THE COVERAGE OF THE INTIFADA
IN THE UK ARAB DAILY PRESS

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
Abstract

This thesis presents the results of an examination of the coverage of the Palestinian uprising, the Intifada, by the expatriate Arab newspapers in Britain. The study breaks new ground in two respects. First it examines the performance of the expatriate Arab press, to which almost no scholarly research or analysis has so far been devoted. Second, it provides data on media responses to the Intifada, which the scholarly literature has also tended to ignore, particularly regarding Arab media.

The thesis employed two methods: content analysis (both quantitative and qualitative) and interviews with a number of the papers' editors and personnel. These methods were believed to be proper for providing the required data for examining the papers' attitudes towards the Intifada, either by assessing the major articles and news items or the photographs and cartoons which illustrated the Palestinian uprising.

Our examination of the papers coverage of the Intifada showed that they all allocated an extensive and a regular coverage to the Intifada news, as well as their regular comments and analysis on its developments. They, however, relied primarily on the news from within the Occupied Territories on wire services rather than their own correspondents.

The papers expressed an unlimited support for the Palestinian struggle, directing their accusation towards Israel. Moreover, they criticised the overall Arab reaction to the Intifada, but showed a satisfaction with the responses of their owners' home countries. The papers were critical to the reaction of the Western countries, particularly the USA and the role played by the UN and its failure in dealing with the Israeli harsh measures in the Occupied Territories and called for practical UN resolutions to put an end to the Israeli oppression. The British reaction to the Intifada was, however, viewed by the papers satisfactorily.

As far as the peace process was concerned, the expatriate dailies typically called for a peaceful solution to put an end to the conflict, and they all blamed Israel for the stalemate in the peace process. They supported the PLO's peace policy of reconciliation and compromise and backed the Arab proposed international peace conference.

In conclusion, the expatriate Arab press generally took a very firm stand towards the Intifada, offering both sympathy and support to the Palestinians, and criticising other parties involved, but at the same time typically showing their support so far as the peace process is concerned, which no doubt reflects their moderate line regarding the conflict as a whole.
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Dedication

To the soul of my father Abdel-Fattah,
   to my mother Fatimah,
   to my wife Basmah,
   and to my children Albara, Anas, and Ehab.
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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction

The significance of communication has become well known to politicians, intellectuals and a vast sector of the masses. The important role played by the press, and indeed all of the mass media in this respect, has become evident in all aspects of human life. Coverage of events by the media makes the public aware of what is taking place in their daily life and increases their involvement in the political, social, and other facets of life. Moreover, the more events and occurrences are covered and highlighted by the mass media, the more prominent those events become in people's lives, since the coverage by the mass media of a certain issue is a major factor in promoting this issue and placing it at the forefront of people's daily concerns, as it is "the manner of journalistic coverage [which] helps determine the public perception of the importance of an event" (Nir, 1992: 48). According to Fowler (1991: 13), "News is not simply what happens, but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy."

The press in particular plays a vital role in the field of mass communication. It is the handy medium from which the readership can obtain daily news, information, and entertainment. The quality press, which addresses a relatively more educated readership (in comparison with the readership of the tabloids), maintains a high quality of coverage and analysis. The quality press is important because it tends "to deal with the news more seriously, to stress political and economic affairs, the serious side of social problems, and scientific developments" (Merrill, 1968: 27). It is read and considered seriously by the élite in society, including politicians, and therefore has an impact on the process of decision-making.

1.2. The subject of the study

The press not only operates for the purposes of providing news and information, and as a profitable business. It also aims to influence public opinion and seeks to make changes in attitudes prevalent in society. However, such influence would be more likely to occur when a certain important issue is covered by particularly important
newspapers. Furthermore, the way that issue is perceived and thus covered and presented by the different papers defines to a large extent how those papers' different audiences view it. In other words, each newspaper shapes an issue through its coverage and presentation. This happens not only by the selection of certain events of that issue, highlighting specific events in the headline and presenting them on the front page with an impressive picture, but also in the in-depth coverage, comments, and analysis, which reflect the way the daily paper perceives that issue.

In this study, the coverage of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) by the expatriate Arab newspapers in the UK has been examined. For some time the Intifada captured the attention of the world, and much has been written about its causes, aims, and political, economic, and social impact on Israel and the Palestinians. However, there has been little examination of the important aspect of the media coverage of the Intifada. The international (including Arab) media attention given to the Intifada was to a certain extent an important factor in sustaining and bolstering the Palestinians' belief in its legitimacy and thus it made possible its continuation. The absence of any examination of the coverage of the Intifada in the media is a serious gap in its assessment and is the main reason for conducting this study.

The importance of this study derives from the significance of the Intifada and the expatriate Arab press. On the one hand, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was generally considered a most significant development in the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict, for it had major international implications and drew extensive international media coverage. On the other hand, the expatriate Arab press in the UK is of considerable interest and significance both in itself and in its relationship to the Intifada. For various historical reasons, Britain has a flourishing Arab-language press serving the expatriate Arab and Islamic communities as well as providing a major source of information and a forum for strands of opinion within the Arab world alternative to those of the national presses of Arab countries. It is not tied
by government restrictions, regulations, or censorship, although financial, and to some extent political, pressures do affect certain newspapers to a varying extent. The UK Arab press is nevertheless produced in a free environment and it is in a better position to objectively cover the Intifada. The expatriate Arab press in the UK is an interesting and peculiar phenomenon which contributes to this study an additional significance.

1.3. The objectives of the study

The aim of the study is to establish the attitude(s) of the expatriate Arab dailies towards the Palestinian uprising by examining and evaluating all the relevant material published in the issues scanned. In addition, it assesses and highlights the similarities and differences between their respective coverage and attitudes.

More specifically, this study attempts to answer the following questions:
- How was the Intifada, as a major Arab concern, in its various aspects, viewed by the expatriate Arab dailies?
- What were the attitudes of the newspapers toward the Palestinian, the Israelis, the Arab countries, the Western countries, the UN, and the peace process?
- What were the similarities and differences between the newspapers in their treatment of the Intifada?
- What were the images and depictions of the different characters and events of the Intifada in those dailies?
- And, how far did the factors of ownership and the place of publication (Britain) affect the judgement of the expatriate papers of the Intifada?

1.4. Methodology

The research coverage concerning the expatriate Arab daily press has examined the five dailies which are currently published in Britain: Al-Arab, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Ahram International, Al-Hayat, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. However, three Arab dailies - Al-Qabas (Kuwaiti owned), Al-Ahdath (pro-Iran), and Ath-Thawrah
International (Iraqi owned) - ceased publication during the Gulf crisis and have not been examined, partly because they do not exist in Britain any more and because there is no known collection of copies in the UK (Al-Ahdath used to be published irregularly during the period concerned).

An English-language newspaper, The Guardian, has also been examined for the purpose of cross reference. The Guardian has been selected for the following reasons:
(a) It has traditionally provided a more extensive and regular coverage of overseas news and developments than other comparable British papers, with the exception of The Times in an earlier period.
(b) It tends to be the traditional choice for expatriates in Britain, particularly those of a journalistic, academic, or intellectual background.
(c) It is regarded as being particularly independent, relative to the pro- and anti-Israel, or pro- and anti-Arab lobbies within British politics.
(d) It is one of the central and influential British 'papers of opinion', and is generally regarded as a typical representative of the British quality press and its traditions.

Since very little secondary literature was found on the expatriate Arab press and the coverage of the Intifada in the media, the researcher sought two main empirical methods for conducting this study: (a) interviews, and (b) content analysis.

(a) Interviews
Interviews can be a direct and efficient method of gathering certain types of information. They are also a necessary technique for the purpose of this study since only a little amount of data for several aspects of the expatriate Arab dailies in the UK has so far become available. Questionnaires can also efficiently elicit some of the type of information for which the interview method was employed, particularly in the first round. However, experience has shown that journalists and editors in general, and Arab editors in particular, were typically unable or unwilling to give the time required
for filling in questionnaires. The principal first-round interviewing method performed was that of the *structured interview*, based on a previously submitted questionnaire. Although there are well-known dangers in the interview technique, principally that the interviewee (the editor) would do his best to present the positive and cover up the negative aspects, experience did nevertheless show that the editors of the newspapers were willing to talk in an open and frank manner.

Two rounds of interviews were conducted and form the basis of the study as far as the interview method was concerned. A first round of interviews was held with the editors of four newspapers (one editor was not at that time available for interviewing since he was outside the UK most of the time) and was designed to obtain general information concerning the newspapers themselves, their funding, affiliations, and general policy. The interviews were held at the offices of the editors in London. These interviews helped to formulate the content analysis structure as well as to provide basic background information.

A second round of interviews was conducted after the completion of the content analysis and was designed to follow up issues arising from it. In this round the editors of three newspapers (*Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, *Al-Arab*, and *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*) and a number of relevant members of the staff of the newspapers were interviewed.

(b) Content analysis

According to Holsti, "Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969: 14). It "is used most frequently to describe the attribute of messages, without references to either the intentions (encoding process) of the sender or the effect of the message upon those to whom it is directed (decoding process)" (Holsti, 1969:27). In brief, "Content analysis usually focuses on the substance (the "what?" question) of
messages. It has also been used to analyse style (the "how?" question)" (Holsti, 1969: 59).

The sample period of publication for studying the coverage of the Intifada in the chosen newspapers was four periods of two months each, 1 December to 31 January, for the first four years of the Intifada (a total of eight months between 1987 and 1991).

The choice of the dates for the sample eight-week period was made because the media coverage of the Intifada was at its highest in its first two months, December 1987 - January 1988, and with ongoing anniversaries of it the same periods provide an appropriate framework for studying how the coverage developed or changed over the four years of the Intifada. In this way it would be possible to determine trends and see whether there have been significant changes in the papers' attitudes about the Intifada.

The four-year overall period has also allowed (a) the inclusion in the study of two important new papers that were not established at the very start of the Intifada: Al-Hayat, which was founded in 1988, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which began to appear in 1989; and (b) an examination of the coverage of the Intifada in the light of major world developments affecting the region, particularly the Gulf crisis.

The content scanning took place in the offices of the Arab newspapers in London, except for Al-Ahram International, which was analysed in the Library of the University of Durham.

Primarily, the pages examined of each newspaper were: front, Arab affairs, investigative reports, opinion, finance, and editorial pages. The types of material examined were: news stories, investigative reports, opinion articles, and columns,
editorial comments, photographs, and cartoons. The total number of items analysed in the five newspapers was 4,202, in addition to 182 items in The Guardian.

The content analysis was conducted in two forms:

- Quantitative content analysis. A basic quantitative analysis was made of the extent of coverage in terms of the number of items, size, the topics covered, item type (i.e. whether news stories, investigative reports, interviews, opinion articles and columns, or editorial comments), the source of the news, and the use of additional photographs and cartoons.

- Qualitative content analysis. This method was used to assess the nature of each paper's coverage. Their attitudes in handling the different aspects of the Intifada, which became apparent through the interviews with their editors, were an aid in this kind of analysis. Moreover, by qualitatively analysing the papers' coverage, it was possible to assess the delicate differences between them towards this particular issue (the Intifada).

Both methods, quantitative and qualitative analysis, were designed to supplement each other and cover the different aspects of the coverage of the Intifada.

Additionally, the image of the Intifada was examined by qualitatively analysing the photographs and cartoons relating to the Intifada provided by the newspapers, an important part of the papers' treatment and presentation of the Intifada.

1.5. Difficulties in data gathering

Owing to the extremely busy timetables of the editors, the appointments were not easily fixed and even, when they were fixed, the editors were not able to spend a long time with the researcher. Therefore, it was essential for the researcher to concentrate
on the most important points and this has consequently affected some aspects of the study.

As far as the content analysis was concerned, a major difficulty faced the researcher in that most newspapers kept the old issues in bound volumes (and not on microfilm). Therefore, photocopying was extremely difficult. In fact, only *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*, which keeps its issues on microfilm, and *Al-Arab* permitted photocopying. *The Guardian* was easily accessible since it is available on microfilm in the University of Leeds.

Another problem was that copies of *Al-Ahram International* were not available at its office in London. Therefore, the researcher had to travel to the Library of the University of Durham, where the newspaper is available, in order to analyse the paper's coverage of the Intifada.

As a consequence of these problems, the analysis consumed much more time than had been planned.

1.6. The framework of the study

**Chapter One: Introduction**

This chapter is intended to state the problem of the study and to highlight its objectives.

The chapter also includes a description of the methodologies employed. It discusses the way the sample was chosen, how it has been examined, and the framework of the study.

**Chapter Two: The Palestinian Intifada**

The Palestinian uprising, which forms the prime element of this study, is examined in this chapter in some detail, given that it is the necessary background to the subsequent
chapters. A brief historical background of the post-1967 period of the Occupied Territories has been dealt with in this chapter. The causes of the Intifada, its characteristics, aspects, impact on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides, as well as its political achievements are examined.

Chapter Three: The expatriate Arab press in the UK
This chapter describes the Arab daily newspapers in the UK. It provides an assessment of the reasons for these papers' being published outside the Arab world, their characteristics, their role, and their political tendencies. The general attitude of these newspapers towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is also highlighted in this chapter.

Chapter Four: The coverage of the Intifada in the expatriate Arab dailies: a quantitative analysis of the extent of coverage
This chapter establishes primary data concerning the way the Intifada was handled by the newspapers under study. It analyses quantitatively the following:

(a) Extent of coverage (by measuring the space area allocated to the Intifada by each newspaper, and the number of Intifada-related items).
(b) Item type (by measuring the number of hard news items, investigative reports, editorial comments, opinion articles, interviews, and letters to the editor).
(c) Subject matter (by measuring the number of news stories concerning the violence, politics, human rights, and other matters).
(d) Source of news (by measuring the number of news stories from Israel and the Occupied Territories provided by news agencies, correspondents, and sources which are undefined).
(e) Use of photographs and cartoons (i.e. measurement of the number of photographs and cartoons).
Chapter Five: The coverage of the Intifada in the expatriate Arab dailies: a qualitative analysis

This chapter examines qualitatively the main issues of the Intifada covered by the newspapers. The chapter aims to evaluate the attitude of the expatriate Arab dailies, with cross-references being made to The Guardian (as a representative of the British press) over the four periods which were chosen for the research.

Chapter Six: The image of the Intifada as portrayed by photographs and cartoons in the expatriate Arab dailies

This chapter examines the image of the Intifada as projected by the expatriate Arab newspapers through their inclusion of graphic items. This contributes to the qualitative assessment of the presentation of the Intifada by the papers since it helps provide a clear indication of the view the papers hold regarding Intifada issues and characters.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

In the light of the discussions of the previous chapters, this chapter reviews the findings and extracts conclusions. It assesses the main themes of the study in the light of the hypothesis on which it was based.
Chapter Two

THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA
2.1. Introduction

The West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli occupation in 1967 as a result of the Six Day War between Israel on one side, and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other side. Prior to 1967, the Gaza Strip had been administered by Egypt, while the West Bank had been ruled by the Kingdom of Jordan. The Gaza Strip had not been regarded by the Egyptians as part of their country, while in contrast the West Bank had been considered by Jordan as part of the Kingdom.

Israel spread its control to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and ruled them as Israeli administered and occupied territories. Israel made it clear that it would never quit the Occupied Territories without settling its dispute with its enemies, the Arab countries, and maintaining its security in the region. At the same time, Israel did not wish to formally annex the Territories because they were inhabited by more than one million Arabs. According to Kouri (1985: 268), some demographic experts warned that such annexation would turn Israel into a multi-ethnic state and would thus destroy the ideal of the 'Jewish' state since Arabs would then outnumber Jews. The continuous atmosphere of enmity between the Arab states and Israel led to the Israeli decision to keep the overall status of the Occupied Territories unchanged, i.e. under military rule, until a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict took place (Khoury, 1985: 271).

Israel's policy in the Occupied Territories included the annexation of the Old City of Jerusalem and the establishment of Jewish settlements within the Territories. It appointed military governors in the Arab cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and approved several tough measures to be applied against the Palestinian people. The Palestinians were, for instance, subjected to Israeli military orders rather than to a civil law. They also had no political rights for independence or self-determination. They
were prohibited from practising any political activity though Israel itself has a
democratic system for its Israeli (Arab and Jewish) citizens.

The situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the Israeli occupation was
described by many observers as appalling. Shehadeh (1991: 33) stated that "Israel's
control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has always rested ultimately on physical
coercion." However, the occupying authorities claimed that the living standards in the
Occupied Territories had improved substantially since 1967 (Peretz, 1990: 9).
Nevertheless, Hunter stressed that the military government, under which the
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories lived, had been harsh and oppressive:
"Palestinians had no political rights, and no real administrative control over their own
lives" (Hunter, 1991: 19).

One of the most worrying aspects of the occupation for the Palestinians was Israel's
confiscation of land for the building of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories.
This policy, which intensified during the 1980s and "was to be supported by a tougher
line against the Palestinian opponents of government policies," increased the
Palestinians' frustration (Peretz, 1990: 27).

The economic situation in the Occupied Territories was also deteriorating. It was
totally dominated by Israel, and there was no chance to develop a Palestinian
economic system under the occupation (Peretz, 1990: 100). According to Shehadeh,
there was a real economic exploitation by Israel of the Occupied Territories. Israel
found "cheap labour and an unrestricted export market for its own goods" in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, it restricted the Palestinian exports to insure
the domination of its own products (Shehadeh, 1991: 36).

Most aspects of daily life suffered from the Israelis' restriction measures imposed in
the late 1970s and in the 1980s. Israel imposed restrictions on Palestinian newspapers
and journalists, subjected people to check lists, and investigated their political background and their security records (Hunter, 1991: 53).

This policy of the occupying power fomented strong feelings of rejection among the Palestinians and encouraged them to defy and protest against the occupation. The Palestinians confronted the Israeli forces on many occasions, but the Israelis were always able to overcome and contain all protests which took place before 1987.

In general, the Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories was characterized by suppression and manipulation of the Palestinians, and by the enforcement of the Israeli authority on the Territories. This policy also included Israeli attempts to create a new reality by annexing East Jerusalem and building Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. Accordingly, by such measures, Israel would only give up the minimum area of land in any future peace compromise.

The major objective of the Israeli policy was to retain Israeli sovereignty over as much of the land as possible in order to ensure its security and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, Israeli security has for long been the top priority in the Israeli strategy.

Jordan continued to partly sponsor the Palestinians' social, educational, and religious affairs in the West Bank and continued to grant them Jordanian passports, hoping to recover one day the occupied West Bank. Nevertheless, the absence of a Jordanian authority in the West Bank (and of an Egyptian authority in the Gaza Strip) and the increasing restrictive Israeli measures in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, paved the way for Palestinian national identity to be crystallized. Obviously, the PLO played a principal role in filling the vacuum of a legitimate authority by forming and supporting PLO affiliate economic institutions and political factions in the Occupied Territories. Indeed, the PLO helped establish the infrastructure of a possible future
Palestinian state. A large number of national institutions, among which were educational, industrial, agricultural, social, and cultural institutions, were established and sponsored by the PLO and its affiliates in the Occupied Territories. The PLO also played an important role in mobilizing the Palestinian people through its affiliate clandestine political factions.

All these factors - the absence of any genuine Arab authority, the restrictive Israeli measures, and the PLO's influence in the Occupied Territories - increased and reinforced nationalist feelings and the desire among the Palestinians to resist the Israeli occupation. This desire was reflected on a number of occasions in the several clashes between the Palestinian citizens and the Israeli soldiers, the last of which was the Intifada.

2.2. The Intifada

The Palestinian uprising ("Intifada") was the expression of the Palestinian revolt, which began in December 1987, against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. All of the Occupied Territories, the habitation of more than 1,700,000 Palestinians (more than one million of them in the West Bank) (Hunter, 1991: 17), became the arena of the conflict between the Palestinian people and the Israeli occupation forces.

The Intifada was one of the most striking events in the 1980s and a significant development in the problem of Palestine. During twenty years of occupation, nobody expected such a popular movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, not even the West Bankers and Gazans themselves.

In his book *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond*, McDowall stated that the uprising was "the most important political process since 1967," and predicted that "there will be no return to the situation that pertained in the Occupied Territories
before the uprising began." He went even further when he described the uprising as an event which "was more important than the rise of the PLO itself twenty years earlier and more important, too, than the rebellion of 1936-9 in the struggle of national independence" (McDowall, 1989: 14).

The uprising is important in the context of the Palestine issue because:
1- It did not remain a local event in the refugee camp of Jabaliya (the largest refugee camp in the Gaza Strip) or even in the Gaza Strip as a whole. It spread to prevail in all towns, villages, and refugee camps of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
2- It began as a spontaneous event and continued in an organised way.
3- It gained unprecedented international sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause.
4- "It was the first time that the people of the Occupied Territories had acted with cohesion and as a nation" (McDowall, 1989: 2).

2.3. What was the Intifada?
The word "Intifada" came from nowhere except from the Palestinians themselves who launched the rebellion in the Occupied Territories. Friedman (1989: 375-376) notes that "it was the Palestinians who named their uprising 'Intifada'. They did not call it a 'thawra', the standard Arabic word for a revolt." He adds that while the PLO had used the word 'thawra' for twenty years, the West Bankers and Gazans chose 'Intifada'. Friedman notes that in Hans Wehr's Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic the word intifada may be translated into English as "tremor, a shudder or shiver." To explain why this word was chosen over 'thawra', he observes that the triliteral root of the word 'Intifada' is 'n-f-d' and the verb 'nafada' means "to shake off one's laziness, to have reached the end of, to be finished with, to rid oneself of something, to break with someone." He concludes that "the West Bankers and Gazans used this term instead of 'revolt' because they, unlike their compatriots in Lebanon, did not see themselves, first and foremost, as overthrowing Israel as much as purifying themselves of 'Israeliness' -
getting Israeli habits, language, controls, and products out of their systems" (Friedman, 1989: 375-376). Moreover, the word Intifada was welcomed and accepted by all of the Palestinians inside and outside the Occupied Territories, and by the Arab countries as well, and it has become well known world-wide. The Palestinian people insisted on this term since it implies the sense of resistance to the Israeli oppression. It does also "sound more 'legitimate' than, for example, 'disturbances'" (Nir, 1992: 55).

The Arabic term 'Intifada' has been commonly used for several years to describe the moves of violent Palestinian protest waves against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (and even in Israel itself by the Israeli-Arabs). Abdel-Rahman (1989: 43-44) mentions six Intifadas in the Occupied Territories which took place before the last Palestinian uprising. These Intifadas were:

1- The 1976 Intifada, known as the 'Land Day', which was started in Israel by its Arab residents and spread across the West Bank and Gaza. Six Arabs were killed in Israeli Arab cities.
2- The 1980 Intifada, which followed an attempt by Jewish settlers to assassinate three Arab mayors (Basam Ash-Shaka'a, Ibrahim At-Tawil, and Karim Khalaf) in June of that year.
3- The 1981 Intifada, which consisted of a series of demonstrations on many occasions including the second anniversary of the Camp David treaty between Israel and Egypt, the thirty-fourth anniversary of the establishing of Israel on the 15 May, and the fourth anniversary of Sadat's visit to Israel on the 19 September.
4- The 1982 Intifada, when the Israeli authority dissolved the council of Al-Beereh town, and protests also took place against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Forty-nine Palestinians were killed in that year.
5- The 1983 Intifada, when fifty Palestinians were killed in several waves of uprising on national occasions.
6- The 1985 Intifada, also on the traditional national occasions.
Other writers have suggested that there might have been other Intifadas. Qatar News Agency, for example, adds the 1967 Intifada, "which was described by Moshe Dayan as a complete revolution" (Qatar News Agency, 1989: 31-32).

All acts of resistance that occurred prior to the 1987 Intifada were however "sporadic and localised and could be contained by Israeli troops" (Hunter, 1991: 2). Therefore, the continuation of the 1987 Intifada has been regarded as its most important distinguishing feature, and one which made it such an important development in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.4. The commencement of the Intifada

The Intifada began in Jabaliya refugee camp and spread immediately into the Gaza Strip. In a few days the West Bankers responded to their compatriots in Gaza and carried out their violent protests against the Israeli occupation. That was on the 8 December 1987 when "an Israeli truck had ploughed into a car in Gaza killing four Palestinians inside" (McDowall, 1989: 1-2). "The following day, the refugee camps erupted with violent protests. Two demonstrators were shot dead by the Israeli army. By the end of the week ... mayhem and bloodshed had engulfed not just Gaza but the towns of the West Bank" (Smith, 1988: 216). The Palestinians believed that the Israeli truck-driver had killed four Arabs intentionally in revenge for the stabbing and killing of his relative Shlomo Sikle in Gaza two days earlier (Qatar News Agency, 1989: 63-64).

In the beginning nobody expected that this Intifada would continue for a long time, because it was more or less similar to the previous Intifadas, but "as the days passed the uprising spread rapidly. Remote villages were encouraged to demonstrate. This widened the Uprising geographically" (McDowall, 1989: 3). If that was so, why did
the Intifada happen and continue? Who stood behind its activities? And what was it heading for?

2.5. The causes of the Intifada

One can observe a great number of incidents which took place before the Intifada. The cases of hardship in the Occupied Territories, where more than half of the population lived in poor refugee camps (Peretz, 1990: 24), were countless, and thus there were always chances for confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. However, the causes of the Intifada can be divided into two categories: immediate (direct) causes, and long-term (indirect) causes. Both categories helped increase the tension between each side (especially the Palestinian side), and sparked the violence in December 1987.

So far as the immediate causes are concerned, Abdel-Rahman (1989: 45–47) has pointed out that there were some important events within the context of which the Intifada took place on the scale it did. He listed some of these events as follows:

- The continuous tension because of the killing of a number of Arabs by Israelis on the 12th and 17th October 1987.
- The successful escape of six Palestinians from Gaza prison on the 18th May 1987.
- An armed clash between a group of Palestinians and the Israeli forces in Gaza on the 6th October 1987. Two members of the Palestinian group were among those who escaped from Gaza prison in May 1987.
- The successful military operation carried out by a Palestinian from south Lebanon on the 26th November 1987 when a number of Israeli soldiers were killed in the Galilee area.
- The killing of the four Arab workers by the Israeli truck on the 8th December 1987.
He also referred to the participation of the Islamic political movement in the resistance; the Arab Summit in Jordan in November 1987, which gave priority to the Gulf War; and the superpower Summit in early December 1987, which did not discuss the Middle East problem and gave priority to other world issues as immediate causes for the Intifada.

Smith (1988: 216-217) emphasised that it was the despair and hopelessness the Palestinians felt towards the outside world, the Arab countries, and even the PLO which composed the original reason for the eruption of the uprising. He quoted this paragraph from an Israeli journalist written after the superpower Summit in Washington in December 1987: "It's doubtful that the people of Gaza knew how they had been forgotten in Washington. But they could hardly have chosen a more symbolic moment to scream out against the betrayal and hopelessness they had every reason to feel." Smith added that the Palestinians had "lost hope in the Arab world, [as] the Arab leaders had met in Jordan and relegated the Palestinian problem to the sidelines." Furthermore, according to Smith, "many had lost hope even in the PLO and Yassir Arafat. Some young protesters of Gaza viewed Arafat as an old globe-trotting diplomat."

In terms of the long-term causes, it was the overall situation under occupation, in which the Palestinians lived, that caused the frustration and thus the wave of protests against the Israelis. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had been hoping for twenty years that a magic solution might come one day from outside (either the international community, the Arab countries, or the PLO). Their suffering from the occupation had increased during that period, while no sign for optimism had emerged outside. The killing of four Palestinians on the 8th December 1987 was all the situation needed to explode. This incident, according to Jahshan, caused "the serious and visible escalation in Palestinian resistance," producing a 'technical beginning' of the Intifada which "had been brewing long before" (Jahshan, 1989: 81). This has been
confirmed by Hunter, who stresses that "it took twenty years for general uprising to materialise" (Hunter, 1991: 37).

Hamdan (1989: 15-31) points out that the Israeli authorities are to be blamed for the bad situation in the Occupied Territories in the period before the Intifada. He adds that the provocative Israeli practices in these Territories had accumulated in the past twenty years and had engendered the anger of the Palestinians. These practices consisted of:

- Confiscating land and establishing Jewish settlements.
- Detentions and restraining freedom of Palestinians.
- Demolishing houses.
- Deportation.
- Attacking holy places.
- Economic oppression, by imposing restrictions on exports, industry, and other economic affairs.
- Educational oppression, such as the closure of schools and universities, and the exercising of control over academic syllabuses.
- Media censorship.
- Restricting the health services.

He also points out that the growing 'Islamic awareness' and the frozen peace process encouraged the Palestinians to take the initiative in fighting the Israelis by their own means.

Consequently, although the direct reason for the Intifada, as has earlier been indicated, was the killing of the four Arab workers on the 8th December 1987, the indirect reasons which fed it with the spirit of continuation were the series of Israeli actions under cover of the state of emergency under which the West Bank and Gaza Strip had been living since 1967.
The Israeli attempts to crush the Intifada by force, and particularly its policy of collective punishment, caused the spread of the Intifada in all Palestinian areas (Hunter, 1991: 88). Moreover, the failure to contain the uprising by the Israeli forces encouraged the Palestinians to insist on the importance of its continuation. "Many said that this was the way it should always have been" (Hunter, 1991: 216). It soon became essential, therefore, for the Palestinians to proceed with their protests in an organised way, to articulate a coherent set of aims and objectives, and to face the consequences which would affect the whole of their society thereafter.

2.6. Who was behind the Intifada?

Al-Jarbawi (1989: 67-68) argues that the outer face of the new wave of uprising did not initially reveal any substantial differences from the previous ones. Strikes, demonstrations, and stone-throwing were employed in the Occupied Lands even before the era of the Intifada. Inside or outside the Territories, no one had set a specific date for the Intifada, explained its way ahead, nor determined its aims or predicted its future. Al-Jarbawi concludes that the Intifada started at the people's level when the political leadership in the West Bank and Gaza realised that this Intifada's enormous energy enabled it to be different from the previous ones. The leadership started to interact with the events of the Intifada thereafter.

The organisations which had been directing the Intifada since December 1987 and instructing the people of the Occupied Territories to carry out strikes and demonstrations had nothing to do with the decision to set off the Intifada. The event had passed them before they decided to join it. Nevertheless, both the main political movements in the Occupied Territories - the Unified National Leadership (UNL) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) - claimed responsibility for launching the uprising. In the book Filastin: min al-Intifada ila Al-Dawla Al-Filastiniya prepared by Qatar News Agency (1989: 185), it was claimed that the PLO and Abu-Jihad (one of

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1 The UNL emerged in late January 1988, while Hamas was said to have been established on 14.12.1987, but came to prominence through its communiqués early in 1988.
its top leaders assassinated in Tunis by Israel in 1988) in particular had planned the Intifada and directed it from the beginning. McDowall (1989: 3-4) also mentions that the UNL of the Intifada, which was a composition of local representatives of the main factions of the PLO operating in the Occupied Territories, afterwards quickly emerged claiming authority for the Intifada, but at the same time he makes clear that the Intifada was "free from outside control or consideration" (McDowall, 1989: viii). He obviously means by that to refer to the PLO, which was, according to him, "no less surprised than Israel by the uprising, and at first was uncertain how to react" (McDowall, 1989: 11).

Friedman (1989: 389) also points out that the impetus of the Intifada had nothing to do with the PLO leadership in exile. According to him, "Arafat had to have known perfectly well how little he and the PLO leadership were responsible for the Intifada in its origins; it clearly took them by surprise as much as everyone else. The biggest revolt by Palestinians since the 1930s had begun without PLO direction." The image Friedman tries to convey is that it was 'made-in-Israel' Intifada and that the Palestinians in exile, "following the Intifada through fax machines in Tunis, will never fully understand what happened to their compatriots in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (Friedman, 1989: 357).

Nevertheless, the PLO exerted immense efforts and played a fundamental role in getting the Intifada organised under the UNL, and in expressing the plight of the Palestinians under occupation (Peretz, 1990: 3).

The UNL of the Intifada consisted of four principal PLO resistance organisations (Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Palestine Communist Party (PCP)). The clandestine UNL affiliation to the PLO was explicit from the beginning,
and thus they each were playing a complementary role in the Intifada (Hunter, 1991: 65).

Controversy as to whether the Islamic movement Hamas started the Intifada arose because this movement did not exist as a political organisation before the Intifada. When the Intifada emerged, it was clear that the Islamic element would have a great effect on the development of the revolt since members of Islamic groups played a significant role in the resistance. Many people tended to believe that Islam was going to offer them some form of compensation for what they had lost because of the policy of the PLO and Arab countries. "Islam with its revolutionary zeal and political platform, offered them an outlet for the only emotions they trusted (towards the occupation): anger, hatred, revenge. God, one young Gazan said, was their only leader" (Smith, 1988: 217). Smith (1988: 229-230) pointed out that the Israelis blamed Muslim clergymen and fanatic religious groups for the escalation of the Intifada in its first days.

The Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its acronym Hamas (which means 'zeal' or 'enthusiasm'), was said to have planned and decided on the clash with the Israelis and on the right time. This plan, according to Jihad (1988: 48-50), was formulated a few months before the Intifada. Hamas's followers led the demonstrations on the 8th December 1987 and regarded that date as the 'zero hour' for a decisive struggle against the occupation. The first victim of the Intifada was Ra'ed Shehadeh, who was, according to Jihad, a member of the Islamic movement.

What is important in this argument is that the Hamas movement emerged, participated in the resistance, developed, grew strong, and became a key player in the conflict during the period of the Intifada (Peretz, 1990: 106). Hamas, which essentially saw itself as a competitor with the PLO for leadership of Palestinian society, stated its goal
as "the achievement of an Islamic state in the whole of Palestine, including the area 'occupied' by Israel [in 1948], through holy war" (Hunter, 1991: 117).

How, we may ask, did these two movements manage to establish themselves and to assume the lead of the Intifada? How did they lay the foundation for their organised activities, and how did they obtain the credit from the people?

In brief, Palestinian society has for long been politicized. All PLO factions, plus several Islamic groups, existed in the Occupied Territories even before the Intifada had built underground organisational structures during the twenty years of occupation. Those organisations were well known to the Palestinian people (and even to Israel), and were quite salient in the universities and unions in elections.

When the Intifada occurred, the leadership of these political groups had to activate and "benefit from Palestinian structures and organisations that were already in place" (Aronson, 1990: 329). It was the time for all parties to get themselves organised as quickly as possible in order to acquire the privilege of leading the Intifada.

2.7. The methods of the Intifada

One of the important characteristics of the Intifada was the participation of the masses in the protests. The Intifada "mobilised the broad range of the entire Palestinian community - students, workers, union members, professionals, and business interests - in an unambiguous declaration of Palestinian opposition to continued occupation" (Aronson, 1990: 324). That made it easy for the Intifada leadership to organise mass protests, such as strikes and demonstrations. The huge participation of the masses in the beginning and the Israeli collective punishment that followed made the Intifada "a way of life for everyone" (Hunter, 1991: 2).
In order to ensure the continuation of the struggle by the people, and for the purpose of providing services for the localities in the Occupied Territories, the UNL formed what was known as 'Popular Committees'. These committees also played the role of authorities in their areas and led the resistance against the occupation (Hunter, 1991: 138-140).

Although the people's participation declined as time passed, it continued to be the prime support and reinforcement for the Intifada activities, as was apparent in the overwhelming response to the instructions of the leadership. Special units (called 'Hit Squads') were established in 1989 because of the decline of the mass participation and the outlawing of Popular Committees. Their task was to provoke confrontation with the occupying forces and to keep the activities of the Intifada running. This was a different stage from the mass protests since "quick attacks by small groups of stone-throwers became the rule" (Hunter, 1991: 201). The less the participation of the masses in the protests, the more violent the Intifada became. In the 1990s, and particularly after the Gulf crisis, a wave of stabbings of Israeli Jewish people took place. Also the use of arms increased dramatically in a radical change of the Intifada's activities.

The principal method of the Intifada still remained stone-throwing. Stones, which became the symbol of the Intifada, were adopted by the West Bankers and Gazans, according to Friedman (1989: 385-486), for operational reasons. This was "encouraged by Yassir Arafat and the PLO leaders for diplomatic and propaganda reasons." However, "the use of stones became symbolic of an entirely new strategy of Palestinian resistance." Stones "symbolised not working in Israel, [and] refusing to co-operate with the Israeli military government in the Occupied Territories."

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1 In Arabic they are called ‘Al-Qowa Ad-Dariba’, which has been translated by Peretz (1990: 91) as ‘Shock Teams’, and by Aronson (1990: 331) as ‘Strike Forces’. 
Demonstrators also used iron bars, petrol bombs, and anything they could lay their hands on to attack the Israelis. They also burned tyres to block roads in front of Israeli military vehicles (Abdel-Rahman, 1989: 66-88).

Hunter (1991: 82) argues that the use of simple weapons rather than arms against the Israelis was only for the purpose of "the humiliation of the Israeli soldier (the symbol of the occupation)." The Palestinians aimed to score a moral victory over the Israelis, since a physical victory was impossible.

Moreover, the Palestinians used other peaceful means of resistance in the Intifada. These included general and commercial strikes, which continued to be the easiest practical and symbolic way of protest. Moreover, the distribution of communiqués and the regular graffiti painted on walls were also part of the Intifada activities. In addition to their role as means of communication, they were considered by the Palestinians as a way of protest and an expression of their opposition against the occupation.

The Palestinians also sought other tactics to strengthen their positions. In March 1988 "almost half of the 1,000 Palestinian policemen in the Occupied Territories had resigned" (Hunter, 1991: 124). The Israelis had themselves to take on many jobs, formerly left to Palestinians, using military personnel, and this widened the gulf between the two sides in the conflict.

During the Intifada the Palestinians made it clear that they intended to sever their economic links with Israel. The Occupied Territories have been a consumer market for Israeli products since Israel is the only gateway for imported goods. Therefore, and in the light of the Israeli restrictions on the Palestinian industrial and agricultural sectors, the Occupied Territories depended heavily on Israel in their economy. The Palestinians boycotted Israeli products which had Palestinian substitutes, such as "clothing, cigarettes, soft drinks, soap, and candies" (Peretz, 1990: 99-100). Although a
complete severance from the Israeli economy was impossible, the Palestinians aimed by the boycott to enhance their "self-sufficiency... as part of opposition to the occupation," and "to reduce dependence upon Israel for goods and services" (Hunter, 1991: 133).

Nevertheless, the Occupied Territories continued their dependence on Israel as far as their economy was concerned. One of the major issues in this respect was the Palestinian labour in Israel. During the Intifada, a large number of Palestinians continued working in Israel. The leaders of the Intifada did not introduce a substitute for the more than 120,000 Palestinians who worked in Israel on a daily basis. In fact, although there was an attempt made in the days of the Intifada by the Palestinian youths to ban those workers from going to Israel, the leaders of the Intifada gave a low profile to this issue since there was (and still is) no alternative to working in Israel. The mostly unskilled Palestinian labour in Israel goes back to 1968 when, after the Six Day War, Israel introduced legislation to enable the Palestinians to work in Israel. In the mid 1970s the number of workers reached about 70,000, and in the mid 1980s about 95,000. Many of those workers were not registered in the Israeli offices of employment in the Occupied Territories. For instance, in 1989 there were only 45,000 registered workers, while the actual number of workers reached 116,000 (Hiltermann, 1991: 20). The Palestinians were not the only people who were in great need for jobs in Israel, but also there was a real demand in Israel for cheap and unskilled labour. Therefore, Israel did not impose a ban on the Palestinian workers from entering Israel as a measure of collective punishment in response to of the Intifada. However, when some workers participated in activities against Israelis inside Israel, Israel imposed restrictions on those who wished to work in Israel. For instance, special identity cards were introduced for those workers whose security records showed that they did not participate in activities against Israel. Such identity cards proved to be an efficient way of organizing the Palestinian labour in Israel, and a
practical way of controlling the large numbers of illegal Palestinian workers in particular.

The Intifada faced an internal danger from those who collaborated with Israel to undermine the resistance. The Palestinians had to strengthen the Intifada vis-à-vis the challenge of the Israeli secret services by dealing with the collaborators. Israel recruited thousands of Palestinian agents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the period preceding the Intifada. Most of these agents (collaborators), according to Hunter, came from the low class of Palestinian society and were employed by the Israeli authorities to help undermine the Palestinian resistance. Many collaborators worked mainly as information gatherers. Many were armed by Israel while few of them were known to the Palestinians as collaborators. The role played by the collaborators became extremely vital with the eruption of the Intifada when Israel exhausted all possible efforts to restore order and control. However, it became increasingly important too for Israel to provide adequate protection for those agents (Hunter, 1991: 113). The collaborators, who were regarded by the Palestinians as the internal danger, were asked to repent and join the Intifada. Peretz (1990: 91) reports that hundreds of collaborators repented, admitted guilt, and asked for forgiveness. However, many of them were killed. "These killings were a way of striking back at the occupation authorities, a form of resistance to Israel" (Hunter, 1991: 203). However, despite the increasing difficulties and risks in the collaborators' work, Israel continued to rely heavily on collaborators as an important element in its intelligence and security systems relating to its operation in confronting the Palestinian resistance.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the Intifada suffered a set-back and lost much of its brightness and the world's sympathy during the radical political developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Not only was this set-back caused by the diversion of the media's focus to those epochal changes, but also, and more importantly, the situation was clouded by the attendant of the immigration of Soviet
Jews to Israel, which was viewed in popular world opinion as a humanitarian cause. The Soviet Jews, who had for decades suffered from tough Soviet restrictions, mainly against freedom of travel, obtained for the first time an opportunity to travel freely to Israel starting in December 1989 during the Gorbachev policy of *perestroika* (Beit-Hallahmi, 1990: 46). For Israel, while the Intifada was considered a nightmare, the immigration of the Soviet Jews was considered as a relief and a miracle. In addition to the morale boost which the Israelis enjoyed, there was a demographic dimension of the Jewish immigration to Israel, for it would insure a Jewish majority in Israel and the Occupied land for decades to come.

The size of the immigration was so large that "in November 1989, 2,000 Soviet Jews arrived in Israel. The number almost doubled the following month to 3,700. Together the two-month tally accounted for 76 per cent of the year's total Soviet arrivals. In the first ten days of 1990, an additional 5,000 arrived in Tel Aviv. February saw the arrival of a further 5,700" (Aronson, *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1990: 36).

The immigration of the Soviet Jews caused real embarrassment for the Intifada and the Palestinians. It came at a time when the Palestinians were progressing in their "peace assault", abandoning their old claim to the ancient land of Palestine, and recognizing the right for Israel to exist. Therefore, it was hard for them to stand against the Jewish immigration, particularly because they wanted nothing to detract from the international sympathy which the Intifada had gained. In a memorandum signed by 31 prominent Palestinians, there was no suggestion that the Jews should be denied immigration to Israel. The response of the Palestinians (i.e. PLO and its affiliates in the Occupied Territories) centred on their condemnation those who had denied the Soviet Jews liberty to settle in Western counties, especially the USA. They also condemned the Israeli policy of settling those immigrants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and, more forcefully, East Jerusalem (*Middle East Report*, 1990: 48).
The general feeling of the Palestinian public in the Occupied Territories was one of great frustration and defeat in view of the size of the Jewish immigration, because the former triumphal feeling among the Palestinians and their hope of making a political change appeared to have been blown apart by the flow of the Jewish immigration into Israel. This immigration proved to the Palestinians that, in reality, their Intifada had achieved nothing and the Occupied Territories, which they were hoping to "liberate", could stay in the hands of Israel for even longer than they expected. In other words, the Jewish immigration to Israel broke the momentum of the Intifada, revived the Western sympathy for Israel, and redressed the damage caused by the Intifada. It deprived the Palestinians of their moral "victory" achieved by the Intifada and damaged the public's confidence in the vigour of the Intifada.

In summary, the Palestinians used every possible means to strike against the Israelis in their attempt to show their refusal of the occupation and to convey their plight to the outside world. The Israeli forces, on the other hand, were sucked into a war in which there was no winner.

2.8. The Israeli response

Israel was taken by surprise by the spontaneity and the size of the events of the Intifada and thus the Israeli leaders, according to McDowall (1989: 6), "were ill-prepared to deal with them." There was a great need for Israel "to restore authority in the Occupied Territories, regardless of the long-term implications of the wave of unrest."

The Intifada created a consensus in Israel on three main points: (a) it was "not a flash in a pan, a passing series of incidents that could be surpassed in routine fashion by the normal complement of occupation forces", and thus (b) "a political rather than military solution" was the only way to end the revolt, and (c) "new measures would be necessary to maintain law and order to keep the situation in hand" (Peretz, 1990: 44).
Israel initially followed the traditional way to confront the protest. However, the Israeli reaction to the violence was tougher in comparison with previous incidents. Indeed, all aspects of the occupation became intensified under the impetus of the Intifada (Shehadeh, 1991: 33). There was a change of rules, permitting the soldiers to use tougher measures against the Palestinians. For example, "open fire regulations were relaxed, [and] houses belonging to the families of fugitive suspects were demolished" (Hunter, 1991: 196).

