An Analytical and Historical Survey of Theories of Development in the period 1945-1975.

Peter Wallace Preston

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The University of Leeds, Department of Sociology.

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Abstract

This study concerns itself with pursuing the remarks made by Hilal ("Sociology and Underdevelopment", Durham mimeo 1970 ppl-3) to the effect that the 'discovery' of the Third World was (is) as significant for present day social-theorizing as was that 19th century discovery of industrialization made by the 'founding fathers' of sociology and the classical political economists. The elucidation of this claim has been effected by the preparation of a critical history of the career of 'development-studies' in the post war period, 1945-75.

Three 'schools' have been identified, labelled 'positivist', 'radicals' and 'marxists', by asking how the linked matters of disciplinary independence and theoretical autonomy have been regarded by the practitioners themselves. Briefly, it is argued that: (1) the earliest efforts regarded development as a technical matter of the appropriate application of the established procedures of economics, where economics was taken as a 'positive science'; (2) the efforts characteristic of the middle period adopted varieties of 'sociologized' economics and lodged claims for the independence and theoretical novelty of 'development-studies'; (3) the marxists, the most recent identifiable grouping, deny the independence and novelty of 'development-studies' and subsume its questions and concerns within a wider historico-economic schema which revolves around the idea of a 'world capitalist system'.

The career of 'development-studies' is seen as an emergent series whereby the self-conception of the practitioners broadens such that a narrowly technical engagement gives way to a richer and increasingly subtle exercise in social theorizing. The contributions of each 'school' have been considered by means of sociology of knowledge-informed analyses of exemplars. The study has looked at the occasions for theorizing, at the intellectual resources invoked, and has been interested in displaying their characteristic 'argument forms'. This 'formal' aspect has provided the means whereby the study as a whole has been both integrated as a text and related to recent debate as to the proper nature of social-theorizing. Social-theorizing is taken to be concerned with, in the prime case, the construction of ideological (where this term is used non-pejoratively) schemas serving to order and legitimate action in the world; and, thereafter, with the criticism and comparative ranking of such schemas.

We conclude by insisting upon the fundamental practicality of social theoretic engagement and suggest that theorists must pay attention to what it makes sense for them to say given their particular circumstances and problem situations.
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Abbreviations

C W - Conventional Wisdom (after J K Galbraith).
D C - Developed Country.
ECLA - United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.
ERP - European Recovery Programme.
GNP - Gross National Product.
G T - Growth Theory.
H-D - Harrod-Domar.
ICOR - Incremental Capital Output Ratio.
M T - Modernization Theory.
MNHC - Multi-National Corporation.
MIST - Neo-Institutional Social Theory.
NL - New Left.
NLR - New Left Review.
NS - New Statesman.
SDF - Students for a Democratic Society.
SPD - Social Democratic Party (W. Germany).
SNCC - Student Non violent Coordinating Committee.
UDT - Underdevelopment Theory.
UDC - Underdeveloped Country.
UNCTAD - United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development.
UNRRA - United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).
Section One: Prologue.

Chapter One: the scope and concerns of the study.

A point of departure.
We may begin by noting that it has been observed that the so called 'discovery of the Third World' is as significant for present day social-theory as was that 19th. century discovery of 'industrialization' for the classical theorists of political economy and the 'founding fathers' of sociology. It is towards an elucidation of this claim that our study may be taken to be directed. It is an underlying assumption that if it is true that the discovery of the Third World in some way recapitulates the experience of the 19th. century theorists, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that the 'career' of 'development-studies' will provide a series of unequivocal, undisguised, non-routinized, 'raw' examples of social theorizing in action. The particular 'object' of our enquiry is taken as the 'career' of 'development-studies', and this history we treat in the hope of uncovering and displaying something of the nature of social-theorizing.

1.0 The constitution of the 'object' of study and the method appropriate thereto.
The matter of the constitution of our 'object'(1) will serve to offer a preliminary statement, an over-view, of the way we shall treat the history of the period. It will also offer a programme for the study and establish the legitimacy of the enterprise. Having treated the 'object' of study we will consider the method to be used.

As we want to claim that the theorist bestows coherence upon the period selected by virtue of the questions he is moved to raise, then it seems clear that this construction of an 'object' is itself a process. The particular interests of the theorist are lodged within the frame of his discipline, itself lodged within history. The 'object' of enquiry is a distillate of particular
interests, disciplinary constraints and the common sense of the society of which the scholar is a member. Rather than simply announce the 'object' of the study we will review, albeit in a simple fashion, this process.

In this work the period treated is bounded by two wars. This presents the period both formally, i.e. two dates, and commonsensically. Thus the start is indicated by the end of the Second World War, and the end point by the defeat of the USA in Vietnam and the response of the community of nations thereto. Now if this identifies the period formally, then the substantive issues/problems shaping it—that is, the criteria of selection and coherence—are the changes in approach to problems of the development of the Third World. This aspect we take to represent the experience of the discipline of 'development-studies', given our particular interest in argument strategies.

This matter of the changes in approach to development is the key to the constitution of the 'object' of study. It permits our enquiries to begin with the ideas of the practitioners themselves. Thus if we ask to what extent is it legitimate to pick out theories of development as a discrete realm of discourse, or how much is it a new separate discipline, and when did it start and why, then we can identify three general sorts of answers. These will provide the material, lodged within the dates noted, which with the addition of our own questions will constitute our 'object'.

On the question of the independence and theoretical novelty of the discipline of 'development-studies', the three views are: first, that it is not proper to single out 'development-studies' as the whole enterprise properly belongs to a positive science of economics; second, that it is proper to single out 'development-studies' and that, moreover, they have good reason to be regarded as the basis of the first adequate economics; and third, that it is an error to single out 'development-studies' as these concerns and questions should be subsumed within the study of the historical development of the world capitalist system.
So firstly it may be argued that it is an error to single out 'development-studies' as being anything other than a sub-specialism of positive economic science. The purist Bauer (2) adopts such a position. He seems to want to deny that 'development-studies' and theories are especially novel in the light of the efforts of colonial governments, which he takes to have been pursuing development for many years, and the corresponding intellectual reflection upon these matters. Any novelty development-theories might have is that of being wrongheaded and generally mistaken in diagnoses and prescriptions. Bauer is critical of aid and planning, arguing that neither are necessary conditions of development. Economics in the end is a form of technical assistance.

That economics is to be seen as a science, and that the proper exchange of economics and the problems of the Third World is one of the application/extension of the established, proven, tools of the former to the circumstances of the latter, is generally taken for granted by those we can identify as taking this line on the matter of the status of 'development-studies'. However those who take this line do not, in the main, adopt Bauer's purism. The 'conventional-wisdom' of 'development studies', established in the immediate post-war period, as we shall see is in its initial presentation quite clearly Keynesian. It is this that Bauer rails against.

It is characteristic of the work in this early period of those who would follow the general theoretical line indicated, that it pursues what we can call an ideology of 'authoritative interventionism'. That 'development' was taken to be a technical matter we have noted, but further it was also assumed that the experts of the presently developed nations had access to the requisite technical expertise. A relationship of super and sub-ordination was thus legitimated, and responsibility for the future reserved for the technical experts of the developed nations and their agents.

The second view on the matter of the disciplinary
status of 'development-studies' can be seen to be evidenced in the work of a fairly diverse group of writers.

In general we can suggest that they would take it to be proper to single out 'development-studies', but it should be noted that there would be differences in the strengths of their respective claims. The representatives of our second view might be most conveniently presented as three groups: together they encompass work on the fringe of the economic orthodoxy detailed above, through to work on the fringe of marxian schemes.

The first may be introduced by reference to Seers' 1963 article(3). In it he denies that the orthodoxy of economics is of any use when treating the economies of the Third World. Attention must be paid, on the one hand, to the institutional and social context of the economies in question, and on the other to their location in the world economy. The emphasis on 'situating' analysis is taken up by Streeten(4), who is not only the most philosophically sophisticated member of this group but can also be taken as Myrdal's exegetist.

Streeten advances the claim that 'development-studies' only got going after the end of the Second World War. The occasion for this involves two sets of reasons; (1) problems of resources and people are taken to be urgent in view of the population explosion and soluble in the light of the success of post-war Western European recovery; (2) political change, in the form of the rise of the new states of the Third World and the start of the Cold War, increases the concern of the 'West' for the 'proper' development of these areas. The earlier, Keynesian-derived efforts of the orthodox are taken to be a theoretically misconceived departure. The concepts used by 'development-studies' must necessarily be fashioned in the problem-situation of the Third World societies themselves. The Streeten/Myrdal line is resolutely problem-centred, and the wider implications of their efforts are not systematically developed. Whether they take themselves to have extended/revised/replaced the economic orthodoxy is not made clear; indeed their problem-centred
scheme of 'institutional social theory' would probably dismiss the issue as uninteresting. We will offer an answer insofar as it is contained in our estimation that their work can be taken to be pursuing an ideology of 'revised(cooperative) authoritative interventionism'.

The second strand to be picked out is largely inspired by Latin American work. The theorist Prebisch makes the first break with the orthodox when in 1949 he rejects the Ricardian notion of international specialization which had justified Latin America's role in the world economy being restricted to that of primary product exporter. Prebisch advocates industrialization behind protective tariff barriers. The policy change is mirrored in theoretical revision: the equilibrium model of the orthodoxy is set aside in favour of a 'structuralist' analysis which takes the putative national economy to be a concatenation of 'residues', 'enclaves', and 'parasitic forms'. Later the gradual failure of ECLA reformism occasions a reworking of these views. In the middle and late sixties the notions used were 'institutional' and 'structural' economics. According to Girvan(5) the revision entailed (a) adding an historical aspect to structural and institutional method and (b) giving the synthesis the empirical content necessary to generate a full theory of underdevelopment.

From Furtado(6) Girvan draws an interesting point vis à vis the status of economics. Furtado comes to see the Latin American debate as resolving the issue of whether one or two economics were required to treat respectively 'rich' and 'poor'. The answer is that we are treating a world-historical system and that consequently one economics is needed— and it is to be found in the tradition exemplified in Furtado's own career. That the school of dependency economics began as a reaction against the economic orthodoxy was due to the latter's being inapplicable to the circumstances of the Third World, but now it transpires that the orthodoxy makes no sense in the circumstances of the rich either! If 'development-studies' is seen as a product of the post war period, then it is surely independent of the orthodoxy of econ-
-omics which is now regarded as chimerical.

The third group of those who would affirm the novelty of 'development-studies' are represented pre-eminentely by A.G. Frank, though their views in this context are oddly insubstantial. In brief, to the above noted dependency line there is to be added an influx of marxian notions which serves to produce what Leys(7) terms a 'left UDT/dependency'. The phrasing is deliberate and serves to indicate that the theoretical realm of UDT/dependency is not abandoned, rather a political re-orientation takes place. However, in contrast to the two above-noted threads, each of which would grant 'development-studies' a measure of autonomy, the marxist infusion is in a sense self-annihilating. It shifts from a political radicalisation of common themes to a renunciation of its own perspective as being, ultimately, 'bourgeois' in theoretical character and liable therefore to 're-absorption. The most recent messages from this group commend the adoption of a thoroughly marxist standpoint.

The third view on this matter of the independence and theoretical novelty of 'development-studies' adopts the strategy of subsuming its concerns and questions within the very much broader framework of the analysis of the historical development of the world capitalist system. This view is exemplified, paradigmatically, in the work of those who regard themselves as either marxists or as working in a tradition of social theory which counts Marx as its most distinguished figure.

The major line of marxian analysis of the Third World is usually associated with Baran and the notion of 'dependency', where this connotes the subordinate incorporation of peripheral areas in the world economy. But if this can be regarded as the 'conventional-wisdom' of the marxists then it is also a disputed wisdom. The renaissance of marxian scholarship is recent. In the 'West' it is strongly associated with the 'New Left', and its initial engagement with the Third World was via the cooption of 'liberation struggles' to the efforts of the New Left.
The subsequent exchange between this circumstance-specific renewal and established traditions of theorizing within marxism on the one hand, and on the other a dawning appreciation of the complexity of debate in respect of 'development', has produced if not a theoretical babel then at least a highly complex discussion that has, as one centre, the question of the precise nature of a properly marxian analysis of the Third World. It is in this area of enquiry that we find the most ambitious efforts to theorize the matter of 'development'.

We have now taken note of the formal limits of our period of study, and have considered the various distinguishable efforts of the practitioners themselves—ordered around the matter of disciplinary status, itself called forth by our interest in argument-forms. To this technical issue we must add a broader interest, both to give shape to the enquiry and to acknowledge recent debate within social science as to the precise nature of the endeavour.

We have noted above that we are interested in the idea that the 'career' of development-studies might provide a series of 'raw' examples of social-theorizing in action, and that consequently it might be expected to illuminate the matter of the way in which social theorizing is to be done. Also, we take the proper centre of such enquiry to be located within the ambit of the concerns of the marxian renaissance of scholarship that we have referred to.

The 'object' of our study, the 'career' of 'development-studies' in the period 1945-1975, is taken (in the light of the above report of the practitioners' views) to have involved, at least in the earlier efforts, the attempt to constitute an autonomous discipline; which project collapses under the combined weight of events, its own implausibility and its success in occasioning refinement in argument. The 'career' of 'development-studies' is not taken to be the whole of the story of the renewal of marxian scholarship, but it might quite reasonably be taken to be a major
part of the process of re-constituting that tradition of critical social enquiry exemplified in the work of Marx. Generally, the 'career' of 'development-studies' is seen as an emergent sequence, such that a narrowly technical engagement gives way to a richer and increasingly subtle exercise in social-theorizing.

Having reviewed the process of the construction of our 'object' of enquiry, we can here indicate the method of analysis appropriate thereto. Indeed this method has been anticipated in the foregoing: both explicitly in the references to the process of 'object' construction, where the mention of 'distillates' of various interests reveals a sociology of knowledge informed approach; and implicitly - as will become clear a little later - in that the constitution of the 'object' by the theorist is taken to be determined by the resources available to the theorist. We claim that presumptions about the nature of a proper analysis are integral to the constitution of the 'object' of enquiry.

Having indicated that the 'objects' of social theoretic enquiry are here taken to be socially produced, and having reviewed the process of the constitution of our own 'object' in a fashion which reveals it to comprise a series of efforts to make sense of the exchange of rich and poor nations, it will come as no surprise that the notion of ideology figures centrally in our work. In line with the anticipations noted above, it appears both as an analytic technique and as a notion encompassing our presuppositions in respect of explanatory propriety.

Firstly it presents itself in the guise of the analytic stance of the sociology of knowledge. Thus the particular elements of the history of 'development-studies' are treated by means of the preparation of sociology of knowledge informed critiques. As our 'object' of study was taken as a distillate of various elements, so too are the various distinguishable efforts within 'development-studies'. In particular we consider 'exemplars' taken as representatives of 'schools', and of their work ask after: its milieu; the political demands made
upon it; and the body of theoretical resources used. Clearly this treatment presents these exemplars as producing ideologies, as this would be ordinarily and pejoratively understood. However, the reconsideration of the legacy of Marx within the social sciences has also seen a reconsideration of the notion of ideology, and here is our second area of use.

That we might properly use a notion of ideology as the methodological key to social theorising can be established in a preliminary fashion by recalling recent interest in language. Thus, after MacIntyre(8) we can argue that if it is true that thinking goes on by the use of our commonly accepted language ('language is practical consciousness', as Marx puts it), then the limits of my world equal the limits of the explanations available to me. The explanations available to me will be limited to those that I do accept, or could accept if they were spelt out to me. Now if this is my ideology then clearly it is not going to be an elaborated scheme taken on board as a result of consumer choice amongst preferred alternatives, but rather it is a taken for granted body of knowledge which expresses some sort of structured/constituting relationship of self, social location, and explanations.

At this point the issue broadens in a fashion that introduces presently debated topics in social theory. The scope of these matters, and the idea of the non-arbitrariness of ideology, can be introduced by referring to the work of Giddens(9).

In respect of the question of the nature of social theorizing and its proper method, Giddens approaches an answer via the 'debate with positivism'. Three streams are run together: (i) hermeneutics, the concern with understanding; (ii) phenomenology, the creation of everyday life in the routine detail of social life, that is, in interaction; (iii) analytic philosophy, with its affirmation of the centrality of language to any adequate explanation of the social. The thrust of the effort is towards the presentation of an elaborated
notion of praxis, where Marx is taken as an undeveloped counter-tradition to the orthodox 'Durksonian' scheme. This extension of the notion of praxis serves to elucidate the claim that men make their own histories and lives, but not as they choose. The extension proceeds via four steps: (a) it is granted that language equals reality; (b) it is noted that realities do change; (c) this introduces the process of making structures and the idea of the dual nature of structure as product and ground of interaction; (d) finally, language as the ground and vehicle of action reflects asymmetries of power inherent in action.

Now there seem to be two elements in all this. One is that ideas about the nature of language provide the basis of an analogy - thus as we have speech/language, so we have action and interaction, that is, the production of social life and an established structure that is over and above individuals and is the expression of and basis of action. The use of this analogy serves, it seems, to provide Giddens with the means whereby a sociological general theory of the construction of the social world might be envisaged. In addition to this, 'language' entails an ontology. Thus if 'language' constitutes the social world then any relationist epistemology - that is, one involving centrally a subject-object dualism - is denied: subject and object interpenetrate, and 'explanations' become the central concern of social scientific effort.

We now have an 'object' of enquiry, and have presented a methodological notion that seems appropriate to it. A history of the 'career' of 'development-studies' might now be prepared. However to proceed thus would be presently inappropriate. We have constituted our 'object' by taking note of the debates, internal to 'development-studies', in respect of the status of their endeavour. This particular 'reading' of their work was occasioned by our interest in argument-construction; but these interests are themselves to be lodged within the frame of the discipline of learning governing our study. The constitution of the 'object' of study is determined, in
part, by the resources available to the theorist, and these resources represent our reading of that recent debate in social theory noted with Giddens above. Given then that we shall treat the history of 'development-studies' in the period indicated with a view to uncovering the characteristic argument forms of the distinguishable efforts, and moreover do so in the hope of illuminating the nature of social theorizing itself, it seems appropriate to offer some preliminary statements in respect of our conception of social theory...

2.0 Received wisdom: some suppositions of our study.
These remarks are offered as an introduction to those theoretical issues with which we are concerned: it is this cluster of problems which constitutes the formal counterpoint to the historical material presented in the study. At the outset we have three areas of concern: firstly, the question of the nature of the theorist's involvement with his work; secondly, the broader issue of the nature of the exchange between theorists and their social surroundings; and finally, the more abstract matter of the nature of social theorizing, taken paradigmatically as 'ideology construction', and the problems of this conception.

Hawthorn, in his history of sociological thought, remarks that all 18th and 19th century theorists had a moral model of man as a reference point around which data, explanations, and arguments were organised. Confronted with a given theorist we should proceed, advises Hawthorn, by asking "what exactly did he consider as a defensible social, political and moral order? ....for it is that which most directly informed analysis "(10). This is interesting for two reasons.

In the first place it lets us link, in an intuitively persuasive way, theorist and theory; in that an element of the self-image of the theorist is included as a basic organising element of the theorist's product. If we regard this as a piece of 'moral psychology'
then we can extend it by looking at the notion of integrity. This we can take to comprise two elements, one being the demand for consistency in formulation of moral statements, the other being the requirement of continuity of personal identity. The requirement of consistency in statements is general to intellectual discourse, but the necessary link to personal self-image would seem to be novel to moral discourse. The hoary old problem of value freedom is 'solved' in that it is denied that this is, at base, a coherent notion; that a person is thoroughly involved in what is being said is not a defect to be regretted and removed, rather it is a necessary condition of that discourse being moral discourse. Interesting support for this view comes from Gellner, who makes social theorizing (though he does not use this term) the attempt to make sense of novel and disturbing social situations. Thus sociology is seen as a 19th century invention in the face of the rise of the 'modern world'. The 'transition' (a continuing and pervasive phenomenon for Gellner) is marked by a loss of identity; this is, he says, "the very paradigm of a moral problem" (11).

The second point raised by Hawthorn is the closely related question of the manner in which we take such a model of man to be inserted into theorizing. Now Hawthorn builds, at the end of his study, what he calls a 'typology of intentions' derived from those theorists he has looked at. The first such 'intention', both logically and historically, has been to account for man's place in the 'scheme of things' in such a way as to distinguish man from some external realm; or as he puts it, "man is in some sense separate from nature" (12). This first 'intention' is the base of all subsequent theorizing; consequently he argues that "only when one has convinced oneself of the properties and possibilities of human nature .........can one convince oneself of the properties and possibilities of man's relation to society" (13). To this we can say that we want to agree that a model of man is central to theorizing. But we would
deny that this model emerges *ex nihilo* into the mind of
of the theorist, or that it can be used as Hawthorn
rather seems to suggest: that is, first decide what social
atoms are and then how they fit together. Hawthorn's
voluntaristic phrasing invites a slide into regarding
moral vision as the organising principle of the theorist's
effort. But the point we wish to urge is that moral vision
is only one element of the organisation of the theorist's
effort; the other part is his membership of a community
of scholars, and here criteria of evidence, insight and
moral propriety are given. The theorist's activity is
expressive within a given (albeit not fixed) frame.

Reference to the 'disciplinary frame' invites the
extension of these remarks into the vexed area of the
relationship of theorists to their historical society,
and the constitution of the problems they approach. As
the individual theorist is to be lodged in his discipline,
so that community is to be seen as lodged in history. The
matter of the extent to which models of man might be
determined by specific historico-social locations is
taken up in Chapter Two when we discuss the idea of
'development'.

In regard to the question of the nature of the engag-
ment of the theorist with the wider social world, the
tripartite scheme of 'interests' presented here by Pay
must now, one supposes, be widely known. Pay is concerned
with the relationship of conceptions of social theorizing
and political practice: thus he reports that "I am claiming
that implicit in the theories of knowledge which I examine
...... is a certain conception of the relation between
knowledge and action, and that such a conception, when
elaborated in the context of social life, is a political
theory"(14). The three 'varieties' of reason, with their
attendant politics, can be presented, in brief, as follows;
(1) the instrumental knowledge of natural science, with its
positivistic extension into the realm of the social in the
the guise of 'policy science'; (2) the interpretive appreci-
ation of the webs of meaning-constitutive social rules,
and its political practice which revolves around notions of broken communication; (3) the critical, lodged firmly within the humanist and marxist traditions, and characterized by its engagement. Pay takes this line of thought to be the only candidate for a plausible social science.

This tripartite division is reworked in a sociological context by Bauman (15), who propose to distinguish on the one hand (1) Durksonian sociology, and (2) the existential critiques of that orthodoxy. Yet these two are adjudged to remain the same, in this sense: they are both committed to a notion of 'truth' as describing things 'as they really are' and providing thereby a firm basis for action. The 'true description of the facts' is the arbiter of debate. In this tradition of social philosophizing such a stance is taken as submission to positivism. Horkheimer and Adorno (16) have traced the historical/intellectual route whereby the open-ended and emancipatory reason of the Enlightenment collapses into a restricted descriptivism.

The historical base for this is indicated by Goldmann (17) in his essay on the Enlightenment, who argues that a triumphant bourgeoisie did not need or want critical negative philosophy; what they did need was a positive philosophy which affirmed, by its moral dis-engagement and technical manipulative mode of reasoning, the emergent status quo. To these two Bauman contrasts (3) emancipatory reason; it is characterized as not seeking to describe the world taken for granted, but rather trying to fracture that commonsense. It aims, we are told, to promote 'historical' at the expense of 'natural' reasoning, and Marx is taken to provide the most advanced example of such 'historical' reasoning.

The nature of the 'engagement' of the theorist will concern us throughout our substantive analyses, as we observe the various strategies of self-deception on offer, and it is a matter we shall return to in our concluding remarks.

The difference between those theorists' efforts which aim, on the one hand, to 'describe the world' and those
which, on the other hand, endeavour primarily
to 'express a response to the world' has, occasioned extensive debate in respect of the matter of validation/ authentication. We can take note of this for two reasons: (1) it points up the difference between orthodox and critical theory introduced above, and (2) it lets us sharpen an hitherto implicit commitment to the notion of a critical stance, by introducing a distinction between 'deployment' and 'grounding'.

Both Fay and Bauman note that the confirmation of the efforts of the critical theorist is, in part, accomplished by the theorist's product becoming a significant cultural object. In the case of the work of the natural scientist, the community of experts does the testing in accordance with the criteria of validity current in the community, and if approved the product is released for use by the population at large. But in the case of the efforts of the critical theorist, testing within the community of experts is preliminary to the test of historical relevance. Thus Bauman notes, "Authentication—becoming true in the process—can occur only in the realm of praxis, of which the institutionalized, partial discourse of professional scientists constitutes only the initial stage" (18). This revision of the orthodox scheme of science is indeed radical, but it seems to me that it grants too much to the orthodox in that 'grounding' a theoretical effort is still taken to be the business of the expert and, more importantly, the initial stage. As will become clear in our substantive analyses, we take a more jaundiced view of the matter of building theoretic efforts; social theories we take to be constructed, at particular times, in particular places, and with specific intent. The matter of their 'grounding' is technical and secondary. The orthodox interest in epistemology—including the revisions/extensions proposed by Bauman and Fay—is implicitly demoted, and the practical question of ranking competing ideologies comes to the fore. This is a matter of the plausibility of various efforts at explanation, and seems to be a wider issue than orthodox
schemes usually treat.

If we return to the familiar area of the matter of 'grounding' we can approach our conception of the business of social theory. We do so in the context of academic discourse, and we present the claim that the construction of ideologies, ordinarily understood, is the paradigm of what it is to be engaged with society in a social-theoretic manner. To put this another way, if we are asked what is it to do social theory, we reply: it is to be involved in constructing ideologies.

Hollis and Nell concern themselves with this problem of 'grounding' in their book 'Rational Economic Man'. They distinguish three sorts of models — predictive, programming, and production, — and they describe their respective functions. Thus "a production model gives conditions for the system to continue, a programming model shows how to improve performance, and a prediction model forecasts whether the conditions will in fact be met or the improvement forthcoming"(19). The models present a story in logical time — a blueprint to which reality can be adapted, or by means of which it can be altered. Hollis and Nell go on to point to two areas of debate in regard to the career of such a story in logical time; thus it will be taken up and used (1) if it is a sound theory (and this is made to be a technical matter for the scholarly group in question), and (2) if it is recognisably a solution to perceived problems.

The issue of 'grounding' is presented in epistemic guise. Hollis and Nell affirm a 'conceptual rationalism' and introduce it as follows: "positivism civilized logic making it a human invention, but only to insist on the utter bruteness of the independent facts. Pragmatism civilized the facts too. A true belief is true only insofar as it coheres with all others we choose to believe at the time"(20). Yet as pragmatism is right to say that facts are theory laden, so Hollis and Nell argue that we must regard theories as independent.
Theories are independent in that they are derived from necessary truths which "introduce central concepts which define the subject and scope of theories" (21). They go on to claim that "a sound theory is a system of necessary truths whose application is a contingent matter" (22). These conceptual necessary truths are 'real definitions'; that is, they tell us what a thing essentially is if it is to count as that sort of thing. It is to be distinguished (we are reminded) from the usual trio of lexical, stipulative, and persuasive definitions. Interestingly, as an example of the presentation of a 'real definition' Hollis cites Lukes' book, "Power: A Radical View".

Setting aside, for the moment, the questions that occur in respect of this scheme (23) we can go on to note that the practical test of such a rationalist theory is going to be dependent upon the richness and problem-appropriateness of its assumptions. It is pointed out that in contrast to positivism (which says: never mind the assumptions, what about the successful predictions), rationalism urges that sound theory depends upon its assumptions. In regard to economics Hollis and Nell proceed to dismantle the orthodoxy: its empiricist positivist prop is useless, and its assumptions fantastic. A set of assumptions underpinning classical marxian economics is advanced instead.

If we turn to Marx, we can extend this discussion of rationalism by invoking the work of Rockmore, who is concerned to treat the relationship of philosophy and science in Marx. In the course of this analysis he finds that he is able to offer some conclusions on the structure of Marx's work: thus he takes the effort to be constituted by a set of philosophical ideas. Rockmore argues that "three of the Marxian philosophies distinctive characteristics are monism, a categorical scheme, and philosophic anthropology, all of which are general features of 19th century philosophy" (24). It is the second aspect which interests us here. What is the character of the 'categorical' approach detected in Marx? Firstly
it is a matter of procedure; in the Grundrisse, claims Rockmore, "Marx suggests that there are only two approaches to experience: either one can begin with concrete or real existence, then progress to abstract relations in order finally to reconstitute the real in terms of abstract concepts; or conversely, one can begin from abstract categories, such as population, in order to reconstitute the real directly." (25) It is the latter procedure that is affirmed by Marx as correct. Secondly, as regards the nature of these categories, they are out of the Hegelian school with the important difference that they are not permitted to become fixed; "On Marx's view categories correspond to actual social relations ... and need to be revised as society changes." (26) Thirdly, in respect of the deployment of these ideas, the categorical element continues to be central and presents itself as the land/labour/capital set: of this Rockmore notes, "first it presents a series of categories adequate for the interpretation of any and all aspects of capitalistic economy. Second the inner arrangement is hierarchical." (27)

This hierarchy revolves around the notion of alienated labour, derived in turn from philosophical anthropology - Marx's model of man.

If we now ask just how do we produce a social theoretic analysis of some set of circumstances, then we may answer provisionally that it involves the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame' whose product might properly, and non-pejoratively, be regarded as an ideological schema serving to legitimate and order action in the world. Now this pitches the matter at a general level, one of 'broad' treatments. However we do not want to restrict the 'ideological' to this realm. Following Giddens (28), 'ideology' is not taken as a discrete realm of discourse, rather we say discourse can be more or less ideologically elaborated. Social theoretic engagement, as we have detailed it here with references to Marx and classical political economy, we take to be the paradigm of ideologically elaborated discourse.

This view, as will become clear, informs our substa-
-ntive analyses of the 'schools' of 'development-studies'. Producing sociology of knowledge informed studies, ordered around the distinction between conception and intent, is a critical strategy that derives quite obviously from our notion of ideology construction. It should also be clear that this is a fairly low level use of the idea of critique. At this point we can introduce an extension to our core conception of social theoretic engagement: Habermas and the extended notion of critique used in that tradition of thought. Here the ideas of democracy, critique and ideology-ranking come together, in that the latter pair suppose an ideal speech situation which in turn supposes a democratic society.

We can now draw out a wider view of social theorizing; we take social theorizing to be involved with the construction, criticism, and comparative ranking of ideological schemas.

3.0 A programme for the rest of the study
Our 'object' of enquiry is the 'career' of 'development-studies' in the period 1945-1975, and we treat this history in the hope of displaying something of the nature of social theorizing. Our approach to this history involves the construction of an emergent series/critique of the body of work in question, and it revolves around the issue of the status of 'development-studies' as a discipline of learning. Three general views are identified. The earliest regarded development as a technical matter of the appropriate application of the established procedures of economics, where economics was taken as a 'positive science'. We have labelled these theorists 'the positivists', and their work is considered in Section Two of the study. The efforts characteristic of the 'middle period' adopted varieties of
'sociologised' economics, and lodged claims for the independ-ence and novelty of 'development-studies'. These theorists we have called 'the radicals' and they are treated in Section Three of the study. To complete the substantive work, we look at the efforts of the most recent 'school', who deny the independence and novelty of 'development-studies' and subsume its concerns in a wider historico-economic schema which revolves around the idea of a world capitalist system. These we label 'the marxists' and their work is treated in Section Four of the study.

Throughout the presentation of this historical material, which treats the constitution of various ideological efforts (29) in a sociology of knowledge informed fashion, a series of theoretical issues will be taken note of; these revolve around those three themes we have introduced. In Section Five of the study we present some concluding remarks on the matter of social theorizing itself, and on the more immediate question of the nature of the engagement of the 'western' scholar with matters of the Third World.

Before we begin this programme there remains one task that can usefully be accomplished at this stage. Routinely, in texts of a general nature treating matters of the Third World, there is some self-disclosure on the part of the writer of ideological or value positions taken. Now in this case, as we have argued that social theorizing is necessarily and crucially engaged, something more than pro-forma declarations seems to be called for. We will therefore present, in Chapter Two, a statement in respect of the idea of development that is supposed in this study.
Chapter Two: the idea of development.

Introduction.
The idea of 'development' tends to be presented in the literature of 'development-studies' as a technical notion: so 'development' is taken as entailing (or, as evidenced by) the accretion of some set of characteristics. In what is arguably the crudest version of the stance, these characteristics are virtually taken as a set of artefacts. Thus 'modernization theory', in its undisguised formulations, sees the process of development as the business of the acquisition by the UDCs of the traits and characteristics of the DCs. Of course it is true that the orthodox lines in 'development-studies' do not all display this transposition of the politico-ethical into the technical in quite such a transparent fashion; indeed the switch can be made quite subtly. In the case of Myrdal's 'fabianism', for example, the issues arising from the fact that to affirm a notion of 'development' is to affirm a politico-ethical stance are not dismissed. Rather, they are set aside; a notion of 'crisis politics' is invoked, and it is asserted that in these circumstances the course we must take is obvious. One may hazard that the Myrdalian claim to the obviousness of the propriety of the engagement of 'development-studies' represents the response of the mainstream of the discipline.

It will be the business of this chapter, at its most general level, to recall attention to the engagement entailed by deploying the notion of 'development'; we hope to make it clear that 'development' is a politico-ethical notion and not a technical one. To put this another way: 'development' is not the simple accretion of some set of artefacts, cultural/industrial/social, it is rather the instantiation of a politico-ethical orientation. It may present itself 'in reality' as the accumulation of artefacts, but it would be naive to reduce it to that accumulation.

There are more particular interests to be pursued. Most trivially, we offer an essay in ideological self-disclosure. The more interesting questions revolve around
two matters. First, as regards social theorizing per se, we have declared that the paradigm case of social theoretic argument is the construction of an ideological schema where this construction involves the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'. We take this politico-ethical (moral) aspect of theorizing to be given, at least in its general outline. So what is this moral core? We will here present an abstract treatment focusing upon the origins and scope of the idea of progress. The notion of 'development' can be regarded as either the discipline ('development-studies')-specific instantiation of the idea of progress, or (rather more loosely) as a simple synonym. As a detailed investigation of usage would be required to establish the former reading, we have tended to regard 'development' as a synonym for 'progress'. Additionally, if we recall Hollis and Nell's discussion of 'real definitions' (and their citing of Lukes' treatment of power as an example of such a definition), then it would seem that our notes might be taken to form the basis of a 'real definition' of 'development'. But this we do not pursue.

We do however pursue a matter which flows from the above-noted views and is our second concern. If it is true that the politico-ethical aspect of theorizing is in some way given, then how should we approach treatments of the matters of the Third World. In particular, are we not inevitably committing ourselves to a fixed stance and opening ourselves thereby to charges of one-sided insensitivity to the views of the people of the Third World themselves. We follow up these issues by anticipating (1) our substantive analyses. Thus we take these substantive efforts as exercises in social theorizing and consequently as morally informed. We can treat these stances as variations upon our already identified core set of ideas and offer a series of instantiations of the notion of progress. The issue of the one-sidedness or otherwise of our politico-ethical stance toward matters of the Third World is investigated through the various instances of the idea of progress.
The origins of the idea of progress.

We begin with the origins of the idea of progress in intellectual history and we note two approaches. The general ideas will be presented by using Passmore's philosophical history. Passmore relates the career of the notions involved as a history of ideas; tracing the shifts in argument and the various problems thrown up, faced, evaded or simply not seen. The context of these ideas we will note using Pollard's sociology of knowledge informed history.

The idea of progress is modern, which is to say it belongs to the post-Renaissance period of European history. But if it is a modern notion then it can also be seen as one recent manoeuvre in an even longer argument that which Passmore identifies as treating the idea of the perfectibility of man. It is reported that the notions of perfection are based in Greek philosophy and are taken up by Christian theologians. We can set aside all this period and note simply that the Christian intervention entailed the denial of the possibility of perfection here on earth in favour of preparation for perfection in some after life. In the 5th century the heresy of Pelagius argues against this, denying original sin and affirming a duty to strive for perfection in earthly life. These now set the terms of the Christian debate, but in the 14th century the Renaissance humanists present a notion drawn from a re-interpreted Aristotle, that of civic perfection. This is the first step in a radical change which establishes a third route to perfection: social action.

The impact of Renaissance humanism—its ethic, its science and its success—results in a shift of gravity of discussions of perfection which Passmore sums up under three points. (a) Perfection comes to be defined in natural not metaphysical terms; (b) it is now seen that it has to be gained with the help of one's fellows rather than God's grace or individual effort; (c) there is a shift in focus from an unrealisable purity of motive toward doing
the maximum of good. This shift also involves the view that the contemplative life is that of the scholar/scientist and not that of the mystic, and it is the rise of science that is taken by progressives of the time as the key to subsequent change.

The idea of progress emerges in the 18th century and its emergence can be read in two ways. In the first place, as an idea, it may be interpreted as an answer to the problem presented by Locke. Thus in the course of the theoretical shift just noted the ideas of perfectibility and perfection are divorced. Passmore adds that the general doctrine is reformulated such that all men are capable of being perfected and to a limitless degree. If it is asked how, then the candidate is plain, that is education and Locke shows that it can do the job; this lays the ground for discussions of education and social action in the 18th and 19th centuries. However the classic texts of education fail to confront a problem that Marx will point up, that the educator needs educating. Locke may have established that man can be perfected, but the gap between perfectibility and actually being perfected has to be bridged. If secular perfectibilism lacked the metaphysical guarantor of a God, then the position was retrieved by two steps; in the first the educator is made subsidiary to a method; in the second he is abolished altogether.

The first step was to conceive human history in such a way that it guaranteed that man will continue to improve his condition; if this is done then the occasional errors of educators, law-givers or whatever can be set aside as unimportant. We arrive at the idea of progress. Passmore goes on to relate that this idea was argued for in part inductively; for example it was pointed out that the optics of Newton were superior to those of Descartes, but the major discovery of the early modern philosophers was method.

The second view of the emergence of the idea of progress involves taking note that the focus on method reflects the social expectations of the theorist in
alliance with commerce. Thus Pollard points out that these ideas were not taken up in a vacuum. The advance of science is not a result of its sudden evident superiority coupled with a new tolerance on the part of the Church. Rather the advance depended upon the support of powerful groups. Pollard's summary is familiar; "it was the New Men of Europe, the merchants and traders and manufacturers ....... whose experience tallied with the new philosophy and whose needs called forth the new science" (4). Passmore notes that the Enlightenment thinkers were confident that a science of man had been established and would be used. Why this confidence? The self-perception of the Enlightenment thinkers involved their emergence as a new and distinct social group: they were a self conscious community, seeing themselves as the natural governors of society through an equally natural alliance with the commercial classes. As Passmore puts it, "Overt power to the middle class, actual power to the intellectuals" (5). Progress is evident in history, appropriate to the present and underpinned by reason.

This optimism reaches a peak in the work of the philosophes, and thereafter declines and becomes diffuse. The idea of progress is generally accepted through the 19th century but is presented by various groups in various countries. The intellectual and social career of the notion, so to say, is very complex. Greatly simplifying matters we can again offer a twofold reading. Thus firstly, treating the history of ideas side we can note that as an idea the notion of secular progress lacks a guarantor and that the response to this, after the unsatisfactory nature of the focus on method is seen, is to abolish the educator altogether and to invoke guarantors in the shape of history and biology. Thus we have theories of progress as natural development. With Darwin we can associate a range of evolutionisms, but the initial precision of formulation tends, in the social theoretic versions, to the descriptive general. Historical guarantors are first presented by Leibniz. Themes of unfolding by means of dialectic present social
mechanisms and are better explanations. A central 19th century figure here is Marx. If we turn to the second reading, the social responses, then the alliance of commerce with science is seen as restrictedly progressive given the incompatibility of an open-ended progressive method oriented to the closure implied in the establishment of the bourgeois state. The response is the search for a new motor of progress, and in Marx the endemic conflict of bourgeois and working class is grasped in his class dialectic. On the part of the bourgeoisie the progressiveness of science in respect of the social is curbed, and classic political economy becomes social science.

We have now traced the origin and career of the idea of progress from its inception in Greek philosophy to the forms taken by the 19th century theorists of industrialization. The range of debate relevant to matters social we take to be fixed at this time; on the one hand the marxian classical conceptions of progress, and on the other those of orthodox social science. The range of subsequent variation, (with national socio-logies, particular streams of thought etc.) we do not wish to consider. Instead, in regard to the career of the idea of progress we shift directly to our own area of interest; that is, the post-war career of 'development-studies'. Before doing that however we consider the scope of the idea of progress.

2.0 The scope of the idea of progress.
We have noted the route whereby the idea of the individual pursuit of perfection was transformed into naturally guaranteed social progress. We have also seen that as this key idea of the tradition of political thought we inhabit was in point of formation it simultaneously assumed two forms: the one pursuing the core, now taken as a radical line, and the other endeavouring to fix change either in place by invoking schemes of overweening generality or in a mundane realm (cf Hawthorn where in the USA in particular progress is equated with increasing consumption). We can now turn to
consider the ethico-political substance of these two lines. This will let us treat the issue of the scope of the idea of progress.

That there are two such distinguishable lines in political theory is a familiar claim and there are diverse characterizations of their respective substance. Berlin, for example, distinguishes 'positive' and 'negative' ideas of liberty, where the former is pernicious and characterized thus: "I wish above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not" (6). This passage is quoted with approval by Macpherson (7) whose work we will here rely on.

The drift of Macpherson's work is that we can separate out two traditions of politico-moral thought and argue that the more familiar scheme is unsatisfactory and should be revised to meet the criticisms of the overshadowed counter-tradition. We can approach the argument—which presents itself in many aspects—via the distinction that can be drawn between 'powers' and 'power'.

The use of the notion of power in treatments of political conflict is familiar, and Lukes (8) to whom we have referred analyses 'power' in this fashion. Lukes makes the core of the idea of power, 'power over' and contrasts this with orthodox schemes which focus on voluntaristic decision making. But Macpherson objects to the use of what he sees as the restricted starting point of political conflict. This focuses upon the issues of the source of power, but Macpherson wants to claim that concern for the purpose of power is a richer orientation and one that reintroduces classical notions of developmental power: 'power to be', an ethical notion, and the base of the idea of 'powers' in contrast to 'power', a descriptive notion. With this schema Macpherson turns to consider what
he takes to be the justificatory theorem of western capitalism, that is liberal democracy.

The justificatory claims of liberal democracy, to maximize men's power(s), involves, it is claimed, a vacillation between the two notions of power. It is argued that the democratic notions (that is powers) are extra-liberal and attempt to link with pre-17th century notions of man which made his activities intrinsically valuable: the Aristotelian-derived scheme of civic virtue and flowering of natural capacities. This is the ethical concept of powers, and includes access to whatever external means are needed for their exercise. Limitation of access constitutes therefore a diminution of ethical powers. The descriptive, liberal, concept of power includes a man's natural powers plus whatever gains he has made by controlling the powers of others. A man's power is just that which he presently has. The conflation of the two concepts of power, the one treating man as concerned to develop intrinsic skills and valuable thereby, and the other treating man as consumer, is attempted in response to intellectual and social events by JS Mill. Mill attempts to introduce the ethical concept, but into a liberal capitalist theory. The descriptive concept of power is used in analysis (of the liberal market economy), and the ethical in justifications (of the claimed result of maximization of individual and social good). But the two notions of power are incompatible, and the power liberal democracy claims to maximize is not that which it in fact maximizes.

In regard to the scope of the notion of progress we can, in the light of Macpherson's analyses, identify the two limiting cases that we inherit from the 19th century. On the one hand the efforts of a victorious bourgeoisie to fix their position produces the doctrine of liberal-democracy, taken by Macpherson to be a fundamentally incoherent conflation of two models of man: the liberal regarding him as an infinitely desirous
consumer, and the democratic seeing him as possessed of natural talents and attributes—the development of which is his proper nature. On the other hand (and in terms of Passmore's history of ideas representing the more plausible central line of reasoning), we have what is now seen as the radical line, that is the democratic with its model of man as a rational doer rather than consumer.

3.0 The idea of development in treatments of matters of the Third World.

When the question of sensitivity to value assumptions in the context of stances adopted toward Third World matters usually arises, it does so in terms of claims to the crudity of some stance or other. That is to say, discussion seems to proceed by regular steps; first the identification of some set of assumptions, followed by the lodging of claims in respect of their impropriety, and finally the indication of some set of counter - claims. The central question at issue never seems to be confronted directly; that is, the question 'just what is a proper politico-ethical stance' does not appear.

In the light of our discussions of the origin and scope of the idea of progress this is perhaps unsurprising; and for two reasons. Firstly, the notion appears on all occasions (inevitably) in the context of some specific practical context, as an element of some ideological intervention in the world. This we can suppose suggests to disputants that present consideration of the idea should treat present instances of the idea; that is, focus on the lines taken within current debate in respect of practical theoretic engagements. Secondly, it is clear that to approach the matter abstractly would involve much very complex argument; and, moreover, argument whose major reference points within established work would be given by the concerns of moral philosophers rather than those of the social theorists. Thus much unnecessary work could ensue.
We shall follow the routine strategy and approach an answer to the core question of the nature of a proper stance by offering reasons for the exclusion of certain presently affirmed lines. We will, however, in the light of our insistence that 'development' be taken as an ethico-political and not a technical term, formalize the procedure to some extent so as to take some account of the more abstract aspects involved.

Thus we offer a definition of what it is to adopt a 'crude' stance, and ask, of identifiable positions within present debate, how they stand in respect to this definition; do they come close or do they distance themselves? These various positions will be presented as a series of instances of the idea of progress. In respect of each of these versions of the idea of progress we will ask: does it lie in the mainstream or on the periphery? To put this another way, in respect of each instantiation of the idea of progress we ask two questions. How does it stand with respect to our definition of the 'crude'? And how close is it to the core of the idea of progress?

We want a definition of a 'crude' effort, so as to be able to order discussion, and we can construct such a definition by negating what we take to be a subtle effort. Our definition of the 'crude' anticipates in a negative abstract fashion the theoretical conclusions of our study. However this characterization is called forth not by any substantive anticipation—else a circularity of argument might be suspected—but by running through what we have established as our proper method of analysing social theoretic efforts (the sociology of knowledge informed scheme of conception and intent) and treating it abstractly. A 'crude' effort would in this light be most easily characterized as one that was un-reflective in both conception and intent, and which failed to treat the implications of the idea of 'the social construction of social theory'.

The sociology of knowledge informed terms present
themselves in our required definition as the notions of eurogromorphism and europocentrism. The first we can understand as the affirmation of the priority of what are held to be typically European categories of thought(9), and the second we can take to be the affirmation of the priority of the material and practical interests of the 'west'. With this we can now move on to treat the broad distinguishable instances of the idea of progress in the post war 'career' of 'development studies'. These instances are given to us by the programme identified in chapter one: 'positivist', 'radical', and 'marxist'.

The first instantiation of the notion of progress we take to be presented by that 'school' we have labelled 'positivist'. We hold this to belong to what Ehrensaft(10) has dubbed the 'pre-Seers consensus' and it may be seen to comprise two versions— an earlier UK/UN flavoured effort, and a later distinctly US schema—of a basic idea of authoritative intervention. If we unpack this notion of authoritative intervention, which we see as analogous to Fays 'policy science', we come up with a scheme of analysis/engagement which takes the exchange of the theorist/world to be in essence the knowing manipulation of the latter by the former. Typically, an empiricist epistemology which holds 'theory' to be a complex summary statement of the correspondences of events and reports is used. The methodology of the scheme is that of modeling. Although the theorists usually lodge disclaimers in respect of the status they would wish to accord these models, they are (given their formalism, empiricism and technical manipulative intent) inevitably more or less scientific. Theorists adopt the role of experts, and the procedure for any practical analysis involves the disaggregation of abstract models to fit given circumstances.

In regard to the ideological function of this scheme, we can identify the legitimation of a relationship of super and sub-ordination whereby the 'development' of
the present UDCs is ordered by the experts of the DCs and their agents. 'Development' or progress is understood as a technical matter, and taken as elicited by this authoritative intervention and as presenting itself in indices of economic growth. Progress is equated with growth.

In early versions, given the efforts Keynesian intellectual roots, this conception occasioned much concern for statistical indices (GNP, ICOR etc.); but in later revised versions the economic core was fleshed out by social, 'non-economic', factors and the economic statistics were joined by indices of non-economic factors, such as literacy rates, urbanisation etc. In the elaborated US versions, the essentially technical character of the effort became submerged in a broth of pseudo-social science, most famously in V.W. Rostow's scheme of the 'stages of economic growth'.

That the notion of progress used by the early 'positivist' school is, in the light of our treatment of the origin and scope of the idea, firmly lodged within the (now dominant) peripheral line should be clear. The idea of progress is presented in narrowly materialistic guise and is to be secured by orthodox social science.

Where then does this instantiation of the idea of progress stand vis-à-vis our definition of what it is to adopt a 'crude' approach? Evidently it is close enough to be worth noting; the theorists of the orthodoxy would reply to a question in respect of the propriety of their efforts with a dual affirmation. The present extent of the line's reflexivity we will treat in chapters three and four. Here we can offer a sketch of an answer in the form of notes on its history. (It is the English theorists that we have in mind here).

(1) As regards the issue of reflexivity we can identify a long history of presumption in this regard which cuts across a spectrum of issues: from questions of participation in government to questions of rationality
itself; from regarding colonies as reservoirs of resources for the home economy to treating them as responsibilities to be discharged. Probably the most uncompromising general statement appears in the late 19th century jingoistic themes of the complete superiority of western man in contrast to the childish natives. These images are called forth not as a result of the exchange between people of the Third World and westerners, but by the politics of colonialism. Sachs points out that the image of the 'native' shifts from the time of the philosophes, who used it as a model of man untainted by civilization's vices, towards the routine deprecatory view of the late 19th century. Sachs notes: "after the French Revolution of 1789 the noble savage ceased to be indispensable to the development of European ideas, and furthermore the race for the colonies resulted in a hardening of attitudes of the part of Europeans" (11). As an ideology it assumes that the colonial powers have a 'civilizing mission' - and if we wanted an elaborated, paradigmatic, model of a 'crude' approach this is presumably the place to start gathering material.

(2) Subsequently this stance relaxes, and Hetherington reports that the period 1920-1940 sees a clear shift in position from the above exploitation to a notion of responsibility, where this entailed ideas of eventual independence. Curiously, it was German demands for return of their colonies which prodded the British into action (12). Hetherington notes: "In the 1920's the colonies were still largely thought of as an extension of Great Britain and collectivist demands were made on behalf of British interests. By the 1930's the eventual separation of the African colonies from Great Britain could be envisaged, and there was a fairly general acceptance of a new kind of collectivism which involved British Government intervention in the interests of Africa" (13).

(3) There is a further softening of the position in the case of the orthodoxy of the immediate post-
war period; and whilst it would be clearly unreasonable to link in any very direct fashion those we have called the 'positivists' with the jingoists associated with(1) above, there is nonetheless a clear family resemblance. The modern version of this stance, whose character we noted above, would deny its effort was un-reflexive if by this it is granted that an error of some sort is being made. Thus both 'growth' and 'modernization' theorists argue or assume that the developed 'West' just is the model, and that orthodox economics are scientific and thereby applicable generally. It is at this point that critics of the orthodoxy become suspicious that what is in progress is a largely verbal shift, akin to replacing 'backward' with 'developing', and that what we have is a sophisticated reformulation of the jingoistic scheme. It is pointed out that orthodox economics is not scientific; in the sense its practitioners would like to claim, and nor is the history of the 'West' a programme for subsequent nation states - the idea of 'recapitulation' is taken as nonsense.

We hold the view that the idea of progress affirmed by this 'school' is, of the three we shall consider, the most impoverished. Furthermore we take the theoretical engagement of this 'school' to be the least plausible of those we shall consider, and this we would hope to make clear in our subsequent substantive analyses.

The second instantiation of the idea of progress we take to be presented by the efforts of that group of theorists we have labelled 'radicals'; they include theorists whose work can be characterized by noting an increasing radicalism. Thus all begin with orthodox economics (Myrdal, Furtado, and Frank are our 'exemplars' here) and reject 'it for what has been called 'sociologised economics'. Progress is no longer associated with economic growth, called forth by the application of the technical expertise of the economists, but is conceived more broadly; it becomes equated with ordered social reform.
For present purposes we can collapse Frank and Furtado into one; that is, read their differences as being due to Frank's polemics. This being so we have two schemes to note: Myrdal's 'world welfarism' and Latin American 'dependency'. Of them we may note that both are interventionist schemes, seeing the theorists' business as the production of knowledge of an instrumental kind. Nevertheless it is also true that their conceptions of social theoretic engagement, though different, are markedly richer than those of the economics dominated orthodoxy.

We can trace the links and revisions around three important points. (1) **Problem specificity**: the claims of the orthodox to be applying or extending a generally applicable intellectual (scientific) scheme is denied. Thus NIST (14) is piecemeal, sceptical, empiricist and insists upon the pursuit of realism in models. This in turn attaches to the key idea that concepts have ecologies; which is to say that they only work in certain circumstances and, contrariwise, knowledge of the problem situation is a pre-requisite of the construction of appropriate concepts. The general methodological dictum is the pursuit of problem-specific formulations and not general theories. Similarly 'dependency' rejects the claims of the orthodox and, through a series of steps (which we uncover in the career of Furtado) a methodology which treats structural institutional and historical factors emerges. 'Dependency' resembles NIST in that it began as an attempt to theorize the situation of the Latin American economies, that is, it sought to be relevant; but paradoxically it ends— with Furtado—by claiming to be the first generally adequate economics, in contradistinction to the limited scope of the orthodoxy. (2) **Valuation**: the claims of the orthodoxy to neutrality of expert status are denied, but in different fashions. Both NIST and 'dependency' respond to their engagement in the social processes of which they write; but their proposals in this respect differ, and their doing so we may take to reflect their
circumstances. Thus Myrdal's efforts lodge within the experience of 'decolonization' and concern themselves with reworking long established colonial relationships. Power is to be handed over; there is a continuity of governmental procedure, and 'development' is to be ordered authoritatively. Myrdal writes for the reasonable men in charge of the new state's planning machinery (the scheme's implausibility is acknowledged in the idea of the 'soft state'). Ehrensaft rightly calls the entire scheme 'Fabian'. With 'dependency' the position is rather different: the pursuit of relevance which moved early 'dependency' work admits of a range of development that is different to that permitted by the injunction to problem-specificity which informed NIST. 'Dependency' has a more orthodox frame than NIST; and this, when coupled with the stance's evidently politically blocked circumstances (for in Latin America, at this time, the reasonable men are, typically, not in control of the state), issues in a drift to generality. Thus we have the claim to have replaced the orthodoxy on a general level. (Frank we might note offers here a third version, the shift to political activism). (3) Scientism: we have noted that Furtado remains close to the orthodoxy, so too does Myrdal. Both NIST and 'dependency' are empiricist interventionisms, though their theorizing is suffused with an appreciation of the social character of both that which they study and their study of it. Indeed much of what is theoretically characteristic of these efforts flows from the tension between the restrictions they place upon themselves by their respective acknowledgements of the dictates of the orthodox conceptions of science and its extension to the social, on the one hand, and their continuing and central urge to practical engagement on the other.

Progress is conceived as ordered social reform. If we ask where they fit in respect of our treatment of the idea of progress, then the answer is that clearly they remain within the dominant (peripheral) line which attaches to orthodox social science. However,
that said, we can add that if it is desired to construct a policy science in the area of 'development-studies' then these efforts must be regarded as prime candidates. In particular Myrdal's 'Fabianism' can be readily seen as subtle, humane and plausible.

That the orthodoxy could conceivably be seen as 'crude' was made plausible by offering a series of stages; jingoistic, revised, present. With NIST and 'Dependency' the matter is a little more difficult. So, as regards the location of these approaches to 'development'in connection with our definition of a 'crude' approach then we may note that in respect of intent, both would reject any suggestion of favouring the interests of the metropolitan centres; claiming that their interest is the establishment of new economies, not the reinforcement or sustaining of subordinate incorporation. We can note that in neither case has this intent been questioned: there is no suggestion, as there was with the orthodoxy above, that their efforts might be taken as (self-deluding) reformulations of a narrow and unreflective orthodoxy. Both operate within the injunction of 'nationalist developmentalism'.

As regards the matter of conception and our definition of the 'crude', whereby self-serving categories of analysis are blandly assumed to apply generally, both NIST and 'dependency' would deny that their schemes could be regarded as 'crude'. The replies would be different, but both would be rather ambiguous. Furtado claims to transcend and encompass the orthodoxy, which is taken to be cleansed and properly established. Myrdal too looks to establish a defensible procedure, but in doing so professes to resolve problems of valuation by lodging appeals to 'obviousness'.

With Furtado we shall note (this is presented in chapter 6) a progression in his work, from a scientific pursuit of a typology of models of economies and their sectors to the dynamic scheme of 'dependency' with its 'structural/institutional/historical' method. Furtado, having begun with the pursuit of relevance, claims that this 'dependency' scheme offers a generally
adequate economics, in contradistinction to the untenable claims of the orthodox. That is to say, Furtado thus lodges himself within a realm of discourses that transcends and encompasses the orthodoxy, which we have taken to be the remote inheritor of the imperialist jingoistic view of the superiority of 'Western' man - the paradigmatically 'crude' approach to theorizing the exchange of 'rich' and 'poor'. Furtado's denial of europomorphism is emergent; 'now we have a generally adequate economics'. It seems to be an ambiguous effort, whose ambiguity revolves around granting the notion of a generally adequate economics; it is this that seems to link Furtado to the interventionist orthodoxy. In his work 'dependency' shifts from a problem-specific politically informed orientation to a general, 'scientific' one: a wrong idea of social science and a typically orthodox one. We end up with an ideology we can label 'Reactive (Nationalist) Interpretative Interventionism'.

With Myrdal, if we look for evidence of sensitivity to the problems arising from conceiving social theorizing to be socially constructed then we can find it, simply because matters of valuation constitute a point of departure in his work; this is made clear by his exegetist Streeten. This evidence of reflexivity is related to the basis of a denial of europomorphism. Myrdal would claim that his effort is free of any taint of the wrongful importation of foreign concepts or dispositions, as his epistemic starting point was the idea of concepts having ecologies and his procedure was problem specific. In terms of the dispositions, the position taken would be one of the obviousness of welfarism in crisis politics. Once again this is an ambiguous effort in that the epistemology is unpersuasive, as is the idea that appealing to the obviousness of courses of action in times of crisis is a satisfactory resolution of the problems attendant upon deploying the politico-ethical notion of 'development'. Myrdal may thus claim to be free of the taint of unreflexiveness, but to the extent that his effort is Fabian (as Ehrensaft jibes) then to that
extent the effort must be tainted as Fabianism is evidently a circumstance-specific policy science. However, even if we grant this, NIST constitutes a marked distancing from what is implied by our definition of the 'crude', and from the orthodoxy treated above.

We take the idea of progress affirmed by this group, in their different ways, to be the most readily accepted notion. That it represents the common-sense of much of 'development-studies' is an immediate suspicion. It is a considerably richer idea of progress than that adopted by the orthodox, yet it remains within that dominant (peripheral) line of the history of the idea of progress. As regards the theoretical engagement of these theorists, we confront (in NIST especially) what must be the common sense of 'development-studies': pragmatic, humane and concerned with governmental ordering of 'development'. Its plausibility should not, however, blind us to its defects.

We have argued above that the efforts of the classical political economists, and in particular Marx, constitute the best model of what it is to argue social-theoretically. We have also claimed that the marxian tradition continues the main trend from the career of the idea of progress, that is, by presenting such notions as democracy and the 'free development of all', and treating its occasion/realization as having a natural guarantor in the historical dialectic of class. We now consider this school of social thought as they present themselves in the post-war career of 'development-studies'; that is, we look at the group labelled 'neo-marxist'.

We treat 'neo-marxism' in the established fashion, taking it as a specimen of social-theoretic engagement and not as self-evidently coterminous with a 'marxian analysis of the Third World'. 'Neo-marxis' constitutes our third instantiation of the idea of progress; it attempts to recover the submerged counter-tradition of politico-ethical thinking, that is, the radical democratic scheme that presents man as a 'doer' rather than a 'consumer'. Additionally, 'neo-marxism' seeks to
present a scheme of theorizing which is reflexive at
the level of the totality (in contrast to say NIST
whose reflexivity was a partial refinement of tech-
nique in a generally orthodox scheme), and thereby to
locate itself in the social processes it seeks to under-
stand and effect.

Generally we take the classical-marxian mode of
enquiry to be engaged: its value orientation suffuses it
and requires effective deployment. The notion of the
unity of theory and practice demands that moral engag-
ment be practically developed and, in regard to this
practicality, it adopts a categorical analysis of its
social situation. It is thus apparent that it is the
antithesis of a 'crude' effort. The self-deluding accom-
odation to the demands of the status quo evidenced by
the orthodox is rejected in favour of an explicitly
revolutionary praxis. Yet, although it may be the anti-
thesis of 'crude'; it does not thereby lay claim to some
position from which it can be free of the circumstances
of its construction and thus general in application.
It is thoroughly reflexive and therefore locates itself self-consciously in society and history. It is
this reflexivity that is the basis of its denials of
any approximation to the 'crude'. That position is
turned inside-out. Thus it would claim to be the most
fruitful mode of analysis and always practical. The
history of marxian analyses should, in the light of
this conception of it, appear as a history of the
circumstances of theorizing. Marxian theorizing, we
would claim, should always appear as circumstance
specific and problem centred; and if it does not then
we may suspect that something has gone awry.

Palma identifies three major efforts of marxian
analysis of the exchange of 'rich' and 'poor'. (a) The
efforts of Marx and Engels themselves who, reports
Palma treat "capitalism as a historically progressive
system ... which will spread through the backward nations
by a continual process of destruction and replacement
of pre-capitalist structures" (15). (b) The efforts of the original theorists of imperialism, schemes presented in the circumstances of attempts to grasp Russia's situation as a 'backward' state. Capitalism is taken as progressive, but altered in its effects by the dictates of monopoly, and by the 1920's the emphasis has switched to the idea that post-colonial change might be blocked by metropolitan monopoly capital and local bourgeoisie. (c) The 'neo-marxism' of the post-second world war period: capitalism is no longer taken as progressive; in the metropolitan centres crisis management seems to offer to guarantee an irrational longevity, and the peripheral areas are condemned to subordinate incorporation. The political implications for the 'poor' are of disengagement from world capitalism and the pursuit of planned socialism.

Thus in respect of what Palma identifies as the third marxian attempt to grasp the relations of centres/peripheries of world capitalism we confront the last group of theorists to appear in our reconstruction of the post war career of 'development-studies': the 'neo-marxists'. In respect of this group we may note that we treat the major efforts: that is, the orthodoxy of 'neo-marxism', as it were. Palma distinguishes three lines; a Baran-inspired line; a revision of ECLA (he cites Furtado), and a third in the work of Cardoso. We treat the first of these.

In respect of the idea of progress affirmed by the 'neo-marxists', we can report that it is the broadest of those instanced in the career of 'development-studies'. It is also integral to their analyses. Thus with Baran, the 'father' of this approach, a notion of economic surplus is used and social forms are ranked according to how humane its allocation. Monopoly capitalism with its militarism, imperialism, and consumerism is deemed irrational. The impact of monopoly capitalism in its peripheral areas is indicated by noting its misuse of economic surplus: subordinate incorporation results and the possibility of an autonomous capitalism and thereafter some higher social form is blocked. The
whole is an argument for socialist planning as a political alternative route to economic and social rationality. With the peripheral areas this requires dis-engagement and in Frank this is read straightforwardly as socialist revolution.

The extent to which this 'neo-marxism' is actually marxist is a matter of sharp debate. The critics, on the left, tend to suggest that the schemes of the 'father', Baran, are those of an 'idealist left wing Keynesian': aggregative economics coupled with the sentiments of a liberal reformer. Again, in this line, Palma notes of Frank that his effort is orthodox in that it tries to build a 'mechanico-formal' model of the underdeveloped areas of the periphery. The extent to which their efforts manage to be problem-specific and reflexive is thus called into question; there is, it seems, suspicion of a retrogressive collapse toward the descriptive-general.

This raises a crucial and difficult issue (that is): how close does 'neo-marxism' come to being classical marxian social theoretic engagement? The question spills over from being a simple report on where 'neo-marxism' sits in terms of our career of the idea of progress, or our definition of the 'crude', and raises issues which anticipate directly the central concerns of our concluding chapters. The matter of the precise nature of a social theoretic enquiry and the proper limits of the efforts of the western academic in respect of questions about the Third World we shall leave until these final chapters. However for present purposes we would affirm that 'neo-marxism' has the richest idea of progress and deploys the subtlest scheme of analysis as it treats the world historical development of the capitalist system.

4.0 Concluding note: some criticisms rebutted. It might be objected that having at the outset of the chapter decried the habit of lodging proforma statements of values we have proceeded to offer just such a statement, and moreover a somewhat grandiose one. We
reply that in what is a complex and densely considered area any brief treatment of these issues is liable to appear unsatisfactory in this way. However we do extend the treatment of the politico-ethical into the substantive material that is to be our concern, and in these substantive histories the issue of the theorist’s engagement recurs.

In respect of the politico-ethical material presented, it might be objected that we are guilty of an embarrassing derivative simplicity and would have done well to have left these matters to those whose academic business they are. We reply that this appeal to intellectual compartmentalism is typically orthodox and is a prejudice we do not share. Confronting matters of the Third World entails a breadth of treatment and thus the sligh ting observation that we are borrowing from the work of others is simply fatuous – of course we are, what else is there to do?

These two lines of objection can come together in a claim that our effort here is over-general, and that the idea of progress appears in countless forms. This last point is true, but we would reply that we have tried to trace the career of the idea of progress and to present its scope. We have tried to identify the notions available to the classic political economists and the founding fathers of sociology in the 19th century. Subsequent variation – national sociologies, or particular streams of thought or schools of social theorists – we have not treated; rather we have confronted the matter of the instantiation of the idea of progress in the post-war career of ‘development-studies’. We have established, it is hoped, that ‘development’ has to be taken as a politico-ethical notion and not a technical one; this stance entails acknowledging a distinct range of issues in respect of social theory which are not within the usual realm of the orthodox.
Section Two: The 'Positivists'

Introductory remarks to Section Two.

The period we now treat is that which encompasses the 'pre-Seers consensus' referred to by Ehrensaft(1): this 'consensus' is the theme which is most prominent in 'development-studies' up until, roughly, the mid-sixties and it may be conveniently termed 'positivist'. We take it to comprise two distinguishable streams: an earlier somewhat general statement, exemplified in the 1951 U.N. report(2), and a subsequent rather more distinctly US effort that elaborates this line. Each line is presented in a separate chapter.

Historically, the division of the period treated in Section Two flows from our view of the behaviour of the developed areas to the non-developed areas. We can explain, briefly, as follows. From Brookfield we draw the observation that aid flows to the Third World did not become significant until the mid-1950's; prior to that "international development aid remained quite small"(3). Thus for some ten years after the end of the Second World War the developed nations with, in the 'West' certainly, all the experience of a remarkable recovery of economic health did little it seems. That they might have been expected to be more active is indicated in Brookfield's observation that 'development' had been on the Allies' 'agenda' since 1942 when the Japanese conquered SE Asia and promoted locals into 'government'(4). Yet if the inaction is perhaps curious, then the occasion for activity is illustrative of much of the rationale and spirit of the developed areas' involvement in the Third World. According to Zeylstra(5) it is the distribution of aid by the USSR in 1954 that provokes the USA into raising aid expenditure.

Thus in the period 1943-55 aid is largely internal to the developed areas and it is only from 1955 that the attention of the 'rich' turns outwards to the Third World. Implicitly then in this first period of the establishment of the orthodoxy of 'development-studies'
the demands of nascent Third World nationalisms and the few 'new nations' established in this period are downgraded in importance. And historically we have the start of the efforts of the Allies to come to agreement about the ordering of the post-war economic and political world. After the arrival of the USSR on the aid scene and after the declarations of the Bandung Conference the eyes of the theorists turned outwards, and the demands of nationalist developmentalism were acknowledged in the doctrines of modernization.

In Chapter Three we treat the earlier efforts, and from this period we take as a central event the institution of Marshall Aid and the European Recovery Programme. This lets us present what we take to be the essential idea of the 'positivist' orthodoxy, that is, 'intervention'. This idea we unpack and this permits us to identify as the practical core of orthodox 'intervention' the three principles of (1) growth, both as theory and as doctrine, (2) planning, (3) aid. These three, we will argue, may be taken to constitute the skeleton of 'positivist' development theory from its inception, in the wake of the Second World War, to its 'flowering' at the time of the Kennedy administration. The theoretical products of this time may be characterized loosely as the response of specialists to quickly moving events. Notions of 'growth' were constructed out of existing economic doctrine and used as general theories whereby dealings with 'client' states might be legitimated. The period is dominated, intellectually, by 'positive economic science'; the other members of the family of the human sciences are cast in the role of 'under-labourers'.

In Chapter Four we consider the circumstances surrounding aid competition with the USSR: the 'Cold-War' bulks large in this period. At this time, reports Brookfield, the economists felt that they had solved the problem of growth; and the notion of 'modernization' allows acknowledgement of differences in basic circumstances of the non-developed and, simultaneously, affirms the pattern of life of rich nations as the model.
"Confidence in the inevitability of progress rose steadily from 1945 to a peak around 1960" (6) argues Brookfield. The time of Kennedy's 'new frontier' is taken to mark the high tide of positivist conceit, and thereafter the collapse is general. It is observed that the optimism is now hard to credit and difficult to see in context.

In Chapter Four we treat two main lines of enquiry: (1) the revision of the essentially pessimistic message of Harrod-Domar by Solow and the emergence of a neo-classical theory of growth which identifies the process as natural, self-regulating, and self-sustaining; (2) the concomitant relative emancipation of the sociologist from the status of 'under-labourer'. The treatment of 'non-economic aspects' of economic growth broadens into something entailing more of a 'master-scientist' role for the sociologist with ideas of 'modernization'. The themes in economics, sociology and the other human sciences are blended by Rostow in a widely influential book which we note in order to return from abstract to concrete issues.

In Chapter One we presented the notion of ideology as our methodological key to these substantive efforts. Here we can indicate how that key is to be used. Thus Dobb (7), observing that the history of economic thought reveals that 'history conditions theories', asks how this is so. He answers in terms of a dialectic between current practice and presently accepted theory, both having their own dynamic. Current practice throws up problems (8) that are shaped by their social context, of which he notes that "this context itself is a complex mixture and interaction of accepted ideas and systems of thought ...... and the problems (8) presented by current events and practical situations" (9). Conversely, 'thought' is not to be taken as a passive recipient of problems presented to it: "current problems are something created as much by thought-inspired human action upon an existing situation as by the given objective
(but changing) situation itself"(IO). The source of the medium of criticism, theoretical language, is the body of existing theory re-worked as seems appropriate. Consequently "new ideas are necessarily shaped in part by the antithetical relation in which they stand to the old"(II).

This presents the exchange of theorists and circumstances in a relatively simple sociology of knowledge fashion. We make practical use of the schema by organising our substantive analyses around the sequence: milieu, those most general explanations available to the theorist; the 'limits of the thinkable'; demands, the political and problem-relevant expectations made of the theorist; resources, the intellectual resources available to the theorist, namely the constructs of the various specialist disciplines; and finally the product, the completed effort itself. We may note, finally, that whilst this sequence is the key to our procedure in respect of our analyses of the distinguishable efforts we treat, it is not followed slavishly. And indeed in these analyses the sequence is submerged in the looser Dobb-derived scheme of the dialectic of the dynamic of society (milieu, demands) and the dynamic of theory (resources, products).
Chapter Three: The crystallization of the positivist orthodoxy, 1943-1955.

1.0 Dynamic of Society: the occasion of theorizing.

We will begin with some details of the broad history of the period. What we want to identify primarily is (1) the backdrop to the pronouncements of the economic orthodoxy of the early post-war era. From this (2) we will go on to identify the fundamental structure of that interventionist schema, treating the notions of growth, planning, and aid. This treatment is complemented by (3) notes on the initial efforts of the orthodoxy to extend their theorizing into the realm of matters of the Third World.

This 'backdrop' to the emergence of the first efforts of 'development theory' is complex, and our treatment will rely heavily on the work of a small group of historians and economists. The central historical event is a crisis of enormous proportions, the Second World War, and through this period the rivalries of the US and UK are played out. Around the figure of Keynes the two sides manoeuvre for advantage, until with the abrupt ending of 'Lend-Lease' in 1945 the power of the UK is curbed and, in Kiernan's phrase, "it was America's turn to be carried up to the mountain top and shown the kingdoms of the earth" (12). We can identify three elements in this backdrop: these are (1) issues of economic theorizing and the rise of Keynesianism, (2) matters of the multiple conflicts of the 'Big Three' and (3) the reconstruction of Western Europe and Marshall Aid.

1.1 Economic theory and the Keynesian revolution.

From the discussions of the so called 'Keynesian revolution' we draw three points. First, the inter-war period sees the occasion of the Great Depression—an event which could not happen according to neo-classical doctrine. Secondly, there is the impact of the apparent contrast of the success of the USSR's planned economy; and thirdly, there is the radical overhaul of neo-classicism effected by Keynes.
The economic historian, and Keynesian, Clairmonte, traces the history of the disintegration of economic liberalism. The point of departure of his study is an enquiry into the extent to which 'British Integral Liberalism', 'Ricardianism', or the 'classical approach' might be taken to be a part of the ideological superstructure of the emergent bourgeoisie of British capitalism in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. It is taken to be just that: 'Ricardianism' is an aggressive doctrine of and for the bourgeoisie. This line is familiar: it is detailed for example by Hobsbawm. It is noted that the actual period of genuinely free trade was brief, and that it was the dominant position of the British economy in world trade that permitted the reification of notions of liberalism into a self-serving and enclosed formal system.

Now whilst the doctrines of liberalism suited (for a while) the situation of the UK, their relevance to the problems of other areas was far from evident. In fact the disintegration of liberalism may be taken to start very early. Indeed it is to the strategic requirements of the new American republic that Clairmonte traces the criticisms that he makes culminate in Keynes. The views of Hamilton with regard to the nurturing of local industries are taken to be a formative influence upon List, of whom it is observed, that "underlining the pitfalls of integral liberalism he emerges as the leading protagonist of purposive policy interventionism".

If the fall of economic liberalism is taken to be protracted, then its demise in the 1930's is seen to be unequivocal; thereafter, claims Clairmonte, "we see the mushrooming of every species of restrictionism with the concomitant proliferation of massive aggregations of power and increasing state intrusion". However, so far as the neo-classical doctrinaires are concerned it was not the mechanisms of the market that had been shown to be at fault; rather, it was interference with them. This illusion is located (on the part of UK theorists at least) by Clairmonte in the familiar mis-apprehension of the UK economy in the period 1870-1914: what is
taken as a golden age is in fact a period of industrial decline masked by receipts from empire.

To this phenomenon of justificatory ideas parting company with reality is added an element hinted at by Lichtheim (17): that is the spectre of Bolshevism. If the issue for the West and Third World is now how rather than whether to plan, as Clairmonte would claim, then in his view "it was basically the irrepressible and unprecedented tempo of industrial and scientific advance in those formerly funereal half-Asian, half-European nations of the Tsarist empire within forty years, two disastrous wars, encirclement and unconcealed hostility, which dramatised the viability of the planning mechanism .... the seminal fact is that the impact of Soviet planning left its ineradicable impress on the economic policies of many countries" (18).

This line is confirmed by Kurihara's investigation of the impact of history on Keynesian theory. Two events are cited, "namely (a) the establishment of the first centrally planned economy in Russia, after World War I and (b) the Great Depression of the 1930's" (19). Kurihara takes Keynes to have plotted a middle course through the alternatives of laissez-faire and authoritarian intervention. As regards the theses established by Keynes, three are identified as flowing from the experience of Depression and Bolshevism. They are: (1) the notion of depression equilibrium; (2) deficit finance and the idea of the multiplier; and (3) the compatibility of full employment and liberty.

(1) In the 1930's the economic orthodoxy rested upon the work of the 'equilibrium theorists', men such as Jevons, Marshall, Walras, and Pareto. Setting marxists and socialists to one side, amongst the criticisms voiced, Sraffa (in 1926) had argued, in effect, that the notion of 'perfect competition' was untenable as each firm not merely competes but seeks to differentiate itself in the market. Ruling out 'perfect competition' denies the possibility of a general theory of equilibrium; it thus cuts at the heart of the
project of the orthodox neo-classical theorists. Attempts at repair by Robinson ('imperfect competition') and Chamberlin ('monopolistic competition') in 1933 are deemed by the economic historian Napoleoni to fail. The contribution of Keynes to this debate is introduced thus: "Parallel with the revision of the theory of market forms another criticism was levelled at the theory of economic equilibrium. This criticism concerned the statement that a competitive economy, left to itself, will automatically achieve the full employment of resources in general and of the labour force in particular" (20). Keynes shows that it is perfectly possible for economies to go into depression equilibrium whereby factors of production were so used that optimum configurations were not achieved. The neo-classical scheme argued this was impossible.

