Being Chinese and Indonesian:
Chinese Organisations in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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The University of Leeds
Department of East Asian Studies

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Claire and Helen. Thank you for all your love and support. This thesis is dedicated to you.
In 1998 Indonesia was on the verge of huge political changes. The economy was in crisis and President Suharto’s thirty-two year New Order government was coming to an end. Violence, largely directed against the ethnic Chinese in a number of cities on the archipelago, accompanied the political and economic crises. The changes which unfolded led to peaceful elections in 1999, which were judged by international observers to be fair and democratic. These elections placed a new administration in power and with it the hopes of the people that reformasi (reform) would ensue. Immediately after Suharto stepped down things began to change for the ethnic Chinese who had never been fully accepted as Indonesian within Indonesian national discourses. Indeed the presence of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was constructed as a problem; the “Chinese problem” (masalah Cina). During the New Order, policy towards Chinese Indonesians was particularly harsh. They were not permitted to celebrate any aspect of their Chinese heritage and official policy dictated that they should assimilate into Indonesian society. This changed after 1998 and the debate about how Chinese Indonesians should behave, and how they should be treated, emerged once again. This thesis investigates a number of Chinese Indonesian organisations which were established or re-established after May 1998. I am particularly interested in how they are articulating both their Chinese and their Indonesian identities in this new climate. I argue that as a result of Indonesian national discourses which construct Chinese Indonesians as “outsiders”, it may not be possible for the groups to achieve their joint aims of overcoming anti-Chinese stereotypes and having their Chinese heritage accepted within Indonesia. During the New Order years many ethnic Chinese were reluctant to declare themselves Chinese publicly, or speak about their experiences, which has led to a dearth of empirical material relating to how Chinese Indonesians themselves understand their identities. Therefore, this research is a particularly useful addition to the study of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.
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<td>official ideology</td>
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<td><em>asimilasi</em></td>
<td>assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>asli</em></td>
<td>indigenous</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Baba Chinese</em></td>
<td>A term used to describe Chinese of mixed ancestry in Malaysia, formerly the British Straits Settlements</td>
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<td><em>Bahasa Indonesia</em></td>
<td>Indonesian language</td>
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<td><em>bangsa Indonesia</em></td>
<td>Indonesian people or nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>bangsa Tionghoa</em></td>
<td>Chinese Indonesian people or nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bhinneka Tunggal Ika</em></td>
<td>plurality, but unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>gotong royong</em></td>
<td>community self-help, mutual co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cina</em></td>
<td>China, Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>cukong</em></td>
<td>master, Chinese businessman who collaborates with a member of the political élite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>gotong royong</em></td>
<td>Indonesian method of community co-operation whereby decisions are made consensually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>huaqiao</em></td>
<td>overseas Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>huaren</em></td>
<td>ethnic Chinese</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>huashang</em></td>
<td>trader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>integrasi</em></td>
<td>integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>huaqiao</em></td>
<td>Overseas Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>jago</em></td>
<td>tough guys, toughs</td>
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<td><em>jaringan</em></td>
<td>network</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>jus sanguinis</em></td>
<td>nationality by descent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kampung Peranakan</em></td>
<td>local-born Chinese district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kartu Tanda Penduduk</em></td>
<td>identity card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kebersamaan</em></td>
<td>togetherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kerukunan</em></td>
<td>social harmony</td>
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<tr>
<td>laoke</td>
<td>old-timers</td>
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<tr>
<td>leto</td>
<td>short sleeve (a term for ethnic Chinese in Burma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letshe</td>
<td>long sleeve (a term for ethnic Chinese in Burma)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marga</td>
<td>Chinese family name</td>
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<td>masalah Cina</td>
<td>Chinese problem</td>
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<td>min Guangren</td>
<td>people from Guangdong</td>
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<td>monumen nasional</td>
<td>national monument</td>
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<tr>
<td>negara kolonial</td>
<td>colonial state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-pribumi</td>
<td>non-indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nusantara</td>
<td>The archipelago of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>The Five Principles which are the Indonesian national ideology</td>
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<td>pembangunan</td>
<td>development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pembauran</td>
<td>integration, assimilation</td>
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<tr>
<td>peranakan</td>
<td>Chinese Indonesian of mixed ancestry, Indonesia-born Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persatuan dan kesatuan</td>
<td>union and unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pribumi</td>
<td>indigenous Indonesian</td>
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<tr>
<td>priyayis</td>
<td>members of the Javanese official class</td>
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<tr>
<td>rakyat</td>
<td>the people</td>
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<td>reformasi</td>
<td>reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republik Rakyat Cina/Tiongkok</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ronda</td>
<td>walks around ones neighbourhood at night in order to prevent crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rumah Abu</td>
<td>Ash Houses</td>
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<tr>
<td>suku, suku bangsa</td>
<td>Indonesian ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suku Tionghoa</td>
<td>Chinese Indonesian ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumpah Pemuda</td>
<td>Youth Oath (signed in 1928)</td>
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<td>tanah air</td>
<td>homeland, fatherland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tionghoa</td>
<td>Chinese Indonesian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiongkok</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totok</td>
<td>pure Chinese, China-born Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tuyul</td>
<td>a spirit being who steals people’s money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wayang</td>
<td>Javanese shadow puppet performances</td>
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</table>
wenhua Zhonghao
xinke
cultural China
newcomers
# List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakom-PKB</td>
<td>Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa, Communication Body for the Appreciation of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baperki</td>
<td>Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td>BKPM</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Muslim Pemuda, Co-ordinating Body for Muslim Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPKB</td>
<td>Badan Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, Organisation for the Promotion of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Biro Pusat Statistik, Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>ex-tahanan politik, ex-tapol, ex-political prisoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKKB</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Kesatuan Bangsa, National Unity Communication Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GANDI</td>
<td>Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi, Indonesian Anti-Discrimination Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMKI</td>
<td>Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, The Indonesian Christian Student Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMNI</td>
<td>Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, National Student Movement of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLKAR</td>
<td>Golongan Karya, “functional groups”. The government political party during the New Order and still functioning as a political party in post-Suharto Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPMI</td>
<td>Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia, The Association of Young Indonesian Entrepreneurs</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMTI</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Tionghoa Indonesia, Association of Chinese Indonesian Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRP</td>
<td>Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTI</td>
<td>Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa, The Chinese Indonesian Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISJ</td>
<td>Instituut Sosial Jakarta, Jakarta Social Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komnas HAM</td>
<td>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, The National Human Rights Commission</td>
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</table>
KKN Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme, Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism
Kopassus Army Special Forces
KTP Kartu Tanda Penduduk, National Identity Card
LBH Jakarta Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta, Jakarta Legal Aid Institute
LPKB Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, Institute for the Promotion of National Unity
MADIA Masyarakat Dialog Antar Agama, Society for Inter-Religious Dialogue
MATAKIN Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia, The Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly
MPRS Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
NU Nahdlatul Ulama, Revival of Islamic Scholars. The largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, founded in 1926. Abdurrachman Wahid was leader until his election in 1999
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party
Parpindo Partai Pembauran Indonesia, Indonesian Assimilationist Party
PARTI Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia, Chinese Indonesian Reform Party
PBI Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia, The Unity in Diversity Party
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PDK Partai Demokrat Katolik, The Catholic Democratic Party
PDR Partai Demokrasi Rakyat, People's Democratic Party
PDS Partai Dua Syahadat, Party of the Two Professions of Faith Party
Peta Pembela Tanah Air, Indonesian troops during the Japanese occupation
PITI Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Ethnic Chinese Muslims
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td><em>Partai Komunis Indonesia</em>, Indonesian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMII</td>
<td><em>Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia</em>, The Indonesian Islamic Student Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMKRI</td>
<td><em>Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia</em>, Association of Catholic Students of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td><em>Partai Nasional Indonesia</em>, Indonesian National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSMTI</td>
<td><em>Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia</em>, The Indonesian Chinese Social Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWBI</td>
<td><em>Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia</em>, Indonesian Citizens Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td><em>suku, agama, ras dan antar golongan</em>, ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMPATIK</td>
<td><em>Solidaritas Pemudi-Pemuda Tionghoa Indonesia Untuk Keadilan</em>, Solidarity of Young Chinese-Indonesian Women and Men for Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNB</td>
<td><em>Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa</em>, Solidarity for Motherland and Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGPF</td>
<td><em>Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta</em>, Joint Fact-Finding Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THHK</td>
<td><em>Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan</em>, Chinese Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUK</td>
<td><em>Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan</em>, Volunteer Team for Humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsinoy</td>
<td><em>Tsinong Pinoy</em>, Chinese Filipino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNI</td>
<td><em>Warga Negara Indonesia</em>, Indonesian Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNI <em>keturunan asing</em></td>
<td><em>Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan Asing</em>, Indonesian Citizen of Foreign Descent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YLBHI</td>
<td><em>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia</em>, Association of the Legal Aid Institute of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note on Style

The spelling of words in Bahasa Indonesia changed in 1972. In this thesis I have used this new form of spelling, except for quotations or titles of books and articles which use the old spelling. Particularly worth noting is that the old spelling uses “Soeharto”, while the new spelling uses “Suharto”.

I have used pinyin to romanise the Chinese-language words, rather than the older Wade-Giles system, again except for quotations or titles of books and articles. However, some of the Chinese Indonesian media are not consistent in their use of these two methods. Therefore, sometimes a combination of both pinyin and Wade-Giles romanisation appears.
Chapter 1

Introduction and Methodology

The Chinese in Indonesia

According to the 2000 census, Indonesia, with 205.8 million people, has the fourth largest population in the world, after China, India and the United States of America (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 1). The same census places the number of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia at 3.087 million or 1.5 percent of the population.¹

The census of 2000 was the first since 1930 to include a section on ethnic classification. Up to that year the numbers of ethnic Chinese were estimates from the 1930 data. The number of those who declared themselves to be Chinese in the 2000 census was actually much lower than was generally thought among writers on the subject. In fact the numbers of ethnic Chinese were shown to be a lower percentage of the population than they had been in 1930.² Up to 2000 estimates of the numbers of ethnic Chinese were between 2.5 and 5 percent of the population, which would have made them the fourth largest ethnic group in Indonesia, next to

¹ Suryadinata Arifin and Ananta have used data published by Indonesia’s Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik). This data contains information about the 8 largest ethnic groups in each province. The ethnic Chinese come inside the top 8 in 11 provinces, covering 68.45 percent of the total Indonesian population. However, there is no published data on the ethnic Chinese in 19 provinces and therefore the authors must estimate the numbers of ethnic Chinese in these 19 provinces (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 76).

² The number of Chinese in Indonesia according to the 1930 census was 2.92 million people or 2.03 percent of the population (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 79). The 2000 census distinguishes between ethnic Chinese with Indonesian citizenship and those with foreign citizenship. In 1930 there were no “Indonesian citizens”. Rather, the census included four categories; Native, Europeans, Chinese and Arab (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta. 2003: 75).
the Javanese, Sundanese and Madurese (see Jacobsen, 2003: 16; Lee, 1999; Coppel, 1983; Pan 1998 and others).

Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta suggest a number of explanations for the drop in the percentage of the population since 1930 declaring themselves to be ethnic Chinese. Firstly, the incomplete data which the authors worked with is a factor (see note 1). Secondly, the authors suggest that since self-identification was used, if an ethnic Chinese person did not consider themselves to be Chinese, despite being considered so by other Indonesians, then the census would record that person as non-Chinese (Suryadinata et al. 2003: 74). Thirdly, the writers suggest that since the violence of 1998, which was largely targeted at ethnic Chinese, some people may have felt fearful about identifying themselves as Chinese (Suryadinata et al, 2003: 75). Fourthly, the authors point out that the fertility of the ethnic Chinese is relatively much lower than the rest of the population (Suryadinata et al, 2003: 79). Finally, they suggest that during periods of violence against them over the previous 70 years, large numbers of Chinese Indonesians may have left Indonesia. However, the authors believe that the numbers leaving Indonesia as a result of violence are not high.

Most Chinese in Indonesia are citizens of that country. Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta estimate the numbers of those who are not citizens at 93,717 or 0.05 percent of the total population of Indonesia. They live mostly in West Java and Banten. The writers suggest that these may be poor ethnic Chinese who cannot afford to pay the cost of Indonesian citizenship, or people who simply do not care enough about issues of citizenship to change (Suryadinata et al, 2003: 76). Citizenship for ethnic Chinese people has proved a contentious issue in Indonesia, with the rules governing procedures changing at various political junctures. I will return to this topic in more detail in chapters four and five.

Chinese people have been arriving on the archipelago of what is now the Republic of Indonesia since as early as the fifth century. The level of communication between China and Southeast Asia very much depended on the attitude of the Emperor who was in power at any particular time. For example, for much of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) creating links with places outside China was not considered a priority, however, the Yongle Emperor (1403-1424) was more
enthusiastic, sending official missions to Southeast Asia and posting commissioners in various ports in the region to supervise mercantile manoeuvrings. As well as officially sanctioned trading ventures south, Chinese also went as labourers to work in the tea plantations and tin mines of Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia.

Those early Chinese migrants tended to be viewed as traitors and deserters by the authorities in China because in leaving home they “left their filial duties undone — their parents unattended, their forefathers’ graves unswept, their ancestral sacrifices unoffered”, and went in search of profits and trade (Zhuang, 1999: 98). Only those who had official duties away from home, those who were taken away to do forced labour, or those who left to study, were considered by the Chinese authorities to be legitimate; and it was understood, by the Chinese government and by their families, that they would all eventually return home if they could (Wang, 1998b: 16). In 1727, the Yongzheng Emperor decreed that “the majority of those who go overseas are undesirable elements. If they are allowed to go as they wish without any time limit, they will become more undesirable, and will encourage more people to follow suit” (Zhuang, 1999: 98). Although people continued to leave China for Southeast Asia, this attitude did not change until 1893 when the Qing state lifted the ban on emigration (Duara, 1997: 43).

In the late nineteenth century the introduction of steamships made it easier to bring wives and families to Southeast Asia and facilitated return travel to China. This permitted ethnic Chinese migrants to maintain a Chinese cultural identity which led to a distinction between these new migrants and earlier generations of migrants who tended to integrate into the local populations. In Indonesia the term peranakan is still used to refer to those of ethnic Chinese heritage, most of whom have tended to be of Hokkien origin, who have intermarried with the local population and who display Indonesian cultural influences (Pan, 1998: 157). Totok is the term used to describe newer immigrants who speak a Chinese language in the home and orient themselves more towards Chinese cultural expression. As well as Hokkien, Hakka are also numerous among the Totok (Pan, 1998: 157). Mely Tan has pointed out that the usefulness of a continued distinction between totok and peranakan in Indonesia is questionable, since 1966, when Chinese
language schools were closed. In 1967 the government also issued regulations prohibiting the use of Chinese characters and the outward expression of Chinese culture in public places (Tan, 1997: 42). All the people I interviewed for this research are *peranakan* who have lost the knowledge of which part of China their families left, except for one man, Nurdin Purnomo, who is a *totok* of Hakka origin.

The stock market crash of 1932 had a detrimental effect on the economies of Southeast Asia and their need for immigrant labour began to wane. After Indonesian independence was declared in 1945 and after the communists won victory in China in 1949, emmigration from China had more-or-less dried up. This has created a difference between Chinese emmigration to Europe and America, which continues to this day, and emmigration to Southeast Asia. With no new waves of immigrants the Chinese in Southeast Asia have tended to integrate into their chosen societies. I will return to this theme in chapter three when I analyse the literature on “overseas Chinese”.

Although the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have integrated into that society, this has not tended to lead to their becoming Muslim. According to Leo Suryadinata Chinese Indonesians tend to be Christians, Buddhists, Taoists and Confucianists. He also mentions the eclectic mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism called *Tridharma* or *Sam Kauw* (the Three Religions). Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta do not provide the numbers of Chinese Muslims or Christians in their survey of the 2000 census. In 1997 Suryadinata asked Chinese Indonesian exponent of Islam, Junus Jahya, how many ethnic Chinese Muslims there were. Although there are no statistics Jahya suggested that between 0.5 and 1 percent of the ethnic Chinese population were Muslim. Based on the 2000 census that would

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3 The *peranakan* writer Kwee Tek Hoa (1886-1951) spread the idea of *Sam Kauw* and established the organisation *Sam Kauw Hwee* (Three Religions Organisation) in 1934 stating that “[a]ctually, the beliefs of most Chinese are a mixture or conglomerate of these three religions” (Suryadinata, 1997: 149). There has been debate over the extent to which these religions can be united doctrinally, however, I found lingering evidence of “the Three Religions” in temples I visited in Jakarta where statues of Confucius sat alongside Buddha and other Taoist deities within the one temple.
put the number at between 14,924 and 29,847 Chinese Muslims. The number of Buddhists was stated in the census as 1,694,682 or 0.84 percent of the total population, though not all of them can be presumed to be ethnic Chinese. Since 1979 Confucianism has not been recognised as an official religion in Indonesia. The 1971 census indicated that there were 972,133 Confucians, making up 0.82 percent of the total population, scattered all over the archipelago (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 130). There was no category for Confucianism in the 2000 census. Although Abdurrahman Wahid recognised Confucianism as a valid religion after he came to power in 1999, those who consider themselves Confucian in 2000 had to tick the box marked “others” on the census (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 131). However, at 411,629, the number of “Others” in 2000 was less than half the number of Confucians in 1971.

Indonesian National Identity and the “Chinese Problem”

Although Chinese people have been arriving in, assimilating into and influencing Indonesia centuries before the Dutch colonials began arriving in the sixteenth century, however, from colonial times to present day Indonesian politics the ethnic Chinese have never been fully included in official discourses within the nation-state. They have been perceived as outsiders, and therefore, not genuinely Indonesian. This has tended to be portrayed as a problem: the “Chinese problem” (masalah Cina).

As the Dutch gained control of the archipelago, they began to differentiate between “foreign orientals” and “indigenous people”. Different laws and dress codes were enforced for “foreign orientals” and their residential areas were separate from the rest of the population. Despite the distinctions enforced by the colonials, when Indonesia declared independence in 1945, suku Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian ethnic group) was included by President Sukarno as one of the official ethnic groups of the new nation. While Sukarno was in power (1950-1965) the ethnic Chinese were permitted to organise themselves into cultural and political groups and were visible in many sectors within Indonesian society.

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4 I have based this figure on the numbers of Chinese Indonesian citizens and have not included the numbers of ethnic Chinese with foreign citizenship.
However, a distinction continued to be made within Indonesian national discourses between the ethnic Chinese, non-*pribumi* (non-indigenous) who are perceived as originally arriving in Indonesia from outside the archipelago, and "indigenous", *pribumi* Indonesians, who are believed to be primordially Indonesian.

During the thirty-two years of Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998), anti-Chinese policies became more institutionalised than they had been during the Sukarno era. Suharto’s policy towards the ethnic Chinese was one of assimilation. This was in reality a practice of discrimination since other ethnic groups, those which were considered to be indigenous, were celebrated as part of Indonesian national identity. It was not permitted to celebrate Chinese culture publicly, Chinese Indonesians were strongly encouraged to change their Chinese names to Indonesian-sounding ones and Chinese language materials and Chinese medicines were banned. Indeed, these language materials and medicines were included along with drugs, firearms and pornography as banned substances on the customs declaration form.

Despite these assimilatory policies, however, Chinese identity was never quite eradicated. A code on the national identification cards allowed officials to know who was ethnic Chinese, even if they had changed their names. Chinese Indonesians had to apply for citizenship, even if they were born in the country to parents who were Indonesian citizens. A distinction was maintained between *pribumi* and non-*pribumi*, which was evident in public discourse and official documentation throughout the New Order period.

In 1998, after widespread violence directed largely at the ethnic Chinese, and with the demise of the Suharto regime, a period of reformasi (reform) was instigated. Peaceful democratic elections were held in 1999 and a social space seemed to become available in which the ethnic Chinese could express their Chineseness.

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5 When a Chinese Indonesian is born they are registered on their father's citizenship papers, and when they reach seventeen they have to apply to the government for their own citizenship papers. These papers are needed in order to receive a passport and other official documentation.
more openly. A number of the discriminatory laws were repealed and some Chinese Indonesians started to demand a political and cultural voice.

Discourses surrounding Chineseness have manifested themselves in a series of stereotypes which Charles Coppel has drawn together. They are worth quoting in their entirety because they summarise succinctly the way the ethnic Chinese are still perceived by “indigenous” Indonesians.

The Chinese are clannish, they keep aloof socially and prefer to live in separate areas. They cling persistently to the culture of their ancestral homeland. Their loyalty to Indonesia is dubious at best: at worst they are down right hostile to Indonesia. Chinese who apparently identify with Indonesia are not genuine; they are only pretending to do so for opportunistic reasons, rather than from a true sense of identification with the country and its people. This opportunism is characteristic of a people concerned with money, trade and business. They are not, like Indonesians, dedicated to ideals. Having been given a favoured position by the Dutch, the Chinese dominate the Indonesian economy, oppressing the Indonesian masses and preventing the rise of a national (i.e. indigenous) entrepreneurial class. Not content with their dominant position, they also engage in economic subversion, since they are expert in bribery and smuggling (Coppel, 1983: 5).

Stereotypes are a common way in which people differentiate between ethnic groups in Indonesia. However, all the stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians seem to be negative, whereas for other ethnic groups the stereotypes are more positive. For example, the Bugis, according to Lee Khoon Choy, are known for “their fierce character and sense of honour” (Choy, 1999: 311). The Javanese are refined and self-controlled (Choy, 1999: 45) while the Sundanese, who also live on Java, are more easy-going and enlightened than their neighbours (Choy, 1999: 158).

Framework of this Study

This thesis will investigate how Chinese Indonesians are articulating their national and ethnic identities in the post-Suharto environment and how these expressions fit with the dominant societal discourses. In order to explore this question I will analyse a number of ethnic Chinese political, cultural and religious groups, which were established or re-established, after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime, in May 1998. I chose to study these groups because they are the first in thirty-two years to be organised by Chinese Indonesians who openly
declare themselves to be ethnic Chinese and who are dealing with issues directly relating to Chinese Indonesians. Also, in the weeks and months after the fall of the New Order, the leaders of these groups took it upon themselves to act as mouthpieces for the Chinese in Indonesia.

As well as being multi-ethnic and multi-religious, Indonesia is also a relatively new nation and has struggled to develop a sense of national identity to match the deeply-held regional ethnic identities. This thesis questions the sense in which the “imagined community” of the nation is an homogenous space, either culturally or ethnically. In particular I will explore how nationalism in Indonesia has coped with diversity and what changes, if any, have been made since 1998. This will provide an understanding about whether a genuine space has opened in a more democratic Indonesia for Chinese Indonesians to play a part.

Up to now both ethnic and national discourses have been incorporated into a sense of Indonesian-ness. The national identity tends to be a political identity, whereas ethnic identities provide a cultural heritage to be celebrated. This has caused problems for Chinese Indonesians who during the New Order at least, have not been permitted to express Chinese cultural practices. Within Indonesian national discourses the way to solve the “Chinese problem” has been discussed in terms of either assimilation (asimilasi) or integration (integrasi). During the New Order period the government policy was assimilation and no deviation from this was possible. In the post-1998 climate the debate has surfaced again. The groups discussed in this research began to insist that Chinese Indonesian culture should be celebrated as a genuinely Indonesian culture. This thesis will explore what this means for both Chinese and Indonesian identity in the post-Suharto period.

The study of national identity in post-Suharto Indonesia, undertaken in this thesis, has wider implications than just an understanding of the position of Chinese Indonesians. After the fall of Suharto, national identity and national cohesion became pertinent issues not just for Chinese Indonesians, but also for groups who have been considered primordially part of Indonesia. Separatist violence broke out
in Aceh and in West Papua\(^6\), and heavy-handed responses from the Indonesian government have not quelled the demands of these regions. Other violent attacks took place in Central Sulawesi, where Muslims and Christians clashed leaving 542 people dead in 1998 (Cohen, 2003: 48). In Western Kalimantan the Christian Dayak ethnic group unleashed a “rampage of violence” against the Muslim Madurese who have been moving into the region in search of work since the 1920s, fleeing the poverty of their native Madura (Young, 2001: 223).\(^7\) Tension had been rising in Kalimantan since 1997 with the worst outpouring of violence in 2001 when 500 Madurese were killed (Elegant, 2001: 14-18). Questions were raised in the media, and in the outpouring of academic literature published after the 1998 riots, about whether post-Suharto Indonesia would manage to stay intact. This post-1998 rush to publish has dried up to a certain extent, or perhaps has been overtaken by events since then, such as, the War on Terror, and Muslim militancy in Southeast Asia. Therefore, although this study concentrates particularly on the position of the ethnic Chinese an understanding of some of the difficulties and challenges in maintaining national cohesion is also provided.

It is important to point out at this stage that the ethnic Chinese have a unique position in Indonesia. The national discourses have never succeeded in accommodating the presence of this minority, in other words, the Chinese in Indonesia have a particular position as outsiders to the nationalist discourses which other ethnic groups, who are considered “indigenous”\(^8\) to Indonesia, do not suffer. Chinese Indonesians also differ from other ethnic groups because all indigenous groups are regionally based, whereas the ethnic Chinese are scattered

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\(^6\) West Papua was formerly called Irian Jaya. However, when Abdurrachman Wahid visited the province in January 2000 he announced that the province was to be renamed Papua. This is the name favoured by many people in the region as Irian Jaya had been the name favoured by supporters of integration into the Republic of Indonesia (Chauvel, 2001: 202).

\(^7\) Young points out that although immigration of Madurese into Kalimantan began during the 1920s, numbers remained relatively small. The flow of migrants accelerated in the 1980s which coincided with the intensification of large-scale logging and plantations where many of the migrants found work. One of the claims made against the Madurese by the Dayaks was that they logged forest considered sacred by the Dayaks (Elegant, 2001: 19).

\(^8\) I will question the use of the term “indigenous” to describe Indonesian ethnic groups in chapter three. Throughout the thesis the word should be read as if it is within quotation marks.
throughout the archipelago. The ethnic groups are primordially attached to their regional homelands and the extent to which this differentiates the ethnic Chinese, and marks them as outsiders, is difficult to overemphasise. It is also important to state that I do not claim that the groups investigated here represent all Chinese Indonesian opinion on ethnic and national identity at this time. Chinese Indonesians are heterogenous in their social, cultural and Chinese sub-ethnic backgrounds. They are also diverse in their outlooks and in their beliefs about how to solve the “Chinese problem” in Indonesia. I chose to focus on these groups because they were vocal in the media after 1998 and because such groups are a new phenomenon in Indonesia.

The thesis has been divided into three sections: literature review, historical framework and empirical research. The literature review has been divided into two chapters because in carrying out this research I found it necessary to cover various approaches from a number of different disciplines as it was difficult to locate an approach into which this topic neatly fits.

Therefore, chapter two will review literature on nationalism. After providing an outline of the nationalism debate in the academic literature I will investigate the usefulness of the concepts of “civic” and “ethnic” nations for my study of Indonesia. Fred Halliday has appealed for research in this area which provides more interaction between the general theories and the development of discourses of national identity within individual nations (Halliday, 1997: 27). This suggestion has guided me in my analysis of this very large body of literature.

Chapter three begins with an exploration of two fields of study, multiculturalism and diaspora, which question the homogenous nature of nations and voice some of the concerns of minority groups within the nation-state. The ethnic Chinese outside China tend to be considered part of a “Chinese diaspora” and I question the usefulness and appropriateness of this for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Other questions raised in this chapter relate to what makes somebody Chinese and why people with no links to China and no Chinese language skills are still considered Chinese, either in Indonesia or elsewhere.

This thesis investigates theory on nationalism in more detail than theory on ethnicity because my main interest is in understanding how the ethnic Chinese groups are
attempting to find a place for themselves within Indonesian national discourses. Their desire to be accepted as fully Indonesian is not easily manifested within the discourses of nationalism in Indonesia, and I am interested in exploring whether theory on nationalism helps in understanding the activities of the ethnic Chinese organisations. Also, this thesis is concerned with the ways the groups articulate their identities. Ultimately it is an "emic" rather than an "etic" study. In Indonesia ethnic identity tends to be understood as a natural, primordial identity. Ariel Heryanto writes that among Indonesia's academic elite, "ethnicity" is "widely accepted (that is 'constructed') as existentially 'given' and conceptually unproblematic" (Heryanto, 1998: 95). Another Indonesian academic, Professor Parsudi Suparlan, describes Indonesian ethnic groups (suku bangsa) as "special kinds of social groups which are ascriptive in the same way as one's age or sex" (Suparlan, 1999: 153). Since the group members do not question their ethnicity, I have spent less time in this thesis exploring theory on ethnicity.

Chapters four and five provide a historical framework for the thesis. Chapter four discusses national and ethnic discourses from the colonial period up to the end of the New Order. Chapter five explores the background to the fall of the Suharto regime and the violence of 1998. I left Indonesia just as Abdurrachman Wahid was ousted from office, therefore, my analysis covers the tenure of B.J. Habibie, Suharto's successor up to the elections of 1999, and Wahid who was removed from power in July 2001.

Chapters six, seven and eight provide an analysis of my empirical material. Chapter six introduces the eleven groups which are the basis of my research. In chapter seven I investigate the ways the groups are trying to overcome the anti-Chinese stereotypes and the paradoxes which emerge out of their activities and demands. Chapter eight discusses the ways the groups are articulating their Chinese and Indonesian identities and how their explanations correspond both with Indonesian national discourses and with the academic writing discussed in chapters two and three.

9 "Emic" refers to "the native's point of view" and "etic" refers to the analyst's concepts and analyses (see, Eriksen, 1993: 11).
This empirical research is a particularly useful addition to the study of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. During the New Order years many ethnic Chinese were reluctant to declare themselves Chinese publicly, or speak about their experiences, which has led to a dearth of empirical material relating to how Chinese Indonesians themselves understand their identities. In relation to post-Suharto Indonesia more generally, much has been written about the economic and political changes which have been taking place, but issues relating to how individuals and groups have reacted to these immense changes have not been tackled to the same extent.

Methodology

I chose to carry out my empirical research in Jakarta because that is where the organisations and the people who established them are based. Having stayed for seven months during 2000 and 2001 I gathered three types of empirical data — interviews; manifestos and other documents published by the groups; and Chinese Indonesian media.

Interviews

The main aim of the interviews was to allow me to learn about the organisations set up by the ethnic Chinese after 1998, and also to facilitate an investigation of themes relating to how these people saw themselves within Indonesian national discourses. In order to do this I used a qualitative analytical method to carry out semi-structured interviews. In the book *Theory and Methods in Political Science* Fiona Devine argues that qualitative methods “are most appropriately employed where the aim of research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences” (Devine: 1995:138). In my research I am trying to understand how my interviewees and their organisations portray themselves and the meanings they give to the world in which they live, therefore, I found qualitative research methods to be most appropriate.

During interviews I asked questions in three categories — information about the organisations, thoughts on Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian identities, and future prospects for Chinese Indonesians. The interviews did not always follow
the same trajectory, with individuals expanding on issues which were important to them. However, broadly speaking all the interviews dealt with similar questions and the questions I used as a guide are provided in the appendix.

Although this was quite a controversial subject, and I was informed by academics before I went to Indonesia that people may be unwilling to speak about these issues, I found the group members very willing to speak to me. In fact, they seemed to appreciate the opportunity to express themselves after being silent for so long. Also, since these people had established organisations in order to deal in an open manner with Chinese Indonesian issues, they were willing to speak out. I might have had a different experience if I had been trying to engage with non-members about these kinds of issues.

**Manifestos and Other Publications of the Organisations**

All the groups produced manifestos in order to explain the aims of the organisations. My second method of analysis was examining the language and symbols used in these manifestos. All the manifestos I studied have a similar content. They provide a mission statement of each of the organisations, aims and obligations, organisational structure and an explanation of the symbols used.

The manifestos have been produced for members of the organisations who tend to be ethnic Chinese, however, all but one of the groups invite non-Chinese to join. Therefore, the manifestos have been written with both Chinese and non-Chinese readers in mind. This material is important for my investigation of how the groups are articulating their ethnic and national identities because it provides an understanding of how the groups wish themselves to be understood by other Indonesians.

**Print Media**

The same is true for my third set of data, Chinese Indonesian media. I examined Chinese Indonesian published magazines spanning from November 2000 to the
dismissal of Abdurrachman Wahid as President in July that year. The two principal magazines published by Chinese Indonesians post-Suharto are Mandarin Pos and Sinergi. Mandarin Pos is published in both Indonesian and Chinese. Sinergi is published in Indonesian. Both magazines are distributed throughout the archipelago. I also analysed articles published by group members in the national press between 1998 and 2001.

**Analysis of Data**

In order to analyse the data and determine how these groups are expressing their Chinese and their Indonesian identities I have used concepts relating to discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is appropriate to the analysis of the interviews, manifestos and media I have gathered because I argue that national and ethnic identities manifest themselves discursively.

In an explanation of discourse based on the ideas of the theorists Laclau and Mouffé, David Howarth articulately explains:

> [F]or things and activities to be meaningful, they must be part of particular discourses... The social meaning of words, speeches, actions and institutions are all understood in relation to the overall context of which they form a part. Each meaning is understood in relation to the overall practice which is taking place, and each practice in relation to a particular discourse. Hence we are only able to understand, explain and evaluate a process if we can describe the practice, and the discourse within which it is occurring (Howarth, 1995: 119).

Stuart Hall writes specifically about national identities writing that such identities are not things we are born with, rather they are “formed and transformed within and in relation to representation” (Hall, 1992: 292). Using the example of Englishness, Hall suggests that we come to know what it means to be English through the meanings produced within the nation. He considers national culture to be a “discourse” which produces meaning about the nation through stories, memories, and symbols associated with it (Hall, 1992: 292-293). Hall illustrates ways in which the discourses of the nation are represented — through the stories told in national histories, literature and the media.

Discourse refers to “[t]he multiplicity of acts that are performed through language” (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997: 212). Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan
Potter view discourse as “meanings, conversations, narratives, explanations, accounts and anecdotes” (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 2-3). Van Dijk states that discourse consists of three main aspects; “language use,” “communication of beliefs” (cognition) and “interaction in social situations” (van Dijk, 1997a: 2). All these analysts emphasise the interactional aspect of discourses, in other words, there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and practices of people in the society in which they are found. Teun van Dijk emphasises that both spoken and written texts are included in the concept of discourse. He points out that although talk is easily understood as a form of interaction, for example, everyday conversations or parliamentary debates, the written word is not so obviously interactive. Readers for example, seem to be more passive in their interaction than people sitting listening to a lecture who have the opportunity to question the speaker directly. However, van Dijk concedes that there are enough similarities between written and spoken texts to warrant inclusion of both in the notion of discourse (van Dijk, 1997a: 3). Norman Fairclough also emphasises the interactional nature of both written and spoken discourse. He states that “‘discourse’ is used... to refer to extended samples of either spoken or written language... this sense of ‘discourse’ emphasizes interaction between speaker and addressee or between writer and reader, and therefore processes of producing and interpreting speech and writing, as well as the situational context of language use” (Fairclough, 1992: 3).

The modern study of discourse developed in the 1960s in the humanities and social sciences (van Dijk, 1997a: 25). Robert de Beaugrande considers discourse analysis to be in part a reaction to the tendency in linguistics to disconnect the syntax of language from the social and cultural environment in which the language develops (Beaugrande, 1997: 39-40). Discourse analysts “emphatically define language as a system integrated with speakers’ knowledge of the world and society” (Beaugrande, 1997: 40 [italics in text]).

Discourse analysts use the concept of “triangulation” to validate their work. This refers to “[the] endeavour to work interdisciplinarily, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of different empirical data as well as background information” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 35). This thesis uses a variety of empirical data as
outlined above. The historical background presented in chapters four and five is also important for my analysis of the national and ethnic discourses. Discourse is studied as a "constitutive part" of local and global contexts. Therefore, "context structures" are an important part of any discourse analysis. Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter use the term "situated use" to explain the importance of the context of discourse. They state that "the sense of texts or talk is not seen as derived from their abstract meaning or organization but from their situated use" (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 90). The historical background is also important for another reason. Norman Fairclough states that "meaning-making depends upon not only what is explicit in a text but also what is implicit — what is assumed" (Fairclough, 2003: 11). The analysis of my empirical data is in part based on making assumptions according to an understanding of national and ethnic discourses in Indonesia.

I will argue that the ethnic Chinese groups investigated in this research are trying to find a place for themselves within Indonesian society. Although they seem to be falling into Chinese Indonesian stereotypes, by acting in an exclusive manner and harking back to the culture of their Chinese ancestors, within the discourses of Indonesian national identity, in which both national and an ethnic identities have a role, their activities make sense.

I was drawn to research the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia after the violence which they suffered in 1998. I was motivated by a question which Ten Ang also highlights in a recent paper. She suggests that, "[o]ne of the most urgent predicaments of our time can be described in deceptively simple terms: how are we to live together in this new century?" (Ang, 2003: 141). I could have explored this question in the place of my birth, Ireland, or any place on earth for that matter. However, Indonesia in 1999, after the first free elections in over thirty years, was a very exciting place for me to make a start.
PAGE
MISSING
IN
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Chapter 2

Nations and Nationalism

According to Bhikhu Parekh nationalism cannot help but offer “a homogenized, reified, and ideologically biased abridgement of a rich, complex, and fluid way of life” (Parekh, 1999b: 324). I will begin this chapter with an outline of the difficulties faced by the Indonesian leaders on winning independence and their attempts to inculcate a sense of Indonesian national identity in the population. Having set out the case in Indonesia I will then turn to the academic debate on nationalism and nations. I will begin with an outline of how the debate is structured followed by an explanation of some of the definitions of key terms. The main part of my discussion of nationalism will focus on the concepts of “civic” and “ethnic” nations and where Indonesia fits into this debate. This distinction is frequently made in the literature and raises questions about how different types of nations treat minorities. At the end of the chapter I will offer some conclusions explaining how this literature helps to understand nationalism in Indonesia.

Nation Building in Indonesia

The Need to Manage Ethnic Diversity

The multi-ethnic makeup of Indonesia has meant that the state has had to struggle to try to develop a common national culture which could compete for people’s loyalty with the existing cultures of the various ethnic groups (suku bangsa) on the archipelago. The need to deal with the diversity has been part of Indonesian nationalist thinking since a Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) was compiled at the Second Youth Congress of Indonesia in Jakarta in 1928. The pledge is still affirmed by people (including the Chinese Indonesian groups I interviewed) when
they wish to sum up the essence of Indonesian nationalism. According to Leo Suryadinata, the oath of 1928 is the "hallmark of Indonesian nationhood" (Suryadinata, 1992: 12). *Sumpah Pemuda* emphasises the desire to unify Indonesians into one culture. The pledge asserts that:

> We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, recognize one motherland — Indonesia... one nation — the Indonesian nation [and] hold in high esteem a unifying language (*bahasa persatoeuan*) — the Indonesian language; after passing this resolution, the congress has recommended that those principles be used by all Indonesian nationalist associations and that unity be strengthened by paying attention to a unifying foundation: [common] desire, history, language, customary law [and] education (Suryadinata, 1998a: 59).

When Sukarno became leader of an independent Indonesia in 1950, he insisted that the new nation should comprise all of the Dutch East Indies. The acquisition of Irian Jaya (West Papua) in 1962, which the Dutch had refused to concede, extended his rule over the entire territory (Steinberg, 1987: 424). Writers have reacted both positively and negatively to this. Hugh Seton-Watson suggests that this success could be "variously interpreted as a triumph for Indonesian unity or for Javanese imperialism" (Seton-Watson, 1977: 308). It may have seemed like Javanese imperialism at the time that Seton-Watson was writing, however, as Herry Priyono has pointed out, the nationalist movement in Indonesia was not an attempt to take over sultanates or kingdoms, nor was it an attempt by one ethnic group to subjugate another. Rather, it was a project to take over the running of the colonial state (*negara kolonial*) (Priyono, 1999: 191).

*Pancasila*

In an attempt to reconcile champions of both a secular and a non-secular state, Sukarno encouraged the leaders to accept the five principles of *Pancasila* as the "philosophical basis" of the new Indonesian nation; principles which he believed embraced elements which were common to all Indonesian ethnic groups (Suryadinata, 2000: 48). In a speech made on 1 June 1945 Sukarno introduced the concept of *Pancasila* (Ramage, 1995: 11). Michael Leifer has pointed out that the nationalist leaders of Indonesia were moved by a desire not to alienate any of the ethnic groups within the archipelago. Therefore, the necessity to deal with cultural and religious diversity was central to the concept of *Pancasila* (Leifer, 2000: 159).
The first principle of Pancasila is “belief in one supreme God” (*ketuhanan yang maha esa*). This principle avoids the problem of deciding what should be the official religion in a multi-faith society by declaring that Indonesia is a religious state but not based on any particular faith (Ramage, 1995: 12). The second tenet is “humanity that is just and civilised” (*kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab*) (Horn, 2000). According to Joannes Riberu this principle obliges Indonesians to treat all other citizens with “mutual tolerance, respect and understanding” (Riberu, 1990: 169).

The third principle of Pancasila is “Indonesian union” (*persatuan Indonesia*) and it is this principle which is particularly pertinent to my investigation of ethnic Chinese identities in Indonesia. According to George Kahin this principle can simply be termed “nationalism” (Kahin, 1952: 123). Mark Berger suggests that writers on post-independence Indonesia, including George Kahin, hoped, and even expected that “ethnic loyalties and so-called primordial sentiments would fade, and new loyalties to the modern nation of Indonesia would become the central aspect of every citizen’s identity” (Berger, 1997: 323). Speeches from the early nationalist leaders suggest that they too hoped that a national Indonesian culture would replace the many regional ethnic group (*suku bangsa*) identities, which were acknowledged as being deeply felt by the population. For example, the Minister of Basic Education and Culture, Professor Prijono, stated in 1959 that:

> As long as our consciousness of *suku* is strong and constitutes a solid moral foundation, our national consciousness will remain relatively weak. Therefore, we must, if possible, abolish *suku*-consciousness and raise men’s consciousness to the level of the nation... National consciousness must become stronger than consciousness of any other kind, stronger than consciousness of *suku* (Prijono, in Feith and Castles, 1970: 326-327).

In the “Birth of Pancasila” speech, Sukarno was vague about this tenet. He declared that the Indonesian people were one, however, he is not specific about how this unity ought to be expressed. Sukarno stated that:

> [T]he Indonesian Nation is the totality of all the human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the

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11 This was initially the first principle, but Muslim leaders in 1945 insisted that belief in God should be number one.
unity of the entire Indonesian archipelago from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian... Because amongst these seventy million human beings _le désir d'être ensemble_ already exists; there is already _Charaktergemeinschaft_. The Indonesian Nation, the Indonesian People, the people of Indonesia total seventy million persons, but seventy million who have already become one, one, once again one (Sukarno, 1945: 42-43)!!

An interpretative difference has remained among writers on Indonesia which highlights that up to now there is still uncertainty about how to handle the ethnic and religious diversity. The writer Froly Horn asserts that union is reached by “celebrating all the differences in ethnicity, culture and belief” (Horn, 2000). However, Donald Weatherbee argues that this tenet requires the “submergence of regional and ethnic loyalties to an allegiance to the Indonesian state” (cited in Ramage, 1995: 13).

The fourth principle of _Pancasila_ is translated as “people’s democracy guided by wisdom in the unanimity arising from consultation and consensus through representation” (_kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmah kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan_) (Ramage, 1995: 205 note 9). Froly Horn suggests that this simply means “democracy”, but it was interpreted in numerous ways by both Sukarno and his successor, Suharto. According to Joannes Riberu this tenet refers to the traditional method of decision making which is “not conducted in a spirit of political adversity, but in a spirit of communal brotherhood, togetherness... and co-operation” (Riberu, 1990: 179). The final principle of _Pancasila_ is “social justice” (_keadilan sosial_) (Ramage, 1995: 13). This refers to social and economic egalitarianism.

