Victorian Japan in Taiwan
Transmission and Impact of the ‘Modern’ upon the Architecture of Japanese Authority, 1853-1919

HUI JU CHANG

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Architecture
The University of Sheffield

Edited e-thesis
December 2014
Abstract

This research assesses how contact with Europe and America from 1853 created a new notion of the modern in Japan and colonial Taiwan, through exploring the architectural expressions of Japanese architects. Taking a detailed look at relevant theories of the modern, and the geo-political, governmental and intellectual histories of Meiji Japan, I analyse how Japan used architecture in their nation-building process, and later the role of architecture in building colonial modernity in Taiwan. The study explores how colonial buildings crystallised Japan's fledgling modernity, cumulating in an extensive case study of the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, focusing on how the building spatially embedded hierarchical relationships, and how through mastery of European architectural forms it became an artefact of techno-cultural superiority.

Through these analyses I find that whilst Japan's modernity was genuine (in that it was rationally innovative and fashionably reflected up-to-date forms and technologies) the conditions that produced it were sufficiently different that Japan effectively created a split in the idea of what it meant to be modern. Whilst modernity in Europe occurred over a long period, driven by the Enlightenment and the growth of imperialism, in Japan the primary driver was the desire to be seen as civilised, which required instrumental utilisation of reason (and later colonisation) to achieve. Japan's architectural modernity was intrinsically tied to the state's drive towards Great Power status, dominance over East Asian neighbours and the reframing of a national Japanese cultural identity as intrinsically superior. These diverse aims led to a unique cultural gap between public and private life developing in Japan, and to Japan politically and culturally splitting off from East Asia.

This thesis looks in detail at the story of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan, through exploring a number of themes. First, how translated concepts entered Japan through Josiah Conder, the first Professor of Architecture in Japan, who instituted a new ranking of building types that placed indigenous architecture below European masonry. Second, how political centralisation led to the creation of a modern Japanese architecture style promoted by Conder's successor TATSUNO Kingo, which became a national style through its use first in Japan and later more extensively in Japan's colonies. Third, due to the foundational splits in the basis for architectural education in Japan, new social boundaries were created through the Governor-General's Office which allowed colonial architects to shore their sense of superiority whilst avoiding Orientalist rackets. In spite of this the building remains equivocal: the modern split between Japanese administration and residential architecture even applied to the Governor-General, and implied Euro-American authority remains through the necessary spatial and stylistic appropriations. As the first study that traces the formation of modern architecture in Taiwan to Japan and further back to Victorian Britain, this thesis provides a trans-disciplinary contribution to the field.
For my parents and husband.
Note to Reader

In this thesis Japanese and Chinese names are displayed with surname before forename (following the usual Japanese and Chinese order) with capital letters used for surnames when a full name is given. When a Japanese or Chinese name is first introduced, the Japanese or Chinese characters will be also shown, for example: TATSUNO Kingo (Jap. 辰野金吾). All other names are written forename before surname in lower case. However, English or other languages names remain forename before surname.

Japanese or Chinese names for places, people, and buildings are typed as English transliterations in regular font with the Japanese or Chinese character and a literal translation in brackets if necessary, for example: the Sōgaku-dō (Jap. 奏楽堂, lit. Concert Hall). All other Japanese and Chinese terms are written in lowercase italic using either the Japanese hiragana or Chinese pinyin system with the original Japanese/Chinese character and a literal translation in brackets, for example: daimyo (Jap. 大名, lit. big name).

British spellings are used throughout unless in quotation.
Table of Contents

Abstract  I
Dedication  II
Note to Reader  III
Table of Contents  IV
List of Figures  VI
List of Tables  XII

Introduction  1-36

Chapter 1 Dual ‘modern’ theory  37-72
  1.1 Conceptual framework  38
  1.2 European modernity  42
  1.3 Meiji Japan’s dual modernity  58

Chapter 2 The formation of dual ‘kindai (modern) Japan’  73-154
  2.1 The transition from Edo Japan to the Meiji Restoration  75
  2.2 The Meiji’s government’s preparation for modernity  112
  2.3 Meiji Intellectuals’ attitudes towards modernity  137

Chapter 3 Architectural dual kindai (modern) movement in Japan  155-255
  3.1 The practices of carpentry before the ‘kindai (modern)’  156
  3.2 Pioneers of ‘kindai (modern)’ architecture: carpenters and surveyors  168
  3.3 The education of the first Japanese ‘architects’ under Josiah Conder  180
  3.4 The formation of Victorian Japan under foreign architects  202
  3.5 Japanese inheritors of the modern mission  219
  3.6 Transmission of binaries and creation of hybridity in Japanese architecture  238

Chapter 4 Civilising the Qing: Urban development under Imperial Japan  256-337
  4.1 Illumination of ‘modern Japan’ through imperialism  257
  4.2 Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan  281
  4.3 Government-planned ‘modern’ spaces atop a ‘primitive’ past in the capital Taipei  300
  4.4 Emergence of modern institutions in the colonial capital  320
## Chapter 5 A symbol of dual modernity: the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 338-467

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>The establishment of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence and Office</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>The utilisation and allocation of central leading institutions</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>A showcase of scientific evolution</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Authoritarian displays of Imperial power</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s legacy</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Conclusion 468-476

## Appendices 478-491

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Definition of ‘modern’ from the Oxford English dictionary</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Definitions of ‘modern’, ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’ in Japanese-English dictionaries</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Government-built architecture in Taipei, 1895</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Government-built architecture in Taipei, 1920</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Summary of Regulations for the Taiwan Governor-General's Office new design prize</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Bibliography 492-516
### List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.</td>
<td>Conceptual framework displaying the conditions for Japanese modernity.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.</td>
<td>Conditions for Euro-American modernity.</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.</td>
<td><em>An Outline of a Theory of Civilization</em> by Fukuzawa, 1875.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.</td>
<td>Map of allocation of land in Japan, 1664.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.</td>
<td>East Asian section of ‘Chart Of The Inhabited World; Exhibiting The Prevailing Religion, Form Of Government, Degree Of Civilization &amp; Population Of Each Country’.</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.</td>
<td>‘Government of Satsuma’s’ Pavilion at the Exposition Universelle in Paris, 1867.</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.</td>
<td>Public bath house drawn by Josiah Conder in 1886.</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.</td>
<td>Japanese popular print, <em>kaika injun kohai kagami</em>, 1873.</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.</td>
<td>Section of a folding screen showing Edo Castle.</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.</td>
<td>Plan and section of the <em>tenshu</em> (keep) of Edo Castle.</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.</td>
<td>Isometric projection of the <em>tenshu</em> (keep) of Edo Castle. Dated 1638.</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.</td>
<td>Structural section of Great Buddha Hall, Tōdaiji, Nara, repair completed 1911.</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.</td>
<td>SHIMIZU Kisuke II (master carpenter): Print of First National Bank of Japan, built in 1872.</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.</td>
<td>Comparison of the forms of SHIMIZU Kisuke II’s First Mitsui Bank and Second Mitsui Bank.</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.</td>
<td>Ginza plans: the original street plan; the proposal by Waters 1872; the plan as executed.</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.</td>
<td>Thomas James Waters: Ginza brick town.</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10.</td>
<td>Ginza street view in the 1870s.</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11.</td>
<td>Statue of Josiah Conder in front of the department of architecture on the campus of University of Tokyo.</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13.</td>
<td>Josiah Conder: Design of a country house for the Soane Medalist Competition First Prize in 1876. The entrance front.</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.15.</td>
<td>Josiah Conder: Plan of Tokio University, 1877.</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17.</td>
<td>William Burges: Castel Coch.</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.18.</td>
<td>Final Examination questions for Architecture Diploma at the University of Tokyo, 1881</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.20. Josiah Conder: Meiji Palace, Tokyo, 1886. Site plan showing Conder’s proposal for the reception hall on the right.
3.21. KATÔ Heitarō: Plan of the Meiji Palace (Jap. 大日本帝国御造営之図), the Kyūden (Jap. 宮殿, the Palace) completed in 1888.
3.23. Upper floor plan of the Hokkaidō Sales Hall.
3.24. Interior Plan of the guest room in the Hokkaidō Sales Hall.
3.27. Museum at Ueno Park, Tokyo, 1878-81.
3.29. The ground floor plan of the Rokumeikan, 1882.
3.30. Top floor map for a dance party on the emperor’s birthday in 1893.
3.31. Picture of the Ladies’ Charity Bazaar at the Rokumeikan by Yoshu.
3.32. Masquerade ball in the Rokumeikan, 1887. Foreign Ministry’s Entertainment Hall.
3.34. Ende and Böckmann: Proposal for the Centralised planning of Ministries.
3.35. Josiah Conder: The 1st and 2nd proposal for the Centralised planning of Ministries.
3.38. TATSUNO Kingo: College of Engineering, dormitory across moat, Tokyo Imperial University, Hongo, 1888.
3.41. Josiah Conder: Mitsubishi No. 1 building, Tokyo, 1894.
3.42. Street of Mitsubishi buildings, Tokyo.
3.43. SONE Tatsuzo: Mitsubishi No. 2 building, Tokyo, 1895.
3.44. A newspaper illustration around 1870s.
3.46. TATSUNO Kingo: Former Matsumoto's residence, 1912.
3.47. ITŌ Chūta: Comparison of the proportions of an Etruscan temple with the middle gate at Hōryū-ji (Jap. 法隆寺, lit. temple of the flourishing law).
3.49. ITÔ Chûta: Evolution theory of architecture in English, 1909. 245
3.50. ITÔ Chûtai: System diagram of Oriental art development. Adapted from Itô, 1937. 246
3.51. Itô Chuta: Tsukiji Honganji, 1934. 250
3.52. Sôgaku-dô (Odeon). Front oblique view after 1983-97 restoration. 252

4.1. Japanese Officials within the rock garden at the Old Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, formerly the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen. 284
4.2. December 1895 Taipei map. 303
4.3. Taipei city wall orientation, facing the largest mountain, 1895. 304
4.4. Taipei city wall orientation. 305
4.5. Topographic map of Taipei prefecture in 1888. 307
4.6. Japanese map of Taipei walled-city in 1896. 308
4.7. 1900 Taipei intramural urban planning map. 313
4.8. 1901 Taipei urban correction map. 314
4.9. Taipei Wall Urban Planning in 1905. 315
4.10. Tree lined boulevards of Taihoku (Taipei) in 1920. 316
4.11. Taihoku (Taipei) in 1920. 317
4.12. Taipei Weather Station in 1905, 1897. 319
4.13. The development of authority buildings in Taiwan, 1897(Japanese map) and 1945 (American map). 320
4.14. Taiwan Shrine, 1901. 322
4.15. Chintan Chinese Temple. 323
4.16. The Plan of the Taiwan Shrine in 1896. 324
4.17. The route to the Taiwan Shrine. 324
4.18. The Meiji Bridge in 1901. 325
4.19. Interior of the Taipei Prison, 1906. 326
4.20. The Plan of Taipei 327Prison 1899-1906. 327
4.21. Liu’ s railway line altered by Japanese, 1910. 331
4.22. Kodama’s stone statue in the Taipei Park, 1908. 332
4.23. Detail of Taipei Park in 1911 map. 332
4.24. Detail of Taipei Park in 1918 map 332
4.25. Open-air performance stage in Taipei New Park. 333
4.27. NOMURA Ichirou: The Taiwan Governor-General’s Museum, 1915 334
4.28. The British Museum (1753). 334

5.1. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, rebuilt in 1911. The main entrance. 343
5.2. Temporary Office of the Taiwan Governor-General in the Reception Yamen. Source from the Taiwan Education Association, 1937. 344
5.3. The Urban Corrections Plan of Taipei walled-city in 1900. 345
5.4. The site of the Office in 1911, the sport club.

5.5. TATSUNO Kingo: Katsuta Hall, 1918.

5.6. NAGAO Uheiji: Winning competition entry main front, 1909.

5.7. Moriyama’s graduation design project on ‘A University Hall for the University of Tokyo’ in 1897.


5.9. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: ‘The Taiwan Hall’, at the Tenth Kansai Competitive Exhibition at Nagoya.

5.10. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: ‘The old Royal Pavilion (1927)’ at Shinjuku Royal Garden in Tokyo.

5.11. NAGANO Ueiji: The second placed design in 1909.

5.12. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: Redesign in 1911.

5.13. Outline of a yamen template.

5.14. Plan of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen and the Reception Yamen.

5.15. Interior of the old Office of the Taiwan Governor-General in the Reception Yamen.

5.16. Plan of the old Office of Taiwan Governor-General in the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen.

5.17. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, 1919. The back (West) entrance.

5.18. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: The Taiwan Army Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA, Jap. 臺灣軍司令部), 1920.

5.19. The ramped portico entrance of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Taipei.

5.20. The ramped portico entrance of the Austrian Parliament building, Vienna.

5.21. The main entrance of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office.

5.22. The main entrance of Austrian Parliament.

5.23. The Taiwan Governor-General’s personal office.

5.24. Upper floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, 1911, fireplaces in the red.


5.27. German postcard of the emperor Meiji during Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905: ‘Mutsuhito, emperor of Japan’.

5.28. A meeting in 1929 ‘National Library Association’.

5.29. The 1936 Taiwan Exhibition.

5.30. Emperor’s portrait room behind the stage of the meeting hall.

5.31. Cross section of the central axis showing the Taiwan Governor-General’s personal office and the emperor’s portrait room.
5.32. Space-syntax of First Floor Plan of Governor General’s Office for workers’ exits. 382
5.33. First floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. 383
5.34. Space-syntax of Ground Floor Plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office for workers’ exits. 384
5.35. Ground floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. 385
5.36. Basement floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. 386
5.37. William Burges: Cardiff Castle, The summer smoking room, 1868. 389
5.38. Bathroom units on the basement floor. 390
5.39. Bathroom units on the basement floor. 390
5.40. Bathroom unit for men on the third floor. 390
5.41. The dining room for higher officers. 393
5.42. The schematic format of the red affixed-refined-tile on the Tokyo Station. 399
5.43. The schematic format of red affixed-refined-tile on the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. 399
5.44. The Taiwan Pavilion at the 5th National Industrial Exposition, 1903. 404
5.45. The South Seas Pavilion at the 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 406
5.46. The Aboriginal Pavilion at the 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 407
5.47. The Magic Arena at the 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 408
5.48. The Welcome Gate at the 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 408
5.49. The front entrance plaza of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office at the 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 410
5.50. Postcard of scene for the Taiwan Industrial Exhibition, 1916, in front of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. 411
5.51. Postcard of the Taiwan Industrial Exhibition, 1916, of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and the Reception Pavilion. 411
5.52. The view of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in the city. 421
5.54. TATSUNO Kingo: Osaka Hall, 1918. 422
5.55. Bronze decorations on a column of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office lobby outer wall. Original pre-war decoration. 425
5.56. Bronze decorations on a column of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office lobby outer wall. Restored post-war decoration. 425
5.57. Official entrance Portico 426
5.58. The ramp at the official entrance. 426
5.59. The official entrance portico after the Second World War. 426
5.60. George Gilbert Scott: The grand staircase at the Foreign Office in 1868. 427
5.61. Lobby of Governor General’s Office. 427
5.62. Interrupted gable decorated with flowers and mouldings. 428
5.63. Decoration of a roaring lion’s head. 428
5.64. Bucranium on Composite frieze in lobby. 429
5.65. Customised Composite capital in lobby. 429
5.66. Eagles Flying Over Japan with the Japanese Flag Design, 1907.
5.67. ‘Eagle Carrying the Magatama with an Illustration of Emperor Jimmu’ from an unidentified series, 1907.
5.68. Stained glass of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office.
5.69. North elevation of the lobby with Stained glass.
5.70. Cypress tablet for beam raising ceremony.
5.71. Cypress tablet for beam raising ceremony.
5.72. The detail of Governor General’s Official Residence in 1911 map.
5.74. The entrance of Governor-General’s private residence.
5.75. The private residence by the Official Residence after 1920.
5.76. ‘The Most Famous View in Tokyo: Brick Buildings along the Ginza’ by Hiroshige III, c. 1874.
5.77. ‘Mitsui Bank and Mitsukoshi Department Store (#3),’ April 1930 [May 1929].
5.78. Postcard one: Taiwan Governor’s Office, Communication Department, Taiwan Electric.
5.79. Postcard two: ‘Command view of Governor Office from a plane’.
5.80. Postcard four: 30th Anniversary postcard of the Administration of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, 1925.
5.81. Postcard three: 21st Anniversary of the Administration of Taiwan Governor’s Office, 1916.
5.82. Postcard five: 1923 Postcard in Commemoration of the itinerary of Prince Hito IV.
5.83. Postcard six: Postcard of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office with the Taiwan Shrine.
5.84. Postcard seven: The 1935 Taiwan Exhibition postcard, the main venues of the exhibition.
5.85. The Governor-General’s Office’s front plaza with the 400 metre long boulevard.
5.86. The parade on Double Ten National Day in 1957.
5.87. One yen note with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office produced in 1961.
5.88. Commemorative poster for the Presidential succession in 1975.
5.89. Two hundred yen note with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office produced in 2001.
5.90. Georg De Lalande: View of the Korea Governor-General’s Office from the Gyeongbok Palace shortly before its destruction.
5.91. The lobby of the Korea Governor-General’s Office of Korea.
5.92. ITÔ Chûta: Dendô-In, Kyôto, completed in 1912.
5.93. The 1st proposal for Ende and Böckmann’s Diet Building, 1886.
5.94. The 2nd proposal or Ende and Böckmann’s Diet Building, 1886.
5.96. YOSHII Shigenori and Oscar Tietze: Main facade, second temporary Imperial Diet Building, Tokyo.
5.97.  WATANABE Fukuzo. Proposal for the Imperial Diet Building, first-prize design for the Imperial Diet, 1919 Competition of 1918-19. 462
5.98.  Model of Imperial Diet Building, Tokyo, 1936. 463
5.99.  The Imperial Diet Building’s tower, Tokyo. 464

List of Tables

1.1. Categories of nineteen definitions of modern 43
1.2. Categories of definition of civilization in Japanese, 1862-1924 62
1.3. Categories of definition of progress in Japanese, 1862-1924 65
1.4. Categories of definition of modern in Japanese, 1862-1924 66
2.1. Development of types of Schools by Date of Establishment 85
2.2. Total Number of Shijuku (private academies) through 1872 by field of study 89
2.3. Development of types of schools by date of establishment. 130
2.4. Total number of shijuku (private academies) through 1872 by field of study. 131
4.1 Extraterritoriality in Japan. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010. 277
4.2 Student numbers in Taiwan, 1933 * including ‘a few’ aborigines 298
Introduction

My research assesses the impact of the 'modern' upon Meiji Japanese architecture, through examining sites of Japan announcements of itself as a nation-state and projections of a 'universal' self-image of modernity. This study investigates the reordering of public social and political institutions which constituted the Meiji urban state and the expression of new social hierarchies through these institutions; also the rationalism and chauvinistic universalism which became established into the top levels of Japanese society beyond the original European myth of 'modernity'.

There are a number of intertwined, dovetailing and roughly sequential matters contained in these government commissioned projects and their social context. Foremost was the insertion and translation of a framework of concepts and terminology from Western Europe and the United States. These shaped the Japanese world view towards creating modernity (kindai), civilisation (bunmei), enlightenment (kaika), progress (shinpo) and other targets, all of which were filtered into Japan during a time of great inequality between Japan and the Western powers. This led to a revaluation of Japanese history and future priorities. Following this, a centralised authority was created, concerned with forming new institutions and professions as a springboard. Rather than being guided by the people, the Meiji state was paternalistic in their wish to enlighten people to serve the progress of the new nation. I explore the creation of the unprecedented profession of architects, which became a key part of their empire-building process, creating symbols of civilised Japan. Finally, I examine the erection of binary boundaries across Japanese society: the adoption of modern practices led to the creation of a new layer of civilised entities and a reconceptualisation of past relationships and hierarchies. Divisions between modern and tradition, Occident (Seiyō) and Orient (Tōyō), civilised and primitive, architects and carpenters, art and craft, public and private, linear and fractured, religious and secular, coloniser and colonised were all (re)developed as opposites. I view these schisms as both amplified in government commissioned architectural sites, and leading to the first hybrid state of modernity in East Asia. These emergent orders serve as a lens to understand how and why government-commissioned architecture in Japan and colonial Taiwan developed as a platform for displaying their public face of modernity, which masked their pre-existing sense of belonging. When these intertwined concepts were manipulated into colonial Others, the fledgling Japanese modernity derived clearer progress and further ambition, revealing the voraciousness and dominance that serves a modern state.

---

1 These notions led Japanese authorities to see their own history as static: “The picture of a changeless or static past is usually itself a construction of early-modern European historical or historical thinking. It has seldom been a non-Western society’s way of describing itself until recent times. Just as “traditional” societies do not usually see themselves as “traditional”, similarly societies ascribed to have changeless pasts – such as Indian society before British rule or the Australian Aboriginal society before European occupation – seldom saw themselves in those terms until their subjugation by Europeans or European modes of thought. Both arguments for and the arguments against the tendency to see any history or culture as static, are themselves modern.” (Chakrabarty, 1998: 286)
Instituting *kindai* (modern) architecture

“What we must do is to transform our Empire and our people, make the empire like the countries of Europe and our people like the peoples of Europe. To put it differently, we have to establish a new European-style Empire on the Eastern Sea.... The Japanese must achieve a system of self-government and a vigor of conduct sufficient to assure the creation of a strong people and a powerful and effective government.... How can we impress upon the minds of our thirty-eight million people this daring spirit and attitude of independence and self-government?” IONUE Kaoru, Japan’s First Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1887. (Quoted in Meech-Pekarik, 1987, 145)

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, following the signing of unequal treaties with the Great Powers\(^2\) of Seiyō (Jap. 西洋, lit. Western Sea),\(^3\) the system of several hundred mini-states ruled by daimyo (Jap. 大名, lit. big name) gave way to fifty prefectures governed from the centre by state-appointed governors. Contacts with other countries, once limited almost entirely to traders at Nagasaki, were broadened, initially to a few treaty ports, and then everywhere, as Japan took part in the international order. Yet in the most profound change to everyday life Japan, authorities decided to abandon institutions adopted in the early seventeenth century for the regulation of society, politics, and foreign policy. Since the announcement of government organization act in 1868 under the Seitaisho (Jap. 政体書, lit. Regime Statement), new institutions were required simultaneously. In order to create a progressive image and a strong nation, Japan’s authorities looked west for inspiration. The new naval communications systems were modeled on the British; the police, initial legal system, and the initial army formation on the French; the banking system on the American; and the educational system on a series of models (the French, the American, the German). Other organisations were targeted for emulation leading to the establishment of factories, political parties, newspapers, chambers of commerce, clubs, museums, stock exchanges, professional societies, and more. Japan is often

---

\(^2\) ‘Great Power’ (Jap. 列強, rekkyo, lit. strong order/list) was a term used often in Japan, Europe and America to connote the world’s leading powers. I use the phrase following Bill Sewell who summarises the various angles of the use of the phrase Great Power in the pre-Second World War Japanese context, incorporating both its progressive sense and the Saidian critique: “The term ‘Great Power,’ though value-laden and in some ways antiquated, expresses the identity associated with this goal [to make their societies powerful and respected] neatly. The term signifies an exclusive club of nations that militarily overwhelmed the world trying to imbue it with specific values and tastes while incorporating it into certain economies and empires. Connoting a society’s physical and mental organizational frameworks, the term combines perfectly the concerns for national security with an honourable identity. The desire to achieve or maintain the status of Great Power, moreover, helped fuel more than imperialism–competition inherent in the Great Power system was at the root of the First World War and fuelled global transformations. These transformations were at the heart of creating modernity.” (Sewell, 2000: 47-48)

\(^3\) Seiyō was the term most often used by Japanese in the historical period of this study to describe the Euro-American states in contact with Japan. This is a Japanese translation of the concept of ‘the West’ which takes the Japanese perspective: it only includes the nations of Western Europe and America which were both strong and had a relationship with Japan from 1853 onwards. It is used throughout the thesis with this Japan-centric definition, and taken to mean Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the U.S.A. and the Netherlands, all of whom were well known in Japan.
regarded as a society that modernised largely through its own internal resources, yet in nearly all areas the initial transformation of Japan relied heavily on the deliberate emulation of Western organisations.

By the end of the Meiji period in 1912 there were few institutions in the major industrial societies that did not have their counterparts in Japan. This even extended to the authorities themselves: after 1888, the reformed Meiji oligarchy was based on a national assembly, an appointive Council of Advisors (Sangi), and eight Ministries. In the first four years, the initial formation of the infrastructure of Meiji Japan was slow, and weak although united upon the principles laid down in the first statement of the new regime, the Charter Oath, which outlined the future course for Japan. For instance, motivated by the idea of universal education which was a cardinal principle of the new government, elementary and middle schools were established in the metropolitan district of Tokyo only in 1870. It took the Iwakura diplomatic mission (1872-73), sent across dozens of the most powerful countries, to catalyze the project. A great national building programme grew from this mission as Japanese authorities first sought to project a view of Japan as ‘civilised’ in architecture, an easily recognisable vision of their aspiration for modernity and an essential image to present to the world under an era of cultural nationalism. These buildings required a profession of the architect, the creation of which is explored throughout the thesis as the most significant hook in the development of kindai (modern) architecture: Japanese architects learnt from and belatedly adapted a mainly British architectural educational system. These architects created a wide range of new building functions without historical precedent in Japan, and imitated a European aesthetic, particularly for national monuments. The now urgent creation of centralised institutions was even transferred and adapted in their dominations overseas.

The transmission of ideas into the cultural context of Meiji Japan resulted in a new version of the modern being articulated in these works of architecture. The period following the Meiji Restoration (Jap. 明治維新, 1868-1912) was most notable for the government and elite-led initiatives toward Great Power status. Therefore, I have chosen to concentrate upon authority architecture, taken to mean any building built by government authorities, and so including administrative, military, commercial, financial, public and religious architecture. These buildings implied the culture of the leaders, presenting evidence of how they influenced and changed the country so rapidly. By focusing on authority architecture, I acknowledge the power of architecture to “influence, coerce and legitimize” (Coaldrake, 1996: xix) on the one hand, and the central role that Meiji authorities had upon architecture on the other.

Like the monuments of unification in Italy and Germany, the national architecture of Meiji was created during a juncture of radical political and social change. But Japan was unlike the paradigmatic state of

---

4 The details of the Charter Oath are expanded upon in Section 2.2.
these countries in having no stone architecture, which was seen as the only true architecture by contemporaneous architecture historians such as James Fergusson.\(^5\) Japan had no existing stone palatial structures or recognizable Euro-American institutions prior to 1853 which would be readily available as models for the nation’s buildings. This process of self-definition of national architecture was therefore informed by a dominant foreign (largely British) influence. This was complicated by the fact that, during this early period, Japan was held as semi-civilised, lacking the progressive spirit of Europe and America and architecturally primitive in the eyes of most foreign commentators. In spite of these challenges, by the early 1900s, the visual modes of presentation were used to express a Japanese national image equal to, yet mostly unique from, Seiyō civilisation.

With the rise of trans-disciplinary approaches, architecture is not only open to empirical studies but approaches such as critical research are now valid, and are suited to examining the vague transmission of architectural form through exploring the conditions of the Japanese encounter with Seiyō. This thesis critically analyses the reason for the deep impact of kindai (modern) upon the architectural experiment in accordance with a conceptual framework based on transculturation and altered identity in the historical context of the Empire Japan (1868-1949). The story of the modern which is told in this work begins with the genesis of the concept of modernity. It begins with the first appearance of ‘civilisation’ in a Japanese dictionary in 1862 (defined as behaviour made proper) to the public intellectual FUKUZAWA Yukichi’s (Jap. 福澤諭吉, 1835-1901)\(^6\) Outline of Civilisation of 1875 which promoted reason, learning and identifying with Seiyō, and ends with the construction of nation’s first overseas domination headquarters to fulfill this idea of modernity in 1919. This is also a story of how freedom from Seiyō became discrimination against the rest of Asia.

I have chosen to end the study in 1919 as a landmark moment, as it is important to distinguish this initial transmission of kindai (modern) into architecture from the subsequent modernism of the Secessionists and Bauhaus (1919-1932) movements which were introduced to Japan from 1920. This earlier period involved a marvelous merging of materialist aesthetics and rejection of Japan’s cultural ‘tradition’. Later these ‘traditions’ were reinterpreted after the Second World War with architectural innovations such as the ‘Tange module’.\(^7\) This following period was twined with Americanisation and

---

\(^5\) In the main text book that the first generation of Japanese architects studied from, Japanese architecture was described in these terms: “In all the higher branches of art [the modern Japanese] take a very low position, and seem utterly unprogressive… Their architecture stands on the same low level as their other arts.” (Fergusson, 1876: 710)

\(^6\) Fukuzawa’s ideas about government and social institutions had a deep influence on Meiji Japan. An exploration of his biography and theories can be found in Section 2.3.

\(^7\) The ‘Tange module’ was a design tool based on a re-calculated version Le Corbusier’s famous Modular to Japanese scale by TANGE Kenzō, which had a wide influence after the Second World War.
later a growth of self-preservation of visible and invisible ‘traditions’ in the Metabolist movement. Yet all these movements after the Meiji modernisation were inevitably obliged to redevelop, reconsider and transcend to some extent the issue of Westernisation and to reconnect with Japan’s own past. So the opening to western Europe and America until the end of the Great War is the fundamental period in the field of Japanese kindai (modern) architecture that I intend to cover and refer to as Victorian Japan.

Whilst the political and intellectual context in Meiji Japan has been distinguished and explored by scholars, the experimental government-commissioned architecture projects remain isolated from wider study. These buildings performed an interlocking role in terms of cultural capital first in mainland Japan and later in her colonial domains. Therefore, the exploration of this research focuses on both mainland and colonial authority buildings, and specifically on the formative Taiwan Governor-General Office, home of the political elite of Taiwan which commenced their outward domination. Colonial authorities commissioned buildings with unprecedented procedure and status, which became a part of official propaganda of the Japanese nation’s progressive series and historic separation. The Office is a typically prima facie European looking building (in the style of red brick Renaissance revival but in the taste of Japanese architects) which is not only present as a case study, but in fulfillment of the prior theoretical basis that I argue: reification of progress can best be completed through domination. The building still survives as a legacy of Meiji Japan’s modernity: since its construction it has continuously held the highest authority in Taiwan, first of all housing the Governor-General and second, after the Japanese colonial period ended, the President until today (even after the civic centre of Taipei moved away to the East side of city in 1990). Focusing on a chronological overview and the ideological register of authority buildings, it becomes clear that Meiji Japan’s official definition of nation-building was fundamentally affected by European and American (pre) conceptions of non-Western nations in general and of Japan in particular. The creation of the institutional spaces within the traditional fabric in the late 19th century can therefore be placed in the broader context of Empire Japan’s difficult and paradoxical search for a new yet historically grounded identity.

The argument and evidence that the thesis takes to establish this contribution is given in Chapters 1 and 2 which examine the idea and application of Japanese modernity through researching this unprecedented concept and how it filtered into society.

Chapter 1 sets up a framework for understanding the notion of the modern in Europe and Japan through a detailed look at the etymology of ‘modern’ in the English language, and the conditions which were required for modernity to arise in Europe. Through etymological analysis, I found that modernity is

---

8 The Metabolist movement was a radical avant-garde movement pursuing the merging and recycles of architectural styles and a rediscovery of the ‘hidden tradition’, the ‘invisible tradition’ within an Asia context since the second half of the 20th century.
an exclusively European concept, used to distinguish time periods, objects and people from the past, suited to times of extreme change. This concept was also claimed by Octavio Paz (1991)\textsuperscript{9} to be founded upon critical reason. It was understood in a programmatic sense (that the modern is a project of improvement) and a transitory sense (that the modern is most associated with schisms and change). The term was formed through a series of precise social and political conditions: first, the development of critical reason as a value system following the Renaissance and second, reified self-ascribed superiority, gained through dominating non-European peoples. These conditions filled in the concept of modernity as a period of progression above non-Europeans through reasoned innovation. The modern was essentially a self-description of how Europeans understood themselves in recent history.

Subsequently I explore how Japanese modernity was distinguished by definition and use from the English version, and how the concept was derived from and gradually adopted within the Japanese vocabulary by the 1890s. Even before this time, the idea of civilisation was well utilised by authorities as a generic policy to progress to a new stage of history and ‘improve’ socially; through this emerged a critical spirit by the 1850s and the progressive self-conscious intelligentsia (the Meirokusha (Jap. 明六社, lit. ‘the Meiji 6 Society’)) were first formed in 1873. The word \textit{kindai} came to be used as ‘modern’ by the 1910s, and related to a new period of history, distinct from ‘feudalism’, a period later understood to run from 1868 until 1945 (the era of the Empire of Japan). Modernity in Japan was not contiguous to the European idea, as it related to a different time period, and had a different basis: modernity in English was a self-description whilst \textit{kindai} was an aspiration and a changeable objective as a programme of progression which represented a cultural shift from seeing civilisation as present in China and Japan to Seiyō. The notion became a powerful vehicle to allow Japanese authorities to realign their country to Europe and the U.S.A., and to form their own future which was later claimed as a truly Confucian idea of civilisation and a Buddhist philosophy of impermanence.

Chapter 2 begins tracing the entry of new ideas and movements to Japan by examining social and political structures during the Edo period and the continuities from the late Edo period until the Meiji period. For instance, the idea of ‘civilisation’ was present and commonly expressed throughout the Edo period, with reference to Confucian behavioral standards. This notion shifted along with the geo-political context that Japan found itself within: once Qing China had been humiliated in the First Opium War (Chi. 鴉片戰爭, 1839-1842) and Perry’s Black Ships had led to the signing of the ‘unfair treaties’, Japanese elites in the Shogunate and in the regional \textit{han} began to protectively adopt technologies from the West, eventually leading to a brief civil war and the Meiji Restoration. Following this, the world-view of elites altered to accept the nations of Europe and North America as pre-eminent;

\textsuperscript{9} Octavio Paz (1914-1998) was a Mexican writer, poet and diplomat, and the winner of the 1990 Nobel Prize for Literature.
a new centralised regime began instituting changes which reflected this understanding. I analyse the factors for Japan’s success in managing the situation, and find that Japanese authorities had a willingness to culturally compromise that was not present in Qing China. This thread of comparison between Japan and China is maintained throughout the thesis because the Japan-China axis was a primary relationship, utilised by Japanese elites to demonstrate the new sense of cultural superiority they felt was required to become ‘modern’.

The chapter goes on to discuss how Seiyō became idealised through contact with Europe and America through government missions and a new universal education system and how Japan was viewed by the Europeans and Americans at the time (being denigrated by some as a ‘nation of copiers’). Through awe, respect, idealisation and fear of the Great Powers, the idea of modernity was translated and took root. The exact meaning of what it meant to be kindai (modern), and to modernise, is analysed subsequently through the works of pre-eminent Meiji intellectuals including Fukuzawa and NATSUME Sōseki (Jap. 夏目漱石, 1867-1916).10 Japanese intellectuals reflected the intellectual fashions of Europe at this time, seeing Japan as entering a new rational era, and later using social Darwinism terms to understand the process which was made profound under KATŌ Hiroyuki (Jap. 加藤弘之, 1836-1916), a strong believer in the works of Herbert Spencer. Meiji modernity consisted of re-identification with the world, and the adoption of a universal notion of the progress of nations as an inevitable consequence. This outlook led to the creation of the notion of Tōyō (Jap. 東洋, lit. Eastern Seas, or the Orient) as the ‘Other’ to Japan, and to Japanese distancing themselves from their own customary practices.

Chapters 3 through 5 chronicle the architectural kindai (modern) movement (1868-1912) through pre-modern Edo to post-modern colony to assess how Japanese authorities were influenced by kindai and created a new architecture through professionalisation and systematic dominance.

Chapter 3 explores how the governmental and intellectual encounter with Seiyō shaped building construction and architectural education in the Meiji era, first addressing the topic of Japanese carpentry, before and after the Meiji Restoration. This first section explores how carpentry was a national, literate, competitive community of practice: I challenge the twin myths that Japanese artisans in the Edo period were somehow idyllic and that ‘pre-modern’ Japanese architecture was homogeneous and static. Carpenters were brought together by hinagata writings, shared reverence for wood, and the religious system of hōgaku. The trend towards monumentality, which grew during the Edo period, was continued by carpenters in the Meiji period. Carpenters began building using their

10 Born NATSUME Kinnosuke, (Jap. 夏目金之助) Natsume was a Japanese novelist of the Meiji period, as well as a scholar of British literature and a composer of haiku, kanshi, and fairy tales.
interpretation of European aesthetics under the official desire for de-Japanisation, and gradually built more and more rationalised structures, eschewing decoration where unnecessary. Parallel to this, foreign surveyors and architects were hired in Japan to build important buildings for new functions such as a national mint, barracks, Tokyo University and the first European-style town planning. The subsequent rise of foreign builders represents the power dynamic between builder and natives, and the \textit{ad hoc} nature of early Meiji commissioning practices. Initially, the master carpenter and the foreign architect were parallel and even rival professionals. This changed with entrance of the British architect Josiah Conder (1852-1920), the key figure in Japanese architecture at the time, to Japan in 1877.

Conder’s arrival was the first concrete sign of a truly programmatic change in Japanese architecture: the Meiji government, first, established schools of engineering with foreign experts as teachers, second, oversaw translation of architectural books and the establishment of Japanese language architectural journals, and, third, instituted the introduction of European building styles and building functions without precedent in Japanese history. As a Victorian, Conder taught students the concerns of 19th century Britain that architecture was a profession separate from engineering, architecture was both an art and a science, and priority should be given to solidity in buildings. He maintained Orientalist notions of ‘Eastern’ architecture as static and unchanging, and a concern with the problem of style in national buildings. All these concerns are revealed through Conder’s writings and key buildings in this chapter. Each of these concerns placed contemporaneous carpentry on a lower level than architecture, due to the premise of a pre-existing cultural pecking order held by Conder and other architects at the time.

Subsequently, I focus upon the first Japanese architects who, within a decade, had replaced Conder as the architecture instructors and head government architects. This part examines the key apprentices of Conder and their interpretations of \textit{kindai} architecture. Whilst they instituted a course on Japanese carpentry as part of the architecture degree at Tokyo University and understood Japanese architecture to be at a higher level than their European peers did, there were more continuities than departures from Conder’s notions of architecture. These first Japanese architects were agents of ‘civilisation’, who said that no nation could be compared with the Japanese who are burning with ambition to rank with the most civilised nations of the world.\textsuperscript{11} A hybridisation of architecture styles ensued creating a wide range of new buildings across the country.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine how the \textit{kindai} (modern) mission was fulfilled in Japan’s first colony (1895-1945), Taiwan, a country of conflicting culture and identity, to illuminate the progressive series that comprised the \textit{kindai} movement.

\textsuperscript{11} A statement from one of Conder’s successors, SONE Tatsuzō (Jap. 曾禰達蔵, 1852- 1937), from his graduate thesis titled ‘The future domestic architecture’ in 1879. (Sone, 1879)
Chapter 4 begins the discussion of Taiwan through analysis of the history, purposes and effects of Japanese imperialism. Simultaneously seeking legal equality with Seiyō and dominance over Tōyō, Japanese diplomats and military achieved a politically superior position over their neighbours, beginning with the colonisation of Hokkaidō before reversing the teacher/student relationship with China. This was most notably achieved through the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 which resulted in the Qing ceding Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Japan’s motivation for acquiring colonies was based on the need for survival and self-protection but it was also a part of establishing Japan as a modern nation. Engagement with the modern requires engagement in the process of distinguishing from the non-modern, and the most direct and effective method of doing this was colonisation. Chapter 4 utilises the example of Taiwan to understand how the formation of notions of superiority and critical reason were fulfilled in Japanese imperial possessions. Taiwan was colonised after decades of forays to the South of Japan, beginning with the annexation of the Ryūkyū kingdom. With the arrival of GOTÔ Shinpei (Jap. 後藤 新平, 1857-1929), the most influential head of civilian affairs in Taiwan (1898-1906), the ‘modernity’ imported into Taiwan became increasingly clear: scientific investigation of the local customs and institutions, persuasion through impressing the locals, and what was called ‘biological politics’, a Japanese interpretation of social Darwinism adapted for colonisation. These policies saw material and cultural changes in Taiwan, an island which had already been growing in importance in the century leading up to the Japanese takeover.

In order to contrast the traditional and the modern, I compare the government-built spaces in Qing Taipei, when a Chinese aesthetic was maintained, and Colonial Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan since 1885. I concentrate on the city planning, the representation of the city on maps, building types, and the rationale for building forms and spaces as sites of projecting kindai (modern). The governor responsible for constructing Taipei as a provincial capital was part of the Self-Strengthening movement, a movement with similar slogans to Meiji Japan: adopting ‘Western technology’ and ‘Eastern ethics’. Yet a comparison in the cityscape demonstrates that the Qing were not ‘modernising’ in the European sense revealed in Section 1.2: there was no evidence of schisms and fractures with the past. City planning in Qing Taipei harked back to ancient planning principles, mapping was based on idealised representations, and building forms followed centuries-old principles of governance. Although European public building types were few, these new institutions were settled with urgency, in response and in preparation for Japan’s aggression. By contrast the city created by Japan atop this template was fundamentally kindai: city planning was inspired by Paris with the city walls replaced by tree-line boulevards, maps were scientific and accurate, public, commercial and financial buildings were

12 Gotô was a statesman, cabinet minister and qualified doctor serving from the later Meiji to the early Shōwa period in Japan and her colonies. He was the head of civilian affairs of Taiwan under Japanese rule, the first director of the South Manchuria Railway, the seventh mayor of Tokyo City, the first Chief Scout of Japan, and the Home Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan.
introduced, and the building forms purposely followed European archetypes. These products signified deeper and more fundamental changes to the city, from the introduction of nationalism to the changes to the flow of life in Taipei: the measurement and experience of time altered, the city became more accessible yet more closely monitored as the closing time of gates for the city was disestablished, and the principle that the city should change peoples’ behavior became instituted through public, leisure and sanitation institutions housed in new forms. The changes followed a rational line into Taiwan and were settled upon using elements of ‘Victorian Japan’.

Chapter 5 enters the architectural empirical study to explore the prior theories that I have argued. This final chapter looks in depth at Japan’s planned innovation with the architectural design competition, the process of construction, and the space, forms and use of the building once complete. The case study is of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (1919) was an example par excellence of Japanese modernity in colonial authority architecture, from its use of the first architectural competition onwards. The Office was placed on the diagonal to the provincial-level Chinese yamen (Chi. 衙門 lit. central administrative gate), the building that was used as the Office for the first 24 years of Japanese colonial rule. This is taken as an indication that Japanese bureaucrats in Taiwan were able to reasonably easily adapt to Chinese habitual spaces, with their common architectural vocabulary of transitional spaces and gates. Regardless, the new Office was set up as a diametrically opposed building to the yamen, focused on simultaneously incorporating the total control of building’s inhabitants which was the rule on the island with the imperial hierarchy headed by the emperor, a hybrid symbol of modernity and tradition. The spaces of the Office betray the focus on technology that was the hallmark of early modern Japan, which were utilised in ways that suited the habits and cultural attitudes of the inhabitants: cleanliness, class and harmony.

The Japanese interpretation of science and technology is explored through analysis of the use of building as the host for the first national exhibition in 1916. This exhibition displayed the products of Japanese improvements in the agriculture, industry, arts and science of Taiwan, for the purpose of demonstrating the superiority of the colonisers. The building itself was a technical artefact of Japanese modernity, whose materials were almost solely from mainland Japan, and whose earthquake proofing was a demonstration of the mastery of Japanese scientists and architects in seismology. This in itself is revealing: Japan’s unique path of adopting mature Seiyō concepts such as science led towards a pragmatic focus in developing their own capabilities and a new path towards modernity that was qualitatively different to the one pursued in Europe and America.
The Office building played a role as a pioneering expression of Victorian Japan’s dual modernity with its symbolic brick facing to express civilisation and the establishment of programmatic reasoning before the introduction of modernism. My analysis of the building’s semiotics focused on symbols of modernity and native artistic/cultural expression as well as the representation of the building in postcards. Through this examination it becomes clear that the building was purposefully designed as a ‘pure’ example of Seiyō-influenced modernity, eschewing and masking anything that would be deemed ‘traditional’. This expression was influential in first in Japan’s colonies in instituting a new hierarchy of architectural expression that implicitly denigrated customary forms, and second in mainland Japan where the template of revival forms atop a ferro-concrete frame became the norm for important public buildings until the end of the Second World War. Through this building, a significant symbol of modern Meiji was fulfilled in terms of cultural nationalism.

Theories of kindai (modern) upon architecture

The transition of Japan towards modernity has been ongoing since the middle of the 19th century, a period of great upheaval in the world. ‘Modernity’ was an important subject in this period in the context of the world’s trend of cultural nationalism. Yet there is a large gap in the field of architectural studies in Europe and East Asia as far as dealing with the cultural issue of ‘modernity’ is concerned. Studies on the movement ‘modernism’ are much more popular in art and architecture (particularly in English) and as a result there is little in-depth understanding of ‘modernity’ and architecture. This becomes obvious when discussing periodisation of modern architecture: the ‘modern’ time is less convoluted for English language works (and more simplistic) than Japanese works. Modern architecture in Japan in English works is commonly interpreted as beginning with the entrance of European architecture in 1853 and seen as continuous from the entrance of the first European buildings, to the influence of modernism architecture, and to post-war architecture. A typical work such as David B. Stewart’s (1987), ‘The Making of Modern Japanese Architecture’ covers the modern architecture development from Meiji time (1868) to 1987, narrating the key empirical studies, and gives only a vague definition of what it means to be modern. From this it may not be easy to understand from English language works why the modern has been seen for so long as a large problem in East Asia: the ‘architecture of modern Japan’ is seen as synonymous with the ‘modern architecture of Japan’. For the Japanese, these are two separate issues.

Before the Second World War, the term ‘modern architecture’ was not popular or widely utilised in Japan. Importantly, it did not indicate ‘European architecture’ which was instead so-called Western-style (yōfū) architecture. Since Secessionist architecture was introduced to Japan in 1920, the issues of reconsidering ‘modern Japan’ and the specific problem of the modern architecture movement arose.
The hinge of this debate was the word ‘modern’ in relation to architecture which was first claimed by HAMAGUCHI Ryūichi in *Architecture of Humanism* (1947). The Japanese Marxist ZUSHI Yoshihiko (1947) rebounded against Hamaguchi’s idea and asserted that ‘modern architecture’ is exactly the same as ‘modernised architecture’: as long as architecture is in a modern, capitalist society it is inevitably modern. Unlike Hamaguchi, Zushi believed the ‘architecture of the people’ was also to blame, as it was as much within the modern system as anything else. From the Marxist point of view, Zushi believed that the ‘modern’ should be ridden over and overcome.

These two arguments caused a huge debate about the meaning of ‘modern architecture’ and later on the meaning of modern in Japanese history. The periodisation debate became settled in 1949 by the *rekiken group* of contemporary Japanese historians. They wrote that “because the contemporary world has become one, it is inconvenient for our country alone to be using a different chronology. Also, a thorough understanding of the past will prove difficult without a knowledge about what happened in the world at that time. Therefore the epochs of world history must from now on be unified.” (Ishimoda et al, 1949: 5) In order to avoid confusion with *modanizumu* (modernism) architecture, Japanese (and later Chinese language works also) distinguished the periodisation: the name *kindai* (modern) indicated pre-WWII architecture whilst *gendai* (Jap. 現代, modern) indicates post-war. As can be seen from the dating, the modern period is not simply a problem of temporal distancing in Japan, but the Pacific war (1941-1945) must be involved: ‘Modern architecture’ appeared categorised with the defeat of Japan, which gave hope and pride to post-war Japanese architects and historians. It represented the chance for a clean break from the past. As a result of this however, the tense debate on what *kindai, gendai* and *modanizumu* represent is now lost and forgotten, and the debate between a progressive notion of modern architecture versus the Marxist perspective has proven difficult to end.

The modern architecture and modernist architecture were discussed actively and separately (because modern architecture became a matter of history whilst modernism was ongoing) after the Second World War with a split between those considered pro-modern and anti-modern. The definition of modern architecture and the possibility that Japan actually had a history of modern architecture was questioned. The pioneering books of European architecture (Jap. 洋風, Yōfū) of the early Empire Japan did not appear until the Showa period (1926-1989): these were the Japan Federation of Engineering Societies (1927); HORIKOSHI Saburō (1929); Architecture Institution of Japan (1932 and

---

13 *Architecture of Humanism: Outlook and reflection of modern Japanese architecture* (1947) concerned the major trends of modernism architecture in the world and intended to explore its essence. Hamaguchi attempted to examine the prospects for the future and the historical necessity of ‘modern architecture in Japan due to an imperative to fit inside world trends. He claimed that the modern architecture in Japan had lost contact with the people it should be concerned with: Japanese society. By reconnecting with society, Hamaguchi wished to determine the cause of immature industrial production and counter the social peculiarities of the architect.

14 This was a group of historians belonging to the Historical Association (*rekishigaku kenkyu* or *rekiken*) in the 1950s and 1960s.
1933). These books contributed to and were followed by what are considered the first books on Japanese modern architecture history in Japan ‘Modern architecture of Japan’ by INAGAKI Eizō (1959) and then ‘Japanese Architectural History of Technology’ by MURAMATSU Teijirō (1959). During this time many research groups tentatively established a new way for modern architecture to transcend Westernisation under the auspices of the Metabolist movement.

In Inagaki’s first book on Japan’s modern architecture (1959) his drawings in his historical survey of modern architecture begins from the time of brick, steel and concrete. Inagaki tried to establish what can be called ‘modern architecture’ and also formed a fundamental foundation for future studies. According to Inagaki, the speed and rapidity of architectural development in Japan did not matter: what mattered was that their architecture the architects always aimed to be progressive as one of the goals of modernisation. Following this foundation, individual studies on the architecture of modern Japan also increased after 1960. The experience of re-reading the works of this time suggests that starting from the current awareness, they pursued a surprisingly diverse number of targets and perspectives: KŌJIRO Yūichirō (1961) described in parallel the modern architecture of the West and Japan; KIRISHIKI Shinjirō (1961) captured the propagation of veranda motifs across Europe and the United States, Asia and Japan; and INAGAKI Eizō (1961) analysed the manufacturing architecture system starting from the late Edo period. The implicit purpose of these books was to link Japan to the world story, as a parallel site of modern practice.

I found that Inagaki’s (1959) book was given tribute by being used as a template and a foundational reference for later works by Japanese researchers such as MURAMATSU Teijirō (1977), FUJIMORI Terunobu (1993), and ISAMU Yoneyama and ITŌ Takayuki (2010). All the mentioned cases above later on became key studies in the modern architecture of Japan often indicated as further thematic and empirical studies. Given that these works share a definition of kindai architecture, it seems that as the topic was debated from the 1940s to 1960s, a consensus appeared about what is modern in Japanese architecture: kindai architecture is all architecture produced in kindai period (1868-1945). A different term exists for modernism and whilst these terms are not mutually exclusive, this framework results in less conceptual confusion.

On the topic of how kindai (modern) architecture was understood in the Empire of Japan, architecture studies were never extended from Japan to its colonies in a single series. This is somewhat problematic as relations of domination in the Victorian era were so ubiquitous that “metropole and colony have to be seen in a unitary field of analysis.” (Cohn, 1996: 4) For Japan and colonial Taiwan, the ‘centre and periphery’ are usually analysed separately although they have a symbiotic relationship: they formed two parts of a whole and one part cannot be studied without the other. Unlike Japan, the
‘peripheral’ subject is very commonly studied in Europe: British imperialism has begun to be treated from a new and more critical perspective, particularly following the work of Edward W. Said (1978). Imperial architecture studies now loom large among other established fields from the European perspective with works on British Imperial architecture by many experts such as Thomas R. Metcalf (1989), Mark Crinson (1996), Andreas Volwahsen (2002 and 2004) and Robert K. Home (2013).

In Chinese language works on colonial Japanese architecture in Taiwan, the buildings are frequently referred to ‘Western style’ or ‘architecture from the Japanese occupation’. However the term jiēndài (Chi. 近代, modern, the same character as Jap. kindai) is used to describe all architecture from the period 1860 (the first treaty port in Taiwan) to 1945 (the end of WWII). All post-Second World War architecture is classified as ‘contemporary’ (for example in SUN Chuan-Wen, 2004), using the same term used as Japanese for contemporary, xiàndài (Chi. 現代, contemporary, same character as Jap. gendai). Xiàndài therefore describes modernist and functionalist architecture and any other types built in the post-war period. The influence of Japan on this categorisation is clear\(^{15}\) and there is little debate concerning this architectural terminology due to the compromise of definitions: the major difference is that in Taiwan, pre-war architecture is seen as colonial architecture as well as ‘modern’.

There are very few articles in English language on architecture and urban planning which have included colonial Taiwan besides those by Joseph R. Allen (2000, 2005, 2007 and 2012); most available research is in the Chinese or Japanese language. Although there are a few books on Taiwan’s architecture in different centuries, there is only one book by LI Qian-Lang (2004[1979]) which is about Taiwan’s architecture history from the earliest architecture to present (which categorises 1895-1945 architecture as ‘Japanese colonial period’ architecture). Yet there is a huge amount of research on kindai (modern) architecture under Japanese occupation (more than 100 unpublished theses and published books) which adds much basic knowledge. These usually take one of three approaches, all of which are focused on collecting and presenting as much data as possible: either searching for the modern in practical ways such as cataloging technologies and materials, for example LI Hong-Jian (1994) and YEH Nai-Chi (2002); there is good data of modern architecture facilities in LIAO Chen-Cheng (2007), empirical studies of kindai building types which focus on the development of individual cases of colonial buildings, for example YANG Qing-Wu (1995), CHEN Hsin-An (2004) and LI Shang-Ying (2005); or through studying the transition of urban planning, for example LIAO Chun-Sheng (1988), YEN Shu-Hua (2005) and CHENG Chin-Fang (2005). The state of scholarship is somewhat opposite to that of British imperial architecture, with a great deal of material published on the topic of kindai architecture but very few critical studies on the topic. Although other architecture studies

\(^{15}\) This influence is partly a consequence that most prominent Taiwanese architectural historians were at least partly educated in Japan.
have focused on the pre-war period in recent Chinese and Japanese language works, and there are many works on the topic, yet these assume a very generic understanding of the modern as most have focused on empirical studies, comparative studies such as ASHIHARA Yoshinobu (1991), SHA Yong-Jie (2001), and NAKAMURA Shigeharu (2002), or SHEN Fu-Xu and KONG Jian’s (2008) study of modern schools of thought in architecture.

In contrast, there is little published material on the colonial architects who worked in Taiwan, and what little there is (such as the work by HUANG Chien-Chun (1995) and LI Jun-Hua (2000)) focuses on the later stages of Japanese occupation. The featured studies on architecture policy focus on the building rules (YANG Chich-Hung (1996)) and the experience of weather adaptation (LIN Szu-Ling (2006)). Whilst various theses have been written on Taiwan’s architectural ‘modernisation’, and have been helpful, they contribute little to the theoretical approach I have taken in this work, and have labored under the assumption that ‘modern’ is the same as ‘Colonial Japanese’. One rare notable critical work on modernity by HSIA Chu-Joe (2002) has been translated into English: ‘Theorizing Colonial Architecture and Urbanism: Building Colonial Modernity in Taiwan’. There are very few existing Taiwanese items of literature that explicitly question the way the idea of modern was created.

This is not merely an issue of lack of analysis of the modern in East Asian architecture; the idea of ‘modern’ in architecture is also ill-researched in academia worldwide. This is something of a periodisation issue in Japanese and in Taiwan, and a result of fundamental definitions in English with too few terms to understand the modern phenomenon. In recent works in English, ‘modern architecture’ is usually used synonymously with ‘modernism’, under the premise that the real ‘modern architecture’ began when architects became conscious of their modernity and strove for change in architecture, for example Colquhoun (2002), Tourikiotis (1999) and Crinson (2003). This is unlike the Japanese definition, which sees kindai architecture as a product of the kindai age. The English definition of ‘modern’ reflects the idea that architecture is an autonomous profession, detached and only influenced in a limited way by wider modernity. Due to this, when reasons are given for identifying ‘modern architecture’ with ‘modernism’ they are given with reference to developments in architecture rather than in and with society. For instance, the only reason Alan Colquhoun gave for not labelling nineteenth century architecture as ‘modern’ was because “Already in the early nineteenth century, there was wide dissatisfaction with eclecticism among architects, historians and critics.” (Colquhoun, 2002: 9) This statement assumes that because a number of architects and historians were dissatisfied with revivalism it could not be a genuine ‘modern’ architecture. Colquhoun did not feel the need to provide further justification for this periodisation and this shows that there is currently an implicit, general, mutually agreed understanding of what architects mean by ‘modern architecture’.
This conception has replaced an earlier one which saw modern architecture as architecture which was a product of modern times. For instance, the Victorian architectural historian, James Fergusson, wrote *A History of the Modern style of Architecture* (1873) which examined the development of revivalism in Europe, America and India. By 1921, Banister Fletcher conceptually separated modern styles from revival styles whilst placing them on the same level. This conceptual distancing has continued, so that 19th century architecture is now both no longer ‘modern’ and no longer seen as the root from which modernism sprang: modernism is viewed as a movement characterised by its originality. This is partly due to a historical focus on style which gives the impression that modernism was indeed a break from revivalism. A recent study by Neil Levine (2009) found that in most accounts of modern architecture, “there is an assumption of a direct descent from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, yet an almost total disconnect between the early manifestations of formative ideas and their later realization.” (Levine, 2009: 2) In this view, “The schizophrenic nineteenth century occupies a no-man’s land of historical revivalism and eclecticism, where engineering appears temporarily to supersede architecture as a place for experimentation and invention in building.” (Levine, 2009: 2) Levine instead proposes to view modern architecture as a continuous historical development from the 18th century onwards by not concentrating upon style but upon what buildings represent. (Levine, 2009: 2-14) From this view, modern architecture has a stable development as eclectic architects were grappling with similar notions of representation as modernist architects: mythologising and the creation of a new, progressive idea of history.

However even Levine takes a view that begins with architecture and what it represents: beyond Hilde Heynen (1999) and MAEDA Ai (2004) there are few examples of studies of the influence of the ‘modern’ on architecture and urbanity which begin with the idea and wider meaning of ‘modern’. Studies on ‘Victorian Japan’ are a popular research field whether in Japan or Taiwan, but there is currently no published research in the UK, Japan or Taiwan which connects the architectural traces from Victorian Europe, through Japan to Taiwan, and which begins with the historical and conceptual basis of the transformation. Although within the field of architecture it is common to see theses about ‘Modernism’, the root of this word and of global architectural styles have come from the idea of the ‘modern’. An early definition of modern in an English dictionary in 1485 is ‘not antiquated or obsolete’.  

It is a concept open to interpretation and changes in fashion by its very definition. One fundamental reason that this study looks at the idea of the modern is because the theory of modern has been most significantly framed by the Western world and the aim to be modern still influences many ‘developing’ countries. The continued desire to be modern is also one of the reasons for the creation of the emerging global culture, which has a profound impact on the existence of local cultures. Yet like Heynen, I believe that the concept of the modern found in modernism seems a naïve rendition of what it

means to be modern and denies the complex historical roots of this idea. (Heynen, 1999: 2) Likewise, I trace the issue of the modern from Japan to Taiwan to view the symbiosis of ‘centre and periphery’ which is key to understanding the story of the modern in Victorian times.

The aim of this research approach is to reveal the fixed universal idea of civilisation and modernity across different cultures and to dispel the attendant notion that progress in the architectural space was synchronised with social spaces. The establishment of three layers of relationship between pre-Meiji, kindai (modern), to post-Second World War architecture is a tribute to the defining power of the most transformational era of Japanese history, the Meiji kindai period. I trace this time from the critical junctures from the first encounter with the modern West in 1853, the formation of a united modern nation-building project in 1868, the professionalisation of the architecture system from 1877, the establishment of first non-Western recognised legislative body in 1889, and the fulfillment of civilised (modernised) others by imperial aggression in 1895, until the beginning of modernism in Japan in 1919.

Critically, understanding kindai architecture is not just a matter of understanding the visual appearance, the architects’ intentions, or the period it was built in: beyond these issues are the problems with the new ‘civilised’ concepts which can be seen from analysing Japanese authority architecture in early modern Japan. In this light I propose that kindai (modern) architecture was a result of two necessary conditions:

1. The growth of rationality in architecture: Japanese architects were greatly influenced by the use of ‘reason’ in architecture. Architects made decisions largely on pragmatic grounds, with their own religious values playing very little role. They made use of and developed scientific knowledge, most exceptionally in earthquake-proofing. They also used an ever increasing range of masonry materials and complied in inaugurating new building functions throughout Japanese and colonial cities.

2. Building a progressive image of Japan: As one of the most important and obvious symbols of a state, architecture had a crucial role in forming the image of the Meiji state and a new mythology of Japan. Imitation was widespread as Japanese authorities used architecture to become associated with the West. Japanese architects learnt from this and followed programmatic designs developed in the West for building types and the manipulation of these styles for ideological reasons.

Rational architecture became bound up with the need to convey an image of Japan as a civilised and progressive nation, rather than being seen as the result of centuries of philosophical and scientific
development. The argument is that Japan had responded to the Euro-American methodical approach without changing the inherent nature of their systems of belief: striving for belonging to the modern world was most vital to the character of Meiji authority architecture and the driving force for how architecture developed in the period. Given that this sense of belonging was the key factor in pushing Japan to become modern, Japanese architectural modernity had a different basis to Europe and America, not based on movements in civil society but seemingly on desperate imitation and the adoption of the correct architectural syntax. With no real choice and urgency due to the geo-political context, the reaction to this period is evidence of the consequences of identifying with Seiyō. Since WWII Japanese architects have attempted to rediscover and reclaim the valuable elements and modes of being that have been excluded from adopted Seiyō-mind: once deemphasised, now different cultures have again become the themes of architecture according the leading Japanese architect KUROKAWA Kisho (1993).

**Reading architecture sociologically**

Architecture is a unique discipline in some ways: “there is no other class of object [other than buildings] which through the production of material forms purposefully organises space and people in space.” (Markus, 1993: 27) It has long been recognised that the effect that buildings have on peoples’ lives is not limited to behaviour; at this point, “the question is not whether architecture constructs identities and stabilizes meanings, but how and in whose interests.” (Dovey, 2009) However there has been a historic split of architecture from social science, so that the conventional understanding of buildings is as objects of art and engineering, rather than as objects which are a result of, and productive of culture. Rapprochements in studies of history and art do not tend to solve this historical split: “those social historians or critics – radical as they may be – who see an intimate connection between art and society, have left architecture out in the cold. Those architectural historians and critics who treat buildings as art objects, have left society out in the cold.” (Markus, 1993: 27) Similarly, almost all architectural studies of the modern in architecture are limited to studying modernism whilst almost all studies of modernity exclude architecture.

The new wave of architecture historians try to embed architecture in society and society in architecture to give a full account of architecture and its links to society. To do this requires an understanding of society and the methods to study it, what I call sociology of architecture, following Paul Jones (2011). This approach is a vital component of this study given that the object of study is the transmission of Euro-American concepts into Japan through authority architecture in colonial settings: these are power-laden cultural fields which require a nuanced understanding. Jones uses sociology as “a proxy for a critical approach to the connections between the architectural field, political power, and the
construction, maintenance and mobilization of collective identities.” (Jones, 2011: 1) As a critical approach to architecture, this slant “involves revealing the ways in which power is socialised in the cultural sphere, with such an approach seeking to question how structures of power come to be taken for granted as legitimate and ‘natural’.” (Jones, 2011: 1) Without this critical approach it is impossible to fully situate architecture in socio-political conditions, to understand how it is used as an object of legitimisation, how identities are created through buildings and how cultural conditions impact on the profession of the architect. Following Jones (2011) there are two main objects of study in sociology of architecture, which will be outlined below: architectural practice, and the objectified results of that practice.

To understand the practice of architects it is important to understand what an ‘architect’ is. This is particularly important given that Japan did not previously have an architectural profession. Architecture as a profession in Europe and America underwent drastic changes in the past two centuries: “the profession of architecture as we know it today emerged during the nineteenth century, as the process of designing buildings split from the process of building them.” (Davis, 2008: 272) In the early nineteenth century, the architect “designed buildings, he directly supervised construction, he worked out problems on the construction site, he selected materials. This was typical business at the time.” (Davis, 2008: 276) The training of architects at schools rather than through apprenticeships signified a division of labour and rationalisation of roles which was taking place in various fields across society. Whilst this allowed the architect to concentrate on a smaller role, the split between design and construction changed the building design process, so that the intuitive thinking of a builder was no longer present in the architect’s mind.

This split took a different form in Japan. The Japanese carpentry profession was disparaged after the firm establishment of the architect as a new profession following 1877. Japanese carpenters were seen “ultimately as 'anonymous' artisans, subsuming their individual character within a group tradition which was antithetical to the notion of individual creativity lying at the heart of the Western humanist tradition.” (Coaldrake, 2001: 46) Japanese carpentry was seen by outspoken British engineers in the 1880s as possessing “practically no knowledge of the higher branches of carpentry... The principle involved in the construction of the most famous Japan temples is no higher than that embodied in the fisherman’s hut.” (Clancey, 2006: 48) Japanese architecture removed these contested practices by not involving carpenters in the ‘architectural project’ until after the profession was formed.

These opinions were not formed in a vacuum: building practice is shaped by culture, education and through relationships with others. By being the conduit of decision-making about building choices, architects are put in a position of power. However, these contextual factors matter since they limit the
form, function and space choices of architects and building commissioners, who can “choose only from those possibilities that are known to them.” (Moore and Webber, 2008: 287) Very few studies of architecture, even those which concern the profession of the architect, relate practice to wider social-political and cultural trends. Notable exceptions include Paul Jones (2011), Mark Crinson (1996) and Gregg Clancey (2006), who all attempt to situate the architect as a product of a particular time, who acts politically as a unit and against one another, and who are cultured. It is their example which I attempt to follow in this thesis.

I understand the practice of architecture as idea-laden: from ‘art’ to ‘science’, from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’, all these notions affect what the public, clients and builders see as good/real architecture. In Meiji Japan, these ideas were either imported from foreign languages or underwent complete change so that the original meaning bore little resemblance to the new one. The paucity of engaged literature in concepts that apply to architecture means that the simple notion of ‘modern’ architecture is unrelated to how the idea has developed in other disciplines such as sociology. Engagement with this can be beneficial to better connect architecture with how the ‘modern’ was understood by society and clients, rather than limiting the scope of study to what architects alone understand the concepts to mean. Architectural practice needs to be situated in its cultural and educational context to be understood with greater accuracy.

I situate architects in their cultural context in four ways. First, by analysing the culture of the late Edo period in order to understand the conditions that formed the carpentry profession. Second, by analysing and understanding the culture of the authorities who commission the architecture in Sections 2.2 and 4.1. By specifying the modus operandi of Meiji authorities and the context that they worked within, it is possible to explore the purpose of the architecture profession and what authority architecture meant for the state. Third, I situate architects in their cultural context by analysing Japanese culture through understanding the debates and concerns of the day in Meiji Japan in Section 2.3. This is done through analysis of secondary literature relating to the public intellectuals of the early to late Meiji period, and by locating where Meiji architects of different generations fit into this schema. Finally, I explore the thought and concerns of the Meiji architects themselves, which occurs from Chapter 3 onwards.

Similarly, for education, I explore five different aspects of how the education of architects impacted on their practice. Beginning with the principles of education founded in the Edo period, and how these principles were altered and added to by contact with the Great Powers, I then analyse the institutions which were set up in order to emulate Seiyō in creating a new profession of architecture through education. In Chapter 3 I then explore the thought of key figures in the education of Japanese architects, beginning with Josiah Conder. The fourth aspect covered under education is the topics
covered in Meiji architectural education and the conceptual lenses that were inculcated. Finally, I explore the underlying biases present in this education system, through exploring the impact of Orientalism present in the structure of the architecture course.

The products of these cultured, educated architects are buildings which, following Marcus, I understand as “metaphors, readily interpretable where a community shares the assumptions they are based on (e.g. the equation of a building’s height with its importance).” (Markus and Cameron, 2001: 68) Markus’s (1993) study on the emergence of the modern building type analysed what the building meant from all dimensions, and his approach allows that everything about a building has social meaning: its form, function, and spatial structure are each capable of being analysed according to their social meaning.

I analyse buildings in this thesis in three main ways. First, by the feelings they transmit through their appearance. Buildings can inspire a sense of awe, respect, status and authority, or conversely, familiarity, banality and disrespect. Second, buildings transmit influence through the organisation of space and rooms within a building. “The articulation of space always embeds relationships of power, insofar as it governs interactions between users of a building, prescribes certain routines to them, and allows them to be subjected to particular forms of surveillance and control.” (Markus and Cameron, 2001: 68-69) This issue can also be explored culturally: for instance, what habits does an architect presume in the organisation of space?

The third method is the most salient for this study and requires the most unpacking. Through their design, buildings can transmit ideas and symbols. Importance and status can be shown by distinguishing them from other buildings in the general vicinity or functional group by their size, craftsmanship, expense, and through decorations. Beyond status, the forms of building chosen throughout the Meiji period were indicative of both the self-identity of the newly emerging government and the esteem which the Japanese government held Seiyō forms to impress and dominate the governed population. The particular forms thought to be ‘superior’ change over time and by culture to culture: “addressing the role that architecture has in codifying and reproducing social identities requires analysis; architecture is on cultural space in which political projects attempt to become socially meaningful, and where particular visions of publics are forged.” (Jones, 2011: 1-2)

On this theme, architecture is not only subject to culture but a producer of it: there is a reciprocal relationship. A sociological approach to ideas in architecture needs to be “sensitized to the specificity of architecture as a form of cultural production, which involves revealing the contingencies, complicities and contested processes that characterise the incorporation of elements of the built environment into
frames of social and political meaning.” (Jones, 2011: 2) Another way to put this is that buildings are rhetorical; they stand in the stead of ideas as concrete reality. Representation “describes an essentially theatrical situation in which a virtual or ideal set of recognisable figures or elements is perceived as standing for, that is to say, representing, an absent set of real ones to which they are meant and believed to correspond.” (Levine, 2009: 5) Since buildings can be read in various ways which are not necessarily intended by the client or architect, the “success of the rhetoric lies in its power to make the fiction stand for the reality, to convince the viewer of the “truthfulness” of the representational elements” (Levine, 2009: 5) rather than make alternative interpretations. For instance, in Heynen’s example of the Heyselstadium (1999b), the rhetoric of a unified Belgium around the monarch was not taken as a salient symbol and hence as less truthful. The concept of ‘representation’ shows that, whilst ideas can be attempted to be transmitted through buildings, these are not necessarily going to be taken up by the public, the client or even other architects: “Like all forms of artistic representation, political meaning in architecture is discursive—dependent on culturally defined interpretations of form—not inherent in form itself.” (Wendelken, 2000: 819)

In order to understand this discursive meaning, my thesis also requires a substantial amount of historical context. The framework for historical analysis will follow the example of Spence (1999) in using multiple sources and types of data including pictures as visual representations of the culture of the times. In addition, the historical narrative will avoid the example of Weber (1915) whose “preferred analytical tool is the ideal-type. This is not a description of reality but a normative and classificatory construct.” (Sprenkel, 1964: 350-351) Such analysis can quickly lead to ethnocentric assumptions, so grounding my narrative in data, the theories generated by my research will be inductively generated rather than deduced from prior hypotheses. As a key component to understand Japan’s ‘modern’ architecture, I begin the study with an analysis of meaning of modern from the root words in English and Japanese. Through this etymological approach I have explored the use and meaning of the ‘modern’ from English to Japanese. My sources for this are the Oxford English Dictionary and selected Japanese-English Dictionaries (the details are in appendices I and II).

My sources for Chapters 2, 3 and 4 come from a mixture of archives and secondary literature. The majority of my architecture archival work was from fieldwork in Japan in 2010 where I focused upon the education of Japanese architects, the works of key architects, media representations of architecture, and colonial records of Taiwan. The main archives I used in Japan were located in Tokyo University, the National Diet Library, Tokyo National Museum, and Japan’s National Archives. I also undertook further fieldwork in Taiwan in 2009 and 2012, together with the previous fieldwork during my study and conservation office work in Taiwan (2000-2005), focusing on architectural activities by the colonial
government. This was mostly using the National Taiwan Library, \textsuperscript{17} Academia Sinica Library, the Taiwan Historica, \textsuperscript{18} the National Central Library of Taiwan, \textsuperscript{19} the National Taiwan Museum and C. Y. LI Architecture & Engineers Office archives, as well as several field trips to key sites, including every one of the buildings by my thesis’s key architect, MORIYAMA Matsunosuke (Jap. 森山松之助, 1869 -1949), particularly the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. In the UK I acquired the majority of my secondary literature and some primary sources relating to Josiah Conder. I mainly used R.I.B.A Library, the British Library, and the National Archives for these sources. I also visited key buildings in the UK which had influence over the architects of the early Meiji era such as William Burges’s Cardiff Castle, Castell Coch and Harrow Lecture Hall, and the Queen Anne revival buildings of Richard Norman Shaw (1-2 St. James Street, Pall Mall, and the Norman Shaw Buildings, Westminster).

The case study (described below) and architecture history is supported by an analysis of the general history of the period 1853-1919 in Japan and Taiwan. The historical analysis focuses upon the contact zones formed in the domains of politics, education and civil society in Chapter 2 and Section 4.1. This ensures that an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the transmitted meanings of the architecture has been fully explored.\textsuperscript{20}

For architectural literature, there are a number of studies in English which have taken a similarly nuanced approach to the architecture of the period and have collated a great amount of primary research and combined this with contextual information. Dallas Finn (1995) and Gregory K. Clancey (2006) provided brilliantly sourced books with a deep insight into architectural culture in the Meiji period. Alice Tseng (2008) has written a well sourced and argued text on the Museums of Meiji Japan, connecting these buildings with the overall government nation-building project. William Coaldrake’s (1996) work on authority architecture provides a rich overview of the entire history of Japan. TOSAKI Eiichi (2004) wrote an excellent article on how style in the early Meiji period reflected socio-political trends. For the specific literature on the architecture profession, Azby S. Brown (1989), Cherie

\textsuperscript{17} After the Second World War, the ruling regime alternated, and frequent earthquakes and typhoons damaged the library collections of the Japanese occupation. The book collections were relatively rare to survive. However, the National Taiwan Library received three major archival collections: ‘Taiwan Governor-General’s Library during the Japanese occupation’, the ‘Southern archives’ and in the postwar period purchased the ‘Book collection from Japanese Professors of Taipei Imperial University’. These numbered up to 18 million volumes. As the space of Library was insufficient and most collections were sealed in stacks, Academia Sinica Library began to manage the collection from ‘Taiwan Governor-General’s Library during the Japanese occupation’ after 1999 and is developing a Digital Archive. This includes Taiwan’s literature database from the Japanese occupation period: the Taiwan Architectural Journal’, ‘the Taiwan Education Journal’, maps of Taiwan, electronic books of Taiwan’s documents and the Taiwan newspaper database including ‘Taiwan Daily News’ in both Japanese and Chinese languages.

\textsuperscript{18} The Taiwan Historica stored the Archives of the Taiwan Government under Japanese Rule (Taiwan Soutokufu Archives, 13,146 volumes), Archives of the Monopoly Bureau of Taiwan Government under Japanese Rule (Taiwan Senbaikyoku Archives, 12,815 volumes), Taiwan Development Corporation Archival (2871 volumes) and databases for the official newspapers of the Taiwan Government under Japanese Rule. These archives have been included in the National Digital Archives Program, Taiwan, since 2002.

\textsuperscript{19} Comprising a digital archive collection called ‘Taiwan Memory, the National Central Library of Taiwan has collated over 4 million volumes, including a large range of historic documents on Taiwan, such as Taiwanese post cards and photography from the Japanese colonial period.

\textsuperscript{20} A summary of this literature is in the section ‘Reading Victorian Japan’ further below.
Wendelken (1996) and Coaldrake (2001) offer well sourced works of the history of the carpentry profession in Japan whilst Don Choi (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008) has given me his extensive writings on the formation of the architectural profession in Japan, particularly on education and the teaching of architecture history. All the works of literature above offer a critical and nuanced view on the topic of Japanese Meiji architecture, and are quoted liberally throughout the thesis. From my fieldwork I found that whilst there are numbers of articles written by Josiah Conder himself which formed one of my key sources for assessment of architectural modernity. Besides Conder’s authored works, there is a lack of English language publications on Josiah Conder (the British architect who is considered the Father of (early) Modern Japanese architecture) apart from a few papers and source books: Collection of the posthumous works of Dr. Josiah Conder (1931) and Josiah Conder (2009) were published in Japan mostly in Japanese with part English translation. I have also been able to access the dissertations of the first generations of Japanese architects, which are written in either English or Japanese.

As noted earlier, I have chosen to focus on Taiwan, Japan’s first colony, because, as I will show in this thesis, Meiji Japan's ‘modernity’ was tied to territorial expansion, which became a defining feature of the Meiji era. (Ito, 2004: 213) As shown above, the literature on modernity in Japanese colonial architecture has been poorly developed in English, Japanese and Chinese, either being limited in scope or in engagement in the cultural and political context. This is in some sense unsurprising given that the ideal of studying colonial powers and their colonies together is very rarely fulfilled in the historical literature on European nations and Japan. (Schmid, 2000: 951) In Japan’s case, naichi (Jap. 内地, lit. the inner lands) are studied distinctly from gaichi (Jap. 外地, lit. the outer lands) in Japanese historiography, and yet the impact of relations with Asia on Japan was a powerful element in the construction of the Japanese national identity. (Iwabuchi, 1994: 7) This mirrored the way that Europe used the ‘Orient’ to create its own identity: “Japan in turn, made the rest of the ‘Orient’ as ‘Other’ in order to create its own identity somewhere between the Occident and Orient.” (Kikuchi, 2004: 224) This was not a passive, intellectual use of the Orient, but one which sought to reify Japan’s impression of itself as the most civilised and advanced nation in Asia, in the best position to become the leader of Tôyô through colonisation, development and education. Therefore I have chosen the most important symbol of this domination, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, as the case study for this thesis.

I chose to only to conduct one case study for several reasons. As the building is of such a large scale this allows extensive analysis of spatial elements and forms, and showed a many cultural and behavioural facets. This meant that the building could be analysed in depth for the three criteria above: the feelings transmitted, the organisation of space, and the ideas and representation of the building. It linked very well to the main narrative of my thesis as it involved two of the main architectural figures of
Victorian Japan: ITÔ Chûta (Jap. 伊東忠太, 1867–1954) and TATSUNO Kingo (Jap. 辰野金吾, 1854 - 1919). The building also makes a useful single case study as it was path-breaking on a number of levels including in scientific (use of ferro-concrete materials) and civilising (use of the first architectural competition). Finally, the building is not studied in isolation: it is used as a conclusion to the story of modernity before modernism where architecture is only a part of the story, not the story itself. Focusing on several in depth case studies would not have served this purpose as well, and would have taken focus away from the contextual issues that allowed the formation of this towering Renaissance revival architecture built by Japanese in Taiwan. Instead I have used a single large case study in Taiwan and several smaller case studies in Japan and Taiwan.

As I have only chosen one case study, I chose a large project which was fundamentally tied to the authority of colonial Taiwan, beyond any other building. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office represented the whole intention of the Japanese authorities in Taiwan and allows significant analysis of the building and its relation to urban space, and society, as this was where the policies and laws were decided. As the thesis focuses on authority and superiority, these concepts could be seen most clearly in their colonial office.

Given these parameters it would have been possible to choose the Korea Governor-General’s Office. Ultimately, the Korean Office was not a suitable case study for my purposes and has served as little comparative value. This was due to six main reasons:

- The Korea Governor-General’s Office was modernist and so did not fit the aim of the thesis to explore modern architecture prior to modernism.
- The Korean Office was less an expression of nation building and did not fit the narrative of the thesis as it was designed by American architects rather than Japanese.
- The city planning in Seoul was very different and less experimental than Taipei as the capital had been fully built whilst Taipei was half rice fields in 1895. For the Korean office, the Gyeongbokgung Palace was partly demolished to construct the building whilst the Taiwanese office was constructed on unused land. The urban context was very different, allowed less innovation and originality, and did not fit the aim of the thesis to uncover the underlying dynamics of Japanese modernity.
- The Korea Governor-General’s Office was not an enduring icon of modernity and was more a symbol of Japanese dominance to Koreans; the building was demolished for this reason in 1995-1996. In contrast, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is today the Presidential Office of Taiwan: it is the symbol of highest authority as well as a symbol of
modernity and the nation, with the image still today used on banknotes and postcards. Choosing the Taiwan Office allows deeper exploration of what it still means to be modern and how an eclectic colonial building can be considered to be defined by the term ‘modem’.

- The final reason is a pragmatic one. As I am Taiwanese with a much greater understanding of Taiwan’s history and languages than Korea’s history and languages, it was logical for my study to focus on colonial Taiwan rather than Korea. I have an intimate understanding of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office as when I worked for the conservation architect C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers, in 2003-2004; I participated in the conservation of the Office and other projects. My involvement was as an architectural assistant who had recently completed a Bachelor’s degree in Architecture. This experience gave me a deeper understanding of the building, the relevant sources and the building practices than I could have gained by studying another building.

The reasons above point to the uniqueness of the Office in comparison to other similar Japanese colonial buildings: it was an experimental building built by Japanese, yet remained in line with the most recent architectural developments, which pre-dated modernism but is seen as a symbol of modernity. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is of interest for one further reason: the building process was the longest construction procedure of colonial times. This was in part because the building was also subject to Japan’s first public architecture competition. This makes it an excellent case study for a sociological approach: as Jones explains, “the competition process involves competition between architects for material and symbolic capital. A mainstay of architects’ practice, competitions are to some extent unrestricted by ‘real-world- constraints, the competition stage allowing the architect to embrace fully the aforementioned aesthetic and artistic dimensions of their role.” (Jones, 2011: 33) This provides another layer to the analysis of the relation between architects and authority, the profession of the Japanese architect, and the selection of forms.

My fieldwork on the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was later completed in two visits to the building on open days and accumulating all possible documentary information including recent CAD drawings, conservation reports, two studies on the building, Huang, J., (2004) and Shue and Huang (2003), and the relevant achieves of Taiwan Governor Office. Analysis of how the building was used during the colonial period is supported by three interviews with LI Chung-Yueh (李重耀)21 the founder of C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers, who worked in the Office during the colonial period in 1943-1945. He later

---

21 Li is a Taiwanese architect who was educated in the Japanese colonial period. He is now 88 years old. When I worked in his architecture office (C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers) Li was the recently retired head. Li held a very important role before and after WWII for Taiwan; he was one of the rare Taiwanese architectural technicians in the Central Construction and Maintenance Division and later an architectural engineer of Central Construction Department. Li conducted more than 100 historical architecture conservation projects, including the most important national monuments of Taiwan.
led on conservation projects including the building’s reconstruction in 1946, the Office site for Taiwan Province of Expo in 1948, restoration for the façade in 2003. Unfortunately much of the data including the construction reports of the Office itself (but records on the building process, materials used and many archives were produced by the Office) was destroyed during the Second World War, and in my fieldwork in Japan, I found that the National Libraries and Archives of Japan also contained disappointingly little data on the Office itself. In spite of this, there is a great deal of information on the building process, materials, form and space of the building and how it was represented after being built. This data has never been published in English to date and represents a unique contribution of this thesis.

The analysis of the building’s features was accomplished through an in-depth study of the spatial dimensions of the building, the technologies and materials used, and the evidence of how the building was used. I also make use of analytical tools which Markus used such as spatial syntax maps (Markus, 1993: 13) for my main building case study. Yet whilst Markus analysed how power infiltrated every level of a building, I focus on analysing how the preoccupation with becoming modern permeated the building case studies and how the building was designed as a representation of Japanese nationalism and therefore modernity.

Reading nation-building

In addition to the concrete elements of state building such as taxation, building an army, and putting down rebellions, the Meiji government also engaged in the related but different task of nation-building. Given the use of architecture as a means of nation-building, any study of authority architecture during the Meiji period must include an account of what it means to build a nation and where architecture fits with this. This aspect of the thesis study is crucial to understand, as cultural identity in Meiji was mainly under the broad rubric of nation-building. This section outlines my understanding of nation-building as a recent development comprising the creation of a shared culture and fostering the recognition of fellowship; deriving from Europe and filtered to Japan; and possessing three main strands of creating collective identities, existentially aligning with Seiyō, and territorial expansion.

As the modernity of the ‘nation’ is a key contention in this thesis, it is worth unpacking. The attributes of a nation include “a mass, public culture, a single economy, and rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 2000: 3) which corresponds to very few places in the world prior to the late 18th century. If any of these attributes are dropped, it appears counter-intuitive to name these as ‘nations’ because “the nations of the modern epoch appear to be quite different from those mooted in earlier epochs: they are mass nations, they form legal-political communities with a concept of citizenship, they have compact territorial
Nations and nationalism are both well-established topics in Europe and America with a good deal of consensus on the meaning of the nation in scholarship. The great modernist theorist of the nation, Ernest Gellner stated that “nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity. Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances.” (Gellner, 1983: 6) Gellner extrapolated and clarified the link between nationalism and the nation, stating that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” (Gellner, 1983: 1) Another facet of nationalism is the centralisation of the state: “modern societies are always and inevitably centralized, in the sense that the maintenance of order is the task of one agency or group of agencies.” (Gellner, 1983: 88)

Nations are a product of recent times and require people with a shared culture (a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communications) and a recognition that they belong to the same nation. (Gellner, 1983: 7) A shared culture does not imply a passively/naturally created culture: nations moulded and created their own images through salient symbols. These mechanisms and created symbols are what Hobsbawm described as ‘invented traditions’ which were developed due to the need for elites to control the newly enfranchised masses. Through rallying citizens around these symbols “the nation became the most important agent of social control in the time of capitalism: by engineering ‘invented traditions’ of a largely fabricated national history, symbolism and mythology, the upper classes were able to channel the energies of the masses into new forms of status system and new kinds of community.” (Smith, 2000: 8) The second component of a nation, recognition of belonging, was made possible by what Benedict Anderson refers to the ‘imagined community’. The development of the printing press allowed communication and dissemination to fellow nationals, creating a community of ‘fellows’ in the mind. This was a relatively stable community in the mind, long-lasting and immutable which “appeared to vouchsafe to mortals that solace of continuity beyond death which the great religions and dynasties had ensured.” (Smith, 2000: 8) Nations represent a form of systematic

 borders... and they form part of an international system of national states.” (Smith, 2000: 3) The processes which created ‘the nation’ are all novel developments in history which emerged at a similar time to create a new phenomenon within states.22

22 In this sense, the nation is sharply distinguished from the idea of the ‘state’. Weber’s definition of the state – “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919: 1) – is adequate except to add that in the past states on occasion delegated some of that monopoly to private lords, for example, the right to feud in feudalism. Under this conception of the state, there are four categories of differences between nations and states. First, states have existed since ancient times whilst nations are relatively recent. Second, states are geographically based whilst nations are culturally defined. Third, a state is a legal entity whilst a nation is culturally imagined entity. Finally, states are concrete and easy to distinguish whilst nations are abstract and contested. Because of these differences, very few states are also single nations and very few nations are completely within a single state; according to Walter Conner (1993) only ten percent of states contain a single ‘nation’. Due to this, building a state is a very different task to building a nation: building a state involves taxation, building an army, and putting down rebellions, whilst nation building involved education of the masses, creating national symbols, and international relations.

23 This contingency is contested by perennialists who hold that nations have existed for millennia, but under the definition of a nation above (legal-political communities with compact territorial borders) makes perennialism seem illogical and flawed.
self-love: “in a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the camouflage.” (Gellner, 1983: 88)

Japan and other East Asian countries did not have the concept of the nation until after contact with the Great Powers in the mid-19th century. (Holcombe, 2011: 6) Prior to this contact, in Edo Japan (1600-1867), Japan was a loose collection of clans administered by regional, hereditary leaders. As a result of the caste society and decentralisation of authority, the Japanese before the Meiji period had less conception of a nation or nationality than of the class to which they belonged in society and their social status (Nish, 2000: 82; Howell, 2005: 4) or the locality. In the late-nineteenth century after the unification of Italy and Germany, “nationalism was viewed as a good thing for all modern states.” (Nish, 2000: 83) This opinion on the nation in Japan entered for the first time to a ‘national’ consciousness only after the Restoration of the emperor Meiji. The slow creation of a Japanese ethnic and national identity was the product of a “long process of border drawing.” (Howell, 2005: 3) However, Sakai (1997) found that often in literature on the formation of Japan’s national identity assumes that ‘Japan’ must have existed for as long as the geographic area of ‘Japan’. (Sakai, 1997: 44) Yet embedding this shared assumption was a novel task for the Meiji authorities: creating a nation called ‘Japan’ bore no resemblance the importation of “Sui and T’ang civilization from China in early times, the permeation of Sung and Yuan culture in medieval times, or the influence of Iberian Catholic culture in early modern Japan.” (Daikichi, 1985: 51)

The translation of nationalism into Japan did not conform to European definitions of what it meant to be a nation; the relevant notions were interpreted in a particular fashion. For instance, in the first theoretical statement on what it meant to be nationalist in 1878, the great Meiji intellectual, FUKUZAWA Yukichi, used the word kokken to mean both ‘the state’ and ‘nationality’, which he defined as ‘the development of national power’. (Howland, 2002: 149) Similarly, the term State Shinto in Japanese could also be translated as National Shinto. (Hardacre, 1989: 67) The nation then, was not a clear, dictionary defined term in Edo Japan. It was filtered into Japan under conditions of power imbalance and a struggle to reclaim sovereignty. Defining the contours of the Japanese nation requires an in-depth understanding of the context of the times to unpack its meaning yet this is a worthwhile exercise: the development of the nation in Japan is a powerful lens through which to understand the framing of culture change during the Meiji period. The literature on Meiji Japan suggests that there were three main elements that constituted the construction of the Meiji nation: new collective identities, new notions of time and universality, and the growth of the Japanese Empire.

Much of the literature on how Japanese authorities first constructed a collective national identity focuses upon the figure of the emperor as a unifier: Meiji period “nationalism was identified with the
position and ideology of the Emperor, the focus of the new state becoming the emperor system (kokutai).” (Nish, 2000: 84) As far back as 1864, Japanese scholars argued that Japan’s ‘national essence’ was a ‘divine country’, with a divine being as emperor. (Sakai, 1978: 163) Identification with the ‘progressive West’ was also an important component: for example, stories about women were promoted by literary magazines so that that Japan could stand “shoulder to shoulder with the various Western nations.” (De Jardin, 2012 [1887]: 67) This realignment with Seiyō heralded some changes in moral values and widening of longstanding local identities. However, this aspirational identity as ‘civilised’ was still consistently linked to Confucian principles (Shively, 1959: 304), so that ethics teaching in Meiji Japanese schools was a syncretic blend of Japanese, Chinese and Western moral teachings. (Howland 2002: 59-60) Japan’s national self-image was not a fixed position in the Meiji era, and fluctuated between the pivots of Japan, Seiyō, and Asia. For instance, the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 led the Japanese to begin identifying more as a nation within Asia as well as in relation to the West. (Wendelken, 2000: 820) These collective identities were united by a strongly nationalistic bent: identification within Asia was part of becoming recognised as the preeminent power in East Asia.

In spite of these power-laden sentiments, Japanese historians have treated nationalism and sovereignty as based on the premise that “sovereign nation-states co-exist on the same plane as equals, even if they might on occasion endorse the state’s unconstrained adventurism”. (Maruyama, 1949: 205) Japan kept in step with the idea of linear time progression through adopting the Gregorian calendar in 1872 (which is discussed in Section 4.4). This compression and alignment of time between Japan, Europe and America “was really only possible when the old medieval cosmological frameworks had given way to linear conceptions of time in which communities appeared to move through an ‘empty, homogeneous time’ measured by clock and calendar to an unknown destiny.” (Smith, 2000: 8) This was a part of what I call ‘existential realignment’ with Seiyō which Sebastian Conrad (1999) found was established with the concept of history-as-science, imported in the 1880s in Japan at Tokyo University through the appointment of Ludwig Riess (1861-1928), a 26 year old German positivist historian, and the establishment of a Faculty of History the same year. The purpose of this establishment of the discipline of ‘history’ was to integrate and adapt to Seiyō worldview “in the context of nation-building and attempts to ward off Western imperialist encroachments.” (Conrad, 1999: 68) The Eurocentrism of Japanese historiographers can itself be said to be an indicator of modernity: by being fundamentally influenced by European historical frameworks, “the history of Japanese thought carries with it the seal of modernity.” (Sakai, 1997: 50)

All kinds of cultural artefacts and practices, from basket making to rocket technology, may be discussed in terms of what they ‘say’ about the ‘imagined community’ of the nation (Anderson, 1983), but this tendency is especially marked in relation to architecture, reflecting the status of buildings as “relatively
permanent and highly salient features of the landscape: they persist over time, they stay in the same place, and compared to many other cultural phenomena (e.g. literary works or styles of dancing) they are highly obtrusive.” (Markus and Cameron, 2001: 139.) Creating sets of architectural values gave the illusion of a common history, and of ‘moving together’ through history. (Jones, 2011: 59) Exercises of identifying buildings with the nation are not always successful (see Heynen, 1999b) and require a deal of skill on the part of the architect and timing on the part of the commissioner in order to be so. The ‘style’ chosen for European architecture styles was often an essentially contested choice with “social meanings attached to particular historicist styles and buildings taking on a ‘moral’ dimension.”(Jones, 2011: 50) Meiji authority architecture was complicit in all three of the levels of Japanese nation-building (collective identities, existential alignment with Seiyō, and aggression and territorial expansion) and I aim to show through this thesis that architecture was an integral element in this exercise of nation creation. (Smits, 2008: 104) As one of the most important and obvious symbols of a state, architecture had a crucial role in forming the image of the Meiji state and a new mythology of Japan: “Modern buildings… would show that Japan was not a backward nation but a country worthy of being treated as an equal among other developed nations.” (Watanabe, 1996: 23) Architecture was a key component in building Japanese elite’s standing nationally and internationally. The early Meiji architects “were to be instruments for accomplishing this evolution/revolution in Japanese material culture: the replacement of a “native” landscape with one that marked Japanese participation in the global culture of the nation-state.” (Clancey, 2006: 17)

**Reading Victorian Japan**

The construction of Meiji Japan can be seen as a first initiative by a non-Western country to respond to the world by adapting fundamentally to the international order and adopting the same mode of progression in spite of non-accordance. Yet the aggression from others and later from Japan was the key point in forming the whole system at that time, persuading Meiji elites that the values and behavior they were adopting were universal and necessary. The modernity of Europe and America was also a universalism, seen as applicable to all countries regardless of their background. The culture, the rules, the value systems of the strong were spread by absorbing and eliminating the weak. Indeed, the subsequent decline in this way of thinking after the Second World War is the reason that topos, regionalism, and the ‘noise’ of minor, different cultures have once again become the themes of architecture.
In this context, on a number of levels Victorian Britain had the greatest influence on Japan during the period 1853-1919; being the pre-eminent imperial power in the world, Britain was a worthy role model for ‘modernisation’. (Ruxton, 1998; Cooper, 1992) The opinions of the British on Japan during this period also had a large influence in shaping the country. (Yokoyama, 1987; Jackson, 1992) The eventual architecture education system was designed by Victorian Brits, and what became the informal national architecture style was based on Queen Anne revival found in 1880s London. (Finn, 1996; Suzuki, 2003) I therefore describe the architecture of the time ‘Victorian Japanese’, acknowledging the large role played by Brits and the image of Britain in shaping the building culture. Using ‘Victorian’ as an adjective also points to another aspect of the period which was once ignored in the literature: the issues of the Meiji period were an entangled mix of issues related to becoming more synchronised with the Victorian world. The issues were not simply technological but also cultural, related to power and identity. Stefan Tanaka puts it: “It is not a contradiction to say that as Japan was becoming more modern and “Western,” both socially and politically, its leaders were becoming more concerned with Japan itself.” (Tanaka, 1993: 109)

However, this conception has been used in the past to smuggle both Eurocentric notions, particularly the idea that modernisation is an a-cultural issue. Until the last two decades, Japanese modernisation has been largely seen as inevitable progressive transformation (Garon, 1994: 346) which placed Japan on an evolutionary scale. (Harrison, 1988: 149) This understanding was premised on the belief that the impact of Seiyō was only significant on the implementation of “modern technology and modern organizations” (Fairbank et al, 1965: 7), not on culture, and that the modernisation process managed to retain its essential ‘Japaneseness’. (Smith, 1997) These works have an implicit understanding that modernisation was inevitable, somehow natural, and do not account for the softer effects of power in that period. These studies also continued the vein of earlier conceptions of Japan as being the autonomous instigator of its modernisation.24

In my use of secondary historical sources I have tended towards more recent studies which consciously seek to understand the impact of modernity upon the culture and collective identity of the Japanese archipelago, and to delve deeply into the cultural ambiguities of the Meiji time. These works all rely on the premise that modernity was a necessarily Eurocentric notion, a position which has been argued robustly by Mouzelis (2003), Barlow (1997), Dussel (1993) amongst others: these authors offer grounding to the genesis of the idea of modernity from a non-Western perspective. The remainder of literature I have used on the history of Japanese modernity can be split into 1) general histories of Meiji

24 For instance, in 1878 David Wedderburn wrote an article titled “Modern Japan” which stated: "One thing is evident, that a slight external impulse only was required to topple down the existing fabric of Japanese society at the time when foreigners forced their way into the country producing an effect analogous to that of a solid dropping into a fluid of the verge of crystallization, and converting it suddenly into a solid mass." (Wedderburn, 1878: 417)
Japan, and 2) critical analyses of the period. On the general history of Meiji Japan, Marius Jansen (2000) offers a well sourced book on the process of the transition from Edo to Meiji Japan. Kato (1965) and Daikichi (1985) offer works on the culture of the Meiji period, whilst Takeuchi (1987) produced a work exploring how Japan learnt from the outside. Chang and Myers (1963) offer one of the few analytical reviews of Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan, whilst Sewell (2004) tracks the idea of progressive modernity from Japan to colonised Korea. Amongst other works on specific events such as the Iwakura mission (see Cobbing, 1998; Ohta, 1998; Checkland, 1998; Ruxton, 1998) and Meiji education (see de Maio, 1998; Hayhoe, 1995; Wada, 2007) there is an excellent chapter on the discourse on “Overcoming Modernity” in Japan which was buried post-WWII. (Ryoen, 1995)

I have also used a large number of texts which take a more critical approach to the idea of the modern in Japanese history. The first type of these studies have analysed how identities were constructed in the Meiji period onwards: Smith sees Meiji collective identities being constructed out of a complex interaction of modernity and tradition (Smith, 1997), Barlow studied the role of colonialism in forming the Japanese modern identity (Barlow, 1997) and Silverburg tracked the cultural construction of the modern girl (Jap. モダンガール, pronounced modan gaaru) in the 1920s (Silverburg, 1991). A number of other studies have engaged with Said’s ‘Orientalism’ (1979) to understand the changes of the Meiji period. Prominent amongst these is Kikuchi’s (2004) study of Mingei theory, which showed how Orientalist notions shifted the conceptual lens of Japanese intellectuals. Iwabuchi (1994) called this phenomenon of complicit exoticism ‘self-Orientalism’. Tanaka’s book (1993) examined how the Japanese construction of Tōyō was used as an Other to Japan in order to raise Japan above its neighbours and on a level with Seiyō. Other studies have attempted to chart how the influence of Seiyō led to culture change, either through translation of foreign ideas (Howland, 2000, 2001; Sakai, 1997), or how the impact of a new notion of time helped create modern Japan. (Tanaka, 2004)

One of the key contentions of this thesis is that European modernity was created in part due to critical reason. Reasoning led to the critical challenge of customs and created several prominent binaries in society between rational/irrational, modern/premodern, past/present, religious/secular and others. Through engaging with the Great Powers under asymmetrical power conditions from 1853 onwards Japan interpreted, engaged with, and dealt with these binaries. With the insertion of the architecture profession into Japan when an existing profession of carpenters already existed, the most relevant couple for this thesis is the modern/traditional binary. This binary has long been questioned outside of Japan studies: Shiner (1975) critiqued the methodological utility of the tradition/modernity binary,

25 Similarly, Kikuchi called the somewhat ironic phenomenon of Orientalism towards neighbours by Japanese ‘Oriental Orientalism’.

26 The Japanese had been influenced by Rangaku (Jap. 関学, lit. Dutch learning) from the 17th century onwards, but this had a limited impact on authorities and an ambiguous legal status, and was not associated with a threat of colonisation.
Salvatore (2009) fundamentally questions the idea that tradition is a barrier to modernity, or that there are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ traditions.

Academics studying Japanese history have found that the idea of tradition in Japan has been used to create an idea that, without modernity, Japan would be static and changeless. Dipesh Chakrabarty concluded in the Afterword of Mirror of Modernity: Invented traditions of Modern Japan. (1998), that scholars of Japanese history should see the invention of tradition in Japan first conceptually, that the very idea of tradition did not previously exist in Japanese language, and that scholars should question the impact that the idea of tradition has had upon the Japanese worldview. (Chakrabarty, 1998) This has been fulfilled in several studies such as Jordan Sand’s (2005) excellent study of the ‘home’ in Meiji Japan, which found that to avoid becoming simply ‘modern’ in the Western sense or reverting to ‘traditions’ and being labeled by foreigners, the Japanese had found a middle way in domestic life by searching for a ‘national’ taste between the two. Westney’s study of the adoption of Western organisational and institutional forms found that these institutional forms were altered rapidly to adapt to Japanese habits and patterns of behavior. Terakawa’s (2001) study of the architect SHIRAI Seiichi’s (Jap. 白井晟一, 1905-1893) thought found a sophisticated understanding of tradition that saw it as something which “cannot be isolated from ones existence.” (Terakawa, 2001: 9) These scholars all found that the idea of tradition had influence on Japan but this influence was often revised or rejected, at least intellectually, by Japanese.

Other created boundaries in the Victorian Japan era have also been explored in the literature on this period, such as art against craft (Snodgrass, 2006; Kikuchi, 2004; Guth, 1996), religion against secularism (Kisho, 1993), and the present against the past (Tanaka, 2004; Ikuko, 1997). Many of these binary couples were used to create a new identity which is in opposition to an Other. This Othering was used as a method to create a national identity out of a clan- and class-based society. For instance, numerous works in recent years have concentrated on the creation of separation between Japan and China (Itō, 2004; Tanaka, 2004; Keene, 1998) with the adoption of the term shina, which reflected the English word China. Others have shown how Japan constructed a ‘civilised’ identity, partly using English concepts (Israel, 2006) and partly Chinese (Kleeman, 2003), and so defined themselves in opposition to the primitive Other. (Shimazu, 2007; Kleeman, 2003; Beasley, 1995; Barr, 1988). A vital part of this Othering process was Japanese imperialism. The colonisation of neighbouring countries provided a platform to both demonstrate their superiority to natives (Kleeman, 2003) and to create an experimental sphere for Japan to project their identity. (Chang and Myers, 1963) Barlow (1997) and Hsia (2002) argued that imperialism allowed the establishment of what they called colonial modernity, and that, without colonialism, there could be no modernity for Japan at that time.
Using these sources, I found that these ‘unstable binarisms’ (Clancey, 2006: 95) that Japanese architects operated in were crucial in the formation of a building a nation, and architecture therefore became an arena for the contestation of national identity. (Schmids, 2008: 104) Architecture became a symbol of what Maeda and Kisho have called dual-modernity in Japan: a symbiosis of Japanese, Euro-American and East Asian culture. My research complements (and challenges) these findings by focusing upon how this dual-modernity is fundamentally (and possibly irretrievably) biased towards a Seiyō conceptual lens, which can be seen most clearly in the Japanese colonial architecture of Taiwan. To make this point effectively I have used the idea of the contact zone (Pratt, 1991) to conceptually set the roots of Japanese modernity in an unfamiliar and domineering culture.

This study constitutes the first in-depth look at the processes and practices of the idea of modern from its roots, tracing what modern means in English and the conditions which created it, to what it meant in Japan and how the necessary conditions differed there. Through this approach I explore the influence of Europe and America on the meaning of ‘modernity’, tracing how the expression changed as Japan moved from struggling for sovereignty to dominating her neighbours using techniques of imperialism. Insofar as Japanese authority architecture (1853-1919) goes, I state my contribution as follows:

- Academics in the area usually take either the approach of labeling the socio-political changes in the Meiji period as ‘modernisation’ or sometimes ignoring modernity in the period. Through my research I have found that contact with Europe and America resulted in a highly skewed and yet recognisable version of the modern in Japan. Although early Japanese officials interpreted it as such, the modern is not just a set of criteria to fulfill, but the result of a process that arose from a set of specific conditions in Europe. The Japanese interpretation of the modern as a target to be reached was due to the unequal relations between Japan and the Great Powers in the contact zone which led Japanese authorities to comply with Seiyō ideals rather than losing her sovereignty. I found clear evidence that modern was not a single flavour but a European version and a facsimile in Japan (1853-1919).
- Modernity was expressed in Japanese architecture as a series of separations and splits from the past. Whilst Meiji authorities mostly wished to present a genuine image of civilisation to Seiyō, the changes in the education system to achieve this authenticity were so fundamental that they altered the cultural logic of building, moving away from what was conceptualised as ‘traditional’ and ‘religious’ and towards ‘reason’ and ‘scientific’. I found that the conceptual lens of Japanese architects had changed so fundamentally that attempts to reconnect with the past were possible only through style, as authority buildings had come to represent entirely different issues and priorities than buildings in the Edo
period. Although the purpose of architectural reform was image projection, early Japanese architects internalised Euro-American world view, making their efforts to re-identify with Japan’s architectural past skewed and ultimately futile at that time.

- I have provided the first study that traces the formation of imperial architecture in Taiwan to Japan and further back to Victorian Britain. I have therefore contributed one of the first architectural studies in English of colonial period architecture in Taipei. In addition, I have given a case study of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office which has very little coverage in English academia. Almost all the material from the case study of the Office is not available in English and I have used original drawings, CAD drawings and source books on the building to explore one of the most interesting buildings built in East Asia in the 20th century. Through this case study and Chapters one to four, I supply a strong background of what it meant to be modern through analysing Japan’s architectural methods and results: how modern was re-articulated through establishing new types of construction, altering the flow of daily life and time, and creating a modern essence in the new territory of Taiwan.

Given the importance of the ‘modern’ across the world, it is important to find out what ‘modern’ initially came to mean in the East, where the first recognisably ‘modern’ non-Western country is located: Japan. The research question for this thesis changed as I learnt more about the subject matter. The original aim of this research was to “understand what ‘modern’ meant in occupied Taiwan in its architectural context and how Japan articulated this idea in architecture.” Yet this began to seem to me to express a slightly naïve rendition of what it meant to be modern: that there is a single version, originated in Europe and propagated through the vague process of globalisation. Instead I wished to reflect the uniqueness of the Japanese experience in my research questions. My research questions for this thesis therefore are ‘How did contact with Europe and America in the mid-19th century create a new notion of the modern in Japan and colonial Taiwan? How was this expressed by Meiji architects in Japan and colonial Taiwan?’
Chapter 1
Dual ‘modern’ theory

“The modern age is a separation. I use ‘separation’ in its most obvious sense: to move away from something, to cut oneself off. The modern age begins as a breaking away from Christian society. Faithful to its origins, it is a continual breaking away, a ceaseless splitting apart; each generation repeats the act by which we were founded, and in this repetition we deny and renew ourselves. Separation unites us with the original movement of our society, and severance throws us back on ourselves.” (Paz, 1991: 27)

As very few architectural studies directly focus directly on the relationship between people and the total range of aspects which constitute an environment (Franz, 1994: 442) the approach of this study is attempt to retain the complexity of the architectural and the historical context of Meiji Japan and colonial Taiwan whilst developing a strong conceptual framework able to interpret the modern in Japan. The objective of this study is to understand the fundamental characteristics of the process through which the idea and representation of modern emerged in Japan and colonial Taiwan through looking at the relevant aspects of how the selected buildings reflected the modern and how they were represented. This approach differs from the mainstream approach to Japanese architecture in Japan such as LI Qian-Lang (2004[1979]) whose analysis is limited to describing the buildings themselves: I aim to describe the cultural and social forces which help to shape which buildings are built, where these fit in the history of the urban environment and how the buildings were used.

In order to achieve a conceptual foundation, this chapter aims to establish the idea of European modernity (outside its architectural context) and the conditions which caused this idea to arise. Subsequently, I explore the idea of the modern and associated concepts in Japanese to examine the differences between the two notions. The results of this exercise form the core critical framework in the study to understand Meiji Japan and her architectural products.

Before doing so it is important to introduce some concepts that have aided my understanding of how the early contact with the Great Powers shaped the culture and identity of Meiji Japan. Theories such as Marxism and Orientalism function to produce models in which every activity must fit. This is also the case for Modernisation which placed nations of the Third World on an evolutionary scale, at the apex of which were ‘modern’ Western societies. (Harrison, 1988: 149) Yet when models attempt to explain everything they illuminate very little as phenomena are not perceived as unique instances but inevitable
consequences. Whilst modernity and modernisation have been interpreted as universal theories for every human, this thesis uses middle range theories to understand the development and application of these worldviews. Middle range theories are constructed with observed data in order to create theoretical problems and to be incorporated in proposals that allow empirical testing. The concepts used within this thesis are designed to explain specific occurrences such as first contact with imperial powers or how identities are formed and change.

1.1 Conceptual framework

This thesis uses two sets of concepts, shown in fig. 1.1, from two temporal periods in Japanese history: transculturation and identity formation during 1853 to 1895 and Japanese modernity during 1895 to 1919. The period from when Perry’s Black Ships arrived in Japan (1853) to the end of the Sino-Japanese war (1895) is characterised as the time when the contact zone with the Europe and America was initiated and established. The period from the annexation of Taiwan by Japan (1895) to the end of World War I (1918) is deemed Japanese ‘modernity’, when Japan reified their status as a Great Power.

1.1. Conceptual framework displaying the conditions for Japanese modernity.

---

27 The year of first contact with the USA through Commodore Perry’s Black Ships.

28 The end of the Sino-Japanese war, won by Japan, and the ceding of Taiwan to Japan.

29 The date of the completion of the main case study, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and the recognised date that Secessionist architecture entered Japan.

30 ‘The Black ships (Jap. 黒船)’ was the name given to all Western vessels arriving in Japan in the 16th and 19th centuries but usually refers to the gun ships of Commodore Perry in 1853.
Establishment of the contact zone

The contact zone refers to “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today.” (Pratt, 1991: 33) The idea of contact is borrowed from linguistics, where the phrase “contact language” indicates an improvised language that develops among speakers of different tongues. According to Mary Louise Pratt, the contact zone is:

“the space of imperial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict. (Pratt, 2007: 8)"

Whilst talking of colonial frontiers is usual, using the idea of the “contact zone” shifts the center of gravity away from ‘place’ to a locus of socio-linguistics. It invokes the space and time where subjects previously separated by geography and history are co-present, the point at which their trajectories now intersect. The term “contact” foregrounds the interactive, improvisational dimensions of imperial encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by accounts of conquest and domination told from the invader’s perspective.” (Pratt, 2008: 8) Through examining relations within the contact zone, ideas of the profound cultural changes that occurred during the period of Westernisation, when a few men with limited yet gradually increasing contact with Seiyō led the ‘modernisation’ process, can be more accurately examined.

It was in this early stage of contact that the first treaty ports were established along with diplomatic relations, schools of ‘Western Learning’ were established, Europeans and Americans began to take residence in Japan, and the Japanese government began to apply policies to please the Great Powers whilst upgrading its armed forces. Although Japan was not colonised in the 19th century, its cultural changes in that period were in some senses even deeper than what occurred in some colonies, because they were led by willing adopters of new arts and customs. Although this meant that Japanese statesmen and intellectuals could put boundaries upon the extent of their adoption of the modern, the uncertain and unequal context of the period meant that Japan was modernising due to the perceived threat of colonisation and, after the Meiji Restoration, due to the desire to be considered (at least legally) equal. The concept of the contact zone is applied due to this context of military threat, very similar to that experienced by other nations prior to colonisation; the difference being that the outcome of contact was not ultimately colonisation and that there appear to have been no long-term plans to do so.
Besides architecture, I explore several zones of contact which shaped the elite culture in Japan: namely diplomatic relations, government missions and education in Chapter 2.

**Through the contact zone: Transculturation**

The changes that Japan went through have been described as ‘industrialisation’ (see Hamilton and Kao, 1987) and ‘Westernisation’ (see Wanandi, 2004). This thesis works on the premise that all Westernising practices in Japan had at their root the fear of colonisation by Seiyō31 and this must be acknowledged in the conceptual lens used. Concepts such as industrialisation do not sufficiently account for this power dimension, dealing with the changes as ‘inevitable’ technological development. On the other hand, seeing the changes in Meiji Japan as Westernisation simplifies the process by using a blanket term to describe a complex process which saw continuities in ethics as well as the changes in Japan’s use of reason, and cultural frames of reference. Rather, during the early years of contact with the West, the process of culture change is best described as ‘transculturation’. This better reflects the unique power relations between Seiyō and Meiji Japan:

“Ethnographers have used the term *transculturation* to describe processes whereby members of subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted by a dominant or metropolitan culture…. While subordinate peoples do not usually control what emanates from the dominant culture, they do determine to varying extents what gets absorbed into their own [culture] and what it gets used for. Transculturation… is a phenomenon of the contact zone.” (Pratt, 1991: 34)

As Eleanor Westney (1987) shows, whilst the transfer of Euro-American institutions to Japan was to almost all conceivable areas of public policy, Japanese elites were selective in which models were chosen and, once chosen, the models underwent innovative change to better fit Japanese priorities and needs. Similarly, during the period of first contact with Seiyō, Japan quickly assimilated many foreign concepts as well as practices and attitudes. (Howland, 2001: 1) Developing a new vocabulary for politics was not planned or predicted but arose as a direct result of the perceived threat of colonisation and the destabilising effect that this had upon Japan socially, politically, and economically. The potency of Europe and America in comparison to the earlier contact Japan had with Europe in the 1500s meant that traditional understandings of how to deal with foreigners were overturned. This power imbalance led to a gradual understanding of Japan’s place within Western hierarchies: until the 1860s, Japan held Westerners to be ‘barbarians’; only ten years later, Fukuzawa claimed that Japan needed to move from its state of semi-civilisation to civilisation. (Fukuzawa, 1875, quoted in Shunsaku, 1993: 500)

---

31 This veracity of this premise is explored in Section 2.1.
This was an indication of transculturation in that, as foreign pressure led to changes in Japanese elite culture, more information entered Japan from the outside. This took place on an individual level, starting with political elites such as diplomats, then the rising intellectuals, and then to the first individuals sent abroad to study in Europe and America, grappling with new concepts and ways of looking at the world. The case of how Japanese carpenters mixed cultural motifs as Seiyō fashions became preponderant is addressed in Section 3.2 whilst the individual transculturation of the first Japanese ‘architects’ is addressed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 of this thesis.

This rapid shift in attitude by the Japanese towards their own country was due to culture change which occurred as they attempted to reach the ideal of modernity, explored further in this chapter, where the contact with Seiyō was gradually expanded to touch almost all areas of public life. Yet the denigration of ‘traditional’ Japanese culture led to unresolved questions due to ‘modernisation’ and adopting a new world view.

**Through contact zone: Altered identity**

Japan’s expansion of contact with Seiyō altered the way that Japan expressed itself to the world. During the period of initial contact, Japan’s sense of self, and particularly its sense of place in the world, had to be altered in order to fit with the existential threat that was felt. This dynamic of identity and context is the key issue before and after the Meiji Restoration. In line with my sociological approach to architecture, I favour viewing the self in relation to society: for Alvesson (1996), a strong sense of ‘self’ is desired so as to function in relation with others. This is a commonality with psychoanalytical perspectives which see individuals’ sense of self as fundamentally and intrinsically affected by the contexts within which they find themselves. This was also the case for the political elites of the early Meiji period who had to decide on the extent and spheres of reform on issues such as dress, diet, religion, military order, and even public nudity. The change in identity is addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, particularly Section 2.2 which discusses the policies of the early Meiji government and the formation of a new identity for Japan.

This identification of Japan as ‘newly civilised’ led to a strong affinity with Seiyō, especially in government circles during the early Meiji period. Yet this closeness had a corollary shown in the distinct move away from the culture of Japan’s neighbouring states and from her own past. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the relationship of power and patronage between China and Japan reversed entirely through the course of the 19th century, and influential thinkers (particularly Fukuzawa) called for Japan to ‘break free of Tōyō’.

This divorce from the past and invention of new forms in Japan can be seen vividly in architecture. The predominance of ‘Western-style’ (Yōfū) architecture in the Meiji period led to the decline and diminishment of ‘traditional’ carpentry. This was nowhere more clearly seen than in the character of public architecture in Japan, to the extent that the public buildings created shared no clear commonality with buildings of the past (until the Japan revival style in the 1910s). This meant that a new building idiom was adopted by the Japanese government in order to symbolise the new identities created. As well as revising the position of architects from a culturally dominated group, the Japanese government attempted to change the relationship of Japan with the world, so that it belonged in the inner sphere of civilised nations. The cityscape began to reflect this aspiration. Further than this, because of their Universalist interpretation of ‘modernity’, Japan began to express itself as having a different identity to ‘the West’, as a unique nation simultaneously as civilised as Seiyō and a part of Tōyō.

1.2 European Modernity

In order to ask what effect ‘modernising’ had upon Japan and Japanese architecture it is necessary to first analyse the meaning of ‘modern’ in English\(^32\) and how this idea developed historically in Europe. This section is focused on the idea of the modern in the West from the first use in the fifteenth century to today. I will discuss how the word modern is defined in the English language, how it has been utilised in society, and the conditions appear necessary to create the modern movement.

The ‘modern’ is today still an idea that has an inherent attraction to governments and civilians: to be called a modern nation, or to have modern views is usually a positive badge. Yet what does it mean to be modern, beyond existing in the contemporary world? Why is the idea of being modern attractive? Through etymological analysis of the word ‘modern’ and its suffixes we can begin to understand the historical development of this concept.

Defining Modern

There are nineteen different definitions of ‘modern’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, eleven of which are adjectives, eight are nouns. Within these nineteen definitions I have created six broad categories\(^33\) of how the word has been used. Chronologically, these categories of definitions are: present, current period, up-to-date, ordinary, new fashion, and against tradition. These are summarised in the table

\(^{32}\) This is because the idea of modern in Japanese appears to have been adopted from English (rather than other languages).

\(^{33}\) I generated these categories by consulting the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) and with three specialist dictionaries (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1966), and A Concise Etymological dictionary of the English Language (1927)). For a full breakdown, see Appendix I.
below. Many of the dictionary definitions can fit into more than one category; when the word developed its meaning, it could be used with both a prior meaning and a current one. This illustrates the inherent difficulty in neatly unpacking the history of a word whose definition has continuously but subtly changed over the past five centuries.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Meaning of modern} & \text{First usage} & \text{Number of uses} \\
\hline
\text{Present (obsolete)} & 1485 & 1 \\
\text{Current period} & 1585 & 6 \\
\text{Up to date} & 1590 & 4 \\
\text{Ordinary (obsolete)} & 1591 & 1 \\
\text{New fashion} & 1756 & 7 \\
\text{Against tradition} & 1888 & 4 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Table 1.1. Categories of nineteen definitions of modern. Adapted from Oxford English Dictionary, 1989.

1. Modern as present/current period

The first recorded use of ‘modern’ in English was in 1485 when it was used to mean “Being in existence at this time, current, present.” Modern could be used to mean a current holder of a position, as in the following sentence: “Our maist gracious queen moderne” (Year 1485, quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). Later and deriving from this usage, modern was defined as current times: “Of or relating to the present and recent times... relating to, or originating in the current age or period.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) For example, “The writings of the auncient and moderne Geographers.” (Year 1585, quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) Whilst the definition of modern as ‘present’ has become obsolete, the idea of modern denoting the current period is still widely used.

Under this definition, the concept has a simple purpose of measurement: the intention of using the word is to measure which objects/periods are current and which are not. This function is reflected in the Latin origin or the root of the word, \textit{modus}: “a measure, hence a measure one should not exceed, a limit, hence manner, way of doing something or behaving.” (Origin: a Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, 1958) From this root was derived \textit{modernus}, meaning a measurement referring to time and thus for distinguishing periods. Therefore the use of modern in this sense implies a temporal judgment.

2. Modern as up to date

From as early as 1590 to be modern was also used to describe an entity which was up-to-date: “characteristic of the present time, or the time of writing; not old-fashioned, antiquated, or obsolete; employing the most up-to-date ideas, techniques or equipment” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) In this sense a person could also be modern: “Of a person or something personified: up to date in
behaviour, outlook, opinions etc.; embracing innovation and new ideas.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) Rather than a purely temporal definition of being recent, to be modern was to distinguish between contemporaneous people or objects. Even tables and beds can be described as modern, as in the following sentence: “With modern furniture it would be delightful” (Year 1811, quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989).

Whilst the word ‘modern’ initially only alluded to a temporal standard, with this adaptation, the ‘modern’ also became tied up in normative standards and desirability. It became a matter of debate whether or not a person or object was modern or not. Given that being modern meant one was not “old-fashioned, antiquated or obsolete”, being modern was also a desirable characteristic.Whilst one could not be modern if one was not contemporary, a contemporary person may not necessarily be modern; existing in the present was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be modern.

The adaptation and increasing usage of the word modern as being up-to-date was in the context of a great increase in a number of technological innovations, from steam power at the end of the eighteenth century to electricity by the late nineteenth century. Given the correlation between technological innovation and usage of ‘modern’, “the word technology is sometimes interpreted to indicate something that is particularly modern.” (Davis, 2006: 13) I believe this is a consequence of the constant shifting of technological development during the formation of modernity (a word first used in 1672) which is both a characteristic and a driver towards others keeping up to date with the latest developments. This increase in rate of change in society also underlies the next adaptation.

3. Modern as new-fashioned

By 1756 the most commonly found definition of ‘modern’ had begun to be used: modern shifted further towards describing innovation and became associated with new fashions. A modern could henceforth be “a person with modern tastes or opinions, or who belongs to the modern school of thought on any subject; a person who advocates a departure from traditional styles or values” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). Modern could be used to describe one on the cutting edge of fashion as in: “it will be deemed old-fashioned by the latest of the moderns” (1897 quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). This definition comes out of the idea of modern as being a standard of fashion to be reached; thus, a typeface can be modern, a secondary school can be modern, and even people can be moderns. With modern implying fashions and tastes (as well as keeping ‘up to date’), modern began to be understood in more hierarchical terms; some people, industries, professions and nations were modern and others were not. Therefore one of the key components in being modern is being fashionable and ‘keeping up’ with the places, people and ideas deemed as more modern.
It is worthwhile briefly exploring the nature of fashion in order to understand what is meant by this usage of the word. Fashion is a social force based on shared meanings which develop over time. Fashion is linked strongly with class and acceptance: in clothes fashion, the sociologist Thorstein Veblen (1957-1929) found that the “upper classes invented fashion to distinguish themselves from those below. When the styles and practices of the upper classes were imitated, when their fashions ‘trickled down’ to their social inferiors, the upper classes were impelled to reconstitute themselves.” (Sancaktar, 2006: 38) As with clothing fashion, invented by the upper classes, being modern promotes feelings of superiority, whilst not being modern is to be inferior.

This hierarchical differentiation implicitly leads to people who follow fashions to identify with other fashionable groups, and in time creates a sense of belonging for these people. If one is not modern it can therefore promote a sense of denigration from others, and even a desire to belong to this group.

Charles-Clemens Rüling writes that “Fashion acts as a sign, and activates forces of differentiation in terms of taste, social identity, and cultural capital. It is used to create identity and differentiation. Fashion has normative power in setting standards and creating uniformity. It serves the accumulation of symbolic capital through conspicuous consumption, and it needs continuous innovation in order to keep up its distinctive capacity.” (Rüling, 2000: 3) With modern meaning new fashion, the notion encapsulated a social force which promoted change.

4. Modern as against tradition
In the 20th century the final definition of the modern arose. The definition based on anti-traditionalism (present in the idea of modern as a new fashion and as up-to-date) was expanded, most particularly in the arts and in architecture. Modern in this sense is “A work of art, architecture etc., which is a product of a modern trend or movement.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) Modern is used in this way solely to describe artifacts or the creators of these artifacts: “In the visual arts the Walker Art Centre house a world-famous collection of moderns.” (Year 1975, quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) This movement arose in the early twentieth century to move away from the use of traditional forms to create new types of objects which were not consciously based on previous forms. This was inherently anti-traditional which, whilst linked to the idea of keeping up with current trends, is different in that it is a closed definition. Modern in this sense can only be an object identified as part of this movement which is itself a current trend/fashion. This use of the word modern is most commonly seen in movements such as modern art and Modernism in architecture. Modernism needed the modern: without the social changes required for the modern to arise, modernism and postmodernism would never have occurred as social movements.
Due to this fourth definition, in the field of architecture (and art) the idea of modern is confused due to the artistic developments of the early 20th century, when the whole profession of architecture was revolutionised. Previous conventions (such as historical revivalism) were disparaged in favour of a new aesthetic and a way of thinking about beauty. Whilst this anti-tradition type of definition has had little effect on discussions of modern in the social sciences, this association of the modern with ‘modernism’ has meant it is difficult to disentangle the notion of modern as separate from modernism in architecture. Indeed, modern architecture happened before modernism: for instance some architecture can have once been up to date, preceded modernism and still be considered to be modern (James Fergusson’s seminal architectural text “History of the Modern Style of Architecture”, 1873, attests to this). Therefore throughout this thesis I use the phrase ‘modern architecture’ to refer to architecture in the sense that it was viewed as either up to date or a new fashion in its own time rather than architecture which fits within the modernist architectural movement (as has occurred in Europe and America after the 1920s). To avoid confusion, in this thesis Modernist architecture will be referred to as modernist architecture rather than modern architecture.

Modernity, Modernisation and Modernism

The idea of modern, after five centuries of linguistic formation, has morphed into three main concepts: modernity (first used in 1672), modernisation (1770), and modernism (1929). This section explores each concept, taking the earliest (and most significant) first: modernity.

1. Modernity: between the new and improved, and the transitory

Modernity is a concept which shifted with the changing definitions of the modern, being defined as “The quality or condition of being modern; modernness of character.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) Indeed, the meaning remains ambiguous, as we are still within the modern epoch. The categories of definition above (modern as current, up-to-date, new fashion, and anti-tradition), whilst accurate given the inductive method to create them, require refinement in order to apply them to the concept of modernity. This is because modernity is the state reached when a substantial number of moderns exist in a society; rather than the characteristic of a single person or object, it is the characteristic of a society full of moderns. Modernity is a qualitatively different concept to modern and has different trends and characteristics. The architectural critical theorist, Hilde Heynen, provides an excellent account of modernity in her book ‘Architecture and Modernity’. She begins by presenting her schema for the meaning of the word modern which is designed to fit her idea of modernity: “Etymologically speaking, one can identify three basic levels of meaning accorded to the word modern: ... The current, the new, and the transient.” (Heynen, 1999: 8-9) Of these three levels the first meaning, current, corresponds exactly with the first aspect of my categories of definitions, and the second and third are ideal types (as
no dictionary definitions exactly correspond to these). It is these second and third definitions which are of most interest: the two broad conceptions of modernity based on Heynen’s scheme distinguish between **programmatic** and **transitory** notions of modernity.

