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Rethinking the Practices of UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Early Post-Cold War Era:
The Implications of the Cases of Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo

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Acknowledgments

War gives birth to sorrow. Though the end of the Cold War has dramatically reduced the possibility of an outbreak of total war between super powers, a number of civil wars and intra-state conflicts have erupted in many regions since the event. Not only people who have lost their family and friends in civil wars and massacres during the early the post-Cold War era, but also people who have had to fight for peace in the troubled areas might need to cross 'the river of sorrow'. It does not seem even in the far future that war and conflict will be removed from human history. The continuing eruption of war and conflict will make the river flow on and on. How do we the international community encounter this fate safely crossing the river for a more peaceful and just human society in the future? This thesis has grown with this question within my interest and experience in the study of peace and humanitarian affairs.

I greatly appreciate the assiduous and thoughtful supervision of my first supervisor, Dr. Rhiannon Vickers. She has guided me through the years with invaluable help and skillful management in co-supervision with Professor Andrew Taylor, my second supervisor. I am also deeply grateful to him for his very helpful comments and careful advice. Professor Rein Müllerson, an international law and human rights expert in the School of Law at King's College London, greatly influenced my legal approach to this thesis. His class and books have been very useful sources of analysis of the legal aspects of UN peacekeeping operations and the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. I am greatly thankful to him. My academic achievement through this thesis owes much to Professor Sung-Hak Kang at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy in Korea University, who has been a source of academic inspiration to me. I specially thank him. Sarah Cooke, the postgraduate research secretary of the department, has provided tireless support in many administrative aspects of this thesis and my research at the department. Her beautiful smile will never be forgotten whenever I remember my days at Sheffield.
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To Eun-joo, my wife, I express my thanks for more than I can say. This thesis and my life as well owe her an enormous debt. Her tireless support and warm-hearted care have been greatly helpful to overcome many difficulties and hindrances in conducting this research. Many thanks also to my parents for bearing with my preoccupation with this study and providing a supportive environment in which the thesis has been successfully completed. Some friends at Sheffield also deserve a special mention. I was very fortunate to have Caroline Palmer, Joseph Chiu, Teng-Chi Chang (Simon), Wedekind Fabian, and Yuki Abe as colleagues.
Abstract

This thesis examines the practice of UN peacekeeping operations during the first decade of the post-Cold War era, focusing on three cases: Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. During the early 1990s, the international community escalated its expectations of and demands upon the UN and its peacekeepers for massive and expanded interventions to deal with increased intra-state conflicts. In this sense, the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were the test cases of the UN's capabilities and the political willingness of the international community. Many believe that the peacekeeping experiences in both regions were one of the most important developments for the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. This thesis argues that the operations in Somalia and Bosnia were not evidence of the evolution of peacekeeping, but were cases of the misuse of peacekeeping techniques, and furthermore that this misuse was the key reason for the failures of the operations. In other words, the deployment of UN peacekeepers to places where there was no peace to keep deeply affected the outbreak of the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia. The decision-makers of the UN and member states of the Security Council employed an inappropriate measure to tackle the crises that required well-prepared military enforcement actions in terms of planning and capabilities including structured command and control systems. As an agential factor of the failures in Somalia and Bosnia, the misuse of peacekeeping techniques was deeply affected by the structural features of the post-Cold War order: the increase of intra-state or regional armed conflicts with intense hostility on an unprecedented scale and the construction of an identity by Western governments to tackle conflicts stemming from the widespread belief of the 'liberal triumph' in the early post-Cold War era. For the better performance of future peacekeeping operations, the Kosovo intervention has taught two useful lessons: the major involvement of regional military organization and use of air power.
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (<em>Bosna i Hercegovina</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>DLK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN Secretariat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EISAS</td>
<td>ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALD</td>
<td>Field Administration and Logistics Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Yugoslav Army (<em>Jugoslovenska Armija</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDAM</td>
<td>Joint Direct Attack Munition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army (<em>Jugoslavenska narodna armija</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCY</td>
<td>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Operation of the United Nations in Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo)</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Precision Guided Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QFR</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Presidential Review Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAD</td>
<td>Suppression of Enemy Air Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Task Force</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPAs</td>
<td>United Nations Protected Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangements System</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOB</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC/SNA</td>
<td>United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOPP</td>
<td>Vance-Owen Peace Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>YPA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

UN peacekeeping operations were born of necessity in 1948 when the UN intervened in the first Middle East war. Since its birth, peacekeeping has played an important role in maintaining international peace and security. In terms of global security, it is one of the most innovative and useful creations in the modern history of international relations. For five decades, military and civilian personnel from many countries have carried out under the UN flag tremendous tasks to save lives in danger, implement settlement to conflicts, and preserve peace in troubled areas. Their efforts in hostile and dangerous circumstances have played a significant role in reducing the level of conflict over the globe. UN peacekeeping forces received the Nobel Peace Prize for 1988.¹

With the end of the Cold War UN peacekeeping operations suddenly seemed reborn. The change of the international system dramatically increased the demands on the UN and its peacekeepers for massive and more effective interventions to tackle the conflicts in the post-Cold War order. There emerged an optimistic expectation of the UN’s role in maintaining the post-Cold War international peace and security. The first half of the 1990s was the period when the increased demands and expectation were matching the complex and dangerous realities on the ground. The interventions in Somalia and Bosnia were the test cases of the UN’s capability and the political will of the international community in terms of conflict resolution of the post-Cold War order. Unlike the optimistic expectation and notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm to tackle intra-states crises, the results in Somalia and Bosnia were very unsatisfactory and eventually not

¹ UN agencies, and mission bodies or persons have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 7 times since 1950: The prize for 2001 to the UN and UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan; 1988 to UN peacekeeping forces; 1981 to UNHCR (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva); 1969 to the UN labour agency, ILO (International Labour Organization); 1965 to UNICEF (The United Nations Children’s Fund); 1961 to UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld; 1954 to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR (Geneva); 1950 to UN Middle East mediator in Palestine, Professor Jeremy Ralph Bunche (Nobelpize.org 2007).
successful. What is interesting is that in the Kosovo crisis the international community chose multilateral armed intervention by NATO from the initial stage of its intervention instead of using peacekeeping techniques under the auspices of the UN like in Somalia and Bosnia. Its response to the Kosovo conflict was also very different from the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia in that the intervening states heavily depended on the use of air power rather than sending massive ground troops. Why did the international community react differently to the conflicts? This fundamental question has led me to conduct this study. This introductory chapter begins by outlining the main research questions and arguments before going on to explain the choice of case studies and research methods.

1.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations and the End of the Cold War

It is difficult to subsume peacekeeping operations under any one clause of the Charter. When the UN was founded, its creators established the collective security system in Chapter VII of the Charter to maintain international peace and security. Due to the political stalemate between the West and East in the Security Council, it was impossible to properly implement the collective system during the Cold War era. Instead of using the system, which rarely came into being under the constraints of the Cold War, attempts were made to give the UN any means possible that could tackle conflict and contribute to peace. Peacekeeping operations were the attempts. The first peacekeeping mission was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)\(^2\), which initially came into being during the first Middle East war of 1948 to supervise the truce in Palestine between Israel and Arab countries. The Swedish UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, asked UN Headquarters to send urgently a small group of officers to help him monitor the cease-fire. He requested 21 observers each from the three member states of the Palestine Commission

\(^2\) UNTSO is the oldest peacekeeping mission body, which is still working. The unarmed observers of UNTSO remain today in the region to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours after the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973.
(Belgium, France, and the United States) with a further five staff officers from Sweden. The Secretary-General Trygve Lie responded by asking the states to make such officers available to the United Nations, and also made available 51 guards, recruited from the Secretariat's security force at Headquarters, to assist the observers. The Security Council finally passed its resolution 50 (1948) to form the basis of what would become UNTSO (United Nations 1996a: 17-20). It was the beginning of the history of UN peacekeeping operations.

The UN and international community faced a major crisis as the second Middle East war erupted in 1956. The forces of Israel, the UK, and France occupied large portions of Egyptian territory including the Suez Canal area. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, and Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of External Affairs of Canada (Foreign minister of Canada) reacted with speed and firmness. To tackle the crisis, they considered a new – somewhat larger – operation, which was the first to be armed and was very different from UNTSO because the tasks of the operation would be to supervise not only the cease-fire but also the withdrawal of the armies of Israel and two super powers from the Suez Canal area. Thus, the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established as the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 997 (ES-I\(^3\)) on 2 November and 1000 (ES-I) on 5 November 1956. These resolutions refer to the creation of a peacekeeping force and the first large-scale armed peacekeeping operation. Soon after that the resolutions were adopted, Dag Hammarskjöld submitted to the General Assembly a report on the plan for the emergency international United Nations Force for UNEF on 6 November 1956 (United Nations 1996a: 35-7). In this report, he defined the concept of the force and provided principles for the organisation and guidelines on its functions. Eventually, the practices of UNEF according to the report established many of the principles and guidelines on which later operations have heavily relied, including the three basic principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force in self-defence only. Most of the detailed rules and specific ways and means of quickly setting up and running a peacekeeping operation

\(^3\) This is a sequential code used to identify the General Assembly sessions. ES-I means 'the first emergency special' session.
emerged from actual practice, in which the Security Council and Secretariat played a major part.

The end of the Cold War brought both chances of properly implementing peacekeeping escaping from the constraints of the Cold War and challenges of planning and conducting the increased and enlarged operations in terms of their number and size within complex contexts. Regarding the practices of peacekeeping in the early post-Cold War period, much of the debate about the nature of the practices revolves around the difference between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Traditional peacekeeping is normally contingent on the existence of a genuine political agreement between the parties to the conflict. Military operations of traditional peacekeeping missions are undertaken with the consent of all major parties concerned and are designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a cease-fire and/or truce agreement between them. They also function to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement of crisis. In this sense, traditional peacekeeping operations are part of an overall package of assistance to a peace process facilitated by the UN.

By contrast, Chapter VII enforcement actions are means to restore peace in an area of ongoing conflict. They may be needed when all other diplomatic and pacific efforts fail. Thus, peace-enforcement is almost a war-fighting mission, which includes low-level military operation to support humanitarian assistance. Fundamentally, the UN does not wage war. To maintain international peace and security the UN can authorise the use of force within enforcement contexts including war-fighting. The legal right to use force is entrusted not to the UN itself but coalitions of willing member states. Two examples are the Korean War in 1950 and Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in the Gulf War authorised by Resolution 678 (1991) (United Nations Security Council 1991d). Peace-enforcement is basically a legal, not a military term. It means all coercive actions, both non-military and military, authorised under Chapter VII. When the Security Council perceives that enforcement action is required, the member states of the Council collectively identify an aggressor and takes action using an escalating ladder of means until its aggression is stopped.

The domain between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is a ‘doctrinal
void’, which is a vaguely defined area in terms of military activity. Ruggie (1993) dubbed the domain the ‘grey zone’ in his famous article, ‘Wandering in the Void: Charting the U.N.’s New Strategic Role’. Regarding the UN’s experience of peacekeeping operations in the early and mid-1990s, it is obvious that the UN and international community has got themselves into serious trouble by entering the grey zone without any guiding operational concept and proper preparations. The interventions in Somalia and Bosnia were the result. In both regions the majority of the blue-helmeted peacekeepers out in the field served within contexts for which peacekeeping was not intended. They continued to conduct their missions under inadequate rules of engagement and with frequently insufficient equipment somewhere between traditional peacekeeping mission and war-fighting.

The UN and international community strategically and operationally failed in Somalia and Bosnia. The first research question of this thesis is: **What has brought the UN and states involved in the interventions to the point of outright strategic failure?** The practices of peace-enforcement actions by UN peacekeepers in both regions have made many believe that UN peacekeeping operations have radically evolved from traditional peacekeeping through the early post-Cold War era. For them, peacekeeping operations of this era are a comprehensive mission, which includes other kinds of peace operations, such as preventive actions, peacemaking, and state-building. Cerjan (1994) argues that ‘peacekeeping today is a term applied to a wide range of activities, including monitoring and supervision of cease-fires, stabilization of war zones, preventive military deployments, disarming of forces, monitoring of elections, administering transitions to new government, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, maintenance of civil order, state building, and peace-enforcement’ (p.4). From this perspective, the failure in Somalia and Bosnia can be understood as a problem of conducting the interventions. Put differently, if the UN and the states involved did properly in carrying out the peacekeeping operations there, the result of the interventions would have been successful. My hypothesis has a different perspective: **the interventions of the UN and international community in the regions could not be successful because they used peacekeeping techniques as a means of intervention.** That is to say, they used the wrong measure. The operations in Somalia and Bosnia
were not evidence of the evolution, but were cases of the misuse of peacekeeping techniques. I argue that the misuse of peacekeeping in an environment that required enforcement actions to be conducted was the primary cause of the failure in Somalia and Bosnia. In the first half of the 1990s its growing misuse did strain the UN materially and institutionally. I think this is the reason why the UN could not satisfy the optimistic expectations of the international society for a more active and enlarged role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security in the early post-Cold War period. It is one of the key purposes of this study to verify the hypothesis answering the first research question.

There is the other aim of this research. Some scholars such as Ruggie (1993) and Ghebali (1995) also talk about the misuse of peacekeeping operations in the cases of post-Cold War interventions. However, it does not seem that there are many studies, which give emphasis to answering this question: What caused the misuse of peacekeeping? I answer the two research questions through examining and comparatively analysing three cases.

### 1.2 The Analytical Framework and Case Studies

As mentioned in the previous section, this thesis poses two research questions: ‘What has brought the UN and states involved in the interventions to the point of outright strategic failure?’ and ‘Why did the UN and international community inappropriately use peacekeeping as a means to tackle the crises in such hostile environments inadequate for their missions?’ These two questions are answered through the three case studies: Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and the answers are comparatively analysed in Chapter 6. Both questions are examined within the analytical framework of the structure-agency interrelationship. The ‘structure-agency’ question is one of the most important theoretical issues in the social sciences. It seems almost unavoidable that any type of explanation will employ a position on structure and agency to examine the causality of political events. Agency refers to ‘individual or group abilities’ to affect their environment.
Structure usually means the contexts or conditions, which ‘define the range of actions available to actors’ (McAnulla 2002: 271). Some scholars heavily rely on structural factors in explaining political events. They are dubbed structuralist. Others tend to focus on actors of political events, studying the intention and behaviour of individuals and/or human groups. This kind of explanatory approach is labelled as intentionalism. Some contemporary social scientists have formulated quite clear and influential theoretical positions on the relationship. Such positions, like Giddens’s structuration theory and Archer’s morphogenetic approach, are usually referred to as ‘dialectical approaches’. They have attempted to overcome the theoretical limitations of both structuralism and intentionalism by examining the interactions and relationship between structure and agency in shaping the course of political events and phenomena. One of the most notable attempts was the strategic-relational approach of Jessop and Hay.

Like Giddens’s theory of structuration, the strategic-relational approach also recognises the artificial dualism of structure and agency. However, there are two clear distinctions between the strategic-relational approach and structuration theory. First, differing from Giddens’s understanding of the dualism, Jessop and Hay argue that structure and agency are indeed different. Second, they insist on the idea that agents are reflexive and formulate strategies within the ‘strategically selective context’ to tackle the problems, which are created by the context. For Jessop and Hay, actors are conscious, reflexive, and strategic. The strategic actions of agents within structural circumstances are continuously changed through an active process of ‘strategic learning’. As a key concept of the approach, ‘strategic action’ provides an essential theoretical link between structure and agency because it is how an agent interacts with structure. Strategic action of actors yields two things: ‘direct effects’ and ‘strategic learning’ (Hay 2002: 126-33). In some occasions, behaviour and decision-making of actors directly affect structure, producing a partial transformation of the structured context, like the effects of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost upon the end of the Cold War. Through the process of strategic learning, agents are able to reformulate their identities and interests within the constraints and/or opportunities of the structured context and then engage in their strategically re-calculated actions.
Agential and structural factors are all important in explaining political events or phenomena. They should be to some extent equally considered as analytical perspectives. Archer suggests that 'the key to avoiding structuralism or intentionalism is not, as Giddens proposes, to conflate structure and agency, but rather to examine how structure and agency relate to one another over time' (McAnulla 2002: 285). In this sense, what is needed in explaining political events is to examine how the factors affected each other. I employ this perspective of the structure-agency interrelations to analyse each case. Thus, each case study is conducted in both agential and structural analytical frameworks and then analysed within the perspective of the interrelationship between structure and agency.

This thesis does not set out to 'test' the strategic-relational approach. Rather, it borrows from the approach a way of analysing the interrelation between structure and agency. Since the key purpose of this thesis is not to verify the theoretical pretensions of the approach but to review the practices of UN peacekeeping operations in the early and mid-1990s, I would here neither provide a synthetic explanation of the approach itself nor pull together the pieces of explaining it in various perspectives. I only employ its theoretical structure to comparatively analyse the case studies. Thus, the epistemological and ontological basis of constructivism is not deeply discussed in this thesis.

As mentioned above, the analytical framework of this research is inspired by the strategic-relational approach in terms of the following two epistemological perspectives: the structure-agency interrelationship concerning the formation of identity and interest of actors; and strategic action of agent within the strategically selective context of structure. The key factors of the explanatory framework of the thesis are national interests of the intervening states in peace operations and the humanitarian trends of the post-Cold War era. I regard the geopolitical context of each conflict in the 1990s and humanitarian trends of the post-Cold War era as a structure, in which the intervening states in peace operations formulated their identities and interests. These are two crucial motives of state behaviour, which make states choose between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement action including war-fighting within the post-Cold War structure. That is to say, as the end of the Cold War was ushered in, the leading states of the international community
formulated their identities and interests within the post-Cold War context, and then they strategically chose peace-enforcement actions with peacekeeping techniques in Somalia and Bosnia. In acting on hard-learned lessons from the interventions in both regions, the states reproduced their actions against threats to international peace and security. The Kosovo intervention was a product of the reformulated strategy and intention of the states through the process of strategic learning.

The central research strategy of this thesis is based around the comparative analysis of the three case studies. My design of case study strategy is fundamentally a multiple-case design and the structure of the design is twofold: first, each case study exists independently to answer its own research questions; and then they are examined within the framework of the comparative analyses to answer the first main research question of the thesis. `Yin (2001) points out that in a multiple-case study, each case must be carefully selected considering whether it either predicts similar results to the other or predicts contrasting results (p.47). The Somalia and Bosnia cases are selected to find out the similarities between the reasons for the strategic and operational failures, and the Kosovo case is chosen to compare with the other two cases to examine its implications in terms of the way of intervention.

Regarding the selection of the cases, two important points were deeply considered. First, all the three conflicts were very brutal and complex cases, which UN peacekeepers could not tackle in terms of their facilities and mandates. Rather, they are the cases that required almost war-fighting missions with peace-enforcement mandates. However, the responses of the international community to these conflicts were very different. In Somalia and Bosnia, the UN and states intervened, using peacekeeping techniques within peace-enforcement circumstances. But, to tackle the Kosovo conflict, they chose multilateral armed intervention by the regional military organisation, heavily depending on the use of air power. What caused these differences of the strategic choices of the actors between the crises in the early 1990s and the conflict in the late 1990s? To answer this question is the key purpose of why the Somalia and Bosnia cases are comparatively examined to contrast with the Kosovo case.
The second point considered in terms of the research strategy of the comparative case studies is the success and failure of the interventions in the crises. The Somali and Bosnian interventions are very important cases among the peace operations in the post-Cold War era because they are the most unsatisfactory peacekeeping operations in the practices of UN peacekeeping. On the contrary, Kosovo is a relatively successful case. It is difficult to categorically state whether something is a success or not. The central focus of this thesis is not on whether or not the interventions were successful, but really why some actions were seen to have worked and some actions were not. Nonetheless, it is helpful to broadly define the three case studies in terms of which ones were successful. The criterion that I shall use is whether the key actors accomplished their stated objectives of the peacekeeping missions or armed actions.

In Somalia and Bosnia, it is obvious that the key actor, the UN, failed to achieve the objectives of the missions established by its mandates. The key objectives of the UN mission in Somalia were: to prevent any resumption of violence; to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organised factions; to seize the small arms of all unauthorised armed elements; and to secure or maintain security at all ports, airports, and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UN Secretary-General 1993b: paragraph 57). The attack on 5 June 1993 against Pakistani peacekeepers by Somali militiamen and the accident, Black Hawk Down, clearly mean that the peacekeepers failed to achieve the stated objectives and thus were not able to fulfill its mandate. In Bosnia, the UN and European states also failed to accomplish the key aims of their intervention: to protect UN-designated ‘safe areas’ and to prevent mass killings. The fall of Srebrenica was evidence of the failure of their mission. As the situation in the former Yugoslavia was getting worse, the UN Security Council had to continuously change UNPROFOR’s mandate, adopting new or revised resolutions on the mission. Thus, the UN strayed away from its original aims and consequently was unable to successfully complete their mission.

Unlike the Somalia and Bosnia cases, in Kosovo the UN played a minor role of supporting NATO and the EU in terms of ending the conflict. NATO and its leading member states successfully achieved their goals in the armed interventions.
Blair clearly stated the five objectives of the intervention in his speech at the Economic Club of Chicago: ‘a verifiable cessation of all combat activities and killings; the withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; the deployment of an international military force; the return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid; and a political framework for Kosovo building on the Ramnbouillet accords’ (Blair, 24 April 1999). In short, the ultimate aims of the NATO intervention have been clearly and unambiguously expressed by the leaders of the states involved: to stop Serb aggression against Kosovar Albanians and ensure the safe return of Kosovar refugees to their homes.

The military campaign of the intervention in Kosovo was conducted by the regional military organization and highly contingent on air strike strategy with the minimised use of ground force. Regarding these two points, the experience in Kosovo has some important implications at the strategic and operational level for the better performance of future peacekeeping operations. The Kosovo case is compared with the other two cases to examine the implications in the third section (6.3) of Chapter 6.

1.3 Qualitative Methods and Definitions of Key Terms

This thesis mainly employs qualitative methods. This is a generic term that refers to a range of techniques including observation, participant observation, document analysis, individual interviews, and focus group interviews. Many qualitative case studies combine more than one method. Multiple methods can be a good idea since researchers may improve the reliability of their arguments by examining various sources from different methods. The two qualitative methods, elite interviews and the use of documents, have been conducted throughout the duration of my PhD.

Interviewing was a method to collect qualitative data for the thesis. My interview strategy was semi-structured elite interviewing, which means a type of interview conducted within the context that an interviewer has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what an interviewee answers in addition to the
arranged sequence of questions. With the strategy I interviewed two UN officials during my field work in New York, and one British politician and one former British diplomat in London, who were deeply involved in the Yugoslav crisis: Mr Salman Ahmed, the Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations; Mr Frederick Mallya, Coordination Officer at the Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Lord David Owen, the former EU Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995; and Lord David Hannay, the former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations from 1990 to 1995.

As we know, a PhD thesis is required to form a distinct contribution to knowledge of the subject. To achieve this purpose PhD candidates need to discover new facts, or at least find evidence that supports the arguments in their thesis. In this sense, the interview is a useful tool for obtaining necessary data and thus a preferred method of social science as it allows researchers to probe deeply into issues or affords evidence of the originality of the discovery of new facts. Stedward (1997) raises two preliminary questions regarding interviewing as a research method: ‘Is an interview the best or only method available to gather the information required?’ and ‘Is it right for you concerning the techniques or processes of interviewing?’ (p.152). As to my research topic, interviewing was a very useful method to obtain internal information about UN peacekeeping operations. As the actions of the UN and international community to tackle the enormous human suffering associated with the post-Cold War conflicts which erupted from 1991, especially those in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, have increased, UN peacekeeping operations have become a popular issue among scholars and students of international relations and many academic works about it have been produced. Thus, in order to contribute to current knowledge of peacekeeping, it is essential to raise new arguments supported by original proof. Interviewing the UN officials, the British politician, and the British diplomat who had been involved in the operations in Somalia and Bosnia provided an opportunity for that.
Personal and official documents which can be derived from the United Nations, the United States, and media outputs have been collected through archival works in various libraries and searching the Internet during the whole period of my PhD. I conducted fieldwork in the United States from March to May 2005. The primary purpose of the research trip was to collect empirical qualitative or quantitative data required through conducting interviews and archival work. The question, where to go for fieldwork, definitely refers to the question: ‘where is the data?’ Research fieldwork should be conducted where what researchers seek to obtain exists. New York and Washington D.C. fully contained what I needed for my research, such as UN and U.S. government officials with plenty of knowledge and experience about the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and an enormous amount of relevant documentation in archives and libraries. The Library of Congress was the main archive I consulted. It is one of the world’s largest repositories of books and other printed materials. In the library I collected many useful primary and secondary sources as well. It was definitely the right choice to visit New York and Washington D.C. as a place for fieldwork.

The development of information and communication technology has dramatically changed the research environment. Through the Internet researchers can easily obtain data required for their research. Two points, however, should be clearly mentioned: first, the Internet does not contain all relevant data for research; second, researchers cannot find out about the existence of useful documents by only surfing the Internet. For example, I found one document, the so-called ‘PDD 25’ (Presidential Decision Directive), during my archival work in Washington D.C. This document was very useful for my thesis because it is an internal policy review of the Clinton Administration about U.S. involvements in peacekeeping operations until 1994. While the details of the actual Secret PDD 25 are still concealed from public scrutiny, an unclassified summary of PDD 25 was released onto the Internet. I did not even know of the existence of the document before the archival work in the Library of Congress. I came to know the existence in the course of consulting a GAO report, which was discovered through consulting with librarians and directly visiting the Government Accountability Office in downtown Washington D.C.
Consequently, the Internet is a very useful tool for data collection. However, it may not be a primary repository for the archival works of academic research.

The materials and data collected through archival work and surfing the Internet have been thoroughly examined and analysed to verify the hypothesis of this study and answer the questions posed in each chapter. I deal with various kinds of written records such as UN Security Council resolutions, U.S. governmental papers, and episodic records from autobiographies of key persons related to the three cases. Many excerpts and quotations are extracted from these documents to support my arguments. In particular, UN Security Council resolutions are a rich source of the document analysis of this thesis and using the resolutions is a primary methodological means for it. UN resolutions allow me access to the details of the events in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo that may be difficult or impossible to research through direct and personal contact. Moreover, through systemically analysing Security Council resolutions I could probe into how the UN and its member states concerned made their decisions and took actions for their interventions within the multilateral decision-making context.

Defining key terms used in the thesis is an important component of the methodological framework because it enables me to clarify how UN peacekeeping and other peace operations in the post-Cold War era are different from practices during the Cold War period. In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature to examine various definitions and ways of understanding the four key terms: peacekeeping operations, peace operations, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking. In order to define the terms in my own way, I employ Sartori (1970)'s strategy for conceptualisation of a term dubbed as 'the ladder of abstraction'.

A concept comprises two key elements: *extension* (denotation) and *intension* (connotation). The formation of a concept is to define a term by considering and deciding the proper level of the denotation and connotation of the term. Sartori (1970) describes this process of concept formation as a way of climbing or descending a 'ladder of abstraction'. Climbing the ladder means to broaden the denotation of a term increasing the abstraction of its meaning, and conversely descending the ladder reduces the denotation and increases the
The connotation of the term enhancing the precision of the definition (p.1041). The formation of a concept is a delicate work because it can be easily distorted unless the process of conceptualization is conducted through the thorough consideration of the context of research such as its purpose, scope, and topic. Thus, in order to avoid the misformation of a concept it is essential to decide the appropriate level of abstraction maneuvering both upwards or downwards along a ladder of abstraction within the research context. In the thesis, I would descend the ladder to keep the abstraction level low in defining the terms. The practices of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era have made the denotation of the definition extremely expanded over other peace operations. I believe this has caused the operational difficulties especially in Somalia and Bosnia and the conceptual bewilderment in academia and the field. Thus, it is necessary to reduce the abstraction of the meaning of the terms and enhance their specification and configuration as much as possible to prevent those confusions. My definitions of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking are as follows:

'Peacekeeping operations' means that the interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed UN forces, including police personnel or civilians, in an environment with the consent of all the parties concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a settlement or to impartially buttress a political agreement between them through the means authorised by the Security Council.

'Peace-enforcement' is basically a legal process to maintain or restore international peace and security under the authority of the UN Security Council by an escalating ladder of means specified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter including both non-military options under Article 41 and military actions under Article 42 and 43. Differing from peacekeeping forces, the forces of enforcement mission according to Article 43 do not require the consent of parties to conflict when they are deployed in troubled areas, and would partially respond to outright aggression if necessary.

'Peacemaking' is the active involvement of the UN or UN Member States under the authorisation of the UN Security Council to persuade parties of the conflict to accept a pacific solution through any means based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
The term *peace operation* is a relatively new term in this field. It is a broad and comprehensive term without any consensus on its definition embracing various types of the operations of the UN and international community, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peace-building (or state-building). In this thesis, I use the term as an umbrella word to encompass all kinds of UN and governmental operations to maintain international peace and security with humanitarian purposes.

### 1.4 The Outline of the Chapters

This research consists of six chapters, which are grouped in three parts. The first part is Chapter 2, which primarily outlines the challenges of post-Cold War peacekeeping and its various definitions. The second part establishes three case studies: Somalia in Chapter 3; Bosnia in Chapter 4; and Kosovo in Chapter 5. The analysis of each case study is conducted within the analytical framework focusing on both agency and structure. It is also examined how the agential and structural causes affected each other in each case. In the third part, Chapter 6, the case studies are analysed in the comparative strategy. The chapter then analyses some of the critical issues that have arisen for peacekeeping operations of the post-Cold War international order.

Chapter 2 is designed to provide the basic background for the chapters to follow. It does this by first outlining the history of UN peacekeeping during both the Cold War and post-Cold War era. It then examines the conceptual diversity and practical confusion of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s through the examination of the relevant literature. The main purpose of the examination is to clarify the meaning of peacekeeping operations within the context of post-Cold War regional conflicts. For this, I review the various definitions and understandings of peacekeeping and also other peace operations, peace-enforcement and peacemaking, from the literature and formulate my definition of them at the end of this chapter. It is vital to clarify the meaning of both terms because many
peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period were conducted within the context of peace-enforcement or along with peacemaking without clear separation in performing the missions.

The aim of Chapter 3 is to examine the reason why the UN and international community failed in Somalia. 'Black Hawk Down' was the key event, which caused the frustration of the UN peacekeeping mission and U.S. operation in Somalia. In this chapter, I examine the causation of the debacle within the agential and then structural framework. The end of the Cold War was a key environmental factor in terms of the structural perspective. It is thoroughly examined in each case study how the systemic change of the international order affected the decision-making and actions of the agents: the United Nations, the United States, major EU states, and/or NATO.

The Bosnia case is studied in Chapter 4. Though the key purpose of the chapter is to examine the failure of the multilateral intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, other conflicts which erupted in Yugoslavia are also examined in the chapter because each crisis was closely linked to and affected the others. As is well known, the Bosnian crisis was ended by the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995. This was mainly achieved by the U.S. government with the support of NATO. Although British and French UN peacekeepers superbly conducted their duties and played a vital role in stabilising the situation there, the UN eventually undertook a minor role in the ending of the crisis. It is mainly examined in this chapter.

In Chapter 5, I look at the three key issues that have arisen regarding the Kosovo intervention. Differing from the Bosnian crisis, the Kosovo case is definitely an intra-state conflict because Kosovo was a territorial part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. In relation to the Western intervention in Kosovo, the status of the crisis caused a legal dispute on humanitarian intervention and the principle of non-interference. The second issue to discuss is air strike tactics as a means of conducting a military intervention. The NATO's campaign in Kosovo was mainly conducted by high-precision air strikes minimising casualties of troops and civilian losses. The implication and meaning of this new way of military operation within the context of post-Cold War peace
operations are examined. The last issue of the chapter concerns the utility of regional and/or military organisations such as NATO in maintaining international peace and security, which is the UN’s primary responsibility. Regarding the limits of the capabilities and resources of the UN system to shoulder a burgeoning number of security missions in the post-Cold War era, using regional and/or military organisations can be a useful option to reduce the burden of the UN. The Kosovo case has some important implications for this issue.

As the third part of the thesis, Chapter 6 answers the key research questions and verifies my hypothesis. As explained in the second section (1.2), this analytical chapter conducts the comparative studies on the three cases to answer the questions and also to examine their implications for the future practice of UN peacekeeping operations. The comparative analysis is conducted in two different ways within the research strategy of inter-systemic similarities and differences respectively. The Somalia and Bosnia cases are compared to explain why the UN and international community failed in the regions by finding similarities between the cases. The Kosovo case study is contrasted with the two other cases to highlight differences between them.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude the thesis by summarising all the key arguments discussed in each chapter including the three case studies. The chapter also concludes with a set of my suggestions for the future for more reliable and efficient peacekeeping operations.
Chapter 2: The Old Paradigm and New Trends of Peacekeeping Operations

The blue helmets of UN peacekeepers conducting their duties in the fields of conflict have become the symbol of the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping has a 50-year history. Between 1945, when the UN was set up, and 2006, it has created sixty-one peacekeeping bodies, forty-eight of them since 1987. UN peacekeepers during the Cold War era played limited roles such as monitoring the established cease-fire between opposing factions, supervising government functions, or supporting aid workers in humanitarian assistance. These traditional peacekeeping operations were only possible to a very limited degree and within very limited mandates. From 1991, the mandate and tasks of UN peacekeeping missions changed and broke out of the traditional boundary of their roles. Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were the scenes of the change. Such interventions with expanded mandates were widely held to be an innovation of the post-Cold War era. However, they have left the conceptual and practical clarities of peacekeeping operations, which had been established through the practices during the Cold War, in confusion or at least in controversy.

It is not easy to formulate a clear and concrete definition of peacekeeping within the context of peacekeeping practices in the early post-Cold War era. To be sure, there exists a great deal of confusion regarding the meaning of peacekeeping, as a number of scholars have defined it differently to suit their individual needs or analytic purposes. The range of possible meanings varies all the way from the self-consciously scientific attempt at a rigorous and precise definition to a rather flexible and also somewhat ambiguous definition. Such a variety of definitions can be a source of frustration, bewilderment, and disillusionment. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine how the international context for peacekeeping has changed in the post-Cold War era and to formulate a new definition of peacekeeping that is fitting for this new context. I believe that it is possible to detect behind all the conflicting definitions and assertions a convergence of similar and related perceptions and perspectives.
In addition to the search for a definition of peacekeeping within the changed context of the post-Cold War era, it is also essential to formulate proper definitions of other kinds of peace operations, such as peacemaking and peace-enforcement. The UN’s practices of peacekeeping missions in the early and mid-1990s were very distinct from the traditional missions during the Cold War period in terms of the complexity of their operations. Peacekeeping on many occasions moved in step with peacemaking in a combined process of conflict resolution and sometimes was converted into peace-enforcement. In many of the UN’s practices of intervention since the early 1990s, peacemaking has not been separated from peacekeeping operations and has been conducted within the process of peacekeeping missions, thus it has usually gone into ‘operational hibernation’. In Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN peacekeepers had to conduct their missions within the context of peace-enforcement, which is a means of collective security system under Chapter VII of the Charter ultimately including war-fighting. In spite of the existence of the clear definition of peacemaking and peace-enforcement proclaimed by An Agenda for Peace (1992) and endorsed by the Charter, use of the terms in practice has been unclear and ambiguous. There are a number of different definitions and various ways of understanding of them. The conceptual diversity and practical confusion in the field during the first half of the 1990s made many UN peacekeeping missions less effective or even put them in danger. To scrutinise the features of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era, properly understanding other UN peace operations is definitely a good starting point for the analysis.

This chapter comprises three sections, which are examined based on the literature review. The first explores the genesis of peacekeeping as a UN practice and its history in the Cold War period. It demonstrates how the international community coped with regional or intra-state conflicts to maintain international peace and security during this period. In the second section, I examine the new features of peacekeeping operations, especially in the early 1990s. The purpose of this examination is to make sure that it is necessary to rethink peacekeeping and other peace operations in terms of definition to escape from the conceptual and practical anarchy surrounding the terms. Finally, the third section defines the terms,
peacekeeping and peacemaking, which is the most unclear and ambiguous term among peace operations. In order to do this, firstly I examine various definitions and the understanding of many scholars, and then employ Sartori’s strategy for conceptualisation of a term dubbed as ‘the ladder of abstraction’ to find a proper definition of each term. Additionally, I clarify the meaning of peace-enforcement and peace operations.

2.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War Era

According to political realists, international relations have been rightly defined in terms of their anarchic milieu, but the fact that nation-states interact with each other in the so-called “state of nature” does not mean that international relations are uniformly disorderly or interstate conflicts always equally deadly and destructive. Given the anarchic condition, international relations have exhibited varying degrees of cooperation and efforts to develop peace. One of the strongest backbones for this idealist perspective is the existence of the United Nations. In accordance with the hope of the idealist, the first of the purposes of the UN listed in its Charter is ‘to maintain international peace and security’. To achieve this end, the Security Council takes ‘effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace’ (United Nations 1945: Article 1).

Throughout most of its history during the Cold War, the UN had faced a need for effective measures to cope with new conflicts. The new conflicts, which particularly arose during the process of decolonisation, were fundamentally different from the two World Wars, which had led to the foundation of the UN. While the Great Wars were the so-called ‘total war’ between sovereign states, the new conflicts were ‘limited war’ on a small scale between nations or factions in a state.4 A way had to be found to stop hostilities and to control conflicts because

4 Total war implies a far wider global conflict than regional conflicts in a limited climate and, while limited war suggests a degree of constraint, self-imposed or otherwise, total war
many of them could not be resolved by peaceful means listed in the Charter. The UN Charter contains coercive means of conflict resolution such as peace-enforcement under Chapter VII, but the Security Council had been unable to choose the use of the means due to the fierce relationship during the Cold War between the West and East. Out of that need, UN peacekeeping operations were created as ‘holding actions’. There was no particular legal base or theory behind peacekeeping. It was born of necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring action.

Traditional UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era can be divided into two broad categories: unarmed military observer missions and armed peacekeeping missions. The key task of observer missions was to supervise the implementation of cease-fire agreements. Whereas unarmed military personnel conducted observer missions, armed peacekeeping missions were mainly performed by lightly armed infantry units to stop hostilities and eventually create conditions for peace. Officially, the first observer mission as a UN peacekeeping operation was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was established to tackle the crisis in Palestine in June 1948. However, some raise a question as to whether UNTSO was genuinely the first mission of UN peacekeeping operations because there was another UN mission, which was established in October 1947, one year ahead of UNTSO. It was the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB / 1947-51). The key tasks of the committee with 11 members were to monitor compliance with the General Assembly’s recommendation on the issue of a state of agitation or disturbance around the border of Greece and investigate outside support for guerrillas in the region. As Durch (1993) notes, the observation function was firstly utilised in the Balkans (p.1), but the UN does officially recognise UNTSO as the first observer mission (United Nations 1996a: 4) because the mandate of UNSCOB was closer to fact-finding rather than monitoring a truce or settlement of conflict. It is still in controversy.

implies a lack of constraint. For more about total war and limited war, see Freedman (1994): Section F and G.
Armed peacekeeping missions on a large scale began when the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was set up by the General Assembly in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1956. There were fifty-six peacekeeping bodies by 2003, thirteen of them existing before 1987. Through the practices for several decades during the Cold War, the UN has developed a clear definition of peacekeeping operations. A UN publication, *The Blue Helmets*, explicitly outlines what peacekeeping is as follows:

As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on the consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the ‘enforcement action’ of the United Nations under Article 42 (United Nations 1990: 4; quoted in White 1993: 183).

Peacekeeping operations have been most commonly employed to supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to assist in troop withdrawals, and to provide a buffer between opposing forces. Very contrasting with UN enforcement forces, peacekeepers have no rights of enforcement of conflict resolution and their use of force is limited to self-defence, as a last resort. Their role is restricted in line with the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Regarding the genesis of peacekeeping as a UN practice, UNEF and ONUC (United Nations Operation in Congo / 1960-1964) were very important in terms of the following two points: first, the respective legal powers of the Security Council and General Assembly in restoring peace and security; and second, providing the guidelines and principles of peacekeeping as an essential precedent. The creation of such peacekeeping mission is surely a matter for the Security Council these days, but it was not necessarily so in the early years of its genesis. UNEF I was established by the General Assembly in 1956 and ONUC as the second armed UN peacekeeping operation was formed by the Security Council in 1960. According to
the UN Charter, it is very certain both politically and legally that the Security Council is in charge of exercising peacekeeping function. Article 24 (1) of the Charter states that the Security Council has a primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, which is the first purpose of the UN enshrined in its Charter:

*A Article 24*

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf (United Nations 1945).

However, UNEF I was established by the General Assembly because the Security Council was paralysed as the United Kingdom and France used their vetoes. This caused a legal dispute over the General Assembly's powers and functions in maintaining international peace and security. In other words, regarding the establishment of UNEF by the General Assembly, some UN member states raised questions about whether the General Assembly has the legal power to carry out the primary purpose of the UN.

The division of functions for the maintenance of peace and security between the Security Council and the General Assembly is clearly stated in the Charter:

*Article 11 (2):*

The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, [...] except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

*Article 12 (1):*

While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests (United Nations 1945).

These provisions are designed to prevent functional and legal clashes between the two bodies. The restriction of the General Assembly's powers and competence contained in the provisions was an example of political compromise between the powerful Member States of the Security Council and the other smaller states in the Organisation. In the early period, the United Nations was dominated by the West. The fierce relationship between the West and East during the Cold War made the Security Council paralysed in exercising its functions. Especially, the Soviet Union frequently used its veto in the Security Council to protect its interests⁵ (White 1993: 119-20). To tackle the situation that the Security Council could not play its role provided in the Charter the Western dominated General Assembly introduced a new approach that the provisions were 'flexibly interpreted in such a way that there is no strict division of functions' (Gray 2000: 149). General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, Uniting for Peace, was passed in this political context.