(2) The question follows, what conditions if any will ensure full employment? The answers to this question provide for a new idea of the government's role in the economy. The laissez-faire scheme had been attacked on three points: (a) unemployment, (b) misuse of available resources, and (c) trend to monopoly. Policy proposals flow from this view: generally, if the level of total expenditure falls below that necessary to sustain full employment, then the short-fall is to be made up by government spending. This in turn rests on the two notions of the 'multiplier' and 'deficit financing'. Thus the role for a government is sharply altered in line with revision of the established conception of the market.

(3) This counter-cyclical role with regard to unemployment does not necessarily alter any fundamentals in the system. Policy proposals which might flow from charges of mis-use of resources or mal-distribution of income would involve more radical change. So Keynes reassured doubters that full employment policies did not entail significant diminution of ordinarily understood liberties (though we might note that the political import of Keynes has been regarded as deeply ambiguous).
What we can take from all this is the observation that the work of Keynes grows out of two circumstances: first, the situation of protected monopoly capitalism working at greatly reduced capacity whilst simultaneously having massive unemployment, and the concurrent manifest theoretical absurdity of the rump of British Integral Liberalism; secondly, the combined encouragement and awful warning of the apparently successful efforts at planning in the USSR. To this we may add that with Keynes the economic orthodoxy was very sharply overhauled, resulting in a style of government intervention that for many years after the war was taken to have tamed the system's periodic crises.

1.2 The political and economic context for post-war thinking about development.

Having looked at the roots of the Keynesian enterprise, we now go on to indicate the initial set of political factors which gave form to those subsequent efforts to make use of it in guiding policy in regard to 'development'. The crucial considerations here revolve around the determination of the USA to order the post-war world in a fashion acceptable to itself. The gist of this element of our study is that the USA, under the guise of an enlightened liberalism and couched in the internationalist rhetoric associated with (most familiarly) the UN organisation, established in the period 1943-1947 its economic hegemony over the 'West'.

The first schemes of help for developing countries operate within this frame, the 'Pax Americana'. Of the war aims of the USA Kolko has observed that: "In considering world war II, and especially the years 1943-45, there are three major issues or themes which subsume many, if not most, of the concerns of those in Washington who thought about the problems of American war and peace aims. First was the question of the left which is to say, the disintegration of the pre-war social systems and the growth of revolutionary movements and political upheaval everywhere in the world. Next
was the problem of the Soviet Union, which at times appeared very much connected with the issue of the left. Finally there was the issue of Great Britain, invariably set in the context of the future of the world economy and its present and future relationship to the US. It is argued that the Americans, once they were in the war, quickly began to establish a series of economic war aims. This task is reported as falling to the Department of State, under Cordell Hull, a disciple of Wilson's laissez-faire liberalism and a man marked, as was Keynes, by the experience of the depression. Yet Hull drew opposing conclusions: tariff blocks and controls were the road to economic ruin and war, and the solution was laissez-faire. Kolko wryly notes: "The identification of the interests of the world and future peace with Hull's doctrines and American prosperity looked more and more like the classic pursuit of national self-interest in an ill fitting wrapper of internationalist rhetoric" (24).

It is reported that there were two major elements in US thinking, finance and relief/trade. The discussion of finance was initiated in 1942 with a British submission prepared by Keynes, envisaging the growth of world trade with an international fund to smooth over deficits and channel investment money through the world economy. To this the US replied with the White plan (White was no. 2 in the Treasury), and debate revolved around the control of these proposed institutions and the ground rules of their operation. The debate continued right up to July 1944 and Bretton Woods: the British eventually agreeing, having removed the most blatantly pro-US elements. However the IMF and IBRD were "far closer in their principles to the US scheme than any other" (25). Bretton Woods established the US view of the post-war economy; that is, one run by business on business principles.

As regards trade/relief, Kolko takes the view that UNRRA, set up in late 1943, was seen as a temporary necessity and was only ever incidental to the pursuit
of US interests. The overall view was that "emergency reconstruction and relief programs would exist, but they would be temporary and solved essentially as a by-product of the creation of a rational world economy, based on liberalism and the Open Door, that assumed the general interest of the world was synonymous with that of the US"(26). These notes, derived mainly from the work of Kolko, serve to correct the common-sense view of this period which would have it that the US and UK were in close harmony and that only the recalcitrant behaviour of the USSR prevented the establishment of a new world order(27). In respect of the relations between 'east' and 'west', Fleming(28) argues persuasively, for all his brittle moralism, that the period of the 'Grand Alliance' was a wholly untypical episode in the history of these relations. Lichtheim too speaks of the struggle between "communism and anti-communism which had been going on all over Europe since 1917"(29). Kolko traces the evolution of US thinking through the war and subsequent occupation of Europe, and corrects in persuasive detail the orthodox notion of the westward surge of godless communism. In relating the history of the western allies' occupation of Italy (a crucial precedent), France, Belgium and Greece (a brutal example), it is clearly established that the western allies did not lend their support to local democratic groups (which usually included communist elements) but instead imposed governments and leaders acceptable to themselves. Truman's later March 1947 declaration of 'Cold War' effectively fixes the division of Europe into two occupied camps.

By the end of the war the US had committed itself to organising a counter-revolution: "the old order of pre-war capitalism and oligarchy with which the US identified .... was dying in the colonial world and a dependent China; it committed suicide in Eastern Europe, and the US could refurbish it in temporarily acceptable ways only in Western Europe"(30). Kolko continues: "Only the US had the power to engage fully in international counter-revolution and sustain the forces of conservatism
for prolonged periods and it was this militant intervention into the affairs of literally every area of the world that set the pattern for post-war politics. By 1945 Washington’s decision to undertake that role was an unquestioned postulate in America’s plans for the future of its power in the world” (31). The style in which the US was later to approach matters of development was also clear. Again Kolko: "America’s foreign policy at the end of World War II necessitated the ability and desire to employ loans, credits and investments everywhere to create a world economic order to its own desires" (32). We shall see that 'growth theories' flowing out of an authoritative and instrumentalist stance were clearly theoretically congruent with this dominating political need. It is clear that Streeter’s choice of Marshall Aid as one of the roots of 'development-theory' is apposite; the Europman Recovery Programme (ERP) evidently encapsulates a wealth of tensions, and it is to the history of post-war Europe that we now turn.

1.3 The economic recovery of Western Europe. Streeter (33) argues that it was the dramatic recovery of Europe’s economy that lent credence to the notion that deliberate intervention in an economic system to raise its level of activity was possible. Postan (34) confirms this reading of the response to European recovery; at the outset he declares that "the unique feature of the post-war economy in the West is growth". He identifies four phases. The first being 'de-mobilization and readjustment' as economies are shifted off war footings, during 1945-48. Postan notes that it was not until 1948 that the majority of European nations recovered economically to their 1939 levels (35). The second phase identified is that of 'recovery proper', dated from 1948-53, the period when the dominant economic/political pattern of the post-war period was established. Internal factors are cited, in particular measures to control inflation. Turning to external factors Postan reveals the orthodoxy of his views: thus he says "By far the most dramatic, as well as the most effective contribution to recovery was the
announcement in the summer of 1947 and the subsequent passing by the American Congress of the so-called 'Marshall Plan' for foreign assistance by which the USA undertook to provide economic aid to European countries and thus under-wrote the costs of their economic reconstruction.

The nature of the ERP can now be considered. The views of the US government may be approached via the views of an academic proponent of the ERP, Seymour Harris. In 1948 Harris produced a book with the title, 'The European Recovery Programme'. At the time he was professor of economics at Harvard, and we may take him to represent the Keynesian element in the US establishment. In the justification of ERP, crisis in Europe and fear of communism figure prominently. Thus Harris says, "Self-interest rather than charity inspired ERP. Frightened by the onward movement of communism, which feeds on distress, the American people rallied to the support of the Marshall Plan... Americans realized also that economic recovery in Western Europe would rebound favourably on the American economy". In addition Harris notes the pressure of particular US economic groups which had surpluses on their hands, for example farmers. The mixture of both political and economic aspects is evident.

Politically the major event of this period was the promulgation of the 'Truman Doctrine' which was presented in a speech to Congress on March 12, 1947. Its essence was that political change was to be arrested: "Truman spoke for the bulk of American conservatives and allied himself with reaction around the globe". The Marshall Plan followed on from this stance, and in Western Europe the aid administrations' powers were used, reports Fleming, "to discourage social reform... the effect of our economic intervention in Europe has been not only to oust the communists from the governments but to put the socialists out or decrease their influence."
economics and economic theory (which Harris treats in that he attempts to settle doubts about the propriety and efficacy of ERP). In respect of the economics, Zeylstra's following remark is instructive: "For the first time the Truman Doctrine contained a concept of international aid based on the need to promote a suitable rate of growth in the receiving countries, a prototype thus of modern development aid"(41). Zeylstra passes by the use of 'to promote' and 'rate of growth' without comment, his target being development aid. But as we have seen with Keynes, that growth could be described theoretically and actually promoted as a matter of policy were the greater novelties. Yet Zeylstra's words reveal both the essence of the orthodox notion that specific policy-guided interventions could be made to secure a targeted growth rate; and the fact that such ideas have become a part of the common coin of 'development-studies'.

We can complete this brief review of ERP by taking note of the views of those who explicitly run together economics and politics. Postan for example tends to let the politics take care of themselves: a 'neutral' treatment -ERP was a source of finance. Yet we have seen with Kolko that the issue of the manner in which European re-construction would be effected was by no means simply a technical matter of finance. The questions of the post-war shape of Europe and the division of Germany were closely bound up with issues of reparations, reconstruction, and access for the US to European markets. The US consistently opposed the breaking up of Germany or using its industry to supply European reconstruction. The US had surplus capacity and finance and needed to use it. In Europe, Kolko reports that the divergence of views, in regard to the nature of the post-war world and the role and form of bodies such as IMF or IBRD, between the US and its allies grew progressively more acute. By the end of the war there was no agreement, and the US imposed as and when it could its own views.
Returning to Postan's history, we can note that he sketches the backdrop and novelty of the post-war period in comparison to the depression years. The story in Postan's hands is not so much one of design as of a dam bursting. Thus he says of the potential for recovery in Europe that: "shortages of goods had been accumulating for years, the needs of reconstruction were great and urgent, the reserves of unemployed resources were immense" (42). It is pointed out that a surge of activity was to be expected: "Is it to be wondered at that the initial momentum of economic growth should have been so strong?" (43). It is the fact that following this understandable surge growth is sustained that is novel. Postan goes on: "In all European countries economic growth became a universal creed and a common expectation to which governments were expected to conform" (44). The pre-war economic policy orthodoxy had stressed financial probity; that growth was preferred and that policies were fashioned to that end is the novelty of the post-war, post-Keynes period. Thus at back of European doctrines of growth there is "a confluence of tributaries, the policy of high aggregate demand and full employment, the welfare state, the defence of the west, obligations to underdeveloped countries and American pressures and influences" (45). From all this it is clear that the extension of post-war interventionist techniques to matters of the development of the Third World was something other than the straightforward exercise which studies of that time seem to have taken it to be. The extraction from this tangled web of a simple 'programme for development' has been dismissively labelled by Brookfield as the pursuit of a "development vending machine: you put in the money, press the button and get growth" (46). However whilst the enterprise may have been ill-conceived, even naive, it nonetheless has an elegant and deeply persuasive model of explanation at back of it. In our next section we will try to draw this out.
I.4 Summary of section I.
The above we take to outline the environment from which the early post-war orthodoxy, subsequently deployed in treating matters of the development of the Third World, emerged. The history presents, albeit perhaps in an overly general style, the 'structure of the possible' for the post-war theorists. The possibilities opened by the theoretical work of Keynes are squeezed between the twin pressures of popular(left) demand and US determination to hold the line against change. Ordered reconstruction and development is now taken to be within the grasp of governments, but the ruling factor in any such efforts is the overwhelming economic and military power of the USA. Interventionist activity is subsumed, paradoxically, under the imposed rubric of economic liberalism.

The shift from this point to the treatment of the Third World can be effected by citing the work of Streeten, who argues that the subject 'development-studies' has its origins in two general sets of thoughts: problems of resources and people are taken to be urgent in view of the population explosion and soluble in the light of the success of post-war European recovery; secondly, political change in the form of the rise of new states in the Third World and the cold war increases the concern of the 'West' for the 'proper' development of these areas. The Marshall Plan is thus an appropriate symbol for the start of 'development-studies'. More technically we see that out of the set of descriptions/explanations available to theorists in the wake of depression, war and cold war, the demands of the reform and defence of western capitalism crystallize out three novel theoretical devices. Thus the explanatory theory, the overarching and legitimating construction that permits and guides action oriented to development problems, is found in 'growth-theory'. This will be our first concern below; our second will be the elucidation of the schemes and techniques whereby intervention is organised, that is, planning. Finally as a corollary of one and two, we look at the matter of the execution of such intervention schemes as may be prepared; that is, aid.
2.0 Dynamic of Theory I: the nature of the orthodoxy

The notion of 'intervention'.

Our treatment rests on the claim that out of the melange of theoretical possibility identified by Keynes, political necessity as established principally by the US, and example provided by European recovery, the theorists of the orthodoxy distil an intellectually coherent and politically relevant scheme. As Zeylstra puts it, "when finally the economists made common cause with the politicians in world wide promotion of development, this happened not only because the latter seized and exploited ideas of the former, but also as the outcome of the economists' own course of theoretical thinking" (47). In Shaw's (48) Gramscian-derived terms these economists were 'organic intellectuals'. More familiarly, Zeylstra remarks that, "Since Keynes the economists had grown familiar with normative theory, with identifying themselves with the problems of the political scientist and the public administrator" (49). Thus the distillate, so to say, of the period was a variety of 'policy science'.

The term 'policy science' we take from Fay who uses it to designate the assumed product of mainstream social science, such that in response to the question—why have a social science?—the answer is made that it permits the rational ordering of decisions in complex modern societies; or more bluntly it "will enable men to control their social environment" (50). It is clear that our notion of 'intervention' as a label summing up the orthodoxy of this time is apposite, and further we may claim that it designates the substantive core of this 'conventional wisdom'.

If we take the notion of 'intervention' and unpack it, we can make a preliminary identification of what the idea presupposes and entails. Thus if we take any particular occasion of an intervention then, commonsensically, it might be understood as a 'deliberate action whose objective is to bring about a particular change in some array and thereby achieve or approach a preferred state of affairs'. Here we seem
to have three basic elements: the suppositions that 
(1) there is something to be acted upon, an object, 
(2) that it will respond, and in a predictable fashion, 
and (3) the idea that the intervention is accomplished 
by an actor in a precise manner according to some 
clear set of expectations.

There are two related points to note out of this. 
Firstly, that the story above requires that the actor 
confront (or constitute for his present purposes) an 
object; that is, there is implicit in the ordinary 
notion of intervention a subject–object dualism. Now, 
whether this dualism is taken as a moment in some more 
general procedure or as a fixed assumption is a matter 
of the wider philosophy of science into which a partic-
ular theorist's object drops. We can see this more 
clearly if we go on to look at another element from 
above, that of a predictable response. For 'critical-
theory' the products of the thinker are finally 'auth-
enticated' by their being taken up by groups within 
society. That is, the critical theorist is in the busi-
ness of making sense, and this being so the element 
of 'subject-object' is but a moment in a longer all-
embracing process of theoretician's meditations and 
their dissemination and translation – or not – into 
practice. On the other hand so far as empiricist 
positivism is concerned the dualism is a fixed assump-
tion. There is an array of objects and (relatively) 
detached from them the actor, whose intervention alters 
in some way that array of objects. That there are 
objects whose behaviour is amenable to intervention 
such that its result is knowable beforehand entails 
that empiricist positivism subscribes to an idea of 
the exchange between theorists and reality as issuing 
in description in terms of causes, rather than, as 
with 'critical theory', tendencies. The products of 
the empiricist thinker are 'validated' by their 
corresponding to the facts. In general we can claim 
that positivism as a variety of empiricism entails 
an ontology of things, separate from other things.
Thus Strawson (53) constructs his 'descriptive metaphysics' and identifies as fundamental elements of our ontology two sorts of things, material things and persons (a special sort of material thing).

If the above is true, then clearly the 'interventions' of the critical theorist are not those of the orthodox empiricist positivist. Those of the former are interpretive-directive (moral persuasion, broadly) whilst those of the latter are causal-descriptive (manipulation of objects), and in some measure these ideals of explanation flow from the monistic/dualistic metaphysics affirmed. Related to this is the matter of our second observation upon our 'definition', and this concerns the form of explanation required by the demand for/pursuit of causal explanations. It is clear that for an intervention to be successful it must be a knowing intervention, that is, in the right place, at the right time and of the right kind. Thus manipulative intervention demands a general set of explanations which will tell the actor or agent how the object in question behaves in the absence of intervention and in the presence of specified interventions. In ordinary parlance, what is needed is a 'theory'; but it is not that simple. The role and status of 'theory' and 'models' and so on, on the one hand, and political and social practice on the other, and the nature of their relationship are much debated questions. Here we shall be content with noting a few views from economists; which, as we are interested at present in establishing the nature of the set of explanations of the inhabitants of the orthodoxy is both appropriate and a legitimate temporary evasion of these difficult problems.

From Napoleoni's history we draw the important example of 'deductive empiricism'. Robbins publishes in 1932 a book which argues that economics is to be seen as a science which derives its propositions from a set of particular (obvious) assumptions. These are "certain simple and indisputable facts of experience relating to the way in which the scarcity of goods,
which is the subject of economics, is actually revealed in everyday life"(54). The method follows: "if these premises are accepted as corresponding to reality, the generalisations economics achieves by way of deduction also correspond to reality"(55). The situation is thus of a deductive core erected upon a bed of formally expressed commonplaces , issuing in complex descriptions of reality, and having remote consequences (deduced) taken as true of reality. Napoleoni reports that Robbins 'deductive empiricism' was the methodological counterpart of equilibrium economics and that it was an influential text in the years before World War Two.

The general drift of subsequent reflection upon the grounding and procedures of economics within the mainstream would seem to be one of a relaxation of this strict line, There is a shift from 'deductive empiricism' to what Hindess will dub 'epistemology of models', where realism is crucial. In respect of 'growth theory', Harrod plays a central role. Of his work Robinson notes that he falls into the familiar and unhappy procedure of deriving policy prescriptions of great precision from premises of great abstractness. Thus she writes: "It is a common vice of present day economic argument to jump from a highly abstract piece of analysis straight to prescriptions for policy, without going through the intermediate stage of examining how far the assumptions in the analysis fit the facts of the actual situation. There is a big gap between Mr. Harrod's ingenious and instructive manipulation of his three G's and the conditions of any actual economy"(56).

In 1953 Friedman(57) publishes a famous text wherein he argues that the realism of model builders' assumptions is not an interesting question; instead, economists should look to the success or otherwise of the predictions made from them. Developing this line with reference to Popper, Hutchison has argued (58) that economics can at last 'grow out of' its apriorism: the task would become the improvement of the predictions routinely made in social life, a collection as it were of extremely soph-
isticated rules of thumb. Yet in general it would seem that these arguments are overly subtle, work within economics repeatedly collapses into a common sense that is straightforwardly empiricist, even though it might be an attenuated strain compared to Robbins.

Thus Solow has proposed to regard growth theory as a parable whereby typical economic relations may be displayed; and it is within the empiricist frame that economics sought to fashion the stratagems for intervention demanded by political events. What they came up with, and refined to great levels of sophistication and politico-social generality, was 'growth theory'.

2.1 Growth theory: 'intervention' legitimated.

We begin with the origins of growth theory in Keynes's work. We have already seen how Keynes effects a sharp reformulation of neo-classicism; his effort, organised around the pressing need (both practical and intellectual) to resolve the problem of treatment of unemployment, offers a challenge to neo-classicism at several points as we have seen. However, whilst Keynes' analysis issues in conclusions distinctly unpalatable to neo-classicism, he nonetheless remained within the ambit of neo-classicism. It is only later (e.g. Robinson 1962) that the idea that Keynes has re-invented political economy is entertained.

Against this background Harrod produces his essay of 1939 and the fuller collection of 1948. Kurihara notes that Harrod (with Domar later) "established growth economics as a going concern on the foundations of Keynes' saving-investment theory"(61), and helps us further by offering a summary of the shift in emphasis and orientation effected by Harrod. "If Keynes effected the transition from micro-analysis (with emphasis on profit maximization for the firm à la Marshallian price theory) to macro-analysis (with emphasis on employment maximization for the whole economy à la General Theory), then Harrod can be credited with effecting the post-Keynesian transition from short run macro-
-statics to long run macro-dynamics. Harrod emphasized the long run importance of the growth-promoting, capacity-increasing aspect of saving, whereas Keynes had concentrated on the employment-impeding, demand-decreasing aspect of saving; Harrod also emphasized investment both as a cause and as an effect of capacity expansion, whereas Keynes has treated investment mainly as a source of effective demand"(62).

It would now be appropriate to look at the H-D (63) model in a little detail and to take note of one major subsequent change. The influence of the H-D model has been extensive: Brookfield notes that it was this theory that "underlay the growth policies actually put into effect"(64). Looking at the model will let us grasp the narrowness of its origin and form; for example Zeylstra describes it, quite accurately, as a "by product of the Keynesian revolution in income and employment theory"(65). The theory of growth is not an easy area for the non-specialist to penetrate; for example Brookfield remarks that the division of efforts into two schools is a "rather fine distinction .... of greater importance to economists than to users of their work"(66). Yet Jones notes that from H-D's work "radically different conclusions have emerged"(67). Thus Brookfield's remark entails either his having misread the import of the technical debate or his tacit agreement with Zeylstra, who has the 'politicians' taking what they wanted out of the work of the economists. He says, "Once confronted with reality in the developing countries the economists began arguing among themselves about aid theories and strategies they preferred leaving to the politicians the opportunity of adhering to the most convenient opinions"(68). However the results of theorizing have been used, it is the case that two 'schools' may be identified. Thus Kregel (69) distinguishes two lines of thought, both revolving around H-D, but with one descending from neo-classical equilibrium theory, whilst the other derives from classical economics via Keynes and Kalecki. This reading is supported, in emphatic terms, by Jones, who reports
that the 'Cambridge school' including Kaldor, Robinson and Sraffa has heavily and persistently criticised the neo-classical schemes represented by Solow and Samuelson at MIT, at Cambridge, Mass. Jones reports that "Few controversies in the history of economic thought have been conducted with so much vigour and, at times, virulence as the series of interconnected debates between the two Cambridges on the concept of capital, and the process of economic growth and technical change" (70). Earlier it is noted that "theories of growth have generated bitter controversy" (71); and when Solow's 1956 reworking of H-D's problem is looked at it is not hard to see why.

Harrod's work is in the style of Keynes, as regards terminology, assumptions and techniques. His essay focuses on "the necessary conditions for equilibrium between aggregate saving and investment in a dynamic economy" (72). The basic proposition is that \( \frac{Ga}{s/v} \) where 'Ga' is the actual rate of growth of National Income, 's' is marginal propensity to save and 'v' is the marginal capital-output ratio. This 'fundamental relation' (73) can define a growth path if it can be linked to a statement of the entrepreneur's estimations. The notion of 'warranted growth' is introduced, it seems, to fulfill the Keynesian role of entrepreneur. The entrepreneur invests, and his investment today depends upon his estimation of tomorrow's possibilities. If he is to be reassured that his reading of the economy is correct then \( Ga \) will have to be equal to \( Gw \). In addition to \( Ga \) and \( Gw \) Harrod has \( Gn \), which is the 'natural' rate of growth flowing from given rises in population.

If these are put together we have the first major conclusion to issue from his work. Thus; "If, by coincidence, the actual rate of growth equalled the warranted rate, which itself equalled the rate of growth of the labour force, then steady growth at full employment would occur" (75). Harrod thinks it extremely unlikely (76), and as Jones says "this conclusion is thoroughly Keynesian in spirit: there is no reason to
believe that full employment equilibrium will be attained"(77). This being the case it is noted that all subsequent growth theory has been aimed at evading Harrod's thesis(78).

The second line of thought on growth models comes from the USA and falls into the tradition of neoclassicism. It is this line that is most used; it is the "dominant method of growth economics"(79). It may be taken to begin with a paper by Solow(1956) which was aimed explicitly at the first of Harrod's 'problems', the difficulty of 'getting on target'; but in the course of his paper both 'problems' are treated. Solow's theory is constructed in the same fashion as Harrod's; that is, he begins with a series of assumptions and derives a set of conclusions relevant to practice.

The notable features of his model, for our purposes, are the impact his assumptions have on it in comparison to Harrod's assumptions. In fact he contrives to by-pass all the problems presented by Harrod's model. In Harrod the role of entrepreneurial expectation is, following Keynes, of major significance as a source of instability in the system yet Solow chops out entrepreneurial expectation. The other major change concerns the type of production function used, the way capital and labour are fitted into the model. Solow uses a scheme whose import is that warranted and natural rates of growth coincide automatically; the 'first Harrod problem' thus disappears. (80)

Solow's model (or parable) inverts Harrod: the growth path is not only obtainable but economies tend to move towards it. Cigno sums it up. "This model projects the image of a well-ordered and stable society, whose prosperity depends on the thriftiness, inventiveness and technical skill of its members, and where everyone is rewarded according to his contribution to the common good"(81).

We now turn to some criticisms of the H-D procedure. If the foregoing presents the emergence of the formal
explanatory core of the early post-war orthodoxy, now we may ask (1) how does it translate into practice? (in rich areas, in poor areas) and (2) what are the fundamental problems (if any) of going about things in this way? We may answer that as regards the precise form and associated problems of H-D's extension to matters of the Third World, this is a topic for part 3 of this chapter, and for Chapter Four. The relevance to situations of 'rich' we will touch upon in Section three when we look at the disintegration of the orthodoxy. Here we pursue the question of the use of models as the typical frame of the explanatory-justificatory schemes governing 'intervention'. (82). We want to argue (1) that the H-D model not only is not a developed social theory, but cannot be turned into one; (2) that the H-D model must be regarded as an elaboration of common-sense, and as it claims to be something more than this it is thus ideological in a pejorative sense.

(1) That the H-D model is not a developed social theory is readily apparent; it does not claim to be one. However (as Brookfield, Jukes, Streiten and others note) it does underlie the policies put into effect. If this is so then we can say that it is a poor place to start. We can recall our characterization of social theory and indicate how, in comparison, to make sense. Social theorizing, it was suggested, can be seen as the deployment of a morally informed categorical scheme where the categories are (for the theorist) given and value-sloped, and the moral involvement is self-defining and secondary. Now in contrast to the product we might envisage flowing from such an exercise, the H-D effort is defective in two areas. It is 'intrinsically' defective in that it is unreflective. H-D theorists are making a moral intervention in the world and this is not an acknowledged part of their effort. Claims to 'value freedom' are not credible, and equally unsatisfactory are pro-forma statements. The second defect—'extrinsic', as it were—of the H-D model is that its style compounds the errors encouraged by its unreflectiveness. We note three points.
(a) Streeten points out that the formal mode adopted invites a slide from the possibly true claim that 'economic facts' are accessible, quantifiable and manipulable to the wholly false claim that 'economic facts' are somehow 'objective' in a way that political, social or moral considerations are not. It is noted that "though logically fallacious this type of reasoning which attempts to substitute 'objective' criteria for political choices provides an intellectual escape mechanism from difficult or unpleasant political decisions".(83). But, it might be objected, thus far H-D are possibly being held responsible for the sins of those who have used their work; is this not unreasonable? (b) However, the dominant style of economic theorizing out of which background they came lodged claims to factual adequacy; thus Robbins (1932) presents his 'deductive-empiricism'. The assumptions of economics are "certain indisputable facts of experience"..."if these premises are accepted as corresponding to reality the generalisations economics achieves by way of deduction also correspond to reality"..."the admissibility of the premises on which economic science is built cannot, according to Robbins, be doubted since these are simple and obvious propositions"..."they are the object of our everyday experience".(84). (c) The tradition of economics as a deductive science, coupled with Streeten's note in respect of the tendency to equate quantification with objectivity, plus desire of theorists in government to provide policy-informing analyses, issues in an environment that can be seen to be conducive to reading H-D models as, if not reporting fact, then close to it, or (in the same line but with minimal commitment) as helpful in uncovering it.

(2) What then is the status of H-D? Hindess (85) points out that in mathematics a 'model' is a precisely specified set of rules relating one area of mathematical discourse to another. This is a "paradigm case of a theory in which the concept of model has a definite and rigorously defined function"(86). From here on (thinks Hindess, if we have understood him right), things
get worse.

In positivist philosophy of science this intratheoretic relation is altered; a model now details the relation between theoretical machineries and the real world, a set of observations. Hindess takes this to be the substitution of analogies for models. Indeed, claims to the use of models in natural science are taken to be few and implausible.

In the realm of the social sciences the notion of model reaches its nadir. Bauman (1972) and Levi-Strauss (1968) are cited. Bauman is quoted as saying "theorising consists in modelling reality. Theories are models" (87). Hindess comments: "In these lines we have a concise statement of what might be called the epistemology of model building. Knowledge of the world is to be obtained through the construction and manipulation of models" (88). He then delineates, with reference to prior discussions of the role of models in mathematical logic, the consequences of this view. The precisely formulated correspondences of elements of theoretical realms in mathematical logic, or the rigour of the (eventually unsatisfactory) positivist attempt to explicate the relation of theory and observation, are abandoned. Citing Levi-Strauss, he comments that now "theoretical activity consists in the construction of models that are similar in certain 'essential' respects to the empirical domain in question. But how similar is similar and how does one choose amongst the multiplicity of possible models?" (89). It is concluded that: "At its best the epistemology of model building would result in a complex and sophisticated theoretical construct resting on an arbitrary and merely plausible foundation in resemblance" (90).

Returning to the status of H-D, it seems to be fairly clear that the scheme operates within the ambit of what has been called the epistemology of models. Recalling our references to the procedures of Robbins' 'deductive empiricism' we can compare them with those of the epistemology of models. Of these Hindess notes
that "the epistemology of model building is an epistemology in which scientific knowledge is said to be produced through the construction and manipulation of models" (91). "Models are obtained through a double process of abstraction and simplification and they may be subject to an 'experimental' manipulation ....... knowledge may be produced through the experimental manipulation of formal systems" (92). At the end of the day models, conceived so, reduce to the status of persuasive metaphor. The theorist begins from some formalized element of common sense, be it the common sense of society or the common sense of the discipline, and thither he eventually returns.

As a general theory providing legitimation for 'intervention', 'growth theory', based on H-D models and theories of development derived therefrom, would seem to be untenable. However, whilst the effort is unsatisfactory in a technical sense, its ideological role remains serviceable.

Touching upon the ideological role of H-D, we may recall from Postan that governments were caught up in a tide of opinion and only then did doctrines of growth emerge. What began as a solution to problems of unemployment—that is, a relatively specific remedy—was extended and transformed into a fully-fledged, if unclearly spelt out, social doctrine. In the 'rich' world it underpinned 'social democracy', and with regard to the Third World it attained its most florid guise in the work of Rostow with his 'stages of growth'.

Putting a date to the emergence of the doctrine of growth is a little difficult. From Brookfield we have the following: "The quasi-religion of economic growth has had its origins in the 'long boom' experienced most joyfully in the West" (93). Postan we have seen dates 'recovery proper' as beginning in 1948, and the 'boom' takes off with the Korean war. By 1958 Galbraith is using 'growth' in the sense of 'doctrine'. In 1959 Kurihara publishes an exposition, so presumably the notion
itself is earlier. The 1951 U.N. report of Lewis et al is cited by Kurihara as the first fruits of the Keynesian approach in regard to matters of development. Thus we may say the doctrine emerges between 1951 and 1958, the period (as Postan puts it) of the West's most 'robust' growth.

2.2 Planning: 'intervention' organised.

Now we move from matters of legitimation to those of organisation, that is, planning. The conceptual relation is straightforward, in outline at least. Thus, given that we have a 'theory', based on growth models, we need to have an idea of how to go about using the theory to achieve those ends it was constructed to help achieve; and also to achieve those ends the process of theory construction has revealed to us. How do we organise, initiate, monitor and control our 'intervention'? How do we plan? Indeed, can we?

In regard to the theoretical possibility of planning, we may begin by noting that it is possible with the notion of 'planning' (as with any other term in the social science lexicon) to distinguish a range of meanings. To offer even a preliminary exposition of the term's conceptual and historical range would be a long and, more pertinently, often irrelevant task at present. We shall begin where our discussion so far indicates that we should, that is, with economics and economic theory.

The debate about the possibility of planning begins, it has been argued, not with Marx and Engels (who advocated but did not treat the notion of a 'planned economy'); but with an Austrian economist, Von Mises, who in the 1920's argues that a planned economy could not work rationally. The gist of his argument is that, separating the economy from its institutional frame, it is the economy's job to allocate scarce resources between competing ends. This requires precise indices of scarcity, else choices would be ungrounded. The only way to get these indices is to allow market determination of price. Thus an economy with no market cannot provide any index of scarcity and so cannot rationally allocate scarce
resources.

Unfortunately for Von Mises a reply was to be found in established equilibrium theory. The answer follows from Walrasian analysis of 'price'. Commonsensically, 'price' is the rate at which goods are exchanged; they may additionally be expressed via a 'standard', say relative to the price of gold. Walras' system goes rather deeper and issues in the entirely non-intuitive assertion that, from the general character of the system, 'price' can be established prior to—indeed independently of—any involvement with the market. Napoleoni, who provides this analysis, sums up his treatment by noting that "the price of one good in terms of another can be determined at least in theory as the rate of technological and psychological equivalence of the two goods whether or not an actual act of exchange takes place in a market" (95). More directly, "if one accepts that the mechanism which determines the choices of individuals, that is, the mechanisms that generate relative prices, can be put in the form of a system of equations, then one has to accept, at least in principle that given the terms of the problem the prices can be calculated without any need for a market" (96).

Subsequent debate revolved around the practical possibility of planning. Thus Hayek and Robbins objected that the Walrasian equations would take so much time and data as to be unusable for practical purposes; whereas Lange and Dobb both defended the notion. Lange opposes Von Mises yet grants much of the force of the criticisms of Robbins and Hayek. In doing so he reproduces, says Napoleoni, a mechanism rather like the market. Dobb's line points to a distinction between the efficient use of presently available goods on the one hand, and on the other to the longer term problem of raising the productive capacity of an economy; planning is thus conceived as an instrument for accumulation rather than another style of allocation.

The history prepared by Turner and Collia (97) of notions of economic planning fills out the above treat-
ment in that it permits us to add two further notes. Firstly they distinguish, both as practical and as theoretical efforts, between 'imperative' and 'indicative' planning. The former identifies those conceptions thrown up by socialist thinkers, and the latter one those patterns of government intervention developed by the 'west'. The former seeks to replace the market whilst the latter seeks to reduce the possibilities for market dis-equilibrium; both through monetary and fiscal policies and via the reduction of uncertainty; that is, the government acts as an information clearing centre. The second note to be made is that the history of theorizing on these matters, (whether imperative or indicative) has been marked by the elaboration of sophisticated modeling, forecasting, gaming etc. techniques.

What this brief sketch establishes for our purposes is that the required notion of planning was not wholly novel, nor incoherent, for the orthodoxy; and (recalling Clairmonte) it was increasingly an element of the actual behaviour of capitalist enterprise in an era of concentration. Nonetheless the notion, cutting at the heart of the dogma of the market, was not uncontested (98).

We now consider institutional change. Above we have seen how the idea of 'intervention' elicits the idea of planning and how that idea was a contested element of established economic theory, available for use when required for the construction of theories of development. We now come at the same issue, the emergence of planning, from a different direction and show how the notion's theoretical availability was translated, ambiguously, into practice as an element of the 'Keynesian revolution' as further shaped by the emergence of doctrines of growth.

Brookfield notes that a contributory factor in the rise of the preoccupation with 'growth' was the 'reconstruction of capitalism', specifically monopoly forms of enterprises and a recasting of the relationship of state and industry. Writing as some sort of a
marxist he properly notes that "there is nothing new about the partnership between capital and state" (99); what is novel is its respectability and organisation. The aspect of 'respectability' is well expressed in Clairmonte's work, as when discussing the emergence of interventionism he remarks that: "By the end of the thirties the Keynesian approach to problems of economic stabilisation and full employment had become generalized" (100). Now this is a bold claim; and whilst with regard to subsequently established war economies it is arguably true (101), with regard to post-war capitalist economies of the 'west' it is very probably false. Indeed Clairmonte notes that between 1950-54 there was a stream of US government reports stressing market principles, and Robinson (1962) notes that Keynesianism was only ever patchily taken up.

That Clairmonte can make his bold, if anxious, claim reflects, as we shall see in chapter four, the optimism of the period. Here we can record that legislative innovation accompanies the emergence of the doctrine of growth. The doctrine itself is novel but, says Postan, "even more fundamental were the legislative and institutional innovations introduced by individual governments in their pursuit of economic development" (102). After that gesture to theory he notes the practical counterpart, saying. "If immediately after the war France was almost alone in trying to work out and to enforce a central 'plan', eventually most governments equipped themselves with machineries and policies for the concerted planning of economic growth" (103).

The theoretical basis for these changes from pre-war attitudes was Keynesian; and in the 'west' these new machineries have taken the form of varieties of indicative planning devices. The extent and style of adoption varies; so in the USA acknowledgment of a Keynesian-style role of government was, at least ideologically, more fraught. Thus Harris talking of the ERP notes that it points up an uncomfortable gap'
between US ideals of market forces and actual US practice. Some see this tension as resolved in favour of the status quo; thus Sweezy argues that with the Kennedy period the reformism of Keynes is finally extinguished (IO4). However any debate about the career of Keynesianism is resolved, it remains the case that in matters of respectability and organisation the work of Keynes legitimated and permitted a reworking of the relationship of state and industry, and a reworking of public attitudes thereto. Keynesianism, we have tried to point out, was the particular intellectual/ideological form in which a prior political need to 'intervene' manifested itself.

2.3 Aid: the lowest tier, 'intervention' implemented.

Thus far we have looked at the legitimation of the idea of 'intervention' in the construction of growth theories which serve (or purport to) the purpose of telling the intervening agent how a given system might be understood to behave. The 'might' is not unimportant, as we noted that the claim of model users and economists in regard to the status of these models was problematic. We intimated that even if the claim to deductive-empirical scientific status was not lodged then it was very easy to slide from regarding a model as a heuristic device to seeing it as a, maybe imperfect, statement about an external, given, reality.

Subsequently we pursued the matter of the organisation of intervention: if we know in principle how our target system behaves then we need as a next step to be clear as to how, precisely, we may approach and manipulate it. This requirement of 'intervention' we took to have spawned the interest we noted, amongst theoreticians and practitioners, in planning. The planner, our agent, seeks to establish mechanisms for the organisation of specific interventions. This role is subject to two polar interpretations: the master scientist and the under-labourer. Both are out of the same school of interventionism, and thus shifting from one to the other represents a change of emphasis within...
an approach, rather than any change of line. Waterson plots this as an historical shift, very well (105).

Treating the period of the late '60's he argues that the style of 'planning from the top down' gives way to the inverse style, that is 'planning from the bottom up', where the pursuit of straightforwardly given opportunities is substituted for the pursuit of more general ideologically-derived objectives of development. Yet, whatever the style and whatever the mix of the above two elements, in the end the planner writes plans; blueprints for 'interventions'.

We thus reach the third stage of 'intervention': from legitimation, through organisation, to implementation. Aid—which generically we can take to be specific, piecemeal interventions in the system having the aim of contriving a preferred state of affairs—may be in the form of 'one-off jobs', a part of a sequence, a programme, a set, etc. Here we look at questions of the origins and principles of aid, and the extension of interest to the Third World.

The sources of the idea of aid can be placed in: the nature of the ideology of growth; that is, aid is a logical consequence of growth models. As regards the origin of present conceptions of aid as a practical activity, most theorists point to the immediate post-war period (106). The usual conception of this time is most clearly expressed by Mikesell when he writes that "(i) aid theories provide an analytic framework for determining the amount and timing of the aid and the policies which must be followed by the recipient country for (ii) achieving a given target rate of growth which can be sustained without further external assistance" (107).

Zeylstra identifies two sources of interest for aid giving, and these reflect wider differences than he explicitly notes between US and European interests. Thus we have noted a split between H-D et al and Solow et al, and here we may add an historical aspect to the
Mikesell argues that "the vast bulk of French and British foreign aid is directed toward their respective community of nations. Unlike the US, Britain and France have not had to develop a special rationale in terms of either Free World security of universal humanitarianism for obtaining public support for their aid programs"(108).

Zeylstra's first source is aid to allies, exemplified by the ERP by means of which the US disbursed aid to sixteen European nations. White(IO9) in his politically sensitive treatment of aid identifies the period 1948-52 (original ERP programme years) as the time of the first phase in the career of the notion of aid. The second phase represents a geographical extension: thus as ERP secured allies in Europe, so aid will secure allies in Asia, 1952-56. These two periods constitute what we have taken as the period of 'internal orientation'on the part of western theorists and agencies. With the shift of aid to the Asian sphere its perceived task is broadened, and the notion of development comes to the fore rather than reconstruction. The notion becomes diffuse. This process is further advanced when, in the wake of the 1955 Bandung Conference's advocacy of the claims of the 'non-aligned', the USSR emerges as a source of aid. The division of the world into two camps is thus broken and the Third World becomes a realm of competition. Aid is no longer to allies, but is rather a contract; demands that recipients become allies are no longer tenable, rather a development ideology is propounded. As Streeten puts it,"growth according to their respective Western and Eastern recipes was held out as the reward for keeping out of the other camp"(110). This set of events we take to mark the switch from 'internal' to 'external' focus in regard to growth.

The second source of interest in aid-giving identified by Zeylstra is the 'decolonization' process. This is taken to have been split into two periods. The first was the more or less enforced withdrawal from Asian and Arab lands. The problem of 'off-loading' remaining areas, principally in Africa, in an ordered manner
is then confronted. The result is that from 1957 to '64 (the period of ordered withdrawal) aid flows are linked to the transfer of power from colonial to indigenous regimes with whom agreements relating to development are made.

The above indicates the divergent sources of interest in, and consequent character of, the notion of aid. Identifying a core to such an idea is difficult, yet Zeylstra attempts this. (In his case it is to fix a measure against which practice may be judged; for our purposes, it is to reveal the character of the notion in the light of our idea of 'intervention'). Zeylstra attempts to construct his criterial definition out of an examination of ordinary usage; thus he says the analysis "needs a concept defined strictly according to the purpose that is expressed by it". Five criteria of what is to count as international development aid are identified. (a) "cooperation with a foreign state or autonomous political unit". Here he acknowledges the problematic nature of the state: de facto authority over an area is a sufficient condition, de jure not a necessary one. Zeylstra begins here—not an obvious starting point, as one of his concerns is to locate the idea of aid within the corpus of western categories surrounding the 19th century rise of industrial states: the relevance of this set of notions he questions. Polemically he reduces 'development aid' to a "missionary inspiration to propagate the western way of life". The thrust of this critique we have treated in chapter two, when we asked, in effect, what else?

(b) "with the object of assisting that state or autonomous political unit in furthering its economic growth and social purpose". The linking of questions of 'statehood' to notions of 'progress' is probably correct: we have intimated above that the present form of the 'idea of progress' is 'growth', understood as a doctrine. The ambiguity here, of which Zeylstra seems to be aware, lies between propounding 'progress' (taken
as integral to Western thought) and the notion of 'development' on the one hand, and on the other 'growth' seen as a post-war bastard form of 'progress': an 'intervention' indeed designed to buy off conflict!

(c) "The peoples to be assisted should be completely responsible for their countries' economic and social development" (II4). Here there is a hint at the formal aspect of aid: the development aid should be planned, assistance is targeted, it is not like flinging fertilizer about and hoping. Thus a functioning government machine is a necessary condition of receipt of aid.

(d) "The decision to offer assistance, however, should not be dominated by the wish to create ....... advantages (nb. for donor) intentionally" (II5). Aid is not an export-credit guarantee, for instance (as the 'left' correctly perceived the Marshall Plan). Advantages accruing to the donor should be secondary. This is the moral aspect of 'aiding', as Zeylstra sees it; the effort ought not to flow from an instrumental stance but from an ethic of ends.

(e) "Insofar as development cooperation refers to economic development, presuming its efficacy presupposes that development, growth, progress, are not predetermined elements of a 'given reality', but subject to human effort" (II6). Zeylstra talks of 'effort', not control; he hedges on extent to which human input to history is taken as being effective. A naive view of planning would approach, say Fabian/liberal, ideal of replacement of politics. The converse would be a thoroughgoing determinism. It is the mix of these two and the resulting claims for extent of human power (both theoretically, and as a practical historical possibility for the present) that is the difficult question here. Zeylstra dodges it. That this is the crucial element Zeylstra indeed recognises, noting that "in all social fields attention became focussed on the role human effort played as a creative element" (II6a).

This final criterion, (e), is in fact the basis of any aid effort, whilst the other four list in idealist
fashion the ordinary-language derived definition of aid. That such a definition may be of use in examining the practical record of donors becomes clear when we add that this arguably rather empty analysis follows an explicit setting aside of familiar political notions of aid. For the present we note that Zeylstra offers the beginnings of a formal definition of aid, what we would expect to derive from 'intervention' and couples it with an odd acknowledgement of his status as a western theorist. The criticisms aimed at the notions of progress/state/development are in some sense moral, the notions are taken to be problematical in some way. That they are not absolutes, we may grant; that they are thereby negotiable in any significant or immediate sense, seems to us to be a false conclusion (as we saw in Chapter Two).

The foregoing indicates the practical sources of interest in aid and its scope as a concept guiding action. It is not a report on how it has been used. This is White's procedure; of his own effort he notes that it looks at "the many ways in which the many different sorts of resource called 'aid' have been used". It will now be appropriate to ask how the orthodox notion was deployed vis a vis matters of the development of the Third World. Here we use the work of White; his 'empiricist' approach to aid easily reveals the facts brute-relative to our present concerns. We ask how does aid sit with orthodox economics? The answer, to anticipate, is: very closely, with 'supplemental theories' whereby specific interventions are aimed at unsatisfactory areas of the recipient's economic system.

White's procedure presents problems, thus his 'empiricism', although declared, is flawed. He seemingly deploys an aprioristic categorization to types of aid theories and entirely fails to see how the most familiar type of theory, in his own estimation, flows from the fundamental 'intervention' orientation of the 'C W'. Thus he says of his first category, 'supplemental'
"that(it) predominates in most of the literature on aid" (II8), and he goes on: "this in itself is a phenomenon which requires explanation. In principle the four categories are indeed of equal status" (II9). Setting aside the question of what this last remark entails for his declared 'nominalism', we may ask whether his answer to his own question is adequate. His answer is that in the 'ideas market' supplemental theories were in demand. In contrast, Zeylstra's effort here is richer: he also shows the element of political demand, but goes on to note that the theories produced were developed out of existing economic theory resources. It seems safe to assert that thinkers pursue consistency even if they are operating in a market for ideas. The failure of White to relate supplementary theories of aid to the dominant orthodoxes ethos flows, it would seem, from his insensitivity to the role of theory in social science.

White begins his report as follows: "The starting point of supplemental theories is the identification of some key factor of the development process" (II0). We can note that White does not split the intervention sequence into three parts as we have done, consequently he criticises supplemental schemes for being more than descriptions of how aid works, saying: "they are essentially theories about the role of savings or foreign exchange or skills or institutions in development, not about aid as such, and it is from a view about the role of savings etc. that they prescribe rather than describe the role of aid" (II1). If he regarded aid as the third leg of an intervention sequence then this criticism couldn't arise, because the wholly formal aspect of description is effected by the 'growth model' stage of the treatment. A second point from the above is that the view noted fits with our examination of the notion of 'intervention', but we may ask why 'key factor' and not 'key factors'? Is this simply an accident of intellectual history in the sense that a theory, H-D, liable to single-factor interpretation, was available on the shelf when called for? Or might there be
an intrinsic tendency in this interventionist line toward identifying a 'key factor' out of some wider preliminary set? If the realm of the social is regarded as a field of interactions behaving analogously to natural science 'causes', then the possibility of identifying one element that just is the crucial element is open. It follows from the principle of economy in explanation, as a logical possibility. However on the face of it White's explanation seems more plausible; presumably the confidence of the theorists did not extend to their being prepared to claim that their models were that accurate. If that estimation is correct then a sociology of knowledge and/or psychological explanation is to be sought for this habit of producing 'key' factors.

White notes that in the 1950's and early 1960's this 'key factor' was usually savings. He goes on to say that by the mid-1960's 'single factor' approaches were falling out of favour. Supplemental theories were revised, he tells us, by adding 'transfer of organisation' to the development brew, and this was significant. "The emphasis shifted from resources for development to institutions of development and to the forms of social organisation most likely to stimulate development" (122). The significance of this is taken to be two-fold; firstly, 'assistance' becomes 'leverage'; and secondly, expectations of impact of aid veer from enhancement of local trends to effecting of fundamental changes in recipient states' social orders.

Two points arise from this. First the shift from 'help' to 'leverage' is non-existent. White takes 'leverage' to be a late 1960's notion, whereas with Harris we have noted its being an element of ERP. It also rather goes against what he has to say with respect to history of aid. Thus his phase 11 (early 1950's) sees the US offering aid to allies in Asia to fight communism; surely that counts as 'leverage'? The second point is rather more significant. We may ask whether White is lumping together US modernization theory with Streten/
Myrdal 'institutional economics'. Clearly they have resemblances, yet we wish to distinguish them. Following Ehrensaft we take the latter to be 'closer to reality'. Ehrensaft does not treat any modernizers explicitly; only implicitly, as part of the unexamined orthodoxy. A little light is thrown on this with White's next claim: "The two dominant influences in the construction of growth models as a basis for supplemental theories have been the H-D model... and WW Rostow's theory of the stages of economic growth" (123). Now it is clear that 'institutional economists' (if they include Seers, Streeten, Myrdal, etc.) do move away from any H-D/Rostow line. This latter line leads straight to the Kennedy 'high tide' period. Thus we may suggest that Rostow (abusing much work on ICOR, according to Brookfield) combines the H-D model, as adjusted by Solow such that growth is 'natural' and not un-likely, with US proselytising, in modernization theory. In this case there are indeed two lines to be distinguished, and it is not clear that White does this.

We began this sub-section by asking how the principles of development aid looked at sat with the economic orthodoxy. We answer that the relation is close in the case of supplemental theories of aid, in that aid is: (1) seen as a specific intervention, this assumes the guise of an implication of H-D model, though that model is later heavily revised in very many ways (see Mikesell); (2) seen as being of short duration, vulgarly Rostow's 'take-off'; (3) seen as resulting in the raising of the economic system to a new higher level of activity where growth is self-sustaining.

2.4 Summary of section two.
Beginning with the notion of 'intervention', we have tried to display the nature of the early post-war orthodoxy of 'development-studies'. We have argued that political demand lodged within the theoretical context of the Keynesian revolution, as indicated in Section One, called forth the policy-scientific notion of
ordered growth.

"Intervention", we argued, required a tri-partite treatment. One: legitimation, a general theorem, and this we saw as being provided by 'growth-theory'. Two: action must be ordered; here we looked at ideas of planning, both those lodged in the history of economic debate, and those called forth by Keynesian recasting of the role of government. Three, aid: the final stage in the interventionist scheme, that is, implementation.

Now we have had something to say about these issues as they present themselves in the context of treatments of matters of the Third World, but thus far only in passing. We now turn directly to the question of the application of this general strategy and set of assumptions to the issue of the development of the Third World.

Dynamic of Theory II: Early practice, Keynes exported.

In the earlier parts of this chapter we have looked at the preoccupations of the politically dominant groups of the 'West' and at the subsequent efforts, on their behalf, of economic theorists. Now we must look at examples of this orientation at work with issues of Third World development. Thus we now effect the shift from historical resume and analytic exegesis to critical reporting: we look at Keynesianism in action.

Kurihara provides the lever when he observes that: "The UN 1951 publication 'Measures for the economic development of underdeveloped countries' was an eloquent testimony to the new post-war, post-Keynesian hope of raising the living standards of economically backward countries through deliberate action, instead of leaving it to the accident of laissez-faire international capital movements or to the caprice of old fashioned empire builders and colonialists"(I24). This provides a starting point, but then we are given two specific preliminaries. Kurihara remarks: "that UN report could not, I believe, have been written prior to the appearance of Harrod's 'Dynamic Economics' or possibly without Joan Robinson's challenging suggestion that Harrod's
growth theory should be applied a fortiori to capital-poor under-developed economies" (125).

Harrod's work we have already taken note of and here we are concerned with applications, so we begin with Joan Robinson. The suggestion that Kurihara refers to (126) is to be found in her 1949 review of Harrod's essays. In the course of the review she has occasion to ask just what is meant by the notion of a 'warranted rate of growth'. The answer involves the familiar Keynesian terms—savings, investment, capital, etc. The relevance of all this to the situation of 'under-developed countries' (UDC's) is the realization that the notion of 'unemployment' used in developed areas is not suitable to the situation of UDC's, more useful is 'Marxian unemployment' (127).

This is of interest to us, not for any purposes of economic analysis, but because it clearly leads into the central issue for these Keynesian inspired economists: that is, how to plot the behaviour of economic factors and indicators in a Keynesian-informed way when the economies being treated are so radically different to those of the industrialized nations. The line into this area may vary; thus Nurkse (1953) for example focuses on the generation of savings, where Clarke and Kuznets pursue issues of quantification. The major report that follows up Robinson's remarks in the sense of centreing the work on 'employment' is the 1951 U.N. report of Lewis et al.

3.1. The 1951 UN Report
We may quote, as they do, from their brief from the UN Economic and Social Council; thus they are instructed to prepare "a report on unemployment and under-employment... in UDC's, and the national and international measures required to reduce such unemployment and under-employment" (128). The authors admit to having problems in "interpreting the term 'under-developed countries" (129). But apparently they find the use of the notions of employment straightforward, thus they first list and review
the four types of unemployment found in UDCs. However, there is an implicit appreciation here of Robinson’s point, for they re-define their task as focusing on "economic development rather than upon unemployment" (130). Their treatment involves looking at (1) pre-conditions of progress; thus they see as a necessary condition 'proper' cultural orientations. Here we may note that the committee's narrow intellectual background is revealed in that what distinguishes UDCs from DCs is labelled/dismissed as 'pre-requisites'. They go on (2) and note the role of the government, though here the Keynesianism is blurred as its task is presented as passive and enabling. The effort rests on the analogy of UDC governments facing development and DC governments facing depression.

Now matters technical are treated; thus (3) domestic saving is dealt with, and here they offer a tacit definition of their assumed goal. They note that DCs' rate of capital formation is 10% of National Income, whereas the rate for UDCs is only 5% of National Income. The question is how to raise the rate of capital formation. In White's pejorative phrase this tends to 'gappery' or supplemental thinking, thus aid is seen to be one way of plugging this gap. Several techniques are discussed, and what is most interesting is how matters of economics and politics are casually jumbled together. In para. III they observe that "people of middle and higher incomes in many UDCs are well known for their tendency to conspicuous consumption and there is no doubt that a fall in their consumption would be in the public interest" (131). The authors neither pretend to be neutral social scientists nor do they come out and explicitly argue a case, as our notion of social theory requires. Rather they take the role of 'experts' and argue a case against a backdrop of unexamined, unacknowledged, assumptions.

The intellectual link between Robinson and Lewis et al.'s work can be seen most clearly in the latter's treatment of deficit financing and inflation. Asking about the use of idle resources they go straight on to
"considering the possibility of creating capital by employing the under-employed to work for wages on public works...." if this labour were employed on public works, capital would be created without any fall in either output or total consumption"(132). Having presented the rationale, they go on to contrast the situation in DCs, where governments can create money and lift employment rates and activity rates via the multiplier, with the situation in UDCs. Here, they say, "the process is not so simple"(133); they note a propensity to import and pressure for inflation as the system cannot respond to a rise in demand from consumers. This is an interesting area and here we may cite the work of VKRV Rao, a contemporary critic, whose treatment is distinctly sharper. His view is that the Keynesian approach breaks down (134).

Rao's critique begins by rehearsing the main points of Keynesian theory. It is noted that Keynes was mostly concerned with "the problem of involuntary unemployment in the richer countries"(135) and that "the remedies he puts forward, viz. cheap money, deficit financing, redistributive taxation, and public investment have all become current coin in national economic policies with full employment as the major objective"(136). This general set of notions, this newly constituted common sense of economics, has been applied (as might be expected) to various circumstances, in particular those of the UDC. Rao notes: "unfortunately Keynes did not formulate the economic problem of the UDCs .... the result has been a rather unintelligent application .... thus it is common ground with most writers on the economics of UDCs that what was required for their economic development was an increase in the purchasing power of the people. Deficit financing and created money have figured in practically all the plans...."(137).

Rao goes on to consider the presumptions of the Keynesian scheme; that is, he asks in what particular circumstances do these concepts make sense? It is then indicated how these concepts are inadequate to the situation of
a UDC (India is taken as illustrative case). Rao focuses his attention on the matter of 'employment' and asks what are the conditions in which the 'multiplier' will work? The answer is, immediately, 'involuntary unemployment', and thereafter the free market economy which this phenomenon presupposes: "involuntary unemployment of the Keynesian type is necessarily associated with a free-enterprise wage economy where the majority of earners work for wages and where production is much more for exchange than for self-consumption"(138).

That the economies of UDC's can be said to have 'involuntary unemployment' is not obvious. Rao recalls that Robinson (Essays in the Theory of Employment) has introduced the term 'disguised unemployment' and that this might be thought appropriate to UDC's, but this would be wrong. Robinson's 'disguised unemployment' flows from a decline in demand, whereas UDCs have always operated at a low activity level; so 'disguised unemployment' is normal, thus we might even properly speak of 'voluntary unemployment'. Anyhow, a presumption of the 'multiplier' thus does not hold and "the multiplier principle as enunciated by Keynes does not operate in regard to the problem of diminishing unemployment and increasing output in an under-developed country"(138). Of course policy based on these assumptions will not be helpful either; indeed, the simple extension of Keynesian ideas is taken to have done a great deal of harm. In this Brookfield concurs reporting that these early attempts to apply Keynes "proved disastrous (140). Interestingly Rao suggests, finally, that the work of the classical economists might prove a more rewarding area of intellectual enquiry.

Returning to the 1951 UN report, (we note that) it goes on to treat (4) planning. We are given an anodyne definition of planning as "concerned with the proper disposal of resources between different uses"(141) That Lewis et al are advocates of planning should not surprise anyone. However, we note their 'defence' (for they do offer one) as it illuminates the aside made by Robinson in her review of Harrod, (Where she noted that Harrod...
executes a familiar and unhappy manoeuvre of argument: namely, "It is a common vice of present-day economic argument to jump from a highly abstract piece of analysis straight to prescriptions for policy, without going through the intermediate stage of examining how far the assumptions in the analysis fit the facts of the actual situation" (142).

The 'experts'(as U.N. and Kurihara 1954 describe them) say that economics provides two general principles. First, the notion of the margin: thus "resources should be used in such a way that a transfer of marginal units from one use to another could not increase welfare" (143). Now this is the 'welfare economics' version of the neo-classical notion of an optimum configuration, and as such it is acceptable. But they go on to make the following claim, that the 'corollary is that one should not think of any single industry or economic activity as more important than any other and should not therefore concentrate all resources in one particular part of the economy" (144). The shift from a piece of neo-classical formalism to a policy injunction is abrupt. The corollary, as thus far reported, is either a simple equiform methodological note issuing in the dubiously derived conclusion that a wholly unlikely situation ("all resources") is prohibited, or it is the set-up for the introduction of a clearly un-related, non-consequential, policy prescription. They go on: "Progress must be made on all fronts simultaneously" (145); and this, if it means 'balanced growth', does not follow from the simple statement of Paretian optimum. Robinson's point would seem to be confirmed.

The second principle of policy the 'experts' take to flow from the substantive difference between micro and macro level changes in the system. Thus "large movements of resources within the economy will have effects which are disproportionately different from marginal movements" (146). The planning dictum apparently derived from this is that if marginal adjustments do not look promising, try structural ones. The justification drawn from theory of this rule of thumb looks strained, and indeed the rule of thumb we have been presented
with looks trivial. However, this 'argument' is then used as a 'hay-maker for neo-classical economics. Thus if it is structural changes we are looking at, then micro-economics of marginalism are of secondary importance. Further, as quantification is so difficult at these aggregative levels and as data differs from one UDC to another, it is not possible to offer any general rules governing economic planning: "those who are responsible must soak themselves thoroughly in the facts of each particular case and must then use their best judgment as to what will be the most desirable directions of movement"(147). This is one of the more breathtakingly optimistic sections of this report. The orthodoxy from which Keynesianism sprang is cast off entirely and replaced by the planner's "best judgment". Indeed it calls for nothing less than carte blanche for the economic planner.

There are two further elements of the 1951 U.N. report to note. Thus (5) the report looks at terms of trade. On this they affirm a loose internationalism that is in accord with the style to be expected of a U.N. study, and, more pointedly, fits with American notions of the proper development of post-war trade. They affirm that international trade is important to all; and as regards cyclical fluctuations in the trade cycle, long term decline in terms of trade, and protectionist measures by the developed, the 'experts' are sure that the DCs can sort these problems out.

Finally, (6) we come to the matter of external sources of capital. Here we see two points of interest. Firstly they answer the question of the extent to which capital is needed from abroad by seeking to indicate a quantity. This they grant is difficult, so why do they do it? It meets the orthodox desire for precision, and falls into line worked by C Clarke and S Kuznets. The immediate thought must be that they are arguing in the light of the experience of Marshall Aid where large sums were shifted about. This impression is reinforced when, discussing the government's role as provider of infra-
-structure, they go on to say: "We do not suggest that aid should be given unconditionally to UDC's. This would not be wise. Each grant should be linked to a specific function, and there should be international verification that the funds are used only for the purposes for which they have been granted" (148). Thus aid is targeted and monitored according to 'wise' prescriptions. This is what we would expect to find: it is the practical expression of a 'policy science', and indeed it is how the Marshall Plan worked, at least at first.

3.2 An early general statement: Arthur Lewis

The above critical exposition of the 1951 U.N. report had as its objective the elucidation of its Keynesian inspiration and commensurability with an interventionist ideal. It was one of the earliest efforts to make sense of the matter of the Third World. We can further pursue the question of the 'export of Keynes' with the theorist Lewis, who in 1955 publishes a formal treatise on the development of the UDC's.

Lewis (149) declares in the book's preface that he is not presenting original ideas but offering a framework for studying economic development. "A book of this kind", he says, "seemed to be necessary because the theory of economic growth once more engages worldwide interest, and because no comprehensive treatise on the subject has been published for about a century. The last great book covering this wide range was JS Mill's 'Principles of Political Economy' published in 1848" (150).

Lewis begins by identifying his subject as "the growth of output per head of population" (151). His method is a combination (unspecified) of the deductive pursuit of consistency of formulation of statements (the familiar realm of economics, he says), and what he calls 'evolutionary' study. We must "apply the inductive method to historical data" (152). That this empiricism is to be taken as inferior to that of the natural sciences is a point Lewis makes, and he calls for modesty of conclusion when predicting how far "changes which occurred in the wealthier countries as they developed may be expected to
repeat themselves in the poorer countries if they develop "(153).

The level of the enquiry is announced early: thus causal explanation is assumed but not pursued, rather a general level of 'proximate cause' is fastened on. There are three such 'proximate causes', Lewis tells us, with which we can grasp these matters of growth and development. These are first, the "effort to economise" (154), which notion Lewis uses to characterize the DCs: included within it, or as illustrations of it, are experimentation, risk taking, mobility, and specialization. We can take it as straightforwardly descriptive of his world. Its liability to criticisms developed with the notions of over-simplification, aggregation, and value insensitivity, are evident. The second cause Lewis cites is the increase of knowledge and its application. We can regard this as a simple corollary of the first point; thus Gellner remarks that "science is the mode of cognition of industrial society" (155). Finally we are reminded that growth depends upon increasing the amount of capital; which is vacuous, except that it reads development as an economic matter.

From these three elements Lewis sketches a procedure of un-packing; thus he shifts closer to 'history', asking why do these 'proximate causes' operate in some societies more strongly than in others. He takes this sequence to be one of a search for consistency—just what environment is conducive to economic growth? These questions are then reformulated to focus on the evolutionary aspect: how do 'environments' change, becoming more or less conducive to economic growth? This is the area of historical research and social scientific interest.

Lewis, it seems, is fixed in the economist's deductive empiricism. The trio of 'proximate causes' are simply presented; they are obvious, and with hindsight clearly of no greater status than any other groups taken-for-granted assumptions. For our immediate purposes we note that they reduce to an affirmation of the commonsense of the orthodoxy plus an emphasis on the role of capital.
We can go on to look at what he has to say about capital; the comments on social/cultural pre-conditions we will leave until Chapter Four, when we look at the rise of the wider social scientific contribution in the guise of 'modernization theory'.

In regard to the issue of capital, Lewis is concerned to look at (A) the amount of capital required for economic growth, (B) sources of savings and, (C) the process of investment.

(A) Lewis begins with a weak claim: "economic growth is associated with an increase in capital per head" (156); and as regards the matters of quantification he acknowledges the work of Clarke and Kuznets as pioneers. The work begins with ICOR, taken as embracing two generally accepted generalizations: that ICOR is constant at the margin, and that in DCs it is 3:1. The question becomes how can this be shifted to situation of UDCs. The debate revolves around the issue of whether ICOR is higher or lower in UDCs. Lewis looks at the debate, which is couched in the familiar aggregative mechanics of economics, and concludes that "we do not know what the marginal capital income ratio is in any UDC ... all the same if for want of anything better we use the ratio which has been found for industrial countries, it is easy enough to see why income grows so slowly in the less developed countries" (157). Briefly, rates of investment as a percentage of National Income are lower that in DCs; the conclusion is that "this in turn raises the question how rapidly capital formation can be accelerated" (158).

(B) Looking for sources, Lewis begins with the claim: "The proposition which we have established in the preceding section is that investment is necessary to economic growth" (159), and here we may note the relation between growth and capital has shifted from 'association' to 'necessity' via an admittedly inadequate route that is, ICOR, and the discussion attached thereby. Lewis has not established this link, either empirically or conceptually; though that is where the link is, in his
presumed Keynesianism. However from this claim Lewis remarks that "it follows in a passive sense" (160) that saving is necessary for growth because savings have to be equal to investment. Quite what he means by 'passive sense' is not clear: it follows within the logic of neoclassical economics, but the issue which he goes on to treat, as to whether and how they are in balance, is more particularly Keynesian. He remarks that "we have therefore come to analyse separately the forces determining saving and the forces determining investment" (161). Either way the problem for UDCs, as Lewis sees it at this point, is a lack of savings to finance investment. Given this requirement for savings, and having ruled out deficit financing, he asks about sources, identifying two: firstly domestic, such as hoards, taxation, banking and profits etc.; and secondly external finance, a supplement to local efforts.

(C) Under the heading 'investment' Lewis discusses some institutional pre-conditions of economic growth. He makes note of such financial arrangements as 'limited liability', 'flexible bank lending policy', 'easy marketability of investments' and so on. The list presented of pre-conditions is that of the superficial characteristics of a post-war Keynesian-run economy plus descriptions of various mechanisms peculiar to the industrial 'west', modified where it seems appropriate to 'fit' the UDC situation.

Let us now, briefly, consider Lewis's strategy in his version of the 'export of Keynes'. Most generally it is clear that Lewis argues out of a 'school': he writes 'explanation-in-the-light-of-x', where x happens to be that set of Keynesian-derived ideas treating growth which centre on the role of capital. So how does this differ from the preliminary notes on the notion of 'social theory' presented in Section One of the Study? (I) Epistemologically the effort is taken to be empiricist, and consequently it gets confused. Much pertinent detail is taken note of, but the material lacks any plausible frame of explanation. The material appears to be all 'on a level',
and elements of the text are not distinguished according to role, or at least not in any obvious fashion. Consequently the material presents itself as very largely descriptive in character. The general form assumed is deductive, and this requires that its start-points be taken as facts: high level generalizations, from which an explanatory model is made. The model, correctly manipulated, will generate remote conclusions and these will be taken as drawn from and corresponding to facts where the latter set can then inform policy decisions. We have argued above that this is an implausible scheme; and when we add to this a set of start-points that so resemble common sense, that the resultant material should present itself as orthodoxly descriptive should come as no surprise.

(II) With engagement, the orthodox take the role of the 'expert' and conceive their role analogously to that of the natural scientist. The class or group they represent is consequently not clearly identified and nor, inevitably, are the implications of their relation to a social group spelt out. Thus the whole 'realm of valuation' is sidestepped, indeed the orthodox is supposed; what we have is 'policy science'.

(III) In the light of the preceding two notes we add one on theory. In Lewis's scheme the role of theory is, to our mind, mishandled. For Lewis the role of theory is passive; it is an assemblage of deductions from evident truths, it is a kind of scaffolding for getting from familiar A's to unfamiliar and hopefully policy-relevant B's. Grounded in social facts, the edifice helps uncover others. Contrariwise, the notion of social theory we introduced, in our Prologue, made theory a more central phenomenon. Theorizing we took to be concerned with actively displaying the nature of the social construction of explanation; that is, we placed stress on the business of 'making sense'. Theory was taken as a moral intervention in the world, not just an attempt to model it.

3.3 Concluding note.
The work of Lewis we take to be an exemplar of the posit-
-ivistic empiricism of orthodox policy science. He begins with assumptions of a superficially formal kind, adds in aggregated empirical notions and builds abstract models. The return to the practical-empirical is effected by the removal of simplifying assumptions. This procedure admits of a wide variety of treatments of any particular problem. Assumptions may be varied, aggregated notions varied, and procedures of stepping down to 'reality' varied. This amount of intrinsic 'slack' in the procedure permits the pursuit of a practical problem to be so ordered as to produce a favoured 'sort' of answer for the theoretician's 'client'. We may note that this is not science, however loosely that is defined. Solow's re-write of the H-D model throws up into clear relief the question of the precise status of this style of modeling.

However we should not stress this aspect of the orthodoxy to the exclusion of all else. The effort was not monolithic, and nor was it fruitless; indeed the reverse is the case. Evidently these theorists were sensitive to (I) the difficulties of shifting established tools to the Third World and (II) the complexity of the problems themselves. Given the demand that they produce something by way of a 'development theory', their procedure was both what we would expect, thus their theories reveal their intellectual roots, and sensible in that they apparently began with the world-as-it-was and sought to identify its possibilities. That they misconceived their start-point, or miscast it theoretically, is pointed out by Streeten and is a view we would echo.
Chapter Four: The positivist high tide, 'Modernization Theory'.

1.0 Introduction.

Chapters three and four comprise one section of this study and the relationship of these two elements may be expressed in the claim that what is at issue is a revision of the legitimating theorem of 'intervention'. Thus 'modernization theory' replaces 'growth theory' as the orthodoxy of 'development studies, and does so within the context of cold war competition between super powers for influence in the Third World.

We will begin by taking note of the then current political preoccupations of the USA, the principal actor in this period. In Chapter Three the historical material presented focused upon the pre-war revisions of Keynes, the wartime alliances, and the economic role of the ERP in European reconstruction. Here we must start with the more general counterpart to Marshall Aid, that is, the Truman Doctrine and the so-called 'cold war'. It will be our contention that 'modernization theory' is the ideological child of the cold war: US theorists, operating within the ambit of the notion of 'containment', seek to secure allies for the US within the Third World. Competition with the USSR necessitates that self interest be disguised; thus the US offers 'modernization' and membership of the 'free world' as against 'socialism'. It is here that we find the moral core of 'modernization', and from this point we seek to show how this evaluative core is given analytic and descriptive substance by examining the efforts of economics and the wider group of the social sciences.

Following our note on the 'cold war', we develop the line of Keynesian theorizing that we have already come across as it experiences further refinement and general reformulation vis a vis Third World development. The 'debate with Harrod' is noted as one aspect of the wider process of the emasculation of Keynes and the reconstitution of neo-classical economics. Specifically related to matters of the Third World we observe the
continued reliance on growth models, and note that they become elaborate in their pursuit of realism. One side issue, of note for the future, is the nascent rediscovery of political economy associated with the 'new Cambridge' post-Keynesians.

The elements of economics constitute one thread of theoretical or disciplinary work that carries over from Chapter Three. There is another, insofar as it was latent in the efforts of Lewis et al (I) and Lewis (2), and this concerns the rise in importance of the contribution made by the wider group of the social sciences. It is here that we can plot the elaboration of the 'modernization' scheme through the use of a series of dichotomies serving to elucidate the one over-arching distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies.

Following the discussion of the occasion and character of 'modernization' we go on to investigate the impact as a legitimating theorem for 'intervention' of the work of Rostow (3). We consider the way he uses the theoretical resources available to him to fashion, in response to political demand, his own widely influential scheme of 'modernization'.

Having presented a review of the material via its critics, and a review of the work of Rostow, we take note that the career of 'modernization' can be taken to traverse a series of 'stages' and that as its gaudiest manifestation, in Rostow, achieves widespread notice, so too does an almost unremarked line of revision point to a reintroduction of the concerns of classical political theorizing.

By this time it is also clear that the world of 'cold war' is not that of elaborated 'modernization': in two senses. First, the ideology of 'modernization' is broader and less stridently enunciated than Truman's 'cold war'; and secondly, the 'reality' of the world situation is no longer that of the cold war era. In particular, US paramountcy has already given way, even if not yet in the perceptions of the US government, to a more complex pattern. Thus as 'modernization'
reaches its apogee in the Kennedy years, its assumptions and thus formulations become wholly implausible.

2.0 Dynamic of Society: the occasion of 'modernization'.

The period covered by this chapter, insofar as 'themes' attach to otherwise identified historical periods or events, runs from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's. We begin by following White (4) in distinguishing between the locus of interest on the part of the theorists. Thus Chapter Three treated the interventionist orthodoxy in its internally oriented phase. Here development was construed along lines taken as identified in the episode of the Marshall Plan, and we went on to treat what we termed the 'export' of Keynesianism to the Third World. Now White's second phase is the subject of the present chapter; here the theorist's attention is firmly directed to matters of the character, dynamics and directions of change of the societies of the Third World. White, whose study is concerned with the politics of aid, identifies the Bandung Conference as marking this shift.

Up until 1953 the USSR is taken to have regarded the world as split into hostile camps; hence 'non-alignment' was viewed with disfavour. With Stalin's death there is a relaxation in that stance which coincides with a 'thaw' in the 'cold war' proper. White records that in July 1953 the first sign of a new line was the USSR's pledge of one million dollars to a U.N. aid programme. This shift was reinforced by the Bandung Conference of 1955 which asserted, on the part of a group of Asian and African countries, the notion of 'non-alignment' and anti-colonialism. In 1956 Krushchev, in a report to the 20th Party Congress(5), announced the USSR's willingness to offer aid to 'developing' countries. This offer saw practical expression in that in the wake of the USA's withdrawal of financial support for Nasser's Aswan High Dam the USSR stepped in.

As a consequence of these events there opened up, with regard to aid giving, "a grey area between the two camps which constituted an area of competition" (6).
Henceforth aid, the clearest example of concern with the
Third World on the part of the rich, was not distributed
solely by the US and on condition of military alliance
against the Soviets. The situation was now competitive
and as this political situation changed so too did the
conception of the precise role of aid. Thus whereas
Marshall aid had had clearly defined objectives and
(hypothesised) mechanisms, aid to the Third World had
neither. Initially, in White's phase of 'US hegemony',
aid was used to strengthen allies in Asia; so when the
question was raised as to what this aid was supposed to
achieve, a foreign policy-derived answer was available.
As regards the mechanisms of aid-impact upon recipients,
these issues could be lost in the cold war objectives.
Yet when the USSR came upon the scene, and when the
notion of 'non-alignment' was promulgated, justifying
aid in terms of donors' foreign policy objectives became
more difficult. The emphasis shifted to the developmen-
tal aspects, and thus were mechanisms of aid impact
brought to the fore.

