The Emotions

Biology, Language and Culture

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Abstract

Philosophers, and theorists in other disciplines, have disagreed over the character, function and mechanisms of emotions. Amongst the persistent issues that have arisen is the question of what exactly emotions are. Are they a vivid perceptual awareness of physiological processes? Evaluative judgments? Dispositions? Neurophysiological states? Or perhaps an aggregate of some or all of the above? Typically, theorists who study the emotions have tended to divide into two camps. On the one hand there are those who adopt a broadly biological / adaptationist perspective, which emphasises the corporeal nature of emotions. On the other side of the divide are those who adopt a socio-constructivist perspective, which emphasises the cognitive nature of emotions. Proponents of the biological stance have tended to favour universal, basic emotions whilst socio-constructivists tend to favour the more exotic. In support of the latter approach a significant literature has emerged from ethnography, anthropology and cognitive linguistics. This literature adopts a “lexicocentric” perspective on the emotions.

The biological/adaptationist perspective seems to capture something important and right about the essential nature of emotions. However, the aim of my thesis is to demonstrate that the basic emotions theory, as characterised by Ekman, is weakened by its failure to pay attention to, and fully to engage with, the literature regarding the effect of language on our emotional landscape, an area which has ostensibly been the domain of the social constructionist. I argue that what is required is a linguistically inclusive theory of emotion. Such a theory acknowledges that any coherent and comprehensive theory of emotion must include a robust linguistic and cultural element.
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Notes on the Revised Version

The Examiners identified four main recommendations to secure a successful re-submission of the thesis, each of which I have specifically addressed. Firstly, in accordance with the recommendation of the Examiners, in this revised version of the thesis I have re-orientated the opening and conclusion of each chapter to highlight the relevance of the material presented to the overall argument of the thesis. This gives more direction as to what the reader should take from the material discussed in each chapter. The introduction, abstract, and conclusion of the thesis have been amended to reflect the need identified by the Examiners to give more clarity to the central theme of the thesis and to signpost the argumentative strategy.

Secondly, it was particularly recommended that I include a discussion of Prinz’s Perceptual Theory of Emotion, which is a contemporary development of the basic emotions theory. This has been included in the introduction to the thesis. The discussion highlights concerns with Prinz’s theory, and so further motivates the need to explore the value of a lexicocentric approach.

In addition, a third recommendation was that the existing material be re-orientated to show in what way the lexicocentric approach is necessary. The development of the introduction and conclusion to each chapter indicates how the material in each chapter provides support for the lexicocentric approach to emotion.

Finally, the central ambition of the thesis has been altered. It is no longer the ambition of the thesis to show how the basic emotions approach and the social constructionist approach to emotions can be integrated. That has now been withdrawn. The main thrust of the thesis is to show that a lexicocentric approach to the emotions is an essential element of an adequate theory of the emotions and that a basic emotions approach on its own is incomplete. The biological/adaptationist perspective seems to capture something important and right about the essential nature of emotions. However, my aim is to demonstrate that the basic emotions theory, as characterized by Ekman, is weakened by its failure to pay attention to and to fully engage with the literature regarding the effect of language on our emotional landscape. I argue that what is required is a linguistically inclusive theory of emotion. Such a theory acknowledges that any coherent and comprehensive theory of emotion must include a robust linguistic and cultural element. I agree with the biological theory of the emotions to the extent that it is required to account for the distinctive emotionality of the emotions, which gives them their special place within our cognitive and affective landscape. Yet I cannot endorse the usual list of basic emotions, since 1) what is biologically basic about emotions can be socially and culturally recruited for a range of potential
emotions; and 2) lists of emotions are apt to be misleading, since they rely upon the vocabulary of a particular language.

So I will conclude these notes with a few remarks as to what the lexicocentric approach amounts to. I see it as a research strategy, rather than a single explicit theory. What the research strategy insists on is that we should pay careful attention to the way in which language shapes and affects emotion. As to the actual effects of language on emotion, and the ways in which language can modify and articulate our biologically-given capacity to feel emotion, a number of claims are possible. The first, and most modest, is that we should not restrict our attention to the emotions as described in just one particular language, such as English. This is hardly controversial, and will surely be universally accepted. However, there is a further, connected point which I wish to press, and this is that we should be cautious about identifying biologically basic emotions in terms of the emotional vocabulary of English: for further discussion of this theme see the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 6.

The lexicocentric approach also maintains that language has an effect upon both the incidence of emotions and upon reactions to them. Exactly how these effects operate is a major field for further research. It is possible to maintain that people in different cultures, speaking different languages, can actually experience very much the same range of emotions. As is well known, one need not be a German-speaker to experience schadenfreude. But, of course, having a word for it can make a difference. In some cases lexicalization of an emotion can operate as an inhibiting factor, if cultural norms represent a particular emotional response as shameful or unworthy. So being able to name the state you are in as a case of ‘schadenfreude’ or ‘self-pity’ may serve as a check upon emotion. More often, however, the availability of an emotional classification in a particular lexicon makes available thoughts which not only facilitate an emotional reaction, but even partly constitute being in that very lexicalised emotional state. Many possible illustrations of this are provided in the course of the present thesis. Indeed, I suppose I should recognize that I am exposing English-speaking readers to potential infection by foreign emotions!

So names for emotions do make a difference. But the lexicocentric approach should not be limited to considering the naming of kinds of emotions. There are other ways in which language can shape and influence emotions. This is clearly a topic so huge that an attempt to engage with it is doomed to seem pitifully inadequate. Yet I felt that the material in Chapter 8 had to be included in the thesis in order to acknowledge that the lexicocentric approach is not restricted to the impact of having names for particular emotions. Overall, I am in no way denying that our capacity to
experience emotions is part of our biological human nature. The present thesis merely wishes to
give the power of language to work on that capacity its full due.
Introduction

Emotion Theories

One approach to the study of emotions is to see them as evolved fitness enhancing adaptations. Those who support this position argue that each emotion should be understood as a set of programs that guide cognitive, physiological and behavioural processes when a specific type of problem is encountered in the environment. In other words, emotions are specialised cognitive modules shaped by natural selection in ways that increase the organism’s ability to respond adaptively to environmentally recurrent challenges. This is the approach adopted within the field of Evolutionary Psychology (EP) (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a and 1990b, Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Keltner et al., 2006) where, for example, sexual jealousy is conceptualised as a universal, innate emotional “smoke alarm”, designed to detect signs of a partner’s infidelity and initiate behaviour designed to avoid or limit reproductive loss.

Another approach is to argue that emotions are social constructions. The motivation for this approach is that emotions typically take place in social situations. The emotions are not internal, personal reactions, located primarily within the body or mind of the individual. Instead they are primarily social phenomena, regulated by social norms, values and expectations. Humans are deeply socio-centric. The majority of our most significant emotional experiences arise from real, anticipated or imagined interactions with other human beings. Identifying the interpersonal, institutional and cultural factors surrounding emotional experience can help clarify, the causes, consequences and functions of emotions in everyday life. Thus, such theories put social factors at the centre of emotional experience. One of the most influential theories that adopt this approach is Averill’s account of emotions as transitory social roles or syndromes (Averill, 1980, 1982, 1986). A syndrome can be characterised as a collection of all the appropriate responses of a particular emotion, which are generated by social norms and expectations, but none of which are essential or necessary for that emotional syndrome. It also consists of beliefs about the nature of the eliciting stimuli and perhaps some non-social elements. Research in anthropology and cognitive linguistics indicates that the way we use language exposes the socially constructed meanings a particular speech community holds for various emotions. Some theorists within cognitive linguistics have argued that this is particularly manifest in the common metaphors people use when wishing to articulate or communicate a particular emotion.
Alternatively, other theorists concentrate on attempting to explicate the emotion process itself. Judgment theories developed by philosophers (Nussbaum 2001, 2004; Solomon, 1999) consider that the early part of the emotion process ought to be seen as a cognitive process: an emotional response begins with a judgment or evaluation of the stimuli in a particular way. As Solomon (1993: 126) puts it:

[ ] my embarrassment is my judgment that I am in an exceedingly awkward situation. My shame is my judgment to the effect that I am responsible for an untoward situation or incident. My sadness, my sorrow or my grief are judgments of various severity to the effect that I have suffered a loss. An emotion is an evaluative (or a “normative”) judgment; a judgment about my situation and about myself and/or about all other people.

The judgment is specifically connected to the individual’s beliefs about themselves and their place in the environment, both social and ecological. For Nussbaum emotions are “forms of intense attention and engagement in which the world is appraised in its relation to the self” (Nussbaum, 2001: 106). Both Solomon and Nussbaum have argued that such judgments or evaluations need not involve self-consciousness or deliberative reflection.

Cognitive appraisal theories (Roseman, 2000, Lazarus 1991, and Scherer 1993, 2001), developed by those working in psychology, also stress the role of evaluation of the stimuli in determining the emotion. But appraisal theories in psychology differ from cognitivist accounts in philosophy by offering a more thorough analysis of the sorts of appraisals involved in the emotion process. The aim of appraisal theory in the psychology of emotion is to identify which features of the emotion-eliciting situation lead to the production of one emotion rather than another. A typical way of establishing this has been to define and study a set of appraisal dimensions. According to dimensional appraisal theorists an appraisal takes the form of a set of dimensions against which potentially emotion-eliciting situations are assessed. Appraisal theorists disagree on the exact number and content of appraisal dimensions, although there is a distinctive pattern or profile of dimensions that are typical of such theories. These are goal –conduciveness, coping potential, norm compatibility and novelty (Scherer, 1999).

According to Roseman’s (1984) dimensional appraisal model1, for example, the dominant emotion that a person feels in response to an event depends on five appraisals:

(a) situational state: whether the event is consistent or inconsistent with the person’s motives (goals, preferences etc.);

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(b) motivational state: whether the most important motives relevant to an event are punishment (“aversive” motivation) or rewards (“appetitive” motivation);

(c) whether a motive-relevant event has an unknown probability of occurrence, or is uncertain or certain to occur;

(d) power: whether the person is in a position of (moral or tactical) weakness or strength in responding to an event, and

(e) agency: whether the most important cause of an event is an impersonal circumstance, some other person or the self.

Sadness, for example, would be experienced when an event is appraised as inconsistent with an appetitive motive, certain to occur, caused by circumstances beyond anyone’s control, and when one is relatively powerless to influence the event (e.g., when it is perceived that a loved person has died from natural causes); fear would be experienced when an event is inconsistent with a motive and caused by some other person, and when one is relatively strong in one’s ability to respond (e.g., when a loved person is in danger of being attacked by someone whose actions can be stopped).

Paul Ekman’s neuro-cultural theory (Ekman 1992a 1992b, 1999, 2003, also attempts to explicate the emotion process. He argues that there are innate, universal emotions which are biologically based and non-cognitive. These basic emotions, which include fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy/happiness and surprise, are the result of an automatic appraisal mechanism and an affect programme. The essence of the affect program theory is that each of the basic categories into which we could divide emotions corresponds to a complex program that is genetically hard-wired in the brain. This program co-ordinates the activation of a suite of short-term, stereotypical responses involving alterations in the subject’s neurophysiological and somato-visceral state, including a motor expression component, musculoskeletal responses (e.g. action tendencies) and autonomic nervous system changes. When the brain detects potential danger or a threat, for example, there will be the activation of stress-induced analgesia as a consequence of the activation of the subject’s natural opiate system, and through the nerves of the autonomic nervous system the brain will send messages to bodily organs and adjust the activity of those organs to match the demands of the situation, resulting in the subject typically sensing a taut stomach, racing heart, clammy hands and dry mouth. These physiological changes are then linked to emotional feelings. These “affect programs” occur without the need for conscious direction and therefore appear passive; they seem to simply come over the subject in response to an affective stimulus.

Ekman’s theory has been the subject of a considerable amount of empirical research... This research seems to suggest that some emotions, specifically the affect programs emotions, are indeed pan-cultural syndromes facilitated by inherent biological resources that give rise to stereotypical physiological and behavioural responses. According to Griffiths (1997, 2004) these affect programs create a distinct psychological category of emotions that can be treated as any other traits that are classified by evolutionary biology. All other emotions can be divided into the higher cognitive
emotions (sexual jealousy, envy, shame) and the socially constructed emotions (mere transitory covert social roles involving the pretence of emotion, e.g. running amok).

Any theory that hopes to explain the behaviour of contemporary humans must tell us what it is that causes humans to be so much more variable than any other species and why this peculiar capacity for variation was favoured by natural selection. My thesis attempts to elucidate the extent to which the study of emotions and emotion concepts can contribute to the search for such a theory. The burden of existing evidence suggests that emotion comprises both universal and culturally diverse elements. On the biological – socio constructivist divide proponents of the biological stance favour universal, basic emotions whereas socio-constructivist theorists generally favour the culturally exotic.

An adequate view of emotion must integrate both corporeal and cognitive dimensions and examine the nature of the relationship between these dimensions. In response it might be argued that the corporeal and cognitive dimensions of emotion are two distinct categories of things that we call emotions. This is certainly Griffiths’ view. However, in disassociating the mechanisms of the affect program emotions from the “higher” cognitive emotions, it becomes difficult to see where the “higher” cognitive emotions gain their embodied emotionality. I can make the judgment that someone has wronged me or mine without experiencing the corresponding emotion of anger. I might respond with bemusement, dejection or be completely dispassionate about the situation. On the other hand, emotions cannot be reducible to a mere collection of bodily sensations, since there is insufficient differentiation of bodily feelings to account for the myriad of different emotional states in human experience. There is something right about both positions. We need an integrated theory of the emotions to accommodate what is correct about both positions. A significant corpus of literature has emerged from ethnography, anthropology and cognitive linguistics, or what I shall refer to as the lexicocentric perspective on emotions. This literature makes a valuable contribution to the cognitive theories of emotion. However, within the philosophy of emotion there has been little attempt to integrate this literature with the biological/evolutionary perspective on emotions.

Evolutionary Psychology and the Standard Social Science Model

My thesis can be situated within a broader debate in psychology between Evolutionary Psychology and the Standard Social Science model of our human cognitive architecture. Evolutionary Psychology attempts to bring to bear on the study of the mind constraints from evolution, since the brain is, like the body, a product of evolution. Our behaviours, no less than our bodily characteristics, are laid down in the human genome and are a biological phenomenon.
The discipline of EP sets itself in opposition against what it characterises as the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). The SSSM, as it is presented by EP, is a minimalist model of the architecture of the human mind. It contains little more than a few basic drives, such as hunger and fear, together with a general capacity to learn from a few content-free procedures. In effect, we are born with a mind that is essentially a tabula rasa. It is culture and experience that play the most significant role in shaping human psychology.

Evolution is thought to contribute little beyond offering an account of these drives and the general-purpose, content-free learning or computational equipment that form the SSSMs model of human nature. This modest cognitive equipment governs such diverse human behaviour as learning languages, recognising facial expressions, and choosing our leaders or sexual partners, since the mechanisms that direct learning, reasoning and memory function homogeneously, regardless of the content they are operating on or the larger category or domain involved.

If this model of the architecture of the human mind were correct, evolutionary psychologists claim, we ought to expect human behaviours to vary radically both over geographical areas and temporal periods. However, instead, we find that there are many robust human universals; e.g. gendered patterns of mate selection, preference for genetically related group members over non-related members, universal facial expressions of emotion, reciprocity, language acquisition and many others identified by ethnographers and anthropologists. If culture played an essential role in explaining patterns of human behaviour, the presence of these robust universals would be startling. Couple the existence of these universals with plausible hypotheses as to how they might be adaptive, at least in our ancestral environment, and the evolutionary

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2 Anthropology seems to progress without a clear definition of what culture is. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have a working definition, and a useful one has been offered by Richerson and Boyd:

*Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation and other forms of social transmission.*

*By Information we mean any kind of mental state, conscious or not, that is acquired or modified by social learning, and affects behaviour.*

Richerson & Boyd, 2006 p 5

This might be a good definition to adopt, though I recognise that it identifies information with mental states, and I do not wish to deny that artefacts and behaviour are a significant component of culture too. I therefore shall delimit the definition of culture broadly to the communicative and meaningful aspects of social life from language to the meaning carried by symbols, persons, actions and events.
account looks unavoidable. Our behaviours, no less than our bodily characteristics, are laid down in the human genome.

For the Evolutionary Psychologist the design of the human psychological architecture, the equipment in the human brain, and the nature of our bodies play a primary role in the transmission of representations, and explain why we preference some ideas over others and limit the type of social interactions humans engage in. It is therefore necessary to focus on describing the evolved human psychological architecture if we are to hope to produce a social theory that can confidently distinguish the effects of population level cultural dynamics.

The SSSM model is accused of attempting to dissociate the social sciences from the natural sciences. Culture, as the source of social and mental organisation is seen as external to the individual. The causal arrow flows from the cultural environment to the individual and detaches the social sciences from the natural sciences. Therefore, the claims made by sociobiologists, behavioural ecologists and evolutionary psychologists about the evolutionary patterning of human behaviour can simply be rejected. Kaplan (1965) exemplifies this position:

Anthropology has formulated concepts, theoretical entities, laws (or, if one prefers, "generalisations"), and theories which do not form any part of the theoretical apparatus of psychology and cannot be reduced to it. This is the logical basis of treating culture as an autonomous sphere of phenomena, explainable in terms of itself. It is wholly beside the point to maintain that anthropologists cannot proceed that way, for the brute fact of the matter is that, in their empirical research, this is the way they do most often proceed.

Kaplan, 1965: 973

Urban legends, legal systems, cooking techniques, architecture, and rites of passage marking the transition from one social status to another (marriage ceremonies, headhunting, bar Mitzvahs) are cultural types which fail to correspond to the sorts of things studied outside the social sciences, since they are not reducible to biological or psychological types.

However, the EP response to the SSSM model is that the general purpose, content free psychology central to the SSSM could not generate human universals. The EP preferred explanation is that these universals are our genetic inheritance from our Palaeolithic ancestors. They are the result of adaptive behaviour laid down in our modular brains. Our minds have primarily been sculptured to cope with the Pleistocene environment of Evolutionary Adaptation (EEA). Many opponents of EP assume that the cultural and historical variability in cultural forms refutes the claim that humans share a universal, species-specific psychology. However many EP proponents would argue that their opponents need to demonstrate that these cultural changes in behaviour are not predicted by the EP’s account of the mechanisms responsible. It is, they argue,
therefore misguided to represent cultural explanations as *alternatives* to biological explanations, rather than continuous with them. Genes do not operate in a rigidly deterministic fashion. The rich complexity of each individual is produced by a cognitive architecture embodied in a physiological system which interacts with the social and non-social world that surrounds it. To attempt to disassemble the human individual into biological versus non-biological aspects is to perpetuate a tired and discredited dualism endemic to the Western cultural tradition. It would make little sense to attempt to separate culture and biology when looking for explanations of human behaviour. The Holocaust, Morris dancing, Islamic fundamentalism, hoodies, binge drinking and gang culture, the mass suicides at Waco and traditional Tuvan throat singing are all the result of the synergy of biology and culture. They are not irreducibly cultural things.

**Emotion Universals and Constructivism**

The natural biological basis of the emotions is often regarded as proven by the universal existence of many emotions, not only among adult humans but also among animals and human infants which are devoid of social consciousness. Disgust is frequently said to be one of the basic emotions, universally recognisable across all cultures (Ekman, 1992). The most primordial form of disgust, what Rosin and colleagues have identified as *core disgust* (Rosin and Fallon, 1987), has animal precursors, and guards against contamination via the mouth. It is an emotion that is adaptively employed as an oral defence against ingesting contaminated food (e.g., the smell of sour milk or bad eggs will elicit the typical disgust behaviour avoiding the danger of ingesting something that will result in sickness). Because the level of response is strong and vivid, the obvious facial and bodily behaviours associated with it clearly communicate an aversive attitude and will help observers to avoid the same danger. So, core disgust can be characterised as an evolved behavioural defence; mechanism that enabled healthy individuals to perpetuate their genes.

Without ever abandoning his notion of core disgust, Rosin recognises that disgust extends beyond mere food rejection to include bodily and animal waste products, and domains that include sex, hygiene, death, violations of the body envelope (gore, amputations) and socio-moral violations. The Motion Picture Production Code, known in Hollywood as the Hays Code was adopted in 1930 and was technically still in force at the time of the original release of Hitchcock’s *Psycho* (1960). The Code states that

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3 The code was replaced by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) rating system introduced in 1968.
the treatment of low, disgusting, unpleasant, though not necessarily evil, subjects should always be subject to the dictates of good taste and with regard for the sensibilities of the audience.

*Psycho* was the first film to depict a toilet, and a bathroom. It was designed to provoke shock and pathological disgust in contemporary spectators (with its vulgar implications of bodies, excrement pollution and contamination). The typical evaluation and response for contemporary spectators would have been repugnance and disgust. These negatively valenced emotional responses would have primed the film’s original spectators for feelings of repulsion felt during the notorious shower scene. The point is that such a response would not be primed in today’s spectators. The sensibilities of typical spectators have been culturally altered. For the same reason, the emotional impact of the extended scene in which Norman Bates fastidiously cleans the shower room and disposes of Marion’s body would be significantly defused of emotional impact for modern spectators. A 1960s audience would in turn plausibly have been more sensitive to and disturbed by the general thematic references to excrement in the film (for example as Marion’s car , with its ANL registration number, sinks into the swamp, and the final scene in which Marion’s car is pulled out of the swamp using a thick chain).

The shift in public sensibility between Hitchcock’s original cinema audiences and today’s audiences towards these elicitors indicates that responses to images of typical disgust elicitors can be weakened over time, or eradicated. In addition, the emotion of disgust in the adult undergoes considerable symbolic and cognitive elaboration, where disgust becomes a response to vices such as hypocrisy, cruelty, betrayal, even third party violations not involving the self. This socio-moral disgust is a reaction to a subclass of moral violations - those that reveal a person has a psychology that is repulsive, sick or perverted, or more generally lacks the normal moral motives.

The general conclusion is that the English concept lexically encoded by the term *disgust* is both the product of evolution and culture. Disgust in humans has been elaborated into a more complex emotion, contributing to the maintenance of social order, self-control and the norms of moral decency. At the same time this most visceral of emotions reminds us of our mortality and of our animalistic origin. To recognise the evolutionary origins and the adaptive function of disgust as a sentry of the mouth makes it difficult to resist the notion that it is a purely instinctive drive, like hunger or thirst. The disgust response in infants is, Carruthers (2004) argues, part of a suite of triggerable innately represented action sequences like hiccupping, sneezing or blinking. The universality of a genetically determined syndrome of disgust does not tell us much about the precise composition of the *disgusting* or help explain to what extent we are justified in appealing to the emotions as a foundation of our social or moral norms.
It seems right to say that, whilst a dog may display submissive behaviour that we interpret as cringing when threatened after taking food from the dinner table, the animal does not feel embarrassment or guilt. The warranted ascription of such categories as guilt is conditional on the recognition of the violation of a moral rule, and an understanding that such violations are not merely unpleasant but wrong. The dog may be able to exhibit appeasement behaviour, such as gaze aversion, but the capacity to experience social disgrace, genuine shame or embarrassment requires a developed theory of mind, perhaps the acquisition of a natural language and cultural information.

On this view, such emotions are socially constituted. They lack a homologue in the animal kingdom, and infants do not experience these emotions. Mature human emotions, and their expression, embody social meaning. Thus, it will be necessary to embed oneself within the culture in which they are expressed, since such meaning will not be transparent. Emotions are construed as affective states linked to discourse regarding those states. They are linked to cultural paradigms that help us understand those feelings by offering a basis for knowing what their proper objects are, when they are appropriately elicited and directed, and therefore correctly displayed. Even a visceral emotion like disgust is a richly linguistic and cultural phenomenon. Emotions are feelings connected to perceptions and cognitions and to the cultural context in which it makes sense to have those feelings.

For the Social Constructivist, we are not determined by our biological nature but we reshape or mould ourselves, through culture. Behaviour like the well documented reciprocal altruism demonstrated by vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984) may represent a type of proto-altruism but it certainly does not qualify as genuine morality. Full blown altruism has the same biological basis but is transformed by culture. Exploring the emotional mechanisms behind pro-social behaviour sheds feeble light on explaining genuine moral judgments because these are by definition independent of personal interest. They are irreducible to emotional and behavioural programmes as biological explanations, which is why we distinguish between pro-social emotions and genuine moral judgments. Morality is therefore not universal but a contingent product of cultural development. Those friendly to the constructivist theory argue that it has the virtue of recognising the social psychological foundation of emotions, and the possibility of altering or conquering our emotions.

The SSSM, as characterised by EP is guilty of cultural reductionism, whilst, on the other hand, the opponents of Evolutionary Psychology frequently mischaracterise the EP approach as biological reductionism. However, one way of looking at the debate between the SSSM and EP is that it concerns not whether behaviour is the product of genes or the environment, but the
relative importance of each. It is fundamentally a dispute about the significance of history and culture. Those on the nurture side of the equation do not deny that biology is an important influence upon behaviour, or certainly ought not to. Instead, they hold that this influence is powerfully mediated by culture. The EP approach suggests that the differences we can observe between ourselves (and our own culture), and those of far removed from us geographically and temporally, are relatively superficial. All people share the same human nature, which places significant constraints upon the ways of life available. Proponents of the SSSM generally acknowledge, or should acknowledge, that we all share a common nature and that this nature sets limits, but SSSM believes that whilst nature sets boundaries there is nevertheless considerable scope for significant diversity within those boundaries which are set by social norms and rich cultural history. There is surely good reason to think that human behaviour is significantly influenced by social norms. If, as some proponents of EP are prone to do, we neglect social norms and cultural history, we might be led into wrongly attributing existing social norms as the direct expression of human nature and miss the extent to which it is within our capacity to alter these norms.

In emotion theory the tension between universalism and relativism is evident in how frequently and how precisely the question arises as to whether or in what ways emotions can be said to be universal. The universalist focuses on emotion as a panhuman capacity or process that is unvarying in its essence (its internal feeling state). Any phenomenon acknowledged to be culturally variable, for example the language available for emotion discourse, is treated as epiphenomenal. Those concerned with the ways in which emotions differ cross-culturally tend to define emotion more as a socially endorsed judgment then an internal affective state, and hence their focal point is the translation of emotion concepts and the social processes surrounding their use.

The debate over the universality of emotion parallels, in many ways, earlier discussions about cross-cultural variations in cognition, which reduce to grappling over concept definition and over what differences matter -- that is over what cognitive or emotional differences are either fundamental or significant, or interesting. Most would agree, however, that all humans have the potential to live emotionally similar lives and that at least the emotional surface of the lives of others may appear different to the outside observer. Whilst the dichotomy may be rejected as false or unproductive, it nevertheless has continued to structure much of the theoretical discourse on emotion.

There is a presumption that emotions are fundamentally biological, that we all have the same biological make up and all humans have the ability to understand another’s emotional state.
That understanding is effected through empathetic (and usually non-verbal) communication and is conceptualised as either an intellectual understanding or a more direct emotional one. In the latter case, particularly, people's emotions are seen as transmitted to those around them so that we catch and feel others emotions rather like a contagion. We are thereby affected and influenced by the emotions of others. This picture emphasises the corporeality or embodied nature of emotions. This can be taken to mean that they are immediately understandable cross-culturally. If we are to competently engage in social exchange we have to be reasonably adept at recognising the motives and intentions of others. Of course, some people are more skilled at this than others, and those who are better seem to have a competitive advantage over those who are less skilled. We can feel confident that we can correctly infer and interpret much of another’s affective state, such as embarrassment or disgust, because it is often clearly demonstrated, verbally and physically but we are also convinced that we are correct because we are ourselves no stranger to those kinds of emotional responses and we can feel confident in our reading of particular social interactions because it makes complete social and psychological sense. The difficulty lies in the fact that the concept of empathy presumes what it is often used to establish; the universal and transparent nature of an emotional experience.

Yet, the cultural specificity and variability of several dimensions of emotion are not in question. The various causes of emotion are clearly cultural in their specifics (whether or not there are also some causes of some emotions that might be argued to be universal or innate). What makes a person angry depends upon those situations or events that are considered offensive or frustrating. The same action will inspire outrage in some societies and not others. The same objects will provoke fear in one culture but not another. The labelling of emotions clearly differs cross-culturally, and we do not need to reference exotic cultures for examples of emotions terms that have no equivalent in English. The Spanish term *duende* is said to encapsulate a synthesis of passion, energy and artistic excellence and describes a climatic show of spirit in a performance of a work of art that is mediated by emotional authenticity or energetic instinct. The word originally referred to an imp or goblin and then came to refer to anything magical. It has now developed a rich level of complexity of meaning which is extremely difficult to translate. The Portuguese term *saudade* is another emotion term that is difficult to translate. One definition of the word is that it refers to a feeling of longing for something that one is fond of which is gone, but might return in the distant future (Bell, A F, 1912). It often carries a fatalistic tone and a repressed knowledge that the object of longing might never return or might never exist. A vague and constant desire for something that does not and probably cannot exist, for something other than the present, a turning towards the past or
towards the future, not an active discontent or poignant sadness but an indolent dreaming wistfulness. This can be directed at anything that is personal and moving. There is, as a further example, the German term *fernweh* which roughly translated refers to a desire for unfamiliar places or situations. This perhaps trivial observation suggests a deeper problem. How can we be sure that it is only the lexical labels that vary, rather than their reference? The identities of the affective phenomena to which these labels refer seem to be open questions.

There is also evidence to suggest another significant area of emotion discourse is metaphor. There is a near universal adoption of metaphor in every culture that has an emotion vocabulary. Metaphors and theories of emotion are often closely linked together and often transposable. There is evidence that they also influence the individual’s experience of the emotion itself. Evidence for the variability and diversity of emotion metaphors could be evidence of a further dimension along which emotions themselves vary culturally, if it is correct that beliefs about emotions determine or significantly influence the nature of the emotions experienced.

The search for linguistic correlates of basic emotions is motivated by robust findings of biological invariance in facial expressions associated with the English language terms anger, disgust, fear, happiness, surprise and shame (Ekman, 1992). Inspired by research in colour categorization that shows colour lexicons are universally structured according to a small set of prototypic categories, numerous authors have speculated that prototypic models may be an effective means of representing emotion concepts as internally structured categories (Gerber, 1985; Russell, 1997) or scenarios (Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987). Lexical studies of our entire corpus of terms extracted from linguistic and social contexts generally produce highly abstract results. As we have seen, analyses focusing on the conceptualisation of emotions in ordinary language have identified more complex cultural or propositional networks of meaning associated with key emotions terms (e.g. Rosaldo, 1980). In the discipline of cognitive linguistics analyses of metaphors show that metaphors associated with a particular emotion play a central role in the elaboration of cultural understanding of the emotion. Emotion metaphors often acquire their significance by linking together other metaphors pertaining to the conceptualisation of bodies, persons and minds, e.g. *she exploded with rage* obtains its meaning in relation to such metaphorical propositions as *the body is a container for the emotions* (Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987). Both comparative and developmental studies show that implicit models of emotion frequently take the form of “event schemas” in which feelings and other psychological states mediate antecedent events and behavioural responses (Lutz, 1988). The most systematic framework developed for the analysis of emotion language is that of linguist Anna Wierzbicka, who has proposed a metalanguage capable of representing the meanings of semantic primitives. In this approach,
script-like understandings of emotion are represented as a string of propositions forming prototypic event schemas.

However, there has been little attempt on the part of those working within the philosophy of emotions to critically engage with and integrate the abundant research that has emerged from the ethnography, anthropology and cognitive linguistics (which I shall characterise as the lexicocentric perspective) together with biological / evolutionary perspective on emotions. Without it we are left with a seriously impoverished account of the emotions.

**Gut Reactions – A Perceptual Theory of Emotions**

Prinz (2004) has recently defended the James-Lange view that emotions are perceptions of body states. He opens with an examination of the cognitivist debate. The debate has often centred on the difficulty of arriving at a precise and satisfactory definition of what “cognition” is. Prinz offers his own definition, which is that cognitions are states that contain representations that are “under direct organismic control” (p.49). Such mental states, Prinz suggests, can be identified as those under the control of executive systems found in the prefrontal cortex. With this definition in place he argues that emotions are non-cognitive perceptions of bodily states that reliably track specific kinds of environmental conditions relevant to the agent. A particular bodily state, for example, is consistently generated by perception of potential danger in the environment. The perception of this specific bodily state is an occurrence of the emotion labelled fear. This is what Prinz refers to as the nominal content of the emotion. Since this bodily state is reliably linked with the perception of potential danger it is right to say that fear is the representation of potential dangers in the environment. Prinz labels the representation of the danger in the environment the real content of the emotion of fear. To further illustrate his point Prinz adopts Kenney’s notion of a formal object. In broad terms the real or abstract content of an emotion is its formal object. Prinz further identifies these real contents as core relational themes, referring to Lazarus’ influential taxonomy of emotional themes: i.e., anger is a demeaning offence against me and mine, fear is facing an immediate, concrete and overwhelming danger. He argues that Lazarus’ core relational themes identify a credible list of formal objects. Where he differs is that Prinz claims that these themes identify the content of the emotion rather than its structure. Prinz then uses the lack of definitive evidence against the James-Lange theory to defend his view that emotions are embodied appraisals. He further argues that emotions are natural kinds since these embodied appraisals are under the causal control of a mechanism that links various judgments with these bodily appraisals. He suggests that his theory can reconcile two opposing views, namely nativism and social constructivism, since it allows both for universal kinds of perceived body
states and learned culturally specific ones. The socially learned ones can count as emotions since agents can learn to associate new contents with particular kinds of body states.

Prinz's theory is least persuasive when he argues against the view that emotions are behaviours or action states. It is assumed that we are able to identify the formal object of an emotion without making any connection with action states or behaviours typically associated with it, since the behaviour is contingent but the formal object is not. However, it seems unlikely that the identification of formal objects can be made in the absence of identifying appropriate behaviours and actions in response to them; for example identifying a formal object of fear without reference to the fact that there are things it is appropriate to avoid or flee.

In addition, Prinz's theory is committed to the position that an emotion is a perception of a perception for a particular type of action, but the action itself is a matter of choice, and indeed may not be a necessary action. If an embodied appraisal of an object as a potential threat is the emotion of fear, and fear is not the appraisal of a bodily state, the perception of the specific bodily state is identified as fear because it is reliably and recognisably consistent in its corporal manifestation. Prinz argues that the reason it forms a corporal kind is that the changes in the bodily state prepare the agent for fleeing and thus avoiding danger. Prinz's view is that emotions initiate the search for appropriate actions but they do not themselves cause actions and emotions are certainly not composed of action programmes. However, if flight is just one of a number of contingent possibilities in response to an object of fear why would fear reliably lead to the flight response? According to Prinz the decision to seek redress is a choice that is made after one has experienced anger. On Prinz's view of cognition as organismic control this makes emotional action cognitive. If the notion of organismic control is too strong then agent “choice” must be the result of some other system. It would appear that Prinz is committed to the view that the emotion of fear does nothing to ensure flight yet he agrees that flight is the typical response to danger, and usually the appropriate choice.

Prinz's view leads to a further problem. We often refer to emotions in seeking to explain actions that are irrational when considering the typical types of goals we identify as guiding action choice. The response to a spider, might be to withdraw much further than is necessary to achieve the goal of putting oneself out of danger. Similarly, the response to a perceived offence might be excessive and go well beyond that required to achieve the goal of seeking appropriate redress. In such cases one explains the behaviour by reference to the strength of the emotion. Such behaviour can be seen as irrational and yet is common. It can be explained if we accept that the motivation to flee, for example, is part of the emotion of fear. Fear is in part composed of the motivation to flee and the greater the fear the stronger the motivation to flee. We can explain the
flight beyond the satisfaction of any chosen goal because the flight mechanism is active. The stronger the fear, the more powerfully the flight mechanism is activated. To consider another emotion, the swift, involuntary onset of blushing in response to a perceived potential source of embarrassment can be explained if we consider the bodily response as part of the emotion. Indeed, it is part of the social value of the bodily response that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control or fake. For observers it is a physical signal of the veracity of the agent’s response and the deliberate inducement of embarrassment in a particular member of a group can aid the regulation of social conduct.

Neither Griffiths nor Prinz have fully engaged with the role of language in the debate over the nature of emotions. The general assumption seems to be that emotion terms are linguistically and culturally easily translatable. The lexicon of every language will contain everyday words for the conceptual categories that have been identified as the basic emotions. Indeed, they would seem to be critical to the vocabulary of any language as part of the ethnographic discourse of the speakers. However, this assumption has been challenged. Part of the problem in the past has been the lack of standards for comparing emotion terms, which has meant that the conclusions of cross-cultural research are frequently challenged. A second issue is the fact that subjects and scenarios used in cross-cultural studies are rarely equivalent. Some of these methodological problems can be overcome by conducting research with bilinguals. These subjects offer a research population that can cross physical, linguistic and cultural boundaries.

What I wish to argue for is a linguistically inclusive theory of emotion. Such a theory acknowledges that any coherent and complete theory of emotion must include a robust linguistic and cultural element. One reason for believing this to be the case is that we can distinguish emotion terms which, though linguistically translatable, have a cultural salience and meaning which differs from culture to culture. The cross-cultural research with bilinguals also shows that while emotion may be accompanied by a bodily change it is not constituted exclusively by that change. An emotion may be recognized in the face of another individual and even given the same linguistic label but the experience referred to by the label might be different if the observer and the individual observed are from different cultures. In yet other cases there are emotion terms which have huge cultural significance in the daily lives of the members of a particular speech community but which have no direct or simple equivalent culturally or linguistically in others. Emotion terms in individual languages can conveniently encapsulate unique, complex and nuanced shades of meaning that can become common linguistic currency and shape the emotional landscape of the speaker. Such emotions acquire deep social significance and become an essential part of the basic ethnopsychology of the speech community. They represent a rich,
socioculturally determined pattern of experience and expression which is acquired and is subsequently felt in the body and determined in specific social situations. A proper understanding of the emotional experience referred to therefore requires the acquisition of a culturally informed perspective. What seems to be universal is the ability to learn emotions, in the sense of acknowledging their importance in a specific cultural context and adopting their use and even their manifestation. In this sense, emotions are both universal and specific. They are universal because as humans we are prewired to have emotions, and even to learn emotions, but also specific because the emotions we do have are influenced by the culture and language in which we live.
Chapter 1

Basic Emotions

If one should seek to name each particular one of the emotions of which the human heart is a seat, it is plain that the limit to their number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the seeker, each race of new men having found names for some shade of feeling which other races have left undiscriminated.

William James, 1890/1955:229

Paul Ekman’s research on the facial expressions of emotion suggests that these expressions are not culturally determined but universal across human culture, and thus biological in origin. As a major exponent of the basic emotions view, his research has been highly influential. His theory is ubiquitous in psychology, setting a research agenda that continues to be both wide ranging and productive. The first section of the chapter sketches Ekman’s neurocultural theory, of emotion and offers an explication of some of Ekman’s most significant taxonomy. In the second section I focus on a longstanding dispute between Ekman and Alun Friedlund, who represent two opposing views on whether, and how, facial expressions signal emotions. The section begins with an outline of Ekman’s notion of “display rules” (a significant part of Ekman’s “neurocultural” theory) followed by a discussion of two recent studies examining the influence of culture on the processing of facial expressions, which neatly highlights the debate. Broadly speaking, Ekman’s Emotion view is that emotional expressions reflect the inner feelings of the expressor, i.e. there is a one to one correspondence between the expression and the emotion. Fridlund’s Behavioural Ecology View is that these expressions are social devices for influencing others. I examine these contrasting views and conclude that emotional expressions are neither expressions of pure emotions nor are they simply manipulative communicative signals or displays. Rather, they are both. I end the chapter with a general discussion of some of the limitations of Ekman’s theory. What I identify as the central problem is Ekman’s assumption that emotions can be defined purely in terms of eliciting conditions and physiological responses. Wierzbicka argues that emotions are in fact a semantic domain amenable to investigation in terms of a metalanguage composed of semantic primitives or universals shared by all human languages. This metalanguage purportedly offers a framework which enables us to adopt an objective, culture-free and non-contextual starting point, avoiding what Wierzbicka sees as the ethnocentric universalism of Ekman’s uncritical adoption of English emotion terms.
Basic Emotions Theory

The standard view of basic emotions theorists is that the diverse number and variety of human affective phenomena classified under the label “emotions” derive from a small number of primary emotions. Although there is controversy regarding which emotions can be counted as basic, there is fairly robust agreement amongst these theorists regarding “the big six”, namely happiness, anger, surprise, sadness and fear. These emotion categories are classified as universally and innately recognised discrete biological states with (i) dedicated evolutionarily preserved neurobiological substrates (ii) a distinguishing phenomenological element and (iii) characteristic facial expressive behaviour (and other instrumental behaviour, such as action tendencies) of evolutionary derivation. On the basic emotions view, emotions are evolved species–typical functional responses to the environment. Nothing can emerge as an emotion unless it originates from our ancestral history as a solution to a fundamental life task. Such tasks include reproduction, avoidance of harm or physical threat, maintenance of social alliances and protection of young.

Through their interrelationship with an individual’s autobiographical experience and cognizance these primary emotions prolifically generate a variety of complex and idiosyncratic affective experiences that can be considered secondary emotions. Whilst these complex emotional phenomena can be explicated as composites of two or more of the basic emotions, the basic emotions themselves are irreducible. A metaphor frequently adopted is that the basic emotions are the atomic units of the molecular chemistry of the more complex, compound emotions that are part of our human emotional repertoire.

Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872/1998) offered the first account of emotions as evolved functions. He argued that emotional expressions, as a component of the emotional state, evolved to prepare the organism to cope with essential life tasks presented by the environment. However, the typical expressive behaviours then acquired a secondary adaptive function, which was to facilitate the communication between individuals of their internal affective state. Whilst the original primary function disappeared, the secondary function was preserved. Darwin’s work represented an initial stride towards an adaptationist perspective on the emotions. Tomkins (1955) later proposed a two-factor theory of emotions. The biological factor created the basis of a small number of universal emotions while the culture-specific aspect dictated the social norms for the display, masking or inhibition of emotional expression. (Tomkins, 1962). Tomkins identified the face as the primary focus of emotional expression (Tomkins, 1962) and the face has remained an influential focus of subsequent research on the emotions. Ekman’s work on the facial expression of emotion in particular has been greatly
influenced by Darwin and Tomkins. It continues to make a substantial contribution to emotion theory.

Underpinning this focus is the fact that the human face is an immensely rich source of environmental information and seems to form a unique class of visual stimulus. From even a momentary glance it appears possible to make a fairly accurate assessment of an individual’s age, gender, kin or ingroup membership and their affective state. Facial cues affect our impression of an individual, influencing our behaviour towards them. They affect our choice of individuals we select to help, trust and affiliate with or opt for as a partner. The engaging face of a happy, thriving human infant naturally and ubiquitously elicits approach and protective responses (Berry & McArthur, 1986; Zebrowitz, 1997), an irate expression generates avoidance and defensive responses (Balaban, 1995; Marsh, Ambady & Kleck, 2005) In fact, simple exposure to a face can cue impressions of physical well being, authority and acumen. The profound significance of the face as a visual stimulus is central to Ekman’s theory of basic emotions. He argues that the face is evolved to encode a small number of universal emotion categories in the form of specifiable configurations of facial muscular activity related to biological states that are triggered by dedicated, evolutionarily preserved neural circuits (affect programmes), and the identification of these signals is hardwired, reflexive and universal.

**Ekman’s Distinguishing Characteristics for Recognition of Basic Emotions**

Classification or identification starts with the recognition of the entity which you are seeking to observe and deconstructing it into its constituent parts. Emphasising the role that evolution has played in determining both the unique and the universal features of emotions, and their adaptive significance, Ekman has proposed the following list for identifying (1) the basic emotions one from another, and (2) the shared characteristics or cluster of properties that emotions exhibit but other contiguous affective states, such as reflexes, moods and emotional dispositions do not. 