According to this resolution, the General Assembly has the right to take the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security:

*The General Assembly, [...]*

1. *Resolves* that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. [...] (United Nations General Assembly 1950)

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⁵ See Table 2.1 (p.29) and Figure 2.1 (p. 29)
This resolution was the key legal base of the creation of UNEF I. Using the procedure stated in this resolution, the General Assembly established the first armed peacekeeping force in 1956 by the authorisation of such non-coercive military mission with the consents of parties to conflict conducted in the Suez.

Along with *Uniting for Peace* Resolution, the *Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case* was also the key legal source of the construction of UN peacekeeping operation techniques. In relation to UNEF I and ONUC, France and the Soviet Union refused to contribute to the costs of these peacekeeping operations on the grounds that ‘both of these forces were unconstitutional’ (Harris 1998: 975). Their refusal to pay the financial contribution caused a legal dispute about whether the expenditure for the operations could be considered within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. Article 17 states:

*Article 17*

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly (United Nations 1945).

On the one hand, it was an issue of interpretation of the term ‘expenses of the Organization’ as to whether certain types of expenses like those resulting from UN missions to maintain international peace and security, which might not be referred to as ‘regular expenses’ of the Organization such as the salaries of staff, must be regarded as ‘expenses of the Organization’ under Article 17. On the other hand, it was the continuing controversy since the creation of the UN about the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly brought this legal issue to the International Court of Justice, requesting the judicial opinion of the Court on this issue of financing as well as the constitutionality of both of the peacekeeping forces. The Court concluded that the expenditures authorised by the General Assembly for UNEF and ONUC constitute ‘expenses of the United Nations’ within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter (Harris 1998: 975-6; 982-3).

UN peacekeeping was created without any legal base or theory. The *Certain Expenses* case provided a concrete legal basis for the constitutionality of
UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, the practices of UNEF and ONUC set an essential precedent for later peacekeeping operations. Especially, UNEF created many of the guidelines and principles on which other peacekeeping operations have heavily relied. The Suez crisis erupted in 1956 when the forces of Israel, the UK, and France occupied large portions of Egyptian territory including the Suez Canal area. The General Assembly adopted resolutions 997 and 1000 on 2 and 5 November respectively to establish UNEF I. On 6 November soon after these resolutions, Dag Hammarskjöld submitted to the General Assembly a report on the plan for the emergency international United Nations Force for UNEF. In the report, he provided the functions and principles of the UN peacekeeping force:

[...] the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the [General Assembly] resolution of 2 November 1956. The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers’ corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly (ICJ Reports 1962, p.171; quoted in Harris 1998: 981).

As White (1993) argued, the principles of peacekeeping were firmly established to a certain extent by the International Court of Justice because the Court provided the concrete legality of peacekeeping techniques by quoting the paragraph of the report above in the Expenses case (p.200).

As mentioned above, during the Cold War, the Security Council could not entirely fulfil its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In order to undertake peace-enforcement action, the Security Council needs to link conflict or dispute in a specific country to ‘a threat to the peace’ or ‘breach of the
peace', because it is the legal prerequisite for enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter that the Security Council determines the existence of the threat or breach. In most cases, the Security Council failed to produce the link due to a lack of political will or a collision of national interests between Security Council member states. Boutros-Ghali (1992) agrees that the adversarial rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union made the original promise of the Security Council impossible to fulfil (p.470). Roberts and Kingsbury (1993) also state as follows:

[... ] the UN, for over four decades in which the world had been divided between East and West, had been unable to act effectively; indeed, in matters relating to war and peace it had been almost completely powerless due to frequent threat or use of the veto in the Security Council (p.4).

The UN Security Council consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members. The five permanent members are as follows: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia (previously the Soviet Union), and China. Each year the General Assembly elects five non-permanent members (out of 10 in total) for a two-year term. The ten non-permanent seats are distributed on a regional basis: five for African and Asian countries; one for Eastern European countries; two for Latin American and Caribbean countries; two for Western European and other countries. The five permanent member states, which were the victors of World War II, have the right of veto under the UN’s founding rules.

The UN Charter does not mention the word veto. The veto power was the condition upon which both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to join the UN. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, decisions of the Council are made by an affirmative vote by nine members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. If a permanent member casts a negative vote, the draft resolution being voted on is not passed. This is the rule of “great Power unanimity”, often referred to as the right of veto or the veto power.

The veto system of the Security Council has been widely criticised, especially during the Cold War, because the heavy use of the veto by the Soviet Union and the United States has frequently sunk draft resolutions of the Security
Council. The mandate and functions of the Security Council have often been bogged down by the threat to use the veto. As shown in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1, the Soviet Union was responsible for nearly half of all vetoes ever cast. The United States has invoked its veto power 82 times, usually to ward off actions against Israel (Kafala 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>USSR/Russia</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1990</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Kafala 2003 and Nahory et al. 2007)

Since the succession of the Soviet Union’s membership of the Security Council in 1991, Russia has cast the veto only three times up to 2006. The first U.S. veto was cast in 1970 over Southern Rhodesia. Until 1990 the United States invoked the veto power 69 times (Kafala 2003). In sum, the United States and Russia cast 189 vetoes in the Cold War era, which is more than half of the total vetoes (260).
2.2 The New Trends of Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War brought the international community new challenges together with opportunities in terms of two features: the increase of regional conflicts and the revitalization of effective UN systems, specifically the functions of the UN Security Council. Skidelsky (1995) states that 'the collapse of the overarching imperial structures of the Cold War would release not the cosmopolitan Utopia but the historical passions and enmities which the bipolar hegemony had kept under control' (p.xi). Although international tension between the superpowers has dramatically reduced, regional conflicts have become more threatening. As Gibbs (1997) states, civil wars and ethnic hatreds replaced East-West tensions as the principle pivot of world politics (p.122). As the post-Cold War era commenced, waves of killing and destruction tended to be more within national borders, sometimes on ethnic lines, than between sovereign states. Civil strife, and ethnic, nationalistic and religious conflicts emerged on an unprecedented scale, not only in the former Soviet Union but also in many other parts of the world. Huntington's (1997) assertion has stirred up more debate than any other arguments: after the Cold War, 'global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines.' In other words, culture and cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world (pp.19-20).

These statements compel us to answer a question: why did this change emerge? Howard (1978) states as follows:

The basic fact that has been recognised by every serious political thinker who has turned his attention to the matter – by More and Bacon, by Hobbes and Locke, by Montesquieu and Rousseau, by Kant and Hegel – is that war is an inherent element in a system of sovereign states which lacks any supreme and acknowledged arbiter (p.132).

The end of superpower rivalry and Cold War alignments obviously led to dramatically reduced international tensions between the superpowers. Indeed, the
end of the Cold War has made the outbreak of large-scale wars less likely. However, regional conflicts have become more threatening because of the disruption of the balance of power that resulted from the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the international arena, and the enhanced ability of many regional powers to acquire modern military equipment and technology (Rabie 1992: 123). Carl Von Clausewitz (1976) defines war as follows: 'war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will' (p.75). The suppressed social and political 'wills' of each nation and faction of nation-states erupted when the 'supreme and acknowledged arbiter' was removed. The eruption turned into hostile feelings and hostile intentions, which was defined as the motives of war by Clausewitz (1976), because those states or nations lacked enough social, political, and economic infrastructures to contain the wills (p.76).

The changed environment in the post-Cold War period moved the issue of peacekeeping forwards on the international agenda and made the UN develop more effective actions and an enthusiasm for legitimate, authorised, multilateral intervention in order to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations has been in the spotlight unlike ever before. As Roberts and Kingsbury (1993) agree, with the end of the Cold War, it has been at last in a position to act more or less as its founders had intended, taking a decisive role in many crises, such as in the Gulf in 1991 (p.4). Increasing numbers of UN operations in the post-Cold War era have also been mandated to meet emergency humanitarian needs, to try to ensure safe delivery of aid, and to seek to deter attacks on civilians. This has become possible because the end of superpower rivalry and Cold War alignments freed the Security Council member states, especially the permanent members, from the deadlock of the right of veto. Peace operations aimed at providing humanitarian relief are now mainly about collective response through the United Nations.

With relation to the efforts of the international community to maintain international peace and security in the early post-Cold War period, there were strong trends of active involvement in civil wars and intra-state conflicts. These trends were based on the perception that such conflicts in the post-Cold War era are more prevalent, violent, and threatening to international peace and security than in previous eras.
The advocates of the new development of the trends contend that the protection of ethnic, religious, and other minorities endangered by conflict and hostile governments is now increasingly a recognised obligation of the international community.

One of the trends is that international society has legitimised the collective use of force in terms of international law, specifically under the UN Charter. In the post-Cold War era, the widespread suffering of large numbers of victims increasingly involves international institutions in situations of armed conflict. According to Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1998), the occurrence of humanitarian emergencies in recent years has increasingly provoked debate about the extent to which intervention to reduce human suffering should be restricted by the traditional rights of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction (p.49-50). Some argue that with Article 2(7) of its Charter restraining intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, the UN has traditionally been reluctant to be involved in what are internal or domestic affairs. The article states as follows:

> Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (United Nations 1945).

As Franck (1999) argues, it is a mistake to cite Article 2(7) of the UN Charter as a ban on UN’s intervention ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’, because this restraint does not apply when the Security Council decides to impose ‘enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ (p.116).

As we know, sovereignty is the foundation of international law, which fundamentally came from the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. And the principle of non-intervention expresses the correlative duty to respect the sovereignty of other states. Under the terms of the Charter there are only two cases in which armed force may be employed: (1) self-defence from an illegal armed attack and (2) armed action

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6 Related to this, see Michael F. Glennon (1999)
authorised by the UN security Council as an enforcement measure. The strongest argument for an exception to the prohibition on armed force is the use of force to save populations that are threatened by massacres, atrocities, widespread brutality, and deprivation of elementary human rights. The practices of the post-Cold War era, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, have led to a new kind of operation in terms of the exception of the use of force under the UN system.

During the Cold War period, the UN had tried to stick to Article 2(4) of the Charter, which expresses the respect of territorial integrity or state-sovereignty. The article states that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

For example, when, Indian troops acted to protect Bengalis in East Pakistan in 1971 from Pakistani troops, the UN General Assembly declined by a large majority to support the Indian arguments, calling on India to withdraw its force. Despite much sympathy for the East Pakistani Bengalis, UN member states were unwilling to legitimate India’s armed action as a permissible exception to Article 2(4) (Schachter 1991: p.83). However, as Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1998) argue, ‘the shift to preoccupation with the possibility of collective action under aegis of the UN rather than self-help by states, and to focus on Article 2(7) of the UN Charter rather than Article 2(4), has opened the whole matter out for reinterpretation in the post-Cold War era’ (p.49-50).

Sarooshi (1993) says that Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) and 794 (1992) dealing with the situation in Somalia are significant because they link humanitarian issues to a threat to international peace and security. He also states that the Security Council firstly recognised that widespread human suffering could constitute a threat to international peace and security through the resolutions (p.8). Resolution 751 (1992) states as follows:

The Security Council,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict
and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1992g),

Resolution 794 (1992) also states in the same way:

_The Security Council,_

_Determining_ that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1992c),

According to Wheeler (2000), the UN and U.S. intervention in Somalia is historic, because it was the first time that the UN Security Council authorised a Chapter VII intervention – without the consent of a sovereign government – for explicitly humanitarian reasons. He also says that this was the first time that the Security Council had formally recognised that widespread suffering in itself can constitute a threat to international peace and security (p.173). Knudsen (1996) has also argued that Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992 on the Somalia case established the link between a humanitarian crisis and the use of force to restore international peace and security (p.155). The moral legitimacy of the Somali operation was not in doubt. There certainly was a moral obligation for the UN to act. Somalia provides support for the legitimacy of peace-enforcement action. The overwhelming support that the operation received provides evidence of new attitudes and readiness to intervene on grounds of humanitarian concerns.

Resolutions 751 (1992) and 794 (1992) are significant in terms of the direct link between humanitarian concern and a threat to international peace and security. However, these resolutions were not the first to recognise that human sufferings could constitute a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 688 (1991) on the Iraqi situation precedes the resolutions on the Somali crisis in terms of this link. Resolution 688 clearly states that the Security Council ‘condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region’ (United Nations Security Council
1991c). In other words, as Knudsen (1996) states, ‘the harbinger of the wave of post-Cold War military humanitarianism was the allied intervention in northern Iraq in April 1991 to save Kurdish and other Iraqi national minorities from the humanitarian disaster they face after their failed rebellion in the aftermath of the Gulf War’ (p.153). Sarooshi (1993) argues that because China specifically opposed any references in the resolution to action being taken under Chapter VII, the value of this resolution as a precedent for a link between humanitarian crises and an Article 39 determination is unclear (p.8). However, though the resolution made no express mention of Chapter VII, the resolution’s reference to the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and its concern about the crisis amounted to an implied determination under Article 39.7

In addition, SC Resolution 713 (1991), which recognised humanitarian disasters in Yugoslavia as a threat to international peace and security, was adopted a year before resolutions 751 (1992) and 794 (1992). The resolution states as follows:

_The Security Council,_

_Deeply concerned_ by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries,

_Concerned_ that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1991a),

From these arguments, we can infer the following conclusion: through the Security Council Resolutions 688 (1991), 713 (1991), 751 (1992), and 794 (1992), the right to intervene with humanitarian purpose can now be activated under Charter VII. The idea of linking human rights to international peace and security represents a significant development and departure from previous UN attitudes on the right to intervene. With regard to this, Higgins (1994) argues that what Article 2(4)

7 The resolution ‘insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq’ and ‘appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organisations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts.’
prohibits is the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (p.245).

The other trend, which has caused the new legal and moral attitudes to active involvement in intra-state conflicts, is the emphasis on human rights. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) assert that appeals to humanitarianism have become increasingly common in the post-1945 period. For instance, the UN Charter clarifies that ‘the purpose of the United Nations’ is the aim of achieving ‘international cooperation in solving international problems of a . . . humanitarian character’ (Article 1(3)). Since then, considerations of humanity have been increasingly and widely recognised in international law, with references to ‘principles or laws of humanity’ proliferating in preambles to international conventions, in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and, more generally, in recent diplomatic practice (p.8). Especially, soon after the Second World War and during 1950s key legal instruments for humanity and human rights had been established:

1946: Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (UNHCR)
1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1949: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
1951: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
1952: Convention on the Political Rights of Women; Declaration of the Rights of the Child
1954: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; Convention on Territorial Asylum; Convention on Diplomatic Asylum (Weiss and Collins 2000: 19)

Through this development, human rights in the contemporary world are almost universally accepted – at least in word, or as ideal standards. All states regularly

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8 Related to this, Henkin (1977) defines ‘universalisation’ of rights as their general
proclaim their acceptance of and adherence to international human rights norms, and charges of human rights violations are among the strongest charges that can be made in international relations (Donnelly 1989: 1). Impetus for the universalisation and internationalisation of human rights was provided by the mass murders, concentration camps, and other forms of inhuman treatment of individuals as a part of the official policy of some governments prior to and during World War II (Bennet 1995: 395).

According to Donnelly (1989), while we can trace multilateral human rights activities back over forty years to the very beginning of the United Nations, human rights have been an active concern of the national foreign policies of most countries for scarcely fifteen years. For example, U.S. legislation, which has focused on linking foreign aid and arms sales to human rights practices in recipient countries, goes back only to 1973. Even such countries as Norway and the Netherlands, who have gone the furthest in their efforts to pursue human rights concerns in their foreign policy, can trace these endeavours back not much more than a decade. And human rights do not appear to have had any place at all in the foreign policies of the Soviet bloc states (p.259). In the Cold war era, to maintain their ‘ideological blocs’ was more significant for the leaders of each bloc than to protect human rights. For instance, actions by the United States to protect the “free world” from “communism” had a devastating impact on human rights in such countries as Guatemala, Chile, South Korea, Indonesia, Zaire, and South Africa.

Müllerson (1997) states that ‘Human rights seem to affect the post-Cold War international relations more than before because there is no longer an overwhelming security threat; instead there are multifarious threats to international stability, many of which have their origin in the human rights situation of a particular country.’ In addition, he argues that ‘there is less reason for the misuse or abuse of human rights issues in foreign policy, and there is more room for relatively effective diplomatic efforts with a view to promoting and protecting human rights’ (p.180). We can see the ideas of the universality of human rights or acceptance by national governments, and ‘internationalisation’ of rights as the recognition that treatment of citizens in one country has become the business of other countries. See Louis Henkin (1977)
humanitarian values in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993. Kopi Awoonor, Ghana’s permanent representative to the UN, affirmed that ‘[h]umanitarian aid in our time springs from the universal acceptance of the principle of international cooperation as a necessary component and expression of our common humanity’ (Cited in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 163). This emphasis on human rights in international relations today has promoted active involvement of the international community in intra-state conflicts of the post-Cold War era.

Commenting further, Donnelly (1989) argues that since human rights are ultimately a profoundly national, not international, issue, the probable impact of international action is limited. Thus, other states are not directly harmed by a government’s failure to respect human rights; the immediate victims are that government’s own citizens (p.266). However, recent practices of the international community show that his assertion is not wholly true in the context of post-Cold War human rights activities. For example, experiences in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, and in particular, Somalia show that the local power-holders can obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid and unduly benefit by confiscating it. Moreover, soldiers of peacekeeping operation troops have been harmed and killed in the operations. The end of the Cold War has enabled the relationship between human rights and the efforts of the international community for maintaining international peace and security to be closer.

Like many political institutions, the United Nations has been faced, virtually throughout its practices for maintaining international peace and security, with a deep gulf between theory and practice, between the principles and objectives of the Charter and the political realities of our time. The effort to bridge this gulf has been the main theme of the post-Cold War years of the United Nations. Nowhere has the gulf between theory and practice been so evident as in peacekeeping operations. Unlike the Cold War period, due to the changes argued in the previous section, peacekeepers are required to cope with more harsh and dangerous situations. Moreover, the operations have now become more a case of trying to understand how non-forcible military options and non-military options should be brought into
play in response to humanitarian crises. The changes have expanded the mandate of
UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are no longer just observing cease-fire
agreements between parties concerned. They now include forcible actions for
human rights protection and disaster relief. Thus, we need to newly define the
operations in terms of the changed context and climate.

2.3 Defining Peacekeeping, Peace-enforcement, and Peacemaking
Within the Context of the Post-Cold War Era

Peacekeeping is a unique UN function in that it fits neither the classical patterns of
peaceful settlement nor the model of collective security. Although Haass (1999)
states that in contrast to Chapter VII, which addresses enforcement actions,
peacekeeping takes place under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which addresses
pacific settlement of disputes, there is no statement mentioning the term in the UN
Charter (p.57). Peacekeeping is a UN creation without any legal support from the
Charter. However, through the UN’s peacekeeping practices for five decades, this
technique has been clearly recognised as a significant contribution to conflict
resolution. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992), peacekeeping is ‘the deployment of
a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties
concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and
frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace’ (p.475).
Brian Urquhart (1981), who was the Under-Secretary-General and worked in the
Secretariat when UN peacekeeping was created, has described peacekeeping as
follows: ‘the use by the United Nations of military personnel and formations not in
a fighting or enforcement role but interposed as a mechanism to bring an end to
hostile forces. In effect, it serves as an internationally constituted pretext for the
parties to a conflict to stop fighting and as a mechanism to maintain a cease fire’
(p.6). Haass (1999) also defines it similarly as follows: ‘Peacekeeping involves the
deployment of unarmed or at most lightly-armed forces in a peaceful environment,
Normally to buttress a fragile or brittle political arrangement between two or more contending parties' (p.57). For Evans (1993), peacekeeping is 'the deployment of military or police personnel, and frequently civilians as well, to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between government or parties who have been engaged in conflict.' It is 'premised on cooperation, and, except for self-defence, its methods are inherently peaceful' (p.99). Weiss and Collins (2000) define peacekeeping more specifically: 'peacekeeping is the deployment of a U.N. presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, to allow contending forces that wish to stop fighting to separate with some confidence that they will not be attacked in order to create conditions conducive to a political settlement'; 'peacekeeping normally involves U.N. military and/or police personnel, and frequently civilians as well' and 'military mission mandates include monitoring existing peace arrangements.' (p.8).

Though these various definitions clarify peacekeeping in their own words, they share common ideas on it. They agree that peacekeeping denotes the interposition of armed forces in a territory with the consent of the territorial sovereign or internal factions. Its validity lies in the consent to their presence given by the competent territorial sovereigns. Thus, it will demand a fair treatment of both parties concerned and support neutrality. In this sense, peacekeeping is conciliatory not confrontational. Its purpose is usually to act as a buffer between warring states or factions, to supervise a peace without enforcing it or merely to observe a ceasefire line, for instance arranging elections, protecting aid workers, and monitoring the implementation of the peace accords. Based on this consensus, I formulate my own definition of peacekeeping operations (PKO):

The interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed UN forces, including police personnel or civilians, in an environment with the consent of all the parties concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a settlement or to impartially buttress a political agreement between them through the means authorised by the Security Council.

Here I need to discuss how to define a concept in political science. A word
as a concept has two dimensions: \textit{extension} (denotation) and \textit{intension} (connotation). The extension of a term is ‘the class of \textit{things} to which the term applies’ and the intension of a term is ‘the collection of \textit{properties} which determine the things to which the word applies’. In other words, the denotation of a term means ‘the totality of objects indicated by the term’ and the connotation of a term is ‘the totality of characteristics anything must possess to be in the denotation of that word’ (Sartori 1970: 1041). The formation of a concept is to define a term by considering and deciding the proper level of the denotation and connotation of the term. Sartori (1970) describes this process of concept formation as a way of climbing or descending a ‘ladder of abstraction’. Climbing the ladder means to broaden the denotation of a term reducing the connotation (p.1041). This procedure provides a broad generalization of the term, but loses the precision of the concept increasing the abstraction of its definition. On the other hand, by descending the ladder concept formation can obtain a specific and precise meaning of a term, but it is inevitable that this will prevent universal conceptualisation of the term. For example, as to defining UN peacekeeping operations if I form my definition of PKO at the high level of abstraction by moving up the ladder, the definition will be a broad concept with a large denotation including various kinds of peace operations. However, this high level conceptualisation cannot differentiate each peace operation due to the vagueness and conceptual obscurity of its definition. On the other hand, by descending the ladder it will be a very specific and configurative definition with a narrow denotation. In order to avoid the misformation of a concept it is essential to maneuver both upwards and downwards along a ladder of abstraction within the context of the purpose and scope of the research for which the concept formation is required. In this sense, defining peacekeeping should be considered in the context of the changes of the post-Cold War era.

As the experiences of some UN operations showed, peacekeeping operations today seem very different from traditional peacekeeping. As Ambassador Jeane K Kirkpatrick testified before the U.S. Congress, traditional peacekeeping is ‘interposing troops where peace exists’ and ‘helping prevent further violence’ between warring parties. They may ‘not even help negotiate outstanding differences’ (Curtis 1994: 178). Cerjan (1994) states that peacekeeping
operations in the post-Cold War era is ‘a term applied to a wide range of activities, including monitoring and supervision of cease-fires, stabilization of war zones, preventive military deployments, disarming of forces, monitoring of elections, administering transitions to new government, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, maintenance of civil order, state building, and peace-enforcement’ (p. 4). Given the context of the expanded roles of UN peacekeeping in some operations the very meaning of the term peacekeeping has radically changed casting doubt as to its validity in defining peacekeeping within its traditional denotation. During the Cold War era, each of the peace operations within the UN system had been clearly distinct from the others in terms of both their conceptual definition and practices in the field. In the post-Cold War era, though Boutros-Ghali and the UN officially clarified the concept of peacekeeping operations through An Agenda for Peace and other UN publications, its conceptual and practical meaning have become very ambiguous and included many different kinds of activities. In most ways, the term peacekeeping has been used by the media, scholars, and government officials as an umbrella term encompassing peacemaking, peace-building, and even peace-enforcement. This is because as shown in the practices of the UN and international community especially in Somalia and Bosnia the roles and mandates of the peacekeeping operations have expanded to include peace-enforcement and peace-building throughout the missions there. These expanded UN operations have been dubbed by Ruggie (1993) in his article as ‘grey area missions’ for which ‘the UN lacks any guiding operational concept’. According to him, the grey area that the UN has entered is a domain of military activity between traditional peacekeeping operations and war-fighting (p. 26; 28). It is obvious that the UN missions in Somalia and Bosnia were very distinct from traditional peacekeeping and made the UN itself get into serious trouble in the domain between peacekeeping and enforcement. As Ruggie (1993) points out, the domain is a ‘doctrinal void’, which is vaguely defined (p. 29). Though since the demise of the Cold War system many academic works have been conducted about the new features of UN peacekeeping operations, we still need more efforts to avoid its conceptual confusion and fill the ‘doctrinal void’ by clarifying the concept of post-Cold War peacekeeping.

There are two key issues in defining UN peacekeeping operations in the
post-Cold War international order: first, whether to climb or descend a ladder of abstraction; second what are the essential elements of its definition as connotation? Before answering the two questions, it is very worthwhile to mention Ruggie (1993)'s statement on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement:

Peacekeeping essentially attempts to overcome a coordination problem between two adversaries: the peacekeeper seeks to ensure that both parties to a conflict understand the agreed-upon rules of the game and that compliance with or deviation from these rules is made transparent. Enforcement, on the other hand, is akin to a game of chicken: the international community, through escalating measures that ultimately threaten war-making and military defeat, attempts to force an aggressor off its track (p.29).

Fundamentally, peacekeeping is a different kind of game with different rules from peace-enforcement and any other types of peace operations. I wonder whether the so-called grey area missions of the UN in the early post-Cold War era are a new kind of UN peace operation. As Ruggie argues, UN peacekeeping surely entered into the grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, but it does not mean that the operations conducted within the grey area are very different from traditional peacekeeping in terms of its concept. Many believe and argue that UN peacekeeping has evolved and thus the UN and international community have created an evolved peace operation throughout the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia. I do not think this idea is right. Post-Cold War peacekeeping is still within the conceptual and practical boundary of traditional peacekeeping. The misperception of the evolution of peacekeeping had been caused by the fact that UN peacekeeping was used in the inappropriate circumstances and contexts for which the peacekeeping mechanism was not designed. This key argument of my thesis is more deeply discussed in the analytical chapter of the thesis, chapter 6. The denotation of the concept of peacekeeping should not be expanded by keeping the concept at the low abstract level of conceptualisation.

The other issue regards the key elements of peacekeeping operations. The elements of the concept are undoubtedly these three principles: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence. These principles have
been developed through the practices of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War era. As explained earlier, the most important operation in terms of the establishment of the principles was UNEF. Dag Hammarskjöld’s report on the plan for the emergency international UN Force for UNEF explicitly provided the guidelines and principles of a peacekeeping operation in the Suez crisis. As the paragraphs of the report related to them were quoted in the Expense case, the three principles came to obtain a concrete legal base as the essential part of peacekeeping techniques (White 1993: 200).

Some raise a question as to whether the principles are still valid and reliable within the context of the post-Cold War peacekeeping practices. These are not only the essential principles under which peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era should be conducted, but also the conceptual connotations that differentiate the term peacekeeping from other types of peace operations. The Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit (currently Peacekeeping Best Practice Section) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN published a handbook in December 2003 on peacekeeping operations regarding their multi-dimensional aspects. The key roles of the unit are ‘to capture the knowledge gained’ by previous UN peacekeeping operations; ‘to disseminate best practices, at headquarters and in the field’; and ‘to promote the adaptation and use of best practices for the better conduct of UN peacekeeping’ to solve problems and develop better policy (Peacekeeping Best Practices Section 2007). Thus, the handbook can be regarded as a collection of the lessons that the UN has learned from the practices of its peacekeeping operations for the last 10 years. According to the handbook, the consent of the parties to conflict and impartiality are critical principles for successful conduct of peacekeeping operations:

Consent: Peacekeeping and progress towards a just and sustainable peace rely on the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. In the absence of freely given consent, the military component and the peacekeeping operation as a whole will find it hard to implement its mandate. […] Consent, at all levels, must be encouraged by building confidence among the parties and enhancing their stake in and ownership of the peace process. Impartiality is the best guarantee that a mission will gain and
Impartiality: Impartiality and even-handedness should always guide the actions of a military component of a UN peacekeeping operation. Impartiality is understood as an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of provocation or challenge. Impartiality does not mean inaction or overlooking violations. UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict [...]. If the peacekeeping force is perceived as being partial, people may lose confidence in the UN's ability to act as a neutral party, which can damage the credibility of the mission and threaten the peace process. At worst, a perception of UN partiality could lead parties to the conflict to withdraw their consent to the presence of the mission and return to violence as a means of resolving the conflict (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2003: 56-7).

The handbook does not clearly state that the principle of the use of force only in self-defence is an essential condition for successful peacekeeping. Rather, it says that the use of force by UN peacekeepers is contingent on the consideration of the Security Council upon the situation in the field:

Appropriate use of force: Since peacekeeping operations need the consent of the parties to a conflict, military forces under UN command are not usually required to use force beyond that necessary for self-defence. Self-defence includes the right to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN protection.

The use of force by the military component will depend on the mandate of the peacekeeping operations and the rules of engagement; sometimes the Security Council will authorize a peacekeeping operation to use armed force in situations other than in self-defence. The circumstances under which the operation may use armed force will then be spelt out in the relevant resolution of the Council. [...] (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2003: 57).

Thus, the application of force as a last resort and in self-defence may be a principle of the conduct of peacekeeping missions, but not a key one as the other two are. Regarding all the arguments so far with relation to defining the term peacekeeping within the context of post-Cold War practices, I formulated my definition of
peacekeeping operations earlier in this section.

‘Peace operations’ is a relatively new term, which is recently being used in UN and governmental documents. For example, the Department of Defense of the U.S. Government regards that the term ‘encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted to support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace’ (U.S. Department of Defense 2001: 404). To date the term peace operations has been used as an umbrella term for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. There is no consensus on its definition and it is just used in many ways as an alternative word referring to various types of the operations of the UN and international community. In this thesis, I have also used the term with a more expanded denotation as an umbrella word to encompass all kinds of UN and governmental operations to maintain international peace and security with humanitarian purposes, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peace-building (state-building).

Peace-enforcement and peacekeeping are distinct undertakings. Each can be effective in the appropriate circumstances. Whereas peacekeeping operations are basically the non-coercive use of military force with the consent of all the parties concerned to preserve a peace which is already established between the parties, peace-enforcement actions are almost war-fighting missions through the deployment of lightly- or heavily-armed forces in a hostile environment without the consent of the parties involved. This is how many appreciate peace-enforcement, and the way in which they misunderstand and misuse the term. Military actions by armed forces are the key aspect of peace-enforcement, but that is not all. Many scholars, journalists, and government officials refer only to military action when they mention peace-enforcement. For example, Cerjan (1994) defines it as an armed operation ‘using military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state’ (p.4). To the U.S. government, peace-enforcement means ‘the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to control compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order’ (U.S.
Department of Defense 2001: 403). As a part of the collective security system of the UN, peace-enforcement operations are conducted by both military and non-military measures specified in Chapter VII of the Charter.

The collective security system of Chapter VII is twofold: non-military enforcement measures in Article 41 of the chapter and military enforcement measures in Article 42.

*Article 41 [of the UN Charter]*

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

*Article 42*

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (United Nations 1945).

There are two crucial points to properly understanding peace-enforcement: first, as clearly stated in Article 42 military enforcement measures are employed only when the non-military enforcement measures have failed or more specifically the Security Council considers that those measures are inadequate to achieve the objectives of what the UN decided to do; second, peace-enforcement is a definitely a legal procedure based on the UN Charter escalating from non-military means to the use of military forces to maintain or restore international peace and security. As Ruggie (1993) states, peace-enforcement is ‘primarily a legal, not a military, term’ (p.28).

The first step of the procedure is that the Security Council ‘determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’
(United Nations 1945: Article 39). Before taking any specific action according to Article 41 and 42, the Security Council sets up some provisional measures that are not enforceable at all to prevent an aggravation of the situation and recommends the parties concerned to comply with the measures (Article 40). If the aggressor or aggressors collectively identified by the Security Council and then the General Assembly does not act in accordance with such provisional measures, the Security Council will decide what non-military measures such as economic sanctions and diplomatic enforcement will be adequate to tackle the situation (Article 41). The military enforcement measures including low-level military actions to help humanitarian assistance and high-level use of force to intensively fight with the aggressor such as in the Korea War in 1950 and the Gulf War in 1991 are employed by the determination of the Security Council when the non-military options are considered to have failed to stop the aggressor (Article 42). Consequently, peace-enforcement is defined as follows:

Peace-enforcement is a legal process conducted under the authority of the UN Security Council with or without the consent of parties to conflict to maintain and/or restore international peace and security by an escalating ladder of means including both non-military and military options until the aggression is ended.

Unlike within the UN system, peacemaking in the field and academia is a relatively ambiguous term lacking practical and academic consensus in defining and understanding it. The perceptual spectrum of peacemaking is very wide and its usage is radically various. For instance, authors such as Towle (2000) and Macmillan (2001) use the term merely to mean actions or efforts to create peace during conflict or after war. They recognise the term in exactly same way as ordinary people literally understand it including all kinds of action to 'make peace'. Some definitions of other authors are more academic. Mingst and Karns (2000) define peacemaking as 'all efforts to bring parties to agreements' (p.76). However, it is still too broad.

The UN's official definition is as follows: 'peacemaking refers to the use of
diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute’ (United Nations 2000a: 72). Whereas this UN’s definition places a great emphasis on non-military options of peaceful settlement, some authors refer to peacemaking as peace-enforcement itself (See Ray 1993).

According to Haass (1999), some in the U.S. military prefer the phrase “aggravated peacekeeping” instead of “peacemaking” and others define it ‘to encompass a host of activities, including diplomacy and sanctions, designed to help bring about conditions of peace’. In his book, the term peacemaking is used ‘to cover those activities falling between peacekeeping and war-fighting, in environments characterized by the U.S. military as neither “permissive” nor “hostile”’ but “uncertain”’. He distinguishes it from ordinary warfare in terms of the goal and the scope of the combat: whereas the goal of pure war-fighting is ‘to inflict significant destruction on the adversary’, peacemaking is ‘carried out with measurable restraint’. Peacemaking often involves one or more relevant local party that is friendly or neutral, and a geographical context in which the hostile parties cannot be isolated. In this context of peacemaking, war-fighting is either not available or brings with it severe costs (pp.59-60).

Weiss and Collins (2000)’s definition is more specific. They state that ‘peacemaking, also known as “conflict resolution,” is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VII9 of the U.N. Charter, i.e., through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.’ ‘Military missions include military-to-military liaison, security assistance, preventive deployment, and show of force.’ (p.8)

In terms of international law, peacemaking seems to be defined as what comprises both consensual peacekeeping (under the authorisation of the Security

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9 Chapter VI mentions the peaceful means for conflict resolution, not Chapter VII. It could be a printing fault or an authors’ mistake. Article 33 of Chapter VI: ‘The parties to any dispute, [...], shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.’
Council and the Secretary-General) and non-consensual enforcement action (under Chapter VII of the Charter). Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. It does not include the use of military force (peace-enforcement) under the authorisation of the Security Council based on Chapter VII of the Charter.

As Haass (1999) points out, peacemaking is an imprecise and misleading term. As shown above, the term peacemaking in current academia and journalism is used to cover all kinds of activities falling between peacekeeping and war-fighting (p.59). The variation in definitions of peacemaking without consensus causes the conceptual confusion. For example, Evans (1993) argues that while peacekeeping is about ensuring that agreements are implemented, peacemaking is about reaching them in the first place (p.99). This is right in terms of the context of the Cold War era. Traditional peacekeeping operations are actions occurring after conflict. However, practices since the end of the Cold War have shown that peacekeeping can be an option available to peacemakers to assist the parties in bridging the gap between the will for peace and the achievement of peace. In some cases, peacekeeping operations were conducted as a part of peacemaking.

Moreover, it is unclear how peacemaking is different from other actions for restoring peace, such as peace-enforcement in most of its definitions. Evans (1993) says that non-consensual enforcement action (e.g. peace enforcement) is to achieve its objectives by depriving the party concerned of the military or economic means to maintain the offending behaviour by means which are not premised on the consent of all relevant sovereigns or factions (p.133-4).

With regard to all the arguments above, I believe that we need to stick to the UN’s definition of peacemaking or understand it at least based on the UN’s definition because in the current international system the UN is a key body to take a responsibility for maintaining international peace and security conducting peacemaking missions in troubled areas. Thus, I formulate a definition of peacemaking relying on the UN’s definition:

Peacemaking is the active involvement of the UN or UN Member States
under the authorisation of the UN Security Council to persuade parties of the conflict to accept a pacific solution through any means based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

As mentioned in the introductory section, the practices of peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era have left the conceptual and practical clarities of peacekeeping in confusion. Thus, it is important to formulate coherent definitions of the key terms related to peace operations to examine the practical and conceptual confusion. In the following chapters, I scrutinize each case study on Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo respectively based on the devised definitions.
Chapter 3: Peace-enforcement by the
‘Blue Helmets’ in Somalia

[... ] Then there was an explosion overhead. Waddell looked up to see a Black Hawk
twisting oddly as it flew. ‘Hey that bird’s going down!’ shouted one of the men across
the street. [...] He had seen the flash of the RPG launcher and had followed the smoke
of trail of the grenade as it rose up at the tail of Black Hawk Super Six One, which was
directly overhead. They all heard the thunderclap. (Bowden 1999: 117-8)

On 3 October 1993, two U.S. helicopters were shot down, eighteen U.S. soldiers
were killed, and eighty-four were wounded by the poorly equipped Somali militia.
This accident was a turning point in the military intervention of the U.S. and UN in
Somalia’s civil war. Although hundreds of Somali militiamen were killed in the
encounter, it was obvious the perception was of U.S. failure. There were 1,700 best
combat troops of the U.S. army such as Rangers and Delta Forces in Somalia at the
time, backed up by helicopters, gunships, and armoured vehicles. Heavy casualties
suffered by U.S. forces in operations undermined their apparent military supremacy
against Aidid’s militia. As Haass (1999) points out, the perception was ‘reinforced
by television images of a dead soldier being dragged through the streets of
Mogadishu and pictures of a captured U.S. airman’ (pp.45-6).

Although four days later, on 7 October, President Clinton announced his
intentions of reinforcing the U.S. military presence in and around Somalia for a
period of just less than six months, virtually all U.S. troops would be withdrawn at
the end of that time (Haass 1999: 46). The U.S. began disengaging from Somalia.
At the end of October 1993, legislative support from the U.S. Congress for the
continuing U.S. operations in Somalia totally collapsed. Congress rejected a
request of the administration for a proposed $175 million contingency fund to
cover immediate UN peacekeeping costs, and also informed the president that the
U.S. share of peacekeeping costs should be cut down from 31.7 % to 25%
(Shawcross 2000: 102). The last units of U.S. troops left Somalia on 25 March
1994. Remaining UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia II) forces
finally withdrew under the protection of U.S. Marines at the beginning of March 1995.

The United Nations officially concludes in one of its documents, ‘Completed Peacekeeping Operation: Somalia – UNOSOM II’ (1998), that their operations in Somalia were quite successful. According to this document, the major political achievement of the United Nations in Somalia was to help bring about a cease-fire, first in Mogadishu and then nationally. Additionally, it states that success was greatest in the humanitarian field. Millions of Somalis benefited from these activities, and, at a minimum, an estimated quarter of a million lives were saved (United Nations 1998). However, it is questionable whether the operations in Somalia were in fact completely successful. Academic accounts of UNOSOM II have been critical. Abiew (1999) argues that UN ‘peace management’ efforts in Somalia had clearly failed. Since the withdrawal of U.S. and UN forces in March 1995, the political situation in Somalia remained at a stalemate. There was no political solution in sight, and sporadic fighting continued (p.166). Johansen and Mills (1996) argue that though UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia I / April 1992 to April 1993) was quite successful in securing the administration of food aid and saving as many as 350,000 to 500,000 Somalis, UNOSOM II (May 1993 to March 1995) failed to disarm the warring clans and achieve peace (pp.112-3). The UN Secretary-General (1993b) clearly stated the key objectives of UNOSOM II in his report: to prevent any resumption of violence; to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organised factions; to seize the small arms of all unauthorised armed elements; and to secure or maintain security at all ports, airports, and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (paragraph 57). The attack on 5 June 1993 against Pakistani peacekeepers by Somali militiamen led by General Aidid was surely evidence of the failure of UNOSOM II. 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks. Its peacekeepers failed to achieve the stated objectives and consequently were not able to fulfill its mandate.

My aim in this chapter is to explain why the intervention by the UN and United States in Somalia’s civil war virtually failed. As mentioned in the introduction, an analytical framework focusing on the interrelationship between
agency and structure will be employed here to examine the practice of UN peacekeeping operations and U.S. military intervention in Somalia. For this chapter, I raise three research questions: Why did the accident, ‘Black Hawk Down’, happen?; What were the mistakes of the UN and U.S. decision-makers in the Somali intervention?; and How did the end of the Cold War affect their decision-making and actions in the operations?

This chapter is mainly divided into four sections. The first section introduces background knowledge of the Somali crisis. It is important to comprehend post-World War II Somalia to examine why the crisis erupted and how it developed. The second section answers the first and second research question within the analytical framework focusing on agency. It specifies the decisive factors of the failure. The third clarifies the effects of the structural factor on the actors in the Somali crisis. It draws upon the interrelationship between the agential and structural factors of the failure in Somalia. And finally, the last concludes this chapter.

