit from their Norman lands.

If we move outside the families included in Appendix IV, it is possible to cite a case where a widow was not able to afford to plead for the recovery of her Norman lands. The Querimoniae Normannorum of 1247 records that Richard de Tostenvilla claimed certain properties, "quae... ad dominium regis Philippi devenerunt de quadam matertera istius, quam maritus suus duxit in Angliam, et mortuo ibi marito ipsa reversa ad partes istas praedictam terram et redditum requisivit a rege Ludovico, qui cum differet dare responsum, ipsa prae paupertate non valens sequi curiam, in Angliam remeavit, ubi fuit mortua"(1). This case also provides another example of a cross-Channel relationship after 1204.

The French kings also allowed male members of at least three of our families to add lands in Normandy to their English holdings. The three men concerned were William de Forz(2), William Bardolf(3) and Nicholas Malesmains(4). Each of these three men had inherited his claim to lands in Normandy after 1204 and had been a minor or possibly not yet

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(1) Q.N., no.73.
(2) Appendix IV, section C, no.46.
(3) Ibid., no.53.
(4) Ibid., no.98.
born in that year, so that he had never in fact rejected the
Norman allegiance for himself. At first this fact seemed
significant, especially in view of Matthew Paris' statement
in 1257 in connection with Henry III's renewed claim for the
return of the conquered provinces. Paris commented that
"Non enim videtur juri consonum vel pietati ut filius patris
iniquitatem portare judicetur"(1). However, although we do
not know on what terms the three men just mentioned were
allowed to recover their Norman lands, it seems likely that
the grants were made as a favour and not as of right. In
the first place, even allowing for the fragmentary character
of the Norman records, it seems that a larger number of such
cases would have come to light if all men in the same position
as these three had been entitled to their Norman lands as a
matter of right. In the second place, in a similar grant to
a member of a family not included in the Appendix, Louis VIII
specifically stated: "Sciendum est autem quod cum idem Robertus
non posset de jure hereditarie in hereditate predicta ad usus
et consuetudines Normannie, pro eo quod Girardus pater ejusdem
Roberti defunctus fuit in Anglia, nos de gratia nostra
concessimus eodem Roberto jus heritandi in illa hereditate.."(2)
Another factor which should be taken into account is that not
all men may have wished to recover their Norman lands. Our
sources give the impression that a very high number of those
who chose the English allegiance were compensated for the loss
of their Norman lands by grants of terrae Normannorum in England.

(1) M. Paris ... Chron.Maj., V, 659.
(2) C.N., no.351.
Such grants were frequently made at the king's pleasure\(^1\) and would presumably have been revoked if the grantee had subsequently recovered his Norman lands; occasionally they were specifically made "quousque recuperaverit terram suam Normanniae"\(^2\). No doubt some men felt they were better off with additional lands in England rather than their former estates in Normandy now that the kingdom and the duchy were under different rule.

The English king's attitude towards the widows of men who died in Normandy is not as clearly discernible as the French's king's attitude to the widows of men who died in England. The widow of Guy de Saint-Valéry\(^3\), who seems to have been living after 1204, was granted her dower in England in 1210 on payment of a fine of forty marks and a palfrey. The widow of Ralph d'Aubigny\(^4\) was granted her dower in South Ingleby, Lincolnshire, in 1227 but her son had been in possession of his father's English lands since 1215 which makes this a special case. William de Préaux\(^5\) was granted Coleby in right of his wife Philippa in 1215. However, Philippa's former husband, William Malet, to whom Coleby had belonged, had died shortly after the conquest of Normandy; it seems, therefore, that this grant was intended as a favour to William of Préaux and not as the restoration to Philippa of her rights. Eustachia de Pavilly\(^6\), widow of

\(^{1}\) e.g. Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, pp.3,5b,93b.
\(^{3}\) Appendix IV, section C, no.93.
\(^{4}\) Ibid., no.47.
\(^{5}\) Ibid., no.88.
\(^{6}\) Ibid., no.84.
Thomas whose exact date of death is not known, was in possession of her dower in England by 1242. Again, however, there seem to have been special circumstances. Her two younger sons had been granted lands in England at some time prior to 1238 by John, earl of Lincoln, who is described as their uncle; thus, Eustachia had influential relatives in England. We have no evidence that any of these widows retained their lands in Normandy when they were granted their English lands, but, in view of their special circumstances and the French kings' attitude towards widows, it seems very likely that they did. Another lady who recovered her lands in England was Eleanor de Vitre (1). However, it is not clear whether she ought to be classified as a widow, for it is not known whether her fourth husband, Gilbert Malesmains, was dead or alive in 1216. Eleanor, too, had influential relatives in England. Ela, her daughter by her third husband, William earl of Salisbury, was countess of Salisbury in her own right. In the case of Eleanor, we have definite evidence that she continued to hold both her Norman and English lands from 1216 until her death.

On the whole, therefore, it seems that only exceptionally were widows allowed their dowers in England when their husbands died in possession of their Norman lands alone.

When we turn to the men who were allowed to recover their English lands, we are faced with more questions than answers. If we look first at the times at which various individuals were granted their English lands one striking fact emerges and that is the number of grants which were made in the period 1215-16.

(1) Ibid., no. 107.
Grants in this category were made to Philip d’Augbigny (1), Gilbert de L'Aigle (2), Robert filius Ernisii (3), John de Harcourt (4), Ralph Martel (5), William and John de Préaux (6), William de Semilly (7) and Richard and William de Tournebu (8). Robert de Marmion (9) did not recover his father’s English lands until 1220 but had first entered into negotiations with the English king in 1216. Three other men may possibly have recovered their lands in 1215-16; all we know about Henry d'Estouteville (10) is that he acquired his lands in England between 1215 and 1226; all we know about Thomas d'Aunou (11) and Reginald de Saint-Valéry (12) is that they acquired lands in England before 1221 and 1224 respectively.

The concentration of grants in the period 1215-16 suggests that King John was trying to add to his supporters in England at a time when he faced first the threat and then the fact of baronial rebellion. Possibly he thought that men who had

(1) Ibid., no.47. (It is not clear whether the grant to Philip created a case of double tenure immediately because it is not known whether or not his father was still alive at this time.)
(2) Ibid., no.49.
(3) Ibid., no.60.
(4) Ibid., no.68.
(5) Ibid., no.75.
(6) Ibid., no.88.
(7) Ibid., no.70.
(8) Ibid., no.100.
(9) Ibid., no.73.
(10) Ibid., nos.95-7.
(11) Ibid., no.48.
(12) Ibid., no.93.
recently received a favour at his hands, and had been out of the country while the struggle was developing would be more likely to support him than his opponents. If this were the case, events proved him wrong in at least one case, and possibly more. Gilbert de L'Aigle(1) definitely joined the rebels for a time and temporarily lost seisin of his English lands as a result. Richard and William de Tournebu(2) may have joined the rebels for they had lost their English lands again before 1219.

It is not always easy to suggest a reason why men outside this category recovered their English lands when they did. Among the proven cases of double tenure, Peter de Saint-Hilaire(3) recovered Corfton in right of his wife in 1220 and Ralph de Meulan(4) recovered Ipplepen between 1221 and 1223; no particular reason suggests itself for the timing of either of these grants. James de Bavelingham(5) did homage in 1233 for his wife's share of the lands of her mother, Eleanor de Vitre, who died in that year. However, this should perhaps be regarded as an instance of succession to an existing case of double tenure rather than as a new case. Robert Malet(6) recovered his English lands in February 1242, probably on the

(1) Ibid., no.49.
(2) Ibid., no.100.
(3) Ibid., no.91.
(4) Ibid., no.76.
(5) Ibid., no.98.
(6) Ibid., no.65.
understanding that he would join King Henry in Poitou later in the same year. In the event, however, Robert joined King Louis and died some time between 21st July and the end of September 1242, while serving in the French king's army. On 25th October, 1242, William Caperun was granted "restitution... of the manor of Coleby, which he held before of the king's gift but whereof the king disseised him and committed the same to Robert Malet". Perhaps the least explicable of all the grants was that made to Ernulf de Mandes\(^{(1)}\) in October 1217, at the request of Prince Louis. This is the only such case which has come to light and it seems strange that Prince Louis should have concerned himself with just a single case while negotiating terms with the English king. Among the probable cases of double tenure, Henry de Mara\(^{(2)}\) recovered his English lands in 1205 and Stephen Longchamp in 1207\(^{(3)}\).

When we turn from the timing of the grants to the sort of men to whom they were made, the picture is even less clear. In most cases, the grant was made to the very man who had forfeited the lands in 1204 or to his heir after his death. In the case of the d'Aubigny family\(^{(4)}\), however, the grant was made to the son of a man apparently still living, while the Marmion\(^{(5)}\) lands were originally granted to the younger

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., no.80.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., no.72.
\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., no.56.
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid., no.47.
\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., no.73.
brother of the rightful heir. When Ralph Martel\(^1\) recovered his English lands he granted them to his brother William, but whether it had been a condition of their recovery that he should do so is not known.

Another question which cannot be answered is why some men recovered their English lands while others did not. In several cases\(^2\), it can be shown that a person who recovered his English lands had influential relatives on this side of the Channel and even where such relationships cannot be proved they may nevertheless have existed. On the other hand, however, it is possible to find persons who had relatives in this country but who did not recover their English lands\(^3\). It is possible that the English king was not prepared to restore his English lands to any man who held Norman lands forfeited by someone who had chosen the English allegiance in 1204. However, the fragmentary character of the Norman records make it impossible to test this theory; we cannot assume that a man did not hold lands forfeited by someone choosing the English allegiance just because there is no evidence of such a holding in the meagre Norman sources.

Another possible factor is that many men probably did not feel it worthwhile to attempt the recovery of their English lands. One gains the impression that in 1204 most men chose to support the king in whose land the larger of their two estates was situated. Consequently, the English estates of

\(^{1}\) Ibid., no.75.

\(^{2}\) e.g. Ibid., nos.47,49,107.

\(^{3}\) e.g. Ibid., nos.52,55,64.
many of the smaller Norman landowners were probably very small indeed. By the time a man had crossed the Channel to negotiate the recovery of his English estate and paid the requisite fine (1) the whole matter may have ceased to be an economic proposition, especially when it was likely that the estate would be seized again by the English king whenever a truce with France expired (2).

Another aspect of the cases of double tenure which must be considered is how long they lasted. In the first place, this enquiry makes it clear that Powicke's statement that "in 1244 Saint Louis put an end to the slight connection which still survived" (3) is misleading. Successive members of the Estouteville (4) family held lands on both sides of the Channel throughout the thirteenth century, and into the fourteenth, while Agatha Trussebut (5) and Robert de Esneval (6) both apparently enjoyed the privilege of double tenure until their deaths in 1247. Unfortunately, it has not become possible to suggest why these persons were especially favoured in this respect.

In the second place, it is clear that many cases of double tenure were terminated for one reason or another before 1244.

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(1) Robert Marmion, for example, offered a fine of £500 in May 1218 (Ex e Rot. Fin., I, 9) - Appendix IV, section C, no. 73.

(2) See also pp. 224-5 below.

(3) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p. 297.

(4) Appendix IV, section C, nos. 95-7.

(5) Ibid., no. 104.

(6) Ibid., no. 61.
In some cases, the date of termination is not known (1). In other cases, the date of termination coincides with the death of the person enjoying the privilege of double tenure (2). In yet other cases, the date of termination is known but did not correspond with a death. Sometimes this date suggests a reason for the new forfeiture. Robert of Dreux (3) lost his English lands between January and June, 1227, and in July 1227 was granted compensation for his loss by Louis IX. This suggests that Robert lost his English lands because of the part he played in the later stages of the war of 1224-7. Robert Malet (4) forfeited his English lands during the war of 1242-3 in which he served with King Louis. In the case of Ralph of Meulan (5) we are specifically told that he lost Ipplepen, Devon, "quia...non venit ad exercitum domini regis quando rex fuit in Britannia". On the other hand, William filius Ernisii (6) lost his English property in 1222 which may or may not have been the date of his death; if it was not the date of his death, no particular reason for the loss can be postulated. In one instance, a case of double tenure was terminated when the English lands were sold; Reginald de Saint-Valéry (7) sold the property which he had inherited from his

(1) e.g. Ibid., nos. 53, 56, 58, 100.
(2) e.g. Ibid., nos. 49, 75, 80.
(3) Ibid., no. 92.
(4) Ibid., no. 65.
(5) Ibid., no. 76.
(6) Ibid., no. 60.
(7) Ibid., no. 93.
mother to Hubert de Burgh between October 1224 and September 1227. Presumably he found that it was not an economic proposition to retain it any longer and his decision was no doubt precipitated by the fact that the property had been temporarily confiscated during the war of 1224-7.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that when one of the persons named in Appendix IV had to choose between the French and English allegiances in 1244, she chose the opposite allegiance from the one she had chosen forty years before. In 1204 Lauretta de Auffai and her husband chose the English allegiance. After her husband's death, Lauretta recovered her dower in Normandy and in 1244 chose the Norman allegiance. Her English lands are subsequently described as *terrae Normannorum*. Nor was Lauretta's an isolated case; if we move outside the families listed in Appendix IV, other similar cases can be found. The Greinville family will serve as an example. In 1204 Eustace de Greinville chose the Norman allegiance but his son, Gerard, remained in England. In 1225, Gerard's son, Richard, was allowed to succeed to Eustace's lands in Normandy in spite of the fact that Gerard had died in England and he himself was resident in this country. In 1244, Richard chose the Norman allegiance and his English lands are subsequently described as *terrae Normannorum* (2). The histories of Lauretta de Auffae and Richard de Greinville demonstrate very clearly that men and women could still feel

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(1) Ibid., no.50.

(2) P.R. 6 John, p.34; C.R.R., IV, 261; C.N., no.351; Ctr. R. 1242-7, p.192.
equally at home on either side of the Channel.

In view of the many questions which remain unanswered, it is difficult to sum up the results of this enquiry into cases of double tenure after 1204. It seems that Thomas de Saint-Valéry (1) as well as William Marshal continued to hold lands in England and Normandy after 1204 but this possibility does not effectively invalidate the generally accepted view that after 1204 all tenants holding properties in both England and the duchy, with the exception of William Marshal, were forced to choose between them. Thomas occupied a rather special position in that his main interests were in Ponthieu and it seems likely that he was in Ponthieu when Philip confiscated the Norman lands of those who withdrew to England and John retaliated by confiscating the English lands of those who remained in the duchy.

It would be a more serious challenge to the generally accepted view of what happened in 1204 if it could be claimed with any degree of certainty that all women who were already widows in 1204 were spared the necessity of choosing between their English and Norman estates. So far, however, it is only possible to suggest this rather tentatively in the light of three such cases which have turned up in the group of families selected for study (2). Further research might in time show whether or not these cases were exceptional.

When we turn from the situation in 1204 to the situation

(1) Supra, p. 207.

(2) Supra, p. 207.
in later years, there is more justification for amending the current orthodoxy represented by Powicke's statement that "the number of those who served two masters was few" (1). A total of twenty five proven cases of double tenure out of one hundred and seven families known to have held lands in both England and Normandy before 1204 is a fairly high proportion. In addition, there are five further families which may have enjoyed estates in both the kingdom and the duchy after 1204 although certain proof is lacking (2). As far as one can tell, there is no single principle that applies in all the cases of double tenure which this enquiry has revealed. It is probable that the French king allowed all women who were widowed in England after 1204 to recover the lands to which they were entitled in Normandy (3) but this claim is so far based on only five cases (4). Although the English king occasionally allowed women widowed in Normandy to recover their English dowers, there is no evidence to suggest that restitution was granted as a matter of right as appears to have been the case in France (5). When considering the cases of persons other than women widowed in England who at some time after 1204 held lands on both sides of the Channel, all it is possible to say is that neither king seems to have regranted confiscated property according to a rigid set of

(2) Supra, p.206.
(3) Provided that their husbands had not been traitors - see below, p.231.
(4) Supra, pp.208-9.
(5) Supra, pp.212-3.
principles. Both kings took the view that such men were no longer entitled to hold estates in both countries and made it clear when returning forfeited estates that the grant was made as a favour and not as of right.

On what basis and to what sort of persons such grants were made has not emerged with any clarity. In the case of the king of England, we have seen that a number of grants of previously confiscated property were made in the years 1215-16 when John was presumably trying to raise support at a time of severe domestic crisis (1). We have found instances, too, of persons being re-granted forfeited English estates at times of war with France, presumably on the understanding that the English king would benefit in some way for his generosity (2). In other cases, however, it has been impossible to suggest specific reasons why grants were made although possible factors have been suggested, which cannot be proved (3). In the case of the very few grants of previously confiscated property made by the French king to persons other than widows, we have so little information that no conclusions at all can be drawn (4).

When we consider the possible reasons why some tenants were able to enjoy the privilege of double tenure for long periods while others enjoyed it for a relatively short time, it is again impossible to generalise. It is clear that where the grant of previously confiscated property was conditional upon support during periods of war, then it was withdrawn when

(1) Supra, pp. 213-214.
(2) Supra, pp. 215-216.
(3) Supra, pp. 215-217.
(4) Supra, pp. 210-211.
that support was not forthcoming. In some cases 1244 was a significant date, but in others it was not. In several cases the grant was withdrawn when the recipient died but in other cases his heir was allowed to succeed him. In yet other cases there is no evidence that the withdrawal of a grant coincided with the death of the tenant concerned, while at least one case of double tenure was terminated by the sale of the English property.(1).

It seems, then, that with one possible exception(2), a grant of previously confiscated property in either country was a favour which had to be won from the king concerned like any other favour. If the king of England was more generous with this particular favour than the king of France, it was no doubt because he had more need of the kind of support which a grant "at pleasure" produced, fewer resources from which to make such grants and less to fear from the renewal of cross-Channel tenures.

We must now turn to a consideration of the political implications of the continuing links between England and Normandy which have just been described.

One would have thought that the loss of their Norman lands on the French king's initiative would have given those who chose the English allegiance a vested interest in supporting the attempts of the English kings to recover the lost duchy. It

(1) Supra, pp. 218-220.
(2) i.e. grants by the French king to women widowed in England.
is well known, however, that both John and Henry III had great
difficulty in arousing any enthusiasm for their continental
expeditions. The explanation of this paradox seems to lie
in the fact that many of those who lost lands in Normandy
received compensatory grants in England, often out of the
terrae Normannorum. It has not been attempted to follow up
this claim on a systematic basis because the results would
hardly justify the amount of work involved. Moreover, whether
a grant was made out of terrae Normannorum or not, we cannot
assume that it was a compensatory grant unless the relevant
writ specifically says so\(^{(1)}\), for, after all, men received
grants of land in the thirteenth century for a variety of
reasons. Nevertheless, one gains the impression that the
number of those who received compensatory grants was probably
high. However, the English king did not entirely throw away
the advantages which should have accrued to him from the action
taken by the French king in 1204. When grants were made from
the terrae Normannorum, they were frequently made at the royal
pleasure\(^{(2)}\). This meant that when the king summoned all those
who held terrae Normannorum to accompany him to the continent—as he did, for example, in July 1229\(^{(3)}\) — the summons carried
with it the implicit threat of confiscation in cases of default
of service.

\(^{(1)}\) See, for example, Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, pp.9b,28,194; for
grants of terrae Normannorum to persons who are known to
have lost lands in Normandy but where no mention is made
of this when the English lands are granted, see Rot.Lit.
Cl. 1204-24, pp.10 b,11 b,24 b in conjunction with
Appendix IV, section B, no.16 and section C, nos.46,59.

\(^{(2)}\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, pp.3,5 b,93 b.