The problem for the Israelis was that the more the oppression increased, the more the Palestinian determination grew to proceed in the resistance. It became clear, therefore, to the Israeli officers that this "unusual courage" shown by the Intifada activists was not an act of terrorism, but rather a form of national movement (Peretz, 1990: 86-87).

The aim of containment and suppression of the Intifada was Israel's short-term and immediate response to the violence. However, the long-term strategy was considered by the Israeli leaders, involving the final status of the Occupied Territories (Tessler, 1991: 43). In fact, Israel did not have a consensus about what the final status would be. Therefore, for the purpose of keeping the balance in Israel until a political change took place in the Middle East, the Israeli leaders preferred the status quo option. Hence, the Israeli government tended to focus on the short-term measures to contain the events in the Occupied Territories, for there was no ray of hope on the horizon indicating a clear, long-term strategy for a lasting solution.

As far as their aim to contain the Intifada by force was concerned, the Israeli forces confronted the Palestinian demonstrators, using live ammunition, rubber and plastic bullets, in addition to tear gas. They also used beatings and arm-breaking, especially of Intifada activists, as a military action, in order to prevent them from participating again in the protests (Abdel-Rahman, 1989: 91-106). These kinds of use of force produced a large number of casualties among the Palestinians.
In their attempt to decapitate the Palestinian organisations operating in the Intifada, the occupation authorities deported or detained as many as they could of the known active members of those organisations (Cobban, 1991: 83). By this act, which left thousands of Palestinians in detention and many in exile, Israel aimed to paralyse the Intifada by eliminating its leaders and activists. This action was one of the Israeli policies of collective punishment against the Palestinians. Israel aimed by this policy to put pressure on the Palestinian people and to make them realise that they would not achieve any of their goals by violence.

The policy of collective punishment, which was one of the harshest measures used to curb the Palestinian Intifada, brought world-wide criticism of Israel. The policy included a number of measures that violated human rights. One of these measures was administrative detention. Thousands of Palestinians were detained under this kind of detention for up to six months (renewable) without charge or trial (Peretz, 1990: 63).

Curfews were another kind of collective punishment widely used in the Occupied Territories. "During curfews, no one was permitted to leave home for any reason; inhabitants were ordered to stay away from windows and balconies; curfew violators were often shot; even being seen at a window by patrolling soldiers could result in being shot at or intruded upon by troops," Peretz (1990: 67) explains. He adds that a minimum 1,600 curfews were imposed in the first year of the Intifada throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Under curfew regulations, the press was prohibited from entering Palestinian territories subjected to this measure, which resulted in the isolation of these areas from the outside world (JMCC, 1989: 26). Other measures similar to curfews were implemented by the Israelis to restrict the movement of news reporters in the Occupied Territories. One of the most common measures was the declaration by the
Israeli army of a selected Palestinian area as a 'military closed zone'. This could be declared at any time by the army to prevent not only journalists, but also all outsiders from entering that specific area. However, people inside the zone declared closed were left free to leave their homes. JMCC (1989: 26) reported a foreign news photographer as saying that this measure was "equivalent, in effect, to a closure of the press." Moreover, Peretz (1990: 67) regards this measure by Israel as a kind of collective punishment, because "during 'closure', water, electricity and telephone services were often disconnected."

Another dangerous collective punishment adopted by Israel was the closure of the Palestinian schools and universities. All schools (including nurseries) and universities were closed for several months when the Intifada erupted in 1987. Some universities remained closed for years. Closure of schools continued frequently after they had been officially reopened for the first time (since the Intifada started) for the academic year 1988-1989.

During schools' and universities' closure, the Palestinians attempted to bridge the gap caused by that policy, and thus launched what was known as 'popular education'. Palestinian local committees organised alternative classes for school children and university students at mosques, churches, and other off-campus sites. "The Israeli authorities declared those classes illegal and periodically raided them, arresting both students and teachers" (Peretz, 1990: 75).

Lastly, Israel imposed increasing economic pressure on the Palestinians. In the first weeks of the Intifada, the Israeli authorities prevented food convoys from entering Palestinian refugee camps. Later, it blocked the export of olive oil (the main product of the Palestinians) to Jordan from the West Bank and restricted the amount of money which people could bring from Jordan (Peretz, 1990: 72). Israel also countered the Palestinian attempts at self-sufficiency. It imposed "marketing prohibitions, monetary
restrictions, agricultural sanctions, fuel bans, closure of organisations and institutions," and many other measures (Hunter, 1991: 146).

Although the Israeli authorities confronted the Intifada with its armed forces, Israeli civilian settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip raided Palestinian villages on several occasions. Hunter (1991: 119) reports that "during the first ten months of the revolt, Jewish civilians [settlers] shot and killed ten Palestinians." These attacks, which involved breaking into homes and beating up Palestinian civilians, were usually in retaliation for the stoning of settlers' vehicles by the Intifada youths (Peretz, 1990: 69).

2.9. Intifada objectives

According to Friedman (1989: 380), the message that the Palestinians were trying to convey to the Israelis was: "I am not part of you, and I have no intention of becoming part of you," and they were trying to convince the Israelis and themselves that they were a nation. Nevertheless, Friedman (1989: 292) believes that the Palestinians "failed to accompany those stones and bottles with a clear message to Israelis as to exactly what their objectives were. Sure, privately many Palestinian individuals in the West Bank and Gaza said they just wanted an end to the Israeli occupation, but they never said it publicly as a community."

The general aim of the uprising was to end the misery in which the Palestinians had lived during twenty years of occupation. According to Smith (1988: 216-217), the Palestinians "let the world know that enough is enough. That they had nothing to lose except their misery."

At the beginning of the Intifada the Palestinians did not reveal or articulate any clear message regarding what the Intifada was all about. All that the people wanted was to fight against injustice, the ruthlessness of the occupation, and to break the endless
number of restrictions and military measures imposed by Israel on the various aspects
of life in the Occupied Territories.

As early as January 1988 however, a number of prominent Palestinian personalities
who were known as PLO supporters and some of whom later became members of the
Palestinian delegation to the peace process and members of the Palestinian National
Authority, made an important statement. They announced a fourteen-point statement,
which represented the principal demands of the Palestinian people for ending the
violence (Hunter, 1991: 68). This statement appeared to be an indirect PLO
manifesto. Despite the fact that Israel rejected any compromise and regarded any
acceptance of the Palestinian demands as a concession, the statement remained the
bottom line of the Palestinian requirements for halting the uprising. In essence the
statement constituted a brief 'political manifesto' for a future lasting solution for the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It dealt mainly with immediate problems and difficulties in
the Occupied Territories caused by the occupation. For instance, it stated that Israel
should stop all its measures in the territories which involved human rights violations
and the building of settlements. The statement also called for preparations to be made
for an international peace conference under the United Nations' umbrella, and attended
by all parties including the PLO (Peretz, 1990: 201-203).

As the Intifada continued, it became clear to everybody that the Palestinians were
determined to end the occupation. It was a difficult target, but it was also the first time
that the Palestinian struggle had managed to seize this momentum. "Palestinian
political objectives were [finally] defined as a self-determination and independence for
Gaza and the West Bank, to be achieved through an international [peace] conference
convened by the members of the UN Security Council, and attended by Israel and the
PLO" (Hunter, 1991: 3).
That goal was in fact designed by the PLO and its affiliates in the Occupied Territories. However, as has earlier been mentioned, the Islamic group, Hamas and also a smaller Islamic group, Jihad, declared that they would continue their struggle to liberate the whole land of mandatory Palestine. Therefore, these two organisations have continued to lead the Intifada, in spite of the peace deal between the PLO and Israel in 1993, which was followed by the cessation of the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada.

2.10. The Intifada's impact

The Intifada had several implications for and made impacts of different degrees on all the different parties involved. These arose mainly from its being a vigorous revolt which lasted for a long time and from its general abstention from the use of destructive or military weapons. It greatly affected all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Israel, the Arab world, and the overall development of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.10.1. The Palestinians

Despite the large-scale devastation and damage to many aspects of the Palestinians' life, there were several positive impacts of the Intifada on the Palestinians. Although they did not gain any materially significant achievement, the Palestinians believed they had achieved a moral triumph, which was the best they had been able to achieve in decades of struggle. The following are instances of what could be described as positive implications of the Intifada for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories:

(a) It brought the Palestinian question to the forefront of the international agenda, and created a hope that a better reality (compared with the status quo) and final solution for the Palestinians would be reached.

(b) For the first time, the Palestinians acted as a single unit against the Israelis, and set aside their differences between themselves (Friedman, 1989: 382).
(c) The Intifada made some social changes in the Occupied Territories, which were regarded as developments and improvements for society. For instance, there was emphasis in the press on the return to customary law (Hunter, 1991: 3), solving social problems through traditional Palestinian mediation (rather than going to court) (Hunter, 1991: 132), the shift of the leadership to the young generation, and the rapid development in the increased participation of women in many aspects of life (Peretz, 1990: 97).

(d) They succeeded in gaining the sympathy of the international community, and changed the image of the Palestinian people in the West from one of 'terrorists' and 'enemies of peace' to one of 'victims' and 'oppressed people'.

(e) They (to some extent) harmed Israel by causing damage to its economy, distorting its image world-wide, and causing losses and casualties among soldiers and settlers.

Most of the losses were also among the Palestinians, since they were the party to suffer from the Israeli counter-measures. The casualties and losses on the Palestinian side in thirty months of the Intifada, according to the Palestine Media Office in Cairo, were as follows:

- 1,170 persons killed.
- 74,000 persons injured.
- 68,000 persons detained.
- 60 persons deported.
- 1,868 houses demolished.
- The burning of 18,897 crop-bearing trees.
- The confiscation of 100,846 dunums of land.

*(Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 11.6.990).*

While these facts indicate that the Palestinians suffered heavy casualties in the Intifada, they continued their daily clashes with the Israeli soldiers. However, the Palestinians were mostly affected by three main factors which weakened their revolt: (a) the
increasing Israeli ability to contain many aspects of the uprising (particularly the participation of the masses in the protests), (b) the way the Intifada became a monotonous "accustomed feature of daily life for the Palestinians", and (c) the decline in media coverage of the Intifada (Brynen and Caplan, 1991: 10).

2.10.2. Israel

In Israel, although normal daily life went on and was not affected by the Intifada, with the exception of the intensified security measures particularly at Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, there were many signs that various aspects of life were affected. The first effect was on the Arab community in Israel. The Intifada stirred sympathetic feelings among the 800,000 Israeli Arabs. Many of these Arabs took a practical role in support of the uprising by offering food, clothing, money, and other kinds of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Two weeks after the eruption of the Intifada the Israeli Arabs organised a general strike to show their solidarity with their 'compatriots'\(^1\) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Peretz, 1990: 143-145).

Israel was also affected by the Intifada in that it had to revive the Green Line (the border which separates Israel from the Occupied Territories) to prevent the Intifada from disturbing the country. Consequently, the idea that Israel could assimilate the Occupied Territories was no longer tenable. According to Lesch (1989: 274), the Intifada abolished the idea the Israelis had "that the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will accept occupation once they realise that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from any part of the territory and that the 'administered areas' can therefore be retained, and eventually annexed, with no significant cost to the Jewish State."

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\(^1\) It should be pointed out that many Israeli Arabs have relatives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In Israeli society itself a tremendous split occurred over how Israel should deal with the Intifada. The confusion centred on both concern at the violation of human rights by the Israeli soldiers, and the political future of the Occupied Territories. Thus, many questions were raised and drew greater attention than they had done in previous times. These questions focused on whether the Israeli government should compromise on the Occupied Territories. According to Hunter (1991: 172), in this respect "the right [in Israel] became more right, the left more left." Therefore, a climate of uncertainty dominated in Israel for several years, and the fact that the Israelis did not trust the Arabs helped prevent any commitment by Israel to any political solution.

The division in Israeli society was reflected by the appearance of new political movements on both the right and the left. Peretz (1990: 136,140) lists a number of these movements, such as, on the right, "the Moledet (Motherland) party, formed during 1988 in response to the Intifada, [which] called for the 'transfer' of Arabs from the territories." On the left, he mentions, for instance,

the Twenty-First Year, founded in January 1988, [which] had the broadest perspective and adopted the most far-reaching programme. Its Covenant for the Struggle Against the Occupation declared that after twenty-one years of occupation, Israel was losing its democratic character and that the situation was not only deplorable for the Palestinians but had a pernicious effect on all aspects of Israeli society.

The Israelis showed more concern over the Intifada's effect on the Israeli army, which was not prepared for such a 'war'. For instance, Friedman (1989: 409) states that "the uprising has been serious enough to force the Israeli army to double from thirty days to sixty days the maximum amount of annual reserve duty required of Israeli males between the ages of twenty-one and fifty-five." However, Peretz (1990: 127-131) argues that it is the credibility of the army which became the serious casualty and he adds that anxiety and stress were apparent among troops in the territories, which was a sign of "possible deterioration."
The Israeli economy was also affected. For instance, "Israel's Gross Domestic Product grew between only 1 and 2 per cent in 1988, compared with a growth of 5.2 per cent in 1987" (Friedman, 1989: 409-410). Much of the decline in the Israeli economy was because of the decrease of tourism, and the drop in Israeli sales in the Occupied Territories because of the Intifada. For example, the fall in the Israeli sales of agricultural products to the Territories was 60% in 1988 (Hunter, 1991: 148).

As far as the Israeli casualties are concerned, Friedman (1989: 409-410) states that the "Israelis killed in the first year of the uprising amounted to roughly the number of people killed in traffic accidents on the Israeli highways every two weeks." However, although the total casualties on the Israeli side were far less than those in the Palestinian side, there were obvious worries among the Israeli people about the increasing amount of losses (particularly in lives) with the continuation of violence.

There were 5,068 attacks on military personnel and civilians (ranging from bombs and shooting live ammunition to petrol bombs). The total Israeli losses in thirty months of the Intifada (according to the Palestine media office in Cairo) were as follows:

- 91 captains and soldiers killed.
- 28 settlers killed.
- 4,740 soldiers injured.
- 798 settlers injured.
- 6,435 military vehicles damaged.
- 3,315 vehicles belonging to settlers damaged.
- 430 offices damaged.
- 890 buses and coaches damaged.

Approximately 21.29 million dollars of direct damage and about 4.8 billion dollars of indirect damage (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 11.6.1990).
2.10.3. The Arab world

The Intifada generated enormous sympathy and solidarity in the Arab world. There was a real worry that "the example of mass popular upheaval in the Occupied Territories was an unsettling precedent to the neighbouring Arab governments" (Gause III, 1991: 191). Several demonstrations, a number of them violent, took place in Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia. Andoni (1991: 173), for instance, referred to Jordanian official figures which revealed that the police dealt with 117 demonstrations in the country during the first nine months of the uprising.

The Arab governments realised that a strong support for the Intifada was necessary, "for it has been seen as an obligation by all Arab states, not a matter of choice" (Gause III, 1991: 191). The Arab heads of state held an extraordinary Summit in June 1988 in Algeria and offered, in addition to strong verbal support, financial aid to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and encouraged media coverage of the Intifada. They called for an international peace conference under the UN auspices for a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Peretz, 1990: 181). Peretz argues that the response of the Arab leaders to the Intifada was weak and he stresses that they were unable to take any tangible action, so that what they did for the Palestinians after the Summit was little (Peretz, 1990: 181). The Intifada put particular pressure on Egypt, since it was the only Arab state to have diplomatic relations with Israel, to end the peace accord. In fact, the Egyptian foreign policy as a whole was affected by the Intifada (Korany, 1991: 196), since Egypt was in the process of recovering its relationship with the Arab world when the Intifada erupted. According to Gause (1991: 191), the Intifada "threatened to further complicate Egypt's relations with Israel, and perhaps with the United States." Primarily, there were internal pressures on the Egyptian government to abrogate the peace deal with Israel. Opposition parties, as well as different civil society associations, mobilized public opinion for the support of the Intifada (Korany, 1991: 203) and demanded an end to the Egyptian-Israeli relations. However, the Egyptian government resisted all pressures and, alternatively,
it spelled out clearly its condemnation and resentment of the oppressive Israeli measures in the Occupied Territories, and played a significant role in actuating the peace process.

2.10.4. The West

The Intifada, and particularly the tough Israeli measures against the Palestinians in the Territories, drew world-wide reaction in the form of condemnations by many countries which called upon Israel to stop the policy of oppression and collective punishment. This reaction was voiced by governments as well as by human rights organisations. The tough reaction shown by Western countries which had long been traditional allies of Israel was embarrassing for Israel. The unusually quick UN resolution 605 on 22 December 1987 (only two weeks after the Intifada began) and the abstention of the USA from voting or using the veto to block the resolution, were serious indications of the anger felt in the West. Moreover, "nearly a score of resolutions were passed condemning Israel during 1988 in the General Assembly, a UN body in which the United States has no veto" (Peretz, 1990: 164).

In the USA, there was clear concern among the White House administration, and even among the Jewish community, over the situation in the Occupied Territories. Although "the Americans were not ready for an open rift with Israel," the spokesman of the State Department stressed that the USA "had always counselled against the use of lethal arms in circumstances such as this [revolt]" (Hunter, 1991: 83).

The European Community also expressed its regret and strongly condemned the Israeli measures in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Hunter, 1991: 84). Furthermore, Israel's relations with both West and East Europe were adversely affected by the Intifada. For example, "Poland scuttled its plan to raise the level of diplomatic representation [with Israel] from existing Interests Section to a higher level." Also "Ireland continued to refuse to accept an Israeli ambassador" (Peretz, 1990: 165).
These reactions, in addition to similar positions taken by other countries, were mainly in response to the Israeli violation of human rights. Additionally, there was an increasing concern in the West over the future of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in the light of the Israeli rejection of the proposed international peace conference. Israel's Western allies continued their efforts to persuade Israel to seek a political avenue in dealing with the Palestinian revolt, and to search for a final and just peace with the Arabs.

2.10.5. The peace process

The Intifada shifted the balance of power in favour of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. The balance had been in favour of the PLO in exile before the Intifada, particularly before it had been driven from Beirut in 1982 (Abdel-Rahman, 1989: 133-159). This shift proved to the Palestinians that the struggle from inside (Palestine) was more effective than from outside. The revolt, however, did not promise a victory or liberation of the Occupied Territories. It created rather a real demand for a political solution and encouraged (in the long term) all parties, including Israel, the PLO, the Arab countries, and the USA, to seek such a solution.

At first, the Intifada brought the PLO into prominence and revived its role as the representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO, which seized the opportunity, was pushed to moderate its position (Hunter, 1991: 4). But before the PLO took any action, the Kingdom of Jordan, which had been responsible for the West Bank since the end of the British mandate, made a decision to relinquish all links with the territory in July 1988 (Andoni, 1991: 165). King Hussein of Jordan was reluctant to take this decision because, although he would have liked to regain the West Bank as part of his kingdom, he realized that he could no longer dream of going back to 1967 (Raphael, 1991: 96). This step by Jordan was necessary for the Palestinians to keep up the
momentum of the Intifada, to reinforce its recognition of the political identity of the Palestinians, and to pave the way for the PLO to proceed in the peace process.

In November 1988 the PLO began what was called the 'Palestinian peace assault'. This involved a series of decisions which enabled the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel. In that month, the Palestine National Council (PNC) met in Algeria and proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, renounced all acts of terrorism, and recognised the UN resolutions 242 and 338, which implied the right for Israel to exist (Hunter, 1991: 4-5). Later, the PLO explicitly recognised Israel and thus met all the American conditions to open a dialogue between the USA and the PLO (Cobban, 1991: 90).

The PLO could not, however, make a breakthrough in the Israeli policy and start negotiations with its government (which was dominated by the right-wing Likud). Nevertheless, after the Gulf War in 1991, the USA put pressure on all parties to attend a regional peace conference held in Madrid. Although the PLO was excluded, a Palestinian delegation combining prominent Palestinian figures from the Occupied Territories (loyal to the PLO) participated in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

The peace negotiations which began in Madrid faced enormous difficulties because there were a large number of differences between the two parties, and thus the progress was very slow. In the meantime, after the Israeli Labour Party won the election in 1992, the PLO and the new Israeli government held secret talks in Norway to sort out the differences and make a breakthrough in the stalemate of the peace process. The two sides agreed on a two-stage solution for the conflict. The first stage, an interim period, was to be implemented in phases and to last for five years. The second stage, which envisaged a final solution for the Occupied Territories and the Palestine problem as a whole, was to be negotiated from the third year of the interim
period. The deal was signed by the PLO and Israel in the United States in September 1993, and the first phase (Gaza-Jericho-first) was implemented in 1994.

The first stage of the deal includes Israeli redeployment in the Occupied Territories and the handing over of Arab towns and villages to the Palestinian autonomous authorities to be chosen by the leadership of the PLO (and to be elected later by the Palestinian people). The second stage will be based on negotiations between the two parties over more complicated issues, such as the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the border-crossings, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian demand for total independence with full sovereignty on the land.

Although the Intifada managed to push all parties to search for a political solution that would put an end to violence and make it possible for the unpredictable mutual Israeli-PLO recognition and talks to take place, several Palestinian factions, leftist and Islamic, rejected the peace deal and pledged to continue the Intifada. Thus, the Intifada has, since the Gulf War, turned into an armed struggle led by the Islamic movement Hamas in the Occupied Territories. Other forms of resistance, such as demonstrations and stone-throwing, have continued but on a very limited scale. Moreover, the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank have continued to respond to the call by Hamas for the monthly general strike, which is regarded as the symbol of the Intifada.

2.11. Summary

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 brought to the fore a new complexity in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel, which had adopted a democratic political system when it was established in 1948, had to put the Occupied Territories under military rule. The deterioration of the political situation in the Occupied Territories led to repeated violent clashes between the Palestinian civilians and the Israeli army. The last outbreak of violence waged by the Palestinian people erupted on
the 9th December 1987, when an Israeli truck crashed and killed four Arabs. The violent reaction, which was in the beginning spontaneous and popular, continued and became organised, and was called by the Palestinians "Intifada". The Intifada became one of the most important turning-points in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict as Israel failed to put an end to it and the Intifada gathered an unprecedented world-wide sympathy and support.

Many writers regarded the Intifada as an outcome of the accumulated miseries produced by the Israeli occupation. They argued that it was not the first wave of violence carried out by the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation. Nevertheless, it was a unique one since all anti-occupation feelings became intensified and focused in the Intifada, in such a way that the Palestinians on the one hand used all the means they possessed to resist the occupation, and on the other hand Israel used all methods that an occupier can use to suppress the revolt and restore order in the Occupied Territories.

Within few weeks' time, the Intifada became well organised and was led mainly by two competing leaderships: the classical PLO affiliate leadership in the Occupied Territories, which formed the UNL, and the rising Islamic Hamas movement. Hamas, and to a lesser extent the Islamic Jihad movement, emerged in the first days of the Intifada and claimed responsibility for its eruption. Although it was a hard task for Hamas to compete with the well-established PLO leadership, the emergence of the Muslim organisation however was the start of a new political map in the Palestinian arena.

The way the Palestinians handled the Intifada, by using simple and primitive means such as stones and boycotting Israeli products, drew world-wide support for their cause, and caused great embarrassment for Israel, whose armed forces confronted the Palestinian protests with live ammunition and tear gas. However, the Palestinians
tended to intensify the use of knives and other weapons at a later stage, particularly after the Gulf War. In fact, the PLO was reluctant to use arms in the Intifada since it felt that it would distance further any prospects of peace. Hamas on the other hand tended to push for the use of arms and, indeed, all forms of struggle, since it regarded the Intifada as the first step toward liberating occupied Palestine, seeing its struggle as "legitimate" while the occupation was "illegitimate".

The Intifada had a great impact on the Palestinian people. Although the Palestinians talked proudly about their courageous resistance and steadfastness, they still suffered dearly from the consequences of the Intifada. In addition to the scores who were killed, injured, and imprisoned, there were devastating consequences of the Intifada on the educational system, economic development, and social aspects of life. Comparatively speaking, the Intifada had little impact on Israel owing to the state's powerful military, economic, and political systems.

However, since the Intifada brought the conflict to a deadlock, for there was no winner in the contest, the USA and its Western allies exerted increasing pressure on all parties in the Middle East, particularly Israel, to bring them to the negotiating table. This in fact became inevitable after the Gulf War in 1991, when the Western allies showed determination to put an end to the Middle Eastern regional conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In 1992, a peace conference took place in Madrid, and thereafter the Palestinians and the Israelis pursued long, hard negotiations on a political settlement that would permit to the Palestinians self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but because of the difficulties both sides faced in the process, the PLO and Israel held secret talks in Oslo and broke the deadlock. Both sides reached an agreement in 1993 that the issue should be discussed, starting gradually, it was implied, with Gaza and Jericho, and then continuing with the rest of the Occupied Territories, but leaving the most crucial
issues to a later stage. The Intifada practically stopped, but the Islamic movements Hamas and Jihad continued their resistance, but this time in the form of armed insurrection.
Chapter Three

THE EXPATRIATE ARAB PRESS IN THE UK
3.1. Introduction

During the last twenty years, the phenomenon of the Arab press in the UK has grown strikingly, since many Arab publications have emerged and flourished in Britain, and some of them have even become leading pan-Arab newspapers and magazines.

There are three factual surveys of the expatriate Arab press in the UK. They all provide guides, listing current and discontinued publications, and supplement this information with brief explanations of policy, ownership, principal staff and writers, and addresses. None of the surveys claims to provide an academic assessment of the expatriate Arab press in Britain, as their main objective is to offer assistance to researchers, journalists, and decision-makers. The three surveys are: "The Arab Press in the UK" (Voice Intelligence Report, 1989), Daleel Al-Sahafah Al-Arabiya fi Baritanya (produced by the Contemporary Studies Centre, 1990), and The Arab Press in Britain (produced by Mohammed Ragab, 1993).

The last-mentioned, which is the most recent, lists 50 current publications being issued in Britain, among which are 6 dailies. The rest of them are weeklies, fortnightlies, monthlies, and quarterlies, and others published irregularly. The guide also lists 158 discontinued publications, among them 3 dailies which ceased publication because of the Gulf War.

Al-Houni (a former Libyan minister, the owner and editor-in-chief of Al-Arab daily) stated in an interview with the researcher (1990) that Al-Arab (The Arabs) was published in London in June 1977 as the first Arabic British newspaper. There was then no other Arabic daily in London, although, some weekly and monthly publications did exist before the establishment of Al-Arab newspaper. The first Arab paper that appeared in London was in 1868, published by a Syrian journalist who had
escaped from the Ottoman Empire. Its title was *Rajoum wa-Ghassaq ila Faris Al-Shidyaq* (*Voice*, vol.2, no.1, 1989: 2).

However, it has only been in recent years that the Arab press has settled, developed, and become widely read in Britain, Europe, and the Arab world. One year after the establishment of *Al-Arab* newspaper, another daily, *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* (*The Middle East*), started publication in London, then in 1988 came *Al-Hayat* (*Life*), and in 1989 *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (*Arab Jerusalem*), both published in London. *Al-Ahram International* (*The Pyramids International*), which is the international edition of the well-known Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram*, started publication in London in 1984.

The Gulf War forced two leading newspapers to cease publication in London: the Kuwaiti *Al-Qabas International* (*The Burning Brand International*), and the Iraqi *Ath-Thawra International* (*The Revolution International*), which had launched their London operations in 1985 and 1990 respectively. Both were international editions of their home dailies. A third newspaper, *Sawt Al-Kuwait International* (*The Voice of Kuwait International*), was established in London in 1990 during the Gulf crisis, but stopped publication after the liberation of Kuwait. Lastly, one more newspaper, repeatedly mentioned in the context of the expatriate Arab press in the guides, is *Al-Ahdath* daily. There is little information available about this paper since it does not appear regularly in newsagents' stores and it has not been possible to contact any of its editors.

Consequently, the expatriate Arab dailies which are being published currently in the UK are (in chronological order of their dates of establishment in London): *Al-Arab, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Ahram International, Al-Hayat, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi*. 
3.2. The 'Expatriate' press

There is a controversy among journalists and observers as to whether the Arab press in the UK is rightly named 'expatriate', 'London-based', or even the 'British' press (for the Arab community in Britain). Awad based his thesis on the image of the West in the Arab press on the ground that the Arab dailies in the UK do represent the Arab media in general. He argued that the Arab mass communications abroad are part of the collective Arab media efforts owned and produced by Arabs, and they face the same problems that are faced by mass communications in the Arab world. Therefore, he commented that although "these media [in the UK] are effectively under fewer restrictions than those which exist in the Arab societies", they "are in every sense a reflection of the Arab press" (Awad, 1992: 120-127).

This argument may be true to a certain extent. However, it must be emphasised that the fact remains that the Arab press in the UK has chosen to operate from outside the Arab world for various reasons, as will be discussed later in this chapter. This fact alone excludes this type of press from being equal to the Arab 'home' press. Furthermore, as a consequence of operating from Europe, the expatriate Arab press has to adjust to and coexist with a different social, political, cultural, and economic environment from that in the Arab world. It looks at Arab issues and affairs from outside, which is a different angle from that of the Arab 'home' press. It also employs a plurality of Arab nationalities, who affect, in one way or another, its coverage and reporting. Additionally, it frequently has the opportunity to meet Arab and foreign politicians and decision-makers who visit London (the centre of diplomacy for the Arabs and the Europeans).

Paradoxically, Al-Houni (interview, 1990) argued that his newspaper is a 'British' Arabic daily. He rejected the idea that the paper is an expatriate, since it was established in the UK in the first place, and had not existed in and migrated from anywhere else. Al-Houni distinguished between the Arab newspapers which have
international editions, those which have migrated from Arab countries for political or other reasons, and those which were originally established in Britain. While the first type is representative of the Arab home press and the second is migratory (or expatriate), the third, Al-Houni stressed, is a British Arab press.

In fact, the predominant characteristic of the Arab press in the UK after the Gulf War is that it has tended to be more British in the sense that their proprietors had the conviction that by being published in Britain they would be able to communicate with the Arab readers in many parts of the world freely and in a much better way than the Arab home press. In the 1980s there were several attempts to produce international editions of some newspapers by establishing liaison offices in London for forwarding the printing and distribution of the international edition. With the exception of Al-Ahram International, not only did those attempts fail and suspend publication during the Gulf crisis, but neither have there been other attempts by any other newspaper.

However, the notion that the Arab press in the UK is 'British' may easily be refuted, simply because it was established by Arabs who typically live in Arab countries and are primarily concerned with Arab home affairs. In a very limited number of cases, some Arab publications in London were formed to serve the Arab community in Britain. But this is not the case for most of the Arab press in the UK, particularly the newspapers, whose main market beyond the borders of Britain, namely the Arab world. They are thus operating on British soil, but are preoccupied with Arab affairs for readers in the Arab world.

This argument leads us to consider the reasons for the expatriation of the Arab press and the newspaper proprietors' reasons for choosing Britain as their place of publication.
Generally speaking, the dominant political situation in the Arab world, where freedom of expression either does not exist or is restricted, has encouraged many intellectuals, journalists, writers, and opposition political activists and leaders to seek freedom in the West. Evans (1992: 16) reported the following example of press restriction in the Arab world as an indication of the situation of political tightening: "There," she said, "you have to have a licence, usually from the interior ministry, to publish a cookery book let alone a political weekly." She also indicated that even some of the Arab ruling elite have admitted that they have links with Arab publications in Britain because there they can write the things they cannot say about their government in their own countries. Moreover, Somerlad (1966: 41) suggested that the press in the Middle East, in general, suffers from instability, so that it can be affected by changes in the 'political wind'.

The chief editors of the Arab dailies in London have emphasised the importance of the element of freedom for publishing outside the Arab world. Al-Houni (Interview, 1990), for example, stated that the reason for establishing Al-Arab in Britain is the degree of freedom enjoyed in this country, which is not comparable with that of any other country, even elsewhere in Europe. Al-Khazen (interview, 1990) also stressed that his paper, Al-Hayat, sought to secure freedom as well as continuity of operation by basing itself in Britain.

However, Atwan (of Al-Quds Al-Arabi) (interview, 1990) and Al-Omair (of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat) (interview, 1990) stated that freedom of the press has not been the prime reason for the emigration of the Arab press. While Atwan argued that many Arab publications in Britain are loyal to Arab governments, Al-Omair stressed that for the purpose of distribution in the Arab world, the Arab dailies in the UK have to watch what they are publishing, and therefore they are not truly free. Moreover, according to Milhem (1993: 17), in order to distribute in the Arab world, most
publications which are financed by Arab governments "had to operate within the usual constraints," and therefore "publishing in the West did not mean greater freedom."

Consequently, there are other reasons why these elements of the Arab press chose to operate outside the Arab world. One of the reasons was the competition among Arab countries to influence the Arab readership in the Arab world and abroad. This was indicated by Evans (1992: 16), who argued that Saudi Arabia in particular is trying to dominate the world of the Arab press (and the media as a whole) in London. She quoted Al-Omair as saying, "We have the biggest banks, the biggest pan-Arab trading companies, why not the biggest newspapers? Twenty years ago, we were run by Cairo Radio and Mohammed Heikel of Al-Ahram. Now it is our turn. It is our age, it is the Saudi trend."

Indeed, the Arab press in the UK competes in Europe, the USA, and, more importantly, in the Arab capitals. By operating outside the Arab world, they have been able to invade the markets of the opposition press and, in addition, they have attempted to spread their views and ideologies among the Arab communities at home and abroad. Moreover, publishing in a Western country conveys to the readership the (perhaps unquestioned) message that those newspapers are independent and free of any Arab government's control. It adds credibility to the papers and makes them more acceptable to the readership at home, as well as the readership elsewhere. In other words, a number of Arab publications were established outside the Arab world by certain Arab regimes purposely for the aim of countering the opposition press abroad and, furthermore to manipulate Arab public opinion inside and outside the Arab world.

Political freedom, whether it is genuine or superficial, is an important element which characterizes the expatriate press. However, we may argue that it is more significant for this press to be free from social, religious, and cultural restrictions. Although the expatriate press has to take these dimensions into consideration in its coverage of any
issue, it still, enjoys a large measure of freedom, away from the traditionally restrictive Arab societies. This comment is to a greater extent applicable to the Arab Gulf-owned press. The social traditions and cultural values in some Arab Gulf states form some kind of censorship and impose restrictions on a number of media programmes, prohibiting them from offending or touching those traditions and values. Issues such as women and religion are extremely sensitive and can only be discussed more freely by outside (e.g. expatriate) media. For example, women’s right to participate in political life would not be addressed by the Saudi home press, while the Saudi-owned expatriate daily, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, can easily discuss such an issue.

Finally, it has been argued by Al-Omair (interview, 1990) that the main reason for establishing some Arab newspapers in the UK has been economic. He reasoned that because many Arabs have followed the fashion of migration to the West, which has coincided with the development of Arab economic interests in the West, it would then be sensible to establish Arab publications there that would be expected to be successful. That could indeed be true in some cases, but the fact is that most newspapers remain financially dependent on governments or businessmen, because, according to Altschull (1984: 262), "it is growing increasingly difficult in most places to operate newspapers without government subsidies."

But why, we may ask, did most of the main expatriate press choose London? Although there is a large number of Arab migrants in Canada, the USA, Western Europe, and Australia, many Arab publications, especially expatriate Arab dailies, are centred in London. Some people believe that Britain has the best political system guaranteeing freedom of speech for everyone. Al-Houni (interview, 1990), as has been indicated earlier, stressed that the freedom in Britain is not matched by any other European country. However, the chief editors of the expatriate dailies acknowledged that there are other important reasons for choosing London (given the fact that freedom is available in all of the Western countries, though to different degrees). In
brief, they considered the following points as the main distinguishing characteristics of Britain as a suitable place for the expatriate Arab press:

(a) It is the traditional centre of world communications, especially between the Middle East and the West.
(b) It could be regarded as a contact point for the different parts (West and East) of the Arab world.
(c) Many qualified Arab journalists and writers, and even skilful technicians, have migrated to Britain in the last few decades. These people have been able to establish highly professional journalistic enterprises that no other Arab home press can match or compete with.
(d) The English language is spoken globally and it is a second language for many Arabs, thus enabling the Arab press to function effectively and to deal easily with the British system.
(e) The reputation of Britain can be said to guarantee prestige and honour for the many Arab publications that are produced there.

In summary, the expatriate Arab press in the UK is significant because:
(a) It is published in a free country, relatively (or at least theoretically) remote from the restrictions and government censorship of the home country.
(b) It is a pan-Arab1 press, not a local or even a national press, and can therefore distribute on a larger scale than the home press. On the one hand it has an additional value to the expatriate Arab community, since it publishes in its language and covers its interests from a similar perspective, unlike the 'foreign' English press, while on the other hand it is seen by the readership in the Arab countries as more objective than the local publications, since it publishes overseas, away from conditions that pertain locally. Consequently, its publications are read by the influential circles and policy-makers in these countries.

1 The term 'pan-Arab' is referred to in this context in the sense that the expatriate press tries to appeal to pan-Arab audiences rather than the readership in a particular Arab country.
(c) The Arab press in the UK is again particularly significant because it is read by a cross-section of the Arab readers in, and coming from, different Arab countries. As a result, it needs to take into account and try to balance the different cultures, the considerably different national interests, and the various needs of the people of the Arab world as a whole and of the expatriate Arab communities abroad, in contrast to the local readership to which the home press appearing in each Arab country inevitably caters.

(d) Since it is away from government censorship, whether of a political, ideological, or cultural nature, it can and does cover issues not covered in the local Arab press, and it does so in greater depth and from a different and perhaps more objective perspective.

(e) It is usually run by economically powerful and professionally skilful people, who surpass those in the Arab world.

(f) It attracts the best journalists and writers, not only expatriates, but also in the Arab world, because of its popularity among the readership, its openness (because of the free environment in which it operates), and its good reputation as a pan-Arab press.

3.3. The Arab dailies in the UK

The four expatriate Arab newspapers, in addition to Al-Ahram International, have become increasingly prominent, popular, and highly respected pan-Arab dailies around the world. They have been widening their circulation to cover many parts of the globe. They have also been investing extra efforts to improve their services by increasing the number of pages, attracting more prominent writers and journalists, allocating more correspondents at many places world-wide, and paying more attention to deep analysis and reporting of different views about many current issues.
3.3.1. Al-Arab

All the expatriate Arab newspapers are said to be privately owned. Al-Arab newspaper, which was established in 1977, is owned by the Libyan family Al-Houni. Its owner and editor-in-chief, Ahmad Al-Houni (interview, 1990), denied any relations between his paper and any Arab government, either financially or politically. He stated that Al-Arab is absolutely independent and does not reflect points of view of any government or organisation. However, it is said that Al-Arab is friendly to Colonel Gaddafi of Libya and that it expresses his views and ideas (Voice, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 9). The paper advocates Nasser's theory of Arabism. This is apparent through its slogan: "Al-Arab for all Arabs. From the (Atlantic) Ocean to the (Arabian) Gulf is our fatherland. Our goal is Arab nationalism and unity" (CSC, 1990: 21-22).

Al-Arab takes pride in being the first Arab daily to be published and distributed anywhere in the European continent and in being distributed there and in the Arab world. This fact is emblazoned on the newspaper's front page. According to the CSC report (1990: 22), Al-Arab is influenced by the personality of its editor-in-chief, in consequence of which it is emotional in its tone and outspoken in its headlines.

As far as the policy of Al-Arab newspaper is concerned, it is said to be critical of certain Arab governments, such as Kuwait. "It has sometimes seemed to readers that no issue of Al-Arab was without critical appraisal of Kuwait" and some particular personalities (Voice, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 9). Additionally, it has been noted in the CSC report (1990: 22) that Al-Arab has attacked some expatriate Arab dailies such as Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat.

The editors-in-chief of the newspapers were unwilling to disclose full details of the ownership and control of their newspapers.
During the Gulf War, Al-Arab sided with Iraq against the Arab Gulf states, which became a target of its criticism and attacks. The paper is also very critical of the USA, Israel, and the peace process in the Middle East. The Voice report (1989, vol.2, no.7: 9) indicated that the paper attacks some personalities in the PLO for their remarks "concerning possible reconciliation policies with Israel," for example Bassam Abu-Sharif, the personal adviser of the PLO chairman Yassir Arafat.

Al-Arab has always supported the Palestinian cause. Al-Houni (interview, 1990) affirmed that it is the duty of Al-Arab to back the Palestinian struggle, especially the uprising. Moreover, he stressed, the paper has called for all Arab states to back the Intifada and protect it from internal and external conspiracies, and to open the boundaries between Arab countries and Israel for military operations against Israel, as a practical means of sustaining the Intifada.

The newspaper employs people of different Arab nationalities and, according to Awad (1992: 134), "most - if not all - of its staff are from the opposition of their respective countries." He also stated that the paper has been under the spotlight because one of its staff (Saeed Hindawi) "was contacted of [sic] an attempt to blow up an El-Al [Israeli] plane at Heathrow, London in 1987."

Al-Arab is printed only in London and distributed in Europe, most of the Arab countries, and recently in the USA. Since the Gulf War, the paper has been prohibited distribution in Egypt, Syria, and the Arab Gulf states1 because of the political stance it took during the war. Al-Arab's daily circulation is about 70,000 copies (Al-Houni, interview, 1995).

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1 Recently, Qatar has allowed the distribution of Al-Arab and other Gulf states are expected to do the same.
Al-Arab publishes articles and columns by writers from different backgrounds. However, according to Qabartai (interview, 1995), all writers for Al-Arab are chosen for their believing in Arabism (Arab national unity) and opposition to the regressive (i.e. non-leftist or nationalist) regimes in the Arab world. He stressed that other people who want to participate may only do so in the letters page and the editor usually comments on what they write. The chief writers, among whom are some of the paper's staff, are:

Mohammed Qabartai: A Jordanian journalist who has been working for Al-Arab since its establishment and acts as the deputy editor-in-chief. He sometimes writes the editorial comment of the paper. Qabartai used to work in the Arabic section of the BBC World Service. He is known as an advocate of Arab nationalism and an opponent of Israel, the USA, and the peace process in the Middle East.

Mohammed Sa'id Al-Junaidi: A Jordanian journalist who previously worked as editor-in-chief of Al-Iqtisad Al-Arabi magazine in London in the 1970s. He also worked for the Lebanese magazine Al-Hawadith. He is currently a columnist and one of the editors of Al-Arab.

Fathi Ghanim: A prominent Egyptian writer and novelist. He was formerly the editor-in-chief of the well-known Egyptian magazine Roz El-Yusuf. He is known as a moderate, who does not oppose the peace process, but one who is against normalization with Israel before recovering the Arab rights.

Abdel-Rahman Ash-Shater: A Libyan journalist and one of the editorial team of Al-Arab.

Mohammed Moro: An Islamist Egyptian writer, who comments on Arab issues, and advocates Islamic causes and Muslim organizations.

Tayseer Kamleh: A Palestinian journalist, who writes on Palestinian, and sometimes other Arab, issues and adopts a hardline stance in the peace process.

Yusri Husein: An Egyptian journalist, well known for his criticism of Arab official policies. He supports the continuation of the struggle against the Israeli occupation and opposes the peace process, particularly as long as the Arabs are in a weak position.

Al-Arab is printed only in London, but is distributed in Europe, most of the Arab countries, and recently in the USA. Since the Gulf War, the paper has been prohibited distribution in Egypt, Syria, and the Arab Gulf states1 because of the political stance it took during the war. Al-Arab's daily circulation is about 70,000 copies (Al-Houni, interview, 1995).

Until the Gulf crisis, the paper used to advertise for some Gulf companies. However, since the crisis in August 1990, advertisements form a minimal proportion of the paper's contents. In one issue of the paper no more than ten small-size advertisements could be found. Most of the advertisers are small restaurants in London. Even prior to the Gulf crisis, the number of advertisements was very few, the only difference being that there was a small number of advertisements for some companies from the Arab

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1 Recently, Qatar has allowed the distribution of Al-Arab and other Gulf states are expected to do the same.
Gulf. Therefore, the main revenue of the paper is its circulation, while the advertisements provide it with an insignificant proportion of the total income. To cover the expenses, the paper has had to seek funding several avenues. It should be pointed out that the owners of the paper own their headquarters building in London as well as the printing machinery. Moreover, the paper employs only a small number of office staff as well as correspondents. By these means the paper saves a great amount of money which might otherwise have been spent on rent, printing, and staff. The paper offers a printing service to other newspapers as a way of increasing income. However, the prime proportion of the paper's income comes from its sales to Libya and, to a lesser extent, to Tunisia and Jordan.