The tenets of _Pancasila_ remain the guiding principles of the Indonesian nation up to today. In chapter four I will explain in more detail how they were used during the Sukarno and Suharto administrations. It is sufficient to say for now that _Pancasila_ was an attempt by leaders at the time of independence to forge a path

!! “_Le désir d'être ensemble_” is taken from Ernest Renan’s definition of a nation. In order be a nation the people must have the desire to be together. “_Charaktergemeinschaft_” is a quote from Otto Bauer who wrote in his 1907 book _Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie_ [The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy] that “_Eine Nation ist eine aus Schicksalsgemeinschaft erwachsene Charaktergemeinschaft_” [A nation is a community of character which has grown out of a community of shared experience].
for Indonesia which took account of the diversity while inculcating a sense of national identity in the population.

**The Ethnic Chinese at the Time of Independence**

Anthony Reid makes the interesting point that during the national struggles in Southeast Asia, Indian mythology, Buddhism, Islam, and Christian ideas were very influential in shaping national identities. Chinese influences, however, were generally not evident because “Chinese cultural icons were being assertively mobilised at this time in the service of the competing overseas Chinese identity” (Reid, 1997: 55). Another problem for the ethnic Chinese was that they were perceived as Dutch sympathisers who had profited under colonial rule. According to Michael Leifer, Indonesian nationalism “was defined with reference to external foes and their domestic sympathisers” (Leifer, 2000: 157). Therefore, “Chineseness became one of the most important ‘others’ against which the new national identities defined themselves” (Reid, 1997: 55). Ariel Heryanto has also highlighted how the “othering” of the ethnic Chinese, has been central to the construction of an authentic, national, native, self in Indonesia (Heryanto, 1998: 100). Following this line of argument it is clear that the concepts surrounding “Chineseness” in Indonesia are closely linked to how national ideologies were formulated.

Although as outlined above, the nationalist leaders were conscious of the difficulties posed by ethnic and regional diversity for national unity, the ethnic Chinese were hardly mentioned in speeches and manifestos relating to these issues. Instead, those speeches deal with “indigenous” diversity (Feith and Castles, 1970: 340). Herbert Feith and Lance Castles point out that at the time of independence there was a sharp distinction in Indonesian political thinking between diversity within the *bangsa Indonesia* (Indonesian people or nation) on the one hand, and the relationship between the *bangsa Indonesia* and “minorities of foreign descent” (*orang orang bangsa lain*) on the other. The ethnic Chinese were considered a separate *bangsa*, *bangsa Tionghoa* (Chinese Indonesian people or nation). Charles Coppel has mentioned that few political parties in the pre-war period even accepted ethnic Chinese as full members (Coppel, 1983: 2-3). This is
despite the fact that as early as 1930 almost 66 percent of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were born there. Indeed, at this time more than 43 percent were already third-generation inhabitants. By the late 1950s about 80 percent of Chinese Indonesians were born in Indonesia (Coppel, 1983: 1).

In relation to citizenship, the 1945 constitution provided that “citizens shall be native Indonesians (orang-orang bangsa Indonesia asli) and other races (orang-orang bangsa lain) who are confirmed as citizens by law” (Coppel, 1983: 3). Charles Coppel argues that the word asli not only meant “indigenous, native, original”, but also “genuine, authentic”. He suggests that “the wording and the substance of the constitution and the citizenship law therefore gave colour to the view that the real Indonesians were indigenous and the members of other groups who obtained Indonesian citizenship did so by favour of the Indonesian nation” (Coppel, 1983: 3). Coppel also suggests that the term “Indonesian citizen” (WNI, Warga Negara Indonesia) had “artificial, legalistic” connotations from the beginning. It is used as an abbreviation of WNI keturunan asing (Indonesian citizen of foreign descent) and does not tend to be used to describe an “indigenous” Indonesian (Coppel, 1983: 3).

The early nationalist leaders also established a national motto: Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. This phrase is commonly translated as “unity in diversity”, however, Thung Julan prefers to translate it as “plurality but unity” because rather than placing the emphasis on the unity, emphasis is placed on the long-established roots which the different ethnic groups have within Indonesia. According to Thung, since the ethnic Chinese have their historical roots outside Indonesia (they came from China some time in the past) they are not viewed as part of the Indonesian plurality (Thung, 1998: 13 note 5). Filomeno Aguilar also suggests that the perception that the ethnic Chinese originally came from outside the archipelago, makes them “the internal Other of the ‘true’ Indonesian” (Aguilar, 2001: 505).

The ideology which continues to keep the ethnic Chinese outsiders in Indonesia is that of nationalism. The distinction which had been used during the colonial period, between “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” groups, was maintained in Indonesian national discourses. Therefore, the ethnic Chinese remained in a precarious position after independence: they lived in Indonesia, were educated in
national schools and spoke the national language, but to some extent they remained outside the discourses of Indonesian-ness. Having outlined the difficulties facing Indonesia after independence and the position of the ethnic Chinese, I will turn now to an investigation of the academic literature on nations and nationalism in order to explore how relevant it is to a study of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. According to Peter Alter, "'nationalism'... is one of the most ambiguous concepts in the present-day vocabulary of political and analytical thought... It can be associated with forces striving for political, social, economic and cultural emancipation, as well as with those whose goal is oppression" (Alter, 1989: 4-5). This is indeed a very complex literature with little agreement among authors about the definitions of key terms. However, since I argue that the Chinese Indonesian groups are trying to find a place for themselves within Indonesian national discourses, it is where my investigation begins.

**Nations and Nationalism in Academic Literature**

The academic scholarship on nationalism has tended to take the form of "grand theories" with each scholar exploring the general concepts and presenting their own particular explanation of the origins and development of the nation. Despite the many differences between the individual "grand theories", they tend to be grouped together based around where and when scholars believe nations to have emerged. Those who espouse "modernism" argue that nations are modern constructs. Primordialists believe nations are natural entities, and ethno-symbolists argue that ancient symbols and identities are important for nationalism to develop.13

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13 This general categorisation is not without criticism. Umut Özkirimli uses these divisions in his book *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, but then suggests that a distinction between 'constructivists' and 'essentialists' is more satisfactory (Özkirimli 2000: 215). He contends that there is little in common among modernists other than that they consider nations to be recent developments. He criticises the ethno-symbolists for not taking into consideration the many differences between those they place in the modernist camp (Özkirimli, 2000: 214). David Brown (2000) divides the literature into those who view nations as primordialist, situationalist, and constructivist (Brown 2000: 5). Anthony Smith (1998) distinguishes between perennialists and primordialists. The perennialists do not view nations as natural, rather they are an ancient social and political order (Smith, 1998: 159).
Modernism

The most common approach among recent scholars of nationalism is that nations are modern constructs, developing out of modern societal conditions such as capitalism, industrialism, urbanisation and secularism, which began to develop in the eighteenth century. Two of the most influential theorists who take a modernist approach are Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. They base their understandings of nationalism around social and cultural changes which have occurred with the arrival of modern society. Ernest Gellner focuses on the development of industrialism and the emergence of exo-socialisation in nineteenth century Europe. He argues that there is a necessity within an industrial society (which was not the case in a pre-industrial society) for a link between the state and culture. This "is what nationalism is about, and why we live in an age of nationalism" (Gellner, 1983: 38). Culture, in a modern society, does not divide different groups, as was the case in the agrarian society, it brings people together. "Culture is now the shared medium in which all people breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture" (Gellner, 1983: 37-38).

Gellner rejects criticism of nationalism as such arguing that it is not nationalism which imposes homogeneity. Industrial society demands homogeneity and nationalism provides the means to bring this about (Gellner, 1983: 46). Gellner goes on to assert that as well as sharing the same culture, people must also recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, particular attributes (such as the same language, or, territory) which distinguish one group of people from another, do not create nations; what is needed is the recognition that people feel they belong to the same group, and benefit from rights and accept duties as a result (Gellner, 1983: 7). In this regard the problem which Indonesia has faced is that nationalism seems to demand a homogenous culture, whereas. the multiethnic, multireligious population there has made this task very difficult.

There are added difficulties for the ethnic Chinese because historically there has been a feeling among non-Chinese Indonesians that they do not really belong to the nation. Of particular importance to my study of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is Gellner's theory of "entropy-resistant classifications". Most
differences between people are of little importance in a modern industrial society, he argues. There may be many different types of people, from different social, religious and ethnic groups, dispersed throughout society. In entropy-resistant cases, however, people with a particular characteristic will become concentrated in one part of a society (Gellner, 1983: 64-65). Gellner asserts that entropy-resistant characteristics are a very serious problem for an industrial society. In an agrarian society, where there was a clear distinction between those who had power and those who had none, entropy-resistant characteristics were the norm. By contrast, modern society is much more fluid and ideally there is less distance between each social group (Gellner, 1983: 65-67). Gellner states that “in this kind of situation grave sociological obstacles, not easily removable by mere goodwill and legislation or by political irredentism and activism, block the way to... cultural homogeneity” (Gellner, 1983: 69). Chinese Indonesians, it could be argued, have entropy-resistant characteristics. Some differ physically from other Indonesians and most Chinese have different religious practices to the “indigenous” population. Chinese Indonesians have also tended to be associated with a particular section of society — the economic sector. The Dutch colonialists tended to use the ethnic Chinese as trade allies and the “indigenous” people were given jobs in the bureaucracy. During the New Order they were kept out of most sectors except for the business sector. This makes it very difficult for the ethnic Chinese to assimilate fully into Indonesian society and also to be accepted by non-Chinese Indonesians.

Benedict Anderson, as a scholar of Southeast Asia, was aware of the particular difficulties facing Indonesia when he wrote his book *Imagined Communities* (1991, revised edition). Unlike Gellner, who bases his theory around industrialisation, Anderson links the rise of nationalism to the emerging system of capitalism, particularly “print-capitalism”. Anderson argues that the novel and

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14 Most Indonesians are Muslim whereas the ethnic Chinese tend to be either Christian, Buddhist or Confucian.

15 I will explore the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society more fully in chapters four and five.

16 Anderson links the importance of both printing and capitalism to the development of nationalism by citing China, where printing appeared possibly 500 years prior to its
the newspaper, which originated in eighteenth century Europe, "provided the technical means of 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (Anderson, 1991: 25). In relation to the newspaper Anderson states that "[t]his ceremony is performed in silent privacy yet each communicant is aware that the ceremony is being replicated simultaneously by others of whose existence he is confident" (Anderson, 1991: 33-36).

Language as a nationalising force is central to Anderson's thesis. He cites extracts from books written by José Rizal in the Philippines and Marco Kartodikromo in Indonesia. Anderson also highlights the importance of writing in the vernacular. He argues that "from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be 'invited into' the imagined community" (Anderson, 1991: 145). Language is certainly a unifying tool in Indonesian nationalism. The actual language, according to Anderson, was not important. He suggests that if Holland had arrived in the nineteenth century rather than in the seventeenth, the national language of Indonesia could have been Dutch. He states that "[n]othing suggests that Ghanaian nationalism is any less real than Indonesian simply because its national language is English rather than Ashanti" (Anderson, 1991: 132-134).

Language was not the only nationalising tool, according to Anderson. In attempting to explain why Indonesia survived as an entity into the twentieth century, whereas the Spanish colonies of Central and South America did not, Anderson explains that in the Dutch East Indies, Batavia (Jakarta) remained the administrative, educational and political apex. When people from all over the archipelago went to Batavia they knew they were at the centre of colonial activities (Anderson, 1991: 132). In contrast, in South America, there were separate economic and administrative zones. So, for example, "creole Mexican"

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17 As mentioned above, the desire to have a common Indonesian language went back to the Youth Oath of 1928. According to George Kahin, the Dutch felt that their prestige and Indonesians' feelings of inferiority could best be maintained by refusing to allow them to speak Dutch (Kahin, 1952: 39). Therefore, the language which became the national language was Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian Language) which developed out of Pasar Melayu (Bazaar Malay). This language was originally a means for the Chinese and non-Chinese to understand each other when carrying out business and trade (Grief, 1988: 3).
or "creole Chilean" administrators only served in the territories of colonial Mexico, or colonial Chile (Anderson, 1991: 56-58). With the arrival of print-capitalism these administrative zones began to be imagined as nations (Anderson, 1991: 61).

Other adherents of the modernist approach explain the development of nationalism in terms of political changes which began to occur in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Max Weber's definition of a nation as "a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own" has influenced scholars, such as Anthony Giddens and John Breuilly to emphasise the political rather than the cultural aspect of nations (Smith, 1998: 14). Giddens describes nationalism as "the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising communality among the members of a political order (Giddens, 1985: 116). Breuilly argues that "the departure point for an understanding of nationalism should be a political one" (Breuilly, 1985: 75). He states that to concentrate a study of nationalism on culture, identity, class or modernisation is to overlook the point that nationalism is primarily about politics and politics is about power (Breuilly, 1993: 1).

**Primordialism**

The approach which modernists have primarily battled against is that of primordialism. Adherents of this approach argue that nations are natural entities which stretch back into time immemorial. Few scholars promulgate this view, rather this tends to be the approach taken by those in the midst of a nationalist struggle.¹⁸ For example, in Indonesia during the war of independence, the future President, Sukarno, spoke of the naturalness of the nation of Indonesia. In his speech announcing "The Birth of Pancasila" Sukarno criticised the writers Ernest

¹⁸ Some scholars who do take a primordialist stance are Pierre van den Berghe. Primordialism has also been associated with Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils. For example, Paul Brass has stated that Geertz accepted that ethnic groups in a society are "givens", "relatively fixed at birth... [and] rooted in the non-rational foundations of the human personality" (Brass, 1991: 267). Anthony Smith also misrepresents Geertz stating that "underlying cultural realities" of race, religion and custom kept ethnicity prevalent (Smith, 1998: 151). Actually Geertz was interested in the "attribution" of significance to these allegedly primordial traits (Özkirimli, 2000: 72-73).
Renan and Otto Bauer because in their understanding of nations they looked to the feelings of the people in a community, but did not emphasise the territory inhabited by the people. Sukarno stated that, "God Almighty made the map of the world, created the map of the world. If we look at [it], we can point to where the ‘unities’ are. Even a child if he looks at a map of the world, can point out that the Indonesian archipelago forms one unity" (Sukarno, 1945: 41).

Sukarno used to speak “with complete sincerity of the 350 years of colonialism that his ‘Indonesia’ had endured” (Anderson, 1991: 11-12). He cited the two kingdoms of Sriwijaya and Majapahit as forerunners to the modern Indonesian nation. At the national monument (monumen nasional), which was built by Sukarno in the centre of Jakarta, and where the official story of the development of the Indonesian nation is displayed in glass cases, the struggle for independence is said to stem from the Pledge of Palapa in 1331. In that year, Gajah Mada, the vice-regent of the Majapahit kingdom pledged that he would not eat the fruit palapa until the archipelago of Indonesia (nusantara) was united.

**Ethnosymbolism**

The final category of theorists are the ethnosymbolists who position themselves some way between modernists and primordialists. They do not argue that nations are natural, nor do they assert that they are wholly modern constructs since in their view nations emerge out of communities which possess a pre-modern ethnic core. The main proponents of this approach are John Armstrong, John Hutchinson, and Anthony Smith. Armstrong was the first of the three to cast some doubt on the modernist arguments in his book *Nations Before Nationalism* (1982). This book investigated pre-modern Islamic and Christian ethnic identity formation. Anthony Smith argues that “attempts to explain how and why nations emerged must start from the ethnic ties and identities that have commonly formed their cultural basis” (Smith, 1991: 52). He argues that there are some examples of nations which do not have a deep ethnic heritage to draw on, but this is rare, usually there are “some dim memories and elements of culture and alleged ancestry, which it is hoped to revive”. He goes on to state that the lack of such ethnic sentiments “is likely to constitute a serious impediment to ‘nation-building’” (Smith, 1986: 17).
Modernist critics of ethnosymbolism argue that it misunderstands the concept of “the nation”. For example, Symmons-Symonolewicz propounds that the nation is not simply a large ethnic group, rather, an ethnic group undergoes many changes and absorbs many elements of other cultures and societies, before becoming a nation (cited in Özkirimli, 2000: 183-184). Another criticism is that ethnosymbolists misunderstand the differences between modern nations and earlier ethnic communities. John Breuilly has stated that to say these ethnic sentiments are the basis of modern nationalism, rather than “historical achievements to which nationalists choose” is misleading (Breuilly, 1993: 405-406).

Definitions of Key Terms

The different forms which nationalism has taken in the world has meant that no agreement has been reached in the academic literature about definitions of the key terms. Umut Özükirimli argues that confusion is caused by disagreement over the extent to which religious, class, and ethnic identities contribute to the construction of a national identity. This causes some scholars to emphasise “objective” criteria such as religion and language, while others argue that “subjective” criteria, such as “self-awareness” and “solidarity”, are more significant. This leads to disagreement between those who see the nation as “self-defined” and those who argue that it is “other-defined”. Most scholars combine objective and subjective criteria (Özkirimli, 2000: 58).

The confusion over definitions permits the meaning of nation to range from an ethnic group that does not constitute a state, to a state that contains more than one ethnic group” (Townsend, 1996: 6). This confusion leads some scholars to present their definitions as temporary. In Nations and Nationalism (1983) Ernest Gellner outlines “two very makeshift, temporary definitions of the idea of the nation” (Gellner, 1983: 7). Two people are from the same nation, according to Gellner, if they “share the same culture, where culture... means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating” (Gellner, 1983: 7).

19 Again this shows the difficulty people have in defining these terms conclusively. Emphasis added.
Nationalism for Gellner "is a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" (Gellner, 1983: 1).\(^{20}\)

Like Gellner, Benedict Anderson also presents his definition with qualifications. He offers a "workable" definition of a nation as "an imagined community - and imagined as both limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991: 6, emphasis added). It is "imagined" because even members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members. The nation is "limited" because even the largest nation is not coterminous with all the world's people, and it is a sovereign community because, Anderson suggests, the concept emerged during the Enlightenment, when the hierarchical dynastic realm was being overturned and an idea of "horizontal comradeship" emerged (Anderson, 1991: 6-7). Anthony Smith also offers a "working definition" of the nation: "the 'nation' is a named population, occupying an historic territory, with shared myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common legal rights and duties for its members" (Smith, 1999: 30-31).

The disagreement over terminology partly results from each scholar presenting their own "grand theory" of nationalism. John Breuilly criticises this method stating that the sheer number of different nations makes it very difficult to develop general principles about nationalism which everybody will agree on (Breuilly, 1985: 65). He attempts to deepen our understanding of the key concepts by assembling a typology of nationalism, instead of yet another general theory. Only after exploring different types of nationalism, he argues, can one attempt to outline general similarities between them (Breuilly, 1993: 2). What is needed, he suggests, is a "fruitful combination of historical analysis and theory" (Breuilly, 1985: 66). This attempt by Breuilly, to look historically at the development of nations in particular places and at particular times, is admirable; anything less than this detailed study could be considered speculative. However, he admits that

\(^{20}\) Benedict Anderson provides an example which questions whether this manifests in reality. Some of the people on the eastern side of Sumatra are not only very close physically to the population of the Straits of Malacca, they are also ethnically related, have a common language and religion. However, they are both members of different nations - the east Sumatrans are Indonesians whereas the Malays of Malacca are Malaysian (Anderson, 1991: 120-121).
as a result of this "no one person can understand in detail more than a tiny fraction of so vast a subject" (Breuilly, 1993 ix), and so he must define his terms very narrowly. Nationalism for Breuilly is a strictly "political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments" (Breuilly, 1993: 2). 

Like Breuilly, Umut Özkirimli suggests that we need to move away from the ambitious "grand theories" which profess to explain all nationalisms, to "partial theories" which concentrate on particular aspects of nationalisms (Özkirimli, 2000: 227). Özkirimli overcomes Breuilly's problem of defining nationalism very narrowly, by suggesting that "what unites diverse forms of nationalism is the 'discourse of nationalism'" (Özkirimli, 2000: 229). This "discourse of nationalism" must be reproduced in everyday life in order to be effective (Özkirimli, 2000: 230-231). The discourse has three main characteristics: it demands that the interests of the nation override all other interests; it regards the nation as the only source of legitimacy, and it operates through "binary divisions" — between "us" and "them", "friends" and "foes", and so on (Özkirimli, 2000: 230). By considering nationalism to be a discourse Özkirimli formulates an "umbrella definition" of nationalism as "a particular way of constructing the social reality we experience" (Özkirimli, 2000: 229).

Anthony Smith criticises the trend away from grand theories arguing that, when nationalism and national identity have become so central to politics in the world today "all the partial 'little narratives' will have to lean on, and tacitly take their meaning from one or other version of the existing grand narratives" (Smith, 1998: 219). However, the ideas of Smith and those arguing against "grand theories", are not as divergent as they seem to think. Özkirimli encourages close investigation of

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21 Unlike other theorists such as Alfred Cobban and Gerard Chaliand, Breuilly denies that the American Revolution was a national movement (Chaliand, 1989: 1-2) because the leaders made "little reference to a distinct cultural identity to justify their claims" (Breuilly, 1993: 5).

22 Fred Halliday also calls for a move away from "grand theories". He argues that the debate on nationalism "has in some ways reached an impasse: an array of general theories is offset against a mass of individual accounts with relatively little interaction between the two" (Halliday, 1997: 26). Halliday suggests that "what is needed now is a moratorium on general theories, of which we have plenty, and indeed a questioning... of whether a general theory is either desirable or necessary" (Halliday, 1997: 27).
the general theories in order to formulate “partial theories”, which will shed light on a particular aspect of the phenomena, for example, the participation of various groups in nationalist projects (Özkirimli, 2000: 233). Fred Halliday has also acknowledged that there needs to be more interaction between the general theories and the writing about individual nations. He has called for “comparative, individual, histories that are both written in the light of these general theories and that, critically, test them against the historical record” (Halliday, 1997: 27). As I mentioned in the introduction, in this thesis I am guided by Halliday’s suggestion. I am looking at the general theories in order to assess their usefulness in explaining Indonesian nationalism and the place which the Chinese Indonesian groups see themselves as having within the national discourses.

Civic and Ethnic Nations

Origins of the Distinction Between Civic and Ethnic Nations

The nationalism literature which I found most useful was that on “civic” and “ethnic” nations. This distinction runs through the academic literature and is useful for my research because these kinds of nations are said to treat ethnic minorities in different ways. Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid argue that some nations, such as Germany and Russia, are based on blood and kinship. Other nations, such as the United States and France, are based on more civic ideas which, theoretically at least, allow people from outside to become part of the nation (Chirot, 1997: 17-18). In order to investigate whether different kinds of nations treat ethnic difference within the nation-state more sympathetically, I will now turn to an investigation of this literature.

Leah Greenfeld acknowledges a confusion engendered by “civic” and “ethnic” concepts of the nation:

The term ‘nation’ applied to both conceals important differences... the two concepts under one name reflect two radically different forms of the phenomenon (which means both two radically different forms of national identity and consciousness, and two radically different types of national collectivities — nations) (Greenfeld, 1992: 8-9).

According to David Brown, civic nationalism is a “shared commitment to, and pride in, the public institutions of state and civil society, which connect the people
to the territory that they occupy" (Brown, 2000: 34). The civic understanding of the nation stems from the French Revolution of 1789, which was heavily influenced by the political thinking of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) (Schwarzmantel, 1991: 25). Rousseau argued that people did not unite to form a nation simply because they resembled each other, rather, there had to be benefits for people to come together. Rousseau maintained that the people should be educated to love the nation, and that sovereignty should rest with the citizens of the nation (Özkirimli, 2000: 20-21). He argued that nationalism was a necessary accompaniment to sovereignty and modern democracy (Diamond & Plattner, 1994: xii). For Rousseau the concept “nation” expressed “the idea of a shared, common, equal citizenship, the unity of the people” (Özkirimli, 2000: 21).

Another French scholar, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), (who was cited by Sukarno above) also argued that ethnic ties were not necessary to form a nation. He published a very influential pamphlet Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? (What is a Nation?) in 1882 in which he argued that, “to have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more — these are the essential conditions for being a people” (Renan, 1990: 19). He suggests that a common race, language, material interest, religion, geography and military necessities are not adequate for the creation of a nation. Rather, the nation is “a daily plebiscite” in which there is “the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life” (Renan, 1990: 19).

Another contribution to the debate on nationalism came from the German Romantics, who were reacting to the invasion of the German principalities by Napoleon’s army in 1806. They rejected the Enlightenment belief that the law and equal citizenship were what kept a nation together, and promulgated the notion that it was the common ethnic characteristics of the people which created a nation (Ignatieff, 1994: 4). Both German Romantic thinkers, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) viewed the nation as “an organic cultural unit... a historic entity whose cultural features developed over a long period of time [which] determine[s] individuals and make[s] them what they are” (Schwarzmantel, 1991: 33). In his Addresses to the German Nation (1907), Fichte promulgated what Anthony Smith calls ethnocentric nationalism: “For an
‘ethnocentric’ nationalist, both ‘power’ and ‘value’ inhere in his cultural group” (Smith, 1971: 158-9). Fichte asserted the superiority of the German nation above all other nations, claiming that “only the Germans constituted a true Volk” (Schwarzmantel, 1991: 23). Herder’s nationalism is what Smith calls polycentric nationalism (Smith, 1971: 158-159). This type of nationalism “resembles the dialogue of many actors on a common stage” (Smith, 1971: 158). Herder asserted that each nation has its own particular culture but each contributes equally to the diversity of the world (Schwarzmantel, 1991: 23).

**Different Routes to Nation Formation**

Some scholars suggest that the experiences of the potential national communities had important implications for whether they became “civic” or “ethnic” nations. The colonial societies had in many cases to struggle for their independence and this was certainly the case for Indonesia. Nations which developed later, and in reaction to oppressive forces have been considered less liberal than those which developed earlier and already had an indigenous state structure in place.

In *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (1958) Hans Kohn outlined two different types of nationalism which correspond with “civic” and “ethnic” types of nations: “voluntarist nationalism”, which regarded nations as free associations of rational human beings who entered into the nation voluntarily, and “organic nationalism”, which viewed the nation as a fixed organism, stamped on its members at birth. The former he considered to be typical of England, France, America and Holland where “the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future national state” (Kohn, 1958: 329). In Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe and Asia, “nationalism grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern” (Kohn, 1958: 329). Kohn argues that, “[w]hile Western nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century, the later nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia easily tended towards a contrary development” (Kohn, 1958: 330).
John Plamenatz also distinguishes between "western" and "eastern" nationalism (Plamenatz, 1973: 23). Like Kohn, Plamenatz argues that the type of nation which emerged depended on the experiences of the elites or potential elites within the national communities. Unlike Kohn, Plamenatz includes Germany and Italy with the "western" form of nationalism because although their nationalism has not been entirely liberal (nazism in Germany and fascism in Italy) it is nevertheless the nationalism of people "already united politically" (Plamenatz, 1973: 29). For Plamenatz, the eastern nationalism flourished among the Slavs of Eastern Europe, and in Africa and Asia. Like Kohn, Plamenatz argues that in eastern nations "there was an awareness that the skills, ideas and customs acquired from their ancestors were inadequate" (Plamenatz, 1973: 30). As a result, this "eastern" form of nationalism "is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates, and is apt to be illiberal" (Plamenatz, 1973: 34).

Anthony Smith also, surprisingly, argues that there are various routes to nation formation and these lead to either a more civic or more ethnic type of nationalism. As an ethno-symbolist, Smith emphasises the importance of ethnic ties in the formation of nations. In his attempts to distinguish between different types of nations, Smith differentiates between "lateral" (bureaucratic incorporation) and "vertical" (vernacular mobilisation) types of nation formation (Smith, 1991: 52-53). Lateral ethnie were generally composed of aristocrats and higher clergy who were socially confined to the upper strata and who formed close links with the high status members of neighbouring ethnie. The first nations of England, Scotland, Holland, Sweden and France developed in this way, according to Smith (Smith, 1999: 32). On the other hand, in the "vertical" type of nation formation, the high status ethnie was spread to lower strata of the population and was centred around notions of a common history and traditions. Examples of this "vertical" type of nationalism, according to Smith, are Catholic Irish and Orthodox Serb nationalisms, which arose out of subjection to English and Ottoman Turk rule.

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23 Ross Poole points out that Smith's thesis that nations have an "ethnic core" is not easily reconcilable with the claim that there are distinctions between "ethnic" and "civic" nationalisms. Poole suggests that the two are compatible if you are careful to explain, which Smith does not, that historically, some nations have emphasised ethnic aspects more than others (Poole, 1999: 174, note 80).
Irrespective of interference by these alien states "there were internal social and cultural resources — local institutions, family networks, life-cycle customs, ballads, traditions, memories of heroes, and the like — that preserved and reinvigorated the popular culture of the subject ethnies" (Smith, 1999: 33). Out of this mobilisation of the people by a local intelligentsia emerged a type of nationalism in which the ethnic bond was more intense than in the "lateral" type of nation formation (Özkirimli, 2000: 178). This leads Smith to divide nationalisms into two different types: "territorial", stemming from "bureaucratic incorporation" and "ethnic" nationalism which develops out of "vernacular mobilization" (Özkirimli, 2000: 182-183). This type of "vertical" nation formation has also been in evidence in the Middle East, Asia and parts of Africa (Smith, 1998: 194).

Ressentiment

By the 1820s, according to Benedict Anderson, there was a "model" of the nation available for "pirating" (Anderson, 1991: 81-82): "the nation proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent" (Anderson, 1991: 67). However, there were certain standards which a nation had to reach. All people within the territory had to be included, so serfdom and slavery had to come to an end (Anderson, 1991: 81-82). In the explanations of the spread of nationalism mentioned above, nations in the West, where the ideas first emerged, are considered to have developed an enlightened, civic form of nationalism. Non-western countries are said to harbour feelings of resentment that their culture was inferior to that being imitated and possibly not adequate for the successful appropriation of these new nationalist ideas.

Liah Greenfeld looks in detail at these contradictory feelings which she calls "ressentiment". This concept relates to a "psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred... and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings" (Greenfeld, 1992: 15). In some situations "ressentiment" may lead to what Greenfeld calls the "transvaluation of values": "the transformation of the value scale in a way which denigrates the originally supreme values, replacing them with notions which are unimportant [and] external" (Greenfeld, 1992: 16).
She argues that “wherever [ressentiment] existed, it fostered particularistic pride and xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered” (Greenfeld, 1992: 16).

This idea of ressentiment allows Greenfeld to distinguish between what she considers the original form of nationalism — in which democracy and self-determination were central concepts — and the later forms of nationalism which were more likely to be authoritarian (Greenfeld, 1992: 10-11). She even goes so far as suggesting that the distinction may prevent the export of democracy to illiberal, non-Western societies.

Elie Kedourie argues that nationalism in Asia and Africa is neither indigenous to the regions nor “an irresistible tendency of the human spirit”, rather, it is an importation from Europe (Kedourie, 1971: 29-30). At the heart of nationalism in these places, according to Kedourie, was a paradox. On the one hand, those Asian and African leaders who led the nationalist movements in their countries tended to be European educated and therefore were unlikely to have faith in the “primitive superstition” of their homelands (Kedourie, 1971: 76-77). On the other hand, the discourse of nationalism encouraged that each nation be defined by its past, and so traditional kinds of behaviour were celebrated (Kedourie, 1971: 92-93).²⁴

Partha Chaterjee highlights very clearly the confusion and resentment felt by those struggling for independence in post-colonial societies. In Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (1986) Chaterjee propounds what he considers to be the central contradiction of the emergence of nationalism in colonial societies. This type of nationalism, he argues,

²⁴ Kedourie gives the example of Jomo Kenyatta. He studied anthropology in London, but encouraged cliterodectomy when he returned to Kenya (Kedourie, 1971: 76-77).
This complex acceptance and refusal to fully embrace Western ideas is highlighted in an example from Indonesia. Speaking, in 1945, during a debate about the future of the Indonesian political system, the Javanese aristocrat Raden Supomo argued that the new Indonesian constitution should be based on an “integralist” state structure. Supomo asserted that “every state must reflect the unique cultural and legal heritage of its people” (Bourchier, 1997: 159-160). He “held that village communities all over the archipelago were characterized by their attachment to values of communal harmony, social solidarity, and their feeling of oneness with their leaders” (Bourchier, 1997: 159-160). However, the idea that a constitution should be based on a “master concept”, such as integralism, was adopted from a Dutch ideology which was heavily influenced by German tradition (Bourchier, 1997: 179 note 3). Indeed, Supomo named the European thinkers Hegel, Spinoza and the nineteenth century German Romantic Adam Müller, as leading theorists of integralism (Bourchier, 1997: 160-161).

Criticisms of the Distinction between Civic and Ethnic Nations

That nationalism in Asia was an import from Europe does not necessarily mean that it became subverted in the process. In recent years criticism of the distinction between “good” (civic) and “bad” (ethnic) types of nationalism have been rather forcefully made. Partha Chatterjee argues that nationalism is “irrational, narrow, hateful and destructive [and is also] one of Europe’s most pernicious exports [being] a child of... fervent romanticism, of political messianism whose inevitable consequence is the annihilation of freedom” (Chatterjee, 1986: 7). A division into different types of nationalism was, according to Chatterjee, an attempt by “liberal-rationalist” thinkers to deal with a dilemma: these liberals believed that nationalism was an enlightened idea which emerged in Europe with industrialism and democracy. In order to maintain this thesis, other forms of nationalism which emerged outside Western Europe, and which may have been illiberal in character, were deemed to be an “impure, often deviant” form of the original (Chatterjee, 1986: 3-4).

Stefan Auer also complains about the tendency in the West to label Eastern nationalism as “bad”. Auer disagrees with Plamenatz’s suggestions that the people
of Central and Eastern Europe are destined to an illiberal type of nationalism. He complains that when illiberal forms of nationalism emerge in Germany or Italy this is seen as an aberration, whereas, outside Western Europe it is seen as the norm (Auer, 2000: 223-224).

Even those scholars who accept the distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nations have become more cautious. Michael Ignatieff has pointed out that Enlightenment societies acted as if they were ethnically homogenous (Ignatieff, 1994: 4). The dilemma over who was entitled to become a citizen was less complicated in Rousseau’s time than it is today: if you were not white, male and propertied, you were not entitled to become a citizen, and as a result, women, black slaves, and aboriginal peoples were excluded from the nation (Ignatieff, 1994: 4).

Greenfeld concedes that most nations are a mixture of “civic” and “ethnic” tendencies, but, the mixtures within each nation vary significantly enough to justify her classification system. She argues that the “character” of a specific national identity was defined during the early stage of its development and “[i]ts effects, in the political, social, and cultural constitution of the respective nations, as well as their historical record, are attributable to this original definition” (Greenfeld, 1992: 22-23).

Ross Poole also argues against making such clear cut distinctions between nations. He suggests that for people who have been discriminated against — Jews, Blacks, Gypsies — even the most civic of nations has an ethnic side (Poole, 1999: 41). Poole is more willing than Greenfeld to believe that the degree to which a nation emphasises “civic” and “ethnic” characteristics can change. He suggests that “the content of various nationalisms is not determined by history, but by ongoing political struggles and debates. These contribute, not merely to the nation’s sense of its present and its future, but also to the ways in which it interprets its past” (Poole, 1999: 42). As a result, he proposes that instead of seeing ethnic and civic national identities as rooted in history, we should “investigate the social and political circumstances in which these forms of closure come onto the political agenda” (Poole, 1999: 43).
Conclusions: The Case of Indonesia

Indonesians were brought together initially through the desire to oust a colonial power and the leaders insisted that the new nation should include the whole territory of the Dutch East Indies. After independence, Indonesia was faced with nation-building in a country which was vast both in its territorial expanse and in its diversity and complexity. The five principles of *Pancasila* were formulated in order to create some kind of unity and fuse that unity out of the perceived traditions of the different ethnic groups.

The most common assertion in the academic literature is that nations are modern constructs, developing out of political and societal changes which arrived with industrialism and modernity. This is particularly obvious in the case of Indonesia which has struggled to inculcate a sense of national unity among the many *suku bangsa* within its borders. Also pertinent to Indonesia's experience is that ideas of nationalism came from Europe and were diffused throughout the population by a European-educated elite. The fact that Sukarno spoke of Indonesia's glorious past points to the "discourse of nationalism" which, to paraphrase Özkirimli, constructs the social reality we experience. This "reality" stems from an "immemorial" past and reaches into a "limitless" future (Anderson, 1991: 132).

Another element of the discourse of nationalism is that it tries to unite a nation around a common culture. As outlined above, in the case of many countries fighting for independence from colonial powers they did not have a common culture at the time of independence. These were areas cobbled together by power struggles and rivalry between the European masters and did not necessarily form historical unities. These new nations had to set about building a nation through the inculcation of a nationalistic ideology. Elie Kedourie has called this process "a method of teaching the right determination of the will" (Kedourie, 1961: 81).

The Chinese in Indonesia were taught, along with all the other ethnic groups, about "the right determination of the will", however, they were still fundamentally excluded from the nation from its inception. Despite the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, Indonesia tends to be considered a "civic" nation in the academic literature. David Brown argues that although civic nationalism is usually associated with democracy. Suharto's Indonesia is an example of civic nationalism.
which is authoritarian (Brown 2000: 56). Anthony Reid and Daniel Chirot also classify Indonesia as a civic nation. They argue that “Indonesian nationalists by virtue of having to deal with significant religious and ethnic minorities throughout the immense and varied territory... were obliged to create a more civic than a blood type of nationalism” (Chirot, 1997: 20). As a result, they argue that no matter how much anti-Chinese sentiment there might be, through “cultural conversion” on their part it is possible for the ethnic Chinese to be accepted (Chirot, 1997: 20). Anthony Smith argues that Indonesia created a “civic, territorial” nation through a “dominant ethnie” model whereby “the culture of the new state’s core ethnic community becomes the main pillar of the new national political identity and community”. In the case of Indonesia this core ethnic culture was the Javanese culture which Smith suggests shaped the identity of the political structures being developed (Smith, 1991: 110). Placing Indonesia in the category of “civic” nation contradicts much of the literature which holds that nations which developed later and in reaction to existing state structures tended to be illiberal in nature. This highlights how complex Indonesian society is, and how difficult it is to categorise it.

As outlined above, it certainly is the case that Indonesian nationalists had to contend with considerable ethnic, religious and cultural diversity when fomenting ideas about Indonesian nationalism. Pancasila was an attempt, and continues to be an attempt, to unite diverse groups of people into an Indonesian nation. The Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) of 1928 was an attempt to unite people by promulgating a common language. However, I do not accept that the literature has taken account of the extent to which the ethnic Chinese have not been fully accepted as genuine Indonesian. Therefore, I consider Indonesia to be what I have termed an indigenist rather than a civic nation. As mentioned above, diversity among the indigenous ethnic groups has been accepted, however, the ethnic Chinese heritage has not been included in national discourses. Leo Suryadinata alludes to this when he suggests that all the countries of Southeast Asia, except for Singapore, are “indigenous state-nations” where “the indigenous group is used as the ‘model’ of the nation” (Suryadinata, 1997b: 5-6).
In recent years academic literature has questioned the homogenous nature of the nation. The voices of minority groups within the nation have begun to be heard. I will begin chapter three with an outline of two fields of study, multiculturalism and diaspora, which I consider of particular interest to an investigation of Chinese Indonesians (although the literature is not without its problems). Since the ethnic Chinese outside China have had particular difficulties being accepted into many nations in which they have settled, not just Indonesia, I will also discuss academic literature relating to Chineseness in particular.
Chapter 3

Discourses of Difference

There has been an acknowledgement in the academic literature in recent years that nationalist discourses have tended to ignore the experiences of “marginal groups” within the nation. Although a “civic” form of nationalism might be more accepting of those who are not ethnically related to others within the nation, both “civic” and “ethnic” concepts tend to promote cultural homogeneity. Civic nations may accept ethnic and cultural minorities, however, these groups have been expected, until recently, to play down their ethnic identity and assimilate into the dominant national culture. Globalisation is changing the way people think about nations. On the one hand people are settling in nations in which they were not born, they are also keeping in touch with nations they have left. On the other hand, ethnic conflict is a continuing problem and people have become more conscious of those who are not considered to belong. According to Len Ang “the world is now a space of complicated entanglement, of togetherness-in-difference” (Ang, 2001: 5). Changes in the debate about nations and nationalism, and a move away from general theories, are partly the result of an awareness that the multiethnic aspect of most nation-states calls into question what a nation is and who belongs in it.

In a country such as Indonesia, the inculcation of a national identity is complicated by the diversity of the population and the deeply-felt ethnic identities. There is a tension between the strongly-felt ethnic identities among the population, and the inculcation of a nation-wide identity. An “indigenist” discourse has also ensured that up to now only those cultures considered to be indigenous are accepted.
Sukarno regaled during a meeting with Ho Chi Minh that there were no minorities in Indonesia. If there were minorities, there were majorities, and then there would be exploitation. Instead, according to Sukarno, the ethnic groups of Indonesia were all part of the one Indonesian national body. According to Siauw Tiong Djin, Sukarno's words ensure that “every cultural activity from every ethnic group contributes to the richness of Indonesian culture” (Siauw, 1998: 26-27). In reality Chinese Indonesians have not been accepted within the national discourses but the groups set up after 1998 are asking for this kind of recognition for their Chinese heritage.

This chapter will discuss some of the academic debates which question the homogeneity of the nation. I will begin with a brief discussion of “multiculturalism”. Although the Indonesian government does not use the term “multiculturalism”, and the academic writing on this topic tends to deal with multi-ethnic nations in the West, such as the United States, Australia and Canada, I have found that some of the questions raised in this literature are useful to my examination of the Chinese experience in Indonesia. I will then move on to an investigation of the literature dealing with “diaspora” and assess whether it is useful to describe the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as part of a diaspora. Finally the chapter will explore “Chineseness” itself and ask what makes people who have lived in Indonesia for generations, “Chinese”.

**Minorities in the Nation-State**

Demands for recognition by minority groups have been common all over the world during the last thirty years or so. Before the 1960s a concept which became known as the “Anglo-Conformity” model ensured that immigrants in western societies were expected to integrate entirely into their new communities. However, during the 1970s, fuelled by demands from minority groups themselves, a more pluralistic policy was adopted and minorities were encouraged to maintain some aspects of their ethnic heritage. (Kymlicka, 1995a: 14-15).

Bhikhu Parekh raises the problem of minorities within the nation-state who are not included in the national discourses. He states that: “National identity... is a matter of moral and emotional identification with a particular community based
on a shared loyalty to its constitutive principles and participation in its collective self-understanding" (Parekh, 1999a: 69). However, "minorities cannot feel part of a political community if its very self-definition excludes them and treats them as outsiders" (Parekh, 1999a: 70). Istvan Pogany also writes about minorities who are not included in national discourses. Writing about groups in Central and Eastern Europe, Pogany argues that pluralism, whether religious, linguistic, ethnic or cultural does not, in itself, cause the problems which have become familiar there. Firstly, he states that “political units” which are not based on the principle of national self-determination, such as Empires, do not have these problems (Pogany, 1999: 143). Such problems have only emerged in “highly suspect ideologies which regard ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic homogeneity as of overriding importance in the construction of States” (Pogany, 1999: 144-145). This resonates with Gellner’s ideas about the function of the state in modern society as the only organisation large enough to cater to the needs of modern society, and the difficulties cultural difference causes in this more fluid society. Unlike Pogany, Gellner does not blame nationalism for this situation. For Gellner, industrialism needs a nation-state in which to function. Secondly, Pogany argues that the behaviour of particular minorities, as well as their size and economic dominance, may be a factor in determining the degree to which there is intercommunal friction within states (Pogany, 1999: 145). Pogany also points out, however, that majorities often judge minorities according to their own prejudices and assumptions, rather than on the basis of “objective information”. Attitudes towards minorities are likely to have been ‘learnt’ in childhood, or based on personal experience, rather than statistical information. (Pogany, 1999: 145). Basically, Pogany argues that problems for minorities in Central and Eastern Europe are as a result of the form of national identity based on ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity (Pogany, 1999: 145-146).