- Distinctive universal signals
- Distinctive physiology
- Automatic appraisal, tuned to:
- Distinctive universals in antecedent events
- Distinctive appearance developmentally
- Presence in other primates
- Quick onset
- Brief duration
- Unbidden occurrence
- Distinctive thoughts, memories, images
- Distinctive subjective experience
Let us examine Ekman’s proposed characteristics in more detail. How do emotions function as adaptive mechanisms? Emotions are selected for their swiftness and efficiency. They therefore need to be capable of operating both non-consciously and swiftly (within milliseconds). The emotion episode also needs to be of short duration, to allow the system the flexibility to respond quickly to the next change in the environment that denotes a significant life task or event. Moods, by contrast, tend to keep the individual focused towards persistently seeking to experience and express a particular emotion. Since it was also adaptive for emotions to have communicative value for conspecifics they ought to have distinctive universal signals (facial expressions, vocal prosody, gestures). For example, observing a conspecific display the distinctive facial expression of disgust (the raising of the nose and upper lip with the adjacent nasolabial muscles (le vator labii superioris)), emitting the disgust vocalisation signal Eew and displaying avoidance behaviour or withdrawal postures will communicate to the observer the conspecific’s visceral revulsion and nausea-related response to an offensive object. The adaptive value of such communication is to alert the observer directly to the internal affective state of the conspecific and avoid the noxious, contaminating or offensive object.

The communication of emotional signals appears critical for social interaction. Through the communication of emotion conspecifics can successfully manage interpersonal interaction and influence the behaviour of others. A facial expression in response to an emotional stimulus may have three (at least) consequences for social interaction. Firstly, it has the consequence of spontaneous, veridical communication where the sender is not attempting to hide the emotion. Secondly, a facial expression may be used for deceptive communication, where the sender is using facial display to communicate deliberately misleading information about their emotional state to others in order to acquire some social benefit. A doctor will need to mask or suppress arousal of strong negative emotions (fear, disgust or distress) in order to obtain cooperation from her patient and gain their trust by placating them with a reassuring smile. Such a smile would not be a genuine smile, where the doctor actually experiences and would self-report a positive emotion, but an attempt to mask strong negative emotions that are actually felt. Signs of the felt emotion that the masking smile is intended to conceal may persist and provide evidence that the smile is false (Ekman and Friesen, 1982) A masking smile will exhibit the smiling action (zygomatic major) which is part of the genuine smile expression, but will have traces of muscle movements from one or other of the negative emotions. Whilst Ekman concedes that facial expressions of emotion can be convincingly masked, simulated or faked, he insists that, with sufficient training, we can distinguish a counterfeit display through the detection of hard-wired micro expressions. These last between 1/15th to 1/25th of a second and are “leakage” of fragments.
of the spontaneous, veridical emotional expression. A third consequence of a facial expression for social interaction is emotional regulation through facial feedback\textsuperscript{4} (a term coined by Buck, 1980), to induce an emotional state in oneself or a conspecific. Ekman concurs with Darwin (1872/1998), James (1890/1950) and Tomkins (1962) in supporting the facial feedback hypothesis that facial expressions of emotion can \textit{generate} as well as reflect emotional experience.

Although Ekman prevaricates over whether a universal signal is the \textit{sine qua non} for emotion (Ekman 1984; 1992a, 1992b) his position is that to date there is no evidence for the identification of states or mental entities that exhibit all (or a significant number of) the other characteristics yet are unaccompanied by a distinctive, universal display signal. In addition, if emotions originate from a shared evolutionary heritage then we ought to expect to observe certain elements of human affective display across related species and these emotional expressions have their homologues in primates and other related species.

Ekman also argues that if emotions are something that we have by virtue of natural selection and have evolved to deal with primary life tasks then we should be able to identify some consistency in the \textit{circumstances} in which a particular emotion is evoked, for example the experience of irrecoverable loss has been identified as a widespread elicitor of sadness, facing the threat of physical harm as a common elicitor of fear, and the detection of an offence or

\textsuperscript{4} The \textit{strong version of the facial feedback hypothesis} argues that facial expressions are either necessary or sufficient to produce emotional experience. A weaker version argues that facial expression can intensify or moderate an emotional experience. An ideal test of the necessity aspect of this hypothesis would be an evaluation of emotional experience in a patient suffering from a bilateral facial paralysis. Such patients are rare but at least one patient (referred to as FP) has been the subject of a case study and, despite her inability to convey emotions through facial expressions self-reported normal emotional experiences. When viewing emotionally charged slides her reactions were not weakened relative to a normative sample, and in fact FP expressed frustration at her lack of ability to communicate those emotions to others. Whilst the results are not consistent with the facial feedback hypothesis it may be that feedback of the facial nerve stimulation that occurs entirely within the central nervous system plays a role in the experience of emotion via a central feedback loop involving the hypothalamus or brainstem (Heilman, 1994). So, its possible that the motor commands for the facial expression do not have to be carried to the face but instead it is feedback from the activation of facial motor programs, within the brain, that is important to the experience of emotion. Individuals may differ widely in the extent to which they rely on self-produced cues (feedback from their own facial expressions, posture, arousal etc) Whilst FP's normal ratings of emotionally evocative stimuli and normal experiences suggest that feedback from facial expressions might not play a large role in the modulation of emotional experience it is possible that there may be a large contribution from semantic knowledge being brought to the task. It remains to be determined whether humans innately posses a complex repertoire of facial expressions that need never be produced externally in order to influence emotional experience. It is still possible that the loss of facial feedback would disrupt normal \textit{development} of emotional development and imagery, even if facial feedback is not necessary for the \textit{maintenance} of those functions in normal adults.
infringement of one’s values as an elicitor of anger. There ought also to be distinctive physiological alterations (autonomic nervous system (ANS) patterns) linked to an adaptive response to the fundamental life task, since emotions facilitate motor behaviour adaptation appropriate for the events that have triggered the emotion. These bodily responses are not arbitrary. Fear has the function of promoting escape from an actual or perceived threat of harm and triggering the necessary physiological changes to facilitate flight (or to fight). Disgust has the function of avoiding the ingestion or contact with noxious, contaminating or offensive objects. The adaptive value of these responses supports the claim that they have an evolutionary derivation.

As part of the adaptive value of the emotion, the appraisal of the situation needs to be automatic and non-conscious to allow for a rapid reaction to the significant task or event. In Ekman’s work the automatic appraisal mechanism is conceptualised as a cognitive subsystem dedicated to determining whether a stimulus will elicit a basic emotion and able to operate independently of the cognitive systems that lead to conscious, verbally reportable appraisal of the same stimulus. The basic emotions therefore have the characteristic of what Ekman refers to as “unbidden” occurrence. They happen so swiftly that the automaticity and quickness of the emotional response makes it difficult for the individual to control. This is because the ANS activity and other physiological responses which are part of the unique signature of the emotion function largely below the level of consciousness. Presumably the unique physiological activity correlated with each of the basic emotions is also what experientially differentiates the subjective sensation of each of the basic emotions and is where our subjective experience of the emotional state originates.

Finally, emotions “regulate the way in which we think, and this is evident in memories, imagery and expectations” (Ekman, 1999 p 55). Emotions help us cope with the flow of waking experience. They focus our attention towards salient features of the environment. and help shape our information gathering, such that motivationally relevant items receive heightened attention. The emotion of shame will highlight salient details of the particular situation that can be classified under the criteria of events that are “detrimental to the emoter’s positive self-representation”. The thoughts of the emoter who experiences shame will focus on her self-representation. The presiding emotion will encourage further surveillance of the emotion eliciting event for features that are apposite to the occurrent emotional state and may reinforce or extinguish the emotion. This in turn will prime the emoter’s attention to its implications for future social interactions which will influence behaviour, motivation and goal setting. In this way emotions are not epistemally inert. They pervasively influence our judgments and cognitive processing.
In regard to the relationship between emotion and memory, which Ekman refers to, there is empirical evidence that vivid autobiographical memories tend to be related to events involving intense emotional arousal, such as those involving acute shame or experiencing great joy (Talarico, J M, LaBar, K S and Rubin, D C, 2004). Damasio’s somatic marker theory (Damasio 1994; Damasio et al, 1991) proposes that the linking of emotion to past experiences reduces the decision making “space” to enable efficient decision making among those options still available after “pre-filtering” by emotional processes. In other words, it assists us to frame relevant options. How might this work? For each biologically basic emotion there is a correlated distinctive pattern of physiological alternations reliably activated by specific eliciting conditions that are directly related to an evolutionary recurring environmental concern. The body therefore acts as a physical barometer of the status of the relationship between the individual and her surroundings, or a warning tone that identifies something in the environment that the individual needs to attend to. One might argue that emotions can arise in the absence of the perception of somatic changes. However, Damasio’s hypothesis is that the brain states that recognise the body patterns can arise in the absence of the actual bodily changes. Just as one can envisage an object without seeing it we can imagine the bodily changes without them taking place.

Ekman does not privilege any of the above characteristics as a single feature that differentiates between the emotions, or distinguishes them from contiguous affective states. Presumably a suitable subset of these characteristics would be sufficient. Ekman is agnostic regarding the issue. The list itself is offered as a guide for directing empirical research and setting a research agenda for attempting to capture what is unique about emotions. The central concept that ought to be borne in mind is that an emotion is an occurrent present day response to a primary life task or problem that co-opts behaviour adaptive to similar situations in our evolutionary past (though it will not necessarily be adaptive in the present). At the time of writing Ekman has identified six basic emotions (and eleven potentially very strong candidates)
Established basic emotions
- Anger
- Fear
- Sadness
- Happiness
- Disgust
- Surprise

Candidate basic emotions
- Contempt
- Excitement
- Shame
- Pride in Achievement
- Guilt
- Relief
- Embarrassment
- Satisfaction
- Awe
- Sensory pleasure

Affect Program

At the heart of Ekman’s theory is his account of an affect program. The essence of an affect program theory is that each of the basic categories into which we could divide emotions corresponds to a complex program that is genetically hard-wired in the brain. This program coordinates the simultaneous activation of the suite of short-term, stereotypical responses involving alterations in the subject’s neurophysiological and somatovisceral state, including a motor expression component, musculoskeletal responses (e.g., action tendencies) and autonomic nervous system changes that characterise the emotion. When the automatic appraisal mechanism of the brain detects potential danger or a threat, for example, this will trigger the appropriate affect program. There will be the release of stress-induced analgesia as a consequence of the activation of the subject’s natural opiate system, and through the nerves of the autonomic nervous system the brain will send messages to bodily organs and regulate the activity of those organs to match the demands of the situation, resulting in the subject typically sensing a taut stomach, dry mouth, increased heart rate and sweating palms, which is then linked to emotional feelings. These affect programs occur without the need for conscious direction and therefore appear passive. They seem to simply come over the subject in response to an affective stimulus and outside of voluntary control. This accords with the common folk psychological theory of emotions as natural forces and the adoption of metaphors such as feeling engulfed, overwhelmed or swept away by them.

Whilst Ekman’s theory predicts emotion-specific response patterns for each emotion he fails to fully endorse Tomkin’s (1962) notion of underlying neuromotor affect programs and more recently has suggested that the affect programs are akin to Mayr’s (1974) notion of an “open” as opposed to a “closed” program. An open program is not rigidly encapsulated but is sensitive to
additional information acquired through conditioning, learning or other experiences and open to cultural influence.

Unfortunately, Ekman has failed to elaborate further regarding the exact nature of his affect program but he emphasises the notion there are different circuits for the distinct responses that characterise each emotion. (Ekman, 2003 :67). The theory therefore supports the assumption that a “prewritten” program exists for each particular discrete emotion. This program is executed in response to appropriate eliciting conditions, and this will take place in a temporally swift and unified manner, which suggests that emotions do not dynamically unfold. They are typically much closer to a reflex action with the onset of all the elements of the pattern being orchestrated to produce the suite of psychological and physiological changes synchronically. This is a central part of the emotion’s adaptive value. However, Ekman (1992a) also argues that emotional episodes can unfold relatively slowly (over seconds or minutes rather than milliseconds). Emotional responses are not always the result of automatic appraisals. They can occur, for example, in response not just to actions but to words (an offensive remark, declaration of affection), or to complex events requiring extensive appraisal processing that involves conscious, effortful deliberation and reflection. In such cases, the onset of the emotion will be more gradual and it will also be possible to interfere with the emotion one is beginning to experience.

Research in neuroscience offers empirical credibility for Ekman’s position:

Emotions are things that happen to us rather than things we will to occur. We have little direct control over our emotional reactions. While conscious control over our emotions is weak emotions can flood consciousness. This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than connections between the cognitive system and the emotional systems.

(LeDoux, 1998 p 19)

LeDoux and colleagues have studied auditory Pavlovian fear conditioning in rats and discovered two different pathways for the processing of sensory stimuli. The thalamoamygdala pathway or “low road” (Ekman’s automatic appraisal mechanism) produces a swift, crude, rough-grained affective appraisal of the stimulus, followed by the triggering of a suite of autonomic responses (increased heart rate and blood pressure, involuntary muscle control, increased galvanic skin response etc). This pathway bypasses the neocortex altogether, so it is prior to any cognitive intervention, or sophisticated parsing of the stimulus. The second pathway, the thalamocortical “high road”, is slower and in fact essential for conscious recognition of the stimulus. This second route enables the subject to assess the appropriateness of the preceding automatic response, and presumably attempt to modify or control the initial appraisal and the subject’s subsequent
responses. LeDoux demonstrated that the “low” pathway between the thalamus and the amygdala is necessary for normal auditory fear conditioning. If the thalamoamygdala pathway is interrupted or if there is interference with amygdale function, auditory fear conditioning is disrupted. If, instead, the second, thalamocortial pathway is interrupted auditory fear conditioning is unaffected.

**Emotion Families**

Ekman has also introduced his notion of emotion “families” into his theory:

Each emotion is not a single affective state but a family of related states. Each member of an emotion family shares the characteristics I have described. These shared characteristics within a family differ between emotion families, distinguishing one family from another. Put in other terms, each emotion family can be considered to constitute a theme and variations. The theme is composed of the characteristics unique to that family, the variations on that theme are the product of individual differences, and differences in the specific occasion in which the emotion occurs. The themes are the product of evolution, while the variations reflect learning. [Ekman, 1999: 55]

I take Ekman to mean that we ought to consider each emotion as constituting a class of related affective states which share commonalities in their expression, physiological activity and in the sorts of evaluations or appraisals which act as elicitors. These shared characteristics within an emotion family distinguish one emotion family from another. Variations within the anger family, for example, would include affective states ranging in intensity from peevishness or mild annoyance to fury and should include different forms of anger such as resentment, which is anger resulting from feeling personally aggrieved at a real or imagined wrong, outrage, characterised as anger elicited where there is a judgment that another, rather than oneself, has been the subject of mistreatment, and indignation, which is anger arising from something considered offensive or insulting richly connected to dignity, social rank and status in honour cultures.

The characteristics shared by all members of the anger emotion “family”, according to Ekman, constitute the theme for that emotion. The theme of anger might centre on the (negative) evaluation of an offence by a responsible agent and the desire to punish as a protective strategy for defending one’s values. Pique, annoyance, irritation, frustration, resentment, indignation and outrage are all variations on the central theme of anger, since they are feelings infused with but distinguishable from it. Anger is the product of evolution whilst variations such as exasperation, pique, or resentment are socially constructed affective states related to anger. Regarding commonalities in expression, for example, Ekman purports to have identified at least 60 anger expressions that share particular configurational properties which were distinguishable from,
those of the fear and disgust expression families. These variations of expression within the anger family are hypothesised as a function of such variables as the intensity of the emotion, whether the emotion is spontaneous or simulated and the antecedent event that provokes the emotion.

Ekman’s theory requires empirically isolating the theme and variations for each basic emotion family. The definitive evidence regarding what constitutes a family of affective states, and in particular the definition of the theme for each family, will rest on a thorough cross-cultural examination not simply of facial expressions but of appraisal processes, motor responses and emotion-specific activity in the autonomic and central nervous systems.

**Recognition Paradigm**

The same facial expressions are associated with the same emotions, regardless of culture or language......There are some facial expressions of emotions which are *universally characteristic* of the human species....While facial expressions of emotion will often be culture specific because of differences in elicitors, display rules and consequences, evidence now proves the existence of universal facial expressions...regardless of the language, of whether the culture is Western or Eastern, industrialized or preliterate, these facial expressions are labelled with the same emotion terms : happiness, sadness, anger, fear disgust and surprise. (Ekman, 1980 : 137-8). [italics added]

For Ekman the strongest evidence so far for distinguishing one emotion from another comes from research discovering pancultural facial expressions and much of the empirical evidence supporting Ekman’s theory has been grounded in a recognition paradigm. This involves showing
photographs of facial expressions to observers in different cultures who are then asked to identify the emotion displayed. If the observers from different cultures successfully label the expressions with the same term this has been interpreted as evidence of universality. and cross-cultural studies have yielded recognition scores significantly above that expected by chance. A series of cross-cultural studies by Ekman (Ekman, 1972; Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 1969) and, independently, Izard (1971), indicated high levels of agreement between observers of different western and non-western cultures who were asked to match posed photographs of facial expressions with a single emotion label selected from a short list of emotion words. In further studies that allowed respondents to choose their own emotion word agreement scores were slightly lower, but still greater than chance (Izard, 1971) A modified judgment method was adopted for members of visually isolated, preliterate cultures. Ekman and Friesen (1971) gave participants three photographs of posed emotional expression which had previously been tested in literate cultures and judged to be good exemplars. They were then presented with a narrative selected to demonstrate a prototypical example of a situation that related to one of the emotions. The participants were then asked to match the expression to the emotion concept illustrated in the narrative. Again, the number of participants who chose the predicted facial expression to match the narrative was greater than chance level. Ekman and Friesen then asked the Fore participants to compose facial expressions appropriate to the six emotion narratives. When the experimenters showed the Fore expressions to American participants the Americans were consistently able to distinguish expressions of anger, disgust, happiness and sadness. The finding that posed photographs of facial expressions of emotions were similarly interpreted cross-culturally strongly suggested that these expressions are not simply arbitrary, or the result of anything that we might generally refer to as socio-cultural learning (I shall return to this point a little later). The exception to this was a lack of discrimination between expressions of surprise and fear. The Fore participants did not differentiate between expressions of fear and surprise and the American participants were unable to distinguish Fore posed expressions of surprise and fear. Ekman and Friesen hypothesised that in this case cultural factors may have affected the ability to make the distinction. In that the kinds of events that would be surprising in this cultural setting would be likely to be perceived as frightening. An alternative interpretation of this finding is that surprise is not in fact a basic emotion, or that surprise and fear expressions share very similar components (e.g. raised eyebrows).

More recent attempts to address some of the methodological criticisms directed at the studies appear to yield further support for the universality of facial expressions. Improved forced-choice formats have been adopted. For example, Frank and Stennett (2001) used a
modified forced choice format that provided observers with an extended option list of six emotion words and a “none of the above” option, and a second study in which the correct emotion label was removed altogether from the list. In the trial where correct emotion label was included most of the participants ignored the “none of the above” option and selected the correct emotion label. In the trial where the correct emotion label was removed most of the participants selected the “none of the above” option. In a third trial where the six emotion labels were extended to include four plausible additional labels (alarmed, bored, contemptuous, and excited) recognition scores remained more or less the same.

These studies strongly suggest that the outputs of Ekman’s affect programs can be given a evolutionary explanation, because affect programs are pan-cultural and apparently homologous with responses in related species. The fact that emotional responses emerge in very early infancy also supports Ekman’s evolutionary explanation, mitigating against the explanation that emotion expressions arise as a response to exposure to cultural learning, as does research that indicates congenitally blind and deaf infants display emotional expressions similar to those of normal infants, adopting the same patterns of muscular activity (Eibl-Eibesfelds, 1973; Thompson, 1941). Other findings that provide compelling evidence that the production of spontaneous facial expressions of emotion is not dependent upon observational learning comes from a study conducted by Matsumoto and Willingham (2009). The authors compared the expressions of both congenitally blind and non-congenitally blind athletes taking part in the 2003 Paralympic Games with those produced by sighted athletes in the 2004 Olympic Games. They found no differences between the congenitally blind, non-congenitally blind and sighted athletes, either on the level of individual facial actions or in facial emotion configurations. This provides strong support for the argument that these facial expressions of emotion are innate. They are hardwired into our genes.

Nevertheless, it appears that recognition accuracy does vary with culture (Elfenbein & Ambady 2002; Haidt & Keltner, 1999). The highest recognition accuracy, for example has been observed in western cultures (78-95%). Recognition accuracy is lower in non-western cultures (63-90%) and still lower in isolated cultures (30-95%). Furthermore, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) reported recognition accuracy to be higher when emotions were expressed and recognised by members of the same national, ethnic or social group, suggesting a within-group advantage. This advantage diminished with increased exposure to members of other cultures.

Ekman acknowledges that we know little about the type of information observers typically derive from a facial expression when engaged in real face to face encounters, since any information from facial expressions in situ is not seen in isolation but is usually accompanied by other affect indicators, such as vocal prosody, gestures, body posture, and expectations that arise
from the social context in which the facial expression is observed. We can, and in typical social interactions do, draw on different cues to infer an individual’s emotional state. Studies using the recognition paradigm, where observers see the face out of context, only tell us what information the face can encode not what information it typically does encode (Ekman, 1996)

Ekman also acknowledges the importance of temporal dynamics of facial expression for interpretation of the observed facial behaviour. Most research on the perception of emotional expression is conducted using static faces as stimuli. However, facial displays of emotion are a highly dynamic and spontaneous phenomenon and a static, posed photograph is a very unnatural representation. Ekman has described various facial expressions from a dynamic perspective (Ekman and Friesen, 1975). Other studies have demonstrated that the dynamic presentation of facial expressions improves the emotional recognition of the expression (Harwood, Hall & Shinkfield, 1999; Kozell and Gitter, 1968; Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt and Scherer, 2000). In addition, dynamic relative to static presentation improved emotional recognition in prosopagnosic patients, who suffer from an impairment of the ability to recognise, faces (Humphreys, Donnellly and Riddoch, 1993). This data suggests that compared to static presentation, dynamic presentation of facial expressions enhances facial processing.

Having looked in detail at Ekman’s recognition paradigm, the topic of the final section is a longstanding dispute between Ekman and Fridlund, who represent two opposing views on whether, and how, facial expressions signal emotion. Broadly speaking, Ekman’s view is that emotional expressions reflect the inner feelings of the expressor, i.e. there is a one to one correspondence between the expression and the emotion. Fridlund’s view is that these expressions are social devices for influencing others. I shall be examining these views but I begin by looking at Ekman’s notion of “display rules” and two recent studies examining the influence of culture on the processing of facial expressions which neatly highlight the debate between Ekman and Fridlund.

Display rules

Ekman describes his theory as a “neurocultural” theory of emotions. This is because it can describe how emotional expressions can have both universal features (facial configurations associated with particular emotions) and culture-specific features, namely display rules. Display rules, a term coined by Ekman and Friesen (Ekman and Friesen, 1969), are characterised as culturally prescribed norms that govern the regulation, control and appropriateness of emotional displays depending upon the social context (Ekman and Friesen, 1969). These display norms serve to intensify, diminish, neutralise or mask emotional displays that would otherwise be
generated automatically. They are conscious “management techniques” to override or control the affect programme. The concept of display rules gained prominence from a classic study in which American and Japanese students viewed stressful stimuli, first alone and then with an authority figure (a high status experimenter) present (Ekman, 1972a). The participants’ facial behaviours were encoded using Ekman, Friesen and Tomkin’s Facial Affect Scoring Technique (FAST). Coding indicated that in the first condition there was no cultural differentiation between the expressions of the students. They exhibited the same facial expressions of disgust, sadness, anger and fear. In the second condition the results indicated that whereas the Americans on the whole exhibited the same negative emotions as they had in the first condition, the Japanese either showed no emotion or smiled. The differences were explicated by Ekman et al to have arisen because of a Japanese display rule regarding the masking or inhibition of negative emotions in the company of high status observers. The role of these display rules is to reduce the ambiguity of situations, preserve social order and facilitate effective interaction within specific social environments. These rules (which dictate when emotional expressions ought to be exaggerated, neutralized or masked) are assimilated early in the development of the culture bearer and specific display rules can become internalised as a function of one’s ethnic background, socialisation and gender. As a result of internalising these rules the behavioural response will feel automatic and natural, as opposed to “fake” or “phoney”.

The Japanese socio-psychological concepts of honne and tatemae are often cited as an integral part of Japanese social behaviour. Honne refers to a person’s authentic, genuine affective state, reflecting their true wishes impulses and desires, which may be in opposition to what is socially approved and therefore generally kept private (except from close friends) since honne essentially disregards public social mores. Tatemae (literally, façade) refers to official or socially required rules and behaviours, which one is expected to adopt regardless of one’s private attitude regarding the circumstances. These social “white lies” are designed to obviate social conflict or disharmony and in that sense are beneficial. Learning to exploit evolved facial expressions suitably in a social context appears to be evolutionarily profitable. Western emphasis on internal and external emotional consistency suggests that Americans find it harder to live with the cognitive dissonance of ambivalent emotions than the Japanese typically do, identifying tatemae with hypocrisy and insincerity, but is such dyadic thinking confined to Japanese culture? It seems the trait is simply cultivated to a greater extent in Japanese culture.

5 Extending Ekman’s neurocultural theory from the expression to the perception of emotion Matsumoto (1989) argues that whilst all people universally perceive emotion expressions in the same way there are culturally specific norms (decoding rules) regarding whether or not to acknowledge that one has understood or recognised the expression. So, we learn rules about how to both modify and manage our facial emotion expressions but also culturally specific rules regarding how to manage our judgments about them.
Masuda et al Cultural Effects on Processing of Facial Expressions of Emotion

Examining the influence of culture on the processing of facial expression of emotion two studies using computerised icons and human images Masuda et al (2008) tested the hypothesis that in judging people’s emotions from facial expressions Japanese, more than Westerners, incorporate information from the social context. In the first study participants viewed cartoons These depicted a happy, sad, angry or neutral person surrounded by other people. In some pictures the other people were depicted as expressing the same emotion as the central person and in others expressing a different one. When American participants were presented with the picture of five people and asked to judge the central person’s emotion they were more apt to focus on the target face. In contrast, Japanese participants were more sensitive to contextual cues and integrated the emotions displayed by background figures into their evaluation of the central person’s emotional state. It should be noted that the expressions of the background figures did not change the interpretation of the basic emotion categories as the facial expressions used were unambiguous, but they influenced the interpretation of the intensity and complexity of the emotion evaluation.

Several psychological processes might account for the differences. The first is that Japanese and Americans both attend to all the people in the situation but the Japanese rely on this initial perception as it resonates with their folk psychological understanding of human behaviour, ie to behave appropriately is to adjust to the expectations and preferences of other people one cares about rather than to advance one’s own personal goals since assertive self-expression is construed as puerile and self-centred. Natural agency is a matter of engaging with the perspective of others and fulfilling one’s expected role and promoting social cohesion. Conversely, American or Western folk psychology understands human emotions as expressing the spontaneous, unique inner feelings of the individual and will therefore exclude the expressions of other people’s emotions from the evaluation of the emotion being felt by the central person in the picture. Another explanation might be that in circumstances when Japanese see an individual expressing an emotion in a social environment they routinely and habitually pay attention to the whole group, whereas Americans attend exclusively to the central individual. A third hypothesis is that in fact both Japanese and American participants start by focusing on the central individual but that Japanese participants then broaden their attention to include relevant cues from the expressions displayed by other persons present in the social context. Attention remains fixed on the central individual for their American counterparts. Replicating the first study but this time measuring the eye-movements of participants Masuda et al found support for the third hypothesis.
Ekman’s Emotions View and Fridlund’s Behavioural Ecology View of Facial Expression

Masuda et al’s research neatly highlights a debate within emotion theory. What information is provided by facial expressions? The studies seem to indicate that the folk psychological view prevalent in Western society is that facial expressions are largely determined by the emotional state of the expressor, or are a consequence of emotion eliciting appraisals. They are advocates of the emotions view of facial expressions endorsed by Ekman (and others). In contrast, the prevalent folk psychological theory of emotions within Japanese culture appears to be closer to the behavioural ecology view of facial expressions (Fridlund, 1992, 1994 and 1997). The behavioural ecology view does not deny that facial expressions may convey information about emotional reactions, it nevertheless assumes that there is a broad domain of information that is conveyed through our facial displays and, in particular, argues that facial expressions communicate the expresser’s social motives in a particular situation, irrespective of their internal emotional state.

A strong version of the view is that all facial expressions are enacted to some social group (whether present or imagined) and have been designed to manipulate others rather than provide them with explicit details of the expresser’s affective state. In Fridlund’s terms they are manipulative communication displays. No distinction is made between “fake” or “social” facial displays and “authentic” or “genuine” facial expressions. There is no inhibition of an authentic self by a social self. Instead, all displays are considered to be the result of social interaction and communication, thus there is only a social self. It is worth noting again that the view does not deny the relationship between emotion and expression but argues that the relationship between them is more complex than previously recognised. Facial expressions are more accurately seen as a social messages, perhaps a remnant of an early preverbal, gestural language, rather than spontaneous, nonconscious outputs of affect programs (which ought to occur regardless of whether or not the emoter is aware that there is an observer there to see the expression, if the communicative value of the facial expression is not underlying its display).

The suggestion from the Masuda studies is that within Japanese culture the motive behind facial expressions is to prompt social communication and harmony. This might appear incompatible with the behavioural ecology view, which typically sees facial expression as a way of promoting one’s personal motives and intentions (i.e. an individual displays a sad face when they do not necessarily feel sad in an effort to get another person to feel sorry for them and offer assistance), but self interest is in itself a strong motive for seeking to promote social cohesion, since the
individual’s well being will be greatly enhanced by being a member of a socially harmonious group. The Masuda studies are therefore compatible with the *behavioural ecology* view.

On the *behavioural ecology view* the private contexts of each interactant will be constructed from the individual’s desires, motives and expectations, including expectations arising from prior social interactions. The social context refers to the social background in which the interaction takes place and the shared expectations or common ground between the interactants arising from previous social encounters. The social context therefore subsumes a great part of the private contexts of the interactants via their shared assumptions and expectations arising from their previous interactions with others and the shared social background in which the present encounter takes place. The central claim of the view is that facial expression is a way of communicating through the medium of a social context. For those who hold this view it is not possible to characterise facial expressions in terms of universal emotions. Facial displays exert their influence in the particular context in which they are displayed, and are only interpretable within that context. However, I would argue that this is not inconsistent with the view that there are universal emotions. The possibility of social communication is, surely, grounded in the existence of certain standard messages.

If facial expressions are *primarily communicative* it would, of course, make sense for those expressions to be shown more frequently during social interaction (though it is not the communication view that sociality will always lead to increased frequency or intensity of facial displays). Observing the spontaneous facial expressions of those engaged in sports such as bowling and ice hockey, and audiences, both during interactive and non-interactive episodes, Kraut and Johnson (1979) found, for example, that those playing bowls smiled more when facing their teammates than when facing the bowling pins irrespective of whether their performance was good or indifferent where one might have thought delight at a good score would elicit a smile, perhaps magnified when looking at teammates, and frustration at a poor or indifferent score would elicit an expression of irritation or frustration. In a later study 10 month old babies were filmed as they played with a selection of toys whilst their mothers were seated behind them. Although the infants did smile nonsocially when they played with the toys, they smiled far more when they turned round to look at their mothers. Smiling also increased when the mother was attentive to the infant and decreased when the mother was instructed to remain passive. (Jones, Collins and Hong, 1991). The strong implication is that infant smiling is heavily dependent upon there being a suitable social *recipient* (caregiver or mother) for the signal rather than a simple expression of internal affect. Fridlund takes failure of expression to correspond closely with elicitors as evidence against Ekman’s neurocultural version of Tomkin’s theory.
There are neither fundamental emotions, nor fundamental expressions of them. They are simply behaviours that manifest social intentions. Facial expressions display what we want to do, or intend to do and to fulfil the function as a communicative signal they ought to be linked to the organism’s social motives and ought not to be considered related to the expressor’s underlying emotional state. Facial expressions can be completely accounted for by social motivations or social intent.

Both views are problematic. Ekman’s display rules theory can be criticised for a dubious classification of faces as either authentic or faked. Is a spontaneous smile which indicates the wish to placate or affiliate with a conspecific less authentic than a smile which indicates sensual pleasure? We need a theory that takes into account the promiscuously transactional nature of emotions. Humans display a great deal of mimetic behaviour, particularly in group behaviour. The human capacity to imitate others is arguably critical for the development of our individual behaviour patterns. The profound importance of mimetic behaviour should not be neglected as a natural component of much of our social interaction. We consciously and non-consciously induce reciprocal affective states in others. We spontaneously imitate the speech patterns, hand gestures and facial expressions of those with whom we are engaged in social interaction as an effective means of promoting social attachment. Such mimetic behaviour ought perhaps not to be construed as artificial or inauthentic, but rather as a reflection of an instinctive desire to engage with another and a natural part of our behaviour pattern in the sense that it is not managed or counterfeit behaviour. Ekman seems to suggest that the production or suppression of behaviour to take account of social relationships necessarily requires conscious, cognitive deliberation and can only result from acquired cultural learning but this needs further support, given the evolutionary advantages of the automatic appraisal mechanism having an evolved spontaneous sensitivity to social context. Fridlund’s behavioural Ecology view, on the other hand, fails to explain how a particular facial expression becomes correlated with a specific intention, or why communicating intentions has adaptive value (feigned emotions can deceive the observer as an adaptive strategy), and, crucially, it fails to engage with the relationship between the face and the subjective experiential aspect of emotion.

I suggest the most parsimonious conclusion is that emotional expressions are not simply the expression of pure emotions nor are they simply manipulative communicative signals or displays, but rather both. Ekman is primarily concerned with the physiological and neurological mechanisms behind the production of facial expressions of emotion, while Fridlund’s focus is on their functional role in social communication. The mistake is in thinking that these are incompatible.
Limitations of Ekman’s Theory

Ekman’s work has been hugely influential and the research agenda that has it has stimulated has proved extensive and productive. The characteristic facial expressions and other behaviour associated with the basic emotions are unquestionably one significant criterion by which we typically apply emotion terms. Nevertheless, the selection of facial expressions as the primary focus of research in Ekman’s account has led to a theory strongly favouring the investigation of negative emotions (of the six basic emotions for which it is argued there is fairly well established evidence four are negative (anger, disgust, fear and sadness), one neutral (surprise) and only one is a positive emotion, i.e. happiness). The result is that euphoric or positive emotions are almost entirely neglected. Affection, for example, characterised as the short, unbidden emotional efflux of tenderness or love connected to forms of caregiving, is one potential candidate for a basic positive emotion, since there is evidence for it as a biological primitive involving the impulse towards protective behaviour and attachment to perceived vulnerable subjects. The evolutionary adaptiveness of positive emotions is barely recognised within Ekman’s research.

A further concern is that meta-analysis of the cumulative data has failed to establish robust evidence of discrete prototypical somatovisceral response profiles for Ekman’s basic emotions (Cacioppo et al, 2000; Stemmler, 1989, 1992). There is evidence that the profiles of the peripheral nervous system (PNS) (which comprises the autonomic nervous system and somatic nervous system), configure for conditions of threat and challenge (Quigley, Barrett & Weinstein, 2002, Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leiter, 1993) and for positive versus negative affect. (Cacioppo et al, 2000) and any philosophical theory of the emotions must find some way of accommodating these empirical findings, but there is as yet no unambiguous evidence to physiologically discriminate Ekman’s basic emotion categories beyond this point. This may be the result of the methodological challenges posed by laboratory constraints, but it may be that there are no specific profiles or signatures to be discovered.

It is also a central premise of Ekman’s theory that these biologically discrete states are expressed as clear and instantly recognizable signals involving muscular facial activity. However, in a recent study when asked to label the emotion conveyed by different expressions, by means of photographs of prototypical facial expressions frequently used in emotion research, children between the ages of 4 and 9 were significantly more likely to label the disgust face as anger. Indeed, just as likely as they were to label the angry facial expression as anger (Widen S L and Russell J A, 2010). The children were also shown a disgust face and asked to supply an appropriate storyline related to the cause and consequence of that emotion (what made her feel like this? What did it make her do?). The typical responses were indistinguishable from the
responses offered for angry faces, even for those subjects who had accurately labelled the disgust face. The underlying assumption of Ekman's theory is that young children can decode these facial expressions since their expression evolved as part of an innate emotion signalling system. Production of an unrecognised signal has no adaptive value and production of an ambiguous signal may well have maladaptive consequences. This raises a concern for the basic emotions theory. If, contrary to expectations, children close to their tenth birthday do not competently and spontaneously correlate the disgust face with disgust then how can we accommodate these results within Ekman's theory?

Social constructivist and cognitive linguistic approaches have emphasised the differences in emotion taxonomies and have also challenged Ekman's theory of basic emotions on these grounds. Since the categorisation of emotions differs among languages and even amongst individuals, such theorists are sceptical as to whether neurobiology and facial expressions can be said to truly reflect the essential nature of emotions. On this view, the speakers of other language do not read any human faces as angry, sad or fearful but rather interpret them in terms of their own language-specific categories. The experience of the English emotion fear is a conceptual act and it is the structure of our natural language, rather than an affect programme, that enables us to transform internal sensory information from the body into a psychologically meaningful state by combining it with external sensory information about the world and situation specific knowledge of the emotion acquired from cultural experience. On Ekman's account cultural meaning systems do not appear to be essential for the emotion system since they do not affect the way emotional reactions unfold. Studying the lexicon of emotions will therefore not play a central role in discovering these "discrete phenomena" since emotions can be defined purely in terms of eliciting conditions and motor behaviour subserved by specific ANS and CNS activity. We can therefore disregard conceptual analysis of emotion terms in favour of empirical investigation. However, if emotions are social phenomena then discourse and verbal communication are obviously crucial to understanding how those emotions are constructed.

Many basic emotion theorists accept that pure experiences of the basic emotions are exceptional, sporadic and brief, in which case most of the daily emotional experiences of adult humans are not constituted by Ekman's basic emotions. However, there is another important sense in which emotions can be considered basic which plausibly may indicate a richer source of information regarding human emotional experience than the biological reductionism of the basic emotions approach and that is the degree to which an emotion has been hypercognized or hypocognized (Levy, 1973; 1984). Hypercognized emotions are those which are culturally amplified or enhanced through theorising and thereby assume substantial cultural salience. Such
emotion categories become the focus of persistent cultural cognizance and focal attention. Hypocognised emotions, on the other hand, are relatively neglected and tend to be only weakly delineated or culturally elaborated. There will be little culturally supplied representation and theory regarding the emotion. On this view an emotion is considered basic in the sense that it plays an essential role in the socio-cultural life of the culture bearer. A striking ethnographic example is Grima’s study of the Pakhtun emotion of gham, which can be glossed as “sadness”, “burden”, “loss”, “troubles”, “grief” (Grima, 2004). Grima’s account describes how Pakhtun women of Pakistan and Afghanistan gain social recognition and honour through their stoic endurance of suffering and hardship, and gham is characterised as a culturally hypercognized emotion that includes not only an internal bodily state but is intimately linked with culturally embedded required or expected behaviours and emotion discourse. The emotion is ritualistically articulated through women sharing narratives of the overwhelming misfortune that has structured their life experience. What is suggested is that there is a clearly elaborated cultural framework within which Pakhtun women give meaning to these experiences and on Grima’s account it is difficult to understand this culturally fundamental emotion or the behaviour outside of its context in relation to Pakhtun ideology.

It is notable that despite their cultural importance in the folk psychology of emotion and their identification as a primary focus of research on emotions in the field of Evolutionary Psychology (EP), love and sexual jealousy are absent from Ekman’s list. This is perhaps surprising since it would seem that good evolutionary functions or adaptive explanations can be offered for them. Whilst Ekman accepts that they are emotional experiences they do not qualify as basic emotions. They fail to instantiate a sufficient number of the required characteristics. Evolutionary Psychologists, on the other hand, have argued that our innate emotional apparatus extends well beyond those identified by Ekman and others. For Ekman only the basic emotions are the real emotions. If the real emotions are those given to us by evolution then evolutionary thinking can be applied to a large number of so-called complex emotions and need not be limited to a catalogue of innate universal signals and affective sensations. Indeed, an increasingly popular position defended within EP, which we will examine next, is that in fact all our emotions are adaptations. However, what I identify as the central problem is Ekman’s assumption that emotions can be defined purely in terms of eliciting conditions and physiological responses. Wierzbicka argues that emotions are in fact a semantic domain amenable to investigation in terms of a metalanguage composed of semantic primitives or universals shared by all human languages. This metalanguage purportedly offers a framework which enables us to adopt an objective,
culture-free and non-contextual starting point, avoiding what Wierzbicka sees as the ethnocentric universalism of Ekman’s uncritical adoption of English emotion terms.
Chapter 2

Jealousy: Evolutionary Psychology

Introduction

A number of accounts of jealousy have arisen in the field of psychology in an attempt to elucidate its causes and possible function in the economy of the human mind and human behaviour. Evolutionary Psychology (EP) proposes that jealousy is an evolved psychological mechanism deeply scripted in our biology that has evolved to protect the individual’s investment in a relationship where procreation is a possibility (Buss, 2000). It is conceptualised as a universal, innate emotional “smoke detector”, designed to detect signs of a partner’s infidelity and motivate behaviour designed to avoid or limit reproductive loss. Whilst it has been reported that men and women do not differ in either the frequency or intensity of their jealousy, and that jealousy plays a significant role in the retention of partners and relationships for both sexes, there is evidence that men and women differ regarding the cues that are jealousy-eliciting. Males feel more threatened (and hence experience more jealousy) in response to a partner’s sexual infidelity than a partner’s emotional infidelity, whereas the reverse is true of females. Females are more threatened by fear of emotional infidelity than sexual infidelity. EP proposes that the similarities and differences of men’s and women’s psychologies in relation to jealousy results from the fact that they faced some similar adaptive problems in respect of the reproductive consequences of infidelity and partner loss; but in some respects those adaptive problems recurrently diverged, and the asymmetrical psychologies between men and women is a reflection of those differences. The first section of this chapter outlines the EP approach and reviews the empirical evidence. A Socio-Cognitive hypothesis, the so-called “double-shot” hypothesis, raised as an alternative explanation of the data is also discussed. I argue that both the advocates of the EP approach and its opponents face the challenge of developing more sophisticated research paradigms if the debate is to progress much further.

6 In using the term Evolutionary Psychology I am here referring specifically to the theoretical and methodological commitments adopted most notably by Stephen Pinker, David Buss and Leda Cosmides working in the field of psychology and by John Tooby and Donald Symons in the field of Anthropology. There are many researchers who adopt an evolutionary perspective (e.g. human evolutionary anthropologists, human behavioural ecologists, human sociobiologists) and who might be thought to come under the broad umbrella of evolutionary psychology, but they would not necessarily wish to endorse the theoretical and methodological commitments of Evolutionary Psychology (EP) I outline here.
Given the primary importance of the protection of social relationships it is tempting to think of jealousy as a universal response to any perceived potential threat to the stability of that relationship. So it seems to be an extremely promising candidate, as an instance of an emotion which is explicable in fundamentally biological terms. However, I argue that a robust examination of the universality of the emotion and the existence of gender specific mechanisms that make different types of cues more salient to one sex than another would require a more detailed examination of how the concept labelled ‘Jealousy’ in the English language is cognized in other cultures. Indeed, a shared understanding of the emotional lexicon of different cultures is of increasing importance, given the significance of global communication and the need for multicultural co-operation and understanding. Furthermore, a lexicocentric approach can make a significant contribution towards developing new research paradigms for the Evolutionary Psychologist.