What unites the rival ideas of modernity as the programmatic and as the transience is that for both continuous innovations are very important aspects. The idea of modernity as a period of change (particularly changing fashions) captures this essence of constant renewal; in modernity, fashions are changing all the time. Modernity is more a way of being than a checklist. As Heynen puts it: “**Modernity** refers to the typical features of modern times and to the way that these features are experienced by the individual: modernity stands for the attitude toward life that is associated with a continuous process of evolution and transformation, with an orientation toward a future that will be different from the past to the present.” (Heynen, 1999: 10)

What is contentious between these two basic understandings is of what this future consists. The advocates of programmatic modernity “interpret modernity as being first and foremost a project, a project of progress and emancipation. They emphasise the liberating potential that is inherent in modernity. A programmatic concept views modernity primarily from the perspective of the new, of that which distinguishes the present age from the one that preceded it.” (Heynen, 1999: 11-12) This relies on an implicit claim that modernity is a different type of period from previous periods (or else there would be no need for a new word).

To understand what makes modernity a different type of period it is necessary to understand the concept of time and repeatability in modernity. During the Renaissance “the idea began to gain currency that history contained a course of development that could be influenced in a certain direction.” (Heynen, 1999: 9) The earliest example of this was the famous *Querelle des Anciens et dea Modernes* when “the question was raised whether the “Moderns” could not rival or even surpass the “Ancients” in their attempts to achieve the highest ideal of art. The main result of this discussion was that the cyclical model was definitely replaced by a progressive model that viewed every age as unique and unrepeatable and as an advance on the achievements of preceding periods.” (Heynen, 1999: 9) This underlines the notion of modernity as something new and programmed to progress: history cannot repeat itself due to the project of modernity to improve upon what came before. This notion has huge implications for how time is thought about in the West and the role of modernity in this: Modernity, Octavio Paz says, “is an **exclusively Western concept** that has no equivalent in other civilisations. The reason for this lies in the view of time that is peculiar to the West, by which time is regarded as being linear, irreversible, and progressive.” (Heynen, 1999: 9, emphasis added)
The other concept of modernity, the transient, has a similarly revolutionary view of time. With one eye continuously on the future and staying up-to-date, the most obvious characteristic of modernity is change, and how transient and momentary society becomes. According to Heynen, “A first formulation of this sensitivity can be found in the celebrated definition of [modernity by] Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867): ‘Modernity is the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art of which the other half is the eternal and the immutable.’” (Heynen, 1999: 12) Instead of highlighting progress (as in the programmatic view), this analysis of modernity sees modernity as a period in which tradition is discarded with ease. Yet whilst, according to Heynen (1999) the need for constant innovation and the rebellion against tradition are part of the generally accepted ingredients of the modern, Baudrillard “radicalises these elements. Modernity, according to Baurillard, establishes change and crisis as values, but these values increasingly lose their immediate relation with any progressive perspective. The result is that modern set the scene for its own downfall.” (Heynen, 1999: 12)

Both views cannot be true yet neither are both false. Western modernity is an entity which is forever darting between the two poles of programmatic and transitory. Programmatic modernity stands for a more positive way of looking at the changes which characterise modernity than the transitory view. This openness and flux is reflected in Bill Sewell’s notion that we should conceive “modernity as a continuously unfolding project, an ever-distant goal beckoning energetic minds to improve their current situations in ways best seen fit. This means, then, that modernity is not a constant.” (Sewell, 2004: 216) Modern, in the sense described, is therefore a notion which is open to interpretation, yet one where ‘moderns’ usually believe they are living in an a condition which is constantly improving. For instance, what is ‘up to date’ or a ‘new fashion’ is up to individuals and societies to decide: revivalism was both fashionable and modern in the nineteenth century, yet would not be so viewed today.

What is measured as modern and what is obsolete is measured by the mores and norms of society. Yet this flux between the two poles of a modern programme and the transitory are the two main features of modernity. In an eloquent description of this state of being, Heynen writes “Marshall Berman argues that for the individual the experience of modernity is characterised by a combination of programmatic and transitory elements, by an oscillation between the struggle for personal development and the nostalgia for what is irretrievably lost: ‘To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world – and at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are.’” (Heynen, 1999: 13-14, quoting Berman)
2. Modernisation

From a later date, 1770, modernisation, a derivative of modern, has been used to describe the activity by which modernity is reached: “The action or an act of modernizing; the state of being modernized” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). It was usually used to denote an object which had been updated to modern standards, often on historical buildings, as in: “The Marquis of Winchester’s noble house at Englefield has suffered by some late modernizations” (1770). It was not until the idea of modernity was conceptualised thoroughly that the notion of modernisation as a general process (rather than a specific process on objects or areas) was articulated. Given that modernisation theory had little prominence until the mid-twentieth century, ‘modernisation’ is a label for a process that had already happened in Europe, America and Japan. Adaptation of the word ‘modernisation’ to a concept used in a general theory means that, to a greater extent than the word modern or modernity, I will treat the idea of modernisation as an ideological construct created to place countries on a scale of development rather than an active agenda during pre-World War two industrialisation. My approach to this concept is in line with recent use of ‘modernisation’ in Japan studies where “few historians and historical political scientists of Japan consciously think about modernization theory any longer.” (Garon, 1994: 348)

Given this, ‘modernisation’ can be more usefully described as “the process of social development, the main features of which are technological advances and industrialization, urbanism and population explosions, the rise of bureaucracy and increasingly powerful national states, an enormous expansion of mass communication systems, democratization, and an expanding (capitalist) world market.” (Heynen, 1999: 9-10) Modernisation theory offers an idealised Western-centred viewpoint on how modernity was reached and what the driving forces were behind this. Again, modernisation can be seen as a project to become an improved nation or one where change and innovation is valued regardless of its trajectory.

3. Modernism

Modernism is an artistic and cultural movement with roots in the late nineteenth century. It derived as a response to the separation of the individual from previous ways of living, and from a sense of aspiration about how the arts should respond to this development: “the experience of modernity involves a rupture with tradition and has a profound impact on ways of life and daily habits. The effects of this rupture are manifold. They are reflected in modernism, the body of artistic and intellectual ideas and movements that deal with the process of modernization and with the experience of modernity.” (Heynen, 1999: 3)

This movement focused upon aspects of modernity that had salience at the time, namely, orientation toward the future and the desire for progress. Therefore, Davis writes, “modernism, as it has been defined through the twentieth century, is inherently antitraditional.” (Davis, 2006: 17) This is in part due to the central place that science attained in the societies from the mid-19th century in Europe and
America, acting as an increasingly valued critical voice that question any aspect of the status quo that had not been rationally queried. Due to this link, Modernist theorists such as Otto Wagner (1841-1914) held Enlightenment ideals as central to the fledgling Modernist movement.

From this overview it is clear that modernity is central to both the process of modernisation and the modernism movement. The attitude and ways of thinking in modernity is the causal factor behind both modernisation and modernism and, both physically and etymologically, modernity is prior. Modernity “constitutes the element that mediates between a process of socioeconomic development known as modernization and subjective responses to it in the form of modernist discourses and movements. In other words, modernity is a phenomenon with at least two different aspects: an objective aspect that is linked to socioeconomic processes, and a subjective one that is connected with personal experiences, artistic activities, or theoretical reflections.” (Heynen, 1999: 10) These twin aspects of modernity are explored in the following section on the necessary conditions for modernity to flourish.

**Necessary conditions for modernity**

This section on why the ‘modern’ occurred in Europe explores three questions: Why did the concept of ‘the modern’ need to be invented in fifteenth century Europe? What were the pre-requisites for some in the West to pursue the latest developments and create new fashions? What were the reasons for belief in modernity in Europe? The first part of the answer lies in the development of critical reason.

1. Critical reason

It is a truism that over the past 500 years technologies have been developed which have greatly altered the way of life in Europe. This technological development was the basis of the Industrial Revolution (around 1750-1850) whose pre-requisite technologies of steam and later electricity were continuously adapted to suit the needs of the owners. Whilst many of the most important technological applications were driven and propagated by economic forces, they required a way of thinking which was previously absent. I posit that the base of these technological improvements was a new method of reasoning derived from the scientific revolutions of the 16th to 18th centuries. This had a great impact on both the norms of society and the material life of citizenry to the extent that “during the Enlightenment the idea of modernity became bound up with the notion of critical reason.” (Heynen, 1999: 9) Therefore any examination of modernity must need to take a view on the role of critical reason to distinguish whether critical reason was concurrent or causing modernity.

A leading proponent of the idea that critical reason is the leading principle and factor behind the rise of modernity was Octavio Paz, who wrote that:
"Critical reason, our ruling principle, rules in a peculiar way: rather than building systems invulnerable to criticism, it acts as self-critic. It governs insofar as it unfolds and sets itself up as the object of analysis, doubt and negation. It is not a temple or a stronghold, but an open space, a public square and a road, a discussion, a method – a road continually making and unmaking itself, a method whose only principle is scrutiny of all principles.”
(Paz, 1991: 26)

Under the tenet of critical reason, all knowledge is open to reason using logic. This idea is linked strongly to the idea of the modern, with concern with the present, and with continuous innovation: continuous critique is presumed to lead to progress. This ideal has its roots in Socratic dialogue whereby a critical figure, through questioning assumptions, leads an argument towards truth. This idea was later expanded by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1931) and other nineteenth century liberals. Hegel and other proponents such as Karl Marx (1818-1883) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) all held views that history was a process of progression attained through dialectic (the art of discussing and finding the truth of opinions). In the schema of dialectical reasoning, prepositions lead to counter prepositions which eventually lead closer and closer to a version of the truth. Given that the idea of this process was dynamic modernisation itself is not a static process across time: manifestations of ‘the modern’ have changed from the 18th century, “tugging in one direction then another… - the Enlightenment, critical reason, liberalism, positivism, and Marxism.” (Paz, 1991: vi) What all expressions of modernity have is a destructive effect on how the value of the past is viewed: “What is modern breaks with the past, denies it entirely.” (Paz, 1991: 2) This is because critical reason is the thought system that characterises modernity. When applied in Western modernity, critical reason systematically questions all assumptions and ways of being.

It is in this sense that critical reason is part of the basis for what is called modernity. Given that the modern is a concept focused upon difference and improvement on previous times, the term can be contrasted in relief with the idea of progress. In common with ‘progress’, modernity has an end (truth) and means to that end (critical reason). According to Robert Alexander Nisbet (1994) ‘progress’ has been a highly influential trend of thought since as far back as Ancient Greece: this implies that the development of the notion of progress does not capture the full gamut of changes since the Scientific revolution, as its roots lie partly in Ancient Greek thought rather than that of recent times. In short, progress is not necessarily a modern concept. However, under the programmatic idea of modernity, progress and this ideal of modern are closely related. If critical reason is a cause of modernity, it is likely to have impacted upon the term progress since its advent too, and it will be worthwhile to assess to what extent ‘the modern’ and ‘progress’ are still distinctive concepts.
What is meant by progress is “first and foremost that humanity is advancing toward some goal continuously, inexorably, and necessarily.” (Nisbet, 1994: 139) An alternative definition is: “the idea of progress holds that human experience, both individual and collective, is cumulative and future-directed, with the specific objective being the ongoing improvement of the individual, the society in which the individual lives, and the world in which society must survive.” (Bowden, 2009: 50) Both the definition of progress and of programmatic modernity emphasise that progress is a collective endeavor and that it is directed towards improvement through change.

Yet the idea of the modern, when considering both its programmatic and transitory sides, does not necessarily fulfill the criteria for progress. According to Nisbet, there are five crucial premises to the idea of progress. Only three of these can be strongly associated with modernity: “conviction of the nobility, even superiority, of Western civilisation; acceptance of the worth of economic and technological growth; faith in reason and in the kind of scientific and scholarly knowledge that can come from reason alone.” (Nisbet, 1994: 317) Of the two other premises, one may be associated with modernity but is not a necessary condition (“belief in the intrinsic importance, the ineffaceable worth of life on this earth”) whilst the other actively works against modernity (“belief in the value of the past”), particularly in modernity’s transitory guise. Modernity, as articulated by Paz, is a state which is not necessarily progressive (although the effects are usually labeled as ‘progress’) and due to the impulse to constantly innovate, may undermine progress made in the past.

‘Progress’ is mainly distinguished from modern in that it attempts to build upon the past, not to seek to challenge all assumptions if these have been shown to be valuable. This being so, the idea of modernity in Europe is irreversibly tied to critical reason in a manner that progress is not. Before the establishment of critical reason as a primary value of the Enlightenment in the mid-18th century, what was modern referred to the current times; modern “was not critical nor did it imply the negation of tradition. On the contrary, it affirmed its continuity. [Baltazer] Gracian [1601-1658] says the Moderns are more witty than the Ancients – not that they are different.” (Paz, 1991: 2-3) What changed with the rise of the modern was that the current time was conceived as a period not continuous with the past but a new and different era: “our modernity… is a rejection, a criticism of the immediate past, an interruption of continuity.” (Paz, 1991: 3) This separation from the past was not a constant factor before 18th century Europe: “Traditionalist peoples live immersed in their past without questioning it. Unaware of their traditions they live with and in them.” (Paz, 1991: 8-9) The schism of time, between modernity and tradition, was only found in Western society where critical reason became the ruling principle. (Paz, 1991: 24-26)
What this schism implies is that a belief in critical reason is a belief in the linearity of time. With continuous development and edging towards truth, there is a new way of thinking about time: “The modern age rejects cyclical time in the same trenchant way Augustine did: things happen only once, they are unrepeatable.” (Paz, 1991: 28) By focusing on what will be “modern man is pushed toward the future with the same violence as the Christian was pushed toward heaven or hell.” (Paz, 1991: 30) The rigour of critical reasoning has potentially huge consequences on the nature of modernity and can push society towards the transitory:

“Critical reason, by its very rigor, accentuates temporality. Nothing is permanent; reason becomes identified with change and otherness. We are ruled not by identity, with its enormous and monotonous tautologies, but by otherness and contradiction, the dizzying manifestations of criticism. In the past the goal of criticism was truth; in the modern age truth is criticism. Not an eternal truth, but the truth of change.” (Paz. 1991: 26)

The incessant questioning of the way things are currently done leads to continuous technological innovations and new fashions. This is because constant improvement requires the attitude of keeping up with modern trends. Constant questioning, creating new trends and innovations have all led modernity to be described as a condition of ‘homelessness’. (Heynen, 1999: 14) Bringing the consequences of modernity and critical reasoning to an individual level, Heynen writes that:

“Modernity frees people from the limitations imposed on them by their family or clan or by their village community, offering them unheard-of options and often material improvements as well; there is, however, a price to pay. The renunciation of the traditional framework of reference for their lives means a loss of certainties and of meaning. For many people it is far from easy to learn to live with this.” (Heynen, 1999: 15)

These material developments and social issues could only have arisen after large scale questioning of shared assumptions (that are usually called traditions). Centuries of questioning assumptions in science and engineering, as well as in society, politics, religion and economics, has produced a society at once more convenient and rich, as well as breaking down common beliefs such as Christianity. Modern people are less close to one another, more emotionally dissonant and more bereft of socially shared meaning. These outcomes account for modernity being between the programmatic and the transient. Modernity brings with it critique and judgment, but this results in a loss of identity, especially of collective identities. Traditions lose authority when questioned, and are looked down upon for not being modern. Faith in critical reason allows every foundation to be challenged.
Modernity also creates manifold opportunities for the agents of change. The first variable that explains the path that architecture took in the modern age is growth of a certain type of rationality among both architects and clients in authority. This increasing rationality was a logical development of the understanding that modernity was driven in Europe by the growth of technological sophistication and rational planning in its buildings. In architecture in Europe and America, ‘Reason’ was first used implicitly in planning and building technologies and later made a virtue: by the end of the 19th century there were a growing number of architects who set a value on reason above all other values.

One exponent of rational architecture who was contemporaneous with the period of study was Otto Wagner. As he was a practitioner of Art Nouveau, the roots of modernism can be seen in his writings, but he was also a part of a longer movement for rationality in architecture. In his book “Modern Architecture” (1902) he directly linked ‘modern’ architecture with reason: “This new style, the modern, in order to represent us and our time, must clearly express a distinct change from previous feeling, an almost complete decline of the romantic, and an almost all-encompassing appearance of reason in all our works.” (Wagner, 1988[1902]: 79) Both Art Nouveau and Modernism saw the influence of the triumph of reason, declared in the 18th century, impact explicitly upon architectural forms, functions and spaces. For Wagner the ideal impact of reason on architecture was that:

“All modern creations must correspond to the new materials and demands of the present if they are to suit modern man; they must illustrate our own better, democratic, self-confident, ideal nature and take into account man's colossal technical and scientific achievements, as well as his thoroughly practical tendency – that is surely self-evident!” (Wagner, 1988[1902]: 78)

Rationality for Wagner meant that architecture should change, be separated from architecture of the past and fulfill the promise of man. In promising this, Wagner opened a schism within modern architecture,34 fulfilling Paz’s model of the consequences of critical reason. Wagner (as was later common with modernist architects such as Le Corbusier (Heynen, 1999: 13)) also clearly belonged to what Heynen describes as the programmatic notion of modernity, modernity for a better future. (Heynen, 1999: 10)

Summarising the above, there are four categories of effects of using critical reason in modernity, which have affected society from artists to accountants: separation from unreasoned systems; placing value

---

34 Conforming to Paz's notion of modernity, Wagner himself fermented a schism in the Viennese Academy and bitter opposition to his own designs, eventually dying in virtual isolation. (Wagner, 1988[1902]: 185)
upon change; the creation of new oppositions and schisms, and; unending movement often described as progress.

2. Reification of progress through domination

Whilst critical reason may be a constituent part in modernity, it is not an unbiased process. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the modern became a normative judgment of both time and belonging when it was adapted to mean up-to-date. This had a significant consequence for how non-European places were categorised by Europeans. The idea of modernity as a judgment of development gained traction when European countries began coming into contact with hunter-gatherers in the Americas: “The question was first raised when in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries Westerners began to come in contact with peoples such as the aborigines of the Americas. How do we best explain their differentness from us; it was asked increasingly but not only the explorers themselves, but the people back home to whom the explorers reported their findings.” (Nisbet, 1994: xii) The answer to this question “rose right out of the idea of progress and its premise of uniform development. The Indians of the Western Hemisphere and other aborigines on the continents of the world could be seen as “contemporary ancestors,” that is, as peoples still in the early stages of cultural development in which Western society once existed, but had long since progressed beyond.” (Nisbet, 1994: xiv) The explorers and intellectuals in the West began to “classify them, arrange them in a progressive series all the way from Tierra del Fuegians (then thought to be the most primitive of all extant people) to the inhabitants of London, Paris, and all the other capitals of the West.” (Nisbet, 1994: xiv) Modernity (a self-description of European countries) was located at the top of a framework of universal human development.  

Yet whilst hunter-gatherers were easily categorised, more ‘advanced’ countries were not: a central challenge for the Enlightenment in Europe in the eighteenth century was the question of how to classify ‘the other’. Efforts were made by the Europeans to reach general assessments of Islamic, Indian, and Chinese thought. But as so often in cases of attempts at cross-cultural evaluation, the result was curiously self-centred and limited. Western philosophers strove valiantly to grasp the fundamentals of classical Chinese philosophy but ended up, in the main, merely mirroring their own prior obsessions.” (Israel, 2006: 640) For instance, pointing to the priorities of intellectuals engaged in the rational project of the Enlightenment, what appealed most to one 18th century Enlightenment thinker, Bruzen de La Martiniere (1683-1746) in the context of the venal office system in France was that “Confucius’ China was a meritocracy rather than a land governed by autocracy or nobility.” (Israel, 2006: 642) This shows

---

35 This perspective is more understandable when adopting a historical perspective: it is only in the last couple of decades that it has become clear through DNA analysis that we are all the same species with the same potential (see Cavalli-Sforza’s The History and Geography of Human Genes (1994) for more details). Differences of culture and language were very alienating and it was relatively easy to believe that there could be primitive human beings.
they merely picked on the aspects they wished to see and could not analyse the Chinese deeply. This was somewhat inevitable given that European intellectuals had enormous physical and linguistic and very few Europeans went to China or had any opportunity to learn the language.

Attempts to retain the complexity of other states and peoples in the face of vastly different structures of understanding were ultimately rendered moot after the advent of high imperialism, particularly after the British Empire incorporated India in the early 19th century, as one of the great centres of ‘civilisation’. Using the model of universal human development, the relationship between coloniser and colonised quickly became that of civilised and semi-civilised, developed and undeveloped, modern and pre-modern. This process of European colonisation reified Europe’s view of itself as the centre of civilisation and Enlightenment, a viewpoint first propagated in the fifteenth century.

These hierarchies of development were strongly reflected in various theorists, most explicitly in the work of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and his theory of social evolution. As with the theory of universal human development, “of crucial importance to Spencer’s theory of social evolution was his notion of primitive humans. The ‘primitive’ was conceptualised as the point of departure for social evolution, the meeting point of animality and humanity, with the presumed attributes of the former usually predominating although these were wedded to distinctly human vices such as mendacity and lust.” (Hawkins, 1997: 98) The communal living of these primitives was a great distance from the increasingly individualised world of modernity. Spencer needed “to portray primitives as immoral, irrational and aggressive in order to show how individuality, freedom and morality emerged, during the process of evolution through a logic of differentiation, specialization and individuation. It enabled him to construct an evolutionary continuum and, by means of his recapitulation perspective, to substitute a number of contemporary social categories for those at the lowest point on the continuum.” (Hawkins, 1997: 98)

The reason behind the European application of the idea of modernity to other countries in such a hierarchical fashion can be seen as due to the practice of colonialism. Colonialism displayed the progress of Europe starkly and cemented Eurocentricism in both European and non-European worldviews. That modernity is a Western centric concept is clear in the dating for stages of modernity. These are often said (for example Berman, 1983) to be Early modernity: 1500–1789 (or 1453–1789 in traditional historiography), Classical modernity: 1789–1900 or 1789–1914 in Hobsbawm's scheme and Late modernity: 1900–1989 or 1914–present in Hobsbawm's scheme. These dates correspond exclusively to events in the West: 1453, the fall of Constantinople (and the subsequent beginning of the Renaissance); 1789: the French Revolution; 1900: the end of the 19th century in the Julian calendar; and 1914: the start of the First World War in Europe. This schema separates events in the West from the outside world, splitting modernity into a phenomenon not only originating in the West but occurring
in the West also. The Eurocentric version of modernity helps to explain why the extended idea of modern (or modernisation) in the colonial academic field is so often confused with Westernisation. Therefore throughout this thesis what I describe as ‘modern architecture’ is often that which is in ‘Western style’.

As I have explored in this section, “modernity is the self-recognition of Europe as seen within history, that regarding of itself as distinct from the feudalism which Europe gained in the process of liberating itself from the feudal.” (Yoshimi, 2005: 54) Modernity was seen as a time when critical reason allowed for continuous change, leading to the permanent development of technology and generation of new fashions, all of which undermined traditional assumptions. This was a social process unique to Europe and then followed in America, displayed in fig. 1.2 above. Yet without imperialist interactions with non-Europeans, the idea of modernity would have been very different. The set of attitudes which characterise modernity and the set of necessary activities which characterise modernisation were formed, solidified and theorised due to colonial activities: there would be no necessity for a theory of modernisation unless modernity was seen as a model for exporting. Yet modernisation has often been transplanted as a copy of the results of this process (high technology, bureaucratisation, science and industry) rather than the critical rationalism and continuous innovation which characterises the modern. Therefore whilst modernity has always been seen as peculiar to Europe it became most powerful when applied to non-European countries, where Europe was the pinnacle of the modern. The modern became an idea both influential and problematic due to the belief that modernity was possible.
throughout the world. As will be shown in the following section the modern has been interpreted outside Europe in a way which does not see critical reason as the central requirement. Rather the results of the process (such as a strong military, democracy and industry) were seen as the main conditions.

1.3 Meiji Japan’s dual modernity

Modernity as understood in the previous section started to be implanted within Japanese society from the opening of the country in 1853 with the arrival of Commodore Perry. From this point the concept of the modern gradually became a symbol of the impetus for drastic change. At this time Japan was undergoing rapid changes: “the pace of development was extraordinarily quickened; the Emperor was restored to power, a modern state was established, and the Japanese were set on the path of progress.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 17) The social and historical development will be elaborated in Chapter 2 whilst this section analyses the concept of the modern for the Japanese, and frames how the modern has been viewed, adapted and utilised by Japan since the 19th century.

Introducing Japanese modernity

First, ‘modern’ was not the only English word imported into the Japanese vocabulary after the contact established with Seiyō after the mid-19th century. It has been vehemently argued that “the concepts that defined the content of westernisation did not translate well: they did not have a natural fit with existing Japanese concepts… [The adoption of a Western political discourse] required the invention of a new terminology with which to engage in the new political discourse.” (Howland, 2002: 2) The word ‘modern’ was introduced as part of whole lexicon of new foreign words and this was a symptom of wider cultural change in Japan at that time.

It is worth a brief exposition of this process of conceptual importation as “the semantic perspective on culture is something that cultural analysis can ill afford to ignore.” (Wierzbicka, 1997: 1) First the fact that there was no word for modern in Japanese before Euro-American contact may lead to an argument that even if there was no specific vocabulary, the Japanese still had the concept of ‘modern’. This is an argument long disputed in linguistic circles; Anna Wierzbicka writes that:

To assume that people in all cultures have the concept of ‘sadness’ even if they have no word for it is like assuming that people in all cultures have a concept of ‘marmalade’ and moreover, that this concept is somehow more relevant to them than the concept of ‘plum jam’, even if they happen to have a word for the latter but not the former. (Wierzbicka, 1997: 9)
Accepting Wierzbicka’s suggestion, the approach of this enquiry is that if there was no word for ‘modern’ prior to 1853, then modernisation was not a process that was occurring before European and American contact (as modernisation theorists such as Edwin O. Reischauer (1965) suggest). Instead the idea arrived along with connotations of the superiority of Seiyō in the mid-19th century from Japan’s perspective, giving the idea a premise of a pre-existing cultural pecking order. This hierarchical understanding of the term was revealed when I discussed the English modern meaning of new fashion first used in 1756. Cultural analysis is crucial to understand the idea of modern in a theoretical perspective.

My basic claim is that the modernisation of Japan was due to culture change rather than deriving from the culture of Japan. In the Ancient Chinese philosophy of time “contrary elements are not removed but reconciled and harmonized” (Paz, 1991: 24) an approach also encapsulated in customary Japanese hōgaku (Jap. 方角, lit. auspicious/inauspicious directions). The culture of Meiji Japan was manipulated purposefully in order to become what contemporaneous Europeans believed to be modern. This view is based on a notion of culture that is malleable, that is, able to be manipulated. Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of culture holds that “there are things which may be changed by people, made different from what they are. They are to be treated differently from other things, which stay beyond human power. The first we call culture, the second nature. If, therefore, we think of something as being a matter of culture, rather than nature, what we imply is that the thing in question is manipulable, and that there is a desirable, ‘proper’ end-state for such a manipulation.” (Bauman, 1989: 142-143) The modernisation of Japan in the 19th century should be seen as a massive culture change initiative conducted by the Japanese (particularly Japanese authorities) but not in circumstances that they chose.

Japanese ‘modernity’ must be framed in its original context to understand it accurately. Although the Japanese were changing the culture of Japan, they were influenced strongly by Seiyō. The role of Europe and America in this process has often been underestimated. Japan was characterised by foreign visitors as a nation that copied others, from the 6th century influence of Tang China to its modernisation in the Meiji era. Japan was described as a “country without originality.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175) It was seen as a serial copier since first contact with China: Algernon Freeman-Mitford (1837-1916), the British diplomat to Meiji Japan “defined Japan as a ‘borrower’ from other civilisations since the very beginning of history. Mitford thought it would be easy for a borrower to cast away old traditions without suffering loss of pride and he wrote: ‘It must be remembered that Japan has never originated anything.’” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175) This explanation was highly influential in Europe and

---

36 Bauman is one of the world’s most eminent social theorists, who has written on how modernity created the conditions for the Holocaust, ethics in postmodernity, consumerism, and sociology more broadly.

59
America for decades and was preferred to acknowledging the existence of massive imbalances of power between Japan and the West. Instead of a small push given by European and American diplomats (the preferred explanation for Japan’s modernisation), the threat of colonisation was the main causal factor in Japan’s cultural changes of that time, a threat which pushed Japan towards a modernity whose existence was inconceivable to them prior to the mid-19th century and the coming of Perry in 1853, a topic expanded upon in the following Chapter.

The formation of a power relation between Japan and Seiyō had been brewing since 16th century when the Japanese started to take an interest in ‘Western Learning’, which they “eagerly adopted because of its ‘extreme usefulness.’” (Kōsaka, 1958: 9) Rather than being forced upon Japan, innovations were at first used where needed and had little effect on the general culture of Japan. This ‘Western Learning’ became particularly useful by the 1830s when Japan experienced famine and bad crop conditions, for an understanding of socio-economic issues pushed the popularity of ‘Western Learning’. By the 1850s, there emerged a critical spirit, and a spirit of practicality was awakened among the intelligentsia. These intelligentsia had important roles of forming ‘modern’ Japan as “they were precursors of the opening Japan, the modernization of Japan”. (Kōsaka, 1958: 2) According to KŌSAKA Masaaki, a self-conscious intelligentsia did not exist in Japan till 1873, yet I would like to emphasise that this ‘self-conscious intelligentsia’ had adopted Seiyō-mind (to the extent that they understood ‘the West’) to a far greater degree than their predecessors. In 1873 the Meirokusha38 was formed. Its main intention was to ‘promote civilisation and enlightenment’, and to introduce Seiyō ethics and the elements of Seiyō civilisation to Japan (the co-founder and Minister of Education, MORI Arinori (Jap. 森有礼, 1847-1889), even proposed to change the language of Japan from Japanese to English in 1872. (Seargeant, 2011: 4) Around these times, in crucial circles, a new political vocabulary was adopted: all ideas translated from English.

For Japan, reaching the same technological and economic standards as Seiyō was a key component of their modernisation. By 1868 the Japanese elites were fully committed to this path: “Confronted by an apparently superior ‘civilization’ represented by the states of Europe, the Japanese confronted tasks of achieving modernity - making themselves into a "nation" and a "state" – following the opening of their country.” (Sukehiro, 1989: 432) Upon opening the country, the government wished to institute policies to quickly reach what they perceived as the next stage of development. “To create a ‘great civilization’ meant educating "high and low alike," and it had to be done quickly so that “Japan could take its rightful

37 ‘Western Learning’ briefly became a crime during the “Trouble of Barbarian sympathizers” which started in 1839 in the Edo period (1603-1868). (Kōsaka, 1958: 7)

38 After six years of Meiji revolution, Meirokusha (明六社) was formed from the intellectuals who returned from the Iwakura mission (1871), which is explored in Section 2.1.
place among the nations of the world" in wealth and power." (Sukeyho, 1989: 469) The right to be named ‘civilised’ was a key motivating factor to the Meiji elites: “Western models had a measure of propaganda and diplomatic value, insofar as their adoption might persuade foreigners of Japan's right to the label ‘civilized,' and hence to their respect.” (Crawcour, 1989: 619) Therefore Japanese modernity should be seen as a government and elite level *initiative* towards great power status, and this was composed of several key terms adopted from English: civilisation, enlightenment, progress and ‘the modern’. I will discuss how the words were defined in the Japanese language through examining a selection of ten English-Japanese dictionaries by a mix of Japanese and British authors published between 1862 and 1924.

**Defining modernity in Japanese**

1. Civilisation

The first definition of civilisation in Japanese in 1862 was “behaviour made proper” (Jap. 行儀正シ). (Hori, 1862: 129) The presence of this definition implies that civilisation was an essentially contested concept at this time, and one which was important to a sufficient number of people. In these ten dictionaries, one finds seven distinctive definitions of civilisation in Japanese. Chronologically these definitions of civilisation were: *behavioural standard*; *openness*; *change/development*; *socio-political betterment*; *to teach*; *civilise away*; and *culture*. These are summarised in the table below. It is important to note that none of the definitions referred to *Seiyō* or to ‘Westernisation’ since among the ruling class of Japan, even the Shogunate by the late 1860s, the attitude of ‘Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians’ (Jap. 尊王攘夷) remained a very strong motive for the Meiji Restoration in the first place. (Swale, 2009: 175) In Japan’s own terms ‘civilisation’ did not simply mean Westernisation, and given that the roots of the movement lay in the threat of colonisation, civilisation could never have this simple equation. Moreover, there emerged a new slogan: ‘Revere the Emperor, open the country’ which signalled a complete change in the Japanese elites’ opinion.

---


40 The first English-Japanese dictionary was created by FUKUZAWA Yukichi in 1860 which only included common nouns and so was not included in the analysis.

41 A comprehensive exposition of all the definitions of the word civilisation, progress and modern from ten English-Japanese Dictionaries can be found in Appendix II.

42 This social movement has its origins in China derived from Neo-Confucianism and became a political slogan in the 1850s and 1860s Bakumatsu (幕末, late Edo period).
Evidently direct Westernisation was an unappealing option for Japanese elites, who preferred to use other terms to describe the process. In popular debate over the issue of ‘modernisation’ after the Second World War, the foregoing attitude was clearly shown in Kōsaka’s *Japanese though in the Meiji Era* in 1958. He wrote: “The new Japan was not simply a copy of modern Europe. While the pursuit of new ideas was present in this period, there was also present the attempt to create a distinctive culture.” (Kōsaka, 1958: iii)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition type</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural standard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change/development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1873, 1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-political betterment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1876, 1892, 1915, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To teach</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1903, 1915, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilize away</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2. Categories of definition of civilisation in Japanese, 1862-1924. Adapted from Hori, 1862; Hepburn, 1867; Hepburn, 1873; Satow, 1876; Hoffmann, 1892; Hepburn, 1903; Maruya, 1914; Inouye, 1915; Satow, 1919; and Takehara, 1924.

The most important conception of civilisation during this period was first seen in the 1876 dictionary, when the word *bunmei* (Jap. 文明) was used to describe civilised behaviour as an aim for the nation to adopt. This conception was popularised by FUKUZAWA Yukichi who used the word in two particular ways. First it was seen as a stage of history that Fukuzawa wished Japan to enter: political betterment. Prior to the Meiji Restoration Fukuzawa wrote “I busied myself with writing and translation work on the chance of being able to lead the Japanese into civilization.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 72) For a country to be led into civilisation pre-supposes the existence of a state of development beyond which Japan stood at that time.

Second, civilisation was seen by Fukuzawa as a better way of being/behaving: social betterment. In his influential publication of *An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation* (Jap. 文明論之概略, fig. 1.3) of 1875 Fukuzawa wrote “civilization comforts man physically and elevates him spiritually... civilization advances the well-being and dignity of man, since man acquires these benefits through knowledge and virtue. Civilization can be defined as that which advances man’s knowledge and virtue.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 73) This was understandable that civilisation was first defined as ‘behaviour made proper’ when it was adopted from English word in 1862. This definition is one of hope and one which fits within other definitions of civilisation as a process of improvement. Unlike definitions of modernity, the idea of civilisation has a moral dimension; rather than just being a state of improved knowledge, it is also one of improved virtue. This links the idea of civilisation to that of civility, commonly referred to in English-Japanese dictionaries.
In government slogans the word *bunmei*, or civilisation, was usually accompanied by *kaika* (Jap. 開化), or enlightenment, used in reference to the 18th century movement towards a rational society rather than the indigenous Buddhist belief. Alistair D. Swale notes that the usage of *kaika* (enlightenment) in this context was often extremely vague and linked to the general movement to improve the nation:

“It should be acknowledged that conceptions of enlightenment are extremely broad-ranging and hard to pin down. Enlightenment is a word that has come down to us suffering from ravages of extraordinary over-use and acquiring some less than helpful nuances along the way. Much like the word ‘modern’, which merely denotes that some thing is contemporary or of the current mode, it came to function, for the most part, as a de facto synonym for ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. Enlightenment has connotations of moral or intellectual excellence, it indicates a higher or better form of consciousness, however it has evolved with a decreasing sense of what is practically excellent or what makes one form of consciousness ‘higher’ than another.” (Swale, 1998: 9)

The phrase ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ was related less to the pursuit of critical reason in society, as it had not arisen through social forces, and was seen more as a call to educate the Japanese people to raise the country’s stage of development. These two words in Japanese both meaning ‘civilisation’, and *kaika* (enlightenment) were even used before *bunmei* (civilisation): in 1903 the word *kaika* (enlightenment) meant ‘civilization, development’, whilst *kaika sura* (Jap. 開化する, enlighten) as verb meant ‘to be reformed, to become civilized’. In an earlier period (1873) the definition of *kaika suru*
(enlighten) was even more starkly related to change: ‘to open and change, to be reformed, to become civilized’. Given that no contemporaneous dictionaries contained the idea of modernising, it appears that in the political context of late 19th century Japan as defined after the Second World War, the idea of civilising was one which was important.

A Kanji character analysis of the Japanese word further profoundly demonstrates the implication of ‘civilisation and enlightenment (Jap. 文明開化, bunka kaika). Civilisation was used as a metaphor for ‘bright culture’ and enlightenment was a metaphor for ‘change and open’:

- **Bun** (Jap. 文): a man with a painted or tattooed chest which meant ‘literature, culture, writing and language’.
- **Mei** (Jap. 明) was composed with 日 (sun/window) and 月 (moon): a metaphor for the moon shining through a window which meant ‘bright, light and brilliant’.
- **Kai** (Jap. 開) was composed with 門 (door) and 手 (hands): a metaphor for a pair of hands opening a door. The idea of opening had salience due to the historical context of Japan, for during the Tokugawa Shogunate Japan had forbidden any Westerners to enter Japan until the treaties of 1854. Moving away from this closure to the outside world required civilising through opening Japan to Western influence. Such openness was a key component of early civilising efforts, as reflected in this meaning, and in contrast to definitions of civilisation in English.
- **Ka** (Jap. 化) was composed with 人 (person) and 匠 (spoon/knife): a metaphor for a man with new tool which meant ‘change, convert and reform’.

Taken together, ‘bunmei kaika’ in Japanese had a similar meaning to ‘modernisation’ in the English, programmatic sense: a positive phrase used to describe an improving culture, becoming open to change. Taking it as a national slogan, the Meiji authorities used the term to support their reforms in a positive way, against popular movements counter to adopting the ways of Seiyō.

Civilisation was also used in Japanese in four ways uncommon to English. The first unusual usage was as a behavioural standard (‘behaviour made proper’), the remains of the Confucian concept, second to teach assuming a passive acceptance, third as openness which fits with enlightenment, and fourth to civilise away. For the final definition is important to understand the contours of Japanese modernity and how the idea of civilisation developed in the late Meiji period:
• **Civilise away (Jap. 脱する):** Again unlike the English definition, civilisation could be seen as to civilise away or reject savage or barbarous customs (1915). Whilst by the turn of the 20th century the word 'modern' in English took upon the concept of fighting against tradition, in Japanese this concept was added to the idea of civilisation.

Civilisation in the Meiji period was defined primarily in terms of the change and process of reform that was being undertaken. This is reflected in the main idea of *bunmei* as well as the notions of civilisation as change/development, as in to open and change, and also to civilise away bad customs. At the same time, civilisation was seen as a standard to be reached, giving it a similar function to the notion of modernity in English.

2. Progress

Civilisation was not the only phrase that constituted the idea of modernity in the Meiji period. Take for instance the sentence from the 1924 dictionary “The Turks have contributed in no way to the progress of civilization” (Jap. 土耳其人は文明の進歩に何等貢献せしこごなし). This emphasises the notion of progress which had great popularity in Meiji Japan, and was tied strongly to the idea of civilisation and enlightenment. Fukuzawa wrote in *Encouragement of learning* (Jap. 學問のすゝめ) in 1872 that “if we seek the source of all this prosperity, we find that it is the blossom on the branches of a tree, whose trunk is learning… Devotion to learning may look a diversion, but it is the only way to arrive at progress.” (Fukuzawa, 1872, quoted in Takeuchi, 1987: 7) This relates to the idea of progress in knowledge and progress in civilisation; increasing the sum of knowledge will lead to progress and to becoming more like *Seiyō* civilisation.

The way that progress was actually defined was the most simple of all the definitions looked at in this section. Whilst the earliest English-Japanese dictionary defines progress as both “to improve and to make quicker” (1862), it is not a conception followed through in any other dictionary. Typically, progress was defined as ‘to advance; to go forward’ (1867). Later it was also seen as to improve (1873) and to develop (1919) yet these definitions are implied in the idea of advancing which are summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition type</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance/improve</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make quicker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be promoted</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3. Categories of definition of progress in Japanese, 1862-1924. Adapted from Hori, 1862; Hepburn, 1867; Hepburn, 1873; Satow, 1876; Hoffmann, 1892; Hepburn, 1903; Maruya, 1914; Inouye, 1915; Satow, 1919; and Takehara, 1924.
Yet, as will be seen in Meiji intellectuals’ attitudes toward modernity in Section 2.3, progress was seen in terms of social evolution in the main (Swale, 2008: 97) and this is reflected in the more detailed definitions. Ernest Mason Satow’s (1843-1929) dictionary of 1876 saw progress being used in Japanese to mean 1) progress in knowledge (Jap. 進); 2) progress in skill (Jap. 手上がり, lit. to ‘hand up’); and 3) progress in civilisation (Jap. 進歩, lit. to ‘step forward’). The Kanji character progress (Jap. 進) was composed of 行 (walking) and 隹 (a short-tailed bird) metaphor as walking like bird which meant advance, make progress and enter. The idea of an entity stepping forward in civilisation terms is not a common notion in English, yet it reflects the sense that Japan had of itself in the Meiji period, moving towards counting itself as a civilised country.

3. Modern
The English idea of modernity was either translated rather inaccurately into Japanese as ‘Civilisation’ or ignored until the 20th century as the logic of creating modernity through progressing towards civilisation was not a common notion in Meiji Japan. Modernisation was understood to be progress towards civilisation rather than creating modernity. This is evidenced by the fact that the idea of the modern did not match the English definition until after the death of the emperor Meiji in 1912.

I have categorised the definitions of modern from the mid-1800s to 1924. These categories were generated by looking for patterns and comparing these to the definitions of modern in English. The four categories that definitions of ‘modern’ in Japanese fall under are: present period; new fashion; up to date; and new thinking as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition type</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present period</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1903, 1914, 1915, 1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fashion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1867, 1915, 1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1915, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New thinking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1915, 1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4. Categories of definition of modern in Japanese, 1862-1924. Adapted from Hori, 1862; Hepburn, 1867; Hepburn, 1873; Satow, 1876; Hoffmann, 1892; Hepburn, 1903; Maruya, 1914; Inouye, 1915; Satow, 1919; and Takehara, 1924.

The first definition, present period, was found in all but one dictionary and was overwhelmingly the main definition of the idea of modern until 1915 which is just after the Meiji period. Although a simple idea, the idea of modern was not merely the present, but a period of time as distinguished from previous periods. There was not a singular item of vocabulary which meant the ‘present period’ but several words which came in and out of use: chronologically, these were ima (Jap. 今, lit. now), kinsei (Jap. 近
By 1915, these words were beginning to be redeployed in a new way: to describe the progression of history since the Edo period. This progression follows the Euro-American historical categories of savagery followed by medieval, then kinsei (Jap. 近世, early modern) kindai (Jap. 近代, modern) and finally gendai (Jap. 現代, contemporary). This corresponds to Kōsaka’s summary of perceived stages of development in the Meiji period. Expressed in the Meiji lexicon the stages were: “From savagery or nomadic hunting to early agriculture was one stage; barbarism was mainly an agricultural feudal state, civilization was the progressive, scientific stage of modern society.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 73) Whichever terms were used, after the changes of the Meiji period, the stages of history were described in the same hierarchical manner as in Europe and America, including the breakdown of stages of modernity. This categorisation became even more embedded after World War Two when Japanese historians deemed that it was necessary for the epochs of world history to be unified, so that Japanese modernity was seen as the same period as for the rest of the civilised world. (Minshu Shugi Kagakusha Kyōkai, 1949: 5) This created clear boundaries of progression in history where the modern became synonymous with civilisation: before ‘civilisation’ was ‘barbarism’ whilst before ‘modern’ was ‘pre-modern’.

Modern also came to be employed to describe the up to date, new fashions and new thinking yet this did not occur until 53 years after the first dictionary studied here (1862). In 1915 all these definitions were used in INOUYE Jukichi’s English-Japanese dictionary: the definition of ‘modern’ began to approximate the same meanings as could be found in contemporaneous English dictionaries. It was used especially to refer to people as moderns, those who follow the latest fashions and the newest thinking. After 1915, modern as a description of innovation/followers of innovation became the most common definition. It is interesting to note that before 1924, there was not yet any definition of modern/modernism which included a notable anti-tradition slant, indicating that modernity in Japan was at first a matter of changing appearances rather than private customs, hinting at public/private dichotomy which developed during the Meiji period.

A Japanese idea of modernity was not fully articulated until 1915 when it reflected the period of confidence in Japan and a crisis over what Japan stood for. After the early Meiji period when ‘civilisers’ such as Fukuzawa and Mori were pre-eminent, by the 1920s Japanese theorists started looking introspectively at the Meiji ‘progress’ and re-defined this progress by applying the idea of modernity.
The 1910s and 1920s “saw the debate on ‘overcoming modernity’ (kindai no chōkoku) [Jap. 近代の超克] which questioned Occidental-style modernization and searched for an alternative indigenous approach.” (Kikuchi, 2004: 23) This movement cumulated in the ‘Overcoming Modernity Conference’ of 1942. The underlying assumption throughout the symposium “was that modernity was a European phenomenon and that modernity in Japan was the influence of Western European civilization.” (Minamoto, 1995: 207) SUZUKI Shigetaka opened the conference with a speech which questioned the fundamental assumption of modernity: the rejection of the past:

“The Renaissance was basically something born out of the Middle Ages in the sense that it was to reverse what the medieval had done. And here we come to a basic question. Apart from the fact of whether the beginnings of modernity can be traced objectively to the Middle Ages, I think there is something to the view that subjectively speaking, the modern individual began from the rejection of the Middle Ages. This is the contradiction of the modern age. Do we not need to overcome this contradiction? If there is something wrong with the spirit that rejected the Middle Ages, perhaps reflection on what we owe the Middle Ages…is one way to overcome modernity.” (SUZUKI Shigetaka, quoted in Minamoto, 1995: 210; emphasis in original)

Suzuki’s quote demonstrates an understanding of kindai as a phase which is defined by splits and schisms from the past, as containing deep contradictions, but also as something which may potentially be overcome through valuing and appreciating the past. Even before the 1940s, the polarity between seeing modernity as positive or negative had become firmly established. Yet before this time the Meiji government and Fukuzawa had a programmatic view of the modernity (seen as progress towards becoming civilised) but critics saw the modern as corrosive toward Japanese identity, and something to be overcome. This gave the modernisation process a specific understanding which is distinguished from the English definition: “encouraged by revisionist Occidental ideas, [Japanese intellectuals] searched for an alternative Japanese-style modernisation with its own national cultural identity.” (Kikuchi, 2004: 23) This stage would repay further research.

Whilst the Meiji period fulfilled many of the criteria created for the purposes of modernisation theory, such as democracy, industrialisation, higher education, et cetera, the Japanese of the Meiji period did not themselves understand the process of national ‘improvement’ (in which they were engaged) in terms of the modern. Instead, until 1915 at least, ideas of civilisation, enlightenment and progress were the terms in which the European notion of modernity was expressed.
Distinguishing Japanese from Euro-American modernity
During the Meiji period ‘modern’ in Japanese was seen as the present period. The idea of modernity in Meiji Japan then was a temporal period; the modern distinguished the past from the present. Considering the usage of the word during the Meiji period, there was no clear character to the idea of modernity, and, in particular, the word modern in Japanese was not implicitly linked to the change and transience that occurred in the Meiji period.

However, change was a theme which imbued the Meiji era, and this was described in the concepts progress and civilisation. Progress was seen as a characteristic of civilisation. Yet civilisation itself was also seen as a process, unlike in Europe and America. To civilise could be used as a verb, since civilisation in Japanese was something to aspire to. The idea of civilisation as socio-political betterment implies that the Japanese may have seen improvement as a key part of being civilised. This fits well with the idea of modernity in English as a period of change. Yet the character of this change was initially very different and implied opening to Seiyō rather than opening to reason.

The idea of ‘civilisation’ gave a more direct idea of the cultural hierarchies of the late 19th century, and implies that the Japanese felt lower and needed to join the modern period, rather than that they considered themselves already there. Literary works of the period reveal the inferiority that the Japanese felt, and it is even clearer in the works of architecture produced in this period, which will be examined from Section 3.1 onwards.

In emphasising social and political development (rather than the continuous production of innovations) the Japanese idea of what it meant to join modernity was one in which the state played a central part. Enlightenment and progress needed to be understood by the government first and then to be pursued systematically by the state in order to reach civilisation. This meant that the Japanese notion of civilisation had much less emphasis on the role of the individual than in the West: nations needed to become civilised first, as opposed to individuals needing to become rational and innovative.

This can be seen in the political debates of the time and in the way these ideas were used in discussions. For example the word liberty was used in a suspicious manner in Japan: although the concept was firmly established by 1875, liberty was not seen as a wholly positive tendency due to the strong Japanese norms of loyalty, order and duty to others. Rather, liberty was seen more as “a means to civilization than as a necessary right of the individual.” (Howland, 2002: 97) Even Fukuzawa and NAKAMURA Kei’u (Jap. 中村正直, 1832-1891), both proponents of individual autonomy, “both recast
the independence of the individual as bounded autonomy by linking him to family and others through
duty and love.” (Howland, 2002: 107)

In the previous section it was argued that one of the necessary conditions of modernity in the West was
the critical reasoning of individuals who drove forward the enlightenment and the technologies of the
industrial revolution. Howland concludes that for the Meiji Japanese, liberty was not causally linked to
the creation of political institutions but was instead the product of intellectual and political tutelage,
something that accompanied political change. He argues that for the elites of Meiji Japan “liberty does
not produce or cause anything; it grows with knowledge and is manifest under conditions of political
constitutionalism.” (Howland, 2002: 121) Therefore the autonomy of individuals was not central to the
‘modernisation’ of Japan in the Meiji period and was not the driving force. Much more crucial was the
political will of the Meiji authorities to catch up with the West. This implies that critical reason was not
the central driving force for the establishment of Japanese modernity.43

This statist drive underlies the fact that these various definitions were translated from the West and
thus from a different cultural context. The ideas of civilisation, enlightenment, progress, liberty and
modernity did not arise from indigenous practices. Because they were ideas adopted in the context of
perceived external threats, the idea of modernity in Japan was ambivalent, an idea pushed upon Japan
to some extent rather than generated from within. Thus, modernity in Meiji Japan had a very different
flavour than in European countries.

The idea of civilisation in Japanese modernity is one which remains an important concept in
understanding the character and the rationales for change in the Meiji period. Douglas R. Howland
writes that “Modernization theorists routinely equate civilization (bunmeikaika) [Jap. 文明開化] and
modernization (kindaika) [Jap. 近代化] – a conflation that reduces the problem of explaining
bunmeikaika civilization to an account of intellectual factors in the modernization process, particularly
the rationality and scientific thought characteristic of ‘enlightenment’.” (Howland, 2002: 16) This implies
that Japan’s process of improvement in the Meiji period is not accurately described when it is simply
called modernisation: it was seen more at the time as a ‘civilising’ process. Howland also implies that
modernisation theory makes the roles of political institutions and elite policy makers secondary;
modernisation theory assumes that the cultural changes from the Enlightenment in Europe have taken
place and are pushing the process of ‘modernisation’ forward. Instead, outside of Europe and America,
this was never wholly the case, as the decision to embark on modernisation was taken by elites who
needed to import a whole vocabulary of political concepts before understanding could occur between

43 This does not preclude the notion of critical reason being utilised to progress to the ‘status’ of their modernity.
European and non-European countries. Indeed, the idea of modernisation later became a word specific for non-European countries intent on developing the same socio-economic standards as Western Europe and North America. Therefore, the idea of modernisation is often easily conflated with Westernisation due to the central role of Europe and America in adapting the modern. However, both the process and the results of modernisation were different in Japan from Europe and America.

The result of this conceptual importation is a **dual idea of modernity** during the period of study: modernity was a more-or-less *shared definition* between European and American nations and an *aspirational definition* in Japanese and other non-Western nations. After several decades of ‘civilising’ by the Japanese, they reached a level of modernity that was close to parallel, yet still different to that of Europe and America. This created a parallel idea of the modern, split off from *Seiyō*, which was later replicated throughout Asia.**44** Rather than being deeply rooted and intrinsic, the aspirational nature of modernity in Japan can still be seen in the overcoming modernity (*kindai*) conference, which essentially questioned whether the aspiration for modernity was sensible for Japan. Modernity had been opted for, but it could also be opted against. At least for the period of study, modernity was not something fully owned by Japan.

This split understanding on the motivations of the dual definitions of modernity is well extrapolated by Yoshimi who described how through imperial activities, Japan took upon itself the modern:

> “Europe’s invasion of the Orient resulted in the phenomenon of Oriental capitalism, and this signified the equivalence between European self-preservation and self-expansion. For Europe this was accordingly conceptualised as the progress of world history and the triumph of reason. The form of invasion was first conquest, followed by demands for the opening of markets and the transformation to such things as guarantees of human rights and freedom of religious belief, loans, economic assistance, and support for educational and liberation movements… From within this movement were both the distinctive characteristics of modernity: a spirit of advancement that aims at the infinite approach toward greater perfection; the positivism, empiricism, and idealism that supports this spirit; and quantitative science that regards everything as homogeneous.” (Yoshimi, 2005: 55)

It is only now possible to unpack this effect that European imperialism had during the 19th century, due to the rise of postcolonial studies and the new conceptual frameworks to understand unbalanced encounters (such as the contact zone, transculturation and identity formation). Whilst the critical

---

**44** For example the earliest time that “Chinese adopted a word meaning ‘modern’ [Chi. 現代, the same character as Japanese] was during the early 20th century and that was itself imported from Japanese.” (Huang, K., 2006: 76)
framework of how Japanese modernity came about provides general themes through which to look at Japan and Japanese architecture during this period, it is only in the application of this framework that firm conclusions can be drawn. The focus on first contact with Seiyō, described as threatening and invasive, and the consequences of this contact, described as homogenising, are the basis of discussion for the remainder of this thesis. Through this discussion, I explore the mechanisms and effects of smuggling the idea of the modern into Japan through exploring Japan’s contact with Seiyō and the effect this had upon developing Japanese architectural modernity from 1853 to 1919, through utilising the concepts of the contact zone and identity formation.

Arguments in Japan had a different dynamic than in Europe and America towards modernisation and modernity. This indicates that the conditions which gave rise to modernity in the West were different from those in Meiji Japan. From a linguistic standpoint, Japan did not have the same definition of modern as in English, because modern is a culturally specific word. It arose out of the Renaissance and then the Enlightenment, and was used to describe and uphold the social trends which arose after long periods of change in culture. These social changes did not occur in the same way in Japan and hence the concept of modern was significantly different: rather than a self-description in English, it was a debatable objective. This demonstrates the perceived malleability of the idea of modern in Japanese and that Japan was considered to be able to construct its own version of the modern being neither willing nor able to fully incorporate Seiyō civilisation into Japan.
Chapter 2
The formation of dual ‘kindai (modern) Japan’

“[A]lmost all foreigners whose work brought them to the treaty ports, especially the consuls and missionaries, thought of themselves as belonging to a ‘higher’ civilisation, which it would be in Japan’s interest to adopt. They argued not only that trade would bring prosperity, contributing in the long run to an improvement in welfare and stability, but also that the West possessed, in addition to advanced scientific concepts and technology, a superior system of ethics and social principles, even of ‘culture’. These, they argued, should be models for semi-civilized Japan.” (Beasley, 1995: 140)

The Meiji Restoration on 3rd January 1868 was a critical step for the formation of modern Japan, the turning point from the feudal Edo period, a phase of Japanese history in which the islands were again ruled by the Tokugawa Shogunate (Jap. 徳川幕府, 1603-1868) of the Tokugawa clan. The end of the Edo period was a time of cultural transition in East Asia as a whole, most notable for the context of foreign aggression. After China refused to trade directly with some of the Seiyō powers, Britain launched and won the First Opium War; as a result China was forced to open five ports and Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in 1840. These events “brought home to many Japanese the danger they faced from the West”. (Hoare, 1994: 2) Japan noticed this danger and at the time was split on what to do to counteract it. In 1842, the Japanese repulsed American ships off their coast, and continued their policy to close the country to non-Dutch foreign relations with Seiyō which had stood since 1639 when all Europeans had been barred from the Japanese mainland.45 However at this time Japan was militarily unable to compete with Seiyō military technologies and as the Japanese rulers at the time were a military Junta, they had a more realistic assessment of the comparative state of their military and their vulnerability as an island state.

Japan ended its isolationist foreign policy in 1854 after Perry’s Black Ships had arrived in 1853, when the state’s weakness led to Japan being forced to open ports with the United States and to sign the ‘unequal’ Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. This was during the period Bakumatsu (Jap. 幕末, lit. end of the curtain), which was distinguished by major events occurring between 1853 and 1867. According to Edwin O. Reischauer (1965) the largest immediate consequence of open ports was to cause disorder to the economy as cheap foreign products severely undermined natively produced goods. (Reischauer,

---

45 Dutch traders continued to be allowed to trade with Japan off an artificial island near Nagasaki. This remained the only point of contact and sharing with the West until 1853 and meant that a number of Japanese could read and speak Dutch but no other European languages.
1965: 210) As in China, these treaties were deemed a humiliation as they granted extraterritoriality, the opening of treaty ports and the right of Seiyō authorities to set their own duty rates in Japan. The wish to be free from the impositions of the treaties eventually led to the establishment of a new doctrine of self-strengthening and the Restoration of the emperor Meiji. This Japanese doctrine was promoted from the central government during the Empire of Japan (1868-1945), particularly the Meiji Period (1868-1912). This policy resulted in fundamental changes to Japanese society, caused by the opening of intense and sustained contact with Euro-American ideas, not least through government missions and the education system. This led to identity confusion as shown through the words of late Meiji intellectuals such as NATSUME Sōseki explored in Section 2.3.

The Bakumatsu was a turning point from the Feudal Edo period to Meiji Restoration, “a transition from early modern [Jap. 近世] to modern [Jap. 現代] as Japanese put it; from late-feudal to modern institutions, as many historians have described it, from Shogunal to imperial rule, and from isolation to integration in the world economy.” (Jansen and Rozman, 1986: 3) These different words all point to the central tension in historiography of this period: that before the Meiji Restoration Japan was something and after the Meiji Restoration it was something else. Throughout this chapter I will attempt to show the dissonances and continuations of certain aspects of Japanese society and thought, so that although momentous, the changes in late Edo Japan were a joining of the ideas of Seiyō with Japan, who had ideas of their own.

Becoming kindai (modern) is widely seen as the second revolutionary cultural borrowing in Japan's history: “If one allows for certain changes in circumstance and technology, the methods by which Japan acquired a knowledge of China in and after the seventh century were not so very different from those that were used to study the West in modern times. The same cannot be said for what was learnt.” (Beasley, 1995: 8) This argument is a familiar one, which is that Japan was used to borrowing from China and this merely continued in the late Edo period. After the arrival of Black Ships from Europe and America, first in the 16th century and then again in the 19th century, Japan starting engaging with the ‘Western outside world’. Prior to this, although described as isolationist, Japan was only isolated to the ‘West’, even as it maintained contacts with the Dutch. According to Marius B. Jansen, “Japan’s “seclusion” was aimed principally at the West, and it is Western ethnocentrism to think that a country that chooses to cut itself off from Westerners has cut itself off from the world.” (Jansen, 2000: 87) Instead Japan went from voluntary, partial relations with China, Korea and the Dutch, to intense and imbalanced relations with the leading Great Powers of the time.
An account of the changes instituted by the opening of a new contact zone through Seiyō incursions during the Bakumatsu period is given below: the history of the transition from ‘Feudal’ Edo to the Meiji Restoration. This chapter begins by providing historical context for how the dual idea ‘modernity’ was politically constituted through an in depth examination of Edo Japan, their foreign relations, the growth of Seiyō imperialism and its impact on China, and how Seiyō imperialism affected Japan in the late Edo period. Following this, the character of the new Meiji government and the factors which led to and framed the changes in government policy are set out, and examined by focusing on government missions and educational developments. The chapter ends analysing how the wider geo-political context and domestic policies filtered to the ideas and ideals of the Meiji intellectuals in order to see how these changes were promoted, rationalised and opposed with the introduction of the idea of the modern by the state into 19th century Japan to provide evidence towards the ambivalent idea of modernity.

2.1 The transition from Edo Japan to the Meiji Restoration

Before the contact with the Great Powers of the Victorian age in the mid 19th century, Edo Japan was a decentralised authoritarian state, only a quarter of which was directly controlled by the Shogun, the head of the military Junta who used the authority of the emperor to rule feudal vassals. The system he ruled over was highly complex and original in world affairs, and thus requires some explanation. Besides the small area of direct control by the Tokugawa Shogunate “three-quarters of Japan was under the control of daimyo⁴⁶; their domains stretched from Kyushu in the south west to the fringes of Hokkaido in the north” (Jansen, 2000: 49). These daimyo had been powerful rulers from the 10th century to the middle 19th century, and were subordinate only to the Shogun. Prior to the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Ashikaga Shogunate (1336–1573) had been feeble and their authority directly contested following the Ōnin War (1467–1477). There had been no de facto central power for over one hundred years until Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) overthrew the Ashikaga Shogunate 1573 and, following this, no Shogunate for thirty years in Japan; this period of anarchy (known as the Sengoku period (Jap. 戦国時代, lit. the Warring States Period) named after the era in Ancient China) led to the establishment of a delicate political system composed of powerful daimyos ruled from afar by the Tokugawa Shogunate. During this period, Japan became culturally closer to China before the changing geo-political context prompted Japan to revise their collective notion of what civilisation meant, laying the foundations for modernisation in the Meiji era.

⁴⁶ Daimyo is a generic term referring to the powerful territorial lords of pre-Meiji Japan who ruled most of the country from their vast, hereditary land holdings as the military class.
Edo ‘civilisation’

This administration depended on an interpersonal system of fidelity to the master, or bakuhan taisei (Jap. 幕藩体制). The daimyo themselves used bands of sworn retainers (kashindan, Jap. 家臣団) to administer their domains. A council of elders (karō) held responsibility for policy and for the superintendence of other officials, among whom were the heads of military units, superintendents of the castle town, rural administration, finance, security, public works, religious affairs, education, a secretariat, and many other specific posts. Within their domains the greater daimyo had considerable freedom, even to the point of issuing their own paper currency (with the shogun's permission).

The political units of the system presided over by daimyo were known as han47 (Jap. 藩, lit. domain). These domains were similar to the fiefs in early medieval Europe in that they were ruled over by daimyo, whose lands were inherited by their heirs. Each province contained han; some provinces had as many as 18 han whilst others had only one. The provinces where a single han ruled the entire domain were more powerful than their peers and were given the title kokushu (or 'provincial lord'). Although it is widely accepted that each han should have one castle in each domain, this was only the case in the early Edo period. By the mid/late-Edo period, a number of the largest han had more than one castle, whilst some of the lowest han with little land had no castles whatsoever. Whilst it is right to say that domains were usually run from castles, not all daimyos did so and following the fire which destroyed Edo Castle in the capital there was a trend to rule from low, palatial complexes.

Although the daimyo were lords of their domain, some spheres were reserved for the Shogunate. In this partitioned state, the Shogun controlled business and foreign trade in order to reinforce his authority, particularly with the growing prosperity of south-western daimyos close to Nagasaki, the only port opened to Dutch trade and linked to many ports which welcomed Chinese trade. However, sources are mixed on how the Shogunate viewed external trade. According to Hoare’s (somewhat ethnocentric) point of view, the Shogunate “saw trade as the sole cause of the economic difficulties that increasingly beset Japan, for the Japanese were neither able to understand the causes nor very inclined to search deeper than foreign trade for them.” (Hoare, 1994:12) This view is contradicted by other viewpoints which claim the Shogunate placed much importance on trade: “most bakufu [Shogunate] trade policies were designed for access to Chinese goods, and in this regard they were highly successful. Foreign trade and the Nagasaki system were so important to the bakufu that it subsidized domains that produced copper for export in order to keep them going and to prevent them from selling it on the domestic market, where it brought higher prices.” (Jansen, 2000: 87) Given the cultural benefits of this trade, such as ensuring a steady flow of knowledge from the Netherlands, it is likely that the Shogunate

47 Han was the name of the estate belonging to a warrior in Japan after the 17th century. The fiefs of the daimyos of the samurai class of Japan during the Edo period were called han.
saw sufficient benefits, both economic and cultural, to support foreign trade (albeit with reservations of the potential influence of Christianity and firearms, both banned in the early years of the Tokugawa Shogunate).

The goods that the Dutch sold were in fact Chinese, the trading of which was started in 1635. In addition, the Chinese and Koreans brought more Chinese goods to Japan than the Dutch: throughout the Edo period, a large number of Chinese and Korean ships traded in Japan. (Jansen, 2000: 87) The total number grew rapidly after the establishment of the Shogunate; there were 193 visiting Chinese ships in 1688. Due to this expansion, the Shogunate decided to limit their numbers and finally the trade began to decline in the eighteenth century. Foreign trade was neither insignificant nor exceedingly extensive: whilst the Shogunate controlled foreign trade, and foreign contact, it had no central treasury and budgeting or even tax codes. (Jansen, 2000: 60)

The Tokugawa period was defined more by Confucian orders of society, whereby trade was, at least formally, disparaged. The segmentation of society in Tokugawa Japan materialised as part of the fidelity to the master system. This was the Mibunsei (Jap. 身分制), or system of status which was established in 1591, during the Azuchi-Momoyama period following the abolition of the Ashikaga Shogunate. In an attempt to bring order to the country where peasant uprisings were common and dangerous with the introduction of firearms from Spanish and Portuguese, lapsed division between castes in society became reformed, with only samurai allowed to bear arms (and guns banned completely). Following neo-Confucian teachings, “the principal status divisions of the period were codified in the occupational distinctions – samurai, farmer, artisan, merchant.” (Jansen, 2000:97) Above the samurai was the Imperial court. Samurai, including their family members, represented “about 5 or 6 percent of the population of Japan, and constitutes an extremely large privileged class.” (Jansen, 2000: 105) Having such a large proportion of society as member of the ruling class is quite striking in comparison to France before 1789, where only 0.5 percent to 0.6 percent belonged to the clergy or nobility. (Jansen, 2000:105) The proportions of the various classes varied by domains which each had their own social structures related to the percentage of samurai: some han “had so many samurai that the castle town could not contain them, and in consequence [the daimyo] allowed them to live in the countryside. (Jansen, 2000: 50) Having a high proportion of samurai caused wealth inequality in the whole domain, as in the example of Satsuma 48 (Jap. 薩摩町) han, “whose swollen military establishment of Sengoku times was retained throughout the [Edo] period, had samurai families everywhere, forming 20 or 30 percent of the total population”. (Jansen, 2000: 50) Having such large proportions of samurai in the outer domains was a drain on resources, given that samurai were also well educated, which meant that

48 Satsuma was an old town before 2005 located in Satsuma District, Kagoshima, in the south West of Japan, far from their powerful and traditional enemy, Tokugawa. Satsuma was part of the alliance against the Tokugawa’s before the Tokugawa Shogunate had been formed.
these han were economically less developed than the Tokugawa heartland around Edo, renamed Tokyo in 1868. (Jansen, 2000: 50)

In the social structure of Tokugawa Japan, farmers made up 80-90 percent of the population; agricultural products were the main economic outputs in the Edo period. With the high development of agriculture in Japan this surplus of farmers became an increasingly important group. Given the excess of produce in some areas, some farmers also became involved in cottage industries, often as a second job. (Cheng, L., 2008: 112) Other farmers capitalised on the agricultural boom and managed to become rich. Indeed there was also a class system within farmers measured by the land area. Farmers were a major, complex group: Farmers’ “productivity, welfare, and discontent mirrored the success or shortcomings of government.” (Jansen, 2000:111) As foreign immigration was controlled, the growth of farming products and cottage industries were the cause of a rise in the population of Edo Japan. Much of this population became concentrated in the cities and urban development was a strong trend in the Edo period. These towns were centred around the samurai: “Most of the area [in a castle town], and all its desirable space, was given over to samurai residences and temples, leaving artisans and merchants squeezed into what remained… By the eighteenth century some 10 percent of the average domain’s inhabitants, including virtually all its samurai, were to be found residing there.” (Jansen, 2000: 142) As noted earlier, each han generally had only one large town, the daimyo’s castle town. Therefore, castle towns were planned cities and “laid out as administrative centers and created, rather than derived from, commercial centers. Many daimyo invited merchants from larger metropolitan areas to come to their towns. The towns held a monopoly position in their area.” (Jansen, 2000: 142) In addition, every daimyo was required to have an annual routine trip to Edo lasting months to pay respect to the Shogun at certain times of the year, therefore “within the castle walls… life was dominated by the rhythm of the annual trip to and return from Edo.” (Jansen, 2000: 143) This allowed control of the daimyo from the administrative centre whilst boosting the population of the capital to the extent that Ian Morris (2010) claims that Edo was the largest city in the world by 1720, eventually reaching over a million people.

The character of the pre-Meiji town was also formed by the activities of the industry guild controlled by Shogunate and daimyo, which formed from the period of 1804-1830. Other types of town also existed, such as the commercial towns near the castle towns, port towns, inn towns and Temple gate towns. The new class chōnin (Jap. 町人, lit. townsmen) made up the majority of the population in these places, drawn from the third and fourth ranks of the social order: the artisans and merchants. Within this new class there was again great status differentials, for instance, between the Shogun’s head builder and a
village carpenter. Late Edo society was not simply as a strict hierarchy where no merchant was allowed to be richer than a farmer, but a layered complex with the *samurai* on top: as Jansen suggests, “it would be better to think of Tokugawa status society as consisting of a series of complementary hierarchies, each of which had its own upper, middle, and lower classes.” (Jansen, 2000: 124) The development of agriculture, cottage industries and urbanism in Japan in turn led to the development of cities, improved transportation and greater currency circulation within Japan.

Yet whilst the *chōnin* grew in influence, the *samurai* were the defining class politically during the Edo period and had a great influence on cultural identity. Within this reformed caste system “the samurai was the only one who, by not having to “work,” was free to concentrate on virtue and to embody it in society.” (Jansen, 2000:103) The ideals of *samurai* became closely associated with the ideals of the government. During the Edo period, “peace was so rampant throughout the land that the samurai, with the Tokugawa encouragement, evolved from uneducated, brave warriors into learned and highly competitive bureaucrats... A flourishing middle-class culture bloomed that produced Kabuki theatre, imaginative fashions, influential painters, and lasting poetry.” (LaFeber, 1997: 8) For the 250 years preceding the Meiji Restoration, *samurai* did not represent war and martial vigour in Japan but virtue, good governance and other Confucian ideals.

To link this to the Section 1.3 discussion on civilisation, the previously held concept of civilisation in Edo Japan was determined by whether or not a people held Confucian ideals; if they did not they were considered to be barbarians. (Pines, 2005: 60) Confucianism suggested a certain attitude towards the ‘Other’ with the difference between ‘China’ and aliens being primarily cultural, and hence changeable. (Pines, 2005: 62) In Chinese history, Others were defined as *siyi* (Chi. 四夷, lit four barbarians/foreign tribes), located to the north, south, east and west of the central Chinese plains.49 Japan broadly followed this distinction, so that when Europeans first made contact with Japan in the 16th century they were known as *nanban* (Jap. 南蛮, lit. southern savages) as they arrived from the south. As the word was taken from Chinese cosmology, the Japanese characters were the same as in Chinese. According to Charles Holcombe, *siyi* does not literally refer to foreigners as barbarians unlike the European concept with its Greek basis:

> “Barbarian is an English word that derives from an ancient Greek expression for those unintelligible “bar-bar” noises emitted by strangers who were so uncivilized as to not speak Greek. Not only did the ancient Chinese naturally not use this word, there really was no word in classical Chinese that was exactly equivalent to it. There are, indeed, several

49 There are *dongyi* (Chi. 東夷, lit. eastern foreign tribes), *nanman* (Chi. 南蠻, lit. southern savages), *xirong* (Chi. 西戎, lit. western rong clans) and *beidi* (Chi. 北狄, lit. northern di minorities).
Chinese terms that are commonly loosely translated into English as "barbarian," but this (as is often the case with translations) is a little misleading. More precisely, they are all generic Chinese names for various non-Chinese peoples. The word Yi, for example, was used for non-Chinese peoples in the east." (Holcombe, 2011: 8)

The term for China, zhongguo (Chi. 中國, lit. middle state), and the term for barbarian, yi (Chi. 夷, lit. spread out), referred to areas rather than behaviour. The ancient name of China, Huaxia (Chi. 華夏, lit. grand and illustrious/descriving a civilised society) referred to common standards but also to the ancestors of the han people from Zhongyuan (Chi. 中原, lit. central plain). In Chinese the idea of civilisation was distinguished by territory, and cultural affinities and superiority. As a result there was no ethic present for 'civilising' other peoples, and this led to a tendency in Confucian states to be inward looking.

In Confucian societies such as China, Japan, Vietnam and Korea, civilisation was a concept based on identity and belonging, whether racial belonging or cultural belonging. (Pines, 2005: 60). This recognition of belonging to a wider Confucian society was strengthened in the Edo period: “As the less civilized Manchus swept over China in the seventeenth century, Japan saw itself as the old China, that is, Japan-as-central-kingdom. The Tokugawas gave refuge to Chinese scholars, and even set up a form of tribute system in which Korean, Ryukyu, and Dutch envoys paid homage to the Shogun.” (LaFeber, 1997: 8) Although often characterised as isolationist, Japanese cultural links with China were strengthened to their peak during the Edo period:

“If some news of Western developments managed to penetrate Tokugawa Japan, contacts with other parts of East Asia were naturally even greater. In fact, it has actually been claimed that Tokugawa Japan was "orientated more than ever before toward the language and classical culture of continental China". Higher education in Japan was still conceived primarily as mastery of the written Chinese language and the Confucian Classics... Yamaga Sokō [Jap. 山鹿素行] (1622-1685) for example, argued that samurai justified their economically non-productive existence because leisure from work allowed them to cultivated the Confucian values of loyalty, duty, and service and to lead the common people in the classic Confucian fashion by setting a virtuous example. The Tokugawa period, in fact, became the acknowledged golden age of Confucianism in Japan.” (Holcombe, 2011: 183)

Yamaga was a Japanese soldier and Confucian scholar during the Edo period. Confucius’s idea of the ‘superior man’ (that individuals should attempt to be role models to others) was applied by Yamaga to the samurai class of Japan. This ethic became an important part of the samurai way of life and later became codified as bushido (Jap. 武士道, lit. the way of samurai) in the early 20th century.
The influence of (Neo-) Confucianism and the model of insular China meant that Japan was inward looking and disassociated from those considered lacking in proper behaviour; during the Edo period the sakoku (Jap. 鎖国, lit. locked country) policy meant that any Japanese who left the country would face the death penalty. Instead of outward engagement, Japan instituted a tributary system with China as the model, whereby foreign monarchs would give gifts to the Shogun to demonstrate respect towards the Shogunate. The most noted examples of tributaries were delegations from the Dutch East India Company and the Ryūkyū kingdom which travelled annually to Edo to deliver tribute. Notions of civilisation in the Edo period, taking inspiration from China and Confucius, emphasised respectful relations from others.

After the Tang dynasty had culturally penetrated Japan in the 6th century, Japan defined itself using Buddhist and Confucian concepts: “A Japanese ‘constitution’ of 604, attributed to Prince Shotoku, stated in its first article that harmony, above all, was most to be valued. That early – and forever after – Japanese emphasized harmony, or wa, over acquisition-for-ascent…. Within this space and these institutions, Japanese leaders believed, wa alone held back disorder, anarchy, and destruction.” (LaFaber, 1997: 6) One and a half centuries after this in 756 Japan even changed its official name to wa [Jap. 和]. This harmony was maintained during the Edo period through an elaborate political system which ensured the Shogun’s allies would always be close to central power and his old enemies were always barred from this, as well as underlying the rigid Edo social structure. Some scholars have claimed that the sakoku policy was designed to cut the western han from lucrative trade with foreigners which had customarily been theirs in order to maintain a closed stable country with the centre stronger than the peripheries. (Calman, 1992: 2)

Internally, the governing system had inherent tension: the strict de jure structures of Edo Japan meant that some daimyo were permanently barred from posts in the ruling Shogunate, and had no opportunity to ever be close to the central power. The ‘fidelity to master’ system had severe repercussions for those daimyo which had not been loyal to the Shogun: “translated to the world of Edo feudality, [paternalism in Japan] brought a distinction between the traditional Tokugawa house vassals, the fudai [Jap. 譜代] daimyo, and the tozama [Jap. 外様] or ‘outside lords’,” (Jansen, 2000: 38) the locations of which are shown in fig 2.X below. Some daimyo had opposed the Tokugawa forces at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600 while others had cooperated; the latter were and would always be ‘inner’ daimyo and those who opposed the Tokugawa would always be ‘outer’ daimyo, never changing their classification throughout the Edo period. What was true at the high level of daimyo was even more so at the level of ordinary

---

51 There were over 200 daimyo in the Edo period and their territories were reorganised based on their production of rice from rice paddies and according to how close they were to the ruling Tokugawa family: the kinsmen (Jap. 親藩, shinpan); the hereditary vassals (Jap. 譜代, fudai) and the less-trusted allies (Jap. 外様, tozama).
samurai: “Daimyo could interact, compete, and rank themselves in relationships to the Shogunal hegemon, but their vassals lived within a world structured around the daimyo. The categories of fudai and tozama thus served to separate the Tokugawa house from its peers. Tokugawa house vassals could serve in the bakufu organisation, while tozama were forever outside it.” (Jansen, 2000: 38) This lack of social and political mobility created an era of stable prosperity and refinement in the arts but was one of the causes of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. These splits only became a live issue after the crisis precipitated by the arrival of foreign emissaries who had come to open Japan.

The growth of Seiyō imperialism
The re-entrance of Seiyō to Japan in the mid-nineteenth century has a wide and significant geopolitical context in East Asia as a whole and beyond which has been studied in great detail in multi-archival works for the past century: issues such as the growth in global power of the ‘West’, the internal difficulties of the Qing dynasty and the growth of geopolitical relations between China, Japan and the European states have been competently covered elsewhere (for example Blanken, 2012; Bickers, 2011; Kayaoglu, 2010; Hevia, 2003; Bickers and Henriot, 2000; Gillard, 1977; Hobsbawm, 1975). This section takes a precise approach to the wider geo-political context by understanding a) the changing motivations and rationale of the Great Powers Europe and America (Seiyō) in East Asia before 1853,
and b) how China, which was the model for the Shogunate in many aspects, particularly foreign affairs, reacted to the demands of these nations.

**European and American imperialism: motivations and rationale**

Blanken (2012) suggests that Seiyō imperialism can be usefully split into two periods in the modern era: pugnacious imperialism (1400-1800), courteous imperialism (1800-1914). Both periods saw varying motivations for the Powers involved, varying relations between these Powers, involvement in different areas of the world, and varying intensity of the colonial activities. Pugnacious imperialism was the first, and longest, phase and involved first the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch, and later the British and French, who were competitive and warlike both in Europe and abroad. Foreign trade was treated as “a mild form of war” and continued even into the 18th century Enlightenment period, particularly between France and Britain from the Indian subcontinent to North America. (Blanken, 2012: 7) As argued in section 1.2, this period saw the slow reification of European superiority over non-Europeans and the erection of stable chauvinistic boundaries between Euro-Americans and others. However, these boundaries were not so rigid that Europeans were not inspired or respectful of cultural ‘others’, for example during the Enlightenment China was respected by many intellectuals for the fairness of its examination system in comparison to the nepotism in 18th century European governance.

Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, the European Powers of Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary negotiated a peace at the Congress of Vienna which would ensure that Western Europe would remain (mostly) war-free until 1914. This Congress also confirmed the colonial possessions of each country and began a long period where International Law became more formally established, with long-term decisions made on the abolition of the slave trade, regulations on shipping freedom, and the ranking between diplomatic representatives. This stability heralded a period of courteous imperialism, with continued colonial activity in abundance but with relative peace among the imperial rivals. This “courteous imperialism resulted in a ‘checker-boarding’ pattern of colonial acquisition. The competition for access to foreign goods and markets became much more peaceful among the colonizing powers, despite an explosion in in the actual size of formal European empires…. This pattern of behaviour was a stark contrast to the brutal imperial struggles of the previous two centuries.” (Blanken, 2012: 7) This stage of imperialism allowed largely uninterrupted shipping and trade for newly industrialising states to profit from.

---

52 Arguably this courteous imperialism gave way to New Imperialism (1870-1914) following the unification of Italy and Germany (who defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871) and were better able to project their power across the world. New Imperialism has been deemed an unstable period of world history when the nations of Seiyō (and later Japan) had increased competition for territory and economic resources. This period is covered in more detail in Section 4.1 concerning Japanese imperialism as this shift in imperial tone provided the major context for Japan’s increased aggression and colonialism.
This period of relative cooperation allowed the Powers of Seiyō a collective power against other states that was unprecedented in world history. That this power was used to dominate other parts of the world was largely seen as justified by the leading thinkers of the time, whether liberal or not, and resistance to colonialism was uncommon in the main departments of cultural thought. (Said, 1993: 96) For instance, “Liberal though he was, John Stuart Mill – as a telling case in point – could still say, ‘The sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not binding towards those to whom nationality and independence are certain evil, or at best a questionable good’.” (Said, 1993: 96)

Whilst non-recognition of the rights of ‘non-civilised’ countries was not new, the intensity of feeling of superiority had never been so prevalent, nor had these states had the force of application to make their notions of superiority de facto before. The right to colonise the non-civilised was “already current in the English subjugation of Ireland during the sixteenth century and, as Nicholas Canny has persuasively demonstrated, was equally useful in the ideology of English colonization in the Americas. Almost all colonial schemes begin with an assumption of native backwardness and general inadequacy to be independent, ‘equal’, and fit.” (Said, 1993: 96) The emergence of the Encyclopaedia movement in Enlightenment France meant that these ideas became catalogues, written down, shared and made real by policy makers and explorers who fed into the notion of the world having varying levels of civilisation which could be accurately assigned, with little knowledge or research deemed to be required.

The map in fig. 2.1 is an American cartographer’s representation of the world, made 20 years after the Congress of Vienna. This map represents the whole world, though I focus here on East Asia. China and Japan are shown as half-civilised (two ‘levels’ below enlightened, only found in Europe east of Moscow and in eastern North America). The notion of China and Japan as half civilised was repeated frequently by the envoys and ambassadors of Japan from Britain, such as Rutherford Alcock (Beasley, 1995: 141) and Laurence Oliphant (Oliphant, 1859: 244). It is notable how many guesses were made concerning these states, and the gaps in knowledge in some areas such as Korea, which was culturally similar to China and Japan yet remains unlabelled and assumed to be barbarous. Due to the low level of civilisation in East Asia (and elsewhere outside of Europe and parts of North America inhabited by people of European origin) all these states were seen as potential beneficiaries of enlightened rule through colonialism. Imperialism was seen as a “sort of pedagogical project, one designed to teach natives how to behave in a white man's world of new and unfamiliar relations of power.” (Hevia, 2003: 3)
It is also worth noting that, given the perceived low level of civilisation outside of Seiyō, the envoys and traders of Europe and North America devised systems of ensuring that they would not be tried under native courts when crimes were committed by expatriates. This was a system of extraterritoriality, which was a method (sometimes unintended at the time of signing the treaties) of undermining the sovereignty of the country, causing instability and allowing other more invasive forms of imperialism, such as becoming a protectorate (that is within a country's sphere of influence) or occupation (becoming a directly ruled colony). Seven of the 15 states which were subject to British extraterritoriality (all of which were part of the Ottoman Empire to varying degrees) preceded extraterritoriality being applied in China, which itself preceded similar treaties in Japan, Thailand and Korea. The process of how these treaties were agreed in China and Japan and the effect that these had is explored in the remainder of this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Abolition</th>
<th>Method of Abolition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Occupation (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Occupation (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Protectorate (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Protectorate (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Protectorate (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Occupation (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Occupation (Germany/United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Protectorate (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Occupation (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Occupation (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. History of British Extraterritoriality. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010.
**Seiyō imperialism in China**

The story of the relationship between China and Seiyō is important to understand the Japanese trajectory following the initial incursions by America in 1853. This is first because the opinions formed by Europeans and Americans, and the strategies that followed, had a huge influence on how Japan was treated by Seiyō. Secondly, China was seen as respected, civilised and impregnable by contemporaneous Japanese (in spite of their Manchu rulers), and the knowledge that Seiyō had defeated China was hugely important in how Japan dealt with the Europeans and Americans; they had already been mentally softened by the harsh actions of Europeans in China. This Japanese trepidation led to a trend towards accommodation and adaptation of Seiyō ways in Japan. Finally, the actions of Seiyō, particularly Britain and France, provided a template for how Japanese diplomats and politicians would later treat their neighbours and, eventually, the Great Powers: expansion through creating spheres of influence and legal imperialism, and then through formal colonisation. Architecturally too, the examples of Seiyō buildings in their colonies would provide templates to work with and against in their colonisation of Taiwan.

The first significant economic contact between China and Europe was the tea trade, established by the Dutch in the seventeenth century. The Dutch, however, bought the product from Asian traders through their base in Batavia rather than dealing with the Chinese directly. Direct tea trade by European agents only began in 1689 chiefly in the ports of Amoy (today known as Xiamen, Chi. 廈門, in Fujian province) and Canton (today known as Guangzhou, Chi. 廣州, in Guangdong province) where British, French, Belgian and Dutch merchants vied for Chinese goods, especially tea and silk, in exchange for European goods and silver from the Americas. The Dutch then sold much of their Chinese goods to Japan, as shown above. The development of this trade was almost accidental: “Bassett argues that the British East India Company originally was interested only in the Japanese trade, and it was only after a series of rebuffs, as well as the military successes of the Qing on the Chinese mainland, that the Company’s directors began “toying with the possibility of opening trade with China proper” in the early 1680s.” (Blanken, 2012: 90)

The European traders were relegated to these two ports in order to prevent missionaries penetrating China and, “after the British trader James Flint defied Chinese law by penetrating to Tianjin in 1759, were consigned to the single port at Canton.” (Blanken, 2012: 93) Canton was eighty miles from the sea at the mouth of the Pearl River where foreigners were allowed to reside and trade, and then only during the October to January trading season, under the close supervision of the local authorities. A complex system of intermediaries was created headed by the Canton Governor, and the Chinese Customs superintendent, known to the Europeans as the ‘Hoppo’. (Bickers, 2011: 18-19) In spite of
these restrictions tea had become a massively successful import, particularly in the British Isles: “By 1810, Britain was importing 25 million pounds of tea and duties on import constituted 6-7% of the British government’s total revenue. (Blanken, 2012: 90)

The trade restrictions allowed for a functioning trade system in the control of China, but the burgeoning international self-confidence of the Europeans, as well as the vast trade networks created after the Congress of Vienna, meant that this situation was increasingly at odds with the European sense of decorum and superior status. The model of relation being forced on the European traders was a vassal-tribute relationship, a valid model for formal Chinese relations with foreign states. (Blanken, 2012: 90) Bickers states that “British and Chinese, Britain and the Great Qing Empire, were not equals in Chinese eyes, and all relations and interactions between them needed to demonstrate this fact clearly.” (Bickers, 2011: 21) This interaction might have been more bearable for the Europeans except for “the failure of European goods in Chinese markets” which led to China developing a gross balance of payments surplus, while Britain, France and others were forced into trading silver reserves for tea and silk. (Blanken, 2012: 90) The system was therefore tolerated by China because it seemed harmless and supplied the Chinese with an infusion of silver bullion. (Blanken, 2012: 90-91)

During the period of 1757 to 1839, foreign traders in China were quarantined to a narrow strip of factories along the Canton waterfront, unable to buy land, to interact with locals, to learn Chinese, or to sell to anyone but the cohong (state-monopoly merchants) under the jurisdiction of the hoppo. If disagreements broke out within these trading arrangements, these European traders, deemed barbarians in Chinese cosmology, had no political rights and no avenues of remedy. (Blanken, 2012: 90) For example, a Chinese mob burned down the foreign trading factories on May 12, 1831, and the hoppo refused to redress the losses of the European merchants: “The foreign factories, it was pointed out, rested on Chinese soil…. The regulations for the conduct of the inhabitants of such factories were rightly the product of Chinese authority.” (Blanken, 2012: 90-91)

By the 1830s, European traders wished to increase their economic access to China and to substitute their payment in silver by trade in opium,53 particularly after the East India Company’s trade monopoly was ended in 1834. After this, aggressive commercial activity by myriad private opium traders provoked the Chinese state to protestation. (Blanken, 2012: 95) Trade itself was changing following the Industrial Revolution, with factories in England needing markets abroad. Whilst the Qing rulers were rich and had a complex and advanced culture, “they had little interest in European trade and diplomacy, which in British circles were synonyms for progress and enlightenment. Confucian administrators regarded

53 Opium was “first transported from Bengal to China by the East India Company in 1729, opium increased in usage among Chinese and created a burgeoning market by the early part of the nineteenth century; it remained the single largest British import until 1890.” (Blanken, 2012: 95)
commerce as demeaning, and diplomacy as unnecessary, while Europeans believed China’s laws, transport, and hygiene to be archaic and primitive. By the common tests of religion and material progress China appeared pagan and uncivilized.” (Daniels, 1996: 2) Further, British government officials “wanted direct access to the Qing emperor and his government, preferably through the establishment of a legation in Beijing. Commercial agents wanted an end to the government-sanctioned monopoly guild of Chinese traders, the Co-Hong, which Qing emperors had created for managing all European trade”. (Hevia, 2003: 4-5)

Beyond the desire for trade and access to markets, there was a new, and arguably historically unique, power asymmetry between Seiyō and China, embodied in the combat and logistical capabilities of Europeans. (Blanken, 2012: 94) Blanken puts this Euro-American military superiority down to three interconnected reasons: China’s lack of competition with rivals (both in East Asia and with European Powers), the lack of naval capability throughout the Qing period, and a focus on internal control. (Blanken, 2012: 84) All three of these reasons also applied to Japan in varying degrees: the region had become closed to visitors since the early Qing period, with Japan’s Sakoku policy and Korea being known as the hermit kingdom, in addition to China’s own relative isolation. This era of isolation and peace meant that investment in trade and naval power was consequently low, and that internal control became the natural direction for the armed forces to turn to. China’s flat bottomed ships were qualitatively outclassed by the deep-hulled European ships with modern artillery and excellent gunnery skills. This naval superiority was proven during the First Opium War: in one 1839 engagement two frigates decisively defeated twenty-nine war-junks. (Blanken, 2012: 85-86) The focus on internal control meant that the armed forces were set up to deal quickly with regional conflagrations and were left uncoordinated to prevent potential coups: from the Sung dynasty onwards, individual military units were intentionally kept separate from one another. This was a theme which continued throughout the Qing dynasty: “This repetition of internal threats, coupled with isolation from competition with the leading military innovators (namely Europeans) of the 15th-18th centuries, led to a force structure that was thoroughly non-competitive by the mid-nineteenth century.” (Blanken, 2012: 86-87)

These three reasons meant that it was in Britain’s interest to pursue war and to alter the terms of the relationship between Britain and China: war meant that economic concessions could be granted, trade could be expanded, and military losses would likely be small. Given these factors, Britain only required a minor pretext to become belligerent and found one in 1837 when Qing government officials seized and destroyed Indian opium belonging to English merchants who intended, in defiance of Qing law, to sell it in China.54 (Hevia, 2003: 4) However, this offense against private property and “free trade” was

54 For a full account of the war itself see Peter Ward Fay, 1997, The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the Way by Which They Forced the Gates Ajar (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press).
only the most recent cause of friction between the British and Qing Empires: ultimately the free trade convictions of British diplomats and merchants, backed by military supremacy “served to justify the use of force against the Qing and resulted in a whole new order of “foreign relations” between China and other powers, which quickly came to include France, the United States, Russia, Germany, and eventually Japan. (Hevia, 2003: 5)

The Opium War between Britain and China lasted from 1839 to 1842, and was mostly fought in the Pearl River delta and the Yangtze River, suiting Britain’s strengths in naval warfare. The Treaty of Nanjing ended the war in August 1842. This was the first of several treaties later named the ‘unequal treaties’, unfair because Britain and the succession of Seiyō countries who China had signed these with had no substantial obligations under the treaties while they made numerous substantial demands. These treaties were the “principal instruments for creating the new order… usually couched in terms of promoting “peace, friendship, and commerce.” Through these legal documents, the Qing government was forced to grant Westerners the host of rights they desired in China.” (Hevia, 2003: 5) The Treaty of Nanjing abolished the Co-Hong, ceded the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain in perpetuity, opened the ports of Guangzhou, Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai to Seiyō trade, and approved the permanent residence of foreign consuls and their families in these treaty ports. This treaty was signed hurriedly, according to the British, and in the supplemental Treaty of the Bogue in 1843, Qing sovereignty was limited in these newly opened ports through three additional provisions: “The first stipulated that British consuls could try their own subjects for crimes committed in China; that is, Euro-Americans in China enjoyed “extraterritorial” legal rights. Second, the British were given the right to fix customs duties on their imports into China; they were set artificially low in the treaty itself. Third, Britain received most-favoured-nation status, which meant that any privileges given to other powers would automatically go to the British without negotiation.” (Hevia, 2003: 5) This extraterritoriality was gradually granted to all the major Western and Northern European nations as well as to the United States and Japan (see table 2.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home state</th>
<th>Start of Extraterritoriality</th>
<th>Number of Consular Courts in 1926</th>
<th>Dates of the Abolition of Extraterritoriality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1/9/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1/11/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2/28/1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1/11/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4/1/1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2/10/1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5/29/1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11/20/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5/20/1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4/5/1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11/10/1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2. Rise and decline of Extraterritoriality in China. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010.
In addition to all the stipulations of the British treaties, further substantial concessions were made by France in the Treaty of Whampoa of 1844 (which included the right to propagate Catholicism in China) and by the United States in the Treaty of Wanghsia of 1844 (which called for revision of the treaty terms in twelve years’ time). (Hevia, 2003: 5) Given Britain’s “most favoured nation” clause, these provisions were added to the Treaty of Nanjing. It was China not honouring the renegotiation clause which directly led to the Second Opium War (Ch. 第二次鴉片戰爭, 1856-1860). When the time for revision of terms arrived, Britain demanded the opening all of China to British merchants, legalising of the opium trade, exempting of foreign imports from internal duties, suppression of piracy, regulation of the coolie trade, permission for a British ambassador to reside in Beijing, and for the English-language version of all treaties to take precedence over the Chinese: demands which were rejected by the Chinese. As a sign of the courteous imperialism of the time, France and Britain acted together to defeat China once again. During this war, the Europeans acted in a yet harsher manner than in the First Opium War, with the temporary colonisation of Guangzhou (Canton), headed by Sir Harry Parkes, and the destruction and looting of the Summer Palace being most prominent. The result of this war was the gain of still greater concessions from China: “The treaty concluding the Second Opium War in 1860 granted ten additional treaty ports, freedom of movement for Christian missionaries throughout China, and the right of the treaty powers to establish embassies in Beijing. China was required to pay indemnities to cover the cost of both wars.” (Hevia, 2003: 5-6) This served to bankrupt the Qing authorities who were mid-way through a civil war (the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864).

This pervasive power politicking by Britain and France served to make “a wild frontier zone of East Asia.” (Bickers and Henriot, 2000: 1) At the root of this picture, more than any other policy concession were policies that elevated Seiyō sovereignty above Chinese on Chinese soil, such as extraterritoriality, caused a constant strain on the relationship between European states and China. In spite of this clear example of imperialistic behavior, it is also clear that “far from the simple dichotomy of imperial states/subjects and colonised states/subjects we must re-envisage the East Asian experience for what it was: a network of multiple overlapping imperialisms, in the interstices of which opportunistic groups carved out new livelihoods and new roles.” (Bickers and Henriot, 2000: 2)

Whilst these activities by Britain and France were calculated, scholars of the era understand that imperialism in China was opportunistic, not planned. This is not to say that no planning was involved, but action was taken in relation to how the other acted (for instance if China had been sufficiently effacing and had accepted the demands for a revision of the Treaty of Nanjing, it is unlikely that the Second Opium War would have occurred when it did). These treaties were not a part of a grand plan or
project, but were adapted reactions to perceived weaknesses, exploited for maximum economic and political benefit. Bickers states that:

“This was a connected world, and the continuities are important, but there was no grand scheme, design or plot. There was no imperial ‘project’ at the heart of this story, unless European and American history in the nineteenth century can itself be accounted a project. There were certainly some consistent inclinations and responses amongst the actors in this story, and sufficient repetition in their actions and statements to demand notice, but contingent event, opportunity, and even defeat, gave equally as much shape to the world that developed.” (Bickers, 2011: 11)

The policies of Britain, France and other imperial powers in China were initially designed for extracting maximum value from commercial dealings: China offered the prospect of exports to Europe (silk, porcelain, cabinets and mostly tea) and a potential import market. (Blanken, 2012: 89) This motivation lent itself to adaptation and maneuvering as market forces changed and the potential for new markets emerged to be exploited through political means (such as abolishing the Co-Hong and opening an ever increasing number of treaty ports).

However, as the additional, calculated move to insert a concession for extraterritoriality by the British treaty makers at Nanjing in 1843 suggests, the Opium wars were also about status: reversing the prevalent Chinese chauvinism regarding Europeans and North Americans as barbarians, so that the Euro-American perception of themselves as enlightened people in a half-civilised land could be maintained. This had not been possible when European and American traders were forced to trade in one city for only a few months a year, without recourse to their own legal systems. As the European worldview of ‘Western civilisation’ became reified following the Second Opium War, the differences between China and the emissaries of Seiyō became essentialised over time, a dynamic of opposition between two sets of opposites. It is worth noting that this group identification as ‘Europeans’ would have been unlikely prior to the establishment of peace following the Napoleonic War, but allowed the beginnings of a collective European identity, politically as well as culturally (one which American traders were able to skillfully avoid by not trading in opium and emphasising their difference from Europe).

Key figures in China, such as the British diplomat Sir Harry Parkes, reflected these new East/West divisions: on the eve of the Second Opium War (1856), Parkes wrote “It is the cause of the West against the East, of Paganism against Christendom”. (Daniels, 1996: 7) Parkes was a somewhat typical example of a Briton in nineteenth century China, willfully lacking appreciation for the cultural achievements of China and viewing China through the prism of British technical superiority:
“Parkes had never completed his formal education and lacked intellectual sophistication. Not surprisingly, the achievements of China’s civilization rarely moved him, for they were too subtle for his practical and impatient nature. He preferred the steamship to Confucius and judged China by her politicians and poverty, not by her arts and cultural splendour. In China Parkes’ objective had been the advancement of trade and diplomacy. Wars had been fought to open ports and to establish a Legation in Beijing. However, the implementation of treaties which confirmed these changes was always tortuous. Chinese officials often accepted treaties unwillingly, in moments of defeat, and afterwards attempted to obstruct their working.” (Daniels, 1996: 14)

The treaties, presided over by envoys such as Parkes, never had the feeling of a partnership for two reasons: first, Seiyō diplomats did not view the Chinese as equals; they had little respect for these Pagan ‘Orientals’ who did not cooperate, and attempted to ignore treaty stipulations where possible. Second, the Chinese did not view the Europeans and Americans as equals; the Chinese cosmology showed these people from the West to be barbarians. Civilisation had always been determined in Chinese terms, in much the same way that groups of Europeans had seen themselves as the source for judging what was civilised since the time of the Ancient Greeks. Foreign relations were historically only conducted on a tributary basis in China and, as the idea of ‘civilization’ had not changed following Seiyō contact in the 1600s, this Sino-centric idea was still largely extant up to the fall of the Qing dynasty.

In addition Euro-Americans did not feel equal as, practically speaking; China could not have withstood Seiyō if they had used their full force against them. This was acknowledged by Chinese elites, especially following the Second Opium War: a memorandum written by a Chinese prince stated “Before the defeat at [the Battle of Taku Forts, 1860], we had the choice of either fighting against the foreigners or making peace with them. After it, we can only appease them…. We certainly cannot fight, not even to defend ourselves.” (Blanken, 2012: 88) This point seemed objectively true: “The combat casualty exchange ratios experienced between European and Chinese forces during the period dispel any notion that the Europeans could not have handily defeated the Qing Dynasty had it chosen to do so.” (Blanken, 2012: 88) The Europeans and Americans were in possession of the mechanisms for control of China, and used both soft and hard powers to affect the workings of Chinese policy in so far as they could.

There are contrasting views about what the Seiyō powers wished to achieve in China following the First Opium War. Blacken’s (2012) institutional theory of imperialism states that the more democratic powers in China such as Britain, France and the United States “wanted to bolster local institutions capable of
maintaining the bargains which had been struck, but also sought to leverage bargains in their interest, using their military power to do so. In short, they sought to coerce China without collapsing the Qing or impairing its ability to quell internal unrest.” (Blanken, 2012: 101) English diplomats, “far from attempting to occupy or plunder China, [were] instead striving to maintain a careful balance and thereby gain access to the country within the refraining equilibrium.” (Blanken, 2012: 98) This was a purely rational calculation for these democratic countries according to Blanken, who believes that the Europeans feared crushing the Qing outright and being drawn onto the Chinese interior should the Qing dynasty collapse. (Blanken, 2012: 98) This policy was even in place to a large extent by the beginning of the twentieth century: in the wake of the Boxer suppression, when the government was split, anti-Seiyō feeling was at its height and the European powers were in control of Beijing, Great Britain and Germany issued a joint agreement that stated they “would not… make use of the present complication to obtain… any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of the Chinese empire” (Quoted in Blanken, 2012: 99) All of this is evidence of efforts among the more democratic states to maintain the refraining equilibrium through diplomacy as well as through military activity.

James L. Hevia (2004) by contrast sees the imperial mission as having a pedagogical function. The two sides of imperial pedagogy were the violence of arms and the violence of language: “Guns not only force compliance, they also persuade. Words and images do not simply persuade, they also coerce.” (Hevia, 2003: 4) The diplomatic and military agents of Great Britain in particular “often thought of imperialism and colonialism as pedagogical processes, ones made up of teaching and learning by means of gun and pen. This was especially the case in China, where warfare and treaty making marked critical moments of British imperial pedagogy.” (Hevia, 2003: 4) The self-identity of these teachers, and what they attempting to persuade the Chinese of through the multiple zones of contact, was that of a benevolent, if strict teacher, who had accomplished much and provided an example of how modern civilised nations should act. Bickers (2011) supports the notion of Seiyō pedagogy, stating that Europeans and Americans were proud of their achievements in China where they had:

“constructed roads, drains and jetties, smart banks, busy business ‘hongs’ (offices) and ‘godowns’ (warehouses), churches, schools and clubs…. They made, they like to recall, excellent harbours, ‘bunding’ the water fronts, dredging the silt, constructing lighting systems, and devising rational procedures for the arrival and dispatch of goods and people. They built railways, made maps and charts, and ordered all that they saw. They brought regularity and rationality, sanitation and salvation, science, revelation, and culture. They found, they said, a once fine civilization in decline, the ‘sick man of Asia’, and they raised him up… They did not want to fight, recalled the foreigners, but by jingo when they had to
they fought firmly and fairly…. They knew and spoke for China, they said, and they knew the Chinese, knew the Chinese better even than they really knew themselves…. They were proud of what they had done. They made Shanghai, they claimed: they built up great cities from those stinking mudflats, constructed hospitals and universities, brought employment, and aided what they saw as the reform and modernization of China’s government, society and culture.” (Bickers, 2011: 6-7)

Yet the initial opportunism of Britain of the 1830s had continued as the *modus operandi* for policy in China: whilst this had provided a degree of relative stability when the Chinese elites were largely cowed following the Second Opium War, the increasing competition between Great Powers meant that Blanken’s theory of democratic imperial Powers ensuring minimal stability did not hold in the final years of the Qing dynasty when nations such as Germany, as much as Russia, were displaying increasingly competitive behaviour, carving out ever large spheres of influence in China. This aggressive trend, already seen in Africa and South-Asia over the previous 30 years was confirmed

“in November 1897, when German troops were landed at Kiaochow in China’s Shantung province. William II was one of the first political leaders to be profoundly affected by social Darwinist ideas in his formulation of policy. By 1894-5 he had been convinced by current arguments that the British, American and Russian empires would soon come to dominate the world’s markets and resources, and that the Germans would have considerably to extend their exercise of power in the world if they were not to be squeezed out.” (Gillard, 1977: 162)

The sense that the European powers were no longer attempting to balance stabilisation with exploitation in China is echoed by Hevia: “By the end of the nineteenth century… some observers could seriously discuss the possibility that China would soon be carved up into separate European colonies. This scenario seemed so likely, in fact, that the U.S. government, which in the past was quick to take advantage of European military successes against the Qing, now called for an “Open Door” in China so that all of the powers would have an equal opportunity to exploit the China market.” (Hevia, 2003: 6)

**The effects of imperialism in China**

Seiyō activity in Qing China became increasingly pugnacious following the Second Opium War as more concessions were extracted and vulnerabilities were found/created and exploited, so that by the end of the nineteenth century Qing sovereignty was in effect fatally wounded. From 1839 to 1912 and beyond, whilst falling short of formal colonialism, the imperialistic actions of Seiyō had a huge impact on
Chinese togetherness and prosperity. During the Second Opium War, “China was a deeply divided nation.... As a result, British forces could hire porters and guides with little difficulty.” (Daniels, 1996: 10) In the first 198 years of the Qing Dynasty before the First Opium War (1644-1842) there had been four major rebellions, roughly one every fifty years. From 1842 until 1912 when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown there were six major rebellions or one every 12 years. British diplomats, at least, did not see themselves as contributing to the strife but saw themselves as the only potential saviours of China. During the Taiping Rebellion, Parkes wrote in 1861 to his wife: “We have seen... misery... rife in this poor country owing to the weakness... of the government which in the first place gave rise to the rebellion and now cannot be put down.” The only hope for rejuvenation seemed to lie in a “warm stream of commerce” which would benefit Britain and China alike.” (Daniels, 1996: 11) Opening trade did appear to have some financial benefit to China from this perspective: Seiyō powers set up an International Maritime Customs Office and ran this for the Qing dynasty, collecting tariffs. By 1885 this contributed 14.5 million taels, 20 percent of the total income of China. (Blanken, 2012: 100)

Yet whilst this finance may have helped keep the Qing government afloat, the fundamental attitude of Seiyō (and the consequences which followed this attitude) had been the key ingredient in destabilising the Chinese state. Previously during the Jin, Yuan, and Qing dynasties when the new rulers of China had been foreign, the invaders had recognised the cultural sophistication of the Chinese and the usefulness of adopting the culture of China in order to rule. External threats had never before come from invaders who had believed whole-heartedly that China was only semi-civilised and that the Middle Kingdom needed to be taught civilised behavior. None of these formal conquests by foreigners such as the Manchus had “changed the face of Chinese political economy as much as the informal imperialism perpetrated by European powers in the second half of the nineteenth century. This is ironic because the European states never replaced the imperial leadership – preferring instead to change Manchu policy through negotiations, threats, and restrained applications of force”. (Blanken, 2012: 91) With only minimal territory changing hands, by 1898 the Qing had still “lost provinces and ports, armies and fleets, riches, an emperor and a future.” (Bickers, 2011: 324)

For China, today, the period from the First Opium War to the overthrow of the Qing is still sore, seen as a period of humiliation, indeed, a historically unparalleled humiliation due to the high-handed approach of Seiyō:

“The catalogue of conflict is crowded: the Anglo-Chinese Opium wars (1839-42, 1857-60), the Sino-French (1884-5) and Sino-Japanese wars (1894-5); the Boxer uprising and war

55 These figures differ however: according to Blanken (2012) there were four internal rebellions between 1644 and 1839, and four internal rebellions between 1839 and 1912. The scale and length of these later rebellions was far greater.
(1900-1901), when troops from eight foreign states invaded northern China; the subsequent Russian occupation of Manchuria and the bloody Allied ‘punishment’ expeditions. And then, above all, there was the Japanese invasion of the northeast from 1931, and of China more widely from 1937…. People suffered, and culture suffered. Priceless treasure and relics were looted or destroyed; libraries were burned. The glorious Summer Palace of the ruling Manchus was vindictively and systematically destroyed in 1860, to ‘punish’ the defeated court. Caravans of plunder made their way to the coast and then to Europe and America. The absolute centre of power and authority, the imperial palace in Peking, was seized and occupied in 1900. Foreign soldiers marched in victory through the gate, their officers snapped themselves posing on thrones…. At the turn of the twentieth century many feared the extinction of the Chinese state, and feared that China, like an Asian Poland, would cease to exist as European predators and Japan carved away slices of the ‘Chinese melon’.” (Bickers, 2011: 5-6)

The Chinese elites were unable to accurately diagnose their issues and find acceptable solutions to their flaws, compounding this sense of being assaulted on all sides: “The Chinese recognized this weakness; the scholar-official Feng Kuei-fen lamented: “The largest country on the globe is... controlled by small barbarians.... Why are they small yet strong? Why are we large and yet weak?... [The answers are] solid ships and effective guns”.” (Blanken, 2012: 102) This answer was limited in scope and understanding, not acknowledging that the Europeans had qualitatively changed. With only this technical understanding of China’s deficiencies, Chinese scholars could not begin to address the rationality that was required to develop these ships and guns and the underlying cultural norms which underlay European ‘reason’. Rather than the guns themselves “it was the overall doctrine, training, command, and control of the British (and later other European powers) – combined with superior firepower and mobility – that allowed for the European mastery of Chinese forces on the battlefield”. (Blanken, 2012: 87)

On the other hand, this technological perspective for modernisation meant that China managed to preserve its style of governance. It had been the certainty and conviction of Confucianism and the rigidity of Confucius’s principles of propriety and respect of elders which had allowed China to flourish for so long, and meant that Chinese self-strengthening failed, at least in absolute terms: “the Confucian scholar-official system could not execute the modernization policies it desired without undermining the cultural rigidity that ensured its own dominance and threatened the very fabric of their society.” (Blanken, 2012: 102) The failure to modernise the military technology of China in the nineteenth century was a spur for the weakened Chinese state to attempt deeper changes in their socio-political system: “these efforts proved, however, to be too little and too late. In 1911 the Qing emperor and his
imperial government, the primary objects of British pedagogy, ceased to exist as functioning political entities. They were replaced by the Republic of China, a nation-state modeled after those to be found in the West and Japan.” (Hevia, 2003: 6)

As was stated in the Introduction, when Japan was beset by a similar threat, they undertook three main transformations: the use of new concepts and terminology to reflect Seiyō discourse, a renewed centralisation of authority to create a Japanese ‘nation’, and the instigation of new binary boundaries (for example between the old and the new, Seiyō and Tōyō, architect and carpenter). During the Self-Strengthening Movement in China, none of these three trends took place to a great extent: the Enlightenment-developed notions of reason and science (and their corollaries ignorance and superstition) and centralised planning meant that the self-strengthening efforts in China fell short of producing a recognisable version of ‘modernity’.

This was not due to incapacity to imitate European and American methods; China was a literate society of great sophistication with a past which was able to reconcile foreign elements into its cultural identity, yet in this period there was little willingness to be found to compromise. Japan by contrast “was more willing to imitate the west than many other non-European countries and more capable of doing so.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 148) The reasons why China was unwilling to imitate Europe and America have been explored to a wide extent in other works: the remainder of this thesis explores how and why Japan was more prepared to change, why they took this deeper approach to modernisation, the limits to these changes, and what impact that it had on the cultural identity and architecture of Japan.

Knowledge in Japan of Western imperialism before 1853

For Japan, prior to 1853, under the Sakoka policy regarding the Seiyō powers, only the Dutch were allowed direct contact and trade with Japan, and like China they were limited to one port only. This remained the only point of sustained contact with Seiyō until 1853. Through this contact, the Dutch had provided information on European science and medicine, spawning a new discipline Rangaku (Jap. 蘭学, lit. Dutch Learning) in Japan. The relative power of the Dutch in Europe had waned significantly in the 18th century, and so they provided little information to raise Japan’s awareness of the state of affairs between European powers. This lack of knowledge of Europe was unsurprising given how Seiyō (besides Holland) viewed Japan in the early 19th century: “Until 1800, foreign powers all but ignored Japan. The most aggressive and powerful, Great Britain, disdained the tea and silk trade conducted by the Dutch, a trade paltry compared with the British profits from India, the Americas, and parts of Southeast Asia. In 1814, one British official examined the record and flatly declared ‘that the Trade with
Japan can never become an object of attention for the Manufactures and produce of Great Britain.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) This perceived lack of profit meant that given the closed country system and the distances involved, European states were largely uninterested in trade with Japan so the Dutch remained the only direct source of Japanese knowledge of Seiyō.

Russia and the United States of America had new frontiers opening which bordered Japan in the first half of the 19th century, which gave them a larger incentive and interest in trading with Japan. The reasons for interest in Japan were various, but “there had been popular legends about the fabled wealth of Japan since the days of Marco Polo, and in some quarters it was believed that enormous fortunes could be made if Japan was opened.” (Hoare, 1994: 2) Yet, although this myth was later proven untrue, strong “strategic, commercial and humanitarian reasons all prompted Western interest in Japan.” (Hoare, 1994: 2) First, for the Russians, as they “moved across Siberia into the Amur River region and over to Alaska during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they clashed with fishermen from Japan's northern islands. Both the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin were soon contested by the Russians and Japanese.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) Further to this non-official contact, in 1804 the Russian-American Company visited Nagasaki to request trade relations in order to supply the Russian settlements north of Japan, which the Japanese flatly rejected. The Russians sought retribution by “raiding villages in the northern islands. The Japanese did not back down. Instead, they captured a Russian official in 1811 and held him for two years until the tsar’s officials finally apologised for the raids.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) As a result of this opening aggression by a previously unknown foreign nation, Japanese writers began to warn that Russia posed the major threat to their country’s security.

The relationship between the USA and Japan was more cordial though similarly persistent: between 1790 and 1853 at least twenty-seven U.S. ships (including three warships) visited Japan, all of which were turned away. (LaFeber: 1997: 10) The concessions wrung out of China at the end of the First Opium War had a direct impact on Japan after 1840 when Shanghai was opened to trade. This led U.S. ship captains to follow the shorter way from newly settled California to Shanghai via the north circle route that brought them close to Japan. This route became ever more used following the 1846-48 conquests of the California ports from the Spanish, along with an accelerated industrial and agricultural revolution in that state. According to LaFeber, this west coast pacification by the USA “opened a historic opportunity – but also a potential trap. The opportunity was noted by Secretary of the Treasury Robert Walker in 1848: “By our recent acquisitions in the Pacific, Asia has suddenly become our neighbour, with a placid intervening ocean inviting our steamships upon the track of a commerce greater than that of all Europe combined.” (LaFeber: 1997: 10-11) This Pacific opening was used by American politicians to galvanise the minds of Americans away from the pro-slave South and anti-slave North divide by distracting the populace with foreign problems. (LaFeber: 1997: 11)
Japan had been aware of this increasing interest from Russia and America for some time and had worried for several decades about how to confront it. Although Euro-American ships had begun to enter Japanese waters since 1790 “a series of edicts forbade Westerners to visit Japan and forbade Japanese from going abroad or building ships capable of making long voyages”. (Hoare, 1994: 1) The logic of isolationism was slowly being undermined prior to the entrance of Admiral Perry, however: even before this, thinkers such as the Confucian scholar AIZAWA Seishisai (Jap. 会沢正志斎, 1781–1863) had gained limited though substantial knowledge of Seiyō and the dangers of this new period of imperialism. Aizawa’s fundamental messages in his New Theses (1825) were that: first, the world situation facing Japan was dissimilar in crucial ways to anything in her history. Second, the “Western barbarians” had changed sufficiently that they were unlike those dealt with up to now. Third, the Shogunate was recommended to devise new policies to overcome the unprecedented danger it faced. (Wakabayashi, 1986: 108) According to Tadashi Wakabayashi, “It was these fundamental messages, not Aizawa’s misinformation that late Tokugawa leaders and shishi took to heart.” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 108) Seishisai’s work bolstered the policy of the Shogunate of 1825 which called for expelling all foreign ships off the shores of Japan, following Russian aggression, whether or not they flew the Dutch flag. This underlay a semantic shift: up until this point, Japanese scholars had called for eradicating “what is barbarian” from Japan, after this point they called for eradicating “the barbarian”. (Wakabayashi, 1986: 9) Barbarism became located in a people rather than within an abstract concept.

The perceived threat was interpreted by Seishisai as a prompt to strengthen the country. This arguably led to some ambiguity in achieving the aim of expelling the barbarian: ultimately, any means could be considered so long as the barbarians were expelled. This was necessary for two reasons: the strength of the new barbarians and the precarious geographical position of Japan. First, Seishisai attributed the “Western barbarians” with “an ability to employ the strategy used by Chao Ch’ung-kuo and Chu-Ko Liang. Like these legendary Chinese geniuses of military tactics, Western generals procured provisions in the enemy’s homeland and enlarged their own armies by first taking over small states and conscripting captured enemy troops.” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 109) Second, Japan’s position was compared to the Chou state during China’s warring states period (403-221 B.C.), “a tiny kingdom whose precarious existence hinged on the tolerance of other, greater powers though its cultural tradition was the richest and most venerable.” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 111) This new context meant that a more adaptable set of policies was required if the long-term aim of expelling the barbarians was to be achieved.

Seishisai’s writings and the government reaction to them underlies the point that confronting the West was not an enormous surprise to Japan: they had been tackling this issue for around 30 years.
(Hobsbawm, 1975: 149) However their concern was heightened after the British victory over China in the First Opium War (1839-42) which demonstrated to Japan the achievements and possibilities of the ways of Seiyō. It made Japanese question themselves: “If China itself could not resist them, were they not bound to prevail everywhere?” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 149) The threat of Russia in particular appeared to be acute by the 1840s and 1850s. The scrambling for concessions by Seiyō following the Opium war was concurrent with the Russians dispatching Rear Admiral Evfimii Putiatin to Japan in 1842-43 to open trade, “but Japanese resistance and the trade’s skimpy rewards led Putiatin to put his considerable talents to work elsewhere.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) In 1842, the Japanese again repulsed American ships off their coast, and in 1849 James Glynn had begun negotiating with Japan, albeit without success.

These events “brought home to many Japanese the danger they faced from the West”. (Hoare, 1994: 2) Japan noticed this danger and at the time was split on what to do to counteract it. They continued their policy to close the country to ‘barbarian’ intercourse which had stood since 1639. However at this time the Americans and Russians had not come at Japan with any real force so that, whilst Japan was militarily unable to compete with the military technologies of Russia and America, they were not immediately forced into any decision.

**Bakumatsu (the end of the Edo period) 1853-1867**

This situation changed when the Sakoka edicts were disbanded in the summer of 1853, broken by Commodore Perry’s arrival off the coast of the capital Edo. Perry’s Black Ships, four black steam frigates, arrived in Edo Bay near the Tokugawa’s capital in July 1853 with the intention of delivering a letter from President Millard Fillmore, itself aimed at securing friendship and trade between America and Japan. Upon being refused, Perry gave a letter to Japanese delegates stating that, if the Japanese chose to fight, the Americans would destroy them, and proceeded to shell some buildings in the harbor of Uraga (Jap. 浦賀) with newly developed shells which could be fired at high speed and exploded upon impact causing huge damage. Perry then had his request accepted, landed near the capital and delivered the letter to Japanese Shogunal delegates. These aggressive actions followed James Glynn’s recommendation to Congress that American ships should return with the threat of force to secure these treaties.

Japan ended its isolationist foreign policy in 1853 following this direct confrontation. The time from 1853 to 1868 under the late Tokugawa Shogunate has become known as the Bakumatsu. This was in many ways the key period of contact with Seiyō because first the US and then European states began to
span the gulf between Japan and foreign countries to make direct contact with Japan for the first time in several centuries. Without this contact there would have been no Seiyō criteria on the form of modernisation or civilisation that Japan needed to take on. As a result of this contact, “the bakufu rescinded its ban on the construction of oceangoing ships as early as 1853…and buried the last of the seclusion provisions in June 1866 with a tariff convention.” (Jansen, 1995: 172)

In 1854 Perry returned with twice as many ships as the previous year and after another extended piece of gunboat diplomacy managed to achieve the signing of an edict allowing foreign ships to resupply off Japan. The Shogunate’s awareness of its relative weakness led to Japan being forced to open ports with the United States and to sign the ‘unequal’ Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. After further diplomacy and shows of strength, between 1858 and 1869 Japan signed treaties with most European powers and with the United States, which provided trading facilities and the right to reside in Japan at certain ‘open ports or cities’ in Japan. Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Hakodate were opened to trade in 1859 and the principle of extraterritoriality was instituted at these locations.

The threat from the West to Japan

As Seishisai had noted in 1825, the ‘foreign barbarians’ had changed. Peter Duus notes that “In the early stages of industrialization, the possession of superior technologies, and the sense of superiority they conveyed to both dominator and dominated, made the encounter between the Western societies and the rest of the world a lopsided one.” (Duus, 1995: 6) Prior to this, Japan was a match for foreign powers who could only bring a small portion of their armies and navies halfway across the world: “In the early seventeenth century the Japanese had thrown the Spanish, the Portuguese, and even the English out of their country without much fear of retaliation, but Commodore Perry and his four black steamships posed a threat that threw the country into a panic.” (Duus, 1995: 6) However, the nature of this threat and how far it was perceived rather than real is a matter of debate, though strong evidence exists that suggests that Japanese kindai (modernity) was tied to the military by products of science and rationality: without these, and Perry’s demonstrations of force, it would have been unlikely that the Shogunate would have reacted with such panic.

As with Britain and France in China, the motivations of the Americans and Russians were primarily trade, but tied in strongly with notions of civilisation and the inferiority of Japanese. On the first point, “Perry forced Japan open because Washington officials wanted it as a strategic way station to the potentially rich Chinese markets.” (LaFeber, 1997: Xviii) Without opening Japan, the long trip to China was more difficult to justify. On the second point, the level of Japanese civilisation was a point of contention for Americans wishing to expand their civilising mission. One American editor linked the
American Indians and the Japanese: “The same law of civilization that has compelled the red men… to retire before the superior hardihood of our pioneers will require the people of the Japanese empire to abandon their… cruelty.” (LaFeber, 1997: 4-5) This was also a pragmatic point since “Sailors washed ashore from the wrecks of ships once involved in China trade or the equally lucrative whaling business would be better treated than had been their unfortunate predecessors if the Japanese were taught civilized manners.” (LaFeber, 1997: 5) Given this, we can say that Japan had quickly become absorbed in the same discourses of market expansion and imperialistic pedagogy as China.

This civilising mission was nuanced as the Japanese were clearly in possession of the idea that Japan was more civilised than Seiyō, given their terminology of using the blanket term of namban (Jap. 南蛮, lit: southern barbarians, the same term used by the Chinese). This outlook was completely unacceptable to imperial Powers who were convinced of their superiority, which underpinned their actions in China and the treaties which were negotiated. The potential for trade with Japan along the same lines as the Dutch, who were happy to act as a vassal to Japan in order to remain trading, was therefore unacceptable to Americans, French, British and Russians, who sought either to trade with Japan with the superior status of Seiyō confirmed, or not to trade at all.

British envoys in particular, representing the supreme naval power of the time, were particularly strict in their notion of the proper status and hierarchy of nations between themselves and the Japanese. This superior tone is demonstrated most clearly by the envoy Laurence Oliphant who, as an aide to Lord Elgin, was part of the 1858 mission to Japan. Oliphant called the Dutch practice of following the Japanese emperor’s Court etiquette “humiliating”. According to an interview between Oliphant and a German doctor, the Dutch ambassador would be signalled to enter the hall for an audience with the Shogun and “he crawled on his hands and knees to a place shown to him, between the presents ranged in due order on one side, and the place where the Emperor sat on the other; and there kneeling, he bowed his forehead quite down to the ground, and so crawled backwards, like a crab, without uttering a single word. So mean and short a thing is the audience we have with this mighty monarch.” (Oliphant, 1859: 246-247) Oliphant went as far as to say that “Assuredly, if our political agents in Japan inaugurate our intercourse with that court by crawling about on our hands and knees, playing the drunkard and singing love-songs, we shall very soon have a Japanese war on our hands.” (Oliphant, 1859: 249) Overall, Oliphant believed that:

“If we hope to conduct relations within Japan on a satisfactory footing, our true policy is to intimate distinctly to the Government that we intend to enforce every one of our rights to the uttermost letter.” (Oliphant, 1859: 246)
What did Oliphant mean by a satisfactory footing? I assume that it refers to the Japanese respecting the traders and envoys of Britain and a move away from the tributary relationship which was used for centuries by Japan (and for millennia by China on whom the Tokugawa modelled their neo-Confucian rule).

However whilst this priority of appearing superior was held by the somewhat harsh and high-handed British diplomats based in China and Japan, in London, the foreign secretary of the time, John Russell, was apprehensive of anything which might lead to war with Japan. In 1863 anti-foreign forces from Choshu han attacked all foreign ships in the narrow Shimonoseki strait between two of the main islands of Japan, Honshū and Kyūshū, for a number of weeks. The British envoy to Japan, Rutherford Alcock, feared the rise of anti-foreign activity and felt that it would be better to withdraw from Japan rather than to lose status by being expelled by force. Alcock allied with America and the Dutch in retaliation to these attacks to defeat the forces of Choshu. For Alcock, success against Choshu was preferable to withdrawing from Japan or being expelled. (Daniels, 1996: 27) However, the British government did not see Alcock’s triumph from this viewpoint, and “Russell, the Foreign Secretary, believed that military measures could not be justified…. When London heard of Alcock’s plans for a bombardment he was recalled to explain his policy to his superiors. The British Government always intended that the Shimonoseki indemnity should be a lever to exact commercial concessions, for it realized that if the indemnity was paid in cash, trade would be taxed to raise the necessary revenue. As a result British merchants would suffer.” (Daniels, 1996: 28) The envoys’ intentions did not always align with those in government, with envoys more inclined to take actions that constantly kept their country’s position on a higher footing. For the British government, the overall purpose of Britain’s policies in Japan appears to have been to make money rather than to give the appearance of a colonial power. This trading motivation was even the case when force was actually applied.

This discrepancy between the home governments and their representatives can be put down to the past experience of these representatives: some of the diplomats were taken from China and offered new posts in Japan. The most famous of these was the aforementioned Harry Parkes, the British representative in Japan from 1865 to 1883, who was centrally involved in the Second Opium War, even being the de facto ruler of Canton throughout 1858. A fluent Chinese speaker, Parkes was nonetheless a man who believed in the inherent superiority of Europe over ‘the Orient’:

“On leaving China Parkes’ impressions must have been simple, if erroneous. The Orient was stagnant and its people often malicious. All enlightenment flowed from the West but, in their blindness, the ‘Orientals’ ignored it. Parkes believed that ‘Orientals’ should be taught by treaties and disciplined by force. So far he had only encountered Chinese negotiators
but there seemed no reason to think that Japanese officials would be different. Most reports made them appear much the same. They, too, had resisted the West and shown plentiful evidence of barbaric ways. In his new post Sir Harry would employ familiar tactics for these had already brought him success, fame and royal approval.” (Daniels, 1996: 15)

Given this, there was continuity in approach from the British envoys in China to Japan. There are several examples which strengthen the view that Parkes functioned as a continuation of the belligerent and hard approach used by British representatives in Japan in the Victorian era, out of touch with official government policies towards Japan. First, Parkes had served under Rutherford Alcock (himself once an envoy to the Qing government) earlier in his career and prior to taking post in Edo Alcock met with Parkes: “In January 1865, Rutherford Alcock called at Shanghai [where Parkes was Consul] on his way home from Edo. He had been recalled for consultations, to explain his use of force. Sir Harry agreed that Alcock’s policies were right and felt that Whitehall was out of touch with Japanese realities.” (Daniels, 1996: 13) Second, a later example of how Parkes dealt with Korea shows that the diplomats to Japan were often more harsh than policy from home required. In 1875, when based in Japan, Parkes was worried about an attack by Japan or Russia on Korea and an annexation of a Korean port by Germany. He proposed annexing Port Hamilton in a pre-emptive strike for a possible future military action in the area, and to encourage Korea to open to foreign trade. The Foreign Office in London rejected this idea, as they thought it might encourage other countries such as Germany to do the same. (Daniels, 1996: 160) The Foreign Office believed that “the idea of a Perry-style mission” was not desirable “on the grounds that it might lead to an extremely unpleasant war.” (Daniels, 1996: 162) From this we can surmise that, Parkes had formed his impression of China through his dealings with Qing officials between and during the Opium Wars and applied much the same reasoning and tactics in ‘opening Japan’.