The rights of minority groups within nation-states have been taken up by the United Nations which has ensured that minorities all over the world have become more aware of their rights to express their ethnic identities. Article 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language (Bowring, 1999: 4).

Again in 1992, following many years of drafting, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Bowring, 1999: 7).

One of the dominant discourses to develop out of calls by minority groups for more recognition is that of “multiculturalism”. This is a contested term which, as David Bennett points out “has served variously as code for assimilation and cultural separatism; campus marxism and ethnic nationalism; transnational corporate marketing strategy and minority competition for state resources” (Bennett, 1998: 1-2). Ien Ang puts it in rather simple terms as “the official and informal recognition that racial and ethnic minorities in a particular nation-state have their own distinct cultures and communities, and... [are] recognized and appreciated as such” (Ang, 2001: 14).

The term multiculturalism was coined by a Canadian Royal Commission in 1965 (Bennett, 1998: 2) and it is the Canadian academic, Will Kymlicka, who is one of its leading exponents. Kymlicka explores two forms of multiculturalism. On the one hand there are those groups he calls “national minorities”, who were previously self-governing and tend to prefer to continue as distinct communities, demanding various forms of autonomy, and self government (Kymlicka, 1995a: 10-11). He calls these “multinational” societies (Kymlicka, 1995a: 17-18). On the other hand there are immigrant minorities, who usually wish to be accepted as full members of the new society, but may seek to “modify the institutions and laws to make them more accommodating of cultural differences” (Kymlicka, 1995a: 10-11). Societies with immigrant minorities are described as “polyethnic” societies (Kymlicka, 1995a: 17-18).

A central point made by Kymlicka is that people should have access to “societal cultures” (Kymlicka, 1995a: 101). He argues that “the modern world is divided into... ‘societal cultures,’ whose practices and institutions cover the full range of human activities, encompassing both public and private life” (Kymlicka, 1995a: 75-76). This also echoes Ernest Gellner's ideas about the need in modern society for a common culture, including a unifying language, through which common
economic, political and educational institutions are developed (Kymlicka, 1995a: 76-77). According to Kymlicka, there are many minority groups throughout the world who are denied this access; unable to participate fully in society or maintain their own societal culture. Generally, Kymlicka believes that people with societal cultures tend to want to form nations. National minorities have societal cultures, but, immigrant groups do not (Kymlicka, 1995a: 101).

Kymlicka asks some pertinent questions about what kind of society a multicultural one should be:

Should each ethnic or national group have publicly funded education in its mother tongue? Should political offices be distributed in accordance with a principle of national or ethnic proportionality?...[and] [w]hat are the responsibilities of minorities to integrate (Kymlicka, 1995a: 4-5).

These are some of the questions which the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are now grappling with. For example, those I spoke to generally agree that Chinese Indonesians should be schooled in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) and that Chinese languages might be taken as choices within the school curriculum. Whether Chinese Indonesians should be allocated positions in government and whether ethnic Chinese are needed to represent the views of their community is a highly contested question. Some, such as those who have set up political parties, believe that Chinese Indonesian public representatives are needed in order to ensure that their voices are heard, others believe that this is not the case. The extent to which the ethnic Chinese should integrate is also hotly contested. I will return to these questions in my analysis of my empirical data in chapters six, seven and eight.

This multiculturalism debate acknowledges diversity within the nation-state but there is a concern that group identities may become essentialised. Critics of “multiculturalism” query whether there is a need for an individual to be located within a single cultural framework. David Brown states that the multiculturalist arguments echo earlier primordialist views of ethnicity as providing a powerful emotional bond (Brown, 2000: 129). Such an ideology embeds people in one identity. Jeremy Waldron argues that “the sheer existence and vitality of the cosmopolitan alternative is enough to undercut an important part of the case for the preservation of minority cultures” (Waldron, 1995: 100). Waldron criticises
Kymlicka’s emphasis on societal cultures. He argues that “the project of individuating societal cultures presupposes that cultures are somehow isolated and impervious to external influences... Cultures have influenced each other so much that there is no meaningful way to say where one culture ends and another begins” (cited, Kymlicka, 1995a: 101-102).

John Packer also raises concerns about the essentialising of ethnic identities. He argues that we need to move away from the idea of the nation state as “an homogenous, pure entity” (Packer, 1999: 270). Pluralistic societies are the norm around the world and therefore, “we must think in terms of securing and expanding opportunities for multiple, open and evolving cultures and identities” (Packer, 1999: 270). Nira Yuval-Davis also queries this “identity politics” which is characteristic of multiculturalism. She states that “[i]dentity politics’ tend not only to homogenize and naturalize social categories and groupings, but also to deny shifting boundaries of identities and internal power differences and conflicts of interest” (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 119).

Multiculturalism as a set of policies was not promulgated by the Indonesian government as such, however, the official motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which I translate as “Plurality but Unity”, encompasses the multiculturalist concept that there are distinct ethnic groups within the society, “living-apart-together”, to use len Ang’s succinct phrase (Ang, 2001: 14). As Thung Julan has pointed out, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika emphasises “the different roots of ethnic groups which existed long before the creation of Indonesian national unity” (Thung, 1998: 13 note 5). These ethnic identities remain a very strong point of reference for people in Indonesia.

Although, as discussed above, theorists question whether there are in fact separate ethnic identities into which people easily fit — and I would agree with their questioning of the primordial aspects of the multiculturalist debate — in this thesis I am interested in the ways the Chinese Indonesian groups are articulating their identities and they do have a primordialist attitude towards their ethnic identities. I argue that their attitude to their ethnic identity corresponds with the discourses of Indonesian national identity. In other words, within Indonesian national discourses, the suku bangsa (ethnic) identity is considered primordial.
After 1998 the Chinese Indonesian groups called for more recognition of their ethnic heritage and they want their cultural heritage to be treated in the same way as other ethnic groups in Indonesia.²⁵

Another kind of identity which undermines the homogeneity of the nation, and on which there is a vast amount written, is the concept of a diaspora. Ien Ang argues that out of the failure of assimilation in the West, ethnic groups began to move away from the weak position of "ethnic minority" and assert themselves as part of a "diaspora". This imparted "a sense of being a 'people' with historical roots and destinies outside the time/space of the host nation" (Ang, 2001: 12). The literature on diaspora appears to be particularly relevant to this study of the Chinese in Indonesia because the large numbers of people who have left China and settled in other countries has led to the Chinese being written about as part of a diaspora. However, as the next section will show, there are limits to its applicability to the case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

**Diaspora**

According to Elaine Tay, the difference between a "diaspora" and an "ethnic group" is that the diaspora maintains links with the original homeland. Tay quotes Khachig Tölölyan who states that "'a diaspora is never merely an accident of birth', it is not merely something defined by 'being' but also by 'doing' and 'feeling'" (Tay, 2000). Emmanuel Ma Mung also highlights the active part of being in a diaspora. He argues that there are two characteristics needed to be considered a diaspora: "multipolarity of the migrations... and interpolarity of the relations" (Ma Mung, 1998: 36). In other words, relations must be continued with the country of origin, but also, between the various dispersed communities (Ma Mung, 1998: 36).

Michael Jacobsen questions the necessity of coherence in a diaspora. He argues that "a diaspora constitutes a decentred, multi-levelled and fractious, generally ethnically affiliated, ideational network that allows people to move in and out of a given diaspora depending on their current social and political situation (Jacobsen.

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²⁵ As I mentioned in chapter one, I take an "emic" understanding of ethnicity throughout this thesis.
Jacobsen argues that the ethnic Chinese are using the spaces which have opened up as a result of global pressures on national sovereignty to establish "diasporic like networks" which provide for "transnational ethnoscapes" or "nations without states" (Jacobsen, 2003: 2).

Wang Gungwu questions the use of the term "Chinese diaspora" because it creates the image that there is a single global Chinese community which is ultimately loyal to China. He has appealed that "the Chinese overseas be studied in the context of their respective national environments, and taken out of a dominant China reference point". He is wary about the homogenising effect of the term "Chinese diaspora" and wants to emphasise that there is diversity among the world's Chinese. Wang states that "unless [the term diaspora] is used carefully to avoid projecting the image of a single Chinese diaspora, [it] will eventually bring tragedy to the Chinese overseas" (Wang, 1999 cited in Ien Ang, 2001: 81-84).

Websites

One of the ways in which diasporas can maintain communication between participants is through the use of the internet. After the violence in Indonesia in 1998, which was directed mainly against the ethnic Chinese, the website huaren.org was established in response to the violence. Elaine Tay uses the website as an example of "long distance nationalism" (Tay, 2000). Ien Ang mentions that according to the people involved in producing huaren.org "any Chinese-American or Chinese-Canadian would do well, to all intents and purposes, to be Chinese first, and American or Canadian only second, and so help

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26 This contradicts Wang Gungwu's position on the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors of the Chinese Heritage Centre, which was established in Singapore in 1995. According to Wee Cho Yaw, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the centre, "[t]he establishment of this centre has made it possible to study overseas Chinese globally, rather than as separate communities" (Wee, 1998).

27 Chinese Indonesian property was attacked, which tended to be the pattern of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. However, a more shocking new tactic was the rape of Chinese Indonesian women. This may have fed the outrage which led to the establishment of the website. I will discuss the violence in 1998 in more detail in chapter 5.

28 huaren.org was established by Daniel Tse, a Chinese-Canadian research engineer, who emigrated from Hong Kong in 1980, and Joe Tan, a research chemist who emigrated from Malaysia to New Zealand in 1978.
bolster the internal cohesion and solidarity of the global Chinese diasporic community" (Ang, 2001: 80). The site asserts itself as “a cyber-clan organization that takes the traditional family, village, clan, and same-surname associations into a globalized cyber-level that is borderless [and] transnational” (http://www.huaren.org/editorial/id/082898.html [accessed: 18 June 2000]). The name Huaren is used because it is the “standard Pinyin transliteration of the term ‘Chinese’... [and it is used] by the majority of Chinese speakers” (http:www.huaren.org/aboutus/ [accessed: 18 June 2000]).

The website huaren.org was cited widely in academic literature at the time of the violence in Indonesia as an example of Chinese diaspora activity. The site was established as a reaction to the violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in 1998. However, many Chinese Indonesians felt uncomfortable with this and there were calls for the website to look at the situation for Indonesians more generally, not just the ethnic Chinese.

While huaren.org was considered an example of ethnic Chinese acting together globally, over-riding national identities and finding common cause in their Chineseness, there are other websites that could be cited, which illustrate the opposite — that is, the ethnic Chinese in different countries engaging with the national discourses of those countries in which they have settled, and trying to integrate into those societies. Obviously these websites still convey Chinese identities, but, they are less focused on linking up with other ethnic Chinese and more interested in reaching out to the communities in which they find themselves. For example, the Philippine-Chinese website tsinoy.com explained that it was “focused on engaging our community with the Chinese and the Filipino culture” (tsinoy.com, 2 December 2001 [“Welcome to tsinoy.com”]). For the celebration of the 104th anniversary of Philippine independence tsinoy.com looked at “the significant contributions of Tsinoys in our ancestors’ fight for sovereignity” (tsinoy.com, 21 June 2002) [“A Salute to Tsinoy Heroes”]). The website chinatownsydney.com deals with the Chinese in Sydney, Australia. The site “comments on the Chinese community and their relationships with the broader Australian community”. This site is also trying to breakdown stereotypes. It suggests that “[t]ime and again, we are told the Chinese are not interested in
politics; they don’t have views. In Ozwatch, writers will provide commentaries on Australian and international events from Australian Chinese perspectives” (chinatownsydney.com, 2 December 2001 [“Overview”]). The British Chinese website Dimsum engages with other ethnic minorities in Britain. One of their writers, Wai Lam, explains the background to Ramadhan. Another correspondent, Shireen, looks at the “struggle for identity” of British-born Asians (dimsum.co.uk, 2 December 2001 [“Welcome to Dimsum”]). From these websites it is obvious that these ethnic Chinese do feel in some way Chinese and they are expressing their Chinese identity. It is also clear, however, that they are engaging with the nations in which they live. By only citing the website huaren.com the idea that the ethnic Chinese are focused on their Chineseness becomes compounded and their enthusiasm for engaging with issues relating to the countries they have settled in becomes lost.

**Ethnic Chinese and Jews**

The outsider status of the ethnic Chinese outside China has been underlined by comparisons which are often made, both in the historical records and in the academic literature, between the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Jews of Europe. This literature also emphasises the Chinese position as part of a diaspora. In historical records these comparisons have tended to be unfavourable. Edmund Scott, who travelled in Java during the first years of the seventeenth century wrote that, “the Chyneses... like Jewes, live crouching under [the Javans], but robb them of their wealth and send it for Chyna” (cited in Coppel, 2001: 4). Another comparison was made with the Jews by Sir Thomas Herbert, who travelled to Sumatra and Malacca in 1621. He stated that the Chinese traders were “too subtle for young merchants, oftimes so wedded to dicing, that, after they have lost[,] their whole estate and wife and children are staked; yet in littel [sic] time, Jew-like, by gleaning here and there, are able to redeem their loss; if not at the day, they are sold in the market for most advantage” (Pan, 1991: 129).

Denys Lombard argues that the colonials considered the Chinese to be serious competitors and never forgave them for anticipating them in introducing complex structures of commerce to Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Chinese were compared
unfavourably with the Jews in Europe (cited in Coppel, 2001: 4). Citing Walter Zenner, Hillel Kieval suggests that Southeast Asians learned from European colonial administrators and scholars “to assign the specific moral evaluations of anti-Semitism to the local ethnic context” (Kieval, 1997: 215). Comparisons between Jews and Chinese made their way into nationalist discourses in Southeast Asia. In 1914, the European-educated Thai King Vajiravudh (who ruled from 1910 to 1925) published anti-Chinese papers entitled “The Jew of the East” in which he stated that the Chinese in Thailand were like the Jews in Europe — “foreign, antinational parasites”. This comparison was despite the fact that the Thai royal family was in part Sino-Thai (Chirot, 1997: 11).

This comparison between the Chinese and Jews, although not following the distasteful stereotypes, has also been carried into the academic literature. In their book Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe (1997), Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid see the comparison not as one of all Jews with all Chinese, rather “[t]he important comparison is in their creative and vulnerable role as ‘outsiders at the center’ in dynamic processes of change” (Reid, 1997: 34). Chirot and Reid call the Chinese and the Jews “entrepreneurial minorities” (Chirot, 1997: 3). Abner Cohen calls them a “trade diaspora”. “Middleman minority” is another term used to describe them. Reid and Chirot suggest that anti-Chineseness and anti-Jewishness intensified during the time when nationalism was creating more fixed notions of who belonged and who did not belong in the nation, both in Asia and Europe (Reid, 1997: 36).

The comparison between ethnic Chinese and Jews is not always appreciated by Southeast Asian Chinese who are trying to fit into the countries in which they have settled. At the “International Conference on the Chinese Diaspora”, held in Berkeley, California, in November 1992, some Southeast Asian delegates objected to the use of the term “diaspora” because of implications that a diaspora would one day return to the motherland (Reid, 1997: 36). Anthony Reid tries to allay their fears by using the term “diaspora” in the “modern” sense in which the word is used by Abner Cohen: “a nation of socially interdependent, but spatially dispersed communities” (cited, Reid, 1997: 36). I would question whether the
term “diaspora”, even in this sense, is a useful concept to apply to the ethnic Chinese I have interviewed in Indonesia. My main reason for disputing the usefulness of this concept is that by and large the people I spoke to do not have contact with other ethnic Chinese outside Indonesia, therefore, they do not constitute a socially interdependent nation.

**Distinctions Between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous People**

In a discussion relating to “middleman” Jewish minorities in Europe, Hillel Kieval questions the terminology used in this literature. His questions are also useful for an investigations of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Theorists use the words “host” and “native” to describe the societies in which the Jewish minorities had settled, however Kieval suggests that the use of these words in the European context are often political constructs. For example, Jews have been in the Czech Republic at least as long as the Slavs, and certainly longer than the Germans (Kieval cited in Chirot and Reid, 1997: 212).

The use of the term “indigenous”\(^{29}\) in Indonesia is also problematic. Sukarno was himself aware of the difficulty of deciding who might be indigenous and who a descendant of immigrants. The Chinese Indonesian magazine *Mandarin Pos* quotes a speech made by Sukarno before the Congress held by the Chinese Indonesian group Baperki\(^{30}\) in Jakarta in 1963. During the speech he states that “from time to time I ask myself, hey Sukarno, who is really an indigenous Indonesian? I don’t know. Try, who can indicate those who are indigenous and those who are not? I don’t know. Maybe I myself am two percent, five percent, ten percent Chinese” (Oei Hiem Hwie, 2001: 9).

As I mentioned in the introduction, the ethnic Chinese have been arriving in Indonesia for centuries and have been inter-marrying with the local population perhaps since the fifth century. There is even a suggestion that it was a Chinese person — Zheng He — who introduced Islam to Indonesia (Lee, 1999: 233). Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon mention Chinese Muslim communities.

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\(^{29}\) *Pribumi* and *orang asli* are the Indonesian language terms used.

\(^{30}\) The Chinese Indonesian group Baperki, which was established in 1954 will be explored further in chapter four.
which had established themselves along the southern coast of China as early as
the ninth century, and which participated in the Islamization of Java (Lombard and
Salmon, 1994: 116). They also discuss collaboration between Chinese Muslim
merchants and the Sultans of the archipelago. For example, John Jourdain passed
through Banten (West Java) in 1614 and recounted that the Regent there had two
or three Chinese Muslims as his principal advisers and assistants (Lombard and
Salmon, 1994: 117). By the seventeenth century Lombard and Salmon describe
Chinese Muslims who were “sufficiently desirous of participating in local
administration to be converted [to Islam], take a vernacular title, and settle
permanently in their host country” (Lombard and Salmon, 1994: 117). There is
historical evidence from across the archipelago of Chinese Muslim marriages into
élite families. It has even been chronicled that the founder of the first Javanese
sultanate was a Chinese (Lombard and Salmon, 1994: 116).

Lombard and Salmon also suggest that integration occurred at the lower levels of
society. Numerous towns had a kampung Peranakan (local-born Chinese district)
next to their Chinese kampung. According to reports from the nineteenth century,
these Peranakan (local-born Chinese) “marry Javanese women; this results in
mixed blood which become less so from generation to generation” (Lombard and
Salmon, 1994: 120). These assimilations have tended to be forgotten. For
example, Lombard and Salmon have traced the descendants of Han Siong Kong
who was born in China in 1673 and who died in Java in 1744. Entire branches of
the family have converted to Islam and have “assimilated into the surrounding
Javanese society, to the point of forgetting their origin” (Lombard and Salmon,
1994: 116). Politically, these connections have also been suppressed. The
Javanese historian, Slamet Muljana, published a book in 1968 which explored
Chinese participation in the Islamization of Java. However, this book was
withdrawn from circulation in 1971 by order of the public prosecutor (Lombard
and Salmon, 1994: 116). 31

31 Lombard and Salmon do not suggest why this book was banned, however, I would surmise
that the alleged communist coup attempt of 1965, in which, according to official propaganda,
China and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were implicated, may have left the authorities
feeling uneasy about any suggestions that much of the population might well have some
Chinese blood.
Like the debate over "multiculturalism", scholars have begun to question the usefulness of the term "diaspora" which is ultimately essentialising and bounded. len Ang feels reticent about using the term "diaspora" at all because although it moves beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, it creates its own boundaries between the Chinese people, and everybody else (Ang, 2001: 16). Ang promulgates the idea of "hybridity" as a way of acknowledging the blurring of identities between people (Ang, 2001: 16). She states that "centuries of global Chinese migrations have inevitably led to a blurring of the original limits of 'the Chinese': it is no longer possible to say with any certainty where the Chinese end and the non-Chinese begin" (Ang, 2001: 88). She calls on people to move away from essentialised concepts of Chineseness towards a more hybrid concept of identity. Ang urges the construction of "open-ended and plural 'post-Chinese' identities... through investments in continuing cross-influences of diverse, lateral, unanticipated intercultural encounters in the world at large" (Ang, 2001:50-51).

According to Ang, hybridity is an important concept to hold onto because unlike other discourses of difference, such as, diaspora, and multiculturalism "it foregrounds complicated entanglement rather than identity, together-in-difference rather than virtual apartheid" (Ang, 2001: 3).

Ang argues that Peranakan identity in Indonesia is a "thoroughly hybrid identity" (Ang, 2001: 27). Although I concur that objectively this is the case, the ethnic Chinese groups in this research do not tend to consider their identities as hybrid identities, as such. This is a confusing, but very interesting aspect of Indonesian identity. Although there has obviously been inter-mixing of ethnic groups, and Sukarno alluded to this when he questioned to what extent one could be considered indigenous, there are also distinct ethnic groups into which, according to the ethnicity of their father, people are placed. So, for example, in the census of

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32 Ang's ideas on "hybridity" stem from Homi Bhabha's writing on "culture's in between" (Bhabha, 1998: 29). Bhabha argues that the claim that national identity is a homogenous identity is a fiction. Influenced by Benedict Anderson's investigation of the ways through which nations are imagined and sustained, Bhabha states that "it is from those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west. An idea whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force" (Bhabha, 1990: 1). Bhabha celebrates the "quiet contamination" of dominant narratives by minority groups within the nation-state which leads to a "third space"; what len Ang describes as "the in-between space of hybridity" (Ang, 2001: 2).
2000, the first to ask a question about ethnicity, there was no opportunity to state one was a mixture of ethnicities. Instead, one had to write one ethnic group according to that of one’s father.

In the case of whether Chinese Indonesians should be considered part of a diaspora, I argue that at this point their in history they should not. Although Chinese Indonesians are included in the Chinese diaspora in the literature, they are trying to find a place for themselves within Indonesian society and are generally not actively engaged with Chinese groups outside Indonesia. This may change in the future, of course, as they have more access to internet technology and as they learn more about their Chinese heritage. It may be more useful to the discussion of diaspora if the Chinese as a whole were not included, but those Chinese who are actively engaged with Chinese groups outsider their countries, or who have maintained links with China are included, and others, who do not have an active engagement with these activities, are not. This points to the fact that where the Chinese went and when they left China has had an important bearing on their identity, and on their behaviour towards their adopted country, as well as towards China. I will now turn to the literature on the Chinese outside China.

**Chinese Outside China**

Eighty percent of the Chinese who live outside China live in Southeast Asia (Wang, 1998c). As I mentioned in the introduction, by the late nineteenth century some Chinese communities had been established in Southeast Asia for centuries. These included the “Baba” Chinese in the British Straits Settlements, and the “Peranakan” in Java (Esman, 1986: 146-147).

The difficulty for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to be accepted as part of the nation resembles the experiences of Chinese all over the world. The desire that the

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33 Only one of the group members I spoke with, and the only totok among them, Nurdin Purnomo, was actively engaged with Chinese groups outside Indonesia. As chairman of the Indonesian Hakka Association and chairman of the Federation of Asean Hakka’s Association, he was involved in organising conventions and meetings of these groups. All the other groups, are engaged with developing links with groups within Indonesia and not with groups outside.

34 This statistic comes from Wang Gungwu and he includes in his understanding of “China” all those who live outside the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
nation should be as racially and culturally homogenous as possible was used as a reason to keep the Chinese out of the USA, Canada, and Australia in the nineteenth century (Ang, 2001: 77). In the USA it was felt that the Chinese did not fit in with the culture of American life and Chinese immigrants were not eligible for citizenship until 1952 (Stratton and Ang, 1998: 161 note 51). The policy in Australia was more explicitly based on race and it was not until the official introduction of multiculturalist policies and the liberalisation of the White Australia policy in the 1970s that restrictions on Chinese migration there were reduced (Stratton and Ang, 1998: 151).

As I mentioned earlier, the waves of immigration which had continued to Southeast Asia from the sixteenth century caused gaps to emerge between the “old-timers” (laoke), and the “newcomers” (xinke) (Wickberg, 1998: 116). At first the migrants were mostly men who intermarried with the local population. Later on as more women went abroad the Chinese tended to marry within their own ethnic group, and so distinct Chinese communities developed in Southeast Asia. Robin Cohen cites 1911 as the point at which the traditional pattern of Chinese sojourning became more difficult to maintain. Chinese families were now two or three generations in Southeast Asia, and were gradually losing their close identity with China. Also, the emerging nationalism in former colonies was incompatible with the close political ties which had been in place between China and those Chinese overseas (Cohen, 1997: 89). Yen Ching-Hwang suggests that the rise of indigenous nationalism in some Southeast Asian countries was a reaction to the nationalism of the “overseas Chinese” which developed in the nineteenth century (Yen, 1995: 147-148). Before World War Two both types of nationalism co-existed. After the war, however, with the increased demands for independence from the indigenous nationalists, the Chinese faced a dilemma (Yen, 1995: 147-148). They had to decide whether to stay or whether to return to China; whether to assimilate into the new nation or whether to maintain their Chinese identity (Wang, 1999: 104). Robin Cohen outlines the problems felt by Malaysian Chinese at the time. On the one hand, if they continued with their tradition of sojourning, they were persecuted for not showing any commitment to the struggle for independence. On the other hand, if they did attempt to assimilate into Malaysian
society, they were considered a threat to the indigenous population (Cohen, 1997: 90).

**Terminology**

In the following section I will question the usefulness of some of the terms used to describe the ethnic Chinese outside China. This section highlights the importance I place on the terms used to name people. I concur with Stuart Hall's assertion that identities are not things we are born with, rather they are "formed and transformed within and in relation to representation" (Hall, 1992: 292). Academics — both ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese scholars — are in a powerful position in relation to representing the ethnic Chinese. By using terminology such as "overseas Chinese", for example, scholars undermine attempts by ethnic Chinese to find an identity within the nations in which they have settled. In this thesis I argue that the Chinese Indonesian groups are trying to find a place for themselves within Indonesian national discourses, therefore, I question the appropriateness of this terminology both for the Chinese in Indonesia and elsewhere.

The term "overseas Chinese" (huaqiao) is widely used in English language literature to describe the ethnic Chinese outside China. The term tends to be used unquestioningly in the literature on the ethnic Chinese in Europe, whereas in relation to Southeast Asia, where the Chinese have been settling for centuries, the term is more contested. Len Ang suggests that whereas "overseas Chinese" used to be the most commonly used English term to describe migrant Chinese groups, in the past decade or so the term "Chinese diaspora" has been used more frequently (Ang, 2001: 77). This shift from "overseas Chinese" to "diaspora" is very clearly evident in the change of title to Lynn Pan's book *Sons of the Yellow Emperor*. The first edition of the book, published in 1990, has the subtitle, *The

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Story of the Overseas Chinese, whereas, the second edition, published in 1994, has the subtitle, A History of the Chinese Diaspora.\textsuperscript{36}

Yen Ching-Hwang and Wang Gungwu have argued that the term “overseas Chinese” describes a particular period in their history: those who “sojourned” outside China prior to the mid-twentieth century and maintained strong links with China. In China and the Chinese Overseas (1991) Wang Gungwu argues against the general use of the word huaqiao to describe all ethnic Chinese. He explores the historical use of the terminology and suggests that the dominant pattern of Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia from at least the nineteenth century was the huashang (the trader) mode. Wang contrasts this to the huaqiao pattern which he suggests became more common between 1900 and the 1950s. Instead of using huaqiao as a general term to describe the Chinese outside China, he argues that the term was introduced at a particular historical point to unite the Chinese in Southeast Asia in support of the nationalist ideology emerging in China at the end of the nineteenth century. Instead of describing groups of Chinese according to the place within China from whence they came (for example Min Guangren to describe people from Guangdong), the term huaqiao was used to instil in the people a sense of loyalty towards China as a whole (Duara, 1997: 41-42). Wang Gungwu argues that the term huaqiao should now refer to Chinese nationals (including those from the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong) who have left their native place to live abroad, but who have not become citizens of their new place of abode (Wang, 1998b: 16-17). He uses huaren (ethnic Chinese), to refer to people of Chinese descent who have foreign nationality or permanent residence rights outside China (Wang, 1998b: 16-17).

Wang argues that the difficulty in using appropriate terminology is a result of the “upgrading of migrants”. He suggests that the most successful “upgrading” in Southeast Asia has been in Thailand. There the former Chinese migrants have been integrated into society to such an extent that the term huaren may no longer be applicable (Wang, 1998b: 25). In Indonesia, Wang argues, the upgrading has

\textsuperscript{36} Not only is it interesting that “Overseas Chinese” has become “Chinese Diaspora”, it is also interesting that the phrase “The Story” has become “A History”. The author seems to be accepting that there are many versions of the Chinese experience outside China. Lynn Pan does not comment of this change of title in the afterword she wrote for the new edition.
been incomplete. He suggests that “the government is conscious of the ethnic Chinese who still think of themselves as Huaren, and the majority of them are normally limited to commercial activities and certain technical professions” (Wang, 1998b: 25). Wang Gungwu also criticises the terminology used by the sending country, particularly the People’s Republic of China, which tends to use the term Huaqiao-Huaren to describe ethnic Chinese who reside outside China. He suggests that this is too ambiguous and fails to take into account the variations among ethnic Chinese (Wang, 1998b: 26). In the end Wang propounds that as the ethnic Chinese become more involved in the national politics of the country in which they have settled, the sooner the concept of huaren will lose its resonance (Wang, 1998b: 28).

As I mentioned, Yen Ching-Hwang also considers the term “overseas Chinese” to refer to those who left China during the first half of the twentieth century (including those who went to Hong Kong and Macao).37 These people maintained strong links with China, and hoped to return at some stage in the future. After the Second World War, however, many Chinese residing in Southeast Asia adopted the citizenship of these new nations and, thus, changed from being “overseas Chinese” (huaqiao) to “ethnic Chinese” (huaren) (Yen, 1995: ix).

Paul Bolt uses the term “Chinese overseas” which he claims avoids the problems of using the historical and political “overseas Chinese” (Bolt, 1996: x). However, as he points out, this term, “Chinese overseas”, is not without difficulties. For example, it may imply that the Chinese who are citizens of countries other than China are not really “home”. He also suggests that the word “Chinese” implies a homogeneity when in fact these are diverse groups of people (Bolt, 1996: x). Ch’ang-yung Ku rejects this narrow interpretation of the term huaqiao and argues that it refers to people who are ethnically and culturally Chinese. He also points to the confusion of the English term “overseas Chinese” because it can mean both huaqiao and huaren (cited in Bolt, 1996: 118).

37 Note that Yen Ching-Hwang suggests that those Chinese who went to Hong Kong were considered “overseas Chinese” while Wang Gungwu argues that Chinese who left Hong Kong to reside elsewhere were “overseas Chinese”.

Lynn Pan also differs with Wang and Yen in her use of the phrase "overseas Chinese". She uses it to describe most Chinese in Southeast Asia — people who are Chinese by descent, but who hold the citizenship of their new countries. She calls these people "hyphenated" Chinese. They are "Chinese by descent but [their] non-Chinese citizenship and political allegiance collapse ancestral loyalties" (Pan, 1998: 15). Pan distinguishes this type of Chinese from others who have been assimilated, either through marriage or otherwise, into a different culture and cease to call themselves Chinese. Pan suggests that people who have assimilated into the host culture may choose to call themselves Chinese at some point in the future (Pan, 1998: 15). For example, the babas in Malaya were highly integrated into Malay culture, but in the twentieth century, in the communal environment of Malaysia, they reasserted their Chinese identity once again, joining Chinese political parties and social groups. (Wickberg, 1998: 116).

Ien Ang explores in detail the definitions presented by Lynn Pan. Ang explains that between those "hyphenated" Chinese and those who are considered to have assimilated "is the nebulous and fuzzy border zone where the Chinese/non-Chinese boundary is decidedly up for grabs, indeterminate and unsettled" (Ang, 2001: 86). Ang suggests that anybody interested in the ethnic Chinese should be exploring this porous border area between Chinese and non-Chinese because in this era of globalisation it is this area which will become more crowded and gain in significance (Ang, 2001: 87).

Adding to the confusion over the appropriate terms to use for ethnic Chinese outside China, terms have also been coined in the many countries where they have settled. For example, the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia are called baba. This term, baba, and the term peranakan which is widely used in Indonesia, refer to ethnic Chinese who have intermarried with the indigenous population and lost much of their Chinese identity (Lee, 1997: 83). Peranakan Chinese are those who have been in Indonesia for a number of generations, who no longer speak Chinese and have integrated into their Indonesian community.

Interestingly, these terms emphasise more explicitly the national orientation of these ethnic Chinese groups towards the countries in which they have settled and do not emphasise the links back to China as much as the English and Chinese
language words. Those who do have strong links with China — who are first
 generation Chinese or maintain Chinese cultural activities — are called *totok* in
 Indonesia and so are distinguished from the more culturally Indonesian
 *peranakan*. In Burma the ethnic Chinese are known either as *Letshe* (long sleeve)
or *Leto* (short sleeve) depending on their occupations. *Letshe* refers to white-
collar workers such as bankers or traders, *Leto* refers to blue-collar workers such
as farmers, or coolies (Than, 1997: 117). In the Philippines they are called *Tsinoy*
a shortened version of *Tsinong Pinoy* (Chinese Filipino) (See, 1997: 177).

In Indonesia the term Chinese Indonesians generally use to describe themselves is
*Tionghoa*. Most ethnic Chinese I spoke to preferred this term to the term *Cina*
which was used during the New Order. They considered *Cina* to be a term of
abuse which associated them too closely with China. According to Filomeno
Aguilar, *Tionghoa* was commonly used in the Dutch East Indies by the 1910s. In
China the term *Zhonghua* was not widely used until the 1930s. Aguilar concludes
that the term *Tionghoa* can be said to have a distinctly Indies/Indonesian history
(Aguilar, 2001: 511). The belief that the word *Tionghoa* describes the ethnic
Chinese in Indonesia and not those in other countries outside China is a view
prevalent among ethnic Chinese I interviewed and is a term they commonly use to
describe themselves. In other words, by using the term *Tionghoa* rather than *Cina*
the Chinese in Indonesia are associating themselves more closely with Indonesia.

As I have shown here, the terminology used to describe the ethnic Chinese outside
China to varying degrees emphasise the "Chineseness" of the person and a
perceived link with China. Charles Hirshman appeals that the ethnic Chinese in
Southeast Asia today should be understood as minority groups who happen to be
Chinese, rather than as Chinese who happen to live outside China (Hirshman,
1988: 30). I agree with this sentiment and in this research I will not use the term
"overseas Chinese" to describe the people I interviewed in Indonesia. They do not
use that term and they do not consider themselves to be Chinese overseas, rather
they see themselves as Indonesians of Chinese origin. I will use the terms
"Chinese Indonesian" or "ethnic Chinese" instead. Again, I am interested in their
articulations of their identities rather than what categories theorists say they fit
into. Although the people in the organisations I have investigated consider
themselves to be Indonesian, they also maintain an identity as Chinese. Therefore, the next section will explore what kinds of characteristics it might be necessary to have in order to be Chinese.

**Being Chinese**

Large-scale migration by ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia had more-or-less ceased by the early 1930s, after which, according to Benton and Gomez, the ethnic Chinese began to identify with the countries in which they had settled (Benton and Gomez, 2001:18). If this is the case, then why do they still consider themselves, and why are they still considered by others, to be Chinese? As mentioned above, the ethnic Chinese suffered discrimination in many countries in which they settled. Tu Wei-ming acknowledges that it is precisely this discrimination towards them and restrictions on them that have played a role in ensuring that they hold on to a sense of their Chineseness. For example, in relation to the Philippines, Tu suggests that a policy of restricting certain occupations to citizens and making it difficult for Chinese to become citizens, has made assimilation problematic (Tu, 1994: 20). Len Ang recounts the experience of William Yang who had “a... harsh coming into awareness of his own, unchosen minority status” (Ang, 2001: 37). Yang, who grew up in a small mining town in Australia, was jeered at and taunted by a child at school who said he was Chinese. Yang had no idea what the child meant and returned home to ask his mother if it was true that he was Chinese (Ang, 2001: 37). Both of these examples resonate with the experiences of Chinese Indonesians. There were reports from people I spoke to in Indonesia that during the violence of 1998 school children, who had no knowledge that they were ethnic Chinese, had similar experiences to William Yang.

The extent to which particular objective traits are necessary in order to be Chinese is contested in the academic literature. Some scholars have argued that certain characteristics and cultural practices are an important part of being Chinese. Lynn Pan, for example, suggests that “[t]he possession of [an] ancestral language is the supreme mark of being Chinese, imparting as it does a sense of unbroken continuity with the earliest years of Chinese history” (Pan, 1991: 248). She has
said that if one does not have sufficient command of Chinese to understand Tang poetry, one would not be able to appreciate what it means to be Chinese (Khanna, 1995). David Yen-Ho Wu indicates two sentiments which identify a person as Chinese — culture and race. Wu suggests that “overseas Chinese (regardless of racial mixture) remain Chinese in the fullest sense as long as they are able to claim a Chinese male ancestor, a homeplace in China from where this ancestor supposedly emigrated, and observe some manner of cultural practices” (Wu, 1994: 152).

Running through this literature there has been an assumption that ethnic Chinese outside China feel the pull of their “homeland”. Tu Wei Ming suggests that “the push of local conditions as well as the pull of the homeland impels the Chinese to become unassimilable” (Tu, 1994: 20). China is also central to Lynn Pan’s representation of who is Chinese. A pictorial representation of different categories of Chinese in *The Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas*, which she edited, shows that the closer one associates with China the more Chinese one is, until one reaches the outer limits of being Chinese (furthest away from China on the diagram) and becomes assimilated (Pan, 1998: 14).

Recent scholarship tends to be more nuanced. Increasingly scholars are concluding that China no longer sits at the top of a scale of what is considered to be authentically Chinese. Benton and Gomez argue that “‘Chineseness’ is no set edifice or residue of some ancestral culture that can be preserved against erosion or rescued from decay but the outcome of a process of struggle and negotiation” (Benton and Gomez, 2001: 28). Tan Chee-Beng has criticised Peter Gosling for suggesting that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia “have become increasingly Southeast Asian rather than ‘Chinese’”. That they will have appropriated a more Southeast Asian approach is true, but, Tan Chee-Beng criticises the tendency among scholars to compare the Chinese in Southeast Asia to “an invisible static model of ‘traditional’ Chinese identity” (Tan, 1988: 157-158). He argues that ultimately it is the consciousness of being Chinese which counts and not some material and cultural features (Tan, 1988: 139). Ariel Heryanto also asserts that “Chineseness is not — and has never been — a quantitative substance or immutable essence that can be said to be either present or absent. He attempts to
go beyond the question of whether Chineseness "as some sort of 'thing' frozen in time" has survived or not (Heryanto, 1998: 110).

Some scholars are also moving their focus away from links with China and towards the idea of ethnic Chinese "growing roots where they land" (luodi shenggen) (Wang, 1998: vii). This was the theme of the International Conference on Chinese Overseas, held in San Francisco in 1992. The luodi shenggen concept was compared to the luodi guigen (return to their roots) paradigm which was common among earlier migrants from China (Wang, 1998a: x). Tan Chee Beng does not accept that there is a "global Chinese identity". Instead, he suggests that the increased communication between Chinese in different countries highlights their diversity rather than their similarities (Tan, 1998: 44). Tan stresses the need to distinguish culture from ethnicity. He also makes the very important point that there needs to be a distinction between an identification with Chinese culture and genuinely felt identification among ethnic Chinese with the nations they have settled in (Tan, 1998: 44).

Tu Wei-ming’s edited volume The Living Tree was an attempt to decentre China from what it means to be Chinese (Tu, 1994: vi-vii). Tu discusses the concept of "cultural China" (wenhua Zhonghao) which he suggests consists of "three symbolic universes". Firstly, those societies populated predominantly by "cultural and ethnic Chinese", the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Secondly, those countries in which there is a significant Chinese minority. Thirdly, people such as scholars, journalists, writers and traders "who try to understand China intellectually and bring their own conceptions of China to their own linguistic communities" (Tu, 1994: 13-14). Tu wishes to "explore the fluidity of Chineseness as a layered and contested discourse" and in the process moves the cultural centre of what it means to be Chinese away from China towards "cultural China" (Tu, 1994: viii). Ien Ang argues that this movement away from China towards a "cultural China" is yet another centring, another homogenization (Ang, 2001: 42-43). She states that "the metaphor of the living tree is by no means ideologically innocent" because everything flows back to the roots, that is, everything still flows back to China (Ang, 2001: 44-45).
The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are a good example of the difficulties involved in defining who constitutes a “Chinese” person. On the one hand some people are considered to be Chinese although they no longer speak a Chinese dialect, and no longer have a Chinese name. There are also ethnic Chinese people who no longer consider themselves to be Chinese but who are treated as Chinese by other Indonesians. Charles Coppel defines Chinese in Indonesia as:

persons of Chinese ancestry who either function as members of and identify with, Chinese society or are regarded as Chinese by indigenous Indonesians (at least in some circumstances) and given special treatment as a consequence...such a definition includes a number of people who regard themselves as Indonesians and have refused to align themselves in any sense with Chinese society, but whose ancestry (or Chinese physical appearance) has been treated as socially and politically significant or relevant (Coppel, 1983: 5).

Leo Suryadinata provides an ascriptive definition of Chineseness suggesting that a person in Southeast Asia is Chinese if the indigenous population considers them Chinese (Suryadinata, 1998c: 50). len Ang, herself born into a Chinese-Indonesian family, has pointed out that even though the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia tend no longer to speak Chinese or have any links with China, they still consider themselves to be Chinese. In relation to her own Chineseness she says that “there is an instinctiveness to our (sometimes reluctant) identification as ‘Chinese’ which eludes any rationalization and defies any doubt” (Ang, 2001: 47).

As I mentioned in the introduction, “ethnicity” tends to be widely accepted as a fixed, given identity, even among the academic elite (Heryanto, 1998: 95). This is also the case among the ethnic Chinese groups I have investigated here. In the Western academic literature scholars have been moving away from this primordial understanding of ethnicity. I sympathise with those scholars such as Stuart Hall and Etienne Balibar who discuss ethnicity as “plastic and malleable social constructions” (Smith, 1998: 204). Ethnicity in my understanding is a social and political construct. It is a discourse as national identity is a discourse. Stuart Hall makes this link with discourse when he states that: “[t]he term ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, situated, and all knowledge is contextual” (Hall, 1996: 446). However,
the Chinese Indonesians I interviewed identify themselves as primordially Chinese. Even though they do not speak a Chinese language, or have links with China, many of them feel Chinese because they have Chinese ancestors. I will return to their understanding of their Chineseness when I analyse my empirical data in chapters six, seven and eight.

Conclusions

This chapter has investigated some of the concepts which have begun to question the value of trying to maintain a homogenous nation. The world is a place of movement and flux with people settling away from the nations they were born in and keeping in touch with the nations they have left. Multiculturalism insists on the acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural diversity within the nation, however, there are fears that this kind of recognition locks people into identities and does not take account of the informal ways in which cultures and identities change through contact with others. Diaspora is also in the end a bounded and internally homogenising identity. As Indonesian scholars point out, however, the primordialness of ethnic identities in Indonesia tends not be questioned, therefore, Indonesia is perceived by the people who live there as a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic country where each person has a primordial ethnic identity.

The multicultural debate raises interesting questions about how a multi-ethnic society should be managed in order for it to be a fair place for all ethnic groups. The groups I spoke with have organised themselves along ethnic lines, and have raised some of the questions Kymlicka raises about language teaching and political organisation. However, unlike the societies which Kymlicka writes about, such as Canada, Australia and European societies, the Chinese in Indonesia are not calling for special treatment as such. They are asking for the same treatment as other ethnic groups in Indonesia.