\(^{(3)}\) Cl.R. 1227-31, p.248.
The continuing links between England and Normandy can only have been a source of satisfaction to the English king. They would certainly mean that he was always kept well-informed on the situation within the duchy, while there was even the hope that Normans who had received favours at his hand might offer positive support if he attempted to recover Normandy by force. Indeed, we have already seen that Henry III obviously expected Ralph of Meulan (1) to join him in Brittany; when he failed to do so, he lost his English lands. The only occasion when the existence of cases of double tenure might have represented a threat to the English king's security was when Prince Louis invaded England. However, those acting on behalf of the infant Henry III were clearly aware of the potential danger, for, when they offered to restore Gilbert de Aquila's (2) English lands in December, 1216, they excluded Pevensey castle from the offer, "quia, si esset in manu vestra, Ludovicus illud a vobis exigeret, nec illud ei denegare possetis....".

The French king was faced in 1204 with a far more complex situation than that which faced the English king. Because he could not be sure of the loyalty of his newly conquered subjects, it was he who took the initiative in forcing men to choose between their English and Norman estates. In view of the fact that the English king refused to accept the loss of the duchy as final, the French king clearly desired that complete severance of the two societies which Powicke claims that he achieved (3). However, the loss of their English estates was

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(1) Appendix IV, section C, no. 76.
(2) Ibid., no. 49.
(3) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p. 297.
not likely to endear the persons concerned to their new master. At this stage of the proceedings two alternative policies were open to the French king: he could ensure his continued possession of the duchy by either a policy of conciliation or one of repression. In the event, he seems to have rejected the former possibility which would presumably have involved compensating those who chose the French allegiance for their losses in England. We do not have a great deal of evidence for the relations between the French king and his Norman tenants-in-chief, but the general impression given by the sources is that throughout the period under review the Normans were treated as a conquered people whom the French kings did not trust. A contemporary English chronicler, Ralph of Coggeshall, records that in 1205 when John was planning a continental expedition at the request of certain Poitevins and Gascons, "Nonnulli etiam Normannorum id ipsum obnixe flagitabant, quia de tyrannide regis Philippi nimium querebantur". Even William the Breton, an employee and favourite of Philip Augustus admits that after the conquest of Normandy:

"Indignante diu portavit vertice Regis
Mite jugum, dominumque nequit nescire priorem".

The fact that one can find very few cases of persons who lost lands in England in 1204 being granted additional lands in Normandy after that date would not on its own be significant in view of the incomplete nature of the Norman records. On the

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other hand, however, the *Querimoniae Normannorum*\(^{(1)}\) proves in passing that a considerable amount of the land confiscated from those who chose the English allegiance in 1204 was still in the French king's hand in 1247. The *Querimoniae* also reveal, of course, a wide range of complaints about the administration of Normandy between 1204 and 1247. Some of these complaints arose from the confiscations of 1204\(^{(2)}\), while others were directed against the malpractices of government officials during three reigns\(^{(3)}\). Petit-Dutaillis, who takes the view that the Normans were soon quite happy with their new French kings, claims that the "*Querimoniae elles-mêmes, faites pour ne signaler que les abus, sont bien significatives par la rareté des griefs graves, qu'on trouve si nombreux dans la plupart des Enquêtes*"\(^{(4)}\). However, those Normans who presented grievances to Saint Louis' enquéteurs were unlikely to have been aware that others were worse off than themselves, and even if they were so aware, their knowledge was unlikely to make them feel less keenly the wrongs that they had undoubtedly suffered. In this connection it should be remembered that J.R. Strayer in his book, *The Administration of Normandy under Saint Louis*, has shown how for nearly a century after the conquest, Normans were rarely given important

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\(^{(1)}\) *Rec.des hist.*, XXIV(i), 2-73.


positions in their own government\(^{(1)}\). The Masters of the Exchequer of Normandy were "non-Norman almost without exception" and were "trained in the curia before their Exchequer work"\(^{(2)}\), while "at first the baillis were all non-Norman and practically all from the old royal domain.... Normans were appointed only later in the century, and even then were an exception"\(^{(3)}\). That the many Frenchmen placed in the duchy were a source of annoyance to the Norman magnates is suggested by Roger of Wendover's account of Fulk Paynel's treachery in 1230. Fulk and his brother William and "cum eis ad sexaginta milites, viri strenui et potentes" approached Henry III while he was in Brittany and tried to persuade him to attempt the reconquest of Normandy. When he refused, on the advice of Hubert de Burgh, they asked him to assign two hundred knights from his army "cum quibus Normanniam intrarent, certissimis ei assertionibus promissentes, quod omne genus Francorum de Normannia exturbarent"\(^{(4)}\). This second request was also refused, again on the advice of the justiciar.

Since it is only on the occasion of Henry III's expedition to Brittany that we have incontrovertible evidence of active assistance being given to the English king by Norman vassals of the French king, this is probably a convenient point at which to look at the events of 1230-31 more closely.

\(^{(1)}\) J.R. Strayer, \textit{op.cit.}, p.6.

\(^{(2)}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.92.

\(^{(3)}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.95.

\(^{(4)}\) \textit{Chronica Rogeri de Wendover liber qui dicitur Flores Historiarum}, ed. H.G. Hewlett, III (Rolls Series, 1889), p.5. See Appendix IV, section C, no.82 for a fuller account of this incident.
A full account of Fulk's treachery is given in Appendix IV(1). However, we have record evidence of others in the Norman allegiance who went over to the English king at this time; unlike Fulk, though, they failed to recover their Norman lands and returned to England with Henry III.

The Norman records reveal that in May, 1231, John de Vineis was granted the land of Thomas de Gorges(2) and John de Friscamp was granted the lands of Richard and Sampson Foliot, Nicholas and William de Sancto Germano and Robert de Monasteriis(3). On 20th February, 1255, Henry III made a "grant for life to Richard Folyot and Juliana his wife, who by reason of their service to the king were long since disinherited of all their lands in Normandy, of ten marks a year from the issues of the county of Exeter."(4) On 12th May, 1239, the English king granted "to Richard de Sancto Germano thirty marks and to Sampson Foliot twenty marks... in aid for redeeming their lands in Normandy which they lost for the king's service"(5). Presumably Richard was connected in some way with Nicholas and William de Sancto Germano. Thomas de Gorges and Robert de Monasteriis both apparently died in England, for their wives were granted licences to go to Normandy to seek their dowers in November 1236, and April 1241, respectively(6).

(1) Appendix IV, section C, no.82.
(2) C.N., no.378.
(3) Ibid., no.379.
(4) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.399.
(5) C.L.R., I, 382.
(6) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.169; C.L.R. 1237-42, p.293.
By a fortunate chance, the results of their endeavours are recorded for us among the judgements of the Norman Exchequer. At the Easter session of 1237 it was decided that "relictta Thome de Gorgis non habebit dotem de terra dicti Thome, cum ipse Thomas, qui erat ligius homo domini regis et in garnisione, tradidit castrum domini regis in manu inimicorum suorum, et abit in Angliam contra dominum regem". The case was heard again at the Michaelmas session of the same year but with the same result for Thomas' widow. This time, however, it was agreed that "Filius Thome de Gorgis postnatus habebit portionem suam de terra matris sue". At the Easter session he had not even been allowed to plead his case "antenato suo absente, qui est contra regem". Here, of course, we have yet another example of a family divided: from about 1231 Thomas, his wife and their elder son lived in England, while the younger son remained in Normandy. The widow of Robert de Monasteriis was refused her dower in 1243 because Robert "proditor fuit et forfecit terram".

An interesting incident which reflects the atmosphere of fear and suspicion in Normandy at this time is recorded in the Querimoniae Normannorum. The complaint is quoted in full:

"Sebilia, relictta Engerrandi de Sancto Philiberto... conqueritur quod Johannes de Vineis, tempore guerrae quae fuit

(1) Rec.de Jugements, no.623.
(2) Ibid., no.635.
(3) Ibid., no.634.
(4) Ibid., no.621.
(5) Ibid., no.750.
apud Sanctum Jacobum de Bevrun, imposuit marito suo quod
inimicos regis receptaverat et quod conscius fuerat captionis
Petri de Ponte, majoris Falesiae, quem cepit Ricardus Suart,
frater dictae Sebiliae, super quibus non potuit habere
inquisitionem, quam petivit per abbatem de Fonteneto et per
alios quamplures: non enim audebat comparere coram eo ne
incarceraretur, eo quod senex erat, debilis et valetudinarius,
et quia non comparuit, accepit terram suam in manu domini regis,
quam dominus rex dedit Symoni Cornuto...quam adhuc detinet idem
Symon, eo quod dictus Engerrandus, non audens comparere, sicut
superius dictum est, ivit in Angliam et ibidem decessit, super
quo petit dicta Sybilia a domino rege quod ipse filiis suis,
liberis dicti Engerrandi, si placuerit, agat misericorditer et
benigne"(1).

Jean de Vignes, who was bailli of Rouen at this time,
was not a Norman. According to Delisle, he "avait débuté dans
la carrière sous le règne de Philippe-Auguste et de Louis VIII
remplissant les fonctions de prévôt de Senlis" but was sent into
Normandy at the beginning of the reign of Saint Louis (2).

All things considered, it is hardly surprising that the
French mistrusted the Normans with their continuing links with
England. The situation, however, was a difficult one to
resolve. It might have been possible in the circumstances of
1204, when France and England were still at war, to force men
to choose between their Norman and English estates, especially

(1) Q.N., no.439.
(2) Rec.des hist., XXIV(i), 100.
when many of them felt that the French conquest of the duchy might yet be reversed; it was another matter altogether to prevent men from recovering their English lands from a willing English king at times of truce between the two countries. Moreover, there was nothing anyone could do about the continuing cross-Channel relationships which existed after 1204; these presented a completely insoluble cause of concern. The continuing links of all kinds were, of course, most suspect in times of war. There seem to have been very few cases of double tenure at the time of King John's continental expedition of 1214 and the French king had himself initiated the war of 1224-7 at a time when England's king was a minor and England did not present a serious threat. As we have seen, there is evidence of Norman treachery in the war of 1229-31, but at this time, France's king was himself a minor and Blanche of Castile, though a formidable woman, had too many problems with which to cope to risk antagonising the Normans further; no doubt she was satisfied for the time being with having emerged safely from a dangerous crisis. Consequently, matters drifted on until the war of 1242-3. According to Matthew Paris, Louis IX had tried to come to terms with Henry III before the war was properly under way because he feared not only the treacherous kings of Aragon and Castile and the equally treacherous counts of Toulouse and La Marche, but also the "Normannos vaci 1 lantes, Angliae conterminos et quadam affinitate concatenatos" (1). When Saint Louis eventually emerged the victor, he apparently decided to settle the matter so far as lay in his power.

(1) M. Paris ... Chron.Maj., IV, 204.
Our only authority for the fact that when, in 1244, Henry III seized the English lands of all subjects of the king of France, he was acting in response to a prior move by Saint Louis, is the much maligned Matthew Paris. However, on this particular occasion, there are good grounds for accepting Paris's version of events, which reads as follows:-

"...rex Francorum, Parisius convocatos omnes ultramarinos, qui terras habuerunt in Anglia, sic est affatus: 'Quicumque in regno meo conversatur habens terras in Anglia, cum nequeat quis competenter duobus dominis servire, vel penitus mihi vel regi Angliae inseperabiliter adhaereat'. Unde aliqui terras et redditus habentes in Anglia, eas relinquentes, possessionibus, quas habebant in Francia, adhaeserunt, aliqui et converso. Super quo certificatus rex Angliae, omnes de regno Franciae, praecipue Normannos, jussit terris suis, quas in Anglia habuerunt disseisiri. Unde regi Francorum videbatur, quod rex Anglorum, quia non in adoptionem eorum statuit conditionem terris hinc vel inde suis privandorum, ut ad alterutrum regum transmigrarent libere, sicut ipse rex Francorum fecerat, treugas inter eos confregisset..."(1).

In the first place, Matthew Paris was probably in a position to know the truth about this particular incident, for only three years later he personally performed a service for the king of France(2). Secondly, the whole tone of the passage is more favourable to Saint Louis than to Henry III and it therefore

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(1) Ibid., IV, 288.
(2) Ibid., IV, 652. He took letters patent from Louis IX to the King of Norway.
seems unlikely that Paris invented the story that the French king made the first move. Thirdly, the story fits the facts of the situation as we know them from elsewhere. The French king had good reasons for wishing to terminate the cases of double tenure; while it is perhaps understandable that Henry should retaliate, it seems inconceivable that he should voluntarily destroy a situation which could only be to his advantage. Lastly, Paris's account is very much in keeping with what we know about Saint Louis' statesmanlike qualities; it is not difficult to believe that he was sufficiently shrewd to realise, in his moment of victory, that the kings of France may not always be stronger than their English counterparts and that it would be wise to put an end to the existence of double tenure while he was strong enough to do so.

However, quite apart from the fact that a few cases of double tenure remained in existence after 1244, Louis' action did not really resolve the situation. Many cross-Channel relationships still remained and men of the thirteenth century never lost an interest in lands which had once been theirs (1). Moreover, the French king could never be sure, as long as the kings of England continued to claim the duchy as their own, that they would not at some future date renew their former practice of allowing certain Normans to recover their English lands. Indeed, Saint Louis may have been aware that the lord of Tancarville was offered his English lands, at a price, in 1252 (2), although he does not seem to have seized his opportunity.

(1) Some men even attempted to recover their English lands after the Treaty of Paris, 1259. See Appendix IV, section C, nos. 51, 82.

He may have been aware, too, that in 1257, Henry III granted to William de Hastencot "that if he die without heir begotten of his body, William Graundyn, Luke de Montlaundryn and Thomas de Devilevil, his nephews, though Normans, shall succeed him in all lands which he held in fee in the realm"\(^1\).

Certainly, it is clear that in spite of the events of 1244, Saint Louis still mistrusted the Normans after that date. Le Nain de Tillemont records in his *Vie de Saint Louis, roi de France* that after the arrival of Henry III in Gascony in August 1253, the French king's council not only sent an army to Poitou because "Les Poitevins passaient alors pour avoir peu de fidélité" but "envoya aussi en Normandie des chevaliers, des sergens des carreaux pour mettre dans les machines"\(^2\).

Matthew Paris tells us that in 1257 when the French king heard of the election of Henry III's brother, Richard, as King of Germany, he "fecit optime communiri castra Normanniae, et a personis suspectis amovit custodias et magistratus, et liberavit eas sui Francigenis; et Normannos, quos noluit amovere, affinitatis et alio foederis generi sibi indissolubili vinculo sociavit; domosque religiosorum, quae in confinio fuerant, amovit, et pro ipsis alia loca commutavit, tam in locis versus Alemanniam conterminis, quam Normanniae, et conditiones eorum ampliavit, castra firmavit, et firmata provide communivit, ne rex Alemaniae qui Pictaviam vendicavit, vel rex Angliae qui

\(^1\) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.603.

Normanniam postulavit, receptacula, si forte supervenièrent hostiliter, invenirent. Formidabant Francia vehementer ne inter hos, quasi inter duas molas, contereretur..." (1)

All things considered, it is clear that the kings of France would never feel sure of Normandy as long as the kings of England continued to claim the duchy as their right.

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(1) M. Paris ... Chron. Maj., V, 636.
(i) The severance of the Channel Islands from continental Normandy

The first question which arises in connection with the Channel Islands is why they did not become French in our period along with the rest of Normandy. On geographical grounds alone, it seems strange that the îles Normandes \(^{1}\), as the French still call them, ever came under different rule from the rest of the duchy. When one considers that in 1204 the Islands were not only geographically but also politically, administratively, legally and ecclesiastically an integral part of Normandy, then the failure of the French kings to acquire them seems even more remarkable.

Although the sentence of confiscation passed against John by Philip's court in 1202 applied just as much to the Channel Islands as to the rest of the duchy, it had to be effected by force here as elsewhere. The sources for the period enable us to follow Philip's gradual conquest of the Norman mainland in considerable detail \(^{2}\). Unfortunately, however, they are almost completely silent about the Channel Islands at this crucial point in the Islands' history. If we confine ourselves to record sources, we find that the last reference to the Islands before the capitulation of Rouen in June, 1204 is as early as

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(1) Larousse du XX	extsuperscript{e} siècle, IV (Paris, 1931), p. 15.
August, 1203. On the thirteenth of that month, John ordered Peter de Préaux, Lord of the Islands, to take one fifth of their annual income from all persons, lay or ecclesiastical, who had land or rents in Jersey or Guernsey. The purpose of this levy was "ad sustentandum milites et servientes qui predictas insulas defendent ab extraneis" (1). Although it is not clear from this instruction whether or not the Channel Islands were already under attack (2), it is clear that King John did not intend to surrender them without a struggle.

The next reference to the Islands does not occur until September 1205 when they were still apparently under John's control (3). However, it seems that at some time between August 1203 and September 1205, the Channel Islands had fallen to the French and subsequently been recovered.

We have no information at all about the loss of the Islands in the first place, but the Roman d'Eustache le Moine tells us about their recovery. The Roman is a poem of 2305 lines which Michel believes was written between 1223 and 1284 by Adam le Roi, chief minstrel at the court of the duke of Brabant (4). Like most of the poems of its time, the Roman is a mixture of fact and fiction, but it has been amply demonstrated that "la verité historique y tient une bien plus grande place que les faits sortis de l'imagination du trouvère" (5). If we look first at


(2) Cf. ibid. 1201-16, pp.15,32 b.


what the Roman tells us about the recovery of the Channel Islands, we can then assess the probability of the poet's account in the light of contemporary record material.

The relevant part of the poem tells us how at some unspecified date, Eustace the Monk, seneschal of the Count of Boulogne, quarrelled with his master and fled to England. Disguised as a Templar he sought out King John and asked to be taken into his service. The English king granted his request but not before Eustace swore to serve him faithfully and surrendered his wife and daughter as hostages. After recounting how Eustace entered John's service, the poet launches straight into an account of his expedition to the Channel Islands. According to the Roman, Eustace set off with thirty ships supplied by the king. The force defending the Islands was assembled under a castellan named Romerel who gave orders that Eustace and his men were to be attacked as soon as they landed. However, as soon as they disembarked Eustace's men took the initiative. Eustace himself took an active part in the fighting, wielding first an axe and then a dagger. The defending force was eventually defeated and expelled from the Islands which were then subjected to great devastation by the victor.

Although the author of the Roman does not ascribe a date to the incidents just described, it is possible to work out approximately when they occurred. In the first place, we

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(2) Ibid., lines 1910-51.
know that Eustace's arrival in England took place in or before November 1205 when his name first appears in the English records. In the second place, we know that Eustace did not flee from Boulogne before August 1203 for in that month he was still acting in his capacity as seneschal of Boulogne\(^1\).

The poet tells us that Eustace quarrelled with the count of Boulogne in person and subsequently took to the forest from which he harassed his enemy's men and property. Both the Roman and the *Histoire des ducs de Normandie* imply that this state of affairs existed for some time\(^2\). According to the Roman, Eustace was eventually captured by the count, Renaud Dammartin, who decided to send him for trial by the French king's court. En route, however, he managed to escape and crossed the Channel to England\(^3\). If the Roman's account of the quarrel is accurate then Eustace's flight must have taken place in or shortly after January 1205. We know from other sources that Renaud only visited Boulogne on two occasions between August 1203 and November 1205. His first visit lasted from December 1203 to January 1204\(^4\) and his second visit took place during January, 1205\(^5\). Presumably, therefore, the original quarrel took place on the first of these visits and the final encounter on the second.

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\(^3\) Wistasse le Moine, ed. W. Foerster and J. Trost, lines 1644-1880.