3.3.2. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat was founded by the two Saudi brothers, Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz, as part of their giant Saudi Research and Marketing Company. This publication company runs a chain of about a dozen weekly and daily newspapers and magazines from London. The owners of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat established themselves in Britain in 1972, when they issued the first Saudi paper in English, Arab News (Voice, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 25). Ragab (1990: 27) described Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat as "the jewel in the crown of the two brothers' series of publications." The paper, Ragab added, is an explicit advocate of the pan-Islamic line, in shape and content, so that, for instance, "the words, 'In the name of God the most merciful and most glorious' precede the title of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and both the front and back pages are in green, a symbol of the Islamic and Saudi flag."
Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat has been repeatedly accused of being the voice of the Saudi regime. Voice (1989, vol.2, no.7: 25) reported that Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz in particular, the governor of Riyadh, one of the closest princes to the King, and an adviser of the King in media matters, has a great influence on the newspaper. Moreover, Evans (1992: 16) claimed that Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat is actually owned by Prince Salman and not only influenced by him. She argued that the Saudi princes are involved in attempts to own and dominate all the Arab press in the UK. Nevertheless, the editor of the newspaper has stressed that it is independent because it is owned by businessmen who established it for economic reasons (Al-Omair, interview, 1990).

The CSC report (1990: 17) suggested that although the paper reflects Saudi government views, it at the same time tries hard to look independent. Whatever be the actual case, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat is regarded by its readership, as well as by observers, as a Saudi-oriented newspaper. Moreover, it reflects the foreign policy of "moderation" of Saudi Arabia and "acts as an effective platform for Saudi government policies" (Voice, vol.2, no.7: 24). The paper is most popular in the Gulf (and particularly in Saudi Arabia, where it is printed in three cities simultaneously) and among the Arab communities in the West. Awad (1992: 140) categorized it journalistically as "the most powerful, successful, and best produced Arabic newspaper."

Unlike many other Arabic dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat offers the opportunity for different ideas and views to be expressed in its pages, as a feature of its moderation and relative openness. The general stance of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat is, in addition to being pan-Islamic, critical of Arab disunity. It is also regarded by Voice (1989, vol.2, no.7: 24) as conservative, anti-communist (or generally anti-leftist), "abrasive about Washington's 'encouragement' of Israel, [and] intensely concerned about the Islamic image in the West." Since its establishment, the paper has extensively covered the prime and hottest Arab issues, particularly the Lebanese Civil War, the Iraq-Iran War,
the Palestine question (especially the Intifada), the second Gulf War, and lately the peace process in the Middle East.

Al-Omair (interview, 1990) stated that his paper pays special attention to the Palestinian struggle, particularly the Intifada, against the Israeli occupation. He affirmed that the paper supports the line of the PLO as a legitimate and elected representative of the Palestinian people. However, according to Al-Omair, *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* does its best to give a fair coverage of all Palestinian factions including the leftists and the Islamists, yet this does not mean that the paper adopts any of these lines. Finally, he added that the paper's editorial line believes that the role of the paper is to mobilize Arab public opinion in favour of the Palestinians' cause. The support for the Intifada is, in the editor's opinion, important since the uprising is an effective method of struggle that could force Israel to halt its policy of oppression against the Palestinians.

*Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* is a newspaper of a large size (at least 20 pages) and is issued 7 days a week. It is transmitted from London and printed in Cairo, Jeddah, Dhahran, Riyadh, Kuwait, Casablanca, Marseilles (in the summer only), Paris, Frankfurt, and New York. It is distributed in the European countries, the Arab states, and the USA. *Voice* (1989, vol.2, no.7: 24) commented on its wide distribution that "much to its credit and prestige it is available all over the world." According to the ABC distribution company, the daily circulation of the paper in 1994 was 217,960 copies.

*Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* employs a number of Arab journalists of various nationalities and from different backgrounds. The paper also publishes articles and analyses by prominent Arab writers and journalists who are known to be in accord with traditional, conservative Arab thinking and supportive of the Arab regimes in their own countries. According to Uwaydah (interview, 1995), the paper makes an effort to publish articles
by the most experienced, well-known, and professional writers in the Arab world and abroad, thereby aiming to gain for the paper promotion and prestige in each Arab country, since the reader will recognize names of writers from his own country. Uweydah also points out that the characteristics of the paper's writers are respectability, prominence, and professionalism. He notes that they enjoy a wide margin of freedom to comment on current issues, as long as their comments are supported by valuable and quality arguments. Moreover, the paper publishes exclusive articles by prominent Western writers and personalities, among whom are the British analyst, Peter Mansfield, and the American President's wife, Hillary Clinton.

The chief writers of the paper were:

Ameen Al-Hafez: An independent Lebanese Sunni Muslim politician, Member of Parliament, and writer on Lebanese and Palestinian affairs. Al-Hafiz is known to be cautiously supportive of the peace process and to have a conservative attitude toward Arab-Israeli normalization.

Ahmad Baha Eddin: An Egyptian journalist with a long-established reputation as an analyst. He is known for his nationalist views, expressed in loyalty to the principle of support for the interest of Arab countries and peoples Arab unity, democracy, and freedom in the Arab world. Therefore, he shows caution towards and suspicion of all Israeli peaceful gestures, and frequently warns Arab leaders to be careful in seeking peace with Israel.

Ahmad Hamroush: An Egyptian writer and analyst. He has been known as a politician active in the African affairs since his chairmanship of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. Moreover, he has long experience in military affairs, as he was a major
in the Egyptian army. He believes that force and strength create political changes and he therefore supports peace with Israel only if the Arabs are in a strong position.

Akram Zu'a'iter: A prominent Palestinian historian and a specialist in the history of the Holy Land. He is known as a writer from the traditional Palestinian side, who is loyal to Jordan and advocates the official Arab points of view. He is vigorously opposed to Israel and believes in the historical, religious, and political rights of the Palestinians in the Holy Land.

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat has been known as the crown of the Saudi Research and Publishing Company, which, as previously indicated, publishes a large number of items. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat has achieved remarkable successes in achieving significant increase in its circulation. It circulates, for instance, about 100,000 copies in Saudi Arabia alone (Tayyash, interview, 1995). It has also attracted a large number of wealthy advertisers, mainly in Saudi Arabia. The paper, according to Tayyash, has been one of the prime financial sources for the company as a whole, yet it is only part of a very active publication company, which has other businesses in Saudi Arabia, other than press. Thus, for instance, according to Tayyash, the company has the exclusive right to publish all school books in Saudi Arabia, not to mention its capability, as a powerful publisher, to work privately in the publication of university and academic books, as well as novels and various other publications.

3.3.3. Al-Hayat

Al-Hayat newspaper was first published in Lebanon in 1946 but ceased publication in 1976 because of the Civil War in the country. It was eventually reissued in London in
1988 and emerged as one of the leading pan-Arab dailies. Al-Hayat is a continuation and development of the old Lebanese version since its owner, Jamil Mroue, the successor of the old Al-Hayat ownership, has followed the same policy and further developed its personality as originally established.

Al-Hayat describes itself as "a quality Arabic newspaper for the quality reader." The Voice report (1989, vol.2, no.7: 12) put it in terms of quality and type of readership on a par with The Times, The Independent, and Le Monde. Voice pointed out that Al-Hayat is read by intellectuals, academics, and decision-makers.

Though Al-Hayat is regarded by many observers as right-wing in its line, the paper allows leftists to contribute to debates and discussions of various hot issues concerning the Arab world, such as democracy, peace with Israel, and Islamic fundamentalism. It could fairly be described as much more liberal and secular than many other Arab dailies. The paper operates a unique policy of not having formal editorials or editorial comments by the paper as such. Its editors contribute in columns in the 'opinion page' and express their views freely under their own names. According to Voice (1989, vol.2, no.7: 13), the editors of Al-Hayat "enjoy a rare freedom within the broad guidelines laid down by the publishers. They publish what they see fit journalistically with 'professionalism, accuracy and objectivity'." The editor, Al-Khazen, stated in the interview (1990) that there is no typical article that could be regarded as reflecting the paper's policy. Though Al-Khazen himself does have a daily column (on the back page), he is eager to point out that all opinion articles and columns reflect their writers' own views.

However, Al-Hayat is widely known as a pro-Saudi newspaper. Voice (1989, vol.2, no.7: 12-13) and CSC (1990: 12) pointed out that the close relationship between the paper's editor-in-chief and certain Saudi princes has led the paper to reflect Saudi
interests. Some writers have actually accused *Al-Hayat* of being owned by the Saudi Prince Khalid bin Sultan (Evans, 1992: 16), although others explain that the Prince has simply invested in the paper for twenty years (Milhem, 1993: 17). Although the paper has in the past denied any connections with the Saudis, it has recently acknowledged the investment by Prince Khalid bin Sultan in the paper for ten years. Nevertheless, the paper preserves to a large extent its moderation, (relative) liberality, and independence. Milhem (1993: 17) pointed out that the Saudi influence in the paper is not apparent at first glance, since it is meant to look like being independent and free from any control. It must still be asked, even if Saudi views are not obvious in *Al-Hayat*, why is it subsidized and sustained by the princes of the Kingdom? Evans (1992: 16) argued that both *Al-Hayat* and *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* have a reasonable margin of freedom for reporting and commenting on other countries' affairs, and in that sense they are not even rivalled. Furthermore, *Al-Hayat* handles issues that would never be discussed in papers inside Saudi Arabia, such as Islamic fundamentalism and leftist issues. Such issues are explicitly and plainly set for discussion in the paper by its editors and writers (Milhem, 1993: 17). However, according to Evans (1992: 16), "when it comes to those oil-rich regions where kings, emirs and sultans, and the West hold sway, the pens are muted. The coverage of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular seldom strays from the official version of news." It seems reasonable to deduce that Saudi princes subsidize *Al-Hayat* in order to buy its silence over issues concerning their country and the Gulf in general. Moreover, we may argue that the explicit contacts of the Saudi princes with *Al-Hayat* mean that while it reserves its relatively 'secular' and 'liberal' trends, it nevertheless reflects an aspect of political tides in the Saudi regime. This in fact explains why the two newspapers - *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* and *Al-Hayat* - are supported by members of the Saudi royal family. While they have different policies, the first leans to the 'traditional' Saudi policies and the second reflects the more 'modern' face of Saudi thinking.
Generally speaking, *Al-Hayat* shows to a large extent a considerable degree of objectivity and neutrality. It is sought by newspaper readers because they believe it to produce highly professional and accurate reports and to avoid any "propagandistic, sensational or emotional style" and any attempt to use the paper as a platform for personal attacks (*Voice*, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 13). This policy of *Al-Hayat*, although it generates credit and popularity among the educated readership, may upset some Arab governments and thus prevent its distribution in certain countries. *Al-Hayat* was, for instance, prohibited from distribution in Saudi Arabia in 1992 for twenty or thirty days, in spite of the close relationship the paper has with the royal family. The reason for the imposed ban was the paper's publishing an article that the Saudi "government felt ... was a slight directed against the King" (Milhem, 1993: 17).

This policy of *Al-Hayat* has made it the single most important Arabic daily as it is attractive to a discerning Arab public and is now read and considered seriously by intellectuals and middle-class people (Milhem, 1993: 17).

*Al-Hayat* gives more consideration to Lebanese affairs than to other international and Arab news stories. Palestine affairs come second. The newspaper appears to be mainly critical of the Syrian role in Lebanon and, to some extent, of the PLO (*Voice*, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 13). During the Gulf War, the newspaper sided with the allies, but remained very objective and accurate in its reporting. *Al-Hayat* supported the Intifada and gave full coverage of the daily events in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to Al-Khazen (interview, 1990), "We don't have any choice but to support the Intifada for many reasons. They [the Palestinians] are right and the Israelis are wrong. The Intifada is a positive national act, and it is a legitimate means of struggle. If the liberal Jews support the Intifada, it is our duty then to back it up." The paper aims by its coverage of the uprising to gain a long-term political influence on public opinion. *Al-Hayat* has had, soon after its re-establishment, at least one correspondent in Jerusalem, a step which has not been taken by any other Arabic newspaper.
The paper is transmitted from London by satellite to, and simultaneously printed in, Frankfurt, Beirut, New York, Al-Manama, Cairo, and (in the summer) to Marseilles. *Al-Hayat* was the first Arabic daily to have an office in Moscow. It is currently distributed mainly in the European countries and the Arab world, in addition to the USA and Canada. Its circulation is estimated to be 50,000 copies a day (Al-Dajani, interview, 1995).

*Al-Hayat* has been known as a platform for most Arab views and opinions. After its re-establishment in 1988, the paper employed a large number of Lebanese journalists, who had experienced the relative freedom of the press in Lebanon, even during the civil war. In particular, the paper employed a number of journalists who had worked for the Lebanese daily *Al-Nahar* and some others from *Al-Safeer* and the former *Al-Hayat*. The wide spectrum of people on the newspaper's staff representing different ideas and thoughts has lent a distinct and unique character to *Al-Hayat*. However, what characterizes *Al-Hayat* more than anything else is the professionalism and the high quality of the argument it presents. According to one of its editors, Walid Noweihedh (interview, 1995), the editorial staff of the paper pay particular attention to presenting the highest quality of journalism. He added that the long professional experience of the paper's editors has made it possible to maintain news coverage of a high standard and thus to compete with other dailies, and also has enabled the paper to tolerate all (well-presented) views and opinions. In general, the paper's editors and writers could be described as moderate, but they are at the same time bold and daring, while their main concern and priority is their (relative) freedom of expression. They use their talents to criticize policies and make sharp comments on governments'
performances, without however offending and upsetting most of the Arab regimes. Moreover, the paper has attracted a number of prominent and respected writers and intellectuals from many areas of the world. Thus, a number of foreign writers contribute to the newspaper, such as the British writer on Middle Eastern affairs, Helena Cobban.

The chief writers for the paper have been:

Khirallah Kirallah: One of the prominent Lebanese journalists, who previously worked as editor-in-chief of the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar. He has served as manager of the editorial of Al-Hayat and has frequently written on Lebanese, Palestinian, and sometimes other Arab, affairs. Khirallah backed a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but argued that the Palestinians should play the political game right to compel Israel to give up the Palestinians' rights.

Yazid Sayegh: A well-known Palestinian analyst and writer, and political activist. He has gained reputation as a prominent academic (he lives in Oxford, UK), since he has participated in various symposia and academic discussions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was a member of the Palestine National Council and was active in bringing about an Israeli-Palestinian common understanding. He was a member of the Palestinian (Madrid) delegation in the peace negotiations and insists on the importance of improving the conditions of the peace process.

Hazem Saghieh: A Lebanese journalist and a former editor of the Lebanese daily, Al-Safeer. He was formerly a member of the Lebanese Communist Party, but later came to support Islamic trends. He is now an advocate of the peace process in the Middle East and calls for full relations and normalization with the Jewish State.
Kamran Qarah Daghi: An Iraqi Kurdish journalist. He was formerly a member of the Communist Party and worked as the correspondent for the former Russian news agency, Novosti. He now tends to be liberal and is a specialist in Kurdish affairs.

George Sam'an: A Lebanese journalist and the former editorial manager of Al-Hayat. He is currently the editor-in-chief of the London-based weekly and affiliate of Al-Hayat, Al-Wasat magazine.

Abdel-Wahhab Bader Khan: A liberal Lebanese journalist, used to work for the Lebanese daily, Al-Nahar. He is currently an editor at Al-Hayat. The editor of the opinion page, and the director of the front page of the newspaper.

Al-Hayat has been known as a paper which invests a lot of money in enhancing its quality and reputation through employing the best journalists, having as many experienced correspondents in many parts of the world as possible, utilizing state-of-the-art communications technology, and encouraging writers to make their contribution by offering them generous payments. A substantial proportion of the paper's income comes from its circulation and advertising. The number of advertisements in Al-Hayat newspaper is in fact relatively few (compared, for example, with Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat). In the examined issue of the paper (18.1.1990) there were only four advertisements. The paper's plans focused on increasing the number of advertisements in order to cover the deficit in its budget. However, the Gulf crisis hit the paper's business and delayed the fulfilment of its plans (Asfahani, interview, 1995). The annual deficit in the paper's budget, according to Asfahani, is usually between two and three million pounds. This is always covered by the investor, Prince Khaled Bin Sultan. Asfahani added that the Prince is aware of the problems the
paper has been facing, but he is committed to supporting it for private reasons. Asfahani concluded that the future of the paper is promising, as the Prince is hopeful that the paper “with his financial support” will serve his political aspirations.

3.3.4. Al-Quds Al-Arabi

As its name implies, Al-Quds Al-Arabi is a Palestinian owned and directed newspaper. It was established in London in 1989 by the Abu-Zalaf family, who own the well-known leading Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds in Jerusalem. The CSC report (1990: 25) claimed that Al-Quds Arabi is subsidized by Yassir Arafat, while it has kept its ownership under the name of Abu-Zalaf. This accusation was however denied by its editor-in-chief and director, Abdel-Bari Atwan. However, Evans (1992: 16) has noted that the newspaper is clearly connected to the policy of the PLO, regardless of who owns or subsidizes it. Atwan stated in the interview (1995) that the paper is no longer owned by the Abu-Zalaf family. He indicated that he himself is the only person in charge of the paper, because he has taken over its ownership with the support of a number of private investors.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi is described as financially poor in comparison with Al-Hayat and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, since it does not have a similar access to the Saudi wealth. According to Evans (1992: 16), the paper depends heavily on Western news agencies because it has a small number of "underpaid stringers and a fraction of their staff working for half the wages."

The paper is widely read by Palestinian people outside the Occupied Territories and by those who are interested in Palestinian affairs. It "covers in depth Palestinian affairs and devotes a full page (normally page ten) to translating articles and editorials which
appear in the Israeli press and are of interest to the Palestinians" (Ragab, 1993: 21-22).

As far as the policy of Al-Quds Al-Arabi is concerned, Atwan (interview, 1990), who had long experience in working in the Saudi press, stressed that his newspaper is the only independent expatriate Arab daily, given that all other dailies are connected in one way or another to Arab governments, and in this respect his paper fills a gap. However, Al-Quds Al-Arabi has been said to have good contacts with Jordan and it attempts to obtain and keep the PLO's support (Voice, vol.2, no.7: 19). Moreover, it has been described as close to the mainstream of the PLO and as paying special attention to the policy of its chairman, Yassir Arafat (Awad, 1992: 139), while giving a fair coverage to the rest of the Palestinian factions. The CSC report (1990: 25) pointed out that the paper represents the views of the PLO, and particularly Arafat's line. It added that not only has the paper adopted the positions of the PLO affiliate leadership of the Intifada (UNL), but that it has also published its communiqués and covered its activities, while ignoring the role of the Hamas movement.

Atwan (interview, 1990) has described his paper as a 'liberal' daily which tries to be in the middle (i.e. objective) and not to show any bias. Therefore, the paper avoids reporting Palestinian differences inside and outside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Ragab (1993: 22) argues that the paper follows the principle of 'pluralism' in its policy of publishing different opinions, as a step toward political pluralism in the Arab world.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi is centrally interested in Palestinian affairs and covers extensively events in the Occupied Territories. The main news of the Arab world comes second and then, at a lower level, international news. It stands firm against the policy of the USA towards the Middle East, especially the Palestine issue and the Gulf crisis. It could be described as hostile to the USA-Israeli alliance against the Arab interests, and
blames both countries for failure and setbacks in the peace process. Though it has always been critical of Arab disunity, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, which sided with Iraq during the Gulf crisis, has attacked the Gulf states and accused them of jeopardizing the Arab unity by being 'puppets' of the USA. The paper is the only "mainstream Arab daily willing to comment regularly on Gulf affairs" and consequently it was "locked out of the Arab world's most lucrative advertising market" (Evans, 1992: 16).

*Al-Quds Al-Arabi* is printed only in London and distributed on the European continent, North and South America, and in the Arab world. However, the paper has been banned in the Gulf states since the War, though some Gulf countries have recently permitted the paper to be distributed again. Three states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain) still prohibit it from entering their borders. The daily circulation of the newspaper is 35,000 - 40,000 copies, and in the summer the number goes up to 50,000 (Atwan, interview, 1995).

*Al-Quds Al-Arabi*'s editors and writers are, to some extent similar to those of *Al-Arab*. However, the main difference is that while the those who write in the latter represent an ideology, i.e. Arab nationalism, the writers of *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* are committed to a cause, i.e. the Palestinian cause. They make every effort to convey the Palestinian suffering and agony under the Israeli Occupation. The at the same time sustain the peace process, with a clear and constant blame of Israel for all problems and obstacles in the peace talks, and accuse Israel of intentionally attempting to ruin the peace process. The writers of *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* are described by the paper's editor-in-chief as liberal and intellectual people who devoted their lives for democracy, liberty, pluralism, and peace in the Arab world (Atwan, interview, 1995). The writers, as the policy of the paper as a whole does, take an aggressive line against the Arab
Gulf states. The writers do not hesitate to criticise the governments in those countries, while at the same time showing their support to Iraq.

The chief writers of the paper are:

Al-Ghassan Al-Atiyeh: An Iraqi academic, researcher, and writer. He was assistant to the Arab League's secretary-general for information and media affairs. He stands at the moderate opposition side of the Iraqi regime.

Adli Sadeq: A Palestinian writer. He was active, militarily, against Israel until he was arrested and spent ten years in an Israeli jail, before his release in the 1980s in Israel's exchange of prisoners of war with the PLO. He is realistic in his arguments and an enthusiastic defender of the Arabs' rights and common interests.

Mohammed Fadhel Jammali: A former Iraqi Prime Minister, foreign minister, and a permanent ambassador to the UN. He was sentenced to death in Iraq during the 1958 revolution, which was led by Abdel-Kareem Qasem. Later he was released and left Iraq for Tunisia where he settled as a lecturer at the University of Tunis.

Mohammed Abdel-Hakam Diab: An Egyptian nationalist writer, who lives in Britain. He has a liberal tendency and takes a special interest in academic analysis of events, though he believes in Arab nationalism as a principle for a future Arab unity.

Rahshad Abu-Shawar: A prominent Palestinian writer and author, who contributed for a long time to the paper before becoming a member of its staff. He could be described as a leftlist who believes in the importance of recovering all the rights of the Palestinians, i.e. the liberation of the whole land of mandatory Palestine. He explicitly opposes the peace process between the PLO and Israel.
Al-Mahdi Al-Manjarah: A prominent Moroccan intellectual and thinker. He is a member of the Royal Academic Institute in Morocco and the author of more than twenty, mostly academic, books. He is a professor and lecturer at the University of Mohammed Al-Khames in Rabat (Atwan, interview, 1995).

Al-Quds Al-Arabi, when compared with the rest of the expatriate papers, could be described as financially the poorest. It employs few staff and correspondents, it does not possess the building in which it operates, and it does not have any source of money apart from the circulation and some private payments in the form of donations in recognition of the fact that the paper speaks for the Palestinian people abroad. The paper does not publish any advertisements, not only because it is the herald of a cause, but also because in advertising it would have to compete with giant newspapers and publication corporations, e.g. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat. According to Atwan (interview, 1995), the paper therefore covers more than 80% of its costs and expenses from its circulation, the deficit being easily covered by wealthy Arab people and businessmen.

3.3.5. Al-Ahram International

Unlike the rest of the expatriate Arabic dailies in the UK, Al-Ahram was not established in Britain first but in Egypt in 1876 and launched its international edition in 1984, choosing London as its base for European distribution. The final edition and layout of Al-Ahram International is still carried out in the headquarters in Cairo. The London office receives the newspaper by satellite and provides the printing and distribution in Europe. Masoud Al-Hinnawi (1993), Al-Ahram International's London
office editor, stated in an interview that the newspaper is registered in Britain as a British company and therefore functions under English law. It is also registered with the Post Office for the purpose of the reservation of the logo and the title. Al-Hinnawi stated that the newspaper operates officially in Britain like any other UK company, but in practice it is an international issue of an Egyptian newspaper.

The London office of Al-Ahram International not only operates as a centre for distribution in Europe, but acts as a source of news. It also prepares and edits an exclusive weekly page titled "Sabah al-Khayr ya Baritaniya" (Good Morning Britain).

Voice (1989, vol.2, no.7: 7-8) includes a review of Al-Ahram International in its feature "The Arab Press in the UK". The article states that the newspaper was launched in London "following the fashion of an international edition." Also, CSC (1990) and Ragab (1993) list the paper among the Arab expatriate newspapers and periodicals which are issued in Britain and distributed in the country and elsewhere.

Al-Ahram International is the only paper based in the Arab world which has a widely distributed international edition. The long history of the paper as a leading pan-Arab daily, in addition to its unique policy, since Camp David, in advocating the peace process as the only way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, make it interesting to our study among the rest of the expatriate papers. It should be borne in mind, however, that Al-Ahram International is apt to reflect more influence from the government of its home country (Egypt) in comparison with the rest of the papers under study since its headquarters as well as its editor are based in Egypt, and not in London. Moreover, the paper pays more attention to Egyptian home news for the same reason.

Al-Ahram was established by two Lebanese brothers, Salim and Beshara Takla, who migrated from Lebanon to Egypt. It is now owned and run by Dar Al-Ahram in Cairo,
a publication house which employs 5,000 people (Voice, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 7-8). It has been categorized by many writers as one of the world's top dailies. Merrill (1968: 138) indicates that it has been called by Americans "the New York Times of the Arab world".

The newspaper has a wide spectrum of readers among politicians and decision-makers, although its rank as the top Arabic daily has declined since Camp David. The paper in fact faces tough competition from its Lebanese and Saudi rivals.

Al-Ahram International (and its sister Al-Ahram) is known to be close to the Egyptian Presidency. Its role as reflecting the official Egyptian policy since President Nasser has added to its importance in the whole Middle East (Merrill, 1968: 137). Awad (1992: 140) describes it as most powerful newspaper which plays a crucial role in the Egyptian decision-making process. Moreover, Ragab (1993: 12) calls it the "semi-official newspaper of Egypt." It has been reported that Al-Ahram has been a propaganda instrument for the government, although it does sometimes show some degree of 'independent spirit' (Merrill, 1968: 138).

Until the 1970s, the paper tended to be aggressive against Israel and the USA. However, after the Camp David treaty, the paper changed its policy towards both countries. It is now subtly critical of the US policies in the Middle East. During the Intifada, it harshly criticised Israel for its tough measures in the Occupied Territories, but kept a low profile on the prejudices the Camp David treaty suffered as a result of the Intifada.

The paper used to be anti-Iran, anti-Syria, pro-Iraq, and anti-Libya (from time to time). Its policy changed during the Gulf crisis, when it sided with the allies, in accordance with the official Egyptian stance. It adopted thereafter a pro-Syrian and anti-Iraqi policy. It remained aggressive against Iran.
As far as the PLO is concerned, Al-Ahram International was for long supportive of the moderate line of Yassir Arafat, "but [was] sometimes critical of the PLO" (Voice, 1989, vol.2, no.7: 9).

The CSC report (1990: 5) indicates that Al-Ahram International's office in London employs 25 staff. The newspaper is printed (in addition to Cairo and London) in Frankfurt and New York, and distributed in the Arab world, Europe, North and South America, and Japan. Al-Ahram's total circulation is about 1,500,000 copies daily, while the international edition reaches 250,000 copies, printed and distributed outside Egypt (Al-Ahram International Office, London, 1995).

Al-Ahram International has been long known as a publishing house for the prominent Egyptian, and indeed Arab, journalists and writers. Because of the paper's long history as one the top quality Arab newspapers, which has survived many challenges, mainly associated with the changes of political regime in Egypt, and because it receives Egyptian government support, it has attracted the senior writers of Egypt. As a general rule, all the paper's writers are Egyptians, with very few exceptions. They all well known, not only in Egypt, but also throughout the Arab world. The writers enjoy a reasonable margin of freedom and play their role in analysing and commenting professionally on various Egyptian, Arab, and international issues. Although most of the paper's writers tend to support the Egyptian government's policies and particularly the line and policies of President Mubarak, yet, as part of its belief in freedom of opinion, the paper pays a good deal of attention to what the other Egyptian
newspapers and magazines write and reprints a daily selection of articles and opinions from those publications.

The main writers of *Al-Ahram International* are:

Sa'd Eddin Ibrahim: A prominent Egyptian academic and writer. He is a professor at the American University in Cairo in the Department of Social Science.

Fihmi Howeidi: A prominent Egyptian Islamist writer. He writes in different newspapers and magazines, among them the London-based weekly, *Al-Majallah*. He has been known as a moderate Islamic writer who advocates the awakening of Islam and the role of the Muslim movements in the Arab world and abroad. He is sharply critical the Western values and proclaims that Islam should be given the chance to rule and participate in political life.

Halah Mustafa: An Egyptian researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. She is a specialist in the role of the Islamic movements in the Arab world and shows a degree of sympathy with the moderate Islamic movements.

*Al-Ahram International* is, as previously mentioned, part of Dar Al-Ahram, which is a publication and research company. It is the international issue of the original home daily *Al-Ahram*. Therefore, the paper derives prominence, prestige, and vigour from its home sister, and indeed the bigger publication company, *Al-Ahram*. The paper could be classified as a financially comfortable newspaper and one capable of covering its expenses. This is made possible by four factors, *viz*: (a) it is part of a company which has additional functions, particularly publishing books; (b) it has a large circulation, mainly in Egypt; (c) it attracts advertising revenue from a large number of
big Egyptian companies and institutions; and (d) it has for long been backed up by the Egyptian regimes and, as mentioned earlier, is regarded as the mouthpiece of the Egyptian government. Thus, as long as it acts on behalf of the government, it will always have the chance of financial support, especially given that its headquarters are in Egypt.

3.4. The structure of the papers' pages

By examining the structure of the pages of the newspapers, one can detect the following points.¹

1. As the headlines and main stories show, the newspapers typically focus on the major Arab news in their front pages, and then give attention to other important international news stories. More specifically, Al-Hayat and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat pay primary attention to Lebanese news. In the case of the former, this is because it was originally a Lebanese newspaper and news of the Lebanese civil war dominated the rest of the Arab news at the time. Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi pay particular attention to the Palestine question in their headlines (and in the case of Al-Arab the editorial comment which appears on the front page also relates to the Palestine question), indicating their commitment to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major challenge for the Arabs. Al-Ahram International pays greater attention to Egyptian home news.

2. As far as the Arab affairs pages are concerned, Al-Hayat focuses on the events and developments in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, in the Occupied Territories. Yet, the paper does not entitle the two pages of Lebanese news "home affairs", as do Al-

¹ Further details of the structure of the papers' pages are given in appendix C.
Ahram International and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Al-Ahram International allocate one page for home affairs because it is edited, and mostly circulated, in Egypt, while Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which was originally established to communicate on behalf of the Palestinians with Palestinians in diaspora and Arabs who are interested in the question of Palestine, allocates two pages for Palestinian affairs. Therefore, the chief issue for the paper is, in the first place, the Palestinian issue, and then other Arab and international affairs.

3. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat allocates four pages, and Al-Hayat three pages, for Arab affairs, while the rest of the papers allocate only one page (excluding the home news page in Al-Ahram International and the Palestinian affairs page in the case of Al-Quds Al-Arabi), revealing that the two former papers tend to cover Arab news of a wider area, in an attempt to appeal to Arab readers across the world. In fact, a simple comparison in percentage terms of the proportion of Arab affairs pages to the total number of pages in the papers shows that the two papers allocated 20% and 18% respectively, while Al-Ahram International allocated 7%, Al-Arab 8%, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi also 8%.

4. International affairs, which, on the sample date, centred on the political developments in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, did not occupy a substantial proportion of the papers' pages. Most of the international news stories were squeezed into one page (7% of the total pages in Al-Ahram International, 8% in

1 Unless page three is supposed to deal with Arab affairs, in which case the number of Al-Hayat's pages on Arab affairs will be four.
both Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi), with the exception of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat which allocated two pages (10% and 12.5% respectively). Therefore, the international news items were generally concise and lacking in-depth reporting. Surprisingly, the expatriate papers typically did not pay any attention to British internal politics. With the exception of Al-Arab, which allocated a whole page entitled "British Affairs", they all focused only on the outstanding international news stories and did not pay particular attention to news from within the United Kingdom, the country in which they operate. Al-Arab covered just a few news stories from within Britain, but none of these stories dealt with internal British politics.

5. The two papers Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat allocated four pages (29% of their total pages) and two pages (12.5% of their total pages) respectively for business and finance. The rest of the papers allocated only one page for business and finance (7% of the total number of pages in Al-Ahram International, 8% in both Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi). This reveals that the first two papers made a fair coverage of economic news if compared with the number of pages politics and also if compared with the coverage of economic matters in the rest of the papers.

6. The papers allocated one page for opinion articles, with the exception of Al-Ahram International, which allocated two pages. Opinion articles and analytical views also appeared on other pages of the papers, i.e. page eight (for reports) in Al-Hayat, page three (for reports) in Al-Ahram International, page six (for reports and articles on Arab nationalism) in Al-Arab, and page ten (for articles from the Israeli press) in Al-Quds Al-Arabi. In addition, a number of columns, which also reported views and
opinions, appeared on various pages other than the opinion pages. For instance, there were columns on page two (Arab affairs) and page four (foreign news) in Al-Arab newspaper, two columns on page sixteen (soft news) of Al-Hayat, two columns on page three (Arab affairs) of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, one column on page two (radio and television), and two columns on page fourteen (soft news) of Al-Ahram International, and in Al-Quds Al-Arabi one column on page twelve (soft news). Therefore, we may argue that the opinion pages in the papers, and indeed the other columns and articles containing comment, which focused on three major issues: the crisis in Lebanon, the changes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the peace process in the Middle East, all of which were allocated a fair proportion of the space in the papers.

7. The number of pages dealing with hard issues, i.e. political and economic issues, formed more than half of the newspapers. The proportion in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat was 54% (thirteen pages), Al-Hayat 69% (eleven pages), Al-Ahram International 64% (nine pages), Al-Arab 58% (seven pages), and Al-Quds Al-Arabi 67% (eight pages). This reflects how the papers were preoccupied with the major political events and developments in the Middle East, and in the world at large. They tend to be more "political newspapers" than "general newspapers".

8. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat allocated one page for religion, emphasizing its close relationship with Saudi society, which is dominated and coloured by religious ideological principles, traditions, and values, through its ownership and circulation. On the other hand, Al-Arab allocated one page for Arab nationalism, indicating its
ideology of Arabism and emphasizing its intention to highlight issues which could, in its view, bring about Arab unity.

9. The pages on arts, culture, literature, and miscellany provided the reader with an adequate diet of the Arab interest in the book, cinema, television, music, and, to a lesser extent, the theatre. Arts outside the Arab world were accorded trivial, if any, attention, indicating the mostly Arab concerns of the papers. Al-Ahram International was preoccupied by Egyptian news, not only in art and cultural matters, but also in most of the paper's contents.

10. The papers allocated one page (except for Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, which allocated two pages) for sports. The sports pages focused on sport in the Arab world and on top international sports news. The sports pages, as is typical in the Arab press as a whole, focus on football and, to a lesser extent, on basketball, volleyball, and tennis. They also cover other outstanding contests in other sports, such as boxing.

11. Finally, the last pages of the papers present funny, peculiar, and bizarre news stories, as well as critical, but light, comments and articles. They are generally designed to compensate the reader for the serious type of material presented on the front page.

3.5. Summary

In the last two decades, the British capital, London, has become a base for a large number of Arab daily, weekly, and monthly publications. A few of these publications
operate in Britain for political reasons, i.e. as an opposition press. However, the majority of the Arab presses in Britain have typically had good relations with their home Arab regimes. Five Arab dailies in particular operate in London, but distribute mainly in the Arab world. Although they regard themselves as "Arab-British", they are totally linked with the Arab world in terms of their ownership, distribution, and, more importantly, their concerns and coverage.

The reasons why the expatriate dailies were established in Britain are generally one or more of the following:

(a) The lack of freedom of expression in the Arab world, which has led to many journalists', prominent writers', and intellectuals' emigrating to Western countries, among which has been Britain.

(b) The competition between the Arab countries to influence Arab readers in the Arab world and elsewhere, and particularly to confront the Arab opposition in exile. By establishing themselves in Britain, the Arab presses have created an impression of independence and impartiality, and thus they could be more influential than the Arab home press. Moreover, the expatriate press has enjoyed a respected reputation and prestige by merely being "made in Britain".

(c) Technical reasons. London provides a high standard of communications owing to the availability of advanced technology, as well as its central geographical location between West and East. Also, the English language, the current international language, provides another dimension to the importance of the choice of Britain by the Arab press.
The five Arab dailies operating in Britain are:

(a) Al-Arab. Owned by the Libyan family Al-Houni. It is said to be close to the Libyan regime. The paper's policy is centred on advocating Arab unity, being hostile to the USA and Israel, and the Arab Gulf states especially after the Gulf War. The paper is also critical of the peace process in the Middle East and attacks Arab concessions made in the negotiations with Israel.

The paper's writers 're mostly leftists, believers in Arab nationalism, and opponents of the Arab "regressive" regimes. It clearly prefers articles which serve its ideology and declared principles.

The paper covers its expenses by its circulation and advertisements. The number of advertisements is very few, and mostly for restaurants and stores owned by Arabs in London. However, the paper covers most of its expenses by sales to Libya and, to a lesser extent, Jordan and Tunisia.

The paper contains of twelve pages, most of which are devoted to political and economic news and views (as do those of all the expatriate papers). The paper allocates one page for in-depth coverage of issues related to Arab nationalism - the declared principle and ideology of the newspaper. For British affairs the paper also allocates one page, in which it reports the outstanding news from within Britain, though it avoids dealing with British internal politics.
(b) **Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat.** One of a chain of weeklies and dailies published by the Saudi Research and Marketing Company, owned by the Saudi brothers Hafiz. It is said to have strong contacts with the Saudi royal family. The paper allows a fair margin to the expression of different views, but remains conservative and pan-Islamic. It is critical of Israel for its policies, critical of the West, especially before the Gulf crisis, and strongly supportive of the Palestinian struggle, backing the PLO's policy.

The paper's writers are known to be prominent in their countries and even in the Arab world more widely. They are known to be conservative and representative of traditional Arab thinking.

**Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat** is financially a powerful newspaper, as it is part of a giant Saudi publishing company. Its circulation, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states, and the large number of advertisements for huge Saudi companies, also provide the paper with a substantial share in the coverage of its expenses.

The paper is the largest as far as the number of pages is concerned. It contains twenty pages showing a relatively extensive coverage of Arab, international, and economic news. The paper allocates one page for religious affairs, indicating its Islamic identity and the influence of the Saudi ownership and large circulation.

(c) **Al-Hayat.** Owned by the Lebanese family Mroue, but later invested in by the Saudi Prince Khalid bin Sultan. Although it adopts the traditional Lebanese style of reporting and allows a wide margin for the expression of different views, the paper is said to
reflect certain lines of moderation among the Saudi rulers. Al-Hayat is a highly professional newspaper and maintains a high standard of journalism. It employs prominent journalists and writers who have long experience, mostly as editors in other journals. Although Al-Hayat has never been a mouthpiece for Saudi Arabia, it is said to be silent on issues concerning the Arab Gulf states.

The writers of Al-Hayat are known to be prominent writers and academics. In fact, the paper's editors, who are known to be professionals and experienced people, make a fair contribution in the comments and analysis.

The paper annually suffers from the problem of covering its expenses. The number of advertissments is very few, though they are from companies and institutes in Saudi Arabia. The investor in the paper covers the losses, in the hope that it will cover its own expenses in the future.

The paper contains sixteen pages. It makes a fair coverage of Arab, international, and economic news. It takes a special interest in Lebanese affairs, reflecting its original ownership and editorial interest.

(d) Al-Quds Al-Arabi. A newspaper owned by a number of private Palestinian investors, it is a liberal paper which covers mainly Palestinian affairs and concentrates on the Palestinians' plight. It backs the general policy of the PLO on the ground that the PLO represents the majority of the Palestinian people. It is an advocate of peace, but has reservations on the recent Palestinian-Israeli deal and calls for a stronger
position for the Palestinians and the Arabs in the face of Israel, in order to secure
better conditions for the peace process that would regain the Palestinians' rights.

The personnel and writers of the paper are supportive of and interested in Palestinian
matters. The writers are known to be liberal, critical of the policies of the Arab
regimes, and campaigners for the Palestinians' rights, democracy and pluralism in the
Arab world. They are anti-Israel and the USA, and pro-PLO and Iraq.

The paper could be described as the poorest among the expatriate newspapers. It does
not include a single advertisement. Yet, the paper's expenses are very limited, as it
employs only a limited number of journalists and other personnel, and it functions on
the minimum level of expenses because of the shortage of money. The paper could be
described as a "cause paper", i.e. it operates primarily to serve the Palestinian cause
irrespective of cost-effectiveness.

The paper contains twelve pages. It is evident from the way in which space is
allocated that the paper pays particular attention to the details of the Palestinian affairs
since it devotes two pages to Palestinian news. Moreover, the paper sets aside a whole
page for articles and opinions reprinted from the Israeli press.

(e) Al-Ahram International. The international edition of the Egyptian paper Al-Ahram.
The paper chose London to be the centre for its European edition. It is owned by Dar
Al-Ahram (Publishing Company) and has for decades kept close to the policy-making
élite in Egypt. Nevertheless, the paper allows a fair margin to the expression of
different opinions, but at the end of the day reflects the official Egyptian policy. The paper is therefore critical of Israel, Iran, and Iraq, while it backs the moderate line of the PLO.

The paper's writer are known to be prominent in Egypt. They are, in fact, well-known writers and journalists from across the Arab world. Although they are loyal to the regime in Egypt and to the conservative regimes in the Arab world, some of them are critical of the policies of those countries. They tend to be critical from within, avoiding any clash or embarrassment with the Egyptian government and other Arab ally governments.

The paper is known to be a financially powerful newspaper, given the fact that it has a large circulation in Egypt and abroad. It also carries a large number of advertisements from Egyptian companies and banks, and sometimes ministries. It is also part of a major publishing company. Furthermore, it has traditionally been known as the mouthpiece of successive Egyptian governments and, therefore, does not suffer from financial difficulties.

The paper contains fourteen pages. The bulk of the paper's news and other material are of Egyptian nature. The paper, for instance, allocates one page for home news. It tends to represent the home country and to address Egyptian people.
Chapter Four

THE COVERAGE OF THE INTIFADA IN THE
EXPATRIATE ARAB DAILIES:
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF COVERAGE
4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a quantitative measurement of the extent of the coverage of the Intifada in the UK Arab dailies and in *The Guardian*. In this way we can establish how much attention was relatively given to the Intifada by the newspapers regardless of the way in which it was handled.

For the purpose of assessing the extent of coverage, this study considers the question from several aspects. It calculates the space given to the Intifada, the number of Intifada items which appeared in each newspaper, the numbers of each type of item, and the sources of the news items. A comparison of the proportion of the number of Intifada items with the total coverage of Arab and Palestinian affairs helps to evaluate the relative importance of the Intifada's coverage amongst Arab and Palestinian news in general, and pursues the changes in that proportion during the examined period.

The item type indicates relatively how much spot-news reporting, how much in-depth reporting, and how much comment on and analysis of the Intifada was included in each of the newspapers. Moreover, the study examines the principal news categories under which Intifada-related matters were reported in order to show how widely the papers covered it in addition to the routine reportage of violence by newspapers.

The sources of the reportage are significant for establishing whether the Arab papers made use of the opportunity provided by being published in Britain to maintain links with the Occupied Territories, an opportunity which Arab newspapers published in Arab countries without diplomatic relations with Israel had lacked. The news sources indicate the extent to which a newspaper was able to obtain news coverage through its own correspondents. In the case of the expatriate Arab press, news from the Occupied Territories supplied by their own correspondents implies that the paper was (unlike the
Arab home press) free enough to deal indirectly with Israel, and made use of the opportunity to extend or deepen its coverage.

Lastly, an additional quantitative evaluation of Intifada-related photographs and cartoons is complementary to the study of the textual content of the newspapers, since these are a vital element of the processes through which newspapers communicate news and views to their readers.

4.2. Extent of coverage by space

Table 4.1 summarizes the space allotted to the Intifada in the newspapers over the period as a whole. It shows that the first two months of the Intifada witnessed the largest amount of space in general accorded to its coverage in the three papers - Al-Ahram International, Al-Arab, and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat - which were being published at the time. The second month of the Intifada showed the highest percentage of space allocated to the uprising, as the violence spread to all of the Occupied Territories and it became apparent that it was not a transient event. The periods that followed show a significant drop in the space allotted as Intifada-related occurrences became increasingly more routine events from a news perspective. However, the constantly high level of coverage of the Intifada reveals that although there was a significant drop in comparison with the first two months, the papers continued to regularly cover the uprising.¹

The table also shows that the British quality press, as represented by The Guardian, followed a similar pattern, although of course the overall proportion of space given to the Intifada by the Arab press was much larger. The Intifada also gained its highest

¹ In addition, in the first two months the Intifada enjoyed a large space on the front pages, as well as on the opinion pages (tables 5.2-5.7). As far as the number of items in the newspapers in the first two months was concerned, it surpassed that in the rest of the examined period. This result is obviously consistent with general space allocation. Moreover, as table 5.10 shows, the number of Intifada items also formed a high percentage of the Arab affairs in that period. Similarly, the highest proportion of the Intifada items in relation to Palestinian items, was again in the first two months, when the Intifada was the most dominant event regionally and internationally.
Table 4.1

Average percentage of space given to Intifada coverage

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>DEC 87</th>
<th>JAN 88</th>
<th>DEC 88</th>
<th>JAN 89</th>
<th>DEC 89</th>
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<th>DEC 90</th>
<th>JAN 91</th>
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<td>6.4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Guardian       | 4.3    | 6.5    | 1.5    | 0.9    | 1.5    | 0.4    | 1.2    | 0.2    |

Figure 4.1

Average percentage of space given to Intifada coverage
level of coverage in the first two months in the British press and was subsequently also covered regularly, though of course receiving relatively far less attention from the Arab press. Table 4.1 also shows that Al-Quds Al-Arabi all the time allocated relatively much more space to the Intifada than did the rest of the newspapers, thus reflecting its Palestinian ownership.