**Evolutionary Psychology**

Evolutionary Psychology is a research programme that attempts to map the structures that make up the mental architecture of the human mind by synthesizing cognitive psychology with evolutionary biology theory. At the conceptual level most Evolutionary Psychologists subscribe to the assumption that the mind is composed of many evolved psychological mechanisms or cognitive modules, which are physically embodied through the neural circuitry of the brain and which can be explicated in computational terms. David Buss, a strong advocate of EP, offers a concise definition of these mechanisms (Buss, 1995 p 5–6)

An evolved psychological mechanism is a set of processes inside an organism that (1) exists in the form it does because it (or other mechanisms that reliably produce it) solved a specific problem of individual survival or reproduction recurrently over human evolutionary history (2) takes only certain classes of information or input, where input (a) can be either internal or external, (b) can be actively extracted from the environment or passively received from the environment and, (c) specifies to the organism the particular adaptive problem it is facing, (3) transforms that information into output through a procedure (e.g., decision rule) in which output (a) regulates physiological activity, provides information to other psychological mechanisms, or produces manifest action and (b) solves a particular adaptive problem.

EP theorists further claim that natural selection eliminated broad mental plasticity in favour of a massive number of these cognitive modules or micro-programmes generating shallow

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7 Within Decision Theory, which is concerned with identifying the values, uncertainties and other issues relevant in a given decision, its rationality and the resulting optimal decision, a decision rule is a function which maps an observation to an appropriate action
behavioural output. These modules are designed by natural selection as part of the universal specie-typical design, and are thus innately specified or genetically determined. A central argument within EP is that human minds have evolved in precisely the same way that human limbs and opposable thumbs have evolved. In much the same way that we have mapped human physiological adaptations we are able to identify the functioning of human psychological adaptations. Mental function, expressed in set patterns of behaviour, is fixed at the neurological level and the best explanation for that fixity arises from a perspective that adopts evolutionary assumptions.

Emotions, according to the EP view, are defined as superordinate cognitive programmes that synchronise evolved cognitive micro-programmes and subroutines (in computer terms, a portion of code within a larger program that performs a specific task and is relatively independent of the remaining code) to behave functionally in response to a specific set of ancestrally recurrent adaptive challenges posed by the environment, typically relating to such fitness enhancing themes as survival, mate selection, courtship and sex, betrayal and cheater detection (Buck, 1999 Cosmides & Tooby, 2000, Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a and 1990b). Such challenges occurred frequently enough and were important enough to sculpt specific patterns of targeted adaptive responses, including sexual arousal, sexual jealousy, social fear and panic behaviour. For the Evolutionary Psychologist our emotions reflect our evolutionary history and these complex functional mechanisms were favoured by natural selection.

We are, according to EP, living with minds that have a cognitive architecture which was essentially completed in the Pleistocene (the human Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA)). A key issue for Evolutionary Psychologists is the impact of the differences between the current environment and the EEA. Some changes will be benign and have little or no impact on the functioning of psychological mechanisms, some may alter the behaviours originally generated by the mechanism, perhaps beneficially, and some might be detrimental or positively maladaptive to psychological functioning. Evolutionary Psychology does not use evolutionary theory to make predictions about current human behaviour because the modern environment is so different from that which our ancestors faced. Instead it attempts to use evolutionary theory to identify which behaviours would have been selected in the EEA.

The Evolutionary Psychologist does not accept that the behaviour of modern humans is adapted to current ecologies (i.e. that we are fitness maximizers). One example in support of this position that is typically cited is that it has been shown that fertility rates decline with increased social status in modern societies, reversing the correlation between social status and reproductive success that held in the days before the availability of contraception. Modern high status males
are therefore not seeking to maximise their fitness. They are, however, enjoying more sexual activity with more partners than lower status males, particularly as they grow older (Pérusse, 1993; Skirbekk, 2008). They have become adaptation *executors* or “mechanism activators” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).

Another central premise within EP is that the domain general goal of maximising gene replication, reproduction or fitness could not be selected for and so could not evolve to constitute part of our cognitive system. The general goal of fitness cannot be tracked throughout the course of a single lifetime because what can be considered as fitness enhancing changes over the course of an individual’s life history, altered and influenced by factors such as the individual’s age (what is fitness enhancing as an infant and toddler will differ from what counts as fitness enhancing for an adolescent or an adult), gender, ecological conditions and so on. It is impossible for selection to produce a domain general mechanism to fulfil this demanding remit, all selection can work on is the generation of domain specific mechanisms. In addition, domain general mechanisms are conceptualised as solving many adaptive problems with competing job demands, and therefore sacrifice the benefits of speed, reliability and efficiency offered by domain specific mechanisms devoted to solving specific adaptive problems. I should emphasise, before proceeding further, that it is not my aim in this chapter to attempt to address the complex debate between proponents of the so-called “massive modularity hypothesis” and their opponents directly, but to consider whether the research paradigm engaged in within EP in respect of one of their flagship research successes, namely the existence of a sexually dimorphic jealousy module, is robust enough to support EP claims (I will argue that it is not) and evaluate an alternative and broader account of jealousy from socio-cognitivist theorists that favours the existence of a domain-general mechanism.

**Sexual Monogamy, Biparental Care and Sexually Dimorphic Jealousy Modules**

The emergence of sexual monogamy and biparental care in humans may have occurred at any of several times in hominid evolution, but the EP view is that it is most likely to have occurred during the basal radiation of the hominid clade onto the grasslands of Africa some 5 million years ago. With the evolution of bipedalism females had to carry their infants in their arms instead of on their backs, increasing their “reproductive burden”. It is unlikely that hominid males were able to obtain enough resources to attract or sustain a harem in a savannah environment, where resources were outspread and danger was frequently encountered, but they could provide subsistence resources and protection for a single mate. However, ancestral males, unlike females, could not be sure that they were the genetic parent of their mate’s offspring, representing a
challenge for males. The challenge for females was to ensure parental investment in their own offspring rather than a rival’s. According to the Evolutionary Psychology theory of sexual jealousy these challenges lead to different gendered sensitivity to sexual and emotional infidelity.

We can characterise infidelity as a partner’s infringement of accepted boundaries or standards of conduct regulating the degree of emotional or physical intimacy with individuals outside the relationship. It is seen as an act of disloyalty or betrayal which signifies that the accepted level of trustworthiness required to sustain the unique character of the close interpersonal relationship between the members of the dyad has been contravened. This infringement can take the form of sexual infidelity, emotional infidelity or a combination of both. Sexual infidelity, for our purposes, is any conduct that involves sexual contact with someone outside the primary relationship. This can involve anything from coitus to any intimate physical contact that is designed for sexual stimulation or gratification. We can characterise emotional infidelity as referring to any conduct that involves the formation of or attempt to form a significant reciprocal bond of mutual affection or emotional attachment to another person outside the primary relationship. It can involve such behaviour as engaging in flirtatious banter, exchanging personal information in intimate conversations or communications, dating a member of the opposite sex or falling in love. Internet dating, the viewing of pornography and cyber-sex, are also now within the scope of behaviours construed as possibly involving emotional or sexual infidelity. Some spouses consider internet relationships to be just as threatening as real affairs. What constitutes infidelity will vary, depending upon the type of relationship that is established between the partners. Nevertheless, a committed relationship typically includes a stated or implicit agreement of sexual/emotional intimacy strictly reserved for the primary relationship that is not shared with another outside the dyad.

The EP hypothesis is that males are more upset by sexual infidelity, because of the risk of cuckoldry, while females are more distressed by emotional infidelity because it represents for them a loss of resources and biparental investment in offspring. These emotional differences are hypothesised to have evolved as the result of tracking identified sex-specific optimal mating strategies, and to deal with the risks of extra-pair bonding (Daly, Wilson & Wehorst, 1982; Buss et al, 1992, Platek and Sheckelford, 2006 though see Buller 2005 and Harris, 2003 for a rebuttal). So, the assumption of the Evolutionary Psychologist is that a sex-specific and content-specific information-processing jealousy mechanism evolved because men’s and women’s reproductive success has been recurrently threatened by different types of infidelity. The male jealousy mechanism preferentially processes cues signalling a partner’s sexual infidelity whereas a
woman’s jealousy mechanism will preferentially process cues signalling a mate’s emotional infidelity.

**Empirical Evidence for the EP Account**

A significant amount of empirical evidence has been gathered in support of the EP position. For example, there is research which indicates that men are better able to recall cues signally their mate’s sexual infidelity, whereas women were better able to recall cues signalling their mate’s emotional infidelity (Schützwohl and Koch, 2004). There is also some empirical evidence from a study using a forced-choice format that men and women selecting the adaptively primary infidelity type (i.e. female sexual infidelity and male emotional infidelity respectively) made their decision significantly faster than making decisions selecting for their secondary infidelity type (Schützwohl, 2004). Two later studies by Schützwohl that were also concerned with sex differences in the cognitive processing of infidelity cues once again support the EP theory in respect of various cognitive processes (Schützwohl, 2005, 2006). For example, in one study (Schützwohl, 2006 – study 1) it was found that men led to suspect a mate’s infidelity actively requested more information concerning sexual aspects of the infidelity than women. Conversely, women requested more information concerning the emotional aspect of the suspected infidelity than men. Furthermore, men were significantly faster than women in deciding whether infidelity cues would elicit either a first pang of jealousy or intolerable jealousy if these cues were more diagnostic of sexual jealousy. For cues more diagnostic of emotional infidelity, women made this decision significantly more rapidly than men (Schützwohl, 2005).

In the related psychological realms of mating deception and regret there is further support for the EP theory. Regarding deception, women self report far greater distress than men to a partner exaggerating their feelings in order to obtain access to sex, or exaggerating his status or income whereas men report greater distress than women at a long term partner deliberately underreporting her level of previous sexual experience or exaggerating her degree of faithfulness and being “led on” regarding the possibility of sexual access (Haselton et al, 2005). These differences are interpreted as tracking divergent sexual strategies.

In respect of regret, the affective experience of regret is hypothesised to function to improve future decision-making by enabling people to avoid mistakes that have important consequences. If this is correct then feelings of regret ought to track sex differentiated adaptive problems, including problems of partner choice for women (more than men) and problems of attracting multiple partners for men (more than women). Missed sexual opportunities would be more costly for ancestral males than women, whereas sexual encounters with undesirable or non-
investing partners would be more reproductively costly for women. As predicted by the hypothesis, in response to hypothetical regret scenarios women more than men reported that they would regret having sex in a relationship that turned out to be only short-term, whereas men more than women reported they would regret missing an attractive sexual opportunity (Haselton et al., 2005). These effects are also partially corroborated by participants’ reports of regretted experiences in spontaneous lists. Whilst men and women both listed sexual commission regrets women reported that they regretted acts of sexual commission more intensely than did men.

A recent meta-analyses of the evidence (Harris, 2003) indicates that the most robust support for the EP theory of jealousy is from studies that use a research paradigm developed by Buss et al. (1992). This means that the majority of these studies (conducted mostly with college students) have used a forced-choice paradigm, favoured because it allows for an unambiguous distinction between responses to sexual and emotional infidelity. The studies have also consistently relied on the use of hypothetical scenarios (DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; DeSteno et al. 2002; Harris, 2002, 2003).

In the majority of the studies participants are instructed to think of a serious committed romantic relationship that they have had in the past, that they currently have, or that they would like to have. They are then requested to indicate which scenario would cause them more distress - imagining their partner forming a deep emotional attachment to another person or imagining their partner enjoying passionate sexual intercourse with another person. Men tend to select the prospect of their partner becoming sexually involved with another as more distressing, whilst women tended to select emotional attachment.

There are several problems with the research paradigm. Firstly, difficulties in conceptualising the construct of emotional infidelity raise the issue of whether participants are consistently interpreting statements such as “deep emotional attachment” and “falling in love” in a similar manner. Secondly, how can we be confident that forming a “deep emotional attachment” is the precise emotional equivalent to “passionate sexual intercourse”? Deep emotional attachment could be construed simply as forming a warm, friendly interpersonal relationship with a friend, which may not necessarily represent a relationship threat, whereas passionate sexual intercourse seems a fairly unambiguous example of extreme infidelity. Thirdly, it seems plausible, I think, that some people are more adept at making categorical distinctions and are able to characterise their emotional experiences in discrete emotional terms but that others may rely on characterising their emotional experiences in broader, more global terms. Some people are simply more able to make fine distinctions between their emotional feeling states, regularly attempting to analyse and interpret them, whilst others less frequently engage in this type of
introspection. They are therefore less able to articulate or self-report them, utilising general labels for emotional responses that indicate negative valence such as anger to cover emotional feeling states such as being annoyed, frustrated, exasperated, livid or merely peevish. Fourthly, individuals may differ in their imaginative capacity. It seems plausible that someone who is less sexually experienced and had less exposure to sexual imagery than others may be unable to easily imagine their partner trying different sexual positions with another partner, or may be reluctant to do so. Similarly someone who has had a number of serious relationships may find it easier to imagine their partner forming a deep emotional attachment with someone else than someone who has less experience of such relationships.

Edlund et al’s (2006) study attempted to address the criticism that responses of forced choice, hypothetical experiences of infidelity might well not align with responses using continuous measures and experiences of actual infidelity. They found that, as predicted by the EP hypothesis, when recalling actual experiences of partner infidelity men self-reported greater jealousy with respect to the sexual aspects rather than the emotional aspects of the infidelity and the reverse was true for their female respondents. However, these results can be challenged since they are dependent upon the participant’s ability to accurately recall a situation of infidelity and respond to it in precisely the same way that they reacted to the actual experience of infidelity. Moreover, retrospective reports are notoriously unreliable and subject to any number of biasing influences. For example, there is every possibility that certain types of individuals are more likely to be the victim of infidelity than others. It therefore seems that retrospective reports cannot address the earlier criticisms of the forced-choice, hypothetical paradigm.

I shall also here consider another method of investigating the hypothesis which has been adopted, namely the measurement of physiological responses to imagined infidelity situations in an attempt to determine whether jealousy manifests itself physically. Unfortunately, the results of such studies are mixed. Some supported the EP theory on all measures (electrodermal activity (EDA), pulse rate (PR), and electromyographic activity (EMG) (Piertzak et al., 2002), some found no sex difference in arousal (Harris, 2000), and still others found results that were the exact opposite of those predicted by EP theory (Grice & Seely, 2000). In fact, physiological responses may have absolutely nothing to do with jealousy; they are simply measuring the individual’s level of physiological arousal. The causes of these physiological responses might be jealousy or alternatively the responses could be due to other sorts of arousal, for example sexual arousal to imagining or fantasising about acts of sexual infidelity. A parsimonious interpretation of the mixed results of physiological measures is that this is an unreliable methodology for attempting to assess sex differences in jealousy.
The Double Shot Hypothesis

DeSteno and Salovey (1996) and Harris and Christenfeld (1996), both criticise the EP account and provide an alternative explanation of the observed sex differences. They argue that these differences in psychology are not bequeathed to us via evolution but rather are the result of socially acquired beliefs about men and women, and about jealousy and romantic relationships. Their respective studies indicate that respondents’ beliefs regarding the emotional implications of men’s versus women’s sexual involvement with an interloper are different. This supports a shared hypothesis, which DeSteno and Salovey (1996) have termed the “double shot” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis women hold the belief that emotional infidelity implies sexual infidelity. They believe that men cannot become emotionally involved with someone without also engaging in or desiring a sexual relationship with that person. Men, on the other hand, believe that women can become emotionally involved with someone without necessarily engaging in or wishing to engage in a sexual relationship with them but that sexual infidelity on the part of women implies emotional infidelity, since women are thought not to be capable of sex without emotional involvement. Women are typically thought not to engage in casual, recreational sex where the emphasis is on short term sexual gratification based on novelty and variety of sexual partners with little or no emotional investment in the relationship. Women do not separate their sexual gratification from the emotional realm.

So, according to the hypothesis, since women believe men can engage in sexual activity without being in love but that men cannot become emotionally involved with another partner in the absence of a desire for a sexual relationship, emotional infidelity is doubly distressing for women since it represents a twofold deception (DeSteno & Salovey, 1996). Conversely, men believe that if a woman is engaged in sexual infidelity this also implies emotional infidelity on her part. Men will thus be doubly distressed by sexual infidelity. Men and women are upset by both forms of infidelity, but the crucial difference lies in how much they believe each form of infidelity signals the other.

This holding of different beliefs between males and females, according to the “double-shot” hypothesis, is what explains the distinction in response to situations that provoke sexual jealousy, rather than a sexually dimorphic adaptation. Whilst the EP theory predicts sex differences in attitudes towards infidelity as a result of selection pressures, the double-shot hypothesis predicts sexual differences in the meaning attached to infidelity as a result of current socio-cultural mores, in particular gender socialisation (which can be characterised as the process
of acquiring a sense of self that has gendered qualities and characteristics through acquiring beliefs about goals, attributions and strategies applicable to one’s gender).

In response to the "double-shot" hypothesis the EP proponents argue that, given the large sex differences stemming from fundamental differences in reproductive biology, it would be extremely unlikely that natural selection would have failed to produce a sexually dimorphic jealousy module. Furthermore, these sex differences, they argue, have been replicated cross-culturally, covering opposite ends of the scale of cultural and sexual liberality. The EP theorist can also argue that a rigorous causal theory needs to be provided if we are to accept the "double-shot" hypothesis. Whilst it may be that the difference in beliefs causes the distinction between the sexes in the weighting of emotional distress in jealousy there could be other explanations. It may be that the differences identify a mere correlation between the two because they co-vary with gender. Alternatively the gender distinction in weighting of emotional distress could be the cause of the differing beliefs, or there may be some third variable that accounts for the distinction.

In four follow-up studies, Buss and his colleagues tested the EP theory against the "double-shot" hypothesis (Buss et al., 1999). In the first of these investigations, Buss et al. (1999) asked participants to imagine their partner (a) forming a deep emotional (but not sexual) relationship with another person, or (b) enjoying a sexual (but not emotional) relationship with another person. Results confirmed women's greater fears of emotional infidelity and men's greater fears of sexual infidelity. In the second study, Buss et al. (1999) asked subjects to imagine that their partner had become sexually involved and emotionally involved with another person. They then asked which aspect of their partner's imagined infidelity was most upsetting. Sixty-three percent of men, but only 13% of women, reported that the sexual aspect was more upsetting. In contrast, 87% of women, but only 37% of men, reported that the emotional aspect was more upsetting. These results were replicated in additional U.S. samples, as well as in Korean, Japanese, and Dutch samples (Buss et al., 1999). Additionally, in Wiederman and Kendall's (1999) test of the double-shot hypothesis in Sweden the predicted sex differences in jealousy were found irrespective of participants' beliefs about the conditional probabilities of men's and women's sexual and emotional involvements.

Unfortunately, this does not settle the debate between the two sides. Once again, these studies rely on a research paradigm which may be untrustworthy. Firstly, they measure a conscious, rational response rather than a spontaneous, evolved "gut" reaction. Secondly, they are dependent upon the participant's ability to imagine a hypothetical situation of infidelity and respond to it in precisely the same way that they would react to an actual experience of infidelity. Self-report studies with participants who have been victims of infidelity in the past and who are
asked for their response to actual experiences are similarly unreliable and subject to any number of influencing biases. In addition, all these studies are directed at measuring the participant’s reaction after the act of infidelity has already taken place rather than assessing sensitivity to potential infidelity cues. If the evolutionary hypothesis is based on the idea that jealousy evolved as a method of protecting one’s relationship from certain types of threat that could potentially harm one’s reproductive success, then one could argue that measuring a person’s distress after the infidelity has occurred is hardly a reliable way of assessing evolved sex differences in jealousy. In these circumstances the male would already have been cuckolded or the female would already have lost her mate’s attention to a rival.

Even if we were to accept the EP paradigm it has produced some anomalous data. There has been significant cross cultural variation in the percentage of males reporting sexual infidelity as more upsetting than emotional infidelity. In Korean, Chinese and Dutch samples the percentage of males selecting sexual infidelity as more upsetting than emotional infidelity ranged from 53% (Korean sample) and 47% (US sample) to as low as 23% (Dutch sample). It is also significant that the EP theory fails to explain the results obtained from studies of lesbian and gay participants. Sheets and Wolfe (2001) conducted a study of heterosexual, lesbian and gay subjects and asked them to report which type of infidelity would cause them more distress. All groups except heterosexual men reported greater distress to thinking about their partner’s emotional infidelity. So, although heterosexual and homosexual males differed in their self report to imagined sexual and emotional infidelity cues, gay men and lesbian women did not. Gay men are, like lesbian and heterosexual women, more distressed by emotional infidelity. Harris’ (2002) study found no gender differences when participant homosexual and heterosexual adults recalled personal experiences of actual infidelity. When asked to rate the degree to which they focused on their mate’s emotional infidelity and the degree to which they focused on their mate’s sexual infidelity using a 5-point scale (1-not at all to 5-completely) both heterosexual and homosexual adults on average reported focusing more on a mate’s emotional infidelity rather than on a mate’s sexual infidelity. A robust test of the evolutionary hypothesis would require establishing that:

H1: Men react more jealously to sexual infidelity than emotional infidelity
H2: Women react more jealously to emotional infidelity than sexual infidelity
H3: Men react more jealously to sexual infidelity than women
H4: Women react more jealously to emotional infidelity than men

These are independent sub-hypotheses. All, some or none of them might be true. Each needs to be backed up by empirical data that focuses on research paradigms that get closer to assessing jealousy in vivo and eliminating potentially moderating factors.
Conclusion

Given the primary importance of the protection of social relationships it is tempting to think of jealousy as a universal response to any perceived potential threat to the stability of that relationship. However, a robust examination of the universality of the emotion and the existence of gender specific mechanisms that make different types of cues more salient to one sex than another would require a more detailed examination of how the concept labelled ‘jealousy’ in the English language is cognized in other cultures. Indeed, a shared understanding of the emotional lexicon of different cultures is a highly desirable goal, given the significance of global communication and the need for multicultural co-operation and understanding. This chapter outlined the EP account of sexual jealousy and reviewed the empirical evidence. The so-called “double-shot” hypothesis, raised as an alternative explanation of the empirical data was also considered. I have argued that both the advocates of the EP approach and its opponents face the challenge of developing more sophisticated research paradigms if the debate is to progress much further. The “double shot” hypothesis is part of an alternative, socio-cognitivist explanation of the empirically discovered sex differences in sexual jealousy/ In the next chapter I examine the socio-cognitivist approach in more detail.
Socio-cognitivist theorists have particularly emphasised two factors that can impact on the likelihood of experiencing sexual jealousy (1) when some aspect of a person’s self-concept, self-regard or other representation is threatened and (2) when relationship rewards are threatened. In this chapter I introduce a literary example of a prototypical sexual jealousy evoking situation taken from Andrea Levy’s *Small Island* (2004) to which I apply two alternative models of jealousy that each examine one of these different factors. According to the Self-Evaluation Maintenance model, in all cases of jealousy (sibling rivalry, professional jealousy, romantic jealousy) the attention individuals receive from their relationship partners is jeopardised by a rival for that attention, and this attention serves as a signifier of an individual’s value or worth. Consequently, any such loss of attention signals a threat not only to the relationship but also, more importantly, to an individual’s self-evaluation. It is this threat to self-evaluation that is, according to the SEM model, the central factor in the elicitation of jealousy (Salovey, 1991; Salovey and Rothman, 1991).

Another model of jealousy offers a way of explaining the discrepancies between the way sex and romantic relationships are viewed by females and males through the application of Social Exchange Theory (SET) to romantic relationships. Social Exchange Theory analyses interactions between two parties by examining the costs and benefits to each member of the dyad. The key point of the theory is that it assumes the two parties are both giving and receiving items of value from each other. According to this theory interactions between the parties are only likely to persist if both parties feel they are coming out of the exchange with more than they are giving up. That is, if there is a positive amount of profit for both parties involved.

It might be that jealousy evolved as a general mechanism, as suggested by socio-cognitivist theories, in response to any sort of relationship threat but different hard wired triggers could be built into this mechanism that make specific types of threat more salient to males than to females, or vice versa. In this way the sex differentiated theory of evolved jealousy can be accommodated within the theory of jealousy not just as a response to a threat of sexual treachery but as a response to general relationship threats. This would acknowledge the overwhelming importance placed on human social relationships and the fundamental need to safeguard them. Naturally, individuals will respond to jealousy-eliciting stimuli in idiosyncratic ways based on their appraisal of the situation, cultural mores and the significance of the relationship but below
this conscious response there could be an evolved mechanism deeply scripted in our cognitive architecture that has made different types of cues more salient to one sex than the other.

Introduction

The double shot hypothesis, introduced in the last chapter, is part of an alternative account of sex differences in human behaviour provided by social cognitive theorists (e.g., DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996). According to this view jealousy is the result of an evolved but domain-general appraisal mechanism sensitive to all types of threat posed by rivals (e.g., sibling or professional rivalry), aroused when a rival outdoes someone in domains that threaten one’s self-image or esteem, including friendship (Harris 2000; 2003). Since both emotional and sexual infidelity represents a threat to an important relationship for men and women we should not necessarily expect to find universal sex differences in emotional and sexual jealousy. Instead differences, if they exist, will be the result of culturally determined gender roles. On this account members of some societies are easily threatened by events arousing romantic jealousy, whereas in other societies they notice the events but do not become distressed by them. Attitudes expressed in the cultural values towards property ownership, progeny, pair-bonding, and sexual activity are the major determinants of the potential for feeling threatened in a jealousy situation. Societies with social values that put a premium on personal ownership of property, require personal descendants for social and economic support in old age, make marriage a prerequisite for guilt-free sex, and require a mate in order to survive economically and to be accepted as a mature adult, create the conditions in which an individual is easily threatened by a jealousy event. Social-cognitivist theorists have particularly emphasised two factors that can impact on the likelihood of experiencing sexual jealousy (1) when some aspect of a person’s self-concept, self-regard or other representation is threatened and (2) when relationship rewards are threatened.

Self – Evaluation Maintenance Model

According to the Self-Evaluation Maintenance model in all cases of jealousy (e.g. sibling rivalry, professional jealousy, and romantic jealousy) the attention individuals receive from their relationship partners is jeopardised by a rival for that attention. This attention serves as an indication of one’s value or worth and, consequently, any such loss of attention signals a threat not only to the relationship but, more importantly, to an individual’s self-evaluation. It is this threat to self-evaluation that is, according to the SEM model, the central factor in the elicitation of jealousy (Salovey, 1991; Salovey and Rothman, 1991). To expand on this a little further, events that have the possibility to arouse jealousy must involve the real or imagined interaction of a
relationship partner with a rival. Once an individual becomes aware of any such interaction appraisal is made regarding the threat posed by it to one’s self-esteem. The appraisal of the interaction as a threat to one’s self-esteem serves as the proximate cause for jealousy, which then leads to behaviours designed to reduce or remove the threat. Such an appraisal need not involve a conscious attempt at assessment. Appraisals of emotion-relevant stimuli often occur automatically (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000)).

An important concept within the self-evaluation model involves the notion of reflective and comparison processes. An example of the reflective process is the scenario in which I have a sister who is an extremely popular author. I am, in this scenario, a successful solicitor. We are therefore not competitors in the same professional sphere and this leaves us free to enjoy each other’s achievements. We can each feel good about ourselves as a result. Each sister’s self-esteem will be enhanced by basking in the “reflected glory” of the other’s success. However, in domains of equal importance to our self-esteem where there is competition a superior performance by my sister will, according to the SEM model, automatically lead to my engaging in unflattering comparisons between us, threatening my positive self-image. According to the theory there are only a few domains that are crucially significant to any given individual’s self-image, but when close others excel in those domains we feel the pain of the unflattering comparison.

DeSteno & Salovey (1995, 1996; Salovey, 1991; Salovey & Rothman 1991) have adapted the SEM model to examine sexual jealousy. The relationship in which jealousy is provoked crucially involves a third party, a rival. Whilst the presence of any rival will cause jealousy the SEM model argues that certain rivals will provoke greater jealousy than others because the rival is a target of comparison. Jealousy is therefore hypothesised to increase in intensity when the perceived rival excels in domains of particular importance to one’s self-image. In particular, if a partner displays interest in another who excels in a domain of critical importance to one’s sense of self it implies that the rival may be superior in that domain. There is a sense in which one automatically compares oneself with the rival and sees oneself as falling short. Outside those domains critical to our self-image jealousy is likely to be felt less strongly. The intensity of the emotion is a function of the rival’s abilities and characteristics in domains that are of the utmost importance to one’s self-image (Salovey, 1991; Salovey & Rothman, 1991).

DeSteno and Salovey (1996) tested their hypothesis by asking university students to read hypothetical scenarios describing situations in which their partner flirted with another individual of the opposite sex. The rival was characterised as excelling in three different domains identified as typically very important to university students’ self-definition: intelligence, athleticism and popularity. In each scenario the rival excelled in one of the three identified domains and
participants rated how jealous they would feel if their partner flirted with a rival that had that particular characteristic. The students were also asked (in what they were led to believe was a separate questionnaire) to rate the importance of the three domains to their evaluation of self-worth. DeSteno and Salovey found that jealousy was intensified if the scenario involved a rival characterised as excelling in a domain identified by the student earlier as important to their self-image.

This bodes well for the SEM model, and the model itself certainly seems well motivated. It is uncontroversial that a significant part of our self-image is dependent upon the evaluations and judgments of the people with whom we have valued social relationships (spouses, siblings, work colleagues). It is difficult to see oneself as amusing, intelligent or attractive if this is not validated by those whose judgments I value. One’s identity is to a large extent social and public. This is unavoidable and a source of uneasiness, since it means that one’s identity is never entirely a free choice under one’s control since it is not determined by one alone. The SEM model is also grounded in a fairly plausible assumption, namely that maintenance of a positive self-evaluation is generally scaffolded by social interaction with members of our own social group; people who one considers are like me. Indeed, Individuals in DeSteno and Salovey’s study reported that, outside of the flirting situation, they would actually have a stronger liking for those rivals who excelled in the domain of importance to their own self-image than they would for rivals who did not. In order to examine this account further I shall introduce a literary example of a paradigmatic sexual jealousy scenario.

**Andrea Levy’s Small Island**

Jealousy has been construed by Parrott (2001, p 306) as involving an entire “emotional episode”, including a complex “narrative”. This narrative comprises of “the circumstances that led up to the episode, jealousy itself as an attempt at self-regulation, subsequent actions and events and the resolution of the episode” (Parrott, 2001 p 306). A literary illustration that stands as a paradigmatic example of sexual jealousy is given in Levy’s novel. This is a useful illustration since the most interesting and complex emotions are best explained within the cultural framework in which they are experienced, and a literary treatment offers one way in which we can set an episode within a cultural context. In the novel the narrative focus switches between four main protagonists. Gilbert and Hortense (a married couple) are part of the influx of Jamaican immigrants that arrived on the Empire Windrush in search of a new life in post war England and reside with Queenie Blythe. Queenie is an English woman whose husband, Bernard, suddenly returns home following an unexplained two year absence after being demobbed. Queenie has, in
her husband’s absence, entered into a sexual relationship with another Jamaican tenant. This tenant has since left and Queenie has found herself pregnant. Although the baby’s birth is imminent she has successfully hidden her pregnancy from her neighbours, tenants and Bernard, who simply think she has gained a little weight. Gilbert, who like everyone else was completely unaware of Queenie’s pregnancy, narrates the scene immediately after the home birth where Hortense has helped with the delivery after Queenie went into labour. Gilbert looks in on the room where Queenie is now nursing her new born infant, whilst her husband Bernard looks on.

        Never had I heard such a noisy quiet. We three – no we four – caught in a scene that defied sensible comment. Queenie fondled her pickney that was plainly still wet behind the ears. The blameless baby wiggled, unaware of the accursed situation it had squeezed itself out into. Her husband, staring on them straight-backed as if on parade, wiped a hand back and forth across his head in the exact spot were his cuckold’s horn would rise. While I frowned. For I knew Queenie had put on a bit of weight but what an astonishment to find it was the type that you could dress in a bonnet. Some word was needed to break this frozen clinch. So it was I who said, “Shall we still get a doctor?” The fool husband then turned his gaze to me. So bewildered was his countenance it was almost comical. But this situation’s funny side was obviously not what was troubling him at that moment. His eye locked on mine. And in that steady stare lurked true pain. My tongue had just begun with urgency to click to the roof of my mouth to utter the words, “No, man, this is nothing to do with me,” when he lunged at me”

Bernard then violently attacks Gilbert, who, after a while, manages to knock him to the floor, and then tries to explain

        I told him once more, “Cha, nah, man, I sorry for you. But this business is nothing to do with me”.
        Softly I hear him mumble. “It’s everything to do with you. You and your kind”.
        And hear this, soft-hearted man that I am, I go to help him up, For suddenly pity for him flowed over me like a wave. No man – no matter how fool-fool a white ras clot – should have to look on his wife suckling a baby that is not his. “Let me help you up, man?” I said. But he thrust my hand away. Then, slowly lifting his hard he glared upon my face with unmistakable hate. The man attack me, pour blood from my nose, accuse me of all sorts of things I had never got the chance to do with his wife. Come, let me tell you, all at once I was pleased that this dogheart English bastard had too-too much to bear.


How might the SEM model apply to this example? One of the domains central to Bernard’s self-image is likely to be his masculinity, sexual prowess and fitness as a mate. A primary role of a good mate is to father a child. Earlier in the novel we are made aware that Bernard and Queenie had been trying unsuccessfully for a baby for over a year before the war intervened. It is also made clear that they were both upset and concerned at Queenie’s failure to conceive. There is, of
course, tangible evidence of the superiority of his rival in this regard. According to the SEM model, if Bernard’s masculinity and fitness as a father are significant aspects of his self-image, then his jealousy will be intensified because of an unflattering comparison between him and his rival. We could also hypothesise that the pregnancy itself might either consciously or subconsciously be interpreted by Bernard as evidence of Queenie’s unflattering comparison of him with the rival with whom he was replaced, and that as a cuckolded husband he will fear significant others outside the triad relationship perceiving him as weaker and less masculine than his rival.

Racism is also raised as a significant issue in Levy’s novel. Many of Queenie and Bernard’s neighbours considered it disreputable for Queenie to accept Jamaican lodgers and were openly hostile towards her as a result. It is fairly safe to assume that Queenie’s infidelity would be considered a profound social disgrace by them. There would then follow a reversal of the reflective process where self-evaluation is bolstered by the success or accomplishment of a close other. According to the SEM account Bernard will feel reflective shame at Queenie’s disgrace and the fact that she faces being socially ostracised. Queenie’s fidelity and the social benefits of marital status with all its attendant implications of conferring adulthood, social respectability and maturity play a substantial role in maintaining Bernard’s self-image. The corrosive effect of her infidelity leads to an intense feeling of alienation, uncertainty and confusion. Just as the SEM theory predicts, Bernard’s self-image is profoundly threatened.

“Everything about this dreadful homecoming was awry. Nothing of the life that played before me was recognisable. I felt I’d stumbled into someone else’s existence by mistake and was now busy trying to find my part.” [p. 507]

If my analysis is correct, the complexity of the jealousy narrative implies that there are three elements of comparison which can impact on the intensity of jealousy (1) unflattering self-comparison with a rival (2) one’s partner’s perceived unflattering comparison of oneself with a rival and (3) unflattering comparison of oneself with a rival by significant others outside of the triad. It is not clear from the DeSteno and Salovey studies which, if any, of the three elements is more significant for the participants. In respect of the studies generally, once again they are open to the criticisms raised earlier in respect of the adoption of hypothetical scenario paradigms and the reliability of individuals self-reports about their emotional response. For example, can we be certain that the respondents are reliably and accurately assessing the importance of the three domains in their evaluation of their self-image?
Nevertheless, the characteristics of the rival are undoubtedly a significant factor that influences the degree to which the feeling of sexual jealousy is intensified. An extensive psychological literature has documented that feelings of jealousy are related to rival characteristics and Self–Evaluation Theory has been suggested to account for these relations. In mature relationships intensity of sexual jealousy may be influenced far more by the length of time the relationship has been enjoyed, the degree of deception involved in the episode of infidelity, whether friends and relatives were aware of the deception before the injured partner became aware of the “offence”, or the degree of intimacy displayed rather than the characteristics of the perceived rival. Indeed, in many episodes of jealousy we may not have any or only vague awareness of the specific characteristics of a rival.

According to the SEM model presented by DeSteno and Salovey the adaptive functioning of jealousy is intrinsically tied to social interactions through which numerous essential needs are satisfied (protection, resource acquisition, reproduction). Given the rewards provided by relationships competition for them often occurs and it is not unlikely that an emotion emerged specifically to protect these relationships. Moreover, it is plausibly more efficient to have a single emotion that is sensitive to rival-induced threats to any established or potentially rewarding relationship than to have discrete systems designed for each particular type of relationship, as suggested by the EP theory. Why might we favour a model of episodes of jealousy that gives prominence to the role played by self-evaluation? The reason is that the attention one receives from a partner in a valued relationship is taken as a signifier of self-worth. We are dependent on others for our very identity. The focused attention of significant others is part of how one form’s one’s own self-image, and the threat to the relationship that the partner places on the rival is a function of the degree to which one’s self-image is threatened. Vigilant protection of one’s self-esteem therefore helps protect the physical and psychological benefits associated with relationships. The possessiveness of jealousy may have much more to do with concerns over identity than ownership. In displaying jealousy, what Bernard seeks to protect is the role that Queenie plays in his sense of selfhood.

A model that focuses on the relationship between the individual and their partner, rather than the rival, might provide a useful additional perspective on jealousy-evoking situations. As indicated earlier, socio-cognitivist theorists have particularly emphasised two factors that can impact on the likelihood of experiencing sexual jealousy (1) when some aspect of a person’s self-concept, self-regard or other representation is threatened and (2) when relationship rewards are threatened. This second factor is given prominence in the Social Exchange Theory of Jealousy.
**Social Exchange Theory of Jealousy**

An alternative way of explaining the discrepancies between the way that sex and romantic relationships are viewed by females and males is through the application of Social Exchange theory (SET) to romantic relationships. SET analyses interactions between two parties by examining the costs and benefits to each. The key point of the theory is that it assumes the two parties are both giving and receiving items of value from each other. According to this theory, interactions between the parties are only likely to persist if both parties believe they are coming out of the exchange with more than they are giving up. That is, if both parties profit from their interactions.

The theory is a development of Kelley’s exchange theory of interpersonal relationships (Kelley, 1979, 1986). Using Levy’s literary example, the exchange theory suggests that Bernard and Queenie entered into their relationship to the extent that it provided them with personal rewards. These rewards are delivered on their understanding of the mutual exchange of costs and benefits of the relationship to each other. In the early stages of a typical romantic relationship the balance of exchange will simply not be an issue. It is only later, once the “honeymoon” period of the relationship is over that costs will be related to satisfaction with the relationship. In deciding what is equitable and fair within the relationship both members of the dyad will consider whether there is a satisfactory balance between what they individually put into and get out of the relationship in the way of emotional, social and economic rewards.

The essence of the theory is that social behaviour is the result of an exchange process to maximise rewards and minimise costs. Rewards can be characterised as anything that a person gains from the relationship (social status, emotional security, economic stability, sexual access) and costs will involve the negative consequences of the relationship (wasted energy, time and effort, loss of status). This can be narrowed down to very specific behaviours. If a wife spends a great deal of time and expense choosing a card and gift for her husband to mark their first wedding anniversary, which can be regarded as a relationship maintenance activity, and her husband fails to reciprocate in kind she may believe that she has been insufficiently rewarded. She may be angry that her husband has been insensitive to her need for the significance of their relationship to be mutually recognized in this very specific way and consider that it signals a lack of interest in the relationship, particularly if she is aware that her husband is conscientious about never forgetting his mother’s birthday and always takes great pains to find her a gift that he believes will give his mother enjoyment and pleasure. Her husband has only a finite amount of time and emotional energy to expend and she may well feel that she is being emotionally “short changed”.

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This behaviour is likened to economic exchanges in the market place with tokens of love, affection and emotional commitment as the currency. It is predicted that failure to get the expected reward here in the form of reciprocation will lead to anger on the part of the wife since, according to the theory; reciprocation is the basis of all human social interaction and will have a direct impact on relationship satisfaction and stability. Stable and happy relationships are those in which the exchange of costs and benefits is equitable for both parties, and the theory is concerned with looking at the factors that mediate the formation, maintenance and breakdown of exchange relationships and the dynamics within them.

The core assumptions of the theory can be summarised as follows: (1) individuals seek rewards and avoid losses (2) they will seek to maximise rewards and minimise losses guided by their expectations of receiving a reward or avoiding a loss (3) these expectations are the result of rationalising from the information they have about possible alternative outcomes (4), the standards by which these costs and benefits are calculated vary between individuals and an individual’s standards may vary over time (Sabatelli and Shehan, 1993).

The theory has heuristic value here because, referring back to the Levy example once again, it is straightforwardly applicable to the situation in which Bernard and Queenie find themselves. In the marketplace of social economics their cultural system endows female sexuality with value, whereas male sexuality is treated as relatively worthless. Female virginity, fidelity, chastity and faithfulness have positive values that are not applicable to males. Through her sexual infidelity Queenie has given a valuable female commodity to someone outside the relationship. In the past Bernard has given her rewards such as companionship, respect, material resources and emotional commitment in exchange for that commodity and expected her fidelity in return. After the jealousy episode the couple’s decision to stay together will be a pragmatic one based on weighing up the costs and benefits that would result if the relationship was dissolved. Both Queenie and Bernard, for example, stand to lose their reputation as a respectable couple (no small consideration in the prevailing social climate) and the narrative suggests (although we are not told) that they will choose to move away together.

We can surmise from the narrative that Bernard recognised that he had let Queenie down in his role of husband and provider. In addition, unbeknownst to Queenie, prior to being demobbed he had been court marshalled and spent two weeks in prison. He had also had a sexual encounter with a prostitute which he profoundly regretted, and for a while suspected he had contracted syphilis. All three factors were a cause of shame for Bernard, but these last two events were particularly shameful and motivated his decision not to return home immediately after being demobbed. He felt guilty and believed Queenie deserved a better husband, which he
was going to try to be. On the principle of reciprocity, with its notions of fairness, the exchange theory predicts that this should lessen any anger he feels towards Queenie caused by any of her actions he considers shameful. For her part Queenie recognises the pain she has caused Bernard.

It would be a misconception of the relationship, and the exchange theory as it is espoused by some recent theorists who are keen to acknowledge the fruitfulness of building emotion and emotional processes into exchange theorising (e.g. Lawler & Thye, 1999; Lawler, 2001; Molm et al, 1999, 2000) to believe that their decision making is devoid of emotional weighting. Emotions are fundamental features of social exchange because they generate affective attachments to social units. The relationship between Queenie and Bernard is based on their emotional investment in the relationship and genuine concern for the other person involved that follows naturally from the commitment they entered into on marriage. It is based on the recognition of each other’s needs, and it can therefore been seen that it is not tethered to a purely capitalistic, market concept of human marital relationships. However, their interdependence rests upon the ability each has to control the rewards and punishments of the other. They control each other’s fate to the extent that Bernard and Queenie both care about what the other does to him or her and need support from each other. They also have behavioural control over each other to the extent that their rewards, such as social approval, social status, companionship, self-esteem and emotional security are dependent upon a certain combination of the actions of both. The outcomes of the partners have become intertwined and in long term committed relationships short term irregularities can be tolerated as their calculations of the rewards of the relationship begin to be made over longer periods of time.

Bernard’s jealousy acts as an awareness cue for both Queenie and Bernard that may well promote the survival of the relationship since the violent episode it provokes makes both of them sensitive to the value they place on the relationship and their desire to protect it. Bernard’s jealousy can therefore have positive consequences, since it may motivate reparation and improvements in the relationship.