Japanese officials would form their initial opinions of Seiyō through its envoys rather than by central government contact, which did not occur until the Iwakura Mission of the early 1870s. To the Japanese it would appear that in East Asia the essence of British policy was, as Gallagher and Robinson suggest, “trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary.” (Quoted in Duus, 1995: 8) From these examples it seems that the reason that the notion of a ‘colonial threat’ is so strong in readings of Japanese history is not that writers and envoys of Seiyō explicitly stated their intention that Japan should be colonised, or that there were active plans in Europe to colonise Japan; even in China, when territorial possessions were eventually taken, public and private discourse tended to veer away from talk of invasion and formal colonialism. Instead this perception had its foundations in the power imbalances, the examples of other countries which had been colonised, the opportunistic nature of
nineteenth century imperialism where weaknesses were exploited quickly, and that Japan was vulnerable as an island, with few defensive points.

Underpinning these factors, and making the risk of being colonised seem extremely high and imminent, was the communication from Seiyō diplomats from early after the intrusion of Perry. The clearest example was when the American ambassador, Townsend Harris, met with the Shogunate’s senior councillor Hotta Masayoshi in 1868 prior to signing the crucial second treaty of Kanagawa (1858) which allowed for the establishment of foreign concessions, extraterritoriality for foreigners, and minimal import taxes for foreign goods. After meeting the Shogun, Harris first “enumerated the reasons why at a time when the invention of the steamship and telegraph had made communications vastly easier among nations and the whole world had become like one family, each country must maintain friendly relations with other countries. There were two requirements: the stationing of diplomatic personnel in the capitals of other countries and the opening of free trade.” (Keene, 2002: 35-36) Given this, Harris appealed to the modernity which was seen as inevitable and allowing for time to be compressed, was bringing all states closer together; using the language of modernity Harris attempted to persuade the Japanese that they were in a new era. Second, Harris fabricated a threat, exaggerated by fears of America, that Britain and France intended to expand their colonies in East Asia:

“Harris warned the Japanese of the danger of the British waging a war with Japan if they failed to obtain a commercial treaty. The British navy might well occupy Sakhalin and Ezo, and if the British and French forces that were at the moment pressing on Peking were successful, France was likely to demand Korea, and England might demand Taiwan from China. America, though, desire only peaceful relations; moreover, if the Japanese relied on the America, they would repel the excessive demands of the British and French. Harris warned that if war broke out with England, Japan would lose.” (Keene, 2002: 36)

For the Japanese envoys, signing the treaty was made to seem inevitable to avoid being engulfed in war and even colonisation of islands tacitly claimed by Japan, even though the British had no plans in this respect. As the first unequal treaties for Japan were signed during the Second Opium War, during the occupation of Canton, this would have seemed believable. The Americans greatly exaggerated the danger in order to get the treaty signed, and made themselves look entirely peaceful even promising not to sell opium, to distinguish themselves further from the British. In effect though, signing the Treaty first with America, and then with all European Powers active in East Asia, allowed informal colonialism and the erosion of Japanese sovereignty.

---

56 As shown in Section 4.1, one of the first actions taken after the restoration of the emperor was to act on this threat to Ezo (today Hokkaidō) and formally annex it.
Whilst the Americans had painted the British as happy to make war with Japan, and happy to colonise Korea and Taiwan with the French, the British diplomats could have disabused the Japanese of these notions, but decided against it because it served to ensure that Japanese would keep their ends of the treaties that they signed. British diplomats were aware of this perception:

“The cordiality of our reception at Yedo was, in certain quarters, the mask which a somewhat shallow diplomacy led them to assume, in order to avert a danger they deemed imminent, and which they dared not meet. They fancied they saw impending over them the fate of India, and they believed that the only alternative was to grant us concessions such as we had already wrung from China. It is only fair to ourselves to say that they were entirely mistaken in this assumption.” (Oliphant, 1859: 246-247)

The British were aware that the Japanese believed they were under threat of colonisation when negotiating treaties. It appears clear that, during the 1850s and 1860s, Japan was made to believe that they were under the threat of Seiyō colonialism as this was a useful belief to leverage concessions. Colonisation was especially unlikely during the 1850s when the treaties were signed, as at this time European powers were largely distracted by the Crimean War (1853-1856) and then by the Second Opium War (1856-1860). However as shown, many of the Ambassadors in Japan had also presided over the subjugation of China and were therefore liable to react harshly to treaty infringement by Japan.

That the Shogunate did not infringe on the treaties does not imply that Japan was not under threat if they had done. There was a real danger for Japanese diplomats in defying, accidently or purposefully, international law, which was at once unknown, complex, and crucial to how non-colonial relationships were performed between Seiyō and non-Seiyō countries. It has been argued that international law is an example of creating a system that validated the preferences of Seiyō and allowed them to be dominant. Using this recently constructed legal framework set up by Europeans, non-European states were

“put at a disadvantage by their unfamiliarity with the framework of “international law” under which the European imperialist nations operated. This system of law was assumed to be universal among the “community of nations.” When leaders in non-Western states ignored or “violated” international law out of ignorance, the Westerners frequently seized the moment to impose sanctions, including the establishment of their own dominion... Many Western international legal theorists took the position that ‘backward’ or ‘uncivilized’ peoples had no sovereign rights over the territories they inhabited and that territorial rights should be recognized only if held by states able to protect its inhabitants. Such arguments, for example, sanctioned the European partition of sub-Saharan Africa.” (Duus, 1995: 5)
Small legal pretexts could allow imperial Powers such as Britain to take offence and start military actions to gain further concessions, as had happened in China over the jurisdiction of the ex-British ship, the Arrow. Actions stemming from legal pretexts had benefits for Britain and, ultimately, for the development of anti-Shogun forces as a demonstration of the weakness of the bakufu. For instance, the British Bombardment of Kagoshima (1863) (known in Japanese as the Anglo-Satsuma War (Jap. 薩英戦争, Satsu-Ei Sensō)) following the murder of a single British man by a retainer of the daimyo of Satsuma, “convinced many in Satsuma of the folly of conflict with the Western powers, and the Kagoshima leaders began an all-out effort to strengthen ties with Britain. Neale in turn reciprocated this friendship. Britain’s efforts to strengthen the Shogun had so far proved unsuccessful. She now welcomed this new friendship.” (Daniels, 1996: 26)

The ideology of Seiyō imperialists in the nineteenth century was permissive of imperialism and, if Japan had resisted the treaties as forcefully as China, Japan would have been more likely than China to have become a formal European colony. How likely colonialisation would have been for Japan if the Shogunate had persistently remained isolationist is very difficult to say and a matter for debate. Japanese scholars and politicians were aware of the possibility of Seiyō colonialisation of Japan and Euro-American diplomats used this possibility to their advantage in the signing of the unequal treaties.57 I conclude this point by stating that the threat of colonisation to Japan was there unless Japan gave no opportunity to be colonised. There is little to suggest that, with the advent of New Imperialism in the 1870s onwards, when increased competition between rival powers meant that harsher policies were taken towards China, South East Asia, and Africa, that Japan would have retained its sovereignty without its extreme modernisation which meant that it was seen much less as potential prey. How the various Japanese factions responded to this perceived threat up until the Meiji Restoration is explored below.

**The response in Japan**

To return to the state of Japan upon Perry’s arrival, “War was not openly threatened, but the implications were clear, and the Japanese were aware that they had to respond or face reprisals.” (Keene, 2002: 19) As noted, the Shogunate was indecisive from the first contact with Commodore Perry,

57 Whilst it is interesting to explore whether ‘blame’ can be assigned in the modernisation of Japan, it is not crucial and best avoided except to understand the key factors in how this process began and how this helped shape the trajectory of Japan. I follow Said’s argument in not seeing it necessary to put all the problems of post-colonialism upon Seiyō but that the culture of Euro-American intellectuals and politicians was a key factor in the development of cultural hierarchies between the West and the rest. This approach to understand the cultural underpinnings of nineteenth century international politics has valuable explanatory value:

“Part of our difficulty today in accepting any connection at all is that we tend to reduce this complicated matter to an apparently simple causal one, which in turn produces rhetoric of blame and defensiveness. I am not saying that the major factor in early European culture was that it caused late nineteenth-century imperialism, and I am not implying that all the problems of the formally colonial world should be blamed on Europe. I am saying, however, that European culture often, if not always, characterized itself in such a way as simultaneously to validate its own preferences while also advocating those preferences in conjunction with distant imperial rule. Mill certainly did: he always recommended that India not be given independence. When for various reasons imperial rule concerned Europe more intensely after 1880, this schizophrenic habit became useful.” (Said, 1993: 96-97)
and this was exacerbated by the slow death of the existing Shogun at the time of Perry’s arrival. Given this situation, the leading advisors of the Shogun requested the opinions of other daimyōs for the first time in the Edo period (Hobsbawm, 1975: 149) which was divided between a minority who were for accepting contact with America and those against it. On August the 5th 1852, the Shogunate sent a translation of the American President’s letter, following which “Two senior figures Tsutsui Masanori (1778-1857) and Kawaji Toshiakira (1801-1868), argued that the American request to open the country should be accepted; they contended that after more than 200 years of peace, military preparations had become lax, and people no longer possessed their old resoluteness.” (Keene, 2002: 16) This consultative action was pathbreaking in that since 1605, the shogunate had made all decisions by itself, “but now that the order established more than 200 years ago seemed to be crumbling, it had no choice but to give the daimyōs a voice in national policy.” (Keene, 2002: 16)

This consultation alone shows that the arrival of Seiyō was a climate changing event in itself, rather than a small push, as was frequently argued in the late nineteenth century by Europeans and Americans following Japanese modernisation. The threat of force from Perry, however minor, was sufficient for the Shogunate to seek outside (tozama) daimyo and Court support, as the government required a national response, rather than only the daimyōs who were in league with the Tokugawa family (the fudai). With the division of han into three types (Shogun, inner and outer) there was inevitably potential for political divide. This gradually led to social upheaval at the end of the Edo period with the growing dissent of the outside (tozama) daimyo. The millennia-long disempowerment of the Imperial Court also began to end, because “Help was needed… from the emperor, even though he did not have a single soldier or gun at his command. Once a precedent of consulting with the emperor had been established, it proved difficult for the shoguns in future years to ignore his wishes.” (Keene, 2002: 19) That this consultation began the chain of events that led to the Restoration of the emperor meant tozama daimyo and the Court were empowered by this dangerous situation; it is hard to see how the Shogunate could have fallen so quickly without this crisis.

Following the first and second treaties of Kanagawa (1854 and 1858), from the perspective of the Shogunate, the newly open ports “also contained elements of hope for the bakufu: Tariffs provided a new source of central income, and the purchase of foreign weapons and foreign assistance in training soldiers and sailors was more easily available to the bakufu than to other governments in Japan.” (Jansen, 1995: 171) Yet issues related to the enforced class system and the strict political structures were beginning to surface as Japan “was in the throes of a revolution in economic and social matters.” (Hoare, 1994: 3) The social class system, although still formally existing, had changed through the course of the Edo period as merchants and other chōnin (townsmen) in particular were no longer in the lowest social position and samurai were increasingly educated but unable to choose professions. From
Hoare’s economic perspective, “the samurai, the nominal military class, had grown lax in the long years of peace and had become an unproductive group, unbalancing the country’s economy.” (Hoare, 1994:3) The treaties brought difficulty to the Shogunate, as the Shogunate was established following civil war as symbolising absolute authority. The necessity to bow to Seiyō demands severely weakened the Shogunate’s prestige as the country’s protector: Japan was not strong enough to oppose America and the European Powers with military force, and this left the authorities with few palatable choices but to bow to their demands.

That the Shogunate had potential to adapt to this world order demonstrates that Japanese cosmology was more flexible than Chinese: Japanese acceptance was aided by Japan not having completely fixed ideas about itself as centre of its world system, as during the Edo period the Tokugawa was dealt differently with Korea, China, the Ryūkyūs and the Dutch. For Japan, the free trade imperialism which entered after signing the unequal treaties had shown that “On the one hand, the ‘civilized countries’ refused to recognize traditional practices of interstate relations within East Asia that rested on notion of suzerain-vassal relations and elaborate rituals of exchange. Instead, they insisted on a new system of “international law”… that assumed that all members of the “community of nations” would deal with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity.” (Duus, 1995:17) The swiftness with which the Japanese sought to understand this system is impressive: “By the mid-1860s works like Wheatley’s International Law had been translated into Japanese, and the Japanese leadership accepted it as a fixed and universal system… upheld by all ‘civilized nations.’” (Duus, 1995:17) Whilst this understanding was to the long-term advantage of Japan, in the short-term it allowed the daimyo to understand that in signing the unequal treaties, the Shogunate had forced Japan into an inferior position, one which would likely be very difficult to get out of, particularly the right for extraterritoriality. The loss of full sovereignty indicated a two-way acceptance that the signatory was less civilized, although the Japanese magistrates in Shimoda “did not foresee the magnitude of their concession.” (Keene, 2002: 35)

Whilst attempting to quickly adapt to the situation, the Shogunate were left “caught in a trap not of its own choosing; whichever way it turned, it failed to satisfy either the foreigners pressing it from one side, or its enemies in the country.” (Hoare, 1994: 4-5) Although the Shogunate at that time was unable to see the benefits of the system, Hoare concludes: “it may be only coincidence that such modern economic development is linked to former treaty ports but analysts in a variety of disciplines argue that the historical experience of opening to the outside world is an important factor.” (Hoare, 1994: 178) The treaty ports of Yokohama, Osaka and Kobe, and others, would drive an economic boom in the coming decades: although Osaka was only sparsely inhabited by European and American traders, both Yokohama and Kobe had over one thousand foreign (non-Chinese) inhabitants each in 1900. (Wason, 1900: 27-31) Trade with the outside world would see the value of Japanese exports increase from less
than 1 million Mexican dollars in 1859 to over 200 million Mexican dollars in 1900 (229 times more) and imports increase from over 500 thousand Mexican dollars in 1859 to nearly 300 million Mexican dollars in 1900 (476 times more). (Hoare, 1994: 179) However in the short to medium term, this situation was not necessarily beneficial to Japanese merchants and commoners as cheap foreign products severely undermined natively produced goods. (Reischauer et al, 1965: 210)

The growing perception of foreign threat, after so many years of seclusion, and the reduction in the power and authority of the Shogunate, whose raison d’être from the inception of the Tokugawa was in part to protect Japan from barbarians, led to a growing anti-Western and anti-Shogun sentiment. This was expressed in the phrase sonnō jōi [Jap. 尊皇攘夷], or ‘revere the emperor, expel the barbarians’. 58 The Shogunate’s decentralised political system did not help stem this opposition:

“Direct resistance was hopeless, as the feeble attempts to organize it proved. Mere concessions and diplomatic evasions could be no more than temporary expedients. The need to reform, both by adopting the relevant techniques of the west and restoring (or creating) the will to national self-assertion, was hotly debated among educated officials and intellectuals, but what turned it into the ‘Meiji Restoration’ of 1868 i.e. drastic ‘revolution from above’, was the evident failure of the feudal-bureaucratic military system of the Shoguns to cope with the crisis.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 149)

Opposition to the bakufu grew, coalescing around the leadership of Choshu and Satsuma han, (both of which had earlier been involved in short wars with Britain and her allies) while supporting the emperor: following the ‘Anglo-Satsuma War’, these han would eventually modify their anti-foreign stand. Indeed these anti-Shogunate domains were the first han to send students abroad from the early 1860s. Satsuma han, the most important, had grown powerful enough and independent-minded enough to enjoy representation at the Paris exposition in 1867 (fig. 2.3). In Satsuma, “by 1865-6 they recognised and acted on the need for the domain to know more about the West. Fourteen students were selected and sent to London under the guidance of domain officials. Once in Europe the students were set to studying a variety of technological and military specialities.” (Jansen, 1995: 184) The leaders of the resistance and ‘modernisation’ at the end of the Edo were figures from Satsuma and Choshu who were European-educated samurai. These han, which had been the centres for “visceral xenophobes” had rejected contact with foreigners in the 1850s and early 1860s because they thought that “consorting with Western barbarians was polluting, defiling, and disgusting.” (Duus, 1995: 13) By the late 1860s,

58 “In the [Japanese phrase] ‘use the barbarian’, Westerners were described as ǐ, a term by which both Chinese and Japanese identified those who were outside the bounds of Confucian society.” (Beasley, 1995:1)
following further examples of Seiyō military technology, this disgust had turned to the Shogunate, as
the signing of the treaties “revealed national weakness and ignorance.” (Duus, 1995: 13)

The collapse of “secluded” Edo Japan was mainly due to the way “the Western powers had created the
bakufu’s political problems, and they remained to complicate them by their presence in the ports that
had been opened.” (Jansen, 1995: 171) The political divisions at this time were mainly between the
pro-imperialists, the Shogunate forces, and highly independent han motivated by their personal power.
The final days of the bakumatsu were a clear power struggle for the destiny of Japan. In this struggle
the decentralisation of power became a huge drawback for the Shogunate: “even the bakufu army was
only one, admittedly large, force among others, and bakufu efforts to coerce depended upon the
cooperation of its vassals’ armies. When that cooperation was withheld in the 1860s the bakufu
gradually declined to the status of a regional power.” (Jansen, 2000: 60)

In the final years of the bakumatsu, the differences between potential rulers were no longer clear cut.
The forces which supported the emperor had for some years following the Anglo-Satsuma war in 1863
been distinguished from the Shogunate by their adoption of foreign technology, yet by 1867 the Shogun
too had embraced reform, to a much deeper extent than was seen in Self-Strengthening China. After
extensive discussions between the French representative Léon Roches and the new Shogun,
“Administrative reforms followed; these set up a sort of cabinet system with specialised responsibilities
replacing the monthly rotation of all-purpose generalists that had been the pattern. New personnel
practices were designed to facilitate the selection of competent officials, with a regularized salary
system for government departments… Military reforms were pushed particularly rapidly. A French
military mission arrived in January 1867. Western uniforms were adopted; obsolete forces were disbanded.” (Jansen, 1995: 188) The Shogun’s younger brother was even sent to France to study, another sign of the Shogunate’s new belief in the need to adapt to Seiyō demands.

Yet these efforts were to prove too little and too delayed: without enough time to strengthen his rule, “in January 1868, the Imperial Palace at Kyoto was seized and a decree issued stripping the shogun of all his power; the rule of the Tokugawa Bakufu was over. Administrative power was, nominally at least, restored to the emperor.” (Hoare, 1994: 5) Seen in the context of Shogunal reforms however, the victory of the Imperial forces was not a victory for modernisation over feudalism: “the civil war in 1868 was fought over the issue not of whether Tokugawa feudalism would survive, but whether its demise would be presided over by Tokugawa or anti-Tokugawa leaders. It was no longer a matter of saving the bakufu system but of replacing it, now that it was collapsing.” (Jansen, 1995: 188) Indeed, both forces which in 1858 had been strongly anti-foreign had by 1868, and in the face of superior military technology, been persuaded to adopt Seiyō technology and to strengthen the country against further foreign intrusions through imitating the styling of Seiyō. This continuation of a trend is shown in that the departing shogun, TOKUGAWA Yoshinobu, “in his letter of resignation as shogun, expressed the hope that a change in regime would enable the country ‘to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the world.’” (Duus, 1995: 13)

It was pragmatism which led the future Meiji elites to change their national aspiration from ‘Expel the Barbarians’ to ‘civilisation and enlightenment.’ The parallel modernisation efforts of the Shogunate and anti-Shogunate forces displayed logic of survival regardless of the cultural costs (which for some in Europe and America became seen as an example of Social Darwinism in action) but also an instance of rationality superseding custom, which had seen Seiyō as barbarians. This foundation of applying critical reason rather than sentiment and xenophobia to the issue of sovereignty set the cultural parameters of the Meiji period, where enriching and ‘civilising’ the country became the end purpose and rational means were used to achieve this.

2.2 The Meiji’s government’s preparation for modernity
One of the first acts of the new Meiji government was to disestablish the class and han (Jap. 藩) system. With the abolition of the daimyo’s feudal rights, the old han system disappeared, prefectures were set up, more state schools were established, wearing swords was banned, as was the bobbing of hair (only allowed for samurai) in order to destroy the outward signs of the samurai class. The cultural mores of the Shogunate system was replaced largely by systems of Seiyō modernity so that ‘Western
clothing’ became the official formal wear for government officials. Other more substantial changes occurred with the adoption of European style buildings, public carriages (rather than sedan chairs), trains, and gas lighting, all of which appeared in Japan within decades of the Restoration. Some Japanese began changing their customs, for instance eating beef and drinking beer, activities earlier unseen in Japan. In 1872, use of the solar calendar (rather than the previous lunar calendar) and the 24 hour day were stipulated. (Cheng, L., 2008: 145) The principle of learning from abroad seemed to apply to all areas of cultural and political life. However, the process of adaptation was more subtle and selective than it first appears, as will be explored in the remaining sections of this chapter.

The principles of Meiji policy
Soon after the Meiji Restoration the new government quickly established its priorities. These were codified in a quasi-religious ceremony in Kyoto with the leaders of the new government and the emperor on 6 April 1868. These priorities were affirmed as a series of oaths taken in front of the emperor which were named the ‘Five Charter Oath’ (Jap. 五箇条の御誓文). The oaths from the Official Journal of the Imperial Government of Japan (Jap. 大政官日誌掲載) went as follows:

1. We shall determine all matters of state by public discussion, after assemblies have been convoked far and wide;
2. We shall unite the hearts and minds of people high and low, the better to pursue with vigour the rule of the realm;
3. We are duty bound to ensure that all people, nobility, military, and commoners too, may fulfill their aspirations and not yield to despair;
4. We shall break through the shackles of former evil practice and base our actions on the principles of international law;
5. We shall seek knowledge throughout the world and thus invigorate the foundations of this imperial nation. (Breen, 1996: 410)

The strong language regarding the Japanese past, labeling some practices as ‘evil’ and equating the future with internationalism, demonstrate the beginning of a self-identity as semi-civilised. The first and second oaths are key and are unambiguous in spelling out the intention to build a democratic nation-state in Japan, following the example of states in Europe and the U.S.A. The fifth oath for the immediate priorities of the state, and perhaps the most significant in relation to this thesis, was: “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule.” Under this principle of learning from the world (already evidenced in oaths one to four) Japan
established a Euro-American-based political system, set national slogans to promote *Bunmei Kaika* (civilisation and enlightenment) and *Fukoku Kyōhei* (Enrich the Country and Strengthen the Military) and promoted *Seiyō* ideas in social and educational settings. At this time liberalism, utilitarianism and democracy were concepts translated into Japanese for the first time and then increasing used by the Meiji government, amongst other concepts (as discussed in Chapter 1).

The role of the emperor in this ceremony was crucial in authorising these revolutionary Oaths. After the oath was taken the Chief Executive, SANJŌ Sanetomi (Jap. 三条実美, 1837-1891), said on behalf of the emperor:

“My intention is to implement reform the likes of which have never before been seen. I have, therefore, seized the initiative; I have sworn an oath before the gods of heaven and earth; I have set forth our national goals, and I hope, thus, to establish a path of safety for all my subjects. May you be inspired by this initiative. Unite your hearts and be unsparing in your efforts.” (Breen, 1996: 412)

These aims and concepts were given a platform to succeed by the state that the new government created; this state was the platform from which Japan achieved self-defined ‘civilisation’. During the Meiji period “Japan came to acquire almost all the ingredients of a modern state that other countries were also in the process of obtaining.” (Iriye, 1995: 276) Primarily, the early Meiji government established the state on the basis of three inter-linked levels: political unity, administrative reform and national consciousness centred on the emperor.

On the first level, internal political unity replaced the cumbersome Tokugawa Shogunate system. The new Tokyo government “quickly established a bureaucratic apparatus so that within a few years after 1868 it boasted of a multitude of ministries of Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and others for which ‘enlightened’ elites were recruited. These elites were mostly former *samurai* who had been active in *bakufu* and *han* affairs in the year before the Restoration, and many of them had spent several years studying in the West.” (Iriye, 1995: 276) The heads of Ministries and bureaucrats were picked more on their ability to carry out the priorities of government, than on their own connections or relationships (although the majority came from the two clans which drove the Restoration, Choshu and Satsuma). This principle of selecting according to ability (which had itself originated in Enlightenment scholars’ veneration of the Chinese examination system) led to the end of the feudal system and the class system where each *han* was run by a hereditary *daimyo* who employed retainers. Instead each subject
of the emperor could in principle choose their own career, and provinces were run by men who shared the vision of the new state.

Second, the early Meiji government also undertook substantial administrative changes “involving tax reforms so as to obtain revenue from the agricultural sector and to turn it over for industrialisation. The government took steps to identify and protect merchants and industrialists, to establish model factories and quality inspection stations, and to instil in the people the idea that “enriching the country” was just as important a goal as was “strengthening the defense.” (Iriye, 1995: 276) In their respect for the activities of merchants these reforms constituted a complete reversal of the Confucian-inspired class system in which merchants were nominally at the bottom. Consequently mass incorporation of the citizenry into the state also proceeded, through population registers, military conscription, and education. By the 1870s “numerous political parties, study groups, and community organisations had come into being, superimposed on traditional family and religious institutions.” (Iriye, 1995: 277) By empowering the citizenry to take a part in the nation-building activities, in particular through supporting merchants, the Japanese leaders attempted to boast their trade economy and ownership of the political changes which were occurring.

Third, the Japanese government used the symbol of the divine emperor to develop a national ‘Japanese’ consciousness, unique compared to other nations. Most European states in the early 1870s were monarchies, but these did not use their monarchs as consciously as Japan to create a centralised bureaucratic system. This was possible due in part to the Japanese monarchy's unique longevity (traditional history stated that the same family had ruled Japan since 660BC) and in part due to the Meiji emperor's key role as a symbolic saviour in the years preceding the Restoration. By identifying the new arrangements (beginning with the Five Charter Oaths) “as rule by the sacred emperor, an aura of sanctity was accorded to them. Japan's armed forces and bureaucrats would be “the emperor's soldiers and Officials,” making them perhaps less vulnerable to partisan attacks than might have been the case in other societies with shorter periods of dynastic history. By combining a newly created bureaucracy, civilian and military, with the prestige of a fifteen-hundred year-old institution, the Meiji leaders succeeded in giving modernization almost instant legitimacy.” (Iriye, 1995: 278) Alistair D. Swale supports this view of the emperor as uniquely unifying, writing, “the Imperial household possessed what the Shogunate did not: the capacity for charismatic inspiration, a religious dimension that would enable incongruent forces and disparate elements to be recast into a new whole.” (Swale, 2009: 176) As part of this, the Shintō Worship Bureau (Jap. 神祇事務局) was set up in 1868 to oversee the religion, since this native belief system had no formal structure beyond a set of practices, and to separate Buddhism from Shintō (Jap. 神道, lit. Dao of the Gods, adapted from the written Chinese
shén dào as in Taoism). This was followed in 1871 by nationalisation of the country’s Shintō shrines and in 1872 by the creation of a ranking system of the said shrines. By simultaneously cutting funding for Buddhist temples and establishing the purely Japanese Shinto as a coherent national religion, the government created conditions for a semi-state religion, with the ‘divine’ emperor Meiji at its head.

Official slogans such as Fukoku Kyohei and Bunmei Kaika were important to the government. Perhaps the most interesting in terms of Japan’s articulation of kindai (modern) was the slogan Wakon-yōsai (Jap. 和魂洋才, lit. Japanese spirit, Foreign/Western technology). This phrase functioned to resist the argument of ‘superior Western culture and backward Japanese culture’. This phrase maintained “the fiction of pure Japaneseness in the clearly demarcated realm of the ‘spirit’ as opposed to the superficial realm of ‘technology’.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 114) It was crucial for Japanese authorities to present the modernisation efforts as not affecting the core identity of the Japanese, notable in the context of establishing Shintō as the state religion. Not all scholars agree with the idea that Japanese elites were attempting to maintain a core Japanese identity in the early Meiji period: Sakamoto states that “early Meiji discourse of ‘civilization and enlightenment’ is built on an awareness that the ‘spirit’ of Western civilisation has to be implanted successfully to resist Western imperialism, and therefore the notion of pure Japanese identity had to be abandoned altogether.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 114) Ultimately, this core idea of ‘Japaneseness’ which had developed throughout Japan’s history was greatly affected by the modernisation process beginning in the early 1860s. This change in core ideals was especially the case in areas where the basic education methods and content was adapted and undertaken by foreign experts. For instance, where Japanese history was taught by European and American teachers, the identity of Japan was viewed through the prism of Victorian scholarship and was often seen in negative terms.

Whilst these reforms were broadly successful in building a state capable of achieving its aims, the clear motivation remained to match the imperialist Powers operating in East Asia in military, political and socio-cultural terms. This motivation was one which would not have been recognised as at all desirable in the years preceding the Meiji Restoration, but by 1868 the authorities had internalised a demand for ‘civilisation’ in order to be seen as equals. These reforms became seen as necessary to secure revision of the unequal treaties. Zeal for treaty revision, and consequently for winning the esteem of Seiyō, elicited many bureaucratic efforts to reform Japanese customs. For example, an ordinance that forbade public nakedness and mixed bathing in public bathhouses was justified by the government with the claim that although “this is the general custom and is not so despised among ourselves, in foreign countries this is looked on with great contempt. You should therefore consider it a great shame.” (Pyle, 1969: 101) Government efforts to win foreigners’ approval also included methods of architectural
persuasion, as we shall see in Chapters 3 to 5, which are worth briefly exploring here. To continue the theme of bathing, following a ban on mixed bathing, the Meiji government also built public bathhouses with separate sex areas, as shown in fig. 2.2. This segregation, unprecedented prior to the Restoration, was an example of cultural revisionism following the perceived tastes in bathing of Seiyō at this time.

![Public bath house](image)

The walled complex provided shelter to the bather from public eyes whilst the parallel halves of the building formally segregated men and women. Hobsbawm summarises the overall tenor of the principles of this new Japan: “What was the Meiji Restoration, if not the appearance of a new and proud ‘nation’ in Japan?” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 84) Japan managed to navigate Seiyō’s discourse of superiority, adapt to their methods, techniques and conceptual language without self-identification as inferior and losing their pride. This was in spite of deeply profound influence by the Great Powers, particularly at the initial stage of change.

**Western influence over Meiji Japan**
That Japan was ultimately successful in resisting foreign pressure was a shock to observers at the time, for at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was held to be a less than illustrious East Asian state,

---

59 The most striking example of architecture used to please the Euro-American residents in Japan and to provide contact with them was Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan “a gaudy Victorian hall, opened in Tokyo for the purpose of entertaining foreign residents with cards, billiards, Western music, dances, and lavish balls.” (Pyle, 1969: 101) This is explored in detail in Section 3.4.
unlike China. The context of Japan’s rise in the late-nineteenth century is summarised by Eric Hobsbawm: “Of all the non-European countries only one actually succeeded in meeting and beating the west at its own game. This was Japan, somewhat to the surprise of contemporaries.... By the mid-nineteenth century it seemed to the west no different from any other oriental country, or at least equally predestined by economic backwardness and military inferiority to become the victim of capitalism.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 147)

A necessary foundation in understanding how Japan was able to adapt to the Great Powers on their own terms was that Japan’s notion of civilisation was altered after contact with the nations of Euro-America in the 19th century. One of the main factors of why Japan’s notion of civilisation changed was that the leading nations viewed themselves as the only source of civilisation (an opinion that had only truly come to fruition by the end of the 18th century). Unlike the Confucian-based criteria for civilisation in Japan, civilisation in Europe as conceptualised in the 19th century was based on quasi-objective and scientific criteria: for the liberal thinker John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the most translated political author in Meiji Japan after Herbert Spencer (Nagai, 1954: 55), uncivilised societies were thinly scattered; had an unequal distribution of wealth; and lacked commerce, manufacturing, or agriculture. (Tunick, 2006: 593) Mill believed countries from Ireland to India were not fully civilised. For Mill such countries justified being colonised on the basis it would be “for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners” (Mill, 1963: 121). A dependent country that is not yet civilised, “if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it,” to facilitate its “transition to a higher stage of improvement.… We need not expect to see that ideal realised; but unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust.” (Mill, 1861: 567-568) Given that Britain considered itself civilised whilst Oriental countries were not, Japanese elites interpreted ‘civilisation’ initially as corresponding with the characteristics and actions of the leading nations (or ‘Great Powers’), particularly Britain. The Meiji elites may have taken this approach because, unconsciously, they assumed the Confucian idea of civilisation which was based on territory, identity and belonging, and finding the location of superior role models.

As argued in Section 1.3 civilisation, having been seen as a behavioural standard early on, became instead seen as openness to the outside, as some form of change or development, and socio-political betterment. These changes reflect the transition from a Confucian (behavioural) concept to an open concept, a concept which reflected what was commonly believed to be civilised in Europe and America. Japanese elites wished to demonstrate that they were capable of transitioning alone, without colonisation, to a high stage of development and becoming civilised on the terms of Euro-American scholars and politicians; this was required in order both to avoid colonisation and to reverse the Unequal Treaties.
As I later consider why Meiji architects wished to display ‘civilisation’ in their architecture it is worth establishing here that foreign attitudes toward Japanese buildings had themselves fundamentally shifted from first contact in the 16th century to the 19th century. In the first phase of contact with the ‘Western barbarians’, adopting ‘Western’ architecture was not an issue for Japan, as Japanese architecture was viewed as both beautiful and impressive by foreign visitors, and the European powers such as Portugal, Britain and the Netherlands were not powerful enough to impose their views in any case. Consider the description of the Portuguese Jesuit priest Luis Frois (1532-1597) of Gifu castle (Jap. 岐阜城, rebuilt in 1567):

“I wish I were a skilled architect or had the gifts of describing places well, because I sincerely assure you that of all the palaces and houses I have seen in Portugal, India and Japan, there has been nothing to compare with this as regards luxury, wealth and cleanliness… in order to display his magnificence and enjoy his pleasures to the full, [Oda Nobunaga, who overthrew the previous Shogunate] decided to build for himself at enormous cost this his earthly paradise.” (Frois, 1585, quoted in Cooper, 1995: 131-132)

In the first period of extensive contact and trade with Europe (1543-1639) Japanese architecture of authority continued on its own path, and European forms, functions, spaces and materials did not influence Japanese architecture in any discernible way (Coadrake, 2001: 48), which at the time was undergoing an enormous castle building boom. Over three hundred years, the attitudes of European and American scholars and government officials had changed fundamentally following the Renaissance, imperialism and Enlightenment: viewing the architecture of other countries from a lofty position meant that unabashed admiration was no longer a valid position. Instead foreigners in Meiji Japan adopted the role of civilised agents for change.

The root causes for adapting the state to fit Seiyō expectations were the Meiji elites’ esteem for nations such as Britain and France and the influence of senior diplomats in Japan close to those in power. During the crucial period of transition from Edo to Meiji, figures such as the French and British ambassadors were advisors to the authorities. The content of their advice is important to note, as it influenced the later adoption of the slogan bunmei kaika as well as the notion that Europe was the centre of civilisation. William G. Beasley's important work on Japan’s interactions with foreigners in this period of transition found that:

“almost all foreigners whose work brought them to the treaty ports, especially the consuls and missionaries, thought of themselves as belonging to a ‘higher’ civilisation, which it
would be in Japan's interest to adopt. They argued not only that trade would bring prosperity, contributing in the long run to an improvement in welfare and stability, but also that the West possessed, in addition to advanced scientific concepts and technology, a superior system of ethics and social principles, even of ‘culture’. These, they argued, should be models for semi-civilized Japan.” (Beasley, 1995: 140)

An example of this trend could be found in the writings of Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897), British Minister in Japan from 1859 to 1864. He wrote that ‘In a more general sense, although the Japanese possessed ‘a material civilization of a high order, in which the industrial arts are brought to as great a perfection as could well be attainable without the aid of steampower and machinery’, their ‘intellectual and moral pretentions… compared with what has been achieved in the more civilized nations of the West during the last three centuries, must be placed very low’. For all that, he believed, they were improvable. Their capacity ‘for higher and better civilization than they have yet attained’ ranked ‘far above that of any other Eastern nation’. ” (Beasley, 1995: 141) Westerners in Japan widely held an attitude of cultural superiority, which when coupled with the apparent threat of colonisation, led the Meiji rulers to desire close ties with the ‘West’ and to replicate the products and principles of this advanced civilisation in the ‘East’.

As adaptations to Seiyō were taking place, foreigners who had been enamored with Japanese traditions and mystique also began to re-evaluate their impressions of Japan. One writer (Alexander Innes Shand, 1832-1907, in 1874 writing about the Japanese at the Vienna exhibition in 1873) described Japanese in Western dress as incongruous and as a masquerade, clearly surprised that a non-Western people could ‘modernise’ with such confidence:

“…there was one strange type of nationality you met at every turn – small, slight-made men, with olive complexions and black twinkling eyes slit almond-fashion. But on their way to Vienna they had probably passed by Paris, and were dressed in such garments as are able to be procured at the Belle Jardinerie or the Bon Diable, with tall chimney-pot hat that came well down upon their foreheads. They had taken wonderfully kindly to these new clothes of theirs, and yet there was something about them that told you that they were masquerading cleverly… They hopped on behind the crowded tramway cars with an utter absence of dignity we regard as the birthright of oriental blood.” (Shand, 1874, quoted in Yokoyama, 1987: 115)

This obvious Westernisation of dress with Japanese in positions of authority had a peculiar effect on contemporary Europeans and Americans. In the 1860s many observers of Japan wrote of the
ambiguous feelings at the ‘West’s role in Japan, since it was America, Russia and Britain that had forced the opening of the ports, eventually leading to the Restoration of the emperor and prompting some of the Japanese customs beloved by contemporary Orientalists to disappear. Yet when the Japanese adapted to the Great Powers by becoming more like them and began imitating some of their habits, these same observers began to reassess the West’s role in the transformation. (Yokoyama, 1987: 141) Adaptation did not fit at all well with ideas of ‘static Japan’ (widely held of a country deemed isolated from the outside world for centuries). One example of the rejection of any significant responsibility for Japan’s odd adaptive behaviour can be found in the writings of D. Wedderburn in 1878 on the cause of the Meiji Restoration:

“One thing is evident, that a slight external impulse only was required to topple down the existing fabric of Japanese society at the time when foreigners forced their way into the country producing an effect analogous to that of a solid dropping into a fluid of the verge of crystallization, and converting it suddenly into a solid mass.” (Wedderburn, 1878: 417)

Contemporaneous Japanese would have been likely to embrace such discourse, as it supported the idea that Japan had changed little following the Restoration, and that Japan’s modernisation fitted with the slogan of ‘Japanese spirit, Western technology’.

However the tone of Orientalists’ attitude towards Japan would shift again further into the Meiji period, from a self-propelled country to one which had always been an imitator. By the end of the 1870s, adaptation on a large scale to ‘Western thought’, concepts, and ways of thinking, led to a reputation of Japan in Europe and America that was far from that of the ‘static’ model prevalent only 20 years earlier. From about 1880, “the image of an unreal Japan became firmly established in Britain and began to exert a broader influence. For example, the image of ‘a civilization without any originality’, which was as romantic an idea as the tourists’ idea of Japan as an elf-land, became an element in the way British intellectuals thought about Far Eastern questions in general.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175) A part of this reimagining was due to the fact that “raw information about Japan never appeared in magazines and reviews in its original complexity.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 172)

This simplification of Japan as a mere imitator, though, was pervasive in Western scholarship. Even Algernon Freeman-Mitford, who once had a subtle knowledge of Japan (Yokoyama, 1987: 175), found it simple later in his career to label Japan as an easy imitator, and to suggest that this imitation held no drawbacks for Japan. Such a notion, even if not consciously meant, was self-serving, as in declaring that Japan was both uninventive and suffered no loss in changing, it implied that the British and other peoples of Europe and America would be foolish to feel any guilt for causing the admired Japanese
tradition to be eroded and in some instances replaced. Indeed, the idea that imitation was the best that non-Western nations could attain “was a notion on which Mitford and many of his contemporaries relied to defend the British Empire.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175)

Whilst it seems outlandish to downplay the role of Seiyō in Japan’s cultural changes, given how much effort Japan made to adapt and modernise, it fitted the times as Japan was growing in confidence. Further evidence of Japan’s collective aspiration to be counted amongst the civilised nations was their principles of dealing with their neighbours, particularly China. As will be shown in Section 4.1, the Meiji government’s actions towards China heralded a transitional period when the criteria for civilisation were filtered through a Euro-American prism rather than a Confucian one. In order to understand how and why this transition occurred, I will analyse two of the main points of knowledge generation for learning about the Europe and America during this early transitional period: government missions to the Europe and America and education.

Contact zone 1: Government missions to the West

Japanese architecture from 1850 to 1895 was a central part of a wider process of Japan becoming seen as ‘civilised’. Yet it was only a small if significant part of this process. I argued in Section 2.1 that by the mid-1860s, the only option pursued by both Shogunal and Imperial factions was adapting to Seiyō: it had long been accepted by the Meiji political elites that becoming as strong as the Great Powers was necessary to avoid the humiliation of China and the potential for colonisation. Referring to the conceptual framework of Section 1.1, during this early period of modernisation, Japan was undergoing a long period of identity re-formation. Whilst coming to terms with the harsh international conditions, the Japanese had to reposition their identity as a nation with a Confucian spirit to one where critical reason was central, and where civilisation was not seen as residing in China but in Europe.

With the theory of ‘contact zone’ in mind, it is important to examine the sites where Japan learnt about Seiyō and how their position of inferiority impacted upon this learning. Given this conceptual framework, what are most interesting to examine in these contact zones is the changes in the conceptual framework of Japan, and what kind of cosmology replaced the previous one following this contact. Due to the great geographical distances involved and the differing cultural perspectives, it was unsurprising that early attempts to visit and learn from Europe and America following the signing of the Unequal Treaties in 1858 met with little success and little genuine exchange. The first foreign mission to Seiyō was the 1860 Mission to America. In contrast with later missions, “officially… study of the West had no part in proceedings at all.” (Beasley, 1995: 58) The mission totalled 77 people, with staff inspectors (Jap. 60 Incidentally, this consensus is why that the Meiji Restoration was not deemed a revolution.
Due to the fact that the envoys had never been abroad, the mission encountered numerous difficulties, of which “language was the greatest obstacle of all. Official communications were in Dutch” (Beasley, 1995: 63) which required a double translation and therefore, since the Americans did not speak Dutch, all translators had to be present to permit communication.

One envoy of this mission, TAMAMUSHI Sadayū (Jap. 玉虫左太夫, 1823-1869), was relatively positive towards America and noted that there might be something to be learnt from the American navy, with the caveat that “I would not go so far as to esteem barbarian ways.” (Beasley, 1995: 66) While less senior members of the Mission were “better able than the diplomats to deal with Western technology, [the chief envoys were] too bound by Japanese social concepts to arrive at any real understanding of how Western society worked... The more senior the Japanese, it appears, the less useful were his observations. The pattern was to be repeated when a mission was sent to Europe in 1862.” (Beasley, 1995: 70)

This first mission to Europe occurred two years later and, like the mission to America, was supported by the foreign envoys in Japan “who believed that the more the Japanese became aware of the West’s superiority, the less they would be inclined to resist the West’s demands.” (Beasley, 1995: 70) In contrast with this hope, there was little evidence of learning by the Japanese envoys on the trip, the most noteworthy event being their visit to Holland, since trading contacts between the Dutch and Japanese had been so longstanding and so influential. The embassy was disillusioned in what they found in the Netherlands after seeing the wealth of France and Britain. This disappointment stretched to the Dutch language: “As a language, Dutch was not widely used. Even in Holland the people bought mostly books in French and German, while scholars in France and England expressed amazement when they heard that the Japanese relied on it in their studies. As a consequence, [one envoy wrote] ‘we have become ashamed of it and stopped telling people’. If the Bakufu planned to send students to Europe, as he had heard, then they must at all costs, he believed, go to France or Britain, not to Holland.” (Beasley, 1995: 85) This policy was effected immediately upon return to Japan, and foreign students thereafter rarely studied in the Netherlands.

Subsequent missions included the Shibata mission (1865, followed by a French military mission 1867-68), and the (illegal) Satsuma mission to Europe (1865). The graduates of the Satsuma mission were all promoted for what they had done, “in marked contrast to the way in which the Bakufu treated many of its envoys” (Beasley, 1995: 113) who were often sidelined upon their return. It was only in the final years of the bakumatsu period that the Shogunate began to systematically send students abroad.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the bakufu and the future Meiji government (in fact an Oligarchy, overwhelmingly consisting of elites from Satsuma and Choshu han) were keen on sending students abroad partly because a number of the governing clique had themselves studied in Europe and America. In fact, prior to the Restoration, sending students to study abroad, particularly students from Satsuma and Choshu, was far more important for persuading students of Seiyō’s geo-political dominance than the government missions were. That these students were not restricted to learning technical and military subjects reflects this trend. In 1870-71, the subjects that the Meiji government sent its students abroad to study were in three tiers of priority: “military and naval studies took first place, though only by a narrow margin. Next came medicine, science and non-military technology. Law, politics and economics, which were seen to be the proper educational concern of aspirant bureaucrats, were a close third. Britain (93 students) was still at this stage the most popular destination, followed by the United States (75), Germany (46) displaced France (37) from the third place it had held in earlier years.” (Beasley, 1995: 152) Around 90 private students also studied abroad in 1870-71. (Beasley, 1995: 152) Yet although many of these students were to become a part of the government bureaucracy when they returned, the Meiji government was also planning to send a large proportion of the central leadership of Meiji Japan on a path-breaking mission across the globe, focusing on America and Europe.

Whilst previous missions were born of political necessity, the envoys of the Iwakura mission (1871-73) brought with them a very different attitude. The status of the envoys had also increased beyond bureaucrats in the fledgling foreign office: “The embassy which left Japan in December 1871 was led by men of higher standing and more authority than any of its predecessors. Its senior member was Iwakura Tomomi (Jap. 岩倉具視, 1825-1883), who as Minister of the Left and former Foreign Minister was the second-highest official of the emperor’s government.” (Beasley, 1995: 157) Iwakura himself was close to Sir Harry Parkes who was Britain’s Ambassador in Japan, and frequently turned to the British for advice. As early as 1868 “Some members of the old Imperial Court showed welcome signs of modernity and Parkes was much impressed by the skill and ability of Iwakura, who consulted him closely on the policies which Japan should adopt in its attempt to become strong and respected. Parkes, as always, emphasized the need for a strong central government which could control defence, foreign policy and legislation. However caution had its place in his advice, for he stressed the need for continuity and ‘the grafting of new upon the old’ rather than any thoughtless search for innovation.” (Daniels, 1996: 92) In 1869, Iwakura was encouraging his colleagues to “perform admirable service to this development enterprise and to spread civilization widely…. We must do our all to enhance the Empire’s power abroad.” (Mason, 2012: 1) Overall Iwakura was familiar with the political discourse of
Seiyō and sought to ally and identify with the Great Powers rather than with East Asians (even whilst he believed them to be Japan’s enemies, as shown in Section 4.1).

Four powerful vice-ambassadors joined him, one of whom would later become the first Prime Minister of Japan and hold that position on four separate occasions: ITŌ Hirobumi (Jap. 伊藤博文, 1841-1909).

The official party was 48 strong including an official chronicler and, in a sign of their diminished political responsibilities, a mere five former daimyo travelling to see the world. (Beasley, 1995: 162) Taken as a whole, the mission was “perhaps the first overseas mission in world history to include such a large percentage of a country’s leadership.” (Ruxton, 1998: 54)

The envoys of the delegation had three main objectives:

1. To assess the civilisation of the West, with a view to adopting those parts of it which would be of value to Japan.
2. To secure international recognition for Japan’s restored imperial regime at the highest level.
3. To enter into initial negotiations for the revision of the “unequal treaties”: the five treaties of 1858. (Beasley, 1995: 157)

The first objective related to the transition towards seeing Seiyō as a valuable source of knowledge rather than as a barbarous area yet fulfilling this required ‘translators’ able to communicate with the Japanese people. One of these ‘translators’ was KUME Kunitake (Jap. 久米邦武, 1839-1931), the official chronicler of the Iwakura Mission, a 33 year old Confucian scholar. Kume’s great talent was to translate foreign activities into a language understandable to the Japanese; Kume “even contrived to describe industrial processes in classical terms,61 which, however impenetrable they may appear today, certainly struck a chord in early Meiji Japan, where many of his readers were struggling to reconcile the suddenly fashionable ideas from the West with their own cultural background.” (Cobbing, 1998: 4)

Whilst Kume deemed that the official mission was wherever Iwakura was, members of the embassy split off at various points and had specific roles related to the collation of knowledge. For instance, in San Francisco, KIDO Takayoshi (Jap. 木戸孝允, 1833-1877), second in command of the Mission, “mostly spent his time [in San Francisco] visiting schools, as he was to do in other cities, observing in

---

61 For instance, when describing a busy intersection in Victorian London, “Kume called on his knowledge of Chinese classics to describe this thoroughfare, for it reminded him of Linzi [Chi. 青丘], the capital of the state of Qin [Chi. 秦] (379-221 B.C.), which had been renowned for its prosperity in ancient times. According to Sengoku Saku [Jap. 戦国策, Intrigues of the Warring States], compiled by Liu Xiang [Chi. 劉翔] (77-6 B.C.), Linzi had once been a bustling centre, where vehicles ran so close together that the hubs of their wheels touched, and the crowds were so dense that people rubbed shoulders in the street. Kume believed ‘it would be no idle boast’ to apply this phrase from ancient China to convey a sense of the thriving scenes he had seen in the streets of Victorian London.” (Cobbing, 1998: 6-7)
his diary that it was vital for Japan ‘to promote the enlightenment of the common people’ if the country was ‘to maintain our national sovereignty and prevent any infringement of our independence’.” (Beasley, 1995: 163) Using this system of splitting the embassy allowed the political objectives to run alongside the aim of assessing Euro-American civilisation.

On this aim of learning from Seiyō, Iwakura seems to have held strong opinions. “In January 1869, for example, when thanking the British minister for his government’s readiness to recognize the new regime, he [Iwakura] sought advice about ‘how far we might profitably adopt in Japan the institutions which obtain in Europe’, explaining that while the country had inherited from the past its own culture and traditions, ‘still we recognize, since our contact with foreign nations, that in many respects our civilization is inferior to theirs’.” (Beasley, 1995: 158) This was a shocking change of tone from ten years earlier when Japanese officials remarked they could not esteem ‘barbarian ways’.

The second objective on recognising the new government as legitimate was achieved with little difficulty as the Japanese were welcomed as the rulers of Japan in each country visited. The admiration for the countries visited was not limited to the diplomats. The tone of respect adopted by the Japanese press towards Seiyō was striking, as shown in the passage below on the Mission’s welcome:

“The distinguished men who headed [the Iwakura mission]... entertain grateful feelings towards those who spared neither pains, nor marks of respect, nor expense, to please... Rarely have men ever been received with more truly cordial warmth, or entertained with more lavish hospitality. Kings and Queens opened their palaces to them, nobles and corporations feted them, the populace followed and ran after them. Whatever was to be seen in America or among the nations of Europe of magnificence or beauty, of ingenious industry, of peaceful effort or warlike preparation, was exhibited to them with the kindliest readiness.” (Japan Mail, 1872 quoted in Nish, 1998: 192)

This rhetoric served two functions: on the one hand a myth was being created about Seiyō as a place of magnificence, beauty and industry; on the other, Japan boosted its morale concerning its position in world affairs.

On the third object, whilst in public forums such as newspapers and speeches the tones on both sides were respectful, the envoys encountered much resistance to their negotiations on treaty port revision. The leading power at the time, and the one closest to Iwakura was Britain, which strongly rebuffed the Ambassador’s enquiry. Iwakura, in conversation with the British Foreign Minister, Granville Leveson-Gower, second Earl Granville (1815-1891), indicated that:
“He and his colleagues had come to England… ‘to study her institutions, and observe all that constitutes English civilizations, so as to adopt on their return to Japan whatever they may think suitable to their own country’. Granville did not believe this to be Foreign Office business, but he did comment that Britain would only be prepared to make concessions on the subject of the treaties, such as might put British citizens under the jurisdiction of the Japanese, ‘in precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization’.” (Beasley, 1995: 165)

This attitude of cultural superiority was not unusual and was particularly evident at diplomatic levels. For instance, the biographer of James Bruce (1811-1863), 8th Earl of Elgin wrote on Elgin’s mission to Japan just a year after the Iwakura mission had left Britain that: “The governor goes out to a young and half-civilized country, invested with the dignity of an ancient sovereignty [Queen Victoria] and a great power.” (Reeve, 1873: 39)

The Iwakura mission returned to Japan extremely dissatisfied in respect to revising the extraterritoriality laws in Japan, on which they received no promises for future revision. Although they contributed to fulfilling the other two objectives this progress was not taken to be the main purpose of the Mission outside of the government itself: “Outside the delegation, contemporaries tended to interpret success narrowly in terms of Treaty revision.” (Nish, 1998: 193) This was by far the most difficult objective: “a satisfactory renegotiation of the unequal treaties (including the abolition of extraterritoriality) was not achieved until 1894.” (Ruxton: 1998: 55) Yet though it was 22 years after the Iwakura Mission that this concession was granted, it was during this Mission that the method for Japan to become equal was spelt out: as the British foreign Minister Granville stated, Japan would be granted concessions “in precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization.” (Beasley, 1995: 165) The resistance of both European and American diplomats to revising the unequal treaties may have been just as educational, as pointing towards civilisation and enlightenment, broadly conceived. The mission had a significant effect, not just on government and economy as was the initial intention, but also on the society and culture of Meiji Japan.

After the Iwakura mission returned in 1872, state policy changed from the military focus adopted in the envoys’ absence (the returning ambassadors’ first action upon returning to Japan was preventing a war of aggression against Korea) to a nation-building focus. This strategy built on the initial Meiji movement for political unity, administrative reform, and national consciousness centred on the emperor. This renewed focus was a result of the rump of the Iwakura mission taking over control of Japanese politics and heralding the revolutionary years of the 1870s. Their “policies were influenced by their experiences abroad, and especially by their feelings about the backwardness of Japan and her need to learn from
the West.” (Nish, 1998: 191) Public figures in Japan were “divided on the most basic issues: What kind of culture was Japan to have? How were they to build it, what was to be its centre, and to what purpose? Out of these internal disputers the ‘reform’ or ‘enlightenment’ bureaucrats – a faction led by men like Ōkubo Toshimichi [Jap. 大久保利通, 1830-1878], Kido Takayoshi, and Itō Hirobumi – came to dominate. It was they who held the reins of government under the emperor system.” (Daikichi, 1985: 52)

Whether consciously or not, this nation building and culture change from elites appears to correlate directly with the desire to overturn the unfair treaties by advances in enlightenment and civilisation, adopting the logic of the British Foreign Minister. The experience of the delegates acted as a form of identity regulation, prompting efforts to reframe Japanese diplomats’ self-identities towards acceptance that Japan was far from ‘enlightened’ in European terms but could make efforts to become so.

The mission had a great effect on the terminology used in government about the process of adopting new institutions. The phrase ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ was only present in English-Japanese dictionaries after 1876: three years after the Iwakura Mission. The change from seeing civilisation as a behavioural standard to a shining culture associated with openness and reform demonstrates the difficulty of adapting to the conditions set by Seiyō diplomacy. Second it shows that, although modernity was not yet defined in Japan, the transience of modern conditions was being felt in Japan where civilisation was synonymous with change. Whilst modernity was criticised in the mid-19th century by figures such as Charles Pierre Baudelaire (1821-1861), civilisation was viewed by Japanese politicians as a project to be embarked upon, and this was the dominant view by the end of the Edo period. Yet familiarity with the vocabulary of civilisation was not the only objective to be achieved: in order to keep its subjects satisfied, the Meiji government needed to find a sense of purpose and identity for this nation during its civilising process.

The Iwakura Mission was the last major mission of the Meiji era. The prolonged exposure to the leading nations of Euro-America had altered the worldview of these Japanese leaders, prompting a rethink about Japan’s place in world affairs and what they could do to improve their position. “But they did not return to high office merely as evangelists for the West. Indeed, when they took over the administration, they disagreed not only over the handling of the Korean question but also over many of the reforms which had been introduced by their predecessors too fast... They slowed down the pace of modernization which, they claimed, should not be adopted until the people could understand the need for it.” (Nish, 1998: 191) This did not mean that the intensity of learning from Seiyō would lessen, only that it would take different forms. As a foreign mission, it had an unprecedented impact on Japanese domestic policy as most of the major social, technical and educational institutions would be formed following its return; indirect contact with Seiyō would continue in the Meiji education system.
Contact zone 2: Education from Edo to Meiji

One of the most interesting and probably the most significant method by which the Japanese people found contact with Seiyō was receiving information about the rest of the world and about Japan’s status in the world was through schooling. This was particularly related to the events following the direct contact of the Iwakura Mission, as a large part of the first aim of the mission was dedicated to exploring educational systems, deemed the crucial method to reform Japan to become a kindai (modern) nation. So after the Iwakura Mission returned in 1874, the impact of the Mission continued through reforms of the education system which was one of the key contact zones between Seiyō and Japan during the Meiji period. Because of this impact, it is worth considering in detail education from the late Tokugawa to late Meiji period, to explore how this contact zone grew. This discussion provides a basis for later discussions on architectural education in Chapter 3, as the later architects of ‘Victorian Japan’ also went through this education system, and education had also been an important consideration for Japan even in the years prior to the Meiji Restoration.

The main educational establishments of the Edo period were split into four broad categories: gōkō (Jap. 郷校, official Shogunate school), hankō (Jap. 藩校, local daimyo school), shijuku (Jap. 私塾, private academy), and terakoya (Jap. 寺子屋, common school). Gōgaku (Jap. 語学) as ‘village schools’ were also called gōkō created by the Edo bakufu were divided into hankō, state schools (local daimyo), and terakoya for commoners. (Frédéric, 2002: 252) This confusion over terminology was because distinctions between the various school types “were not clearly made during Tokugawa itself. Nor, with the exception of terakoya, were the terms themselves commonly used.” (Rubinger, 1986: 210) Instead the schools were simply called by their individual names. They are distinguished here since doing so aids my purpose of demonstrating changes to civil society in the Edo period, and the importance of education to non-samurai and the basis this provided for the efforts to create new institutions during the Meiji period.

In reference to Section 2.1, the education system broadly reflected social hierarchies (based on Confucian ideals), with exceptions in the private sphere:

“The private academies, unlike the official schools of the bakufu and han, had no geographical or class criteria for entrance… For most of the Tokugawa period the primary purpose of the bakufu and han schools was the moral training of an hereditary elite. The constituency of these schools was limited to the upper echelons of the samurai class, and the curriculum was narrowly based on the traditional combination of bun [Jap. 文] and bu [Jap. 武], letters and the military arts. In response to the military danger posed by Perry’s
arrival, the bakufu and the domains made efforts to upgrade their defensive capabilities. An important part of these efforts was reform of the official schools where leaders were trained. The bakufu reorganized the central institution of Confucian orthodoxy, the Shoheiko [Jap. 昌平], regularizing lessons and establishing grade levels.” (Rubinger, 1986: 197)

These traditional practices began to change during the bakumatsu. As stated earlier, samurai were generally educated with 200 of 215 han having a policy of compulsory schooling for higher samurai, yet by 1857 some han began to allow commoners into the han schools. (Rubinger, 1986: 198) Still, schooling in this period was characterised by “wide disparities in educational offerings, class and sexual discrimination at official schools, and a tradition of ad hoc and discontinuous private schooling.” (Rubinger, 1986: 199)

The table below puts the gōkō and han schooling into some perspective: by 1868, there were only 343 government schools (118 gōkō schools and 225 han schools) out of a total of 11,621. This is a mere 2.95 percent of the schools established during the whole Edo period. However this proportion was greatly altered in relation to that of 1750, when the share of government schools was 43.6 percent. This means that in a period of just 117 years private schooling increased so much as to make the number of official schools almost insignificant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>gōkō (Official Shogunate)</th>
<th>han (local daimyo)</th>
<th>shōjuku (private academies)</th>
<th>terakoya (common)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600 - 1750</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-1788</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1789-1829</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-1867</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>6,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Unknown</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Edo Period</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>10,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-1872</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date not conclusive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>11,237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3. Development of types of schools by date of establishment. Adapted from Rubinger, 1982.

The first and most obvious conclusion from this data is that in the pre-modern era countries such as Japan, which chose to isolate themselves from open contact with other countries, did not remain ‘static': in the education field, there was an enormous increase in the numbers of schools that were established, a trend which began many years before Perry’s Black Ships. Second, the growth of private academies (a 1760 percent increase from 1750 to 1868) is indicative of the rise of the chōnin (townsman) class who aspired to improve their social achievements and had the means to pay for this privilege. Finally, the phenomenal increase in terakoya schools (a 4133 percent increase from 1750 to 1868) shows that
at the time of the Meiji Restoration, Japan already had a large number of citizens with some form of schooling, a large number of towns and villages with education establishments, and a great number of teachers. These three factors were very helpful in establishing a national education system.

The table below shows the private academies, and the most interesting to us in terms of the contact zone between Japan and Euro-America are the ‘Western studies’ academies. It is worthwhile pointing out that these schools were only 3.2 percent of the total, which whilst being a tiny percentage would nonetheless supply graduates and teachers who would become important at the time of the bakumatsu. The majority of other academies were either engaged in Chinese studies (again demonstrating that Japan had not isolated itself culturally) or calligraphy studies (69 percent of all academies).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Studies</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calligraphy Schools</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculation Schools</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Studies</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Studies only (English and Dutch Language schools)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Studies and Japan-Chinese studies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Schools</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Studies</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing (lower level only)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Studies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,482</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4. Total number of shijuku (private academies) through 1872 by field of study. Adapted from Rubinger, 1982.

The ‘Western studies’ academies “tended to be provided by the larger and more strategically placed domains, such as Chōshū, Tosa, Satsuma, Kaga, and Saga. Others were less enthusiastic. Kasama han, for example, specifically forbade Western style calculation to be taught in its school.” (Rubinger, 1986: 199) These Western studies schools were mostly run by Dutch doctors and therefore operated quite differently to other academies: “The Dutch schools were advanced and specialised schools orientated towards practical knowledge and scientific techniques. Problems of character and morality were secondary, if dealt with at all. Unlike Confucian scholars such as Hirose Tanso [Jap. 広瀬淡窓, 1782-1856] who devoted all his life and energy to running his school, most of the Dutch scholars were physicians who ran schools as sidelines to their medical practices.” (Rubinger, 1982: 104)

From the fruits of these Dutch schools and academies for Seiyō studies came specific institutions, such as the bansho shirabesho (Jap. 藩書調所, lit. Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books), established in
1856. Once a “woefully neglected translation office” (Rubinger, 1986: 197) it became the most important locus for ‘Western learning’ in the late Tokugawa period:

“[T]he Shirabesho, as it is usually called, opened in what is now the Kanda district of modern Tokyo early in 1856. It had at that time a staff of fifteen men, no less than six of whom had been trained as doctors. Only three were direct retainers of the Shogun, though four more came from the domains of vassal lords and two from those of Tokugawa relatives (one of them Echizen). Another three were from the ‘outside’ [Jap. 外様, tozama] domains of Satsuma, Chôshû and Uwajima, which were to play a major part in the politics of the following decade.” (Beasley, 1995: 48)

These schools directly aided the translation of Seiyô thought at the opening of contact between Japan and the Great Powers. At first the name of the school was apt since “translation duties took priority over teaching, because the opening of the ports brought an enormous increase in foreign-language paperwork, but students were admitted from February 1857 and some two hundred soon availed themselves of the opportunity. Three teachers of English were appointed in 1860, reflecting Japan’s diplomatic and commercial needs, and there was a gradual extension of the curriculum thereafter to include French, German, science, geography, and history.” (Beasley, 1995: 48) To reflect the changing character of the institute (and the changing opinion of ‘Westerners’) the institute was renamed kaisei sho (Jap. 開成所, Development Institute) in 1863. This institute was a forerunner of European-style universities: indeed it was one of the institutions which collectively founded the University of Tokyo.

Alongside the Meiji government’s centralisation process was a growing belief that education should be seen as fitting within other societal processes rather than being treated as a private responsibility. TANAKA Fujimaro (Jap. 田中不二麿, 1845-1909), the commissioner for education on the Iwakura Mission, “wrote that the Mission was also planning to look into museums, libraries, hospitals, workhouses, institutions for physically and mentally handicapped people, asylums and so on. This clearly indicates that the notion of ‘education’ of the Iwakura Mission not only covered a wide sphere of the administration of school education, but also included cultural policies and social welfare.” (Ohta, 1998: 14) Given the emphasis on education that had preceded the Meiji era and led to the exponential growth of shijuku and terakoya schools, it is unsurprising that this trend continued into the new period. When deciding upon a new education policy, the Meiji government largely followed the American system because “it was industrialization that took place first in Britain, and the idea of the education of the mass public came later chronologically… In America, on the other hand, a systematic education of the general public from an early age was a prerequisite for the enhancement of industrialization and
national growth. In other words, mass public education and industrialization were sought simultaneously in America. It was quite obvious that the American model was more suited to the necessities of Meiji Japan than the British model.\(^6\) (Ohta, 1998: 16)

This openness to learning, regardless of the lack of fit with customary logic, was reflected in the planning for early Meiji educational policies. Kido, who was second in command of the Iwakura mission, instigated great changes to the education policy in 1872. After visiting America (and in clear reference to the Five Charter Oath), Kido believed “that the Meiji government’s ability to uproot social evils, create a true civilization, and enhance the glory of the country all depend on whether or not the Japanese people are educated.” (Daikichi, 1985: 55) Following the mission:

> “On February 1, 1872…the Ministry of Education announced the “establishment of public elementary schools and schools for Western studies in the Tokyo metropolitan prefecture,” and permission was granted for school administrators to accept applications from foreigners. On September 4, 1872... the government issued decree No. 214 that proclaimed a universal education system to ensure that ‘henceforth there shall be no community with an illiterate family nor a family with an illiterate person.’ This was an astonishingly resolute step” (Daikichi, 1985: 55-56)

Yet this was an achievable step. The large number of schools established before the Meiji period means that “even before the modern system was established there were already large numbers of experienced teachers, numerous young people who had been exposed to at least the basics of reading and writing, and many families who had been introduced to a style of life that included school going for their children.” (Rubinger, 1986: 196)

Due to the scale of change, the first years of universal education were less systematic than the following decades. The content of universal education in the first years was flexible and unrestricted, reflecting the \textit{ad hoc} nature of the early years of Meiji rule. The Ministry’s manual of 1872 said: “the textbooks compiled by the Ministry of Education are only to serve as examples of style and content. The Ministry would very much welcome those who want to write or translate textbooks.” (Education Ministry, 1872, quoted in Takeuchi, 1987: 5) In a reflection of the education in the Edo period, “textbooks for the higher grades of primary schools and all textbooks for secondary schools were left completely to private publication.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 5) In addition to the content of teaching materials,

\(^6\) This decision was another instance of the process of rationalisation seen in various aspects in Japan from 1853. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 were young and open-minded towards the value of \textit{Seiyō}, implementing bureaucratic reforms on Euro-American lines almost immediately: “The new Tokyo government quickly established a bureaucratic apparatus so that within a few years after 1868 it boasted of a multitude of ministries of Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and others for which ‘enlightened’ elites were recruited.” (Iriye, 1995: 276)
the form and content of education itself was not stipulated for a number of years. From 1872 until the mid 1880s, “the compilation of school textbooks was entrusted mainly to private initiative and was not under the strict control of central government… In this happy period there was no fundamental contradiction between government policies and the ideologies of the authors of the textbooks, who at this time, were for the most part pro-Western” (Takeuchi, 1987: 6)

Whilst some theorists such as Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862, described in the following section) were deterministic towards the possibility of achieving ‘civilisation’, the Japanese education system promoted the opposite view:

“Another distinctive feature of early Meiji geography textbooks is a strong faith in the possibility of economic development. For a country such as early Meiji Japan, which is just beginning to pursue economic development, such a belief is perhaps not surprising. Backwardness was never ascribed to physical factors such as climate: this might lead to a fatalistic attitude. Rather it is put down to the laziness of the people, misgovernment and so on. For instance, China had been defeated in the Opium Wars and had become a semicolonial country because it was ruled despotically and its people were apathetic. By contrast the United States, thanks to its democratic system and the industriousness of its people, had become comparable to Great Britain in industry and to France in culture.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 8)

The Meiji government’s early fervour for the civilisation, progress, and the Great Powers, could not be sustained forever given the Japanese public’s lukewarm opinions towards the Seiyō nations who had been considered barbarous only a decade earlier. In the intellectual scene of the 1880s in Japan, “there was a growing ambivalence and hostility towards Western conceptions of representative government among the new wave of elites, many of whom were coming through Tokyo University (though not exclusively so). In tandem with this, there was a growing section of the urban public in general whose antipathy for the government’s program of “Westernisation”, combined with an enthusiasm for military expeditions in the broader Asian region, was burgeoning.” (Swale, 2009: 175) This nationalist trend began to be reflected in text books, with a decrease in focus on the rest of the world: “The first marked change in school textbooks took place with the introduction of the system of ministerial approval. This was the reduction of the coverage of foreign countries, their societies and cultures. For instance, in the primary school curriculum the history of foreign countries vanished completely, and was only taught in connection with Japanese history and very much from a Japan-centred viewpoint.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 9) Nationalism was emphasised in the education system as in other spheres after the promulgation of the new constitution in 1889, and the convocation of the First Diet in 1890 after many years of groping for a
suitable political framework. (Pyle, 1969: 144) This adoption was widely heralded, and began a period of self-belief in the progress Japan had made and was continuing to make: many Japanese “saw these institutions as a means of recovering national pride and even of demonstrating Japanese equality with Western nations. A leading politician wrote that, at the time the constitution was promulgated, ‘certain European people ridiculed the idea of Japan’s adopting constitutional government saying that… [it] is not suitable for an Asiatic nation, and is only adapted to the cool-headed people of Northern Europe; even the Southern European nations have failed in establishing constitutional government. How can an Asiatic nation accomplish what Southern European nations have found impossible?’” (Pyle, 1969: 145)

As confidence in the strength of Japan’s civilising efforts grew over time, the adoption of Euro-American institutions, the education system in Japan began to move in a different direction, reaching a turning point in the middle of the 1880s. This related to a wider change in tenor on the idea of becoming kindai (modern): “Not only was there an institutional change in the system of compiling textbooks, but also there was a general change in Japan’s modernisation process. There was a reaction against Westernisation, an emphasis on the mystique and divinity of the emperor, the beginnings of colonial expansionism and so forth. It was the start of the true period of “Japanese spirit and Western learning.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 8-9) Given that this change was related to strengthening nationalism following the largely successful attempt to create a ‘nation’ of the 215 han of Japan, we can see the assimilation of many ideas which were contemporary in Europe and America. Where once Japan was more willing to be open-minded towards countries deemed less civilised by Seiyō (for example, the Iwakura mission visited several countries such as Egypt, Sri Lanka and Singapore) educational textbooks began to have more ethnocentric views towards these countries: TAKEUCHI Keiichi wrote

“In this and other secondary school textbooks, besides such environmentalist explanations, there are to be found the sorts of racial descriptions which hardly existed in the early Meiji textbooks. When discussing the population of each country, racial differences are always highlighted: thus, for instance, the misery of the American Indians is put down to their “primitive and simple nature.” The Caucasians are considered the most advanced. As a parallel to this, the uniqueness and superiority of the Japanese is stressed in comparison to other, inferior, Oriental races. It is at least partly because of such racialist education, that the racial prejudice of the Japanese was, and to my deep regret still is, especially strong towards Asian peoples.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 9)

This belief in the superiority of Japan formed a seed of popular anthropology towards the primitive which was later another evidence of the forming of ‘modern’ Japan; Japanese had absorbed ‘Western learning’ and digested an Orientalist and ethnocentric viewpoint.
These political developments were being achieved whilst the education system was still dealing with basic terminological difficulties. As schools were not defined as such in the Edo period, the deliberate choice of the word for ‘school’ in the Meiji period is of interest. According to ISHIZUKI Minoru, before the Meiji period the Kanji character く (Jap. 校, lit. institution) in gakkō (Jap. 学校, lit. learning institution) had only infrequently been combined with the character for learning (Jap. 学, gaku) to indicate a school institution. Gakkō was more often used to denote a sense of restriction, limitation, or conformity to a uniform standard. That being the case, the choice of characters for the modern word gakkō, Ishizuki suggests, was entirely appropriate, symbolising a shift to a new kind of institution that was part of a larger system whose goals were fashioned by a central authority. (Ishizuki, 1972: 78) By centralising schooling in an era of patriotism, the government was able to engineer its populace in its own image of what it was to be both ‘civilised’ and ‘Japanese’.

In terms of higher education, in addition to the bansho shirabesho mentioned earlier, two technical schools were established prior to the Iwakura Mission: seitetsusho kōsha (Jap. 製鉄所公社, lit. the ironworks school, established in 1865) and the shugi-kō (Jap. 手技校, the school to master techniques, established in 1870). (de Maio, 1998: 164) After this, as will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3, more formal and centralised engineering institutions were set up, most exceptionally the College of Engineering in Tōkyō, set up by the Scot, Henry Dyer (1848-1918) in 1873, recruited as part of the Iwakura Mission.3 It has been said that “Dyer realized his own programme for the college and that there was no such college in any other part of the world that balanced theory and practice in this way, the former being preferred in French and German engineering education, the latter in British tradition... In fact, after the Iwakura mission, Japanese attitudes towards foreign employees, the oyatoi gaikokujin [Jap. お雇い外国人], had changed: Japanese were now more self-reliant and more conscious of the priorities in the modernization of their country.” (de Maio, 1998: 167)

Japanese education as a contact zone then was largely informed by the Iwakura Mission’s desire to follow foreign models, implementing these with the help of foreign experts, and absorbing the basic assumptions. This allowed Japan to be free of direct foreign influence because assimilation of view points and concepts from Seiyō after these unequal contact zones had been opened meant that foreigners were no longer needed to direct the modernising project; Japanese elites and educated persons had internalised the ‘Victorian’ frame of mind sufficiently to go their own way in creating Japanese modernity. As we shall see in the following section, Japan did suffer greatly following the Meiji Restoration. Whilst the government pushed through policies against the traditions and the

---

3 Henry Dyer was recommended to ITO Hirobumi by his professor, William John Macquorn Rankine during the Iwakura Mission. He was appointed to the post of Principal and Professor of Engineering at the new Imperial College of Engineering in Tokyo in 1872 when just 25 years old.
previous identity of the country, many citizens and intellectuals of Japan experienced great difficulty in adapting to new notions and ideals.

2.3 Meiji Intellectuals’ attitudes towards modernity

Whilst the previous section mapped the causes and drivers of modernisation in Meiji Japan this section links these changes to Japanese civil society. What did the intellectuals of the period think of the social, political and cultural changes during the Meiji era? In what terms did they conceptualise kindai (modern)? And crucially, to what extent had the intellectual discourse been influenced by the unequal contact zone?

Early Meiji thought: Fukuzawa

It is worth restating that the changes which occurred during the early Meiji period were unprecedented in Japanese and possibly in world history: “A major survey of modern world history concluded that the change undergone by Japan in the Meiji period (1868-1912) ‘Still stands as the most remarkable transformation ever undergone by any people in so short a time.’” 64 (Pyle, 1969: 3) This process latently and actively began eroding Japan’s ‘traditional’ culture; such changes were difficult to take for many Japanese. The protests which followed the Restoration were not grassroots movements calling for another new system but were reactionary, to economic difficulties partly, and against the changes which affected the lives of ordinary Japanese. Between 1868 and 1872 there were 343 village protests and disturbances in the Japanese countryside (Koji, 1967: 35). One typical riot of around 1000 people in Tottori (鳥取), 1873, led to a petition of six demands:

1. The lowering of rice prices;
2. The banning of all traffic with foreigners;
3. Abolition of the military conscription law;
4. Abolition of primary schools;
5. Opposition to the solar, or Western, calendar;
6. Opposition to the law ordering Western style haircuts. (Kōsaka, 1958: 81-82)

64 It is worth noting from the outset that this culture change was a very different type to previous historical changes in Japan, in a large part due to the stimulus: “The situation [of culture change in Meiji Japan] bore no similarity to the introduction of Sui [Chi. 続] and T’ang [Chi. 唐] civilization from China in early times, the permeation of Sung [Chi. 宋] and Yuan [Chi. 元] culture in medieval times, or the influence of Iberian Catholic culture in early modern Japan. … The main concerns of its leaders was not so much one of protecting traditional culture as mastering the secrets of their (Western) enemies’ wealth and power quickly – in other words, the utilization of Western civilization to strengthen Japan” (Daikichi, 1985: 51)
Such complaints all had at their root resistance to the ‘modernisation’ of Japan. However after the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, no group appeared which tried to resist the government by military power, and the conflicts moved instead to civil society. Although the ruling class of Japan, even the Shogunate, had by the late 1860s shed the slogan of “Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians”, this “sentiment was the overriding factor influencing the majority of the samurai class, who threw their support behind the Satsuma and Choshu led Restoration in 1868.” (Swale, 2009: 176)

In this context, Japanese intellectuals began to formulate ideas on how best to deal with the process of modernisation. As shown in Section 1.3, the key concept discussed and debated by Meiji intellectuals was ‘civilisation’: how could Japan become a civilised country? How much of their traditions would have to be shed? What would be the effects of this process? In attempting to find answers to these questions, Meiji intellectuals informed government actions, and shifted the ways in which cultural arts were studied and performed. Without the influence of these intellectuals, and without the dovetailing vision of Meiji government elites, the scale and depth of change in the early Meiji period would not have been possible.

The key intellectual figure in the transition from the late Edo period to the early Meiji period was FUKUZAWA Yukichi. Although he was a samurai raised on studies of Confucius, Fukuzawa went to Nagasaki and began studying Dutch in 1855 at the age of 20 in spite of strong societal resistance. His success in ‘Barbarian studies’ led clan authorities to order him to go to Edo and start a school to teach Dutch to young clan samurai in 1858. When visiting Yokohama he could not find any foreigners speaking Dutch so he began learning English, which seemed a more useful language. After travelling to America in 1860 with the first government mission to Seiyō, he published his debut book, the first English-Japanese Dictionary. In 1862 he visited France, England, Holland, Prussia, and Russia with the second official Shogunate embassy. The first volume of his Conditions in the Western World (Jap. 西洋事情, Seiyō-jijo) was published in 1866 and sold a quarter of a million copies. In 1858 he started the Keio Gijuku (Jap. 慶應義塾, a private school on ‘Western studies’) in Edo which grew quickly and eventually became Keio University, the oldest higher education institute in Japan.

Fukuzawa was a prolific writer. By 1869 he had published fifteen more books explaining Western science and social customs. Between 1872 and 1876, he published 17 volumes of Gakumon no Susume (Jap. 学問のすゝめ, lit. an encouragement of Learning or (more idiomatically) On Studying). Fukuzawa advocated his most lasting principle, "national independence through personal independence". To achieve this independence, as well as personal independence, Fukuzawa advocated ‘Western learning’.
Given his wide experience of Europe and America in an era when few Japanese had any, his popularity and his prolific writing, Fukuzawa represents an example of a model contact zone intellectual, whose thought lay between Japan and the outside world. Before the 1868 revolution, he had already been part of Tokugawa embassies to five Seiyō countries, produced a dictionary as well as producing many volumes of studies of Seiyō for the Japanese public and created a school of ‘Western learning’ in Edo (Tōkyō). He was probably the foremost expert on Seiyō in early Meiji Japan, whilst also possessing an accomplished understanding of traditional Japanese cultural arts. The fact that he so distinctly promoted full ‘Westernisation’ of Japanese thought had a great impact on the thinking and government policies in the Meiji era. Unlike other writers, it is difficult to consider Fukuzawa mainly as a result of his times, given his influence on the Meiji reforms as Japan transitioned from the han system to one modeled on Seiyō: he was a strong force in himself and played an active role in ensuring his beliefs would become the Meiji reality.

Concerning the transition from the Edo to the Meiji period, Fukuzawa famously stated at the start of the Meiji period, Japanese people were each one person with two lives: they were among the few people in history to have had experience of both old (Japanese) traditions and new (Seiyō) civilisation. Fukuzawa did not desire Japanese to be followers of only the ‘second life’ however, he wanted intellectual independence from the universalistic theories produced in Europe and believed it was possible: Japan was in a better position to talk about civilisation than Euro-Americans since they were currently going through the civilising process. (Hiraki, 1984: 211)

Fukuzawa had a highly original idea of the meaning of civilisation for the period, based in the original and independent method of development by individuals rather than collective projects such as ‘industry’ and ‘democracy’: “in Western civilization,” Fukuzawa wrote, “the social fabric includes various theories that have developed side by side, have drawn closer to one another, and finally united into one civilization – in the process giving birth to freedom and independence.” (Fukuzawa, 1973[1874]: 37) In describing Western civilisation in such a way, Fukuzawa pinpointed the faculty of critical reason which was a necessary condition for European modernity (see Section 1.2). For Fukuzawa:

“civilization means not only comfort in daily necessities but also the refining of knowledge and the cultivation of virtue so as to elevate human life to a higher plane... [Thus] it refers to the attainment of both material well-being and the elevation of the human spirit, [but] since what produces man’s well-being and refinement is knowledge and virtue, civilization ultimately means the progress of man’s knowledge and virtue.”(Fukuzawa, 1973[1874]: 35)
This was an idea which resonated with Japanese educated in Confucian ideals, and this moral focus may also have helped bridge the intellectual gap between Chinese (Confucian ideal of an orderly and harmonious society) and Seiyō ideas of civilisation. Fukuzawa believed that civilisation was relative to time and circumstance, as well as comparative nations. For example Fukuzawa believed that at the time China was relatively civilized in comparison to some African colonies, and European nations were the most civilized of all. He claimed that “dualistic representations such as Western control over nature versus Japanese dependence on nature, or Western technology and Japanese lack thereof, these differences embody a time-lag between the two identities, not an essential difference.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 118) Thus Fukuzawa followed the belief of the American diplomat, Townsend Harris, who had stated that “the invention of the steamship and telegraph had made communications vastly easier among nations and the whole world had become like one family” (Keene, 2002: 35-36): this temporal squeeze meant that the thought that all states were on a single development path became much more seductive and truthful.

The process of becoming civilised was not as straightforward as the government’s rapid adoption policy seemed to suggest; for Fukuzawa although Japan could create the “external elements of civilisation” (such as modern armies, communications and buildings), it was more important to adopt the “spirit of civilisation”. Indeed “it was impossible, in Fukuzawa’s thinking, to be able to catch up with the leaders simply by purchasing modern arms, machinery and external structures, since civilization meant the development of the inner spirit, namely the virtue and knowledge, of the entire nation.” (Shunsaku, 2000: 500)

This idea very much chimed in with some foreign books, particularly British, being translated into Japanese at this time. NATAMURA Masanao, as mentioned earlier, translated a book renamed “Stories of Self-made Men in the West”. It was in fact a translation of the Scot Samuel Smiles's Self-Help (1859). In the preface Natamura writes: "is it true that a strong army secures public peace and order? Do you mean that the strength of Western countries derives from military might? No. The strength of Western countries relies upon people's strong faith in Heaven's way. In other words Western countries are strong because the people's right of self-government is widely recognised there and both administration and legislation are based on this principle." (Takeuchi, 1987: 7)

Fukuzawa and Nakamura therefore wished for a more radical ‘Westernisation’, adopting the ideas and perspective of Seiyō, not just the external products, (Hiraki, 1984: 212) as was desired by Chinese scholars such as Feng Kuei-fen. The dangers of not undergoing mental revolution were manifold according to Fukuzawa: either countries would adopt the movement to “taste the fruit of civilisation” or they would be left without a choice in their own destiny. However there was no ultimate goal of the
modernising process, humans would all progress, and one day in the future “current Western civilization would be regarded as barbarous.” (Hiraki, 1984: 213)

The idea of the public intellectual and a strong and independent civil society, separated from the government, was key in Fukuzawa’s writings, and was modeled explicitly on the functioning of European and American societies. This can be seen very clearly in its effect upon the architecture of Japanese authority in following sections, where architects were trained as autonomous agents. For Fukuzawa, “to be a nation meant to be ruler and be ruled simultaneously. The Japanese were not a nation since, historically, they had only been subjects… Progress for Japan would depend on the people becoming a nation by assuming the dual role of ruler and subject.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 80) This remained an issue throughout the Meiji period, when public participation was generally shallow and the modern tendency was led by government forces. This was in contrast to development in Europe and America at the time where, in spite of repression abroad, liberalism was the dominant political philosophy.

Although he was a social critic of ‘traditional’ Japan, Fukuzawa also riled against foreign ideas which discriminated against Japan, particularly ideas which opposed his trust in the possibility of ‘progress’. For example he criticised Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilisation in England (1857), which posited the binary notion of a world divided in two: civilisation in Europe and civilisation exterior to Europe. Buckle suggested that it was impossible for other places, including Asia, to become civilised to the same extent as Europe, due to physical matters such as climate and supply of food. (Hiraki, 1984: 211-212) By the time that Fukuzawa was writing such theories no longer held much weight, however. By the 1870s:

“the thing that contemporary English-speaking intellectuals discussed earnestly was “progress” in the sense of promoting the scientific advancement of social institutions according to a conception of social evolution, not the ad hoc dispensing of high culture or ‘enlightened’ manners. Indeed it could be said that we can find a measure of how thorough a particular intellectual figure’s grasp of the contemporary English-speaking intellectual milieu was precisely by establishing how far they were inclined to discuss the dynamic implications of the evolutionary model; if they were quoting Buckle and Guizot (or Bacon and Newton) rather than Smiles and Spencer, one could conclude that they were either working with stale material or were perhaps simply more interested in the literati-orientated concept of enlightenment rather than the Positivist approach to civilization.” (Swale, 2009: 97)
Fukuzawa, whilst preceding Spencer into Japan, fitted neatly into this overweening interest in progress because it enabled him (and other Japanese intellectuals) to conceive of progress outside of predetermined cultural models.

This belief that Japan could (and currently was engaged in) progress was against the background that prejudice against other Asians had become common in the Meiji period. Asia, and particularly China and Korea, underwent a period of Othering by many Japanese intellectuals, with Fukuzawa (1885) leading the movement to ‘escape from Asia’. By 1885, Fukuzawa believed that Japan had become aligned more closely with Seiyō than with its neighbours:

“Not only have we escaped the old habits of Japan, but we have devised a new strategy concerning Asian countries; its fundamental idea is “escape from Asia”…. Today China and Korea are no help at all to our country. On the contrary, because our three countries are adjacent we are sometimes regarded as the same in the eyes of civilized Western peoples. Appraisals of China and Korea are applied to our country… and indirectly this greatly impedes our foreign policy. It is really a great misfortune for our country… It follows that in making our present plans we have not time to await the development of neighbouring countries and join them in reviving Asia. Rather, we should escape from them and join the company of Western civilized nations. Although China and Korea are our neighbours, this fact should make no difference in our relations with them. **We should deal with them as Westerners do.** If we keep bad company, we cannot avoid a bad name. In my heart I favour breaking off with the bad company of East Asia.” (Fukuzawa, 1885 quoted in Pyle, 1969: 149, my emphasis)

In terms of approach to foreign policy, pragmatism, power politics, and interference in other nations’ affairs, all accelerated after the Meiji Restoration. These were all activities practiced by the 19th century Great Powers and promoted by Fukuzawa. Cultural affinity, for instance, had no bearing on Fukuzawa’s view on how to deal with Japan’s neighbours. This is partly because Fukuzawa saw culture as a malleable substance that should be shaped to promote civilisation. I can state that Fukuzawa had a view of culture similar to the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman: “If… we think of something as being a matter of culture, rather than nature, what we imply is that the thing in question is manipulable”. (Bauman, 1989: 142-143) Through cultural distancing Fukuzawa created a legitimate discourse of breaking from Asia. Concern with progress appeared to hinder connections to the past irrevocably in Fukuzawa’s thought, and this can be seen as part of a broader movement of Othering Japan from Asia.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this identity formation and differentiation was achieved through study of the Orient from an ethnocentric historical viewpoint, which involved the creation of a new geographical entity comprised of Japan, Korea and China alongside other ‘Oriental’ countries from Turkey to India. This area was named Tōyō, (with its corollary as Seiyō) and a discipline dedicated to its study, Tōyō-shi (Jap. 東洋史, lit. Oriental history), was created. According to TANAKA Stefan:

“Tōyō played a dual role: like the Western Orient, it was the respected antiquity, but for Japan it was also one that was older than the beginning of Europe. In this way Japan was able to place itself on the same level as the Occident and incorporate the figurative future – the West – into its world. However, contemporary shina (China) was a disorderly place – not a nation – from which Japan could both separate itself and express its paternal compassion and guidance.” (Tanaka, 1993: 108)

Intellectually, this split was very helpful to both Japanese intellectuals and Japanese statesmen, who could historically recognise their link to Tōyō whilst distancing themselves from the current unprogressive states in Korea and China. In doing this, Japan was put into a better bargaining position for reversing the unequal treaties.

The establishment of five schools of thought
Following Fukuzawa’s early writings, the arguments that followed on what Japan’s path should be resulted in a new discourse. Several distinct streams of attitude towards the civilisation mission pursued by the Meiji government began to develop on the direction that Japan was taking, a somewhat
chaotic situation, and the source of popular satire as shown in fig. 2.5. By 1888 SHIGA Shigetaka (Jap. 志賀重昂, 1863-1927), a public intellectual and educator, had identified five schools of thought that dominated the debates over the course Japan should take. These splits indicated the growing schism between ‘traditional’ ways of understanding the world and new Seiyō-based world-views, as well as the growth of a syncretic approach to these issues:

- The first school of thought was that of the influential journalist, TOKUTOMI Sohō (Jap. 徳富蘇峰, 1863-1957), and his group, the Min'yū-sha (Jap. 民友社, lit. People’s Friends), who argued for Nihon bunshi Daha Shugi (Jap. 日本分子打破主義, lit. eliminating Japanese traditional elements), or Heimin Shugi (Jap. 平民主義, lit. total modernisation/westernisation of Japan from the grass roots). This advocacy called for constructing a productive, democratic society and for reforming the previous feudalistic, militant one. The Min'yū-sha also had a magazine, Kokumin no tomo (Jap. 国民之友, lit. the Nation’s Friend), as their tool.

- The second was the Seikyōsha (Jap. 政教社, lit. Society for Political Education), to which Shiga belonged. They advocated Kokusui Shugi (Jap. 国粹主義), which called for preservation of what had been unique to Japan while modernising the country. They campaigned for Japan’s adaptation of Seiyō ideas and institutions, but insisted that this adaptation should be selective, based on the needs and particular character of the Japanese people. Other than Shiga the other key intellectuals were MIYAKE Setsurei (Jap. 三宅雪嶺, 1860-1945) and KUGA Katsunan (Jap. 陸羯南, 1857-1907) and the journal, Nihonjin (Jap. 日本人, lit. the Japanese) was set up and supported their viewpoints.

- The third group was comprised of intellectuals such as Jukyōshugi Sha (Jap. 儒教主義社, lit. Confucian scholars) and Kokugaku Sha (Jap. 国学社, lit. scholars of National Learning) who supported Nihon Kyūbunshi iji Shugi (Jap. 日本旧分子維持主義, lit. maintenance of Japanese traditional elements, particularly Confucian principles). The most representative scholars of this school were MOTODA Eifu (Jap. 元田永孚, 1818-1891), who taught the emperor Meiji, and NISHIMURA Shigeki (Jap. 西村茂樹, 1828-1902), who established the Tōkyō Shūshin Gakusha (Jap. 修身学社, lit. the Tokyo Morality School) in 1881 which expanded and was renamed as Nihon Kōdō-kai (Jap. 日本弘道会, lit. the Japan Morality School) in 1888.
• The fourth group advocated Setchū shugi (Jap. 折衷主義, lit. the syncretic or eclectic approach), the blend of matter and spirit through which the scientific ethos of ‘the West’ could be synthesised with the moral values of the Orient.
• The fifth group was represented by the Meiji government. Government policy was discussed at some length in Section 2.2: their policies for the indiscriminate Westernisation of Japan were criticised by most of the other groups as disguising with coats of paint. (Gavin, 1999: 12-14)

In the late 1880s the first two groups were particularly influential. The critical period of debate on the purpose of modernisation in Japan began in 1885 with the publication of an influential book proclaiming the emergence of a new generation of ‘Meiji youth.’ Tokutomi, the leader the People’s Friends “urged youth to seek total Westernisation of Japanese society along the lines of nineteenth-century liberal doctrine. Only thus, he argued, could Japan become a strong industrial nation, the equal of the Western powers. Tokutomi became a leading spokesman for the new generation; and the Westernism advocated in Min'yū-sha periodicals enjoyed for a time great vogue among educated young Japanese.” (Pyle, 1969: 4-5) Given the modernisation efforts of the early Meiji leaders, who were mostly in their 20s in 1868, this movement was very influential and credible.

Tokutomi wrote in the years after Fukuzawa’s heyday on eliminating Japanese traditional elements; his key works were Youth of the New Japan (1885) and Japan in the Future (1886). Like Fukuzawa, Tokutomi was born of a samurai family, became a student of English and later a prominent journalist. Tokutomi wrote in the same vein as Fukuzawa, emphasising the positive aspects of Seiyō and taking on the idea that civilisation could be achieved in Japan. This argument was based on the assumption that the differences between Japan and Euro-America were not essential, categorical differences but the lack of Japanese civilisation was due to a current lack of ‘progress’ that could be overcome in time.

According to Tokutomi, the main issue facing Japan was that the old power structure of Japan remained strong and the new enlightened people establishing civilisation were still immature. (Hiraki, 1984: 214) These people in the future would be able to break down the power structure through industrialisation. Tokutomi had followed the intellectual fashion of the English speaking world in following Spencer; he held that all societies of the world were either of the ‘military type’ or the ‘industrial type’. Tokutomi was particularly influenced by Herbert Spencer’s notion of unilinear progress of humanity, arguing that every society in the world would progress from military to industrial society in a straight line. To do this Japan should follow ‘the general trend of the world’ and introduce civilisation
appropriately. The main mechanism to gain it was through industry which would lead to a “democratic society [as] an inevitable result”. (Hiraki, 1984: 216)

Taking the idea of evolution into the human sphere, Tokutomi was also an advocate of the “escape from Asia” movement of Fukuzawa, believing that Japan should rise above its pre-industrial neighbours. This was particularly since “countries that did not follow this trend would be dominated by the industrial nations.” (Pyle, 1969: 40) Tokutomi held to Spencer’s theory that the old world (the West) would struggle against the new (other countries) and that in the end the old world would be defeated. (Hiraki, 1984: 217) Tokutomi’s writings were optimistic for the future, but reflected the perception that Japan was currently on a lower rung of the evolutionary ladder than the ‘Occident’.

Tokutomi was criticised by his contemporaries such as NAKAE Chōmin (Jap. 中江兆民, 1847-1901) particularly concerning his idiosyncratic idea of ‘progress’ and heimin shugi (Jap. 平民主義 lit. broad people rule righteously (a phrase used to describe democracy)) the total modernisation of Japan. Tokutomi’s belief in the God of Progress was related to his belief in Spencer’s theory of progress, which he may have considered the latest theory to emerge from Seiyō. (Hiraki, 1984: 216-217) Tokutomi saw pre-Meiji Japan as fitting neatly into the militaristic phase, where society was subject to strict hierarchies in which: “from the despot down to the slave, all are masters of those below and subjects of those above”. (Pyle, 1969: 38) Tokutomi, “believing that Japan was subject to the same kinds of forces that Spencer had described in Western nations,… pictured Meiji Japan as moving from an aristocratic, militant social structure toward a democratic, industrial society.” (Pyle, 1969: 39) Tokutomi’s thought was “dominated by a negative image of Japan’s traditional culture and the character traits it had bred… One searches Tokutomi’s early writings in vain for some sense of Japanese individuality that might give a modern Japanese pride. But one finds only a shameful negative identity” (Pyle, 1969: 49), and this was an identity taken up by a great many of his acolytes and other adherents in civil society. The Min’yū-sha could find no worth in the particularistic values and achievements of Japanese culture. Tokutomi stated that: “Our country can never be preserved by... the Tosa [Jap. 土佐] school of painters, or by the architecture of the Horuji [Jap. 法隆寺, Hōryū-ji] or the Shosoin [Jap. 正倉院], or by sculpture, or by the celebrated capitals Nara and Kyoto.” (Pyle, 1969: 147-148)

This group, though influential, were by no means representative of the wider society, many of whom found the cultural borrowing of modernisation deeply alienating and confusing for the cultural identity of Japan:
“For many Japanese in this period of intense national consciousness, alienation from their own cultural heritage posed perplexing dilemmas. Building a powerful industrial nation required supplanting much of Japanese tradition with techniques and practices borrowed from the West. Young Japanese were troubled by the implications of this process, for the very modernity they sought had in some sense to be regarded as alien in origin. They were in fact painfully sensitive to the self-effacement that cultural borrowing implied. They saw in Westernization the destruction of Japanese identity.” (Pyle, 1969: 4)

The anti-traditional groups did not garner much wider appeal beyond government officials and other reactionaries, and so genuine cultural revolution to copy the social results of the Enlightenment did not fully occur.

As the decade wore on, the Seikyōsha (Society for Political Education) developed as a rival group, and gained increasing appeal. The group was founded in 1888 with the declared purpose “the preservation of Japan’s cultural autonomy. Although its members… were imbued with Western values and committed to the adoption of many Western institutions, they believed that only by maintaining a distinct cultural identity could Japanese feel equal to Westerners and recover their national pride. In their writings they sought to define Japan’s uniqueness and to formulate an independent Japanese role in international society.” (Pyle, 1969: 5) The emphasis of the Seikyōsha was on the necessity of reform of Japanese society due to external factors rather than the intrinsic worth of ‘Westernisation’. Yet at the same time, leading theorists, such as Kuga, wrote of their respect for Seiyō:

“We recognise the excellence of Western civilization. We value the Western theories of rights, liberty, and equality; and we respect Western philosophy and morals. We have affection for some Western customs. Above all, we esteem Western science, economics, and industry. These, however, ought not to be adopted simply because they are Western; they ought to be adopted only if they contribute to Japan’s welfare. Thus we seek not to revive a narrow xenophobia, but rather to promote the national spirit in an atmosphere of brotherhood.” (Kuga, 1889: 2-3)

The Seikyōsha posited that a country needs to be centrally administered with spiritual integrity, while advancing technologically according to the imagined model of Seiyō; otherwise the country’s very existence could be threatened by a ‘superior’ race such as the Anglo-Saxons, as had happened to the native Maori in New Zealand. Shiga himself was convinced that this was in accordance with the theories of Darwinism; New Zealand being perfect proof of the survival of the fittest. Britain was the most ‘superior’ nation at that time and there was an urgent need to build Japan’s economic, political
and spiritual foundations in a more constructive way than by merely copying everything European or American.

An intellectual who fitted the thinking of the fourth school of thought, the eclectics and synthesisers, was MORI Ogai (Jap. 森鴎外, 1862-1922), a doctor who had trained in Western medicine in Germany. For Mori, Seiyō symbolised science and a logical, systematic way of thinking. For him modernisation was an unfinished process in Japan:

“It was not without regret that I returned to a country which does not yet afford necessary conditions for exploration of new fields in science,- I say ‘not yet,’ because I do not think that there is no hope for the Japanese race.” (Mori, 1911 quoted in Kato, 1965: 432)

Due to the lack of advancement in technology and industry, Mori stated that “Japan is yet in construction.” (Mori, 1910: quoted in Kato, 1965: 432) As late as 1910, Mori emphasised the transitional nature of his contemporary Japan, which still required considerable building. Whilst disparaged, the Meiji government stood for the fifth school of thought; the most powerful and dominant viewpoint was characterised by indiscriminate Westernisation of Japan.

**Meiji critics of superficial Westernisation**

As was the dynamic in government policy, the overall state of confusion and self-castigation was influenced by how Seiyō opinions and theories fed into the debates. For instance, Buckle’s ideas of the permanent lack of progress outside of Europe were necessarily rejected by Japanese and, as seen throughout this thesis, the ideas of progress and civilisation were informed most strongly in the 1870s by Herbert Spencer. This rejection can be seen as a blow to the strict structural Orientalism of Said. Said states “Western Orientalist literature has created the image of the Orient as the West's Other, which signifies primitiveness, stagnation and unreason.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 115) Yet such theories, whilst present in intellectual circles under Buckle and others, were important in Japan for providing a starting point: theories which characterised the East as stagnant and primitive acted as a spur in Japan to become kindai (modernize). Whilst this may not have been the case in countries which failed to resist Seiyō imperial power in the 19th century, overcoming the idea of the static East explains a great deal of how Japan was able to overcome the perceived threat from abroad. Japanese intellectuals refuted the idea that Japan was inherently static, and stated the importance of joining the stream of progress:

“Japan should follow “the general trend of the world.” (Pyle [quoting Tokutomi], 1969: 49)
“[Innovations] ought not to be adopted simply because they are Western; they ought to be adopted only if they contribute to Japan’s welfare.” (Pyle [quoting Kuga]65, 1969: 119)

Whilst largely united by the notion that progress was desirable, Meiji ‘enlightenment’ was “highly pluralistic and indicative of more than a single set of ideas.” (Najita, 1974: 89) These process orientated theories underlined a general recognition that Japan was ‘civilising’, that is, undergoing changes that would lead to it being viewed as a civilised nation. To do so required contesting past identities as with TOKUTOMI Sohō.

Outside the mainstream, other thinkers were critics of the modernisation process though these were not so unified as to create a ‘school of thought’; the manifest emptiness of copying the forms of another culture and only partially transplanting the content was the strongest complaint. The Christian UCHIMURA Kanzō (Jap. 内村鑑三, 1861-1930) developed his theories outside of the five established schools of thought laid out by Shiga above; his key works were The Earth and Man (1897) and A New Civilisation (1926). For Uchimura, ‘Westernisation’ was an empty process without ‘Western’ religion because the progress of Seiyō was essentially connected to the Christian faith. For the purpose of progress, heathen nations should be converted to Christianity as the “religion of Civilization” modelling themselves on the Christian nations that gave concrete form to it. (Hiraki, 1984: 217-218) Christianity was another perspective for viewing Seiyō culture: the Japanese were even trying to find the perspective of religion, which shows how they sought the foundations of ‘modernity’ in any possible way throughout the Meiji period and after.

As modernisation without religious change occurred in Japan, the products of the process were distorted imitations of the culture: “Ancient Jews described hypocrites with the words ‘whited sepulcher’; ‘white painted house’ may be the best word to call the present Japanese.” (Uchimura, 1897, quoted in Kato, 1965: 432) This may be a reference to the ‘Western’ buildings built by Japanese carpenters in the Meiji period, explored in Section 3.2, showing the influence of architecture as a symbol of ‘Westernisation’. Uchimura went as far to say that:

“Japan [is] adopting this Western civilization which is no civilisation… True, Japan by her adoption of the Western methods of warfare, has won her place among the Great Powers of the world in less than a century;… but she lost the love of the world… Japan Westernized herself and the West has disowned her.” (Hiraki, 1984: 220)

65 The quote is from ‘Tōkyō Dempō’ (Jap. 東京電報, Tokyo Telegraph) on 9th June 1888 by KUGA Katsunan.
The novelist and playwright NAGAI Kafū (Jap. 永井荷風, 1879-1959), on the other hand, represented a secular, ambivalent attitude towards modernity. For him Seiyō symbolised sensitive forms in which a historical culture was incarnated; it was not possible to simply transfer Europe elsewhere. Nagai often stated assertions such as Meiji “is not reform, not progress, not construction. Meiji means nothing but destruction: the beauty of old aspects was destroyed only to be replaced by a confusion of all bad qualities produced in one night.” (Nagai, 1909: quoted in Kato, 1965: 433) Reflecting the pressure to conform to the Westernising path, Nagai said “There may be no country where you can do so many things so easily as in present day Japan. If you refuse, however, to live in such a way, you have to give place to others and retire.” (Nagai, 1915: quoted in Kato, 1965: 433) For him, the civilising process led to the false and untrue.

NATSUME Sōseki, known by his pen name ‘Sōseki’, was the most significant of the critics of ‘Westernisation’: a wildly popular novelist, he is still considered the greatest literary figure of the Meiji era. He was a scholar of British literature and composer of haiku (Jap. 俳句 lit. no separate plural form), Chinese-style poetry, and fairy tales. In many ways he can be considered a melancholy product of his times, ambiguity and confusion being central to his character. Born in 1867, he was the eighth and final child of his family and was adopted twice and mistreated and left twice. Although unwanted until age ten, he became the hope of his family after his brothers grew sick. Sōseki grew to love Chinese art and literature in childhood, and enrolled at a private academy where only Chinese classics were taught. He decided at 16 to go to Tokyo Imperial University and knew he needed to study English to do so: his choice was made in a society when telegraphs, trains, baseball, Western-architecture, and beef serving restaurants were being introduced: an expertise in Chinese literature did not seem conducive to a good career. Although he flirted with the idea of becoming an architect, he instead chose English studies which he studied and taught until the age of 40.

After graduating Sōseki gained a prestigious job teaching English studies at the University, but unexpectedly quit to teach at a provincial high school. He also wrote and submitted haiku and Chinese verse. After a number of years working in the provinces he was brought to the attention of the government who ordered him to London (1901-1903) on a government scholarship where he became the first Japanese scholar in English literature. His years there were not happy. Describing the time later, he said: “the two years I spent in London were the most unpleasant years in my life. Among English gentlemen I lived in misery, like a poor dog that had strayed among a pack of wolves.” (Sōseki, 2009[1907]: 48) At 40 Sōseki wrote his first novel, I Am A Cat, and soon became a full time writer. He subsequently wrote 8 books in 9 years, as well as essays and lectures. Although his career was brief
he was heralded in own life time, and had a number of disciples; unfortunately his physical and mental health had always been poor and he died at the early age of 49.

For Sōseki Seiyō symbolised individualism and internalised moral values. Because Japan underwent a process of hurried transfer rather than a lengthy translation, the process of ‘Westernisation’ had produced a large number of superficial actions which Soseki highlighted:

“What we are doing now is not a result of our own development, but of the influences from outside. In one word, the modernization of contemporary Japan can be summed up as a superficial one. I am not saying all of it must be superficial. On such a complicated problem we should refrain from any sweeping generalisation. Yet I cannot help admitting that the large part of our modernisation is at its best like this. My point is not that we should stop it, but that we actually have no choice, however sad it may be, other than to go on with this superficial way.” (Sōseki, 1911, quoted in Kato, 1965: 432)

Yet he tried to explain and make sense for why Japan had taken this step in his earlier novel Sanshirō (Jap. 三四郎, a protagonist's name):

“We are the young people who cannot stand the oppression of old Japan, but at the same time, we cannot stand the oppression of the new Occident. We have to shout out loud to the public that we are living under these two oppressions. The oppression of the new Occident is as torturous for our generation as the oppression of old Japan. We are scholars of Occidental literature and art and this is just study. It is totally free from any idea that we surrender to them. We do not study Occidental literature and art to be captured by them. We study them so that we can release ourselves from them.” (Sōseki, 1908, quoted in Kikuchi, 2004: 78, my emphasis)

In Soseki the cultural ambiguity of Japan’s pursuit of kindai (modern) is best seen, for the process was a transplanted and hurried one: “because the enlightenment in the West – what Soseki called ‘general enlightenment’ – in an internal development and the enlightenment in Japan is externally derived, Japan, perforce, must suffer twofold agonies. It is Japan’s fate that its enlightenment, which must be transformed into an internal one if it is not to be false, must remain an externally developed one.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 446) Whilst Fukuzawa successfully pushed for a policy of leaving Asia and joining the West (in diplomatic terms certainly), it was a joining where it was difficult to feel any sense of true belonging.
It is interesting to note the similarities between FUKUZAWA Yukichi and NATSUME Sōseki in spite of their divergent attitudes towards Seiyō. They were two of the most important intellectual figures in the Meiji period, and, retrospectively, the most important figures overall. First, much of what they wrote came grounded in life experiences, with interest and respect for both the Occident and Japan gained through direct contact with both. Second, a particularly striking commonality between them was their shared interest and expertise in ‘Western learning’, particularly in English. Their strong understanding of the culture of Seiyō led to a more balanced appreciation of both the value and the havoc that adopting foreign practices would cause in Japan. Finally, both were fierce critics of the superficial character of Meiji modernisation; by changing so much at only a shallow material level, modernisation only spread confusion and lacked a cohesive national identity.

Sōseki was a less conventional figure than Fukuzawa, since his views came from a more personal position of alienation and ambivalence concerning the modernisation project. He wrote later than Fukuzawa and so the political climate was no longer so uncritically positive towards Westernisation; when Sōseki was appointed Professor of English literature at Tokyo University it was to replace the popular foreign professor Patrick Lafcadio Hearn (Japanese name KOIZUMI Yakumo, Jap. 小泉八雲, 1850-1904) as part of a process of promoting Japanese graduate students to become University teachers, a process that the British architect Josiah Conder (explored from Section 3.3) also felt the force of midway through his career in Japan. (Sōseki, 1978: 263) The bitterness and conflict between Japanese and Western values is a much more apparent theme in Sōseki’s works. For example, the main character, Sanshirō (in the 1908 novel Sanshirō) was “one of those destined to stand wistfully between worlds, never able to step in.” (Sōseki, 1978: 269) This resonates with Fukuzawa’s prophetic phrase ‘one person with two lives’.

According to my notion of Japanese institution of kindai (modernisation) as a reactive culture change driven by external conditions, Sōseki is the intellectual who gets closest to the heart of the issue and ambiguity of the Japanese condition in the Meiji period, for he points to the inevitability of modernisation in the context. His own depression and identity crisis can be put down to some extent to these geo-political issues, particularly his years in the UK. Yet given the political context of Seiyō latent aggression, change and strengthening was the only positive path to be taken in Japan. Hearn wrote in 1894 that “Japan has attempted too much; yet under the circumstance she could not have attempted less.” (Hearn, 1894, quoted in Pyle, 1969: 3) This caters to Bauman’s idea of ‘modernity’: once you have become modern there is no way to retire. (Lecture in 2012)
To sum up, fearing the fate of China after 1842, and after directly experiencing the new geo-political context of the late-Edo period in which Seiyō was politically and militarily dominant, it became clear to the leaders of both the Shogunate and anti-Shogunate forces that Japan must change. From the evidence presented in this Chapter, we can see that for scholars and intellectuals of the Meiji period, there was little disagreement with the necessity for fundamental change to Japan. This agreement points to the deep and fundamental impact that the unequal relations of the contact zone had exerted on Japan: at the elite level, transculturation occurred, fusing two cultures, the original Japanese culture and the new, ‘powerful’ one from abroad. Given this fusion, we can say that the desire for maintaining the existing cultural identity came into conflict with the desire for cultural evolution to fit with the ‘modern times’ presented to Japan.

The question dealt with by government officials and intellectuals was therefore a question of boundaries and where to set these: what limits should there be to the changes to the Japanese cultural identity? Different answers were given to this question, from changing the religion to Christianity, adopting ‘Western’ culture totally, or maintaining a Confucian identity to the maximum possible extent. Even detractors of the ‘total Westernisation’ school such as the Seikyōsha either held or engaged with the assumptions of social Darwinism and other ‘modern’ theories. But no school or intellectual questioned that fundamental change was necessary for Japan: there was a deep seated will (or a deeply taken decision) to change and adapt at the elite level.

This situation resulted in a large contrast with the approach taken in China to a similar threat. When Hobsbawm considers why Japan alone successfully took the change and strengthening approach, he points out that Japan was the only country to possess both the will and capacity to do so:

“China was plainly capable of beating the westerners at their own game, at least in as much as it amply possessed the technical skills, intellectual sophistication, education, administrative experience and business capacities required for the purpose. But China was too enormous, too self-sufficient, too accustomed to considering itself the centre of civilization for the incursion of yet another brand of dangerous and long-nosed barbarians, however technically advanced, to suggest immediately the wholesale abandonment of the ancient ways. China did not want to imitate the west. Educated men in Mexico did want to imitate liberal capitalism... [but] the will was greater than the capacity. But Japan possessed both.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 148)

This will to change in Japan, coupled with the skills and sophistication to adapt, was mirrored in the sphere of carpentry and architecture, which, as we have seen, had gained a status as symbolic of the
wider approach to modernisation in Japan by Meiji critics. Yet, as shall become apparent, the changes in the field of carpentry were largely forced on practitioners by changes in taste and in the new purpose of public buildings: to display to Seiyō that Japan could match the Great Powers in artistic and scientific endeavors. This trend left customary carpentry practice as a low priority and had a large effect upon the architectural identity of Japan.
Chapter 3
Architectural dual *kindai* (modern) movement in Japan

“So far as our knowledge at present extends, there is not a single permanent building in the island [of Japan] of so monumental a character as to deserve being dignified by being classed among the true architectural examples of other countries. It may be that the dread of earthquakes has prevented them raising their buildings to more than one or two storeys in height, or constructing them of more solid materials than wood. It may be, however, that the Japanese do not belong to one of the building races of mankind, and have no taste for this mode of magnificence. Such information as we have is very discouraging; and it is to be feared that, though quaint and curious in itself, and so far worthy of attention, it is of little interest beyond the shores of the islands themselves. On the other hand, it is feared that the extent of our knowledge is sufficient to make it only too clear that the art, as practised in Japan, has no title to rank with that already described in the preceding pages, and consequently no claim to a place in a general history of architectural art.” (Fergusson, 1876: 709-710)

“Chinese structures have nothing durable about them, for perishable wood forms an essential element in their construction… The architecture of the Chinese temples does not differ from that of the other buildings…. Chinese architecture is as invariable as everything else in the Celestial Empire, and Chinese art, generally, is the same as it was many hundreds of years ago.” (Rosengarten, 1876: 54-56)

In order to discuss the effect that the centralisation of administration, fundamentally changing the notion of civilisation, and the drive to create a new vision of Japan had upon architecture, it is important to first explore ‘traditional’ buildings in contrast with those called modern. This is because in many ways the *kindai* (modern) buildings were created in response to existing Japanese buildings and the growing negative perception of them abroad and then consequently in Japan. The quotes from James Fergusson and Albert Rosengarten are from the architectural history textbooks used in England and then imported into Japan in the first university architecture course; whilst written by Europeans from positions of ignorance (Rosengarten wrote only three sweeping pages on Chinese architecture and did not mention Japan), the propagation of Orientalist viewpoints on the architecture of China and Japan led students to see traditional buildings as lacking permanence, monumentality, dynamism, and a place in the world history of architecture.
This section begins with the stereotypes attributed to pre-Meiji carpenters by Seiyō and Japanese, what their building practices were and what these practices produced. By examining these issues we can more accurately judge why a profession of ‘architect’ was deemed necessary and how kindai (modernity) infiltrated the practice of Japanese carpentry. Subsequently this chapter explores how carpenters adapted to the conditions of Meiji Japan before exploring the role of foreign experts and the education system they set up. Finally this chapter looks in depth first at the buildings of Victorian Japan built by foreign architects before exploring how the first two generations of Japanese ‘architects’ inherited their mission of modernity.

3.1 The practices of carpentry before the ‘kindai (modern)’

From the Meiji period until today, a legacy of the early Orientalist studies on East Asia has been that Japanese craftsmen have been largely characterised as 1) idyllic and perfectionist and 2) static and ‘pre-modern’. The first myth was particularly created by foreigners in the Meiji period to represent Japanese carpenters as people who lived their art, never stopping until reaching perfection, yet never striving to reach beyond the collective to create unique and individual works of art. Such ideas about the Japanese proliferated in the Victorian age, when fascination with exotic cultures led to states such as Japan being characterised as being pure and somewhat naïve, leading to fashions for Japanese art and landscape gardening as a taste of the pre-modern.

Prior to the Meiji Restoration “writers sought the ‘Old Japan’ of the interior which was idealized as a paradise, a dreamlike ‘wonderland’ peopled by ‘chubby children and rosy maidens’.” (Jackson, 1992: 280) Such myths were propagated by those who had lived in Japan and had idealised the conditions there: for instance, the founder of the College of Engineering in Tokyo, Henry Dyer, wrote in his book, *Japan: the Britain of the East*:

“During the Tokugawa period, extending over two hundred and sixty years, Japan was in a state of perfect tranquillity, and the feudal chiefs did a great deal to encourage and protect manufacturing industry, especially that of an artistic nature. The energy which was formerly spent on internecine war was expended in friendly rivalry in the industrial arts, and the consequence was that a very high standard of excellence was attained. The best work was not made for sale, but for use or presentation; time was not money, and the artificers and artists threw their personalities and all their skill into their work. Both artists and workmen were free to work when they felt in the mood to do justices to their objects, and equally free to seek repose the instant fatigue notified them of their failing powers. They therefore had real pleasure in their work, and each of the products was a distinct specimen of skill,
perfect, novel, and idiosyncratic. Nothing short of what they considered perfection was allowed to pass; for their honour as craftsmen and artists was at stake.” (Dyer, 1904: 153)

Works such as Dyer’s promoted the naïve view that Japanese craftsmen (whose products were prized and fashionable in Europe and America as part of the Japonisme trend) were not under economic pressures themselves, that strife did not exist and that industrialisation was not present in any sense: Japan was everything that Industrial Britain was not. These ideas of high attainment of art and lack of organisation are only understandable alongside the second myth of Japanese carpenters: Japanese architectural development was stuck in one style and distinctly pre-modern, a view propagated in part by post-war architectural historians such as:

“We can divide the history of Japanese architecture into two periods by this [Meiji] revolution; it may be said that Japanese architecture had developed continuously without its style being changed before this revolution and since then it has developed into modern architecture under the strong influences of the West.” (Abe, 1954: 13)

Both the statement on Japanese craftsmen by Dyer and the pre-modern/modern distinction by Abe represent a gross simplification and a lack of rigour in scholarship. As for the first myth on craftsmen, this section will explore whether this idyllic imagining of the Edo-period was accurate for carpentry. For the pre-modern/modern stylistic separation in Abe’s work, 1954, whilst some distinctions are needed between periods it is dangerous to apply hard labels to architecture work. Stylistic categories in Japanese architecture such as Wayo (Jap. 和様, lit. Japanese style) and Zenshuyo (Jap. 禅宗様, lit. Zen style), are only useful in indicating collections of commonly held characteristics: they are historical afterthoughts. When classifying work as ‘Classictist’, ‘Gothic’ or ‘Baroque’ it is necessary to bear in mind that historical architects decided from the limited palette of styles available to them and did not always ‘choose’ styles. The divisions between styles often say more about the divider than the divided. Grouping pre-Meiji carpenters together into one category does as great a disservice to the sophistication and development of those carpenters as dividing British architectural history into ‘pre-Victorian’ and ‘Modern’ architecture would do to British architectural development.

As scholarship in architecture has moved on in recent decades, “it has proved more useful to examine the contribution of architects as individuals or, in the case of customary building traditions, to identify the characteristic contributions of families of master artisans.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 172) This method of rigour and study of individuals and currents is what makes distinctions by academics such as Ade of dividing Japanese architecture into simple pre-modern/modern dichotomies so unsatisfactory. This
section will use contextualised case studies of individuals/guilds and their products to understand the development of the profession of carpentry in Japan. In doing so the myths surrounding pre-Meiji carpenters will be addressed, particularly their supposed lack of professionalism and development.

It is important to ask in this section, who were Japanese carpenters? How did they work? What did they build? Most carpenters worked within a family tradition (which individuals could marry into). Master carpenters were in the artisan rank and so were below the *samurai* and farmers but above merchants. By the Edo period many carpenters were *chōnin* (Townsmen), a new class for upwardly mobile artisans and merchants; *chōnin* could more easily socialise with *samurai* and even be given extraordinary titles for great work. Usually carpenters operated within family guilds and worked together along a division of labour, having different tasks in the building process; master carpenters though were expected to have knowledge of every part of the design and construction process.

The education of a carpenter goes some way to explaining how they worked. During the Edo period, the education of carpenters mostly took place at work through allocation of tasks. This apprentice system was at once a part of the division of labour at the building site and an opportunity for learning from elders in practice. The carpenter was a part of a system within which he worked, and education was difficult to separate from work. This method of education is explained by the contemporary master carpenter, NISHIOKA Tsunekazu (Jap. 西岡常一, 1908-1995), who saw his education as coming from an equally valid approach to academic study which has “1,300 years of experimental observation in Japan alone.” (Brown, 1989: 30) This education was through on the job learning and an apprentice system: “this means providing them with the best possible example and allowing them to learn through observation and experience.” (Brown, 1989: 32)

In his study of the roots and philosophy of Japanese carpentry, Azby Brown writes of this process of learning that “once an apprentice has begun to develop the proper attitude, he is gradually introduced to tools and begins to assist the senior carpenters with their individual responsibility. In about seven years, he will be capable of shaping a complex piece from shop drawings and templates; after fifteen years or so, he will know how to make the templates themselves from the master’s drawings.” (Brown, 1989: 32) The correct attitude was fundamental to carpentry education, which was taught before skills were learnt. The attitude learnt was one of respect towards his elders, towards religion, and towards building materials. Carpentry education was therefore moral as well as practical:

“…Priority is given to instilling in the young apprentice a sense of respect and humility, not merely toward his superior, but more importantly toward the wood and the work. The first
tasks are deceptively simple: sweeping the shop floor, fetching tea, helping to lift heavy
members. Yet even these seemingly mindless tasks have the potential to teach
concentration, exactitude, and teamwork, all of which are absolutely essential for the more
complicated work ahead." (Brown, 1989: 32)

Following the instillation of the ‘correct’ attitude, the process of construction and design was learnt by
apprentices through imitation of actions and forms over a long period of time. This ensured that not only
knowledge but also behaviour was passed down through generations through the apprenticeship
system. This transmission was key to maintaining a coherent sense of cultural identity for the
carpenters: as Shils wrote, “The idea of tradition as a handing down of attitudes, habits, and rules is
integral to the definition and coherence of a culture.” (Shils, 1981: 19) As a result of this cultural
transmission, carpenters possessed a keen sense of intuition concerning building: “Rarely is anything
explained fully to the apprentice; he must draw his own conclusions and develop his own instincts.”
(Brown, 1989: 32)

For carpenters of the Edo period, learning about the past was not usually the result of conscious
decisions because transmission of past practice was the cornerstone of education. Given that the focus
of education was on respecting elders, there was very little scope for processes of constant innovation,
for innovation in building meant going against the ways of elders, and as stated in Section 2.1,
Neo-Confucianism, with its focus on respect to seniors (parents and lieges especially), was at its
historical high point in the Edo period. Building practices did gradually change, for instance, in the
standardisation of measurements during the Edo period. However change was slow and was never a
primary concern to Edo carpenters or in client demands. Instead the past was learnt about through
elders in the work group, generally following standard principles. It is also clear that in the late Edo
period, carpenters had information on past architectural forms and had “a historicist awareness”.
(Wendelken, 1996: 30) Carpenters kept previous designs, and utilised this knowledge: for instance the
Nakai family rebuilt the emperor’s palace in 1855 based on designs from 1790 which was itself a
historicist revival of Heian period (Jap. 平安時代, 794-1185) architecture. (Wendelken, 1996: 30)

Beyond oral learning, by the Edo period (1600-1868) carpenters manuals were also developed which
codified knowledge previously passed on by spoken tradition. These manuals are known as hinagata
(Jap. 雛形, lit. template), which were written by master carpenters and sometimes written in secret
languages. The hinagata had “two main types, hinagata-ban [Jap. 雛形版], which were pattern books
similar to those which appeared in increasing quantities in Europe from the time of the Renaissance,’
and hidensho [Jap. 秘伝書], or “secretly transmitted records.” (Coaldrake, 2001: 49) Whereas before
the two knowledge sources were strictly separated, by the early seventeenth century the distinction between the two types became blurred, “with records surviving which contain both architectural drawings and written instructions about proportions to be used in designing buildings. From the early eighteenth century, in an intellectual climate of historicism, these records were to include complex genealogies and contorted histories of style which were intended to dignify the present rather than illuminate the past.” (Coaldrake, 2001: 49) By the early 1600s, these hinagata-ban became popularised and a part of urban culture. These books are important to note for a number of reasons. First, they allowed learning and improvement to occur across a range of practitioners. Each group of carpenters can be said to have formed a community of practice: an informal group that shares values, perspectives, and ways of doing things. Second, the existence of such books demonstrates that at least some carpenters were literate. Third, the secret manuals indicate competitive behaviour between families. Fourth, the later development of public records of style meant a widening of the profession and professional standards across families. (Coaldrake, 2001: 46)

Whilst the above has detailed the education of carpenters, in terms of how they worked, I will now highlight four categories: materials, principles of orientation, sacred aspects, and construction principles. First, the choice of wood as a building material greatly affected the method of working. The Japanese carpentry system relied to a great extent on the character of the materials: although building design was not material led, the nuances of materials required great care and attention in choice of wood. Carpenters would use the most appropriate tree species from the most appropriate region of Japan growing at the most appropriate location. This counted even to the extent that trees grown on the southern face of a mountain were used on the southern side of the building. According to a contemporary master carpenter:

“The strongest trees grow above the midpoint of a mountain, where they receive the best sunlight and air circulation… These trees should be used for columns. On the other hand, trees that stand below the midpoint, where they must compete for sunlight with trees above and thus send their trunks higher before branching, are a source of thinner logs that are relatively free of knots. These logs should be used for exposed members requiring a fine surface. Trees growing in valleys produce inferior lumber of high moisture content, but are nonetheless usable for ceiling boards and other parts requiring neither strength nor fine finish.” (Brown, 1989: 57)
Second, orientation was decided by ほおがく in Japanese buildings. These principles have many similarities with feng-shui (Chi. 風水) and appear to have derived from it.66 ほおがく “loads [the] built environment with great symbolic significance and conveys information about social relations and worldviews.” (Kalland, 1999: 17) ほおがく did not only apply to the building itself but to how the building affected its environment. According to the master carpenter Nishioka, echoing the principles of feng-shui, “the ideal building site has a mountain to the north, a river to the east, a pond or lake to the south, and a straight road to the west… Carpenters extend the geomancy principles to human relations as well: a certain balance of personalities is required among crew members just as among pieces of timber if a project is to result in the creation of unity.” (Brown, 1989: 55) However, these principles were by no means rules; rather they were consequences that need to be taken account of. Indeed, at times buildings could even be placed in inauspicious areas for symbolic reasons. Nijō castle (Jap. 二条城) represents the great architectural example of the principles and symbolism of the Tokugawa rule, the message for which can be read in the syntax of ほおがく. The castle (actually a palace) was built in 1603 in Kyoto (the emperor’s base), three years after the establishment of the Shogunate. The relationship between the buildings was designed to echo the relationship between the Shogunate and the emperor: “The Shogunal palace was set to the northeast of the lake and the imperial palace to the southwest, the most hostile and most benevolent directions respectively. The Tokugawa thereby protected the emperor from the flow of evil forces in the universe.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 144)

Third, as can be surmised from the influence of ほおがく on buildings, there is also a ‘religious’ aspect to Japanese carpentry which is not present in modern architectural practice. Both Daoism and Shintoism were important considerations for carpenters. Both doctrines hold nature as sacred which makes the carpenter’s role potentially a morally ambiguous one: “A carpenter must put a tree to uses that assure its continued existence, preferably as a thing of beauty to be treasured for centuries. There is a prayer that [master carpenter] Nishioka recites before laying a saw to a standing tree. It goes in part, “I vow to commit no act that will extinguish the life of this tree.” Only by maintaining this pledge does the carpenter repay his debt to nature.” (Brown, 1989: 21) In connection with this, customary joinery in Japan does not use any nails or fittings in the wood as these would eventually rust and damage the wood. Instead, wooden parts are slotted together in subtle ways. Thus for carpenters, respect for religion, the environment and materials was a central part of building practice.