As to whether the Chinese group members I spoke with are part of a Chinese diaspora, on the whole I argue that they are not actively part of a diaspora, even though they tend to be considered part of a Chinese diaspora in the existing literature. Despite their lack of connections with China and their lack of Chinese language skills, however, they do believe themselves to be Chinese. Like the
groups engaged in making websites such as tsinoy.com and dimsum.co.uk, the ethnic Chinese groups accept their Chinese identity, but also wish to find a place for themselves within the nation in which they have settled.

Having discussed literature which is relevant to an analysis of Chinese Indonesian articulations of their identities in post-Suharto Indonesia, I will continue to underpin my argument that although the Chinese groups which developed after 1998 are promoting themselves as Chinese, they are also trying to find a place for themselves within Indonesian national discourses. The following two chapters provide an historical analysis which underlines the difficulties which the Chinese groups face in their activities and will also show that Chinese Indonesians have been trying to find a place for themselves within the nation since it was declared in 1945.
Chapter 4

Colonial Times to the New Order

By providing an historical overview of nationalist discourses in Indonesia this chapter and the following one will allow me to contextualise the arguments of the ethnic Chinese groups. As mentioned in chapter one, discourse is situated within an historical and social context, therefore, the following two chapters will provide an historical context for the analysis in the later chapters. Another important reason for the inclusion of this historical background is that during my interviews with Chinese Indonesians most of the interviewees stated that colonial policy and New Order policy in particular promulgated discourses that excluded them from becoming fully accepted Indonesians. Chapter four will discuss the period up to the end of the New Order in 1998. The dramatic events of 1998 will be discussed in chapter five.

Late Colonial Indonesia

The Ethnic Chinese in Colonial Times

By the time Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 the ethnic Chinese were a minority who were apart from the rest of the population. There had been violence towards them during the colonial period. The earliest cited attacks against them were in 1740 when Chinese revolted against Dutch authority in and around Jakarta and were met by fierce resistance both from the Dutch and later from local rulers in the area (Somers Heidhues, 1999: 152). Daniel Lev argues that this speeded up the process of categorising the ethnic Chinese as a “minority” (Lev, 2000: 1-2). He explains that Chinese who were arriving in Indonesia long before the Dutch, were not considered particularly strange or dangerous, however,
Dutch policy towards them ensured that they were singled out for special attention. Dutch policy also highlighted the ambivalent position of the ethnic Chinese which to some extent has continued to this day. In relation to commercial practices the ethnic Chinese were treated under Dutch East Indies law as other western traders were. However, in relation to the criminal law they were treated as "indigenous" Indonesians (Lev, 2000: 4).

According to Benedict Anderson there were three “fundamental forces” which led to a change in the process of gradual assimilation of Chinese into their respective societies in South East Asia. Firstly, the policies of the colonial powers eventually led to Chinese segregation from the rest of the population (Anderson, 1998: 13-14). Between 1677 and 1777 the Dutch East Indies Company extended its political and economic domination over Java and the colonials used the ethnic Chinese to collect taxes from the indigenous population, and to run the colonial enterprises. As mentioned above, in some legal areas the Chinese enjoyed a higher status than the indigenous population, they lived in segregated areas, and their children attended Chinese-language schools. The Dutch also forced them to wear the Manchu queue and dress in traditional Chinese clothing (Schwarz, 1999: 102). According to Mary Somers Heidhues, unlike in the Philippines, where the ethnic Chinese were treated as a “special kind of native” by the Spanish colonials, in the Dutch East Indies they were treated as a “special kind of Chinese” (cited in Aguilar, 2001: 506).

The second reason why Chinese assimilation into the indigenous populations of Southeast Asia halted was the Taiping rebellion (1850-64) which led to the loss of Qing control of the southern coast of China. This, along with the advent of the steamship, and a shortage of labour in Southeast Asia, led to unprecedented levels of migration (Anderson, 1998: 14). Finally there was an upsurge in Chinese nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1877 the first Chinese consulate was established in Singapore. By the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, 46 consulates had been established around the world. These consulates sold honours and titles to the ethnic Chinese outside China and also recruited support for China’s economic development among the Southeast Asian Chinese (Zhuang, 1998: 99). Between 1900 and 1911 the constitutional monarchists, led by Kang
Youwei, and the Republicans led by Sun Yatsen, also tried to garner support from the Southeast Asian Chinese for their vision of the future of China (Duara, 1997: 39-40). The Chinese in Indonesia, and in Southeast Asia generally, had been divided by speech groups, by native place in China, and by trade and occupational group (Pan, 1998: 76-77). The reformers and the Qing government were trying to transform these fluid identities into a fixed sense of Chineseness which also hardened the boundaries between Chinese and non-Chinese (Duara, 1997: 40-41). Along with this activity among the ethnic Chinese, by the beginning of the twentieth century they also had to contend with the nascent nationalism of the Indies population. The following section will outline these early nationalist discourses.

**Early Nationalist Discourses**

*Budi Utomo* (Pure Endeavour), which was established between 1906 and 1908, was one of the earliest nationalist organisations in Indonesia (Kahin, 1952: 64-65). This was a student organisation which began at Stovia (The School for the Training of Indonesian Doctors), the first higher education institute in the East Indies (Suryadinata, 1998a: 50-51). *Budi Utomo* called for the development of traditional as well as Western education among the people, the improvement of agriculture, industry and commerce and “everything that will guarantee them the life of a dignified people” (L.M. Sitorus cited in Kahin, 1952: 65). By the end of 1909 *Budi Utomo* had about 10,000 members (Kahin, 1952: 65). However, the organisation had been taken over by priyavis (members of the Javanese official class) and non-student members quickly outnumbered students. This has led some to suggest that the first nationalist youth movement was the *Tri Koro Dharmo* (Three Noble Objectives) which was founded in March 1915 and which later changed its name to *Jong Java* (Young Java) (Suryadinata, 1998a: 51).

At first these organisations were cultural rather than overtly political. *Jong Java*, for example, promoted Javanese music and dancing (Suryadinata, 1998a: 52-53). Also, they reflected Javanese rather than Indonesian nationalism (Suryadinata,

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1998a: 71-72). Although there were non-Javanese students at Stovia, none of them were involved with *Budi Utomo* (Suryadinata, 1998a: 51). *Jong Java* did not admit non-Javanese until three years after it was established.\(^\text{39}\) Indeed, other regions, influenced by *Jong Java*, established youth organisations: *Jong Sumatran Bond* (Young Sumatran Association) was founded in December 1917 in Jakarta, and *Jong Minahasa, Jong Ambon* and *Jong Celebes* followed (Suryadinata, 1998a: 52).

Ethnic Chinese did not tend to get involved in these organisations. Mary Somers Heidhues has pointed out that the nationalist movements of this period emphasised racial differences and encouraged competition between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese (Somers Heidhues, 1999: 184). *Sarekat Islam* was one such nationalist movement. It grew out of *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Islamic Trading Association) which was formed in order to protect "indigenous" traders from Chinese business successes which were harming their businesses, particularly in the batik and *kretek* cigarette industries (Somers Heidhues, 1999: 154-155). Boycotts of Chinese goods were organised and in 1912 there were riots against the ethnic Chinese in Surakarta and Surabaya (Kahin, 1952: 67). Religious differences were also emphasised by this nationalist organisation. George Kahin argues that *Sarekat Islam* "was seen by Indonesians in general, regardless of their economic function, as a symbol of religious — and thereby of Indonesian — unity against foreigners, at first especially Chinese" (Kahin, 1952: 67). Lynn Pan argues that perhaps there was more hostility between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous groups in Indonesia than anywhere else in Southeast Asia because unlike other countries, there was more commercial competition between indigenous and non-indigenous in Indonesia (Pan, 1991: 215).

By 1919 *Sarekat Islam* had a membership of two and a half million people and its aim was complete independence of Indonesia, by force if necessary (Kahin, 1952: 66). The Dutch authorities decided against an outright ban on the organisation, reasoning that due to the large membership, a huge backlash might ensue. However, they felt they needed to do something to quell the rising demands for

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\(^{39}\) The Sundanese share the island of Java with the Javanese.
independence. In March 1914 an act was passed which conferred legal status on some branches of Sarekat Islam, but official status was refused to the organisation as a whole. This move made it very difficult for Sarekat Islam to develop in a co-ordinated manner and it seriously weakened the organisation (Kahin, 1952: 69-70).

Although Sarekat Islam was the largest nationalist organisation at this time, other influential organisations were also established. In 1912 the Indische Partij (Indonesian Party) was formed. It had “an embryonic concept of an Indonesian nation (Indische natie)” (Suryadinata, 1998a: 71-72). The party’s motto was “the Indies for those who make their home there” (Kahin, 1952: 70). The aim of the Indische Partij was to “create a free nation” made up of people who considered the Dutch East Indies to be their motherland, regardless of their ethnic origin. The membership of the party was small and its leadership was predominantly Eurasian with a few Javanese intellectuals: as a result its influence in the East Indies itself was negligible. However, their ideas influenced East Indies students in Holland, who would return in the 1920s and take the lead in the anti-colonial movement (Suryadinata, 1998a: 71-72). Outstanding among these leaders was Sukarno who in 1927 established the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and became the first president of Indonesia in 1950.

The Japanese occupied Indonesia from 1942 until 1945. In their efforts to win support from the Indonesians for their war effort, the Japanese unwittingly aided the nationalists in their struggle for independence, and more inhabitants of the East Indies became aware of nationalist ideas (Simone & Feraru, 1995: 71). The Japanese permitted the Indonesian national anthem Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia) to be sung, and the national flag to be flown (Suryadinata, 1998a: 76)40. They also established a unified educational system; Indonesian schools replaced Dutch schools, Bahasa Indonesia became the common language and they trained

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40 The flag consists of two equally sized horizontal stripes, the top one red and the bottom one white.
an Indonesian military force, the *Peta* (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland)\(^{41}\).

In order to enlist the support of the prominent nationalist leaders for their war effort, including Sukarno and his future vice-President Mohammad Hatta, the Japanese promised that self-government would ultimately be granted (Kahin, 1952: 106). The Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence was established in 1945. The Committee comprised of an elite group of mostly secular nationalists. They drafted a constitution during the closing months of Japanese occupation. This 1945 constitution was a short, vague document which provided for a strong president and a weak legislature (Masters, 1999).

**Independence and the Status of the Ethnic Chinese**

After the end of the Second World War, the Indonesians had to fight against Dutch attempts to re-control their colonial territories and finally won independence in 1949. In relation to the Chinese, it was decided that any Chinese person who was born in Indonesia automatically became a citizen of the new nation after independence, so long as they did not reject Indonesian citizenship and actively opt for Chinese citizenship. Leo Suryadinata suggests that the young republic was weak and desperately needed the support of the economically powerful Chinese community (Suryadinata, 1998a: 96). According to James Mackie and Charles Coppel, this automatic acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as citizens raised doubts in the mind of indigenous Indonesians about the loyalty of the Chinese (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 10). In fact, from 1949 to 1950, under new regulations, a large number of ethnic Chinese did reject Indonesian citizenship. At this time, Mao Zedong's victory in China reinvigorated a pride in feelings of being Chinese (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 10). Approximately 40 percent of ethnic Chinese (600,000-700,000 people) rejected their Indonesian citizenship and another million Chinese were foreign-born, so were automatically excluded as Indonesian

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\(^{41}\) *Peta* is an abbreviation for *Pembela Tanah Air*. This is the force which fought the Dutch when they attempted to restore colonial rule in 1945.
nationals (Aguilar, 2001: 515). This was a great worry to the Indonesian authorities.

Even those who had not opted for Chinese citizenship were a worry because they still had dual nationality of China and Indonesia because under the Chinese principle of *jus sanguinis* every child of an ethnic Chinese parent was a citizen of China, regardless of their birthplace (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 9). A process to end dual nationality was begun at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955. Present at this ceremony were the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zhou Enlai, and his Indonesian counterpart, Sunarjo. The treaty was ratified in 1960 and over a two year period from 1960 to 1962, anybody who had dual citizenship had to declare in a court of law whether they opted for Chinese or Indonesian citizenship (Tan, 1997: 33). Official Indonesian sources estimate that 65 percent of the approximately 1 million with dual nationality opted for Indonesian citizenship (Tan, 1997: 35).

During the 1950s action had been taken to curtail the activities of the “alien” Chinese on the archipelago, that is, those Chinese who did not have Indonesian citizenship. This may explain why so many took up Indonesian citizenship when the opportunity arose in 1960. Actually, Charles Coppel suggests that although these policies were aimed at alien Chinese, not those who were citizens, the intention was to advance indigenous Indonesians rather than Indonesian citizens generally (Coppel, 1983: 105). In order to try to improve the economic position of the indigenous entrepreneurs the “Benteng system” was introduced in 1950. Under this system only indigenous Indonesians were given licenses to import certain goods. This system ended in 1954 with no obvious success, mainly due to continuing inflation, the inexperience of indigenous businessmen and the activities of ethnic Chinese silent partners who continued to run the businesses (Suryadinata, 1992: 132). There were also attempts to “indigenise” the rice mills and harbour facilities, however, these did not lead to widespread improvements for the indigenous population either (Suryadinata, 1992: 132-133). During the transition to Guided Democracy and the Guided Democracy period itself, discrimination in the economic sector was aimed specifically at alien Chinese rather than all ethnic Chinese. A head tax was imposed on aliens in 1957, and in
1959 Presidential Decree No.10 refused permission to alien Chinese to pursue retail trade in rural areas.\(^42\) This caused an exodus of over 100,000 Chinese to China and caused huge disruption to the national economy, since indigenous businessmen were not equipped to take over so quickly from the alien Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 37).

The People’s Republic of China viewed Indonesia as an important ally and kept a close eye on how the ethnic Chinese there were treated. The Chinese government was very disappointed by Sukarno’s actions in 1959 when he banned retail in villages carried out by “alien Chinese”. As a result, they launched a campaign to invite the Chinese in Indonesia to return “home” to China. A statement made by one Chinese official stated that “[w]e want none of our dear ones to suffer in foreign lands and it is our hope that they will all come back to the arms of the motherland” (Pan, 1991: 216-217). Continued attention from China, and the increasing power of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) put the Chinese Indonesians in a very vulnerable position “since it made them seem ever more like Fifth Columnists” (Pan, 1991: 218).

Those Chinese who did opt for Indonesian citizenship still found that they were not accepted fully into Indonesian society. The ethnic Chinese protected themselves from discrimination by bribing underpaid officials which merely served to reinforce stereotypes of Chinese behaviour among the indigenous population. There was also the continuing suspicion that they simply chose Indonesian citizenship because they felt it best served their interests, not because they felt any loyalty to Indonesia (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 11-12). The issue of ethnic Chinese citizenship status and loyalty to Indonesia has been a constant theme in Indonesia since independence. In 1962 the issue was settled temporarily with those who chose Indonesian citizenship gaining legal status. Although this gave them some legal redress if they were discriminated against, with the administrative and economic chaos leading up to the more authoritarian Guided

\(^{42}\) This limit on retail trade in rural areas is called PP10. The retail ban caused difficulties during the discussions with the Chinese government to end dual nationality and caused implementation of the treaty to be delayed until 1960 (Coppel and Mackie, 1976: 11).
Democracy period (1959-65), unofficial forms of discrimination were common (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 11).\(^{43}\)

As well as attempts to improve the position of indigenous Indonesians in the economic field, there were also attempts to decrease the influence of Chinese culture in Indonesian society. In 1957, in an attempt to reduce the numbers studying in Chinese-medium schools, it became illegal for Indonesian citizens to attend “alien schools” (Coppel, 1983: 36-37). Leo Suryadinata notes that there were 2,000 Chinese-medium schools with 425,000 students of whom 250,000 were Indonesian citizens. By July 1958 there were 850 Chinese-medium schools whose 150,000 pupils were all alien Chinese (Suryadinata, 1992: 151). There were also attempts to reduce the Chinese language media. In 1958, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, Nasution, decreed that all newspapers with a script other than Latin or Arabic should be shut down. This was later modified, however, when it was decided that there was still a need for Chinese language newspapers to inform people about government policies and regulations (Suryadinata, 1992: 159).

Despite these government attempts to remove visible signs of Chineseness from Indonesian society, ethnic Chinese citizens found a voice for themselves in political and cultural debates of the time. There were two main schools of thought among the ethnic Chinese during the Old Order — assimilationist and integrationist (Coppel, 1976: 44). The themes which were argued over and discussed by these two political streams have parallels with those discussed in the groups established after 1998. For example, there was disagreement in the 1950s and 1960s about whether Chinese Indonesians should completely assimilate into Indonesian society, or whether they should maintain their cultural distinctiveness. They also disagreed about whether Chinese Indonesians should join mainstream political parties, or whether they should form their own party to defend their interests and how ethnic Chinese could show loyalty to Indonesia.

\(^{43}\) Guided democracy, despite the name, marked the end of Indonesia’s experiment with liberal democracy. During this period Sukarno’s personal rule was reminiscent of Javanese feudalism (Schwarz, 1999: 16). Political parties were restricted in their activities, political arrests became more frequent and the press was restricted (Feith, 1962: 593).
Early Chinese Indonesian Politics

Strategies which the ethnic Chinese adopted during the 1950s and 1960s, to try to integrate themselves into their local communities, tended to be viewed with suspicion by non-Chinese Indonesians. The observations of Charles Coppel sum up the dilemma which the Chinese Indonesian found themselves in at this time, and they also have resonance today. In his discussion of the difficulties for the ethnic Chinese in the area of political participation Coppel stated:

The Indonesian Chinese are caught on the horns of a dilemma if they consider political activity. If they engage in the politics of dissent, they are labelled subversive. If they support the authorities of the day, they are labelled opportunistic. And if they keep clear of politics, they are also opportunistic because they are said to be only interested in profit (Coppel 1983: 24-25).

Integrationists

Integrationist views were represented by Baperki (Badan Permuyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) which was established in 1954. The leader, Siauw Giok Tjhan, stated that:

We founded Baperki because we rejected the idea that citizenship problems are the concern of the ethnic groups involved. We are of the opinion that citizenship problems are national problems and their solution must be struggled for by an organization of national character (Baperki, 1963: 112).

Despite this aim to make citizenship a national issue and open Baperki membership to all Indonesians, 98 percent of its members were ethnic Chinese and 1 percent were other citizens of foreign descent (Coppel, 1976: 46).

Baperki's stated aims were the promotion of Indonesian citizenship among the ethnic Chinese and the elimination of discrimination towards them. They considered themselves a mass organisation rather than a political party, however, they did field candidates in the 1955 election when its chairman Siauw Giok Tjhan was elected to parliament, and another candidate won a seat in the constituent assembly44 (Coppel, 1976: 46). Baperki supported the ethnic Chinese

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44 The constituent assembly was established in 1956 to devise a new Constitution for the country. It was dissolved in 1959 when Sukarno declared the 1945 Constitution to be the only legal Constitution of Indonesia (Ramage, 1995: 16-20).
against the “indigenisation” of Indonesian industry and also opposed the government’s requirement that dual nationals reject their Chinese citizenship (Coppel, 1976: 48).

Baperki was also involved in the field of education. After the government banned Chinese Indonesian citizens from attending Chinese-medium schools Baperki set up Indonesian-medium schools which followed the national curriculum. Again, these schools were open to indigenous and non-indigenous pupils, however, the vast majority who attended were ethnic Chinese. This had the effect that although the ethnic Chinese were now studying the national curriculum in the Indonesian language, they were in schools which were catering almost exclusively to ethnic Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 17). Baperki also established University Res Publica in central Jakarta in 1960 which was attended by a majority of ethnic Chinese students (Suryadinata, 1992: 153).

Although Baperki took a politically non-aligned position at first, it did gradually come to be associated with the communist PKI. Siauw Giok Tjhan never called himself a communist, although he did have a desire to mould “an Indonesian socialist society” (Baperki, 1963: 115). This shift to the left corresponded with Sukarno’s own move to the left during the Guided Democracy period. This led to Baperki’s demise after the alleged communist coup attempt in 1965. Baperki schools at the time were placed under government control and University Res Publica was burnt to the ground. Siauw himself was arrested and spent thirteen years in jail (Siauw, 1993: 124).

On the one hand Sukarno supported the integrationist stance of Baperki and included the ethnic Chinese as an integral part of the Indonesian nation (Bangsa Indonesia). In a speech to the Baperki conference in 1963 Sukarno asserted that the peranakan Chinese were one of the legitimate ethnic groups (suku) of Indonesia. On the other hand, in the same year, Sukarno also supported the establishment of the assimilationist organisation LPKB (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, Institute for the Promotion of National Unity) (see below). Suryadinata asserts that Sukarno had very vague ideas about “what the Indonesian nation actually was and may have had the hope that various ethnic groups would be united into an ‘‘Indonesian national identity’ which was still in the making”
As I have explained in chapter one, there were hopes among nationalist leaders at the time that the ethnic identities of Indonesians would become less important than an archipelago-wide identity which they promulgated.

Assimilationists

The assimilationist LPKB was led by K. Sindhunata. The members disagreed with Baperki about what they considered to be an “exclusive” organisation. Baperki asserted that they were not exclusive because they permitted “indigenous” people to join, even though most of their membership were ethnic Chinese. For the assimilationists, Baperki (and other organisations such as the Chinese Association of University Students, *Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesian* who played an active role in the Indonesian Student Federation, *Perkumpulan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*) was still exclusive as long as most of the members were ethnic Chinese (Coppel, 1976: 52). As well as opposing integrationist organisations, LPKB also encouraged ethnic Chinese to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones, and to marry “indigenous” Indonesians (Thung, 1998: 45). They also asserted that one of the main obstacles to assimilation was the exclusiveness of the Chinese themselves. As Baperki had aligned itself with the left, the assimilationist movement accepted support from the other dominant power in Indonesia at the time, the army (Coppel, 1976: 55). One prominent assimilationist, Onghokham, wrote in his 1960 article, “The Case for Assimilation” that:

> Progress toward... unity can only be achieved by means of assimilation, so that the exclusiveness of the minority is destroyed and the relations between minority and majority are improved and mixed marriages increase... Assimilation means the abolition of distinctions between one group and another, so that discrimination naturally disappears because the differences are no longer visible (Onghokham, 1960: 348).

Interestingly LPKB as an organisation did not encourage the conversion of ethnic Chinese to Islam (although individuals who were involved in the organisation did convert, for example, one of the leading spokesmen on Chinese assimilation, Yunus Yahya) (Suryadinata, 1997a: xix). Nor did they demand that Christian schools should be closed along with Chinese ones. Coppel suggests that the first tenet of *Pancasila* (belief in one supreme God) allowed them to decry religious
assimilation. This policy was probably also related to the large numbers of Chinese Christians among the assimilationists (Coppel, 1976: 53-54).

Assimilationists in Indonesia often refer to the Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) of 1928 to explain their ideas. In 1961, a group of thirty Chinese Indonesians who espoused assimilation, signed an “Assimilation Charter” (Piagam Asimilasi) which asserted that their aspirations were based on the Youth Oath of 1928 (Suryadinata, 1997c: 159-160). They stated that:

For those who have received Indonesian citizenship the consequence is that they must have a firm intention to serve their country, Indonesia, and their nation, the Indonesian nation, with body and soul; have the firm intention to become one with the entire Indonesian people and become true and patriotic Indonesians, and to reject and rid themselves of attitudes and actions which are in conflict with this intention (Assimilation Charter, cited in Suryadinata, 1997c: 159).

Charles Coppel makes a very important point, criticising the assimilationists for not dealing with the question of what kind of identity the ethnic Chinese should assimilate into. He suggests that “most writing on assimilation presupposes a ‘master cultural mould’ or a ‘core society and culture’ to which minorities might assimilate... The problem of applying these concepts to a ‘new nation’ with frail national integration, like Indonesia, has not been faced squarely by the assimilationists” (Coppel, 1976: note 114, 221-223). Coppel asks:

Must the Chinese assimilate to the indigenous sukus first, before they were themselves welded into a national whole? Or should they, being heavily concentrated in the large urban centres which were often ethnically heterogeneous, assimilate in one jump to the all-Indonesian culture... which was developing there (Coppel, 1976: 54)?

This question is just as pertinent today after years of pressure from the Suharto administrations for the ethnic Chinese to assimilate. I will return to this when I investigate how the post-1998 groups propose Chinese Indonesians should behave in order to be fully accepted into Indonesian society.
The Alleged Coup Attempt of 1965

Widespread Violence

On the 30 September 1965 an alleged coup attempt led to the deaths of up to 500,000 people and changed the face of Indonesian politics and the Chinese Indonesian position in it (Ramage, 1995: 24). Much of the violence occurred on Java and later on Bali, with some smaller scale outbreaks in other parts of Indonesia. In most areas the violence was carried out by units of the army and civilian vigilante groups (Cribb, 1990: 3). The truth about what actually happened is still unclear. Robert Cribb points out that information about who was killed, where, when, why and by whom “is so patchy that most conclusions have to be strongly qualified as provisional” (Cribb, 1990: 3).

Robert Cribb, who has carried out extensive research into these events, puts forward four possible explanations for the violence. The first explanation is that the military orchestrated the violence. Some argue that Suharto was directly involved in order to be rid of his main rivals for power, the PKI. Cribb does not go this far. He suggests that he finds this argument “implausible though, like most conspiracy arguments, not impossible” (Cribb, 2002a: 552). Cribb argues that military involvement does not explain why so many people were murdered in Indonesia. He compares the violent crackdown on communism in Indonesia to state suppression of communism in Argentina and Chile, which occurred shortly after the events in Indonesia. The death toll in Indonesia was much higher which suggests to Cribb that other factors were involved (Cribb, 2002a: 552).

The second attempt to explain the violence at this time is that it was a result of “extreme political tension” throughout the archipelago (Cribb, 2002a: 553). There was great political uncertainty and lots of questions about whether Indonesia would take a communist, Islamic or another road to modernity, and who would be in charge of this process. At the same time, Indonesia was one of the poorest countries in the world. During the first half of the 1960s inflation was 600 percent and foreign debt was rising rapidly (Berger, 1997: 1997). This argument suggests that the pressure which came to bear on the population led them into a frenzy of
violence (Cribb, 2002a: 553-554). The third explanation of the violence takes into account the variations across the country in local patterns of violence. These variations have led scholars to suggest that localised social and political tensions also had a part to play in the bloodshed (Cribb, 2002a: 554-555). Finally, it has been argued that Indonesian society seems to include a subculture of violence in the form of *jago* which Cribb translates as "tough guys" or "toughs". Research which has been carried out on this kind of violence tends to conclude that the *jago* are tolerated by those in power because they fulfil a useful role of intimidation and murder of those considered a problem by the government (Cribb, 2002a: 556-557).

Despite these numerous possible explanations for the violence, Mary Zurbuchen makes clear that the Indonesian people were given only one official account of what happened. Through government rhetoric, symbolism and also through the school curriculum, Indonesians have been inculcated with the belief that the PKI were completely to blame for the murder of the generals, and as such they were traitors who needed to be eliminated (Zurbuchen, 2002: 566).

**Ethnic Chinese Involvement**

It was presumed at the time that Chinese Indonesians were involved with the PKI and that those killed included large numbers of Chinese. For example, *Life* magazine and the *Far Eastern Economic Review* claimed that hundreds of thousands of Chinese had been slaughtered (Coppel, 1983: 58). Cribb disagrees with this and argues that the violence tended to be directed against alleged communists irrespective of ethnicity (Cribb, 2002a: 557). This concurs with Charles Coppel's assertion that the anti-Chinese violence at this time was to a certain extent action against the left generally and not focused on the Chinese in particular (Coppel, 1983: 55). Chinese who were considered supporters or members of the Communist Party were killed, but killing of Chinese because they were Chinese was more sporadic (Coppel, 1983: 58). Coppel estimates that

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45 *Jago* were also in evidence during the violence in 1998, which led up to the fall of the Suharto regime. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
around 2,000 ethnic Chinese were killed in the months following the coup attempt. This is based on Chinese government estimates in 1965-66.

As I mentioned, most massacres of communists took place in rural Java and Bali, where Chinese people had been under-represented in the population. Since the retail trade ban of 1959 had driven them out. Also, most of the Chinese left in these rural areas were relatively wealthy and able to pay protection money to the local military or take refuge with relatives in urban areas (Coppel. 1983: 58-59).

Finally, the leader of the communist party, D. N. Aidit, had already removed the ethnic Chinese from leadership positions (Schwarz, 1999: 105). This is not to say, however, that the Chinese were not right to be worried. As James Mackie points out, many of their supporters and protectors in elite circles were overthrown to be replaced by those most virulently opposed to them in the army and Muslim political parties (Mackie, 1976: 111). Pressure on the ethnic Chinese varied from province to province but intimidation and fear caused many thousands to flee to China. In Aceh and North Sumatra in particular the pressures on the ethnic Chinese to leave were immense, and thousands ended up in refugee camps in Medan (Mackie, 1976: 116).

The stigma attached to closeness with the communists became hereditary. Family members of those involved in the PKI, those sympathetic to them, or people who had family members who were sympathetic towards them, have passed on the stigma to the next generation. Those who have suffered violence and discrimination as a result have included non-Chinese as well as Chinese Indonesians (Heryanto, 1998: 99). An example of this stigma is outlined by Mary Zurbuchen. Those imprisoned as communists, or communist sympathisers during this period had “ex-political prisoner” (eks tahanan politik, eks tapol, ET) stamped on their identity card on release. This allowed the authorities to carry out surveillance of these people and their families (Zurbuchen, 2002: 568). This also meant that ex-political prisoners and their families did not have ready access to the social services available to other citizens. The government now issues identity cards without the ET code, however, those cards belonging to ex-political prisoners have expiry dates, whereas, ordinary identity cards do not expire (Zurbuchen. 2002: 568).
Ariel Heryanto argues that the “official narrative” of the events of 1965 — that the attempted coup was carried out by the PKI who, due to this traitorous behaviour, needed to be annihilated — “should be regarded as constituting a central component and force in the processes that gave birth to the New Order ‘Self’” (Heryanto, 1998: 97). Thung Julan suggests that the events of 1965 could be viewed as “the turning point in Indonesian history from a situation of mild acceptance of plurality... under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy to a strong emphasis on unity... under Suharto’s New Order” (Thung, 1998: 38). As mentioned above, despite evidence that few Chinese Indonesians were involved with the PKI, the ethnic Chinese tended to be associated with them. This led to a narrowing, almost to the point of extinction, of the areas where Chinese cultural and political activities were acceptable. The next section of this chapter will explore the policies towards Chinese Indonesians during this post-1965 period which ended in 1998, as it had begun, with violence.

The Ethnic Chinese During the New Order

Difficult Beginnings for the Ethnic Chinese

For the ethnic Chinese the New Order had an unpropitious beginning at an army seminar in Bandung in 1966. The main aim of the conference was to reformulate the role of the army in the new political times. At this conference the decision was made to use the term warga negara Cina (Chinese citizen) to describe an ethnic Chinese with Indonesian citizenship, instead of warga negara Tionghoa which had been used previously. The People’s Republic of China became known as Republik Rakyat Cina instead of Republik Rakyat Tiongkok (Coppel, 1983: 89). Suharto agreed with the use of Cina and he made this official at the cabinet presidium of 1967 (Aguilar, 2001: 505). The reasons given for using Cina rather than Tionghoa or Tiongkok were that Cina had historically been used in Indonesian to describe China and the Chinese. More ominously, officials also explained that they particularly wanted to “remove a feeling of inferiority on the

46 Tiongkok is based on the Hokkien word for Zhongguo (Mandarin for China) (Aguilar, 2001: 511).
part of our own people, while on the other hand removing the feeling of superiority on the part of the group concerned within our state” (Coppel, 1983: 89). Benedict Anderson points out that although all the national languages of Southeast Asia have derogatory words for the Chinese, only Suharto’s Indonesia insisted on the official use of such a word. As a result Chinese Indonesians tended to use the English word “Chinese” to describe themselves instead of the Indonesian term Cina which Anderson translates as “chink” (Anderson, 1998: 14 note 28).

In 1967 the word pribumi rather than asli became the official term to describe indigenous citizens. Coppel sees this as an improvement suggesting that the word pribumi lacks the sense of “genuine” and “authentic” which was contained in the term asli. According to Ariel Heryanto however, the term pribumi did come to have this sense of authenticity associated with it. He argues that “[n]ation-ness, and hence the distinction between Indonesian and non-Indonesian, are only a step away from the ethnic dichotomy of pribumi and non-pribumi” (Heryanto, 1998: 100). Although the Indonesian constitution is not based exclusively on ethnicity and descent, and Suharto’s New Order regime projected an image of social harmony within the ethnic diversity, only the pribumi ethnic groups were included (Heryanto, 1998: 101). The use of the term Cina rather than Tionghoa underlines the desire on the part of the New Order to distance the ethnic Chinese from the discourse of the nation.

The New Order had a more comprehensive policy towards the ethnic Chinese than had been the case during the Old Order. This was a policy of cultural assimilation in which there was much less scope for Chinese political organisation than had been the case during the Sukarno era. In 1967 “The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem” was published. It set out rules for Chinese behaviour. All except one Chinese language newspaper was closed. The one newspaper remaining — Harian Indonesia — was run by the government and was used by the authorities to communicate government policy to the ethnic Chinese. Expressions of Chinese culture were confined to the home, Chinese language schools were phased out, Chinese script was outlawed, and Chinese Indonesians
were encouraged to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones (Schwarz, 1999: 106).

Citizenship Issues

When Suharto came to power there were still over 1 million alien Chinese in Indonesia, out of an ethnic Chinese population of around 3.29 million people. With the New Order’s concentration on economic growth and stability they made an attempt to deal with the issue of alien Chinese once again. In 1967 diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia were severed because of alleged Chinese activity in the coup attempt of 1965. Official relations did not resume until 1990 (Tan, 1997: 35). In 1969 Suharto abrogated the Dual Nationality Treaty which had been signed in Bandung in 1955. This meant that the children of alien Chinese, who had the opportunity to choose Indonesian citizenship themselves after coming of age, lost this opportunity and had to go through a naturalisation process (Tan, 1997: 35). Coppel suggests that the government feared for the security of the country if ethnic Chinese were permitted to choose Indonesian citizenship without proper intelligence screening (Coppel, 1983: 155). The Indonesian authorities permitted naturalisation of Chinese from 1969, but high costs and excessive bureaucracy prevented large numbers from taking up the offer (Suryadinata, 1997a: 97).

Chinese language schools for aliens were all closed down in May 1966 in continuing attempts by the government to reduce the links between China and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Coppel, 1976: 64). Some children had their education disrupted as a result of this, however in 1969 “special project national schools” were opened with funding from the totok Chinese. The language of instruction was Indonesian and up to 40 percent of the places were given over to alien Chinese, although this figure was sometimes higher (Coppel, 1976: 64-65). Chinese chambers of commerce, regional speech group associations and Indonesia-China Friendship Institutes were also shut down (Coppel, 1976: 65).

On the one hand, having a large population who held the citizenship of another country was an embarrassment to the Indonesian government and a potential threat to security. On the other hand, mass expulsion was not an option as it would
threaten the economic stability of the country. Offers of citizenship to these alien Chinese were rejected by Suharto for fear of widespread opposition from militant groups opposed to the ethnic Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 95). There was also suspicion that the alien Chinese were using the institution of marriage to gain citizenship even though they were not loyal to Indonesia. Eventually, in 1980, Suharto issued a presidential decree simplifying the procedure for these alien Chinese to become Indonesian citizens. By the end of the 1980s there were 288,000 alien Chinese left in the country (Suryadinata, 1997a: 8).

New Order Pancasila

Pancasila was used as the ideological basis of Suharto's regime as it had been during the Old Order. However, it shifted from being a common platform under which different groups could come together, to being the "ideological pillar of the regime". The government became the only official interpreter of Pancasila and used Pancasila to justify its authoritarian rule (Ramage, 1995: 24). The New Order view of society was similar to that of the integralists of the 1940s and 1950s: Indonesia was conceived as "one large integral family with Bapak (Father) Suharto as the 'paternal figure'" (Antlöv, 2000: 210).

In 1978 the People's Consultative Assembly approved a decree entitled "The Guide to the Full Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila" (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila). With this began a nation-wide indoctrination programme to instil the state ideology in the minds of all Indonesians (Ramage, 1995: 31-32). In 1983, after "winning" a third term in office, Suharto declared that the state ideology of Pancasila was the most effective way of holding together all the diverse groups in Indonesia "now and in the future" (Suryadinata, 1998a: 38). In 1985 all social, religious and political organisations were forced to adopt Pancasila as their asas tunggal (official ideology) (Suryadinata, 1998a: 40). Suharto argued that if different groups and political parties were permitted to pursue their own agendas, there would be chaos (Suryadinata, 1998a: 38).

Suharto also linked economic development to Pancasila. The regime argued that the final tenet of Pancasila, "social justice", was violated by Sukarno and
economic prosperity was linked to the implementation of this tenet. Mark Berger has pointed out that during the Suharto era “a powerful Indonesian development (pembangunan) discourse” developed. This discourse advocated that Indonesians “work together to develop the nation... under the leadership of the ‘father of development’ (Bapak Pembangunan), Suharto” (Berger, 1997: 344).

Also central to the Pancasila indoctrination programme was the importance of social harmony (kerukunan). As part of this desire for kerukunan the government introduced a policy which prohibited any discussion of ethnicity, religion, race, or group differences (suku, agama, ras, antar golongan; SARA) which might provoke unrest or cause tension between societal groups. According to Sumartana, this ban on the open discussion of SARA issues meant that tension simmered below the surface and was not dealt with in any meaningful way (Sumartana, 1999: 254).

This policy of SARA also meant that anti-Chinese propaganda was less overt than it had been, however, it did not disappear altogether. For example, newspapers would subtly highlight the ethnic origin of Chinese convicted of dishonest practices, but leave out the ethnic identity of Chinese Indonesian sports people and other individuals who carried out positive activities (Coppel, 1983: 158). Under SARA, the New Order had a particular method of dealing with “indigenous” ethnic groups also. According to Michael Jacobsen “indigenous cultures” were used by the New Order to “exemplify the national motto: ‘Diversity in Unity’”. Therefore, only the performative aspects of indigenous culture were permitted, not those which may have jeopardised Pancasila indoctrination, such as social organisation or legal traditions (Jacobsen, 2000). In relation to the ethnic Chinese of course, even the more benign aspects of their cultural traditions were not permitted.

As well as banning the celebration of Chinese Indonesian culture, the New Order government also had an ambivalent attitude towards Confucianism even though the right of Indonesians to practice a religion is central to the ideology of Pancasila. In 1965, Presidential Decree No. 1 recognised both Confucianism and Buddhism as religions (Coppel, 1983: 107). The Suharto government considered religion to be a useful force against the re-emergence of the PKI and after 1965
citizens were required to have their religion printed on their identity cards (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk*). Those who did not were suspect in the eyes of the authorities (Suryadinata, 1997b: 162). Presidential Instruction number 14, issued in 1967, also acknowledged the right of Indonesian citizens to practice their chosen religion. The government stated, however, that:

> without derogating from the guarantee of freedom to embrace a religion and to carry out its observances, those manners of Chinese religious observances which have aspects of cultural affinity which are oriented to their ancestral land should be practised privately amongst the family or individually (Coppel, 1983: 144).

In 1979 Confucianism was de-recognised as a religion. Suryadinata suggests that by the mid-1970s the New Order had consolidated its hold on power and Confucianism, which had been supported as a force against the re-emergence of communism, was now considered contrary to the government’s assimilationist policy. The government also feared ethnic Chinese demands for religious rights such as the teaching of Confucianism at school and the recognition of Confucian holidays, which was also considered contrary to its assimilationist policy (Suryadinata, 1997b: 164-165). Therefore, although it was still possible to practice Confucianism privately after 1979, it was not considered an “official religion”. This meant that Confucianism was not permitted to be practised in public, there were no Confucian religious holidays officially marked by the state, Confucianism was not offered as a religious subject in school, and Confucian marriages were not recognised by the state (Suryadinata, 1997b: 165).

**Chinese Indonesian Organisations During the New Order**

The LPKB, whose influence was evident in the New Order policies, by putting pressure on ethnic Chinese to assimilate, sought a new role during the Suharto era. They wished to become chief policy formulators relating to both the ethnic Chinese citizens and alien Chinese. After MPRS sessions in 1966, which highlighted the need for the promotion of national unity, LPKB made an even

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47 The official religions were now Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hindu-Bali.

48 Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat Semu*ntari).
more grandiose bid to become the main organisation in the promotion of unity in
the nation, not just in relation to the ethnic Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 80). However,
government resolve to dissolve organisations they considered in conflict with
Pancasila meant LPKB had to be satisfied with a much reduced role in national
affairs (Coppel, 1983: 81). After the MPRS session of 1966 their function was
reduced to dealing only with matters pertaining to Chinese Indonesian citizens. By
1967 LPKB themselves decided to halt activities altogether. They stated that
LPKB policies had already been accepted by the government and they felt no
further need to have a separate body to promote assimilation.

Charles Coppel suggests that there are other reasons for the LPKB’s decision to
stop their activities. He suggests that the job of promoting the activities of a
particular ethnic group became too risky, even if it was assimilation that was
being promoted. Also, many people who joined LPKB did so to oppose the pro-
communist position of Baperki. After the demise of Baperki and the communists
those involved felt it was no longer necessary to have an organisation such as
LPKB (Coppel, 1983: 143). The New Order considered Chinese socio-political
groups to be exclusive and contrary to their policy of assimilation. Organisations
based on politics, commerce or industry which had been common, were no longer
permitted after government policy towards the Chinese was published in 1967
(Suryadinata, 1992: 205).

After rioting in Jakarta in 1974 and alarm at how the increasing gap between rich
and poor was being perceived along racial lines, some former members of LPKB
set up the Organisation for the Promotion of National Unity (Badan Pembina
Kesatuan Bangsa, BPKB), with the approval of the Governor of Jakarta. They
played a low-key role in Jakarta until 1977 when they took part in a conference
entitled “Communication Week for the Appreciation of National Unity” (Pekan
Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa). At this conference they suggested
that a forum for communication and consultation between the ethnic Chinese and
the government should be established. The result of this was Bakom-PKB which
was established on 28 October 1977.49 Like LPKB before it, Bakom-PKB was

49 Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Communication Body for the
Appreciation of National Unity)
established to promote assimilation of the ethnic Chinese and to liase with the
government on behalf of Chinese Indonesians (Suryadinata, 1992: 204).

One of the main policies which had been promoted by LPKB and Bakom-PKB
was the need for a clear division between Chinese Indonesian citizens and alien
Chinese, and an end to the division between ethnic Chinese and "indigenous"
citizens (Coppel, 1983: 74). They wanted Chinese citizens to be treated like any
other group in Indonesia and not treated differently because of their Chinese
origins. Charles Coppel explains that despite LPKB requests Suharto did not treat
the ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese equally. This ambivalence is evident in
Suharto’s 1967 independence day speech. On the one hand, Suharto states that all
citizens of Indonesia, including the ethnic Chinese, have the same rights. On the
other hand, he singles them out and encourages them to assimilate and not to be
exclusive. They therefore do not have the right, as other groups do, to feel they
fully belong to the Indonesian nation. In the speech Suharto asserted that:

We must draw a clear line between alien Chinese and Chinese who are
citizens of Indonesia. Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, although
they are of Chinese descent, are still citizens of Indonesia and have a
position, rights and duties which are the same as everybody else’s... Also, we must make efforts to help them lose their exclusive ways and
try to develop one nation by simplifying the procedure for changing of
names. We appeal to citizens of Chinese descent not to delay any
longer assimilation with the native people of Indonesia (masyarakat
Indonesia [asli]) (Suharto’s 16 August 1967 independence day speech,

Paradoxical New Order Policies

Anti-Assimilation Policies

Discussion up to now has centred on governmental pressure on Chinese
Indonesians to lose their association with Chinese culture and assimilate into
Indonesian society. Complete assimilation was prevented, however, since the
identity cards of the ethnic Chinese contained codes to differentiate them from
indigenous Indonesians. This means that no matter how much effort a Chinese
Indonesian makes to lose her Chinese culture and assimilate into an Indonesian
culture, she will always be considered Chinese by the state. Chinese-Indonesians
were strongly encouraged to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones, but to access public services they still need to declare their former Chinese names (Heryanto, 1998: 104). Intermarriage has been encouraged, but up to today the children of an ethnic Chinese man are still classed as non-pribumi even if their mother is indigenous (Heryanto, 1998: 103). This is part of the official way in which the ethnic Chinese have been made to feel "other". They have never really been permitted to assimilate.