Cognitive Appraisal Theory and the SEM and SE Models

Socio-cognitive theorists highlight the critical importance of cognitive appraisal in jealousy episodes, drawing on the work of Magda Arnold (1960) and Richard Lazarus (1991). One particular model proposed by White and Mullen (1989) distinguishes between what are called primary and secondary appraisals. Broadly speaking Bernard’s primary appraisal will have involved appraisal of the event of the birth of Queenie’s baby as having a positive, negative or no consequences for him. Since his appraisal was negative he will then determine the scope of the
threat and engage in secondary appraisals designed to cope with the threat. In Bernard’s case, of course, the primary appraisal of threat is elicited by the birth of his wife’s baby fathered by a rival. In other cases a simple event such as an apathetic response from Queenie to a declaration of affection (signalling emotional disengagement or seeing Queenie hold the gaze of another male for a longer period than necessary might be cues (not necessarily consciously assessed) that elicit within Bernard a vague sense of threat to the relationship. This functions to motivate actions that will result in breaking up the threatening relationship or liaison. In Bernard’s case it results in him attacking Gilbert. Additional secondary cognitive appraisals will come into play as Bernard engages in efforts to understand the implications of the infidelity for the relationship and for him. These appraisals then affect the intensity and direction of his jealous feelings. By integrating both the SEM and SE models within an analysis of Bernard’s behaviour we can, I think, gain a further valuable perspective on the cognitive appraisals associated with his jealousy.

Conclusion: Evolutionary Explanations and Social Explanations

It is plausible that the foundations of any relevant mechanisms regarding mating and rearing strategies emerged far earlier along the path of our evolutionary history than that postulated by the EP theory, in which case we cannot rule out the possibility that different proximate causes might have led to different proximate mechanisms. Even if this were not the case it is not clear that a more general jealousy mechanism, as suggested by socio-cognitive theorists, could not have been selected for rather than the hard-wired sexually dimorphic jealousy mechanisms postulated by the EP model. Wood & Eagly’s (2002) cross cultural data suggests the relative contribution of males and females to subsistence varies greatly cross-culturally, depending upon the type of resources available. This present day unpredictability makes it quite difficult to reliably infer what the precise conditions were in the Pleistocene era. We have no confirmation that infidelity occurred in sufficient rates for the emergence of a sex specific jealousy mechanism. Why might it not be equally possible for high female mortality rates in childbirth to have worked to produce a mechanism that reduced male promiscuity? A pair-bonded male who engaged in sexual promiscuity risked not only danger of assault from the rival mate of the female but also risked losing a scarce commodity, namely his own mate. The best strategy might therefore have been to remain monogamous once a mate was found. On this view it is not claimed that infidelity never occurred but that the fitness risks may have outweighed the benefits, making infidelity a non-maximising strategy.

As this alternative account demonstrates, plausible adaptive hypotheses are easily generated. However, confirmation of them is problematic. Any trait’s relative fitness value will
depend upon the environment and the range of competing alternative traits. It is easy come up with plausible accounts of recurrent situations of the kind postulated by EP theorists in correspondence with most if not all emotions and describe these recurrent situations at some arbitrary level of specificity. We could therefore equally posit jealousy of parent, jealousy of offspring and jealousy of territory mechanisms as distinct emotion programs, according to EP. The availability of plausible hypotheses regarding the evolution of such mechanisms clearly does not provide evidence for their existence and without further, more robust empirical paradigms with which to investigate their claim the EP theory regarding the existence of a sexually dimorphic jealousy mechanism remains unconfirmed.

That, of course, does not exclude an evolutionary explanation of jealousy. Regardless of the environmental conditions, it would not be fitness enhancing to devote one’s time and emotional energy into establishing and maintaining a relationship that results in valuable rewards (such as a commitment to life-long pair bonding, exclusive sexual access and sharing the raising of children) then fail to respond negatively to any potential threat to that relationship. Whilst pathological or morbid jealousy is destructive, a moderate degree of jealousy can be beneficial. Jealousy need not always be a reaction to an infidelity that has already occurred but a way of taking the initiative. It can operate as a preventative strategy to protect the relationship where infidelity is suspected. A display of jealousy when doubts about one’s partner’s fidelity are aroused can motivate reparation and improvements in the relationship by drawing the attention of the “offending” partner to the fact that they have been neglectful or insensitive to the needs of the other. This might encourage the “offender” to focus their attention on the rewards that they receive from maintaining the bond with their partner or significant other, such as emotional security and pleasurable interdependence. It might also make the “offending” partner focus positively on the significance of the relationship for their own self-esteem and social identity. Deliberately evoking jealousy in one’s significant other can result in a variety of rewards, such as the other partner beginning to display more affection within the relationship, or becoming more generous with his or her time when they are reminded of the desirability of their mate to potential rivals. Evidence that one’s partner experiences a significant degree of jealousy can confirm the strength of the other’s commitment to the relationship and bolster one’s sense of self-worth. It affirms one’s status in the life and happiness of the other. On the other hand, absence of jealousy can be an indicator of lack of interest and emotional commitment to the relationship. By construing jealousy as a mechanism that acts as a vigilant barometer to help monitor the strength of the other’s commitment to a relationship we can begin to see it as a valuable part of our human psychological arsenal.
In the last chapter I examined the EP theory of a sexually dimorphic jealousy mechanism and argued that both its advocates and its opponents face the challenge of developing more sophisticated research paradigms if the debate is to progress much further. It might be that jealousy evolved as a general mechanism, as suggested by socio-cognitivist theories, in response to any sort of relationship threat but different hard wired triggers could be built into this mechanism that make specific types of threat more salient to males than to females, or vice versa. In this way the sex differentiated theory of evolved jealousy can be accommodated within the theory of jealousy not just as a response to a threat of sexual treachery but as a response to general relationship threats. This would acknowledge the overwhelming importance placed on human social relationships and the fundamental need to safeguard them. Naturally, individuals will respond to jealousy-eliciting stimuli in idiosyncratic ways based on their appraisal of the situation, cultural mores and the significance of the relationship but below this conscious response there could be an evolved mechanism deeply scripted in our cognitive architecture that has made different types of cues more salient to one sex than the other.

Given the primary importance of the protection of social relationships it is certainly tempting to think of jealousy as a universal response to any perceived potential threat to the stability of that relationship. A biological approach to jealousy is naturally founded in both the benefits and costs of reproduction and child care. There are some respects in which this situation is replicated generation after generation in humanity, irrespective of particular forms of social organization and cultural norms surrounding intimate relationships. These are the aspects of jealousy particularly associated with sexual intercourse and child-rearing, and so dependent upon sexual dimorphism and parental care. However, we have seen that there is more to jealousy than that. There are other social relationships that need to be protected, and societal and cultural variation can influence what the consequences of loss or weakening of these social relationships can mean. Even in the context of sexual relationships between partners, cultural practices concerning fidelity can influence what sort of a threat signs of emotional or sexual infidelity can pose to men and women. So on the whole the understanding of jealousy supplied by an evolutionary explanation should not restrict the focus of attention in relation to jealousy. To understand the phenomenon of jealousy in all its complexity requires a socially informed and cross-cultural approach. There may be some truth in the evolutionary explanation of jealousy. But like most evolutionary explanations it should predominantly be thought of as historical, and cannot be expected to cover the full range of that emotional kind.
Chapter 4

Embarrassment

One way of adopting a lexicocentric approach to the emotions is to consider distinctions between emotion terms in a single language. There will not be so much to gain from entering into cross-cultural linguistic studies until we have made some progress in examining how specific emotion terms are cognized in English. In this chapter I shall argue for a distinction between embarrassment and shame and focus on embarrassment as a way of examining the relationship between the so-called basic emotions and the self-conscious emotions. I will examine a number of different models of embarrassment which have identified antecedent events (connected to exposure of physical frailty or cognitive ineptness, loss of control [either physical or cognitive] and failures at privacy regulation). These can be seen as problems that embarrassment seems designed to solve. They are typically connected to infringements of social conventions. Social rules, in the form of conventions, are a basis for the formation of co-operative alliances and the maintenance of smooth social interactions. From a functionalist perspective, displays of embarrassment serve the emoter as a mechanism for the swift, non-verbal communication to others that such social norms are respected and the sincere desire to make amends in the event of an offence against some norm. This is consistent with the fairly robustly held belief that humans are naturally and profoundly socio-centric creatures, whose physiological and psychological well-being is predicated on seeking co-operation from, and developing alliances with, others. Echoing a theme from the earlier discussion of jealousy, we foster mutual interdependence and this promotes the emergence of emotions that support and maintain the development of such relationships. Indeed, for many theorists embarrassment has a serious claim to the status of a human universal, valid for all cultures, with origins in the deep past of our species and echoes in the social hierarchies of present day non-human primates. Unlike the established basic emotions, such as fear and disgust, however, it requires the representation of other’s mental states and, as I shall argue, is crucially dependent upon a lengthy developmental process, perhaps longer and more complex than most emotion theorists have previously acknowledged.

The self-conscious emotions seem to be the most distinctively human emotions, relying as they do on appraisals of the most characteristically human aspects of our lives, i.e., appraisals of the self, group membership, and morality. Although analogues may be identified in non-human primates and other species the substantial elaboration of human self-representation and group dynamics constitute a quantitative leap in emotional complexity. If it is eventually established, as Ekman and others suspect, that embarrassment is a human universal it is likely to be the case that
different cultures find new solutions to the problems for which embarrassment, and other self-conscious emotions, have been identified as the solution. It is also possible that different cultures may find new uses for the emotion of embarrassment. Differences in the moralisation of self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment, shame and guilt and their elicitors might be indicators of cultural variation in the function of these emotions.

Introduction

One day a couple of weeks ago, me and roughly 10 friends were jamming on the heath, kicking a football, drinking and smoking, when Aaron said to me, “So, Jack, what’s all this Living with Teenagers bullshit?” I looked at him for a moment rather baffled and asked him what he was talking about. Everyone else around started to look down at the ground and avoid eye contact as if a deep, dark secret was being concealed. So I demanded an explanation and immediately my friends Thea and Amy started to shout accusations at Aaron, demanding to know why he’d told them I already knew about this. Knew about what? What were they talking about? At this point I was really starting to get annoyed, so I stood up, silenced the crowd and shouted till my wants were met.

Then they all began to explain my predicament: for the past two years my mum had been publishing (on a [...] weekly basis) all goings on within our household. And, completely unknown to me, they’d all been reading it, and for quite a few weeks now they’d all been certain it must be my mum, but hadn’t said anything for fear of embarrassing me.

At first, due to having friends with an incredibly imaginative habit of pranks, I refused to believe it. It was a joke, right? But no. That’s when I was to find out that it was not only true, but it had also been made into a book and 3 out of 10 of my friends already owned it! I took a deep breath, gathered my thoughts and asked how long they had known? “Bout as long as we’ve known you, Jack. My mum gave it to me,” answered Thea slightly forlornly.

Right, I thought, where do I start? I tried calling my mum, but luckily for her it was engaged. I just didn’t know what to think or what to say. That first couple of minutes after I found out it was like a very well hidden secret had just exploded. Everyone was rather sheepish. The girls acted slightly shell-shocked, while the boys couldn’t stop laughing. It wasn’t appreciated.

“What kind of stuff does it say?” I asked, immediately wishing I hadn’t. “Everything you could possibly wish for” they said, “from arguments over sofa seats to times when you grabbed for the vacuum cleaner as a weapon – and even the slow, steady but sure growth of your pubic hair”.

At this point I was really beginning to not be impressed. Highlighting my puberty? Surely my mum wouldn’t stoop that low? I was starting to feel like a pestered celebrity with the gasping public taking an interest in the minor details of my life on a day to day basis, and honestly, no one needs that.

But the secret was out and I really wasn’t sure what to think about it. While we were on the heath I needed to collect my shorts from Thea’s house and so she and I had a little walk while I gathered my thoughts. Still in recovery from my embarrassment, I asked her what she really thought of the book. She replied that she never really reads books, but she read Living with Teenagers in a flash, and at one point it even made her cry. “The bit about when you were a baby and how much your mum loved you and all that”.
This improved my mood a little bit, but at the same time I realised that I was not going to live this down for an awful long time. For two years I’d had no idea that almost every little stupid thing I said or did was being written down for public consumption. Right now it’s been about three weeks since I found out. Today I was still ridiculed three times (no exaggeration) for the specific column that referred to my pubic hair. I’m now known as Mr Three Hairs, and my friends were even kind enough to quote that particular section of the article in a forum on the internet for all to see.

“Farewell Eddie, Becca and Jack” Family, Saturday Guardian 14 June 2008.

So, for the past two years, and totally unbeknownst to him (and his two older siblings), Jack’s mother had been writing a weekly column which was published in the Family section of a well known Sunday newspaper. The column was intended to present the frustrations and joys of being a parent of three teenagers. Each week details their exploits, tantrums; character development and sometimes intimate physical development were described in affectionate but frank detail. The anonymous columnist attempted to protect the privacy of her family but it was not long before close friends of Jack’s realised that the column was written about him. Some assumed that he knew about the column but that he did not wish to discuss it. Other friends did not broach the subject because they felt uncomfortable. Others probably relished the knowledge that Jack was totally unaware of the situation. Although Jack only directly identifies his emotional reaction towards the end of the narrative for most readers it really is superfluous. The circumstances described are enough for us to be aware of the emotion that he was feeling. His mother’s actions had placed him in a socially awkward position. He had been made aware that he was the subject of gossip regarding his private life. He was also exposed to derogatory, albeit relatively good natured, comments regarding his physical development. It seems hard to imagine a more apposite scenario likely to elicit embarrassment in an adolescent boy.

In fact, whether embarrassment should count as a self-conscious emotion distinct from shame is not intuitively apparent to everyone. Although embarrassment does not seem to involve the distressing sense of remorse regarding a transgression that characterises guilt its distinction from shame is less clear. Did Jack in fact experience shame rather than embarrassment? Is embarrassment part of or a less severe form of shame?
The distinction between Shame and Embarrassment

Embarrassment and shame are similar in that both seem to arise from identity-based concerns but several theorists have highlighted differences between them (Babcock and Sabini, 1990; Sabini, Garvey and Hall 2001 Smith et al, 2002) While both emotions seem to involve a sense of self-exposure and smallness, and both motivate avoidance behaviours (Tangney et al 1996) it has been argued that people feel embarrassed when they think that others will see them as flawed but feel ashamed when they think that they themselves are flawed (Sabini et al 2001). It has also been argued that whereas shame often stems from behaviour that oversteps moral prescriptions prototypical scenarios of embarrassment involve behaviours that infringe social conventions (Parrott, Sabini & Silver, 1988). These distinctions between the two emotions suggest that they will often co-occur if an individual both fears that the flaw is present and fears what others may think about it. Embarrassment, but not shame, will occur in situations where one does not internalise the sense of a flawed self. On this account, it seems unlikely that shame and embarrassment always co-occur together. It also appears that the experience of embarrassment has a distinctive phenomenology. Typically associated with a sense of feeling doltish and more than a little flustered, embarrassing scenarios are the stuff of light farce. They do not carry the overtones of serious misconduct that accompany shame, with its sense of feeling small and worthless, leading to strong feelings of depression or regret (see Buss, A (1980) Self Consciousness and Social Anxiety. San Francisco: W H Freeman for further discussion).

Is Jack feeling shame or embarrassment, or both? The feelings that Jack describes are hardly those involving an evaluation of him as worthless or morally flawed. Whilst they involve a sense of self-focussed mortification or chagrin it is not his core self but his presented self that is negatively evaluated. Jack’s assessment is that it is his social persona or image that has been the focus of attention. He will have to endure merciless teasing from some of his friends, but his evaluation of his core self is still positive.

Shame is usually associated with internally directed feelings, centred on self-recrimination and a lowering of self-esteem. Jack is primarily concerned with what others think about him. In fact, his self-image seems remarkably intact. His emotion was the result of believing that others might see him as flawed, not the belief that he was flawed and, whilst initially flustered, three weeks after the event he is able to take control, or at least he is confident enough to believe that he can cope with the situation. He even has the poise and self-assurance to

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8 I am here using the term “core self” in the sense adopted by Judge et al. The core-self involves evaluations described as the fundamental premises individuals hold about themselves, or the extent to which individuals possess a positive self-image (Judge, Erez & Bono, 1998). Individuals with positive core self-evaluations appraise themselves in a consistently positive manner across situations, such individuals see themselves as capable, worthy, and in control of their lives. (Judge et al 2004).
write about the whole incident in the very newspaper where his mother’s weekly column appeared and look back on the situation with good humour. This would be impossible if the situation had been one that generated shame. Shame is typically associated with the belief that one’s behaviour has been immoral, that one has harmed another in a way that will cause lasting and substantial damage to one’s social identity. Shameful acts are suggestive of intrinsic personal faults. Shame therefore has stronger implications for interpersonal relationships than embarrassment, which tends to follow minor, non-moral transgressions. If shame, involves a focus on immoral behaviour then it might be associated with a tendency to ruminate over specific changes in features of the self that could, in a sense, undo the negative situation. In fact, there is some empirical evidence in support of the claim that agents who feel shame do engage in such counterfactual thinking (Niedenthal, Tangney and Gavinski, 1994). Jack does not describe engaging in any such counterfactual thinking.

Embarrassment and shame also appear to differ in that whilst shame can typically be experienced in the absence of others embarrassment is an emotion that is primarily experienced within a social group. It is a public emotion involving a sense of conspicuousness and being under the scrutiny of others. This does not mean that embarrassment is exclusively an emotion felt in the presence of others. Private embarrassment seems possible when the person imagines the reaction of a potential audience, which prompts the focus of attention towards the self as a social object (Schlenker, 1980), or one may feel embarrassment alone after the emotion-eliciting event when one suddenly realises that others may have witnessed the embarrassing predicament. Nevertheless, it does seem that embarrassment is primarily an emotion experienced when others are present. Shame, on the other hand, is much more likely to occur in the absence of others (Tangney et al 1996) involving a painful realization of one’s own imperfections.

Another distinguishing characteristic is that the antecedents of embarrassment tend to be surprising or unexpected events, such as slips of the tongue, pratfalls, cognitive errors or loss of control over one’s body or emotions, and are more sudden in their onset than the antecedents of shame-provoking scenarios. Jack’s narrative itself supports the idea that there is a tendency for the antecedents of embarrassment to be connected to unforeseen or unanticipated events.

In addition to the fact that there are distinctions between the antecedent events that prompt shame and embarrassment, and the two emotions have a distinct phenomenology, there is also evidence that they result in distinctive expressive non-verbal behaviour that unfolds in a distinct pattern. Typically the sequence for embarrassment (according to Keltner & Buswell, 1996) is:
1. Gaze aversion
2. A smile control, which is a lower facial action that potentially inhibits the smile
3. A non-Duchenne smile, (which only involves the zygomatic major muscle action that pulls the corners of the lips upward)
4. A second smile control
5. Head movements down
6. Face touching

The evidence suggests that the display unfolds in a different temporal order from amusement display and is distinct from shame display (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). A similar pattern has been observed in young children (Lewis et al 1991; Lewis, Stanger & Weiss, 1989). There is also evidence that, to a certain extent, embarrassment and shame have distinct autonomic physiology (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Perhaps the most notable is the blush which it has been claimed is more typical of embarrassment than shame and distinguishable from the blush resulting from excessive exercise, alcohol ingestion or sexual arousal (Miller, 2004; Leary, Britt, Cutlip & Templeton, 1992), although it is possible to experience embarrassment without blushing.

Indeed, embarrassment exhibits many of the criteria Ekman (1992a and 1992b) has identified as characterising basic emotions. It can have rapid, involuntary and relatively automatic onset. It is typically accompanied by a unique pattern of nonverbal behaviour that distinguishes it from other emotions. The non-verbal behaviours that accompany embarrassment and shame may reflect human analogues of the appeasement displays observed in non-human primates. When threatened socially many non-human primates display a set of stereotypic actions that diffuse the threat (averted gaze, nervous smile) and features of this behaviour can be seen in the non-verbal behaviours of humans (Leary, Britt, Cutullip and Templeton, 1992).

In Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology Roberts (2003) describes embarrassment as a “shallow variant” of shame (2003: 230. I have argued above that there is strong support for the claim that shame and embarrassment are related but distinguishable self-evaluative emotions that involve different types of evaluations and have characteristically distinct objects. Assuming acceptance of this distinction, we can now examine Jack’s narrative account in more detail.

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9 Keltner & Buswell’s study observed the display pattern only in connection to being asked to produce a funny looking facial expression during a videotaping session (which might be included under categories of embarrassment that involve inept performances and audience provocation where others intend to embarrass). I suspect it is unlikely that this particular display will accompany all categories of embarrassment. Categories involving guilty knowledge or loss of script may generate only part of the display pattern, though such categories of embarrassment may prove difficult to capture empirically.
Jack’s Account

We have already seen that Jack’s retaining a positive self-image and being able to look back on the episode with humour are more compatible with embarrassment than shame but why choose this particular token of emotional experience? The episode exhibits the main features of prototypical events that elicited embarrassment identified in recent studies. Parrott and Smith (1991) addressed the question of our folk psychological understanding of embarrassment and drew up a table listing the frequently reported features of actual experiences of embarrassment and compared this with respondents’ beliefs about the characteristics of typical episodes of embarrassment. Along with other studies (Miller, 1992; Keltner and Buswell, 1996; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996), their work has indicated that certain central themes recur and Jack’s narrative is consistent with this data. Jack’s account fits all of the seven identified characteristic “predicaments” leading to embarrassment (including, for example, private or intimate matters revealed, situation out of control, other people present, contradicting desired identity or image). In addition, his account fits five out of six of the specific feelings identified as prototypical (centre of attention, feeling awkward and uncomfortable) and appears to fit four out of six identified prototypical responses (changing the subject (collecting shirt) leaving or escaping, making a joke of it, looking away or hiding face).

Another reason why narrative accounts like Jack’s are useful is that they situate the episode very specifically in the emotional life of the target emoter. They highlight the dynamic flow of the emotion, what Austen calls the “little zigzags of embarrassment” (Austen, 1816/2003 : 151). Such accounts illustrate the moment to moment nature of the process and the interaction between those involved in the episode, which, I believe, offers an illuminating perspective on the social interaction that generates the emotion. Although the fidelity of Jack’s memory might be questioned it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the episode made a powerful impression upon him, because of its significance for his relationships with others, and its stimulus for reflection upon his personal identity and his identity within his peer group. His account, I submit, is therefore likely to come close to recreating a great deal of the naturally occurring emotional experience we label embarrassment.

It could be argued that the main disadvantage of the narrative account is that, unlike studies that involve manipulation of emotions in the laboratory, we do not have a description of Jack’s facial expression, changes in vocal affect or any autonomic nervous system responses. However, the account does offer some indication that Jack is sensitive to typical behavioural responses to embarrassing predicaments (looking sheepish, gaze aversion in others as a result of
their feeling vicarious or empathetic embarrassment, to which I will return later) and is therefore more than capable of identifying these responses correctly in himself when he self-ascribes embarrassment.

If we accept that Jack’s account offers a narrative that accurately describes the unfolding of an embarrassing scenario (as opposed to one that was shameful or merely amusing), and I submit that there is overwhelming evidence that it does, we can then begin to look at how causal theories of embarrassment are related to the narrative.

Models of Embarrassment

Dramaturgical/awkward interaction model

Social Science not infrequently adopts theatrical metaphors. Individuals are often referred to as “actors” and their actions as “performances” or “roles”. Following Goffman’s dramaturgical model of social interaction (Goffman, 1956, 1957, 1967) these metaphors have become part of the analytic tools and categories used to examine motivations behind complex behaviour. Put simply, in dramaturgical analysis a target interaction (a business meeting, participating in a group sport, gang behaviour) is compared to the staging of a play. This is then used as a way to identify the underlying strategies, rules and functions of social conduct and the ways in which people negotiate and interpret their place in interactions. The dramaturgical or awkward interaction model of embarrassment (Goffman, 1956, 1967; Parrott, Silver and Sabini, 1988; Silver, Sabini and Parrott, 1987) claims that embarrassment occurs when one fails to follow or loses one’s place in a social script. Social arenas are stages upon which we perform.

To labour the metaphor a little further, individuals are directors engaged in stage-managing their behaviour in order to be in command of the impression they give to observers, a process Goffman refers to as “impression management”. We are primarily concerned with presenting ourselves in a manner that is both appropriate for our chosen role in the particular social context in which we find ourselves and reflects positively or advantageously on us. Our social lives are separated into front or “on-stage performance” regions and backstage regions, analogous to the backstage of a theatre. In public or collective situations we are social actors who are in the business of collaborating in the maintenance of on-stage performances and the concealment of certain backstage behaviours. Awkward situations or surprising predicaments disturb the social order as they represent infringements of the script dictated by the social arena and the on-stage performer is left flustered and embarrassed.
On this model it is the actor’s awkward vacillation and uncertainty about what she should do next that is the causal mechanism leading to the affective arousal we identify as embarrassment. Jack’s account reveals that he lost his composure. He found himself in a “predicament” and did not know “where to start”. He acknowledges that “I just didn’t know what to think or what to say”, “the secret was out and I really wasn’t sure what to think about it” and at one point he takes a deep breath to try and regain his equilibrium. This attempt fails him. In fact, he leaves with Thea. Ostensibly this is to collect something from her house, but really it is a welcome opportunity to withdraw from the social arena and collect his thoughts. Embarrassment arises from anxious uncertainty and loss of direction in the social interaction between Jack and his peers. The smooth flow of interaction between them has become blocked. Jack feels flustered and is unable to comfortably continue the interactional performance. Thus, embarrassment based on awkward interaction is strongly related to one’s social interaction skills and competence.

Rather than any concern he might have about losing the esteem of others the model suggests that Jack’s embarrassment is triggered by his perception that he cannot perform coherently in the situation. Being able to perform a particular role is an intrinsic part of social interaction and Jack has become distressed and uncomfortable at finding himself unable to think of an appropriate response to the situation. He simply does not know how to behave. This is something that is independent of whether Jack believes that the situation represents a threat to his esteem amongst his peers. The highlighting of the awkwardness of the felt experience of embarrassment seems to capture something fundamental about the emotion but what distinguishes the dramaturgical/awkward interaction model is that it identifies this sense of incompetence or flustered confusion as the cause of the emotion, not simply a component part of it. The embarrassment arises because Jack is at a loss to know how to continue the interaction with his peers after the revelation of his mother’s actions since he feels that he cannot find an appropriate behavioural script to perform that will allow him to continue the social encounter. So, he leaves with Thea.

We can identify at least two other ways in which Jack’s narrative account of the incident fits the awkward interaction model, with its emphasis on a loss of social roles and scripts. The parent and child relationship between Jack and his mother clearly does not include the expectation that a parent will reveal private family matters in a national newspaper. Jack’s mother failed to observe the bond of trust that exists between parent and child by revealing too much detailed information that allowed his peers to identify him. In addition, between Jack’s peers there was an implicit script regarding the revelation of personal information. By referring
to the newspaper column in front of Jack, with the others present, Aaron departed from the implicit social script amongst the group to remain silent about the matter when Jack was present. As an aside, it is also worth noting that the model is compatible with the identification of embarrassment as typically involving unexpected or surprising events. In Jack’s case he was simply not prepared for the revelations that unfolded during the social interaction on the heath.

**Loss of Self-esteem/ Social Evaluation theories**

There are two main versions of esteem theories of embarrassment, Loss of Self-Esteem and Social Evaluation theory. Both claim negative social evaluation is the cause of the emotion. Rather than arising as a result of being flustered or feeling awkward, although this can be a potent component of feeling embarrassed, embarrassment is triggered when one is fearful of unwelcome social judgment. However, as we shall see, one account emphasises the primacy of personal evaluation the other emphasises the primacy of the individual’s beliefs about how others are evaluating one’s personal character or identity.

The loss of self-esteem model argues that embarrassment is caused by the individual believing that they have failed to act in accordance with their own personal standards (Edelmann, 1987; Modigliani, 1968, 1971) or is caused by experiencing a loss of situational self-esteem (Modigliani, 1968). On the situational self-esteem account, embarrassment occurs due to unwanted social evaluations and one’s personal disapproval of one’s behaviour in response to a specific social predicament. (Modigliani, 1971) The loss of self-esteem arises from negative self-evaluation about one’s performance because of how that performance is likely to be perceived by onlookers. The knowledge that others are negatively evaluating one’s conduct leads to self-disapproval and it is this that causes embarrassment

The esteem model emphasises the primacy of negative personal evaluation. One is acutely distressed at one’s own behaviour and self-esteem plummets as a result. Social Evaluation theory, on the other hand, argues that embarrassment ensues when one anticipates or suspects that one’s esteem in the eyes of others has fallen, irrespective of whether one’s self-esteem plummets. On this account embarrassment is primarily dependent on what we assume or believe others think of us rather than concern about our self-evaluation. Most of us wish to be liked or well thought of, or if not well thought of we wish to be respected and the primary focus of embarrassment, on the esteem model, is what others think of us. One’s self-esteem is threatened since an audience may form an undesired or unfavourable impression (Edelman, 1988; Miller, 1996; Miller and Leary, 1992)/ This does not mean that individuals will always seek to elicit positive evaluations from others, since it is possible for someone to be motivated to project a self-
image that is threatening or intimidating. Any evaluation that poses a threat to maintaining a
desired presentation of oneself to significant others could be a potential source of embarrassment.

How do esteem theorists account for Jack’s embarrassment? It is the loss of face he
experiences in the eyes of his peers. The interdependent self-construal that Jack has sought to
maintain with friends has been eroded by the revelation of the “dark secret” and he fears a
temporary loss of regard or respect in their eyes. As soon as this realisation dawns on him Jack
will become flustered, mortified and will feel embarrassed. However, the model that seems to fit
Jack’s narrative most closely is one that accepts that he can maintain a positive self-evaluation
even when he believes or fears that his desired presentation of himself to his friends has been
threatened.

Throughout the narrative Jack maintains a fairly robust core self. It is his presented image
that he fears may need repairing. This is the main focus of his concern, not self-disapproval. His
primary fear is that he is the subject of undesirable evaluation by his peers. Jack’s narrative
account therefore suggests support for the social evaluation model over the loss of esteem
models, since his account is compatible with a model that accepts it is possible to maintain a
positive core self image whilst fearing that one’s presented self had been diminished in the eyes
of others. In human groups social position is often determined by the possession of socially
valued personal, material and social attributes. From an evolutionary point of view human fitness,
as social creatures, is likely to be contingent on the ability to attract positive social attention and
the ability to recognise when there is a threat in that regard.

Of course, Jack’s assessment depends on the strength of the correlation between his self-
estee m and esteem in the eyes of others. He seems perfectly capable of dissociating his core self
and his presented self but realises that he is not an entirely bounded, autonomous and self-
sufficient social unit independent of others. Being over-concerned with the evaluation of others
would be debilitating and deprive him of social confidence. Nevertheless, Jack realises that in the
eyes of his peers his image might have been eroded to some degree and he is motivated to repair
the damage to his self-presentation. Part of the repair process (his “image maintenance”) involved
writing the article quoted at the beginning of the chapter, which was printed immediately beneath his mother’s final column for the newspaper. It achieved at least two things for Jack. Firstly, it showed him in a positive light. He is good natured about the teasing he receives, though it clearly annoys him. The narrative is self-deprecating and humorous, implying that any perceived transgressions on his part (those silly things he did that his mother has pointed out about him) have been relatively trivial and can be overcome. He indicates, in a very public manner, that he can rise above his predicament and is capable of maintaining his social
poise. Secondly, it gained him some prestige with his male friends when he announced that the piece was going to be published in the national press. This might have been particularly beneficial to Jack. Achieving even minor celebrity seems to be a potent social elevator amongst teens – one friend begged Jack to specifically mention him by name in the column just so he could see his name in print. Becoming so mortified by the embarrassing event that he simply left the scene may well have been counterproductive for Jack. It may have created a poor impression amongst his peers (Levin & Arluke, 1982) leading to increased teasing and ridicule at their next encounter - in particular from his male friends. However, the social status Jack gained through national exposure in the media may have made a significant contribution towards restoring his desired self-presented image within his peer group.

There is another reason why the loss of self-esteem model seems inadequate to explain Jack’s narrative account. Jack is to a large extent the recipient of an embarrassing act, rather than its perpetrator, as might be the case with a cognitive error or inept performance.

An example of a cognitive error leading to embarrassment occurred when the Welsh Government Minister, Rhodri Glyn Thomas, was asked to announce the winner of the Wales Book of the Year at an awards ceremony at the Hilton Hotel, Cardiff. The Minister misread the card and incorrectly announced that the runner up, Tom Bullough, was the recipient of the £10,000 prize. Unfortunately he did not realise his mistake until Tom had almost made his way up onto the stage, amidst great applause, to pick up the cheque. Rhodri hastily corrected himself and Tom had to turn round and walk empty handed all the way back to his seat as the audience gasped with embarrassment and discomfort. Tom did not return to the stage to collect his runner-up prize. He later described the experience as “truly appalling” adding that “such a quick succession of euphoria, bewilderment, vertigo, humiliation, despair and absolute broken – heartedness have no place in real life”. Rhodri was mortified and sent a written apology to Tom, the organisers of the event and the winner of the prize.

Jack, however, does not revert to the strategy of offering excuses, justifications or apologies. He is not responsible for the predicament in which he finds himself since it was the actions of his mother which singled him out for attention because of her failure to observe implicit privacy regulations. He describes feeling “[like a pestered celebrity with the gasping public taking an interest in the minor details of my life on a day to day basis, and honestly, no one needs that”. Simply being on the receiving end of an embarrassing act, or having a dislike of being the centre of unwanted attention have no necessary correlation with negative self-

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10 BBC News /Wales 2 July 2008 Minister sorry over prize Error http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/7485884.stm
evaluation\textsuperscript{11}. As far as the personal standards account is concerned the finding that people rarely experience embarrassment in the absence of an audience (Tangney \textit{et al}, 1996) suggests that other cognitive appraisal processes are being engaged rather than a simple comparison of one’s actions with personal standards of behaviour (Miller, 1996). Of the two esteem accounts, the social evaluation model more closely accords with Jack’s narrative.

\textit{Evaluating the Models}

Should we privilege the social evaluation/awkward interaction model over the dramaturgical or awkward situation model? The dramaturgical model has received strong support from Solomon who argues that “embarrassment is an \textit{innocent} emotion. One might say it embodies a disclaimer, a waiver of responsibility. One finds oneself in an awkward situation but accepts no fault” (Solomon, 2006: 93-94 italics added).

Solomon’s insistence that the agent accepts no fault fails to acknowledge the appeasement function of embarrassment, particularly in relation to physical pratfalls, inept performances or cognitive shortcomings. Rhodri Glyn Thomas felt the need to apologise for his error in reading out the wrong name of the winner of the Wales Book of the Year prize because he felt some degree of \textit{fault}. Indeed, it is difficult to see how he could have felt any sense of mortification if he considered himself entirely blameless or without fault. He failed to take care in the performance of his role and wished to show that he felt a degree of responsibility for the embarrassment and discomfort it caused. Apologies seem apposite where there has been unintended harm to another through cognitive failure, ineptitude, clumsiness or other normative public deficiency. The apology offered by Rhodri served a number of functions. It indicated he had perceived a threat to his positive social identity as Culture Minister and wished to make amends. It also indicated how seriously he took the predicament. He did not offer a perfunctory excuse or attempt to treat the matter as comical. He acknowledged that it was detrimental to the organisers and painfully embarrassing for the main participants. It also indicated he intended to take steps to avoid repeating such errors in the future. The motivation to make amends shows that we can feel blameworthy for normative public deficiencies that are harmful to others however \textit{innocent} we might be of intending harm.

\textsuperscript{11} In fact, of course, being the object of \textit{positive} but undesired public scrutiny can be an antecedent to embarrassment (Miller, 1992; Parrott & Smith, 1991).
Nevertheless, the dramaturgical model, which Solomon endorses, illustrates the manner in which overtly ritual interactions, such as the awards ceremony, can be viewed as a drama in which the participants perform prescribed roles based on scripts. This can be extended to all social interaction. The focus of study, on the dramaturgical model, is not the individual but the expressive rules that govern action in public life. The concept of character is central to the dramaturgical model. It makes reference to the effect of self-presentation performances in the eyes of others and examines how individuals respond to the expressive demands of social life. The model still has to explain how an understanding of ritualised performances is related to an individual’s sense of personal identity that functions to build a cohesive identity from diverse ritualised performances. How is personal identity related to the individual components of personality evident to different audiences (work colleagues, authority figures, siblings, family, peers, and outsiders)? It is easy to see the relevance of this model when dealing with isolated performances, like Jack’s in the social episode discussed. Yet, uncertainty remains as to the actual principle involved in linking together such performances with a sense of personal identity. Nonetheless, this should not preclude us from accepting that such episodes are a valid object for analysis in social psychology as contexts for making sense of social life.

On the other hand, if the social evaluation model were the only account needed to explain embarrassment this would seem to establish something which is trivially true. We are concerned about what others think of us. Our esteem in the eyes of others is important to us. Miller’s definition of embarrassment states that “the acute state of flustered, awkward, abashed chagrin that follows events that increase the threat of unwanted evaluations [negative or positive] from real or imagined audiences (Miller, 1996 p 129). Miller’s definition has the failing of not being able to account for the fact that we can actually blush from pleasure. For example, the unexpected receiving of praise from a positive role model can result in blushing with pride and has no plausible connection with feelings of unwanted evaluation and certainly will not involve a feeling of chagrin. The embarrassment following from positive attention has proved problematic for esteem theorists. Advocates of the dramaturgical model could account for these problematic episodes by arguing that it can be difficult to respond appropriately to being singled out for praise or a compliment. Our esteem in the eyes of others is indeed important to us, and when we receive unexpected acknowledgement of that esteem this can lead to blushing with embarrassment, which may be accompanied by feelings of awkwardness but this need not be a disagreeable experience. While, for Miller, the only necessary condition for embarrassment is an uncomfortable, acute concern about social evaluation, the dramaturgical model suggests that our
emotions are also invested in there being a stable micro-order, a sense of stable identities in our interactions.

The Unwanted Exposure of the Self

The models discussed so far have certainly captured something of our folk intuitions regarding episodes of embarrassment. It is possible that they identify distinct dimensions of embarrassment. Self-induced embarrassment (involving actor responsible predicaments, including tactlessness, inept performance and rule violations) is perhaps more likely to be triggered by and associated with a flustered social script and awkward interaction scenarios. Other inducements of embarrassment, on the other hand, are perhaps more frequently to be associated with anticipation of negative social evaluation. However, it remains to be established that either beliefs about others negative evaluations or one’s flawed social performance are necessary conditions for embarrassment. Embarrassment can sometimes occur when one is being praised, as noted earlier, or more simply it can occur merely from the uncomfortable recognition that the attention of others is being directed at oneself. Neither of these cases seem to imply negative evaluations and although there may be insecurity and uncertainty regarding how one ought to respond this hardly seems to be necessary. More recent accounts have characterised embarrassment as the unwanted exposure of the self. It essentially involves the construal of oneself as involved in interpersonal exposure to which one is averse or would simply prefer not to receive (Purshouse, 2001; Robbins and Parlavecchio, 2006).

Embarrassment, on this account, involves an aversive self-conscious awareness of self through the imaginative projection of the evaluation of others. In Jack’s case, there were certainly intimate personal revelations that he would have preferred to remain private. He obviously found being the object of scrutiny by his peers, without his knowledge, deeply embarrassing. Being unaware that he was the object of such scrutiny left him psychologically unguarded and exposed. He was unable to control the projected self-image that informed his peers’ evaluation of him. The sharing of intimate details between members of a dyad or group is typically an indication of the strength and status of the relationship. By taking away his ability to control interpersonal exposures Jack’s mother had deprived him of a social mechanism by which he can selectively establish close intimacy. On this account there are very good, rational reasons for seeking to avoid the sort of exposure that Jack was subjected to. Some common metaphors regarding embarrassment are also directly linked with exposure, I felt naked, I was caught with my
pants down, I wanted to crawl under a rock, I wanted the earth to swallow me up. Jack himself uses an exposure metaphor to describe the situation as “like a very well hidden secret had just exploded”.

Embarrassment is intimately connected with psychological defenceslessness, the surrender of conscious control, and physical vulnerability. The physiological accompaniments of embarrassment engenders a focussing on the body as a source of information, reminding us of our physicality, our gross corporeality (the fact that we are made up of mucus, bodily fluids, organs), and uncomfortably reminds us that our corporeal body is an object for others (most embarrassment scenarios specify an audience). The characterisation of embarrassment therefore, I suggest, ought to include the unwanted physical or psychological exposure of the self. In particular, it frequently involves the sudden, unwanted exposure of psychological or physiological frailties. We typically seek to manage our self-presentation to others in a way that conceals those parts of the self (both physical and psychological) that we prefer to keep private. However, it need not necessarily include any projection of the evaluation of others. Embarrassment can occur simply through recognition that one is in the focal cross-fire of others, regardless of whether there is an evaluative component. It is the fact that one is reminded that there is potential for one to be the subject of evaluation that grounds embarrassment. For deeply socio-centric creatures such a mechanism is invaluable.

A Developmental Account

Lewis’ developmental research on embarrassment in the field of child psychology, based principally on observation of behavioural expressions, has identified an early form of self-consciousness, “exposure embarrassment”, distinguishable developmentally from a second, more cognitively complex form of self-consciousness, which he labels “evaluative embarrassment”. Exposure embarrassment emerges as soon as the cognitive capacity for representation of the self is acquired. It does not appear to have evaluative aspects. Rather it reflects exposure of the self when the individual is the object of the attention of others, for example receiving an unsought compliment, being pointed at unexpectedly or being asked to tell a joke in front of others. An awareness of self is a prerequisite for exposure embarrassment. However, following emergence of self-awareness the progression is made towards evaluative embarrassment, which requires the ability to evaluate the self in relation to various standards, rules and goals (SRGs). The features and character of SRGs, and what constitutes success or failure, varies between individuals and across cultures, though many may be shared. One important aspect of future research might fruitfully focus on exactly how one comes to evaluate an action, thought or deed as either a success or failure. Precisely how does one attain the capacity not only for self-consciousness but
the ability to acquire internalised standards and from these internalised standards to then construct attributions for (non)conformity with them? This aspect of self-evaluation is crucial since the same SRGs can result in radically dissimilar emotions, depending upon whether the success or failure is perceived and attributed to the self. Differences in SRGs within social groups and between cultures will arise because groups within society and different cultures prize some SRGs above others. The preliminary evaluation of one’s behaviour in terms of success or failure is also an important feature of the organisation of plans, the formulation of new goals and expectations of future success or failure.

There is growing neurobiological evidence that the human social brain (those regions of the brain identified as specifically involved in social interactions and understanding other people, undergoes profound structural and functional changes beyond childhood well into adolescence, defined as a period of social, physical and psychological transition between childhood and adulthood that begins at the onset of puberty (see Blackemore, 2008 for a review). Structural imaging studies on humans have demonstrated, for example, that prefrontal and temporal brain regions supporting emotion understanding, self-awareness and development of the self concept do not undergo protracted anatomical development until late adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sebastian et al, 2008; Shaw et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 1999). This is supported by evidence from social psychology which has characterised adolescence as a period of social change, including heightened self-consciousness, the increased complexity and importance of peer relationships and an improved understanding of others (Buhrmestor, 1990, 1996; Levitt et al., 1993). Adolescents are more sociable compared to their younger siblings. They form more complex and hierarchical peer relationships and become more cognizant of and responsive to acceptance or rejection by others. The quality of friendships deepens as social competence improves, with an increasing emphasis on initiating social communication, self-disclosure, emotional intimacy, and the provision of psychological and emotional support to others.