Finally, prior to building, carpenters paid attention to the planning of construction. These plans were extremely complex and required great understanding of techniques, drawing, stress, mathematics and aesthetics. Hinagata records reveal the use of special systems of proportion based on modules known

---

66 In comparison to feng shui, “little attention has been given to the Japanese counterpart hogaku (lit. directions and corners), which is mainly expressed through divination for orientation of houses (kaso) and the land (chiso).” (Kalland, 1996: 17)

161
as *kiwari* (Jap. 木割, lit. wood proportion), similar to the orders of classical Rome and Greece, which were popularised in the Renaissance by Palladio. Even after carpentry forms began to reflect European tastes, the principle of *kiwari* continued to survive after the Meiji Restoration in buildings such as the Sōgaku-dō (Jap. 奏楽堂, lit. Concert Hall), discussed in Section 3.6.

These principles of construction were reflected in the buildings constructed, and were derived in a large part from the class system, influences from China, and the social dynamics within the carpentry profession itself. One such example of how socio-religious values were interpreted is that for buildings representing authority, height was very important. For instance, imperial buildings needed to be highest: in any social situation it was forbidden to look down up on the emperor, even to look from a window whilst the emperor went down a street could have severe repercussions. This implied that to be physically above the emperor was taboo, a social norm that continued into the Meiji period (see Section 5.2). Using tall buildings to demonstrate authority was very common. For instance the largest building in Edo (former name of Tokyo) before the Meiji period was built by the new Shogunate; Edo Castle was the tallest building ever built in Japan until the mid-Meiji period at 58.4 metres. (Coaldrake, 1996: 132)

The first great architectural epoch in Japanese history was the Nara period, in the 8th century AD. At this time, Japan was first introduced to Chinese culture and took it on wholeheartedly, assimilating the arts, religion (Buddhism) and even parts of the written language. Highly skilled carpenters built Japan’s first monumental architecture in Nara (Jap. 奈良) in the Kansai (Jap. 関西) region, where many buildings still stand (often rebuilt due to fires), including the largest extant wooden building in the world, the 8th century Tōdai-ji (Jap. 東大寺). This process of architectural assimilation and then development was not a swift process: “it took some two hundred years of experiment and refinement for Japanese to reshape borrowed Chinese aesthetic forms into configurations closer to their own ideals. Roof curves became more gentle, certain structural elements more delicate, and composition at times asymmetrical.” (Brown, 1989: 45)

The temple architecture style was the most highly developed form of building up until the end of 15th century. This was the ‘Warring states’ period of the 1500s when, due to the uncertain political situation, castle architecture (also built by carpenters (Coaldrake, 2001: 49)) became more important. These buildings borrowed their decorative forms from temples but were built in a more impressive manner and made more use of stone. Castles became a reflection of a daimyo’s power but also exhibited new sense of aesthetics that marked a clear departure from the sombre monotones favoured during the previous period. These authority buildings’ function was to rule over the surrounding area:
“First and foremost, the castle town was military headquarters for the daimyo, and it was from here he ruled his fief. He built his castle to be easily visible from the town and the surrounding area, a constant reminder to his subjects of his power and hold over them. Although the castle was designed for defense, it was accessible enough so that the townspeople could reach it when they came to conduct business at the governmental offices located on the grounds.” (Schmorleitz, 1974: 31)

During the long period of civil war prior to the Edo period, the development and construction of castles was possibly one of the greatest building projects in the history of the world. However by the Edo period (1600-1868), new authority buildings were less frequently castles, some of which were even dismantled with the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and more frequently palaces. These were somewhat similar in spatial form to the Chinese yamen (the building which comprised the main administrative functions of the locality in China and Taiwan, explored in Section 5.2): a sprawling building complex over a wide area.

Given this thesis’ aim to explore Japanese authority architecture, it is worthwhile to illustrate this transitional building type and its principles at greater length using the example of the largest building project of the Edo period: Edo Castle (see fig. 3.1). Edo Castle covered over 33,000 square metres, took over 30 years to complete, was funded by all daimyos of Japan and had three master carpenters at its head. The Shogun’s palace within the castle complex covered three main enclosures: “(1) the great outer palace or o-omote [Omote, Jap. 表], which contained reception rooms for public audience and apartments for guards and some officials; (2) middle interior or naka-oku [Jap. 中奥], where the shogun met with his relatives, more important lords, and carried on the affairs of state with his councillors; and (3) great interior or o-oku [Ōoku, Jap. 大奥], which contained the apartments of the shogun and his ladies-in-waiting.” (Schmorleitz, 1974: 103)
At its fullest development, Edo Castle had 38 gates guarding it with each layer having a number of gates; in the Edo period, the number of gates was proportional to the importance of the building. (Schmorleitz, 1974: 108) According to a Dutch contemporary in the Edo period, Francois Caron (1600–1673) noted that the gates were not placed in a straight line, but were staggered so a person seeking passage had to go in a half circle to find the next one.” (Schmorleitz, 1974: 105) Although the complex itself was highly impressive the tenshu (Jap. 天守, lit. the central tower of Japanese castle) is perhaps even more so given the evidence of its skilful and meticulous planning. The tenshu was designed by KORA Munehiro (Jap. 甲良宗広, 1574-1646) who was eminent in his time:

“The building projects he supervised indicate a prolific creative personality. His active building career coincides with the primary period of Tokugawa architectural consolidation. Munehiro [Kōra] was engaged in the most important projects of the age, including the

---

67 Francois Caron was a French Huguenot refugee to the Netherlands who served the Dutch East India Company for 30 years and is sometimes considered the first Frenchman to set foot in Japan.
mausoleum of the founding Tokugawa shogun leyasu [Jap. 徳川家康, 1543-1616], the Tōshō-gū [Jap. 日光東照宮] at Nikko (from 1634-36), and the central keep (tenshu) of Edo Castle (1639), the focus of Tokugawa government and authority and the most visible official building in the entire metropolis of Edo.” (Coaldrake, 2001: 50)

The evidence of planning by Kōra supports recent research which has shown that these master carpenters were not mere builders but conscious designers able to plan buildings with meticulous attention to detail that would rival contemporary Europeans. Not only were spatial dimensions calculated with great precision on each floor plan and section (fig. 3.2) but Kōra was able to create three dimensional projections of the building on paper (fig. 3.3). This had several advantages as it allowed the carpenter to imagine the feel and overall appearance of the building, and made it easy for assistants/clients to understand the building’s eventual appearance.
Due to increased political stability these palaces were not primarily built for defense. This shift was "marked in building design by a shift from an age of vertical emphasis to an age of horizontal emphasis, from a period of preoccupation with the symbolism of towering castle tenshu and massive masonry walls, to an age of single-story palaces." (Coaldrake, 1996: 141) Thus, as we shall see in Section 5.2, these buildings bore many similarities to the yamen in Taipei, with strict hierarchies of functions and spaces developed over centuries to create similar forms for authority buildings both sides of the East China Sea. In keeping with this trend for single story buildings, when the tenshu of Edo Castle burnt down in 1658 it was not rebuilt.

Politically the fief system weakened daimyos through the obligation to reside in the capital for part of the year, which vastly altered the urban make-up of Edo. Around 60 percent of the city was occupied by
the palaces and mansions of daimyo which invested the town with great national authority, and it centralised power by providing a de facto capital containing all important personages for part of the year. After the Meiji Restoration and the destruction of the old political order, this gave the government a large number of authoritative buildings over a large area to use as temporary government departments, schools and as land for development. The cityscape of Edo was characterised by low yet sprawling buildings up until the advent of the Meiji period, when the preference for a European building aesthetic translated to tall buildings able to easily tower over their Japanese counterparts.

This brief overview of the history and character of carpentry in Japan has argued that carpenters were a profession with codified knowledge, that they planned and designed, had strict principles on the sacred, orientation and materials, pursued stylistic development, and were capable of building monumental architecture. A Western perspective of architectural style, which has traditionally focused upon the façade, is limited and hardly applicable to Japanese architecture development. For in Japan, style was not judged on exterior appearance but by interior structure: the joints between timber and the layers of roof are known as the style. These can even be seen as a hierarchy: viewing a section of the 8th century Tōdai-ji in Nara (fig. 3.4) the layers of roofing indicate the building order and the most complex series of joints in the building structure. Whilst the roof looks almost cumbersome, this is because it is in proportion to the rest of the building.

This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library.

![3.4. Structural section of Great Buddha Hall, Tōdai-ji, Nara, repair completed 1911; from Report on the repairs to the Great Buddha Hall at Tōdai-ji. (The left was main entrance as it shows more layers of roof structure). Source from Wendelken, 1996.](image)
As a result of their education, carpenters were well prepared to adapt to the changes in architectural taste of national elites, being literate, able to plan buildings, and having an excellent knowledge of materials. This echoes much of the rest of Japan, where the increase in schooling over the past century and half from 1700 had created a complex layered society with many highly talented people who were limited by the caste system in what they could achieve in their careers. During the Edo period, “there was an active dialogue among Japanese carpenters and a sense of competition which resulted in constant innovation and perceptible improvement in skills for the craft as a whole, all accomplished while struggling against a progressively diminishing quality of available wood. But at that time, wood construction represented the only technology available for building in Japan.” (Brown, 1989: 30) By the end of the Edo period, there was an increasing demand to build new types of structures with European appearance which carpentry education had not prepared them for. Yet many were able to adapt their skills to this new idiom. The reliance on wood did not change after the Meiji Restoration, for with the increasing fashion and desire from clients to have foreign looking buildings, carpenters (being the only organised residents in Japan who could design and build) were the first to try their hand at building European-style structures and continued building residential housing until today. These were the pioneers of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan, to be explored in the following section.

3.2 Pioneers of ‘kindai (modern)’architecture: carpenters and surveyors
There were two intertwined changes in the 1860s that significantly affected Japanese carpenters: first, there was a growing contact zone between the Japan and Seiyō, and; second, there was a growing market to build a new style of architecture, first through foreign clients and later through Japanese authorities. Both these factors were initially caused by the treaty ports, as foreigners in the ports required foreign styled buildings. According to David Stewart, a leading English-language expert on the architecture of this period, “the bitter experience of these [treaty] agreements had convinced the new Japanese leaders of the necessity to conform with outward standards and behaviour of the mid-Victorian age, initiative in which devolved upon the Meiji emperor and the court…. Within a short time de-Japanization had evolved as a norm of progress and a behavioural ethic.” (Stewart, 1987: 15) This trend extended to public buildings, as authorities would attempt to reinvent the image of Japan through its authority buildings.

Ad hoc modernisation by Japanese carpenters
New ideas of ‘civilisation’, explored in previous chapters, had entered Japan in the mid-19th century. Given the crucial 5th of the Five Charter Oaths which underpinned all other oaths (to ‘seek knowledge throughout the world’) there was great cachet in giving the appearance of internationalism to an area.
This process was elite-led: “As the Meiji government replaced the feudal domains with prefectures under central control, it appointed powerful local governors to enforce its programs. These men seem to have taken particular pride in producing Western buildings, apparently seeing them as a good way to advance their careers and civilization at the same time.” (Finn, 1995: 24) These local buildings were built by carpenters, adapting their knowledge to foreign-style architecture, using new materials such as glass for windows, and with new stylistic features such as Greek and Roman-style columns, balconies and hinged doors.

Dallas Finn notes that the first government offices in Tokyo after its renaming used the former mansions of daimyo, but these were slowly replaced by ‘Western-style’ buildings. Tokyo’s earliest Seiyō styled buildings were not authority buildings but “private ones inspired by the treaty ports, where carpenters and contractors had flocked for work during the hard times of early Meiji.” (Finn, 1995: 17) This required carpenters in the zones of initial contact who learned through observation, copying, and reading imported books; informal rather than formal education. As shown in Section 2.2, in the Edo period, school-based education had been on the rise for a century before the advent of direct foreign influence. The number of private academies increased by 1760 percent between 1750 and 1868, yet these schools were rarely concerned with practical subjects – the most common subjects were Chinese studies and Calligraphy. In this sense, carpentry had remained independent of formal schooling throughout this period and carpenters continued their patterns of informal learning.

But many carpenters were literate, using translated Dutch and English books and later incorporating them in the traditional practice of compiling hinagata-bon, or instruction manuals. As early as 1871 a shin-hinagata “was issued describing the techniques of brick construction, including methods of laying bricks as well as techniques for framing the structures.” (Coaldrake, 1994: 50) These books and knowledge sources were used by enterprising carpenters who went to the treaty ports and elsewhere where their clients demanded Seiyō buildings. In doing this, many were anticipating later demand for these building types in larger cities. This learning focused on how to make wooden buildings look like European masonry buildings. For Japanese government commissioners it was vital to transform the impression of Japanese architecture towards new forms valued by a government wishing to be viewed as modern by visitors from the Euro-American Great Powers.

Responding to this demand, in the 1880s and 1890s there was a proliferation of wood-block printed Shin-hinagata explaining Seiyō systems of rigid triangulated roof trusses and the methods for inserting iron bolts into wall frames; the use of such hinagata eased the transition to building in foreign styles. Such manuals outlined the different styles of European architecture (such as Gothic, Renaissance and Baroque) and described the process of building in new materials such as brick. They had been created
by trained carpenters who educated themselves in foreign styles by visiting and sketching buildings in treaty ports such as Yokohama. Their forms were replicated by the carpenters who created new types of buildings which melded common native forms and techniques with Seiyō ones. This organic process of learning and dissemination was undertaken upon the initiative of individual carpenters and work teams rather than as a planned exercise.

Therefore the first influence of kindai (modern) upon Japanese carpenters came with learning from contemporaneous buildings rather than historic buildings. The new types of public buildings and changing fashions after the treaty port system was established gave many carpenters the opportunity to adapt. This innovation meant carpenters were learning about the building forms of architecture without historical precedent: carpenters were not learning about the past of Seiyō but about forms extant in Japan. This learning about ‘the current’ led to new fashions being developed. Whilst these carpenters used past techniques, they also adopted forms not practised by their forbearers, creating a more ambivalent relationship with the past. This approach of altering the external form without fundamentally changing the approach or learning style of carpenters created a transcultural, hybrid style of building, especially popular in the 1870s. Of the early building work it was clear that “architecture and townscape in Meiji Japan reflected the vigor and optimism with which any new cultural age is undeniably infused.” (Stewart, 1987: 16)

The outstanding exponent of this early style was SHIMIZU Kisuke II (Jap. 二代清水喜助, 1815-1881) who created several crucial authority buildings for the early Meiji state. Shimizu II practised carpentry for his father-in-law’s firm, later opening an office in Yokohama in the 1860s, seizing the opportunity presented by the treaty ports. Shimizu grew renowned in Yokohama as a skilled exponent of this Giyōfū (Jap. 擬洋風, lit. pseudo Western-style) style and was commissioned by the newly expanding shipping company Mitsui (Jap. 三井) to build a bank in Tokyo. The original First Mitsui Bank (1871-72) was built as a national bank under the auspices of Mitsui yet within a short time it was ceded to the Japanese government to be used as the First National Bank; together with the newly constructed mint, the bank was the most important of all national institutions built by 1872 in terms of portraying the stability of the government and keeping up its prestige abroad. In the early 1870s, the remnants of old Edo were still abundant, there were no areas of exclusively Seiyō architecture and foreign experts had not yet gained precedence of the domestic construction scene. The authorities had quickly recognised the importance of monuments to reflect their ideals of civilisation and the bank was a prime example of this monument, often being featured in wood-block prints of the period as in fig. 3.5.
The First Mitsui Bank was faced with stone and had symmetrical front facades presided over by the kind of pagoda like cupola which came to be admired during the Edo period. The Mitsui bank “supported a closed octagonal lantern with a flagstaff at its pinnacle... The gallery contained five bays and, therefore, had ten columns, plus [a] pair of demicolumns.... Like the balustrade, these were also of bronze, a fact which accounts for their extreme attenuation and wide spacing. As there is barely any attempt to create an order as such, these columns behave proportionally more like rows of simple colonnettes.” (Stewart, 1987: 24) Motifs included auspicious dragons, pine boughs, and stylised Chinese cloud forms.

Two years after the first Mitsui bank was completed, a second national bank for Mitsui at Suruhacho, Tokyo, was completed in 1874. Like its predecessor, it was a large, squarish building but with three main floors instead of two. The topmost of these was set back from the lower façade or, put another way, the massively unwieldy tower of the earlier building has been expanded into a third story of usable proportions. (Stewart, 1987: 31-32) The symbolism is obvious in fig. 3.6, with the Second Mitsui Bank in the centre, Mount Fuji (Jap. 富士山) in the top left and the First Mitsui bank on the top right.

The influence of pragmatism was revealed very early on in the Meiji period by carpenters such as Shimizu who was trained in Japanese customary arts and signifiers. Shimizu’s buildings progressed towards increasing formal rationality by following clients’ wishes and showed an erosion of the use of traditional cultural and religious forms. Mitsui’s two banks were strong instances of this transculturation giving way to rationalisation. Scaled drawings of the two buildings are shown below in fig. 3.7.
The many differences in space and form after only one year are quite startling given that the building’s functions were the same and the carpenter the same. The second bank was “the most interesting proof of the shift towards a certain rationalization process in architectural design.” (Stewart, 1987: 31) The materials of the banks were similar, though the second was not faced in stone. Other foreign elements were further articulated in the second bank: the portico was roofed in Italian style with a balcony atop.
There was an additional porch too, but the most striking change was the total lack of traditional ornamentation. On the second bank “the historiated ornament of the first bank has disappeared for good, and the massive entablature was surmounted only by a tiled, hipped roof with a nominal cupola. This had no lantern but was topped instead by a huge finial, traditionally of dark fired porous earthenware tile and sometimes gilded, but here cast of bronze.” (Stewart, 1987: 32) This trend towards lack of ornamentation became a long term one.

This roofing material was the only evidence that the second bank building was Japanese, “except for this feature, [it] would have been at home in the likes of mid-Victorian Salem or Portsmouth, New Hampshire... There... all the baffling modes of European historicism were being rung in something like an orderly succession. In Japan, this orderliness was less than apparent, although the intention in the years to come was that it should be reflected.” (Stewart, 1987: 32) The castle-style tower, instantly recognisable to native Japanese, was replaced by a functional working space less monumental and impressive, but spatially better suited to the building type.

This idea of stylistic progression can begin to be seen in Japanese architecture from this period, but the progression had a different path from that in America as the cultural roots were completely alien. Shimizu’s First Mitsui bank, by directly combining pure Japanese forms atop a Seiyō-style base had great strength of conception, and was qualitatively unique; ultimately however, this bank did not meet the practical needs of the client effectively nor did it fit the archetypes of architecture seen in Europe and America by the returning oligarchs of the Iwakura Mission. However, the transition from the first to the second bank saw an early expression of the influence of rationality in Japanese architecture. The second bank was an example of the cultural values of the carpenter giving way to a client’s demand for a simpler aesthetic and a more practical spatial arrangement. This reduction in Japanese elements can also be understood in the cultural context of greater familiarity and desire for a Seiyō aesthetic following the return of the Iwakura Mission in 1873.

As we can see from the buildings of Shimizu, “Meiji architecture was not just ‘Western style’ building in Japan. It was also the conventional architecture of Japan continuing in the new era.” (Coaldrake, 1994: 23) Carpenters were forced into diverting their skills away from the traditional styles in public and commercial architecture in the Meiji period. Despite the lack of desire for transcultural buildings by the highest Meiji authorities, Giyōfu buildings proliferated in the capital, following Shimizu’s first bank, as did more explicit Seiyō style buildings. Evidence of the extent of this is in GOICHI Takeda’s (Jap. 五一武田, 1872-1938) study of buildings within the populous area between Shinbashī (Jap. 新橋) and Kanda Suda-cho (Jap. 神田須田町) in central Tokyo. Takeda’s investigation of 1911 (42nd year of Meiji,
39 years after the First Mitsui Bank) found that there were a great number of wooden buildings in the area in a few specific styles:

- Fourteen Renaissance style buildings.\(^{68}\)
- Four Renaissance and Vienna Secession style buildings;\(^{69}\)
- Four Japanese and Renaissance style buildings,\(^{70}\) and;
- Four Unknown Style buildings.\(^{71}\) (Takeda, 1911 quoted in Tosaki, 2004: 12)

All 26 of the above-listed buildings in this area were made by builders or carpenters, who were never formally trained in European styles, but proceeded by copying from illustrations from French, German, Dutch and English magazines. All these buildings were built from wood pillared plaster wall, and thus were quasi-Western style (Giyōfu). (Tosaki, 2004: 12) This conformity of styles within a narrow idiom, dominated by Renaissance style architecture, is a finding repeated throughout this thesis.

The continuation of building practices is shown in that “in both public and private sectors during the first half of the Meiji period, the master carpenter and the architect were parallel and even rival professionals working in similar capacities but in different materials” (Wendelken, 1996: 28) though eventually public buildings would be overwhelmingly built by architects. In general, the built environment of Meiji Japan had “no abrupt break with the building practices of pre-modern Japan. Meiji-era construction was overwhelmingly executed by carpenters using methods and materials not unlike those used in the late Edo period (1600-1868).” (Wendelken, 1996: 28) However there was a sea change in the ideals of public architecture: “not since the eighth century had there been so concerted a national effort to redefine the image Japan displayed to the world.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 209) Arguably, given the scrutiny and ease of communication following the development of the telegraph, steamboat and newspaper, the architectural effort was far more likely to be noticed, communicated and to have an effect.

Although buildings such as the first Mitsui bank were vigorously rendered and reflected the age of cultural adaptation, “this compromise style was scarcely adequate for the grand buildings of Meiji Japan. Foreign architects knew only Western modes and were naturally enthusiastic about their introduction.” (Checkland, 1989: 73) These great public buildings were first reserved for foreign

---

\(^{68}\) Including the branch office of Yokohama Kasai Transportation Insurance Company, Yamazaki Western Style Clothes Shop, provisional building of Mitsukoshi Kimono Store.

\(^{69}\) Including Matsu-ya Kimono Shop, Kameya.

\(^{70}\) Including Yomiuri Newspaper Co, Tsumura Junten Do pharmacy, Hattori Watchmakers.

\(^{71}\) Including Jyuujii Ya, Imperial Commodity Museum (Teikoku Haku hlin kan)
surveyors supported by Japanese workers. Throughout this period of adoption and innovation, carpenters building in Seiyō building styles used Japanese carpentry baselines. Therefore European architecture remained merely a style developed for masonry building transplanted atop wooden buildings. The lack of authentic brick/stone constructions built by carpenters was due to many factors: inappropriate training aimed mainly at skilful use of wood, lack of raw materials, lack of will by the state to use carpenters for this function, and the transfer of knowledge using manuals written by carpenters for carpenters. For the state this meant that the buildings produced demonstrated an unsatisfactory degree of authenticity, and the government searched for alternative providers.

Ad hoc modernisation by foreign surveyors

As argued in Chapter 2, in the early Meiji period, modernisation became synonymous with Seiyō civilisation and enlightenment. To this end various foreign (mainly European) architects, engineers and surveyors were appointed for service in Japan. Among these were the Frenchman Charles Alfred Chastel de Boinville, the Italian V. Cappellette; and the Englishmen T.J. Waters, A.N. Hansell and Josiah Conder. It was Josiah Conder who was destined to become a colossal influence, which will be discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Before Conder was hired though, a number of the most important state commissions were undertaken by foreign workers.

As seen above, the first contact zone between foreigners and Japan in terms of architectural knowledge transfer was the treaty ports. The very first buildings put up by foreigners in these treaty ports, "were simplified structures with a modicum of what was reckoned to be correct detailing, and any flourishes were culled from some built source or possibly a pattern book. Early examples were invariably framed in timber." (Stewart, 1987: 16) The designer of buildings in the foreign quarters would sometimes be an engineer but "more commonly a plain merchant, missionary or Catholic priest. A world apart from this display of Western architectural genius stood the Japanese town, but it should be kept in mind that here was also the source of materials and all labour." (Stewart, 1987: 16) The dynamic of the political dominator as architect and native as labourer was repeated later in the first Japanese colony, Taiwan, but it was first experienced by the Japanese in the newly opened ports.

The foreign builder who most represents this power dynamic between builder and natives, as well as the ad hoc nature of early Meiji commissioning practices was Thomas James Waters. Waters was a British surveyor who landed at Kagoshima (Jap. 鹿児島) in Kyushu (Jap. 九州), chief town of the powerful and pro-imperial Satsuma fief in 1862, sometime after the siege imposed by the Royal Navy, which contributed to the open-country policy of the late Edo period. Waters was recruited "to supervise
the construction of a new steam powered cotton mill housed in a simple gable-fronted building of stone. This was completed in 1867 after designs which accompanied the spinning machines from Manchester." (Stewart, 1987: 18)

Waters continued his work in Kyushu by working as an architect for local authorities and foreign residents. Walters also drew the designs for Glover’s Residence (an influential British merchant) in 1863, which was then carried out by a native, without supervision from Waters. After making this connection with Glover, he was recommended by Glover to authorities in Tokyo. In 1871 in Tokyo Waters designed the Commercial Museum, said to have been to city’s first brick building. He is known to have first imported brick from Hong Kong and later set up a brick kiln around 1871, probably the first in the history of Japan. Here he made some of the bricks for the first national mint (1872), a greatly important symbol of authority, as well as those for the museum and other Tokyo buildings like the Takebashi Barracks (Jap. 竹橋軍營, 1870-74) and the British legation (1872). Waters used military design manuals from the United Kingdom to provide templates for much of his work, particularly Takebashi Barracks which was similar to Old Board of Ordinance at Woolwich 1718-20. Thus we can see that the first foreign builders in Japan, like the Japanese carpenters relied on manuals of style and composition. The carpenters used manuals due to working in a new idiom, Waters due to his being insufficiently trained.

The later obsession with building in brick in Japan can be said to have begun with Waters’ urban design of the Ginza (Jap. 銀座) district in Tokyo, 1872. Until the early Meiji period, the new authorities had not begun any large scale town planning projects; in the treaty ports (besides Kobe (Jap. 神戸市) which was based at a pre-existing city) building was unregulated within the designated foreign encampments, and new buildings in Edo were built on an individual basis following the town plan from the feudal period. Waters used brick in his reconstruction of the Ginza in Tokyo after the fire of 1872. (fig. 3.8) In addition to the bricks “the street of shops known as Ginza Brick Street also had a covered way or colonnade supported by stone pillars. Contemporary pictures, which are all that remain, with trees and gas street lamps, suggest a European boulevard.” (Checkland, 1989: 207) (figs. 3.9 and 3.10) The houses were promoted as fireproof and 916 were built. In spite of this, “the new buildings, however, were not immediately favoured with occupancy on account of both dampness and fear of earthquakes.” (Stewart, 1987: 22) This fear was justified, as none of the buildings are still standing today due to seismic events.

---

72 Whilst brick has been used in China since at least the 6th century AD (the Songyue (Jap. 嵩岳寺塔) Pagoda was built in brick in 523) there is no evidence that brick had ever been used in Japan before Waters’s arrival.
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library.

3.8. Ginza plans: the original street plan (left); the proposal by Waters 1872 (middle); the plan as executed (right). Source from Sha, Y., 2001.


Waters’ work in Ginza had the most impact of any foreign architect up to that point. However, this experiment with town planning was short lived and highlights a poignant difference between Japan and cities under colonialism in the 19th century:

“In Arabic-Islamic cities, the practice was to construct a new district based on Western principles outside the old district based on traditional principles. In the case of Tokyo, however, modernization took place as it was needed to meet new requirements, but was realized by projecting these changes on top of the old neighbourhoods. A section called Akashicho [Jap. 明石町], for example, was set aside for foreigners to live in and many Western-style houses sprang up there, but no change was made in the structure of the district. The city would widen old roads or construct new ones using the old road patterns. Rather than major surgery, Tokyo chose continuous and organic change to achieve growth and development.” (Jinnai, 1998: 30)

Individual builders on individual commissions remained the norm for foreign architects in Japan, although taken as a whole they had a substantial and profound influence. Whilst Waters was an influential builder in Japan, others after him had a more lasting influence on building culture. As mentioned in Section 2.2, after 1868 foreign instructors were hired in large numbers to teach many subjects: the specialists were called oyatoi gaikokujin (Jap. 御雇い外国人 lit. honourable foreign employees). These foreigners came at great expense to the new state of Meiji Japan, still recovering from civil war and the effect of cheap imports. The oyatoi gaikokujin “brought expertise, enthusiasm and youth; but the princely salaries which they were paid became a great drain on Japanese resources. As one observer notes, ‘The salaries of the oyatoi gaikokujin employed by the University of Tokyo in 1877 made up as much as one-third of the entire budget of the Ministry of Education, a financial burden that hastened the replacement of the oyatoi gaikokujin by Japanese in government institutions.’” (Checkland 1989: 73)

Another surveyor, C.A. Chastel de Boinville, built a pathbreaking building in Tokyo, the College of Engineering in 1877, as part of the growth of mature educational institutions following the early Meiji period. Like Shimizu’s Banks and Waters’ Mint, the College was a new function for the Meiji state. The buildings were very successfully received by both natives and foreigners: the British journal Nature claimed that “the large and splendid buildings erected for the Engineering College” were “the finest pile of European edifices in Japan.” (Nature, 1886, quoted in Choi 2003: 18) According to Don Choi, “Here students learned to eat, dress, sit, and sleep in the Western manner. The laboratories, lecture halls, dormitories, and library inculcated patterns of movement and use.” (Choi, 2003: 45-46) This College
became a symbol of civilising in the early Meiji period as one of the only authentic Seiyō style buildings in the country. The hall “with its ‘handsomely decorated aula’ [was] much used by the government for their official functions.” (Checkland, 1989: 207)

Until the completion of the College of Engineering, the architectural revolution in Japan had taken place on an *ad-hoc* basis. As we have seen in the case studies above, the decision-making process for the new national buildings went as follows: a new mint was needed and a foreign surveyor had just been introduced to the relevant authority, so he was given a commission. A national bank was required and Mitsui had built a bank for that purpose, so the state bought the building. There was a certain systematisation of style for authority buildings in that a pure European aesthetic was generally preferred, but there was little planning for the future architecture of Japan.

This situation changed after the return of the Iwakura Mission. KIDO Takayochi, who was second in command of the Mission (mentioned in Section 2.2), instigated great changes to the education policy of the Meiji government, establishing a universal primary education system from 1872. Daikichi, 1985: 55-56) *Ad hoc* learning by groups of carpenters did not fit this model of education and so the early Meiji government made no effort to input into carpenters’ education. Hiring foreign surveyors and architects would also not have suited Kido’s vision of true civilisation, which should be formed from education upwards. Instead, for some significant building types, the government decided that a new class of Japanese builders needed to be produced with a new education system focussed upon meeting “the modern requirements of the country.” (Dyer, 1904: 4) This shift was not in isolation and was an integral part of the three major shifts in education in Japan:

1. From wide regional variation in the provision and quality of schooling to greater national standardisation;
2. From officially sponsored schools that exhibited sharp class distinction to an integrated system that fostered mobility based on talent; and
3. From a loose configuration of discontinuous and mostly private arrangements to a compulsory system having a clearly articulated structure controlled by public authority.” (Rubinger, 1986: 195)

The remainder of this chapter will explore the impact of these three changes on architecture in depth, first through exploring the career of Josiah Conder, who laid the main foundation upon which *kindai* (modern) architecture development rested, connecting his life to the architectural context of his day, and then through an extensive analysis of the ideas and practices of his contemporaries and successors.
3.3 The education of the first Japanese ‘architects’ under Josiah Conder

Following the national standardisation of education, integrated across classes and controlled by public authorities, an alternative education system to train architects was also established after 1873. With the building of the College of Engineering and the hiring of foreign staff, contingency based planning largely ceased to be and was replaced by systematic education of Japanese students into architects in the Seiyō mould. As Astrid Edlinger says in her chapter on the Japanese art of appropriation (2008) the reform of Japanese building culture took place at three closely related levels with learning being the central pillar:

1. The institutionalisation of an architectural profession through establishing schools of engineering and universities to which were invited foreign experts as teachers, advisors and instructors;
2. The implementation of architectural discourse through translation of architectural books, import of texts and journals from Europe, and establishment of Japanese language architectural journals and magazines;
3. The introduction of European building styles and building functions without precedent in Japanese history, to communicate authority and strength to the Japanese people, stability and civilisation to foreign visitors. (Edlinger, 2008: 59-60)

This formal, three pronged approach to the teaching of building construction was more radical for architecture than it was for other areas with established classroom teaching practices, such as Chinese studies and mathematics. The change was a result of a blanket approach to education taken subsequent to the Iwakura Mission. Whilst the College of Engineering building was still being constructed, the Meiji government’s tour of the UK during the Iwakura mission brought ITŌ Hirobumi (future four-time Prime Minister and Resident-General of Korea) into contact with 25 year old Henry Dyer in 1872, who was hired to head the new College of Engineering. Having only completed his undergraduate studies in 1873, Dyer left for Japan the same year, drafting the curriculum of all courses during the journey. Dyer wrote that:

“It was [ITŌ Hirobumi’s] wish that a College should be organised which would train men who would be able to design and superintend the works which were necessary for Japan to carry on if she adopted Western methods. Fortunately, for some time previously I had made a special study of all the chief methods of scientific and engineering study in the different countries of the world and of the organisation of some of the most important institutions, with the intention of devoting myself to the advancement of engineering
Dyer’s qualification therefore then was partly as an expert in the current state of engineering education across the world: he was acutely aware of what was up-to-date in engineering and scientific teaching. Given this recognition of his expertise, in spite of only graduating himself the same year, Dyer’s College curriculum plans were accepted by the Ministry “without change of any kind.” (Dyer, 1904: 2) Dyer’s impact through the College of Engineering was immediate and enormous, as he was involved upon arrival in Japan in practical projects such as railway building. Dyer only left Japan nine years later in 1882, and later wrote with some bravado that:

“I was at the head of an institution which was to be the chief means of developing not only the railways and other means of communication, but also all the other industries of Japan. Students of the Imperial College of Engineering (Kobu Daigakko) are to be found in important positions in almost all the undertakings which have caused so great a change in the economic, industrial and political conditions of Japan.” (Dyer, 1904: 129)

The post of architecture instructor appears to have been problematic, only being filled a year after all other posts. Josiah Conder was eventually chosen as the first permanent Professor of architecture at the College in 1877 and became the man widely known as the father of modern architecture in Japan, (Watanabe, 1993: 43) a title gained in a large part due to his implementation of a new architectural education system. Serving the Meiji government, he taught at the Industrial College of Engineering, worked for the Ministry of Engineering as an architect, and spent the rest of his life in Japan as a private architect after retiring from government service. Conder’s importance in shaping Meiji architecture came from his central role in developing architecture practice and his 43 years of contributing to Japanese kindai (modern) architecture. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Conder in the establishment of European style architecture in Japan: Conder was told by a group of the leading Japanese architects in 1920 that the development of European architecture in Japan was largely down to him. (Conder, 1920: 55) The appreciation to him was shown by his ex-students in Collection of the posthumous works of Dr. Josiah Conder, F.R.I.B.A: this work contained the following tribute “He was the first man to give systematic instruction in Western architecture in a Japanese education institution and his pupils graduated from the college were indeed the pioneers of our new world of architecture… It is well said that he was a benefactor to our architectural world.” (Sone et al, 1931: I)

Conder was appreciated by Meiji authorities in his own time, receiving the Fourth-class Order of the Rising Sun in 1884, and the Third Class Order of the Sacred Treasure and the Imperial rank of
Honorary chokunin [Jap. 勅任] in 1894. (The Builder, 1920: 274) In 1892, Tokyo University made Conder a Professor Emeritus and in 1915 he was awarded an honorary doctorate. (Stewart, 1987: 37) Beyond these awards, Conder introduced Japan to the world stage of architecture: Josiah Conder “changed the initial Japanese emphasis on utilitarian engineering to doctrinaire architectural style. With Conder, Japan entered the international forum of architectural ideology as well as design practice.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 217) He built important buildings, promoted Japan in both Europe and America Seiyō, instituted the foundations of architectural education, and educated the first generation of Japanese architects. Today, in front of the engineering department at Tokyo University, he is honoured by a life-sized statue; despite being made of bronze it survived the scrap metal drive during the Second World War as it was carefully hidden by the department. (fig. 3.11)

This section will provide insight into how Conder created links between Japan and Great Britain, and how his role in architecture training and his Victorian background influenced the character of his notion of architecture, in order to explain how this marker provided a strong contact zone in the field of Japanese kindai (modern) architecture.

73 Chokunin was one of the highest official positions under the Meiji Constitution.
Conder’s background and ideals in architecture

Some background is required to explain how this contact zone was established in relation to architecture. The notions of architecture in early Meiji Japan were transplanted from either carpenters with visual ideas of Seiyō architecture or by Seiyō surveyors. As discussed in Section 3.2, there was a lack of understanding by foreigners such as Waters and by the Ministry of Works about the different logic and concept of architecture in Japan, and they instead preferred to simply build in a masonry and brick style as soon as possible. These early surveyors were not hired to interpret Japanese architectural logic, however, only to commission and/or construct foreign-style monuments.

The first man whose notions of architecture were integrated systematically into the instruction of architecture courses was Conder who carried with him his Victorian background. He was born in Kensington, London, in 1852 at the zenith of the battle of styles which was the environment of conflict between supporters of the Gothic style and the classical style in architecture in Victorian Britain. The debate on style occurred after Classicism had led the architectural field for centuries: “Classical columns and pediments, as used by Alberti and Sangallo, Michelangelo and Palladio during the Renaissance, enjoyed virtually unchallenged dominance as the international style of architecture until the middle decades of the nineteenth century when the grandeur of the Gothic style of the middle ages was rediscovered.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 211) Typical for the mid-Victorian era, Conder was an eclectic architect, who never built the same style twice, because he believed that an appropriate style should be found for each commission. This was a difficult message to pass on to his inheritors, none of whom had a similar Victorian background.

Conder’s education had brought him into contact with two giants of the Victorian architecture world: T. Roger Smith and William Burges. Conder was educated from 1869 at the South Kensington School of Art (now the Royal College of Art) and the University of London which offered him practical training in architecture taught by T. Roger Smith. At the same time he worked in the office of T. Roger Smith 1869-1873 who was an Associate of the Royal Institution of British Architects and a Fellow. After he graduated, Conder worked under William Burges on buildings for the Marquess of Bute from 1873. Combining theoretical, practical and work experience made Conder one of the first roundly trained architects in Britain.

As professor of architecture and building construction at University College (now the London’s Bartlett School of Architecture) 1881-1903, T. Roger Smith was an influential teacher of Conder. Indeed, whilst “we know nothing of how Conder felt when he set out on his journey” (Fujimori, 2009: 13) and why he wanted to go to Japan, one possibility is that Smith told Conder about the Japanese government’s search for a British architect, for Smith was the editor of The Architect. (Watanabe, 1993: 45) Smith’s
training was in “the classical tradition: he was taught the Greek and Roman orders, and in the proportional harmonies of the Renaissance.” (Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) He used to tell his pupils to avoid Gothic; he found the nub of the Victorian dilemma was not in creating but in reviving an old style. (Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) The issue of art to architecture was again fermented in this Victorian architect, as Smith believed that architecture should be “not merely serviceable as structures, but impressive as monuments.” (Watanabe, 1993: 47) A similar idea was taught by Conder to his architecture students: “The utilitarian age in which we may be said to live is one in which there is a tendency to disparage the value of the Arts, so much are we absorbed in the progress of scientific investigations, and political and commercial enterprises.” (Conder, 1878: 1)

Conder’s career followed a similar pattern to that of Smith, although in Tokyo rather than London. Smith was not only an architect but he held an important role for the architecture training; he not only showed commitment to professional education but also a determination to create a mixed system of office pupillage and university training which was validated by the Royal Institute for British Architects (RIBA). This gave Conder a good example when it came to setting up the integrated architecture training system in the College of Engineering.

In a practical sense, Smith made his name in India, travelling to the sub-continent in 1864. Much as Conder would be in Japan, Smith “seems to have been regarded as an expert in Western-style architecture in India.” (Watanabe, 1993: 45) He was the first editor of The Architect which he founded in 1869 and in which there were various articles related to India written by Smith until 1876. Importantly for Conder, Smith discussed how a British architect should build in non-European settings. As a Victorian architect Smith’s theoretical position for colonial building types and styles in his article to the RIBA was that the European primary elements be accompanied by secondary features of the ‘tropical climate’ style, an influential idea to British architects. This provided Conder with the idea of searching for a suitable type for Japanese architecture on which to base some hybrid style. Conder was critical of what had been tried in Japan by other Europeans and Americans, even writing that “to design a civil building in masonry having all the characteristics of the classical styles of Europe, and to crown it with fantastic lanterns, roofs and turrets of timber in imitation of portions Japanese religious constructions, is not adapting the national style to modern purposes - it is to create a bizarre and hybrid ensemble as revolting to Japanese taste.” (Conder, 1893: 369)

Although it was the period of the battle of styles, Smith stated that, when building in colonies, he supported the use of any European style, wherever the source. Smith discussed in detail the practical attitude to consider the local context and technical issues, but whilst he could be charged with

---

Euro-centricity, he stated that “as long as it is Southern European, it doesn’t matter whether the style is classical or Gothic” (Smith, quoted in Watanabe, 1993: 50) if so “it is acceptable to introduce oriental elements as part of architecture design” (Smith, quoted in Watanabe, 1993: 49). In Bombay, Smith combined Italian Renaissance and Gothic, and the result was a sort of ‘Ruskinian Rundbogenstil’. (Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) However Smith’s eulogy to Oriental art is much like other Victorian architects and Conder also had much the same tone when he said: “I was an enthusiast in the beauties of Japanese art”. (Conder, 1920: 63) This passion is also related to fervour for Oriental art evident in his other master: William Burges.

After graduating in 1873, Conder became associated with the RIBA and an architectural assistant in the office of the famous Gothic revival architect William Burges for two years where he was influenced by a another set of assumptions about architectural style which conditioned his way of thinking. (Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) Judging by Conder’s winning design for the Soane prize (figs. 3.12 and 3.13), Conder had the capacity to be more ‘Burgessque’ than Burges himself. Burges was fascinated by the beauty of the Middle Ages and gradually expanded his interest to include India, China and Japan. Conder developed an interest in Japanese painting while he worked for Burges, who had collected Japanese prints since the 1850s. Burges reviewed the Japanese exhibits at the International Exhibition of 1862 in London. Suggesting they were products of ‘the real Middle ages’, he said: “Truly the Japanese Court is the real medieval court of the exhibition” (Burges, quoted in Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 24)
Conder’s first task in Burges’s office was Trinity College (fig. 3.14), Hartford, Connecticut; the design was early French Gothic with touches of North Italian, which was later an object of emulation for Conder’s first large scale substantial design in Japan (Tokyo University, fig. 3.15). (Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 24) Tokyo University was a building which had both Early English and eastern elements: “The style is Early Gothic, but the details have, where possible, without incongruity, been infused with a Japanese spirit, more especially in the international architecture and fittings.” (Conder, 1884: 790) but the main building (not designed by Conder) was criticised by Conder for some details in its style and the framework of building in ‘The Builder’ 1884. The method of constructing the building on a Tokyo marsh was one difficulty as “the frequent and oftentimes severe earthquakes that occur there, [are] a difficulty that naturally makes an architect look to iron construction as one most likely to serve him; but the Japanese authorities have not as yet taken kindly to the idea.” (Conder, 1884: 786)
The concerns for adaptation an improvement of materials were to preserve the building from natural damage but also shows the idea of how new modern critical reasoning moulded Conder’s thinking. Also functions such as Universities should be in a higher status of form and material, following a British architectural hierarchy. Conder’s plan for Tokyo University presented the University as if it were in the English countryside but with a Japanese pagoda and a courtyard beyond of a type which he had experienced in Burges’s Office. Following his direct employment with Burges, Conder worked for a further year for H. Walter Lonsdale, Burges’s chief artist who was responsible for many important projects including the Victorian mansion of Cardiff Castle (1868-1881, fig. 3.16), and Castel Coch (1871-1891, fig. 3.17). During the period that Conder worked with Lonsdale, he was working on Skelton Church, Yorkshire (1870-76) as the assistant producing stained glass and cartoons. This implies continued work in the Gothic idiom and also indicates Conder’s high level of artistic competence.
This opinion on architecture influenced Conder, whose definition of architecture was somewhat looser: “I use the term architecture to designate any style of building irrespective of material.” (Conder, 1886/1887: 104) At the same time, Conder saw the use of wood as due to lack of progress. This slow progress was because of infrequent contact with the outside world. He integrated Japanese buildings within the architectural idiom carefully: “The dwellings of the higher classes, which are called ‘Yashiki’ [Jap. 屋敷] or ‘Miya’ [Jap. 宮], are considerably large and more architectural.” (Conder, 1877/1878: 181) When Conder researched the demonstration of knowledge and principles of Japanese traditions, he was obviously aware of the lack of progress by Japanese architects compared with standard European practices such as perspective: “Fore-shortening is frequent and well rendered; and though the Japanese artist does not seem to have understood the principles of perspective, which are often violated when dealing with representations of buildings and rectilinear forms, the perspective of all natural forms is carefully noticed and imitated.” (Conder, 1886/1887: 181) With his sliding scale of what type of buildings constituted ‘architecture’ and applying British measures of practice to Japanese construction, Conder remained inconsistent in his writing. This shows his ambiguous use of personal standards and his tacit Orientalism.

Although Smith and Burges had exerted a large influence on Conder’s ideals in architecture by defining the traditions that he inherited, a former colleague at Burges’ office William Millard (Trinity University project) said after Conder’s death that “Conder was a student of architecture who wasted no energy in fancy-flights, but grimly stuck to whatever he had to do, soon proving himself a man who could be relied on to carry through whatever he had deliberately undertaken.” (The Builder, 1920: 474) Conder was a tenacious and hardworking architect, with a fully rounded education, yet he did not possess the brilliance of his teachers. He was by all accounts a very personable man, which combined with his work ethic and rigour, made him a very suitable candidate as teacher of architecture and a main conveyance of foreign learning for Meiji architecture: he certainly brought the Victorian problem of the Dilemma of Style to Japan. As we shall see in Section 3.4, Conder’s solution to Japan’s national style in his early career in Japan was the Indian Islamic style. He declared just before his death in 1920: “So far as my studies of the national styles went there were no decorative or ornamental forms, or forms of outline or contour, which lent themselves constructionally to an indigenous or wooden style, and it became necessary to seek in Indian or Saracenic architecture for forms which, having a logical treatment in brickwork or stonework, would impart an Eastern character to the building.” (Conder, 1920: 64) His attitude towards Japanese architecture combined with his Victorian idea of modern architecture was reflected in his practical works.
The primary reason for Conder gaining employment in Japan was his design skill rather than his teaching capacity: he had received the Award of Soane Medalist Competition First Prize, RIBA in 1876 for the design of a country house. The prize of £50 was given to travel in Europe and research the grand buildings, a prize system that gave the winner a solid foundation of sketches and inspiration for their career. This institutionalised journey was also a clear indication of the veneration for past architecture and the importance of having a grasp of a number of styles. However since the Japanese government recruited Josiah Conder so shortly after his success in the Soane competition, Conder asked the RIBA Board whether instead of following the usual course he could use half the money to travel to Italy and the other half to make an architectural study of the ancient buildings of Japan; not only that, Conder wrote that “I should of course consider it my duty to transmit the drawings produced by me in Italy, and later in the series of Japanese studies as evidence of the use I hope to make such an opportunity of study.” (Conder, 1876/1878: letter) Conder made good on his promise, thereby becoming the first Euro-American architect to write a comprehensive account of traditional Japanese architecture.75

This early dedication to the study of Japan translated into Conder’s working life. He served the Imperial Japanese Government as the first permanent Professor of Architecture at the College of Engineering from 1877 and then for two years as a part time lecturer in Tokyo University from 1884. At the same time, he worked for the Ministry of Engineering as an architect from 1877, participating in the design and construction of many public buildings. After 1888, he started being commissioned for private architectural works alongside his public commissions. Most notably he worked as an Architectural Consultant for the Mitsubishi group and led a private architectural practice from 1887-1901. Yet it was his teaching which had the greatest impact upon the future of Japanese architecture, and is covered below.

**Conder’s role in architecture training**

In his first seven years as Professor of Architecture, Conder taught and trained 23 students, most of whom became very influential in Japan, particularly the first cohort which included TATSUNO Kingo (Jap. 辰野金吾, 1854-1919), KATAYAMA Tōkuma (Jap. 片山東熊, 1854-1917), and SONE Tatsuzō (Jap. 曽禰達蔵, 1853-1937). That group dominated the architectural scene of Japan for the next 40 years, showing that Conder’s architectural training was a critical step for building Imperial Japan.

Conder’s time in Japan coincided with great changes in the Japanese state: four years after Conder’s arrival in 1881, the Japanese emperor promised to give the nation a constitution. Alongside this, a modern cabinet with ministries of war, local and foreign affairs, and finance were also being established. These ambitious programmes needed new arenas for their activities, which required architects capable of constructing appropriate buildings for the politicians, behind a newly nationalist background following the early Meiji period when new models and basic Seiyō institutions were bedding in. Japanese architects taught by Conder or Conder’s ‘apprentices’ were the main executors of these grand plans between 1886 and 1906, yet they first studied under Josiah Conder at the Engineering College thereby becoming the new building elite and the top architects of official Japan. (Finn, 1996: 93)

Japanese authorities’ trust in foreign experts meant that the focus of education was decided early on by foreigners rather than Japanese, from Henry Dyer to Conder. This was important, as it meant that the worldview of the Japanese was superseded in architecture and replaced by whatever education was deemed to be civilised. Therefore the moral focus of education for carpenters was quietly ignored and replaced by an emphasis on developing the knowledge and skills of architecture students. Conder interpreted the aim of his job in the Imperial College of Engineering as training the Japanese students in the theory and skills necessary to produce European-style buildings. The application of these skills was in a quite different role from that of carpenters: Japanese architects were trained to be “executives” who could design projects in Seiyō style, separated from engineers and serving as intermediaries between patrons and builders, rather than participating in building themselves.

As mentioned in Section 3.2, the Department of Architecture was initially under the tuition of William Anderson and Chastle De Boinville. Conder was employed to replace these two teachers whose tenure was widely viewed as having been unsuccessful. (Fujimori, 2009: 13) Although both were established architects, “neither of them had the necessary teaching skills. They concentrated wholly on instructing their students in draftsmanship and onsite skills, but failed to offer a systematic knowledge of architecture. In particular, Boinville spoke with a heavy French accent which made him difficult to understand and liked to ridicule the Japanese, which did little to endear him to his students.” (Fujimori, 2009: 13) Conder, a bright young architect with a strong penchant for all things Japanese, heralded a new era in architecture in Japan, both in its instruction and as a leader in the field of building.

Content of Conder’s Course
As noted, the purpose of the Architecture degree course had been to facilitate the adaptation of foreign building technology and foreign architectural styles in Japan. This purpose was supported by the Meiji government itself which was a generous patron of Seiyō buildings and was the primary employer of the
early graduates, who were obliged to work for it for seven years after graduation in exchange for their training. (Choi, 2003: 28) Graduates of the course all therefore became government employees and architects building Meiji authority architecture.

The architecture course was first developed by Henry Dyer and then adapted by Josiah Conder. According to Don Choi, “in Glasgow Dyer had investigated engineering education reforms, he was unprepared for one aspect of the Engineering College in Tokyo, namely the establishment of the architecture department. The “fine arts” component of architecture fell outside the purview of engineering as defined in Britain” (Choi, 2003: 9) Dyer’s architecture programme was pragmatic and made no mention of architectural design or the fine arts, and only a brief reference to style. (Choi, 2003: 9) Given that at this time, art was not even defined in Japanese dictionaries, this would not have been an issue which the Japanese authorities would have been aware of, and it took Josiah Conder’s initiative to include fine arts components in the course.

The breadth of topics eventually covered by the architecture course at the College of Engineering was ultimately wider than was usual in the UK or France, with a focus on technical knowledge, practical experience and (after the recruitment of Conder) artistic skill. The syllabus demonstrates this comprehensiveness:

“During their first two years in the general and scientific course, architecture students studied English, math, geography, mechanics, physics, chemistry, and drawing. In the third year, they spent most of their time in the architectural drawing studio, although they also took classes in geology, engineering, and math. Fourth-year instruction consisted exclusively of lectures on architecture and architectural drawing studio. Each academic year ended with examinations. The practical course of the fifth and sixth years provided students hands-on experience. Students spent most of their time at construction sites of European-style buildings, for instance Conder’s Prince Arisugawa Residence (1884). They returned to campus for the year-end examinations, and at the end of their sixth year, they demonstrated their knowledge through three academic exercises: a comprehensive written examination, a design project, and a graduating thesis… The examination covered the gamut of architectural subjects taught at the Engineering College, ranging from sanitation to structural calculations to building contracts.” (Choi, 2003: 47)

Conder’s lectures focused upon the artistic and the practical: “The “History and Art” lectures covered architectural history from ancient Egypt to modern Europe, yet also included India, China, and Japan. The “Building Construction” lectures treated foundations, materials, construction methods, and
architectural specifications." (Choi, 2003: 37) The examination questions (a sample of which are in the fig. 3. 18 below) were mostly taken from R.I.B.A. examinations, and as such were not much adapted to the national context of Japan. This is particularly the case for questions on ‘History and Design’, none of which were tailored to Japan.
The examination covered a great range of topics: structural calculations, construction, decoration, and professional practices such as estimating. It also included a sketch design project for a porter’s lodge and a gateway for a prince’s residence (probably a reference to Conder’s Prince Arisugawa Residence (1884) which his students worked on). In his curriculum at the Imperial College of Engineering, Conder covered a broader range of subjects than his peers in London, since architectural design was not taught at the English universities. (Choi, 2003: 47-48) The depth of instruction can be surmised by the exam questions: the material section covers not only expected categories such as Portland cement and glass, but also the causes of stone rot and experience of using oil paints and varnish in Japan.

The purpose of modernising meant that architecture students had a much wider focus than their carpenter predecessors: Seiyō architectural materials, practices such as contracting, Seiyō architectural history, science and technology were all new.

**Teaching methods and materials**

Schooling in Britain for architects in Conder’s time was unintegrated and disorganised, as reflected in his own education: “at the time when Conder was in London, no British school offered a systematic, comprehensive architecture course.” (Choi, 2001: 36) Gathering together new innovative methods of architectural teaching, Conder and Dyer created a new system, by definition at the cutting edge of the ‘modern’. Conder’s method of teaching was to start with basic essentials then move on to the history of European architecture, planning, construction and the installation of various facilities. Conder explored the state of current Japanese architecture, focusing in particular on the relationship between Japanese and Euro-American construction techniques. The methods of instruction for Conder’s course were 1) lecturing on architectural theory; 2) work on design composition; and, 3) site practice.

Conder’s lecturing on theory was split into two distinct parts: history and the art of architecture, and the qualities of materials and principles of construction. It is worthwhile noting that the so-called theory in the architecture course and the College as a whole was in fact almost wholly practical: whilst “Dyer chose to emulate the Zurich Polytechnikum’s balance of practice and theory” (Choi, 2001: 40), this theory was not philosophical but rather engineering based. This focus on practical education was planned because, by appointing British educators rather than French, the School of Architecture was not influenced greatly by the Beaux Arts tradition of France which focused solely on composition. Conder did integrate design composition into his course, with years one and two including drawing instruction whilst years three and four concentrated upon work away from the lecture hall and in the design studio. Practical experience followed in years five and six, when students spent most of their time at European-style construction sites.
Conder provided comprehensive instruction in the class and drafting room, but he also involved his students in projects he was working on. The first project they were involved in was the Museum at Ueno (1881), which provided practical training in every facet from drafting and administration to site organisation. This third method, on-site practice, accidently meant that the education system designed by Conder was one suited to the Japanese experience of learning how to build because of its focus on practical training. A wholly academic syllabus, such as the one practiced in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, would have been a complete break from Japanese carpenters’ training which was solely concerned with learning on the job, with master carpenters also making use of *hiragata-bon*. In this sense there was some continuity. This was not the purpose of Conder and Dyer; both were concerned with applying the most up-to-date training methods for architecture and engineering, but coincidentally, this method of joining the practical with the theoretical made the transition for the Japanese somewhat more acceptable.

If the method of learning on-site may have been broadly similar, the context was not. The first four years of architectural instruction were spent developing knowledge through reading, writing, listening, and drawing. Students were not taught by doing manual labour, and certainly not by sweeping up. They were taught through words far more than through actions. Whereas carpenters were educated through their work teams and knowledge was gained by imitation, the Japanese architects were encouraged to be original and were trained to be leaders, and given great investment by the state. These huge differences in methods of education meant that architectural education was revolutionised and had a different root to carpentry education. The methods of education were designed to promote autonomy in the first cohorts of Japanese architects, to create agents capable of acting independently, able to adapt to new fashions and to instigate change in the character and methods of construction in Japan.

Given its short time of establishment, the College of Engineering drew on a surprisingly wide range of materials to aid teaching:

“The circulation of architectural and pedagogical ideas was accompanied by the transportation of material objects. To support their endeavours, architects and educators brought with them books, plaster casts, photographs, and other tangible items. Dyer and his faculty established both a library and a museum at the Engineering College, the latter containing models, tools, drawings, and other artefacts. The architecture collection of the library expanded greatly after Conder’s arrival, and Conder also suggested that ‘casts of Architectural ornament… be placed in the Drawing office’ to serve as models for freehand drawing and shading.” (Choi, 2003: 40)
Conder’s students had few models of European-style architecture beyond these books. Although some Seiyō structures were extant in Japan in this period, Conder counselled against using them for sketching: “I must warn you against taking example, too much, from the buildings of the European settlements in your Country.” (Conder, 1878: 13) Indeed for the most part Conder appears to have used texts to give examples of buildings. There is evidence to suggest that in his lectures, Conder taught directly from the books *A History of Architecture* by James Fergusson and *A Handbook of Architectural Styles* by Alfred Rosengarten, both standard texts of the time. In comparing the notebooks of ITŌ Chūta (see Section 3.6 for a full discussion of ITŌ) in his student days with the textbooks Choi found that in structure and content, Conder follows the books in his teaching rather slavishly. (Choi, 2003: 253) As Conder himself had only recently finished his formal education, these materials were likely to be an authoritative component of the student’s education.

As for the content of Fergusson’s text, he was fascinated by world architecture and was a widely travelled architecture historian. Fergusson did not believe that European architecture, particularly Gothic architecture, was better than all other forms, and wished to educate his countrymen in this opinion. Yet he clearly held up ‘the West’ as highly civilised in comparison to all others (an opinion reflected strongly in Conder’s student’s writings, shown in Section 3.5). This superior attitude is particularly evident in the short section on Japan in *A History of Architecture*. A tone of condescension is evident in Fergusson’s writing in “A History of Architecture” volume three:

“It is to be feared that, though quaint and curious in itself, and so far worthy of attention, [Japanese architecture] is of little interest beyond the shores of the islands themselves. On the other hand, it is be feared that the extent of our knowledge is sufficient to make it only too clear that the art, as practiced in Japan, has no title to rank with that already described in the preceding pages, and consequently no claim to a place in a general history of architectural art.” (Fergusson, 1876: 710; quoted in full at the beginning of Chapter 3)

Given this dismissive tone (to the point of excluding Japanese architecture from the history of world architecture, reflected in exclusion of Japan in the study of world architecture history) and the lack of a Japanese instructor knowledgeable in Japanese carpentry, Conder’s method of teaching was to deepen students’ understanding of ‘Western architecture’ through theory, practice and design rather than attempting to also cover Japanese traditional architecture.

Contact with Britain was deemed a crucial part of the education of Japanese architects by Conder. Before him, there was no formal architectural contact between Japan and Britain and, prior to 1853, the main method of contact was one way information from Holland to Japan through books. As shown in
Section 3.2 this situation had changed by the early Meiji period, when carpenters were designing hybrid buildings and foreign surveyors and engineers were employed to build in Seiyō styles. After building the College of Engineering in 1873, an architecture teacher and leader was required who was close to the current practices in Seiyō architecture. Josiah Conder filled this gap and started establishing conditions similar to a contact zone between the authorised teacher of Seiyō, with Japanese students. Due to this situation, for the first time the architectural contact zone was two-way.

Conder evidently felt the need to stay in touch with the RIBA from Japan; after sending the Institute his studies of Japanese architecture, he also sent an issue of reports of the College of Engineering (Conder, 1876/1878: letter), and later helped to establish the Architects Association (Zouka Gakkai). Conder even wrote to RIBA in 1887 asking them to “extend their recognition of this rising institute in a foreign country by making an exchange of printed proceedings and Transactions, regularly.” (Conder, 1887: letter) Conder wrote as a member of RIBA himself, being an Associate from 1878 and a Fellow from 1884. (Stewart, 1987: 36) When writing to the RIBA requesting a formal link with the Architects Association, Conder claimed that the Association “contains among its members gentlemen well acquainted with the ancient arts of Japanese; as well as scientific and practical men full of experience with in [sic.] Europe and in their own country.” (Conder, 1887: letter) Conder successfully aided the set up the ‘Architecture Institute of Japan’ in 1888 and became the first honorary president.

Conder’s attitude towards Japanese carpentry
Conder’s attitude towards Japanese architecture, combined with his Victorian idea of modern architecture, was articulated through his practical works. Whilst his RIBA funded study trip was to Italy and Japan, the first part was put to practice in designing in Italian Gothic, but he never designed traditional Japanese buildings, instead Conder catered for the taste of the Japanese government.

This lack of engagement in Japanese forms was not inappropriate for the period. As a result of the Meiji Restoration, Japanese intellectuals saw the past through a new conceptual lens: kindai (modern) was defined as a new era, and so the current times were distinguished more clearly from the past. The policy of bunmei kaika meant that new ideas from abroad were adopted, ideas that revolutionised customary practices. The influence of social Darwinism emphasised not only the survival of the fittest but also evolution, which implied a necessary improvement upon the past. These trends were all influential in eroding the customary respect towards what had come before.

This is not to say that the past was henceforth ignored, only that the way it was looked at was transformed: Japanese architects learnt about the past to distinguish the past from the present. One of
the main differences between the *ad hoc* education of the pioneer carpenters and the first Japanese architects was the latter’s contextualised learning: styles were not seen as static but as trends with a history that changed greatly until modern times. Styles, spaces and practices were understood as fashions to a much greater extent. For example, examination questions such as “Trace the historical changes in the art of window tracery which took place throughout the Gothic styles, and illustrate by sketches” (Choi, 2003: 261) required a deep understanding of the past in Europe.

This focus on the past was because “like other British architects of the day, [Conder] believed that historical precedents served as the basis for modern design. To teach architecture, then, meant to inculcate the history of architecture into the Japanese students. In other words, architectural history entered Japan as part of the desire to modernize.” (Choi, 2008: 737) History and use of history was a great part of Conder’s philosophy as an architectural educator: “Fergusson’s sweeping history of the architecture of the world was prescriptive - he hoped the lessons of history would lead to the improvement of contemporary practices. Conder himself exhorted his students to look to history as a guide to future design.” (Reynolds, 2002: 531)

Yet what concerns me most here is the relationship Japanese architects had with their own country’s past and what they learnt of this past. One aspect of the teaching by Josiah Conder which is often forgotten is his attitude towards Japanese buildings. Whilst it seems that Japan was not alone in the ‘civilised world’ in later having an architectural identity crisis, as was described in chapter 2, the Japanese faced much overt, if accepted, prejudice in the form of Orientalism and the belief in racial superiority. These attitudes filtered directly into the study of architecture, as was seen in the writings of Fergusson (cited below). In spite of this, there is little evidence that Conder himself displayed overt prejudice against Japanese architecture in his teaching, as he spent most of his life during his career in Japan engaged with Japanese architecture, and arranged for the contributions of Japanese architects to appear in the English-speaking world through the RIBA Transactions.

Conder argues persuasively in his seminal lecture to his Japanese Architecture students “A few remarks on architecture” (1878b) that “it seems to me that there is little use in the changes in building in your country, if the chief aim is not solidity and strength.” (Conder, 1878: 4) Conder publically showed respect for Japanese architecture, apart from its endurance. For his students, Conder stated that changes in architecture are not due to cultural inferiority, only material inferiority as he said “without a certain necessary amount of substantial material we can produce only sheds and bungalows which cannot be dignified by the name of architecture.” (Conder, 1878: 3) This statement on the value of Japanese architecture has a corollary in that Conder did not teach that traditional forms of architecture
can be used with wood, and he was adamant on one issue: “Upon one thing I insist, and that is, that a building must be substantial.” (Conder, 1878: 3)

Whilst praising past carpentry in Japan, Conder was somewhat scathing of the current practices of carpenters (almost certainly carpenters such as Shimizu): “the experience of your ancestors is entirely forgotten in these modern timber constructions of which I was speaking; which, in addition to their other faults, are high, and exposed to heat and wet, with the short eaves of Northern stone architecture… such buildings are generally covered with unsightly white paint.” (Conder, 1878: 4) This message is directed only at contemporaneous carpentry and there is no evidence that Conder criticised the ancient architecture of Japan to the Japanese; Conder told his students that “You have your monuments too, of a different type, to the appreciation of which I am for ever urging you” (Conder, 1878: 14) According to Choi, Conder wrote, “great notice will be taken of the principles and beauties of the Architecture of the Country, with a view to encourage the retention of the best characteristics of the National Architecture in future building, so far as is consistent with stability and security of construction, and with all modern requirements.’ However, both the methodology and the specific buildings of the architectural history familiar to Conder were derived from the nineteenth-century European context and thus had little to do with the buildings of Japan.” (Choi, 2008: 738) Although Conder praised past wooden buildings highly, he nowhere suggested a return to using wooden architecture (although he clearly taught on the use of wood in buildings since two questions of the 1881 exam were on this).

Whilst Conder’s attitude towards Japanese architecture cannot be discerned from his teachings, his predisposition to it must have affected his teachings. Indeed, when the audience changed he had a different attitude. When writing to the architects at RIBA “Further notes on Japanese architecture” (1885/1886) Conder displayed scepticism about the value of buildings in Japan, as with the earlier quote which discounted Japan from world architecture history. He wrote, on separate occasions that:

“In all their works, overweening weight is often given to insignificant matters. [This] has robbed [Japanese buildings] of grander and more monumental results which the bolder enterprise and stronger faith of other eastern nations have obtained.” (Conder, 1885/1886: 186)

And the following year:

“Whilst falling short of the lasting and monumental, they have attained the utmost delicacy and refinement, and their best domestic buildings can hardly better be described than as exquisite pieces of joinery and cabinet making.” (Conder, 1886/1887: 104)
There are a number of reasons that Conder held the opinion that Japan’s new architects should not continue the building traditions of Japanese carpenters. These reasons were: conflict of interest, prejudice, lack of knowledge, and lack of interest. These are discussed below.

First, his commission to induct and educate the first generation of Japanese architects and build ‘Western style’ buildings did not necessitate Conder to have great understanding or to place great value on Japanese traditional buildings. Indeed it would have been something of a conflict of interest from Conder’s point of view.

Second, assumptions about the lowliness of architecture in pre-Meiji Japan are reflective of an overweening Orientalism of the Victorian period; Conder belonged to the paradigm of ‘Western supremacy’ as much as any other Englishman of the Victorian age. This ‘Western supremacist’ construction of architecture history was taught in the textbooks used to describe the progress of history. These histories generally saw modern styles as Western and also as superior to all previous styles. This hierarchical outlook was reflected in Bannister Fletcher’s tree of architecture (1921, fig. 3.19).

Under this system, Japanese architecture was seen as having the same essence as Chinese architecture. Also, being on the very lowest branch, Japanese architecture was as far from modern architecture as it was possible to be. Given the prevalence of social Darwinism at the time, this position alongside Assyrian architecture, an empire which ended 2,500 years previously, shows that Japanese architecture was seen as static, reflecting cultural assumptions found in the unfashionable works of Buckle, fought against by Japanese intellectuals. Banister Fletcher posited that Oriental culture and architecture were stagnant and decadent (Choi, 2003: 61) whilst Fergusson (in a text used by Conder to teach his Japanese students) stated that:

“...They [The Japanese] have no poetry, properly so called, and no literature worthy of the name. Their painting never rose much above the scale of decoration, their sculpture is more carving than anything we know by the higher name, and their architecture stands on the same low level as their other arts.” (Fergusson, 1876: 710)

During the late Victorian period, the main educational texts on non-European architecture were Orientalist: knowledge about the ‘East’ was not based on facts and knowledge but on preconceived archetypes that saw all ‘Eastern’ societies as broadly similar to each other and of a different type to ‘Western’ societies. As Conder relied heavily on sources such as Fergusson and was himself educated using the same texts, the progress of history was seen in terms of Seiyō architectural history; given the
contempt Japanese architecture was held in, it would prove very difficult for a Britain to integrate Japanese architectural history into the framework of architectural history at the time.

3.19. Banister Fletcher’s ‘Tree of architecture’ (the earliest version). Source from Banister Fletcher, 1921. (Courtesy of the British Library Collections)
Third, whilst prejudice was rife, the audience at the RIBA Conder was writing to had little knowledge about Japanese architecture. Consider the response of one R. Phene Spiers to Conder’s first paper “Notes on Japanese architecture” his 1877/1878 paper presented to the RIBA: “I am afraid, with regard to the architecture of Japan, there is no architecture, as we understand it: that is, whatever there may be in decoration, in dress, in objects of art, and in other works of Japan, from the architecture of the country we shall learn scarcely anything.” In such a critical environment with a general lack of knowledge it is not unusual that Conder refrained from promoting the worth of Japanese architecture too strongly.

Finally, Conder himself may not have been as fascinated with Japanese architecture as he was with other aspects of Japanese arts, such as painting, costume and landscape gardening on which he wrote more extensively for a British audience. Conder showed great appreciation in Japanese decorative art as in his first report to the RIBA states: “A striking quality of sculpture of this kind is the extremely careful imitation of nature, leaves and flowers being carved with a delicacy and truth to nature that is marvellous, and coloured with the same care and beauty.” (Conder, 1877/1878: 190)

Therefore, in spite of encouraging words to his students, Conder’s attitude towards native architecture comprised of three aspects: first, treating traditional architecture as antiquated and of little relevance to modern building practice; second, disparaging current carpentry practices as tasteless, ad hoc and, therefore, unfashionable; third, he taught that it was not necessary to study Japanese ‘traditional’ architecture in the College course due to his strict Victorian thought on what is ‘architecture’ (that is, without a certain necessary amount of substantial material, it is ‘not architecture’). These attitudes were important in creating a historicised Orient in the minds of Japanese architects, which was quaint, beautiful and yet of limited utility in the ‘modern’ capitalist world which was in vogue in this period. This was a shared attitude amongst several of the teachers at the College of Engineering (such as the Dean, Henry Dyer) who had an ambiguous position of publicly teaching recently developed technology, yet privately being appreciative and often fascinated by the ‘historical’ Japan that was disappearing before their eyes.

Yet it can be said that it was not Conder’s duty to think about the effect of his teaching native Japanese the way of the modern world, as he only came to provide a ‘door’ for Japan to Seiyō (especially Britain). Even so, his notions about Japanese ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ architecture gave an example to Japanese architects which they seem to have adopted. Conder’s syllabus did not include the teaching of Japanese carpentry, ensuring that until 1889 the architecture course was an instance of the ‘West’ in

76 Conder’s interest in Japanese garden was influential to Edwardian Britain landscape before the First World War through his book in 1893, Landscape Gardening in Japan. (Tachibana, Daniels, and Watkins, 2004)
the ‘East’. His course covered design, mathematics, European architecture history, professional practice, contracting, and materials used in Western architecture. This meant that if a prospective Japanese student wished to learn about the past of Japanese carpentry, their only option was to become a carpenter’s apprentice or to pursue this privately.

In this sense an important conclusion can be drawn about the European approach to architectural history in Japan as shown through Conder’s course. From a Western perspective, Japanese architecture was seen as being outside of history: historical revival meant only revival of European styles. This is seen strongly in the fourth edition (1901) of Banister Fletcher’s *A History of Architecture* which “was divided into two sections. The ‘Historical Styles’, which covered all the material from earlier editions, and The ‘Non-Historical Styles,’ which included Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Central American, and Saracenic architecture.” (Baydar, 1998: 8) Through being educated to design modern buildings, Japanese architects were re-educated in their worldview, where the only valid ‘modern architecture’ was European architecture. Conder’s buildings show how he and other foreign architects attempted to articulate models by which architecture in Japan could progress to encompass ‘Oriental’ roots.

### 3.4 The formation of Victorian Japan under foreign architects

Through Conder’s British-inspired architectural education, European architecture hierarchies were slowly embedded into public buildings in Japan in this period. Whilst the education of architects set up the potential for a type of modernity to arise in Japanese authority architecture, it was only in the practice and discourse of architects that this modernity was expressed to the Japanese public. As a prolific architect, Conder had a large part to play in this, participating in 134 projects whilst working in Japan, mostly in Tokyo. In the first part of this section I discuss the buildings which give a picture of the essence of Conder as an architect, before discussing later foreign architects.

**Conder’s government buildings**

Conder’s early architectural practice work was commissioned by the Japanese Government’s Ministry of Engineering: as an architect he produced his most important buildings from these commissions during his early career in 1877-1884. This is because his major works were executed before his students had attained sufficient experience to run the College and take on major commissions; before these students had graduated Conder was considered to be the pre-eminent architect in Japan. In his later career Conder worked as an Architectural Consultant for Mitsubishi group during 1887-1901 and led a private architectural practice.
Conder’s proposal for the contract for the Imperial Palace in Tokyo (1879-1888) was one of his first activities upon entering Japan and followed his studies on pre-Meiji palaces at Kyoto as presented in papers sent to the RIBA journal in 1886. He was one of the bidders for the ‘Western style’ reception hall, designed to be a separate pavilion from the palace itself. Conder’s reception hall was to be “symmetrical, with carefully designed facades that produced a monumental frontality. Their schemes displayed a comprehensive spatial geometry and subjected the program to an overall organizational logic.” (Wendelken, 1996: 31) (fig. 3.20) As mentioned the Japanese government wished to create Seiyō architecture for their public buildings but buildings such as temples and shrines with traditional functions kept their traditional forms. Therefore, although Conder entered Japan with a high reputation, this reputation was only in the area of Seiyō architecture.

Ultimately both the palace and the reception hall were constructed by the traditional master carpenter of the miyadaiku (Jap. 宮大工), KIGO Kiyoyoshi (Jap. 木子清敬, 1845-1907), as desired by the emperor himself who preferred to live in Japanese quarters. Kigo, although responsible for the main reception room, relied on the advice from Conder and other foreign engineers for the public rooms. As was often the case in Meiji Japan, the reception rooms, the most public part of the palace, were Seiyō style; yet Japanese and foreign methods overlapped in surprising ways. (fig. 3.21) Indeed the imperial palace was a watershed building in combining Japanese forms in modern architecture with full use of the traditional arts of wood carving, lacquer work and painting. However, although Japanese elements were incorporated, the fundamental principle of Meiji public buildings remained: the outward face should appear ‘Western’ whilst the private interior could remain traditional.

77 Miyadaiku was a title for master carpenters who constructed Japanese shrines and temples, and were renowned for their use of elaborate wooden joints.
Shortly after this submission, Conder’s Hokkaidō Sales Hall in Tokyo (1880-1881) was built, the first building in Japan which strongly drew on Burges’ work. The building “bore a close resemblance to Burges’ original design for building at Harrow, the British public school” (Finn, 1995: 53) with the features of truss-structure roofs secured by iron bolts, a chimney, and fireplaces being introduced in this building (fig. 3.22). However, the building had an eclectic touch: the roof is low-pitched, hipped rather than gabled, and with bracketed eaves like an Italianate Villa, in other words, not Gothic. This Venetian style building, built to show off products from newly conquered Hokkaidō, was delicate looking and showcased displays of canned salmon, edible seaweed, and coal: the beautiful form for a mundane function is another example of Meiji addiction to architectural display. The two-story 30m long brick building was constructed of bricks made in Japan, and was “the first building in Japan to use a Western invention for protecting a building against earthquakes.” (Lerski, 1979: 272)
It was one of rare survivors of the 1923 earthquake: just “burned on the inside, but standing erect with its walls uncracked.” (Lerski, 1979: 273) After the commissioning department collapsed (as noted in Section 4.1 on Japanese imperialism), the newly formed Bank of Japan (established in 1881) took over the building as an interim base in 1882 and it became a bank, which seemed a more appropriate function for the grand form, though if built in Britain at the time it would have been no more or less than a middle-class villa. This building demonstrates the Japanese Meiji government’s early fascination with architectural form: the building is really a hall for selling products from Hokkaidō, yet the spaces are full of rooms for a gentleman’s club including a billiard (snooker) room and a drawing room (shown in figs. 3.23 and 3.24) with “much of the Oriental taste for the interior decoration” (Furuichi, 1931: 11) which underlies Conder’s reputation in Japan for thoroughness.

3.23. Upper floor plan of the Hokkaidō Sales Hall. Adopted from Kawahigashi, 1980. (Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, the University of Tokyo)

3.24. Interior Plan of the guest room in the Hokkaidō Sales Hall. Source from Suzuki et al, 2009. (Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, the University of Tokyo)
In the same year 1881 (Meiji Year 14), Conder’s first Museum was built. This was the first concrete example of a long-trend trend, underlying the development of new building types for the general public. Alice Tseng believes this development was due to “the emergence of a new patronage and audience for art in the social and political transition from feudalism to a constitutional monarchy. The modern departure from traditional artistic praxis fundamentally involved a shift of physical and intellectual ownership. Many places, objects, and conventions hitherto limited to the purview of the elite were reassigned as the nation’s prerogative, to be maintained for national ends.” (Tseng, 2008: 3) The need for national art museums was directly linked to the need to use buildings to create a new national consciousness by Meiji elites, creating spaces for a shared experience of the arts. Given this, both the contents and the building itself are important to understand how the vision for kindai (modernity) was conceived.

The Museum of Ueno was an interesting example to show how far some government clients’, enthusiasm for Seiyō style buildings outstripped Conder’s: this Museum’s design was not actually Seiyō enough for the Japanese, as Conder wanted to create a style between East and West whilst the Japanese only wanted a pure Seiyō style. This voluntary Westernisation is very different from the ordinary concept of Orientalism and colonial domination, and provides further evidence of the change in culture (or transculturation) of the Japanese elites. The two-story brick museum had an area of 27,300 square feet and faced along “the central axis the fairground in Ueno Park, ultimately confronted by a monumental building.” (Tseng, 2004: 472) It was to function as an art gallery in the second national industrial exhibition in 1881 as in fig. 3.25. In style it was a Victorian Gothic building with Indian Islamic influence and Moorish features. For Conder it was another attempt to marry ‘Western’ architecture with ‘Eastern’, particularly Mogul, elements. Conder wrote that:

“No, a foreign architect arriving in this country imbued with the idea of the continuity of a national style, generally first attempts to find some way by which he can perpetuate the national architecture, whilst giving it the modern improvement of arrangements, solidity, and scientific advantages. So far as my studies of the national styles went (and I was an enthusiast in the beauties of Japanese art) there were no decorative or ornamental forms, or forms of outline or contour, which lent themselves constructionally to an indigenous or wooden style, and it became necessary to seek in Indian or Saracenic architecture for forms which, having a logical treatment in brickwork or stonework, would impart an Eastern character to the building.” (Conder, 1920: 43)
Although some historians (for example Stewart, 1987) did not see Ueno Museum as a successful style for Japan, for Conder the building was an expression of his dedication to finding a suitable hybrid style of architecture for Japan, between East and West, that did not use Japanese ornamental forms as he deemed these as suitable only for wooden buildings. Both his eclecticism and his concept of a generalised ‘Orient’ can be highlighted here. For a British architect in the Victorian period it was not unusual for style to be chosen as representing the concept of the architect, or as a means to symbolise
what the building stood for; the fact that few understood what Conder was trying to do demonstrated a lack of embedded understanding about eclecticism, and how style could be used as a symbol. After the Museum had been completed, INOUE Kaoru (井上馨, 1836 -1915), a highly influential Japanese statesman, succeeded in dissuading Conder from the pseudo-Saracenic style which the architect had thought appropriately Oriental, and propelled him instead toward what has been described as his “Renaissance villa” style. (Finn, 1995: 97) One of Conder’s purposes, as he saw it, was to generate a national style of public architecture for Japan, whilst using ‘modern’ materials, particularly brick and stone. In Ueno museum he used what he thought of as a generic ‘Eastern’ style, borrowing what he considered to be ‘Eastern’ architectural decorative features, such as Moorish arches (fig. 3.26), inspired by Burges.

But in retrospect the choice of Moorish style shows Conder’s Orientalism. He believed that Japan, even with no historical connection or knowledge of the Islamic North African nations, would accept a Moorish style as a suitable example of the Orient, just as an American would have accepted Greek revival. This suggests an assumption on Conder’s part that all Oriental nations possessed an essential commonality, that there were general stylistic characteristics original to the ‘East’, perhaps of ‘lightness’ and ‘exuberance’ (captured in the photograph in fig. 3.27), making any Oriental style more valid in Japan than the generic European style currently being practiced.
After he was deterred from his Moorish style, Conder’s most important work in political and social terms was the Rokumeikan Palace (Jap. 鹿鳴館, lit. Deer Cry Pavilion), built in Tokyo 1883 (Meiji Year 16) immediately after the Museum at Ueno. The Rokumeikan was commissioned by the Foreign Minister INOUE Kaoru who believed that Japan needed to establish a new European-style Empire on the Eastern Sea, on the model of Britain. Inoue wished the Rokumeikan to be built so that the Japanese would meet Europeans and Americans face to face and realise their weakness compared to Seiyō:

“The Japanese must achieve a system of self-government and a vigour of conduct sufficient to assure the creation of a strong people and a powerful and effective government. How can we impress upon the minds of our thirty-eight million people this daring spirit and attitude of independence and self-government? In my opinion, the only course is to have them clash with Europeans, so that they will personally feel inconvenienced, realize their disadvantage, and absorb an awareness of Western vigorousness. I consider that the way to do this is to provide for truly free intercourse between Japanese and foreigners…. Only thus can our Empire achieve a position equal to that of the Western countries with respect to treaties. Only thus can our Empire be independent, prosperous and powerful.” (Inoue Kaoru, 1879, quoted in Slade, 2009: 95)

For Conder this was an important commission, and he decided again to follow the pattern of British eclecticism, this time borrowing a French Classical style and adding Indian Islamic influences. As a place for Japanese elites to practice the social skills needed for dealing with foreigners, this mixture of ‘Western’ and ‘Oriental’ styles was likely to be seen as suitable by Conder. It was used as an entertainment hall for the foreign Ministry which was a major locus of social intercourse for elite Japanese learning from Seiyō, and particularly European, society. Through participating in the events
held in the building, Japanese elites became well versed in Seiyō culture. Here Conder again demonstrated his versatility and desire for cultural equivalence.

The two-story brick building (fig. 3.28) was described as “the scarlet woman of Meiji buildings. Its name Rokumeikan, literally “The hall of the cry of the Deer,” was “taken from a Chinese poem celebrating hospitality to strangers, a custom its architecture was intended to promote.” (Finn, 1995: 97) It was constructed at a cost of about 140,000 Yen, an enormous sum for the Japanese state to spend on a building to hold balls and other events. Whilst it was not the first building with this entertainment function,76 in its period the Rokumeikan was more than simply a building: it became a symbol of a way of life. (Watanabe, 1996: 21)

Its function as a socialisation space for Meiji and foreign elites is clear from the spatial functions, with billiard rooms, drawing rooms, numerous dining rooms, a common room and a newspaper room shown in fig.3.29. The upper floor map in fig. 3.30 shows the floor plan for the emperor’s birthday celebrations. Written in French, the menus and rooms were redesigned to replicate all the functions of a French party. Following this party, the Japan Weekly Mail praised the building, writing that “we imagine the hospitable people of Tokyo must often congratulate themselves on possessing a handsome and stable building so admirably adapted for the accommodation, distribution, and easy circulation of large assemblages of guests.” (Japan Mail, 1885, quoted in Smits, 2010: 12)

76 Its precursor was the Hoheikan (1880), Sapporo’s hotel-guest house which also showed concern for a proper Western ambiance.
The Rokumeikan provided an informal contact zone for Meiji authorities to mingle with European and Americans, held on Western cultural terms. Given this was a contact zone, it is unsurprising that some transculturation occurred, significantly in the role of women as a guest of their husbands or even as public figures raising funds: “Wives traditionally left [at] home, were encouraged to participate in the Western way. Shortly, under the patronage of Countess Itô, court and government wives, many in hats and dresses, put on Japan’s first, and highly successful charity bazaar.” (Finn, 1995: 97) This new female role, displayed in the bazaar scene in fig. 3.31, as an equivalent to the relatively independent women of Seiyō, was a source of pride for some Japanese. Following the emperor’s birthday in 1885, the Japan Weekly Mail wrote that “in the dancing last evening the Japanese ladies took a large share. Indeed, it has now become difficult to distinguish them from their sisters in the West, so thoroughly have they adopted European costumes, and so perfectly versed are they in the usages of Western Society.” (Japan Mail, 1885, quoted in Smits, 2010: 12)
Yet this obvious example of assimilating Seiyō culture was too overt to last. The picture in fig. 3.32 from 1887 shows a large masquerade ball held in the Rokumeikan where Japanese and foreigners dressed as characters from European history and literature. This event was criticised by the Tokyo public as a terrible use of government funds: whilst the expense was decried, their anger was mainly towards the function of the building, the manners of the guests, and the priorities of the government. This scandal led to the Foreign Minister Inoue, the building’s commissioner, resigning, and the government sold the Rokumeikan for private use in 1889.

This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library.
In addition to its unpopularity in late 1880s Japan, when nationalism and self-confidence was rising, the Rokumeikan did not even have the desired effect on foreigners: as noted in Section 2.2 many European commentators reacted critically to the Japanese copying European ways. Part of the complaint was that the copy was inferior to the original: some visitors such as the French writer Pierre Loti, who attended a ball in November 1886 in celebration of the emperor’s birthday, were unimpressed with the building itself, describing it as reminiscent of a second-rate French casino. (Finn, 1995: 98)

Other foreign visitors believed that Japan should remain different and exotic. These events brought out feelings of cultural and racial superiority: Westerners believed that non-European people could not master European ways in any depth. For example, a French naval officer wrote following the emperor’s birthday celebration in 1885 that the Japanese women’s dresses were ‘brilliant disguises’ and on the dancing, “They dance quite properly, my Japanese in Parisian gowns. But one senses that it is something drilled into them, that they perform like automatons, without any personal initiative.” (Meech-Pekarik, 1986: 149)

Contact between Japanese and Europeans appeared to have had little effect on European opinions of Japan’s modernisation being mere imitation and rather than prompting shame in Japanese as Inoe wished brought anger at Westernisation being a well funding part of the government strategy.

The Rokumeikan became a symbol of government pandering to Seiyō, as being in conflict with private desire and social customs. The building represented the pinnacle of the early Meiji government’s architectural ideology to integrate Japan into Seiyō. Conder was important as the only permanent foreign architect working alongside this ideology. However he was also implicated by this position: he became marginalised by the Rokumeikan controversy since “within years of the Rokumeikan's completion, many intellectuals began voicing concern about the implications of making modernization synonymous with westernization.” (Guth, 1996: 17)

The conclusion of Josiah Conder’s building activities for government authorities was in 1894 (his first commission from the government for four years) when he constructed the Navy Ministry building in Tokyo. It appears clear that Conder was chosen partly due to his nationality. Often, Japan chose model nations to follow in each area of government, so France was the model for imperial buildings and the police, Germany was chosen for expertise in military affairs and town planning, and Britain stood for industry, railways, and particularly the Navy. (Sorenson, 2002: 50; Finn, 1995: 115) Throughout the Meiji period the Japanese navy showed an almost undivided loyalty to Britain, purchasing battleships only from British shipyards and hiring foreign instructors from the Royal Navy.

In spite of the likely desire for Britishness, in the façade, “there is a residue of Conder’s Hindu-Saracenic style of several years earlier in the alternating voussoirs of the windows.” (Stewart,
Yet this eclecticism was itself very British. In the parlance of 19th century, ‘style’ was a key issue for architects, who learnt about the meaning of forms in a prescriptive and normative way. The diversity of styles coincided with nationalism; the continuing trend of eclecticism, in a nationalist background, was a challenge for architects to determine the most suitable style for each modern country. Acting as a civilised ‘nation’ state through architecture therefore required national styles, and Conder was one of the main figures attempting to promote a Japanese national style, even setting the title for the dissertations of the first cohort of Japanese architects as ‘The Future Domestic architecture’ in 1879.

As shown in the examples above, Conder himself attempted to provide a solution to the issue of national style, which he saw as his task as soon as he arrived in Japan. (Conder, 1920: 63) He believed that solving this issue was laudable, and often stated his objective “to perpetrate the national characteristics of style in modern works.” (Conder, 1893: 369) In spite of his enthusiasm he was not personally able to solve this issue and contributed mainly by his suggestion that Japanese traditional motifs and rooflines on modern masonry buildings created “a bizarre and hybrid ensemble… revolting to Japanese taste.” (Conder, 1893: 369) Hybrid buildings were designed only by foreign architects in Japan (rather than Japanese architects) such as Adolph Stegmueller, Ralph Adams Cram, Hermann Ende, Willhelm Böckmann and Franz Baltzer.

Conder soon found that the majority of his clients disliked Oriental-inspired styles, and by 1890 he had been sufficiently discouraged to move completely away from them. The two story entrance hall and grand staircase of the Navy Ministry were a hallmark of Japanese Governmental buildings in this period, as was the symmetrical Renaissance style, and the red brick with white trimmings, also seen in Ende and Böckmann’s Ministry of Justice and in the British Consulate in Nagasaki. The Navy Ministry was particularly distinguished by its showy cavetto roofs, oculi, and elegant pilasters. The building remains interesting for the development of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan as “in this late work of the pupil of Burges, the overall aims of High Victorian Gothic and Renaissance derived idioms can be seen to merge.” (Stewart, 1987: 47) With the two German built government offices built nearby, Conder appears to have put particular effort into the design of the building, attempting to imbue it with a monumental character. In doing so he provided an appealing model for his students to inherit in Japan and their colonies.

Contemporary Victorian Architects in the Mid-Meiji
As part of governmental policy after 1894, all government building contracts were transferred to Japanese architects, the most productive and influential of who were Conder’s students.
return visit to England, Conder remained in Japan and became a private architect with an office in Tokyo in 1888. The opening of this office corresponds with the end of his academic career, though he continued to be a government servant, not ceasing to “advise the Ministry of Home Affairs on topics related to building and construction.” (Stewart, 1987: 37)

Yet Conder’s influence over the form of authority buildings inevitably waned after his move into the private sector, and other foreign architects and engineers built most of the iconic buildings of the mid-Meiji period. Contemporary with the Navy Ministry was the tallest building in the Eastern hemisphere, erected in 1890: the Ryōunkaku (Jap. 凌雲閣, lit. cloud-surpassing tower) in Asakusa (Jap. 浅草), Tokyo, shown in fig. 3.33. Twelve stories high at 225ft (69 m), it was built by the Scottish engineer William Kinnimond Burton, who would later be responsible for the sewerage system in Taipei. The building was used to sell goods from around the world, to display art and to observe Tokyo from the top floors. The construction was brick over a wooden frame, it contained Japan’s first elevator, and it was only 70ft shorter than the world’s highest building in New York. The building is notable for its iconic status in Japan and the continuing importance attached to height in the Meiji era.

The Japanese government employed other European and American architects who, unprompted, attempted to solve the problem of national style with their own ideas for Japan. Meiji urban development was mainly in Tokyo, formerly the central setting of the Shogunate, and gradually influenced other cities. The urban Europeanisation of Ginza planning of Brick Street (1872, discussed
in Section 3.2) and Hibiya centralised planning of Ministries (1886) were the main urban reforms during
the Meiji era instigated by the government.

After the Ministry of Technology was reformed in 1886, and reinvented as the Ministry of Works, public
architecture in Japan moved for a brief but significant period towards German architecture, for the
departmental head, MATSUZAKI Bancho, was an architect trained independently in Germany. (Stewart,
1987: 38) An imitation of the European trend for creating a new urban plan of the government district in
capital cities (such as in London) was proposed by ITŌ Hirobumi’s Cabinet in the Hibiya area, as a
result of the same political reasoning as the Rokumeikan: to achieve a revision of the unequal treaties
through demonstration of Japan’s level of civilisation. Ministries had been located separately around
the Imperial palace during 1875-1887; the government required a government district.

The Ministry of Works came up with a simple plan which was rejected. Conder was then approached
and came up with two urban plans centred around his Rokumeikan and again near the emperor’s
residence, both to the west of it. Conder interpreted the proposal in the first instance cautiously,
planning only three major buildings composed of a series of hollow squares in a plain and unambitious
manner. After the rejection of his first plan, Conder proposed another, (both shown in fig. 3.35) this time
with a stronger sense of holistic planning, including ten buildings adjacent to one another surrounding a
small park. Yet this plan was also rejected, perhaps again because it did not appear sufficiently
monumental: the planned National Diet building, for instance, was surrounded and crowded by other
buildings, not befitting its rank as the most important civic building in Japan.

In 1886 two architects from Germany, Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Böckmann, were invited to design a
plan to “construct a civic center comparable to those found in cities in Europe where all the ministries in
preferred Ende and Böckmann’s plan as “they had originally intended a grandiose complex in the
neo-baroque style with boulevards and a radial road pattern which will have had the effect of
perspectives one finds in Paris and other European cities.” (Jinnai, 1998: 34) With the arrival of Ende
and Böckmann the government opened a short-lived contact with Germany since “Ende and Brockman
[sic.] later returned to Berlin with a contingent of more than 10 Japanese trainees”. (Stewart, 1987: 39)
They produced a vision for urban redesign that included a new park, draining the castle moat, a space
for expositions and a military parade ground as well as grouping many government functions. Whilst
parts of the urban redesign were eventually achieved, such as the park and draining parts of the moat,
the scheme as a whole was later dropped due to the expense.
This type of planning fitted strongly with the Meiji idea of presenting a coherent, pure view of the civilised nation of Japan: having a district where all buildings would be seen uncontroversially as ‘architecture’ by foreign visitors would greatly aid impressing foreigners that Japan was not a hybrid country, where the pre-modern and the modern were alongside each other. This was clearly not the case in 1900, when Tokyo was still being described as follows: “as the city is in a transition state, it necessarily presents many strange anomalies. Side by side with lofty stone buildings stand rows of rude wooden houses. As with the buildings so with the people; while the mass still wear the native dress, numbers appear in European costume. The soldiers and police are dressed in uniform on the Western model.” (Wason, 1900: 24) The city was seen as a reflection of the people in it: whilst “the city has in many portions been thoroughly modernised” (Wason, 1900: 24) there were wide swaths where this was not true.
The shift from towards creating a modern European inspired capital implied a move away from both Japanese and Chinese forms. This could be seen clearly in instances when foreign architects proposed ‘traditional’ designs that were rejected; most obviously with the National Diet Building and Tokyo Station. Tokyo Station “was to become no less than a temple to progress and a monument to empire. It paid homage to the power of rail in the development of the state through its mastery of Western transportation technology and civil engineering.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 223) This was in keeping with the contemporaneous function of railway stations to display an international, aspirational and progressive image. Given this function, the original ‘traditional’ design by the German Franz Baltzer (fig. 3.37) was refused as it was out of keeping with the intention to represent its authority as “a modern, Westernised nation.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 232)

The final Tokyo Station was designed by one of Conder’s graduates and had no obvious ‘traditional’ features. The desire to discover a national style brought in by Conder stood at odds with the continued desire of the government to work within a Seiyō architectural vocabulary and grammar. As I shall discuss in the following section, this desire was shared by Conder’s students, who worked almost exclusively in Seiyō styles, with kindai (modern) sensibilities and mindsets.
3.5 Japanese inheritors of the modern mission

When Josiah Conder’s seven year tenure as Professor of Architecture ended in 1884 he was replaced by his former student TATSUNO Kingo (even designing a new dormitory himself in 1888, fig. 3.38). Two years later, the government abolished the Department of Public Works, placed the College of Engineering under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, and promptly incorporated the Imperial College of Engineering into the Imperial University. The course was substantially shortened from five years to three years. Under the original Architecture course 21 students graduated from the Engineering College architecture department, 19 under Conder and two more under Tatsuno: the first and second cohort went on to dominate the Japanese architecture scene for the following decades. (Choi, 2003: 65) The preceding text sections explored the form and content of the new education system and the buildings constructed by foreign experts during the mid-Meiji period. The following sections cover how this new system of education and design was received by Conder’s students, what effect these educational activities had on those educated on the Architecture course, and how a subsequent turn towards European architecture took place in Japan led by those students after Tatsuno became head of the Department of Architecture at the College of Engineering.

This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library.


Early Japanese architects’ absorption of Seiyō perspectives

Upon beginning the architecture course, the first issue that the Japanese students had to confront was understanding English. This apparently simple linguistic problem was a thoroughly complex one as

79 During the period when Conder was Professor of Architecture, the annual graduations were as follows: 1879, four graduates (including TATUSNO Kingo, KATAYAMA Tokuma, SONE Tatsuno and SATACHI Shichijiro); 1880, two graduates (including WATANABE Yuzuru); 1881, three graduates; 1882, five graduates; 1883, three graduates; and 1884, one graduate.
students were introduced to a great number of new concepts derived from the English language which had no counterpart in Japanese and which had not yet been adequately translated. When viewing the content of the first architectural courses, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the “Western architectural grammar would have been difficult for them to understand and incorporate in their thinking.” (Tosaki, 2004: 5) Given the characters in Japanese for architecture, which translate as ‘house building’, there was a lot of confusion for students as to what architecture was and what the course was actually teaching, as shown by the following anecdote: “At the Kobu Imperial University [Jap. 工部大学校], there had been a Zoke gakka [Jap. 造形学科] (faculty of house building) founded in 1877, but there was some misunderstanding of the term architecture even then, since many people thought the Faculty’s purpose was to turn out master carpenters.” (Tosaki, 2004: 5) Other concepts, just as fundamental to understanding the content of the course, needed to be translated or created, for example “art”, “tradition” and “history”. Struggling for an understanding of Occidental ideas so soon after their introduction to Japan, the first cohorts of students gained little critical distance and tended to assimilate the ideas of Conder’s course unquestioningly, especially as the teaching was in English.

In the period of this study, 1853-1919, the English idea of ‘modern’ was not fully understood in the Japanese word kindai. As shown in Section 1.3, the modern was defined in Japanese as kindai, the current period, rather than as conforming to the latest fashions and technologies. From 1915 on, dictionaries began reflecting this full definition. However, due to the early contact zone established between Japan and Seiyō in the architectural field, the discourse about architecture among Conder’s students largely conformed to the English idea of modernity in the late 1870s. Japanese architects were early ‘modernisers’ before the concept had even reached the Japanese dictionary. This being so, students were taught an eclectic range of building styles, and learned to choose a suitable style for the new state building rather than robustly to engage in debates on the meaning of Classicism in relation to Gothic. Aesthetic concerns were initially prioritised over the underlying meaning of forms, though the necessity for stability overrode even this in a country beset by natural disasters. Evidence from the students’ dissertations shows that, “on pragmatic issues such as fire prevention, sanitation, and heating, students at the Imperial College of Engineering argued that European techniques should be adopted.” (Choi, 2003: 50)

As a result of the students’ outward-looking tendencies, a sense of Japanese identity is not easily located in the early Japanese architects educated by Conder. Likewise indicators of their class and national identity were not easily found in the architecture student dissertations of the Meiji period. However, the students were well aware of the purpose of the architectural college and of their status within the wider ‘civilising process’: SONE Tatsuno, another of Conder’s first cohort of students, wrote
that “in quick advance of civilization no nation could be compared with the Japanese who are in a 
burning emotion to rank especially with the most civilized nations of the world.” (Sone, 1879: 18 quoted 
in Manzano Visita, 2009: 37) This quote shows both concern and pride with the progress of native 
civilisation, and reveals the course as part of this process of catching up with the ‘most civilised nations’.
The students saw their purpose to ‘scientifically’ learn the truth about European architecture (rather 
than the inauthentic practice of carpenters building in a foreign style): “The science of Architecture has 
been laid in our college as one of the main professional branches of study and the true principles of 
European Architecture is being here taught with the view of learning their true principles in our country.”
(Funakoshi, 1883: 9 quoted in Manzano Visita, 2009: 38)

Of all of Conder’s students, TATSUNO Kingo became the most influential Japanese architect and 
teacher of the Meiji period. His influence even spread to the colonies in Taiwan and Manchuria. Tatsuno 
completed his formal studies in 1879 and was then sent to England to work under William Burges, 
benefiting from Conder’s connection to his old employer. Whilst in the UK, Tatsuno caught up with the 
latest London building fashions, including the Queen Anne revival style which strongly influenced his 
later stylistic choices. Whilst Tatsuno replaced Conder as Professor of Architecture he would later 
become the first Japanese graduate to set up his own architecture practice in 1903. Tatsuno went on to 
gain many of the most important commissions in Japanese architecture such as the headquarters for 
the Bank of Japan, the National Sumo Arena, and Tokyo Station and he became one of the founding 
members of Japan’s Architectural Association.

Most of Tatsuno’s formative principles can be seen in his graduation dissertation; particularly his 
passion for brick, which he believed should even be used for decoration. Tatsuno wrote in his thesis 
that “I put, however, a greater credit on those solid buildings built with stone or bricks, if the employer 
be able to bestow a proper expense upon his buildings, owing to the following reasons: first we can 
help the interior of a building be cool in summer and warm in winter by its thick wall; secondly the 
suitability of the climate and changing customs might by procured by the due consideration of 
Architects.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 7-8) This first point echoes Conder’s call for the benefits of brick buildings 
in a hot climate yet the second is a clear indication by Tatsuno of the role of architects in both reflecting 
and promoting ‘modern’ customs. By suggesting the suitability of brick buildings for changing culture 
and customs in Japan, Tatsuno was placing value on the superiority of European building materials 
above and beyond Conder, who maintained to his students that the main benefit of brick and stone was 
solidity. As the first Japanese intimately familiar with Seiyō building theory and design, Tatsuno and his 
peers were of a generation enthused with a spirit of reform and authority, later to be reflected strongly in 
the buildings they made.
As demonstrated in Section 1.3, Japan underwent a change in political vocabulary through contact with Seiyō. This process saw words and concepts slowly being integrated into the Japanese vocabulary, with the definition of ‘modern’ in Japanese not identical to English in 1879 at the time of Tatsuno’s thesis: as noted above ‘modern’ [kindai] indicated the ‘present period’ (Satow: 1876). However, I found that the discourse in Tatsuno’s thesis supported the adoption of ‘the modern’ in Japanese architecture following the three primary characteristics analysed in Section 1.2 from the English definition: adopting new fashions, being up-to-date, and (to a limited extent) being against tradition. I argue below that whilst the vocabulary in Japan had not yet caught up, students left Conder’s course as agents of modernisation in a substantive sense.

On adopting new fashions, Tatsuno’s thesis displayed evidence of reflecting three new fashions in architecture and Japan: the search for a national style, eclecticism/Queen Anne revival, and reverence for Seiyō. First, Tatsuno showed his interest in discovering a national style: “I conclude that if we design domestic buildings, with Gothic construction principles and classical outline, with some of the Eastern Architectural elements added, we would obtain the result approaching towards the suitability for a new style of domestic Architecture to be developed hereafter in Japan.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 31-32) This discourse was broadly in line with contemporary European debates as interpreted by Conder on finding a ‘national style’ of architecture: by engaging in this debate Tatsuno was self-consciously engaging in the talking points of the period.

Second, as implied above, Tatsuno adhered to Conder’s eclecticism: he wrote “there is a large number of Architectural fields in the west and east as well, whence we might pick out ideas in order to develop a new style of architecture suitable for Japan; nevertheless we have much of the same in our temple and palatial buildings.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 31) This element of ‘choosing a style’ was strongly reflected in the current fashions of the times as described by Tatsuno: “The present age has no essentially characteristic Architectural Style, such as sometimes adopting the early best one, Classic or Gothic, and sometimes the Renaissance, and sometimes blending with those elements past.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 3) In his first contact with the Occident through Conder and his teaching materials, the new fashion presenting itself was eclecticism, and Tatsuno was clearly an adherent of adapting style to function. Indeed, as the fashions in Britain changed, with eclecticism moving out of favour and Queen Anne revival becoming popular, Tatsuno adapted his favoured style and adjusted to the times.

Third, the contemporaneous fascination with Seiyō in Japan and with the idea of bunmei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment) is strongly shown in the wording of the following passage of Tatsuno’s thesis: “The empire having been awakened lately, by the Western civilised people, has a wonderful progression in the civilisation, which produced a change to the original line of our wooden architecture
and accompanied the introduction of their solid and wooden styles. And now the change is going on with its initial velocity, which is, indeed, indispensible as our customs and ideas are changing.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 4) The use of the word ‘awakened’ implies that Japan was asleep or resting before, and such positive language shows that Tatsuno strongly agreed with the opening of Japan by Seiyō. Tatsuno also links civilisation to solid architecture, implying that one will follow the other. In Tatsuno’s thesis we see the impression that the concepts of Japan’s elites were changing which Tatsuno believed was pushing the changes in architectural taste.

On the second aspect of the modern, to be (technologically) up-to-date, there is ample demonstration of Tatsuno’s fascination with stylistic and technical modernity (in addition to his demonstration of being up-to-date with architectural fashions) because more than half of his dissertation is spent describing the technologies and techniques of construction, all of which were foreign. It is unquestionable that Tatsuno was concerned with sturdiness and his dissertation covers much ground in discussing the most suitable Seiyō building technologies to apply in order to create solid structures.

Evidence for the third aspect of the modern (to be against tradition) was more ambiguous in Tatsuno’s thesis, in part due to the era (anti-traditionalism was not a large component of ‘the modern’ until the turn of the 20th century) yet more likely because Tatsuno (as with most Japanese outside the People’s Friends school of thought) did not see the necessity of replacing tradition. Resisting Conder’s suggestions, Tatsuno did not rule out using wooden buildings: “Although some people say that the wooden buildings are perishable, yet some of ancient buildings still exist without ruin, such as Todaiji at Nara… all of which have been erected after the entrance of Buddhism (about 1300 years ago).…Though undoubtedly they [wooden buildings] would be less long-lasting than stone or brick buildings.” (Tatsuno: 1879: 7) Tatsuno looked upon wooden buildings with practical eye rather than a condescending eye.

The idea of the modern in English was as much about belonging as innovation, and attempting to relate Japanese architecture to prestigious Seiyō architecture could easily be seen as an attempt to raise the status of native building methods. For Tatsuno, Japanese architecture could still include wooden buildings:

“I have no objection to introduce a wooden style for the detached houses, even in the new prevalent style, if designed with the best principles and executed properly… especially when their cheapness is required.” (Tatsuno: 1879: 7)
Tatsuno was not necessarily against tradition: whereas Conder wanted all buildings to be solid and looked down on wooden buildings, Tatsuno constructed wooden architecture, although only for detached houses due to the fire risk. Tatsuno was more of a pragmatist than the doctrinaire Conder, who believed in adapting forms constantly based on their respective meanings. The national style that Tatsuno discussed is also above the contemporaneous architecture practices in Japan: Tatsuno found all building types acceptable yet whilst he preferred ‘traditional’ Japanese wooden architecture to the contemporary Giyōtū, (pseudo-Western style) style, both were subordinate to the genuine ‘modern’ architecture that Tatsuno had been taught. However in the passage above it is again the language used by Tatsuno that is particularly interesting (“I have no objection to introduce a wooden style for the detached houses, even in the new prevalent style”). Tatsuno assumed a blank slate for kindai (modern) Japanese architecture to build upon, showing his rational outlook. This is in keeping with his education into Conder’s eclectic tradition which gave the impression “first, that every nation must possess its own unique style, sustained by an orthodox lineage of orders and motifs, and second, that within the bounds defined by their lineages, appropriation of other national styles was in fact the order of the day.” (Sand, 2003: 112) Using this approach, Tatsuno attempted to create a national style of architecture in his building practices, borrowing plans and decorations from other national styles, primarily Britain.

The creation of an architectural discourse by Japanese architects such as Tatsuno was founded in the early period of elite transculturation in Japan, from 1853 until 1895, when the dominant culture in architecture was British. This meant that theses such as Tatsuno’s were written in English in Tokyo University and that their concerns and vocabulary reflected a colonialist discourse of opening up to Seiyō and ‘civilising’. This ‘burning emotion’ to ‘join the leading civilised nations’ was an attitude greatly suited to the late-Victorian mindset of Seiyō superiority, as imitation flattered countries such as Britain. Tatsuno’s writings reflected the dominance of foreign tastes and the lengths to which Japanese architects would go to raise their country’s reputation, and ultimately to pacify the perceived threat from Seiyō.

After graduating, Conder’s students, such as Tatsuno, Katayama, Kawai, and Watanabe, went to Europe and observed Victorian Gothic, Renaissance and other traditional styles. After visiting, each of them “inevitably began to realize that Conder’s style was very limited and personalised, and not representative of European authentic style at all (however, this mixture of styles was quite popular at the time when Conder was an architecture student in London).” (Tosaki, 2004: 6) As we have seen, there were originally no purely specific European authentic styles in Meiji Japan, except for a small number of cases in which other foreign architects had visited Japan such as Ende and Böckmann who were both established German Gothic architects. (Tosaki, 2004: 12-13) Apart from by SONE Tatsuzo,
considered to be Conder’s protégé, his styles were seldom repeated by his students. There were several important points of departure from Conder:

- Tatsuno: design for the *Nichi-gin* (Japanese Imperial Bank) Headquarters (1896) and Tokyo Station (1914);
- Katayama: *Akasaka Rikyu* (Akasaka) off-site Imperial Palace (1910), and Nara (1894) and Kyoto (1895) museums;
- Soya: Kobe Mitsubishi Bank (1900) and Keio Library (1911); and
- Kawai: Design for Kobe Local Court (1904).

The first departure from Conder was as early as Tatsuno’s first commission, the Bank of Japan (1896, fig. 3.39), which replaced Shimizu’s wooden bank building of 1873. Following a study trip to Europe of national banks, Tatsuno modelled the building on the Bank of Belgium. Unlike Shimizu’s predecessor, the building had little ornamentation. Although not a work of great artistic merit, the building was seen as proof that Japan could replace expensive, foreign architects with their own, although it was not complete until 1896, over thirty years after the Meiji Restoration. Stone was used in the building to symbolise unwavering security. Tatsuno’s research was used elsewhere following this: some architects even became experts in certain building types and of Tatsuno’s 140 buildings, two thirds were banks. (Coaldrake, 1996: 233)
This example was the first in a new direction for Japanese architecture, part of the process of imitation before autonomy (symbolised by trips abroad to search for fashionable examples of the building type). On one level studying for inspiration in Europe was a similar architectural exercise to the Sinification of Japan 1200 years earlier when Tang dynasty China was resurgent and dangerous yet the rigorous approach was new. It was the greatest cultural change and revolution in image that Japan displayed to the world, making it clear “that Japan had to [adopt]... the institutions and trappings of Western civilization if it were to survive.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 209) This was achieved architecturally by the expedient of making their cities look like ‘civilised’ Europe. Style was used as a form of impression management by Japanese authorities and their architects, in order that Japanese citizens and foreigners would consider the government apparatus to be civilising.

In Japan, the stylistic challenge from Conder prompted a never ending debate, as had happened in Europe and America: “The array of historicist styles never evolved in Tokyo beyond a problematic efflorescence of manner; yet it furnished a requisite emblem of progress.” (Stewart, 1987: 33) Whilst the architecture students had been encouraged to engage with this issue from the late 1870s onwards, the first public debate on what the national style of Japan should be was as late as 1910 at the Society of Japanese Architects on the topic of “What Should Be the Future Architecture of Our Country?” (Sand, 2003: 113).

Yet before these arguments had been even partially resolved, the most obvious example of a national style for authority architecture in Meiji Japan was the red-brick Renaissance revival style with Classical white bands (Finn, 1995: 194) and domed roofs, to be known in the rest of this thesis as ‘Tatsuno style’. It was in many ways similar to Queen Anne Revival, which “was a nickname applied to a style which became enormously popular in the 1870s and survived into the early years of this [20th] century. ‘Queen Anne’ came in red brick and white-painted sash windows, with curly pedimented gables and delicate brick panels of sunflowers, swags or cherubs, with small window panes, steep roofs, and curving bay windows” (Girouard, 1977: 1) Queen Anne was particularly suited to Japan as the formation of the style was influenced by Japan itself: the pioneers of this style “began to take an interest in the art and architecture of pagan Greece, of Muslim North Africa and above all of Japan, which had just been opened up to the West and had become a fashionable subject of speculation in both France and England.” (Girouard, 1977: 12) Whilst for Japan, the style was appealing as a symbol of fashionable Seiyō, for architects in Britain and France Queen Anne style was attractive for its exotic, Oriental overtones.
Whilst Tatsuno was the most prolific proponent of this style, before he had designed any buildings in this quasi-Queen Anne form, Conder’s Mitsubishi building No. 1 (1894), Ende and Böckmann’s Ministry of Justice building (1895) and Conder’s Ministry of Navy building (1895) had all been constructed using more or less the same stylistic principles (fig. 3.40). Whilst Tatsuno was “no literal-minded imitator” (Finn, 1995: 194-195) the presence of prominent buildings built earlier in the same style by foreigners Conder and Ende and Böckmann in Tokyo undoubtedly places a question mark over the
‘Japaneseness’ of this style. Despite the questionable native authenticity, having a recognisable ‘Japanese’ architectural form from the early architects of Japanese modernisation “would serve partly as crystallized diplomacy, an argument towards accomplishing the principal goal of the first generation of Meiji politicians: revision of the hated Unequal Treaties.” (Clancey, 2006: 17) Meiji Japanese authorities propagated the style, first seen by Japanese architects visiting London, through giving various commissions to TATSUNO Kingo’s firm throughout the fledgling Japanese Empire, particularly in Manchuria (Sewell, 2004: 222) and Taiwan. Using this form in both mainland Japan and her colonies strengthened this quasi-national style so that it can be considered a genuinely influential and politically useful form. The underpinnings and rationale of this style, also adopted in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, are explored at greater length in Section 5.4.

The style was first used in Japan by Conder and Sone in their designs for commercial buildings with Mitsubishi. SONE Tatsuzo was Conder’s protégé, who worked extensively for Mitsubishi. IWASAKI Yanosuke (岩崎彌之, 1851-1908), the Mitsubishi commissioner, was so determined that the buildings in this district should reflect a proper British air that he sent Sone on an architectural tour of Britain. (Finn, 1995: 130) Sone was charged with completing the Mitsubishi buildings project in the Marunouchi (丸の内) area of Tokyo after Conder had designed Building No. 1 (fig. 3.41). Of Conder’s students, Sone was the most similar to Conder in his preference for solidity and dignified façades, and he worked more closely with Conder after graduating than any other pupil. The overall planning of the Marunouchi district in Tokyo from 1895 was one of his most important commissions. It was known as ‘Little London’, (possibly inspired by central London’s Lombard Street), and Sone had responsibility for Buildings 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. (fig. 3.42)
The initiative of the private sector in Japan was apparent in this case, with the first building of the future ‘national style’ sponsored by the conglomerate Mitsubishi (Jap. 三菱). This was a landmark piece of architecture. Although not unusual in style, it signified the beginning of a new type of economic and architectural development in Japan: the Marunouchi area became not just the site of Mitsubishi headquarters but Japan’s first, and highly successful, commercial rental district. (Finn, 1995: 188) Mitsubishi built a broadly based corporation; it played a central role in the modernisation of Japanese industry, and was close enough to government that they were able to undertake this huge town planning project in the centre of Tokyo. Mitsubishi developed the area around the turn of the century after buying the land from the government in 1890 for 1,280,000 Yen. It had been a military parade ground and army barracks next to the imperial palace, yet it became Tokyo’s premier office district after the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914. (Cybriwsky, 2005: 228) Mitsubishi conceived the area as its centre for business and prohibited wooden buildings unlike the other famous brick-town, Ginza, where wooden buildings continued to be built. Mitsubishi “also set up standards to regulate the appearance and scale of the development.” (Fletcher and Cruickshank, 1996: 1240)

The exterior and interior design of these buildings reflected London at the height of the British Empire. Building No. 2 (fig. 3.43) was the second built and used a red brick, Renaissance style with mansard roofs and sheet lead covering the roof flat. As with many buildings of the time, the area was designed with European dignity in mind, as four-story, red-brick buildings, with wide streets in a systematic grid pattern. (Cybriwsky, 2005: 228)

80 Mitsubishi was first established as a shipping firm by IWASAKI Yotaro (岩崎弥太郎, 1834-85) in 1870. In 1881, it entered into coal-mining to gain the coal needed for ships. Mitsubishi diversified their business into other branches related to its core business of shipping, such as founding an iron mill to supply iron to the shipping yard and starting a marine insurance business to cater for its shipping business. It later even expanded into manufacture of aircraft and equipment, also a trading business.
The first building was designed by Conder, and his proposal was a received model expression of street architecture, adopting the terrace form with which he had been familiar with from living and working in London, using exposed red brick for the exterior walls with the familiar white stone banding around the windows. After his experience at Ueno, the Orientalised elements such as dome tracing in the doorways were absent from the design, replaced by symmetrical and unpretentious English Renaissance styling.

This was a suitable style for much of the brick architecture constructed in the Meiji period, because the material was easily produced after Waters’ efforts in producing bricks decades earlier. Beyond practicality though, this style of architecture was one deemed to be modern by Conder’s apprentices, given that both Tatsuno and Sone had surveyed London and found it to be a conspicuous new style. Sone described the urban plan for the area in the following way:

“With a view to fulfil the requirements occasioned by the development of commercial business in the city, as well as to supply the gradually increasing demand on the part of the citizens for residences of a better class, and at the same time with the object of enhancing the metropolis, the Mitsu Bishi Company are proposing to cover the land with solid and substantial buildings of various sorts, in the modern style, making all private roads, foot-paths, squares, drainage, &c.” (Sone, 1895: 2 [emphasis added, original written in English])
Whilst Tatsuno had championed fashionable, up to date architecture, this passage was the first explicit evidence that the Japanese architects of this period were attempting to follow ‘the modern’ in their architecture; given the totally British appearance of the buildings, similar to London (Finn, 1995: 188), it is easy to interpret that ‘modern’ meant in line with Seiyō fashions of the day fitting with the Euro-centricity of modernity as explained in Section 1.2. It is interesting that Sone described Queen Anne style as ‘modern’ but perhaps more interesting was the use of the definite article: there was a single authentic type of modernity in Japan (in line with what Mitsubishi required). It was this style and type of architecture, associated with material progress for Sone, which was copied and propagated across the Japanese empire in the following years.

This style had a number of attributes which made this a logical national style: it had a strong benefactor in Tatsuno, it was masonry rather than wood, and it was Renaissance rather than Gothic and was relatively cheap. To take the first point first, Tatsuno was himself a strong agent for nationalism, and built close to 200 buildings before his death in 1919. (Finn, 1995: 194) Unlike Conder who built the great majority of his buildings in Tokyo, Tatsuno built throughout mainland Japan and the Japanese Empire. The elevation of Tatsuno to Professor of Architecture in 1884 to replace Conder was a key development in the propagation of this style, as it made Tatsuno, rather than Conder, the pre-eminent architect of Meiji Japan.

The style was by necessity a masonry style due to the education Tatsuno received from Conder. For a British instructor: “even American examples of modern architecture in wood would likely have seemed exotic” (Clancey, 2006: 19) as masonry was almost exclusively used for construction in Britain at the time. Masonry was core to the very identity of British architecture in the 1870s (which had been growing since the Great Fire of London in 1666), and in the 19th century it was believed in architectural circles that masonry had replaced wood “wherever civilisation had occurred.” (Clancey, 2006: 15) Given that Japan wished to civilise along Seiyō lines, a brick or stone style was necessary, and as stone was a rare resource in Japan, brick made more sense economically and logistically, at least before the spread of concrete. Given the prejudice against Chinese and Japanese wooden architecture in the text books of Banister Fletcher and James Fergusson it is unsurprising that Japanese architects sought their national style in masonry form.

The Japanese national style for this period embodied an aspiration to belong to a milieu beyond its Japanese roots whilst simultaneously demonstrating that Japan was a sophisticated and powerful nation. Whilst developing a national style was not an explicitly modern trend, it was interpreted as such

---

81 For Fergusson, the use of wood meant that Chinese architecture history barely existed: “it is still doubtful whether the materials exist in China for any extended history of the art. Such facts as have some to light are not encouraging. Wood has been far too extensively used throughout for any very permanent style of architecture ever having been employed” (Fergusson, 1876: 709)
in Meiji Japan. By contrast, in post-Ottoman Serbia of the late 19th century, “The Serbs strove to establish a link with the Middle Ages rather than seek inspiration in modern cultural achievements... Serbian architecture was historicist not by choice but by necessity; it was not a fashionable trend, but a product of the inherently conservative cultural milieu.” (Pantelić, 1999: 36) Serbia, Greece, Germany and Russia were proponents of romantic nationalism in architecture, reviving past forms in a romanticised fashion; these were all countries that felt that they had been victimised by the hegemony of other European powers in the early 19th century, by Austro-Hungary, the Ottomans and by revolutionary France. So Japan, instead of being inspired by its own history, sought nationalism in the modern, the current and up to date, in order to build a vision of itself that appeared civilised both to outsiders and to themselves. If in Serbia, past forms were seen as civilised, in Japan they were not, as witnessed by the satirical Meiji cartoon in fig. 3.44 below:

Alongside Sone and Tatsuno, KATAYAMA Tōkuma (Jap. 片山東熊, 1854-1917) was another talented and influential early Japanese architect. Of the group, he built the most magnificent buildings after becoming the imperial court architect. He often built in the French tradition, famously with his (former) Imperial Museum of Kyoto. For his most high-profile project, Akasaka Palace (Jap. 迎賓館, built from 1899-1909), he researched European palaces, just as Tatsuno was sent to study banks. Through this process of sending prospective architects on study trips concerning particular building types, according to Markus, commissioners prescribed styles due to the ideological power of the forms. (Markus, 1993: 37)
Inspired by the palaces of Versailles and the Louvre, the Akasaka Palace was possibly the greatest architectural monument of the Meiji era. The interior contained Japanese armour motifs and frescos by Japanese artists, trained in European painting styles. The palace’s spatial composition was inspirational to many later authority buildings in Japan and her colonies, with large square courtyards to either side of the central axis, the main advantage being that it allowed both natural light throughout the building and efficient circulation of space as shown in the fig. 3.45 below.

Once built, Akasaka Palace was arguably the pinnacle of earthquake-proofing in the world at that point. (Coaldrake, 1996: 220) This was not only due to the brilliance of Katayama: one of the most impressive indigenous innovations by Japanese architects was the application of scientific knowledge on buildings and construction techniques. This was a pragmatic initiative as scientific endeavour was used to make the buildings fulfill their functions more effectively. In fact, this was Tatsuno’s main innovation upon becoming Professor of Architecture. After several foreign-style buildings were destroyed in the
earthquakes of 1891 and 1894, the approach was further strengthened: as Clancey (2006) has explained, Japanese architects responded to this earthquake with numerous surveys, meetings, and experiments, and the list of their subsequent achievements is impressive. Tatsuno helped design and build an earthquake-proof house with parabolic walls around 1893, finding a potential solution to earthquake-proofing through science and the Japanese building tradition (which made frequent use of such walls) to correct the masonry of Seiyō. (Clancey, 2006: 181)

Whilst keeping the trend for brick buildings, Japanese architects improvised with wooden frames so that the bricks were not load-bearing and became much stronger during earthquakes. (Coaldrake, 1996: 238) SONE Tatsuzo was sent to the United States in 1893 to study iron construction, but iron remained impractical for Japan until the economic boom during the Great War, as the material had to be imported. (Clancey, 2006: ft285) Despite this, a series of research papers and experiments led Japan to become world leaders in seismic-proofing buildings in a short period of time; Japan had appointed the world’s first Chair of Seismology at the Imperial University in 1886. (Clancey, 2006: 98)

This development of seismology should be seen as corrective to the opinions of Josiah Conder, who cautioned against the use of wood in building because of their perceived lack of seismic properties. Conder believed Japanese carpentry was unsuited for the kindai (modern) age: “As early as 1882 Dresser [a British Japanophile architect] brought the attention of western audiences to the earthquake-resistance of five-story pagoda, a contention bitterly contested by a Japanese-resident expatriate architect, Josiah Conder.” (Clancy, 2006: 92) Conder continued the British dichotomy of brick and stone being seen as civilised and wood and other perishable materials being primitive. As a whole, Japanese architects, trained and familiar with masonry, continued to create non-wooden buildings, and as they were the main agents of building the national image of Japan in the late-Meiji period, the most important government commissions continued to be built of brick and stone, although adapted for seismic purposes.

Some trained architects (as well as all carpenters) continued to build in wood, despite the danger of fire. Tatsuno built in wood on occasion, though in a generic Seiyō style rather than following Japanese carpentry, since he was never trained in those arts. His most famous work in the medium was for MATSUMOTO Kenjirō (Jap. 松本健次郎, 1870-1963), another prominent Meiji industrialist. Mirroring work done by Conder with the Mitsubishi family, Matsumoto “had procured a Western style house (Yokan), designed by Tatsuno [fig. 3.46], to be used mainly for the reception of foreign guests... Soon after the Yokan was built, Matsumoto had a Japanese style house built, and took up residence in it himself. It was typical to have both Western style and Japanese style on the same property. This
parallel style was an inevitable result of the conflict between Westernization and traditional Japanese lifestyle according to which this parallelism emerged." (Tosaki, 2004: 7) With the growth of contact between Japan and Seiyō, many industrialists had foreign business partners and would have felt ashamed to entertain them at their Japanese residence. To save face these Occidental residences were built, but were rarely used except to entertain. Instead, in one of the great paradoxes of the Meiji era, even elite members such as Matsumoto continued to live in (and trust) traditional houses made of wood.