3.1. The Background of the Somali Crisis

The Somali people are ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous. For a long time, Somalis have lived scattered sparsely over the region, which is called the Horn of Africa. Nearly all Somali people speak Somali and are Muslim. These facts, however, do not mean that they have been in unity in terms of political and social context. Though there is no clear consensus on the divisions of the clans and sub-clans, the following five are recognised as major clans of Somalis: Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq, and Rahanweyn including Digil. These clans are divided into many sub-clans. As Shawcross (2000) points out, the main organizing units of Somali society are the clans (p.67). People identify with their clan, not with the state. The basis of Somali society lies in the family, sub-clan, and clan system. Map 3.1 on the next page shows the distribution and

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10 Some recognise Digil as a sub-clan of the Rahanweyn whereas others list the Digil as a separate clan from the Rahanweyn.
boundaries of Somali clan groups during the years 1991 to 1994.

Map 3.1: Somalia

Three fifths of the Somali people live as nomads or semi-nomads in harsh and dry desert area (Shawcross 2000: 67). Thus, family and clan are crucial units for their social and cultural life, and eventually the units have come to play an important role in Somali politics. As Figure 3.1 (p.56) shows, all the political movements in Somalia are based on the divisions of the clans. It is clear that the roots of the conflicts and civil war since decolonisation definitely lie in this Somali clan system.
Somalia became an independent state in 1960 by combining the former British and Italian colonial areas in the Horn of Africa. Though Somalis constitute a single government, three regions of Somali clan groups remained outside the republic: the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the north-eastern province of Kenya, and Djibouti, at that time still ruled directly by France. Successive Somali governments failed to secure the return of the lost territories by diplomacy. It caused small-scale border wars in 1963 and 1967, in which Somalia was unsuccessful. In 1969, after nine difficult years as a Muslim republic, General Mohammed Siad Barre took power by coup d’état, which temporarily stabilised the regional conflict. He began to establish a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Somalis suffered a standard of living ranked as one of the lowest in world, yet their nation was strategically important in terms of geopolitics. The horn of Africa is placed at a strategic point along the route to the Suez Canal, which has been used as a key gate from the Indian Ocean to Europe. Barre used this to his advantage by receiving huge amounts of aid, arms, and military equipment from the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, and then from the United States after Moscow switched
support to his rival, Ethiopia, in 1977 (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 95-8).

Siad Barre ruled by force for 20 years during the Cold War. He suppressed clan loyalty by forcing fealty to himself in a single-party structure while manipulating clan rivalry through the distribution of weapons and other benefits based on affiliation with his clan. Somalia’s history and nomadic, clan-based society are not conducive to nation-state organization (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 103-4). According to Kaldor (1999), there was no rule of law and no public control of violence because Somali society had no civil society to protect itself from social violence. Thus, despite the growth of humanitarian and human rights organizations, nothing was done to stop the tragedies in Somalia (p.204).

Civil war erupted during the 1980s and worsened between 1989 and 1990; and on January 26, 1991, Barre fled Mogadishu. After a few months two Hawiye clan warlords, Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohammed Farah Hassan Aidid, became locked in an inconclusive battle for control of Mogadishu. Struggles among other factions and subclans occurred elsewhere in the country. In May, northern Somalia declared independence. Once Barre’s authoritarian rule was broken, the already fragile unity of Southern Somalia also collapsed, as did state institutions. The United Somali Congress (USC), formed in spring 1989, drove Siad Barre from Mogadishu in January 1991. Having ousted Siad, two USC Hawiye leaders, General Aidid and Ali Mahdi11, could not agree on how to share power. This conflict between the two factions, which were the most heavily armed and dangerous militia based on traditional and loyal clan groups, split Mogadishu into two armed camps polarised along clan lines, causing an estimated 14,000 people to be killed, and another 30,000 to be wounded. During the conflict, as many as 300,000 people perished from famine, and 700,000 became refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia and to a lesser extent in Yemen, Europe, Scandinavia and North America (Wheeler 2000: 174).


11Ali Mahdi represented the original Hawiye inhabitants of Mogadishu and Aidid was a leader of a branch of the USC (United Somali Congress) linked with the Issagi SNM (Somali National Movement) in the north (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 106).
Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre [January 1991], the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia, and by March 1991 was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved in the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful settlement. (United Nations 1994: 98)

The international community’s full-scale intervention in Somalia began in April 1992 and ended in March 1995. After some difficult negotiations between UN Special Envoy James Jonah and Aidid and Ali Mahdi, in March 1992 a ceasefire was agreed at UN headquarters. The ceasefire agreement enabled the resumption of humanitarian relief by the international community. However, fighting and plundering between various factions seeking to control ports and distribution routes became an important factor in the political economy of the militia, and put the international relief agents in jeopardy greatly reducing the effectiveness of aid deliveries. Security became a critical issue for the humanitarian relief operations of the UN and NGOs (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 108; Wheeler 2000: 175). In order to help provide the security needed to deliver food and other relief services and supplies the United Nations deployed peacekeeping troops pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 751 (1992). But, despite the airlift and the presence of U.N. troops, hundreds of thousands of Somalis died. The international community became more eager to intervene in Somalia. Operation Restore Hope began on 9 December 1992, which was a largely U.S.-run and manned operation under UN auspices. By mid-January 1993, U.S. troop levels peaked at around 25,000. France, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Pakistan, and other UN member states also deployed troops in the name of the United Task Force (UNITAF) following a UN Security Council request.
The turning point came on October 3, 1993, when two US helicopters were shot down, eighteen US soldiers were killed, and eighty-four were wounded in a single engagement with a hostile Somali militia led by General Aidid. This debacle stirred up public opinion in the U.S. and the Clinton Administration eventually called for U.S. troop withdrawal from Somalia under the pressure from the anxious public and congress. UN Security Council Resolution 954 (1994) also ordered the complete withdrawal of all peacekeepers by March 1995.

3.2. Black Hawk Down and the Failures of the Operation

Many observers conclude that the failings of UN operations in Somalia were due to failures of leadership between both the heads of government of the permanent members of the Security Council, and the Secretary-General's office. According to Wheeler (2000), the United States was 'not prepared to pay the price of nation building and was eager to hand over to the UN as soon as possible'. Whereas to U.S. leaders the efforts to bring peace to Somalia meant feeding starving people, to the UN Secretary-General it also included warlord hunting. In addition, the participants in the intervention, particularly the U.S., lacked strategic consideration about the short- and long-term goals of humanitarian intervention (pp.205-7). Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) point out that a tension between the U.S.-dominated headquarters of UNOSOM and European and Commonwealth commanders was a critical cause of the failure (pp. 213-4). In this sense, Weiss' (1994) argument is absolutely right: the Somali case illustrates a situation in which the U.S. and its Western allies 'have not systematically prepared UN operations, with the result that symbols dwarf effective action' (p.143).

The explanations above from many observers are rationally acceptable. The decision-makers of the U.S. government and UN failed to systematically prepare the operations in Somalia, to cope with the public 'back-draft' on the unexpected fatalities of their personnel, and to strategically consider their aims in Somalia. However, this chapter mainly argues that what they explain is not a decisive factor
of the failures. All the failings were fundamentally caused by the U.S. and UN leaders' misuse of peacekeeping techniques in circumstances that peacekeeping operations could not cope with and the fact that rather well-prepared peace-enforcement actions were required from the initial stage of the armed intervention. As Boutros-Ghali (1992) clearly defines in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence 'with the consent of all the parties concerned' acting as a 'neutral intervener' (p.475). Neutrality and the consent of parties are the key conditions for successful peacekeeping operations. The decision-makers misconceived the nature of the mission in Somalia disregarding these key conditions. Consequently, soldiers in the field had to conduct coercive military operations within peacekeeping techniques, facilities, and rule of engagement. This misconception and misuse led the Somali mission into a hotbed of armed conflict against Somali factions and eventually caused the accident, the so-called 'Black Hawk Down', which was a precipitating event causing the frustration of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Here I raise a question: why did 'Black Hawk Down' take place? Before answering this question, it is necessary to understand what happened beforehand. As mentioned earlier, the international community began to intervene in Somalia on a full scale from April 1992 under the UN's authority. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 (1992), establishing UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia) with a mandate to restore peace and protect humanitarian relief operations. The resolution states as follows:

*The Security Council, [...]*

2. *Decides* to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM);

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu [...];

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General as part of his continuing mission in Somalia to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance;
13. Calls upon the international community to support, with financial and other resources, the implementation of the 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia; [...] (United Nations Security Council 1992g)

On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the deployment of the unarmed observers (United Nations 1996b). As Tripodi (1999) points out, after Resolution 751 (1992), international society became more eager to participate in the operations in Somalia (p.140). The initial UN operation in Somalia came under the category of peacekeeping and partly peacemaking. With the ‘consent’ of major factions, the mission conducted the monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu, support for the humanitarian assistance of the UN and NGOs, and continued consultations with warring factions to restore peace in Somalia (United Nations Security Council 1992e).

As time passed, the mission lost neutrality, which is one of the key features of peacekeeping operations, and was transformed into a kind of peace-enforcement differing from peacekeeping. According to Wheeler (2000), ‘the Secretary-General wanted quicker results in Somalia and was pushing for a more forcible response to the crisis’ (p.177). For this, the UN needed stronger legal support for the peacekeepers based on Chapter VII of the Charter, which gives authority to the Security Council in deciding ‘necessary actions and measures’ without the consent of the parties in conflict. On 3 December 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794 (1992), which aimed to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia and authorized, under Chapter VII, the use of ‘all necessary means’ to do so. Resolution 794 (1992) asked the United States to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or kind for the operation:

*The Security Council, [...]*

7. **Endorses** the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;
8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment; […]

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above […]; […] (United Nations Security Council 1992c).

With President-elect Bill Clinton’s support, President George Bush, Sr. responded with a decision on 4 December 1992 to initiate Operation Restore Hope, under which the US would assume the unified command of the new operation in accordance with the resolution.

After the adoption of Council Resolution 794 in December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, despite those improvements, a secure environment had not yet been established, and incidents of violence continued. There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organized civilian police and no disciplined national army. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations, UNITAF, and NGOs was still high in areas of Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM I troops to the northeast and northwest, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern (United Nations 1998; Lewis and Mayall 1996: 114).

On 19 December 1992, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report in which he described actions taken to implement Resolution 794 (1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM I and the transition of UNITAF. The Secretary-General thought that a more effective mandate and
expanded military tasks endowed with enforcement powers were needed to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia (United Nations 1998). To that end, the Security Council established UNOSOM II by Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, which took over from UNOSOM I and UNITAF, following recommendations by the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993. The responsibility of UNOSOM II, in broad terms, was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law, and order in Somalia (Abiew 1999: 164). By May 1993, responsibility for U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope had been passed on to the UN through UNOSOM II as well. As Weiss and Collins (2000) point out, UNOSOM II was the ‘first armed Chapter VII humanitarian operation’ under UN mandate and authority (p.83).

The operation took a turn for the worse with the UN mandate expanding to peace-enforcement, which involved disarming the factions and arresting uncooperative faction leaders. The mandate generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. They had not only refused to disarm, but they had resorted to violence in order to frustrate the efforts of UNOSOM II. On 5 June 1993, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 went missing and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militiamen, apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by General Aidid. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading treatment (United Nations 1998).

Following the event of June 1993, UNOSOM II pursued a coercive disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. Active patrolling, weapon confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots were undertaken, together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population understood UNOSOM activities. In the course of this, the search for Aidid led to the deaths of many Somalis, UN peacekeeping forces, and even foreign journalists. The violence intensified until early October when U.S. forces suffered heavy casualties in an operation.

Bill Clinton (2004) clearly states in his autobiography that after the accident of June 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and his representative for Somalia,
retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, decided to arrest Aidid, believing the UN mission could not succeed without capturing him (p.550). At the time, the UN was not a peacekeeper any more, but a party of conflict warring against USC/SNA led by General Aidid. The UN peacekeepers would not be able to apprehend him, because they were not suitable to conduct such an operation requiring highly skilled and trained performance, and Aidid was well protected by heavily armed forces. Thus, the UN needed United States’ help, which was then asked for. Clinton (2004) illustrates the situation in detail:

Admiral Howe [the representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia] was convinced, […], that arresting Aidid and putting him on trial was the only way to end the clan-based conflicts […]. […] Colin Powell came to me with a recommendation that I approve a parallel American effort to capture Aidid, though he thought we had only a 50 percent chance of getting him, with a 25 percent chance of getting him alive. […] Repeated UN failures to capture Aidid had only raised his status and tarnished the humanitarian nature of the UN mission. I agreed (p.550).

To apprehend Aidid, it was essential to capture two of Aidid’s top aides, who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack as well as subsequent attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities. The raid on 3 October 1993, with a code name ‘Irene’, resulted in the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident. Why did it happen? There was no expectation that the raid would result in disaster. The raid team consisted of highly trained U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Forces, and their target was relatively poorly equipped Somali militia. The reason was that the field commanders of U.S. troops failed to conduct the operation with appropriate strategic consideration. They focused on military tactics without considering the political context as a peace operation. On 3 October 1993, Major General William Garrison, the American commander of the Rangers, ordered the Army Rangers and Delta Forces to capture Aidid’s key aides. The operation was conducted in daylight, because the troops had carried out three previous daylight operations successfully. Carrying it out in the daytime meant that Garrison underestimated the military ability of Aidid’s militia. It was a critical cause of the failure. One of the renowned military strategists in human history, Clausewitz (1976), says that ‘the act of attack
[in military operation], particularly in strategy, is [...] a constant alternation and combination of attack and defense’ (p.524). A military operation, even if it is to capture some personnel of the enemy, is absolutely different from a SWAT assault to apprehend drug users. General Garrison and his assistant commanders should have prepared for the possibility that US troops would need to defend themselves against Aidid’s militia. Without considering the possibility of aggressive counterattack, they commanded the mission in daylight in the expectation that the operation would succeed without encountering much opposition. Eventually, the U.S. troops were humbled by a small African militia.

As Garrison stated in his letter to Clinton (2004), the mission was a success in terms of military operation because ‘targeted individuals were captured and extracted from the target...’ (p.553). It is true in that sense. The US troops succeeded in apprehending twenty-four suspects, including two key aides to General Aidid. It was not, however, a success at all in terms of the context of a peace operation. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk, were shot down by Somali militiamen’s rocket-propelled grenades. While evacuating the twenty-four USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers came under concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and eighty-four were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured and subsequently released on 14 October 1993 (United Nations 1998). It became a turning point in the peace operations of the UN and U.S. because although hundreds of Somalis were killed in the encounter, the perception was of U.S. failure (Haass 1999: 45-6). There were 1,700 U.S. combat troops in Somalia at the time, backed up by helicopters, gunships, and armoured vehicles. Heavy casualties of U.S. forces in the operation definitely undermined its military supremacy against Aidid’s militia. With regard to the supremacy of the equipment and firepower of the U.S. troops, the accident was almost a disaster. Clinton (2004) points out exactly why the operation was eventually perceived as a failure:

In wartime, the risks would have been acceptable. On a peacekeeping mission, they were not, because the value of the prize was not worth the risk of significant casualties and the certain consequences of changing the nature of our mission in the
eyes of both Somalis and Americans (p.553).

Clinton’s argument is right. Consequently, ‘Black Hawk Down’ was a symbolic and decisive event, which led to the failure of the UN’s peace operation in Somalia. The accident stirred up public opinion in the U.S. and eventually caused the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. Following Black Hawk Down, U.S. public opinion was exposed to the horrifying television images of a dead soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by an angry Somali crowd and pictures of a captured U.S. airman. U.S. Republican Senator John McCain received a letter from a father, who lost his son in Somalia:

American soldiers have always been prepared to give their lives for the safety and security of this nation; without a higher purpose for such sacrifice, their deaths would be pointless and hollow (cited in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 213).

The U.S. Administration decided to disengage from the difficult and hostile operations in Somalia. President Clinton declared his intention to withdraw U.S. troops within six months. On 14 October, he told a White House news conference that ‘the United States being a police officer in Somalia was turned into the waging of conflict and a highly personalised battle which undermined the political process. That is what was wrong, and that is what we attempted to correct in the last few days’ (Friedman 1993). In the period between October 1993 and March 1994, most military units left Somalia. As the withdrawal accelerated, military support provided by UNOSOM troops to United Nations agencies, human rights organizations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was greatly reduced. At the end of 1994, 18,000 UN troops were still deployed in Somalia, mostly from African and Asian countries. In March 1995, the last Pakistani and Bengali ‘blue helmets’ left Somalia permanently (United Nations 1998).

The next question to answer is that: what were the mistakes of the UN and U.S. decision-makers in the Somali intervention? First of all, UN and U.S. leaders of the mission had made a mistake by isolating Aidid from the political process and by becoming so obsessed with tracking him down. They did not consider Aidid to be a
party to their peacekeeping operation, but rather a hindrance to a successful mission to restore peace and security in Somalia. This had not been the case at the initial stage of the intervention. In early January 1992, Mr. James Jonah, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited Somalia with senior UN officials as a peacemaking mission. During the talks between the mission delegates and the faction leaders, most of the leaders agreed to support a cease-fire in Mogadishu except General Aidid (United Nations 1996a: 288). It was usual at that stage of a peacemaking process that some parties of conflict do not cooperate with the negotiator. Despite Aidid’s uncooperative attitude, the UN and U.S. had recognised Aidid as a partner for their mission up until June 1993 when Somali militiamen attacked Pakistani peacekeepers. The recognition had worked in a sense. ‘Report of the Security Council Mission to Somalia on 26 and 27 October 1994’ states as follows:

He [the Special Representative of the UN SG in Somalia, Ambassador Gbeho] felt that one solution to the question of participation might be for both sides [Mahdi and Aidid] to agree to set up a credentials committee as is often customary with conferences. This idea apparently was acceptable to Mr. Ali Mahdi but not to General Aidid (United Nations Security Council 1994a: 3).

After the June attack against Pakistani peacekeepers, the UN had become sceptical about Aidid’s intentions, because they suspected that Aidid’s militiamen were complicit in the attack. The UN had started to think that Aidid was not only being cooperative with the UN in order to restore peace and stability in Somalia, but also to gain control over Somalia through the UN’s mission plan. The mission report on 26 and 27 October 1994 continues to state:

The Special Representative [Ambassador Gbeho] was concerned that General Aidid would unilaterally proceed with convening a national reconciliation conference on 1 November and declare a Government, which in his assessment, would invite renewed fighting (United Nations Security Council 1994a: 3).

The UN agreed that the mission had been conducted with a lack of Somali cooperation over security issues (United Nations Security Council 1994a: 10). In
other words, the UN decided to proceed with the Somali mission without consent and cooperation from Aidid. It means that the mission cannot be recognised as a peacekeeping operation, which essentially needs the consent of all the parties concerned. The idea to remove Aidid from the table of negotiation was a big mistake because one of the critical principles for successful peacekeeping operations is neutrality. In this sense, Kaplan (2002)'s argument is worthy of mention:

Western policymakers believe that dictators can be defeated merely by removing them. The nineteenth-century Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt writes: Like bad physicians, they thought to cure the disease by removing the symptoms, and fancied that if the tyrant were put to death, freedom would follow of itself.” [...] But because the dictators themselves were manifestations of bad social and economic development, their removal frequently permitted the same uncivil practices to continue in democratic clothing; [...] (pp. 6-7).

If the UN and U.S. personnel believed that they were working as peacekeepers, they should have negotiated with Aidid even in the presence of any kind of difficulties, not converted their mission into a ‘cops-and-robbers operation’ or even ‘war-fighting’.

Then, why did they fail to keep the neutrality in the mission? An ancient military strategist, Sun-Tzu\(^{12}\), explains that ‘in war the “highest excellence” is never having to fight, for the commencement of battle signifies a political failure’. He states that ‘the best way to avoid war – the violent result of political failure – is to think “strategically”’ (cited in Kaplan 2002: 41-2). The transformation of the Somali mission of the UN and U.S. from initially peacemaking and then peacekeeping to peace-enforcement warring against a party of conflict poses a question about whether the political decision-makers and field commanders of the intervention had ‘strategic’ consideration for their mission. To put this differently,

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\(^{12}\) He was a great philosopher and military strategist of ancient China in the late third century B.C. His renowned work, *The Art of Warfare*, may represent the accumulated wisdom of many people who experienced that chaotic period of ancient Chinese history. Kaplan (2002) states that ‘there is arguably no work of philosophy in which knowledge and experience are so pungently condensed as Sun-Tzu’s *The Art of Warfare*’ (p.41).
they misconceived who they were and what they could and should not do as peacekeepers. That is why U.S. troops and UN peacekeepers had fought against Somali militia conducting peace-enforcement missions, which do not need to be neutral and do not require the consent of all the parties of conflict.

Another question needs to be raised. What factor affected their misconception? My answer is clear: a structural factor that was the end of the Cold War. To say this more precisely, the misunderstanding was caused by a new paradigm of the early post-Cold War period. Regarding this new paradigm, the next section explores how the demise of the Cold War rivalry affected the perception and actions of UN and U.S. decision-makers relating to peace operations in the post-Cold War era. In this sense, the next section provides a linking explanation of the interrelation of the causal factors within the agential and structural perspective.

3.3 A New Paradigm of the Early Post-Cold War Era

The superpower rivalry of the Cold War arose in the wake of the Second World War, between two rigidly hostile blocs, one led by the Soviet Union, and the other by the United States. For more than five decades this antagonism was not only a competition for political and military hegemony but also a rivalry between communism and liberal democracy. It was evident that the international system of the Cold War was a bipolar system. With the disappearance of the bipolar system following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, at least two competing models have emerged. One is a unipolar system that is projected by the United States, the other is much more diffused and plural system, in other words multipolar system, in that several different powers or groupings of powers compete or coexist with each other, without any one being predominant in relation to the others. Though the debate is still in dispute in some points, it is obvious that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent nearly complete withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the international arena left the United States as the world's
supreme power.

At the moment of the Cold War's end and during the few years succeeding it, there emerged a reaction to the implication of U.S. supremacy for the post-Cold War international order. It was the optimists who thought its historical significance lay in the new opportunity for a more liberally democratised international community. One of the key advocates is Francis Fukuyama. He claims in his controversial article, 'The End of History?' (1989), that the end of the Cold War stands for 'the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government' (p.2). This does not mean that the nature of human civilisation has ended but does mean the triumph of the Western idea, liberal democracy, against 'absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism' (p.1). Despite some academics who still raise a question about whether the triumph of liberal democracy against Marxism is genuine in terms of human philosophy, the effect of his claim on Western society was vast. Many academics and political leaders of the West believed that they had won the Cold War and the victory belonged to the idea of liberal democracy. Gorbachev's perestroika, which means 'reform', no doubt provided a rallying point for the claim and belief. As Kissinger (1994) points out, perestroika was firmly based on the belief that 'liberalization would modernize the Soviet Union' (p.795). As even the Soviet Union accepted liberal democracy as their political creed, the Western world was convinced of the triumph of liberal democracy. The former U.S. President, George Bush, Sr., was assured of the idea in his address to a joint session of Congress on 6 March 1991:

Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a “world order” in which “the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against the strong...” [...] A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations (cited in Gardner 1992: 31).

Gorbachev's successor, Boris Yeltsin, also supported the idea that post-Communist Russia ought to be transformed into a liberal and democratic regime. In the United Nations Security Council Summit Opening Addresses on 31 January 1992, he
stated that:

[n]ow we must accomplish the most difficult task. That is the creation of legal, political, and socio-economic guarantees to make democratic changes irreversible ... Our principles are clear and simple: primacy of democracy, human rights and freedoms, legal and moral standards [...] (cited in Abiew 1999: 141).

Some academics shared with political leaders the belief in the liberal triumph. Chris Brown argued that ‘the end of Cold War’ was seen as ‘ushering in an (indefinite) period of world dominance by forces which ... could be seen as “liberal”’ (cited in Clark 2001: 19). Rabie (1992) claims that the end of the Cold War ought to be considered as being the result of exposing the limits of communist ideology and its social forces. The collapse of the communist alliance has inspired the former president Bush to declare the victory of democracy and liberalism (p.116).

Here I answer the third question of this chapter: How has the end of the Cold War affected UN and U. S. decision-making and actions in the Somalia operation? Understandings and attitudes toward liberal democratic victory do not lead to the ‘Western liberal order’, as Clark (2001) labels it (p.23). To design a new order, actual policies need to be implemented by international organization or superpowers, such as the UN and the United States respectively. First of all, I examine how the UN and U.S. had shaped their policy in terms of Western liberal order and then explore the effects of the new approach on the Somalia mission.

Some U.S. presidents, such as Jimmy Carter, proclaimed the desire to project political democracy and the idea of liberalism into foreign policy. George Bush, Sr., however, was the first president who could achieve this desire throughout the world in terms of the changed international environment. In the Cold War period spreading the desire over the globe meant a total war between the Soviet and Western bloc or at least severe conflicts that could cause political or military damage to both of them. This ‘mutual destructive structure’ had changed as the end of the Cold War got rid of one side. In his inaugural address in 1989, Bush strongly proclaimed that:
[...] The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. There is new ground to be broken, and new action to be taken. [...] Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door to freedom. Men and women of the world move toward free markets through the door to prosperity. The people of the world agitate for free expression and free thought through the door to the moral and intellectual satisfactions that only liberty allows. We know what works: Freedom works. We know what's right: Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on Earth: through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state. For the first time in this century, for the first time in perhaps all history, man does not have to invent a system by which to live. [...] We must act on what we know (Bush 1989).

The international society positively responded to this attitude. In a Security Council Summit meeting at the level of Heads of States and Government on 31 January 1992, leaders of the Security Council Member states referred to human rights as an issue of concern for the international community (Abiew 1999: 140). In the meeting they agreed that 'the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields' also 'have become threats to peace and security' in the age of new challenges and urged the United Nations 'to play a central role' to make 'rapid progress, in many regions of the world, towards democracy and responsive forms of government' and to constitute a major contribution 'to the encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' (United Nations Security Council 1992b). The UN's response was more concrete. A Secretary-General report, An Agenda for Peace (1992), was a clear picture of guidance for international action outlining the UN's ideas on the issues of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. It was an attempt to integrate the concerns of states for international order with the concerns of human rights and justice. In the report, Boutros-Ghali states as follows:

81. Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires as well a deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable
groups of society [...]. The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong domestic institutions of participation are essential. Promoting such institutions means promoting the empowerment of the unorganized, the poor, the marginalized. To this end, the focus of the United Nations should be on the "field", the locations where economic, social and political decisions take effect. In furtherance of this I am taking steps to rationalize and in certain cases integrate the various programmes and agencies of the United Nations within specific countries (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 496).

This movement toward a liberal and democratic world order was strongly supported by the Clinton Administration. Clinton had pursued more ambitious objectives than Bush or any other international political leader in terms of shaping the world with democracy and human rights. The former secretary of state of the second Clinton term, Albright (2003), points out that since 1993 'the Clinton administration approved a new policy toward Central and East Europe designed to bolster democracy, reduce trade barriers, and reward nations undertaking economic reform' (p.167). 'A new policy' in her statement does not mean what it means literally. It is a brand-new approach opting for the changed context of the post-Cold War era. It is clear that Clinton not only signed up for the idea of the 'new world order', but also added others that amounted to a considerably more ambitious agenda.

Then, what does the 'new world order' stand for? How is it related to the Somali intervention? By looking at the way in which terms are used in speeches, we can learn about the nature of Clinton's foreign policy and the new world order. Warren Christopher was the Secretary of State of the first Clinton term from 1993 to 1997. He was also the transition chief to President-elect Clinton in 1992. He is, hence, one of the key persons who can tell us exactly how foreign policy of the Clinton Administration was. In remarks at the World Conference on Human Rights on 14 June 1993 at Vienna, he proclaimed that American foreign policy stood up for democracy and human rights:

[...] America's identity as a nation derives from our dedication to the proposition "that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights”. Over the course of two centuries, Americans have found that advancing democratic values and human rights serves our deepest values as well as our practical interests. That is why the United States stands with the men and women everywhere who are standing up for these principles. And that is why President Clinton has made reinforcing democracy and protecting human rights a pillar of our foreign policy – and a major focus of our foreign assistance programs. Democracy is the moral and strategic imperative for the 1990s. Democracy will build safeguards for human rights in every nation. Democracy is the best way to advance lasting peace and prosperity in the world. [...] In this post-Cold War era, we are at a new moment. Our agenda for freedom must embrace every prisoner of conscience, every victim of torture, every individual denied basic human rights. It must also encompass the democratic movements that have changed the political map of our globe. The great new focus of our agenda for freedom is this: expanding, consolidating and defending democratic progress around the world. It is democracy that establishes the civil institutions that replace the power of oppressive regimes. Democracy is the best means not just to gain – but to guarantee – human rights. [...] Today, the global movement from despotism to democracy is transforming entire political systems and opening freedom’s door to whole societies. The end of the Cold War is the most uplifting event for human rights [...]. [...] President Clinton is determined to meet the challenge of leadership – to tip the world balance in favor of freedom. [...] My country will pursue human rights in our bilateral relations with all governments [...]. [...] American foreign policy will both reflect our fundamental values and promote our national interests. It must take into account our national security and economic needs at the same time that we pursue democracy and human rights. [...] And we will assist militaries in finding constructive new roles in pursuit of peace and security – roles that respect human rights and contribute to international peace. [...] (Christopher 1993).

Clinton’s first inaugural address also provided clues about his foreign policy:

[...] Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues. [...] Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism’s collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. [...] Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape
change, lest it engulf us. When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act with peaceful diplomacy when ever possible, with force when necessary. The brave Americans serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve. [...] Our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the world, we see them embraced—and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause (Clinton 1993).

Deprived of the restraints imposed by the Cold War, the Clinton Administration pursued an ambitious agenda in international relations, which could be identified with 'internationalism' or 'interventionism'. The critique of this agenda is normally labelled as 'isolationism'. The history of American foreign policy has been laid between these two approaches. The Clinton Administration faced new challenges brought about by the end of the Cold War: the massive emergence of intra-state armed conflicts with intense hostility and the demand for forcible massive peace operations to tackle the conflicts. The administration's interventionism was their strategic reaction to the challenges.

The ending of the Cold War has released waves of killing and destruction within national borders, not between states. There are three reasons. First, the demise of the Soviet Union has increased the number of 'failed states', or 'states that have descended into conditions of anarchy'. The removal of economic and political supports from the leader of the communist bloc has left some states, such as Somalia, incapable of maintaining their domestic political and social order. Second, the end of the East-West rivalry facilitated the break-up of multinational countries, such as the former Yugoslavia. The intra-state conflicts in those states were caused by historical, political, and religious passions and enmities, which had been kept under control during the Cold War period. After 198913 as the political and economic incentive from the leaders of each bloc, which was a useful tool to

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13 It is broadly recognised that the post-Cold War era started from 1989 because there was a summit meeting in Malta in December 1989 between Gorbachev and George Bush, Sr. (George H. W. Bush) to officially declare the Cold War over.
suppress ethnic forces, had been removed, ethnic concerns emerged and moved to the forefront of political discourse (Winnefeld et al. 1995:12-3). Finally, the disruption of the balance of power caused the enhanced ability of many regional powers to acquire modern military equipment and technology. Arms controls under the Cold War rivalry went out of control after the demise of the rivalry.

Following the political changes in the international system after the demise of the Cold War order and the development of a more cooperative spirit between the permanent members in the UN Security Council, the emergence of civil strife and of ethnic, nationalistic, and religious conflicts on an unprecedented scale moved the issue of forcible massive peace operations forwards on the international agenda. This kind of intervention was a challenge to the international community because it has been rarely experienced beforehand. During the Cold War, most of the multilateral responses of the international community to regional conflicts were ‘non-forcible’ peacekeeping operations. Due to the political stalemate in the Security Council, the peacekeeping missions were limited to non-coercive roles such as helping maintain cease-fires already set up and monitoring elections.

Along with the emphasis on human rights and democracy, the demand during the early post-Cold War era for more effective and massive armed peace operations was a difficult challenge to the United States, especially the Clinton Administration, because they were not ready to cope with the new kind of intra-state conflicts. They lacked strategic preparations in terms of their role in the conflicting area, what to do as peacekeepers, and how to achieve their short- and long-term goals. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) is clear evidence of the strategic failure of the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Just after the painful incident, Black Hawk Down, in October 1993, President Clinton ordered a comprehensive inter-agency review of U.S. policies and programmes for UN peacekeeping operations. According to PDD 25, the main purpose of the review was to ‘develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period’ (U.S. Department of State 1996). One of the key issues raised in PDD 25 is the problem of ‘choices about which peace operations to support’. It states that although ‘peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN
involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective'. It states:

[...] Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to an intermediate or final objective, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. [...] The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operation. [...] 

It became clear that before PDD 25 the U.S. government had no overall national policy or operational guidelines for their involvement in peace operations. In 1993, the administration drafted Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13), but this draft document was re-evaluated as the situation in Somalia grew worse and consequently replaced by PDD 25. Soon after that PDD 25 was issued by President Clinton in May 1994, the U.S. Army was called on to make major adjustments to the military engagements of U.S. troops in peace operations in accordance with PDD 25. The result was a field manual of the Department of the Army, dubbed as ‘FM 100-23 Peace Operations' in December 1994, which provides full guidance for U.S. soldiers and decision-makers who execute peace operations (See U.S. Department of the Army 1994).


But traditional-style UN peacekeeping has by no means always succeeded in keeping the peace much less in bringing an end to fighting when the parties themselves were unwilling to lay down their arms. In an increasingly disorderly and chaotic world, scrupulous respect for national sovereignty and the consent of parties in conflict has grown harder to rationalize. [...] If the United States and the United Nations are to avoid becoming endlessly mired in the swamp that many predicted Somalia represented last year, the peace-enforcement experiment must be reformulated to meet the realities of the country, its people, and their problems (cited in Curtis 1994: 182-3).
At every turn in modern history, victorious forces have claimed the right to design a new world order and have done so in a manner most conductive to achieving their objectives. Though in terms of the emphasis on democracy and human rights Clinton’s new world order is manifested in different way from any other old orders, international relations in an order are designed to serve national interests and interact with various domestic interest groups. James Mayall (1996) states that ‘the idea that there could be an international humanitarian order, somehow divorced from strategic considerations, was an illusion, as become abundantly clear when the state collapsed in Yugoslavia and Somalia’ (p.7).

3.4 The Transformation of Peacekeeping Missions into Peace-enforcement

This chapter has argued the reasons that the UN and U.S. intervention in Somalia virtually failed. In terms of the agential perspective the failure of the mission was decisively caused by the incident, ‘Black Hawk Down’. Within the structural analytical framework, the ending of the Cold War was an underlying factor causing the frustration of the mission. How were these two events, Black Hawk Down and the end of the Cold War, related to each other? In what way was the underlying structural factor connected with the precipitating event? The UN and U.S. intervention in Somalia on a full scale began in April 1992 by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) establishing UNOSOM I and ended in March 1995 with the complete withdrawal of all peacekeepers ordered by Resolution 954 (1994). In this time sequence the key moment occurred on 26 March 1993, when UNOSOM II was established by Resolution 814 (1993). Put another way, the transition from UNOSOM I and UNITAF to UNOSOM II is the logical linking point between the agential and structural explanation about the failings in Somalia.

It is obvious that Black Hawk Down was a decisive event, which made the UN and U.S. mission unable to be completed by stirring up U.S. public opinion and then forcing the Clinton Administration to decide upon the withdrawal of their
troops from Somalia. The field commanders of U.S. troops failed to conduct the operation with appropriate strategic consideration. They might have approached the operation to apprehend General Aidid and his assistants very strategically in terms of military tactics but their strategic consideration lacked a political rumination on the context of their mission as a peace operation. The UN and U.S. leaders were fundamentally responsible for the mistake in the field because they converted the peacekeeping mission into a ‘cops-and-robbers operations’ and eventually ‘war-fighting’. The Secretary-General and other senior officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN adhered to the notion that capturing Aidid could dramatically improve the situation in Somalia. The U.S. leaders were strongly supportive of their enthusiasm and agreed on a new plan in order to achieve their goals. That was the establishment of UNOSOM II transited from UNOSOM I and UNITAF. As Weiss and Colin (2000) specify, UNOSOM II was the ‘first armed Chapter VII humanitarian operation’, which was absolutely different from ordinary UN peacekeeping missions. A critical problem of the transition was that the UN and U.S. were not ready to cope with the situation in Somalia in terms of peace-enforcement operations. They lacked information and intelligence on the military capability of Aidid’s militia and more importantly the strategic consideration of the short- and long-term goals and how to achieve them. For example, to conduct a peace-enforcement mission requires a more sophisticated strategy than a peacekeeping operation in order to win the international and domestic support of interest groups, political opponents, and the public, because it could cause significant casualties. As Clinton (2004) states, on a peacekeeping mission the risks of significant casualties like in Somalia were not acceptable (p.553). Consequently, after the transition the UN peacekeepers and U.S. troops in Somalia were not peacekeepers any more in terms of mission and mandate, but still remained within the peacekeeping context. That is why at that time the UN and U.S. became a party of the conflict warring against USC/SNA led by General Aidid with the name of peacekeepers.

Then, why did the UN and U.S. decide the transition without the appropriate preparation for a peace-enforcement mission? More precisely, why did they naively reach the decision without noticing that they were not ready for it and
by misapprehending the practical distinction between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping? It was the effect of the Cold War ending. As explained in section three, the end of the Cold War has spread widely throughout the globe the expectation of the new world order for a more liberally democratised international community along with the emphasis on human rights and freedom. World leaders, especially those in the UN and U.S. government, transformed the expectation in the early 1990s into their actual policy. The decision-making related to the Somalia mission including the transition to UNOSOM II was also performed in this optimistic environment. Regarding the Somalia intervention the UN and U.S. leaders were too optimistic about their aims in Somalia. In addition, this was also the case in terms of how to achieve their aims. The end of the Cold War has brought about the new challenges: the massive emergence of severe intra-state conflicts and the demand for coercive peace operations to tackle them. Though the international community lacked experience of this kind of collaborative peace-enforcement missions in dealing with civil warfare, the decision-makers in the UN and U.S. optimistically approached the Somalia case, which was a typical intra-state conflict of the post-Cold era. Consequently, I argue that all the failings in Somalia occurred within the context of the end of the Cold War.
Chapter 4: ‘Aggravated’ Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina

*Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* drew me to Yugoslavia. […], travel there spelled neither life-threatening adventure nor an escape into the visually exotic; instead, it offered a collision with the most terrifying and basic issues of the century (Kaplan 1993: 8).

The Yugoslavia crises in the early 1990s were, as Kaplan states, a mixture of ‘the most terrifying and basic issues of the century’. The beginning of their complete history could go back to the beginning of the 20th century or even earlier. They were interwoven with the basic issues of conflict: religious hostility, ethnic hatred, cultural differences, and economic divide. These issues have been the sources of war and conflict in human history. However, they do not directly trigger war or conflict by themselves. Agential and structural factors around the sources do that. In Yugoslavia, the key cause of the crises was Milosevic and his Serb expansionism, which was applied as a strategic means to achieve his political ambition. He used Serb nationalism to exploit the issues and eventually the issues made the conflict in Yugoslavia extremely violent and complicated to settle. In modern Yugoslav history, especially after the Second World War, the issues were under control during Tito’s totalitarian regime. The structural and environmental changes of the post-Cold War era gave Milosevic the chance to exploit the issues. In this sense, the agential cause of the crises was interrelated with the structural contexts of the post-Cold War international order.

The Yugoslav crises have four distinctive features: first, as explained above the nature of the crises were in part deeply rooted in past religious and historical experience and the sources of conflict have a long history; second, the case of Yugoslavia was not a crisis, but more accurately a series of crises; third, there were many parties involved in the crises; fourth, it is controversial whether the crises were intra-state conflicts or inter-state conflicts. The crises comprise several key conflicts between Croatia and Croat Serbs; Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) and Bosnian Serbs; Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims; Bosnian
Muslims and Serbs. The abundance of parties to the conflict – that is, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Croat Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims – made the crises more complex and difficult to solve. In addition, in the early stage of the crises they were clearly intra-state conflicts because all six ethnic groups were part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This nature of the conflict changed as international society recognised the declaration of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. On 7 April 1992, the United States recognised the independence of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Bosnia achieved the recognition of the EU (at that time EC) on the same day, and finally, the UN General Assembly accepted Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia as UN members on 22 May (Mayall 1996: 167). In terms of customary international law, the formation of a new state is completed by achieving international recognition. Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia became obviously recognised governmental entities. Therefore, after May 1992 the Yugoslavia crisis was legally transformed into inter-state conflict. In this sense the crisis is unique.