This competitive aid-giving took the form of offers of
on the one hand 'socialism' and, on the other, membership
of the 'free world' with its capitalist free market.
With the US the latter scheme was presented within the
ambit of development-studies as 'modernization-theory'.
Where in Chapter Three we followed the crystallization of
Keynesian derived 'growth-theory' out of the multiple
conflicts of the 'Big Three', particularly the conflict
of UK and USA, here in Chapter Four we trace the con-
struction of 'modernization-theory'. Broader and blander
than 'growth-theory', it was the ideological by-product
of the globalist stance of 'containment' created by the
USA in the wake of the disintegration of the wartime
Grand Alliance. Those who asked after the 'how' and the
'why' of aid-giving could now be given an answer.

2.1 The history of the period leading up to and emba-
cing the business of aid competition and the production
of 'modernization-theory' may be reviewed at this point.
We begin with a sketch of the occasion and immediate consequences of the end of the wartime Grand Alliance.

The story of this dissolution and partition of Europe reflects the fact that the USSR and USA had become pre-eminent world powers. Lichtheim notes that at the same time a de-facto agreement between the two was reached: essentially a realpolitik regard to respective spheres, with a corollary that peripheral areas were not worth a major war. This being the case such states were subject to the disciplines of the alliance leaders. This view was established early: Kolko, following the same line, notes that even before the 'collapse' of the British in Greece in 1947 and the subsequent establishment of bi-polarity, "neither the Americans, British, nor Russians were willing to permit democracy to run its course anywhere in Europe at the cost of damaging their vital strategic and economic interests"(7).

Aron's treatment of the US, in the first half of his work, is aimed at elucidating the nature of its diplomacy. Here he suggests the interesting idea that after the end of the Second World War the nature of the 'inter-state system', as he terms it, changed. What had been a European-style negotiation between states—a sort of diplomatic free market, its theory flowing from Machiavelli—becomes a bi-polar situation where two 'great powers' confront and accommodate to each others interests. So in this period the style of US 'inter-state' activity is— with regard to its allies—that of generalship. This requires the consent or acquiescence of those so organised.

It seems, on the face of it, that the notion of bi-polar diplomacy, if it doesn't actually entail 'interventionism', certainly is thus disposed. Ronald Steel quotes De Gaulle as remarking of the US, in the late'50s, that they had developed "a taste for intervention"(9). (Aron cites the episodes of Hungary and Suez as examples of great power 'discipline').

The career of the orthodoxy we have subsumed under the label of 'intervention' thus parallels, with 'development-studies' as 'modernization-theory', the
period of bi-polar diplomacy and US paramountcy. The dis-
integration of the US position and (says Aron) bi-
polarity in diplomacy is reflected in the disintegration
of orthodox interventionist optimism: so it has been
observed that "as the conditions which gave rise to
modernization theory have changed .... the flow of new
'theories' of modernization also seems to have ebbed"(10).

Granting this post-war de facto agreement over
European partition, the question arises as to the precise
nature of the 'cold war'. Aron presents three readings.
One flowing from the notion of fundamental and irrecon-
cilable hostility of the two systems. Fleming we could
take to follow this line, arguing as he does that it
was only the size of the Red Army that stopped the
Western allies from seriously considering 'rolling back'(11)
the Soviets. Nixon, then Eisenhower's Vice President, is
cited as advocating 'roll back'. Within this fundamental
hostility, 'cold war' expresses the situation of there
being just two 'great powers'. The second reading is the
common sense notion of war carried out by all means
short of war; yet Aron, in the end, prefers a third
notion which takes from both and adds a significat
measure of historical specificity. Thus the 'cold war'
was precisely that period we so designate, and it repre-
sented merely an unusual heightening of the tensions
inherent in what he dubs the 'inter-state system'. This
conclusion represents his version of a 'realist' history;
which is to say that he focuses on the behaviour of
ruling groups within a system of diplomatic-strategic
meanings (rather than by explaining their actions in
terms of economic interests, say). This being the case,
bi-polarity represents for Aron a change in style, or
perception of role, and 'cold war' hysteria is taken as
a mask for acceptance of the new perceptions. This line
is followed by Lichtheim when he argues that 'cold war'
and 'coexistence' were "two sides of the same coin"(12),
and that Kennedy plus a general relaxation of tension
allows 'coexistence' to be publicly acknowledged.

One element of both Aron's and Lichtheim's treatment
is thus the reduction of the 'cold war' to the status of a grandiose 'PR job' designed to placate the US public. This aspect of the matter indeed seems worthy of further enquiry, and Caute(I3) in his history of the 'cold war' indicates that its inception and development owed not a little to matters of party politics in the US. Yet to implicitly deny the 'cold war' a broader relevance seems misleading. Kolko details the economic interests of the US during the war and argues that it was whilst the war was in progress that the US prepared for its global role. If this is true then the 'cold war' was more than 'PR' for a change of diplomatic style: it was an integral element of a clearly articulated resistance to the 'left' in general and the USSR in particular. So it is noted that in the wake of war, "only the US had the power to engage fully in international counter-revolution...... By 1945 Washington's decision to undertake that role was an unquestioned postulate in America's plans for the future of its power in the world"(I4).

2.2 However, this is a debate about proper historical explanation which we need not pursue at this time. Rather, we must focus on what we take to be the background to the genesis of 'modernization-theory': that is, the rhetoric and practice of cold war, the US policy of 'containment', and the results of that policy. In preferring this route into these matters we follow our methodological dictum in regard to 'available explanations'. It is here that we must start, though we follow Kolko in matters of substance. One other apparent omission may be noted and this is our treatment of the USSR. The behaviour of the USSR is not closely examined, as to do so would entail our offering a characterization of the USSR; this is a debate we do not wish to enter, and indeed which we are not obliged by our material and approach to enter. In terms of the efforts of the orthodoxy the USSR appears as a shadowy 'other' against which US ideology, in part, defines itself.

US concern was initially focused upon Europe in the
wake of war-time upheaval, both the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviets and the activities of the 'left' in Western Europe. Subsequently attention is extended to the Third World in a period of disintegration of formal European empires. That the interests of the US, W. Europe, and Third World are divergent throughout this episode, we here take for granted (this is taken up more fully in Chapter Five); a 'modernizer', would not, affirming instead an elaborate scheme which collapses divergent interests into those of the US in a style redolent of Secretary Hull (whom we met in Chapter Three).

The domestic political background to the inauguration of 'containment', in the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, is described by Caute(I49). It is noted that when Truman came to power "federal and state statute books were already bristling with anti-communist legislation. All that was required, and conspicuously lacking under F. D. Roosevelt, was the will to enforce it". This political will came to be provided in the period immediately following the end of the war, when Truman came under increasing pressure from the right and gave ground to it. In 1946 during the mid-term elections for the House of Representatives the Democrats were reduced in strength, and faith in the efficacy of red-baiting was reinforced. Truman's response to this is seen by Caute to have been governed by considerations of party advantage; thus he sought to steal the vote catcher of the Republicans. It is noted that "It was Truman and Clark (his Attorney General) who produced the loyalty program, who codified the association of dissent with disloyalty and legitimized guilt by association"(I5). This is important to note in that it indicates that the period's excesses are not to be laid solely at McCarthy's door. By 1947 red-baiting, as an integral element of the US political scene, was well under way.

But all this, it may be said, is simply a matter of style; and indeed it is in a sense. Thus in Western
Europe the prevailing political tone was anti-communist without there being a witch-hunt. However we can reply that our interest is in the manner of production of 'modernization-theory': with what intellectual raw materials, and under what political circumstances and pressures. Thus the climate of opinion in the US is of interest for more than stylistic reasons.

Hawthorne (16) offers an illuminating viewpoint on this issue. Arguing from the use of a liberal 18th. century constitution for essentially conservative ends at the time of the establishment of the Republic, he suggests that the equation of dissent with disloyalty was latent in US legitimating ideologies; whereas for Europeans this was not, generally, the case. This, when coupled with what Kiernan describes as a "mystic faith in its special destiny" on the part of the orthodoxy of US thought, may be seen to have been given expression in all levels of discourse (17). Steel offers a slice of this ideology in sentimental guise when he posits in the 'ordinary American' "an instinct to help those less fortunate and permit them to emulate and perhaps one day achieve the virtues of our own society" (18). These sentiments, when expressed at the level of political rhetoric and in the context of a contrast with supposed views of the USSR, issue in the following absurdity: Truman in March 1947 avers that "the earth is deeply divided between free and captive peoples" (19). This stance has obvious implications, and these were picked up and elaborated by the periods 'organic intellectuals'. Yet this was, arguably, a deeply ambiguous service: Caute has the liberal intelligentsia collapsing in front of 'cold war' red-baiting. Not only did they not (with a few honourable exceptions) resist the witch hunt and maintain their scholar's stance of critical evaluation, but they contributed their own two-pennorth in the form of celebrations of the US as exemplar of modern society. In the period of the late '40's and early '50's when the first efforts in the direction of 'modernization-theory' were being undertaken, the model of the modern
was not merely the image of the US writ large, but an image suffused with the demands of the "patriotic imperative"(20). It was the business of the US to reconstruct the world in its own image. And where is the ambiguity in this service?. It is identified by Caute when he makes the claim that "it was the liberals rather than the reactionary right ....... who set the US on the disastrously interventionist and egotistical course that culminated in the horror of the Vietnam war"(21-22)

Turning to 'structural' matters, we may note that the debate about the extent to which US diplomacy flowed from economic interest is one that is pursued by Aron in debate with those he terms 'para-marxists'. However we do not need to pursue the detail of this debate. Rather we note that the ideology of the US, whatever its precise well-springs, did equate: (a) the interests of the US, (b) functioning liberal market economies, (c) resistance to communism, and (d) the future prosperity of the world. This doctrinal package was labelled 'the Free World', and as Caute notes "Soviet policy challenged America's claim to offer itself, or impose itself, as the model on which the future of world civilization would be based"(23). Peace and stability thus required, it seemed, the continuous presence of the US as guarantor of the 'Free World'. It was Truman's March 12th 1947 address to Congress that officially launched the doctrine of 'containment'; what the US government attempted to do was to proscribe any change not agreed by it.

Here Aron distinguishes concept from doctrine: the concept was the defensive expression of the competition of USA and USSR, whereas the doctrine was its expression in policy. Again Aron's Weberian-derived focus on 'ideas' lets him present the antagonism of US/USSR as latent in the US idea-system and as being called forth by the political activities of the USSR; for example, the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, or Korea 1950-53 (24). This line of argument lets Aron distinguish, against
the 'para-marxists', between 'imperial' and 'imperialism'. So the US may be imperial in its behaviour, but it is not imperialist: its power and sway were extended in response to political vacuum in the inter-state system consequent upon the collapse of old Europe and the political aggressiveness of the USSR, and not in pursuit of economic objectives. This evades the 'para-marxists', but Aron cannot sustain his case: he goes on to argue that revision of the concept opens up a slide in the US position. Thus: "the concept of containment was in fact expanded into a doctrine of international order, and this doctrine was calculated to lead to imperial or even imperialist intervention, or to put it another way intervention in order to uphold a government favourable to the institutions and ideologies of the US, even against its people's aspirations" (25). Aron's Weberianism issues here in an acknowledgement of those brute-relative historical facts that are the raw materials for the 'para-marxists' (26) and the 'given' context for the constructor's of 'modernization-theory'.

If US domestic politics and the demands of an ideology of economic liberalism are two of the roots of the promulgation of the 'containment' doctrine, then its full development bids us take note of the manner in which the initial outlines of the post-war political map were drawn. The notion of 'containment' was at first directed to Western Europe and its objectives secured via the disbursement of dollars; that is, the Marshall Plan. From this point the doctrine broadened, both geographically and practically. In Western Europe it acquired a military aspect with the formation of NATO in 1949 in the wake of the left-coup in Czechoslovakia of the year before. Its geographical extent was made general with the onset of the Korean war of 1950-53.

The list of US activities under the 'containment' notion is familiar, with the stationing of permanently based armies in Western Europe and the removal of left influence as far as possible. The US undertook military interventions in East and South-East Asia, in Central
America, Southern Europe, and Central Africa; covert interventions in the Philippines, Indonesia, the Middle East, Latin America and Southern Europe. The detail we need not pursue here (27).

We may conclude by noting that the ideology and practical activity of the US are thus not in doubt, insofar as they constitute the climate within which 'modernization-theory' was to be constructed and developed.

2.3 It is to the fashioning of the intellectual counterparts of the new US expansionism that we now turn. The resources available to the theorists comprised two major areas. First, the efforts of the economists: hesitantly rediscovering the work of their classical progenitors, they confront the problems attendant upon the scale and complexity of the macro-economics of growth. Second—initially a residual group, but subsequently aspiring to the status of 'master scientists' of this particular area of social science—we have the sociologists, historians, psychologists and so on, whose efforts constituted 'modernization-theory'. The work of the economists we will briefly review, noting their internal disputes and continued optimism. The work of the theorists of development who produce 'modernization' we will pay more attention to, looking at the genesis and form of their central concepts.

3.0 Dynamic of Theory I: further developments in the work of the economists.

Jones remarks of the history of growth economics that it may be characterized as being a sustained effort to evade the unpalatable implications of Harrod's work. Thus he says that whilst Harrod's conclusion is that "there is no reason to believe that full employment equilibrium growth will be attained ....... much of the literature on the theory of growth in the last twenty years is capable of being interpreted as a sustained attempt to weaken this conclusion" (28).
This debate around Harrod and the possibilities of growth may also be seen as an element of a wider debate around the implications of the work of Keynes for economics in general. Two tendencies may be identified. First, the 'new Cambridge school' ('new' to distinguish it from the Cambridge school of Marshall) which seems to have taken Keynes to have re-invented political economy, understood as a style of social theory. And second, the continued neo-classical line, promoted by scholars at Cambridge Mass.; which takes Keynes to be assimilable to the neo-classical line, where economics is taken to be a matter of the construction of economic-analytic calculi. Jones observes: "few controversies in the history of economic thought have been conducted with so much vigour and, at times, virulence as the series of interconnected debates between the two Cambridges on the concept of 'capital' and the process of economic growth and technical change" (29).

With regard to this wider debate, we will not here pursue any of its technical aspects; rather, we will make just two notes. Firstly, and in anticipation of matters to be raised later, we note that the intellectual roots of the 'new Cambridge school' are to be traced both to the work of Keynes and his circle of students and to the work of the classical economists; particularly, it seems, Ricardo whose collected papers were edited by Sraffa. This 'broader' vision of the school extends to their taking Marx seriously (thus Kregel regards Marx as the first modern economist to treat the system dynamically), and to a preference for what Jones calls 'grand theory': a blend of sociological, historical and economic analysis. Robinson sums up the impact of Keynes thus: "The Keynesian revolution has destroyed the old soporific doctrines and its own metaphysics is thin and easy to see through. We are left in the uncomfortable situation of having to think for ourselves" (30).

The second point concerns the 'gradual emasculation of Keynes' vision to conform with the neo-classical
method of thinking"(31). Though resisted by the 'new Cambridge school', this indeed seems to be the fate of Keynesian thought in regard to its general impact on thinking about economics. Sweezy argues that whilst Keynes looked radical at a time when radical solutions were perceived to be required, the post-war working-up of the formal aspects of Keynes's schemes have permitted the social reformism to drop away. As regards the US, Graham (33) argues that with the 'cold war' there is a change in the liberal position away from the redistribution of wealth to the doctrine of growth. There is a collapse toward the 'end of ideology thesis', which is seen as the ideology of an exhausted liberalism perceiving a political choice of cautious reformism or irrelevant socialism. The choice of 'planning', advocated in the 1930's, was no longer mentioned. Sweezy sees the post-war development of Keynesianism as being characterized by absorption: the creed of growth coupled with techniques of demand management now enhances the stability of that status quo which Keynes criticised. Keynesianism, remarks Sweezy, "is now used in order to bulwark the system, not to reform it"(34). Others have gone further and identified a fundamental political ambiguity in the 'General Theory'. The stress on job-creation evoked fascist admiration. Subsequently the US Democratic Party has been criticised for basing full employment on continual preparations for war. Critics from the left have advanced the notion of a 'permanent arms economy'.

Both these aspects may be seen in the behaviour of the Kennedy administration. Sweezy thinks that "the victory of what I would call the New Keynesianism, often called the 'New Economics', came really with the Kennedy administration"(35). He goes on to say that the celebration of that victory came in June 1964, when Treasury Secretary Dillon gave a speech to the Harvard Business School which used the notion of a proper level of unemployment; thereby removing the heart from Keynesianism. Dillon is a figure praised by Seymour Harris, an
advisor to Kennedy: the ambiguity and emasculation is brought out when Harris comments upon the administration's record. Thus he observes: "Perhaps the most important factor in the lag of welfare programs has been the rising demands of the military. Defence, space and related expenditures accounted for about 75% of the increase of expenditures under Kennedy through fiscal year 1964"(36).

Returning to the narrower area of growth economics, we shall again eschew any involvement with technical detail. We have seen in Chapter Three that with the semi-formal mode of reasoning adopted by orthodox economics the possibilities for theoretical novelties are extensive. It will not help our study to attempt to pursue the economists through their labyrinth, for as Brookfield remarks "growth theory quickly become highly elaborated and often very esoteric: contact with the real world was not often established"(37).

If there is any simple way of characterizing the change in economics between 'growth-theory' and 'modernization-theory' relevant work, it is encapsulated in Solow's neo-classical model of growth where the pessimistic assumptions of Harrod are simply struck out. Economic growth is made freely available (in theory) to those who would have it. Clearly, in terms of aid-donor competition, this is both more useable (e.g. by administrations) and saleable to recipient governments.

From Mikesell we may draw the observation that from their inception growth models underwent a two-fold development. Initially taken as presenting an oversimplified model of the growth process, they have "become more complex by the introduction of larger numbers of economic and non-economic factors and have borrowed heavily from theories dealing with the process of social and institutional change"(38). So models have become both more complex and less narrowly economic. Another way of regarding the development of growth models is to say that there have been continuing efforts to translate into the mould of the economic calculus matters
external to that calculus yet transparently relevant to the issue of growth. Thus Mikesell notes of the Cobb-Douglas model (a familiar starting point for neo-classical style work) that it "fails to include a number of important determinants of growth such as technical progress"(39). He then goes on to report on the work of an economist who, looking at technical change, executes the following intellectual manoeuvre: "one approach is to assume that technological change represents that part of the growth of output which cannot be explained by the growth of capital and/or labour"(40). The matter is thereby reduced to a relationship between established economic concepts, and may be translated into algebraic form and then manipulated as one more element of the model.

This pursuit of greater realism in modelling by means of piecemeal emendation of simpler growth models now regarded as unsatisfactory in this or that aspect, has produced the vast and obscure literature referred to by Brookfield. Indeed the point is that this conception of the task of the theorist investigating development, and this intellectual procedure, lend themselves uniquely to the elaboration of scholastic detail. With the use of a mechanistic logic, coupled with a subtle notation, fine distinctions can be made ever finer simply by the use of established methods. These thoughts we will pursue in Section Three when we look at the work of Streeten. Here we can simply note that within economics at this stage the slide from economics understood as the manipulation of formal machineries towards economics taken as actually involved in the world is under way. The distinction between economic growth theories and theories of social and economic change grows increasingly blurred; it is to the latter that we now turn.

4.0 Dynamic of Theory II: 'modernization-theory', a new master scientist.

Theories of social and economic change constitute our
second area of substantive interest carried over from the previous chapter. Now whilst there these matters were touched upon very briefly and almost in passing, here we trace the emancipation of the broad range of the social sciences from their early status as 'under-labourers' to economics. In general we can say that where Chapter Three traced the construction and deployment of 'growth models', in this chapter we see the resources of a wider set of disciplines being plundered for elements which might flesh out a theory of 'modernization'.

We must also note that here our 'thematic' approach runs into particular difficulty. It is not easy to identify a coherent notion of 'modernization'. formulations of what is an intrinsically vague idea differ sharply, and this being the case we confront the problem of avoiding constructing a 'straw man' as our target. We distinguish genesis and form in investigating how the modernization thesis grows out of the resources available to the theorists of the time: the resultant version of 'modernization-theory' is thus our own, rather than any one extant theory or 'assemblage from many such theories.

4.1 With regard to the origins of 'modernization-theory, Tipps makes the very general observation that its origins can be placed in "the response of American political elites and intellectuals to the international setting of the post Second World War era"(42). Indeed he goes on to say that this was the first time that substantial resources had been deployed in making systematic sense of the world beyond the US borders. This surge of interest presented social scientists with novel demands, and we are offered a quasi-Kuhnian explanation for the variety of conceptual schemes offered. They provided "surrogates for a tradition of inquiry into the problems of these societies which was almost entirely lacking"(43). Without an established literature, theorists plundered their disciplines' histories in search of a general paradigm. So 'modernization' is "deeply rooted in the perspective of developmentalism" claims Tipps(44), citing Nisbet.
Further sociology of knowledge information on the genesis of 'modernization' may be found in Tipps' ideological critique of the thesis. A resume of the criticisms of 'modernization' is begun by noting the charge of ethnocentricity. The modernization-theorists talk of 'traditional' and 'modern' where 19th century evolutionists, from whom comes 'modernization's' theoretical underpinning, spoke of 'civilization' and 'barbarism'. This is deemed to be a cosmetic change: 'modernization' remains a style of evaluation which measures a society's progress/status by "its proximity to the institutions and values of Western, and particularly Anglo-American, societies"(45). Here we can anticipate issues which will be fully aired in Section Five, and note that analogously to Lewis(1955), the 'modernization-theorists' have grasped the right nettle—albeit in an unsatisfactory and clumsy way. With Lewis, we commented on his substantive treatment; here it is a matter of evaluative orientation. If we take 'social-theory' to be essentially morally-informed then clarity and explicitness about one's own stance seems crucial, and this is more than a demand for mea-culpa statements on the part of theorists; liberal apologetics seem to us to be no more helpful than conservative condescension. That 'modernization' constructed a moral-evaluative schema for treating the Third World is, in itself, quite proper. What is objectionable is, to put it bluntly, the hypocrisy involved in the particular construct they came up with.(46).

In addition to the use of the model of the modern—West, plus the use of the dichotomous style of 19th century evolutionists, the 'modernization' scheme was shaped by peculiarly American pressures. Tipps notes that "the idea of modernization is primarily an American idea, developed by American social scientists in the period after the Second World War and reaching the height of its popularity in the middle years of the 1960's"(47). He goes on to note that "Two features of this period stand out: a widespread attitude of complacency toward American society and the expansion of American
interest throughout the world"(48). This complacency has its counterpart in social theory. Thus Hawthorn sees US sociology in the early 1960's deploying a familiar mixture of normative functionalism, social psychology and empirical survey analysis, but against the rather new question of the "possibilities of stable change"(49). He goes on to take note that "the answers were curiously soothing. Industrial societies, it was claimed, were all converging towards a common destination dictated by the technical and organisational imperatives of advanced industrialisation"(50). Kerr (1960) advances the notion of a 'logic of industrialization', observing that "The world is entering a new age – the age of total industrialization. Some countries are far along the road; many more are just beginning the journey. But everywhere, at a faster or slower pace, the peoples of the world are on the march towards industrialism"(51). The fate of the Third World was one of disintegration and reformation in line with this 'logic'. Hawthorn reads this view in the light of US intellectual traditions in social thought, and current preoccupations and problems. He notes: "in such a way contemporary history was assimilated to the foreshortened historical understanding in American social thought so that the diverse peculiarities of other societies and the worrying features of America itself could always be explained away"(52). A related strand of thought 'establishes' the propriety of US style of democracy; one thinks of Lipset's 'Political Man' and also Taylor's critique of its 'cheating' argument style (52a).

Tipps notes that the increase of research was designed to increase the "flow of information concerning these societies in the US, and especially in official circles" (53). It is this demand for what Fay would call policy science that is at back of 'modernization'. However from this point Tipps' argument shades off into confusion and ambiguity. It is argued that an 'ideological' critique
is not enough to throw over the thesis of 'modernization', yet insofar as these theorists lay claims to value-free work and claim for their results generality, they provide the lever to topple the whole edifice. As Fay points out, to uncover the ideological nature of a stance that denies such a character in favour of claims to the status of (natural)science, is to deal it a mortal blow: it collapses into ideology ordinarily understood.

Paralleling these issues, Tipps goes on to remark that there is no reason to suppose that the notion of 'modernization' itself is "inherently incompatible with a variety of ethnocentrisms, or that a revolutionary or socialist version of modernization theory could not be developed"(54). Our commentator, we may assume, has grasped (albeit unconsciously) the idea we gestured to above: that is, that 'modernization' as an evaluative stance is proper insofar as it takes a stance. However, the conclusion that a 'left-modernization' is possible is not helpful. 'Modernization' is clearly 'policy-science', and unless we want to construct a positivistic 'left' philosophy of social development, 'modernization' has no place in it(55). That Tipps can consider the idea reflects his empiricist distinction between fact and value. To carry over the wholly proper idea of moral-engagement and call that 'modernization' would be a needless and obfuscating stretching of the notion of 'modernization'. The empiricist frame and narrow notion of ideology used by Tipps are the cause of his eventual confusion. It is claimed of 'modernization' that "Far from it being a universally applicable schema for the study of the historical development of human societies, the nature of modernization theory reflects a particular phase in the development of single society, that of the US"(56). It is this aspect of the matter, the clearly situation-bound character of 'modernization', that not only establishes Tipps' thesis to the effect that 'modernization' needs replacing rather than adjusting, but also provides the stance's continuing interest: that is,
it displays clearly the essential character of social theorizing as the business of making sense. Our commentator misses the point of what his critique of ideology provides him with.

4.2 Thus far we have looked at 'modernization' as being a (primarily American) ideology. But what of its character and typical mode of argument? In order to discover the form of 'modernization', we will rely upon the work of in the main--recent critics. What follows is a brief review, serving only to identify the typical argument form of the 'modernization' scheme.

Brookfield begins his treatment of 'modernization' by taking note of the general matter of strategies of explanation; thus he says that he is writing "about dichotomies in the theory of development" (57). The whole episode of 'modernization' is taken as characterized by its adherence to a dichotomous characterization of the issue of development. It is this strategy for grasping the exchange of 'rich' and 'poor' that is Brookfield's target. He argues that having conceptualized the general circumstances in terms of the dichotomy 'traditional society'/ 'modern society', theorists of the school then proceed to attempt to elucidate matters by deploying a further set of dichotomous constructs. Familiarly: dual economy, agricultural and industrial sectors, community and association, and so on. What Brookfield wants to show is that the dichotomies used are a linked set and, in toto, an unhelpful set. That they are linked may be established in two ways: 'analytically', by reporting on work derived from Parsons' 'pattern variables'; and 'associatively', by reporting upon the diverse efforts of those seeking descriptive characterizations of traditional/modern. That they are an unhelpful set is a matter of noting the inadequacies of their argument forms. We shall follow in rough outline this scheme of Brookfield's.

(I) Linked set: analytic/associative. Brookfield observes,
rightly, that 'modernization-theory' is, in contrast to 'growth-theory', a broader based effort: it embraces contributions from a variety of sources. Four are noted in his treatment: "The 'acculturation' thesis of anthropology was an important element; others included Talcott Parsons' theories of 'action' and of social change, notions of the plural society originating with Furnivall, theory in political science on the evolution of nationalism" (58). Other critics offer variations of such a 'list' of contributions to the 'modernization' scheme; yet all would follow Brookfield's view that these contributions are channeled through "a particular view of change which is essentially dualistic: tradition and modernity are seen as opposed forces, the latter growing at the expense of the former.... Dichotomous thinking thus underlies the whole argument of modernization theory" (59).

(Granting this, we can also report that it is noticeable that with 'modernization' critics feel free to give vent to their scorn, where other targets do not seem to draw this sort of fire quite so readily). Additionally, Huntington offers the view of the characteristic terms of debate in the late 1950's and early '60's, 'tradition' and 'modernity', that "these categories were, of course, the latest manifestation of a Great Dichotomy between more primitive and more advanced societies which has been a common feature of Western social thought for the past one hundred years" (60). So we can note, as do Huntington and Brookfield (treating anticipations of the 'acculturation' of the anthropologists): Maine's status/contract, Durkheim's mechanical/organic, Tonnies' gemeinschaft/gesellschaft or Weber's traditional/rational. Doubtless a search of the literature would reveal other similar orientating metaphors. The argument strategy of 'modernization' has been summed up as follows: "The bridge across the Great Dichotomy between modern and traditional societies is the Grand Process of Modernization" (61).

Of this dichotomy Huntington claims that the modern set of notions attempting to flesh out the before/after metaphor originate with Parsons' and Shils'
'pattern variables', "and the subsequent extension of
these from 'choices' confronting an actor to character-
izations of social systems"(62). The 'pattern variables'
appear in simple forms in early 'modernization' work.
Thus Bernstein, notes that "the participation of other
social science disciplines in the discussions of devel-
opment was recognised as being necessary, often being
expressed in the 'social conditions of economic growth'
or 'non economic barriers to economic growth' types of
formula"(63)He cites as an example of "an occasionally
useful eclecticism"(64) Hoselitz's 1952 work "The
Progress of the Underdeveloped Areas", which included
essays from Gerschenkron, Watnick and Hirschman. In
Hoselitz's essay, 'Social Structure and Economic Growth'
we find a systematised dualism; that is, seeking to
characterize 'tradition' and 'modernity' the 'pattern
variables' are invoked. Three out of five are taken to
be pertinent. Hilal summarises: "Thus, while developed
societies are characterized by universalism, achieve-
ment orientation and role specificity, underdeveloped
countries have the opposite properties of particularism
ascriptiveness and role diffuseness. Once this is stated
it becomes easy to see that development consists in the
acquisition of the first set of characteristics and the
loss of the opposite set"(65). Here the dichotomies
which purport to elucidate the nature of the major bi-
furcation are clearly a linked set. In the instances
where the 'pattern variables' are invoked they gesture
to an 'analytical' linkage. But more often than not
we find that, whilst the Parsonian scheme is cited, the
set of dichotomies are linked only insofar as they
belong to one group of efforts to produce a descriptive
and general model of 'tradition' versus 'modern'. The
linkage is rather 'associative',

The pursuit of a descriptive/general scheme of
evolution had one ready consequence; as Roxborough notes
it "usually led to the formulation of a series of
stages of development"(66). In A G Frank's famed critique
of 'modernization' dualism ('Sociology of Development
and Underdevelopment of Sociology') the Parsonian-
derived scheme of Hoselitz using the 'pattern variables'
is one of two versions of the general line which Frank
dubs the 'Ideal-typical index approach'. The other
is stage theory: here Rostow is cited, and his work
we treat below. As regards Frank's "magisterial"(67)
critique, we find that he identifies three lines within
the orthodoxy of modernization, and attacks them all
in turn under the headings of empirical, theoretical,
and policy inadequacy. Thus he observes that there is
a "deep similarity in the extent of the three modes'
empirical inaccuracy, theoretical inadequacy and policy
ineffectiveness"(68). He argues that this reveals sim-
ilarities in argument strategy. So the ideal typical
index approach is taken to be concerned with setting up
the characteristics of development, diffusio#ism with
how the characteristics of the 'modern' are transmitted
to the 'traditional', against what obstacles; finally :
the psychological approach, a "Freudianised Weber"(69),
treats the absorption of these stances by groups/indiv-
duals within the 'traditional' societies.

We can move beyond Frank's attacks by noting Hilal's
extended version of this critical stance. Here there is
reference to Parsons 'neo-evolutionism', described
as a very general scheme which provides "an assurance
of stability and a semblance of order in a situation
of apparent rapid change"(70). Hilal thinks Parsons'
scheme is "little more than useless"(71), but ideologically
its usefulness might be appreciated if we recall Haw-
thorn's characterization of US sociology as being
concerned above all with the issue of stable change.
Hawthorn reports that methodologically US sociology was
(as we noted above) "still a mixture of normative
functionalism, pragmatist social psychology and tech-
niques for analysing survey data "(72). And their
interests? ... "it was of the possibilities of stable
change, and once more the answers were curiously
soothing. Industrial societies were converging towards
a common destination dictated by the technical and
organisational imperatives of advanced industrialisation" (73). Extended to the Third World this scheme came up with the following: "Non-industrial societies .... would if they were not already doing so experience a differentiation of structures the more efficiently to meet the imperatives dictated by economic development..." (74). So the 'modernization' schemes reflected this reassuring and optimistic view, and as Rhodes notes this dualism of 'tradition' and 'modernity', lodged in an evolutionist frame, suited the dispositions of the US theorists. The effects of colonialism were ignored, the inhabitants of the Third World made responsible for their own conditions, and the possibility of revolutionary change discounted. "Thus the substitution of an evolutionary for a truly historical perspective had very convenient ideological consequences" (75). The convenience of some of these ideological consequences—if this is the right way to cast it—can be seen clearly in the work of Rostow, explicitly a 'non-communist manifesto'.

It seems clear that what we have in these 'modernization' schemes is an effort to effect a descriptive-general policy science which not only characterizes the process and goal of 'modernization' in a fashion appropriate to the needs of current political demand, but also seeks to identify specific points of intervention within the 'target' systems.

(2) An unhelpful set. From the above lines of critique/characterization we can perhaps pick out two areas of criticism which usefully relate to issues pursued in this study. So we look at the particular issue of dualism, in two areas. First economic dualism, which attempts to provide a single theory of economics—in contradistinction to the 'classic'dualists, who advanced claims for distinct schemes treating 'rich' and 'poor'. Second, we look at the sociological dualisms of 'traditional'/'modern' societies, attacked by many. Following this, we add a note on the more general issue of attempts to construct descriptive general models. There we register what for us is the crucial problem with 'modernization' formulations.
Brookfield notes that it "is a matter of simple observ-
ation that the economies of a great many developing
countries are organised in two parts......almost as
though they formed two different societies and econom-
ies"(76). That this general observation is plausible
is confirmed by Frank. In a critique of the dual society
thesis he observes that "Evident inequalities of income
and differences in culture have led many observers to
see 'dual'societies and economies in the underdeveloped
countries"(77). It is the shift from common sense-
 informed observation/description to generalized models
that purport to explain that occasions the mendacious
confusion attacked by theorists like Frank or Griffin.
That the shift is illegitimate is not something which
it is entirely clear that Brookfield has grasped, even
though he makes reference to arguments for recasting the
manner in which the work is conceived rather than simply
continually making piecemeal revisions.

The thesis of the dual economy is taken as presented
by Boeke and Furnivall, both writing before the Second
World War. It is reported that Boeke, who anticipates
Furnivall, takes Western economics to be inapplicable
in the circumstances of colonial dependencies; and that
"two sets of economic principles are required"(78).
Brookfield continues by noting that "the central problem
in understanding a tropical dependency, he [Boeke] argued,
arises from the contact between the two social and
economic systems"(79). It is this view which anticipates
the familiar dual economy-society thesis, but it also
informs a line of more particularly economic thought on
these matters. 'Classic'dualism is rejected in the
attempt to construct a single economics.

"The essence of the theory of economic dualism is the
attempt to combine in one system theory for an advanced
and for a backward economy"(80), where the two 'sectors'
are characterized in the usual way. "The primitive
statement of economic dualism is the ... paper of WA
Lewis(1954) on 'Economic development with unlimited
supplies of labour'. Though not formally a dual-economy
model, Lewis's formulation concerns two coexistent sectors and the conditions governing the supply of labour to the growing industrial sector from the agricultural"(81). Now according to Brookfield this type of orthodox-formulated investigation of the exchange between a 'modern sector' and a 'non modern sector' was extensively treated through the 1950's. It is reported that these "...models of economic dualism are growth models and this characteristic has become more pronounced in the 1960's"(82). These efforts parallel, it would seem, the more familiar 'sociological' schemes.

But where is the interest in all this? Clearly this note goes no way to elucidating what is evidently a complex debate within an area of economics. Yet our remarks do serve to call attention to this aspect of the history of economic thinking on such matters; and the debate is of interest in that it anticipates a remark made by a noted 'dependency' theorist, Girvan (83). The latter, having reviewed the work of Furtado, observes that here the old debate about whether one or two economics are needed can be resolved. The orthodox scheme (which would embrace an economic dualism) is found wanting, but not in favour of the two schemes of economics; quite the reverse. Now that 'dependency' has established an economics adequate to the dependent economies (Latin America in particular) it can also be seen that this scheme is appropriate to the economies of the developed areas. The orthodoxy is now rejected as demonstrably inadequate to its own and the circumstances of Third World economies. There is now one economics, 'dependency'. This argument we treat in a later chapter, where we will detail the confusions between conceptual progressivity in natural science and ideology-ranking in the social that give rise to it.

Turning to sociological dualisms and the concern with "The bridge across the Great Dichotomy" (84), we can codify some of the criticisms that have been brought against 'modernization'. We can move from what we
take to be the more obvious to the rather more subtle criticisms.

We can begin with objections to the characterizations made of the two central notions used, 'modern' and 'traditional'. As regards the former element of the dichotomy it has been strongly argued that the characterization of the 'modern' is highly dubious. The well known use of Parsons' 'pattern variables' is criticized with all the familiar points brought against that scheme: thus it is ahistorical, static, neglecting of class and matters of conflict and power. Frank, treating the 'Ideal Typical Index Approach', confronts Hoselitz's Parsonian-inspired characterization of the modern with a series of rhetorical, common sense fact-presenting questions and shows it to be untenable. It is an empirically unsatisfactory description. This line is followed by Hilal: speaking of the ideal-typological approach he observes that "In its dominant version it is unrepentantly empiricist" (85). There is, the same author continues, a "distinct tendency to compile check lists of attributes" (86). These criticisms apply also to characterizations of 'traditional'. Of this approach Hilal quite rightly questions its "meaningfulness" (87).

There is a further line of criticism made of the category 'traditional'; and if we follow this, we can open up the issue of residual categories and note some of the difficulties associated with them. We can agree that the category 'modern', even if characterizations produced are faulty, does at least stand in some sort of clear and direct relationship to the material circumstances it would grasp. And even, to go one step further, if we note that abstracting and generalizing are faulty procedures we can grant that with 'modern' the procedure is at least minimally plausible. This is not so with 'tradition'. This concept is constructed not by abstraction and generalization, but by spelling out the particulars in which it is supposed that the non-developed fail to measure up to the model of the
This collection of deficiencies presents itself as the model of traditional society. As Huntington notes "Dichotomies which combine positive concepts and residual ones ....... are highly dangerous analytically. In point of fact, they are not properly dichotomies at all" (88). It is from this fundamental incoherence that the errors flow, because this dichotomous formulation has the effect of masking the implausibility of the 'modernization' theorists' argument strategy. They attempt to model the interaction of two specific circumstances(objects). But we can see that in the usual natural science-aping syntax the argument appears to be curiously circular: we have a fairly clear end-point in presently experienced modern society, but the putative start-point is merely a 'negative image' of the end-point and not actually independent or different at all. If, on the other hand, the pretence to the status of (natural) science were dropped in favour of an explicitly argued case then this problem would not arise. In the literature of criticism of this specimen of 'development-studies' this argument is not usually pushed through. Thus Bernstein, who sees (as do the others) the over-generality of the concept 'traditional', writes that "The first objection to be noted concerns the methodological procedure by which the traditional is simply defined negatively in relation to the modern so that ..... differences between empirical societies allocated to the residual category of the traditional are ignored" (89). He starts off in the right direction and then disappears up the familiar side-street.

Two related points can be presented here. One concerns 'dice-loading' and the other 'collapsing arguments'. As regards 'dice-loading' we would argue that a dichotomous construct that affirms one category and identifies the other as a concatenation of non-prime category elements is immediately value-skewed. Consider the idea of the 'non-medical use of drugs'. This is a term which purports to allow the cool-headed discussion of social drug use, in particular recreational
use. It is taken to be a movement forward from simple condemnation. But we can ask, just when and by whom was the model of medical use established as prime case against which other uses might be classified? Clearly, when the dichotomy \textit{medical/non-medical} is written in full, then the implicit criticism of any drug use that is other than prime case—that is, which is not legitimated by an authoritative medical practitioner for approved use—is revealed. The expression \textit{non-medical use of drugs} is presented as non-judgmental, a basis for free and equal discussion. Clearly it is not; and generally, if value-skew is either not acknowledged or, because the particular skew is clothed in 'common sense' as with our example, \textit{not seen}, then we get simple bias. In the case of our example, we move from a situation of outright condemnation, which is relatively easy to attack, to a situation of disguised condemnation, which is very much harder to attack. The point of all this is fairly clear: the notion of \textit{modernization}, as it presents itself in its usual scientistic formulations, tends, to our mind, to simple bias in the same way. The \textit{modern} is taken as the self-evidently given, and the non-modern constitute so many deviations from it. A proper approach to matters of theorizing the exchange of \textit{rich} and \textit{poor} involves, as we argued in Section One, explicitly arguing a case. To the extent that \textit{modernization-theory} neglects the reflexive posture attendant upon arguing a case it must be judged to be \textit{low grade ideology}.

The second point concerns \textit{collapsing arguments}. We draw this line of criticism from Huntington. It is noted that the characterizations of \textit{modern} and \textit{traditional} are unsatisfactory, but in comparison with the idea of \textit{modernization} they are lucid and clear. Criticising the scheme for ambiguity in respect of claims (are these actual stages or ideal types?) it is remarked that "Inevitably, also, the dual character of the concepts undermined the conceptual dichotomy"(90). The problem is that all societies display \textit{traditional} and \textit{modern} characteristics, which is no problem if
it is static descriptions that are required. But, "Viewed as a theory of history or change, however, the addition of a transitional category tended to exclude the traditional and modern stages from the historical process" (91). The two notions 'traditional' and 'modern' come to represent, it is claimed, the start and end of history. "But if all real societies are transitional societies a theory is needed which will explain the forms and processes of change at work in transitional societies. This is just what the dichotomic theory failed to provide." (92). This is surely a crucial attack: the fundamental argument-strategy of 'modernization', the elucidation of change across a general dichotomy by means of invoking a series of particular dichotomies, fails when the scheme is brought to bear on 'the world'. The scheme is unable to grasp change, or transition, and can only offer static comparisons in abstract and ahistorical terms. This is not just an empirical inadequacy but is rather a fundamental conceptual incapacity.

Finally, we can add a mention of two instances of value-skew in 'modernization'. Thus in respect of Rostow's stage theory Frank notes that the scheme supposes a 'primitive starting point' from which even the presently developed are taken to have emerged. Frank thinks this is fallacious, "This entire approach to economic development and cultural change attributes a history to the developed countries but denies all history to the under-developed ones" (93). The presently 'rich' have the history of their emergence, whilst the 'poor' have yet to move, so to say, and consequently have no history. Griffin follows Frank in regarding this as ludicrous, observing that classifying Third World countries "as 'traditional societies' begs the issue and implies that the under-developed countries have no history or that it is unimportant" (94). Both Frank and Griffin argue that, far from the Third World countries having been 'traditional' and unchanging in a way that could plausibly be taken to leave them with 'no history', it is precisely their history that explains their
present: in particular, the centuries-long exchange of peripheral with metropolitan areas. Again the 'modernization' scheme is condemned as theoretically incapable of treating what, on any account, would be taken to be part of the common sense of an enquiry. The formulation 'traditional/modern' is thus skewed in that it rules out consideration of the part played by the 'rich' in creating the present circumstances of the 'poor'.

An interesting line on the issue of valuation-skew is presented by Rhodes, who argues that the evolutionary school (which includes, in the present, 'modernization') has emphasised the cultural and psychological in reaction to Marx. Rhodes identifies a bastardized Weber, with the 'Protestant Ethic' being read as having refuted Marx, as the well-spring of interest in these lines. It is noted that "Two closely related approaches to development have emerged as the result of Weber's influence, the cultural and the psychological"(95). These are criticised for various reasons in what is a subtle argument which concludes that "the evolutionary perspective has provided an ideal conceptual framework within which the forces of colonialism can be ignored, disguised or dismissed. The fusion of an outdated theoretical perspective and lack of historical knowledge with certain ideological and institutional forces has created a social science which is incapable of understanding the dynamics of economic development"(96).

Finally, in pursuit of the Brookfield-inspired claim that the categories of 'modernization' are an unhelpful set, we can turn to the matter of descriptive general models. The above treatment is a review of 'modernization' and its critics which rests largely within the terms of their debate, and within these terms the charges of the critics we would grant. However, in order to link with our general interest in argument-construction we have to note that, for us, the trouble with 'modernization'—taking it as an exercise in social theorizing—is that it has an impoverished (and arguably disingenuous) conception of a proper and fruitful analysis.
The scheme takes the proper mode of enquiry to be the establishment of policy-scientific general models, which descriptively characterize the structure of the society in question in such a fashion as to permit manipulative interventions governed by an authoritative 'objective' knowledge. This is the effort's strategic error; thereafter its adherents are liable to criticisms which attach to the use of residual categories, skewed arguments, and collapsing dualisms which we have noted above. Their fundamental strategy is clearly grasped by Hilal: first define 'modern', then in opposition 'non-modern', and 'modernization' is the route between them. The rest is just detail, which may or may not be intrinsically interesting. Smith follows this and identifies the same uniform theme at back of the various schemes of 'modernization': "Ultimately, the various societies with their different cultures and modernizing routes can be analysed in terms of an ideal-type of these trends. They constitute so many 'deviations' from the general direction of these trends, so many variant patterns on a common theme"(97).

The 'modernization' scheme is seen by Hawthorne to be part and parcel of US sociology, of this overall picture he notes: "...contemporary history was assimilated to the foreshortened historical understanding in American social thought so that the diverse peculiarities of other societies and the worrying features of America itself could always be explained away"(98).

5.0 Dynamic of Theory III: the apogee of 'modernization'.
We conclude with a brief mention of Rostow: a figure we associate with the apogee of 'modernization', and evidence of the re-emergence of a counter-tradition to 'positivistic' social science. We proceed by noting that the episode of 'modernization's' 'career' can be itself described as a series of 'stages', and that Rostow appears in the period of the maximum celebration of 'modernization'. Having taken note of why Rostow's effort was so popular, we finish with a reference to what seems
to be an almost un-remarked development; that is, the 'revisionist-modernization-theorists' explorations in the realm of what Gellner (99) calls 'classical political philosophy'.

5.1 What we might call the 'initial phase of modernization' we can make parallel the pre-1955 period of US dominance in aid giving. According to White's history, it is the occasion of the extension of the Marshall Aid doctrine to similarly distressed areas in the Third World. It aims to secure allies for the US, and insofar as an articulated theory was concerned a version of the Harrod-Domar model (as core) plus a range of 'non-economic factors', was in use. The particular 'factor' that linked the Harrod-Domar core to political requirements was what Kolko identifies in US European policy: the equation of economic health with lowering of liability to communist 'infection'. In practice, prior to 1956, flows of aid remained small and what there was went mostly to SE Asia where "aid policy .... was virtually indistinguishable from strategic policy" (100). This orientation continues to inform enquiry into the matter of the development of the Third World. But around 1956 there is a change.

The second phase, which we might label the 'phase of the elaboration of modernization' (1956-61, say) sees the invention of 'modernization'. It was in 1955 that the Bandung Conference affirmed the principle of 'non-alignment'. Together with the entry (as White reports it) of the USSR into the realm of aid-giving, this constitutes the political occasion of a shift in legitimating theorems. This change in the politics of aid necessitates changes in its presentation and thus theorizing. The themes of legitimation, in US work, shift from foreign policy objectives couched in 'cold war' terms, to the encouragement of 'development'. So 'containment' is revised and 'modernization' within the ambit of the 'free world' is offered to counteract the USSR's offers of 'socialism'. The theoretical counterpart is a concern, as we have seen, for the explication
of the matter of stable change; and the US intellectual scene produces general, systematic, theories of the emergence and character of industrial life. Systems functionalism, as the general paradigm, permits detailed empirical work, intermediate level (project) theorizing and very general schemes of societal development.

The third phase, which is notable for its optimism, we can label the 'phase of the apogee of modernization'. This peak coincides with the Kennedy administration, and it declines slowly as the US sinks into the Vietnam quagmire and as 'development' fails to materialize.

The first root of the optimistic formulation of 'modernization' would seem to be lodged in the Kennedy administration's foreign-policy efforts. Thus the Truman Doctrine is re-affirmed in the Inaugural Address, and according to Graham (101) foreign policy becomes the only area of operation for an administration that is stymied at home. After the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis is taken (wrongly, according to Young (102)) as a vindication of 'crisis management'. Nonetheless, the chance for Kennedy to recoup his political fortunes lay, thinks Kiernan (103), in Vietnam. These 'New Frontiersmen' are characterized by Nolting (the US ambassador in Vietnam, 1961-63) as being "very gung-ho fellows, wanting to get things straightened up in a hurry, clear up the mess. We've got the power and we've got the know how and we can do it" (104). If this is one root, then the other is to be found, on White's account, in the shift of aid-debate to the level of the general.

Here there are two political considerations. At the end of the 1950's there was a surge of decolonization, of mostly Black African states. This surge of decolonization occasioned a reworking of accepted notions of aid, as the character of Black African states was evidently more fragile than had been the case in the earlier colonial withdrawal from Asia. There is a double shift, from regarding aid-flows as unusual and transitory phenomena to seeing aid as both continuing and proper. By the
end of the 1950's White reports that the provision of aid and its efficacy were taken for granted; it was all "self-evidently desirable"(105). The reinforcing political circumstance was the aid-recipients' response to the US/European debate, in the wake of the Cuban episode, on 'sharing the burden' of defending the interests of the 'free world'. This is taken to have looked rather like a 'donors club' and it is recorded that the aid recipients responded by trying to shift the debate to the UN where they had a voice. White sees this as having the effect of wrenching aid-giving out of various local and evolving contexts and fixing the debate at a very general level. The impact on theorizing was unfortunate, thinks White, because "it had to be assumed, falsely, that the objectives were self-evident and accepted; that is, that the nature of the development process and of the aspirations of those who sought to promote such a process was not in dispute"(106). It is into this context of optimism, and non-controversiality, that Rostow's work is introduced.

5.2 We can now turn to Rostow, whose 'Stages' might be taken to encapsulate the theoretical elements looked at in Section Two as a whole. Thus the core of the Rostovian scheme is, it would seem, the Harrod-Domar model. Mikesell notes that "Rostow was considerably influenced by the Harrod-Domar model in his definitions of take-off in terms of the critical rate of investment required for the achievement of a level of income and savings sufficient to assure self-contained growth"(107). Brookfield would agree with this, and adds a remark on an area of work in economics that we have not treated; this is the quantitative work which parallels the more formal elaborations of Harrod-Domar models. It is reported that there was "a spell of quite profound research into the capital/output ratio"(108). The suggestion is that Rostow takes the theoretical position of the Harrod-Domar model, adopts the quantitative work on ICOR, and comes up with the notion of 'take-
Now, if the core of the Rostovian effort is the growth model work of the economists, then its frame—its general theory of change—is a neo-evolutionary scheme. Essentially dualistic, Rostow presents five 'stages'. The fifth is the model of the US, and the first is a combined residual and antithetical concept to set against the model of the US. The remaining three, centering on 'take-off', treat the transition from 'tradition' to 'modernity'. That this sort of descriptive-general dualistic characterization is unsatisfactory as an explanation of change has been argued above.

A detailed exposition/critique of the Rostovian effort we will eschew providing: it has been done before on numerous occasions, and the bones of this particular debate are surely picked clean. We do want to make one point (arising from our interest in argument strategies) which is not often made in treatments of 'modernization'. But before that, we can ask: just why was Rostow's work so popular?

Hagen, in a review of Rostow's scheme, notes that the "conception of stages of economic growth almost immediately captured the attention of laymen.... It was given serious though not generally favourable attention by social scientists as well"(109). It is with the 'laymen' that we should concern ourselves, noting that the term must include primarily government circles who were, after all, involved in these matters. A sketch of an answer to the question of the popularity of the Rostovian scheme can be presented in terms of 'ideological-fitness'. This analogy comes from design-problems, where a 'design problem' is a matter of fitting functional requirements to the possibilities of the materials and the constraints of the environment. So we ask: how does Rostow's melange of proffered explanations sit with the political needs of those embroiled in matters of development? We can identify two broad areas which serve to illuminate Rostow's peculiar suitability: the timing and origin of his message on the
one hand, and on the other the optimistic generality of its content.

Rostow's 'Stages' is the pre-eminent theory of development through the early 1960's. The work was first presented in a 1956 essay, in the Economic Journal, 'The Take-Off into Self-sustained Growth' and represented in its familiar form in 1960. Thus its initial publication coincides with the shift from US hegemony in aid-giving and subsequent search for an elaborated theory of 'modernization' during White's phase of aid-donor competition. In the 1960 publication the anti-communist theme and the core message of the Harrod-Domar model fit Rostow into the mould of the 'New Frontier'. It is here that we find the highest expression of the notions of 'interventionism'. Rostow was a part of this establishment; and as the pronouncements of the most powerful state on Earth are of understandable interest to others, then the work of one of its members may be expected to be studied for clues as to that government's likely activities.

The counterpart is the messages acceptability. In the 1960's, as we have just seen, a confluence of factors effectively shifted international discussion of aid and development onto a very general level. Debate came to focus on the 'rules of the game'; and this being the case, questions about what aid was actually for, how it was supposed to work, and what existing conceptions supposed and entailed, all dropped away. In its place, as White argued, there was a presumption of 'self-evidence'. Here the descriptive, un-reflective generality of the Rostovian scheme was, we can suggest, wholly appropriate. This point is made, if in passing, by Hagen: "Undoubtedly one of the causes of the wide popularity of Rostow's book is the perception conveyed by it that there is order in this uncertain world; that once a certain sequence is entered upon, economic growth will follow" (110). In addition to the acceptability at the level of the general, so to say, we can discern in
the Rostovian effort some more immediate attractions. Thus if we imagine the circumstances of international conferences and so on, then we can see that the time period for 'take-off' proposed by Rostow (20 years) was such as to be (a) conceivable and (b) long enough not to be oppressive. Equally the mechanism of 'take-off'—the creation of a rise in ICOR from 5% to 10%, which is taken from Lewis in particular—is obviously quantifiable; so targets can be set for aid flows, growth rates and the rest. Brookfield summarizes the scheme's persuasiveness as follows: "It seemed to give every country an equal chance; it 'explained' the advantage of the developed countries; it offered a clear path to progress—without spelling this out in detail; it identified the requirements for advance with the virtues of the West; it suggested comfortingly that the communist countries were in fact following Western recipes, with a difference; it debunked the historical theories of Marx".

5.3 The Rostovian schema we take to be the gaudiest manifestation of 'modernization' in the phase of its apogee; Baran and Hobsbawm speak of a mixture of "coffee house sociology and political speculation". But at the same time we find stirrings of a fruitful line of revision. We take Gellner to exemplify this line.

Gellner writes from within the school of Popperian liberalism, and we may provisionally label him a 'phase four revisionist modernization-theorist'. We can see how his treatment of 'social change' is adequate to the importance of the debate as practical social theorizing, and sensitive to its intellectual complexity and disciplinary import.

We may approach these matters by noting that Gellner takes a different line, with regard to the internal logic of the various basic metaphors of change, than does Rostow. In particular his conception of the ideological role of such metaphors is to be noted. Gellner's 'neo-episodic' conception of change—where the interests
and metaphors expressed by the classical evolutionists, treating the broad sweep of history, are reworked into a less ambitious theory focused upon a circumscribed object, a discrete historical episode—does not easily correspond to the evolutionist scheme of Rostow. Thus Gellner's notion is essentially an element of an attempt at an explicit moral ordering of the world, which procedure is necessarily tentative and self-involving. The Rostovian pursuit, on the other hand, is of a general descriptive scheme; along with other 'modernization' theorists, it is 'recipe' knowledge that is sought.

Gellner begins by noting that "...men generally have a view of the nature of their society. They also have views concerning what validates the society's arrangements. The two things, image and validation, never are and cannot be wholly distinct" (113). Three explanations/legitimations are presented, each taken as expressive of a fundamental metaphor of progress. Of these, the simplest is taken as identifying "one episode, one transition from one bad state of affairs to one good state" (114). We are given the example of the explanation offered by the Enlightenment thinkers, the device of the 'social contract'. These 17th and 18th century views, (their predecessors are unspecified) are taken to be sociologically impoverished, and thus unsatisfactory given their demanding role. A richer and enduring schema is generated by 19th century thinkers and is the familiar evolutionist type, validating society in terms of an all embracing and permanent process: transition as such. The metaphor's persuasiveness Gellner locates in its 19th century incorporation into common sense as the general theory of the(natural) progress (of the West). These schemes are objected to on the ground that they tend to confuse history and mechanism: thus a period is taken (wrongly) to be explained when it is slotted into some wider postulated series. Marx is excepted insofar as he presents a mechanism of change and thus offers a genuine explanation. Gellner also takes exception, as we might expect, to the latent determinism of evolutionist
schemes, arguing that it tends to squeeze out the moral agent. Finally he adds that anyway, as a simple matter of fact, these efforts do not fit the situation of the Third World and so are largely irrelevant to today's problems.

Gellner's third conception of 'social change' is his own and he constructs it from basics. He begins by observing that the conditions of the legitimacy of a social order are its being (i) industrialized or modernizing and (ii) non-colonial. This is taken to be both a matter of fact and, as it happens, a correct political philosophy. He reformulates it thus: "the diffusion of industrialism, carried out by national units is the dominant event of our time. This is an 'episode', however large and fundamental it may be" (115). Gellner attaches to his revised, focused, evolutionism the practical conclusion of his Popperian liberalism; and so as the key to 'the transition' we have the affirmation of science and its method. Analogously, in the realm of politics (and presumably only for the Third World) he advocates the rule of the modernizing elite.

If the foregoing indicates how the notion of 'social change' may be taken to be able to encapsulate the complex issues thrown up in the efforts of the post-war period to grasp this matter of 'development' (and does so in a way which reveals the intellectual impoverishment of the run of the mill 'modernization-theorists'), then we may note, as a corollary, a general point with regard to the matter of social theory itself. Thus Gellner, after presenting the two core elements of what he takes to be a presently relevant political philosophy, goes on to make the remarkable claim that "the heir of 'classical' political theory is now sociology" (116). The task of political theory is here taken to be the formulation of descriptions of society in terms of which action is informed; or briefly, the construction of ideologies. If it is to be a good ideology then it must necessarily take cognisance of how societies function and change, thus it will be sociological. Gellner takes the business of sociology in the 19th century
to have been the rendering intelligible of the novel, and morally problematical, process of industrialization. He notes that "the emergence of industrial society is the prime concern of sociology" (117). If we recall our paraphrasing of Hilal vis a vis the 'discovery' of the Third World, we can note that Gellner goes on to say that "when industrialization had happened only once, those who had been through it tended to confuse it with what may have been accidental or once-only concomitants of its first occurrence. Now, the repetitions provided by new combinations of circumstances, and the attempt to understand and facilitate the process in new places, also throws light on its earlier occurrence in the West" (113). The old problem of political philosophy—that is, the 'problem of order'—is now overthrown in favour of investigation of the bases of industrial society.

It is with Gellner that we see how the fruitful legacy of 'modernization' may be taken to have been established. The line from a narrow Keynesian-derived 'growth-theory', via the ideological naivete of early and elaborated 'modernization', to this explicit acknowledgment of the richness and complexity of the problem of development is completed. The fruit, erroneous formulations aside, is a rediscovery of 'social theory', what Gellner calls 'classical' political philosophy.

It is our view that particular marxian-inspired schemes of social theorizing are the appropriate vehicles for further enquiry of this sort. These we will come to. At this point Gellner's remarks invite a review of the then contemporary efforts at similarly theoretically 'rich' treatments of the Third World, but this is an area we cannot here review.

It must, finally, be noted that if Gellner points to a 'better' modernization than the run of the mill efforts, then he does so, arguably, because he inhabits a different, European, intellectual tradition. Quite how important this fact is will become clearer in the course of the next chapter when we look at 'decolonization' and the work of the theorists of 'neo-institutionalism'.
Section Three: The 'Radicals'

Introduction.
In Section Two we looked at the 'positivists' within the 'career' of 'development-studies', the dominant school within the immediate post-war, 'cold war', period. Now we turn to an examination of the contributions to, and results of, the partial disintegration of this position. Again we must recall that we are treating a web of events in the real world, theoretical responses amongst academics and practitioners, mediated by political demands and disciplinary traditions. We are dealing with themes: and, more particularly, with one theme picked out of the web of the history of the sixties. The 'positivist' orthodoxy does not simply go away and nor does this period of the 'radicals' end neatly with the resurgence of marxian scholarship. The three periods overlap, and theorists change their roles as we change our questions.

The material of Section Two offers our second distinguishable answer to the question of the independence and novelty of the efforts of 'development-studies': in their differing fashions the lines treated here would claim to see 'development-studies' as independent and novel, and as constituting a clear advance over earlier work. Thus Section Three confronts two problem areas: the independence and theoretical novelty or otherwise of 'development-studies'; and the matter of ranking competing efforts.

In Section Three, the 'positivist C-W' is subjected to a threefold critique, and we treat each after the style of Dobb(1). These critiques have it in common that they deny the possibility of separating matters of economy on the one hand from matters of society on the other. The familiar calculus of the economists is inadequate to those tasks which are typically those of 'development-studies'. This denial takes its starting point in different places for the three critiques and issues in distinctive, though related, analyses.

The 'European line', we term 'neo-institutional...
social theory', following Gruchy(2), and take to form a distinctive alternative to orthodox lines. In terms of noted practitioners, we exchange Lewis(ch.3) and Rostow(ch.4) for Myrdal, Seers and Streeten (whom we meet in ch.5). The key to the scheme is expressed by Seers(3) in his 1963 article when he denies that orthodox economics is of any use in treating the typical problems of the Third World. Attention must be paid to the social and institutional context and to the world economic context within which these economies function.

The 'Latin American' line is taken by Girvan(4) to begin with the rejection of Ricardian-derived notions of international specialisation, in favour of industrialisation, by Prebisch(5). Girvan argues that in the late 1960's the schemes in use were institutional economics which we have noted above, and structuralist economics the genesis of which we can locate in a reaction to monetarist explanations of inflation(6). The denial of such monetarist explanations focused attention on issues of economic structure. The consummation of this trend, argues Girvan, "took the forms of adding (I) an historical perspective and analysis to the structural and institutional method, (II) giving the historical/structural/institutional method the kind of theoretical and empirical content needed to construct a general theory of dependence and under-development"(7-8).

The third line may be exemplified by A G Frank and 'under-development theory'. In general it may be argued that the 'UDT' line deals with more or less the same phenomena as do dependency theorists with the difference that the notion of dependency is located within a functioning world capitalist system with the analytical stress on 'capitalism', that is, criticism is couched in marxian terms. Ehrensaft takes this to be simply a difference of interpretation of the same phenomena, and we may note that the precise status of these 'UDT' efforts has been a matter of sharp debate amongst theorists.

These three reactions to the orthodoxy will be
treated in Section Three as we have treated previously noted theoretical efforts; that is, we indicate the genesis of the critiques and then go on to 'unpack' them in order to reveal their characteristic argument forms. On this matter of the genesis of the critiques we may observe that hitherto, in accordance with our methodological program, we have tried to plot the way in which given sets of resources have been selectively plundered and reworked in response to particular political demands. But in Section Three the political demands are not unequivocally 'positive'; they are rather to some extent 'critical'. The clients for whom the theorists prepare their efforts are not those of Section Two; that is, the nature of the political demand informing the critiques is of a different order to that informing the efforts of the orthodox. The nature of the revisions made in the political demands will be a matter of no little concern. In addition to this, and corresponding to the shift in character of the political demand, there is a re-consideration of the 'positivist' orthodoxy because it forms the object over against which the critiques, at least in part, are defined. Here we may perhaps indicate a reason why the resultant critiques all partake of a single family of concepts.

The program for Section Three will be as follows: chapter five will treat the ideology of the 'neo-institutionalists', and chapter six will treat the varieties of dependency and 'UDT'.

Chapter Five: The contribution of the 'Neo-Institutionalists'.

1.0 Dynamic of Society: An underlying divergence.

Our particular schema (after Dobb) for constructing sociology of knowledge analyses, that is the set of necessary elements of a complete treatment, is organised around the business of theorizing. We grant the general schema of the double dynamic of society and theory and order it around the supposed position of the theorist or group. Thus we take social-theorizing to be an activity whose outline we can describe thus: the theorist lodged within a particular historical milieu is confronted by political demands to interpret current social change. This he accomplishes by invoking in a selectively critical fashion the intellectual resources of his discipline of learning. The product of all this, a theory ordinarily understood, we take to be an ideological construct serving to interpret, legitimate and order action in the world.

Here we look at the general milieu within which the neo-institutionalists worked. We may begin with a point made by Nafziger in respect of the sources of critiques of the dominant, 'economics-positivist', notions of development. He observes that "Fundamental criticism of existing conceptions of reality in development studies originated in Latin America and continental Europe, and to a lesser extent in Asia and Africa, all with some 'inside' perspective on the weakness of dependent economies, rather than in the U.S." (9). That these criticisms emerged outside of the U.S. we may take, granting the sociology of knowledge as a premise, to reflect differences in the situations of the various actors. In this descriptive vein we can record briefly two complex trends running through this period. On the one hand we find an economically reconstructed Western Europe divesting itself of formal colonial empires; and, on the other, we see the 'interventionist' creed of the U.S. reaching its apogee with Kennedy's 'New Frontier', and the subsequent full expression of that, namely Johnson's 'Great Society'.
Of this post-war career of the U.S. Mandel(10) observes that "never in human history has a country exercised global power comparable to the U.S. at the end of the Second World War. No power ever lost absolute supremacy so quickly. The 'American Century' did not last ten years". Citing Mandel recalls that this discussion might, in contrast to the descriptive treatment above, be cast in the form of an enquiry in respect of meaning-systems; that is, ideologies. Further, it is clear that the discussion is ideologically alive; thus the nature of the relationship of the U.S.A. to western Europe and likely changes in that relationship are matters of present concern and differing interpretations.

The former line is pursued by Schurmann who notes that up to the mid-sixties the position of the U.S. seemed secure: "then it seemed as if American economic and military power were virtually unlimited"(11). Yet as early as 1968 the position is seen as crumbling; inflation, unemployment and a weakening dollar are cited. Schurmann presents all this as an introduction to treating the gradual process whereby the ideology of U.S. supremacy became untenable. He claims that: "From the end of World War II till 1968, the vision of the American Empire rested on three fundamental assumptions: (1) that only America had the strategic military power to protect the free world from attack by the Eurasian heartland communist nations, Russia and China; (2) that the powerful American economy was the foundation of all other capitalist and free world economies; and (3) that the political power of the American government alone was capable of organising regionally the free world"(12). Schurmann then goes on to indicate how these assumptions lost credibility. He follows Kiernan's treatment, which focuses on "shifts in economic strength"(13). Two of these are noted: the resource drain of the 'imperial style', and the gradual encroachment of western European and Japanese competition. In regard to the former, Kiernan notes that notwithstanding that up until 1972 the U.S. "maintained a surplus on exchange of goods and services"(14) the drain of maintaining the role of 'world policeman' has outweighed this. This outflow peaked with
the commitment in Vietnam. In regard to the latter point, the effective refurbishment of Western Europe and Japan under U.S. hegemony has raised up competitors who have forced the U.S. to open up its own economy and have competed effectively in the world economy generally. As evidence of the loss on the part of the U.S. of organising power within the 'West', Schurmann presents the refusal of western European nations to send troops to Vietnam.

That there was a divergence in the circumstances of the U.S. and western Europe is clearly a claim that our quoted sources would make. The plausibility of their analyses may be open to question, yet to note this simply serves to introduce the second aspect we noted with Mandel; which is, that the relationship of the U.S. and Western Europe is a significant part of current political debate. That this is the case bids us recall that even if we can retrospectively identify what might be taken to be early signs of the diminution of U.S. power and the divergence of U.S. and Western European interests, it is still the case that this disintegration of U.S. hegemony is far from being 'obvious'. The minimum we can safely take from this (here unexamined) debate is that there has been a recovery of European economic power; thus Lichtheim notes that "in 1947 western Europe's share of international trade had fallen to less than 34 per cent of the global total, whereas by 1965 it had risen to over 40 per cent" (15). In addition, U.S. capital penetration has stopped short of establishing in western Europe what it has established in Canada. Finally, and most important for our purpose, common perceptions of the relationship of U.S. and Western Europe have changed sharply and have worked to render problematical that which for most of the post-war period has been taken for granted.

All this historical material, the substance of continuing debate, we present in order to indicate the broad divergence of U.S. and Western European interests.
That is, we are not interested in constructing a detailed resume of the post-war history of relationships and comparative performances of U.S. and western Europe; rather we wish to indicate that most general milieu within which European theorists operated. Further than this, it is with the issue of 'decolonization' that we meet the proximate cause of the sharp and unequivocal divergence that may be observed in the realm of development-studies between U.S. theory and that of Europeans. We take 'decolonization' to represent a peculiarly European exchange with the Third World. It invokes traditions and histories of which the US has no real counterpart. For example, it provides (we may hazard) at least an element of that moral core necessary to any social-theory. So where the U.S. in dealings with UDC's invoked the 'patriotic imperative' and presented it in the guise of 'modernization-theory', Europeans are in a position to invoke a tradition of 'stewardship'. This may, indeed, be just as hypocritical in the end as the core of 'modernization theory'; but it is also arguably richer and more subtle in its conception of the relationship of the parties involved, and of the possibilities for change inherent in those circumstances.

It is around this idea that the episode of 'decolonization' was a peculiarly Western European experience, and that as such it called forth distinctive efforts of theorizing, that we shall organise the rest of our enquiry. If we ask what it is for circumstances to 'call forth' a theoretical response, we can answer in terms of our Dobb-derived schema. Thus the problem (ordinarily understood) is of withdrawal from formal empire, and the circumstances of the problem comprise the espousal of notions of democracy and current exploitation which it is desired to continue. The practical solution is that pattern of handover, or withdrawal in favour of local elites, identified as 'decolonization'. The theorist's problem, running alongside and informing the practical problem, is to grasp/interpret/organise/legitimate this practical solution. To do this he not only has the
accepted situation (milieu) plus political demand (the problem ordinarily understood), but he also has his own intellectual discipline with its own dynamic. Thus he tackles the given problem with and in reaction to the established notions of his discipline.
2.0 Dynamic of Society II: Greater divergence.

Within the framework of the general divergence of interests of U.S. and western Europe, we now focus our attention upon those local circumstances which encompass the emergence of a European reply to 'modernization-theory'. Our principal claim, or point of departure, is that the episode of 'decolonization' was a peculiarly western European experience and that, as such, it called forth a distinctive effort of theorizing. The corollary of this view is that the particular character of the work of Seers/Kyrdal/Streeten can be illuminated by taking the episode of decolonization as formative. The actual argument-forms developed and intellectual traditions evoked, we can consider below (in part 3).

In part 2.0, we treat the theme of the dynamic of society, taking 'decolonization' as the 'best' solution to the problem of withdrawal from empire. We show how it emerges from the experience and routine of colonial government. This is accomplished by first noting the 'fact' of nationalisms, and then abstractly considering the response of the colonial power. A range of responses are imputed to the colonial power and the ideal is taken to be minimum necessary change. Historically we see various responses. It is the minimum change effected in withdrawal from sub-saharan Africa by the U.K. and France that is taken as the paradigm of 'decolonization'. We also note that this set of circumstances was subsequently accorded the status of a general model of the relationship of newly independent and ex-colonial powers. From this point we continue in part 2.1 and effect a shift from matters of the dynamic of society to those of the dynamic of theory. We consider the notion that 'decolonization' presents the form of a theory legitimating it; that is, that practice leads to the solution of its own problems. We present an argument to this effect by comparing the forms that the practice of intervention takes in the U.S. context and in the Western European context.
The episode of the decline of the European empires is one of the more obvious features of the history of the 20th century. Indeed Barraclough makes it fairly central. He argues that "the history of the present century has been marked at one and the same time by the impact of the West on Asia and Africa and by the revolt of Asia and Africa against the West"(16). He goes on to say that "when the 20th century opened, European power in Asia and Africa stood at its zenith" ... "sixty years later only the vestiges of European domination remained"(17). Barraclough discusses the revolt of the subject peoples against the 'West' in terms of European expansionism calling forth a reaction - that reaction being organised around what(he notes) has been called Europe's greatest, and most ambiguous, export - nationalism.

With the rise of nationalisms within subject-territories the colonial powers faced the problem of contriving a response. The general problem for them, we can suggest (impute), is of identifying: (i) a creative response to nationalist pressure for autonomy, where such calls are defined (at least in part) by the very presence of the colonial power; and (ii) a similar creative response in respect of the related calls for the initiation of 'development', where this is taken (at a minimum) as being something rather different to simple incorporation in a colonial economy. That 'autonomy', both political and economic, is so defined by the nationalists makes the colonial power's problems of evading its demands distinctly awkward. The interests of one party are, on the face of it, wholly incompatible with those of the other. The most general principle governing the entire episode must be, for the colonial power, that of minimum necessary change to the status quo. Now in addition to these objectives, which we can plausibly impute to the colonial power, the immediately available mechanisms and philosophy of response are going
to be that principle which informs government practice; that is, 'intervention', what Skillen(18) calls 'statism', the view that it is the business of government to order matters in and of society.

Can we identify any minimum requirements of this response to the pressure of 'nationalist developmentalism'? Consider first the colonial situation. At one limit it issues in the total incorporation of the subject people, both economically and culturally, and at the behest of the colonizers. Power will reside with the colonizers and be relinquished only when nothing untoward can follow from their relinquishing power. Here perhaps is the location of the conservative colonists' equation of political and organisational sophistication with experience of government and administration; issuing, as Worsley(19) notes, in the line that 'the natives are not ready to look after their own affairs yet'. But clearly on this view the transfer of power can be infinitely delayed, and 'troublemakers' can be treated with repression. The other limit will be a speedy acquiescence to nationalisms and an ordered withdrawal, with in-between a variety of stances accommodating to the pressures of nationalism. If we turn to the end result of withdrawal we find the reverse of incorporation, that is, genuine autonomy - governmental, administrative, economic, cultural. Power resides in the hands of the 'new' elite (this is a specific form of hand over), and the ex-colonial power is involved only to the extent that the 'new' elite from time to time deem to be appropriate. Thus we have a symmetrical frame of possibility - from repression through accommodation to acquiescence.

Within that frame of limits, and given our imputed problem for the colonial power, we could now sketch out a series of theory-derived responses open to the colonial power(20). However if the question of the minimum necessary requirements of response to 'nationalist developmentalism' for a particular area, then we confront an empirical
question. Here the question of 'minimum requirements' is a matter of an historically specific set of changes in historically specific established relationships. The circumstances of European withdrawal from empire provide a series of 'answers' in respect of minimum requirements of responses. We can follow Zeylshe and White in distinguishing an early and a late phase of the withdrawal (this is, of course, to exclude the issue of 'white dominions' altogether). In the first phase, completed more or less by 1956 with the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, there is accomplished the withdrawal from Asian and Arab lands. The second, later phase covers the withdrawal from sub-Saharan Africa. The early phase reveals some of the variety of methods of accomplishing withdrawal. On the one hand the U.K. withdraws from the Indian sub-continent, Ceylon and Burma by January 1948. In respect of the withdrawal from India/Pakistan, the colonial power at one point declared in advance an intention to withdraw by a particular date so that rival nationalist groupings would settle. When the U.K. finally withdrew, Walter Lippman wrote in the Washington Post that the withdrawal was "the work of political thinking which requires wisdom, maturity and vigour; and it has been carried out elegantly and with a style which will command respect for the civilised world"(21). Grimal adds that "Both the rapidity of the solution and its clear-cut nature astonished international opinion". On the other hand we can note the forcible ejection of the French from Indo-China and the Dutch from the East Indies. In both instances metropolitan governments decided after the war to re-establish their authority over colonial territories. However the war itself had seen their essentially precarious holds fatally loosened. Both efforts collapsed into bloody wars before returning powers were beaten off. Indeed Grimal reports that it was in no small measure the wars of independence that created distinctly national states, where before there had been a disparate and maybe only loosely associated collection of groups within the colonial territories.
The later phase also offers distinguishable 'answers' to the problem of 'nationalist developmentalism': thus the French in Algeria fight a bloody war and are ejected in much the same way as they were from Indo-China. The Belgians and, with a different prelude, the Portuguese present another style — that of 'precipitate withdrawal'. In southern Africa varieties of colonisation linger. But, as for the rest, we note the ordered process of 'decolonization'.

Both White(23) and Zeylstra(24) use the phase I/phase II distinction we have thus far followed. We must now ask why, and with what degree of propriety. The establishment of independent states in this first phase was, reports Zeylstra, taken as marking the end of any financial or other responsibilities toward ex-colonies by sometime colonial powers. This is fairly obviously the case with the U.K. and Zeylstra indeed makes this clear. However he also wants us to believe that this is generally the case for all phase I withdrawals — but he offers no supporting evidence. White, who also uses this phasing, again mentions the U.K. withdrawal from Asia, but adds in respect of the other colonial powers that: "Further east, countries such as Indonesia had won their independence in circumstances which had led to a sharp diminution of relations with the former colonial power"(25). Here is the first problem in respect of this phasing: that phase I is characterized generally by a cutting off of aid and other responsibilities by colonial powers is not established. It is true of the U.K.; but whilst it may be plausible in the case of other colonial powers, they offer no evidence other than its plausibility. For two empiricists, this is no good.