One final point to make concerns the space given to the Intifada during the Gulf crisis and the Gulf War. The table shows that the coverage of the Intifada was quantitatively not greatly affected during the crisis and just before the war. However, the coverage of the Intifada in the papers was greatly reduced during the actual war. The Intifada, notwithstanding, was still regularly covered by the papers during the war.

This trend was also evident in the number of items printed of the uprising as part of the continuous coverage during the critical period of the Gulf crisis. One might have expected a sharp decline in the coverage at that time. However, although the coverage did drop significantly, it would be hard to tell from looking at the number of items relating to the Intifada, by then an 'old' event by news standards, that were nevertheless published that a very major crisis for the Arab world had occurred, which could have been expected to push it out of the newspapers almost completely particularly so bearing in mind that a curfew was also introduced. According to table 4.8, for example, in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat the average space allocated to the uprising in December 1990 (during the Gulf crisis) was only slightly less than that of January 1989 in the year before the crisis. This is particularly significant because this newspaper represents the Saudi viewpoint and was very critical of the position adopted by the Palestinians in support of Iraq in the conflict in the Gulf. In terms of the number of items, its average number per day in the same period in December 1990 was actually equal to that of January 1989.
4.2.1. Proportion of space in the pages for Arab Affairs

4.2.1.1. The inside pages

As far as the distribution of coverage is concerned, we find that in most newspapers the percentage of Intifada coverage was the greatest on the Arab affairs pages. These pages adopt the normal journalistic style of aiming to give an overall coverage of Arab affairs news stories, deemed important by the paper. The newspapers allocated more space to covering current news stories in the relevant inside pages than to in-depth and analytical articles, which usually appeared on pages devoted to investigative reports, opinion, and editorial.

This was the general trend of the papers, with the exception of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, which, as shown in table 4.4, allocated on some occasions a higher percentage of space to items reprinted from other newspapers (December 1987, December 1988, and January 1989). It allocated a similarly high percentage of space to items of investigative reporting (December 1989 and January 1990). Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which devoted a whole page for Palestinian affairs, allocated most of the space on that specific page to the Intifada news.

4.2.1.2. Front-page coverage

During the first month of the Intifada, Al-Arab allocated the highest proportion of space on its front page to this topic (table 4.3). This indicates the level of immediate concern felt by Al-Arab for Intifada news. However, this large proportion of space on the front page (which reached 29% in January 1988, the early period of the Intifada) dropped sharply in the following years. There was a similar pattern in front page coverage being the highest during the first two months and declining thereafter in all papers.
Table 4.2  
Percentage of space given to Intifada coverage in Al-Ahram International

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>DEC 87</th>
<th>JAN 88</th>
<th>DEC 88</th>
<th>JAN 89</th>
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Table 4.3  
Percentage of space given to Intifada coverage in Al-Arab

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Percentage of space given to Intifada coverage in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat

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Table 4.5

Percentage of space given to Intifada coverage in Al-Hayat

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Percentage of space given to Intifada coverage in Al-Quds Al-Arabi

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Table 4.7

Percentage of space given to Intifada coverage in The Guardian

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</table>
Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which was only established in 1989, allocated to the Intifada the largest proportion of space (12.7%) on its front page in December 1989, the first anniversary of the Intifada. This figure dropped later.

Al-Hayat allocated an average amount of space to the Intifada on its front page in comparison with the other papers (table 4.5). What is striking however is the high percentage of space allotted by Al-Hayat on the front page in December 1990 during the Gulf crisis. The comparable space allocation was very low in Al-Ahram International and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, the two papers which supported the Allied forces in the Gulf War. Al-Quds Al-Arabi and Al-Arab, which both supported Iraq, kept a relatively high proportion of space for the Intifada on the front page. The reason why Al-Hayat, which supported the Allied forces during the conflict in the Gulf, maintained this high proportion of space allocation is probably because it generally approached the problem in a more detached and objective manner than did other papers, at least relatively so.

4.2.1.3. The opinion page

The opinion page is one of the most important pages in the newspaper. It usually contains the editorial, and also comments analysing and accentuating the major current events, or trends. By monitoring the contents of the opinion page, the newspaper's attitudes and policies can be identified and assessed.

The important point regarding the opinion pages in the papers of this study is that all papers did regularly provide a significant amount of space for discussing the Intifada. There were almost always opinion articles and editorial comments on the development of the Intifada.

The largest space allocated to the Intifada among all newspapers in the opinion page was 31.4% by Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (table 4.4), followed by 30.2% by Al-Arab. (table
4.3). Each of these dailies is different in its policy, style, and readership. Thus, the allocation by both of them of that extent of space indicates the high degree of concern the Intifada received in its first period by different newspapers.

Al-Hayat (table 4.5) and Al-Quds Al-Arabi (table 4.6) started their operations in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The highest percentage of space in their opinion pages was therefore given to the Intifada in December 1989 and December 1990 respectively. The high percentage of Intifada space also on the opinion page (13%) in December 1990 in Al-Hayat and Al-Quds Al-Arabi (11%) underlines the point of the Intifada's remaining of importance and concern even during the Gulf crisis.

4.2.2. The Guardian

There was almost always some space on the front page for the Intifada in all Arab newspapers under study. This was different in the British press, exemplified in The Guardian, which almost wholly relegated the issue to the inside pages after the first two months. Although the coverage of the Intifada on the inside pages was consistent, front-page treatment was only occasional, for the most outstanding events of it. This was obviously because it is a British newspaper, which treats the Intifada like any other foreign event.

In summary, the largest amount of space given to the Intifada was in December 1987 and January 1988, the period which brought to the fore a huge event of the kind which interests the press. In the same way, the least space accorded to the uprising was in January 1991 during the Gulf War, as this new event dominated the news and overshadowed the Intifada for a while. However, the important point regarding the space given to the Intifada was the significant proportion of total space allocated to it by all newspapers all the time. This was true even during the Gulf crisis and the war. It also continued to be covered regularly on the front pages. This, therefore, reinforces
the conclusion that the Intifada was regarded by the Arab newspapers as the most important ongoing issue to the Arab world.

4.3. Number of items

The proportion of the space given over to a particular subject within a newspaper is only one indicator of the extent of coverage. A single long article may take up a substantial percentage of the space available, but several shorter items, each with their headings and touching on different aspects, might well have a larger impact on the reader even if the space occupied was similar. In addition to the total space given over to the Intifada, the number of Intifada-related items published were therefore counted also.

It should be pointed out that the number of items does not necessarily have to be in proportion to the percentage of the space given to the Intifada, since a large number of items do not necessarily occupy a lot of space. An item could be but a few lines in one column, but presented in such a way that it will be considered by the reader as one individual item covering a discrete topic and with an exclusive subheading.

As far as the average number of Intifada items in the expatriate papers is concerned, table 4.8 shows that there was always an average of two or more items every day. The exception was the period of the Gulf War, during which the average dropped to as little as 1 item a day, as the Occupied Territories were for weeks under heavy curfew. The highest average number of items per day was 16.8. This was in Al-Quds Al-Arabi, reflecting how this newspaper devoted most efforts to the Palestinian cause.

As far as the British press was concerned, table 4.8 indicates that the number of Intifada items covered by The Guardian was of course much less than that of any Arab daily. This appears to be typical of the Western press coverage of the Intifada. Gilboa found that the New York Times, for example, printed an average of two stories a day
from December 1987 to April 1988 (Gilboa, 1989: 193). Similarly, as table 4.8 shows, The Guardian printed an average of 2.1 items during the period December 1987 to January 1988. Naturally, this average dropped later to less than 1 item a day.

Al-Ahram International, although edited in Egypt and as such as much or more a home as an expatriate newspaper, showed a similar pattern of coverage to the expatriate dailies, both in terms of the space given over to Intifada coverage and the number of items carried.

Tables 4.9 (and figure 4.3) and 4.10 (and figure 4.4) show another aspect of the number of Intifada items, that is to say, respectively, the proportion of their number to the number of items dealing with Palestinian affairs or with Arab affairs. By examining these figures, it is possible to determine the relative significance of the Intifada coverage within that of Palestinian or Arab affairs in general. The percentage varies a great deal from time to time, but overall the Intifada coverage remained as one of the major news stories in the region.

As far as the proportion of Intifada items to general Arab affairs was concerned, the percentages in Al-Arab and, to a lesser degree, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat were always higher than in the case of Al-Ahram International, simply because the last mentioned includes a large number of Egyptian home affairs stories. In the case of Al-Hayat, which began publication in 1988, the percentage was more or less similar to that of the other papers. However, Al-Quds Al-Arabi showed a different pattern, which was in fact similar to that of The Guardian (figure 4.4). In both newspapers the proportional percentage of Intifada items, compared with Arab affairs items, was very high. In The Guardian it was around half of the coverage of all Arab affairs in the first two months, and then it only dropped to as low as 11% in December 1990. In January 1991, when the Gulf War took place with British forces involved, this percentage of course dropped. This high percentage shows that The Guardian considered the Intifada as one
Table 4.8

(a) Number of Intifada items per month
(b) Average number of items per day*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>DEC 87</th>
<th>JAN 88</th>
<th>DEC 89</th>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>6.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td></td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>2.52</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Al-Ahram International and As-Sharq Al-Awsat are published every day including Sundays.

* Al-Quds Al-Arabi is published 6 days a week (it is not published on Sundays).

* Al-Arab is published 5 days a week (it is not published on Saturdays and Sundays).

* Al-Hayat was published 6 days a week until 1990, and since that time it has been published every day including Sundays.

The daily average is thus the more significant figure.
Figure 4.2

Average number of items per day
Table 4.9

Proportion of Intifada items to general Palestinian items (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>DEC 87</th>
<th>JAN 88</th>
<th>DEC 88</th>
<th>JAN 89</th>
<th>DEC 89</th>
<th>JAN 90</th>
<th>DEC 90</th>
<th>JAN 91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>34.9</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arab</td>
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<td>84.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>60.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>78.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hayat</td>
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<td>68.7</td>
<td>44.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Quds Al.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>56.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td></td>
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**Figure 4.3**

Proportion of Intifada items to general Palestinian items (%)
Table 4.10

Proportion of Intifada items to general Arab items (%)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Paper</th>
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<th>DEC 88</th>
<th>JAN 89</th>
<th>DEC 89</th>
<th>JAN 90</th>
<th>DEC 90</th>
<th>JAN 91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arab</td>
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<td>25.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>22.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hayat</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Quds Al.</td>
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<td>27.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.4

Proportion of Intifada items to general Arab items (%)
of the most important ongoing events in the Arab world (apart from the Gulf crisis) in its regular coverage of outstanding foreign news items. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* also gave a high proportion of its Arab affairs items to the Intifada. The percentage was almost one fourth and only dropped to one tenth during the Gulf War. This emphasises that *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* viewed the Intifada as a principal concern, as was to be expected from the fact of its Palestinian ownership. The trend of *The Guardian* in allocating a high proportion of its coverage of Arab affairs to the Intifada also reflects Western news values. The nature of the event in which the Intifada manifested itself was eminently 'newsworthy'.

4.4. Item type: news and views

The Intifada was covered by the newspapers under each of the standard categories: news stories, investigative reports, interviews, editorials, opinion articles, columnists contributions, letters to the editor, and reprinted items from other press publications. Not all newspapers necessarily provide all of these categories of course. For example, *Al-Hayat* carries neither editorials nor a letter page or section.

4.4.1. News coverage

The news stories form of course the bulk and the substance of the coverage of the Intifada by the newspapers. They provide also the raw material, the information on which other writers make their comments and editors base editorials, and which observers use to analyse the situation. Though news stories may include a general assessment, they do not include an "explicit opinion of the individual journalist" (Van Dijk, 1988: 124).

---

1 'News item', or 'news story' means a factual statement that "describes some event or object" (Klaidman, 1987: 62).
2 "Investigative reporting is the name usually given to detailed in-depth examination, extending over a period, into given news situations... The essence of this type of writing is the close attention to detail and the systematic interviewing of people involved so that a dossier is built up from which general deductions can be drawn" (Hodgson, 1984: 38-39).
3 Opinion articles, opinion columns, and comments are value statements which "are not confirmable or falsifiable, because they assess and appraise rather than describe" (Klaidman, 1987: 62).
Tables (4.11-4.16) show that the number of news items was in all but one case always greater than that of other types of material. The one exception was Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, in December 1989, when the opinion articles surpassed the news stories by four items. In that specific month the newspaper allocated whole weekly pages for opinion articles marking the Intifada's anniversary.

The coverage of the Intifada's daily events in all newspapers seems to have been high, regular, and frequent. The increase and decrease in each newspaper's inclusion of Intifada news stories was mainly subject to the occurrence of other events at a particular time. According to Gans, it is the availability and the suitability of news which determines the story selection (Gans, 1979: 81). However, since events potentially newsworthy happen on a daily basis all round the world, it could be argued that the extent of coverage for particular types of event depends not only on the news value of the events themselves, but also on the level of a paper's concern. Hypothetically, as news of the Intifada became routine, the interest of the press in it may be expected to have decreased. "Novelty is part of the definition of news and is circumscribed by the period between the previous and current deadline" (Gans, 1979: 167). Nevertheless, tables 11-16 show that the number of news stories did not regularly decline, except after the high coverage at the outbreak of the Intifada when it was hot-news, thus indicating that this issue did not lose its significance in the expatriate papers. Also, it could presumably be expected that in the months of December (the Intifada's anniversary), the extent of coverage in terms of number of the news items might rise. The tables show that this was not invariably so. According to the tables, there was no clear pattern in the ups and downs of the number of news stories. The newspapers' coverage of the Intifada was continuous all the time, evidencing their constant concern regarding this question.
Table 4.11
Coverage by type: Al-Ahram International

<table>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

New stories = Presented as a 'news-item', typically on the news-pages.

Opinion = Articles presenting an analysis or viewpoint by a named author.

Reprint = Items reproduced from another newspaper, usually from another country's newspaper including Israel, indicating how the situation is being seen there. (In the case of Al-Ahram International, reprinted items are always from other Egyptian press)

Edit. comments = Formal Editorials by the newspaper.

Interviews = Articles in the form of an extended conversation with a named person of frame or position.

Reports = Investigative reports by correspondents or news agencies

Letters to Editor
### Table 4.12
Coverage by type: Al-Arab

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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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Coverage by type: Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat

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Coverage by type: Al-Hayat

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### Table 4.15
Coverage by type: Al-Quds Al-Arabi

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<th>Dec. 90</th>
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Table 4.16

Coverage by type: The Guardian

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<tbody>
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<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opinion</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most striking comparative feature was the extremely large number of news stories in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, which regularly covered the internal Palestinian affairs, including Intifada news. This coverage was provided in a large number of short news items. The number of news items in *The Guardian*, the sample British paper, was naturally very small compared with those in the Arab papers, but still significant considering the relatively low level of importance which events in Palestine represented specifically for British foreign policy.

4.4.2. Interpretative coverage

Investigative reporting items are equally important since they focus closely on the events and provide extensive description of them. This kind of coverage is usually provided by a correspondent (or own-reporter) rather than a news agency. Their reports are therefore likely to be exclusive to the individual newspapers. Tables 4.11-4.16 show that this type of coverage was provided by all newspapers, but to a lesser degree compared to news items. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* was the paper to publish the largest number of investigative reports. The rest of the Arab papers published investigative reports regularly, but to a lesser extent. It is worth mentioning that *Al-Hayat* was the only paper (other than *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*) to publish investigative reports even during January 1991, when the Gulf War erupted. *The Guardian*, of course, published fewer such in-depth treatments than the Arab newspapers, but again a significant number.

Editorial comments and opinion articles are equally important. While news stories provide information to readers and make them aware of events taking place everywhere, editorial comments and opinion articles provide broad analysis and various interpretations of the events from different angles.

The editorial comments usually reveal what the paper regards as the top regional and international current events. They do not therefore handle one issue regularly unless it is seen as crucial. The editorial, in particular, reflects the paper's concerns and defines its views and political stances.
As shown by tables 4.11-4.16, in December 1989 there were striking figures, especially in *Al-Ahram International*, which had an exceptionally large number of editorials and opinion articles even after January 1988. *Al-Hayat* and *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* had their highest number not only of opinion articles, but also of news stories and investigative reports in December 1989. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* also had a large number of opinion articles in that month.

In general, apart from the first two months of the Intifada, December 1989 was an outstanding month in terms of coverage of the Intifada, which was extensive. In the other months of December, the sample period witnessed crucial events in the Arab world apart from the Intifada. The first was the PLO's radical change towards a peaceful solution with Israel in December 1988, and the second, in December 1990, was the Gulf crisis.

Opinion articles and columns are different from editorial comments in that they represent the writers' own views and analyses, as distinct from the editorial comment, which is explicitly formulated from the point of view of the newspaper or its editor (Van Dijk, 1988: 124). However, we may argue that the views in opinion articles and columns should be consistent with a paper's policy, or at least not contradict that policy. Therefore, the volume of the opinion articles on a subject as well as analyses could be regarded as an indication of a paper's political orientation.

As table 4.14 shows, the number of opinion articles in *Al-Hayat*, which does not include an editorial comment, was high in the months of December (the Intifada's anniversary) and relatively low in the months of January. The greatest number of these articles was in December 1990, despite the political developments in the Gulf, which might have been expected to draw attention away from the Intifada.
As far as interviews are concerned, they are a particularly prominent feature of the Arab press because politicians, other figures of eminence, and specialists customarily present their views in the form of conversations, which sometimes attract the Arab readers' attention more than do long articles and comments. It is interesting to note that in the case of the Intifada, interviews did not in fact appear very frequently in comparison with other types of material. Tables 4.11-4.16 show that the number of interviews was not particularly high in any paper.

Finally, letters to the editor provide a way of measuring the response of the feelings and readership. These could not however be considered an accurate means of measuring concern because, on the one hand, a newspaper does not publish all the letters it receives and, on the other hand, many readers do not respond by writing letters to the editor. The letters do however offer an impression of the attitude of both the newspapers, in the sense of letters selected for publication, and also of the views of their readers, both to the events themselves and their response to the views of the newspaper about them.

As is shown in table 4.12, the number of the letters to the editor relating to the Intifada published in Al-Arab dropped during the uprising from 12 in January 1988 to none in the last three months of the examined period. This is consistent with the regression of Al-Arab's attention given to the Intifada. Table 4.15 shows that there was only one letter published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi during the four months covered by this study. Although Al-Quds Al-Arabi does not publish a large number of letters as a rule, this may still reflect a weak response from the paper's readership.

As table 4.13 shows, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat had the greatest response from its readership. The number of published letters from readers was repeatedly high (January 1988, December 1989, and January 1990).
Al-Ahram International did not publish a single letter from its readers on the subject of the Intifada. All letters published in this paper were concerned with Egyptian home affairs.

Table 4.16 shows that letters to the editor on the subject in The Guardian were very few. They reached as many as 5 in January 1988, after which it was hard to find one in any given month. This reflected the different interests and concerns of The Guardian's readership and those of the newspapers published for an Arab audience. According to Mishra (1979: 375), in the USA in particular (as well as in the West generally), there is a "low interest level of readers in the foreign news in general."

4.5. Source of news

Unlike their rivals in the Arab countries, all but one of the expatriate Arab dailies in the UK have correspondents in the Israeli Occupied Territories, the exception being Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat. However, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat co-operates, to at least a very limited extent, with a number of Palestinian academics in educational institutions and press service bureaux in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These agents provide the newspaper with some exclusive surveys, investigative reports, and analyses concerning the uprising and other Palestinian matters.

The correspondents of the Arab dailies in the Occupied Territories were always Palestinian journalists who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This is principally owing to the following:

(a) the common language shared between the newspapers and the Palestinians.
(b) the availability of a large number of Palestinian journalists in the Occupied Territories who are professionals, well aware of the situation, and familiar with the area in which they operate.
(c) the absence of any other Arab nationals in the Occupied Territories because of the state of war between Israel and most of the Arab countries.
Al-Ahram International also has a Palestinian correspondent in Jerusalem. Moreover, it usually sends a special reporter with the Egyptian officials who conduct formal visits to Israel (Al-Hinnawi, interview, 1993). Al-Ahram International is naturally in a better position to monitor and report news than the rest of the Arab press because of the diplomatic ties between Egypt and Israel.

Like most of the Western, and particularly the British, press, The Guardian has had a correspondent in Jerusalem since the beginning of the Intifada. He is British and covers both Israel and the Occupied Territories.

It might therefore be assumed that most of the news which comes to the newspapers from Israel is supplied by the papers' own correspondents. However, an examination of the papers' news coverage of the Intifada shows that this has not necessarily been the case. News stories supplied by news agencies were typically dominant throughout the studied period in comparison with those provided by correspondents.

Table 4.17 shows that Al-Ahram International relied to a large extent on news agencies in covering Intifada news items. Correspondents participated in reporting a very small proportion of the news items. Al-Ahram International frequently published news stories from undefined sources, which might however have come from its correspondents, but at least as far as the evidence goes, news agencies remained the dominant source for the newspaper throughout the Intifada.

As table 4.18 shows, Al-Arab did not publish a single news item accredited to a correspondent. However, it too published a large proportion of its news items with no reference to the source, and it is not clear what proportion of the category 'undefined' might have come from correspondents within Palestine.
Table 4.20 shows that Al-Hayat by contrast not only used correspondents but in fact increased its reliance on correspondents over the period. The proportion of news stories originating from correspondents reached 25.7% in January 1991, compared with 4.5% in December 1988. Al-Hayat also published a very small proportion of news reports supplied by press service offices in the Occupied Territories, and even fewer items from other mass media sources.

Contrary to possible expectations, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which has the best communication with the Palestinian press and journalists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and whose owners and editor are Palestinian, as far as cited sources are concerned, used far more news items provided by news agencies than by correspondents. This was partly owing to the financial difficulties facing the paper (see Chapter Four). However, the paper's editor maintained that the 'undefined' sources of news stories were usually correspondents whose names could not be repeated more than once in the issue. He added that some correspondents preferred not to state their names in the paper (Atwan, interview, 1995).

Because it does not have a correspondent in Israel, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat drew a high percentage of news items from news agencies (see table 4.19). On only a very few occasions did it refer to persons (believed to be freelance correspondents) as its source of Intifada news from the Occupied Territories. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat also maintained contacts with press service offices in the Occupied Territories. The table shows that the paper started receiving news items from Palestinian press offices in 1989, but this did not greatly alter its dependence on agencies.

In its quest for reliable information, The Guardian, like most of the Western prestige dailies, depended to a large extent on its own correspondent in Israel for coverage of Intifada news (see table 4.22). However, the evident decline in the percentage of news provided by The Guardian's own correspondent may be attributed to the steadily more
Table 4.17

Percentage of the sources of news items from within the occupied territories as given by Al-Ahram International

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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<td>88.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

News agencies = International and Arab news agencies.

Correspondents = staff correspondents and freelance correspondents.

N. Agenc. & Corres. = Ascribed to a combination of news agencies and correspondent sources.

Undefined = no external source given.

Press Offices = Palestinian press offices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which operate as local gatherers and distributors of news and information.

Other media = Source given as another publication, such as other newspaper or television station.
### Table 4.18

Percentage of the sources of news items from within the occupied territories as given by Al-Arab

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>News agencies</td>
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<td>68.6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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### Table 4.19

Percentage of the sources of news items from within the occupied territories as given by Ash-Shaprq Al-Awsat

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<th></th>
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<td>96</td>
<td>90.9</td>
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<td>69.7</td>
<td>71.9</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other media</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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Table 4.20

Percentage of the sources of news items from within the occupied territories as given by Al-Hayat

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>News agencies</td>
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<td>84.6</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other media</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.21

Percentage of the sources of news items from within the occupied territories as given by Al-Quds Al-Arabi

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec. 89</th>
<th>Jan. 90</th>
<th>Dec. 90</th>
<th>Jan. 91</th>
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<td>23.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondents</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. agenc. &amp; corres</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
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<td>Press offices</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other media</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.22

Percentage of the sources of news items from within the occupied territories as given by The Guardian

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>36.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>62.5</td>
<td>66.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
routine pattern of Intifada news. In the first two months, the newspaper depended almost entirely on its correspondent because the Intifada was a unique event and news of it was highly desired by the media. However, after the Intifada news lost its novelty appeal, then as usual with special correspondents, their employment shifted to new issues and the paper tended to obtain the bulk of Intifada news from news agencies, which continued to routinely cover most of the incidents taking place in the Occupied Territories. The undefined source of news stories in The Guardian is also likely to have been news agencies, because these reports are characterized by their brevity and limited headline appeal. Typical of agency reportage, they "try to remain as neutral as possible" by not including "items of evaluation" in their coverage (Van Dijk, 1988: 122).

The limited use of correspondents by the expatriate Arab press raises some general issues and questions. Generally speaking, the press in the developed countries has correspondents in many areas around the world. It relies on them for coverage of major world events as well as home news. According to Merrill (1968: 48), the élite daily press "must be able to receive a variety of services from news agencies, as well as to collect much national and world news with its own correspondents." Therefore, news from the wire services which appear in these papers is usually a sign of its being seen as less important than news which is reported by correspondents.

By contrast, the press in the Third World is still considered the main consumer of the news agencies' output. Correspondents of the Third World press predominantly cover their own governments' affairs and moves abroad, and, in addition, provide a very limited national and international coverage, drawn almost wholly from the standard output of news agencies.

The expatriate Arab press in the UK behaved in the same manner as the press in the Arab world and in the Third World in general in respect of news sources, in spite of
the fact that it operates in a developed country, since it published a large proportion of agencies' Intifada material in comparison with that of its own correspondents.

The circumstances under which the correspondents operate are however an important consideration to be taken into account. Journalists, especially Palestinians, in the Occupied Territories face various difficulties. As was indicated earlier in Chapter Three, the Israeli measures, such as curfews, closure of areas as military zones, and the military censorship procedures on a regular basis, are real obstacles facing journalists (JMCC, 1989: 41). Moreover, Palestinian journalists face even more hardship in their work given that they are considered by the Israelis as people from the opposite side who are subject to the military law which is applied to the Palestinian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. In their book Journalism under Occupation, the Committee to Protect Journalists and Article 19 reported that the Palestinian journalists "are often treated like participants" at demonstrations "and are most likely to be arrested" (CPJ, 1988: 132).

Consequently, it could be argued that the press which depends on Palestinian sources, such as stringers or press offices, has been affected to a greater extent than that which depends on foreign journalists.

According to the study conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, "at the beginning of the uprising there were an estimated 1,200 journalists covering the occupied territories. This number... dropped [by 1989] to an average of about 300 journalists at any given time" (JMCC, 1989: 27). The figure dropped partly as a result of the increasing measures taken by the Israeli authorities in an attempt to put a limit to the world-wide media coverage of the Intifada, partly owing to the realisation that the event was not finishing in a matter of weeks or months, and especially because it became clear that major changes were unlikely in the context of
the Intifada. This has increased the likelihood of news agencies' being essentially the main source of Intifada news.

As far as the sources of the investigative reports are concerned, table 4.23 shows that the general trend of the newspapers was to rely on both correspondents and news agencies. This trend has been contrary to expectations because the large number of news stories published daily by the papers and originating from news agencies suggests that correspondents might have been the sole source and played an important role in providing investigative reports. The table shows that Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat depended largely on news agencies and that Al-Arab did not accredit a single investigative report to a correspondent. The rest of the papers published, variably, investigative reports from both correspondents and news agencies.

This pattern, which implies inefficiency in the role allotted correspondents as a source of investigative reports, appears clearly when the case of The Guardian is considered. All investigative reports published by The Guardian were provided by its correspondents.

However, the gap between the investigative reports from correspondents and those from news agencies was not, as the table shows, as wide as that in the news stories. This was owing to the limited number of the reports, which, unlike news stories, did not have to be published on a daily basis. Namely, the papers depended largely on news agencies for news more than on investigative reports, since they published a larger number of news stories than investigative reports.

### 4.6. Subjects of news items

Tables 4.24-4.29 show that most of the Intifada news coverage in the expatriate papers was in terms of violence and politics. Al-Quds Al-Arabi was the only paper to concentrate on the human rights abuses in the Occupied Territories, making this
subject dominant in its coverage of the Intifada. The tables also show that the number of items of a political aspect is always more than that of items concerning violence. Nevertheless, many news stories on violence were in fact included in stories of the political development of the Intifada. The large number of items dealing with the political aspects reveals that the papers were paying more attention to this dimension even though it was only stirred by violence. However, we may argue that while violence lost some of its novelty after the first year of the Intifada, the political aspect kept developing and changing over time.

The tables show that social, educational, and economic aspects of the Intifada were covered to a significantly lesser extent than the violence, human rights abuses, and political aspects. The educational aspect was given the least attention in comparison with the rest of the topics.

As far as changes in the coverage from time to time are concerned, the tables show that in the three papers Al-Ahram International, Al-Arab, and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, it was the political aspect which suffered a dramatic drop after the first two months of the uprising. This shows that the coverage of violence continued, to some extent, steadily, with no great shifts, while the political aspect was subject to changes. Although the acts of violence became routine, they continued to be of very high news-value, as acts of political violence typically are. Thus, the papers continued their coverage of the aggravated violent incidents in the Occupied Territories throughout the period under study, but they considered the uprising of less political news value after the first two months, with the continuing stalemate in the political process.

4.8. The use of photographs and cartoons

Photographs in many cases act as a substitute for, or even tower over, words used to report and portray events, incidents, places, or participants (Hodgson, 1984: 27-28). According to Somerlad (1966: 173), "Pictures have their own 'language': they are a
Table 4.23

Sources as given of investigative reports of conditions within the occupied territories

<table>
<thead>
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Number of news items according to subject categories: The Guardian

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special method of communication which must be learnt to be understood. We take for granted that a picture tells its own story, that a two-dimensional photograph represents a three-dimensional scene. "Their appearance in the newspaper is as important as the text itself, and sometimes more so. News stories with accompanying photographs have a greater impact than those without pictures, since the photographs add an influential element to the story. Moreover, "when stories are of lesser importance, top editors frequently pay more attention to pictures than to text; and periodically such stories are chosen to justify the use of a strong picture" (Gans, 1979: 159).

The quantity of photographs used, alike in terms of numbers and sizes, and their frequency indicate the level of attention given by a paper to an event.

The visual aspect of the Intifada news has been the most influential and appealing element to the audience in the media coverage. Scenes of the imbalanced confrontation between unarmed Palestinian youths and well-armed Israeli soldiers were dramatic and therefore of great value for the press and TV alike.

The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre reported that although the Israeli army confiscated journalists' films in some incidents, photographers and television crews rarely submitted their material to Israeli censorship (JMCC, 1989: 31,33). This (a) explains the large number of photographs printed by the papers, (b) interprets why scenes of violence were widely published in the press, and (c) indicates that the image of the Intifada as portrayed in photographs and television news reels was authentic since the photographs and films escaped much of the censorship in Israel.

Journalists in the Occupied Territories gathered a huge amount of pictures since the Intifada commenced in 1987, despite the Israeli censorship. The press had access to the Intifada pictorial material in a similar, or probably better, way than it had to news texts, since it obtained pictures on a regular basis. This offered the newspapers the
chance of covering the political violence (the most favoured subject by the press) in pictures and words. Thus, it is not surprising that the newspapers published a large number of Intifada photographs. Table 4.30 and figure 4.5 show that the Arab dailies in the UK published Intifada photographs regularly. The table indicates that photographs continued to appear in the papers all the time, even during the Gulf crisis. With the exception of January 1991 (the month when the Gulf War commenced), photographs appeared in the Arab papers at least once every two days. In some cases (as with Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat in January 1988), photographs were published on an average of three a day. The Guardian also published Intifada photographs regularly, though of course to a lesser extent than did the expatriate Arab dailies.

Cartoons are substantially different from photographs in that they reflect an opinion formed by the cartoonist and adopted by the editor of a newspaper, while a photograph contains an illustration of a news story with a fairly limited degree of interpretation. So the difference between them is similar to the difference between the news story and the opinion article. The cartoon, according to Hornby (1965: 27), "plays an important part in providing a link between the news and views of the paper over any particular story."

The cartoon is important because it summarizes an idea in simple lines which can be understood by all readers. According to Slyomovics (1993: 21), it is "short and direct... and condensing history, culture and social relationships within a single frame."

She adds that the cartoon images "can recontextualize events and evoke reference points in ways that a photograph or even a film cannot... they challenge the ways we accept official images as real and true." They appeal to the reader because they are usually critical and contain an ironic element.

The Palestinian Intifada has been the raw material for cartoonists to expose the 'heroism' of the Palestinian people, the 'weakness' of Israel, the 'ignorance' of the
Table 4.30

Number of photographs used by the newspapers

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Figure 4.5

Number of photographs used by the newspapers
world. In the Arab press in general, cartoons "have played a central role in examining such issues as the power of the media, political rhetoric and persuasion, censorship and resistance" (Slyomovics, 1993: 21).

Table 4.31 and figure 4.6 show that the expatriate dailies published Intifada cartoons regularly throughout the examined period, which is another indication of their concern with the Intifada. Obviously, the number of cartoons in the papers concerning the Intifada is limited since they have only one main cartoon which covers different Arab and international issues. Therefore, the regularity in publishing cartoons on the Intifada is a sign of the papers' great attention to it (figure 4.6).

As could be expected, The Guardian gave over its cartoon slot to the Intifada only once, in January 1988 (see table 4.31).

4.8. Summary
The chief finding of this chapter, which is introductory to the qualitative chapter, is the extensive and regular coverage of the Intifada by the expatriate newspapers. Although some papers paid more attention to the Intifada than others, they, nevertheless, showed no significant differences in general in the regularity of their coverage throughout the period. As could be expected, the first two months of the uprising witnessed the largest amount of coverage by all newspapers, reflecting the immediate vigorous response by the papers to the Intifada, and the period of the Gulf crisis, three years after the beginning of the uprising, witnessed the least coverage of the Intifada by the papers. Yet, the papers continued to cover the Intifada even during the Gulf War, when the Occupied Territories were under curfew. Al-Quds Al-Arabi was the paper to allocate the largest space and number of items to the Intifada in comparison with the rest of the papers. This was also to be expected, since this particular paper is Palestinian owned.
Table 4.31

Number of cartoons used by the newspapers

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Figure 4.6

Number of cartoons used by the newspapers
The highest percentage of space allocated to the Intifada was on the Arab affairs pages in all the papers. The papers also allocated a significant and regular part of their pages to investigative reports and opinion articles.

As far as the proportion of the Intifada news to the Arab news was concerned, it was very high in Al-Quds Al-Arabi and similarly in The Guardian. This reveals that both papers regarded Intifada news relative to other events in the Arab world as more significant than did the rest of the papers. As for the relative importance of the Intifada to Palestinian affairs, the papers regarded it as the most significant part of Palestinian affairs.

The papers which had usually the larger number of news stories in comparison to other item types, nevertheless devoted to the Intifada significant numbers of investigative reports, opinion articles, and editorial comments.

The papers' source of Intifada news has been an interesting topic, since the papers could maintain correspondents in Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Territories. It was striking that all the papers relied primarily on news agencies for the bulk of their news stories as well as investigative reports from within the Occupied Territories. Only Al-Hayat showed an increasing reliance on its correspondent.

The papers covered news violence constantly with no significant differences from one period to another. This reflects the continuous attention paid by the papers to the actual Intifada incidents as a form of political violence. Though the papers paid more attention to news of the Intifada's political aspects, this pattern changed, especially with the great falling off of attention after January 1988.

The use of photographs and cartoons shows that there was a substantial and frequent use of such material by the papers. There were Intifada photographs and cartoons all
the time in all the papers, showing also the great attention paid by the papers to the image of the Intifada portrayed by the pictorial material.
Chapter Five

THE COVERAGE OF THE INTIFADA IN THE
EXPATRIATE ARAB DAILIES:
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
5.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the coverage of the Palestinian uprising by the expatriate Arab dailies in Britain, with cross-reference to coverage by The Guardian. It examines the following themes:

- The way the newspapers perceived the Intifada, i.e. its causes, significance, effectiveness, and future prospects.
- Particular attention is given to the image of the Palestinians as reflected by the press.
- The Israeli reaction to the Intifada including its policy towards it and the impact of the uprising on the country.
- The role played by the Arab world in general and then, specifically, by Egypt and Iraq.
- The reaction of the West. This section examines in particular the papers' coverage of reactions by the United Kingdom and the United States. The role of the United Nations is also dealt with in this section.
- The peace process.

In general, although there has been no disagreement in the Arab world to recover the Occupied Territories, the Intifada in particular gathered unprecedented support among the Palestinians, not only in the Arab world, but also in most countries, East and West. In fact, there was a consensus in the Arab world on sustaining the Intifada for a number of reasons, among which were its spontaneity, its limited use of violence, and its popularity.

The expatriate Arab dailies in the UK registered an immense support for the uprising from its first days. Not only did they commit themselves to covering its various aspects, especially the daily clashes with the Israeli forces, but they also maintained
their support through their regular analysis and comments which provided a continuous assessment of the conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising that the papers did not, essentially, differ in supporting the Intifada as a movement of resistance, but they did differ in their coverage of associated issues, such as its strategic objectives, the reaction of the outside world, and the peace process. Thus, the Intifada was not the typical issue that could reflect the differences between the newspapers. Nevertheless, the coverage of the uprising in the expatriate papers revealed the origins of the later, most important differences on a number of current issues, such as the emergence of the Islamic organisations, which took over the uprising after the peace agreement between the PLO and Israel. Also, the extensive use of arms in later stages of the Intifada, as well as the peace process itself, have been at the core of controversy between the papers.

5.2. The Intifada

5.2.1. The reasons for the Intifada

The Arab dailies in the UK seem to have been united on the causes of the Intifada, asserting as the main reasons the Palestinians' frustration and despair, their disappointment with the Arab leadership, who failed in their attempts to solve the Palestinian problem, the oppressing Israeli occupation, and the indifference of the world.

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat reflected the view that the Intifada happened mainly because of the disappointment and despair of the Palestinians at the lack of any political solution on the one hand, and because of their suffering through the occupation on the other hand. Ameen Al-Hafiz\(^1\) (6.12.1987: 9) pointed out that the Palestinians lost any hope of an international peace conference to solve their problem, especially after the superpower Summit in December 1987, which provoked the eruption of the violence in the Occupied Territories. Moreover, the paper argued in its editorial comment

\(^1\) A Lebanese MP and writer.
(16.12.1987: 9) that the Palestinians had lost hope in the Arabs and in some Palestinian factions. In spite of the several wars and campaigns which have taken place over the last decades, the paper has often levelled accusations against Arab countries, claiming that the Arabs had not only done nothing to resolve the Palestinian problem, but they had also failed to fulfil their promises to liberate Palestine. The Arab leaders, the paper added, held many conferences, voiced a number of promises and announced initiatives, but did not support the Palestinians in anything but words. As far as the Palestinian factions were concerned, the paper added that some of them had become agents for certain Arab regimes and had therefore lost credibility among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who could not wait for them to act on their behalf, and thus did not have any choice but to act themselves against the occupation.

Furthermore, the editorial comment of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (16.12.1987: 9) argued that the Intifada was an inevitable consequence of the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. The paper added that the revolt was a natural response of the occupied people to the occupation and to the international ignorance of their legitimate rights. A reprinted article from The Financial Times (16.12.1987: 6) maintained that the Intifada had erupted because Israel had, for two decades, suppressed the Palestinians' ambitions and denied them any kind of economic or political rights. It added that Israel did not realise that this revolt could not be contained militarily, since that would cause more violence and more political complications. Stressing the occupation and its results, a columnist Ahmad Baha Eddin1 (18.12.1987: 7) argued that these causes were misunderstood by people in the West, who claimed that it was the misery, despair, and certain Israeli practices against the Palestinians that were the reasons for the Intifada. He added that it was only the occupation, with all its political complications, that was the real reason for the uprising, which would only stop when the occupation ended.

1 A prominent (nationalist) Egyptian journalist and writer.
Al-Ahram International and Al-Arab typically referred to the same reasons as Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat for the eruption of the Intifada. Atiyeh Esawi wrote in Al-Ahram International (17.12.1987: 4) that there were two main reasons for the eruption of the Intifada. The first was the absence of a political settlement for the Palestine question, and the second was the Israelis' "ruthless and oppressive" practices in the Occupied Territories. Ali Eddin Hilal (28.1.1988: 7) added that the Arabs' ignorance, particularly as demonstrated in the Arab Summit in Amman in November 1987, of the Palestinian agony in the Occupied Territories had contributed to the eruption of the Intifada. In Al-Arab Mohammed Ash-Shafe'i (15.12.1987: 3) wrote that the Intifada had taken upon itself to face the Israeli policies of abduction and 'Judaization' of the Palestinian land.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi concentrated on the frustration among the Palestinians, because of the Arabs' failed role in the Palestine problem, as the main reason for the uprising. The paper's editorial comment (9.12.1989: 11) stated that the Intifada was a revolt against the suspected political initiatives (to dissolve the Palestine problem) and against the weakness of the Arabs. Abdel-Bari Atwan (9.12.1989: 11) added that the uprising had started because of the conspiracy (ta'amur) (of the Arab regimes) against the Palestinians, and also because of the massive accumulation of feelings of frustration among the Palestinian people.

The Guardian pointed out that the occupation was the explanation "why the pent-up frustration of Palestinians has erupted in the way it has" (editorial comment, 24.12.1987: 8). The paper argued that the violence in the Occupied Territories is "almost certainly a classic manifestation of second-generation discontent" since this generation has "never known anything other than living under occupation in dismal camps" (editorial comment, 15.1.1988: 12). The paper's correspondent in Jerusalem, Ian Black, reported (26.1.1988: 25) that the Intifada was a cry by the Palestinian
people that "we have had enough of being caged in, contained, oppressed and forgotten. We cannot stand it any longer." He reported a leading Palestinian nationalist as saying that the uprising had been created by Israel, which had antagonized every Palestinian.

5.2.2. The aims of the Intifada being a new phase of struggle

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat regarded the Intifada as a very important event for the Palestinians as well as for the Arabs. Ameen Al-Hafiz (16.12.1987: 9) regarded the uprising as a symbol of the international resistance at large and of the Palestinian struggle in particular. Additionally, the paper argued in its editorial comment (20.12.1987: 9) that the uprising had made this the most important stage in modern Palestinian history, since it had become clear that the Palestinian people had decided to enter the war against Israel "with a gun in one hand and the olive branch in the other."

Although the paper regarded the Intifada in some instances as a first step to more violence to achieve the liberation of Palestine (Othman Al-OMair, 22.12.1987: 15), it later viewed it as a means of making progress toward to a political settlement. Ahmad Hamroush¹ (26.1.1988: 9) argued that the continuation of the Intifada was an objective in itself, for it was the only way to create political changes. This argument was not in fact in contrast with the general trend of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, which called for a political settlement and at the same time the escalation of the Intifada, as will be elaborated in more detail in the last section of this chapter.

Al-Ahram International² regarded the Intifada as a turning-point in the history of the Palestinians' struggle, typically in the same way as Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat viewed it. The paper emphasised the importance of using all possible means in the resistance,

¹ A prominent Egyptian politician and writer. He is the president of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and a former army major.
² The commentators and writers in Al-Ahram International are usually Egyptian journalists and writers, unless indicated otherwise.
including civil disobedience and armed struggle (Mohammed As-Sayed Sa'id, 6.1.1988: 6). Although this argument was not dominant in Al-Ahram International, this could be regarded as a significant trend in the paper in the first weeks of the Intifada. The official stance of the paper, as projected by its editorial comments regarded the Intifada as a prime cause for the Palestinian peace moves. In its editorial comment (8.12.1988: 6) the paper argued that the Intifada had succeeded in producing some achievements, such as encouraging the PLO to launch a political struggle. Nevertheless, it admitted that the uprising's goals were still remote, especially in the light of the Israeli and American ignorance of those goals (Ihsan Baker, 10.1.1989: 4).

Nevertheless, in a reprinted article from the Palestinian weekly Al-Yawm As-Sabe', the paper, insisted that it was important for the Intifada to continue, since it placed pressure on Israel and was a means to achieve the major aim of putting an end to the occupation and establishing the Palestinian state (Bilal Al-Hasan, 1 29.1.1989: 7).

Al-Arab regarded the Intifada as a new phase in the Palestinians' struggle. Abdel-Razak Al-Yahya (11.1.1988: 6) stressed that it was a new facet of the resistance and an absolute rejection of the occupation. Moreover, Amjad Naser (14.12.1987: 3) pointed out that the Intifada was the real face of the Palestinian national struggle and that it complemented the role of the military operations which were carried out by the Palestinian and Lebanese guerrillas from South Lebanon against Israel.