Although immense resources of the UN and European states were poured into the missions in Yugoslavia, the result of their intervention, especially in Bosnia, did not seem to be successful. Academic evaluation of the UN missions has been critical. Curtis (1994) says that in the Bosnian mission the UN could not adhere to essential guidelines: impartiality and non-coercion (p.180). According to Ruggie (1993), in Yugoslavia the majority of the nearly 70,000 peacekeepers served ‘in contexts for which peacekeeping was not intended’ (p.26). This study argues that peacekeeping in Bosnia was not successful because the UN and European states failed to achieve even the key objectives of their intervention: to protect UN-designated ‘safe areas’\(^{14}\) and to prevent mass killings. The abundance of the adopted Security Council Resolutions related to the crisis and the continued expansion of the mandate of the key mission body UNPROFOR are evidence of the

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\(^{14}\) United Nations Safe Areas were established in 1993 on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina by resolutions 819 (1993) and 824 (1993). These resolutions designated the towns of Tužla, Žepa, Srebrenica, Goražde, Bihać, and Sarajevo as ‘safe areas’. They were also dubbed ‘UN Safe Havens’ (United Nations 1996a: 525).
failures of the mission. By 2003, the Security Council had passed 144 resolutions
governing the peacekeeping mission across the former Yugoslavia. In addition, UN
needed to establish an unusually large number of mandated bodies of the mission in
Yugoslavia. While the UN has usually established one or two mandated bodies as
part of a peacekeeping mission to intervene in a conflict, seven bodies of the
mission were established in Yugoslavia: the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) (February 1992–March 1995), the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) (March 1995–February 1999), the United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) (March 1995–
January 1996), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
(December 1995–December 2002), the United Nations Transitional Administration
for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) (January 1996–
January 1998), the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
(February 1996–December 2002), and the United Nations Civilian Police Support

The initial mandate of UNPROFOR under Resolution 743 (1992) was ‘to
create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis’. Its specific objectives were as follows: to
monitor the work of the local administration and police forces; and to use its good
offices to ensure that any changes to the status quo were consistent with the spirit
this resolution its mandate was repeatedly expanded to conduct more difficult
objectives in terms of the use of force such as to protect Sarajevo airport, to
monitor UN-protected areas in Croatia, and to secure the delivery of humanitarian
aid. Although UNPROFOR’s peacekeepers should observe the normal rules of
engagement as UN peacekeeping forces in implementing their new mandate, they
were allowed to broadly interpret the principle, the use of force in self-defense, as
its mandate was gradually expanded. Resolutions 757 (1992) and 770 (1992)
impliedly referred to Chapter VII of the Charter within the peacekeeping context.
UNPROFOR was authorised by Resolution 776 (1992) to aggressively use its force
to ensure the protection of UN personnel and the safe delivery of humanitarian
relief supplies as approving the paragraph of the Secretary-General’s report on 10
September 1992: ‘in this context, self-defence is deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate’ (United Nations Secretary-General 1992a: paragraph 9). In order to protect the UN safe havens, Resolution 836 (1993) authorised UNPROFOR to take the necessary measures including the use of force ‘in reply to bombardments against the safe areas’ or ‘to armed incursion into them’ by any of the parties (United Nations Security Council 1993e: paragraph 9). These changes to UNPROFOR’s mandate clearly mean that the peacekeepers there could not tackle the crisis in the absence of a firm cease-fire and without the cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Consequently, the UN was not able to play a major role in the ending of the Bosnian crises. What factors affected the failures of the UN peacekeeping in Bosnia? This key question is explored along with answers to other subsidiary questions.

This chapter is divided into three main sections in the same way as the previous chapter on Somalia was structured. The first section introduces background knowledge of the Yugoslav crises. The focus of the chapter is on the Bosnian war. However, because the crises were very complex and the events, which happened during the crisis and in the course of the intervention, were immense it is essential to examine the entirety of the Balkans crises to thoroughly understand the Bosnian conflict. The second and third sections explain the failures of the UN peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the analytical framework of the agential and structural perspective respectively. In the third section, I also examine how the agential and structural factors affected each other.

**4.1 The Background of the Bosnian Crisis**

The former Yugoslavia (the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) consisted of six component republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including two autonomous regions within its territory:
Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia. Since 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic
has split into five self-declared or internationally recognised independent states: the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003.
For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion, the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is referred to here as the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina as
Bosnia or itself, and the others as themselves.

Some recognise that the apparent beginning of the crisis came with the end
of the Cold War. It is definitely true that the Yugoslav crisis erupted and developed
in the structural context of the post-Cold War international order. However, it is
arguable what event triggered the crisis. For example, Haass (1999) states that `the
real Yugoslavia crisis began in March 1992 with the formal declaration of
independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina' because it brought on civil war and more
importantly ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia (p.38). I would argue that it
was in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence because the
declarations caused the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. After that, Macedonia
and Bosnia followed in turn. The Bosnian crisis broke out in the course of that
dissolution. Then, why did Bosnia become the `heartland' of the whole Yugoslav
crises? Why not Slovenia or Croatia? To answer these questions, it is necessary to
examine the modern history of the Balkans.

Yugoslavia as a state was established after the First World War. Before the
war, the Balkans was under control of the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian
Empire in turn. The Ottoman Turks had ruled the region since the end of the 14th
century. At the end of the 17th century, Austria-Hungary grew stronger in the north
and undermined the Ottoman Empire’s power in the region. The fall of the empire
was accelerated by a rise of nationalism through the Balkans from the end of 19th
century. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were the first successful challengers.
They became independent in 1878 by the Treaty of Berlin, which was signed by
Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey (See Map
4.1, p.86). The Treaty recognised the complete independence of the principalities
of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and the autonomy of Bulgaria.
In 1912, Montenegro started a war against the Ottoman Empire and other Balkan nations – Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece – joined the war. They drove the Turks out of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. Unfortunately, the victory of the allies was the start of a new disaster. Albania gained independence, but Kosovo and Macedonia could not because Serbia turned against its allies and occupied Kosovo and Macedonia. Austria-Hungary was deeply concerned about Serb expansionism. To resolve the crisis and prevent Serbia from taking control of the Southern Slavs, in 1914 the Austro-Hungary Empire sent Archduke Franz Ferdinand who was the emperor’s heir to Sarajevo. He was shot dead by a young Serb nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo on 28 June. As we know, this event triggered the First World War (Glenny 1999: 228-36).
At the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, the victors of the war— the United States, Britain, France, and Italy—redesigned the Balkans and the Versailles Peace Treaty legally confirmed this afterwards. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had been split into two small countries, Austria and Hungary; Bulgaria had to yield part of its territory to Romania and a new Kingdom; finally the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’ was founded. In 1929 King Alexander I changed his Kingdom’s name to ‘Yugoslavia’, which means ‘land of the southern Slavs’ (Poulton 1991: 5-6). The foundation paved the way for a new series of crises in the Balkans, because the Serb-dominant situation of the Yugoslav government provoked anti-Serb movements especially among Croats. The Second World War transformed the movements into atrocities by all ethnics in the land. Croatian nationalists welcomed the German invaders, as they could build up an independent ‘puppet state’, which also incorporated Bosnians and other minor ethnic groups around them. Italians occupied Montenegro and Germans took control of Serbia (Sowards 1996). Under the Croatian nationalist regime during wartime, many Serbs, Jews, Muslims, gypsies, and anti-fascist Croats were killed. Nevill Forbes says that ‘the Serbs and the Croats were, as regards race and language, originally one people, the two names having merely geographical signification’ (cited in Kaplan 1993: 25). It could be right in some senses, because they come from the same Slavic race, they speak the same language, and they shared many things as neighbours for a long time. However, the long history of rivalry between Croats and Serbs made them recognise clear distinctions in their ethnic and social identities. Moreover, the atrocious experiences during the war developed solid ethnic hatred among the ethnic groups replacing the mere distinctive perception of their identities.

Yugoslavia was made a Socialist federation comprising the six republics by Marshal Tito in 1945. As a partisan leader and communist, Tito fought the Germans during the war. He had a cooperative relationship with Dragoljub Mihailovic, a Serb nationalist, who also fought the Germans and Croat fascists (BBC News). The relationship provided a solid political foundation when he constructed the Socialist federation of the six ethnic groups. Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, and other ethnics gathered under a national flag. Although ethnic
tensions still existed, Yugoslav demographic politics was balanced under the leadership of President Tito during the Cold War period. Tito introduced the collective governing system including collective leadership, regular rotation of personnel among posts, and the strong autonomy of each republic. The system enabled the federal government to integrate very different ethnic communities under the same roof. Regarding the ruling system, the revision of the Constitution in 1974 was a key institutional event because it allowed increased power for the republics weakening the centralised rule of the federal government. In 1979, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was launched as a federal structure to maintain the collective governing system of Yugoslavia. After the death of the charismatic Yugoslav leader in May 1980 it took over his responsibilities rotating the presidency and key posts of the federation (United Nations 1996a: 487). However, the LCY could not restore the strong leadership of Tito. The nations of the federal republic started to come unglued after his death.

The LCY system had been sustained during the 1980s in spite of economic and political crises and increasing tensions among the country’s constituent ethnic groups. The demise of the Soviet Union and the following the break-up of the Cold War structure caused the collapse of the LCY system. Yugoslavia was splintering, beset by strife. As Huntington (1996) points out, ‘the Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line’ and then turned into ‘a line of bloody conflict’ at times (p.28).

During the period of 1991 and 1992, Yugoslavia had been ripped into independent states and this dissolution caused the bitter conflicts among the ethnic groups. First on 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence following a brief spell of fighting and then a savage war. Macedonia split off on 8 September without violence. The declaration of independence by the Bosnian parliament on 15 October made its nation become engulfed in conflict with the Bosnian Serbs, backed by Milosevic of Serbia. Serbia formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with Montenegro on 27 April 1992 (Mayall 1996: 166-7). Why did the independence of Croatia and Bosnia cause more severe conflict than that of others?; why did the Bosnian conflict become the key event of the whole Yugoslav crisis in the course of the disintegration?
The Yugoslav-Slovene war started on June 27 two days after Slovenia declared its independence. The Yugoslav government launched a massive attack against Slovenia. After 10 days, this war was ended by the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army with under 70 dead. Why did Milosevic suddenly stop the war and accept Slovenian independence? Haass (1999) suggests two plausible reasons: first, ‘Slovenian strength’ was stronger than Milosevic had expected, and second, ‘a lack of Serbian will’ in terms of ‘the policy of Serbianisation’ (p.38). Both of them might be true, but the latter was a key reason. Serbia has a long history of nationalist expansionism and Milosevic was a full successor to the Serb expansionism. His intention in the post-Cold War Balkans was to create a stronger and expanded Serbia. In this sense, for Milosevic, Slovenia was less important than any other region, because there was only a negligible Serbian minority in Slovenia. The percentage of Serbs in the population of Slovenia was 2.23%, whereas it was 32.02 % in Bosnia and 11.55 % in Croatia (See Table 4.1 and Map 4.2, p.90). Holbrooke (1998) points out that ‘Slovenia’s departure from Yugoslavia made it easier for Milosevic to create a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs, since it removed from the country a republic with almost no Serbs’ (p.29).

Table 4.1: Ethnic Groups by Republic and Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic or Province</th>
<th>Montenegrin</th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Macedonian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Slovene</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Yugoslav</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>36.30</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>39.52</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>32.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>68.54</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>13.63</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>75.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>67.01</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>19.76</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>90.52</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>85.44</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>13.22</td>
<td>77.42</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>54.42</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>28.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 1981 census; Szayna 2000: 130)

On 17 September 1991, Macedonia declared its independence from the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the early stage of the dissolution,

**Map 4.2: Ethnic Distribution of the Former Yugoslavia 1991**

![Map of the ethnic distribution of the former Yugoslavia, 1991.](http://www.reisenett.no/map_collection/europe/Yugoslav.jpg)

Serbia wanted to form a federation including Macedonia and offered to join their new federation at the meeting in Ohrid between the Macedonian president, Kilo Gligorov, and Milosevic. The former president of the Macedonian Parliament, Stojan Andov, stated in an interview:

> The Serbian side has posed a question of whether we will join the common state which would consist of Serbia, Montenegro and possibly Bosnia and Herzegovina. [...] Since the Serbian representatives in Ohrid have, quite naturally, asked us
whether we intend to enter any other kind of state (made up of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), we have clearly stated that in the near future we can not enter into an association with any of the republics until the problem of Yugoslavia is solved (Ordanovski, 13 Jan. 1992).

The Macedonians refused the Serb offer and went their way to create an independent state. Serbia did not take military action to annex Macedonia and rather seemed to show less interest in doing so. That was because they were worried about the reactions of Bulgaria and especially the regional super power of the Balkans, Greece. Macedonia was controlled by the Ottoman Empire until 1913 when the Balkan War ended. Then, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria divided the land and each took a portion (See Map 4.1, p.86). After the Second World War, Macedonia became a communist state named as ‘the Socialist Republic of Macedonia’ and soon after, joined the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito (Panov, 22 Apr. 1993).

The proportion of Serbs in the population of Macedonia was 2.33 %. In comparison with Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia, this amount was negligible for Serb nationalists to create a ‘Greater Serbia’. Under the circumstances of Bulgaria and Greece accepting Macedonian independence, Serbia could not take the risk of confronting Bulgaria and Greece when there was such little significance for their political ambition. It was Bulgaria that first recognised the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Greece accepted the independence, but opposed just the use of the state’s name and flag. Greece claimed that the land the Republic of Macedonia occupied was only part of wider Macedonia, which was also part of Greece, and that they were the sole heirs of the symbol Macedonia used in its national flag. What really worried Greece was that the use of the name and symbol could imply ‘territorial ambitions toward the northern Greek region of Macedonia’ (BBC News, 17 Dec. 2005). Due to the reason, Greece launched a diplomatic campaign to prevent the European Community’s recognition of Macedonia and urged the UN to accept Macedonia as a member state with a temporary description, ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. Macedonia joined the UN in April 1993 with the temporary description and after the long-
running dispute Greece finally ratified the recognition of Macedonia in 1995.

A massive conflict of the Yugoslavia crisis began between Croats and Serbs. They are neighbours divided by religion, history, and economics. Serbs are Orthodox Christians; Croats are Roman Catholic. As shown in Table 4.1 (p.89) and Map 4.2 (p.90), the major ethnic groups of Croatia are Croats and Serbs. Croatia was under Austro-Hungarian rule until 1918 when Yugoslavia was formed. Its Serb minority – about 12% of the population – was introduced by the Habsburgs into border areas as good fighters against Ottoman incursions. The key actor of the crisis was the ethnic Serbs. Croatia declared itself an independent country on 25 June 1991. This triggered massive insurgencies of the Croat Serbs waging a war between Croatia and Serb rebels backed by the Yugoslav army (JA)\(^{15}\). In the Croat war, ethnic hatred between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs opened up with the murder of civilians, the burning of villages, the shelling of apartments, the destruction of churches and mosques, and reports of mass rape. The war lasted six months and over 10,000 people including civilians were killed (USA Today, Feb. 14 1996). As the world witnessed the disaster day after day, the war brought great concern from the international community and UN as they regarded that it could have been a threat to international peace and security. In November 1991, the warring parties agreed to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from Croatia. This tenuous cease-fire took hold in January 1992.

As Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991, Bosnia also started to prepare its independence. Other ethnic minorities in the land, Bosnian Muslims and ethnic Croats, supported the referendum of independence except Bosnian Serbs. They boycotted the referendum and passed their own deciding not to secede from Yugoslavia in November 1991. Bosnia declared its independence in March 1992 without the Bosnian Serbs’ favour of secession. In April, ethnic Serb forces backed by JNA waged a vicious war against the Bosnian government. This war triggered several more armed conflicts between Croatians and Bosnian government forces; and between Croatian and Serbian forces. An

\(^{15}\) The Yugoslav Army (JA) was the successor of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), which was also referred to as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA)
estimated 200,000 people died and millions lost their homes in the wars (United Nations Security Council 1992a).

Here, I need to make clear my answers to the question of this section: why did Bosnia become the ‘heartland’ of the overall Yugoslav crisis? Table 4.2 below shows the key points of what I have explained so far in this section. It seems obvious that the proportion of Serbs in the population and the ethnic distribution in each land were crucial factors in explaining how the conflicts in Yugoslavia took place, grew, and spread. The conflict map of Yugoslavia was drawn along ethnic lines. However, this factor does not explain completely why the conflicts erupted. The underlying agential cause of the Yugoslav crisis was ‘Serb expansionism’. Milosevic and his nationalist followers had a sole political ambition, creating a ‘Greater Serbia’. The concept of a Greater Serbia could be clarified in Milosevic’s famous line, “Where ever there is a Serb, there is Serbia” (GlobalSecurity.org 2005a).

**Table 4.2: Major Conflicts in the Yugoslav Crisis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serb forces Vs.</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Serb population (%)</th>
<th>Duration of Fighting</th>
<th>Notable feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Jun. 1991</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>Powerful army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Jun. 1991</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>About 6 months</td>
<td>First international concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Sep. 1991</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>No fighting</td>
<td>Greece and Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (BiH)</td>
<td>Mar. 1992</td>
<td>32.02</td>
<td>Several years</td>
<td>Severer ethnic conflict than others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A UN Security Council report clearly states what Milosevic and his Serb people wanted:

The JNA’s objectives in Croatia were not force-oriented, or even terrain-oriented in areas not inhabited by Serbs. Rather, the JNA and the ethnic-Serbian paramilitary forces targeted the civilian population in areas deemed to be part of the «Greater Serbia», primarily centred in the Krajinas. JNA operations in Croatia underwent at least three phases. First, JNA forces secured key bridges over major rivers and neutralized Croat police forces. Second, the JNA cut the capital of Zagreb off from Slavonia, the Krajinas, and Dalmatia [See Map 4.3, p.94]. Then Slavonia, Banija,
Krajina and Dalmatia were secured. The last phase involved an «ethnic cleansing» campaign to militarily expel non-Serbs from Serb controlled territory, to which the Croats responded in kind (United Nations Security Council 1992a).

In Bosnia, the strategy and aim of the Serb forces’ military operations were almost the same as in the Croat war. Milosevic was a brutal predator who desired to make Serbia bigger and bigger causing atrocious disasters in the Balkans. His Serbianisation policy meant that Serbia and Montenegro could not achieve international recognition when they formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992. The FRY was admitted as a member state of the UN in 2000.

**Map 4.3 The Former Yugoslavia 1993**

(Source: http://www.reisenett.no/map_collection/europe/Former_Yugoslavia.jpg)

Then, why did Milosevic and Serb nationalists aspire to create a Greater
Serbia? Although it is a big question, which could be answered from historical, political, or many other perspectives, and actually out of this thesis' main theme, the practices of UN peacekeeping in the early post-Cold War era, I need to explain the reason because Serb expansionism was the decisive agential cause of the whole Yugoslav crisis. One reasonable explanation is that the expansionism was a strategic choice of the Serb nationalist elite for the survival of Serbia. The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences produced a memorandum for a new national programme in 1986. It shows how the elite were deeply concerned in terms of their national strategy about Serbia's secession from Yugoslavia and the annexation of ethnic Serb terrains in other republics' territories based on several presumptions:

- That any Yugoslavia not dominated by Serbia was contrary to Serb national interests;
- That the Communists had created a number of spurious nations (Montenegrins, Muslims and Macedonians) in order to weaken the Serb national corpus;
- That the very federal organization of the Yugoslav state had divided up the Serb nation and was thus inimical to its biological survival – consequently republican borders were illegitimate (or merely "administrative");
- That Yugoslavia was a political formula imposed upon the Serbs from the outside, and that Serbs must decide their future on their own, irrespective of – and if necessary in conflict with – all other Yugoslav nations (cited in Magas 1994).

Maslow (1943) suggests five basic needs for human motivation: physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualisation. Among these, the need for safety or survival is the most crucial cause of human behaviour, especially under the circumstances of competition and coercion. Throughout their history, ethnic Serbs had to struggle for ethnic survival against the imperialism of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, fascism under the Nazis, and communism under socialist Yugoslavia. They also needed to compete with neighbouring ethnic groups. In this sense, the 'strategic choice for survival' theory sounds reasonable. However, it did not make sense in the post-Cold War era. Neighbouring states, such as Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Greece, were not seeking expansion. Other
nations of the former Yugoslavia were weaker or smaller than Serbia (See Table 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 p.104). Serbia did not need to make itself bigger for survival.

Table 4.3: Population Distribution of Yugoslavia 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Serbia incl. (Kosovo / Vojvodina)</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (in 1000s)</td>
<td>9,279 (1,585 / 2,028)</td>
<td>4,578</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Szayna 2000: 131)

Table 4.4: Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>8,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>4,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>1,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>1,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>1,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,428</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 1981 census; Szayna 2000: 129)

Thus, the expansionism was chosen as a means for another purpose: the self-justification and perpetuation of Milosevic’s political power. Milosevic started his political career as president of Belgrade city communist party. He was a little known politician in Yugoslavia until he gave his speech in Kosovo in 1987, which firmly made Serbian nationalism a key word of Serbian political discourse. The speech on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989 before a crowd of hundreds of thousands made a name for him as a Serbian nationalist and charismatic leader for Serbia’s future. He stirred up Serb minorities in Kosovo,
who were allegedly discriminated against there, saying “Never let anyone do this to you again”. He resorted to Serbian nationalism and used it to establish his political power in Yugoslavia. Finally, he won the 1990 elections and became president of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia (Szayna 2000: 105-7). The situation of the break-up in 1991 was a challenge to him. He chose to exploit Serb expansionism to maintain his leadership because it had been the backbone of his political power. The result was brutal conflict between the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

The Yugoslav crisis is divided into three distinctive phases: the Slovene, Croat, and Bosnian conflicts. As explained earlier, the conflict in Slovenia lasted for 10 days in June and July 1991 between the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Slovenian army. Soon after the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, a war waged between the Croatian army and Serb militia together with the JNA in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia. It was in the second phase of the Yugoslav crises. The JNA officially withdrew from Croatia in November 1991, but maintained its support to the Serb militia and other local Serb forces in Croatia. The third phase of the crises involved the conflict in Bosnia, which was caused by the declaration of its independence in March 1992 (United Nations Security Council 1992a). While international concern over the Balkans started to grow from the second phrase, actual armed intervention by the international community commenced in the third phase.

Bosnia had been a multi-ethnic state shared between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims (also called Bosniaks), all of whom held a considerable demographic portion of Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslims made up 39.52 per cent of the population; ethnic Croats, 18.38 per cent; and Bosnian Serbs, 32.02 per cent (See Table 4.1, p.89). Each ethnic group has its own religious creed: Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam respectively. Though the Bosnian conflict was caused by Milosevic’s ‘Greater Serbia’ project under the context of the post-Cold War paradigm, the factors which made the conflict brutal and hostile were the demographic and religious features. The sheer brutality of the fighting and horrific campaigns of ethnic cleansing drew much attention from the world media and concern and sympathy from international society.
The Bosnian declaration of independence in March 1992 triggered simultaneous fighting in the territory of Bosnia between Bosnian government forces and Serbian forces, Croatians and Bosnian government forces, and Croatian and Serbian forces. At first, the Bosnian Serbs rejected Bosnia’s independence and immediately declared the establishment of the Republic of Serbia (Republika Srpska), which was based on the idea of creating a purely Serb ethnic enclave in northern and eastern Bosnia. To create a homogeneous Serb land in Bosnia, the army of the Republika Srpska led by General Ratko Mladic began a policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ against Bosniaks. This caused not only armed fighting between the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims but also created many refugees and massive counts of human rights crimes such as rape against Muslim women and girls, and mass executions of Muslim men and boys.

The initial peacekeeping involvement of the United Nations in the crisis began in September 1991 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 713 (1991). It was the first resolution in the UN’s history, which applied the concept, ‘a threat to international peace and security’, to a regional intra-state conflict:

*The Security Council,*

[...]*Concerned* that the continuation of this situation [the fighting in Yugoslavia] constitutes a threat to international peace and security,


The first adoption of the concept of working with Chapter VII of the UN Charter meant that first, the United Nations had a chance to implement its tools to maintain international peace and security without any of the restrictions of the Cold-War era; second, the UN showed an enthusiastic intention to cope with the Yugoslav crises. However, the result of the UN intervention in Bosnia was unsatisfactory. The UN exposed problems in its peacekeeping and peacemaking operations throughout their implementation and mandates.
4.2 The Failures of Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Missions in Bosnia

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Bosnia was ineffective in dealing with the crisis. The UN has been criticised for its handling of the conflict, and rightly so. The campaign of ethnic cleansing was a key issue of the conflict. As Simms (2001) points out, it was not merely the outcome of the tension among the ethnic groups or ‘the by-product of war’, but rather ‘the purpose of war’ (p.xv). The UN peacekeepers could not prevent the ethnic cleansings and failed to defend UN Safe Havens in Bosnia. Why did the UN fail to achieve the key objectives? There are three reasons of this agential failure. First, the UN sent its peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep; second, the Bosnian crisis was almost a war waged by regular armies of states differing from other regional conflicts in which the UN had intervened; third, the UN was not ready to manage the massive military intervention to cope with such hostile and intense fighting as occurred in Bosnia.

The Bosnian crisis was not a case that usual UN peacekeepers could cope with. As a key UN document about UN peacekeeping, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, clearly states, UN peacekeeping is designed to conduct the following tasks: ‘protecting humanitarian operations’, ‘protecting civilian populations’, and ‘pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation’. Regarding its composition, armament, and logistic capability, it is very dangerous for UN peacekeepers to require such strong use of force to tackle extremely hostile situations, as was the case in Yugoslavia (Boutros-Ghali 1995: Section B). That was why the peacekeepers in Bosnia were unable to adhere to two of the essential guidelines for traditional peacekeeping, namely impartiality and non-coercion, and the nature of the mission was extended to peace-enforcement without appropriate facilities and mandates. While UN peacekeepers were sent to Croatia in the circumstances that there was at least a peace to keep as they were deployed after a cease-fire was agreed between Croats and Serbs, in Bosnia they were deployed in the course of fighting without any of the prerequisites for successful peacekeeping operations.
UN peacekeepers for the Yugoslav crises were first deployed in April 1992 in Croatia with the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Originally, the mission of the peacekeepers was to patrol the truce in Croatia. By the summer of 1992, their role had broadened to include ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to millions of needy people, especially in Bosnia. As mentioned, the United Nations began to intervene in Yugoslavia with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 713 (1991). After two months, another resolution 721 (1991) was adopted, which asked the Secretary-General to produce a plan to intervene in the crises by stating as follows:

*Approves* the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and expresses the hope that they will pursue their contacts with the Yugoslav parties as rapidly as possible so that the Secretary-General can present early recommendations to the Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia; (United Nations Security Council 1991a)

Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/23280), which contained ‘the United Nations Peacekeeping plan’ in the former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR was established by Resolution 743 (1992) in February based on the plan of the Secretary-General report. According to the plan (S/23280, annex III), the general principles of UNPROFOR’s mission were:

1. A United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslavia crisis. […]
2. […] [All members of the peace-keeping operation] would be required to be completely impartial between the various parties to the conflict. Those personnel who were armed would have standing instructions to use force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence (United Nations Security-General 1991).

The peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was to create ‘the conditions of peace’, not peace itself. The peacekeepers should not be partial to any parties to conflict and limit their use of force to only the purpose of self-defence. Regarding the principles
and the situation in Bosnia, their mission was almost impossible because Milosevic’s Serbia, which had substantial military power, did not have any intention to stop the hostility. His aim was to ‘unite Serbs around him’ (Ruggie 1993: 29). To achieve this, he counted on war and continued to commit humanitarian crimes against other surrounding ethnic groups. In this sense, Ruggie’s argument is worthy of mention:

There was no peace to be kept in Bosnia. [...] Therefore, deploying a UN humanitarian mission to Bosnia by definition meant that its personnel would not be considered impartial and that they would, therefore, become potential pawns in the conflict. Seeking to protect them with peacekeepers only added to the number of potential international hostages on the ground (p. 29).

Within the new international order, where the desire for peace is not a high priority on the part of warring groups, the deep-seated ethnic and historical roots of the conflicts could make any intervention by the international community more difficult. Therefore, implementing peacekeeping operations under traditional guidelines and rules of engagement will result in a high probability of an inevitable slide into coercive peace-enforcement.

Regarding the use of force and enforcement action in Bosnia, two points should be clearly mentioned: first, unlike in Kosovo the UN mainly took charge of the use of force in Bosnia instead of NATO; second, although there was no clear consensus among the decision-makers of the UN and Security Council on whether the use of force, especially using NATO’s air power against Serb targets, could be defined as being in ‘self-defence’, bombing was conducted by directives to UNPROFOR from the Secretariat that air power could be used in self-defence.

The Bosnian intervention was at variance with the Kosovo case in the point that the UN was a main player in terms of the use of force and NATO was only an assistant. In Bosnia, the use of NATO force was performed at the request and authorisation of the UN mission body established in Bosnia and then the Secretariat. For example, in April 1994 two NATO planes dropped three bombs on a Serbian artillery command post near Gorazde. This sortie was initially requested by General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of UN forces in Bosnia, and then Yasushi
Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, gave his approval (Mayall 1996: 169). This does not mean that in Bosnia NATO was placed under the UN’s authority in the hierarchy of the command structure. The UN and NATO cooperatively worked in the operations and most of air strikes against Serb targets were executed only with the agreement of the UNPROFOR Force Commander and the NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces South that was dubbed ‘the dual key arrangement’ (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: 30). However, in contrast with the Kosovo case it was clear that the UN had a leading role in Bosnia in planning and executing the use of force, and NATO stepped aside supporting the UN’s missions. NATO’s stated objectives were ‘to provide support for UNPROFOR’ and ‘to support the Geneva negotiations’.

As the hostage crisis\(^\text{16}\) was unfolding differences of interpretation emerged from the Secretariat on whether using air power was in accordance with the principle of peacekeeping, the use of force in self-defence only, or for peace-enforcement action. The Secretary-General’s interpretation on Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) and its paragraph 9 is proof of it. The paragraph states:

9. Authorizes UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys; (United Nations Security Council 1993e).

The Secretary-General gives his interpretation in his report on 30 May 1995 as follows:

Resolution 836 (1993) referred to Chapter VII, but paragraph 9 defined the parameters for the use of force as being ‘in self-defence’ and the mandate given to UNPROFOR did not include any provision for enforcement (United Nations

\(^{16}\) Thirty of the UN peacekeepers were taken hostage during the Serb attack against Bosniaks from May to June 1995.
It is a legal contradiction to state that Resolution 836 (1993) referred to Chapter VII, but paragraph 9 was identified as being apt to the peacekeeping principle. The Secretary-General’s stance on the use of force at that time is fully understandable because he may have deeply considered the practical problem of UNPROFOR using force. He noted that when UNPROFOR had used force against the Serbs other than in self-defence, ‘the Bosnian Serb side quickly realized that it had the capacity to make UNPROFOR pay an unacceptably high price’, particularly by taking hostages, which happen in 1995 (United Nations Secretary-General 1993a: paragraph 63). However, his interpretation of the resolution and paragraph was not explicitly endorsed by the member states of the Security Council. It was apparent that until the hostage crisis involving UN peacekeepers UNPROFOR was executing the use of air power in terms of ‘in self-defence’. A Secretary-General’s report on Srebrenica tells us this:

[...], the Secretariat engaged in serious internal debate on the matter, and soon thereafter communicated to UNPROFOR its view on the circumstances under which resolutions 836 (1993) and 844 (1993) provided for the use of air power. These were:

(a) In self-defence;
(b) In reply to bombardments against the safe areas;
(c) In response to armed incursions into the safe areas;
(d) To neutralize attempts to obstruct the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR forces or humanitarian convoys.

112. The UNPROFOR Force Commander developed a concept for the use of air power within these parameters, specifying the particular criteria which would trigger its use in given situations (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: paragraph 111 and 112).

Another failing of the UN’s mission in Bosnia was that the decision-makers of the UN peacekeeping did not clearly identify the nature of the Bosnian crisis, which was almost a war waged by regular armies of states. In terms of the military
strength of the warring parties, a peacekeeping operation was an inappropriate means to use. The parties were absolutely different from lightly armed Somali militia. They had well trained troops equipped with tanks and heavy artillery. Table 4.5 below shows how they were as powerful as a regular force.

### Table 4.5: The Strength of each Party’s Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armies</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Artillery pieces</th>
<th>Planes</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav (FRY) army</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serb army</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Serb army</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian army</td>
<td>100,000 − 150,000</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Croat militia</td>
<td>30,000 − 50,000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian government army</td>
<td>120,000 − 180,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renegade Muslim forces</td>
<td>4,000 − 8,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: USA Today, Feb. 14 1996)

The Yugoslav army was not an official participant in the Bosnian conflict, but it provided air defence and other military and financial support to the Bosnian Serbs. Renegade Muslim forces were also supported by Serbs. Thus, pan-ethnic Serb forces comprised almost 290,000 men and 4,000 pieces of artillery and tanks. The Bosnian Croat militia was aligned with the Bosnian government, thus the strength of the Bosnian side reached up to 230,000. In comparison with the strength of the total UK regular forces – in 2004 it amounted to 213,160 (Ministry of Defence 2004) –, this demonstrates that both sides had powerful military force. On the other hand, as of 1995, the strength of UNPROFOR, which was a main peacekeeping body in the Yugoslav intervention, amounted to just around 40,000 with light armaments including about 700 military observers (United Nations 1996a: 489). The relatively smaller strength of under-equipped peacekeeping forces was not sufficient to deter hostile action from the mighty armies of the parties. This was proved in Srebrenica in July 1995, in which Europe’s worst massacre since World War II happened.
Srebrenica was one of the three areas in eastern Bosnia, where Muslims remained. Each enclave was designated a UN safe area and was full of refugees. Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic ordered his forces to shell Srebrenica and after five days took the town. Then, his army expelled the women and children from the town and killed most of the men. Based on the ICRC figure, more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims and refugees were slaughtered and as of January 1997 around 7000 people disappeared after the fall of Srebrenica. In addition, an estimated 25,000 people were forcibly evacuated (Rohde 1997: 350; Albright 2003: 187). At that time the Dutch peacekeeping contingent was there in Srebrenica. Albright (2003) says that the Dutch peacekeepers could not stop General Mladic's full-scale assault:

The Dutch peacekeeping contingent in Srebrenica lacked the firepower to stop the Serbs. Thirty of the peacekeepers were taken hostage during the Serb attack. Commanders accepted at face value General Mladić's promise not to harm the men of Srebrenica. By the time the killings took place, the peacekeepers had been withdrawn. In April 2002, an independent inquiry commissioned by the Dutch found their government responsible for committing the Dutch peacekeepers to an "ill-conceived and virtually impossible mission" of protecting Srebrenica without adequate preparation and support (p.187).

In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Bosnia, the UN needed the enlargement of the peacekeeping mission to conduct peace-enforcement. Thus, the UN expanded many times the UNPROFOR's mandate and strength over the land of Yugoslavia, which was originally deployed in Croatia and designated to supervise the cease-fire between Serbs and Croats. However, UNPROFOR was designed by the UN to act only as a peacekeeping force, not a war-fighting force in terms of its facilities and the rules of engagement. This means that UNPROFOR in Bosnia had to conduct a peace-enforcement mission against the powerful warring parties accordingly to enforce their status as peacekeepers. An undesirable event resulted from this dissonance. In May 1995, NATO conducted air attacks against Bosnian Serb positions. The overwhelming Bosnian Serb forces seized over 350

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17 The others were Zepa and Gorazde.
French UN peacekeepers and used them as ‘human shields’ against further NATO bombing (Holbrooke 1998: 63). As Owen (1995) points out, at the time of the initial deployment of UN forces to Bosnia in the autumn of 1992 UNPROFOR’s mandate did not include ‘any element of enforcement’. However, it had been easily forgotten that UNPROFOR was only a peacekeeping force sent to Bosnia to secure Sarajevo airport by agreement with the Bosnian Serbs. And then, the UN mandate for its forces changed over time (p.354).

The other problem the UN exposed throughout its Bosnian mission was that the UN was not prepared to tackle massive military operations like the Bosnian intervention. The UN secretariat itself was not able to identify the nature of conflicts and the military requirements of the operation. Albright said that ‘if I had to choose a single word to evoke the problems of U.N. peace keeping, it would be “improvisation”’. As the U.S. ambassador to the UN, she argued that ‘a kind of programmed amateurism shows up across the board’, including what she described as ‘the near total absence’ of contingency planning, ‘hastily recruited, ill-equipped and often unprepared troops and civilian staff’, the absence of centralized military command and control, and ‘the lack of a durable financial basis for starting and sustaining peacekeeping operations’ (Smith and Preston, June 18 1993). For example, the former head of UN forces in Sarajevo, Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie, vividly described the problem of insufficient staff: ‘do not get into trouble as a commander in the field after 5 p.m. New York time, or Saturday and Sunday’, because ‘there is no one to answer the phone’ (Smith and Preston, June 18 1993). Albright (2003)’s statement supports this:

Both Presidents Bush and Clinton understood that the UN was not equipped to handle its expanding responsibilities. When I first arrived in New York, there were only about a dozen people in UN Headquarters assigned to manage peacekeeping. There was no twenty-four-hour operations center and virtually no control over logistics. Every new operation had to start from scratch, recruiting commanders and troops, and procuring everything from blue helmets to pencils and trucks. I told audiences that the global 911 number was either busy or open only from nine to five, and that the Secretary General had to devote much of his time to begging for participants and money (p.147).
In order to cope with the new type of conflict shown in Bosnia characterised by a bewildering diversity of ethnic and religious war, the UN needed to reorganise the peacekeeping staff, prepare an efficacious training programme for peacekeepers, and create a 24-hour command centre, not just a situation room.

In terms of preparation for armed intervention, the UN also failed initially to understand the hindrances of their mission in dealing with a former Communist country, which had the traditions of ‘state-controlled media’ and ‘dictatorial hierarchy in military command and control system’. Owen (1995) testifies about these as follows:

Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic all simply manipulated public opinion by using their control over television and much of the written press, a control which made it very difficult to get the UN message of impartiality through. Moreover, Communist command and control practices meant that each commander in the former Yugoslav army down to a low level was a dictator in his area of responsibility who could have one of his soldiers taken out and shot whenever he commanded. These extremes of delegation explained why permits for convoys were continually blocked at a low level (p.200).

Peacemaking is a means stated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter to bring hostile parties to agreement through the peaceful process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements. This procedure could be accompanied by regional arrangements based on Chapter VIII of the Charter:

*Article 52*

[...] 3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council (United Nations 1945).

In the Balkans, the UN’s regional counterpart was the European Community. The UN Secretary-General and the President of the Council of Ministers of the EC co-
chaired the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which was a key regional arrangement to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. This conference was firstly convened in London on 26 to 28 August 1992 and broadened the existing arrangement of the EC, the European Community’s Conference on Yugoslavia. The UN also cooperated with other permanent member states of the Security Council, Russia and the United States, to cope with the crisis (United Nations 1996a: 492).

The Co-Chairmen of ICFY appointed the Secretary-General’s personal envoy, Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, as the Co-Chairmen of a Steering committee, which took responsibility for creating a framework for a general settlement and associated measures. Vance was succeeded in May 1993 by Thorvald Stoltenberg, and Owen by Carl Bildt in June 1995. From September 1992, the co-chairmen of the Steering committee commenced their work and finally produced a comprehensive peace plan package for Bosnia on 4 January 1993. It was dubbed the ‘Vance-Owen Peace Plan’. This comprehensive plan was divided into four sections comprising ten constitutional principles. Its main points were as follows:

I. Constitutional Principles
- Defines Bosnia and Herzegovina as a decentralised state, with guaranteed freedom of movement throughout.
- Gives substantial autonomy to the provinces while denying them any international legal character.
- Provides for democratically elected national and local government and a mechanism for resolving disputes between them.
- Stressess strong, international monitored human rights provisions.

II. Military Paper

*Requires:*
- Cessation of hostilities within seventy-two hours;
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo in five days and from remaining areas in fifteen days;
- Demilitarisation of Sarajevo, and eventually the whole country;
- Separation of forces followed by a return of forces to designated provinces within
forty-five days.

III. The Map

- Delineates a ten-province structure reconstituting Bosnia-Herzegovina.

*Annex: Working Paper on Interim Arrangements*

- Nine-member interim central government (three members from each party) to take decisions by consensus.
- Multi-ethnic provincial governments to be set up to reflect all groups fairly, based on the pre-war census.
- Reversal of ethnic cleansing to get under way immediately.
- International Access Authority to be established to guarantee freedom of movement.
- National authorities to be created to restore power, banking services, telecommunications and civil aviation (Owen 1995: 89-90).

Through intense negotiations between ICFY and the three parties of the Bosnian conflict - the Bosnian government, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs - from January to March 1993, President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Mate Boban, the leader of the Bosnian Croats signed an agreement on all the elements of the plan. However, the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic signed just the agreement for peace of Military Paper and the Constitutional Principles. He rejected the idea of the interim arrangements of the Annex and a revised map of provincial boundaries (See *Map 4.4*, p.110), which were the key elements of the plan (United Nations 1996a: 492-3). The Bosnian Serbs were the most severe opponents of the 'cantonisation' of Bosnia.

Although the Muslim-dominant Bosnian government was initially opposed to the plan because they wanted a fully unified state, they finally agreed. The Bosnian Serbs also accepted the plan under enormous pressure from Milosevic. The only remaining opponent to the plan was the U.S. government. The key reason the plan was discarded was that the UN and ICFY failed to acquire the support of the U.S. government. As the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher said 'we’re not happy with the maps' (Glenny 1999:640) and the U.S. National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, recalled that 'we didn’t think it was viable and made sense, it was
Map 4.4: A Ten-province Structure of VOPP, 2 January 1993
Vance-Owen Peace Plan and ethnic predominance

![Map of Bosnia with ethnic distribution]

(Source: http://monarch.gsu.edu/jcrampton/bosnia/maps/vopp.jpg)

so higgledy-piggledy'. The U.S. government and Bosnians refused the plan because they objected to the idea of 'cantonising Bosnia'. Especially for the U.S. leaders, the cantonisation seemed like a reward to the Serbs for their brutal ethnic cleansing and expansionism (Simms 2001: 147). However, the underlying reason for the U.S. refusal was that the success of the plan could have required at least 50,000 ground troops (Glenny 1999: 640). According to Holbrooke (1998), there was no unity of opinion towards the Bosnian war within the U.S. foreign policy team (p.52). Whereas the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the involvement of the government, the NSC and some other members of the team such as Ambassador Albright were eager to tackle the crisis. In the midst of the deep division, President Clinton was reluctant to play an active role to
resolve the conflict and at least determined not to send U.S. ground troops in order to avoid the risk of casualties. This was one of the key objectives of the Clinton Administration’s policy regarding the Bosnian intervention at that time.