Another government activity which worked against assimilation was their categorisation of economically weak and strong groups along racial lines (Suryadinata, 1998b: 36). As discussed above, the Chinese in Indonesia have been dominant in the economic field since arriving in Indonesia as traders and acted as middlemen during the colonial administration. During the Old Order there was anti-Chinese feeling linked to their dominant position in the economy. What distinguished the New Order period from these earlier periods is that during the latter the ethnic Chinese found it difficult to enter into other professions. No Chinese Indonesian served in any of Suharto's cabinets, there were no ethnic Chinese in the top ranks of the military, and ethnic Chinese students found it difficult to gain admission to state universities (Schwarz, 1999: 106).

**Suharto's Cronies**

The Suharto era also saw the development of what became widely known as the cukong system. The term cukong (which means "master" in Hokkien dialect) is used to describe an ethnic Chinese businessman who collaborates with a member of the political élite. Under this system the ethnic Chinese partner runs the business and the non-Chinese, usually a member of the military, provides protection and access to influential people (Suryadinata, 1988: 266). Suharto's ties with ethnic Chinese businessmen stemmed from his position as military

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50 Lineage is patrilineal so if you are the son or daughter or an ethnic Chinese woman and an indigenous man it is possible to assimilate, if you do not have physical features which are very obviously Chinese.

51 At the very end of the New Order administration Suharto did appoint his friend Bob Hasan to his cabinet. However, Hasan, one of Suharto's crony businessmen, was not popular with the ethnic Chinese or non-Chinese.
commander in Central Java in 1957. Military units used Chinese traders to provide supplies and it was here that he met two of the most powerful ethnic Chinese tycoons, Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan (Freedman, 2000: 109). Anthony Reid hints that these business dealings were not always straightforward, with smuggling and other "shady business" going on (Reid, 1999). The cukong system led to the growth of a small number of very wealthy, usually totok, businessmen who had very close links to the Suharto government. In exchange for providing political funds and business opportunities to their patrons the big Chinese cukongs received tax breaks, access to trading licences, introductions to foreign investors and funding from state banks (Schwarz, 1999: 107-108). According to Siauw Tiong Djin the impression was that the ethnic Chinese were Suharto's partners (sekutu) (Siauw, 1998: 13).

These two developments — the concentration of ethnic Chinese in the economic sector and the cukong system — led to huge feelings of resentment among the non-Chinese. Rumours spread that the ethnic Chinese who constituted three percent of the population owned seventy percent of the economy. Charles Coppel asserts that the ethnic Chinese under the New Order “had much less scope to assert their Chineseness than in the years preceding the coup attempt”. At the same time, however, “the opportunities for Chinese businessmen to prosper were probably greater than at any time since Indonesian independence” (Coppel, 1983: 175). The New Order government rejected demands from indigenous Indonesian businessmen that there should be “a more radical assault” on the position of the ethnic Chinese in the economy (Coppel, 1983: 175). The close relationship between the cukongs and the government, and the favours they received led to allegations of corruption which were attached to ethnic Chinese generally, not just the privileged élite. The fact that these cukongs tended to be totok rather than peranakan reinforced the perception that the ethnic Chinese were more loyal to China than to Indonesia. Ariel Heryanto argues that Suharto’s New Order regime carried on the divide-and-rule policy of the Dutch towards the ethnic Chinese (Heryanto, 1999: 326). This was a policy privileging the Chinese business

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52 This statistic still appears in newspapers when discussing the economy (see Mann, 1999: 180).
community, but reducing the ethnic minority to “near pariah status” in all other areas, such as, culture, politics, education, language, public service and law (Heryanto, 1999: 326). Heryanto also astutely points out that anti-Chinese feelings worked in the interests of the New Order regime. Dependence of the ethnic Chinese on state protection during the New Order made them unlikely to overthrow the state, and their dominance reduced the likelihood of the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie which might have more success in undermining the state. Anti-Chinese violence also deflected violence away from the government and on occasion provided opportunities for the New Order authorities to arrest potential dissidents among the protesting pribumis (Heryanto, 1998: 102, see also Heryanto 1999: 327).

**Anti-Capitalist Sentiments**

As well as a feeling of resentment that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were benefiting from close relationships with the élite, there is another problem which those in business have to contend with in Indonesia. Arief Budiman has pointed out that although Indonesia has adopted capitalism, at an ideological level the individualism and materialism which are inherent to this system are rejected in Pancasila. Wealth through capitalist means is not quite acceptable (Budiman, 1999b). As Joannes Riberu points out, the Pancasila economy fostered by Sukarno was based on “[a] communal spirit of solidarity and mutual co-operation” (Riberu, 1990: 171). Filomeno Aguilar provides a very interesting discussion of perceptions of ethnic Chinese business activity during this period. He asserts that Chinese wealth is considered morally questionable and stigmatised because of its basis in commerce. Pribumi who are wealthy are said to have “inherited” their wealth, whereas the Chinese extract theirs from the poor pribumi in dubious moral circumstances (Aguilar, 2001: 522).

Based on research carried out by Onghokham, Arief Budiman mentions a Javanese traditional belief that wealth for a person who is not part of the ruling élite, is believed to come from a tuyul, a spirit being who steals people’s possessions and money during the night (Budiman, 1999b). Aguilar suggests that based on this belief, looting Chinese property could be considered a legitimate way for the
people (rakyat) to reappropriate what is rightfully theirs (Aguilar, 2001: 523). Another observation made by Aguilar and Budiman is that during the New Order period, officials were perceived as innocent people who were corrupted by immoral Chinese. With pribumi in the role of the tempted, "in the final analysis this thinking absolves Suharto and his family of greed, corruption, and plunder. They merely succumbed to the 'deception' posed by monied Chinese". Some even suggest that Suharto himself might be part Chinese. This is the only way they can explain how he was capable of such deviousness (Aguilar, 2001: 525).

**Chinese Indonesian Opinion**

Although indigenous Indonesians were generally very suspicious of the ethnic Chinese and doubted their loyalty to Indonesia, the small amount of empirical research, carried out during the New Order period, showed that young Chinese Indonesians tended to feel loyalty towards Indonesia. A survey carried out by the magazine *Editor* in 1990 explored Chinese Indonesian views on Indonesia and China. According to the 129 17-25 year olds surveyed, 14.72 percent considered China to be their fatherland, wished to visit China regularly and maintain Chinese customs. 41.86 percent considered China to be their ancestral land but did not wish to visit China, and 43.41 considered China to be a foreign country. 93.79 percent regard Indonesia as their "real fatherland", 2.32 percent were unsure about this. Only 5.42 percent of respondents were still able to write and speak any form of Chinese. 35.65 percent understood some Chinese and the rest understood none (Suryadinata, 1997a: 17-18).

Thung Julan argues that young Chinese Indonesians have been adapting themselves to the official discourse that they should assimilate and lose their Chinese cultural identity. She concludes, however, that this does not lead them to feel more Indonesian. They are willing to assimilate but feel insecure as a result of the government policy which in the end means they are not fully accepted as

53 An "indigenous" interviewee of mine suggested this to me also.

54 This research was carried out prior to the normalisation of relations between Indonesia and China which had been suspended in 1967 and were resumed with a Memorandum of Understanding in 1990 (Tan, 1997: 36).
Indonesians either (Thung, 1998: 308). In research undertaken in Jakarta in 1998, she found that only one out of her eighteen ethnic Chinese respondents described themselves as “Indonesian”. Nine respondents described themselves according to their profession and social group, not according to an ethnic or national identity. For Thung this shows that they are losing their affiliation to Chinese culture but are not necessarily replacing this with an Indonesian identity (Thung, 1998: 142). As Thung stated, the “ideal model” for a good citizen during the New Order was to be, or to become, “non-Chinese”. She suggests that her research indicates that Chinese Indonesians have tended to comply with this rule (Thung 1998: 58).

**Nationhood and Chineseness At the End of the New Order**

By the end of the New Order, to use Ernest Gellner’s phrase, “entropy resistant characteristics” had been ensconsed in Indonesian society by the discourses surrounding nationhood and Chineseness. Officially it was not possible to be both culturally Chinese and Indonesian. Their culture was banned and they were strongly advised to assimilate. The perception that the ethnic Chinese were not genuinely Indonesian has been in circulation since ideas about an Indonesian nation were first formulated. It was also the case that as a result of the inability of the ethnic Chinese to fully assimilate, it was actually not possible to be both ethnic Chinese and Indonesian, even for those ethnic Chinese who lost all links with and knowledge of their ancestral culture.

During the New Order period there was what Ariel Heryanto has called an “erasure” of Chinese identity. (Heryanto, 1998: 104). Chinese business élites, had little political power and were dependent on state protection, therefore, they did not threaten the domination of Suharto and his governments. Essentialist ideas of the ethnic Chinese were promulgated. These stereotypes — that they were industrious, good at business, thrifty — led Chinese Indonesians to be branded as unpatriotic, selfish, and exclusive. This policy of favouring an ethnic Chinese business élite also deferred the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie (Heryanto, 1998: 102-103).
Filomeno Aguilar highlights the paradox which is at the core of the Chinese position in Indonesia. Because they are perceived as coming from outside the nation the ethnic Chinese:

have been consigned to a time that stood still because of the imagined irreconcilability of inside and outside... However,... the 'problem' is that the Chinese are fully imbricated with and historically inseparable from Indonesia: the orang Tionghoa and orang Cina are inexorably inside Indonesia (Aguilar, 2001: 517).

The New Order came to an end amid economic collapse and violence in 1998. In the next chapter I will outline the events which led to the dramatic fall of the regime and the violent aftermath. The violence was largely targetted at the ethnic Chinese and in chapter five I will also survey the ways the violence was reported in the national press. Since the press is one of the ways in which the discourse of national identity is promulgated, this analysis will help me to understand the position of the ethnic Chinese just prior to the establishment of the groups.
Chapter 5

1998: A Defining Year

According to Judith Bird 1998 “was one of those years in Indonesia’s history that stands out, like 1945 or 1966 in which momentus and tumultuous political changes take place with no defining clues as to whether the year would slip into disaster or end in hope” (Bird, 1999: 27). This chapter will begin with an outline of the events leading up to the fall of the Suharto regime on 21 May 1998. I will then discuss the violence during that month, which was largely targeted at the ethnic Chinese population. 1998 was a very significant year for Chinese Indonesians. Both the fall of Suharto and the violence of that year influenced some Chinese Indonesians to establish groups to look out for their interests. Within a national context, the events of that year enabled a space to develop in which Chinese Indonesians could articulate their hopes and desires for the future.

The End of the Suharto Regime

In 1997 financial crisis descended on East Asia. The first country to be hit was Thailand, but the contagion spread across the region and the Indonesian rupiah fell from 2,400 to the American dollar in November 1997 to 17,000 to the dollar in January 1998 (Wibowo, 2001: 129). In May 1998, as a pre-emptive strike before an IMF meeting on 4 May, which would decide whether to release funds to Indonesia, the government reduced fuel and electricity subsidies. They also increased the price of kerosene by 25 percent; the fuel used by poor people for cooking. Diesel increased in cost by 60 percent and petrol by 71 percent (Eklöf, 1999: 175-176). Before the crisis, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS, Biro Pusat Statistik), 22.5 million people, or 11.3 percent of the population
lived below the poverty line. The International Labour Organisation calculated that after the crisis that figure was expected to climb to 100 million people, or 48 percent of the population (cited Eklöf: 120).55

Suharto secured “re-election” in March 1998, however, students who had been demonstrating against his “re-election” did not halt their protests after this result. Nevertheless, Suharto went ahead and chose his cabinet. Eklöf views these appointments as the actions of a lonely president, who chose people not for their competence, but for their loyalty to him (Eklöf, 1999: 155). In this cabinet, for the first time in his 32 year rule, Suharto selected a Chinese Indonesian. The appointment of Bob Hasan was not a victory for Chinese Indonesians, however. Hasan, a timber baron, was one of Suharto’s crony businessmen. He was never active in the Chinese community and was not considered by the ethnic Chinese to be their representative (Suryadinata, 1998a: 109).

Suharto’s new cabinet only lasted a couple of months. He stepped down as President on 21 May 1998 after pressure from students, NGO activists, intellectuals and even his own cabinet, became too great (Eklöf, 1999: 210-213). Suharto’s vice-President, B.J. Habibie, took over control of the government and he took over a nation in crisis. Although he was despised by those calling for reform, due to his closeness to Suharto, Habibie surprisingly facilitated the holding of elections in 1999 and instigated a number of policies which liberalised the repressed society over which Suharto had presided. For example, Habibie permitted freedom of the press. Publication licences became easier to attain and government was not permitted to close down a newspaper or magazine because they disagreed with its content (Anwar, 2001: 9).56 Habibie also freed up the restrictions on political parties which led to the emergence of about 140 parties, 48 of which took part in the election of 1999 (Anwar, 2001: 9).

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55 Eklöf points out that the official numbers of those below the poverty line were low by international comparison, before the crisis, which may mean that the real number of people below the poverty line was higher before the crisis hit (Eklöf, 1999: 120 note 50).

56 Dewi Fortuna Anwar was personal advisor to Habibie during his time in office.
Violence Against the Ethnic Chinese

The commonly cited statistic that the ethnic Chinese, who made up about three percent of the population of Indonesia, controlled seventy percent of the wealth of the country, led them to be targeted with much of the blame for the economic catastrophe. Chinese Indonesians were also heavily criticised in the media and by the military and political elite for leaving the country in great numbers and taking vast sums of money with them; money which it was felt was badly needed for economic recovery. Their loyalty to Indonesia was questioned. For example, in January 1998, the commander of the armed forces called on the owners of the top thirteen conglomerates to bring their money back to Indonesia. He did not mention the word “Chinese” in his appeal, but it was well publicised that wealthy Chinese Indonesians had been leaving the country with vast sums of money (Human Rights Watch, 1998). In late January, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid referred to the ethnic Chinese as “rats” who had no sense of nationhood and who were taking away “the fruits of our national development” (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Suharto’s son-in-law and then head of the army Special Forces (Kopassus), Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, endorsed claims that the crisis had been caused by “the conglomerate group [and] their henchmen overseas” (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Suharto alluded to “certain business people” as responsible for the economic crisis which Stefan Eklöf asserts was a reference to the ethnic Chinese (Eklöf, 1999: 136).

On 13 to 15 May 1998 there was an outpouring of anger and violence towards the ethnic Chinese in a number of cities across Indonesia. The worst hit areas were Jakarta, Solo (Central Java) and Medan (North Sumatra), but there were also smaller scale riots in Surabaya in East Java and in Palembang and Bandar Lampung both in South Sumatra (Eklöf, 1999: 189-190). This violence involved looting and burning of Chinese shops and businesses. In their analysis of the Jakarta riots, The Volunteer Team for Humanity (TRUK, Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusian), one of the first NGOs on the scene, discovered a pattern in the way the violence was instigated. Local people reported that small groups of unknown, highly trained individuals came from outside the communities and instigated the violence. These groups were bused in to an area, shouted anti-Chinese slogans,
burned tyres, wood, and other goods to attract people to particular areas and encouraged the local people to join in looting of the shops, however, the instigators of the violence did not take part in the looting (TRUK, 22 May 1998). During his research James Siegel heard people say that the groups who instigated the violence “came in trucks and some had on [military] boots” suggesting that sections of the military, may have been involved in instigating the violence (Siegel, 1998: 81).

In Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya rape of ethnic Chinese women also occurred, and in some cases their torture and murder. The number of victims is still debated. In their final report the Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF, Timp Gabungan Pencari Fakta) verified sixty-four cases of rape and nine cases of other sexual violence or torture (Eklöf, 1999: 187-188). These figures are in contrast to those in an earlier version of the documentation given to me by TRUK, one of the groups involved in the Joint Fact Finding Team. They cited the number of rapes in Jakarta, Solo, Medan, Palembang and Surabaya as 168 (TRUK, 13 July 1998). TRUK also cited a larger number of dead than government estimates. TRUK’s figure of 1,190 dead was more likely than the governments 288, because bodies had already been removed for burial before the government investigation began (Eklöf, 1999: 187 note 19). Most of the material damage to property and also the rapes were suffered by Chinese Indonesians. Some public property including buses, a refuse truck and two motorway toll booths were set on fire. It is wrong to assume, however, that all the victims were Chinese Indonesians. In their report TRUK writes that local people took advantage of the situation “to have what is normally beyond their buying capabilities” and 1,200 non-Chinese who became trapped in the burning buildings also lost their lives. (TRUK, 9 June 1998). 58

57 TRUK was established after the shooting of four students at Trisakti University during a peaceful protest on 12 May 1998. TRUK’s role at first was to provide medical assistance but they saw a need for people to gather evidence and information about atrocities which occurred so they turned to evidence gathering (interview with Sandyawan, September 2000).

58 There was criticism at the time that all the attention was focused on the ethnic Chinese victims, while the non-Chinese victims were not reported in the media, either in Indonesia or outside the country. As a result the violence in May 1998 became synonymous with “anti-Chinese violence” (Purdey, July 2000: 1). Fr. Sandyawan related to me his dismay with the UN because they “only concentrated on the rape cases [and] did not broach the substantial case which was organised state violence” (interview, 13 September 2000).
Sofyan Wanandi has written that attacks on Chinese-Indonesians and their property was not new but “this time the situation is different. Never before have they felt so totally hopeless and unprotected. There is a widespread feeling that the Government has allowed this to happen and even that some sections of the Government were behind the campaigns targeting Chinese-Indonesians” (cited Mann 1999: 187). Ariel Heryanto suggests that the violence at this time was driven by a number of factors including feelings of economic inequality, political manipulation and racial hatred (Heryanto, 1999: 310).

There is no doubt that people did take advantage of the chaotic situation in order to have things which would normally be beyond their reach. Children and young people who went to look at the spectacle became caught up in the violence (see TRUK 9 June 1998). However, Ariel Heryanto rejects the suggestion that the violence was a spontaneous reaction against the perceived wealth of the ethnic Chinese. He does not wish to deny that there is racial antagonism and economic discrepancies, rather, he questions the links which are too often made between the violence in 1998 and the economic crisis (Heryanto, 1999: 315). He argues that blaming “an imagined collective mass” of urban poor, who have no power to refute such claims, provides some sort or rationalisation and even justification for the violence, and also exonerates the real culprits, Suharto and those close to him. Heryanto also suggests that this explanation does not make clear why violence did not take place in other cities like Semarang, Surabaya or Yogyakarta, each of which have large ethnic Chinese populations and large industrial bases. It also does not explain why the most intense violence outside Jakarta took place in Solo, where the ethnic Chinese population had been considered well integrated into the local communities and economic discrepancies were not as great as in other cities (Heryanto, 1999: 314-315).

TRUK highlighted the very systematic way in which the violence developed. A number of things led them to the conclusion that the violence was orchestrated. The leader of the organisation, Fr. Sandyawan Sumardi related to me that “the violence was very systematic. The military and the political and economic elite were involved. These groups used the ordinary people as a field of conflict and blamed the conflict on the ordinary people” (interview, September 2000). At a
presentation before parliament in Washington, Fr. Sandyawan, stated that the riots were inseparable from the power struggle which had intensified in the days leading up to the violence. The aim of the riots was to cause chaos so that military rule would be justified (Ocorandi, 1998). Because the main aim was to cause chaos and halt any chance of student demands for reform being realised, Fr. Sandyawan stated that the riots were not racist in nature. This caused some discontent among those who were concerned about the fate of the ethnic Chinese. However, Fr. Sandyawan has also argued that in order to carry out their plan the élites in the power struggle took advantage of the increasingly anti-Chinese atmosphere and the scapegoating of ethnic Chinese in the wake of the financial crisis, by targeting Chinese-owned businesses. (Ocorandi, 1998, see also Ocorandi’s interview with Fr. Sandyawan, 21 June 1998). In the case of the rape of ethnic Chinese women, Fr. Sandyawan told me that “the Chinese women were chosen because the government wanted to make it look like a racial problem” (interview, September 2000).

In its final report on the violence in 1998 TGPF, stated that the violence was organised at “the level of the highest decision-making people”, which implies that Suharto was involved (cited in Eklöf 1999: 195). However, the team were unable to present concrete evidence about who organised the riots and whether there were connections between the violence which occurred in various cities across the country. Therefore, they stopped short of concluding that the violence had been orchestrated as part of a national plan. In the case of the rapes, both TRUK and Ariel Heryanto argue that the rapes were more likely to have been carried out by members of the military rather than by members of the public (Heryanto, 1999: 317; TRUK, 13 July 1998).

Although the evidence suggests that this violence was state orchestrated, the fact that the authorities were able to tap into anti-Chinese feelings among the population highlights the racial antagonism felt by the people towards the ethnic Chinese. Jen Ang suggests that “Indonesia is an intensely racialised social formation, in which the Chinese/Pribumi distinction is generally read in terms of economic advantage/disadvantage. In other words, ‘Chineseness’ in contemporary Indonesia does not denote primarily cultural identities, but economic identities”
In order to explore further the discourses of Chineseness in Indonesian society at this time, the next section will analyse how the national press reported the violence against the ethnic Chinese in 1998.

**Reproducing Ethnic Chinese Discourses**

As mentioned in chapter two, the press is one of the methods through which societal discourses are channeled. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out the newspaper is a very important tool in the “re-production” of the nation. He argues that the newspaper is a “technical means of ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson, 1991: 25). Michael Billig also acknowledges the importance of newspapers in his analysis of “banal nationalism”: the daily “flagging” of the nation in the lives of its citizens (Billig, 1995: 6). Arus Yumul and Umut Özkirimli use Billig’s idea to explore the flagging of the Turkish nation in thirty eight daily newspapers. They quote John Hartley who argues that the national press “presents a ‘consensual model’ of society which ‘requires the notion of unity: one nation, one people, one society, often simply translated into ours - our industry, our economy, our nuclear deterrent, police force, balance of payments, etc.” (Yumul and Özkirimli, 2000: 792).

This section surveys articles from eight national newspapers between May and December 1998. I am interested in the language used in the articles when discussing the ethnic Chinese. The articles reveal attitudes of the journalists, military, government, business elite plus ethnic Chinese themselves, mainly members of the newly emerging groups. An image of the ethnic Chinese is being presented to reinforce the idea that they actually have brought their problems upon themselves because they cannot be bothered to fully assimilate, thereby perpetuating the myth about Chinese Indonesians.

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59 Billig argues that in the West it is generally believed that nationalism is not as prevalent as it is in some of the less stable parts of the world. He refutes this claim and explores how the nation is “flagged” in a banal (but not necessarily benign) way in the print media in Britain.

60 The eight newspapers I have used are Bisnis Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, Kompas, Media Indonesia, Merdeka, Republika, Suara Karya and Suara Pembaruan. According to Idris and
Although in 1998 the violence against the ethnic Chinese was discussed in the press and questions were raised about why it happened, and how it might be prevented in future, two inter-linked discourses dominated the newspaper articles. Firstly, Chinese Indonesians were still portrayed as not genuinely part of the nation. Secondly, because they were not considered an inherent part of the nation, they constituted a problem, which was only solved when the ethnic Chinese assimilated into the “indigenous” population. In the following section I will explore some of the ways in which the newspapers articulated these two themes.

**Distinctions on Economic Grounds**

Siauw Tiong Djin writes about the difference in meaning between the words *pembauran* and *assimilasi*, both of which are translated into English as “assimilation”. According to Siauw, *pembauran* means a less rigid form of assimilation than *assimilasi*. *Pembauran* does not ensure that an ethnic group must “lose the characteristics of its ethnicity”, rather, it urges “association with the people in a society” rather than intermarriage in order to disappear into the people (Siauw, 1998: 27). The newspapers which I analyse in this section use both terms interchangeably, and none of them make a distinction between the two types of integration. As the previous chapter indicated, during the New Order period the ethnic Chinese were expected to lose their Chinese cultural identity and assimilate into their local population. Therefore, although the word *pembauran* was used during this time, it had a stronger connotation than Siauw’s understanding. The ethnic Chinese did indeed have to lose the characteristics of their ethnicity.61

Len Ang’s suggestion that the distinction between Chinese and *Pribumi* in Indonesia tends to be in terms of economic advantage/disadvantage is evident in the newspaper articles I have analysed. Perhaps this also stems from New Order policy towards them. Since they were not permitted to openly display their Chinese culture during the New Order period, the ways in which they are

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61 I will return to Siauw’s understanding of the terms *pembauran* and *assimilasi* again in chapter eight. The ethnic Chinese groups, who also discuss assimilation, do seem to be making the distinction between *pembauran* and *assimilasi*. 

Gunaratne there were twenty national dailies in circulation in 1998 (Idris and Gunaratne, 2000: 274).
criticised are based on economic rather than cultural differences. Again and again the ethnic Chinese are portrayed as wealthy compared to poverty stricken indigenous Indonesians. The statistic that the ethnic Chinese who make up three percent of the population own seventy percent of the wealth of the country was mentioned in a number of articles (see *Merdeka*, 22 May 1998; *Republika* 14 June 1998; *Bisnis Indonesia*, 4 July 1998; *Jakarta Post*, 29 July 1998; *Merdeka* 29 September 1998). Their involvement in KKN (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) in order to maintain their privileged position is also mentioned (*Republika*, 6 June 1998; *Media Indonesia*, 7 June 1998; *Merdeka*, 11 June 1998; *Republika* 14 June 1998, ). Those who fled Indonesia are urged to return and bring their money with them, in order to help rebuild the economy. Many articles concentrated on the numbers of ethnic Chinese who fled the country during this period. The occupancy rate of hotels in Singapore was said to be one hundred percent with prices in the range of ninety-seven US dollars per night, a prohibitive amount for most Indonesians (*Merdeka*, 23 May 1998). An article in *The Jakarta Post* has the title “Ethnic Chinese at the Ready for Quick Escape” perhaps suggesting that Chinese Indonesians are not loyal, although the article also included Chinese Indonesians whose property had been destroyed declaring their love for Indonesia (*Jakarta Post*, 13 June 1998).

In order to show that they are genuinely Indonesian, Chinese Indonesians writing in the media use an economic argument also, explaining that they are not all wealthy. The badminton star, Rudy Hartono, who is of ethnic Chinese descent, stated that Chinese Indonesians feel horrified by the size of the businesses of Liem Sioe Liong and other conglomerate owners (*Republika*, 6 June 1998). William Soeryadjaya, chairman of Astra Group, stated that all ethnic Chinese are not like the tycoon Liem Sioe Liong. Rather, there are many who are poor and who are still in Indonesia; they did not flee abroad (*Merdeka*, 23 June 1998; see also *Media Indonesia*, 1998; *Merdeka*, 1 August 1998). The leaders of the organisation Persabai, an organisation established in 1997 in order to gather together Chinese Indonesian Muslims, urged all “Indonesian citizens of foreign descent, especially the ethnic Chinese” (*warga negara Indonesia keturunan asing, terutama keturunan Cina*) to remain in solidarity with the nation and not flee abroad. This organisation goes on to explain that the reason for the violence is frustration
among people at the wealth of the ethnic Chinese and an inability to channel this frustration through political means (Media Indonesia, 21 May 1998).

A poor ethnic Chinese living in Jakarta states that Chinese Indonesians should not live in exclusive areas, rather they should assimilate and then the situation would be more peaceful (Hidup berbaur dengan masyarakat jauh lebih aman) (Media Indonesia: 7 July 1998b). In this article the lack of assimilation is associated with wealth. The wealthy Indonesians who live in exclusive areas of the city are considered to have assimilated less successfully than poor Chinese Indonesians such as himself. Interestingly, this poor ethnic Chinese who is calling for more assimilation has kept his Chinese name, Liang Gun Heng. During the New Order Chinese Indonesians were encouraged to take Indonesian sounding names in order to show an affiliation with Indonesia. Liang explains that one’s name is given by one’s parents and that it is therefore disrespectful to change it. Liang also states that he does not believe that a person’s name is the main problem. Another ethnic Chinese explained that during the violence of 1998 the poor Chinese of his area were not attacked because they were one with the non-Chinese of the area. He goes on to suggest that assimilation may be limited by social class (Merdeka, 1 August, 1998).

**Ethnic Chinese Must Make the Effort**

Having illustrated some of the ways in which the ethnic Chinese are distinguished from the non-Chinese Indonesians, this section will depict how the onus falls on the ethnic Chinese to make efforts to assimilate in order to be fully accepted as part of the nation. Although there is some acceptance that there is discrimination against ethnic Chinese, it is up to Chinese Indonesians to change their behaviour. One article suggests that restrictions on Chinese in government, the civil service, and at state universities should be lifted so that they can assimilate. If they are permitted to join politics and the civil service and the military, their outlook will be opened up. They will not just live for business, but they will also care about the nation (Media Indonesia, 4 July 1998). Also, when government officials admitted that some administrative practices — such as the distinguishing mark on the identity card, and the need for ethnic Chinese to apply for a citizenship certificate
— discriminated against the ethnic Chinese, the acknowledgement was couched in demands that Chinese Indonesians also make efforts to assimilate. A government official stated that “if the ethnic Chinese do not change their attitude and assimilate, the pribumi who discriminate against them will not be entirely to blame” (Merdeka, 30 June 1998).

Non-Chinese Indonesians writing in the newspapers tend to blame the ethnic Chinese for the problems between Chinese and non-Chinese. For example, the non-Chinese psychologist, Djamaludin Ancok, suggested that a segment of the ethnic Chinese population, who own enterprises, are to blame for the problems and are so numerous it is hard to avoid them (Media Indonesia, 7 June 1998). The article suggests that research into relations between Chinese and non-Chinese carried out twenty years ago is still relevant. In fact the article argues that Chinese Indonesians have become more exclusive, for example they go to America to study and attend schools especially for ethnic Chinese (Media Indonesia: 7 June 1998). Ramadhian Adi Broto suggests that “citizens of Chinese descent need to strengthen their affiliation” with Indonesia. He states that attitudes such as friendliness (bersahabat), group orientation (berkelompok), working together (bekerja sama) and caring for other people (peduli kepada orang lain) all aid assimilation (Bisnis Indonesia, 7 June 1998). At a symposium held in June 1998 and attended by Amien Rais one of the speakers suggested that, with Chinese Indonesian inclusion in politics and the opening up of avenues outside the business sector, it was hoped that they would end their collusion with the government (Suara Karya, 8 June 1998). On another occasion a Muslim leader, Kiyai Hasyim, stated that ethnic Chinese who had a higher standard of living than non-Chinese held themselves back from the community. Racism was not just the fault of the non-Chinese, according to Kiyai Hasyim, ethnic Chinese businesses preferred to hire Chinese Indonesians (Suara Pembaruan). Another article states that Chinese Indonesians who marry non-Chinese tend to be banished from their families (Bisnis Indonesia, 10 June 1998). The governor of Jakarta urges the ethnic Chinese to assimilate by not living in exclusive areas because this causes jealousy and outbreaks of violence (Kompas, 27 June 1998).
In almost all the articles which express some sympathy with Chinese Indonesians for the violence they suffered, there are also calls that they make more effort to assimilate. In 1998 the then Minister for Justice, Muladi, said that the government was willing to ratify the international convention against racial discrimination and the convention against torture, but that the ethnic Chinese must make an effort to assimilate (membaur) and to lose their exclusive tendencies (Kompas, 12 June 1998, Bisnis Indonesia, 13 June 1998). The governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, apologised to the ethnic Chinese for the violence of May 1998, but went on in the next sentence to instruct (berpesan) Chinese Indonesians to assimilate fully. He particularly insisted that they live in areas which were not exclusively inhabited by other ethnic Chinese (Kompas, 27 June 1998). The Co-ordinating Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry of the time, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, stated that the government was very sad at the devastation suffered by the ethnic Chinese and he assured them that they were an integral part of the nation. On the other hand, he said that no government help would be available for the ethnic Chinese who had to re-build their businesses because funds were very scarce. Anyhow, Ginandjar went on, the ethnic Chinese did not need help. He stated that they had suffered this kind of violence before and overcame it because they have a network (jaringan). This network means that they can look after themselves (Suara Pembaruan, 1 June 1998). He also echoed what Bambang Wiyogo, the leader of Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia (Hipmi, The Association of Young Indonesian Entrepreneurs) had urged, that is the return of those who fled the country along with the money they have taken. Like Wiyogo, Ginandjar argued that because they made their money in Indonesia, with many benefits from the Indonesian government, ethnic Chinese were obliged to bring the money back to Indonesia (Suara Pembaruan, 1 June 1998). There is a sense that the ethnic Chinese are viewed as not really loyal to Indonesia because they have fled with lots of money, which is needed for economic redevelopment. It also implies that those Chinese Indonesians who have left did not really deserve this money, rather, they have cheated the “real” Indonesians out of it. Another government minister, Muladi, stated that he would introduce legislation to protect ethnic Chinese from

62 In this article pembauran and asimilasi are used interchangeably.
racial discrimination, however, they would have to be less exclusive in their behaviour \textit{(Bisnis Indonesia, 13 June 1998)}. These kinds of comments lead to what might be considered an explanation or even a justification for the violence against the ethnic Chinese.

According to the majority of the articles, it is very much the responsibility of the ethnic Chinese to take the initiative in trying to assimilate. In one article it is explained that since the \textit{pribumi} have accepted the ethnic Chinese \textit{(sudah menerima mereka)} as citizens since they first arrived on the archipelago, so it is now up to the ethnic Chinese to start assimilating \textit{(Merdeka, 30 June 1998, see also Bisnis Indonesia, 7 June 1998)}. Yunus Yahya cites an anecdote expressed by Mohammad Hatta\textsuperscript{63} that if there is a gap of 100 metres between an ethnic Chinese and a non-Chinese Indonesian, then the ethnic Chinese must quickly close the gap, not the "indigenous" Indonesian \textit{(Merdeka, 12 August 1998)}. It is clear that although the non-Chinese are encouraged to be more accepting of ethnic Chinese who do endeavour to assimilate, the onus is on the ethnic Chinese to make most of the effort in initiating the assimilation process.

Surprisingly, perhaps, calls in the media for the ethnic Chinese to assimilate by becoming Muslim are not in evidence. This highlights the complexity of the concept of assimilation in Indonesia and also the difficulty for the ethnic Chinese who might feel fully assimilated but might still have attributes which some consider non-Indonesian. Different people highlight different means by which assimilation might take place. Despite these differences of emphasis, however, the main discourse is that the ethnic Chinese must assimilate more successfully into Indonesian society.

\textbf{Stigmatised as Outsiders}

The outsider status of the ethnic Chinese is also reinforced by emphasising that they originally came from outside the archipelago. A discussion about the history of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was entitled \textit{"Mereka yang Datang dari Utara"} (Those Who Have Come from the North), even though the article acknowledges

\textsuperscript{63} Mohammad Hatta was vice President of Indonesia after Independence was won from the Dutch in 1948.
that Chinese have been coming to Indonesia for centuries. In fact the article stated that they have been arriving in Indonesia since long before the kingdom of Sriwijaya was established in the sixth century. Despite this their arrival from outside the archipelago was still highlighted in the title of the article (Media Indonesia, 7 July 1998a).

Highlighting their “Chineseness” also raised questions about their genuineness as Indonesians. For example, in an otherwise quite sympathetic interview with some people who fled to Hong Kong after the violence in May, the people’s Chinese names were included along with their Indonesian names, even though they no longer used the names or spoke any Chinese (Merdeka, 27 May 1998). In a discussion about the business practices of Chinese Indonesians, their hardworking, diligent behaviour, and their perceived tendency to trust only their close family and friends, was said to stem from their Confucian heritage (Bisnis Indonesia, 10 June 1998).

The terms used to describe the ethnic Chinese also reinforces the idea that they are not really authentic Indonesians, which means that their presence in Indonesia constitutes a problem. A distinction is still made between ethnic Chinese who are citizens and indigenous citizens. The most common term used to describe Chinese-Indonesians at this time was non-pribumi (non-native). Another term used to distinguish them from “indigenous” Indonesians is WNI keturunan (Indonesian citizens of foreign descent). As discussed in the previous chapter, this phrase has a contrived, legalistic tone and the phrase “Indonesian citizen” (WNI, Warga Negara Indonesia) is not used to describe “indigenous” Indonesians.

The way the ethnic Chinese were represented in the newspapers followed the pattern of urging them to become more Indonesian by overcoming the anti-Chinese stereotypes, such as living in less exclusive areas, caring about something other than money, and genuinely showing loyalty to Indonesia. Even when articles were sympathetic to Chinese Indonesians who had suffered during the violence, they also took a rather defensive attitude, urging ethnic Chinese to behave more appropriately and they would not suffer abuse. Despite this rather negative reporting, there were also positive outcomes, one of which was that Chinese Indonesians themselves began to have a voice in the national media, as the next
section describes. Although these voices urged Chinese Indonesians to act in ways which did not anger the non-Chinese, they also began to argue that Chinese Indonesians should be treated like any other ethnic group in Indonesia, and that their cultural heritage should be accepted.

**Chinese Indonesian Voices**

Teun Van Dijk argues that it is common for minorities living in specific nations to be voiceless in the media. They tend to be reliant on the voices of supporters (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 173). In Indonesia in 1998 the ethnic Chinese were not voiceless any more. Some of their voices were heard through groups such as those I have investigated in this research. However, in many ways the ethnic Chinese writing in the media, and those who spoke to journalists, illustrated how they had internalised the anti-Chinese discourses. For example, they called on the ethnic Chinese to be less exclusive, to use their money to help Indonesia, and to declare their loyalty to Indonesia. Stuart Hall discusses a similar phenomenon in an essay entitled “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”. In a discussion of diaspora Caribbean representations of their cultural identity, Hall states that in a person’s cultural identity there is an awareness of difference as well as an awareness of similarity with others. He suggests as well as being constructed as different in Edward Said’s “‘Orientalist’ sense” there is also an internalisation among those classified as “other” so that they too conform to this norm (Hall, 1993: 394-395).

Throughout the newspapers I examined ethnic Chinese also use the rhetoric of the stereotypes in their appeals for calm. For example, in an article appealing to ethnic Chinese not to leave the country they are called on to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their fellow Indonesians to solve the economic and social problems (bersama-sama turut bahu-membahu memperbaiki krisis yang kita alami bersama-sama) (Media Indonesia, 21 May 1998). The badminton champion Rudy Hartono, who is of ethnic Chinese descent, called on Chinese Indonesians not to lose heart after the riots of 1998, and to continue to give service to the country (Mari kita terus memberi darma bakti pada negeri ini) (Republika, 6 June 1998). In both these examples they are trying to show that there are ethnic Chinese who care about the country and want to stay to re-build it.
Another way in which the ethnic Chinese showed that they were loyal Indonesians was to declare their love for Indonesia in a very forthright manner in the articles. This necessity is probably linked to the discourse of "assimilation" in that the pressure is on Chinese Indonesians to prove that they are true Indonesians. One individual who fled to Hong Kong, for example, said that Indonesia was still his homeland, he was born and grew up there and would return. In an article entitled "Citizens of Foreign Descent Genuinely Love Indonesia" (Warga Keturunan itu Sejatinya Begitu Cinta Indonesia) a staff journalist from the magazine Asiaweek who is based in Hong Kong, and is Chinese Indonesian, declared that he felt just like a pribumi. He speaks Indonesian with his family, passionately loves Indonesia, from the culture and natural beauty to the political system, and he feels that China is just like any foreign country and does not hold a special place in his heart (Republika, 28 May 1998a). A second article in Republika on 28 May about the Chinese Indonesians who had fled the country was entitled, "I Still Love Indonesia" (Saya Masih Cinta Indonesia). This victim said that "rain of stones in your own country is better than golden rain in a foreign one" (Republika, 28 May 1998b). Another Chinese Indonesian who fled abroad said that Indonesia was still his homeland (tanah air), that he was born there and grew up there and would return when the situation became calmer (Merdeka, 27 May 1998). Another Chinese Indonesian says that she has lots of Pribumi friends and so feels very lucky (Bisnis Indonesia, 7 June 1998). A man whose shop was destroyed during the riots in 1998, and whose father and grandfather also had businesses destroyed in riots in 1990 and 1947, still insists that "[Indonesia] is also our country. We were all born and grew up here" (The Jakarta Post, 11 June 1998). The Chinese Indonesian leader of the organisation Parpindo (Indonesian Assimilation Party), Jusuf Hamka, stated that "we love peace, and love and care for all the people of Indonesia. Although we are citizens of foreign descent we were born here and wish to die in Indonesia" (Merdeka, 11 June 1998). In August Chinese Indonesians performed wayang in Jakarta. According to one of those involved in the production, Dandoel, the aim was to show that the ethnic Chinese were not just close to Chinese culture. He stated that Chinese Indonesians have been in

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64 Wayang is the Javanese tradition of telling stories using leather or wooden puppets.
Indonesia a long time and they feel that Indonesia is the country of their ancestors, therefore, the culture of Indonesia is understood and loved by them (Merdeka, 21 August 1998).

Many seminars organised by NGOs, intellectuals and members of the new Chinese Indonesian groups were held to discuss the difficulties between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese after the violence. Although “assimilation” was still central to the discussions, the meaning of the term became more unclear and more open to interpretation. For example, the cultural observer, Ignas Kleden, said that there needed to be assimilation in various sectors which had not been possible up to now, such as politics, the economy as well as culture. In other words, he said, everybody should have the same opportunity to express themselves in the political, economic and cultural sectors. Kleden seems to be suggesting that all the ethnic groups in Indonesia, including the ethnic Chinese, should have the freedom to express their ethnic heritage and to feel they belong to the nation (Suara Pembaruan, 29 June 1998). Kwik Kian Gie also follows this line of argument (Media Indonesia, 4 July 1998). In a seminar entitled, “The Problem of Indigenous and non-Indigenous at this Time” (Masalah Pri dan Non-Pri Dewasa Ini) the social commentator Nurcholish Madjid said that diversity should be accepted as a national asset (Kompas, 25 June 1998; see also Republika, 29 July 1998; Media Indonesia, 4 July 1998; Merdeka 24 August 1998; Media Indonesia 24 August 1998). This fits more with Siauw Tiong Djin’s understanding of the term pembauran which I mentioned above.

The press in 1998 in some ways continued to articulate discourses which strongly encouraged the ethnic Chinese to assimilate completely into Indonesian society, and although sympathy was expressed in the press for the violence which was perpetrated against them, their exclusive behaviour and lack of loyalty to Indonesia was also highlighted as possible reasons for the violence. However, changes also seemed to be happening in the portrayal of Chinese Indonesians. These changes were particularly evident in the opportunity which Chinese Indonesians had to voice their opinions about what had happened and what should happen in the future. Seminars and conferences were organised in which people discussed the racial problems in Indonesia and these were reported in the press.
This would have been unheard of under the New Order rules on SARA. (see *The Jakarta Post*, 29 June 1998; *Suara Pembaruan*, 29 June 1998; *Media Indonesia*, 4 July 1998). Chinese Indonesians started to speak out more forcefully about the problems they faced. For example, at a seminar in August 1998 a conference heard how the ethnic Chinese feel like visitors in Indonesia (*Suara Karya*, 8 August 1998). There also started to be discussion about stopping the use of *pri* and non-*pri*, and changing some of the regulations which affected Chinese Indonesians, such as, the mark on the identity card which allowed the authorities to know who was ethnic Chinese (see *Bisnis Indonesia*, 29 June 1998, *The Jakarta Post*, 30 June 1998; *Kompas*, 24 July 1998; *Suara Karya*, 19 October 1998).