\(^5\) Ibid., p.94.
If we turn from the probable date of Eustace's escape to England to the probable date of his expedition to the Channel Islands, we are on slightly less firm ground. Although Eustace's name does not appear in the English records until November 1205\(^1\), we have record evidence that the Channel Islands were once more in English lands by September 1205. An entry in the Charter Roll dated the nineteenth of that month reads as follows: "Precipimus vobis quod manuteneatis et defendatis et in bona pace esse permittatis insulas de Gernere, Aurene et Gerse, sicud nostra dominica, nec eis faciatis vel a nostris fieri permittatis dampnum vel gravamen"\(^2\). This enrolment has in fact been cancelled and a cross-reference made to the Patent Roll. Although there is no trace of a similar enrolment on the Patent Roll, it nevertheless seems safe to assume that an instruction of this nature was applicable at the time. Unfortunately the addressee's name is not recorded but it seems highly probable that the order was intended for Eustace the Monk. In the first place, the Histoire des ducs de Normandie states that the Channel Islands were granted to Eustace by the English king as a reward for his services\(^3\). While it seems unlikely that any formal grant was made, this statement suggests that Eustace seemed at one time to be in control of the Islands. The author of the Histoire does not suggest a date for Eustace's de facto lordship but it was presumably before May 1206 when Geoffrey de Lucy and Hasculf de

\(^1\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.57.
\(^2\) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.166 b.
\(^3\) Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d'Angleterre, ed. F. Michel, p.167.
Suligny were the king's chief agents in the Islands\(^{(1)}\). In the second place, the instruction not to cause any damage in the Islands but to let peace prevail would have been particularly appropriate if the writ were addressed to Eustace for the Roman records that after he defeated the defending force

"Wistasces d'illuc les jeta,
Et tous les isles essilla,
K'il n'i remest riens a ardoir
Ne en castiel ne en manoir"\(^{(2)}\)

Finally, we do not hear of anyone else being the king's representative in the Islands until May 1206 when the king wrote to "Galfrido de Lucy et Hascuillo de Suleney et ceteris fidelibus suis in Insulis"\(^{(3)}\).

It seems likely that Eustace had only just obtained control of the Islands when the writ of September 1205 was issued. This is suggested both by the wording of the writ and by the fact that Eustace's name first appears in the English records shortly thereafter. In November 1205 the king instructed Angerus de Sanwico to hand over to the archdeacon of Taunton the money which Eustace the Monk and "homines Justiciae" had seized and which he had in his custody\(^{(4)}\). The fact that Eustace had secured his booty on an expedition in which he was accompanied by "homines Justiciae" suggests that the expedition had an official character.

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\(^{(1)}\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.70 b.


\(^{(3)}\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.70 b.

\(^{(4)}\) Ibid. 1204-24, p.57.
and was not just a simple pirate raid. In fact, this piece of record evidence lends considerable weight to the story told by the author of the Roman.

Whether or not the writ of September 1205 was addressed to Eustace, King John clearly believed that Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney were under his control while the author of the Roman tells of Eustace harrying "tous les iles". It would seem, however, that the French returned to the attack and several months elapsed before the English king was fully in control of the Channel Islands. The first hint of renewed difficulties comes in December 1205. In that month the king wrote to Hugh de Gournai, a Norman baron who had deserted him in 1203, to tell him that at the request of the Holy Roman Emperor Otto IV he had been pardoned for this offence. He went on to instruct Hugh "quod secure venias per terram nostram ad eundum in servicium nostrum in insula de Geres' vel apud Rupella ubi melius viderimus expedire"(1). Now we know that by December 1205 all Poitou had fallen to Philip Augustus except for Niort and La Rochelle. Both these towns held out against the French until King John himself arrived in Poitou in June 1206(2). By grouping La Rochelle and Jersey together in his letter to Hugh de Gournai, the king seems to imply that both places were in a similar situation - in English hands but under French attack. It seems very natural that after Hugh's previous treachery, King John should wish to test his loyalty in active

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(2) A.L. Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087-1216, pp.441-2.
service against the French, whether in Poitou or the Channel Islands.

Lest this interpretation of the letter should be dismissed as pure supposition, it should be stated that other factors support the contention that the English king did not enjoy full control of the Islands from September 1205 on. In the first place, there is the negative evidence that no administrative instructions relating to Island affairs are recorded in the surviving Chancery records for the period prior to May 1206. In the second place, there seems to have been a large expedition to the Channel Islands in the spring of 1206. On 29th April the barons of the Exchequer were instructed to credit to William de Wrotham, archdeacon of Taunton, the sum of £138 for the allowances for forty days of 275 sailors sent to the Islands on the king's service in five galleys and three great ships. Finally, there is the evidence of a witness in the Assizes held in the Islands in 1309; he stated that "a certain King of France disinherited the lord John formerly King of England of the Duchy of Normandy and then the said King of France on two occasions had ejected the said lord John the King etc. from these islands and occupied them as annexed to the said Duchy. And the said lord John the King with armed force on two occasions reconquered these islands from the said King of France. And from that his said second conquest he and his posterity Kings of England have held these islands up to the present". Although this statement was made more than a hundred years after the loss of Normandy and

(1) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p. 69.
(2) R.A. 1309, pp. 11-12.
is not therefore necessarily reliable, it so happens that it fits in well with what we learn from other sources. The first time the English king recovered the Islands from the French would be the occasion described in the Roman. As we have seen, the date of this first recovery was probably early September 1205. The second recovery cannot be dated precisely and may have been a gradual process. In the case of Guernsey the English king had certainly recovered full control by July 1206\(^1\) and had possibly recovered it as early as May 1206\(^2\). In the case of Jersey, the first specific reference to the Island does not occur until October, 1207\(^3\). However, it seems unlikely that fighting continued after October 1206, when a truce was made between England and France\(^4\). Moreover, a reference to Hasculf de Suligny, the first known post-1204 Warden of Jersey\(^5\), occurs as early as May 1206. In that month King John issued a writ addressed to Geoffrey de Lucy, the first known post-war Warden of Guernsey and Alderney\(^6\), Hasculf de Suligny and "ceteris fidelibus suis in Insulis"\(^7\).

Although it would have been more logical to discuss the loss of the Channel Islands before discussing their subsequent recovery, it was necessary to reverse the logical order because we have some

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(1) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1204-24, p.73.
(2) Ibid. 1204-24, p.70 b.
(3) Ibid. 1204-24, p.92 b.
(4) A.L. Poole, op.cit., p.442.
(7) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1204-24, p.70 b.
information about the latter event but no information about
the former. It seems likely, however, that the Islands fell
to the French in the summer of 1204. In January, 1200, they
had been granted to Peter de Préaux together with sixty librates
of land in England and a rent of £100 Anjou in Rouen, for the
service of three knights (1). Since Peter was actively involved
in the defence of mainland Normandy during the war of 1202-1204 (2),
his cannot have spent much time in the Islands. Nevertheless,
he was still lord of the Islands in August 1203 when they occur
in the English records for the last time before September 1205.
It seems that subordinate officials administered the Islands on
his behalf during his absence, for the writ of August 1203 was
addressed not to Peter himself but to "baillivis Petri de Pratellis
de Gerse et Gerner' etc" (3). Peter himself was in military
command of the Norman capital when it was besieged by Philip
Augustus in May 1204. On 1st June 1204, terms were agreed
upon for the capitulation of Rouen in thirty days if no help
was forthcoming from King John in the meantime and Peter's
name heads the list of those within the city who were party to
the agreement (4). According to the terms of this armistice,
all the knights and burgesses present in Rouen on 1st June 1204
were to be allowed to retain all their lands provided they did
homage to the French king (5). Presumably, therefore, if Peter

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(1) Rot.Chart. 1199-1216, p.33 b.
(2) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, pp.28-9, 35 b; R.N., pp.64,75,87,106, 114.
(5) Ibid., no.803, p.381, lines 23-7.
was still lord of the Islands at that date, he surrendered them to Philip with his other Norman holdings on 24th June and received them back again in return for homage to the French King. In 1206 Peter switched his allegiance back to King John. The Patent Roll records that in June that year, Peter was given letters of safe-conduct to enable him to come to England. At the same time he was informed that "dominus rex reddit ei terram suam in Anglia et gratum suum faciet de Insulis secundum consilium R.Comitis Cestriae et Ingeri de Pratell" \(^1\). In fact Peter never recovered the Channel Islands or his original English holding but in March 1207 was granted lands in Essex and Cambridge instead \(^2\). However, the fact that the question of the Channel Islands arose on the occasion of Peter's return to John's allegiance strongly suggests that he had remained in possession of them until he was obliged to surrender to Philip Augustus at Rouen in June 1204.

Although John apparently lost the Islands to the French king twice, they were not all continuously in his own hands thereafter. On two later occasions one or more of the Islands fell into the hands of his enemies. Very little is known about the first of these occasions. However, on 4th November 1214, Roger de Chauton and Thierry de Arden "qui duxerunt fratrem et avunculum Eustachii monachi prisones de Insula de Serk" were granted forty shillings for their expenses \(^3\).

\(^1\) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.68.

\(^2\) Ibid., 1201-16, p.69 b; Appendix IV, section C, no.88.

\(^3\) Rot.Lit.C1. 1204-24, p.175.
On the same day the sheriff of Southampton was ordered to take over from the constable of Porchester fourteen sergeants captured in Sark. He was then to take them to Winchester and hand them over to Matthew de Wallop. Still on the same day, instructions were given to the constable of Porchester about the handing over of these fourteen sergeants and also about the way he was to treat "milites et fratrem Eustachii Monachi quos homines Philippi de Albiniaaco duxerunt usque Porecestr". It would seem that some sort of expedition had been led against Sark resulting in the capture of these prisoners. Presumably it had been led by Philip d'Aubigny whose men had been responsible for conducting Eustace's relatives to England. Philip had been Warden of Guernsey and Alderney since August 1207, and Warden of Jersey since November 1212 and was made Warden of Sark in December 1214. If the expedition had been led by Philip then it must have taken place between 22nd August 1214 and 4th November 1214 for Philip was in Poitou on the former date. How long Eustace and his men had been making a nuisance of themselves in Sark is not known. They may have settled on the Island when they first entered John's service for we hear of no specific references to Sark before November 1214. Moreover, in May 1206 and again in April 1208, Eustace the Monk was granted safe-conducts allowing him to visit

(1) Ibid. 1204-24, p.177.
(2) Ibid. 1204-24, p.177.
(3) J.H. Le Patourel, op.cit., p.121.
England within specified periods\(^{(1)}\). This suggests that Eustace was usually based outside England itself. If Eustace had formally left John's service by November 1214, the breach must have occurred after October 1212. In that month the sheriff of Nottingham was notified that the king had given Eustace until the end of November to pay a debt of twenty marks. He was also instructed to give Eustace seisin of his land in Norfolk, which had presumably been seized for the non-payment of the debt and to allow him to retain it "quamdiu fuerit ad praesens in servicio nostro et quamdiu nobis placuerit"\(^{(2)}\). It may be that no formal breach did take place but that Eustace and his men had just become less discriminating in selecting targets for attack from their base in Sark. Whatever the nature of the breach, it may have been over as soon as January 1215\(^{(3)}\) and was certainly over by March 1215 when thirty four prisoners were released\(^{(4)}\). The reason for the restoration of Eustace and his men to favour is not known but in the months before Magna Carta King John clearly needed to build up support wherever he could.

The second occasion when John lost control of one or more of the Islands to someone other than the king of France was during the civil war of 1215-17 and again Eustace the Monk was involved. The only record evidence we have for this loss of control is the Treaty of Kingston concluded in September 1217 between Henry III of England and Prince Louis of France. One of the clauses of this treaty reads as follows: "Item de

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\(^{(1)}\) Ibid. 1201-16, pp.65,81.
\(^{(2)}\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.126.
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid. 1201-16, p.130 b. See also pp.133 b, 144.
insulis sic fiet; dominus Ludovicus mittet literas suas patentes fratribus Eustachii Monachi, praecipiens quod illas reddant domino Henrico Regi Angliae; et, nisi illas reddant, distinget illos dominus Ludovicus, pro legale posse suo, per feoda, et per terras eorum, quae de feodo suo movent, ad illas reddendas; et si haec facere noluerint, sint extra pacem istam

Reference is made to Eustace's brothers rather than to Eustace himself because the renegade monk had met his death in the battle of Sandwich the previous August. The terms of this clause in the Treaty of Kingston suggest that although Eustace and his men were ostensibly acting on behalf of Prince Louis and the rebellious English barons, in practice they tended to act somewhat independently. Louis had been invited by the rebellious English barons to claim the English crown and was thus acting on his own behalf and not on behalf of his father, Philip Augustus. Indeed, Philip specifically disclaimed any responsibility for Eustace in his reply to the legate Gualo when the latter requested a safe-conduct in 1216. He said, "Per terram nostram propria conductum libenter praestabo; sed si forte incideris in manus Eustachii Monachi, vel aliorum hominum Ludowici, qui custodiant semitas maris, non mihi imputes si quid tibi sinistri contingat".

Exactly when Eustace and his men obtained control of the Channel Islands is not known. The only reference to the event occurs in the Annals of Dunstable. The annalist tells how the civil war was waged not only on land but also at sea.

(1) Foedera, i (i), 148.
After mentioning the part played by the barons of the Cinque Ports in intercepting Prince Louis' supplies on their way from France, he continues, "Nam Eustachius dictus Monachus, pyrata fortissimus, et Galfriedus de Luchi ex parte Ludowici insulas regi ceperunt, et multas seditiones ei moverunt" (1). This reference to the war at sea and Eustace's part in it follows immediately after the annalist's account of Prince Louis' visit to London shortly after he arrived in England and precedes his account of the withdrawal of the count of Nevers from the siege of Windsor. Now we know that Louis' visit to London lasted from 2nd to 6th June 1216 (2) and that the Count of Nevers withdrew from the siege of Windsor in September of the same (3) year so we can give an approximate date to Eustace's seizure of the Channel Islands. Nor is there any positive evidence which contradicts this approximate dating. Indeed, our last positive evidence that the Islands were still in John's hands dates from as early as 6th October 1215 (4). Moreover, we know that Eustace had deserted John's cause and joined the rebellious barons by mid-September 1215 (5).

It seems that Prince Louis must have issued the letters required by the Treaty of Kingston almost immediately and that Eustace's brothers responded promptly to his instructions for the Treaty was sealed on 11th September 1217 (6) and by 22nd September the king was issuing writs to Philip d'Aubigny in his capacity as Warden of the Islands (7). From this date until

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(3) Ibid., pp.376-7.
(6) Foedera, I (i), 148.
(7) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.323. See also ibid. 1204-24, p.230 b.
the end of the period with which we are concerned, the Islands
seem to have been continuously in English hands.

Considerable space has been devoted to this account of the
fate of the Channel Islands between 1204 and 1207 because no
detailed narrative of these events has been given hitherto.
However, other writers have shown how much attention both
John and Henry III devoted to fortifying and garrisoning the
Islands after 1204 and have made it clear that the English
kings were aware from the very beginning of the troubles with
France of the increased importance of the Channel Islands once
Normandy was lost. Trevor Williams and Professor Le Patourel
have both pointed out the importance of the Islands as the
only safe haven on the sea route from south-east England to
Poitou, Saintonge and Aquitaine, even when the Count of Brittany
was temporarily in alliance with the English king. In the
thirteenth century the science of navigation was not very far
advanced and seamen liked to keep within sight of land.
Consequently, most ships passing through the Channel en route
from south-East England or north-east France to any part of the
western coast of France sailed close to the Islands, especially
Guernsey, and very often stops were made at one or other of
the Islands ports, especially St Peter Port. Possession of
the Islands was thus of some economic importance in view of
the wine trade between south-west France and England. Moreover,
if England was to retain control of her territorial possessions
in south-west France, it was vital that the English king's
officials should be able to travel freely between the two areas.
After the loss of Poitou in 1224 they were liable to be inter­
cepted by pirates from La Rochelle but at least English
possession of the Islands gave them a safe haven in the Channel. Professor Le Patourel has suggested that the English kings also regarded the Islands "as a foothold in Normandy, and a legal and military basis for the recovery of the duchy". Certainly the fact that they retained the Islands meant that they were still dukes of part of Normandy in practice as well as in theory. Although it is doubtful how positive a part the Islands could have played in any attempt to recover Normandy by landing on the Norman coast, they would certainly have needed to be in English hands. However, the Islands were used as a base from which to harass the Norman coast when the English king's main efforts were being directed elsewhere.

Clearly, then, one of the reasons why a previously integral part of the duchy of Normandy remained in English hands after 1204 was that the English kings went to a great deal of trouble and expense to ensure that this should be so. Obviously they had recognised from the very beginning the increased economic and strategic importance of the Islands once continental Normandy was lost. Unfortunately we have very little information about the effort expended and the costs incurred during the crucial period from August 1203 to the spring of 1206 but the very fact that the English king wrested the Islands from the

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(2) J.H. Le Patourel, Jersey and her environment in the Middle Ages. Three lectures (unpublished) delivered in Jersey on 8, 9 and 10 April, 1964, under the auspices of the Don Balleine Trust, p. 50.

French king at least once and probably twice during these years suggests that a very considerable effort was made. In view of John's lack of success in other areas in the same period, one is tempted to conclude that a particularly vigorous effort was made in the case of the Channel Islands. When the first truce with France was arranged in October 1206, the most crucial period was over, for the English king now had time to organise matters in the Islands to his own best advantage. Fortifications were erected and there are henceforth constant references in the sources to these fortifications and their garrisons, especially in times of war between England and France\(^{(1)}\). However, even with the help of strong fortifications and garrisons sent from England, it is unlikely that John and Henry III could have retained the Islands in the face of large-scale local resistance and a great deal obviously depended on the way the two kings treated their remaining Norman subjects.

As Professor Le Patourel has pointed out, some administrative changes were necessitated by the new position of the Channel Islands as an English outpost close to a hostile coast but as far as possible the \textit{status quo ante bellum} was maintained\(^{(2)}\). This was obviously necessary if the loyalty of the Islanders was to be retained. However, it involved allowing the continuation of a very high degree of contact between the Islands and the Norman mainland which must have been a source

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(1) T. Williams, \textit{loc. cit.}, passim.

(2) J.H. Le Patourel, \textit{The Medieval Administration of the Channel Islands, 1199-1399}, p.36.
of some concern to the English kings. It is this continuing contact to which attention must now be turned.

(ii) Continuing Ecclesiastical Links between the Channel Islands and Normandy

The continuing link with the Norman Church was even stronger in the case of the Channel Islands than it was in the case of England. In the first place, the Norman Church had a relatively larger stake in the Islands than it had in England. In the second place, the Islands remained part of the Norman diocese of Coutances throughout the period under review.

In his *Histoire du Cotentin et de ses îles*, Dupont remarks, "Quant aux îles, leur territoire presque tout entier devint l'apanage des établissements religieux". De Gruchy, in his *Medieval Land Tenures in Jersey* is justifiably critical of this statement. As he says, "an examination of the ecclesiastical holdings on a map of the Islands would have shown the learned historian how exaggerated this statement is. Even in Guernsey and Alderney where the property of the Church was largest, it only amounted to one third of Guernsey and one half of Alderney. In Sark the Church holdings were very small, whilst in Jersey, which is considerably larger than the rest of the Islands together, the Church property, though important, was far smaller than either the king's demesne or the lay fiefs".

However, de Gruchy's own statement reveals that the Church had a very large stake indeed in the Channel Islands. Moreover, as we


shall see shortly, when we speak of the Church's stake in the Islands, we are speaking primarily of the continental Church, and especially the Norman Church.