At the early stage of the crisis, the British government was also reluctant to massively intervene in Bosnia. The foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, told the House of Commons in mid-July 1993 that ‘I do not believe and have never used rhetoric that would lead anyone to believe, that it was part of Britain’s interests to pretend that we could sort out every man-made disaster in the world, of which there are many at the moment... It is in our interests to do out bit, but we should not over-pretended, or let rhetoric get in the way of reality’ (Simms 2001: 7). In contrast, France was eager to intervene in the Yugoslav crisis. The French government had contributed most of the peacekeepers to the UN mission in Bosnia. The Germans had historically had deep geopolitical relationships with the Balkan states. During the period of the conflict in the 1990s, there had been over three hundred thousand Bosnian refugees in Germany. Regarding the Bosnian war, the key concern of the German government was to reduce their political and financial burden of refugees (Holbrooke 1998: 275). That was why the government very quickly responded to the declaration of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and was first among the Western states to recognise their independence. The diversity of views on what to do about Bosnia meant that the VOPP got stuck in unfriendly circumstances unable to be fulfilled.

As Webb (1996) points out, the peacemaking mission in Bosnia was ‘an exercise in frustration’. The situation had not been improving and rather it deteriorated (p.176). The key reason was that the leaders of the UN and ICFY were failed to tune the voices of each state, especially the United States, which had the vital capability and resources to resolve the conflict. Owen (1995) says that ‘I still believe that had the Clinton Administration supported the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, we would have been able to carry it out’ (p.38). This argument is quite acceptable. Indeed, although the Clinton Administration was pressured by the international society, they were very reluctant to actively involve in the UN’s peace operations in Bosnia. Rather, they effectively sabotaged the peace process of the ICFY. To say this precisely, the failure of the VOPP was not due to the lack of U.S. support, but
due largely to the fact that Owen and other ICFY leaders failed to persuade the U.S. government and were eventually unable to achieve its support. Lord Owen was heavily criticised, even personally, by many U.S. politicians. The Republican Congressman, James Moran, attacked him saying that Owen 'seems to be playing the role of Neville Chamberlain'. According to Simms (2001), in many interviews and talk shows on television, Owen 'rubbished the doubters' of the plan and dismissed their objections as a 'rant', uttering 'you haven't got troops on the ground. I speak for a country that has got troops on the ground' (p.147). He could get nothing from those whom he criticised.

The critical difference between the failure of VOPP in 1993 and the success of Dayton in 1995 was the absence and presence of any effective means to make the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic accept the plan. The economic sanction imposed in the former Yugoslavia at the early stage of the conflict did not effectively work. Military forces from the member states of the UN in the region also lost their utility as a 'stick' because they were just lightly-armed peacekeepers sent to the place where required robust peace-enforcement actions. Peacemaking is not an isolated action between warring parties and a negotiator. As a technique for peaceful settlement it primarily requires a strong political will of parties involved to seek a solution to their differences. Thus, the impact of the dynamics of relationships among all actors concerned is a critical variable for success in the context of peacemaking. The UN and ICFY were jammed by hesitation between Europe and America and consequently failed to produce a more viable peace plan for the Bosnian crisis.

Thus, the UN as the key actor was not prepared to deal with the military situation in Bosnia. It did not have the capability to react quickly and properly to a changing situation. Any action of an agent is the product of explicit strategic calculation within the structural contexts in which its action is formulated. Actors monitor the immediate consequences of their actions assessing success or failure of the actions in securing their prior objectives and then strategically learn from the consequences. Through this learning process within the strategically selective contexts, actors formulate their revised actions or reactions, which partially cause 'direct effects' upon the structured contexts producing a partial formation of the
structure. Consequently, strategic action of an agent interacts with structure through these two functions: direct effects and strategic learning. The next section explores how the strategic actions of the UN and European states in Bosnia were formulated within the structural contexts of the post-Cold War order and the context of the interrelationship with the strategic actions of the U.S. towards the Bosnian crisis.

4.3 The Structural Effects of the Cold War Ending

The varying challenges the international community has confronted in the post-Cold War era were new to the UN and its member states. The United Nations has sought to expand the scope of its operations, but the problem is, as Davis (1993) explains, that the conflicts erupting around the world are different, and the conditions that made the international community’s response possible and appropriate do not exist (p.27). He also points out that these conflicts involve violence within states among ethnic and religious groups seeking autonomy and independence. The rival groups are often unwilling to stop fighting short of achieving their goals. For such conflicts, political solutions upon which to base a peaceful settlement are difficult even to define, and any outside intervention to bring peace carries high risks and low probabilities of success (p.1). Thus, as for most conflicts in the post-Cold War era, the conditions that were critical to success in past peacekeeping operations are not likely to exist. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN failed to thoroughly understand these features of post-Cold War regional conflicts. Then, how did the end of the Cold War affect this strategic failure of the agent in the intervention?

The end of the Cold War brought the United Nations new challenges together with opportunities in terms of two features: first, the increase of intra-state armed conflicts and second, the revitalization of the UN system, specifically the functions of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. The changed environment made it possible for the UN to take a decisive role in
many crises as its founders had intended. The UN has been in the spotlight unlike ever before regarding its peacekeeping function. The state leaders convened at ‘the Security Council Summit meeting at the level of Heads of States and Government’ on 31 January 1992 and endorsed that ‘all member states expect the United Nations to play a central role at the this crucial stage’, in which the international community faced new challenges in terms of the search for peace (United Nations Security Council 1992b).

However, in spite of the initial optimism about the UN’s role and capability, the UN actually failed to manage and create peace in the ethnic conflicts in the early post-Cold War period. As explained in the previous section, the UN’s failures were caused by the fact that the UN has entered a domain of military activity, which was a vaguely defined grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission without any operational concepts and other appropriate physical, financial, and organisational preparation for the transition. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) of the U.S. Department of State (1996) clearly notes that UN peace operations need to be improved and reformed for successful accomplishment of its missions. The directive indicates that the UN needs substantial improvement to its command and control capabilities, planning and preparation, and organizational changes at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As Ruggie (1993) points out, the growing misuse of peacekeeping operations has caused the situation that ‘the majority of the nearly 70,000 blue-helmeted peacekeepers now out in the field serve in contexts for which peacekeeping was not intended’ (p. 26). In short, the mission the UN conducted in Bosnia and other former Yugoslav land were essentially hostile military missions by lightly armed military personnel within the non-coercive contexts.

The structural effect of the end of the Cold War on the UN was that the new international humanitarian order of the post-Cold War era compelled the UN to do something to tackle the increased armed conflicts. The UN was definitely under pressure. Boutros-Ghali (1992) states in An Agenda for Peace that in the changing context of the post-Cold War international order traditional peacekeeping has been extended to include peacemaking, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building (p. 471-4). It is obvious that the UN’s intention to change its peacekeeping
function to a grey area mission was created and carried out within the structural contexts of the post-Cold War international order. *An Agenda for Peace* itself was the expression of the UN’s desire for the new world order. Then, the question can be raised: why did the UN desire to enter the grey zone in spite of their unreadiness? According to the ‘rational decision-making’ model, an agent is trying to conduct a ‘rational choice’ through the process in general: situation → analysis → action. In the trend of the early post-Cold War international order, the UN simultaneously produced its ‘actions’ based on the ‘situations’ without the ‘analysis’ process. It seemed to be almost a conditioned reflex action. Whenever regional or inter-ethnic conflicts occurred, the UN immediately sent its peacekeeping troops, lacking strategic consideration and attempts to clarify the diversity of each conflict. At the beginning of the 1990s, the UN deployed only around 10,000 military personnel in ten peacekeeping missions. However, in 1994 the number was rapidly increased to over 80,000 military and police troops in seventeen operations. After the UN had learned from the lessons of the failures in Somalia and Bosnia, only about 14,000 were engaged in UN peacekeeping missions in 1999 (Weiss and Collins 2000: 31-2).

The failure of the European states in Bosnia was fully predictable. As explained in the Somalia chapter, the structural change of the Cold War system raised expectations that a new world order could be constructed, which would be more peaceful and democratic. For many European leaders the end of the Cold War created an opportunity for the European Community to set itself up as a premier security institution within the new order in handling armed conflicts or any other security issues in Europe. The Bosnian crisis was a test case to take such a role. However, most of the existing institutions for European security at that time were not able to effectively tackle the crisis because they were not suitable to handle such a serious armed conflict. Freedman (1994b) states as follows:

> All institutions with some claim on the security affairs of the new Europe have been damaged through their association with the Balkan crisis. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was just stirring as the crisis broke and
was immediately sidelined. The Western European Union (WEU) showed that it could be used for the more symbolic forms of military action (such as the monitoring of the trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic), but that it could not handle serious military operations, for which only NATO had the capacity (p.7).

NATO had the military capability to influence Serbian behaviour, but the military option of using NATO forces on the ground was not considered as it would mean risking NATO casualties. The crisis was regarded not so severe as to risk embroiling troops because it was perceived as an intra-state armed conflict though it was actually a war waged by regular armies of states.

NATO is an essential institution for European security. However, its action to handle European security issues is not decided by European states only. It is explicit that America is the strongest and most influential actor in NATO. The lack of political will is often cited as a source of problems of international affairs. The reason that NATO did not consider the situation serious enough to use its ground force was because the key actor, the United States, did not have want to employ them. In the initial stage of the crisis in Yugoslavia, the insufficient political will of the United States to forcefully use NATO forces was a major stumbling block in resolving the conflict and preventing further catastrophes such as the fall of Srebrenica. This reluctance and the pushing of the UN into the theatre instead of NATO were the strategic actions of the United States towards the Bosnian crisis in the structural context of the post-Cold War. The early 1990s were crucial years for the U.S. foreign policy in terms of conflict management on a global perspective, regarding the Gulf War and resisting the tide of nationalist events of the post-Cold War order. The Bush Administration passed the Balkan issue to Europe to tackle the crisis by themselves. As Freedman (1994) points out, the United States might sense that 'either this was a small enough problem to be managed using the Community’s economic and political instruments, or else was such as a can of worms that it should be grateful for an excuse to keep clear' (p.7). As soon as elected, President Clinton appeared to take action to lead its NATO partners for the crisis. *Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13)* in 1993 was a proof of this. However, soon after the event Black Hawk Down in Somalia the Clinton
Administration was trying to minimise the involvement of U.S. troops in the Bosnian crisis to avoid political and military risks, though their political rhetoric demanded the active involvement of international society in the conflict. The former Danish Ambassador to the UN, Thorvald Stoltenberg states as follows regarding the situation of the early stage of the mission in Yugoslavia:

[...] the fewer people governments had on the ground, the more courageous statements they gave, demanding that 'you must undertake military action'. American and German politicians were in the forefront of demanding more military actions while they had not a single young woman or man as a UN soldier on the ground. The French and the British were called cowards. But they had thousands of their own people there (Wolfgang Biermann, 16 October 1997: p.6).

The 'strategic learning' from the failures in Somalia worked at this point. In 1995, it seemed to suddenly happen that the administration changed its pathway to active involvement in the crisis and taking a decisive role in restoring peace in Bosnia. It is clear that this sudden change of the U.S. policy broke the deadlock in Bosnia and eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, which ended the Bosnian conflict. Why did Clinton decide to alter his stance and to be actively involved in the crisis? How did the 'strategically selective context' and structural environment of the post-Cold War peace operations affect this decision-making of the key agent in the Bosnian intervention?

Albright (2003) says 'Bill Clinton's willingness' was one of the factors, which ended the Bosnian crisis (p.189). Although she (2003) does not clearly explain why Clinton changed his mind, she alludes to the fact that the key factor of his turn-around was the massacre in Srebrenica:

After Srebrenica, the President's frustration had boiled over, and Tony Lake [Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1993-97] had asked for endgame papers focusing on the kind of post-conflict Bosnia we wanted to see. The papers were discussed at a key meeting in the White House Cabinet Room [...]. As we had been from the beginning, the President's advisors were divided. I argued that U.S. troops were going to be in Bosnia sooner or later, [...]. Europe has failed to resolve the crisis and, in the process, had diminished both
NATO and the UN. [...] Neither the State Department nor the Defense Department suggested doing anything different from what we had been doing, with the Pentagon recommending a “realistic” approach under which we would accept the reality of Serb military power and seek a permanent cease-fire based on the status quo. [...] I now waited tensely as Tony completed his summation and we all turned to the President to see his reaction. [...] The president normally began his response to a presentation with a series of questions. This time it was obvious from the moment he started to speak that he had his mind made up. “I agree with Tony and Madeleine,” he said. “We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few months. We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we can’t get that at the bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield.” (p.189-90)

After the massive killing in Srebrenica, Bill Clinton decided to play an active role in the intervention. Clinton (2004) confirms this by saying that ‘after Srebrenica was overrun, I pressured the UN to authorize the rapid reaction force we had discussed at the G-7 meeting in Canada a few weeks earlier’ (p.666). However, it does not tell us that Srebrenica itself was the solitary motivation for the sudden change of the U.S stance towards the Bosnian war. It could have been a precipitating cause, but may not have been a decisive factor. States do not act without national interest, especially when there are great risks in performing their policies. What interest did President Clinton find in Bosnia and how did his administration try to secure U.S. national interest within the post-Cold War structural context avoiding the risks of the intervention?

The Clinton Administration’s foreign policy could be identified as interventionism. During his tenure Clinton and his administration, stressing human rights and democracy, had been eager to intervene in Yugoslavia, Somalia, North Korea, Haiti, and the Middle East. He said that ‘with a few thousand troops and help from our allies, even making allowances for the time it would have taken to deploy them, we could have saved lives [of Rwandans]. The failure to try to stop Rwanda’s tragedies became one of the greatest regrets of my presidency’ (Clinton 2004: 593). He was keen to tackle humanitarian crises and resolve regional conflicts. Then, why was the administration reluctant to intervene in Bosnia and what changed the unwillingness?
The U.S. government initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem. According to Holbrooke (1998), Washington believed that, ‘with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe’ (p.29). This idea is related to President Clinton’s view on the role of NATO in the post-Cold War era. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the question was raised: With no Soviet threat, why does the West still need NATO? According to Albright (2003), Clinton’s answer was that ‘it remained the cornerstone of European security’ and ‘other threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ethnic cleansing’ in the region had taken the place of the Soviet threat (p.251). For Clinton, therefore, NATO and Europe should primarily have taken charge of the inter-ethnic wars and ethnic cleansings in the Balkans.

The Yugoslav crises started in 1991. It was during the tenure of President Bush. George Bush was not interested in Yugoslavia because his administration thought that the United States had no express interests there. Moreover, at that time due to the Gulf War, the Middle East was a more critical region than the Balkans for U.S. national interest. The United States first started pressing for some form of military intervention in Bosnia in late 1992 when Bill Clinton was elected as the U.S. president. The Clinton Administration was pressured by both international and regional organisations, but was very reluctant to actively participate in the UN’s peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The very essence of the dilemma the Clinton Administration faced at that time consisted of two things: first, defining U.S. national interests in the use of military forces for intervention with humanitarian purpose and second, determining and developing a coherent national policy based on the interests concerned. The lack of a clearly articulated national policy for operating in the ‘grey zone’ between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission in hostile and intense inter-ethnic wars like the one in Bosnia could make the U.S. face another torment of the Vietnam War. The administration, thus, had sought to develop national policy on peace operations in drafting PRD 13, which called for increasing involvement of the U.S. troops in the greatly expanded UN peace operations around the world (Smith and Preston, June 18 1993). Though this draft document was not presented to President Clinton and was re-evaluated as the Somali crisis grew worse, the review itself implies that the active involvement of
the U.S. government to suppress genocide and crimes against humanity was congenial to American national interests. A memorandum of the State department to the President confirms this as follows:

If the United States expects to retain its political leadership in the world, it must not be derelict when the slaughter of innocents occurs. The world looks to the United States for leadership when such depredations threaten. In cases such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the governments of Europe, which had the most immediate stake in stopping crimes against humanity, nonetheless refused to act without the political and military involvement of the United States. The United States, which leads in almost every other international endeavour, cannot simply exempt itself when mass murder of unarmed people unfolds (Frye 2000: 23).

At a meeting of the U.S. foreign policy team in late June 1995, Albright (2003) as the U.S. Ambassador to the UN argued that:

When U.S. leadership is questioned in one area, it affects our leadership in others. French President Chirac’s recent statement that ‘the position of leader of the Free World is vacant’ had been chilling my heart for weeks (p.186).

For the Clinton Administration, to secure U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world was a vital national interest. The term national interest can be divided into two sub-concepts: ‘material interest’ and ‘ideational interest’. The national interest with regard to U.S. leadership is an ideational interest. The dilemma for the administration related to the Bosnian conflict was that with only the ideational interest, Clinton and his assistants could not accept a great risk of casualties, which they might face if they decided to send U.S. troops in Bosnia. In the Gulf War, the U.S. government very quickly responded against the Iraqi invasion due to the material interest, oil. Bosnia was almost nothing to the U.S. in terms of material interest. That was why the U.S. government insisted on a casualty-free operation, ‘lift and strike’, which refers to removing economic sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslavia and then using NATO’s air force to strike the Bosnian Serbs.

According to Woolley (1994), the determinants of military intervention are many: ‘calculations of domestic political support, legal restraints, moral arguments,
the importance of the target area, the interest and possible reaction of other nations and other military forces, available military forces, appropriateness of training for the mission, and the perceived value of the intervention compared to alternative measures' (p.190). One of the most critical determinants among them for the administration was domestic political support from Congress and the public. The CRS Issue Brief\textsuperscript{18} of Serafino in December 1996 on the U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping states that regarding the issue of involvement, the U.S. Congress was primarily concerned with two points: first, 'when the President should consult with Congress and seek its approval to send U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions; and second, whether the Congress should restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. control' (Serafino, December 3 1996). The massacre in Srebrenica and a Serb mortar attack on the main outdoor market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, which killed sixty-eight Bosnian civilians, gave President Clinton a chance to seek Congress' approval and the support of the public. The events evoked the deep concern of the U.S. public and international community over the situation in Bosnia. Soon after the mortar attack, the United States called an emergency meeting of NATO ministers; Yeltsin announced that Russia would deploy its troops around Sarajevo; and NATO's air strikes began. As explained earlier, just after the mass slaughter in Srebrenica President Clinton decided to play a decisive role in the Bosnian intervention.

In some regional conflicts such as the Bosnia war, the U.S. government faced the difficult problem of identifying U.S. national interests with regard to the structural challenges of the new international order: the massive emergence of severe intra-state conflicts and the demand for coercive multilateral peace operations (Glenny 1995: 101). According to Hastedt (1991), in order to identify their national interests, states concern themselves with 'how the international system provides opportunities and challenges to the realization of foreign policy objectives'. The international system is regarded in that consideration as comprising two parts: 'structural constants' and trends of international order. In

\textsuperscript{18} CRS refers to the Congressional Research Service, which is a part of the Library of Congress preparing its reports for the U.S. Congress.
terms of the structural constants, the international system, which has been in 'ordered anarchy', is a 'self-help' and 'stratified' system. The self-help system means that states have to rely on themselves to accomplish their foreign policy objectives. Thus, policy-makers of each state try to make a balance between their goals and available power resources. The stratified system implies that agents in the system are born unequal. The ability of states to achieve the goals of their foreign policies varies from state to state (pp. 8-10). The post-Cold War international system is also in ordered anarchy, a self-help system, and very stratified as well. The United States in the anarchical order of the early post-Cold War system had the chance to become a genuine world leader and this was a key objective of its foreign policies. As the end of the Cold War removed the U.S.'s rival from the stratified system, it came to enable the U.S. to achieve its goal. For the accomplishment of this, the U.S. has tried to create a balance between the goal and resources it has had, and the Bosnian intervention was one of the results of this balancing. There is another effect of the post-Cold War structure on the agents' strategic actions. The 'trend' of the post-Cold War international order as examined earlier is the expectation of the new world order for a more liberally democratised international community along with the emphasis on human rights and freedom. World leaders, especially those of the UN and U.S., transformed the expectation into actual policies. The ideational national interest of the U.S. meets its active involvement in the Bosnian crisis at this point. As the sole super power remaining in the post-Cold War international arena, the U.S. was expected to adopt a stance toward the crisis of international peace and security around the world.

4.4 The Failure to Fill the Doctrinal Void

This chapter has mainly explored the reasons for the debacle in Bosnia within the agential and structural framework in section 2 and section 3 respectively. The failure in Bosnia was due to the agent not being able to respond to or meet the military requirements in Bosnia, while the changes in the international structure meant that there were unrealistic expectations of what the UN could do. Hence, it
was a combination of both agent and structure. In terms of the agential perspective the failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was fundamentally caused by the fact that the UN employed peacekeeping techniques within the wrong context. Peacekeeping is a very useful tool to tackle small-scale and less-aggressive armed conflicts, but not suitable for such hostile and intensive war-fighting as occurred in Bosnia, which required the massive military operation of peace-enforcement action. The UN failed to appreciate the nature of the conflict and its own capability to manage it. Consequently, it sent its peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep.

The UN has been criticised for its handling of the conflict. The UN peacekeepers could not prevent the ethnic cleansings and even failed to defend UN-designated ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs seized UN peacekeepers and used them as a ‘human shield’ against further attacks from NATO. Regarding the fact that the Bosnian crisis was almost a war waged by well-disciplined and heavily-armed forces differing from other regional conflicts in which the UN had intervened and that there was no peace to keep, the usual UN peacekeeping forces in terms of their mandate and facilities could not cope with the conflict. As Ruggie (1993) states, although the UN peacekeepers there had conducted a significant humanitarian role, they were unable to accomplish their mission as they were deployed in ‘a security environment for which the peacekeeping mechanism was not designed’ (p.26). In response to the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, the UN needed the enlargement of the peacekeeping mission in order to conduct peace-enforcement. Thus, the UN repeatedly expanded the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR)’s mandate and strength, but UNPROFOR was fundamentally designed to act only as a peacekeeping force, not a war-fighting force in terms of its facilities and the rules of engagement. They also lacked adequate training and support from the UN for massive fighting with the mighty warring parties. The decision-makers of the UN mission sent the wrong type of troops to Bosnia.

The initial involvement of the United Nations in the crisis began in September 1991 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 713 (1991). It was the first time throughout the UN’s history that the UN applied the concept, ‘a threat to international peace and security’, to a regional intra-state conflict. That means that the UN was very eager to tackle the crisis and eventually entered the domain of
the grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission without any operational concepts to fill the doctrinal void and the required physical, financial, and organisational preparation for the transition. As Boutros-Ghali states in *An Agenda for Peace*, this shift was intentionally designed in the changing structural context of the post-Cold War international order. The end of the Cold War had widely spread the expectation of the new world order for a more peaceful and democratised international community, and made world leaders embody the expectation in their action to tackle regional and ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era like the Bosnian crisis. The UN was under the pressure of the international community to take such a role within this structural context.

The Bosnian crisis was a test case for American and European leaders in that the European Community set itself up as a premier security institution in tackling armed conflicts or any other security issues in Europe. However, apart from NATO, European security institutions, such as CSCE and WEU, were not ready to cope with such a hostile and intensive armed conflict as that in Bosnia. Their strategic action to handle the crisis was to push the UN’s way to the frontline of the brutal conflict, making the UN exploit the peacekeeping techniques within the inappropriate context. In other words, strategic considerations for the intervention were placed primarily on their policy stance in the structural change of the post-Cold War international system rather than the adequacy of established peacekeeping methods to cope with the new challenges with which the international community was confronted. As Luck (1995) states, it is crucial that ‘the right medication be applied to the right ailment at the right time’ (p.72).

The Kosovo crisis is similar to the Bosnian conflict in terms of the brutality and intensity of their war-fighting, but very different in terms of the reaction of the international community. While peacekeeping and associated conflict management techniques were employed in Bosnia, the U.S. and European state chose multilateral armed intervention by the regional military organisation, NATO, heavily depending on the use of air power in Kosovo. The next chapter explores how this difference of the strategic action of the actors was formulated through the learning process of previous actions and within the structural contexts of the post-Cold War order.
Chapter 5: The New Challenges of the Old Issues in Kosovo

The Security Council,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 [...].

Annex 1:

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis: [...] 

– A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; (United Nation Security Council 1999a).

This is one of the key paragraphs of Resolution 1244 (1999) of the UN Security Council. Ignatieff (2003) dubs it ‘political science fiction’ (p.68). Why is it? The main reason is that the resolution contains conflicting or contradictory principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis. It reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over Kosovo while promising substantial autonomy and self-government to the people of Kosovo. The two principles for the political settlement of the crisis, the territorial integrity of the FRY and substantial autonomy of Kosovo, do not function together at all, especially in the situation where Kosovars have strived to keep their autonomy allowed by the 1974 Constitution and Serb nationalists would remove the Albanians’ autonomous rule over Kosovo. It is impossible that the G-8 foreign ministers and representatives of member states of the Security Council did not know that the two principles are mutually exclusive when they adopted the resolution. There must have been reasons why they would serve a purpose. This
The Kosovo crisis was different from the Bosnian conflict in terms of the nature of the conflict. While still controversial in a sense, the Bosnian crisis is identified as almost inter-state fighting; the Kosovo case is definitely an intra-state conflict. As the federal government of Yugoslavia collapsed at the early stage of the crisis, there were no legal arguments about national jurisdiction and territorial integrity in the way that there had been when the international community decided to intervene in Croatia and Bosnia. Kosovo was a territorial part of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia. Any problems in Kosovo were under the domestic jurisdiction of the FRY and sovereign states should refrain from intervening in matters within other state’s national jurisdiction. This problem was one of the key issues, which the international community faced during the Kosovo intervention.

The modern international system has been constructed based on the two universal concepts of ‘state-sovereignty’ and ‘domestic jurisdiction’. These concepts established the ‘principle of non-interference’ in domestic affairs of sovereign states, which was legalised as stated in the UN Charter and other key sources of international law. The military action of the international community against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – Serbia and Montenegro) breached the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY.

This issue is linked with the claim of humanitarian purpose in the NATO intervention. The NATO air strike in Kosovo was conducted in the absence of explicit authorisation of the Security Council. However, as Morris (2005) notes some claim that ‘the action, though technically illegal, was nevertheless legitimate’ (p.306). Hence, the Kosovo case is very important in terms of this mutual exclusiveness of the two tenets: humanitarian intervention and the principle of non-interference. First, NATO’s intervention resolved the crisis itself, but the old issue of the exclusiveness of the tenets still remains unresolved; second, this legal dispute has an explanatory connection with NATO’s role in Kosovo and the question about Resolution 1244 mentioned above. To respond to the crisis in Kosovo, the Western states chose the unilateral armed intervention by NATO without clear UN authorisation on the use of force. This strategic action of the agents was different from their interventions in the Somali and Bosnian conflicts,
which were expressly authorised by the Security Council and conducted under the full auspices of the UN. The second section explores the reason why the UN did not authorise the NATO action and discusses legality and legitimacy of the action.

The second issue is the mean of military intervention used in the Kosovo crisis. NATO’s campaign in Kosovo was mainly conducted by air strikes to minimise casualties of the operating military persons. This new way of conducting a military operation implies that a new style of modern warfare emerged and offered the opportunity for the international community to have a new option for military intervention in conflict. Regarding the high risk of casualties in armed peace operations, states are more likely to solely rely on air power as a strategic and/or tactical means of their intervention in a humanitarian crisis rather than sending ground troops. Actually, the casualty problem has been seriously considered by states when they have decided to intervene in a troubled area. However, it is controversial whether using air power is a proper means for military intervention with humanitarian purpose. An air campaign using precision strike weapons raises these three questions: Do air strikes minimise the risk of civilian casualties?; Is it possible for countries other than the United States to use the strategy of air strikes given the military resources, technology and capabilities that they require?; and Are air strikes a more useful strategy than conventional ground operations for humanitarian intervention? I answer these questions in the second section.

The last key issue to discuss in this chapter is related to the UN’s role in the Kosovo intervention. It is explicit that the strong political will of NATO member states to tackle the conflict brought an end to the crisis. The intervention of the Western states in the Kosovo crisis comprises three different types of operation: first, the NATO air campaign (24 March – 9 June 1999) as the unilateral use of force; second, peacekeeping operation by NATO force, KFOR (12 June 1999 – present); and third, UN peace operation, UNMIK (10 June 1999 – present). As soon as the crisis erupted, NATO member states quickly responded to the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. Within the context of this international eagerness, the NATO bombing was conducted for 78 days without the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. In his speech at the Economic Club of Chicago, Blair (24
April 1999) stated the key objectives of the NATO action:

- A verifiable cessation of all combat activities and killings
- The withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo
- The deployment of an international military force
- The return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid
- A political framework for Kosovo building on the Rambouillet accords

Through the air campaign and following peacekeeping operation by KFOR, NATO successfully achieved these objectives. The NATO action stopped Serb aggression against Kosovar Albanians and ensured the safe return of Kosovar refugees to their homes. NATO proved itself to be capable and effective in crisis management.

The first elements of the NATO-led ground force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999. Its mission is to conduct peacekeeping operations under the authorisation of the Security Council through Resolution 1244 (1999). The mandate of the robust UN-authorised NATO peacekeeping force is derived from the resolution and a Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia: ‘to deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslavia and Serb forces; to establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army; to support the international humanitarian effort; and to coordinate with and support the international civil presence’ (NATO 2008). KFOR has been successfully carrying out this mandate so far.

The UN’s role in Kosovo was different from that of the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. Its multifunctional peace operation in Kosovo is being conducted by UNMIK, which was born on 10 June 1999 under the authorisation of Resolution 1244 (1999). This resolution has called upon UNMIK to pursue the objectives as follows: to perform basic civilian administrative functions; to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status; to coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; to maintain civil law and order; to promote human rights; and to assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (UNMIK
These multilateral burden-sharing approaches to the crisis between the UN and regional military organization NATO were the distinctive feature of the Kosovo intervention of the Western states, in particular contrasting with the Somali and Bosnian cases, where the UN and member states used peacekeeping techniques within peace-enforcement circumstances. What caused these differences of the strategic choice of the international community in tackling the crises in the early 1990s and the conflict in the late 1990s? The third section answers this question.

5.1 The Outbreak and Development of the Crisis in Kosovo

As the Dayton Peace Accord of 21 November 1995 put an end to intense fighting and violence in Bosnia, the Balkans crisis seemed to end hostilities between the warring ethnic groups. However, differing from the expectation of the international society, severe open conflict resumed in the Balkans between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. During the first phase of the conflict from February 1998 to March 1999, the escalating conflict between Serbian paramilitary and police forces and Kosovo Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of around 1,000 civilians and over 1,500 soldiers, and the evacuation of 400,000 people who sought or were forced into refuge outside Kosovo (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 2). Why did the Kosovo crisis arise?

It is obvious that the conflict was triggered by Serbian leader Milosevic’s decision to remove the Kosovo Albanians’ autonomy within Kosovo and take direct control of the region from Belgrade. His decision to alter the status of the region led to the Kosovo Albanians’ peaceful civil disobedience until 1997 and then uprisings followed by intense armed conflict, which caused deep concern to the international community. Then, why did he decide to face the easily predictable risk? It was 1989 when he stripped Kosovo of a high degree of its autonomy. It was also the same year that he became President of Serbia. This tells us something about the relationship between Milosevic’s grand ambition of a Greater Serbia and the land of Kosovo. To put it differently, historical and demographical factors
worked as a catalyst allowing and facilitating Milosevic to exploit them in order to achieve his ambition of political leadership of a Greater Serbia.

As explained in the previous chapter, Kosovo was one of the key resources of political power for Milosevic. He rose to supreme power in Serbia by channeling Serbian nationalism, especially through his speech on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989. What was the meaning of the Battle of Kosovo or Kosovo itself for Serb nationalists? Why would Milosevic and Serb nationalists not leave the Kosovo Albanians to enjoy their autonomy? Kosovo has been a land of long-running dispute between Serbs and Albanians. Both ethnic groups have put forward their own claim to the land. Albanians assert that they are Kosovo’s original inhabitants and Serbs say that the land is a part of their medieval kingdoms. The Ottoman Turks had ruled the region since the end of the 14th century. Serbs had fought several battles against the Turks including the Battle of Kosovo. Serbia achieved its independence as a state in 1898, but Kosovo still remained under the Ottoman Turks’ rule (BBC News, 5 June 1999). Nearly five centuries of Ottoman rule left two different key legacies to Serbs and Albanians: the Serbian ethnic symbolism of ‘the Battle of Kosovo’ and the change to the balance of population in Kosovo.

The Battle of Kosovo was waged in 1389. The Serbian prince, Lazar Hrebeljanovic, led an assembled force of mainly Serbs and some Albanians and Bosnians to fight the invading Ottoman Turks in Kosovo Polje. The Turks defeated the Serb-led allied force and Prince Lazar died in battle. As the loss of the battle paved the way for the Turks’ control over all of the Serbian lands, Serbs have considered the defeat as the beginning of the oppression and degradation of the Serb nation. Even today, the Battle is recalled in Serbian epic songs and poems. The political implication of the event is that as the Battle has exercised a powerful grip on the Serbian imagination, Kosovo has been a significant part of the Serbian national consciousness (GlobalSecurity.org 2005b). In other words, the historical event became a cornerstone bridging the gap between Serbian nationalism and the land of Kosovo. The call to ‘avenge Kosovo’ became a symbolic motto of awakening Serbian nationalism. As previously argued, Milosevic used the ‘symbolised Kosovo’ to make himself a charismatic Serbian leader. He resorted to
it when he delivered his speech in Kosovo on the 600th anniversary of the Battle. His tactic was successful in awakening Serbian nationalism and making a name for himself as a nationalist leader.

The other legacy of Ottoman rule was the demographical and religious changes of the inhabitants in Kosovo. According to Todorova (1997), this legacy of the Ottoman Empire was different from that of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in the ways of dealing with minority problems. Whereas the Austro-Hungarian Empire allowed each ethnic group to maintain the highest degree of their own national consciousness and culture, the Ottoman Empire assimilated inhabitants or emigrants into the imperial homogeneity of the Empire (p. 176). Though it is not easy to fully appreciate the causes of this difference between the two imperial systems, it seems obvious that one of the major and crucial factors was the religious dissimilarity. Christianity has a tendency to coexist with ethnic identities, but in the Muslim sphere the national consciousness of each ethnic group survives less than in the Christian domain as it is dissolved into the Muslim brotherhood. Of course, it does not mean that Islam fully became an alternative form of national consciousness. In the Muslim sphere of the Balkans, Turkish, Bosnian, and Albanian nationalism existed. However, their national consciousnesses were weaker than that of Serbs and Croats. Thus, the differentiation between Christianity and Islam explains why Serbs migrated to the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the period of Turkish rule and 70% of the Albanian population converted to Islam from Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy under the Turkish rule. In the course of the Serbs’ armed struggle against the Turks up to the 17th century, many Serbs who had lived in Kosovo moved northwards to the land of the Austrian Empire. For Orthodox Serbs, it might be easier to live with Catholic Croats in the Christian community in spite of the different denominations of Orthodoxy and Catholicism than to convert to Islam. Albanians who lived in the hostile mountain areas filled the demographical void of Kosovo’s fertile land. As the number of Serb emigrants to the land of the Austrian Empire increased, the majority of the population of Kosovo changed from Serbs to Albanians.

In 1974, Tito’s Yugoslav government granted Kosovo full autonomy, which
was equivalent to Yugoslavia's six republics. Through the granting of the constitutional rights except rights for foreign affairs and military force, Kosovo came to have its own parliament, government and police force. Serbs were also worried because due to Serb emigration and a high Albanian birth rate the proportion of Serbs in the province had fallen to a mere one for every nine Albanians. As Milosevic grabbed power by manipulating these grievances, he needed to show Serb nationalists something strong through his 'policy of Serbianisation' in order to transform his own image into that of a charismatic political leader. It was the deprivation of the constitutional rights for the Kosovo autonomy. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo Albanians opted for the Ghandian-style peaceful resistance to Serbian rule declaring their independence and running a parallel state. However, over the two years till 1998 Rugova had come under increasing attack from radicals who claimed that this pacifism was tantamount to passivity. As the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged, Albanians increasingly turned down Rugova's non-violent movement and prepared to take up arms against Serbia (Wheeler 2000: 257-8).

It was 1989 when the right of self-government was removed from the Kosovo Albanians. Then, why did the Kosovo crisis arise after almost 10 years? From 1989 to 1998 there had been continuous uprisings by Albanians and violence between both sides. During the first half of the 1990s, both Milosevic and the international community could not give their full attention to the situation in Kosovo because it was relatively less serious than the crisis in Croatia and Bosnia. In the course of the Dayton peace negotiations in 1995, Milosevic temporarily ditched his nationalist rhetoric for the claim of a Greater Serbia, and instead spoke of peace and conciliation. What was essential for him at that time was the lifting of the international economic sanctions, which were imposed in 1991 and seriously damaged the Serbian economy from then onwards. He was quite successful throughout the peace negotiation and was finally rewarded with a partial lifting of the sanctions (Judah, 9 March 1998).

The situation in Serbia and Kosovo began to sharply deteriorate from 1996. Milosevic faced massive protests from Serb nationalists against his government due to his political gesture of peaceful relationships with other ethnic parties shown
during the mid-1990s. Many Kosovo Albanians were losing their patience with the Rugova’s Ghandian-style passive resistance to Serbian rule. This was because not only had they been exhausted by the hopeless and painful struggle, but also the Dayton Peace Accord was focused only on Bosnia and there was no mention of Kosovo. Kosovo was not a priority at all for the international community at that time. This was the key motivation, which made many Kosovars feel that the strategy had finally failed and look to more radical and violent movements such as the KLA (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 50). In addition to the Dayton aspect, there was another external factor, which affected the intensification of the KLA’s armed struggle against the Serbs. It was the anti-government uprising of 1997 in Albania. The ongoing situation of insecurity in Albania during the mid-1990s produced the large scale Albanian Diaspora spreading especially over Western Europe. The Diaspora’s financial support for the KLA enabled it to be equipped with arms and be well organised to fight against the Serbs. The emergence of the KLA changed the situation dramatically because it meant the sharp increase in reciprocal violence and terrorism. The hit-and-run type of terrorist attacks by Kosovo Albanians on Serbian police or paramilitary forces increased and at the same time pervasive Serbian police harassment was proliferated and intensified. The escalating mutual violence eventually paved the way for open and serious armed conflicts between both sides. The fighting in the Drenice/Drenica region was one of the major conflicts, which mainly caused the deep international concern. As more than 80 civilians were killed there in late February 1998, it marked the end of the domestic ethnic dispute with the campaign of non-violent resistance and the onset of massive military conflict with deep international concerns.

5.2 The Use of Force of the Key Actor, NATO

The Dayton Agreement was half successful. It managed to stop violence and massive humanitarian abuses in the regions of the republics of the former
Yugoslavia mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also paved the way for another conflict in Kosovo. The outbreak of the Kosovo crisis was the proof that the objective of the Accord, to obtain a peaceful and secure environment in the Balkans, still remained out of reach. One of the key reasons was that the Accord refused to pay attention to the Kosovo Albanians’ expectations. The ‘betrayal of Dayton’, as it was dubbed by Kosovars, made the Albanians change their non-violent strategy performed by the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova into the hostile and aggressive movement. It resulted in the emergence of the KLA. The significance of the KLA’s surfacing derives from the increase of intensified violence between Serbs and the Albanians. The KLA started to attack Serb targets and Serb forces responded by spreading their assaults against the Albanians using heavy weapons and air power. The KLA guerrillas’ strategy was not to defeat the Serbs but force foreign intervention. They succeeded brilliantly. As the fighting grew more severe, the nature of the conflict in Kosovo had transformed from a small-scale domestic dispute to an internationalised humanitarian crisis in terms of the international concerns about it. However, the international community did not seriously consider the crisis at its early stage. The UN and Western governments were standing in a neutral position blaming both sides. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 (1998) on 23 September:

The Security Council,

[...]

Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo [...],

[...]

Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region (United Nations Security Council 1998b),
However, the tone of the Security Council's voice changed during late 1998 and early 1999. In Resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council confirmed that the crisis in Kosovo should be regarded as an international crisis, with which all the UN member states should be deeply concerned for international peace and security. The resolution states as follows:

The Security Council,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1999a),

As legal terms, 'a threat to peace and security in the region' mentioned in Resolution 1199 (1998) and 'a threat to international peace and security' in Resolution 1244 (1999) are very different in the degree to which they express the 'prospective response' to a threat. While the former will bring no actual action or limited intervention with non-military means, in the case of the declaration of the latter the UN would use all possible means including the use of force in order to prevent the threat because to maintain international peace and security is the prime purpose of the UN. Thus, the change of the terms implies that the member states of the Security Council were reluctant to intervene in Kosovo at the early stage of the crisis, but as the crisis was getting worse they were increasingly concerned that something needed to be done about the situation. However, although the UN referred to Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security, it did not authorise the NATO bombing. The key issue was domestic jurisdiction and territorial integrity. Chapter I of the UN Charter contains the purposes of the UN and principles that the UN itself and its members should follow in pursuit of the purposes:

Article 2 [of Chapter I]

[...] 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

[...]
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (United Nations 1945: 6-7).

These principles are universal and essential to maintaining the current international system based on the spirit of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. However, there are no laws without exceptions. The last sentence of the 7th principle means that international community can intervene in any matter of any state if the Security Council decides to do so in order to maintain international peace and security according to the process of Chapter VII of the Charter:

Article 39 [of Chapter VII]

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

[...]

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. [...]

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. [...] (United Nations 1945: 27-8).