Phase II is established as a contrast to Phase I. Here, both White and Zeylstra agree, the withdrawal of colonial power was marked by its being orderly and part of a scheme which entailed the assumption of long-term responsibilities to aid in 'nation building'. Again, we note that this is offered as a general characterization. But this is preposterous; we can shatter this claim by intoning
AlCeria, Congo, Angola, etc. Nonetheless, to the extent that it is possible to present the withdrawal from Africa as being in not a few cases ordered and peaceable and entailing long term commitments to new nations, it is evident that White and Zeylstra have hit upon something worth noting.

In the arguments and histories presented by Zeylstra and White there is thus a double failure. This issues in the conclusion that the distinction they aimed to draw between phases I and II, in terms of the nature of the post-independence relationship of new nations to their old colonial masters, is not tenable. There is no such distinction to be drawn. How important is this for their general views? In our opinion, not very. Both writers fail to secure their points, simply because they adopt an empiricist approach and try to present perfectly sensible theoretical notes as being derived from reading history. White's 'nominalism' fails him in that his effort to derive his theory from the facts results in a ludicrous misrepresentation of those facts; and Zeylstra's effort is a hopelessly transparent attempt to make the U.K. example serve all cases, which clearly it does not.

However, given our abstract sketch of the possibilities for re-working a challenged relationship and the imputed wishes of the colonial power, we can measure history (the 'facts') against this ideal of a programmed response of minimum change. Zeylstra in fact presents this programme as it was manifest in withdrawal from English and French 'Black Africa'; yet failing to see how the procedure flows from the unhindered 'logic of the situation', he takes it to be an adventitious bit of history needing interpretation. We are able to take, then, the ordered withdrawal from Anglo-French sub-Saharan Africa as being a classic accommodating response on the part of the colonial powers. It is this style of withdrawal for which we reserve the theoretical-descriptive term, 'decolonization'. That we take 'decolonization' to be a particular variety of withdrawal is both reasonable (in the light of our above 'abstract' arguments) and banal in the light of history. Who would
wish to use the same term to designate the withdrawal of, say, the Dutch from Indonesia and the British from Africa? The former power ejected; the latter installing what Hargreaves might call 'collaborators'.

The distinction drawn between phases I and II is thus unhelpful and unnecessary. That the withdrawal from Anglo-French sub-Saharan Africa entailed a peculiar sort of relationship we can grant. It is both the 'best solution' and the paradigm from which other withdrawals more or less diverge. In place of White and Zeylstra's two 'phases' we substitute two categories of response, the 'best' and the 'rest'.

We can bring out the particular character of 'decolonization' by quoting from White and Zeylstra. While using the distinction we have criticised, White observes that "In Africa the transition for most territories was less abrupt. Administrative structures remained intact. There was an expectation of a continuing flow of communication, and of resources. The need for external resources to develop relatively backward economies seemed much clearer in Africa than it had in Asia" (26). Zeylstra, concerned with the relationship between withdrawal and provision of aid, argues that only in one area were development programmes initiated prior to independence: this was in sub-Saharan Africa. His desire to let geographical and chronological differences serve as a basis for an emergent characterization of development-aid programs leads him to this obfuscating looseness - 'sub-Saharan Africa'. What he means is the Anglo-French withdrawal from Black Africa. Yet he clearly picks up the essential novelty. He observes: "Assistance to colonies was integrated in a systematically planned decolonization. There, assistance became identical with preparation for the acceptance of responsibility for one's own country's destiny - a long term process, in the course of which at some time or other sovereignty was being transferred as a necessary condition for its
completion. This kind of decolonization [i.e. withdrawal] ... cannot be imagined as resulting only from a loss of political power and prestige. On the contrary it must have its roots in a colonial policy including concern with the welfare of the subject peoples. Historically seen it must have been a logical consequence of an idea embedded in the rationale of colonialism"(27).

We observed above that our point of departure was that 'decolonization' was uniquely European, and might be taken as formative for Seers et al. That it is unique we should have established prima facie above. We must now turn to the 'formative' aspect, for this is our principal concern—and not, as might be supposed from the length of these reflections, the elucidation of a theoretical history of the process of withdrawal from empire in general and 'decolonization' in particular. Prior to that, however, there remains one final task. This is to note, with White, that the pattern of interstate relations made manifest in the withdrawal of decolonization is, by the end of the 1950's, taken as the norm. White reports, after noting the particular character of aid to his 'phase II' recipients, that "from the late 1950's onwards first the newly independent countries, and then other developing countries as well, came to expect aid, which thus became more diffused, more diversified, and more closely integrated into long-term policy making"(28). White presents this as simply a 'generalization' of the 'phase II' African situation, though he is not specific: presumably he would argue that the behaviour of one colonial government toward its client would be enough to establish a precedent which might then be invoked. If the precedent was set thus, the general expectation he takes to have been reinforced by Nixon's(1957) reception in Latin America when he was abused, in part, because the U.S. had 'neglected' Latin America. The model established in Africa was most visibly and dramatically brought out in the Indian exchange crisis of 1957-58. Here the Indian development program ran into finance problems and
was bailed out by the Aid India Consortium of rich trading partners. White observes: "The India Consortium was the first and perhaps most ambitious collective attempt by a group of donors to underwrite a national development strategy...[he adds]...The precedent had an almost immediate impact on aid to Pakistan, for which a similar consortium was established in 1960" (29). Whether this bit of history should be regarded simply as a result of 'accidents of history' (as White rather suspects) or as some sort of 'unconscious' realization on the part of the 'new nations' that their precise status was close to the model of decolonization and that this was the appropriate starting point for their relations with the rich, is not a matter we will pursue - though it is the obvious question in the light of the above discussion. Rather, we shall content ourselves with noting that the relationship inherent in 'decolonization' did in fact become the norm. White goes on to note that it was fixed in the period 1961-65, when a combination of U.S. and Third World pressure invited all concerned to take for granted what had thus far been established.

Given that the pattern of 'decolonization' became the paradigm of the exchange between rich and poor nations, we may turn to Zeylstra and pick out its particular characteristics; and in observing these we may see how close they come to a speculative 'cashing' of the 'argument from colonial interest' we noted above. In this respect we may say that, given the presumed interest of the colonial power, then within the African context it is clear that withdrawal could be reduced (in line with 'statist' ideology) to a 'transfer of sovereignty' that would be a sham: simply a replacement of role incumbents within a continuing frame of practice and expectation.

We can detail the characteristics of 'decolonization' as follows: (i) the withdrawal was accomplished in an ordered manner; that is, within the ambit of existing resources, both intellectual and organisational; (ii) the withdrawal was legitimated by reference to the notion of
stewardship, which was available to the African elite for transformation into notions such as 'father of the nation'.

(iii) the withdrawal was taken as an element of a longer term process of 'nation building'.

"Putting all this another way, what we may claim is that there are certain resources available within the actual experience of the colonial episode which may, in concert with the colonial power's intellectual tradition and present world economic/political situation, be taken to have contributed to the form of the process of 'decolonization'. We can order the resources and opportunities which the colonial episode itself presents to the decolonizers according to the schema of 'intervention' we have presented; thus we may fuse theory and practice and present this exchange in an historically specific guise as the response of real people to real, practical problems. We are thereby able to indicate how a characteristic orientation to problems of development is generated. In sum, the situation expresses the form of its appropriate theory."
2.1 Dynamic of Theory: Decolonization and its legitimating theorem.

We now turn from presenting decolonization as the 'best' form of withdrawal from empire, and ask how we might establish our claim that the process calls forth its own theory. We look at the 'dynamic of theory' - or, at least, the preliminary intermediate stage. In order to show that the situation expresses the form of its appropriate theory with the persuasiveness necessary to convince a sceptic we would have to write a 'fine-grained' history of the period detailing the circumstances, behaviour and utterances of the main actors. This would be the basis of a fully developed sociology of knowledge treatment, and is beyond our scope. A weaker demonstration of our claim, and one that adopts a more immediately intelligible strategy, would be to offer a comparison. In part 2.1 we compare the form the practice of 'intervention' takes in the U.S. context with 'modernization-theory', and in the western European line with 'neo-institutionalist' social theory, and attempt to show how the given problem shapes the articulation of the invoked theory. To put this another way: by contrasting 'modernization-theory' and 'neo-institutionalist social theory' we can see how the two problem-situations impact on the use of theoretical resources.

In scholarly terms these resources are in many respects the same; what is different is the European tradition of involving theorists in liberal state reformism (particularly in the U.K.), and the context of 'decolonization'. Crudely, 'neo-institutionalist social theory' evolves out of an on-going situation whereas 'modernization-theory' is cobbled together in response to a developing situation. Part 2.1 is therefore transitional between 2.0 which dealt with the dynamic of society and part 3.0 which will treat the dynamic of theory. In sum, we have three elements: (2.11) the possibilities inherent in the colonial situation, or experience itself; (2.12) the possibilities inherent in the established mode of government, 'statism'; (2.13) the resultant practical form/theoretical
explanation of the process of decolonization. This we take to be exemplified in the efforts of Seers, Streiten and Myrdal. We elucidate these three aspects in contrast to U.S. efforts.

2.11 Having cast the start of part 2 of our paper in the form of asking after the colonial powers' view of the pressure for withdrawal from empire, it is appropriate to focus on their established colonial practices as the first source of resources available to them in fashioning a response.

We can identify an available moral core for any response to 'nationalist developmentalism' in the notion of 'stewardship'. We can follow Grimal in granting that, in general, "the colonial policies of the European countries were not deliberately directed towards emancipation"(30) and add that nonetheless within their relationship was the possibility of invoking, if need be, a progressive scheme(31). The various European colonial powers took different lines; but in the case of the U.K., the notion of leading dependencies toward independence was established in the cases of the 'white dominions', and then taken as general. Cooption of locals to colonial governments clearly placed a transfer of power on the list of possibilities. Grimal notes that this was all ordered by the U.K.; thus "progress towards autonomy had to be cautious and controlled, leading towards a solution that could satisfy both the principles of self-determination and the interests of the home country"(32). This 'moral dualism' is reflected in the behaviour of the other colonial powers. According to their espoused 'democratic' principles they were obliged to talk in terms of colonialism benefitting subject peoples. They nevertheless searched around for ways of protecting their interests in face of calls for self-government. The French vacillated between the policies of assimilation and association, and the Dutch after rather belatedly introducing the 'moral policy' in 1902, invent the doctrine of 'synthesis' in 1922. This
supposedly involved fusing 'the best of the east' with 'the best of the west' — though Grimal notes that it was never clear just what this meant.

Very generally then — and arguably very much as an incidental to straightforward exploitation — the Europeans did acknowledge the minimum notions required by their putative ideologies of democracy. A slow movement towards some sort of emancipation was envisaged, and this conception was available when, after World War Two, demands for independence became pressing. Thus we may observe that the moral core of this European style of 'intervention' is not that which informed U.S. efforts. The moral core of modernization theory lay in the cowed response of liberals to red-baiting politicians; the result was a florid celebration of the 'patriotic imperative' (33). The moral core of European efforts we can take to invoke the colonial episode — 'stewardship' — and a notion of 'proper development' which issues out of the long exchange between colonial power and subject people; in comparison we can presume it to be richer and more subtle than anything flowing from a relationship struck up under the banner of the 'free world' and the 'fight against international communism' (34).

That the European exchange with colonial areas was more immediately rich in usable notions and data we may take to be a simple function of social exchange over a period of time. The colonial authorities and subject people will necessarily come to share some ideas through shared experience. Thus it is usually suggested that the result of this interchange is evident, for example, in political and social ideas of the new elite. We have above noted the case of 'nationalism'. Macpherson argues that development-ideologies have been constructed largely from European intellectual resources and often may be characterized as a blend of 'early' Marx plus Rousseau (34a). More generally, as Grimal puts it, "the district officers, who maintained the peace and subjected the inhabitants to
such measures as the taking of a regular population census, the levying of taxes ... served in the long run to build up a communal identity'(35)- and that 'identity' served not only subject peoples but also colonial power when it came to re-working their relationship with their dependencies.

Here we may recall White's work and draw out another difference in the European and U.S. experiences. White observes that when the U.S. endeavoured to extend aid and containment from western Europe, where it worked well, to the Third World - in particular S.E. Asia - two factors militated against success. "Firstly the status of the Asian allies as client states was far plainer to see. Secondly and more significantly the immediate task of the aid was harder to identify ... Aid had become a form of generalized support, the purpose of which was described slightly by its critics as being to 'shore-up' weak regimes"(36). If we recall White's four proximate causes of the success of Marshall Aid— (a) volume of aid, (b) clear task, (c) political congruence of objectives, and (d) shared culture—then we can see that in S.E. Asia the U.S. was short of (b), (d) and arguably (c). In contrast, for European and colonial areas (b), (c) and (d) were less obtrusively problematical.

Finally we may note a third resource which the actual experience of the colonial episode made available when 'decolonization' had to be programmed and theorized. This is the simple practical experience of the territories on the one hand, and on the other the habit of liberal reformism. A U.S. counterpart to the practical experience is difficult to identify from their involvement with Latin American states, and Hawthorn (364) does not identify any habit of reformism in U.S. government/academic relations.

2.12 If the above represent the resources immediately available within the situation of moves to withdraw from the colonial relationship, and if they are clearly available to Europeans and not to the U.S., then the prism
through which these lines are focused is common to both. This is, the government habit, or style, or ontological mode, of 'intervention'. Skillen identifies it as 'statism', and takes it as the typical pattern of a capitalist state, as we saw above.

2.13 Here we indicate how the resources of the situation present themselves in the exchange with theory. Theory is treated below, as is the fully developed product of this episode, 'neo-institutionalist social theory'.

The available notion of 'stewardship' and the partial incorporation of subject people in terms of ideas and material interests issues in the legitimating notion of 'transfer of sovereignty'. For the colonial power this is the logical consequence of the notion of 'stewardship', and for the indigenous 'replacement' elite it is the assumption of that role of 'stewardship' in the guise of the leader as 'father of the nation'. This all represents a loose summation of historical events; abstractly, it reduces to the minimum change desired by the colonial power if we present it as being simply a change of role incumbents. The extent to which the 'transfer of sovereignty' is other than this simple change of political personnel is a matter for empirical observation of the various cases. As to the U.S., the alien nature of its 'intervention' was noted by Kiernan when he observed that the host nation's armed forces often were seen as the most 'progressive social formation'. Hence, as a result supplies of arms became equated with 'nation building'. The notion of transfer of sovereignty is not an option for U.S. theorists.

The legitimating notion of transfer of sovereignty, with its consequence for the role of the new government being that of 'building a nation', couples up with the practical experience of territories and liberal-democratic reformism to present the organisational principles of neo-institutionalism as 'obviously' appropriate to the task. Here, recalling Dobb, we must introduce the exchange of
the theorist with the 'conventional-wisdom' orthodoxy; for it is this, in the light of the above noted constraints and demands, that fashion the new stance. These matters we treat below in part (3). Here we may hazard the outline that the established patterns of colonial and metropolitan administrative activity are broadened and deepened into 'nation building'; and the social theory of neo-institutionalism presents itself as uniquely suited to the task. Administered national development requires the possibility of translating economic models into 'circumstance-relevant' programmes, and systemic analysis is ideal. Both new elite and colonial power can agree that their task is largely one of 'system construction' - a technical task. Subsequent matters of implementation are piecemeal: projects, programs, plans and so on. Thus theory and procedure 'grow out of' practice for Europeans where for the U.S. this was not possible.

We can summarize as follows: with 'neo-institutionalists' the political content of the calls for 'intervention' has shifted from confronting expansionist communism, as was the case with modernization-theory, toward the project of reworking established colonial relationships. The effort as a whole is, not unexpectedly, informed by a different set of ideas. As regards the moral core of modernization theory, we noted that it was formed by cowed liberals in the situation of red-baiting and presented in the context of donor-competition with the U.S.S.R. The moral core of European efforts is formed in response to pressures of 'nationalist developmentalism', and invokes tradition of 'stewardship' integral to (if latent within, for the most part) the colonial situation. Generally the European theorists invoke a moral tradition of social reformism; thus Myrdal, for example, is described by Ehrensaft as 'Fabian', and Seers and Streeten clearly fit the category of 'establishment liberals' identified by Hawthorne. The sets of resources used by the two groups of theorists can also be distinguished; where modernization theory had recourse to structural functionalism and an emasculated Keynesianism,
the 'neo-institutionalist social theorists' have recourse to the experience of the colonial episode, and a distinct European tradition of social thought: the latter being characterized with reference to a relationship with government that disposes them to practical policy making rather than the elaboration of formal schemes of great generality. To put this another way (this point we may call the methodological context): the U.S. theorists pursued, if not quite a 'general theory', then a set of policy-relevant pieces of work presented using that syntax. The Europeans, using essentially the same sociological and economic ideas, within the same empiricist epistemology, produce piece-meal studies. This we may take, following Hawthorne, to be a function of the relationship of the two groups of theorists to their respective government machines.

It is for these reasons that we take the episode of 'decolonization' to be formative for Europeans.
3.0 Dynamic of Theory II: The proximate intellectual source of the European efforts.

The foregoing remarks indicate from whence arose the impulse to a neo-institutionalist informed critique of the 'conventional-wisdom' of development-studies, where this is taken to encompass those efforts constructed around that area of economics dominated by the Harrod-Domar model. (It thus includes not only the early efforts to use Harrod-Domar in the context of an extended/exported Keynesianism, but also subsequent efforts which took the guise of more general programmes of 'modernization'). It is now appropriate to ask: what is the character of this critique? We turn then to matters of the structures of sets of ideas and their histories. We begin part (3) by asking after the general origin and character of institutionalist theorizing; then, after looking briefly at Myrdal's version, we go on to consider in detail some characteristic argument-forms.

3.1 What is 'institutionalist economics'?

Institutionalism we take to be a particular approach to economics; in brief, it is a 'sociologised economics'. That is, notions drawn from economics are considered with reference to their social assumptions. Economies, as functioning social systems, are considered, rather than the elaborate calculi of abstract models. We take institutionalism to be reformist in character, and carefully non-Marxian; here we may cite Myrdal and Galbraith, but the line traces back to Veblen. It is, by and large, a European tradition, though it has received its most elaborate and familiar presentation in the work of the theorists of the New Deal. We will present our exposition of the origins and preliminary characterization of institutionalism through the work of Gruchy, who (falsely) assimilates all institutionalist thinking to a single, U.S., school. What is crucial in all this is institutionalism's character as a 'sociologised-economics' and its association with economic and social crisis.
Here we look at 'institutionalism' in its most prominent, New Deal, guise. Otis Graham (38) in a history of planning experiments in the U.S., establishes that within U.S. government and academic worlds there has been pressure for the establishment of some sort of 'directed capitalism'. Graham cites Roosevelt's New Deal as the response/solution of one variety of liberalism to the catastrophe of the Depression. This history is presented as the story of a conflict between government, big business and academics on the one hand and, on the other, an alliance of smaller business, miscellaneous pressure groups and Congress pressing to maintain the status quo. In this, Graham's thesis is that whilst Capitol Hill needs planners, unfortunately all it has got are interest groups, lobbyists, and power-brokers; that is the 'Broker State', as he dubs it.

This theme is familiar: thus in the post-Second World War period the names of Galbraith and Myrdal come readily to mind. Yet their criticisms and those of the 'New Dealers' are by no means novel. Gruchy sees Galbraith and Myrdal (and others) as 'neo-institutionalists', invoking an older pre-Second War tradition of 'instituional theory'. This inter-war period is characterized by Myrdal as requiring practical theorizing. He observes: "The Great Depression and the practical problems raised in its wake rescued me from my critical philosophy and restored my scientific productivity" (40). It is at this juncture that Myrdal coincides most closely with the pre-war U.S. institutionalists (notwithstanding, that he is at some pains to distance himself from this tradition, and to recount his intellectual biography in terms of Swedish scholars, as we shall see below). We can take the U.S. tradition as the 'main stream', and as such this line is older than Gruchy makes it.

Dorfman argues that the background to institutional economics involves "a slice of the whole development of civilisation in the U.S. since the end of the Civil War" (41). He traces the emergence of the school out of the conflict engendered by the rapid U.S. industrialization of
the last third of the 19th century. Tracing the flux of the debate(42) he observes that at the turn of the century the "narrow practicality(43) of the business community found its champion in Jevons and the 'marginalist revolution', subsequently developed into the neo-classical line by Marshall. This was the target against which Veblen "launched his barbs"; Dorfman adds "it was at this point that institutionalism, as we know it, reached maturity"(44).

If the key figure in the pre-First World War effort was Veblen, then it seems that through the 1920's and 1930's there were a series of American theorists following similar lines of enquiry (including, according to Gruchy, Rexwell Tugwell who is cited by Graham as a key figure of the 'New Deal' and the 'father' of U.S. planning). A number of economists are noted who have it in common that "the economic system is analysed within the framework of the total culture of which the economic system is a part(45). Methodologically they subscribed to a general evolutionary paradigm, and their relations with the other social sciences were eclectic. Gruchy goes on to say that the "institutionalists of the 1920's and 1930's were mainly interested in how to prevent depressions and how to stabilize economic activity at a full employment level ... the main issue was the 'social control of business!'" (46).

Gruchy is at some pains throughout his lengthy study to apologise for the 'radical' tone of the theorists he treats, and he disavows on behalf of Veblen's later followers the marxian 'flavour' of that theorist's work. Indeed Dorfman notes that "the view of Marx and his disciples as 'pre-Darwinian' - to use Veblen's term - is a major negative characteristic of institutionalists and serves to differentiate them from most of the critics of the dominant economics(47). This is both rather ambiguous and, recalling Myrdal on Marx, interesting. It is ambiguous in that it does not say anything about these other critics of the 'Conventional-Wisdom' - and the context of the remark is not such as to lead us to suppose that he has marxist
critics in mind. This being so, that the institutionalists felt obliged to attack Marx must indicate that they saw affinities between his work and their own, and that they were anxious to deflect an obvious line of attack from the orthodox. As regards Myrdal's sensitivity to Marxian critique we may note that its anticipations go right back to Veblen. Further than this Gruchy observes that the U.S. theorists never fully developed their evolutionary schema of economics; and Gordon, after proposing Schumpeter as the theorist who actually did proceed to 'fill-out' the institutionalists' programme, suggests that why institutionalists would hesitate to accept Schumpeter as a co-worker is precisely the extent of his critique. Thus Gordon observes that he "took the entire story of capitalist evolution and possible decline as his province. American institutionalists, I think it is fair to say, have not been willing to go this far in their institutionalism" (48).

If institutionalism had a European theoretical input to a U.S. situation, then that imported aspect was rapidly domesticated. Thus Veblen's marxian elements are quickly struck out and replaced with a Deweyite pragmatism (49). Institutionalism is thereby taken into the U.S. university scene which, says Gruchy, "provided more academic opportunity for the dissemination of the economics of dissent than was the case in Western Europe" (50). Now this is a misleading remark: 'institutionalism' is the 'economics of dissent' and has been presented as specifically American. Nonetheless it lets us see how Gruchy makes his tacit claim that institutionalism is the only dissenting economics.

Western European critical lines are represented by the Fabians on the one hand and Keynes on the other. The former are taken by Gruchy to resemble the institutionalists but are dismissed as secondary to Veblen; and Keynes is presented as 'depression-relevant' and subsequently just irrelevant. The post-war emasculation of Keynes is not treated and nor is the work of the 'new Cambridge School'. Gruchy simply equates the work of Keynes with the Keynesianism of orthodox government regulation of the
economy. Partly, we may hazard, this flows from a desire to separate the institutionalists, who were concerned as Gruchy noted above with full employment, from Keynes—just as the institutionalists themselves have been anxious to eschew any connection with the Marxian tradition—and partly we could take it to be a reflection of the fate of Keynes in the U.S. But, more interestingly, it derives we can suggest from Gruchy's apparent haste to 'de-radicalize' his radicals. Thus he presents the exchange of event and theory in a simplistic manner; he observes "Keynesian economics and economic policy proposals have come to have diminishing acceptance as post-World War Two problems have come to the surface". All of which makes theory a simple response to event. In the case of Keynes, this ignores the element of the active 'killing-off' of the reformer, detailed by Sweezy (in V. Early), and in the case of the neo-institutionalists it permits the presentation of Myrdal and Galbraith as neutral scientists. Gruchy wants them to have it all ways—the richness and relevance of a developed political economy and the 'untainted' status of a natural scientist (52). Gruchy's apology for the radical roots of the ideas he propounds is captured in his observing of the neo-institutionalists that they differ from Veblen, in that "whereas Veblen looked forward to the demise of the private enterprise system the neo-institutionalists think in terms of preserving this system" (53).

In the end the drift of Gruchy's effort coincides with that of Graham in regarding the options open to the government of a developed state as being limited, and the choice— for reasonable men—as a foregone conclusion. A return to laissez-faire is taken as nonsensical, the Broker State is out-moded, and the only remaining choice is of a centrist-planning ideal; a 'regulated capitalism'.

The foregoing has presented 'institutionalism' in an historical guise as the response of reform-minded liberals to the various problems thrown up by the developing industrial society in which they found themselves. The institutionalists have often, it seems, been dismissed as
'generalists', and thus either not suited to or alternatively rather difficult for scholarly treatment. Clearly their disposition to 'generality' flows from their construction of an ideology of planning. This we take to be based upon either (as, say, in case of western Europe and the U.K.) the gradual accretion not of government powers of intervention, but of established areas of intervention, or (as, say, in the case of the U.S.) upon fewer areas of intervention and a more clearly argued case for these patterns of activity. The tradition is resolutely problem-centred, and the core of the stance is picked out by Gordon. He notes that the institutional line is not easy to define and offers a set of criteria: "the term 'institutional' economics suggests to me a series of propositions which, taken together add up to a particular way of approaching the study of economics"(54). He offers the following: that economic behaviour is "strongly conditioned by the institutional environment"(55) and that the "process of mutual interaction is an evolutionary one"(56). Gordon introduces 'conflict' in several ways, thus in a criterion which seems to echo the circumstances of depression he notes the key role of "the (largely conflicting) conditions imposed by modern technology and by the pecuniary institutions of modern capitalism"(57). Conflict is the business of economics rather than any harmonious equilibrium, and that this is indeed the case opens the door to the requirement of "social control of economic activity"(58). The principle of 'rational economic action' is denied. He concludes his summation by noting the argument that "Granted the preceding assumptions, much of orthodox economic theory is either wrong or irrelevant because it makes demonstrably false assumptions and does not ask the really important questions"(59).
3.2 Myrdal and institutionalism.

Gruchy claims Myrdal for this (essentially U.S., so far as he is concerned) tradition in quite unequivocal terms. Thus after observing that "among European economists none is better known today in the U.S. than the eminent Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal", he goes on to characterize his work as follows: "Myrdal's main interest has been in the analysis of the developing economic process and the movement towards more fully integrated or planned economies in the western world and elsewhere" (60). Now whilst we can easily grant a general resemblance, it is not clear that Gruchy is not being somewhat misleading.

Myrdal describes his intellectual roots as Swedish, recalling that his early intellectual milieu was dominated by Wicksell and the analysis of dynamic economic processes. Myrdal also notes Cassel's influence: "There was, I felt, a healthy realism in his approach to economic problems, a desire to avoid metaphysical speculation and get down to facts and figures" (61). This 'practicality' is emphasised.

Myrdal distinguishes his generation from the preceding one by noting that they were familiar with crises, the Great War, inflation and recession, so he notes that "when they faced undesirable situations, such as unemployment, they had fewer inhibitions than the older generation to think constructively about measures which would mitigate them" (62).

All this contributes, we may hazard, a retrospective reading of his own career. But in addition to these intellectual sources there is one seminal experience. After recalling that his work was running into the sands over the issue of 'values', he records "Meanwhile the happy 'twenties had ended. The gathering Great Depression and the practical economic problems raised in its wake rescued me from my critical philosophy and restored my scientific productivity. My outer life had already placed forcefully before me that important phenomena: Social Crisis, and I have remained, with the rest of the world, under that sign ever since" (63). From what Myrdal has to say in his biographical postscript it seems as if his work
comes to resemble that of the U.S. institutionalists only insofar as there was a common practical orientation. Myrdal notes that he received the work of Keynes with pleasure but no great surprise. As for the U.S. institutionalists, he reports coming into contact with them and adds that their naive empiricism helped him clear up a few points in respect of 'value'. The core of the resemblance is the treatment of social crisis through government intervention, with the disciplinary corollary of practicality in research. Around this convergence, called forth by the historically common experience of the Depression, the various theorists take their different stances. Thus whilst there is undoubtedly a family resemblance, the precise nature of those resemblances is a matter requiring detailed comparison. Gruchy's assimilation of Myrdal to a U.S. school must be denied.

The substantive material we can briefly note. Myrdal's writings are very extensive and often apparently repetitive; and as we shall not treat them in any detail here, we offer a sketch to show how his style and line do coincide with the institutionalists we have noted above. Myrdal is taken by Gruchy to react against the equilibrium theory orthodoxy of 1900-1929 in favour of "a new economics of integration oriented around the concept of a cumulative process of development" (64). The motor of the social dynamic is derived from Wicksell. Where Wicksell uses the notion of a 'moving equilibrium' such that divergence on the part of the economy from its 'ideal track' was self-correcting, Myrdal on the other hand — rather like Harrod — sees a continuing divergence. Once some given direction of social change is instituted, a process of 'circular cumulative causation' tends to reinforce that disposition to change. In addition to this general theoretical revision Myrdal introduces people and groups into his schema, treating them naturalistically: they become causal agents of change. On the most general level an evolutionary schema is invoked, whereby the present result of the process of cumulative causation is the modern organisational welfare state,
perfected in the 'West' as a series of national welfare states. The next, 'logical', step is therefore the establishment of "the world welfare state"(65).

In respect of the states of the Third World, Myrdal applies his notion of cumulative change to their particular situation vis à vis the world economy. In regard to internal institutional structures, his conclusions are notoriously pessimistic. The Third World states are locked into a debilitating position in the World economy and are internally crippled by 'outmoded' social forms. The remedy - if there is one - is to use the weapon of nationalistic planning to shift the economy into an upward dynamic; as he says, "what in fact we all mean by development is the movement upward of the whole social system"(66). Thus we come to Myrdal's focus on the state and, in view of the manifest inadequacy of his identified agent to meet his theories' requirements, the 'soft state'.

To pursue Myrdal through his voluminous writings would be exhausting and unhelpful. Rather we may recall our characterization of institutionalism as the crisis - occasioned ideology of the planner and ask after the nature of the method of analysis used by Myrdal, taken as our representative neo-institutionalist. Three issues present themselves: (1) the use of social science resources by theorists of neo-institutionalism; (2) the treatment of 'values', that is, of the role of the theorist; and (3) the related policy line, that is, planning and the 'soft state'. Our treatment of these issues will focus upon the work of Paul Streeten, who may be regarded as the principal English exponent of the work of Myrdal. Additionally his own work falls within the ambit of neo-institutionalism, and he helpfully adopts the guise of a philosophically sophisticated empiricism. To put this another way, we can say that Streeten's work both interprets Myrdal to us and is, of itself, too sophisticated to ignore.
The strategic use of the resources of the social sciences

Nikesell (67) has noted that the early efforts of the economists, built around the core of 'growth theories', have undergone a twofold change: the models have become more complex as more variables have been introduced, and there has been a greater use made of the resources of the wider circle of the social sciences. There has been, in a nutshell, a pursuit of greater realism in modelling.

In this context we can recall the institutionalists' concern for realism and empirical research, in contrast (as Gordon argued) to the 'metaphysics' of the neo-classisists. Kyrdal, in his intellectual biography, compliments an early teacher by noting that 'there was, I felt, a healthy realism in his approach to economic problems' (68). However, rather than continue with a general style of exegesis, we can turn to Streeten for specimens of work revealing the use made by institutionalists of the resources of social science. His substantive conclusions are not our concern here.

Streeten presents no general theory. In contrast, the theorists of 'modernization', deploying their conceptual armoury of dualisms to the "Grand Process of Modernization"(69) did to a greater or lesser extent couch their efforts in such terms. Streeten evidently feels no obligation to present a 'general theory' or to couch his contributions to 'development-studies' in that syntax. Whether Streeten regards this pursuit of 'the general' as properly empiricist and as amenable to full elaboration and presentation (given time), or whether he takes it as a forlorn hope like Nikesell - 'I do not believe that a realistic general model of economic and social development is possible, at least one which would be worth very much from the standpoint of prediction and control' (70) - is a matter that need not concern us now. Here we may simply observe that Streeten works out of the institutionalists' frame, taking it for granted. Thus his work is piece-meal, sceptical, empiricist and concerned with realistic modelling; and whilst he does not present, or pursue, a
general theory, he uses the data and more particularly the concepts of social science in order to get clear the outlines and character of the economy he happens to be concerned with. Given the Kyrdalian project of 'development', Streeten is thereby able to identify the nature of the changes that can be initiated given the existing institutional frame, and subsequently identify the necessary conditions of further, more radical change. He exemplifies Gordon's observation of institutionalism: that is, that in the end it adds up to "a particular way of approaching the study of economics" (71).

Streeten's empiricism and institutionalist line are confirmed when he observes that "the bias in our view of economic and social reality enters before the model building begins, at the level where concepts are formed" (72). And in this respect concept formation is taken as the bringing together under a concept of a mass of data. Aggregation and isolation of data, says Streeten, let us separate out sets of data (concepts). Streeten reveals his general orientation to theorizing thus: "All thought presupposes implicit or explicit model building and model using. Rigorous abstraction, simplification and quantification are necessary conditions of analysis and policy" (73). Clearly Streeten subscribes to what Hindess has called the 'epistemology of model building' (74). In this sense we have a sophisticated empiricism confronting the naive efforts of the early orthodox schemes. As Streeten puts it, "it is of the essence of what is sometimes called the institutional approach to probe into the psychological, social, political and cultural justification for the formation of certain concepts" (75).

We consider first a general statement on the formation of concepts - the essay entitled "The Use and Abuse of Models in Development Studies". In this essay, it is claimed that model building typically reveals four 'systematic biases'. The first of these concerns the decision as to what counts as a variable and what counts
as a parameter.

Streeten observes that "the separation of parameters from variables in Western orthodox models is partly determined by what is appropriate for advanced industrial nations, partly by ideology and vested interest, and partly by convenience of analysis"(76). He develops this point in terms of spelling out the functional conditions of any economic concept being a realistic concept. In contradistinction to the orthodox myth of the (imagined) world of laissez-faire constituting a universally relevant ideal, Streeten bids us focus on the context of whatever problem engages us. The problem will reveal what is to count as parameter and what as variable. From these points he derives the moral of specificity; thus he says To be useful models will have to be, at least initially, much more specific to individual cases and much less general and 'theoretical'" (77).

Using this distinction - parameters/variables - Streeten goes on to characterize and counterpose to his own position the views of the orthodox and of the marxists. The orthodox treat economic variables (ordinarily understood) and eschew meddling with 'attitudes'; the marxists suppose such meddling is unnecessary. Thus these two very different analyses are taken to manifest a convergence-in-neglect of the 'social aspects' of development. This is a curious argument. In construction it seems to involve the conflation of two distinct matters: (1) that of the habit of the orthodox of preferring inherited and now irrelevant concepts to the more difficult job of fashioning their own (the notion of the 'conventional wisdom'); and (2) that of the manner of treatment of parameters (which is the key to his critique of that orthodoxy). In point this argument rather seems to be designed both to draw the sting of his critique of the orthodox and to distance himself from any marxian line by means of an almost reflex side-swipe.

Streeten's second source of bias invokes the notion of fashion(78). His reference lets him juxtapose the pursuit of
various putative 'strategic' factors of growth with an, (unspecified) problem-relevant and catholic analysis. That one factor has been picked out of complex reality at some time or other and peddled as 'the' answer to development is justly ridiculed; but that the pursuit of a single strategic factor is in itself a misconceived endeavour Streeten does not establish. He observes: "It soon became obvious however that numerous other conditions both account for past growth in advanced countries and are required for development in 'U.D.C's'. But instead of embarking on a careful analysis of the necessary direction and coordination of policies in particular cases a new one-factor analysis has tended to replace the old" (79).

Again, it rather seems as if two issues are being conflated. The first is the ordering of explanatory principles: do we necessarily do this hierarchically (reducing, in the extreme, to the priority of one notion); or, at the other limit, are all explanatory concepts of equal weight? The second is the habit of disciplines of having 'fashions'. Running these together, Streeten implies that explanatory equality is obviously the line to follow, but in no sense does he establish this. Rather, he ridicules the former - hierarchical - view by invoking academic fashion (80).

Streeten's third source of bias resembles the above. He presents it as the habit of shifting from regarding some facet of the development situation as being a necessary condition to seeing it as a sufficient condition. He dubs this 'illegitimate isolation'. Thus from the stance of propriety of analysis of the system-as-a-whole, he is able to indicate the foolishness of aid missions descending, investigating and then reporting in terms of proposals to treat this or that aspect in the expectation that the rest of the system will then respond favourably.

Streeten's fourth source of bias in modelling we can take to indicate another use of social science - that is its data. This third error represents a more immediately
reconisable institutionalist point; thus he observes: "Almost all concepts formed by aggregation suitable for analysing Western economies must be carefully considered before they can be applied to underdeveloped economies" (81). He does not, of course, object to aggregative concepts per se, but to the use of such concepts where their functional prerequisites are absent; or in brief, where they do not make sense. This use of familiar notions in unfamiliar and unsuitable situations entails, so Streeten claims, a 'category mistake'. This is Gilbert Ryle's notion, and is usually taken as indicating a particular quality of 'wrong-ness' in the use of a concept. Thus for Streeten, to treat the lack of 'regular gainful employment' of some Third World peasant as a matter of unemployment would be to commit a category error.

Of this notion of 'category error' we may note two things. Firstly, that it is very suggestive and seems on the face of it to be a logician's analogue of familiar ideas of ideological stance. Here a plausible question can be shown to be foolish when all its presuppositions as to what is the case are displayed. In terms of 'ideologies', this is familiar to social science: indeed divining the ideological stance of an author is virtually a reflex habit in this area. What is noted in general is that as ideologies 'order' the world they also establish that some questions are sensible and others necessarily foolish. The borrowing from Ryle seems to repeat this strategy/situation at an abstract level of argument form. However, and this is our second point, philosophers have looked rather askance at the notion. So what does Streeten add to his discussion of the functional requisites of empirical concept deployment by invoking the notion 'category error'?

Streeten's image of empirical concepts in model building entails them being attenuated replicas of reality. The concept is a model in itself. Given this schema of concept construction, then it seems obvious that whilst an attenuated version of some aspect of 'reality A' may be useful in 'reality A', it will not be in 'reality B'.

Streeten's analysis of 'unemployment' presents this strategy of argument. Yet a shift of concept from 'home' to 'foreign' context where it simply will not work seems to be just an error in the use of a concept: a misuse of a notion flowing from empirical ignorance of the novel situation. There does not seem to be any reason to regard the misuse of the notion 'employment' in some Third World country as being a 'category error', where this is some peculiarly philosophical type of error. Streeten's use of the term does not, then, seem to advance matters.

We can now try to summarize the uses made of the resources of social science by the institutionalists, via the particular work of Streeten. Streeten takes empirical concepts to be simplifying abstractions of raw data - aggregative isolations from experience. Thus a subtle grasp of the data of economy A, B or C is a necessary condition of concept formation and subsequently model making. A poor grasp of data will result in a greater likelihood of the construction of inadequate concepts. Thus facts discipline concepts. Epistemologically, fine-grain social science data is thus necessary to Streeten, so as to be able to (1) construct concepts; it is also used to (2) check concepts. Here Streeten's notion of 'bias' indicates errors of which he is familiar. His identification of these is sociology of knowledge-informed. Thus the use of the notion of 'unemployment' in a poor economy A, B or C is a mistake - a mistake in modelling, which flows from ignorance of the facts of the situation. This 'checking' use is presented, by Streeten, as being in a sense 'formal' - Ryle is invoked. But these are not philosophical objections; rather they seem to be a variety of ideologically-sensitive objection. Thus he reports that the concepts of the orthodoxy are inadequate in respect of model construction, yet they are functionally adequate in the sense that they serve the interests of the status quo. Thus at the level of concepts, or logical geography, Streeten deploys a style of criticism often used in social science to attack ideological stances.
Methodologically, as he takes empirical concepts to be abstractions from particular concrete situations, he is able to ask of any concept: just what is the empirical situation from which it abstracts? Rephrased, we see that as his economics are lodged within an institutionalist frame, then his concepts (insofar as they are 'social' and not just 'economic') are borrowings from the conceptual store of social science. Social science data establishes the possibility of realistic concepts, whilst social science concepts provide the governing frame for concept formation. All this follows the institutionalists' problem-centred empiricism, in contrast to the abstract-formal style of the neo-classical orthodoxy. Coupled up to their ideology of planning, this reveals the source and impetus in their work to the construction of realistic models.

There is a related procedural/methodological point here. Since social science (concepts and data) provide a technique of testing the adequacy of data, and as Streeten takes economies A, B or C to be intimately lodged within some institutional frame, the habit of thought of social science is used to generate criticisms. It both orders the data brought to bear on concepts suspected of being un-realistic, and is the point of departure of critical speculations, a source of questions to put to otherwise 'innocent' data. Thus the thoroughly sceptical nature of social science is used. Rather than accepting that which is 'taken for granted' or 'obvious' etc., social science is invoked. There is a final note to be made, a corollary of the scepticism just noted, and this is the habit of reflexive criticism. Streeten, and the institutionalists, regard their own discipline through the eyes of a sociologist of knowledge.
Myrdal describes Streeten as "a friend of much intellectual affinity" and it is through Streeten's exegesis that we shall approach this matter of 'values'. As regards the role of the theorist, Streeten presents Myrdal as posing a threefold question: "can one be at the same time objective, practical and idealistic?". To this he adds, revealingly, that Myrdal's career "looks almost like a series of attempts to extort from concrete problems ... the replies to these and similar fundamental questions".

Myrdal reports that the issue of 'values' arose in the context of academic work in Sweden. The orthodox preached 'value-neutrality' whilst clearly having an impact in the realm of practical politics. These early efforts Myrdal comes to disavow. Their relevance is overtaken by the Depression and concurrently he comes to regard his critiques of the orthodox as wrong-headed; simply a naive empiricism resting on the principled strivings after value-neutrality of the theorist. It is through his experience of the U.S. institutionalists that this is brought home. Myrdal records that "By their naive empiricism which was flagrant they forced me to become aware of the need for a rational method of introducing value premises into economic research". He cannot, he reports, resolve the issue. However, the Depression presents a solution in that its demanding urgency shrinks such critical problems; and in fact the value consensus of 'social crisis' provides the answer. Myrdal sums up the matter thus: "The crux of the matter is, of course, that when the old liberal postulate of harmony of interests is renounced, political conclusions - and ultimately theoretical research - must be founded on explicit value premises which must be concrete and take into account the actual conflict of interests between different social groups. However in a situation experienced as crisis, it is a matter of empirical fact that interests converge and that conflicts of valuation disappear. Political conclusions can then be drawn from value premises which are homogenous and defined
in concrete terms" (85). Thus is Myrdal's dilemma resolved by practical activity within the context of social crisis; this is a 'solution' Myrdal has hung onto. It is out of this 'practical' orientation that the distinctively Myrdalian treatment of 'values' is constructed. Streeten reports that in 'An American Dilemma' (begun in 1938) "Myrdal draws a distinction between 'programmes' and 'prognosis', and adds that "these two key concepts open the door to his approach to the whole problem of value" (86).

Streeten defines a programme as "a plan of intended action ... it consists of certain objectives or ends, and rules about the manner in which these objectives are to be pursued" (87). The complementary concept is that of prognosis, defined thus: "By prognosis is meant a forecast of the probable or possible course of events" (88). Here we can see how the Myrdalian solution to the fact/value problem flows out of the position of centrality given to a certain type of practical activity. Streeten notes that the distinction is "related to the more familiar one between analysis and policy" (89). It is also like the split between means and ends, but it is not the same. Where the means/ends split lets the practitioners of the conventional-wisdom shunt off matters of 'value' into the given ends and thereafter treat means as a technical issue, Streeten sees the programme/prognosis split as preventing such an escape manoeuvre. He observes, "This complex of desired ends, means and procedures, ... all of which is conditioned by valuations, one may call 'programme'" (90). The core of this Myrdal/Streeten line as regards the practical efforts of the theorist is a denial of the orthodox means/ends split in the context of a certain sort of theorizing-activity. The programme, by definition, includes both means and ends. It is thus a counter-stance that rules out the 'conventional-wisdom' line, rather than any direct criticism of that line. The style of validation that it would have applied to itself are the tests of realism and relevance. Realism because it claims to produce a better model of what in fact is the case, in contrast to
'conventional-wisdom'; and relevance because the whole effort takes as its point of departure a reading of some problem inherent in social crisis (as opposed to matters of the formal elaboration of now irrelevant equilibrium notions).

The relationship of programmes and prognosis is dialectical: "A programme without a prognosis is an impotent utopian dream. On the other hand, a prognosis without programmes is necessarily incomplete. Prognosis depends upon programmes in two distinct ways. First and obviously, the programmes of others are data for the social observer and theorist" (91). This is a fairly trivial point requiring theorists to note that group beliefs are causally effective (a naturalistic treatment of 'meanings'). He goes on: "Second, and perhaps less obviously, the observer and theorist himself has something like a programme which determines his analysis and prognosis" (92). Here is the acknowledgement that the theorist is a person; thus the theorist is bound by the discipline of learning, rules of evidence, procedures for bringing data under concepts, and problems of bias. In sum, all these are areas where the claims of the orthodox to 'value-free' endeavours break down. We may note, however, that the necessity of which Streeten speaks is not that of Dobb. Where Dobb sees theory as necessarily linked to practice via the specified agent of the theory's execution, Streeten sees theory linked to practice via the truth-degrading chains of person-hood. Streeten sees the link to practice as essentially problematical and not — as with Dobb — enabling.

Streeten observes that "In social analysis valuations enter not only at the ultimate (or initial) stage in decisions about sets of given ends, but at every stage. People do not attach value only to ultimate ends ... and they are not indifferent between the means which promote those ends" (93). Indeed this may well be true, yet it illustrates once again the fact of Streeten's orientation in all this discussion. We want to say that 'valuation'
enters from the moment that we actually speak — language is 'value-sloped'. Streeten's actors; bestowing or attaching 'value', are working in a moral market place. This is a restricted view: what Streeten is talking about are the ideologically-informed 'lines' we take on issues. If we recall his starting point for all this exegesis, that is the relationship of fact/value, then we can see that his empiricism is untouched and the disjunction between 'is' and 'ought' is affirmed. What is being done is that the related notions of analysis/policy and means/ends are being re-organised within the model of the essentially unproblematical activity of the crisis-theorist.

If Streeten is affirming the disjunction between fact and value, then how does his subsequent discussion of 'values' in social theory differ from that of the 'conventional-wisdom', or from that we might get from critical-theory? It seems that he takes the 'conventional-wisdom' to be splitting fact/value and thereafter separating them. Thus there are statements of fact and there are statements of valuation; the two sets are distinct, and particular statements of fact can be linked with any statements of value that you choose. But we have seen that this is untenable ( in chapter two, "The Idea of Development") and issues in moral nihilism. Streeten's course rather seems to entail that, after granting the split, the two sets of propositions be taken as closely related. Thus valuation inevitably adheres to factual description. The relation is not a necessary one — rather it is contingent, but a general fact. If Streeten is a consistent empiricist then presumably these 'adherences' are regarded as the products of habit. Fact and value are thus split, but then paired. For critical theory the position is different again: fact and value, properly regarded, are simply fused. Thus people do not go around habitually attaching value. Rather, they just inhabit a value-suffused world, and statements of fact are 'brute-relative' to some context.
None of all this denies the obvious fact of day to day living, which is that we can and do distinguish between judgments of fact and judgments of value, rather the issue is how this commonplace is taken up into theory and what conclusions are then drawn from it. Presented thus, we can suggest that Streeten is taking the 'conventional-wisdom' to be adhering to an ideal of value-neutral study, and as wilfully refusing to acknowledge what the routine practice of theorizing reveals. That is, that a value-neutral study is impossible — valuations just do keep getting caught up. Streeten then seems to be saying that far from resisting this and the subsequent job of making a list of deviations from the ideal, as brute reality forces itself upon the observer, the list of deviations should be systemized and embraced. Thus a new conception of the job of the observer and theory is posited. To this end Streeten follows Myrdal and constructs a sophisticated scheme of 'value-seepage', endeavouring to minimize the seepage in some places (for example by advocating 'reflexive' theorizing), and at others granting it; for example, theory is 'value-relevant' because it has a purpose and we had best declare it at the outset.

What we would want to do, affirming the notion of 'social-theory' as the deployment of a morally informed categorical frame, is to go further than Streeten and deny the propriety (and efficacy) of the conception of 'ideal plus list' and make value-suffused practical activity the paradigm of the exchange of theorist and his world. Whatever rules-of-thumb governing the construction of theories we are to establish — and Streeten's list is just that — in the end — the unavoidable nature of 'social-theory' is that it is a morally informed, moral intervention in the world. Indeed if we recall our approval of Gellner's idea of the rediscovery in 'development theory' of classic political philosophy, then we can see that the moral core of 'social theory' is not something to be regretted, rather it is the well-spring of the whole effort.
Streeten continues his exegesis in a revealing way when he asks, given all this 'value-seepage', whether or not we can continue with social science or must we "plunge at once into valuation and ideologies" (96). He answers in terms dismissive of the study of 'ideologies' and in line with his interventionist disposition. Thus he says: "To be useful and truthful, the social scientist, and in particular the economist, should start with the actual political attitudes of people, or groups of people, not with their rationalizations and pseudo-theoretical ideologies" (97). The task of the scientist is to grasp the form-of-life of groups. Streeten seems to advocate a psychological hermeneutics; thus such an effort is not a matter of the elaboration of formal systems, "it is more like the exercise of artistic imagination and sympathetic understanding" (98). In sum, we may say, the social scientist perfects a mechanics of social inter-action. With Myrdal this is slotted into an evolutionist frame which takes the present task of society to be the construction of a rationally managed system. The whole is evidently the ideology of a planner: authoritative rule by the reasonable in the interests of the general good. Much of what is said in regard to the execution of practical research (i.e. engaged, or familiarly empirical study) is eminently sensible, but the whole is deformed by the refusal to acknowledge that the effort is fundamentally ideological.

As regards the 'institutionalist' treatment of the related issues of valuation and the role of the theorist, we can summarize thus. (1) We have seen that whilst Myrdal poses the 'problem of values' in theoretical terms, derived from a debate with his intellectual mentors, he fails to resolve the issues. (2) He goes on to offer a 'parallel solution whereby he resolves the matter practically, in 'crisis politics' — the nature of 'crisis politics' is taken to be such as to obviate any great problem with 'values'. (3) What he now has to say about 'values' flows from his practical activity; that is, 'crisis politics' lets basic values be assumed, and thereafter the problem
is simply of removal of idiosyncratic valuations, or bias, or 'seepages'. (4) He adopts the stance of a 'reasonable man' and takes his procedure, with its element of mea culpa and various rules of thumb, to be fundamentally sound. (5) The whole is an empiricist scheme; not a naive empiricism, and equally with Myrdal not, perhaps, very sophisticated either. Yet with Streeten the effort becomes indeed a highly subtle approach.

3.5 Policy — planning and the 'soft-state'

Myrdal, like the other institutionalists, argues out of reaction to the 'conventional-wisdom' of neo-classicism and the experience of the Depression to the rational necessity of 'planning'. As Gruchy noted, the issue for institutionalists was the "social control of business" (99) and the agent of control was to be the state. Myrdal reveals this as the core of his theories' practical engagement when he observes that "what a state needs, and what politics is about, is precisely a macro-plan for inducing changes, simultaneously, in a great number of conditions, not only in the economic, and doing it in a way so as to coordinate all these changes in order to reach a maximum development effect of efforts and sacrifices. This may, in popular terms, be a definition of what we should mean by planning" (100).

Observing that the situation in the Third World simply does not measure up to these requirements of his theory, Myrdal invokes the notion of the 'soft state': an encapsulating term for the extent to which reality diverges from the requirements of theory. It is explicated thus: "By that term I want to characterize a general lack of social discipline" (101). He then presents a detailed list of the failings of the typical (102) Third World state, and concludes that his observations "should rightly lead up to an investigation of the policy issue of by what means the 'soft state' can be changed into more of a 'strong state'... This is, in my view, the most important task to be
fulfilled in order to make possible rapid development"(103). Without all this, planning for development is futile. However, we should not be downhearted: "To begin with the problem must be discussed honestly and effectively, as a problem of planning"(104)(my emphases).

Myrdal is rather pessimistic about the chances of the Third World putting its own house in order. He has reason to be, since his policy proposals take the form of a vague injunction: "the under-developed countries have to struggle on a broad front to make their states less soft"(105). But the agents of this reform are never clearly identified, much less openly discussed. The role of the presently developed is ambiguous - the use of 'leverage' to press for more 'social discipline' is advocated, yet this in turn rests on the assumption of power of liberal-progressives in the governments of the developed nations. In respect of the Third World states Myrdal has observed that little can be done before "the power structure has been changed by evolution or revolution"(106). The reform of the political and social structures of the under-developed, plus changes in orientation on the part of the developed, are made the pre-requisites of planning the development of the Third World. And it seems that it is the 'planners', the reasonable men, who must press for these reforms.

We can make a series of objections to this:

(1) Perhaps the most familiar objection to be brought against this line of argument is the one we can dub the 'tactical'. Such critics ask why a part of the problem - the present nature of the state - should be made into a vehicle of the solution of these problems. They add that this 'mystery' is not to be resolved via the internal renewal of the state through the gradual extension of the area held by 'reasonable men'. This line of criticism we will not pursue.
A alternative line of criticism can be generated if we recall the work of Dobb. We noted above his argument that theorizing is incoherent without an identified agent of the execution of the theory. Analysis thus entails prescription, in that a 'complete' analysis necessarily involves some suppositions and suggestions as to mechanisms for the execution of the solution presented in analysis. Theories are not simply constructed for somebody: they involve as necessary assumptions 'somebody' acting as the theory supposes/suggests. With no identified agent the theory simply does not touch the ground.

So who, or what, is Myrdal's 'agent'? We can approach the identification of his 'agent' via his stance on 'values'. Myrdal does not pursue 'value-neutrality' so much as a 'virtuous non-partisanship'. Two techniques support the pursuit of this goal. On the one hand Myrdal wears his 'values' on his sleeve, which, claiming these are both general and obvious, he seems to take to deflect criticism of ideological taint (which it does not, of course). On the other hand, the elimination of anything that militates against realistic modelling of development. This latter aspect is the elimination of 'value-seepage', which quasi-medical metaphor is wholly appropriate. This pursuit of technically rational social knowledge, free from ideology, and his tacit granting of the need to identify an agent - which he does in affirming the value-principle 'development' - issues in the identification of the state as the agent of execution of his theory. But what sort of a commitment is this? Can we call this an unsatisfactory minimum commitment?

Let us recall Bauman's (106) jibe at Berger and Luckmann; their 'actor', around whom they display their sociology of knowledge, is not a human but an epistemic being, established as the minimum necessary link with reality for that exercise in idealistic theorizing which they are disposed to present. The essential historical and social specificity of any exercise in the sociology of knowledge
is ignored, and we have an idealist abstraction from common-sense whose only acknowledged link with reality is an actor devoid of any characteristics. The 'actor' serves as the necessary condition of their theorizing, but plays no role in it. The 'actor's' presence simply satisfies a technical requirement of the logic of theorizing.

So, is Myrdal's 'state' an epistemic phenomenon—called forth by the demands of the logic of theorizing, and thus to be taken as satisfying a technical requirement—or is it any identifiable state in the real world? What then is the nature of an adequate analysis of the state? For our part that must be answered in terms of a marxian analysis—but for Myrdal? It is claimed that his methodology is essentially the pursuit of realism in modelling; the facts come first. Thus in respect of the 'state', we should expect the discussion of, and around, the state to be predominantly concerned with how it is. But the reverse is the case, here Myrdal's treatment of the state is dominated by his notion of the 'soft-state'—where this is transparently a measure of the divergence of reality from the requirements of theory. Thus his analysis is dominated by how the state ought to be. In considering his treatment of the issue, of state, it seems to be the case that Myrdal, having just established by moral and practical reflection how the world is and how it ought to be, then proceeds to search for an agent. The agent he invokes is made in his own image. It is the embodiment of the pursuit of the general public good; and, as we have noted, the 'soft-state' is to be discussed as a "problem of planning"(109). Myrdal does not begin his analysis of the state from, as we would expect, how it is, rather he begins from how it has to be if Myrdalian theory is to be executed.

The reforming state is a necessary condition of the deployment of the Myrdalian scheme; Myrdal's 'state' is the minimum necessary acknowledgement of the logical
requirement to identify an agent of theory-expectation. This agent of Myrdal's derives from the requirements of the logic of theorizing in the particular context of Myrdal's pursuit of a 'virtuous non-partisanship', and not from any historically specific analysis of the nature of the state in Third World society.

The Myrdalian scheme thus touches the ground only in a technical sense. Whether this invalidates the entire effort—that is, whether there is a requirement in theorizing for the 'agent' to be realistic (so to say)—we have not asked. Clearly the use of a technical grounding only must reduce the plausibility of any policy proposals that are stronger than tentative; and as Myrdal makes the 'state' the core and key to the implementation of his effort, then this technical grounding seems to be insufficient. His 'state' does not seem able to carry the weight the general argument requires it to. What we are saying, then, is that the Myrdalian 'state' must be taken as insufficient to carry the argument; and therefore, as the basis of practical policy making, unsatisfactory. The prior question of whether or not the Myrdalian 'state' is enough to properly meet the demands of the logic of theorizing we do not know. We can note, however, that if the Myrdalian state is a device for the evasion of political commitment, which is a jibe made by some (and not only Marxists), then this would seem to entail that Myrdal is pursuing a theory which is not grounded; that is to say, a perfectly irrelevant theory. And that notion certainly does look incoherent.

(3) We can construct another approach to these matters if we recall Passmore's remarks on the pursuit of knowledge and the manner of its dissemination and use, in the light of the ideal of progress.

The notion of the perfectibility of man comes down to us, so Passmore argues, from the ancient Greeks. Prior to the Renaissance such discussions of perfectibility were couched in metaphysical or theological terms, and concerned
the pursuit of a goal— that is, the state of perfection. Locke transforms the idea, arguing that men are capable of being improved by moral education, that is social action. This is the idea that is influential in the 18th and 19th centuries: the focus is on the role of education, and the process of improvement. However, a damaging criticism of this line is to point out that the educator is a member of corrupt society and presumably corrupt also. Marx will accuse Locke and his followers of forgetting the matter of the education of the educator. This opens up the search for a guarantor— if Locke has established the possibility of the moral advancement of the citizens and their society, the question becomes one of securing the fact.

Two lines of argument flow from this point. The first, presented by the philosophe’s (very much aware of their own novel social status) argued for the rule of the best—a version of the Platonic ‘philosopher-king’ idea. Thus Passmore observes that “Helvetius, a convinced Lockian, is the founding father of modern governmentalism” (111), and that he focused on the role of the state. But this does not meet Marx’s question—the matter of control is not here resolved. Passmore presents this line as moving via Bentham and J.S. Mill (who were experienced in government, unlike the philosophe’s) down to the Fabians and their stress on legislation. The second line, on the other hand, has recourse to the model of the natural sciences. Here the need for a guarantor focused upon a method. The extension of the method of natural science into the realm of the social was entailed, as was the dissemination and use of the resultant knowledge. The notion of ‘progress’ is presented, and progress is taken to be normal insofar as it is not blocked by sinister partial interest. However this line fails also; for the dissemination of scientific knowledge is problematical, as is the expectation that any knowledge will be acted upon. The method of natural science is no guarantee of progress in society. (The further extension of the argument


involves taking the question of a guarantor completely out of the hands of anybody: thus we have determinist schemes, the social determinism of rationalists from Leibniz down to Marx and the natural determinisms of Darwinian evolutionisms. We need not pursue these.

What then of Myrdal? He refers to himself as "a student in the great liberal tradition of the Enlightenment"(112)and cites the state as the agent of progress. If we follow Passmore's argument then clearly Myrdal follows the Locke-Helvetius-Mill line down to Fabianism. Indeed Ehrensaft(113)dissmissively labels him as just that, a Fabian. If we allow Passmore's arguments, then it is clear that Myrdal's use of the state as agent of development is unsatisfactory in that it cannot, in theory, meet the demands of recurring progress.

Variations on the idea of the 'philosopher-king' have in the main been rejected. In addition to this, there is also discernible in Myrdal an element of line two; that is, the invoking of the method of science. Not only is this evident in the relatively unsurprising sense that it is entailed by his rejection of the centrality of the notion of ideology, and his constant harping on the question of the elimination of bias; but it is also revealed - if we follow Passmore - in his appeal to the progressive-minded, reasonable men. The idea that there is an ever growing reservoir of knowledge that is free from ideological taint represents the direct and obvious argument from the model of science. Myrdal invoking the steady, diverse, broad-fronted pressure of the reasonable men represents the corollary, which is the argument from the supposedly self-evident propriety and superiority of properly transmitted scientific knowledge. Myrdal's belief in the power of reflexive institutional theory echoes the belief of the philosopher in the power of rational argument - and this is the most optimistic aspect of an argument from science.

In Myrdal these two elements (we noted) are run
together; in that the state, invoked as the agent of development (that is, progress) is also the locus of (social) scientific method. The state is served and staffed by reasonable men bent on the pursuit of the general public good. This is revealed in the quotation we have noted already: "What the state needs, and what politics is about, is precisely a macro-plan for inducing changes ... This may in popular terms, be a definition of what we should mean by planning"(114). But the state as guarantor of progress is unsatisfactory. The explication of the role of the state reveals the failure to secure 'progress'; and the method of science as guarantor is equally unhelpful. The adoption of this as key does not secure 'progress'.

In summary, we note that above we argued that the Myrdalian 'state' is an epistemic device to secure a grounded theory; and that, as such, it represents a minimum response to the demands of the logic of theorizing. We argued that the Myrdalian treatment of the state conflicted with the avowed method of the pursuit of realism in modelling, and that the notion was too weak to carry the load the general argument required it to. (We further suggested at this point that here was the site of a possible collapse into incoherence for the entire effort - but we did not try to secure this argument). To these points we added that, even setting aside doubts as to the adequacy of the Myrdalian state, the state combined with the method of science was insufficient to secure 'development' (for reasons Passmore has presented).

These notes are about Myrdal's argument-strategies. From our criticisms it does not follow that anything by way of statements of (brute relative) facts made by Myrdal are necessarily false (or uninteresting). Whether or not Myrdal's 'facts' are right is a matter of 'checking the facts'. Our point is that even if he has got the facts straight, his argument is deeply flawed, as we have seen, and this is a reason for doubting any derived policy proposals.
Dynamic of Theory III: The status of 'Neo-Institutional Social Theory'.

In the introductory remarks to this Section we made reference to the broad context of enquiry into which this particular effort slotted. Noting that the institutionalists have lodged claims to the effect that their endeavours constitute an independent and adequate development-studies, in contradiction to the products of the 'conventional-wisdom' (where this comprises both 'growth theory' and modernization theory), we indicated that we would consider this claim. In the light of our above researches we are now able to redeem this promise. In part 4-1 we treat the question: to what extent can neo-institutional social theory be taken as establishing an independent development-studies? In part 4-2 we ask to what extent can neo-institutionalist work be taken to represent a theoretical advance over the material of the 'conventional-wisdom'.

4-1. We can introduce our analyses by asking whether or not neo-institutional social theory can be taken as establishing an independent development-studies. This seems to be roughly the burden of Streeten's work. It is partially granted by Ehrensaft in his history, when he distinguishes a 'pre-Seers concensus', static and wrong-headed, from subsequent movement towards an adequate theory of development. Streeten observes that "Awareness of a problem of development is remarkably recent. The academic literature, the public debate, voluntary and official agencies and institutions and policies are not more than twenty years old" (115). He goes on to locate the source of this rise in interest in two related sets of circumstances: (1) problems of resources and poverty are taken to be urgent in view of the population explosion, and soluble in the light of the success of post-war European recovery; (2) political change in the form of the rise of 'new nations' of the Third World.
within the context of 'cold war' occasions concern for the 'proper' development of these 'new nations'. Streeten goes on to remark that "The psychological, political and even military origins of our interest in development have coloured the approach and the content of development studies"(116). Streeten makes these remarks in line with the 'reflexive' aspect of his general orientations. In addition we have seen that the orthodoxy of neo-classicism forms a theoretical object against which 'neo-institutional social theory' is defined, and the Keynesian-derived growth models are assimilated to that orthodoxy. The method of neo-institutional social theory entails the pursuit of realistic models of developing economies; bias is to be purged, and in this light the early efforts of the 'conventional wisdom' are taken as a theoretically misconceived departure.

Yet, even if we grant all this, precisely what follows is not clear. Let us then pose the question in regard to career of development studies: in what sense is an institutionalist scheme independent? If we ask whether the practitioners of neo-institutional social theory are independent of orthodox economics, then we have to report that in regard to neo-classicism they take themselves to encompass and surpass that scheme. The result is that they re-constitute a general political economics, which is distinct from both Marxian radicalism and orthodox narrowness. But for us the question of their relative independence reduces to a question of intent and style of analysis. We have noted above, with both Gordon and Gruchy, that neo-institutionalism is a style of approaching economics that lodges the economic system within an institutional framework. It is thereby more immediately plausible in the context of the Third World, but nonetheless any genuine theoretical novelty must be restricted. Following on from this, we can say that even if the mode of analysis is richer (which it must be, to the extent that it treats institutional aspects) then the
intent remains the same. That is, just as 'conventional-wisdom' is an economics designed to legitimate/organise intervention by an authoritative state to promote development, then so too does neo-institutional social theory aim to legitimate/organise authoritative state intervention. Further, in the light of the refusal of neo-institutional social theory to acknowledge its status as ideology, it must be accounted (along with the growth and modernization theories) as itself ideological in the pejorative sense; that is, blind to significant elements of its own nature. In the light of our interest in the elucidation of the nature of 'social theory' (a morally informed categorical frame), neo-institutional social theory, for all its greater subtlety, remains firmly within the framework of the orthodox.

But what would the theorists of neo-institutional social theory say to this question of ours? It seems likely that they would both deny that the question is especially interesting (in that their ideology disposes them to affirm a practical bent, thus implicitly eschewing what could be seen as academic-departmental scholasticism) or that it is particularly difficult to answer, in that they would affirm their orientation to these matters as being manifestly more adequate to the novel problems of the post-war world than the efforts of the 'conventional-wisdom'.

If political-economics is an empirical (indeed, problem-centred) science conceived in an empiricist vein, then theirs is at least potentially an adequate political economics in contradistinction to the efforts of the orthodoxy. Yet this self-conception to our mind lodges them firmly within the realm of the orthodox, even if we grant their greater plausibility. Can we then take neo-institutionalism to provide the basis for an independent development-studies? It seems as if the question does not make very good sense because, in sum, we have to say that neo-institutionalist social theory is a problem-centred
European line of thought, within social science, whose intent is the legitimisation/organisation of authoritative interventions. If the exchange of the rich and poor nations is properly conceived as a matter of 'intervention', then neo-institutional social theory does have claims to be the most subtle intervention to date. But to our mind that relation is improper and, in the end, untenable. Again, if we take development studies to be about the pursuit of a 'science' of 'Third World' society, then neo-institutional social theory has claims to some approximation to that ideal, but to our mind this goal is absurd.

Setting aside the matter of the independence of an institutionalist development studies, we turn to the major question, which is: Can we take neo-institutional theory to represent a theoretical advance over modernisation theory and any Harrod-Domar informed orthodoxy?

This question raises the prior issue of theory. Can we, having indicated that we take neo-institutional social theory and modernization and the early orthodoxy built around Harrod-Domar to be ideologies, rank ideologies? If ideologies can be ranked, then how? Here we offer a brief answer, before going on to consider Seers and Ehrensaft and the relative positions of the ideologies we have thus far met.

Bernstein offers an answer to the question of ranking ideologies which focuses on the aspect of argument. (This is in contrast to, say, Goldmann, who takes explanatory scope; thus the 'better' ideology is the one that explains the narrower one. Or again in contrast the Mannheim, who focusses on the relativism of points of view). Bernstein observes that "ideologies are based on beliefs and interpretations which purport to be true or valid. These beliefs and interpretations are consequently subject to rational criticism" (117). How these 'rational criticisms'
are to be ordered, or how we might judge between one ideology and another, becomes a complex-issue to be treated via a distinction between validation and authentication; between the discipline the community of scholars imposes, and thereafter the significance that comes to be attached to any cultural objects they may construct. Here we can note that our task is apparently easier, since all of the theories (ideologies) we have thus far looked at claim to be both (1) empiricist, that is modelling themselves on the natural sciences and (2) aimed at legitimating/organising/implementing authoritative interventions, where this requires a model of the world and a measurement/intervention technology; together these permit the theorist to 'go to work on the world'. So, out of the ideologies we have so far assembled, which is the best in regard to this essentially technical requirement?

With regard to those efforts which are built around the Harrod-Domar model, that is, the 'export-Keynes' and 'early modernization theory', we have to say that the neo-institutional social theory line does indeed constitute an advance. If we note the papers of Seers and Ehrensaft we can illustrate this—probably widely accepted—view. Both Seers and Ehrensaft operate within what Hindess has called the 'epistemology of model building'; that is, both conceive their task as the realisation of realistic models of reality. We can see with the work of Seers that the institutionalists' line is strong. He argues the orthodox are simply 'out of touch', and his explanation of this is an amalgam of observation on the teaching and career pattern of economists which reduces to the claim that there is an incapacity of vision on the part of the orthodox which renders them incapable of seeing the world straight. The specific area of conceptual inadequacy follows the line we have noted with Streeten: the 'conventional-wisdom' is inadequate to its object and objectives, in that it represents a set of intellectual tools fashioned for use in the rich world and not the poor. Ehrensaft treats this in
terms of a contrast between, on the one hand, the claims to generality on the part of the orthodox; and, on the other, the fact of their claims being situation-bound. The upshot is to open up the basis of a familiar line of criticism: "when these assumptions are scrutinized, it is readily apparent that they describe conditions contrary to the typical case of world societies"(118). We can suggest that, according to the criteria of adequacy that would be proposed by the 'conventional-wisdom', that the Harrod-Dormar informed theories of growth and of modernization are inadequate; and that, in addition, the efforts of 'neo-institutional social theory' are an advance. Henceforth the question of the 'best' ideology so far is lodged in respect of neo-institutional social theory and revisionist-modernization.

When we turn to a comparison between revisionist-modernization and neo-institutional social theory, the problem of ranking becomes rather more problematical. If we take Gellner as a representative of a sophisticated revisionist-modernization and compare his work — insofar as he presents a general theory of process of development (119) — with that of Myrdal, then we can observe a number of 'strategic' resemblances.

We have seen that Myrdal, in the course of the pursuit of progress (in the guise of development) invokes the state and (secondarily) the method of science as agents and guarantors of progress. The particular agents of change were, upon observation, found to be the diffuse efforts of the 'reasonable men': it was in these people that the possibilities inherent in the conjunction of social scientific knowledge and state intervention were lodged. We indicated grounds for scepticism in respect of this schema. Now if we turn to Gellner we find a similar conception of the possibility of progress. Gellner regards the intervention of the social theorist as constrained by the dual circumstances of, on the one hand, the tendential yet overwhelmingly strong movement of
industrial and science based development (a world historical phenomenon; and on the other hand, the restriction of the nature of any theoretically-informed grasp of the process to the limits set by natural scientific method. The 'transition', as Gellner calls the whole process, is to be accomplished with critical reason as the guide towards the goal of 'being developed'.

Thus where Myrdal takes the state to guide the social dynamic of 'cumulative causation' toward the goal of 'world-welfarism', Gellner sees an essentially opaque process of transition, illuminated (from within, as it were) by the possibilities inherent in scientific method and a very good, if rough, idea of the end-situation of transition. Where Myrdal, describing himself as an Enlightenment liberal, identifies the effective locus of human intervention in the social science-informed intervention of the state in the hands of the progressives, Gellner sees the locus of human intervention in the 'transition' as bounded by the development-orientated deployment of 'critical-rationalism'; a Popperian liberalism whose roots are essentially 17th century. As Myrdal's effort fails, so too does Gellner's; the method of science is no guarantor.

Both theorists are pessimistic. Gellner attempts to make this a virtue of his stance; whereas Myrdal, notoriously, expects little in the way of development. The strategies resemble each other in this general form: thus (a) both affirm a notion of progress in the guise of development, and (b) both seek an agent to act as guarantor. That is, they both fall short of accepting the only cogent guarantor-strategy; which is to make progress 'natural' by involving notions of determinism. In terms of their 'meta-theories', it is difficult to identify any means whereby they may be, generally, ranked as development theories vis a vis each other.

There is another line of argument which bears upon this issue of ranking, namely... the issue of progress in conceptualization. Here, with Ehrensaft, we can take note of one way in which our question about ranking, and more narrowly technical adequacy, cannot be answered.
Ehrensaft's article sets out an exercise in "economic sociology" and he declares his objective thus, "the purpose of this essay is to explain why semi-industrialization occurs in Third World capitalist regimes rather than full industrialization" (120). Prima facie it would seem to be the case that Ehrensaft takes himself to be telling us something about how things are, an empirical matter. He also seems to adopt an empiricist frame; thus in referring to the recent history of economic sociological formulations, he notes that "each successive step brings us closer to approximation to actual social relationships". In addition he goes on to say: "I will review these steps one by one, showing how each successive analysis builds intellectually on the ones which preceded" (121). We seem to be presented with a scheme of increasingly accurate approximations to reality: which scheme echoes the familiar idea of the progressive character of natural scientific conceptualization.

Ehrensaft adopts the stance of some sort of dependency theorist, and reviews the post-war history of development-studies in the light of such theory. This, of course, is his privilege. The error seems to come when he elects to relate his history of theory in the mould of the natural sciences' progressiveness of conceptualization. It may be argued that natural science conceptualizations are progressive to the extent that they approximate more closely to reality than their predecessors. But with the social sciences there is no reason to expect, or look for, this progressive tendency; and with the history of dependency-theory, or any other distinguishable effort within the social sciences, there is no reason to cast the history in this natural science-echoing style. If we recall Dobb's schema, then we see that the dynamic of theory is but one aspect of theory (ideology)-construction (not evolution), along with the dynamic of society. Indeed we can move further away from the analogy of natural science by noting that it is this second aspect of the basis of elaboration of ideologies which is, arguably, the principal determinant. In the schema presented by Dobb there is no pursuit of a general-theory qua natural science
general theory - and no reason therefore to look for any analogous progressiveness of concept. Ehrensaft's pursuit of a progressive evolution of concepts towards a realistic economic sociology is, so far as we can determine, a misconceived project. There is no reason to suspect that such a progressive sequence exists; indeed with Dobb, there is reason to suppose that it does not. This sequence of Ehrensaft's cannot serve as the basis for claims to the primacy of neo-institutional social theory over the 'conventional-wisdom', or for that matter of dependency over neo-institutional social theory.

Yet with Bernstein we have noted that ideologies can be ranked; Ehrensaft's effort would perhaps have been more helpful if it had been restricted to an exposition of the benefits to be derived from paying attention to the institutional context of economies, thereby showing how the original notion of relevance-of-context could be fruitfully deployed in several areas. If Ehrensaft's effort is anything other than an idiosyncratic introduction to 'dependency theory', then it is precisely an examination of the realms of use of this seminal notion. However, this is not developed, and Ehrensaft's contribution to the elucidation of theory does not transcend Girvan's question-bagging formulation - "historical/institutional/structural method" (122). What remains unclear is just how these bits fit together. The answer is not to be found in any sequence of concept refinement from the start-point of the pre-Seers consensus.