Although neither Matthew nor New mentioned the alien priories of the Channel Islands in their respective books (1), more work has been done on the extent of the Norman Church's possessions in the Channel Islands than on its possessions in England. In his _Medieval Land Tenures in Jersey_, de Gruchy lists all the Church's interests in the largest of the Channel Islands (2). Ewen, on the other hand, is only concerned with the landed property of the Church in his article, "The Fiefs of the Island of Guernsey" (3). However, Ewen's work is easily supplemented by reference to the _Cartulaire des îles Normandes_ (4) which also provides all the information referred to in this study on the smaller islands of Alderney, Herm, Sark, Jethou, Lihou, Ecréhou and Chausey. It seems, therefore, that there is no real need to present a detailed description of all the Norman Church's holdings in the Channel Islands. The following table lists just the Norman religious establishments concerned and the Islands in which they had interests.

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(2) G.F.B. de Gruchy, _op.cit._, pp.93-109.


(4) _Cartulaire des îles Normandes_, _La Société Jersiaise_ (Jersey, 1924).
### The Possessions of the Norman Church in the Channel Islands in the Middle Ages

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* Post-1204 reference.

(1) The references for the table are given overleaf:
The references for note (1) on the previous page are:

(a) C.I.N., no.337.
(b) Ibid., no.327; G.C.XI, col.334.
(c) C.I.N., nos.279-90 passim.
(d) Ibid., nos.319-24; R.A. 1309, p.159.
(e) C.I.N., nos.291,296.
(f) Ibid., nos.228-54.
(g) Ibid., nos.312-15; R.A. 1309, pp.159,183.
(h) C.I.N., no.337.
(j) C.I.N., nos.255-278.
(k) Ibid., nos.310-11.
(l) Ibid., nos.306-9.
(m) Ibid., no.326.
(n) Ibid., nos.1-166 passim and no.338.
(o) Ibid., nos.167-227 passim.
(p) Ibid., no.328.
(q) Ibid., no.325.
A full examination of the sources cited in connection with this table shows that the lands and other interests of the Norman Church were not restricted to certain parts of the Islands but were well scattered, thus maximizing Norman influence after 1204. In Jersey, for example, the Abbey of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte had lands or other interests in all twelve parishes\(^1\). In Guernsey, the abbey of Mont-Saint-Michel had the largest and most scattered interests. A papal bull of 1155 confirms to the abbey its "quartam partem" of that Island\(^2\) while the Guernsey Extent of 1248 records that "medietas Insule de Gernereye est domini Regis..., alia medietas partita est inter abbatem Montis Sancti Michaelis de Periculo Maris et Robertum de Ver\(^3\)". However, Mont-Saint-Michael's estates were not in a solid block but were scattered over the north-western half of the island and lay in five of Guernsey's ten parishes\(^4\). As in Jersey, there was no parish in Guernsey in which some Norman religious establishment did not have lands or other interests\(^5\).

Although at least four English religious houses received grants of property in continental Normandy\(^6\), no evidence has been found that any received grants of property in the Channel Islands. Of the continental houses with interests in the Channel Islands, only two were non-Norman and both of

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., no.181.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., no.10.
\(^{(5)}\) C.I.N., passim, e.g. no.337.
\(^{(6)}\) See above, Chapter I, p.25.
these had strong Norman connections. The two houses concerned are Marmoutier and Cormery, both near Tours. In an early twelfth-century charter in favour of the former, Henry I confirmed his father's grants in Guernsey and the charter specifically states that the property concerned was intended for the monks of Marmoutier's priory at Haev ville in Normandy: "Haec omnia sicut hujusmodi sunt precipio ut monachi Majoris Monasterii qui apud Heauvillam teneant et possideant bene et in pace..." (1). Similarly, a charter issued by Edward I in 1292 reveals that Cormery's Guernsey property was intended for the monks of the Abbey's priory of Sainte Hélène, near Cap La Hague in the Cotentin. The charter refers to the sale by the abbot and convent of Cormery of "redditus et libertates una cum pertinenciis quos et quas habebant et habere poterant in Insula Generoii spectantes ad prioratum dictorum religiosorum sancte Elene in Hagua." (2)

When one considers that by 1204 there was no independent religious house in the Channel Islands, then it is clear that in the monastic sphere, at least, Norman influence was paramount. There only ever seems to have been one independent abbey in the Islands in the Middle Ages and that was the Abbey of St Helier, Jersey, founded in about 1155 (3). However, in about 1179, the Abbey was reduced to the status of a priory of the Abbey of

(1) C.I.N., no.305.
(2) Ibid., no.331.
Cherbourg on the grounds that both houses were too poor to develop independently. Henceforward, the former abbey became known as the Priory of L'Islet, a title which reflected its situation on a rocky islet just off the Jersey coast by the town of St Helier.

There can be no doubt that the Priory of L'Islet was a conventual priory. In the late 1180's Walter, Archbishop of Rouen, confirmed his predecessor's decision to make St Helier subject to Cherbourg and his charter of confirmation orders that "in domo Sancti Elerii in Insulis quinque canonici ad minus secundum dispositionem abbatis (i.e. of Cherbourg) regulariter viventes Deo deserviant, qui modis omnibus potestati et voluntati abbatis prenominati loci permanebunt subjecti". Although it cannot be demonstrated from evidence dating from the period 1204-1259, it is clear from later evidence that the Priory of L'Islet remained a conventual priory throughout the Middle Ages.

The status of other Channel Island priories is more difficult to establish, especially if one confines oneself to evidence from the period 1204-1259. Altogether, one finds references to thirteen more priories in the Channel Islands in the Middle ages, five in Jersey (Bonne Nuit, Lecq, Noirmont, St Clement and St Peter), three in Guernsey (Martinvast, la

(1) C.I.N., no.229.
(3) C.I.N., no.230.
Refrerie and the Vale(1), and one each in Sark, Herm, Lihou, the Chausey Islands and the Ecréhou rocks. Six of the priories belonged to Mont-Saint-Michel (Chausey, Lecq, Lihou, Noirmont, St Clement and the Vale), two to Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte (Bonne Nuit and St Peter) and one each to Blanchelande (Martinvast), Cherbourg (Herm), Croix-Saint-Leufroi (la Refrerie), Montebourg (Sark) and Valricher (Ecréhou).

We have twelfth or thirteenth century evidence for the existence of chapels belonging to the priories of Bonne Nuit(2), Lecq(3), St Clement(4), St Peter(5) and Ecréhou(6). We also read of priors of Bonne Nuit(7), Lecq(8), St Clement(9) and St Peter(10) in the thirteenth century and of Ecréhou(11) in the early fourteenth century. These priors, their predecessors and successors probably had only the one companion which canon law decreed for we have early fourteenth century evidence that only two monks were then resident at the priories

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(1) As a result of reclamation in the early nineteenth century, the Vale is now an integral part of the island of Guernsey. In the thirteenth century it was, like Lihou, only accessible from Guernsey at low tide.

(2) C.I.N. no.206.
(3) Ibid., no.35.
(4) Ibid., no.43.
(6) C.I.N. no.328 and note 1.
(7) Ext. 1274, p.10.
(8) C.I.N. no.39.
(9) Ibid., no.73.
(11) R.A. 1309, p.240.
of St Clement\(^{(1)}\) and Ecrehou\(^{(2)}\) and similar thirteenth century evidence for the priory of St Peter\(^{(3)}\). The prior of Bonne Nuit may have had more than one companion, although this seems unlikely; the only reference we have to monks other than the prior dates from the twelfth century and is a reference to "monks" in the plural without any number being specified\(^{(4)}\).

We know even less about the eight remaining priories than we do about the five just mentioned. The prior of the Vale witnessed a charter in 1179\(^{(5)}\) and a complaint made against his successor in 1274 mentions "monks" in the plural\(^{(6)}\).

Some slight remains of the priory buildings existed beside the church of the Vale until recently and may still survive\(^{(7)}\).

The church itself is the only surviving church in the Channel Islands with twelfth century architectural features. We first read of a prior at Lihou in the thirteenth century\(^{(8)}\) and we know that a prior, his companion and at least one servant, were resident there in 1302. By this date, if not before, the priory had its own chapel\(^{(9)}\). The earliest references

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\(^{(1)}\) C.I.N., no.26.

\(^{(2)}\) R.A. 1309, p.240.

\(^{(3)}\) C.I.N., no.181.

\(^{(4)}\) C.I.N., no.206.

\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., no.144.

\(^{(6)}\) Ext. 1274, pp.36-7.

\(^{(7)}\) E.F. Carey, "The Vale Priory", La Société Guernesiaise, Transactions, X (1931), 285.

\(^{(8)}\) C.I.N., no.111.

to the priors of Sark and Herm occur in the Rolls of the 1309 Assizes and the latter at least had his canonical companion (1). The former, however, might have been the successor of other solitary monks of Montebourg resident on Sark. The grant made to Montebourg c. 1160 of the chapel of St Magloire in Sark included a grant of straw "ad focum monachi ibi manentis in predicta capella ministrantis" (2), and two charters of the 1190's refer to a rent in Sark payable to the monk of Montebourg resident on the island (3). There were two monks living on Chausey in 1337 (4), one of whom presumably bore the title of prior, while it is not until 1365 that the existence of a prior of Martinvast first comes to light (5). In the case of la Refrerie, described as a priory in 1464 (6), we are left to infer from the Guernsey extent of 1248 that the Abbot of Croix-Saint-Leufroi had at least one representative there. The extent states, "Also there are in the same island six carucates of land of which the Prior of St Leofrid holds three carucates, William Roheis one carucate, and in the fief of Anneville there are two carucates which ought to be and are used, in turn and according to their tenures, to keep prisoners, and they can and ought to take pledges of the prisoners, giving nothing to the bailiffs unless they are taken by act of harele or for felony whether for breach of the peace of other grave

(1) R.A. 1309, pp. 195-6, 198 (Sark); ibid., pp. 16-19, 115 (Herm).
(2) C.I.N., no. 306.
(3) Ibid., nos. 307-8.
(4) Ibid., no. 26.
(5) Ibid., no. 289.
(6) Ibid., no. 330.
crime against the Crown of the lord the King"(1). Presumably it would not be satisfactory merely to send a monk over to Guernsey when the need arose.

Although much of our information on the Channel Island priories dates from after the period 1204—1259, and even then is not very full, it is tempting to conclude that the twelve priories mentioned so far all date back to before 1204 for the mother houses already owned their Channel Island lands and interests by that date and these had to be administered by someone. However, the case of Noirmont suggests that one should be careful about making such assumptions. Noirmont first appears in the records as a priory in 1414 and is also given this status in post-confiscation sources(2). It seems likely, however, that this priory was a late creation and that the Noirmont fief was previously administered from elsewhere. We have evidence dating from 1259 of a case "inter religiosos viros et honestos dominum abbatem et conventum Montis Sancti Michaelis de periculo maris ac priorem suum Sancti Clementi in insulis de Geresey ex una parte et homines suos de Nigro Monte ex altera"(3) which suggests that the Noirmont fief was then being administered by the prior of St Clement.

It seems unlikely that any of the Channel Island priories except for the Priory of L'Islet was ever occupied by more than two monks but the monks of these dative priories would have

(2) G.F.B. De Gruchy, Medieval Land Tenures in Jersey, p.98.
(3) C.I.N., no.73; see also R.A. 1309, p.276.
their servants (1). In 1274 a complaint was made in Guernsey against the monks of the Vale Priory and "quidam extranei servientes" (2) while a servant of the prior of Lihou in 1302 was described in 1304 as "a native of Normandy" (3). It may well be that other monks at other times brought over Norman servants instead of recruiting local labour.

Although we do not hear their Channel Island properties described as "priories", other abbeys may have had at least one representative resident in the Islands. Certainly this would be true of Marmoutier if eleventh century conditions were maintained into the thirteenth century. About 1048 Duke William of Normandy granted Marmoutier various properties in Guernsey including "unus hospes cum omni integritate sue reddibicionis ubi faciat habitaculum ad manendum monachus qui preerit illi obeadienci" (4). A charter of 1091 refers to a monk of Marmoutier named Walter "qui morabatur in insula Grenesoi" (5). Houses which did not have permanent representatives in the Islands would presumably have to send representatives from time to time to collect their revenues and uphold their interests in the courts.

This survey makes it clear that genuine monastic life was not much in evidence in the Channel Islands during the period with which we are concerned. However, such monastic life as

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(2) Ext. 1274, p.37.


(4) C.I.N., no.297.

(5) C.I.N., no.304.
did exist was under the control of Norman abbeys or priories. When we turn to the secular Church we again find that Norman influence was paramount. Altogether there were twenty five parishes in the Islands, twelve in Jersey, ten in Guernsey and one each in Alderney, Sark and Herm, and all twenty five parish churches were in the hands of Norman abbeys, priories or secular ecclesiastics. In Jersey, five of the churches were held by Saint-Sauveur, two by Cherbourg and one each by Lessay, Mont-Saint-Michel, Blanchelande, the archdeacon of Vauvere and Cérisy. In Guernsey five were held by Marmoutier's Norman priory of Heauville, four by Mont-Saint-Michel and one by Blanchelande. In Alderney, Herm and Sark, the patrons were the chapter of Coutances, the abbey of Cherbourg and the bishop of Coutances respectively. Unfortunately, we know very little about the place of origin of the priests appointed to these churches by their Norman patrons. In only one case do we know anything beyond the name of a priest appointed between 1204 and 1259. Between 1251 and 1279 a list was compiled for the bishop of Coutances of all the Channel Island parish churches. This list mostly confines itself to details of the churches' patrons and the distribution of their revenues. However, an entry for the church of St Martin de Bellouse in Guernsey, whose patron was the abbot of Blanchelande, contains the following information: "Anno XLIX° ista ecclesia collata

(2) C.I.N., nos.337,314.
fuit fratri Henrico canonico de Blancalanda pro eo quod non reperiebantur seculares qui ad ipsam essent ausi accedere et hoc de gracia speciali"(1).

Not only did the Bishop of Coutances retain his property in the Channel Islands after 1204, but the Islands remained subject to his spiritual authority long after this date. Indeed, it was not until 1568 that, by an Order in Council, they were annexed to the English diocese of Winchester(2). Jersey formed one rural deanery within the diocese of Coutances and Guernsey, Alderney, Sark and Herm together formed another. Both rural deaneries formed part of the archdeaconry of Bauptois along with other rural deaneries in continental Normandy(3).

Their continued subjection to the bishop of Coutances meant that there were continuing ecclesiastical links between the Islands and Normandy of a kind which did not exist between England and Normandy. The most important of these additional links was the necessity of the Islanders to appear from time to time before the bishop's court in Normandy. No examples of such appearances have been found for the period 1204 to 1259 but it is clear from slightly later evidence that they were by no means a rare occurrence(4).

(1) Ibid., no.337.
Otherwise, the continuing ecclesiastical links between the Islands and Normandy meant much the same sort of continuing contact between the two areas as we found in the case of England and the duchy. Again, evidence from the period 1204 to 1259 is almost entirely lacking but there is no reason to suppose that the situation indicated by later evidence\(^1\) did not exist in the half century with which we are particularly concerned. One difference is that Norman ecclesiastics usually did homage for their Channel Island property at the same time as they did homage for their English possessions which meant that the ceremony tended to take place elsewhere than the Islands\(^2\). On the other hand, links may have been closer in another respect. In view of the fact that genuine monastic life in the Islands seems to have been limited to the existence of five Augustinian canons resident at the Priory of L'Islet, it seems likely that Islanders with a monastic vocation would continue to find their way into the abbeys of Normandy\(^3\). Certainly this would seem the natural way for them to turn; not only were the continuing ecclesiastical links with Normandy very strong indeed but no evidence has been found of ecclesiastical links between the Islands and England before or after 1204. Then again, although no example can be cited of an Islander entering a Norman abbey between 1204 and 1259, a later example can be found\(^4\).

\(^1\) C.I.N. passim
\(^3\) For pre-1204 examples, see C.I.N., nos.116,117.
\(^4\) Ibid., no.94.
The English king does not seem to have differentiated in any significant way between the Norman Church's possessions in the Channel Islands, and its possessions in England. As usual we have much less evidence in the case of the Islands but we have sufficient to uphold this claim. The seizure of the property of the Norman Church after the loss of mainland Normandy may not have taken place until after the recovery of the Islands from the French king but, as in the case of England, it was only temporary. When speaking of the seizure of lay fiefs in Guernsey, de Guérin makes the extraordinary statement that "The lands of all the Norman abbeys were also forfeited for a time, and were only restored c.1238, by Henry III" (1). He does not cite any evidence in support of this claim and it is easy to cite contrary evidence.

Although we have no surviving contemporary reference to the original seizure, we know that instructions were issued for the restoration of Marmoutier's Channel Island possessions in September 1206 (2) and Bellosanne's in October 1207 (3). If this implies a general seizure, then there must have been a general restoration. It is true that in March 1208 the Channel Island bailiffs were instructed to give Hasculf de Suligny "redditus clericorum Normanniae... qui habent redditus

(1) T.W.M. De Guérin, "Feudalism in Guernsey", La Société Guernesiaise, Transactions, VI (1918), 65.
(2) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.67. See also ibid. 1201-16, p.70.
(3) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.92 b.
ejusdem Hasculfi in Normannia" (1), but there cannot have been many similar cases for we have definite evidence that a number of Norman houses were in possession of their Channel Island property at various dates between 1206-7 and 1238, as well as long afterwards. The houses concerned are Marmoutier's priory of Heauville (2), Mont-Saint-Michel (3), Cherbourg (4), Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte (5), Blanchelande (6) and La Trinité, Caen (7). The years involved are 1212, 1217-19, 1221, 1227, 1229-31, 1234 and 1236-7. There is, moreover, no extant evidence to suggest that any further seizures took place in periods of war between England and France during the period under review. Indeed, we know that Henry III appealed to Norman ecclesiastics with property in the Channel Islands to assist in the defence of the Islands in 1224.

The appeal was in fact addressed in general terms to "abbatibus, prioribus et omnibus qui de elemosinis tenent in insulis de Gernere, et de Gerese, et de Alnere, et de Serk" but, as we have seen, the only abbots with property in the Channel Islands seem to have been Norman abbots and the only priors, representatives of Norman houses. These men were

(2) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.179: 1237.
(4) C.I.N., no.238: 1212; Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.187: 1227; Cl.R. 1227-31, p.185: 1229 (L'Islet); C.I.N., no.235: 1236 (St Helier).
(5) C.I.N., nos.223-4: 1218; ibid., no.226: 1219; ibid., no.227: 1227.
(6) ibid., no.285: 1217; ibid., no.283: 1231; ibid., no.284: 1234.
(7) Ibid., no.320: 1221.
instructed "quod in auxilium sitis Philippo de Albiniaco et
baillivis suis ad insulas nostras predictas muniendas,
custodiendas, et defendendas, secundum quod vobis competit,
sicut terras et tenementa vestra diligentis, et sicut auxilium
a nobis habere volueritis cum opus fuerit...^1'. Here we
have something much closer to a royal threat than anything we
find in England but the Channel Islands were, of course,
much more vulnerable.

How then did Guérin reach his remarkable conclusion that
the Channel Island property of the Norman Church remained in
the hands of the English Crown until 1238? It can only be
concluded that he was misled by a passage in the Rolls of the
1309 Assizes which reads: "The said lord John the King after
his said second conquest of these Islands as also in England
banished and disinherited all the Normans living in France
or Normandy, as well ecclesiastics as laymen and disposed
of their lands and goods at his will...And...afterwards for
the whole time of the said lord King John those Normans were
never reconciled to him but the said lord King John died in
seisin of those their tenements which he had not already
given away. After his death the said lord King Henry succeeded
him in the kingdom as his son, which said lord King Henry,
continued a like estate of the tenures of such Normans for a
long time until peace was renewed between the said Kings of
England and France...And... in the very deed after the said
peace was renewed between the said Kings, the said lord Henry
the King reconciled many Norman ecclesiastics and laymen"(2).