Thus, in order to prevent the spread of the violence the international community could have intervened in Kosovo at the early stage avoiding the initial hesitation if the Security Council decided to do so. Unfortunately, the Council was unable to do that because of the political tension between the West and the East. The old issue
of the Cold War period resumed, in a different guise, in the post-Cold War era. The conflict between the principles in Resolution 1244 (1999) resulted from a compromise between America, and Russia and China. This is the reason why the resolution turned out to be `political science fiction' as explained in the introductory section. In the Bosnian crisis, Russia and China did not stand against the West throughout each stage of the crisis rather they were cooperative. However, why did they oppose the early attempt of Western governments to intervene in Kosovo? The reason is linked to the issue of domestic jurisdiction.

As permanent member states of the Security Council, Russia and China did not vote against the early resolutions for the Kosovo crisis. However, both governments expressed deep reservations about the intervention in Kosovo. In the 3868th meeting of the Security Council on 31 March 1998, Russian Ambassador Fedotov strongly argued that `the Russian Federation had viewed the recent events in Kosovo as the internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' and `that autonomous region [Kosovo] must remain within Serbia on the basis of unswerving compliance with the principle of the territorial integrity of the FRY'. In the meeting, Chinese Representative Shen Guofang also stressed that the crisis in Kosovo should be resolved `on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY' (United Nations Security Council 1998d: 10-11). Russia and China has been deeply concerned about Western intervention, especially by the U.S., in their own ongoing domestic disputes such as Chechnya and Tibet respectively. For example, the U.S. government had repeatedly expressed its concerns for the status of human rights in China mentioning Tibet and the Dalai Lama. The recognition of Taiwan as an independent state is still a hot issue for China. The Chinese government has been very sensitive to the claim of Taiwan. The Russian Federation has been also concerned about potential intervention of the West within the crises in autonomous republics of the federation. For Russians, the West seemed to be focusing unfairly on what it saw as a disproportionate use of force against the Muslim fighters in Chechnya. Mr. Shen Guofang revealed the fundamental reason for the objection, saying that `Many countries in the region are multi-ethnic. If the Council is to get involved in a dispute without a request from the country concerned, it may set a bad precedent and have a wider negative
implication' (United Nations Security Council 1998d: 11-12). 'A precedent' was the reason that Russia and China strove to claim the principles and the Western member states needed to compromise on the resolution in order to secure the intervention of the international community in Kosovo.

This political compromise has caused a legal controversy about the legality of the NATO bombing. As mentioned in the introductory section, the Security Council did not expressly authorise the NATO action. In 1998, it passed three resolutions in response to the situation in Kosovo: Resolution 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), and 1203 (1998). Gray (2000) notes that these resolutions 'may justify a claim that NATO was acting in pursuance of the aims of the international community, but they cannot support any claim of implied authorisation of force against Yugoslavia by NATO' (p.194). Several states such as France, the Netherlands, and Slovenia, tried to justify the military action by NATO, emphasising that the resolutions were passed under Chapter VII and NATO had been entitled to act in accordance with the resolutions. In the 3989 meeting on 26 March 1999, the Security Council voted on a resolution, which affirmed that 'the unilateral use of force by NATO constituted a violation of Article 2(4), Article 24 (on the primacy of the Security Council), and Article 53 (on the need for Security Council authorization of enforcement action by regional organization)'. This draft resolution was rejected by three votes in favour (China, Namibia, and Russia) to twelve against (Gray 2000: 34).

The Security Council referred to the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security in Resolution 1244 (1999), suggesting that there could be some basis of legitimacy to international action. Determining what constitute a threat to international peace and security by the Security Council is as Morris (2005) dubs 'the trigger mechanism for the utilization of its Charter powers under Chapter VII' (p.304). He argues that the NATO action in Kosovo did not 'constitute a total rejection of UN principles':

NATO member states insisted that they were acting pursuant to previous Security Council resolutions and in accordance with human rights principles enshrined in the UN Charter; a draft Russian-sponsored resolution condemning NATO action was
overwhelmingly defeated by twelve votes to three; there was widespread support for NATO action outside of the Council, though this was never tested in the General Assembly; and, following the cessation of hostilities, the United Nations assumed responsibility for maintaining security in the region (p.306)

Along with this legal controversy over the legality and legitimacy of the NATO action, *Operation Allied Force* has raised another controversial issue, the use of air power as a means of military intervention with humanitarian purpose.

The retired U.S. General Wesley Clark (2001) was the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO during the crisis and so he was the top field officer, who was in charge of all NATO operations including air strikes. He describes his dialogue with Robin Cook at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in the spring of 1998 in Luxembourg:

Robin Cook, the British foreign minister, called me aside for a discussion. Could Milosevic’s policy of increasing repression be halted by the threat of airpower? He asked. I related my collection of our experiences in 1995, and the conversation with Milosevic after the Dayton agreement. Yes, probably, I concluded. Cook and several others seemed determined that we would not allow another round of this Balkan tragedy (pp.113-4).

For the leaders of the NATO states, air strikes were considered the best option to stop Milosevic, but they were not sure how to use armed force at the beginning because it was the first time the international community had massively used airpower in a peace operation without the support of ground troops. NATO has experienced the use of airpower in Bosnia, but it had the limited purpose of supporting the mission of ground troops of the UN and NATO. One question can be raised: Why did the NATO leaders choose airpower as the prime means of their mission in Kosovo in spite of the uncertainty of its efficacy? The reason is clear: they wanted to minimise the risks of casualties, their own and civilian. This is definitely the effect of the lesson learned from the intervention in Somalia. As shown in Somalia, the consensus to support armed intervention for humanitarian purposes can be easily shaken by media coverage of the death of even a single
soldier.

The risks of armed ground operations are a thorny problem for decision-makers of peace operations. Clinton (2004) states in his autobiography that he was ‘determined not to allow Kosovo to become another Bosnia’ and ‘so was Madeleine Albright’ (p.849). As the U.S. intervention in Kosovo was called ‘Albright’s war’ by the media, she was surely eager to resolve the crisis as much as Clinton was. According to Ignatieff (2000), Holbrooke wanted to demonstrate in Kosovo that American leadership could stop any crisis and secure peace if they wanted to and that ‘his own highly personalised diplomacy’ could achieve the expected result as proven at Dayton (pp.16-7). Despite the enthusiasm of Clinton’s foreign policy team, the U.S. government was reluctant to intervene with armed forces at the beginning of the crisis. The first reason was as explained earlier that the conflict in Kosovo was recognised as a domestic affair under the national jurisdiction of the FRY; and the second was that the lessons of Somalia had made the military planners cautious about the risks of deploying ground troops for peace operations. Clinton (2004) says that ‘After Black Hawk Down, whenever I approved the deployment of forces, I knew much more about what the risks were, and made much clearer what operations had to be approved in Washington’ (p.554). It is a very harsh task for the planners to persuade and console the public including the families of the soldiers who had lost their lives in peace operations in foreign lands. Soon after Black Hawk Down, Clinton visited Walter Reed Army Hospital to meet several of the wounded soldiers and the families who had lost their sons in the event. There, he was asked tough questions by the families, ‘what their sons had died for and why we had changed course’ (Clinton 2004: 554). On armed peace operations, the risk of significant casualties is scarcely acceptable because for many ordinary people the value of the prize of a successful peace mission is not worth the risk.

On 23 March 1999, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana ordered, with the full support of the Clinton Administration, General Clark to commence air strikes against Serbian targets. The air strikes lasted 78 days. In the month before the beginning of the bombing, the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress voted 219-191 to support the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo ‘if there
was a peace agreement’ (Clinton 2004: 850). It implies that the U.S. government would not send its troops to create peace or even conditions for peace in Kosovo. The only means of armed force to be used for this purpose was the use of air strikes. Blair initially made it clear that ‘We do not plan to use ground troops in order to fight our way into Kosovo’ and also stressed that ‘I do not accept that land troops are necessary to curb repression in Kosovo. Air strikes properly targeted – directed against the military capability of the oppressor – can achieve the objective that we set ourselves’ (quoted in Vickers 2000: 57). Clinton also did not consider sending ground troops as a possible option for Kosovo. Though Blair wanted a new stance on it later and had a discussion about the option with Clinton, this did not mean that the policy to rule out the option would be changing. They kept their initial position as promised (Vickers 2000: 65). Regarding the ground option, Clark (2001) states as follows:

He [U.S. Secretary of State] also clarified the U.S. position, at least as far as this summit [NATO’s fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington on 23-25 April 1999] was concerned: “Nothing about ground forces. We have to make this air campaign work, or we’ll both be writing our resumes.” It was clear guidance (p.271).

Clinton (2004) argued against those who were uncertain about the reliability of air strikes as a military tactic for a peace operation saying that:

Some people argued that our position would have been more defensible if we had sent in ground troops. There were two problems with that argument. First, by the time the soldiers were in position, in adequate numbers and with proper support, the Serbs would have done an enormous amount of damage. Second, the civilian casualties of a ground campaign would probably have been greater than the toll from errant bombs (p.851).

Are his arguments right? The first one could be political rhetoric. If a U.S. president decides and directs, the Department of Defense is able to mobilise a lightly armed infantry brigade to be deployed anywhere on the earth within a month by using large transport planes such as the C-17 Globemaster III or C-5 Galaxy. A GAO report said that as the U.S. army has made significant progress in
transformation, creating the so-called 'Stryker Brigade'\(^{19}\), the army is able to deploy the brigade to any region within two weeks\(^{20}\) (U.S. GAO, June 2003: 2) (See Figure 5.1). If they used Special Forces such as Seals or Rangers, it would not take a week to deliver to the target area several teams of them by submarines or C-130 transport aircrafts. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993 showed how quickly the U.S. government was able to deploy their troops 'in adequate numbers' for peace operations if they wished. According to Clark (2003), in the Gulf War in 1991, the planning for the huge military operation consumed only five months, but in Kosovo, 'the planning for the ground campaign wasn’t even permitted until even the air campaign had been under way for the better part of a month' (p.13).

**Figure 5.1: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air Deployment\(^{21}\)**

(Source: GAO's analysis of Military Traffic Management Command data; U.S. GAO, June 2003: 11)

\(^{19}\) It is an infantry brigade equipped with a newly developed eight-wheeled armoured combat vehicle, the Stryker. The key purpose of the creation of the Stryker and Stryker brigade was to enhance the ability to rapidly deploy infantry brigades anywhere in the globe, increasing its firepower in combat.

\(^{20}\) The army's original goal was the 96-hour worldwide deployment of a Stryker Brigade (U.S. GAO, June 2003: 3).

\(^{21}\) In the figure, the star symbols stand for the locations of aerial ports, where Stryker brigades would embark.
The second of Clinton's arguments is related to the first question of the air strike issue mentioned in the introductory section: Do air strikes minimise the risk of civilian casualties? A report of the Ministry of Defence (2000) states that although the air campaign in Kosovo was 'one of the most accurate air operations ever mounted, and resulted in very few instances of collateral damage', it was 'not possible to avoid some collateral damage' in the armed conflict. 'Collateral damage' is a military term used to describe 'the unintended loss of civilian life or injury to civilians, or the damage to civilian property, which is caused by attacks on military objectives'. According to Human Rights Watch, between around 488 and 527 Yugoslav civilians were killed by NATO air strikes. However, the Allied forces did not lose even a single pilot during the air campaign. NATO destroyed a total of 440 static and 1,067 mobile targets, such as command posts, military airfields, oil refineries, tanks, artillery pieces, and military vehicles, through the campaign (pp.35-7). Comparing these figures to the toll of civilian casualties, the bombing could be assessed as a successful operation from the viewpoint of the military strategy. While air strike could be a very useful means to achieve 'zero casualties of military service-persons', who were involved in operations, it is sure that the use of air power does not guarantee 'zero casualties of civilians' in any armed conflict. On 14 April 1999, NATO missiles hit two civilian convoys of Kosovo Albanians leaving western Kosovo. The result of this mistaken bombing on the road between Djakovica and Prizren was that around 75 people died and 25 were wounded (CNN.com, 15 April 1999).

Is it possible for countries other than the United States to use the strategy of air strikes given the military resources, technology and capabilities that they require; are air strikes a more useful strategy than conventional ground operations for humanitarian intervention? What is an important point in air campaigns is the accuracy of the strike. In Kosovo, Serbian forces widely used 'asymmetric tactics', which means non-conventional tactics in war. For example, the Yugoslav and Serbian forces deployed their tanks or military equipment in the middle of civilian villages to prevent the bombing of NATO, as it was concerned with minimising collateral damage (Ministry of Defence 2000: 35). In that situation, Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) were essential in order to achieve 100% accuracy of
bombs. The conventional non-guided bombs also played an effective role in some sorties, but NATO heavily relied on PGM, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile, laser guided bombs like Paveway II and III, and Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). Moreover, attacks against the tactical targets in Kosovo required the highly precise capability of searching and identifying targets and of protecting bombers from the threats of FRY’s air defence capabilities like anti-aircraft guns or Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM). For this, many kinds of aircrafts are required: for example E-3D, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); E-8C, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS); and EA-6B Prowler, the Electronic Warfare (EW) and the Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)-capable aircraft. As is easily predicted, PGM and those aircrafts are very expensive and need a high cost of management and maintenance. Thus, precision bombing is a costly strategy that is beyond the military capabilities of most countries in the world. It is estimated that NATO spent approximately £2.5bn on the bombing in Kosovo (BBC News, 15 October 1999).

Regarding the Defence expenditures of major European and North American countries, there are only a few states, which are able to cope with such an amount of cost for a peace operation in a foreign land (See Table 5.1, p.145). It could be possible that the United Kingdom, France, Germany or maybe Italy would solely conduct precision bombing as a means of humanitarian intervention, but none of them would do it without the United States due to the cost and efficacy of the campaign.

The air campaign in Kosovo was the largest combat operation in NATO’s history. The key objective of the bombing was to compel Milosevic to cease the violence in Kosovo and restore peace throughout the Balkan region. A war has three levels of performance: strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, a country sets up major and minor goals for its use of forces and formulates plans to use resources to achieve the objectives. At the operational level of war, commanders of forces make plans and conduct major campaigns and operations to accomplish strategic objectives within the theatre of war. The tactical level of war
is the level at which battles\textsuperscript{22} and engagements are planned and conducted to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (U.S. GAO, July 2001: 5).

### Table 5.1: Defence Expenditures of Major NRC\textsuperscript{23} Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>4,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9,077</td>
<td>12,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>3,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>47,768</td>
<td>54,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41,160</td>
<td>39,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,056</td>
<td>7,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>19,375</td>
<td>32,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8,012</td>
<td>10,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>12,523</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8,651</td>
<td>13,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6,606</td>
<td>11,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>33,836</td>
<td>52,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>278,856</td>
<td>472,236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: NATO, 8 December 2005)

At the operational and tactical levels, the objectives of the air campaign in Kosovo including precision strikes were not fully achieved because there were many

\textsuperscript{22} A battle means a series of armed encounters with a force of an enemy, whilst an operation is an arrangement of battles to accomplish strategic objectives (U.S. GAO, July 2001: 5).

\textsuperscript{23} The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created in May 2002 to facilitate cooperation and inter-operability between NATO allies and Russia on various issues of the post-Cold War security environment. The creation of this body was based on the existing mutual cooperative organisation, 'the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council', which was established in 1997.
mistakes in bombing and collateral damages. That may have been because the campaign was conducted in the harsh circumstances of Milosevic’s strong intention not to move back from Kosovo; the strategic decision strictly imposed on the operation to minimise the risk of military casualties; and the strategic goals of the campaign which were to be accomplished without the support of ground troops. For example, on 7 May 1999, NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade killing three Chinese nationals. That serious mistake put the whole peace operation in Kosovo in jeopardy by provoking the protest of the Chinese government against the campaign. It was the kind of mistake which the military in Kosovo could hardly avoid because they were mostly using aerial photography to identify targets without the assistance of ground troops for surveillance and to search for targets. In this sense, some may say that air strikes are not a fully reliable means for humanitarian intervention. As shown in Kosovo using an air campaign without the support of ground troops for armed intervention can remarkably reduce the efficiency and efficacy of the intervention at the operational and tactical levels. However, others would argue that that way force was used was helpful in bringing an end to the crisis in that it made Milosevic give up his hostile intention and it enabled states to more easily decide on intervening in the conflict. From this point of view, the air campaign could be regarded as a useful means to achieve the key objective of the intervention at the strategic level. Then, what is the implication of the performance of NATO’s air power for the future of peacekeeping operation? The UN’s failure to solve the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia does not mean a failure of UN peacekeeping operation itself. The key issue related to the failings there was the problem of casualties. An air campaign is not a perfect method of intervention in terms of incidental loss of civilian life, but it could be a very useful means to minimise the casualties of military service-persons from contributing countries in peace operations. This new type of peace operation may be a very attractive way to facilitate states’ involvement in conflicts and not to repeat the failings. The lessons of the NATO air campaign for future peace operations will be discussed in the next chapter.
5.3 Peace Operations of NATO and the UN in the Post-Cold War Structure

Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998) states as follows:

The Security Council,


An agreement was signed on 15 October 1998 between the FRY and NATO and on the following day another agreement was made between the FRY and the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE). The key object of the agreements was to establish the NATO Air Verification Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission respectively. The missions aimed to verify compliance by all parties to the Kosovo crisis with Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), which calls for the cessation of all hostile and violent actions by the security force of all parties and international monitoring on the situation (United Nations Security Council 1998b). As the statement of Resolution 1203 (1998) above implies, the OSCE and NATO were the main actors in coping with the crisis from the initial stage of the intervention of the international community, but the UN was not. Ramet (2005) argues that the UN was marginalized and brought in only for the purpose of legitimating the intervention in Kosovo (p.220). Her allegation is wrong. It is obvious that the UN played an important role in coordinating and partly running humanitarian assistance through UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and also in facilitating the international community’s response to the crisis by adopting Security Council resolutions. In this sense, the UN was not a bystander, but it was definitely a minor player in comparison with the OSCE and NATO. For instance, UNPROFOR in Bosnia was under the UN’s authority and mandate, but KFOR was the ground force of NATO. In most crises of the post-Cold War era, especially those which broke out before 1995, the UN positioned itself at the front line of the conflict resolution and at the heart of the peace
operations in the crises. As argued earlier in other chapters, the UN had been very eager to intervene in the regional conflicts as the international structure of the Cold War era collapsed. However, the Kosovo intervention was an exception for the UN. To be precise, the UN’s intervention in Kosovo was a sign of the change of the UN’s stance towards the post-Cold War regional conflicts. In order to clarify the change, I need to answer this question first: Why did NATO play a key role in Kosovo instead of the UN?

Before discussing NATO, it is necessary to explain the OSCE’s role and what it did in Kosovo. The OSCE was one of the key players at the early stage of the conflict resolution. As explained above, the OSCE established the ‘Kosovo Verification Mission’ (KVM), which consisted of up to two thousand international civilians or unarmed military personnel to verify whether all parties to the conflict were in compliance with Security Council Resolutions demanding the cessation of any violent actions. On the point that the KVM was the first ground operation of the international community, the OSCE’s effort as a part of the peace operation in Kosovo was worthwhile. However, it does not mean that the OSCE was a more significant actor than NATO in the Kosovo intervention. First, the KVM’s mandate was limited to the passive mission of the verification, not actively creating peace or conditions for peace like NATO did afterwards; and second, the KVM faced a number of difficulties in pursuit of its mission and finally failed to achieve its goals. The key reason for the failure was that the KVM was unable to create conditions for the political settlement of the crisis and stop Milosevic’s intention to control over Kosovo due to the lack of the essential facilities and support needed to achieve them. According to Holbrooke, the term ‘verification’ was carefully selected, but it simply means ‘monitoring’ (cited in Walker 2001: 140). Nothing of the mission was different from ordinary UN observer missions in conflict. Thus, it is obvious that NATO was a more significant actor than the OSCE in terms of their role and mandate.

At the early stage of the Kosovo crisis, the Western states did not have specific plans to intervene in the crisis. As crimes against humanity became widespread over the whole region, they had an idea that they should do something, but there were no clear answers to the questions: what to do and how to do it.
General Clark (2001) describes the attitude of the states towards the crisis at the early stage as follows:

At the NATO foreign ministers meeting a few weeks later in Luxembourg, Klaus Naumann and I briefed the situation in the Balkans and our NATO efforts. Subsequently, Secretary Albright and most of the foreign ministers spoke of the impending dangers in Kosovo. There was a common condemnation of Milosevic and his policies, but no call for any specific action. [...] When the session resumed, Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister, spoke as strongly as any. Since he represented Germany, he was listened to very carefully. He wanted to halt the campaign that we could all see unfolding. “A clear red line must be drawn,” he said emphatically. I was impressed by the strength of his remarks. As he left the hall I jumped up from the side to walk out with him. “Mr. Minister, great statement,” I said. “But let me ask you, what is the red line you have in mind?” I was concerned about the implications for our forces. The fact was, at the moment, there were no clear ideas on how to proceed. Policy was still unformed (p. 113-4).

This situation had changed to something serious as the term ‘credibility’, which was one of the most frequently used words in the course of the intervention, came to the mind of the Western leaders. According to Wheeler (2000), the argument that ‘NATO’s credibility was at stake’ was one of the four key rationales24, which Western governments called for to justify their intervention in Kosovo (p.265). Robin Cook, the British Foreign Minister, delivered his speech in the House of Commons on 25 March 1999 emphasising the rationale:

[... ] reason why Britain has a national interest in the success of this military action. And there are others. Our confidence in our peace and security depends on the credibility of NATO. Last October it was NATO that guaranteed the cease-fire that President Milosevic signed... What possible credibility would NATO have the next

24 The other rationales are as follows: first, ‘their action was aimed at averting an impending humanitarian catastrophe’; second, ‘ethnic cleansing in Kosovo could not be allowed to stand in a civilized Europe and it posed a long-term threat to European security’; third, ‘NATO’s use of force was in conformity with existing Security Council resolutions’ (Wheeler 2000: 265).
time our security is challenged if we did not honour that guarantee? The consequences of NATO inaction would be far worse than the result of NATO action (Wheeler 2000: 266).

Tony Blair also concurred, saying that ‘to walk away [from Kosovo] now would destroy NATO’s credibility’. Throughout the crisis, the leaders of NATO member states continually emphasised, with agreement, that the decision of the NATO’s bombing campaign lased from 24 March to 11 June 1999 was obligatory for two reasons: ‘(1) to stop the violent ethnic cleansing that the NATO bombing precipitated, as anticipated; and (2) to establish “the credibility of NATO”’ (Chomsky 1999: 134).

Why did NATO’s credibility become a key word of the intervention? To what extent was it significantly considered when Western governments decided to be involved in the crisis? These two questions provide the answers to this question: Why did NATO take a prime role in resolving the crisis instead of the UN? Furthermore, answering the two questions tells us how the systemic change of the international society since the demise of the Soviet Union affected the players in Kosovo, such as NATO state leaders and NATO itself. The two events, the Cold War ending and the Kosovo crisis, have almost a 10 year-gap. NATO is bridging the gap. To put it differently, the end of the Cold War caused Western political leaders to raise a question about the credibility of NATO and this situation affected NATO’s role and actions in Kosovo.

NATO was created in 1949 based on the North Atlantic Treaty of April within the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The objective of the alliance is ‘to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter’ (NATO 1999: 23). As a political and military organisation, an alliance needs a key factor: a shared purpose. For NATO, it is to protect member states from the threats of a common adversary. Thus, the existence of a ‘common enemy’ is the essential condition for the sustainability of an alliance. The end of the Cold War was a great challenge to NATO. As the Soviet Union and its alliance, the Warsaw Pact, collapsed together, many Western leaders posed a question: With no Soviet threat,
why does the West still need NATO? NATO’s prime enemy was the Soviet Union and its allies. A NATO handbook clearly states that ‘at the time of the Treaty’s signature, the immediate purpose of NATO was to defend its members against a potential threat resulting from the policies and growing military capacity of the former Soviet Union’ (NATO 1999: 23). The end of the Cold War stripped NATO of its adversaries so that it made NATO seemingly futile and purposeless. The problem of its credibility came to a head.

NATO made an effort to revitalise its credibility in the post-Cold War era by developing many programmes, such as the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)25 and the opening-up of its membership especially towards East Europe26. One of the remarkable programmes was creating a new structure of cooperation with Russia. NATO and Russia had developed a reciprocal commitment since 1991 including the exchange of liaison officers and regularisation of enhanced dialogue. It resulted in the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council27 in 1997 and the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act also in 1997, which is a body to build confidence and develop a pattern of regular consultations and cooperation. As NATO’s Cold War adversary became its partner, the change seemed to be great progress for European and international peace and security, but it was also a signal for the crisis of NATO’s credibility. To tackle the situation of NATO cooperating with its adversary, the U.S. government and its allies needed to figure out a new mission for NATO stripping it of the old one, defending members from the threat of the Soviet Union.

According to Albright (2003), Clinton’s view of the new role of NATO in

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25 The EAPC was established in 1997 through the long preparation since 1992. Its main object is to develop dialogue and cooperation between NATO and its Cooperation Partners to strength peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The members of the EAPC meet twice a year at both Foreign and Defence Minister level (NATO 1999: 84).

26 NATO enlargement was considered from the early 1990s by its member states. Through the intensified debates and comprehensive process of deliberation for almost a decade, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland finally became members of the alliance in March 1999. Furthermore, another seven Eastern European states joined NATO in March 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

27 In December 2001, foreign ministers at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council decided to create a new council by May 2002, which is now ‘the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)’. 
the post-Cold War era was that 'it remained the cornerstone of European security' and 'other threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ethnic cleansing' in the region had taken the place of the Soviet threat (p.251). The leaders attempted to take on the renewed central objective of the alliance. It was to seek to 'create an environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force' (NATO 1999: 24). Kosovo was a test case for the new role and function of NATO. That is why NATO was at the front line of the crisis. In this sense, the NATO-led allied forces' intervention in Kosovo aimed to save victims of humanitarian disaster and massive killing and also NATO itself. The leaders of NATO understood that to intervene in Kosovo would provide a proper chance to deliver NATO from the problem of its credibility. As it successfully put an end to the crisis, NATO could be converted from a Cold War-type military alliance to a regional organisation appropriate for the international security environment of the post-Cold War era, which takes responsibility for the regional security and peace in Europe. Due to this reason the UN had to step aside from the front line of the Kosovo intervention.

There is another reason for NATO's active role in Kosovo. NATO is an organisation more suitable for that kind of military mission in Kosovo than the UN. As a military body NATO has C3I (Command, Control, Communication, and Information) capabilities and its own troops and facilities, but the UN has not. Under the Military Committee of the NATO Headquarters, there are five major divisions: Intelligence, Operations, Plans & Policy, Cooperation & Regional Security, and Logistics, Armaments & Resources. Although NATO does not have its own capacity to gather intelligence, it functions as a central body, coordinating and analysing intelligence from its member states. The Intelligence Division assesses and disseminates gathered information, and then the Plan & Policy Division develops strategic plans and operational policies based on the information. The Operations Division has responsibility for conducting operations or training in peacetime and the Logistics, Armaments & Resources Division supports the division in operations (NATO 1999: 239-41). It is a well-organised body appropriate for conducting massive military operations. In the UN, however, there
are no military components of being able to perform a war as took place in Kosovo. This is also the reason that the failings of the UN armed operations were unavoidable in Bosnia.

A geographical factor affected the role of NATO in Kosovo. As for air strikes, the distance from air base to bombing targets is crucial due to the limited range and payload of bombers. In Kosovo, NATO conducted more than 30,000 sorties. The success of these highly-frequent air combat missions was possible because NATO has air bases in the vicinity of the Balkans. If NATO had had to use the long-range strategic bombers such as B-2 and B-52 for the air bombing, the campaign could have faced difficulties in terms of the cost, duration, and efficacy of bombing.

The other reasons for the minor role of the UN were the lessons of Somalia and Bosnia. Figure 5.2 below shows that the number of UN peacekeepers had rapidly increased between 1992 and 1995, when the UN had been intervening in Somalia and Bosnia. As the UN established its mission in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999, the figure rose again, but it was relatively lower than the numbers during the period between 1992 and 1995. After the agonising experience in Somalia and Bosnia, the UN and its member states realised that the UN was not well prepared for coping with such massive armed operations as in Somalia and Bosnia.

Figure 5.2: Military and Police Personnel Deployed in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2000 (in thousands)

(Source: Weiss and Collins 2000: 32 and UN DPKO website)

28 The nearest NATO air base from Kosovo frequently used in the air campaign is located in Germany.
The Brahimi Report on UN peace operations was produced within this regretful circumstance. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel in March 2000 to thoroughly review the UN’s peace operations, especially those of the 1990s. The key aim of the report was to produce a clear set of specific, concrete, and practical guidance and recommendations for the future peace and security activities of the UN. The panel of the report concurred that the UN needs to make a number of changes in many aspects for better peace operations in the future. Here are some key points regarding the need for change:

0. The need to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided to the United Nations system to carry out that responsibility of Member States for the maintenance of international peace and security;
0. The need to have more effective collection and assessment of information at United Nations Headquarters, including an enhanced conflict early warning system that can detect and recognize the threat or risk of conflict or genocide;
0. The critical need to improve Headquarters planning (including contingency planning) for peace operations;
0. […] [The need] to acquire the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations rapidly and to sustain them effectively;
0. The necessity to provide field missions with high-quality leaders and managers who are granted greater flexibility and autonomy by Headquarters, within clear mandate parameters and with clear standards of accountability for both spending and results;
0. The imperative to set and adhere to a high standard of competence and integrity for both Headquarters and field personnel, who must be provided the training and support […], guided by modern management practices […]; (United Nations 2000c: 1-2).

Through this report, the panel stressed many compelling needs for change in almost every aspect of peace operations: strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, Headquarters resources and structure, operational planning and support, and the use of modern information technology. It means that without the changes required, the UN could not perform any successful massive armed
operation on the scale of the intervention in Somalia and Bosnia. The UN had recognised its problems in conducting such activities and was reviewing past experience and its system and structure during the Kosovo crisis. Thus, it was not possible for the UN to play a massive and primary military role in Kosovo.

5.4 The Reflections of the Kosovo Intervention

This chapter has examined three main issues prompted by the Kosovo intervention: to use force to intervene in an internal affair of a sovereign state; the political tension between the East and West in the Security Council; and the risk of casualties in armed peace operations. These issues are actually old ones, which have existed throughout the practice of the use of force by the international community during the Cold War and early 1990s. The states involved in the Kosovo crisis faced these old issues in the guise of the new challenges, which have been caused by the structural change of the post-Cold War international order. In comparison with the Somalia and Bosnia cases, the Kosovo intervention was able to successfully put an end to the conflict and achieve its initial objectives because it was a military operation conducted by a military organisation. The strategic action of the agents, the Western states, concerning the crisis was to employ an air campaign by NATO, a mighty regional military organisation suitable for such armed conflict in Kosovo. Soon after the bombing in the absence of the express UN authorisation, they deployed NATO peacekeepers and the UN began its peace-building mission by establishing UNMIK. This 'strategically designated and phased' intervention of the states was an intentional reaction to cope with the issues formulated within the changed context of the post-Cold War structure. Hence, the Kosovo intervention was also a combination of both the strategic intention of actors and structural context, the same as the Somali and Bosnian interventions were.

The use of force to interfere in a sovereign state's internal matter with humanitarian purpose started in the early 1970s. Wheeler (2000) argues that the
Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 was the first case in the post-World War era in which humanitarian claims were raised to justify the use of force (p.71). As the American historian Marc Trachtenberg has stated, ‘no firm legal principle separating ‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ intervention has yet emerged in the post-Cold War’ (cited in Karns and Mingst 2001: 219). The dilemma as to whether to intervene claiming humanitarian purposes or keep the principle of non-interference is still an ongoing legal controversy. Some claim that the Kosovo intervention firmly showed that respect for human rights constitutes a fundamental value of the current international community. Wheeler (2004) states that the practice of the NATO bombing campaign made it clear that ‘legal considerations shaped the possibilities of action’ (p.213). Western powers have justified their military actions over Kosovo citing the need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and claiming that the violation of human rights is an offense against humankind as a whole. It is very difficult to clarify whether the military action was decided genuinely based on the humanitarian consideration. In the post-Cold War international order, it is widely believed that respect for human rights is a matter of the utmost interest to the international community. What can be sure is that states would not refrain from claiming that safeguarding human rights is not solely and exclusively a matter for the domestic jurisdiction of states whenever they strongly need to interfere in an internal affair of a state.

Such disjuncture between legality and legitimacy is linked to the division of the permanent members of the Security Council in the Kosovo intervention. Even though the post-Cold War era began with unprecedented unity among the P5, future decisions over UN intervention are not likely to maintain the unity. The course of the Kosovo intervention clearly revealed the sharper P5 divisions between the East and West over intervention issues. Russia and China are jealous of their domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty. They are also wary of precedents for international interventions under UN auspices that may look to them like American or Western neo-imperialism. Given the dual history of colonialism and the Cold War, there is widespread concern about Western interventionism. The experience of NATO in Kosovo creates a feeling of vulnerability in other parts of the world. I think that the problem of division among the permanent members over
humanitarian intervention issues might only be solved by a return to a narrow interpretation of when and where the United Nations can or should intervene.

The NATO air campaign heavily depended on high-precision bombing. This was a strategic action of the intervening states to reduce the risk of casualties among their military persons. This decision of the actors was formulated within the given structural context, the lessons of the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia. As experienced in Somalia, the casualties among soldiers during peace operations could seriously affect the result of the operation. An air campaign does not guarantee zero civilian casualties at all, but it was proved in Kosovo that that means is at least very successful in minimising the casualties among military persons. In that sense, countries contributing to UN peace operations are more easily willing to rely on an air campaign as a means of peace operation to avoid sending ground troops with the high risks of casualties. However, the strategic decision to use an air strike depends on geographical and military factors. For example, it might be difficult for Western governments to adopt only an air campaign without the support of ground forces as a means of peace operation in some regions of conflict in Africa. Thus, this strategy of intervention would not be suitable in all circumstances. Consequently, solely using air power would attract more involvement from states in armed humanitarian intervention, but it is not possible to successfully complete humanitarian mission without the support of ground troops. Using ground force would have helped prevent civilian casualties. It is the reason why NATO's huge military presence, KFOR, was required in Kosovo following the bombing.

It is important to explore the ‘strategically designated and phased’ intervention conducted to tackle the Kosovo crisis because the lessons of the practice will provide the way for efficient and eligible UN peace operations in the future. The next analytical chapter examines the meaning of the practice of the intervention in Kosovo in terms of future peace operations of the international community along with studying what we have learned from the failures of the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia.
Chapter 6: Scrutinising UN Peacekeeping Practices in the Early Post-Cold War Era

12. Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and forced separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars (United Nations 2000c: 2).

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, convened a high-level Panel on 7 March 2000, which was chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria. The key task of the Panel was to thoroughly review how the UN had conducted all its kinds of peace and security activities during the decades since its foundation and to produce ‘a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations’ for the better future of UN peace and security actions (United Nations 2000c: i). This vast and comprehensive examination of the past experience of UN peace operations resulted in a thick report, which is dubbed ‘the Brahimi Report’. While An Agenda for Peace by Boutros-Ghali is a key reference of UN peace activities, proclaiming its aspiration and perspective for an active role to maintain international peace and security in the first decade of the post-Cold War period, this report is also important because it shows how the UN evaluates its activities and operations during the decade.

The paragraph of the report mentioned above tells us two important points: first, inside the UN there was a strong belief that UN peacekeeping operations had evolved from their traditional missions; and second, they acknowledged that the changes had happened in the 1990s, especially in the first half of the decade. This idea about the evolution of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s is widely accepted by many academics, field activists, and political leaders. Schnabel and Thakur (2001) say that the UN has expanded the role of traditional peacekeeping during the past 15 years (p.238). Albright (2003) states that during the Cold War era UN peacekeepers conducted so-called ‘cook and look’ missions rarely being involved
in ‘hot’ wars. However, in the post-Cold War world the UN has attempted to make qualitative and quantitative changes to their missions by developing new mandates and roles and increasing the number of peacekeepers and missions (p.135).

As explained in Chapter 2, traditional UN peacekeeping is defined as an action not to make peace but to prevent further violence where peace exists by interposing troops between warring parties. Thus, its key missions were monitoring the established cease-fire between opposing factions, supervising government functions, or supporting aid workers for humanitarian assistance. It is obvious that in the 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations were radically changed from the traditional operations. Especially in the early operations of the decade, the UN enlarged its missions by expanding their mandate and roles. For example, in Somalia the UN transformed UNOSOM I and UNITAF into UNOSOM II, which was the ‘first armed Chapter VII humanitarian operation’ under UN mandate and authority. Also, in the Former Yugoslavia the UN enlarged many times UNPROFOR’s mandate and strength, making its peacekeepers conduct more hostile and aggressive missions, which were not originally intended when UNPROFOR was established. As well as the change in the mandate of missions the number of missions and peacekeepers also steeply increased during the period. There had been 60 peacekeeping missions up to 2005, 15 during the Cold War period before 1989 and 45 since.

Did these qualitative and quantitative changes to peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War period mean that UN peacekeeping evolved and fundamentally changed in terms of its principles, guidelines, and operational conception? To answer this key question of this chapter is very important because recommendations for the better performance of peacekeeping operations in the future are contingent on how the changes to the operations during the period are understood. In other words, the answers will provide very different types of solution for future peacekeeping. Additionally, it is also crucial that the answers have a mutually explanatory linkage with the reasons for the failure of the UN and international community in Somalia and Bosnia.

The main purpose of this analytical chapter is to clarify the implications of the three case studies of the previous chapters through answering the question of
whether peacekeeping in the 1990s evolved. The studies tells us that at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the United Nations had entered a domain of military activity that lay somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. In Somalia and Bosnia, UN peacekeepers were not 'neutral peacekeepers' of the status of peace but a party to the conflicts, fighting with the disputants. However, many still believe that those operations were appropriate to peacekeeping in terms of its conception and practical guidelines. This chapter mainly explores the meaning of the UN's experience of entering into the so-called grey zone between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in both regions and the lessons learned from the operations for the future of UN peacekeeping operations. Through this exploration, I will argue that during the early post-Cold War period peacekeeping did not fundamentally change in terms of its principles, guidelines, and operational conception so that it should be firmly understood that peacekeeping did not evolve in the period. The Somali and Bosnian interventions were only cases of the misuse of peacekeeping, not proof of the evolution of peacekeeping.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I provide my answer with supporting arguments to the key question of this chapter: do the qualitative and quantitative changes to UN peacekeeping in the first half of the 1990s mean that UN peacekeeping evolved in operational conception and guidelines? To answer this question, the Somalia and Bosnia cases are compared while the similarities of the cases are examined. The arguments in my answer are expanded in the second section. Through discussion based on the findings and assertions from the three case studies the arguments are examined within an analytical framework of both agential and structural perspectives in the second section. The focus of the third section is on the lessons of the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo for the future of UN peace and security activities. The Kosovo case study is contrasted with the other two cases to highlight differences between them. The fourth section concludes this chapter.
6.1 The Myth of the Practical and Conceptual Evolution of UN peacekeeping

As mentioned in the introductory section above, many believe that UN peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War period evolved as the collapse of the Cold War international structure triggered the explosion in the need for the UN’s actions and increased the demands of the international community for the UN’s role to maintain international peace and security. It is a very popular idea being found not only in many scholars’ literature, but also in political leaders’ works or remarks. Even in the United Nations, there is a strong belief that UN peacekeeping has been expanded from the traditional mission to something different. They understand that through the evolution in the 1990s UN peacekeeping operations have become a new kind of peace operation between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. I would pose a question against this belief: Has UN peacekeeping genuinely evolved? To get an answer to this question it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the ‘evolution’.

As a biological term, evolution means a process that results in heritable changes of a trait/traits in a population spread over successive generations, as determined by shifts in the allele frequencies of genes (Moran 1993). Put in a simple way, evolution is the qualitative change of genes of a species over a certain time through the process of ‘adaptation’ to the changing environment, which is surrounding the species. The three key elements of the mechanism that produces evolutionary change are these: the environment for natural selection, adaptation, and speciation. Environmental conditions cause the change of specific genetic traits [natural selection]. If the change is heritable for a period of time, the traits become common in the next generation of species [adaptation]. Then, finally new biological species arise [speciation]. For those who claim that UN peacekeeping evolved over the early post-Cold War period, this process of biological evolution could seem metaphorically similar with the changes to UN peacekeeping operations in the first half of the 1990s. As the structure of the West-East rivalry was demolished, the end of the Cold War released waves of killing and destruction
through civil conflicts mainly within national borders. The increased demands made by the international community to the United Nations for more effective and massive intervention to tackle the conflicts are analogous to the process of natural selection of biological evolution. As a response to these demands, the UN played an active role in coping with many intra-state conflicts and eventually entered the grey zone between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission as a species [UN] adapts to change of their environment [the increased demand for the UN’s role in the post-Cold War order]. Finally, a new kind of UN peace operation within the grey zone seems to have arisen in a way similar to the speciation of biological evolution.

However, if this analogy would logically make sense, the alleged new kind of peacekeeping operation should firmly have these features: first, the grey zone mandate must have been genuinely common in most UN peace operations in the 1990s; second, peacekeeping operations have to have changed in terms of not only their mandate but also their planning, capability, and performance; third, the grey zone operations ought to be definitely a different kind of peace operation from traditional peacekeeping operations and also peace-enforcement actions. The changes to the UN peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era need to be examined within these three points. For this, it is essential to comparatively analyse the three case studies conducted in the previous chapters. As mentioned in the introduction to this study, this analysis is conducted within the research strategy of inter-systemic similarities and differences. The Somalia and Bosnia cases are compared to explain why the UN and international community failed in these regions by finding out similarities between the cases. The Kosovo case study is contrasted with the other two cases to highlight differences between them.