In other instances, Al-Arab interpreted the term it used to describe the Intifada, "the real face of struggle," as the genuine form of struggle against Israel to liberate all (mandatory) Palestine. Mohammed Ash-Shafe'i (15.12.1987: 3) argued that the Intifada was a step taken towards regaining the land which had been occupied by Israel in 1948.4 Abdel-Jabbar Odwan5 (31.12.1987: 3) stressed that the aim of the

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1 A Palestinian journalist and a former editor-in-chief of Al-Yawm As-Sabe'.
2 A Palestinian poet, journalist, and writer.
3 An Egyptian writer.
4 These views were repeated in articles in Al-Arab by Mohammed Hasan Birqedar (29.12.1987: 3) and Abdel-Jabbar Odwan (22.1.1988: 3).
Intifada was definitely not to establish a mini-Palestinian state, nor to make peace with Israel, since the Palestinian refugees had no interest in such a solution. He added that what the refugees wanted was to return to their towns and villages in Palestine.

Although Al-Hayat did not discuss the causes of the Intifada, it emphasised its goals and means. The paper regarded the Intifada as a peaceful protest for the purpose of obtaining a permanent settlement of the Palestine problem. Suleiman Shaqour (7.12.1988: 3) pointed out that the Intifada used non-lethal means in order to signal that its aim was not the destruction of Israel. Its aim, according to Shaqour, was to establish a Palestinian state side-by-side with Israel. Khirallah Khirallah¹ (7.12.1988: 7) argued that the dilemma and confusion in Israel on how to deal with the Intifada reflected how clear and realistic its aim was. According to Khirallah, a division would not have occurred among the Israelis had the aims of the Intifada been ambiguous and/or unrealistic, e.g. such as the destruction of Israel. On the contrary, Khirallah added, the Israeli people would unite and back their government in fighting the Intifada if it had raised the slogan of terrorism and extremism.

Nevertheless, Al-Hayat admitted that the uprising had failed to achieve its major aims. Ghassan Al-Khatib² (12.12.1990: 5) pointed out that the uprising had failed to force the occupier to leave the occupied land, had failed to secure the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, and had failed to establish a Palestinian state. Azmi Bisharah³ (12.12.1990: 5) pointed out that although the Intifada had turned the Israeli occupation into an expensive project, it had failed to make Israel unable to afford the expenses. However, despite the Gulf crisis in 1990, Constantine Zurayk⁴ (21.12.1990:

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¹ Editorial manager of Al-Hayat, a Lebanese journalist and a former editor-in-chief of the Lebanese daily, An-Nahar.
² A Palestinian lecturer at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank.
³ A Palestinian lecturer at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank.
⁴ A prominent Palestinian thinker and historian.
9) regarded the Intifada as "the only light shining in the Arab darkness, and as a beacon of hope for those Arab youths who looked to the future pessimistically."

In its assessment of the first year of the uprising, The Guardian argued that the Intifada had failed to end "two decades of dependence on the Israelis." The paper pointed out that the Palestinians themselves admitted that the stones and the petrol bombs had not defeated "the most powerful army in the Middle East." However, it stated that "the Intifada is more a state of mind than insurrection" and so "all the Israeli measures failed to crush" it (Ian Black, 9.12.1988: 12).

Yet, The Guardian repeatedly emphasised the fact that the Intifada was still far away from converting its achievements into a "real movement towards a diplomatic settlement" (Ian Black, 8.12.1989: 15). That was despite the Palestinians' clear message that the objective of the Intifada was 'the two-state solution' which was described by David Hirst (9.12.1989: 23) as "moderate" through its non-armed method of uprising. Moreover, Sari Nusseibah (9.12.1989: 23) wrote in The Guardian that although the Intifada aimed to achieve Palestinian freedom and independence, it had not however endangered Israel, nor had it deprived the Israelis of any of their rights.

5.2.3. The future of the Intifada

In time, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat showed an increasing concern over the future of the uprising in the light of its failure to impose a political settlement. In an analytical report (6.12.1989: 4), Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat reported that the Palestinians feared that their revolt had reached an impasse, since Israel had not moved from one inch of the Occupied Land. Moreover, the paper argued that although the world had paid attention to more sensational events elsewhere, this did not mean that the Palestinians were defeated. It added that there was an increasing tendency to resort to the use of arms, particularly among the extremist Palestinians, who argued that the use of stones
was no longer adequate. Nevertheless, the paper focused on the rejection of the use of arms in the Intifada by the Palestinian people. In an exclusive report (30.12.1990: 6), the paper highlighted the resentment of prominent Palestinian leaders in the Occupied Territories against the use of arms. The leaders admitted that the situation was deteriorating, but argued that it was not in the Palestinians' interest to use arms in the Intifada.

_Al-Ahram International_ clearly reflected the frustration because of the political deadlock in the peace process by December 1989. The paper pointed out that the Intifada had resulted in heavy casualties and losses on both sides, indicating how dangerous and threatening the situation for the security of the region was (editorial comment, 3.12.1989: 6). The paper suggested that the Arabs should take that into consideration when assessing the Intifada, on its second anniversary, and the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories.

In the light of the increasing frustration, the paper warned that the conflict could turn into an armed struggle. The paper argued that the calls for the use of arms in the Intifada did not receive popular support among the Palestinians, because the leadership of the Intifada believed that the quantitative, cumulative effect of the peaceful struggle would finally produce qualitative changes in Israel (Tawfiq Abu-Baker, 1 6.12.1989: 6). Moreover, the paper's correspondent in Jerusalem, Ameerah Hasan (9.12.1989: 10), reported that the Palestinian leaders in the Occupied Territories stressed that the Intifada was a message of peace, and thus that it was important that weapons were not used in it. However, the paper warned that despite the danger of the use of arms, the Palestinians would find themselves pushed down that road if Israel insisted on its position with regard to the peace process (editorial comment, 14.12.1989: 6). Contrary to its rejection of the armed struggle, the paper defended the use of knives in the Intifada, during the Gulf crisis, and regarded it as a

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1 A Palestinian journalist and writer.
result of the Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Mohammed Rida Moharram, 5.12.1990: 9). It pointed out that the "Intifada of knives and stones" proves that the struggle will continue despite the Israeli prediction that the Intifada would stop.

The paper increasingly did not hide its fears that the Intifada was facing the danger of coming to a halt without any achievement. Fihmi Howeidi2 (30.1.1990: 7) warned that there were many signs indicating that the Intifada was about to end. He warned that there were political, economic, and educational dilemmas facing the Intifada, in addition to the decline in the people's participation in the resistance. However, Musa Hawamdeh (17.1.1990: 11) defended the continuation of the Intifada by arguing that, as a method, it would one day cease, but stressed that that should only be after it had achieved its aims.

Apart from during the first year of the Intifada, Al-Arab did not explicitly interpret the Intifada as a step toward liberating all of Palestine. Rather, it stressed the importance of the continuation of struggle as the only way to regain the Palestinians' rights. Specifically, the paper encouraged the armed struggle to achieve this goal. Tayseer Kamleh3 (5.12.1989: 3) argued that the Intifada should turn into armed struggle, mainly to retaliate against the increasing 'Israeli terrorism'. Moreover, the editorial comment (31.1.1990: 1) pointed out that the PLO was right when it hinted at its intention to discontinue its political moves toward achieving a peaceful solution and to return to the armed struggle, mainly because of the increasing Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union. The paper went even further when it stated, "We would like someone to drop a nuclear bomb on Israel to put a quick end to the conflict,

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1 The use of knives in the Intifada was spontaneous, particularly in the period from the Al-Aqsa Mosque massacre to the Gulf War. The papers seemed to have defended the use of knives because it took place at first on an individual basis, and it did not need to be organised in the way the armed struggle did. The papers did not in fact expect the consequences of the use of knives to be as bad as those of the use of arms in the Intifada.

2 A prominent Islamist Egyptian writer.

3 A Palestinian journalist.
especially since an Islamic country will be able to produce that kind of bomb very soon."

The paper viewed "arming the Intifada" as even more important during the Gulf crisis. Khairi Gharah (21.12.1990: 3) called for an arming and escalating of the Intifada at that very moment. He argued that such a step would bring the Palestine issue again to the fore and, moreover, it would reinforce the Iraqi argument of the linkage between the Kuwaiti and the Palestinian problems. Mohammed Moro¹ (28.12.1990: 3) defended the increasing use of knives and the gradual use of arms in the Intifada. He admitted that the Palestinian leaders had avoided the use of arms, which was justifiable since they were selling out their people and were on their way towards negotiations with Israel. He added that those leaders who had dropped the armed struggle as an alternative, had lost credibility.

Al-Hayat defended the escalation of the uprising in 1990 and particularly the use of knives, and considered that to be the result of the Israeli practices, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque massacre (Yousef Khazem,² 6.1.1991: 8). Unexpectedly, as Randa Haidar³ (28.1.1991: 8) reported, a prominent Palestinian, Faisal Al-Huseini,⁴ who had been known as an advocate of peace, regarded stabbing as a success, since it imposed the necessity of separating the Occupied Territories from Israel. Haidar pointed out that although Al-Huseini had not proposed an alternative for those Palestinians who worked in Israel, he had stressed that the closure of the Israeli borders in front of the Palestinians as a result of the use of knives in the Intifada would help to separate the Palestinian from the Israeli economy.

¹ An Islamist Egyptian writer.
² A Lebanese journalist who works at Al-Hayat.
³ A Lebanese journalist and writer.
⁴ A member of the Palestinian National Authority Council.
Al-Hayat totally rejected the use of arms in the Intifada. Faisal Al-Huseini (10.12.1990: 3) explained in an exclusive interview that the question, "When will the Intifada use arms?" implied a misunderstanding of the nature of the uprising. He stressed that the Intifada was a peaceful struggle with political aims. Sari Nusseibah (11.12.1990: 5) argued that, in theory, arming the Intifada was sensible, but, in practice, it was a crazy idea.

The articles reprinted by Al-Quds Al-Arabi from the Israeli press emphasised the setbacks and deterioration which the Intifada suffered because of the Israeli measures, and the consequent increased fear and desperation among the Palestinians. This despair, the reprinted articles pointed out, would become expressed in even more violence. The papers maintained a number of negative aspects of the Intifada which could have threatened its future. For instance, Yoram Levi (4.12.1989: 10) wrote in Davar that the Intifada had lost the people's support and was now run only by groups of activists, while the people had become divided into two parties: pro-PLO and pro-Hamas. Additionally, an article quoted from Davar (28.12.1989: 10) argued that the definite increase in the killing of Palestinian collaborators proved the role played by activists. The paper argued that this phenomenon was very dangerous and that even the PLO itself had shown great concern about it. Nevertheless, the Israeli press, as reported by Al-Quds Al-Arabi, argued that the Palestinians had managed to make the Intifada a way of life, despite the large degree of success of the Israeli oppression (Gid'on Samet, Ha-Arets, 7.12.1989: 10). 2

However, the editorial comment of Al-Quds Al-Arabi (4.12.1989: 11) argued that the Intifada, on its second anniversary, was still as strong as it had been when it started in 1987. The paper added that the Intifada was capable of breaking the deadlock of the political process, which the USA and Israel had failed to do. According to the paper,

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1 A prominent Palestinian intellectual and professor at Bir Zeit University.
2 See also Al-Quds Al-Arabi, an article from Yediot Ahronot, 13.12.1989: 10.
this would be accomplished by armed struggle, which would form the next stage of the uprising.

Moreover, Ali Al-Marashdeh\(^1\) (10.1.1990: 11) argued that the future of the Intifada should only have been determined by itself and without external powers. He regarded the Intifada as a unique revolt since it was free from any influence of external powers, and because it was flexible and realistic and thus could have adjusted to the political developments. He argued that the Intifada should be dealt with as a strategic struggle and should not be subject to future negotiations. Therefore, he added, the Intifada, which had destroyed all possibilities of peaceful coexistence between the Arabs and the Jews, had gathered momentum for armed, as well as political, action.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi explicitly defended the escalation of the Intifada and the use of knives and arms against the Israelis. The editorial comment (18.1.1990: 11) anticipated that there was a real opportunity that the Intifada was going to resort to armed struggle as long as the peace process was at a standstill. Later, the paper argued in its editorial comment (8.12.1990: 11) that the Intifada had resisted the use of arms to avenge the martyrs who were being killed by the Israeli soldiers on a daily basis, not because of weakness, but because of the conviction that the Israelis should not be given a chance to face an armed battle, in which they had more experience. However, the paper argued, the "war of knives, which has prevailed recently in the Occupied Territories, is a new chapter of the Intifada, and surely there will be other chapters that will surprise everybody, in the same way the first stone of the uprising did."

The reprinted articles from the Israeli press, on the other hand, expressed fears that the Intifada might turn into armed struggle, not because the Palestinians wanted it, or were able to pursue it, but because the situation was running out of control. Arieh Belji wrote in Al Ha-Mishmar (11.12.1990: 10) that the Palestinians were tending to

\(^{1}\) A Moroccan writer, concerned with Palestinian affairs.
reinforce their struggle by increasing the use of arms in the Intifada. He argued that this was not a sign of strength, but was in fact a sign of total despair. Avi Benhyo [sic] stressed in his article in Al Ha-Mishmar (8.12.1990: 10) that the Intifada had not yet escalated into armed struggle. However, he added, the increasing use of arms was worrying and could be considered to be an indication of the will among the Palestinians to turn the Intifada into a bloody armed conflict. He pointed out that the deadlock in the political process had led to more acts of revenge, despair, and religious outrage, expressed in more violence. Emanuel Rozin wrote in Ma'ariv (10.12.1990: 10) that the leaflet which the leadership of the Intifada had issued, calling for the use of all forms of struggle against the Israelis, was a clear indication that the leaders had become tired of the classic style of struggle. According to Rozin, this drew a big question mark over the extent of their control on the street and whether they would be able to resist the extreme desire of the people to intensify the violence.

The Guardian noticed from the early days of the uprising that the degree of violence was not enough "to make the cost of continued occupation intolerable for the occupiers" since there had only been a few casualties among the Israelis (Ian Black, 16.12.1987: 21). However, the paper argued that the Intifada highlighted the dimensions of the disaster that would come if no solution were found to the Palestinian question (Ian Black, 22.12.1987: 1). The prospects of danger increased over time with the increasingly tough Israeli measures and the deadlock in the peace process. By the end of the second year of the Intifada, the paper indicated that the Palestinians had stepped up their use of arms against the collaborators (Ian Black, 1.12.1989: 1). It argued that the killing of collaborators did not, directly, affect the Israelis, although they did fear the danger of the Intifada's turning into an armed insurrection. On the other side, the Palestinians were pushing for more violence. The Guardian reported one Palestinian as saying, "I believe our leadership has made too many concessions to the Israelis and the Americans. Now they must concentrate on improving our struggle" (Ian Black, 6.12.1989: 22). Nevertheless, David Hirst
(9.12.1989: 23) pointed out that the Palestinians were not waging a systematic armed struggle against Israel, "but there will probably be a growth in occasional, selective operations." However, Hirst warned that "that kind of carefully calibrated escalation could easily get out of hand."

The call by the Intifada leadership in December 1990 in its monthly leaflet for the use of "all forms of struggle" was interpreted by The Guardian as signs of the Intifada’s turning to arms (Ian Black, 4.12.1990: 13). Black stated that the leadership "seemed to approve the recent spate of knife attacks against Israeli civilians" and that the leaflet indicated a violent mood and provided "further evidence of growing extremism among the Palestinians, with moderates being forced to toe the line."1

5.3. Palestinians: two competing camps

5.3.1. The Muslim organisations: Hamas and Islamic Jihad

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat indicated in the first period of the uprising that the emergence of the Muslim organisations as new participants in the protests was an important development in the conflict. However, the paper expressed its concern over the rising role of these organisations as a result of the deteriorating political and security circumstances in the Occupied Territories.

The participation of the Muslim organisations was mentioned by the paper in two reprinted articles, the first from The Financial Times (16.12.1987: 6) and the second from The Observer (21.12.1987: 6). The first indicated that Israel was facing a difficulty in confronting the revival of the Islamic activities in the wake of the new wave of violence in the Occupied Territories, while the second reported that Israel was blaming both the PLO and Muslim fundamentalists for the violence. Moreover, Imad Eddin Adeeb (18.12.1987: 2) predicted that the 'Islamic tide' would spread dramatically among the Palestinian youths in the foreseeable future and that it would

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cause an increase in the participation of the Muslim groups in political life, as well as in the clandestine national activities against the occupation.

Although the participation of Muslim organisations was not denied by *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*, the paper argued later that there was some exaggeration in focusing on them. Mohammed Al-Arabi Al-Khatabi¹ (27.12.1987: 9) accused Israel of lying, because it had claimed that the Palestinians were encouraged by fanatical religious groups. He stressed that these claims had been made because Israel was greatly shaken by the uprising. Khaleel Al-Wazir (Abu-Jihad) explained, in an exclusive interview (28.12.1987: 1), that the Muslim groups were not an extraordinary phenomenon since they had long existed in Palestinian society and had acted under the umbrella of the PLO. He confirmed that there had recently been an agreement and unification concluded between the nationalists and the Islamists in the Occupied Territories.

However, it became clear later that the Muslim organisations were operating apart from the PLO, to such an extent that there were clear differences between the two sides on some occasions. Yazid Sayegh² (9.12.1989: 6) stated that the competition between the Palestinian factions had led to more differences, mainly between the Islamic movement³ and the factions of the PLO. Moreover, all Muslim organisations were criticised by As'ad Abdel-Rahman (13.12.1989: 12)⁴ for operating outside the PLO. He described them as minorities, and stressed that working outside the PLO would cause damage to national unity, and thus would produce no beneficial results.

¹ A Moroccan journalist and writer.
² A prominent Palestinian academic and writer, a resident of Oxford, a member of the PNC, and also a member of the Palestinian team in the peace negotiations with Israel.
³ The term 'Islamic movement' is usually applied to the major Muslim organisations in the Occupied Territories, particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
⁴ Abdel-Rahman is a Palestinian academic and writer, and a member of the PNC. The article was also published on the same day by *Al-Ahram International*: 10 and *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*: 11.
One year later, in the wake of the Gulf crisis and Al-Aqsa massacre, the Hamas movement had become more active in the Occupied Territories. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* indicated that there were significant, but worrying, developments in the Intifada. Isam Numan\(^2\) (9.12.1990: 15) stated that although Hamas had been formed only a few years previously, its membership was now rising because of the failure and the set-backs of the nationalist tide (i.e. the PLO). He warned that if the Arab and Western leaders continued to ignore the imbalance of power between the Arabs and Israel (weighted in favour of the latter), and if they ignored the future of the Intifada in the light of the Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel, then the "strict fundamentalist factor will become the most active variable after the Gulf crisis."

However, the newspaper commented on the killing of three Israelis by Hamas (14.12.1990) in Jaffa, defending that action in its editorial comment (16.12.1990: 13). The paper blamed Israel for rejecting the international peace conference, and regarded its rejection as the prime motive for more and more violence by the Palestinians to remind the world of their suffering and despair.

The participation of the Muslim groups was dealt with by *Al-Ahram International* more extensively than by *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*. *Al-Ahram International* viewed this factor in the Intifada as a reality and a new development in the Palestinian political map in the Occupied Territories. The paper noticed the participation of the Muslim groups in the Intifada as early as 12.12.1987, when Abdel-Ati Mohammed (12.12.1987: 8) wrote that the violent incidents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were different from the PLO's style. He ascribed those incidents to "Islamic forces" who were leading this resistance. He added that this could be the reason why the PLO had

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\(^1\) On 8.10.1990 the Palestinian worshippers in Al-Aqsa Mosque protested against the Jewish Temple Mount Faithful group who had attempted to lay the cornerstone of Jewish Temple in Al-Aqsa Mosque. A bloody clash took place, in which the Israeli army interfered, resulting in 18 Palestinians' being killed and about 140 being injured. Israeli sources added that the Israeli army's interference came after the Muslim worshippers in Al-Aqsa Mosque had "rained a barrage of stones on the heads of Jews worshipping during the Succot-Tabernacles festival at the adjacent Western (Wailing) Wall" (The Guardian, 9.10.1990: 1).

\(^2\) A Lebanese MP, political activist, and writer.
allocated four seats to the Muslim organisations in the Central Council. A columnist, Ahmad Bahjat (18.12.1987: 2), registered support for the involvement of the Muslim organisations when he wrote, "We are facing a new position... a new law... the law of jihad, which came out of the religious awakening and which will lead us to the origins of the Palestine problem."

In its assessment of the Muslim organisations in the Occupied Territories, Al-Ahram International published an article by Halah Mustafa\(^1\) (8.1.1988: 13), who looked at the recent history of the Palestinian Muslim factions and confirmed that they had become increasingly powerful in the last two decades. She predicted that this phenomenon would not threaten the PLO, which would co-operate with them. However, she warned that they would become a danger to Israel despite its ability to play on the differences between the Palestinian factions.

In acknowledging the important role of the Muslim organisations, Al-Ahram International published a number of articles which argued that this fact should be taken for granted and should not be ignored when assessing the Intifada. The paper reprinted an article from the Egyptian paper Ash-Sha'b (28.1.1988: 6), by the prominent Muslim scholar Mohammed Al-Ghazali, in which he attacked the press for having avoided dealing with the role of the Muslim groups in the Intifada. He added that the press claimed that by so doing, it had prevented the conflict from falling into the category of religious conflicts. He stressed that those people who held that view were mistaken, since it was Israel that was waging a religious war against the Muslims when it acted according to the Torah in its policies. Fihmi Howeidi (6.12.1988: 7) focused on the role of the Muslim forces in the Intifada and regarded that role as most significant since those forces guided the people to the "right path against the occupation" and "for the sake of liberation." He attacked those who distorted history and those who claimed that Islam was not the power behind the Intifada through their occasional

\(^{1}\) A researcher in Islamic movements at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
attempts to cast that fact in a suspicious and sometimes even frightening light. Howeidi argued that no one would benefit from excluding and marginalizing the role of the Muslim organisations in the Intifada. He concluded that everybody should concentrate on and answer one question: "How should Islam be employed and invested to the maximum in the liberation process?"

Al-Arab also did not deny that the Muslim organisations had participated in the Intifada, but it insisted that the Western media had exaggerated in their treatment of these organisations. The columnist Amjad Naser (16.12.1987: 3) attacked the Western media for concentrating on the role of 'Muslim fundamentalism', and accused them of trying to exclude the PLO from any role in the future. Moreover, another columnist, Ali Hashem (7.1.1988: 3), felt that the media's concentration on the Muslim groups implied a separation between the two concepts of Arabism and Islam. He added that this was not acceptable and pointed out that these claims had been made up intentionally. Abdel-Jabbar Odwan (14.1.1988: 3) went further when he wrote, under the title "The Islamic movement rebelled against Israel", that it was Israel which had participated in creating some of the Muslim organisations. He argued that Israel had armed some of these groups and had allowed them to attack and abuse other national groups and civilians. He stressed that the claim that Muslim fundamentalist forces were behind the Intifada was an exaggeration, the purpose of which was to distort the image of the Intifada, especially because the bad image of the Islamists had already been created because of Iran's policy. He added that the concentration on those organisations would lead to the exclusion of the PLO from any role in the dispute with Israel, and since those organisations rejected the existence of the Jewish people in Palestine, then there would be no possibility for the Palestinians to participate in any political activity in regard to their cause.

Later, there was an indication that Al-Arab paid more attention to the Islamic movement Hamas. The editorial comment of the paper (4.1.1990: 1) praised the
spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and regarded him as righteous in comparison with Yassir Arafat. The paper regarded Yassin's principle, the liberation of Palestine, as a holy duty and as the only right principle deserving of support.

As far as Al-Hayat was concerned, it focused on the reality of the problems facing the Intifada because of the differences between the PLO and the Muslim movement. The Palestinian journalist Dawod Kuttab (1.12.1988: 3) wrote from Jerusalem that although the PNC emphasised the significance of national unity, a dispute had erupted in the Occupied Territories within the national (PLO) factions on the one hand, and between these and the Muslim organisations on the other hand. Additionally Rabīʿ Al-Madhoun1 (17.12.1990: 9) stated that allegiance to the Hamas movement was rising and the differences between it and the national movement had become apparent. However, the paper distinguished between Hamas and the PLO by showing Hamas to be less significant than the PLO in leadership of the uprising. In a report from the Occupied Territories by the paper's correspondent, Ruba Al-Husari (18.12.1990: 3), analysing the Israeli decision to deport four Hamas leaders following the killing of three Israelis in Jaffa, she distinguished between Hamas and the PLO leadership, and pointed out that Israel's decision of deportation targeted Hamas only and not the leadership of the Intifada (UNL). Al-Husari added that Israel knew that if it deported any of the Intifada leaders, there would be pressures put on it by the USA because those leaders enjoyed the status of representatives and kept open channels of contact with the USA, in addition to their being ready to start a dialogue with Israel. This report implied that the PLO and its affiliates in the Occupied Territories were the only leaders of the Intifada and the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Hamas, in this respect, was distanced and was dealt with as a third party in the conflict, in which case the Israeli punishment of its activists would not affect the UNL.

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1 A Palestinian researcher and writer who lives in Cyprus.
Al-Quds Al-Arabi focused on the worrying tendency of the increasing support in favour of Hamas among the Palestinians. In a reprinted article from the Israeli daily Ha-Arets (7.12.1989: 10), Gid'on Samet argued that there was obvious despair among the Palestinians because of the stalemate in the peace process. He added that the PLO felt anxious and uncomfortable because its control in the Occupied Territories was growing weaker. He pointed out that if the peace process made no progress, then Hamas would grow stronger. He argued that Hamas was already strong enough and that that was why the Intifada had continued, and he stated that if an election were to take place then in the Occupied Territories, the Muslim extremists would pick up more than one third of the votes. In an article reprinted from the Israeli daily Davar (18.12.1990: 10), by Awn [sic] Levi, who commented on the Jaffa killing, he argued that Hamas had called for an intensive use of knives and arms against the Israelis. He attributed that to the deadlock in the political situation and stressed that Hamas exploited the state of despair among the Palestinians, who took refuge in religion and thus became a fertile recruiting ground for Hamas. However, the call by the PLO affiliate leadership in the Occupied Territories in the same period for "the use of all forms of struggle" was regarded in another article in Al-Quds Al-Arabi as a tactic and not a strategy. In an article reprinted from the Israeli paper Yediot Ahronot, Ron Ben Yishai (19.12.1990: 10) argued that the competition between the PLO and the Muslim groups was becoming fierce and he explained that after Al-Aqsa massacre, a wave of stabbing in the "fanatical Muslim tradition style" had taken place. He argued that the secular Palestinian organisations (in the UNL) could not retreat and so had issued that "ambiguous statement" calling for "the use of all forms of struggle" against the occupation. He stressed that the PLO feared the use of arms in the Intifada because it would turn it into a conflict which only Israel could win.

5.3.2. PLO: threatened leadership

As far as the PLO is concerned, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat regarded it from the beginning as the only organisation responsible for the Intifada, on the ground that the PLO was
Ameen Al-Hafiz (16.12.1987: 9) pointed out that the PLO had taken the correct step when it had assumed leadership of the Intifada and revived the spirit of struggle and resistance among the Palestinians. The paper's editorial comment (31.12.1987: 9), on the twenty-third anniversary of the establishment of the Fatah movement (the largest faction of the PLO), referred to the Intifada as part of the Palestinian revolution (launched by the PLO in 1965), despite the fact that it acted in a different way from the methods of the PLO, as in its use of stones, and that it occurred only inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ahmad Hamroush (4.1.1988: 9) added in his article that the US administration and the Israeli government were trying hard to create a gulf between the Palestinian people and their legitimate representative, the PLO, by claiming that there was no link between the PLO and the Intifada. Hamroush added that the Israelis and the Americans had failed to find any Palestinian representatives for the peace negotiations apart from members of the PLO.

It is evident that *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* regarded the Intifada as being run by the PLO and as being represented by the PLO outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Commenting on the PLO's peace moves, the columnist Imad Eddin Adeeb¹ wrote (9.12.1988: 6) that the Intifada offered the PLO a chance and legitimacy to step forward confidently for peace. Adeeb added that it was difficult for the PLO to call for peace in the absence of the Intifada since that would be regarded as a surrender to Israel.

During the Gulf War and apparently because of the position taken by the PLO during the Gulf crisis, the PLO was treated negatively by *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*, which pointed out that the PLO did not act in accordance with the requirements of the Intifada. Mohammed Abdel-Hakam Diab² (30.1.1991: 10) wrote that the Intifada had been

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¹ A liberal Egyptian journalist and writer. He is currently the editor-in-chief of the Egyptian daily *A'alam Al-Yawm*.
² An Egyptian writer who lives in Britain.
going in the opposite direction to what had been happening outside the Occupied Territories. He added that the PLO leadership outside Palestine had depended on the theoretical slogans of the top line, but in practice had failed to meet the bottom line of the Palestinians' requirements, which, according to Diab had led to a number of political concessions which the Palestinians had had to live with for the past ten years. He argued that the Intifada revealed how the Palestinian action was going in two contradictory directions: the first, a popular one in the Occupied Territories, that was a result of and reflected by the Intifada; the second, an official one, that was a response to international and regional pressures. He concluded that the latter went down badly in its concessions, while the first had been successful in managing to keep the popularity of the Intifada untainted by any negative implications deriving from outside leadership.

Al-Ahram International stated on many occasions that the PLO was the representative of the Palestinian people irrespective of the emergence of the Muslim groups in the Palestinian political arena. Ihsan Baker (21.12.1987: 4) argued that although there were new powers in the conflict, the PLO remained the framework capable of combining all the Palestinian national factions. Moreover, the paper pointed out that it was the duty of the PLO to take steps to lead and to sustain the Intifada, and it focused on the significance of PLO unity in enabling it to conduct that role. Lam'i Al-Mutei (29.12.1987: 6) stated that the Intifada was a challenge to the PLO, since it held the winning card in its hands. The challenge, according to Al-Mutei, depended on how the PLO would first unite its factions and then play that card. In addition, in its editorial comment (13.1.1988: 6), the paper encouraged the PLO to follow the example of the Palestinian unity underlying the Intifada in order to revive the unity of its own factions. It suggested that the unity of the Palestinian factions under the umbrella of the PLO would help to form a government in exile capable of playing a political role to bolster support for the Intifada.
Al-Ahram International published a number of articles in January 1988 which rejected claims that the Intifada was a spontaneous event and that it had nothing to do with the PLO. The paper reprinted an article from the Palestinian weekly Al-Yawm As-Sabe' (17.1.1988: 7) by Bilal Al-Hasan defending the close relationship between the PLO and the Intifada. He described the Intifada as "the crown of the continuous [PLO] revolution," and described the PLO as "the soul of the Intifada." Furthermore, Lutfi Al-Kholi (28.1.1988: 7) claimed that the Intifada had been planned by the leadership of the PLO inside and outside the Occupied Territories.

On the first anniversary of the Intifada, Al-Ahram International assessed the role of the PLO and expressed the opinion that the Intifada linked all the Palestinian parties with the PLO. In its editorial comment (9.12.1988: 3), the paper argued that the Intifada had encouraged the moderate line among the Palestinians so that the PLO was then leading the Palestinian people while holding the flag of peace. This showed how the paper approved the moderate line of the PLO and regarded it as representing the view of the majority of the Palestinians.

In contrast to Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Ahram International, Al-Arab sharply criticised the PLO from the early days of the uprising. In its editorial comment (18.12.1987: 1), the paper stated that in addition to the Arabs' weak response to the Intifada, the PLO had responded with only a few announcements. Also, the columnist Abdel-Rahman Ash-Shater1 (21.12.1987: 2) wrote that it had been appalling that the factions of the PLO had not played their part in supporting the Intifada. Al-Arab criticised the PLO for a second time in its editorial comment (22.12.1987: 1) for not taking efficient and practical steps to sustain the Intifada. It described the PLO's decision to support the uprising as below the level and the requirements of the Intifada. However, in some case, the PLO was treated by Al-Arab positively. Adel

1 A Libyan journalist and one of the editorial team of Al-Arab.
Samarah (8.1.1988: 3) expressed his worries over claims that the PLO was not involved in the Intifada. He argued that the Intifada was not spontaneous and accused those who so claimed of trying to abolish the role of the PLO, when in fact it was behind the uprising and the instigator of national awareness among the Palestinians.

In December 1988, Al-Arab attacked Yassir Arafat personally and cast suspicion on the legality of a PLO's decision. In its editorial comment (14.12.1988: 1), the paper stated that Arafat had told the Libyan President, Mu'ammar Gaddafi, and the Tunisian President, Zein Al-Abedeen Bin Ali, that he did not recognise the State of Israel. By contrast, soon after that, he announced in Geneva that he did recognise Israel. The paper stated that either Arafat was lying to the Arabs or to Israel. Moreover, the paper called for a referendum in order to decide on this issue, since the Palestine National Council could not alone take such a historical decision.

The Guardian linked the incidents of the Intifada in its first days to the "rising support for Muslim fundamentalists" in the Occupied Territories (Ian Black, 10.12.1987: 10). In addition, the paper regarded the PLO, represented by its leader Yassir Arafat, as another inspirer of the Intifada. The cool reception that Arafat received in the Arab Summit in Jordan in November 1987 was seen by The Guardian as an important factor leading to the eruption of violence in the Occupied Territories (editorial comment, 14.12.1987: 12). However, according to the paper, the PLO, whose secular affiliates were galvanized by the example of the Muslim fundamentalists (Ian Black, 12.1.1988: 21), was taken by surprise like anyone else by the Intifada (editorial comment, 15.1.1988: 12). Despite the fact that the paper denied a 'hidden hand' directing the Intifada, it argued that "once the disturbances gathered momentum, the PLO would have been foolish not to have encouraged them" (Ian Black, 29.12.1987: 7).

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1 A Palestinian journalist was the editor of the economics page of Al-Arab.
After one year of the uprising, the paper noticed that the Muslim movement Hamas was becoming increasingly influential (Ian Black, 10.1.1989: 7). The paper stated that the differences between Hamas and the UNL were becoming evident, since both organisations "issued conflicting instructions about when and how to conduct strikes and protests." It added that this worried the Palestinians who thought that both sides should work together.

With the increasing despair and the deadlock in the peace process, the paper reported that Arafat's Fatah group worked "closely with the fundamentalist Hamas organisation," a sign which reflected the increasing trend of the PLO to escalate the Intifada (Ian Black, 8.12.1990: 23). The paper confirmed that "the PLO may be losing control of the street," and that the radical Muslim organisations were gaining and "moving towards real 'armed struggle' from the slogan and the stone to the knife and the gun," as a result of the stalemate in the peace process (editorial comment, 12.12.1990: 20).

5.4. Israel: unlimited hostility

5.4.1. Excessive use of force

The expatriate papers showed their explicit hostility against Israel and attacked its excessive use of force against the Palestinian protesters. They condemned Israel's actions for their brutality and as reflecting Israel's own weakness.

An article in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, reprinted from The Sunday Telegraph (28.12.1987: 6), pointed out that the large number of casualties among the Palestinians had been due to the fact that the Israeli army had not been prepared for a confrontation with civilians. Nevertheless, Imad Eddin Adeeb (31.12.1987: 2) argued that Israel was a sectarian, racist, and militarist country, since it had applied draconian emergency regulations in the Occupied Territories. He added that Israel, under the state of emergency, had imposed a military censorship on the media, had confiscated land,
issued orders to use live ammunition against stone-throwers, and detained Palestinians on a wide scale. The continuation of the tough Israeli measures was assessed by an article in the Israeli paper Davar, reprinted in by Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (11.12.1988: 4). The paper stated that Israel had changed its policy of 'carrot and stick' to a new policy of 'gun and stick', indicating the increased use of violence by the Israeli army against the Palestinians. The paper warned that the Israeli army was making a big mistake by adopting this policy and indicated that the Intifada was in fact fuelled by those mistakes. This Israeli policy was described by the writer Ali Al-Dajanil (12.12.1988: 11) as maniacal and mad, driving Israel to become more lustful for blood and aggression. Moreover, Imad Eddin Adeeb (19.1.1989: 4) attacked the Israeli settlers who had called on the government to use more force against the Intifada. He described the settlers as the "ugly face of the Israeli citizens" because they regarded the Israeli "terrorist and intimidating measures" as soft and tolerant.

The paper accused Israel of using settlements in the Occupied Territories as well as religion to counter the Palestinian resistance. Nawwaf Al-Zaro (3.1.1990: 10) described the settlements as military bases for terrorizing the Palestinians and added that those settlements contained religious schools, which were adding a religious dimension to the conflict, especially in view of the anti-Palestinian attitude of the Jewish Rabbis.

However, the paper indicated that Israel's increasing pressures and use of force against the Palestinians reflected its weakness and inability to face the Intifada. In an article reprinted from The Guardian (27.1.1989: 6), the paper, which was commenting on new measures adopted by the Israeli authorities against the Intifada, argued that those measures reflected the degree of despair in Israel because of the Intifada. It added that the Defence Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who had announced the measures, had confessed that all measures that had been used since the start of the Intifada had failed.

1 A Palestinian writer and a former Minister in Jordan.
Al-Ahram International was to a large extent similar in its approach to Ash-Shaq Al-Awsat in handling the Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. The paper attacked Israeli authorities for their indiscriminate policy of shooting (Atiyeh Esawi, 17.12.1987: 4) and for their assaults on Muslim worshippers, and described them as "losing their heads" (editorial comment, 18.1.1988: 6).

The paper focused on the failure of the Israeli measures in facing the Intifada. In its editorial comment (28.12.1989: 6), the paper analysed the Israeli statistics of the toll of Palestinian children killed by the Israeli soldiers and considered them to be a sign of Israeli weakness. The paper argued that the increase in the number of killings among children meant that Israel had failed to confront the Intifada youths. It added that there could have been another reason for the high figure of the children killed, which was that Israel wanted to halt the resistance at its roots, given that those children would grow up and might become Palestinian soldiers in the future.

Al-Arab warned that Israel's failure to face the Intifada was reflected in its attempts to cause tension with Arab governments. Moreover, it stated, the failure had become evident in the increase in the level of Palestinian resistance with every new method the Israelis adopted. The columnist Abdel-Rahman Ash-Shater (18.1.1988: 2) stressed that the harsh Israeli measures and oppressions were indeed the main source of the rising Palestinian resistance. Furthermore, the columnist Yusri Husein1 (18.1.1988: 3) argued that Israel was offering the Palestinians the excuse to use armed force in their resistance. Additionally, Sami Thibian2 (8.12.1988: 3) pointed out that Israel was trying to escape its failure to quell the Intifada by issuing threats to its neighbouring Arab countries. Israel, according to Thibian, which could not put its tanks into action against the Intifada, could easily stand a war with another Arab country. The Israeli

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1 An Egyptian journalist.
2 A Lebanese journalist.
failure to face the Intifada was even linked by *Al-Arab* with the American aeroplane crash over Lockerbie. Shortly after the Lockerbie disaster, Yusri Husein (4.1.1989: 3) argued that it was the Israeli secret service, the Mossad, who stood behind the tragedy. The motive, according to Husein, was to set the blame at the door of the Palestinians in order to tarnish their image as well as the image of the Intifada. He stressed that the Intifada would not stop and the Israelis would not succeed in labelling the Palestinians as terrorists.

*Al-Hayat* also accused Israel of creating external conflicts to cover over its failure in facing the Intifada. The editor Khirallah Khirallah (10.12.1988: 7) commented on the Israeli raids into South Lebanon and referred the motivation for these to the Israeli difficulties in putting an end to the uprising.

As far as *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* was concerned, it regarded the Israeli measures as reflecting the weakness of the Israeli security forces (Arab press office, 2.12.1989: 5), and as the fuel of the Intifada (editorial comment, 6.12.1989: 11). Moreover, in a reprinted article from the Israeli daily *Al Ha-Mishmar* (14.12.1989: 10), Pinchas Anbari criticised the Israeli Defence Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, for contradicting himself. Rabin was reported to have said that there were limits for imposing policies on the occupied people, while at the same time he insisted on keeping up pressure on the Palestinians. He was described by Anbari as incapable of implementing his wisdom.

The excessive use of force was shown in another reprinted article, from *The Jerusalem Post*, by Andi Goldberg (29.12.1989: 10) who accused the Israeli army of beating Palestinian children on a daily basis. She expressed her concern over the increasing tendency toward the use of force and attitude of intolerance among the Israeli soldiers against the Palestinians. Moreover, in another reprinted article, from *Yediot Ahronot* (25.1.1990: 10), *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* indicated that there was a hidden aspect of the instructions given to the Israeli soldiers in shooting on Palestinians. The paper argued
that the soldiers were allowed to shoot and kill on one condition: that nobody could see them.

During the time of the Gulf crisis, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* exposed, mostly by articles from the Israeli press, the increasing Israeli difficulties in handling the Intifada. In an article from *Yediot Ahronot* by Ron Ben Yishai (17.12.1990: 10), he suggested certain measures to confront the Palestinian wave of stabbings against the Israelis. However, Ben Yishai argued that although all the Israeli measures might reduce the number of stabbings, they would not abolish the causes of the desperate Palestinian actions. Thus, he concluded that the Intifada would continue and it would keep on bringing annoyance to the Israeli people. He warned that Israel was in a critical position since any sharp and comprehensive action taken by Israel against the Intifada would be met by a decline in the international support for Israel. In another article, from *Ha-Arets*, Ze'ev Schiff (18.12.1990: 10) argued that the Gulf crisis had made it difficult for Israel to impose more pressure on the Palestinians. Therefore, there was a noticeable decline in the level of Israeli pressure during the third year of the uprising, and more specifically since the start of the Gulf crisis, in consequence of the policy adopted by the Defence Minister, Moshe Arens, who had succeeded Yitzhak Rabin. The Palestinian journalist Hamdi Farraj (18.12.1990: 11), who analysed that decline in his article in *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, argued that this policy was a tactic and not a strategy. He added that the motives for this policy could not be humane and that it was designed to take away the media attention from the Occupied Territories.

On the eve of the Gulf War, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* expressed fears of more Israeli harsh measures if war were to take place. The editorial comment of the paper (12.1.1991: 11) stated its concern over Israel's possibly adopting a policy of increased killing of Palestinians. It added that the most fearful measure was the possible mass deportation of the Palestinian people, since they did not hide their support for Saddam Hussein. Moreover, during the Gulf War, the paper's editorial comment (31.1.1991: 11) noted
that Israel did not distribute gas-masks to Palestinians to protect them from possible Iraqi chemical weapons, as a new method of abusing the Palestinians. The paper argued that, in this sense, Israel was using Palestinians as human shields against Iraqi missiles.

On the other hand, Al-Ouds Al-Arabi explained the failure of the Israeli measures against the Intifada by a number of reprinted articles from the Israeli press by right wing writers expressing their dissatisfaction over the way Israel was dealing with the Intifada. The paper reprinted an article from Yediot Ahronot by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu (20.12.1990: 10), who argued that the absence of an adequate response against the people who committed stabbings compelled the Israeli citizens to take the law into their own hands. He called on the government to design proper deterrent measures to safeguard the Israeli people.

Israel was viewed by The Guardian as in a defensive position, specifically with regard to its international reputation. Ian Black (16.12.1987: 21) argued that Israel "cannot both keep the occupied territories and make all the embarrassing bloodshed and international criticism go away." Even on the battle field, the paper argued, the Intifada had put Israel, for the first time, on the defensive over the Palestinians. Therefore, the Israelis had to handle the Intifada carefully, but that did not prevent them from using various means to stop the violence (editorial comment, 15.1.1988: 12). The Guardian pointed to different tactics such as creating disagreement among the Palestinian activists and the rest of the Palestinian society, which was suffering economically (Ian Black, 18.1.1988: 6). Also, the Israeli raid on South Lebanon in December 1988 was viewed by The Guardian as "a show of strength; and its timing indicated a diversion of attention away from the Occupied Territories" (editorial comment, 10.12.1988: 22). This Israeli policy towards the Intifada was described by David Hirst (9.12.1989: 23) as a refusal to grasp its significance from the beginning. That constant policy, and particularly during the Gulf crisis, led the paper to question,
"How much longer can Israel hold back the tide of change which is engulfing the Middle East?" (editorial comment, 12.12.1990: 20).

5.4.2. Damaging impact on Israel

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat repeatedly pointed out that the Intifada had caused a great deal of damage to Israel. In three articles reprinted from The Guardian, the (undefined) German press, and The Sunday Telegraph (23.12.1987: 5, 24.12.1987: 6, and 28.12.1987: 6 respectively), the involvement of the Israeli Arabs in acts of violence against Israel was portrayed as an extremely serious threat to Israel. While the first article referred to the common factors between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories as the main reason for their involvement in protests, the second article regarded this as a most dangerous situation to Israel. The third article argued that this participation particularly affected the psychology of the Jewish people who lived side-by-side with those Arabs. The columnist Ahmad Baha Eddin (6.1.1988: 9) described the acts of violence by the Israeli Arabs as a sign of double loyalty to Israel (their home country) on the one hand, and to their origins as Palestinians on the other hand. He warned that these incidents threatened the future of the internal relations of Israel.