Industrialists such as Mitsubishi and Matsumoto were both procurers of Wayo-heiyo, parallel style architecture and Conder and Kingo were their respective designers. This created an uncomfortable dichotomy between public life and private comfort. It was this nebulous discomfort that prompted the first Japanese architects to retread ground broken by Shimazu decades earlier and to ‘re-invent’ the Wayo-secchu (Giyōfu, pseudo-Western) style. Rather than perpetuating this dichotomy, in using “Wayo-secchu (hybrid) style, architects were aware of the discrepancy, and sought a new direction for architecture which would amalgamate Western and Eastern styles within a single architectural expression.” (Tosaki, 2004: 7) Tatsuno showed that Japan, though adaptable, was not prepared to lose its identity, and attempted to express this through the ‘national style’ movement and ambivalence towards Conder’s dislike of wooden architecture. In spite of this, Japan’s kindai (modern) architecture was initially founded upon Seiyō ways of understanding the world. These ideas continued to filter through to the next generations of Japanese architects, though less obviously as Japan’s architects grew more confident in their sense of modernity.
The Second Generation of Japanese Architects

As mentioned, TATSUNO Kingo returned from working England in 1884 to the post of Professor in the College of Engineering and “in the subsequent transfer of architectural education to the Imperial University his influence succeeded Josiah Conder’s, especially after Tatsuno became departmental head.” (Stewart, 1987: 48) Conder’s forced retirement from government work occurred in 1888 when the Head of the Japanese Ministry of Education, MORI Arinori, began his educational reforms at Tokyo University in 1886, intentionally reducing the numbers of foreign professors and ensuring all department heads were Japanese.

Tatsuno gradually revised the focus of the course in two main ways. First, and most significantly for the development of seismology in architecture, there was an increased focus upon science and technology. Whilst the standard dissertation questions of Conder’s tenure had usually concerned architectural style (for instance TATSUNO Kingo, KATAYAMA Tokuma, SONE Tatsuno and SATACHI Shichijiro were all given the topic “The Future Domestic Architecture of Japan”), under Tatsuno’s stewardship the topics became much more focused upon scientific and technological issues. For instance, the title of MORIYAMA Matsunosuke’s thesis (the primary architect for the Governor-General’s Office in Taiwan) was “A few considerations on stress in roof trusses and methods of dimensioning”. As a consequence of the new technical focus, very few theses after 1884 concerned the style and direction of Japanese architecture.

The second change in focus was that a separate course on Japanese architecture was created. In 1889 Tatsuno hired the Master carpenter KIGO Kiyoshi to teach architecture students at Tokyo University. He was a master carpenter who won the contract for the Meiji palace in Tokyo (above Josiah Conder). He was from a family of carpenters with Imperial connections: “The Kigo were responsible for repair, maintenance, and minor construction at the Imperial Palace.” (Wendelken, 1996: 30) In 1889 he started to teach Japanese architecture at the Imperial University. His approach to teaching was a practical one. “He taught kiwariho [Jap. 木割法], the traditional timber construction technique which was an expression of a living tradition rather than an abstracted science. However, he also initiated his students into conducting detailed field surveys, gauging important temples of the Kyoto and Nara region as well as Shinto shrines.” (Edlinger, 2008: 61) Indeed, Kigo “was not trained as an historian, and although little is known of the content of his lectures, it is clear from his surviving notes and the work of his students that he taught not a distant past history but a living tradition of design and construction.” (Wendelken, 1996: 32)
This was the first course of its sort and the first time that native architecture was thoroughly covered by the architecture course, 16 years after the College of Engineering had been established. That the education provided by Kigo was in carpentry techniques rather than architectural history may have been of benefit to students in hearing about a topic far from Conder’s paradigm: “Kigo's lectures have been devalued by some scholars as dealing not with Japanese architectural history at all…. But perhaps Kigo was influential precisely because he taught *kiwariho*." (Wendelken, 1996: 32) This revision of focus led to an increased depth of knowledge on technological and scientific issues and increased breadth of knowledge on construction and traditional Japanese architecture which was reflected in the attitudes of architects educated after 1889.

Tatsuno’s attitude towards teaching architecture was therefore not as clear cut as Conder’s, who taught only *Seiyō* topics and styles whilst paying lip service to traditional Japanese architecture. Yet Tatsuno’s relationship with traditional carpentry was certainly ambiguous. Whilst this move was bold given the previous curriculum, it had taken five years for him to appoint Kigo to teach Japanese architecture. This slow decision speaks of Tatsuno’s reluctance to introduce teaching of Japan’s architectural past. One important story on why Tatsuno started allowing Japanese architectural history to be taught at Tokyo University stated:

“During Tatsuno's stay in England his mentor, architect William Burges, asked him about the ancient architectural monuments of Japan. Tatsuno, ashamed that he was unable to answer, decided to institute courses on the history of Japanese architecture upon his return to Japan. Architectural historian Inaba Nobuko has recently pointed out, however, that Tatsuno’s meeting with Burges took place almost four years before Kigo began teaching at the university, and that Kigo's appointment was more likely owing to his triumph in the Meiji Palace project. The final design of the palace signals the beginning of the movement to educate architects in the history and practice of Japanese construction. The crediting of Burges for this change in the intellectual climate constitutes yet another myth of origins in the reevaluation of Japanese tradition.” (Stewart, 1987: 31)

Whether or not the story is true, the narrative about Burges was used by Tatsuno to explain why he instituted a class on carpentry. This fact is revealing for three reasons: First, Tatsuno knew almost nothing about Japanese architecture if he could not talk about the monuments of Japan. Second, this story distances Tatsuno from the decision, showing the motivation as being external to himself and viewed as not altogether necessary but beneficial to the students. That credit for reversing the lack of Japanese Architecture history was given to Burges, can be interpreted as a sign of respecting *Seiyō* authority. Finally, as shown in Section 3.3, Burges was a collector of Japanese art, a fashionable
activity at that time, and so was interested in Japanese architecture. Tatsuno’s preferred architecture style, Queen Anne revival, had also been influenced strongly by Japanese art and architecture, showing the esteem in which Japanese aesthetics were held in Britain at the time when he was living in London. Tatsuno took this esteem into account, perhaps partly because British architectural fashions were an essential requirement in the formation of kindai (modern) Japan. Indeed, Tatsuno’s later adoption of the Queen Anne style of architecture was a further demonstration of this sensitivity to fashion.

This act of appointing Kigo as Professor of Japanese architecture legitimised the study of Japanese architecture in Japan and led to a more equitable standing for Japanese architecture in university education. This gave the architects a stronger self-identity: they were no longer attempting a ‘pure Westernisation’ but began to allow their ‘Oriental’ aspects more public exposure.

### 3.6 Transmission of binaries and creation of hybridity in Japanese architecture

The second generation of Japanese architects (under Tatsuno’s professorship) grew more confident in their understanding of their native architecture. Spurred on by the teachings of Kigo, this group of architects began cataloguing Japanese architectural history, generating a much more comprehensive knowledge. Their education led them to be familiar with Japanese forms, carpentry techniques, space, and to some extent architectural history. Lack of Japanese forms in authority buildings by the second generation could not therefore be put down to unfamiliarity with ‘traditional’ architecture.

Yet whilst the architectural past of Japan was included in their education, Japanese architecture was peripheral to this education, additional rather than central: the core education remained Seiyō architecture, and Japanese architecture was a separate module. As a result Japanese architects were first ‘kindai’ (modern) and second ‘Japanese’. The key period in producing this dynamic was that of Conder’s tenure when the further educators graduated, taught only to be ‘modern’, following the policy of Meiji authorities. This created a binary situation, a foundational divide between carpenters and architects replicated among the whole of Meiji society to a lesser degree where public rather than private spaces underwent the furthest reforms. After 1889, the education system was altered to attempt to create architects who were both ‘modern’ and ‘Japanese’, essentially hybrid. Yet this hybridity was shallow since the core of the education remained a foreign transplantation: the teaching of Japanese architecture was simply assimilated into this system. As a result, it was left to Japanese architects themselves to resolve this dynamic.
The architect and theorist ITŌ Chuta was the most important figure in making sense of early ‘modern Japanese architecture’ and is recognised as the leading architect and architectural theorist of early twentieth-century Imperial Japan. (Watanabe, 2006: 240). Íto first studied architecture as an undergraduate at the Imperial University of Tokyo from 1889 to 1892 under the professorship of Tatsuno. Upon finishing, rather than beginning to practise architecture, he entered graduate studies in architectural history at the Imperial University and prepared a survey of the buildings of Japan’s oldest Temple, Horyuji at Nara. In 1901 Íto received his doctorate and joined academia (the School of Engineering) becoming a Full Professor in 1905, a position he held until retiring in 1928. Íto became a very distinguished and influential architectural theorist and conservationist. As a member of Japan’s Society for the Preservation of Ancient Shrines and Temples founded in 1896, he also received the Cultural Medal of Japan in 1943. The formation of the profession of architecture took a long time to develop due to three separate strands needing to be established: construction workers, professional architects and academic architects. Whilst Conder was the father of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan, Íto is known as the first Japanese architectural historian and theorist of the architecture of Japan, leading the development of a class of genuine academic architects.

The contact between young architects and master builders in the Imperial University from the late 1880s expanded the focus of architectural education beyond modern construction technology and Seiyō-style design. Being among the first students of KIGO Kiyoyoshi, the students of this period were much more knowledgeable about the principles of design and construction of ancient buildings of Japan previously ignored by the curriculum. So they became the first academically trained experts trained in a modern fashion. After receiving his doctorate, Íto became the de facto intellectual leader of Japanese architecture. Through his intellectual and practical works, Íto exerted three main influences on Japanese architecture in his time:

1. Creating a deeper connection to Seiyō;
2. Reconnecting with Tōyō; and,
3. The creation of hybridity as the basis of a dual modernity.

These three aspects will be explored in turn in conclusion of this chapter.
Creating a deeper connection to Seiyō

Whilst Itō was affected by studying under a master carpenter, he was also influenced strongly by Tatsuno and Herbert Spencer, in particular by the view that the world tended towards progress and the malleability of culture: “the translation of Spencer’s works on sociology standardized the new and abstract conception of ‘society,’ which, as a reified, organic thing amenable to scientific law and political praxis, enabled Japanese intellectuals to rethink Japanese society on a new scientific basis and to produce new interpretations of Japan’s past, present, and future.” (Howland, 2000: 68) This aspirational element from Spencer was hugely influential for Japanese architects who took it upon themselves to use scientific reason constantly to improve the architecture built, making it more usable, scientific and monumental, as well as flexible to changes in society. Architects saw themselves as social forces who themselves had a role in shaping society and Itō took on this task.

Itō had a clear vision and a forceful personality, and he resolved some of the long standing issues of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan. During the transition between the first foreign surveyors entering Japan in the 1850s and the first generation of Japanese architects, architectural forms were copied without much understanding of what they meant or even how to talk about questions of meaning, as the Seiyō concepts of ‘art’ and ‘architecture’ were still undergoing translation into Japanese. The term for art (Jap. 美術, bijutsu) was first used “in a modern context... in relation to the 1873 Viennese International Exhibition. Professor Ernest Fenollosa [of the University of Tokyo] famous lecture bijutsu shin-setsu (The true meaning of art), published in 1882, was the first serious debate on the concept of art in Japan.” (Watanabe, 1996: 26-27) Yet Japanese art students who were educated in Seiyō art had been following the products of foreign artistic developments for a number of years before this debate occurred.

As for architecture, from the founding of the architecture course in the College of Engineering, ‘architecture’ was generally known as Zō-ka (Jap. 造家, meaning ‘house building’). Since the 1860s translations of Dutch and English books had also used the word kenchiku (Jap. 建築, meaning ‘to construct firmly and lay a solid foundation’) to translate ‘architecture’, as the practice was in some ways different to construction in Japan. There was no analogous word for ‘architect’, and translators decided that the terms traditionally used for the building profession, daiku and toryo, were too old-fashioned to apply to the architecture of the kindai (modern) age.82 As a result, there was confusion amongst students about the discipline of architecture, about what distinguished architects from master carpenters, and their Institutes, such as the Society of Japanese Architects, had names that jarred with their purposes.

82 Ironically daiku, now normally translated as ‘carpenter,’ uses the characters for ‘great’ and ‘carpenter/builder’. It is therefore similar in meaning to the etymology of the term ‘architect’ (in Greek, archos, or chief, and tekton, or carpenter”), (Coaldrake, 2001: 48)
Understanding the definition of the architect was necessary to understand the identity (and roots of identification) of the profession. The concept of the architect was debated and the term for ‘Architect’ in the Society of Japanese Architects was changed from Zō-ka to a new word, kenchikuka, in 1897 after three years of lobbying by Itō. The circumstances of this development are of interest. Whilst 1897 was only four years after Ito’s graduation, he had a crucial role in moving the discourse of architecture away from it being seen as a field of construction towards being considered an applied art, in line with Conder’s preferred definition, a sign of Conder’s influence and his desire for solid architecture. (Conder, 1878: 2) At the annual Society of Japanese Architects in 1897 Itō gave:

“an aggressive polemic calling for a unification of terminology[.] Itō observed that the real nature of “architecture” (aakitekuchūru) was the “manifestation of true beauty in an appeal to line and form,” and that the word zō-ka failed to encompass the tombs, memorials, and triumphal gates that “architects” (aakitekuto) planned and the pagodas and temple halls whose construction they managed. The new name thus made it clear that the society’s business was the art of design rather than the mere construction of shelter.” (Sand, 2003: 113)

Itō prompted a dual change in the definition that both broadened and narrowed the scope of architectural practice: architecture was broadened from mere house-building to encompass all types of buildings, and narrowed to formally split off the function of construction, leaving the role of designer. The word kenichiku (architecture) did not exist until modernity began to settle and kenichikuka (architect) was only coined by Itō in 1897. Yet beyond this dating: “what is at stake is that the whole notion of architecture was imported from the West alongside the notion of ‘history’ and the discourse of ‘art’… Surely, the practice of building construction had long been established, but never the role of architects as academically trained designers, nor the discipline of architecture for that matter” (Terakawa, 2001: 13) By positioning architecture in Seiyō’s terms (as an ‘art’, itself a concept previously unknown in Japan) Itō was tacitly suggesting that Japanese architecture should no longer belong in an Asian historical continuum (as implied by his use of the phonetic katagana alphabet to translate ‘architecture’ for the word ‘aakitekuchūru’). This is a crucial point because, in distancing the practice and profession of construction from its historical roots, Itō laid the groundwork for the Japanese to further invent new traditions for themselves, which were Orientalist towards their past architecture and towards other Asian countries, including their future colonies.

Before this intervention, Itō had shown a tendency to reinterpret Japan’s past: he “published a graduation thesis on Horyuji, (‘Horyuji kenchikuron’, an architectural theory of Horyuji) one of the oldest Buddhist temples in Japan (7th century), in Kenchiku Zasshi in 1893.” (Edlinger, 2008: 61) This work
was an important first step in moving architecture back towards Seiyō after the blossoming of nationalism of the 1880s, and re-evaluating the roots of Japanese architecture. Itō’s thesis attempted to create a link between historical Japan and historical European architecture, as Tatsuno had tentatively attempted to do. As mentioned, Tatsuno’s relationship to Japanese traditional architecture was closer than Conder’s, and Tatsuno was the first architect, Japanese or otherwise, to imagine a shared approach between traditional European and Japanese architecture. Tatsuno wrote in his graduation thesis that “These [Edo period kiwari building] rules have some affinity with those in the Roman Renaissance:- thus in the former all the scantlings of the building timbers entirely depend on and partake from that of a common shaft, whereas in the latter every part of a building has certain proportion to the diameter of a column.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 4)

In beginning to make the case that traditional Japanese and Roman architectural principles were not vastly different, Tatsuno led the way for later more theoretically-minded architects such as Itō to deepen this imagined connection further. If this connection between Seiyō and Japanese architecture was believed to be true, it also meant that when Seiyō buildings were constructed in Japan they were in some small way traditional. By historically connecting Seiyō architecture with traditional Japanese architecture, Tatsuno attempted to raise the prestige of the latter (by supposing common architectural roots) and the prestige of architects who built in styles with roots in Seiyō (who would be seen as more legitimate if this connection was imagined valid).

In his seven volume thesis ‘Architectural philosophy (Jap. 建築哲學),’ Itō posited that Alexander the Great’s conquests influenced Japan through China and India so that Europe and Asia shared a common Greek architectural root as shown in fig. 3.47. This underlay the tendency to associate the history of Europe with Japan, as he concluded that “the entasis (graceful bulge) of the Horyuji’s pillars was evidence of a Hellenistic influence on classical Japanese architecture. In basing his appreciation of an indigenous structure on this point, Itō was in essence claiming that Japanese architecture was important because it was not really Japanese.” (Dorsey, 2001: 352) Regardless, Itō believed that Japanese architecture needed to reclaim and express this Seiyō aspect of its history “in order to achieve what he called the next stage of development. He described this as ‘Eastern architecture adjusted to Japanese needs.’” (Wendelken, 2000: 822)
Because of his intention to use history to connect Japan with Seiyō in both the past and the future (by driving the name change of the Society of Japanese Architects), to take Itō as an anti-Western ‘hero’ is unrealistic. Although he attempted to prove that Japan belonged to the same historical continuum as Seiyō, this was not a popular view in Japan; if it had been, then it is likely that Japanese and Seiyō architects would have been allowed to build in a conscious ‘Japanese’ style like Baltzer’s design in Section 3.4 above, as these would be considered as civilised as Greek revival. The majority of scholars disagreed with this notion of equivalence, and Itō was seen as an eccentric by some. However, he was searching for roots of belonging to the Great Powers: whilst most architects in the early 1900s would not have agreed with a view of overlapping architectural histories between Japan and Seiyō, the majority were happy to believe that Japan had taken its place among the Great Powers who were shaping the world.

Reconnecting with Tōyō

As related in Section 2.4, intellectuals in the late Meiji period created the Seiyō (Jap. 西洋, Occident) and Tōyō (Jap. 東洋, Orient) binary to which they related themselves. This was partly in reaction against foreign intellectuals such as Buckle, who wrote dismissively that progression of civilisation in Asia was impossible due to the climate and other unchangeable factors. By the late Meiji period, this was manifestly untrue, as Japan had modernised on a number of levels; in cultural, political, social and technological terms, Japan was becoming more like ‘Seiyō’ and less like ‘Tōyō’. The fashion of Darwinian perspectives at that time meant that theories such as Herbert Spenser’s social Darwinism
gained much traction in civil society to explain Japanese successes in comparison with its Asian neighbours: within this paradigm, Japan’s architects could tell themselves that their architecture had evolved and that Japan had become a superior nation.

Itō’s role was to emphasise the value of the Japanese past and, from this, to theorise on its direction. In 1897, Itō was part of a group which drafted the first the Ancient Temples and Shrines Preservation Law of 1897, an early measure to protect the Cultural Properties of Japan. (Wendelken, 2000: 821) Following these early triumphs, in 1902 Itō set off on what would be a three-year journey across Asia and Europe. Along this trip for the study of historical building, Itō took in China, Burma, India (where he stayed one year), Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. Along the way he sketched and wrote travel diaries describing ancient sites which were then published in the architectural journal *Kenchiku Zasshi*. (Finn, 1996: 167) He eventually visited Western Europe and the United States, returning to Japan in 1905, just after the Russo-Japanese War. (Wendelken, 2000: 820)

Travel broadened Itō’s horizons beyond Japan and he began a Darwinistic movement in architecture partly as a reaction against James Fergusson’s critical outlook on Japanese (and Oriental) architecture. Fergusson had stated that the Japanese are not a race of builders, and (recalling Section 2.1 when visitors from Western Europe to 16th century Japan had held Japanese buildings in high esteem) that their buildings should no longer even regarded as ‘architecture’ or as part of global architecture history. This Seiyō denigration of Japanese architectural forms during the late Edo period (which at the time were affected by the declining economic power of authorities (Coaldrake, 1996: 207)) meant that a move away from customary forms would be advantageous if Japan wished to move towards a new image of what it meant to be civilised. Japanese arts had already made only a poor first impression at the Philadelphia exhibition in 1876 where Euro-American commentators held that “Japanese achievements in the decorative arts demonstrated that they were only on ‘the first stage of progress’ in the arts.” (Jackson, 1992: 248) Japanese architects wished to avoid being labelled as barbarous in the same way, so they imitated Seiyō forms, symbols, functions, spaces and discourse.

Itō wished to go beyond the conception of Japanese as imitators and formulated his ‘Evolution theory of architecture’ (based on a lecture of 1908 and published on the AIJ in 1909) which aimed to explain why Japanese architecture had recently fulfilled its aims of modernising along Seiyō criteria. Itō was concerned with creating a view of history in which it was possible to depart from tradition and evolve to a new level of architecture. This theorised Japan’s recent departure from customary practice showing the planned innovation by the Japanese government towards Westernise architectural development as progress. Itō’s conception of Tōyō and Seiyō were signified in a diagram representing the development of world architecture (figs. 3.48 and 3.49, translated from Japanese).
The first thing to note is the obvious social Darwinian perspective in the diagram, with arrows indicating evolution and improvement (another indication of the importance of the idea of progress in Meiji Japan). The only arrow in the Tōyō sphere is from Japan and is evolving to move away from Chinese (and Japanese) culture. This also suggests that Japanese architecture was improving upon traditional forms rather than destroying them. The dynamics shown by the Seiyō sphere indicate the reflected supremacy of ‘the West’, yet Itō puts Japan on the same evolutionary path as America and Art Nouveau, moving away from their larger domain. The transient nature of modernity is highlighted with Japan, America and Art Nouveau moving away from the past and into historically unprecedented spheres.
This fits well with Enlightenment discourse on the use of critical reason to reach the Truth, rather than staying attached to unquestioned assumptions. Itō and his successors had not only been influenced by Orientalism but had also been transformed by the scientific Enlightenment movement and the rationalist impulse to separate out discreet phenomenon into hard categories. For Said (1978) "preparing the way for modern Orientalist structures was the whole impulse to classify nature and man into types." (Said, 1978: 119) In Ito's conception categorisation reached down to many levels: Japan was not only a part of the East, but a part of the Chinese cultural sphere, which interacted with the Indian sphere, and not with the neighbouring Islamic sphere.

Since Japan was a part of the East and had progressed, Itō did not discount the possibility of change for other Asian countries. In 1908 though, Japan was the only Eastern nation to make progress and was consequently becoming the Other in Asia. Japan's Asian heritage was split off in early Meiji, and later re-attached in a deliberate fashion through the education system in architecture. However, this heritage was interpreted anew with a Seiyō conceptual lens.

Although this evolutionary theory of architecture, attempting to display Japan's uniqueness within Asia, could be seen as simple nationalist bigotry, it is clear that later in his career Itō did not seek to overly inflate Japan using history but saw it as a historically minor influence within Asia, only having a direct impact upon the art and architecture of Okinawa (Jap. 琉球) a startling admission in the hyper-nationalist time of 1937. This can be seen in Ito's system of Tōyō art development in fig. 3.50 below. Japan was only influenced directly by China and Korea ) and the centre of Asia in art is Central Asia minor. Itō’s extensive research into Eastern art history is shown in his understanding of the transmission of art from culture to culture. In categorising it so, Itō endeavoured to draw a new map of world architecture by removing Europe from the centre and redefining Eurasia.

3.50. ITŌ Chūtai: System diagram of Oriental art development. Adapted from Itō, 1937. (Courtesy of the National Diet Library)
As with his theory on the evolution of architecture, Itô’s system of Tōyō art development emphasised commonalities between Eastern civilisations, showing all of Tōyō within a single coherent framework in both models. Itô’s Tōyō system responded to Banister Fletcher’s tree of architecture, which saw the ‘Orient’ as static: instead Itô saw and represented the cultural shifts in Asian history, belying this Orientalist outlook. Yet in other ways, this system was a product of fashions of the times, for instance, seeing countries as discreet civilisations rather than smaller nations. By essentialising the states east of Europe, Itô used a similar methodological framework to his Seiyō contemporaries.

Ito’s concept is a sophisticated reimagining of Japanese identity in the face of both Seiyō and Tōyō: Japan was recreated as the only progressive nation in Tōyō. This exercise in reimagining national identity was not unique to Japan: as David Lowenthal wrote in The Past is a Foreign Country, “by changing relics and records of former times, we change ourselves as well; the revised past in turn alters our own identity. The nature of the impact depends on the purpose and power of those who instigate the changes.” (Lowenthal, 1985: 411) Until this point architectural reform had focused on the image of Japan. With Itô’s “System of Tōyō Art Development” and “Evolutionary Theory of Architecture” this reform stretched to the history of Japan. In terms of self-understanding, ITŌ Chūta was the architect most influential in late-Meiji era architectural theoretical discourse.

By conceiving Japan as simultaneously similar in its evolutionary trajectory to Seiyō and as the most advanced nation of Tōyō, Itô was reinventing both the past and the present. This was an underlying theme for much of the architecture produced in the Meiji period: Alice Tseng’s excellent study of the architecture of the Meiji museums found that these buildings reflect, first and foremost, the trend for change following “the new relationship, of entwined political, economic, and cultural interests, that Japan entered into with the nations of the West in the 1850s, after centuries of having nearly no diplomatic ties. The abruptly renewed relations with powerful, encroaching forces prompted the imagining of a categorical indigenous self (a national Japanese homogeneity) in contrast to the foreign other.” (Tseng, 2008: 3) This new relationship changed the way that architects wished to represent themselves and their new nation to the world, and Itô offered a happy compromise between respect for Seiyō alongside recognition of Japan’s roots in Tōyō, a compromise that was only possible after adopting the terminology of Orientalism.

What differentiated Japan from the rest of Asia was that Japan had managed to evolve and improve in order to avoid Seiyō domination. Whilst recognising this, Itô was not only concerned with Japan: “Itô reached out to China and India, partly searching for Japan’s cultural roots, but also in the thrall, like European artists and scholars of this era, of Asia. He too rode on donkeys through mountains and deserts, sketched and wrote travel diaries (duly published in the architectural journal Kenchiku Zasshi
Itō can be related to two strong, somewhat contradictory, currents in the late Meiji period: first, a renewed interest in the history and identity of Japan and Asia; second, an increasing identification with the ‘civilised’ nations of Euro-America. The work of Ernest Fenellosa (1853-1908) and OKAKURA Kakuzo (岡倉覚三, 1862-1913 a.k.a. Tenshin,) reinforced the national trend to emphasise Japan's links with Seiyō while underscoring its Asian roots. Kawamitchi and Hashitera (1999) have found that Itō’s theories of architecture were influenced by the art historian Okakura who argued that:

“Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment the broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life.” (Okakura: 1905: 1)

This passage shows Okakura taking on the task of locating the essence of Asia and categorising it with respect to ‘the West’. This was one of the earliest expressions of Pan-Asianism, an exercise taken on by Itō in his theory of Oriental art development. Whilst establishing a common root and positing a common race, Okakura also believed Asia was ‘one’ in its humiliation by Seiyō: they had collectively fallen behind in achieving modernisation, and thus were together colonised by the Great Powers. Later Okakura felt compelled to protest against Japan for trying to catch up with the Seiyō powers by sacrificing other Asian countries in the Russo-Japanese War.

In both of his diagrams, Itō underlies Okakura’s position that ‘Asia is one’. Yet in spite of this inspiration, Itō was supportive of Japan’s imperialism (demonstrated by his central involvement in designing the Taiwan Shinto Shrine and place in the jury for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office) described in
Chapter 5. Given that Itô was conventionally educated in the 1890s (unlike Okakura who was raised by American missionaries), a time of growing nationalism, this support is unsurprising but is a demonstration of Itô’s central part in the project of making Japan kindai (modern), rather than resisting modernity by going back to traditional architecture and traditional relationships with China and Tôyô.

The creation of hybridity and the basis of dual modernity
In effect, whilst engaging in the logic and history of Seiyō and re-affirming Japan’s connection to Tôyô, Itô was aiming for hybridity: Homi Bhabha’s notion of ‘hybridity’ developed Said’s analysis of a binary system of dominators and dominated into a ‘third space’ stressing interactions rather than structures. (Kikuchi, 2004: xvi) The idea of hybridity allows for the idea of marginal practices: practices which lie at the edge of accepted paradigms and are not dominated by them. Itô saw Japan's architecture as neither Asian nor Seiyō but a syncretic architecture which blended the two to create something new. Through this syncretic approach, Itô was one of the architects responsible for the first kindai (modern) national style, the shajiyō based on the study of ancient Japanese shrines and temples. (Wendelken, 2000: 821) Ito's theories and the growth of nationalism in Japan eventually resulted in a renaissance in the ‘Shrine and Temple’ style architecture (a style mentioned in Section 3.1), although it was executed quite differently to pre-Meiji Shrine and Temple style. Ito's work includes Okura Shukokan Museum (1927); Memorial Hall for the Earthquake of 1923 (1930); and the Main Hall of the Temple Tsukiji Honganji (1934), all located in Tokyo. Along with Itô, SEKINO Tadashi (1869-1938), OE Shintaro (1879-1935), and TAKEDA Goichi (1872-1938) are also considered to be a part of the Shrine and Temple Style movement. (Stewart, 1987: 30)

Whilst Itô did not often build for the state, the hybrid architecture he produced during the war years can in complementary ways be seen as supporting the goals of the empire. (Wendelken, 2000: 827) Ito’s work represented the perceived spiritual and cultural attributes of Japan, and their connections with other parts of both Tôyô and Seiyō. Ito’s largest religious commission was the Tsukiji Honganji, a Buddhist temple of the Shin (Amita Buddha) sect, shown in the fig. 3.51 below. This group were heavily connected to the state at the time and offered the closest equivalent to a State religion that Japanese Buddhism produced at the time. This government relationship was a comfortable fit for the religion, since the Buddhists had pan-Asian and universalistic aspirations, considering themselves to be a ‘world’ religion, rather than a ‘Japanese’ one. (Wendelken, 2000: 823) The temple was built in Tokyo, in 1934 to replace a traditional wooden temple destroyed in the Kanto earthquake of 1923. Itô designed a structure of reinforced concrete with arched, leaded windows. The symmetrical design is a “mix of forms that suggest the influence of the Buddhist architecture at Ajanta in India; other features seem to be Southeast Asian or even Hindu in character.” (Wendelken, 2000: 822) Given that this building
preceded Itô's theory of Oriental art development by three years, it is an example of Itô reifying the inter-Asian connections which he held to be true.

The interior was differed from the façade, with an aesthetic far less antique, employing painted coffered ceilings and concrete walls cast to look like the inside of a building constructed in timber. This recalled wooden temples with a rough and natural look. It also allowed Itô to "treat the building surfaces as a plastic medium, and the interior iconography is completely divorced from the formal themes of the exterior. The temple also incorporated such Christian influences as stained glass, fluted columns, and a large pipe organ to the rear of a large congregation hall furnished with wooden pews." (Wendelken, 2000: 822) Given the period of colonial expansion in which it was built, this means that this pan-Asianism should be treated with some suspicion, but themes can be found which appear later in the thesis. The main point of interest is the attempt to create hybridity with materials recalling stone edifices in South-West Asia: the use of reinforced concrete was simultaneously "modern" and an attempt to create a new connection to the past and to neighbours.

The genesis of using materials derived in Seiyô but developed in Japan, was a theme which permeates the history of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan. To a large extent this was due to the figure of Conder as the founder of modern architecture: his negative opinions towards wooden buildings filtered with great strength to his students. This can even be called his most significant legacy, and this bias against wood is notable when the Japanese architects' opinions are contrasted with those of ordinary Japanese citizens: in early Japanese modernity, there was a wide gap in opinions between citizens and elites on what was 'civilised architecture'. Brick buildings did not evoke broad public approval; subsequent to the Mino-Owari earthquake (Jap. 美濃尾張地震) in 1891, Itô wrote that "my opinion is not
that brick is superior to wood, but I can’t stand to hear those people who speak ill of brick too much. The masses clamor against brick.” (Quoted in Clancey, 2006: 180) This is an instance of the ‘rational’ educated architect feeling an emotional attachment to the material.

Whilst science and rationality played a very significant role in the development of architecture and other institutions, Japanese modernity was not a straight application of rationality and reason. Rather than using the customary matter, wood, which itself had earthquake-proof qualities, Japanese architects innovated with the chosen material of brick (and later concrete), preferred by both clients and architects from the beginning of the Meiji period. The choice of material was in part a reflection of belonging for Japanese elites and architects: what the first two generations of architecture graduates from the Imperial University wished for most was “to share the identity “architect” with Europeans, while developing their own national style (itself, of course, a European concern)”. (Clancey, 2006: 212)

Moving on from simple imitation to the aspiration of creating a national style was partly due to Japanese architects’ desire to be a profession equivalent to architects in Europe. Therefore whilst the use of reason was an important factor in the adoption of pragmatism, science and kindai (modern) materials, the architects’ own convictions and values were also in line with these developments.

Being an ‘architect’ did not imply being culturally ‘Western’: although there were obvious crossovers, many Japanese architects wished to go a third way. Creating hybridity, with Japan as an intellectually essentialised synthesis of ‘Seiyō progression’ and ‘Tōyō culture’, was an important development for architecture in Japan. Yet the execution of hybridity looked very different depending on whether the architects were educated pre- or post-Conder.

Previously, architects such as YAMAGUCHI Hanroku (Jap. 山口半六, 1858-1900) had managed to combine kindai (modern) and ‘traditional’ construction techniques without creating this essentialistion of Seiyō and Tōyō. Wood was used most particularly for buildings by the Ministry of Education and by architects such as KURU Madamichi and Yamaguchi who was sent to study architecture abroad in France before Conder had arrived in Japan in 1877. The Sōgaku-dō (Jap. 奏楽堂, lit. Odeon) was a rare example from the group of first generation architects, such as Yamaguchi, who made the intentional Japanese Wayo-secchu (hybrid) style architecture in later years following the earlier example of Shimizu.

The Sōgaku-dō was built from 1889 to 1890 (before Tatsuno’s first building was completed) as the Hall for Instrumental Music, and thus the main building of what was to become the Tokyo University of Fine Arts. It also functioned as the National Theatre for Seiyō music until after World War II. This wooden building was curious for two reasons: first, in its mix of traditional carpentry techniques for the structure
and second, because it exemplifies that wood had become a lower material of construction (though still a valid one). As with most timber frame buildings of the early Meiji, the Sōgaku-dō was “built using traditional Japanese joinery and carpenters’ tools, the roof trussing and interior space – particularly in the concert hall – is based on Western engineering techniques.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 242) In this mid-Meiji period, wood was a material used for a great many buildings, but only for those of middling importance to the state: schools, shops and concert halls such as the Sōgaku-dō were usually built in wood, probably for budgetary reasons as well as lack of expertise in working well in brick and stone.

The building, shown in fig. 3.52, conforms to the tastes of the times: well-proportioned in an Italian manner, deemed suitable for a Seiyō concert hall. However there are several crucial features which are artefacts of the rapid process of transculturation (introduced in Section 1.1) in carpentry, as discovered during a recent restoration project. First, the roof is covered with traditional composite pantiles (sangawara), like the second Mitsui bank. Second, several carpenters’ tools from the original construction project of 1889-90 were discovered, all of which are conventional Japanese tools. Third, the restoration also uncovered the existence of sumi-ink numbering using the traditional bansuke system on the wooden components framing the building. The numbering “is definitive evidence that the construction of the building followed the procedures of traditional building practice, with the parts prefabricated and labelled in the carpenters’ workshop prior to assembly at the building site according to the ezu-ita or plan-board system.” (Coaldrake, 1994: 31) Fourth, the master carpenter used traditional joinery to hold the wooden construction together as well as iron bolts and fittings. The building would have stood without the bolts but not without the fittings, so this building represents one of the first examples of using Seiyō technology to enhance traditional building techniques.
Finally and most interestingly, given the theme of historically connecting Western and Japanese architecture, the building also applied both modular proportions from the Japanese building tradition and proportions based on modules aligned with the classical orders of Europe. Using a base of the Japanese modular proportions meant that the Palladian principles were transplanted onto the structure. This was only possible because the ‘grammar’ of the two systems was inherently similar, as both were systems based on proportions (as noted by Tatsuno in his thesis).

This congruence between systems was a muted theme in the architecture of Conder’s and Tatsuno’s students, as very few attempted to reconnect their practice with the national historical architecture. This left carpenters marginalised, as they were practising architecture with principles and tools which became progressively side-lined. Although in their early years carpenters were obliged to go through the compulsory schooling system, they remained outside specialist education while architects were trained as a new type of technician. Architects such as Yamaguchi were an exception to the rule: generally there was split between carpentry and architects, a development of parallel professions of master carpenters and ‘Western style’ architects such as Tatsuno which effectively sabotaged any attempt at genuine hybridity.

Because the first generation of architects had no teaching at all by carpenters, the second and subsequent generations had to relearn carpentry after it had first been categorised as historical, not modern. This meant that Japanese architects became excellent agents for the state’s policy for ‘surface Westernisation’ but were poorly equipped to implement an authentic Japanese national architectural style. For these students the contact with Seiyō architecture was of such intensity that they only developed skills in Seiyō arts, and existed in an environment closed off from native influences. This situation altered after the introduction of Kigo as a teacher at the College of Engineering because students were subsequently no longer cocooned from their architectural roots and could begin to conceive their own architectural history in a deeper way (though still using Seiyō’s analytical methods). Architecture graduates thereafter became conversant in different building techniques to those derived from the ‘Occident’.

Consequences of early modernising for Japanese architecture
In the ideal of programmatic modernity, described in Section 1.2, as opposed to (closed) Edo Japan, knowledge and practices were shared across cultures with actors using reason to determine which methods and approaches were useful in reaching a target. As Japan came later than Europe to such progressive practices, this cherry-picking exercise was far more intense and so a whole system of architecture was imported into which architecture students were inducted. Building rituals, which had
strong foundations in cultural values such as prayers before the use of wood, were no longer practised. In the professional life of architects, customary values had become diluted due to rationalisation and were understood only in a general way; ‘religion’ moved out of the realm of workplace practice and into private beliefs.

Japanese architecture education methods and approaches both created a gulf between *kindai* (modern) practices and ‘traditional’ practices. For instance both the focus on theory and the act of theorising separated architects from the past: carpenters neither learnt theory nor theorised on their practice for their education. As with wider society, the new education system meant that architects became a totally different category of worker from carpenters. The education of architects created new divisions of labour between designers and builders.

This division was compounded by the differing views that Japanese architects held of past building practices of Japan due to frameworks of understanding departing from a nativist approach. Instead it was an Englishman, Josiah Conder, who created the formalisation of Japanese architectural education and was later known as ‘the Father of modern Japanese architecture’, (Watanabe, 1993: 43). His framework with its subtle bias towards Japanese and ‘Oriental’ architecture was telling. By definition, then, modern Japanese architecture had its roots in *Seiyō*; the conceptual frameworks were developed in *Seiyō*, the style of teaching was derived from *Seiyō*, and even the founder of the profession was British.

This produced a split between the past and present. In turn this split created an issue of belonging for Japanese architects after learning European and American architectural history: Japanese architects were not the same as Japanese carpenters, and did not want to be. These architects would go on to build with prejudices (first conceived in Europe) of Japanese carpentry in mind; the foundations of the education system actively pushed Japanese architects away from their native past and towards the aspiration to be modern. Yet the initial ‘Westernisation’ approach from Meiji authorities left the consequence of a confused identity of both what it meant to be *kindai* (modern) and to be Japanese, which had to be dealt with by ‘modern’ architects such as Ito. Through theory and production of architecture, Itō provided some clarity on where Japan should stand in relation to *Seiyō* and Tōyō, though only by recreating the underlying binaries of Orientalism.

According to Octavio Paz, in the West the modern was “the knife which splits time in two: before and now.” (Paz, 1991: 4) This split was greater in Japan in some respects, when this splitting of time occurred with even greater violence. In this chapter the temporal split has been particularly shown in terms of how Japanese architects learnt about the past. Yet the schism between traditional carpentry
and architecture was due to the shift towards learning about Seiyō architecture history. Whilst the use of reason was a central condition in the development of Japanese authority architecture, critical reason was in the first place promoted to a great extent in authority architecture due to another condition: the desire of Meiji elites to appear civilised to Seiyō. In sum, borrowing the notion of ‘modern’, and embedding it in institution-building created a new framework of hierarchies, in which Seiyō, and particularly critical reason, became the new hallmarks for a superior civilisation. This dynamic was further extrapolated after Japan’s growth of imperialism and colonisation of Taiwan in 1895.
Chapter 4
Civilising the Qing: Urban development under Imperial Japan

“During the past seventy years, Japan has been doing her best to import the civilization of far advanced Western nations, and thereby elevate herself to the same level as any civilized nation of the Occident. Her efforts in this direction have turned out successful, and she finds herself ranked among the most civilized and most powerful nations of the world. There is now nothing which she can learn from any other nation. Japan is no longer a [child]; she is an adult. Years ago, she was dependent in many ways upon the civilization of the Western nations. Today, she is quite independent in that respect, and, therefore, is required to form her own civilization.” (Naito, 1938: 53)

The promotional text above on Japan’s colony in Taiwan implies that the modern transformation from Seiyō was intended by the Meiji authorities, particularly IWAKURA Tomomi and YANAGIHARA Sakimitsu, to demonstrate that Japan was capable of transitioning alone to a high stage of development and becoming civilised on Seiyō terms. Yet implicit in the quote is that Japan’s requirement to form her own civilisation demanded the capability to reify progress through domination; this became the only acceptable evidence to prove Japan had completed the modern transformation and attained Great Power status. Yet, the reason that Japanese modernisation retains such an acute interest is that the modern influence in architecture in Japanese history was not essentially a ‘Western’ process but a Japanese initiative formed in the contact zone as discussed. These rapid transformations came about under conditions of unequal power relations, where the native wooden architecture was demeaned and became split off from conventional authority architecture, creating a primary schism in kindai (modern) architecture. These schisms continued during Japan’s expansion and became clearer as her past architecture was hidden in her colonies and so Japanese ‘tradition’ was not shown in tandem with its modernity. In the course of this process, Japan’s kindai (modernity) became a duality with Seiyō modernity, existing alongside Euro American modernity with interactions between the two, but becoming culturally independent.

Analysis of Japanese modernity without reference to Japan’s imperialism is limited and cannot grasp the cultural context that prefaced the rise in confidence in Japan’s modern architects. The Shrine and Temple style architecture became popular at the beginning of the 20th century with the growth in national confidence. This confidence was in no small part due to Japan’s success in its aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours at the end of the 19th century. The creation of new relationships
between past and present, between Japan and Tōyō and finally, between Japan and Seiyō, were planned and implemented through colonial policies to reach everyday life within the urban setting.

The authorities in colonial Taiwan practised three principles. First was an efficient organisation and carefully planned policies. Second was persuasion, taking on the British colonial style of impressing the native, mainly through uniforms and architecture. Finally, and underpinning the first two policies, was social Darwinism, with colonial authorities seeing all nations as being in a struggle of ‘survival of the fittest.’ Japan needed to obtain colonies to survive and to put Taiwan on the path to progression through scientific methods. All these principles functioned to distinguish the Japanese from the ‘pre-modern’ Taiwanese natives, therefore reifying their superiority.

Yet even before Taiwan was taken as war indemnity from China in 1895, Japanese leaders had been projecting Japan as a proto-imperialist power since the Meiji Restoration. For Japan, a country keen to establish itself as one of the civilised nations of the world, imperialistic expansion became a preoccupation. Colonialism led Japan to move their civilised nation forward as they digested Seiyō modern learning. In doing so Japan could reify their superiority over lesser countries and truly join the Great Powers of the time. This chapter explores how and why Japan became an imperial power and the consequences of this, how Japanese authorities expressed themselves in Taiwan as her first colony, how the city of Taipei developed in the Qing dynasty (and was treated as ‘un-modern’), and how Japan attempted to demonstrate their modernity on the cityscape with their new kindai (modern) institutions.

4.1 Illumination of ‘modern Japan’ through imperialism
As argued in Chapter 2, in the first instance Japan's motivation for acquiring colonies was based on the need for survival and self-protection in a geo-political context where even China had been humbled by a small number of militarily advanced forces of Britain and France. Japan's economy and military were relatively undeveloped and Japan's leaders believed the acquisition of colonies would supplement their own slender resource base. Additional resources would give them the necessary bargaining power to exist in a world of intense international rivalry. (Chang and Myers, 1963: 433) For Japan, colonialism would be a form of pre-emptive protection in the event of war, a buffer against the powers of Seiyō and a boost to the economy of the home islands. This third factor was particularly important for Japan, as colonising was an effective method of jumping ahead economically, a necessity given that Japan had only been chasing modernity for a matter of decades. (Chang and Myers, 1963: 436)

I define imperialism here conventionally as “the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies.” (Collins English Dictionary, 2009)
Yet Japanese colonialism was in a new category to European colonialism. As Nicholas Thomas put it at the beginning of his book Colonialism’s Culture: “Colonialism: the word’s immediate associations are with intrusions, conquest, economic exploitation and the domination of indigenous peoples by European men.” (Thomas, 1994: 1) The case of Japan’s colonial activities was different in two respects: they were not European and their imperialism was over an area of which they were a part. Rather than treating Japanese imperialism as part of an overarching category, in this chapter I will follow Tani Barlow’s suggestion that terms such as colonialism and modernity must be carefully examined for their specific local meaning. (Barlow, 1997: 4)

Given that the remainder of this thesis looks at kindai (modern) in the colonies of Japan it must be asked: Why does this thesis look at colonialism to understand the modern? The answer lies in the definition of the modern explored in Chapter 1. Engagement with the modern requires engagement in the process of distinguishing from the non-modern (as befits a concept that has its roots in differentiating different times and the fashionable from the unfashionable). Adoption of the modern requires constant distinction from others to prove superiority or at least equality with them. This necessitates constructing a hierarchical relationship through discourse, policies and foreign relations. Colonialism has been and remains the perfect tool to demonstrate superiority over an Other: it creates a parent/child, leader/follower, master/slave relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. The Other’s power is taken away, the dominated appear childlike and malleable, thus giving them the appearance of being pre-modern and requiring a superior presence to guide them.

Before examining both the context and instances of Japan’s imperialism between 1868 and 1895 it is important to clarify two related conceptual issues: first, that Japanese imperialism only begins before Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895; and second, that the drivers of Japanese imperialism should be seen in relation to theories of imperialism in spite of the differences with European colonisation.

Several major studies of Japanese imperialism share the general assumption that Japanese imperialism began in 1895 with the colonisation of Taiwan, such as the Japanologist W.G. Beasley in Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (1987). This assumption has led to colonialism and kindai (modernisation) often being conceptually split in studies on Meiji Japan, yet this is a historically inaccurate split. Although studies of Japanese imperialism often begin in 1895 with the colonisation of Taiwan, Japanese colonialism did not start in Taiwan, but with Hokkaidō, the Ryūkyū Islands, and with Japan’s aggressive foreign policies towards Korea and China which indisputably followed the example of Seiyō countries in favouring gunboat diplomacy and unequal treaties over the previous Sakoku (Jap. 鎖国, lit. locked country) policy. Although Japanese rule in Taiwan set the tone for her later colonial
developments (Tsai, 2009: 10) the colonisation of Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyūs also set the tone for the colonisation of Taiwan. Japanese imperialism thus had two stages: an initial stage where it was an important albeit secondary concern (from 1868 to 1895) and a later stage that underpinned the asserted modernity of Japan (from 1895 to 1945).

In agreement with this position, Robert Eskildsen wrote that Japan’s imperialism began before 1895: “The establishment of Japan’s formal colonial empire has served as an influential historical guidepost, but it also encourages the view that Japanese colonialism happened after Japan had accomplished its own modernization, rather than that colonialism and modernization happened concurrently, and this has created a historiographical blind spot about the colonial dimension of the Taiwan expedition.” (Eskildsen, 2002: 2) Given that Meiji Japan’s bellicose foreign policy was concurrent with the initial ‘modernising’ efforts, it is important see how the new concepts, centralisation and binary boundaries that were being established in fields from education to architecture were reflected in Japan’s early imperialist actions, rather than imagining that these only began after the first Sino-Japanese war.

**Meiji Japan’s imperialist approach**

Given that Japanese imperialism was a part of the overall policy of the Meiji state rather than a late adaptation, it is important first to understand which theories of imperialism best fit the early foreign activities of Meiji Japan. The four most influential theories of imperialism I examine here are J.A. Hobson’s theory of under-consumption leading to imperialism, Lenin’s theory of imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism, Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that imperialism was an atavism of an earlier, more aggressive stage of development, and nationalism which stresses national security and national sentiment as the driver for imperialism. Whilst each of these theories are likely to hold some truth for some regimes, I concentrate here on how they applied to Japan’s early colonial activities given that the conditions faced by Japan were quite different to Europe.

Given Japan’s undeveloped capitalism in the late nineteenth century, it appears that imperialistic expansion was based more on ideology than capital. This is unsurprising given that the power and control of the state was a defining feature of the Meiji period. Hobson’s theory suggests that the existence of excess capital leads to seeking profits overseas. However, during this period Japan had no excess capital, had a significant trade deficit, and, following the annexation of Taiwan, even had to borrow large amounts from Britain and the United States to finance its rapid industrial expansion. (Gordon, 2003: 4) Lenin’s theory of imperialism (Lenin (1917)) advocated a theory of monopoly capital where capitalists wanted to employ surplus capital abroad to achieve higher profits than in the domestic market. This does not appear to apply to imperial Japan. For instance, most of the funds from foreign
debt following the acquisition of Taiwan went on military expenditure, and only three percent of the funds went to development of Japan's colonies. (Lockwood, 1954: 35)

Schumpeter's theory appears to have more validity. He wrote that imperialism represented the survival of older social structures, such as a warrior class, within a capitalist economy. This theory seems to partially explain the attitudes of Japan's leaders toward imperialistic expansion. There were some continuations, such as the strong desire for the country to be respected, which underlay treaty revision. Calman (1992) attempted to revise the idea that the West had a framing impact on Japan and that Japanese pre-Perry history had a defining impact upon Japan: “Japanese imperialism was not simply a response to external conditions; its well-springs are to be found within Japanese history.” (Calman, 1992: xxi) Calman sees continuation of political dynamics from the Edo period as being the key to understand all developments. Given that Japan continued to gather territories following the reversal of the unequal treaties, Japanese imperialism can clearly be explained not only by a reaction to the low international position of Japan, but as something internal to their own culture.

However, rather than simply a continuation, the transition from the Edo to Meiji represented a great and obvious break from Japan's past, and the recent past of Japan had been peaceful and isolated. Breaks with the past were dramatic: the first declaration of the Meiji period in the Five Charter Oath abolished the class system which took away all samurai privileges. Arguments that suggest imperialism in Japan was due to the samurai spirit often forget that samurai had changed their role fundamentally in the Tokugawa period; without wars for 250 years they had become well educated administrators, as shown in Chapter 2. The samurai who disagreed with these decisions were also swiftly put down; one of the first major disagreements in the Meiji period was the Satsuma rebellion (Jap. 西南戦争, lit. Southwestern War) which defeated the Meiji forces who wished to attack Korea, as this policy did not fit with the government vision of foreign relations which preferred the Seiyō strategy of gunboat diplomacy. Although the idea of the martial samurai was later revived in the lead up to World War Two, this was in essence a (re)invented tradition, given that the army since 1868 was composed of all classes; by the turn of the 20th century, the notion of samurai as a warrior class had become a useful anachronism.

Ultimately, Meiji Japan's imperialistic objectives were more to do with burgeoning nationalism than any other factor. (Gordon, 2003: 6) The following points support nationalism as the best theory to understand Japan's wars and colonial acquisitions: 1) Japan's deep concerns for national security, 2) its emulation of the imperialistic behaviours of Western powers, and 3) Japanese national ideals and personal characteristics. The concept of social Darwinism, which saw the ultimate domination of the world by the strongest nations, fitted well with the belief of many Japanese that they were the chosen people of Asia.
and a divinely favoured race. FUKUZAWA Yukichi, one of Japan's educational leaders and founder of one of Japan's most influential newspapers, expressed Japan's early imperialistic desires in 1882, "We shall someday raise the national power of Japan so that not only shall we control the natives of China and India as the English do today, but we shall also possess in our hands the power to rebuke the English and to rule Asia ourselves." (Nester, 1996: 63) The Japanese people also had certain personal characteristics that supported the country's rapid economic growth and imperialistic expansion. Allen (1981) explains, "Throughout their history they have shown a gift for rapidly assimilating new ideas and practices, a boldness in executing large projects and, above all, a trained and frequently exercised capacity for organization." (Allen, 1981: 15) This means that the theory which best explains the drivers for Japanese imperialism in the Meiji period is nationalism. It was the internalisation of the narrative of joining the progressive civilised nation-states of Seiyō to avoid the fate of China that provided the strongest argument in favour of becoming an imperial power.

**Conditions shaping Japan's early imperialism**

After the Black Ships of Commodore Matthew Perry made their belligerent entrance into Edo Bay in 1853, thrusting Japan towards participation in what was already a highly inequitable system of world trade, the "Japanese were keenly aware of their tenuous position in relation to the West." (Mason, 2012: 14) Japan's decision to expand her territory was not made in a vacuum: the late nineteenth-century international scene was dominated by large states competing with one another for the control of resource areas. As argued in Section 2.1 this was a tonal change from the early nineteenth century when increased competition between states and a hardening of the idea of Western superiority within the Great Powers meant that all uncolonised areas outside of Europe and North America were under increased danger of imperialist actions. This was the context for Japan's initial colonial expansion: from the mid 1880's to World War One, a surge of aggression from Britain, France and new aspiring imperial powers had almost entirely divided and partitioned the African continent and had occupied the remaining unclaimed portions of Asia and the Pacific except for China, Japan, and Siam. (Peattie, 1984: 3) This late-nineteenth-century burst of imperial activity by the industrial West became known as the 'New Imperialism' and "created modern colonial systems notable for the rapidity with which they were assembled and the degree to which they were similar in arrangement, structure and evolution." (Peattie, 1984: 3)

By the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders displayed a degree of paranoia, seeing enemies on all sides, perceiving a threat from others. Reacting to this indirect threat, Japan acted strategically to counter it. This attitude is clear from reports about and words from IWAKURA Tomomi, leader of the Iwakura Mission. Sir Harry Parkes, the British Envoy to Japan, was “much impressed by
the skill and ability of Iwakura, who consulted him closely on the policies which Japan should adopt in its’ attempt to become strong and respected”. (Daniels, 1996: 92) Although Iwakura was friendly, it was without naivety as to the threat that Parkes and other ambassadors might one day pose to Japan. Iwakura noted in a memorandum to SANJO Sanetomi, the Minister of the Right, in 1869:

“Although we have no choice in having intercourse with the countries beyond the seas, in the final analysis those countries are our enemies. Why are they our enemies? Day by day these countries develop their arts and technology with a view to growing in wealth and power. Even a little country like Holland remains independent among the powers and submits itself to no other power. That is because the people’s hearts, high and low, are united in revering their monarch and loving their state. Thus, every foreign country tries to place itself over other countries. Country A directs its efforts at country B, country B at country C – they are all the same. That is why I say, all countries beyond the seas are our enemies. Therefore, henceforth, in dealing with foreign countries our great objective must be neither to sully the emperor’s glory nor to impair our national rights.” (Iwakura, 1869, Quoted in Duus, 1995: 16)

This was in no way an isolated opinion: Iwakura’s suggestions on how Japan’s foreign relations should be conducted only became hardened and more concerned with competition over time, particularly following the partition of Africa. Foreign minister INOUE Kaoru, commissioner of the Rokumeikan, summed up this consensus in a long memorandum in 1887:

“The [European] countries are all devoting their power more and more to the colonization and development of overseas territories… In India, Cambodia, Cochin-China, and elsewhere, the weak become prey for the strong… During the past three or four years the European countries have expanded their power into Asia and Africa more than ever before, and they are brandishing their power in the Far East as well. Ah, the continents of Africa and Asia are about to become the cockpit of conflict among the Europeans.” (Kaoru, 1887, quoted in Duus, 1995: 17)

The discourse in Meiji Japan concerning the foreign policies of Seiyō was that all areas of the world were becoming colonised more rapidly than ever before, and that Asia was soon to become a central zone of conflict amongst the European powers.
Reversing the Unequal Treaties

Japan did not react in blind panic to these concerns but with thoughtful and ruthless planning to ensure they would remain strong and independent. As shown throughout this thesis, the first priority from the time of the Restoration in 1868 was revising the unequal treaties and, specifically, abolishing extraterritoriality. This priority was strengthened after the Iwakura Mission failed in 1873 on this point. Japanese elites followed the suggestion of the British foreign minister Granville, who stated “Britain would only be prepared to make concessions on the subject of the treaties, such as might put British citizens under the jurisdiction of the Japanese, ‘in precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization’.” (Beasley, 1995: 165) The most direct correction for Japan to reverse extraterritoriality was to have a legal system that Seiyō residents in Japan could trust. Having European law models allowed Europeans to be confident that they would be treated similarly to at home. This was achieved methodically through Meiji legal codification and reform, expanded upon in Section 5.2. The success of this approach was acknowledged by the English Orientalist Robert P. Porter in his 1918 book Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power, who described how Japan had shaken off “her tariff and juristic shackles” and that Japan “had already codified much of her law and organized her law courts after European models.” (Porter, 1918: 120-121) Peter Duus claims that for every domestic policy “Whatever benefits or harm a particular policy might entail on other grounds, its effects on Japan’s international standing always figured in the debate.” (Duus, 1995: 15) At least to some extent, domestic Meiji policy was designed to function and fit with broader foreign policy agendas.

However, ‘civilised’ legal reform was insufficient to reverse the treaties, given that the benefits given by these agreements to European states and the USA were not only legal but financial in nature. Quite apart from her domestic policies, Japan would also need to follow the foreign relations policies of the Seiyō Great Powers in order to be seen as a serious potential ally or enemy. Therefore Japan adopted imperialist practices “in much the same way that they imported, assimilated, and transformed other cultural and institutional structures.” (Duus, 1995: 11-12)

This approach to imperialism is important to highlight in the case of Japan because it represented a new manner of relating to foreign states and, therefore, required to be rapidly learned from the Great Powers. It is important to understand that Japan’s approach and justification for dominating depends on the dominant power believing itself superior to the dominated. In colonial governance, these ‘civilised’ characteristics are purposefully accentuated since: “the differences from one culture to another help illuminate each culture’s particular characteristics.” (Davis, 2006: 25) Social differences in a colonial context are constructed and managed by the way the colonial power decides to represent itself. As Japan was a newly powerful state from the perspective of Europeans and Americans, these initial representations were important to display a coherent image on the world stage. Japanese officials
wished to show themselves different from neighbouring countries, even China: “Japanese aggression in China constitutes a puzzle for observers, who argue that “it seems… freak[ish] that a country barely out of danger of being ‘colonised’ should think of colonies herself.” (Blanken, 2012: 104)

Whilst the architectural project of ITŌ Chūta promoted a deeper connection with Seiyō and reconnecting with neighbours, I suggest that Japan’s imperialism, 1868 to 1895, was treading a different yet complementary course, focused on two objectives: striving for superiority over Tōyō and striving for equality with Seiyō. Both of these aims would incentivise becoming an imperialist power within East Asia. This section looks first at two case studies that illuminate Japan’s pre-1895 colonial activities: the colonisation of Hokkaidō and Japan’s shifting relationship with China. These examples are used to discern what Japan achieved through these policies, what underlay Japan’s imperial approach, and, later, how this approach shifted and expanded with the colonisation of Taiwan.

**Striving for superiority over Tōyō**

The process of gaining formal legal equality with Seiyō was understood unquestionably as part of increasing the imperial power of Japan. Because of the necessity to grow their imperial power in order to appear civilised and gain treaty revision, colonialism went largely unquestioned in Meiji Japan. Apart from a few dissidents such as KOTOKU Shusui, hardly a voice was raised in protest against a programme of expansion: in the Meiji period doubt about imperialism is notable by its absence. (Duus, 1995: 12) Imperialism was accepted as a way of being in Japan, the main disputes “revolved around the speed, direction, and management of expansion, not its legitimacy, which was no more questioned than was the legitimacy of steam-driven machinery or constitutional systems. In this sense, the pursuit of an expansionist agenda was part and parcel of the larger mimetic project of the Meiji elites.” (Duus, 1995: 12)

Japan’s mimicking international behavior was tempered by its status as an East Asian nation with deep historical relationships to its neighbours. Indeed, if Japan was purely mimicking Seiyō, they would have colonised geographically distant states rather than areas governed by states with a similar cultural background. These more geographically immediate relationships and the activities which formed these would become the areas of greatest foreign activity between 1868 and 1895, rather than relationships with Seiyō. How these relationships shaped Japan’s foreign policy is explored below in examining Japan’s actions with two territories: the colonisation of Hokkaidō and Japan’s relationship with China up to 1895.
Early imperialism: Hokkaidō

To the north of Japan’s largest island, Honshū, the southern-most peninsula of Hokkaidō (formerly known as Ezo (Jap. 蝦夷)) had been only loosely part of Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration. It was inhabited by around 20,000 indigenous Ainu people, ethnically and culturally distinct from the Yamato people. The programme of expansion began almost from the commencement of Meiji rule with the colonisation of Hokkaidō, Japan’s first experiment in colonial administration. After being defeated on the Japanese mainland by restoration forces, the outgoing remnants of the Shogun attempted to set up a breakaway Republic of Ezo on Hokkaidō. However, the navy loyal to the emperor ended this attempt in May 1869 with the Battle of Hakodate on the southern tip of Hokkaidō. Thereafter the island of Hokkaidō was slowly and deliberately integrated into the administration of the mainland; a Development Commission (Jap. 開拓使, kaitakushi) was established in 1869 by the new Meiji government following the final act of the war with the Shogunate. The colonisation of the island enacted “Japan’s desire to avoid being colonized by Western powers as a central motivating factor of Japan’s vigorous pursuit of colonial domination in the region. This posturing began as early as 1869 when Japanese ideologues asserted in the Iwakura Proposal that the colonization of Ezo would be instrumental in negotiating respect and influence with the West, in general, and Russia, in particular.” (Mason, 2012: 14-15)

In 1882 the Development Commission was abolished and Hokkaidō was made into three prefectures. These were abolished four years later in 1886 and the Hokkaidō Agency (Jap. 北海道庁, Hokkaidō-chō) was established. These incremental developments were a sign that Hokkaidō was being “gradually incorporated into the modern nation-state of Japan,” (Kleeman, 2003: 12) yet Hokkaidō remained peripheral and only became an equal prefecture in 1947. Hokkaidō was not run as part of the other islands of Japan, nor as an internal colony, but as something in between these states, “internalized by the colonization process that took place during the Meiji era.” (Mason, 2012: 13)

The example of Hokkaidō is particularly relevant to understand how kindai (modern) became adopted in Japan and later in Taiwan because the three ingredients identified through my analyses as part of the modernisation of Japan/Taiwan could all also be seen in the colonisation of Hokkaidō. These were: first, the adaptation of new concepts and behavior in the international sphere; second, the deployment of centralisation in creating a more programmatically driven process of change in Hokkaidō; and third, the erection of binary boundaries, particularly between the natives of Hokkaidō and Japanese on the main three islands. These three aspects will be explored in turn.

On the first point, even in 1868, a year after the Meiji Restoration, the basic concerns and language of Seiyō upon establishing colonies (the ideas of imperial power and of spreading civilisation) were already
The outlook of the fledgling central government was in turn adopted by the Hokkaidō Development Agency (kaitakichi), which itself officially exhorted the first governor to expand the imperial power of Japan:

“The flourishing condition of the Imperial Power is dependent upon the colonization and exploitation of Hokkaidō. At present there is urgent need of action. We realise the great difficulties of governing this area which lies several hundred li in the Arctic North. On your official tour of duty do your best to exploit the area and to open the lock on the Northern
Gate [Hokkaidō’s literal meaning] so that the people may prosper and these may be a firm base for the expansion of the Imperial Power.” (Kaitakichi, 1869, quoted in Mason, 2012: 25)

This use of terms which were becoming central to European foreign policy such as civilisation and imperialism, shows that from the very beginning, the cultural outlook of foreign office officials in Japan was strongly informed by contemporaneous European theories on how states should act to secure their borders against foreign incursion, which was justified by the higher level of civilisation that the imperial power possessed. In addition, even in 1869, Hokkaidō was seen as a base for imperial expansion rather than the end. Theories which suggest that Japan did not have a long-term intention to colonise territories, and that these only came about by an accident of war, do not appear to be supported by this evidence about the intentions of early colonial authorities in Hokkaidō.

On the second point, Japan’s centralisation and absorption of Hokkaidō marks a pertinent break with the Tokugawa period. Whereas prior to the Meiji Restoration Hokkaidō was controlled very loosely with the southern peninsula of the island being part of a daimyo’s han, after the Meiji Restoration they had a Commission established to promote the integration of the island into the mainland and to exploit the resources of the island. Central authorities modelled their administration after California and the U.S.A’s expansion. In 1880 the director of the Hokkaidō Development Agency, KURODA Kiyotaka (Jap. 黒田清隆, 1840-1900) stated that the achievement of Hokkaidō so far “pales in comparison to California, frequently referenced benchmark for colonial ambitions in Hokkaidō, which boasts more people, reclaimed land, revenues, sheep and pigs, but he is confident that efforts of the agency will yield greater success in the coming years.” (Mason, 2012: 27)

With California as the model, the colonisation of Hokkaidō was a central government initiative which pushed the colonial endeavor forward in a programmatic way. Hokkaidō was “at once formally Japanese territory (in contrast to colonies such as Taiwan and Korea) and peripheral and secondary in status. This is confirmed [OE Shinobu] observes, by the custom in Hokkaidō and Okinawa, still in currency today, of referring to the metropolitan center as the mainland (naichi and hondo respectively).” (Mason, 2012: 20)

Yet as it was closer to the main island geographically and politically, as well as being more vital strategically, Hokkaidō was incorporated into the Japanese state in the mid-Meiji period (and has remained a part of the Japanese polity ever since). Establishing Hokkaidō as a colonised part of Japan proper was achieved through Japanese leaders using historical arguments to suggest that Hokkaidō had been part of Japan for centuries: these officials “attempted to authenticate their national boundaries, authority, and identity through colonial expansion, first in Ezo/Hokkaidō and then beyond, amid
pervasive Western depictions of Japan as an emasculated, uncivilized, childlike country.” (Mason, 2012: 14) Early colonisation showed that Japan was skilful, familiar with arguments justifying territorial acquisition, and competitive in the international sphere, particularly with respect to Russian aspirations.

This centralisation was problematic for the Ainu natives of Hokkaidō, as the Japanese government designated all land on the island as officially ownerless, following the lead of Seiyō powers. (Mason, 2012: 8-9) The Ainu were made Japanese citizens and the colonisation effectively disregarded any notion of Ainu sovereignty. (Mason, 2012: 9) Whilst making the island a part of Japan, the elites “presupposed that the Ainu were a primitive people who utterly lacked civilization.” (Mason, 2012: 10) Similar arguments and policies were made by the European colonists in North America and Australasia against natives, although Japan’s authorities did not even sign an agreement with Ainu elders recognising at least a nominal transfer of authority.

On the final point, given their disregard of the peoples on the periphery, Hokkaidō was the first example of Meiji Japan reifying binary boundaries between ethnic Japanese and Hokkaidō natives, between the civilised and uncivilised. Michele M. Mason believed these boundaries were created in the collective consciousness of the Japanese in order to give meaning to notions of ethnicity and nationality, which was “accomplished through the construction of difference (e.g., nature/culture and barbarian/civilised) and the disavowal of Ainu history.” (Mason, 2012: 6) The history of the Ainu, if conceptualised at all, was seen as static and frozen in a period of pre-modern history; possibly the first instance of Oriental Orientalism by Japan. Mason writes that:

“Defined as the “denial of contemporaneity” of an Other, this conceptual operation in the Meiji context insisted that Ainu, despite their simultaneous physical existence with Japanese, occupied a distinct, fixed, and unquestionably premodern time frame on an universal historical chronology. On this timeline of enlightenment, Japanese society was located irrefutably in the modern period, albeit behind the even more advanced Western civilization.” (Mason, 2012: 10-11)

This boundary-making was a defining feature of colonial administration in Hokkaidō. Unsurprisingly given the role of architecture in mainland Japan, colonial architecture played a role in this self- and other-identification: these boundaries would be partially enacted through architecture. Engineering and architecture were used by the colonial authorities to demonstrate their modernity: some of the earliest Gijyōfū buildings were constructed in Hokkaidō or by the Hokkaidō Colonisation Commission on the mainland. The first dome built by a Japanese person was the ribbed dome on the central tower of the Hokkaidō Development Commission headquarters in Hokkaidō’s capital, Sapporo (completed in 1888).
It was the tallest building in the city, and a “spectacular symbol of authority with its copper roof gleaming in the sun”. (Coaldrake, 1996: 236) Modern engineering was also used; railway lines were set up by the Hokkaidō Colliery and Railroad Company; in another echo of the opening of California, the trains used American designs. (Finn, 1995: 139)

Presaging how the colonial capital of Taiwan would later be used, Hokkaidō’s towns were used as a symbol of the central government’s drive to show itself to be civilised. Given Hokkaidō’s sparse population of around 20,000 native Ainu, and the few permanent settlements that existed on the island, the architecture built by the Hokkaidō Colonisation Commission would have had a greater impact on the landscape than new buildings in highly populated cities such as Tokyo. In a first for Japan, the Hokkaidō Colonisation Commission agreed that “all its new buildings would be Western”; because of this, “Western architecture developed more rapidly here than in any other part of Japan.” (Finn, 1995: 52) Such decisions, as well as Conder’s elegant Hokkaidō Sales Hall in Tokyo covered in the previous chapter, would help create an impression associating colonisation with modernity and distinguish the Japanese as more developed than the natives.

**Early imperialism: China**

Whilst Hokkaidō served as a colonial laboratory, the example of China provided Japanese officials with ground to form their foreign policy principles towards non-Seiyō countries allowing officials to project an identity towards both their neighbours and to Seiyō, an identity of a strong and culturally independent country which was in the process of becoming the self-proclaimed centre of civilisation in Tōyō. Hokkaidō was depopulated and uncontested by other powers; acquiring other territories would require dealing with other states and the Meiji government was in no position to embark on an expansionist policy against established and powerful states in the 1870s and 1880s due to Japan’s low financial, political and military resources. But by gradually altering its relationship with China, Japan laid the groundwork for its imperialist credentials.

As introduced in Section 2.1, the relationship between Japan and China was complex and long, beginning in the first century AD. Before the Meiji Restoration, the Tokugawa Shogunate did not take Chinese culture as the cultural meridian point; however aspects of Chinese culture were defining influences of the period. In Edo Japan, educators and elites embraced and respected Chinese culture, particularly neo-Confucianism. However they had a less positive outlook on China as a country, given that the Qing dynasty was ruled by ethnic Manchus rather than Han Chinese. (Keene, 1998: 247) Japan’s status in relation to China was similarly complex. Japan had sent tribute to China as recently as the late Ming Dynasty in 1547, but although Japan had often sent tribute to China and taken part in the
tally system, forming embassies to China had always been sporadic. In addition, the decision on whether or not to send tribute to China was usually dependent on the Japanese view of China, rather than *vice versa*, understandable since there was no history of China invading Japan after refusal of tribute. According to some Japanese scholars Japan had been one of the countries most reluctant to participate in the Sinocentric world order: “Japan did not identify itself as a vassal state of China during most of its history, no matter how China saw it.” (Mizuno, 2004: 109) However, it remains ambiguous in scholarship whether the Tokugawa’s contacts with Ming and Qing China were as tribute to a superior or as two equal powers. (Mizuno, 2004: 129)

Following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese foreign office officials assumed a much more explicit position in relation to China: having embarked on a reform programme, Japanese officials believed they had climbed one or two rungs higher than the Chinese on the ladder toward “civilisation”. Unlike the Tokugawa period when direct relations between the states were very rare, the Meiji government pursued a more direct relationship with China. In 1870 while attempting to reestablish relations, Japanese officials tried to extract an “Unequal Treaty” from the Qing government modeled on Seiyō treaties with China. (Duus, 1995: 14) The Chinese did not share the assumption of Japan being more civilised than themselves and rebuffed Japan’s attempt. The Japanese ambassador was however successful in opening a proto-consulate in the International Settlement shared the benefits reaped by France and Britain following the Second Opium War. (Bickers, 2011: 254) For China, this encounter was a shock; Japan firmly positioned herself as being far from a tributary state, but a competitive peer, modelled on Seiyō: indeed, maybe “the most compelling evidence of the perverted order of things from the point of view of the Qing, was the role of Japan.” (Bickers, 2011: 252) At Japan’s initiative a commercial treaty was signed in 1871, the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty (Jap. 日清修好条規), a concession made in part so as not to antagonise a near neighbour. (Bickers, 2011: 254)

Following this agreement, relations between Japan and China were focused on resolving questions related to ‘the South’, and Korea. The idea of ‘the South’ requires some introduction. Between Japan’s first interest in Taiwan and its colonisation there was the relatively long period of gestation of over 20 years. Taiwan was a part of what Japan conceived as ‘the South’ (the lands to the south of Japan) which were “the focus of much interest in the decades following the Meiji Restoration and during the establishment of the Japanese colonial empire.” (Kleeman, 2003: 11) In the late 19th century Japanese intellectuals, from journalists to architects, had created the idea of Tōyō (Orient), of the Orient which they were a part. Yet they were a distinct part of Tōyō, the only civilised country within the sphere from their perspective. Given the desire to expand, and their Orientalist conception, the South became the ideal area to expand into: “the South was a land of untouched, natural beauty and untamed savages, an area
where the Japanese imagination could be given free rein, a region into which the burgeoning population of Japan could expand in an Asian version of colonial empires then maintained by all the major European powers.” (Kleeman, 2003: 11) Southern expansion became a common refrain in the late nineteenth century; naval commander SATÔ Tetsutarô (Jap. 佐藤鉄太郎, 1866-1942) said: “Our future lies not in the north, but in the south, not on the continent but on the ocean”. (Peattie, 1984: 179) The open geographic space below Japan was seen as a challenge by some, with the journalist, TAKEKOSHI Yosaburô (Jap. 竹越与三郎, 1865-1950) insisting “it is our great task as a nation to turn the Pacific Ocean into a Japanese lake.” (Peattie, 1984: 179)

To the immediate south, Satsuma province’s long dominance over the Ryûkyû Islands transformed into a Japanese possession when the islands were claimed by the Meiji government in 1872. Following this, “Japan demanded that Okinawa sever all ties with China and reform its government.” (Kleeman, 2003: 13) This incorporation of the Ryûkyûs could not be taken unilaterally however, as China had also received tribute from the Ryûkyû Kingdom from 1655. An incident occurred in 1871 (one year before the Ryûkyû Islands were claimed by Japan) which gave a pretext for assertion of Japanese sovereignty over the Islands and to explore China’s sovereignty over other islands to Japan’s south, when fifty-four shipwrecked Ryûkyûn sailors were killed by Paiwan aboriginal people on Taiwan’s south-eastern coast. This allowed the next meeting between Japanese and Chinese representatives to be taken as an opportunity to start a conversation about Qing assumptions underpinning relations with the Ryûkyû Islands, and the nature and extent of its sovereignty in Taiwan. (Bickers, 2011: 253)

This conversation happened on 29th June 1873, as the Iwakura Mission was drawing to an end, when the Japanese Foreign Minister, SOEJIMA Taneoni (Jap. 副島種臣, 1828-1905), went to China for a diplomatic audience with the Qing emperor to begin a more formal dialogue with China. Whilst previous Qing emperors had not allowed direct contact between themselves and foreign envoys, the Tongzhi emperor (who reigned from 1861 to 1875, mostly as an adolescent) was interested in modernising China and openness to Seiyô following the Taiping rebellion and the second Opium War. In his first audience with foreign envoys, Soejima had intelligently used his understanding of international law to ensure that he entered first and alone as the most senior Ambassador present, dressed in formal Western-style diplomatic uniform. (Bickers, 2011: 253)

Soejima had several objectives for this diplomacy. First, to assume the position of teacher over his cultural mentors: Soejima pointed out to the new Qing emperor that his Western clothes were useful and how his navy escort was entirely Japanese-crewed. Soejima showed a new opportunity for China, to assume the trappings of Seiyô and to foster a spirit of nationalism in order to fend off the threat of Britain,
France and others. Second, Japan’s ambassador used the shipwreck and murders in Taiwan as an opportunity for Japan to assert its sovereignty over the Ryūkyūs. Soejima pressed claims for reparation and punishment in the European manner with the Qing, and questioned Qing preparedness to assert its control over all of Taiwan and its peoples. Soejima believed he had secured statements from the Zongli Yamen (Chi. 總理衙門, which functioned as the Chinese foreign office) that the aboriginal population of Taiwan was not wholly under Qing control. These statements underpinned Japan’s 1874 mission to ‘punish’ people in southeastern Taiwan for the murders, and, more covertly, to establish a colonial bridgehead. (Bickers, 2011: 253) In the end, a Japanese army landed in Taiwan in 1874 and stayed in Taiwan for several months until they received a large compensation package from China. Just two years later, in 1876, Japan mimicked Perry even more closely by using gunboat diplomacy to open Korea, another tributary state of the Qing, just as the United States had done to Japan 20 years earlier. As Soejima had noted to the Tongzhi emperor, Japan was eager to show the Koreans how easy it was to assimilate the benefits of “civilisation.” (Duus, 1995: 14-15)

This diplomatic wrangling, the ensuing punitive mission in Taiwan, and the opening of Korea, were chastising to China in a way that the aggression of Seiyō had not been. After 1876 and the increased number of treaty ports it has been obliged to open, the Qing found itself forced to revise or remodel its notions of relations with states that had previously accepted it as overlord, such as the Ryūkyūs. China “had to attempt to strengthen its frontiers, accelerating processes of conquest and consolidation already long under way”. (Bickers, 2011: 265) One method of doing this was to familiarise themselves with international law, which China’s would-be mentors were happy to aid: “textbooks on international law, which stressed the need for control to be substantive and effective, were presented to the Zongli Yamen by the Japanese as justifications for the 1874 venture, challenging Qing practices in Taiwan, and implicitly on all its borders.” (Bickers, 2011: 265)

For Japan, these early experiences showed that Japanese diplomacy had already absorbed the lessons of Admiral Perry and Seiyō imperialism, including the threat of force to gain concessions rather than direct force itself. Blanken finds that “Early efforts at territorial control by Japan focussed on aggressive diplomatic efforts for joint jurisdiction of Qing tributary states, such as Korea and Ryūkyū. The forcing open of Korea in 1876 through the treaty of Kangwha, and the acquisition of the Ryūkyū Islands (re-designated Okinawa Prefecture), was achieved in 1879 without force.” (Blanken, 2012: 104) As a result of these actions, “the formal designation of Okinawa as a prefecture in 1879 marked the beginning of Japanese cultural assimilation and direct administration of the South.” (Kleeman, 2003: 13)
These actions abroad had a large impact on how China was viewed in Japan, even though the lasting impression of China in Japan as culturally sophisticated was difficult to shake. Linguistically, many loan words for English and German terms used Chinese characters following the tradition of Chinese learning; the Meiji philologist, ŌTSUKI Fumihiko (Jap. 大槻文彦, 1847-1928), had the impression that many young government officials and teachers were former samurai who were proud of their intellectual traditions and their familiarity with literary Chinese. (Howland, 2002: 85) Following events with China including the Taiwan Incident of 1873, the beginning of conflict with China over Korea in 1882 the Sino-French war of 1884, as well as Fukuzawa’s anti-China rhetoric, a debate began in 1880s Japan on the future of Chinese learning given the geopolitical conditions in East Asia. The primary argument against Chinese learning was that there was a connection between China’s language, the content of Chinese learning, and the type of civilisation that China produced. (Howland, 2002: 51) For some Japanese modernisers, because Japan wished to master Seiyō civilisation, Chinese learning was no longer relevant. The secondary argument held that Chinese literary culture was limited when compared with the cultures that had produced modern science: for these scholars, who leant on European Orientalist scholars, Chinese language and culture struggled to articulate the abstract, lacked detail and precision, and so was unscientific. (Howland, 2002: 51-52)

This second point relates to wider trends in Meiji thought and the assumed need for categorisation and understanding in Meiji Japan. For the Meiji linguist ARIGA Nagao, Chinese language emphasised the individual and the particular. These aspects tainted the totality of the Chinese language by concern with the individual thing, in its concrete and idiosyncratic manifestation, at the expense of categories of things. (Howland, 2002: 52) For Ariga, as for Fukuzawa and Inoue, Confucianism praised unique acts of kings rather than promoting a unified principle like freedom or systems of governance such as constitutionalism. (Howland, 2002: 52) Edward Said believed this whole impulse to classify nature and man into types prepared the way for modern Orientalist structures. The emergence of scientific measurement and taxonomy began “the intellectual process by which bodily (and soon moral, intellectual, and spiritual) extension – the typical materiality of an object – could be transformed from mere spectacle to the precise measurement of characteristic elements was very widespread… These types and characters belonged to a system, a network of related generalizations.” (Said, 1978: 119)

By engaging in this process of categorisation, Japanese scholars and politicians engaged in a system of thought where generalisations were easily generated, and thought systems which could not generalise, such as Chinese learning, were disparaged. This led credence to the trend in Japan to treat China as the Other and to Orientalise China and the rest of Tōyō as culturally stagnant and unable to civilise without deep reform. The impulse to classify led to ambitious works such as ITŌ Chūta’s Evolutionary theory of
history to arise as great works of Orientalist scholarship. For such scholarship to flourish in Japan, the Chinese first had to be made the ‘Other’. They had to be studied, disassociated with, moved away from in education, culture and politics before supremacy could be claimed. This was something of an irony, as the Japanese culture had many roots in Chinese culture; Japan would need to move away from its source culture in order to look down on it.

This trend of disparaging Chinese learning and Othering China fitted well with, and validated, the foreign policies of the Meiji state. The spirit of nationalism was further entrenched at the turn of the century by successful wars and colonisation: “There is nothing quite so effective for developing the nationalist spirit as war and Japan emerged on the winning side in four wars: China in 1894-1895 and in 1900; Russia in 1904-5; and in the First World War.” (Nish, 2000: 84) This outward spirit of expansion was mainly against neighbours who were previously considered cultural relatives, such as China, Korea and Taiwan, reifying the new cultural superiority of Japan.

The first of such conflicts, the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) is especially important, resulting as it did in the formal acquisition of Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula. (Blanken, 2012: 104) The war was waged over growing friction about whether Korea should remain within the Chinese sphere of influence or whether it should become de jure independent. Yet the war was justified in Japan as a conflict over civilisation. By 1894 on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese Christian, UCHIMURA Kanzo, “issued a call to the nations of the world “to see and understand the cause we fight for.” (Keene, 1998: 251) Uchimura stated that “Japan is the champion of Progress in the East, and who except her deadly foe, - China the corrigible hater of Progress, - wishes not victory to Japan!”. (Keene, 1998: 251) The war was brutal and brief: “The Chinese armies were smashed in Korea, the Liaodong peninsular, and Manchuria. By March 1895, Peking lay at [Japan’s] feet, the roads open from the east and south, no prospect of a successful defence in sight. (Bickers, 2011: 324) This ‘Progress’ appeared to be real and Uchimura’s point was echoed by contemporaries in Europe who equated military prowess with ‘progression’: the Japanologist Robert Porter stated that “Her victory over China forcibly demonstrated that she was a progressive State, entitled fully to regulate her own fiscal affairs.” (Porter, 1918: 120-121)

For China, as with the initial strong arm tactics over Taiwan and the Ryūkyūs, the defeat by Japan was a humiliation too far. Bickers states why this war was a specific source of shame:

“The European powers had had the advantages of technology in 1842, in 1858 and 1860. The French had too, in 1884-5, though it was a harder fought war. Those defeats made a sad sort of sense. But Japan was an Asian neighbour, a former tributary state, itself still formally subject to the same style of sovereign-serving treaty system as China’s. It had only
recently been as unprepared to deal with foreign aggression as the Qing… But now, the ‘dwarf pirates’… had smashed China’s forces, and shattered its pride.” (Bickers, 2011: 324)

Scholars focus on the Sino-Japanese war above other foreign policy developments in the Meiji era (such as reversing the unequal treaties) yet how aggressive and unusual the Japanese were in their relations with China remains an arguable point. Some scholars see Japan as having calculated designs on Chinese territory (for example Calman, 1992), others see a Japan as a natural responder to opportunities (for example Gillard, 1977: 161) just as Britain and France had been in East Asia since the 1830s. For Gillard, Japan would become modernised without colonialism, relying on the linear notion of progress on Western grounds. Under this viewpoint, Japan is seen as passive, not ruthlessly maneuvering to control Korea. On the other hand, Calman points out that Korea had been a target for decades: even the Satsuma Rebellion was caused by a split in the Meiji governance about whether to attack Korea immediately or to strengthen first before attacking.

Whilst it will never be completely clear to what degree Japanese diplomats had intended to start the first Sino-Japanese War, it is clear that Japan had a consistent policy in expanding South into Chinese tributary states and was keen for Korea to be within the Japanese sphere of influence. It is however also clear that once the war had ended, rather than using war to punish China and seek new bargains (as the British had done in 1856-60, and France had done in 1884-85), Japan instead attempted to “take maximum advantage of the victory by expanding the war goals to include the annexation of Chinese territories.” (Blanken, 2012: 105) This accomplished, by the end of the war it was clear that Japan, not China, was the pre-eminent power in Tōyō.

Consequences of Japanese imperialism (1868-1905)
The colonisation of Hokkaidō and altering the relationship with China had a number of consequences which provide insights into answering my research questions.84 First, looking at the phenomenon of imperialism in early- to mid-Meiji Japan further demonstrates the point that the concepts that underpinned contemporaneous foreign policy in Seiyō had been quickly assimilated into Japan’s foreign policies. As early as 1868, Meiji leaders such as Iwakura had called for the colonisation of Hokkaidō to strengthen the imperial might of Japan and to bring civilisation to the natives of the islands. Whilst Japanese had previously pursued an idea of civilisation based on Confucian ideals it had never before been so central to foreign relations This period contained an about turn in Japan’s approach to foreign relations, all underpinned by a change in the notion of civilisation: what it meant to be civilised, the

84 ‘How did contact with the West in the mid-19th century create a new notion of the modern in Japan and colonial Taiwan?’
means to become civilised, and where civilisation lay. At that time of ‘civilising’, leading Western countries, known in Japan as Seiyō, were Imperialist.

Japan did not have a history of colonialism apart from the short and disastrous Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–98). Like China, Japanese authorities had preferred to use foreign relations to garner respect and tribute from neighbours, but not to expand. In contrast to the sakoku policy, Seiyō nations promoted expansion abroad, setting up official offices in their colonies, desiring domination as well as respect. The most notable early example of this attitude being embedded into Japan's foreign policy was the Ryūkyū islands. Prior to the Meiji Restoration, in 1609, Satsuma han had invaded the Ryūkyūs and made them vassals of the han; the islands also gave tribute to Qing China. After the Meiji Restoration the Japan state mimicked Seiyō nations by directly controlling the kingdom first through the central Foreign Office and later by the Home Office. By 1879 the islands were formally annexed by Japan to become a part of the ‘nation’ in much the same way as Hawai‘i was to the U.S.A.. Engaging in these concepts served to strengthen the central authority, as there had been a shift in how a state gained legitimacy after opening to Seiyō in 1853: tribute was not the currency for recognition any longer, instead imperialism was. Just as tribute had once strengthened the central authority of the Shogunate, so imperial expansion strengthened the legitimacy of the Meiji state. Thus imperialism was another example of a method to bolster the nation and to define it using imperial actions.

The key to this transition from desiring to be considered civilised by Seiyō to becoming the self-appointed centre of Tōyō was Japan’s colonial experiences in the East. These experiences created a positive self-identity, as a member of the elite nations of the world, capable of defeating China and Russia, one of the ‘Great Powers’, in war. From this position, Japanese intellectuals and public figures such as Itō, Okakura and Soseki began to reassess the roots of their cultural identity and to feel kindred to ‘civilisations’ currently dominated by Seiyō powers. Whilst decades earlier Japan attempted to escape Asia, politically, culturally and architecturally; the threat of colonisation made any previous benign relationship with its neighbours politically dangerous. By the early 20th century Japan was politically, economically and militarily strong enough to be less concerned with existential threats.

Redrawing boundaries

These developments were crucial in order to create foundations of equality with Seiyō. However it required martial demonstration to change what modernity actually meant to civil society in Seiyō countries, and for Japan to accrue benefits from its changed status. In terms of pivotal moments, “the Sino-Japanese War undoubtedly produced a change of opinion about Japan in the West. Few experts predicted that Japan would win the war against the mighty continental power, and when the initial
victories proved not to be flashes in the pan, it was grudgingly admitted that the much-decried ‘superficial modernization’ was in fact genuine.” (Keene, 1998: 278) This led to re-evaluations of Japan’s relation to both Seiyō and Tōyō: Japan was easier to understand to Westerners if conceptually separated from the rest of Asia. Porter, writing in 1918, emphasised the large distances between Japan and China, stating that Japan has been “a laboratory in which a unique type of human being and a unique type of culture have been produced.” (Porter, 1918: x) For those such as Porter, Japan became a moral peer: “We can measure our moral, aesthetic, and intellectual progress by the standard of Japan before she adopted Western manners and methods, and benefit greatly by observing the attitude in recent times of this highly intelligent and progressive nation towards Western civilization.” (Porter, 1918: x-xi) In short, Japan’s victory over China gave clear evidence, for the first time following the establishment of Euro-centric notions of civilisation, that the Japanese could reasonably be considered equals, as early as 1895.

Following the criteria of Seiyō in demonstrating their level of civilisation through legal reform and conducting aggressive international relations, Japan became seen as sufficiently ‘progressive’ to revise the unequal treaties. Extraterritoriality was abolished in Japan, starting in 1894 with Britain (one month before the first Sino-Japanese war began) and ending in 1897 with Portugal as shown in Table 4.1. According to Turkish scholar Turan Kayaoglu, there were three reasons why Japanese extraterritoriality was striking as compared with Chinese and Ottoman extraterritoriality. (Kayaoglu, 2010: 66-68) First, it was short-lived: in Japan it lasted 41 years (with the average treaty length around 33 years), compared to China’s 100 years and the Ottoman Empire’s 106 years. This supports the argument that Japan best understood how to react to Seiyō imperialism in a manner that would prevent the long-term political influence of the Great Powers in Japan’s internal affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home state</th>
<th>Treaties starting Extraterritoriality</th>
<th>Courts (Mid-1880s)</th>
<th>Treaties Ending Extraterritoriality on July 17, 1899</th>
<th>Years extant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>25/8/1858</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15/7/1894</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>31/3/1854</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22/11/1894</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7/2/1855</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28/7/1895</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24/1/1861</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4/4/1896</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9/10/1858</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4/8/1896</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12/1/1867</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19/10/1895</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>25/8/1855</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1/12/1894</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30/1/1856</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8/9/1896</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>18/10/1869</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5/12/1896</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6/2/1864</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10/11/1896</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3/8/1860</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26/1/1897</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden-Norway</td>
<td>11/11/1868</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1/5/1896</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1/8/1868</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22/6/1896</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>19/8/1871</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4/4/1894</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12/11/1868</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2/1/1897</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32.7</strong> (average)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1. Extraterritoriality in Japan. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010.
Second, Japanese extraterritoriality was not associated with high numbers of Europeans and North Americans remaining in Japan. Comparatively few missionaries and merchants entered and resided there, with some treaty ports having fewer than one hundred foreign residents; even large thriving treaty ports such as Osaka, with a population close to 500,000 in 1895 only had a foreign (non-Chinese) population of 121. (Wason, 1900: 30) Foreign civil servants ran no services, were hired and later fired, as evidence that Japan’s modernisation was internally led.

Third, the abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality influenced other cases. This influence occurred in two ways: first Seiyō states used the Japanese reforms as an example that countries like China and the Ottoman Empire should emulate, whilst Chinese and Ottoman diplomats used the Japanese example to accuse Seiyō of hypocrisy. (Kayaoglu, 2010: 68) Both countries who were subjects to extraterritoriality and Seiyō saw in Japan the chance that things could be different, an example of throwing off the dominance of the Great Powers and an example of heathens emulating the civilisation found in Europe and North America.

Japan became an example used by European and American writers who were interested in arguing that culture rather than race was the main determinant for success in modernisation. Although the ‘development’ of Japan did not alter the fundamental discourse on the degree of civilisation across the world (Japan largely took on, accepted and attained the European idea of ‘civilisation’) the Japanese example did alter the idea of potential progress, so it became empirically possible for non-European races. At the same time this progress had an ambiguous impact on the role of imperialism in this process. Japan was never colonised by European powers, who often tried to bring civilisation to their colonies. Yet no colony of Europe became counted as civilised to the extent that Japan became recognised; in the early 20th century only Japan among the uncolonised became ‘civilised’.

Beyond avoiding Seiyō dominance, Japan aimed for Great Power status: as ITÔ Hirobumi, twice Prime Minister of Japan, noted in 1899, “the hope of competing with the Powers for leadership” lay behind the post-Restoration development of the country. (Duus, 1995: 15) A sign of the partial fulfillment of these intentions (and acceptance of Japan as a modern Power) was Britain ending 30 years of geo-political neutrality (known as ‘Splendid Isolation’) with the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. After Japan had been diplomatically coerced into surrendering their claim to the Liaodong Peninsula by Russia, Germany and France in the Triple Intervention (Jap. 三国干涉) it was clear that Japan was not taken seriously by all of the major Powers of Seiyō, particularly after Russia had swiftly acted to take the Peninsula themselves. However, following their 1905 victory over Russia, Japan was clearly a force to be reckoned with and a
source of fear for paternalistic men of influence such as Bishop William Awdry (1905), who detested the idea that heathens could become players on the global stage:

“The sudden revulsion of feeling has come when those who, not a generation ago, were thought of as pretty, interesting, artistic, little dolls or children, fantastic and whimsical, unsettled in purpose and loose in morals, dishonest in business, and cruel if you scratched through the skin, “great in little things and little in great things,” have come out on the broad stage of the world.” (Awdry, 1905, quoted in Mason, 2012: 14)

Whilst Japan had won victories over China and Russia in quick succession, the Japanese were still not treated as peers and, due to the paradigm of Orientalism, could not be: “Although written in 1905, such racist sentiment was not limited to that specific point in time but represents a culmination of many decades of prejudicial foreign views about Japan that assumed its political, military, cultural, and moral inferiority.” (Mason, 2012: 14) In spite of deep-seated prejudice, Japan was only truly deemed civilised by some after it became a genuine imperial power, defeating China and Russia and annexing Taiwan, Korea and south Sakhalin. Thus imperialism was an implicit requirement for a modern, civilised nation in the early 20th century. This was acknowledged at the time by OKAKURA Kakuzo who wryly commented that “as long as Japan indulged in the gentle arts of peace she had been regarded as barbarous, but victory in war had induced the foreigners to call Japan civilized.” (Keene, 1998: 278) This opinion was repeated by critics in Britain also, who held that it was shameful that the label of ‘civilised’ was only given to Japan following war rather than peaceful development; the founder of the College of Engineering in Tokyo, Henry Dyer, quoted a British military advisor to Meiji Japan, Francis Brinkley, who stated that:

“No one who should tell the Japanese to-day that the consideration they have won from the West is due solely to their progress in peaceful arts would find serious listeners. They themselves held that belief as a working incentive twenty years ago, but experience has dissipated it, and they now know that the world took no respectful notice of them until they showed themselves capable of winning battles. At first they imagined that they might efface the Oriental stigma by living up to civilised standards. But the success they attained was scarcely perceptible when suddenly their victorious war with China seemed to win them more esteem in half a year than their peaceful industry had won them in half a century. The perception of that fact upset their estimate of the qualifications necessary for a place in the ‘foremost files of time,’ and had much to do with the desire they henceforth developed for expanded armaments.” (Dyer, 1904: 126-127)
Ultimately, without victory over China (and in 1905 over Russia), Japan would not have been diplomatically accepted as a Great Power, and imperial expansion and war were therefore of central importance to be considered civilised at the turn of the twentieth century. This served the purposes of Seiyō at the same time as it tied dominance and colonisation to advancement, and thus justified the imperial possessions of Europe and the expansion of the U.S.A. With intellectuals such as J.S. Mill arguing that colonialism was justified if done to raise the development of the colonised as Great Britain was nominally doing in India, Japan’s colonisation of Hokkaidō, the Ryūkyūs, and Taiwan, placed Japan in a position to prove themselves an enlightened (kaika) and modern (kindai) power concerned with the universal trend for ‘progress’. Japanese politicians learnt that imperialism and military dominance were indicators for civilisation, whilst peace and closure denoted semi-civilised societies.

On the other hand, Japan’s military and diplomatic victories were a demonstration to themselves and other non-Seiyō leaders that other ‘races’ could become civilised, undermining chauvinistic theories such as Buckle’s that biology was more important than culture and society in producing ‘civilisation’. Residing in Asia, Japan managed to craft an image of a modern Power without sharing a European culture. That this was possible seems unsurprising today but it cast reverberations widely across the world at the time: the Indian Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1905 that “so far and wide have the roots of Japanese victory spread that we cannot now visualize all the fruit it will put forth” whilst the Chinese nationalist leader SUN Yat-sen (Chi. 孫逸仙, 1866-1925) was “similarly exultant. Returning by ship to China in late 1905, Sun was congratulated by Arab port workers at the Suez Canal who thought that he was Japanese.” (Mishra, 2012: 1)

As for the Japanese themselves, government officials attempted to retain an identity as different and unique yet equal to Seiyō in socio-political terms. This required great cultural sacrifices that other countries such as China, India and Egypt had not been willing to take. In rebuke to authors such as Donald Calman, who hold that the Meiji period was marked more by continuations than departures, this identity-building appears to have sat alongside the nation-building project which, as established in the Introduction, was an exclusively modern development. Nation-building required “an extraordinary overhaul of the country at every level… to transform from the semi feudal polity of the Tokugawa period to a nation-state that could contend with aggressive Western capital and colonial encroachment. This was at once a process of demolishing, abolishing, revamping, refurbishing, and constructing.” (Mason, 2012: 13) To do this required a transformation, a transformation which had become established in Japan following strenuous reform in the 1880s. The policies developed in the late 19th century were made uniquely in Japan in response to failures in other countries and would be re-interpreted and applied with renewed vigour in the first modern colony of a non-Seiyō power: Taiwan.
4.2 Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan

Hokkaidō’s assimilation into Japan was the only expansion the Meiji authorities took to their north. Instead, the South became increasingly important to Japan as both a target and a subject of discourse towards the end of the nineteenth century, particularly after the colonisation of Taiwan and the mandate given by the League of Nations over a group of South Pacific islands by the League of Nations. (Kleeman, 2003: 13) The very character of this expansion had altered with the acquisition of Taiwan: before 1895, colonial expansion consisted primarily of private citizens migrating to specific places in Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, and other parts of Southeast Asia (as well as South America) to pursue opportunities unavailable in Japan due to the poor economic situation. (Kleeman, 2003: 15) The incorporation of Taiwan was path-breaking in moving Japan from being a nascent imperial power to a fully-fledged one. Taiwan heralded Japan’s first formal colony, governed separately by a Governor-General along Seiyō lines, rather than having a local representative of the island involved in mainland Japan’s government.

Whilst Taiwan was a Qing province at the time of the Japanese takeover, it had only been a formal part of the Chinese empire for just over two centuries, from 1681 to 1895. Under the pressure of Seiyō and Japanese imperialism in the mid-19th century, Taiwan became more vulnerable and grew in strategic importance. (Winkler and Wu, 2005: 43) From the start of the Qing period the Qing governance was uncomfortable with the colonialism of Taiwan however, and careful to enforce rules and limits on ship sizes for fear that trade and full colonisation would “lead to the dissemination of secret information about China’s defences to foreign powers, cause a drain of precious silver from the country, and encourage piracy and other forms of crimes.” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 57) So although the possibilities of making large profits in China through Taiwan from foreign trade were huge, the Qing state was suspicious of any foreign trade.

The official Qing presence in Taiwan was light until near the end of their sovereignty: “Beyond setting up four maritime customs offices… and trying to enforce an across-the-board tariff of 20 percent on foreign imports, the Qing state failed to develop the necessary mechanisms, preferring instead to work through systems of kickbacks or purchased monopolies. With the arrival of more powerful Western traders in the eighteenth century, this decision was to be a fateful one.” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 57-8) Qing policy had left Taiwan politically isolated until the decades leading up to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. By 1895, the Chinese state had weakened to the extent that the resurgent Japanese were able to defeat China and, finding that the Chinese were willing to cede territory to Japan, the Japanese negotiators secured Taiwan as a colony of Imperial Japan in 1895.
Japan in Taiwan

Japanese policies in Taiwan were by no means uniform during the 50 years of occupation. The first period of colonial rule was from 1898 to 1918 (and most relevant to this thesis). It has been called the Gradualism Policy, and was best articulated by the most effective Civil Administrator of Colonial Taiwan, GOTÔ Shinpei in post from 1898-1906. This gradualism was based on empirical study and assessment: Gotô stated that “In governing Taiwan, first of all we must investigate scientifically the local customs and institutions, and not adopt any policy that provokes the locals.” (Gotô, quoted in Yao, J., 2006: 46) As part of this, an enormous land survey was produced over a seven year period which involved more than one and a half million personnel, and gave the Japanese a comprehensive review of both the land and people so that “nothing would escape the colonial government”. (Yao, J., 2006: 48) This concern with control was reflected in the elevated role of the police from this point of Japanese rule onwards: from the beginning the status and numbers of police were very high, and in emergencies the police chief was empowered to direct the prefectural heads in his area. (Ts’ai, H., 2006: 100)

After 1919, in the middle of the reign of emperor Taishô (Jap. 大正天皇, 1879-1926) which was known for its stability and democracy in mainland Japan, the Japanese administrators reduced segregation between Japanese and Taiwanese in education, Taiwanese were encouraged to participate in local politics, and marriages between Japanese and Taiwanese were made legal. In 1935 Taiwanese were allowed to vote for the first time (though not many: only 0.7 percent of the population voted and only half the parliament was elected). However, for Catherine Shu-Fen (Yu) Fewings, the differential treatment of Taiwanese continued and genuine assimilation remained shallow. (Fewings, 2004: 20-21)

Prior to World War II the approach of the colonial administration changed again towards full assimilation: the teaching of classical Chinese in common schools was repressed, as were Chinese newspapers and Taiwanese style clothes, while Japan aimed to build a Shintô shrine in every village. The Taiwanese were even encouraged to change their names to Japanese names. (Takeshi, 2001: 211) During the assimilation phase, the De-Sinicization campaigns were accelerated to de-emphasise the cultural and historical roots of Taiwan in China. The purpose of this policy was instrumental for Japan’s new notion of a Japanese modernity: Japan’s administrators wished “to turn Taiwan into a strategic bastion against southern China and Southeast Asia…. Nevertheless, so long as modernity was both subsumed in total war and entangled with culture and race, it was reduced into a tool. As a tool, modernity could beget more desires for cultural and racial constructs targeted at full recognition of eventual autonomy.” (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 209) In this sense, the socio-political conditions in Japan and their shifting attitudes towards modernity were strongly reflected in colonial policies in Taiwan: from the chaotic enthusiasm and ambition of the Meiji period, to the democratic and more peaceable tendencies
of the Taishō period, until the final explosion of ultra-nationalism and militarism of Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s.

This section will concentrate on the first twenty-four years of colonial rule (from 1895 to 1919), the period when Taiwan’s colonial masters found creative and ambitious solutions to the initial paradox of how a non-Seiyō country could administer a Seiyō-style colony, beginning the process of internal Othering. This was the period when the Japanese administrators explored and sought to understand their role as imperialists, resolving some of the central tensions as they ‘became modern’. Whilst the period up to 1895 was a period of unbalance, with Japan as a clearly unequal partner in global affairs, through Japan’s acquisition of colonies they became more associated with the ‘civilised’ world of Great Powers. Yet the issues of cultural hybridity and Oriental Orientalism became starker during this period of gradualism than they were in the later integration and assimilation policies, for foreign practices were more prominent than under the later nationalism which swept up Japan and much of the rest of the world up to World War II. In addition, the major authority buildings were built during this first 24 years, including the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the main case study of this thesis, which was completed in 1919. In that year Japan’s first urban planning system became legalised and the focus thereafter moved from government buildings to the regulation of the private sector. (Sorensen, 2002: 83) Therefore colonial Taiwan up to 1919 is the most fruitful era to explore Japan’s nascent imperialism through political and cultural policies, authority buildings, and the notions of modernity so entailed.

**Early years of Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan**

The colonisation of Taiwan in 1895 was symbolically important for Japan because less than thirty years earlier Japan had seen itself in danger of being colonised. This turnaround was remarkable and almost uncomfortable for some Japanese. The discomfort was shown by colonial officials asking advice from foreign consuls soon after Taiwan’s incorporation into the Japanese empire. (Townsend, 2000: 102) Japan’s style of government in Taiwan was first debated in 1895 when it was decided to follow a French advisor’s suggestion of integrating Taiwan into the Japanese empire by following Japan’s laws and eventually eliminating dissimilarities between the countries. However, the British suggestion of emphasising prestige was also followed, though to a lesser degree, by the colonial administrators, particularly in the early stages of the colonial project when the government officials wore splendid Seiyō uniforms (see fig. 4.1) and commissioned “imposing classical architecture for its official buildings.” (Townsend, 2000: 102) This followed the trend of having civic buildings designed in grand Seiyō styles as influenced by Josiah Conder. (Reynolds, 2002: 531)
Between 1895 and 1898, when Japan crushed the short-lived Republic of Formosa and other rebellions, aimless drifting and chaos characterised the administration of Taiwan. The Governor-Generals were rotated quickly which bred instability. One early conception of the administration of Taiwan by the relatively successful second Governor-General, KATSURA Tarō (Jap. 桂太郎, 1848-1913) linked the acquisition of Taiwan to southern expansion when he declared:

“If we want to frame a policy for managing Taiwan, we must formulate a policy toward China. This requires devising policy for managing south China, and to accomplish that, we must manage the harbor of Amoy and Fukien. If we intend to do these things, we must ultimately consider a policy that relates to South-East Asia.” (Katsura, 1896, quoted in Chang and Myers, 1963: 434)

Though his plan was never realised, “Katsura proposed, as a beginning, that the police force in Taiwan be increased, public health be improved, transport and communications between Taiwan and Japan be expanded, a trans-island railroad be built, and new harbors constructed. Internal and external (Taiwan-Japan) transport improvements were given top priority as all-important for the future penetration of south China.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 434) According to a government sponsored book during the second Sino-Japanese war, in the second Governor General’s time in office Katsura’s achievements included “the establishment of the regulations for the handling of opium, opening of subsidized routes, establishment of the judicial system, government hospitals, the law and regulations concerning weights and measures.” (Naito, 1938: 44)

In spite of the speed of setting up this framework, Katsura was recalled to Japan to become War Minister four months after his appointment, which showed a lack of coherent policy-making by central authorities.
in Japan. But Katsura’s initial blueprint remained influential, coming as it did from the culture of Meiji Japan. Of particular importance in Meiji Japan from the overthrow of the Shogunate was an emphasis on control, probably as a corollary to the liberalisation of the class system. Colonial control in Taiwan should be seen in this context, as Ts’ai explains:

"Pre [Second World] war Japan's colonial rule relied on three major categories of supporting staff: technical support, administrative assistance, and the police force. The police system in prewar Japan was backed by a powerful state. The system was a unified national organization, with its chiefs directly appointed by the government. At the summit of the centralized hierarchy was the Home Minister, who personified police power. Virtually no other nation-state in the world - the West included - had developed such a strong arm in the person of the state as prewar Japan. The Japanese police system was first modeled after the system in England, but later after the French and German systems. Whereas England adopted self-rule as its principle, both France and Germany selectively applied only part of that principle. Thus Japan was... unique in constructing a thoroughly centralized police system." (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 72)

Government control, particularly through the police beginning at local neighbourhood level, would remain the unchallenged cornerstone of Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan.

**Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan under Gotô and Kodama**

The three years of colonial rule up until 1898 were ultimately to be of little consequence; it was not until the arrival of KODAMA Gentarô (Jap. 児玉源太郎, 1852-1906), fourth Governor-General between 1898-1906, and his Civil Administrator GOTÔ Shinpei in Taiwan on March 28, 1898 that a recognisable set of colonial policies were put in place. Both men were known for their use of *kindai* (modern) methods. During the Satsuma Rebellion, Kodama had served with distinction on the general staff, and in the 1880's he had achieved recognition for his attempts to introduce German military organisation to the Japanese ground force, before touring Europe in 1891 to observe German military training. His death in 1906 was deemed a national tragedy in Japan. Kodama’s counterpart, Gotô, studied ‘Western learning’ in Japan and then medicine in Germany in his twenties before working with the army, heading various field institutes. Both Kodama and Gotô had gained their experience in the early Meiji period, a time characterised by change and uncertainty. Both men “displayed outstanding qualities of leadership which impressed their superiors and brought quick promotion to more demanding and responsible positions. They attempted to introduce new Western ideas in their respective fields.” (Chang and Myers, 1963:435)
Their period of governing Taiwan from 1898 to 1906 was the formative one for Taiwan when Japanese rule was gradually implemented and the general approach and method used to govern the natives was established.

These achievements were possible due to the large measure of independence enjoyed by colonial governors. This autonomy was instituted first in Taiwan and then replicated in Korea and Manchukuo. According to Beasley, the governors in all three colonies were selected by the highest authorities in Japan:

Governor-Generals were “chosen after consultation between the premier, the elder statesmen, and senior army leaders. Partly this reflected the very high prestige attaching to these posts, which were often held by men of great political influence. Kodama Gentaro, for example, who was Governor-General of Taiwan from 1896 to 1906, served simultaneously as War Minister, later as Home Minister, during his term of office, then became Chief of Staff…. Such subordinates would have been difficult for any minister to control.” (Beasley, 1987: 144-145)

Kodama was a bold governor, administrator and general. As Governor-General he was holder of a highly prestigious office and famous in Japan following his experience of being Vice-minister of War during the Sino-Japanese war. Yet it was Gotō who was to have a larger impact on Japan and to become one of the foremost figures of Meiji Japan and beyond (largely due to Kodama dying unexpectedly in 1906 whilst still Governor-General). After leaving his post as Civil Administrator in 1906, Gotō was the first director of the South Manchuria Railway, after the 1923 earthquake he became mayor of Tokyo unseeing the city’s revival. He also served as Home Minister twice and as Foreign Minister for Japan. Gotō’s efficient and scientific mind was key to his promotions. During his time as head of civilian affairs in Taiwan, three principles of action seemed to shape Gotō’s policies: efficient organisation, persuasion, and biological politics. These will be explored in turn as these principles, once established, guided the subsequent governors of Taiwan for the following decade, on topics from the economy to architecture.

**Efficient organisation**

Gotō believed in centralised bureaucratic organisation, with policy shaped by a top coordinating unit. As in Japan after the Meiji Restoration, reorganising the governing apparatus was one of his first and most important tasks. Arriving after the chaotic early years of Japanese rule, “Gotō was outspoken in attributing the dismal showing in Taiwan to prior administrative errors which… seemed like ad hoc decision-making rather than carefully planned policy.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 437) Gotō’s tenure saw
the colonial administration systematically take control of what he saw to be the proper roles of imperial governance: all aspects of taxation, communications, public health, education, economic development, legislation, and law enforcement.

This wide scope was matched with depth of control, which was only possible through the utilisation of past governmental practices from the Qing era: “At the local level use was made of institutions of control inherited from the pre-colonial period: landlords, village headmen, household groups…. It was highly trained and tightly organized.” (Beasley, 1987: 145) Ts’ai found that the baojia system (Chi. 保甲制度, lit. protective armour system, but essentially regular military service) was key to first ensuring safety through conscription and in maintaining political and social control: “The Japanese government attempted to regulate Taiwanese social and religious practices through the hook/baojia system. The baojia system had been employed as a tool for political control and social organization over the past one thousand years in China. In Taiwan the system was revived by the Japanese in 1898, and remained fundamental to Japanese control and consolidation over rural Taiwan.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 83ff)

Parallel to this, one of the first actions of the Japanese colonialists was to organise a domestic law and order system, and to separate law courts from the main governance buildings. Gotō also created “a much more economic infrastructure by building roads, railways, communications systems, factories, and harbours to facilitate export to Japan.” (Ho and Park, 2004: 4) These widespread actions taken to reorganise the social, political, legal and economic infrastructure of Taiwan implied a great deal of freedom for the administrators. This was not granted automatically on receiving the colony in 1895, but was worked through with some difficulty:

“The law which spelt out the nature of Japanese administration of Taiwan in 1896 evaded some... issues by asserting the principle of Japanese political unity, while denying that the Japanese constitution applied within the colony. The Diet's legislative powers were delegated to the Governor-General in order to make this feasible. In due course similar provisions were made concerning Karafuto (1907) and Korea (1911). The effect was to give their governors immense authority, combining legislative and executive powers. They were also unusually free from ministerial supervision, exercised from the capital. A Colonial Ministry was formed in 1896 to administer Taiwan and Hokkaidō, but was abolished after little more than a year. From 1897 to 1910 there was no central office responsible for overseas territories: Taiwan and Karafuto came under the Home Ministry, Kwantung in most respects under the Foreign Ministry.” (Beasley, 1987: 144)
Whilst in 1897 this freedom was not taken advantage of, Gotō during his tenure created a sustained system which organised colonial administration from top to bottom.

**Persuasion**

The second principle that Gotō practised was persuasion. Whilst efficiency and organisation were important, for Gotō this organisation would be for naught if “the people were not convinced of the soundness of Japanese rule and the need for compliance. Gotō urged Kodama to take action which would distinguish the present colonial authority from the past authority in Taiwan.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 438) As mentioned earlier, the British colonial style of impressing the natives was adopted in colonial Taiwan, mostly on Gotō’s initiative, especially in city planning. As a British visitor to Taipei remarked “Many of the modern aspects of the metropolis are due to the genius of the first (1897 [sic.] to 1906) civil government, Baron Shinpei Gotō” (Terry, 1914: 777) Gotō’s recommended building impressive public architecture offset by large streets and park because:

“This would be a symbol of power and leadership, impressing on the minds of all that Japan intended to remain in Taiwan and rule. He also suggested that all civilian officials wear uniforms and live in a designated compound under proper health supervision. The separation of officials from the populace would enhance the former's status and authority.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 438)

Clearly one of the main methods of persuasion was through architecture; this persuasive facet of colonial policy, itself a beneficiary of Gotō’s reorganisation of administration, is explored further in Sections 4.3, 4.4 and in Chapter 5.

Another part of this persuasion was to encourage wealthy Taiwanese to study in Japan. This was a subtle attempt by the Japanese to encourage the Taiwanese gentry to identify with Japan whilst allowing them to see the superiority of the mainland first hand. The intention was clear and was linked to assimilating natives into the modernisation project: “The experience in Japan was never what it was expected to be for Taiwanese elites, but in some ways it was much more. The original expectation was that through living in Japan, they would somehow acquire the knowledge that would make their culture modern. Having this knowledge they would be able to return to Taiwan and begin their own process of modernization.” (Heylen, 2010: 160)

There were important unintended consequences to this prolonged direct contact for the Taiwanese however, as familiarity with Japan would also show many colonial subjects that Japanese culture was
little different from Chinese, and the Japanese did not appear to be inherently superior. For some Taiwanese who studied in Japan, the sense of heightened respect for Japan was gradually “replaced with a belief that Taiwanese culture was in no sense inferior to Japanese culture, and likewise, the idea that Taiwanese were colonial subjects because their culture was inferior became ridiculous. They came to see that Taiwanese were colonial subjects because Japan had colonized Taiwan and only for that reason. While many Japanese were warm and open people, Japan as a society remained closed and unwilling to accept them.” (Heylen, 2010: 160-161) Many of Japan's attempts to impress natives appear to hide the insecurity that the Japanese would be seen as imitators who were basically the same as Chinese people. In particular, this sense of underlying sameness justifies why building monuments was so important to Japan: they were a mask that gave evidence of Japan’s cultural superiority, proving that they possessed kindai (modern) and civilisation (bunmei) whilst the Taiwanese did not.

Biological politics
The final principle, which was the overarching principle for the Gotō rule, was ‘biological politics’ (Jap. 生物学の原則, lit. principles of biology). This was a new configuration for understanding civilisation, progress and modernity, as seen through the eyes of a trained and practicing doctor. In his clearest extrapolation of this concept, Gotō sent the following passage in a memorandum to Kodama:

“Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be based on principles of Biology. What are these principles? They are to promote science and develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and police force. If these are satisfactorily accomplished, we will be able to persevere in the struggle for survival and win the struggle of the "survival of the fittest." Animals survive by overcoming heat and cold, and by enduring thirst and hunger. This is possible for them because they adapt to their environment. Thus depending upon time and place, we too should adopt suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties that confront us. In our administration of Taiwan we will then be assured of a future of brilliance and glory.” (Gotō quoted in Chang and Myers, 1963: 438)

The language used by Gotō is almost transplanted from that of Herbert Spencer, with influence too from Darwin on evolution. Gotō saw colonial policy as serving a broader purpose, performing the function of forced evolution on the part of the colonised, in order to move them from their lower state of being towards a higher state. Gotō, like many of his contemporaries, had a linear view of history and a programmatic notion of modernity: that modernity was a project of steady improvement. This
improvement should be seen in the widest sense to mean both material improvement and cultural development. For Gotō cultural followed material progress: Gotō “came to consider progress the result of laying the necessary material foundations which would make it possible for a higher civilization to emerge. Cultural development was an integral part of this early development in his view, and establishing institutions such as technical and medical schools and public health agencies fostered human progress.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 436) This powerful idea of civilisation, only translated into Japanese for 40 years (Hori, 1862: 129) became the main rationale given by colonial officials who saw themselves as bringing civilisation to the moribund Chinese: “In Taiwan, Gotō emphasised building these institutions, and later, as first president of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, he advocated that the new company must acquire a broad vision of purpose and invest to establish appropriate “cultural foundations” in south Manchuria. The conception of Japan as a civilizing force in East Asia was an important objective of Gotō’s policies as a colonial official.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 436-437)

This biological understanding underlay Japan’s assimilation policy: the colonies of Japan would become a part of the main body only after first adapting (that is, being made to adapt) to the main body of Japan. This was one of the widely held assumptions that underpinned Japan’s rule in East Asia. Another related supposition

“was the desirability of their being ultimately integrated with Japan, both culturally and politically. Another was that Japan had a civilizing – or perhaps one should say, modernizing – mission, which applied as much to promoting education and public health and economic development as it did to political behaviour. With the passing of time there was a tendency to put such ideas into a traditionalist framework of Japanese political thought, that is, to relate colonies to the ‘national polity’ (kokutai), implying a special relationship with a divinely descended emperor.” (Beasley, 1987: 143-144)

To become genuinely Japanese, to adapt and survive, Taiwan would have to progress on both material and cultural fronts. These separate but not unrelated dimensions will be explored in the remainder of this section.

**Material progression**

In terms of material progression, the primary focus was always economic and viewed in terms of the Japanese empire as a whole rather than Taiwan alone. Although in 1895 Taiwan was an economically poor Chinese island on the periphery of the Chinese empire, it had irretrievably changed into a prosperous part of the Japanese Empire by 1945:
“Taiwan was supplying Japan with great amounts of industrial products, from wood pulp and chemicals to copper and food stuffs. Its already impressive network of airfields was being expanded, as were the docking facilities at Keelung and Kaohsiung, and the entire railroad network... The economy of Taiwan was prospering in the dependency alliance with Japan.” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 429)

This growth accelerated following Gotō’s arrival until the end of World War I when “Taiwan sustained economic growth, due mainly to strong demand from abroad. The Government-General of Taiwan initiated new irrigation projects, improved and expanded roads and harbors, added new banks, and built technical and commercial schools.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 84) This demand-driven economic growth continued into the 1920s, and by the end of the Japanese occupation, Taiwan was the only colony of Japan which was both self-sufficient and paying for its own modernisation efforts.

Given my aim to examine both the impact and the process of kindai (modern) upon Japan, the question of how and why Japan laid the foundations for these material improvements is my concern here. For Kodama, improving the economic usefulness of Taiwan as a colony was foremost in his mind. Colonising and thereafter ‘modernising’ Taiwan was a protective action for Japan, whose authorities were still mindful of the Seiyō threat and required economic resources at the turn of the 19th century in order to counter it. Kodama extrapolated his plan at length in 1900, which is worth quoting to understand the full rationale of the governors of Taiwan:

“In recent years, the European powers have expanded their influence in Asia. How should we meet this threat? The military strength of the West is derived from their science and knowledge. Asian countries cannot match them in this area.... For this reason the Western powers have been able to oppress the peoples of the Far East. In order for us to acquire the power to oppose them so that we can continue to dominate in the Far East and preserve the peace, there is no other recourse open to us but to acquire more knowledge and increase our wealth...

“When Western countries war with one another, they invariably utilize their power and resources. They do so in order to win special interests and political advantages. This is called economic warfare. When they wage war, only those countries which are materially strong and can sustain a heavy military burden for a long period of time will win. A country will surely suffer defeat if this is not so. We may speak of economic warfare today as being war waged from the standpoint of economic power...
“Today's most urgent task is to develop the resources of Taiwan. Taiwan cannot ignore the challenge of economic warfare, the trend so prevalent in the world today. As the island's production will soon double, this will enable us to keep pace with the progress of other countries in the world. Japan and her territories will then be on an equal footing with the European powers in the event of economic warfare.” (Kodama, 1900 quoted in Chang and Myers, 1963: 436)

A number of points can be made from this speech. First, that rather than feeling assimilated as a fellow Great Power and identifying with the West, Seiyō was still clearly seen as comprising a (potentially) hostile group of nations who are alert to weaknesses. Japan's policy of strengthening Taiwan and Japan economically was still seen as a protective action. Second, the basis of Seiyō's strength was seen to be founded on science and knowledge. This drive for knowledge framed much of the colonial policy of Taiwan, where evidence and surveys were the basis of deciding guiding principles. This was also a large influence on education policy in the colony which was as enthusiastically pursued in Taiwan as it had been in early Meiji Japan. Finally, Taiwan was clearly viewed unsentimentally as a resource to be expanded rather than as a nation of people related in culture and customs to the colonisers. They were viewed at a strategic distance. Improving the lives of the natives was seen as a byproduct of protective modernisation rather than as the primary aim.

Japanese colonial policies were therefore designed primarily to exploit the full economic potential of Taiwan to strengthen Japan in the event of ‘economic warfare’. Methods for the economic improvement of Taiwan were established early in Kodama’s rule as Governor-General: whilst peace was beginning to be established in Taiwan, the administration promoted a number of measures to protect and open new financial markets whilst expanding the tax base. There were three related initiatives to do this:

1. First, a land survey and land tax reform were instituted to guaranteed the protection of private property and provide incentives to increase production for the market;
2. Second, a unified system of weights and measures was introduced to integrate local markets internally as well as with Japan;
3. Third, a central bank was established to issue credit, systematise issue of notes, and promote new businesses, in Taiwan and beyond. (Chang and Myers, 1963: 440)

The enthusiasm for imperialism and its potential interests also played a role in the tone of such financial ventures. The goal of founding Taiwan Bank stated the purpose clearly in 1899: “to regulate the financial situation, explore Taiwan's resources, stimulate economic development and furthermore to expand business territory to South China and Southeast Asia.” (Yanaihara, 1988:61)
Closer ties between Taiwan and Japan were achieved through improving island transport and reducing shipping costs. Within Taiwan, “by 1904 one good road extended the length of the island and the total length of public roads, of which at least half were over six-feet wide, was 5,922 miles. The length of telegraph lines was increased from 871 to 2,700 miles, and the number of post offices increased nine fold.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 442) These improvements in transport and communication infrastructure were founded on the basis that they would facilitate the production and export of Taiwan’s farming industry, and also had an impact on urban life, as will be shown in Section 4.4. These steps had begun early in Kodama’s tenure: “In 1899 the agricultural department set up an experiment station and imported cane, Rose Bamboo and Lahaina, from the Hawaiian Islands for experimental planting. Yield from the imported cane was far greater than from the native variety. On the basis of research findings, the administration decided to encourage some company to build a modern sugar mill in southern Taiwan.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 443) This focus on agriculture over industry and manufacturing underlies the point that modernisation did not equal industrialisation Taiwan’s industrial capacity was mostly left untouched, exporting raw foodstuffs its main ‘industry’, yet it was still modernising.85 This could be seen in that Kodama’s administration built upon the Qing’s focus on camphor production in north-west Taiwan (an early plastic that was in demand throughout the world as a crucial element in making film). During the years 1891-1895 Taiwan exported thirty percent more camphor than all the rest of the world. (Friedman, 2010: 22)

Such evidence suggests that after the Japanese colonial period Taiwan was still not an industrial nation. With only nine percent of employees in industry and nearly two thirds in agriculture in 1953, (Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 633) Japan had only partly industrialised Taiwan prior to World War II with their economic focus mirroring that of other imperialist countries: the export of raw materials to the coloniser where these were then manufactured. The notion of the centre and periphery was easily seen in Taiwan’s early material development when Taiwan was used instrumentally to bolster Japan: “Kodama insisted that Taiwan’s agriculture, particularly the export of food and raw materials to Japan, be developed to augment Japan’s power for economic warfare... Subsequent colonial administrators only imitated Kodama’s economic program.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 449) Taking a pragmatic approach,
Taiwan's traditional economy was not destroyed completely, but restructured in such a way that land and labour became more productive and resources previously idle were now employed.

Cultural progress
In spite of the later economic success of Taiwan, for the first decade the colony was a great economic burden on Japan due to the necessary investment in infrastructure, and the colonial government faced severe criticism at home for what was deemed an unnecessary luxury. Yet, Taiwan's importance was also symbolic: "As the only non-Western imperialist power... the possession by Japan of its first overseas colony became an exercise beyond purely economic considerations." (Ching, L., 2001: 16-17) As well as economic progress Japan's role as coloniser also lay in culturally developing the island in order to support Japan's desired position as leader of Tōyō. The importance to Japan of successfully colonising Taiwan was not overstated by Gotō who said “our nation's history as a Colonial Power commences with the story of our administration in Formosa [Taiwan], and our failure or success there must exercise a marked influence on all our future undertakings.” (Takekoshi, 1907: V) As mentioned earlier, the financial institutions also had a cultural and symbolic purpose: the Bank of Taiwan stated upon its foundation that “This bank is different from other banks, it has special duty. It can not only think about profits and loss, but will also have to strive for national future and national glory, even though it has to sacrifice itself.” (Yanaihara, 1988:64) This path to national glory lay in reforming the civilisation that it found in Taiwan and, later, throughout Asia.