(2) R.A. 1309, p.12.
Since peace was not made until 1259, this would not justify Guérin's choice of 1238 for the year in which the Channel Island property of the Norman clerics was returned to them. However, a number of references occur in the records for that year to the restoration of certain Channel Island property to the abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel\(^{(1)}\). These may possibly have convinced him that the 1309 statement was accurate in terms of reigns but not in terms of years. If this was the case, a closer examination of the records would have brought to his notice the evidence already cited to demonstrate that a number of Norman houses, including Mont-Saint-Michel, were undoubtedly in possession of their Channel Island property long before 1238.

As in England, the king did not merely allow the Norman ecclesiastics to retain their property, but he continued to treat them very much as before. Payments made from the ducal revenues in the Islands before 1204 apparently continued to be made after that date\(^{(2)}\) and abbots and priors were able to obtain a number of concessions from the king. Apart from the instruction of 1224 already quoted, there is no evidence to suggest that the king did not feel he could rely upon the Norman clergy to fulfil their obligations in the Channel Islands. He did not even object when in 1253 William de Cheney, who had custody of the Guernsey lands late of Robert de Vere during the

\(^{(1)}\) C.I.N., nos.97,103,112; C.P.R. 1232-47, p.217.

minority of his son, ceded his rights to the abbot of Mont-
Saint-Michel in return for an annual payment of twenty five
pounds sterling\(^{(1)}\). As we have already seen, Mont-Saint-Michel's
own estates comprised one quarter of the Island and Robert de
Vere's another quarter\(^{(2)}\) so for a time the abbot had control
of half of Guernsey. In addition, the king apparently had no
objection to Islanders making new grants of property to the
Norman Church. On the other hand, no trace has been found of
any new gifts of lands or revenues made by the king himself
such as one finds in England. Although even such fragmentary
evidence as survives provides us with an example of the proposed
sale by a continental abbey of Channel Island property\(^{(3)}\), it
is clear from later evidence that there can have been very
few sales. A perusal of the Rolls of the 1309 Assizes makes
it abundantly clear that in the early fourteenth century the
Norman Church's holdings in the Islands were much the same
as in 1204\(^{(4)}\). This is perhaps the best proof that the Norman
Church was treated in a way that gave no more than usual cause
for complaint. If the king was not inclined to make new
grants of lands and revenues, the Islanders themselves were.
We know of at least eight new grants to Norman houses between
1204 and 1259 and the dates of these gifts range from 1217 to
1255\(^{(5)}\). Yet, no trace has been found of a grant to an English

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(1) C.I.N., no.130.
(3) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.179.
(4) R.A. 1309, passim.
(5) C.I.N., nos.72,92,223,281,283,284,285; see also no.320.
Clearly the loyalty of the Islanders was still towards the Norman Church.

(iii) Continuing Economic Links Between the Islands and Normandy

If ecclesiastical links between the Islands and Normandy were very strong indeed, so too, it would seem, were economic links. Something has already been said about the role of the Islands as a safe haven on the wine routes from Poitou and Aquitaine to England, and they occupied a similar position on the trade routes from Poitou and Aquitaine to Normandy (1). However, it was not through the wine trade alone that Islanders and Normans enjoyed commercial relations after 1204. Fresh and salted fish, livestock and various animal products were all apparently exported from the Islands to the duchy. The main imports from Normandy to the Islands seem to have been millstones and timber.

Most of our information about commercial links comes not from references to individual transactions, but from references to labour services and trade regulations found in various Channel Island extents. For example, we learn from the Guernsey extent of 1248 that customs duty was payable by Island boats taking fresh fish to Normandy (2). According to the Guernsey extent of 1331, the king was then in receipt of a customs-duty known as the Petty Custom "viz : from every

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(1) T. Williams, "The Importance of the Channel Islands in British relations with the Continent during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries; a study in Historical Geography", La Société Jersiaise, Bulletin Annuel, XI (1928), 2-3,53.

(2) Ext.G. 1248, p.28.
man taking or loading any beast to wit horse, ox, steer, bull, heifers, mares, pigs, sheep, lambs, cured pig, suet, lard, wool, hides, skins and any other commodities for sale without the Island in Normandy or elsewhere without the kingdom of England"(1). Although this extent was drawn up over seventy years after the end of the period with which we are concerned, it seems unlikely that the trade in live-stock and animal products was a completely new development.

As far as imports from Normandy are concerned, our evidence is again later but clearly refers to a situation which existed before 1204 and continuously thereafter. On several occasions after 1204, the bringing of millstones and/or timber from Normandy for the maintenance of the king's mills is recorded as a current tenurial burden(2) and the following complaint made in 1274 suggests that 1204 was not usually a significant date in this connection: "Item dicunt quod heredes Jordani le Esveske et Nicholai le Esveske subtraxerunt serviciun domino regi debitum ut de carioando de monte beati Michaelis et de Chereburgh' usque ad insulam predictam (Jersey) molas et meremium ad reparandum et sustinendum molendinum que idem rex in parochia predicta (St Peter) habet et hoc a tempore quo rex Anglie Normanniam dimisit"(3).

So far no specific examples have been cited of named individuals visiting continental Normandy for economic reasons.

(1) Ext.G. 1331, p.70.
(3) Ext. 1274, p.24.
However, we do know of at least one and possibly two such cases. An entry in the Close Rolls dated June 1234 records instructions for the return of Robert de Vado's land in Guernsey which was seized by royal officials while he was "in Normannia ad perquirendum victum suum". An entry on the same Rolls dated March 1229 records similar instructions concerning the land of Richard de la Ruwe, another Guernseyman. Richard's land had been seized while he was "in Francia ad perquirendum sibi necessaria suaa". Since both men were seeking their living abroad, they were clearly not just fulfilling obligations attached to their land. Incidentally, both entries make it clear that absence in France for economic reasons was not an offence even in time of war, presumably because the Islands were not self-sufficient. No direct evidence has been found of visits by Norman merchants to the Islands in connection with fish, livestock or animal products but one finds references to Norman wine and salt merchants in the Islands, so the economic links were not all one way.

Although on the whole king John preserved the status quo ante bellum in the Islands, he does seem to have attempted to limit trade with France, which now included Normandy. This was done by introducing a number of restrictive measures. The Guernsey extent of 1248 states that "all men

(1) CI.R. 1231-4, p.445.
(2) Ibid 1227-31, p.164.
(3) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.48 b bis.
of the whole island used by custom in time of peace to carry to Normandy or elsewhere as they pleased all their commodities, whether alive or dead, from the sea or from the land, for sale, excepting congers in the season of éperquerie, paying nothing therefor; and they could and were accustomed by right, without molestation to go and return by any port they pleased in the aforesaid Island. But after Normandy was lost, by precept of the lord King John of good memory, it was otherwise provided as will be shown later. The time of éperquerie should every year last from Easter to the feast of St Michael. What apparently happened was that "it was established that every foreign ship, which was not of his (i.e. King John's) dominion, and which came to land in the Islands, should pay by custom a silver mark. But after the death of the lord King John, on the petition of Philip d'Aubigny, the lord King Henry, son of the lord King John, abated a half mark. It was likewise established that every boat of the said Island carrying floating fish to Normandy for every trip should pay twelve sols; but on the petition of the said Philip, half has been abated by the same lord King Henry. At the same time the salting of congers was established between the feast of St Michael and Easter, which (salting) the bailiffs of the lord the King put to farm as Eperquerie, and salting was first made and established for the fishermen who carried fish to the enemies of the lord the King. At the same time it was established that all merchants should pay custom from all their goods for oxen, swine and flax and other purchases, but the folk of the Island should be quit as to their own victuals."


(2) Ibid., p.28.
As the editor of the extent has pointed out, the meaning of the fourth sentence of this second passage is not at first clear. He suggests that it means that the practice of salting congers at the king's éperqueries, or drying places, was first established for the fishermen taking fish to men who were now, but were not then, enemies of the king.\(^1\) However, there seem to be three objections to this suggestion. In the first place, the king had no enemies in 1248 who were not his enemies immediately after the loss of Normandy when the new measure was first introduced. In the second place, the new measure was clearly restrictive and cannot therefore be regarded as having been introduced "for" the fishermen. Thirdly, and most importantly, éperqueries existed in Guernsey during the reign of Richard I\(^2\). It seems that the word "pro" in the original Latin "et salicio primo facta fuit et constituta pro piscatoribus qui piscem detulerunt inimicis domini Regis"\(^3\) must mean "because of"\(^4\) rather than "for". According to the first passage quoted from the 1248 extent in this connection, the season of éperquerie had previously lasted from Easter to Michaelmas\(^5\). By applying the same regulations to the period between Michaelmas and Easter, King John was covering the whole year. It is clear from other evidence that by the thirteenth century the royal right of éperquerie had come to mean more than simply the king's right to make his

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid., p.28, note 12.


\(^{(3)}\) Ext.G. 1248, p.28.


\(^{(5)}\) Ext.G. 1248, p.27.
men bring their congers to his drying places. The position was in fact that the king's men were forced to sell their congers to the men who held the éperqueries at farm. They were supposed to be given a fair market price and there were special arrangements for fixing this price\(^1\). Nevertheless, this was clearly a monopoly which would affect those selling congers adversely.

It would seem that the statement in the 1248 extent concerning the reduction by Henry III of the customs duties imposed by John is in fact accurate. In August 1233 while Philip d'Aubigny was Warden of the Islands, he was instructed to ascertain what customs the men of Guernsey used to pay before the loss of Normandy and to be content with exacting the same dues\(^2\). It is clear from later evidence that as a result of Philip's enquiries the dues were merely reduced and not abolished altogether\(^3\). It therefore appears that the earlier statement in the 1248 extent which claimed that before 1204 free trade conditions applied, except for "congers in the season of éperquerie"\(^4\) may have been inaccurate. Alternatively, the king may have decided that he could not afford to abolish the duty altogether.

In Jersey, too, customs dues were reduced by Henry III. Indeed, the reduction seems to have been made at an earlier date in the larger Island. In May, 1230, Richard de Grey,

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(1) Ibid., p.27; Cl.R. 1242-7, p.547.
(2) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.245.
(3) Ext. 1274, p.11.
then Warden of the Islands, was instructed that the men of Jersey were to be allowed to take foodstuffs and other merchandise to and from the Island without paying any customs-duty beyond what they used to pay "usque ad tempus quo Hasculfus de Suliny, qui tunc habuit custodiam insule predicte, predictam consuetudinem allevavit, ut dicitur"\(^{(1)}\). Hasculf de Suligny was Warden of Jersey from the time the Island was recovered from the French king until November 1212\(^{(2)}\). Apparently it was not clear what duties had been paid before the loss of Normandy for in July 1230, the bailiffs of Jersey were ordered to ascertain the facts\(^{(3)}\).

Since the new duties were imposed at a time when king John was anxious to conciliate the Islanders as far as possible, we can only conclude that he felt the need to impose such duties for some other reason than merely increasing his revenues. He cannot have wanted to sever economic links between the Islands and Normandy completely; if this had been his aim a total ban would have been attempted. The most likely explanation is that he was trying to ensure the availability of adequate supplies for the royal garrisons now stationed in the Islands. Once the export duty had been imposed, the home market would be more favourable but the fishermen and others would still be able to export any surplus and would not therefore suffer as much as in the case of a total ban. The new arrangements concerning congers were

\(^{(1)}\) Pat.R. 1225-32, p.369.

\(^{(2)}\) J.H. Le Patourel, op.cit., p.121.

\(^{(3)}\) Cl.R. 1227-31, p.423.
presumably another means to the same end.

It is interesting that the customs duty was reduced in Jersey in the year 1230. Since this was a year when England and France were at war, exports to the king's enemies would be forbidden anyway. However, both the king and the Islanders knew that trade with the continent would be resumed as soon as the war was over, and the king had presumably felt the need to show some favour to the Islanders in order to encourage their loyalty at a crucial moment. No doubt the men of Guernsey pressed for a similar reduction when the news of the changed situation in Jersey came to their attention.

The restrictions on the free sale of congers were also eventually eased but not apparently until October 1249, a date which does not seem to have any special significance. The new situation was that the men of Guernsey and their heirs "who will fish between Michaelmas and Easter may sell when and as often as they choose, and after Easter, they may sell three times a week in the king's power fresh and salt fish and make their profit thereof without impediment of the king's bailiff, saving the king the customs duty thereof" (1).

No reference has been found to either the imposition or the easing of restrictions on the free sale of congers by the men of Jersey or the smaller Islands.

One further aspect of the economic links between the Islands and Normandy remains to be considered. Long after the loss of Normandy money payments due to the king in the Islands

(1) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.51. See also Ext. 1274, p.48.
were made in Norman rather than English currency. Most of our evidence is late but it seems reasonable to assume that conditions had remained the same from 1204 to the period from which our evidence dates. The Rolls of the 1309 Assizes record a dispute about the currency in which payment was to be made to the king's agent by one of the king's grangers who had been responsible for the sale of some of the royal corn. During the course of the case it was said on the king's behalf that the "king of England may and ought to take the moneys of the king of France current in his land in the manner and form in which the same king of France takes them" (1). The Jersey extent of 1331 records that "le sire le Roi perçoit et a été accoutumé de percevoir de temps dont il n'existe mémoire toutes rentes et profits à lui appartenants en deniers, et aussi la coutume des navires en telle monnaie que le Roi de France reçoit de ses sujets dans le duché de Normandie" (2). The Guernsey extent of the same year lists a number of dues payable to the king in the Island, including fees of court, and goes on to say that "all the aforesaid payments should be made in such money as the men of Normandy use" (3). All the sources just mentioned make it clear that the money in question was the money of Tours. This is significant because, until Philip's conquest of Normandy, the duchy's chief currency had been the money of Anjou (4). However, in the same year as he conquered Normandy, Philip captured Tours (5) and thereafter the money of Tours became

(1) R.A. 1309, p.7.
(3) Ext.G. 1331, p.74.
(4) Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p.224, note 84.
(5) Ibid., p.160.
Normandy's chief currency, although Philip decreed that sterling money and the money of Le Mans should also have legal recognition within the duchy\(^{(1)}\). Although sterling money was also used in the Islands\(^{(2)}\), the fact that money payments due to the king were made in money of Tours, suggests close economic links with the Norman mainland after 1204.

(iv) The Channel Islands and Normandy - a shared law

Before moving on to look at the continuing family connections between the Islands and Normandy, it will be convenient to consider a continuing link between the Islands and the duchy which has no parallel in Anglo-Norman relations. Before 1204 the Islands were an integral part of the duchy and as such were governed in accordance with Norman law. It is true that there were a few variations but basically the Islands and continental Normandy shared a common law. Not only was Norman law retained in the Islands after 1204, but the Islanders kept in touch with developments on the mainland, so that instead of standing still, or developing differently, law in the Islands kept \textit{au courant} with the law administered in Normandy itself\(^{(3)}\).

Again, our evidence is mostly late but this does not detract from its value for our period. The Rolls of the 1309 Assizes record that the men of both Guernsey and Jersey were asked by what laws they claimed to be governed, "by the law of England, or of Normandy, or by special customs granted to them by the

\(^{(1)}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.279.

\(^{(2)}\) \textit{C 1  R. 1 2 3 4-7}, p.416.

The former were the most cautious in their reply. They claimed that they were governed, "neither by the law of England nor of Normandy, but by certain customs used in this island from time immemorial" (2). The latter, however, said that they were governed "by the law of Normandy, except that they have certain usages in this Island from time immemorial differing from the laws of Normandy" (3). As Professor Le Patourel has shown, the differences between Channel Island law and Norman law were "no more than local usages such as grew up in all parts of Normandy, save the Cotentin" (4). Other sources make it abundantly clear that, basically, Channel Island law was Norman law. For example, the king himself, in an instruction of July 1236 addressed to the Warden of both Jersey and Guernsey, states the "lex et consuetudo ... partium Normanniae" on a particular issue and orders the Warden to act accordingly (5).

For the earliest evidence that Island law remained au courant with the law administered in Normandy itself, we have to turn again to the Rolls of the 1309 Assizes. These record a complaint by William des Mareys, for the king, that the men of Jersey "now as it were anew, have taken to themselves a certain new suit of a certain treatise which one by the name of Maucael, a Norman, made some time after the Normans had

(1) R.A. 1309, pp.29,69.
(2) Ibid., p.29.
(3) Ibid., p.69.
(5) Cl.R. 1234-7, p.289.
withdrawn from the allegiance of the lord the king of England and his writings they follow in certain things that please them and certain things thereof they pass over as appears in their schedule and so the islanders here are at variance with the usages of the other islanders. And he claims for the lord the king that just and ancient custom be reformed, so that all the islanders may use the same law and custom and that their customs may be known and acknowledged... And the commonalty say that they and their ancestors have used such customs as they now claim. And they say that they have great regard for the said 'Summa de Maukael' because the laws of the Normans are well contained in the same". This and later evidence noted by Professor Le Patourel make it certain that the "Summa de Maukael" can be identified with the Summa de Legibus Normanniae, also known as the Grand Coutumier de Normandie. According to Besnier, the Grand Coutumier was compiled after 1235, but before 1258.

There is, of course, nothing unusual in the fact that the Islanders were allowed to retain the laws which governed them before 1204 but the fact that the Island law remained au courant with developments in the duchy suggests very close continuing links between the Islands and the Norman mainland.

(1) R.A. 1309, pp.72-3.
(4) For a later example of the sort of contact involved, see J.H. Le Patourel, "The Origins of the Channel Islands Legal System", The Solicitor Quarterly, 1 (1962), 202-3.
(v) Family connections between the Channel Islands and Normandy

It is clear from the extant charters of certain Norman abbeys that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries many of the Channel Island fiefs were in the hands of mainland Norman families (1). Where these families had no English estates, their choice of allegiance in 1204 was not much in doubt. We know from the number of fiefs in the Islands and the sort of services they owed that most of the lay fiefs were relatively small. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that we find a considerable number of references to terrae Normannorum in the Channel Island sources after 1204 (2). However, some of the Norman families with Channel Island holdings had estates in England too (3). Their choice of allegiance was presumably influenced by the relative size of their Norman and English estates with their Channel Islands holdings now counted with the latter. Thus, in the Islands, as in Normandy and England, we see a major upheaval in 1204. As in the duchy and the kingdom, however, the break was not a clean break and needs to be examined in some detail.

In the case of the Channel Islands it is much more difficult to select a group of families for full examination. There is no surviving equivalent of the 1172 list of Norman tenants-in-chief nor is there any other pre-1204 collection of Channel Island names which could usefully be used instead. At first

(1) C.I.N., passim.

(2) e.g. Ext. 1274, pp.18-20,22-4,31-5.

(3) e.g. Baard, d'Ouville and Wake - see Appendix V, section A, no.3; section D, nos.35 and 32, respectively.
it seemed as if a list of Channel Island tenants compiled from the surviving eleventh and twelfth century charters of certain Norman abbeys (1) might prove a suitable basis for our study. However, it soon became apparent that there were specific as well as general disadvantages in an arbitrary list of this kind. Not only does later evidence make it clear that such a list would be far from complete, it also makes it clear that the grants made to the Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries often comprised the entire Channel Island holding of the family concerned (2).

Although it is easier to trace families forward from a pre-1204 date than it is to trace them back from a post-1204 date, an attempt at the latter proved unavoidable in the case of the Channel Islands. Even then, the list of families which has been used is to a great extent an arbitrary list and not a natural grouping.