After the violence of 1998 and the fall of the New Order regime it became clear that people were calling for radical changes in the political structure of the country. According to Siauw Tiong Djin, of all the reforms that needed to be introduced, many related to the policies towards minorities, particularly the Chinese minority (Siauw, 1998: 7). This was important according to Siauw because racism against the ethnic Chinese dampened their spirits and led to corruption, collusion and nepotism. It also undermined Indonesia’s reputation as a modern nation which upheld acceptable standards of human rights (Siauw, 1998: 8). To have the ethnic Chinese integrated or assimilated (*terintegrasi/terbaur*) into the body of the nation was Siauw’s hope at the start of the reform process (Siauw, 1998: 8).

In the rest of this thesis I will explore what some Chinese Indonesians did with the more accommodating space which opened up within Indonesian society after the demise of the New Order regime. In the next chapter I will introduce eleven of the Chinese Indonesian groups which developed out of the chaos and violence of 1998. It is difficult to over-emphasise how radical their activities were, given the ban on Chinese culture which had been in place for over thirty-two years. As is evident from the newspapers at this time, they began to voice their concerns and their hopes for the future, particularly their hope that Chinese Indonesians would be accepted as a genuine, loyal Indonesian ethnic group. The significance of 1998 for the Chinese Indonesians I interviewed is that the violence highlighted for them the vulnerable position they were in. Within the more open space which emerged
after the violence these people decided that it was time for Chinese Indonesians to speak out and look after themselves.
Chapter 6

Chinese Organisations in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Chapters four and five have provided the context within which the groups emerged. After the fall of the New Order regime, a very new situation developed because for the first time in thirty-two years Chinese Indonesians were organising themselves as Chinese and gathering with other ethnic Chinese to demand changes to the way they were treated. Not all ethnic Chinese engaged in this way with the reform movement. There were some who were acting individually and joined political parties, and non-governmental organisations. There are also ethnic Chinese who are not involved at all. The groups I am looking at are significant because for the first time in thirty-two years they are dealing mainly with issues relating to Chinese Indonesians.

This chapter will introduce eleven Chinese Indonesian groups which were established in 1998. My categorisation of the organisations is based on a list produced by The Indonesian Chinese Social Association (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia, hereafter PSMTI), one of the organisations which will be examined in this research. They have divided the groups into non-governmental organisations, religious associations, and political parties (PSMTI, 2001). During the fieldwork it became clear that there is a division within the non-governmental organisations category between those which concentrate on social and cultural issues, and others which campaign on anti-discrimination issues. Therefore, in this research the non-governmental organisations have been divided into “social-cultural groups” and “anti-discrimination groups”.
Actually, I would argue that despite the categorisation, all these organisations are broadly political, although some of the groups told me that they are trying to stay out of politics. In this regard I agree with Jenny Chapman who argues that “[p]olitics is about all decisions that shape our lives, not only those made in a restricted arena conventionally defined as ‘politics’” (Chapman, 1995: 100).

My aim was to meet with members from at least one group in each of the four categories of organisation. In total I spoke to representatives from six out of ten NGOs (both social-cultural and anti-discrimination groups), three out of four political parties, and two out of four religious organisations.

Non-Government Organisations: Social-Cultural Groups

*Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia*

*The Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI)*

PSMTI was one of the first Chinese Indonesian organisations to be established after the violence of May 1998. It was set up by a former Brigadier General, Tedy Jusuf, on 28 September 1998. *Marga* in Indonesian means “family name” and this association developed out of Chinese family name groups in Jakarta. Primarily, PSMTI developed out of the *Rumah Abu* (Ash Houses) in Jakarta. Ash Houses are places where Chinese Indonesians have traditionally brought the ashes of family members who have passed away. In Ash Houses candles are lit, photos of the deceased family members are placed on the walls, and family members visit to honour their relatives. The Ash Houses are organised by family name, and 69

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65 The numbers I provide are based on the list given to me by PSMTI and my own knowledge of the organisations. There may be other groups that I am not aware of.

66 The non-governmental organisations I did not meet with are *Forum Komunikasi Sarjana Tionghoa Indonesia* (Communication Forum of Chinese Indonesian Scholars), *Yayasan Lestari Kebudayaan Tionghoa Indonesia* (Foundation for the Preservation of Chinese Indonesian Culture), *Paguyuban Banlam Indonesia* and *Badan Koordinasi Antar Alumni se Jakarta* (The Coordinating Body of Alumni of Jakarta).

67 The political party I did not meet with was *Partai Buddhis Demokrat Indonesia* (The Democratic Buddhist Party of Indonesia).

68 The religious organisations I did not meet with were *Dewan Pengurus Pusat Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia* (Walubi. Central Committee of Buddhist Leaders of Indonesia), and *Paguyuban Umat Tao Indonesia* (Puti, Association of Taoist Leaders of Indonesia).
family names are represented by an Ash House in Jakarta (PSMTI, 2000a). The original declaration of PSMTI was signed by 88 individuals who represented different Chinese family name groups. They now have branches of the organisation in more than forty districts throughout Indonesia.

The functions (fungsi) and aims (tujuan) of the organisation are set out in *Anggaran Dasar, Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Program Kerja 2000-2003* (Statutes, Rules of Association, and Programme of Action 2000-2003). The functions as stated in the statutes are, to co-ordinate and channel the aspirations of the members of the organisation, to facilitate communication between the members, and between members and other groups (PSMTI, 2000b: 17). They have very broad aims, the first of which is to play an active part in all aspects of the development of Indonesia, and to strive for justice and prosperity for the people. Secondly, they wish to bring about integration in Indonesia in accordance with the Youth Oath (*Sumpah Pemuda*) of 1928 and the concept of “Plurality but Unity” (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*). Finally they aim to ensure that human rights are protected, especially those of the ethnic Chinese (PSMTI, 2000b: 17).

PSMTI established itself as an organisation in which only Chinese Indonesians could become full members. Non-Chinese Indonesians who are family members (husbands, wives, children) or are closely involved with issues relating to Chinese Indonesians may become honorary members (PSMTI, 2000b). PSMTI is the only organisation established since 1998 which does not permit non-Chinese to become full members. Tedy Jusuf explained to me that “in Indonesia all ethnic groups have such organisations so the Chinese should too” (interview, April 2001). Another member, Ernawati Sugondo, explained that “before May 1998 there was no organisation where the Chinese could go to ask questions or voice their aspirations. There has been discrimination against the Chinese and now this organisation lobbies the government on behalf of the ethnic Chinese to get rid of discrimination” (interview, May 2001).

Aspects of PSMTI policy, including the ban on non-Chinese members, caused a large number of the original members to leave the organisation. According to Tedy Jusuf, 90 percent of the members left at one point. Despite this setback Jusuf claimed to have rebuilt the organisation and said there are branches in 40 districts

*Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa*

*The Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI)*

INTI was established on 5 February 1999 in Jakarta (INTI, 1999a: 2). The General Chairman of the organisation is Eddie Lembong, the owner of the pharmaceutical company PT Pharos Indonesia. He explained to me that:

INTI was declared on 10 April 1999. It is not a political party and I specifically did not want it to be mistaken for one so I called it a *perhimpunan* (association). INTI is a mass social organisation. We want all Chinese Indonesians to become members of INTI. But, very importantly, it is not only for the ethnic Chinese (interview, 4 April 2001).

The purpose of INTI, according to Eddie Lembong, is to solve the “Chinese problem” (interview, April 2001). According to Lembong, “this problem is a historical product, in other words, INTI do not perceive the problem to have been caused by the ethnic Chinese, nor by other people. It is part of the history and heritage we have inherited” (interview, April 2001).

The stated aims of the organisation are: to defend and build upon the philosophy of *Pancasila*, to educate people about the positive side of pluralism and to emphasise that everybody is equal in the eyes of God, to implement the historical mission of the nation of Indonesia, that is, to develop a nation which is prosperous and just, and finally, to help develop a modern culture which will prepare Indonesia for the twenty-first century (INTI, 1999a: 3). As with PSMTI, these are very broad, vague aims and there are various different departments within the organisation each of which has a specific part to play in fulfilling them. INTI’s aims are also very ambitious and long-term. The Education Department, for example, aims to build new schools and improve schools which have a low standard of education. In the long term they hope to build academies and universities, establish public libraries and provide scholarships to students who cannot afford to continue their education (INTI, 1999b: 3-4). The Legal Department aims to provide legal aid to all members of the organisation, to fight to eliminate all types of discriminatory laws, and recruit lawyers to work for the
organisation full-time (INTI, 1999b: 4). The Art and Culture Department hopes to encourage the development of the culture and traditions of all the ethnic groups in Indonesia, including those of the ethnic Chinese. They also hope to establish schools of dance and art (INTI, 1999b: 5).

Members of these two social-cultural organisations tend to be older people, many of whom remember the situation of Chinese Indonesians before the coup attempt of 1965, and the subsequent crackdown on Chinese culture. This may explain why they are keen to re-introduce Chinese language and culture to the younger generations. For example, both Tedy Jusuf and Eddie Lembong spent some time in Chinese language schools during their childhood.

Both organisations are very interested in encouraging young people to re-discover their Chinese heritage. PSMTI have published a number of booklets aimed at young people, such as, *Sekilas Budaya Tionghoa di Indonesia* (A Glance at Chinese Indonesian Culture) which introduces issues such as Chinese marriage and burial traditions, traditional Chinese clothing, and religious traditions (Jusuf, 2000). They have also published a booklet with information about all the Chinese family names in Jakarta along with addresses of Rumah Abu where people can go to reintroduce themselves to Chinese social networks (PSMTI, 2000b). As part of their campaign to encourage Chinese Indonesians to return to their Chinese names and to choose Chinese names for their children, they have also published a book of Chinese names for boys and girls. (interview with PSMTI member Eddy Sadeli, May 2001). INTI have established a Youth Department through which they hope to gather together young people and students, especially those of Chinese descent, and organise “positive activities which prepare for the future of the nation” (*kegiatan-kegiatan positif sebagai kader bangsa*) They also hope to integrate the recreational activities of young Chinese Indonesians into the general activities of young Indonesians at a local and national level (INTI, 1999b: 4).

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69 A prominent lawyer is a member of INTI. His practice provides advice on citizenship issues, changing of names from Chinese to Indonesian ones, and immigration documentation. On his company’s documentation he provides his Chinese as well as his Indonesian name (his Chinese name is in roman lettering not Chinese) so he is obviously promoting his practice towards Chinese Indonesians.
These groups are still tentative about getting involved in politics. Neither PSMTI nor INTI wishes to be portrayed as political. After calling for the law to be changed so that it is not necessary for the President of Indonesia to be an indigenous person (orang asli) as was stated in article 6 of the Constitution, Tedy Jusuf of PSMTI stated that he did not want people to think that they had political aims, or wanted an ethnic Chinese to be president, because PSMTI was not a political organisation and did not have any affiliation with political parties. It was simply that PSMTI did not want the Constitution to be discriminatory (*Rakyat Merdeka*, 4 March 2000). They also state this in their rules and regulations (PSMTI, 2000b: 16). Eddie Lembong also reassured people that INTI was not interested in politics (*Suara Karya*, 12 April 1999). When asked whether the ethnic Chinese would “demand” to be included in the Cabinet after the 1999 election, Eddie Lembong replied:

> We would be very grateful... but for us what’s more important is that each Cabinet member must fight for the interests of the whole nation, not the interests of a certain ethnic or other group (*The Jakarta Post*, 26 October 1999).

Eddie Lembong explained that “at the moment INTI promotes education. If we talk about reforming the government and so on it would be very political which we try to avoid”. Lembong describes INTI as “a mass social organisation” (interview April 2001). Tedy Jusuf explained that “it is important for the Chinese to take part in politics and also to join other sectors (other than business). But, the Chinese should join political parties which are not exclusively for Chinese; they should join mainstream organisations. This organisation is not a political organisation. It is cultural and social” (interview, April 2001).

Neither PSMTI or INTI were willing to disclose how many members they had in their organisations. There are 109 people listed as being part of the Central Board of PSMTI, however, general membership is not listed (PSMTI, 2000b). INTI have no details in their literature about how many members they have. In response to the questions I asked in relation to membership all the groups were very unwilling to respond. I surmise from this and from my knowledge of Indonesian society that the groups do not have as many members as they would like. Many Chinese Indonesians were still unwilling or not interested in getting involved in such
openly Chinese organisations so soon after riots against them. I also speculate that most of their members are ethnic Chinese. Although INTI are open to non-Chinese the emphasis on encouraging Chinese cultural activity means that most non-Chinese are not interested in getting involved.

Non-Government Organisations: Anti-Discrimination Groups

Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi

Indonesian Anti-Discrimination Movement (GANDI)

I found that younger Chinese-Indonesians have tended to become involved in more overtly political organisations, which are also integrated to a greater extent into the reform activities of other non-ethnic based groups in Indonesia. GANDI is one of these groups. It was established after the violence of May 1998 by Nico Krisnanto, a Chinese Indonesian businessman who works for the financial and banking group, Lippo. According to GANDI literature, they were very concerned about the tragedy of May 1998 so “a group of Indonesian Chinese businessmen and executives gathered and after much deliberation decided to form an institution to fight for our dignity and human rights” (GANDI, 1998).

The name GANDI was suggested by Abdurrachman Wahid who associated the vision of the organisation with the peaceful aims of Mahatma Gandhi. GANDI was officially established on 6 November 1998 at the home of Wahid (Ciganjur). Also in attendance was the current President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Although there seem to be close links between GANDI and Abdurrachman Wahid (some former members of GANDI are now in Wahid’s party PKB), GANDI declares itself to be a non-partisan and non-profit organisation and no members of the organisation are permitted to be members of any political party (GANDI, 1998).

One of the main aims of GANDI is to pressure the government to abolish legal regulations which discriminate against Chinese Indonesians. In their mission statement they explain that “[w]hile racial tension and conflicts emerged and spread across the nation, only the Chinese are treated unfairly under a legal framework” (GANDI, 1998). Their programme of action is explained in their yearly report. GANDI identifies government policy (formal and informal) which
they consider discriminatory, and along with other organisations, lobby the government to change these laws. The organisation also identifies international conventions which deal with the issue of discrimination, and lobby the government to ratify these. In relation to the population at large GANDI wish to highlight discriminatory policy through the mass media, and through seminars, journals and articles, so that people reach an agreement about the importance of all their fellow citizens. They hope that they can create a dialogue between different groups in society so that they can learn to understand and to value each other. GANDI also hope to establish networks with organisations in Indonesia and overseas to promote issues such as human rights, discrimination, and democracy. Finally, GANDI aim to carry out advocacy work on behalf of individuals who have suffered discrimination (GANDI, 2001: 3).

GANDI have also outlined how they have begun to put into practice this programme of action. They have collaborated with other non-governmental organisations, including Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission), SNB (Solidarity for Motherland and Nation) and FKKB (National Unity Communication Forum) to organise conferences related to issues of discrimination and human rights. The proceedings of some of these have been published, including *Menjalin Persaudaraan dalam Perbedaan* [Weaving Friendship out of Difference], a conference held on 15 December 1998 in Jakarta which consisted of dialogue between various religious leaders. Another publication of conference proceedings is *Indonesia Menuju Penghapusan Segala Bentuk Diskriminasi* [Indonesia Aims for the Abolition of all Types of Discrimination], held on 5 May 1999, and opened by the then chairman of Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission), Marzuki Darusman.

GANDI has also established a “Friends of GANDI Forum”. These are a group of interested people including students, academics, social commentators, and members of the public, which meets to discuss issues relating to discrimination. In the year 2000 they debated “Fanaticism and Fundamentalism in Indonesia”, “Implementation of (Penegakan) the Law in Efforts to Abolish Racial Discrimination”, “Equal Citizenship in the Future; Ideas for the Amendment of Section 26 of the 1945 Constitution”, “The Chinese Minority and Equal

On 3 January 2000 GANDI became a member of the Working Committee for the Review of Discriminative Policies along with Komnas HAM (National Commission for Human Rights) and FKKB (National Unity Communication Forum). This work involved examining current regulations and legislation which was discriminatory and preventing discriminatory legislation being introduced in the future (GANDI 2001: 21). They held discussions with government departments which have enforced discriminatory laws. With financial aid from the Asia Foundation (an American NGO which funds democratisation programmes in the Asia Pacific) GANDI also arranged public seminars, discussion groups, and television appearances in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makasar (South Sulawesi), Medan (North Sumatra) and Pontianak (West Kalimantan) to gather the suggestions of local people to a change in law number 62/1958, which relates to citizenship in Indonesia. The result was the presentation of new draft citizenship legislation to the government (GANDI, 2001: ii).

GANDI have also taken a photographic exhibition to West Kalimantan and East Java. The photos depict the violence of May 1998. In West Kalimantan they collaborated with the local branch of the fire brigade (Pasukan Mencegah Kebakaran Republic Indonesia) and in East Java they collaborated with The Communication Forum of Religious Leaders (Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama) (GANDI, 2001: 37), to bring this exhibition to the people. Finally, according to their literature, GANDI also contributes relief and assistance to people suffering in areas where there is social unrest (GANDI, 2001: 39).

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70 I will return to the ideas which developed out of these discussions in chapter eight.

71 These departments were The Department of Justice and Human Rights, The Education Department, The Department of Religion, The Department of Internal Affairs, The Director General of Immigration, and The State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) which was represented by the Director of The Coordinating Agency for Chinese Problem (BKMC).
**Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa**

Solidarity for Motherland and Nation (SNB)

Another organisation set up after 1998, and working in similar areas as GANDI, is SNB. This organisation was established by Ester Jusuf, a young Chinese-Indonesian lawyer from East Java who previously worked at the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta*). It was while working at the Legal Aid Institute in 1996 that Ester’s eyes were opened to how corrupt and discriminatory the legal system was. At this time the Jakarta offices of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s party, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*), were attacked by the military. The left-wing People’s Democratic Party (PDR, *Partai Demokrasi Rakyat*) were blamed. Ester, who was acquainted with these people through her work at the Legal Aid Institute, knew that they were not to blame. It was after this that she decided to try to work to change the legal system (interview, April 2001).

SNB was established to fight to end racial and ethnic discrimination in Indonesia. They hold seminars, discussions and workshops in which they collaborate with other groups on issues relating to discrimination and human rights. They also lobby the government to change laws which are discriminatory. They carry out advocacy work on behalf of people who have been discriminated against, for example, SNB has offered legal advice to MATAKIN (The Supreme Council of Confucian Religion in Indonesia) in their attempts to have Confucianism recognised as a religion in Indonesia (SNB, 2000). SNB has also been involved in the attempts to investigate the mass murders of 1965-66. Ester also takes part in international conferences run by the United Nations and other transnational groups (SNB, 2000).

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72 PDI were formed in 1973. They were a fusion of Protestant, Catholic and nationalist parties which were forced to consolidate under Suharto’s conception of Pancasila democracy. This was a concept started by Sukarno whereby political parties would not be permitted to form a viable opposition (Ramage, 1995: 28-29).
Solidaritas Pemudi-Pemuda Tionghoa Indonesia Untuk Keadilan
Solidarity of Young Chinese Indonesian Women and Men for Justice (SIMPATIK)

Two other anti-discrimination groups, which have been established by young Chinese Indonesians, will be discussed in this section. SIMPATIK is a very small organisation made up of about ten people. The founders are Surya Chandra, a lawyer with the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, and Ali Sutra. Both Surya and Ali used to be members of PSMTI, but they left after disagreements with the leader, Tedy Jusuf, over the role the military should play in the political system of the country (interview, August 2000).

SIMPATIK meet regularly to discuss the national situation and are also invited to discussions and demonstrations by other organisations such as GANDI, SNB, and Komnas HAM. Like GANDI and SNB, SIMPATIK are adamant that they do not concentrate solely on issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. According to Chandra, they also deal with labour issues and help people whose land has been confiscated by the government (interview March 2001).

Himpunan Mahasiswa Tionghoa Indonesia
Association of Chinese Indonesian Students (HMTI)

The student organisation HMTI was established in Jakarta on 2 June 2000 and has 100 members. There are also older branches of the organisation in Pontianak (West Kalimantan) which has 500 members and Semarang (Central Java) with 50 members (interview, 10 August 2000). According to the president of the organisation, Isyak Meirobie, HMTI was established as a response to the need for a student organisation which expresses the value of togetherness (kebersamaan); a value tested of late, which has led to the weakness of the integrity of the nation (Suara Pembaruan, 17 July 2000). He explains that for the 32 years of the New Order regime negative stereotypes of the ethnic Chinese were maintained. This was partly because Chinese Indonesian students were separated from other students and because they acted in an individualistic manner, according to Meirobie (Suara Pembaruan, 17 July 2000).
The aim of the organisation is to advance the creation of a new Indonesian culture based on science and technology, which encourages the development of a just and prosperous Indonesia (HMTI, 2000a: 4). HMTI also hopes to encourage an understanding of Chinese Indonesian culture, which had not been permitted up to 1998. They have organised discussions and seminars with other student organisations and non-governmental organisations. HMTI campaign on issues relating to discrimination and democratisation.

The important role which students have played in the establishment and development of the Indonesian nation is highlighted by HMTI. Students are considered an important moral and intellectual element in the nation, who can encourage the growth of cultural values which correspond with Pancasila, and who can ensure prosperity for the nation through their modern, scientific and technological education (HMTI, 2000b). Meirobie insists that although the word Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian) is in the name of the organisation, it is open to any student, of any ethnic group, who wishes to join (Suara Pembaruan, 17 July 2000).

Unlike the social-cultural organisations mentioned previously, the four organisations explored in this section are all run by young people — people in their 20s and 30s. Also, unlike the social-cultural organisations they have developed networks with international human rights groups. Their main aim is not to re-introduce Chinese culture, rather, they are concerned that in the law, and in society in general, the Chinese are treated just as other ethnic groups are treated. To this end these groups campaign to change the citizenship law which discriminates against the Chinese, and they lobby the government to investigate the violence of May 1998, which was largely directed against the Chinese. They have also broadened their campaigns to include other ethnic and religious groups who have suffered discrimination.

The anti-discrimination groups tend to have more non-Chinese involved with them. Of the ten people directly employed by GANDI, three of them are Chinese Indonesians — the chairman, Nico Chrisnanto, the General Secretary, Albertus Sugeng and the Deputy President, Wahyu Effendy (interview with Sugeng and Effendy, March 2001). The Deputy leader of HMTI was non-Chinese. SIMPATIK
was made up entirely of ethnic Chinese, however, at protests which they organised to commemorate the violence in May 1998, non-Chinese were involved. SNB also has non-Chinese members of staff.

The offices of the anti-discrimination groups I visited also had a very different feel to those of the social-cultural groups. In the offices of PSMTI there were photos of Chinese Indonesians on the walls, and framed pictures of Chinese characters. This was not the case in the anti-discrimination groups’ offices where there were no such outward expressions of Chineseness.

**Political Parties**

*Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia*

*Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (PARTI)*

Historically, political parties in Indonesia have tended not to be based around ethnicity or religion. After 1998, however, a number of Chinese Indonesians felt it necessary to establish political parties as a vehicle for Chinese participation in politics. Other than the ethnic Chinese no other group established a political party based on ethnicity. A number of political parties were established based on religion, however. Of the forty-eight parties eligible for the 1999 general election eleven considered themselves Muslim parties, two Catholic parties.\(^{73}\) Two Christian parties, were also established but were not eligible for the election.\(^{74}\)

Suryadinata argues that the Baperki approach to Chinese issues, which he calls an “ethnic approach” re-emerged after the violence of 1998. This approach manifested itself in ethnically Chinese based parties working for ethnic Chinese interests (Suryadinata, 1998a: 110). The first ethnic-based political party to emerge after 1998 was the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (PARTI), which was established on 5 June 1998. The founder of the party is Lieus Sungkharisma, a 41 year old ethnic Chinese businessman, whose small business in Glodok (Jakarta’s

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\(^{73}\) The two Catholic parties were *Partai Demokrat Katolik* and *Partai Katolik Demokrat*.

\(^{74}\) The Christian parties were *Partai Reformasi Cinta Kasih Kristus Kebangssan Indonesia* (The Nationalist Reformist Party which Loves Christ) and *Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Christian Party).
Chinatown) was destroyed during the violence of May 1998. When I spoke to him he was trying to re-establish the business having had no insurance (because he did not expect such violence) and no help from the government (interview, June 2001).

The party was established to encourage Chinese Indonesians to take part in politics (interview, June 2001). He explained that:

> The aim of the party is to encourage Chinese into politics because the Chinese have mostly gone into business. We must be free to become politicians, military or whatever we want (interview, June 2001).

During the launch of the political party one of the founders, Ponijan Law, director of a language school, said that the aim was “to defend our rights and create true harmony among Indonesian citizens” (*Jakarta Post*, 11 June 1998). Sungkharisma explained that the more mainstream parties, such as Golkar and PDI-P, do not have special policies for ending discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, therefore, he does not feel that the discrimination will end unless Chinese Indonesians fight for it themselves. Sungkharisma acknowledged that people like Kwik Kian Gie, former Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry and member of Megawati’s PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), have never struggled for Chinese Indonesians specifically. Kwik will not change his position, therefore, according to Sungkharisma, new people are needed who will take up the issues relating to the ethnic Chinese (interview, June 2001).

**Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika**  
*Unity in Diversity Party (PBI)*

The other two political parties established by Chinese Indonesians after 1998 do not have the word *Tionghoa* (Chinese Indonesian) in the title. The only one of these parties to win a seat in the 1999 election was PBI. This party was officially declared by Nurdin Purnomo on 11 June 1998. Purnomo is *totok*. His mother was from China but grew up in Mauritius and his father was born in China. He came to Indonesia on business, met his wife, and settled there. Purnomo is the only *totok* I came across during my research. He owns a travel agent company with branches in Jakarta and Bali. He also owns the Chinese language newspaper *He Ping Ri*
Bao, which, according to Purnomo, is distributed in fifty cities across Indonesia (interview, March 2001). In addition, he is chairman of the Indonesian Hakka Association and the General Secretary of the Federation of ASEAN Hakka’s Association.

Purnomo’s aim in establishing the party was to take part in building a society which is just and prosperous, in which all groups, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or other group identities, have equal rights. They lobby the government to change discriminatory laws, and suggest ways of improving the economic situation. (PBI, 1999: 13).

Since winning the seat in Parliament, PBI has split in two in a very acrimonious fashion. The seat was won by the West Kalimantan branch of the party and a member of the West Kalimantan branch, Susanto, took up the seat in Parliament. Susanto claims that 19 of the 23 areas where PBI have branches support him, however, Purnomo tried to have Susanto barred from parliament. Both Purnomo and Susanto accuse each other of corrupt behaviour.

Susanto was born in West Kalimantan and is the only non-Javanese person I interviewed. Like many ethnic Chinese in West Kalimantan and unlike most in Java, Susanto can speak Chinese. In fact, he can speak Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka and Teoqiu (from East Kanton). Also typical of Chinese Indonesians, he can speak these dialects but cannot write or read them.75

During an interview with me, Susanto explained that he felt his job as an MP was to abolish all types of discriminatory laws and to ensure that the ethnic Chinese have equal opportunities to attend state universities, join the military or become public servants. Both Purnomo and Susanto stated that they do not only represent the Chinese. According to Susanto, more Dayak in his area are members of the party, rather than Chinese. He believes this is because the Chinese are still afraid of politics (interview, May 2001).

75 Very interestingly, Susanto also told me during our interview that he still has family in China. His father also had a wife and family there. He came to Indonesia to do business and then after 1949 could not return to China. He never saw his family in China again. Susanto has visited his relations in China only once.
Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia

Indonesian Citizens Party (PWBI)

This party was established on 18 August 1999 by Tan Suie Ling, who is also the editor of the magazine Sinergi (a post-1998 magazine aimed at Chinese Indonesians). He established the party because he was frustrated that broad based political parties were not addressing issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. He complained that even though after 1998 there were some Chinese Indonesians in Parliament, such as Alvin Lie (PAN), and Kwik Kian Gie (PDI-P) they were apprehensive about taking up issues relating to the ethnic Chinese for fear that they would be branded exclusive (interview, April 2001). Tan preferred to set up his own party rather than joining another already established Chinese Indonesian party because he felt they had no overall concept about the nation and no concepts about the Chinese problem in Indonesia in relation to the nation. (interview, April 2001). The party has about 50 members and they are trying to extend support throughout the country because to take part in the general election in 2004 a political party must have branches in 66 percent of the provinces in Indonesia (interview, April 2001). In relation to the magazine which he established, Sinergi, he explained that he is trying to describe how Chinese culture is in Indonesia — how it has mixed with the local cultures. Chinese Indonesians are Chinese, Tan says, but Indonesian in the first place (interview, April 2001).

Of all the groups established, Chinese Indonesians who have established political parties are perhaps looked on with the most suspicion by non-Chinese Indonesians. It is seen as another sign of their exclusivity that they do not join mainstream parties. The debate in the newspapers in 1998 outlined a fear among ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese that the formation of ethnic based political parties would be detrimental to the unity of Indonesia. With the word Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian) in its title, PARTI seems particularly unlikely to succeed PBI and PWBI may have more success because they are trying to broaden their appeal and deal with issues which relate to all groups, not just the ethnic Chinese. Some ethnic Chinese are wary of what they deem to be race-based parties. Kwik Kian Gie was fearful that by establishing these political parties the ethnic Chinese would be open to even greater discrimination. He states that “on the one hand,
some are saying that they don’t want to be discriminated against. But if they set up their own institutions, what do they expect? We have to assimilate." (Solomon, 8 June 1998). Kwik declared ethnic Chinese political parties to be “ahistorical” (ahistoris) and “going astray” (sesat) (Republika, 14 June 1998).

Another Chinese Indonesian who was disturbed by the establishment of these parties was the prominent Chinese Indonesian Muslim, Yunus Yahya. Yahya has long been calling on Chinese Indonesians to assimilate fully into Indonesian society by becoming Muslim and forgetting their Chinese heritage. The foundation which he helped to establish in 1991, Yayasan H. Karim Oei (H. Karim Oei Foundation), criticised these parties. They asserted that “[t]he foundation followed with deep concern the establishment of political organisations that are based on ethnicity and ancestry... [the establishment of such political parties is] not in line with the spirit of 1928’s Youth Pledge [of] one motherland, one nation and one language: Indonesia... It’s not right to fight for our aspirations in an exclusive manner” (Jakarta Post, 11 June 1998).

Lukas Sugeng Musianto, a doctoral candidate at Airlangga University, Surabaya, agreed that these communal based political parties were a step backwards in Indonesian politics, but that it was important to understand that they were also a spontaneous reaction by Chinese Indonesians to years of repression under the New Order (Suara Pembaruan, 22 June 1998).

The people fearful that the establishment of these ethnic based parties would start a new trend in party politics in Indonesia have not had their fears realised so far. Of the three parties investigated in this section, only one, The Unity in Diversity Party (PBI) had enough financial backing and members to take part in the General Election in 1999, and they only won one seat in parliament, however, they also

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76 Abdulkarim Oei Tjeng Hien (1905-1988) was a close friend of Sukarno’s who converted to Islam and encouraged other Chinese Indonesians to convert to Islam (Yahya, 2000: 5).

77 Yunus Yahya has for many years been very active in encouraging Chinese Indonesians to become Muslims. After 1998 Yahya, along with fellow Chinese Muslim, Jusuf Hamka, set up the organisation Parpindo (Partai Pembauran Indonesia, Indonesian Assimilationist Party). This was a political party which intended to promote assimilation, but the group was dissolved because the founders concluded that an organisation designed to try to assimilate one ethnic groups (ethnic Chinese) was actually hindering assimilation. They concluded that it was more acceptable to join one of the mainstream political parties (interview April 2001).
won seats in local and district parliaments. All these parties are still hoping to take part in the elections in 2004, but they do not seem to have the support they might have hoped for. Even members of the organisations such as PSMTI and INTI, which are trying to promulgate Chinese culture, are adamant that Chinese Indonesians should vote for the mainstream political parties (speaking with members of PSMTI and INTI May 2001).

**Religious Organisations**

Finally in this chapter two religious organisations will be explored: PITI (Indonesian Association of Ethnic Chinese Muslims) and MATAKIN (The Supreme Council of the Confucian Religion in Indonesia). The two religious groups are the only organisations which were re-established from older organisations. As was the case with the political parties discussed above, it has been acceptable in Indonesia to distinguish between different religious groups in a way in which it has not been permitted to distinguish between ethnic groups because Pancasila permits people to chose from a variety of religions.

The two religious organisations I have chosen are from either end of religious activity in Indonesia — a Chinese Muslim group and a Confucian groups. The Muslim group educates ethnic Chinese about Islam, while the Confucian groups has been campaigning to have Confucianism accepted as an official religion of Indonesia.

**Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia**

*Indonesian Association of Ethnic Chinese Muslims (PITI)*

PITI was established in Jakarta in 1961 and was initially linked to the organisation Muhammadiyah. PITI was set up because there was no organisation at that time which proselytised the Muslim faith in ethnic Chinese communities (Effendy, 2000a: 1). In the early 1970s the Attorney General urged the organisation to change its name so that the name of the ethnic group (Tionghoa) was not so prominent. The name was changed to Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam (Cultivator of Spritual Defenders of Islam PITI) in 1972 (Effendy, 1987: 26).
PITI is a social organisation, not political, according to one of its former leaders, Pandy Wijaya (Effendy, 1987: 27). Its main function has been to introduce Islam to ethnic Chinese who are interested in becoming Muslim. Since 1998 Usman Effendy, along with other Chinese Indonesian Muslims, has set about relaunching PITI as *Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Ethnic Chinese Muslims) once again. They see their role as one of uniting the nation because Islam does not differentiate between different races and ethnicities. They also wish to show that once Chinese Indonesians become Muslim they are completely accepted by other Indonesian Muslims (Effendy 2000b). PITI meet regularly to hold discussions and introduce new members to the religion. They have worked with BKPM (Co-ordinating Body for Muslim Youth) to organise activities for young people, such as sports events and poetry readings (Effendy, 1987: 30). PITI also tries to find places for people who wish to study at a *pesantren* (schools of Koranic studies for children and young people, most of whom are borders) (Effendy, 1987: 34).

As well as being dedicated to encouraging Chinese Indonesians to follow Islam, Usman Effendy is also very proud of his Chinese heritage. He speaks fluent Chinese and does not see any contradiction between his Chinese ethnicity and his Muslim faith. Unlike fellow Muslim Chinese, Yunus Yahya, Effendy does not believe that Chinese Indonesians need to forget their heritage when they decide to become Muslim. Effendy criticises Yahya for forgetting about his heritage and believes that Chinese culture should be accepted just as other regional cultures are accepted in Indonesia (interview, June 2001).

*Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia*

*Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia (MATAKIN)*

According to Chandra Setiawan, chairman of MATAKIN, adherents of Confucianism, and the organisations which they established, have been in Indonesia for centuries, arriving on the archipelago with the Chinese traders and sojourners (MATAKIN 2001: 20). Religious practices varied between the

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78 Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) was established in 1912 and is the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia after NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*).
believers who arrived from different parts of China and one of the aims of MATAKIN throughout its history has been to homogenise the rituals and practices of Confucianism in Indonesia.

Setiawan asserts that Confucianism in Indonesia has been officially organised since 1923 when *Khong Kauw Tjong Hwee* (Central Association of Confucian Religion) was established, with Bandung as its headquarters (Setiawan). According to Leo Suryadinata, the emergence of Confucianism as an organised religion is closely linked to Indonesian politics, particularly the state ideology of *Pancasila* (the first premise of which is belief in one God) (Suryadinata, 1997b: 167). It is a Chinese Indonesian religion, not a wholly Chinese religion, however, the authorities during the New Order period refused to accept it as an “Indonesian religion” (Suryadinata, 1997b: 168). 79

MATAKIN (The Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia) was established on 16 April 1955. The organisation held a yearly congress up to 1979 and continued to try to unite the rituals and practices of Confucianism across Indonesia. According to Chandra Setiawan, MATAKIN continued after 1979 but their activities were limited and not reported and they had to act surreptitiously. They were not permitted to build new temples or renovate old ones. In order to build a temple a licence to build a house was usually acquired and the building was then used as a ceremonial place, Setiawan explained (interview, April 2001).

Things have become easier for MATAKIN since 1998. They have been included more in general meetings of religious groups and Setiawan is also Secretary General of the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP) which was established in 1999. In August 1998 MATAKIN were permitted, by the Minister for Religion, to hold their thirteenth national conference, which brought together members and leaders of the religion from all over the archipelago (MATAKIN 2001: 21). In 2000 Confucianism was reinstated as an official religion in Indonesia.

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79 In the academic literature there are many questions about whether Confucianism is in fact a religion at all, in the strict sense of the word. Followers of Confucianism in Indonesia do not engage with this question. They have portrayed Confucianism as a religion because it is tied up with the *Pancasila* discourse which states that everybody must have a religion.
The mission of the organisation is to guide followers of Confucianism in order that they live a sincere and moral life. MATAKIN also hopes to encourage its members to put into practice the Four Books and the Five Classics of Confucianism\(^{80}\) and to make a positive contribution to all aspects of society in Indonesia (MATAKIN, 2001: 22-23). MATAKIN wishes to aid Confucian spiritual leaders in developing a basis for Confucianism in which there is a more intense “spiritual dialogue” between members of the Confucian community and God. The organisation also wishes to empower members of the Confucian religion so that they act as moral individuals who have the capability to make a real contribution to society, and create a “social dialogue” which is genuine and inclusive. Finally, MATAKIN intend to publish materials which explain Confucianism to a wider audience so that a “cultural dialogue” can take place and a deeper understanding of their beliefs can be developed (MATAKIN, 2001: 23).

The Chinese Indonesian groups which developed after the fall of the Suharto regime did so for various reasons. On the one hand, they were shocked by the violence perpetrated against the ethnic Chinese during May 1998. When the Suharto government lost power, and calls for reformasi (reform) were voiced by many section of Indonesian society, some Chinese Indonesians set about ensuring that their voices were heard in a new, democratic Indonesia. Having introduced the eleven organisations here, I will move on in the next two chapters to analyse the interviews, manifestos and other materials in more detail. Chapter seven will explore the arguments which the groups make in order to illustrate that they are loyal to Indonesia. My analysis questions the usefulness of considering these ethnic Chinese to be part of a Chinese diaspora. Rather, they seem to be trying to find a genuine place for themselves in Indonesian society. This activity throws up questions about the kinds of national and ethnic identities they are promoting and chapter eight will discuss these themes.

\(^{80}\) The Four Books are the *Great Learning*, *Doctrine of the Mean*, *Analects*, and the *Book of Mengzi*. The Five Classics are the *Book of Changes*, the *Book of Odes* (also entitled the *Book of Songs* or the *Book of Poetry*), the *Book of History* (or *Book of Documents*), the *Book of Rites* and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. See Xinzong Yoo (2000: 57-67).
Chapter 7

Being Good Indonesians

Michael Billig has said that “[t]o have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood” (Billig, 1995: 8). This chapter and chapter eight will discuss how the members of the Chinese Indonesian groups are articulating their national and their ethnic identities. The language and arguments which the groups use emphasise the ways in which they are trying to be “good Indonesians”. This reinforces my hypothesis that Chinese Indonesians are very focused on being accepted as genuine Indonesians with the result that terms such as “overseas Chinese” and “Chinese diaspora” are not very helpful in describing the Chinese in Indonesia. Of course, the desire of the groups to promote good behaviour may be the result of violence perpetrated against Chinese Indonesians in 1998 and therefore fear that such acts could happen again, and not genuine feelings of love and loyalty for Indonesia. However, as chapters four and five have elaborated, there is a long history of Chinese Indonesian efforts to be accepted as genuine Indonesians rather than as Chinese people who happen to live in Indonesia.

The efforts of the groups to articulate the desires of the ethnic Chinese are not straightforward. Chapter seven and eight will explore two of the paradoxes which have emerged out of the aims and activities of the organisations. The first paradox relates to the reasons the groups were established. On the one hand, they were established so that Chinese Indonesians could “look after themselves”, since, after the violence of 1998 they did not believe they could trust other groups to protect them. On the other hand, one of the main aims of the organisations is to overcome stereotypes that they are exclusive in their attitudes and behaviour. These joint aims of “looking out for themselves” and overcoming anti-Chinese stereotypes create a paradox, in that it is not possible for Chinese Indonesians to concentrate
on themselves while also trying to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes that they are only interested in themselves. This first paradox will be investigated in this chapter.

This first paradox leads into a second, which will be investigated in chapter eight. Although the groups encourage Chinese Indonesians to behave in ways which overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, they also insist that Chinese culture be accepted as a genuine culture of Indonesia. In making such a demand the groups use the discourses of Indonesian nationalism in ways that do not correspond with the understanding of many non-Chinese Indonesians, and perhaps ethnic Chinese also. Chinese Indonesians have been classed as outsiders to these nationalist discourses, therefore, as much as they might assure people that they are genuine Indonesians, the language and concepts of nationalism in Indonesia do not allow them to take up a position within the discourses.

**Coming Together**

One of the first sentiments expressed by these Chinese Indonesians during interviews was the desire to do something about their own fate. After the violence of 1998 many of these people had come to believe that they could not rely on others to guarantee their safety and that Chinese Indonesians had to look after themselves. In this sense the groups asserted themselves as the representatives of Chinese Indonesians.

One reason why some Chinese Indonesians joined these organisations after May 1998 was that well-known ethnic Chinese personalities began to write in newspapers and magazines about issues relating to Chinese Indonesians. The ethnic Chinese seemed to feel particularly hopeless after 1998. Sofyan Wanandi wrote that, attacks on Chinese-Indonesians and their property was not new but this time the situation was different. He stated that “[n]ever before have they felt so totally hopeless and unprotected. There is a widespread feeling that the Government has allowed this to happen and even that some sections of the Government were behind the campaigns targeting Chinese-Indonesians” (cited in Mann, 1999: 187). Other Chinese Indonesian personalities also spoke out. The lawyer Frans Winarta, and the badminton star Tan Joie Hok, began to write in
newspapers and magazines about issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. They wrote that, if Chinese faith in the government was to be restored, then discrimination against the Chinese would have to end (Mann, 1999: 182). Tan Joe Hok felt called by his conscience to speak out. He asked when people would come together under “unity in diversity” and why the Chinese in Indonesia were discriminated against (Sinergi, November–December 2000: 31).

A number of my interviewees explained how they felt after May 1998. Ester Jusuf of SNB explained that she was not interested in Chinese culture or in her Chinese identity before 1998, but felt that she wanted to do something to change the discrimination against the Chinese after 1998 (interview, April 2001). Susanto of the political party PBI said that he became involved in politics because after 1998 the Chinese had two choices — “leave the country or fight for your fate” (interview, May 2001). According to those who established the anti-discrimination group GANDI, there was so much concern about the tragedy of May 1998 that “a group of Indonesian Chinese businessmen and executives gathered and after much deliberation decided to form an institution to fight for our dignity and human rights” (GANDI, 1998).

In explaining why he established PSMTI, Tedy Jusuf also directly linked his motivations to halting discrimination, stating that:

The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia face discrimination so they must struggle together for their rights... Now in Indonesia there is a lot of conflict so this organisation [PSMTI] helps the Chinese to support each other (interview, April 2001).