In addition to the effect of the Intifada on the Israeli Arabs, which was only in the first period of the Intifada, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat reported a number of damaging effects of the Intifada on the Israelis. The paper focused primarily on the tarnished Israeli image abroad and the division in Israeli society as a result of the Intifada. Ahmad Baha Eddin (31.12.1987: 9) wrote that Israel was experiencing difficulty in retaining its good image abroad, which had been tarnished by the uprising. He argued that Israel could not describe the Intifada as terrorism because it was an unarmed revolt and was not directed by outsiders. Therefore, he added, the Israeli oppression which was shown in pictures to people around the globe, could not be wiped out from the people's memory with a few words by Israel. The bad image of Israel was noted in one reprinted article
from the American daily the New York Times by Anthony Louis (26.1.1988: 6), who argued that Israel was slipping down the road towards dictatorship and tyranny because of the Intifada. In another article, Ahmad Abul-Fateh (1.12.1989: 9) quoted Anthony Louis as saying that Israel would be stigmatized as a country of savageness and violence, and would become isolated on account of the Intifada.

More importantly, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat emphasised the split in Israel, at both the popular and official levels, over how to deal with the Intifada in particular and the future of the Palestinian problem in general. A reprinted article from The Times (5.1.1988: 6) argued that the Intifada had deepened the differences in Israel regarding the future of the Occupied Territories and the peace process. In January 1989 the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, visited a military base near Nablus in the West Bank, where he was met by a wave of angry questions from his soldiers. The editorial comment of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (20.1.1989: 9) analysed the incident and stated that it was a clear sign of the Intifada's success in causing a rift in Israeli society. The paper argued that the Arabs did not place confidence in the Intifada as such, but in its main result: the rift in Israel.

Al-Ahram International typically was similar to Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat in focusing on the participation of the Israeli Arabs in the violence against Israel, and then on the division among the Israelis because of the Intifada.

Al-Arab also stressed that the Intifada had had great effects on Israel. Abdel-Jabbar Odwan (22.1.1988: 3) argued that the Israeli Arabs had virtually joined in the Intifada with their compatriots in the Occupied Territories. He added that more importantly, that the Intifada had caused a state of despair and confusion in Israel. According to Odwan, it was becoming clear that the idea of coexistence between the Arabs and the Jews had vanished.

1 A prominent Egyptian writer.
Al-Hayat pointed out that the most outstanding effects of the Intifada on Israel had been the division and the feeling of hatred against the Palestinians in Israel. George Sam'an (9.12.1988), wrote that the Intifada had escalated the internal dilemma and had split Israel. He argued that this division would continue as long as the Intifada continued. Additionally, a reprinted article from the Israeli daily Ha-Arets by Ephraim Sneh (4.12.1988: 7), a former head of the civil administration in the Occupied Territories, argued that the Intifada had imposed a climate of fear and hatred among the Israeli people towards the Arabs. He observed that the Israelis had, in effect, been pushed to extremism and not to moderation.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi emphasised the gulf between the Israeli political leadership and the Israeli people with regard to the Intifada. In an article reprinted from the Israeli paper Davar, Ephraim Golan (6.12.1989: 10) argued that it was the right time for the Israeli people to say that their youths (soldiers) were paying the price of the politicians' mistakes. He added that the Israeli young men were the victims of the Intifada, because they had been educated and fed on democratic values, and yet were being sent to the Occupied Territories to confront the children and break their arms. Moreover, in another article (11.12.1989: 10), Golan argued that the whole Israeli nation suffered from lack of information, since they were prevented from seeing the real image of the conflict. The government, which controlled the only TV station and imposed censorship on the press, had shaped the people's perceptions of the Intifada. He pointed out that the Israeli people had suffered most from the Intifada and, at the same time, had been denied their rights to receive information freely.

Finally, in contrast, Gid'on Samet argued in his article in Ha-Arets and reprinted by Al-Quds Al-Arabi (12.12.1990: 10), that Israel had not suffered great losses in lives and property. He commented that because the number of deaths among the Israelis had

1 A Lebanese journalist, editor-in-chief of the expatriate weekly in London, Al-Wasat, and the former editorial manager of Al-Hayat.
been very small, the Israeli people had not felt and realised the actual dimensions and the size of the threat imposed by the Intifada on their lives. He pointed out that the Israeli ability to live with the Intifada (in spite of its effects) did not reflect how strong Israel was, but, on the contrary, reflected the scale of the Israeli unawareness.

The Guardian pointed to the negative effects of the Intifada on the Israelis, but argued that Israel could cope. As far as the violence carried out by the Israeli Arabs was concerned, the paper belittled those incidents and regarded them as insignificant (Ian Black, 22.12.1987: 13). The paper stressed that there were principal differences between the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and those who lived in Israel. The Israeli Arabs, "despite the discrimination," enjoyed civil and political rights and had their representatives in the Knesset. However, those violent incidents, according to Ian Black (22.12.1987: 13) increased the fears of the Israeli government over the possible dimensions of the conflict in the absence of a political settlement. He added that the incidents "will also sharpen the general and growing sense of Arab-Jewish enmity on both sides of the old 'green line'."

The paper reported the negative impact of the Intifada on the Israeli security service and the army. It stated that the Intifada was imposing a "mounting concern at senior command levels over the effect on both morale and training" of the Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Ian Black, 29.1.1988: 9). Moreover, the effectiveness of the security service was challenged by the strength of the Intifada. Ian Black (8.12.1988: 13) reported that the Israelis' powerful and secretive Shin Bet internal security service had faced difficulties in dealing with the Palestinian uprising. He regarded the public praise by the Defence Minister for Shin Bet's exposing Palestinian 'terrorist cells' as a move to improve its morale. He argued that the Intifada proved that Shin Bet was ill equipped to handle a "sustained popular resistance," though it was "considered to be good at classic counter-terrorism."
Additionally, the paper pointed out that there was more damage because of the Intifada on Israel, particularly, (a) the country's image abroad had been distorted in a way unprecedented in its history, and (b) the differences between the two main political parties about the need for a political settlement had deepened (Ian Black, 19.1.1988: 9).

5.4.3. The 'Jewish mentality' behind the oppression

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat attacked the Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories and regarded it as a sign of 'sickness' reflecting 'Nazi' behaviour. Ahmad Abdel-Salam Al-Begali (22.12.1987: 9) ascribed the tough Israeli measures against the Palestinians to a psychological complex in the Jewish mind. He argued that the Jews had lived for centuries as minorities and that this had caused some kind of sickness in them, the most important symptom of which was that they could not control the level of pressure they used against other people (i.e. they put tremendous pressure on others without realising how devastating that pressure was). In addition, Imad Eddin Adeeb (12.1.1988: 2) accused Israel of practising the same methods as the Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler. He pointed out that the Jewish people who had suffered from Nazism had failed to realise that the Palestinian people had suffered from intimidation in the same way that the Jewish people had. The Jews, according to Adeeb, paid the price in the 1940s, and the Palestinians were paying the price in the 1980s and maybe in the 1990s. Moreover, Khaled Ayed (13.12.1989: 12) accused Israel of being a tool of international imperialism. He argued that, in essence, the existence of Israel contradicted the rights of the Palestinian people, so that Israel could not recognise these rights unless it were defeated. The only way, Ayed concluded, to achieve that result was to support the Intifada.

1 A Moroccan journalist, writer, and former politician.
2 A Palestinian researcher living in Lebanon. The same article was published on the same day by Al-Ahram International: 10.
Although Al-Ahram International did not go so far as that in analysing the Israeli practices in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and condemning the 'Jewish people', it nevertheless accused Israel in one instance of applying 'Nazi' methods. Abdel-Aziz Mohammed (27.1.1990: 6) wrote that Israel behaved like the Nazis in punishing the Palestinian people. He added that when, for example, Palestinians were put on trial, the evidence was usually kept secret. He warned that Israel was conducting a social, cultural, and physical programme to exterminate the Palestinians, a programme which put in danger the whole area at the centre of which was "the Nazi and racist state, Israel."

In the same way, Al-Arab repeatedly labelled the aggressive Israeli measures in the Occupied Territories as 'Nazi' and 'Fascist' (Yusri Husein, 24.12.1987: 3). As a corollary to this accusation, the columnist Fathi Ghanim1 (26.1.1988: 6) called for the establishing of a record of those Israelis who had oppressed the Palestinians and recommended that they should be pursued, even if it took generations, so that they might be prosecuted and tried as war criminals.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi interpreted a decision by the Israeli authorities in 1989 to use live ammunition against the Intifada as a sign of anxiety among the Jewish people. Adel Samarah (15.12.1989: 11) wrote under the title "The killer is not the [Israeli] individual, the killer is the Zionist mentality" that the anxiety behind the Israelis' decisions derived from a historical Jewish persecution complex, since they had not had the chance to rule for thousands of years and, when they did obtain that chance, they had not been able to control their actions.

1 A prominent Egyptian writer. He was formerly the editor-in-chief of the well-known Egyptian magazine Roz El-Yusuf.
5.5. The unsatisfactory Arab response

5.5.1. The weakness of the Arab response in general

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat viewed the Intifada as a sign of the Arabs' evident weakness and regression. It emphasised that the Intifada was a significant event in the modern history of the Arabs. In its editorial comment (8.1.1988: 7), the paper regarded the Intifada as "a spotlight in the Arab darkness" that would wipe out some of the "Arab shame, timidity, and division." In another editorial comment (16.1.1988: 9), the paper commented on the establishment of a new Palestinian radio station launched from Syria exclusively for the support of the Intifada, stating that the Arabs should leave that revolt alone to face its fate and fight for itself and on behalf of the Arabs. The paper added that Arabs had abandoned Palestine four times in forty years. Some, it said, had shown timidity and cowardice, while others had been guilty of conspiracy in 1948. The Arabs had concealed their defeat in 1956 and alleged victory, had fled like 'rats' in 1967, and, since 1973, had followed Henry Kissinger in his peace efforts. They had lost Lebanon, fought against each other, and destroyed towns and villages that did not belong to the USA or to Israel.

The paper expressed the view that the Intifada was not only a revolt against Israel, but also a protest against the Arabs' silent position (Abdel-Rahman Khalaf, 13.1.1988: 15). However, the paper called for a practical and efficient role to be played by the Arabs to sustain the Intifada. The columnist Imad Eddin Adeeb (19.1.1988: 2) stressed that something should be done to support the Palestinian Intifada. He argued that what should be done did not necessarily have to be the liberation of the whole of the Palestinian land. The Arabs, according to Adeeb, could change from passivism, disability, and anger, to do something positive that could help, regardless of how simple it was. He encouraged all Arabs to discuss practical measures to assist the Palestinians, because, he said, "they have carried out their revolution for our sake." A prominent writer, Ma'n Abu-Nowar1 (27.1.1988: 9), wrote that the escalation of the

1 A former Jordanian Minister.
Intifada and the increasing violence against Israel required that the Arabs should take a clear, brave, and firm position. "We have to rescue our people," he stressed and added that the Arabs should prepare for war, which could be the result of the Israeli rejection of dialogue. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* put this message clearly in its editorial comment (29.1.1988: 7) when it argued that a comprehensive and just peace would not be achieved and protected without force. The Arabs, according to the paper, should learn how to follow both tracks: the track of peace and the track of war.

Mohammed Fadel Al-Jammali (30.1.1988: 9) suggested that the Arabs should cooperate with the PLO to support the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories by money and weapons. He also called upon the Arabs to exert all possible means to put pressure on Israel to accept peace and negotiate with the Palestinian people, so that both peoples would live in peace in Palestine under international legitimacy.

*Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* published a number of articles criticising the Arabs' weak reaction to the Palestinian revolt and the general Arab silence regarding the Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. In a letter to the editor, Abu-Zakariya Shtewi and Salameh Al-Atwi (25.1.1988: 8) expressed their anger at the weak response by the Arabs to the Intifada. They described the "silence of the Arabs, who as usual wait for UN resolutions," as a "disgrace, a matter of regret, and a mark of shame on the forehead of the Arab nation." This condemnatory criticism of the Arab reaction to the Intifada was the constant tone of *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* all the time until the Gulf crisis, when, at last, the paper acknowledged some degree of satisfaction with the Arabs' efforts to support the Intifada. Ali Al-Dajani (10.1.1991: 13) argued that the UN resolution 681 was a result of the Arabs' efforts despite their differences over the

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1 An Iraqi writer and a former politician.
2 See also Mustafa Ameen (a prominent Egyptian writer), 28.1.1989: 3; As'ad Abdel-Rahman, 6.12.1989: 6 (the same article was published on the same day by *Al-Ahram International*: 11); editorial comment, 9.12.1989: 13; Mohammed Al-Rumeihi (a well-known Kuwaiti writer and journalist), 31.1.1990: 5 (the same article was published on the same day by *Al-Ahram International*: 11 and *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*: 11).
Gulf crisis. He advised that the Arabs should learn from their past mistakes and regather their efforts to follow up those resolutions.

Al-Ahram International was similar in tone to Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat in criticising the Arabs' reaction to the Intifāda. Moreover, it warned that the impact of the Intifāda might extend beyond the Israeli borders. In a very strong warning on the possible effect of the uprising on the Arab world, Al-Ahram International reprinted an article from the Egyptian magazine Roz El-Yusuf, by Fathi Ghanim (19.1.1988: 6), titled "The warning bell: a warning to Israel, the United States, and the Arabs". Commenting on the term "warning bell", which had first been used by President Mubarak of Egypt, Ghanim argued that the Arabs could not adopt a negative position toward the uprising and that they had no choice but to support it. Ghanim warned that unless a positive stance were taken by the Arabs at the official level in the face of the Israeli practices, before any popular reaction, the Intifāda would turn into a tornado that would storm and destroy everything standing in its way. He reminded the paper's readers of the 23rd July 1952 Egyptian revolution which had targeted the monarchical regime because of its failure to win the battle in Palestine in 1948.

Later, the paper voiced its encouragement for the Arab people to support the Intifāda, apparently when it had become clear that there was no danger of the Intifāda's undermining the stability of the Arab world. Sa'd Eddin Ibrahim1 (2.12.1989: 6) wrote that, given the fact that the Intifāda was a popular action in its essence, the Arab peoples should act and support it financially and morally. On the other hand, there were voices calling upon the Arabs to stop interfering in the Intifāda in the light of the weak Arab support. In an article published by Roz El-Yusuf magazine and reprinted by Al-Ahram International, Philip Jallab2 (16.1.1990: 6) suggested that the only thing the Arabs could do to help the Intifāda was to stay away from it. The reason, he said,

1 A prominent Egyptian writer and a professor in Social Science in the American University in Cairo.
2 A prominent Egyptian writer and former editor-in-chief of the Egyptian daily Al-Ahali.
was that there was a tendency in the Arab world to stop financing the uprising because of a growing fear of instability in the Arab world similar to that which was surfacing in Eastern Europe.

**Al-Arab** viewed the Arab response a little differently, but in a more critical manner than **Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat** and **Al-Ahram International**. It started with sharp criticism of the weak and inefficient role played by the Arab League in supporting the Intifada. The columnist Amjad Naser (17.12.1987: 3) described the statement of the General Secretary of the Arab League condemning Israel and supporting the Intifada, as very weak.¹ The paper's criticism of the Arabs' role in general was even tougher and sharper. The paper's columnists Abdel-Rahman Ash-Shater (19.1.1988: 2) accused the Arabs of playing the same role as the Israelis in their attempts to quell the uprising. He argued that there was no difference between the Israeli soldiers who beat Palestinian women and children, and those (in the Arab world) who did no more than issue merely verbal condemnations. The paper's criticism continued to be voiced in later years and with the same degree of sharpness. Two years later, Tayseer Kamleh (21.12.1989: 3) noticed that the coverage and support of the Intifada in the Arab world had declined. He mentioned as an example the action taken by some Arab Gulf governments to prohibit distribution in their countries of cassettes of pro-Intifada songs. He asked whether this was a sign of the "official Arab conspiracy" against the Intifada.

In the light of the Gulf crisis, **Al-Arab** accused the Arabs of even more weakness in their support for the Intifada. The columnist Abdallah Imam² (5.12.1990: 6) stated that the coverage of the Intifada in the Arab media had noticeably declined. He added that there was a deliberate ignoring of the Intifada at that particular time.

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¹ See also the editorial comment, 22.12.1987: 1.
² A prominent Egyptian writer.
Al-Hayat voiced mild criticism of the Arabs' reaction to the Intifada mainly during the Gulf crisis. The prominent Arab historian Constantine Zurayk (21.12.1990: 9) pointed out that the Arabs were in a quandary because of the Gulf crisis, which had diverted their attention away from the Palestine question. He added that general Arab support was further away from the Palestinians than at any other time. Moreover, Salah Eddin Hafiz, the deputy editor of the international edition of Al-Ahram, wrote an article in Al-Hayat (22.12.1990: 9) accusing Saddam Hussein of being the reason for the decrease of the Arabs' support of the Intifada by diverting their attention and efforts to his invasion of Kuwait.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi focused mainly on the Arabs' minimal financial support for the Intifada. Abdel-Bari Atwan (4.12.1989: 11) criticised most of the Arab governments for failing to play their part in sponsoring the uprising.

5.5.2. Controversy over Egypt's role

The Intifada erupted at the time when Egypt started re-establishing normal relations with the Arab world after eight years of isolation following the Camp David treaty in 1979. Egypt did not hesitate to condemn the Israeli measures against the uprising. Nevertheless, there was an increasing pressure on the Egyptian government from the Egyptian opposition as well as from some Arab countries to sever its diplomatic relations with Israel. However, the Egyptian government had its reasons for keeping the treaty intact,¹ and that position was appreciated by a number of Arab countries.

The different views over the Egyptian response to the Intifada were apparent in the expatriate Arab press. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat regarded that response as adequate and satisfactory. The paper's correspondent (21.12.1987: 3) reported from Cairo that the

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¹ Egypt was very keen to keep its peace treaty with Israel because its economy had suffered greatly in the past owing to the state of war which had continued for decades between the two countries. The treaty led to increasing Western aid to Egypt and allowed a relatively stable political atmosphere in which to develop its economy. Moreover, the peace treaty resulted in Egypt's regaining the Sinai Peninsula, which had been occupied by Israel in 1967.
Egyptian position concerning the Israeli "inhumane and repressive" practices against the Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories had gained the acceptance of most of the Arab countries and was even praised by Arab diplomats and ambassadors in Cairo. With the increasing popular pressure on the Egyptian government, especially the violent demonstrations which took place in Egypt in late December 1987 and early 1988, *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* reported (3.1.1988: 2) that the Egyptian government was making special efforts to support the Intifada and, at the same time, to protect its own peace deal with Israel. Additionally, the paper reported (5.1.1988: 1) that Egypt had received an undertaking from the USA that the latter would not veto a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli practices, provided that Egypt did not withdraw its ambassador from Israel. Moreover, the paper criticised the anti-Israeli demonstrations which took place in Egypt. The columnist Mustafa Ameen (16.1.1988: 3) described those demonstrations as unjustified for two reasons: (a) because President Mubarak and the Egyptian government had already expressed their criticism of Israeli policy, and (b) because they were violent, causing damage to property.

Registering his satisfaction over the official Egyptian policy regarding the Israeli practices against the Intifada, Ahmad Hamroush (24.1.1988: 1) wrote that Egypt had shown that it stood at the forefront of the Arab countries in opposing Israel. The editorial comment of the same issue of the paper discussed Mubarak's peace initiative of 22.1.1988, which had called for six months' stoppage of violence, the freezing of Israeli settlements, and the starting of immediate practical steps to prepare for an international peace conference. The paper described the initiative as a "clever step" and a "peace assault" on Israel parallel to the Intifada. It considered it as part of a design to entrap Israel politically and to put media pressure on it. Lastly, the way *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* viewed the Egyptian role was summarized by an article from *The Sunday Telegraph*, reprinted by *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* (25.1.1988: 5), and titled "International admiration for the balanced policy of President Mubarak". It argued that Mubarak had been able to elevate the violence in the Occupied Territories from the status of a local tragedy to that of an international catastrophe. It noted that Mubarak's
position had been praised by the Western leaders and had met with a warm response in Israel, showing how he could keep his balance while walking a tight-rope. According to the paper, he voiced the anger of the Arab world regarding Israeli oppression against the Palestinians, while, at the same time, firmly resisted pressures to sever the Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic relations. The paper added that he was now working hard to prepare for an international peace conference in which Israel and its Arab neighbours could sit down together and resolve their differences.

Al-Ahram International was not substantially different from Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat in assessing the Egyptian role. In one strong article defending Mubarak's peace initiative, Salameh Ahmad Salameh (31.1.1988: 7) wrote that the initiative was a step in the right direction for the purpose of making a political achievement out of the Intifada. He criticised the PLO for being silent and not being supportive of the initiative, and he also criticised other Palestinian factions who rejected it and claimed that it would abort the Intifada. In an indirect sharp attack on the Palestinians who did not support the peace process, Salameh stressed that resisting Israeli tanks with stones would not bring an end to the occupation and pointed out that the Intifada should be exploited by such a peace initiative.

However, Al-Ahram International published views of the opposition on the way Egypt should react to the Intifada. The paper reprinted an article from Al-Wafd, an opposition Egyptian daily, by Abdel-Aziz Mohammed (5.1.1988: 7), titled "A revolution till victory". He explicitly called for the severing of relations between Egypt and "that fascist enemy," Israel, who did not care about peace or international conventions and treaties. Mohammed regretted that the Egyptian government had gone on to contain the anger of the opposition and to confirm its commitment to the treaty it had signed with Israel.
Al-Arab handled the Egyptian role in a totally different and more hostile way than Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Ahram International. Its news coverage as well as its views on this issue in the first few weeks of the Intifada called repeatedly on Egypt to put an end to its diplomatic relations with Israel. It reported most, if not all, of the incidents that took place in Egypt in protest against Israel and the Camp David treaty. For example, it reported (2.1.1988) on the front page the demonstrations in Egypt under the headline "The opposition parties call on the Egyptian government to sever relations with Israel. The police suppress a huge demonstration, and besiege Al-Azhar [Mosque]". It also focused on the calls coming from abroad to end the relationship between the two countries. It reported (8.1.1988: 2), for instance, that a Jordanian newspaper had called on Egypt to expel the Israeli ambassador.

Al-Arab clearly expressed its views over the role that Egypt should be playing to support the Intifada. In its editorial comment (18.12.1987: 1), it stated that it was surprising that the Egyptian government had not yet withdrawn its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Additionally, the reaction of the Egyptian People's Council (Parliament), in condemning the harsh Israeli measures against the uprising, was criticised by the columnist Ra'ed Abu-Zaid (28.12.1987: 3). He described the comments of the Council as diffident because they included only indirect statements critical of Israel, such as "we hope that Israel will learn the lesson," "there is no stability for Israel as long as the occupation continues," and "oppression is an obstacle in the way of the peace process." He argued that such statements could be expected from a European parliament, but not from the Egyptian. According to Abu-Zaid, the least Egypt could do was to end its links with Israel, because the latter had violated the dual, as well as the international, treaties. More explicitly, the editorial comment of Al-Arab (29.12.1987: 1), titled "A Call to President Mubarak" and signed by the paper's editor-in-chief, Ahmad Al-Houni, called for the Egyptian President to abolish, or at least freeze, the Camp David treaty. Al-Houni argued that Israel had waged a war against the Arab people in the Occupied Territories, without paying attention to the
international calls to stop its oppression, and without any respect for its treaty with Egypt. Moreover, Al-Arab warned in another editorial comment (2.1.1988: 1) that if President Mubarak continued listening to his advisers and to the USA, the situation between the government and the people in Egypt would deteriorate. The paper reminded the President of the revolution in Iran and expressed its fears that such a revolution could be repeated in Egypt.

Al-Arab distinguished between the official and the popular Egyptian positions. In commenting on the angry popular reaction in Egypt to the Israeli measures against the Palestinians, the columnist Abdel-Rahman Ash-Shater (6.1.1988: 2) pointed out that the Egyptian people had nothing to do with the "treasonous treaty" with Israel. He praised the people of Egypt for being the only Arabs who went onto the streets to demonstrate solidarity with the Intifada. As far as the peace initiative of President Mubarak was concerned, the paper voiced its explicit rejection of it. The two columnists Abdel-Rahman Ash-Shater and Amjad Naser (26.1.1988: 3) criticised the initiative. In his column, Amjad Naser commented that it was illogic to call for the stoppage of the illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories in exchange for the stoppage of the legal uprising. He suggested that it was not yet time for any peaceful compromise with Israel.

5.5.3. Limited positive Arab reaction

The expatriate dailies commented on very few occasions on the positive reaction of certain Arab countries. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, in addition to its satisfaction with the Egyptian position, published its clear praise for the Saudi stance in supporting the Intifada. The paper's editorial comment (28.12.1987: 9) discussed the significance of the speech by King Fahd made at the Gulf Summit, when he referred to the Intifada as an important event for the Arabs. The paper stressed that the King had renewed the historical Saudi commitment towards the Palestinian people. Two editorial comment items of the paper (5.1.1988: 9 and 22.1.1988: 7) praised the efforts carried out by the
Saudi Royal Prince Salman Bin Abdel-Aziz, in re-establishing the popular committees which had been set up twenty years previously to provide financial support for the Palestinian people. In the latter comment the paper boasted that Saudi Arabia stood at the forefront in the "struggle against Zionism." It was, according to the paper, a religious responsibility which Saudi Arabia held and a task to exact "revenge against the occupying enemy."

Al-Ahram International referred positively to the role played by the Arab Gulf states. The paper’s correspondent in Riyadh (30.12.1987: 6) reported that the Intifada had been the main item of agenda at the Arab Gulf Summit. He pointed out that the Intifada had been the subject of considerable concern by the leaders, who had agreed on the importance of practical support for it.

Al-Arab commented positively on the role of Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. It focused on the Libyan President Colonel Gaddafi’s calling the Arab countries to open their borders with Israel to the Arab fighters to reinforce the Intifada (15.12.1987: 1). Moreover, Al-Arab referred in its editorial comment (17.12.1987: 1) to the popular committees for the support of the Palestinians in Libya and Saudi Arabia as good and practical examples to be followed by the rest of the Arab countries. The paper’s editorial comment (19.1.1988: 1) praised the Saudi and Kuwaiti financial support for the Intifada, and called on the Arab League to take this as an example and act positively to support the Palestinians.

5.5.4. Iraq and the Gulf crisis
Not only did the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2.8.1990 divide the Arab world into two - anti and pro-Iraq - camps, but it also divided the Arabs on the impact of the invasion on the Intifada. That division was clearly reflected in the expatriate dailies. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat blamed Saddam Husein for "aborting the Intifada" by putting it back as a delayed secondary issue on the international agenda. The paper, which was
commenting in its editorial (16.12.1990: 13) on the debate in the UN Security Council on resolution 681, stressed that the international community would have been able to take a firm stand for such a resolution if the Iraqi invasion had not happened.

Similarly, Al-Ahram International in its editorial comment (9.12.1990: 7) stated that the Gulf crisis gave Israel the opportunity to tighten its fist on the Palestinians without feeling embarrassed, since an Arab leader, Saddam Husein, was doing the same thing to an Arab people, the Kuwaitis. Moreover, in another article, Atiyeh Esawi (28.12.1990: 5) blamed Saddam Husein for offering Israel an excuse to keep the Palestinian land, when he insisted on keeping the Kuwaiti land. However, Husein Sha'lan (5.12.1990: 9) argued that despite the negative consequences of the Gulf crisis and the mistakes committed by the Iraqi leader, it was important that the Intifada should continue in the face of the Israelis.

Yet Al-Ahram International also noted a positive aspect of the impact of the Gulf crisis on the situation in the Occupied Territories. Ihsan Baker (10.12.1990: 7) wrote that the Gulf crisis could be viewed as a test of the USA and the Western allies in the way that they were treating the Palestinian cause in the light of Israel's rejection of peace talks. He stressed that the USA, which had mounted its efforts to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, should, in accordance with the same criteria, press on Israel to join the peace process when the Gulf crisis was over.

Al-Arab focused on some advantages of the Gulf crisis for the Intifada. The paper highlighted that theme by focusing on the Iraqi steadfastness in the face of the USA, rather than on the occupation of Kuwait. In an interview with the former mayor of Nablus in the West Bank, Bassam Ash-Shaka'a (7.12.1990: 6), he stated that, in spite of what had been said about the negative effect of stoppage of the financial support from the Gulf states, the Iraqi steadfastness had granted the Intifada a new momentum and had served the Palestinian struggle. Moreover, Khairi Gharah (21.12.1990: 3)
called for Palestinian action to support Iraq. He suggested that the use of arms in the Intifada would reinforce the Iraqi position and create a linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Palestinians' cause.

*Al-Hayat* argued that although the world was busy in the Gulf with Iraq, Israel should understand that the Palestine problem had not changed because of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (Abdel-Wahhab Bader Khan¹ (editor), 18.12.1990: 9). However, the paper implicitly indicated the negative impact of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, which had caused Arab disunity and the setting back of the Intifada as the top regional issue. Another editor, Irfan Nizam Eddin² (23.12.1990: 15), stressed that all Arabs should put their differences aside and unite their efforts to achieve the superior goal, that is the support of the Intifada, and to reinforce the struggle to liberate the Occupied Land and make a comprehensive peace settlement.

*Al-Quds Al-Arabi* focused on the negative impact of the Gulf crisis on the Intifada by blaming all Arab states for abandoning the Intifada. It was concerned about the future of the uprising in the light of Arab division and the stoppage of the Arab financial support from the Gulf (Tal'at Ahmad Muslim³ 4.1.1991: 4). It also pointed to the international ignorance of the suffering of the Palestinians during the crisis in the Gulf. In an article reprinted from the Israeli daily *Ha-Arets*, Ran Kislev (28.1.1990: 10) argued under the title "Has Saddam Husein managed to dissolve the Intifada?" that the international spotlight had shifted from the Occupied Territories to the Gulf. He added that there was a considerable decline in the international sympathy for the Palestinians. However, he argued that even if the Intifada stopped as a consequence of the Gulf War, it would start again as long as the causes remained.

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¹ A Lebanese journalist and writer, editor of the opinion page and responsible for the front page at *Al-Hayat*.
² An editor at *Al-Hayat*.
³ An Egyptian expert on military affairs and a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
In its assessment of the role of the Arabs, *The Guardian* stated that "the Arab world is more vocal than practical in its help for the Palestinians" (editorial comment, 24.12.1987: 8). The paper added that it was not expected that the Arabs would provide the Palestinians "with a permanent subsidy, or even the leg-up needed for development." However, the paper pointed out that there were increasing pressures on Jordan and Egypt, in particular, to respond more effectively to the Intifada. As far as Jordan was concerned, the paper indicated that although Jordan had been sympathetic toward the Palestinian protests and had allocated special funds to relieve the families of those killed by Israeli soldiers, there were fears that the violence could have spread in the country "where an estimated 60 per cent of the population are of Palestinian origins" (a correspondent, 3.1.1988: 6).

In Egypt, the Intifada caused a real embarrassment for President Mubarak and threatened the peace treaty with Israel. The paper stated that "the Palestinians will put it to him that if he, with his peace treaty, is powerless to improve their situation, the treaty should be abrogated. That would be disaster. Egypt must be on either a peace footing or a war footing with Israel, and to apt for military menace would add further turbulence to the region" (editorial comment, 21.12.1987: 12). Therefore the paper regarded the Egyptian anger over the killing of the Palestinians in the Intifada as serious, owing to the sensitive relations between Egypt and Israel (Tom Porteous, 21.12.1987: 7). According to *The Guardian*, Egypt had to react strongly to the Israeli measures in the Occupied Territories, since "Mubarak clearly recognises that the best form of defence is attack" (editorial comment, 21.1.1988: 12).

The increasing pressure on Egypt was both at home (particularly by Muslim fundamentalists (Tom Porteous, 12.1.1988: 8)) and in the Arab countries, which sought to induce Egypt "to be more Arab" (Tom Porteous, 25.1.1988: 8).
The Egyptian protests against the Israeli measures, and specifically the deportation of four Palestinian activists in January 1988, were exploited by Israel to show that the diplomatic relations between the two countries remained intact. Ian Black (6.1.1988: 5) reported that the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the Egyptian ambassador who carried the message of protest from President Mubarak, was unusually open to photographers. Black pointed out that although the message was not friendly, Shamir had exploited the event to highlight the fact that Egypt had not severed its diplomatic ties with Israel.

5.6. Little Western sympathy

5.6.1. Generally muted Western response

The general reaction of the West to the Intifada was met with dissatisfaction by Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Arab. The two papers attacked the West for not showing support for the Palestinians, who had been subjected to the Israeli oppression. Khaled Abdel-Rahim Al-Mu'ina (20.12.1987: 15) wrote in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat that the West had been standing mute while watching what was happening in Palestine, as if the West were paralysed when faced with "the barbaric practices of the Zionist enemy." He charged the Western press with hypocrisy because it sympathized more with less important issues like animal rights. In an attack which was made on the "international conscience" by Muwaffaq Al-Allaf (9.12.1989: 6) for its silence regarding the killing of Palestinian children, he accused the West of double standards respecting the Palestinians' human rights, because the Westerners only broke their silence to register their deep sympathy with the Israelis who were killed.

In Al-Arab, the columnist Yusri Husein (24.12.1987: 3) accused the Western press of being subject to Jewish control. However, he argued that the Intifada had managed to overcome the Zionist influence, thanks to its strength which made it outstanding news.

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1 A Saudi journalist and writer, editor-in-chief of the Saudi daily Arab News.
2 A senior Syrian negotiator in the peace talks with Israel.
Moreover, on another occasion (18.1.1989: 3), Husein cast suspicion on the European efforts and contribution in the peace process in the Middle East. He argued that the European proposals for peace were designed only to rescue Israel because of its failure to quell the Intifada.

5.6.2. The "brave" British response

The attitude of the European countries was generally critical of the way Israel handled the uprising, and showed a certain degree of support for and sympathy with the Palestinians. The visit of David Mellor (a former British Foreign Office Minister) to the Occupied Territories and his bitter comments on the appalling circumstances of the Palestinians under occupation was one of the most outstanding events illustrating the British reaction to the Intifada. This stance by Mellor was applauded by the Arab states, which regarded his reaction as symbolic of the British attitude towards the conflict in the Middle East. The expatriate newspapers, which presented the British reaction to the Intifada as sympathetic and supportive, highlighted Mellor's visit and registered their support for his comments.

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat praised Mellor's visit to Gaza and seized this opportunity to encourage Britain to condemn Israel and support the Palestinian struggle. In its editorial comment (6.1.1988: 9) titled "The awakening of the British conscience", it described this awakening of conscience in terms of the great moral responsibility of Britain concerning the Palestinians' rights. The newspaper called for a firm stance from Britain in line with the "well-known British morality, traditions and democratic values." It described Mellor as a "brave" man, whose remarks had pleased the Arabs. Moreover, the paper warned that the future of Mellor was at a cross-roads since he would be faced in Britain with the enemies of the Arabs, who would try to block his promising future.
Al-Ahram International reported Mellor's statement, but did not give much heed to it, possibly because it had coincided with President Mubarak's efforts to restart the peace process. In one instance, Mohammed Isa Ash-Sharqawi (7.1.1988: 4), writing in his column, described Mellor as "brave". He predicted that Mellor's remarks promised future changes in the Western countries' stances towards the Arab-Israeli conflict because of the Intifada.

Al-Arab newspaper praised David Mellor for his "courage" and called upon the UK and the Arabs to build on his stance and increase the pressure on Israel. The paper published an article by Abdel-Jabbar Odwan (6.1.1988: 3) titled "A courageous minister", commenting on Mellor's visit to the Gaza Strip. He attacked Israel for claiming that Mellor was not aware of the actual circumstances in the region. He stated that Israel did not respect its British "masters who [had] illegally granted her Palestine, and whose mandatory emergency regulations were being implemented by Israel in the Occupied Territories." Odwan argued that regardless of the (negative) historical attitude of the UK towards Palestine, and although Mellor's remarks had not exceeded the UN resolutions, he should be hailed for his firm and strong stance. He called upon the UK to exert practical pressure on Israel to end its occupation. In an editorial comment (7.1.1988: 1) titled "Mellor and Arab diplomacy", the newspaper predicted that Mellor's statement in Gaza would anger the "Zionist lobby" in Britain, who would launch an attack on Mellor and smear his personal history and stance, in an attempt to make him a lesson to those who dared to attack Israel. The newspaper called on the Arab diplomacy in Britain to "move and face the Zionist challenge before it destroys Mellor and distorts his reputation."

The Guardian defended Mellor's remarks in the Gaza Strip. The paper argued that the appalling situation in Gaza upsets most visitors, who are dismayed for the first time by the scenes there, "and Mellor... is no exception" (Ian Black, 5.1.1988: 7). The news story which appeared on the front page, titled "Britain condemns 'squalor' of Gaza",
stated that Mellor was "shaken by what he described as 'the utmost squalor'." Mellor's stance in Gaza was reported by The Guardian "to have been deliberately planned by the government, which firmly supported the Foreign Office minister against a torrent of Israeli outrage" (Ian Black, 6.1.1988: 1). Black added that Geoffrey Howe (the former Foreign Office Secretary) was well aware of what Mellor was going to say. The Guardian's editorial comment (6.1.1988: 10), titled "Our man in Gaza: right or wrong?", defended Mellor's action and stated that although he had been informed of what he was going to see, "dry reports of officials can't quite prepare you for the real horror." However, the paper criticised the minister, who should, it said, be of a "political instinct while presenting his country abroad" and should have counselled caution. Yet, in its response to Israeli accusations, the paper stressed that the minister did not intervene in Israel's internal affairs since the Occupied Lands are an international issue and not part of Israel.1

Following Mellor's row in Gaza, The Guardian voiced a general European protest against the Israeli measures in the Occupied Territories. It reported that the EEC governments "would be reluctant to implement a sanction" on Israel (by suspending part of their trade agreements with Israel) because of its policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (John Palmer, 8.1.1988: 8). Palmer pointed out that the EEC governments shared Britain's anger expressed by David Mellor.

5.6.3. Superficial changes in the US policy

Although Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat did not regard the US attitude as totally negative, it noticed the little change in the US policy towards the conflict. The American criticism of Israel and the pressures exerted with regard to its violation of human rights were seen as positive and constructive. Reviewing the positive role of the USA, the newspaper expressed its hope that it would play its part in ending the occupation.

1 Similar views were expressed by Martin Woolacott (6.1.1988: 25) who regarded Mellor's remarks as a "breach of etiquette," but "entirely in line with what has been British policy throughout the Thatcher government."
Imad Eddin Adeeb (11.1.1988: 2) wrote under the title "The American action" saying, "There is a positive change that cannot be ignored in the USA's policy in the region. However, we are not expecting that this is the start of a permanent change in Washington's relations with Tel Aviv, nor being over-optimistic." He argued that the USA's performance in the UN, by not objecting to the resolution condemning Israel, was a step in the right direction and he stressed, "We can confidently say that the American administration has for once not supported its Israeli ally, as if to send a message to Israel saying 'there are limits'." In the same issue of the paper Ahmad Baha Eddin thanked the USA for not using the veto to block the UN resolution. However, he pointed out that it was not doing a favour to the Arabs in this case, because condemning the Israeli repression and deportation of the Palestinians was an international duty and should be taken for granted. The editorial comment of the paper (25.1.1989: 13), titled "Waiting for Washington to study the Palestinian file", examined the prospects for dealing with the Palestinian issue after the electing of President George Bush. It argued that the Intifada had affected US public opinion and therefore there was a real possibility that the USA would be dealing with the Palestinian question on its merits.

More specifically, during the Gulf crisis, the newspaper voiced its optimism over a possible USA reaction to the Israeli deportation of four Palestinians. The editorial comment of the paper (20.12.1990: 13) stated that the deportation decision would be confronted by the USA, which had shown resentment over the recent Israeli measures. The paper expressed its confidence that the USA would not allow Israel to exploit the Gulf crisis to camouflage its violation of human rights.

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, however, showed caution over the US role and did not underestimate the strength of the US-Israeli relations. It argued on several occasions that the change in the US position was not substantive. Mustafa Ameen (22.12.1987: 3) criticised the USA for practically defending human rights all over the world, while it
only verbally expressed its sorrow for the "measures committed by the Israeli soldiers in Palestine." He added that the USA, at the same time, had surprised the world by supplying Israel with aid and weapons, while objecting to the selling of arms and military aeroplanes to some Arab countries. The newspaper reprinted an article from *The Sunday Telegraph* (4.1.1988: 6) titled "Why does the USA turn a blind eye to all Israel's faults?". The article stressed that, regardless of the Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories, the US-Israeli alliance was still very strong because of the Jewish influence in the USA. Imad Eddin Adeeb (24.1.1988: 2) argued in his column that this US policy encouraged Israel to inflict more oppression on the Palestinians and to increase its harsh measures. Moreover, Ahmad Abul-Fateh (1.12.1989: 9) stated that the muted position of the USA towards the conflict encouraged Israel to continue its rejection of a peace conference. He urged the USA to break its silence and put pressure on Israel to join the efforts for a political settlement.

*Al-Ahram International* viewed the response of the USA to the Intifada typically in the same way *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* did, until the Gulf crisis. During the period of the Gulf crisis, the paper considered the US policy in the UN regarding the Intifada as avoiding the embarrassment because of the crisis. The editorial comment (17.12.1990: 7) discussed the delay of a UN resolution and argued that the delay was because of the USA which wanted a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, but because of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait it had had to seek all possible ways to avoid being accused of double standards. In this instance, the paper indirectly criticised the USA for failing to back a UN resolution condemning Israel for its practices in the Occupied Territories and calling for international protection for the Palestinians.

*Al-Arab* also viewed the US reaction to the Intifada to a large extent in the same way as *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* and *Al-Ahram International* did. However, the paper did focus primarily on the imbalanced US policy, which was evidently pro-Israel. Mustafa Sawaq (20.1.1988: 3) wrote under the title "The voice of the Intifada penetrates the
American wall of silence" that the USA was dealing with results (the violence) and not with reasons (the occupation), and that it only criticised the Israeli tactics (and not the policy) in confronting the Intifada. According to Sawaq, "the USA treats the victim and victimiser at the same level by calling on both sides to exercise self-restraint and end the violence." He added, "The USA should call only for Israel to desist from violence because ending violence on the Palestinian side meant surrendering to the occupation."

In other articles, Al-Arab more sharply criticised the US attitude towards the Intifada. In an article by Sa'd Eddin Ibrahim (12.12.1988: 3), titled "After one year of the Intifada... The children of the Intifada and the ugly American", the US Secretary of State George Schultz was described as "ugly", "stupid", and "foolish" because he had refused Arafat a visa to enter the USA to attend the meeting of the General Assembly of the UN, despite all the concessions made by the PLO. Ibrahim argued that Schultz wanted the Palestinians to surrender to the American plans and quit their land, history, and future. He stressed that the only way to deal with this USA's arrogant attitude was to continue to support the Intifada. Additionally, the paper attacked the American media and accused them of being biased toward Israel. The newspaper reported (18.1.1990: 2) that an American TV station had shown a film entitled "The Intifada in Israeli eyes", which had dealt with how the Israelis viewed the Intifada and its effects on their society and future. The sub-heading of that story, "The American media continue their campaign against the Intifada", clearly expressed the newspaper's criticism of the US reaction to the uprising.

Al-Hayat stated the view that the Intifada had managed to make a breakthrough in the American policy towards the Palestine question. George Sam'an (8.12.1988: 5) considered that there were evident signs that the USA's policy had been affected by the Intifada. He stated that the first sign was that the USA had not vetoed the UN

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1 The same article was also published by Al-Ahram International on 10.12.1988: 6.
Security Council resolutions condemning Israel. Secondly, he added, the USA recognised the basic rights of the Palestinian people; and thirdly, the USA had agreed to the idea of an international peace conference.

However, during the Gulf crisis, Al-Hayat subtly criticised the US policy towards the Israeli practices. The paper's correspondent in Jerusalem, Ruba Al-Husari (18.12.1990: 3), described the US reaction to the Israeli decision to deport the four Palestinians as a diffident sort of protest. Al-Husari added that this position taken by the USA reflected the limited impact of the Israeli measures on public opinion in the USA. Moreover, the editor, Abdel-Wahhab Bader Khan (18.12.1990: 9), argued that Israel was relaxed because of the Gulf crisis, since the differences between Israel and the USA had been minimized, or even frozen. He felt that this relaxed atmosphere between the two countries was because Israel had kept a low profile in the Gulf crisis, implying a US green light for Israel to go ahead with the deportation.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi concentrated on the negative aspect of the US reaction to the uprising. This was evident in the sub-headings used for news stories as well as opinion articles and editorial comments. For example, the newspaper published a report (4.12.1989: 1) about a statement by Sheikh Zaied Bin Sultan (the Emir of the United Arab Emirates), titled "Washington may lose the friendship of the Arabs if it continues its bias towards Israel". Moreover, the paper reported (12.12.1989: 4) a mass rally in Jordan on the second anniversary of the Intifada. The sub-heading was "In a rally in Jordan, Sheikh Al-Sayeh (the former chairman of the Palestine National Council) said: Our first enemy is Washington". Under the sub-heading "An American organisation stood silent in front of the events in the Occupied Territories" (6.1.1990: 4), the newspaper accused the Human Rights Watch organisation of being silent with regard to Israeli crimes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In its editorial comment (4.12.1989: 11), the paper accused the USA of being totally aligned to Israel and its policy regarding the peace process. The paper stated that, by offering proposals
unacceptable to the Palestinian people, both countries were pushing the Palestinians into a position of desperation where they would be forced to resort to armed struggle.