Thus research in the fields of social psychology and the neurobiology of the adolescent brain is consistent with the notion that social emotion processing and understanding may continue to develop significantly during puberty and adolescence. Puberty may therefore be considered to be a time of increased sensitivity to self-conscious emotions, such as embarrassment and shame. Jack particularly focuses on the salience of the revelations regarding his pubertal development as a source of embarrassment and social discomfort. It is plausible that the physical and hormonal alterations that accompany puberty contribute to the enhanced development of feelings of self-awareness and self-consciousness through the mechanism of increased sensitivity to social and environmental considerations that jeopardize one’s self-image.
Vicarious Embarrassment/shame and Social Bonding

In Jack’s narrative he mentions the vicarious embarrassment (or perhaps shame) of some of his peers. What is the social value of these emotions? There appears to be an asymmetry in the relationship between the two emotions of vicarious shame and embarrassment. In one study, participants were asked to recall a time when they felt embarrassed, ashamed or guilty for another person’s behaviour and to make ratings of the specific emotions they felt to the event they described (Schmader & Lickel, 2002). Interestingly people who were asked to recall a time when they felt ashamed for another person’s actions reported high levels of both shame and embarrassment. However, people asked to recall a time when they felt embarrassed for another person’s action reported significantly higher levels of embarrassment than shame. Thus, feelings of vicarious shame often involve a component feeling of embarrassment, although vicarious embarrassment can be felt without shame. Furthermore when feeling embarrassed for the wrongs carried out by others we might also imagine that believing in the existence of the flawed identity would be critical for distinguishing embarrassment from shame. For example, when considering emotional responses to stereotypical actions of in-group members, Tracy, Robins and Tangney (2007) predict that individuals who consent to the validity of the negative stereotype ascribed to the group will feel shame and embarrassment, since witnessing the behaviour would remind them of the negative social identity attributed to them (as a member of the group). Conversely, those who rejected the stereotype might experience embarrassment since their peers were giving a negative impression that seemed to endorse the stereotype, but they should not feel shame.

There is a paucity of research attempting to systematically discriminate between vicarious shame and embarrassment. However, studies have investigated the propensity to experience embarrassment when observing the display of embarrassment exhibited by others in socially uncomfortable situations. This research indicates that manipulations that can cue an empathetic perception of the other person or establish some prior relationship to the individual increase the tendency to feel a sense of vicarious embarrassment (Miller, 1987). In addition, Shearn et al’s, (1999) study of empathetic blushing in friends and strangers indicates that the blushing of a subject watching a video of a friend sing was not significantly distinguishable from that of the subject herself whilst watching the video. When performers watched the tape of their
performance they blushed significantly more than strangers watching the same video, but not more than their own friends. Other research indicates that apprehension of negative evaluation is associated with a propensity to experience vicarious embarrassment (Thornton, 2003). These findings appear consistent with the assertion that variables which increase fear of identity threat or represent greater self-other “overlap” would amplify feelings of embarrassment (Tracy, Robins and Tangney, 2007).

Why might Jack’s friends blush empathetically? The accurate detection or inference of Jack’s emotional state and the appropriate agreement of their emotional responses with his might be one condition for empathy, but Jack’s friends could make an accurate judgment of his emotional state without it evoking an empathetic response. Affective empathy can be provoked by cues that trigger emotional reminders of our own earlier emotional circumstances. For Jack’s friends the physical signs of his embarrassment (and that of his other friends) may function as cues to trigger unconscious reminders of their own personal experiences of feeling embarrassed and elicit affective empathy. Jack’s peers may have experienced both shame and embarrassment at the breaking of the rule not to use the fact that Jack’s mother was writing the column to deliberately humiliate or ridicule him, which might have been amplified by vicarious embarrassment at witnessing Jack’s obvious discomfort. The fact that members of the group display embarrassment communicates to him (and to each member of the group) that they share in his discomposure.

Jack’s male friends frequently indulge in teasing and practical jokes that are deliberately designed to provoke embarrassment as a mechanism for promoting within group pro-social behaviour. Social groups endorse a set of norms that their members are expected to adhere to. One thought is that ridiculing non-conformists may be a mechanism to enforce the demands of social order. Adolescents use ridicule, through ritualised teasing, sarcasm or verbal insults to admonish peers who violate prescriptive norms, or display social ineptitude. Those who are accomplished at making their peers laugh at others gain social status and influence within the group (Danesi, 1994 and Goodchilds, 1959). As he points out, Jack is used to his peers playing jokes but his previous experience of embarrassment by his peers has enabled him to avoid group rejection by helping him to identify their shared social norms and values. This in turn helps stabilise the established micro-social order amongst the group. His conformity to group standards signals membership, increasing Jack’s access to all the physiological and psychological benefits of affiliation. As observers the members of a group will be attentive to an individual’s degree of conformity to a wide variety of social standards since (1) conformity is indicative of the individual’s desire for membership and (2) an individual who displays conformity is a valuable
asset to the group. It enables the group to predict the behaviour of individual members, signifying coordination with other group members, which is fundamental for cooperation.

Self-representational concerns about how one is evaluated by others are a strong motivating force in human behaviour. It is likely that young children have many of the presumed prerequisites upon which self-presentation is founded. These include an interest in shaping other’s behaviours, a self-conscious awareness of being the focus of other’s attention and a cognitive capacity for reasoning about others’ beliefs. The salience of social evaluation concerns as a determinant of social behaviour is likely to increase as a result of a child’s experience with peers. Reasoning about self-presentation involves more than the cognitive capacity for second-order mental-state reasoning about other’s beliefs about the self. It is also necessary to develop motivational concerns for social evaluation which is likely to result as a reflection of the increasing salience of social evaluation arising from the growing significance of social experience and the importance of group acceptance as a primary social goal. Adolescents, like Jack experience a number of relevant social life changes in exposure to socialization agents, experience of social activities and roles, and development of group and individual interpersonal relationships. These transitions are likely to generate further refinement and sophistication of self-presentation processes.

**Conclusion**

If we are to engage in cross-cultural examination of different emotion lexicons we must first establish robust definitions of the English terms we use. In this chapter I have argued for a distinction between *embarrassment* and *shame*. In addition I have focussed on embarrassment as a way of examining the relationship between the basic emotions and the so-called self-conscious emotions.

Here we see a way in which emotions can be biological in origin, and yet not exclusively biological. For some emotions are directed towards the status of the individual as a social participant and agent. So while there is a biological need for emotional reactions to regulate the individual’s social standing, and in particular to protect the individual from loss of reputation thus assuring others that this is an appropriate person for interaction and alliances, such an emotional kind will inevitably be of a mixed character. What makes an individual a decent and reliable member of the community is dependent upon the demands of social norms, and these can clearly be culturally variable. It is also possible that different cultures may find new uses for the emotion
of embarrassment. Differences in the moralisation of self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment, shame and guilt and their elicitors might be indicators of cultural variation in the function of these emotions. In the next chapter I will focus on grief and mourning as a way of broadening the discussion of emotion to begin to more fully examine the influence of culture on emotional experience and expression. Again, what seems to be important is the ability to learn emotions in the sense of acknowledging their importance in a specific cultural context and adopting their use and even their manifestation. They are universal because we as humans are prewired to have emotions and even to learn emotions but also specific because the emotions we do have are influenced by the culture and language in which we live. In the following chapter I deal with the subject of grief and mourning practices which illustrate this point further.
Chapter 5

Grief and Mourning: A Study of Emotion Regulation and Affect Display

Introduction

Grief seems to be a universal human experience. It is natural to assume that it is a hard-wired, biologically innate response to the loss of a loved one. Yet basic emotion theorists do not include it amongst their list of universal emotions. It is relegated to a secondary or even tertiary emotion, with sadness being identified as the more fundamental and basic emotion. However, grief and mourning have received a great deal of attention from a wide range of disciplines, including social history, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and literature. There is therefore a rich diversity of sources, from which to examine the effect of culture and language on the emotional experience, emotion regulation and affect display associated with them.

There is another motivation for selecting grief as the focus of this chapter. According to Ekman basic emotions are characterised as evanescent. They are transitory, with swift onset and short duration. However, so called basic emotions, like anger and fear, also appear to have a durational character. One can experience intense yet brief episodes of anger, but it is perfectly intelligible to say that for the last 20 years John has been angry at what he believes to be a miscarriage of justice that led to his wife’s wrongful imprisonment following their child’s cot death. This does not mean that John constantly displays the physiological arousal associated with anger. It means that he is prone to experience episodes of anger when he is reminded of a particular judgment, namely there has been a miscarriage of justice and my family has been wronged. The so-called non-basic emotions, like jealousy, also appear to have both an episodic and a durational character. One can experience an acute episode of jealousy and it also is possible to be jealous of the same person for years, as might be the case in some instances of sibling rivalry. Disgust, as the most visceral of emotions, is typically experienced as an occurrent response to an occurrent stimulus, such as the sight of a severed ear, or the smell of blood. So, not all emotions are propositional. In such cases one is responding directly to an occurrent stimulus. On the other hand, as we have seen, there are emotional responses that are stimulated not by occurrent stimuli but by propositions and inferences. The proposition “my beautiful mother is dead” might lead to the inference, “No one will ever call me angel in that way again” or “She would have loved this sunset” which in turn might lead to the experience of grief. Such thoughts can catch us unawares, stimulated by cues in the environment that recall specific memories that lead us to recall the proposition that the loved one is dead. We need to differentiate between these two different types
of stimuli. Grief can be experienced as an evanescent emotional episode in response to an occurrent stimulus (seeing the body of the loved one), but it can take on a dispositional character. It can be experienced as a temporally stable, persistent, enduring emotion. The durational character of grief (the fact that it can be reliably evoked or re-stimulated over an extended period of time), seems well established. It is a significant part of the Western folk psychological concept of grief and the grieving process, as narrative accounts and descriptions of the emotion testify. This suggests that it is a fruitful subject for the examination of the potential role of cultural influence in relation to other durational emotions.

I begin with an explication of the concepts of affect display rules and emotion regulation. I then sketch a suggested outline of the developmental processes behind their acquisition and the cognitive architecture that underpins them. This is then followed by an analysis of the affect display rules surrounding grief and mourning in middle and upper class Victorian culture, and their role in the development of identity and self-presentation. By way of contrast I then offer an analysis of Enright’s literary treatment of grief in The Gathering (2008) set within contemporary Irish culture, where I consider some of the general identity conditions of grief. In this section I also look at emotion regulation and the relationship between grief and self-construal in more detail. I then contrast this with an analysis of the performance of Pashtun female gham (grief, sadness, misfortune, misery) narratives. Finally, I consider some evolutionary and constructivist explanations of grief in the light of these distinctive perspectives.

**Affect Display and Emotion Regulation**

Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not “seems”
’Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected behaviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shows of grief
That can denote me truly. These indeed “seem”,
For they are the actions that a man might play,
But I have that within which passeth show –
These but the trappings and suits of woe

*Hamlet, 1.2 76-86*

Shakespeare’s Hamlet distinguishes between the highly structured formal customs that accompany public mourning and the internal mental anguish that is recognised as the early stage of genuine grief. His black clothing, sighs, tears and sad expression fail, on their own, to represent his internal state or “denote him truly” not because they are a false reflection of his emotional
state, since his grief is utterly genuine, but because it is possible that these outward signs of emotion, all the “forms, moods and shapes of grief”, could be affected and designed to deceive others. The passage introduces recognition of a significant fact about emotions. They are both social and private. They are social in that they are a form of communication between members of a social group and private because they are truly accessible only to the emoting agent. The communication of an affective state through external expressions of disgust, happiness, distress, joy or anger might represent the genuine mental state of the agent but can also be incongruent since one can falsely display an affective state one does not feel. As Hamlet points out, it is possible to go through the process of mourning without grieving. It is also possible to grieve without going through the process of mourning.

Affect display is a term adopted in psychology to refer to non-verbal communication of an affective state, where an affective state can be characterised as a physiological arousal or motor expressive evaluative response to a significant stimulus. Affect display takes the form of facial expressions, gesture, posture and vocal intonation. Facial configurations corresponding to distinct emotions, such as disgust, fear, anger, joy and surprise are, according to Ekman, universally recognisable non-verbal communication phenotypes (Ekman, 1984; Ekman 1992a and 1992b), but displaying an emotional state through vocal intonation, gestures and body posture also offer a rich affective vocabulary. Emotional prosody is a fundamental component of expressive oral communication and can augment, amplify or completely contradict semantic content. It can also add affective content to speech that is semantically meaningless or neutral. It is possible to communicate boredom, enthusiasm, sarcasm, contentment, or incredulity, for example, through nuanced vocal stress, modulation or inflection. Simply humming or whistling can be used to indicate a positive mood of contentment. At the other end of the scale deeply felt loss can be expressed through a musical eulogy, such as Byrd’s Ye Sacred Muses written on the death of Tallis. Gesture and posture are also extremely effective forms of affective communication. In his polemic against poverty The Road to Wigan Pier (1937) Orwell describes the profound resentment and vexation daily provoked in Mr Brooker (Orwell’s landlord) as he goes about the household chores. Meanwhile, his wife rarely moves from the sofa. She is permanently ill though no one is able to explain exactly what it is that supposedly incapacitates her.
In the mornings he sat by the fire with a tub of filthy water peeling potatoes at the speed of a slow-motion picture. I never saw anyone who could peel potatoes with quite such an air of brooding resentment. You could see the hatred of this “bloody women’s work” as he called it, fermenting inside him, a kind of bitter juice. He was one of those people who can chew their grievances like a cud.

George Orwell (1937/1986) The Road to Wigan Pier, p. 10

Orwell’s description is striking and evocative. We are familiar with the expression of a whole range of emotional states through body language. One can show gratitude towards a friend by simply hugging them, or display anger at the disloyalty of a friend by tearing up their letter of apology in front of them. Children may adopt sulking as a face saving device, involving a bodily display such as crossing their hands at the chest, spreading their legs wide, holding their head down while pouting and perhaps gesturing by pushing at a nearby object. A professional football player might choose to express his deep displeasure at the incompetence of the referee by kicking lumps out of an advertising board and staging a sit down protest in the opposition’s half.

Developmental process behind emotion regulation and acquisition of affect display rules

Much of the time we attempt to regulate our emotions in some way by amplifying, inhibiting, disguising, altering or completely disowning them. There is some evidence that even children as young as three have the ability to regulate the expression of their affective state (Cole, 1986; Takahashi, Kusanagi and Hoshi, 1998). However, the ability to practice socially acceptable displays of affect requires engaging in a significant amount of social interaction before it is acquired. The developmental trajectory plausibly involves the ability to describe and identify emotional experiences, the identification of feelings as distinct from mere bodily sensations of emotional arousal and the ability to distinguish external events from inner experiences. The child then gains an understanding that others act the way they do because of their state of mind, and that their state of mind is causally influenced by the environment and interaction with others. So, attributing beliefs and motivations to others through perception of their emotional reactions becomes a crucial part of social engagement. The child is able to interpret behaviour in a rational manner presumably by recognising that emotional responses have reasons and tell us something about the intentional state of the subject.

The emotional communication account suggests that this is a development from emotional contagion. Emotional contagion avoids the need for generating a complex mental simulation or representational model since affective convergence between the observer and the observed is achieved through the mirroring of the affect display. Plausibly, the next
developmental stage is that the child then learns that someone’s overt emotional expression need not correlate with their genuine internal affective state, and this in turn requires the child acquiring the ability to take the perspective of another and develop a sensitivity to the social context in which the emotional display is expressed: for example, learning to distinguish between real and play-related emotions in rough and tumble games with a parent.

This understanding presumably becomes more sophisticated as the child gains in social and emotional aptitude. Children need to acquire the capacity to understand that a number of discrete emotions may be simultaneously elicited by a single event and that mixed emotions can be congruently or incongruently valenced. Learning that emotions typically have social consequences the child recognises that regulation of the emotions, through the management and control of emotional experience and the expression of emotion, have a profound impact on their social interactions. The motives for adopting affect display rules fall broadly into two categories,

(1) prosocial – the child learns to alter their emotional expression in order to respect the feelings of others, e.g., smiling when offered an unwanted present by a loved one so that the loved one won’t feel sad

(2) self-protective – the child learns to mask or inhibit the expression of their genuine emotions to avoid undesirable consequences, i.e. if I show anger they will think I’m childish and won’t play with me anymore.

The child learns to follow affect display rules (Ekman (1973) having acquired the ability to determine whether an emotional display will be considered inappropriate or is likely to lead to detrimental results, either for themselves or others. In other words, the child gains the understanding that feelings and the expression of emotions can be subject to normative appraisal. Shame, for example, involves the cognitive evaluation that the contempt of others towards a particular action is justified and one ought to feel shame. Emotional introspection (the sensitive monitoring and awareness of one’s occurrent affective states), will be important in the successful recognition of levels of affective response that spiral beyond socially acceptable levels. The child then learns to employ affect regulation in situations where they can test for the presence of an occurrent undesirable affective state, which will then prompt the use of cognitive and behavioural operations to diminish or negate this undesirable state. From this the child also learns that to maintain good social relations and gain the esteem of others they may have to deceive them, through the public expression of emotions that are assumed by the observer to be driven by motivations and beliefs that they in fact do not have.

In a sense the child discovers that there are two observers, oneself and other people. She understands that there can be a disparity between the feelings one observes in oneself and those
perceived by others, since through affect display it is possible to generate false beliefs about those feelings in others. This is a significant cognitive achievement, displaying an understanding of their own and others emotional experiences and the ability to adopt deliberate emotional response strategies to achieve goal directed outcomes. For example, the child may learn that weeping enables her to gain the initiative in an argument since the argument cannot continue if she displays enough misery or distress.

Affect display rules are a crucial part of the currency of human social interaction and are culturally sensitive. By adopting them one can act as a socialised agent within one’s own social group and distinguish group members from outsiders. But it is not only the overt external manifestations of affect that may be controlled in response to social considerations. Most cultures offer strategies for dealing with strong emotions and engage in the deliberate fostering of emotions for their own sake. The sharing of these strategies and experiences is unquestionably an important part of promoting social cohesion and harmony.

Modularity,

When reflecting on the complex range of human behaviour that can be included within the concept of affect display we can distinguish between behaviour that is the result of an affect programme, which circumvents the exercise of conscious control of bodily actions, and affect displays that are consciously willed and agent directed. But in what sense can we describe affect displays as modular? It has been argued, as discussed in the first chapter, that the basic emotions each have a distinctive suite of somatic signatures, deeply rooted in human psycho–evolutionary history. These signatures, which include changes in facial or bodily expression, hormone levels, the musculoskeletal system and the autonomic nervous system, are collectively termed affect programmes. Griffiths (1997) makes the case that these affect programmes should be viewed in the light of a Fodorian notion of modularity (Fodor, 1983). They are mandatory, fast and passive responses generated by information derived from a circumscribed range of perceptual input, and this input is not shared with any other, more central processes such as those underlying intentional action.\(^\text{12}\) These mechanisms are more than simple reflexes, though perhaps not much more than that. They are certainly generated well before any sophisticated cortical processing can occur. Once the affect programme has been triggered the resulting motor activity (changes in the musculoskeletal system and facial expressions) which constitutes the affect display is automatic

\(^{12}\) I am not here concerned with where in the lower brain these affect programmes are realised, neither do I assume that there is either a single locus or involvement of a single neural pathway
and immediate. Ronald de Sousa (2008) and others have argued that Griffiths’ characterisation is too strong since these basic emotions do not neatly fulfil the Fodorian desiderata but I do not need to enter into the modularity issue fully here. For my purposes I only need establish the weaker position that some aspects of what Ekman identified as the basic emotions are similar to modular mechanisms.

For reasons of simplicity in what follows I concentrate on facial expressions as the paradigmatic example of the automatic processes associated with affect programmes. Two distinct neural systems have been identified for volitional or “contrived” facial expressions of emotion and spontaneous or “authentic” facial expressions. Only a genuine smile of pleasure, for example, causes the contraction of the lateral part of the orbicularis oculi (Duchenne’s muscle). The strongest evidence for the claim that genuine and inauthentic expressions of emotion are controlled by distinct neural circuits comes from the complementary syndromes of emotional and facial paresis. In subjects suffering from emotional facial paresis their ability to produce authentic, genuine facial expressions of emotion is unimpaired. However, they are unable to produce “contrived” or “fake” expressions. Conversely, subjects suffering from volitional facial paresis are able to produce “fake” or “contrived” expressions of emotion but are unable to produce spontaneous facial expressions (Hopf, H. C, Muller-Forell, W and Hopf, N. J, 1992).

This supports earlier studies conducted with children between the ages of four and ten which indicated that congenitally blind children produce spontaneous facial expressions of some emotions, (such as joy, anger, sadness, and surprise) that are structurally similar to those of sighted children of the same age (Charlesworth and Kreutzer, 1973; Eibl-Eibellsfeldt, 1973; Goodenough, 1932; Thompson, 1941). In contrast, when it came to generating voluntary expressions of emotion those of the blind subjects were less appropriate and less clear than those of sighted subjects (Ortegaq, Iglesias, Fernandez and Corraliza, 1983; Rinn, 1991). The conclusion is that spontaneous expressions in both the blind and sighted are activated by the same subcortical motor action schemes, which do not require learning, whereas voluntary expressions are activated by cortical motor centres which are more influenced by learning and visual information about the face.

The expressions activated by the affect programme are innate, automatic responses, the putative evolutionary explanation for which is that they evolved to fulfil the function of eliciting fitness enhancing purposive action in response to the environment or internal state of the agent without the need for conscious reflection. As a further indication of the nature of these responses Tracy and Robins (2008) investigated the assumption that humans evolved the capacity to quickly and efficiently recognize emotions in two studies that examined:
(1) how quickly perceivers could recognise expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, shame and surprise

(2) whether accuracy was improved when perceivers deliberate about each expression’s meaning, as opposed to responding as quickly as possible, and

(3) whether accuracy was affected by cognitive load.

Overall their findings indicate that facial configurations associated with specific emotions can be rapidly (within 600 ms) and accurately discriminated under cognitive load. On this evidence recognition of facial expressions of emotion appears to be an efficient automatic process, indicating support for the evolutionary developmental theory.13

Affect Programmes and Cognitive Theories of Emotion

This and other research supporting the existence of affect programmes seems to argue against cognitive theories of emotion, which state that an emotion is or entails a cognitive appraisal or judgment (e.g. Robert Gordon, Gabriele Taylor, William Lyons, Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum). Judgment theorists differ regarding the relationship between emotion and judgement, since some consider that emotions are identical to judgments, others argue that judgments are a sufficient condition for emotion and still others argue that judgments are a necessary but not sufficient condition for emotion. Nevertheless, most cognitive theorists agree that the essential aspect of emotion is that it should be identified with an evaluative judgment about a situation in terms of one’s own desires, values, interests and goals. If I am angry that a neighbour has driven his car into my garden fence this indicates that I believe my neighbour’s negligence or incompetence caused him to damage my fence and I judge that I have thereby been wronged. The difficulty with this view is that it leaves out the “emotionality” of emotions since I can very well make the same judgments without necessarily becoming angry. I could be bemused, resigned, astonished at his incompetent driving or I could simply be dispassionate about the incident. So, there needs to be something more than just a cognitive appraisal or judgment.

13 The study has its limitations. Given that the researchers used a forced-choice response format the research has not examined emotion recognition in real-life conditions (though I strongly suspect that such studies would confirm the hypothesis regarding the automaticity of emotion recognition), but just as importantly only two targets were used, a male and female, both Caucasian, so we need further studies using participants and targets from different ethnic groups to establish whether such findings apply cross-culturally.
Jenefer Robinson (2005) challenges the theory of emotions as judgments, insisting that emotions are processes that have at their core non-cognitive “instinctive” appraisals. Robinson cites three sources of empirical evidence. (1) Ekman’s research on facial expressions identifying basic emotions; (2) research that suggests distinct physiological profiles, or affect programmes, differentiating these basic emotions; and (3) evidence that emotions can occur too swiftly for there to be any cognition involved at all. These physiological emotion profiles can be aroused in emotion-eliciting situations without there being any cognitive participation. LeDoux (1998) provides a functional neuroanatomical model which describes how this occurs. He has studied auditory Pavlovian fear conditioning in rats and discovered two different pathways for the processing of sensory stimuli. The thalamo-amygdala pathway or “low road” produces a swift, crude, rough-grained affective appraisal of the stimulus, followed by the triggering a suite of autonomic responses (increased heart rate and blood pressure, involuntary muscle control, increased galvanic skin response etc.). This pathway bypasses the neocortex altogether so it is prior to any cognitive intervention, or sophisticated parsing of the stimulus. The second pathway, the thalamocortical “high road”, is slower and in fact essential for conscious recognition of the stimulus. This second route enables the subject to assess the appropriateness of the prior automatic response, and presumably attempt to modify or control the initial appraisal and the subject’s subsequent responses. LeDoux demonstrated that the “low” pathway between the thalamus and the amygdale is necessary for normal auditory fear conditioning. If the thalamo-amygdala pathway is interrupted or if there is interference with amygdale function, auditory fear conditioning is disrupted. If, instead, the second thalamocortical pathway is interrupted auditory fear conditioning is not affected.

So, Robinson argues, we have empirical evidence that emotions can occur “instinctively”. It might be argued that what is going on here is still a kind of appraisal but it is not the kind of cognitive appraisal that judgment theorists are referring to. We can evaluate the meaning of an event as “good” or “bad” before we know what the event is and what is bad about it. It is not a sophisticated evaluative judgment in the sense of “I am angry because my neighbour has wronged me by ruining my lawn”, or in the case of grief the judgment that “my beautiful, wonderful mother is dead”. It is a crude, rough-grained appraisal, closer to “yikes!”, “weird!”, or “enemy!” that bypasses the higher cortical centres. It operates in the limbic system, in the “lower” brain. So it seems that emotions work at this lower, swift, coarse-grained level.

This research, according to Robinson, indicates that emotions should not be described as any one thing, either as a judgment, a feeling, a set of physiological responses, as a bit of behaviour or a set of action tendencies. Rather, emotion is a dynamic process and at the heart of
the emotion process is the non-cognitive, affective appraisal which immediately produces physiological responses which then gives way to a slower, cognitive monitoring of the situation.

Robinson’s theory has some explanatory appeal. Since cognitive monitoring is not a necessary condition for emotion it is unproblematic to attribute emotions to infants and some non-human animals. In addition, the theory explains why even though a given stimulus may evoke the same kind of initial affective appraisal in two distinct individuals the overall response of each person may differ, since each individual’s cognitive monitoring will be influenced by their unique cognitive and emotional life history. How might the cognitivist respond? According to Robinson the judgment theorist claims an emotion either is or is caused by a judgment or a cognitive evaluation with an intentional object and Robinson denies both. However, few theorists would endorse the strong claim that cognitive judgments are a sufficient condition for emotion. The cognitivist need not disagree that non-conscious, swift affective responses are a necessary criteria for emotion, or an emotional episode. The so called “high road” is not required for some types of fear, anger or disgust but is required for cognitively sophisticated emotions, such as remorse or nostalgia. Emotional processing therefore has an immediate and a mediated form, the crude, unsophisticated affective appraisal contributes to the later cognitive appraisal, though is distinct from it. The first type of emotions, the basic emotions, are immediate and a product of evolutionary experience of the species, and humans share these with other animals. These basic emotions were naturally selected as a means of prompting appropriate responses to threats. The more sophisticated, cognitive emotions are variable, specific to humans and subject to learning and voluntary control.

Robinson rejects the idea that judgments can form the basis of an emotion, since she argues that evaluative judgments alone cannot cause an emotion (p.90) but I do not find this idea so very dissimilar to the thought that emotions are caused by “appraisals.” albeit that they are swift and preconscious. Furthermore, it seems that an evaluative judgement is an essential prerequisite to the affective appraisal of some situations. An example from literature is the moment in Ian McEwan’s Atonement (2001) when Robbie Turner realises with certainty and horror that he has made a dreadful mistake. The note he has given to Cecilia’s younger sister to pass on to her is not the final typed draft he intended Cecilia to read but his earlier, handwritten draft which contains a brief and obscene expression of his sexual desire for Cecilia.. The note he intended to give to Celia read is back on his desk at home, but Cecilia’s younger sister has already rushed off to perform her errand. The evaluative judgment that his note will shock and offend Celia elicits fear and embarrassment. Without that judgment there would simply be no threat to provoke the emotional response.
The fact that some components of an emotion can be activated before full awareness of its cause need not conflict with a cognitive view. LeDoux’s research is sometimes construed as demonstrating that emotions can be precognitive events because his research appears to suggest that fear-relevant behaviour activation can occur before awareness of the cause and before affective feelings can be generated. However, the cognitive view only maintains that the representation of the significance of a stimulus, rather than the stimulus itself, can be the trigger for emotion processes. LeDoux’s work simply suggests that these representations can be widely distributed in the information processing system, so that they may be partially processed in one part of the brain before being fully processed in another.

This is the picture of our cognitive architecture that I have in mind for the purposes of the following examination of grief and mourning, although I recognise that it is by no means uncontroversial or fully fleshed out.

Grief and Mourning: Victorian Cultural Norms

Mourning and the social display of grief became extremely formalised and circumscribed in middle and upper class Victorian English culture (Strange J M 2005; Jalland; P 1996 Taylor L 1983; Pointon M 1999)14. When the social practice was at its most fully elaborated it had broadly two phases; deep or full mourning followed by a period of half-mourning. Contemporary social norms dictated that the length of mourning considered appropriate following bereavement was primarily dependent upon the individual’s kin relationship to the deceased. A period of two years was prescribed as the appropriate period of time to be spent in mourning following the loss of a spouse, whilst for the loss of a parent or child a period of one year was appropriate. For grandparents, siblings, or a guardian who had left an inheritance six months was considered proper. And finally for other close relatives (in-laws, uncles/aunts, nephews/nieces) the period of mourning thought appropriate was three months. It was expected that a widow in full mourning would adopt a wardrobe entirely of lusterless, dull black (including black accessories and a weeping veil when leaving the home). She would also be expected to refrain from wearing an elaborate hairstyle or jewellery, and to restrict her social contact with others. During half

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mourning there was a second period, lasting for nine months, during which minor ornamentation was permitted by adding fabric trim, mourning jewellery (jet, pearls), though the main dress was still made from lusterless black cloth. However, the veil worn outside the home could be lifted and worn back over the head. After this period the widow could progress to black silk, and during the last six months gray, lilac and white fabrics were permitted.

There were similar rules relating to the loss of other relations. Parents who lost a child would be expected to wear deep mourning for nine months and half mourning for three. The death of a sibling required three months of deep mourning and three months of half mourning. Half mourning was considered appropriate for in-laws.

Mourning dress, conventions and etiquette, particularly as it applied to widows, served a number of social functions. It provided instant visible identification of the bereaved. It also provided evidence of the depth of grief felt at the loss of the loved one. The gradual adoption of gray, violet and white fabrics was a visual metaphor reflecting the changing emotional state of the bereaved as she progressed through the grieving process. In a sense it is like a speech act, informing others of her affective condition.

The convention of isolating the bereaved could also have served a number of social functions. Firstly, the fact that the widow in full mourning did not go out into society, or receive or accept visits and avoided places of entertainment ensured that rules of etiquette regarding social interactions during the mourning period were less likely to be breached. It reduced the risk of inappropriate social exchanges. Secondly, it kept any potentially excessive emotional displays by the bereaved, particularly women, out of the public gaze. Men were expected to observe normatised codes of masculine behaviour that valued self-control and stoicism. Victorian folk psychology viewed women as less able to control their strong emotions. There was therefore a need to isolate the widow from public view. Thirdly, there is a tendency when one is experiencing profound bereavement to become absorbed by thoughts of the loss of the beloved and to be unable or unwilling to direct one’s thoughts towards anything else. By socially normatising the isolation of the bereaved it may have been thought to have the benefit of allowing them to more fully engage in the private grieving process.

Conforming to the complex rules governing the social display of grief was also a way of communicating to others that one wished to be identified as someone with the emotional sensibilities of a particular social class. For example the adoption of a plain hairstyle indicated a proper lack of vanity or conceit, compatible with overwhelming sorrow where one is fixated on reflection and remembrance of the deceased and ones’ sense of loss. The adoption of these carefully constructed rules enabled the individual to conform to a desired self-image and exhibit
a socially praiseworthy moral character. It represented an unambiguous declaration of the wish to be recognised as a person capable of endorsing valued social and moral norms, in this case involving beliefs and attitudes regarding the appropriate and decorous display of deeply felt grief. In the middle and upper class Victorian social arena grief as a display of profound emotional sensibility is expressed in its most refined and cultivated form through silence and stoicism, with inner feelings of anguish and distress externalised and represented through dress. We can apply the Aristotelian concept of the golden mean to the Victorian view of the rational, appropriate expression of grief. Express too little grief and one will be thought insensitive, too much and one will be thought narcissistic or hysterical but just the right amount is virtuous. It is something that the bereaved ought to display but with rational control, dependent upon such things as the closeness of the relationship between the bereaved and the deceased.

Victorian discourses surrounding death and grief contributed to the construction a normative way of mourning, setting boundaries regarding the appropriate length of time grieving should take place and how acute a normal mourner’s grief should be, with variations according to cause of death, age of the deceased, form of relationship and gender. For the bearers of Victorian culture such codifying of bereavement behaviour provided a socially acceptable way of expressing grief. Death was a rich part of Victorian domestic culture. All family members, including relatives by marriage and servants, were expected to wear mourning clothes, even infants were dressed in black, and the house itself was “dressed” in mourning as a further externalised expression of the grief of the bereaved.

Although grief is an inevitable part of life it is now almost hidden in Western culture and no longer an explicit feature of everyday life. The Victorian symbols of mourning that designated the individual as bereaved are now rarely adopted. Social practices such as mourning dress codes and the production of artefacts such as post-mortem photography, death masks, funeral teapots, memorial jewellery and the re-emergence of lachrymatories (tear bottles) as a symbol of deep emotion, which formed a rich part of middle and upper class Victorian material culture, have

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15 This discussion can be placed in the larger context of the role of the female within the middle and upper class Victorian household. Victorian ideology regarded cheerfulness as a female and wifely duty. Women were expected to exercise constant emotion management to promote and foster the positive mood in the domestic sphere as part of her female duties. However, it was not sufficient that cheerfulness was outwardly displayed it ought to be inwardly felt. The home was a refuge for the male provider. It was his haven from the public sphere. Female members of the household were expected to ensure his peace of mind by keeping a cheerful temper and tone. Temperamental behaviour or bad humour was deemed indicative of a failure in their domestic role and wifely responsibilities of emotionally and physically cocooning her husband or father from the outside world.
become normatively devalued. In fact they are commonly perceived as part of a morbid dysfunctional grieving process tantamount to fetishism, self-indulgence or neurosis. But it is important not to be left with the stereotypical but certainly mistaken impression that Victorian widows were either superficial, socially motivated hypocrites or societal outcasts. Although it is difficult to assess the therapeutic and social value of mourning rituals and etiquette to the recently bereaved it was not necessarily an intolerable burden on those experiencing overwhelming and genuine grief. The primary functions of Victorian mourning dress were to identify the mourner, elicit the sympathy of the community, foster the adoption of congruent affect or mood and demonstrate respect for the deceased.

Victorian social attitudes towards death, grief and mourning gradually changed. Jalland (1996) and others have persuasively argued that the decline in Romanticism and Evangelicalism, combined with alterations in demography (advances in sanitation and health care leading to a gradual move from infancy to a relatively old age as the more probable time of death) allowed society’s preoccupation with death to begin to decline as it becomes seen as a natural and timely event concluding a long life. A further change in attitudes towards grief and mourning practices was influenced by the cultural shock of the Great War. The sudden and violent loss of healthy young adults on an overwhelming scale was far removed from the previously stereotypical peaceful, gradual deaths at home amongst the family. The bodies of the deceased were frequently unidentifiable, leaving no possibility for traditional deathbed and funeral rituals. As a result the conventional Victorian social scripts were an inadequate social mechanism for responding to the grief of those bereaved as a result of the Great War.

Anne Enright’s: The Gathering (2008)

Charged with bringing the body of her brother Liam home from Brighton, following his suicide by drowning, Veronica returns to Ireland and her widowed mother who still lives in the home in which Veronica and her nine surviving siblings were raised. At 39 Veronica is only 11 months younger than Liam and regards their childhood relationship to have been closer to that of twins. As she makes tea for her mother, who is in the early stages of Alzheimer’s, Veronica notices a nick in the wall which triggers the memory of the circumstances which led to it having got there. Liam once threw a knife at their mother. It was a nasty incident which resulted in all her brothers fighting with him having taken him outside into the garden. But the beating quickly descends into playful wrestling, with the children ending up helpless with laughter. “If nothing else”, she muses, “the family had fun”. She then finds herself
“[a] trembling mess from hip to knee. There is a terrible heat, a looseness in my innards that makes me want to dig my fists between my thighs. It is a confusing feeling - somewhere between diarrhoea and sex – this grief that is almost genital”. 16

This is a description of an evanescent episode of grief. It is an intensely overwhelming physical experience that creeps over one without consent or complete understanding. These physiological changes are what give the experience of grief its emotionality. However, the somatic experience is not the object of Veronica’s grief. The sight of the nick on the wall is an emotionally salient stimulus because it triggers the memory of the unpleasant incident involving Liam, which in turn prompts painful recognition of the fact that he is irrevocably gone. The recognition of this state of affairs triggers Veronica’s physiological response. The object of Veronica’s grief is the judgment that Liam, a valuable person and an important part of her life, is dead.

Grief, it seems, cannot be reduced to a simple Ekman-type affect programme, not least because it does not seem to have a unique somatic signature. There are typical somatic responses associated with grief but they are not distinguishable from the physiological response to any deeply traumatic event that makes one feel helpless or threatens ones safety and Veronica’s description illustrates that some of them are difficult to articulate. For her it seems to have been some sort of abdominal distress. For others grief might be accompanied by tightness in the throat, sighing or lack of muscular strength. Still others might describe grief as tension or pain “as if a nail from the world had entered my insides” (Nussbaum, 2001:39). But this physiological turmoil, where it is assumed that part of the natural physiological responses associated with early, deep grief are being wrestled with internally, is only one part of grief, an outward expression or expulsion of an inner mental anguish. Grief is also intimately connected with memory, reflection and a tendency to wish to extract oneself from society and seek solitude, as Veronica does by cutting herself off from her husband and family and going for long night drives alone, putting a physical distance between her and others. All the while her mind is preoccupied with obsessive recollections of Liam, their childhood and reflections on her own life.

There are two senses of loss described in Enright’s novel, the sense of Liam missing from the family and also of lost possibilities, counterfactuals, different paths that his life could have taken. She feels guilt and blames herself for real or imagined failures in her relationship with Liam. We learn that she may have witnessed his sexual abuse by Mr Nugent, an old friend of their grandmother’s. This might have been the turning point that led the beautiful young boy...
Veronica knew on the path to becoming a hopeless alcoholic, a “messer” who could be “a completely shocking human being”.

These complex thoughts and feelings that are all connected with grief and the grieving process cannot possibly be fully understood or empathised with by Veronica’s eight-year-old daughter, Rebecca, who attends Liam’s wake. Rebecca feels discomfort and confusion having been brought into an adult arena she simply does not have the emotional competence to comprehend. She approaches her mother during the wake.

Rebecca comes back to me. Her face is full of unshed tears and I take her outside for a minute. The other room is occupied by the coffin so we have nowhere to go except the stairs, where we sit while my gentle, drifting daughter weeps in my lap for something that she does not understand. Then she sharpens up a little.

“I want to go home,” she says, still face down.
“In a little bit”
“It’s not fair, I want to go home”
“Why is it not fair?” I say, “What’s not fair about it?”
She is insulted, in her youth, by the proximity of death. It is spoiling her ideas about being in a girl band, maybe – or so I think, with a sudden impulse to bring her in to the coffin and push her on to her knees and oblige her to consider the Four Last Things. Jesus. Where did that come from? I have to calm down.

“This is not about you, all right? People die, Rebecca”
“I want to go home!”
“And I want you to be a little bit grown up here. All right?”
And so it goes.
“I didn’t even like him” she says, in a final, terrible whimper, and this makes me laugh so much she stops crying to look up at me.

“Neither did I, sweetheart. Neither did I.”

Her daughter’s distress provokes an impulse that shocks and unsettles Veronica. She seeks to disown the response since she realises that it is an irrational reaction to Rebecca’s emotional immaturity. She reacts irrationally because of her grief, and realises that her impulse is something that ought to be repressed. Failing to quickly take control of the impulse triggered by her reflecting on what see identifies as Rebecca’s youthful self-absorption and egotism would be unfair and only compound Rebecca’s distress and unhappiness. Veronica has initially made a conscious appraisal of Rebecca’s behaviour which elicits an action tendency that is swiftly repressed when the behaviour is reappraised. Emotions alter when the appraisal of the object changes. She is able to take a step back, whilst feeling the emotional impulse, and question whether she really wants to go along with it, or whether it is better to quash or redirect the

impulse in light of her changing appraisal of Rebecca’s behaviour. Such response reappraisal may well form the basis for mature emotion regulation.

In passing we can note that in this short exchange Enright illustrates how, typically, we experience a flux of emotions. Sometimes the initial emotional response fades as others are generated, sometimes conflicting emotions can be experienced as evanescent and transient, following in swift succession or we can experience two or more oppositely valenced affective states simultaneously. However, Veronica’s grief is durational. It is ongoing, even when no specific incident gives rise to it and brings the emotion to the surface. Such an emotion is based on a persistent judgment or appraisal. Namely, that Liam was an important part of her life and that he is gone. It is the painful recognition of this state of affairs - the tragedy of Liam’s suicide and its relationship to her well-being - that is the persistent object of her grief. And grief will continually resurface when she is reminded of this state of affairs.

Elster (1996), along with others, argues that unlike most emotions, in the experience of grief there is no action tendency, no impulse or state of readiness for action to maintain or achieve a kind of relationship with the environment. In guilt the action tendency is the desire to atone for one’s wrongful action, to make amends, in shame we seek to withdraw from the gaze of others. If emotions function to facilitate action the only effective action in the case of grief would be one that directly resulted in the satisfaction of the desire to have the deceased return. Since this desire cannot be satisfied by any effective mode of action the emotion of grief involves no action tendencies (Frijda, 1986). Frijda defines grief as

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\text{[T]he emotion of finality, of definitive, irreparable loss. Finality has its own specific painfulness in the helplessness that it implies. It also has its advantages: No efforts make sense, nothing has to be endeavoured, no effort has to be spent.}^{19}
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Quite simply, grief is psychologically paralysing since all actions in response to the loss are futile and therefore do not have rational meaning. If this analysis is correct then much of the pain connected with grief is attributable to the frustration of the performance of any rational action tendency since no plan or goal directed action will have the desired outcome. On this analysis we might conclude that the lack of an effective action tendency led, in Veronica’s case, to anger which was then directed towards her daughter but once Veronica engages in a cognitive process that puts the information processed regarding the stimulus (Rebecca’s perceived egocentrism and lack of consideration) into context (Rebecca is a child and emotionally unequipped to deal with the situation) this modulates the affective response and she is able to quash her anger.

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However, even if one cannot achieve satisfaction of the desire to have the loved one restored to life, (and this can no doubt lead to anger and feelings of desperation), one can surely have motivations, such as the desire to be comforted, to place flowers at the site of the fatal accident, set up a charitable trust in the name of the deceased, dedicate a book one wishes to publish to their memory, or write a fitting eulogy any one of which might have the positive benefit of assisting the bereaved as coping strategies to assist in the grieving process. These seem quite rational desires that one might seek to fulfil in response to loss of a loved one.