In regard to the matter of the theoretical priority of neo-institutional social theory in relation to modernization-theory, Ehrensaft's work offers few clues. He simply recapitulates the view that institutional sensitivity advances the realism of modelling - a point established by Seers and Myrdal - and goes on to locate this in an untenable schema which reduces Myrdal and neo-institutional social theory to the status of a preliminary 'step in the right direction', namely towards 'dependency theory'.
Are we now in a position to answer our question vis a vis the relative sophistication and problem - adequacy of neo-institutional social theory and modernization theory? If we mean an advance in terms of practical efficacy, in the sense of the deployment of a more subtle set of concepts, or more adequate concepts in the light of some controlling idea of a 'science of (Third World) society', then the answer must be yes. We have argued for this above: the experience of withdrawal from empire as 'decolonization' and the European intellectual/governmental tradition provided resources which lent themselves more readily to a project of authoritative interventionism oriented to 'development' goals than did the resources of the U.S. theorists of modernization. The crucial difference was identified as concerning the theorists' social milieu and the nature of the respective political demands; that is, the dynamic of society rather than the dynamic of theory. Indeed, these straightforwardly theoretical resources were largely shared. The European effort was thus adequate to its task. If we mean an advance in terms of the nature of theorizing, in the sense of a movement towards a notion of social-theory as the 'deployment of a morally-informed categorical' frame and away from notions of social science as poor relation to natural science, then the general answer has to be no. There is no theoretical advance. Both neo-institutional social theory and modernization-theory are ideologies, which are in conception empiricist and in intent authoritative-interventionist.
Chapter Six: Disciplinary Independence and Theoretical Progressivity.

Preamble.

In the Introduction to Section Three we noted that the material of the section presented us with two strategic issues. These were, first, the matter of the putative independence of "development studies" from the body of the social sciences in general (and in particular from economics); and second, the related issue of the progressive theoretical status of those intellectual schemes considered in this section. As these two issues have not been resolved thus far in this section (i.e., in chapter 5), the logic of the study as a whole bids us acknowledge them here. Chapter 6 will be organised around these two theoretical issues.

Evidently this represents a change in our procedure from the more straightforwardly sociology of knowledge line followed before, but we can advance reasons for this. Thus, in addition to invoking the dictates of the logic of the structure of the study as a whole we can offer two points. Firstly, if we recall that a sociology of knowledge treatment would require us to relate the dynamics of the exchange between historically conditioned political demand and relevant theoretical traditions, then it is clear that the results if such an analysis have been most competently anticipated by more than one writer, (e.g., O'Brien 1975, Booth 1975, Girvan 1973). This being the case there is little point in our presenting yet another variation on this relatively well worn theme. Secondly, we can note that our study is of "western" theories. This raises the issue of the manner in which clearly Latin American inspired theoretical departures are to be incorporated in our text. In the absence of a fully prepared sociology knowledge treatment, it seems appropriate to observe that within the general ambit of an interest in "development" there seem to be some important shared concepts. Thus Girvan, treating the Caribbean school of "dependency theorists", refers to the "historical/structural/institutional method" (1). Our interest then, granting this note and in
the light of the interest accorded these Latin American efforts by "western" theorists, may therefore be pitched quite reasonably at an abstract level.

In sum: we invoke the fact of the established exchange and (more particularly) the conceptual similarities of Latin American and "western" work on the one hand, and on the other the fact that sociology of knowledge treatments have been executed in major respects already, as the basis of a decision to pitch this chapter at an abstract level and organise it around the related issues of disciplinary independence and theoretical status, as demanded by the logic of the study as a whole.

Having thus declared an intention to simplify the tasks of this chapter we will add one further simplification, and this refers to the substantive attachments of the chapter. We noted in the Introduction to Section Three that our thematic treatment of these complex issues of the nature of the exchanges between theorist and world required that theorists change their roles as we changed our questions. That remark is nowhere more apposite than in the present context. The debate we endeavour to capture for our study ranges over a wide area, from the structuralist reformism of ECLA to the marxian-style polemics of AG Frank. The simplification we adopt here is the association of 'dependency' with Furtado and 'underdevelopment theory' with Frank. This lets us organise our questions/material thus: when we treat 'disciplinary independence' we will focus upon 'dependency' and Furtado; and when we treat the matter of 'progressivity in conceptualization' we will focus upon 'underdevelopment theory' and AG Frank.

A distinction between these two lines is fairly often drawn, though the status of the distinction remains problematic. In particular the issue of whether or not the "UDT" line is properly to be taken as marxist has to be acknowledged. The manner in which we have
proposed to treat our material, that is by "focusing" first this way and then that, implies that we are identifying two aspects of the same one thing; and that consequently "UDT" is not marxian, because the "dependency" of Furtado surely is not. However, implications aside, we can reasonably ask whether this simplifying schematism actually commits us to any view, one way or the other, on the status of AG Frank's work and "UDT". It seems not; we are simply associating one question with one distinguishable line of work and the other question with another line of work. That is, our engagement with this material is, at present, to be taken as fairly narrowly technical and investigatory; and not as flowing from, or subsumed under, any general estimation that the two lines are (or are not ) sharply distinct.

A final note may be appended to this preamble; which is to observe that, having invoked the "logic of the study as a whole", it might also be recalled that the study has a dual nature. Thus we enquire into the nature of the post war 'career' of "development studies" with a view to elucidating the nature of social theory. Put simply, Chapter Six, after a series of substantive analyses of elements of the 'career' of "development studies", recalls our attention to our overarching interests in social theorizing. Thus if the Prologue to the study established theoretically the possibility of regarding efforts in 'development studies' as exercises in social theorizing (ie ideology making), then the substantive sociology of knowledge analyses may be taken both as illustrative confirmations of that view's plausibility and as further investigations of its inherent explanatory richness. Chapter Six, treating "disciplinary independence" and "theoretical progressivity", is thus intermediate between our preliminary theoretical arguments for taking "social science" to be, properly speaking, a matter of social theorizing (ie ideology making) and the eventual fuller presentation of the case promised for Section Five.
2.0 Disciplinary Independence.

We can recall that Chapter Five treated, amongst others, the question—does NIST(2) establish an independent and adequate development studies? After noting and setting aside the practitioners' self-images and considering the intent and form of their efforts, we answered that the question made little sense, and that rather we would wish to say that NIST established the most sophisticated scheme of "authoritative interventionism" to date. A similar issue may be phrased as follows: does "dependency" establish an independent and adequate development studies? Anticipating a similar pattern of reply (3) to that just noted, we can break down this question into two parts: 2.1 what is the form and intent of "dependency"? and 2.2 does "dependency" supersede 'CW' economics?

2.1 Form and intent.

If we argue that NIST aimed at establishing a subtle and cooperative "authoritative interventionism" whose function was to legitimate and order a withdrawal from formal empire, and which subsequently became the model of the exchange of rich and poor nations, then precisely what does "dependency" function to legitimate and order? At first glance, and adopting the manner of "ideology labelling" we have used above, the answer would seem to be "reactive(populist) interventionism". This line of argument we now consider (4).

2.11 Sociology of knowledge sketch of 'dependency'

Resting on already existing work (Brookfield, Ehrensaft, Girvan, Oxaal(ed), Furtado, DiMarco and others) we may present the circumstances of the emergence of "dependency" in terms of the invocation of available resources within a general milieu in response to particular political demands. Now if we are taking Furtado to exemplify the "dependency" line, then our presentation of the position needs must be sequential in form. Furtado's work encompasses (1) the critical revisions to the orthodox views initiated by Prebisch and...
developed by ECLA, (ii) the concern to rebut monetarist views with structuralist analyses of inflation, and (iii) the lodging of claims on behalf of 'dependency' to have replaced the orthodox insofar as that school represented a truly adequate economics.

(i) Prebisch's early work grows out of the experience of the Latin American economies after the crisis of 1929 when their traditional economic mode, that of exporting primary products, was severely curtailed by the contraction in world trade. The measures initiated by governments to mitigate the impact of this loss of export markets had the incidental effect of initiating a process of import substituting industrialization. After the end of the war, with a revival of credit lines to Latin America and of world trade, the now established process of industrialization was in need of a legitimating and ordering explanation; and Prebisch and ECLA provided it. The principal theoretical object over against which Prebisch developed his views was the claim of traditional theories to the effect that international specialization conferred benefits upon all those involved. Clairmonte locates the establishment of this doctrine in the heyday of what he calls British Integral Liberalism – through the middle part of the 19th century. Against it Prebisch utilizes a version of the centre/periphery notion, which was a long established motif not only in liberalism and marxism but also in indigenous Latin American anti-imperialist and anti-marxian writings. He argues that within the ambit of the orthodox theory, and pre-1929 status quo, Latin American economies were condemned to a secondary and relatively declining position. The solution was to pursue industrialization behind protective barriers. In the first instance the advocated policy was via import substitution: precisely that pattern which had grown up in the wake of the crisis. In addition to this re-working of the conception of the position of Latin
American economies within the world economy, there is a concurrent, re-working of explanations of the nature of these peripheral economies. Here the equilibrium model of neo-classical orthodoxy is rejected, in favour of an empiricist-flavoured, pragmatic, and problem-oriented approach, namely structuralism. The structuralist effort takes off from an attempt to model the local situation. It thus present a scheme whereby the putative one national economy is seen as split into a very loosely integrated set of quasi-autonomous 'sectors', each of which represents either a residue of the historical process of the expansion of European capitalism, or a present requirement of the newly dominant capitalist centre (that is, the USA). The distinctively 'autonomous national economy' simply does not exist save as a concatenation of 'residues', 'enclaves', and various 'parasitic forms'. As O'Brien puts it, "An underdeveloped country is underdeveloped precisely because it consists of different structures each with a specific type of behaviour" (5).

(ii) The reformist structuralism propounded by ECLA belongs to the first of what Furtado calls "three easily identifiable periods" (6) in the economic history of post-war Latin America. The first is characterized as one of rapid growth based upon favourable terms of trade, accumulated reserves from the war years, and currencies strong enough to be able to withstand gradual devaluation in the face of already active inflationary pressures. By the end of the early 1960s the position is changed, and the policy of industrialization via protected import - substitution is apparently failing. Furtado (7) notes a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade and a "marked slackening" in the rate of growth. On top of this, the experience of the Cuban revolution provokes widespread questioning of the "real significance of the region's economic development" (8). The deteriorating situation presents itself to the ECLA school in the form of concern for market size and international exchange. As Girvan puts it: "ECLA thus pursued a two pronged strategy of pressure and persuasion in the 1960's:
the first, on Latin American governments in favour of regional integration, the second, on governments of the developed countries for more liberal trade and financial policies"(9).

Setting aside matters of integration and trade we can focus on the topic of finance. Here the question of inflation provides an issue whereby we can see, in the work of Furtado, a clear example of the progressive re-working of the theoretical resource established in the ECLA line. This change is anticipated, as Brookfield points out, in the 1965 work published by Furtado in the wake of the 1964 coup in Brazil. Here Furtado writes of the "dialectic of capitalist development", where in his 1950s essay collection he presents a "theory of underdevelopment"; and the whole expresses a shift from a simple additive treatment of social aspects attendant on economic changes, towards a richer conception of structural change in the process of industrialization (10). The debate around the matter of inflation enables Furtado to counterpose to the financial orthodoxy of monetarism (which regards inflation as a matter of the poor functioning of money flows and which diagnoses either demand or cost inflation) a structuralist analysis. Thus Furtado insists that even if these familiar patterns of inflation did occur, then "they were nearly always responses to more deep seated pressures, or rather they reflected an adaptation effort within the framework of more complex processes, whose main ingredients were structural inflexibility and the determination to press ahead with a development policy"(11). This argument is unpacked in terms of the various responses contrived by the sectors of the economy in endeavouring to avoid the burden of financing the government's deficit. Thus Furtado deploys (not entirely consistently) notions such as 'basic inflationary pressures', 'propagation mechanisms', and 'decision centers', where these latter are the financial authorities and the point at which the monetarist arguments get started. In this debate with
the orthodox, over a pressing practical problem, we see Furtado developing that which was latent in the reformist ECLA line into what might be dubbed an "oppositional meaning system".

(iii) It is out of this debate around the issues of the exchange between the Latin American countries and the metropolitan centres, within the context of continuing failure to achieve the establishment of autonomous economies, that the notion of 'dependency' as that which characterizes most fruitfully the situation of the Latin American economies crystallizes.

Brookfield notes that "Furtado's disenchantment with the ECLA industrialization policies became in time complete"(12). His original approval was replaced by a view which explained the failure of industrialization policies in terms of the position of Latin American economies within a dual frame of external dependency and internal fixity of social and economic structures. In a 1976 work Furtado observes that "there can be no doubt that development based on exports of raw materials and import-substituting industrialization has reached the limits of its possibilities, at least in the case of the region's largest countries. Similarly the institutional framework inherited from the colonial period, or established shortly after separation from the mother countries, seems to have exhausted its possibilities of adaptation to development needs. It is understandable, then, that problems relating to structural reform should have become the region's foremost concern" (13). Having said that, Furtado goes on to list matters of international relations first — with the USA, with MNCs, and with the world economy generally — after which he turns to questions of the economy and society of the peripheral economies and presents familiar structuralist and ECLA notions.

This represents the point at which the 'dependency' line fully emerges. Familiar structuralist themes are firmly lodged within an explanatory frame which locates crucial elements of the local problems beyond
the underdeveloped state's immediate control.

2.12 Furtado and the emergence of the 'dependency' theorists conception of a proper and fruitful analysis.

Girvan has been quoted earlier as observing of Latin American work that "the development in thought, generally, took the forms of (I) adding a historical perspective and analysis to the structural and institutional method, (II) giving the historical/structural/institutional method the kind of theoretical and empiric-al content needed to construct a general theory of dependence and underdevelopment"(14). We shall pursue the matter of the "dependency" theorists' conception of useful and proper analysis with this passage in mind. We organise our questions thus:

(i) What is Furtado's epistemology?
(ii) What is the nature of Furtado's early formulations?
(iii) What are the post-1964 coup revisions?
(iv) What is the nature of his late '60s work?

(i) Furtado's epistemology and methodology.

Furtado's early study, "Development and Underdevelopment" (1964), begins with a chapter on "The theory of development in economic science" which treats the issue methodologically and in terms of the history of ideas in economics. The chapter is revealing in several ways, and in character most strongly recalls Myrdal's style of enquiry. The handicap of using what Hindess dubs 'the epistemology of models' is again demonstrated. Furtado begins thus: "The theory of economic development endeavours to explain, from a macroeconomic point of view, the causes and mechanisms of the persistent growth in productivity of the labour factor and the repercussions of this growth on the organisation of production and on the distribution and utilization of the social product"(15). This is Furtado's reading of the work of the Classical School, and the presentation of his own area of enquiry. He continues: "That explanatory task is projected here on two planes. The first,
in which abstract formulations prevail, comprises analysis of the actual mechanisms of the process of growth ... 'building models or simplified schemes of existing economic systems ... models based on stable relationships between calculable variables deemed to be relevant and important'(16). Thus the Classical line of treating the realm of the economic as 'determinate in the end' is here acknowledged, and simultaneously transposed into the post-war, neo-classical informed, language of the precise elucidation of mechanisms. Additionally, these elucidations are taken as exercises in modelling reality; though it is at this point that we encounter the first of those disconcerting lurches that seem to characterize this style of analysis. The phrase 'deemed to be' is unexpected and intriguing. It would seem either to introduce the space for Furtado to distance himself from those technical efforts that he might want to disagree with, or to permit the possibility of referring intellectual schemes to the position of their producer—whether in the style of Seers, or after the style of those who invoke the notion of ideology. Whatever the reason for Furtado's remark, the 'deemed to be' phrase sounds voluntaristic and is not the phrase to be expected from a writer who took economics to be 'about the facts'.

Furtado continues: "The second, the historical plane, comprises critical study in the light of a given reality and on the basis of the categories defined by the abstract analysis"(16a). Three points arise here. Firstly, we have Furtado saying that historical analysis is informed by categories 'defined by the abstract analysis'. But if we recall that these analyses are exercises in modelling 'existing economic systems', then it seems as if Furtado is about to present a singularly un-historical analysis. Unless, that is, he lodges some claims to universality on behalf of the abstract categories. This
he does; there is, he says, "some degree of universality pertaining to the definitions of broad basic concepts whose explanatory validity, though limited, has undeniable practical bearing"(17). Abstractions from the present are taken to have universal relevance. This would seem to recall the a prioristic line of Robbins, the formal 'spokesman' of the neo-classical school. Thus from basic, 'obviously true' generalizations, models can be built from which, via deductive argument, other 'facts' are generated. This formalism sits uneasily with Furtado's disposition to affirm the problem-centredness of economics.

The second point is similar. Furtado argues that 'history' is to be used to test the model. It is not enough, Furtado argues, to build an abstract model; "it is just as important to demonstrate the explanatory effectiveness of such a model as applied to historic realities"(18). This lets the model be tested and reworked as necessary, a routine part of this epistemology of models scheme; but to what end? Furtado rejects the habit of resting content with generality of the abstract—only to pursue, it seems, a generality of the concrete. In contrast to the problem-centredness of Myrdal, Furtado seems forever tugged at by the neo-classical pretensions to scientific status; that is, generality in formulations is taken as the essence of the truly scientific, and consequently the adopting of this style of argument is taken to secure claims to scientific status. It is a spurious argument; but in this early work it is one that Furtado has not yet purged himself of.

Our third point again indicates Furtado's apparent confusion as to the nature of the exchange between theorist and world. We are told that all this model testing is necessary "in order to make it valid from the point of view of a given reality"(19). It is the phrase 'point of view of a given reality' that is odd. Is this use of 'point of view of a given reality' the same as the earlier 'critical study in the light of a given reality'? (my emphases). Are we to take 'reality to be a simple
given for the theorist, or something that is shaped by ideological orientation? Does Furtado vacillate between the two stances?

From this plane of epistemological reflections Furtado descends to the level of methodology. Here amongst a series of pertinent and acute points, the image of the natural sciences continues to sow confusion. This confusion revolves around the dilemma of the effort to integrate the pursuit of generality in statements (which Furtado evidently takes to be properly 'scientific') with the implications of the conflicting tendency of regarding economics as problem-relevant, and thereby specific - in terms of its explanatory mechanisms and content - to particular historical and socio-economic circumstances. We can follow Furtado through one effort to resolve his dilemma. Thus after making reference to Ricardo's work, with its late concern for the matter of production in the light of the growing system of factory based manufacture, Furtado presents the following observation: "The question of the abstract or historical nature of the method used by the economist is not then independent of the problems concerning him" (20). This, claims Furtado, permits the following split: a concern with production necessitates an historical approach, whereas concern with distribution permits the formal elaboration of general statements. This simple division of economics into two halves, each with its appropriate method, evidently makes Furtado uneasy for he promptly retreats. Thus: "economic development is a phenomenon with clear cut historical aspects" (20a). Or again, whilst Furtado will grant that there is no complete and 'problem neutral' economics, he asserts (as we have seen) that there is an established body of basic truths; there is "some degree of universality pertaining to the definitions of broad basic concepts whose explanatory validity, though limited, has undeniable practical bearing" (21). Having thus secured economics as unitary and fundamentally scientific by virtue of a core of generally true propositions, he proceeds to make these claims otiose by rehearsing a point usually
It is because we are often forgetful of the limitations of that validity when approaching problems in concrete historic situations that we pass surreptitiously from the field of scientific speculation into that of dogma"(22). It seems that economics is either scientific, general, and of no practical use; or it is useful, historically specific, and not 'general' in the way science ought to be. Clearly the effort to encompass the scheme treated with Dobb's double dynamic of society and discipline of learning within the framework of an empiricist epistemology of models is, in the end, only productive of confusion.

(ii) Early formulations in Furtado's work.
First we consider problems of the pursuit of propriety. The tension between the goal of generality and the fact of problem-centredness is evident in the programmatic statement made in the Preface to Furtado's earliest collection of essays. These are from the period of the 1950's when he was on the staff of ECLA. Furtado observes that "...the most necessary effort to be made on the theoretical plane at the present stage consists of the progressive identification of factors that are specific for each structure. That effort will subsequently serve as a basis for establishing a typology of structures"(23). It is the notion of the specificity of structures that seems to be the key to his efforts. Thus he notes in the Preface: "The need for diagnosing the the problems of national economic systems in various stages of under-development led him [nb. Furtado] to bring economic analysis closer to the historical method. Comparative study of similar problems on an abstract plane, within variants conditioned by different historical situations and dissimilar national contexts, progressively induced him to adopt a structural view of economic problems"(24).

Now, 'relevance of context' in economic formulations is an idea we have met before; and in matters of treating the Third World it is probably most readily associated
with Seers' 1963 article. Others use the idea: we have looked at Streeten, Myrdal and Ehrensaft. It is within this tradition of a 'sociologised economics' that Furtado is working. It is a tradition that breeds confusion: while the sociology of knowledge line lets us discuss the exchange between society's demands and disciplinary resources in the process of the production of 'a theory', the present sub-tradition casts the effort within the shadow of a routine conception of 'natural science'. Hence Furtado's dilemma between 'problem relevance' and 'scientifically proper generality', which he attempts to resolve by on the one hand invoking some (unspecified) set of fundamental concepts, and then, on the other, arguing that these must not be taken as a basis for a supposedly general economics (in the way the neo-classical writers did with the concepts pertinent to the marginalist analysis of an unregulated market). The affirmation of the idea of 'relevance of context', subsumed under the style of the natural sciences, results in the pursuit of relevance being undertaken in the manner of disaggregation of models. The economic model, informed by these general concepts, is tailored to fit both local circumstances and local problems. These early efforts of Furtado remain within that empiricist and interventionist schema of the relationship of knowledge and politics that we have already met. Furtado, at this stage, is pursuing technical rational recipes for development.

We can further elucidate the character of Furtado's work by introducing the idea, invoked and referred to in previous chapters, that a given form of argument makes its own demands. That is, that a particular conception of logic of explanation will help fashion the substantive explanations given. In respect of Furtado we would want to claim that, once the idea of 'models of reality' is affirmed, then a particular sequence of theory elaboration follows. As an introductory comparison, let us recall the subject of Chapter Two and the orthodox arguments of the economists. Here we saw that their
form of argument—that is, quasi-formal, combining technical notions and the use of mathematical notations—lets them produce vast quantities of elaborate and arcane material almost mechanically. So if the raw material of their efforts is given by ideological notions and common sense 'facts', then the general formal characteristics of the elaborated theory are a consequence of their conception of the proper manner of explanation. Similarly, if we recall the efforts of Myrdal and Streeten then we can see that their notion of adequacy of explanation—realism in models—involved a characteristic use of the resources of the social sciences, both in the construction of concepts and in the ordering of those concepts. The upshot was a problem-centred empiricism compatible with their ideological predispositions and work interests.

In an analogous fashion, we can indicate how the construction of the structuralist scheme is conditioned by the epistemology of models approach and the ideas of specificity of structures and typology of structures. Here the construction of a model involves generalizing about, or simplifying from, some given situation; thus the idea that a model is inevitably specific to that which it is a model of is a ready deduction. Equally ready is the response to this limited applicability: a set of models may be prepared, both of differing present economies and of these same economies through time. This historical set aspect requires a general meta-theory in order to provide the means of constructing these models of the past, and so as to provide an integrating frame for all these models. Thus we see, for example, this sort of manoeuvre: "The foregoing discussion reveals the close interdependence between the evolution of technology in industrialized countries and the historic conditions of their economic development". (25). The simple logic of the notion of model gets Furtado this far, and routine historical ideas provide the substantive resource. Thus a series of models can be built; but what of present comparisons? The two dimensions
are needed in order to be able to generate any appropriate model. A full set of models must be possible, as we operate under the dictates of the image of natural sciences and the shibboleth of generality in formulation. Furtado builds in this aspect by generalizing from the observation of the dis-integrated nature of UDC economies in contrast to the integrated nature of the DC economies. (Brookfield, let us note, has remarked that even if 'dualism' is difficult to grasp in theory, the fact of it is most obvious). This observation of the UDC economies as comprising disparate and quasi-autonomous elements is presented using the notion of 'structure'. Economies have structures, and these are specific to time and place; the DCs have such and such a structure, and the UDCs have another. Here is the vehicle for comparing present economies.

Thus we have a way of making models of circumstances through history (a sequence) and of models of circumstances existing now (a collection). These two aspects are then integrated to generate the full set of models, by invoking the available resource of the notion of 'Centre Periphery'—giving the one total system.

If we now ask just what does all this produce by way of a 'theory', we get with Furtado the following scheme. "The advent of an industrial nucleus in 18th century Europe disrupted the world economy of the time and eventually conditioned later economic development in almost every region of the world. The action of that powerful dynamic nucleus proceeded to operate in three directions" (26). First in Europe, second in the 'empty lands' of the USA and Australia, and third towards the already inhabited regions, some of which were densely populated, whose old economic systems were of various but invariably pre-capitalist types" (27). Furtado continues: "The effect of the impact of capitalist expansion on the archaic structures varied from region to region, being conditioned by local circumstances" (28). Furthermore "the result was almost always to create hybrid structures" (29). This notion is finally unpacked in an exercise
of historico-formal exegesis which details the nature of the presently underdeveloped areas (in Latin America). "Thus, three sectors came to coexist within the economy: one was the 'remnant' economy.... the second comprised activities directly connected with foreign trade; the third consisted of activities directly connected with the domestic market" (30). Thus the 'theory' presented by Furtado is elaborated as a series of interrelated models.

So far we have noted the way in which Furtado has pursued his objective of working towards a 'typology of structures'; and we have seen how this flows out of the 'pursuit of relevance' within the frame of the model of the natural sciences. This is clear insofar as the 'typology' is concerned. But what of 'structure'? The notion would seem to be for Furtado expressive of the level of analysis achieved when the general economic model is tailored to fit specific circumstances. That records the matter epistemologically/methodologically; however, we can further elucidate the nature of Furtado's effort by considering the origins of the term.

In this case, it would seem that the term 'economic structure' is designed as a revision of the orthodox style of analysis so as to fit the situation of a UDC economy. Thus an 'economic structure' is taken as a set of sectors in just such and such a relationship; so Furtado can speak of "simple underdeveloped structures" having one or few dynamic sectors, and "more complex underdeveloped structures" having multiple dynamic sectors (31). Yet the use of the terms 'sector' and 'structure' are at this juncture fluid. Speaking of UDCs, Furtado notes that their situation is not 'basic' or 'original' but is created by the "penetration of modern capitalistic structures into archaic structures" (32). This penetration may be simple, as with enclave development. Or it may be more complex, thus: 'The most complex situation as in the Brazilian economy at the present time, is that in which there are three sectors in the economy: a subsistence structure, a structure oriented
mainly towards export and an industrial nucleus connected with the domestic market." (33). Here it seems as if we have a different notion of what 'economic structure' involves; it is not now a set of sectors in relationship but is rather something each sector has. If we were to be pernickety at this point we would have to write off these passages as hopelessly confused; yet more charitably (and interestingly) we can read them as marking the process of the transformation of an orthodox notion of sector into a form useable in analysing a UDC economy (which is seen as dis-integrated), and presenting thereby the issue of the manner in which quasi-autonomous sectors interact; hence 'structural' analysis. (34).

(iii) Revision in the middle period.
Thus far we have considered the notion of a structure having a specific character given by its location in, and career within, the world Centre-Periphery system. In addition we have seen that Furtado's acknowledgement of the familiar image of the natural sciences leads him to couch his enquiries in the style of a pursuit of a typology of structures. Thus comparative and historical enquiries enter Furtado's work at an early stage. We have seen also that they enter Furtado's work in the course of his effort to model realistically the economies of the UDCs. The term 'institutional' now enters this exegesis. In Furtado's early version (1964) the term was not in evidence, though a turn in this direction entails no sharp change in the analytical machineries thus far constructed. As we saw in chapter 5, the neo-institutional line was concerned, in certain aspects, with the pursuit of realism in modelling. With Furtado working in this same general area of 'sociologised economics', it is not very surprising that he should come to consider the institutional natures of given economic structures. That Furtado should move in this direction is also unsurprising if we recall the above sociology of knowledge presentation; which
recorded that the early 1960s threw doubt upon the then ECLA line, both in regard to its technical points and in regard to its assumptions about 'development'. In addition it was in this period that the neo-institutionalists began to establish their stance.

The introduction of the term 'institutional' occurs within the post-1964 coup context of a revision, by Furtado, of his position vis à vis the assumptions of the orthodox line in economics. Thus he is able to commend a marxian notion of dialectic, and see in it a notion of 'development' which can order efforts to grasp the movement of social change. Quite what sort of method Furtado ends up with is debatable; his own developing version of what Girvan will call the 'structural/historical/institutional method' seems to be equated with the core of a rehabilitated Marx. This in itself seems implausible; yet we may recall a similar discovery of Marx's notion of 'development' by Kregel, who observed that the work of Marx constituted the only genuinely dynamic treatment of economic growth and change.

This broadening in Furtado's conception of the process of development, and consequent adjustment in his notion of the model required, is evident in the passage that Brookfield finds so significant: "Economic development, being fundamentally a process of incorporating and diffusing new techniques, implies changes of a structural nature in both the systems of production and distribution of income. The way in which these changes take place depends, to a large extent, on the degree of flexibility of the institutional framework within which the economy operates. And this flexibility is dependent on the greater or lesser capacity of the ruling classes to go beyond the natural limitations of their ideological horizons" (35, 36). Furtado goes on to sketch the history of the development of the 'West', and rehearses the view that the presently underdeveloped were created by the irruption of capitalistic enterprise into their
archaic social forms. (This chapter, we may note, is entitled "The Dialectic of Capitalist Development").

In this chapter we see how Purtado has 'broadened' his conception of what counts as a plausible explanation of development; and how he has plundered classical political economy and marxian lines in order to produce a distinctive scheme which presents, in outline, the now familiar 'dependency' argument. Thus in respect of the UDCs he notes the historical manner of their incorporation into the world capitalist economy (whose nature he characterizes), and concludes that "since the growth of these economies is basically dependent on the activities of the groups responsible for the accumulative process, the historical conditions, under which these groups emerged, and those under which they operate, must be considered in each specific case if we are to distinguish the possibilities for growth in a particular society with an underdeveloped structure within the capitalist dynamic". (38)

(iv) The later work.
The 'dependency' theme is fully present in a 1975 work, "Economic Development of Latin America", wherein we find a more precise and formal statement of the thesis that the economic structure of Latin America is a result of the manner of that continent's incorporation into and present role within the world capitalist economy. The nature of Girván's 'historical/structural/institutional' method is exemplified in the thesis presented. Thus that which admits of a description (or disaggregated modelling informed by generally true economic propositions) in terms of economic structure also admits of a complementary description in terms of a functionally necessary institutional framework. Historical analysis provides data for examples and the construction of a sequence of models; and further, borrowing from classical economics and marxian traditions, an over-arching frame which firmly locates the Latin American economies in the dependent peripheral area of the world capitalist
economy. Problems of 'development' are then treated in terms of the lack of fit between, on the one hand, the possibilities for development provided by technological levels; and, on the other, the restrictions and possibilities attendant upon a given structural arrangement and institutional circumstance.

Furtado's 1975 work ends with a chapter summarizing his argument and identifying the necessary conditions of any future advance. Here, he observes: "here can be no doubt that development based on exports of raw materials and import substituting industrialization has reached the limits of its possibilities ... Similarly the institutional framework inherited from the colonial period ... seems to have exhausted its possibilities of adaptation to development needs". (39). With that analysis he notes it is not surprising that "discussion has focused increasingly on the means to be used for a structural reconstruction" (40).

These matters are listed in two sets. Firstly, reference is made to matters of external dependency. Thus we have: "re-entry of the regional economies into the expanding lines of the international economy" (41), "reshaping of economic relations with the US " (42), and "re-shaping of relations with the big international consortia" (43). The second set of matters treats the internal characteristics of the Latin American economies, and here Furtado presents a list of tasks appropriate to the state's ordering of the necessary transformation of out-moded institutional forms and economic structures. At this point Furtado has emerged to present the familiar outline of 'dependency' theory.

2.13 Comparative ideological character

The foregoing discussion was designed to elucidate, through looking at Furtado's work, the 'dependency' theorists' conception of what counted as a proper and fruitful analysis; that is, we were concerned with the form of their arguments. Now we must turn briefly
to the substance of these efforts in the sense of asking after their intentions. Just why did they prepare these distinctive views? Much of the answer to this question has been given during the course of parts 2.11 and 2.12 so here we will add a simple comparative summary of the ideological character of 'dependency' vis a vis those efforts that we have thus far treated.

In chapter 3 we treated the conception of development theory which was instantiated in the early Keynesian-derived 'growth theories'. We stressed the priority of Keynesian ideas, looking at them set against the historical period of the 'depression' and their theoretical sources in neo-classicism. We noted their implications for the role of government and then went on to consider their extension, via the work of Harrod, to the circumstances of the Third World. The notion of the development of the Third World was, in its turn, seen as a particular and secondary version of the general doctrine of growth; which notion saw its genesis in the needs of the West's elite to combat 'the left' in general and the USSR in particular. Formally, we argued that the 'growth models' were conceived within an empiricist epistemology and that their function was to legitimate and organise an 'authoritative interventionism' (viewed as knowledgeable manipulation of a subject economy in the light of the science of economics, essentially a technical matter). This is the effort's self-image. We can label it: Basic Authoritative Interventionism.

Following this, in chapter 4, we treated the conception of development theory produced by the circumstances and perceived interests of Cold War America; that is, 'modernization theory'. The political demand at back of the production of 'modernization theory' was two-fold: the doctrine of containment provided the moral core, but aid-competition with the USSR necessitated a disguised presentation of this pursuit of self-interest. Thus we get the notion of the 'free
world. Given these demands, theorists had recourse to two areas of work: firstly an emasculated Keynesianism, and secondly structural-functionalism. There is a clear move from treating economic growth and its social aspects (as in chapter 3), to treating the matter of the growth of industrial society (as in chapter 4). 'Modernization theory' provides a revised and elaborated legitimating theory of authoritative intervention. Knowledgeable manipulation of a subject society in the light of the social sciences, this is its self-image. We label it Elaborated Authoritative Interventionism.

In chapter 5 we looked at the efforts that the 'neo-institutionalists' made in attempting to comprehend 'development'. In the case of the 'neo-institutionalists', the political context of calls for 'intervention' has shifted from confronting a supposedly expansionist communism— as was the case with 'modernization theory' and, to a lesser extent, with 'growth theory'— toward the project of re-working long established colonial relationships. The resources invoked by the 'neo-institutionalists' include: the actual experience of the colonial episode, a distinct European tradition of social thought, and a relationship with government that disposes them to practical policy-making rather than the elaboration of formal schemes of great generality. The product, 'neo-institutional social theory', is characteristically problem-centered, piecemeal and sceptical. It constitutes the effort to theorize the withdrawal from Black Africa which subsequently becomes the model of the exchange of rich and poor. Its self-image is of the pursuit of realistic models of a development process to be ordered and implemented by government direction. We label it: Cooperative Revised (Authoritative) Interventionism.

So what of the school represented here by Furtado; that is, 'dependency'? We may begin by noting that the 'dependency' effort is to be located in the context
of Latin American efforts at industrialization and problems attendant thereon. Furtado's effort resembles that of Myrdal; there is (i) a pursuit of realistic models, though Furtado in his earlier work lays very much stress on the goal of a general set of models where Myrdal focuses simply on problem relevance; (ii) a similarity in methods of analysis; and (iii) agreement in granting the centrality of the role of the state in any UDC's search for development. Yet, where Myrdal's 'reasonable men' are in nominal control of the state, those to whom Furtado would 'naturally' turn are either not in control of the state or, if they are, their grasp on the levers of power is apparently tenuous. Thus rather than there being 'liberal democratic' states there are typically right wing, probably military, regimes.

We can pursue this aspect of the agent of execution of Furtado's work as the key to uncovering its differences in character from previously treated lines. This apparently politically unfavourable situation results in Furtado detaching himself from any direct identification with the 'reasonable men' in the way that Myrdal does. Recognising the precarious position of the 'reasonable men', he couches his analyses in more neutral terms; he affects to illuminate the nature of Latin American economies generally.

The natural agent of execution of a stance like Furtado's is the body of reasonable men in control of the state; and in the absence of any plausibility in this claim Furtado retreats into a more non-committal posture. Myrdal confronts the matter of the implausibility of his work by invoking the notion of the 'soft-state' — his agent is required to 'pull itself together'.

Even if there is no agent of execution identified by Furtado, nonetheless the outline of the 'dependency' stance may be noted. Thus as the national economy is integrated into the world economy, and moreover
operates at less than its potential capacity, the solution is the pursuit of autonomous and efficient economic development. This position is unpacked into a series of reform proposals. Furtado's work is, then, certainly in its early form, another variety of authoritative interventionism; and whilst the political aspects of the situation do come to the fore in later work this frame is not changed, though it is subtly re-emphasised. Thus whilst the early work affirms a rather routine empiricism, there nonetheless remains a considerable tension between this adopted frame and the demands of specific, practical analysis. When this is coupled with his awareness of being, so to say, politically blocked, then the whole effort changes character and takes on an interpretive aspect. We can catch this in the Preface to the post-1964 coup "Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis". Here Furtado propounds the thesis of the supra-rationality of the intellectual, who is thereby morally obliged to present analyses which are free of group or class loyalty. This looks at first glance like an extension of the Myrdalian position, or Fabianism gone mad; but it might be more fruitfully regarded as flowing from the particular circumstances of Brazil, and Latin America generally. This non-class-specific theorizing we can take as nationalist, insofar as the entire effort is a reaction to the theoretical and practical dominance of the 'West'; and latently populist in that in its developed form it both presents a general non-class-specific recipe for national progress and calls for the removal of present elite groups. We label it Reactive (Nationalist) Interpretive Interventionism.

2.14 Is 'dependency' independent?. Is it adequate? (44)

In the literature which treats 'dependency' there are two areas of debate which bear upon these issues, (that is, if we exclude all the multiplicity of technical points). Between 'dependency' theorists and putative marxists there is a confused debate around the matters of the proper nature of a marxian analysis of the Third
World, and the concomitant matter of the development of a marxian line in a novel (45) situation, which presents itself as a problem of 'up-dating' Marx. This area of debate we shall for the moment set aside, and instead look at the argument between proponents of 'dependency' and those workers who are content to remain within the ambit of the orthodox.

In the case of this second debate there are two related questions. On the one hand there is the manner of 'dependency's construction: that is, do we take 'dependency' as growing out of the structuralist scheme, or as established over and against structuralist positions? The other concerns the issue of the extent to which 'dependency' can claim to be novel vis à vis the orthodox economics.

The first point revolves around the following claims. (i) 'Dependency' is a reformulation of that which was inherent in the first structuralist effort. Here, as we see in the particular case of Furtado's intellectual evolution and as Pinto and Knakal argue (cited in Girvan (45a)), "recent 'dependency' formulations can be accommodated within the terms of Prebisch's Centre-Periphery model". (ii) 'Dependency' is a new departure. Here the structuralism of the ECLA position is taken as a theoretical object over against which the new position is developed in response to changing circumstance. In this instance O'Brien provides our example. "The theory of dependency is the response to the perceived failure of national development through import substitution industrialization and to a growing disillusionment with existing development theory" (46). Related to this is O'Brien's view of the debate about 'dependency' and the orthodox economics; he observes, "In brief it is an attempt to establish a new paradigm" (47).

The second question is exemplified in the exchange between Girvan and Cumper. Girvan highlights the novelty of 'dependency' (somewhat inconsistently,
perhaps, given his approval of Pinto and Knakal's paper and his observing of Prebisch's Centre-Periphery model that "the idea of the economic dependence of the Periphery is evidently implicit in the conceptualization") (47a). But Cumper is at some pains both to deny that 'dependency' supersedes orthodox economics, and to establish that it is properly to be taken as the self-serving ideology of a post-independence intelligentsia.

To our mind, both these debates - the manner of the establishment of 'dependency', and its nature once established - can be taken as occasioned by the practical effort to establish an 'oppositional meaning system'; that is, to theorize the situation of Latin American economies and societies in a theoretically autonomous and progressive form. However, this effort is presented at the meta-theoretical level as a debate about disciplinary independence and adequacy. The proponents of 'dependency' lodge their claims in conventional (that is, disciplinary) terms. This opens them up to the range of criticisms of their stance and objections from the orthodox lodged by Cumper. Neither party to these related debates is right. 'Dependency' is neither (treating the practitioners' claims) on the one hand the basis for an 'adequate general economics'; and nor is it, on the other hand, distinct from structuralism. Yet as against its critics, it is not a worthless by-product merely of self-aggrandisement.

So what is it? Let us re-work the discussion and return to our point of departure at the beginning of part 20. Given our resume of the establishment of 'dependency', our explication of its argument form, and the comparative exercise in labeling; does all this tend to establish 'dependency' as a candidate for the descriptions of 'independent discipline' or 'adequate development studies'? The second term of description, which on the face of it would seem to entail the former, is often applied by commentators who simultaneously invoke a notion of theoretical progressivity in setting up 'dependency' over an orthodoxy which encom-
-passes 'growth' and 'modernization' theories. Yet to our mind, just as the question was inappropriate in regard to 'NIST' versus 'MT', so it is inappropriate here. 'Dependency' can only be read as an ideology.

When we treated Myrdal and the neo-institutionalists, we asked if they had prepared a scheme which was superior (in terms of its grasp on the world) to the efforts of 'growth' and 'modernization' theory. 'Growth' theory was dismissed, for the present issue, as crude. The comparison of 'NIST' and 'MT' revealed that, in terms of practical efficacy, 'NIST' was superior to 'MT' in that its background provided for the establishment of a more subtle scheme, even though intellectual resources were largely common. As regards conceptual advance, we felt there was none. Both 'NIST' and 'MT' remained in conception empiricist and in intent authoritative interventionisms. They were both exercises in what Fay would call 'policy science'.

But what of 'dependency'? If we measure it against a notion of ideology as the result of the deployment of morally informed categorical frame, then we can note two issues. One is the matter of reflexive consistency; that is, at its simplest, does the stance in question grant that it is an ideology and shape itself accordingly? (morally informed). Second, what is the scope of its core ideas (categorical frame)? Do they fit the job they are required to do? This is a vast question; but here we simply want to see if problems call forth theoretical forms.

We have already seen, in discussing Furtado's epistemological ideas, that 'dependency' does not regard itself as an ideology and indeed in many respects tries to ape the natural sciences. In addition, 'dependency' fails to specify any agent of theory execution; like Myrdal's effort it floats uncomfortably above the world. Thus far 'dependency' looks like more policy science. However, if we ask after the core ideas of
'dependency' the position changes somewhat. With 'NIST', as we presented it through the work of Streeten, the key idea had been that of a concepts having an ecology; that is, it was argued that a concept only worked within the context of just such and such a set of institutional circumstances, and that realistic models needs must be pragmatic, piecemeal, sceptical efforts. All this fitted, as we saw, the 'decolonization' episode. If we ask whether or not there is an analogous fruitful and novel core to 'dependency', then we are bound to pick the idea of economic theorizing being situation specific. Thus the orthodox economics is judged irrelevant and it is proposed that answers to Latin American problems must be prepared with the peculiar characteristics of Latin American economies to the fore. Evidently this line of argument bears no little resemblance to that of 'NIST', yet the context and manner of its emergence make it difficult to regard as straightforwardly policy scientific. Interventionist - yes, empiricist - yes; but also sensitive in its formulation to its own circumstances, even if (measured against our ideal definition of ideology) the political sensitivity remains more or less latent.

In sum, we can say that 'dependency' no more establishes an independent and/or adequate development studies than did any of its predecessors. It too is an ideology, an exercise in social theorizing; and its nature can only be properly comprehended via an understanding of its milieu, occasion of construction and intellectual resource base.

2.2 'Dependency' and the supercession of the Conventional-Wisdom: a problem misconstrued.

Above (2.14) we made reference to the debate of Girvan and Cumper in respect of the putative independence and theoretical superiority of 'dependency' in regard to the 'CW' of economics. In respect of this debate we observed that it was occasioned by the project of propounding an 'oppositional meaning system' using the syntax of orthodox social science. That is, Girvan
did not present his exposition as the why and wherefore of a novel ideological departure. Rather, he claimed to be revealing the manner in which the orthodox notions of a discipline came to be rendered liable to supersession. Here we consider this debate; not so much because we take Girvan and Cumper to be major figures in all this work but rather because their exchange presents an accessible vehicle for treating the theoretical point at issue.

Girvan argues that the school of 'dependency' economics established not only an economics that was adequate to Latin America, but also an economics that could be taken as generally adequate. This was in contrast to the hitherto unchallenged economics of the developed world, which was now to be seen as generally inadequate (which entails its being inadequate to the economies of the rich nations themselves). This claim raises three issues that we wish to pursue.

1. This is on the face of it a narrower issue than that treated in part 2.1; or, to put the matter another way, there seems to be a continual ambiguity in treatments of 'dependency' in regard to its proper disciplinary location. Are we treating economics, or some effort derived from the wider set of the social sciences? In the present situation Girvan would seem to be firmly locating 'dependency' within that tradition of thought called economics. If the conception of 'dependency' is thus restricted, then the issue of 'disciplinary independence' becomes that much more acute. In the above discussion 2.1, we approached these matters by asking: just what did 'dependency' function to legitimate and order? We still take that approach to be appropriate; but here Girvan's treatment has to be seen to open up the possibility of debating the issue of 'dependency' versus 'CW' on a technical level. We find this to be an unhelpful level of debate; yet it is the terrain chosen by Girvan and Cumper. Technical debates within an agreed ideological frame
make sense; technical debates across the boundaries of ideological frames produce nonsense.

2. We are presented here with an example of intellectual expansionism. Girvan, having mis-read or mis-reported his ideological departure as scientific advance, goes on (in the light of the notion of generality of formulation) to claim for his effort an area of broad application (i.e. replacing the orthodox). Such a claim would be seen to be nonsensical if he had properly grasped the nature of his own effort as ideology. In addition it is obvious that such a claim invites reply from the proponents of the orthodoxy in orthodox terms; that is, the fundamental points at issue, namely the disputes of the two ideologies, are missed or may be ignored.

3. Girvan adds a final element of confusion in that he presents his views with reference to an established debate within economics. That is, Girvan takes the 'dependency' effort as resolving the issue of whether or not there is one general economics or two, one for the rich and one for the poor (49).

Thus we can see that the issues of disciplinary independence, intellectual expansionism, and the matter of the number of the sciences of economics, come together in the claims presented here by Girvan to the effect that 'dependency' has set economics on its feet. But rather than pursue these three questions for their own sake, which would involve us in much maybe irrelevant and unnecessary work, we will approach these issues only insofar as they are made manifest in the debate between Girvan and Cumper. This should ensure that our writings remain relevant to the job in hand, whilst at the same time acknowledging the importance of the matters presented by the dispute. In respect of the debate, our point of departure is the observation that the central axis of confusion is that between natural science (ordinarily understood) and ideology (understood as social theory).
If we first consider the work of Girvan, we can report that, building on the efforts of Sunkel and Furtado, he argues as follows. Out of the efforts to produce an indigenous economics, the notions of 'dependency' in fact present a solution to the issue of whether one or two economics are needed; in that comprehending the nature of the dependent sub-system must involve the comprehension of the entire system (50). Thus far this is arguably trivial: we have simply re-discovered the concept of a 'world economy' that was present in the notion of 'imperialism' from which Prebisch derived the original 'Centre Periphery' motif (51). Where the matter becomes other than trivial is in the claim that 'dependency' itself makes a distinctive (and implicitly seminal) contribution to the establishment of the proposed one economics of global capitalism. This is troubling for several reasons. First, the intellectual expansionism of the 'dependency' ideology entails that the efficacy of the 'structural/institutional/historical' method be affirmed. One can envisage the establishment of a project to generate a set of models of economies, the whole being subsumable under the premier concept of the capitalist world system. In reply we would want to argue that the trio of concepts, fruitful as they are, is not enough to generate a general economics (whatever that might be); and that rather we should begin, philosophically, to build a political economy around the notion of production (51a).

Second, Girvan continues to use the syntax of orthodox social science; which matter is our present concern insofar as it is productive of confusion. In addition it grants sense to the notion of a 'generally adequate economics', "relevant and valid" (52) for rich and poor. But we may ask: just what counts as a 'generally adequate economics'? (53).

If we now move on to consider Cumper's reply to Girvan's paper, we can see that Girvan's synthesising generality is confronted with detailed criticism. There are broadly three lines of attack.

Cumper observes that Girvan's separation of
of 'dependency' into distinct Latin American and Caribbean lines is untenable. Girvan is charged with ignoring Seers, misrepresenting Lewis and forgetting about the impact of the collapse of the West Indian Federation and the Cuban Revolution. This mishandling of the detail serves to establish the distinction between Latin American and Caribbean schools. This is all on the face of it pertinent; but then Cumper destroys its critical force by noting that all that rests on this for Girvan is "the scheme of his paper" (54). This is trivial: Cumper is objecting to the simplifications Girvan makes in order to be able to present a readily assimilable scheme. Moreover, Cumper adopts precisely the same sort of simplifying manoeuvre when, in respect of the orthodox economics whose rejection Girvan urges Cumper observes that "within modern Western economics one can distinguish two broad schools, which for convenience we can label the Continental and the Anglo Saxon" (54a).

The matter of the rejected orthodoxy is pursued by Cumper. He presents a series of orthodox analytical techniques and asks, rhetorically do the 'dependency' theorists reject this, or this, etc. As an argument strategy its unconvincing. Even within the misleading syntax adopted by Girvan, the proposed supersession of orthodox cannot be taken to entail the wholesale rejection of the particular technical constructs of the 'Cw'. In addition, if we consider that Cumper goes on to lodge a sociology of knowledge critique of Girvan, it must be open to the speculation that Cumper knows full well that what Girvan wants to do is reject the orthodoxy qua ideology. This line of attack from Cumper seems to be disingenuous.

Finally, Cumper launches a critique of Girvan which is informed by the notion of an 'ideology'; where this is taken in the fairly narrow sense of the presentation of a self-serving schema. It is suggested that 'dependency' is the ideology of an intellectual in a post independence
state, wishing to secure his position as an 'organic intellectual' at the expense of other intellectuals and groups generally. The general points about the status of the intelligentsia in newly independent states may well be true, but Cumper undermines any force the attack might have by making ideology the same as bias. Claiming that Girvan et al are unprincipled careerists is an _ad hominem_ argument that leads nowhere. Cumper grants this when he acknowledges a distinction between origin and validity, such that the former does not entail anything by way of truth or falsity for the latter. Cumper retreats at this point into claiming that he is simply interested in sensitising readers to 'ideological distortion'.

Against Cumper we would argue that bias cannot flow from an ideological stance. Bias flows from prejudice, and that this is to be regretted and extirpated is a trivial observation. If bias is present in Girvan or his fellows' work, then it is unfortunate. It is not enough to overturn their ideological stance.

The equation of ideology with bias crops up when Cumper grants that his stance could be called ideological. He answers that to go beyond this ideology-spotting routine requires a pragmatic test of what is or is not objective truth. Cumper proposes a crude notion of consensus; thus the more who accept an idea, the greater its likelihood of being objective. He further proposes 'track record': the more an analysis has been used operationally, the more we can take it to be objective. Evidently these both beg the question; orthodox views will be preferred and used by people whose views are orthodox. That a view is orthodox says nothing on Cumper's own terms (origin/validity), about the truth of that view. Additionally we may observe that invoking the notions of consensus and track record when treating a line which deliberately opposes the orthodox seems singularly inappropriate. The observations which
Cumper makes in the light of the notion of ideology seem to run into the sand. The attack finally has no point and no force.

We can now summarize this exchange. The essential tentativeness of the project in respect of which Girvan makes his explicatory report (that is, in our view, the construction of an ideology), and the particular unfortunate syntax chosen (that is, a quasi-natural science revision of a discipline's concepts) combine to present Cumper with a ready opportunity for 'missing the point' and launching a thinly disguised counter-attack on behalf of the orthodox. Girvan's presentation of the matter permits criticisms to be couched in orthodox vein — it does not require the orthodox to confront the fundamental (ideological) issues at stake. The upshot is that Cumper is able to dismiss 'dependency' as a novel orientation, and condemn Girvan's paper on and espousal of 'dependency' as slip-shod, untenable and self-serving.

In general, it is our view that the matter of the relationship of 'dependency' to the 'C7' is a matter of comparing and contrasting the form and intent of two distinct ideologies. Their comparative ranking is a difficult task, and the way in which such an analysis might be accomplished will exercise us through the rest of the study. What is clear is that to cast the matter in empiricist terms, and pursue an argument in respect of the supposed supersession of a technical scientific discipline's notions by a new set of concepts, is to invite confusion (as we have seen with Girvan and Cumper).

2.3 Disciplinary Independence — a chimera?

We began part 2 of this chapter by asking whether or not 'dependency' could be taken to establish an independent and/or adequate development studies. Recalling the views in respect of the nature of social theorizing propounded in the Prologue to the study,
we began a pursuit of an answer to our question by asking what is the form and intent of 'dependency'. At the end of that treatment, our disposition to regard 'dependency' as an ideology was seen to be entirely plausible. In regard to the exchange between practitioners of 'dependency' and their orthodox predecessors, we saw in the context of the Girvan-Cumper debate that the issue of ranking the disparate efforts was couched in terms of the dictates of the model of the natural sciences. The particular metaphor borrowed to treat the process of advancing this or that ideologically informed set of claims in respect of development was that of a 'finally adequate theory', in contradistinction to some orthodoxy or other. The model of the natural sciences was borrowed, and disparate ideologies were compared as though what was at issue was the construction of some set of concepts adequate to an external, given object. An independent and adequate discipline was taken to be one that had both a particular object of study and an agreed and effective investigatory procedure. We argued that this was a total misapprehension of the nature of the exchange between theoretical lines in development studies, and that consequently all subsequent debate in respect of 'disciplinary independence' could only be sterile and misleading.

In sum, it is our contention that the issue of 'disciplinary independence' is a chimera that is occasioned by a fundamental misapprehension of the business of the development theorist.
Thus far we have treated the matter of 'disciplinary independence' in the company of an exposition of 'dependency theory'. The upshot of these discussions has been that 'dependency' is to be properly taken as an ideology - like those efforts we have looked at in earlier chapters - and that the issue of 'disciplinary independence' is a chimera. The debate about all this can only get off the ground if the social theorist involved invokes the model of the natural sciences. But as we argued in our Prologue, social theory is not a variation on natural science; consequently the debate is sterile. Having thus resolved this issue and rejected the model of the natural sciences, we are left with the sciences of the social as, properly regarded, being concerned with the construction and analysis of ideologies. The question which is raised in this part of the chapter is that, if social theories are ideologies, then how are we to rank competing schemas? We pursue this question in the company of 'underdevelopment theory'.

We first present two arguments which are familiar in the literature: the argument from a sequence, and the argument from the identification of paradigms. We shall deny that these arguments help to establish either that there is progress in conceptualization within the history of social theorizing, or that there has been progress in conceptualization within the ambit of development studies. Further, we shall argue that these lines of enquiry (albeit informed by a genuine issue, viz. ranking ideologies) are misconceived, in that they begin with the model of the natural sciences and search for social science analogues. They fail to secure their objectives for precisely the same reasons as those who pursue 'disciplinary independence': their goal is illusory (55).

After treating these two arguments, we go on to confront directly the issue of ranking ideologies and through the medium of a presentation of Frank's 'underdevelopment' work we offer a series of preliminary and
tentative remarks.

3.1 The argument from a sequence.

We have seen in the case of Furtado's intellectual career how the establishment of the 'dependency' view can quite properly be regarded as an emergent sequence; that is, from the initial Centre-Periphery notion presented by Prebisch the 'dependency' position may be derived (56). As Girvan puts it, noting the Prebisch formulation, "The idea of the economic dependence of the periphery is evidently implicit in this conceptualization" (57). In addition to this observation, we can note that latent within the typical (favourable) commentary upon 'dependency' there is often some sort of reference to this sequence, and the claim is implicitly lodged that the mere existence of this sequence testifies to the truth of the final product. We have then two elements to consider: on the one hand the sequence, and on the other the claims made for it or in the light of it. What we take to be the typical and erroneous fusion of these matters is most accessibly presented by Ehrensaft.

Ehrensaft begins by observing that "During the last decade a diverse stream of analyses emerged which taken together do much to update and correct our perceptions of the Third World"; and he goes on to declare that "my intention in this essay is to give an initial synthesis of some of this new thinking ..." (58). Already the phrasing (with our emphases) points up the plausibility of our general claims in regard to 'dependency's' expositors; and Ehrensaft goes on to display quite unequivocally the typical resolution of the matter of sequence and truth status. Thus he declares: "The central proposition of this essay argues that the structural position and interests of national bourgeoisies in Third World capitalist regimes block them from undertaking and carrying out these tasks of economic, political and cultural mobilization. This
proposition emerges in five steps from the new writings on Third World political economies. Each successive step brings a closer approximation to actual societal relationships. I will review these steps one by one, showing how each successive analysis builds intellectually on the ones which preceded. (our emphasis), (59).

Ehrensaft here declares himself to be some sort of 'dependency' theorist: a stance that he reduces to a 'central proposition', which he states. The history of the post-war period is then reviewed in the light of this orientation. This procedure is familiar, legitimate, and entirely his own affair. But to our mind in making his presentation he commits a familiar and pernicious error, and this is of general interest. The error seems to come when he elects to relate the history of the establishment of his preferred view in the mould of the supposed progressiveness of conceptualization of the natural sciences. When Ehrensaft writes that his purpose is to "explain why semi-industrialization occurs" (59a), we can note that it would seem to be the case that Ehrensaft takes himself to be telling us something about how the world is; that is, reporting on an empirical matter. This reading is reinforced by his treatment of the sequence of notions which issues in 'dependency'. Of his history he says that "each successive step brings us closer to approximation to actual societal relationships" (60). This presentation seems to invoke the model of the natural sciences, as they are ordinarily understood. We are presented with a scheme of increasingly accurate approximations to a reality independent of the theorist's engagement.

Now whilst it may be argued that natural science conceptualizations are progressive to the extent that they approximate more closely to an independent reality than their predecessors (and presumably Ehrensaft would affirm this), we should note that this formulation of the
process of natural science work is both (a) commonsensical and (b) in terms of the debates within the philosophy of science, naive. Just what is going on within the ambit of the natural sciences, how they may be demarcated, and what ontological or epistemological commitments attach to any one proposition of the natural sciences, are all matters of vigorous debate. Ehrensaft thus makes two assumptions: (i) that the history of the formulations of the natural sciences is one of increasingly subtle approximations to an independent reality; and (ii) that the history of the formulations of the social sciences is analogous to that of the natural sciences. Now, without reference to the debates within the philosophy of science, it can be granted that assumption (i) is at the very least open to question; and that assumption (ii) is widely denied. These remarks, let us note, attach to the idea which informs and structures Ehrensaft's entire argument, and from where it draws its force. If they are called into question then so is the entire Ehrensaftian project. It seems to us that Ehrensaft's argument can be reduced to the status of a covert appeal to common sense to support his schema. We can offer an alternative.

In contradistinction to what is seemingly assumed by Ehrensaft, we would wish to argue (setting aside matters of the nature of the natural science effort) that with the social sciences there is no reason to expect, or look for, this progressive tendency; and that within the history of 'dependency' theory or any other distinguishable school within the social sciences, there is no need to cast expositions in this natural science-echoing style.

If we recall the schema presented by Dobb, then we see that the dynamic of theory is but one aspect of the production of social theory (i.e., ideology); the other being the dynamic of society. It is within the ambit of this second element that Dobb locates those societal conflicts and changes that issue in the demands, made
of theorists, to produce useful explanations. Quite what the practical significance of autonomous developments in theory might be we have not asked. Some role must be granted to such intra-disciplinary developments if we are to give the theorist a role broader than that of an apologist responding, essentially passively, to the demands of whatever social group he may feel beholden to. However, it is clear that (whatever the solution to this question) the idea of the double dynamic of social theory and social problem presents a sharply divergent picture of the nature of social theorizing to that of Ehrensaft's natural science-informed commonsense. More particularly, if social theorizing entails some measure of 'social practicality' then it is impossible to conceive of any progressivity of conceptualization on the model of that supposed to be present in the natural sciences. The notion of 'progressivity' is at least plausible in respect of the natural sciences, but seems wholly improbable in the realm of the social sciences. In this latter case, the only 'progressivity' would be within the frame of some 'social problem' — that is, a specific exchange of theorist/world — and such 'progressivity' would be of a different sort to that which would be invoked in respect of natural scientific-type movement toward an ever more subtle grasp of a fixed and given reality.

In sum, we have to say that: (i) Ehrensaft's pursuit of a progressive evolution of concepts towards a realistic economic sociology is, so far as we can determine, a misconceived project; (ii) there is no reason to suspect that such a progressive sequence exists; and (iii) there is reason, in the light of the arguments of Dobb, to suppose that it does not exist.

It is not enough for proponents of 'dependency' to point to a sequence of concept development and thereby claim that the present end point of the sequence is true, coherent and useful. Indeed the reverse is the case; the identification of a sequence in a concept's
history establishes nothing in respect of that concept's truthfulness, and to argue that it does is to wrongly draw upon a particular model of the natural sciences.

3.2 The argument from paradigms.

We have noted and discussed above the notion that a sequence of argument, ECLA-Furtado-Frank, may be identified such that the end point may be regarded as some sort of theoretical consummation of this progressive sequence. We have dismissed that argument; but there is an analogous and related argument which treats the same material using a notion of 'paradigm shift', drawn from Kuhn, such that the complex and confused debate which lies between a start-point of ECLA and an end-point of Frank is taken as an instance of a 'paradigm shift'. We can take this to be used as an argument for theoretical progressivity, in that the notion 'paradigm shift' claims to encompass and render intelligible an intra-disciplinary process whereby a failing orthodoxy is superseded and replaced. How are we to regard this argument for theoretical progressivity?

With reference to Bernstein's work we can review both the Kuhnian notion itself and the use made of that notion by social scientists. Kuhn is tagged by Bernstein as a 'post-empiricist', one of a number of philosophers of science who have attacked the (commonsense) idea of science as the incremental accumulation of facts which are subsequently ordered by theories. Kuhn's work endeavours to capture science as a social activity and as a set of procedures for apprehending the nature of their given object. Thus the Kuhnian notion of a 'paradigm' has two related senses. In the first, it denotes that set of very general shared assumptions whereby the scientific community constitute their activities; and secondly, it denotes a particular practical exemplification of their practices. Kuhn later revises his terminology such that the former sense is presented as 'disciplinary matrix' and the latter as 'exemplar'. Bernstein notes that whilst these revisions of termin-
ology help clear up some confusions, they do not help with one crucial issue. As he says "What is frequently forgotten or neglected is that a primary aim of his book is to help us understand what is distinctive about science" (61b). Bernstein thinks that what Kuhn has to say about 'paradigms' can apply quite happily to any other discipline of learning. Thus he remarks: "What he has to say about paradigms, their acceptance, the ways in which they are imposed, is just as true for the history of schools. There are many disciplines such as philosophy - which Kuhn distinguishes from science - where what Kuhn says about science is perfectly applicable" (62). If there is nothing distinct about the notion of a 'paradigm' when it is supposedly applied to the natural sciences, then to invoke it to illuminate events in social science is to present a vacuous explanation. The conceptual link-up with the natural sciences turns out to be non-existent, and all the talk of paradigm shifts and normal/revolutionary science advances the analysis of intra-disciplinary change in social science not as extensively as assumed. Additionally, we may note, it does not provide the long sought for route to scientific respectability for the social sciences. In all these arguments reference to 'paradigms' entails using an unstable metaphor.

So much for Kuhn himself; his work, Bernstein argues, is too ambiguous to be of any direct and immediate use. What then of the use made of Kuhn's by social scientists? Bernstein discusses two 'mainstream social scientists', and after criticising their misuse of Kuhn - which it is argued takes the form of reading the notion of 'paradigm' so very generally, as to lose all contact with Kuhn's efforts (63) - suggests that a fundamental question is being begged. He observes that "what is at issue is not only whether political science is or is not in a 'pre-paradigmatic' or 'paradigmatic' phase, but whether this very way of speaking is appropriate and illuminating...... if one
thinks that political science is in a pre-paradigmatic stage, this suggests that surely a scientific paradigmatic stage must arise if we are patient and work toward it. But there is absolutely no warrant for such an inference on Kuhn's ground or any others" (63a). In other words, to argue thus is to beg the question of the precise nature of social science. In all these debates reference to paradigms entails the obfuscation of crucial issues.

What are the implications of these remarks for the use of the notion of 'paradigms' in the social sciences? If we regard their use as either metaphorical or obfuscatory then two lines open up. In the first case, we can treat the use of the term 'paradigm' as marking the effort to express and give preliminary shape to the participants' (and commentators') sense of the theoretical novelty and importance of those new departures with which they are concerned. Thus, simply, it is one way whereby the totality of the ECLA-Furtado-Frank line may be grasped/presented. Clearly, if we could establish a suitably cautious (and, in particular, non-natural science-referring) use of the terminology, then this would be unobjectionable; if only because it would not be any different in import from the way we ordinarily talk about new 'schools'. The other, second, use remains objectionable. Here we may hazard that the term in question simply serves as an obfuscating notion whereby an essentially theoretically empty effort may be passed off as coherent and/or novel. As regards the 'novel' reading, we could end up close to H. Bernstein's view of the 'radicals' of development studies; which has it that they reduce to bourgeois orthodoxy plus moral outrage. The 'coherent' reading might attach to those familiar scientistic efforts of orthodox social science whereby underdeveloped ideologies are loosely disguised as efforts of science; that is, as being properly scientific.

The foregoing discussion can be integrated into our
preceding remarks on the influence of the natural sciences. Thus if we consider the familiar debates within social science we can interpret them in two ways: as inevitable; as transient.

Kuhn opts for transience—on, we may suggest, the analogy of the established natural sciences—and then re-works the history of the natural sciences on the model of the social sciences. Thus he has 'pre-paradigm' debate (from the social sciences) issuing in eventual 'paradigm' agreement (from natural sciences). There is one story, a sort of 'unified theory' for the natural and the social sciences. Reconstructing the argument strategy, we obtain the following picture. Working one way, the empiricists' model of incremental science is denied in favour of suggestions drawn from the image of the social sciences; thus natural science is seen as a social activity. Working the other way, debate within the social sciences is not taken to be endemic, and nor is social science taken to be hopelessly polluted by bias and ideology. The core of the natural science effort, the agreed apprehension of a unitary truth of an external world, is made available to social science. All social science has to do is sort out its agreed paradigm and thereafter get on with it.

In regard to the search for an agreed paradigm, it is observed that parties to debates (i) sketch out differing and incompatible positions (this is routine in the social sciences); but (ii) only bother to do this in the natural sciences when there is debate or recourse to philosophy, and that this is extremely unusual in the natural science. The Kuhnian 'unified theory' then presents us with the notion of pre-paradigm debate occasioning the critical identification of hitherto taken for granted paradigms. These exercises in the critical identification of the presently assumed serve to permit or enable the construction of the new and superseding paradigm.
If we now return to our start point and take debates within social science to be inevitable, and if we also affirm that these endless squabbles are not evidence of the futility of social science, then we are bound to ask for an explanation of the nature of social science that acknowledges and integrates into explanation that which is routinely observed of social science, viz. endless debate. Let us therefore embrace the notion of ideology and see what that entails. On the basis of arguments and discussions presented in preceding chapters we can report that this leads to a position like Dobbs, or similar. Here the business of social science is the activity of making sense; and the history of social science efforts is the history of the various results of the double dynamic of society and discipline.

In regard to the particular exercise of constructing a theory, we can see that the theorist is (i) confronted with a problem presented by society (i.e. 'make sense of X'), and (ii) has available a given set of disciplinary resources. The 'new theory' is developed out of a debate with existing theory according to the particular demands of the present problem. Thus established theory is revised in the light of the new problem; it is not simply extended.

It is at this point that the two lines coincide; so, paradigm shift in the social sciences and theory invention look to be the same thing.

To conclude, we can note that the treatment of intra-disciplinary change which uses the notion 'paradigm shift' represents, to our mind and in line with the observations of earlier parts of this chapter, the influence of the model of the natural sciences. It is our view that recourse to Kuhnian terminology does not advance our understanding of how 'schools' emerge and how they are constituted. Indeed, it obscures investigation of the more plausible view that revision of a set of concepts (within the realm of the social
sciences) flows not from an improved apprehension of
an independent reality, called forth by the 'anomalous
behaviour' of that reality, but rather from the
advancing of the claims of a novel ideology by a
particular group in response to or in the light of
changes within their social world.

The argument to theoretical progressivity is not
secured by using the notion of paradigm shifts. That
an established body of theoretical resources has been
transmuted into a novel ideological form does not, of
itself, establish the progressivity of that transmutation;
and the question of the ranking of ideologies remains
open.

To anticipate some questions which might be raised, we
note that there are, in addition to the lines seen above,
a whole set of versions of one familiar argument to the
effect that progressivity entails you ditching your
ideology in favour of my science. This is routine inter-
ideology debate amongst the practitioners of the early
efforts we noted in the preceding chapters. We can
safely ignore this style of argument.

Also, related to this is the Bernstein/Leys/(Frank)
argument to the effect that they have transcended simple
radicalism by adopting marxism. On the face of it this
argument partakes of all the devices examined above. Progress
in conceptualization is effected through transcending
radicalism; where 'transcending' implies both a preparatory sequential movement and a distinct break. We
are presented with what could be called the 'take-off into
marxism'. Yet this must be regarded as largely a matter of biography, as the marxian line just is distinct —
this debate, just what counts as a marxian line we
leave to Section Four.
3.3 How do we rank ideologies?

The foregoing discussions issued in a rejection of the notions of sequential conceptual development and paradigm shifts as means whereby the adequacy of differing explanations could be judged. So how can we compare the theoretical status of various efforts? Thus far we have argued that all the substantive efforts we have concerned ourselves with are to be taken as ideologies. How then do we rank ideologies?

With Bernstein in Chapter Five, we contented ourselves with noting simply that they could be ranked. We went on to observe that the efforts thus far treated (Keynesian 'growth', 'M-T', 'MIST') were all empiricist in conception and authoritative interventionisms in intent; that is, generally speaking the same. This made questions of ranking fairly straightforward; that is, in line with simple (internal to the set) criteria of technical efficacy, even if these measures are illusory. But what if the ideologies are not generally 'the same' in the sense used; how then do we rank ideologies? We will pursue this question with AG Frank and 'under-development theory' (UDT).

3.32 AG Frank and 'under-development theory'.

If we present a sociology of knowledge sketch of Frank's work, using our scheme of 'demands', 'resources' and 'product', then the picture we obtain is as follows (64). Out of a general milieu of long-term foreign and in particular U.S. dominance of the area and the experience of the Cuban revolution, Frank conceives the task of contributing to a revolutionary critique of orthodox theorizing and expectations. Brookfield speaks of Frank's "most rapid conversion to radical ideologies" (65). The available resources are threefold. Firstly the orthodox economics of the neo-classical dominated 'modernization' theories provide an object over against which the new departure may be defined. Secondly, the analytical machineries are largely provided by the structuralist line associated with ECLA. These cons-
titute the principal theoretical resource used by Frank, whilst the political reformism associated with ECLA provides another negative defining element of Frank's stance. Thirdly, a simple strategic metaphor is borrowed from the marxism of Baran; that is, the notion of the debilitating metropolitan extraction of surplus from long-integrated peripheral areas. The product of this effort we here designate 'UDT' (66): the situation of Latin American economies, and indeed those of the Third World generally, are to be explained in terms of their subordinate incorporation into the world capitalist system.

This product, Frank's 'manifesto', is expressed in a 1963 work thus: "All serious study of the problems of development of under-developed areas and all serious intent to formulate policy for the elimination of underdevelopment and for the promotion of development must take into account, nay must begin with, this fundamental historical and structural cause of underdevelopment in capitalism. Indeed, all serious study of development must take into account the fundamental relation the development of development has had, and continues to have, with the development of underdevelopment. All serious study of capitalism, of its manifestations in the development of the metropole and of that in the underdevelopment of the periphery, and especially the study of the contemporary single world capitalist system and its development in the past and future, must begin with capitalism's unity and its fundamental internal contradiction, which has always and everywhere expressed itself in diffusion and exploitation, development and underdevelopment" (67).

Ehrensaft labels Frank's effort 'satellitization', and remarks that "Substantively, the satellitization approach deals with the same phenomena as does the structuralist. The difference consists largely in the interpretation given to these phenomena" (67a). Translating this observation out of its empiricist style, we can see that Ehrensaft is making the point
that in conception Frank's effort resembles that of the structuralists ('dependency'), whilst in intent it does not.

As regards Frank's conceptual equipment in these early works, Ehrensaft's view appears to be correct. Ehrensaft quotes Frank from the essay 'The Development of Underdevelopment' to the effect that where he, Frank, differs from some other structuralists is that he is not ideologically blinkered. The implication being that, in respect of conception of analysis, there is a very much greater convergence of view than might otherwise be expected. Turning to this text we find that it is indeed close to the 'dependency' style of analysis. Without going all the way through Frank's work to establish this, we can quote him directly. Thus he says, after considering the character of Brazilian economy and society, that "the same historical and structural approach can also lead to a better development theory and policy." Any such product must be made by the peoples of the dependent states themselves. Frank goes on, "to change their reality they must understand it. For this reason I hope that better confirmation of these hypotheses and further pursuit of the proposed historical, holistic and structural approach may help" (69). In addition, and at a more general level, Frank's approach resembles that of the 'dependency' line; in that, couched in the syntax of natural science, both efforts are conceived in 'epistemology of models' fashion (70).

Turning to the matter of the intent of Frank's work, it is clear that Ehrensaft is right in pointing to the ideological differences between Frank and 'dependency' (71). However it also seems to be the case that Ehrensaft, bound up in his pursuit of theoretical progressivity, entirely fails to grasp that the crucial novelty of Frank's line resides precisely in his overt political commitment. Frank's work is readily contrasted with previous writers noted in this study. What is strikingly evident in the Frank line
is its political engagement; Frank makes his work's political engagement not simply obvious, but central to his effort (72). Thus he declares "These essays were written to contribute to the Revolution in Latin America and the world" (73); and again, he argues that problems of underdevelopment can be resolved "with the only true development strategy: armed revolution and the construction of socialism" (74).

In respect of this centrality of political engagement in Frank's earlier work, we can ask (in the light of our notion derived from Dobb, of a theory requiring an 'agent of execution'): just how is Frank's effort supposed to fix onto the world? With Myrdal we identified the reasonably acting state as agent of theory execution, and the notion of the 'soft state' as the apology for this views implausibility. With Furtado we saw a similarly free-floating theory, that required an enlightened nationalism from unspecified quarters. What is the position with Frank? Frank's early work is, it may be suggested, best regarded as that of a political pamphleteer (75); rather than as sociology, economics, political science, or whatever. If we read Frank as a pamphleteer then two points seem to follow.

First, in contrast to earlier writers considered in this study, the agent of theory execution has a different status or presence in Frank's work; that is, the idea of revolution enters Frank's work very early on. In thus having a clear political aspect Frank's agent of theory execution becomes omni-present, rather than being just one more element in some wider general scheme. Myrdal however has a neo-institutionalist theory of Third World society; additionally, affirming the value principle of 'development', he is obliged to identify a political agent of theory execution - thus we get the 'reasonable state'. Myrdal's agent is called forth by the logic of theorizing, and is a minimum commitment/engagement which is incapable of carrying the weight the overall Myrdalian scheme requires of it.
Frank in this early work does not, to our mind, come armed with a general theory of Third World society; rather he comes armed with a radical political commitment which presents him with a ready-made agent, viz. the political activist, just as soon as he begins to sketch out his model of the situation (76). Frank's agent is intrinsic rather than additional to his scheme. Whether the line is any more plausible than preceding efforts is another, albeit related, question.

The second point is related to the first. It concerns moral/political commitment, and the syntax of the natural sciences. Frank, we want to say, presents his moral/political engagement as an empirical matter (77). That is to say, he offers a programmatic statement in respect of the exchange of rich and poor and takes this to be liable to confirmation/disconfirmation in the light of future research — empirical research. Yet to our mind Frank's orientation does not admit of empirical analysis; rather, it informs study and action. That Frank chooses to present his political stance in terms which do not invoke political philosophy or ethics, but instead in terms claiming to be routinely descriptive of how things are in respect of rich and poor, is simply an error. As Frank's agent was intrinsic, so his politics are taken for granted. Recalling our notion of social theorizing as the deployment of a morally informed categorical frame, it is clear that Frank has time to acknowledge neither aspect; but he instead proceeds straight to the fray with a Schumpeterian 'vision' (78), the refinement and explication of which he thereafter (wrongly) takes to be a matter of empirical research and appropriate adjustment.

In sum, it should be clearly noted that Frank does not develop a scholarly treatise nor even a half way systematically presented piece of social science (79); he does not try to. Given this, the criticisms of the limited nature of Frank's early efforts rather seem to miss the point. A political pamphleteer is not to be
judged as a political philosopher, an economist or a sociologist, though he may well have recourse to the work of all three. The pamphleteer presents a critique; and we can regard this as an elementary exercise in ideology making.