Clearly for Japan to be able to claim that they should develop Chinese customs in Taiwan there had been a revolution in Japan’s self-perception. After the colonisation the discourse of ‘civilising Japan’ was no longer appropriate, as Japan was a Great Power in their own right. In the parlance of the times, being a colonial master implied a duty to civilise the natives. Japan effected a separation from the natives of Taiwan through new political rhetoric, on the premise that the Japanese were superior to their Asian neighbours: “With the sinocentric worldview of the Middle Kingdom as their model, the Japanese developed their own cosmology that placed Japan at the center of the civilized universe and adopted Chinese terms like ‘fan’ or ‘yi’ that characterized ethnic others on the margins as barbaric.” (Kleeman, 2003: 12) This appropriation of terms and Othering of Asia can be seen as a part of the Escaping Asia movement, began by FUKUZAWA Yukichi whose discourses reflected “an attempt to resist the West by hybridizing Japanese identity, which resulted in the construction of the image of 'Asia' as being inferior to the 'hybrid' Japan.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 114) As was shown in the writings of ITŌ Chûta, a new idea of what it meant to be kindai (modern) for architects was derived from this hybridisation.
A partial explanation for this attitude can be seen in the way civilisation was defined in Japanese. At first civilisation was mostly seen as an objective to be reached, yet one which was vaguely defined. When this objective had been achieved, the Japanese changed their understanding of what it meant to be civilised, as was explored in Section 1.3: socio-political betterment; to teach; civilise away. This change in tone towards associating civilisation with the English notions of ‘progress’ and ‘the modern’ was effected by a new self-understanding by the Japanese to view themselves as belonging with the ‘civilised nations’ and as superior to their neighbours. Taking on board the common Occident/Orient split of the day, Japan engaged with Asia as a superior (yet kindred) power, which was a key aspect of Japan’s early modernity as it reified the ‘progress’ that Japan had made, demonstrating that Japan was indeed a part of the group of civilised nations. As part of this membership, Japan was to ‘civilise away’ the customs of the past in Taiwan, such as foot-binding, and encourage the natives to take on the customs of Japan and join the wider genus of Japan, albeit as lower branches on the family tree. The effect on Japan was to expand the definition of Japanese-ness, as explained by Ann Heylen:

“Using the grand discourse of a ‘civilizing mission,’ the Taiwanese colonial subjects were trapped into the locus of Japanese modernity. “Becoming Japanese” entailed a process that destined them to be linguistically subdued and culturally incorporated over a period of time…. [This] served the purpose of liberating the native population from their backwardness and prepare them to participate in the modern world that Japan promised.” (Heylen, 2010: 149)

Japan’s perceived path to glory lay in expansion southward, in liberating and taming the exotic and uncivilised. Whilst it was a difficult rhetorical jump to fully conceive of the Chinese on Taiwan as uncivilised, given the cultural foundations of Japan and the lingering respect of Confucianism and Chinese cultural products, it was a much easier notion to accept a civilising mission with regard to the Taiwanese aborigines. The process began after the murder of Okinawan fishermen in 1871 by Paiwan (Jap. 排灣族) aborigines of Taiwan: subsequently the ‘barbarians’ became a talking point in Japan. In the opening passages to the ‘Document of the Essentials of Managing the Barbarians’ (Jap. 処藩趣旨書) published by the bureau of Indigenous Peoples Management in 1875, the author wrote: “Alas, the Taiwanese barbarians are vicious, violent, and cruel. It is indeed appropriate that all the nations of the world have since antiquity considered them a country of cannibals. This is a pitfall of the world; we must get rid of them all”. (Kleeman, 2003: 19) Twenty years after this publication the notion of the barbarians was still a powerful one: “the first governor general, Kabayama, remarked not long after his arrival in Taiwan: “In order to colonize this island, we must first conquer the barbarians.” (Kleeman, 2003: 20)
This ‘conquest’ began through careful study of the natives when anthropology was used for colonial purposes as it had been by Europeans in Africa: “As early as 1895, the year the Japanese military took over the island, the ethnographer Ino Kanori ([INŌ, Kanori, Jap. 伊能嘉矩] 1867-1925) was hired by the colonial government to explore Taiwan.” (Kleeman, 2003: 20) Thereafter the Japanese colonists used a combination of military power and (re-)education to deal with the ‘barbarians’. The method of civilising depended on the category which the Japanese and Chinese fitted them into: “Following the Chinese lead, the tribal people, though culturally and linguistically diverse, were lumped into two groups: ‘untamed barbarians’ (literally raw, uncooked barbarians, seiban [Jap. 生蕃]) and ‘tamed barbarians’ (literally ripe, cooked barbarians, jukuban [Jap. 熟藩]) in accordance with the degree of their civilization.” (Kleeman, 2003: 21) The terminology was highly significant as it fulfilled an “important function in the Japanese colonial ideology of the day. Terms like ‘primitive,’ ‘trivial,’ ‘undeveloped,’ and ‘exotic’ all take imperial Japan as the norm and define the rest as inferior, different, deviant, subordinate, and subordinateable.” (Torgovnik, 1990: 21) Through this hierarchy of terminology, “all Japanese colonial subjects… were used by the empire to establish its own superiority as a ‘civilized’ culture shining above the darkness of primitive culture.” (Kleeman, 2003: 31)

Just as the USA had attempted to ‘civilise’ the Native Americans and claim their lands, a similar process went on in Taiwan from 1874 to 1945. Unlike the Qing, Japan's civilising activities drew inspiration from the nation-state (as befitting an imperial power which was founded on the principle of learning from abroad), not traditional philosophies such as Confucianism: “Whereas in the case of the U.S.A. these ‘civilized ways’ were defined in terms of Protestant ideology and an agricultural lifestyle, during the late Qing dynasty Confucianism and wet paddy rice farming served a similar purpose. The civilizing mission was no less central during Japanese rule, although loyalty to the Emperor replaced Confucianism.” (Friedman, 2010: 19) Japanese rule laid emphasis on control of the population through the use of symbols of nationalism, displaying the centrality of the nation-state to Japan.

Whilst GOTŌ Shinpei emphasised a gradual assimilation approach to controlling the aborigines, these policies did not last and “just five years after Gotō’s departure, his gradualist policies were overturned in favour of a more aggressive military intervention that would allow for state and private companies to profit from the exploitation of both the forests (for camphor) and possible mineral wealth in the Aborigine territory.” (Friedman, 2010: 25) By 1915, resistance in all but 122 aborigine villages had been crushed. (Friedman, 2010: 25) The long war had won the subjugation of the aboriginal people and, therefore gained easy access to economic resources and labour, but it had cost the Japanese colonial forces nearly 10,000 lives, while an untold number of aborigine lives were lost through warfare and starvation.
The approach that Japan took to the Chinese populace was far softer and utilised local *hoko* societies (part of the *baojia* system in Chinese) for conforming customs. The Japanese attempt to reform Chinese and aboriginal customs was intrinsically linked with the modernisation project of Meiji Japan, a point extrapolated by Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai: custom reforms “reflected a conscious political decision by the colonial government to promote its own interests in political control and cultural assimilation. On the whole, it also reflected the trend towards modernization that was underway in colonial Taiwan.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 92-93) These societies encouraged the prohibition of practices such as burning “spirit money” for the deceased, which were deemed superstitious by the colonial authorities. As part of this “Efforts were made to simplify ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals, and thus cut down on expenses incurred.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 91) The target was not simply efficiency and cleanliness of the Chinese in Taiwan but the erosion of Chinese cultural identity. Ts’ai gives the example of the use of the lunar calendar to illustrate this point: “The Japanese government soon realized that the continued use of the lunar calendar by the Taiwanese was symbolic of Chinese identity.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 91) However, whilst local societies agreed to do this, the changes were not as fundamental as in Japan, (Tsai, 2010: 91-92) where the lunar calendar was completely scrapped.

*Hoko* societies were used alongside education which was the crucial element in creating Japaneseness in Taiwan. Japanese elementary schooling in Taiwan was highly attended by Taiwanese school children, and was compulsory, just as the US had established it in the Philippines, and in contrast to the harder colonial regimes of the European powers. This basis meant that the path of secondary and higher education was much clearer in Taiwan, whilst Koreans struggled and continued with private Confucian education. Education in Taiwan was also in contrast to Korea, long a cultural rival to Japan where “nationalism proved a more powerful attraction than modernity in a society in which a Korean’s opportunities were limited, whatever his skills.” (Beasley, 1987: 149)

In Taiwan, the Chinese were placed on a similar level of civilisation to the Japanese when compared to the aborigines. One example of this is the use of the tale of WU Feng (Chi. 吳鳳, 1699-1769). WU Feng was purportedly an ethnic Han Chinese resident of Taiwan who had befriended the aborigines and attempted to persuade them to give up their practice of headhunting. The story, which first appeared in the seventeenth century in Taiwan, ends with WU Feng sacrificing himself, dying in order to prove his point about the evils of the practice. The Japanese government translated this tale into Japanese and taught it to Taiwanese school children and in Primary schools in Japan. According to Faye Yuan Kleeman, this story was useful to both the colonial administrators and in mainland Japan itself, though serving different purposes: “In the colony, it reaffirmed the prejudices of the Taiwanese of Chinese descent against the aborigines and left them grateful for the empire’s protection. In Japan, it justified the
colonial civilizing mission and portrayed the majority of the colonized populace as willing partners in this project.” (Kleeman, 2003: 27)

Whilst education was highly taken up in comparison to the Koreans, the education system as a whole was designed to keep the Formosans as a race of labourers. The contemporaneous attitude of the superiority of Japan over shina (China) underlay the reluctance to grant equal educational opportunities to natives. According to an independent and confidential report by the British Consul in Taiwan in 1933, the format of Japan’s education system in Taiwan meant it was “not surprising that the native sees little attraction in what his rulers offer him.” (Wyndham, 1933: pamphlet) Further, the report states that “it will be seen from the foregoing remarks that whilst Japan can justly claim to have instituted a real educational system for the island, and to have given Formosans benefits never previously enjoyed by them, critics may observe that obstacles to full facilities are deliberately maintained. Assimilation by education has, up to date, failed, and must necessarily fail so long as there is discrimination in higher education and in the filling of administrative posts.” (Wyndham, 1933: pamphlet) This discrimination could be seen in the low numbers of Formosan students in education beyond elementary level as shown in the table below (even if these numbers were far higher than would be seen in the British colonies, for the British were reporting on Japan in order to learn from a colonial peer).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Institution</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Formosans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary schools</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>34,850</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>281,662*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Elementary schools</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>3,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schools</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7,505</td>
<td>3,694</td>
<td>1,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational schools</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical colleges</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. Student numbers in Taiwan, 1933 * including ‘a few’ aborigines. Source from Wyndham, 1933.

The tension between instituting a comprehensive education system, keeping the natives appeased yet inferior, and Japanese-ising the Taiwanese was never resolved during the colonial period, particularly not in the first 24 years. Japanese travellers to Taiwan ISHIKAWA Tatsuzo and SATO Haruo both “perceived the basic flaw in colonial education. Bound by an ideology requiring them to ‘civilize’ the barbarians, the colonial power drilled the natives in all the imperial and militarist myths. But this intellectual framework, determined in the metropolis thousands of miles away, was meaningless and irrelevant to the lives of children living in small, destitute villages far from the realm of modern urban life.” (Kleeman, 2003: 38) Textbooks encouraged Taiwanese to be honest, obedient and harmonious whilst Japanese primary school text books encouraged an enterprising spirit; this was even the case when
using the same educational materials. Japan did not encourage upward mobility or political skills in their colonial subjects. (Ts'ai, H., 2009: 6)

Given the educational materials of the Meiji period, which increasingly emphasised racial differences and the superiority of Japan, attitudes towards the Chinese natives did tend towards racism at times: as a Japanese journalist touring Taiwan wrote: “We, Japanese, usually look down on the Chinese and despise them on account of their dirty habits, but in the Chinese houses which I saw in Formosa, I was surprised to find the floors raised more than four feet from the ground, fully two feet higher than in Japanese residences and official buildings. This is done for sanitary reasons.” (Takekoshi, 1907: 317) This Japanese colonial stereotype of the Chinese as dirty was common and was supported by the Japanese belief in their own cleanliness and the advances in science and medicine during the Meiji period.

Inevitably and necessarily there remained a significant gap between the Chinese and Japanese in Taiwan: Japanese colonials “intended to distance themselves from their colonial subjects, and this imposed distance was reciprocated by the hontōjin [Jap. 本都人, lit. Chinese natives] towards the Japanese.” (Shimazu, 2007: 28) This reciprocal distancing implies a lack of full control of the native Chinese, and that understanding of Japan's history of cultural equivalence with China played a part in how the colonial masters were perceived. Japanese travellers “were aware in varying degrees that Japanese colonization of Taiwan was not based on the notion of absolute superiority of the colonizer, but on a relative one based on the notion of modernization.” (Shimazu, 2007: 34) Yet absolute superiority was understood as existing between the Japanese and the aborigines: “it was only in their encounter with the banjin [Jap. 蛮人, lit. aborigines], who did not share the sinic culture, that they felt acutely a sense of racial difference and, consequently, of superiority.” (Shimazu, 2007: 34-35)

Notions of Japanese modernity as a fixed and inflexible programme do not seem to suit Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan; as on the main islands of Japan, policies continued to change depending on need, appearing to be more contingent on resources than on an overarching vision. Rather than envisaging the ruling of the society and then going on to frame policies accordingly, Japanese rule in Taiwan was more inductive: utilising and integrating "native" social forces to ensure cooperation. What was consistent was the notion that the role of Japan was to promote economic and cultural progress in Taiwan. This resulted in Taiwan being partially assimilated whilst becoming "an internal other" (Ts'ai, H., 2009: 209) that was productive of Japanese cultural identity as kindai (modern) and creator of a new and appealing type of civilisation in Tōyō.
In spite of this rhetorical purpose, the Japanese authorities were pragmatic in general and sought to assimilate the Taiwanese only to a degree suitable for their perceived level of development. Japanese language was a prerequisite for Japanese administration and one of the most obvious targets for Japan’s social reform. (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 143) The Japanese language was used as an effective measure to promote Japanese ideas and to breed a loyal Taiwanese population, whilst ensuring that their education would be limited in comparison with their Japanese superiors. After 1895, the Japanese had attempted to build a *kindai* (modern) system in Taiwan out of the traditional system, yet in terms of reforming traditional practices the colonial government “did not score well.”¹⁸⁶ (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 143) This was due to the inevitable split in any modern colony between the rulers and the ruled: genuine assimilation could only have occurred if traditions were forcibly destroyed or if equal citizenship rights were given to the ruled.

Maintaining a genuine barrier between the colonialists and the colonised continued to be a difficult, nebulous, yet vital task for the Japanese. Japan needed to practically demonstrate a pre-eminence over the subject population and did so by building grand civic buildings which required advanced *Seiyō* (and later Japanese) technologies. The capital city, Taihoku (Taipei), symbolised this attempt to distinguish the colonisers from their subjects more starkly than any other colonial activity. Through analysing the built traditions embodied in the city and its buildings, it is possible to observe the extent to which the Japanese were able to promote *kindai* (modern), and how this idea resulted in changes between the Qing period and the middle of the Japanese colonial period.

### 4.3 Government-planned ‘modern’ spaces atop a ‘primitive’ past in the capital Taipei

Since Taipei was initially designated a provincial capital following the Sino-French War in 1885, the city developed from a small town with a low technological focus, strong traditional principles and little evidence of *Seiyō* culture, becoming a city which pioneered modern technologies and efficient town planning following the Sino-Japanese War (1895). Yet Taipei first became capital for protective/defensive reasons, and these reasons did not disappear following Japanese aggression; the occupation of Taiwan was during the time of the formation of *kindai* (modern) in mainland Japan. By the time of Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II (1945), Taipei had little use of traditional principles, but Western-style (*Yōfū*) buildings were prevalent in all important official architecture. The process responsible for these changes has retrospectively been called ‘modernisation’ which first occurred in Taiwan in 1887 before Japan’s occupation, when Qing Taiwan was governed by LIU Ming-Chuan (Chi.

¹⁸⁶ Ts’ai notes accurately that “The Chinese calendar continues to be used in present-day Taiwan, as do “spirit money” and the still elaborated ceremonial preparations. However, the practice of foot binding disappeared, as did queues. Sanitation improvement in Taiwan was remarkable, the literacy rate rose, and the *hoko* system was in the process of becoming the base for social mobilization.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 93)
Taiwan’s provincial governor who supported the Self-Strengthening Movement (Chi. 自強運動, 1861-1895). This modernisation process continued under Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945).

As a case study on modernisation, Taipei is illuminating because, due to its serial governance by two of Asia’s and the world’s leading powers, the capital Taipei “is a city unique in East Asia, if not the world”. However protective modernisation itself was an issue common to many cities throughout the world, becoming a global issue particularly in the Middle and Far East. The reason so many modernisation projects began under this pressure was not due to the equal threat from outside but rather due to the imagination of how global politics felt in the late nineteenth century: “The global is not just a geographic construct that can be simply contrasted with the regional or local. The global is also a function of the human imagination...local histories images the world.” (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 2006: xi) From this point of view, to analyse global trends through Taipei is valid because “the global does not really begin in the east or the west but can indeed be started and ended anywhere.” (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 2006: xiv) The colonial projects of Seiyō had been unfolding and flooding Europe with great wealth since the 18th century and this had global implications in terms of the search for new markets, resulting in treaty ports in northern Taiwanese cities such as Keelung. Given this context, the modernisation of Taipei began as a consequence of European colonial projects and continued as a colonial project of Japan. These colonial projects had a fundamental and nebulous effect: imperial projects were underpinned by Enlightenment thinking which emerged as a challenge of the arbitrariness of colonial power but ultimately also supported this power. (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 2010: 555) This was shown in Section 2.1 by the way China was able to be defeated not due to advanced ships and weaponry but due to efficiency and reason in Seiyō military which allowed these technologies to emerge.

In the case of 19th century China, the story was different to those of Africa or India, for through ‘colonial arrogance’ China was forced to open her ports. (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 2010: 555) As established in Sections 2.1 and 4.1, Japan was well aware of what was happening to China, that there were more risks than benefits from this opening. The result of this pressure was that both China and

---

87 LIU Ming-Chuan was a Chinese official during the Qing dynasty. Liu became involved in the suppression of the Taiping rebellion at an early age, and worked closely with ZENG Guo-Fan (Chi. 曾國藩, 1811-1872) and LI Hong-Zhang (Chi. 李鴻章, 1823-1901) as he emerged as an important Huai Army (Chi. 淮軍) officer. In the aftermath of the Sino-French War (1884-5), he was appointed the first governor of the newly-established province of Taiwan.

88 The Self-Strengthening Movement was a period of institutional reforms initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following the series of military defeats and concessions to foreign powers. Huang explains the origin and meaning of this movement at length: "The term "Self-Strengthening Movement" comes from a sentence in the Book of Changes: "Heaven moves on strongly; the gentlemen therefore incessantly strengthen themselves."...As the promoters of this movement never felt completely assured that they were beyond criticism, they quoted the classics to stress that there was a change of time and circumstances that justified their following the foreign lead. Another argument that they made defensively was that they borrowed Western learning for its utility; for the fundamentals they never deviated from China's cultural tradition.” (Huang, 1988: 209-210)
Japan underwent an intense period of modernisation either reluctantly by incremental force as in China, or more enthusiastically following national humiliation. These changes were intended to circumvent actual colonisation by Seiyō imperialists, successfully in Japan’s case. By looking at both the Qing Taipei urban planning principles and government-built buildings (from the Self-Strengthening Movement as the model capital of a modern Chinese province), to Japan’s changes under the Gradualism period (when Taipei became a modern capital for Asia’s first imperial Power), it is possible to discuss the emergence of a spatial and temporal colonial ‘modernity’ in the urban environment of Taipei. Studying the transformation in social aesthetics and materials/technologies that Japan made through colonial policies allows a deeper understanding of the expansion of the kindai (modern) architecture movement and of how Japan itself adopted ‘colonial arrogance’ in practice.

The foundation of a colonial kindai (modern) state: the Chinese built capital
The development of Taipei provides insights into the differences within East Asian modernisation. Yet whilst Taipei shares some characteristics with other Chinese capitals, it is significant not only compared to China but also to other cities in Taiwan. In 1875 whilst Taiwan was still a part of Fujian province, the Qing government decided to create a northern prefecture after seeing that it was vulnerable to attacks from foreign powers, particularly after Japan had attacked in the same year as revenge against the killing of 54 Okinawa fishermen by Taiwanese natives, as discussed in Section 4.1. The priority of the Qing was to develop the north of Taiwan to gain more protection throughout the island. Further to this in 1885 Taiwan became a full province of China and the administrative capital of the island was moved north to Taipei, partly to encourage the development of the area following the Sino-French War. As an island on a busy shipping route and off the coast of China, Taiwan was subject to foreign avarice for much of the 19th century; the most serious incident occurred in 1884 when a French army attacked the north of the island and temporarily occupied the port of Keelung. LIU Ming-Chuan arrived in Taiwan in 1884 and repelled the attack. Before this point, the whole of the north had been sparsely populated compared with south Taiwan and with southern China in general. Taipei was to be the new capital, despite being a small market town situated between two much larger towns which can be seen in the map of fig. 4.2: Mengjia (Chi.艋舺), south west of Taipei, (inhabited by the Quanchou clan) and Dadaocheng.

The main purpose of this research is not to find out the original perpetrator of the threat but to see what really occurred during this process of modernisation and why. Rather than attempt the impossible task of allocating blame for a complex social process, I focus on the modern’s influence on the ‘semi-civilised’ culture in East Asia and particularly on Taiwan which was the only location where two interpretations of the modern movement of the two main countries in East Asia, China and Japan, occurred one after the other. Modernisation remains a fundamental issue in the 21st century in East Asia, unlike in Europe and America, particularly in the field of architecture since 19th century as discussed in the introduction: Theories of kindai (modern) upon architecture. There are many scholars (from Hamaguchi (1947) to today) still trying to find the way to accept this modern history as part of the past and to continue with this tainted yet valuable modern history in order to move on. Without coming to terms with this past it will not be possible to improve the future of architectural development in Taiwan, for it to be integrated and for it to be in harmony the East Asia with the rest of the world.

Taipei was a temporarily provincial capital until 1894, the city of Taichung in central Taiwan was to be the capital once the government yamen were built. However, given the lack of resources this did not happen and Taipei became the permanent capital in 1894.
Taipei’s initial state of underdevelopment allowed the political leaders a blank canvas on which to draw. At the time all dominant authorities in Chinese culture were contained exclusively within city walls; the wall was the integral part of what it meant to be a city because the character for both city and wall (Chi. 城, Chéng) was the same. A Chéng (Chi. 城, city) without a Chéng (Chi. 城, wall) is not a city; in Chinese dictionaries, ‘walled-city’ is a synonym of ‘city-wall’. The physical city wall was amongst the first government-built constructions when Taipei became a prefecture in 1875: it was constructed between 1879 and 1884. (Wei and Gao, 2005: 29) According to the different ranks of cities, the walled-cities can be divided into capitals, prefectures, counties and forts. In general, the higher the rank of the city, the greater the size of wall; different wall configurations and official buildings within these walls display the differences in status. In addition, the material used in a wall affected its status: city walls were to be built in brick, stone or soil; without these materials it would not be a genuine walled town.

Taipei’s wall was by far the largest construction in Taipei before 1895, possessing five gates and a circumference of five thousand meters. It took a rectangular pattern, with grid-like roads and regularly
spaced gates. The wall was built with local lime, brick and andesite stone from slightly north of Taipei, Jiandaoshi Mountain (Chi. 剪刀山). This shape and these high-status materials marked the transition from the rank of prefecture city (1875) to provincial capital (1885). During the design process, the orientation of Taipei’s walls changed, partly due to conflicting geographical signs, and partly because the prestige of the city was important. Normally Chinese city walls followed a north-south orientation because of respect for the Great Northern Emperor (Chi. 天皇大帝, Eng. Polaris) and the principles of feng-shui: climatic condition rules also stated that all buildings should be on a north-south axis and facing to the south, as with Japanese Hogaku. But in Taipei there was a stronger influence on the city than straight north-south orientation, namely the natural environment, arguably the most important factor in feng-shui, which was largely overlooked in the first design draft. Feng-shui mainly uses the Lo Shu Square (Chi. 河圖洛書, the magic square), established in the earliest Chinese literature. Following this rule, the capital Taipei consisted of the basic ancient elements: both rivers and mountains were present, forming good natural protection, and it stood near the highest mountain in Taipei (fig. 4.3).

4.3. Taipei city wall orientation, facing the largest mountain, 1895. Adapted from Chou, Y., 2003.

91 The first example was from the ancient Chinese capital city, Loyang, in the Han Dynasty of China.
In order to follow *feng-shui*, the builders considered that the mountains surrounding the Taipei basin were dominated by Shi-Si Mountain (Chi. 七星山, also the direction of the Big Dipper) and the best *feng-shui* should be surrounded with large mountains behind, extending right and left, and moving water in front. In order to do this, the leader of the design process changed the grid direction to have Shi-Si Mountain directly behind (fig. 4.4). This follows the theory in *feng-shui* that city walls or buildings need to rely on mountains which will stand at the back to retain its *qi* (Chi. 氣) the medium of energy regarded as connecting mankind, earth, and heaven. Although *feng-shui* was important spiritually, it also had a strong political role and could symbolise what was important in a construction. Although records of the reasons for the change in orientation have not been found, perhaps the change in city walls from relying upon the Great Northern Emperor to relying on the tallest mountain symbolised mistrust in central government of the Qing then based to the north in Beijing, and a move away from the importance of shared ancient traditions to a focus instead on the immediate environment.

![Diagram of Taipei city wall orientation](image)

There is normally one of the figurative guardians of the four winds from the Chinese zodiac in each direction: the snake and tortoise in the north. To the east there is the green dragon, and the white tiger in the West. Finally in the south is the red bird.

---

32 There is normally one of the figurative guardians of the four winds from the Chinese zodiac in each direction: the snake and tortoise in the north. To the east there is the green dragon, and the white tiger in the West. Finally in the south is the red bird.
Building upon the classical model of Chinese city planning, the late-Qing style of capital was developed on the principle that cities are divided between an administrative centre and residential or business districts. This split represented one of the key principles of Chinese city planning which was the struggle between a military aristocracy and educated advisers. City planning in the Late-Qing continued the ancient principle of capital cities as ‘portable’ and represented long-standing diagrams of political power. Taipei contained the essential elements of a Chinese city of authority: spatial images of the control and hierarchy applied within the institutional establishment which consisted of one or several walled enclosures, axially, north-south orientation and the courtyard. It can be said that due to following this formula, “The town and cities are all of the same kind and appearance which differ only in size and in the wealth. They appeared early in the tradition and were applied very widely, whether to the plan of a little homestead, the layout of a temple, a palace or a city ensemble.” (Boyd, 1962: 49) As Taipei was of a far lower rank than the Forbidden City in Beijing, Taipei walled-city (the capital of Taiwan province) was enclosed by a single wall, the town plan (namely the buildings and roads) was orientated on a north-south axis (although the walls were orientated to Shi-Shi mountain), and all the official buildings contained courtyards: all of these principles were evident in Taipei, even at the end of the 19th century during the height of the Self-Strengthening Movement. In essence then, “Taipei was an attempt at nostalgic signification of local space.” (Allen, 2000: 5)

This argument is strengthened when observing the city’s shape. Whilst the principles of city walls have been discussed above as ‘Chinese’, in fact significant geographical distinctions can be made between different types of wall based on the shape. The box shape in Taipei followed the imperial northern Chinese style seen in capitals such as Beijing which itself followed the ancient capital walled-city Loyang (Ch. 洛陽, founded in the 11th century BCE). Following this ancient example meant that “Taipei was the final walled-city planned in ‘square shape’ accordance with feng-shui in the Chinese history.” (Wei and Gao, 2005: 19) This is in contrast with other walls built in this period, particularly in southern China: “late imperial Chinese city walls, including all those theretofore in Taiwan, were constructed around already occupied areas, accommodating their organic, usually circular shape.” (Allen, 2005: 4) Since at least the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127), square city walls represented “the power of the ruler; a

93 The classical model for a capital derived from the ancient city-states was given to the chief carpenter (Ch. 匠人). This role had three duties: locating and planning, designing institutions and roads, and ancillary works. Kao Grong Ji (Ch. 考工記, the Record of Trades), the earliest record of Chinese city planning, was an independent work compiled in the Warring States Period and was attached to the Zhou li (Ch. 周禮, lit. the Rites of Zhou) in place of the missing section on the Offices of Winter. The Record of Trades achieved prominence within the Confucian textual canon, in its description of the city according to the precepts for the capital. The Record of Trades details the Chinese official craftsman techniques, the national norms, and the principles of imperial standard for a capital. In brief, these are: a square plan of nine li (a li to 300 foot-steps to 500 meters) split into nine squares, with three gates on each wall; nine criss-crossed roads (each road to have a width of nine tracks – a track was eight chi, around 2.67 meters); the central palace should have an ancestral temple on the left, altar of the earth on the right, the imperial government (royal court hall) in the front, and palace in the north. Since Taipei was a provincial rather than state capital, these rules were only followed in using the division into nine squares.

94 That the city faced south can seen from the building orientation in fig. 4.6 where all the roofs and buildings face south on the map.

95 Loyang was considered the centre of China in the Central Plain, an important site for Chinese civilisation.
Southern style, [represents] freedom from government interference.” (Erdberg, 1973: 73) This ancient style had not been implemented for many years and the Qing government's choice to design the walls in a square shape was a sign of Taiwan's new political and cultural importance after the attacks by foreign powers. It also distinguished Taipei from other towns in Taiwan, including the much larger city Tainan, the old capital, to show that regardless of size, Taipei was now the pre-eminent city in Taiwan, for the first time since 1683.

Taipei walled-city was first displayed in a topographical map in 1888 (fig. 4.5) which was drawn using the Chinese cartographical framework: it does not provide strictly accurate measurements but does provide a demonstration of the perspective of Chinese culture and principles. The walls on the map were represented as a square rather than an accurate lopsided rectangular wall and are shown surrounded by mountains and the main river tributaries in the topographical map: the city is shown as set away from the rugged terrain and in a river valley for easy transportation. The names of rivers and mountains are all marked, and are in some ways the main focus of the map; this allows the cartographer to present the contextual feng-shui. The route of the drainage basin shows a hinterland of natural resources and a healthy economic situation. The mountain range is shown within the vertical and horizontal lines indicating the scale of nature that surrounded the towns of northern Taiwan, with roads and infrastructure only shown as faint dotted lines, clearly showing that the capital was set in a basin.

That the walled area was the most important part of the city (in spite of the majority of the population living outside the wall) is indicated from the perspective of a Japanese map of 1896 in which all five gates point inwards (fig. 4.6). The configuration of the city can be interpreted as a reflection of the worldview of the Qing administrators which had strong roots in the past, with less concern for efficiency in civilian life than allowing the authority to control the city more easily as a unit. Nowhere was this more evident than in representations of the five gates which were the most detailed buildings on the map, particularly the barbican of the north gate. These gates were vital as the only exits to the city which was closed at night to control the population. The wall’s main functional purpose was for ‘law and order’ rather than military defence. The gate structures were in two main parts: the base of the gate and the walls were made from stone, while the tops of the gates were brick and mortar structures. The dovetail shapes on the roofs’ spines, with upturned eaves, were the highest designation for a city wall, according to the ancient Chinese concept. The northern gate had a killing ground attached to the front, and slightly beyond was an official guest gate outside the city wall. The north gate was the key gate to protect the city which was shown by this phrase written above the door of a Secondary wall (Chi. 崖疆鎖鑰, lit. the key of the territory) as a warning after northern Taiwan had been under fierce fighting during the Sino-French War.

Fittingly given the phrase, this was also the gate that the Japanese entered Taipei through upon their first entrance to the city.
The walled area surrounded the imperial government’s network of administrative institutions. The extent of Taipei’s importance can be seen, in that it contained five levels of administration with all civil buildings inside the city wall, from the governor down to the local magistrate. The most important part of this governing apparatus was the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen (lit. bureaucrat’s gate, although actually a walled cluster of government buildings). Its importance was indicated by the complexity of functions, with the granary, stables, temples and pleasure gardens all enclosed within its courtyards and gates. The cluster of yamen symbolises “the power and might of the central Imperial government” because “the yamen was the regional administrative center”. (Lee, C. 1999: 35) Before the walls were built in 1884 Taipei had no administrative buildings so “the increase in the number of yashu [Chi. 衙署] administrative buildings reflected the increasing complexity of society and the growing importance of Taiwan as a region within the Chinese imperial sphere.” (Lee, C., 1949: 35) Enhancing the status of Taipei through these buildings was thereby both elevating it above other cities in Taiwan and elevating Taiwan within the Qing Empire.

The main gate in the north was used by officials, shown by its additional reception gate outside the wall. The yamen were the first planned and most complete of all the buildings, in the most densely populated part of the walled city, as indicated by the fact that three of the four artesian wells were located nearby. The finest houses were to be found in the northern part of the city nearest the yamen; the poorest people lived in the crowded streets near the market places and main gates. Given the short time between the construction of the walled city and the Japanese occupation, these distinctions might not be very clear, but the richest people lived on the north gate street, the largest number of households was in front of the Taipei Prefecture City Yamen, and the oldest commercial street was in the back of it. (Wei and Gao, 2005: 29)

After the yamen, the most notable buildings were the highly represented religious buildings: temples to the City God, County God, Confucius, Martial Arts, Mazu (a water God common to the coastal regions of China) and Empress of Heaven. As the island’s capital, Taipei was the highest status city in Taiwan and therefore had the most important temples for officials, the City God Temple and County God Temple. The latter was for the God which protected Taipei city and neighbouring Tamsha county. The local government officers were required to sacrifice every month on the first day and fifteenth day in order to make the province prosperous and to allow the people to live in it safely. Because of this function, some of the temples were located alongside other yashu (government office). In such ways the Chinese city planners maintained traditional life styles in the context of the forces of modernisation.

97 The Confucian Temple (Chi. 文廟) and Martial Arts Temple (Chi. 武廟) were separated for praying respectively to Confucius and to the warrior god. The Empress of Heaven Temple (Chi. 天后宮, the Tian Hau Temple, lit. God of heaven) was used to pray to Tian Hau for successful maritime navigation. This was a specialist deity for Taiwan; the temple faced the ocean and stood by the north gate with the main yamen close by for convenience of government ceremonies and to help administer and protect the city.
Whilst these traditions remained evident and prominent, the Self-Strengthening Movement was also strongly present in Qing Taiwan, in perhaps a more concentrated form than anywhere else: the efforts to modernise in Taiwan were more successful than in China as a whole, perhaps in part due to the small size of the island. LIU Ming-Chuan was key to this success; he “promoted needed and widely heralded innovation,” (Copoer, 2000: 121) particularly in his new capital city, Taipei. The Self-Strengthening Movement in Taiwan had a similar purpose and period to the stated purpose of the Meiji Restoration, but took a different approach which only allowed for very limited cultural change. This movement involved a wide range of constructions, architectural activities and urban planning, most of which was focused on the new capital. In Taipei, there were many new institutions such as the Arsenal Bureau (1885), the Firearms Bureau (1885), the Bureau of Pacification and Land Cultivation (1886), the Astronomical Telegrams Bureau (1886), the Official Medical Bureau (1886), the Camphor Affairs Bureau (1887), the Mining and Kerosene Bureau (1887), the Railway Bureau (1887), the Western Learning Bureau (1887), and the Postal Bureau (1888). These were all completed before Japan’s arrival and during Liu’s tenure. The ‘modern’ engineering activities and constructions were also extensive, such as the Railway Tunnel (1888) and Iron Railway Bridge (1889) built successively during the railway construction, which was most notable among Liu’s innovation given his understanding of the benefit of railways for the interoperability of troops and transportation. This was even reported to the imperial throne in 1880.98

These new institutions were integrated simultaneously, and were built with an urban planning vision as foundation. The first integration was the new city road planning in the half-empty Taipei walled-city, improving the flood defences of Dadaocheng, and road repair of three main areas of Taipei: Taipei walled-city, Dadaocheng, and Mengjia. Liu cooperated with the new municipal administration, constructing roads with willows (a lucky tree in Chinese tradition) and used pitching intervals with pebbles for the tracks of the newly introduced transport in 1887: the public rickshaw. These urban streets often used steam-powered rolling machines for road renovation, and Liu set up a road cleaning bureau (1887) to maintain the newly laid roads. The roads utilised electric lights with a power station constructed in 1888 by a Danish electrical technician. By the side of the city roads new style wells were also excavated and a water storage tank was built which separated drinking and washing water (1888) by a Japanese former vassal of the Shogun, NAGURA Matsumado (Jap. 名倉松窓, 1822-1901). These urban plans were started before Japan’s imperial expansion into Taiwan, although there was not enough time to compete everything or for any great advances to occur.

98 This was the ‘Memorial to Constructing Railways to Self-Strengthen’ (Chi. ‘籌造鐵路以圖自強摺’) sent on the 3rd December 1880 according to Mó yì lüè (Chi. 謨議略). This memorial was a literary type of memorial (Chi. 奏議, zouyi) which is a sub-category to the literary category of historiography known as shibu (Chi. 史部) in the Complete books of the ‘Four Storehouses’ (Chi. 四庫全書). Memorials were reports on regular or irregular administrative affairs or even suggestions on policies submitted by ministers of other state officials to the throne.
In spite of the Self-Strengthening Movement and Liu’s rapid innovations, the buildings in Taipei from 1884-1895 largely kept to traditional planning and architectural principles with high recognition of the past, enhancing the status of Taipei but lacking centralised planning: the vision for the development of Taipei appears to have resided with Liu, for as soon as he was replaced (reportedly partly due to locals on the island being angry with raised taxes to pay for these government projects) the active self-strengthening ended. In addition, Liu had limited time and lacked trained Chinese technical personnel: Taipei’s government projects “were plagued by incompetent managers, by nepotism and corruption.” (Schirokauer, 1989: 457) Given these limitations, his achievements were remarkable. Liu and others in the Qing Self-Strengthening movement integrated new institutions with rapid innovations within traditional urban planning and carpentry principles, even though they lacked systematic and centralised guidelines and time and freedom to experiment. In Taipei Liu’s source of freedom lay in its emptiness: Taipei’s wall was built in an over-large square shape which meant that in 1891 when it had been the capital for six years, over fifty percent of the walled space was still in rice paddies. (Allen, 2000: 4) Filling this space with a mixture of ancient and new institutions underlined Liu’s purpose to restore the authority of the Qing state after Taipei had become the provincial capital, when railroads, electrification, and schools of Western learning, rickshaws, and other material changes were introduced to the city. In spite of its empty space, these new developments were the sign of what would happen when Japan colonised Taiwan: these institutions were to become the basic foundations of a modern colonial state.

**Modern planning altering a static past: the Japanese built capital**

Although the policy changes were not universally popular under Liu’s governorship, both economic and political conditions improved in Taiwan. Yet these changes were insufficient and too localised to allow China to ward off foreign aggression: from the 1870s Japan had retained an interest in Taiwan and “soon found an opportunity to acquire the island.” (Cooper, 2000: 12) As shown in Section 4.2, Meiji Japan’s active modernisation was a scheme which was continued and brought to Taiwan. Instead of reverting to the previous capital and largest city in Taiwan, Tainan, when they colonised Taiwan, The Japanese retained Taipei as the capital\(^99\) and from this base the Japanese administrators oversaw a plethora of improvements in science and technology, as well as other general elements of material progress.

One of the first priorities was interconnecting the urban areas and harbours. Japan concentrated on establishing “a much more economic infrastructure by building roads, railways, communications systems, factories, and harbours to facilitate export to Japan.” (Ho and Park, 2004: 4) By 1905, Taiwan had 300 miles of railroad, ten times the amount in 1895, and work was in progress to double even that.

---

\(^99\) Taipei was renamed Taihoku for the duration of Japanese rule but to avoid confusion Taipei will be referred as Taipei for the duration of this thesis.
Whilst Liu had previously made an abortive effort to introduce electric street lighting to Taipei, “in 1903, Taiwan was electrified, making it the first area outside Japan proper [in East Asia] to take this step into modernity.” (Cooper, 2000: 13) In addition to these technological improvements, scientific thinking also had an effect on Taiwan, where “many diseases were eradicated... making Taiwan the most disease-free area outside Japan.” (Cooper, 2000: 13) These advances in science and technology even filtered through to social logic and habits, developing greater technological and cultural sophistication.

These changes were initially slow outside the capital city: for whilst the rest of the rebellion following the native declaration of the Republic of Formosa took months and years to fully occupy, Taipei was taken by the Japanese in a few days after they were invited in by the local leaders. At first the Japanese were undecided about what to do with Taipei. The ‘Taipei District Planning Committee’ was established in 1897 which was to initiate the trend for ambitious urban planning in Taipei. After the arrival of GOTÔ Shinpei as the head of civilian affairs in 1898, the direction the city was taking was much clearer, although the planning remained experimental. This reflected Gotô’s belief that ‘Taiwan was Japan’s colonial university. (Takekoshi, 1907: v) Taipei evidently represented an ideal city to display the might of Japan: it had been a provincial capital for only ten years, and the wide tracts of empty land within Taipei’s built environment were far from the situation in Tökyō, already densely built when the emperor was restored in 1868, and believed to have been the most populated city in the world in 1720. (Morris, 2010: 483) In Taipei, the new Japanese authorities could experiment, they had open space to use as they wished, and were continuing to master and adapt modern town planning and architectural techniques imported from mainland Japan. Gotô brought Japanese and Japanese filtered European culture into Taipei city, which became the first prototype for cultural transformation of the island.

After only five years of colonial rule in 1900, Taipei city wall had begun its slow but inevitable process of deconstruction, which was in keeping with the plan to integrate the Japanese centre with the Chinese periphery. First nine more gates were opened in each end of street at the wall to connect the city centre with the outside. In the 1900 Taipei initial plan (fig. 4.7) the Chinese grid-like road layout was kept and reconfigured with a series of new streets. Beyond the new gates, the map is striking in its stark omission of the river and other natural features, which suggests that the feng-shui tradition was no longer seen as an important or a necessary component of planning maps. This initial plan did not include either “the extramural settlements of Mengjia and Dadaocheng where the large majority of the Chinese lived and worked—these were included in the 1895 and 1897 maps.” (Allen, 2005: 73) Gotô’s administration saw mainly the intramural area as available for occupation and worthy of their colonial aspirations.
A year later, the 1901 planning map was enlarged but mainly extended into the newly planned southern suburbs for the Japanese residential area: a city plan was produced for the entire walled area and left no empty spaces. Within the intramural area all Chinese religious buildings were removed. This adds evidence to the Japanese mission to eliminate superstitions and those buildings without practical functions which were no longer required. Whilst the planning appears to be informed by rationality, an important exception (covered further in Section 4.4) was the construction of the ‘Taiwan Shinto Shrine’ (1901). Although it was a government priority, the shrine was built far away from the centre, which indicates that the religious and secular were purposefully separated in government planning, underlining a main theme of this thesis: that there was a binary in how the kindai (modern) was exhibited in the public areas while traditions were separated, often into the private sphere. Japanese officials’ residences were built exclusively in Japanese style, mostly to the east and south-east of the city walls (Allen, 2007: 17), and planned as peripheral. Whilst religion was still core in Japanese society and in many ways even more so after the restoration of the emperor, the early years of colonial rule purposefully separated religion from the civic centre in the urban planning. The exception to this was State Shinto: several Shinto shrines were built throughout Taipei in what appears to some extent to have been a nationalist ploy. Japanese shrines were spread throughout the suburbs of both the Chinese and Japanese areas, intended to supersede Chinese temples. By the end of Japanese occupation there were over 200 Shinto shrines in Taiwan.
By 1904 the Japanese administrators decided that the city wall had to be destroyed in order to expand to the outside and improve the efficiency of the city. Where the walls had once been, three-laned tree-lined boulevards were made, that altered and dominated the old circulation of the city. Following this, the centre of authority was no longer totally within a walled box. This was a first big indication of the Japanese translation of modern as kindai: to be open was a definition of both civilisation and progress in Japanese dictionaries at the time, and therefore the removal of the city walls was a clear sign of progress to assist in urban expansion, even though the walls had been in place for only just over 20 years. The substantial amount of brick was recycled into the city to build modern edifices and offices. In 1904, the Qing administration buildings “were either destroyed altogether or [temporarily] transformed into schools or other types of public buildings.” (Lee, C., 1999: 35)

Removing the city walls was a significant move, as without walls, the boundaries of control had shifted and became associated with different institutions. In colonial Taipei under nationalist Japan, the old boundary of city gates controlling the movements of the people were deemed old fashioned and new boundaries were made to allow open movement whilst the police force applied authoritarian control: the walls were unnecessary, representing what Japanese scholars such as Fukuzawa saw as the “static traditions” of Japan’s East Asian neighbours. According to Allen, this trend to destroy city walls was an innovation “borrowed from European examples of medieval walls transformed into roadways and
promenades, changed the internal composition and symbolic value of the city: a traditional bureaucratic center, walled and imperial, is transformed into a site of colonial modernism.” (Allen, 2005: 73) Removing walls removed the traditional ritual at gates, but the importance of gates as sites of transition and culture was recognised by Gotō, who successfully petitioned to keep the city gates and saved all but the Western gate which was demolished to make way for a railway line. These gates remained as architectural marks of the past: by the end of the colonial period, there were no other existing Chinese (or traditional Japanese) buildings besides these four gates within the now-invisible walled city.

In 1905 the integration of the inner walled city with the Chinese Mengjia (south west of Taipei, Quanchou group) and Dadaocheng areas (north of Taipei, Changchou group) (known as the three towns of Taipei (Jap. 三市街, Taihoku sanshigai)) became more clearly the reason for the destruction of the wall. This integration was clearly articulated by GOTŌ Shinpei’s progressive and expansive urban policy: creating a single entity out of three towns was the starting point of modern colonial urban planning, shown in the 1905 plan (fig. 4.9). In his town plan Gotō’s department chose to integrate the Japanese (the southern east area) and Chinese sections of the city and thus began the process of Japanisation of the Chinese, bringing them closer together. In line with the terrain, future plans looked east away from the river and beyond the Japanese residential area where the centre of Taipei is today. The gradual shift of the city from west to east was enabled by a series of typhoons from 1898 which destroyed many Chinese residential buildings in Taipei’s Mengjia and Dadaocheng suburbs, further reducing the stock of Chinese buildings in the city. (Allen, 2000: 11) Moreover in 1911 typhoons destroyed many buildings within the old Taipei walled-city itself. (Wei and Gao, 2005: 35-36) This gave the Japanese authorities a chance to remake the city in their image of a site of modern urbanity, the Japanese colonial capital.

4.9. Taipei Wall Urban Planning in 1905. (Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library)
The examples of Japanese urban developments demonstrated Japan’s capacity to forward plan, which was only possible through systematic thinking. This was established from the experience of developing a viable nation-state in mainland Japan after the Iwakura mission (1871-1873), but it was only in Taipei that the motives, capacity, maturity and resources were utilised to integrate Taiwan into this vision. The Iwakura mission led government authorities to respect the cities of Seiyō, where “Paris in particular impressed the Japanese with its magnificent boulevards and public structures, recently renovated by Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann, and thereafter Paris long represented the urban ideal for many Japanese planners.” (Sorenson, 2002: 81) The aspiration towards a Parisian aesthetic was not only clear to see in Tokyo (as discussed in Chapter 3) but also in Taipei, where it was articulated more obviously, from its wide laned, tree lined boulevards (fig. 4.10) which replaced the city walls with grand parks in expensive central real estate. The Parisian model was a fashionable example of modernity which became a blueprint for Japanese planners on how a ‘modern’ city should look: Taipei was highly influenced by this Seiyō demonstration of expansive public space.

During the Japanese colonial period the authorities put in place six city plans: at first known as ‘Urban corrections’ (Jap. 市區改正) these plans were renamed ‘Urban plan’ after 1930. The corrections began in an urgent manner and were initiated by William Kinnimond Burton (1856-1899), a British engineer appointed to Taiwan from mainland Japan to undertake sanitation investigations. Due to these progressive plans the old intramural area of Taipei had changed significantly by 1920, but essentially it followed the key 1905 plan. According fig. 4.11, by 1920, almost all of the main civil building projects which were extant in the walled city area of 1945 were completed. All of these developments and changes in approach led European contemporaries to proclaim that Taipei was a “modern capital.” (Rutter, 1923: 145) Yet given that there were a plethora of unprecedented changes to Taipei in a period of great change, it is probable that no one set of principles prevailed when planning Taipei. A more
inductive, rather than deductive, approach is necessary as Japan was not following planning customs handed down by many generations, as with Chinese city planning. Analysing Qing Taipei, the blend of traditional principles alongside new urban functions was apparent; Qing town planners were interpreting traditional town planning principles and it was easy to interpret deviations and the meaning of these deviations as there were so few. However, when traditional cultural forms became so difficult to see, when they were repressed in the formal city-scape, these principles can be found only through induction. Indeed, Japan did not have formal planning principles, as the first town planning legal regulations were only passed in 1920. This allowed Taipei to develop very much as an experimental city.

Whilst these were the initial foundations of modern planning, embedded in the city was one of the most fundamental changes to life in Taipei. The change to the measurement and control of time was implicit in the urban planning, which fundamentally rearranged the circulation of the city. This approach to time was one of the main hooks of the Japanese modern movement as a planned and programmatic approach. The city walls had controlled the flow of the populace through curfews and checks in the Qing period. Time was measured by the gate guards who marked the passing hours by gongs. After the city wall was demolished in 1904, there were no curfews, no period to open and close the gates, and no gate...
gongs. The gates previously functioned as a systematic mechanism to make the city and its populace ordered as the gates combined a time-controlling system with prevention of criminal activities forbidding illegal activities such as smuggling. The curfew had been a central part of daily routines for all citizens who visited or worked in walled cities. Instead of being localised and controlled, time became seen as subjective under the Japanese, as a result of the changing logic when the European time measurement system filtered through to Taiwan. The disbanding of the curfew and the gate system was part of the wider movement to make the city consistent with the overall systems and spaces present in Seiyō cities.

From the perspective of Meiji Japan, Seiyō urban planning demanded the operation of Seiyō standard time measurements: these were first noted in Taiwan from 1860 when treaty ports were opened, but were never systematically implemented. Other landmarks arrived under Liu’s proto-modern policy of the Self-Strengthening Movement: time boundaries were reduced with the introduction of the postal system in 1888, the cablegram in 1888, and the railway system in 1893. Yet Greenwich Mean Time was introduced to Taiwan only under Japanese rule and from the earliest opportunity on 1st January 1896. The Japanese also introduced 24 hour days, replacing the ancient 12 double-hour system and implemented the 7 day week; prior to the Meiji period, Japan had used the same measurement system as China.100 Japan was the only Asian country at the ‘International Meridian Conference’ in 1884 and applied the international time standards in 1888. Yet Japan had already changed its time system to the ‘Gregorian Calendar’ in 1872 (Lu, S., 1998: 27-28), four years after the Meiji Restoration, at a speed which demonstrated the desire to match Seiyō and assimilate Seiyō ways of thinking about time as a part of matching the stride of Seiyō through altering the flow of daily life.

With the modern defined as ‘the current time’ following the European ideal of the modern to adopt Greenwich Mean Time, and conforming to a standardised time across the world was profoundly modern. Within Imperial Japan, this standardisation was assimilated mainly through the administration and education systems. Some vestiges of central management of time remained: rather than having gate gongs, the “noonday Gun” was fired at 11am (noon is 11am in Chinese) everyday from 27th June 1895 until 1922 in order to assert the correct time, a technique used in mainland Japan since Meiji Year 2 (1869). From 1906 accurate time was spread through wireless telegraphy at Taipei weather station (1897, fig 4.12) from Tokyo Observatory, and a complete timekeeping system was established through

100 In ancient Chinese culture, marking time to order life rhythms conformed closely to religion and was mostly used for religious practices; after the Song dynasty (960-1279) lives became increasingly tied to time due to business activities and the centralised government. (Lu, S., 1998: 6) The Chinese system of reckoning time was double-hours (two hours were a single unit) varying with the seasons. Each day started from 11pm until the Qing dynasty. Each double-hour was announced in towns using drums and (often elaborate) ceremonies. (Bedini, 1994: 17) There was no standard time, as places had different times for sunset depending on geographical location. “The day was divided into 100 quarters or k’o [Chi. 刻], each equivalent to 14 minutes and 24 seconds of Western time…with the adopting of western timekeeping in China in the seventeenth century, the k’o was established as the Western quarter-hour, or 15 minutes, and the minute as a fen.” (Bedini, 1994:14-15) There was no concept of a week in the Chinese traditional almanac but a xun (Chi. 旬) (10 days) was used as a unit comprising months, seasons and years. The working week was a concept that did not exist in Taiwan, officers would sometimes get time off at the end of three xun and feast days; there was no designated day of rest. In the Edo period, Japan also used the Chinese system of double-hours varying with seasons, and also designated hours by the Chinese signs of the Twelve Terrestrial Branches. (Bedini, 1994: 19)
weather stations, railway stations and post-telecommunications stations across the whole island in 1915. (Lu, S., 1998: 54) Time is used to place events in sequence one after the other, and we use time to compare how long events last: therefore changing solely to single hours and introducing the ‘week’ must have had a profound impact on daily lives in Taiwan, allowing, amongst other things, a new organisation of work timetables, strict times for schooling, and a well-functioning railway network which linked Taipei capital the rest of the island. Standard time was a key change for all the modern urban planning and nation-building. It altered the notion of China and the East as being somehow static and rooted in the past. Standardising time with the 'civilised world' was an essential foundation to help the modern mission of moving forward programmatically and to expand the urban environment.

This systematic character of urban planning led to the rapid development of Taipei, and Taipei developed very quickly with the population even doubling from 1905 to 1945. Taipei would follow a path later trodden by the colonialists in North East China: Japan “sought to lead Manchurian society in new directions through alterations to the built environment.” (Sewell, 2004: 235) Japan imposed modernity in their characteristic way in Taipei: efficiency and forward planning with traditions hidden, a colonial image with a Seiyō planning aesthetic for persuasion and impressing the natives, and the constant improvement and expansion of the capital. All these characteristics functioned to distinguish the Japanese from the ‘pre-modern’ Taiwanese native, reifying their superiority. However, whilst this overview of the city is helpful in uncovering general principles it is less helpful in understanding the meaning of the symbols used and the details of forms, spaces and functions that made up the city at the micro level which were urban uniforms: instituting kindai (modern) architecture. The following section looks at a range of architecture from Taipei to further analyse the meaning of the ‘modern’ in colonial Meiji Japan.
4.4 Emergence of modern institutions in the colonial capital

Taipei was a colonial capital; a deliberately planned city built expressly to house the seat of Japanese imperial power. Power has ultimately to do with resources, and as scholars of architecture it is important to understand how and why an authority divides up its resources to create buildings within the city in order to understand how that power is articulated. (Markus, 1993: 23) In Qing Taipei, the organisation and commission of buildings within the enclosure of Taipei walled-city showed which types of buildings were more valuable, which building was given the highest status, and how the buildings can be understood as a group of Chinese building types. The system of administration expanded after Taipei became the provincial capital and included a Chinese walled-city's essential functions: religious observance, education, administration and relief institutions (fig. 4.13) displaying the customary focus on the government yamen and integrated religious buildings within a walled compound. Besides the wall, the institutions within Taipei City constituted a large group of buildings, built close together as most of them were constructed simultaneously for Taiwan’s inauguration as a province. (Li, Q., 2004 [1996]: 201)

![Map of Taipei showing the development of authority buildings in Taiwan, 1897 (Left: Japanese map) and 1945 (Right: American map). Redrawn from Li, Q., 2004 [1996] and from the U.S. Army Map Service in 1945. (Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library.]

4.13. The development of authority buildings in Taiwan, 1897 (Left: Japanese map) and 1945 (Right: American map). Redrawn from Li, Q., 2004 [1996] and from the U.S. Army Map Service in 1945. (Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library.)

KEY
- Administrative institutions (Red)
- Education institutions (Blue)
- Financial institutions (Light Green)
- Public Facilities (Orange)
- Religious institutions (Dark Green)
- Commercial Institutions (Purple)
Under Japan, Taipei developed from possessing only four essential institutions in the Qing period to seven public institutions in the colonial capital: education, public, military, administration, commerce, finance and religious institutions (fig. 4.13). The drive to be ‘open’ to change, a definition of civilised in Japanese, was present within the urban planning activities, particularly for those public buildings built before the citizens understood how to perform within them. Yet, it is important to understand the ways of behaviour within the urban setting, and how individual feats of architecture and engineering linked the city together. This will aid understanding of the reasons and effects of Japan establishing new building types, in order to comprehend the character of the imperial power which gave the kindai (modern) flavour of Japan’s new territory.

**Establishing new building types**

An enormous number of new types of buildings were built in Taipei during the colonial period, including hospitals, market halls, theatres, assembly halls, museums, parks, hotels, monopoly buildings, business offices, post offices, banks, elementary schools, universities, research stations, a Governor-General’s Office and official residences, courts, prisons, and police offices. This use of new building types was a continuation of a long trend begun at the start of the Meiji period. At this point, the Japanese sought immediate changes in the use of urban space, as explained by Toshio Watanabe (1996):

“...The new government urgently needed new types of buildings for both practical and ideological reasons. From a practical point of view, some buildings were needed to house completely new activities, such as a university in which students would be taught subjects including modern technology and social sciences. Others were needed for institutions that were now understood and organized differently, such as the mint in which a new national currency was produced to supersede the old regional currencies.” (Watanabe, 1996: 22)

In addition to the need for new forms and functions, the scale of public buildings in Seiyō was also important: “large, imposing modern edifices would impress upon the Japanese people the power and stability of the new regime. To build a modern nation, modern buildings were needed.” (Watanabe, 1996: 22) By 1895 Japanese authorities had nearly 30 years of experience commissioning and constructing these types of buildings, even though TATSUNO Kingo’s first major building, the Bank of Japan, had only been built that year. As was typical for Meiji Japan, the prestige of Seiyō building forms is extremely significant: first, as it demonstrated the elevation of foreign forms above Japanese styles for important government-built buildings, and second, because the Japanese used their buildings to raise their own status in world affairs, particularly for the purpose of renegotiating unequal trade treaties. (Sorensen, 2002: 63) This search for international prestige and equality with Seiyō was behind Japan’s colonisation
of Taiwan itself. In Taiwan, as in other Japanese imperial possessions, the urban form was not only intended to raise Japan to the level of the Great Powers of the day, it was also used to raise Japan above the status of the natives.

According to the Kodama, the joint founder of Taiwan’s modern development under Japanese rule, one of the most important construction targets was to establish a ‘Taiwan Shrine’. Kodama ‘believed the purpose of the ‘Taiwan Shrine’ was to unify the people’s consciousness.’ (Sogawa, 1936: 337) The influence on consciousness through religion connotes the relationship between the mind of subjects and God, which since Meiji Japan had been Amaterasu, a major deity of the Shinto religion (rather than Buddhist deities). The prioritisation of a Taiwan Shrine by Kodama was an indication of how religion quickly became a public as well as a private concern with the nationalism in the early Meiji period. In a sign of the link between religion and the Japanese nation, the first Shrine in the capital Taipei was the Taiwan (Shinto) Shrine (Jap. 台湾神社, fig. 4.14) which was built to commemorate and deify Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (Jap. 北白川宮能久親王, 1847-1895) the first member of the Imperial family to die abroad, of malaria during the invasion of Taiwan in 1895. This was an Imperial shrine (Jap. 官幣大社) venerated by the imperial family, the highest level on the hierarchy of Shinto Shrines. The structure was built on a huge site of 1950 square metres with buildings on three levels.

The construction was built by the traditional craftsmen of the Miyadaiku (shrine and temple carpenters) led by KIGO Kiyoyoshi, who worked for the Imperial Household as well as teaching at the Imperial University. ITŌ Chūta, whose work in Japan was to become a foundation for defining kindai architecture discussed in Section 3.6, was hired for the design following his formulation of the Ancient Temples and

101 The first Shrine in Taiwan was Kanshan Shrine in Tainan (1897) which was adapted from the Qing Kaishan Temple.
Shrines Preservation Law of 1897 in Japan. Compared to the new Office and Official Residence of the Taiwan Governor-General (explored in Chapter 5), building the Taiwan Shrine was a more familiar exercise for the Japanese, taking only seven months rather than seven years to build (Feb 1901 to Sep 1901) in spite of Itō’s inexperience. The construction of the Taiwan Shrine, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence and his Office were to play the most significant roles in the reorganisation of Taipei as a Japanese colonial city: the priority of modern constructions was instituted with class and power in both religious and secular buildings.

In 1896, the site for the Taiwan Shrine was chosen, designated to be near the Chintan Chinese Temple (fig. 4.15) which had been on the site of the northern suburb beyond Taipei city wall. According to data in Section 4.3, Japanese city planning in Taipei operated under the principle that only kindai (modern) institutions should exhibited in the public and central area: as it represented tradition, the shrine was split off from the government centre in the northern suburb, closer to the natural environment. Additionally, according to Aoi, “The site for the shrine was kept away out of thought and raised halfway up Mt. Chintan because the shrine required both pure natural landscape and correspondence with the urban area.” (Aoi, 1999: 237) Whilst many national religious monuments such as the Tokugawa Shogun tomb in Nikko were often built in natural surroundings, it had also been common to have Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines within urban areas; what is telling is that this isolated shrine was the only major temple or shrine built in Taipei, and it was built outside the centre, out of thought and functioning as a hidden (though accessible) tradition.

The Shrine was also located close to a new public and open institution, as the first park (Maruyama Park 1897) in Taipei was established immediately to the south of it across the river. (fig. 4.16) This park was later followed by three other parks over the next 25 years: an oval-shaped Park (1904) which replaced the West Gate, Taipei New Park (1908) in the central inter-mural area, and a Botanical Garden (1921)
outside the southern east city wall near the Japanese residential area. After the Taiwan Shrine was finished in 1901, another feast day was added to the calendar: the Taiwan Shrine Festival on the 28th October. In this way the Japanese administrators linked architecture with festivals, which were one of the main expressions of cultural belonging in Taiwan, thus skillfully integrating the Japanese policies within Taiwan. Every year on this feast day the Taiwan Governor-General and his staff took a ceremonial route together, past the site reserved for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Taipei New Park, and the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, along the eastern wall, north through the city to the Shrine. This route linked the highest level of kindai (modern) institutions which were exhibited in the public and central area to the highest traditional institution in Taiwan, hidden in the north. (fig. 4.17) The road constructed for the pilgrimage to the Taiwan shrine was named Chokushi Street (Jap. 勅使街道, lit. Imperial envoy) and was nearly fifteen meters in width with acacias planted to the sides. Given its grand name, it was the first gravel style road and a symbol of the modern; it was extended later to connect to the east side of Taipei city after the wall was demolished in 1904. This road built on innovations by Liu in Qing period, who paved most of Taipei's roads and made sure that all at least had smooth lines of stone paving to ease transportation.
‘In another incremental improvement from Liu, in order to connect the Chokushi Street with the site, Liu’s first Railway Bridge (1889) in Taipei was improved upon and an iron bridge was constructed by a technician of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office: SOGAWA Katarō (Jap. 十川嘉太郎). Named the ‘Meiji bridge’, the bridge had an iron truss structure with wooden decking; it was decorated with a fan-shaped hollow-carved decorative railing (fig. 4.18). After the bridge the road connected with the sandō (Jap. 参道) which was the road approaching the Shrine after the first tori (Jap. 鳥居, gate). This route was planned to fit in with an important element of ‘modern’ transport as it continued Liu’s railway line from Taipei city, a rail line which ran alongside it to a station (Marayama) which lay nearby. Thus the symbolically important sites, secular and religious, were all accounted for by the route to the primary religious building of the colony.

Yet before the Taiwan Shrine was completed to ‘unify the people’s consciousness’ the most urgent institution was more practical: a place of punishment, vital given the strong initial resistance to Japanese rule. Taipei prison represented the beginning of the colonial period of social control and was the first kindai prison in Taiwan. It was built in the early stages of 1899 with a large site of around 16,800m² located just off the Eastern gate behind the quarters of the Artillery and Infantry Regiments. The prison had a similar size but more advanced equipment than Sugamo Prison in the mainland capital Tokyo (Taiwan Daily News, 1904). This modern prison was exhibited in the public and in a central area of Taipei. The development of prisons represented a lasting trend in the transition from Qing administration to Meiji Japanese: modernising by spreading old functions into new buildings. A similar prison function had been held within a small section of the Chinese government yamen. However this area was not known as a ‘prison’ but functioned as a temporary area before sentencing (with the main punishments being the death penalty or exile as jails did not exist).
Prisons were strongly related to modernisation in Japan from the Meiji Restoration onwards. A prison system had begun following the writing of *Kangokusoku* (Jap. 監獄則, lit Prison regulations, written in 1872) by OHARA Shigeya. The timing of this meant that when Prison Regulations were promulgated, Thomas Waters’s plans for the Ginza ‘bricktown’ had just been made public and from this point onwards, stone or brick was preferred for the construction of prisons. (Maeda, 2004: 32) Taipei prison was built using recycled building materials from Taipei city wall and was established with advanced *kindai* (modern) facilities, particularly sanitary equipment which had running tap water (fig. 4.19). These functions were uncommon in Taiwan at that time to the extent that it can be said that the prison’s high level facilities, including flush toilets, were more advanced than could be found in the city itself. (Chen, Q., 2005: 159) Moreover, the prison had a further connection with later architecture as the services of the criminal prisoners were engaged in the production in the brickyard located in the East of prison; prisoners made a contribution to the construction industry to make a ‘*kindai* city’ at that time, the brickworks being a vital function to allow the city to grow rather than only be altered from within using existing materials.

This two-level brick and stone building, surrounded by three metres high walls, was built using material from the walls of the many Taipei *yamens* and echoed the controlled enclosure of a Chinese walled-city, but in fact was fundamentally representing modernity to the colonial administrators. In contrast with the previous *yamen*-based system, this *Seiyō*-style prison was made into a separate building and was modelled on the Pennsylvania system, which itself used the ideas of the British Utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham. The prison design used the principles of Bentham’s Panopticon, as seen in the plan below (fig. 4.20), intended to allow perfect control of the prisoners. This prison type was also popular in Europe and was a new model at the time. Although according to Maeda it is not possible to know whether Ohara
knew of Bentham's existence when he wrote the Prison Regulations, “it is precisely the principle of the Panopticon that is here put into play.” (Maeda, 2004: 35) Maeda claimed that the prison’s principle underlay the whole centralisation of government in Japan following the Meiji Restoration: “This method of grasping space, appropriately captured by the translation phrase “seeing everything at a glance” [ichimoku doshi], does not stop only at the organizing principle of the prison but shapes a hidden context that extends across all of the institutions created by Japanese modernity.” (Maeda, 2004: 36, my emphasis)

In order to establish Taipei alongside similar colonial capitals across Asia, Japan revolutionised the functions in Taipei, inventing public, commercial and financial functions, and greatly reducing the number of sacred spaces during the colonial period. Unlike Edo palaces, administrative functions were split across multiple sites. Whilst under Chinese rule the main yamen accommodated all functions to govern the area of responsibility as well as including a residence for the top official, the Japanese authorities split functions such as law courts and residence from the old administrative building. In addition to other changes, such as the creation of new types of buildings, the reduction in religious spaces was a great difference between the two plans, from three out of 13 buildings in 1895 to one out of 48 buildings in 1945. Sacred spaces were few in the planned ‘kindai spaces (although many were located in suburbs) and generally they were limited to a small shrine or portrait of the emperor in offices and schools (see Section 5.2).

Modernity lay in a rational approach to architecture and planning; foreign visitors such as Owen Rutter (1923) presumably proclaimed Taipei to be a ‘modern capital’ because it possessed the functions a European city would be expected to have at the time. This borrowing of Seiyō bureaucratic functions echoes Otto Wagner’s notion of Modern Architecture. Wagner stated in 1902 that ‘Reason’ should
Influence architecture to bring it into line with scientific trends, with new materials and functions, to join architecture with the wider programme of modernisation, that is, to fit construction with the demands of the present (whatever these were perceived to be). Looking to European cities and replicating their functions served the purpose of fitting the demands of the present for the Japanese colonial authority.

In a trend that harked back to nation building in Japan, the colonial administrators ensured that official institutions were first established and contained in the centre of the capital, yet as befitting the subject of imperialism, these buildings can also be seen as a reification of progress through domination: institutions of colonial expansion. According to their early experience of Seiyō superiority through the ‘contact zone’ established by Perry’s Black Ships, from the Bakumatsu era to the Meiji, colonial modern institutions were not merely authority buildings, but were active ingredients in transculturation and identity formation: buildings that housed new functions, that were aesthetically new for Taiwanese, that were made using new technology and with new materials. Not only this, but the buildings were the result of a social scientific approach by GOTÔ Shinpei, which was instrumental in ensuring gradual control of Japan’s colonial subjects.

In order to give meaning to these new functions, the Japanese made fundamental changes to their Taiwanese subjects’ lives with adoption of modern time measurement in order to utilise these new functions properly as outlined above. A working week timetable formulated by the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office for officers ran from 8am to noon and 2pm to 4pm everyday apart from Sunday afternoon, which was allowed off. Yet these time routines were effective only for officials not labourers (mainly Taiwanese) who were rarely given weekends in their working schedules. There were ten days of public holidays (described as Japanese feast days) per year and one additional day after the Meiji emperor died in 1912. The colonial government focused not only on administration but also saw educational institutions as a main priority and inevitably this revolution of time and control reached beyond bureaucratic routinisation, also infiltrating in the school system. Most obviously there were summer holidays for students as in Seiyō educational tradition as well as strict daily timetables. Prior to Japan’s arrival, Taipei had several educational buildings for officials preparing for imperial exams, these buildings were retained by the Japanese, and the Foreign Language School was prominently

---

102 Due to the tropical hot weather in Taiwan, the time routine changed several times, for there was no air conditioning. The time routine was very complicated until Gotô simplified it in 1899: working time from May to September was 8am to noon and from October to April was 9am to 4pm. (Lu, S., 1998: 58)

103 There were three different types of educational institutions in Qing Taipei: Academy Halls (Chi. 學堂), Classical learning institutes (Chi. 書院) and new style learning institutes (Chi. 新式書院). The Confucius temple always contained an education institution and was used by the governors to demonstrate their high grasp of classical Chinese culture. The government education buildings’ functions were mainly for examinations, not for teaching; therefore study halls (Chi. 明道書院) were located nearby to support the examination halls (Chi. 考棚). In addition to these traditional types there was the first of a new style of study hall in Taiwan: the native learning institution (Chi. 師書院) where officials learnt about the local customs and etiquette, and the foreign language study hall (Chi. 西學堂) where officials learnt mathematics, measuring and manufacture.

---
shown on Japanese maps, but the educational buildings built after 1895 went far beyond what was previously extant. Indeed, all the buildings that are educational or aimed at expanding knowledge make up a staggering amount for the centre of a capital city.\textsuperscript{104}

The commitment to (and perceived achievement of) progress in masonry architecture was a key aspect of how the Japanese authority viewed time and modernity during this period: it constituted an existential realignment with Seiyō, and a temporal split with Tōyō. Reform of time measurement pushed Japan towards universal linear time along Seiyō lines. The strong influence of social Darwinism on Japanese government officials and intellectuals was embodied in the biological politics of GOTŌ Shinpei, with his strong belief in progress made real in setting up appropriate government functions. This was another instance of the conceptual framework of Seiyō states being adopted and then readjusted when implemented in Taiwan to make it acceptably ‘Japanese’.

With such governmentality, alongside the restructuring of working time, Taipei city saw a revolution in new building functions. During the Meiji period, the link between form and function became increasingly explicit and resulted in the idea of a building type for government buildings often being utilised following Seiyō traditions. Building types had long been common in the Europe where design guides had been used since the Renaissance to describe how to construct a type of building. (Markus, 1993: 19) In the early decades of Meiji rule, these types were not closely adhered to: according to the design guides, a bank would not look like a large temple like the First Mitsui bank in the Section 3.2; a villa form would not be used for a merchandise hall or a national bank like Hokkaidō Sales Hall in Section 3.4. This situation was unsuitable for the elite ideology in Japan to appear civilised; for creating their progressive functions the new national institutions required corresponding forms. Eventually, proficiency in modelling this new tradition improved after the first Japanese architects began constructing large buildings after 1890, and began the spread of authentic-looking Seiyō buildings throughout the cityscape.

As with early Meiji carpenters, in Qing Taipei, buildings with new functions (such as the railway) were built in a generalised ‘Foreign’ style, but the Japanese architects who built colonial Taipei were more sensitive and adept in their use of building types than Qing carpenters. The range of functions increased as shown in Section 4.3, and the forms used were usually suitable for their respective function, for instance the Taiwan Governor-General’s Museum, modeled on the British Museum, and Taipei prison modeled on Pennsylvania State. As symbols of the nation in Victorian Britain (such as the Houses of Parliament) were often built in Gothic Revival style, buildings which were national symbols were constructed in ‘Tatsuno style’. For instance, most Taipei University buildings were also constructed in

\textsuperscript{104} The value placed on education is further shown in official documents: reporting on the ratio of schools to houses in Taiwan, there was only one school per 2000 houses in 1910 but this increased to one school per 700 houses by 1920. (Lu, S., 1998: 82-83)
Renaissance style of red brick and stone “celebrating their [Japan’s] colonial aspirations.” (Allen, 2000: 15). This style was seen throughout Taipei to a remarkable extent: in the Taipei Train Station (1901), Taipei Municipal Offices (1915), the Monopoly Bureau (1913-1922), and the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence (1901), as well as minor buildings such as the official newspaper office (1908), the Taiwan Railway hotel (1908); and most famously in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (1919) which was the largest and tallest building built by the Japanese in Taiwan.

The emergence of unprecedented open public spaces

Through adopting time routines in work and education, the idea of leisure was created: if there was a clear and allocated working week, the remaining time would be free time, especially for officials. The possibility for leisure activities was represented in urban planning and the land utilised for the Taipei Park (1908), the Taiwan Governor’s library (1908), the west gate market (1908), and a theatre at the west gate (1911) of Taipei city for the public’s use during their leisure time. In addition, a sports ground (1923) and a department store (1932) were the foremost present in Taipei; the Japanese authorities created many parks (23 in total), gardens and zoos, often grand in scale, creating a new concept of public space to be used by citizens. Furthermore, national parks (made official in 1937) occupied 13 percent of Taiwan and were promoted as leisure destinations. The Japanese government intended to create a leisure environment very carefully to show the positive aspects of their colony; in order to celebrate Taiwan being under Japanese rule for 20 years, the Governor-General decided to have the first industrial fair ‘Taiwan Industrial Mutual-Progress Fair’ in 1916 at the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office to promote and reward industry, attract mainland Japanese to Taiwan as tourists and as migrants, and to project Taiwan as a rich property of the Great Japanese Empire, and thus to consolidate Japanese colonial policy. This exhibition was well attended by both colonial masters and subjects, and is examined in Chapter 5.3.

Leisure spaces were extended to become part of the tourist industry which was developed after the railway system was established in 1898, linking the north of Taiwan with the south; this cut down the travel time to a half a day instead of 11 days of walking as in the Qing period. (Lu, S., 1998: 94) The railway system was needed when travelling to those leisure places which were also the outcome of the standard time routine. The Taiwan railway was begun by Liu; the first line was finished in 1891 with 28.6 km from Dadaocheng (north of Taipei city wall) to Keelung (North Taiwan). In 1893 the railway connected Dadaocheng to Hsinchu with a 78.1km line, giving 106.8 km of continuous railway line in total, which crossed 74 bridges and 568 tunnels. This was the first passenger railway in the whole of China. Yet these new technologies introduced by the Chinese were seen as of poor quality by the Japanese colonialists, whose country had opened their first railway line twenty years earlier between Tokyo
(Shinbashi) and Yokohama in 1872. (Shibata, 2008: 9) Therefore the Japanese spent ten years reconstructing a North-South longitudinal railway based on the Qing railway from south to north along the whole of the west of the island; the line was 404.2km long when complete, finished in 1908 (fig. 4.21) and later was extended from north to south along the less populated east side of the island in 1930.

Japan focused much energy on creating leisure spaces, one of the most important being parks. In what were the vast open spaces of 1895 Taipei, many parks, gardens and a zoo were subsequently built, often grand in scale. In the Chinese and Japanese customs, there had never been ‘parks’ as a public space (though ‘gardens’ as a private space were common). (Chen, Q., 2005: 154) Traditionally, the only public spaces in an urban area were normally in the temple plaza: temple grounds were a considerably more public space than others around Chinese cities, and the construction of a temple in that open area was an invitation for Taiwanese to engage in public activities. (Allen, 2007: 163) It was not only the case in colonial Taipei that religious spaces were converted into secular ones: most Seiyō style parks in Japan and Taiwan had previously been temple areas.

In Japan, the earliest parks were all transformed from temple spaces, for instance the first park in Japan was Ueno Park which used to be Kanei Temple (Jap. 寛永寺); Asakusa park used to be Asakusa temple (Jap. 浅草寺). In Taipei, the largest park was also one of the first foreign style parks in East Asia outside Japan: Taipei New Park (1908) occupied about 10 percent of the intra-mural space of Taipei which followed the spatial plan and function of Tokyo Hibiya Park (1903) near Tokyo’s government district. Taipei New Park was a relatively open space with an open-air performance stage, fountain, and pavilion with a Western garden which was adjacent to a Japanese garden, hidden in the north-western area. Two typical life-size bronze statues stood in the park of KODAMA Gentarō (1906, fig. 4.22) and GOTÔ Shinpei (1911). This was a Seiyō idea, as statues of real people did not exist in customary Chinese or Japanese culture. (Chen, Q., 2005: 146)
Unlike urban parks designed in Europe and America, which were purposefully attempting to recreate a natural environment, the central park in Taipei, in common with most parks built in East Asia, was pacificistically designed for the city environment. (Allen, 2007: 160) The area of Taipei New Park was 71,520 square meters at its initial completion in 1908 (fig. 4.23), and was later extended to include the Gotō and Kodama Memorial Hall, later known as the Taiwan Governor-General’s Museum (now National Taiwan museum, fig. 4.24) with a sports ground in 1915 and an open-air performance stage (figs. 4.25 and 4.26). Yet whilst these public spaces were created, few citizens had sufficient exposure to Seiyō cities to understand how parks should be used.
Monumental persuasion in the new territory

As was common during the same period in Europe and America, the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum (fig. 4.27) was designed in the prevalent Grecian/Roman revival style. This museum was built to commemorate the completion of the first north-south longitudinal railway in 1908 and housed over 10,000 artifacts on Taiwan. The museum was relocated to the new building in Taipei Park in 1915. For Joseph Allen, “The building represents, in both form and content, an early example of a mock-European built space in the public sphere, and it helps configure the park as one of the most important sites for the display of colonization and colonial power.” (Allen, 2007: 187) Compared to the British museum (fig. 4.28), as well as many other museums built in Europe in this period, it is obvious that the museum was purposefully classical in its façade. The cultural meaning is that museums often have ancient artifacts and therefore the architecture harks back to antiquity. Given that Japan does not have a shared Greek and Roman historical background, the architect was therefore copying cultural traditions with an invented relevance to Meiji Japan. In content, the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum focused on the culture and nature of Taiwan rather than the Japanese ‘motherland’. (Terry, 1923: 779) In such ways, Japan subtly demonstrated her tolerance and recognition of the Chinese origins of the populace. This attitude was designed to mollify the colonial subjects and can therefore be seen as another persuasive tactic of the authorities.
The Japanese planning in this period was characterised by the distinctive ‘Japanese’ motivations behind deciding which buildings to construct and which functions were prioritised. Whilst banks, museums and markets were of demarked Seiyō origin, buildings which had a foundation in Japanese culture, such as the value of education and learning, were overly represented, hence the disproportionate number of educational and research buildings in and around the inter-mural area. (Sorenson, 2002: 71) In addition, almost all building projects were centrally planned and, therefore, government built, continuing the Meiji attribute of the overwhelming power of the central government. (Sorenson, 2002: 81) Pyle (1998) suggests that Japan’s modernisation did not assimilate Euro-American values, but further enhanced some existing values (education and science, as seen above) and paid little attention to values in the Euro-American liberal tradition. Whilst this might be overstated given the early cultural adoption of institutions and policies in the Meiji era, Pyle’s argument is compelling for challenging the customary assumption that modernisation is a linear, uniform process rather than a more complex iterative process with its base in Western values.

Gotō’s principle of persuasion was also clear in the city of early Taipei. Being Japan’s first major colonial property, Japan took advice from existing colonial powers, and in the cityscape of Taipei, the prestige component is clear. There were therefore a great number of large, impressive buildings, such as the
largest hospital in East Asia and the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum, which was shown in postcards and posters across the island. This policy of creating monuments was underlined by the Japanese opinion that “our Chinese and Formosan subjects are very materialistic, seeing nothing great save in the glitter of gold.” (Takekoshi, 1907: 34) Such monumental buildings enhanced the image of the Japanese authority in Taiwan which became a principal attribute of government-built buildings in Taipei.

Whilst new functions and spaces were developed in Taipei, the Chinese heritage was crystallised in time, though stripped of former ceremonies and meanings. Important Chinese buildings were not demolished until it was necessary: as shown in Section 5.2 the final Chinese yamen fell out of use in 1919 with the building of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, yet it was not demolished until 1932, and even then parts of the yamen were moved and conserved in the Taipei botanical gardens to this day. (Allen, 2000: 12) As for the gates, preserved without function, these became incorporated into the city plan, with boulevards running alongside where the walls had been which once structured the lives and time routines of the populace. In this, “we have the standard pattern of modernization.” (Allen, 2000: 11)

This crystallising of traditions was in complete contrast to the city planning of Qing Taipei, where forms, aesthetics, functions and spaces had continued to use customary notions of the sacred, particularly in regard to government officials. The building types largely reflected the Chinese idiom, as natives and mainland officials continued in their customary ways of life even after the Opium Wars and treaty ports were established. Chinese modernity then was largely self-reflective: piecemeal attempts were made to reform, but as a long term contact zone was not established with requisite elite for transculturation, the self-strengthening movement was much vaguer in terms of what needed to be done to face the threat of the Great Powers of Seiyō. Whilst traditional planning was systematically applied in the Qing period, no future city plans were produced, only maps of the existing city. From the evidence of the attempts and groundwork in modernisation presented above, it would be disingenuous to say that in Taipei, actual development began after the Japanese began to govern Taiwan in 1895. However the modernisation before Japan’s arrival had been limited by the restraints of Chinese culture.

The purpose of endowing the capital with a distinctive façade to display the goals and values of the state could be seen in Taipei. The façade was one of modernity, of a populace which engaged in modern leisure activities, and where sacred spaces could not be found easily within the city. With the scrapping of the curfew and institutionalising of time and calendars, routinisation of daily life occurred through new measurements of time. This was done with the pragmatic fervor of early Meiji Japan still present in spirit, using the safer approach of adoption of Seiyō institutions: “In order to create national wealth and establish a modern army in the shortest period of time, there were not many options available to new leaders other than importing Western technologies and incubating modern industries.” (Shibata, 2008: 335)
5) As a result, ideas and practices were not clearly separated, which had a large impact on the cityscape; Taipei contained numerous parks and leisure facilities and all the spaces that constituted a modern capital from what Japanese planners understood to be Seiyō criteria. Yet given the history of public spaces in Japan and China, few people knew how to use such spaces, and parallel concepts for areas such as parks developed. The building revolution in Taihoku came from the conviction of the Japanese authorities to create a modern city, rather than a city that matched the lives and practices of its populace.

***

The Japanese principles are notable for their pragmatism and syncretic variety whilst the Chinese Taipei principles are notable for their common theme; Chinese planning in Taipei was concerned with culturally connecting Taipei with its Chinese heritage in the context of technical innovation. Indeed, the overall principle in the Qing period was to continue traditional town planning; for illustration, see the evidence of axiality, courtyards and walled enclosures. However in the Japanese period a number of principles competed and no single principle controlled the others. There was, therefore much less diversity of principles in the Qing era, whilst the Japanese period was rife in contradictions.

It is obvious from comparing fig. 4.13 that the Japanese administrators built a much wider variety of buildings than the Qing period. A major reason for this is that the Self Strengthening Movement had a very different internal context to the Meiji revolution. The Meiji Restoration was initiated and fully supported by the (new) governing body and the spiritual leadership of the emperor, whereas the Self-Strengthening Movement was begun by dissidents and continued as a peripheral activity for a limited amount of time and with limited aims. This is mirrored in the evidence in Taipei: LIU Ming-Chuan’s modernisation efforts were not fully supported in Beijing, received little investment, and after only four years of governorship, Liu was replaced by a more placid governor. In contrast, the Japanese Civil Administrator who modernised the city the most, GOTÔ Shinpei, was widely appreciated by the Japanese authorities, allowed to plan the city with a free hand, and had a statue built in his honour in Taipei New Park. This central support meant that the Japanese were able to do much farther reaching reforms of the city than China was able to do.

In spite of these differences there were several commonalities between the two initial modernising periods. Increasing the status of the city was important for both authorities and for similar reasons: Qing Taipei had been recently named as the new province’s capital, and Japanese Taipei was the capital of
Japan’s first major colonial property. Another more subtle commonality was that, against expectations, Japan also attempted to continue with its traditional priorities. Education and scientific buildings were overrepresented in comparison to other building types, particularly the education of children. From Dutch learning in the 1600s, Japan had been open to foreign science (especially medicine) and a greater proportion of Japanese were educated than Chinese. These customary concerns were evident in Japanese Taipei, with eleven education and research institutions in the city centre, including a primary school in the intramural area.

However, despite the continuation of tradition in these ways, both Japan and China were forced into what I call ‘protective modernisation’ due to the threat of Seiyō. Whilst Japan fundamentally changed its building types, Qing modernisation was not far reaching. This was understood by Hobsbawm (1975) to be because the Qing was able yet unwilling to match Seiyō on Seiyō’s terms, whilst the Meiji administrators were possessed of both the capability and the acceptance that their cultural values should be compromised. In Taipei, of the five education buildings in Qing Taipei’s intramural area, only one was related to foreign learning and this was only concerning language. So the basics of Euro-American technology were disallowed from education, and the fundamental prerequisite of modernisation was not supported by modernisation philosophy. Although both countries were concerned at the rise of Seiyō power, only one country, Japan, wished to join these powers, albeit as a wary peer. Whilst both regimes promoted the newly important status of Taipei, in the Qing period this status was within China and in terms understood by other Chinese, as illustrated by building square rather than rounded walls. Japan’s concern with status was in elevating Japan’s status within the world, to revise Japan’s unfair trade agreements and to be accepted as a world power, and it did so through a demonstration of technical ability and building Seiyō style buildings and several monuments. In contrast, the underlying Chinese belief that it was culturally superior to all other countries meant that such concerns with international status were irrelevant, and ultimately it meant that China in the late 19th century was unable to fully tackle modernisation.

As could also be seen in Section 4.1, landmark buildings of the Japanese colonial period were crucial in bringing together the three major trends of Japanese modernisation: conceptual revolution, centralisation of power, and the construction of new boundaries, both physical and metaphorical. These trends could be found nowhere more obviously than the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in Taipei.
Chapter 5
A symbol of dual modernity: the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office

“The architectural styles changed rapidly following Moriyama’s emergence, which heralded the coming of the second period [of change, 1909-1914].... The old systems were changed into new styles as the Engineering Bureau of the Government of Formosa was also new. Architecture in Taiwan was totally changed after the project of the new Office of Governor-General began at the start of the Taisho period and later entered the period of the Taiwan Industrial Exhibition [1916]. Everything changed from an old to a new system which was shown with the industrial harvesting of cypress trees on Mount Ali and the wholly open railway system [which enabled exporting the wood]. The [First] World War happened soon afterwards, which began an era when nothing was constrained and we could extend ourselves. In other words, [because of the foundation of 1909-1914] we could then enter adolescence.” from IDE Kaoru (Jap. 井手薰, 1879-1944), the Construction Director of Civil Construction and Maintenance Division of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office from 1914. (Ide et al, 1944: 37, translated by Author)

In the first ‘symposium on the transformation of architecture after colonial regime change’ at Taiwan Railway Hotel on 10th April 1943, the Japanese architects’ consensus was that the golden period of colonial architecture in Taiwan had been between Meiji 42 (1909) and the outbreak of First World War (1918). For these colonial architects, Taiwan’s architecture was at its most magnificent during a decade-long period, significantly between two wars both won by the Japanese. After the Russo-Japanese war and the beginning of the rule of the sixth Governor-General, SAKUMA Samata (Jap. 佐久間左馬太, 1844-1915), Japanese authorities started a large scale construction campaign focused on institutions for ruling Taiwan, funded by a large increase in the budget of the Taiwan Governor. Besides the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, all the major city halls in Taiwan, the Monopoly Bureau Building, a major restoration of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, and many other official buildings were all constructed at this time. Due to a consistent theme in the style and material of these buildings, the period was named the Brick Era, (Ide et al, 1943: 38) as brick and tile were replacing wooden buildings, some of which had been eroded by termites. From this period onwards, colonial Taiwan architecture came of age, flourishing with what the Japanese coined as ‘new

---

105 Ide had graduated from the architecture department of Imperial Tokyo University in 1907 under Tatsuno. He worked at Tatsuno’s office from 1907-1909 in Tokyo and was entrusted as a technician of the Central Construction and Maintenance Division from 1911. In August 1914 Ide was promoted as Construction Director yet when the main construction was nearly completed. From 1923 to 1940 Ide was promoted to head the Construction and Maintenance Division, and served the longest as its head. He was also the chairman of The Journal of the Taiwan Architectural Institute from its start in 1929. Ide lived the rest of his life in Taiwan and died there in 1944.
look’ systems, exemplified by the fully opened Railway (1908) together and the Railway Hotel (1908). The architecture produced in this period had much in common with that of the Rokumeikan era (1880s) in Japan, when the clear purpose was revising the general position of Japan through the emulation of Seiyō culture. The values of the 1890s were different, especially following ITŌ Chūta’s influence; in mainland Japan there was new consciousness that indigenous art and architecture should be set apart from imported Seiyō models. This new idea was not carried over to her colony’s own nation-building in official buildings, but was skipped altogether; following the European style authority buildings, Secessionist architecture was introduced in 1920 in the Empire of Japan.

The magnum opus of Japan’s colonial modernity (in architectural terms) was built during this golden era: the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. The building’s rationale, the building itself and its rhetorical aspects make it unique in Taiwan and in the Japanese Empire. This colonial official building tells the story of imperial expansion, symbolising Japan’s dual-modern space and semiotic persuasiveness, and presenting features of authoritarian display that combined to project a universal image of a modern Empire. Whilst these nuanced tasks were made real through other official constructions, the Office became the paradigmatic example of how the role of Seiyō conventions combined with the conditions of rationality and civilisation, a benchmark which influenced other Japanese colonies and later the Chinese Government-in-exile (the KMT). The building was neither just a Western-inspired institution nor merely a container of Japanese state power. It was within an urban showcase representative of Japan’s capable adoption of a foreign culture following its self-image as the modern Tōyō Empire in tandem with their invisible traditions: a symbiotic solution to Seiyō dualism.

The Office’s completion in 1919 marked a turning point in Asian history: in the year following the end of World War I, the May the Fourth movement in Beijing began, protesting against the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, especially Japan’s being allowed to receive territories in Shandong (Chi. 山東) which had been surrendered by Germany after the Siege of Tsingtao. This birth of a New Culture movement, drawing together nationalism and modern literature in China, occurred only two months after Japan had celebrated the completion of the new Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, her first territory in China, the handover of which began an enmity which lasts to this day. At the same time the Office of Governor-General, which had for 24 years been assigned to military governors, was given for the first time to a civilian,106 Baron DEN Kenjirō (Jap. 田 健治郎, 1955-1930). Den promoted a new policy of doka (Jap. 土化, lit. assimilation),107 where Taiwan

---

106 From 1895 to 1919 the island was administered by a series of Japanese Governor-Generals chosen from the Japanese military; from 1919 to 1936 civilians were appointed.
107 Den advocated extension of Home Rule (Jap. 內地延長主義) often associated with Japan’s colonial rule of Korea between 1910 and 1945.
would be governed the same way as the Home Islands, and the Taiwanese would be assimilated into normal Japanese society. For each civilian Governor-General the backdrop of their handover was the most magnificent architectural monument of the colonial period, where twelve of the nineteen executives exercised their administrative, military and legislative power. It may seem ironic that after the Second World War, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was occupied in 1949 by the KMT government product of the May the Fourth movement thirty years before, so the building continued to house the highest authority of two very different political regimes. Whilst the KMT destroyed almost all overt architectural expressions of Japanese identity, the Office was kept as it was, retaining its message of core authoritarian rule as the initial site of a state of Tōyō announcing itself as a kindai (modern) Empire.

As befitted the first seat of non-Western modern colonial power, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was used in a variety of ways, and one of the most important was its earliest use. Even before the building was complete, the Office was the main site of the first Taiwan Industrial Competitive Exhibition in 1916. Its purpose was to exhibit the industrial and economic achievements of Taiwan, the mainland and other colonies in celebration of twenty years of colonial rule. The building was not simply spreading the ‘traditional’ functions of bureaucracy by representing the status of Japan’s consciously kindai (modern) administration. Given the weight of significance and expectation, the building process for the new Office of Governor-General was long and complex, with interventions by the central government on the building’s form and style including a demand to strengthen the central axis in order that the architecture might demonstrate the success of Japan in its progress to be kindai (modern). The process of design and competition, the technical and scientific innovations, the changing of spatial configurations, the stylistic choices, and the role and representation will each be analysed in order to draw out underlying notions of Japan’s imperial modernity through their authority and power in historical Taipei, and to discuss which forms, spaces, materials, semiotics and boundaries were chosen to be publically pursued at that time.

108 Because of this policy, Japan’s first legislation for an urban planning system of 1919 was simultaneously promulgated in Taiwan, displaying the maturity of the new Japanese state. (Sorenson, 2002: 87)
5.1 The establishment of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence and Office

“In Meiji Year 32, the fourth of Governor-General of Taiwan, Count KODAMA Gentarō, was expected to be appointed. His first targets were to establish the ‘Taiwan (Shinto) Shrine’ and the ‘Taiwan Governor-General’s Residence’... Taiwan Governor-General’s Residence was to show the prestige of the Governor-General. Its purpose was to order the Taiwanese people to surrender and to threaten them; therefore, it should have an impressive style.”

SOGAWA Katarō, a Civil Engineer of the Central Construction and Maintenance Division of the Taiwan Governor’s Office. (Sogawa, 1936: 337)

As explored in Chapter 4.1, the expansion to the South of Japan was a long-held goal for the Meiji oligarchy, and the Governor-General in Taiwan was on the throne of this burgeoning Southern Empire. According to Sogawa, one of the first tasks of the new colonial government was demonstrating the prestige of the Governor-General through impressive architecture. Even before the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was built, this purpose could be seen in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence. His Official Residence also functioned as an office, though only for the Governor-General and Chief Civil Administrator, as the main functions of the Office were temporarily set in the Qing Provincial Administration Yamen, the Official Residence’s office space being insufficient. The rapid construction of the Official Residence and its stated purpose echoes Markus’s notion about the effect of architecture on the populace: “buildings, particularly government buildings, produce a powerful experience, and the building form uses the mores and values of its society to great effect to influence the populace.” (Markus, 1993: 27) This influence is even stronger when the building is the seat of government (the Governor-General was the apex of political and military power in colonial Taiwan) and hence a symbol of the country in which it is based.

As noted in the previous chapter, in accordance with Governor-General Kodama’s first targets, the Taiwan Shrine was the only Imperial Shrine and played the main ideological role in representing Japan’s sacred emperor, standing as a metaphor for the ‘unification of the people’s consciousness’. This metaphor only made sense for Japan in tandem with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, which represented the colonial secular dominance by ‘ordering the Taiwanese people’, the other side of Japan’s dual modernity. These two architectural artefacts represented the creation of a dual-modern image for the colonial institutions, combining the colonial governor as the figure of ‘centralised authority’ and the main symbol of progress, with the incorporation of traditions within an authoritarian and assimilatory culture.
The Taiwan Governor-General's Official Residence, 1899-1901 (rebuilt in 1911)

The project to build the Official Residence was set in motion as early as Meiji Year 32 (1899), after four years of experiments in colonised Taiwan, by which time the first bank of Taiwan had opened, the first College (the Taiwan Governor-General's medical school) had been established, the earliest ‘Urban correction’ had been announced and construction had begun on the North-South Railroad from Keelung City (Northern Taiwan) to Kaohsiung City (Southern Taiwan), executed by the newly established Railway Ministry (1899). This highlighted Taipei’s symbolic topography as a kindai (modern) colonial capital in its Japanese period, and the Governor-General's Official Residence became the leading structure to represent Japanese progress.

The Taiwan Governor-General's Official Residence was finished the same year as the Taiwan Shrine in Meiji 34 (1901), and became the pioneer colonial official building in many respects. The initial floor plan and façade design were completed in 1899, one year in advance of the construction; the design was formed together as the principal part of a block of official residences (planned in 1898). It was a two-floor brick and stone building with an asymmetrical neo-Renaissance façade associated with the Veranda style. Neo-Renaissance was very common for mansions in mainland Japan, influenced by Conder and his former pupil Katayama, the primary mansion masters in Meiji time, as discussed earlier. However, the Veranda style was not commonly mixed with Neo-classical by Japanese and European architects in mainland Japan as it was not considered as strictly ‘European architecture’, but this choice may have been a lingering effect of Josiah Conder’s eclecticism. Combination of styles was popular in European colonies such as British India and French Indo-China as a concession to the different climate. This choice seems to emphasise that the Veranda style should be erected in the colonies, yet it was widely used with the Neo-classical in the official buildings of Japan’s colonies.

Among the designers of the building, the leader was HUKUDA Tōgo (福田東吾, 1855-1917), a technician of the Taiwan Governor’s Office since 1898 and temporary manager in the Civil Affairs Bureau of Civil Construction and Maintenance Division of Taiwan Governor’s Office in 1901, who also supervised the Taiwan Shrine in this role. Hukuda’s works were mainly for official residences, jails and land army accommodation with other facilities during the Taiwan rule. He was the colonial pioneer for accommodating officers, bankers, soldiers and even criminals. The Taiwan Governor-General's Official Residence could be considered his masterpiece in Taiwan. Planned as residence and office for the Governor-General, it also provided a guest house function. It was not just a mansion but a semi-public building, combining intense social spaces with Seiyō social manners in a clear example of promotion of Western behaviour, which had formally begun with Conder’s Rokumeikan as previously discussed. The stones were partly from Taipei City Walls and mainly imported from Xiamen (廈門), Southern China.
reception function was formed in highly grandiose manner, with the specification for a banquet room, drawing room and guest room, yet it soon served as a reception for royalty once it was completed in 1901, rebuilt in 1911 for further expansion, and continued to do so until today (fig. 5.1). As for the office function, this asymmetrical Baroque building, rebuilt from Neo-Renaissance, was utilised only by the Governor-General, Chief Civil Administrator and Executives official meeting space, particularly by General Kodama. This office function was used until the Office of Governor-General was completed in 1919.

The Site of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office

The new Office was a curiously authoritarian building which was urgently demanded because, since the beginning of Japanese rule in Taiwan, the main functions of the Japanese colonial administration had been run from the provincial-level Chinese yamen110 (fig. 5.2) within Taipei. The structure of this Qing dynasty building had severely declined both materially and symbolically, as outlined in Section 5.2. The Taiwan Issue records that in Taisho Year 5 (1916): “After a governance of several years, the Governor-General requires a new official office in order to show the political powers of his government and its dominion over Taiwan. In addition, the government’s official office from the Qing dynasty has not been repaired for a long period. The main structure of the building was made of timber which has been seriously decayed by termites.” (Taiwan Issue, 1916: 610) At the end of Meiji Year 38 (1905), a huge fire burnt down four office buildings within the yamen and caused very serious damage which pushed this proposal rapidly forward.

110 For example: Japanese set up Headquarters in the Deng Ying Study Hall (Chi. 登瀛書院), a hospital in a Confucian Temple, military barracks in an examination hall, artillery Regiments in the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen (Chi. 巡撫衙門), the Governor-General’s Residence in the Native and Western learning hall, and the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen within the walled-city.
In the early proposed site seen in ‘Taipei Urban Correction’ of 1900 (fig. 5.3), the plan for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Official Residence and Chief Civil Administrator’s Residence were explicitly specified; at this time the residences for other government offices had been completed. In this plan all the public and official institutions were proposed to be reserved within the walled area of Taipei as important sites. The Office was located at Wenwu Street (Chi. 文武街), in the middle of Taipei walled-city, and the total site area was around 35,723 square metres. The site was levied from the private ancestral halls belonging to the prosperous families Lin and Chen, an area with good feng-shui, as was necessary for the location of ancestral halls. In the five years preceding 1900, the Office’s site was temporarily used as a fashionable ‘Sports club’ which had an oval racecourse (fig. 5.4), displaying the rapidity of Japanese authorities implementation of foreign pastimes. The reasons for choosing this site for the Office cannot verified, but it is safe to assume that GOTŌ Shinpei’s Civil Affairs Ministry was responsible for its planning. The stipulated site was located together with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, the Chief Civil Administrator’s Residence, and the Taipei Park on the official document for the Taipei city planning on 27th March Meiji Year 33 (1900). The previous office in the yamen was just next to the proposed the Office which may have been convenient, considering potential transport problems.

The built area of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is 7,158 square metres (20 percent of the total site area), a huge building project proposed to hold 1000 people. The enormous erection project was an illustration of the scale of effort required; the building included 793 doors, 1,227 windows, 13 staircases and 9 entrances. The building was constructed in the context of early twenty-century Imperial Japan and brought with it a new construction process, new materials, technology and facilities;
also the relevant new firms, roles, and rules of ritual spaces which were produced during a seven year long process, preceded by a controversial design competition.
**Design Competition, 1907-1909**

The government needed a building which showed the ambitions and values of the colonial government. The most vital and expected construction project was to establish a new Japanese authority building to symbolise its new dominion; “Gotō urged Kodama to take action which would distinguish the present colonial authority from the past authority in Taiwan. His recommendations included constructing a large and impressive governor general’s office in the middle of the capitol, Taipei, set off by large streets, boulevards, and parks.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 438) To accomplish this, the building project team decided to raise a design through an open architectural design competition after the Diet of Japan approved the proposal to build the Office.

Gotō still suggested holding a design competition to get the best design even though there were several architectural technicians in the Central Construction and Maintenance Division in Taiwan, all of whom had graduated from the Imperial Tokyo University and were qualified to execute the project. (Huang, J., 2004: 83) This decision was fully supported by the Architectural Institute of Japan (AIJ) to promote talented architects and to practise their skills. Competitions were a very popular method of attracting high quality designs in Europe and Victorian Britain in particular. There were “no fewer than 2500 competitions during the course of five decades [of Victorian rule]: an average of one per week.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 7) This phenomenon in Victorian England filtered through to the Meiji government, as the British Empire was viewed as their ideal. Yet this method was exceptional for Japan: the design for the Taiwan Governor-General's Office was the only competition in Taiwan during the colonial period, and it was the first of its kind for Imperial Japan as a whole.

The competition project was formally proposed by the head of the Civil Engineering Bureau of the Taiwan Governor’s Office at that time, NAGAO Hanpei (Jap. 長尾半平, 1865-1936) on 14th Sep Meiji Year 39 (1906). The competition attracted more than fifty designs, all of which were from mainland Japan due to the strict regulations decided by the civil engineering department and announced after adjudication by the Governor-General. The idea for using stipulations was learnt from formal regulations first manifested in England and drafted by the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) in 1872. These “were developed in order to put paid to competitions.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 8) Yet this draft proposal consisted mainly of a request for a budget for the competition, and a request for construction funding from the Japanese central government. The total cost of construction fees and administrative matters was proposed to be 1,500,000 Yen. The proposal was authorised on 26th April Meiji Year 40 (1907) and the competition was announced for ‘The Governor-General’s Office

---

111 Nagao graduated at Imperial Tokyo University in 1891 and was appointed as the director of Civil Engineering of the Governor-General Office in 1898. He briefly lived with the foremost Japanese novelist NATSUME Sōseki when he was investigating harbours in London in 1901.

112 For reference, 1 Yen could buy 5 litres of rice in Taisho Year 3 (1914) in Tokyo market. (Shue and Huang, 2003: Chap4-35)
design prize’ (Jap. 總督府設計懸賞) on 27th May of Meiji Year 40 (1907) in the official newspaper and architectural journal, also in five other major Japanese newspapers the next day. Two days later on 29th May of Meiji Year 40 (1907), the main regulations from the ‘Regulation for Taiwan Governor-General's Office new design prize’ (Jap. 臺灣總督府廳舍新築設計懸賞募集規程) were announced in ‘Taiwan Daily News (Jap.台灣日日新報)’ newspaper, and are summarised in Appendix V.113

These regulations reveal several attitudes from the Civil Engineering Bureau. First, a long period between the stages and full range of addition information114 shows the vigilance of the project, as it allowed the applicants to read and digest the materials and improve their design. Second, the provision of information on the conditions in Taiwan showed that they wanted the construction to be well planned and suited to the environment from the beginning. Third, the generous prizes were used by the board to generate and encourage a large volume of high quality entries. Fourth, the Seiyō inspiration and knowledge of how to do architectural competitions was shown most clearly in a comment about the usual award sums in foreign countries. Fifth, some commitment to awarding fairly and without bias was shown in the process of guaranteeing the anonymity of the applicants, but conflict was feared as no explanation or objections were allowed. Compared with the European forms of competition, Meiji Japan implied an open and national set of competition rules as in Seiyō to “attract entries from hundreds of ambitious young architects, who see the competitions as a gateway to immortality, while renowned architects often decline to participate for fear of losing face.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 9) Finally, the requirement that applicants be an architecture professional of ‘Empire Japan’ was imposed to obtain designs in a ‘national style’ which resulted in most applicants merely submitting a narrow range of designs due to this unwritten understanding.

The influence of Conder, Ende and Böckmann on Japan became even more obvious at this point, shown in the consensus between entrants’ designs: all were in Neo-classical style, propagated by these foreign architects in Japan. Whilst the Meiji government and civil society in mainland Japan had promoted Wakon-yōsai (Japanese spirit, Western technology) following the end of the Rokumeikan era in the mid-1880s as discussed, this leading project of the golden period of colonial Taiwan architecture showed little influence of this philosophy. Instead the old accusation of imitation of Seiyō semiotics could be applied to the entrants’ designs despite any design restrictions. These controversial Seiyō images continued to operate in Japan’s colony’s official buildings. This brought out the issue of

113 There are twenty-four listed regulations on the ‘Regulations for Taiwan Governor-General’s Office new design prize’ which was based on the proposal by the Director of Civil Engineering Bureau of the Taiwan Governor’s Office, NAGAO Hanpei, on 14th Sep Meiji Year 39 (1906).

114 The information included the site reservation city plan, site section, stratum section, Taipei coordinates and a weather table, the price of materials and transportation, the worker’s payroll, and the bureaucracy divisions. The regulations also stated the details on sales and configurations and even paper, ink, typeface and signs.
how persuasiveness was interpreted by the authorities in Taiwan. As agents of a new power, Japanese architects understood Seiyō architecture as that imbued with authority, and pursued this image only.

Concern with authority was reflected in the competition’s structure too; whilst it was nominally an open and fair competition, the winning design was decided by the Taiwan Governor-General who indicated to the examiners’ board his preferred designs. Explanations and appeals were not allowed. As soon as the proposal was authorised, a temporary examiners’ board had been somewhat unreasonably set up before the ‘Regulations for the Jury’ had been established. This board was appointed by the Taiwan Governor-General and included seven jurors: TATSUNO Kingo, ITŌ Chūta, TSUMAKI Yoriyuki (Jap. 妻木頼黃, 1859-1916), NAKAMURA Tatsutarō (Jap. 中村達太郎, 1860-1942), TSUKAMOTO Yasushi (Jap. 塚本靖, 1869-1937), NAGAO Hanpei (Head of the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office), and NOMURA Ichirō (Jap. 野村一郎, 1868-1942; Head of the Central Construction and Maintenance Division under Civil Engineering Bureau of the Taiwan Governor’s Office since 1904 and a participant in the construction of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence). Two of these personnel worked at the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, and so had good knowledge of local conditions. All were architects and graduates from the University of Tokyo/Imperial College of Engineering except Nagao who studied Civil Engineering; the others were products of Conder’s and Tatsuno’s architecture course. Yet they were undeniably a close group as Tatsuno, Tsumaki and Nakamura had been taught directly by J. Conder, whilst Tsukamoto, Itō and Nomura were taught by Tatsuno: a group without doubts of their supremacy in the Meiji architecture field. The jury included the two most influential architects of the country, Tatsuno and Itō, who were key figures of the practice and theory of the architectural kindai (modern) movement in the mainland Japan as discussed in Chapter 3.

The first stage of the competition focused on the design concept and overall configuration, with drawings at 1/200 scale. The rating criteria were: practicality of the site and floor plans, specification of the construction description, and aesthetics of the elevations. Following this there was consensus between jurors, whereby seven entrants were approved for the second stage but were not ranked according to the judges’ preferences. Although these seven were selected, the jury member Nagao, head of the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office, criticised all applicants for failing to consider adapting their architecture to the conditions of tropical weather. (Taiwan Daily News, 1908) This raises the question of whether any of the applicants had actually been to Taiwan to survey the site.

115 ‘Regulations for Jury’ were stipulated on 21st Aug Meiji Year 40 (1907).
116 These were NAGANO Uheiji (Jap. 長野平右), MORIYAMA Matsunosuke (Jap. 森山松之助), SUZUKI Kichibee (Jap. 鈴木吉兵衛), KATAOKA Yasushi (Jap. 片岡安), MATSUI Kiyotari (Jap. 松井清足), SAKURAI Kotarō (Jap. 櫻井小太郎) and FUKUI Fusaichi (Jap. 福井房一).
Indeed, the jury itself was based in Tokyo according to the delivery address on the regulations. Yet the selected candidates did ‘fine’ for concept and design (Taiwan Daily News, 1908).

It became significant at this point that many of the winners of the first round had links to Tatsuno, Conder and the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office. Of the finalists, Matsui and Kataoka had been working at Tatsuno’s architectural office since 1903 and 1905 respectively; Nagano was cooperating with Tatsuno’s working project and was entrusted with the business of the Bank of Japan since 1896; and Sakurai had worked at J. Conder’s architectural office in 1893-1896. It is curious that Moriyama was even entrusted to become a ‘contractual technician’ of the Central Construction and Maintenance Division from May 1907. So we can almost draw a family tree among these entrants, and in spite of the regulations about anonymity, it is likely that there were opportunities for participants to consult with jury members before formally submitting their designs.

The second stage of the competition took place in 1909 and focused on the construction method details at 1/100 scale and all parts of the specific plans at 1/20 scale; the list of materials and construction methods became essential at this time. The ‘Regulations for the Jury’ for the second stage have not been found, but it seems at this stage the competition employed three more assistants from Taiwan Governor’s Office, and five more from the Ministry of the Treasury. According to one of the assistants of the second stage from the Taiwan Governor’s Office, KAGEYAMA Yorozukura (Jap. 蔭山萬蔵) at the first ‘symposium on the transformation of architecture after colonial regime change’ (recorded in Ide et al, 1944) among the seven entrants selected from the first section of the competition, there were three main controversial issues. First, the smoking rooms on the inner corners of the structure were not appropriate for the seismic activity in Taiwan and led to design revisions. Second, and more seriously, one entrant was accused of plagiarism. The jury initially preferred the design project by Suzuki. However, his design was later disqualified as it was deemed to have copied the design of the ‘Peace Palace’ at The Hague in Holland (Ide et al, 1944: 40) which had recently been part of a design competition. The jury believed that this showed a lack of talent and imagination from the entrant in contradiction of the design competition’s equitable regulations. This comment provides proof that the Japanese did follow contemporaneous European competitions: Suzuki’s design was not similar to the finished building, as the Peace Palace was not even built until 1913. But it is an intriguing puzzle as to why this accusation was made, and whether Suzuki had actually copied the design from Louis-Marie Cordonnier’s first prize entry to the Peace Palace competition of 1906: for me there is little similarity, and even though Suzuki’s central façade section appears to be a miniature version of the front façade of the Peace Palace, it looks much more like the Post Office of Amsterdam built in 1895.

Submission to the Dispatched official office of the Taiwan Governor-General Office at Tokyo city Kōjimachiku area Uchisange-chō town.
The third and longest running controversy occurred when the winner was announced in the official newspaper on 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 1909: the first place was omitted, and the second placed candidate, Nagano, ‘won’ the project and was rewarded with 15,000 yen. Kataoka won the third place and a reward of 5000 yen and the other five entrants were each rewarded with 1000 yen. However Nagano did not lead the project to construct the building; that post was given to MORIYAMA Matsunosuke (who had failed to get through to the second stage of the competition) in 1910 when he was appointed by the Japanese authorities as the construction director of the project. After the announcement the winner, Nagano left Taiwan in anger and returned to Japan, but the controversy over the design continued.\textsuperscript{118}

Taiwan Daily News claimed the first place was omitted because the competition designs were not suitable for the humid, tropical weather in Taiwan: features had to be added reflecting the views of the examination board after the first stage. Also the design paid little attention concerning the location of the materials and how to transport these materials (Taiwan Daily News, 1909a). Such controversy was not unusual in a wider context: in the competition for the Peace Palace the winner was also typically contentious where “one of the outstanding features of the jury report …was its utter triviality.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 9)

In terms of style of competition designs, the main hindrance to the process was the paltry originality seen in the use of historical forms, with many entries showing remarkable similarity to previous designs for Amsterdam’s Peace Palace and Post Office, and Berlin’s Reichstag, to the extent of disqualification for plagiarism. In spite of the jury’s criticism on originality, nine years after the competition, Tatsuno’s ‘Katsuta Hall (Jap. 勝田ホール, 1918)’ in fig. 5.5 was constructed looking suspiciously and remarkably similar in form to the winning design for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (fig. 5.6), designed by his own student, Nagano. This demonstrates that simple imitation of forms was still widespread, even between senior Japanese architects in the 1910s. Yet in spite of these troubled beginnings and reasonable criticisms, this project was considered and improved over a long period by Moriyama and his principal team, who conscientiously revised the plan, including integrating a number of clever technologies into the building, embedding a suitably Imperial hierarchy, and thus rounding off the golden period of colonial Taiwan architecture.

\textsuperscript{118} Nagano soon after wrote in an architectural journal, describing the process as unfair and saying that the government acted like a restaurant owner who ‘advertisises lamb and sells dog’ which was widely reported in journals and newspapers such as Taiwan Daily News on 2\textsuperscript{nd} May Meiji 42 (1909b). Nagano also complained that although his design was selected, his prize was cut in half due to being placed second. Nagano later issued a formal complaint to the civil administration of Japan, which was rejected as the regulations stated that any decision could be made with no objections by the applicant. He was so unsatisfied with the result that it affected his relationship with his ex-teacher Tatsuno and he quit his cooperation with Tatsuno for a project for the Bank of Japan in 1912. (Huang, J., 2004: 148)
MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: the leading colonial architect

The construction director, MORIYAMA Matsunosuke, was a successful colonial architect in Taiwan, building many of the principal town halls. Moriyama was born into an aristocratic family in Osaka in 1869 to a father who was the member of Japan’s House of Lords. He began the Imperial University architectural course in 1894 (two years after jury member ITŌ Chūta had graduated) after the course had been reduced from five years to three years in 1886 during the tenure of TATSUNO Kingo. Following graduation in 1897, Moriyama was hired by the head of the School of Architecture, Tatsuno, to work on building projects such as a branch of the First (National) Bank of Japan as a contract worker. This term as an assistant was short-lived as Moriyama left after three years to work at Tokyo Higher Technical School as an Architecture Lecturer until his Taiwan commission in 1907.

Moriyama was an outstanding performer during his architecture course. He graduated at the first place on his design project thesis available at Architecture Department Library in Tokyo University. Both of Moriyama’s theses were practical: a design thesis on ‘A University Hall for the University of Tokyo’ (fig. 5.7) and a longer technical thesis titled ‘A few considerations on stress in roof trusses and methods of dimensioning’ which demonstrated his talent of engineering technology and construction equipment. It is notable that Conder’s practice of asking students to write on the future architecture of Japan had stopped following Tatsuno’s tenure as Professor of Architecture; consequently after 1884 very few theses were based on the style and future direction of Japanese architecture.
Moriyama’s design thesis is the more revealing of the two documents and contained insights into the man and how he saw the role of the architect. Moriyama’s winning design recalls British Gothic revivalism, with its stained glass windows and asymmetrical layout. The large scale and cool grandeur of the design evokes Tatsuno’s Bank of Japan, finished a year earlier in 1896. The red brick material was a nod to the preferred construction substance of the time, and other evidence of his understanding of the requirements of kindai (modern) buildings could be seen in his interior: the design includes fireplaces, stone staircases, use of concrete foundations and electric lighting. (Moriyama, 1897: 5) At no point does Moriyama use Japanese measurements of tatami or kiwariho which would have been taught on the University course by the master carpenter Kigo (Weldelken, 1996: 32) instead preferring the British measurement system of inches and feet. (Moriyama, 1897: 6-7)

Supporting the conclusion of Section 3.6 (that the customary carpentry learnt by students at Tokyo University was assimilated within a Seiyō framework rather than being seen as a viable alternative), Moriyama followed the British practice on giving the central role of the construction process to the architect. Crucially, Moriyama protected the right of the architect to hire and fire any construction workers: “the Architect is to have full power to discharge or dismiss from the works any foreman, workman or workmen, either for… misconduct and incompetency or otherwise.” (Moriyama, 1897: 2) For Moriyama, the supremacy of the architect certainly stretched to dominion over carpenters; their role was to deliver to order, and fit “wood bricks” into “required positions for the attachment of window frames, door frames, dado and skirtings, wood panelling &c as may be directed.” (Moriyama, 1897: 9) The architect was central, and Moriyama gave no initiative to tradesmen: “Cases, projections and measures to be made where requisite for the carpentry, masonry, plastering and all other trades.”
This implied that for Moriyama, carpenters were an architect’s subordinates and simply another part of the *kindai* (modern) building process, showing that Moriyama stood in the position of Japanese architectural common practice at that time.

Furthermore, Moriyama saw the architect as having a quality control function, checking materials as they entered the construction site: “All the bricks used to be of equal quality” and cases should be “submitted to the architect.” (Moriyama, 1897: 7-8) Clearly, the education given the graduates from Tokyo University was sufficient to judge the quality of masonry materials as well as wood; for the University Hall, Moriyama stated that “The whole of the timber to be perfectly sound and well seasoned, free from sap wood and large, loose or decayed knobs… and all other defects.” (Moriyama, 1897: 13-14) Overall, Moriyama had a clear and legalistic understanding of the role of the architect, from contracting to the rejection of bad materials. He comes across as eager, perfectionist, with a technical outlook and an obvious attention to detail; an architect who was confident and competent, steady rather than highly innovative.

His education at the most prestigious University and his experience at Tatsuno’s office appear to have left Moriyama well equipped to teach on a range of topics, in spite of Tatsuno’s revision of focus of the undergraduate Architecture course. This revision had led to an increased depth of knowledge on technological and scientific issues and increased breadth of knowledge on construction and architectural history. Rather than Conder’s students, it would be Tatsuno’s protégés who would make up the architects who practised in Taiwan. Moriyama displayed his breadth of knowledge in writing ‘The History of Japanese Architecture’ in six volumes for a textbook (*Lecture on Architecture* published in 1905) for the Tokyo Higher Technical School. The book was used as lecture material and covered eight topics\(^{119}\) of study for Japanese architects.

Moriyama’s practical and academic experience, supported by his family’s prestige, gave him a platform for a good architectural career, and he demonstrated a breadth of knowledge from Japanese architectural history to earthquake proofing of buildings. At the same time, Moriyama was published in a journal on a subject of practical and historical interest which shows that he was an expert in his field. The example of Moriyama shows that Japanese architects understood customary Japanese architecture much better by the turn of the 20th century, enough to be confident to write about it at great length. The breakdown of topics, with Japanese history separate from world history, reflects a common

\(^{119}\) The textbook *Lecture on Architecture* included eight subjects: Architecture History (Jap. 建築沿革史), Japanese Architecture History (Jap. 日本建築沿革史), Japanese Architecture studies (Jap. 日本建築学), Building Materials (Jap. 建築材料篇), Scientific assessment of the structural strength of materials (Jap. 材料構造強弱學), Building Tectonic methods (Jap. 建築構造法), Building Construction methods (建築施工法), and Budget Preparation methods (Jap. 預算仕樣編成法).
conception of the time: that Japanese architectural history was viewed as separate to general architectural history, and needed to be studied separately.

After seven years of lecturing, Moriyama was at first entrusted to become a ‘contractual technician’ in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Two months earlier he had led his first building project, presumably as a part of this Taiwan commission: ‘Formosan Pavilion’ (fig. 5.8) for Tokyo Industrial Exhibition (Jap. 東京勧業博覽會臺灣館) at Ueno Park, Tokyo. The structure was known as the Vermilion building and had more than a thousand electric lights by the pond; it was described as a ‘Dragon’s Palace’ and made a strong contrast with other Western-style white pavilions. Three years later on 10th November Meiji Year 43 (1910), Moriyama was promoted to permanent ‘architectural technician’ as a ‘Colonial government office Architect’ and held the position for eleven years. He later led another exposition project, ‘The Taiwan Hall’ (fig. 5.9), at the Tenth Kansai Competitive Exhibition at Nagoya (Jap. 第十回關西府縣聯合共進會臺灣館). This two-level wooden building was described as the ‘Red Sweet Olive flower’. (Taiwan Daily News, 1910) These were the only two buildings he built in Japan while working in Taiwan, before he returned permanently to Japan in 1921.
Moriyama's two Pavilions were both in Chinese Southern Minnan style, chosen as an exotic style to represent the inherent characteristics of Taiwan's Han ethnicity. These buildings emphasised the colony's own unique culture, a consistent style used in all other Taiwan Pavilions in different exhibitions by other Japanese architects. This scheme utilised the binary understanding of modernity at the time: 'modern' and 'Westernised' were considered as the rightful representations for domestic Japan whilst colonial Taiwan fulfilled a subsidiary role with a characteristic native style of 'Crepuscular' and 'Colourful Savage' which served to emphasise Japan as a great, progressive country. Although representing the architecture of Taiwan in native style, these buildings were not at all representative of the buildings Moriyama built in Taiwan; the concession to native style was for guests of the exposition only, and Moriyama's skills were applied in the European idiom in Taiwan. However, this representation of Taiwan’s imagery remained with him for six years after he had returned to Japan, for in 1927 Moriyama built a third and final Taiwan Pavilion (the old Royal Pavilion, fig. 5.10) at Shinjuku Royal Garden in Tokyo. The Garden was later rebuilt after the World War II as the National Garden, and the Taiwan Pavilion survived and was listed as a heritage building. Originally this pavilion was built to celebrate the emperor Showa’s wedding ceremony by the Japanese in Taiwan at that time. Moriyama built a Southern Minnan style wooden Pavilion with all materials transported from Taiwan.

It seems apt for Moriyama, whose buildings came to herald Japan’s architectural golden age in Taiwan at the end of their imperial childhood, to have begun his work in Japan rather than Taiwan. His buildings for the Taiwan Government General were intended to impress fellow Japanese as much as representatives of Seiyō and Tōyō (particularly the local Chinese). This appropriation of Tōyō style was curiously only deemed suitable for being brought to Japan proper; though Moriyama was a marginal figure in Japan, he was a successful and prolific architect in Taiwan, building many of the principal city
halls and landmark buildings throughout the island. Moriyama almost always built in what was known as Tatsuno style, which was to dominate the administrative buildings and most other public buildings in the colony. Yet he was also the leading architect in charge of the Renovation of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence during the same period.

**Moriyama’s Re-design**

The Construction and Maintenance Division\(^{120}\) under the Civil Engineering Bureau of the Civil Affair Ministry supervised and regulated the architecture of the new Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, and Moriyama was the leading architect in charge, leading six technicians. During this highly prestigious commission, his first and most vital tasks were revising and leading the construction based on the winning design of architect, NAGANO Ueiji. To make up for the controversial beginning of the project, he inspected buildings and technologies in Europe and America for two years from 1912 to solve building construction and equipment problems; his rigorous approach may explain why the construction took seven years. As construction director, whilst the reason to have a competition was to construct a building based on the winner’s design, Moriyama, following the Central Construction and Maintenance Division’s recommendations, decided to modify the winner’s designs in reaction to the jury’s criticism. According to Ide, who participated as a technician of the new Office from 1911, the redesign was finished in two stages accomplished by the end of 1911. Revisions were made of both Nagano’s second placed ‘Tower design’ (fig 5.11) and Kataoka’s third placed ‘Dome design’. Moriyama took these designs back to Tokyo, and the revision of Nagano’s Tower design was chosen after discussion. Nagano’s design was weakened by being unable to accommodate the required 1000 Government staff, which had not put him in a strong position to run the project. The redesign process was in fact crucial, and led to a stronger design, better able to fulfil the implicit purpose of design competitions in general that “the winning design would then serve a prototype for buildings of its sort.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 8) Yet developing a prototype had only just begun by the end of the competition, since Nagano’s design was only used as the basis for a version which was radically changed.

In the implemented design plans, the four entrances were made larger in scale with a driveway and two more bicycle entrances added. A magnificent entrance hall was created when the plan was enlarged; and four smoking rooms (assumed to be adapted from Suzuki’s design) on each floor were also added and redesigned to be seismic-proof. In the elevations there were more details on the style and the

---

120 The Central Construction and Maintenance Division had just separated from the Central Civil Engineering Division under the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office in 1902. “Construction in Taiwan only happened after the military and political developments of 1896. After 1896 until the late Taisho period (1926), all administration lay under the direct jurisdiction of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. All construction was undertaken by the Central Construction and Maintenance Division.” (Li, Q., 2004 [1979]: 98) Before 1902 construction had been undertaken by the Central Civil Engineering Bureau.
central tower was made five floors higher. It seems that the Central Construction and Maintenance Division looked at the work of all other entrants and merged the best parts to form the final plan with a new style (fig 5.12).

Once finished, the Taiwan Governor-General's Office appeared to be made from red brick and stone; the cladding over the reinforced concrete created the effect of horizontal bands of ‘red bricks’ and ‘white pebbles’ on the outer walls. On the windows, non-structural keystones were arranged in a wheel shape to add diversity. The façade had sparsely-ornamented arcading along the second floor with the columns reaching down to the bottom of the ground floor. This arcading gave the building a certain Italian squareness and regularity of outline. Although the ground and first floor façade were simple with white square balconies which were separated by solid ‘brick’ columns (again made from concrete), the diversity of form from the second floor and ground floor made the front facade lively. This visual effect was very similar to the architecture of Tatsuno, yet the balconies spoke of adaptation to the climate of
Taiwan and a continuation of the Veranda style which had begun with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence.

Others later criticised the jury for not allowing the winner to coordinate his own project and provide revisions to the style (following Tatsuno’s favoured red-brick with white banding), but it seems that Moriyama himself did not operate with a free hand. According to MORII Kensuke (森井健介, 1887-1976) in 1976, Moriyama’s role of technician on the project of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office followed Tatsuno’s recommendation. Unsurprisingly it seems that the driving force behind the Tatsuno style in this building was the direct manipulation by Tatsuno, the head of the jury and a very influential kindai (modern) architect, not only in mainland Japan like many of his peers, but throughout the Empire of Japan.

The fact that the final design ended up similar to the Jury Chairman’s preferred style is some indication that the authority for the design was not wholly with the designer. That the original design was given to Moriyama and his team of colonial architects to redraft rather than to the original designer, Nagano, is also suspicious: I assume that Nagano was not hired because he was not an employee of the Governor-General, whereas Moriyama was. The overall process was also presided over by the Governor-General himself, with the redrafts conducted to his specifications. These three key points indicate that centralisation was a strong force at play in the initial designing of the Taiwan Governor-General's Office. As identified throughout this thesis, centralisation was one of the three main pivot points around which Japanese modernity was established, and was in some ways the key driver in the process to make it a cohesive movement that was capable of establishing a nation-state, with a particular, Seiyō-inspired spirit. For the Taiwan Governor-General's Office competition to still end up as a victim to centralisation, whilst promising to be the first open architectural design competition in Japanese history, is another indication of quite how vital centralisation was to the construction of Japanese kindai (modernity).

5.2 The utilisation and allocation of central leading institutions

The design of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was executed over seven years from 1912 to 1919. Given the extent of this project and the significance of the architecture for the Japanese project of colonial modernity, the building can be understood in various dimensions, each of which is a significant building block in explaining the scope, character, meaning and protrusion of the Office: first as a principal field of imperial/colonial space, second as a container of rational and conjoining technologies, third as a symbol of Japan’s sense of identity, and fourth as a projective influence for future architecture.
in East Asia. These aspects derived and were cultivated from the experiment of the *kindai* (modern) architectural movement in Imperial Japan’s domestic spaces, but in many cases were first applied in her colonial spaces.

These aspects of central institutions in her colonial spaces when distilled show an imperial hierarchy whose purpose was strengthening Japan, first actualised by adopting the local Chinese administrative buildings in line with Gōto’s biological principles: organic growth by first taking over the host country’s buildings. It was necessary to understand the habits of the Taiwanese population, particularly socio-political institutions, in addition to the reasons for their existence, before creating corresponding policies. After their arrival in 1895 the colonial government carefully studied the order of the Chinese bureaucrats’ buildings (*yamen*) and drew the floor plans of the *yamen* buildings clearly (these Japanese plans are the earliest existing official records of the *yamen*) and utilised these buildings until they were finally made obsolete by the construction of the Office in 1919.