It becomes clear as the novel unfolds that Liam was “lost” to Veronica long before his suicide, but she sees no point in attempting to tell her mother and her siblings what she may have witnessed in the past that could have ultimately led to his alcoholism and depression. Liam’s story is finished and that is what Veronica finds so painful, not least because it also means that part of her narrative has come to an end. He was a part of the web of significant relationships through which Veronica developed a sense of her own identity. Her personal narrative was intimately interwoven with his. The intensity of her grief is intimately linked with Liam’s absence and the recognition that part of her is now absent too. Her identity was in part constituted by their relationship, regardless of how flawed or difficult that relationship was, and that part of her has now vanished. This is echoed in Nussbaum’s personal account of her grief following the death of her mother:

I had the odd sensation of having been robbed of a history, of being no longer a person who had a family history. For this reason the sight of my ex-husband, arriving at the funeral, filled me with joy, because I could recognise in him twenty years of life with my mother, and knew that he could recognise it in me, and prove that it had existed.

Martha Nussbaum *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001: 21)

The grieving process may be a strategy that enables us to come to terms with this double sense of loss and regain control of our lives by repairing or reconstructing our sense of self. Veronica shows signs of doing this at the end of the novel and the painful early grieving process. She finds herself at Gatwick airport and attempts to reengage with her life.

Gatwick airport is not the best place to be gripped by a fear of flying. But it seems that this is what is happening to me now, because you are up so high, in those things, and there is such a long way to fall. Then again, I have been falling for months. I have been falling into my own life, for months. And I am about to hit it now.20

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Enright’s literary description of grief and the mourning process is compatible with Nussbaum’s adoption of the metaphors of grief as a geological eruption on the landscape of daily life (taken from Proust) and as a hole in the fabric of life, e.g. “It felt as if life had suddenly a large rip or tear in it, a gaping hole” (Nussbaum, 2001: 39). In the next section I contrast the perspectives on grief from social history and literature examined so far with a perspective from the anthropological literature.

**Pashtun Gham Narratives**

For over a decade Benedicte Grima has conducted ethnographic studies of (primarily) rural Pashtun communities along the area bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan. Grima’s research suggests that within these communities grief, sorrow, pain and suffering (gham) are considered a criterion of honour amongst women (Grima, 1986; Grima, 2004). The degree of grief, suffering and pain that a woman experiences during her life is taken to be a direct measure of her Pashtunness. The more misery a woman has endured the more honour and status as a good Pashtun wife and mother she acquires. (Grima, 1986; Grima, 2004). This cultural ethic is expressed outwardly in statements and narratives by women in everyday life, but particularly when a son or husband dies, falls sick or is the victim of an accident. On these occasions related and non-related women are under a social obligation to visit the mother or wife to offer support and condolence. On these occasions the mother or wife performs a vivid, theatrical and elaborately detailed narrative account of the circumstances surrounding the distressing event or misfortune that has befallen her. Her object is to forcefully and (to Western sensibilities) melodramatically portray herself as a devoted, self-sacrificing, devastated mother or wife. By doing so she is showing herself, through dramatization, as a woman who fits the cultural norm of expected behaviour within the female sphere. Grima argues that within the context of the visit (tapos) the performance of the narrative acts as a social mechanism through which she can publicly demonstrate her Pashtunness for the benefit of her family and her community. The more anguish and suffering she is able to display, aided by tears and cries of distress, the more “beautiful” the narrative (qessa) is considered. The more beautiful the narrative the more powerfully her reputation is established. These performances may be repeated verbatim many times during the day as visitors come to fulfil their role in the process, offering support and condolence.
As a culturally elaborated form of “impression management” the performance of the gham narrative appears to serve a similar function that observance of strict Victorian mourning dress code, as an enactment of social relations and a source of personal identification. Appropriate behaviour performed in order to maintain a kinship tie and its demands. Grima’s account indicates that young Pashtun girls are not expected to know about or share in gham. They are silent witnesses to the performance, through which, she argues, they internalise the appropriate feelings, gestures and behaviour that will later afford them acceptance within the adult female sphere. As young girls they do not consider themselves to have any significant personal history or narrative. Their narrative typically only begins after marriage, which marks the introduction of gham into a woman/s life, and affords her social status. What is particularly notable is the response of Pashtun men to the expressive performance of women’s gham narratives. These performances are, according to Grima, the subject of male satire. They are considered amusing, slightly ridiculous aspects of the female emotional and behavioural repertoire.

Grima adopts a robustly social constructionist position. The English emotion term grief, as it is used by competent English speakers today refers to a special emotion which is primarily related to the deep mental anguish attached to bereavement following the death of a loved one and, significantly, it represents a disruption of ordinary life. There is no linguistic equivalent in Pashtun. Its nearest equivalent, gham, as I interpret Grima’s analysis, contains many of the semantic components that attached to the original meaning of the English term grief. Grief originally referred to hardship, suffering, pain or bodily affliction, and was derived from the old French grief meaning a wrong, injustice, misfortune or calamity. This in turn has its origins in the Latin gravare, meaning to make heavy, burden or load. Though death is the major event most associated with gham it is a term that can typically also refer to disappointments, misfortunes or calamities of any kind (including illness, the engagement/ wedding of a daughter, birth of a third daughter (where there is no son) or lack of food/money). It is considered the paradigmatic tone of ordinary emotional life, in contrast to, for example, the American emphasis on the fostering of positive optimism. It is also distinguished from grief because the conceptual representation of gham is constituted by richly salient and desirable component notions of status, honour and social purpose. It does not seem to be specifically connected to a disruption of normal life and deconstruction of part of one’s identity but rather, on Grima’s account, is of profound salience in the construction of identity.

Linguist Anna Wierzbicka (2003) argues that her native Polish also lacks a semantic equivalent for grief. Though there are words comparable with sadness, despair, suffering and pain
there is nothing commensurable with grief,21 neither, she suggests, is there a semantic equivalent for grief in Russian or French. Of course, the lack of a lexical encoding of the word does not mean that there is a corresponding lack of experience. Nevertheless, the thought is that the presence or absence of distinct words makes a significant difference to our emotional landscape. For both Grima and Wierzbicka when one looks at the current usage of the English term grief from a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural perspective it seems that modern English has isolated the pain associated with a loved one’s death as a distinct category of incongruity or anomaly in human life. The linguistic currency of contemporary Anglo-American culture has expunged grief from the fabric of ordinary experience. Distinct norms and expectations concerning emotional experience, as well as its behavioural expression, are carried by the very word grief that are not shared by the word gham both of which are highly culture specific. Although grief and gham may share certain universal aspects of human existence and experience neither can legitimately be called a universal emotion. There are commonalities between the English grief and the Pashtun gham but there are also differences and the linguistic differences contribute to, as well as provide evidence for, differences in the experience itself. This might be reflected, for example, in the contrasting emphasis in metaphor between grief as a geological upheaval, disruption or a hole in the fabric of life in Anglo-American discourse and of gham as a weight, or a heavy burden which seems more apposite for the Pashtun experience.

On this account an analysis of the emotional response following the death of a loved one based on Veronica’s narrative would be ethnocentric. Her emotional response is, to a large extent, a construction of contemporary Anglo-American culture and has no claim to universality. For those who reject this account the influence of language and its relationship with emotion is overestimated. It takes further argument to show that the presence or absence of an emotion word really makes a difference to our emotional geography (Nussbaum, 2001: 156). A more detailed treatment of the relationship between language and emotion is beyond the scope of this chapter (it will form the focus of the following chapters). Instead, I shall consider some evolutionary and constructionist explanations regarding what grief is for and how these can be applied to the perspectives from social history, literature and anthropology we have examined.

21 Peter Skrzynecki, a poet and the son of Polish and Ukrainian immigrants to Australia, published The Sparrow Garden (2004) in which, as a native Polish speaker, he uses the Polish word żal, which it is argued (Besemer, 2006 : 41-44) is not simply an emotion concept that is expressed somewhat differently in English as sadness, grief or sorrow but is a category of emotion that is simply not recognised in English and to that extent is completely absent from Anglo-American culture.
**Grief: Evolutionary and Constructionist Explanations**

What purpose does this debilitating and distressing emotion serve for the individual and her wider social network? It what sense can it be seen as adaptive? Evolutionarily speaking, two plausible explanations for the emergence of grief have been offered. The first has its origin in attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1978, 1980). Grief can be seen as an extension of a universal, distressing psychological reaction to the separation from a loved one that has its origins in the mother-child bond, or primary caregiver-child bond. Such a reaction is generally useful since it motivates the individual to seek reunion and protection of loved ones and allies. Those occasions when it is advantageous outweigh the occasions when it is not because the loved one has died. Grief, which on this account is non-adaptive, arises as a by-product of the broadly similar reaction to separation (which is adaptive) and is the penalty Veronica pays for being able to love her brother in the way that she does. Veronica has to go through a process of reorganising her attachments and self-identity. Grief is conceptualized as an innate process that, if allowed to run its course, will bring the survivor to a new equilibrium in a changed world that no longer includes the dead person. Having had the aversive experience of grief she will recognize that she no longer has the chance to love and cherish her sibling, and this may lead to the wish that she had tried to help him more. She will therefore be motivated to value, strengthen and protect her existing significant relationships more.

Loss of an attachment seems a particularly apt metaphor for Veronica’s sense of disorientation. However, there is a paucity of cross-cultural research on attachment theory. We need to identify which attachment behaviours are culture-specific and which universal, and how both universal and cultural attachments are observed in grief. The relationship between Veronica and Liam approximates but does not replicate the mother-child bond, so attachment theory may be of limited use in explaining Veronica’s grief. Liam’s death may have provoked a trauma response that is as universal as the attachment response. It is possible that Veronica successfully coming to terms with her traumatic loss involves changing the way she thinks about the world, her relationship to others and how she views her life in general.

The second explanation is that grief at the loss of a loved one signals the capacity to forge strong alliances with others. The Pashtun mother’s performance of her *qessa* (beautiful story) reinforces her image as a solid member of her social group. There is a need for her *gham* (grief, misfortune, sadness, misery, burden) to be witnessed and publicly acknowledged. Through such behaviour she identifies herself as a good Pashtun mother, partner and ally, someone who can be relied upon to follow cherished cultural norms and develop trustworthy relationships. The narrative of the distressing event becomes a narrative about her and her role as mother rather than
the distressing event itself. Their part in the practice also helps her female guests to reinforce their alliance with her and each other within the female sphere. Suffering is a sign of doing Pashto (following the code of honour). Thus Pashto, in the form of behaviour that is perceived within Pashtun culture as ethnically singular and distinguishable, is a criterion used to discriminate ingroup members from outsiders. Thus, although grief may be non-adaptive at the individual level it has adaptive value at the group level. The deliberate fostering of gham as the paradigmatic tone of ordinary emotional life seems less problematic or mystifying when viewed in this light...

Constructivist theories have recently sought to inform our understanding of grief through emphasising the role of meaning making in bereavement. There is a psychological need for individuals to reassert a sense of purpose and control in the wake of disruptive events and on the constructivist model the purpose of grief is the construction of durable biographies, that is to say individual life histories and social narratives, of the deceased and those who survive. The bereaved integrate the deceased into their lives, and make sense of their own life, by creating a narrative that makes sense of their past and present experience. On this model, we are constantly revising our autobiography in the light of new experience, and the process by which we engage in this is through social interaction since cultural history, myth and ritual provide an interpersonal space within which the individual can construct the meaning of the deceased’s life, death and their influence over their own life.

These evolutionary and constructionist explanations might be identifying two distinct but closely related domains. The first involves dealing with the separation from a lost attachment figure, involving the physiological distress and mental anguish of crying, yearning and remembering the lost one. The second involves activities and engaging in cognitive strategies, which may rely heavily on cultural models, that help the bereaved begin to build a new life and identity in which the deceased is perhaps present in a spiritual or symbolic way but is no longer a physical presence. Adapting to the loss involves both processes.

Conclusion

Social history, literature and anthropology offer three different perspectives on grief and mourning. These sources have shown that emotions are both social and private. They are social in that they are a means of communication between members of a social group and private in that they are only truly accessible to the emoter.

Most cultures offer strategies for coping with strong emotions. They also engage in the deliberate attempt to foster emotions, both for their own sake and to promote social cohesion.
Much of the time we attempt to regulate our emotions in some way by amplifying, inhibiting, disguising, altering or completely disowning them. The sharing of these strategies and experiences unquestionably plays an important role in promoting social harmony. Cross-cultural comparison of affect display and emotion regulation in the expression of grief and mourning provides a striking illustration of this. It indicates that what are considered ordinary or abnormal expressions of grief are, to a significant extent, social constructions. Of course they are not purely social constructions. This would be inconsistent with evidence that certain patterns of emotional disturbance (excesses, deficits or lack of coherence in emotions) as they are manifested in mental and behavioural disorders are found across a diverse range of cultures (Murthy et al, 2001). However, a biological account is incomplete, since each individual seeks to make sense of his or her experience using cognitive or mental models that are supplied by their culture. Our emotional experience and behaviour is shaped by these models.

In relation to grief and mourning sources from social history, literature and anthropology indicate that different cultural scripts regarding the expression and regulation of grief and gham (the Pashtun emotion term closely related to it) produce remarkably distinct behavioural patterns. However, they are made intelligible as grief (or its near equivalent) by their respective cultures. These distinctive behavioural patterns are also amenable to general adaptationist and constructivist explanations of grief based on the same central themes of attachment, allegiance and self-construal. The brief discussion of the Pashtun concept of gham raises an issue which I have not been able to fully engage with in this chapter, namely the relationship between language and emotional experience. This will be the focus of the following chapter.
Chapter 6

Emotion Universals and Cross-Cultural Analysis of Emotion Terms

Within the emotion literature there is persuasive evidence that the recognition, expression and experience of certain emotions are universal across cultures. That some emotions are universal, however, does not mean that all are. Some emotional experiences have been designated as culturally unique, for example gham in Pashtun which we came across in the last chapter, fago in Ifaluk, litost in Czech, and tesknota in Polish. Do these cultures enjoy unique emotional experiences? Are there affective states that are genuinely untranslatable and cannot be fully understood or experienced in cultures that do not include them in their emotion taxonomy? Many bi-cultural and bilingual people have argued that the existence of distinct words for emotions influences their emotional landscape. They claim that the difference in conceptualization makes a profound difference to the texture of their emotional life. In this chapter I will examine evidence from the ethnographic literature and also the anecdotal testimony of bilingual people. I argue that we ought to take the testimony of bilingual speakers seriously. I also look at some of the ways in which conceptual transfer between languages can take place, and how we can begin to engage in conceptual comparisons between emotion words in different languages.

Introduction

Are there affective states that are genuinely untranslatable and cannot be understood, much less experienced, in cultures that do not include them in their emotion taxonomy? Perhaps it is the case that all normally functioning members of the human species are endowed with the capacity to experience the whole range of human emotions, but that some emotions are particularly salient within the ‘ethnopsychology’ of some cultures, whilst others are relatively ignored and inaccessible. In Levy’s (1984) terms some emotions might be hypercognized or hypocognized. Hypercognized emotions have been subjected to culturally elaborated theorising, whilst hypocognized emotions remain relatively unelaborated and are not included within the emotional taxonomy. Cultural differences in emotional lives, on this view, vary because of the difference in prominence and attention given to particular emotion in the ethnopsychology of the culture bearers. They do not arise from distinctive cultural physiological capacities. The Tahitians,
for example, may not have a word for \textit{sadness} but this does not mean that it is a cryptic and unfathomable experience to them. Ekman and other proponents of basic emotion theory have argued that any complex, non-basic emotion can be decomposed into the basic emotions: \textit{happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust} and \textit{surprise}. These are universal, innate, species-typical responses that evolved to serve particular environmental challenges faced by our ancestors. This shared heritage should enable people from different cultures to understand each other’s emotions, regardless of whether their languages share an equivalent lexical taxonomy. One perspective which may shed further light on this issue is the experience of bilinguals.

\textbf{Lost in Translation}

\textit{Whether we speak English, Mandarin Chinese, Cherokee, or Pennsylvania Dutch we all seek linguistic competence. Fluent mastery of our mother tongue offers us the opportunity to articulate our sense of self, our inner feelings and our relationship with the world accurately and comfortably. Many who gain sophisticated proficiency in a second language find that there are words in their mother tongue for which there is no satisfactory equivalent in their second language. They find translation is imperfect. Instead they have to rely on lengthy, awkward explanations which fail to fill a perceived lexical lacuna. However, when we find that a second language offers a perfect lexical fit for the concept we seek to verbalize we are provided with a crucial instrument that helps us feel at home, not least because we are understood. When taking on the task of translating the epic narrative poem \textit{Beowulf} from Anglo-Saxon into Modern English, Seamus Heaney describes how recognition of a single word, \textit{þolian} offered him access to the Anglo-Saxon intellect}

\begin{quote}
“although at first it looked completely strange with its \textit{thorn (p)} symbol instead of the familiar \textit{th}, I gradually realized that it was not strange at all, for it was the word that older and less educated people would have used in the country where I grew up. ‘They’ll just have to learn to thole,’ my aunt would say about some family who had suffered through an unforeseen bereavement. And now suddenly here was ‘thole’ in the official textual world, mediated through the apparatus of a scholarly edition, a little bleeper to remind me that my aunt’s language was not just a self-enclosed family possession but an historical heritage, one that involved the journey \textit{þolian} had made north into Scotland and then across unto Ulster with the planters, and then across from the planters to the locals who had originally spoken Irish, and then farther across again when the Scots Irish emigrated to the American South in the eighteenth century. When I read in John Crowe Ransom the line, ‘Sweet ladies, long may ye bloom, and toughly I hope ye may thole’\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

my heart lifted again, the world widened, something was furthered. The far-flungness of the word, the phenomenological pleasure of finding it variously transformed by Ransom’s modernity and Beowulf’s venerability made me feel vaguely something for which again I only found the words years later. What I was experiencing as I kept meeting up with thole on its multi-cultural odyssey was the feeling that Osip Mandelstam once defined as nostalgia for world culture. And this was a nostalgia I didn’t even know I suffered until I experienced its fulfilment in this little epiphany. It was as if, on the analogy of baptism by desire, I had undergone something like illumination by philology. And even though I did not know it at the time, I had by then reached the point where I was ready to translate Beowulf. Tholian had opened my right of way.”

Instead of being severed from the thing it is meant to signify the word tholian is made palpable. It accumulates associations that strengthen its ability to connote, offering a meeting place for the Anglo-Saxon intellect and Heaney’s Irish intellect from where he acquires a genuine feel for the language of the poem. The word tholian becomes saturated with its appropriate conceptual referent to suffer or endure something with fortitude, patience; to bear something without complaint. The verb possibly has its roots in the Old English noun poll, meaning a peg, a holder attached to the gunwale of a boat that holds the oar in place and acts as a fulcrum (support, point of rest on which the ore pivots) in rowing. If this hypothesis is correct the verbing of the noun acts as a compound conceptual metaphor (involving the mapping of the abstract concept of life as a journey whose trials we need to bear without complaining if we are to reach our goal from the concrete concept of the relationship between parts in the role of the peg in rowing. Like many conceptual metaphors, it is opaque to current English speakers since thole has been replaced by the French linguistic import suffer. Nevertheless, for Heaney the recognition of the word represents a release from cultural determinism, offering the possibility of access to an undifferentiated and presumably universal conceptual store. Does such a universal conceptual store exist? Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) programme in semantics claims to have discovered sixty or so universal human concepts, which corresponds to Heaney’s wish to be liberated from cultural determinism and Leibniz’s notion of an alphabet of human thought, or universal grammar.

According to Wierzbicka it is a universal part of human languages that they have some words for some particular kinds of thought-related feelings (where feelings cover both thought-related and bodily-related kinds of feelings). The meanings of these words are language specific. Generally speaking, they do not match across languages and cultures (Wierzbicka, 1999: 15). Many extremely proficient bilinguals attest to the fact that there are numerous cases of emotion

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terms that exist in one language but seem to have no direct equivalent in others. English does not appear to have a word that directly corresponds to the Polish term tęsknota (a feeling linked with pain, sadness, longing and hurt), which is similar but not equivalent to the emotion lexically encoded in English as nostalgia. Eva Hoffman, a Polish-born émigré, claims it as a distinct conceptual category that represents an elusive intersection of the personal and cultural realms (Hoffman, 1991). Tęsknota for the oppressed homeland was an emotion that helped define the emerging national cultural identity and went hand in hand with visions of the liberation of Poland. English terms like sorrow, pain, sadness, longing and hurt can only hint at what it is like to experience this emotion. Whilst on the one hand tęsknota appears to be a deeply personal and almost inexpressible experience it is, for Polish speakers, one of the most effortlessly communicable of sensations.

Czech born author Milan Kundera has identified litost as a Czech emotion term that can be defined as a state of anguish caused by a “sudden insight into one’s own, miserable self”. He argues the word has no exact translation in any other language. It designates a complex emotional state that is the synthesis of many others and involves grief, sympathy, remorse and an indefinable longing. It also seems to involve feelings of humiliation and misery linking insult to reprisal. Kundera states the word works “like a two-stroke motor. First comes a feeling of torment, then the desire for revenge”. It is a particular feature of adolescence; a state of humiliation elicited by awareness of one’s own immaturity or inadequacy which leads to wretchedness and self-pity. Kundera uses the example of a young male student who goes swimming with his girlfriend. He is a weak swimmer and is mortified by the physical superiority of his girlfriend, who is a powerful swimmer. The boy feels humiliated by his inferior performance as she sprints ahead of him. Once they get out of the water, overcome with litost, he slaps her face. The slap is revenge, inflicting punishment on the person who has induced litost.

Turning to the anthropological literature, Catherine Lutz (1986) has identified fago in Ifaluk culture as a complex emotion that has elements of love, compassion and sadness but it is claimed none of these English terms fully capture the concept conveyed by the word. Love is an

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24 Emotion terms are here being characterised as words that directly refer to specific affective states (elated, happy) or processes (to suffer, to grieve) and function either to express or describe these states or processes.


inadequate translation of fago since whilst both love and fago play a role in structuring care and responsibility for others and both can be used to praise another fago is rarely used to talk about sexual relationships. Fago may involve admiration and positive evaluation of the object of the emotion but unlike the English word love it is less frequently used to idealise the other and often involves assessment of the other as weak, incapable and helpless. The prototypical objects of fago are the infant, the sick and especially those close to dying. It is therefore particularly directed at the needful other who requires shelter or protection and rather than focusing, as the English concept of love does on making the other happy, fago evokes a focus on the practical needs of the object of the emotion. On the other hand, compassion is an inadequate translation of fago since whilst both compassion and fago entail the desire to aid or comfort the other, typically in English and American culture it is used to refer to a feeling rather than, as in Ifaluk culture, a practice. Furthermore, the word fago is more salient in Ifaluk culture than compassion is in Anglo-American culture. Fago is a word that is habitually used in Ifaluk discourse, whereas compassion or “feeling sorry for” is comparatively infrequently used in Anglo-American conversation. In addition, fago and compassion are distinct in the behaviour motivated by the emotion since cultural definitions of what constitute help differ. In American culture the emphasis is on respecting the autonomy, independence and privacy of the other, which narrows the range of situations in which helping behaviour is elicited by compassion compared to fago. Sadness is an inadequate translation of fago since the word cannot be used to talk about a sense of general hopelessness or global loss, as the English word sadness can and although both sadness and fago can result in very similar actions (crying, loss of appetite, passive sitting) fago connotes or motivates activity much more than sadness. Fago is therefore considered less passive than sadness.

The evidence from the ethnographic literature and the anecdotal testimony of bilingual people is that language matters. The existence of distinct words for emotions makes a difference to the quality and texture of the emotional life of speakers and indeed their personality. The experience of bilinguals (who are also often bicultural), suggests that by acquiring a natural language one acquires a particular, culturally specific, way of parsing up and experiencing the world. Encountering a novel language can have an impact on that cultural framework, sometimes a radical impact... It can even influence one’s psychological traits. Commenting on his choice of English as the language in which he decided to write, rather than his native Polish or his second language (French) Joseph Conrad reflects on the relationship between language and self:

The merest idea of choice has never entered my head. And as to adoption—well, yes, there was adoption; but it was I who was adopted by the genius of the [English] language, which directly I came out of the stammering stage made me its own so completely that its very idioms I truly believe had a direct action on my temperament and fashioned my still plastic character. It was a very intimate action and for that very reason it is too
mysterious to explain. The task would be as impossible as trying to explain love at first sight.\textsuperscript{27}

\section*{Conceptual Transfer}

In the context where one language encodes a language-specific emotion category non-existent in the other language, conceptual transfer may be seen in a speaker's attempt to borrow this concept as an interpretive category, e.g. the lexical borrowing of \textit{schadenfreude} by English speakers, or \textit{frustration} adopted from English by Greek speakers. The English lexical term \textit{frustration} is commonly translated into Greek as \textit{apogoitefui} (disappointment), \textit{empodiza} (to hinder, present an obstacle) or \textit{mateosi} (to cancel) yet such translation is obviously imprecise in terms of several conceptual components of the term \textit{frustration}, including somatic states and their interpretations (Panayiotou, 2004). In this case the collective desire of a speech community (communities of discourse practice) to enrich the potential of the language resulted in lexical importing. The adoption of \textit{schadenfreude} and \textit{frustration} are cases where the words have been imported with little or no adaptation. Features such as phonology and orthography\textsuperscript{28} from the original language are preserved. These loan words borrow both their meaning\textsuperscript{29} and their phonetic shape directly from their source language. In the case of \textit{semantic loans} there is adoption of a foreign concept at the semantic level but no new lexical item is introduced into the borrowing language. Instead a native word takes on new meaning. An example is the German semantic loan \textit{überziehen}. The word originally referred only to drawing something across something, covering or coating it (as in coating a wall with whitewash, re-covering a piece of furniture or icing a cake), before it took on the additional borrowed meaning of its literal English translation \textit{overdraw} in the financial sense. In other cases the borrowing involves literally translating the semantic components of a given term in the host language into their equivalents in the borrowing language, i.e. the French \textit{gratt-cief} inspired by the model of the English term \textit{skyscraper}.

Evidence of conceptual transfer of a different kind is illustrated by a study conducted with advanced American learners of Russian (Pavlenko and Driagina, 2007). They found evidence of a “forward” conceptual transfer of the English-based adjectival pattern into Russian. These


\textsuperscript{28} Orthography – the conventional spelling system of a language, and the study of how letters combine to represent sounds and form words.

\textsuperscript{29} This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of the meaning of the adopted term acquiring new culturally specific properties within its adoptive speech community.
instances involved the use of the copula verbs byt’ (to be) and stanovit’sia (to become) with emotion adjectives in contexts where Russian monolinguals use action verbs. For instance, the learners’ references to the main character included utterances such as ona stala serditoi (she became angry) and ona stala eshche bole rasstroennai (she became even more upset) in contexts where native speakers of Russian said ona rasserdilas’ (she got angry, literally translated “she angered herself”) or ona eshche bol’she rasstroilas’ (literally, she even more upset herself). This type of transfer could also be characterised as a framing or conceptualization transfer, since it involves linguistic frames and ways of thinking about events and phenomena. When discussing emotions in Russian the English speakers had transferred their concept of emotions as states and have not yet internalised the Russian concept of the representations of emotions as processes.

**Emotion Lexicons**

Another area of cross linguistic differences involves cases where one language makes more linguistic distinctions than another with regard to particular emotions. Thus, emotions referred to with a single word in English may be lexically differentiated in other languages. Whilst English offers a single term for anger Samoan has two terms that roughly connote anger. (Gerber, 1985) German and the Yankunytjatjara language of Central Australia have three (Goddard, 1991, Durst, 2001) Furthermore, where English refers to the state of being angry as a result of particular experiences, Russian obliges its speakers to discriminate between two processes, that of serdit’sia (to be actively cross at someone, to be upset with them and mad at them) and zlit’sia (to be positively angry or cross but not necessarily at a particular person). Consequently, a speaker of English learning German or Mandarin Chinese will need to learn to speak of anger as an externally observable process and not only as an internal state. These terms refer to somewhat different prototypical scripts, all of which fall within the domain of anger in English. Learning a second language that makes finer grained conceptual distinctions, splitting the emotional realm more distinctly, will require the learner to develop new conceptual categories and restructure existing ones.

This implies that adequate mental representations of emotions minimally involves knowledge of the internal structure and properties of the conceptual category of emotion, e.g. emotions as inner states, actions or relational phenomena, emotions/thoughts etc. and knowledge of the internal structure of particular emotion categories, such as guilt or jealousy, including causal antecedents, appraisal and consequences of particular emotions and somatic states associated with them. It also involves knowledge of the prototypicality of particular emotion scripts and
display rules, since emotion concepts have embedded within them fundamental key cultural propositions and the concepts themselves are nested within a broader understanding of folk psychology, social roles and goals. The very term emotion is, according to Wierzbicka an English classificatory term borrowed from folk English now used by English speakers in a variety of non-defined ways influenced by the folk concept where it contributed towards a culturally shaped perspective on human psychology (Wierzbicka, 1999).

**Studying Emotion and Emotion Words**

From the discussion of jealousy, embarrassment and grief in previous chapters I believe that there is strong evidence that emotions are fundamentally adaptive. It also seems well established that the process of emotional reactions are pervaded with appraisal of the meaning of events. The chapters on embarrassment and grief and mourning illustrate how particular appraisals lead to particular emotions, and appraisals continue as people monitor and regulate their emotions. Some theorists have also argued that each emotion can be described as a “prototypical social script”, that is to say each emotion can be seen as a patterned sequence of events and reactions to those events, including characteristic cognitions, affective experiences, motivations and subsequent behaviours. The conceptual analysis of the term embarrassment in chapter 4, for example, was heavily reliant upon identifying a prototypical example of the emotion, and Jack’s narrative provided my example. In the chapter on Jealousy it was noted that the emotion has been construed as involving an entire “emotional episode”, including a complex “narrative”. This narrative comprises of “the circumstances that led up to the episode, jealousy itself as an attempt at self-regulation, subsequent actions and events and the resolution of the episode” (Parrott, 2001 p 306). This again is another description of an emotion as a “prototypical script”.

My analysis of embarrassment, not only emphasised its functionality. It also characterized emotions as highly organized, cognitive structures. A useful way of depicting the organisation of emotions is through these “prototypical social scripts” (Tangney & Fisher, 1997; Widen & Russell 2010). The assumption is that when identifying different emotions (distinguishing jealousy from envy and shame from embarrassment) each emotion has its own script, which includes

its eliciting event, conscious feeling, facial expression, vocalization, action, physiological manifestation, label, and so on, aligned in a causal and temporal order. Attributing an emotion to oneself or to another requires that one’s current experience or observation resembles the script for that emotion

(Widen & Russell, 2010, p1)
On this view, there is extensive cultural learning that shapes our emotional landscape. The infant learns to recognise more and more situations in which particular emotional responses are appropriate. Each culture also teaches its members “social scripts” for conventional displays of specific emotions. Another form of learning involves increasing differentiation of the so-called basic emotions. This is accomplished by subcategorizing situations and appropriate behavioural scripts that formally fell under a given basic emotion, e.g. in English the child learns to differentiate between anger and its subcategories of irritation, resentment, indignation. Emotion concepts can therefore be seen as narrative structures, patterned sequences of events and reactions. These patterned sequence of events and reactions portray the prototype, gestalt or best illustration of an emotion, including its antecedents and many components. Wierzbicka adopts this approach. The meaning of emotion terms involves references to a feeling that is linked with a characteristic or prototypical cognitive scenario. The prototypical scenario serves as a kind of “reference situation” by which the nature of the associated feeling can be identified. Kundra’s concise conceptual analysis of litost (referred to earlier, and which Wierzbicka endorses) is another example.

An analysis of concept comparability (Pavlenko, 2008) highlights three possible relationships between concepts encoded in two different languages (1) two concepts may be similar or identical (2) one language may have a concept that has no counterpart in the other language or (3) two or more concepts may partially overlap. The first possibility is an entirely inclusive overlap between the two languages. The second involves language and culture specific concepts such as frustration in English culture, stenahoria in Greek culture or fago in Ifaluk culture. These are the concepts bilinguals argue for as unique and untranslatable. To internalise such concepts second language learners have to undergo the process of secondary affective socialisation and to develop prototypical scripts for these emotions. In this process they learn what events and phenomena commonly elicit such emotions, in what contexts and how these emotions are commonly displayed and what consequences they might lead to.

The third relationship between the concepts of two different languages is partial overlap. Pavlenko (2008) has pointed out that this can take different forms, e.g. nesting, partition and differentiation. In a nesting relationship, one concept represents a subset of another. Pavlenko’s example is drawn from Sachs and Coley’s (2006) study of the English notion of jealousy and its Russian translation revnost. Revnost refers only to jealousy in intimate personal relationships, whereas jealousy is not exclusively reserved for that domain but is also used to refer to jealousy of another’s possessions or happiness. (Sachs and Coley, 2006). The English term jealousy is therefore a broader conceptual category than revnost.
A relationship of partition or fissure is found in cases where emotion categories referred to with a single term in one language are lexically and conceptually differentiated in other languages, as we have seen in the case of anger and the Russian concepts of serdit’sia and zlit’sia 30. A yet more complex overlapping relationship is that of differentiation. This is found in cases where a concept in one language shares aspects with several concepts in another language, whilst also featuring some language and culture-specific properties. Pavlenko argues that the case for such concepts is made in Besemeres’ (2006) analysis of the Polish concept of zal that shares some but not all elements with the English lexical terms grief, sadness and sorrow and in Panayiotou’s (2006) analysis of the Greek concept of ntopii that shares some elements with English shyness, shame, embarrassment and discomfort.

It is also worth remembering that, of course, languages are highly complex, self-organising systems in constant flux and conceptual transfer takes place within a language. Consider the statement

“The government will consult on having coterminous Primary Care Trusts and Councils in the vast majority of areas.”

‘Coterminosity’31 here refers to the sharing of a common geographical boundary between two organisations, in this case Primary Care Trusts and Councils. This is the principle sense in which

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30 See earlier section on conceptual transfer for brief discussion of the Russian concepts of serdit’sia and zlit’sia

31 Or ‘conterminosity’: one could say that these two words are exact synonyms, though it is probably better to say that this is the case of a single word with alternative spellings.
the word is used. However, the word is also used to refer to overlapping and sharing metaphorical boundaries, e.g.

“objectives should be coterminous with strategies.”

The Local Government Association discouraged the use of the term in documents that were meant to communicate Local Authority aims and proposals to the general public. As a replacement for conterminous they suggested the idiom singing from the same hymn sheet, i.e. referring to acting in concert, sharing the same outlook, non-conflicting objectives and goals. The use of such terms as revenue stream instead of “income” and thought showers instead of “brainstorming” was also criticised. The utility of these lexical labels is restricted to the social environment for which they were originally intended (government ministers, local authority managers and council workers). Within this environment they had achieved the status of management clichés but they had not entered common linguistic currency outside. Lexical innovations are only accepted through consensus and social learning. A fairly recent example is the term quantitative easing (a more palatable, less emotionally loaded term for printing money - or what is just a more sophisticated economic equivalent of printing money).

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32 Salisbury District Council apparently banned their staff from using the phrase singing from the same hymn sheet in order to avoid causing offence to non-believers. They could, of course, have asked staff to substitute it with the phrase reading from the same page or on the same page instead “Singing from the same hymn sheet may upset atheists” Chris Hastings, Public Affairs Editor 9.11.2008 The Telegraph
Conclusion

In this chapter I examined evidence from the ethnographic literature and the anecdotal testimony of bilingual people. I argued that we ought to take the testimony of bilingual speakers seriously. I also looked at some of the ways in which conceptual transfer between languages can take place, and how we can begin to compare conceptual content between emotion words in different languages. Such cross-cultural and cross-lingual comparison is an important area of investigation for the overall account of what emotions are. On the one hand, the capacity supplied by human biology is not to be denied: we can accept that every normally functioning member of the human species is equipped with the potential to experience the whole range of human emotions. But it should also be acknowledged that some emotions are particularly salient within the ethnopsychology of certain cultures, whilst others are relatively ignored and because of that cultural neglect become less easy to access and express.

So how do matters stand in terms of taking emotion to be a biological phenomenon, or a social phenomenon? We have seen that there can be cultural variation in emotional lives that is attributable to the difference in prominence and attention given to specific emotions in the ethnopsychology of the culture bearers. But this does not establish that there really are anything like distinctive cultural physiological capacities. Ekman and other proponents of basic emotion theory can still maintain that there is a basic emotional palette, and that any complex, non-basic emotion can somehow be decomposed into the basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise). The basic emotional components (the ‘emotional atoms’) are supposed to be universal, innate, species-typical responses that are present in our species because of their adaptive value: i.e., they evolved to serve particular environmental challenges faced by our ancestors. This shared heritage should enable people from different cultures to understand each other’s emotions, regardless of whether their languages share an equivalent lexical taxonomy. Ekman insists that these basic emotions can be defined purely in terms of eliciting conditions and physiological responses. He also argues that it is unproblematic to label these basic emotions with English terms. Can this version of a fundamentally biological theory of the emotions be brought into question? In fact Wierzbicka has challenged Ekman’s assumptions and argued that the terms for ‘basic emotions’ are themselves culturally-specific and cannot be used to identify these postulated universal emotions – if, indeed, there are any such universal and fundamental emotions. Instead, she proposes that in order to understand emotions adequately we should adopt her Natural Semantic Metalanguage theory. This is the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 7

Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage

Introduction

Aboriginal, or culturally specific, emotions have received relatively little attention in the emotion literature and have rarely been the focus of cross cultural evaluation. One theorist who has made a significant contribution in this field is Polish-born linguist Anna Wierzbicka. Wierzbicka has been a strong critic of Ekman’s adoption of English emotion terms. She does not deny the existence of commonalities and indeed universals in emotions, and for his part Ekman does not deny that the ways of thinking and talking about feelings prevalent in different cultures exhibit considerable diversity. They differ regarding how we can distinguish the universal from the culture-specific.

Ekman insists that emotions can be defined purely in terms of eliciting conditions and physiological responses. Wierzbicka argues that emotions are in fact a semantic domain amenable to investigation in terms of a metalanguage composed of semantic primitives or universals shared by all human languages. This metalanguage purportedly offers a framework which enables us to adopt an objective, culture-free and non-contextual starting point, avoiding what Wierzbicka sees as the ethnocentric universalism of Ekman’s uncritical adoption of English emotion terms. Wierzbicka argues that most languages do not have words corresponding to the basic emotion terms happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise. The categorisation of emotions encoded in any lexicon is language specific and simply cannot reflect a universal classificatory scheme (Wierzbicka, 1995: 228). We therefore ought not to seek to categorise basic emotions with words from the English lexicon.

The absence of universal emotion terms does not imply the absence of universal emotions, or that certain emotions cannot be matched cross-culturally with certain identifiable facial expressions. Wierzbicka’s claim is that we simply cannot regard these English terms as referential labels for universal feeling states or basic emotion modes. What certain human facial expressions associated with particular human emotions share is a message which is decodable in terms of a shared language of universal human concepts such as feel, think, know and want, e.g. the facial gesture of the raising of the mouth can be interpreted as conveying the message I feel something good now, the meaning of a downturned mouth is I feel something bad now. I know I can’t do anything. Similarly, fear-like words have the basic cognitive component: something bad can happen to me. I
don’t want this to happen; anger-like words have the cognitive component I don’t want things like this to happen. I want to do something because of this; and shame-like words have the cognitive component: people can think something bad about me. I don’t want this to happen.

Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis

Naturally, it would be desirable to have a rigorous analytical tool that enabled us to investigate the extent to which (putatively) equivalent lexical labels actually occupy, so to speak, the same conceptual real estate. This is what Wierzbicka’s NSM theory is meant to provide. Wierzbicka’s research suggests that in fact all languages have words that directly correspond in their precise meaning to a subset of English terms such as good, know, feel, and want, which reflect universal concepts that are not systematically decomposable into more basic semantic elements. The current state of NSM research has found approximately sixty of these semantic primes. She suggests we can adopt these as building blocks to create cognitive scenarios that can represent any complex meaning, within any conceptual domain in human thought, since this small set of semantic primes represent a true universal conceptual store because they occur in every natural language and suffice to characterise all natural meaning. As mentioned, currently the lexicon of the NSM comprises of approximately sixty elements (see Table 1.)

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<tr>
<th>Table 1 : Table of Universal Human Concepts (Wierzbicka, 2004 : 415)</th>
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<td><strong>Substantives</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Quantifiers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Attributes</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Mental predicates</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Speech</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Actions, events, movements</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Space</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intensifier, augmentor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxonomy, partonomy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similarity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Accismus

It will be helpful to first examine how the NSM approach to linguistic analysis can be applied to explicate non-emotion terms. The concept encoded within the English term accismus refers to an insincere or disingenuous refusal of something that is really desired. e.g., “No, really, I insist you have the last biscuit. I couldn’t possibly eat another”, when that is patently not the case. It can therefore be characterised as a speech act, an ironic, rhetorical semantic device of feigning or affecting disinterest in something whilst actually desiring it. The word carries strong connotations of coyness or bashfulness. It can be illustrated by fairly straightforward examples such as the one given above or the following blog entry:

My name is Elizabeth Urello. I currently live in Greenpoint, Brooklyn. I do not desire to be a writer/actor/comic/playwright/household name/superstar-personality, any more than I desire your good opinion. I do not desperately want more friends, and I am not badly in need of dates. (”About Elizabeth,” at the blog Accismus.)

However, the richness of the concept is perhaps better captured with a more nuanced example from the political sphere. In 2008 David Miliband (then Foreign Secretary) published an article in The Guardian\textsuperscript{33} setting out his vision of the future of the Labour Party and suggesting ways in which it could reassert its authority. The article was almost universally interpreted as a clear indication that he wished to challenge Gordon Brown’s leadership. At a press conference following the publication of the article Miliband told reporters he was certain that Gordon Brown could lead the party into the next election and win, but when directly and repeatedly asked if he ruled himself out of a leadership bid he constantly avoided the question. He insisted he wanted to discuss “arguments, not personalities” saying, “I am not campaigning for anything other than a successful Labour government”.

Why did political commentators refuse to accept Miliband’s protests that the article ought to be taken at face value? One explanation is that political journalists and commentators were very conscious of the context within which the article was published. At a time when Gordon Brown was facing intense media speculation regarding a challenge to his leadership, Miliband published an article which refused to directly support him. In fact, the article made absolutely no reference to Gordon Brown. This was widely interpreted as a veiled indication that, whilst not wishing to openly challenge the PM, Miliband was keen to show that if there was support for a leadership challenge he was ready. Miliband’s protest that he was interested in arguments and

\textsuperscript{33}Miliband, D. (2008) “Against all odds we can still win, on a platform of change” The Guardian
29 July 2008
not personalities was seen as an example of coy, political *accismus*, grounded in a tacit understanding of folk psychology. Another statement that could easily be interpreted as *accismus* followed shortly after when he was again interviewed after the publication of the article. Miliband was asked for his response to those who were calling for him to stand for the leadership. He replied, “I'm not one of these people who has written on the back of an envelope or the back of a napkin x, y or z. My first ambition in life was to be a bus conductor and I've never managed to achieve that! That's my view ... do the day job well. If you are worried about your next job you're not going to do the current job”34.