3.33 Ranking ideologies

Frank's work lets us present, unequivocally, one characteristic of all the various efforts we have thus far considered: that is, they are ideologies. Following Bernstein, who has pointed out that as ideologies claim to be pertinent to action in the world then they are liable to rational criticism, we can now ask just how is such an examination to be carried out?

We may begin by offering a proximate answer to this question, based simply upon the procedures we have either invoked or supposed in the course of our foregoing discussions. We can then look at some of the interpretations of critical theory and ask whether we can accomplish any preliminary revisions of our schema.

If an exercise in 'social theorizing' comprises the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame' (which procedure, regarded ideally, moves from the rationalistically conceived 'general' to an empirically relevant set of 'particulars'), then the resultant 'ideology' may be analysed in terms of the notions of 'conception' and 'intent'. The former line is how we have argued ideologies are constructed, and the latter line is how we have analysed completed products. If we now juxtapose these two approaches, we can develop and extend our manner of analysing completed efforts by invoking our slogan in respect of the manner of constructing ideological efforts. Thus as regards 'conception', we ask how is this notion to be extended in the light of our slogan 'morally informed categorical frame'. Similarly as regards 'intent', we ask how it might be extended. This is to read them as ideologies. But also
they are exercises in argument construction, and liable therefore to the usual rules of intellectual discourse in respect of formal consistency and so on. This procedure generates what seems to be a set of criteria whereby an ideological effort might be evaluated. We present it as a 'check list'.

As regards conception:

A. Does the effort in question display 'reflexive consistency'; that is, does it acknowledge that it is an ideology? There seem to be three sorts of 'reflexive consistency'.

(a) Reflexive Consistency I (Internal). Does the effort in question acknowledge its own value engagement? Does it demonstrate an awareness of being a value-suffused product? Claims to the status of natural science objectivity are simply fatuous; similarly, pro-forma declarations are not enough. On the other hand, Mannheimian style claims to the relativity of all value schemas are unacceptable.

(b) Reflexive Consistency II (External). Does the stance in question specify an agent of theory execution whereby the effort can latch onto the world? This agent of theory execution is understood to be integral to the stance; thus an agent that is simply an addendum designed to meet the requirements of the logic of theorizing will not do. Crudely, the effort has to be engaged. The plausibility of the schema, which will rest in part on the agent chosen and its supposed role, is another question.

(c) Reflexive Consistency III (General). Does the line in question explain itself? Is the effort itself compatible with the claims lodged in the effort? For example, Giddens reports, in respect of Habermas's treatment of the notion of ideology, that "the concept of ideology, Habermas argued, did not just come into being with the rise of bourgeois society; it is actually only relevant to the conditions of public debate forged by that society" (80). Thus Habermas inserts his concern for ideology into
an historical schema which explains the occasion for his interest.

B Does the stance in question display formal or conceptual consistency? This is the routine demand of all intellectual efforts, so we need not pursue it.

C As regards the exchange between conception/intent. Does the effort in question have recourse to a categorical frame whose explanatory scope is commensurate with the demands for explanations flowing from the declared intent? That is, is the set of concepts used rich enough to cope with the ordinarily understood world, the practical starting point of the effort's engagement? Two examples will serve: Girvan seemingly invokes this when he says; "The structural and institutional method came to be two of the most important characteristics of the veritable revolution in economic thought in the two regions in the middle and late 1960's. The developments in thought, generally, took the forms of (i) adding a historical perspective and analysis to the structural and institutional method, (ii) giving the historical/structural/institutional method the kind of theoretical and empirical content needed to construct a general theory of dependence and underdevelopment" (81) (our emphasis). The second example is of a failure: thus in respect of the Great Depression it is argued that the conceptual apparatus of the economic orthodoxy was incapable of treating the events. It was not a matter of the appropriate sub-areas of the discipline being un-developed; rather, the economic orthodoxy denied that it could happen. Clearly it was inadequate, conceptually, to its task of interpreting the economic world in such a manner as to permit rational action in respect of that world.

D As regards the intent. The matter of 'intent' concerns the objectives and evaluations underpinning and guiding the effort. Generally, it seems as if we
confront an issue of practicality.
(a) Intent (External). Is the posited intent tenable? Thus ideology as we understand it is not, for example, religion; it is essentially practical. In this light, if an ideology is intended to secure for its adherents/agents, say, 'eternal cosmic wisdom', then we would wish to rank it lower than an ideology intended to secure, say, some piecemeal change in the distribution of economic power in society.
(b) Intent (Internal). Is the intent proper? That is, does the moral aspect of the effort's intent coincide with or diverge from typically 'Western' views? This question arises from those considerations of chapter two 'The Idea of Development', wherein we postulated a general determinism in respect of the stances open to any 'westerner'. An ideology affirming progress would have to be ranked higher than one denying it.

At this point the coupling of formal requirements to sociology of knowledge analyses, to generate a list of criteria whereby ideologies might be ranked, evidently begins to look strained. This issue of ranking takes us into matters of the philosophy of social science. Any further treatment of the matters must await specialist input; to that end, and in order to indicate how the discussion might be advanced from this point, we can introduce those interpreters of 'critical theory' mentioned above.

To begin this area of additional enquiry we must lodge a disclaimer. We are not presenting an introduction to Habermas' work. Out of the very wide-ranging and complex issues this theorist treats we are trying to pick out one area, that which extends our own immediate interests. The aspect of Habermas' work we are concerned with is the critique of ideology, and our investigations are very much of a preliminary nature. Nonetheless we might note that the themes we tackle, in the context of Habermas' work, are occasioned by general issues of no
little complexity and interest. Thus Bernstein argues that after the self-conception of mainstream social science is challenged and found wanting, a series of issues crop up: "these cluster around the interpretation and understanding of political and social reality" (82). Bernstein adds: "Looming in the background is the central question of how one can rationally adjudicate among competing and conflicting interpretations"(82).

In regard to this enquiry into ideology, we may note that it is not to be taken as ideal-formal but rather marxian-critical. As Giddens puts it: "Marx introduced a radically new perspective into social theory. Henceforth the diagnosis of ideology became a mode of penetrating beyond the consciousness of human actors, and of uncovering the 'real foundations' of their activity, this being harnessed to the end of social transformation"(83). This is echoed by Bernstein: "An ideology must be deciphered"(84). That this process of 'deciphering' is taken to be emancipatory is revealed in Bernstein's detailing of the functions of ideology critique. He begins with injunctions as to how it should proceed in terms of providing descriptions of its object, and moves to indicating how it should serve to actively dismantle its object: "The critique of ideology has several inter-related functions: (1) It must describe and accurately characterise the ideology, and be wary of caricature. (2) It seeks a depth interpretation of the ideology which will at once reveal how the ideology reflects and distorts an underlying social and political reality. (3) It seeks to discover the material and psychological factors that reinforce and sustain it. (4) It seeks to isolate the fundamental beliefs and interpretations that are the basis of the ideology, and to criticise them in order to expose their falsity. (5) It seeks to dissolve the legitimizing power of ideologies by overcoming resistance in the ideologies' defenders"(85). This describes a substantive task; above, we pursued formal criteria.
If this tells us why we should conduct critiques of ideology and in what areas we should develop our analyses, it does not tell us how it is to be done. The answer from Habermas seems to be that ideology critique is a matter of argumentation. This apparently rather disappointing contribution is, characteristically, lodged within a wider frame; that of a general theory of communication. Here Habermas makes a distinction between 'speech action' and 'discourse', where the former supposes a consensus and the latter is the realm of argumentation. This work is very abstract and according to Bernstein, "what Habermas seeks to establish in his theory of communicative competence.....

.... parallels what Marx sought to accomplish in his own critique of political economy. Marx argues that implicit in the concrete historical forms of alienation and exploitation that now exist, are real dynamic potentialities for radically transforming this existing historical situation...... In a parallel manner Habermas argues that human discourse or speech—even in its systematically distorted forms—both presupposes and anticipates an ideal speech situation in which both the theoretical and practical conditions exist for unrestrained communication and dialogue" (86).

This notion of an 'ideal speech situation' seems to serve two functions. Firstly, it provides a regulative ideal for discourse; that is, when consensus has broken down and argumentation is occurring, there is a common or universal inherent goal of language which serves to regulate and order argument. It is rather analogous to, say, Popper's notion of objective truth, where this is taken as a regulative ideal of scientific endeavour; it is the goal we collectively agree to work towards. In Habermas' proposals for ideology critique, the 'ideal speech situation' plays the same role: it is the fixed point around which debate can be organised. Secondly, this equation of 'open debate' with 'open society', so to say, provides the integral value aspect of the work. As Marx fused matters
of fact and value, so does Habermas, arguing that the fundamental structure of language supposes a free society.

More generally, ideology critique fits into a wider schema which serves to locate the theorist and his effort in the 'real world'; the metaphor invoked is that of the therapeutic exchange of psychoanalysis. The scheme is presented as a tripartite process whereby the efforts of the critical theorist are 'authenticated'. We begin with the debate internal to the scholarly community. Both Bauman and Bernstein read Habermas as making this the ambit of positive science (not positivist, they insist). Bauman observes. "It is by the positive analysis of reality, which seeks its legitimation in the sedulous application of the ordinary fact-finding means of positive social science, that the hypotheses of critical knowledge, aimed at the restitution of undistorted communication are first advanced" (87). This seems to be ambiguous; for whilst we can grant that there is a 'moment' of disciplinary engagement, the orthodox methods of social science are lodged within a view that denies the propriety of value engagement. Yet by invoking 'ordinary fact finding methods of positive science' Bauman at once grants plausibility to orthodox claims, and seemingly reduces critical theorizing to a matter of an affirmation of the orthodox plus something. Bernstein even talks of causal analyses; which, recalling MacIntyre (87a) on the appropriate ambit of Humean causes, must be a nonsense.

The second stage of this process is the exchange between the theorist and his target. This encompasses a dialogue of theorist and target/subject, with the objective of transmitting to the subject the habit of critical investigation of assumed commonsense. Here the exchange is theorized by direct reference to the metaphor of psychotherapy. Finally, the third stage sees the subject engaging in critical theory-informed political activity. Thus critical theories' efforts are authenticated to the extent that they become significant cultural objects.
There is much to question in these schemes. Yet our business is not a critical exposition of Habermas' scheme; it is rather the matter of ideology ranking. In this context we can offer two preliminary general conclusions.

(i) If we take competition between ideologies as being 'distorted communication', then invoking the notion of 'discourse' seems not inappropriate. But the question remains: just how helpful is it, in contrast to more familiar patterns of marxian-informed ideology critique? It is not immediately clear, in respect of ranking ideologies of development, that we gain all that much from Habermas' subtle schemes. Treating the clash of ideological lines as a matter for the deployment and counter-deployment of arguments would seem to be a very narrow treatment of these issues: for, after all, these are real political issues and exemplify the conflicts of actual groups in society. Habermas, we may say, argues for the situation of mature western capitalism and its social science and other ideologues/critics. Thus we derive themes of legitimation crisis.

(ii) Insofar as we are treating, in our study, Western efforts to make sense of the Third World then Habermas' line helps us. In the sections above we have treated various stances which we took to be legitimating/ordering particular politically-informed departures. The critique of ideology would seem to be a prerequisite of any defensible and coherent conception of the nature of the exchange between the Third World, as is, and Western academics with their social science.

The permissible intent and scope of the efforts of social science and academics remains an open question. The attempted export of techniques (growth theory), or recipes (modernization theory), or methods (neo-institutionalism), have been criticised in various ways. What has to be asked is, crudely: just what do western social scientists think they can and should do in their discussions and writings on 'development studies'?
Habermas offers a theory which locates the theorist in the world in a plausible fashion, and goes on to provide him with a specified job to do. This invitation to consider the precise role of theorist is probably Habermas' general lesson to us for the present. We will return to matters of 'critique' in Chapter Eight.

In regard to ranking ideologies, per se, we have not here drawn much from his work which we can add to our tentative exploration of the criteria whereby we may rank ideologies, save for an idealist and problematic scheme for ordering debate.
Section Four: The 'Marxists'

Chapter Seven: Elements of the renewal of interest in marxian scholarship; the treatments of the Third World.

1.0 Introductory Remarks.

On the relationship of Section Four to the study as a whole: this may be elucidated in three ways.

(a) Section Four may be taken to represent the third instantiation of the notion of progress in this 'career' of 'development-studies'. Thus stage one, dealt with in Section Two, equated progress with securing economic growth; stage two, dealt with in Section Three, equated progress with securing reasonable and rational programs of social reform; and now with stage three we find progress equated with revolutionary change oriented toward the extension of democracy.

(b) Section Four represents our third distinguishable answer to the question of our Prologue as to the intellectual/disciplinary status of 'development-studies'. Where the 'positivist C-W' of Section Two answered that 'development-studies' should be regarded as an element of, or application of, a primarily economics-based social science; and the 'radicals' of Section Three that 'development-studies' was both independent and novel in regard to a superseded economic C-W; the 'marxists' would submerge the interests of 'development-studies' within a very much wider set of politico-historical concerns.

(c) Section Four may also be taken to represent the third stage in our reconstruction of the post-war 'career' of 'development-studies'. That 'career' spans the period from the end of the Second World War to the end of the US war in SE Asia. This encompasses the occasion for the establishment of US hegemony and the occasion for its dissolution. The efforts subsumed under the label 'development-studies' reflect these wider issues. Thus stage one sees the establishment of an optimistic 'positivistic' line that peaks with Kennedy's 'New Frontier'; stage two sees a reaction and
the emergence of various 'radical' schemes. Stage three sees the decline of consensus, the end of the post-war economic boom, the fatal embroilment of the USA in Vietnam, and a rediscovery of marxian scholarship.

In sum, Section Four can be taken as providing the third instantiation of the notion of progress, the third distinguishable conception of the nature of 'development-studies', and the third stage in our reconstruction of its post war history.

As regards the strategic issues that confront and thereby shape Chapter Seven, we may note that the renewal of interest in marxian scholarship that we will here refer to has been general; but our major interest at this juncture is in finding out what is to count as a marxian analysis of the Third World. We are isolating one aspect of the revival of scholarship and submitting it to a specific enquiry.

Our treatment differs from that which we would expect to produce if we followed the routine schema of milieu, demands, resources and product; in that whilst it takes off from a discussion of milieu, as is usual, it then presents the product (that is, 'neo-marxism') via a review of typical criticisms of it, thereby sketching in some aspects of the issue of resources. Thus the matter of the proper nature of a marxian analysis of the Third World is kept central. We select our material and order it around our interest in the practical efforts of present-day theorists. The revision in procedure is, arguably, minor: instead of pursuing an extensive (and supposedly exhaustive) sociology of knowledge treatment of the newly presented marxian schemes, we offer a self-limiting enquiry that is compatible with the dictates of the logic of the study (a, b, and c, above) and our over-arching concerns in respect of the nature of social theorizing per se.

Three strategic issues confront us as we ask what is to count as a marxian analysis of the Third World.
(1) Dynamic of society: just what occasioned the resurgence of interest in marxian scholarship and analysis, and how were matters in and of the Third World involved?
(2) Dynamic of theory I: how has this renewal of interest in marxian work manifested itself in the context of discussions of the Third World; what have activists said?
(3) Dynamic of theory II: what is the scope of these discussions of the Third World within marxian scholarship; that is, what are the resources invoked, and how are they revised in works of scholarship?

2.0 Dynamic of Society: the occasion for the renewal of interest in marxian scholarship.

Kay, writing in 1973, begins the preface to his book in the following way: "Since 1968 the myth that Capital is unreadable has been exploded. Marxist literature, including Marx's own writings, now proliferate as never before. This recrudescence has a real basis in developments during the sixties: the collapse of consensus politics; the decomposition of the affluent society and the failure of the Americans to win a decisive victory in Vietnam. It also has ideological roots, for as the world has moved on academic social science has stood still" (2). The distinction drawn between 'real basis' and 'ideological roots' seems both unnecessarily orthodox and somewhat ambiguous - what is an ideological root? The metaphors seem confused; nonetheless Kay provides us with a starting point. We will consider the 'occasion for renewal' under two headings: firstly looking at the circumstances internal to the developed societies of the 'west' (though New Left upheaval extended to Eastern Europe); and then, secondly, we consider those events in the Third World which permitted the cooption of the experience of revolutionary groups by New Left thinkers.

2.I Pressures for renewal of interest in Marx I: Internal / Immediate.

If we approach these matters via the idea of the dissolution of consensus politics, we can ask after the occasion
of this dissolution. This is to present the New Left(3). We can here note some of the main elements in their activities and doctrines: that is, we offer a very tentative sociology of knowledge note. It is tentative for two reasons: one, that for our present purposes we require little more; and two, the history of the 1960's and early 1970's is too new, too undigested (indeed it is largely unwritten).

The dissolution of consensus was abrupt and surprising. Birnbaum, writing in 1969, observes that "It was only yesterday that we were assured that our western societies were immune to severe disruption"(4). He goes on to report that liberals saw a secure pluralism, socialists a solidly engineered consent, and conservatives a vulgar consumerism. Interestingly he also mentions radicals, taking them to perceive an iron cage of bureaucratic rationality. Birnbaum asks, "What were the signs we missed?"(5), and answers:"In the first place, of course, we underestimated the significance of the Third World's struggle against the older and newer forms of imperialism, or rather, its multiple meaning and consequences. On one level the success of the Algerians and Cubans in liberating themselves caused the imperialist powers to change their strategies. The French and British (with the West Germans in tow) abandoned military occupation for economic penetration and manipulation. The US, by contrast, after the Cuban trauma went over to ever more naked military intervention in the Third World, culminating in the Vietnamese horror"(6). The example of the wars of liberation are one side of the experience of the Third World coin; the other is the reflexive self-examination occasioned by Vietnam. Thus it is said, "mobilization for the war in Vietnam has exposed for all the world to see the brutal visage of our ambiguous society: a monstrous technological apparatus tended by moral dwarfs"(7). Birnbaum pushes his point home: "...what has occurred is not a distortion but the ultimate truth about our relation to the world"(8). In the US the collapse of consensus and the gradual awakening
of critical scholarship from the predominant quietude of the Eisenhower era is intimately bound up with the experience of Vietnam, but it has for the US radicals a domestic anticipation/parallel in the Civil Rights Movement.

We can note here one or two significant points in respect of the genesis of civil rights in the US. The first was the Supreme Court desegregation of schools decision in 1954, and the second was the Greensboro actions of 1960 where a sit-in at a Woolworths lunch counter snowballed into very large demonstrations. Students came into the South to aid civil rights activities. Goode reports that "The first organisation of the sixties to address itself to these mundane problems was the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee ... The SNCC represented the earliest actual appearance of the New Left. It was established in 1960 to organise the numerous white and black civil rights workers who had gone to work with the people in the south"(9). Goode traces the efforts of SNCC-associated groups, seeing them absorbed by the status quo and eventually issuing in the radical positions of Stokely Carmichael and Black Power. In 1962 SDS is inaugurated at Michigan(9a) and advances the notions of participation and community; and community-based initiatives become widespread.

Goode notes a third strand, the attention paid to reform of the universities. Here we may note with Birnbaum that "...the New Left to a considerable extent has been transmuted into a youth movement"(10). Birnbaum also avers that "At the moment Herbert Marcuse ... is the most influential of New Left thinkers on both continents" (11). We may now turn to the situation of that other continent.

Statera, in what appears to be a Mannheimian informed analysis of European student movements, argues that the prototype was German. In particular he cites the students of the Free University of Berlin(12). This institution, Statera reports, was established as a propaganda exercise aimed at the University in East
Berlin (Humboldt), and its constitution was extremely liberal. Through the late 1940's and 1950's its organisational liberties were increasingly brought into line with those of other universities in West Germany. This was the immediate occasion of protest - the loss of institutional liberties. Concomitantly, in 1959 the SPD revised its marxian constitution and expelled the German students union (also called SDS), which promptly became the sole repository for socialism in Germany (13).

From this point the scope of protest was ever widening. Statera remarks that "Both chronologically and ideologically West Berlin was the birthplace of European student protest" (14). ... "Vietnam was the crucial issue; but from the attack on American imperialism protest extended to the repressive nature of capitalism, to authoritarianism, to the 'manipulation of consciousness'" (15). In Germany Statera reports that Rudi Dutschke presented a Marcusian view; in France, Daniel Cohn-Bendit simplified the anti-authoritarian aspect, and Marcuse was run together with Sartre and Fanon. It was in France that the New Left/Student Movement attained its European apotheosis. From an occupation of administrative offices in Nanterre by a few hundred radicals, France moved to the verge of revolution. Gross reports, "It was in fact precisely in the social science departments at Nanterre that the revolutionary student movement was born" (16).

He continues, "In May 1968 the student movement in France mobilized tens of thousands of students and acted as the detonator and catalyst of a chain reaction which eventually brought 10 million workers out on strike, thus precipitating a situation in which, for the first time in the history of an advanced capitalist country, a revolution might have been possible" (17). If that seems overstated, or even false if one thinks of, say, the General Strike of 1926, then Galbraith can offer a milder, still apposite view; 'May 1968 showed what had come to be doubted through the years of the end of ideology, that history had not stopped' (17a).
Young, treating the matter of the core identity of the New Left, grants that much crystallized around the universities. Thus he says: "The structure of the University was viewed, in its paternalism and hierarchy, as a microcosm of power in the larger society. Its authoritarianism might be less naked, its elites less irresponsible but such organisations still appeared essentially undemocratic" (18).

The loss of institutional liberties which occasioned trouble in West Berlin was one factor amongst others in a wider trend. Thus all the treatments of 'student protest' that we have consulted refer to the massive expansion in student numbers in the 1950's and 1960's. Provision for these extra numbers seems to have been uneven; thus in Italy at Rome University and in Paris at Nanterre there were very large numbers and a low level of provision. More generally, it seems to be the case that authoritarianism and hierarchical patterns of organisation predominated. A final often noted matter of the universities themselves was the shift from 'scholarship' to 'expertise': notions of the pursuit of liberal scholarship gave way to demands that universities provide skilled experts. At this point the issue of the role of the university in late capitalist societies was raised.

Much of the ideology of the New Left seems to have revolved around the notions of technical-rational knowledge and its increasingly central role in society. Statera notes that "False consciousness, manipulated consensus, authoritarianism, and imperialism were concepts which gave shape to the developing utopia of the German students" (19). Again, "Authoritarianism and repression were regarded as dominant themes in the social, political and cultural life of industrial societies whose aim is to establish an immutable order both internally and internationally. The extra-parliamentary opposition, and the students above all, could therefore become the counterpart, on the internal political level, of the Vietcong" (20).
To summarize: thus far we have considered the New Left in America and in Europe. In the US we identified three themes: (a) Third World/Vietnam; (b) race/poverty; (c) university expansion and the slide from scholarship to expertise. In Europe we identified two themes: (i) Third World/Vietnam; (ii) university reform. Birnbaum's reference to Marcuse as pre-eminent figure is appropriate. Marcuse links matters of the Third World, the revision of Marx and the analysis of mature capitalism. Similarly influential figures are Debray and Fanon. We will come back to their work after reviewing the circumstances of the Third World through this period of the New Left. We can ask just what was going on in the Third World that resulted in the incorporation of the Third World as an aspect of the ideology of the New Left? Our interest lies neither in the elucidation of the doctrines of Third Worldism, nor in the presentation of some general ('neutral') history of the period. Rather, we are interested in noting those events which rendered the experience of the Third World assimilable to the New Left ideology. Additionally we should note that the division between 'Pressures for Renewal I and II' reflects our particular interests, rather than any judgment on the relative strengths of the various elements taken into the New Left positions.

2.2 Pressures for a renewal of interest in Marx II: External / Adoptive.

In the works of not a few students of African and Third World affairs there is pervasive sense of disappointment, of promises unfulfilled. This is perhaps unsurprising. It is not restricted to members of the New Left. Hargreaves writes: "During the 1950's many who wrote enthusiastically about the triumph of 'African Nationalism' were excited by the creative possibilities of the period. Europeans with varied political convictions welcomed the spectacle of resisters turning into collaborators in expectation of harmonious benefits all round" (21). But it is clear from the works of Davidson
that such optimism was misplaced. Far from it being the case that nationalist elites were inevitably innovative, they were if anything the reverse; and circumstances conspired to reinforce any such tendencies. Hargreaves' remark that "European expectations in the later 1970's are less euphoric"(22) is apposite. His further observation that "hopes for vital and authentically African political life have receded even further"(23) may be taken to reflect the naivety of the original hopes rather than any unproblematic judgement upon the dynamism (or otherwise) of present African societies.

Davidson analyses the circumstances of decolonization with reference to the particular expectations of the principal actors (groups). Thus he distinguishes the 'few' from the 'many'. The former are the Western educated elite; of these, those present around the turn of the century, in the full flood of jingoistic 'new imperialism', established the basis of the subsequently successful line of response. Davidson makes this their legacy: "That influence established the world of the European nation state as the manifest destiny of the colonial state, just as the colonial system itself would do the same in other and less obvious ways, so that decolonization, when it came, was bound and fettered within the terms of this nationalism"(24).

As for the latter group, the 'many', Davidson reports that they were detached from the nationalists and made a variety of accommodating responses to colonial rule. Durning the years of the great slump and the Second World War the 'many' saw their established practices totally swept away. As Davidson notes, "Every feature of dislocation stamped into the African scene by the great depression was enlarged and sharpened: the impoverishment of rural populations, the flight to urban slums and shanty towns, the dismantlement of traditional communities"(25).

The two groups came together, briefly, in the early post-war period. "The new parties mobilized the clamour in the streets. They became movements of mass
support or mass acclaim. They did not become movements of mass participation. The distinction is important"(26). The interests of the nationalists in political power and the interests of the masses in social reform came together: "This convergence of the 1950's between struggle for nationhood, the 'national struggle', and struggle for social gains, the 'social struggle', thus occurred as a mutual opportunism. The nationalists needed the masses and the masses needed the nationalists, but for purposes by no means necessarily identical"(27).

This is the gap that Davidson sees opening up later, so that the new ruling group quickly comes to stand in the same relationship to the masses as did the old colonial authority. The imported model collapsed and Davidson, adding that this is not surprising, locates the historical interest elsewhere: "..in the working out of confrontation between the colonial heritage and the pre-colonial heritage now that the second is free to challenge the first; and along with that the resultant development of ideas concerned with searching for a different model"(28).

Davidson argues that the spectacle of corrupted elite groups and successions of military coups led to the recognition that any affirmation of the notion of democracy would entail a sharp revision in political theory and practice(29). This new politics slowly began to emerge. It proposed ditching elite-ordered capitalist nation building in favour of an identification by leaders with the problems of the masses. "This new politics could be called the politics of mass participation. Increasingly, as it continued to unfold it became known as the politics of liberation. Its development after 1966 occurred in many forms"(30). The examples of the independent states of Tanzania and Somalia are cited; and the efforts of the then non-independent are noted. Thus Cabral and PAIGC, Mondlane and FRELIMO, and the MPLA in Angola are listed. Of them, Davidson observes that they "..may be said to have been the first in Africa to have fully indigenized a marxist analysis .... But what their evolution really
displayed was an African politics of mass participation in a mature phase" (31).

The struggle against a repressive and often brutal and unjustifiable colonial authority; the creative revision of democratic/socialist/marxist theorems; the identification with the masses, with the corollary of the affirmation of the centrality of social reform; all these, it would seem, are the bases whereby activity within the Third World might be embraced by radicals in the developed nations. Both Hargreaves and Davidson focus their attention on sub-Saharan Africa, but the claim may be extended to the Third World in general. Thus Chaliand follows Davidson in making Cabral and PAIGC genuinely revolutionary; he also adds China, Korea, Vietnam and Cuba as places where political and social revolution has occurred. We can note Chaliand's agreement with Davidson in respect of the distinction social/political, and of the crucial nature of the social struggle. The precise contents of Chaliand's list we will not debate. There is a further matter to note, and this is the manner in which revolutionary struggle in the Third World was taken on board by the New Left.

The clue has been offered by Birnbaum: the circumstances of war. The experiences of Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba are central to the manner of cooption by the New Left of the experience of groups in the Third World. Chaliand treats it as myth making; he observes "A sort of Third World euphoria began to be felt at the close of the 1950's, during the Algerian war, and it was soon given a boost by the radical turn of events in the Cuban revolution in 1960-61. . . . . . the Algerian revolution', geographically so close to Europe, came to symbolize the anticolonialist struggle" (32). In the case of Vietnam: "The war in Vietnam embodies the very model of the Third World myth: a war of the people victoriously resisting the most powerful imperialism" (33). Cuba is seen as the source of the 'ludicrously voluntarist' theories of the guerilla foco, propounded by Guevara and Debray. In sum, we may say that it would seem to
be the case that the pervasive activism of the New Left, when confronted with genuinely relevant events, in the lurid light of the circumstance of brutal warfare, issued in an anguished, and inevitably over-emphatic, cooption of the proffered lessons. The quixotic behaviour of Guevara provided the excuse for fixing in place a romantic interpretation of events; hence Chaliand's 'myth'.

Of the myth, Chaliand notes, "Third Worldism saw the revolutionary potential of the Third World as deriving from two main factors: on the one hand, the grinding, humiliating poverty of the masses, and the contradictions that produced it, and on the other hand, the crisis that could not fail to erupt in industrial countries, once revolutionary regimes put a stop to their pillage of Third World materials" (34). He adds that "Third Worldism was a phenomenon born of the crisis of Stalinism and fed by a policy of peaceful coexistence. It prospered in the 1960's because of the new hopes in the spread of socialist revolution in and by the Third World. But it has turned out to be a myth" (35). Myth it may have been, and Chaliand's argument is persuasive. Yet this is not to say that the original impulse to embrace these novel contributions to theorizing/reforming mature capitalism were wrongheaded. They were not, as we see below.

Our general interest in Section Four is in identifying the proper nature of a marxian analysis of the Third World. It would be appropriate to begin with the efforts most closely associated with the general renewal of interest in marxian scholarship: theorists associated with or embraced by the New Left. This will be our point of departure for considering some of the various post-war efforts to present a marxian analysis of the Third World.
3.0 Dynamic of Theory I: New Left theorizing and the Third World.

Young, who argues that "...it would be quite erroneous to suppose that the NL was ever a marxist movement..." (36), tends to follow Chaliand in regarding the cooption by the New Left of struggles in the Third World as (at best) ill-advised. He is less sympathetic to the root of the interest than is Chaliand; though ironically his style of enquiry ought to make it easy to answer the question of why the cooption was attempted, because he uses sociology of knowledge descriptions and concerns himself with how the New Left constructed their ideological efforts. Young reports that: "Factually and ideologically the division between the urban advanced sector and peasant society was a world wide division that cut across national boundaries. An imagery was needed to express this opposition, and the images of Fanon and Mao were combined with dreams of a Third World peasant revolution strangling and dispossessing the exploitative metropolitan areas. In the West this was an imagery compounded of romanticism, guilt, compassion and pure misunderstanding about the relationship between the peasants and their liberators.... The character of these superficial identifications can, it is also argued, be explained in their association with a more generalized attack on Western values, mounted both by the counter-culture and black American writers, in common with both African and Asian theorists and Western metropolitan intellectuals like Sartre" (37)

3.1 Are these significant analogies

We may begin a reply to Young's dismissive line by enquiring into the similarities between New Left and Third World work and circumstances. Are there significant analogies upon which the attempted cooption might be seen to have been based, or was the whole episode simply and essentially a fatuous passing intellectual fashion? Above (in 2.2) we offered general remarks relevant to this question; here we are trying to be a little more specific. The following would seem to be
the central analogies: (i) the struggle against a repressive and unjustifiable authority; (ii) the centrality of the task of social reform; (iii) the creative revision of marxian/democratic/socialist theorems. We shall consider each of these areas of analogy in turn, and refute Young's claims that the attempted cooption was foolish. (Our position, however, is a comment upon one aspect of the occasion of renewal of interest in marxian scholarship, and not a commitment to Third Worldism).

(i) The struggle against a repressive and unjustifiable authority. That this circumstance holds (or held) in the colonized territories ought not to be in doubt. With Davidson in the case of Africa, and Frank in the case of Latin America, we have seen the suggestion that the history of the exchange of rich and poor nations has been one of the largely unprincipled exploitation of the latter by the former. An exchange that Davidson and Frank report issued in the complete destruction of pre-contact social forms and the absorption of the native population into colonial forms of life. Fanon (recalling the style of our Chapter Five characterization of the options open to the colonial power confronted by 'nationalist developmentalism') characterizes the relationship of colonial power and native thus: "The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations" (38). Fanon goes on to distinguish between the circumstances of the exercise of power in metropolitan and colonial areas: "In the capitalist countries a multitude of moral teachers, counsellors and 'bewilders' separate the exploited from those in power. In the colonial countries on the contrary the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force" (39). The bifurcation of the colonial world is absolute: "This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by
two different species" (40). Fanon treats the matter of repression: that the colonial authorities' behaviour is unjustifiable he takes to be luminously self-evident, and we can follow the historians we have cited and grant that claim. The question that is crucial is: to what extent can it be argued that the mass of the people in the rich nations stand in relation to their rulers as the natives to the colonial authorities? This is the claimed analogy.

In New Left sources, the slenderness of the analogy is granted (tacitly) insofar as notions of repression are presented less in terms of economic disparities and mechanisms of force and more in cultural terms. Thus we have notions of, say, 'repressive tolerance' or the 'engineering of consent'. The precise extent and nature of the comparison's inplausibility as an analogy is a matter for debate. At the most general level it may be observed, both that the majority in the nations of the West do inhabit an inegalitarian, unequal, class society, and that their absolute level of living is far superior to that of the mass of people in the UDC's. The resemblance seems to be one of form rather than substance. On the other hand the issue is easier to tackle in respect of the linked point about justifiability, since this is more of a formal matter anyway. That the behaviour of the colonial authorities is (was) unjustifiable we granted above. What then of the theorems of legitimation presented in and for the rich nations? Here we can observe that the balance of the argument lies heavily in the left's favour. The New Left's critique of the pretensions to liberal scholarship of Western universities are a case in point; the critique of the slide from scholarship to expertise is clearly of continuing relevance. More generally the justifying theorems of Western nations - 'liberal democracy' - have been effectively demolished by Macpherson whose arguments we rehearsed in chapter two. In the case of the justifiability of authority in metropolitan and colonial areas, the analogy is to our mind a significant one.
(ii) The centrality of the task of social reform. This point requires that we make clear the distinctions between the stances of the New Left and the reformist or social democratic left on the one hand, and on the other, between episodes of decolonization and revolutionary wars of liberation.

Young distinguishes between an 'old' New Left and a 'new' New Left. One could associate the 'old' New Left with the bourgeois nationalist episodes of decolonization. Hargreaves apparently does this when he speaks of the disappointment of those who looked to fruitful collaboration (seen above, 2.2). Pursuing this line we would then wish to associate the 'new' New Left with the experience of the revolutionary wars of liberation. But this might be held to involve a wrong association, based upon an unjustifiable fusion of 'old' New Left and reformist elements. Both the 'old' and the 'new' New Left looked to both social and political change. But as Davidson has argued, in respect of the African situation, the coincidence of interest on the part of nationalist elites and impoverished masses was brief and unusual. The interests of those two colonial groups are taken to be divergent. Thus the disillusionment of the reformers is explained (41); as is the attention given by the New Left to the wars of liberation, where mass social reform is made integral to political activity.

Davidson treats these matters in broad historical terms. Distinguishing the 'few' and the 'many', he observes of the populist nationalist movements of the early post second world war years that "...this convergence of the 1950's between struggle for nationhood ... ...and struggle for social gains ... occurred as a mutual opportunism"(42). This gap then opens up. Davidson is unsurprised, and compares the post-independence confusion of Africa with the period following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He concludes: "Once again it was shown that this way of solving the national problem could not solve the social problem; that the
colonial state turned nation state could not be usefully reformed, but must be revolutionized; and that, only a clear priority to the solving of the social problem by whatever means the future might reveal, would be able to fulfill the promises of national freedom" (43). This affirmation of the centrality of the 'social problem'—that is, of the circumstances of the mass as opposed to the elite—is seen by Davidson as the core of the politics of liberation: the abandonment of notions of elite-ordered modernization, and the acknowledgment that the genuine pursuit of democracy would entail sharp revisions of conception and strategy. Davidson says: "This new politics could be called the politics of mass participation. Increasingly as it continued to unfold it became known as the politics of liberation" (44).

Davidson's list of those states attempting new departures has been noted; so too has Chaliand's scepticism. Thus Chaliand reports that the "...term socialism has been widely abused" (45). There have been many bourgeois revolutions and "...these regimes differ markedly from the three or four really radical revolutions that have occurred in the Third World since the end of World War Two: in China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba" (46). This however seems to be a difficult line of enquiry. Sets of lists can always be disputed, the more so when those nation states likely to be listed are also those where any changes in policies are going to be accompanied by elaborate revisions of justificatory schemas. What we want to take from all this is the association of democracy in the Third World with 'liberation politics', which attempts to fuse matters of social reform and political organisation. There is undoubtedly such a distinction to be drawn, and for the present this is all we need. Just how and where it should be drawn in practice need not detain us. Rather, we ask: how plausible is the analogy between such New Left-cited 'liberation politics' and the nature of New Left political activity and doctrinal statement?

Youngs work shows how confused was the brew
of social criticism labelled the New Left. We can pick out some elements. Thus organisationally and generationally there is "...a vision of young activists facing middle aged quietist leaderships, permeated by compromise and opportunism"(47). Young picks out the SNCC and Committee of 100 as key groups in the New Left, and of them reports that neither "...believed in compromise; both believed in merging aims and methods, including the use of participatory democracy in meetings. Both were infused with an anarchistic spirit of decentralism, direct action at centres of power, propaganda of the deed, non cooperation with unjust laws, and symbolic revolution"(48). The movement regarded itself as a community and as an alternative in embryo. Young goes on: "The dominant NL themes of the mid-1960's were those which linked decentralization and community decision making in a participatory democracy"(49).

With the New Left there is an internal/external distinction that can be tentatively made in order to help grasp what they were about. Thus the 'internal' aspect of their line was the 'existentialist' insistence on authenticity. All the while, with the New Left, political action was interpreted as integral to life in general; 'personal liberation' was taken to be firmly bound up with 'social liberation', and political activity ordinarily understood was removed from the centre of the stage. We may compare this with, say, Fanon on the social-psychological redemptive value of revolutionary violence - when the black revolutionist kills a white settler he destroys two men etc. Or again, Debray's elucidation of the dictum that 'it is the duty of the revolutionary to make the revolution'. Nonetheless, political action ordinarily understood (albeit reworked) is fully present in the New Left, and here is the 'external' aspect. Thus the New Left as a political movement pursues notions of community/participation/democracy in the areas of civil rights and poverty programs, in university reform and in the anti-war movement. Similarly the guerilla movements pursue a goal of independent and democratic statehood. States of affairs rather than states of mind.
The analogy invoked, or claimed, equates 'liberation' in the colonial or neo-colonial territories, with its concern for the 'social question', with 'participatory democracy' and libertarian/socialist ideas about people taking control of their own lives. The analogy would seem to be a good one.

(iii) The creative revision of democratic/socialist/marxian theorems. Cranston, touching upon this issue, remarks that "...this association of the New Left with the reformulation of Marxism may account in part for its appeal"(50). This seems to be a grudging acknowledgement of the obvious. More informative is Young's report that, "It is rather amongst the dissident communists of the West ...... that the intellectual origins of the New Left are usually first discerned. Politically isolated and alone, searching for a third way beyond the 'empty cant' of current liberalism, and the Marxist-Stalinist orthodoxies, some vacillated closer to Anarchism and Pacifism" (51). Young regards this searching as issuing in a catholic internationalism, and notes that "In particular Third World movements did not seem to be slavishly following previous revolutionary models"(52). Here then is one acknowledgement of a clear similarity between New Left and liberation movements: both affirmed notions of democracy/socialism/marxism, and both offered substantial revisions to the established orthodoxies.

This is a claim that can either be left at this simple level or extended into a detailed debate. We will leave any consideration of the revisions made by Fanon and Debray until later; here we can note that both are taken to be idiosyncratic in their marxism(s). Thus of Fanon Caute says that "[he] was not a marxist in any traditional sense"(53). Blackburn, noting the influence of Cuba on Debray argues that "What above all distinguishes these writings is their relentlessly Leninist focus on making the revolution, as a political technical and military problem"(54).

As regards the New Left, we have seen that Young takes them to be non-marxian and follows Straterra in regarding
The decline of the New Left as associated with its turning toward Marxian formulations. Young discusses the available languages of dissent and takes Marxism as ready made. He argues thus: "The NL has often been interpreted as a further revision of Marxist ideas. ....... of course any search for a new revolutionary strategy had inevitably involved dialogue with Marx, as well as Lenin's and various other European revisionisms. But it would be quite erroneous to suppose that the NL was ever a 'Marxist' movement - even after 1968" (56). Young grants its interest but feels that, "...the principal impression remaining is of wide ranging ideological eclecticism" (56). This lack of any clear and coherent self-image is cited as the root cause of the eventual collapse of the New Left. Young continues, "The crude conceptualizations that later emerged, the piecemeal strategies, were an inevitable counterpart to the anti-intellectualism, pragmatism and moralism of the movement; as a result they left a vacuum that would be filled by concepts and strategies drawn from dated or external models" (57). Hence the collapse into Marxism. In reply we can note that, even granting all the diffuseness of the New Left elements, if it had a core then that core was a libertarian Marxist humanism. Claiming otherwise is simply tendentious, and indeed this last quotation from Young rather tends to contradict the earlier ones cited above.

If we compare the revisions to respective orthodoxies on the part of the New Left and Fanon/Debray, we get something like the following: presented diagramatically.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revision</th>
<th>Fanon/Debray</th>
<th>New Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>Orthodox CP line dropped in favour of vanguardist activism.</td>
<td>Orthodox political channels ignored in favour of direct action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Orthodox ambiguity dropped in favour of a central affirmation of role of violence.</td>
<td>Un-orthodox direct action becomes increasingly violent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency of Change</td>
<td>Proletariat dropped in favour of peasantry and lumpenproletariat.</td>
<td>Proletariat dropped in favour of marginal groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation and strategy</td>
<td>Military/political are fused, and liberation is to be formative for the new nation.</td>
<td>Means exemplify ends: the monolithic party is eschewed for anarchistically diffuse activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moralism</td>
<td>Voluntarist making of the socialist revolution Redemptive violence of zero sum game.</td>
<td>Self and social liberation are taken to be inter-linked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicality</td>
<td>Cuba/Algeria focus</td>
<td>University/anti-war focus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On these bases the claimed analogy between 'liberation politics' and New Left efforts must be seen to be plausible. It is here that the general renewal of interest in marxian scholarship and radical interest in the Third World coincided. From this point the marxian interest in the Third World generated its own momentum, so to say; and from here on the material we treat becomes increasingly specialist and increasingly technical. Now as this matter of the revision of Marx is of general interest to us, we will consider further those revisions effected by the early theorists of the Third World, Fanon and Debray. In addition to the issue of the production of circumstance-relevant general statements, attempted by Fanon and Debray, we must note that the particular notion of 'learning the lessons of experience' will exercise us.

3.2 Theorists, practitioners, interpreters: Fanon and Debray

3.2.1. We may now turn to the doctrines of these early theorists of the circumstances of the Third World. We begin by noting that both Debray and Fanon (58) are reporting on the lessons of experience. With Dobb we presented one unpacking of the view that social-theorizing was essentially a matter of the construc-
tion of ideological schemas. We made use of a model of the theorist which permitted analysis of social-theoretic efforts under the four headings of milieu, demand, resources and product. The theorist was presented as responding to political demands to provide interpretive guides to action. This raises, familiarly, questions of validation and notions of a process theory of truth. But also it is evident that if we regard theorizing as a social activity then we can introduce matters pertaining to time-scales. Theory and event can be related in more than one fashion (59). With Dobb (reading him naively) we have the following implied scheme: (A) circumstances; (B) produced theory; (C) event, called forth by theory-informed action; (D) new circumstance.

Continuing in this simple fashion, another way in which theory and event may be related is presented by the case of Debray, who is taken by Minogue to be the exponent of the Cuban revolutionary process. The distinctive revisions of Marx that are made here revolve around the practical activity of being a revolutionary. Minogue comments: "It is here - in the area where theory is related to practice - that the Cuban revolution has made its major contribution to Marxism" (60). Minogue goes on to explain as follows; "Che's Marxism, like everything else about him, is concrete and practical. We hear little about historical epochs and very little analysis of class relations. We do hear a great deal about the guerilla. Developed into a theory (61) the guerilla generates the idea of the foco, the process of revolutionary detonation by which a small band of guerillas set up a centre of attraction in the sierra and bring the capitalist or neo-colonialist regimes to its knees. It is essential to this theory, certainly as developed by Debray that the foco be regarded as simultaneously military and political" (62).

Minogue reports that those who generalize from the case of Cuba use 'inductive reasoning' and produce false theories as a result. Minogue argues thus: if we see marxism as a social phenomenon then its history is marked by its heretics. They are the ones who have disregarded established party lines and gone ahead and
forged new schemes of revolution. This is seen as presenting the problem of general theoretical interpretation: "...each change has been followed by a development of theory which purports to learn the lessons of the new experience"(63). Now clearly learning these lessons is a real task, and thus Minogue has a genuine point. Yet he hints that the task is of adapting dogma (where this is taken in its usual pejorative sense) to new circumstances. Arguing thus begs the interesting question of how these lessons are learnt.

Debray reports on his own efforts as follows: "We are never completely contemporaneous with our present. History advances in disguise; it appears on stage wearing the mask of the preceding scene, and we tend to lose the meaning of the play. Each time the curtain rises continuity has to be re-established. The blame, of course, is not history's, but lies in our vision, encumbered with memory and images learned in the past. We see the past superimposed on the present, even when the present is a revolution"(64). Now if we compare this with our presentation of Dobb then clearly Debray is emphasising the 'retrospective' aspect of theorizing. This is concerned with making sense after the event; whereas Dobb's schema was forward-looking, whilst invoking the past as an inevitable/enabling jumping-off point. Debray in contrast lays a heavier stress on the idea of a 'conventional wisdom'. On the radical intellectual as potential guerilla. Debray recalls Castro's view; thus, "...the intellectual will try to grasp the present through preconceived ideological constructions and live it through books. He will be less able than others to invent, improvise, make do with available resources, decide instantly on bold moves when he is in a tight spot. Thinking that he already knows he will learn more slowly, display less flexibility"(65). Two points are involved here; one, the matter of the requisite flexibility of mind required to interpret the lessons proffered by events; and, two, the matter of the imaginative innovation of the practitioner faced with
responding to, rather than interpreting, events.

If we distinguish between the roles of, on the one hand, interpreters, and on the other, theorists and practitioners, then we can present the following schema. Thus, the revision of theory after the fact of revolution is, it seems, the interpreters' task. Revision of theory before or during the revolutionary change belongs to the theorist and practitioner respectively. Minogue fails to make this distinction, and he also offers a wrong criticism. Thus he claims: "The Russians, the Chinese, the Yugoslavs and the Cubans have all indulged in this exercise. Its logic is of course inductive. It consists in transposing the most striking facts of the successful experience into abstract terms and generating theory from them" (66). This is false; if the 'learning' is done crudely then the argument-strategy may be taken as inductive, but not the logic. A general objection to inductive reasoning will not invalidate lessons drawn from the experience simply because the elements of the experience picked out will be selected in the light of established theorizing. The 'learning' is not simply inductive. Indeed, returning to Minogue's 'adapting dogma' jibe, we can reply that it might be better to see this sort of 'learning' exercise—with say the case of Debray, with its detailed elucidation/celebration of the Cuban episode—as casuistry. Indeed at one point Debray quotes Althusser, "Marxists know that no tactic is possible which does not rest on some strategy and no strategy which does not rest on some theory" (67). It might be said that this sentiment rather seems to go against the above noted emphases; a little like a denial of the role of spontaneity, novelty, or plain fluke in practical activity, in order to speed the re-absorption of the novel into the established canon. Althusserian idealism and Cuban voluntarism sit uneasily in Debray. Nonetheless these remarks do confirm the point that 'learning the lessons of experience' involves an accommodating adjustment to general conceptions, and not any simple process of the elaboration of a revised set of generalizations.
If Fanon and Debray interpreted their respective experiences of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, then we may ask: given that the term 'casuistry' implies accommodating doctrinal revisions, just what revisions of marxian work do they propose?

On the part of Guevara/Debray, taken as representatives for the Cuban revolutionary experience, we have already had occasion to note Minogue's summary: "It is here—in the area where theory is related to practice—that the Cuban revolution has made its major contribution to Marxism" (68). Let us turn to the work of Debray and consider this contribution. We may note, incidentally, that Minogue reports that this contribution ".. was brought to its fullest maturity in the writings of Regis Debray" (69); and Blackburn too observes that "Debray is a faithful mirror of Cuban Marxism" (70). Debray is evidently an appropriate subject for us, the more so in view of Blackburn's report that "Debray left France in the early 'sixties partly because of the hopelessness and corruption of the French Left—underlined by the abject role of the French CP during the Algerian war. In the event he has contributed significantly to the re-birth of a revolutionary left in Europe and North America by making available to them the experience of the Latin American guerrillas" (71).

We may begin this brief treatment of Debray by noting his thoroughgoing practical intent. He is concerned both to interpret and learn the lessons of Cuba and to present the actions/theories of the revolutionists as practical activity. Blackburn notes this, speaking of Debray's 'technics': a detailed concern for the nuts and bolts of insurrection. But the matter is also slightly broader. Debray is concerned to interpret the Cuban experience; so the 'history', as it were, is central and thereafter links are made to established areas of debate. Debray is to be understood as interpreting the experience of Cuba to us, and not as proposing some set of doctrinal revisions 'contrived by abstract reflection.
We can see this in the case of the matters of violence and voluntarism. In the case of violence Debray says: "In semi-colonial countries, even more than in developed capitalist countries the State poses the decisive political problem" (72). Hitherto that problem has been approached via the coup d'état, or by mass insurrectionary activity. Debray reads Castroism as having solved the problem of the appropriate strategy of active revolutionary action in Latin America; presented as the theory of the guerilla-foco. He argues as follows: "To sum up: the entire apparatus of organised violence belongs to the enemy. The violence with which the people can strike back, 'mass action', is easily dismantled by the enemy's organised violence. A military coup can overnight pulverize democratic parties, trade unions, the combativity of the masses and their hope; the Brazilian example [presumably the 1964 coup] is valid for the whole continent. What then is to be done?" (73).

The foregoing presents Debray's report of the Fidelists' appreciation of the particular circumstances of Cuba, and arguably of Latin America generally. It poses the central, crucial, issue of the appropriate creative response. Debray continues: "To Lenin's question, Fidelism replies in terms which are similar..... Under an autocratic regime: only a minority organisation of professional revolutionaries, theoretically conscious and practically trained in all the skills of their profession can prepare a successful outcome for the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In Fidelist terms, this is the theory of the foco, of the insurrectionary centre" (74).

§23: If we turn to consider Fanon's work, in particular 'The Wretched of the Earth', we note immediately that it grows out of the experience of the Algerian war of independence. Caute reports that "Algeria had belonged to France since 1830 and it was colonized in depth" (75). When in 1957 the socialist premier Mollet gave way to nationalist pressures "...the scene was set for total war......which spread from Algeria to France itself,
decimated the Algerian people, brought down the Fourth Republic and raised the spectre of military rule or fascism in France" (76). In 'The Wretched of the Earth' Fanon offers a general treatment of the Third World that is didactic, allusive, exhortative, "diagnostic" as Worsley has it (77); and which is steeped in Sartrean existentialism. Caute notes that "the wide canvas of the Third World is filled in with sweeping strokes of a brush exclusively dipped in African paint....The Algerian revolution is implicitly treated as a model for all of Africa" (78).

So much for the general occasion of theorizing; if we now note its character in terms of its appreciation of its circumstances and its response thereto, we have the following. (I) Fanon analyses the colonial scene in terms of a radical bifurcation of society; as we have seen, he speaks of "this world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species" (79). (II) Significant change is taken as a zero sum game. It extends to the notions of 'truth' and 'goodness'; here Fanon argues "Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime.... In this colonialist context there is no truthful behaviour: and the good is quite simply that which is evil for 'them'" (80). (III) Fanon proposes action be ordered around the revolutionary potential of the rural peasantry and the urban poor.

The reasons behind the affirmation of the need for violent revolution are twofold. First, this bifurcation of society leaves all weapons in the hands of the colonial power. There is a straightforwardly repressive government facing the indigenous people; there is, it might otherwise be said, no area of 'civil society'. Secondly, Fanon notes the ease of cooption of elite nationalists by the colonial regime entails that, if there is to be progress, it needs must be achieved by violent means. Thus whilst granting the usual Leninist requirements vis a vis the state, Fanon goes on to lay heavy stress on the unsatisfactory character of the indigenous nationalist parties. Caute reports this as
the last step in Fanon's evolution as a social-philosopher: thus, "First he had assailed prejudice and mystification; then he had turned his fire against colonialism itself; now he recognised that decolonisation would only be authentically revolutionary if it was also authentically socialist" (81). The requirement of violence is derived, it appears, from the experience of radicals becoming absorbed by neo-colonial circumstances and from his appreciation of the character of colonial Algeria. Thereafter it seems violence is embraced as redemptive.

Fanon's proposals resemble Debray's: the nationalist party will sooner or later throw off its genuine radicals, and these will discover a home with the rural population. Fanon celebrates the peasantry as the true source of revolutionary power and plots their course through revolutionary war. We can here quote at length: "The nationalist militant who has fled from the town in disgust at the demagogic and reformist manoeuvres of the leaders there, disappointed by political life, discovers in real action a new form of political activity which in no way resembles the old. These politics are the politics of leaders and organisers living inside history who take the lead with their brains and their muscles in the fight for freedom. These politics are national, revolutionary and social and these new facts which the native will come to know exist only in action. They are the essence of the fight which explodes the old colonial truths and reveals unexpected facets, which brings out new meanings and pinpoints the contradictions camouflaged by these facts. The people engaged in the struggle who because of it command and know these facts go forward, freed from colonialism and forewarned of all attempts at mystification, inoculated against all national anthems. Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the keys to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there's nothing but a fancy dress parade and the blare of trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of readaption, a
few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly marking time"(82).

3.24 We can now offer a comparative summary of the themes of Fanon and Debray.
(1) The Fidelist appreciation of the character of the Third World state is echoed by Fanon. The power of the ruling group is centred on the state and there is no effective diffusion of power through 'civil society'. The Fidelist reaction to this autocracy is shared by Fanon: insurrectionary guerrilla violence and the affirmation of home grown models of action. Thus Debray, arguing that the foco is the paradigm of an answer to the problem of the state in Latin America, goes on to insist upon the locally developed links of military and political activity. He is at pains to distinguish it from imported models which are not derived from the Cuban experience, and which have not proved successful. Fanon too insists upon local circumstance-relevant solutions. In criticising the bourgeois nationalist parties, he observes: "The notion of the party is a notion imported from the mother country. This instrument of modern political warfare is thrown down just as it is, without the slightest modification, upon real life with all its infinite variations and lacks of balance"(83).

(2) Having made this fundamental appraisal, much of the rest is a matter of tactics. Here Debray offers the detail whilst Fanon contents himself with the broadest of sketches. For Fidelism this concerns the role of the guerrilla foco; the 'small motor' that occasions the activity of the 'big motor' of the masses. Fanon too offers a vanguardist schema, involving radical groups splintering from the nationalist party and finding their allies (and the agent of change) in the rural peasantry. In Fanon's work there is no counterpart to Debray's 'technics'; the language is more general.

(3) Debray and Fanon resemble each other on the related point of the dismissal of established radical views and
groups. Thus Debray rejects not only 'putschism' and 'mass action' but also the line of the CP's in regard to the preliminary construction of a bourgeois nationalist state. Fanon follows this, and both condemn established and orthodox aspirant rulers as incompetent to the task of initiating autonomous national development. (4) Both Fanon and Debray concern themselves wholly with the pursuit of socialism. The circumstances of their theorizing are such that the process with which they are concerned can be treated as a zero sum game: hence the 'black and white' style of their work. The corollary of this is their 'practicality': both are absorbed in the circumstances of their respective struggles, and general discussions of the conditions of successful action. The realm of the 'orthodox left', the pursuit of a marxian science of the social is, in their work, muted. That the Cuban and Algerian revolutions in fact represent 'creative responses' is taken as evident from their success. Explanations of the conditions for success of insurrections do not go far beyond a description of the circumstances of which they treat the histories.

3.3 Summary note

Against Young, it is clear that the disposition of the New Left thinkers to attempt the cooption of the 'liberation struggles' to their own efforts was based on significant analogies in respect both of circumstances and of analyses attempted. The events/theorizing in the Third World provided a ready stock of 'examples' that could be drawn upon to illuminate the nature of politics and the lines of attack upon the status quo. We have looked at three such analogies: that of the struggle against repressive and unjustifiable authority; that of the affirmation of the centrality of social reform; and, finally, the creative revision of socialist-democratic/marxian themes. Given the general interests of this study, the matter of the third analogy was of particular interest.

Fanon and Debray we took to present circumstance-
particular efforts of interpretive writing; though both shade off into presenting work that is of the practitioner (partly this is a matter of their own involvement and partly of their reception by wider, western audiences, perhaps). Neither Fanon and Debray (85), nor the New Left, offer any systematically elaborated revision of marxian theory. Young indeed presents it as a crucial failing of the New Left that it never established its own distinct critical language, and instead rested content with the ad hoc adoption of ready made marxian notions.

Subsequent work (in particular, we now treat 'development' and 'Third World' work rather than New Left efforts) has attempted a more systematic and coherent revision of Marx. We may note that given that the New Left did regenerate an interest in Marx, the scholarly efforts at revision/exposition/cooption have been widespread in the 'social sciences'. These general and widespread debates we will not attempt to review. Rather, again, we narrow our interest to 'development-studies'. That our focus has become rather more 'technical' than above is further evidenced in the material we consider. Whereas Fanon and Debray were both (a) anticipators of our technical area of interest and (b) acknowledged influences on the New Left as a whole, the figures of Baran, Sweezy and Frank (to indicate some key writers) are known mainly to the members of the specialist disciplines which treat development matters. In sum, this chapter now shifts from treating widely noted activists to treating comparatively unknown theorists, and more particularly, western academic-based scholars.

The issue of the nature of a 'presently relevant marxism' is here pursued as a theoretical matter; that is, not another exercise informed by the sociology of knowledge. With 'development-studies' the period sees: (a) the occasion of the presentation of the claims of the 'neo-marxists' (to have established a marxian political economy of mature capitalism and of the system's peripheral areas, the Third World); and (b) a variety of denials
of these claims, where these denials revolve around the contention that the 'neo-marxists' are not really marxists at all. We pursue these matters in part 4.

4.0 Dynamic of Theory II: 'neo-marxism'

4.1 From activists to scholars

In terms of the material we have to treat in this subsection, the most striking change from what has gone before, is this: whereas we have been concerned primarily with activists, now we are faced with scholars. This distinction might at first glance seem to be somewhat arbitrary, serving only to note a trivial fact in respect of the biographies of the various writers whose work we look at. Yet it is of rather more interest, and concomitantly more defensible, if we recall our remarks on the temporal relation of the engaged subject to his particular objects. Here we distinguished between: theorists, where we read Dobb naively as making theorists operate 'before the fact': that is, as preparing recipes for action that were subsequently to be followed; practitioners, who we took to be those activists whose very behaviour occasions renewal in established canons of thought (here the example of the Cuban experience was to the fore) and interpreters, who we took to be those writers concerned to learn the lessons of such practical experience: we instanced Debray. Now given this, by using the notion 'scholar' we are presenting, it seems, a variation of the idea of 'interpreter'. We are implicitly distinguishing the circumstances of an 'interpreter' who to a greater or lesser degree shares the experiences of those people whose activity he attempts to interpret (the slide of role is towards that of spokesman); and an 'interpreter' who does not directly share the experience of those whom he writes about (the slide of role is towards commentator). The 'scholar' belongs to this second category. To put this another way: it is one thing to tramp around the jungle with people whose action you are trying to interpret to those you think will be sympathetic; but it is quite another thing to discuss in the comfort of (say) a university study those self-same people, even if
it is done with equivalent sympathy and interpretive intent.

The material we treat in this section is, generally, that of scholars. In particular it is the work of anglophone academics. Just what the full implications of this 'reminder' might be taken to be have not thus far been discovered. Evidently it involves our disposition to consider the role of the academic social theorist in the context of the schema of social theorizing as involving the construction, criticism and comparative ranking of ideological schemes. These three are all tasks that can be plausibly allocated to the 'liberal academic', and if we invoke Habermas' notion of an 'ideal speech situation' then it can be seen that the critical role could count as a practical contribution to the pursuit of democracy.

Putting a gloss on these remarks, it could be said that whilst it is a familiar injunction in marxian writing to remember that theorizing should be concrete and historically specific, it is rather less obviously remembered that theorizing is both a concrete and historically specific activity. In this light it is possible to distinguish between what it makes sense for one theorist to say and what it makes sense for another to say, simply by virtue of their particular circumstances. Arising from this, and noted below, is the matter of the 'slide to the general' that seems to occur in (some) academic marxian scholarship. Deference is paid, so it seems, to some model of 'properly marxian behaviour', where this tends to collapse all radical activity into the one mould of 'marxian revolution making'. This has the effect of suppressing reflexivity of theorizing. Thus, for example, we get hugely elaborate, technical, scholarly analyses of this or that issue which then conclude in a relatively few pages or paragraphs that this or that is the proper political course. (See for example Brenner). There seems to be a crucial disjunction between behaviour, praxis (which in this case is the pursuit of scholarship), and prescriptions for action (which in the case of those affirming the model of 'properly marxian behaviour' looks like a generalized recipe of class war).
Reflexivity in theorizing, which here we are taking as an injunction for the theorist to locate himself and argue accordingly, would seem to entail that there can properly be a diversity of contributions to the pursuit of democracy. The corollary is that the 'liberal academic' should pursue critical theorizing because that is what is appropriate to academic practice.

We can offer a few examples of what we have in mind, by way of illustration. It is clear that this change in the basic character of the discussions referred to in our enquiries has been noted. Negatively, it is invoked by Young when he criticises the New Left for: (1) facile borrowings of revolutionary models from liberation struggles — the Black Panthers being perhaps the 'best' example of a group that failed to consider its own circumstances and the scope of the practical activity open to it; (2) a catholicity of interest that led to the movement collapsing under the weight of its own amorphousness; and (3) the failure to construct an autonomous, self-locating and ordering, explanatory frame. In sum Young regards the New Left as never knowing where they were, what they were doing, or where they were going. Conversely, others have taken a more positive view. Thus Foster-Carter distinguishes 'marxism-as-theory' from 'marxism-as-history'; which permits, amongst other things, the pointing up of the fact that different concerns attach to the practice of abstract theorizing as opposed to practical 'politicising'. So Foster-Carter distinguishes, for example, between the historical situation of revolutionary struggle in the post-second world war period, on the one hand; and on the other, academic efforts to make sense of it. He notes "...neo-marxism as an academic phenomenon is largely a response to the way in which people like Mao and Ho have changed the world..." (86).

In certain cases we can see the vacillation between claims to the role of scholar and claims to the role of activist. Typically these involve the 'slide to the general' we mentioned above. We see that the academics
exemplify their circumstances in their work. For instance Brenner offers a detailed critique of the argument-strategy of the 'neo-marxian' work of Baran, Frank and Wallerstein. This seems appropriate, though at the end of this impressive essay Brenner offers a series of concluding remarks that fudge the distinctions that we are trying to point up. He slides from exemplifying his circumstances (by presenting detailed historically informed work), which entails some view of the contribution to the pursuit of democracy open to the scholar, to apparently denying the specific character of his position and efforts by suggesting that his work be judged according to how it measures up to some implied general model of the proper behaviour of the 'marxian revolutionary'.

Another example of this 'exemplification/denial' movement can be found in Taylor's (87) critique of Foster-Carter. Taylor conducts a detailed critique of Foster-Carter, which we can best regard as 'second order' analysis, internal to the discipline. The concern Taylor displays for precision in formulation of claims exemplifies his circumstances as an academic. Yet his notion of the contribution he is making to the pursuit of democracy vitiates this self-exemplification. Foster-Carter picks out Taylor's view that he, Taylor, is helping provide revolutionaries with the best possible, most advanced conceptual equipment. So a subtle and complex analysis is to be linked to practice in a crude mechanical fashion, one which implicitly grants that there is only one model of revolutionary change (88).

The change in the character of the discourses we must consider can be exemplified in the case of Frank. The 'early' and the 'late' Frank can be compared in manner and tone, as he rejigs his schemes in a fashion we can regard as rendering them compatible/coherent with his circumstances. Frank moves from tending to the role of spokesman toward that of commentator. The task presents itself as the pursuit of an autonomous theoretical base. In general terms, given the context of the recent
history of substantive work in this area, this pursuit presents itself as the attempt of 'dependency/UTT' to secure for itself an autonomous (Marx-derived) theoretical base.

The early work of Frank has been treated above (Ch 6). At that time we noted the circumstances of production of the work; that is, following Booth, that Frank was taken to have been abruptly won over to the radical left view following experience of Latin American conditions. We reported that Frank offered a polemical critique of an orthodoxy that encompassed neo-classical economics, the dependency line associated with ECLA, and the traditional Latin American CP lines. Affirming the principles of historical, holistic and structural analysis, Frank followed Baran in regarding the circumstances of the presently 'underdeveloped' as flowing from the debilitating metropolitan extraction of surplus from these long-integrated peripheries. The solution was the revolutionary removal of an historically incapable national bourgeoisie, and the socialist-governed pursuit of an autonomous national development.

In his later work (1978), Frank recalls that he has contributed to the formation of the 'dependency' school, and that his early efforts have been heavily criticised for tending to the economistic and lacking any genuinely dialectical analysis. Of the 1978 work, Frank says that it represents "an attempt to transcend the 'dependence' approach, but without yet abandoning it or the focus on underdevelopment, and to proceed towards the integration of dependence and underdevelopment within the world process of accumulation" (89). The book tackles a set of particular questions of analysis: issues occasioned by the criticism of the earlier work, though not flowing directly from them. The criticisms are treated in an introductory chapter that indicates Frank's line of research interest. Thus he declares, "This book and these introductory questions to it are an attempt to break out of the vicious circle of 'development theory'" (90). The hoped-for replacement is characterized in three ways. The first is by reference to
method: "To free ourselves from the irrelevance of narrowly limited neo-classical theory.....we may take the global historical vision of Adam Smith and the dialectical analysis of Karl Marx as points of departure in an attempt to advance toward a whole world encompassing holistic, real world historical, socially structural (and therefore in fact theoretically dialectical) theory of development and underdevelopment"(91). Secondly, as regards procedure, he says: "This will require the scientific examination of the historical evidence and record of capitalist development and the better reading(in the sense of Althusser) of Smith and Marx in the light of this evidence"(92). Thirdly, Frank indicates the expected manner of emergence of the product: "With this purpose and in this spirit we review the participation of Asia Africa and Latin America in this world wide historical process; and we emphasize the subordinate dependence of these areas within the process of world capitalist development as the cause of their development of under-development"(93).

If, in order to fix the position of this later work of Frank in relation to the earlier (characteristically 'UDT') efforts, we consider the nature of the procedures noted above, then what does it reveal? Clearly there is no general reconstruction being undertaken; there is no abstract consideration of the categorical framework of his effort. Rather he continues to use the syntax of the natural sciences: thus he seeks to revise his theories with a closer, more detailed reading of history in the light of concepts that are already established in his work—yet liable, he seems to claim, to re-location within a subtler frame derived from Smith and Marx.

Frank's recent work seems to represent an intellectual/political relocation. That which was characteristically Frankian is not so much lost as partially submerged. To put this another way, where Frank's earlier work grasped in one simplifying and synthesising effort the 'answer' in respect of Latin America, it now seems as if he is trying to work backwards, so to say, and discover
those arguments that establish the 'answer'. Yet the change of context introduces a subtle shift of emphasis. Frank seeks not to uncover the arguments specific to his 'answer' in respect of Latin America, but rather to uncover a set of arguments productive of a general answer'. In Frank's case the 'exemplification/denial' manoeuvre entailed by the pursuit of a general answer is made all the more easily by Frank's use of the syntax of natural science (94).

In sum: the discourse we now treat is that of (roughly speaking) scholars and not, as was the case, that of (roughly speaking) activists. Frank has exemplified this shift. He is an appropriate choice, not only for the intrinsic interest of the matters arising from his work, but more pertinently because his early (and indeed later) efforts constitute a familiar and central element of what must now be treated as the orthodoxy of this area of development studies—that is, 'neo-marxism'.

4.2 The contested core of 'neo-marxism'.

Thus far we have been considering the circumstances of the theorist, noting the general constraints that particular situations place upon what it makes sense for the theorist in question to say. Theorizing has been seen as a practical activity, and we have had little to say about its eventual object. Now we dismiss direct concern for the circumstances of theorizing—whether particular workers are taken as activists or scholars, and what difference it makes to them and to us—and we proceed to discuss their object, 'neo-marxism'. Our concern is now couched in terms of intellectual history. We look at resources invoked and matters arising therefrom.

We can begin with the useful essay by Palma on the character of 'dependency'. Palma is interested in asking whether or not 'dependency' is a theory or a method, and in pointing up its marxian background (95). Where Palma uses the term 'dependency' it embraces Frank, Furtado and Cardoso, so his usage is broader than the one adopted here.
Palma begins by noting the marxian programme of analysis of the development of capitalism; he asks after the term 'imperialism' and reports that he finds it "...absolutely legitimate to use the concept of imperialism to designate only those aspects of capitalist development which have related the fortunes of the advanced and backward areas within the world capitalist system"(96). Regarded thus (that is, taking note of the specific sense of 'imperialism' that Palma takes in order to get his treatment of 'dependency' underway), marxian interest in the relations between centre and periphery may be divided into three phases. Palma quotes Sutcliffe: "One (prominent in Marx's and Engels's writings) involves plunder (of wealth and slaves) and exports of capitalist manufactures to the peripheral countries. The second (uppermost in Lenin's writing) involves the export of capital, competition for supplies of raw materials and the growth of monopoly. The third involves a more complex post-colonial dependency"(98). Given these three phases in theorizing about the relationship of centre and periphery, Palma goes on to attach to each a particular view of the role of capitalism in backward nations. Thus for Marx and Engels capitalism appeared as a wholly progressive force, even if the process of dismantling moribund social forms was brutal and incidental to the exploitative interests of the colonial forces. For Lenin capitalism appears as progressive in underdeveloped areas, yet presently shackled by the demands of the centres. The eventual outcome expected is the peripheral development of a capitalism resembling that of the centres. Lenin's analysis is complex and is intertwined with debates on the possibilities for capitalism in Russia. It is the third reading of the role of capitalism in the peripheries that is of particular interest to us. "The third approach was first developed in the 1950's and 'took off' with the publication in 1957 of Baran's 'The political economy of growth'; it is characterized by the acceptance, almost as an axiomatic truth, of the argument that no Third World country can
now expect to break out of a state of economic dependency and advance to an economic position beside the major capitalist industrial powers" (99).

Palma, treating 'dependency' as a school of approaches to political-economy (where marxism is (a) the major school of political economy and (b) the most significant substantive school treating 'dependency' and Latin America), distinguishes three varieties of 'dependency' analysis: (1) Frank and notions of underdevelopment; (2) Furtado and ECLA revisions; and (3) Cardoso, who is characterized as trying to produce a non-mechanico-formal scheme. Now Furtado we have treated and Cardoso we will come to; here we look at the first, 'neo-marxian' line.

In regard to Frank and 'UTD', Palma offers a view that is more immediately familiar than the above noted subsumption of a marxian approach in the tradition of political economy. Palma reports that "There is no doubt that the 'father' of this approach is Paul Baran. His principal contribution to the general literature on development (Baran 1957) continues the central line of marxist thought regarding the contradictory character of the needs of imperialism and the process of industrialization and general economic development of the backward nations" (100). Along with Baran's work we need to mention Sweezy and Wallerstein, as well as Frank.

Briefly reviewing the efforts of these theorists we can thereby sketch the orthodoxy of this area of debate; that is, the 'neo-marxian' schema. Our review is ordered around some criticisms made of the 'neo-marxian' schema by those concerned with matters of theoretical status. That is, we construct the 'object' 'neo-marxism' with reference to those critics who specifically deny that, amongst other things, 'neo-marxism' is marxian. This seems an appropriate line, given our interest in what has been taken as, or is to count as, a properly marxian analysis of the Third World. Little of what we will say in respect of the constitution/criticism of 'neo-marxism' will be new. Discussion has been extensive, and here we rely upon it. First we will introduce
six overlapping and cross cutting criticisms made, and then we will go on to consider them in turn.

(1) We begin with the seminal work of Baran, who is concerned with the inadequacies of orthodox analyses to the phenomena of modern monopoly capitalism. The dynamic of capitalist development has issued in the system of monopoly capitalism. Oligopolistic competition characterizes the system: "...under oligopolistic conditions price competition is at a minimum, but firms still strive incessantly to reduce costs. The inevitable result is a strong and persistent tendency for the economic surplus to increase both absolutely and relatively as the system develops" (101). Monopoly capitalism is a self-contradictory system. It tends to generate ever more surplus, yet it fails to provide the consumption and investment outlets required for the absorption of a rising surplus and hence for the smooth working of the system"(102). The system drifts to stagnation. Efforts to stimulate demand (eg. armaments production) evidence the irrationality of the system. It is here, Culley reports, that Baran and Sweezy's criticisms begin; theirs is essentially a moral critique which revolves around the issue of the extent of realisation and allocation of societies' economic surplus. The evaluative moment of their theorizing is 'preliminary' to their economics: the model of rational realisation of surplus and its humane allocation is presented as the socialist planned economy. Other forms of society are measured according to how far they diverge from this model. Culley strongly disapproves of this line. Criticism number one: objections to moral critique.

(2) As regards underdevelopment: "The explanation for underdevelopment is to be found in an analysis of the development of European capitalism. Baran argues that it was the development of capitalism in the West which simultaneously produced 'underdevelopment' in Latin America, Asia and Africa, and it is the very existence
of the advanced countries today that prevents the economic development of the 'backward' countries"(103). The evolution of capitalism in Western Europe, according to Baran, depended crucially upon mercantile accumulation. This irruption of Western European mercantile trade initiated both capitalist development in centres and capitalist underdevelopment in peripheries: "Such overseas operations greatly increased the economic surplus of Western Europe. The increase in surplus came into the hands of capitalists who could use it for investment purposes. The effects of the extraction of the surplus from the 'donor' countries provided the basis for underdevelopment"(104). The situation of underdevelopment continues and is explained, on Culley's exegesis, by reference to the use of the available surplus. Thus "The main cause of continued underdevelopment is not simply the 'irrational' use of the actual surplus, but the way in which their potential economic surplus is used......It is absorbed by various forms of excess consumption by the upper classes, by maintenance of 'unproductive' bureaucracies and redundant military establishments, and a very large share of it is withdrawn by foreign capital"(105). The critics of 'neo-marxism' object to this scheme, seeing it as a crude polemical inversion of the orthodox; criticism number two, objection to the thesis in respect of the development of capitalism and peripheral underdevelopment.

(3) The notion of 'surplus' is taken to be central to Baran's work; and of it, Baran himself notes that he considers it to be "...the key to the understanding of the general working principles of capitalism"(106). The notion of surplus designates, as Sutcliffe puts it, "...roughly the difference between what a society produces and what it actually consumes(actual surplus), or the difference between what it could produce and what it needs to consume(potential surplus) ...... Under socialism the idea of a planned economic surplus is relevant" (107). The major line of objection, from marxists, to
this notion of 'economic surplus' has been that whilst it recalls Marx's notion of 'surplus value', it has in fact very little to do with it. The notion is aggregative, and Sutcliffe records that Baran has been called a 'Keynesian of the left'. Thus we have; criticism number three, objections to the notion of 'economic surplus'.

(4) The link to Frank is clear in the following quotation from a 1969 essay: "This essay contends that underdevelopment in Chile is the necessary product of four centuries of capitalist development and of the internal contradictions of capitalism itself....My thesis is that these capitalist contradictions and the historical development of the capitalist system have generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centres which appropriate that surplus and, further that this process still continues"(108). Frank goes on to consider the three contradictions of: (I) 'expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus', where he introduces the notions of monopoly capitalism and the 'expropriation chain'; (II) 'metropolis/satellite polarization', where he makes development and underdevelopment sides of the same coin; (III) 'continuity in change', whereby the world capitalist system is taken to be both long-standing and in fundamentals unchanging. Brenner's general summary reads as follows: 

"Frank was unambiguous in locating the dynamic of capitalist expansion in the rise of a world commercial network, while specifying the roots of both growth and backwardness in the 'surplus appropriation chain' which emerged in the expansionary process: surplus appropriation by the core from the periphery and the organisation of the satellite's internal mode of production to serve the needs of the metropolis"(109). Frank's political conclusions are that whereas the present situation offers the underdeveloped only a prospect of continuing subordinate incorporation in the world capitalist system.
and consequent mis-development, socialist revolution offers the prospect of 'genuine', 'autonomous', development. Setting aside the appropriate objections to 'moral critique', 'historical thesis' and 'economistic concepts', here is lodged a fourth objection in respect of the implied goal of the 'neo-marxians'. We have, criticism number four, objections to the implicit model of development: just what is it?