There survives from the year 1274 an extent of the Islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Sark and Alderney and this extent includes a list of twenty-one Jersey fiefs which owed full or half relief (3). Obviously these were among the most important fiefs of the Island and yet in only three cases (Rosel, du Hommet and Robelinoys) can it be demonstrated conclusively that the fief had been terra Normannorum at some time since 1204. In another ten cases (Wynceleys, St Ouen, Philippe de Kertret, ës Hormans, de la Hague, Hundeuaus, William l'Emperere, .

(1) C.I.N., passim.
(2) G.F.B. De Gruchy, Medieval Land Tenures in Jersey, pp.56-7.
(3) Ext. 1274, p.8.
Saumareys, Malet and Richard le Petit) it is possible to establish that the fiefs were in the hands of the same families in 1204 as in 1274. This leaves eight fiefs unaccounted for and it seems very likely that some if not all of them were terrae Normannorum which had been granted out to Island families between 1204 and 1274.

As only thirteen of our original twenty-one Jersey fiefs throw any light on the situation in the Island in and after 1204, it seemed necessary to add other cases to our list. In any case, since many of the fiefs which escheated to the Crown as terra Normannorum seem to have remained in the king's hands into the fourteenth century and beyond, the twenty-one fiefs already named are clearly not a representative section of the main fiefs of 1204. There have therefore been added to our thirteen noteworthy fiefs another ten which were described as terra Normannorum in 1274. (Henot, Botevileyn, Sotuard, Scrakkevill, Serle, d'Orlaundes, Pinel, d'Anneville, d'Ouville, Comaundas). This of course makes our list an arbitrary list which means that we cannot draw any quantitative conclusions from it. Nevertheless, as long as this is borne in mind, an examination of the twenty-three cases finally selected will serve to give some impression of the sort of situation which arose in 1204.

Unfortunately, the extent of 1274 does not list the fiefs owing full and half relief in Guernsey. However, the extent of 1331 repairs this omission and lists nine such fiefs. This time it proved impossible to trace the 1204 holders of six of the fiefs and again one suspects that some of them at least
were *terrae Normannorum* which had been granted out to Island families since 1204. Four of them were held in 1331 by William de Cheney (des Bruniaux, de Fantôme, de la Frayre and Rohais) and we know that the de Cheney family received a number of grants of *terrae Normannorum* in the Channel Islands (1). On the other hand, the same family acquired other Channel Island estates by purchase (2) so one must be careful of assuming too much.

For the reasons given in the case of Jersey, there have been added to the three Guernsey fiefs owing full or half relief which have proved noteworthy, a further thirteen holdings which were described as *terrae Normannorum* in 1274. If the extent of 1331 had provided a list of *terrae Normannorum* it would have been logical to use a list dating from the same year as the list of fiefs owing relief. However, such a list is not provided and one is therefore thrown back on the extent of 1274. One final fief had to be added to the Guernsey list, making a total of seventeen cases. The extent of 1248 records that "half of the Island of Guernsey is of the Lord the King and the knights and others who hold of him in chief, the other half is divided between the Abbot of Mont St Michel de periculo maris and Robert de Vere. Indeed, the quarter that Robert de Vere holds is called the land of the Count." (3) Although the "Fief le Comte" did not apparently owe relief and never became *terrae Normannorum*, it is clearly too important to be excluded from consideration.

(1) e.g. C.P.R. 1232-47, p.328; C.Ch.R. 1226-57, pp.331,419.


In the case of Alderney and Sark, we have to gather our information where we can. It seems that in 1204 the lord of Alderney was a L'Ingenieur (1) while the lord of Sark was a de Vernon (2). The smaller islands were all in royal or ecclesiastical hands except for Brecqhou, off Sark, which was part of the fief de Vinchelez in Jersey (3), which has already been listed for consideration.

Altogether, then, excluding the eight cases in Jersey and the six in Guernsey where the 1204 holder of the fief cannot be established, we have a total of forty-two cases for review. However, two of the forty-two properties involved were in the hands of one family (4) and have been dealt with together which gives us a revised total of forty-one cases.

As in Chapter III, the results of the enquiry are presented in an Appendix. This time, however, the Appendix has been divided into four sections instead of three. Section A again contains all those cases where the 1204 tenants chose the Norman allegiance and no evidence has been found of cross-Channel relationships, a change of allegiance, or the renewal of a cross-Channel tenancy after that date. Section B again contains similar cases where the allegiance chosen in 1204 was the English allegiance. Section C, however, contains the fiefs which in 1204 were in the hands of Channel Island families which

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(1) C.I.N., nos.251,317.
(2) Ibid., nos.306-9; R.A. 1309, p.76.
(4) St Ouen and Philippe de Kertret, both in Jersey.
appear not to have held any Norman property. In these cases, of course, no choice of allegiance had to be made. Section D contains all other cases and again the small letters (a) to (e) have been used after the name of the property to indicate the presence of various features to which it is wished to draw particular attention (1). For the sake of convenience all the cases examined have been placed in alphabetical order under the name of the fief or other property, irrespective of whether it was situated in Jersey, Guernsey, Sark or Alderney. The name of the appropriate island has, however, been indicated in brackets after the name of the property.

In view of the rather arbitrary way in which our forty-one cases were selected for examination, one has to be careful about drawing quantitative conclusions from them. Nevertheless, our study does show that a large number of Channel Island fiefs were attached to fiefs in continental Normandy before the French conquest. In as many as thirty cases, the holder of a Channel Island property held land in Normandy too (2). In only three of these cases was English property also involved which suggests that the more important Anglo-Norman families had either never held Channel Island property or else had granted it away before 1204. We know for example that the Bertrams of Briquebec, the de la Hayes of La Haye du Puits and the Mandevilles of Ollande all made grants of Channel Island property to the Norman Church in the mid-twelfth century (3),

(1) See above, Chapter III, pp.204-206.
(2) Appendix V, section A, nos.1-19; section B, nos.20-21; section D, nos.31-2,34-7,39-41.
(3) C.I.N., nos.214,177,195.
but we hear no further reference to these families in the Islands. Presumably their grants to the Church comprised the whole of their Channel Island holdings. In another of our forty-one cases, the Channel Island property had been part of a Norman estate until at least as late as 1198\(^{(1)}\). In the ten remaining cases\(^{(2)}\) I have found no evidence of any tenurial connection with Normandy but in view of the fragmentary nature of the sources this does not preclude the possibility that such links existed. Incidentally, the pattern seems much the same for both Jersey and Guernsey with the number of property holders having interests in Normandy being fifteen\(^{(3)}\) and fourteen\(^{(4)}\) respectively. In the thirtieth case of double tenure the Channel Island holding was in Sark\(^{(5)}\).

If we look more closely at the twenty-seven cases where just Channel Island and Norman property were involved, it would seem that the Channel Island holding was generally the smaller holding. This is suggested by the fact that the tenants of twenty-four of these holdings ultimately chose the Norman allegiance. The word "ultimately" is used advisedly for our evidence is so incomplete that the extent of 1274 is often our first indication that the 1204 holder of a fief chose the

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(1) Appendix V, section D, no.38.
(2) Appendix V, section C, nos.22-30; section D, no.33.
(3) Appendix V, section A, nos.1,5,8,12,13; section B, nos.20-21; section D, nos.32,34-7,39-41.
(4) Appendix V, section A, nos.2-4,6,7,9-11,14-16,18-19; section D, no.31.
(5) Appendix V, section A, no.18.
Norman allegiance and we cannot necessarily assume that the choice was made c.1204 and adhered to consistently thereafter \(^{(1)}\). In the three remaining cases, the persons involved appear to have remained in the Channel Islands and forfeited their Norman property \(^{(2)}\). However, in two of these cases, the claim that Norman property was held is based on inference rather than established fact. In the case of William de Sallinelles \(^{(3)}\) the occurrence of the name in both Jersey and the Bessin just before 1204 was taken as suggesting a case of double tenure. In the case of Richard de Scrakkevill \(^{(4)}\) the existence of a case of double tenure in 1204 rests on the assumption that the property held by his son in Normandy after that date was, in fact, the father's. In the third case, English interests may have been involved \(^{(5)}\). Certainly the Channel Island fief does not seem to have been larger than the Norman fief if, indeed, it was as large \(^{(6)}\). Philip de Carteret, seigneur of St Ouen in Jersey from c.1130 to c.1178 also held one knight's fee in chief at Carteret in the Cotentin and thirteen or fourteen knights' fees in the honour of Barnstaple, Devon. After his death, his son Renaud succeeded him as seigneur of Carteret and St Ouen while his son Richard apparently succeeded to his Devon

\(^{(1)}\) See Appendix V, section D, nos.32,37.  
\(^{(2)}\) Appendix V, section B, nos.20-21; section D, no.39.  
\(^{(3)}\) Appendix V, section B, no.21.  
\(^{(4)}\) Appendix V, section D, no.39.  
\(^{(5)}\) Appendix V, section B, no.20.  
fief (1). It may well be that in 1204, Renaud was Richard's heir and opted for the English allegiance in case the question of his succession to the family's Devon property should subsequently arise. Of the three Channel Island tenants who held property in England as well as in Normandy, two chose the Norman allegiance and one the English allegiance.

Although the cases at which we are looking are not necessarily a representative sample, it would nevertheless seem that the events of 1204 affected the Channel Islands in rather a different way from England. There seems to have been what almost amounts to a mass exodus from the Islands to Normandy on the part of men with property in both the Islands and the duchy. In fact, the twenty-six Norman lords concerned had probably rarely visited the Islands so it would not be so much their physical absence that was noticed as the fact that their estates were now in royal hands.

Another factor which is striking is that we find only one possible case of double tenure (2) and two cases of a change of allegiance after 1204 (3). Now it is true that the apparent absence of cases of double tenure by men may owe something to the fragmentary nature of the sources. On the other hand, however, one would expect the English king's attitude towards double tenure in the Islands and Normandy to be different from his attitude towards double tenure in England and the duchy. The Islands were much more vulnerable than England because of

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(1) Appendix IV, section B, no.25.
(2) Appendix V, section D, no.34.
(3) Appendix V, section D, nos.32,37.
their relatively small size and their geographical proximity to Normandy and the rest of France. If even a handful of Normans had been allowed to recover their Channel Island fiefs and then proved disloyal, the whole security of the Islands could have been at stake. The same number of traitors in England would not have the same effect and yet provided the king with a useful source of information on the situation within Normandy.

The fact that only two Channel Island tenants seem to have changed their allegiance after c.1204 may again owe something to the nature of our evidence. However, it probably owes more to the nature of the pre-1204 double holdings. It seems that in most cases the original choice of allegiance stood the test of time because the Norman property of the tenant concerned was materially larger than his Island property. Moreover, the likelihood that the French king would ultimately take over the Islands probably seemed greater than the likelihood that the English king would recover Normandy. One of the two cases of changed allegiance after 1204 involved a member of the notorious Paynel family (1) which seems to have been an exception to a number of generalisations (2). The other change of allegiance, that of Enguerrand de Fornet (3) again took place under rather special circumstances. When his brother Silvester chose the Norman allegiance c.1204, Enguerrand was granted his Channel Island property and the most

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(1) Appendix V, section D, no.32.
(2) Appendix IV, section C, no.82.
(3) Appendix V, section D, no.37.
likely explanation of his switch to the Norman allegiance between 1227 and 1233 was that he became his brother's heir and therefore found that a change of allegiance brought him immediate material benefits.

Although the situation in the Channel Islands differed in some respects from the situation in England, there were some similarities. Again we find members of the same family choosing opposite allegiances. The case of the de Fornet brothers has just been cited in another connection (1), as has that of Richard de Scrakkevill and his son (2). Jeanne Gallichan remained in Jersey with her husband Ralph, but her uncles Adam de Sotuward and William de Briquebec went over to Philip Augustus (3). Baldwin Wake, with lands in England, the Channel Islands and Normandy, adhered to King John, whereas his cousin Thomas du Hommet forfeited his Jersey fief for joining the French king (4). Richard Levesque and Robert Serle who both chose the Norman allegiance seem to have been related to Jordan Levesque and Richard Serle respectively, both of whom remained in Jersey. The case of Thomas Paynel is slightly different in that he does not seem to have held property in the Islands before 1204. However, in 1207 he was granted property forfeited by Thomas du Hommet although he had more than one relative who chose the Norman allegiance (5). Members

(1) Appendix V, section D, no.37.
(2) Appendix V, section D, no.39.
(3) Appendix V, section D, no.33.
(4) Appendix V, section D, nos.31-2.
(5) Appendix V, section D, no.32.
of the Pinel family probably chose opposite allegiances c.1204 although it is just possible that John Pinel's widow, who received her dower in Jersey, was resident in Normandy like her relative William Pinel(1).

Again, too, we find an example of a cross-Channel relationship which existed before 1204 and continued to exist thereafter. It seems almost certain that the de Barnville estates in Normandy and the Channel Islands had been divided among four co-heiresses just before 1204. Nicola, who received the Channel Island property as her share, found herself on the opposite side from her three sisters with their Norman property(2).

The fact that a number of Normans lost property in England and were apparently not compensated for their losses by land grants in the duchy was to the advantage of the English king. Numerically speaking, these men were no real threat to the security of his kingdom, and, as we saw earlier, were possible allies at appropriate times. However, the fact that a number of Normans lost property in the Channel Islands created a rather different situation. In the first place, the numbers involved seemed relatively high in relation to the number of fief-holders in the Islands. In the second place, the geographical proximity of the Islands to the duchy made the possibility of an attack a very real threat. In the third place, the continuing contact between the Islanders and the Normans meant there was an ever-present fear that the former might be plotting with the latter. These factors had their effect on the English kings'

(1) Appendix V, section D, no.35.
(2) Appendix V, section D, no.38.
treatment of the Channel Island *terrae Normannorum* and also on their attitude towards those who remained in the Islands.

If we look first at the English king's treatment of the *terrae Normannorum*, two features stand out. In the first place, many of the confiscated properties seem to have remained in the king's hands throughout the period under review. In the second place, of the small number of fiefs which we know were granted out between 1204 and 1259, all but one were granted to men from outside the Islands. However, it should be borne in mind that while these observations are true of the fiefs listed in Appendix V, they may to some extent reflect the fragmentary nature of our sources. While we know that a number of fiefs remained in royal hands, and that a few were granted out, mostly to non-Islanders, we lack any information at all about other Island fiefs. As suggested earlier, some of the fiefs mentioned in the Extents of 1274 and 1331 whose 1204 holders cannot be established, may have been re-granted *terrae Normannorum* and the grantees may have been Island men. Nevertheless, the absence of evidence in some cases is no reason for failing to examine the evidence that does survive. Nor is there any reason to suppose that all the fiefs about which we hear nothing between 1204 and 1259 had entirely different histories from those whose fate can be at least partially charted. Even if they did, their stories may not effect the conclusions drawn from elsewhere. It may be, for example, that in 1204 many of them were in the hands of Island families with no interests in continental Normandy. It is perhaps significant, too, that the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence we do have reflects just the sort of attitude towards the *terrae Normannorum* which one would
have expected the English king to adopt in the circumstances of the time.

If we return to the twenty-six examples of terra Normannorum listed in Appendix V, we find that 16 were still in the king's hands in 1274\(^1\) while 5 were granted out between 1204 and 1259\(^2\). This leaves 5 properties unaccounted for and in private hands in 1274\(^3\). One of the properties concerned is the fief de Robelinoys and this is rather an exceptional case in that the fief was purchased by an Islander from a relative who chose the Norman allegiance. It ought in fact to have been taken into the king's hands and this omission was made good between 1274 and 1309\(^4\). In a second case we learn indirectly that the grant had been made after 1259. The extent of 1274 records that Pierre Arnaud held the escheat of Guillaume de Wereville "ex tradicione Arnaldi Johannis ballivi" and Arnaud Jean did not take up the office of bailiff until 1271\(^5\). It may well be that some or all of the other grants date from after 1259. Alternatively, they may not have been official grants at all. The extent of 1274 records that Laurent Payn and Raoul de Hundeweys held the property once

\(^{(1)}\) Appendix V, section A, nos. 1,3-5,7-8,10-11,16-19; section D, nos.32,34-5,41.

\(^{(2)}\) Appendix V, section A, nos.2,9,12; section D, nos.35,37. See also section D, no.32 - this fief was granted out for a time but escheated to the Crown again.

\(^{(3)}\) Appendix V, section A, nos.6,13,14; section D, nos.36,40.

\(^{(4)}\) Appendix V, section D, no.36.

held by Adam de Sotuward but because "predicti Laurentius et Radulfus pro se nihil ostenderunt set solam longam tenuram allegarunt" it was once more taken into the king's hands\(^{(1)}\). A third possibility is that the persons listed as holding the property and paying a rent to the king may have previously held it from a Norman intermediate lord and paid the rent to him.

When we turn to the fiefs known to have been granted out by the king between 1204 and 1259, we find that only one\(^{(2)}\) was apparently granted to an Islander while five were granted to men without any interests in the Islands before 1204\(^{(3)}\). The property apparently granted to an Islander was the Guernsey property described in the extent of 1274 as "escaetam le legat, Norm\"\(^{(4)}\). In 1247, Drew de Barentin, Warden of the Islands, was instructed to ensure that Ralph Burnel received an annual rent of seven quarters of grain "quae Robertus Legat habere consuevit, et quae nunc sunt excaeta regis"\(^{(5)}\). Although this seems to be the earliest reference to Ralph Burnel, it nevertheless seems likely that he was a Guernseyman. When Henry III gave instructions for the Guernsey extent of 1248, the writ sent to Drew de Barentin stated: "We order you through as many (witnesses) as you shall see fit to procure and such as know best and are willing to tell the truth, you do strictly therefrom distinctly and accurately make an

\(^{(1)}\) Ext. 1274, p.19.

\(^{(2)}\) Appendix V, section A, no.9.

\(^{(3)}\) Appendix V, section A, nos.2,12; section D, nos.32,35,37.

\(^{(4)}\) Ext. 1274, p.32.

\(^{(5)}\) Cl.R. 1242-7, p.523.
Inquisition and at the same time as to what laws and of what nature had King John, our father, instituted in the aforesaid Islands(1) Among the twenty-three witnesses who were in fact consulted was a Ralph Burnel which makes it extremely unlikely that he was a newcomer to the Island. Moreover, in 1331, Ralph's heir, another Ralph, held the fief of Burnel de Noirmont in the Vale parish(2). Since the Legat property was in the Vale(3), too, it seems likely that the Burnel family already held the fief bearing its name when it was granted the escheat of Robert Legat. Although the name Burnel occurs in the English records throughout the period we are considering, there is no evidence to link any of the English Burnels with the Channel Island family.

The five properties granted out to men without any interests in the Islands before 1204 were the fiefs du Hommet, de Moreville, Pinel and de Rosel in Jersey, and the fief d'Anneville in Guernsey(4). As we have seen, the fief du Hommet was granted to Thomas Paynel in 1207. It is not clear what advantage King John hoped to gain from giving a foothold in the Islands to the powerful Paynel family whose head remained in Normandy in 1204. It is clear, however, that the grant was a mistake for Thomas changed his allegiance between April 1214 and the end of King John's reign. The fief once more escheated to the Crown and was still in the king's hands in 1274(5).