Focusing on identity, Chandra Setiawan of MATAKIN stated that:

The May tragedy reminded the Chinese to have their own culture, no matter what their religion. The Chinese have been broken up by religion. The tragedy of May awakened them. We cannot lie that we are not Chinese anymore. Although our citizenship is Indonesian we cannot delete our roots of culture (interview, April 2001).

Likewise, Tedy Jusuf of PSMTI explained that the reason they wanted the membership of the organisation to be solely ethnic Chinese was that “in Indonesia all ethnic groups have such organisations, so the Chinese should too” (interview, April 2001). Also discussing PSMTI, Ernawati Sugondo added:
It is important because before May 1998 there was no organisation for the Chinese to ask questions to, or to voice the aspirations of the ethnic Chinese. Now this organisation explains to people, such as, the government and other organisations, about the aspirations of the ethnic Chinese (interview, May 2001).

Two further statements made by Tan Suie Ling of the political party PKB and Susanto of PBI emphasise the depth of the desire to take control of their own destiny. Tan told me that:

The government has done nothing [to improve the situation for the ethnic Chinese] because there are no representatives of the Chinese community. The Chinese in parliament don’t represent the interests of the ethnic Chinese. They represent their own party interests and are not given instruction from the party to take care of Chinese affairs (interview, April 2001).

Susanto added:

Before the Chinese always voted for Golkar, but got nothing in return. They made the Chinese afraid of politics. So, now I have the duty to encourage people to join politics, because they cannot rely on other people (interview, May 2001).

A difficulty in the groups’ intentions to look out for themselves and overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes is highlighted by PSMTI initiatives to raise money for victims of atrocities. PSMTI collected about one hundred million rupiah from its members at its Central Committee meeting in 2000. The chairman, Tedy Jusuf, urged journalists not to be suspicious. He explained that the money was not for PSMTI members, rather it was for humanitarian projects, particularly for people suffering from inter-ethnic conflict (Mandarin Pos, March-April 2001: 9). This emphasises ethnic Chinese interest in getting involved with social issues and giving money to needy causes. However, Jusuf also explained that priority would go to ethnic Chinese who were victims of violence. He states that, “this is rational. Who can be relied on to help a particular ethnic group in trouble, if not their own ethnic group”. Jusuf was aware that this might be frowned upon and tried to explain that the connection between members of an ethnic groups is very strong, just like the connection between Batak, Javanese, Balinese or Bugis. The also stated that non-ethnic Chinese in need will also receive support (Mandarin Pos, March-April 2001: 9).
Although the groups have diagnosed a need for the ethnic Chinese to come together and take control of their own destinies, the groups are also very keen to show that they are loyal and genuine Indonesians. This creates a paradox because by gathering together in this manner the groups are falling into the stereotype of exclusive Chinese behaviour. By declaring that Chinese Indonesians have not behaved in the correct manner, there is an acknowledgement among the group members that one must act in a specific way in order to be a “good Indonesian”. They are aware of what that particular behaviour should include, and they are willing to act on this. The groups have taken on a role in trying to educate ethnic Chinese about how to behave. This good behaviour was portrayed as taking part in the events of the local community, helping other people, taking up positions in sectors other than the economic sector and not socialising exclusively with other Chinese Indonesians.

The ways in which the groups illustrate their Indonesianness, by seeking to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, depict the ways in which the groups members have internalised these discourses. Michael Billig’s notion of “enhabitation” captures this process well. It is a process whereby “[p]atterns of social life become habitual or routine, and in so doing embody the past... thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into routine habits and, thus, they become enhabited” (Billig, 1995: 42). Billig cites Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” as a useful way of approaching this enhabitation. The habitus is a “set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’” (Thompson, 1991: 12).

**Overcoming Stereotypes**

**Group Symbols**

One of the ways in which the groups try to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes is to show how nationalistic they are. Most of the groups have a symbol which represents them and which appears on all their publications. These logos tend to incorporate elements of recognisable nationalist symbols and highlight the nationalist credentials of the organisation. Having a group logo is typical of an
Indonesian organisation. Symbolism is very important in Indonesia as a way of inculcating a sense of national identity. This is evident in the Indonesian national symbol which many of the groups base their own symbols on. The Indonesian national symbol is the *Pancasila* eagle (*garuda Pancasila*) (figure 1), which was agreed upon by members of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence in 1945. The image of an eagle was chosen because it moves with ease from one place to another and so symbolises Indonesia's move from a developing to a developed country.\(^1\) The number of eagle feathers symbolises the date of Indonesian independence on the 17 August 1945. It has seventeen wing feathers, eight tail feathers, and 45 body feathers. The symbols on its shield include a banyan tree and a buffalo which are wildlife of Indonesia, a stem of rice and cotton which are crops of the archipelago, and a chain which symbolises "union and unity" (*persatuan dan kesatuan*). The star in the centre has five points which symbolises the five principles of *Pancasila*.

![National Symbol of Indonesia](image)

**Figure 1: National Symbol of Indonesia**

The PSMTI symbol (figure 2) is a stem of rice and a stem of cotton encircling the Indonesian flag all placed within a blue flower. The open blue flower stands for safety (*sejahtera*), peace (*damai*), and calm (*aman*). The rice and cotton symbolise justice and prosperity (*keadilan dan makmur*). Blue is the symbol of sincerity (*ketulusan dan keikhlasan*). Yellow symbolises noble character (*budi yang luhur*).

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\(^{1}\) I am grateful to my friend Samto for this piece of information.
The flag is the national flag of Indonesia. Furthermore, the five petals of the blue flower symbolise the five principles of *Pancasila*. The 17 grains of rice and eight pieces of cotton symbolise the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 and mirror the symbols of the *Pancasila* eagle. (PSMTI, 2000b: 26). Of all the groups PSMTI are the most ostentatious in their national symbolism. It is ironic that the only organisation which does not permit non-Chinese to be full members is the most virulently nationalist in their symbolism.

![PSMTI symbol](image)

Figure 2: PSMTI symbol

The social-cultural group INTI uses the symbol of a white fan on a red background and adopts the red and white of the national flag in all their literature (figure 3).

![INTI symbol](image)

Figure 3: INTI symbol Indonesian organisation.
The student groups HMTI incorporate the star symbol from the eagle and includes the phrase *kebersamaan dalam keberagaman* (unity in diversity) (figure 4).

The political party *Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia* also uses part of the national symbol of the eagle and a ribbon matching the ribbon of the eagle contains the name of the party (figure 5). The *Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* literature also includes a photograph of the leader, Nurdin Purnomo, on the first page, wearing the black hat, known as a *peci* or a *songkok*, which is usually worn by Muslim men, but has also been used as a sign of Indonesian nationalism.

Nurdin Purnomo also established the Indonesian Hakka Association and although I have not looked in detail at this group their symbol is also very interesting.
(figure 6). The Hakka Association logo includes the national emblems of rice and cotton surrounding a map of Indonesia

![Figure 6: Indonesian Hakka Association symbol](image)

The PARTI emblem is less elaborate than the previous two. The party uses the chain symbolising “union and unity” as their emblem (figure 7).

![Figure 7: PARTI logo](image)

**Appropriate Behaviour**

As well as using national symbolism, the groups also illustrate how they have internalised the anti-Chinese discourses by urging Chinese Indonesians to behave in an appropriate manner. The declaration paper of PSMTI states that the organisation wants *suku Tionghoa* to take part in all areas of society in a new Indonesia which is democratic, integrated and in which there is ethnic harmony (PSMTI, 2000a: 14). They say that it is the duty of all citizens of Indonesia to care for the country and improve it. Chinese Indonesians must also have an awareness of loyalty to the nation and the state and act to improve justice and prosperity for all. PSMTI was established to facilitate this increased activity (PSMTI, 2000b: 15).

In *Mandarin Pos*, the leader of the Jakarta branch of PSMTI calls on ethnic Chinese to “stop individual ambition” (*Mandarin Pos*, May-June 2001: 14). He
argues that the ethnic Chinese are still individualistic and exclusive (individualistik dan eksklusif) and some ethnic Chinese still put money above all else (mengutamakan uang di atas segala-galanya). After anti-Chinese violence in Riau, which was sparked by suspicion that Chinese Indonesians were running a gambling den, PSMTI issued a statement asking that "Chinese Indonesians no longer undertake activities which clash with the law and which provoke strong emotions among a mass of people" (Mandarin Pos, February-March 2001: 9). An article in Sinergi emphasises that Chinese Indonesians should avoid KKN (Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism). The importance of getting involved in politics is highlighted, and a photograph is included of the Chinese Indonesian politician, Nurdin Purnomo, shaking hands with Abdurrachman Wahid. However, there is a warning that closeness to powerful politicians should not lead to corruption (Sinergi, March-April 2001).\textsuperscript{82} INTI make the point that they are not associated with government officials and other powerful élites (Kontan: April 1999).

The Chinese Indonesian politician and member of PAN, Alvin Lie, urges the ethnic Chinese not to disparage others (jangan berkecil hati). Instead he says, ethnic Chinese should choose to become citizens of Indonesia and no longer think of themselves as Chinese Indonesian (Tionghoa) (Mandarin Pos, September 2000: 29). As is clear from these examples, the Chinese Indonesian press addresses the issue of how it is best for Chinese Indonesians to behave and appropriate behaviour is behaviour which moves furthest from the anti-Chinese stereotypes.

During interviews with members of the groups there was also a clear acknowledgement that Chinese Indonesians should act in ways which overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes. Eddy Sadeli of PSMTI stated that:

Business and jealousy cause most of the problems [between the ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese] and also, the Chinese are always arrogant and conceited. They don't care about the circumstances or situation of others. PSMTI teaches Chinese that they are Indonesian. They must

\textsuperscript{82} I carried out my interview with Nurdin Purnomo just after he had held a meeting with the journalist who wrote the article. Purnomo was furious at being besmirched by the KKN stain and had summoned the journalist to his office and threatened him with legal action. He did not follow through with this threat, however. The journalist was himself ethnic Chinese, and as well as writing for Sinergi he also Purnomo's own paper He Ping Ri Bao.
help the poor and give some of their profit to the poor (interview, May 2001).

Ernawati, who is also a member of PSMTI, explained that, in trying to set up *Forum Komunikasi Wanita Tionghoa Indonesia* (The Communication Forum of Chinese Indonesian Women), they wanted to encourage Chinese Indonesian women involved in social activities.

We want to get ethnic Chinese women involved in solving social problems between *pri* and non-*pri*. We want to discuss with local government, the problems of women and also the problems of *pri* and non-*pri*. We don’t just want to solve social problems by giving money to the poor but we also want to get involved in decision making and discussions of how to solve the problems (interview, May 2001).83

This is significant because before 1998 it had been pointed out that the Chinese tended to give money for such activities, but did not become personally involved. For example, Thung Julan explains how people she interviewed complained that if they offered to accompany non-Chinese Indonesians on the ronda (walks around the neighbourhood at night to prevent crime), they were often expected to provide cigarettes, drinks and snacks. As a result, they tended to just pay money and avoided offering their services (Thung, 1999: 221).

Eddie Lembong of INTI also explained his group’s attempts to try to encourage the ethnic Chinese to become more involved in society.

In the past people (Chinese-Indonesians) only thought about themselves. For many reasons they closed themselves off, but now people are opening up more. The mission of INTI is to unite all the Chinese-Indonesians and to harness their potential and dedicate this potential to the development of the nation, to rebuild Indonesia... We want to unite the Chinese and then they can communicate with and educate each other about how to bring the Chinese to join mainstream Indonesian life as a whole (interview, April 2001).

Lembong has taken part in television interviews and seminars to explain to non-Chinese Indonesians “that the Chinese are five percent of the population and the purpose of INTI is to unite them to work for 100 percent of the population. The

83 The Communication Forum of Chinese Indonesian Women and an organisation for young people, The Communication Forum of Young Chinese Indonesians, were attempts by PSMTI to create more specialised groups which would focus on particular issues. These groups had not been established when I carried out my interviews.
indigenous people worry that the Chinese are only working for themselves” (interview, April 2001).

Tedy Jusuf of PSMTI explained to a journalist: “I convey to ethnic Chinese that I speak to that they must deal with people in their locality in an appropriate and well behaved manner, not exclusively” (Mandarin Pos, March-April 2001: 12). Tan Suie Ling also emphasises the importance of working alongside other groups in order to improve all aspects of Indonesian society. The magazine he founded is called Sinergi which he explains means “working together with other people and organisations with the result that the achievements are greater than if each person and group worked individually” (Tan Suie Ling, November-December 2000: 5). MATAKIN also aims to ensure that followers of Confucius in Indonesia are always respectful to the elderly, good role-models for the young, and always behave as model citizens with a sense of nationalism (MATAKIN, 2001: 22-23).

All the groups except for PSMTI are keen to explain that they are open to all, not just ethnic Chinese and that they would prefer if non-Chinese joined them. A number of groups also emphasised that they are not just focused on issues relating to Chinese Indonesians. For example, despite the emphasis on ending discrimination towards the ethnic Chinese, GANDI do not want to be portrayed as an organisation which only deals with issues relating to that group. During discussions with Albertus Sugeng (General Secretary) and Wahyu Effendy (Deputy President) they repeatedly explained that GANDI work to prevent laws which discriminated against all groups in the country (interview, March 2001). Although this is the case, non-Chinese Indonesians tend not to join. They perceive these organisations as exclusive, Chinese organisations.

Surya Chandra of SIMPATIK explained that it was very important that these groups do not just concentrate on issues relating to the ethnic Chinese.

It is really important that we don’t [concentrate solely on Chinese Indonesian issues]. We also work on labour issues and lobby on behalf of people whose land has been taken by the government (interview, March 2001).

These Chinese-Indonesians are aware that the non-Chinese are suspicious if they deal with issues relating solely to themselves. This was a problem which Baperki faced in the 1960s. An article in the magazine Sinergi highlighted very clearly the
problem which the organisations face. The article suggested that there was a suspicion among non-Chinese that the ethnic Chinese were trying to take over politics as they took over the economy. This suspicion ensures that non-Chinese Indonesians are not interested in getting involved with the ethnic Chinese in the struggle against discrimination. Therefore, most members of the organisations are ethnic Chinese, which leads to more suspicion by non-Chinese Indonesians and which fulfils the stereotype that they are exclusive and just concerned with their own affairs (Sinergi, July 2001: 4).

*Indonesian First, Chinese Second*

As well as suggesting how Chinese Indonesians should behave, the groups also emphasise their credentials as loyal citizens of Indonesia by insisting that their most important identity is their Indonesian one. This reinforces my argument that Chinese Indonesians wish to be accepted first and foremost as Indonesians rather than as “overseas Chinese”. It also undermines the extent to which they are part of a Chinese diaspora. For example, as mentioned in chapter three, Len Ang suggested that according to the people involved in producing huaren.org Chinese-American’s or Chinese-Canadians, should assert their Chinese identities first, and only secondly declare themselves to be American or Canadian (Ang, 2001: 80).

When I interviewed Brig. Gen (Ret.) Tedy Jusuf, chairperson of PSMTI, he told me that his Indonesian identity was more important to him, even though he is interested in his Chinese heritage. Eddy Sadeli, also of PSMTI, explained that both identities are important to him but his first identity is Indonesian.

To be a good citizen is to obey the law, pay tax, and have good relations in society. My first identity is Indonesian, then I am Chinese, then I am a Jakartan (interview, May 2001).

Chandra Setiawan, chairman of MATAKIN, explained that he never says that he is Chinese, but Indonesian. “This [Indonesia] is my country — I live here and try to work to progress the nation” (interview, April 2001).

Martani Wiranata, of the magazine *Sinergi* and the political party PWBl, explains to young people that Chinese culture in Indonesia has mixed with local cultures. He suggested to me that young ethnic Chinese “are Chinese, yes, but Indonesian
in the first place” (interview, April 2001). Nurdin Purnomo of the political party PBI, explained that “even though my parents were from China, my nationality is Indonesian now” (interview, March 2001). Susanto, also of PBI, explained that “I feel Chinese, but, a more important identity is Indonesian” (interview, May 2001).

Lieu Sungkharisma, chairman of PARTI, differs from the others, however he still emphasises that he is Indonesian. He explains that:

Before 1998 I always said “I am Indonesian” but since May 1998 I think this was wrong. I must say “I am Chinese” (Tionghoa), but, one who has been ‘Indonesianised’ (Keindonesiaannya) and ethnic Chinese cannot be shaken from this and must have courage (interview, June 2001).

However, home for Lieus is Indonesia, as he felt when he visited China:

I didn’t feel like I was going home when I was going to China. Home is Java and I must stay to build Indonesia and improve the system (interview, June 2001).

Sugeng of the organisation GANDI told me that:

I’m Indonesian, my perception is Indonesian because I studied, work, make communications with all of [my] indigenous friends, but sometimes I must face reality. My eyes, my skin is different from my colleagues and friends. Physically I am Chinese but in perception I’m Indonesian (interview, June 2001).

In an interview with the Mandarin Pos the Chinese Indonesian politician and member of PAN, Alvin Lie, stated that as a Chinese Indonesian he wishes to give top priority to Indonesia (menomorsatukan Indonesia). He explains that “this is not because I am ethnic Chinese and interested only in promoting the interests of the ethnic Chinese. Rather it is because first and foremost I am Indonesian” (saya, nomor satu adalah Indonesia) (Mandarin Pos, September 2000: 29).

In response to media reports that there was an “exodus” of Chinese Indonesians leaving the country because they feared riots in the run-up to the election of 1999, the leader of INTI, Eddie Lembong, stated that “we can’t ask people to stop worrying as nobody can guarantee their safety now, but all we can do is ask them to think that the country’s problems are also ours” (Jakarta Post, 27 May 1999).

At another level the groups present themselves as Indonesian first and Chinese second by emphasising the Indonesia-focused qualities of the organisations. INTI is
declared to be a social organisation with nationalist qualities (organisasi kemasyarakatan yang bersifat kebangsaan) (INTI, 1999c: 3). Its members feel called upon (terpanggil) and determined (bertekad) to take part in all activities of the nation and the state (seluruh kegiatan berbangsa dan bernegara) (INTI, 1999c: 3). Eddie Lembong of INTI explained that his organisation was not just for the benefit of the ethnic Chinese, but it was for the service (pengabdian) of the whole nation (Suara Karya, 12 April 1999). PSMTI wishes to serve the state and the nation of Indonesia (mengabdi kepada negara dan bangsa Indonesia) (PSMTI, 2000a: 13). The charter which was signed by those who established PSMTI also emphasises their nationalist credentials. They hoped that God would bless them in their service to the nation and the state (PSMTI, 2000a: 13). 

The anti-discrimination groups also emphasise their nationalist credentials. HMTI wishes to help bring into existence a new, more democratic, more prosperous Indonesia (HMTI, July 2000b). HMTI emphasises the importance of upholding “human values” (nilai-nilai kemanusiaan) (HMTI, July 2000b). GANDI have incorporated their aim to end discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, into a nationalistic framework. In a leaflet produced by the organisation they explain that “[o]ur mission is to support national unity, and promote harmony in social and communal relations, in respect to equality in human dignity and human rights” (GANDI, 1998). They argue that the violence of 1998, which was directed at a certain ethnic and religious group (kelompok etnis dan agama tertentu) along with poor people, “reflects the life of us together as a nation” (refleksi kehidupan bersama kita sebagai bangsa) (GANDI, 2001: 2). They go on to say that as a complex nation (sebagai bangsa yang majemuk) there needs to be the development of genuine fellowship (persaudaraan sejati) and an end to discrimination in all areas between citizens of the nation (diantara sesama warga negara bangsa) (GANDI, 2001: 2). SNB also situate their activities within a nationalist framework. They are an organisation “which is concerned with the

84 Semoga Tuhan Yang Maha Esa memberkati kita sekalian dalam mengabdi kepada negara dan bangsa Indonesia

85 According to a non-Chinese Indonesian friend, these values are honesty, friendliness and politeness. He added that they are values “usually ignored by Chinese people”.
creation of a nation which respects values of friendship, unity and ‘human values’” (SNB, 2000: back cover).

The political party PBI sees part of its function as helping to encourage all the people of Indonesia to have high morals (membina masyarakat Indonesia menjadi warga negara yang bermoral tinggi) (Mustaib and Basumin, 1999: 13). The leader of PBI, Nurdin Purnomo stated that for many years the ethnic Chinese have been limited and put in a box. It is now the right time, he suggests, for the ethnic Chinese to work with other members of the nation, to develop a “nation-focused life” (sebuah kehidupan berbangsa) which is more prosperous, healthy, strong and harmonious (Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 5).

Tan Suie Ling of PWBI told me that his party was established because “the Chinese problem in Indonesia is the problem of nationality (kebangsaan)...[it is] a problem not just of the Chinese but of the whole nation... This party is not just for the ethnic Chinese, it’s for the whole nation” (interview, April 2001). In their declaration, PARTI state that the party was established to “struggle to achieve community, national togetherness which is harmonious, just and full of thanks within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia”.

The desire of these groups to be fully involved in Indonesian society is often tied up with the concept of “development” (pembangunan). This echoes the New Order discourse of pembangunan which urged Indonesians “to work together to develop the nation and bring about economic takeoff” (Berger, 1997: 344). The anti-Chinese stereotypes purport that ethnic Chinese selfishly dominate the economy, however, these groups insist that they are encouraging Chinese Indonesians to use their business skills to develop the whole nation. PSMTI argue that their purpose is to embrace the aspirations of the ethnic Chinese so that their role in the development of the nation can be increased (merangkum aspirasi, agar supaya kualitas dan partisipasi suku Tionghoa dalam pembangunan dapat lebih ditingkatkan dan terarah) (PSMTI, 2000a: 15). INTI want to become involved in activities which correspond with the development (pembangunan) of a new Indonesia which is more unified (lebih bersatu), more advanced (maju), stronger (kuat), more prosperous (makmur) and with a modern culture (peradaban modern)
equal to other advanced nations (*setara dengan bangsa-bangsa maju lainnya*) (INTI, 1999c: 3).

INTI met with Chinese Malaysian Chamber of Commerce to encourage investment in Indonesia. This is an early sign of INTI's desire to facilitate the economic development of the nation, according to Eddie Lembong (*Suara Karya*, 26 July 1999). Lembong also encouraged Chinese to return their money to Indonesia (*The Jakarta Post*, 26 October 1999). HMTI see part of their role as criticising injustices in order to unite and improve the wealth of the nation (*Mandarin Pos*, August 2000: 5).

Another way in which the groups show that they are Indonesian first and Chinese second is by using terminology which emphasises their Indonesian-ness and distances them from China. All the articles I read referred to Indonesia as home. This is usually construed by the use of the phrase *tanah air* (homeland) for Indonesia. 86 Even those Chinese Indonesians who now live in China are said to miss their *tanah air* (Indonesia) and wish to return (*Mandarin Pos*, August 2000: 16). China and Chinese people are referred to as "they" and "we" is used to describe Indonesian people and culture. When celebrating the work of a Chinese Indonesian film-maker his work is said to be part of Indonesian "national film" (*Mandarin Pos*, August 2000: 18). Chinese Indonesian are described as "*anak bangsa asal Tionghoa*" (children of the nation who are ethnic Chinese) (*Mandarin Pos*, August 2000: 3-4). People who originally came from China to Indonesia have changed from Chinese people (*Orang China*) to Chinese Indonesian (*orang Tionghoa*) (*Sinergi*, November-December 2000: 12).

**Positive Role of Ethnic Chinese in Past Struggles**

By highlighting the role of Chinese Indonesians in the independence struggle the groups are trying to show that they do genuinely care about Indonesia. Part of the anti-Chinese stereotype is that they are not loyal to Indonesia and tended to be colonial sympathisers during the struggle for independence. By highlighting the

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86 *Tanah Air* literally means "water and air" and it is the affectionate name given to Indonesia. The English-Indonesian dictionary edited by John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily translates it as "fatherland".
role played by Chinese Indonesians in the liberation struggle the groups are placing their loyalty firmly with the Indonesian republic and undermining the discourse that they are only pretending to be loyal to Indonesia for opportunistic reasons, rather than from a true sense of identification with the country.

Nurdin Purnomo of PBI stated that “no colony in the world belongs to the Chinese. They have spread out all over the world and helped to build nations where they settle” (interview, March 2001). He also said that in 1740 the Chinese were the first group in Indonesia to rise up against the Dutch, but that this is not recognised (interview, March 2001).

The ethnic Chinese media is used to highlight the positive role of the ethnic Chinese in past struggles. The magazine *Sinergi* included an editorial in one edition of the magazine explaining that they wish to highlight the social activities of Chinese Indonesians in the past (Tan Suie Ling, November-December 2000: 2). They ask whether this social spirit is still alive today, and conclude that it is. The magazine’s cover story introduces hospitals which were established by the ethnic Chinese during the 1920s. These were run by Chinese Indonesian (*Tionghoa*) doctors who returned from training in the Netherlands and whose hearts were moved (*hatinya tergerak*) by the poverty in Indonesia. The article explains that the hospitals were primarily established for poor ethnic Chinese (*kalangan Tionghoa yang kurang mampu*), however, the hospitals, which were financially supported by the organisation THHK, helped enormously during the independence struggle (*banyak membantu para pejuang Republik*) (*Sinergi*, November-December 2000: 6-7). In the article, one doctor in particular was praised for his idealistic and altruistic behaviour (*idealis dan altruistik*). Patients normally paid the doctor, however, Dr. Kwa Tjoan Sioe often did not accept payment, and was even known to give money to patients who were very poor. This story also undermines the common stereotypical understanding of ethnic Chinese that they are only interested in money.

*Paguyuban INTI* argues that “the independence of the Republic of Indonesia is the result of the struggles and efforts both of the leaders of the nation and all the people of Indonesia, including many of the Chinese community. Therefore the opportunity is for all Chinese to be a community within the republic of Indonesia
based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution” (INTI, 1999c: 2). An article in Mandarin Pos entitled “The Struggle of Ethnic Chinese Citizens in the Independence of Indonesia” (Perjuangan Warga Keturunan Tionghoa dalam Kemerdekaan Indonesia) discusses Chinese Indonesians who played a role in the independence struggle, not just through providing funds, but by being involved in active combat also. They suggest that although Chinese Indonesians did play a role in the struggle for independence, young people are not aware of the role (Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 19).

Genuineness

As well as emphasising that they are trying to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, another way in which these organisations promote their credentials as “good” Indonesians is to emphasise the length of time their families have been in Indonesia and therefore, their genuineness as real Indonesians. Again they are using the discourses which they are familiar with. As I have outlined in previous chapters, the Chinese in Indonesia tend to be considered outsiders because they are perceived to have come originally from outside the archipelago. The groups argue that because they have been in Indonesia such a long time, they should be considered genuine Indonesians.

Articles in the magazine Sinergi discuss the history of ethnic Chinese leaders in different parts of Indonesia (tokoh tokoh keturunan dalam sejarah di...). In Java, in the sixteenth century, a famous ethnic Chinese sculptor, Chi Hui Gwan, is said to have carved the artefacts which became the speciality of Jepara. The objects are still displayed in the local mosque and local people believe that they provide blessings (berkah) to people who visit them. He was made a governor by the local ruler and taught the local crafts people of the region (Sinergi, April-May 2001). Another article mentions the arrival of Zheng He, who is said to have arrived in Indonesia in the fifteenth century bringing a particular sect of Islam called Hanafi. Even earlier than Zheng He and Chi Hui Gwan was Hwui Ning, a Buddhist monk who arrived in Java in the seventh century (Sinergi, March-April 2001).

A photographic exhibition in Jakarta is used to give examples of how long the ethnic Chinese have been in Indonesia, and therefore, how genuinely Indonesian
they are. The photos depict everyday life for people in Jakarta from 1857 to 1950, including images of Chinese Indonesians. According to the article, the exhibition shows that Chinese people (*orang China*) who are now Chinese Indonesians (*Tionghoa*) have been in Indonesia for centuries. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the ethnic Chinese were the largest ethnic group in Jakarta and they married Sundanese, Javanese and Balinese women. This indicates, according to the article, "that we should throw away the idea that Chinese Indonesians are citizens of foreign descent (*warga negara asing*). The cultural and social activities which are shown in the photographs include Confucian temples, Chinese burials and Chinese Indonesian traders. It is also stated in the article that the ethnic Chinese were used by the Dutch to help build the old city of Batavia (Jakarta), with the result that the city has a mixture of styles, some Dutch and some Chinese (*Sinergi*, November-December 2000: 12).

Some articles emphasise the similarities between Chinese Indonesian and Indonesian traditions, which reinforces the important ways that ethnic Chinese and Indonesian cultures have mixed together. For example, a kind of Chinese exorcism called *ruwatan ciswakis* is said to be very similar to traditional Indonesian practices (*Sinergi*, November-December 2000: 19). In another article, an ethnic Chinese landowner in the eighteenth century is said to have practised the Indonesian method of community co-operation *gotong royong* (*Mandarin Pos*, September 2000: 26).

It is clear from what I have outlined so far that the groups are working within the Indonesian discourses already available to them. To a certain extent they are somewhat restricted in how they can show themselves to be loyal Indonesians. Their way of showing that they are "good" citizens is to argue against stereotypes. By emphasising in their literature and in interviews their desire to change their behaviour and change that of other ethnic Chinese, they accept that Chinese Indonesian behaviour in the past has been regarded as unnationalistic, and they also accept that the onus is on Chinese Indonesians to change their behaviour in order for them to be accepted as Indonesians. The indigenous people do not need to emphasise their loyalty to the nation; it is taken for granted. Therefore, by accepting the social discourses on Chineseness in Indonesia, and urging Chinese
Indonesians to change their behaviour, these groups are also maintaining the distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians.

In this chapter I have outlined a number of ways in which the groups are emphasising their Indonesian-ness, however, as I will move on to discuss in the next chapter, this has not led them to feel that they must completely lose their Chinese heritage. On the contrary, after 1998 these groups have a new found interest in exploring their Chinese heritage and want it to be included as one of the ethnic identities of Indonesia. This introduces another difficulty for the ethnic Chinese. During the New Order period in order to show that one was Indonesian, one had to forego ones Chinese heritage. As I have illustrated here, these groups insist that they are loyal Indonesians, however, they also insist that they have the right to express their Chinese culture. This desire to express their Chinese heritage as well as find a place for themselves within Indonesian society will be explored in chapter eight.
In an article in the newspaper *Republika*, Thung Julan divides the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia into three groups based on how they identify themselves. Firstly, those who see themselves as ethnic Chinese and who will always be Chinese (*mereka adalah etnis Cina dan akan selalu menjadi Cina*). This group, according to Thung, wishes to maintain a Chinese cultural heritage. The second group consists of those who feel assimilated. This group considers their Chinese heritage to be a curse (*kutukan*) which prevents them from being fully accepted in the places where they live. The final group contains those ethnic Chinese who feel global. This group of people identify themselves with their work and avoid associating themselves with culture or politics (*Republika*, 27 October 1998). The Chinese Indonesians in the groups investigated in this research do not fit into any of these categories. They are ethnic Chinese who are proud of their Chinese heritage, but also feel Indonesian and assert that their Chineseness is part of Indonesian national identity.

As discussed in chapter seven, the groups emphasise the need for the ethnic Chinese to become better Indonesians. The language of the anti-Chinese stereotypes is used and Chinese Indonesians are urged to act in ways which overcome them. One way in which it has been possible for the ethnic Chinese to become more Indonesian has been to forego any signs of Chineseness. This was particularly the case during the New Order period when the official government policy required Chinese Indonesians to “assimilate”. However, this appeal from the post-1998 groups, that Chinese Indonesians overcome the stereotypes, does not lead them to dismiss their Chinese heritage as un-Indonesian. Rather, they consider this heritage to be a genuine part of Indonesian identity.
The difficulties which the ethnic Chinese face in this regard develop from the way that Indonesian national identity has developed. According to Virginia Matheson Hooker, the national culture in Indonesia would ideally be "a combination of the high points (puncak-puncak) of all the regional cultures of Indonesia, a hybrid mix of the best of existing cultures in the nation" (cited in Thung, 1998: 35). Although there was this desire to develop a strong national culture at the time of independence, Hooker points out that such a culture is still in the making, and that the process of building it might be undermined by a lack of "depth of tradition that nourishes many of the regional cultures" (Thung, 1998: 35-36). Pancasila was promoted as the basic philosophy of the nation, however, within Pancasila there is an acceptance of diversity. Although the national education system and the mass media promoted co-operation and respect for different ethnic groups, as Hans Antlöv argues, there are no values which are shared by all Indonesians other than perhaps the "imagined political community" (Antlöv, 2000: 220-221). I argue here that, as a result of the lack of discourses of Indonesian cultural identity the Chinese Indonesian groups investigated in this research realise that if they want to find a place for themselves in Indonesia, and to be treated in the same way as other ethnic groups, then their Chinese Indonesian cultural heritage must be accepted. Either that, or all ethnic groups will need to lose their ethnic identity and assimilate into an Indonesian cultural identity which is still in the making.

Integration or Assimilation?

As I have shown throughout this thesis, the ethnic Chinese have been treated differently to other ethnic groups in Indonesia. An indigenist national discourse, which accepts diversity among indigenous groups, but not those perceived as coming from outside the archipelago, has ensured that different rules have applied to Chinese Indonesians. The debate about the place of Chinese Indonesians within Indonesian society has been discussed in terms of assimilasi (assimilation) and integrasi (integration) since Baperki and LPKD were established during the 1950s and 1960s. Central to my argument about the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is the point that other ethnic groups, those considered to be pribumi (indigenous), do not have to assimilate. This highlights the problem for the ethnic Chinese. A strong national cultural identity has not developed because non-Chinese ethnic groups
have been permitted to maintain their ethnic identity as a cultural identity. Indonesian identity is not a cultural identity, rather, it is a political identity.

The debate over “assimilation” or “integration” has returned to post-Suharto Indonesia. According to Jemma Purdey there are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is a result of the issue having been cut short in 1965 and subsequently appropriated by the New Order government. Secondly it points to the desire among Chinese Indonesians to find a place for themselves in the new, democratic Indonesia (Purdey, forthcoming October 2003).

As I discussed in chapter three, minority groups tend to demand a voice in a society as a result of the failure of the promise that immigrants who assimilated would become the same as, and be treated equally with non-immigrant citizens. Indeed, Zygmunt Bauman (cited in Ang 2001: 9) argues that assimilation can never be fully successful because being in a position of having to assimilate and not acquiring the desired traits naturally, means that the person assimilating will always be inferior to those who did not have to assimilate but who naturally inherited the desired attributes. This idea could also be applied to post-1998 Indonesia. Out of the failure of assimilationist policies, the ethnic Chinese are now asserting their ethnic identity and seeking to have it accepted and recognised by other Indonesians. Ien Ang asserts that “the politics of identity relies quintessentially on the recognition and mobilization of difference once the ideal of sameness has proved unreachable” (Ang, 2001: 11).

Many of my interviewees blamed Suharto for the problems of ethnic Chinese, which indicates that they wish to move away from his assimilationist policies. They stated that the political structure established during the colonial era continued during the Suharto era and, therefore, did not allow for ethnic Chinese to be accepted as authentic Indonesians. The ethnic Chinese groups tend to dismiss Suharto’s attempts at assimilation and revert to what they see as Sukarno’s more “multicultural”, integrationist vision. In an article in the Mandarin Pos Sukarno is declared to be “the symbol of the unity of the nation” (Mandarin Pos, May-June 2001: 11). Eddy Lembong of INTI praised the vision of the founding fathers of Indonesia very highly when I interviewed him. He stated that in the speech “The Birth of Pancasila” Sukarno “elegantly and convincingly”
described what kind of nation he wanted to develop. Sukarno appealed that Indonesia not be based on any one ethnicity, religion or culture, because there were so many ethnic groups. According to Lembong, “[t]his vision of the founding fathers was neglected totally by Suharto for thirty-two years. so, ethnic conflict now is the fruit of the denial and misconduct against these principles” (interview, April 2001). Sukarno’s integrationist vision for the nation is compared to the enforced (paksaan) assimilation of Suharto (Oei, May-June 2001: 9).

As mentioned in chapter five, the post-1998 discussion of assimilation and integration is more complex and confusing than might be immediately obvious. Siauw Tiong Djin points to a difficulty which arises when discussing this issue in relation to Indonesia because there is a difference in meaning between the words pembauran and assimilasi, both of which are often translated into English as “assimilation”. According to Siauw, pembauran means a less rigid form of assimilation than assimilasi. Pembauran does not ensure that an ethnic group must “loose the characteristics of its ethnicity”, rather, it urges “association with the people in a society” rather than intermarriage in order to disappear into the people (Siauw, 1998: 27). As I touched on in chapter five, although the groups appear to be promoting an integrationist vision, many of them still use the language of assimilation. Also, although Suharto was encouraging the ethnic Chinese to lose all knowledge of their ethnic heritage, both pembauran and assimilasi were used to describe this process during his tenure also.

In their manifesto INTI argue that:

In this era of reform, Indonesians of Chinese descent feel called upon and determined to support all potential as part of the national assets. We wish to fully integrate (pembauran total) into all activities of the nation in order to develop a new Indonesia which is more united, more prosperous, stronger, and happier in one modern culture which is equal with all other progressive nations (INTI, 1999c: 3).

INTI also use the term “assimilasi”. A newspaper article declares that INTI wish to “struggle for total assimilation” [perjuangkan assimilasi total] (Suara Pembaruan, 12 April 1999). It is evident, however, from the aims of the group that they do not mean that the Chinese Indonesians should lose all their ethnic identity and disappear into the Indonesian population.
PSMTI use the terms *integrasi* (integration) and *assimilasi* in their literature. They assert that integration is an older concept in Indonesian national discourses than assimilation. According to PSMTI, integration developed out of the Youth Oath (*Sumpah Pemuda*) of 1928. Tedy Jusuf states that at this time ethnic groups, including *Young Chienesen* agreed to unite to form a nation, "without eliminating each groups ethnic and cultural identity". This is not the usual understanding of *Sumpah Pemuda*. As I explained in chapter two, this oath is usually associated with developing a united, Indonesian identity at the expense of ethnic identities. Jusuf argues that *assimilation* only developed as an idea in 1961 with an Assimilation Charter which stated that "unity occured when groups which had different mental attitudes, customs and cultures, came together as one sociological unity" (Jusuf, 2000: 105-106). Confusingly, those who wrote the Assimilation Charter also referred to the Youth Oath of 1928 (see chapter four above).

As was evident in my discussion of newspaper articles in chapter five, assimilation also tends to be associated with poverty and physical features. Ernawati Sugondo of PSMTI mentions the ethnic Chinese of Tanggerang87 who are assimilated because they have similar professions to the local population, even though they still maintain Chinese cultural practices. She states that,

> The ethnic Chinese [there] have dark coloured skin, the same jobs as the indigenous; they have already assimilated (*membaur*). but, if someone in their family dies, they still pray like the Chinese. They haven’t lost their identity even though they are assimilated. Most of them are Buddhist and a very small amount are Muslims (interview, May 2001).

Leus Sungkharisma said that "the Tionghoa are already assimilated (*membaur*) in Java. They speak Javanese and have lost their ties with China" (interview June 2001).

There seems to be a complex re-negotiation of the terms of the "assimilation" debate. On the one hand the groups argue that Chinese Indonesians should no longer be forced to lose their Chinese cultural identity, however, on the other hand they still use the language of assimilation and argue that they have already

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87 Tanggerang is a town west of Jakarta with a large population of Chinese who do the same jobs as the indigenous people there, such as farming and fishing.
assimilated into Indonesian society or that they want to assimilate more fully. They seem to be changing the meaning of “assimilation” in subtle ways which allows them to argue that once the government and the population at large accepts their Chinese heritage then they will have assimilated because they will be treated just like an “indigenous” ethnic group in Indonesia.

The groups are quite explicit about wanting their Chinese identities accepted as one of Indonesia’s *suku* identities. As well as using national symbolism to show that they are loyal, national, organisations, which I discussed in the previous chapter, the groups also use Chinese symbolism, which I illustrate below. On another level in interviews and in the Chinese Indonesian media they also ask that Chinese culture be accepted in Indonesia. I argue that these demands from the groups fit with the discourses of Indonesian national identity. In a way, if the ethnic Chinese wish to be accepted as genuine Indonesians then they have no choice but to argue that their ethnic identities also be accepted.

**Calls That Chinese Culture be Accepted**

*Chinese Symbolism*

The manifestos and booklets produced by the organisations, as well as the Chinese Indonesian media, all use Chinese symbolism. Despite their lack of proficiency in Chinese languages all the organisations have both Chinese and Indonesian names. The symbolism shows a desire to express their Chinese heritage as well as find a place for themselves within Indonesian society. For example, the booklets published by PSMTI include Chinese symbolism on their covers. The booklet *Daftar Marga Tionghoa di Jakarta* [List of Chinese Family Names in Jakarta] includes pictures of a dragon and a bird, which are Chinese symbols for the representing the masculine and the feminine (figure 8).88 This cover also includes the title of the booklet in Chinese characters.

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88 These symbols are explained in Tedy Jusuf (2000).
Another PSMTI booklet, *Sekilas Budaya Tionghoa di Indonesia* [A Glance at Chinese Culture in Indonesia] (figure 9), includes red Chinese lanterns on its cover with the Chinese blessings “good fortune” (fu) and “double happiness” (shuang xi).
INTI produce a booklet in Chinese (figure 10).

HMTI include Chinese characters in their logo (figure 4) as do the Indonesian Hakka Association (figure 6).

Chinese symbolism is also heavily used in the Chinese Indonesian press. Mandarin Pos translates all its articles into Chinese, therefore, on its cover the Indonesian headlines are also given in Chinese. The example I use here has Gus Dur (in the centre) dressed in traditional Chinese clothing attending Chinese New Year celebrations in Jakarta in 2001 (figure 11).
magazine *Sinergi* is almost entirely written in Indonesian, however, the cover always includes some Chinese characters. The cover below contains the headline “Chinese Indonesians: Shrewd Business Methods” (figure 12). It also states just below the title that it is a monthly magazine for *huaren* (ethnic Chinese).

![Figure 12: Cover of Sinergi](image)

**Explicit Demands**

As well as using Chinese symbolism and characters in their publications, the Chinese Indonesian groups were also adamant in the interviews I carried out that they want their Chinese culture accepted as an Indonesian culture. PSMTI wants the government to:

Allow Chinese culture, permit Chinese language printing and books, make Chinese New Year a holiday, the Chinese must have citizenship, the process of birth certification for the Chinese, as well as the form, is different than for other Indonesians so we want this changed too. We want the ethnic Chinese to be a *suku* like the indigenous ethnic groups in Indonesia (interview, April 2001).

Martani Wiranata of the magazine *Sinergi* and the political party PWBI, also asserts that Chinese identity should be treated equally with other identities in Indonesia. He says that young people do not know what they are. They do not understand that they are Chinese and what that is. The people at the magazine
Sinergi wish to illustrate to Chinese Indonesians that they have a Chinese heritage, however, they do not want people to become chauvinistic. The magazine tries to describe how Chinese culture has already mixed with the "local culture" (interview, April 2001). On the one hand, Wiranata seems to argue that there are people in Indonesia who do not realise that they are Chinese and it is the job of his magazine to point out to them who they are. On the other hand, he still seems reticent or confused about how to deal with this. Wiranata seems to be saying that as well as a distinct group of Chinese in Indonesia, their culture has also mixed with other cultures. Also, the other cultures are "local" cultures, which highlights the arrival of Chinese culture from outside the archipelago. Celebrating two years of the magazine, the editor of Sinergi, Tan Suie Ling, reiterates that all citizens of the nation must be treated equally with no discrimination towards any citizens of Indonesia (Tan Suie Ling, November-December 2000: 5).

In response to my question about why he supported these organisations when he was a Chinese Muslim, Usman Effendy of PITI stated that:

I support organisations because we cannot forget. [Yunus Yahya] has forgotten his ancestors, but, this is not good... Chinese culture is the oldest culture in Asia. Chinese culture is the same as Javanese, Batak — it is a culture of Indonesia (interview, June 2001).