Adopting Wierzbicka’s strategy, the abstract concept of *accismus* ought to be capable of being explicated using semantic primes and combining these with a culture-specific prototypical cognitive scenario. I suggest a semantic explication of the concept, using explanatory paraphrases couched in the metalanguage of universal semantic primes, would look something like this:

(a) X thought something
(b) Sometimes a person thinks about someone else
(c) “This person wants something.
(d) This person wants people to know they want this thing
(e) This person does not want to say they want this thing because they think people will think something bad about them.
(f) This person does not want people to think something bad about them. This person wants people to think something good about them so will not say they want this thing,”
(g) X thought something like this

**Emotion Concept: Relief**

Having developed the theory, Wierzbicka argues that it is a particularly rigorous analytical and descriptive tool for the cross-cultural study of emotion concepts35. According to the theory, the cognitive scenario captures an emotion concept by explicating a cultural-specific prototypical situation by which the nature of the associated feeling can be identified. Explications of this kind are suggested to capture very subtle differences between the meaning of related emotion terms in a form that is readily intelligible and translatable. We can, according to the theory, attempt to describe the nature of the feelings in question indirectly via a culture-specific prototypical cognitive scenario or script which can be used as a basis for interpretation of the emotion and its

34 Will Woodward “David Miliband: I was right to write the Guardian Article” *The Guardian* 31 July 2008
35 It is the application of the theory to emotion concepts that is the focus of my interest. Though there may be general criticisms which may be of wider interest in semantic theory it is the application of NSM to emotion concepts that is my primary concern.
relation to other emotions. Wierzbicka has made over thirty such explications of some of the more common emotion terms in the English lexicon, along with emotion terms in other languages. The cultural scripts have a three part structure. The first part describes the state of mind of a hypothetical individual; expressed by the component *sometimes a person thinks something like this.* This is followed by the component showing the feeling which comes as a result, i.e. *because of this this individual feels something good/bad.* Finally the actual feeling of the emoter is compared to the hypothetical individual in the cognitive scenario (*X felt something like this*). This can be formalised as:

Person X was \[\text{emotion term, e.g. angry, ashamed, relieved, sad}\]

- person x thought something
- because of this, X felt something
- sometimes a person thinks something like this [Y]
- because of this, this person feels something
- person x thought something like this
- because of this, X felt something like this

I want now to examine the application of NSM theory to the concept of *relief,* one of the many English terms Wierzbicka has identified as an emotion concept (Wierzbicka A, 1999: 57-58). Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) defined *relief* as “happiness as a result of something that brings to an end fear or sadness”. Since one could feel relief without feeling happy, and relief could follow the alleviation of pain, anxiety or boredom as well as following the cessation of fear or sadness, this analysis is obviously inadequate. It is also inadequate since happiness, fear and sadness are *themselves* non-basic terms in need of further explanation. The Johnson-Laird and Oatley definition attempts to define an emotion using concepts that are complex and language specific, in need of decomposition into more basic semantic elements. Wierzbicka argues the concept of relief can be clearly and rigorously captured using the NSM framework. *Relief,* she argues, implies that something one expected to happen and which one thought would be *bad* is not now going to happen and she offers the following explication:
Person X felt relief

Person X felt something because X thought something.
Sometimes a person thinks:
“I thought that something bad would happen
I felt bad because of this
I know now: this bad thing will not happen”
When this person thinks this, this person feels something good
X felt something like this
Because X thought something like this

(Wierzbicka, A (1999 : 58)

According to NSM theory, the scenario ought to be testable against native speakers’ intuitions. It should also be readily translatable and intelligible to non-English speakers. This suggests two hypotheses:

**H1:** The cognitive scenario offered would generally be identified by competent English speakers as a situation in which the emotion concept identified as “feeling relieved” would be applied to the affective state of X.

**H2:** Non-English speakers presented with a direct translation of the cognitive scenario in their native language would have a competent grasp of the emotion concept lexically encoded in the English language as relief.

Of course, it is quite possible to feel an emotion without being aware of its cause, but this is perfectly compatible with an analysis of emotion concepts based on a prototypical example and suggesting emotions by adopting hypothetical, but highly evocative, scenarios is a common practice. Describing one of her favourite moments from Inauguration Day, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, recalled watching Marine One lift off. This signified the long awaited departure of former President Bush from the White House and Pelosi said “it felt like a 10 pound anvil was lifted off my head”.36 Whether one is talking about emotion or the language used to describe or categorise it, in normal everyday contexts the emotion situation has gone well beyond any appraisal, arousal or behaviour stage. Pelosi’s metaphor reflected a conscious evaluation and description of the event. We opt for descriptions which social or cultural factors have taught us to associate with whatever emotion it is that has been felt. In other words, as Pelosi recognised, one can tell other people how one feels by telling them that one feels

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like a person feels in a certain situation. Such situations are then identified as prototypical, and for competent speakers of English the meaning of the expression used by Pelosi is meant to be intuitively understood. However, since references to imaginary situations lack the force of cross-cultural generalizability, Wierzbicka instead links feelings with cognitive scenarios involving thoughts and wants, since, she argues, all languages have words for describing feelings based on certain thoughts. Someone feels something because someone thought something.

How successful is Wierzbicka’s analysis of relief? The English term relief, I suggest, refers generally to the cessation of mental or physical stress and need not necessarily imply awareness that something bad might happen. One can feel relief at the cessation of a constant drilling noise from a redevelopment site near one’s office. When the boredom of a long hospital stay is broken by a visit from a friend, we feel relief from the cessation of being weary or agitated through lack of mental stimulation. Moreover, the materialisation of a bad event we anticipated might happen can itself lead to a sense of relief. Take the example of the Denver Broncos. Contrary to what one might have expected, it was clear from their demeanour and verbal responses to journalists and fans that the emotion which flooded out of the Denver Broncos team members after their dream of an undefeated season was shattered at the New York Giants Stadium, was not disappointment, frustration, anger or regret but an overwhelming sense of relief. Something bad had happened (an eleventh hour defeat) but their reaction was relief at the ending of the immense physical and psychological pressure they were under to maintain an unblemished record. It is also the case that when something bad we fear might happen actually does take place we might feel relief since this can alleviate the mental stress of uncertainty. We feel relief when we are aware that we can cope with the situation (it is not as bad as anticipated). In other cases, a difficult decision might be taken out of our hands as a consequence of which an unwanted event cannot be avoided. Under such circumstances it would be plausible to feel relief because the burden of making a difficult decision has been taken from us.

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37 It is also worth noting that whilst words are useful for labelling an internal state and for communicating the nature of one’s internal state to another, in societies such as those of the Oceanic peoples, such as Samoans, Pintupi Aboriginals and Ara speakers of the Solomon Islands, Lutz (1986:267) observes emotion words are used for statements about the relationship between a person and an event, rather than as statements about introspection of one’s internal state.

38 According to Wierzbicka the Polish lexicon does not have common everyday words for the conceptual categories labelled stress, depression and relaxation that appear crucial to the vocabulary of American ethnographic discourse regarding psychological well being. Recent emergence of the adoption of English loan words such as stress and relaks. she argues, highlights the absence of concepts of this kind in Polish folk psychology (1994: 172) "Emotion, Language and Cultural Scripts" in Emotion and Culture : Empirical Studies of Mutual Influences ed. Shinobou Kitayam and Hazel Rose Markus American Psychological Association : Washington DC

Wierzbicka argues that a cognitive scenario is only intended to act as a reference situation by which the nature of the associated feeling can be identified. Nevertheless, she also claims that these scripts provide rigorous specifications of necessary and sufficient conditions for the emotion concept to be fully grasped. They are also meant to demonstrate that the boundaries between these concepts are not nebulous or fuzzy, since even apparent synonyms such as ebullient, ecstatic, euphoric, exhilarated, overjoyed and thrilled, encode different and specifiable conceptual structures. Of course, a concept can have the type of coherency that need not be specifiable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and we might work for a reasonable level of strictness and precision, but Wierzbicka’s claim is stronger than that. The claim of the NSM theory is that a definition is acknowledged only if it can be substituted salva sensu for the definiendum (Wierzbicka, 1988: 12; Goddard, 2002 (b): 6).

The adequacy of Wierzbicka’s explications of emotion concepts, of which she has offered many, have not received genuine empirical testing, and cannot simply be assumed. These semantic explications have yet to be presented to native English speakers to assess whether the descriptions are intelligible and native speakers are able to identify the emotion that is purportedly explicated. Nor have they been tested on non-English speakers in their native language. In any event, the explication of relief does not, I think, fulfil the criteria of preservation of meaning NSM theory sets itself. I suspect it is highly unlikely that someone lacking the concept of relief who was given the semantic explication would recognise many situations depicted in English or American films, for example, where relief was being felt by someone. That would indicate weak or poor acquisition of the concept. It might still be true that competent speakers of English who have already acquired the concept will successfully identify the emotion from the explication but this would not indicate that the concept could be acquired through the explication alone.

Ekman (1995) lists relief amongst the fifteen emotions that satisfy enough of his proposed characteristics to be considered basic or for which evidence supporting its status as a basic emotion is likely to be found. Although Wierzbicka includes relief in her list of emotion concepts for which she supplies cognitive scenarios, she describes it as a so-called emotion term because “the word relief does not imply, by virtue of its very meaning, that something is happening in a person’s body” (Wierzbicka, 1999:23 emphasis added) but she accepts that the ethnopsychological concept of relief frequently includes acknowledgment of a bodily component, as Pelosi’s metaphor attests. It is not entirely clear whether the phrase feeling something good is here meant to refer to thought-related feelings, or bodily feelings, or both. The phrase is opaque and uninformative. It can tell us nothing about the emotionality of relief when it is accompanied by
bodily feeling. As Wierzbicka would concede, the cognitive scenario fails to give us any real access to the unique hedonic tone of a token emotional episode of relief as an interoceptive state.

Whilst the feeling of relief generally has a positive hedonic tone (it can involve intense euphoria) yet one can be flooded with relief but not happy, as might be the case where the parents of a missing child learn that a body has been found but then discover it is not their child. It is uncontroversial that there are unique physiological responses accompanying the cessation of episodes of extreme emotional stress or trauma, e.g. decrease in heart rate, blood pressure, blood flow and decreased glucose to the muscles, and the lowering of epinephrine and norepinephrine levels to normal. In non-extreme cases such physiological symptoms will be felt more or less strongly as a factor of the levels of stress elicited by the unique situation. Though relief comes under the descriptive term of “feeling something good” it is plausibly a distinct bodily response from, for example, feeling pride or excitement. Any explication of the concept of relief ought to acknowledge this but Wierzbicka’s analysis cannot. What Wierzbicka’s analysis also fails to acknowledge is that if we have a competent grasp of the concept we ought to recognise typical bodily responses or behaviours to intense experiences of the emotion, such as a gasp, letting the head fall back, letting out a huge sigh, a hand tremor, shaky laughter, sagging against a wall for support or crying/calling out. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that Wierzbicka’s NSM makes a valuable and important contribution towards the analysis of emotion terms and the identification of emotional universals.

Feelings do not have a structure that can be rendered in words, unlike thoughts. The best we can do is to try and describe what we feel and depend on other people’s experience of similar things to help them understand us. We are, however, getting close to capturing the concept of relief by identifying a scenario in which the concept would be salient, and identifying situations in which the emotion concept is salient is evidence of concept acquisition as well as semantic knowledge. It is obvious, for example, that semantic recognition of the word privacy is insufficient to demonstrate understanding of the concept if one is unable to correctly identify a situation as an invasion of privacy.
I now turn to the Polish emotion term *przykro*, the subject of an extended essay by Wierzbicka (2001), for which she offers the following explication:

(a) I felt something bad
(b) because I thought something
(c) sometimes a person feels something bad
(d) because this person thinks:
(e) someone did something
(f) because of this someone else could think:
(g) “this person doesn’t feel any good feelings toward me”
(h) I felt something like this
(i) because I thought something like this

(Wierzbicka, 2001: 24)

I do not speak Polish and on reading this explication of the Polish term *przykro* I confess to finding it difficult to grasp precisely what these phrases actually mean. Is the person who “doesn’t feel any good feelings towards me” feeling indifference or feeling something bad? How salient is this in regard to successfully grasping the concept? What is the “something bad” that I was feeling? There are different kinds of feeling bad. Is it something close to anger or is it closer to shame? In fact, as explicated by Wierzbicka *przykro* is closer to what English speakers would categorise as feeling sorry, sad, offended, upset or hurt though it is claimed none is a completely satisfactory translation.

Wierzbicka considers some of these comparable English words in some detail. She argues that *hurt*, for example, is an unsatisfactory translation. Feeling hurt necessarily involves another person where the interpretation of the social interaction (or omission) is that someone does not have positive feelings when they think about me. They feel either a negative emotion or indifference. Both *przykro* and *hurt* encode a negative emotion caused by someone else’s apparent rejection or coldness. But Wierzbicka argues that, unlike *hurt*, the emotion concept of *przykro* also applies in situations where the one causing the hurt or pain is oneself, by one’s own actions towards someone else that might appear to indicate emotional indifference or rejection of them. To be the unwitting cause of someone else’s feeling that you are emotionally indifferent or have not acknowledged their personal worth will lead to oneself feeling *przykro*. This differs from *hurt* since the claim is that I will not feel *hurt* if I am the unwitting cause of hurting someone’s feelings. I might feel remorseful, even mortified but I will not experience the feeling of *hurt* (though I
would argue that I might well feel hurt if someone misconstrued my actions or omissions as 
hurtful).

Two other possible translations of this Polish term considered by Wierzbicka are sorry 
and offended. Sorry is an unsatisfactory translation since przykro only applies to interpersonal 
relationships/ The English term sorry does not. I can be sorry I forgot to set my alarm or that I 
broke my favourite vase. But przykro would not be applicable in such cases. Przykro also implies a 
perceived lack of positive feeling towards someone, whereas feeling sorry that I left my keys in 
your car does not. Similarly, offended is an unsatisfactory translation. Examples such as “She was 
deeply offended that you did not consider her for promotion”, “are you offended by my remarks?” and 
the common exchange of “no offence meant” “none taken!” emphasize the interpersonal character of 
the concept and our need to have our personal worth acknowledged, which the concept of przykro 
shares. However, Wierzbicka suggests that the two concepts differ in that whilst offence is 
concerned with the absence of “good thoughts” about someone przykro is concerned with the absence of 
“good feelings” towards someone. The concept of przykro also carries with it a bidirectional 
reflexivity that is lacking in the English concept of offended. I cannot offend myself. I cannot be 
offended by my own actions. I can be mortified, shamed, embarrassed or upset by my actions but 
I, surely, cannot be offended by them. In the case of przykro the experience can coincide with me 
being the agent: I can feel przykro because of something that I have done myself.

If we accept Wierzbicka’s sensitive analysis of the distinction between the emotion term 
przykro and its close English equivalents this does not imply that English speakers never 
experience the feelings associated with the concept of przykro. Her suggestion is that they rarely 
encode their experience in the way that Polish speakers typically do. The interpretation of one’s 
emotional state depends, to a certain extent, upon the lexical grid provided by our native 
language and the same affective state is here labelled differently. English speakers conceptualise 
the feeling using different interpretive categories, linking it to situations in which one 
experienced feeling sorry, hurt or offended. Wierzbicka’s analysis reflects the fact that language 
acts as an attention-directing mechanism. The Polish lexical term przykro draws attention to the 
fact that the cultural norm is that one ought to feel and display positive emotions towards others. 
In contrast, the common use of the English term hurt draws attention to the English cultural norm 
that one ought to avoid making other people feel bad. The analysis of the two terms therefore 
indicates something significant about the folk psychology of these two speech communities.

The advantage of Wierzbicka’s approach is that it brilliantly highlights the problems of 
emigrating into a new linguistic environment. Emotion concepts are clearly important cultural 
signifiers. However, such emotion concepts are not always faithfully captured within
Wierzbicka’s paraphrases. It is my view that a true understanding of the emotion concept of *przykro* would require affective socialisation and the development of a number of prototypical scripts for the emotion, learning what events and phenomena typically elicit the emotion, in what contexts and how the emotion is displayed and the consequences it leads to. Wierzbicka is right that we must avoid an anglocentric emotion lexicon. The complexity of meaning encoded in the Polish term *przykro* cannot be exhaustively captured in Wierzbicka’s reductive paraphrase but it persuasively illustrates the need to recognise the dangers of ethnocentricism. As Wierzbicka herself acknowledges, her set of semantic primitives loses significance if it fails to enable us to explicate complex meaning. It is a requirement that Wierzbicka’s paraphrase is substitutable for the emotion term itself. The difficulty that non Polish speakers would have in truly grasping the concept of *przykro* from Wierzbicka’s paraphrase illustrates the fact that the differences between the meanings of some emotion terms may be too context-specific and culturally loaded to be captured in the abstract language of semantic primitives.

Her thoughtful essay on the emotion term *przykro* is testament to the fact that we can make sensitive and detailed comparisons between emotion concepts across cultures, but it seems to require painstaking identification of corresponding semantic components. Is this necessarily any more complicated than the attempt to capture emotion concepts through reductive paraphrase? It seems likely that, in order to be effective, a definition or explanation of a term has to be expressed not in terms that adopt simpler components on some universal scale but in terms of something that the person to whom the definition is being offered already has an appreciation or understanding of.

**Folk taxonomies**

Lexical diversity and specialisation emerges as each speech community comes to address itself to the unique constellation of ecological and social conditions under which it lives. Language is formed, to a significant extent, for the purpose of organising social responses to the problems presented by particular environments. The general rule is that folk taxonomies are guided by what is relevant to human survival in a particular ecosystem and reflects the adaption of a particular people to a particular place and lifestyle that contributes to survival. The Tofa, for example, have a complex system of reindeer classification based on the animal’s age, sex, fertility and domestication [Harrison, 2008]. The word *chary*, for example, identifies an individual in the herd who is five years old, male, castrated and rideable. A *döngür* is a domesticated male reindeer in its second to third fall, in what would be its first mating season, may be castrated or not but, even if not, will probably not be allowed to mate. This complex system affords efficacy of
information packaging, and allows the herder to efficiently single out any reindeer and refer to it by a specific label. The complexity of the classificatory systems reflects the cultural salience of the animals within the speech community. Taking the trouble to learn these terms is rewarded because it becomes second nature to be able to immediately identify a chary from a döngür within the herd. Such proficiency is extremely useful since reindeer are the mainstay of Tofa life. They provide essential needs, such as milk, clothing and transportation. Tracking the maturity and utility of individual animals is an important part of developing a strong herd on which their survival of the Tofa depended. For the Tofu, the basic category identified by the English lexical term reindeer is thus dissociable into an informationally loaded series of sub-categories that have rich cultural and social significance for in-group members. These informationally loaded terms, which exist within a multidimensional matrix that defines the four salient (for Tofa people) parameters of reindeer age, sex, fertility and rideability, infuse the Tofa perception of these animals and is something which is simply not shared by those outside the speech community.

The same principle applies to emotion taxonomies. Przykro is hypercognized in Polish society. It cements the social relationships of the speech community by encoding complex cultural beliefs, assumptions and understanding. The efficacy of packaging the complex information encoded in this single emotion term has considerable cultural utility. Przykro becomes second nature for Polish speakers, playing a major role in the socialization of children. It is experienced as a basic emotion reflecting core cultural values that foster social cohesion. This is not to suggest that emotions are irreducibly cultural, but grasping the true meaning of a sophisticated emotion concept lexicalised in another language requires being appropriately culturally informed and is not something that is typically reducible to a single explanatory paraphrase.

The extent and limits of diversity in human languages is a complex issue. We cannot offer a clear and scientifically rigorous answer to the question of just how many distinct human languages are currently spoken. However, a reasonable approximation is 6,000 – 7,000 and of these only a quarter exist in any written form (Harrison, 2008). The vast majority remain undescribed or underdescribed, to say nothing of the diverse range of sign languages, most of which have not been properly studied or documented. The assumption that sign languages are simplified versions of the local spoken language rendered visually with an iconic sign for each word or letter, and therefore dependent on spoken language, has been shown to be false. Stokoe’s (1960) work on American Sign Language (ASL) inspired a great deal of research into sign languages that has resulted in a general consensus that they are bona fide, vibrant, complex natural languages in their own right. We ought not to neglect them if we are to get a full picture of the range of human language diversity against which to test Wierzbicka’s theory. As it stands,
Wierzbicka’s theory of universal semantic primitives is grounded in an impoverished sample of the language corpus.

There is already evidence that exotic languages may disconfirm some of Wierzbicka’s assumptions. Evidence from East Cree (Native American language from the Algonquian family spoken in the Eastern James Bay region of Canada by about 13,000 people living in nine different communities) did not support Wierzbicka’s intuition that in all languages cognitively-based feelings can be described with references to bodily sensations e.g., *his throat went dry when he heard this, the sharpness of the insult made her skin on her face tighten*. Examples of such references were simply not found in Cree (Junker & Blacksmith, 2006). When the Cree speak of bodily sensations they usually mean the bodily sensation literally, not a cognitively-based feeling. In fact, to describe feelings using bodily sensations does not seem to be common among the Cree. This may be because, typically, they use references to bodily sensations to refer to *premonitions*, rather than cognitive feelings. So, whilst the possibility of describing emotions via sensations might be universal, the Cree have not found it useful to exploit this in their emotion talk. Another of Wierzbicka’s hypotheses is that, in all languages, cognitively-based feelings can be described via figurative *bodily images*, referring to imaginary events and processes taking place inside the body, for example *his heart sank, she was boiling with anger; kete-(i)malmal* literally translated “tight liver” meaning the liver is tight with anger (Mbula, Austronesian: Bugenhagen, 1990), and *dan-xu*, lit. “gall void/empty” meaning afraid, scared or timid (China: Yn, 2003), referring to the traditional Chinese theory in medicine of the gallbladder as source of initiative and courage. However, this is, again, not common amongst the Cree. Figurative language referring to imaginary events and processes taking place inside the body were almost non-existent. The assumption that in all languages people talk about cognitively based feelings in terms of figurative body images is thus not confirmed by the Cree data (Junker & Blacksmith, 2006). These are dimensions of diversity in emotion reference that Wierzbicka had not anticipated would be found. This indicates that linguists need the most diverse, idiosyncratic and unusual languages to test linguistic theoretical models, since they are the most likely to challenge theoretical assumptions.

Assuming that our folk psychological terms have precise definitions, the adequacy of Wierzbicka’s definitions requires genuine empirical testing and her explication of emotion concepts cannot be taken for granted. These descriptions have yet to be presented to native English speakers to assess whether the descriptions are intelligible and they are able to identify the emotion that is supposedly explicated. Nor have they been translated into different languages

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40 The word *premonition* here is used here to refer to a sense of foreboding, apprehension or forewarning that an event is about to happen, eg I sense that someone is saying something about me, or I sense that I will have a grandchild (even if the daughter-in-law is not yet pregnant. I can sense it).

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and presented to non-English speakers. Would Japanese speakers, for example, upon reading the
cognitive scenario offered for *accismus* be able to differentiate *accismus* from the culturally salient
Japanese term *enryo*, which can be glossed as *reserve, coyness, discretion or deference*? So there is a
degree of similarity between *enryo* and *accismus*. But *accismus* has none of the components of self-
restraint, avoidance of giving opinions or refraining from expressing disagreement with the
majority opinion that is encoded in the Japanese lexical term *enryo*.

**Conclusion**

There are some complicated issues raised by the material considered in this chapter. For
one thing, the meanings of words are often intimately embedded within the semantic and
syntactic structure of the lexical context within which they are expressed, and there are languages
that exhibit radically different structures. For example Broschart (1997) argues that there is no
lexical or *syntactical* noun/verb distinction in Tongan. This suggests one ought to remain sceptical
as to whether the meaning contained within Wierzbicka's paraphrases are as unproblematically
translatable as Wierzbicka assumes. Even if researchers in linguistics were in agreement about the
structure and content of Wierzbicka’s metalanguage, we could not therefore conclude that they
will arrive at identical translations.

Nevertheless, Wierzbicka’s claim against Ekman regarding the uncritical adoption of an
anglocentric emotion lexicon is well supported. The important contribution a cross cultural
analysis of emotion concepts can bring to emotion theory is to caution against the tendency to
treat English emotion concepts as universal conceptual primitives. We need to be sensitive to the
unconscious reification of phenomena which can be conceptualised and categorised in a huge
variety of ways. English lexical categories such as *anger, disgust* and *happiness* ought not to be
considered self explanatory and cannot be taken uncritically as analytical tools.

This does not mean that, at its core, all human cognition might not be fundamentally the
same; irrespective of the language we adopt to express it. This is certainly the prevailing view in
cognitive linguistics. But we should recognise that language can package knowledge in
distinctive ways, offering diverse ways of conceptualising, naming and discussing the world. This,
of course, extends to our emotions. Nothing I have said so far implies that each language is
semantically arbitrary relative to other languages, or that there are no universal constraints that
result in fundamental similarities in the semantic structure of all languages. These constraints
include shared cognitive and sensory apparatus, inherent features of the items being classified,
and the interaction between the two. Lexical diversity does not imply that there is no shared
semantic structure of emotion terms amongst unrelated languages. However, any theory of emotion will be deeply impoverished if it fails to include a strong linguistic and cultural element. Moreover, it may actually lead us into error about what is universal in emotions by misidentifying that with the basic emotions, as lexicalized in one particular language.
Chapter 8

Emotion Concepts: Metaphor and Metonymy

Much of our emotion discourse is highly figurative, but what can the study of metaphor and metonymy tell us about our emotion concepts? Are there universal emotion metaphors? How do emotion metaphors differ cross-culturally? How does metaphorical thinking shape our emotional landscape? In this final chapter I shall argue that Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) offers persuasive evidence that the study of figurative language can play a strong role in developing our understanding of human emotions, especially in regard to how the human body influences and constrains the conceptualisation of emotion. I shall also argue that, along with culturally salient emotion terms there are culturally salient metaphorical concepts that influence the emotional landscape of the culture-bearer.

The cross-cultural study of emotion metaphors has contributed towards developing our understanding of the structure and content of prototypical cultural models of emotions. The cumulative evidence from conceptual metaphor theory indicates that human emotions are to a significant degree developed from an individual’s corporeal, embodied experiences in various cultural environments. They arise from recurring and universal biological-physiological processes in the human body interacting with the external world. The main thrust of the research that has emerged from the conceptual metaphor theory of emotions is that humans do not conceptualise emotions in a way that contradicts our physiology. However, within those constraints imposed by human biology there is substantial room for diversity in the way emotions are conceptualised. Anger, for example, can be conceptualised as an opponent in a struggle, a barrier or shield, an aggressive wild animal, a channel for the release of energy, the loss of sanity or a natural force (a tsunami or earthquake). The value of the exposition of the conceptual theory of metaphor lies in the way it further illustrates the role of language in the construction of emotional experience.

Introduction

Metaphor, metonymy, and other tropes, are promiscuously adopted for communicating and expressing the nuances of emotional experience and the evoking of emotional resonance in others. (e.g., Bush, 1973; Clore, Ortony, & Foss, 1987; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987; Roberts & Wedell, 1994). Figurative language is useful to articulate ideas or concepts that are difficult to express using literal language. It allows us to
communicate them in a compact, precise manner. It also allows us to express them vividly, in a form that is picturesque, dramatic or depictive. These general observations about metaphor and metonymy suggest that they occupy a supporting role, but are not actually constitutive of meaning. The underlying presumption is that most of our thinking is literal. However, an influential position in the field of cognitive linguistics (CL) is that metaphor and metonymy are fundamental tools that allow us to understand both abstract concepts and abstract reasoning. In fact, some theorists have suggested that few, if any, abstract thoughts can be expressed without recourse to metaphor. A substantial literature has been generated in support of this position, referred to as conceptual or cognitive metaphor theory (CMT).

Conceptual metaphor theory shares with Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) theory a lexicocentric focus on emotion. An essential tenet of both theories is that language, particularly its lexicon, is a reflection of our conceptual system. However, CMT denies that the study of emotion meaning can be limited to the study of the core meaning of emotion terms. In other words, it denies the view that the major function of definitions is the systematic differentiation of meaning (in the case of NSM theory by the use of semantic primitives that are taken to adequately define an emotion category). Broadly speaking, on the core view connotation or peripheral meaning is generally considered to consist of various cultural, situational or affective features which do not contribute to the cognitive content of words in any significant way. In contrast, CMT argues that both the core and the connotative meaning of emotion words have a structure that can be studied systematically. This structure is likely to be more complex than the structure associated with core meaning. However, it will more closely reflect human emotional experience. So, they argue, restricting the discussion of an emotion concept to the various uses of a particular emotion term is misleading, what is required is a systematic examination of the entire range of words and expressions related to the concept being studied.

**Cognitive Linguistics and a theory of metaphor**

We are often unaware of the rich metaphorical legacy attached to our lexicon. Consider the word *overwhelmed*. Etymologically speaking, it has its roots in the Old English (O.E) *helmian* meaning “to cover”. Originally the word referred to being literally, turned upside down. Specifically, it referred to being overthrown from a boat that capsizes, or being washed overboard after being completely submerged by a huge wave. It is only later that the word began to be used figuratively, with its imagery of immersion, or being engulfed. We now talk of being overwhelmed by grief, confusion, and paperwork or circumstances which generate such expressions as *swamped* by bureaucracy, *deluged* with phone calls (originating from the Latin
diluvium from diluere literally to “wash away”). The metaphorical use of the word compares mental stress or pressure to the sensorimotor experience of being under physical pressure but the transferred image of being capsized in a boat is no longer evoked for current speakers. The word has, in a sense, become literalised so that its original metaphoric and concrete referents are no longer obvious. Its metaphorical legacy has become inert, or dormant.

Expressions which have lost their overt metaphorical force through frequent use might include lose patience, getting into trouble, heightened attention, fall into disrepair, open the debate misleading argument, field of expertise, let’s be clear, pursuit of the truth, and curb spending habits. Some, if not all, of these metaphorical structures have become so embedded within our language and thought habits that they are difficult to see as metaphors, simply because they do not call attention to themselves as figurative. However, according to CMT, even when metaphors like those cited are identified as inert or dead because they have lost their vivacity, they are in fact not inert because they still govern our thought processes and as such are metaphors “we live by” (Kövecses, 2002).

Of course, it would lead to circularity if every word in the lexicon were metaphorical. The financial economy is a rich target of metaphor, such as. financial depression, economic downturn, credit crunch, revenue streams, money laundering, economic freefall, slush fund, flood the market, liquid assets, and cash flow. To take just the first two examples, literally to be depressed means to be pushed down; its Latin roots are the prefix de (down) and the verb premere meaning to push. The words push and down are non-metaphorical concepts on which the concept of a financial depression is founded. A financial depression is a sustained downturn in an economy. Similarly, down and turn are non-metaphorical concepts on which the concept of an economic model (of a financial cycle in which the financial expansion of the economy reaches an unsustainable state and is followed by a decline) rests. As corporeal beings we engage with the world and are familiar with the bodily experience of gravity, and our experience of spatial orientation is that down is bad and up is good.

According to CMT, originated by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) abstract conceptual domains, such as MENTAL STIMULATION are understood in terms of structurally similar, more concrete domains, such as FOOD, and this is reflected in language. Examples (1) to (3), which are all taken from the opening chapter of Murdoch’s novel The Bell (1958), illustrate the phenomenon.

(1) something exotic in him touched Dora’s imagination, starved throughout her meagre education (p 8)
(2) a natural devourer of the women’s magazines (p9)
(3) A taste for company (p11)
Using these examples we can begin to outline the theory by first defining some terminology. Metaphors make reference to two types of conceptual domains, source domains and target domains. A source domain is a domain providing conceptual access and linguistic expression. A target domain is a conceptual domain understood in terms of a source domain. There is a “mapping” or projection of one experiential domain onto another, so that the target domain is understood partly in terms of the source domain. In the examples given above, FOOD is the source and MENTAL STIMULATION is the target domain. In cognitive linguistics a mapping between the source and the target is usually given as X is Y, e.g. MENTAL STIMULATION is FOOD. The entire mapping is referred to as a conceptual metaphor. This should be differentiated from the words or linguistic expressions that arise from the pairing of the source and target domains, such as those listed in (1) to (3) above. For these, Kövecses 2002, p4) proposes the term metaphorical linguistic expressions. Finally, a conceptual domain can be “any coherent organisation of experience” (Kövecses, 2002 p 4).

More specifically, it can be thought of as a cluster of semantically related concepts or conceptually constituted elements. To qualify as a conceptual metaphor, the mapping from source domain elements onto target domain elements must be systematic, as opposed to capricious or arbitrary, and it must be reflected by more than one lexical metaphor. However, most metaphorical mappings are also partial. Not every source domain constituent or relation plays a role in the target domain.

Though it is an empirical question, it might seem natural to assume that the universal significance surrounding the cultivation, production and consumption of food that results from a shared experiential basis and importance for physical survival would make it a pervasive, even universal source domain. Indeed, the word culture has its etymological origins in husbandry, referring to the tilling of the land (coulter, a cognate of culture, refers to the blade of a plough). We therefore take our word for the most sophisticated of human activities from an entirely physical process. The food domain is a rich source for mapping e.g. the domains of IDEAS, HUMAN TRAITS, SEXUAL DESIRES and EMOTIONS can be structured by the projection of information from the domain of FOOD, giving rise to expressions such as:

- The memory became stale
- He is so uncultured
- I feel gutted
- Students seem to want to be spoon-fed
- This year’s crop of graduates looks promising
- She stirred strong feelings in him
- A wonderful display of raw talent was on show
And poetic, literary examples, e.g.:

“You like to nourish your fears” (Don Delillo The Falling Man p10)

“As a poet in the islands, for fifteen or sixteen years or twenty years, until he made a reputation abroad, he had a hard row to hoe” (V S Naipaul A Writer’s People: Ways of Looking and Feeling p 7)

An example of a fairly recent culturally specific food metaphor is the American expression plain vanilla. The expression initially referred to something that was pure, or wholesome. It was then adopted as a metaphor for anything that can be described as ordinary, or unexceptional, e.g. a plain vanilla laptop refers to a computer that has the minimum number of basic functions. A plain vanilla CV is stereotypical and undistinguished, a plain vanilla financial instrument, is the opposite of an exotic instrument that alters the components of a traditional financial instrument and results in a more complex security. So, metaphor often provides a simple or parsimonious means of communicating complex configurations of ideas between socialised individuals. In the USA consumption of ice cream per capita is high. Eating ice cream is a common, shared experience with many varieties and flavours to choose from. Faced with an enormous choice of flavours, vanilla seems unexciting compared to chocolate almond, butter pecan or Blumenthal’s egg and bacon ice cream. The plain vanilla example illustrates how metaphor is a useful mode of mediation between sensual experience of objects and abstract thought (the blandness of tasting vanilla compared to the greater sensory stimulation that accompanies the taste of more unusual ice-cream flavours and the cognitive stimulation piqued by a particularly notable CV compared to an unexceptional one). This is entailed because, according to embodiment theory, upon hearing the word “vanilla” a complex set of perceptual simulators becomes momentarily activated. The concrete concept of vanilla is rooted in sensory experiences of ice cream and desserts. It involves the partial simulation of the tastes, smells and images associated with them. The generation of such metaphors might also be motivated by the wish to say something in a novel, imaginative and memorable way, or because other metaphors have become over familiar, losing their capacity, to really engage the speaker’s audience.

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, the traditional view is that we could get along without metaphor very well. It is regarded as a type of trope in which a figurative word is simply substituted for a literal word, on the basis of an apparent resemblance. From this substitution-theory perspective metaphor can only be an embellishment to language. Conversely, the cognitive theory of metaphor argues that metaphor is a conceptual category. It is not a matter of language but is a mode of thought. Metaphor is one of the basic principles of human cognition, not merely a stylistic representation of something else that could be expressed literally. It lies at the
centre of natural language semantics, since the theory proposes that the human mind is essentially non-literal in character. The same principles that apply to novel or poetic metaphorical expressions such as youth is a wonderful garment\textsuperscript{41}, the law is a slow burning fuse or the budget process is a carefully orchestrated ballet\textsuperscript{42} also apply to large portions of ordinary language. A set of conceptual metaphors (conceptual correspondences that are mapped) structures our everyday experience, including most abstract concepts such as time, causation, action and modality. Similarly, emotion concepts are understood metaphorically. Figurative speech is a pervasive feature of emotion language dominated by metaphorical and metonymic expressions.

As we have seen, the basis of the metaphor is the cross – conceptual mapping (systematic steps of metaphorical correspondences between concepts from different experiential domains). A conventional metaphor is a partial mapping of one conceptual domain (the source domain) to another conceptual domain (the target domain). For convenience I shall adopt the notion of metaphor as a trope based on likeness, in other words there must be some sort of similarity between the source and the target domains. This is true even though there may be huge differences between them and their similarity has previously gone unnoticed.

Conceptual correspondences between the source and target domains are reflected metalinguistically by the formula TARGET is SOURCE used for representation of the metaphorical mapping. Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology of the source domain (its image-schematic structure), in a way which is consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. Image schemas are characterised as recurrent bodily experiences that get a structure through continuous repetition. Such bodily experiences, or image schemas, include containment, force, and balance. The CONTAINMENT schema, for example, is reflected in such expressions as: Mary went out of the room, I need to get out of this predicament, John went outside of his remit. Metaphors will also exhibit different levels of abstraction (e.g., orientation, motion, space). The superordinate level includes different basic level categories. For example in the LOVE is a JOURNEY metaphor, e.g.

Our relationship stalled when he lost his job
When my wife died I was shipwrecked
By our first anniversary the relationship was already on the rocks
The couple seemed to have their whole future mapped out.
I think we should go our separate ways
We’ll cross that bridge when we get to it

\textsuperscript{41} Iris Murdoch, The Bell p 19
\textsuperscript{42} The Wire, Season 4, Episode 9 “Know Your Place” Story by Burns, E and Corthron, K; Teleplay by Kia Corthron. First broadcast Nov 12 2006
the relationship corresponds to a vehicle, the vehicle is the superordinate category that includes
basic-level subcategories (boats, ships, cars) The basic level is the level of rich mental images and
rich knowledge structure (Lakoff, 1987: 31-50) A mapping at the superordinate level maximises
the possibilities for mapping rich conceptual structures of the source domain onto the target
domain since it permits many basic level instances, each of which is information rich. As an
example, the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING is SEEING explains the systematic nature
of common metaphorical expressions such as

he failed to focus on the main issues
the debate is blinkered by prejudice
You have a distorted outlook
he magnified his problems
verbal abuse diminishes your argument
let’s reframe the debate

We are able to reason about highly abstract and complex things like understanding, love and
marriage, morality or pride using metaphor by mapping concepts from other domains of our
experience that are embodied and involve sensorimotor experience.

Imagine a devoted wife who has just been told that her husband has been fatally injured
in a car crash. She suddenly feels overwhelmed by a feeling of physical weakness. Her body feels
unstable and her knees start to buckle. She wilts a little, leaning on the wall for support. How did
the news cause such an intense emotional response? The woman conceptualises the relationship
of MARRIAGE as a PHYSICAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE. There is a mapping between past
sensorimotor experience with support structures and her understanding of the concept of
marriage. Her understanding of the situation she now finds herself in will involve partial
simulation of those past sensorimotor experiences, evoked by the conceptualisation of the
relationship as a support structure. The relationship has provided a foundation upon which she
has built her future plans and aspirations. She leans on her husband for emotional and financial
support. When she loses her husband this support structure is threatened. She may describe her
response using such expressions as “the bottom has fallen out of my world”, “the rug was pulled out
from underneath me”. In effect, she is responding physically to the metaphorical simulation as if it
were real. She will then interpret these sensations as an emotional experience which might be
described as shock or grief. In this way the emotion concept of grief becomes interlinked with
specific somatosensory responses.

Johnson’s theory of conflation (Johnson, 1997) argues that connections between subjective
emotions and sensorimotor experiences develop in early infancy. Affection, for example, is
typically correlated with the physical warming of the body that occurs when the infant is held. The infant then repeatedly feels the emotion and the sensorimotor experiences at the same time. This leads to conflation, or undifferentiated experience. During a later phase of differentiation the two domains warmth and affection that have been linked together are separated out, but the cross-domain associations persist and form the mechanisms for metaphorical mapping. AFFECTION is WARMTH is an example of what are referred to as primary metaphors (Grady, 1997). KNOWLEDGE is SEEING is another example, where there is a conflation of the sensorimotor concept of seeing and the abstract, subjective concept of knowing. The infant will experience scenes in which an object in a container is not visible, and therefore inaccessible to awareness) and becomes visible as it emerges or is taken out of the container (becoming accessible to awareness). The association made between the perceptual and inferential aspect of such scenes is likely to become robustly established in our cognitive structure. Children regularly hear the word see in contexts in which both the literal and metaphorical sense pertaining to knowledge are relevant, i.e. let’s see what’s behind the curtain! The child in this context cannot distinguish which sense of the word is intended (literal in the sense of visually perceive or metaphorical learning what is behind the curtain). The child develops a conflated sense of the word see having two referents, visual perception and knowledge. A similar correlation exists between the concept of understanding and the concept of grasping, leading to the primary metaphor UNDERSTANDING is GRASPING (e.g. I simply can’t come to grips with the rules of cricket, she’s grappling with a new book, my aunt has a weak hold on reality, I don’t quite catch your meaning). Later as the child gains a fuller understanding of each domain they become distinct, with one domain being judged less literal than the other

These primary metaphors are embodied, generated by our preconceptual bodily experience. They depend directly on our interaction with the world and our physical bodies, and are acquired automatically and non-consciously. In fact, we may be totally unaware that we have them. They are an inevitable result of simply engaging with the environment. They are therefore experientially grounded. Complex metaphors are a conventional and partially conscious combination of these primary “atomistic” metaphors into more complex, molecular metaphors, through conceptual blending and elaboration. This blending and elaboration takes place through fitting the experientially grounded “atoms” of primary metaphors into larger “wholes” or “molecules” by adding knowledge of folk theories, cultural models and theories about artefacts and objects. Whilst a primary metaphor involves a single point of correspondence and therefore a single entailment between the source and the target domain (for which there is an experiential basis) a complex metaphor is composed of combinations of different primary metaphors, and
therefore implies more source domains and more points of correspondence and entailments between the source and target domains.

**Distinction between metaphor and metonymy**

As explained earlier, conceptual metaphor consists of a source and a target domain and the source domain is, typically, a better understood, more concrete domain than the target domain. Conceptual metonymies, on the other hand, involve a single domain or concept. The purpose of a metonym is to provide mental access to a domain through another part of the same domain. Thus, unlike metaphor, metonymy is often characterised as a *stands for* relation (a part stands for the whole or another part of the whole, within a single domain). It can be classed as a metaphor based on association not on similarity. The metonymic transfer between domains does not carry across some natural resemblance but merely links up some customary association (as in the example of the *crown* with *monarchy*.) Sometimes a metonym seems natural or intuitive, a snake as a natural symbol for evil, for example. However, the association does not rely on resemblance; rather it relies on a natural association between the snake and fear. The other part of the metonymic transfer, the concept of evil, is an abstract rather than a tangible, perceptible thing (the same kind of metonymy occurs in personification, a metonym involving some abstraction; its vehicle involves the transfer of concrete, physical attributes to the abstraction). The *Big Apple* standing for New York might not be as natural or intuitive a metonym, although it has been adopted as an officially recognised reference to the city but generally, metonymy is a rhetorical strategy of describing something indirectly by referring to things associated with it where the vehicle and target entities are closely related in conceptual space., such as the term *hoodie* as a metonym for a member of a British youth sub-culture. Broadly speaking, metaphor *creates* the relationship between its objects, whilst metonymy *presupposes* that relation. Both metaphor and metonymy are modes of expressing something by saying something else, but metaphor is a mode of displacement where a point of similarly links what are otherwise quite different terms, and metonymy is a mode of association or contiguity e.g.