(2) Ext.G. 1331, p.122.
(3) Ext. 1274, p.32.
(4) Appendix V, section D, no.32; section A, no.12; section D, nos.35,37; section A, no.2.
(5) Appendix V, section D, no.32.
The fiefs de Moreville and Pinel in Jersey and the fief d'Anneville in Guernsey were all granted to William de Cheney, in 1242, 1244 and 1248 respectively (1). William was related to Philip d'Aubigny, the younger (2), who was Warden of the Channel Islands from 1219-24 and again from 1232-34 (3) and accompanied him on his pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1235 (4). He seems to have acquired his first Channel Island property shortly after his return from the Holy Land, where Philip d'Aubigny had met his death (5). A gift from Gilbert de Greinvill of all the land which he had held in the island of Jersey was confirmed by the king in June, 1239 (6). In 1242 he was with the king in Gascony (7) and remained there until at least March 1243 (8). During this period he witnessed a number of royal charters (9) and was himself the recipient of a charter granting him the fief de Moreville in Jersey (10). On his return from Gascony he received further gifts and concessions from the King in both England and the Islands, including the fief Pinel in Jersey (11) and the fief d'Anneville

(1) Appendix V, section A, no.12; section D, no.35; section A, no.2.
(2) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.107.
(4) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.106.
(6) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.244.
(7) e.g. C.P.R. 1232-47, pp.317,328.
(8) Ibid. 1232-47, p.370.
(9) e.g. Ibid. 1232-47, pp.328,354,359,364,369.
in Guernsey (1). It would seem that King Henry had decided to make William a powerful force in the Islands and further reference will be made to this point shortly.

The fifth of the 1204 confiscations known to have been granted out between 1204 and 1259 was the fief de Rosel in Jersey (2). In 1208, as we saw elsewhere, this fief was granted to Enguerrand de Fornet, the brother of Silvester de Fornet who had forfeited it. Enguerrand seems to have remained faithful to the English king until at least June 1227 but in April 1233 Rosel was granted to Emery Buche "ad se sustentandum in servicio regis quamdiu regi placuerit" (3). Emery seems to have been a Poitevin mercenary who served both Henry III and his father John. In August, 1202, King John granted safe-conducts to Emery and two other men who were described as knights of Hugh le Brun, Count of La Marche (4). In February, 1225, Emery was granted five marks "de annuo feodo x.m. quas percipit ad scaccarium nostrum" (5) and instructions were given for another payment of the same amount in December of the same year although by then the annual payment seems to have been increased to fifteen marks (6). In March 1225, and again in June 1227, Emery was granted letters of protection while he was in the king's service in Gascony (7). In June 1233,

(1) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.331.
(2) Appendix V, section D, no.37.
(3) Cl.R. 1231-4, p.211.
(6) Ibid. 1224-7, p.87.
shortly after Emery's acquisition of Rosel, the king issued an Inspeximus and confirmation of a charter whereby he had sold his land in Little Kynton to the bishop of Winchester. This land had been granted to Emery by Henry le Eyr in return for his homage and service\(^1\). This, however, is the last we hear of Emery and in 1247 Drew de Barentin was granted the ten librates of land in Jersey "quas Emericus de Buche tenuit de balio regis in villa de Rossel\(^1\) ad vitam suam\(^2\). Drew was at this time Warden of the Islands\(^3\). As in the case of William de Cheney, the king had apparently decided to make Drew a powerful force in the Islands but further reference will be made to this point shortly.

It is clear from the king's treatment of the terrae Normannorum that he did not entirely trust the Islanders after 1204 and this lack of trust showed itself in a number of other ways, too. King John, for example, felt it necessary at one stage to take hostages from some of the Islanders. In November 1214, he informed the prior of Winchester that "propter fidelitatem et bonum servicium proborum hominum nostrorum de insulis de Gerneseie et de Gerner\(^1\) quietos eis clamavimus obsides eorum. Ita quod libere possint reverti in partes suas\(^4\) and instructed him to release Colin le Petit, the hostage who had been in his custody. Similar letters were sent on the same day to seven more custodians in respect of

\(^{1}\) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.183.
\(^{2}\) C.I.R. 1247-51, p.5.
\(^{3}\) J.H. Le Patourel, op.cit., p.123.
sixteen more hostages\(^1\), three of whom, like Colin le Petit, were from fiefs named in Appendix V\(^2\). It is not known when these hostages were taken but since they were released directly John's continental expedition of 1214 was over, one assumes that they had been in custody for the duration of the expedition at least. King John's suspicions about the Islanders had apparently proved groundless for on the day the above instructions were issued he wrote to the Islanders in the following terms:

"Grates vobis multas referimus de bono servicio vestro et fidei et quod tam diligenter intenditis agendis nostris et honoris nostro expediendo. Mittimus autem vobis obsides vestros ut vobiscum morentur. Quia de fidelitate vestra plene confidimus"\(^3\)

The wording of this letter suggests that the king had received active assistance from the men of the Islands. They may have taken part in the continental expedition, or stayed at home and harried the shipping of John's enemies. Alternatively, they may have joined Philip d'Aubigny's expedition against the men of Eustace the Monk in Sark, which took place about this time.

Over the next three months, December 1214 to February 1215, instructions were given for the release of a further nine Channel Island hostages\(^4\).

Although it seems unlikely that King John took these hostages into custody much before the launching of his 1214 continental expedition, he had at least one hostage at an

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\(^1\) Ibid. 1201-16, p.122 b.

\(^2\) Appendix V, section C, nos.25,27,29; section D, no.33.

\(^3\) Rot.Lit.Pat. 1201-16, p.122 b.

earlier date and for a longer period. This was the hostage of Renaud de Carteret who, as we saw earlier, lost lands in Normandy when he chose to remain in the Islands in 1204. Presumably Renaud's hostage was taken as soon as King John regained full control of the Islands for we hear of him as early as February 1208. The English king, however, was apparently anxious not to drive Renaud into the opposite camp for he ensured favourable treatment for his hostage by handing him into the custody of Renaud's brother Richard(1), who had property in Devon(2). Renaud's hostage was his son Philip whose uncle Richard would presumably be well-disposed towards him. Philip was removed from Richard's custody some time before November 1212 for in that month the king instructed Stephen de Turneham to release him to Philip d'Aubigny(3). At this time, Philip D'Aubigny was Warden of Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney(4) so again Renaud's hostage was being held in favourable conditions. The date of his eventual release is not known but his name does not appear among the names of the hostages released late in 1214 and early in 1215 which suggests that he had been held in custody under quite different circumstances.

Although no later references have been found to Channel Island hostages, it would seem that the king did not in fact remain confident of the Islanders' loyalty. On 9th February 1223, he instructed the bailiffs of Jersey and Guernsey to

(2) Appendix IV, section B, no.25.
(4) J.H. Le Patourel, _op.cit._, p.121.
forbid any of the knights of the Islands to go to Normandy and stay there more than eight days; any knight who did stay there more than eight days was to have his land seized forthwith. There is no immediately apparent reason for the timing of this order. The truce with France renewed in 1220 was not due to expire until Easter 1224 and Philip Augustus did not die until July 1223, so as yet there was no threat from the future Louis VIII. Presumably those ruling on the young King Henry's behalf were keeping a constantly watchful eye on the Islands and felt that an unhealthy situation had developed which needed remedial action of this kind. The new instruction suggests that the knights of the Islands were maintaining such strong links with Normandy that the English crown could not feel sure of their allegiance should a crisis arise.

It is interesting that the instruction applies specifically to knights. If the term "omnibus hominibus insularum nostrarum" had been used instead of the term "omnibus militibus insularum nostrarum" we might have concluded in the light of the known economic links between the Islands and the duchy that the persons visiting Normandy and staying there for longish periods were primarily persons below the status of knight who had something to buy or sell. Apart from the order of February 1223, our only evidence that contact was maintained at a knightly level in the period under review seems to be the licence given to Philip de

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Carteret in May 1235, "to go to the king of France to obtain, if he can, his land which he says is his right in Normandy, so that when recovered he may give it to his two daughters to marry them, and afterwards return to the king's islands to dwell there as he did before"(1). Presumably Philip would not consider marrying his daughters to persons about whom he knew nothing. Presumably, too, he did not intend to lose touch with them for ever. All this implies that a considerable degree of contact with the mainland was maintained.

After the period with which we have just been concerned, there is no further evidence in the surviving sources of the king's active mistrust of the Channel Islanders. It may well be that as time went by without the discovery of any significant acts of treachery the king began to feel less uneasy about his Island subjects.

We must now consider how the king's evident mistrust of the Channel Islanders, in the early part of our period at least, affected his day to day treatment of them. We have already seen that he was very sparing with grants of terrae Normannorum, preferring to keep most of the confiscated property under royal control. From this one would expect that he was sparing with grants and concessions of any kind and this appears to have been the case.

If we look first at grants of land other than land known to be terra Normannorum, we find that very few were made. Moreover, two of the three grantees were men who also received

(1) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.106.
grants of terrae Normannorum — Drew de Barentin and William de Cheney. In March 1253 Drew was granted at pleasure land in Alderney which William L'Ingenieur had once held. In July of the same year, however, he was granted fifteen librates of land elsewhere in the Islands to compensate for the loss of his land in Alderney which Richard de Grey, then Warden, had taken back into the Crown's possession. Drew had apparently received an earlier grant in the Islands without the king's approval; in January 1240, William de Bueil was instructed not to seize land in Guernsey which Henry de Trubleville had given to Drew but to wait until the latter returned from Rome whence he had gone on the king's business. Presumably the grant was made from lands in the royal hands while Henry de Trubleville was Warden of the Islands (1230-32; 1234-39) for no evidence has been found that Henry had land of his own in Guernsey.

William de Cheney also received a grant of land not known to be terra Normannorum. The Liberate Rolls record that in December 1249 allowance was made to Drew de Barentin, then Warden of the Islands, for "25s. which he used to receive from the land in Gerner" which the king gave William de Chaeny by charter.

(1) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.184; Appendix V, section C, no.26.
(2) Cl.R. 1251-3, p.385.
(3) Ibid. 1237-42, p.165.
(5) Ibid., p.123.
(6) C.L.R., III, 267.
Now the only recorded grant made to William de Cheney in Guernsey before this date was the "rent of 10 l. of Tours ... late of Sampson de Aundeville which was the king's escheat of the land of the Normans"\(^1\). Since the value of the grant is stated in both cases, it is clear that two distinct properties were involved.

The third recipient of a grant of land not specifically stated to be from the terrae Normannorum was Philip de Carteret\(^2\). In September 1227 the king granted him at pleasure the land in the parish of St Ouen, Jersey, which Philip d'Aubigny had granted him while bailiff of the Channel Islands. The land was to remain in his possession until the king provided him with wardships or escheats of the same value\(^3\). This may or may not have been the property to which the following entry in the extent of 1274 refers: "Item dicunt omnes jurati ... quod Reginaldus de Cartreto tenet XX libratas terre in parochia sanctorum Petri et Audoni que fuit et esse debet de dominico regis quam terram Philippus Daubeneye tunc bailivus insularum dedit Philippo de Cartreto patri dicti Reginaldi cum Margeria nepte sua matre ejusdem Reginaldi et quia idem Reginaldus arracionatus qualiter terram illam teneat respondit quod pater suus et ipse post ipsum terram illam in pace tenuerint per XL annos et amplius ex dono regis Anglie nihil de dono ipsius ostendens, capta est terra in manum domini regis"\(^4\).

\(^{1}\) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.331.  
\(^{2}\) Appendix V, section B, no.20.  
\(^{3}\) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.201 b.  
\(^{4}\) Ext. 1274, pp.25-6.
When we turn from lands to rents, we again find reference to William de Cheney. In May 1252 allowance was made to Richard de Grey, then Warden of the Islands\(^{(1)}\), for "10 1 15s. 8d. for rent granted to William de Chaenny"\(^{(2)}\). However, it is possible that this was the value of one of the grants made to William from the terrae Normannorum and not a further grant.

Two persons who were granted small rents were Alan de Winceleis and Herbert Brito. The former, whose place of origin is not known, was described as "servientem regis" and was granted 42s. 3d. in money of Tours during Richard de Grey's Wardenship of the Islands. Since the grant was confirmed in May 1231\(^{(3)}\) it must date from one of Richard's first two periods of office which lasted from 1226-7 and from 1229-30\(^{(4)}\). Herbert Brito was granted a rent of 20s. sterling in Jersey "que eum contingunt jure hereditario"\(^{(5)}\). The date of the grant was February 1237. Herbert's connection with the Islands is not known but it would appear that he had been in the king's service in Gascony for the grant was made "quia...multa damnum sustinuit pro servicio regis, ut idem rex didicit per Reginaldum Ponte". Reginald, a baron of Saintonge and former seneschal of Poitou and Gascony\(^{(6)}\), was acting on the king's behalf in

\(^{(1)}\) J.H. Le Patourel, _op.cit._, p.123.
\(^{(2)}\) C.L.R., IV, 45.
\(^{(3)}\) C.L.R. 1227-31, p.510.
\(^{(4)}\) J.H. Le Patourel, _op.cit._, p.122.
\(^{(5)}\) C.L.R. 1234-7, p.416.
\(^{(6)}\) Rot.Lit.C.L. 1204-24, passim.
Gascony in the year in which the grant to Herbert was made. Clearly in these two cases, the king was merely treating his Channel Island revenues as part of his total revenues and the grants do not reflect an aspect of his Channel Island policy.

Apart from the grants of lands and rents already mentioned, our sources yield only a few examples of non-recurring money gifts and one example of a general concession granted to an individual. In May 1226, instructions were given by the king for the payment of four marks to Enguerrand de Fornet, "de dono nostro ad expensas suas" and of three marks each to Philip de Carteret and William de Salinelles "de dono nostro". Enguerrand de Fornet seems to have been active in the king's service over a number of years. In December 1215 he was in Northampton where he was presumably on the king's business for he was granted "liberaciones suas". In March 1216 he was among the king's supporters in Framlingham Castle, Suffolk, and in June 1222 he was granted a gift of 20s. in England. The reasons for the gift of three marks each to Philip de Carteret and William de Salinelles is not completely clear but it is no doubt significant that the instructions for the payment were given at a time when England and France were at war.

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(1) C.P.R. 1232-47, pp.191-192.
(2) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1224-7, p.114.
(3) Appendix V, section D, no.37.
(4) Rot.Lit.Cl. 1204-24, p.244.
is no doubt significant, too, that the de Carterets had lost lands in Normandy when they chose the English allegiance c.1204(1) while the Salinelles had probably done likewise(2). The general concession to an individual which was mentioned earlier was the grant made to William de Cheney in January, 1253, of "exemption for life ... in the realm of England, or in the islands of Gernereye and Gereseye, from being put on assizes, juries or recognitions and from being made coroner, escheator, forester, verderer, regarder or agister against his will"(3).

Two things emerge very clearly from this examination of the grants of various kinds made by the English king to his Channel Island subjects. In the first place, he was very sparing with grants of all kinds. In the second place, such grants as he did make went mainly to four men, Drew de Barentin, William de Cheney, Philip de Carteret and Enguerrand de Fornet. The last-named, as we have seen, earned his grants as rewards for active service on the king's behalf. Drew de Barentin and William de Cheney were both men who had not apparently held property in the Islands before 1204 but who clearly enjoyed the king's trust. The former's first connection with the Islands seems to have been his appointment as Warden in July 1240. He held this post continuously until April 1252(4) and, as we have seen, received at least one grant of property before he was replaced and another after his replacement.

(1) Appendix V, section B, no.20.
(2) Appendix V, section B, no.21.
(3) C.P.R. 1247-58, p.171.
William de Cheney never held royal office in the Islands and probably became interested in making acquisitions there as a result of his family connection with Philip d'Aubigny, the younger (1), who was Warden of the Islands from June 1219-October 1224 and from September 1232-May 1234 (2). William's first Channel Island property seems to have been received as a gift from Gilbert de Greinvill. The date of the gift is not known but the king gave it his approval in June 1239 (3). Thereafter, William's stake in the Channel Islands gradually increased and, as we have seen, his later acquisitions were gifts from the king. Clearly Henry III felt that in Drew de Barentin and William de Cheney, both of whom held lands in England, too (4), he had loyal subjects in the Islands. The only important Islander to whom marked favour was shown was Philip de Carteret who received a gift of three marks in May 1226 (5) and a grant of land at pleasure in September 1227 (6).

Although the English king was far from sure of the loyalty of his Island subjects and was consequently sparing with his grants to them, his suspicions do not seem to have been reflected in a noticeably harsh administration. It is true

(1) C.P.R. 1232-47, p.107.
(3) C.Ch.R. 1226-57, p.244.
(4) B.of F., III, 39 (Drew), 143 (William).
(6) Ibid. 1224-7, p.201 b.
that some administrative changes were necessary now the Islands were no longer part of Normandy. It is true, too, that new fortifications were built and garrisoned by the Crown. Wherever possible, however, the status quo ante bellum was maintained and many of the administrative orders of the period under review contain instructions that things were to be done as before 1204. Although one finds a number of complaints against royal officials in the Islands, these do not seem to be significantly numerous. Moreover, we find the usual royal pardons for specific misdemeanours. On the other hand, absence from the Islands could be misunderstood. We have already seen how traders and knights were affected by the new position of the Channel Islands as an English outpost close to a hostile coast. We also hear of one or two other persons of unknown status who temporarily lost their Island property while absent abroad.

In October 1242, orders were given for the restoration of William Cuset's land which had been seized "propter absenciam suam, eo quod credebatur ipsum esse cum rege Franci". In fact, William had been in the English king's service.

In June, 1243, a similar order was given in respect of the land of Juliana, daughter of William Godeland of Guernsey, "que capta

(2) Ibid., p.36.
(3) e.g. Rot. Lit. Cl. 1204-24, p.352; ibid. 1224-7, p.114 b; Pat. R. 1216-25, p.290; C.P.R. 1232-47, p.148.
(4) Rot. Lit. Cl. 1224-7, p.114 b; Cl. R. 1227-31, p.185; ibid. 1234-7, p.73; ibid. 1242-7, p.191.
(5) e.g. C.P.R. 1232-47, pp.146, 501; ibid. 1247-58, pp.138, 471.
fuit in manum regis eo quod eadem Juliana moram aliquandiu fecit in Normannia" (1). Presumably both William and Juliana had been absent from the Islands when war was joined between England and France in June 1242 (2) and were automatically regarded as supporters of the French king until they could prove otherwise. According to a royal writ issued in January 1254, Robert Arthur was in possession of three virgates of land in Jersey on the day of his death and his son of the same name was his heir but had not succeeded to his father's property because "tempore mortis predicti Roberti patris sui fuit in partibus remotis". However, Robert junior had now claimed his inheritance and was to be given seisin of his property (3). Unfortunately, the date of Robert senior's death is not known but it may well have been during one of the periods when England and France were at war. Certainly he died before 25th November 1244 for the Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem records under that date that Robert junior was already claiming to be his heir (4).

On the other hand, it seems that absence from the Islands in peace-time could also cause misunderstanding. In April 1235, the Warden of the Islands was informed that several persons outlawed from the Islands were to be granted a new trial by a jury of twenty-four. They had been outlawed in

(3) C.I.R. 1254-6, p.20.
(4) C.I.P.M., I, no.51.
the first place "cum absentes essent tempore quo assise ultimo capte fuerunt in insulis predictis"\(^{(1)}\). Since assizes were held every three years\(^{(2)}\) the last assizes must have been at a time of truce between England and France.

As pointed out earlier in this examination of the continuing links between the Channel Islands and Normandy, it is unlikely that the English kings could have retained the Islands in the face of large-scale local resistance. It is true that the tenurial revolution which undoubtedly took place must have reduced the likelihood of resistance to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, those who chose the English allegiance or who had never had interests on the Norman mainland could have exploited their position as occupants of Islands close to the French coast on which the French king had his eye. The fact that they did not was something of a tribute to the way in which John and Henry III handled Island affairs.