Eddie Lembong of INTI states that:

The vision of the organisation is that all Chinese Indonesians should be allowed to participate in all areas of life in Indonesia. This implies that we suggest and demand that everybody must perceive that the Chinese-Indonesians are a component of the nation, and, as such, they have to be treated equally (interview, April 2001).

The preamble to INTI's manifesto explains that:

According to historical records, the Chinese community has existed in the motherland for centuries, sharing to enrich the religious, cultural, trading and economic treasures of the archipelago... The independence of the Republic of Indonesia is the result of the struggles and efforts both of the leaders of the nation and all the people of Indonesia, including many of the Chinese community. Therefore, the opportunity is for all Chinese to be a community within the Republic of Indonesia.

89 Yunus Yahya is another well know Chinese Indonesian Muslim who does not support these groups and calls on all Chinese to become Muslim and lose their Chinese identities altogether (See footnote 73).
based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution (INTI, 1999d, my italics).

Lieus Sungkharisma of PARTI says that:

Because for thirty-two years the ethnic Chinese were discriminated against, now they must be brave and step forward (menampilkan) to Chineseness (Tionghoaan). But, we can still be Indonesian, like Javanese, Batak, they are still Indonesian (interview, June 2001).

A letter to the newspaper Bisnis Indonesia illustrated how the ethnic Chinese just wish to be treated in the same manner as other ethnic groups. The writer was responding to comments made by a journalist that ethnic Chinese should not use Mandarin or English in public places. He asks why are Javanese, Madurese or other people permitted to speak their local language but not the ethnic Chinese (Bisnis Indonesia, 9 June 1998).

Susanto of PBI explained that:

The government says the Chinese are greedy and only want to be in the economy, but they don’t give them the opportunity for other jobs. So, PBI fights for equal opportunity, equal treatment (interview, May 2001).

Ernawati Sugondo of PSMTI suggests that:

Indonesian identity is like gado gado (Indonesian salad); all the ingredients are together in the bowl but all distinctive and not mixed up together like tea and sugar which mixes and dissolves together. Indonesian identity is not like that. Now Chinese identity is included in this so ethnic Chinese cannot lose their Chinese identity (interview, May 2001).

Sugondo sums up very succinctly her understanding of Indonesian identity and where the ethnic Chinese fit into this. It is the characteristic of each ethnic group having their own distinct identity and therefore, a lack of clarity about what Indonesian identity then amounts to, which I am attempting to capture in this chapter. This lack of clarity about Indonesian identity makes it very difficult for the ethnic Chinese to consider themselves truly Indonesian without a strong ethnic identity. Charles Coppel criticised the assimilationists during the 1960s because they insisted that the ethnic Chinese assimilate, without being clear about how
this might be done in a new nation which lacked national integration.\(^9\) This is still the case for the ethnic Chinese today. During the New Order they were forced to assimilate, but they were not successful. This was partly because they were still discriminated against by the state and within their local communities. However, it was also partly because without an ethnic identity they had nothing to assimilate into.

**Their Chinese Culture**

Although the ethnic Chinese in these groups are adamant that they wish to express their Chinese heritage, after 32 years during which the expression of Chinese culture in public was forbidden, most of the people I interviewed have had limited access to Chinese cultural practices. For example, most of them do not speak any Chinese dialects, do not eat Chinese food and do not celebrate Chinese cultural traditions. On the other hand, none of them question the fact that they are Chinese. As Ariel Heryanto has pointed out, those thirty two years of New Order rule were years of "erasure" of Chinese identity, but never its total removal (Heryanto, 1998: 104).

Many of my interviewees say that they are Chinese because of their Chinese ancestry, rather than any cultural practices. For example, Ester Jusuf feels Chinese even though she does not speak Chinese or celebrate any Chinese festivals. On Ester's mother's side of the family her grandmother came from Taiwan and her grandfather came from China. Ester's father is also ethnic Chinese, although she does not know when his ancestors arrived in Indonesia. Ester travels a lot with her job as an NGO activist, speaking at conferences all over the world. She explains that outside Indonesia she is Indonesian, while, inside the country she is Chinese.

Susanto believes that you do not have to speak Chinese or celebrate Chinese New Year to be Chinese. Now that his mother has passed away his family does not celebrate Chinese New Year. He explained to me that "just because of my blood I am Chinese", although he is not pure Chinese as he believes he has some Dayak ancestors on his mother's side (interview, May 2001).

\(^9\) See chapter four.
Nurdin Purnomo is the only *totok* in my sample. Therefore, he has had more access to Chinese culture than my other interviewees. Both of his parents were born in China. For Nurdin Purnomo an ability to speak Chinese is very important for those who consider themselves to be Chinese, however, it is not necessary. He told me that, "[e]ven if a long long time ago you had an ancestor who was Chinese, you are still Chinese" (interview, March 2001).

Leus Sungkharsima still celebrates Chinese festivals, which he links to his religion. He states that:

I am a Buddhist and Imlek (Chinese New Year) is mixed up with my religion. I go to the temple to pray. You can’t stop citizens from expressing their culture (interview June 2001).

Erna Sugondo explained to me that,

The Chinese in lots of different countries in the world have traditions and culture which are basically the same. But, also their traditions have been mixed up with the culture of the country they live in. For example, at a Chinese celebration in Indonesia they will eat Indonesian food as well as Chinese food (interview, May 2001).

Erna is saying that Chinese identity changes but there is an element of Chineseness which always remains.

Eddy Sadeli and Keng Joe Hok of PSMTI are hoping that young people will become interested in Chinese culture. According to Sadeli, “if you have no culture then you have no identity, if no identity then no dignity. But, the young people are not interested, they are global.” By “Chinese culture” Sadeli explained that he meant language, changing of name back to the Chinese way, and following Chinese customs for marriage and funerals (interview, May 2001). He does not then think it is enough to have an Indonesian identity.

The Chinese Indonesian media contains information about many different Chinese cultural activities. All the magazines provide guidance in learning Mandarin, however, *Sinergi* provides no tones with the romanised words so it is not possible to practice speaking the words. One edition of *Sinergi* included an article about a Mandarin speaking competition held at the University of Indonesia. The article included an interesting disclaimer stating that “we rarely hold special Mandarin language competitions. In future we will also hold English and Arab language
competitions" (Sinergi, May-June 2001: 68). This highlights the radical nature of this kind of activity. Chinese Indonesians do not yet feel comfortable in celebrating their Chinese heritage without ensuring that it is portrayed as non-exclusive behaviour.

The magazines also provide articles on cooking traditional Chinese dishes such as, roast chicken Peking style (Sinergi, June-July 2001: 31), a cold salad called Lang Pun (Sinergi, May-June 2001: 55), and dimsum (Sinergi, April-May 2001: 55). Sinergi provides instructions on the Chinese martial art Wushu and explains how Chinese horoscopes work. Sinergi also advertises Chinese medicines and acupuncture specialists. Mandarin Pos contains articles about feng shui, concentrating on a particular aspect of feng shui in each edition, stemming from the house and garden, to the layout of cities. The final page of Mandarin Pos celebrates film and music stars. Each of the stars profiled are non-Indonesian Chinese. For example, one edition celebrates a Chinese Malaysian singing star, another profiles Taiwanese music stars, another discusses Hong Kong made films. More than any other part of the magazines or newspapers, this section seems to tap into a feeling of pride in being part of this vibrant, successful, Chinese culture. However, as the next section of the thesis illustrates, although it is clear that the groups wish to celebrate their Chinese heritage, and feel themselves to be Chinese, they distance themselves from China.

This distancing from China itself may be a result of Indonesian discourses which after 1965 ensured that links with China were taboo. Few of the group members have any actual links with China, however, even those who visited China emphasise that they feel different from the people there. The groups’ arguments are a complex mix of asserting their Chineseness, while also making their ethnic identity as Indonesian as possible which means undermining any links with the place where their culture originally came from.

For example, the group members I spoke to who visited China all said that they felt different to the people there. Eddy Sadeli has visited China and feels that he is different to the Chinese in China (interview, May 2001). Chandra Setiawan, chairman of MATAKIN stated in an interview that “[w]e cannot lie that we are not Chinese anymore. Although our citizenship is Indonesian we cannot delete our
roots of culture” (interview, April 2001). However, this sense of Chineseness has been dislocated from China, the place where his ancestors came from. He has visited China but said that he “feels a connection with Confucian places but not with China anymore” (interview, April 2001). Ester Jusuf emphasises that inside Indonesia she is Chinese, but outside she is Indonesian (interview, April 2001). None of the groups manifestos mention China at all.

In the Chinese Indonesian media China is referred to as Republik Rakyat Tiongkok (People’s Republic of China) or Tiongkok (China). Indonesia is referred to as “tanah air” (homeland). When China is discussed a distinction tends to be made between “us” (Indonesians) and “them” (Chinese). For example, in an article about a trip made to China in 1963, the Chinese Indonesian wrote that in the town of Xixuangbanna in Yunnan Province, he came across a Chinese minority who resembled “us” (kita). From what followed it is clear that “us” means Indonesians. This Chinese minority wore sarongs, they wore black head-dresses, and they chewed betel. They reminded the author of the people of Aceh (Aidit, 2001: 21).

Another article discussing China’s problems with Portugal over Macau also distinguishes between “us” Indonesians and “them” Chinese (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 4). A Chinese Indonesian man writing about his experiences of living in China for thirty years writes that he still wants to return to his “native village” (kampung halaman) in Java (Sobron, November-December 2000: 20-21).

In an article discussing the re-emergence of business links between Beijing and Jakarta in the post-Suharto era Chinese Indonesians are described as “ethnic Chinese children of the [Indonesian] nation” (anak bangsa etnic Tionghoa) (Mandarin Pos, March 2001: 7). Another article about Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule reiterated Jiang Zemin’s assurances that Chinese Indonesians (Tionghoa Indonesia) would not be actively encouraged to help in the economic development of China, which was described as a “foreign country” (luar negeri RRT) (Mandarin Pos, July 2001: 6). Another article, discussing a trade fair in Jakarta, explains how the contingent from China, selling goods at the fair, are part of the “foreign” (asing) section (Mandarin Pos, July 2001: 10).

As I mentioned in chapter three, the terms used by the ethnic Chinese to describe themselves tends to emphasise the affinity they feel with the countries they have
settled in. These terms distance them from China and emphasise their nationalist credentials. Again I would argue that this undermines their links to the discourses of diaspora if one takes a definition of diaspora which emphasises links with the ancestral country, and links between members of the diaspora. During interviews most people voiced their dislike of the term Cina, which was the name given to Chinese Indonesians during the New Order period. They dislike the term because it associates them with China and is considered derogatory. According to the Tedy Jusuf "orang Cina" (Chinese people) are those who have citizenship of the People's Republic of China (Jusuf, 2000: 108). They prefer the term Tionghoa because it is associated more closely with Indonesia. Again Jusuf clearly sets out that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent are "orang Tionghoa". Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, therefore, can be equated with Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minahasanese, and others (Jusuf, 2000: 109). Lieus Sungkharisma said that the use of the word Cina for China is no problem, but he does not want it used to describe Chinese Indonesians. This sums up their attitude towards China. It is outside the discourse of their Chineseness. Their Chineseness is tied up with Indonesia. Leus Sungkharisma stated that "older people feel Chinese but not people who were born here [Indonesia]". In other words, people who were born in Indonesia do not have cultural links with China any longer.

The Chinese identity is a particular type of Indonesian-Chinese identity which is not found anywhere else and does not have much to do with China, as such. The term Tionghoa (the word Chinese-Indonesians use to describe themselves) is a word used to describe the Chinese in Indonesia only. So these people are talking about a particular type of Chinese identity which has been Indonesianised and as a result is part of Indonesian identity. Another example of the Indonesian nature of their Chinese identity was evident in an interview with Ikhsan Tanggok, a lecturer in Confucian studies at Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Government Institute for Islamic Studies, IAIN). Tanggok pointed out that in order to study Confucianism, one must also study Chinese Indonesian culture. However, he warned that "Chinese Indonesian culture is very different to the culture of the country of our forefathers (budaya leluhur negerinya). Traditions such as marriage and burial ceremonies, have mixed with the cultures of Indonesia, which leads to different
types of Chinese Indonesian ceremonies in different regions of Indonesia” (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 14).

According to Ma Mung’s definition of diaspora the Chinese Indonesians who are members of the groups investigated for this research could not be considered part of a Chinese diaspora. Some members of the groups are starting to become interested in developing links with ethnic Chinese in other countries, however many of them seem to be more interested in trying to ensure that their particular Chinese-Indonesian identities are accepted as genuine Indonesian identities. As a result of policies during the thirty-two years of the New Order government most of the members do not speak Chinese and have not maintained any links with the country of their ancestors.

Jacobsen writes specifically about the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and this less coherent meaning of the term “diaspora”, allows him to consider them part of the Chinese diaspora. His definition “allows people to move in and out of a given diaspora depending on their current social and political situation” (Jacobsen, 2003: 1). It is possible that at some time in their future, Chinese Indonesians will wish to become active in the Chinese diaspora. This I do not dispute. What I do dispute is that they are necessarily part of the Chinese diaspora now, just because they are ethnic Chinese, without having to actively engage with it. So far in their activities the ethnic Chinese groups are more concerned with finding a place for themselves within Indonesian society, rather than focusing on being part of a diaspora. This may be the result of years of discrimination towards Chinese Indonesians who displayed any sign of their Chinese heritage. It may also be fear of violent reprisals if they do not show loyalty to Indonesia. However, based on the evidence of my research I believe that there is a genuine desire on the part of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to stay focused on defining a place for themselves within Indonesia without feeling the need to reach out to other ethnic Chinese. Also, if they do in the future desire to make links with China and with other ethnic Chinese, this does not necessarily mean that their loyalty to Indonesia would be undermined. As Tan Chee Beng stresses, a distinction should be made between an identification with Chinese culture and genuinely felt identification
among ethnic Chinese with the nations they have settled in (Tan, 1998: 44). The two need not be mutually exclusive.

Part of the anti-Chinese stereotype in Indonesia, up to now, as set out by Charles Coppel, is a belief that the ethnic Chinese “cling to the culture of their ancestral homeland”. It is the case that the members of these groups encourage ethnic Chinese to re-discover Chinese cultural practices. However, they promote their Chinese heritage as a genuinely Indonesian one. I argue that this desire to still celebrate Chinese culture, even though the Chinese language and the ties with China have been lost, is linked to the fact that all the other ethnic groups in Indonesia still maintain their individual cultures. There is no cultural “Indonesian” identity, so for the ethnic Chinese to feel Indonesian their ethnic identity must be made equal to other ethnic identities in the country.

**Their Indonesian Identity**

The sentiments expressed by the groups asking that their Chinese heritage be accepted as an Indonesian identity, fits with the discourses of Indonesian nationhood in the sense that all other ethnic groups are permitted to express their ethnic identities. When the groups spoke to me about their national identity and when they wrote about it in the media, they found it difficult to explain what it meant to have Indonesian identity other than through an acknowledgement of diversity.

**Acknowledgement of Diversity**

Susanto says of Indonesian identity that:

> It is better for each ethnic group to have their own identity. Indonesian identity is related to citizenship and language [but] there has also been a mixing of culture, like for me — my father is from China but I am now Indonesian (interview, May 2001).

Members of GANDI also believe that Indonesians should keep their ethnic identities. Sugeng and Wahyu Effendy from GANDI said that “it is important that each ethnic group have its own identity”. They could not explain what they meant by Indonesian identity, but said that it was built out of the different ethnic groups. Wahyu said that “reconciliation is needed” [and that] justice, the poor and
democracy are all things that people can come together to improve” (interview, March 2001).

Tan Suie Ling of the political party PWBI has developed a framework for improving ethnic relations and including everybody in some kind of national identity. He explains that the “duty of the nation’s history” (tugas sejarah bangsa) is “to develop a people who are just and prosperous” (membangun suatu masyarakat yang adil dan makmur). Tan asserts that justice was sidelined during the New Order period and attention was only given to the prosperity of the people. He argues that both justice and prosperity must go hand-in-hand and believes that the fulfilment of these duties should be based on the concept sinergi warga bangsa (synergy of the citizens of the nation). This is possible if three conditions are met: no violence (anti kekerasan), empathy (kenal mengenal secara empati) and healthy communication (komunikasi sehat). Tan warns that violence causes the growth of discrimination, and also oppression, in the sense that its aim is to make uniform anything which is considered to be different. The second principle of “empathy” is based on the principle that people should learn to look at situations not just based on their assumptions about other people. Finally, Tan asserts that it is important for a healthy society that people from different groups can communicate with each other in a way which helps them to understand what other groups are thinking (Tan, 2000).

Ester Jusuf argues that:

Indonesian identity should not be based on race. There are so many ethnic groups living here. People should be considered Indonesian when they want to become Indonesian — live here and follow the law here (interview, April 2001).

All of these ideas about Indonesian identity are civic concepts of the nation in the sense that the emphasis is on accepting people as Indonesian if they are willing to follow the laws and become citizens of the nation. However, there is also a fear that ethnic nationalism is prevalent in Indonesia.

Eddie Lembong argues that an ethnic form of nationalism threatens to exclude the ethnic Chinese, but that this was not the vision of the founding fathers. This ethnic nationalism seems to refer to an “indigenist” type of nationalism. Lembong explains that:
A big problem that the Chinese have to overcome is a strong ethno-nationalism. This is a big problem for the Chinese trying to integrate smoothly into society. We must educate people that ethno-nationalism is wrong. Sukarno did not want ethno-nationalism, but, Suharto exercised it... Ethno-nationalism, either consciously or unconsciously, is in the minds of many Indonesians (interview, April 2001).

Eddie Lembong also stated that:

Now people talk about ‘pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’, but, INTI offers a more dynamic and constructive vision which we call ‘cross cultural fertilisation’. ‘Pluralism’ is static. We are plural, but, where are we going? Also with ‘multiculturalism’. They only describe the present situation. ‘Cross cultural fertilisation’ implies mutual respect of different cultures, including the Chinese culture, which is part of Indonesian culture. All cultures are equal so let’s blend together (interview, April 2001).

This idea of “cross-cultural fertilisation” seems to have an element of identity not staying fixed, but changing as people mix together. This is perhaps a acknowledgement Indonesian ethnic identities are hybrid identities. However, as I will outline below, the groups also argue that their ethnic identity is natural and God-given. Therefore, the extent to which an acknowledgement of a blending of cultures will lead to a discourse of hybridity is not clear.

The richness and diversity of Indonesian culture is always praised in the Chinese Indonesian press, and ethnic Chinese culture is then included in this as an integral part of Indonesian culture. For example, in an article about a cultural festival at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the writer says that “the cultures of Indonesia constitute a richness which is not valued enough [by Indonesians]. There are a variety of arts and cultures, traditions, languages, religions and ethnic groups which have been part of the Indonesian nation up to now” (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 15). At the end of this article the writer suggests that Chinese involvement in the cultural festival shows that “there is an acknowledgement that Chinese Indonesian culture is one of the cultures of Indonesia” (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 15). The national unity seems to be reached through each groups celebrating another group’s culture, including Chinese Indonesian culture. In an article in Sinergi it was said that a week of cultural events is held at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah each year “in order to unite everybody” (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 15). This event has been held there since 1992 in
order to celebrate national days, such as Armed Forces Day, *Sumpah Pemuda*, and Heroes Day, which fall during the festival.

*The Naturalness of Ethnic Groups*

All the groups are asking for equality with other ethnic groups in Indonesia. The groups' attitudes towards ethnicity seems to be based on a belief that to have an ethnic group is to have a natural, God-given identity. The declaration which was presented at the first general meeting of PSMTI in 2000 summarises their beliefs very clearly. PSMTI state that ethnic groups are in existence because it is the will of God and the traditions and cultures of each ethnic group (*suku*) should be able to be expressed and developed by them. *Suku Tionghoa* are a component of the nation who should be equal before the law and actively participate in the development of all aspects of the nation, to make a new Indonesia which is more democratic, more integrated, and more harmonious (PSMTI, 2000b: 14). PSMTI also state that the diversity is a gift (*anugerah*) from God (PSMTI, 2000b: 15). INTI also emphasise the naturalness of ethnicity by suggesting that ethnicity is a gift from God (*anugerah dari Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) (INTI, 1999c: 2). Likewise, HMTI state that the diversity in Indonesia is a gift from God which is “beautiful and priceless” (*indah dan tak ternilai*) (HMTI, July 2000a: 1). Since God is believed to have divided people into ethnic groups, these statements imply that it is not possible to change or lose one's ethnicity; everybody is a member of an ethnic group. This leads to the premise that ethnic Chinese should not be discriminated against because it was not their choice to be Chinese, God made them that way.

This attitude towards ethnicity is understandable within the context of discourses of Indonesian national identity. All "indigenous" Indonesians have a *suku bangsa* of which they are a member. Although there is obviously intermixing of the *suku* (through marriage for example) everyone is a member of just one *suku bangsa*. Professor Parsudi Suparlan describes Indonesian ethnic groups (*suku bangsa*) as “special kinds of social groups which are ascriptive in the same way as ones age or sex” (Suparlan, 1999: 153).
Conclusion

As is clear from the discussion above, the Chinese and Indonesian identities of the people studied here are very closely intertwined. In their manifestos the groups use the language of Indonesian nationalism in order to place themselves within these discourses. All the organisations are based on the principles of Pancasila. Many of them also refer to the Youth Oath of 1928 (Sumpah Pemuda) and the motto “plurality but unity” (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). I would argue that, on the one hand, this is a strategic use of language on the part of the groups in order to show that they are loyal. On the other hand, like the attempts to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, they have no other language in which to frame their arguments and show that they are genuinely loyal to Indonesia.

Their demands are also nationalistic in orientation. PSMTI called for Imlek to be a holiday (Suara Pembaruan, 6 December 2000), want to be called Tionghoa and be an official suku (Suara Pembaruan, 5 July 2000; Rakyat Merdeka, 1 August 2000). They also asked that the Constitution be amended so that non-indigenous could become President (Rakyat Merdeka, 4 March 2000). These demands are nationalist in their orientation. This echoes what Will Kymlicka suggested, that if ethnic minorities ask for changes it tends to be so that they can integrate more fully into the nation. In the case of Indonesia they are asking to be treated in the same way other Indonesians are treated.

The nationalist orientation of the organisations seems to be contradicted, however, by their desire that their Chinese heritage be accepted as a genuinely Indonesian culture. Despite their encouragement to Chinese Indonesians to behave in ways which illustrate their loyalty to Indonesia, the groups also insist that their Chinese culture be accepted. In a sense perhaps, due to the discourses of Indonesian nationalism and the lack of a credible alternative to the deeply-felt ethnic identities of the archipelago, the Chinese in Indonesia had little choice but to see themselves as Chinese. They have been discriminated against for thirty-two years. Even if they manage to portray themselves as indigenous in their local area, bureaucratically their Chinese origins are known. Since they have not managed to assimilate, and since they wish to be considered to be genuine Indonesians, they
need an ethnic identity and so are asking that their Chineseness be considered an Indonesian identity. They seem to want to have an ethnic culture which is equal to the other traditional cultures in Indonesia.

The Chinese groups investigated in this thesis seem to be in a catch-22 situation. On the one hand they are urging their supporters to be “good Indonesians”, on the other hand, they encourage the expression of their Chinese heritage. The national discourses up to now have made it impossible to do both.
Conclusions

This thesis has investigated the articulations of ethnic and national identities made by eleven Chinese-Indonesian organisations which were established after the violence of 1998. On the one hand I have shown that the groups are adamant that Chinese Indonesians must overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes and show loyalty to Indonesia. On the other hand, the groups were established in order that Chinese Indonesians look out for each other, which seems to fall into the stereotype of exclusive behaviour. This creates a paradox because it is not possible, within the anti-Chinese discourses, both to overcome the stereotypes and act together as ethnic Chinese. Another paradox is created by their celebration of their Chinese heritage. The declarations of loyalty made by the groups do not lead them to abandon their Chinese heritage. On the contrary, their interviews with me, their manifestos and the Chinese Indonesian media show that they have reacted to the lifting of the ban on Chinese cultural expression with enthusiasm.

I have argued that Indonesia has struggled to establish a deeply-felt national identity which matches the regional, ethnic identities which are so important to the population. Sukarno introduced the concept of Pancasila in order to inculcate a sense of national identity. Suharto also used the Pancasila discourse and he banned discussion of issues relating to SARA which might cause conflict between the many different ethnic groups in Indonesia. Despite these attempts, the ethnic identities of Indonesians have remained very important identities for people in Indonesia. However, the ethnic Chinese have a unique position within Indonesian national discourses. Since independence they have never been fully accepted as Indonesians and have been portrayed as “outsiders” who must make every effort to assimilate into the Indonesian nation.

Following the arguments of scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson I argue that nationalism is a modern concept which emerged during a
period of industrial and communicative revolution during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Scholars argue that two distinct types of nationalism — civic and ethnic — developed at this time. The civic type of nationalism encourages loyalty to the territory and to the public institutions of the state. The ethnic form of nationalism celebrates the ethnic characteristics of the members of a nation. This has led scholars to argue that civic types of nations are more open to ethnic diversity than ethnic nations. Since Indonesia is such an ethnically diverse country, this has led scholars to argue that Indonesia is a civic nation. I argue that the literature has not taken account of the extent to which the ethnic Chinese have not been accepted as genuine Indonesians. Therefore, I consider Indonesia to be an indigenist nation, where indigenous groups are accepted as Indonesian, but non-indigenous groups are not.

Writers on nationalism have argued that the discourse of nationalism is a culturally homogenising discourse. That is, in order for a nation to function, an homogenous culture must develop. In chapter three I discussed a number of discourses which question the homogenous nature of the nation. The discourses I chose have particular relevance to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The literature on "multiculturalism" questions to what extent minority groups should lose their ethnic identities, and to what extent the state should make allowances for their particular traditions. Questions raised within this literature touch on issues which the Chinese Indonesian groups are grappling with, such as, whether an ethnic group should be permitted to use its language, whether ethnic group members are needed to represent their own communities and to what extent minority groups should integrate. However, this literature is not entirely satisfactory because Indonesia is unlike many of the countries — mainly Western countries — which scholars of multiculturalism study. Unlike those countries, which have long histories of independence, Indonesia has struggled to develop a strong national identity into which ethnic groups might assimilate. Therefore, the Chinese Indonesian groups discussed in this research are not looking for special treatment as such, rather they are asking to be treated in the same way as indigenous ethnic groups in Indonesia.
Another kind of identity, which undermines the cultural homogeneity of the nation is that of “diaspora”. From the establishment of the website huaren.org, which was established after the violence of 1998 in Indonesia, it is clear that ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are included as part of the Chinese diaspora both by other ethnic Chinese, and by scholars writing in the field. I question whether this should be the case. Elaine Tay writes that the difference between an “ethnic groups” and a “diaspora” is that the diaspora maintains links with the original homeland. Emmanuel Ma Mung highlights the importance of active engagement with other members of the diaspora. Among the groups I interviewed this active engagement with the Chinese diaspora and with China was not evident.

Although the groups studied in this thesis are interested in their Chinese heritage, I argue that they are mainly trying to find a place for themselves within the Indonesian nation. Chapter four and five of this thesis discussed the ways the ethnic Chinese have been treated since independence and the organisations which they established. All of the organisations were focused on ensuring that Chinese Indonesians were included in nationalist discourses. This is even the case for Baperki, an organisation which insisted that Chinese Indonesians should be permitted to express their Chinese heritage, but which was also dedicated to Indonesia, working closely with Sukarno and establishing educational facilities teaching the Indonesian curriculum.

After the alleged coup attempt of 1965, Suharto came to power and instigated a policy of assimilation for the ethnic Chinese. The outward expression of Chinese culture was banned and Chinese Indonesians were strongly encouraged to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones. However, the ethnic Chinese were also prevented from fully assimilating because their identity cards included a code which allowed the authorities to know who was ethnic Chinese. Intermarriage was also encouraged, however, the children of an ethnic Chinese father are up to this day still considered non-pribumi even if their mother is indigenous. Despite these difficulties it seems from the small amount of empirical research carried out during the New Order that the ethnic Chinese felt themselves to be Indonesians, and felt no real connection with China, the land of their ancestors.
The violence in 1998 and the fall of the Suharto regime has allowed the ethnic Chinese to explore their cultural heritage in an open way for the first time in thirty-two years. It is not just the ethnic Chinese who have grievances they wish to voice. In post-Suharto Indonesia there are feelings among many non-Javanese that they have not had the access to power that they deserve. Groups other than the Chinese were discriminated against, under-represented in élite positions, and felt aggrieved after 1998. This does not just refer to those in Aceh, and West Papua who are fighting for independence, but also people in Kalimantan and Sumatra who are also underrepresented in élite positions. These are discourses with which the Chinese are now also engaging and demanding a voice in the running of the nation.

However, Chinese Indonesians have a very unique position in Indonesian society. It is very difficult to over-emphasise how radical the activities of the ethnic Chinese groups are. The position of Chinese Indonesians has improved enormously after 1998. Chinese Indonesians have become more vocal in their demands for action by the government to bring people to account for the persecution the Chinese have suffered. On May 11 2000, for example, about 25 young ethnic Chinese held a demonstration outside the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. This demonstration was co-ordinated by members of SIMPATIK. They were demanding that the former President, Suharto, and various police and military commanders be put on trial for the attacks on Chinese homes and businesses, as well as the rape of ethnic Chinese women, in the riots of May 1998. This was the first public demonstration by the Chinese-Indonesian community for over thirty years (Wagner, 11 May 2000). It is now possible for Chinese Indonesians to learn Chinese, display Chinese characters, celebrate Chinese New Year and declare on their identification cards that they are Confucian.

Despite the more open environment which developed after 1998, by coming together and organising themselves into groups, the Chinese Indonesians discussed in this thesis seem to be falling into the stereotype of exclusive behaviour. However, as I discussed in chapters seven and eight, the groups are adamant that Chinese Indonesians should behave appropriately and show loyalty to Indonesia. The symbolism the groups use illustrates the efforts they have made
to show that they are Indonesia-focused. They also highlight the length of time ethnic Chinese have been in Indonesia and the role they played in the struggle for independence. However, they are also enthusiastically encouraging people to learn about their Chinese heritage. Many of the groups also include Chinese symbolism on their documentation and they reject the New Order policy of assimilation. However, the ways they discuss China in their media and in interviews with me has led me to the conclusion that although they relish the opportunity to celebrate their Chinese heritage, they understand this heritage to be an Indonesian heritage, and they delight in being included in Indonesian cultural activities. In fact, the celebration of their Chinese heritage by the groups in the post-1998 environment is not very surprising, since all “indigenous” ethnic groups in Indonesia are permitted to celebrate their ethnic identities and Chinese Indonesian groups are asking that they be treated the same way as all other ethnic groups in Indonesia. However, as a result of the anti-Chinese stereotypes, which do not include them within the discourse on Indonesian nationalism, it may not be possible for the groups to achieve their joint aims of overcoming anti-Chinese stereotypes and having their Chinese heritage accepted within Indonesia.

The image below highlights the extent to which ethnic Chinese have still not been accepted as genuine Indonesians. It appeared in January 2001 in Indonesia’s most respected political magazine, *Tempo*.

![Figure 13: “Ethnic Chinese Still Out in the Cold”](image-url)
After having argued in this thesis that Chinese Indonesians are trying to find a genuine place for themselves within Indonesian society, the picture is incredibly depressing. Although both figures are obviously being friendly to each other, the exaggerated Chinese features and clothing of the person on the right portrays him as very different to the Indonesian person on the left. The image was used to illustrate a survey-article entitled “Ethnic Chinese Still Out in the Cold”. In this article 511 people were asked a number of questions relating to the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 58 percent replied “yes” in response to the question, “would you mind if a close relative married a member of the Chinese community”. In response to another question — Do you agree with ethnic Chinese using their own languages in everyday communication? — 78 percent replied “no”. Another question asking whether Imlek (Chinese New Year) should be a national holiday, did elicit a positive response with 59 percent of respondents replied “yes” while 41 percent said “no”.

This article highlights how the negative attitudes towards Chinese Indonesians, which were evident in the newspaper articles in 1998, and which I discussed in chapter five, still seem to be evident in 2001. The article also highlights how positive changes which the government introduced (see below) in relation to the ethnic Chinese after 1998 have not been accompanied by changes in social attitudes towards Chinese Indonesians.

According to GANDI, at the end of the New Order regime there were 62 pieces of legislation which discriminated against the ethnic Chinese. The new government did set about changing some of these discriminatory laws after the fall of the Suharto regime. On 13 November 1998 the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) revoked the 1978 decree on the implementation of the rules of Pancasila (Decision No.2/MPR/1978). During the New Order regime the government were the only official interpreters of Pancasila. The press, at this time, were constantly reminded to avoid writing “tendentiously or sensationaly” about issues relating to suku (ethnic group), agama (religion), ras (race), and antar-golongan (inter-group affairs) (Idris and Gunaratne, 2000: 272). In 1998 in its place a decree requiring that all state institutions enforce all the United Nations conventions on human
rights was endorsed (Decision No.17/MPR/1998) (Idris and Gunaratne, 2000: 271). Habibie's government ratified the UN convention against discrimination which was meant to ensure that all citizens had equal rights under the law (Anwar, 2001: 10). They also banned the use of pribumi and non-pribumi in government documents and issued a presidential instruction allowing the teaching of Chinese (Allen, 2001).

After the elections of 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, of PKB (The National Awakening Party) became President, with Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) as his vice-President. Decree No. 41 1967 which banned activities relating to Chinese culture was revoked by Wahid with Decree No.6 2000. This meant that in 2000, for the first time since 1967, Chinese-Indonesians were permitted to celebrate Chinese New Year (FEER, 2000: 15). However, in a move which showed the volatility of the situation, the government called for modest celebrations to be held that year. Home Minister Surjadi Sudirja urged that "celebratory activities should also respect the national cohesion and unity context, not be exclusive and if necessary also invite neighbours [to the celebrations]" (The Straits Times, 20 January 2000). The ban on the display of Chinese characters was overturned by Abdurrachman Wahid in law no.62 2001.

Abdurrahman Wahid visited Beijing in December 1999, and during a speech at Beijing University he declared that his daughter was studying Mandarin, and he hoped that "one day she will be here, learning Chinese more fully from you, because I come from Chinese stock". He told the audience that his ancestors went to Indonesia from Xinjiang Autonomous Region 500 years previously (Lawrence, 16 December 1999). During Chinese New Year celebrations in 2000, Wahid also stated that he had Chinese blood. This was reported in the Chinese Indonesian press (see Mandarin Pos, February 2001: 11 and Mandarin Pos, April 2001: 11).

After a protracted struggle during 2001 Wahid was removed from office and Megawati took over the Presidency. In 2001 Megawati revoked the use of Cina and reinstated the formal use of Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian) and Tiongkok (China) for the first time since 1966 (Allen, 2001). In 2002 she announced that
from the following year Chinese New Year would be an official holiday in Indonesia.

Despite these advances there are fundamental changes which Chinese Indonesians have been calling for, but which have still not been tackled by the government. One of the problems which remains for Chinese Indonesians relates to the issues of "assimilation" and "integration". It seems from the actions of governments since 1998 that they have given up their policy of assimilation, however, whether this indicates that there is now room for the ethnic Chinese in the national identity of the country, is still not clear. Certainly the views expressed in the Tempo article above, suggest that changes in social attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese have not yet occurred.

As well as the confusion over the issue of assimilation in the post-Suharto era, the other main issue for the ethnic Chinese is that of citizenship. As was the case during the New Order period, each new generation of ethnic Chinese must make a choice about their Indonesian citizenship. They do not automatically get Indonesian citizenship when they are born. Until they are eighteen years old they are placed on their father’s citizenship papers, after this age they must apply to the government for a citizenship document of their own. Non-Chinese Indonesians automatically receive Indonesian citizenship when they are born. There have been calls to repeal Law No.3/1946 and Law No.62/1958 which deal with this issue (Jakarta Post, 25 March 2000). This is a more fundamental issue than allowing the ethnic Chinese to celebrate Chinese New Year. Providing Chinese Indonesians with automatic citizenship would send a clear message that they were accepted as genuine Indonesians. The groups discussed in this thesis campaign for changes in this law, however, they have not yet been successful.

A wide range of scholars, writing on post-Suharto Indonesia, have emphasised the importance of the government engaging in new ways with the discourses of national identity, not just to improve relations with the ethnic Chinese, but also with many other groups in Indonesia. Benedict Anderson argues that if Indonesia is serious about resuming the nation-building project, then, an overhaul of the complete governmental system is needed. In a public lecture, in Jakarta, on 4 March 1999, Anderson argued that nationalism is a project which "is never finally
complete. It must be struggled for in every generation". Anderson argued that too many Indonesian people think of Indonesia as an "inheritance" rather than a challenge for the future (Anderson, 1999: 8). He uses the example of a baby born in Madura. She may already be considered Indonesian, but the baby is not aware of this. "The process whereby she will become for herself an Indonesian, with an Indonesian spirit, an Indonesian commitment, and an Indonesian culture, is a long one, with no guarantee of success". In order to succeed Indonesia needs to be "large-hearted and broadminded enough to accept the real variety and complexity of the national society" (Anderson, 1999: 7).

A. Malik Gismar questions the continued usefulness of the concept of Pancasila in post-Suharto Indonesia (2002). In his article, "Missing: Homo Pancasilaensis" Gismar discusses how Sukarno and Suharto tried to inculcate the idea of Pancasila and create homo pancasilaensis in order to overcome feelings of inferiority among post-colonial Indonesians. They tried to ensure that Pancasila became an important source of national and personal identity for the people. Gismar concludes from his research that this is not the case post-1998, if it ever was the case. Gismar asked 100 university students in Jakarta to answer two questions: when you think of Indonesia, what comes to mind and when you think of yourself, what comes to mind? None of his respondents mentioned Pancasila. Donald Emmerson also carried out some empirical research on this topic. He discusses a survey of 182 first-year students from Atma Jaya University in Yogyakarta which was carried out in 2001. They were asked: "When you hear the word ‘Indonesia’, what first occurs to you? What do you associate it with?”. In their answers Pancasila was not mentioned and only twelve percent mentioned the national motto “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” or the national flag (Emmerson, 2002). This research seems to correspond with the difficulties my interviewees had in articulating their Indonesian identities. The group members know that they want to be considered Indonesian but they find it difficult to say what it means to be Indonesian other than to accept diversity.

Another aspect of Indonesian national history which has been opened up by the fall of the Suharto regime, and an investigation of which could have positive repercussions for the ethnic Chinese, is a potential revisiting of the events of
1965. Robert Cribb suggests that censorship and self-censorship which was dominant during the New Order regime, were considered by many scholars to be the main reason why Indonesians were reticent about exploring the reasons for the killings. It was expected that with the fall of Suharto Indonesians would be keen to explore this period of their history (Cribb, 2002: 559). A number of organisations have started investigating the events of 1965 and demanding that the government establish an investigating commission. These organisations include the Institute for Research into the Victims of the 1965-1966 Killings (YPKP, Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66), Solidarity for Motherland and Nation (SNB, Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa) and Volunteer Team for Humanity (TRUK, Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan). However, Cribb suggests that the demands for an official investigation are not as widespread as was first expected. This may be because Indonesians have faced so many more practical, more immediate problems in the post-Suharto period. There also seems to be an unwillingness on the part of those in power to delve into the past, perhaps because many of them may have been involved in the violence themselves (Cribb, 2002: 560-561).

Another prominent Indonesian writer, Goenawan Mohamad, argues that “what we need now is a different notion of ‘Indonesia’. Not as wide geography. Not as an impenetrable fort. But as unfinished historical project: a nation will never be finished once and for all, for it must always answer to ‘determining circumstances’ that will keep on changing” (Mohamad, 2001). Goenawan Mohamad sums up the essence of Indonesian national identity rather succinctly. He states that “a nation is finally indeed a project. ‘Indonesia’ is an endeavour of millions of people who differ from one another, to try living together in one community...But it must be said this is not merely an experiment to bring about something practical and useful. For there is something touching, something meaningful, something that rouses both enthusiasm and anxious hopes in that project.

From what these writers are observing it seems the government in post-Suharto Indonesia are not grappling with the issues of what it means to be Indonesian to the extent that many thought they would after the end of the New Order. So, where
does this ongoing need for an engagement on the part of the government with discourses of national identity, leave the ethnic Chinese? Actually, the situation is rather worrying. The government permits Chinese Indonesians to express their Chinese heritage, but, this heritage is still perceived as foreign. Their behaviour has not yet been accepted as Indonesian. This still leave Chinese Indonesians in a very precarious position and could be quite dangerous in the future. Daniel Lev suggests that what is needed in order to end discrimination is education in schools about the history of the Chinese in Indonesia: education which is open and honest and accurate (Lev, 2000: 24). This has not happened so far. Although the government has begun to allow Chinese culture to be openly displayed, they have not begun the process of representing the ethnic Chinese as genuine Indonesians within Indonesian national discourses. As long as this does not happen, the ethnic Chinese will remain outside the discourses of Indonesian national identity.
Appendix

Interview Questions

Information About the Organisations

Why did you establish the organisation?
Why did you join this organisation?
When was the organisation established?
How many members does the organisation have?
How many non-Chinese members?
How many women are there in the organisation?
What are the aims of the organisation?
What does the organisation want to achieve?
What activities have the organisation organised?
Do you work with non-Chinese organisations?
Where does the organisation get its money from?
Are Chinese Indonesian organisations needed to represent the ethnic Chinese?

Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian Identities

What part of Indonesia do you come from?
Where do your parents come from?
Are your parents ethnic Chinese?
What profession do they have?
Do they maintain any links with China?
Have you even visited China?
Would they like you to marry/have you married an ethnic Chinese person or non-Chinese?
Would you like your children to marry an ethnic Chinese?
Have you ever visited China?
Do you speak Chinese?
Do you read Chinese?
If you read or speak the language where did you learn it?
Do you know Chinese stories?
What kind of area were you brought up in? (an ethnic Chinese or a mixed area)
What kind of area do you live in now? (an ethnic Chinese or a mixed area)
What religion do you practice? What religion did your parents practice?
Do you have problems in your area because you are ethnic Chinese?
Do you mix with non-Chinese through your work?
Do you find you are/have been treated differently because you are ethnically Chinese?
Are you interested in Chinese culture?
In your family do you/did you celebrate Chinese culture?
Do you send your children to state or private school?
Do you feel part of a transnational Chinese community?
Do you have links with ethnic Chinese in other countries?
Do you feel in any way Chinese or is it just a label placed on you by others?
Do you have a good relationship with bureaucrats?
Do you pay extra for services?

*Future Prospects for Chinese Indonesians.*

How has your life changed, if at all, since the end of the Suharto government?
Do you think that the ethnic Chinese people should be allowed to speak Chinese in public?
Do you think that ethnic Chinese should be allowed to celebrate Chinese New Year?
What do you think can be done to improve relations between the ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese in Indonesia?
Can something be done in the education system to improve relations between the Chinese and non-Chinese?
Do you fear what will happen if Gus Dur lost his job?
What should the government do to improve relations between Chinese and non-Chinese?
What are your opinions about government activity in relation to ethnic Chinese since 1998?
Do you want the ethnic Chinese to be accepted as a *suku*?
Do you think that ethnic Chinese politicians are needed to represent the interests of Chinese Indonesians?
Is it important to you that Chinese Indonesians become more involved in politics?
Are the ethnic Chinese already Indonesian? If not, what should they do to become Indonesian?

What term do you want used to describe your ethnic group? Is *Cina* acceptable?

Are you hopeful for the future?
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-- (7 July 1998b) “Cina Kecil yang Terkena Getah” [Poor Chinese Who Still Feel the Repercussions].


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