6.1.1 The Changes in the Security Council Resolutions

The armed interventions of the UN and international community in Somalia and Bosnia were representatively unsuccessful cases among the peace operations of the post-Cold War era. The two cases have two similarities at the strategic and operational level of military action: first, the mandates of each mission were
extended, renewed, and changed out of the original boundary of mandate and function; and second, the UN failed to build up or at least had great difficulty in constructing an adequate structure of unified command and control of the peacekeeping forces in the regions.

How did the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia change? The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established on 24 April 1992 by Security Council Resolution 751 (1992). Its key mission was to ‘facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire’, which were definitely the traditional functions of UN peacekeeping operation:

The Security Council, […]

2. Decides to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM);

3. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu […];

4. Agrees, in principle, also to establish under the overall direction of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative a United Nations Security force to be deployed as soon as possible to perform the functions described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of the report of the Secretary-General;

7. Requests the Secretary-General as part of his continuing mission in Somalia to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance; […] (United Nations Security Council 1992e)

The functions described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of the Secretary-General report on the situation in Somalia are ‘to provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies’, ‘to convoy deliveries of humanitarian supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort’, and ‘to undertake their patrol in light vehicles’ by taking the form of infantry organised in the normal manner (United Nations Secretary-General 1992e).
These traditional peacekeeping functions were strengthened and gradually became coercive as the UN changed the mandate of UNOSOM I through the adoption of Security Council Resolution 775 (1992) and 794 (1992). The Security Council decided on the expansion of UNOSOM’s mandate and strength in Resolution 775 (1992):

The Security Council, […]

3. Authorizes the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the subsequent deployment as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General’s report; (United Nations Security Council 1992d).

In the report mentioned in the paragraph above, the Secretary-General strongly urged that it would ‘be necessary for the Security Council to authorize the increases in UNOSOM strength’ that he had recommended including ‘the establishment of the four zone headquarters of UNOSOM’ and ‘the deployment of four additional security units’, a total strength of up to 3,500, including members of all ranks. The reason for the increase in the UN strength in Somalia was that UN peacekeeping functions such as the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitoring cease-fires did not effectively work there due to ‘the vicious cycle of insecurity, the fluidity of fighting, and hunger’. As the report states, Somali militias were very hostile and aggressive because they saw arms ‘as a means not only of personnel security but also of survival’ (United Nations Secretary-General 1992b: paragraph 23, 32, 34, and 37).

The recommendation of the Secretary-General to cope with ‘the lack of an effective cease-fire and the fluidity of fighting’ led to the adoption of Resolution 794 (1992). This adoption was the culminating point of the whole Somali intervention because it provided the UN peacekeepers in Somalia with a legal basis to convert their mission into a more aggressive peace-enforcement operation as it was determined that the situation in Somalia ‘constitutes a threat to international peace and security’ and legitimising ‘Chapter VII enforcement action’ in Somalia:

The Security Council, […]
Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, […]

6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; […]

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia; […]

12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, […]; […] (United Nations Security Council 1992c).

Finally, in Resolution 814 (1993) the Security Council authorised the use of UN peacekeeping forces under Chapter VII. This was unprecedented in the UN’s history. This resolution reaffirmed paragraph 10 of Resolution 794 (1992) and enabled the peacekeepers to implement the enforcement action under Chapter VII by establishing UNOSOM II:

The Security Council, […]

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II),

Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the threat they pose to the reconciliation process, […]

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
5. Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its mandate in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 56-88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, and the provisions of this resolution;

6. Authorizes the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the Security Council; [...] (United Nations Security Council 1993)

The mandate of UNOSOM II was renewed again for a period of six months to 31 May 1994 through Resolution 886 (1993). The fundamental review of the UNOSOM II mandate was continued afterwards due to the deteriorated situation caused first, by ‘deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group 12 supporting Mr. Ali Mahdi and SNA led by General Aidid’; and second, by ‘the continued rejection by USC/SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II’ (United Nations 1996a: 306).

What we need to note with regard to the repeated renewals and changes of UNOSOM mandate explained so far is that the modification of the mandate meant that the UN peacekeeping mission could not handle the continuing incidents of violence and threat by the hostile parties with the functions and facilities as they were initially designed. Even after the repeated extensions and changes to the mandate, the UN mission still could not adequately deal with conditions on the ground. The fundamental reason why the UN could not handle the situation in Somalia was that as explained earlier the peacekeepers were sent to a place where there was no peace to keep. The increase in the number of peacekeepers and change of the mandate did not work as effectively as the decision makers of the UN and Member States had expected because UNOSOM was an inadequate tool in the hostile situation, which required a robust peace-enforcement action rather than a peacekeeping operation.

The Bosnia case resembles the Somali intervention in terms of the repeated renewals and strengthening of the mission mandate. For example, the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was the most important body among the all UN missions in Yugoslavia, was extended on eight occasions from
February 1993 to March 1995. Of course, the mandate was not just extended, but renewed or strengthened on some occasions, as the situation in Yugoslavia grew worse. As showed in the Somali intervention, these renewals and enlargements could not tackle the two fundamental problems: first, the inadequate use of peacekeeping tools in the enforcement mission; second, the failure to establish an efficient and unified command and control structure of the forces in the field.

UNPROFOR was established by Resolution 743 (1992) on 21 February 1992 for an initial period of 12 months with the mandate only relating to Croatia:

The Security Council, […]

Concerning that the situation in Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security as determined in resolution 713 (1991), […]

2. Decides to establish, under its authority, a United Nations Protection Force in accordance with the above-mentioned report and the United Nation peace-keeping plan, and requests the Secretary-General to take measures necessary to ensure its earliest possible deployment; […];

5. Recalls that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis; […] (United Nations Security Council 1992h).

The original mandate of UNPROFOR was to ensure the existence of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)29 in certain areas of Croatia, in which Serbs constituted the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-ethnic tensions had led to armed conflict. This mandate was first extended for an interim period until 31 March 1993 by Resolution 807 (1993):

The Security Council, […]

1. Demands that the parties and others concerned comply fully with the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia […];

2. Demands further that the parties and others concerned refrain from positioning their forces in the proximity of UNPROFOR’s units in the United Nations Protected

29 The Report of the Secretary-General on 11 December 1991 (S/23280) designated Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina as UNPAs.
Areas (UNPAs) and in the pink zones³⁰; […]

5. Decides, in the context of these demands, to extend UNPROFOR’s mandate for an interim period terminating on 31 March 1993; […] (United Nation Security Council 1993g).

The extension of the UNPROFOR’s mandate was continued after this. Resolution 815 (1993) decided to extend it for an additional interim period terminating on 30 June 1993. Another extension of the mandate terminating on 30 September 1993 was approved by Resolution 847 (1993) and then, by Resolution 869 (1993) for 24 hours; by Resolution 870 (1993) until 5 October 1993; by Resolution 871 (1993) until 31 March 1994; by Resolution 908 (1994) until 30 September 1994; and finally by Resolution 947 (1994) until 31 March 1995 (United Nations 1996a: 513-8). It clearly tells us that differing from the early expectations of the decision-makers of the UN and countries contributing to the intervention, they continually had difficulties in implementing their peace plan. The original mandate of UNPROFOR established by resolution 743 (1992) underwent continuing enlargements.

The Secretary-General submitted a report (S/23836) to the Security Council on 24 April 1992. In the report, he decided to ‘advance the dispatch of unarmed military observers to Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (United Nations Secretary-General 1992c: para.20). On 30 April, forty military observers were deployed in the Mostar region. It was the key moment when the mission of UNPROFOR was extended over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Afterwards, the responsibility and roles of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina were increased and strengthened by many resolutions such as Resolution 769 (1992) on 7 August, which firstly authorised the ‘enlargements of UNPROFOR’s mandate and strength’ recommended by the Secretary-General in his report (S/24353) on 27 July 1992 and Resolution 776 (1992) that enlarged the mandate of UNPROFOR to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and

³⁰‘Pink zones’ mean the areas outside UNPAs, but inside the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), which was a self-proclaimed Serbian entity in Krajina and the western area of Slavonia along the Croatian/Bosnian border. The RSK was established on 19 December 1991 by nationalist Serbs in Krajina and ended by the military campaign by Croatian forces in 1995.
Herzegovina.

Resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May and 770 (1992) of 13 August were very important resolutions throughout the whole of the UN missions in Yugoslavia because the resolutions initiated actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. They meant that the peacekeeping mission of UNPROFOR became peace-enforcement action as the transition from UNOSOM I and UNITAF to UNOSOM II converted the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia into peace-enforcement. Resolution 757 (1992) imposed wide-ranging sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which were the non-military measures of the enforcement actions under Article 41 of Chapter VII:

*The Security Council, [...]*

*Dismayed* that the conditions have not yet been established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, [...].

*Deeply concerned* that those United Nations Protection Force personnel remaining in Sarajevo have been subjected to deliberate mortar and small-arms fire, [...].

*Deploring* the tragic incident on 18 May 1992 which caused the death of a member of the International committee of the Red Cross team in Bosnia and Herzegovina, [...]  

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, [...]  

4. **Decides also** that all states shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported there from after the date of the present resolution; [...]

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, [...]; [...]  

7. **Decides** that all States shall;

(a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), [...]; [...] (United Nations Security Council 1992f).  

Resolution 770 (1992) called on UN members states to take ‘all measures
necessary’ to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

The Security Council, […]

Deeply disturbed by the situation that now prevails in Sarajevo, which has severely complicated UNPROFOR’s efforts to fulfil its mandate to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina […], […]

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

2. Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina; […] (United Nations Security Council 1992e).

The situation and process of the conversion to peace-enforcement actions in Yugoslavia resemble those of the UN mission in Somalia. As the two resolutions above show, in both regions UN and participating states were deeply concerned about the rapid deterioration of the situation caused by the hostile parties who did not have any intention to abandon their ultimate objectives. Soon after they realised that they could not control the parties and cope with the situation, especially regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid, with the initial mandate and strength of the missions, the Security Council repeatedly renewed the mandate and enlarged the strength of the missions there. However, the renewals and enlargements rather caused practical confusion and difficulties in the fields because the military components of the peace-enforcement actions in the regions were conducted by peacekeeping forces, which were not designed to undertake such coercive military action in terms of capability, facilities, and rules of engagement. In this sense, it was obvious that peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be successful in their imposed peace-enforcement missions.
6.1.2 Command and Control Issue in the Missions

The second similarity between the Somalia and Bosnia cases is the lack of a unified command and control structure. As stated in paragraph 4 of Resolution 751 (1992) notwithstanding the resolutions above which urged the establishment of a unified command structure under UN authority, the reality in the field was that the UN mission had great difficulty in Somalia in constructing an adequate structure of the unified command and control of the UN force. In his report submitted to the Security Council on 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General recommended establishing UNOSOM II to replace UNITAF, which had dispatched around 37,000 troops in Southern and central Somalia. He pointed out in the report that though the presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia, a secure environment had not yet been established and incidents of violence continued (United Nations Secretary-General 1993b: paragraph 21 and 55). The transition of UNITAF and UNOSOM I to the twenty-nine-nation UNOSOM II meant that a coercive operation that was nearly enforcement action started.

As the Security Council agreed to deploy a military component of 20,000 UN peacekeepers of all ranks and civilian staff of 2,800 individuals to replace UNITAF by 1 May 1993, the U.S. contributed to UNOSOM II forces 8,000 logistical troops and a Quick Reaction Force (QFR) of 1,200 men (United Nations 1996a: 296; Wheeler 2000: 194). The logistical force of the U.S. army and air force came within the formal UN command and control structure, but the QFR with the Delta Forces and Army Rangers that arrived in Somalia in August 1993 were not under UN command and control. Clarke and Herbst (1996) claim as follows:

It is not true, as some have charged and the president has implied, that U.S. troops, including the Quick Reaction Force and the Rangers involved in the fatal firefight, were under UN command. Those soldiers were outside the formal UN command structure. The Rangers were commanded by Major General William Garrison, a U.S. Special Forces Officer who reported directly to U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. The searches for Aideed, including the one that led to the Ranger casualties, were all approved by senior American authorities in Washington.
The operation of the Rangers and Delta Forces against Aidid was arranged and approved solely by senior military officials in Washington, not by the UN officials or commanders in the field. This became a decisive factor, which caused Black Hawk Down and eventually made the whole mission in Somalia unsuccessful.

The peace operations in Bosnia also failed to establish an efficient and unified command and control structure of the forces in the field as happened in Somalia. Enforcement action on a large scale essentially requires a unified command and control structure because it becomes war-fighting in most occasions. The peacekeepers in Bosnia suffered the absence of a centralized military command and control system. There are two levels of headquarters in a command and control system well-structured to conduct a war: strategic-level and operational-level headquarters. As to the Somalia and Bosnia cases, the Secretariat, specifically the Department of Peacekeeping Operations within it, in the UN’s New York headquarters was the strategic-level headquarters, and UMOSOM I & II and UNPROFOR had operational-level headquarters in Somalia and Yugoslavia respectively. In both regions, the strategic-level headquarters failed to accomplish its two primary roles: to anticipate envisaged situations in the missions and to prepare for them. It was due to a simple fact that unlike NATO, the UN is not an organisation designed to conduct massive military actions, including war-fighting, by its own capabilities and facilities. As quoted in the Bosnia chapter, Albright – the former U.S. ambassador to the UN – pointed out many problems such as ‘the near total absence’ of contingency planning, ‘hastily recruited, ill-equipped and often unprepared troops and civilian staff’, the absence of centralized military command and control, and ‘the lack of a durable financial basis for starting and sustaining peacekeeping operations’. It is also revealed in the statement of the former head of UN forces in Sarajevo, Canadian Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie. According to Smith and Preston (18 June 1993), he vividly described the insufficient staff problem: ‘do not get into trouble as a commander in the field after 5 p.m. New York time, or Saturday and Sunday’ because ‘there is no one to answer
Shimura (2001) who worked primarily in the field of peacekeeping in the Secretariat for 24 years describes the procedure of establishing a peacekeeping operation as follows:

Once a new operation is formally authorized, the Secretariat plunges into a period of intense activity. Consultations are held with the representatives of the parties concerned on the detailed implementation of the operations, and on the facilities and services they will provide. A list of potential countries to provide troops and other personnel is drawn up, in consideration of factors such as geographical balance, political neutrality, and past peacekeeping record. This is followed by consultations with each potential contributor. [...] The overall selection of countries to provide the needed personnel to a given operation is essentially made by the Secretariat in consultation with member states. At the end of exercise, the Secretary-General presents the Council with a proposed list of countries that will contribute troops and civilian police forces. The council customarily replies that it “agrees” with the Secretary-General’s choice. This exchange is not, however, regarded as the Council’s formal approval of the Secretary-General’s decision. [...] As soon as all this procedure is completed, peacekeepers are deployed into the region of conflict by the logistic supports of the concerned states (p.50-51).

An operational-level headquarters of a peacekeeping mission is designed in the course of the consultation with member states. During the Cold War period the five permanent members of the Security Council, especially the two superpowers, were not eager to provide military personnel to peacekeeping missions due to the rigid relationship of rivalry between the U.S. and USSR in the Cold War system. Thus, so-called ‘middle powers’ among member states such as Canada, the Nordic Countries, and Austria were needed to contribute to the operations. With the demise of the Cold War rivalry, the five members became eager to participate in peacekeeping operations, for example as was done by France and the UK in UNPROFOR and the USA in UNOSOM (Shimura 2001: 51). A significant problem in the post-Cold War era related to the construction of a unified command and control structure in the operational-level headquarters arose from this active participation of the permanent members. Unlike the middle power states, they –
especially the United States – would not put their troops under UN officials’ charge, and the command and control structure of the UN. As the procedure of forming a peacekeeping mission above shows if at least one of the permanent member states opposes the proposal of the Secretary-General in the course of the consultation, the UN cannot construct a headquarters in the way that they intend. This may cause the operational-level headquarters of a peacekeeping mission in the field to undermine the unity and efficacy of its own command and control structure. UNPROFOR was the case in point. The ‘shared responsibilities’ between the UN and the European Community and the separated command and control systems, that is, one in the UN headquarters in New York and the other in NATO, made UNPROFOR inefficient and unsatisfactory in conducting its missions. Regarding this, Nambiar (2001)’s statement is worthy of mention:

UNPROFOR’s experience showed that when situations emerged where positive results appeared likely, the European Community came on the scene in the hope of drawing credit, but the moment things went wrong, UNPROFOR was left to pick up the pieces; [...] In due course, with the rather dubious arrangements that were put in place for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was inevitable that copies of reports, analyses, and recommendations emanating from UNPROFOR headquarters began finding their way to Brussels, some national capitals, and the office of the European Community negotiator. The irritating and unacceptable part of this development was that, using such information, attempts were made to arrive at arrangements with the belligerents without consulting UNPROFOR; in most cases with disastrous results (p.173).

Then, why do the superpower states want to avoid putting their troops under the UN’s command and control structure? General Bernard E. Trainor of the U.S. Marine Corps testified before the Congress that ‘[…] the entire structure of the UN military arm is for peacekeeping not peace-enforcement. [...] The UN military representation is not organized, trained, equipped for peace-enforcement operations’ (Curtis 1994: 178). It seems obvious that the Clinton Administration believed that in order to encourage U.S. national interests whenever and wherever they wanted to do it, it was critical to retain U.S. forces under the president’s command authority. A volume of the collection of Clinton’s articulations to the

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. [...] Peace operations often have served, and continued to serve, important U.S. national interests. [...] 

In order to maximize the benefits of UN peace operations, the United States must take highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in them. [...] Far from handing a blank check to the UN, [...] [it is required] to undertake a rigorous analysis of requirements and capabilities before voting to support or participate in peace operations. The United States has not hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to ensure that the UN authorizes only those peace operations that meet these standards. 

 [...] On those occasions when we consider contributing U.S. forces to a UN peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces. [...] 

The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times when it is in our interest to place U.S. troops under the temporary operational control of a component UN or allied commander. The United States has done so many times in the past – from the siege of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War to the battles of Desert Storm. However, under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces.

 [...] The lesson we must take away from our first ventures in peace operations is not that we should forswear such operations but that we should employ this tool selectively and more effectively. In short, the United States views peace operations as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself (Clinton 1995: 69-72).

### 6.1.3 The Misuse of UN Peacekeeping

The repeated enlargements and extensions of the mission mandate and the failure to construct a unified and effective command and control structure in the field were fundamentally caused by the simple fact that UN peacekeepers were sent where there was no peace to keep. This obviously implies that neither had peacekeeping
techniques evolved in terms of their nature and characteristics, nor had the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia created a new kind of peace operation defined between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. In both regions, peacekeeping was just employed in inappropriate circumstances. Then, why should we understand the performance of UN peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia as a misuse of peacekeeping? As argued at the beginning of this section, the answers to this question must be regarded within the three points: first, whether the grey zone mandate of the Somali and Bosnian missions had genuinely been common in most UN peace operations in the early and mid-1990s; second, whether UN peacekeeping operations after the Somali and Bosnian crises essentially changed in terms of not only their mandate but also in planning, capabilities, and performance; and third, whether the grey zone missions in Somalia and Bosnia were definitely different kinds of peace operation from traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

The peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia were extraordinary cases in terms of their mandates. Between 1948 when the first peacekeeping mission UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) was established, and 2006, sixty-one peacekeeping missions were conducted. For almost 60 years, there were only three cases of peacekeeping mission with enforcement mandates. In the post-Cold War era, two peacekeeping bodies were established: UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II. There is just one precedent during the Cold War period: the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC). Differing from the usual traditional peacekeeping operations during the period, the UN under the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld did eagerly intervene in the Congo crisis of 1960-64. Thus, indeed it was not until 1992 when UN peacekeepers were sent to Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that the UN again became involved in operations at all comparable to that in the Congo. Except for only these three cases, no peacekeeping operations in the UN’s history have ever been authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter. Table 6.1 on the next page shows the details of the UN’s peace operations conducted during the early 1990s. The table tells us that the UN’s multifunctional peacekeeping operations began since 1989 as the West-East confrontation eased and also that even in the post-Cold War period traditional (or
classic) peacekeeping operations are being still used by the UN. It means that the new experiences in Somalia and Bosnia have not removed traditional peacekeeping from the list of the UN’s counter-measures against intra-state conflicts and civil wars. As to the peacekeeping operations of 1994, out of eight multifunctional peacekeeping operations only two operations were conducted as peace-enforcement actions: in Somalia and Bosnia. Then, a question can be posed: Are traditional operations and multifunctional (or multidimensional\(^{31}\)) operations genuinely different?

Table 6.1: Some Statistics on United Nations activities related to peace and security, 1988 to 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As at 31 January 1988</th>
<th>As at 31 January 1992</th>
<th>As at 16 December 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Council resolutions adopted in the preceding 12 months</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes and conflicts in which the UN was actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking in the preceding 12 months</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peacekeeping operations deployed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As at 31 January 1988</th>
<th>As at 31 January 1992</th>
<th>As at 16 December 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multifunctional</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel deployed</td>
<td>9,570</td>
<td>11,495</td>
<td>73,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian police deployed</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International civilian personnel deployed</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>2,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries contributing military and police personnel</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN budget for peacekeeping operations (on an annual basis) (millions of U.S. dollars)</td>
<td>230.4</td>
<td>1,689.6</td>
<td>3,610.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Boutros-Ghali 1995: 32)

\(^{31}\) From the late 1990s UN documents have been using the term ‘multidimensional’, instead of ‘multifunctional’.
Peacekeeping operations in the 1990s have dissimilarities to traditional peacekeeping conducted during the Cold War period in some points. The number of operations has sharply increased and their role has expanded from supervision of cease-fire and monitoring the agreements between warring parties to multidimensional operations including peace-building with various components, such as civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, and so on. However, it is doubtful whether peacekeeping operations have fundamentally changed in terms of planning, performance, and capabilities. The Clinton Administration’s PDD 25 was partly released in 1996, but it was signed in May 1994 soon after Black Hawk Down happened. The directive was the examination of the failure in Somalia and also a review of UN peace operations up to early 1994 and of U.S. involvement in them. One of the major issues of reform and improvement, which the policy directive addressed, was the ‘UN’s capability to manage peace operations’. In order to reform and improve the capability and efficacy of its operations, PDD 25 strongly recommended the UN to create:

- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operation;
- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24-hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments;
- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating member nations. […]
- Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success;
- Small Civilian Police cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training;
- A rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new mission;
- Data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
- Trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations;
- Modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments;
- A professional Peace Operation Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel (U.S. Department of State 1996).

Six years later, the UN produced a report that was a specific and practical review of UN peace operations in the 1990s. The so-called Brahimi report demonstrated that the UN still has almost same problems, which the PDD 25 had stated needed to be improved and reformed:

The panel [of the report] recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis entity be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). […]

The Panel’s proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS […] […]

The Panel recommends that the United Nations standby arrangements system (UNSAS) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces, […]. The Panel also recommends that the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet the requirements must not be deployed. […]

The Secretariat should also address, on an urgent basis, the needs: to put in place a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel;
to improve the retention of the civilian specialists that are needed in every complex peace operation; and to create standby arrangements for their rapid deployment. [...] 

[The Panel] also believes that staff shortages in certain areas are plainly obvious. For example, it is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, [...].

The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, [...], to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment.

Structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, which should be reorganized into two separate divisions, and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), which should be split into two divisions. [...] (United Nations 2000c: x-xiii)

The UN had learned many lessons from the failures in Somalia and Bosnia and tried to fix the problems based on the lessons. However, as the Brahimi report tells us, the UN's capabilities of planning, performing, and managing peacekeeping still needed to be more improved and reformed. In this sense, UN peacekeeping in the 1990s had little changed.

*Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* by Boutros-Ghali in 1995 argued that the Somali and Bosnian interventions were a new kind of peace operation:

This [the environmental changes of peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War] has led, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia, to a new kind of United Nations operation. Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities. Nor is this peace-keeping as practised hitherto, because the hostilities continue and there is often no agreement between the warring parties on which a peace-keeping mandate can be based (Boutros-Ghali 1995: paragraph 19).
Is it correct that as the statement argues the operations in Somalia and Bosnia were a new kind of peace operation? It is obvious that the environment of UN peacekeeping and the nature of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War era were very new as it says, but the peacekeeping operations in both regions were not of a new kind at all. They were the kind of peacekeeping operation, which the UN had conducted since 1948. The only differences from other peacekeeping practices were that the operations were placed within the context of enforcement action by the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII.

In the third section (2.3) of Chapter 2, I have defined a peacekeeping operation as follows:

The interposition of **unarmed or lightly-armed** UN forces, including police personnel or civilians, in an environment with **the consent of all the parties** concerned to **encourage** the warring parties to negotiate a settlement or to **impartially buttress** a political agreement between them **through the means** authorised by the Security Council.

Authorisation by the Security Council, light armaments, and the three principles are the essential elements of UN peacekeeping operations. Especially, the three principles, the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence, are the key guidelines, which distinguish peacekeeping from other peace operations. The peacekeepers who were sent to Somalia and Bosnia had to stick to the principles because the Security Council authorised to send them as peacekeepers. The difficulties they faced in the regions were caused by the fact that they had to conduct missions within the principles of peacekeeping, in circumstances, which required enforcement action. In this sense, multifunctional peacekeeping operations in the 1990s except the two extraordinary cases, Somalia and Bosnia, were fundamentally the same as traditional peacekeeping. As traditional peacekeepers the peacekeepers with the mandate of multifunction were also lightly armed and conducted their missions based on the three principles within the limited rules of engagement. Even the facilities they use had not much changed. The only key differences were that they had got more missions to conduct
as UN peacekeepers and that the number of multifunctional operations had increased.

As mentioned earlier, many believe that the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia were some of the most important developments for the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations. For example, Thakur and Schnabel (2001) regard the interventions as the ‘fourth generation’ of peacekeeping operations, which was characterised by ‘peace enforcement’. They insist that ‘Somalia most clearly represented the birth (and death) of the fourth generation of UN peacekeeping’ (p.13). With regard to my arguments so far, the Somali and Bosnian interventions are not evidence of the evolution of peacekeeping in the 1990s. The operations in both regions were just exceptional cases, which demonstrate that peacekeeping techniques were applied in inappropriate circumstances according to their growing popularity as the international community’s tool of choice for conflict containment in the early post-Cold War era. Such operations had not been common at all among most UN peace operations in the 1990s. The grey zone missions in the regions were just conducted within the context of enforcement action by the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII.

6.2 Agential and Structural Causes of the Misuse of Peacekeeping

The UN and international community learned many lessons from the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia. One of the key lessons was that UN peacekeeping should be used in a proper environment in which there is at least a cease-fire or peace agreement. It must not be mixed with war-fighting operations to conduct a mission of making peace. The handbook on multidimensional peacekeeping published by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Units of the DPKO confirms these as follows:

In the mid-1990s, following the peacekeeping experiences in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it became obvious that UN forces could not keep the peace when there was no peace to keep. In such circumstances, the Security Council judges it wiser to authorize an enforcement action by a coalition of willing States, directed
by a lead mission, that had both the military capability and political will to bring an end to the conflict using all necessary means. These interventions, although authorized by the Council, are not conducted under UN command (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2003: 56).

This statement definitely agrees that peacekeeping operations were employed in inappropriate circumstances in Somalia and Bosnia. Then, who was responsible for this flawed decision-making? Many would easily come up with the Secretary-General of the UN at that time, Boutros-Ghali. Of course it is unfair to blame him alone. The UN system for planning and manoeuvring peacekeeping missions worked using a collective decision-making mechanism under the authority of the Security Council. However, many academics, commentators, and politicians lay a heavy burden of responsibility on him. Curtis (1994) argues that ‘Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sought to counter the increasing international instabilities by expanding the role of the United Nations from peacekeeping to peacemaking, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building’. In short, he insists that Boutros-Ghali ‘moved the United Nations into the gray zone’ (p.180). Schnabel and Thakur (2001) assert that ‘Boutros-Ghali had great hopes for a fundamental restructuring of the tasks of, and approaches to, post-Cold War UN peacekeeping’ (p.240).

However, my findings through interviews pose a question about whether he was genuinely enthusiastic to call for a new and active role for the UN in maintaining international peace and security. Lord Owen stated that ‘during his tenure, the role of UN peacekeeping was stretched not because he wanted it’, but because he had to do it due to the increasing demands of the international community for the UN’s role in the post-Cold War order (Interview on 16 October 2006). Lord Hannay made a similar statement on Boutros-Ghali’s attitude. According to him, the assertion that Boutros-Ghali tried to expand traditional peacekeeping and had a great hope for restructuring UN peace operations is correct in terms of his general views, which were set out in An Agenda for Peace. However, he had different and specific views on the actual cases. For example, ‘as far as
Yugoslavia is concerned, he [Boutros-Ghali] was always trying to do less, not to do more’. Hannay continued to state:

He was very reluctant in the first place for the UN to be involved [in Yugoslavia] […] And, he couldn’t really prevent being involved. He was very reluctant. He was continually dragging his feet. He was not trying to go in further in Yugoslavia. He was trying to go in less far (Interview on 24 April 2006).

On account of An Agenda for Peace, many academics perceive that Boutros-Ghali was very enthusiastic to enter the grey-zone and greatly expand peacekeeping missions. As Schnabel and Thakur (2001) note, in the report he seemed to make ‘a bold attempt to expand traditional peacekeeping’ calling for ‘a new and comprehensive way of thinking about global peacekeeping responsibilities’. They argue that Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace ‘envisioned peacekeeping as an institutionalized instrument for global security patterns and structures, which serve two primary purposes: to enhance the political and military position of the UN system, and to promote the political and legal status of individuals and subnational groups’ (p.241). These assertions are fully based on Boutros-Ghali’s statements set out in An Agenda for Peace:

15. […] [The UN’s] security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, had emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Our aims must be:
- To seek to identify at the earliest possible state situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this organization (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 473).

According to these statements only, it seems true that Boutros-Ghali had a great aspiration to tackle various problems in the post-Cold War order by expanding the UN's roles into vaguely defined zone of its missions. Then, why did Boutros-Ghali proclaim his or the organisational desire for its more expanded roles and responsibilities in an age of growing violence while he had specifically different views on the actual cases of regional conflicts, being very reluctant to intervene in some? Hannay gave an answer to this question:

First of all, An Agenda for Peace was not an initiative by Boutros-Ghali. It was called for by the Security Council Summit in 1992. They asked him to write a paper about all ways to use [to tackle the crises in the post-Cold War era] including enforcement. He didn't invent it. He explained it. [...] Boutros-Ghali therefore put forward his ideas in An Agenda for Peace, but they were not followed up. He was then pushed into a quasi-enforcement role in Bosnia (Interview on 24 April 2006).

Consequently I would say that, Boutros-Ghali was broadly misunderstood as having great hope for a fundamental restructuring of UN peace operations. It seems right that he had ideas in general for the expanded roles and responsibilities, but he was actually not enthusiastic for the expansion rather reluctant in some cases. His An Agenda for Peace was just a reflection of the expectation and demands of UN member states for the UN's active role in the post-Cold War era. Weiss and Collins (2000) confirm this argument with the statement below:

This new structure of power relations [which emerged by the end of the Cold War] among states needed new ideas, and the Security Council asked the newly elected UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to offer suggestions for an enhanced UN role in international peace and security. In response, the secretary-general wrote An Agenda for Peace, outlining his ideas on issues of preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. An Agenda for Peace was an attempt to integrate the concerns of states for international order […] (p.31).

In this sense, it is reasonable to argue as follows: the growing misuse of peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era was caused by states in the international community, especially the major Western countries, rather than the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali or the United Nations. Hannay said that the UN member states were eager to usher the UN into the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia: ‘[…] the member states, particularly the Europeans with the Canadians and Americans, and Russians because they wanted to avoid getting into a conflict with each other, kept pushing the UN in’ (Interview on 24 April 2006).

The UN and Secretary-General do not have authority over the assets required or the budget necessary for its actions. The assets and budget must come from its member states and there is no guarantee that they will comply. This limitation of the UN stems from its structure as an organisation of individual sovereign states. Mr. Ahmed who is the Special Assistant to the UN Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping pointed out that it is difficult for the UN to go against its member states, especially the members of the Security Council:

Everyone knows…um…our political masters for these operations [peacekeeping operations] are in the Security Council, the fifteen countries. […] That’s reality and a true secret. Um… obviously their decisions and actions that they take in the Security Council are formed by whether they perceive it to be of international interest. It’s a fact. I mean…so… That is the reality we live with. Many people say why did the UN do this or that. They need to be clear. They are talking about the decision of our political masters (Interview on 21 April 2005).

It is definitely right that due to its structural limitations the UN is inevitably contingent on its member states, especially the Security Council members. In this sense, a statement of Kofi Annan’s Millennium report is worthy of mention:

The structural weaknesses of United Nations peace operations, however, only Member States can fix. Our system for launching operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every
time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military (Annan 2000: paragraph 224).

The strategic failure of the states in properly using peacekeeping operations should be considered within the perspective of agent-structure interrelation. There was a structural factor that made UN member states, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, strongly force the UN and the Secretary-General to maneuver UN peacekeeping into the grey zone. It was the end of the Cold War. The demise of the Cold War system has created two kinds of new structures differing from those of the Cold War system: material and ideational. The features of the new material structure of the post-Cold War era are first, the increased number of regional intra-state or trans-national conflicts on an unprecedented scale; second, more intensified civil strife and hostile ethnic, nationalistic, and religious conflicts than ever before. These features of the new world order have been a significant challenge to the international community, and have resulted in the feeling that ‘something must be done’ by someone. In the early post-Cold War era, it was a matter of course that the UN was highlighted as the appropriate body and asked to take a decisive role in tackling the crises. That was why the leaders of UN member states convened at the summit meeting in January 1992 and proclaimed that ‘all member states expect the United Nations to play a central role at the this crucial stage’ (United Nations Security Council 1992). As mentioned, according to Hannay, UN member states, particularly the United States and European countries also with Russia, urged and were pushing the UN to do something in managing the new world order because ‘they wanted to avoid getting into the conflicts’. They regarded the UN as ‘the best possible international tool to avoid the involvement’. Thus, the governments were ‘always in favour of UN’s involvement’ in the crises instead of themselves (Interview on 24 April 2006).

In terms of the structure of the post-Cold War international system, another effect of the end of the Cold War on the excessive expectation of the international
community of the UN’s activities was the widespread belief of the ‘liberal triumph’. As explained in the chapter on Somalia, there was a strong belief in the West that they had won the Cold War and the victory belonged to the idea of liberal democracy. As this claim of the triumph of liberal democracy against absolutism, fascism, and Communism had been widely accepted by the international community, the emphasis on human rights and democracy and the development of a more cooperative spirit between the permanent members in the UN Security Council had moved the issue of ‘forcible multilateral humanitarian intervention’ forwards on the international agenda. In other words, the cognition of the western and liberal triumph had gradually grown and constructed an identity of Western governments actively dealing with the post-Cold War regional conflicts. In this circumstance, the UN was required to conduct its peace operations within the context which had expanded from traditional peacekeeping being appropriate to the increasing demands for more effective and massive armed intervention in conflicts.

As to UN peace operations, American support for its missions was vital to their success. The U.S. government pays around 30% of the regular budget of the UN and usually takes the largest single share of UN peacekeeping expenses. The political changes in the international system after the demise of the Cold War order left the United States as the world’s supreme power in the new world order. In this quasi-unilateral international system, it is inevitable that Washington has an immense influence upon UN peace operations.

The Clinton Administration had two key regional focuses of its foreign policy: the Middle East and North Korea. The two regions were critical for U.S. national interests because the regions have been the would-be theatres of massive armed conflict including tactical nuclear war with the highest probabilities of the emergence of crises compared to other regions around the world. Actually, the policy makers of the administration devoted their efforts to building the concrete political and military system to prevent war in the two regions. One of the results of the administration’s efforts was the ‘Win-Win’ strategy. The problem that the

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32 As of January 2006, the U.S. paid 27% of the expenses. Japan took the next largest share, 19%. Germany: 9%; UK and France 7%; Italy: 5%; Canada and Spain: 3% (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2006).
administration faced was how to tackle the other minor intra-state or transnational conflicts in the other regions, such as Africa or East Europe. They had to resolve the less severe conflicts as well to maintain the U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world order. The Americans needed someone to help them. It was the United Nations.

As explained above, the interests of actors are also constructed within the interrelations of both the material and ideational structure. At the early stage of the end of the Cold War, the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy team formulated its national interests in securing and strengthening U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War international order stressing human rights and humanitarian affairs. To achieve this ideational national interest, the Clinton Administration strategically used the UN as a tool for its foreign policy by sometimes working with it very cooperatively and sometimes heavily criticising it. After Black Hawk Down in October 1993, the U.S. government realised that casualties in peace operations cannot be tolerated when they intervene in the conflict with ideational (or soft) national interest only. Soon after the accident, criticising the United Nations directly or indirectly they shifted the centre of gravity of the strategic calculation related to national interest from the ideational interest to material interests. The result was the non-intervention in Rwanda and PDD 25, which clearly proclaims that the United States would not become involved unless American (material) interests could be secured, and ‘Somalia-like intervention’ will be avoided (Weiss and Collins 2000: 103).

6.3 The Lessons of the Kosovo Intervention

On 15 November 1999, the Secretary-General submitted a report pursuant to paragraph 18 of General Assembly resolution 53/35 of November 1998. In the paragraph, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide ‘a comprehensive report, including an assessment, on the events dating from the establishment of the safe area of Srebrenica’ (United Nations General Assembly
1998). It is called 'the Srebrenica report'. As explained in the Bosnia chapter, it was a truly terrible massacre of the Bosnian Muslim population in the UN-designated safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995. The report is not only the account of the event in Srebrenica but also a painful review on the lessons learned from the crime against humanity. Paragraph 498 of the report states as follows:

[...] peacekeeping and war fighting are distinct activities which should not be mixed. Peacekeepers must never again be deployed into an environment in which there is no ceasefire or peace agreement. Peacekeepers must never again be told that they must use their peacekeeping tools – lightly armed soldiers in scattered positions – to impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of the belligerents by military means. If the necessary resources are not provided – and the necessary political, military and moral judgements are not made – the job simply cannot be done (United Nation Secretary-General 1999).

It is the key lesson learned from the fall of Srebrenica that peacekeepers should not be sent where there is no peace to keep. It is also the prime lesson of the whole Bosnian mission and the Somali intervention. The experience in the regions demonstrates to us that peacekeeping techniques should not be used in a situation of war and the three principles of peacekeeping should be kept as the tenets of peacekeeping in both the field and headquarters. However, the international security environment of the post-Cold War era demanded UN peacekeeping to play a more active role with expanded mandates. The international community does not want to leave peacekeeping mission within the restricted boundary of its traditional mission. Hannay (1996) states that:

[...] the UN does not have the same liberty of choice as does a nation state. It was set up by states explicitly to promote international peace and security, a role which was largely blocked by the Cold War for several decades but is clearly not so any longer. Thus if the UN stays on the sidelines, that is a choice too, and one for which it is likely to be sharply criticised (p.11).

This is the problem that made the UN and international community fail in Somalia and Bosnia. Within this context, which means at the strategic and operational level
should the UN choose to be effective in its peacekeeping efforts? The experience of the UN and international community in Kosovo provides useful implications for answers to this question. The Kosovo intervention was distinctively different from the peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia in two points: the major involvement of regional organisation, which was also a military organisation with full capabilities for armed operations, and use of air power.

The UN peacekeepers in Kosovo successfully worked in coordinating and supporting humanitarian assistance through UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo). With regard to their efforts for humanitarian relief, the UN cannot be perceived as a bystander in Kosovo. However, it was obvious that the UN was a minor actor especially in comparison with NATO, which played a key role to tackle the crisis. NATO was also involved in Bosnia providing air power and sending ground troops, IFOR (Implementation Force). Unlike in Kosovo, NATO was a relatively minor actor in the Bosnian crisis. As the UN positioned UNPROFOR at the front line of the conflict resolution, NATO stepped aside until 1994. NATO’s intervention in Bosnia was initiated by the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa in 1995. After the massacre in Srebrenica, the U.S. led-international community launched a full-scale military intervention in the crisis. Especially, as the Bosnian Serbs were attacking Zepa on 21 July, the member states of the Contact Group and NATO were deeply concerned about the inability of UNPROFOR to deter the attacks of Serbs on the UN’s safe havens. They decided to use decisive force to tackle the violations of the safe areas and protect the people in the areas. Finally, NATO’s full-scale intervention started with the use of air strikes. NATO also deployed ground troops throughout the regions. However, the multinational military contingent of mainly ground units from NATO member states and partly non-NATO member states, which was called IFOR, did not play a major role in the resolution of the conflict. IFOR was established to ensure compliance with the peace agreement between the parties concerned by taking over UNPROFOR’s responsibilities and missions (United Nations 1996a: 558-562). As to NATO’s involvement in Bosnia, it would be useful to listen to Lord Owen’s explanation:

As part of assessing a European Defence capacity, it is important to understand how
and why NATO began to involve itself in a shooting war in the former Yugoslavia, eventually replacing UN forces. Having rejected calls in 1991 to act over the shelling of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and over ethnic cleansing in the summer of 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO only began to move towards intervention from the air in the autumn of 1992. The reason was that it was self evidently intolerable for Yugoslav aeroplanes, claimed as being part of the Bosnian Serb airforce, to be strafing Bosnian Government forces and advancing military objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina with UN forces on the ground, largely British and French, as part of a humanitarian intervention, helpless to prevent such air attacks (Owen, 16 September 1999).