(5) Wallerstein is taken to complete Frank. Thus Brenner reports that "Wallerstein straightforwardly defines capitalism as a trade based division of labour, and it is here that he locates the dynamic of the capitalist economic development" (110). That the 'neo-marxian' effort is economistic in that it totally fails to provide a class analysis is a familiar complaint. Here then we note, criticism number five, objection to reduction of 'class' to 'market': it is neo-smithian.

(6) The political line which attaches to the Baran/Frank 'UDT' approach follows from the above characteristics of analysis; the pre-requisite of any development is the disengagement from the world capitalist market and a pre-requisite of this is the socialist revolutionary displacement of compromised local bourgeoisies from power. Criticism number six; as the analysis is implausible, so its proposals are unhelpful.

In sum, we may constitute the present 'object of debate' (that is, 'neo-marxism') according to its major elements as identified by its critics. We have taken note of the following:
1. Objections to the moral critique of capitalism.
2. Objections to the historical schema used.
3. Objections to the notion of economic surplus.
4. Objections to the implicit model of development.
5. Objections to the reduction of 'class' to 'market'.
6. Objections to the political proposals derived therefrom.
These six may be organised as follows: the aggregative
economic notion of surplus(3) entails an affirmation of an econotistic scheme of society(5). This in turn involves a wrong historical schema of the rise of capitalism, monopoly capitalism and underdevelopment(2). The resultant model of what counts as development is untenable(4) and the general moral critique of capitalism, unhelpful(1). The political line which follows from (1) through(5) is accordingly wrongheaded (and distracts attention from questions of the present dynamic of capitalism in these peripheral areas—and indeed generally).

There is one note to be made in the context of this focus upon criticisms which is that the 'neo-marxian' scheme is a richly developed one. Its critics tend to be scathing, suggesting that it is a simple theoretical farrago. But even if they turned out to be correct in their attacks, it would remain the case that 'neo-marxism' constitutes the orthodoxy of radical thought in this period. If the effort were quite so transparently futile it would be difficult to understand the attention paid to it. One critic lists the virtues of the line as follows: "...it stimulated the empirical study of institutional and structural mechanisms of underdevelopment..." And in the context of the early 1960's when UDT emerged as a militant critique of the ruling ideas of developmentalism, its thrust was unquestionably a progressive one"(111). Leys adds that we should be careful to remember "...some of the intellectual deserts from which UDT rescued us"(112).

We now turn to treat these objections. Here we can note that treatment of one or other of these 'objections' to the Baran-inspired line often involves carefully avoiding invoking the linked criticisms of linked notions. That is, the whole effort hangs together; and its elements overlap in such a way as to reveal that if it is all a farrago, then it is a very well integrated one.

4.21 Objections to the moral critique of capitalism

It is said that Baran/Frank may be taken to present an essentially moral critique of monopoly capitalism and its claimed corollary underdevelopment. Such critiques
are neither marxian nor helpful.

In the case of Baran/Frank the issue of the moral critique of capitalism is coupled up with the issue of their notion of surplus. Culley reports that "The second variant of the concept of surplus ie. the potential economic surplus, is a most important one in Baran's discourse. It is primarily by an analysis of their potentialities that types of society-feudalism, capitalism, monopoly capitalism- are assessed"(113). The notion of potential surplus is the measure of general efficient functioning of the system and is estimated by noting (a) present excess consumption,(b) surplus lost in unproductive labour,(c) surplus lost through simple inefficiency and (d) surplus lost through unemployment. Culley notes, "The Utopian nature of this conception is quite clear. It allows Baran and his followers to launch an attack upon capitalism as an irrational phenomenon with respect to his own ethical position"(114). Culley takes Baran's effort to be humanistic, idealistic, relativistic and teleological: "The similarity of their discussion with the nineteenth century Utopian socialists criticised by Marx and Engels is striking"(115). Culley reduces Baran and Sweezy's investigation to the status of an elaborate and disguised expression of disapproval. Bernstein follows this in respect of UDT: denying that UDT is marxist he speaks of, inter alia, "...the use of a moralistic and idealistic critique of capitalism based on a philosophical humanism, which condemns the objective efforts of the contradictory nature of capitalist development by reference to a utopia free of exploitation, oppression and dependence"(116).

Having affirmed that we take social-theorizing to involve the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame', we are obliged to pursue this matter. So we can perhaps elucidate these matters by proposing the following analogy. As Marcuse uses the trio Basic Repression/Surplus Repression/ 'Diminished Repression'(where this is implied as holding for socialist society) to ground, in a psychological individualism, a moral
critique of contemporary society, so Baran uses the trio Actual/Potential/Planned Surplus to ground, in an aggre-
gative and reformist 'left Keynesianism', a moral critique
of contemporary society.

Marcuse (117) presents the notions of repression/
surplus repression. The argument strategy grants, it
would seem, the (orthodox?) claim that in any society
a measure of repression is necessary to establish social
order. Marcuse begins with individuals as bundles of
instinctual desires unhappily located in an hostile
environment of scarcity. The un-repressed, autonomous,
freely acting, individual is literally asocial. Having
granted a minimum necessary 'amount' of repression,
Marcuse then asks after the particular, historically
specific, repression we have: it is, he reports, that
which is required by the functioning capitalist society.
To Basic Repression is added Surplus Repression.

SR (1) enables the growth of capitalist society's
productivity, which effort simultaneously tends to the
impoverishment of the quality of life; and (2) extracts
a high price in terms of the suppression of the instinct-
ual life of the human organism. The general and the
particular reinforce each other. Two points now follow:
(a) The whole system tends to collapse; as the opportu-
nities for change rise (by virtue of success of capitalist
production) so too does the level of SR needed to main-
tain the status quo. In terms of recent history we can
thus interpret the slide into fascism. (b) As capitalism
has solved the problem of scarcity, SR could indeed be
eased off.

It is clear that all this can be seen as a morally
informed critique. It revolves around the idea of quality
of life available to the inhabitants of the society in
question. What they do have, and what they might have.

Reflecting upon the above noted strategy of criticism
we can make the following points. Recalling the material
of Section One of this study we can contend that,
in respect of valuation in social theorizing, what is at
issue is not whether or not the effort is 'tainted' by
valuation; because, as we have seen, there will necessarily be a significant aspect of valuation. Rather, the matter is one of the character of the valuations made, and the manner of their insertion into social theoretic efforts.

If the above-noted argument took as its moral reference point the schemes involved in Macpherson's 'reconstruction' of the notion of 'democracy', then it would be a moral reference point that we would wish to support. If it also inserted such notions via an explicit statement and in an appropriately secondary form, then the scheme would have a defensible core and a basis upon which to build an appropriate critique of present circumstance.

But in Marcuse's case he takes as a start-point a psychological individualism that is, on the face of it, wholly problematical. A criticism of this start-point could be mounted by invoking, say, Macpherson on Hobbes (118). Now Hobbes strips away the social circumstances of bourgeois man and presents the result—grasping, acquisitive greed—as essential to man; which atom then has to be reintegrated into some sort of social whole. So with Marcuse, his start-point offers a version of bourgeois man, avoiding work and pursuing, egoistically, sensual gratification, which atom is then reintegrated into a social whole. Marcuse's start point is apparently tainted; it is not defensible, because individualism is not. So, in this way, Marcuse's effort could be seen as ideological (pejorative) because it grants as a premise an incoherent and obfuscating notion.

With Baran we seem to have a similar pattern of argument. The notion of 'economic surplus', it is widely granted, is not marxian, even though it recalls the term 'surplus value'. Further, the notion of 'economic surplus' is redolent of Keynesian aggregative macro-economic analysis, and the treatment of society via the issue of the utilization of this surplus (whether rational or irrational) is similarly redolent of a 'liberal reformism'. Myrdal and Galbraith come to mind. It seems as if it could be argued that the key idea of Baran's scheme,
that of 'economic surplus', is tainted in the same fashion as Marcuse's notion of 'surplus repression'. Charges of 'ideology mongering' could be levelled in the same way.

That Baran's effort is critically engaged is not in doubt. Nor is it in doubt that the notion of 'economic surplus' will serve as a core element of a political economic analysis. What is at issue, for us, is the precise nature of the moral core of Baran's effort and the manner of its insertion into analysis.

We saw (with Rockmore in Chapter One) in the case of Marx's work that the moral core, a philosophical anthropology issuing in the notion of alienated labour, was central to the machinery of substantive, practical, analysis. Here is the key to our suspicions in regard to Baran: the evaluative stance, condemning the system's present irrationality of use of economic surplus and pointing to a possible rationally ordered future, is pitched at such a general level as to tend to be indistinguishable from any other 'liberal' critique. The related point (which comes up below, criticism 3) addresses the manner of insertion. It is suggested by Culley that Baran's economics is separate from the moral critique. The economics is seen as heuristic: a vehicle for cashing a moral stance that is presented, in a familiar manoeuvre, as a general scheme.

It might be replied, in regard to 'indistinguishability', that this shows how marxian critique has become a part of the culture (common sense) of the left; and does not, consequently, need spelling out in formal mode. But this seems dubious; and it is certainly a position that it would be difficult to grant, in a study predicated upon the existence of present reflection amongst practitioners as to the precise nature and status of social theorizing.

A better reply might be to invite critics to recall the circumstances of the effort's production; that is, the USA in the late 1950's. Against that political background, and in contrast to 'modernization-theory',
Baran's effort must appear to be hugely sophisticated. Leys' remarks should here be borne in mind.

So, if we read the critics Culley, Bernstein et al as objecting to 'moral critique'—where this is characterized as essentially involving a surreptitious borrowing from the stance to be attacked—then we would wish to grant the argument some force. However, if the critics' attack embraces not just this 'surreptitious borrowing' but all and any evaluative(moral) stance towards social forms and issues, then we cannot agree. Following earlier discussions (e.g., Myrdal) we would have to regard the critics as pursuing the chimera of non-engaged theory.

4.22 Objections to the historical schema used

Criticism number two presents objections to the thesis in respect of the rise of capitalism and withal the creation of underdevelopment.

Here we invoke the work of Brenner; that is, his essay 'The origins of capitalist development: a critique of neo-smithian Marxism'. We may focus on three points.

(a) Brenner says that 'neo-marxian' theorists, in their efforts to explain the rise of capitalism, argue in a circular fashion. They assume the existence of capitalistic social relations in their efforts to explain the rise of capitalism. Brenner analyses Sweezy's work ('The transition from feudalism to capitalism') by unpacking the proffered model and asking after the plausibility and character of the assumptions made in respect of the behaviour of the historical actors mentioned. He concludes: "In sum, Sweezy's entire account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is based on the implicit assumption that capitalism already exists" (119). Sweezy's effort is taken to reduce to the view that the transition from feudalism to capitalism is a matter of the appropriate adjustment in society to the demands of the market; yet the market is the sum of social relations. Brenner reports, "In the last analysis, Sweezy's error is two-fold. It is to posit that the producers' relationship to the market determines their operation and devel-
-opment and, ultimately, their relationship to one another, rather than vice versa. Correlatively, it is to locate the system's potential for development in the capacities of its component individual units (thus the emphasis on motivations), rather than in the system as a whole—specifically, in the overall system of class relations of production which determine/condition the nature of the interrelationships between the individual units and, in this manner, their operation and development"(120).

(b) Brenner argues that the entire 'neo-marxist' line in this area of debate reduces to an inversion of Adam Smith. The 'neo-marxists' follow Smith in equating capitalism with a trade based division of labour, where innovation (and thus growth/expansion) is determined by market pressure. Class relations just follow on. Brenner speaks of 'historical functionalism' and 'a classical form of economic determinism', and takes this as wrong. Instead, he wants to reduce economics to social (class) relations. The core of the matter is the conjugation of class circumstances that trigger and sustain the innovative dynamic of capitalism.

Wallerstein is singled out: "In Wallerstein's 'The modern world system' the Smithian theory embedded in Sweezy's analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is made entirely explicit, and carried to its logical conclusion. . . . . . . . Thus Wallerstein straightforwardly defines capitalism as a trade based division of labour, and it is here that he locates the dynamic of capitalist economic development"(121). There is an economic determinism that "...pervades all aspects of Wallerstein's theoretical framework"(122).

To this Brenner counterposes his own view. Resting upon detailed historical exegesis, he affirms that: "Neither development in the core nor underdevelopment in the periphery was determined by surplus transfer. Economic development was a qualitative process, which did not merely involve an accumulation of wealth in general, but was centrally focused on the development of
the productivity of labour" (123) . . . . "In short the uniquely successful development of capitalism in Western Europe was determined by a class system, a property system, a system of surplus extraction, in which the methods the extractors were obliged to use to increase their surplus corresponded to an unprecedented, though imperfect, degree to the needs of development of the productive forces" (124). It is in this conjunction that the search for an explanation of the genesis of capitalism is to be found, not in any behaviour of an abstractly regarded world market.

Frank repeats this 'neo-marxian' line; development and underdevelopment are explained by reference to international trade-based extraction of surplus, and not to the conjunctions of class circumstances and technological possibility.

(c) In regard to the method of analysis of these theorists, Brenner reports that their failure "to discard the underlying individualistic presuppositions" (125) of Smith's model has resulted in their erecting a mirror version of it. Palma reports of Frank's efforts that: "Probably still unduly influenced by his training as an economist at the University of Chicago, he constructs a mechanico-formal model which is no more than a set of equations of general equilibrium (static and un-historical), in which the extraction of the surplus takes place through a series of satellite-metropolis relationships, through which the surplus generated at each stage is syphoned off" (126).

The historical material we cannot, and do not want to, follow. We note it in order to indicate that here is a large area of discourse, apparently somewhat remote to development studies, that bears upon our concerns. The circularity, inversion of Smith and erection of a mechanico-formal model are matters closer to us. Palma, we have noted, has evinced an interest in political economy as an argument style, and has approved of Cardoso's problem-centred and specific methods. The pursuit of
general theory is again shown to be ill-advised; yet
the issue of the proper presentation and use of such
general formulations remains to be resolved. The problem
seems to be that general formulations are called forth
by specific efforts and that thereafter they are taken
to be analogous to natural science general formulations;
efforts being made to develop and present them accord-
ingly. The result being, in this case, the production
of a mechanico-formal system which detracts from the
original problem. Indeed, at worst, the initial problem-
specificity is ignored and theorists proceed straight-
away to the largely futile effort at the erection of
general formulations, general theories.

4.23 Objections to the notion of 'economic surplus'

Here we treat objections to the notion of
'economic surplus'. The material here largely overlaps
with that of criticism number one; we have a slightly
different focus. Thus there seem to be two main lines of
criticism of the notion of 'economic surplus': (a) criti-
cisms from within the ambit of the orthodox, that is,
non-Marxian economics; we will not pursue these, noting
only that they involve charges of ambiguity and diffi-
culty of measurement; and (b) criticisms in respect of
the notion's theoretical status.

In respect of this latter line, it is argued that
Baran's notion of surplus (and thus the notion used by
the entire UDT-Marxian line) owes more to the aggrega-
tive economics of Keynes than it does to Marx. Sutcliffe
reports that "The conceptual difference is that Marx's
'surplus value' is defined in relation to the ownership
of property while Baran's 'surplus' is defined more in
relation to consumption needs. It is therefore to Baran
something which exists in all societies" (127). We can
offer a preliminary elucidation of this distinction by
calling upon the work of Culley once again. She argues
thus: "Marxism has always rejected concepts of surplus
derived from the postulate of irreducible needs or con-
cepts in which surplus is presented as an excess over
the basic consumption needs of society. In Capital the
concepts of necessary and surplus labour are strictly economic concepts and are not derived from any extraneous economic concept of human needs. For Marx, surplus value is the specifically capitalist mode of appropriation of surplus labour. Surplus labour, that is, labour over and above necessary labour, exists in all modes of production, because the conditions of reproduction of the labourer are not equivalent to the conditions of reproduction of the economy. Necessary and surplus labour must always be defined in relation to a determinate mode of production. The precise form of surplus labour is determined by a definite mechanism of extraction. For Marx, surplus value is the mode of appropriation of surplus labour specific to the capitalist mode of production. The concept of surplus value involves a mechanism requiring private property in the means of production and separation of labour power from the objective conditions of labour (128) (our emphasis).

Culley's point is that the two versions of 'surplus' are quite different in status and working. Baran's is an idealistic notion derived from abstract notions of need. That is, his overall scheme is a morally informed criticism; and his economics are best taken as derived and heuristic, in the sense that they serve to order the otherwise generated critique. Marx's concept, on the other hand, is central to his economics and is firmly lodged within that scheme of analysis: a scheme which claims to be a thoroughly developed political economy, and which reveals the dynamics of the system rather than simply offering a moral critique of it.

Culley's point, in the end, is this. Both notions, 'economic surplus' and 'surplus value', are taken as marxian political economy; but only Marx's notion actually is that. Baran's efforts may lay claim to justification elsewhere—in their moral sensitivity and critique, or in the ease of assimilation of their lessons—but they cannot lay claim to justification by virtue of being marxian-informed political economy, because that, strictly, is what they are not. Put another way, if we borrow from
Phillips, then we might say that as Baran et al begin with the desirability of change—rather than, as with Marx, the real possibility—then to that extent their political economy would seem to be impoverished. In the end we would pursue this softer line, taking it to be compatible with our general orientation and as fitting within the scheme sketched out by Palma which treats these particular matters directly and in broad perspective. (129).

4.24 Objections to the notion of 'development'

Criticism number four focuses upon the notion of development. The notion of 'development' we take to be a synonym for 'progress'. Clearly its use is prevalent in discussions of 'development-studies'. Both in its general and in its local disciplinary use the notion partakes of the pre-eminently 'western' set of expectations/assumptions that attach to the notion of 'progress'.

'Progress' we take to have been conceptualized in the 18th century; it is the heir to notions of perfectibilism, and is taken in its 19th century variants as the guarantor of continued improvement in man's affairs. The model of man affirmed is optimistic and the politics democratic, in Macpherson's sense. We take Marx to have been firmly lodged in this emancipatory tradition. But if this is the core and heart of the notion, it is also true that the idea has presented itself in different guises through the post war 'career' of 'development-studies'. Initially as requiring the application of established economic techniques, or subsequently as involving the reasonable pursuit of measured social reform. However it is with the Marxian work studied in Section Four that the notion used in the 'career' of 'development-studies' begins to come close to the essence of the notion as we have presented it. The question is, just how close do the 'neo-marxists' come?

Phillips is not sure. The 'neo-marxists', arguing that peripheral countries are condemned to mis-development (underdevelopment) by virtue of their subordinate incorporation, affirm some sort of notion of 'development'
as 'autocentric capitalism', which they then indicate is impossible for peripheral areas to achieve, thereby securing the necessity for socialism. Phillips sees this stance as flowing from Baran et al's having to contrive a response to the apparent post war success of capitalist centres in solving their problems. Thus, they pose "...a contradiction between capitalism and development" (130); hence progress in the centres could be taken to be 'not really' progress at all, and the situation in the peripheries as obviously and inevitably other than development. Phillips takes this to (a) block all chance of change in the centres and (b) obscure the interesting question of the nature of the capitalist dynamic in the peripheries.

So what of the notion of 'development' invoked? Phillips seems to take it to be vacillating, nebulously idealist and in the end narrow. Thus, she argues:

"The 'development' against which 'underdevelopment' is conceptualized has tended to become an amalgam of different concepts, such that the theories are partly drawing a contrast between the process of development in the advanced capitalist countries and in the underdeveloped countries, but partly a contrast between development in the underdeveloped countries and an idealized process of development which would ensure 'maximum utilisation of resources' or the 'most rational allocation of surplus'. What emerges is an ideal type of 'normal capitalist development' which serves as a measure by means of which we can recognise underdevelopment" (131). This vacillation conceals the problems Phillips takes to attach to the second element. Here, recalling the strictures noted above on the concept of 'economic surplus', we can observe that this element is taken as idealist and non-Marxian.

The final point comes out of Phillips' remarks upon the sources of the notion of 'development'. The radicals simply take what the orthodox assumed; a sort of nationalist capitalism, where the nation-state was the discrete unit in receipt of aid and planning interventions.
The radicals take this in order to deny that it is possible. Phillips remarks that this naive idea set the terms for the debates that followed.

In further discussing the radicals' dismissal of orthodox development initiatives, Phillips shares their scepticism but then adds, "...this in no way undermines the argument that the development initiative was necessary as a means to overcoming obstacles to the further accumulation of capital"(132). Equally we may note that granted the narrowness of the 'neo-marxian' notion of 'development'; granted its idealism, as with 'economic surplus'; and granted the vacillation; it remains the case that 'neo-marxism' marked a signal advance upon preceding efforts. We have cited Leys to this effect. It is not clear in the end just what the line of criticism here exemplified in Phillips actually achieves, when seen in the context of our history of the 'career' of 'development-studies'. More locally, so to say, the criticism might be seen to have some force. As Kay argues, taking note of the circumstances of production of UDT and the limitations imposed thereby, "The radical critics of orthodox development studies were so keen to prove the ideological point that underdevelopment was the product of capitalist exploitation, that they let the crucial issue pass them by: capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough"(133). This matter of the mal-integration of the peripheries and the continuing dynamism of the world system is tackled by Cardoso (cf below). Any insistence, by UDT, on the irremediably disfigured stasis of peripheral economies is perhaps best seen as polemical over-statement.

4.25 Objections to the reduction of 'class' to 'market'

Criticism number five suggests there is a reduction of 'class' to 'market'. We have touched upon this material in noting criticism 2, treating the rise of capitalism. In particular we referred to Brenner's view that 'neo-marxism' is, in this matter, an 'inversion' of Adam Smith.
Pursuing this, we may note that Brenner argues that "...the method of an entire line of writers in the marxist tradition has led them to displace class relations from the centre of their analyses of economic development and underdevelopment" (134). In respect of Frank, the import of these shifts is presented as entailing a diversion of attention from issues of the inherent dynamism of the capitalist core to the exchange between centres and peripheries; when, additionally, the world capitalist system's dynamism is taken to be fuelled by exchange. Thus we have Brenner's 'neo-Smithian' charge. Wallerstein is taken to systematize Frank, his scheme relying upon the "...immanent developmental dynamic of unfettered world trade" (135). Again,"...Wallerstein straightforwardly defines capitalism as a trade based division of labour, and it is here that he locates the dynamic of capitalist economic development" (136).

Now these criticisms are indeed persuasive, and Palma offers a particularly interesting reading of them (137). Recalling Brenner's analysis of Baran/Frank/Wallerstein, such that they are taken to have provided a polemical inversion of Adam Smith's scheme, Palma observes of Frank that he constructs a "mechanico-formal model" (138) of the world historical dynamic of capitalism. Thus Palma presents a familiar criticism in a fashion that calls attention to the issue of argument strategy. Recalling our earlier notes on Palma in respect of the 'is it really marxian' debate, here clearly is one point at which his conception of political economy is being invoked. We return to this in part 4.4 below where we briefly introduce Cardoso and the point picked up by Palma; that is, specificity in engagement and eschewal of the pursuit of the general.

4.26 An unhelpful politics

Criticism number six 'neo-marxism' issues in an unhelpful politics. The above noted criticisms have attached to the conceptual make-up of 'neo-marxism'. In nuce 'neo-marxism' has been charged with a moralising eclecticism that is, in the end, neither marxian nor especially
helpful in respect of matters of the Third World. Here we can look briefly at the objections typically brought to bear upon the politics which 'neo-marxism' propounds.

(a) It is claimed that 'neo-marxism' is Third Worldist and therefore naive in respect of the Third World. To this we may reply that Third Worldism was not, as we saw above when discussing Young, all that naive and nor was it unfounded.

(b) It is claimed that 'neo-marxism' rules out political activity in the centre. To this we may reply that insofar as 'neo-marxism' entails, or is associated with, an abandonment of orthodox notions of 'proletarian revolution', this is a measure of its sophistication rather than anything else. Additionally, insofar as (d)(below) is true, then 'neo-marxism' is an element of political activity in the centre. We have called Frank a pamphleteer, in his early work, and it is to be noted that much of his impact has been on the perceptions which those in rich nations have of the Third World. This is surely not inconsequential.

(c) It is claimed that 'neo-marxism' is liable, in Kay's phrase, to 'conservative re-absorption'. This seems either trivial or implicitly fantastic. In respect of its triviality we can record that there is no ideological effort that cannot be 'raided' by those it would criticise. For example Middlemas (139) makes use of a simple 'class' notion in order to present his conservative history of British politics in the twentieth century. Why criticise 'neo-marxism' for a general and inevitable problem? Alternatively, we may take the criticism and ask just what sort of stance is being invoked in contrast to those 'liable to re-absorption'. A political creed that was rigorously unacceptable in the realm of the present - else how could it avoid 're-absorption' in some measure or other - would admit of no change in the social system in question. Rigorous unacceptability of the creed implies total dis-connectedness of that creed; but if it is disconnected then how can it ever effect change? The only change in the system permitted by a creed that
is rigorously unacceptable (that is, totally closed to re-absorption) would be total and immediate change; and that is fantastic. The criticism of 'neo-marxism' to the effect that it is 'liable to re-absorption' seems to rest on a contrary notion that is itself both practically and conceptually unconvincing.

(d) It is claimed that 'neo-marxism' is the 'un-happy consciousness' of left intelligentsia (140). This is an entirely plausible claim; why it is a problem is rather less clear to us. We have repeated on several occasions that we take theorizing to be a practical activity that needs must reflect the circumstances of the group doing the theorizing. Cumper, we noted, took Girvan's 'dependency' to be the self-serving ideology (pejorative) of Third World intelligentsia. Cumper's criticisms we dismissed. But the claim we granted might well be true; the fact that UDT/ 'neo-marxism' has tended to tail off into a variety of unarticulated aspiring left policy science efforts is of interest. That 'neo-marxism' may be taken to reflect the circumstances of the theorist, we take to be proper. The real question to ask is: just how well do they acknowledge their circumstances?

The matter of the general nature of social-theorizing, and in particular the issue of what it is proper for the 'western' academic to say in respect of the Third World, will be pursued in the final section of the study (Section Five).

4.3 Summary note

This discussion of the 'Dynamic of Theory II' was intended to review marxian debate on matters of the Third World. We have been concerned to present the claims of the 'neo-marxists' and the counter claims of their critics.

The central element of this area of discourse we have taken to be the work of Baran, and the discourse itself the 'orthodoxy' of the left. The object, 'neo-marxism', we introduced by reference to Palma who is concerned with the matter of the character of argument
in 'dependency'. 'Neo-marxism' is presented as the third major effort to theorize the exchange of Centre/Periphery within the marxian line. Originally we have Marx's scattered writings, then Lenin's revisions, and finally the 'neo-marxian' effort associated with Baren, Sweezy and recently A G Frank. The object 'neo-m-rxism' we constituted via a review of criticisms of it. The conventional objections, noted by Sutcliffe, we have not treated; but the criticisms of the radicals we have. We summarized them thus. The aggregative economic notion of surplus entails an affirmation of an economistic scheme of society. This in turn involves a wrong historical schema of the rise of capitalism, monopoly capitalism and underdevelopment. The resulting model of what counts as development is untenable and the general moral critique of capitalism unhelpful. The political line which follows from all this is, accordingly, wrongheaded.

These critics have tended to fall into the argument, 'is UDT/Neo-marxism' really marxian?'. Palma's essay implicitly makes the claim that this is an uninteresting question. His preferred area of enquiry, and the area in which to search for an answer to the question 'what counts as a marxian analysis of the Third World?', is that of political economy. Political economy is taken as that characteristic 19th century discipline of which Marx was the foremost exponent.

Palma constructs these last noted claims via an examination of the work of Cardoso (with Faletto), who is taken to have provided, in his scheme of 'dependency', just such a 'political economic analysis'. The key, so far as Palma's exegesis is concerned, is specificity of engagement: "It is thus through concrete studies of specific situations, and in particular of class relations and class structures in Brazil that Cardoso formulates the essential aspects of the dependency analysis...... In my view some of the most successful analyses within the dependency school have been those which analyse specific situations in concrete terms"(141). The theorists cited here, Cardoso and Faletto, and the mode of enquiry
invoked, political economy, will be treated in our final section.

Section four represents the last of the substantive sections of this study. In section five we return to the abstract level of theoretical discussion adopted in our prologue. We will be concerned with abstract issues—generally, social-theorizing and the proper nature of the 'western' intellectual's involvement with the Third World—and with redeeming the various promises we have made throughout the study.
Section Five: Concluding remarks.

Chapter Eight: Social-theorizing and the matter of the Third World.

1.0 A statement of the concerns of chapter eight.
Our Prologue began by noting that it had been claimed that the 'discovery of the Third World' was as significant for present day social-theorizing as was the 19th century 'discovery of industrialization' for the classical theorists of political economy and the 'founding fathers' of sociology. It has been towards an elucidation of this claim that our Study has been directed. The particular 'object' of enquiry has been taken to be the 'career' of 'development-studies' in the post-Second World War period. This 'career' is taken to admit of the description that it involved the attempt to constitute an autonomous discipline, which project collapsed under the combined weight of shifting historical circumstance on the one hand and, on the other, both its own inherent implausibility and its success in occasioning refinement in argument. We have treated this history in the hope of displaying something of the nature of social theorizing.

The particular substantive elements of this history have been treated by means of the preparation of sociology of knowledge-informed analyses of exemplars, taken as representatives of 'schools' within 'development-studies'. We have been concerned to display the characteristic argument forms of these efforts, and this 'formal' aspect has provided a means whereby the study as a whole could be both integrated as a text and related to recent debate within the social sciences as to the precise nature of social theorizing.

Now as regards social-theorizing per se we have had comparatively little to say, save for some preliminary remarks in our Prologue and scattered comments.
and observations thereafter. This being so, the 'first main concern' of this concluding chapter will be with the issue of the nature of social theorizing. We wish to consider social theorizing as the practical activity of, in the prime instance, ideology (theory) construction. We do so in the context of post-war treatments of the matter of the development of the Third World.

The idea that social theorizing was, in its central and most unequivocal guise, concerned with the construction of ideological schemas whereby action in the world might be ordered and legitimated we drew from Hawthorne, Gellner, Hollis and Nell, and others. Classical 19th century efforts are paradigm cases of the business of the construction of ideological schemas; that is, political economy and marxian analysis. The argument mode of this tradition of thought we took to involve the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'.

Now, if this indicates the prime conception of social theoretic engagement used throughout this study, then we can see how the sociology of knowledge work can be taken to illustrate the claims made; that is, the substantive work offers specific examples of social theoretic engagement. Thus 'growth-theory' is seen to be derived from the efforts of the 'West' to theorize 'intervention' in the context of the multiple conflicts of the USA, UK, and USSR, and the nascent nationalisms of the Third World. Invoking Keynesian work, theorists construct 'growth-theory'; that is, the legitimating and ordering theorem of an ideology of 'authoritative interventionism'. Empiricist in conception, this takes 'development' to be a technical matter. It further, sees the presently developed nations as having access to the requisite technical expertise; that is, orthodox economics appropriately extended. A relationship of super and sub-ordination is thus legitimated, and responsibility for the future reserved for the technical 'experts' of the 'West' and their agents. Similar analyses were prepared for the other identifiable
'schools' in the post-war 'career' of 'development-studies'.

This preliminary strategy of enquiry has involved the distinction between conception and intent; it is under these two headings that our sociology of knowledge-informed critiques have been produced. This scheme of criticism is both an obvious derivation from our notion of ideology-construction and a fairly unambitious treatment of the idea of critique. Here the scheme of social theorizing can be extended. Thus the notion of ideology critique is a simple corollary of the notion of ideology construction. Now, as the latter has been taken to be best exemplified in the tradition of political economy where we lodge Marx as the most subtle practitioner, so we take the former to be best exemplified in that tradition of marxian theorizing called the Frankfurt School, which comes down to us with Habermas and critical theory. Within the scheme of critical theory the notion of ideology-critique is extended. Here the ideas of democracy, critique, and ideology-ranking come together, in that the latter pair suppose an 'ideal-speech' situation which in turn supposes a democratic society. This notion of critique we take to be a circumstance- and problem-specific extension of marxian analysis, with continuing relevance to the circumstances of mature capitalism, and having implications for 'Western' thinkers' treatments of matters of the Third World. We take the critique of ideology to be complementary, and secondary, to political economic enquiry. Both derive from Marx.

We can now present a wider view of the scope of social theorizing. Social theorizing we take to be involved with the construction, and then the criticism and comparative ranking of ideological schemes. This stance informs our first main concern in this chapter.

As regards our 'first main concern', we want to consider, in the company and in the light of our substantive investigations, the nature of the prime case of social theorizing. Originally given by the circumstances and problems attendant upon 19th century industrializa-
-tion, we confront the business of ideology construction, characterized as entailing the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame', and discuss the mode of argument called 'political economy'. Following on from this we consider the logical corollary of ideology critique, and the attached issue of comparative ranking. We look at the notion of critique in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. Again we make these notes in the company of illustrative material drawn from our substantive analyses.

From this point we turn to our 'second main concern' which is the question of social theoretic engagement with matters of the Third World. Thus Palma has advocated the mode of argument called 'political economy' for those who would grasp the circumstances of Third World societies: it is implicit that this is the business of Third World theorists and their allies. (This notion of 'allies' is ambiguous in regard to the nature of the social theoretic engagement being invoked. We can here recall the link, pointed out by dependency theorists, between centres of metropolitan power and their peripheral 'agents': here there was an obvious economic coincidence of interest. But in the case of 'allies', invoked by Palma, the link is not the same; it is, rather, political sympathy most directly. The role of the 'allies' would seem to be distant and, in terms of engagement, attenuated). Political-economic work according to Palma is to replace current varieties of mechanico-formal theorizing.

Our second area of concern in regard to treating matters of the Third World involves asking after the 'Western' thinkers' engagement with all these issues. Asking, just what does it make sense to say, the general strategy of reply must be to invoke those dictums we have prepared in the light of reflection upon social theorizing as such, and granting these (reflexivity, problem specificity, circumstance relevance, etc etc) endeavour to indicate what this means in practical terms. Thus may recall that Habermas's scheme of critical theory
bids us recreate the sphere of the 'public'. This rather implies that the task of the 'Western' thinker is the critical scrutiny of specific exchanges between rich and poor, and the dissemination of the results of such enquiries.

Diagrammatically we have this:
(The numbers in brackets indicate sections in the chapter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social theorizing</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Abstract points</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(First main concern)</strong></td>
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</table>

(2) Prime case .......... Political economy of (4)
| **(Political economy)** | **Third World** |
| **(Cardoso & Faletto)** |

(3) Specific case..............Democratic critical scrutiny
| **(Critique of ideology)** |

Illuminated by examples from our substantive analyses.

In sum, having at the outset of the study undertaken to consider the post-war history of 'development-studies' in such a fashion as to reveal something of the nature of social theorizing itself, we are now obliged to redeem that promise. We attempt to do this in two ways: by recording, in the company of illustrative material drawn from our substantive analyses, our general views on the nature of social theorizing; and by noting, again with reference to our stocks of examples, the implications of these views on social theorizing for those treating matters of the 'development' of the Third World.

By way of a disclaimer, it should be made clear that the remarks in this chapter are tentative only.
That the remarks in the Prologue, those scattered through the study, and those presented here, together imply a developed scheme covering the nature of social theorizing and its deployment in matters of the Third World we grant. That the remarks in this chapter constitute a first approximation to such a general scheme we deny. Our observations on the 'career' of 'development-studies' serve to indicate only in very general terms how the lessons of this episode for ideas about the nature of social theorizing might be set out.

2.0 Political Economy.

We now discuss what we take to be the central, paradigm, case of social theoretic engagement; that is, political economy. It should be made clear at the outset that our remarks are limited; we come at political economy, as an argument mode, from out of our readings of the 'career' of 'development-studies'. As with Palma we take the 'career' of 'development-studies' to have issued in the requirement that we consider the broadest and richest intellectual tradition available: this we suppose to be political economy. We do not claim the status of Marx-scholar, nor do we claim to be widely familiar with the history of economics; consequently our approach to the detail of political-economic argument is specific also. We follow the lines of interest seemingly growing within the ambit of 'development-studies' (or, if you like, on the ruins of 'development-studies') rather than tackling the exegetical works of the more straightforwardly political economic writing, be it orthodox or Marxian. Thus our view of the mode of argument at issue will be distinctly 'sociological', and will focus upon methodology.

We have taken political economy as representing the central guise of social theoretic engagement, and have said that this ideology construction involves the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'. This slogan is the 'real' which we here wish to 'reconstruct'. We take the problem via three inter-related issues: (1) just what is special about the mode of
enquiry called political economy; (ii) what is there to note in respect of this tradition of enquiry; (iii) and how do the various efforts we have treated in our substantive analyses stand up to the criteria of explanatory adequacy implied?

2.1 The style of political economy

Political economy as a general style is touched upon by Carver. He notes that "much of the effort of the political economists went into what appears today to be a very general enquiry, with statements and defences of their views on definitional questions, and some of the moral and political issues entailed" (1). In addition to this catholicity of intellectual interest involved in the construction of their effort (2) we must also note their thoroughgoing practical intent. Thus of Marx's work Carver, whom we here take to be offering a contrast with abstract and general work, observes that "Marx does not seem to have set out to write a work of political economy......... rather he aimed to study social production......... by looking critically at the contemporary science of social production" (3). It is reported that the critique of the orthodox had a two-fold aim: to contribute to the central problems of the tradition, and to reveal the logic of enquiry in concert with deciphering the 'mysterious' categories of the orthodox. In connection with this second aspect Carver offers a summation which will stand as general. Noting that Marx's critique is subtle and allusive and consequently none too easy to follow, he remarks "Also, he does not limit himself to criticism, but investigates the questions which interest him, and then develops his own point of view - a characteristic Marxian procedure" (4).

This characteristic breadth of scope is picked up by those who would affirm the propriety of this mode of enquiry. The explicit contrast is often drawn with the restricted, partial, institutionalized discourses of the various orthodox sciences of the social. This rejection of compartmentalism is the most general starting point for Cardoso and Faletto, who in recording in most general terms their intellectual history, take note
of the impact of US academic social science and detail their response to it. They state: "We attempt to re-establish the intellectual tradition based on a comprehensive social science. We seek a global and dynamic understanding of social structures .."(5). Beyond this they lodge themselves specifically within a tradition; thus "......we stress the socio-political nature of the economic relations of production, thus following the nineteenth century tradition of treating economy as political economy. This methodological approach, which found its highest expression in Marx, assumes that the hierarchy that exists in society is the result of established ways of organising the production of material and spiritual life"(6).

This point in respect of breadth of scope is echoed by Palma, who reviews the 'school of dependency' and accords Cardoso pride of place. At the end of the review it is observed that "The principal common element in these approaches is the attempt to analyse Latin American societies through a 'comprehensive social science', which stresses the socio-political nature of the economic relations of production; in short the approach is one of political economy, and thus an attempt to revive the 19th century tradition in this respect"(7).

Political economy not only differs from orthodox social science in the case of the catholicity of its intellectual interest and practicality of intent, but it also differs in the overall 'shape' of its method. According to Carver, Marx draws a distinction between logical analysis "in which something complex is resolved or broken up into simple elements"(8), on the one hand, and, on the other, logical synthesis which "proceeds in the opposite direction in order to reproduce the concrete in a conception"(9). It is the second procedure that is taken by Marx to represent the proper direction of enquiry for political economy (and Carver taking note of the approaches in Grundrisse regards these as following more or less this 'direction')(9a). The effort is one of the intellectual 'reconstruction of the real'. Thus it is noted that "Marx develops the
view that his concrete result, achieved by a process of synthesis, is also the 'actual starting point', the starting point which actually exists; in other words to perform the synthesis properly he must, at the beginning, presuppose actuality in order to arrive at the summarized conceptualized concrete" (10). It would seem that Cardoso and Faletto have absorbed this point, a sort of strategic teleology of argument, for they use the otherwise curious phrase "Our approach of course assumes and demonstrates that ...." (11) (our emphasis). We take them to be invoking the idea of logical synthesis: they reconstruct the real in a disciplined fashion in the hope of uncovering its inherent possibility for the future, and the 'real' they identify is an inequalitarian and exploitative social organization of dependent capitalism.

As a scheme of enquiry/explanation, political economy is clearly sharply distinct from the orthodoxy. Enquiry does not proceed by abstraction from the given, generalization and model building; and nor is explanation linked with, or made in some fashion analogous to causal predictiveness. Instead enquiry proceeds by the technically explicit, categorical 'reconstruction of the real'. To explain is to make sense. Of Marx's notion of 'science', Carver notes: "The searching process for Marx was essentially active, investigative, critical and practical; a scientific presentation, in his view, seems to have been one which solved conceptual mysteries and presented the human world accurately, intelligibly and politically" (12).

The differences just noted have been represented in recent critical-theory-inspired work in the guise of a distinction between validation and authentication; which notions we took note of in our Prologue. Cardoso and Faletto seemingly anticipate this distinction when they treat the issue of 'measurement'. They reject the model of social scientific explanation presented in orthodox US work, and assert that "The accuracy of a historical-structural interpretation has to be checked by confronting its delineation of structural conditions..."
and trends of change with actual socio-political processes" (13). They speak of two elements "construction of interpretation and...its practical validation"(14), and note that "the demonstration of an interpretation follows real historical process very closely and depends to some extent on its own ability to show socio-political actors the precise solution to contradictory situations" (15 - 16).

2.2 The character of argument in political economy

If we note briefly the detailed character of argument in political economy, we can introduce a discussion of the substantive efforts we have treated earlier in the study and show the link to our third concern for this chapter: the political economy of dependent capitalism. At the same time we can add some more specific criteria of evaluation to our 'examples'.

Here Rockmore can aid us. We have seen earlier that he is concerned with the extent to which philosophy informs Marx's work, and at one point he asserts that in order to grasp the scope of Marx's effort it is proper to regard it "as a unity in terms of its philosophical aspect"(17). Reviewing these matters moves him to the conclusion that "three of marxian philosophy's distinctive characteristics are monism, a categorical scheme and philosophical anthropology, all of which are general features of 19th century philosophy"(18). Expanding upon these points, Rockmore moves to consider the realization of philosophy: a matter necessitating, as a pre-requisite, an analysis of social circumstance.

The shape of this, so far as he is concerned, flows from the philosophical scheme just noted: it is observed that "Marxian politico-economic theory in general can be accounted for solely in terms of two elements drawn from Marxian philosophy, the general categorical approach and the specific category of activity, which derives from his philosophical anthropology"(19). In regard to this category 'activity', we read it as invoking the notion of homo faber(20), presented in capitalist society as alienated labour. This scheme for encapsulating the fundamental character of marxian (and thereby
all, if its good) political economy we have borrowed and presented in the simplified form of the slogan 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame', which we take to describe the general process of this style of theorizing.

The matter of the politico-ethical orientation of the distinguishable efforts within the 'career' of 'development-studies' was dealt with in Chapter Two. Hence we will not ask after Marx's philosophical anthropology; the locus, we have supposed, of his ethic. However, we can ask after the 'categories' used in 'reconstructing the real'. What is their character, just what categories are used, and where do they come from? Much of this has been anticipated above.

Carver notes of Marx's 'Introduction' (1857) that "A great deal of his work in this text is an effort to investigate a number of fundamental questions - particularly questions about the logical relations that obtain among the concepts and 'categories' of political economy"(21). Of the term 'category' itself we find, in a note, that "Marx sometimes uses 'category' to cover both the sense of 'concept' as the idea of a thing in general and in the sense of the more specific term 'category' as a class or division formed for a particular discussion or inquiry" (22). This double aspect seems to come out in the section of the Introduction (1857) which treats the method of political economy: the generality of ideas and their specificity in respect of some particular economic form.

This treatment of the method of political economy presents, as we have seen, the idea of logical synthesis as the proper direction of explanation. This direction of explanation reconstructs the real, from the simple and abstract to the complex and concrete, but it is not to be confused with the actual genesis of the real. These two aspects, explanatory categorical reconstruction of the real and the actual history of the real, are 'related' in subtle and diverse ways: the relation is occasioned by Marx's view ('language is practical consciousness') that economic categories are expressions of social relations. The scope for confusion is wide;
Marx concludes that economic categories can appear more or less elaborated in more or less developed economies, but clarity in formulation and grasp of simple categories only comes in modern, industrial, society.

Marx discusses 'labour', and indicates that discovering economic categories is not just an intellectual effort; it depends upon change in society. Carver sees this as a "...specification of his general thesis on social determination of ideas..."(23). Marx congratulates Adam Smith on coming up with the idea of 'labour', but adds: "Indifference towards any specific kind of labour presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labour of which no single one is any longer predominant"(24). Labour, as such, only becomes a plausible element of discourse when actual social labour attains a certain character — a general interchangeability within the division of labour. Marx notes: "This example of labour shows how even the most abstract categories despite their validity — precisely because of their abstractness — for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations" (25).

Cardoso and Faletto grant this notion of specificity of concepts, and read it as an injunction to specificity in their enquiries; they seek the intellectual frame of dependency in specific economic forms. Presuming a comprehensive social science, they note that "...the crucial methodological question was to delineate moments of significant structural change in countries characterized by different situations of dependency"(26). Or, again, "Our analyses of concrete situations requires us to find out what forms of social and economic exploitation there are"(27). Of their entire effort they observe that: "If the analytical effort succeeds, general platitudes and reaffirmations about the role of capitalist modes of production can turn into a lively knowledge of real problems. It is necessary to elaborate concepts and explanations able to show how general trends of capitalist expansion turn into concrete relations among men,
classes and states in the periphery. This is the methodological movement constituting what is called the passage from an 'abstract' style of analysis into a 'concrete' form of historical knowledge" (28). It is this element—specific enquiry, for the intellectual means to reconstruct the real—that is heavily stressed by Palma. As he says: "In my view some of the most successful analyses within the dependency school have been those which analyse specific situations in concrete terms" (29).

Carver summarizes thus: "Marx declares that the most abstract categories though valid (in the sense that they are logical universals) for all forms of society are nevertheless very much the products of a long historical process of development. They can only be formulated at a late historical stage when social life has become diverse and complex, and only in a developed society do they posses their 'full validity', their full range of connotations and denotations" (30).

The vantage point of a developed society permits the analysis of the economic forms of the less developed: "The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc. But not at all in the manner of those economists who smudge over all historical differences and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society" (31). Marx, quite clearly, would not have been too pleased with 'modernizers' such as Rostow: "The so called historical presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and since it is only rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to criticize itself........it always conceives them one-sidedly" (32).

Marx concludes his discussion of the method of political economy by noting that in any society one particular form of production is the key to grasping the essence of that society. He says, "In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign
rank and influence to the others "(33). In regard to modern society "...capital is the all dominating economic power of bourgeois society. It must form the starting point as well as the finishing point...."(34). The detail of Marx's political economy is beyond our scope, but we may note with Rockmore that "Marx began his investigations with commodity analysis, out of which he then generated the remaining portions of his politico-economic theory"(35). Here the notion of commodity analysis is taken to derive from the "general categorical approach and the specific category of activity"(36). If the notion of 'commodity' seems to be the key Marx uses for grasping the nature of the capitalist economy, then Cardoso and Faletto similarly pursue an essential characterization of their task. Thus granting the notions of a 'comprehensive social science' of political economy, and taking Marx as the pre-eminent figure in the tradition, they seek to understand the set of social relationships typical of dependent capitalism as these present themselves in particular specific circumstances.

In the light of Marx's notion of social determination of ideas, and his view of the core of his society, we can understand his undertaking the critique of political economy. As Carver says: "There were two advantages for him in starting his study of capitalist production by investigating, in a critical way, the concepts and theories of political economy: they attempted, with a certain amount of success to describe and explain economic activity in capitalist society; at the same time they were marked, in his view, as products of that society"(37). Carver takes Marx to have a dual objective: he is aiming to improve political economy, to actually comprehend in an adequate fashion the dynamic of social production in bourgeois society; and concomitantly, he is aiming to unravel the intellectual machineries of the bourgeois theorist, to reveal their conceptual equipment as being adequate, at least to some extent, to a social world itself mis-shapen (38). This intellectual/practical discovery is Marx's contribution to the struggle of the historically progressive class, the proletariat. The
effort in the end is resolutely practical in intent. In this vein, Nicolaus argues that Marx began his theoretical researches after the failure of the revolutions of 1848 under the leadership of the petit bourgeoisie: "...the defeat of this influence, next time, and the elevation of the working class to the position of leadership of the revolutionary camp as a whole, next time, was the overriding aim of Marx's studies" (39).

Cardoso and Faletto appear similarly practical. After the failure of nationalist developmentalism in Latin America in the early 1960's, and in the case of Cardoso's homeland, Brazil, the anticipated collapse into authoritarianism, they seek to identify the possibilities for the future. In sum, they aver that: "It is not realistic to imagine that capitalistic development will solve basic problems for the majority of the population. In the end, what has to be discussed as an alternative is not the consolidation of the state and the fulfilment of 'autonomous capitalism', but how to supersede them. The important question, then, is how to construct paths towards socialism" (40 - 41).

23 Implied criteria of explanatory adequacy.

From the foregoing notes on the matter of the nature of the mode of enquiry called political economy, taken here as the central example of social theoretic engagement, we can derive a set of criteria of adequacy with which to judge such efforts. This issue of judging competing ideological schemes has been touched upon earlier. At the very outset of the study (in chapter two) we contrived a 'model of the crude' as a reference point around which distinguishable efforts in the 'career' of 'development-studies' could be placed. This 'model of the crude' was generated by negating, on a most general level, the requirements of reflexivity of thinking on matters social. Thus a 'crude' effort was unreflective in matters of conception and intent. This is how we 'located' various efforts relative to one another.

The notions of conception and intent were deployed throughout the study as the (sociology of knowledge-informed) keys to the analysis of specific social
theoretic efforts. At the same time our Prologue had established the idea that social theorizing entailed the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'. We ran these together at the end of Chapter Six and we identified three sorts of reflexivity in conception: value-sensitivity, engagement (a notion of agent-of-theory-execution was involved), and self-disclosure (the effort explains itself). In respect of the exchange of conception/intent, we gestured to notions of conceptual richness and appropriateness of categorical frame. In the case of intent, we read this as a matter of practicality: is the intent tenable, is it proper? It was with reference to this set that we suggested that ideologies might be ranked according to rational criteria. We now have a third line of approach to this general issue of weighting competing alternatives; it flows from our notes on political economy. Appropriately, given the 'balance' of the earlier work (that is, moral intent has been discussed at length, especially in Chapter Two; self-reflexivity was stressed in Chapter One), this lets us focus on the 'categorical' part of the slogan 'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'.

The criteria of adequacy implied in our discussion of political economic argument can be taken as treating the matters of the problem appropriateness and conceptual richness of categorical frames of enquiry. Thus the first criterion to be drawn from discussion is that of breadth of scope. We have, in political economic enquiry, typically, the pursuit of 'comprehensive social science': the approach is general in the sense of its 'level' of treatment and in the sense of the resource base used. The second criterion indicates that political economic argument must be practical in intent; the attempt to construct abstract and neutral social technologies is deemed unsatisfactory. (At this point we might note that one area of development of these particular remarks would be to ask how this 'practicality' sits with the notion of 'engagement'; that is, an effort's having an
agent-of-theory-execution, noted above). The third criterion of ranking which derives from our discussion of political economy concerns the strategy of argument adopted: the 'reconstruction of the real' is taken as appropriate and scientific, and consequently familiar scientistic modelling schemes are rejected as falsely conceived.

The above noted criteria may be taken as somewhat 'formal'. To these we add two further criteria, which involve wider commitments in respect of the nature of the world and the relation of thought to it. The fourth criterion recalls that concepts are occasioned by specific economic forms; and that whilst their application is inevitably going to be general, their fullest expression is going to be specific to some historical economic form. The fifth criterion derives from the argument that the economic form 'bourgeois capitalism' is complex enough to occasion a set of economic categories adequate to the comprehension of all other, existing and preceding, economic forms.

We can consider our illustrative material, in the light of the above, around the questions of (a) practicality of intent (engagement); (b) strategy of explanation; (c) substantive categories used (where the use of such notions as 'capitalism' is taken as proper).

(a) Practicality of intent we have come across at several stages in the study. We have argued, following Dobb, that a social theoretic effort of ideology construction needs must specify an agent of theory execution, else the effort does not engage with the world; it becomes ideological in the familiar pejorative sense, or (as we should say) tends to 'low grade ideology'. In the 'career' of 'development-studies', a variety of 'engagements' have been noted, and in the ambit of the orthodox interventionist schemes this is typically a matter of adopting the role of 'the expert'. So we have the expert as technician in the case of the Harrod-Domar informed 'growth-theory'. Development is equated with economic growth, identified by the movement of statistical economic indices, and is to be secured by the implementa-
tion of policies identified in accord with the results of the (natural) science of economics. Policy generation tends to become a simple (if hugely elaborated) technical matter of professional problem solving. This general pattern is repeated, in more grandiose fashion, in the case of 'modernization-theory'. Here engagement is conceived as technical but the role is that of expert as master scientist. Development is still taken as a matter of promoting economic growth, but this is lodged within a frame claiming to treat wider matters of social change.

We have argued that the role of the expert is an evasion of matters of valuation: writers using this stratagem pretend neither to complete neutrality—for that would be both immediately implausible and, taken more theoretically, manifestly absurd (involving a denial of relevance) — nor do they explicitly argue a case. The role of expert, as a claim to a particular status in the political process, is grasped as the social science analogue of the role of the natural scientist; it serves to provide a legitimating scheme allowing the 'expert' to adopt, or aspire to, the position of extra-systemic cause (42). 'Theory' becomes technical manipulative summary of the results of modeling the world.

With 'Neo-Institutional social theory' (NIST) we confronted a third variety of the role of the expert, and this time we also find an argued case. With 'NIST' the 'expert as planner' was lodged within a view of the world which argued that in periods of social crisis valuation matters become obvious, and indeed politics reduces to planning. This scheme we found to be deeply plausible, in fact the most plausible of all these earlier efforts, but at the same time deeply flawed. Its solution to the problem of values—that is, the appeal to crisis—occasioned 'obviousness'—was deemed to be sophistry; and the engagement of the scheme, via the actions of the 'reasonable men' in charge of a reforming state, was taken to be implausible, an implausibility that was announced by the notion of the 'soft state'.
With 'dependency' the engagement issue was rather more involved. Thus Furtado (our exemplar) begins by affirming the pursuit of relevance (problem specificity) and casts the effort within the frame of an orthodox empiricism. His early work is dominated by the idea of a typology of models of structures of dependent economies. The later work broadens the project: thus Marx is invoked in a distant fashion, and the 'historical/institutional/structural method' is affirmed. The familiar 'dependency' line now emerges. Furtado conceives his effort as an interpretive interventionism; the engagement is thus close to that of the expert, yet also politically nationalist in a general way. More difficulties of interpretation arise when we discover that this 'dependency' scheme is taken by Furtado to be the basis not only of an economics relevant to Latin America but also of an economics relevant to the circumstances of the developed, in contradistinction to an orthodoxy perceived as generally irrelevant. The vacillation in Furtado's work between problem specificity, on the one hand, and the urge to generality (taken, it seems, from orthodox notions of propriety of scientific explanation) recurs throughout his work and throughout the work of the 'school' of which we have taken him as exemplar.

This slide to the general reappears, it may be argued, in the related line which we labelled 'underdevelopment-theory'. Here our exemplar was AG Frank and his surplus appropriation scheme, and the Baran-inspired line of which it is a part. Palma argues that this is 'mechanico-formal', in the end an inversion of the orthodox. This criticism has some point; yet contrariwise we have argued that Frank's earlier work, in particular, is coherently engaged, in the mode of the pamphleteer. That is, Frank's agent of theory execution is the political activist, who is omni-present in his work precisely because he casts himself in that role. Frank's work is transitional, between an orthodox-derived 'structuralism' and a marxian-inspired scheme of 'dependent capitalism'; and it seems to us that both readings, though apparently
contradictory, are tenable in that the work of any one theorist must present itself in diverse aspects. Palma is concerned less with the immediate circumstances of production of work and more with an abstract and general discussion of method. Indeed this last point is perhaps the key to the cogency of Palma's attack. For in his later work Frank is, it would seem, concerned to reconstruct the marxian-theoretical base invoked (in very general terms) in the early work; there is, that is to say, a shift from activism to scholarship. It is in connection with the later area that Palma's attack strikes home.

With the later work of Frank we come across the last area of effort in the history presented in this study: 'neo-marxism'. The matter of engagement is again complex: with Debray/Fanon we found it useful to distinguish the three roles of practitioner/theorist/commentator, and argued that with the later Frank and 'neo-marxism' there was a shift from activists to scholars, where scholarship was taken as a variety of commentary. The engagement of the scholar we suggested, following Habermas, centred upon the critique of ideology; but in the work of the 'neo-marxists' we found evidence of a slide to generality that issued in what resembled, in some cases, a nascent 'left policy science' (see the critic Taylor, for example); which notion clearly is not marxian. As regards political economy, it would seem that the adoption of this mode of enquiry in the circumstances of mature capitalism would constitute, on the critical theory line's view, an indirect engagement at best. And when this mode is adopted in respect of the Third World, it involves, it might be argued, the not altogether obviously satisfactory analogy of agent/ally. Thus it is implied that Third World theorists and their allies needs must use political economic argument. But now plausible is this role of ally?

(b) The efforts of the orthodox and, in various ways, of those calling themselves marxist, adopt what Hindess dubs the 'epistemology of models'. In our substantive analyses this matter of the impact of the
common sense notion of scientific explanation was a principal concern. Again, as we move through the period of our history, the examples of the unfortunate effects of this mistaken acknowledgement of the supposed procedures of natural science become increasingly subtle.

Thus the earliest efforts at grasping the nature of the exchange of rich and poor nations revolve around the Harrod-Domar model. We argued that H-D was a narrowly conceived effort in that its empiricism and aprioristic model building, together with its use of the syntax of natural science, issues in policy science. Modelling—the pursuit of some analogue of reality, corresponding to how things really are—we take to be a fallacious procedure because descriptions of the world are theory-informed; that is, 'facts' are 'brute-relative'. Consequently a 'general description' or 'model' properly conceived can only be regarded as the sum of the commitments entered into by the theorist insofar as he affirms some frame or other of analysis. If his effort is to be plausible this, we might expect, would encompass the world of common sense (that is, what the realistic model builders begin and end with), but it would not be bound by it. In the present case, via a formal consideration of certain aspects of the Keynesian scheme, Harrod proceeds to execute an elaborate series of manipulations of certain notions and to derive from them policy conclusions. We have noted Robinson's scepticism, both of Harrod's effort and the strategy itself as symptomatic of certain bad habits in economics. The scientism of modelling was something we have stressed: abstraction and generalization from common-sensically read experience, coupled with formalism in presentation and more or less explicit claims to the status of (natural)science, all issue in efforts that are scientific. The syntax of natural science compounds errors of conception, and any residual sensitivity on the part of the theorist as to what is involved in social theoretic work is dissipated. The theorist comes to take his efforts as analogous to those of the natural scientist, and the 'role of the expert' thus emerges.
To our mind this is all very low grade ideology. This is very clear in the case of 'modernization-theory' where a model of the modern is affirmed that is transparently a general characterization of the USA, according to the orthodox view. This model of the modern is contrasted with a model of traditional society — called forth by negating the former — and this fundamental dichotomy is elucidated by reference to a further set of dichotomies: rural/urban, agrarian/industrial etc. The process of 'modernizing' entails losing one set of attributes and gaining the other, thus effecting the shift from 'traditional' to 'modern'. The basic crudity is appalling, even in its elaborated versions.

More sophisticated in comparison are the efforts of 'NIST'. Again modelling is the basic approach, but here there are additional stresses on problem specificity, realism in modelling and reflexivity in engagement. 'NIST' represents what can be called a 'sociologised economics', and we considered at some length the use made by 'NIST' of the resources of social science. We found that, epistemologically, fine-grained data was necessary for the construction and checking of concepts; methodologically, social science data establishes the possibility of realistic models and social science concepts their general structure; and finally, procedurally, the habit of reflexive scepticism is used to generate criticisms of proffered formulations. This reflexivity does not extend to reading social theorizing as a matter of ideology making, but rather it is a partial effort: reflexivity appears as an additional technique which serves to permit better modelling. We reported that we took this to be the most sophisticated and plausible interventionist scheme.

When it comes to marxian-informed exercises, the issue of whether or not a correct strategy of explanation is being used becomes rather more cloudy. With Furtado, who makes play in his late work with a rehabilitated Marx, the tensions between problem specificity and generality of formulation colour his entire approach. In the end, what began as the search for an economics relevant to Latin America is taken to issue
in the construction of a new, and generally applicable, economics. The effects of the epistemology of models conception of enquiry continues in avowedly marxian efforts. Frank, for example, is taken to be pursuing 'mechanico-formal models' by Palma; and Frank's use of a simple explanatory frame and the syntax of the natural science orthodoxy permits this reading. An analogous slide to the general can be detected, it would seem, in some academic marxian scholarship; there is a retrogressive collapse into the orthodoxy, which issues in general schemes that ignore the matter of the necessary specificity of the theorist's engagement. General models of 'the one revolutionary path' are of little use.

Turning directly to the matter of the procedure of the 'reconstruction of the real', in contrast to modelling, then in respect of the strategy of explanation adopted by 'neo-marxism' we find ourselves in a quandary. In respect of the (sometimes furious) debate about whether or not Baran et al are really marxists we are agnostic. Baran, the 'father' of the 'neo-marxist' approach, begins with the notion of surplus, which is both an economic and an ethico-political evaluative notion, and proceeds to account for the present circumstances and future possibilities of Third World 'dependent capitalism'. This on the face of it looks like logical synthesis; but Baran has been called a 'left-Keynesian', and the effort of 'neo-marxism' subjected to detailed and extensive criticism. Equally these criticisms tend to focus on showing now Baran's substantive analytical machineries diverge from those deployed by Marx; which strictly would seem to be a largely irrelevant issue unless we are to suppose that the world has more or less stood still over the last century. The more appropriate question, suggested by Palma, is not whether or not this or that approach closes with, or diverges from, the substance of Marx's work, but rather whether the effort is good or bad political economy. It would seem to be difficult to deny that Baran's work is political economy; and if its reception says anything about its problem appropriateness, then evidently we must grant
it that also.

(c) In respect of the substantive categories deployed we can, at a most general level, note a shift from narrowly conceived technical schemes of economics-based work (growth theory, modernization) through elaborated sociologised economics (NIST, dependency) to full-blown marxian-informed efforts. The sequence 'orthodox', 'radical', 'marxist' is taken by us to represent an increasing richness of elements of categorical frame. The ideological schemes become subtler as attempts to constitute an autonomous discipline of 'development-studies' fail.

2.4 Summary note

To recapitulate; social theorizing as it presents itself in the business of the construction of ideological schemes, considered here in the context of the prime case of political economy, may be taken to entail the deployment of a morally informed categorical frame. In terms of a check list of attributes that slogan can be unpacked as follows: theorizing must be (i) problem centred; the pursuit of academically bounded scientifically conceived general schemes is disavowed; (ii) circumstance specific, that is, acknowledging that its business is with particular problems in particular places at particular times; (iii) reflexive (and this can be read as the methodological corollary of ii), as a routine matter of course rather than occasionally or as technique for improving orthodox efforts; (iv) engaged, (where this can be read as a methodological corollary of i); unless the theoretical efforts specify an agent of theory execution, the work cannot be taken to latch onto the world; (v) categorical-morally informed; so most generally we affirm that 'theory' is central to explanation.

3.0 Critique.

If the foregoing indicates what can be taken as the prime conception of social theoretic engagement, then what of the corollary, ideology-critique? Ideology
critique, as it presents itself in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, may be taken as a circumstance/problem-specific extension of marxian enquiry: it is moreover well suited to the academic institutional location of many 'Western' social theorists. Three elements order our remarks:(a) the backdrop of this tradition of critique (b) the critique of ideology;(c) comparative ranking. As we have already had occasion to make reference to Habermas we will approach these matters through considering his work, and only thereafter will we make any wider references to the Frankfurt School or 'humanist' marxisms. Yet at this point it must be clearly understood that our remarks are preliminary, tentative and largely untutored; that is, we make no pretence to a developed grasp of Habermas, much less do we take ourselves to be contributing to the further elucidation of the ideas of this tradition. Our interest is narrow: (i) a circumstance and problem specific extension of Marx? (ii) with implications for 'Western'(academic) theoretic engagement with the Third World?

(a) McCarthy argues that the treatment of the relationship between theory and practice has been an "abiding concern"(43) of Habermas. Observing the decay of the classical notion of politics (in Aristotle, politics did not pursue the rigorous understanding of science; rather it sought phronesis, a prudent understanding) into positivist-informed schemes of technical control, Habermas speaks of a 'technocratic consciousness'; where this pursues an ideal of the effective abolition of politics in favour of "objective necessity disclosed by experts"(44). The crucial question becomes the establishment of a politics appropriate to scientific civilization; and the key to that would seem to be the reconstruction of the public, a sphere of free discussion.

According to McCarthy an outline of Habermas' scheme is to be found in his 'Knowledge and Human Interests'. Here we find the tri-partite scheme of 'interests': the technical interest of the empirical analytic, presently cast in logical empiricist(positivist) guise; the pract-
-ical interest of the historical hermeneutic sciences concerned with rendering the social world intelligible; and thirdly the emancipatory interest of critical theory. Now of this last, Habermas makes Marx's materialist presentation of the Enlightenment's stress on reason the prototype — although never developed by Marx, who regrettably collapsed into scientistic political economy.

At this point we may note two things. (i) Of Habermas' fellow Frankfurt School marxist Marcuse, MacIntyre has suggested that far from 'up-dating' Marx, what Marcuse accomplishes is the re-invention of that Young Hegelian 'critical criticism' which Marx was at pains to break from. ("Is the resemblance between Marcuse and the Left or Young Hegelians whom Marx criticised superficial?" Answering 'no', MacIntyre suggests that "...we ought at least to consider the hypothesis that Marcuse is not a post-marxist, but a pre-marxist thinker who has regressed to just that practice of 'criticism'...... which Marx criticised" (45-46) MacIntyre later confirms the suspicion and observes that Marx's view of the fate of critical criticism is appropriate to Marcuse also). This, or some analogous suspicion must attach to the work of Habermas. If, as seems to be the case, Habermas wants to make 'criticism' not only the presently relevant mode of social theoretic engagement for the European left, but also, further, the paradigm of social theoretic engagement, then this, on our view of political economy as prime form of social theorizing, must be regarded as problematical.

Putting this in a slightly different way, we find that there are two elements in this general reading of Habermas. There is, first, the specific critique of scientism, in its various ramifications, taken as the appropriate mode of action (be it a pre-requisite to something else or self sufficient) for democratic thinkers in mature western capitalist society. Put simply, class conflict in the sphere of the cultural. This would seem to be acceptable and compatible with more orthodox notions of marxism. But then, second, there is the claim that critique
is the model of social theoretic engagement, anticipated
but not developed by Marx. Now, here, to our mind, is the
beginning of a collapse into the general; and McCarthy
even hints at an 'early' and a 'late' Habermas, where
only the former has much claim to any obvious contact
with either the world or the marxian tradition.

(ii) The second, linked, note concerns Marx's
dealings with political economy. In contrast to Carver
(et al), treated above, who make Marx's work a unity, Habermas
seems to present a distinction between the critical and
the political-economic. The latter is read as scientific
reduction; that is, we have the familiar Frankfurt School
motif of the division between genuine marxists concerned
with praxis and the mechanistic and wrongheaded follow-
ers of the Engelsian line of 'scientific marxism'. This
reading of Marx—that insofar as he is involved with
political economy he is tainted—is one that, in the
light of our notes on political economy, and in the
light of our arguments (illustrated from the 'career'
of 'development-studies') to the centrality of political
economy in ideology making, we can not share.

Returning to the project of Habermas' critical
theory, drawn from undeveloped elements of Marx,
McCarthy reports that this is accomplished with a
Freudianized historical materialism. Thus 'distorted
communication', ideology, is regarded as a block to
rational behaviour and supportive of the status quo. The
critique of ideology fractures such common sense and
contributes to change in society. Moreover the ideal
of an autonomous self- hood and free exchange is antici-
pated in the structure of language itself; so communi-
cation anticipates and implies free communication. The
pursuit of open debate, a reconstructed 'public', is
compatible with scholarship, appropriate to scientific
civilization, and tends to the realization of democracy.

Giddens treats this in the following way. In respect
of Habermas' notion of ideology as distorted communi-
cation, he notes: "There are two strands in Habermas'
writing relevant to the characterization of ideology—
and its critique.... The first is part of Habermas'
discussion of the development of modern society and politics, the second locates ideology on the level of methodological analysis" (47). The former is the critique of technocratic consciousness, the reduction of politics to technical expertise; whilst the second presents ideology critique as the central mode of enquiry for social science. The social scientist analyses the process of creation and maintenance of structures of meaning, and their extension in the social world. These procedures and their results are presented in a fashion analogous to the therapeutic exchange of psychiatry. In this 'second phase' matters of plausibility, accessibility and problem appropriateness will be relevant to the acceptance (authentication) of the proffered schemes. The therapeutic process is governed, so Habermas argues, by the notion of an 'ideal speech situation', intrinsic to language, which serves as a regulative ideal for discourse (as opposed to speech where consensus holds), and as an ethico-political engagement in that an 'ideal speech situation' supposes free debate, an 'open society'.

Speaking of these three 'interests', Bernstein remarks that "Habermas' synthesis comes into sharp focus when we examine the third type of knowledge-constitutive interest: the emancipatory interest. It is at once derivative, and the most basic cognitive interest. If we reflect upon the forms of knowledge and rationality guided by the technical and practical interests, we become increasingly aware of the internal demand of reason for free, open communication, and for the material conditions permitting such communication" (48).

McCarthy goes on to review the subsequent progress of Habermas' thought, and regards the increasingly abstract treatment of these issues as resulting in a situation where an 'early' and a 'late' Habermas can be identified. Bernstein too sees this problem; he notes: "...the very self-understanding of the nature of a theory with practical intent by critical theorists requires the existence of a group or class of individuals to whom it is primarily addressed, and who will be the agents of revolution. But as critical theory
became more sophisticated, this central political demand played less and less of a role. No critical theorist, including Habermas, has been absolutely clear on this point in the way Marx was. To whom is critical theory addressed ....... What difference is there between the rarefied conception of critical theory, and the errors of the Young Hegelians that Marx so ruthlessly attacked and exposed?" (49).

So much for the most recent and elaborated scheme of critique: in terms of the division identifiable in Habermas' efforts, we wish to consider the early notions of critique. In particular we wish to see if they extend the ideas of criticism developed in treating substantive work in a sociology of knowledge-informed fashion in any useful ways.

(b) In regard to the 'critique of ideology', we need to take note that the term ideology figures in this area of debate in several senses. Thus in the Prologue to this study we made the notion of ideology the key methodological device for social theorizing. We began by citing MacIntyre's view that the limits of thought equal the limits of my world, and the limits of thought represent my exchange with my social world. Social enquiry thus appears as the investigation of language games, in the first instance. This scheme is affirmed in contrast to orthodox scientistic schemes of modelling. From this point two lines diverge. Firstly there is the methodology adopted in this study; that is, we have attempted to grasp the nature of a series of 'language games' via a sociology of knowledge-informed scheme; we have asked after the nature of a series of ideological statements. The second line involves a stronger development of the ontological aspects of the ideas; that is, rather than treating 'ideology' as an investigative key, it is used as a means of constituting more general characterizations of the social world. We took note of this when we referred to Giddens in our Prologue. In his work we find that the notion of 'language constituting the world' can be reinterpreted in a sociological
and dynamic fashion: thus we have the cluster of notions affirming that reality is structured, that these structures are the product and ground of social interaction, that these structures are maintained and change, and that ordinary language itself reflects power distributions. Clearly, in this fashion our simple sociology of knowledge-informed scheme of criticism, in terms of the conception and intent of identifiable social theoretic efforts, can be extended into a scheme that is radically different. In *nuce*, the difference appears to be between a delimited-formal notion of ideology, which attaches to those efforts of political economy we have instanced as paradigmatically social theoretic engagement, on the one hand; whilst, on the other, we have a pervasive-informal notion of ideology which permits the ideological aspects of diverse language games within society to be uncovered.

We have not had occasion to use an extended notion of critique, one resting upon this 'pervasive-informal' notion of ideology. In the Frankfurt School line the critique of ideology is taken as a prerequisite of social change where culture is repressive and the economic form advanced; in such circumstances (mature western capitalism) the critique of ideology in this elaborated sense does indeed make sense as a proposal. In the Third World, where the economic form of capitalism is of a different, 'dependent', type and the polity is rarely equivalent to that of the 'West', the critique of ideology in a more classically marxian guise seems to make better sense. Thus Cardoso and Faletto, treating Latin America, invoke a tradition of political economy best exemplified in the work of Marx. They do not invoke the language-sensitive schemes of critique as treated by Giddens and the other thinkers we have noted.

In a recent essay Giddens reports that the notion of ideology appears in Marx's work in two guises. One revolves around the ideology versus science polarity, and the other (if we understand Giddens rightly) revolves around the sectional interest versus ideology (pejorative) polarity. Now, in our sociology of knowledge-informed
critiques we have followed a line which reflects this division. We have been interested in conception and intent. Of the former we have considered scientism, concerning ourselves with the pervasive impact upon social theorizing of the image of the natural sciences; and with the latter we have asked to what extent do our exemplars of schools actually come clean and argue coherent cases. At this point we could present a resume of the results of our substantive analyses, in order to illustrate these points; however, this would involve a virtual repeat of remarks made in the section on political economy above. Here we will rest content with two illustrations of the debilitating effects upon analysis of the self-deluding affirmation of the general propriety of the (natural) scientific mode of inquiry.

The confusion possible when the image of (natural) science is invoked is illustrated well by the debate, treated in the study, between Girvan and Cumper. These two thinkers debate the character and status of 'dependency'. Girvan has noted in Furtado's work the basis of a claim, on the part of the 'dependency' line, that an independent, novel and coherent 'development-studies' has been established. Cumper disagrees and dismisses Girvan as a self-seeking ideologue. The strange claim to disciplinary independence and the subsequent confused debate between Girvan and Cumper flows from the mistake of presenting a new ideological departure as an advance in conceptualization within an established scientific area of enquiry. This particular fracas reveals that disciplinary independence in 'development-studies' is a chimera that comes from accepting the model of the natural sciences: the real issue between Girvan and Cumper is the comparative ranking of two competing ideological schemes.

A similar confusion is present in the 'argument from a sequence' propounded by Ehrensaft. In trying to secure the claim that there has, in the 'career' of 'development-studies', been progress in conceptualization, Ehrensaft runs together matters of sequences of arguments
and truth status. The former is taken to secure the latter by virtue of an increasingly subtle grasp of the external world. Here again is the image of the natural sciences at work: to our mind, Ehrensaft's argument reduces to a covert appeal to common sense. Citing Dobb, we can see that there is no reason to look for this sort of progressivity in social science where we have competing ideologies. Now, whilst it is easy to conceive of conceptual progressivity within an ideology, between ideologies it becomes a matter of better or worse schemes.

In terms of judging what is good and what is not so good in the way of analyses of the circumstances of peripheral economies within the world capitalist system, that is, 'development'—then it seems to us, in the light of the foregoing reflections, that the line of critical theory which culminates in Habermas is overly concerned with the subtleties of the investigation of meaning systems within the developed countries. If however our aim is to grasp the issue of 'development', then the simpler notions of critique—those flowing from consideration of ideology-making—are likely to be more fruitful.

In summary: we have taken the production of elaborated and extensive ideological schemes to be the prime case of social theorizing. The efforts of the 19th century political economists are taken as best examples, with Marx pre-eminent. This mode of engagement is displayed in the work of Cardoso and Faletto, to whom we will shortly turn. The notion of ideology-construction readily calls forth the notion of critique, and we have been concerned to look at this. In the Frankfurt School-derived scheme of critical theory, we have taken note of what claims to be both a circumstance-specific extension of Marx and the establishment of a sophisticated scheme of critique. Both claims are problematical; and whilst the questions raised are absorbing, we tend to the view that discussion has become increasingly detached from
the 'real world', and is, in any case, overly self-absorbed insofar as matters of the development of the Third World are concerned. (For example, a democrat confronted by, say, a General Somoza might be well advised to set aside anxieties in respect of elucidations of Habermas in favour of securing a ready supply of Kalashnikovs. We do not want to say that the pervasive-informal idea of ideology cannot be used in Third World polities; but that if theorizing is practical, then maybe delimited-formal schemes will be more immediately useful.). However, there may be one area of enquiry where a critical theory-informed line might be appropriate. This is the area, internal to the developed, of popular perceptions of the Third World and the relationship of these perceptions to the behaviour of rich world governments/business. This question we treat in part 5.0 of this chapter.