The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office housed within its architecture the highest colonial administrators, and was comparable in status to the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen in Qing Taipei. The Office building was created to fit each component of the Taiwan Governor-General’s bureaucracy. Reading architecture sociologically, the building encapsulated colonial Japan’s legal totality over Taiwan as its governing principle; Japan’s government buildings also contained totalising spaces, none more so than the Office. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was allied with the Official Residence as the centre of the administration on the island; the nature of this administration was at once rational and all-encompassing, which can be understood from the spatial experience of the Governor-General whose spaces emphasised his role as a centralised controller; the corresponding experience of the workers reflected this normative governmentality.

Fulfilling Japan’s binary approach to public and private spaces, the centrality of the emperor remained partially hidden in this *kindai* (modern) colonial building; the construction of the Office presented a major challenge to the development of new architecture in the colony. A significant part of this challenge was due to the role of the emperor in Japan’s nation building, especially given that the relationship between the emperor and the Governor-General meant that the latter was an imperial delegate. Evidence of this connection meant that these imperial spaces and their significance in the Office give substantiation of a progressive tradition in modernity. Alongside this, the emperor’s subjects were exposed to what was then the cutting edge of Japanese modernity in the subordinate spaces. In the basement particularly, *kindai* (modern) spaces shaped the occupants’ behaviour and emphasised their subordination, whilst entrapping them within a modern paradigm.
From Yamen to Colonial Palace

The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is commonly associated with the building constructed 1912-1919. However the Office was an institution first and foremost, and whilst its mature location was in the purpose-built building executed by Moriyama after 1919, for the first twenty-four years of Japanese rule, nearly half of the ruling time, the Office was mostly based in a Qing-dynasty yamen. As introduced in Chapter 4, the logic of Qing architecture and town planning was poles apart from the Japanese kindai (modern) plans and buildings built in Taipei. For the most part this gap was a reflection of the comparative progress of the modern movements in China and Japan. This gap became relevant the moment that Japan arrived in Taipei and began inhabiting Qing buildings. Before the establishment of modern bureaucratic institutions after 1895, the central Japanese authorities became engaged in the habitual spaces of the Chinese authorities. These spaces contained longstanding orders and sequences of space established by statutes relating to individual yamen for civilian and military officers.

These statutes were embodied in the Qinding Da Qing huidian (Chi. 欽定大清會典, lit. Imperially endorsed collected statutes of the great Qing dynasty), which was revised in 1899 in the Chen Shu (Chi. 政書, a record of laws and the institution systems of all the past Chinese dynasties). The edicts divided yamen into three overlapping spatial areas in the diagram below (fig. 5.13): an area for processing affairs, an administrative area and a residential area as shown in the diagram below which was the template for all kinds of yamen, added to depending on the functions required, and it was the sequences which were standardised rather than the scale. The yamen is entered from the left; the main Court is normally located after the ‘yi’ (Chi. 儀 lit. ceremonial) gate. Its function is for the Governor and his officials to administer affairs and to hold court. The second Court is located beyond the main court and its function is for County officials (Adjutants) to hold court. The third Court is the final area of the building and the residence for the Governor with his family. Yemens of different status vary, and depending on the grade of the yamen there may be additional spaces such as a storehouse, prison, ancestral temple or examination building. In Qing Taiwan and elsewhere in China, official building types followed a set formula and contained a number of functions together within a walled enclosure, rather than separating these out.

121 For example the ‘Yingzao Fashi’ of the ‘Chen Shu’ recorded instructions for officials to build additional areas depending on the type of yamen which was required: 1. ‘Install a storehouse in the buzhuang shi si (Chi. 布政使司, Institution of Provincial administrator) yamen and the yanyun shi si (Chi. 鹽運使司, Institution of control salt affair) yamen’. 2. ‘Install a prison in the anzha shi si (Chi. 按察使司, Institution of Provincial criminal Judge) yamen and local administration’. 3. ‘Install an ancestral temple inside the yamen’. 4. ‘Install an examination building in the provincial yamen and prefecture yamen’. (Chen Shu, 1899, quoted from Huang, S., 2001: 43)
This sequencing is the foundational notion for all Chinese official buildings. Therefore whilst the buildings had a variety of functions, there was little difference between the space and organisation of religious, administrative or even residential buildings; rather the status of the building determined its size and collection of structures, the orders of beams and dougong (Chi. 斗拱, a structural element of interlocking wooden brackets) on a roof.\footnote{Without understanding the orders of roof brackets, Chinese buildings have often been deemed to all look similar. For instance, according to the classic architecture history text, Rosengarten (1896), “The architecture of the Chinese temples does not differ from that of the other buildings.” (Rosengarten, 1896: 56) This appears to be the case only when the relatively subtle orders and details of structures are ignored which are key to understanding the rank and identity of ‘Oriental buildings’ as discussed in Chapter 3.} The main space is formed by rows of buildings with courtyards in between. Entering the main court required passing through several gates, the number of gates depending on the building’s status. This demonstrates the importance of transitional spaces in Chinese culture, an importance which increases as the status of the building increases. The transitional spaces were open spaces representing thresholds; these were normally much more spacious than internal spaces as they were used as ceremonial ritual spaces, which comprised the main utilised spaces of Chinese buildings. These ritual spaces involved engaging in feats of perspective and memory and were not recognised as circulations; due to the ceremonial aspect these spaces have often been misunderstood as sacred spaces. Actually these ritual spaces were spaces of moral hierarchy which can be seen by the number of different thresholds and by the different height of doorway sills; both gave an indication of the rank of the occupant and the respect a visitor would need to pay. Following the relevant rules was mandatory and the actions performed depended which spaces were entered, as each threshold was associated with a difference in status. These two aspects demonstrate that form is much more meaningful than style in the Chinese architecture.

The political status of Taipei as a provincial capital was architecturally crystallised by the construction of various yamen, the highest rank of which was the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen (or Xunfu Yamen, Chi. 巡撫衙門). This yamen housed the highest ranking government official on the island after the establishment of Taiwan Province in 1885. It was completed in 1889 under the first provincial governor, LIU Ming-Chuan. The position of provincial governor was essentially as an ambassador from...
the central officials in Beijing, separate and above the rest of the provincial apparatus. He was holder of the principal second rank (or the Zheng Er Pin, Chi. 正二品) assuming full responsibility over the military, people, punishments and government of a province. In spite of the high position, the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen consisted of civil and military ministries but was small in size and was only a minor collection of structures as it was initially a temporary office. This building was originally named Xunfu Xingshu (Chi. 巡撫行署, Provincial Governor Department) rather than being a full yamen until 1894 when the Taiwan provincial capital was officially moved to Taipei prefecture. As it was not amongst the largest administrative structures there are no reliable records of this building. According to Li, Q., (2004 [1996]) most of the structure was partly destroyed in 1895 when the Japanese army arrived in Taipei, and thereafter it was used by the Artillery division until being demolished in 1900.

The most significant government building with respect to Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen, or Buzheng Shi Si Yamen (Chi. 布政使司衙門). This building was completed in 1889 under the second Financial Commissioner, SHEN Ying-Kui (Chi. 沈應奎) and was the highest status local government building built in Qing Taiwan in its role as the focal point of local governance. As with the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen, it was initially a temporary office named Fan Si Xingshu (Chi. 藩司行署, Treasurers Administrative Department) until 1894. The purpose of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was to administer Taiwan’s financial, taxation and grain systems, its soldiers and horses, and to announce government decrees to the city, county and prefecture. Specifically it served as the site for Qing government treasury affairs, military payments and even as a temporary residence for the government officials from Beijing on their inspection visits to Taiwan. This building cluster was used extensively as the initial main authority site by the Japanese because the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was the biggest building group in Taiwan. The scale was further increased after an additional section was added to the yamen between 1892 and 1895: the Reception Yamen (Chi. 欽差行臺) for Taiwan Provincial and Administrator Governors which served as a reception for other officials and also offered banquet spaces for executives. Following the

123 Following the establishment of Taiwan Province in 1885 Taiwan’s Provincial capital was initially planned to be in Qiaozitou (Chi. 橋仔頭, now Taichung City) in 1887; moving the capital from Tainan prefecture (1884) for the first time. However the third Provincial Governor, SHAO You-Lian (Chi. 邵友濂, 1840-1901), moved the Provincial capital to Taipei prefecture in 1894, before this period Taipei was only used as a temporary capital. The construction of a new Taiwan provincial capital walled-city at Qiaozitou was ceased in 1891 after LIU Ming-Chuan, the first Provincial Governor, had left. The temporary Provincial Governor Yamen was built in Taipei city in 1891 as Taichung walled-city had not been completed and in the end was never competed. Such administrative complexity and the reversal of major decisions points to the chaotic nature of imperial rule in the late-Qing dynasty.

124 A Buzheng Shi (Chi. 布政使, Financial Commissioner) served under the xunfu’s office, controlling the revenue of a province and held the Chong Er Pin (Chi. 從二品, secondary second rank) rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The buzhen shi was a post in Qing China in charge of a province’s finances, taxation and related affairs.

125 Shen was previous governor of Guizhou (Chi. 貴州) Province who was awarded Military medals in the Taiping Rebellion. He was dismissed as previous governor of Guizhou due to accusations of felony. Afterward he was appointed to Taiwan during the Sino-French war in 1884 and later acted as Provincial financial commissioner in 1889 for two years, before finally becoming the second provincial Governor in 1891 for a year.
addition of the Reception Yamen, the whole building group was 2.4 times the width of the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen, indicating the difference in scale. However in the military vulnerability and independence movements which shook Taiwan during and after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), this Reception Yamen was repurposed as a special military installation (Chi. 築防局) by the fourth provincial governor in 1894 (fig. 5.14).

As the de facto headquarters of provincial administration its importance was indicated by the complexity of functions, with the granary, stables, temples and pleasure gardens all enclosed with its courtyards and gates. There were 18 building clusters within these two conjoined yamens (fig. 5.14), as
well as ceremonial gate, front gate and two outer entrance gates (facing east and west). These two yamens were each fitted with a screen wall for the purpose of etiquette and feng-shui. Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was in Southern-Minnan style and had a main court and second court with the rest area as shown in the plan below. The ke rooms (office rooms) in the Process Affair area were within the side of the yi (ceremony) Gate following the statutes. This hierarchy contained a set of six official offices for bureaucrats and each housed government functions: lì (Chi. 吏, lit. minor official), hù (Chi. 戶, lit. household official), lǐ (Chi. 禮, lit. ceremony official), xíng (Chi. 刑 lit. punishment official), bīng (Chi. 兵, lit. military official) and gōng (Chi. 工, lit. labour official) rooms. These six institutions had a huge transitional space set straight before this main court due to its hierarchical importance. This space was followed by the private section of residences for officials’ dependents and a delicate rock garden which had components made from coral stone; the garden was placed behind the public halls and contained a pavilion, a fountain and a pond.

The hierarchy of spaces can also be seen in the main hall of the Reception Yamen (also known as special military installation), Wanshou pai (Chi. 萬壽牌, lit. memorial archway of the emperor’s birthday), and in the north wing of the Reception Yamen which contains a place for prayer to the Northern Great Emperor as well as a theatrical stage in the front and a rock garden with a pond in the back. The yamen combined both public and private aspects and integrated all functions of the chief official into one expanded space.

In spatial terms the status of the yamen was indicated by depth rather than height: the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen with the Reception Yamen was a sprawling collection of buildings, mysterious to residents, with transitional spaces separating and spreading the yamen across a large expanse of the city. For the Qing it was more useful to have a low administrative building that could be added to, rather than a tall building which could not easily be made taller; this logic reflects the elastic gamut of rigorous planning by Qing authorities, as yamen allowed for a more ad hoc approach. This contrasted with Japanese architectural modernity, as explored in Chapter 3, which generally moved away from temporary expedients (as embodied in Qing Taipei) towards a rational, planned future fitting with George Ritzer’s (1996) dimensions of modernity: predictability, calculability, efficiency and increased control.

The predilection for administrative buildings in Japan before 1868 had been similar in many ways to the yamen that colonial administrators found in Taipei. Before the castle building era in the 16th century, Japan’s authority buildings (such as the Emperor’s Palace in Kyoto, or the Heijō Palace in Nara) followed a similar configuration of having square shaped walled compounds, gates indicating
transitional spaces, strong axiality and a mix of residential, ceremonial, reception and office functions. However, whilst there were broad brush similarities, the Japanese palaces and castles had none of the details that defined yamen, except the standard sequence of spaces. There were sufficient similarities that administrating the colony from the yamen represented a nostalgic return to the past, as the construction principles inherited from China were formative in creating Japan’s first palaces and temples from the Nara period (710-794) onwards. In Japan, administration continued to be from low palace buildings until the Meiji Restoration: even in the capital Edo, where the tallest keep in Japanese history was built at the beginning of the Tokugawa period, “the centre of ritual and administration shifted from the castle keep to the palaces erected within the castle walls”. (Coaldrake, 1996: 132) For former samurai it is likely that the architectural vocabulary of gateways (Coaldrake, 1996: 203) was more familiar to high-level Japanese than the semiology of classical revivalism. This familiarity may have contributed to the long utilisation of the Qing yamen as the main site of colonial authority.

Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen with the Reception Yamen was sketched and analysed intently by Japanese colonial authorities from the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Yet all these functions were not only studied by Japanese colonial authorities but were utilised for over half of the colonial period, most intensely for the first twenty-four years. Whilst the yamen was studied it was simultaneously used as the base of the Japanese Imperial Guard (Jap. 近衛師団) which were in the process of invading Taiwan in 1895. After a few months, when the Guard had advanced into southern Taiwan, the main part of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen served the Army division (it was reformed and renamed as the Taiwan Army Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army (Jap. 臺灣軍司令部) in 1919), which itself was under the Governor-General. Whilst the space of the Reception Yamen (later known as the Special Military Installation) was smaller than the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen, the building materials and architectural style were more sophisticated, owing to its function as a formal banqueting space (fig. 5.15).

Whilst the Army used the larger space, the Reception Yamen was used as the Office of the Governor-General from 1895: the affairs office of the Governor-General was in the north corner space marked ‘O’ in fig 5.35 and initially his dormitory room was two doors away along the corridor (which is marked ‘X’ in fig 5.16). Notably the spatial arrangement of the two building clusters allowed for direct communication and coordination between the army and administration. Whilst the split between the army and the Governor-General is clear, the process of building occupation was complicated and was representative of the gradual supremacy of civil administration over military administration.

126 For more detailed discussion of the Japanese ancient authority buildings at the Edo and Meiji, see William Coaldrake’s 1996 work, Architecture and Authority in Japan.
After six years of occupation, in 1901 the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence was completed and the Governor-General and his key staff (such as the Chief Civil Administrator) moved to the offices on the ground floor of the Residence according to their plan. Construction of the Residence was a priority as it could contain many spatial functions necessary for a modern imperial state, purposefully reflecting the grandeur of the Governor-General. In its combination of living area, guest rooms, and offices, it was similar to the White House in Washington D.C. or India Office in Delhi in scope (if not scale). This allowed the government to build the Office methodically with evident attention to detail. The remaining staff are assumed to have stayed in the former Reception Yamen which became known as the old Office. This split in the staff remained until 1919 when the kindai (modern) Office was completed by Moriyama, (fig. 5.17) and the Reception Yamen/old Office was vacated. A year later the Army also moved into a new kindai building completed in 1920 yet again by Moriyama, the foremost architect for Government office buildings; this building also embodied the colonial kindai mission, strongly influenced by Tatsuno style, displaying consistency in nation-building (fig. 5.18).
What had been the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was then used as a school amongst other functions. After 12 years of intermittent use, in 1932 the yamen complex was destroyed, the site was then occupied by the Taipei Assembly Hall (finished in 1936), the first Public Building for organised urban gatherings in Taiwan, which was used for staged events, meetings, conference and exhibitions. The decision to build the Assembly Hall was made in 1926 to commemorate the ascension of the new Shōwa emperor, and for 1928 a ‘Commemorative Exhibition for Royalty (Jap. 福大典紀念博覽會的舉行)’ was planned. Yet in the event this first building for public gatherings was used first as the main site for the extensive Exhibition in Taiwan: the 1935 International Exhibition held in Taipei. Given this use,

127 Some architects wished to preserve the building, and a long debate ensued, where three options were offered: for the building to remain preserved as heritage of both the Qing and Japanese colonial rule; for parts of the building to be preserved elsewhere; and for the building to be completely destroyed. Eventually the architects reached a compromise where a small portion of the most valuable parts of the building was preserved, deconstructed and rebuilt partly in Maruyama Zoo and mainly in Taihoku Botanical Gardens (previously the Taiwan Forestry Research Institute) at the other side of the city in 1932.
the Assembly building was a thoroughly modern replacement for the yamen, holding multiple public functions.\textsuperscript{128}

The transfer of staff and functions from the old yamen and those working at the Official Residence to the kindai (modern) Office was a momentous event for Taiwan, a crucial step in the virtual cultural transition from Qing China to modern Japan. Japan’s use of the yamen up until this point as the old Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was notable for four reasons. First, regardless of the Japanese authorities exclusively building kindai (modern) authority architecture, a degree of comfort was implied by the long occupation by the Governor-General’s staff; it is difficult to imagine Europeans ruling from native buildings for almost 25 years in a similar manner, especially given the vast economic resources the Japanese central government put into governing the island. In addition, the clear study of buildings implies a discernable difference in the colonial modernity of Taiwan compared to European colonial powers. This difference may have arisen as the Japanese were colonising people of a related cultural background within the East Asia region, unlike Europeans in the era of high imperialism. Whilst the Japanese administrators made efforts to distinguish themselves from the locals, common interests and other commonalities meant that Japanese administrators could tolerate such spaces and adapt much easier than Europeans in similar contexts.

Second, despite Japanese understanding the functions of the two building clusters and the logic of the sequencing (shown in the annotated fig. 5.13) these functions were not followed or respected. The main administration of the colony was housed in the Reception Yamen (used as a Special Military Installation by the Qing in 1895) and the army was housed in the administrative section, which included the spaces for the dispensation of justice and other governing functions. Rather than follow the Qing logic of spaces, the army – initially larger and more important in the colonisation of the island – took the larger building and used the spaces for their own functions. The Japanese study of the building alongside pragmatic utilisation of existing institutions reflects the Japanese approach in Taiwan more generally: to study the habits, customs and behaviour of the natives and utilise these according to Japanese needs, an approach which was also used in Manchuria from 1905.

Third, the gradual move from yamen to kindai (modern) buildings was a trend echoed in other parts of Japan’s early modern history. Sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) have found that social

\textsuperscript{128} Within the four floors of the building there were two main sections: first a gathering area with two layers consisting of 2056 seats, and second a restaurant area split over three floors with a dining area, games room, barber shop, VIP room and kitchen. This public institute was also comprised of a modern observatory dome with an equatorial refractor telescope on the roof.
habits are spatially and temporally defined as well as being embodied by people;\textsuperscript{129} this embodiment means that whether desired or not, traditions and habits of earlier times can continue in new settings and are accentuated in settings reminiscent of earlier locations. This is also likely to have occurred for officials in government buildings, given that major, authentic Seiyō spaces (charted in Chapter 3) were not built until the 1890s. This familiar, slow and elongated transition from Edo palaces to Western buildings was replicated in Taiwan with the slow transition from the somehow familiar yamen building through to the Taiwan Governor-General's Office. This transition made the potential shock of visiting the Office much greater, forcing a more dramatic change of habits and an implied change of self- and other-perception. For instance, the system of gates and spaces of transition was deeply rooted in both Japanese and Chinese architecture: the complete absence of similar gateways, replaced by lobby with corridors or service ‘boxes’, would have had some psychological impact on the administrators. The Japanese colonial government expressed its power in severing the link of customary practices, even whilst this was a link that was in some way sustaining a lived tradition.

Finally, moving from combined occupation of the former Reception Yamen and the Official Residence to the purpose-built Taiwan Governor-General's Office implied a remarkable, if gradual, increase in scale of government functions, which is explored below. This unpredictable growth of the Office from several hundred staff to over one thousand is over and above the growth in Taiwan's population,\textsuperscript{130} which had been under fifteen percent between 1905 and 1915, including Japanese nationals. Given this, the scale and scope of the new Office implied a growth in the ambition of the Japanese authorities with respect to both Taiwan and Asia.

The Office and the Official Residence: totalising spaces of authority
The organisation of Taiwan Governor-General's Office was authoritarian with the Governor-General as the source and font of all authority: the Governor-General dominated the executive, legislative and judicial powers. The bureaucracy consisted of four main Ministries at the beginning of the Japanese colonial period: the Secretariat, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Army Affairs and the Ministry of Assistants of the Navy. The Secretariat included the Secretary, Official clerk, Survey and Foreign Affairs divisions. The Ministry of Civil Affairs had the most divisions: Financial, Communication, Colonial Affairs divisions. The Ministry of Civil Affairs had the most divisions: Financial, Communication, Colonial

\textsuperscript{129} The most common phrasing of this idea today is the notion of habitus which proposes that “human agents are historical animals who carry within their bodies acquired sensibilities and categories that are the sedimented products of their past social experiences”. (Wacquant, 2011: 1)

\textsuperscript{130} According Spence's (1999) figures the population of Taiwan from the first annexation by Chinese in 1624 until 1955 is shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1624</th>
<th>1684</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>3,039,751</td>
<td>3,479,922</td>
<td>3,993,408</td>
<td>5,212,426</td>
<td>6,560,000</td>
<td>9,078,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Production, Civil Engineering (which included the aforementioned Central Construction and Maintenance Division) and Police Bureau; and Local, Legal Affairs and Academic Departments. The Ministry of Army Affairs included Staff Officer, Adjutant, Judge, Manager, along with Military, Medical and Veterinary departments. All these Ministries and divisions were to be housed within the 'Old Office' whilst the Governor-General himself was based in the Official Residence’s office as discussed.

Given these central governance roles, the Governor-General’s Office was the centre of the administration on the island in a way that the Provincial Governor of Taiwan had not been; rather than being an inspector, advisor and executive, the Governor-General’s administration would by necessity of the functions of government be at once rational and totalising. All aspects of taxation, communications, public health, education, economic development, legislation, and law enforcement were covered by the Governor-General: “At the local level use was made of institutions of control inherited from the pre-colonial period: landlords, village headmen, household groups…. It was highly trained and tightly organized.” (Beasley, 1987: 145) Compared to Korea, Taiwan was slightly more controlled from Tokyo, with the Governor-General answerable to either the Home Minister or the Prime Minister, depending on the politics of the time.\(^{131}\) Law in Taiwan was therefore more connected and similar to Japan than it was in Korea, particularly after 1923 when most of the constitutional rights of Japan (established in 1889) were given to Taiwanese. Within four years of the building’s completion in 1919, Taiwan would begin the process of becoming legally continuous with Mainland Japan, under which most Japanese laws were directly implemented in Taiwan.

The legal system that was implanted to Taiwan was so tied to the business of ruling the colony and the system of micro-governance that this role was embodied in the Office building itself. Japan’s laws were first patterned on the German legal system. Codifying began during the negotiations to remove extraterritoriality as part of the process of proving that Japan could be trusted to do justice to foreign residents. This legal code was written and tied to constitutional rights, thus more clear than the Qing (and British) legal system, which was based on an unwritten constitution, natural justice, and was heavily interpretive. The Governor-General was responsible for enacting the Japanese legal system in Taiwan which “was clearly defined, resorting to a well-calculated mechanism of governmentality, which was – ideally at least – universal in application and articulate and rationalistic in contents. Colonial authorities derived their power from, and legitimised their actions with, this legal code.” (Ts’ai, 2009: 19)

\(^{131}\) According to Beasley, “From 1897 to 1910 there was no central office responsible for overseas territories: Taiwan and Karafuto came under the Home Ministry, Kwantung in most respects under the Foreign Ministry. In June 1910 a colonial bureau was created, responsible to the Prime Minister, to deal with Taiwan, Karafuto, and non-diplomatic matters concerning Kwantung. It had a chequered history: abolished in 1913; revived in 1917; transferred to the cabinet secretariat in 1922; finally, absorbed into a full-fledged Colonial Ministry in 1929. At no time was Korea effectively subordinate to it.” (Beasley, 1987: 144).
The change in legal system in the early 1920s had an enormous impact on life in Taiwan. Even prior to this, whilst the separation of court functions to new buildings had been well established in mainland Japan, removing courtyards and dividing walls in changing from the yamen to the court-house and the prison-house caused a major change in the Taiwanese perspective. From a colonial subject’s (Taiwanese) point of view, they had to adapt to a new legal system (albeit gradually) that was in theory much less corruptible and covered far more of their daily lives. Taiwan experienced a change in the legal paradigm, from a loose, malleable system to a totalising function. This was a great contrast for colonials, both in terms of bodily experienced space (going to a court, rather than yamen) and in terms of the encompassment of the law: “The administration of home affairs were almost all-inclusive in the regulation of people’s daily lives, including not only social order and sanitation but also education and economics. This… enabled the Japanese government to penetrate to the bottom of Taiwanese society.” (Ts’ai, 2009: 19) This indicates that the Governor-General’s role and his office should naturally follow this rigorous, controlled approach to the organisation of social spaces, and be an obvious exemplar of progressive thinking.

The inspiration for this role unsurprisingly originated in Europe and America. Japan’s legal codes were aimed at eliminating extraterritoriality; formed in the late 1800s, Japanese administrators formulated a legal code that would be acceptable to foreign residents. (Ts’ai, 2009: 22) Given that these legal systems were aimed at gradual assimilation using Seiyō legal codes, the Governor-General was creating a social space and political institutions that had at their basis foreign notions of governmentality, the powers of government, the rights of citizens, and the paraphernalia of the ruler, some of which could be physically seen in the spatial organisation of the Office. Although the building’s style was undoubtedly important to colonial Japan (and is explored at some length in Section 5.4) the impressive façade presents a limited scope for understanding the substantial utilisation and allocation of the building. In terms of communicating and directly influencing the building’s inhabitants, perhaps the most direct effect was from the organisation of the building’s spaces. The organisation of space “provides the material preconditions for the patterns of movement, encounter and avoidance which are the material realisation – as well as sometimes the generator – of social relations.” (Hillier and Hanson, 1984: ix) The spatial structure shows the practical purpose of the building as well as embedding and managing power relations; the circulation of the building connected all the spaces to emphasise the borders of power and hierarchy. Some of the trends explored in the preceding sections of the thesis - adapting to Seiyō, control over more aspects of life, and new types of spaces - could all be seen within the Office.

The building was simultaneously designed for the Governor-General (and his staff) and was designed to shape his and his staff’s behaviour. The route through the spaces from the front entrance to the
Governor-General's personal office discloses a high level of symbolism. The building shaped the building users' behaviour in a new way, moving from the Qing period yamen to a Seiyō-style authority building: as with the administrative changes, using this spatial lexicon meant that the building users were following a different historical trajectory. In fact, the use of class based entrances was an important and significant aspect of Japanese authority architecture from before the Edo period. In the early 1800s a government edict on gateways explained the types of gateways that were allowed by different ranks of samurai and daimyo, which was later reproduced in an etiquette and regulations manual (the Aobyoshi, lit. Blue cover book) which had a whole section dedicated to daimyo gateways, showing the importance of understanding which gateways were for whom in Edo society. (Coaldrake, 1996: 203) This was a similar lexicon to the ancient Chinese authority architecture used before 1919 displaying the neighbourhood of East Asia region influences. Even though the lexicon had completely changed, the reproduction of ranked gateways in the Office can be seen as a continued engagement in segregation according to rank and class.

The route of the Governor-General is logically the main hierarchy in this building which begins from the main official entrance on the ground floor. This entrance was one of nine entrances and the only one which rose from basement floor to the ground floor with a carriage ramp up to the piano nobile. This official entrance in the middle of the front of the building had a delicate façade surrounding, composed of an independent portico which is often seen in England and Italy, where it was usually preceded by an ornate outer staircase. It often fulfilled the function of allowing inhabitants to access the first floor without using the servants' floor below. This principle of class-based entrances appears to have been applied to the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, given that the basement floor was the servant's level. The axiality and entrance to the building connoted a very different tradition of ceremonial entrance, unlike the main entrances at the yamen which were to the sides. The formal Roman Ionic portico entrance meant that the Governor-General would need to change his behaviour and often parade to enter his office. (fig. 5.19) This followed other European authority building examples such as the Austrian Parliament Building (1874-1883, fig. 5.20), one of the largest structures on the Ringstraße, Vienna, in which the architect responsible for the building in a Greek revival style was Theophil Edvard Hansen. The square shape of this plan, with the portico ramped entrance, meant both buildings shared a remarkably strong central axis. (figs. 5.21 and 5.22) This emphasis on hierarchy, authority and control at the Office was supported by high security at each of the entrances, particularly the vestibules at the main front entrance which contained security guards.
5.19. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Taipei. 
(Photography by Author)

5.20. The Austrian Parliament building, Vienna. 
(Photography by Author)

5.21. The main entrance of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Redrawn by Author. 
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers)

5.22. The main entrance of Austrian Parliament. 
(Public domain)
The Governor-General's entrance to his personal office was extremely direct, only up one flight of stairs. The Governor's office and his secretary's office lay in front and just to the right of the central axis respectively and faced out of the front of the building on the first floor with a balcony at the centre of the main facade. He was also able to enter from the stair with a direct lift to the left of his office so he did not necessarily need to parade. The need to make the Governor-General inaccessible meant additional security was organised for him. This complemented his prime position at the front of the building overlooking the front entrance, which itself was guarded by soldiers. This central position, at the front of the building and overlooking the city from the tallest building in Taiwan, at once implied control through observation and intimidation.

The Governor-General's personal office itself was embedded in symbolism that connoted Japan's adaptation to the tastes of Seiyō, at times regardless of suitability (shown in fig. 5.23). It was a luxurious space with high quality modern facilities. The first notification of this was that it housed one of three fireplaces in the building: other heating facilities were not constructed until 1922. This was a feature imported from the West, (the central element of interior decoration with the dominant status since 1600 of English houses) as fireplaces were very rare in Japanese houses where braziers were more commonly used. Fireplaces were, however, common to buildings constructed by architects educated at Tokyo University; in Moriyama's design thesis of 1893, fireplaces were put in the rooms for the emperor and visiting Ministers of State.


132 Besides the fireplace in his office, the other two were in the Governor’s private reception room and in the VIP lounge.

133 According Girouard, “Wall fireplaces, for instance, first appeared in England in the late eleventh century. Although at first they were luxuries, by the end of the Middle Ages they had become standard fitting for all the inhabited rooms in a country house.” (Girouard, 1980: 246)
This was evidenced even more strongly in the first prestigious target of the Governor-General, the Official Residence, where the original design contained eights fireplaces. This number was increased to seventeen fireplaces when the Official Residence was rebuilt in 1911 (within the construction area only 1900 square metres, fig. 5.24) all constructed with mirrors above them and decorated with different plaster sculpture ornaments. These Seiyō elements were highlighted by using authentic materials: imported tiles from Britain were plastered outside the fireplaces (ten among them). In European countries such as England, heating was crucial. The traditional fireplace symbolised the heart of the home and formed a focal point around which people gathered. (Conway and Roenisch, 1994: 79) Architects in England at this time would always look at the impact of the fireplace on the room as a major focus and celebration. The fireplaces suggested comfort and welcome particularly as they were placed in the reception, meeting, and dining rooms; this matched one of the main functions of the Official Residence. Use in the personal office of the Governor-General is further proof that the fireplace is a strong Seiyō symbol within a Victorian idiom and the architect saw a need to have one in the Governor’s personal office even though it was functionally nearly redundant in the sub-tropical weather of Taiwan.

The second *kindai* (modern) element was the floor of the Governor-General's personal office which was carpeted, something anathema to Japanese traditionalists. (Sand, 2005: 107) In the Near East, the carpet always had and still retains a practical function, as well as a symbolic function whose meaning is now obscured. It signified a magical space whose borders stood for the terrestrial, human sphere, erected as a protective barrier around the field, which symbolised the sphere of the heavens and the divine. (Milanesi, 1993: 26) Unlike the consideration the carpet enjoyed in the Near East, it was deemed exclusively a luxury object in Europe, a symbol of authority and power, totally devoid of ties to practical everyday life. (Milanesi, 1993: 184) Given the décor of the room, the use of a carpet by a Japanese designer in this period was almost certainly following contemporary *Seiyō* usage and symbolism rather than historical Chinese/Middle Eastern carpets. In the late-Meiji period, “all rooms with chairs had carpeting – the minimum two elements needed to make a room ‘Western’.” (Sand, 2005: 107) In Japanese interior design a dichotomy developed between ‘light and refined’ Japanese rooms where one sat on the floor, and ‘rich and gaudy’ *Seiyō* ‘chaired’ rooms, which was maintained throughout Japan, (Sand, 2005: 107) making the Governor-General’s personal office an unambiguously *Seiyō* space.

It seems that *Seiyō* spaces were ingrained with Japan authorities yet not only within form but also functions in various degrees. In addition, as with the sports club built on the site of Office, before the *Seiyō* reception function of the Official Residence was built, the reception hall was placed in the Qing ‘Western Learning Hall’. The legacy of Conder’s Rokumekan of slavishly promoting western behaviour for interactions with Europeans and Americans continued in Taiwan. This reliance on *Seiyō* spaces was associated in the Official Residence. Apart from multiple fireplaces, the rooms were layered with both conventional ‘pile’ carpet and ‘linoleum’ carpet; lace curtains were also added. Moreover, in accordance with the European convention of the upper class as the image of up-to-date, the *Seiyō* social spaces were inputted entirety into the Official Residence, particularly following the rebuilt Baroque style building in 1911 by Moriyama: a tennis court, a small-scale Western front garden, a games room with a pool table for gentlemen, a women’s guest room and a Western-style banquet dining hall were all included.

Remarkably the floor in the outside corridors and in the ground floor lobby utilised English ceramic tile, whilst the stairs utilised white marble, Romanesque columns were used throughout the building, and crystal chandeliers were decorated throughout the buildings in a similar fashion to English mansion houses. The features of a country house were also in evident in the Official Residence by the two level

---

134 The Victorian upper classes were reasonably keen to seem up-to-date, but their modernity tended to be put under pressure by other values. (Girouard, 1980: 274)
servant’s wing in the southern-east area with a butler’s pantry opposite to the dining hall\textsuperscript{135} which was itself divided into four zones following Victorian standards: the butler’s, the cook’s, the housekeeper’s and the laundry-maid’s zone\textsuperscript{136} each of which displayed the technology and the spatial organisation of a country house. (Girouard, 1980: 276) Japanese Seiyō taste, particular for forms and spaces, were purposefully following the zeitgeist, the authentic, fashionable standards of the day, which can be seen in any official Residential buildings of this period as the previous examples such as Akasaka Palace showed.

Given that it is easy for the less familiar to label Meiji design ‘imitative’, acting as a unique nation-state was often subtle in Meiji architecture, and was often strongly linked to the Imperial family. (Nish, 2000: 84) This was reflected in the constant effort to maintain a dual modernity from the early years of the Meiji Restoration which, whilst adopting Seiyō forms, maintained a Japanese unit, following the Meiji official slogan: \textit{Wakon-yōsai} (Japanese spirit, Foreign/Western technology) as remarked in Chapter 2. As the institution of the emperor was over two and half thousand years old, the Meiji emperor was \textit{prima face} identity symbol to utilise in Japanese nationalism: underlying the 1890 constitutional reforms “was a strong emphasis on Japanese nationalism and that nationalism was identified with the position and ideology of the Emperor, the focus of the new state becoming the emperor system (\textit{kokutai} [Jap. 國體]).” (Nish, 2000: 84) The development of State Shinto and the consequential denigration of Buddhism fitted the Meiji emperor within the global trend of nation-building and the process of creating national symbols of the country. As shown earlier in this thesis, the emperor had been explicitly tied to resistance to foreigners and became a rallying symbol for the whole country from the earliest stirrings of the Restoration. As far back as 1864, Japanese scholars argued that Japan’s ‘national essence’ was a ‘divine country’, with a divine being as emperor. (Sakai, 1978: 163) Japan’s modern development began with the Shogun’s aides deferentially consulting the Imperial court (and all \textit{daimyos}) on how to address the issue of the Black Ships in 1853, and the emperor remained central to the Japanese \textit{kindai} (modern) identity from this point onwards until 1945.

Inspired by Britain’s use of Queen Victoria in creating a coherent and powerful identity, Japan reimagined the emperor and his family, and he became a potent nationalist symbol, one more central to both the government of the country and the state religion than the monarch was in Britain. The emperor Meiji was said to exemplify a ‘sacred and inviolable’ tradition dating back to earliest times and was therefore not photographed except in the earliest years of his reign. On the other hand, the emperor

\textsuperscript{135} In the Victorian country house, “the butler’s pantry was often close to the dining room, as at Lynford; the kitchen almost never was. The Victorians, like earlier generation, thought it more important to keep kitchen smells out of the gentry end of the house.” (Girouard, 1980: 280)

\textsuperscript{136} In the Victorian country house, “the butler’s zone was entirely male, the other three entirely female, except, possibly, for a male chef at the head of the cook’s department. Male and female zones were kept separate, each with its own staircase to its own bedrooms. The servants’ hall and steward’s room occupied the neutral ground between them.” (Girouard, 1980: 279)
and his family were presented as symbols of the nation’s progressive ‘Westernisation’ of manners and modernisation. These were two live issues from the 1860s onwards with popular rebellions occurring as outlined in Chapter 2, bringing the renewed importance of having a linking entity. From the late 1880s, Japanese woodblock artists produced many prints celebrating the imperial family, always imagining them in Western attire as shown in fig. 5.25.

These postcards usually showed the Meiji emperor in two distinct ways, simultaneously: as inhabiting a field full of Japanese traditions, including customary carpentry and nature, whilst his personal behaviour, clothing, habits and opinions were modern. The emperor was therefore important as a bridging figure, an icon who allowed a Japanese modern identity, able to adopt the latest international trends whilst not shedding all meaning and context from the past, becoming a model for Japanese to emulate. The Meiji emperor was the figure who managed to successfully straddle the Edo/Meiji period divide, a fulfilment of Fukuzawa’s phrase that Japanese people were each one person, two lives. (Hiraki, 1984: 211) His value as a symbol to the Japanese state, particularly in Japan’s imperial expansion, was therefore enormous. The subtlety of this hybrid figure, both modern and traditional, was rarely captured in popular representations of the emperor in Europe, where the Meiji emperor was either shown as a figure of ‘tradition’, dressed in kimono as he was never shown in Japan (fig. 5.26), or as a Westernised military figure (fig. 5.27).
As head of state, the emperor was directly linked to the Governor-General in that “The Governors-General of Korea and Taiwan were responsible in theory to the emperor personally.” (Beasley, 1987: 144) Given this central role, the emperor completed the imperial hierarchy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, and gave the axis a meaning linked to Japanese tradition. The top of the lobby’s ceremonial stairs was an important space in the building, as directly behind this point was a huge portrait of the emperor, located at the back of the two-floor high meeting hall, the main collective decision-making space. This room also formed the main core of the building in the space-syntax.  

This use of the portrait symbolised that the emperor was always the executive behind the chairman for colonial state meetings where, besides the speaker’s area, the meeting tables faced to the invisible room, the alcove where the emperor’s portrait resided, as shown in pictures of meetings in 1929 and 1935. (figs. 5.28 and 5.29)

---

137 The dignity of the meeting hall was emphasised with a wide-span of space containing ten exposed Ionic columns rising through a double floor with a Baroque ceiling, curved and plastered, and a chequer-pattern of floor tiles.

5.29. The 1936 Taiwan Exhibition. Source from Shue and Huang, 2003.

The portrait was covered by one of only two curtain sets\textsuperscript{138} in the Office with a photograph of a sunrise on the top of the exit (fig. 5.30), further increasing its authority. This was the exact point where the two halves of the building are back to back and so it can be seen as the culmination of axial hierarchy. Therefore in the Office the most important person was the staged portrait of the emperor, placed right on the central axis. This space rose up, with only emptiness above it for two levels; the small space continued straight all the way to the roof and even had its own rooftop (fig. 5.31). To the sides were two small spaces, lower than the central portrait space, and the front entrance was in the middle of the room, directly in front to the portrait and leading into the central meeting room. Whilst the space above was empty the space below was the vault on the ground floor where the wealth of the colony was kept. Although the emperor was not present in person, merely as a portrait the imagery is striking; the emperor’s protection of the state’s wealth and safety was drawn in the space-syntax purposely. This also perhaps reflects an East Asian tradition inherited from the Chinese, for whom ancestors occupied a similar central and elevated position within a symmetrical progression of buildings laid out along a centre-line; this type of sacred space was rare to see in European modern buildings. Yet, rising up staircases in this hidden room (as adopted to the modern building) was passing through thresholds of other floors but did not represent a transitional space; the space indicated the hierarchy of the emperor, transferring what he embodied from a moral to a sacred hierarchy, from a liturgical form to an imperial icon.

\textsuperscript{138} The other set of curtains were used in the Taiwan Governor-General’s personal office. Using this Seiyô symbol of luxury and pomp alludes to the hybrid position of the emperor in Japan’s nationalism.
Whilst the portrait of the emperor was at the centre of the vertical and horizontal axes (space 45 in fig. 5.33), the position of the Governor’s personal office (space 46 in fig. 5.33) also lay at the front of the vertical axis, above the official main entrance. His personal office was under the VIP room after which there were no further rooms; above this room was the central tower, which continued straight up for five floors. This position extending front, centre and into the sky emphasised the extension of domination from the Taiwan Governor-General. Direct and unflanked by obstructions, the position displayed the ‘authoritarian Imperial power’ the underlying premise of Japan’s propaganda thrust used in the colony (an analysis of which is found in Section 5.4). Given this, the Governor-General himself could overlook the city outward and look inward to see much of the building, viewing the two-floor-high lobby with long snaking corridors penetrating left, right and centre. This is similar to official buildings in Europe, often with a central axis and facing the front of the building above the entrance floor. This front vertical axis contained a variety of powerful elements as the emperor was behind this office: it is only by traversing the central axis via a set of stairs that anyone could have been taken through to the Governor-General’s personal office, sometimes through the majestic two floor high committee hall (space 44 in fig. 5.33) and past the portrait of the emperor. This was the central route for higher officers, the important honoured guests, or any important ceremonial activity; the vertical axis is reserved for those of a high status, even the dining hall for higher officials was placed at the back (space 43 in fig. 5.33). This was clear to see from the space-syntax diagram (fig. 5.32) below, where the high status rooms (the higher dining hall 43, the meeting hall 44, the portrait 45, and the Governor’s private room 46) along the central axis on the first floor were all further from the workers’ exits.

5.32. Space-syntax of First Floor Plan of Governor General’s Office for workers’ exits. The starting point, 0, is the ground floor and the red points are exits. Model derived from Markus, 1993.
The floor plan is shown above in two ways: as a conventional floor-plan and as a space syntax diagram, used to demonstrate the rationality applied to the building plan and the most inaccessible spaces. The floor was also designed so that from any of the six sets of stairs leading to the first floor, a worker needed to go through a minimum of four spaces on the first floor to get to his office (space 46 in fig. 5.33). This conforms to Markus’ position that “depth indicates power... The person with the greatest power is at the tip of a tree, reached through corridors, stairs, outer and inner offices and waiting lobbies.” (Markus, 1993: 16) Given this is appropriate that the deepest room was the Governor-General’s private toilet (space 48 in fig. 5.33). Through the Governor-General’s spaces and the emperor’s positioning, Moriyama utilised space to evoke nationalist sentiment: in space and form, acting as a centrally planned, dominant nation-state underlay configurations of architecture during the late Meiji period. This sentiment was extrapolated in the Governor-General’s Office to emphasise the authority of the state, simultaneously hard to reach yet central and controlling, as befitting his role as head of a totalising political apparatus.

139 Started by Hillier and Hanson (1984) and further developed by Thomas Markus (1993), space syntax is a method of analysing floor design by mapping the connections between rooms. Each door passed represents a further level. The further up the levels are, the further from the point of entry. Space syntax diagrams help understand the logic of special arrangements by analysing which room are least and most accessible and the efficiency of the planning.
**Subordinate modern spaces**

The building was arranged with clear status distinctions, harking back to both the Japanese caste system and European divisions between servants and non-servants which were implicit in government buildings. For instance, the Governor-General’s position in the centre-front of the first floor harked back to Japanese castle design where the Daimyo would reside in the central, tallest keep. Thus the first floor was the centre of authority which continued from to the ground floor (fig. 5.35) and below this were subordinate spaces. Whilst the front staircase in the lobby (space 51 in fig. 5.35) on the ground floor was more ornate and used to reach the high status first floor, on the ground floor, there were eight exits/staircases that could be used (labelled 1 to 8). The main entrances were the front ceremonial carriage ramp (space 8 in fig. 5.35) and the back entrance with a smaller ceremonial staircase (space 7 in fig. 5.35), both for the higher officials. The staircases at the four corners and the back side entrance, off the back ceremonial staircase (labelled 1 to 5) were for general office workers to use. The smallest staircase (space 6 in fig. 5.35) right on the side of the main entrance was reserved as an exit for the servant level below only which plainly separated the functions. Besides the main and back entrance (spaces 7 and 8 in fig. 5.35), the other six entrances all led to the basement floor (labelled 1-6) which mean the lower-ranked workers had to enter from the subordinate level. The circulation was planned precisely with this complex series of exits in mind. Therefore the spatial design sacrificed only a little efficiency to maintain the obvious hierarchical importance of the Governor-General and his closest officials. For the ground floor, the further spaces to reach were vaults of space 48, 49 and 50 as laid out in the space-syntax diagram (fig. 5.34).

---

5.34. Space-syntax of Ground Floor Plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office for workers’ exits. The starting point, 0, is the ground floor and the red points are exits. Model derived from Markus, 1993.

---

140 There was also a side staircase (space 9) by the main entrance mainly for the Governor-General to quickly reach to his private office which did not reach the subordinate basement level, but reached to the upper floors.
On the subordinates’ level, the basement floor (shown in fig. 5.36 below), there were eight entrances: four at the four corners (labelled 1-4), the back entrance (5 which could go straight to the ground floor), the service entrance (space 6 in fig. 5.36) behind the main front carriage ramp entrance, and two driveway passages (spaces 7 and 8 in fig. 5.36). The functional service entrance (space 6 in fig. 5.36) was planned efficiently: a servant could go straight to the stairs (space 57 in fig. 5.36) to reach the ground floor from the basement and to the coal storage (space 54 in fig. 5.36) and boiler room (space 53 in fig. 5.36) with parking straight outside. The latter passages were ramped, and one was often used for bicycle parking (space 8); they went right into the middle of two courtyards behind the west façade. According to my interview with C.Y. Li, the entrances were not equal; as a Taiwanese working at the office, he would always use the minor back entrance (space 1 or 4 in fig. 5.36) because there was a strong implication that he should, rather than because he was expressly forbidden from using other entrances. (C. Y. Li, 2009, my translation)
According to the spatial details (particularly by the size of the area and type of servants), spaces in the Office were influenced by the layout of Victorian buildings. In common with the Office, “the peculiar character of Victorian servants’ wings was the result of early-nineteenth-century arrangements being revised to make them more moral and more efficient.” (Girouard, 1980: 276) As revealed above for the Official Residence, this was also the case in the Governor-General’s Office where men were separated from women, with women only present in the basement; the basement itself being divided into 74 separate spaces, more than any other floor. Following the Official Residence, the Office used a typical Victorian spatial plan, containing a cook’s zone (space 24, 26 and 28 in fig. 5.36), and contained other similar functions such as the night duty room and the servant’s rooms. The pantry room (space 26 in fig. 5.36) even had one of the eight lefts in the building installed for food which delivered the meals to ground, first and second floors. This was unsurprising given that the basement service level contained most of the modern equipment and facilities which needed workers to function, such as the power.
distribution room (space 49 in fig. 5.36), the boiler room (space 53) in fig. 5.36, and the electric clock room (space 62 in fig. 5.36), powering the rest of the Office. The servants’ territory was elaborated hierarchically in the Governor-General Office, with unclean functions such as cooking, storing coal, and even rubbish disposal (collected in the corners of rooms 17, 18, 19 and 20 in fig. 5.36 from the disposal chutes in the upstairs smoking rooms) all taking place in the basement. Officers who were senior enough to work above the basement level could avoid accessing the basement level by entering a corner entrance all the way to their floor, and thus avoid any perceived contamination.

Concurrent with hierarchy, comfort, efficiency and hygiene were obvious features of the interior spaces of the Office. The main servant’s unit, the cook’s zone with its kindai (modern) space and pantry, was many steps removed from the ‘traditional’ Japanese and Chinese concept on a pantry based on wooden cabinetry. An Edo period pantry was a mobile storage cabinet, not a stationary space, and was first recorded in the Genroku era (1688-1704). The Meiji period saw changing social spaces when the customary Japanese kitchen moved from a cabinet system into the European idea of a pantry in the Office. The pantry was linked with each dining room, yet kept segregated from the kitchen. This separation was a feature of Victorian life and was applied as thoroughly in the Official Residence. The four pantries in the Office had modern equipment installed, with a ventilation system and an engine-driven service lift for delivering food efficiently so that kinks in the corridor were not needed to keep kitchen smells out and only one central kitchen was necessary.

The kitchen was considered a relatively dirty area reflected in its name ‘katte’ (Jap. 勝手 lit. backdoor). The kitchen was separate in all Japanese houses except single-bed apartments, and it was a space subject to government hygiene campaigns in the early 1900s. (Sand, 2003: 68) Indeed, by 1931 “the everyday world of kitchen work had been transformed by the kindai (modern) hygienic regime into a realm of special danger and taboos.” (Sand, 2003: 73) This taboo was reflected in the difficulty to access the kitchen zone (space 24) from any entrances where the food storage room (space 28) and the pantry (space 26) behind were simultaneously close to the entrance and deep enough from public access rooms for most staff only to see the food when on the table. A popular reform from the late Meiji era can also be seen in this space: from the basement plan several square shapes in the kitchen appear to indicate that the movement for ‘standing spaces in the kitchen’ had caught on in the Governor-General’s Office. In Japanese (and Chinese) customs, kitchen tasks were done in a sitting position: the movement to working standing up was not due to the assumption that standing would be easier, but because standing was thought to be more hygienic and fitted the general notion of rationalising routines. (Sand, 2003: 85)
The kitchen was planned on an open format, with gas used for cooking; in Japan in 1910, the government was attempting to improve kitchen technology under the slogan “ Reform of the Kitchen Is Achieved Through the Use of Gas.” (Sand, 2003: 79) Further than this, gas had only very recently been introduced to Japan in a concerted fashion and was strongly associated with social advancement; for instance HANI Motoko’s 1912 article “Economic study of fuels” called for further study of gas as the “fuel of civilisation” in the magazine Ladies Companion. (Sand, 2003: 80). The prominent place of this civilised fuel in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office – an island previously famous in Japan for its savagery – was an important indicator that the Office was being designed as a site of modernity.

On the topic of hygiene, there were smoking rooms at each of the four interior corners of every floor (adjacent to the corner staircases) apart from the servant’s floor, with sixteen in total. Given social taboos of the time, these rooms indicate that the building was designed for men and that Japan was influenced both architecturally and behaviorally by Victorian Britain where “tobacco had a stronger influence on Victorian planning than tea”. (Girouard, 1980: 294) In Britain even “the smoking room habits of the upper classes came and went in a slightly mysterious manner” (Girouard, 1980: 294) yet in the early 20th century smoking was in vogue again in Britain.

The smoking habit had clearly been transferred to the Japanese bureaucrats, with smoking spaces having a view of the courtyard. These spaces were even hierarchically arranged: there was a single smoking room for higher officers for the authorities of the First Floor, which contained hand-washing facilities. In addition, each of the smoking rooms was allocated to a different division and contained a ventilation system for the smoke. On south-east of the third floor, for example, there was a smoking room for the Civil Engineering Bureau near their offices, nearby to the smoking room for the Mining Division.

Whilst it was probably inspired by British country houses, there appears to be a particularly Japanese aspect to this space which puts into question the role of this social space, if not the habit of smoking. Although a smoking room could also be found within the Official Residence it was renamed as the ‘games room’ (Jap. 遊戯室). It had a huge size and was separate to the drawing room as it was for separate activities; usually for men, originally deemed dirty due to the odour of smoke (before smoking indoors became normalised) and therefore situated far from bedrooms, the kitchen and dining areas. Such spaces were novel in Europe since they replaced the old idea of simply moving furniture around the room to suit various purposes throughout the day, creating a sense of permanence in the spaces of the building. Through following the modern standards of Victorian houses, the Office building

---

141 In the Victorian house, smoking “became the accepted ritual for the men in a house-party, after the women had gone to bed, to don elaborate smoking jackets and retire to the smoking room, where a tray of spirits was laid out for them, in addition to a supply of cigars...
achieved the same purpose. Although the notion of smoking rooms derived from Seiyō (and likely from Britain due to Conder and Tatsuno’s influence: both worked with by Burges who was famous for his summer and winter smoking room in Cardiff Castle, fig. 5.37), smoking rooms were uncommon outside residential buildings in Europe, and it is likely that Japan adopted this space for administrative buildings in order to fit their norms of hygiene, cleanliness, status and comfort and modern standards.

Further evidence of Japan’s adoption of modern standards could be seen in the twenty-one bathrooms and one bathing room in the Office to cater for the staff (numbered over one thousand), the layout of which supports the argument that the Office, from ground floor up, was all populated by men. The only bathroom for women in the whole building was located on the basement floor (fig. 5.38). This design made gender relations somewhat permanent. All bathrooms beside the basement had a similar design with a separate wash room (figs. 5.39 and 5.40) adjacent to the main bathroom, each of which contained modern standing urinals, squat toilets and taps with an efficient drainage system. This separation of spaces within the toilet unit gives evidence of the centrality of hygiene in the Office and throughout the colony.142 This ‘kindai (modern) toilet unit’ (containing a flushing squat toilet for defecating separate and a urinal space, both connected to the sewage system, with water taps for hand/face wash from city’s water supply) first appeared in Taipei in the Taiwan Railway Hotel in 1908 following the first units in Japan in 1884 in Tokyo, yet the toilet bowls were imported from Britain and made from porcelain. (Chen, Q., 2005: 92) Although at the time, kindai toilet units could only be seen in

---

142 One of the most important modern indicators, tap water, was first supplied in Taipei in 1899 after three years of engineering projects by a British technician, William Kininmonth Burton, who was also a sanitation consultant in Taiwan.
official buildings, even in the prisons, the toilet culture brought convenience to everyday life in Taiwan due to the intervention of Japanese authorities.143 Again this ‘kindai’ culture was not present in the official residences although even those toilets had ‘Western toilets’ constructed (using a septic tank system rather than a sewage system) particularly following the ‘House Building Rules in Taiwan’ of 1901. (Dong, Y., 2005: 37)

Apart from these kindai facilities and technologies, modern customer services, resources, media and dissemination institutions were set up inside the building to fulfil the aim of making the institution of the Office comprehensively efficient; these functions could be seen in the post office (space 37 in fig. 5.36) side-by-side with the printing/publishing room (space 39 in fig. 5.36) on the basement floor. These service functions were placed on the upper floors, above the main divisions of the Office but not close to the central axis, effectively constricted to the peripheries. There were numerous spatial signs which indicated that Japanese modernity in the Office consisted of attention to detail on hierarchy and place, efficiency and comfort, hygiene, cleanliness and service.

Japan’s new administrative order in Taiwan was prefaced on a philosophy of legal restrictions and repression of dissidents, but alongside this was the gazette system which required a complex combination of technologies from newspaper editors, to printers to a functioning postal service, the centre of which was at the Office. The Office had its own photographic darkroom on the third floor; its own individual library space (above the back entrance), and a blueprint space for the Civil Engineering Bureau on the fourth floor. These functions consisted of the heavy service of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office: the regular newspaper and propaganda publications, for instance, were

143 In Taiwan, the toilet culture started from Japan’s arrival as sanitary matters were part of the initial nation-building policies which was discussed in Chapter 4. This policy was started in 1896: punishing public defecation with a ten yen fine or 15 day detention (a rule deemed ridiculous for Taiwanese at the time) and the beginning of the construction of many ‘public toilets’ (Jap. 共同便所, Communal latrine). There were five within Taipei walled-city near the five gates, three in Mengjia, and four in Dadaocheng. (Dong, Y., 2005: 26)
evidence that the building was a hive of activity that controlled and nudged the behaviour and mental lives of colonial subjects outside of the Office. This gazette system was new function of governmentality, a break from the Qing past and, for Ts’ai, an attempt to create a new spatiality in Taiwan:

“Unlike the late Qing government, the colonial government managed to reach and educate the masses, and the channel of circulation was made visible via printed media such as gazettes and newspapers. Borrowing Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imaginary communities,” Huang Ch’eng-yi envisions the birth of a “print-capitalism” in Taiwan under Japanese rule. He in effect goes so far as to hypothesize a “legal spatiality,” of which the administrative law made a permanent impact of colonial modernity on the society by allowing people to conceive of Taiwan as a place existing simultaneously with, and in historical complementality to, Japan.” (Ts’ai, 2009: 19)

The gazette system was centred on the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and allowed the creation of a new space of ‘Taiwan’, albeit only as subordinate to ‘Japan’. This required a considerable effort as Japanese bureaucrats worked much more systematically to join people together psychologically than the Qing had (whose most obvious attempts had been through city planning in Taipei, joining Taiwan to the Qing dynasty through institutions and a nostalgic city wall, which could only simply utilise modern lighting and railway systems). However, whilst it was complex, the gazette system in Taiwan under Japanese rule was limited in its effectiveness: newspapers did not penetrate far outside of urban elites. Instead everyday lives were impacted much more by neighbourhood organisation, traffic and market regulations, and improvements in sanitation and education. Whilst the Japanese wished to wholly create the institutions of a kindai (modern) nation-state in Taiwan, these were only partly implemented. Taiwan remained largely non-industrial, having a largely rural and agricultural economy to feed the growth of Japan. Even though imagined modernity was limited in its scale in Taiwan, spaces that displayed the sacred imperial might of Japan were prevalent in the Office itself.

Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan, as with Korea and Karafuto, was always predicated by the idea that these territories would ultimately be integrated into Japan, as the Ryūkyūs and Hokkaidō had been. Another assumption was that Japan had a civilising mission, which applied to promoting education, public health, economic development, political behaviour, eventually relating colonies to the national polity and a special relationship with the emperor. (Beasley, 1987: 143-144) This developmental philosophy implied that one day the subjects of rule would become civilised, a philosophy which could be associated with traditional Confucian concepts of a monarch’s educative function. (Beasley, 1987: 143)
In spite of this ideal of eventual assimilation, during the early years of rule the Taiwanese were clearly seen as inferior, less reliable and best suited to menial work. During the construction of the Office, Taiwanese were only involved after the beginning of construction due to the limited skilled labourers available and the small scale of the construction industry at that time. Yet the construction required a huge amount of labour which of demonstrated by the scale and breakdown of roles. In the case of ‘the land levelling work’ on the site in Taisho year 4 (1915): the director of construction, Ide, proposed 1300 workmen and 200 labourers from mainland Japan and 1300 labourers from Taiwan. (Shue, and Huang, 2003: Chap3-19) It seems that more Japanese than Taiwanese were needed. This was indicated in the breakdown of types of labourers. First, semi-skilled workmen: these jobs were only available to mainland Japanese. The other type, labourers, were used only for low level work. In a further sign of colonial division of labour, “the wages of the Japanese could be three times greater.” (Shue, and Huang, 2003: Chap3-19) According to the official collection of the ‘Taiwan Sotokufu (Governor-General)’ on the transaction of balusters, the Japanese were mainly responsible for construction, whilst transport of materials was solely by Taiwanese.

The colonial limits on work was also revealed from my interview with C. Y. Li, a Taiwanese architect who worked under the Civil Engineering Bureau in the Office at the end of colonial period: “I was never allowed to undertake further responsibilities than basic drawing even though I was very keen to practice with my own time. I was actually secretly learning in my spare time by finishing my work quickly and practicing from virtual and freehand [hand drawing], coping from anything around my office.” (C. Y. Li, 2009, my translation) In the social spaces of the Office these ethnic divisions were also played out. The dining rooms were clearly reserved for ordinary officers and higher officers (fig. 5.41) which showed a boundary of hierarchy on floors. Indeed whilst there was an ordinary dining room on the First and Ground floors, according to C. Y. Li, he never went into these rooms: although he was not expressly forbidden, Li was afraid to go to these rooms for meals and instead he always ate at his desk. For non-bureaucrats there was also a dining room for servants on the servants’ level, which was adjacent to the kitchen and the pantry. Yet even for the servant’s level, Li never had the chance to visit only walking through from one of the back entrances, never using the lifts or the smoking rooms (even though he smoked). Although this was allowed, as a Taiwanese he said that he already appreciated his role in the Office; he knew his responsibility was to not cross the unwritten code of manners due to his past Japanese education experience and his feeling of awe. (C. Y. Li, 2009, my translation) Given this feeling was so strong in a Taiwanese official who could closely touch the highest authority’s space in Taiwan, this shows the unwritten implicit hierarchies contained in the building: imperial power was successfully embedded in the spatial shaping and so displaying the educational approach of Japanese colonialism.
In summary, the spaces of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office were infused with a blend of foreign notions of governance alongside residual pre-Meiji traditions and new syncretic Japanese modernity, which fused Seiyō concerns with Japanese interests in hygiene, class-divisions and the divine emperor. It was also clear that, at the top level at least, the Japanese administrators showed preference Seiyō over Chinese spaces: from the transition from the yamen building to the carpeted ‘chaired room’ of the Governor-General’s private office, as a fundamental principle the administrators and architects agreed that the Japanese-built official spaces should still be as close to authentically Seiyō as possible, apparently fusing its Seiyō style with Japanese taste.

The Office was a learning environment in many respects, with spaces having normative implications towards dirt, smoking, gender and the superiority of Japanese over the natives. The spaces of the Office were designed to showcase modern behaviour and the ultimate authority of the emperor and the Governor-General. The architect, Moriyama, combined these aims in an impressively skilful manner. After their long occupation of the Qing yamen the natives’ old habits were removed from the spatial logic of the new building, and Japanese and Taiwanese administrators found themselves inserted into architectural spaces which had refined imperial hierarchies. This was a purposeful aspect of the Japanese imperial institution’s self-presentation to the Euro-American world powers, forcefully displaying the Meiji government’s continued belief that Seiyō would admit Japan as a social equal if Japan adopted the West’s common colonial rulings, whilst sedimentary habits which were allowed to survive into modernity were catered for within a new spatial context.
5.3 A showcase of scientific evolution

The new Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s space was organised efficiently and designed to impress visitors; most of materials were imported from mainland Japan, and were the most advanced materials available at that time. Alongside the *kindai* (modern) spaces within an Imperial hierarchy was a mechanical and material hierarchy within the building. Important spaces such as the Beaux-Arts lobby contained hidden technologies, the lift and ventilation system in the dining rooms, smoking rooms and treasury. The use of the building as a space for the display of technical and industrial products was entirely in keeping with the building’s structure and functions. One of the most intriguing aspects of the building was the place of modern materials and functionality. The sources of these technologies also give an indication of the root of Japan’s modernity.

The mechanisms in the building were in some cases surprising updates on what existed in Europe and America at that time, and satisfaction with the building was shown in its role as the first international showcase venue for an industrial exhibition in Taiwan. When the building was 80 percent complete it was used to hold the “Grand Sight of Formosa Exhibition”, to celebrate the 20th year of the colony’s foundation under Japanese rule by the Taiwan Governor’s Office in Taisho Year 5 (1916). It was a so-called ‘Taiwan Industrial Mutual-Progress Fair’ (Jap. 台灣勸業共進會) which implied the building was simultaneously a container of exhibits and itself a common signifier of modern style, a strong icon of progress for the Empire of Japan.

The space of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was characterised strongly by rational design, efficient use of technological products, and this was used as a technological showcase. Rationalisation could be seen on a number of levels, down to the large number of individual spaces with separate functions. Just as Mark Girouard wrote of the English country house: “Efficiency involved analyzing the different functions performed by different servants, giving each function its own area and often its own room, and grouping the related function into territories accessible to the gentry’s part of the house which they serviced.” (Girouard, 1980: 276) Public buildings in Japan were able to incorporate Euro-American cultural practices to a much greater extent than Japanese private houses, evidenced from the practice of the design competition to the scientific planning to keep the building hygienic. Public buildings, particularly national symbols such as the Office, became more than simple symbols of civilisation, for they also attempted to force the building users to become civilised through acculturation. The Office was a key component in Japan’s consciously scientific revolution in colonial Taiwan, a product of the unique combination of Japanese traditions, foreign importation and independent developments.
Exemplar of Colonial kindai (modern) technologies

One of the most intriguing aspects of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was the place of modern materials and functionality. The sources of these technologies also give an indication of the root of Japan’s modernity, fitting as they do within my understanding of Western modernity as deriving from enthusiasm for critical reason and fashionable technological products. Given this, the building materials were in line with a long term trend in Japanese architecture, from even before Conder’s arrival. The wooden carpentry of Japanese buildings was derided in Britain, and commonly associated with a generic “medieval period”; former British consul, Sir Rutherford Alcock wrote in 1863 “We are going back to the twelfth century in Europe” when describing the frame of mind needed to understand Japan. (Clancey, 2006: 49) Opinions towards Japanese carpentry and their use of wood scarcely changed in the following decades. In 1892 at a practical demonstration of Japanese and English carpentry in London, former professor at Tokyo University, George Cawley said there were “two types of carpenter, two types of carpentry, and two classes of tool: ‘The Japanese wood worker is a master of decorative rather than constructive art. For the British wood worker I would generally claim the exact opposite.’” (Clancey, 2006: 47) Japanese carpentry was seen by most Europeans as weak, lacking solidity and merely decorative and those who opposed this view were given little credence by the new architectural elites of Japan. For instance, Christopher Dresser in 1882 “brought the attention of western audiences to the earthquake-resistance of a five-story pagoda, a contention bitterly contested by a Japanese-resident expatriate architect, Josiah Conder.” (Clancy, 2006: 92)

Partly due to his elevated position as prime educator of architects in Japan, and partly because the rhetoric on building solidity was so pervasive, Conder won this argument on the solidity of European architectural materials over wood, at least for any architecture built by graduates of his own course. These graduates built almost all the public architecture for the thirty years following Tatsuno’s graduation. Following Conder’s exhortations, solidity was interpreted as equated with masonry architecture. For instance, an anonymous Japanese author wrote in the first architectural journal Kenchiku zasshi in 1888 that: “Gradually, we should make every building in Japan completely in brick or stone. Academically trained people should be in charge of this, and architectural regulations should be set. This is the basis of a strong nation.” (Clancey, 2006: 19)

Yet following the 1892 Nobi earthquake near Tokyo, these brick and stone materials were shown to be insufficient against seismic shocks, with several high profile European-style buildings damaged and destroyed. Japanese architects displayed the Enlightenment ideal of rational development of science and technologies to great effect following this experience. In 1892 “the Diet funded the Ministry of Education’s modest proposal for the Seismological Research Commission by cutting the budget for the army.” (Bartholomew, 1989: 136) This commission heralded a new role for Japanese architects whose
first response to this seismic destruction was to innovate and attempt to make European masonry constructions more resilient to tremors (Clancey, 2006: 180), as introduced in Section 3.5. These attempts signified a key juncture in Japanese architecture to move away from direct imitation of Seiyō buildings; seismic proofing was inevitably a local concern.

By the turn of the 20th century materials in Japanese authority buildings were created using sophisticated techniques. The most important of these was steel- (or iron-) reinforced concrete (also known as ferro-concrete). The earliest use of reinforced concrete in Taiwan was in 1901 in the structure of the Official Residence where steel rods were used to construct a reinforced concrete balcony. According to FU Chao-Ching, the method was "many years ahead of its time and was a pioneering feat for the whole of Asia because at that time reinforced concrete techniques had not yet reached maturity even in Japan or the West." (Fu, C., 2007: 174) A key figure in this was TOGAWA Yoshitaro at the Construction and Maintenance Division who recommended the use of reinforced concrete at the Official Residence, and then in 1905 helped to design the first reinforced concrete floor in Taiwan in the Government-General’s Research Institute. This trend was further elaborated in 1908 with the Taipei Telephone Exchange, designed by a structural engineer, which “became the first building completely constructed from reinforced concrete [in Taiwan]. From then on, reinforced concrete became the fashion in construction as well as a symbol of modernity for those who favoured progress in building development.” (Fu, C., 2007: 174)

In Taiwan, this use of reinforced concrete was a part of two trends: the scientific approach to building technology and the desire to set Japanese buildings apart from native architecture. Building materials were used to show the superiority of Japan over the natives, for instance during the Meishan earthquake (Jap. 梅山地震) of 1906 in central Taiwan which left all buildings levelled to the ground in the town of Dabyo, with only the Japanese Sub-Prefectural Office (made of brick) remaining. (Clancey, 2006: 175) Following the refinement of the techniques to build reinforced concrete buildings, authority buildings in Taiwan were also made earthquake-proof through use of steel-reinforced concrete. The innovative use of ferro-concrete (first invented in France in 1849) was an achievement discovered through rational means and empirical enquiry, which points towards an understanding of natural phenomena using scientific methods, the earthquakes forcing “Japanese architecture into a more complex relationship with the Earth” (Clancey, 2006: 212) and with the building materials inherited from Europe and America.

The most recent developments in construction materials of Imperial Japan were used in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office: reinforced concrete and Japanese patented materials such as
affixed-refined-tile and seismic cement blocks. In using these, the construction team were exploiting the most up-to-date materials available to both Euro-American and Japanese architects at that time (a key component in the English definition of the ‘modern’). Most innovations in material or construction were based on the aim of increasing the resilience and durability of buildings whilst maintaining a preferred aesthetic. Both earthquake-proofing and new materials reflect Conder’s insistence “that a building must be substantial.” (Conder, 1878b: 3)

In order to maintain this cohesive outlook, from the competition and examination to construction and modification of the building, all decisions were made and executed solely by Japanese. Even the construction firms were all Japanese companies with branches in Taiwan. There were three construction firms involved in the building of the Office: ‘Horiuchi Chambers of Commerce’ (Jap. 堀内商會) was founded in Taiwan in 1899 and specialised in the reinforced concrete construction and traded imported building materials from Britain and America; ‘Takaishi Group’ (Jap. 高石組) was founded in Taiwan in 1899 and also traded building materials; ‘Sawai Group’ (Jap. 澤井組) was founded in 1898 and specialised in civil engineering.

These three companies constructed most official buildings in Taiwan but only combined forces on this project, demonstrating the importance and scale of the construction. Producing and supplying materials was a challenge for the first huge construction project in colonial Taiwan. In general, the materials consisted of local and patented construction methods and materials which included tiling, timber, ironware, bronze, quicklime, cement, seismic cement blocks and steel windows. The main structure of the building was constructed using reinforced concrete, brick and tile. Timber was secondary and all the windows, doors and roof trusses used timber.

The primary material, the reinforced concrete, needed a huge amount of cement which was also made using a patented contracture material. The common cement was supplied by Asano Midoro Co., Ltd (Jap. 淺野水泥株式會社). In colonial Taiwan, cement was needed for various projects and was imported from Japan until 1917, when a branch of Asano Midoro Co., Ltd established a factory in Kaohsiung (Southern Taiwan). ‘Sakai’s seismic cement blocks’ (Jap. 酒井式耐震水泥磚) were used on the balustrades of all floors to confront the earthquake environment. This patented contracture material was proposed by architect SAKAI Yūnosuke (Jap. 酒井祐之助) who had failed to qualify for the second stage of the design competition.

This use of two patented materials in the basic material is an indication that by 1910 new types of construction materials were reaching maturity in Japan, and a patent system had developed. (Huang,
The use of patented materials in the Governor-General’s Office also included two kinds of applied tile. First was white affixed-tile used for the inner walls of bathrooms and the face-wash rooms on the ground, first and second floors which were imported from ‘SAJI Ceramic Manufacturing’ (Jap. 佐治製陶所) in mainland Japan. The other patented affixed tile used was a red affixed-refined-tile applied to the outer walls of the building. (Shue, C. and Huang, J., 2003: Chap 3-15) This tile was used to give the appearance of brick-facing and was attached to the main structure. The application of tiling had the additional benefit of making the reinforced concrete waterproof. This was a new technology at the time, developed to replace load-bearing brick structure, as brick had been proven very weak during seismic events.\footnote{144}

In pursuit of this aesthetic, the red affixed-refined-tile was without glaze, so the colour and the feel were exactly the same as red brick. That the Office used so much red affixed-refined-tile shows the preference for brick-like structures in colonial Taiwan. Taiwan had imported brick technology from China before the Japanese colonial period, but there were 36 ‘new style’ brick factories during the Japanese period, the first of which was set up in 1901. (Wang, H., 2001: 2) However, the red affixed-refined-tile for the Office was imported from mainland Japan and utilised patented material supplied from the same factory as used for the construction of Tokyo station: ‘Shinagawa Shirorenga Co., Ltd.’ (Jap. 品川白煉瓦株式會社).\footnote{145} Indeed the format of red affixed-refined-tile used on the Taiwan Office was nearly the same as that of Tokyo station (1914) (figs. 5.42 and 5.43). This kind of affixed-refined-tile used on reinforced concrete was only popular for 15 years after its first use in 1912, and developed at nearly the same time as reinforced concrete. (Shue and Huang 2003: Chap 4-31) This invention was treated like most modern technologies at that time, and brought Japan into a new era as these materials were stable for construction and also a symbol of Seiyō aesthetics. However, after the Great Kantō earthquake in 1923 damaged many brick buildings, brick became a symbol of weakness and even the red affixed-refined-tile gradually lost its popularity.

\footnote{144} This concept of hiding structural materials with a brick façade was one that was practised in Europe and America yet had a distinctive twist in Japan. Jordan’s Sand’s recent study of Tokyo vernacular buildings found that this principle stretched even to native carpenters where the wooden structure was hidden and replaced with a Seiyō-inspired façade. For example, the most common type of modern buildings in interwar Tokyo did not use concrete as the structural material, but wood. Named ‘signboard architecture’ in the 1970s, this architecture was the most common vernacular type found in Tokyo by FUJIMORI Terunobu (Jap. 藤森照信) which was constructed “in wood by native carpenters but fronted with ornamental façades in brick, tile, and copper that made the buildings superficially Western.” (Sand, 2013: 96) Fujimori’s activities and enthusiasm for these buildings was criticised by senior scholars who did not believe these uncanonicalised modern buildings were worthy of study. (Sand, 2013: 97) Whilst Fujimori has continued his activities, modern wooden buildings at that time and until today have been disparaged by the architectural academy, yet they appear to have a principle akin to the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office: that the building should have the appearance of ‘modern’ (that is revivalist) architecture regardless of the structural material.

\footnote{145} ‘Shinagawa Shirorenga Co., Ltd.’ started with making fire-resistant brick in 1875 and was famous as the biggest brick factory in Japan at that time.
Other patented materials like steel windows and door frames used steel production processes from Sugamo Manufacturing (巢鴨製作所) in Japan, as the product was solid, resisted strong winds, was fireproof and even waterproof due to the manufacturing process of advanced machinery and the forging of each piece at very high temperatures. Ironware locks were imported from America by Moriyama in 1915, one of the few instances of importation from outside the Japanese Empire. Bronze for decorations on the columns and metallic materials for handrails were imported from Japan but cast in Taipei. At that time, there was a complete casting manufacturer in Taipei, demonstrating the maturity of the cast metal industry in colonial Taiwan. SAITO Shizumi (齊藤靜美) was appointed as casting operator by the new director technician Ide, as Saito had good experience of making bronze statues in Japan.

These patented materials were also a sign of the times in Japan, where by the 1900s Japanese companies began to be bearers of news of the “latest products and lessons of civilization.” (Sand, 200: 80) Such technologies were bound up in a network of knowledge that integrated all players into social and cultural hierarchies. Europe and the United States were seen as the sources of technological authority, and civilisation was often embodied in new commodities (Sand, 2003: 80) but could also be seen in new building functions and patented materials. In addition, the development of Japanese patented materials was a signifier that technical authority was beginning to also be located in East Asia as well as Seiyō.

Wood was the only natural material from Taiwan used apart from quicklime, as timber from Japan was not suitable for Taiwan’s climate, the tropical weather and the high humidity. Also timber was too
expensive to import from Japan, so using local material saved time and money for transport. Taiwan’s timber was considered to be good quality and was later even exported in huge amounts to Japan. Several types of timber were used in construction: first, Taiwan cypress (Jap. 扁柏)\(^{146}\) and Formosan cypress (Jap. 紅檜)\(^{147}\) were logged by ‘Chiayi-Prefecture Lumber Works’ (Jap. 嘉義製材所) of the Forest Management Bureau from Alishan (Jap. 阿里山, lit. Mount Ali) area; and second, beech wood (Jap. 櫸木)\(^{148}\) was produced by ‘Taiwan lumber Co. Ltd.’ (Jap. 臺灣製材株式會社) from the aboriginal area in Hsinchu-prefecture Dahu sub-prefecture (Jap. 新竹廳大湖支廳) (Shue. C and Huang, J., 2003: Chap 3-14). Both areas were difficult to reach, especially the Alishan mountain area which has an average altitude of 2,500 metres. As explored in section 4.4, transportation was enabled by the construction of the Alishan Forest Railway in 1912 to facilitate the logging of cypress and Taiwania wood. This shows both the advantage of the transportation system and the importance of materials to the Japanese colonialists. Timber was the only building material used with spiritual significance for the Japanese and was the only material used in their ridge-beam raising ceremony in this building, as detailed in Section 5.4.

As might be expected, the wooden components of the building were non-structural. This was in line with how Conder taught wood in the Tokyo University course: wood was only to be used for certain parts of the building (roofs, floors, staircases) rather than whole buildings. Wooden buildings were normally associated to be fire hazards by Conder and his successors. (Clancey, 2006: 14) That Moriyama would continue this trend was obvious even from his design thesis, where he detailed that wood would be used “for window frames, door frames, dado and skirtings, and wood panelling [Sic.]” as directed by the architect, who would lead the carpenters and make projections and measures for these workers. (Moriyama, 1897: 9) By this point in Japanese history, carpenters were clear subordinates to architects and merely another part of the kindai (modern) building process.

According to the archives of official documents from the Governor-General’s Office, and as shown in the foregoing section, construction materials were chosen first on consideration of quality and only second on the basis of price: as a result the costs greatly exceeded expectations. The quality of materials was decided using a strict process:

\(^{146}\) Taiwan cypress is a species of cypress, native to the mountains of Taiwan. The tree only grows at altitudes of 1300–2800 metres.

\(^{147}\) Formosan cypress is a species of Chamaecyparis which is native to Taiwan. It mainly grows in the central mountains of Taiwan at moderate to high altitudes of 1000–2900 m. As an indicator of its popularity, Formosan cypress is now extinct due to habitat loss and over-cutting for its timber.

\(^{148}\) Beech wood is from a species of Zelkova native to Japan, Korea, eastern China, and Taiwan. It is often grown as an ornamental tree, and used in bonsai.
“in order to control the quality of materials, all the purchases were treated exclusively and authorized by the Governor-General. Each material was proposed by the Construction Director to the Governor-General and they were then evaluated (with the choice of listed factories) according to the construction need. After this purchasing procedure a contract was signed to guarantee the quality and deadline. Upon arrival the materials needed to qualify to the product test standard of the Research Institute of the Governor-General’s Office which provided acceptance by the Civil Engineering Bureau.” (Shue, C. and Huang, J., 2003: Chap 3-18)

Such a careful attitude to quality control shows how much attention the Japanese government bestowed on the building, and the value they placed on durability. The colonial construction bureau was led by architects who had been trained at Tokyo University, which put much emphasis on quality control, usually centred on the architect. In this instance, the controlling influence of the Governor-General himself was shown as being the ultimate authority on adequate quality. This quality control task was made more difficult by the trust put in Japanese production, as almost all the materials were transported from Japan by ship. This created transport difficulties, as materials were often delayed by weather and shipping problems (and presumably rejections would have taken much longer to resolve). However using this method each building component was of high quality, reliable and up-to-date, even by contemporaneous Seiyō standards. The ability to import almost every material from Japan demonstrates the modernity of production in domestic Japan.

The basement of the Office was the service level, containing most of the modern equipment and facilities, and powering the rest of the Office. It contained a power distribution room, a boiler room and an electric clock room, rationally designed with new technologies and fuels. The technological features were characteristic of Moriyama’s approach and partly a consequence of his tour of Europe and America 1912-1914 assessing the latest technological developments. However, there were also a number of innovations that spoke to the genius of Japanese designers, which explain why the second draft of the design took over one year:

- Ten lifts were provided within the building, seven for people and three for food. The dining rooms were all placed directly above the central kitchen to allow the lifts to efficiently transport the food and to keep food smells outside the rest of the building.

---

149 Moriyama’s design thesis (1897) elaborated one of the key roles of the leading architect as the quality controller of materials, with the sense that only an architect could be trusted in the Japanese architecture system to adequately assess all types of materials.
Ventilation facilities were installed, one for each of the smoking rooms and four for the kitchen area. An air exchange device was used for the vaults to make sure the money was well ventilated.

Rubbish was collected through chutes on each floor. These were placed within the smoking rooms and collected at the corners of the basement rooms.

The chimneys were very novel. They were emplaced within the clusters of giant order columns in the lobby, the most pristine area in the building. The chimneys started in the large boiler room in the basement and went through to the roof.

There were other areas of the building which required particularly advanced technology. The third floor had an official photo development room which was extended into the balcony spaces during the construction due to lack of room. The basement floor possessed the most expensive supplementary facilities: fire prevention protection water supply installations (costing 9,257 Yen); electric clock installations (13,298 Yen); gas water-heater unit (4,694 Yen); warm water device (4,485 Yen); heating devices (118,568 Yen); and kitchen facilities (747 Yen). The Office was therefore replete in technological features to make the building more comfortable, attractive and impressive.

The 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition

The Office’s structure and functions were entirely in keeping with the building’s initial use as a space for the display of technical and industrial products. The first use of the building reflected the Office’s status as the site of the most advanced technology on the island: it was the main venue of the 1916 Industrial Exhibition, an event which uniquely combined modernity and empire as with all the first path-breaking expositions. Since 1851, the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations in London had established expositions as the highest platform to celebrate the emerging trends of modern industrial technology and design. Expositions became venues to display the political-economic culture and prosperity of all Empires and also provided the opportunity to present the results of ruling colonies. The imperial ‘mission civilisatrice’ that justified colonisation even lowered the boundaries of where such international expositions could be held, first spreading to colonies with that at Sydney in 1879. The rhetorical closeness between the central Empire and the peripheral colony in the advent of New Imperialism became an important aspect of exhibitions, as they showcased the political and cultural achievements of Empire.

Japan was very enthusiastic for all kinds of exhibition all over the world during its modern movement following the Meiji Restoration, and one of Josiah Conder’s first buildings, Ueno Museum, was built for
Japan’s first International Exhibition in 1877. These events were seen as excellent opportunities to implement the targets of Meiji polices and fulfilled slogans such as ‘Encouragement of new industry’ (Jap. 殖産興業) and ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ (Jap. 文明開化). Therefore as they were ruling Taiwan, Japan were ambitious to spread the exhibition experiment there as part of the colonial domination and as an instrument of propaganda.

From 1910, the issue of how to promote the achievements of colonial rule to the world was raised in ‘Taiwan Daily News’, which debated whether to hold an international exhibition in colonial Taiwan. Along with books such as the English language Japanese rule in Formosa (1907) it seemed that Japan were attempting to raise global awareness of the effects of their efforts on economic infrastructure and industrial productions in Taiwan. The decision to hold the first major exhibition was made in 1915, after twenty years of imperial rule. It was an enormous task for the Taiwan Governor’s Office to host an international exhibition given that the majority of exhibition experiences to date had been merely representing Taiwan in Japanese exhibitions. Eighty-four buildings had been constructed for exhibitions in Japan starting in 1897 in Nagasaki, and they often represented Taiwan with a ‘Taiwan Pavilion’ (as with Moriyama’s first buildings in Japan, covered earlier), a ‘Tea room’ or a ‘Sales room for special products’ presenting a supposedly typical Taiwanese house.

The most successful ‘Taiwan Pavilion’ in Japan was built for the fifth Domestic Industrial Exhibition in 1903, in Osaka, and was the representative prototype for future Taiwan Pavilions. The building was sufficiently lauded to be represented on a woodblock print by the celebrated artist, YAMAMOTO Shōun (Jap. 山本昇雲, 1870-1965), presumably due to its exoticism. The drawing was made in 1903 in fig. 5.44 and shows the rhetorical purpose of the building: it is a Chinese building, but festooned with the most obvious symbol of Japanese nationalism: the flag of the rising sun. Flags played a prominent role, and there is a flagpole erected by guests festooned with commendation flags centre-front of the picture. In addition, the red and white flag was a short-lived flag for the Japanese army and its exuberant use symbolised both the role of the army in the administration of the colony and the growing militarism of Japan in the wake of the successful Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This red and white flag also recalls the Satsuma domain flag used in the Meiji Restoration (and the same shades of red and white were used for each of Satsuma’s allies at the time), highlighting the continued legacy of the Restoration and its geographical roots. The populace milling excitedly around the building is mostly Japanese, but central to the picture, given almost as much prominence as the building, is a group of Chinese guests with their hair in pigtails as well as a group that appears from their hair colour to be Europeans or Americans. The admiration these foreigners had for the building is clear from their body language as they gesture towards it.
The main effects of these ‘Taiwan Pavilions’ were to promote the results of colonial rule and to entice visitors in domestic Japan to expand their capital investment in Taiwan; doing so was said to build the glory of the Empire of Japan. Thus the Chinese Southern Minnan style was a typical form of the binary viewpoint which pointedly saw Tōyō as static and unprogressive. That this style was part of a paradigm rather than an isolated stylistic instance is shown by the fact that all the commissioned architecture to represent Taiwan in Japan was in this style. These pavilions were successful and popular, lending confidence in how to exhibit Taiwan as ‘traditional’, without reflecting the architecture which was actually being built by Japanese colonial architects like Moriyama.

Exhibitions in Taiwan itself displayed a different purpose: to provide concrete examples that the whole island was being ‘civilised’ through colonisation. This different consideration was because Taiwan was Japan’s first public baptism in colonial development (far more public than the sparsely populated Hokkaidō). To build in a native Chinese style in Taiwan would have undermined the consistent and totalising image of Japan as a precise, modern power whilst potentially bolstering the burgeoning native nationalism in Taiwan. Given this, the persuasive capacity of architecture was central to the exhibition’s vision, yet even before monumental buildings had been built in Taiwan, the colonial authorities had organised a large number of exhibitions. The groundwork for organising the 1916 International Exhibition in Taiwan was laid in the ‘Products Competitive Fair’ (Jap. 物産品評會) and ‘Products Showcase’ (Jap. 物産陳列所) each organised by a local colonial government with a cross-island audience. The first was as early as 1898 in Taipei, yet after Gotō arrived, and mainly
concerned Japanese products; the first time basic Taiwanese products were introduced was in 1899 in Tainan. (Lu, S., 2007: 197-8) These products were from mined Taiwan resources (gold, coal and aquatic products), whilst later exhibitions had more sophisticated kinds of agricultural products. The business of exhibitions in Taiwan became sufficiently serious for ‘Regulations for the Examiners Committee of Products Fairs and Competitive Exhibitions’ to be established in 1904 and ‘Prizes and Rules for Products Fairs and Competitive Exhibitions’ was promulgated in 1908. The regulation and prize system established a source-based approach for further exhibitions which connotes the requirement of ‘standardisation’ and ‘productionisation’ of Taiwan agricultural products and the policies of industrial upgrading from Taiwan Governor’s Office.

‘Competitive Fairs’ were being held frequently in Taiwan but it was not until 1908 when the island-length railway was fully opened, that a larger fair, the Competitive Exhibition (Jap. 共進會) could be held. This was organised by several local governments, and was held to celebrate the railway’s opening, the railway being a real symbol of the compression of time and distance encapsulated in Japanese Taipei as discussed in Chapter 4. The items displayed at ‘Competitive Exhibitions’ no longer focused on agriculture but widened to cover diverse fields including sanitation, education, aborigines, agriculture, industry, commerce, livestock, forestry, civil engineering, transportation, and electrical appliances. (Peng, H., 2006: 48) The predictability, calculability, efficiency and increased control of modernity were applied and displayed with growing confidence at these exhibitions. The whole island could be exhibited to all visitors, and exhibition products could be transported more easily on the North-South railway. Indeed, use of the railway was actually one of the main activities during the 1916 Exhibition for visits to the rest of the island. Yet some critics complained that whilst the transportation within the island was acceptable, transportation with the outer world was not, and there were insufficient hotels to accommodate visitors.

At the same time during this period in Taiwan, national consciousness movements were raised following the fall of the Qing Empire in 1912, and armed resistance flared five times between 1912 and 1915. Moreover, by 1914, the ‘Taiwan Egalitarian Association’ (Jap. 台灣同化会) had been founded.

---

150 The 1898 ‘Products of Domestic Fair (Jap. 内地物産展覽會)’ advocated the importation of products from domestic Japan to Taiwan as references in order to improve Taiwanese products standards. The 1899 ‘Agricultural Products of Tainan County Fair (Jap. 台南縣農產物品評會)’ was the first fair to show Taiwanese products in Tainan City.

151 In order to celebrate the railway opening fully, the capital Taipei held ‘The 1908 Taipei Competitive Exhibition’. However this exhibition was only organized by the Taipei Agricultural Association as it was more similar to a Competitive Fair than a fully-fledged exhibition.

152 The first exhibition with such a wide range of exhibits was the first Competitive Exhibition of Southern Taiwan (Jap. 第一回南部臺灣物産共進會) organised by Chiayi, Tainan and A-Kau (now Pingtung) City governments in 1911 in the second common school in Tainan City.

153 The Association’s main purpose was to work for the unification of Asians to resist Europe and America. The main pillar of this unification was to be that of close and friendly Japanese-Chinese relations, and so Taiwan was key as an area in which the two peoples come into contact with each other. The Association called for assimilation in Taiwan based on natural fusion, and the Association would be the agency of international exchange between Taiwanese and Japanese people to promote mutual closeness between the two peoples.
and was supported by the Meiji reformist ITAGAKI Taisuke (Jap. 板垣退助) as a pioneering Taiwanese political organisation in the Japanese colonial period. (Lu, S., 2007: 215) However, it was forced into dissolution within two months by the Japanese central authority. Unlike American colonial rule in the Philippines, the Japanese treated Taiwan instrumentally, as a shifting platform used to extend power towards Southern China and Southeast Asia under the ‘Southern Expansion Doctrine’. The proposal to open an ‘Exhibition of Taiwan’ became firmer under this momentum, and stood in opposition to native nationalist movements which were growing on the island.

The aims of the Taiwan exhibitions were multiple under this aggressive doctrine: first to show off Japan’s successful tropical experience, second to attract Japanese investors and immigrants, third to exhibit products from Southern China and Southeast Asia in Taiwan, fourth to dissolve the potential national consciousness of the Han people, and finally to show the results of colonial rule. As was shown in Chapter 4, Japanese administrators wished to demonstrate that they were not only developing resources but also enlightening the people, with a particular focus on the aboriginal native people. The global ambition of the 1916 exhibition was shown in the claim that this was a ‘Worldwide South Pacific Exhibition’ which encapsulated the Japanese colonies of Taiwan, Hokkaidō, Sakhalin, Ryūkyūs, Korean and Manchuria. Also invited were South China, Hong Kong, French Indochina and Siam, British India and Malay Peninsula, Java, and American governed Philippines. Colonial Taiwan was being presented as the ‘key to Japan’s south gate’ the overarching aim of the paradigm of Southern expansion. The ‘South Seas Pavilion’ and ‘Philippines Farmhouse’ were particularly noted as ‘Pointers of southern expansion’ on Taiwan Daily News (5th April, 1916). (fig. 5.45)
Given these aims and the complaints from previous exhibitions, in order for a national and colonial showcase of products to be fully effective other infrastructure was needed which was not yet readily available at the turn of the 20th century in Taiwan. It was not until the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was almost complete in 1916 that the infrastructure was in place to address the previous criticisms. The Office was one of three buildings which formed the first venue of the exhibition. As well as the Office itself, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Museum (introduced in Chapter 4) had already been finished in 1908 alongside the railway, and was used as a branch of the first venue. Besides this, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Library, which had also been competed in 1908, provided a showcase for Japanese domestic arts and crafts.

The first venue formed by the unfinished Office (along with the Museum and Library) was followed by a second venue (set up more with an entertainment function) in the nursery plant field of the Taiwan Governor-General Forestry Research Institute (now Taipei Botanical Garden). There were seven pavilions with facilities for a guesthouse, an entertainment hall, a music hall, a teahouse and rest spots which contained calligraphy and painting galleries, and a large number of temporary shops. The most noteworthy of these spaces was the ‘Aborigine Pavilion’ (also known as the Hall of the Barbarous tribes). Its appearance strongly emphasised the results of colonial governance: the abandonment of brutality and the learning of civilisation through Japan. Within this building the natives were shown sitting down counting knots, so introduced as possessing an immature economy without written languages, yet aboriginals were presented simultaneously as tribes under the control of Imperial Japan and ‘developing’ (fig. 5.46). In contrast, to the side of this ‘Aborigine Pavilion’ was a Magic Arena advertised as ‘the biggest spectacle of the 20th century’ (fig. 5.47). The front gate of the second venue had two enormous pillars of electric lights (fig. 5.48).
The 1916 Taiwan Industrial Competitive Exhibition attracted more than eight hundred thousand visitors in its two venues. The design of displays, venue planning and general arrangements were the responsibility of the Taiwan Governor’s Office. The plan of categories above, which contrasted the technical advancement of the Japanese against the primitive natives, shows the intention of Taiwan Governor’s Office to transplant a particularly Euro-American framework on arts and edifices. There were eleven categories of exhibits in total, far more than in previous exhibitions in Taiwan. The list of exhibits was arranged with two categories on top, which were ‘Education/Scholarship/Sanitation’ and ‘Arts and Crafts’. Whilst the number of exhibits in these categories was nearly thirty times less than in the ‘agriculture’ and ‘forestry’ categories, the top two categories were obviously a priority for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, for there were a number of associated activities including public lectures by Professors from Japan, and all the arts and crafts exhibits were imported from Japan. Whilst the name of the exhibition emphasised industry, there were only 3,924 industrial exhibits (under the categories
‘Industry’, ‘Machinery/Institutions’ and ‘Civil Engineering/Architecture/Transportation’) out of a total 26,443. Because of the lack of items related to industry, it appears that the progressive technologies were not yet mature at this time or ready to be exhibited; the lack of industrial progress before 1945 in Taiwan was also noted in Chapter 4.

Because of this lack of indigenous industry, the main venue itself, the Office, seemed to be on display in itself rather than just being a container. As shown above, the building included diverse technological objects produced mainly by the Empire of Japan – both domestic Japan and her colonies – and so the exhibition gave a central role to the new building; the Office attracted nearly double the number of visitors seen by the nearby second venue with its lively entertainment function. The Office enticed over five hundred thousand visitors during the exhibition, of which 146,000 were Japanese and 379,000 were Taiwanese, along with only 321 foreigners. (Lu, S., 2007: 232)

Attracting so many visitors (particularly local Taiwanese people) demonstrated the lure of Japan’s unique kindai (modern) empire building: the Office’s advanced Seiyō Classicism style and attendant modern technologies were fully shown and utilised from the ground floor to the third floor, where there was an extra external temporary entrance. The front entrance plaza also emulated Euro-American expositions, as a fountain was built with flanking buffalos and two ponds were landscaped with coloured lighting appliances used at night. (fig. 5.49) Perhaps most interesting for visitors was that the tower became a feature of the exhibition: open to visitors, it functioned as an observatory with its two stage lift. This tower was in fact more popular than the exhibition inside the building. (Taiwan Daily News, 16th April 1916) The tower became a landmark for the capital and for the exhibition, a position first established by the Eiffel tower in The Exposition Universelle of 1889 in Paris and inherited here by colonial Japan. The experience of ascending was touching and provoked intense sentiments in the Taiwanese visitors in particular, who made up 72 percent of the visitors to the first venue. (Lu, S., 2007: 232) One Taiwanese wrote several poems during the exhibition to express his feelings, and perhaps the most powerful was written when atop the tower, titled ‘The consummate experience of ascending the tenth floor’ (Chi. 登十層樓二絕):

The low clouds were wonderful, superb,
Misty eyes surrounded by bright light,
Facing west toward the sea and facing north toward the heavy mountain,
This painting mentioned rice paddies and an ocean landscape.

Choosing to board this victorious platform gives unrestrained emotions,
The body in repose half as high as the sky,
Mountains and clouds are passing the eyes…
Ah, the shame of few poems; the fall of brilliant writing.\textsuperscript{154}

Creating strong emotions in the colonial populace was a key function of the exhibition. It was advantageous for propaganda purposes to promote the advanced technologies that allowed this view in the first instance, and such a (comparative) skyscraper visibly signalled a booming economy and a power to rival nature. This rhetoric could also be seen in a set of postcards for remembrance of the exhibition issued by the Taiwan Industrial Mutual-Progress Association. In the postcard in fig. 5.50, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office provided a strong background which highlighted the lively impression created by the fountain and ponds. Most interesting is the postcard in fig. 5.51, where the Office was placed together with the reception pavilion in the second venue which was in Japanese style. This was in general rare for representations of the Japanese Empire, as Japanese style was normally hidden, but it was logical given these two buildings were the main venues for the exhibition. The Japanese design features in the Reception Pavilion implied the identity of the host of the exhibition, and the composition of this postcard, putting the Japanese style together with the highest order of official building in Renaissance-Revival style, connotes the power of their Empire expressed alongside its deeper identity.

The results of the exhibition were multiple: even though attracting immigrants was not achieved, by 1919 the number of Japanese-founded enterprises in Taiwan almost quadrupled, and the number of Taiwanese-founded companies increased by more than eight times from the 1917 level. Most of these companies were industrial and commercial, fitting the theme of the exhibition. The increase of Japanese-founded enterprises may have been as a result of the Great War which positively affected Asia resulting in an economic boom, and investment of Japanese capital in Korea and Manchuria also increased around this time. Moreover according to Nakamura, Taiwan’s role as the key to Southern expansion was confirmed after the 1916 exhibition. (Nakamura, 2002: 23) The southern expansion was observable in these new firms: the joint-stock company, the Southern China bank (Jap. 株式會社華南銀行) and the Southeast Asia Warehouse Company (Jap. 南洋倉庫) were established in 1919 and 1920 respectively. These companies’ names and functions imply a close relationship with the policies of the Taiwan Governor’s Office. Another trace of this policy is reflected in a remembrance postcard of
the 1916 exhibition, which included the regions of Taiwan, the prefectures of Japan, Sakhalin, Korea, State of Northeast China, Hong Kong and Southeast China, and Indonesia.

The most successful result of the exhibition was the more immediate aim of promoting the achievements of colonial rule in Taiwan and showing the successful application of *kindai* (modern) technology and design to the tropics. This success prompted the industrial exhibition to be repeated every ten years following 1916. Two groups seem to have been affected most by the exhibition. First, visitors from China were especially filled with emotion and laments at the progress that Japan had made in comparison to their country. Second, the Taiwanese themselves: the effect could be seen from another Taiwanese poem, titled ‘the Governor-General’s Yamen’ (Chi. 總督府衙), a Chinese translation of the Office’s name. Written in 1916 whilst at the exhibition, the poem shows the impression that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office left on its author:

The towering space cascades into the sky,
Stones and bricks stacked white and reflected red,
This overflowing spirit gives exaggerated pleasure,
And manages to resist any attack by the common people.

Thoughtful planning and a precise structure,
A rocky boundary is the first step in declaring the territory,
Boarding here and setting down they can watch the people’s thoughts…
Not only is trade and industry flourishing but it is congealed together.
(Chang, L., 2000: 335-37; translated by Author)

This poem is notably heavier than the poem written on the tower, with the Office representing a statement of ownership, a ‘rocky boundary’, designed to ‘watch the people’s thoughts’. It was also a symbol powerful enough to bring the Imperial subjects ‘congealed together’ under Japanese rule on the basis of trade and industry. The admiration of the preciseness of the structure is obvious, suggesting that the natives could engage in the project of modernity through simply experiencing the building itself. And yet the building’s purpose, to resist attacks from the common people, implies that it was the rulers who held the expertise, coldly watching behind ‘stones and brick’ without engaging with their subjects. The scientific and technological revolution by Japan was held by Japan alone and was possessed as a sign of superiority.

One of the officials CHANG Zun-Xu (Chi. 張遵旭) from Fujian Province wrote *A travel journal about Taiwan* (Chi. 臺灣遊記) (1960) during his 18 day stay. Another official, QUAN Qi-Zhao (Chi. 全其照), from Jiangsu Province also wrote a visit report about the Exhibition.
Provisionality and a technological evolution

The building itself was a product of a new ‘civilisation’ and it is disingenuous to assume that the civilisation embodied in the Office was that the same as could have easily been seen in Europe or America at the same time. The precise configuration of technology and the strong desire to exhibit this to natives (who had a similar Confucian background) was a unique occurrence amongst the Great Powers of the time, and more particularly in East Asia. At the same time, the effect of adapting Seiyō conceptual terms such as science, technology, industry and reason, pointed to a shift in the basis of thinking. In Taiwan, this shift could be seen most clearly in GOTÔ Shinpei’s biological politics, but perhaps the most profound revolution in thinking was in Japanese architecture.

The strong, rational elements of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, evident even to Taiwanese visitors, were a consequence of the way the ideals of the enlightenment were integrated within the architecture project inherited by Japan in the 19th century. As shown in the introduction, it is often assumed that it was modernism which presaged rational, humanistic architecture yet it was popular for European architectural historians in the Victorian period to link their architecture with Reason: Eugene-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc (1814-1879) attempted to prove that the Greek temple was not copied from the wooden hut, whilst India and Muslim states derived their stone architecture from carpentry practice. Greek architecture was seen as a uniquely European alliance between stone and reason. (Clancey, 2006: 15) Conder gave credence to this view, writing that European architecture “does not receive its inspiration from natural objects, but follows laws established to meet certain necessities. These laws are the result of reasoning.” (Clancey, 2006: 16) Following Conder, early modernist architects such as Otto Wagner pushed this point even further stating that reason should be almost all encompassing in architecture and romanticism should be almost eradicated. (Wagner, 1988 [1902]: 79) European architecture was perceived as a rational product of the Enlightenment by European architects, which fitted a paradigm claiming that wood had been replaced by masonry wherever civilisation had occurred: “the presence or absence of civilization in European eyes was marked not only by the presence or absence of agriculture, but by masonry, and more especially by ruins.” (Clancey, 2006: 15)

As noted throughout this thesis, Japan adapted a whole conceptual framework from Europe and America following the Meiji Restoration, yet as these translations occurred through the unequal contact zone, the changes resulted in something which was transcultural, that is, neither Japanese nor Western. Concepts such as architecture, art, science and technology did not have equivalent concepts in the classical Chinese script that Japan used, and new words and concepts were created. For science and technology in the early Meiji era, “The conceptual schemes of Western science at the time were taken as true because they came from the West, and Meiji commentators gave little attention to differences
between science and technology, regarding them as the same thing, and foreign.” (Bartholomew, 1989: 4)

Eschewing debates on the properties of science in the Meiji period, scientific growth occurred in a way that was dissimilar to Europe. One example is that medicine was the scientific field of greatest growth in Japan rather than physics. (Bartholomew, 1989: 4) By the time the Taiwan Governor-General's Office was being constructed (1912-1919) the traditions of scientific research had formed and were reaching maturity. (Bartholomew, 1989: 3)

The European discourse of science was also strongly associated with individuality and lack of social control, traits that did not fit in with Japan:

“complaints on behalf of individualism in science have a long tradition in Europe and America. Sociologists from Max Weber to Talcott Parsons, as well as numerous historians and scientists, have insisted for decades that science can develop only in societies that have thrown off all vestiges of feudalism. Sociologists and social historians have usually condemned feudalism for obstructing social mobility, impeding disclosure of technical information, and impairing development of personality. Leading figures of the French Enlightenment even saw feudalism as contrary to nature.” (Bartholomew, 1989: 2)

As seen in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, social control was a key factor in Japan’s society and the administration of Taiwan in particular, from grassroots upward to building design. This continuation of social control reflected the Confucian hierarchies that had remained in place in Japanese society; Fukuzawa’s attempted movement for individuality and freedom were largely ineffective in producing any deep change in attitudes to obedience and proper place in Japanese culture. A sign of this is the way scholars and architects were quietly co-opted into the nation building project, as shown in Sections 2.3 and 3.5-6. Partly because of this, the appeal of technology was more salient to Meiji intellectuals than the idea of freedom: according to the Meiji intellectual SAKATANI Shiroshi, "education in the technical areas develops thinking and skills, which encourage the production of technology, which forms the ground of morality.”156 (Howland, 2002: 56) Slogans such as “Japanese spirit, Western technology” (and equivalent slogans in Qing China) support the argument that it was initially technology which was the greatest focus for Japan, rather than (potentially transformative) science.

Therefore science had a less formative effect on Japanese society than it had in Europe, and was generally used for practical measures. This implies that science in Japan was conceptually tied to

156 This link between technology and morality was first made in Ancient Chinese classics, familiar reading for early Meiji elites, where a good king was one who improved the lives of his subjects through development of technology. (Gao, X., 2003: 53) Technology was also seen as important as it would “teach people by using rules, and followers must learn how to apply such rules”. (Gao, X., 2003: 53)
technology, rather than as a means for cultural criticism. Bartholomew has argued that science did not have a revolutionary impact on Japanese society:

Japan “has not historically been part of the Western tradition, and while this fact is obvious, some of its implications are not. Japan’s dominant Confucian intellectual tradition was loosely structured and relatively tolerant of new ideas and perspectives. There was no legacy of revealed religion with an elaborate structure of natural philosophy intricately woven with a formal theology. Controversial theories of modern Western science like heliocentrism or the origin of the species aroused little opposition in the Japanese context and were readily espoused. Japanese scientists did not consider it necessary to slay the dragons of traditional religion but adapted to popular beliefs and refrained from developing a scientific philosophy. The physicist Yuasa Mitsutomo, who noted and disapproved of this fact, even wrote: ‘It was as though Japanese science had had its spirit of [cultural] criticism removed.’” (Bartholomew, 1989: 3)

Since Japanese science lacked substantive social criticism the development of science in Japan allowed the continuation of some deeply held convictions, even if these were kept private. Scholars have written that the adoption of European science was an incomplete paradigm shift, from an East Asian understanding of nature to a translated Western one. This process could not be completed because the underlying philosophies of how nature could be understood were incompatible. Because of the incomplete transfer of science to Japan, traditional views of nature in Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Japan were largely retained, even if these views were not flaunted and not shared to a great extent by Japanese architects (as will be shown in Chapter 5.4). This retention of culturally important traditions contrasted starkly with the way traditional branches of science in Europe such as dietetics were fundamentally split off from scientific knowledge following the Enlightenment, and the idea of the divine rights of kings was severely eroded following the Renaissance and Enlightenment. By contrast in Japan the notion of the divine emperor was strengthened by the Meiji Restoration, which had a significant consequence on the axial hierarchies in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office.

The continuation and strengthening of some Edo cultural practices also had an impact on the practice of science and development of technology in Japan, as well as allowing architectural movements such as the Metabolism Movement to flourish after 1945. Understandings of science following Thomas Kuhn see science as tied to the social and cultural background in which it is practised, which are not only influencing factors but crucial and necessary conditions. (Togo, 2003: 280) These cultural aspects were

---

157 The East Asian states of China, Korea and Japan shared an understanding of the universe where, for example, Qi energy was central. The role of Qi had a major influence on architectural design, but Qi has been deemed immeasurable by Euro-American scientists, partly due to differing epistemological foundations. (Lee, S., 2003: 64)
important, given that Japanese history had neither the stone ruins nor the concept and tradition of scientific research. The underpinnings of science and scientific architecture in Japan were necessarily different to those of Europe and America, providing a different shape and focus. Yet the impetus to adopt rational practice was increasingly present in Japanese architecture, with the buildings produced tied to the *kindai* (modern) project of progress in science and technology.

The very first use of the Office, as a space for an international industrial exhibition, displayed both the products of Japanese industry within the space and the products of modern engineering in the fabric of the building itself. The seismic proofing was a logical extension of what Clancey (2003) called “locational-induced tensions”: strains produced by possessing wooden architecture deemed by foreigners to be flimsy, residing in a region prone to earthquakes, and training architects and scientists who took on the task of researching and solving the problem of earthquake-proofing by innovating with masonry materials. This was a great success from a very early time: in 1887, less than two decades after the Meiji Restoration, the Swiss earthquake investigator F. A. Forel wrote that “More has been learnt from the seismograph-tracer of the Anglo-Japanese observers in two years, than twenty centuries of European science had been able to show.” (Clancey, 2003: 41ft) By the 1910s, Japan was producing and showcasing edifices such as the Office, which since 1919 has withstood over fifty earthquakes registering over 5.5 on the Richter scale whilst standing 60 metres tall.

Whilst starting as a local concern - to prevent the destruction of buildings by collapse or fire - seismology was also a chance for Japan to fill and dominate a scientific niche, and be a part of the global scientific community. (Clancey, 2003: 31) In a similar fashion, Japan embraced the international exhibition, the new notion of hygiene, and rational methods of control through buildings, all of which had originated in Europe and America before taking seed and growing in a new way in the Japanese Empire. International exhibitions were a good mechanism for Japan to showcase their technical developments; if Japan’s new expertise did not receive recognition it would count as a hollow victory. This blend of local and global influences in Japan indicates again that the idea of scientific architecture underlying the Office was not simply a ‘Western’ transplant, but an amalgamation of continued customs/concerns, foreign fashions, and new Japanese contributions to the science of building.

That any contribution to science was made stood at odds with prevailing views of Japan at the time as either static and unable to progress, or as a mere imitator of the ‘West’ (as revealed in Section 2.2). Through their engagement with seismology, Japanese architects built resistances into ‘Western’ building systems that were not already there. This new architecture was a technocultural artefact which became ‘Japanese,’ and Japanese architecture began to become something other than Western architecture in Japan. This process would be taken much farther in the succeeding Taisho period, as
Japanese architects largely abandoned both wood and masonry and “learned how to resist earthquakes with novel materials.” (Clancey, 2006: 211) It was through engagement with science that Japan was able to create architecture that would become recognisably Japanese.

This blend of influences was not at all static, and the balance altered depending on the socio-political situation. The choice faced by the architect and suppliers was between gaining autonomy and accepting a deepening dependence on Europe, which was also a key theme in the development of science in Japan. (Bartholomew, 1989: 7) There was never a consensus on what this balance should be, even amongst officials. However, before 1914, many Japanese officials stressed importation of Seiyō technology and science rather than supporting research at home. Importation was often expressed through spending money on overseas study instead of on domestic research. (Bartholomew, 1989: 7) This dynamic could also be seen in Japanese architecture; although Japan relied on its science of seismology and on Japanese firms in supplying materials, Moriyama toured Europe between 1912 and 1914 in search of the latest technological products to display in an international exhibition. This gives another indication of the unstable binary between taking a unique new path and following Seiyō. But given that science was understood as intrinsically tied with technology, even following Seiyō would result in a degree of provisionality; Japan’s approach meant that oscillating foreign and domestic influences led to a constantly adapting technological apparatus used in buildings.

Japan’s willing adaptation of the modern clearly had a deeper effect on scientific development with them than on the native Taiwanese people’s adoption of science and technology under colonial rule. In the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the early modern technology was impressive, used and understood in an idiosyncratic way with concerns that were largely local such as earthquakes and cleanliness. The construction of this monumental building was itself a vehicle to improve construction-related technologies due to the scale and symbolic importance of the project. Local Taiwanese were never involved in the construction beyond the role of labourers and low-level workers. Given that they were uniformly of lower rank and usually of inferior education, Taiwanese subjects only shared in Japanese science to a very limited extent.

The adoption of scientific skills and knowledge by Taiwanese was necessarily shallow. Scholars of Japanese science believe that transfer of science to Taiwan and other Japanese colonies was a complex process, whereas with technology a simple transfer was impossible. The transfer of scientific knowledge to colonial Taiwan implies several levels to be understood simultaneously: in the first instance transfer of knowledge from Western culture to non-Western culture (Japan); second the nature of colonial science among the Japanese; third the nature of science as practised by subordinate
Taiwanese; fourth, the development of scientific curiosity by subordinate Taiwan; and finally the interrelations and encounters between the colonialists and the colonised. (Togo, 2003: 282)

Whilst applying this model in depth is beyond the scope of this study, transfer of scientific knowledge to the colony was evidently part of the overarching ‘civilising mission’ of Japan. Yet “Science was the intellectual symbol of colonial dominance, and at the same time, it was the colonialists’ most valuable tool for dominance.” (Togo, 2003: 284) This could be seen from Gotō’s biological politics, and the exhibition of 1916 was an example of using the products of science for domination: the Taiwanese were by far the most represented national group of visitors to the exhibition. As colonial subjects, their experience must have been overlaid with awe (and a degree of fear and respect) for their colonial masters, and such experiences would have awakened scientific curiosity in some natives through interrelations with their colonial masters. In my argument of Chapter 1.2, the reification of dominance is a key component of being modern, and it was in such settings as the Industrial Exhibition at the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office that this process of realising dominance must have occurred, fulfilling Japan’s sense of modernity. Yet whilst much of the symbolism used by Japanese colonialists in the Office was reflective of familiar adoption of Seiyō aesthetics, the remaining undercurrent of traditional modes of thinking were still apparent in the building.

5.4 Authoritarian displays of Imperial power
Scientific and technical advancement were crucial in order for the building to become an important symbol to Taiwanese and others of the Japanese capacity to create modern monuments. Without this grounding the building could never have filled its role as a symbol of Seiyō advancement, nor had the capacity to hold international exhibitions or one thousand staff within a single building. Yet these technologies, the initial Exhibition, and spatial interpretations of the building were only the groundwork in terms of what the building was designed to mean. The aesthetics of the Office were particularly meaningful because of the composition of the jury. As a Renaissance revival associated with the Veranda style building of the early 20th century, the semiology of the building was a rich tapestry of implicit European meanings, Japanese reconfigurations of Classical symbols, and new imperial icons that co-opted Taiwanese scenes to display the dominance of Japan on the island.

The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was used with many rhetorical purposes: to create Taipei as a site of colonial modernity, to display the political dominance over the Japanese over the native, and as a monument to Japanese progress. Yet in spite of this, the building can still be read as containing invisible traditions. Whilst by and large these were hidden from view and set apart from the official rhetorical purposes of the Office, the existence of residual customs in the building points to the
incomplete nature of Japan's replication of modernity, and it influenced the way Japanese architects were able to resurrect and reinterpret customary architecture after 1945. Japan’s process of creating an overly Western architecture of authority only makes sense in this context of residual ‘traditions’. Despite the efforts to create a sense of national amnesia around buildings from the Victorian Japan period, the Western-derived conceptual frameworks and binaries remain central to Japanese kindai (modern) architecture.

As described in the preceding section on the 1916 exhibition, the image of the Office was used by the Japanese government for persuasion through postcards and prints. Representation in Japanese-occupied Taiwan was significantly different to the way European Great Powers used colonial buildings, simply because combined styles were implicitly “forbidden” in Taiwan. Instead, architecture was used as a part of national culture, integrating the colony into the construction of a kindai (modern) self-identity. The conundrum faced by Japanese postcard makers was that whilst nationalist semiotics defined Japanese colonial administration, from their inception, kindai (modern) Japanese buildings had been designed to be indistinguishable from Seiyō in order to comply with the zeitgeist of the time. Because these representations of the Office were used to infuse the colonial administration with monumentality, particularly by contrasting the building with the yamen to show progress, towards the end of the colonial period the Office served as a ‘national’ symbol for the integration of Taiwan within Greater Japan.

**Semiotic persuasiveness**

As shown in the previous section, Josiah Conder and other prominent architects in 1910s Japan, such as the structural engineer SANO Toshikata (Jap. 佐野利器, 1880-1956), emphasised the technical development of architecture following several earthquakes. This led Conder to state that the art of architecture was much less relevant in Japan than in Europe due to the importance of seismic proofing. This claim by Conder and Sano was against the inclinations jury members of ITŌ Chūta and TATSUNO Kingo, who continued to see the value in architecture as an art and were the main proponents of this position in Japan. (Clancy, 2006: 183) Whilst technology was very significant in Japanese architecture, it would only be of primary importance following Sano’s promotion to Professor of Architecture. By 1920 aesthetic attitudes had changed to the extent that none of the designs made by architecture graduates of the University of Tokyo used historical revival styles, and the new rationalism of Modernism became fashionable.
The art and style of the Office were crucial to Japan’s projection of power across Taiwan and the rest of Asia, and projection of an identity through art was one of the key purposes of the building from its first proposal, due to the personalities and status of the jury members and the culture amongst Japanese architects at that time. The appointment of Tatsuno as chairman by his peers demonstrates how much he was respected in his profession and displays an unwritten Japanese rule of respecting seniors. As jury Chair, Tatsuno was awarded 10,000 Yen; Tsukamoto was awarded 3000 Yen; all the others awarded 6000 Yen (Jap. 臺灣總督府公文類纂, The Official Document of Taiwan Governor-General Office) meaning that Tatsuno received nearly double the fee compared with other jury members. According to Hwang, Tatsuno’s activities were more extensive than any other jury member, and he was even involved in the stipulation of the design prize regulations. (Huang, J., 2004: 86)

The competition jury was unique in the world thanks to Japan’s highly centralised architectural education system. Not only were all members familiar with each other, but all architects in Japan were likely to be acquaintances. In 1897, only around 45 Japanese architects had graduated from the only architecture course in the country; by contrast, the British 1901 census showed 10,781 men who called themselves ‘architect’. (Clancey, 2006: 20) This reflects the strict way that Japan interpreted the idea of ‘architect’ from Conder and the founder of the College of Engineering, Henry Dyer, compared with the informal architectural training in Europe and America: “this training and titling of architects by the Japanese state was a situation new in world history.” (Clancey, 2006: 20) It resulted in all Japanese architects being ‘classmates’, their exclusivity bolstered by their small numbers. (Clancey, 2006: 20) Restricting the field to Japanese architects demonstrated that the authorities were acting as a nation-state, yet it also meant that all the designs produced would follow similar templates, each showing a keen understanding of European revival styles.

Given that following graduation all Japanese architects served the government, it would have been impossible to find any unaware of the state’s need to define an identity to the world. This identity was difficult to define, as both revivalism and native-inspired architecture were problematic for architects and their clients: “The Japanese architect faced the dilemma that if he adopted the eclectic styles of his European counterparts, he was seen by them (and sometimes by his Japanese peers) as betraying his native tradition, whereas if he championed a native style, he risked falling back into the drawer prepared for him by European Orientalism.” (Sand, 2005: 112) This was a drawer Japanese authorities were keen to avoid, for through their colonies in particular, they wished to be seen as a progressive nation, capable of effectively colonising another people.
That Tatsuno style was consciously used in the Taiwan Governor-General's Office was shown by having the winning design altered from a pale and unadorned façade to one with red ‘bricks’ and white banding. This government and jury interference can be seen as a rubric of nationalism and international architectural trends of the time: to have declined to join in with this nation-building exercise would have appeared ‘uncivilised’. Highly visible architecture in these colonies was built in this style under the patronage of Tatsuno and Moriyama. (fig. 5.52) It is likely that Moriyama’s familiarity with Tatsuno style from working in his office is what made Tatsuno recommend Moriyama. Moriyama’s subsequent employment as chief architect for the most high profile official buildings in Taiwan speak to both Moriyama’s skill and the power of Tatsuno’s patronage. If the style had not been used in the colonies, particularly Taiwan and Manchuria, it is unlikely that it would ever have been called a ‘national style’ at all. The form taken in buildings such as the Office was in some ways definitive for Japanese nationalist expression.

There were echoes of the Queen Anne style in the building, a style which was in vogue when Tatsuno worked in England in William Burges’s office. Enormously popular in the 1870s and surviving into the early years of 20th century, “Queen Anne came with red brick and white-painted sash windows, with curly pedimented gables and delicate brick panels of sunflowers, swags, or cherubs, with small window panes, steep roofs, and curving bay windows, with wooden balconies and little fancy oriels jutting out where one would least expect them.” (Girouard, 1977: 1) This was a suitable style for much of the brick architecture constructed in the Meiji period, which Tatsuno recommended as “cheap and easy to learn”.158 (Stewart, 1987: 38) The main traits of Queen Anne were “the use of plain red brick, English (and perforce Dutch) Renaissance details, a returning inclination towards symmetrical composition, and a quality of lightness and delicacy in treatment not associated with High Victorian architecture.” (Macleod, 1971: 27) As used by Tatsuno, the lightness of the style was less evident than an emphasis

---

158 This was a similar consideration for the interior design of the famous Japanese designer of the early 20th century, Hayashi. Hayashi spoke of the need to attain “the most harmonious, pleasant style for the least expense”. (Sand, 2003: 109)
on solidness (expressed most obviously by a preference for 90 degree angles rather than rounded edges) and the use of white stone to add decoration to the red brick façade. Whilst it is likely that Richard Norman Shaw’s Alliance Assurance buildings (1881-83) were what caught Tatsuno’s imagination with regard to the Queen Anne style (Stewart, 1987: 38) Tatsuno’s buildings look more similar to Shaw’s later work, such as the Norman Shaw Buildings around London’s Scotland Yard (1887-1906, fig. 5.53). They have a robust yet lively façade, similar to a typical Tatsuno style building such as Osaka Hall (1918, fig 5.54).

This building style was used in Taiwan for a tapestry of reasons, most fundamentally its political value. In colonial Taiwan, the formal expression of public buildings was a political statement, not just an artistic and aesthetic symbol as was more common in mainland Japan. (Fu, C., 2007: 174) Whilst public buildings in Japan were targeted at both Japanese and foreign visitors, in Taiwan architecture had the added dimension of addressing the native Taiwanese. Fu gives specific examples of how the form of architecture served political purposes: “Tainan Prefecture Hall and Taichung Prefecture Hall are each crowned with a luxurious mansard roof. The dome and portico of the Tainan District Courthouse and the continuous arcade and Roman portico of the Taiwan Army Second Regiment Barracks also display monumental elements that the people of Taiwan had rarely seen before. Therefore, through these monumental buildings, the Japanese government created a sense of authority in the urban environment.” (Fu, C., 2007: 175-176) The value of these buildings lay in their evident expertise in handling European architectural forms and the sense of superiority derived from this skill.  


5.54. TATSUNO Kingo: Osaka Hall, 1918. (Photography by Author)

---

159 This discourse of superiority over natives was represented in colonial architecture and policies where, unlike British policies, schooling instruction was in Japanese, integrating the superiority of the Japanese over the natives into the social structure.
Tatsuno style was a cumulation of a long trend: from the first generation of Japanese architects onwards, their “handling of yōfū (Western-style) architecture was almost indistinguishable from its handling by Westerners in Japan or abroad. Such indistinguishability was indeed the treasured goal of both the first generation of zokagaku-shi and their ministerial, commercial and industrial patrons.” (Clancey, 2006: 19) I asked one British Professor of architecture history about the Governor General’s Office and he was shocked that it was a Japanese building, believing it more likely to be French or Swiss,160 understandably so given the stylistic similarities of Tatsuno style with European Queen Anne derivations. This indistinguishability in colonial Taiwan meant the building had the potential to be used as a symbol to show that Japan’s level of civilisation could be equated with Seiyō. Further, the use of the same style in both mainland Japan and Taiwan gave the explicit message that Taiwan was being integrated into the Japanese national identity.

The Office’s brick-tiled concrete construction, colonnades, gables, vaulted and oeil-de-boeuf windows, brackets, and composite columns reflect classic European elements common during Taiwan’s Japanese Occupation. Tatsuno style, with its elements of Queen Anne revival, has its roots in Italian Renaissance revival, clear from its symmetrical layout around a vertical axis and classical features. Historically Renaissance architecture represented a return to Roman standards and motifs, and this can be seen in the ornamentation in the Office as well as in the use of Roman varieties of columns such as Roman Ionic in the portico and a variation of the Roman Composite order in the official entrance room. These features created a complex and imposing façade whilst the squareness and proportion of the building gave a feeling of permanence. As noted in Chapter 3, this style was more suited to Japan than Gothic revival would have been, due to Renaissance Revival’s lack of connection to Christianity. Given that Japan wished to demonstrate its identity as civilised and enlightened rather than medieval (as numerous British politicians and writers had characterised Japan), the Gothic style would have been an inappropriate choice, and easily criticised by foreigners. In addition, whilst state buildings in Taiwan almost always used appropriated styles, the competition participants also ignored native styles since Japanese architects had accepted that “styles that could have been appropriated, such as those used for Shinto shrines, were patently unsuitable for the new types of buildings needed because they lacked monumentality.” (Watanabe, 1996: 23) The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was a clear example of the influence of this borrowed type of modernity: as the tallest and largest building in Taiwan, taking seven years to build, it was meant as a demonstration of the capabilities of the Japanese colonialists. At 60 metres high it was probably the tallest building that most colonial natives would ever have seen, far taller and more robust than the yamen it replaced.

160 Private correspondence.
Given the narrowing of Japan’s stylistic palette, a consensus formed about official building styles which could be seen from the competition entrants’ designs. Despite lack of restriction by any design regulations all were in (Western) Neo-classical style. At this time, the Meiji government and civil society in mainland Japan promoted *Wakon-yōsai* (Japanese spirit, Western technology) following the end of Rokumekan era from the mid-1880s, as discussed in Chapter 2. However as the leading project of the new system era in the golden period of colonial Taiwan architecture, the designs of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office showed no influence of this slogan. Instead the value of replication of *Seiyō* semiotics remained in entrants’ designs which continued to operate in the official buildings of Japan’s colonies, and reflects the notion of using architecture for persuasion inherited by GOTÔ Shinpei from Imperial Britain. This policy brought out the asynchronous progress between Japan and China in Taipei: public buildings built by the Japanese were clearly beneficiaries of ‘Westernisation’ unlike the Qing authority buildings.

Renaissance revival as a stylistic blanket was becoming the default in Europe’s empires, displaying power with proud roots in a rational Greco-Roman past: “Classicism would no longer defined only Europe in its geographical and cultural regime at the turn of twentieth century, but develop as a common language of power, empire, and political legitimation. The Classical idiom, the universal signifier of modern high style... was the expedient thrust into international visual politics that Japan desired.” (Tseng, 2006: 133-134) Whilst the stylistic vocabulary and grammar used between empires in the early 20th century was broadly similar, each empire used these building blocks with varying skill and to tell different stories.

The details of this narrative lay in the composition of the more meticulous spaces of the Office, particularly the portico and lobby, the most impressive and public parts of the building. It is also easier to analyse the front entrance and lobby because the vast majority of detailed photographic evidence of the Office from before 1945 is of these two spaces, and after that much of the building was gutted by fire and bomb damage. My interviewee, C. Y. LI, was then ordered to repair it within three months or face being shot by the new KMT government, and therefore much of the original design was greatly simplified. Because under Japanese rule Li had been only an architectural assistant without comprehensive training, the semiology of the building was not understood and some architectural details of the Office were changed drastically. Li had to focus on the main structure first, and could only try his best to repair other parts like the entrances, paving and details to make them as similar to the original as possible. However difficult elements such as the bronze classical ornaments on the columns in fig. 5.55 were interpreted by him as in fig. 5.56 as there was no choice. Therefore the analysis of the

---

161 It was revising its general position on the emulation of Seiyō culture and values in 1890s, there was new consciousness that indigenous art and architecture should be set apart from imported western models. This revising was continued to the modernism was introduced by Secessionist architecture in 1920 in the Empire of Japan.
semiotics of the building below relies on the extant photographs and postcards of the Taiwan Governor-General's Office from the Japanese colonial period.