In the Bosnian crisis, the military combination of NATO and UNPROFOR to cope with the hostile aggressors was not effective and efficient at all due to the very different mandates and approaches of the two organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security. Unlike in Bosnia, the states concerned decided to fully entrust resolution of the crisis in Kosovo to NATO. It was one of the key reasons that the Kosovo intervention became a successful case. As explained in the Kosovo chapter, NATO is a military organisation more suitable than the UN for that kind of enforcement mission in Kosovo. NATO is well structured and equipped to take on the tasks with C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Information) capabilities and its own troops and facilities, which are essential for the nearly war-fighting peace operations. Unfortunately, the UN does not have any of them because UN forces are made up of national forces when they are required to be deployed in troubled areas. In the UN Secretariat, there are no military components of being able to perform a war like that in Kosovo. This is the reason that the failings of the UN armed operations were unavoidable in Bosnia. The Brahimi report clearly confirms this:

The panel recognizes that the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter (United Nations 2000c: paragraph 53).
As the end of the Cold War was ushered in, the number of regional and intra-states conflicts dramatically increased and they became more threatening than before. Peace-enforcement missions in many troubled areas are beyond the UN’s ability regarding its limited resources and capabilities of performing military operations. A peacekeeping operation is a very useful instrument to cope with civil war, intra-states dispute and human-caused catastrophe. However, as the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia demonstrated, it cannot be used to deal with every kind of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Thus, the UN needs to more actively employ regional and/or military organisations to tackle conflicts in hostile and aggressive circumstances, which require enforcement actions or even war-fighting. As to cooperation with regional organisations, the UN already has a clear legal basis in the Charter. Chapter VIII of the Charter clarifies the usefulness of regional organisations and their role in the maintenance of international peace and security:

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, […] […]

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. […]

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, exception of measures against any enemy states, as defined in paragraph 2 of the Article, […] (United Nations 1945). […]

The advantages of cooperation with or reliance on regional organisations for conflict resolution and management are reasonably clear. Such strategies reduce
burdens on the United Nations. Regional actors may well know the parties of local conflicts or disputes and have strong political influence on them so that they might be able to more effectively mediate between the parties concerned. Moreover, regional organisations are more likely to provide the resources required for peace operations in their region because they have direct interests in the operations.

The second lesson of the Kosovo intervention is the use of air power. NATO launched air strikes in both Bosnia and Kosovo. According to the Srebrenica report by Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali and other decision-makers of the Bosnian intervention were very hesitant about using air power against the Serbs:

What is clear is that my predecessor, his senior advisers [...] , his Special Representative and the Force Commander were all deeply reluctant to use air power against the Serbs for four main reasons. We believed that by using air power against the Serbs we would be perceived as having entered the war against them, something not authorized by the Security Council and potentially fatal for a peacekeeping operation. Second, we risked losing control over the process – once the key was turned we did not know if we would be able to turn it back, with grave consequences for the safety of the troops entrusted to us by Member States. Third, we believed that the use of air power would disrupt the primary mission of UNPROFOR as we then saw it: the creation of an environment in which humanitarian aid could be delivered to the civilian population of the country. Fourth, we feared Serb reprisals against our peacekeepers. Member States had placed thousands of their troops under United Nations command. We, and many of the troop-contributing countries, considered the security of those troops to be of fundamental importance in the implementation of the mandate. That there was merit in our concerns was evidenced by the hostage crisis of May-June 1995 (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: paragraph 482).

Because of the reasons stated above, the use of air power was very limited and ineffective in Bosnia. The Kosovo intervention was different in this point. Since there were few UN peacekeeping troops contributed by member states in the field and the UN did not take control of the conflict resolution and military operations, NATO could conduct their air strike strategy more effectively and efficiently.

Owen pointed out that ‘there is a widespread, but mistaken, belief’ that NATO air strikes in the summer of 1995 were the decisive factor in bringing about
the Dayton peace accords’ (Owen, 16 September 1999). In the interview in October 2006, he clearly proves that that belief was definitely misperceived:

The problem of U.S. policy makers is that they had a belief they could do all from 30,000 feet by air power. They couldn’t defend UN safe havens from 30,000 feet. [...] And the British, French and Dutch introduced well-equipped troops with the capacity to fire artillery. Up to that time there were no artilleries in the UN forces. And with radar-attached... So, the artillery could fire even if there was fog around Sarajevo as often there is so aircrafts couldn’t take off. Also radar-monitored mortar units came in. So, the French, British and Dutch were much better equipped by then. So, they could reinforce NATO air power (Interview on 16 October 2006).

Not only the U.S. decision-makers but European leaders also believed that air strikes had been a strong influence on the Serbs in Bosnian. From the initial stage of the air campaigns they were convinced that the threat to repeat bombings forced Milosevic to cease his hostile intention and accept the Rambouillet terms (Owen, 16 September 1999). The belief misguided many American and European leaders to repeat air strikes in Kosovo. The decisive factor in the Kosovo intervention, which ended the crisis, was not NATO’s air strike strategy but the political will of the states involved to resolve the crisis. It is obvious that use of air power without the support of ground troops has a limited effect in peace operations. Regarding humanitarian assistance and relief missions ground troops are very essential for completing the missions. In many ways, peace operations and the use of air power are an ineffective or sometimes non-functional combination of strategies. That was why NATO needed a huge military presence in Kosovo after its air strikes. As soon as the bombing was ceased, with the legal support of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the North Atlantic Council authorised the deployment of KFOR troops in June 1999. However, due to the possibility of reducing the risk of casualties in the field, many states seem to repeatedly rely on using only air power in future peacekeeping operations. We must learn from the past.
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the changes to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. It is very important to clarify whether UN peacekeeping especially in Somalia and Bosnia was misused or evolved in terms of its conception and practice because appropriate recommendations for the better performance of peacekeeping operations in the future are contingent on how to understand the changes to the operations in the regions, which were the most unsuccessful cases in the history of UN peacekeeping. That is, the clarification of the changes will provide very different solutions for future peacekeeping related to these issues: how to conduct operations in order not to repeat the misuse and what to do regarding the expanded roles and functions.

Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were the cases of the change of post-Cold War peacekeeping. For many, such interventions are widely held to be an innovation of the post-Cold War era, but in fact they are just exceptional cases among UN peace operations in 1990s. As argued in the first section of this chapter, peacekeeping was applied to the definitely inappropriate circumstances of the crises. The misuses of UN peacekeeping were deeply related to the failures of the UN and international community in both regions. Unfortunately, the international security environment of the post-Cold War era is demanding more expanded and active involvement of the UN in regional conflicts, increasing the possibility of the repeating misuse of peacekeeping techniques. It seems inevitable that the UN will make efforts to cope with conflicts in any circumstances according to the growing demands of the international community because as Hannay said the UN does not have the same liberty of choice as do its member states.

The UN already has a useful tool for hostile conflicts by aggressive parties, which require massive and coercive armed operations like those in Somalia and Bosnia. That is peace-enforcement. Thus, what is essential for the UN is to improve skills to clarify the diversity of each conflict and develop strategic calculations about the choice of the proper tool appropriate to the nature of a conflict based on its analysis. The selective adaptation of the tool of peace
operations requires the appropriate analysis of national interests of states contributing to the operations. Through UN history, most successful peacekeeping operations were established in cases in which external powers had considerable influence and interests. Indeed, a driving force behind peacekeeping was the superpowers’ mutual interest in bringing an end to conflicts. Therefore, the UN when it launches especially grey zone operations should be very selective and conduct a very careful review of national interests of states concerned based on the conceptual analysis of material and ideational interests. Peacekeeping is not a panacea and should not be used as a panacea. For better performance and success in the future, UN peacekeeping should remain in its traditional responsibility and role. It does not mean that mandate and mission of peacekeeping operations must not be expanded from those of traditional operations during the Cold War. With robust doctrine and realistic mandates authorised by the Security Council, the UN can expand its operational boundary beyond traditional peacekeeping. However, that boundary should not include enforcement actions or war-fighting. And, in operations, it should be firmly perceived and strictly observed by the decision-makers of peacekeeping that the three basic principles of peacekeeping are essential to its success.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study has examined the practices of UN peacekeeping operations during the first decade of the post-Cold War era, focusing primarily on three cases: Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In spite of the initial optimism and eagerness of the international community to tackle the post-Cold War-type intra-state conflicts, the UN and its member states failed in Somalia and Bosnia and the results of the interventions were disastrous. The first research question of this thesis is: *What has brought the UN and states involved in the interventions to the point of outright strategic failure?* It is evident from the case studies of the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia that the failures were mainly caused by the fact that the UN employed peacekeeping techniques within the wrong context. UN peacekeeping is designed to tackle small-scale and less-aggressive armed conflicts in which there is at least a cease-fire or peace agreement, but not suitable for such hostile and intensive war-fighting as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia, which required the massive military operation of peace-enforcement action. Hence, the practices of peacekeeping in both regions clearly prove my hypothesis: *the interventions of the UN and international community could not be successful in these crises because they used peacekeeping techniques as a means of military intervention.*

The practices of peace-enforcement actions by UN peacekeepers in both regions have made many believe that UN peacekeeping operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping. However, the operations there were not evidence of the evolution, but were cases of the misuse of peacekeeping techniques. It is important to properly understand the peacekeeping practices because they could set a crucial precedent for later peacekeeping operations. If we understand them as cases of misuse, such ‘grey zone’ missions would not be repeated any more. However, if they are recognised as a type of newly evolved peacekeeping operation, the UN and international community shall be willing to choose that kind of peacekeeping again whenever they feel it is needed. It should be noted that in the early and mid-1990s UN peacekeeping operations, like a rubber band, had been
stretched beyond their realistic tolerance and capabilities. As they were employed in inappropriate circumstances without proper preparation and support, each mission deteriorated sharply in the regions. Indeed, Ruggie's statement should be kept in mind by decision-makers of peace operations: the 'growing misuse of peacekeeping does more than strain the United Nations materially and institutionally' (p.26).

The prime role of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. For this end, both peaceful means and collective coercive measures are enshrined in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter respectively. Article 41 and 42 of Chapter VII are extremely important because those are the concrete legal basis for the collective security system of the international community to achieve the prime purpose of the UN. The collective security system essentially requires the consent of all the permanent member states of the Security Council. During the Cold War era, on account of the fierce rivalry between the West and the East the security system could not work properly for the maintenance of peace and security. Since the end of the Second World War, decolonisation had caused a lot of ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and humanitarian catastrophes, but the international community and the UN could not easily employ the collective system to deal with those disputes and conflicts due to the political stalemate in the Security Council. UN peacekeeping operations were born in this circumstance.

As is well known, peacekeeping operations are not based on any article of the UN Charter. They have been recognised through the early practices such as UNEF and ONUC; and legal support by General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), Uniting for Peace and the Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case of ICJ. UN peacekeeping falls short of the provision of Chapter VII of the Charter mainly in terms of the enforceability of the use of force. It is also obvious that they go beyond the pacific and diplomatic measures described in Chapter VI. That is why the former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld said that UN peacekeeping might be put in a new Chapter 'Six and a Half' (United Nations 1990: 5). In spite of the absence of a concrete legal base and the limitation of their role and responsibility, the practices of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War years have proved that peacekeeping operations are a very useful instrument for securing peace in troubled
areas. Since the first observer peacekeeping mission, UNTSO in 1948, the UN established 18 peacekeeping bodies during the Cold War era by 1989. Peacekeeping operations have been contingent on mandates from the Security Council, and could therefore be mounted only where there was no objection from the permanent member states of the Security Council. The operations have been successfully conducted in circumstances in which conflicting parties had given their consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a ceasefire had been agreed, that is to say, there was a peace to keep. The success of peacekeeping missions was very dependant on whether peacekeeping forces were trusted by all the parties concerned because the ceasefire agreements that the UN was called upon to police were generally precarious. This in turn required strict impartiality in conducting the missions. The expertise including the three key principles of peacekeeping, impartiality, the consent of parties, the use of force for self-defence only, developed by the UN during the Cold War stands as one of the organisation’s major achievements regarding the key purpose of the UN.

The end of the Cold War has brought enormous changes to the environment of international peace and security. The easing of the East-West confrontation during the Cold War enabled cooperation in the Security Council and provided opportunities to resolve long-standing inter-states conflicts. But, it also has caused the outbreak of other conflicts, giving rise to fierce claims of subnational identity based on ethnicity, religion, culture, and economy, which have often resulted in armed conflict. Responding to the new political landscape, the international community turned to peacekeeping, which grew rapidly in size and scope, especially in the early 1990s. The UN failed to appreciate the nature of the new type of conflict and its own capability in conflict management. Consequently, the peacekeeping missions of the UN in Somalia and Bosnia were unable to achieve their objectives as it sent its peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep.
7.1 The Reflections of the Three Cases

The United Nations and international community got themselves into serious trouble in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. This trouble stems from the fact that they applied a useful tool to inappropriate circumstances. As defined in chapter 2, peacekeeping operations are the interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed UN forces, including police personnel or civilians, in an environment with the consent of all the parties concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a settlement or to impartially buttress a political agreement between them through the means authorised by the Security Council. The elements for success are the three principles: impartiality, the consent of the parties involved, and the use of force for self-defence only. The problem with the Somali and Bosnian missions was that peacekeepers were sent where the principles could not be kept. Then, what caused the misuse of peacekeeping? To answer this second research question, the analytical framework of the structure-agency interrelationship has been employed through the case studies. The structure-agency approach as an analytical framework is very useful to overcome the theoretical limitations of both structuralism and intentionalism. Structure and agency dynamically interact in shaping the course of political events and phenomena. Any type of explanation which employs a position based solely either on structure or on agency possibly faces difficulty in understanding the dynamics of the causality of political events. Hence, examining the relational interactions between structure and agency provides a range of crucial insights into the analysis of the causality.

Any action of an agent is formulated within structural contexts through strategic calculation. A ‘contextualised’ actor within the structure monitors the immediate consequences of its actions. It assesses success or failure of its actions in securing its prior objectives and then strategically learns from the consequences. Through this learning process, an actor formulates their revised actions or reactions, which partially cause direct effects upon the structured contexts producing a partial formation of the structure. Both the misuse of peacekeeping techniques at the strategic level and the operational failures at the field level were the product of
strategic calculation of the actors. These were formulated definitely within the structural contexts of the post-Cold War international order. The structural effect of the Cold War ending on the UN was that the new international humanitarian order of the post-Cold War compelled the UN to do something to tackle the increased armed intra-state conflicts. The UN was definitely under the pressure of the huge expectations of the international community for its active role and enlarged action in the post-Cold War era.

In Somalia, the field commanders of U.S. troops tried to approach their mission to apprehend General Aidid and his assistants very strategically in terms of military tactics but their strategic consideration lacked political analysis of the context of their mission as a peace operation. As Clinton (2004) points out, at that time the UN was not a peacekeeper any more, but a party to the conflict warring against USC/SNA led by General Aidid (p.550). Eventually, the inappropriate use of peacekeeping techniques caused Black Hawk Down, which was a decisive event in the failure of the whole peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Concerning the initial stage of the intervention, *Operation Restore Hope* had some elements of success in terms of securing an environment for humanitarian relief and saving many lives. However, despite this short-term success at the beginning of the intervention the peace operation of the U.S.-led international force under the authority of the UN failed to undertake the harder job of disarming the militia and then eventually ran into the disastrous result of the whole mission in Somalia as Black Hawk Down happened. Albright (2003) testifies to the failure of international cooperation in Somalia as follows:

[...], other nations contributing peacekeepers had followed their own agendas instead of functioning as a team. The Italians had openly disagreed with the UN strategy and were suspected of bringing Aidid’s forces in order to protect their own. The Saudis had said their unique status within Islam prohibited them from engaging in offensive operations. The French had cooperated sometimes, sometimes not. India had provided a brigade but then refused to deploy it to Mogadishu. The Pakistanis had grown understandably gun-shy (p.146).
This failure to cooperate effectively in the operation was fundamentally caused by the fact that the UN peacekeepers had to conduct a dangerous peace-enforcement mission, not a traditional ‘peacekeeping’ mission. The Somali intervention is an explicit case showing how a peace-enforcement mandate without proper military preparation and political willingness within a peacekeeping context seriously spoils the efficacy and effectiveness of multilateral peacekeeping operations. Albright (2003) says in her autobiography that ‘we had to turn the lesson of Somalia into a positive one. Our defeat there didn’t mean we should never get involved; it meant we needed to be better prepared (p.157).’

The UN peacekeepers deployed in the former Yugoslavia could not prevent the ethnic cleansings and even failed to defend UN-designated ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs seized UN peacekeepers and used them as a ‘human shield’ against further attacks from NATO. The Bosnian crisis was almost a war waged by well-disciplined and heavily-armed forces, differing from other regional conflicts in which the UN had intervened. The key point is that in Bosnia, there was no peace to keep. Thus, it was impossible for the usual UN peacekeeping forces in terms of mandate and facilities to cope with the conflict. They lacked adequate support from the UN for massive fighting with the mighty warring parties and some of them lacked even essential training for their mission. The decision-makers of the UN mission send the wrong type of troops to Bosnia.

The other reason for the failure in both regions was the absence of the unified and efficient command and control system in the operational-level headquarters. It was primarily caused by the fact that most of the member states who contributed did not want to give up control of their troops. A GAO report on the limitations of the UN in using force states that:

[...], the United Nations cannot ensure that troops and resources will be provided to carry out and reinforce operations as necessary, especially since such operations are risky and nations volunteering troops and arms may not have a national interest in the operation (U.S. GAO, March 1997: 4).

It seems obvious that the Clinton administration believed that in order to encourage U.S. national interests whenever and wherever they wanted to, it was critical to
retain U.S. forces under the president’s command authority. In *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: 1995-1996*, he clearly states as follows:

In order to maximize the benefits of UN peace operations, the United States must take highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in them. [...] Far from handing a blank check to the UN, [...] [it is required] to undertake a rigorous analysis of requirements and capabilities before voting to support or participate in peace operations. The United States has not hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to ensure that the UN authorizes only those peace operations that meet these standards.

 [...] On those occasions when we consider contributing U.S. forces to a UN peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces. [...] The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times when it is in our interest to place U.S. troops under the temporary operational control of a component UN or allied commander. [...] under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces (Clinton 1995: 69-72).

Many point out that Boutros-Ghali was mainly responsible for the wrong decision-making leading to the misuses. It is widely accepted that he was known to have great hope for a fundamental restructuring of UN peace operations. However, my findings throughout elite interviews show that he was less enthusiastic than it has been perceived about calling for a new and active role for the UN and rather had different and specific views on the actual cases. It seems right that he had ideas in general for the expanded roles and responsibilities, but he was actually not enthusiastic for the expansion rather reluctant in some cases. His *An Agenda for Peace* was just a reflection of the expectations and demands of UN member states for the UN’s active role in the post-Cold War era. The growing misuses of peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era were caused by member states of the international community, especially the major Western countries, rather than the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali or the United Nations.

The Kosovo intervention is a useful case because it provides a good contrast to the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. In comparison with the other two
cases, the Kosovo intervention was relatively successful in putting an end to the crisis. This success was enabled by the fact that NATO played a major role in the conflict resolution and the UN stepped aside from the front line. NATO is an organisation suited to such military intervention in Kosovo, but the UN is not. As a military body, NATO has C3I capabilities, well-disciplined troops, and facilities. However, the UN does not have the military components to make it able to conduct a war like the one in Kosovo. This is also the reason that the UN could not be successful in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. UN forces as peacekeepers were made up of national forces contributed by member states when they were required to be deployed. They cannot conduct operations which are nearly war-fighting due to the lack of a unified command and control structure, proper and sustainable logistic support, and political willingness.

The other lesson learned from the Kosovo case regards the use of air power. Unlike in Bosnia, the decision-makers of the intervention in Kosovo could easily decide to use an air strike because there were few UN peacekeeping troops in the field. As mentioned in the Srebrenica report by Kofi Annan, the safety of peacekeepers was a serious concern for the UN feared Serb reprisals against its peacekeepers as experienced in the hostage crisis of May-June 1995 in Bosnia (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: paragraph 482). As many point out, it was not the use of air power that put an end to the Kosovo crisis, but the political will of the states involved to resolve the crisis. It is clear that the use of air power without the support of ground troops has a limited effect in peace operations. But, this kind of intervention seems very attractive to states contributing to peace operations because the use of air power only is obviously able to reduce the risk of casualties among their solders. It is a key issue, which is a deep concern of states when they decide to be involved in peace operations. Black Hawk Down in Somalia clearly showed us that a high number of casualties makes a peace operation unable to be sustained. Therefore, in order to successfully complete peace missions the UN or states involved should reduce the risk of casualties. The only possible way to do that is that they selectively send their peacekeepers where there is peace to keep and to adhere to the three principles of peacekeeping operations.
7.2 Lessons for Future Peacekeeping Operations

The increase of intra-state conflicts or ethnic strife in the early post-Cold War era may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely does not mean that the role of UN peacekeeping will be gradually reduced in the future. Rather, the UN seems to be more actively used by its member states to conduct multidimensional missions within the complex operational context. As Hannay (1996) points out, the UN does have the limited liberty of choice in making their decisions and conducting actions. Thus, 'the UN cannot really avoid being used by its members, whether it likes the use or not' (p.11). Unfortunately, it is true that the capabilities of the UN system to shoulder a burgeoning number of security missions do not reach the required level. At present, the system is staggering at nearly full capacity. In addition to traditional peacekeeping missions, the UN has many difficult tasks to deal with such as disarmament and arms control in war-torn areas and post-conflict peace-building. Thus, what is essential for the future of peacekeeping operations is to improve their effectiveness and efficacy, and to use the techniques properly in appropriate circumstances.

UN peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and allowed to shoot only in self-defence situations. As we know, peacekeeping does not have any constitutional basis in the UN Charter, thus UN peacekeeping troops have been sent with the mandate of the authority of the Security Council and only sent with the consent of parties concerned. Ruggie (1993) points out that unlike combat units of regular forces of states, 'peacekeeping forces are not designed to create the conditions for their own success on the ground; those conditions must pre-exist for them to be able to perform their role'. Although peacekeeping troops are military personnel and carry arms, their role is fundamentally in non-military mission. Therefore, the effectiveness of field units of peacekeeping forces and the adequacy of UN headquarters' capabilities for the operations were not major issues of concern in the past (p.28). However, the changed environment of the post-Cold
War international order requires the UN to increase the effectiveness and efficacy of their field armed missions. Unlike NATO, the UN is just an intergovernmental political body not a military alliance, which has an institutionalised military enforcement capability. Accordingly, it seems very difficult for the UN to conscript troops and arms from its member states to conduct large-scale military enforcement operations. In the future, a huge multilateral contingent for enforcement actions or war-fighting, such as UN forces in the Korean War, will probably not be possible.

With regard to minimising the inefficiency experienced in past operations and improving the effectiveness of its activities in peace operations, various options have been suggested over the years. One of the plausible options is the creation of standing UN armed forces like the Rapid Reaction Forces. The idea of a standing United Nations force is not new. There has been much talk about the formation of a UN army. Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, made suggestions to this effect as early as 1948. They have been made on numerous occasions since. In 1990 member states were requested to indicate what military personnel they were, in principle, prepared to make available for United Nations service. In An Agenda for Peace of June 1992, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that:

[...] Stand-by arrangements should be confirmed, as appropriate, through exchanges of letters between the Secretariat and Member States concerning the kind and number of skilled personnel they will be prepared to offer the United Nations as the needs of new operations arise (Boutros-Ghali 1992: paragraph 51).

In his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of January 1995, the Secretary-General took this further to propose the formation of a ‘rapid reaction force’, which would be under his ‘executive direction and command’, and which would act as the Security Council’s ‘strategic reserve’ for emergency intervention in crises (Boutros-Ghali 1995: paragraph 38). Studies to this effect have since been undertaken by a number of UN member states and scholars. In all cases these studies have come up against the realities of consensus and jurisdiction as outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The hindrances to a standing UN force exposed through the studies and the past experience of the UN are the various opinions that
member states have on the idea in relation to many issues such as the force's jurisdiction, rules of engagement, budget, and so on. Moreover, they would not want to give up control of their troops and place them under the UN's authority. As Gray (2000) notes, there are many 'serious practical problems with the quality and training of troops, their equipment, and with speed of deployment (p.198). Therefore, it is very difficult to make the states compromise and reach a consensus on it. In this sense, although the idea of the creation of a UN army is a very attractive option for tackling the existing problems of UN peace operations, it would not seem to be feasible in the near future.

Instead of a standing UN army, Boutros-Ghali established a peacekeeping operations 'standby arrangement system' in 1994 to enhance the UN's capacity to set up a new operation quickly and efficiently. Under this system, some 70 member states have undertaken to provide, in principle, a total of some 100,000 personnel to future peacekeeping operations (United Nations 1996a: 7-8). However, contribution to these operations is entirely voluntary and even those member states that participate in the standby system decide on a case-by-case basis whether and what to contribute to a specific future operation. The first test case of the system, that of organising an enlarged operation for Rwanda in 1994, failed when all member states that had registered their willingness declined the Secretary-General's request for troops. In sum, the UN Secretariat has restricted authority over its peacekeeping operations because the assets and budget required for the operations come from its member states and there is no guarantee that member states will comply.

The key motive, which determines whether member states will contribute troops to peacekeeping situations where there is a significant risk of casualties, is the political willingness based on the strategic calculation of their national interests. As the Kosovo intervention clearly showed, using regional and/or military organisations for peace operations is one of the most effective measures to summon the political willingness of states concerned because the member states of a regional organisation usually have strong interests in the troubled areas within their region. Like Kosovo, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'s intervention in Liberia in late 1990 was also a good example of the
military involvement' of regional organization. ECOWAS established the ceasefire-monitoring group (ECOMOG) to restore peace and security in Liberia. The actions of the ECOMOG force were widely regarded as a successful military peace operation in terms of regional resolution of intra-state conflicts.

To conclude, the early 1990s were a time of experimenting and learning hard lessons about the potential and limits of UN peacekeeping operations. One of the most basic lessons taught by the experiences of the international community in Somalia and Bosnia was that an inappropriate use of peacekeeping techniques with the lack of strategic consideration of the conflicts would cause more disastrous results. In contrast, the intervention in Kosovo tells us that we already have various options to effectively tackle a crisis in the post-Cold War era, such as using regional and/or military organisations for peace operations. Each conflict had its own unique aspects normally with a blend of history, religion, economy, and politics. The overriding lesson was clear. The international community has a responsibility to help societies endangered by natural or human-caused catastrophe. An important point is that the means to help them should be thoroughly considered in its preparation and properly employed. This will promote the peace and security of the international community and eventually encourage the national interests of each state as well. In this sense, it is worthwhile to mention Albright's statement:

I acknowledged the UN's flaws but argued that many were correctable and in the process of being corrected – a process it was in America's interests to encourage. The more effective the UN was, the more it could help us by sharing the costs, risks, and responsibilities of promoting peace. If we did not back the UN sufficiently, it would not succeed. And when the UN didn't succeed, we all paid a price. We had seen that in Somalia and Rwanda. And from my first days in New York, we had seen it in Bosnia as well (Albright 2003: 176).

Peacekeeping techniques stand out as one of the UN's most remarkable creations and ambitious undertakings in its effort to maintain international peace and security. It is an inspired innovation in terms of conflict resolution. The Blue Helmets with the UN symbol will continue to break new grounds as the international community is required not only to control conflicts and alleviate the suffering they cause, but
also to prevent the outbreak of civil wars among nations and to build towards enduring peace. What is essential for successful peacekeeping is to develop a comprehensive and robust framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War era and to appropriately use peacekeeping within the framework. The UN has been heavily used by its member states and will be in the future. As Hannay (1996) notes, if the UN were to take a minimal role in military actions, it would be likely to be sharply criticised by its member states. However, the UN would be also criticised for failing to do rightly what it is required to do and for problems exposed in the course of its performance. Hannay (1996) says that:

Did the League of Nations damage itself more by what it did not do over Manchuria or by what it tried and failed to do over Abyssinia? It is sadly the case that the UN cannot really avoid being used by it members, whether it likes the use or not. The tendency to treat it as a scapegoat when things go wrong, therefore, must be condemned for the damage it does to the long term usefulness of an instrument we will no doubt wish to use again effectively in the future (p.11).

The lessons of the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia need to be learned. The UN could surely improve its performance in future peace operations if it carefully analyses the nature of conflicts and the national interests of states concerned; properly employs its measures according to crises; and shares the burden of intervention with regional and/or military organisations.
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Interviews

16 October 2006 / His private office in London / 2:30 – 3:25 PM

24 April 2006 / His office in the House of Lords in London / 11:40 AM – 12:15 PM

Mr. Salman Ahmed – Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations).
21 April 2005 / Room S-3726, UN Headquarters in New York / 3:00 – 3:20 PM

Mr. Frederick Mallya – Coordination Officer at Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations).
22 April 2005 / Room S-3035H, UN Headquarters in New York / 11:20 AM – 12:00 PM
Methodological Appendix: Research trip to the United States for elite interviewing and archival work

Introduction

For my research fieldwork I visited the United States, specifically New York, in which the UN headquarters is located, and Washington D.C. for two months from 1 March to 3 May 2005. The main purpose of the trip was to interview UN and/or U.S. government officials and collect documents relevant to my research topic: UN peacekeeping operations. This appendix gives a full detail of the work undertaken and illuminating research lessons I have learned from it.

This appendix is divided into three parts. In the first section I discuss some preliminary points I considered in the course of preparing for the trip. As we well know, advance preparation is extremely important because it saves researchers time and money by eliminating unexpected time-consuming problems and expenses to the research budget. In this sense it was needed in order to get clear answers to what I am looking for. Regarding this, I examine my preparation for the trip in the section.

The second section looks at how I conducted elite interviewing with UN officials. As a valuable qualitative research method interview consists of the component parts of the process as follows: ‘identifying interviewees and securing interviews; determining interview content; conducting interview; and recording and writing up the data gathered’ (Stedward 1997: 151). In terms of elite interviewing identifying potential interviewees, gaining access to elites, and securing interviews were the most difficult work in my interview experience.

Documentation is a veritable treasure trove for researchers. Using documents as sources of research data, however, has several disadvantages. According to Johnson el al. (2001), document analysis has five limitations: the selective survival of records, the incompleteness of collections, the problem of bias, accessibility in terms of confidentiality, and lack of a standard format (pp. 265-6).
In my archival work I faced one of these problems: accessibility in terms of confidentiality. This is explained in detail in the last section.

**Preparing for fieldwork**

Before starting specific preparation it is necessary to get a clear idea about what I am looking for throughout a research trip. This requires identifying the research topic, specifying the time period and country or countries, listing key words for what I will do, and specifying language. At the preliminary stage of a research trip, thus, researchers should consider the following two key points: where to go and what to do there.

My supervisor suggested I have a trip to the U.S., as a fieldwork place, specifically New York where the UN headquarters is located. The primary purpose of a research trip is to collect the empirical qualitative and/or quantitative data required. The question, therefore, where to go, definitely refers to this question: ‘where is the data?’ Research fieldwork should be conducted where what researchers seek to obtain exists. New York and additionally Washington D.C. fully contain what I needed for my research, such as UN and U.S. government officials with plenty of knowledge about and experience of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, which are my research cases, and an enormous amount of relevant documentation in archives and libraries. It was definitely the right choice for me to visit New York and Washington D.C. as places of fieldwork.

Regarding what to do in a research trip, researchers should get a clear idea about the methodological strategy and relevant methods first. My research uses qualitative methods. I have settled on individual interview, specifically elite interview, and document collection and analysis. Whatever my method is, I will need to justify it and show that I have thought through the practical and analytical issues involved in my choice. The next two sections provide an explanation of the choice.
Elite interviewing

Interview is a useful tool for obtaining necessary data and thus a preferred method of social science as it allows researchers to probe deeply into issues and affords evidence of originality of the discovery of new facts. My interview strategy was semi-structured elite interviewing. As Johnson et al. (2001) pointed out, elite interviewing requires a great deal of preliminary preparation, the ability to gain access to potential interviewees, and interpersonal skill (p.276). Researchers should be ready well in advance of the actual interview. The Research Methods course I took before commencing my research was greatly helpful for conducting the interviews, especially the Qualitative Methods module, which gave me a chance to practise focused and individual interviews. Through the experience, I acquired practical knowledge of interviewing, such as how to prepare, how to secure, and how to conduct interview. In this sense experiencing interviewing may be required for students hoping to read for a PhD degree.

Elite interviewing is difficult work. According to Dexter (1970), a member of the elite is anyone 'who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, nonstandardized treatment' (p.5, cited in Johnson et al. (2001): 272). Regarding the 'special and not-standardized treatment', one of the greatest difficulties is accessibility. It is extremely difficult to access to the elite because they often have 'gatekeepers' who limits access to them. In this sense making a phone call or sending a letter to request an interview is less effective because most of them will be filtered by the secretaries of the elite. My strategy was emailing at the initial stage of the request. These days most people at least have an email account. Sending emails created an opportunity to expose my request to potential interviewees. It does not, however, mean that emailing is the easiest way to arrange an interview. For example, to obtain potential interviewees' contact details and facilitate contact with them, I emailed more than twenty people, who would or could help me. Many of them did not respond to my emails. The golden rule is this: do not give up. Sometimes I emailed a person three times to extract a response. Keeping on emailing requires perseverance but is not always stressful. In the
course of doing that you can get unexpected help. I emailed some academics to request an interview. Professor Michael Doyle at Columbia University, one of the people whom I emailed, replied giving advice and recommending some of his articles related to my research topic.

Another point to consider is who to contact first, that is to say, subordinates first or superiors first. My answer was superiors first and the result was successful. At the beginning of securing interviews with UN officials, I wished to interview Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who is the top man in UN peacekeeping. It was almost impossible to contact him. My alternative was to interview Ms Donna Marie Chiurazzi-Maxfield, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General. After I emailed twice, she replied to my emails and suggested another Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General and the Chief of Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit of the DPKO, Mr David Harland. Harland suggested a Coordination Officer in the Unit, who is his subordinate. In the course of facilitating contact with the suggested interviewees I received great help from Ms Chiurazzi-Maxfield. Finally, I succeeded in interviewing Mr Salman Ahmed, the Special Assistant, and Mr Frederick Mallya, Coordination Officer. I have attached the details of the interviews and interviewees before this appendix.

The other point, which interviewers should deeply consider, is how to interview. Because both of the interviewees were extremely busy I had to limit the interviews to around 30 minutes. I interviewed Ahmed for 20 minutes and Mallya for 40 minutes. The interview questions were carefully selected by eliminating questions that can be answered elsewhere. Johnson et al. (2001) point out that ‘a good rapport between the researcher and interviewee facilitates the flow of information’ (p.275). For this I fairly and very shortly explained the interviews at the beginning, such as the purpose and duration of the interview and the number of questions. Also, I never dominated the conversation in the interviews and tried to maintain good eye contact with the interviewees.

It is very important to write up interviews in a more complete form soon after the interview, while it is still fresh in the interviewer’s mind. An alternative means to record an interview is using a tape or electronic recorder. I recorded my
interviews. Using this kind of equipment is very useful because the interviewer can concentrate on the interview and it allows extra time to quickly change the original order of questioning if necessary or raise new questions to respond to an interviewee’s unexpected answers. Recording may make interviewees uncomfortable because after the interview there can be no denying what is recorded or conversely more comfortable as it may give a chance to check what they said in the course of the interview and correct it if they want. Interviewers, thus, need to get permission in advance. Finally, good preparation buoys the confidence of novice interviewers like me when interviewing important people. I separately prepared a question list as a handout for the interviewees and my question sheet, which was supplemented by some keynotes. I, then, had a mock-up interview several times.

Archival work: acquiring documents as sources of data

At the beginning of the archival work my first choice was the National Archives, which is the main facility of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The archives are divided into two buildings: one is located on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C and the other is at College Park in Maryland. NARA runs a free shuttle service every hour between the buildings in College Park and downtown Washington, for the use of visitors on a space-available basis. When researchers come to the archive facilities to look at records, they are required to show ‘a researcher identification card’. To obtain the card an applicant must show official identification such as a driver’s license or passport that includes a photograph. Additionally, they are also required to show proof of their address. After completing a short form and viewing a short PowerPoint orientation explaining how to handle records and the most basic research procedures and rules, the card is immediately issued.

Though researchers can access the online catalogue of the National Archives’ website (http://www.archives.gov), it does not seem easy to find the
location of records which researchers want to look at. One of the best solutions is consulting with the staff of the archive. The NARA staff whom I met was qualified and ready to assist me in the navigation of relevant indexes. The hindrance I faced was accessibility to the documents I wished to look at in terms of confidentiality. What I was looking for in the archives were diplomatic or internal documents concerning UN peacekeeping produced by the White House and the Department of State under the Clinton Administration. Unfortunately, the archives do not have any documentation related to the Clinton Administration’s foreign policies because according to the archive staff the U.S. government still holds the documentation. Most of the documents may be classified by the federal government until legal action has ceased, the political actors involved have passed away, or the consideration of the sensitivity of the information in terms of U.S. national interests has perished. Executive Order 12958 (April 17, 1995) of the U.S. federal government on classified national security information clearly prescribes that ‘information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision’ and the duration of classification can be extended up to 25 years if the original classification authority of the information determines the extension (NARA 2005). I expected some internal documents of the Clinton Administration produced before 1995 to be available because 10 years had already passed. As an alternative way to access the documents they suggested the library of the Clinton Presidential Center in Little Rock, Arkansas and its website (http://www.Clintonlibrary.gov). Because the library has uploaded a limited number of selected sources online, the best way was to visit the library and conduct off-line research. Although I could not visit the library due to the limits of budget and time, it was a useful lesson that consulting archive staff is important in terms of the efficient navigation of sources which I want to consult and in coming up with alternative ways to access them if they are unavailable in an archive.

The library of Congress was the main archive I consulted. In the library I collected many useful primary and secondary sources. Regarding my research topic and the limits of other libraries’ collections it was the best place for my archival
research. For example, I discovered the U.S. General Accounting Office* Reports to Congressional Committee on peacekeeping or peace operations by the U.S. government, which do not exist in the catalogue of other libraries in Britain. The office is an investigative agency of the U.S. Congress. Congress asks the office to evaluate federal programmes, audit federal expenditures, and issue legal opinion. It advises Congress and the heads of executive agencies of the federal government, such as the Department of State. This means that reports by the office directly reflect the U.S. government’s position on the issues investigated. The office produced dozens of reports related to UN PKO or U.S. peace operations. I picked out eleven reports among them, such as ‘United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace’ (GAO/NSIAD-97-34) and ‘United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations’ (GAO/NSIAD-92-247). The GAO reports I collected may provide crucial evidence supporting the arguments in my PhD thesis.

In New York, I wished to consult the UN Dag Hammarskjöld library. It is, however, a library designated to serve UN Secretariat staff and the staff of Permanent Missions to the UN. Though it is not open to the public, it provides online access to the UN’s official documentation collection through tools, such as the UN Documents Research Guide, the UN Info Quest (UN-I-Que), and UNBISnet. Its online collection has an enormous amount of documents, thus it is necessary to consult a librarian to track down the documents required. A Help Line has been set up to serve this need of external researchers. I consulted with a librarian through the Help Line and found some useful documents, such as the Declaration for the Security Council Summit meeting at the level of Heads of States and Government on 31 January 1992. Most of major UN document series like Security Council Resolutions are available with the full text from the UN’s Official Document System. Some documents that are not available on the Official Document System of the library may be published through the UN Department of

* From 7 July 2004, the GAO’s legal name became ‘the Government Accountability Office’. Some reports of the office produced before the date still hold the original name, ‘General Accounting Office’ report.
Public Information. I obtained some valuable primary sources, such as *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, through the UN Sales service.

**Conclusion**

The research trip was a very useful experience for my research. Through the trip I collected valuable documents and empirical data from the elite interviewing. Additionally, the experience has taught me several lessons with regard to research methodology.

First, the most important thing in the methodological process is preliminary preparation. First of all, researchers should get a clear idea about what they are looking for and how to find out what they want. Advance experience in research methods chosen and background preparation about potential interviewees and archives to consult are also essential for satisfactory results of research fieldwork.

Second, the methods for data collection should be selected by a deep consideration of how to fit a researcher’s purposes and the availability of the data required. As to my fieldwork elite interviewing was the most useful means to obtain what I needed for my thesis. The UN personnel I interviewed are one of the top members of the decision-making process for UN peacekeeping operations or a key person in the unit for evaluating previous PKO missions and policing new missions. They are full of knowledge of peacekeeping operations and experience in previous missions including my research cases. Their answers to my interview questions, thus, were longer and deeper than what I had expected and I got more data than I needed.

Third, keeping records and taking notes are definitely helpful in avoiding derailment from the track of a researcher’s research process. Conducting interviews and archival work in a limited time mostly requires multitasking. In this process, it is very possible for researchers to lose their research position and targets. The records and notes will help a researcher to escape from practical confusion in research fieldwork.
Fourth, research is not always solely conducted by a researcher themselves. Help from supervisors, colleagues, and other assistants around researchers will increase the efficiency of navigating the data required and the reliability of their research. My experience suggests that consulting with a supervisor is vital at the initial stage of the preparation and in the course of fieldwork it is recommended to assertively seek help from archival staff, librarians or any other people who can support the fieldwork.

Finally, what is most required to succeed in research fieldwork is not only proficiency in specific methodological techniques or project management skills, but also more importantly ‘sensitivity to the research attitude’, such as patience and determination (Gorry 1997: 23). Fieldwork is definitely not an easy job. In most cases it takes a long time and many problems come about during fieldwork. Perseverance, thus, is definitely required for satisfactory achievements.