During the Gulf crisis, Al-Quds Al-Arabi expressed even tougher criticism of the USA. The editorial comment of the newspaper (18.12.1990: 11), titled "A question to the American conscience on both the official and popular levels", made reference to the double standards implicit in the US policies towards Iraq and Israel. It argued that the soft language the USA was using towards the Israeli policy of deportation, as well as its (initial) objection to the UN resolution 681, were clear indications of the USA's pro-Israeli policy. In another editorial comment (19.12.1990: 11), titled "We welcome the American veto", the paper discussed the possibility of the veto's being used by the USA to stop the passing of a UN resolution and regarded that as being better than a weak resolution unopposed by the USA that would not meet the Palestinians' demands.

The "unmistakable criticism of its key ally in the Middle East" by the USA was described by The Guardian as "a serious jolt" to the intimate relations of the two countries (Michael White, 23.12.1987: 1). The paper reported the USA as stating that Israel "shared responsibility" for the violence taking place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It argued that the American position appeared to confirm the anxieties of the Jewish-Americans for the restart of peace talks. There were increasing worries, according to White (24.12.1987: 5), among the Jewish-Americans concerning the tragic situation in the Occupied Territories. They have, he said, "begun to withhold automatic support for whatever is done by a government in Jerusalem." Yet, White argued that the US-Israeli relations remained "intense and reinforced by strategic as well as political and cultural comity." He added that Israel still received its annual $3 billion from the USA.
5.6.4. UN resolutions lacking practicality

The UN reacted on many occasions to the incidents in the Occupied Territories and issued a number of resolutions and statements criticising or condemning Israeli human rights abuses and the excessive use of force to quell the Intifada. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* repeatedly expressed its satisfaction with the UN resolutions. In its report on the first UN Security Council resolution on the Intifada, 605, *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* (24.12.1987: 3) regarded the resolution as a victory for the Palestinian people in the international political arena. Similarly, after the UN resolution 681, Abdel-Qader Al-Qaderi (29.12.1990: 15) wrote that the resolution was a clear recognition by the UN of the Palestinians' rights to their protection and liberation. He also described the resolution as a confirmation of the legitimacy of the Intifada and the diplomatic efforts made by the Palestinians.

*Al-Ahram International* regarded the UN resolutions as lacking in practicality. Hasan Fu'ad (4.1.1988: 4) stated that the UN resolutions would not achieve their aims without practical measures to deal with the actual problems which had caused the Intifada. He argued that there were no guarantees that the violence would stop unless practical steps for a peaceful solution were taken. Moreover, the paper's editorial comment (7.1.1988: 6) suggested that the application of the UN resolutions concerning the Intifada should be followed up in order to prevent more complications and an escalation of the violence. The paper proposed that the UN should start with practical steps for an international peace conference for a comprehensive solution.

During the Gulf crisis *Al-Ahram International* registered satisfaction with the UN resolution 681. In an article reprinted from the Egyptian magazine *Akher Sa'ah*, by Nabil Zaki, the paper (30.12.1990: 6) stated that because of the USA's rejection of a strong wording in the draft resolution, the alternative was either a weak draft wording with no US veto, or a strong draft wording with a US veto. The PLO, according to the paper, had chosen the former. The paper argued that the resolution was in any case
of great value, since it strengthened the link between the Palestinian question and international standards of justice. It commented that the resolution confirmed that it was impossible to treat the Palestine problem according to different criteria from those involved in dealing with the Gulf crisis.

Al-Arab attacked the UN from the early days of the uprising for not taking the Intifada seriously. Yusuf Al-Qa'id\(^1\) (4.1.1988: 3) attacked the UN resolution 605 and accused the international community of issuing a hastily prepared resolution in an unusual way in an attempt to bring a quick end to the uprising. He urged consideration of the fact that the Intifada had demonstrated that there would be no peace in the region without a radical and comprehensive solution to the Palestine problem. This fact, according to Al-Qa'id, had not been taken into account by the international community when the UN resolution had been issued.

Al-Hayat focused on the difficulties the UN faced in dealing with the Intifada, particularly in the light of the Gulf crisis. George Sam'an (21.12.1990: 9) stated that the delay in issuing UN Security Council resolution 681 would throw into doubt the future of the UN. He argued that because of the complicated situation in the Gulf, the USA was making it difficult for the UN to function properly and to act against Israel. He warned that this would ultimately affect confidence in the future of the UN. Raghid As-Sulh\(^2\) (11.1.1991: 9) commented on the resolution and described it as "lacking teeth." He stated that it did not propose means to compel Israel to comply because it did not define a specific punishment if Israel failed to comply with it and give up intimidating the Palestinians. He argued that as long as Israel was protected by the superpowers, the whole region would continue to suffer from the evil of violence and its consequences.

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1 An Egyptian writer.
2 A Lebanese writer living in Oxford.
Al-Quds Al-Arabi addressed the issue of the position of the UN mainly during the Gulf crisis. It presented the UN and its resolutions as unsatisfactory and placed little value on them. In its editorial comment (11.12.1990: 11), the paper accused the UN of lacking seriousness in issuing pro-Palestinian resolutions. It called for serious and practical efforts from the UN to protect the Palestinians and to put an end to the occupation. The paper (22.12.1990: 4) reported the UN resolution 681 and the General Secretary's statement which called for international protection for the Palestinians and an international peace conference. The sub-heading was "Palestinian displeasure at the UN Security Council resolution and the statement of the President of the Security Council because they lack practical measures for the protection of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and do not state a time for the international peace conference". The sub-heading gave a negative impression of the resolution by highlighting the Palestinians' criticism and resentment for the resolution.

The Guardian, in its comment on the UN resolution 605, criticised the resolution implicitly and urged more than a mere condemnation of the Israeli measures (editorial comment, 24.12.1987: 8). The paper stated that "it is a rare event for the US to allow a resolution critical of Israel through the UN Security Council." However, the paper argued that "although the Palestinians have a just cause, in that not only half but all their land has been taken from them, condemnation pure and simple is not an adequate answer."

5.7. Peace: the remote hope
Seeking a peaceful solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, and particularly as a fitting conclusion to the Intifada, was regarded by Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat as important and necessitating accompanying force on the Arab side. Ameen Al-Hafiz (16.12.1987: 9) stated that the concepts of struggle and resistance should not be forgotten by those who believed in peace as a way to solve the Palestine question. He argued that peace could also be achieved by resistance working side-by-side with diplomacy. However,
the paper emphasised that the Israelis should decide whether or not they wanted peace and, specifically, an international peace conference. In a number of reprinted articles, the paper highlighted the pressing demand that Israel should choose between the Occupied Territories and peace. The rift in Israel over this issue was regarded as the main obstacle to peace (The New York Times, 19.12.1987: 10). An article from The Independent (22.12.1987: 6) argued that Israel should think of the future of the Occupied Territories in the light of the growing Palestinian resistance. The paper distinguished between the Labour and the Likud parties, and noted that (the former leader of the Labour Party) Shimon Peres was the only person to have comprehended the reality of the situation. Moreover, another reprinted article from The Daily Telegraph (7.1.1988: 5) described Shimon Peres as the person who had worked in the best way for the benefit of his country, since he had pushed the government to the proposed international peace conference.

On the other hand, Ameen Al-Hafiz (13.1.1988: 9) attacked both right and left wings of the Israeli political parties. He stated that the difference between the two parties was superficial and inessential. He argued that the only way to drag both parties to a peace conference was through a "revolutionary force" (i.e. by resistance).

Furthermore, the Israeli moves towards peace came under suspicion by the newspaper's columnists. Ahmad Baha Eddin (21.1.1988: 9) stated that what had been reported about the Israeli Premier's intending to announce a peace initiative when the violence stopped was absolute nonsense. He argued that if violence stopped, the Israelis would claim that there was no need to rush into peace talks, since everything was quiet in the Occupied Territories, but that conversely, if violence erupted, they would insist that they would not negotiate under pressure. He stressed that the Israeli initiative, which would include a Palestinian autonomy proposal, was totally unacceptable since it still failed to meet the Palestinians' right to self-determination.
Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat voiced its support for the Palestinian moves, led by the PLO, towards peace. Imad Eddin Adeeb (9.12.1988: 6) commented that the confident moves taken by the PLO towards peace were legitimate. However, Ahmad Baha Eddin (14.12.1988: 13) wrote that the moderation of the PLO was not final. He warned that if this moderation did not achieve its goal, then it would not be the last word.

This position of the paper was repeated in December 1988, shortly after the USA opened a dialogue with the PLO. Also during that period, the Israeli elections showed a deep rift within Israeli society when neither the Likud nor the Labour parties won a clear majority. A coalition between the two big (and other small) parties was formed in Israel on the basis that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO. In a report into the comments of the British press (17.12.1988: 12), Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat stated that Israel was increasingly facing difficulties because of the dialogue between the USA and the PLO. According to the report, the Israeli government, which had vowed not to negotiate with the PLO on the one hand, and not to withdraw from the Occupied Territories on the other hand, now felt as if it were in a confrontation with the whole world.

The results of the Israeli elections were regarded by Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat as a sign of the continuation of the deadlock in the peace process. Under the title "The real face of the enemy", Imad Eddin Adeeb (19.1.1989: 4) stated that the peace camp in Israel was not, as had been claimed, stronger than the fanatic camp. The Israeli elections, according to Adeeb, proved that the Labour Party, which had tried to be moderate, was forced to play the same game as the Likud, by adopting an uncompromising attitude. Adeeb argued that Israel did not want peace, since it insisted on keeping the Occupied Land under the allegation of its security needs. He accused the Israelis of deception in claiming that they wanted peace, since they knew that the Arabs could not liberate the Occupied Land by force, and so, he asked, why should Israel give it up
by peace? However, Adeeb concluded that he believed nevertheless that the only way to expose Israel was to play with it the same game to the end, so that its alleged peace cards would at last be uncovered and shown for what they were worth.

On the second anniversary of the Intifada, and in the light of the continuing Israeli rejection of the proposed international peace conference, the newspaper doubted the genuineness of Israeli intentions for peace. The editorial comment of the paper (11.12.1989: 13) argued that seeking a political solution was useless. The paper pointed out that all indications confirmed that what Israel sought was not peace, because a just and comprehensive peace would abolish the aims of the "Zionist state". The paper concluded that the only way, under these circumstances, was to stand with and support the struggle against the occupation through the Intifada.

In brief, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat did not, in principle, reject a political solution for the conflict, but it repeatedly voiced its frustration because of the Israeli rejection of the proposed international peace conference. Thus the paper tended to call for the escalation of the Intifada as the only way forward in the light of the political stalemate.

Al-Ahram International handled the peace process to a large extent in the same way Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat did. It repeatedly emphasised that Israel should choose between peace and land, and should make up its mind and join the peace process. The paper stated clearly that the Arabs wanted to make peace in order to put an end to the conflict. In its editorial comment (17.1.1988: 6) the paper argued that, contrary to the Arab mentality which called for peace, the Israeli mentality was practising oppression and putting more fuel on the fire of war by rejecting and frustrating all peace efforts. In another editorial comment (9.12.1988: 3), however, the paper stated that it believed that Israel would not continue in its unjustified rejection of peace for long.
The newspaper showed an understanding of the reasons why Israel rejected, or hesitated to join, the peace process. Tawfiq Abu-Baker (6.12.1989: 6) wrote that the most difficult thing for the Israelis was the first concession. According to Abu-Baker, any decisive concession had to be weighed very carefully by Israel, since any mistake could threaten the very existence of the Jewish state. However, he pointed out that although the extremists had, so far, constituted the majority in Israel, there was a noticeable and significant increase in those in the camp of peace, who believed that Israel could not escape a historical compromise at some stage.

The paper showed dissatisfaction with the Israeli steps towards peace. The Israeli proposal for elections in the Occupied Territories, which would be followed up by negotiations between those who were elected and Israel, was totally rejected by Al-Ahram International. In its editorial comment (18.1.1990: 6), the paper accused Israel of attempting to end the Intifada and blocking the way of peace by the election idea. In another editorial comment (25.1.1990: 6), the paper wondered how Israel was going to conduct the elections while both the people who would be electing and those prominent figures who would be nominated were incarcerated in the Israeli prisons. Finally, Khaled Ibrahim Ba'ba' (24.1.1990: 11) argued that Israel had devoted itself to stretching, complicating, and congesting the dispute, while the Arabs on the other hand had chosen a balanced road to peace. He added that whatever Israel chose, "we shall continue the struggle in both ways: peace and resistance, since we have nothing to loose more than what we have lost."

Al-Arab newspaper took a hard line on this issue and called for an escalation of the violence against the occupation as the only means of achieving the Intifada's objectives. Yusri Husein (18.1.1988: 3) argued that the peace which some people were calling for meant "giving up our rights." He added, "Throughout history we have never seen people raising the flag of peace while they are enslaved, humiliated, and living under the fire of the occupation forces... What is required," he argued, is "to
raise the slogan of liberation, the slogan which has been raised by the children of Gaza and the West Bank. The peace approach has been tried by some regimes in the region [e.g. Egypt] and has never achieved anything except more concessions, collapse, and relapses."

Under the title "The compromise train has not yet come", Amjad Naser (26.1.1988: 3) argued that it was not yet the right time for a peaceful compromise. He argued that any premature peace conference would abort the uprising and leave the Arabs waiting for miracles. According to Naser, "What is required now is to escalate the Intifada in order to reach the political moment when we can swap and compromise."

Moreover, the paper openly criticised the PLO's recognition of Israel in November 1988. In its editorial comment (9.12.1988: 1), under the title "The false concessions", the newspaper pointed out, "The Zionists would not be satisfied with whatever concessions we offered." It added, "Therefore there is no reason why we should offer them the only thing they lack, that is to say the recognition of the legitimacy of the existence of Israel on the land of Palestine."

The paper continued to voice its rejection of a peaceful settlement. In its editorial comment (4.1.1990: 1) titled "The principle of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin", the newspaper stated, "Unfortunately we do not see any sign of an Arab country willing to fight the enemy [Israel], yet most of the Arab countries, if not all, are set to recognise the right of Israel to exist on the land of Palestine." It added, "Moreover, Yassir Arafat showed that he is leaning to this Arab consensus, when he recognised the right of Israel to exist on the condition that it allows a Palestinian state. In the meantime, Israel rejects the discussion of this idea either in an international peace conference or in direct talks with the PLO." Consequently, the newspaper concluded, it was necessary to admit that the principle of resisting the occupation was a holy duty and the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Al-Arab published its total rejection of the Israeli proposals for peace. Hamdi Farraj (20.1.1989: 3) suspected the Israeli proposals for Palestinian elections of being a move towards negotiations. He stressed that the election idea was a conspiracy to kill the Intifada. In another article (4.1.1990: 3), Farraj stated that no one with common sense could believe that Israel was sincere in seeking peace.

On the other hand, Al-Arab on some occasions printed articles which did not totally object to an international peace conference. Amjad Naser (11.1.1988: 3) pointed out that despite the Israeli oppression, the Intifada had promised for the first time the possibility of international pressures being brought to bear on Israel to drive it to the negotiating table. By this means, he added, it would be possible to reach some kind of political solution through an international peace conference. Ali Sa'id Hashem (24.1.1989: 3) stated that the Intifada had helped to further Palestinian political activities according to a clear political programme, irrespective of whether one approved of it or not. Although Hashem did not express either his personal objection to or his approval of the peace process, he regarded that programme as an achievement by the Intifada and called on the Arab countries to lead the political situation to the right conclusion.

Although Al-Hayat argued that a peaceful solution was the only way to solve the conflict, it acknowledged that the Intifada had not succeeded in making a breakthrough in this respect. George Sam'an (8.12.1988: 5) stated that there was no alternative to a political solution. However, the paper reprinted an article from the Israeli daily Ha-Arets by Ephraim Sneh (4.12.1988: 7), who argued that the Intifada had failed to produce political changes, so that the peace process had ever since been in a state of deadlock. This view was confirmed by the Palestinian lecturer at the University of Bir Zeit, Ali Al-Jarbawi, in his article published in Al-Hayat (13.1.1991: 9), in which he stated that the Intifada had not put enough pressure on Israel to go for
peace because the protests were locked in the Occupied Territories. He argued that only recently had the Intifada started to affect the Israelis' lives, through the wave of stabbings and the use of arms within Israel, and that these occurrences would put pressures on Israel and would lead to an increase in the voices calling for peace.

*Al-Quds Al-Arabi* blamed Israel for being an obstacle to peace. In its editorial comment (6.12.1989: 11), the paper commented on the advice to Israel of the former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, on what measures should be taken to deal with the Intifada. The paper argued that Israel needed a rational voice to guide the country to peace, which was the only way to security and stability. Moreover, in a reprinted article from the Israeli daily *Al Ha-Mishmar*, Pinchas Anbari (14.12.1989: 10) argued that the continuous brutal oppression by Israel of the Palestinians would lead to the escalation of extremism and would block Arafat's efforts for peace. He suggested that Israel should declare a unilateral cease-fire to encourage the moderate Palestinians, in accordance with the saying, "Violence produces violence, and non-violence produces non-violence."

*Al-Quds Al-Arabi* frequently reprinted articles testifying to the Israeli voices which were calling on the government to start talks with the Palestinians. Mordechai Gur the former Chief of the Israeli Army, wrote in *Ma'ariv* (10.1.1990: 10), that it was important that the Israelis meet in a dialogue with the Palestinians. Moreover, Shilla Haits Rolf wrote in *Davar* (19.1.1990: 10) that the only alternative to the [unsuccessful] Israeli policy of crushing the Intifada was to negotiate with the pragmatists in the PLO.

In the wake of the Gulf crisis, there was increasing pressure on Israel to agree to attend a peace conference, particularly because there were proposals in Israel of a unilateral withdrawal form the Gaza Strip. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* reprinted an article by Bolus [sic] (5.1.1991: 10) from *Ha-Arets*, arguing that an Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza was not the ideal solution, but that there should be a comprehensive political settlement to the Palestine problem. He suggested that Israel should call on the PLO, Egypt, and Jordan to negotiate a lasting settlement that would include the West Bank in addition to the Gaza Strip. However, because of the situation in the Gulf, Mordechai Gur wrote in Davar (14.1.1991: 10) that the Israelis should halt all discussion and arguments about peace until the end of the Gulf crisis. He insisted that the Intifada had made a political settlement inevitable, but that nothing should be done until the tension in the Gulf was over.

Although The Guardian blamed Israel for the stalemate in the peace process, it accused the international community of being unfair in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. It criticised the countries which, "while professing Israel's right to exist, give... little thought to its security." The paper added that on the other hand "it is a bad international bargain which makes the Palestinians the perpetual losers in a contest no one can win" (editorial comment, 24.12.1987: 8).

In referring to the Israeli intransigence regarding the proposed international peace conference, the paper noted that while there was acceptance for such a conference among the Israeli opposition, the official policy had not changed. It argued that although Shimon Peres realised the importance of such a conference, he had not convinced the Prime Minister, nor probably his own party (editorial comment, 24.12.1987: 8).

The paper explicitly accused Israel of resisting the peace efforts. It argued that although the Israeli Prime Minister might think that it was just a matter of time before the violence ended, it was nevertheless the root cause of the conflict that ought to be tackled. It predicted that unless such a solution were embraced, violence would "resume, each round worse than the last" (editorial comment, 15.1.1988: 12).
The Intifada was considered by the paper as the right and the most promising time to apply external pressure to bring about negotiations involving Israel and the Palestinians. The paper stressed that the Palestinians, particularly the PLO and its affiliates, whom Israel refused to talk to, were a very important part in any "credible peace conference," and thus, there would be no conference as long as the Israeli position regarding the Palestinian representation did not change (editorial comment, 27.1.1988: 12).

On the second anniversary of the uprising, the paper blamed both Palestinian and Israeli sides for the political deadlock. Ian Black (8.12.1989: 15) argued that while the Palestinians were still defiant, the Israelis remained confident that they could cope. However, David Hirst (9.12.1989: 23) pointed out that the Israeli position was still preoccupied by the extremists, while the moderates were a small minority, so that there was no promise of any quick political breakthrough.

5.8. Summary

The expatriate newspapers treated the Intifada as an important event that should be sustained and protected. They all viewed it as a pure and peaceful spontaneous revolt against the Israeli occupation and its devastating consequences. Each newspaper had its own perspective and interpretation of what the objectives of the Intifada were, and how it should be supported and protected. Nevertheless, with the exception of Al-Arab, the papers did not reveal any major differences in their treatment of the Intifada.

The papers typically blamed the Israeli occupation for being the principal reason for the violence. They also referred to the despair caused by the deadlock in the political process and the inefficient role of the Arab countries. With the exception of Al-Arab, the papers looked on the Intifada as a revolt that aimed to bring a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They, therefore, overtly expressed their worries when the
Intifada verged toward an armed insurrection. They did not, however, register much concern over the use of knives in the Intifada, since that was a solitary phenomenon. Al-Arab, on the other hand, did not consider the Intifada as a step toward a peaceful solution. Unlike the rest of the expatriate papers, Al-Arab viewed the uprising as the preliminary to a wider battle to liberate Palestine. Therefore, it was not surprising to see the paper encouraging the use of arms as the frustration and despair of any political breakthrough spread. Al-Quds Al-Arabi's position over the use of arms was monitory, as it reluctantly predicted a bloody insurrection.

The PLO was viewed by the papers as the sole representative of the Palestinians and as the controlling power behind the Intifada. Yet, Al-Arab attacked the PLO for its weak response to the Intifada as well as for its concessions and efforts in quest of peace. Al-Quds Al-Arabi registered its fear of a decline in popular support for the PLO. The papers, however, were concerned over the future of the PLO in view of the growing power of the Muslim groups. Al-Ahram International regarded the Muslim organisations as a new element in the conflict that should not be belittled or ignored. Al-Arab paid increasing attention to this element, especially with the PLO's tending to renounce violence and to seek a political alternative.

The papers constantly viewed Israel as a hostile occupying power that oppressed, intimidated, and attempted to exterminate the Palestinian people. They viewed the excessive use of force by the Israelis as a sign of their weakness and inability to quell the Intifada. The papers accused Israel of being a 'Nazi' country, repeating the Nazi sufferings inflicted on the Jews, but this time on the Palestinians. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Quds Al-Arabi pointed to 'the Jewish mentality', the product of a historical complex, as a reason for the oppressive Israeli measures in the Occupied Territories.
The papers highlighted the negative effect of the uprising on Israel, particularly the split over the future of the conflict. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*, *Al-Ahram International*, and *Al-Arab* focused on the participation of the Israeli Arabs in the protests and predicted that this was another threat to the future of Israel. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* belittled the effect of the Intifada on Israel and argued that there was not enough pressure to make a change in Israel.

With the exception of *Al-Ahram International*, the papers attacked the Arab countries for responding weakly to the Intifada. While *Al-Arab* called the Arab weak response a "conspiracy", *Al-Ahram International* feared that the violence might spread in the Arab world as an effect of the Intifada. This attitude of *Al-Ahram International* was only in the first period of the Intifada but changed later when the paper urged the Arabs to support the uprising.

The papers viewed the role played by Egypt, in particular, as significant since it was the only Arab country to have diplomatic relations with Israel. Therefore, *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* and *Al-Ahram International* defended the Egyptian condemnation of the Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip while at the same time keeping the peace treaty with Israel intact. However, *Al-Ahram International* reported the pressure that Egypt was under to sever its political ties with Israel. *Al-Arab*, on the other hand, clamoured for Egypt to abolish the peace treaty.

The papers pointed to the limited positive reaction of Arab states to the Intifada. It has been noticed that each of the three papers praised the role of its owner's home country in supporting the uprising. They also noted the positive role played by some Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As far as Iraq, during the Gulf crisis, was concerned, the papers expressed their view that the invasion of Kuwait had undermined the Intifada by diverting world attention to the conflict in the Gulf. Unlike
the rest of the papers, Al-Arab regarded the "Iraqi steadfastness" in the face of the allied forces as a support for the Intifada. Al-Quds Al-Arabi criticised the Arab countries for being busy with the Iraqi invasion and abandoning the Intifada.

The general Western response to the uprising was described by the two papers Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Arab as "mute". However, there was great enthusiasm for the British position reflected by the remarks made in Gaza by the Foreign Office Minister, David Mellor. The papers praised that stance, and regarded it as historic and a new development in the British position regarding the conflict. As far as the USA was concerned, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Ahram International, and Al-Hayat noticed a slight development in its position, especially when the USA did not veto a number of UN resolutions condemning Israel. The papers did not underestimate the close and strong US-Israeli relationship, and regarded the new US position as a breakthrough in US foreign policy. Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi criticised the USA for not taking a serious view of the oppressive Israeli measures. They argued that the USA had no real choice but to oppose the Israeli practices. The two papers added that the USA could have stood more firmly to pressurize Israel and force it to abide by international law and stop its oppressive measures.

While Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat registered its satisfaction with the UN resolutions and its concern regarding the Intifada, Al-Arab attacked the international organisation and accused it of attempting to undermine the Intifada. The rest of the papers regarded the UN resolutions as lacking practicality. Therefore, they did not place too much value on the UN resolutions, since they would not deter Israel from continuing its policies.

Although all the papers, with the exception of Al-Arab, advocated peace to be the aims of the Intifada and a demand of the Arabs, they blamed Israel for being an obstacle in the way to peace. They backed the international peace conference
proposed (by the Arab states) as the ideal way for approaching peace in the region. At the same time, they rejected the Israeli proposals, particularly the idea of elections in the Occupied Territories, and regarded that as an Israeli attempt to escape any peace talks. *Al-Arab*, in fact, rejected all peace efforts on the ground that there should be no peace until the Arabs had defeated Israel, so that they would then be able to dictate their own perception of peace.
Chapter Six

THE IMAGE OF THE INTIFADA
AS PORTRAYED BY PHOTOGRAPHS AND CARTOONS
IN THE EXPATRIATE ARAB DAILIES
6.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse photographs and cartoons in the expatriate newspapers as part of the image of the Intifada projected by them. The importance of the pictorial component of newspapers derives from several factors. The choice of photographs and cartoons provides a clear indication of the view the newspaper holds regarding certain issues and characters. The pictorial component in the press is also more than just complementary to the text. The readership may find in the visual materials additional elements, information, and interpretations that were not or could not be provided by the text. According to Hodgson, photographs also "form distinctive eye-catching areas to which the reader's attention is directed when he or she turns to the page" (Hodgson, 1987: 58), so that they thus assist in focusing the reader's attention on issues the paper wishes to emphasise, alongside the other typographic and layout devices employed for the same purpose. While cartoons offer interpretation and analysis, photographs bring the reader closer to the events. Photographs enhance and extend the news text "by highlighting and pressing upon the reader important parts of it and make it easier for the reader to build up a picture of what he or she is reading about" (Hodgson, 1987: 57). Any analysis of modern newspapers needs therefore to consider the pictorial as well as the textual elements.

As far as the expatriate newspapers are concerned, they all widely employed photographs and cartoons in their coverage of the Intifada. The Intifada provided the media with a large number of photographs and subjects for cartoons. The element of Intifada violence, in particular, was the most photogenic aspect of the story and pictorial coverage was therefore demanded by the press and evidently appreciated by the readership. Moreover, the Intifada provided rich and ample inspirations to the cartoonists. They could construct and depict scenes which the camera could not or failed to show. They, furthermore, expressed feelings and views which words alone
were unable to convey, or which the newspapers might not have wanted to state explicitly. They also iconized significant Intifada themes.

6.2. Intifada photographs

The expatriate dailies benefited immensely from the huge number of Intifada pictures readily provided by news agencies and other photograph distributors as part of the world-wide media interest. Most of the photographs used originated from the prime wire services. They had a wide choice for selecting what they regarded as the most effective photographs for their purposes and policies.

Most of the Intifada photographs used in the expatriate dailies portrayed Israel in the role of the 'oppressor' by concentrating on scenes in which Palestinians were humiliated by being held against walls, or being dragged away in front of cameras. They also showed Israel as an 'aggressor' by concentrating on scenes of Israeli soldiers beating Palestinians or shooting at them. Palestinians, on the other hand, were portrayed as 'victims' and the 'oppressed'. Photographs of Palestinians being beaten or dragged away by Israeli soldiers were typical images. The Palestinians were also visualized as 'defiers' and 'resisters', especially when they were pictured in actions such as throwing stones at the Israeli troops. The pictorial presentation was very limited.

The image of Israel was uniformly negative in the expatriate Arab newspapers. This was mainly a reflection of the Arab policy towards the Intifada. There was a lack of photographs showing Israel in a favourable or positive light because of the nature of the conflict and the fact that casualties among the Israelis were very limited.

The captions added to the photographs selected also need to be considered for they show the meaning and significance attached to a photograph by the newspaper regarding an event or a character. Captions are very important also because the photograph, as such, "does not possess a language" (Berger, 1982: 95) and, therefore,

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1 The figures referred to in this chapter are in Appendix A.
it "begs for an interpretation, and the words usually supply it. The photograph, irrefutable as evidence but weak in meaning, is given a meaning by the words" (Berger, 1982: 92). Additionally, "words can enhance both emotional and cognitive values of pictures" (Evans, 1978: 255). Hodgson argues that photographs with no captions introduce "misconception into the reader's mind." He stresses that "no picture should be published without explanation or clear identification" (Hodgson, 1987: 58).

In addition to the explanatory and interpretative roles of the caption, a captioned picture "can also entail other thoughts" in the reader (Berger, 1982: 102). It can stimulate a line of secondary responses and feelings beyond its immediate message.

The main difference between the papers was in their use of captions. The papers tended to use the same or similar photographs most of the time. The same photographic themes were also repeated in the papers. On some occasions, indeed, the dailies used exactly the same photographs. For example figure A.1, which is a photograph published by Al-Hayat on 6.12.1990, was also published by Al-Quds Al-Arabi on the same day; figure A.19 is a photograph published in both The Guardian (15.12.1987) and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (27.12.1987); and figure A.12 is a photograph which was consecutively published by both Al-Ahram International and Ash-Sharg Al-Awsat. Even when newspapers use exactly the same photograph, different captions applied "can give rise to different meanings" (Hunter, 1987: 11).

The expatriate newspapers all used captions extensively for almost all Intifada photographs in order to explain, contextualize, and interpret the pictures. The caption, almost invariably, plays an important role since the photograph "is always an object in a context, and the context is determined most obviously by the words next to the photograph" (Hunter, 1987: 11).

The importance to each other of the caption and the photograph is reciprocal. While the photograph, on the one hand, stands more firmly with the caption, the latter, on
the other hand, draws its significance from the photograph. Consequently, the more powerful is the photograph, the more the caption is meaningful and thus important.

6.2.1. Characteristics of the Intifada photographs
The pictures displayed by the expatriate newspapers combined important characteristics that made them appealing to the reader. The following are the most noticeable and relevant characteristics the researcher has observed in this study:

(a) Violence. The element of violence was obvious in many of the Intifada photographs. Violence is regarded by journalists as one of the most significant elements in selecting news stories for the press. Wilkins notes that "a journalist's definition of a good news story means a catastrophe to someone else" (Wilkins, 1987: 80). Foreign news in particular is "limited to violent political disorder" (Gans, 1979: 53). Violence was reflected by photographs of Israeli soldiers firing bullets and tear gas on demonstrators, soldiers beating Palestinians, Palestinians throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, etc. Figures A.15 and A.20 are clear examples of portrayed violence carried out by Israeli soldiers when arresting Palestinians. In the same way, violence was shown in The Guardian, as figure A.19 shows.

By examining the Intifada photographs, we found that the papers printed scenes of violence carried out by both sides, because violence per se reflects the image of the Intifada and exposes the imbalance in the conflict. Violence carried out by Palestinians creates an image of 'defiance' and 'heroism', while violence practised by the Israelis creates an image of 'oppression', as will be discussed later in this chapter.

(b) Contrast. Evans examined several examples to highlight the significance of 'contrast' as one of the most important characteristics of photojournalism (Evans, 1978: 101-102). The element of contrast was clearly apparent in the Intifada scenes: Israeli soldiers facing Palestinian civilians, soldiers holding weapons contrasting with
the stones in the hands of the Palestinian youths, or sometimes Israeli soldiers ranged against Palestinian women and children. Figures A.7 and A.8, which show Israeli soldiers and Palestinian stone-throwers, are typical examples in this respect.

(c) Symbolism. In the history of photojournalism a picture "can become a symbol for an era" (Evans, 1978: 9). Symbolism comes into play in the process of selecting photographs, as these pictures may not be "descriptive, but have meaning through symbolism" (Evans, 1978: 58). Several of the recurring scenes in the Intifada pictures have become, over time, symbolic of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the Occupied Territories. Photographs of Palestinians masked with kufiyahs and burning tyres, and youths throwing stones have in particular became symbolic images of the Intifada. The photographs of a masked Palestinian youth throwing stones in figures A.4 and A.11 are cases in point.

(d) Action and vitality. Action or movement in photojournalism adds a vitality to the newspaper and breaks the rigidity of the text. The reader is most attracted to photographs with action. This element, which "is not an accident" but an "observation of the movement's time" (Evans, 1978: 75), was usually present in the photographs of the daily Intifada incidents in the Occupied Territories. Most of the photographs, especially in the first year of the Intifada, included the element of action and vitality since the characters were usually photographed in motion. Movements of stone-throwers, Israeli soldiers chasing Palestinian demonstrators, and similar action photographs are exemplified in figures A.1, A.4, A.8, and A.9.

(e) Completeness of story. Many of the Intifada photographs combine the most important elements of the story, although photographs, in general, represent incomplete stories because no photograph can contain all details and elements that compose a story. Intifada photographs could be understood without comments or
explanations since they provide answers to questions such as 'who?', 'what?', and 'how?'. Captions might be needed to explain 'where?', 'why?', and perhaps 'when?'.

The above characteristics lent power and influence to photographs selected for publication. In fact, they were the main reasons for the constant appearance of Intifada photographs in the expatriate newspapers during the years of the Intifada. They gave clarity, distinction, and depth to the images of the main actors: the Palestinians and the Israelis.

6.2.2. The subject matter of the photographs

The major images of the Intifada presented by the photographs published by the newspapers were as follows:

(a) Palestinian defiance. The photographs commonly used to show this theme were those of Palestinians throwing stones at soldiers, burning tyres, demonstrating and marching in towns and villages. Figures A.1-A.12 are sample photographs showing Palestinians engaged in protests and demonstrations against the Israeli occupation. The pictorial image of the Palestinian defiance particularly portrayed the activities of the youngsters in the Intifada.

(b) Palestinian suffering. Palestinian defiance was not the only image to be portrayed by the newspapers. Another image contained in photographs focused on Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. It was the image of an 'oppressed' and 'intimidated' people. Scenes of Israelis arresting Palestinians, searching them, and sometimes beating them in a humiliating manner presented this image. The inability of the individual Palestinians to resist reflected the hardship and the oppression under which they live. The photographs concentrate on the element of contrast between the 'vigorous' Israelis and the 'oppressed' Palestinians, to highlight this image. Figures A.13, A.15, A.16, A.20, and A.21 are photographs demonstrating this theme. A complementary image which can be extracted from these examples is the 'innocence'
of the Palestinians. This image appears clearly in the sample figures A.20 and A.21. The first shows a helpless young girl trying to escape arrest, while the second shows the arrest of a Palestinian youth whose mother is following him and trying to get him released. Similar images appeared in *The Guardian*, as the photographs in figures A.17 and A.19 show.

(c) Israeli oppression. This image is dominant in all the photographs which show the Israelis acting against the Palestinians. In some cases the Israelis were photographed firing bullets and tear gas on demonstrators. Figure A.22 is a picture containing this image since it focuses on the Israeli action, although no demonstrators appear in the scene included in the photograph. In many cases the Israelis were photographed forcing Palestinians to raise their hands against walls (e.g. figure A.13), or to sit on the floor (e.g. figure A.16), or arresting them (sometimes violently, in figures A.14, A.15, A.19, and A.20).

Photographs of demolished Palestinian houses and Palestinian deportees in south Lebanon deepen the image of the Israeli policy of oppression, showing it to be one of inhumanity as well. Figure A.23 is a clear example, focusing as it does on two Palestinian children and their aged grandfather sitting in the remains of their house after it has been destroyed by Israeli forces because it was claimed that their father, already in prison, was a member of a proscribed organisation. The photograph bespeaks a 'heartless' occupation, which denied these people's living in their own house.

(d) The belligerency of the Israeli occupation. A complementary part of the image of the Intifada was the frequent depiction of Arab towns being under militaristic occupation. Those photographs do not show actual confrontations or violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but Israeli soldiers roaming Arab towns and
villages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Figures A.25, A.26, and A.27 illustrate this image of the military nature of the Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories.

Although the caption usually tells the story of soldiers patrolling Arab territories and explains the unseen part of the story, the photograph by itself shows only 'the occupation'.

(e) Israeli casualties. From time to time the expatriate papers showed Israeli casualties, but in a relatively small number of pictures depicting injured soldiers and civilians, or a funeral of somebody killed by the Palestinians. This small number was because the losses and casualties among the Israelis were very limited in comparison with those of the Palestinians. Figure A.30, for example, is a photograph showing Israeli officers being treated in a hospital after having been attacked by Palestinians. These photographs convey a sense of the success of the Intifada in hurting Israel and state that the casualties among Israeli soldiers and civilians is the inescapable price of the occupation.

(f) Arab and international solidarity with the Intifada. Sometimes, the expatriate dailies projected images of the wide support for the Intifada in the Arab countries and worldwide. Photographs of demonstrations and other activities held in various countries in solidarity with the Intifada highlighted the reaction to the Intifada world-wide. This implied recognition of the Intifada as a legitimate struggle, and reflected the level of sympathy and support amongst Arab countries.

Arab and international solidarity with the Palestinian uprising was also portrayed by the papers, particularly in the first year, by featuring demonstrations and selected activities supporting the Intifada in the Arab world and elsewhere (figures A.28 and A.29).
The images of the Palestinians and the Israelis in the pictorial coverage of the Intifada appears to have been almost identical between the British, indeed the international media, and the expatriate Arab dailies. The Intifada photographs in The Guardian include most of the themes represented in the expatriate papers. For example, figure A.4 is a picture from The Guardian which shows a masked young Palestinian 'hero' using his slingshot to throw stones at the Israelis. Also, figure A.5 shows masked Palestinians exposing their knives and axes in a defiant scene in the middle of Nablus city in the West Bank. Figures A.17 and A.19 are photographs that speak for the daily suffering of the Palestinian people under the Israeli occupation. The photographs reveal that the Palestinians do not own their lives and they are subject to Israeli oppression all the time. Figure A.19 is an example of a photograph showing how The Guardian focused on the oppression practised by Israeli soldiers, who are seen here in an attempt to arrest a young Palestinian. The photograph in figure A.17, taken from The Guardian, demonstrates its presentation of Palestinians living under military occupation, in this case Palestinians queuing at a military check point or, for other reasons, under armed Israeli guards. Such photographs also project Israeli policy as oppressive and humiliating. Several times The Guardian also published photographs showing injured Israelis and other Israeli casualties of the conflict. For example, the picture in figure A.31 focuses on an Israeli baby girl who was hurt by a stone during the Intifada. Figure A.32, which appeared in The Guardian, shows the anger of an Israeli man after the killing of three Israeli Jews near Tel Aviv. These photographs underlined The Guardian's inclination to blame Israel for the violence in the Occupied Territories and its constant prodding of Israel to solve the conflict peacefully, since the absence of peace may result in more casualties.

6.2.3. Captions of the Intifada photographs

Hodgson argued that captions should go beyond what the photographs show in order to complement the presentation. He indicated that captions "should not stress the obvious but try to extend what the picture they cover is saying by offering explanation
and context* (Hodgson, 1987: 182). It is essential to make the reader understand through the caption the general circumstances which surrounded the photographed incident and to encourage him to seek more information by reading further in the news text.

In the case of the captions to the Intifada photographs in the expatriate newspapers, we find that Al-Arab and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat usually explained and expanded more fully what the photograph showed. They added their own comments and analysis to the photograph, presumably for the purpose of rendering it to the reader in the way the paper saw it. They went further in using photographs for stereotyping and iconizing respectively the Israelis and the Intifada. Captions were most important when photographs did not include evident elements of violence and action. For instance, Israeli troops roaming Arab towns (figure A.27) is a photograph in which the scene does not present much information to the reader. Therefore, a caption was needed to make the photograph more meaningful.

Captions of Intifada pictures in Al-Arab and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat especially concentrated on two contrasting images of the Intifada:

(a) Strength, heroism, and defiance on the part of the Palestinians. This was a common theme in the captions of the photographs of Palestinian acts of resistance. The captions in this case attempted to reinforce these themes. Figure A.3, for instance, a photograph which shows Palestinian demonstrators, is accompanied by a caption that emphasises the meaning of the Palestinian defiance. It proclaims that the Palestinian Arabs will not be defeated by all of the Israeli weapons. In figure A.7 the caption stresses that the Palestinian people will not give up the struggle until they have regained their rights.

(b) Ruthlessness and oppression on the part of the Israelis. This was evident in the selection itself of the photographs of Israeli confrontations with Palestinian
demonstrations, and the captions confirmed and emphasised this theme. Captions of the photographs in figures A.14, A.15, and A.16, which show the Israelis arresting Palestinian men, stress that the Israelis were acting savagely and brutally. The caption of the photograph in figure A.16 combines both themes, accuses Israel of using the same methods as the German Nazis in their treatment of the Palestinians, and declares that the maltreated youths' humiliation is in fact a moral victory.

The captions in Al-Arab and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat attempted to widen the impact of the photographs by linking them to aspects not in the pictures themselves. They eulogized, applauded and saluted the Palestinian 'struggle', and strongly attacked the Israeli 'oppression' of the Palestinians.

Al-Ouds Al-Arabi, Al-Hayat, and Al-Ahram International avoided the rhetorical description of the Palestinians as 'heroes' and the Israelis as 'ruthless' in their caption phrasing. They used captions to highlight and contextualize the photographs in simple, short, descriptive, and, to a large extent, neutral terms. They tended toward a literal description of the actual photograph's content. For example, the caption to the photograph in figure A.1, published by Al-Hayat, did not include any biased or tendentious phrasing. It merely identified and located the scene of stone-throwing by Palestinian youngsters. Al-Ouds Al-Arabi and Al-Ahram International employed a similar approach, as is shown by their captions to the photographs in figures A.10 and A.12 respectively.

6.3. Cartoons

The political cartoon can be a purposive and influential medium. It possesses a language that incites us to think, rather than laugh, though "it usually implies a degree of fantasy or exaggeration, plus an attempt to use a genuinely 'popular idiom'." According to Awad, it combines simplification and exaggeration at the same time.
(Awad, 1992: 96). It appeals to the readership because it is usually humorous and therefore entertaining (Modlin, 1987: 21).

The cartoon may be more effective than the editorial comment itself, since the cartoonist is more than an artist. He is "a news reporter and leader writer rolled into one" (Hornby, 1965: 27), not to mention his ability in encapsulating themes in simple drawings. There are cases (not all cases, as Awad argues) where the cartoon may "say what the editorialist cannot do or cannot afford to do" (Awad, 1992: 190). Persuasion and influencing public opinion are the main aims of the cartoonists. However, this persuasion could be directed at either changing opinion or reinforcing the viewpoints which people already hold.

The cartoon has often been employed by the Arab press as the only way of expressing its view on certain issues that it did not dare to handle directly. During the Intifada, the cartoon was one of the most important means through which thoughts and feelings were freely expressed by the Arab press, particularly so because they were mobilised against Israel since the very start of the conflict. No other means were as effective as cartoons for the Arab press in voicing hidden feelings on many 'taboo' issues. Through the cartoon it was possible to explore themes such as insurrection against dictatorship and to reject traditional Arab political passivism. The Intifada gave the Arab press the opportunity to assert its solidarity with Arab people struggling for freedom against oppression, in a way which they were unable to do when covering internal Arab politics. The Palestinians could, in fact, be portrayed as a microcosm of the Arab people as a whole.

Take, for example, the way in which the expatriate dailies handled the role of the UN and the international community in reacting to the Intifada. Although all the papers, with the exception of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, overtly criticised this role in opinion articles and sometimes in editorial comments, the cartoon described the UN and the
international community as uncaring and, to some extent, conspirators against the Palestinians. This cartoonists' image expressed the frustration and dissatisfaction of the Arab people at the pitiful reaction of their governments to the Intifada.