4.0 The political economy of dependent capitalism.
A matter that we have had occasion to touch upon earlier reappears at this point. It is the question of what is to count as a properly marxian analysis of the Third World. Debate is occasioned by the blurred lines between 'dependency' and 'neo-marxism', and by the questioned status of the latter scheme.

In regard to discussions of 'dependency', an embracing term for Palma, who argues that the line's "..roots in the tradition of marxist thought" (50) have not been properly brought out. This tradition he then proceeds to review. It is an illuminating effort and presents the analysis of the exchange of centres/peripheries as a legitimate area of enquiry into the dynamic of capitalism. Three attempts to theorize the exchange are identified. First we have those of Marx and Engels, where "..capitalism(is seen) as a historically progressive system which will be transmitted from the advanced countries.....and which will spread through the backward nations" (51). Following this we have the 'classic' theorists of imperialism, treating the circumstances of Russia and regarding Third World possibilities
as "...limited by the new imperatives of the advanced economies"(52). Third in this schema we have the work of the 'neo-marxists' following, pre-eminently, Baran. These works are pessimistic in regard to the possibilities of development of Third World economies so long as they remain incorporated within the world capitalist economy.

Of this last group, Palma notes: "It is in this third phase that the analyses of the dependency school emerge... The core of these analyses is the study of the dynamics of individual Latin American societies through the concrete forms of articulation between 'external factors'... and 'internal factors'... They are therefore a part of the theory of imperialism"(53). Thus does Palma locate 'dependency', as fathered by Baran, in the line of marxian efforts to grasp the exchange of centres/peripheries.

The central figure, for Palma, in this 'dependency' line is Cardoso. We saw above that Marx could be regarded as 'the pre-eminent figure in the important line of enquiry called political economy. This was a view Palma took: he goes on to claim that Cardoso (with Faletto) is a political economist treating 'dependency'. That Cardoso and Faletto, whose joint text we have looked at, are treating 'dependency' is evidently the case. Whether they are adopting the mode of political economy raises less obviously soluble questions. That they take themselves to be political economists working within a marxian line seems on the face of it to be clear. Thus they remark "...we stress the socio-political nature of the economic relations of production, thus following the nineteenth century tradition of treating economy as political economy"(55). They continue: "This methodological approach, which found its highest expression in Marx, assumes that the hierarchy that exists in society is the result of established ways of organising the production of material and spiritual life... we attempt to analyse domination in its connection with economic expansion"(55). So where is the problem; have we not found the properly marxian approach to theorizing devel-
The problem presents itself via two thoughts: the one concerning Baran and 'mechanico-formal analysis', and the other concerning Cardoso and Faletto's self-positioning in respect of Marx.

Palma, in his treatment of the third distinguishable line of enquiry into the exchange of rich/poor within the marxian tradition, has occasion to argue that Baran, Frank, Wallerstein et al, present impoverished and therefore questionable explanations. Briefly sketching the Frankian scheme of the 'surplus extraction chain', established over centuries and now serving to fix peripheral economies in a condition of underdevelopment, Palma raises objections in respect of the argument strategy. He observes that "Frank's error lies in his attempt to explain this phenomenon using the same economic determinist framework of the model he purports to transcend; in fact he merely turns it upside down: the development of the 'core' necessarily requires the underdevelopment of the 'periphery'... he constructs a mechanico-formal model"(56). Contrasting this with the Cardoso line, Frank's approach is condemned for a failure to analyse these matters in terms of the specific characteristics of such societies: "The place which should have been occupied in their analyses by the study of the specificity of capitalist development in Latin America has unfortunately been occupied by easy but misleading concepts such as 'active development of ultra-underdevelopment', 'sub-imperialism' and 'lumpenbourgeoisie'"(57). This call for attention to the specificity of the intersection of particular peripheral economies with the world capitalist economy is repeatedly made by Palma; and recalling our earlier remarks on Cardoso and Faletto it evidently derives from them. Additionally, it is clear that in the light of our review of the nature of political economy, calls for circumstance/problem-specific formulations are appropriate. If we take Frank straightforwardly as a political economist then Palma's critique is apposite; but as we have seen, Frank's work is a little more complex.
than this simple view allows. In regard to Palma's exposition, it seems that he pursues a sociologist's political economy, concerned that analyses should display the exchanges through time of identifiable class groupings. If we now turn to economics-minded thinkers, these objections to what we have termed 'neo-marxism' are presented in considerably more abrupt fashion.

Kay takes the whole 'neo-marxian' effort to have been incorrectly formulated: the claims of the orthodoxy that underdevelopment was an 'original condition' and that the historical development of capitalist metropolises had nothing to do with it were disproved. 'But this is as far as it went. As none of the major works produced by this school was firmly based on the law of value which Marx discovered and elaborated, little progress could be made beyond this point......they let the crucial issue pass them by: capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough' (58).

This concern for the deployment of the 'theory of value' is also shown by Desai: of the general 'neo-marxian' stance of Baran it is observed that "Baran and Sweezy in the Monopoly Capital do not use the value system at all" (59). Desai, like Kay, takes this as the key to marxian economics. The following dismissive conclusion is offered: "Baran and Sweezy's analysis is then a combination of Neoclassical micro-economics, without the assumption of perfect competition, and orthodox macroeconomics. The question whether Marxian economic theory is relevant to contemporary capitalism can easily be answered in the negative after reading Monopoly Capital" (60).

If Cardoso and Faletto are in the line of Baran then they must be making large alterations to the economics and procedural aspects of that scheme. The procedural shifts, from 'mechanico-formal' generality to circumstance and problem-specificity, we have noted. But Cardoso and Faletto are, so far as can be seen, silent on matters of economics. The procedural and sociological (class analysis) and political revisions to 'neo-marxism'
made by Cardoso and Faletto seem, at least in outline, to be clear; but what they would use to replace the economic substance of the dismissed 'mechanico-formal' surplus extraction scheme with is not clear. A doubt arises then, at this point, as to whether or not the scheme advocated by Palma is in fact marxian.

If we shift to our second area of unease we note that Cardoso and Faletto do not, so far as can be seen, actually claim to be marxists. They distance themselves, in a way that the academic Althusserian critics of Baran noted in Chapter Seven do not, from Marx's detailed engagement with the economic substance of the classical tradition of political economy. Marx is taken as an exemplar of a procedure they would affirm to be appropriate to grasping the nature of Latin American economies. They subsume him within a tradition of enquiry in which they lodge themselves. However, the political economy presented by Cardoso and Faletto seems devoid of any economics, save for general elements invoked from time to time in a treatment that seems heavily 'sociological'; thus they discuss the behaviour of interacting groups through history.

Now this is a problem for this study also. We have come to take up a position that resembles Cardoso and Faletto's vis a vis Marx and method. So Marx is taken as exemplar of a tradition of enquiry into which we lodge ourselves, insofar as that tradition and that exemplar are made the paradigm case of social theoretic engagement; against which we locate our own different and restricted critical efforts. Concomitantly we may note that we have come at these matters of political economy out of 'dependency' debates, and not by considering economists on political economy. The suspicion must remain, for the present, that a fully explored political economic analysis of some circumstance or other must involve a significantly larger element of the familiarly economic than Cardoso and Faletto, or ourselves (so far as it might be appropriate) have displayed.

To recapitulate, briefly: given our remarks on Marx and on political economy, the treatment of the detailed
economic aspects of Marx and the marxian tradition, and present discussions of these and their extension to matters of Third World, are outstanding questions. Nevertheless, if we consider the business of revising/recasting/fitting to new circumstances an intellectual scheme, then the work of Baran et al would seem, prima facie, to have been seminal. Palma, let us recall, for all his doubts, does make the 'neo-marxian' scheme the third major effort to comprehend the nature of peripheral economies in the history of the marxian tradition. Subsequent to Baran's early formulations the 'neo-marxian' line has been revised, polished and adjusted over some considerable length of time. That all this work is in error, or is a passing intellectual fashion, seem to be implausible claims. Rather, in line with our above remarks on the nature of social theoretic engagement, we would wish to take the variant of the 'neo-marxist' line presented by Cardoso and Faletto as having established—at least in political, sociological and general economic respects—the essential nature of an elaborated ideological engagement with the Third World. We can now turn to the work of Cardoso and Faletto directly, and take note of Cardoso's career via the exegesis provided by Kahl.

Palma characterizes what he takes to be the third, and most convincing, type of 'dependency' analysis (the others being Baran et al; and the reformulations of ECLA, Furtado and Sunkel) by noting three points. Firstly, that this approach slots the Latin American economies into the world economy, and takes itself to be a re-worked theory of imperialism. Secondly, the internal dynamics of dependency are treated at greater length. Thirdly, there is a thoroughgoing insistence upon the importance of specificity in enquiry. In respect of this third point Palma criticises preceding efforts as 'partial', and urges that attention must be focused on "...how the general and specific determinants interact in particular and concrete situations. It is only by understanding the specificity of movement in these societies as a dialectical unity of both, and as a
synthesis of these 'internal' and 'external' factors, that one can explain the particularity of social, political and economic processes in the dependent societies" (61).

The career of Cardoso we can briefly present by citing the sketch made by Kahl, who is an American sociologist. His stance toward Cardoso recalls strongly that of Gruchy to the 'institutionalists'; that is, the treatment is suffused with an apology for his subject's radicalism. Nonetheless it provides a convenient thumbnail sketch.

Of Cardoso's early work, Kahl says: "Three major influences converged during those years in the mid-1950's. The first was the direct study of the Negro situation in Brazil; the second was a theoretical study of Marxist literature; and the third was participation in radical politics" (62). The early (more orthodox) work treated the position of the Negro in Brazil, but in the early 1960's it is reported that Cardoso's interests shifted. At this time there was a spell of vigorous growth and high optimism. Kahl notes: "There was a widespread feeling that the economy had 'taken off' and that the nation was now engaged in self-sustained economic development. Many believed that the business leaders or 'national bourgeoisie' were heroes who were moving the country... toward... an independent industrial economy and a modernized democratic polity..." (63). In this period Cardoso investigated the community of entrepreneurs who were, according to the orthodoxy of development theory, the key groups in matters of economic progress. It is reported that all this material persuaded Cardoso that the position of the entrepreneurial group in respect of other major groups was fundamentally unstable. "The new industries turned out to be unable to stand on their own feet and were forced to seek external help from international enterprises; the state was too weak to make the reforms that were necessary to widen political participation without creating turmoil" (64). When the US-backed coup of 1964 came Cardoso was not surprised. The next three years were spent with an ECLA group in Chile where
Cardoso worked with Paletto. In parallel with a general reworking of the survey material gathered in respect of the study of industrialists, the notion of 'dependency' was revised and elaborated. In 1967 Cardoso and Paletto published their work 'Dependency and development in Latin America'.

Turning to that enquiry we will now consider specimens of their writing, rather than go on with any more general exegesis. We can look at their study and see how it presents a political economic analysis of the circumstances of Latin America (as seen by theorists actually resident there). In the new (1976) preface to their book, the authors remark that (1) "If the analytical effort succeeds, general platitudes and reaffirmations about the role of capitalist modes of production can turn into a lively knowledge of real processes"; (2) "It is necessary to elaborate concepts and explanations able to show how general trends of capitalist expansion turn into concrete relations among men, classes and states in the periphery". . . . "This is the methodological movement constituting what is called the passage from an 'abstract' style of analysis into a 'concrete' form of historical knowledge" (65). We treat the two elements we have marked in turn; the last quotation recalls the notes of section 2.0 of above.

An example of (1) might be this. Discussing the post-Second World War adjustments in societies to shifts in pre-war class alliances occasioned by changes in relations with the world economy, Cardoso and Paletto make the following report. "In Argentina, where the agro-export sector continued to be economically important, industrialization, although accompanied by substantial redistribution, was not significant, especially in the basic industries. The new situation of the world market presented the alternatives most dramatically: to hold down wages and public expenditures at the expense of the worker-popular classes; or to re-organise and raise the productivity of the agro-export economy in order to use it to continue long term financing of the modern
industrial sector. After the fall of Peron in 1955, the anti-populist opposition chose the latter policy. Nevertheless, the export sector could not by itself impose this objective on the rest of the country, nor could it counteract the pressure of the masses through an alliance with the politically weak industrial sectors, as was attempted by the Frondizi government (1958-62). Military intervention became frequent both as a form of arbitration and as an open reaction against a return to populism. This course of economic development was vigorously blocked by broad sectors of wage earners. It could not be imposed as a policy that, if not legitimate, was at least efficient. Therefore, there was neither development nor political stability" (66).

An example of (2) might be found in their effort to characterize 'the new dependency'. Of this they note that it could be the "...most significant contribution by 'dependistas' to the theory of capitalistic societies" (67) They offer the following: "... peripheral industrialization is based on products which in the centre are mass consumed, but which are typically luxurious consumption in dependent societies. Industrialization in dependent economies enhances income concentration as it increases sharp differences in productivity without generalizing this trend to the whole of the economy... ...accentuating what has been called in Latin America structural heterogeneity" (68).

The elucidation of the various emerging class positions and their relationships over time constitutes the key to Cardoso and Faletto's effort. So they argue as follows: "Inward development in Latin America depended on an improvement in the terms of trade and on some participation by the population in the benefits of development. Momentarily favourable circumstances made it possible to incorporate the masses without excluding the dominant sectors and strata of the period of outward expansion. This incorporation took place through the national populist version of the 'developmentalist alliance' in Brazil under Vargas, and in Argentina under
Peron, and through the 'developmentalist state' in Mexico. When an attempt was made to satisfy the pressures from the peasant and urban popular sectors for greater incorporation, the capacity of accumulation was lowered. This broke an important link in the alliance of political hegemony: the agrarian sector, especially the latifundistas, turned against those urban industrial sectors that might support the demands of the masses; at the same time, the agrarian groups found allies in the industrial and financial groups that could not meet the pressures of the urban popular sectors for higher wages" (69). Thus do Cardoso and Faletto trace the tensions within the typical Latin American economy: a shifting scene of competing, cooperating, cohabiting and mutually un-connected groups, the whole subject to the impact of the world economy, largely beyond any groups control.

This ostensive presentation of Cardoso and Faletto follows our earlier remarks on political economy. Excepting the two problematical points noted, these specimens reveal a Marxian argument strategy: particularly, class analysis. And Cardoso's recent concerns (if Kahl's reports are true) - with the spontaneous modes of organisation of the masses, their potential for effecting change, and the intellectuals ordering/interpreting task - recall the classic statements of the 1848 'Manifesto' on the role of the communist party. It is such specificity of engagement - the element stressed by Palma - which is surely the key to political-economic analysis of Third World societies.

5.0 Democratic critical engagement.
This section will be the most programatic and speculative of this chapter. The earlier sections have been ordered by discussions of particular materials, but here our effort is more prospective. We seek to offer a first approximation of what, in effect, is a frame whereby present engagements might be ordered in the form of a series of study-derived prescriptions as to how democratic-critical engagement treating Third World matters should proceed.
Phrasing a starting question is difficult. If, on the one hand, we proceed by asking just what does it make sense for the 'western' thinker (who will be an academic as like as not) to say about matters of the Third World, then discussion will tend to the epistemic. It will recall the issues associated with our 'first main concern' of this chapter. If, on the other hand, we ask just what is the nature of the social-theoretic engagement with the Third World that could call itself (scholarship-relevant) 'democratic-critical', then discussion tends to the practical. It invites concentration on points falling within the ambit of our 'second main concern'. Here we elect to focus upon the 'practical'; and the 'epistemic' remarks we have made at various times above are here supposed. We will take note of four issues: (1) ideology critique, (2) counter-information, (3) left scientism, and (4) political economy and the matter of agents/allies.

(1) We have taken social theorizing to be a generic term, and would regard the examples and instances of social theorizing to be many and diverse. Each mode we take, ideally, to be circumstance-specific, problem-centred, and occasioning its own typical manner of enquiry. To help us 'fix' debate in position we have offered, and made use of, two exemplars. The idea that social theorizing was, in its most central and unequivocal guise, the construction of ideological schemes whereby action in the world might be ordered and legitimated, we drew from Hawthorne, Gellner, Hollis and Nell, Carver and Giddens. Classical 19th century efforts are paradigm cases of the business of constructing ideological schemas: political economy and marxian analysis. Our second exemplar was the mode of social theoretic engagement called critique. This was taken to be the mode appropriate to mature capitalism, and best instanced in the Marx-derived work of the Frankfurt School.

If we consider the notion of critique, then its character has been approached from several directions in the course of this study. The principal reading of
critique was established with reference to a simple, sociology of knowledge-informed, scheme of conception and intent. This was taken from Dobb and was a straightforward corollary of the notion of ideology-construction which we drew from the above-noted theorists. This reading was subsequently joined by schemes serving to enrich the notion of critique thus far used. The work of Habermas and the commentator Bernstein was noted, as was the analysis of the nature of political economy offered by Carver. Although these three, or four, lines were not assembled into one coherent statement, we have taken them to be compatible. However we have granted one distinction which does seem pertinent to the present discussion.

Critique, substantively, we took to be best exemplified by 'Critical-Theory'; taking this to be the circumstance-sensitive and problem-relevant extension of Marx to the situation of mature (hegemonic) capitalism. The specificity of this Marx-derived effort is evidenced not only in its chosen 'target', cultural criticism, but also in its mode of enquiry. The simple notion of ideology invoked above is capable, when coupled up to analyses of language, of pervasive deployment. The critique of ideology, in our examination of particular distinguishable elements in the 'career' of 'development-studies', we have taken to mean the more familiar examination of self-conscious (more or less) delimited schemes of ideology. The critique of ideology can thus proceed by considering either the delimited and formally elaborated schemes ordinarily understood as ideologies, or it can proceed by considering the pervasive and informal ideological schemes which present themselves as unremarkable common sense.

In the body of this study we have concerned ourselves with the elucidation of a series of ideologies, taken as extensive formal efforts. So we looked at: 'growth-theory', 'modernization', 'neo-institutionalism', and so on. This seems to be a perfectly proper exercise for a 'western' thinker. In terms of judging what is good and what is bad analysis of the Third World, the narrow notion
of critique of ideology seems appropriate and the scheme associated with Habermas seems over-subtle. However we can also note an area of enquiry where attention to pervasive informal ideology critique might be useful.

If we were to consider 'development', 'aid', 'the underdeveloped' etc. just as elements of contemporary societies' common sense explanations of how the world is, then the richer schemes of critique might be useful. We could ask from whence came 'popular' notions of the exchange of 'rich' and 'poor'? How were these images maintained? Which groups' interests do prevalent notions serve, if any? The pursuit of possible means of changing stereotypical views would be the practical intent of these enquiries. To put this another way: whilst the realm of political economy continues to present itself as the crucial explanatory area in treating matters of the Third World, it is nonetheless possible to conceive of an emancipatory critique of 'popular' views of the Third World; seeing this as a pre-requisite to effecting change in the behaviour of powerful groups in society.

(2) A question that follows from the above remarks concerns the extent of critical work. Does the critique of (delimited formal) ideology imply that we should move beyond the displaying of elements of ideologies to the presentation of 'corrected' schemes? That is, should we move from scholarly critique of the efforts of the conventional wisdom to the preparation and dissemination of counter-information?

Counter-information could include, for example, treating the involvement of the UK (taken for the present as a unitary 'thing': the government/business establishment, say) with the Third World. Here it would seem that four areas of enquiry present themselves. (a) The UK as an element of the world economy; here political and trading links to the Third World might be examined. For example in the case of UK firms working in S. Africa this is often done. (b) The UK as a member of the Commonwealth; here the political and trade links to the Third World can be read in the context of 'residues' of Empire.
Recalling the work of some of the historians of colonialism we noted, who spoke of periodic re-workings of the relationship of centres/peripheries, this might be a fairly central area of enquiry. (c) More prospectively, we have the UK as a member of the EEC, a group having extensive contacts with colonial residues, formalized through the Lomé Convention. (d) The UK as a member of the UN. Here we have the 'international-general' level of debate around development issues. We have noted such instances as Bretton Woods, IMF and World Bank and to these we can add a series of UNCTAD conferences and so on. This is an entire area of rich/poor exchange which we have not treated, save in passing.

Bernstein's list of elements of the critique of ideology might be taken to permit such an extension. It was indicated that the critique of ideology involved: (a) a characterization of the effort in question plus a detailing of the means whereby it was sustained; (b) this analysis served to permit efforts to destroy the legitimizing power of the ideology. Indeed, it would seem curious to restrict the efforts of scholarship to the narrowly academic realm. Critical theory, as propounded by Bauman and Fay (amongst others we have mentioned), would certainly expect this mode of social theoretic engagement to present the fruits of its enquiries, at least in the end, in a generally assimilable form. This is essential if the reconstitution of the 'public' is to be effected.

(3) The critique of the ideologies of the orthodoxy of 'development-studies,' and the suggestion above that counter-information schemes might consider the position of the UK in the world economy, recalls the matter of general schemes. We have seen that Cardoso and Paletto argue strongly for specificity in economic/political/social enquiry and reject the pursuit of general explanations. In this we would agree with them. In the light of this we can present one mode of scholarly engagement with the Third World which is spurious.

The manoeuvre of 'exemplification-denyal' has been noted in Chapter Seven, when we looked at some marxist
informed work. We suggested that these scholars exemplified their circumstances in offering subtle and detailed analyses, but then denied their circumstances by collapsing, apparently, into a wholly mechanical politics. Hugely elaborate analyses were taken to have practical lessons, where the measure of practicality was, it seemed, provided by the invocation of the model of 'the one revolutionary sequence'.

The worst case of what might be called 'left-scientism' was exemplified by Taylor. Foster-Carter drew our attention to Taylor's self-conception of academic enquiry as being concerned with the provision of the best possible tools of revolutionary analysis to the theoretically under-developed revolutionists of the Third World. This problem of the ease with which the 'slide to the general' can be effected—even if we do not, like Taylor, embrace it—crops up in our last issue: that of the use of the analogy 'agents/allies'.

(4) The notion of 'agents' is presented in dependency analysis. It serves to underline an obvious, but nevertheless crucial, coincidence of interests between two groups: on the one hand the managements of major multi-national firms; and, on the other, those members of Third World bourgeois industrial and commercial groups with whom they deal. The coincidence of interests admits of a general description based on resemblance; but the crucial point is that this mutuality of interest is occasioned by, and cemented in, their routine business practices. So much for 'agents'; what about 'allies'?

This question arises from considering the efforts of Cardoso and Paletto. They produce a political economic analysis of the circumstances of Latin American economies; and, finding that their present dependent incorporation offers little scope for the future, they turn to the spontaneous organisations of the mass of the populace and ask how these might aid the movement toward socialist change. So who can take on this particular role, this engagement? That their effort is engaged has to be granted; and if we take engagement to be circumstance-specific and problem-relevant, then
it is difficult to see a theorist based in the 'west' being engaged in quite the same way as Cardoso and Faletto.

If we recall the schema of roles which we drew from Debray (in Chapter Seven), then given the trio 'theorist', 'practitioner', 'commentator' the work of Cardoso and Faletto entails taking the first two roles; whereas it is at least plausible to suggest that the thinker based in the 'west' will tend to have open only the role of 'commentator'. So even if both pursue the 'political economy of Latin America' they must do so in different ways. At this point the notion of allies might be introduced; as the multi-nationals have local agents, might not the locally based political economists have international allies? How might this relationship be occasioned and cemented in routine practice? One reply might be to invoke the notion of an international community of scholarship. But this seems dubious: we may grant that there is a single world economy, but we are nonetheless fixed in specific situations. Invoking such general and abstract coincidences of circumstances runs the risk of turning into an excuse for academicism. If we recall our discussion of Young's attack on the New Left cooption of liberation struggles, we can also point out that in rejecting Young's attack we nonetheless insisted upon the significance of the analogies asseted by the New Left. Yet, the notion of an 'ally' clearly is a matter of political sympathy rather than any immediate, routine, coincidence of interest based on routine interaction.

The pursuit of political economic enquiry, it seems to us, must be restrained by insistence upon circumstance-specificity and problem-relevance if the tempting error of the pursuit of the general is to be avoided. This rather suggests that for all the international traffic in ideas that undoubtedly exists, general statements to the effect that 'we are all concerned with world capitalism' must be regarded as declarations of solidarity rather than the basis of a potentially
unified programme of enquiry and action.

In summary, the burden of this section is that social theoretic efforts needs must be sensitive to what it makes sense to say. In political economy this rather implies, in respect of Third World material, adopting a role of commentator and eschewing claims to status of superior theorist. It is true that Marx argued that the more advanced economic form offered the more subtle conceptual armoury; but we cannot see that the circumstances of, say, Cardoso and Faletto, on the one hand, and Taylor on the other are that different. If we want a general summary, then as regards political economic analyses (and excluding the work that fails for the sorts of reasons discussed throughout the study), we are left with a family of them. To attempt to reduce these to one all-inclusive effort would seem to us to miss the point—they are practical, first and last.

With this injunction in mind, we can see that our history of the 'career' of 'development-studies' has shown that a fairly simple notion of critique is usable. However—and here is the corollary of the above notes—if we sharpen this engagement and affirm our insistence on specificity of engagement, then the extended scheme of critical-theory invites study of the obfuscating character of the common sense view of matters of the development of the Third World. The themes are familiar: the Third World is starving, incompetent, tribal, ungrateful etc. etc. It would seem to be appropriate to ask: from whence came these images? How are they maintained, and whose interests do they serve? Again this presentation of critical theory casts the engagement as circumstance specific and problem centred: that is, practical.
6.0 Enilogue.
We began this study by undertaking to prepare an analytical history of the post-war 'career' of 'development-studies' in such a way as to reveal something of the nature of social-theorizing itself. This has been our strategy for elucidating the claims made by Hilal to the importance, for sociological enquiry, of the 'discovery' of the Third World. The substantive work of the study has been concerned with the preparation of sociology of knowledge informed analyses of identifiable 'schools' via exemplars. In this present, concluding, chapter we have tried to go some way towards redeeming our general promises.

What are the main lessons of our enquiry? Considering the question most generally we can briefly note the following.

(1) That social-theorizing is practical. We grounded our study (in the 'Prologue') in a set of claims that made social-theorizing concerned with 'making sense'. Subsequently we have (a) illustrated this claim with our substantive work and (b) used this claim to give shape to our treatments of the historical material. The practicality of social-theorizing is revealed in the substantive work. Each 'school' has been shown to have been producing situation sensitive and problem specific efforts. We have taken this situation/problem specificity to be both (a) the key to displaying the nature of the practicality of the various efforts and (b) as requiring discussion and legitimation in its own appropriate terms and not in terms borrowed from the natural sciences.

After reviewing the 'career' of 'development-studies' it seems quite clear that social-theorizing is fairly directly practical. In general we want to claim that circumstances and problems call forth engagements and that particular sorts of engagements have corresponding forms of enquiry (70).

(2) That social-theoretic efforts are assembled or constructed We take the business of social-theorizing to be with
'making sense' and this manufacture is effected by particular theorists in particular places, at particular times, in response to particular demands. Consequently we think it most fruitful to analyse each distinguishable effort with this in mind. Any effort is taken to be reducible to more or less clear 'pieces of argument'. The reflexive corollary is that as our present works are similarly 'lodged in history' so they too are composed of 'pieces of argument' and that intra-disciplinary, or academic, or 'theoretical' treatment of any given issue should be pursued in a way that makes this obvious.

We take this stance to run counter to the, arguably essentially scientific, common sense of sociology in that the pursuit of a smooth seamless web of description and analysis of the social world is not sought. Instead we look to a mode of enquiry that displays its own presently deployed 'pieces of argument'. Crudely, we take social-theorizing to be more like philosophical than natural scientific enquiry.

Given this dis-integrating view we need to either (a) identify exemplars so as to 'fix' debate (this casts the business voluntaristically) or (b) identify those exemplars which our given social world, or, more narrowly, disciplinary tradition, bequeathes to us. In this second vein we have identified, on the one hand, Marx and Classical political economy and, on the other, Habermas and the tradition of Critical Theory. These we have taken as our two main examples of social theoretic engagement. They locate particular argument-forms in history as a means to 'fix' subsequent, present, discussions. It is principally with the material provided by these two argument-strategies that we have analysed our series of substantive efforts within 'development-studies'.

(3) That treatments of Third World material should proceed in a similar fashion.

As regards social-theoretic engagement with matters of the Third World this too should be specific. Directly engaged work, we want to claim, should specify the problems it addresses, the methods of enquiry adopted and what could count as a solution. (Work claiming to offer ways of
effecting social-change needs must order itself in accord with a specified agent). On the other hand, intra-disciplinary or 'theoretical work', ordinarily understood, must eschew the pursuit of the general and attend to arguments. (71)
Notes

Notes to chapter one.

1. Given that we take enquiry to be a complex exchange between theorist, discipline and society, the language of 'objects' is perhaps unhelpful. The implicit dualism of subject/object, and its requirement that the exchange of subject/object be taken to be essentially one of the accommodation of the former to the dictates of the nature of the latter, is here denied. The review we present of the process of 'object' constitution aims precisely to exemplify our claims in respect of theory informing analysis.


7. C. Leys "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes" Journal of Contemporary Asia VII:1 1977. It might also be noted that our treatment of A G Frank might be thought confusing in that he appears in this history of ours in two places. As the representative of 'UDT'-a position transitional(casting this note in history of ideas fashion) between the sceptical orthodoxy of Furtado's 'dependency' and the critical marxism associated with Baran-and as one figure in the 'neo-marxian' scheme inspired by Baran. Frank's work is not treated in this study as a straightforwardly unified body of enquiry. It seems to us that there are diverse unified body running through it, and different aspects of Frank's work are highlighted as we pursue various issues in his company.

23. The questions revolve around the status Hollis and Nell would accord to abstract theorizing of the sort they execute. Are we to take philosophical reflection as a preliminary? That is, as a means to the construction of analytical machineries which are thereafter applied to the world. Hollis and Nell's arguments rather seem to suggest this. If this is so then we would want to say that they have stood the business of social theorizing on its head. We take practicality as the key to grasping the nature of social theorizing: routine philosophical reflection is made secondary. Issues of 'grounding' have to be settled but they are 'matters arising' and not (intellectually privileged) starting points.


29. What we do not treat is the collapse of these various efforts back into what we might suppose is an eclectic brew of elements drawn from all the schemes (except Marxist) noted—that is, the present 'conventional wisdom'.
Notes to chapter two.

1. 'Anticipate' in the sense of 'introduce early', and not in the sense of 'declaring before the event' what we think results will be. This second sense of anticipate would open up questions of circularity of argument.
9. Phrased thus, it rather seems as if we might consider plunging into the sorts of debate that surround, for example, Winch and his claims vis a vis Azande culture;

continues overleaf........
but this is not so. The 'European categories of thought' we have in mind are those of social analysis, the politico-ethical.


II. I. Sachs "The Discovery of the Third World" 1976.


14. NIST = 'neo-institutional social theory'


Notes to Introduction to Section Two.


5. G Zeylstra "Aid or Development" 1975.


8. There is an ambiguity here: is the first occurrence of 'problem' to be taken to be designating a theoretician's problem, whilst the second occurrence of 'problem' designates a problem ordinarily understood, one general to society or its ruling groups? It seems as if Dobb might be fusing these two; whereas if we follow Giddens with his 'double hermeneutic', we would want to distinguish the two occurrences and make two sorts of problems. The ordinarily accepted problem being simply raw material, pre-digested, for the theoretist who treats it with reference to his own discipline-ruled realm of meanings, which are to be taken as distinct even if they cross-cut with common sense lines.

Notes to Chapter Three

20. C. Napoleoni "Economic Thought of the Twentieth Century" 1963 p. 64.

21. As regards Keynes' personal views, his milieu was the English establishment whose "major unspoken premise ... is that capitalism is the only possible form of civilized society". Sweezy goes on: "in Keynes' eyes, Marx inhabited a theoretical underworld ... and there is no evidence that he ever thought of any of Marx's followers as anything but propagandists and agitators". Keynes' work grows out of neo-classicism and is in terms of structural-political, that is, class analysis, impoverished. Keynes invokes the intervention of the State whenever the market goes awry; and the intervention is "Olympian" remarks Sweezy. (Sweezy in Eagly (ed) (1968) pp. 106/8.)

22. Cf. with O. Graham ("Toward a planned society" 1976) who takes note of a variety of 'liberalisms' in the US establishment: 1. Roosevelt's 'liberalism', a modernist stance favouring cooperation of government and industry regulated by planning machinery. 2. Wilsonian liberalism, favouring a variety of laissez-faire which is informed by notions of the moral stature of early US farmers, that is, the myth of US 'small town'. 3. Secretary Hull's version of this, coloured by depression and equating US interest with both economic liberalism and best interests of world economy. 4. Economic liberalism of 19th century, constructed in UK; this may be taken as the reference point for the
various versions present. 5 Modernist liberalism of Keynesian ideas, prima facie close to Roosevelt's line.


27. Thus Zeylstra, treating these issues, presents what we might suppose is the orthodoxy when he avers that: "Soon, however it became evident that the reconstruction of Europe and the development of backward areas were tasks of altogether different dimensions from those foreseen in Bretton Woods, and would require efforts far beyond the possibilities entrusted to IBRD and IMF. Moreover as a result in particular of the Soviet Union's attitude the spirit of solidarity among the allies did not long survive the end of hostilities, and its weakening dimmed the prospect of a collective approach to world problems as envisaged in Bretton Woods and San Francisco." Zeylstra (1975) p.27.

29. Lichtheim (1972) p.293.
35. This is a curious report to make, in that (a) it rather denies the implicit point of calling his phase two 'recovery proper'; and (b) it clearly runs against the view of the US economist Harris, who makes much of a 'crisis' in 1947 as the occasion for establishing the ERP.
36. This is ambiguous: is he saying (1) aid did do the job; or (2) the announcement of aid contributed to the establishment of general attitudes in Europe conducive to growth, which subsequently followed.
38. S. Harris "The European Recovery Programme" 1948 p.3.
50. Both ontologically, as his alteration to the 'array' is not, usually, taken to alter him; and methodologically, in that his 'self' is no part of the manipulation (though he may for other reasons be pleased/distressed; thus a successful experiment, for example, might advance career prospects as well as human knowledge).

52. P. Strawson "Individuals" 1951.

53. The subject/object dualism, coupled to an empiricist ontology of things, can have clearly unfortunate consequences in analysis. The priority of the 'thing' seems to entail the priority of the 'static'. Thus, for example, AD Smith in his book "Social Change" argues for the logical priority of 'persistence' over 'change' on the grounds that change is always predicated of a pattern or object. The methodological consequence is taken to be that we must start with a given (static) pattern or object. Now here is a movement from logic to method, so where is the link seen by Smith? What he seems to be doing is arguing from the grammar of language to an ontology of things and then back down to method. We can, however, retort that by accepting an ontology of things he thereby accepts the priority of the 'static'. This being so, invoking 'predication of change to objects' as the basis for asserting the priority of the 'static' is a circular argument. Smith does not establish his preference, as he thinks; he merely announces it. Moreover his announcement rests on a reading of the common sense
of ordinary language which, as in this example, can clearly have unfortunate consequences. Smith does not actually say anything about the issue of static versus process explanations.


56. These manipulations were certainly 'ingenious', but quite how 'instructive' they were is rather open to doubt. Brookfield argues that 'growth-theory' quickly became hugely elaborated and wholly out of touch with reality. This mode of enquiry - mechanical and formal - is prone to such manipulations and must suffer as a result. These thoughts we return to below.

58. T. Hutchinson "Knowledge and Ignorance in Economics" 1977.
63. Actually we use Harrod. Domar's work is roughly the same in spirit and conclusion, but begins at a different place and uses differing arguments.
72. Jones (1975) p. 44.
73. Domar sets out from the observation that investment has a dual role. It raises the level of aggregate demand,
and it raises absolute level of an economy's productive capacity. Domar wants to discover the conditions under which the effects of raising aggregate demand fit with the effects of raising productive capacity levels. He identifies a required rate of growth, that which Harrod calls the warranted rate. 

74. Jones (1975) p. 48. This notion of 'Vr' is confusing. Jones expresses it thus: "The increment in the capital stock associated with an increment in output that is required by entrepreneurs if, at the end of the period, they are to be satisfied that they have invested the correct amount, i.e., if the new capital stock is to equal the amount that they consider appropriate for the new level of output and income".


76. Harrod "An essay in dynamic theory" in Economic Journal March 1939: "The dynamic theory so far stated may be summed up in two propositions. (1) A unique warranted line of growth is determined jointly by the propensity to save and the quantity of capital required by technological and other considerations per unit increment of total output. Only if producers keep to this line will they find that on balance their production in each period has been neither excessive nor deficient. (2) On either side of this line is a 'field' in which centrifugal forces operate the magnitude of which varies directly as the distance of any point in it from the warranted line. Departure from the warranted line sets up an inducement to depart farther from it. The moving equilibrium of advance is thus a highly unstable one".


78. In the notation of the economists, what has to happen for there to be steady growth of the system is that Ga = Gw = Gn (where Ga is the actual rate of growth, Gw the warranted rate, and Gn the natural rate). If the equation has its determinants inserted then the problem becomes clear. The elements that determine the three growth rates are independently set, and only accident will bring them into the relation demanded by steady growth at full employment. This is the 'First Harrod Problem', and is a step toward his aim of showing that
the system tends to stagnate. The 'Second Harrod Problem'
might better be called a paradox. It is the problem of
stability. If $G_0$ diverges from $G_w$ then it is likely to
carry on doing so (within limits; presumably there is a
minimum $G_0$ below which an economy cannot fall, given rising
population and improving technology). Once the growth path
is lost, the rational corrective behaviour of the entrepre-
neur is such that things get worse, not better. This problem
is referred to as the 'knife edge'. Jones summarizes thus:
"Three central issues have been noted: a. The possibility
of steady state growth at full employment. b. The improba-
bility of steady state growth at full employment. c. The
instability of the warranted rate of growth" Jones p. 59.
80. Jones p. 89. "We can summarize the relationships
between the Harrod problems and the simple neoclassical
model discussed in this chapter: (1) The first Harrod
problem is removed by the assumption of a neoclassical
aggregate production function implying a variable capital
output ratio, $v$, together with the assumption of perfect
factor markets. (2) The second Harrod problem is by-passed
as a result of the absence in the neoclassical model of an
independent investment function such that the expectations
of entrepreneurs have no influence on the economy in
general and on the determination of aggregate demand in
particular". Now whilst these matters are interesting in
themselves, we are not trying to write an economic
treatise. The reasons for looking at them are: first,
to show neoclassical and neo Keynesian lines of growth
theory exist, contrary to Brookfield; and two, to show
that in economics careful choice of assumptions gets you
any desired answer. That being the case, the epistemology
of models becomes very important as we ask: just what is
the status of such efforts?
82. The notion of model is discussed below with Hindess.
84. Napoleoni (1963) p. 33. As regards (b), we can anticipate
the matters to be looked at in Section Three, by
quoting from Seers and Colin Leys, writing in 1969 for
an IDS seminar, "The Crisis in Planning". Seers notes that "economists as a profession have contributed substantially to the unreality of planning". He points to the economist's training, it will have focused on models, formally elaborate and elegant; "he is hardly prepared, therefore, to look at the economic, let alone the social realities and ask how the resources of the country might be mobilized for change". Seers details the errors and inadequacies built into economic modelling and we pursue these issues throughout this study. Leys argues from the damaging starting point that "the underlying concept of planning contradicts the basic concept of politics", and then proceeds to present a structural-functionalist analysis of policy-making in a political environment; his conclusions being that elaborate models are an elaborate waste of effort.

85. The issue of models and science/mathematics is taken up by Hindess; he looks at the 'epistemology of models' and makes the following claim: "This epistemology shares nothing but the word 'model' with the theory of models in mathematical logic. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said to represent the place and function of models in mathematics or the natural sciences".

"Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences" 1977 p.158

86. Hindess(I977) p.144.
89. Hindess(I977) p.158.
90. Hindess(I977) p.159.
91. Hindess(I977) p.142.
92. Hindess(I977) p.143.
94. The confidence did not last, and by 1967 Mishan can openly condemn the pursuit of growth.
95. Napoleoni(I963) p.20.
97. R. Turner and C. Collis "The Economics of Planning" I977
98. See for example, John Jewkes "Ordeal by Planning" I948 or F. Hayek "Road to Serfdom" I944.
argue that the Labour Party's 'golden age'—that is, the period 1945 to 1951—was not that of the foundation of socialism but rather of the dismantling of a wartime socialist economy. Certainly the establishment of the welfare state was a liberal business; consider Beveridge. Whether the wartime economy was 'socialist' or just a 'wartime economy' is debatable; see for example Joan Mitchell "Groundwork to Economic Planning" 1966.

Some trace back ideas of aid further; thus Brookfield cites pre-war efforts of colonial governments. This sense of 'aid' is however somewhat remote from our use, and although this colonial history is touched upon we do not pursue this line.

In this sentence, the numbers are ours; we note that (1) is general to 'intervention' per se, whereas (2) is specific to a US style of growth economics.

The full categorization is four-fold: 1. economic transfer theories of two kinds: supplemental transfers, displacement transfers; and 2. political transaction theories of two types: recipient oriented comparative politics type, and donor oriented international relations type. See White chapter four.
I28. 1951 UN Report p. 3.
I29. 1951 UN Report p. 3.
I32. 1951 UN Report p. 41.
I33. 1951 UN Report p. 41.
I34. Rao we present simply as an example of reflection upon the export of Keynes. He has published a collection of essays under the title "Essays in Economic Development" (1964), and in a series of articles which were produced in the early fifties he takes issue with various points in the Keynesian lexicon as they are applied to matters of the underdeveloped economies.
I40. Brookfield (1975) p. 32.
I41. 1951 UN Report p. 49.
I42. Robinson (1949) p. 83.
I43. 1951 UN Report p. 45.
I44. 1951 UN Report p. 49.
I45. 1951 UN Report p. 49.
I46. 1951 UN Report p. 49.
I47. 1951 UN Report p. 50.
I49. Lewis worked at various development-related enquiries;
and Cumper notes that "A true assessment of Lewis' contribution to the economics of development is admittedly difficult, because he has operated at so many levels - as a general theorist, as an academic advocate of specific policies, and as an advisor on the execution of these policies ..... However.....his main concern has been with the strategy of development". This we take to mean the general theoreticl work Lewis undertook. Cumper is in Social and Economic Studies p.465 Vol 23 1974.

152. Lewis (1955) p.15.
154. Lewis (1955) p.II.
156. Lewis (1955) p.201.
158. Lewis (1955) p.207.
159. Lewis (1955) p.213.

Notes to chapter four.
1. United Nations "Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries" May 1951. (Referred to in the text as "Lewis etal 1951").
5. The 20th Party Congress is usually noted because it saw Kruschev offering a partial critique of Stalin. This was argues Lichtheim (1972, p300), the start of 'de-Stalinization' which was brought to a climax in the public speech to the 22nd Congress of October 1961.
9. R. Steel "Pax Americana " I968. p.4.
II. D. Caute "The great fear" 1978.
II. Kolko (1968) p.662.
II. Caute (1978) p.28.
II. R. Steel (1968) p.16.
II. Caute (1978) p.22.
II. This theme of the contribution to disaster of the US intelligentsia is picked up by B. Young, when she argues from the misplaced confidence in 'crisis management' of Kennedy's apparatchik's in the wake of the Cuban crisis, to the commitment of troops to Vietnam. Their confidence is traced back to the idea that a truly scientific grasp of politics had been achieved. Young 1972 Ch.9 & 10.
II. Caute (1978) p.29.
II. There is a germ of truth here; thus Kolko notes that the US took Soviet behaviour in 1945-47 to be contrary to the Yalta agreements. However he goes on to argue that these agreements and the 'betrayal' of Yalta are largely matters of US myth, even if the subsequent disillusionment was acute. Kolko (1968) Ch.14.
II. Aron (1973) p.304.
II. Kiernan echos Aron's words: "Anti-communism as an ideology was America's substitute for the 'civilizing mission' of earlier imperialism. It could be grafted onto the ostensible purpose of the Second World War, defence of democracy" (215) .... "In Washington's eyes, since the ultimate goal, preservation of democracy, was righteous, all means toward it were warrantable, including suppression of democracy" (216) .... "No nation was to be allowed to quit the capitalist, or feudal, camp, whether it wanted to or not" (212).
II. See Kiernan (1978) Part Six, for detail.
Implicit in these remarks is a further distinction between the way in which Keynes was received in USA, UK and rest of Europe. Thus in the USA his interventionism was ideologically incompatible with the tone of 'cold war' and reaction to the New Deal; although as Graham makes clear the USA has shifted toward interventionism throughout the post war period. These two aspects are caught by Harris' story of a conversation with Kennedy; where the latter, described by Harris as a Keynesian, wonders if it's a good idea, politically, to let Harris so label him. In the UK on the other hand Keynesian reformism can be seen to be fully within the style of the liberal establishment: thus Beveridge and Keynes are two of the architects of post-war Britain according to Paul Addison (The Road to 1945. 1977). Though here, too, the reformism is restricted; as Postan notes, there is a slide from demands for full employment to the doctrine of growth, with all the functional benefits to the status quo that this entails. Postan(1967) Ch. 2.

33. O. Graham "Toward a planned society" 1976 pp. 93-95.
34. Sweezy in V. Eagly (ed) "Events, ideology, and economic theory" 1968 p. 147.
36. S. Harris "Economics of the Kennedy years" 1964 p197.

41. We shall ask if it is not the case that many of the curious debates about the 'extension' of economics into the Third World don't just flow from taking economics to be a sort of natural science.
42. Tipps(1976) p. 63.
43. Tipps(1976) p. 64.
44. Tipps(1976) p. 64.
46. Tipps does not pursue this but notes, briefly, that
the simple abstraction of the model of the modern from
the experience of Western industrial states provided a
convenient set of analytic categories. The modernization
theorists' product is, we may say, a moral notion expressed
as a set of apparently concrete criteria treating social
character. Tipps hints that this has something to do with
the dualistic character of the theory; but it is not
immediately clear why a systematically and concretely
expressed moral stance needs to be presented in dualistic
guise.

52. Hawthorn (1976) p. 242. (52a - foot of page)
54. Tipps (1976) p. 73.
55. Recalling our Prologue, we note that the 'interventions'
of the positivist policy scientist are not like those of
the critical theorist. The former is manipulative/author-
itative, in conception/intent; whereas the latter is best
read as moral persuasion, that is, emancipatory/particip-
atory in conception/intent.

56. Tipps (1976) p. 73.
60. S Huntington "The change to change: modernization,
development, and politics" in C E Black (ed) "Comparative modernization" (1976) p. 30
63. H. Bernstein "Modernization theory" in Journal of
65. J Hilal "Sociology and underdevelopment" Mimeo,
Durham University 1970. p. 5.
67. G Palma "Dependency: A formal theory of underdevel-
opment or a methodology for the analysis of concrete
(52a. See "Philosophy, Politics and Society" Series III ed.
Laslett and Runciman 1967.)
68. A. G. Frank "Latin America: Underdevelopment or revolution" 1969 p.75.
77. Frank(1969) p.5.
82. Brookfield(1975) p.60.
96. Rhodes(1968) p.408.
97. A. Smith "The concept of social change" 1976 p.87.
101. Graham(1976)
103. Kiernan(1978)
Notes to the Introduction to Section Three.
5. R. Prebisch, head of ECLA in this period.
6. This is perhaps misleading: the genesis is in Prebisch's theorizing, though arguably the scheme was not fully worked out until the debate over inflation.
8. In regard to Latin American work our sociology of knowledge approach points up relevant differences in the circumstances of theorizing, but there is a body of shared concepts.

Notes to Chapter Five.

To do so would be to turn our 'point of departure', the problem as seen by the colonial power, and our 'frame of possibility', into the bases of a set of ideal-typical responses to nationalist-developmentalism. However we do not want any systematic ideal typical analysis, so we use the notion 'minimum necessary change' as a reference point around which history may be ordered.

24. G. Zeylstra "Aid or Development" 1975.


31. P. Hetherington in her book "British Paternalism and Africa: 1920-1940" 1978, traces the emergence of a reformist line. "The writers of the 1920's were still bemused by notions of Britain's civilizing mission and the small voice of criticism was stilled by the authoritative tones of Lord Lugard. By the late 1930's the volume of criticism had swelled to a chorus. The theory of the dual mandate which had earlier been surrounded by an aura of respectability, was now widely regarded with suspicion whilst the policy of indirect rule was under attack for a variety of reasons ... A new form of paternalism was now apparent. This time it was led by
the reformers who stressed the importance of education, development and preparation for eventual independence. It was Lord Hailey who distilled these views into respectable form and provided a new orthodoxy which would justify British presence in Africa" (p.I9) 32.Grimal(1965) p.50.
33.In respect of these remarks we can elucidate briefly. In regard to 'modernization-theory' the general milieu was of hostility to the 'left' in general and the USSR in particular. This provided the frame within which an affirmation of the model of the US could issue in the moral core of 'M-T', what D.Caute("The Great Fear" 1979 p.2I) calls the "patriotic imperative". The available resources of this predominantly US theoretical effort were growth theories and social science policy-relevant work. The demand for a revised theory of intervention flows from aid donor competition with the USSR; the competition necessitates aid being presented as 'for development' rather than as 'for allies', as had been the case. The moral core is disguised - not altered. 34.Anticipating later concerns; on this matter of 'values', if we extend these remarks slightly we can usefully note the efforts of the theorist Myrdal. His work is suffused with a concern for 'values', and he makes central to his efforts what Zeylstra identifies as being typical of efforts in the first half of the 20th century; that is, "..a paternalistic idealism born of western social philosophy" (p.50). Streten describes Myrdal as an international figure and says of his career that it "..might be an exercise in practical methodology"(Streten in "Value in Social Theory"by Myrdal pix). This work was all bent towards the pursuit of a 'world welfare state' J.Gould("Myrdal's Dilemma and Soviet Development Studies" in Acta Sociologica 1974 p408) takes him to be the bourgeois development theorist whose work is free of any latent imperialist apology. He is the 'best' example of this style of European thinking; Gould suggests that "..a critical reading of Myrdal presents an exceptional opportunity to assess the structure and explanatory potency of a bourgeois develop-
-ment theory largely disentangled from the thicket of covert imperialist apologetics".

34a. C B Macpherson "The Real World of Democracy" 1965 Ch. 3.

35. Grimal (1975)
37. The precise nature of the political/social changes attendant upon achieving independence is a matter of continuing debate. J D Hargreaves ("The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa" 1979) goes so far as to use the somewhat sensitive term 'collaborators'. This is lodged within an historian's treatment that identifies two periods of "reconstruction of collaboration" (p81); the first being the institution of formal colonial authority, and the second its removal, that is decolonization. In respect of this second it is argued that after the dislocation of the war years "...the effects, experienced not only in London and Paris, but in colonial capitals where African resistance began to seem an increasing danger, made it necessary to undertake one more "reconstruction of collaboration", to move back from a formal relationship of dominance towards systems which implied political equality between freely contracting partners" (p.xii).
38. Otis Graham "Toward a planned society" 1976
41. J. Dorfman "The Background of Institutional Economics" in "Institutional Economics" 1963 (a set of essays from the University of California).
42. We may note that Dorfman lists some influences upon early institutionalist efforts. Thus in addition to some early anthropological work he cites Lester Ward, an early US sociologist who provided counter-arguments to the Social Darwinists. Also in philosophy the emergence of what is now termed 'pragmatism' was a major influence, as was that line of economic thought known as the
German 'Historical School'.

45. Gruchy (1972) p. 79.
46. Gruchy (1972) p. 36.


49. Gruchy notes: "In effect what these post Veblenians did was to substitute John Dewey for Karl Marx and pragmatism for Hegelianised Marxism. The social philosophy of John Dewey is pluralistic, optimistic and activist in nature". Going on to characterize them, he says: "They are optimistic about the possibility of mankind solving its problems in an orderly, gradualistic and non-revolutionary manner. They are also activists where enthusiasm for social and economic reform leads them to work for the creation of a more reasonable social and economic system" (p. 81).


52. Gruchy: "The neo-institutionalist as a scientist has no concern with 'what ought to be'. As a scientist he analyses the existing wants or goals held by individuals, groups and nations and enquires into how these values or goals were created and how they influence the course of economic activity. If the neo-institutionalist wishes to advocate the acceptance of certain wants or goals, and many of them do not hesitate to do so, they understand that they are no longer acting in the capacity of scientific investigators but instead are advocates of reform" (p. 292).

60. Gruchy (1972) p. 177.
64. Gruchy (1972) p. 178.
67. RF Mikesell "The Economics of Foreign Aid" 1968.
70. Mikesell (1968) p. 43.
74. B. Hindess "Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences" 1977. If we follow Hindess we can argue that the first sentence - "All thought presupposes implicit model building and model using" - is either false (if we take, as does Hindess, mathematics to be the paradigmatic model-using discipline), or banal if we regard it as a metaphor for considered reflection. The second sentence expresses the core of the style's procedure: "Rigorous abstraction, simplification and quantification are necessary conditions of analysis and policy" - and we can say that this is false if taken to imply that abstraction etc. is the starting point of analysis (not even Myrdal would claim this) or, if it is merely an injunction about how to treat data, it is overly simplistic and maybe false.
76. Streeten (1972) p. 52.
77. Streeten (1972) p. 52.
78. The procedures and habits of their own discipline are regular targets for the institutionalists. We can see this as reflexivity.
Two issues come out of this: (1) that theorists have fashions is worth noting, theorists are more than 'epistemic beings' and this is certainly worth bringing out; (2) more problematic is the line Streeten seems to take whereby matters of the logic of argument are tackled by reference to fashion. The sociology of knowledge point is excellent, but that it is presented as germane to matters of the logic of argument seems to be (partially) wrong. We must distinguish between origin and validity, not so as to dismiss the insights of the sociology of knowledge in favour of some timeless universality of concepts and of logic (as is usually done) but so as to be able to construct practical, that is useful, criticisms. We can grant the relativism of the sociology of knowledge—that is, that concepts and rules of evidence are historico-situation bound—but deny that anything of devastating practical import follows. It does not follow that 'all points of view are equally valid'. Criticisms of formulations having such and such an origin must continue, using the tools we have got, those of critical reason. These matters are pursued by Streeten in "The Social Sciences and Development".

Streeten (1972) p. 54.
Myrdal (1958) p. 238.
Streeten in Myrdal (1958) p. ix.
Myrdal (1958) p. 256.
Streeten (1958) p. xvi.
Streeten (1958) p. xvi.
Streeten's effort seems to be predicated on the basis of the assumption that 'reflexivity' permits a 'better' neutrality. But if all this is presented as rules-of-thumb for scholars then it is no good. The most orthodox
can confront the list and say that they take 'appropriate note' of these matters, only to continue just as before. On the other hand if Streeten's arguments are taken as a call for a more thorough-going change (a new self-conception of the theorist's role, and consequent adjustment in method) then what sustains this new self-conception of role and rule? The answer would seem to be some (new) more general schema explaining the need for, and scope of, the change. But in this case the orthodox will reject it; indeed necessarily since, after Dobb, their activities and views will be a negative defining feature of the new scheme. The Streeten/Kyrdal 'improved theory' seems to fall between two stools. It is empiricist, and thus not really new; and what novelty it has is not such as to issue inevitably in any improvements in practice. Their critique seems to remain within the ambit of that which they criticise and is thus liable to 're-absorption', so to say. The improvement that is visible apparently in their efforts, we can suggest, flows from their presenting an adequate (or plausible) empiricism in place of an absurd empiricism. However, given our view of 'social theory' as being something other than empiricist, quite what status we accord to this 'improvement' is by no means obvious.

102. Whether this is taken as some model of a Third World state established with all due care, or alternatively whether it is not just a list of divergences observed, is a moot point. It seems to be just a rough list.
107. Which, accepting its impossibility (claim to fact), would issue in the construction of a social-theory which did not touch the ground, that is, a perfectly irrelevant theory. This notion; at first glance, looks as though it is incoherent (claim to logic): thus the pursuit of 'value neutrality' is doubly futile.
108. Aside, during departmental seminar.
113. P. Ehrensaft "Semi-industrial capitalism in Africa Today 1971
119. Thus we set aside what is really the body of Gellner's work, that is the substance, as this is all philosophically-derived reflection which is not in any very steady way directly comparable to the Myrdalian work. To put this another way; there is the narrow issue of the pursuit of an adequate development-studies, in this respect the two theorists are really rather similar and in the end both are unsatisfactory. In addition there is the wider issue, which interests us, of the advance of conceptions of what development-studies is about; this is, properly, a matter of the philosophy of social science and in this respect Gellner is vastly more sophisticated than Myrdal (though equally, qua philosopher, he becomes rather un-representative as a revisionist modernization theorist).
Notes to chapter six.


2 'NIST' is 'neo-institutional social theory'.
3 That distinctive efforts in social theory (i.e. 'theories' ordinarily understood) are properly and most fruitfully to be regarded as ideologies is a position that has been argued for in our study's Prologue, and is thus an assumption of our more substantive analyses. In formal terms we offer here a further example of, and it is hoped a further elucidation of, that view.
4 We present this ideology ('dependency') with a view to considering its claims (and similar ones from other sources) to independence as a discipline. The effort is illustrative, and it can only be illustrative as we have denied at the outset claims to independence by treating it as ideology, in a double sense: (i) of the ideology in itself and (ii) of the explanatory characteristics of our stance. That our stance has been argued for in the study Prologue is all that disarms a charge of question begging in respect of the strategy of this section.

In part (2.14) we ask whether or not our sketch offers any reasons to treat 'dependency' as independent and adequate. If we go on to ask independent of what? and adequate for what?, we open a route to a treatment of the ideology of 'dependency' that is comparative. Thus we slide towards the question of ranking ideologies, which we have reserved for part 3 of this chapter. It is very easy to slip from considering these odd claims to disciplinary independence to the intelligible matters of ranking, but the two are distinct issues. We must first establish the plausibility of taking 'dependency' as an ideology (and thus not intelligibly independent) before going on to treat the matter of ranking in the company of the Frankian part of this general area of debate.


Furtado (1976) p. 299.

Furtado (1976) p. 299.


Whether Brookfield is right to stress this shift quite as much as he does is debatable. Brookfield presents his exegesis under the sub-heading 'Towards a new paradigm: Prebisch, ECLA and industrialization'; which rather suggests that he follows, say, O'Brien, in regarding the 'dependency' position as representing some sort of break with the earlier structuralist line. It's not clear that this is so - the change in tone that Brookfield rightly picks up could as easily be taken to reflect Furtado's diminishing worries in regard to the presentation of the other than orthodox elements inherent in the original Centre/Periphery motif.


Brookfield (1975) p. 147.


Girvan (1973) p. 12.


Furtado (1964) p. 4.


Furtado (1964) p. 3.

Furtado (1964) p. 4.

Furtado (1964) p. 4.

Furtado (1964) p. vii.

Furtado (1964) p. vii.

Furtado (1964) p. 127.

Furtado (1964) p. 127.

Furtado (1964) p. 127.

Furtado (1964) p. 129.

Furtado (1964) p. 127.

Furtado (1964) p. 136.
Furtado's early work comes from his time as an ECLA economist, and the expectation of the nature of policy prescription resembles the Myrdalian scheme. Thus, in policy terms the focus is on the government's planning and organisation of 'industrialization', where this is a notion flowing from a revised orthodox definition of an UDC. Thus Furtado argues, "we may define an underdeveloped structure as one in which full utilization of available capital is not a sufficient condition for complete absorption of the workforce at a level of production corresponding to the technology prevailing in the dynamic sector of the system" (1964 p141). Subsequent discussion of policy is couched in familiar ECLA terms, with a focus on import bottlenecks and balance of payments/inflation problems attendant upon rapid structural change.

Furtado's treatment of Marx seems to involve two somewhat incompatible aspects: firstly, at a very general level there is an affirmation of what Furtado takes to be the basic Marxian project - that is, a developmental reading of history which utilizes the base/superstructure distinction in providing the social dynamic; and secondly, and subsequently, a systematic rejection of distinctively Marxian notions and argument in favour of a simple and fairly orthodox sociology presented in the guise of political economy.

Furtado and Girvan claim that 'dependency' is the basis of a 'truly adequate' economics, just as Myrdal did in respect of his own work. These 'radicals' present the second general answer to the question in the Prologue.
about the nature of 'development studies': they take
themselves to have established it as an independent
discipline adequate to its object.
45. ...as opposed to, say, left politics in W. Europe, or
marxian exegesis in respect of this or that matter of
political theory. Here the lines of debate are well
established and disputants can agree on much. This is
not the case in endeavouring to present a marxian analysis
46. O'Brien p.46.
47. O'Brien p.47.
47a. Girvan p. 4.
48. One comparison that we have not spelt out is that
between circumstances of production in respect of the
theories 'MIST' and 'dependency'. Furtado touches upon
this when he observes: "Within the group of nations termed
the Third World ...... Latin America occupies a special
position in view of the peculiarity of its relations
with the US", ( p.61, in 'Latin American Radicalism'
edited. by Horowitz and Castro1969 ). The optimism of the
newly independent is contrasted with the Latin American
pessimism. More clearly expressed is the view of IlHor-
owitz: "Liberation from colonialism is radically different
from liberation from imperialism" ( , p.21 as above). If
we regard the histories of the two areas over the last
century, then we can record that colonialism and decolon-
ization in Africa and Asia are not the same sort of
historical experience as that nominal independence
experienced by Latin America.
49. Brookfield notes this debate. 'Classic'dualists, Boeke
and Furnival, argue for a special, second, economics
designed specifically for the Third World; the reply
from the 'Economic ' dualists, Arthur Lewis is cited as
an early voice, involves a return to classical notions
and macro-economic aggregative analysis; this is the work
Kregel treats in his discussion of 'growth'. Furtado
clearly places himself in this line, so this is where
we must place 'dependency'. It is the manner in which the
nature of this line is conceived, and subsequent claims
made, that cause the problems.
50. The locution 'must involve the comprehension' is, on our part, an evasion of the issue of the dubious logic of this argument. If we recast this in terms of the schema of ideology construction, then the requirement to comprehend the 'whole' which governs the 'part' that we are interested in can be satisfied with a series of general declarations or statements. Casting the effort in a natural science-aping style makes for terrible problems—how independent is this sub-system, do system and sub-system share a set of common laws, how do they interact, ....etc—which fortunately we do not have to pursue.

51. see O'Brien, p. 9. 51a. See Ch. 8.


53. The notion that generality of formulation is to be pursued is, as we saw in the case of Furtado's work, best regarded as an ill-digested borrowing from the common image of the natural sciences. What the role of general theory might be in social theorizing we have yet to determine.


55. That some argument-schemes are better than others is undoubtedly true; but this we take to be a matter of ranking ideologies, and not of recording some developmental sequence. Any example of this latter phenomena could only be historical, and this is not the time-scale characteristically invoked by those who argue for progressivity in argument. Thus, for example, the sociology of the present day is, generally speaking, taken to be better than that of the philosophes, say.

56. —or, at least, its general shape may be derived. The basic conception of the exchange of rich and poor is transmitted. Emphasis on this or that element in the set of arguments comprising the conception, plus the presentation of this or that set of data, can result in a variety of developed lines of argument.


Alternatively, instead of trying to make essentially practical sense of the idea of progressivity, we could look for an entirely formal sense. Thus any movement from premises via deductions to a conclusion would be counted as evincing progressivity. Yet, clearly, such a formal notion would be no basis for claims to the status of end products of progressive sequences.


Bernstein's examples happen to be political science but his point is general to social science.

Again, the material used in preparing this sketch is derived from those same writers who provided the material for the analogous exposition of Furtado's work.

See also Booth, p. 61. "A brief spell of teaching and research in Latin America in the early 1960's sufficed to convey to Frank the largely fictional character of of what he had been taught......and to convince him of the importance of familiarity with the actual structure and, still more important, the history of underdeveloped economies ".

We follow C. Leys (1977).


Frank (1969) p. 16.

This resemblance of Frank to the structuralist line is close. Indeed Frank's early work can to some extent be seen as sketching one version of what Furtado's early programme might have looked like if it were executed. Furtado observes that a most important task is the "progressive identification of factors that are specific for each structure. That effort will subsequently serve as a basis for establishing a typology of structures".
Furtado 1964 p. vii) Frank's scheme rests on the location of each sub-system within the world system; as Brookfield notes "In one sense, Frank elaborates dependency economics into a world wide interdependent system" (Brookfield p.164). Brookfield also refers to the marxian aspects of Frank's work as "a derived framework". (Brookfield p.165) AGF's scheme can readily take on the guise of an outline for a set of models.

71. How marked these differences are is a matter for debate. On this point Booth, quoting an ECLA document that takes note of the restrictions placed upon its proposals by present institutional structures, comments that: "it is only necessary to lift the veil of diplomatic language which enshrouds statements of this type to understand why it is that ECLA's studies have influenced revolutionaries as well as reformers" (Booth p57.) This hints at ideological convergence.

72. On this point, see Booth pp65-66. Booth reports that the first conference of OLAS (Latin American Solidarity Organisation) held in Havana in 1967 propounded the view that the Latin American bourgeoisie were incapable of ordering development, and that a socialist route to development was the only possibility. Booth notes that: "It was with the theoretical elaboration and documentation of this proposition that Frank's work was very largely concerned " (Booth p.66.) This is to locate the germ of the characteristically Frankian effort in a political stance whose derivation is precisely mapped. This is the key to Booth's reading of Frank. That Frank's effort is crucially determined by its political engagement is a line we affirm.

73. AG Frank "Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution" 1969 p.ix.

74. AG Frank "Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment" 1972 p.145.

75. See Parkin on the role of 'left intelligentsia' for example. "Class Inequality and Political Order" 1972.

76. As Myrdal's agent of theory execution was modelled upon himself, in the sense that his agent was an instantiation of the principle of 'reasonableness'; so Frank
is his efforts own agent, a political activist; and this
corréquence explains the omni-presence of the Frankian
agent and the reason for labelling him a pamphleteer
(in contradistinction to a political theorist, Marx,
or administrative technician, Myrdal).
77. Compare with our treatment of the idea of develop-
ment, or again, if we recall Hobsbawm and his introd-
uction to "Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations", and the
way in which Ch. 2 translated an ethical question
into a practical one, then we can say that there is
a way of treating moral/political engagement as, so to say, an
empirical matter; but not the way Frank does it, or
says he's doing it.
78. We can see this seemingly 'ready-made' view presented
in Frank very clearly. His general orientation, 'vision',
emerges apparently from nowhere, though he rather seems
to want to claim it emerges from either a critique of
the orthodox or historical analysis or both, (see the
essay 'The Development of Underdevelopment' ). Frank,
adopting the syntax of science, wrongly presents his
gestalt as a hypothesis: that is, as something to be
tested via derived empirical propositions. We want to
say that analysis of the gestalt is in large measure
internal; that is, it is a matter of elucidating the
moral and categorical frame that is supposed by the
gestalt - it just is not an empirical matter, in this
sense, at all. Again, it is arguably clear in the case
of Frank since throughout the period of his early work
the fundamental analytical orientation, the 'vision',
is not revised in any significant way - notwithstanding
a plethora of empirical/historical researches.
79. In the case of AG? this 'vision', insofar as it
entails an argument structure, is minimally developed;
hence, perhaps, all the criticisms of Frank's 'simplistic
schemas'.
p.175.
Notes to Chapter Seven.

1. This notion we use here for purposes of offering a general resume: our history has treated the construction of a series of ideological efforts; and whilst they can be distinguished and lodged in a sequence, they cannot, without doing absurd violence to the material, be designated a fixed series of 'stages'.


3. Compare with A. Arblaster (NS 30/II/79) who observes that there is an 'old New Left' and a 'new New Left'. It is the second grouping that we are concerned with. Crouch writing in 1970 (C Crouch "The Student Revolt") observes that, 'Although political philosophies are couched in universal language, their contents are usually much influenced by major incidents' (p.18). Referring back to Arblaster, the proximate sources of action would be Hungary/CND for the 'old New Left', and Vietnam plus disillusionment with institutionalized socialist parties for the 'new New Left'. The general line must remain the same, and Crouch's list of formative elements will serve, thus he reports that "The New Left stands very firmly in the localist community-oriented, near anarchist tradition of left wing politics, in firm opposition to the other dominant theme - that of the strong centralized state" (p.18). The distinction and view of core elements is shared by Young, who adds a general perspective when he reports that "The political movement of the New Left emerged from a situation of global tension dominated by two vast military industrial blocs. To a considerable degree these antagonistic blocs depended for their maintenance of internal pacification and legitimacy on ideological contrast. As this contrast diminished domestic cohesion
declined; this was reflected in the declining unity of parties committed to support of each of the blocs" (p8).


12. Also noted are the students in Frankfurt, though they are described as being more "theoretical".

13. Presumably Strayera means marxian socialism, for the SPD at least claims to be socialist.


17. A Paraphrase from TV series "The Age of Uncertainty".

18. N. Young "An Infantile disorder" 1977 p.27.


29. See for example CB Macpherson "The Real World of Democracy" (1965).


38. P. Fanon "The Wretched of the Earth" 1961 p. 29.
41. Indeed Davidson, observing that the imported political models collapsed spectacularly, explicitly makes this unsurprising and uninteresting. The real area of interest lies in the "resultant development of ideas concerned with searching for a different model" (p. 295), which introduces the interest of the New Left noted below.
47. Young (1977) p. 28.
52. Young (1977) p. 16.
53. D. Caute "Fanon" 1970 p. 70.
58. Again the question of who to treat presents itself. With Debray or Chaliand we can see that there were many active groups of revolutionaries. We are interested in those invoked by New Left theorists. We can here claim that they fall into three sets: (1) Fanon (2) Guevara/Debray (3) Mao/Giap; of which we will look at I & 2, as they seem to be the principal 'theoretical' influences; where (3) rather tends to become assimilated to the circumstances of the Vietnam war.
59. This is a stratagem to illustrate a point, not the first anticipation of an abstract theory: though the distinctions we use here might well form an element of an abstract theory of social theorizing.
61. This introduces a second issue; if the first is about the matter of learning the lessons of experience, then the second is about presenting these insights as a theory.
82. Fanon (1961) p. 117-118.
83. Fanon (1961) p. 47.
84. This is one line of criticism that is developed in regard to the 'neo-marxism' we treat below. Roxborough exemplifies the criticism, "The final abandonment of revolutionary theory conceived as an analysis of the dynamics of the social structure which could serve as a guide for revolutionary action, came in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution and the Algerian independence movement. It was the task of theorists like Franz Fanon and Regis Debray to divorce revolutionary practice totally from revolutionary theory" (p 134). This judgment we find bizarre.
85. Neither present detailed academic-type revisions. Debray offers a systematic re-write around the notion of the foco, but it is a 'reading' of the marxist canon.
rather than general revision. Fanon's work is even less of a 'revision of Marx'.

86. A. Foster-Carter "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment" 1974 p.68.
88. In their defence, it should be said that in each case they could reply that (a) these criticisms we have presented are not enough to 'secure conviction'; they are really just notes - precisely who, for example, do we have in mind?; (b) in any case the authors cited had fairly narrowly technical issues to debate and were, understandably, not bothered about displays of reflexive consistency; (c) anyway, the sorts of points we have made are routinely granted in these sorts of discussions: it is a part of disciplinary commonsense.
90. Frank(I978) p.x.
91. Frank(I978) p.1.
92. Frank(I978) p.2.
93. Frank(I978) p.2.
94. There seems to be another point to be made in this connection: that is that philosophical reflection upon assumptions (governing method and procedure, and purpose) cannot be initiated simply by abstracting from work that has been routinely engaged with the world (that is, more or less empiricist). The impulse to philosophical type reflection is understandable (given that these people are scholars, and that the 'movement' they consider has seemingly lost impetus), and to our mind appropriate (given our scheme of construction/criticism/ ranking). But it has to be acknowledged as a distinct intellectual endeavour which requires, pre-eminently, that specific questions be put. Treating philosophical-type analysis as glorified tinkering with presently unhappily regarded 'models of reality' cannot generate any useful answers. Roxborough's effort is maybe a case in point here: he presents a very abstract and general treatment of the pursuit of a model of development, but he never manages
to pose a specific question, or set of them, which would get his aspiring philosophizing going.

95. Dependency is taken, by Palma, to emerge in phase III of marxian treatments of centre-periphery relations. Whether 'dependency' is or is not taken as marxian is not stated. In the end it seems as if Palma sidesteps the issue by (1) making 'dependency' a school, that is, a collection of differing analyses; and (2) making the school one of political economy. Marx is subsuned under the tradition of political economy, though granted a major place in that tradition, and 'dependency' is taken as a modern specimen of political economy. The question 'is dependency marxian' is sidestepped. Additionally, there is a somewhat confusing tension between 'dependency' as a variety of (necessarily) marxian-informed political economy, on the one hand, and 'dependency' as an analysis of Latin America on the other.


97. Palma says this division is logical rather than temporal. He then quotes Sutcliffe who certainly seems to take the division as temporal. Why does Palma insert this proviso? To prepare a formal set of assumptions as a basis for questions about method?


III. D. Bernstein "Sociology of underdevelopment versus sociology of development?" in D. Lehmann (ed) "Development theory" 1979 p.94.


not treated economics-informed discussion, and we must also note and leave aside history-informed work.


Notes to chapter eight.
2. See Carver pp1-17 for a sketch of the breadth of Marx's reading.
16. Thus far the criteria of adequacy implied, against which we might review some of our 'examples' are general (i) breadth of scope, the pursuit of a 'comprehensive social science'; here the approach is both general in the sense of level of treatment and general in the sense of its intellectual resource base, a global explanation that bursts given disciplinary boundaries; (ii) practicality of intent, the point we drew from Dobb is crucial and if the effort in question does not specify an agent of theory execution then it is not grounded; (iii) strategy of explanation, thus reconstruction of the real and not modeling.
20. See S. Avineri, "The social and political thought of Karl Marx" I968 pp 77-86.
38. This, we may note, is all problematical; see for example R Kilminster's discussion of Lukacs in 'Praxis and Method' I980.
39. M. Nicolaus "Introduction" to "Grundrisse" I973 p. IO.
41. What lessons can we take from this in regard to weighing the merits of our discussed examples? Three points: 1 concepts are specific to economic forms; 2 form bourgeois capitalism is developed enough to spawn a rich and subtle set of categories, applicable, with caution, to simpler forms; 3 inquiry is always, ultimately, practical. Thus Marx sought to uncover the dynamic of society to his agents of change the proletariat. Cardoso and Faletto concede status of dependent economies, grant internal political stasis, and in practice look to forms of organisation spontaneous to working class/peasant groupings; seeing this as area to introduce their efforts of theorizing. See Kahl, p17.
42. It is for this reason, the aim of 'interventionists'
to render just their behaviour non-causal, that is, extra-systemic, that modern states are concerned with protecting 'official secrets'. If the state's behaviour is hidden, then it tends to equivalence to the extra-system status its self-conception aspires to. State secrecy, in the case of UK, is not an unfortunate bad habit developed by bureaucrats in the wake of Edwardian anti-German scares; it is a functional pre-requisite of present mode of state power - 'interventionism'.

45. A. MacIntyre "Marcuse" I970 p.22.
47. A. Giddens "Central problems in social theory" I979 p.I75.
52. Palma(I978) p.886.
54. Palma notes several different ways of reading this claim, depending upon how the term 'imperialism' is construed. He is at pains to deny that 'dependency', as he regards it, can be taken as being in competition with theories of imperialism.
56. Palma(I978) p.900.
57. Palma(I978) p.904.
60. Desai(I974) p.II6.
64. Kahl(I976) p.I34.
65. Cardoso and Faletto(I969) p.xviii.

70. Indeed when discussing Debray, in Chapter Seven, we hinted at a way in which an extended, richer, version of this scheme, treating the aspect of activity rather than simply enquiry, might be approached, when we distinguished 'commentators', 'theorists' and 'practitioners'.

71. Finally, in regard to this study, clearly the scope of this work is such as to militate against any simple, yet fruitful, continuance at this level of treatment. However, this work could be appropriately continued and deepened by detailed enquiry into a specific example of social-theoretic engagement. We hope to conduct such a further enquiry by treating 'growth-theory'. Thus we would hope to advance established enquiries in terms of theoretical subtlety by means of empirical specificity.
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