However, the conciliation of the Islanders involved allowing the high degree of continuing contact between the Islands and the duchy which this examination has revealed. As we have seen, the existence of such close continuing links meant that the English kings were never quite sure of the Islanders' loyalty, at least in the earlier part of the period under review. In the case of England, the continuing links with Normandy were to the advantage of the English king and put him in a stronger position vis-à-vis the king of France than he would otherwise have been. In the case of the Islands, however, the reverse situation probably applied.

\(^{(1)}\) C1.R. 1234-7, p.177.

As explained in the introduction, the aim of this thesis was to examine in detail the continuing links between England and Normandy between 1204 and 1259 and to consider whether these links had or could have had any political significance as far as Anglo-French relations were concerned. This obviously involved trying to establish the strength of the links in and before 1204 as well as thereafter. It also involved examining the relations of the various sectors of Norman society with their new Capetian rulers since these relations obviously had implications for Anglo-Norman relations.

Inevitably, the task of establishing the strength of the various links between England and Normandy in and before 1204 proved easier in some cases than in others, mainly because of the nature of the evidence. In the case of the Church, it was relatively easy to show the very considerable strength of the links between the kingdom and the duchy in the year of Philip's conquest. It has always been acknowledged that the ecclesiastical links were strong but it has been possible to offer here a more detailed picture of the Norman Church's stake in England than has previously been available.

In the case of the economic links between England and Normandy in and before 1204, the task was much harder. This was partly because the great series of English Chancery records which proved so helpful for the period after 1204 do not begin until the turn of the century. It was also partly because references to trade in the whole period under consideration
tend to be more numerous in times of war than in times of peace, and in the years prior to 1204 England and Normandy shared a single ruler. Nevertheless, it has been possible to establish that trade links between the kingdom and the duchy certainly existed before 1204.

It has always been recognised that some lay families still held lands in England and Normandy by 1204. However, no detailed study of the strength of this tenurial link has ever been made and the impression given by Powicke's appendix on "The Division of the Norman Baronage" has perhaps been that by 1204 only a relatively small number of fairly important families still enjoyed estates in both the kingdom and the duchy. It has now been shown that this was very far from being the true situation. The 1172 list of Norman tenants-in-chief contains the names of 199 men and satisfactory evidence has been found to show that 107 (i.e. approximately 54%) of these men - or their heirs - held estates in England and Normandy in 1204. Nor is this the full picture. Although, for reasons explained elsewhere, these 199 cases were those selected for detailed examination, many other examples of double tenure could have been cited.

Just as it was relatively easy to show the strength of the ecclesiastical links between England and Normandy in and before 1204, so it was relatively easy to show that these links were hardly weakened at all after Philip's conquest of

the duchy. Indeed, to demonstrate that the extent of the Norman Church's property in England was hardly affected by the events of 1204 is to add little to the work of Matthew(1). However, it has been possible to draw attention to an aspect of the continuing ecclesiastical links between England and Normandy which has hardly been more than hinted at elsewhere. Previously no attempt has been made to demonstrate the very high degree of continuing contact between the Norman clergy at all levels of the hierarchy and all classes of English society, clerical and lay. On the whole, this contact arose from the presence of Norman clergy in England for such matters as performing the homage due for their English property, taking part in the lawsuits in which the tenure of this property involved them, or simply administering their property from day to day. When Norman clerics came to England they found that for the most part the English king and his subjects did not discriminate between them and the clergy of the English church. This equality of treatment even extended to the making of further gifts of English property to the Norman Church.

As mentioned above, it is very difficult to estimate the strength of the trading link between England and Normandy before 1204, although we know that it existed. It therefore follows that it is impossible to assess the effect of Philip's conquest on that link, although it has been possible to show that some change and disruption inevitably followed. Nevertheless,

it is clear that between 1204 and 1259 there was regular
trade on a considerable scale between the kingdom and the
duchy which formed a very strong continuing link between the
two societies. It is also clear that John and Henry III
encouraged this trade to the extent of allowing special
concessions to many Norman merchants in times of war with
France.

Perhaps the most interesting fact revealed by this study
is that the tenancy of estates in both England and Normandy
after 1204 was by no means so rare as has previously been
supposed. No one has attempted to make a serious study of
this subject except Powicke, and since his work is presented
in an appendix to his book The Loss of Normandy, 1189-1204(1),
he has naturally concentrated on the situation in 1204 and the
years immediately following. The examination of a larger
number of families over a more extended period of time has
produced results which must to some extent modify Powicke's
view that "the number of those who shared two masters was few"(2)
and give greater credibility to Bracton's statement that "alii
plures" shared the position of William Marshal(3). Since many,
indeed the majority, of double tenancies terminated in 1204
were never in fact renewed, the importance of the new figures
must not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, they justify the
consideration of double tenancy after 1204 as a significant
continuing link between the kingdom and the duchy, which
Powicke's figures do not.


(2) Ibid., p.297.

(3) Henrici de Bracton de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae,
Since it was clear that all the continuing links between England and Normandy after 1204 were considerably stronger than had previously been supposed, the question of their possible political significance had to be considered.

Probably the continuing ecclesiastical link was the least politically significant. On the one hand, relations between the English king and the Norman clergy who visited or lived temporarily in his realm were extremely cordial. On the other hand, it is impossible to see any hint of underlying political motives behind the English king's treatment of the Norman clergy and their property. Certainly being on good terms with the Norman Church could do him no harm, but it is difficult to see how it could be of any positive advantage. After all, the clergy were unlikely to be a decisive factor in deciding the issue between the French and English kings in the event of the latter making a direct attempt to recover the duchy by force. However, if not likely to be a decisive factor, the effects of their support would certainly not be negligible. Since they held more property in Normandy of the French king than they held in England of the English king, they were unlikely to scheme with the latter unless the return of a Plantagenet king-duke would have meant significantly better relations with their ruler than they had experienced since the French conquest.

Because of the limited amount of evidence available, it will probably always remain arguable whether or not the Norman clergy were happy with French rule. Hitherto it has always been assumed that they were, but it now seems that serious consideration ought to be given to the contrary view. In the
first place, it has been shown that John's treatment of the Norman clergy before 1204 cannot be proven to be as bad as some historians have claimed. In the second place, it has been shown that Baldwin could have made even more convincing his recent reversal of the previously accepted view that Philip Augustus adopted a generous conciliatory policy towards the Norman Church. It has also been demonstrated for the first time that Louis VIII and even Saint Louis have also been credited erroneously with deliberately conciliatory policies. Even taken together, these two factors cannot be regarded as suggesting that the Norman clergy would have liked to escape from French rule. On the other hand, taken in conjunction with yet a third factor, they cast considerable doubt on the assumptions of the school of thought represented by Petit-Dutaillis who claims that as time went by, the Norman clergy "became attached to the Capetians by bonds which became more and more cordial and sincere" (1).

The third factor to which reference is made, is the evident suspicion with which Saint Louis in particular seems to have viewed the Norman clergy. Philip Augustus and Louis VIII apparently allowed the Norman cathedral chapters the canonical right of free election and as a result a majority of bishops seem to have come from within the duchy itself. However, from about 1244 onwards, non-Normans were appointed to certain sees and there are strong grounds for suggesting that Saint Louis himself was responsible. The date 1244 is, of course, significant. Although the change in the place of origin of the Norman episcopacy is the most important evidence of Saint Louis' mistrust of the

Norman clergy, it is not the only evidence.

In the case of the towns and merchant classes, it has been shown that Philip Augustus, his son and grandson, did not adopt the conciliatory policy towards them which they, like the clergy, might well have expected in the circumstances and which previous writers have claimed they enjoyed. Again there is very little evidence that the Norman towns and merchants were positively unhappy with Capetian rule, although it is possible to suggest a number of reasons why this might have been so. However, in the case of the towns and merchant classes, there is evidence to show that positive assistance was given to the English kings. Not only did John and Henry III encourage continuing trade between England and the duchy and maintain cordial relations with an important and wealthy sector of Norman society, but they benefited directly from this policy. Specific examples of Norman naval assistance had been cited by both Powicke and Berger but only when these and other examples are considered in conjunction and the tone and wording of the relevant documents examined carefully is the closeness of the relationship between the English kings and certain towns, merchants and mariners of Normandy clearly revealed. Of the three occasions (1206, 1230 and 1253) when Norman ships actually joined an English fleet, two (1206 and 1230) were during periods of war between England and France. On two other war-time occasions (1226 and 1229) Norman ships responded to an English appeal for assistance but were not in fact needed. Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence on the French side to suggest whether the French kings were powerless to stop Norman mariners from assisting the English king in times of war or whether they did not deem it expedient to do so. Whatever the answer to
this question, the positive assistance given by Norman ships to John and Henry III must have been a cause of grave concern to the kings of France.

As far as one can tell, the continuing economic link between England and Normandy after 1204 offered more hope to the English kings and posed a greater threat to the French kings than the continuing ecclesiastical link. It is, however, the continuing tenurial links and family connections which must have seemed to offer the greatest hope to John and Henry III and pose the greatest threat to Philip Augustus, Louis VIII and Saint Louis. As has been clearly demonstrated, the English kings received positive assistance from some of the Norman laity on their continental expeditions, and promises of assistance from others. It is true that the number of individuals whose names can be cited is relatively small but this is not really surprising because the fragmentary nature of the Norman records makes it difficult to follow the fortunes of the Norman laity between 1204 and 1259 in any detail at all. It should be borne in mind in this connection that few men were likely to move into open opposition to the French king unless they knew that they had some backing and even if Roger of Wendover is exaggerating when he says that Fulk Paynel and his brother had about sixty knights with them when they went over to Henry III in 1230, it is certain that the two men were not completely unsupported.

Another factor which suggests that disaffection was fairly widespread is that the French kings clearly did not trust the Norman laity any more in 1259 than they did in 1204. Even after Henry's ignominious failure of 1242-3, Louis still felt
it expedient to abolish the renewed cases of double tenure in England and Normandy and Normans were still virtually excluded from the chief administrative offices in their own duchy, as well as in the central government. According to Le Nain de Tillemont, Saint Louis' council took the precaution in his absence on crusade of sending a royal army into Normandy in 1253 when Henry III visited Gascony. Matthew Paris' account of Louis' own reaction in 1257 to the news that Henry III's brother, Richard of Cornwall, had been elected King of the Romans is further evidence that the Normans were still not trusted.

So far, two closely-related facts have emerged from this consideration of the possible political significance of the strong continuing links between England and Normandy after 1204. In the first place, it is clear that throughout the period 1204-1259 there was an element of support within Normandy for the English king. In the second place, there can be no doubt that the French king was aware of this element of support for the English king and consequently never trusted the Normans. The obvious question which occurs next is just how large was the element of support in Normandy for the Plantagenet kings? Unfortunately, no very precise answer is possible but there are grounds for arguing that it was considerable. In the first place, it was clearly large enough for the French kings to fear it openly as late as 1257. In the second place, there is evidence that some contemporary opinion throughout the period under discussion felt that Normandy was not irrevocably lost to the English kings.

It has been mentioned elsewhere how Ralph of Coggeshall
claimed that in 1205 some Normans urged King John to make an expedition to the continent because they found Philip's rule tyrannical. Similarly, William le Breton's statement in his Philippidos to the effect that during Philip's reign Normandy could not forget her former lord has also been quoted. In Louis VIII's reign, Nicholas de Brai remarks in his Gesta Ludovici VIII that:

"... Philippi Normannia sub pede venit
Francorum jugum portat cervice jacenti..."(1)

The sources for the period of Saint Louis' minority provide similar examples. Reference has already been made on more than one occasion to the attempt made in 1230 by Fulk Paynel, a Norman, to persuade Henry III to invade the duchy. Roger of Wendover who recorded the incident says that Fulk persuaded Henry "ut hostiliter Normanniam intraret, sub spe certa terram subjugandi"(2). The same chronicler claims that when King Henry tried to rid himself of Hubert de Burgh in 1232, one of the complaints he made against the justiciar was "quod cum militarem expeditionem duxisset ad partes transmarinas, ut terras revocaret amissas, idem Hubertus dissuasit ne rex Normanniam intraret hostiliter vel in alias terras ad jus suum spectantes"(3). As seen elsewhere, the record evidence supports the literary evidence in suggesting that 1230 might have been an opportune moment for an attempt to reconquer Normandy.

(1) Nicolas de Brai, Gesta Ludovici VIII. Rec.des hist., XVIII, 340.
(3) Ibid., III, 33.
In the period of Louis IX's personal rule, the troubadour Bernard de Rovenac felt it worthwhile as late as 1250 to direct a sirvente against Henry III of England and James I of Aragon with the object of persuading the two kings to invade Louis' dominions while the French king was absent on crusade. Bernard accuses Henry and James of neglecting their duty and says that shame ought to seize:

"...... al rey Aragones
E al rey que pert Normandia" (1)

Perhaps, too, some significance can be attached to the fact that when a contemporary chronicler ought to be referring to all the former continental possessions of the Plantagenets, he refers only to Normandy. For example, in 1223 the English annalst of Dunstable relates that when Louis VIII succeeded his father, "Pandulfus, Norwicensis episcopus, adversum eum sedem Apostolicam appellavit, ne quis ei coronam Franciae imponeret, nisi prius Normanniam regi Angliae restitueret" (2)

Similarly, the French chronicler Primat states that Louis IX negotiated the Treaty of Paris with Henry III "pour ce que conscience reprenoit le debonnaire roy de France Lois de la terre de Normendie, que le roy Philippe, son aieul, avoit ostée (et par droit) au roy Johan d'Engleterre" (3). In other cases, Normandy is mentioned first, by name, and the other conquered provinces are grouped together under some collective term and

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(3) Chronique de Primat traduite par Jean de Vignay, Rec.des hist., XXIII, 16.
take second place. For example, the English chronicler Roger of Wendover, in his version of the events of 1223, says that when Henry III heard of Philip Augustus' death, he sent envoys to Louis VIII, "constanter rogans ut redderet sibi Normanniam cum aliis terris transmarinis". Similarly, the French chronicler Guillaume de Nangis records that Louis IX finally negotiated a peace with Henry "quia remorosum conscientiae sentiebat pro terra Normanniae, et aliis terris quas Philippus rex Franciae avus suus Johanni regi Anglie ... abstulit".

It may be that Normandy is given most attention because of the specially close relationship between the duchy and England before 1204. It seems more likely, however, that this emphasis indicates that a number of thirteenth century chroniclers were aware of the close continuing links between England and the duchy after Philip's conquest and realised that these links gave Normandy a special importance in Anglo-French relations.

On the subject of contemporary, or near contemporary opinion, however, the most significant point of all is the fact that a number of English chroniclers greatly disapproved of the surrender of Normandy in 1259. The annalist of Burton does at


(2) Guillaume de Nangis, Gesta sancta memoriae Ludovici regis Franciae, Rec.des.hist., XX, 412. The annalist of Dunstable, Roger of Wendover and Primat probably all wrote their remarks during the years under which they are recorded. Guillaume de Nangis (d.1300) did not write his Gesta Ludovici regis until the reign of Louis' son, Philip III. See C. Gross, The Sources and Literature of English History from the earliest times to about 1485 (London, 2nd ed. 1915), nos.1821 and 1864; A. Molinier, Les Sources de l'Histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie (1494), III (Paris, 1903), nos.2531 and 2532.
least acknowledge that the other conquered provinces were involved when he says "facta fuit pax et concordia inter reges Franciae et Angliae, de Normannia et aliis terris regis Anglie transmarinis, apud Parisius, prae sentibus ibidem eisdem regibus cum eorum concilio, et scriptis hinc inde confectis et consignatis confirmata"(1). However, all he has to say about the terms of the treaty is comprised in the following sentence which follows immediately after the sentence just quoted: "Ita quidem quod Normanniam retineat rex Franciae, et ista duo verba, videlicet dux Normanniae ignominiose imperpetuum de stylo regis Angliae et sigillo deleantur, cum antea inseri solent et apponi"(1).

Walter of Hemingburgh, writing somewhat later, ignores the other conquered provinces and described how Henry negotiated with the French king, "ut ... finaliter componeret de Normannia; ductusque consilio malo simplex rex composuit sic ut regi Francorum Normannia remaneret, reddita sibi et haeredibus suis singulis annis certa summa pecuniae"(2). Why disapprove of a purely formal surrender of a former possession which had been held by the kings of France for over half a century and which there was no hope of recovering? Surely comments such as these suggest that as late as 1259 some contemporaries felt that Normandy was not irretrievably lost?

These, then, are the arguments in support of the claim that the element of support in Normandy for the Plantagenet kings


during the period 1204-1259 was considerable. If one accepts this, then one has to ask why this element of support was never fully exploited by the English king. Why did Henry III never make a vigorous and determined attempt to recover the duchy instead of dissipating his energy and resources elsewhere in France? There seems to have been a three-fold explanation. This explanation depends partly upon one aspect of conditions within Normandy which has not so far been mentioned. It also depends partly on the fact that the recovery of Normandy did not merely depend upon the situation within the duchy itself but on the general political situation in France and also at home in England. Finally, it depends to some extent on the relative abilities or deficiencies of the French and English kings of the period under consideration.

As far as conditions within Normandy herself are concerned, the English king must have been faced with much the same uncertainty as faces the modern student of the problem. In spite of all the lines of communication between England and the duchy, Henry III must have found it extremely difficult to assess the extent of the support he would receive in the event of his making a vigorous and determined attempt to reconquer Normandy. To a large extent, this difficulty was a result of the structure of the Norman nobility. In Normandy there was no one great magnate whose yea or nay could be decisive for the English king; there was no Peter of Brittany who could rally the majority of the lay lords behind him if he chose to do so. Instead, Henry was faced with a larger number of lesser men (1).

some of whom he knew would, at given times, actively support him, some of whom were prepared to negotiate but might not prove reliable when the test came, and some of whom probably never even contemplated supporting an English king. Even a more decisive monarch than Henry III might well have hesitated in a situation such as this.

This already difficult situation was further complicated by the fact that the English king could not consider Normandy in isolation. As the aggressor carrying war across the Channel, he could not hope, in the conditions of medieval warfare, to reconquer and hold Normandy without some support from outside the duchy. Unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably, the only allies who offered themselves were the unscrupulous and untrustworthy Peter of Brittany and certain Poitevin barons of like character. The story of how their machinations drew Henry's attention away from Normandy and prompted him to dissipate his energy and his resources in the disastrous continental expeditions of 1230 and 1242 is too well-known to need recapitulation here. The story of Henry's difficulties at home in England is equally well-known.

Similarly, it is hardly necessary to compare the personal deficiencies of John and Henry III with the greater abilities in most respects of Philip Augustus, Louis VIII, Blanche of Castile and Saint Louis. In any case, their importance is perhaps even arguable in view of the nature of the problem facing the English kings. It is perhaps instructive in this connection to think ahead to the Hundred Years' War.
If Henry found it difficult to assess the extent of the support he would receive in the event of his attempting to reconquer Normandy, the Capetians must have shared his difficulty. They were clearly uneasy about the situation within the duchy and could not be sure that the kings of France would always be abler than the kings of England or that conditions would never arise which would offer the king of England an opportunity to exploit his support in Normandy. Saint Louis was undoubtedly statesman-like enough to realise the potential dangers of the situation and did what he could to minimize them. In 1244, from a position of strength after the failure of Henry III's continental expedition of 1242-3, he brought to an end most of the remaining cases of double tenancy in England and Normandy. About the same time, he seems to have begun to encourage the appointment of non-Normans to Norman sees. Nevertheless, as late as 1257 he still distrusted the Normans and there can be little doubt that the close continuing links between England and the duchy were one of the factors which prompted him to make peace with the English king in the Treaty of Paris of 1259 on what some contemporaries felt were unnecessarily generous terms. (1)