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43 One explanation for the origin of the metonym is that in early 1920s there were many racing courses in and around New York City and “apple” referred to the prizes being awarded for the races. As these were important races, the rewards were substantial. Research by American etymologist Barry Popik, suggests that a writer for the *New York Morning Telegraph*, John Fitz Gerald, referred to New York City's races "Around the Big Apple." It is speculated that Fitz Gerald got the term from jockeys and trainers in New Orleans who aspired to race on New York City tracks, referring to the "Big Apple and popularised it If true, this is an example of a metonymy for one referent (prizes) being co-opted for another (a city).
(1) Hoodies blamed for rise in dog fighting across Britain (item of clothing is a metonym for person, group of persons)
(2) Is Iraq another Vietnam? (place is a metonym for what occurred there)
(3) We’ll always have Paris (Paris is a metonym for the shared memory of a love affair)
(4) She loved to curl up with an Agatha Christie (producer is a metonym for product))
(5) The trains are going on strike tomorrow (object used is a metonym for the user)

As has been said, Metonymy is usually characterized as a stands for relationship represented by the scheme X for Y, where X represents the source meaning (or vehicle) and Y symbolizes the target meaning of the metonymic operations. However, recent research suggests that it is better understood as a reference point (Radden and Kövecses, 1999; Langacker, 2000; Barcelona, 2000; Dirven and Pörings, 2002), where a vehicle or source triggers a target meaning, involving a process of meaning elaboration that involves expansion or reduction of a cognitive domain. This emphasizes the conceptual nature of metonymy, since rather than the simplistic view of metonymy as a mere rhetorical trope it suggests a role for metonymy as a ubiquitous mental operation.

Metonymy is, of course, not restricted to language. Gestures also express metonymic thought. The gesture of pointing is metonymic since the spatial locus is only one of the many features of the situation communicated. When a child points to something that has attracted its attention, for example a puppy chasing its tail, the intended meaning is not the object’s indicated location. The gesture is used to refer to a whole event though normally only associated with a single aspect of it. Metonymy is also expressed visually in many aspects of films and theatre. Film conveys drama by replacing one image of a person with an image of something an audience knows belongs to or is associated with the character. A memorable example is the sequence in Fritz Lang’s M (1931) in which we see a young girl buying a balloon. After the girl becomes a victim of a child murderer (which we are not shown) we see the balloon having been burst, lying deflated amongst some electrical power lines, metonymically representing the girl and her fate. The child’s empty chair at the family kitchen table is also a powerful metonymic image. Evidence of the metonymic character of everyday thought from research on categorization, decision-making and gestures, and from film analysis, provides strong support for the ubiquity of metonymy in everyday thought.

44 It is perhaps also worth mentioning the distinction between synecdoche (where a term denoting a part of a thing is used to refer to the whole, or where term denoting a thing (whole) is used to refer to part of it) and metonymy. In many cases metonymy uses something more generally or loosely associated with a particular concept to stand for it but is not actually part of it, but the distinction is not always obvious. Many theorists view synecdoche as a subcategory of metonymy. Others might wish to distinguish between the two. For example, chasing skirt might be considered an example of synecdoche, if we consider the skirt a part of the woman or female, whereas the headline Is Iraq another Vietnam? is an example of metonymy which is using Iraq and Vietnam to refer not to the countries but disastrous international conflicts.
In respect of emotion concepts, they are viewed as wholes having many constituent parts or elements. For example, one element of the domain of embarrassment is the physiological effect of a sudden reddening of the face, and one element of the domain of love is physical weakness. So, we can characterize these emotion concepts as including the metonym to blush which stands for embarrassment and the conceptual metonym of physical weakness which stands for love, i.e.

His face turned crimson as everyone turned to look at him.
I see him and just melt.

The idea that many conceptual metaphors may be motivated or even reducible to conceptual metonymies has become a central theme in the cognitive linguistic debate, though further examination of this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter.

**Emotion Metaphors: Universality and Diversity**

Kövecses (2000, 2002, 2005) offers a comprehensive, and sophisticated, version of CMT. He argues that the metaphor is a many-sided phenomenon that has linguistic, conceptual, social-cultural, neural and bodily aspects and it exists on all these different levels simultaneously. Whilst the metaphor involves a linguistic and conceptual structure, of equal importance is the fact that metaphorical thought is embodied. Why might we expect to find universal metaphors? If metaphor is based on the way the human body and brain function and we as human beings are alike at this level of functioning then it follows that most metaphors will be similar, that is near universal, at least at the conceptual level. However, it is clear that metaphors also vary considerably both cross-culturally and intra-culturally on all levels of their existence. The claim is not that metaphors embodied in universal experience must be found in all languages. It is that, given the universal experiences on which they are based, the metaphors are potentially universal but we ought not to expect to find them in all languages. Where universality in metaphorical concepts is found it is explained by common embodied experience of our corporeal state, and what happens when the body engages in the environment (both physical and cultural). These experiences are shared through human physiology and brain function. Human minds are embodied in a cultural world, and thinking and reasoning are largely metaphorical and imaginative, shaped by embodied and enculturated experience.

What we call “direct physical experience” is never a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather every experience takes place with a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core immediate experience which we then “interpret” in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more
correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our “world” in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself

(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 58)

Since the experiential basis of conceptual metaphor is both bodily and cultural, our minds are embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the specifics of our physical and cultural environment (Gibbs, 1994, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 1999). Therefore, whilst the importance of “direct” embodied experience is emphasised the theory argues for the significance of the cultural basis of metaphorical thought, and states that conceptual metaphors emerge from the interaction between body and culture. This approach allows universalist and constructionist models of emotion to be reconciled by seeing them as complementary descriptions of related phenomena (Hinton, 1999), bridging internal states and external perceptions.

The theory, as it is presented by Kövecses, does not claim that universal experience leads to universal metaphors, nor does it argue that all metaphors are necessarily based on bodily experience, since experience may be overridden by both cultural and cognitive processes, or only selectively used in the creation of metaphors (Kövecses, 2005).

In order to answer the question of why some metaphors are widespread or even universal the theory posits a decomposition account based on the primary and complex metaphor distinction first identified by Grady, Taub and Morgan (1996). Whereas primary metaphors are derived directly from “experiential correlations” or “conflations in everyday experience and judgment with sensorimotor experience” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999:49), complex metaphors, referred to earlier, are a combination of primary metaphors and cultural beliefs and assumptions, and thus could be culture specific. Kövecses allows that primary metaphors need not necessarily be universal, and for the possibility that complex metaphors could be potentially or partly universal.

Emotion Metaphors: Anger

Metaphors reflect schemas (where a schema is characterised as a structured mental representation of a conceptual category that designates a coherent organisation of human experience), which are constructions of reality using the assimilation and association of sensorimotor processes to anticipate actions in the world. Schemas interconnect in our minds to represent how we perceive, act, react and respond to both internal and external stimuli. Far from being mere matters of linguistic style, the cognitive linguistic approach states that metaphors organise our experience, and
that includes the emotional experience of anger. Lakoff and Kövecses (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, Kövecses 2000) have identified a number of metaphors that are typical of emotions, and, some, of anger in particular,

ANGER/BEING ANGRY IS

(a) HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER  She is boiling with anger
(b) FIRE  He’s doing a slow burn
(c) INSANITY  The man was insane with rage
(d) AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE  I was struggling with my anger
(e) A CAPTIVE ANIMAL  He unleashed his anger
(f) A BURDEN  he carries his anger around with him
(g) AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR  Don’t snarl at me!
(h) TRESPASSING (cause of anger)  Here I draw the line
(i) PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE  He’s a pain in the neck
(k) A NATURAL FORCE  It was a stormy meeting
(l) A FUNCTIONING MACHINE  That really got him going
(m) A SOCIAL SUPERIOR  His actions were completely governed by anger

(Kövecses 2000: 21)

These are the basic level metaphors that provide the bulk of the conceptual structure for anger, because these metaphorical source domains address various aspects of the concept of anger and form part of the American English conceptual system that underpins speakers discourse and reasoning about anger. The metaphors and metonymies linked with anger in turn map onto the following proposed prototypical cognitive model or frame (Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), different metaphors mapping onto different parts of the model.

1 Offending event
   Wrongdoer offends self
   Wrongdoer is at fault
   The offending event displeases self
   The intensity of the offense outweights the intensity of the retribution (which equals zero at this point) thus creating an imbalance
   The offence causes anger to come into existence

2 Anger
   Anger exists
   Self experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, agitation)
   Anger exerts force on the self to attempt an act of retribution

3 Attempt to control anger
   Self exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger

4 Loss of control
   The intensity of anger goes over the limit
   Anger takes control of self
   Self exhibits angry behaviour (loss of judgment, aggressive actions)
   There is damage to self
   There is danger to the target of anger, in this case the wrongdoer
Retribution
Self performs retributive act against wrongdoer (this is usually angry behaviour)
The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offense
The intensity of anger drops to zero
Anger ceases to exist

Contrastive Analysis: Anger metaphors in Spanish, Chinese and Japanese

In her contrastive analysis of anger metaphors in Spanish and American English, Cristina Soriano (2003), treats the English term *anger* and the Spanish term *ire* as sufficiently equivalent for her purposes. She concludes that both languages share mappings at the basic level of specificity and share the same schematic frame proposed by Lakoff and Kövecses (Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987). A number of parameters were selected for comparison of the two languages (following Barcelona’s proposals (2001)) and Soriano’s study supports the view that the cognitive models that underlie the Spanish concept of *ira* and the English concept of *anger* are very similar. They share the same schematic structure, their metaphorical structure was coherent with the FORCE metaphor described by Kövecses (Kövecses, 2000), the languages have the same central metaphor for the system (ANGER is a (HOT) FLUID IN A CONTAINER, they also exhibit a similar set of metonymies related to it and the same set of physiological and behavioural effects give rise to those metonyms.

However, the study also identified differences. Whilst both languages share the ANGER is a (HOT) FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, Spanish does not feature the familiar English entailment sub-mapping of the conceptualisation of the effect of anger on a person as steam production, i.e. *blowing off steam*. Spanish has no expressions related to the concept of *steam* in relation to *anger*. However, since the concept of *boiling* is part of the Spanish metaphorical conceptualisation of *anger*, the conceptual relationship between *boiling* and *steaming* meant that non-English speaking Spanish participants had no difficulty in identifying *anger* as the target emotion when presented with idioms such as *to let off steam* and *to get steamed up*. Similarly, within the ANGER is FIRE metaphor the mapping THE EFFECT OF ANGER ON THE PERSON IS BEING FRIED, e.g.

\[
\text{Me tienes frito} \\
\text{(Lit: You have me fried)} \\
\text{I am fed up with you}
\]

(Soriano. 2003)

is Spanish-specific, but English speakers had no difficulty in assigning the idiom to *anger* (Soriano 2003). English elaborates on the metaphorical conceptualisation of the effect of anger as *burning* or
boiling in a number of different ways, i.e. he was seething with anger, she simmered with rage, his anger was still bubbling under the surface. Spanish exploits the same concept in a different way,

Aún podia sentir las brasas de su ira
I could still feel the coals of his/her anger
I could still feel his/her smoulderings

Aún podia semtűr los rescoldos de su ira
I could still feel the embers of his/her anger
I could still feel his/her smoulderings

(Soriano, 2003)

An entailment from the mapping of ANGER is FIRE is that as a blazing fire burns itself out you are left with dying embers and smouldering ash, which becomes part of the conceptual mapping of the gradual extinguishing of anger. Thus, although the entailments exploited by the idioms are not exploited in English, nevertheless the conceptual mappings exist in both languages. The conceptualisation of anger becomes more culture-specific as the basic level metaphors get further elaborated. Soriano suggests that, for example, whilst both languages conceptualise the effect of anger on the person as boiling or burning cultural preferences in cooking might motivate elaboration of the basic level metaphor and the adoption of frying but not stewing amongst the entailments of the conceptual mapping of ANGER IS FIRE in Spanish, whilst the reverse is true in American English. (Soriano, 2003).

Nevertheless, Soriano’s overall results suggest a shared cognitive model between the two languages. This is perhaps to be expected. Both conceptual systems are based on embodied experience, and there is close proximity, both culturally and linguistically, between Spain and the United States. What about other languages? The semantic structure of anger in other languages has been extensively studied and similar results reported in Chinese (King 1989 ; Yu 1995), Japanese (Matsuk 1995) Zulu (Taylor and Mbense 1998), Polish (Mikolajczuk 1998), Wolof (Munro 1991) Arabic (Al-Abed Al-Haq and El-Sharif, 2008) and Hungarian (Kövecses 1990, 2000.

A substantial literature has been devoted to comparison of the conceptualisation of anger in English and Chinese which indicates some interesting distinctions. Studies of the physiology of anger across unrelated cultures indicate that increases in temperature and blood pressure are universal physiological correlates of anger. This accounts for the ANGER is HEAT metaphor in English and many other cultures. However, King (1989) and Yu’s (1995, 1998) research suggests that the conceptualisation of anger in terms of heat is less prevalent in Chinese than in English. Yu (1995) made a comparative study of the metaphorical expression of anger in English and Chinese. His conclusion was that Chinese and English share the same general conceptual
metaphors ANGER is HEAT and THE BODY is A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS. The variation of the ANGER is HEAT metaphor ANGER is FIRE exists in both English and Chinese. However, whilst the variation ANGER is a HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER is common in English, conversely in Chinese ANGER is A HOT GAS IN A CONTAINER is common.

Ta pi-qì hén dá (he has got big gas in spleen / he is hot tempered)
Ta xìn-zhòng yǒu qì (he has gas (anger) in his heart)/ he has anger in his heart)
Ta bì le yì dù zì qù (he holds back a belly of gas)/he is filled with pent-up anger

(Yu, 1995)

In Chinese the major metaphors of anger appear to be based on pressure, not on pressure and heat. In fact qu (gas) is such a pervasive, indispensable conventionalised metaphor for anger in Chinese that it appears more literal than metaphorical to native speakers (Yu, 1995). This suggests that within Chinese culture there is a focus on a different aspect of physiology in the metaphorical conceptualisation of anger, indicating that universality of experiential basis does not necessarily lead to universal conceptualization.

Matsuki (1995) made a comparative study of metaphorical expressions in English and Japanese. He has argued that much of the structure of the conceptual model of anger in Japanese follows the general CONTAINER metaphor and the metonymic association of anger with body heat and internal pressure, redness round the face and neck, agitation and impeded perception that are part of the English folk theory of the physiological effects of anger, e.g.

Mune ga atsuku nar u hodo no ikari o oboeru (to experience anger is to the degree that the chest becomes hot).

Aosuji o tateta okoru (to get angry with blue streaks coming out) – e.g. blue veins standing out because of internal pressure,

Ikari de furueru (to shake with anger)

Ikari de zengo no misakai ga tsukanai (to be unable to tell which side is front or back because of anger)

(Matsuki, 1995)

However, Matsuki points out there are also significant cultural factors within Japanese folk theory which leads to the generation of significantly distinct conceptual metaphors in the domain of anger not shared by American English, in particular the putatively unique Japanese concept of hara e.g.
Hara no naka de hidoku okoru (to get terribly angry in (side) one’s *hara*)
Hara ni suekaneru (to be unable to keep it/anger in the *hara*)
Kimochi wa wakaru heredo hara ni osamete kudasai (I understand how you feel, but keep it inside your *hara*)

(Matsuki, 1995)

Matsuki and others have argued that *hara* is a concept deeply embedded in Japanese thinking that in fact appears to have no direct equivalent in Western languages (Matsumoto 1988, Matsuki 1995, McVeigh 1996, Hasada 2002). There are various conventional Japanese figurative units in which *hara* does not have a literal meaning (denoting a part of the body, the lower abdomen, stomach or belly). In Japanese folk theory the *hara* is considered the locus of the mind, of a person’s inner self, and the centre of vitality, mental energy and emotions. There is no strict separation between intellect and emotions in the East Asian way of thinking. Knowledge is not just a matter of the mind and theoretical reasoning, but rather an activity of a person as a whole. The instrument of thinking ought therefore to be the *hara* and not the heart. Anger metaphors in Japanese involve three parts of the body. It has its source in the *hara* (belly, stomach), it may rise to the *mune* (chest area), and at its most intense may reach the *atama* (the head). This leads to the generation of distinctive, culture specific *anger* metaphors. To *split open* or *cut the belly* is to reveal one’s thoughts or intentions. Similarly, if one’s belly is *transparent* then one’s inner, true thoughts are revealed or made obvious (McVeigh, 1996). These metaphors are not found in English, though the ANGER-CONTAINER metaphor is part of the ethno-psychological theory generating these figurative expressions. This illustrates the point that it is often difficult to explain certain concepts involved in figurative units with (near) universal, biologically based entities (BODY AS CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS). Many concepts involved may be idiosyncratic and culture-specific semiotic codes.

There is also evidence of intercultural change in semiotic codes, that is to say changes in the conventions in use to express or communicate meaning. For example, in the past, as part of our folk biology, the spleen was considered the organ of strong emotion. It was particularly associated with aggressive, impulsive behaviour, and was viewed as the seat of bad temper and morose feelings. Shakespeare frequently referred to the spleen as an organ of anger, merriment or other strong emotion:

> It comes not ill; I hate not to be banishe’d  
> It is a cause worthy of my *spleen* and fury,  
> That I may strike at Athens. I’ll cheer up  
> My discontented troops, and lay for hearts

*Timon of Athens [III, 5]*
Self against self: O, preposterous
And frantic outrage, end they damned spleen
Or let me die, to look on death no more

Richard III [V, 3]

Thou pray'st not well.
I prithee take thy fingers from my throat;
For, though I am not splenitive and rash,
Yet have I in me something dangerous,
Which let thy wisdom fear. Hold off thy hand!

Hamlet [V, 1]

If you desire the spleen, and will laugh yourself into stitches, follow me.

Twelfth Night [III, 2]

Examination of another corpus, the transcripts of proceedings at the Old Bailey criminal courts 1674 – 1913 together with the Ordinary’s Accounts (containing biographies of prisoners executed at Tyburn published between 1679 and 1772)\(^45\) shows that between 1692 and 1798 there are 15 examples of ordinary speakers using the word spleen in association with feelings of ill-will, rancour, resentment or spite (there are no examples of the word being used in association with strong positive emotions)\(^46\). Typical examples include: the following:

As an addition to the rest of his Malice and Spleen, he exprest those words, That Hunch-Nose William was a Thief and a Robber, and deserved to be Hanged as much as a Common Thief,

Edward Coney, Royal Offences - seditious words, 29th June 1692.

Q: Can you give any reason why he had malice towards you?
Holloway: There was some money secreted, which I went and demanded for the benefit of the children and the widow; before that, he was as agreeable as any man; but, after that, he owned me a spleen.

Thomas Hand, Breaking Peace - wounding, 5th December 1770

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\(^45\) These records are now available online and can be accessed at www.oldbaileyonline.org
\(^46\) In these examples there were no overt indications of the interlocutors’ awareness of the adoption of words to convey something other than their ordinary, literal meanings (say, by the use of such phrases as if you like, in a manner of speaking or as it were) but, following McVeigh (1996), I have assumed that, regardless of whether an individual intends reference to the spleen as a figure of speech or as a literal fact about the locus of anger in an ontological sense, its use is metaphorical and distinguished it from examples where the speaker unambiguously refers to the literal state of the physical organ. Such examples might include a surgeon commenting upon his examination of the body of the deceased. I have made this assumption since here I primarily wish to illustrate the occurrence of association of the spleen with feelings of ill will, rancour, etc.
this prosecution is endeavour’d to convince the Malefactors, how unreasonable a Thing it
would be, for any of them to retain a Spleen against their Accusers, or against the
Magistrates who condemned them set on foot out of spleen and malice, and not for the
sake of publick justice;

Daniel Cable, Deception - fraud, 6th July 1748

In contrast, between 1799 and 1913 there were only two instances of the metaphorical use of the
word spleen. The last recorded use of the word with this connotation is in 1888

I saw several attempts to pull mounted policemen off their horses, and saw some of them
struck with club sticks and ordinary sticks—they did not like to attack the men, but
vented their spleen on the horses

ROBERT GALLINGAD BONTINE CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM, JOHN BURNS,
Miscellaneous - perverting justice, 9th January 1888.

The expression to vent one’s spleen is still part of English linguistic currency. There is a long
cultural and historical tradition that explains why the spleen represented a special locus for the
emotions. Nevertheless, as these records demonstrate, reference to the spleen in connection with
anger has fallen into disuse. It no longer accords with our common folk biology. We now
recognize the true role of the spleen, in blood filtration and immunologic competence.

The purpose of presenting this data is to indicate that we ought not to expect any
conceptualised responses relating to anger to remain constant in conceptualising anger, or indeed
emotions in general, intraculturally or cross culturally. Universal embodiment associated with a
target domain might consist of several distinct components or aspects. The conceptual metaphors
that emerge may be based on one particular component or aspect at a particular time and a
different aspect or component at a later time. Which one is chosen will depend upon a variety of
factors in the relevant cultural context. Conceptual metaphors may also be based on one
particular component or aspect in one culture and on another aspect or component in another
culture.

There may be cultures where there is a universal physiological component and yet the
conceptualisation of the emotion is only marginally based on metaphors or metonymies. Indeed,
universal physical or biological embodiment may be ignored altogether in conceptualisation.
Lutz’s analysis of the Ifaluk folk concept of song (Lutz, 1988) is an example where the
characterization of the concept does not reflect the mapping of THE ANGRY PERSON IS A
PRESSUREISED CONTAINER metaphor, but rather is constructed on a model that emphases the
ideological, prosocial and moral aspects of anger. Similar physiology does not lead the Ifaluk to
conceptualise anger as pressure in a container. Song is an abstract concept that is not motivated
by bodily experience. It is chiefly motivated by socio-cultural practices and offers an example of cultural factors overriding universal embodiment.

**Conceptualising Anger**

Within CMT conceptual metaphors or prototypical representations are understood to exist as permanent knowledge structures in long term memory, and are critical to the content of everyday concepts. Scepticism might be expressed as to this claim, primarily because some cognitive linguists doubt whether linguistic evidence can reveal much about human conceptual systems (Murphy, 1996). One instance of this scepticism about metaphors as conceptual prototypes is seen in the problem of multiple metaphors (Murphy, 1996 Gibbs, 1996). According to the cognitive linguistic analysis, the concept of anger can be understood through several different metaphors (e.g., ANGER is INSANITY, A CAPITIVE ANIMAL, AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE, and A NATURAL FORCE). The entailments of these different metaphors vary in certain respects. Thus ANGER is an OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE personifies anger as an opponent against whom one engages in conflict, whereas ANGER is INSANITY refers to loss of judgment and lack of control. These different metaphors appear, at times, to be inconsistent with one another and it is unclear how to resolve such inconsistencies in the mental representation of the concept of anger.

This argument presents a view of concepts as ossified, static entities that necessarily ought to exhibit internal coherence, but the multiplicity of anger metaphors can be explained if we view these prototypical concepts as transient representations that are dynamic and context dependent (Gibbs, 1996). The ANGER is a NATURAL FORCE metaphor may better reflect a particular conceptualisation of anger in certain situations, whilst ANGER is an OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE may arise in forming a concept of anger in different situations. These alternative ways of thinking about human concepts promote the use of multiple metaphors to access different aspects of our understanding of anger to differentially conceptualise these experiences at different moments. Each metaphoric construal of a concept in some context results in a concept that is independent as a temporary representation apart from source domain information in long term memory. The suggestion is, therefore, that conceptual domains may not pre-exist in the sense of continually structuring specific conceptual domains. However, conceptual metaphors may be used to access different knowledge on different occasions as people immediately conceptualise some abstract target domain given a particular task. Conceptual metaphors may also simply emerge as the product of conceptualising processes, rather than serve as the underlying cause of these processes.
However, it is not clear that the methodological approach adopted by Kövecses, eclectically collecting citations or gathering data from introspection, is sufficiently rigorous in quantifying the frequency, and therefore, presumably, the cultural significance, of a particular metaphorical source domain. For example, anger can be conceptualised as darkness, e.g.

- his face went pale and then darkened with rage
- he succumbed to blind anger and lashed out
- anger was occluding his good judgment

Anger can also be conceptualised as possessing or being cut by a pointed or sharp object, e.g.

- the passage of time has blunted his anger,
- he looked daggers at her
- they responded sharply to any hint of criticism.

Such mappings and others may well form a significant part of the metaphorical domain of anger, and hence our conceptualisation of the emotion. The increasing availability of large electronic corpora (for English in particular) provides new opportunities for investigating metaphorical expressions in naturally occurring discourse, enabling us to study linguistic patterns on a large scale and will perhaps provide the basis for a more reliable hypotheses about possible underlying conceptual metaphors.

**How does metaphorical thinking influence our emotional landscape?**

In the last chapter I considered the case for culturally salient emotion terms, that is, language specific categories linked to the core values of the culture. Are there culturally salient conceptual metaphors that reflect a culture’s core values and affect the culture-bearer’s emotional landscape?

How can our emotional landscape, so to speak, be influenced by metaphorical thinking? The metaphorical conceptualisation UNDERSTANDING is SEEING plausibly has its roots embedded in empiricist thought – the doctrine that reality is observable and verifiable by sense-perception, with vision as the primary modality from which cognition verbs such as thinking and knowing are conscripted. Sweetser (1990) suggested that vision has universal primacy as the preferred modality performing this role and verbs such as hear are not enrolled to take on these meanings, although they are often extended to mean understand or obey. However, Evans and Wilkins’ (2000) study of 60 Australian languages indicates the extension of verbs from perception to cognitive meanings is quite different from the Indo-European pattern identified by Sweetser. In Australian languages it is hearing, not vision, that regularly gets extended to the cognitive domain, going beyond the predicted extension of hear to understand to include cognitive verbs such as know, think and remember. In Walmajarri, for example, the word pina (ear) has numerous extensions such as
pina-pina-karrinys (lit: ear-ear-standing) meaning thinks and pina-kangu (lit: ear carry) meaning take and show and pina-l-karra (ear manner adverb) meaning remembering or keeping in mind. Similarly, in Tyemerri ear is polysemous to idea or thought

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ya detjeri ngerimbaty' meny ngiti} \\
\text{Lit: Hey ear I have he said to me} \\
\text{Hey I've got an idea he said to me}
\end{align*}
\]

One hypothesis for these observed differences is that in the Australian context it is due to the frequency of acquiring knowledge about the landscape and associated mythology through hearing “songlines” and narratives. A defining feature of intelligence and accumulated wisdom in indigenous Australian communities is knowledge of the geographic landscape. This knowledge is intimately connected to the aural assimilation of dreamtime stories and folk history. It is not acquired simply by seeing the landscape, since the geographical landscape itself has a narrative that one must understand. This cultural practice engenders frequency of reporting knowledge in terms of hearing. The extension of hear to the cognitive domains of know, think and remember indicates a culture that has a strong oral tradition, reflecting the primacy of spoken transmission in acquiring knowledge. Without mythology there is only the aesthetical ethos that defines our emotional relationship with a landscape. Aboriginal Australians value their landscape with a heightened sense of aesthetic appreciation because the connection with the stories, legends and superstitions derived from the landscape provoke strong emotional responses to the environment which modify behaviour and set beliefs.

The ascendency of the senses, and in particular vision, over other means of knowledge--discovery gave science unique prestige in English culture. However, Isabella Allende’s (Allende, 2003) description of her Chilean background suggests a culture where discussion of the paranormal is given much more precedence. There is the persistence of a belief that there are multiple dimensions to reality. She describes her culture thus

half of Chile is guided by horoscopes, by seers, or by the vague prognostications of the I Ching, the other half hang crystals around their necks or follow feng shui (p 67-68).

and, like her Grandmother, Allende maintains that it is not prudent to trust solely in reason and our limited senses in trying to understand life. Other tools of perception exist such as instinct, imagination, dreams, emotions and intuitions. (p 69). Amongst Allende’s family there were frequent stories of her grandmother having paranormal experiences, involving telepathy and telekinesis. There were also stories about her extended family and ancestors that reach mythological proportions
“I also grew up with the family anecdotes told to me by my grandparents, my uncles and my mother – very handy when it comes to writing novels. How many of them were true? Doesn’t matter. At the hour of remembering no one wants verification of the facts, the legend is enough (p 100).

This happens with many events and anecdotes in my life: it seems I have lived them but when I write them down in the clear light of logic, they seem unlikely. That really doesn’t disturb me, however. What does it matter if these events happened or if I imagined them? Life is, after all, a dream (p 68)

One could say that LIFE is A DREAM is a pervasive conceptual metaphor in Allende’s psychology. In a sense the metaphor motivates her worldview, her fiction (with its element of magic realism, identified by Allende as features of the imagination that “heightened reality”) and much of her emotional response to events.

Differences in the physical geographical environment, the social history of the culture and our own personal history will all influence the development of metaphorical concepts. The Chileans are, for Allende, “a nation eternally rocked by catastrophes that shake the foundations of life” suffering floods, fairly frequent earthquakes and political turmoil. The idea that life is precarious is deeply embedded in the Chilean temperament. It is felt the next calamity could come at any moment. This leads to a fundamentally fatalist disposition. One ought to expect life to be difficult and unpredictable. Allende observes that

Among us Chileans, pessimism is considered good form; it is assumed that only idiots go around happy (p142).

In such a culture the notion of having the right to the pursuit of happiness enshrined in a Constitution, as it is in the USA, is baffling and eccentric. Painful experiences are seen as a natural part of life, essential for mature emotional development.

This suggests that a salient metaphorical conceptualisation in Chilean ethnopsychology, is LIFE is OVERCOMING OBSTACLES (which is coherent with the LIFE is a JOURNEY metaphor), in which impediments to travel correspond to difficulties in life. If one conceives of life as a journey and one constant, relentless series of difficulties then it is possible to think of the whole of life as facing a series of hurdles, impediments or hardships in one’s path. As Allende puts it:

We [in Chile] have the vice of analysing our reality as if it were a permanent problem requiring urgent solutions (p 142).
In Chile, a country subjected to major natural disasters and where many live in poverty, it is considered rude to mention one’s own good fortune. There is a horror of ostentatious display and putting on airs (Allende, 2003 p 103), “there is nothing so ridiculous as to try and pass as a nobleman” (p 36). Allende recalls being employed at the United Nations working for an Italian count who was forced to change his calling card because of the laughter his heraldry provoked. The worst epithet bestowed on the military who took over the government in the 1970s was that they were _boosted up_ _ratas_. According to Allende, typical Chilean characteristics include sobriety, a horror of ostentation, of standing out from others or attracting attention (p.154). It is characteristic for the Chilean to “speak very low and sigh a lot” (p 139) Two ways in which these ideas are conceptualised metaphorically in Chilean culture are those involving plucking and _jacketing_.

In Chile we have a term for talking about our friends and neighbours – _plucking_ – the etymology of which surely comes from plucking chickens, or denuding the out-of-earshot victim of his feathers. This habit is so prevalent that no one wants to be the first to leave, which is why farewells take an eternity at the door. 

(Allende 2003 p 90)

The person who triumphs locally, however, is less than adored; soon there is a tacit accord that he should be taken down a peg or two. We call this sport _chaqueteo_ “jacketing”, grabbing the offender by his coattails and pulling him down.

(Allende 2003, p 97)

The wish to promote social egalitarianism is, of course, not restricted to Chilean culture but there is another form of egalitarianism, _intellectual_ egalitarianism which, broadly speaking seems to play little part in their ethnopsychology. In contrast, intellectual egalitarianism seems particularly salient in Australian culture.

In all directions stretched the Great Australian Emptiness, in which the mind is the least of possessions and the march of material ugliness does not raise a quiver from the average nerves. It was the exaltation of the average ‘that made me panic most.


White’s claim is that in Australian culture intellectual life seems to have no established relation to practical life. Instead it is a culture where mindlessness and mediocrity is celebrated. Intellectuals feel isolated in the cultural landscape, partly as a result of the perceived egalitarian Australian temperament that rails against pretentiousness. This issue was raised more recently in response to the use of a metaphor in June 2009 by Kevin Rudd, at that time the Australian Prime Minister.
Rudd is an astute man. He speaks fluent Mandarin and is widely considered an intellectual. Sensitive to criticism that his new frontbench line-up had overlooked women Rudd dismissed his critics using the following maxim when speaking to Sky News on 9 June 2009

"Fair shake of the sauce bottle mate, if you were to compare what this government has done in terms of the promotion of women of talent and ability compared with our predecessors, it's chalk and cheese... fair shake of the sauce bottle mate"

Some political commentators and opposition members ridiculed Rudd’s language, suggesting that it was “inauthentic”. It was argued that the expression fair shake of the sauce bottle, rather than being a genuine part of his natural Australian English, was adopted by Rudd purely as a political exercise. It was a clumsy attempt to use a figure of speech as an in-group identity prime. Rudd wished to display his occa side – his Australianness – but many commentators have pointed out that in fact it is not an authentic Australian expression.

Conversely, in Australia there is pervasive use of the language and concept of sport. Expressions such as runs on the board, kicking goals, gone through from behind, level playing field, playing with a straight bat, a sticky wicket, hit me for six, a safe pair of hands, play it safe, play the man are common currency. Sport has a prominent place in Australian culture so it is perhaps unsurprising that it should prove a rich source domain. Evocative and familiar sporting metaphors are common in the political domain and other spheres of everyday discourse. This would suggest an underlying metaphor in Australian culture is LIFE is PLAYING A GAME Embedded within this metaphor are some core Australian values that permeate the Australian psyche. These include the notion of fairness (everyone is bound by the same rules), equality, (all are equal on the field of play, regardless of class or cultural background.), admiration of teamwork, and the notion that individualism should only be applauded insofar as it does not conflict with cooperative effort and collective achievement. The belief that Australia is an egalitarian, classless society has long been an important element of the Australian folk psychological understanding of their national identity (Thompson, 1994) as these recent examples demonstrate:

If there is one enduring truth about Australia, it is the notion of deep-seated and genuine egalitarianism. We are a nation that despises pretension. We are a society that happily mocks those who seek high office and honours.

No manners at all, Sydney Morning Herald, March 23 2002

In Australia, while there is always an element of class politics, the reality is that we’re a very egalitarian society in spirit. We may not be in outcomes or experience, but in spirit, we all see ourselves as much the same. If you’re a political leader, you have to relate to
that fact. In fact, you want to relate to that fact, because it's a good thing about being Australian.

ALP Leader, Kim Beazley, Now to bury the Latham obsession with class warfare, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 February 2005

[Just as] an English friend of mine last week had his day clouded by a taxi driver who told him he was arrogant for sitting in the back seat. “You’re in Australia and you should behave like an Australian” the driver raged. Is his belligerent egalitarianism the Aussie way, Bruce?

Excuse me, but etiquette stops us turning into yobbos. Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 2002

Our research confirms that at the heart of discontent is the shattering of the myths of the class society, the egalitarian society, the fair go society. These perceptions may have always been myths but they are powerful and central to our sense of identity. They were tied into our view of ourselves as the classless society - long a comfortable myth but entirely unsustainable now.

Weekend Australian Editorial, June 17-18, 2000

The notion of egalitarianism is one of Australia’s core cultural values, grounded in the pervasive metaphorical representation of life as playing a game, which goes a long way to explaining why the Australian taxi driver had such a strong emotional reaction to his English passenger sitting in the back seat.

Conclusion

Conceptual metaphor theory offers persuasive evidence that the study of figurative language can play a strong role in further developing our understanding of human emotions, especially in regard to how the human body influences and constrains the conceptualisation of emotion. The theory needs to guard against over-generalising from inadequate linguistic evidence. We also need to establish robust procedures for identification of metaphors and metaphorically used words in discourse. The intuitions of researchers frequently conflict regarding what constitutes a metaphoric word or phrase. We need established criteria that can be consistently applied in empirical investigations. Unfortunately, those working within the philosophy of emotion have generally failed to engage with the literature fully and to consider the role of metaphor in cultural models of emotion. For example, along with culturally salient emotion terms (discussed in the last chapter) there are culturally salient metaphorical concepts that influence the emotional landscape of the culture-bearer. It is clear that the study of figurative language has rich potential to supplement comprehensive scientific and evolutionary models which purportedly reveal the
“real” nature of emotion. This is because the study of metaphor illustrates how, through language, we can conceptualise emotions in a huge variety of ways.
Final Conclusion

The study of emotions and emotion theory is potentially an inexhaustible subject. There is obviously much more work that can and is being done in a number of different disciplines. This work will continue and will surely contribute towards the development of our understanding of emotions. However, the point has been reached where it is time to summarize what I can conclude from my own investigations.

There is evidence for the existence of some universal, basic emotions. These basic emotions can be characterised as evolved, species–typical functional responses to the environment and they involve a suite of stereotypical alterations in the subject’s neurophysiological and somato-visceral state. To that extent I am prepared to accept a biological theory of the emotions. However, it is implausible that every emotional experience lexically encoded in the English language or any language is going to be reducible to a unique diagnostic suite of neurophysiological and somato-visceral responses. If we wish to discriminate between nearly synonymous emotional terms such as mortification, shame, humiliation, and embarrassment, we must appeal to their distinctive and specifiable conceptual structures. In particular, their distinctive evaluative components need to be delineated. This also applies to their putative equivalents in other languages. The cumulative evidence presented by Wierzbicka’s research, the testimony of bilinguals, and the ethnographic literature clearly shows that an important contribution which cross-cultural analysis of emotion concepts can bring to emotion theory is to caution against the tendency to treat English emotion concepts as universal conceptual primitives.

We need to be sensitive to the unconscious reification of phenomena which can be conceptualised and categorised in a huge variety of ways. The English lexical categories such as anger, disgust, and happiness ought not to be considered self-explanatory and cannot be taken uncritically as analytical tools. There has been a failure on the part of the advocates of basic emotion theorizing to acknowledge this fully. Emotion theorists in general have as yet not given sufficient attention to cross-cultural studies of emotion concepts. All cultures may have a small number of emotions in common. But language and culture combine to provide manifold ways in which emotions may be finely nuanced, sometimes in thoroughly distinct ways. The effect of language is therefore not confined to the labelling of affective states, but has a wider and more diverse influence on our emotional landscape. It can actually shape our emotions. This is why a recurrent theme in immigrant and ethnic autobiographical literature can be summed up as the consciousness of adopting a different personality and emotional landscape through the acquisition of a new language. If we are to gain further insight into the nature of the relationship
between language and emotion then both cross-lingual research and the insight from studies using bilinguals need to be taken seriously. We need to acknowledge the influence of the linguistic expression of emotional states on those states themselves. Language is not a mere expressive device of independently formed states. It is constitutive of at least some emotional states, and those emotional states are frequently the most culturally salient. Striking examples have been examined in the thesis, including the Polish term *przykro* (Chapter Six) and Pashtun *gham* narratives (Chapter Five). These serve to illustrate the way in which salient emotion terms can influence the paradigmatic tone of ordinary emotional life for the language bearer. Language becomes constitutive of emotional states because thoughts are components of these emotional states and a language’s emotional repertoire affects those thoughts, not least by leading the emoter to represent herself as being in a certain kind of state.

Taking another perspective on the relationship between language and emotion, as discussed in Chapter 8, figurative language is also involved in the conceptualisation of emotions. I have also pointed out how the cross-cultural study of emotion metaphors has contributed towards developing our understanding of the structure and content of prototypical cultural models of emotions. The cumulative evidence from the conceptual metaphor theory of emotions indicates that human emotions are to a significant degree developed from an individual’s corporeal, embodied experiences in various cultural environments. They arise from recurring and universal biological-physiological processes in the human body interacting with the external world. The main thrust of the research that has emerged from the conceptual metaphor theory of emotions does nothing to suggest that humans conceptualise emotions in a way that conflicts with our physiology and evolved, natural reactions. However, the constraints imposed by human biology leave substantial room for diversity in the way emotions are conceptualised.

It has also emerged that emotions have two distinctive types of stimuli. The emotion lexically encoded as *disgust* in English can be triggered in response to an offensive object in the environment, for example the sight of someone eating a rancid piece of meat, the touch of a clammy hand, or the smell of a sewage pipe on a warm day. These responses to occurrent stimuli in the environment are typically the result of spontaneous, swift, non-cognitive evaluations. However, disgust can also be a response to the thought that someone has behaved in a morally offensive manner, for example being told that someone has desecrated the cenotaph. The emotion is triggered by complex cognitions and representations involving beliefs or judgments. In this case, the object of the emotion is the perceived disrespect for the cultural values represented by the cenotaph. The behaviour is appraised as indicating a sick or distorted psychology or a lack of normal moral values, the proper response to which is disgust. It is this capacity for the triggering
of emotional responses by complex cognitions that gives the human emotions their prolific cultural diversity and idiosyncrasy. The specific appraisals associated with particular emotions are generally infused with social context. According to the appraisal account a necessary and sufficient condition for emotion is that the person’s current life situation is appraised as impinging significantly upon personal concerns, the most salient of which relate to our interactions with others. Many of the intentional objects of emotion, the things people get emotional about, relate to other people and their implications for our social relationships.

What makes events or situations important is often dictated by their significance for the development or maintenance of our relationships. So, other people’s emotions not only act as emotion elicitors, but also help to shape or influence our emotional responses to a situation. As was demonstrated in the chapter that considered grief and mourning, the realisation that one’s emotional responses are being judged will play a role in both the internal regulation of our affective state and its outward display. e.g., how much grief is appropriate for a distraught couple following a cot death? Showing too much emotional control may attract a negative response from others, even leading to animosity or hostility. On the other hand, displaying too much wounded grief, or excessive mourning, may be perceived as emotionally dysfunctional. The response of others to what is perceived as the irrationality of the couple’s behaviour and their failure to accept the situation might be anger. Alternatively, it might even be taken as a sign of guilt or provoke mistrust in cases where the precise circumstances surrounding the loss of the child are confused.

Social appraisals emerge in addition to the couple’s individual appraisal of the situation. Understanding that others will respond to their emotional state, either positively or negatively, is something that will have a powerful influence on the couple’s behaviour. Since emotions involve appraisals the expression of the emotion becomes a public presentation of the evaluation and interpretation implied by that appraisal. The couple will therefore attempt to shape their emotional response in a way they deem appropriate for the particular context in which their behaviour will be evaluated. Emotional communication is dynamic and interpersonal and if we are to gain greater insight into the nature of emotions, then research models must find effective ways of accommodating this within their paradigms.

Humans are naturally and profoundly socio-centric creatures. We depend upon others for any hope of leading a flourishing life. Our physiological and psychological well-being requires that we seek co-operation and develop alliances. We foster mutual interdependence and this promotes the emergence of sophisticated, complex emotions that support and maintain these relationships of interdependence. They provide us with the security of repeated reassurance that our social partners are people we can get on with, and they help to represent us as people worth
knowing and caring about. However, I want to point out that insisting on this (as we should) is not to claim that ‘emotions are irreducibly cultural constructions’. In stressing the cultural, intellectual aspect of emotions some theorists have, at the same time, gone so far as to deny the somatic side of affective life. The consequence of this line of thought has been a tendency to separate feelings from the intellect, whereas we should be thinking about emotions in terms of the interconnection between intellect and feelings the problem of the tendency to split the two persists. We should embrace emotional complexity but such complexity should be consistent with what we know about our biology.

This is why Griffiths’ strict demarcation between the so called ‘affect program emotions’ and the higher cognitive emotions seems too strong. Once one disassociates the mechanisms of the affect program emotions from the “higher “cognitive emotions it becomes difficult to see whence the “higher” cognitive emotions gain their embodied emotionality. I can make the judgment that someone has wronged me or mine without experiencing the corresponding emotion of anger. I might respond with bemusement, dejection or be completely dispassionate about the situation. Similarly, I can make the judgment that my partner has been unfaithful without the corresponding emotion of sexual jealousy, or the judgment that I am the focus of unwanted attention without experiencing the corresponding emotion of embarrassment. A comprehensive theory of emotions ought to be able to explain how a particular representation becomes attached to an affect program. How is it that disgust, which can be triggered in response to an offensive object in the environment involving spontaneous, non-cognitive appraisal of the object, can also respond to cognitively sophisticated appraisal or the judgment of some moral offence, which can only be the result of a complex learning process? In attempting to answer such questions language can play a central role in understanding the relation between affective processing — i.e., the appraisals, judgments and beliefs that are constitutive of the emotion — and the rest of our cognitive lives.


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