From this evidence, it was clear that the front entrance was the most high status entrance, only for the Governor-General or important visitors such as the Imperial family; on visiting they would be driven in a private carriage from the left to right ramp (fig. 5.58). The portico (fig 5.57) had large, imposing Roman Ionic columns in octostyle with eight columns presented on approach and was roughly rectangular in shape. Between the middle columns there was a segmental arch with simple boxes hanging in the cornice below the front arch, which was repeated on either side. Under this arch was a large foliage-based relief, which has since been removed, along with much else of the portico following damage in World War Two (fig 5.59). However the original photographs show a classically inspired official entrance which is particularly decorative due to the adoption of Roman, rather than the simpler Greek, Ionic capitals.
Once through the portico, the Governor-General (or high status officers and guests) would have reached the lobby. In European and American government buildings the grand staircase of the entrance lobby was often one of the key points of the building. For instance, the three-dimensional sketch of the Foreign Office in London (fig. 5.60), built in 1868, shows as much dignity as the architect can muster: a delicate curved ceiling with huge decorated pendant lamps and the grand staircase which branches left and right. The equivalent purpose and a similar stairway form can be seen in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. (fig. 5.61) It was a three story high-ceiling Baroque style room which used the Composite order of columniation. Along each side of the lobby there were three openings. Flanking each doorway were two-story high double-pillars with a pair of square-walled pillars directly behind them.
The column stylobate was tall, around waist-height. The openings at ground level were rectangular and each interrupted gable was originally decorated with flowers and mouldings (fig. 62). A large mural by Japanese artist OKADA Saburosuke, a ‘Western-style’ painter and one of the founding members of the Paris-Pantheon art group in 1900, hung on the wall during the Japanese Occupation. The openings at the upper level were arched and had a roaring lion’s head at the top (fig. 5.63). Neither Taiwan nor Japan have native lions; instead this may be a generic empire symbol given that lion is the national symbol of Britain. These lions’ heads stood alongside other imperial symbols, such as bunches of grapes. Fruit was commonly used to represent Taiwan since the colony was known as Japan’s Southern Treasure House, supporting much of the empire’s agriculture.
The bull’s skull in the fresco above these Composite columns, shown below (fig. 5.64), was unusual in its prominence. This motif (Bucranium) was used in classical architecture and often garlanded, but only used with the Doric order. (Parker, 1896: 156; Summerson, 1980: 123; Vitruvius, 1960) The presence of a Bucranium in the centre of a Composite order’s frieze is puzzling in its symbolism, given the importance of its position in the centre of the frieze above the official entrance lobby. The position did demand some treatment and, using the grammar of the classical orders, Moriyama may have found the bull’s skull eye-catching, rather than imbued with meaning. According to Professor Peter Carl: “I agree the bull is a bit odd, but all the ornament seems to be slightly over-developed from well-known prototypes (e.g. what appear to be wings on the capitals); but then this is characteristic for late 19th-early 20th architecture in Europe and America, governed more by the aesthetics of the fine arts than by tradition.” Private correspondence. On balance, it is more likely that this fine arts trend had reached Japan rather than Moriyama being unfamiliar with European architectural traditions.
The columns in the lobby, shown below in fig 5.65, were in the giant order and the capitals roughly followed the Composite order with the key addition of a bird placed between the Roman Ionic volutes, probably an eagle rather than a phoenix, a more ancient symbol for Japan. Along with the lion, this possible use of a Roman Imperial symbol may have reflected that its imperial connotations were suitable to Japan’s first overseas colony, and it came in the aftermath of Japan’s heralded victory over Russia, whose national symbol was a double-headed eagle. (figs. 5.66 and 5.67) Since the fall of the Roman Empire, eagles have been used throughout history as symbols of imperial might: the German, American, Russian, Byzantine, Holy Roman, Spanish, and Polish-Lithuanian Empires all used eagles to symbolise their dominion. Given the way the symbol of the lion was also used, it appears that the architect was attempting to imbue the lobby with generic, received symbols of imperialism, alongside several Japanese artistic elements, all placed within a European, Renaissance revival setting.
Invisible traditions, hidden traditions

Whilst the overall colonial policy of ‘civilising the natives’ in Taiwan was roughly similar in tone to European colonial policies, a syncretic style of architecture was never used in Taiwan, even after architects like ITŌ Chūta had begun using such styles from the turn of the twentieth century in mainland Japan. This was not due to lack of will or skill from the relevant architects. Moriyama produced commendable Minnan style buildings for expositions in Japan. IDE Kaoru, the architect who replaced Moriyama in the final years of the construction of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, and became the most influential architect and the director of the architectural department in the colonial government in the 1930s, wrote that the regional character of architecture in Taiwan should be made more important. (Fu, C., 2007: 178) FU Chao-Ching states that Ide was subsequently unable to pursue this policy in Taiwan and was limited to “various modern styles” “owing to practical considerations and his clients’ requirements”. (Fu, C., 2007: 178) I have noted above that the semiology of the Office had been infused with European motifs, specifically appropriated to emphasise both commonly used symbols of
imperialism from European powers and, more subtly, to convey the Japanese as opposed to Taiwanese identity of the building’s users. However, when it came to the overall style, the architect was never allowed to express a blend of ‘traditions’.

Because the ‘Western style’ became obligatory in Japan’s colonies, ‘Japaneseess’ is difficult to show in the case of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office; for ‘traditional’ forms were not even an option except for residential and religious buildings. Yet hidden under the blanket forms of European revivalism, several details suggest that the Japanese customs had been changed little by modernity, and were retained or redeveloped. The first example was not hard to find. In the front lobby the stained glass in the windows (figs. 5.68 and 5.69) was prominent and unusual, for throughout its history, stained-glass was used mainly for Churches and other religious buildings in the West; it therefore gave a religious flavour. As Japanese building traditions did not use glass, this technology was one imported from Europe (or possibly through America given the use of stained glass in Art Nouveau). The creation of stained glass required artistic skill to conceive a design and engineering skills to assemble the glass. Japanese artists approached this art form maturely in the early twentieth century after it had been developed strongly in Victorian Britain. This is reflected in the Japanese floral designs, which demonstrate the lightness and grace of Japanese wood block prints of the Edo period.
Whilst foreign visitors to the Office might have seen the patterns as an example of ‘traditional/timeless Japan’, for the Japanese they would have been an example of modernity due to the recentness of the development. It was only in 1908 that such re-developed traditions in interior design were gaining popularity. A key figure was Mitsukoshi’s first chief of interior design, Hayashi who

“created distinct motifs for the surfaces and upholstery of each room in the [Japanese embassy in Paris], including ‘autumn colors,’ ‘cherry blossoms,’ ‘chrysanthemums,’ ‘bamboo,’ and ‘weaponry.’ Upon its completion in 1908, the embassy design was well-received in Paris, where it served to represent traditional Japanese taste. In Japan, Mitsukoshi promoted the design by publishing a book by Iwaya describing a fictional visit. Here the novelty of the design and its distinction from traditional architecture were emphasized…. From Mitsukoshi’s perspective, Hayashi’s innovation was to create a Japanese style distinct from the work of vernacular carpenters. In the context of European Japonisme, its only true distinction may have been that it was the authentic work of a Japanese designer. But within Japan, Hayashi’s work could claim to bear Japanese interior aesthetics across the threshold from an unconscious and artless vernacular past into enlightened modernity.” (Sand, 2003: 108)

That such designs were chosen for the lobby of the Office emphasised that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was a site for the ‘state of the art’ in both design and engineering. Yet this example serves better to emphasise that even obviously Japanese designs of the early 20th century were not ‘traditional’ but already re-imaginings and distillations of past practices. They represented a move away from the binary choice between unfashionable Edo art and Seiyō art that did not culturally resonate. They allowed a third way to be created: designs which could incorporate new national symbols (such as cherry-blossoms) within the kindai (modern) paradigm. Stained glass was a perfect vehicle since it was fashionable in Europe with the Art Nouveau movement, but glass was not found in Japan prior to 1853 and so was an unmistakably kindai material. Use of historically derived patterns meant that this stained glass fulfilled several purposes: symbolically representing continuations from the past, mastery of foreign technology, and enlightened modernity.

This was an example of a re-developed tradition,\(^\text{163}\) distinct from the following example which was a retained tradition. By Taisho year 4 (1915) the main construction was almost completed and more effort

\(^{163}\) Some (such as Wu, N., 2012) argue that another re-developed tradition can be found in the building plan. The frame of the plan was changed to have two courtyards so that the outline was the same as the character (Jap. 日) which meant ‘Sun’, the symbol of the Japanese state, but this seems as likely to be accidental as purposeful.
was focused on installing the drainage system, sewerage pipelines, glass for the doors and windows, balconies, balustrades and drainage for the roof. Along with these activities, all common to constructing architecture with Europe, an important ritual took place: the ridge-beam raising ceremony. On the 25th June 1915 a ceremony of just over one hour to celebrate the placing of the highest beam took place. Even today, the related ceremonial object can be found in a room at the top of the main tower. This is an ancient Shinto and Buddhist ceremony where “the old spirits that dwell on the property – be they rice-field spirits or forest spirits – are kindly asked to vacate the premises.” (Brown, 1989: 149) Led by a carpenter, the Governor-General and his staff ascended to the top of the tower, where the beam was placed in its position, and biscuits were spread upon the area in the customary fashion to induce the old spirits to leave. (Brown, 1989: 149) Afterwards the leader of the Construction Division thanked everybody and held the customary feast (though given the time in the morning it is unlikely that the customary sake (Jap. 日本酒, lit. Japanese liquor) was drunk).

The ‘beam’ was actually a Taiwanese cypress tablet (figs. 5.70 and 5.71), inscribed with the date of the ceremony and the names of the government officials and workers responsible for the construction of the Office. The use of a Taiwanese cypress tablet to mark the most important ceremony in the building process harked back to building traditions once shared between the two countries, reflecting their geographical bond. The wooden tablet was clearly a derivation of a custom, given it was not structural and not actually a ‘beam’ making it slightly incongruous since the structural materials were steel and concrete.
The use of a full ceremony spoke to an underlying Shinto belief in qi and kami, used to ward off hazardous spirits that previously resided in the area. That the ceremony was led by a carpenter shows that, although relegated in importance, the carpenter retained a role as master of hogaku, as introduced in Chapter 3, even while being co-opted into the modern building process. The ritual is significantly different in tone to the European ceremony of topping out, which has a similar form (to place the final ‘beam’ at the top of the completed building) but a different function (to deter spirits (kami) from the building rather than simply completing it) even if the original function was the same. The retention of spiritual traditions within a scientific building emphasises the point of the previous section: that science ran alongside tradition in Japanese society rather than in dynamic opposition.

This explanation of customs able to continue with little adaptation must be seen from the perspective of architecture that was not for show. Analysing the residential preferences of the Governor-General shows a split between public rational architecture and a more customary, arguably more authentic, domestic architecture. The rhetorical purposes of the Office stood in opposition to the lived reality of the Japanese colonialists, from the office workers to the Governor-General. In the expansion of Taipei under GOTÔ Shinpei, the residential houses of the Japanese were developed en bloc with a clear vision: the colonials built “houses and Shinto shrines (jinja) in various traditional Japanese styles in Taiwan, not only imposing a Japanese spiritual culture on the colony, but also providing the Japanese residents psychological relief from homesickness.” (Fu, C., 2007: 174) The residential life of the colonialists was de-emphasised and not publicised in comparison with the public buildings.

The homogeneity of Japanese residences was broken by guest houses, which used the forms, functions and spaces of Seiyō country houses for Japanese gentry164 and were strongly influenced by Victorian tastes and habits. In Taipei the only residences built in European style were those for high officials such as the Governor-General, where he was also supposed to host events for guests. The Official Residence was one the first foreign style buildings with substantial authenticity and it had two gardens, one Seiyō style and one Japanese style which followed a legendary land of Chinese mythology:165 the Taoist immortal island of Penglai (known in Japanese mythology as Hôrai).166 The Official Residence is the large building in the middle of figs. 5.72 and 5.73, with the ‘Western’ garden at the front entrance where guests entered and the Japanese garden at the rear, invisible to passers-by. This follows the principle that Japanese architecture and landscape gardening were visible only in more

---

164 Examples of similar buildings in Tokyo were given in Section 3.5.

165 There was a pond with a fountain and a tiny artificial island which was accumulated from clear pond sludge, two delicate European pavilions with copper roofs on the east and west side each, a stone bridge made from materials from the Provincial Tian Hau temple within the Taipei walled-city. The stone lion by the stone stairs was also a relic of the Tian Hau temple.

166 Whilst the presentation of Mount Hôrai in the Japanese cultural tradition is somewhat different from the earlier idyllic Chinese myth according to Lafcadio Hearn’s ‘Kwaidan: Stories and Studies of Strange Things’ it derived from this.
private areas in Taipei, with a perhaps unwitting sense of shame, whilst the Seiyō design was the public face: an example of Japan in this period publicly giving a higher status to borrowed cultural traditions.

In 1901, Gotō had justified the building’s expense to the National Diet by saying that “The Taiwan Governor-General is on the Southern throne and therefore his Residence should be as perfect as possible…. If people criticise the Residence like this, then they do not understand how we manage the South.” (Tsurumi, 1943: 45-6) Yet in spite of its perfection, representing authority and containing the essential spaces to make it a house of power, the various Governor-Generals did not live in the Official Residence. In the first place, a separate private residence for the Governor-General was built in customary wooden style during the governance of Kodama in 1899, next to the south-east city wall near the Japanese residential area. (fig 5.74) It was built on one level, with trees on all sides, and
appears to not have been used for receiving guests. Compared with the Official Residence this building lacks monumentality and a sense of modern fashions, besides the flag of Japan hanging by the front door. It was named 'Kodama’s Pavilion' and was also called the ‘Southern Vegetable Garden’ referring to Kodama’s habit of painting there in his spare time. After Kodama died in 1906, it was donated to ‘The Women’s Patriotic Association of Taiwan’ and was temporarily provided as a residence for the Governor-General again while the Official Residence was rebuilt in 1911. After 1920, a private residence was built permanently where the Governor would live ordinarily, again a wooden Japanese style bungalow, set beside the Japanese back garden of the Residence. (fig 5.75) It was built by order of the 8th Governor-General Den Kenjirō, the first civilian to hold that position who promoted the assimilation policy discussed in section 4.2, during his term of office from 1919 to 1923.
It is likely to have had tatami flooring, and certainly used a form of *shōji* (Jap. 障子, lit. small barrier); it would be tempting to describe the building as a nostalgic revival, except that this type of residence was never replaced by ferro-concrete and was normal for the period. Even today the vast majority of residential buildings in Japan are wooden.\(^{167}\) Customs have also survived alongside these buildings. As with Shinto Shrines, even today wooden residences are considered to have a lifespan of twenty years and are often pulled down and rebuilt after this time has elapsed.\(^{168}\) Whilst wood was virtually forbidden in colonial public architecture, non-wooden materials have remained largely absent in residential architecture. This meant that whilst the adaptation of *kindai* (modern) architecture meant that Japanese officials worked within a rational, modern spatial arrangement with relatively unfamiliar symbols and scientifically developed technology, even the Governor-General lived in a building notably derived from pseudo-religious forms, its wooden structure undoubtedly built by a carpenter, familiar, and reminiscent of ‘home’ in Japan.

In this sense the Office building’s form was deceptive: it was not necessary the preference of the inhabitants to work in such spaces, which were uncomfortable to some extent. The changes in Japanese architecture following 1919 with the arrival of Secessionism and a later return to nativism (which never reached colonial Taiwan to a significant extent), point to the discomfort that Japanese architects also felt with modernity in buildings, and a desire to be truthful to ‘Japanese traditions’. The idea of an ‘invisible tradition’ that ran alongside the Meiji modernisation was the source of some discussion in Japan after 1945. As mentioned in the introduction, the Metabolist movement was foremost amongst the architectural responses to Westernisation, and clearest in their vision to heal the gap between past and present, and between public and private architecture. The Metabolist architects were a radical avant-garde movement pursuing the merging and recycling of architectural styles and a rediscovery of the ‘hidden tradition’, the ‘invisible tradition’ within an Asian context since the second half of the 20th century. (Kurukawa, 1993: 7)

Whilst the Office showed few signs of this invisible tradition, the informal residences point to a parallel process of modernity at play in early twentieth-century Japan, with public architecture almost shedding visible traditions, whilst private architecture only reformed slowly to the modernity of public life. This dualist life of Japan was implicitly recognised in the Metabolist movement: at its core, the movement was concerned with healing the dualism inherited from the early Meiji reforms, to create a new symbiosis that did not reduce elements to a binary opposition. (Kurukawa, 1993: 10) The template of how a symbiosis could occur can be seen in the stained glass in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office,

---

\(^{167}\) According to the 1983 Management and Coordination Agency survey, there were 34.75 million occupied dwellings in Japan, of which 46.1 percent were built of timber, 31.3 percent of fireproof timber, and 22.6 percent of ferroconcrete or other non-timber materials.

\(^{168}\) As with Shinto shrines, the wood is often stored in a pool and reused to build the residence anew.
where traditions were re-developed: forms which had gone out of architectural practice and were being reinserted, fashionable again. This process did not devalue the ‘tradition’ but inserted it into an altered reality, changing the practice and approach in doing so. Whilst to some extent ‘traditional’, this process was syncretic, by which past practices were co-opted into a new template. Whilst it was impossible to return to the past or ‘Overcome Modernity,’ the effort to return was meaningful and had a degree of authenticity due to the parallel paths of modernity practised in Japan. In the Office building itself however, the expression of form was almost wholly exclusive of such traditions.

Representing colonial modernity
Modern architecture can be understood as a purposeful representation of rhetoric, and this rhetoric can be better understood by examining it not only in writings and policies, but also in buildings and the way they are presented in media. In this sense, representation “concerns the form and structure of rhetoric rather than simply its outward effects.” (Levine, 2009: 5) Very often the rhetoric of public architecture is not employed to discern and persuade of the truth but to deceive: “In architecture, as in theatre or the other visual arts, the process of deception occurs in the slippage from truth to verisimilitude – from reality to the appearance of it.” (Levine, 2009: 5) For instance, in the French colonies of Indo-China, the French created a new style of Indochinese/French architecture, particularly in Vietnam. In the process, the generic ‘lightness’ of ‘Oriental architecture’ was identified and syncretically appropriated whilst introducing modern architecture as part of the “civilising mission” in “bringing progress and protecting local cultures.” (Hahn, 2011: 28) Simultaneously, such architecture had at its premise that what was being revived was a long-gone ‘glory age’ of the occupied country, that only a modern imperial power could understand this history using Reason, thus giving it a new, progressive direction through architecture. The following section will analyse the differences between the image Japanese administrators wished to project and the resulting Office.

Beatriz Colomina wrote in 1994 that modern architecture is ostensibly described as artistic practice but in fact buildings are an integral part of mass culture:

“The conventional view portrays modern architecture as a high artistic practice established in opposition to mass culture and everyday life. It has focussed on the internal life of the supposedly autonomous, self-referential object made available to a detached viewing subject, an art object. In doing so, it has neglected the overwhelming historical evidence of modern architecture’s continuous involvement with mass culture.” (Colomina, 1994: 14)

169 This abortive movement occurred in the hyper-nationalist end of the Second World War, encapsulated in the national multi-disciplinary symposium on the topic of Overcoming Modernity. This symposium was dissected excellently in Minamoto Ryoen’s 1995 essay “The Symposium on ‘Overcoming Modernity’.”
Japan’s kindai (modern) architecture was no different in its interface with national culture; whilst European buildings retained an exoticism due to their origin, these forms were appropriated and integrated in the construction of a modern Japanese self-identity. Of the two wood-block print postcards shown below, the first (fig. 5.76) is a representation of Thomas Water’s Ginza Bricktown. As discussed in Chapter 3.2, Ginza was the site of the first modern town planning in Tokyo following the Meiji Restoration, and was considered an area to be proud of. The tree-lined avenues, masonry buildings and smooth roads with a new vehicle type tell the Japanese reader that this is a new kind of space in Tokyo. The second print (fig. 5.77) shows the Mitsui Bank of 1927 (following earlier buildings introduced in Chapter 3.2), and tells a similar story to the other. Rebuilt following the earthquake of 1923, the building was built by a foreign architect, the New York firm of Trowbridge and Livingston, in the Beaux Arts tradition, with electric lights, automobiles and alongside to the right was the Mitsukoshi Department Store, all drawn with a chic modernist simplicity. Whilst the symbols of modernity gradually changed, the idea of representing Japan’s adoption of Bunmei Kaika through buildings had not.

5.76. ‘The Most Famous View in Tokyo: Brick Buildings along the Ginza’ by Hiroshige III, c. 1874. (Courtesy of the MIT Visualising Cultures Collection)
Demonstration of Japan’s mastery of Taiwan and the rhetorical use of buildings could only be fulfilled through publicising the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and other important public buildings. Colomina argues that it is media promotion that distinguishes modern from pre-modern buildings: “modern architecture only becomes modern with its engagement with the media.” (Colomina, 1994: 14)

The use of modern media to persuade both foreigners and Japanese can be seen in the first two postcards of the Office below. Postcard one in fig. 5.78 was evidently popular as it was reproduced from at least four different angles throughout the colonial period. It shows the Office with two buildings to either side (the Communications Department and Taiwan Electric Company, both run by the state). All three buildings are in classic Tatsuno style, red brick, Renaissance revival, all colonnaded, with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office fulfilling an axis as the tallest, most coherent of the three buildings.

Postcard two in fig 5.79 was titled “Command View of Governor General Office from plane”, and shows the same scene in an aerial shot. This displays not only the three buildings but also the other government buildings in this planned district (including the military police headquarters, and the army officers’ club). However, beyond the three buildings in the first postcard the effect is not monumental; whilst it is an interesting view of the land (and with an authoritative title) it does not serve the purpose of showing Taipei as governed by a great and progressive power and so only lasted one edition.
5.78. Postcard one: Taiwan Governor’s Office, Communication Department, Taiwan Electric.
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives of the National Central Library, ‘Taiwan Memory’)

5.79. Postcard two: 'Command view of Governor Office from a plane'.
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives of the National Central Library, ‘Taiwan Memory’)

5.80. Postcard four: 30th Anniversary postcard of the Administration of Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, 1925.
(Courtesy of the National Central Library)
The building’s history and its role as a replacement for the Provincial Yamen was also a theme played out in media images. The *yamen* is shown in the postcards below as overlapped by the image of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. The angle of the shots in both cases make the Office seem as if it is proudly strutting and reaching heavenward due to its tower; in contrast, the viewer is invited to see the *yamen* as low, overly delicate, and even quaint in hand drawn picture in postcard four (fig. 5.80).

Postcard four uses the scenery of Taiwan more prominently for visual effect. With a background of Taiwan’s iconic mountain ranges above the clouds, the tallest mountains in the Japanese Empire, the wooden architecture sketch within this setting appears to be fitting with nature and yet fragile when placed next to the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. The *yamen* was still being used as an image in 1925, six years following the full transfer of functions to the Office. The Office here is shown shrouded in shadow, implying a silhouette is sufficient to identify such a well-known building.

The presence of the Governor-General in military regalia in the top image in fig. 5.81 is also notable: the postcard was produced during World War I and followed the political dominance of KATSURA Taro in Japan, a career military man who had lived seven years in Berlin and was dedicated to strengthening Japan’s international position. As Prime Minister, Katsura had signed up for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), launched a military build-up (1903) and beat Russia in the 1904-1905 war. (Bartholomew, 1989: 146) In postcard three, the Office is automatically associated with the military, correlating the achievement of building it directly with the Governor-General himself.

In a further postcard, number five from 1923 (fig. 5.82), the Office is shown again juxtaposed with Taiwan’s natural environment, this time with tropical trees (palm trees) and fruit (lychees), a symbol also used in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office lobby. Both the palm trees and lychee fruit emphasise the differences between Taiwan and Japan: Japan is clearly imperial in this view, presiding over an island considered exotic by Japanese visitors. The image of fruit was common and displayed the role of Taiwan in Japan’s economy: before 1945, in spite of the results of the 1916 Industrial Exhibition, its industrial capacity was very low and the economy was focused on exporting agricultural products to Japan, particularly sugar and rice. As only ten percent of Japan’s land was arable (compared to nearly 25 percent on Taiwan), Japan needed Taiwan to feed its populace and therefore Taiwan fulfilled a similar role to that of many European colonies: export of raw produce from the periphery to the centre.
5.81. Postcard three: 21st Anniversary of the Administration of Taiwan Governor’s Office, 1916. (Courtesy of the National Central Library)

5.82. Postcard five: 1923 Postcard in Commemoration of the Itinerary of Prince Hito IV. Source: Lui, Q., 2004. (Courtesy of the National Central Library)

5.83. Postcard six: Postcard of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office with the Taiwan Shrine. (Courtesy of the Digital Archives of the National Central Library, Taiwan Memory)
In postcards three to five examined above (figs. 5.80, 5.81 and 5.82) the Taiwan Governor-General's Office is a national symbol of Japan in another land; the recognisable Tatsuno-style architecture used in cities across Japan implies the building as standing as one of many symbols of Japanese modernity. Because of this, it was much less common to see the Office represented alongside symbols of Japanese tradition. A somewhat stark sixth postcard below (fig 5.83) combines Kigo’s Taiwan Shrine with the Office. The angles emphasise the most striking features of both buildings: the simplicity of the torii gate is at centre-front displaying the ritual threshold that the gate represents, whilst the scale and sheer girth of the Office is stressed in the underlapping photograph. The combination does not work well visually and is ambiguous in its message, for both buildings are symbols of Japan, but the differences are so fundamental that the Office appears incongruous in its representative role.

The seventh and final postcard (fig 5.84) is also the latest produced. Manufactured for the 1935 Taiwan Exhibition, the largest exposition held in colonial Taiwan, this postcard uses the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office as part of a wider concept, where buildings played the defining role. The scene is made up of three elements: first, the background of two mountains, snow-capped Mount Fuji and Taiwan’s tallest mountain, Yushan (likely as the mountain is taller than Fuji); second, two of the main exhibition buildings, re-purposed for the event, overlap the mountains; finally, a simplified silhouette of the Office is set in front of one of two exhibition structures. Futuristic looking, these buildings were built for the exhibition as the entrances gates to mark the 40th anniversary of Japan’s occupation of Taiwan and to show the results of progress. Most strikingly the juxtaposition of the two mountains points to kinship of the islands; the differences between Taiwan and Japan no longer being emphasised, in keeping with the new assimilation policy.
The stylised buildings overlap and exceed the height of some of the tallest mountains in the world, a sign of Japanese modernity exceeding nature. In other postcards in this series there is also no incongruence in combining native style buildings with kindai (modern) styles. When different styles were drawn together, all were stylised so that the buildings appeared more similar than they actually were. It was clear that postcard producers had developed methods of integrating ‘Oriental’ building features with modern types. In this final postcard, symbols of power and integration spoke to Japan’s growing confidence in the region, which was reflected in the exposition itself to an even greater extent than in the 1916 exhibition. In the Dadaocheng Southern Exhibition Hall, in one of the oldest parts of Taipei, was an exposition site dedicated to China and South-east Asia, with products from Fujian (the adjoining Chinese province to Taiwan), Thailand and the Philippines, alongside a performance room for Chinese Opera.

From the above examples it is clear that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office had a number of useful rhetorical purposes. It was used to give an impression of Taipei as a site of colonial modernity, where progressive policies were allied to political dominance of the natives, expressed in the monumental form of the Office building. The form contrasted well with the Qing Provincial Yamen which became a part of the folklore of Japan’s story in Taiwan. There were constant improvements in materials, and ambitions rose beyond anything that was built during the Qing period.

The Office was used sometimes as one part of a dual pre-modern/modern identity, since alongside the secular authority sat a new Shinto spirituality, as shown in in postcard six. Yet the symbol of continuing customary architecture next to a symbol of architectural modernity fit together uncomfortably. This was a consequence of the early decision to make a clear stylistic link to the work of the chair of the competition jury, TATSUNO Kingo, which precluded any opportunity for the kind of syncretic architecture style seen in French Indo-China. Yet this style was more suited to Japan’s interpretation of how architecture could appear for public use, representing an imperial nation, confident in its power over nature (particularly earthquakes), and able to create an internally coherent colonial capital to prove a high level of civilisation. Whilst tentative in representing customary Japanese aspects (though they could be seen in close examination), the building was a useful rhetorical device due to its purposeful aura of authority, belying the notion of ‘Oriental’ states as weak or fragile.

### 5.5 The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s legacy

The Office, although embodying Japanese nationalism with the emperor system alongside a Seiyō class-based exterior, retained a sense of unmovable monumentality despite Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Yet the Office was seriously damaged by American bombs, causing fires to spread
throughout the building for three days and making it unserviceable afterwards. The repair work was begun by the Taiwan provincial government and was carried out from 1946 to 1947, the deadline being the celebration of the sixtieth birthday of CHIANG Kai-Shek (Chi. 蔣介石, 1887-1975 or CHIANG Chieh-Shih)\(^\text{170}\) when it was renamed as ‘Chieh Shou Hall’ (Chi. 介壽堂, lit. Memorial Hall for Chiang’s Birthday). It was taken over by the Nationalist (KMT) Government becoming the Presidential Office when the central government of the Republic of China migrated to Taipei from Nanjing in 1949. The Office has therefore held the highest authority for 95 years now, in spite of the government center (or civic centre) of Taipei having moved eastwards since 1990 due to Taipei City’s administrative reorganisation. Yet this move towards the east was planned and predicted in the outline for the Taipei city plan in 1932, showing the continuities between different periods of Taipei’s history.

After the Second World War the Office, whilst primarily serving the President, was initially shared with the headquarters of the Executive Ministry. This lasted until 1957, when the Ministry was moved out to what was Taipei Town hall from the Japanese colonial period (built in 1940). The Office then became entirely the Presidential Office, and its monumental status was formally declared following its announcement as a national heritage site in 1998. The Office, together with the front plaza (ordinarily used as a road), was the major venue for central ceremonial celebrations from 1947 onwards; there assemblies were held, and the President received foreign heads of state and other guests, as well as providing a variety of significant celebrations, a function continued since the Japanese period. The road extending from the front plaza is a 400 metre long boulevard (fig. 5.85) that had been named by the KMT in 1947 ‘Chieh Shou Road’ associated with ‘Chieh Shou Hall’.

After the Second World War the Office, whilst primarily serving the President, was initially shared with the headquarters of the Executive Ministry. This lasted until 1957, when the Ministry was moved out to what was Taipei Town hall from the Japanese colonial period (built in 1940). The Office then became entirely the Presidential Office, and its monumental status was formally declared following its announcement as a national heritage site in 1998. The Office, together with the front plaza (ordinarily used as a road), was the major venue for central ceremonial celebrations from 1947 onwards; there assemblies were held, and the President received foreign heads of state and other guests, as well as providing a variety of significant celebrations, a function continued since the Japanese period. The road extending from the front plaza is a 400 metre long boulevard (fig. 5.85) that had been named by the KMT in 1947 ‘Chieh Shou Road’ associated with ‘Chieh Shou Hall’.

After the Second World War the Office, whilst primarily serving the President, was initially shared with the headquarters of the Executive Ministry. This lasted until 1957, when the Ministry was moved out to what was Taipei Town hall from the Japanese colonial period (built in 1940). The Office then became entirely the Presidential Office, and its monumental status was formally declared following its announcement as a national heritage site in 1998. The Office, together with the front plaza (ordinarily used as a road), was the major venue for central ceremonial celebrations from 1947 onwards; there assemblies were held, and the President received foreign heads of state and other guests, as well as providing a variety of significant celebrations, a function continued since the Japanese period. The road extending from the front plaza is a 400 metre long boulevard (fig. 5.85) that had been named by the KMT in 1947 ‘Chieh Shou Road’ associated with ‘Chieh Shou Hall’.

\(^{170}\) CHIANG Kai-Shek was one of the most important political leaders of the twentieth century, ruling mainland China in competition with the Communist Party from 1928 to 1947 when he was forced to withdraw his forces to Taiwan. As leader of the KMT from 1928 to his death in 1975, Chiang shaped the party and Taiwan under his rule was a one party state.
The road was renamed again as ‘Ketagalan Boulevard’ to symbolise respect for the history and culture of aboriginal Ketagalan (Chi. 凱達格蘭, a Taiwanese aboriginal tribe originating in what is now the Taipei basin). This road formed a main venue for parades and airings for Youth Day, Double Ten National Day and Independence Day annually since 1950s (all associated with the historical roots of the KMT). It was appropriated by surging social movements and political protests from the 1980s until today, and for presentations of a variety of diverse ethnic groups and cultural activities such as fairs, bazaars, concerts and matches since the 1990s. The grandest event is still Double Ten National Day an all-day national event starting with the Flag Raising Ceremony, with parades with tanks forces and other army forces a guard of honour, symbolic pailou (Chi. 牌樓, Arch with traditional Chinese architectural gating style), with the crowd cheering for the ‘Three Principles of the People’ and hurrahs for the Republic of China with peace doves and balloons. (fig. 5.86) As an iconic building, the Presidential Office is still the centre for nationalist expression on the island.

Following the decolonisation of Japan, the Office was altered to represent President Chiang and remained ‘Chieh Shou Hall’ until 2006 when, during the first rule of an opposition party in Taiwan, the Office was renamed more neutrally as ‘the Presidential Office’. The association with Chiang is gradually loosening: an annual celebration for Chiang’s birthday was held until Chiang passed away in 1975. It was no accident that the highest Japanese colonial authority building was chosen to deliver Chiang’s powerful centralised government: it is a long tradition of Chinese culture to replace the previous ruler by
sitting on the previous occupant’s throne, displaying that the new incumbent can live with the pressure. The authority invested in the building was absolute: people who passed it had to bow all the way across it during martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987; also bicycles and motorbikes were forbidden to go past. After the beginning of democracy in Taiwan, the Office with its front plaza became a holy spot for protest and rallies, showing its co-option as a national symbol by both the KMT and Taiwanese.

The Office as a flexible image of authority is still successful, and it appears permanent, spread throughout the island; this condition seems still indelible in the 21st century. This image of the Office was not alone but formed a collective with other Japanese authority buildings (which were not destroyed in the Second World War) together forming Taiwan kindai (modern) architecture. Yet whilst this representation of kindai architecture had formerly expressed the zeitgeist of the previous Meiji era (formally that of Western form and Japanese spirit), after the Second World War it became a symbol of supremacy through the cultural appropriation of colonial cognitive maps, with day-to-day propaganda images of it appearing on bank notes (fig 5.87 and 5.89), commemorative posters (fig. 5.88), magazines and elsewhere. Furthermore, the mainstream colonial kindai architecture was actually brought out firmly after the establishment of the Office due to its influence. The legacy in Taiwan, other Japanese colonies and in mainland Japan was enormous.

5.87. One yen note with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office produced in 1961 (Author’s collection)

Colonial periphery to centre
The story of the legacy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is not simply one about the architects who were most centrally involved in the building. It also includes how the example of the building influenced Japan and its colonies, how the emerging trend of modernity became embodied in this building and therefore set on firmer foundations, and how the city planning example of Taipei influenced other Japanese colonies. Although it was built in the outskirts of the Japanese Empire, both the centre and the periphery were affected. During the Japanese colonial period, the Office was the crowning achievement of the urban development of Taipei and provided an impression of the colonial administration, as well as impressing colonial architects, urban planners, foreign visitors and natives.

1. Manchuria
Besides Taiwan, the links between colonial administration and architecture were the most significant and deepest in Manchuria. Its urban development was tied in the early years to the South Manchurian Railway Company (Jap. 満鉄) which was the chief organisation involved in refracting the kindai (modern) into Manchuria. (Sewell, 2004: 220) The first President of the Railway Company was the commissioner of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, GOTÔ Shinpei, and he applied his biological principles as first developed in Taiwan onto Manchuria, whilst retaining his ambition to shape the colonial environment, building new cities in the taste of the late Meiji era. MIZUNO Rentaro, vice-Home Minister when Gotô was Home Minister, recollected in 1930 that Gotô’s goal in Taiwan’s cities was to create “civilized urban societies” (bunmei tokai) (Sewell, 2000: 66) and this aim was applied equally in Manchuria.

This was possible due to the involvement of the Okada Engineering Company (Jap. 岡田工務所), a firm that employed recent graduates of Tokyo University and “helped reshape the southern Manchurian landscape to suit the tastes of Japanese empire builders.” (Sewell, 2004: 222) The firm had
connections with TATSUNO Kingo\textsuperscript{171} to the extent that it could be said that Tatsuno, through proxies, established the basic tone of Meiji architecture, and this “Meiji architecture in turn became the model for empire.” (Sewell, 2000: 73) These architects had a similar reforming spirit to the early pioneers in Japan, going through a succession of styles from historic revivalism, through to modernism, thus responding to international debates and trends. Eventually the planners and architects of Okada Engineering and other bodies designed plans for 140 towns in Manchuria.

In 1942 the president of the Journal of Manchurian Architecture stated that he was grateful to the role experimentation in Taiwan and Korea had played in the development of Manchurian architecture. (Sewell, 2000: 130) Whilst this influence was initially due to Gotō, Taiwan’s urban planning in general translated well to Manchuria, whose residents were culturally related to Taiwan. The experimental approach used in Taiwan was also an experience Manchurian colonial authorities learned from, particularly in the decade following the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and following the annexation of Manchuria in 1931 which created a Japanese-aligned puppet state extant until 1945.

Taipei’s architectural influence lay in efficiently building ‘\textit{kindai} (modern) paraphernalia and this could be seen in Manchukuo’s colonial capital, Changchun, which “was to be a modern capital, one with plazas, parks, public transportation, and the other amenities commonly found in a modern urban setting.” (Sewell, 2004: 235) This later colonial example shows the influence Taipei exerted as a planned seat of colonial power. Yet Japan’s city planning in Manchukuo was radical in comparison with both Qing Taipei and Tokyo, where an ambitious colonial government, simultaneously progressive and controlling, created an experimental city with a profound influence on later colonial cities, allowing a degree of stylistic hybridity that had been denied in Taiwan. In Manchukuo, Sewell wrote that:

“The style of the official buildings was similarly grandiose, as Japanese architects attempted to endow the new capital—and thus, the new state—with a distinctive facade, one that capped modern buildings with Asian rooflines. In doing so, the architects of the Capital Construction Bureau (\textit{Kokuto Kensetsu Kyoku 國都建設局}) sought to display architecturally the goals and values of the new state.” (Sewell, 2004: 235)

Taiwan’s Governor-General’s Office was not directly influential in that it did not provide a prototype for what a colonial government building should look like, but this was largely due to the approach taken in Manchuria and Taiwan: monumental buildings should reflect the latest trends, and Art Nouveau and modernism were in vogue following 1919 in Japan. The Office was influential as a template building

\textsuperscript{171} In the first place, MAEDA Matsuoto was the first ‘architect adventurer’ in Manchuria arriving in 1904, and his mentor was IKEDA Kentaro, himself a previous assistant to Tatsuno.
within a colonial urban area: the buildings of highest authority should be monumental with distinctive facades, reflect modern fashions, become easily operational as national symbols, and therefore crown any urban plan. Due to Manchuria’s status as an informal colony there was no Governor-General’s Office, but this symbolic purpose could be seen in buildings such as Manchukuo’s Hall of State (1936) and the Manchukuo Supreme Court (1938).

2. Korea
The Taiwanese template for urban development was largely followed in colonial Korea as well. Korea was made a Protectorate of Japan in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. It was formally annexed in 1910, a timing which allowed many of the lessons learnt from Taiwan to be applied in Korea, even though the overall approach differed in some obvious ways. Having a similar political system to colonial Taiwan, an Official Residence was built in 1911, and a site was reserved for a Governor-General’s Office from 1912. (Jung, 2013: 45) After the death of the German designer, Georg De Lalande (1872-1914), of the Office in 1914 construction began in 1916 and the Korea Governor-General’s Office was complete in 1926. The Korean Office was provocative and ultimately counter-productive in a way not seen in Taiwan: it overlooked the city, built to the south of (and within the compound of) the Gyeongbok Palace, the centuries-old residence of the Korean kings and a symbol of Korean nationality. The Palace had been mostly dismantled at this point, yet the remains could no longer be seen from the city centre. The Korea Governor-General’s Office towered over the palace, symbolising how the Japanese had eclipsed the Koreans in their notion of civilisation (fig 5.90).

5.90. Georg De Lalande: View of the Korea Governor-General’s Office from the Gyeongbok Palace shortly before its destruction. (Courtesy of Open Buildings’ Collection)
Like the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Korea’s Office represented modernity through its application of technologies. Whilst Taiwan’s first fully reinforced concrete building was constructed in 1909 (Moriyama’s Taiwan Telephone Exchange), two years before Japan’s first ferro-concrete building, the Korea Governor-General’s Office was a beneficiary of this experimentation and became the first building in Korea to be wholly constructed using ferro concrete. (Jung, 2013: 45) This decision was only made after De Lalande had passed away and the technical and financial expense of a masonry building proved prohibitive. After 1925, city and provincial buildings mostly used reinforced concrete, including the City Halls in Seoul (1925), Gunsan (1928), Sinuiju (1931), Incheon (1932), and Gaeseong (1937). (Jung, 2013: 46).

Like the Taiwan Office, the Korea Governor-General’s Office was faced in masonry (this time granite rather than brick tiling) and the appearance of European grandeur underpinned the building. The lobby was particularly notable, being far less imperial in character than the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s lobby, possessing a lighter modernist and Orientalised space whilst appropriating Classical revival elements (Fig 5.91). The Composite frieze above the stairs is highly decorated as is usual in the order. The grandeur of the lobby was recognised through its use as the setting of the U.N. ceremony of 1950 marking the return of Seoul to South Korean control.

5.91. The lobby of the Korea Governor-General’s Office of Korea. Source from Lin, M., 2009.
Following independence, the Korean Governor-General's Office was used as a national museum. Once restoration had begun on the Gyeongbok Palace in 1989, a debate on the symbolism of the building resurfaced. In 1995 (the fiftieth anniversary of the end of Japanese rule and the eight hundredth anniversary of the Gyeongbok Palace) the Office began to be demolished; by the following year it had all been destroyed but for one stone which is displayed outside the Korea Independence Memorial. (Shie, 2009: 34) In Korea, the legacy of the Governor-General's Office was as symbol of imperialism and national humiliation rather than a useful symbol of modernity, even though the Korean Office was designed by a European rather than a Japanese.

The differences in the legacy of the Offices reside in Japan’s differing cultural and political relationships with Taiwan, and Korea: Korea’s then recent history as the ‘hermit kingdom’, and Japan’s past denigration of Korea, meant that the purpose of public architecture could not be the same as it was in Taiwan. Koreans largely rejected the notion that the Japanese could be more civilised than them, given that Confucianism and Buddhism had reached Japan through delegations from the Korean peninsula. Instead, Japanese rulers often integrated Korean and Japanese architecture as symbolising a new world order, particularly at public showings such as Expositions:

“the 1929 Exposition [in Seoul] had abolished the image of the West as the symbol of modernity. Instead, it celebrated the imagery of ‘Korea’ as a sign of the ‘co-prosperity’ between Japan and Korea. This new sensitivity was most clearly spelled out in an official speech made by Japanese Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi at the opening ceremony: ‘We will try to achieve unity and harmony between Japan and Korea, and the prosperity of our nation and fellow countrymen.’ This speech expressed a change in the Japanese colonial strategy of ‘modernizing’ Korea. Yet it also showed a shift in the way Japan represented the colony. If the 1915 Exposition presented Korea as an ‘uncivilized’ space that could only be enlightened by the grace of Japanese colonialism, that of 1929 depicted Korea as a partner, sharing with Japan the ‘spirit of the Far East.’” (Kal, 2005: 508-9)

In Korea, Japan could not leverage architecture as successfully as they did in Taiwan to mould the self-identity of the island’s natives into believing they were merely semi-civilised, and instilling a motivation to reach the ‘level’ of Seiyō modernity. New paths had to be taken in Korea, which walked a line between co-prosperity and harsh reprisals against Korean nationalism. This fitted with Japan’s overall policy for foreign relations: the early twentieth century writer HISHIDA Seiji wrote that Japan had “on the one hand, consciously adopted the Anglo-Saxon principle of national freedom and equality of opportunity, but it had, on the other hand, kindred sympathies and traditional relations with the backward nations of Asia.” (Hishida 1905: 258)
Pre-colonial Korean buildings in Seoul were retained to a greater extent than in Taipei, though most of the pre-existing architecture of Seoul was demolished during the Japanese occupation. The propaganda remained similar to Taiwan; one Japanese guidebook in 1919 recommended visitors to “make acquaintance with the old attire, peculiar customs, and distinctive architecture of this ‘Hermit Kingdom’ which is no longer shut off from the rest of the world, but is now passing through a great and rapid change under the progressive policy of the Japanese administration.” (Henry, 2005: 665) Korea’s political situation and cultural position was sufficiently different to prompt the Japanese into a harsher approach to urban planning and architecture, and they were less successful in their execution of these policies.

Overall, the architectural ethos in colonial Korea was similar to that in Taiwan: expositions were held to showcase the Japanese administration (at first in Renaissance Revival buildings, later in eccentric modernist structures) (Kal, 2005: 523), monumental architecture was built for official government functions, and the Governor-General of Korea took the lead in postannexation urban reforms. (Henry, 2005: 662) In addition to policies such as land-pooling, which were adopted in Korea after being introduced in Taiwan (Jung, 2013: 18), the city planning pre-dispositions in colonial Taipei were also influential in Seoul: for instance, the characterisation of the natives as dirty and needing to sanitise the entire city, and the separation of the Japanese neighbourhood (to the south as in Taipei) from the rest of the city. (Henry, 2005: 664) Widening the roads, even straightening them in Seoul, was also executed in colonial Korea, revising the geomatic city planning with an open road system (Jung, 2013: 11); this could not be done in Tokyo due to entrenched landowners’ interests. (Henry, 2005: 661) The emphasis on axially in the city, centred on the Korea Governor-General’s Office, which was designed as the locus of the city in Seoul (Jung, 2013: 11) overlooking the city colonial population, followed a model first successfully applied in Taiwan.

3. Taiwan
Besides the influence of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office outlined in this Chapter (instituting a colonial architecture competition system, altering the habits of its inhabitants, being used as a test bed for new architectural materials, and becoming a national symbol of integration and power), the Office also had a central influence on Taipei’s development. Following the 1905 Urban Correction plan, the city was reshaped around the site selected for the Office in the south-east of the walled-city. Its eastward orientation contributed to the future urban development of Taipei:

“In Chinese tradition, the façades of houses face north or south. But the Governor-General’s Office faces east. Of course, in a modern city developed according to a grid pattern, many buildings would face east or west, and only about half would face
north or south. Nevertheless, having a much older building with a very extensive façade facing eastward contributed to Taipei’s geographical development eastward, north eastward, and southeastward directions.” (Shie, 2009: 30)

This focus on the east has resulted in a new modern metropolitan area, including what was the tallest building in the world, Taipei 101, located on a road directly east from the Presidential Office. Today the city centre of Taipei is not in the old walled city, but centred on this new monument. This investment focus to the east has meant that the old Qing dynasty areas of Mengjia and Dadaochen (to the west and north respectively) have been neglected, and even nowadays these areas are less developed economically. (Shie, 2009: 31) The Japanese orientation of the Office still influences Taipei’s urban development direction.

The lead architect of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, MORIYAMA Matsunosuke, soon became the leading architect in Taiwan following his commission, and began several other projects simultaneously, including Taipei City Hall, Taichung City Hall, and Tainan City Hall, as well as many of the major railway stations. As these were built with the same stylistic inspirations as the Office, the early Japanese colonial architecture can be viewed as a corpus of work crowned by the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. In 1914 IDE Kaoru became the Construction Director of the Civil Construction and Maintenance Division, then became more prominent, remaining in Taiwan until his death in 1944. Whilst Ide’s request to build in hybrid styles was refused, from the 1920s onward he built in modernist forms freely, most notably the Assembly Hall introduced in Section 5.2, as part of the trend to reflect the buildings of Japan within the colonies.

The body of architectural work built under the directorship of Moriyama and Ide gave a coherent look to the cities of Taiwan. Buildings formed an important part of the impression of the colonial administration, and prior to the construction of the Office, a number of notable buildings (described in section 4.4) had been built on similar lines, providing the context for the Office itself. The reception of these buildings by foreigners was crucial to their success as authentically modern objects suited to a Great Power. Within 15 years of the colonisation of the island, foreign residents such as the Brit George W. MacKay were already positive about the urban developments: “Of the public buildings which adorn the cities there are innumerable ones. Schools, post office, banks and hotels, many constructed in Western style are to be found everywhere. While in Taihoku, the government buildings and colleges are among the best in the Far East.” (MacKay, 1911: 183) Writing in the Journal of Race Development, MacKay found that “within these last few years the principal cities in Formosa have undergone a remarkable

172 Whilst the pre-eminent colonial architect in Taiwan, Moriyama’s return to Japan in 1921 was much less successful. He struggled to find important commissions as a private architect, though his most famous construction was the Imperial Pavilion at Shinjuku Gyoen National Garden in Japan, later known as the Taiwan Pavilion, given its stylistic influences.
transformation. The crooked, dirty, narrow and uneven streets of the past generation have been done away with. In their places there now exist broad, clean, and well paved streets. Those in Taihoku, the capital, or Kelung are equal to any of the best avenues to be found anywhere in Yokohama or Tokyo.” (MacKay, 1911: 182) It can be surmised that urban reforms directly affected the experience of visitors and residences and were a significant component in giving a positive impression of colonial administration.

The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, once built, became the key architectural attraction in Taiwan for foreign visitors. This impression was guided, as shown by the experience of Owen Rutter: a British colonial official in Borneo. Rutter was invited on a ten day guided tour Taiwan at the invitation of Japanese administrators, and subsequently wrote a book (in 1923) and several articles about his experience. From this it is clear that following the construction of the Office the estimation of the city was heightened, with Rutter suggesting “Taihoku is undoubtedly laid out on a finer scale than any other city in the [Japanese] Empire”. (Rutter, 1925: 160) This is likely to be a truthful statement, since many of the major buildings in Korea and Manchuria were not built until the 1930s, whilst Taiwan’s major official buildings were mostly complete by 1920. In a discussion at the Royal Geographical Society, Rutter describes his overall impression of the island stating:

“It was amazing to me, having come from the country of North Borneo, which has been in the hands of the British for nearly fifty years, to see what the Japanese had done in Formosa in just over twenty-five. It was really positively amazing. There were roads everywhere. A railway ran from north to south. In Taihoku, the capital, there were finer streets… than in the big towns of the Japanese Empire. Money has been poured into Formosa by the Japanese; to them it is like a ewe lamb. They have been intent on developing it, and they have succeeded. There are fine buildings, and the island has wonderful resources.” (Hogath et al, 1927: 286)

According to this impression Taipei was comparable to some of the largest cities in Japan, even if Rutter retains a slight tone of dismissal on the worth of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office given its expense: “The Governor-General’s Palace, although perhaps not quite so grand as it sounds, is yet a residence of considerable dignity…. It is their determination to rule the country permanently.” (Rutter, 1923: 149) In a later article, Rutter went into more detail on the building, relaying a parallel experience to that of the Taiwanese poet CHANG Li-Jun (張麗俊, described in Section 5.3) of ascending the top of the Office’s tower: “Some of the public buildings would not disgrace any city in the world. The Government offices alone cost over £300,000; we went up the little tower that surmounts them to see
the view, and it seemed to us a piece of rather violent (but very typical) extravagance that it should have been fitted with a special lift, used for no other purpose than to save would-be sightseers like ourselves the trouble of walking up a few stairs.” (Rutter, 1925: 160) Owen Rutter’s guide, Takekoshi, had defended the expense of the construction to him stating that: “Many objections were raised at first to the expenditure, but it seems to me quite justifiable. The fact is that our Chinese and Formosan subjects are very materialistic, seeing nothing great save in the glitter of gold, a gorgeous, military display.” (Rutter, 1923: 149)

Whilst the Office was positive in revising the opinions of European and American visitors on the worth of Japan’s kindai (modern) civilisation, the impression these buildings made on the native Taiwanese was far more profound. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office crowned a new hierarchy of materials, consigning timber to a lower position; given that almost all native Taiwanese buildings were made in wood, these buildings effectively persuaded natives to change their own building forms. This was part of the identity-formation process: the unequal contact zone was extrapolated into Japan’s colonies with the roles reversed: the sure power of Japan over the native forces, easily defeated militarily after their initial resistance, led to the gradual transculturation of native elites. This mixing and combining of cultures after modernity was filtered into Taiwan, resulting in hybrid building forms:

“This refracted new architecture of the Japanese period was characterized by foreign features and it introduced certain positive features in terms of environmental considerations and diversity of style and building technology to the development of Taiwanese architecture. Nonetheless, it is important to note the interactions of imported and indigenous cultures. The integration of regional expressions into newly introduced ‘Japanese Western’ buildings resulted in the creation of the hybrid-style residences, street-houses, and tombs. Regional characteristics are expressed in the form of formal and spatial components as well as in decorative elements in courtyards, main halls, pediments, the kinship tablet, and the building materials. The colonizers imposed an idea of modernity that was appropriated locally in Taiwan and thereby transformed into another idea of modernity through various hybrid expressions. This hybrid phenomenon presents an important feature of refracted modernity.” (Fu, C., 2007: 188)

As shown in the quote above, a significant portion of the legacy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and other official buildings was that traditional buildings were adapted to include obvious features that incorporated new styles. These official buildings prompted the birth of hybrid architecture in Taiwan: most examples of hybrid architecture in Taiwan came after the main official buildings had been completed, in the 1920s and 1930s. (Fu, C., 2007: 182-186) Mostly consisting of residences that
combined Chinese and European symbolism, these buildings point to the incorporation of new fashions within new hierarchies of power.

Whilst these symbols became less influential with the arrival of modernism and Chinese revival architecture after the Second World War, European revivalism is even today practised in Taiwan; many new high profile public buildings are built in this style. For instance, the most expensive apartment block in Taiwan (Di Bao, built 2005), a shopping mall (the Bellavita in Taipei, 2009) and a high end hotel (the Mandarin Oriental Taipei, 2014) have all recently been built in an eclectic range of European revival styles. Given the rise of China as a bulwark against Euro-American hegemony, and Taiwanese native nationalism, these architectural products are often derided as ‘tacky’ and rooted in a time that has now passed. Yet whilst the vast majority of administrative buildings in Taipei are modernist (or derivatives), the Taiwan High Court of 2004 was built in a clear Classical Revival style; square, blocky and sparsely decorated it is reminiscent of Tatsuno’s first commission, the Bank of Japan of 1894. Such government constructions are in part a legacy of learning from Japanese rule and the architecture that it produced, and in part an engagement with Europe as a site of superiority: superior aesthetics, cities, living standards, and power. Rather being part of a national Taiwanese identity, these buildings promote exoticism, as Chinese pavilions do in Europe; they speak to the hybrid nature of modernity in Taiwan, due to the partial transculturation of elite culture during Japanese rule. The takeover by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) after the Second World War meant that the filtered modernity derived from Europe still remains influential, muddying the waters of what it means to be ‘modern’ in architectural terms for Taiwan. Unlike pre-War Japan where such architecture was a central part of the nation-building process, these buildings are a part of a trend towards cosmopolitanism, a difference that points to the differing roots of modernity between Taiwan and Japan, which did not have the skewing influence of formal colonialisation.

**Trends of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s encapsulated in Japan**

In Meiji Japan, Tatsuno style was so prevalent that it could also be called Late Meiji style (Sewell, 2000: 123) and therefore it is unsurprising that the main influence of the building was not stylistic: this influence was already apparent from the architecture of Conder, Ende and Böckmann, Sone and Tatsuno. However it is notable that following his involvement in the competition jury for the Office, ITÔ Chûta did build in this style in the Dendô-In in Kyôto in 1912 (fig. 5.92), a building reminiscent of Burges’s Harrow Speaking Hall. This implies that the experience of working with Tatsuno and on the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office had an aesthetic influence that went from the colonial periphery to the centre.
The Taiwan Governor-General's Office encapsulated and solidified important trends that had been long in gestation in Japan. Fifteen years before the colonisation of Taiwan, the first Japanese architecture students had translated their teaching from Conder into a series of hierarchies of materials and styles.¹⁷³ The construction of the Office pointed to the emergence of a viable new material and style, suitable for the highest status buildings: revivalism using steel-reinforced concrete. Unlike Katayama’s Akasaka Palace (1909) in Tokyo, constructed to be seismic-proof but using expensively assembled stone, the Office used cheaper material that could be assembled without importing building materials, and without the necessity to use wood as a structural material. Revivalist aesthetics on a ferro-concrete frame was a configuration of materials and styles which became the norm for the highest architectural commissions in Japan and her colonies for all but a few exceptions following the Great 1923 Kanto earthquake until 1945.

The other major influence that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office had on Japan was in architectural competitions. As the first state-led open competition, the ultimate success of the building (in spite of the difficulties with selection of design, the quality of entries, and the awards) meant that commissioners were often tempted to use design competitions instead of closed commissions. In spite of their popularity with government clients, the Office competition’s flawed process became the norm, leading architects to complain about irregularities and exploitation of labour. As with the Office competition, on a number of occasions one architect had been awarded the first prize only for another architect to receive

¹⁷³ SONE Tatsuzo had conflated the two issues, stating that contemporary Japan was home to five architectural styles: “native, semi-European, European wooden, brick, and stone.” (Sone, 1879) The first three styles were executed by carpenters in wood, and Sone suggests a cultural passage in moving from one style to another: echoing Conder, Sone states that “semi-European” is “tasteless and contemptible.” (Sone, 1879)
the actual commission. The National Diet Library competition of 1953 followed this unpopular pattern: “those setting the rules claimed the right to retain submitted designs, reserved the option of not using the winning architect’s design when the library was actually built, and prohibited architects from appealing the substitution.” (Reynolds, 2001: 175) High-handedness by commissioners during the competition process, underlined by a lack of governing principles, was the rule for many decades following this pioneering competition, which solidified the architect’s position as a subordinate to the state.

Whilst there is little direct connection, these two influential trends were characteristic of the highest status official building in Japan: the National Imperial Diet building. In charting the history of the National Diet we can see how Japanese construction methods and materials developed a primary importance, and how the first, flawed iteration of an architectural competition became the standard. The story of the Diet Building was tied to the drive in the early Meiji period to develop a modern nation-state, including democratic apparatus. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, this movement resulted in a new constitution and a national Diet for Japan at the same time as the highest watermark for foreign architects in Japan. Given this situation, the Japanese foreign minister, INOUE Kaoru, requested the German architects Ende and Böckmann design the building. They submitted two plans for the Imperial Diet in 1887, one in masonry style with dome, mansard roofs, attached columns, pedimented windows and flanking wings (fig. 5.93), the other in a traditional Japanese style with upswept tiled roofs, replacing the domes and classical Western features with Japanese ones (fig. 5.93).

5.93. and 5.94. 1st (Top) and 2nd (Bottom) proposals for Ende and Böckmann’s Diet Building, 1886. Source from Sha, Y., 2001.
Both designs by Ende and Böckmann were sequentially rejected by the Ministry as the political atmosphere changed in the 1890s, and they turned against relying on foreigners for matters of national prestige. Ten years later, the American Gothic revival architect Ralph Adams Cram, whilst studying the history of Japan, submitted a design for the building in 1898. This design was a fantastical sweeping palace complex, with gates, pagodas and upturned eaves, an unashamed reversal of the recent kindai (modern) architecture constructed in Japan, in a way that Ende and Böckmann’s design was not: this was not a Western building with Japanese forms and decorations, but an early Edo period fantasy (fig. 5.95).

Cram’s design was also rejected, unsurprisingly given the Meiji authority’s lingering project of civilisation and enlightenment (Bunmei Kaik shown in Chapter 3, most European architects in Japan at some point in their career proposed a nativist design, or a design which would have obvious ‘Oriental’ tones to a European, and this was a continuation of an entrenched trend. Such ‘Oriental’ designs were anxious attempts “to resharpen the increasingly blurred distinctions between East and West threatened by Japan's modernization.” (Reynolds, 1996: 41) The aesthetic similarity between the revival buildings constructed in Japan from the 1880s onwards and European buildings were problematic for caricatures of Japanese architecture; Cram’s design in particular represented an attempt to reify Kipling’s aphorism: ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’ Ideologically, Japanese ministers did not wish Tokyo to be clearly set apart from Euro-American cities. At the same time, there were worries concerning reliance on foreign architects and practical reasons to reject these designs such as the cost and manufacture of bricks.
Instead, as with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the building was to be designed by Japanese architects with a Seiyō style. This was not an uncontroversial decision however, and the National Diet building was not finally agreed upon and built until 1936. In the meantime, again in a parallel to the Office, the Diet’s functionaries met in a temporary wooden structure, shown in fig 5.96 above. Whilst this building was being used, an architectural competition was run. This contest was first mooted at the turn of the 20th century, by TATSUNO Kingo, supported by TSUMAKI Yoriyuki among others. Under this proposal the entrants should submit a 16th century Italian Renaissance revival design. This notion was attacked in the architectural press. An anonymous reviewer stated “national spirit and the spirit of the age must be manifested through the architectural style of the building ... after all, one would not expect to manifest the spirit of sixteenth-century Italy in Japan’s Meiji-period Diet Building.” (Reynolds, 1996: 43) Such critiques were not dismissed, and influenced further competitions (including the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office which had no style restrictions) and the final design of the building.

This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library.

5.96. YOSHII Shigenori and Oscar Tietze: Main facade, second temporary Imperial Diet Building, Tokyo. Source from Reynolds, 1996.

Reynolds notes that, work began on this temporary structure to house the future Diet in 1888, after Ende and Böckmann’s designs were rejected. The two-story wooden clapboard building was a much more modest affair than the German architects had proposed. The plan was close to the earlier designs, with a central entry and wings for each of the two legislative chambers. The pavilions rising over each chamber were lit with Roman-arched windows and covered with simple gabled roofs. (Reynolds, 1996: 40) After this building was burnt down by an electrical fire after only two months of use, a second building was constructed which was somewhat larger in 1891.
A second competition commission began in 1918, which was won by WATANABE Fukuzo. This was a blockier design than the previous contenders, Neo-Classical without conforming to a particular sub-style; the most striking element of the design was the weighty tower at the centre of the front façade (fig. 5.97). Designs loaded with historicising ornament dominated the architectural competitions in the 1930s and early 1940s, and this design was in line with the later trend. (Reynolds, 2001: 156) However, whilst the prize was awarded it was contested for many years by SHIMODA Kikutaro, whose Japanese revival design was melded with neo-Classical elements, to the disgust of ITŌ Chūta who declared Shimoda’s hybrid design a “national disgrace”. In the context of these disagreements, Watanabe’s Diet design was revised by the competition commission. (Reynolds, 2001: 175) Watanabe’s design itself followed the floor plan of the Ende and Böckmann 1887 designs, rounding off the long series of appropriations made in the Commission’s final design. Whilst Watanabe was not involved in the construction of the building, this was in line with the rules of the frequent competitions run since 1908, which often stipulated that the sponsors would retain control over winning designs.

Following the fashions of the time after the 1923 earthquake, sturdiness was a priority and the new Diet was constructed with a steel and reinforced-concrete frame, and a facing of gray granite, as the Korea Governor-General’s Office had been. (Reynolds, 1996: 45) Whilst the original floor plan was retained, the ornamentation of the building was greatly simplified by the committee, and the monumental dome was reduced in size and splendour (fig. 5.98 and 5.99). At the time of the Diet building’s completion, contemporaries described it as ‘modern style’ (kinseishiki), just as the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office had been (though by the 1930s kinseishiki had implications of modernism rather than Renaissance revival). Whilst the Diet conformed to some elements of 1930s modernism (such as the
retention of the outlines of columns without utilising column orders) (Summerson, 1980: 120), it is likely that the designers arrived at this *kindai* (modern) style through a process of suppressing potentially problematic European and Japanese historicising detail, rather than out of positive affirmation of simplified form in line with contemporary modernist thought. (Reynolds, 1996: 45) Given that the final style of the building was a result of nearly five decades of discussion, the Diet Building became stylistically almost a ‘neutral’ building. Although it was created in a period when nationalism was intense, when viewed from afar, there was no obvious feature that harked back to the traditional architecture of Japan. It seems that to have had Japanese architectural features would have compromised the Japanese government’s persisting desire to be perceived as a broadly conceived ‘modern’ nation state.

---

The consistent censuring of Japanese and Japanese-hybrid styles in the Imperial Diet building ensured that Japanese architecture appeared sufficiently similar to the ‘civilised’ West. At the same time, the design did not surrender a sense of Japanese uniqueness. The emperor was given a prominent place in the building, with Japan’s parliament the only one in a study of more than a dozen parliaments to have the monarch’s throne set high to dominate over both chambers of the Diet. (Parkinson, 2012: 108) In terms of decoration, as with the lobby in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, some modernised native designs were incorporated into the design of the Diet, but these were subtle: ‘The design does include such Japanese decorative motifs as the phoenixes carved in shallow relief over the main
entrance to the Diet and the chrysanthemums carved into the woodwork in the legislative chambers, but these represent a relatively minor aspect of the building as a whole.” (Reynolds, 1996: 45) The commissioners ensured that the shift from Chinese and past Japanese cultural inspiration to using Seiyō and the emperor as a muse was clear and obvious in the building.

The issue of nativeness and authenticity was dealt with through the requirement that all building materials be from Japan, which contemporary government publications emphasised keenly. The news publication Asahi Shinbun described the building at the time of the opening ceremony as “The crystallization of the people's twenty years of effort: The dignity of this great architecture constructed purely from domestic products.” (Reynolds, 1996: 45) Such specifications fed into longstanding arguments on the capabilities of non-White races, extremely important in 1930s Europe, which were understood in Japan as pejorative and refutable through concrete actions. Specific to architecture, constructing buildings using Japanese materials and Japanese designers was a refutation of James Fergusson's work (read by Japanese undergraduates under Conder) that Japan was not a race of builders. The Diet, and other monumental works of architecture promoted by the Japanese state, were intended to elevate Japan to join the great builders of the world, as proven by their technical sophistication, as explained by Reynolds:

“The Diet was described as a modern building produced by means of the latest technology. One government publication went into great length documenting the large size of the structure and offered a chart in which its dimensions were compared with those of other great structures in Japan and elsewhere, including the Great Buddha Hall at Todaiji, the Pyramids, and the Graf Zeppelin. This was clearly an appeal to national identity through pride in Japan's technological accomplishments. Instead of asserting national identity by distinguishing Japan from the Other, this was a claim for including Japan among the great builders of the world.” (Reynolds, 1996: 45)

Aesthetically conforming to Seiyō notions of fashion and modernity, the Diet was used by the Japanese government as a symbol of the nation, promoted abroad through postcards and expositions. In 1935 the English language annual 'Japan Illustrated' captioned a photograph of the Diet with "The Imperial moat and the new Diet towering in the background," juxtaposing symbols of the emperor with the national governance. (Reynolds, 1996: 46) Photomontages were developed by the International Tourist Bureau of the powerful Railroad Ministry which according to Reynolds, included a poster for the International Exposition in Paris (1937) with layered images of the Diet Building, the Great Buddha at Kamakura, Himeji Castle, modern steel bridges, Mount Fuji, downhill skiers, and a profusion of cherry trees. (Reynolds, 1996: 46) Such integration of kindai (modern) symbols with landscapes and
traditional buildings was a trend of 1930s propaganda, as shown in the previous section for the promotion of Japan in the 1935 Taiwan exposition. These examples hint that, 60 years after the Meiji Restoration, a national identity was being formed that could easily pair symbols of the modern together with ‘unadulterated’ tradition. This modern/traditional binary was becoming a familiar trope used to project Japan to the world.

The main difference between the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and the Diet Building was in how public the parliament building was, allowing the frictions and strains within Japan’s national identity to come to the surface. Whilst the design of the Office was steered by the powerful figures of the Governor-General and Tatsuno, the Diet Building became controversial as a symbolic manifestation of what Japan stood for, to the extent that it ended up as the product of a process of design by committee, or rather a long series of committees. It was reduced to a compromise; a neoclassical design denuded of much of its neoclassical detail, created for a time and place in which any fully articulated architectural style would have generated opposition from one camp or another. (Reynolds, 1996: 46) As with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office it did not resolve long-standing questions over style, and was as a result little talked about in the architectural press. However, whilst the Office was also designed by committee, it became a powerful example for better reasons: the Office had far more success than the Diet Building in projecting a coherent identity, whilst using advanced materials as a demonstration of modernity. The Office showed Japanese commissioners that competitions could be successful if well steered, and that in the construction of a coherent national identity through architecture, the strength of building’s appearance and materials was important.

Following the construction of the National Diet building in 1936, European revivalism became less common in Japanese architecture; in the decades following 1945 it became virtually unknown. This was a reflection of the rise of Modernism globally, and particularly the reintegration of pre-1853 principles of construction into kindai (modern) Japanese buildings. The Metabolist Movement, and the Tange module as a unit of measurement in the Japanese building process, grew in influence as a reaction against the pure Seiyō forms of buildings like the Office and Imperial Diet. With this Movement, the configuration of seismic-proof materials within a revivalist encasement was altered so that the materials and scientific basis of the building remained intact (allowing a greater scale in the expression of space), while the aesthetic fashion moved on. The rise of Modernism in Japan reflected global artistic trends, even if the indigenous turn of the Metabolist movement meant that the parallel paths of Japanese and Seiyō modernity were becoming clearer. This divergence was in part due to the construction of a new identity post-war, for as a newly pacifist country, a nation still proud of its roots, yet no longer wishing to dominate its neighbours, Japan no longer needed European styles to demonstrate its imperial might.
There was a second reason for the move away from European revival styles. Contrary to the expectations of Japanese architects, the European Revival buildings constructed in Japan had little effect upon Western notions of Japanese architecture as unchanging and static. ITÔ Chûta’s discourse on the relation between Euro-American and Japanese architecture went largely unnoticed outside of Japan. Architecture Professor KISHIDA Hideto (Jap. 岸田日出刀, 1899-1966) wrote in 1936 that “Generally, visitors from abroad, among whom are included a number of architects, concentrate their attention one-sidedly upon the classical aspects of Japanese buildings. They possess amazingly child-like ideas regarding our modern architecture.” (Kishida, 1936, quoted in Clancey, 2006: 232) Whilst foreign architects and visitors were curious about Japan’s native architecture, it was not because it was a model worthy of emulating but because it was novel and interesting, if not valuable enough to write about. The American Japanophile Ralph Adams Cram wrote in 1905 on how Japan’s wooden architecture was treated by Westerners: “It is dismissed with a sentence. To the western traveller it seems fanciful and frail, a thing unworthy of study.” (Clancey, 2006: 19)

This dynamic of Japanese architects attempting to argue with and express their civilisation and progress through architecture, whilst facing ignorance from abroad and idealisation of ‘tradition’, would continue long into the 20th century. Yet with the adoption of a modernist aesthetic, Japanese contemporary architects such as TANGE Kenzo, KUROKAWA Kisho, ANDO Tadao and ITÔ Toyo became heralded in Japan, East Asia and even throughout the world. Aesthetically, Japanese authority architecture before 1945 had little influence over foreign visitors. It was only when Japan moved beyond revivalism and engaged in Modernism that they had impact, producing consciously global architecture in a way that European Revivalism never could have done. Ironically, it was this turn to Modernism that guaranteed the long-term legacy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in Japan through the development of reinforced concrete as a modernist building material. Experimental colonial architecture produced the capacity to build monumental-scale national architecture whilst protecting against the threat of natural disasters.
Conclusion

This thesis has kept to the theme of its original complex research question of how Japan’s contact with Seiyō produced a new notion of the modern, and how this notion was expressed by Meiji architects in Japan and colonial Taiwan. Answering this question requires asking two prior questions: first, before the encounter with the Great Powers was Japan modern to any extent? Second, how can we know if something is still modern if the concept is different after contact with another culture? Both problems relate to the first theme of the thesis: that Japan’s modernity involved a revolution of concepts through transculturation of elites at its centre. I have approached the first question initially at a linguistic level as the language and concepts that the Japanese used was crucial evidence. I found that there was no prior notion of the modern in Japanese, although there were vaguely similar concepts, such as the Confucian-based concept of civilisation: Bushidō, (Jap. 武士道, lit. the way of samurai) and the labelling of foreign Others as siyi (Chi. 四夷, lit four barbarians/foreign tribes). Yet these concepts showed a different approach and logic to the modern in English: there was no equivalent notion which implied a temporal judgment (current), a normative standard (up-to-date) and a uniform society under continuous renewal (new fashion/against tradition); the idea of kindai (modern) had to be created. Therefore it seems spurious to claim that Japan was modern in Euro-American terms before the mid-19th century. After undergoing the process of elite transculturation, by which Meiji authorities rapidly selected and invented from translated materials transmitted from the dominant Great Powers, Japan underwent a conceptual revolution which reflected a new understanding of its position in the world and a new self-identity: it was only after this that Japan had the potential to become modern.

The second question, how to know if something is still modern if the concept is different after contact with another culture, could only be answered decisively by considering many decades of contact and translation in Japan. In the early 1870s, when there was a fusing of cultures in Japan (exemplified by the buildings of Shimazu), Japan’s politics and society could only be labelled modern to a limited extent. Very quickly, however, authority buildings in Japan underwent a process of rationalisation whereby they were stripped of traditional decorations and adopted the architectural vocabulary of Europe. By the end of the 19th century, continuous and prolonged contact with Seiyō through missions and education resulted in Japanese elites agreeing with and reifying the idea of the modern according to Seiyō criteria. This long period of gestation meant that the definition of modernity (kindai) was not understood in the same way in Japanese as in English until the mid-1910s (almost beyond the period of study). Related concepts had a similar process of gradual adaptation: the definitions of science and technology were not distinguished in Japanese as they are in English, resulting in architectural practice that was different in
tone to that of other parts of the world at the time. Yet whilst different, these variances were not sufficient proof that Japan’s modernity was of a type heterogeneous to that defined in European languages.

Given these linguistic discrepancies I took the approach of examining the necessary conditions of modernity in Europe and compared these to the necessary conditions of Japanese (kindai) modernity during this gestation period. Japanese modernity in the Meiji period had similar but far from identical conditions to European modernity, not least in its minor emphasis on personal freedom. I found that whilst European modernity was based on critical reason and political dominance over non-Europeans, kindai (modern) Japanese authority architecture was made possible by the desire to appear civilised, and used critical reason in order to reach this aim. This instrumental use of critical reason meant that rationality never achieved the high social and cultural status that it did in Europe at the time: the primary purpose of modernising was to appear to fit in with the prevailing world order. The divergence of Japan’s modern conditions from those of Europe and America (which were based far more on domination of weaker ‘races’) was shown in that Japan was only recognised as an equal civilisation when the system of extraterritoriality was removed from Japan after its military defeat of China in 1895, rather than following the reforms in manners, attitudes and fashions of the preceding 30 years. This victory and its spoils led to a shift in approach for Japan, increasingly imperial and resulting in a more bellicose use of foreign relations.

It was the constellation of ideas that entered Japan in the years around the Meiji Restoration that shaped the form of Japanese modernity. Whilst it was different from Europe, the same fundamental dynamics of reason, concern with national identity, and domineering relationships over weaker states were present in both Japan and the Great Powers. In keeping with the European notion of the nation-state, a drastically decentralised Shogunal government in the Edo period was replaced by an increasingly centralised nation. The unique rapidity of Japan’s conceptual revolution had a telling impact: soon after the translation of the word ‘tradition’ into Japanese, ‘traditions’ were revived and reinvented for the purpose of nation building. The strongly centralised state was set up around the figure of the Meiji emperor, which created a religion out of the folk beliefs of Shinto. After the rump of the Meiji government returned from the Iwakura Mission in 1874, the education system, along with all other state institutions, was reformed and became explicitly tied to the state’s aims, promoting science and technology, and teaching on the civilisation levels of various countries (Takeuchi, 1987: 9) - in effect socially engineering the population. The aims of the Japanese state were formed in the context of theories such as Buckle’s, which divided the world into two permanent categories: civilised countries and non-civilised countries. Japanese elites reveled in disproving such theories, particularly following the institution of a written constitution in 1891.
The new nation of Japan needed solid foundations in recreating authentic civilised architecture. The translated conceptual framework had to be supported by railroads for transporting building supplies, factories to produce bricks (and later iron and concrete), modern technologies, and an architectural profession with the capacity to understand and integrate these elements. Given how closely architectural issues in Meiji Japan followed the debates in civil society, Meiji architecture was an illuminating subject of study in this thesis and provided a suitable platform to explore the initiation of Japanese modernity (1853-1919), given the nuances that architecture holds as a process and product, artistic and technical, authoritarian and social. Whilst useful, a purely theoretical perspective is not sufficient to give an understanding of how kindai (modern) developed and was expressed in Japanese history. Through exploring Japanese modernity from the perspective of the architect, it became clear how the expression of identity also has a large impact on behaviour. Using Western-style (Yōfū) architecture for authority buildings implied a different identity for Japanese authorities, architects and office workers; just as wearing suits impacts behaviour, making certain activities ridiculous (such as tea ceremony or kabuki (Jap. 歌舞伎, lit. dance-drama), adopting Yōfū architecture inevitably influenced behaviour, promoting different habits and ceremonies in Japan.

The leading architectural theorist of pre-Second World War Japan, ITŌ Chuta, believed that Japanese architecture should follow three paths: 1) attempting to join the level of Seiyō modernity, whilst 2) leading Tōyō and 3) retaining Japanese cultural identity. This led Japan-based architects to create a unique and distorted modern architecture: reviving native and Asian architecture, using unprecedented materials, and producing an identity with little intrinsic balance. The coherence of Japanese architectural identity was further reduced by foreign intellectuals continuing to view Meiji Japan ethnocentrically, and understanding Japan as an imitator, ‘a civilisation without any originality’. Whilst Meiji Japan was treated as un inventive by these observers, the pioneering studies and applications of seismology, interior design, architectural education, and success in establishing recognisable ‘Meiji’ styles made this point patently untrue.

Fundamental to attempting to ‘civilise’ to the level of the Seiyō states (whilst adding fuel to accusations of imitation) was the adoption of foreign fashions. As seen throughout this thesis, not least in the spatial elements of the Governor-General’s Office, the engagement in the latest fashions and technologies was key to the revolution in architecture. Meiji architects had extensive contact with foreign architects in Japan and in Europe through work experience and study trips, not least displayed during Tatsuno’s time working in London in the 1880s and Moriyama’s tour of Europe and America during the construction of the Governor-General’s Office. In following the fashions of Seiyō, Japanese architects inevitably felt a genuine sense of belonging to Seiyō civilisation which was expressed in the normative spatial designs of
authority buildings, and the European value of reason within architecture; for these Japanese architecture, reason was both a tool and a desired product for the users of their buildings.

This dynamic was exported to Taiwan and particularly in the case study building. The Governor-General's Office was used to represent a strong nation, unambiguously mastering a Renaissance style and avoiding the Orientalist brackets that foreigners were fond of putting around Japan. This was achieved through the thoughtful and rigorous use of reason, particularly shown in the building’s spatial syntax and circulation. Whilst the building’s image was used in the media as an unambiguous symbol of progress, imperial power and nationalism, the structure and contents of the building and its environs were in fact more nuanced. By the 1900s, Japanese architects and designers were no longer imitating the ‘West’: in fact whilst stylistic similarities abounded there was no example in this thesis of a Japanese architect or carpenter who had copied a European building exactly, for the buildings were always adapted to needs. Examples of direct replication were scorned, even though they did occur as seen in the Office’s design competition. Both the idea that Japan’s importation implied blind copying and that it was a corruption of Japan’s ‘national culture’ relied on a false simplified picture of what occurred during the process of appropriation: Japan changed the models that it imported from Seiyō and remained demonstrably ‘Japanese’. (Sand, 2003: 365) Japan used many creative ways in appropriating particular chosen forms in order to join “global trends of fashion and of thought.” (Sand, 2003: 365)

Regrettably, Japan embraced the trend for a racial conception of the world. This led to the construction of ethnic boundaries first used in Hokkaidō, then later in Japan’s other colonies including Taiwan, which reified Japan’s superior position within their cosmology. This policy led to some subtle but remarkable differences between architecture on mainland Japan and architecture in Taiwan. First, hybrid styles were almost never used for Taiwan’s authority architecture, despite pleas from leading architects who had proven adept in building in the local minnan style for Japanese expositions. Second, Japanese ‘traditional’ architectural elements tended to be hidden and existing ethnic buildings, such as the Chinese temples and yamen, were dismantled at the earliest convenience, even though these were not uncomfortable spaces for Japanese to work in. Officially deemed quaint and unprogressive, Qing buildings could also have potentially been used by locals for ethnic nationalist purposes. Third, Tatsuno style was propagated with much more vigour than in Japan, in effect presenting a coherent national identity. Given that Japanese buildings were undergoing stylistic divergence in the early 20th century, the uniformity is striking. As with their legislative policies in Taiwan, Japan’s architectural policy was rational, totalising and dominant.
Due to its roots in Europe, the architectural vision developed around 1900 had other unfortunate consequences. Japanese architects and clients in authority had digested a European colonialist mentality first introduced by Conder, who in turn was influenced by his teacher T. Roger Smith. Conder followed the tenet of Smith that “They [colonial architectures] ought to be European [in style], both as a rallying-point for ourselves, and as raising a distinctive mark of our presence, always to be beheld by the native of the country.” (Smith, 1868: 208) Through following this principle, a European image was strongly expressed in Japan’s Empire. Japanese architects created a uniform style that inevitably promoted Europe and Britain, reifying the cultural hierarchies of the time which made Japan depart from its native architecture for public buildings. This characteristic of colonial architecture reflected the relatively low cultural power held by Japan in this period. Because foreign architects were hired as teachers, and architectural education followed the European mould, the only ‘architects’ recognised by the state were those trained in European traditions at Tokyo University.

Since the foundations of architectural education in Japan derived from abroad, the appropriations of European motifs and styles “were never made freely. The choice of things Western, which seems at times to transcend all other evaluative criteria, replicated relations of power, since the modes of interpretation available for Japanese to conceive their social and material world were determined by the forces of their political world.” (Sand, 2003: 365-366) When architects made choices of appearance these almost always resulted in choosing European forms, even when creatively appropriating fashion as the logic of ‘Western thought,’ particularly related to design, had become internalised. For Pierre Bourdieu (2001), professionals who have cultural capital but do not own the means of production (that is, the things or ideas they use to make something) should be classed as the dominated group. Whilst the Governor-General’s Office stands as a symbol of governmental authority, the implied Seiyō authority remains. Even when attempting to transcend Seiyō styles, Japanese designers were stuck within this dynamic of domination: for example, even original expressions of national identity such as use of stained glass in the Governor-General’s Office lobby required a new technology imported from Europe, and used refracted artistic ‘traditions’ reinterpreted and split off from forms found in woodblock prints.

In importing such templates for forms and technologies (particularly the replacement of wood with masonry) binary splits were caused in Japan that are at the heart of modernity. These splits were fractured, however: although Paz states that the modern is “the knife which splits time in two: before and now” (Paz, 1991: 4) Japan had a number of continuities that were not present in Europe. Although Japanese kindai (modernity) separated the citizens of Japan from her past in public life, this did not mean there were not places where customary practices did not continue. Meiji reforms were so fast and incomplete, that the point of view of Fukuzawa modernity was not achieved. For Japan was not replicating Europe and America socially; the Japanese people had not yet been individualised and
‘Enlightened’. If Fukuzawa’s individualistic theory of civilisation had been fully adopted, the notion of dualist ‘Japanese’ modernity would not make sense. Fukuzawa asserted that Japanese people were each one person, two lives, and they remained so due to the incomplete project of the rationalisation of society. Studies of the home in Meiji Japan by Sand (2003) and Choi (2003) have found that rather than the modernisation that was seen in public architecture, residential buildings underwent hybridisation, a ‘third space’, neither imitative nor Euro-American though containing elements of both.

The framework of critical reason was utilised for public buildings to a more significant degree, leaving a residual notion that Japan should transcend to a superior sphere of reason, where it could be classed as an equal power; this gathered pace after 1919 and the Modernist movement in Japan. Due to the splits created through the state’s desire to appear civilised and the consequences of applying critical reason in public building construction, Japan’s architectural modernity became dual in three senses: first, compared with the rest of the modern world Japan was different (as explored above); second, within Japan public modernity ran parallel to a more traditional private life; and third, Japan gradually became a state apart from the rest of Asia.

For domestic Japan, the process of becoming kindai (modern) created public architecture that was quite different in space, form and structure from commercial, and particularly residential architecture. The latter two were generally built by carpenters who had not been inculcated into the scientific world-view. In colonial Taiwan in particular, material innovation made kindai buildings increasingly dissimilar to what had been made only 50 years before, and the split between administration and residential architecture even applied to the Governor-General. Sideline by intrinsic hierarchies in the architectural system, which valued formal over informal education, the Japanese master builders’ own qualifications, and thus their status and recognition in their own culture, meant that their numbers became reduced to near extinction by the advent of the new professional class of Seiyō trained architects. (Wendelken, 1996: 30)

Yet although these kindai architects had far greater cultural capital (the power to change their culture) than the master carpenters, they were not a dominant group, but were rather dominated from afar by the Euro-American architecture corpus, and initially beholden to their changes in fashion.

The split between native/hybrid and imported forms was not taken as inevitable by Japanese designers, and Itō was not alone in attempting to reconnect with Japan’s native traditions and to distinguish Japan from Seiyō: this became an exercise undertaken across Japanese civil society after the death of the emperor Meiji (1912). KIKUCHI Yūko’s (Jap. 菊池裕子) critical study of mingei (Jap. 民芸, lit. ordinary functional crafts) theory, an original Japanese aesthetic theory created by YANAGI Soetsu (柳宗悦, 1889-1961) has shown that whilst Yanagi attempted to create an authentic classification of traditional
Oriental crafts, this was impossible due to the notions used: the ideas of tradition and the Orient themselves are halves of binaries created through the encounter with Seiyō. She argues that mingei theory is a hybrid and modern product created in a complex cultural politics of Orientalism and modernisation. Kikuchi points out that “Yanagi problematised Japanese ‘modernity’ as standing in the ideas of the culture hegemonies in between the Orient and Occident.” (Kikuchi, 2004: xvii) Yet as with Ito’s evolutionary theory of architecture, this theory was created under the modern movement in Japan, making an authentic reconnection to the past in the arts and architecture impossible. The teaching of architectural history and practice in Japan made the split between architects and carpenters permanent: although the professions were linked, a foundational divide was formed. Hybridity was possible and was practised by Ito and in Manchuria and Korea, but these hybrids in public buildings relied on Seiyō frameworks and technology, being built in kindai materials (as opposed to wooden residential architecture), thus recreating underlying binaries of Orientalism.

Japan was not only moving away from their past by becoming kindai (modern), they were also separating from her neighbours in East Asia. Alone in their positive response to the potential threat of colonisation, Japan was the only state with both the will and the capacity to meet the challenge of the Great Powers. (Hobsbawm, 1975: 148) For Tokugawa Japan (unlike Qing China or Joseon Korea) the premise of pre-existing cultural hierarchies was eventually accepted (within which Japan and her neighbours were initially placed as merely ‘semi-civilised’). Whilst imitating and attempting to adopt the trappings of civilisation, architects were able to carry the belief that they were evolving, and had become stronger and more civilised than their neighbours. Mirroring the new imperialism of the late 19th century, Japan achieved dominance over China, Taiwan and Korea, and the discourse of superiority therefore became more legitimate. Rather than Japanese modernity being the product of a popular movement, it became the role of Meiji Japan elites to introduce kindai in East Asia as part of their political ascendancy and civilising mission. As Japan became the pre-eminent nation of Asia, the narrative of civilising may have helped Japanese architects free their spirit and continue their work with fewer misgivings.

Whilst Ito’s three objectives of reviving traditions, progressing in line with Seiyō, and reconnecting with Tōyō were pursued, they were not pursued evenly. By the 1930s, rhetorical and material separation from neighbours meant that for some “Japan was superior because it represented the culmination of East and West, a privileged site between and above its cultural roots in both worlds.” At the same time others saw that Japan was “neither Asian nor Western. This Japan was sacred and pure, intrinsically superior and separate, and destined to rule.” (Wendelken, 2000: 821) This dichotomy led to a persistent uncertainty at the heart of Japanese architectural identity. The purported leadership of Asia and Japan’s Asian identity was the most likely aspect to be dropped in Imperial Japan’s authority architecture for this reason: the absorption of nationalism, which reached its highest watermark after

474
the 1930s, was incompatible with a wider regional identity. Architecturally, Japan’s modern sense of self was rooted less in Asia than in itself, as part of a wide, if loose, confederation of powerful modern states. This makes the lack of use of Chinese styles in Taiwan more understandable: even before 1919 GOTO Shinpei had based his Taiwan policies on pejorative studies which labelled the Taiwanese as over-anxious about death, obsessed with money, and overly concerned with face. (Zhuang, 1991: 140) The Governor-General’s Office crystalised Japan’s dominance on the island by threatening them, displaying their riches, and giving the opportunity for advancement and high status to those few successful natives who could work in the Office.

Japan’s attitude towards Taiwan helped embed Japan’s self-understanding as a uniquely superior race, one residing at a different temporal level to the natives. The Office brought the conventional mainstream Japanese architecture to Japan through the jury’s revisions, creating an up-to-date design and construction process, an efficient spatial functionality, advanced features that utilised innovative materials and technologies, and represented Japan’s sense of kindai (modern) identity. Moving far beyond Conder’s eclecticism, Japan’s colonial architecture fused appropriate modern elements to create a recognisable national development. The European-styled Meiji architecture built in colonial Taiwan remains an authoritative form and politically neutral, shown by the continuing current use of the Governor-General’s Office. Yet whilst it was functional and often beneficial, East Asian architectural modernity inevitably remains tied to Europe and America, particularly in Japan and her former colonies, as well as showing a derogatory attitude towards the island’s natives.

In Taiwan the architecture built in the colonial period remains somewhat mysterious. Whilst many architectural histories have tracked the origin of Taiwan’s colonial architecture back to Japan, it is important for architectural historians to understand the meanings of the forms, spaces and technology of Japan’s European-inspired architecture. For the Taiwanese these buildings are two steps removed: Taiwan’s position as a refracted container of Japanese colonial kindai (modernity) alongside its unintegrated global situation means that European revival architecture such as Queen Anne style is very little known, and these colonial buildings require study of Chinese, Japanese and European sources. To understand these buildings more fully than comparative case studies would have done, I took the approach in this thesis to jointly analyse the roots of the concepts, beliefs, habits and forms that were eventually found in colonial Taiwan. In this way Taiwan can be understood as more integrated into the global tapestry of modernity.
Suggestions for further study

1. Conder’s School of Architecture: Given the nationality of Conder, work in the English language should be undertaken to examine the influence of the man considered by most Japanese to be the Father of Japan’s modern architecture.

2. The development of public architecture in Japan and Taiwan: There were many interesting cases among the public architecture of Taiwan and Japan, in particular the public park replacing the temple in many major East Asian cities. These developments did not match the use of the city in an organic manner, so the functions of parks and other leisure activities are open to misunderstandings and replacing temple spaces combined civil and religious functions. In replacing socio-religious spaces, some sense of meaning was lost to public life. A study of the history of the East Asian park would be fruitful in elaborating the effect of Western town-planning upon customary behaviour.

3. The effect of architectural modernity upon the carpentry profession: the development of the profession of architect in Japan was found to change the cultural logic of how Japanese building practices functioned. Whilst carpenters had been taught humility and respect, architects under Conder’s education system had a sense of aspiration instilled in them, and were taught to act independently. This separated architects from building practices of the past, yet led them to dominate the construction of authority architecture in the Meiji period. The issue of the history of the surprisingly resilient carpentry profession between the Meiji Restoration and today remains a fascinating question worthy of further study.

4. How the modern continued to influence Taiwan/Japan after 1919/1945: using and adapting the conceptual framework from this thesis, it would be possible to enquire into how the modern in architecture evolved and was distorted after 1919 when the Modernism movement took hold in the Japanese architectural system. After War World II, the complex influence of modernity continued through the new world hegemony of the USA in Japan and Taiwan, whilst the outward dominance of Japan had halted. Under these new post-colonial conditions, the notions of the modern altered and evolved.

5. Japanese translations of Western concepts into Chinese: finally, that the idea of modernity in East Asia was promulgated by Japan, it would be worthwhile to explore how the modern was reinterpreted in Chinese through Japanese. Looking through this double hermeneutic would contribute to understanding the slow gestation of Chinese modernity. If Japanese early modernity was indeed inventive, what of ‘others’ in Asia?
Appendices
/
Bibliography
## Appendix I
### Definitions of Modern from English Dictionary

**Definitions of ‘modern’ from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example usage</th>
<th>Dates of usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present (obsolete)</td>
<td>(Adj) Being in existence at this time, current, present (obsolete)</td>
<td>“Our maiest gracious queen moderne” 1597</td>
<td>1485, 1525, 1555, 1597, 1617, 1700, 1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The first and modern President of the said Society” 1752</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>(Adj) Of or relating to the present and recent times… relating to, or originating in the current age or period</td>
<td>“The writings of the auncient and moderne Geographers” 1585</td>
<td>1585, 1589, 1656, 1676, 1687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The starting point of Modern, in distinction from Mediaval, history” 1864</td>
<td>1706,1713,1757,1774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“In modern times” 1983</td>
<td>1810, 1849, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1900, 1948, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>(Adj) Designating the form of a language that is currently used, or the form representing the most recent sig. stage of development</td>
<td>“Overwritten in small Modern Greek Hand, about 150 years ago” 1699</td>
<td>1699, 1748, 1834, 1841, 1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>(Adj) Designating a person or (less commonly) a place as the contemporary equivalent of a historical counterpart</td>
<td>“Turn his domain into a modern Babel” 1843</td>
<td>1791, 1843, 1845, 1873, 1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“If I don’t sleep at once, choral, the modern Morpheus!” 1897</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fashion/Against tradition</td>
<td>(Adj) Of, relating to, or designating a current or recent movement or trend in art, architecture, etc., characterised by a departure from or a repudiation of accepted or traditional styles and values</td>
<td>“The Phantasiae of the ancients, Modern art,… in what is called Fancy-Pictures, has… debased” 1820</td>
<td>1820, 1895, 1927, 1928, 1938, 1958, 1972, 1978, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The modern movement in art” 1927</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“In arts… modern implies more about aesthetics and technique than about chronology” 1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>(Adj) Of or belonging to the present day or a comparatively recent period of history</td>
<td>“If such a species be termed modern…” 1830</td>
<td>1822, 1830, 1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Modern’ climatic conditions only became established during post-glacial time” 1982</td>
<td>1934, 1950, 1982, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date</td>
<td>(Adj) Characteristic of the present time, or the time of writing; not old-fashioned, antiquated, or obsolete; employing the most up-to-date ideas, techniques or equipment</td>
<td>“Moderne warre, is the new order of warre vised in our age.” 1590</td>
<td>1590, 1598, 1607, 1622, 1676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“with modern furniture it would be delightful” 1811</td>
<td>1747, 1775, 1811, 1872, 1885, 1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They’re spatially very modern, not at all revival” 1998</td>
<td>1937, 1988, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date</td>
<td>(Adj) Of a person or something personified: up to date in behaviour, outlook, opinions etc.;</td>
<td>“But England, Modern to the last degree, Borrows or makes her own Nobility” 1701</td>
<td>1701, 1753, 1804, 1859, 1899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Modern young woman” 1859</td>
<td>1914, 1975, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>embrace innovation and new ideas</strong></td>
<td>“...most of whom are Muslim as well as modern and secular” 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary</strong> (obsolete)</td>
<td>(Adj) <em>Everyday, ordinary, commonplace</em>(obsolete)</td>
<td>“...most of whom are Muslim as well as modern and secular” 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New fashion</strong></td>
<td>(Adj) Designating any of a group of typefaces developed in the late 18th and early 19th centuries</td>
<td>“The modern modern or new fashioned faced printing-type at present use, was introduced by the French, about 20 years ago” 1819</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New fashion</strong></td>
<td>(Adj) Designating a secondary school in which emphasis is placed on subjects other than the classical languages and literature</td>
<td>“...wish to enter this modern school to get off Latin composition and Greek.” 1862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent period</strong></td>
<td>(Noun) <em>A person who lives in or belongs to the present time; a person who belongs to a modern period or epoch</em></td>
<td>“…of which the ancients write, and whome some moderns call Gibbar.” 1601</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent period/New fashion</strong></td>
<td>(Noun) <em>Applied to things</em></td>
<td>“Old pictures only true models, they having being proved by time... fashion may make moderns pass” 1797</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Up-to-date/New fashion</strong></td>
<td>(Noun) <em>With the: that which is modern</em></td>
<td>“Some were allure by the modern, others reverenced the antient” 1756</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent period/New fashion</strong></td>
<td>(Noun) <em>Upon the modern – peculiar to modern times (obsolete)</em></td>
<td>“I apprehend that this character is pretty much upon the modern” 1766</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Against tradition/New fashion</strong></td>
<td>(Noun) <em>A person with modern tastes or opinions, or who belongs to the modern school of thought on any subject; a person who advocates a departure from traditional styles or values</em></td>
<td>“It will be deemed old fashioned by the latest of the moderns” 1897</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New fashion/Against tradition</strong></td>
<td>(Noun) <em>A work of art, architecture etc., which is a product of a modern trend or movement</em></td>
<td>“In the visual arts the Walker Art Centre house a world-famous collection of moderns” 1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### First usage of definition types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning of modern</th>
<th>First usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>1585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date</td>
<td>1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>1591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fashion</td>
<td>1756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against tradition</td>
<td>1905 (first clear instance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Definitions of 'modernity' from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example usage</th>
<th>Dates of usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>(Adj) The quality or condition of being modern; modernness of character.</td>
<td>“Yea but I vilifie the present times, you say, whiles I expect a more flourishing State to succeed; bee it so, yet this is not to vilifie modernity, as you pretend.” 1672</td>
<td>1672, 1782, 1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fashion</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Now that the poems [sc. Chatterton’s] have been so much examined, nobody (that has an ear) can get over the modernity of the modulations.” 1782</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Marcrobius is no good author to follow in point of Latinity, partly on account of his modernity, and partly of his foreign extraction.” 1796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“My dear fellow, modernity simply means democracy. And when once democracy has been forced on us there’s no good protesting any longer.” 1904</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>Something that is modern.</td>
<td>“But here is a modernity, which beats all antiquities for curiosity.” 1753</td>
<td>1753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example usage</th>
<th>Dates of usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent period</td>
<td>To make or render modern; to give a modern character or appearance to; especially (a) to rewrite (an old text) in modern spelling or language; to change (obsolete words, language, spelling) for modern equivalents;</td>
<td>“I have taken the liberty to modernize the language.” 1752</td>
<td>1748, 1752, 1802, 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The young generation are modernizing these antic [=antique] vestments. 1802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The text was modernized throughout.” 1818</td>
<td>1802, 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“No one ever dreamt of modernizing Surrey’s lines.” 1880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date/ New fashion</td>
<td>To make or render modern; to give a modern character or appearance to; especially (b) to remodel and refashion an ancient building.</td>
<td>“Capt. Burton is justly severe on the unwarrantable modernizing of Camoens.” 1885</td>
<td>1885, 1901, 1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The King has decided to have Eindersor Castle thoroughly modernized.” 1901</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The Gatehouse which gave entrance to the now modernized Council House.” 1905</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date/ New fashion</td>
<td>To adopt modern customs, habits, ways, or the like. (rare)</td>
<td>“He scruples not to modernize a little; but then you see, that it is in compliance with the fashion, and to avoid singularity.” 1753</td>
<td>1753, 1802, 1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Muggleton had modernized so far as to have a chitterling tacked into his Holland shirt.” 1802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Several new schools also, or to modernize — ‘colleges’, for the sons of the prophets, have been established.” 1853</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Definitions of 'modernization' from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example usage</th>
<th>Dates of usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to date/ New</td>
<td>The action or an act of modernizing; the state of being modernized. Also,</td>
<td>The Marquis of Winchester’s noble house at Englefield has suffered by some late modernizations. 1770 We cannot always judge by the modernization of a proper name. 1818 The Birds is an abridgement, or modernization, of the comedy of Aristophanes so entitled. 1830 The town of Bletchingley ... is, despite some modernization, an old-world spot. 1895</td>
<td>1770 1818. 1830. 1895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix II

### Definitions of Modern, Civilisation and Progress in Japanese-English Dictionaries

#### Definitions of ‘modern’ in English-Japanese dictionaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present period – New fashion – Up to date – New thinking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

ignorance of the present day is very amazing.
— Telegram (N.Y.).

Contemporary extravagent viewpoint is fairly characteristic of our times.
— Journal (N.Y.).

fashioned
modern people
[kendai]

y)
modern language

sei] e.g. It has been largely rebuilt upon modern lines.
— Tribune (N.Y.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition type</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present period</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1903, 1914, 1915, 1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fashion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1867, 1915, 1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to date</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1915, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New thinking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1915, 1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Definitions of 'civilization' in English-Japanese dictionaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Behaviour made proper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>to open and change</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1873, 1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>[Bunmei] Enlightenment, civilization, refinement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>to teach, educate, train</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1903, 1915, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>to teach, educate, train</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>[bummei] civilization and enlightenment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>civilisation, culture, enlightenment e.g. The Turks have contributed in no way to the progress of civilization. —Sun (N.Y.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definition type**

- Behaviour
- Open
- Change/develop
- Socio-political improvement
- To teach
- Anti-tradition
- Society and culture
- Historical period

**Number of occurrences**

- Behaviour: 1
- Open: 1
- Change/develop: 4
- Socio-political improvement: 5
- To teach: 3
- Anti-tradition: 1
- Society and culture: 3
- Historical period: 1

**Instances**

- 1862
- 1867
- 1873
- 1876
- 1892
- 1903
- 1915
- 1919
- 1924

---

Eastern (Western) civilization E.g. She stands at the point where Eastern and Western civilizations meet. —Lloyd's.
### Definitions of ‘progress’ in English-Japanese dictionaries

**Advance/improve – Quicker – Zealous in pursuit – Ideology – Be promoted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>to make rapid progress</td>
<td>make happen more quickly [notion of speed here]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>To advance, go forward, improve</td>
<td>to be eager for, ardent, or zealous in the pursuit of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>To advance, go forward, improve</td>
<td>to be eager for, ardent, or zealous in the pursuit of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>progress in knowledge [lit. hand up]</td>
<td>progress in skill [lit. improve]</td>
<td>progress in civilization [lit. step forward]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>progress in knowledge [lit. improve]</td>
<td>progress in skill [lit. improve]</td>
<td>progress in civilization [lit. step forward]</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>progressive politics e.g. progressive country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>advance</td>
<td>develop/grow</td>
<td>be promoted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition type</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance/improve</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1919, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quicker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zealous in pursuit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1867, 1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be promoted</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III
Government-built architecture in Taipei, 1895

Government-built buildings of 1895:

Buildings for the public (orange):
1) Railway building

Buildings for administration (red):
2) Xin Fu (Provincial Governor) Yamen
3) Bu Zheng Shi Si (Chief administrator of province) Yamen
4) Taipei City Yamen
5) Tamsha County Yamen
6) Xie Tai Yamen (Military officer Yamen)

Education Buildings (blue):
7) Examination Site
8) Ming Dao Study Hall
9) Native learning study hall
10) Western learning study hall
11) Deng Ying Study Hall

Military buildings (purple):
12) Military appliance Institution
13) City wall

Religious Buildings (Green):
14) City God Temple
15) Tin Hau Temple
16) Martial arts Temple
17) Confucian Temple

Source of Map from Shue and Huang, 2003. Adapted by Author.
Appendix IV
Government-built architecture in Taipei, 1920

Government-built buildings of 1920:

Buildings for education (blue):
1) - 11) Schools and research buildings

Buildings for the public (orange):
12) Taipei Station
13) Taipei Hospital
14) Taipei Park with Taiwan Museum
15) Library
16) Hospital
17) Theatre
18) Market

Military buildings (purple):
19) Artillery and Infantry Regiments
20) Headquarters of Army

Buildings for administration (red):
21) Taipei Municipal Office
22) Governor-General’s residence
23) Prefectural Govt. Residence
24) Weights and measures Bureau
25) Governor General’s Office
26) Law court site
27) Telephone exchange
28) Newspaper

Buildings for Commerce (grey):
29) Taipei Post office
30) Monopoly Bureau factory
31) Monopoly Bureau

Buildings for Finance (light green):
32) Bank

Buildings for Religion (green):
33) Chinese Temple

Source of Map from Yang, C., 1996.
Adapted by Author.
Appendix V

Summary of Regulations for Taiwan Governor-General’s Office new design prize

The rules of the design competition were as follows:

- The entrants of the competition had to be architects of the ‘Japanese Empire’.
- There were two stages of the competition. The requisitions of the design plan were different in these two sections. The first stage selected 10 people at most and the submission period was between 1st to midday 31st November in Meiji Year 40 (1907). The first judgment was in December Meiji year 40 (1907).
- The second stage deadline was from the 1st to the 25th of December Meiji Year 41 (1908) of work selected from the first stage. The second judgment was between January and March Meiji 42 (1909) and the result would be announced in the official newspaper.
- The prize from the first stage was 1000 yen for each architect selected; the second stage would select three winners with 30,000 Yen for first place, 15,000 Yen for second place and 5000 Yen for third place; these second stage winners would not get the additional 1000 Yen reward from the first stage.
• The regulations stated that in ‘foreign countries’ these kinds of large competitions normally awarded around 3000 Yen to the winners; in Japan, applicants would get a 1000 Yen award even if they fail the second stage but pass the first stage.

• The name of entrants should be replaced by a cipher; a photo or fingerprint of that application should be attached and on the drawing, sealed with the cipher. This cipher could not be used again for the second stage entrant.

• The competition jury was not allowed to apply or to help entrants.

• The relevant information was offered to applicants from 10th June to 31st July Meiji Year 40 (1907) from the Taiwan Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in mainland Japan).

• Considering that the (Japanese) architects were unlikely to understand the geography and environment of Taiwan, for this competition the Taiwan Department in Ministry of Internal Affairs offered information on related plans, geography, environmental conditions, building materials available, transport, wages and prices to all applicants.

• Regulations also stated the requisition of the number and size of rooms, the limits of the area and configuration of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, all detailed in the regulation volume.

• The time period allowed for construction was three years from Meiji Year 43 (1910).

• Copying other designs would result in rejection by the competition jury.

• The decision on the winner was final, determined by the Governor-General according to the jury, no explanation being given or objections allowed.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{176} Summary sourced from Taiwan Daily News (1907, my translations), Survey report of the Governor-General’s Office (Shue, C., and Huang, J., 2003), the Story of the Governor-General’s Office (Huang, J., 2004) and Guild of President’s Office: from the Governor-General’s Office to the President’s Office. (Lin, M., 2009)
Bibliography

English language sources

Alvesson, Mats, Communication, power and organization (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996)
Bauman, Zygmunt, ‘Has the future a left?’, at the Ralph Miliband Series on The Future of the Left in association with the Department of Sociology, LSE (14 March 2012)
Berman, Marshall, All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity (London: Verso, 1983)
in East Asia, 1842-1953, ed. by Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 1-12
Checkland, Olive, Britain’s Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1686-1912 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989)
Ching, Leo T.S., Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the politics of identity formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001)
Choi, Don, 'Educating architects in Meiji Japan', resived paper presented at symposium titled Architecture and Modern Japan at Columbia University (October 2000[2002])
Choi, Don, 'Domesticated Modern: Hybrid Houses in Meiji Japan, 1870-1900' (unpublished PhD
Thesis, University of California, 2003
Conder, Josiah, ‘Two letters by Josiah Conder, one from Tōkyō, Japan, to the RIBA, 13 October 1876 & 28 January 1878’, in the RIBA Archive: Letters to Council, 1835-1907 (1876/1878)
Conder, Josiah, ‘Notes on Japanese architecture, Includes report of ensuing discussion’, Transactions of Royal Institute of British Architects, 1st series, 28 (1877/1878), 179-192 & 209-212
Conder, Josiah, ‘A few remarks on architecture, Lecture upon architecture addressed to the architectural students in Japan’, Kobu-Dai-Gakko (Tokio: College of Engineering, 1878)
Conder, Josiah, ‘Tokio University’, The Builder (13 December 1884), 790-793
Conder, Josiah, ‘Further notes on Japanese architecture’, Transactions of Royal Institute of British Architects, 2nd series, 2 (1885/1886), 185-214
Conder, Josiah, ‘Domestic architecture in Japan’, Transactions of Royal Institute of British Architects, 2:3 (1886/1887), 103-127
Conder, Josiah, ‘Letter by the Hon. President of the Association of Japanese Architects, Josiah
Conder, from Tōkyō, to the RIBA, 12 March 1887’, in the RIBA Archive: Letters to Council, 1834-1907 (1887)


Connor, Walker, ‘A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a…’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1:4 (1978), 377-400


Cooper, Michael, They came to Japan: an anthology of European reports on Japan, 1543-1640 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995)


Daniels, Gordon, Sir Harry Parkes: British Representative in Japan 1865-83 (Surrey: Japan Press, 1996)


Dyer, Henry, *Dai Nippon, the Britain of the East: A study in National Evolution* (London: Blackie & Son, 1904)


Fergusson, James, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (London: John Murray, 1876)


Fletcher, Banister, and Fletcher, Banister, Sir, *A history of architecture on the comparative method*, 4th edn (London: Batsford, 1901)


Friedman, P. Kerim, ‘Entering the Mountains to Rule the Aborigines: Taiwanese Aborigine Education and the Colonial Encounter’, in *Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy*, ed. by Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 19-33

Fujimori, Terunobu (藤森照信), ‘Josiah Conder and Japan’, in Josiah Conder, 1st edn, ed. by Hiroyuki Suzuki and Terunobu Fujimori and Tokuzō Hara (Tokyo: Kenchiku Gahōsha, 2009), 13-17


Gavin, M., Shiga Shigetaka, 1863-1927: the forgotten enlightener (Richmond: Curzon, 2001)


Girouard, Mark, Sweetness and Light: The Queen Anne Movement, 1860-1900 (Gloucester: Clarendon Press, 1977)


Hawkins, Mike, Social Darwinism in European and American thought, 1860-1945: nature as model and nature as threat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)


Hillier, Bill, and Hanson, Julienne, *The social logic of space* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)


Hoare, James E., *Japan’s treaty ports and foreign settlements: the uninvited guests 1858-1899* (Folkestone: Japan Library, 1994)


Hori, Tatsnoskay, A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language (Yedo: Kaiseijo kankō, 1862)


Howland, Douglas R., *Translating the West: language and political reason in nineteenth-century
Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002)


Kal, Hong, 'Modelling the West, Returning to Asia: Shifting Politics of Representation in Japanese Colonial Expositions in Korea', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 47:3 (2005), 507-531


Kayaoglu, Turan, *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)


Lee, Ch’ian-Lang, *Introduction to traditional architecture in Taiwan*, trans. by Joan Stanley Baker (Taipei: Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan, 1999)


Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution’, *Pravda* 26 April 7th (1917)


Li, Qian-Lang, *Introduction to traditional architecture in Taiwan*, 1st edn, trans. by Joan Stanley Baker (Taipei: Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan, 1999)

Lowenthal, David, *The past is a foreign country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)


Moriyama, Matsunosuke, ‘Graduation design project on a University Hall for the University of Tokyo’ (unpublished Diploma thesis, Tokyo University, 1897)

Moriyama, Matsunosuke, ‘Specifications of Work to be done in erecting and finishing a building called The University Hall on the ground of the Imperial University of Tokyo’ (unpublished Diploma design, University of Tokyo, 1897)


Oliphant, Laurence, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan in the years*


Pratt, Mary Louise, ‘Arts of the contact zone’, *Profession* (1991), 33-40

Pratt, Mary Louise, *Imperial eyes: Travel writing and transculturation* (London: Routledge, 2007)


Rutter, Owen, *Through Formosa: an account of Japan’s island colony*, 1st edn (London: TF Unwin, ltd., 1923)
Rutter, Owen, ‘The awakening of Formosa’, *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 41:3 (1925), 158-164
Ruxton, Ian, ‘Britain: The Mission’s Aims, Objectives & Results’, in *The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment*, ed. by Ian Nish (Richmond: Japan library, 1998), 35-44


Schmorleitz, Morton S., *Castles in Japan* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1974)


Shie, Vincent H., 'Coloniality Embedded in the Urban Space of Taipei' (Research Paper, Tokyo University, 2009)


Shimazu, Naoko, 'Colonial Encounters: Japanese Travel Writing on Colonial Taiwan' in *Refracted Modernity: visual culture and identity in colonial Taiwan*, ed. by Yuko Kikuchi (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 21-39


Shively, Donald Howard, *Motoda Eifu, Confucian Lecturer to the Meiji Emperor* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959)


Swale, Alistair D., ’America 15 January – 6 August 1872 The First Stage in the Question for Enlightenment’ in *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*, ed. by Ian Nish (Surrey: Japan Library, 1998), 7-24


Takehara, Tsuneta, A standard Japanese-English dictionary (Kobe: Taishu Wan, 1924)
The Builder, ‘The late Mr. Josiah Conder’, *The Builder*, 119 (1920), 274
The Lavenberg Collection of Japanese Prints
Torgovnik, Efraim, *The politics of urban planning policy* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990)
Townsend, Susan C., *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese colonial policy: redeeming empire*, 1st edn
(Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000)
Ts'ai, Hui-yu Caroline, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An institutional approach to colonial engineering (London: Routledge, 2009)
Ts'ai. Hui-Yu Caroline, ‘Engineering the Social or Engaging “Everyday Modernity”?: Interwar Taiwan Reconsidered’, In Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy, ed. by Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 83-101
Vitruvius Pollio, Marcus, The ten books on architecture, 1st edn, trans. by Morris Hicky Morgan (New York: Dover, 1960)
Wada, Masanori, ‘Engineering Education and the Spirit of Samurai at the Imperial College of Engineering in Tokyo, 1871-1886’ (unpublished Masters thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2007)
Wagner, Otto, Modern Architecture: A Guidebook for His Students to This Field of Art, 3rd edn (CA: Getty Publications, 1988 [1902])

Wason, Charles W., *European settlements in the Far East: China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, Etc.* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1900)


Wierzbicka, Anna, *Understanding cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)


Winkler, Robin J. and Mi-Cha Wu, *Ten short talks on Taiwan history* (Taipei: Thirdnature Publishing Co., 2005)

Woodbridge, William C., *Moral & political chart of the inhabited World; exhibiting the prevailing religion, form of government, degree of civilization, and population of each country* (Hartford: Belknap & Hamersley, 1837)


Yao, Jen-To, ‘The Japanese colonial state and its form of knowledge in Taiwan’, in *Taiwan under

Japanese and Chinese language sources
Aoi, Akihito (青井哲人), 台湾神社の造営と日本統治初期における台北の都市改編（Construction of the Taiwan Shrine and the Urban Planning of Taihoku (Taipei) in the Early Colonial Period 1895-1901), Journal of architecture, planning and environmental engineering, 518 (1999), 237-244
Aoki, Koji, Meiji rwmin tojo nenjiteki kenkyu (Tokyo: Shinseisha, 1967)
Chang, Lijun (張麗俊), 水竹居主人日記（Diary of Chang Li-jun, 1906-1937), vol 4 (Taipei: Shi Nan'gang Qu, 2000)
Chang, Zun-Xu (張遵旭), 臺灣遊記 (Travels in Taiwan) (Taipei: Taiwan yin hang, 1960)
Cheng, Liang-Sheng (鄭梁生), 日本史: 現代化的東方文明國家 (History of Japan: Modernization of the civilized countries of the Orient) (Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2008)
Chuang, Yung-Ming (莊永明), 台北老街 (Taipei old street), 1st edn (Taipei: China Times Publishing Company, 1991)
Conder, Josiah, ‘ジョサイア・コンドル博士表彰：コンドル博士の経歴’ (Commendation of Josiah Conder: the experience of Dr. Conder), Journal of architecture and building science, 34 (1920), 265-279
Dong, Yi-qiu (董宜秋), 帝國與便所：日治時期臺灣便所興建及污物處理 (The Empire and them: the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan’s buildings and sewage treatment) (Taipei: Taiwan Books, 2005)
Du, Mu (杜牧), 考工记 (Book on Diverse Crafts) (Shanghai: Shanghai shu dian, 1994)

Fukuzawa, Yukichi. *An encouragement of learning* (West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2013[1872])

Fujimori, Terunobu (藤森照信), *日本の近代建築 (Modern Architecture of Japan)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993)


Guo, Mingliang, and Ye, Chun Lin (郭明亮, 俊麟叶), 一九三〇年代的臺灣 (1930s Taiwan) (Taipei County: Bojan cultural undertakings, Ltd., 2004)

Huang, Chien-Chun (黃建鈞), '台灣日據時期建築家井手薰之研究' (The Study of Ide Kaoru, an Architect in Taiwan during the Occupied Period) (unpublished Masters Thesis, National Cheng Kung University, 1995)

Huang, Jiunn-Ming (黃俊銘), '總督府物語: 台灣總督府暨官邸的故事' (The story of Government General's Office) 1st edn (Taipei: Sole Culture, 2004)

Huang, Ko-Wu (黃克武), '現代「觀念之源起與歷史研究的本土反思' [The origin of the concept of the 'modern' and historical research into indigenous introspection], 當代 (Contemporary Monthly), 223:115 (2006), 76-95

Huang, Shu-Lin (黃琡玲), '台灣清代城內官制建築研究' (A Study on the Official (sic.) Buildings of Taiwan Walled-cities) (unpublished Masters thesis, Chung Yuan Christian University, 2001)


Ide, Kaoru (井手薰) et al, '改棣以後建築的變遷 (一)' (The symposium on the transformation of architecture after colonial regime change), *The Journal of the Taiwan Architectural Institute*, 16: 1 (1943), 17-48

Inagaki, Eizō (稲垣榮三), *Nihon no kindai kenchiku (Modern architecture of Japan)* (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1959)

Inagaki, Eizō (稲垣榮三), 神戸の洋館と (Western-style "Foreign concrete" in Kobe) (Tokyo: Japan Institute of Architects and Architecture, 1961)
Isamu Yoneyama and Itō Takayuki (伊藤, 隆之, 米山, 勇), 日本(にっぽん)近代建築大 (The Modern Architectures in Japan) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2010)

Ishizuki, Minoru, Kindai Nihon no Kaigai Ryugakushi (A History of Studying Abroad in Modern Japan), 1st edn (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 1972)

Itō, Chūta (伊東 忠太) '法隆寺建築論' (A Treatise on Horyuji Temple), Journal of architecture and building science, 7:83 (1893), 317-350

Itō, Chūta (伊東忠太), 建築哲學 (Architectural Philosophy) (unpublished Diploma thesis, University of Tokyo, 1895)

Itō, Chūta (伊東忠太), '建築進化の原則より見たる我邦建築の前途' (The Future of Our Architecture in Terms of the Evolution Theory of Architecture), Journal of Architecture, 265 (1908), 4-36

Itō, Chūta (伊東忠太) 東洋建築の研究 (上) (Research on Oriental architecture), 1st edn (Tokyo: Ryu Gin Co., 1936)


Kōjirō Yūichirō (神代雄一郎), 現代建築と芸術 (Art and modern architecture) (Tokyo: Shōkokusha, 1961)

Kondō, Tomie (近藤富枝), 鹿鳴館貴婦人考 (Noblewomen’s thoughts on the Rokumeikan) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1980)

Kuga, Katsunan, 'Kokumin Teki no Kannen' (Citizen's consciousness), Nationalistic Notion (1889), 9–13

Li, Hong Jian (李宏堅), ‘臺灣日據時期鋼筋混凝土地建築技術與樣式發展問之關係探討’ (A research on relationship between the development of architecture style and construction technique of reinforce concrete during the period of Japanese occupation) (unpublished PhD thesis, Chung Yuan Christian University, 1994)


Li, Qian-Lang (李乾朗), 台灣近代建築 (Taiwan’s Modern Architecture), 3rd edn (Taipei: Hsiung-Shu Art publisher, 2004)


Liao, Chun-Sheng (廖春生), ‘台北之都市轉化－以清代三市街（艋舺、大稻埕、城內）為例’ (The transformation of Taipei metropolis: the example of the three towns of Taipei (Mengjia, Dadaocheng, the inner walled city) in the Qing Dynasty)(unpublished Masters thesis, National Taiwan University, 1988)

Lin, Man-Houng (林滿紅), 總統府一樓導覽「從總督府到總統府」：建築的故事 (Guild of President’s Office: from the Governor-General’s Office to the President’s Office), 1st edn (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2009)


Liu, Qing-Hao (劉謦豪), ‘台灣總督府官葉’ (Postcards issued by Taiwan Governor’s Office), 2nd edn (Taipei: Taiwan Heritage Co., Ltd., 2004)

Lu, Shao-Li. (呂紹理), 水螺響起—日治時期台灣社會的生活作息 (Water-snail horns: The rhythms of life during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan), 1st edn (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd., 1998)

Matsumoto, Akemi, and Hiseh, Sen-Chan (松本曉美, 謝森展), 臺灣懷舊 (Taiwan revisited), (Taipei: Creation Culture Co., Ltd., 1990)

Minshu shugi kagakusha kyokai (Association of Democratic Scientists), Nihon no rekishi (The Birth of Japanese History), Rekishigaku (Tokyo, kenkyūkai: 1949)

Moriyama, Matsunosuke (森山松之助), '建築學講本' (Lectures on Architecture), in The History of Japanese Architecture in six volumes (Tokyo: Kenchiku-gaku Kōkyōkai, 1905)

Muramatsu, Teijirō (村松貞次郎), 日本建築技術史 (Japanese Architectural History of Technology) (Tokyo: Chijin Shokan,1959)


Nakamura, Köji (中村孝治), 大正南進期與臺灣 (Taisho period of Southern Expansion and Taiwan), trans. by Bu-Kui Bian (卞鋪奎) (Taipei: Dao Xiang Press, 2002)

Nakamura, Shigeharu (中村重治纂著), '中日近代建築外観のイメージに関する研究' (Comparative
study on the image of the Sino-Japanese modern architecture) (National Diet Library, 2002)
Sha, Yong Jie (沙永杰), '「西化」的歷程－中日建築近代化過程比較研究' (The process of
"Westernisation": Comparision of the Chinese and Japanese process of architectural modernisation) (Taipei: Garden City Publishers, 2001)
Shen, Fuxu, and Kong, Jian (沈福煦, 孔键), 近代建築流派演變與鑒賞 (Evolution and appreciation of modern architecture schools) (Shanghai: Tong ji da xue chu ban she, 2008)
Shima, Hideo (島秀雄編), '雇い外国人バルツァーの論文発見 (Tōkyō-eki tanjō : oyatoi gaikokujin Barutsā no ronbun hakken) (Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai, 1990)
Shue, Chin, and Huang, Jiunn-Ming (薛琴, 黃俊銘), 國定古蹟總統府修護調查與研究 (Investigation and Research for the repairs to the National Monument Presidential Office) (Taipei: Nei Zheng Press, 2003)
Sogawa, Katarō, ‘總督官邸樹石物語’ (The story of wood and stone in the Taiwan
Governor-General's Residence), The Journal of the Taiwan Architectural Institute, 8:5 (1936), 337
Sun, Chuan-Wen (孫全文), 當代建築思潮與評論 (Thoughts and comments on contemporary architecture) (Taipei: Garden City Publishers, 2004)
Suzuki, Hiroyuki (鈴木博之), 伊東忠太を知っていますか (Do you know Ito Chuta) (Matsudo-shi: Ōkusha, 2003)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 5th July Meiji 37 (1904)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 20th February Meiji 41 (1908)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 30th April Meiji Year 42 (1909a)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 2nd May Meiji Year 42 (1909b)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 6th May Meiji Year 43 (1910)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 5th April Taisho Year 4 (1916a)
Taiwan Daily News (台灣日日新報), 16th April Taisho Year 4 (1916b)
Taiwan Issue (Governor-General's Office) (臺灣事情), 臺灣事情 (Survey of Formosa) (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtoku-fu, 1916)
Takeshi, Komagome (駒込, 毅), きずな : 駒込毅詩集 (Kizuna : Komagome takeshi shishū)
(Tokyo: One Grain Company, 2001)
Tokutomi, Sohō (德富蘇峰集), 現代日本文學全集 (Collection of Tokutomi Sohō’s Work) (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1930)
Wang, Hui-Jun (王惠君), '磚材生產過程與材質之調查研究' (Manufacturing Process and Materials'
Properties of the brick in Taiwan) (unpublished research project, National Science Council of Taiwan, 2000-2001)

Watanabe, Yoshio (渡邊義雄), 日本の心宮殿と迎賓館 (Heart of Japan: Imperial Palace and Akasaka Palace) (Tokyo: Shueisha Inc., 1980)

Wei, De-Wen and Gao, Chun-Qi, (魏德文, 高傳棋), 穿越時空看台北：台北建城 120 周年：古地圖、舊影像、文獻、文物展 (Through time and space to see Taipei), 2nd edn (Taipei: the Cultural Affairs Bureau of Taipei, 2005)

Yanaihara, Tadao (矢内原忠雄), 帝国主義下の台湾 (Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism), 1st edn (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 1988)

Yang, Chich-Hung (楊志宏), '日據時期臺灣建築相關法令發展歷程之研究' (The development of Taiwan's architecture regulation during Japanese occupation) (unpublished Masters Thesis, Chung Yuan Christian University, 1996)

Yang, Qing-Wu (楊慶吾), '台灣近現代地方政府建築之研究-以台灣西部五大都市之發展為例' (A study of the local governmental building in Taiwan: in the case of five cities in western Taiwan) (unpublished Masters thesis, National Cheng Kung University, 2006)

Yeh, Nai-Chi (葉乃齊), '台灣傳統營造技術的變遷初探' (A Preliminary Study On Transition in Taiwanese Traditional Building Crafts From Qing Dynasty to the Japanese Colonial Period) (unpublished PhD thesis, National Taiwan University, 2002)

Yen, Shu-Hua (顏淑華), '日治時期「艋舺埋立地」土地建物發展之研究' (The Research on the Development of Land and Building in “Man-Ka filled land” during the Japanese Governance of Taiwan) (unpublished Masters Thesis, Chung Yuan Christian University, 2005)


Zushi, Yoshihiko (図師嘉彥著), 日本の劇場回顧 (Nihon no gekijō kaiko) (Tokyo: Sagami Shobō, 1947)
**Primary sources**

Complementing the site visits and interviews described in the introduction, primary sources have been taken from a mixture of Japanese, Taiwanese, British and digital archives:

**Japanese archives:**
The National Diet Library; Tokyo Metropolitan Library; Tokyo National Museum; Japan’s National Archives; Tokyo Central Library; Architecture Department Library, the University of Tokyo; and the AIJ Library.

**Taiwanese archives:**
C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers, Taipei (private archives); Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica Library; the National Taiwan Library; the Taiwan Historica; the National Central Library of Taiwan; National Taiwan Museum; and the Official Documents of Taiwan Governor-General Office.

**British archives:**
RIBA Library Collections; the British Library; and Britain's National Archives.

**Digital archives:**
The Digital Archives of the National Central Library, ‘Taiwan Memory’; Digital Gallery of Rare Book and Special Collections, Keio University Library; Lavenberg Collection of Japanese Prints, the Kjeld Duits Collection; the MIT Visualising Cultures Collection; and the Library of Congress Database.