This negative image of the Arab countries in the cartoon was different from and even contradictory to the image shown in the photographs. The overall image of the Arab states in the photographs printed was positive, since the photographs portrayed the (albeit superficial) stand taken by leaders of Arab countries towards the Intifada. The cartoons depicted a totally opposite image of the Arabs, particularly of certain regimes, when they portrayed the underlying substance of their attitudes. The pictures, therefore, presented a superficial image of the Arab states by showing their ostensible activities, while the cartoons reflected how the papers viewed and interpreted these activities, and gave their assessment of the role of the Arab states in the Intifada. This difference is a strong evidence that the cartoon played a vital role in expressing the real image of the Arab countries in the expatriate newspapers. In other words, the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular presented not only a rich, raw seam of material for cartoons, but also provided principal ingredients for the Arab cartoonists who usually tackled foreign and international issues.

6.3.1. Symbolic features of the Intifada cartoon in the expatriate dailies

Although the appearances are usually distorted, "caricatures nevertheless prompt recognition" (Hagan, 1980: 257). By using a set of symbols representing events and characters, images in the cartoons may easily be deciphered. According to Awad,

"every nation or society maintains a collection of key symbols of others. The cartoonist's job usually is to interpret these symbols into pictorial images which help him in putting the message through, and assist the reader in understanding and, subsequently, re-coding these pictorial images and transferring them into attitudes, views and feelings towards the parties involved" (Awad, 1992: 112).
Consequently, defining the symbolic features used in the Intifada cartoons by the expatriate press is essential since these symbols constitute the tools with which images are identified.

The following are the main symbolic features of the major characters in the Intifada cartoons:

(a) Israel and the Jews. The cartoons personified Israel in caricatures of the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and other senior and well-known ministers such as Yitzhaq Rabin and Shimon Peres. The cartoons also symbolized Israel by images of well-armed Israeli soldiers with the star of David on their helmets. Jews were presented as bearded men wearing religious hats and the distinguishing star of David on their clothes, symbolizing also the Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories. It was not only in depicting the Intifada that these symbols were used. Additionally, the caricatures of Israeli leaders, the star of David, and the heavy-bearded men as symbols of Israel (among the less used symbols in the papers) were used in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole (Awad, 1992: 237).

(b) The Palestinians / the Intifada. They were symbolized by youths, children, and / or women wearing the Palestinian *kufiyah*. Stones were the most important symbols of the Intifada. In a later stage of the Intifada, knives were used to symbolize the wave of stabbing attacks launched by the Palestinians against the Israelis.

(c) The Arabs. A man with a *kufiyah*, or a man whose head is a globe with a moustache usually symbolized the Arabs in the cartoons. Other symbols, such as Arab leaders, oil fields or barrels, people wearing US uniforms (or flags), and (veiled) women, were also used in cartoons.

(d) The USA, Europe, and the UN. The American flag, the letters 'US' on weapons, and the President usually symbolized the USA.
Europe was symbolized either by a man whose head is a globe with a western hat on the top, or a well-known politician such as the former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, or the former Foreign Office Minister, David Mellor. The UN was also symbolized by a man with a globe as his head, or by a man carrying a bag, on many occasions labelled with the letters 'UN'.

6.3.2. The main images in the Intifada cartoons:

Intifada cartoons in the expatriate dailies reveal that the image of each actor was clear and could easily be interpreted and assimilated. The clarity of the image may suggest that the cartoon permits a clear and vivid inference to be made about the papers' policies towards each party.

The examined cartoons reveal that each cartoon item focused on one image of one character. However, images of other parties were also included in the cartoons as a secondary element. For instance, figure A.60 is a cartoon mainly handling the image of the international community in the context of its role in the Intifada, but the cartoon additionally contains indications of the image of the Palestinians as well as of Israel (as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter). Thus, we may find in our examination of a single cartoon item more than one, either explicit or implicit, image.

The following were the major images presented by the cartoons in the expatriate papers:

(i) Israel: Israel was portrayed as 'ruthless', 'vicious', 'brutal', etc. It was shown as a state which violates human rights and international legitimacy. These themes were evident in cartoon reproduced scenes of Israeli soldiers and leaders beating and killing women and children. For example, the cartoon in figure A.46 states that Israel has committed many crimes and has conquered Palestine by oppressive force. The cartoon, by showing Israel raising the emblem of democracy over sculls, mocks the
contradiction between the claims and the reality of Israel. The second example, figure A.48, is of a cartoon which shows, in addition to Israeli 'ruthlessness', another theme, that is to say 'hatred' toward the Palestinians. It widens the scope of the image, to include the Jewish people rather than the Israelis. Another cartoon of Al-Quds Al-Arabi, reproduced in figure A.49, suggests that Israel was waiting for the Gulf War to take place in order to punish the Palestinians under occupation. The image of Israel as a butcher who is prepared to cut up a piece of meat, and the Palestinians as the piece of meat on the butcher's table, reflects the theme of the 'ruthlessness' of the Israelis vs. the 'innocence' of the Palestinians.

In other instances Israel was shown as weak and incompetent in the face of the power of the 'vigorous' Palestinian Intifada. Nevertheless, the image of Israel as the 'criminal' who committed, or intended to commit, a crime remained implicitly in these scenes. The image of the 'weakness' and 'incompetence' of Israel emerges from the inevitability of the failure of its ruthlessness. Figure A.34, for example, is a cartoon showing Israel as unable to defuse the bomb which symbolizes the Intifada (or the dilemma into which Israel has fallen). It draws the former Israeli PM, Yitzhak Shamir, as a pigmy who is sweating with fear and cannot reach the fuse of the bomb. Another sample figure, A.35, shows simply the contrast between Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinian catapult on the one side of the scale outweighing the Israeli heavy weapons on the other side, is an image of the Israeli 'weakness' and inability to overpower the Intifada.

Another example in this context, figure A.37, is the only cartoon that appeared during the period under study in The Guardian. Although it shows the Palestinians as a giant and the Israelis as pigmies, the main theme of the cartoon is the Israeli 'ignorance' of the Palestinians' rights for a long period of time. The giant in the cartoon reflects the Intifada, which by itself is a clear message to the Israelis to recognise the Palestinians' 'forgotten' rights.
The cartoons published by Al-Quds Al-Arabi and Al-Ahram International, reproduced in figures A.41 and A.42 respectively, stress that Israel is failing to quell the Intifada. Moreover, they indicate that the Israeli measures against the uprising backfired on Israel and led to more complications and an escalation of violence. The potential ability of the Intifada was underestimated by Israel, the cartoons stress, and therefore all its tough measures failed and will continue to fail until the Palestinians' rights are recognised.

Cartoons from the Israeli press were also frequently reprinted in Al-Quds Al-Arabi in order to stress the theme of Israeli 'fears' and 'anxieties' about the future of the conflict. The cartoon shown in figure A.45 illustrates this theme and is used to stress that 'fear' is growing among the Israelis because of the non-stop escalation of the Palestinian Intifada. It implies that the Palestinians still possess the potential necessary to carry on their struggle. For the Arab reader, this Israeli cartoon, which appeared in Ma'ariv newspaper, conveyed hope, although in its original setting it had conveyed exactly the opposite, i.e. doubts and worry.

(ii) The Palestinians: The cartoons did not distinguish between the Palestinians and the Intifada as a form of struggle, and concentrated on the Intifada's achievements as well as the suffering of the Palestinian people. The image of the Palestinians, contrasting with the image of Israel, was as follows:

(a) Defiant, resistant, heroic, and powerful. Cartoons depicted Palestinian women and children throwing stones at the Israeli soldiers, and sometimes facing tanks and advanced weapons. This image was usually accompanied by the image of Israeli weakness and failure. The cartoons in figures A.35, A.36, A.40, and A.43 illustrate this theme. Figure A.35, for instance, is a cartoon depicting a Palestinian youth challenging the Israeli policy of the 'iron fist'. Similarly, figure A.43 is a cartoon
depicting a Palestinian child throwing stones at an Israeli tank, although another child is lying dead beside him as a result of the confrontation.

(b) Victims, innocent, abused, oppressed, and deprived of their basic rights. This image was presented through scenes of Palestinian women and children beaten or killed by Israeli soldiers. It was in many cases implied in cartoons dealing with the attitude of the UN and the Western countries towards the Intifada. The cartoons in figures A.57, A.59, A.60, and A.62 show how brutally the Palestinians are being intimidated and abused. Scenes of unarmed, helpless Palestinian women and children in the cartoon in figure A.57, for example, create an image of innocence. By contrast, depictions of beatings and killings of these Palestinians carried out by Israeli soldiers create an image of oppression.

(iii) The Arab states: The general image of the Arab states in the cartoons in the expatriate Arab press was negative. It shows them as fearful, uncaring, and collusive (deliberately reacting weakly to the Israeli brutality). Scenes of Arab states aware of the Israeli oppression on Palestinians without offering their help were typical. The cartoon examples shown in figures A.50 - A.56 stress this image. The cartoon in figure A.55 suggests that the Arab countries are ignoring the Intifada since they are depicted as the "three wise monkeys: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil". That is probably because they were fearful of getting into trouble with Israel, yet at the same time embarrassed before the Arab peoples because they were unable to help. In a cartoon published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi, reproduced in figure A.53, the Arab states are explicitly accused of collusion since they are shown wearing ties in US flag colours, and seeking protection from the fallout of the Intifada behind Israel. They are embarrassed because they want peace with Israel (their hands are held toward 'Israel' in a tentative, pleading manner) while the Palestinians continue their struggle. The Arabs and the Israeli soldier in the cartoon form the number 1989, indicating an assessment of the Arabs' role at the end of that year.
**Al-Ahram International** depicted the Arab countries critically. Figure A.54 is a cartoon depicting two Palestinian youths who are aware that the Arab leaders are talking vigorously (but emptily) about their cause, but in terms which are meaningless to them.

**Al-Arab** newspaper focused more than others on the negative image of the Arab regimes. It used an ironic and sardonic style in depicting Arab leaders and their role in the Intifada. The three cartoons in figures A.50 - A.52 not only criticise the Arab states for their attitude in the Intifada, but also mock them for their negative and naive behaviour. The cartoon in figure A.50 shows the Arab countries sending their provisions to the Intifada in the wrong direction. The barrels of oil in the truck, shown as a kind of 'support for the Intifada', is a hint by the newspaper of the role played by the Arab Gulf states. As a matter of fact, this hint makes the cartoon exclusively directed toward the Arab states in the Gulf, rather than toward all the Arab countries. Another cartoon, in figure A.51, shows an Arab official telling a journalist that he intends to sustain the Intifada by recognising Israel. The cartoon reveals that this action by an Arab country is ridiculous since the Intifada would be harmed rather than benefitted from any recognition of Israel at that time. In the third cartoon in this context in figure A.52, the Palestinians realise the negative role of the Arab states, which evidently have no intention of dealing with the problem. The Palestinian child decides to fight alone against Israel and seeks protection from God from the deeds of the Arab states' leaders.

A positive image of the Arab countries in the Intifada cartoons can hardly be found. This attitude is consistent with the papers' criticism of the general role of the Arab states in the context of the Intifada, as has been indicated earlier in the analysis of the text. Of course, political cartoons seldom approve; they are there to criticise and are expected to do so.
(iv) The United Nations: The image of the UN was also negative in the expatriate newspapers' Intifada cartoons. They were shown as ignorant of the Palestinians' rights and sufferings, keeping a blind eye with regard to the Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. They were also portrayed as weak, disabled, and failing. This image emerged in cartoonists' reactions to the inability of the UN to relieve the Palestinians and to take action against the Israeli practices. In many instances, the UN were shown standing and watching the Israelis beating or killing Palestinians without taking any restraining action. The cartoon in figure A.57, taken from Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, is a typical example of the image of the UN in the expatriate dailies. According to this cartoon, the UN are well aware of the Palestinians' sufferings, even though they do not take any serious action to relieve them. The cartoon stresses how weak and insufficient the reaction of the UN to the Israeli oppression was, since they comply with the Israelis' 'do not disturb' sign. A similar cartoon appeared in Al-Hayat newspaper, reproduced in figure A.59, showing the UN to be impotent. Another example from Al-Arab daily, reproduced in figure A.60, sharply criticises the international community for failing to protect the Palestinian children from being killed. The banner of the 'Human Rights Declaration', strung on the Israeli knives planted in the backs of the Palestinian children, indicates that Israel is ignoring international conventions by violating human rights. The evident reason for this Israeli attitude is the expected weakness of the international community (represented by the UN) in the face of the Israeli violations of human rights.

On some occasions, the cartoons in the expatriate papers showed a positive image of the UN, as, for example, in figures A.61 and A.66. In the first example it is the USA that manipulates the UN and prevents it from issuing a strong condemnation of the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. The second one, which was published during the Gulf crisis, shows that the UN have regained their power not only towards Iraq, but also, unexpectedly, towards Israel. However, this cartoon implies the past
negative role of the UN regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is expressed in the depiction of Israel falling from its comfortable former reliance on the international organisation while perpetrating its outrages. Both cartoons appeared in *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* newspaper, which supported the Allies in the Gulf War and therefore defended the role of the UN.

(v) The United States: The image of the USA was also negative since it was shown as the sustainer and sponsor of Israel. It was also shown as being uncaring about the Palestinians' rights. This image makes transparent the tacit US agreement to the Israeli practices against the Palestinians. The example mentioned previously, figure A.61 which shows the US President Reagan's face on the good pen, illustrates the negative role of the USA towards the Intifada. In this instance, the USA is doing a favour to Israel by preventing a strong UN resolution condemning Israel for its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

(vi) The West: The image of Europe in particular and the West in general was negative, similar to that of the USA. The West was shown to be uncaring and offering no help in respect of the Palestinian tragedy. The role of Britain, represented by the visit of David Mellor to the Gaza Strip, was however shown positively. This was clear in *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*. Figure A.62 is an example of a cartoon which shows that the West is two-faced regarding the Palestinians' sufferings under the Israeli occupation and the Jewish rights in the former Soviet Union. The Palestinians, according to the cartoon, are being abused and killed, and are appealing for help, while the Jewish community in the former Soviet Union is merely being questioned by Soviet intelligence. The West has acted angrily against the oppression of the Jews, while evidently it deliberately ignored the Palestinian tragedy.

A positive image of the West was reflected on some occasions by *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* newspaper. The cartoon in figure A.63 shows how the paper viewed and
appreciated the visit of David Mellor to Gaza. It portrayed Mellor as the person who exposed the real character of Israel (a deceiver who pretends to be peaceful while hiding viciousness) in its discourse to the West. Although the West is portrayed here as realising and becoming aware of the real character of Israel, the representation nevertheless implies a negative image, that is to say for the West's having been deceived for such a long period by Israel.

6.4. Summary

Photographs and cartoons are extremely significant in newspapers since they are more expressive than words. The Intifada provided the press, and in our case the expatriate press, with a wide range of daily photographs. Most of the photographs concentrated on the violence and highlighted the Israeli oppression and the Palestinian plight. Moreover, they focused on the Palestinian defiance and projected the 'heroic' Palestinian activities. The papers also published, but few in number, photographs of Israeli casualties, and also scenes of Arab and international solidarity with the Intifada. The fewness of such photographs was because news of the Intifada's violent incidents was dominant, particularly in the scenes of the Palestinian side.

The differences between the papers' treatment of the photographs was reflected in the captions they applied to them. Al-Arab and Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat appended a detailed, rhetorical, and interpretative captions, while the rest of the papers avoided that style by giving concise, explanatory, and literal captions.

As far as the cartoons were concerned, the papers depicted the following images:

(a) They depicted Israel as a 'vicious' and 'ruthless' country which kills innocent women and children and violates basic human rights. Israel was also shown as weak and unable to quell the Intifada. The image of Israel as portrayed in the Israeli press and reprinted by Al-Quds Al-Arabi was centred on themes of fear and anxiety of the escalation of the violence.
(b) The Palestinians were shown as defiant and heroic, and at the same time as victims and oppressed people. That is to say, the papers projected the resistance of the Palestinians as heroic, and their sufferings as a tragedy because of the Israeli oppression.

(c) The Arab states were always portrayed negatively by showing them as uncaring and ignorant. The papers stressed the image of the Arab states as giving little attention to the Palestinian suffering and sometimes as conspiring against the Palestinians.

(d) The UN was also portrayed negatively for it being unable to relieve the suffering off the Palestinians. During the Gulf crisis, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat portrayed a positive image of the UN when it depicted it as abandoning Israel.

(e) The USA was also shown negatively in the papers' cartoons. It was depicted as a close ally of Israel and uncaring about the Palestinians' plight.

(f) The general image of the West was also negative in the papers, as it was accused of being muted and unable to do anything to help the Palestinians. The only positive image of the West was that of Britain, particularly the visit of David Mellor, who was portrayed as a brave person who dared to expose the 'bad' real face of Israel to the world.
Chapter Seven

CONCLUSION
The expatriate Arab press operating in Britain has a special, almost unique, place amongst the press-systems of the world. It is neither one of the émigré presses, in the sense of being established by and for Arabs living in Britain, nor is it one of the opposition presses in the sense of being established and run by opponents of the regime in power who were forced to leave their own countries and seek to continue their opposition from abroad (El-Rayyes, 1991:90). The owners of these expatriate Arab newspapers typically live in their own countries and maintain contacts and good relations with their governments. Though the newspapers rely almost wholly on Arab journalists and writers who live in Britain, their main interest is covering the news and issues of the Arab world and serving the readership within the Arab world, and they give little, if any, attention to the affairs of the migrant Arab community in Britain. Above all, they are available across the Arab world - at least typically so, at most times and in most countries despite the fact that they operate within substantially more liberal journalistic parameters than what would usually be permitted to newspapers within the countries themselves.

This highly unusual development has led to much discussion as to whether they are to be regarded as a special part of the Arab 'home' press or something generically different. In terms of ownership, readership, and quasi-official acceptance, they are part of it. On the other hand, they are also very different from it. By virtue of being published in Britain, their editors and journalists being physically away from the Arab environment, the papers have very different operating conditions from those of their rivals published inside Arab countries. Although it is recognised that the papers are influenced in various ways by the 'home' Arab regimes, they still operate away from direct censorship and their staff is personally much less under their control than those at 'home'. Being distributed in a number of different countries also makes it more difficult to exercise the level of editorial control which can be
exercised over a domestic newspaper. The expatriate Arab press therefore enjoys a degree of freedom which no Arab 'home' newspaper has ever enjoyed.

Although they employ qualified Arab journalists, as do the home newspapers, these are journalists who have been living in the West and have been inspired by the ethos and values in general of a Press grown up in a pluralist and democratic framework, and especially of the 'quality press' branch to which, in terms of its readership and style of presentation the expatriate Arab press belongs and which it seeks to emulate. Furthermore, the editorial staff of each of the newspapers, irrespective of the particular Arab country to which its owners might belong, typically come from different parts of the Arab world. This mixture of backgrounds, particular knowledge and perspectives must at least hypothetically enrich the editorial quality of expatriate papers over their 'home' competitors, and this is re-reinforced by having a readership across most of the Arab countries and indeed world-wide, rather than primarily of a single Arab country. These papers are therefore seen as being 'pan-Arab' in function and orientation, articulating the broader 'Arab' issues and perspectives, and as serving the readership of the 'Arab nation' over and above the individual nation states within it. In a real and practical sense, this is a function which can only be fulfilled by a press physically located outside. The importance of this expatriate but centrally Arab press has been considerable and has also been growing increasingly during the last decade with the growth of issues which required more co-operation and collective responses on the part of Arab countries, and of which the Intifada itself was one.

There are inevitably many delicate and complex balances and compromises involved in the operation of such a press. In none more so than in the relationship between each of these 'expatriate' papers with their pan-Arab readership and the particular Arab country which ultimately owns - whether through an individual citizen of it or otherwise - the newspaper. Indeed, the Western concept itself of the
functions of the press and of the 'quality press' in particular, which these newspapers aim to realise in their particular circumstances, is a complex one. It is resolved in the operational distinction drawn between the different ways newspapers are expected to fulfil respectively their twin functions: of being 'news' and 'views' papers. In its news-coverage a 'quality' newspaper should present information as accurately and in an as balanced and unbiased way as possible. It should however also have a policy. It should cogently and effectively present arguments and interpretations of the information from a particular viewpoint. In the free market of ideas of the pluralist ideal, other newspapers would do the same from other viewpoints. The ideal of a pluralist press is therefore that the reader should thus be both in possession of 'all the facts' and be fully aware of the range of different perspectives through which their significance and implications may be seen, and therefore 'the nation' would come to be enabled to conduct informed debates and arrive at a rational consensus. It is therefore perfectly legitimate within that concept for, say, The Guardian to be the voice of the centre-left perspectives and for The Daily Telegraph to be that of centre-right. What is not legitimate for either of them is to 'cook the news' itself and fail to present their respective readers with the facts, whether they are convenient or inconvenient from their respective perspectives. From this ideal standpoint, it is therefore legitimate for each of these expatriate newspapers to articulate the particular perspective on events which represents that of the country of its ownership, and thus to facilitate the rational debate within the 'Arab nation'. One important other element of this concept is at least a measure of openness, that is that it should generally be known to the readers which perspectives each of the news-papers represent.

Within the additional complexities of serving this function for the 'Arab nation', with individual nations and their governments rather than political parties within a single entity being those alternative perspectives, the expatriate Arab press has emerged from this study as being quite successful in balancing the complexities
involved. It is generally known which newspaper is affiliated to which national area. In fact, this is commonly talked about by the readers. Much speculation is generated by these connections between particular regimes and particular papers, and the editors and staff of the papers themselves do not hide or deny them. But they all also strongly deny any control over their news-coverage, undue editorial interference or direction, or being in general in the possession of a particular Arab regime.

It would be quite impossible in present circumstances to establish what degree of truth there may be in the common speculations outside the newspapers or in what they themselves say. The records which might prove or disprove those claims are simply not available and may not be available for many years yet, if ever. Therefore, instead of seeking to speculate further in this study about the exact nature of their relationship to their owners, the research concentrated instead on evaluating their coverage of one of the most important and a centrally 'Arab' issues of the last decade: the Intifada. What is public knowledge and not denied in any case by the newspapers, namely the broad affiliation of each, was stated and borne in mind in evaluating their coverage. This allowed us at times to make inferences which suggested, not proved, the common assumption that in addition to broadly representing the perspectives of their owners' countries' governments on the events and issues arising, the expatriate newspapers might at times also have been affected in their coverage by the considerations deriving in some way from their relationship to the regimes of the countries of their owners. In general, however, the research has not found evidence of undue interference in with the function of providing an adequate and reliable coverage, only a fair consistency in their respective interpretations of the implications of the events from the viewpoints represented by the policies of their countries of ownership and their governments.
The Palestinian question as a whole is a major challenge for the Arabs and is central to the conflict in the Middle East, and the Intifada is increasingly now recognised as one of the most crucial stages in that conflict. Furthermore, the uprising was to a large extent sustained and its effects enhanced by the media. They played a vital role in bringing the events into and keeping them in the focus of world attention, and through the sympathy and concern created and in turn reflected back by the media, the Palestinians were encouraged to continue and escalate the uprising. It gave them a sense that, thanks to the media, they were winning this contest against Israel, on their own and on behalf of the Arabs as a whole, at least in the sense of making Israel accept the need to seriously get down to peace negotiations not only with the PLO but the Arab states in general. The Intifada also forcibly showed up the divisions and weaknesses amongst the Arab states from time to time. Finally, the Intifada also contributed to the rise in the power of fundamentalist Muslim organisations within the Arab world.

The way in which the Intifada, with all its associated issues and challenges for the Arabs as a whole, was handled by the expatriate press therefore provided a very good test case.

The principal conclusions of this study bore out some general assumptions which could readily be made, such as that the newspapers would have shown a commitment to supporting the Intifada should it prove to be effective against Israel, and further brought out some other features which could be less readily anticipated. Their regular coverage of its events could be related to the size of the protests themselves, but the large amount of coverage in space and number of items suggests that the papers were determined to exert extra effort to support the uprising by allocating that extent of coverage. This becomes clearer when looking at the control newspaper in this study, The Guardian, which, although providing regular coverage of the uprising, paid significantly less attention to it than did the
expatriate papers. These papers almost typically allocated a large amount of space to the Intifada (at least an average of 2.5% of a page per day, apart from January 1991). This was also the case for the space allocated to coverage on the front page, where the top news stories, as viewed by the papers, are located. Again, the number of items, another indication of the extent of coverage, showed exactly the same results. Moreover, the proportion of the number of Intifada items to general Palestinian, and then to general Arab, affairs showed that the papers regarded the Intifada as the prime Palestinian news event and a significant Arab issue.

As far as the item type was concerned, the papers relied heavily on news stories, primarily from news agencies, for most of their Intifada news. This indicates the awareness of the papers of the desirability of reporting current Intifada news. Moreover, other types, especially editorial comments, opinion articles, and investigative reports, which provide analysis and in-depth coverage, appeared regularly, but to a lesser extent than the type of news stories. Furthermore, the papers' extensive reliance on news agencies suggests that they did not take the opportunity of being published in Britain to maintain a reliable and strong link with journalists in the Occupied Territories. This could be attributed to the effect of the state of war between the Arab countries and Israel on the papers' coverage. Although the papers proclaimed that they maintained correspondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, our analysis shows that this source was to a large extent inactive, as the relative number of items provided by such correspondents was very limited.

The lack of material from correspondents could be the reason why the largest proportion of the news items were on two subjects: violence and politics. Our examination of the subjects of news items reveals that there was little coverage of other Intifada aspects such as human rights abuses and social, educational, and economic matters. This could be ascribed, in addition, to the almost complete
reliance on news agencies and to the fact that political violence and its political consequences greatly appeal to the press. Other topics received less attention, especially because the violence continued and its coverage predominated throughout the examined period. The exception in this was Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which paid much attention to the abuses of human rights, probably owing to its Palestinian ownership and editor.

By qualitatively examining the papers' assessment of the Intifada, we found that they appear to have devoted themselves to supporting it and defending its continuation and achievements. It was apparent that their treatment of the Intifada-relevant issues depended mainly on this fact, irrespective of the way each paper treated those issues. With the exception of Al-Arab, they all regarded the uprising as a step toward a comprehensive political settlement to put an end to the Israeli occupation. Although Al-Arab in a number of articles regarded the Intifada as a step toward liberating the whole land of Palestine by war, it later argued that the Intifada should exert more pressure on Israel in order to achieve a just peace. We therefore found that, with the exception of Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi, the papers opposed and rejected calls to arm the Intifada. They argued that the use of arms would put the Intifada in jeopardy and would give Israel the excuse to crush the Palestinian resistance. On the other hand, while Al-Arab called for and advocated the use of arms, Al-Quds Al-Arabi warned that the deadlock in the political process would end with the Intifada's turning into an armed insurrection. This indicates the influence of the ownership on the papers' coverage. Al-Arab reflected the traditional Libyan radical position, which called for an intensification of the struggle by all means in order to liberate Palestine. Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which emphasised that there should be a political compromise to end the conflict and that pressure should be exerted to break the deadlock in the peace process, represented the position of the PLO, which repeatedly warned against turning the uprising into an armed revolt. Al-Ahram International, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, and Al-Hayat
voiced the positions of most of the Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were calling for an international peace conference to put an end to the conflict.

As far as the Intifada's leadership was concerned, the papers typically registered total support for the PLO and its affiliate in the Occupied Territories: the UNL. This was mainly because the PLO had been acting for more than two decades as a representative of the Palestinian people, and also because of its moderate line in comparison with the radical Palestinian factions. Therefore, it was the legitimacy of the PLO in the Arab world and in the international political arena which led the papers to focus on its affiliate, the UNL, in their coverage of the Intifada. Al-Quds Al-Arabi, however, reprinted articles from the Israeli press showing a great concern over the decline of the popularity of the PLO, and expressed fear that the situation might fall into the hands of the Islamic movement, Hamas.

Unlike the rest of the papers, Al-Arab attacked the PLO for its weak response to the Intifada and for its peaceful approach. Nevertheless, the reason was not because the paper backed other Palestinian rejectionist parties since it did not show any support, for instance, for the Palestinian Islamic opposition, namely Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movements. This further indicates the influence of the ownership on the paper, particularly in the case of Al-Arab, which echoed the position of Libya in criticising the PLO and rejecting its political moves.

In their treatment of Israel, the papers did not show any sign of moderation. They attacked Israel for its excessive use of force to quell the Intifada and argued that this was a sign of weakness and inability to confront the Intifada. They accused Israel of using 'Nazi' methods, and some of them (i.e. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Arab, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi) published articles which referred to the nature of the Jewish mentality as a reason for this policy. This attitude expressed by the papers
was not in keeping with the political environment where they are published; that is to say that while operating in the UK the papers did not adopt or develop a moderate attitude towards Israel, which is regarded as the classical enemy of the Arabs.

Contrary to our expectations, although all of the Arab governments pronounced their support and backing for the Intifada, the expatriate papers criticised the general Arab reaction to it and accused the Arab countries of abandoning it. This position could be ascribed partly to the freedom the papers enjoy by being British-based. However, the reaction of Egypt was a matter of controversy among the expatriate papers. While Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Ahram International expressed their satisfaction with the reaction of Egypt, Al-Arab called on Egypt to sever its diplomatic ties with Israel. This reflected the position of the home countries of the papers' owners regarding the peace process led by Egypt. This becomes even clearer when considering the papers' satisfaction with the limited of certain Arab countries' reaction, among which were their owners' respective home countries (i.e. Al-Arab mainly praised Libya's reaction; Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat praised Saudi Arabia; and Al-Ahram International praised Egypt), thus indicating the impact of ownership on coverage.

Also contrary to expectations, the papers criticised the general response of the West to the Intifada. In particular, as far as the US position was concerned, the papers noticed some, but not sufficient, change in the US policy in the Middle East as a result of the Intifada. The papers criticised the USA for its total bias towards Israel, and argued that Washington was reluctant to act against Israel and did so only to avoid embarrassment. The overall Western reaction, though included for the first time bitter criticism of Israel, was described by the papers as biased toward Israel. We expected this position by the West to be met by the papers with approval and satisfaction since, for the first time, it placed pressure on Israel to start
negotiating with the Palestinians and the Arabs for a lasting peace in the Middle East. However, the papers showed great enthusiasm for the British response to the Intifada, which was voiced in a vigorous manner by the Home Office Minister, David Mellor, during his visit to Gaza. Mellor's criticism of Israel, which was shocking to the Israelis and surprising to the British, was met with pleasure by the Arab papers. The papers benefited from being in Britain in that they were able to cover this event and follow it up extensively, especially because Mellor's remarks were in favour of the Arabs.

The UN resolutions, which criticised and deplored the Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories, were regarded by the papers as unsatisfactory and lacking in practicality. In spite of the fact that the USA did not veto a number of UN resolutions in the way it had done before the Intifada, the papers called for practical measures to be adopted by the UN to force Israel to comply with those resolutions. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* was the only newspaper to consider the UN resolutions as a breakthrough and a victory for the Palestinians. This general attitude of the papers indicated their broad support for the Intifada, which was not, according to them, dealt with satisfactorily by the UN. The papers seemed to realise that mere condemnations of Israeli measures would not be able to put an end to the conflict or bring about a peaceful settlement. *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat*, however, which regarded the UN resolutions as a qualitative change in the position of the international community, realised that those resolutions were the only measures the UN could take against Israel, since any further steps would be blocked by the USA's veto.

Although the expatriate papers advocated peace as the prime objective of the Intifada, they put the responsibility on Israel's shoulders for the deadlock in the peace process, as it rejected (a) an international peace conference, and (b) the representation by the PLO of the Palestinian people. *Al-Arab* voiced rejection of
the proposed international peace conference and urged the Arabs not to pursue a political settlement as long as Israel was not defeated. *Al-Arab* believed that the overall objective of the Arabs was to liberate the whole land of Palestine, but they could go for political negotiations with Israel at a certain stage when they could have the upper hand. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* reprinted articles from the Israeli press calling on the Israeli government to soften its position regarding the peace process. Moreover, the paper backed the PLO's political moves for a peaceful settlement with Israel, on the ground that the PLO represented the majority of the Palestinian people.

This stance by the expatriate papers was in line with the general policy of the Arab countries which called for negotiations with Israel through an international peace conference. The exception was always *Al-Arab*, which evidently voiced the Libyan position of rejecting the reconciliatory approach for a settlement in the Middle East.

Our examination of the image of the Intifada-related characters as depicted by photographs and cartoons in the expatriate papers revealed that the papers concentrated on the positive image of the Palestinians by showing them as heroes and victims, while depicting Israel negatively as vicious and oppressive. This image was apparent in the photographs, especially emphasised by the captions, as well as in the political cartoons, which usually appeared on the editorial page. The cartoons focused on the negative Arab reaction to the Intifada, the negative Western reaction (with the exception of the UK), and the negative reaction of the UN. This general trend of the visual material published by the expatriate papers was totally consistent with the textual coverage of the Intifada and enhanced the themes discussed above.
In summary, it has been evident that the editorial attitudes of the expatriate papers were influenced by three main factors in their coverage of the Palestinian uprising. These were:

(a) The Intifada's being perceived as a major Arab affair that was spontaneous and popular. This should be seen in the context of the historic, cultural, religious, and socio-political ties between the Palestinians and the Arab world.

(b) The owners of the papers, who belonged to different Arab countries and maintained strong contacts with Arab regimes and thus represented their different political attitudes.

(c) The newspapers' being published in Britain, where the environment is totally different from that in the Arab world, particularly in the freedom of the press, which the Arab world lacks, and a corresponding influence of Western values concerning the place of newspapers in democratic and pluralist frameworks.

The papers showed to a large extent a similar pattern in their support for the Palestinians and enmity toward Israel. They were typically critical of the Arab countries, the West, and the UN for their 'insufficient' response to the Intifada. The papers, with the exception of the pro-Libyan Al-Arab, which took a hard line in regard to a political compromise with Israel, backed the peace process and regarded a peaceful solution as the desired outcome of the Intifada. Hence, our study has shown that the Intifada represented, and continued to be, a major concern to the expatriate dailies. The papers thus also played an important role in sustaining the Intifada itself, keeping it in the forefront of Arab readers and indirectly of their governments as well as encouraging the Palestinians. The papers were in line, in the way they viewed the Intifada and its associate issues, with the policies of their owner's home countries' governments.
7.1. A comparison between the Arab home press and the expatriate press with particular regard to the Intifada

The mass media in the Arab world have been categorized by a number of writers as an instrument and mouthpiece of the Arab regimes. Ayalon (1992: 272, 273) examined the history of the Arab press and emphasized that the Arab presses have been directed and provided with guidelines by governments which have "defined priorities for them." He added that "the new rulers, aware of the limitation of written organs in a largely illiterate society, invested heavily in developing the electronic media as powerful means of control and 'education', thereby further undermining the position of the press." In his book, The Arab Press, Rugh (1987: 25) described the characteristics of the Arab home press and pointed out that in most of the Arab states "the media operate under variations of the authoritarian theory" or model of the press. Some Arab presses operate under more authoritarian controls and some others less, but they are all within a broadly authoritarian framework. The Arab home press has been seen for a long time as "a medium for national struggle in a cause and through tactics set by the political and military leaders. It is an instrument with a mission: to educate society, spread the message of its leaders, and confront its enemies" (Ayalon, 1992: 275).

Being organs within an authoritarian framework, the chief purpose of newspapers is to "support and advance the policies of the government in power, and to service the state." They may be owned either privately or publicly, but they exist with the authorities' permission. They are controlled by the state's "patents, guilds, licensing and sometimes censorship" authority (Siebert, 1963: 7). In the authoritarian framework, the press is subject to advanced "censorship and punishment for deviation from rules laid down by political authorities."

So far as the expatriate Arab press is concerned, it has distanced itself to a fair degree from the Arab home-base, where it would have been an integral part of the political

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1 The four principal theories of the press are: (a) the authoritarian theory, (b) the social responsibility theory, (c) the libertarian theory, and (d) the Marxist theory.
system, and thus directly serving the regime's policies and objectives. Nonetheless, the expatriate press has kept the necessary contact lines with the Arab regimes and the Arab societies, simply because it is attached to the Arab world through ownership, concerns, and circulation. Because of this kind of relationship with the Arab world, but in the light of the extra freedom it enjoys in comparison with the Arab home press, the expatriate press could be described as a semi-authoritarian press.

In operating outside the Arab world, especially in a country like the United Kingdom, the expatriate newspapers have enjoyed a number of advantages the Arab home presses lacked. Control is less direct and less immediate. The conventions of the press world within which they operate in the locality of their publication are more liberal and at least some of their readership living in Britain or in general in the West have different expectations. However, they have large circulations in the Arab world, and their ownership and direction remain in Arab hands. As a result, the expatriate dailies have ended up sharing a number of similarities with the Arab home papers. Both kinds of press adhere to the Arab mind-frame and share the general way which Arab readers conceive facts and arguments. For instance, they both build their arguments on the assumption that priority in all matters should be given to the overall Arab nationalist interests, unity, and steadfastness in the face of external challenges, chiefly from the USA and Israel. Moreover, both presses avoid involvement in, or they only cautiously tackle, internal political and security matters in Arab countries, especially of those in which their owners live or in which an expatriate newspaper has a large circulation.

This has been evident in the case of coverage of the Intifada. Both types of press paid great attention to it as an important turning-point in the Palestinian struggle against the common enemy of the Arabs: Israel. The expatriate dailies registered clear and continuous support for the Intifada. They viewed it as a prototype for the struggle of people all over the world against the powers of oppression. This attitude of the expatriate papers was in line with the traditional attitude of the Arab home press,
which also showed overwhelming support for the Palestinians and total enmity for Israel. The coverage of the Intifada in both the expatriate papers and the Arab home press was, in general, similar (as was the case with other fundamental issues). Both presses showed clear commitment towards the Palestinian people and their struggle against Israel. This enmity towards Israel was also clear in criticisms of the latter's occupation of the occupied lands and its oppressive policy against the Palestinian people.

However, there are a number of differences between the two presses which have resulted in somewhat divergent and wider views regarding the consequences of the Intifada, such as the peace process. Thus, the expatriate presses have enjoyed the freedom to discuss the peace process explicitly irrespective of the policies and declared positions of individual states. This is in contrast to the Arab home presses, whose views were a re-iteration of the official position of their respective home countries. These differences did not affect the essential coverage stance of the presses, in support of the Intifada. The expatriate presses continued with the same policy as the Arab home presses in viewing the different confrontations facing the Arabs. Their commitment to the fundamental issue of the "Arabs" was clear and paramount. The expatriate presses' views echoed those of their Arab readers who, essentially, would not negotiate their position in the struggle.

The differences between the Arab home and the expatriate presses resulted from the latter's publication outside the Arab world. The expatriate newspapers are located outside the reach of Arab censorship, and nobody can physically force them to comply with the various regulations for the pre-censorship of news which is applied and monitored by the ministries of information in the Arab states. However, in reality, all papers which intend to (and all of them indeed do) distribute in the Arab states must take those regulations into consideration. They have to abide broadly by the restrictions and the 'red-lines' drawn by the states for the local as well as the
expatriate, and even the foreign press (Rugh, 1987: 27, 28). As Tayash, the deputy chief editor of *Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat* (interview, 1995), pointed out, instead of having one censor, as any Arab home publication does, an expatriate newspaper has twenty-two (the number of the Arab states) censors to try and satisfy. Expatriate newspapers have to avoid what could be regarded as an offence by any Arab country, as failure to do so may lead to being banned from circulating in that country. *Al-Hayat*, for instance, as mentioned in Chapter Three, was prohibited from circulation in Saudi Arabia for few weeks in 1992. This has inevitably required the expatriate papers to operate self-censorship to a high degree by closely monitoring the home publications of the principal countries in order to establish what has drawn no objections from the censorship of the various Arab regimes. Consequently, some core and fundamental political and, on occasions, social topics and events which may have been referred to in some newspapers are avoided by them. For example, violent demonstrations in support of the Intifada in its early stages, mainly in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, as we have seen in Chapter Five.

The editor-in-chief of *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, Atwan (interview, 1995), admitted that in normal circumstances the rule is for the paper to comply with the home regulations. However, he commented, a problem occurs when an expatriate paper covers incidents in another Arab country which have been censored in the local papers by the government, or if the expatriate paper publishes an article criticizing that government or blaming it for the way it has handled an issue. The expatriate paper, Atwan added, sometimes takes a decision and sacrifices its market in that specific country for the sake of publishing the "truth", or expressing its views freely. Therefore, being expatriate makes a considerable difference, since if any Arab home paper were to behave in a similar fashion it would be closed by the authorities at least for a period of time. The geographical location of the expatriate papers outside the Arab world, in Western democratic societies, thus ensures the survival of these papers. They may, however, be subjected to some sort of punishment by some Arab regimes on
occasions. For instance, Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi are banned from distribution in some Arab Gulf states. The political and security uncertainties which the journalists and editors face are also worrying. For example, the correspondent of Al-Hayat in Jordan has recently been detained and accused, awaiting trial, of making lies and fabricating news in his reports to his paper. Nevertheless, there is a degree of freedom available to the expatriate papers which sets them apart, at least to some extent, from the home papers.

It has been clear from our analysis of the expatriate papers' coverage of the reactions of the Arab countries that none of the papers attacked any particular Arab country in the context of the Intifada. Their criticism was usually indirect and against specific policies, particularly the Egyptian stance and its rejection of demands to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. However, some papers attacked certain Arab countries during the Gulf crisis, and mostly in the context of the crisis itself, and not the Intifada. In particular, Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi took an anti-Allies line in the conflict and, therefore, were banned from circulation in the Arab Gulf states. Yet, they continued functioning and distributing in a number of Arab countries in addition to Europe and the United States.

By being based outside the Arab world, the expatiate papers can and do place information and reflect public opinion according to the priorities of their consciences when dealing with events and news. This is in contrast to the Arab home press, whose journalist place the government's opinion first and public opinion next, as in general he "is an amplifier of his master's voice, or else utters sounds acceptable to his master's ears" (Ayalon, 1992: 276). This also becomes apparent when considering the coverage by both kinds of press of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab home press has been traditionally known to be totally in-line with the government's policy, which has been aggressive toward Israel (Rugh, 1987: 7, 8), and hence, for example, to avoid reports of and discussions about the peace process beyond the government's policy. The
expatriate daily press, on the other hand, has been a platform for all views in this respect, though taking into account the policies of the Arab regimes. Although the margin of expression varies from one to another, the expatriate papers publish articles and views of a wide spectrum of Arab thoughts, from moderate to conservative, and even to extremist and leftist. The expatriate papers make efforts to reflect the pulse of public opinion across the Arab world at home and abroad. This does not mean that the Arab home press altogether ignores public opinion, or that the expatriate press turns a blind eye to the Arab governments' views; it is rather a matter of degree. The absence of a directly controlling government body over the Arab dailies in the UK allows them to pay more attention to public opinion.

The newspapers in the Arab world are considered as national newspapers which primarily distribute within the home country. There are a number of Arab home newspapers that are sold in several Arab capitals, and even sometimes in Europe. However, they have always been regarded as Arab national newspapers first, in the sense that their target audience is their home country and that they reflect specifically the domestic political, social, and cultural atmosphere. The characteristic of being an 'international' publication was always linked with being printed and having an office in Europe. Mere distribution in Europe has not conferred on any Arab home newspaper the 'international' character. The international editions of the national newspapers, e.g. Al-Ahram International, have not put them on the same rank with the expatriate newspapers, which are regarded as 'truly' international, not just an extension of Arab home dailies. This difference is also reflected in their structure and layout. The Arab home press is dominated by home affairs, regarded as the priority. Other Arab news comes next, followed by international affairs. By contrast, the expatriate press is primarily concerned with covering Arab and international events with implications for the Arabs in general. Therefore, more coverage was given to the Intifada, as a broadly Arab and also an international issue.
Furthermore, the way the Arab home press views Arab and international events and matters is usually manipulated and influenced by the local circumstances and the government's current policies and perceptions, and thus has its agenda-setting done in accordance with the local daily politics. The expatriate presses, on the other hand, by operating outside the Arab world and thus possessing the character of being international, have a different and wider perspective on Arab and other international issues, given that no specific Arab climate is surrounding them. This is evident in what is written by the contributors of the opinion articles and political analysis, who represent a wide range of opinions and include many prominent Arab writers and journalists in the Arab world and abroad. Some expatriate papers, particularly Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, publish exclusive articles by British, American, and Russian writers on various topics, including Arab and Palestinian affairs (Tayash and Nweihedh, interviews, 1995). This has enabled the expatriate press to view and evaluate events from a broader range of perspectives within the Arab world, and develop the ability to consider various Arab and even Western perceptions. This has not been the case for the Arab home press. The Arab home presses mainly present contributions by writers who are not only Arabs, but are also from the home country of the paper. The views represented in them are, therefore, the dominant local policies and perceptions.

The open forum which the expatriate papers have generally provided for the Arab elite and intellectuals, unlike the Arab home press, provided a platform for a relatively free and relatively democratic discussion between various Arab writers concerning the Intifada. In fact, the ‘international’ image of the expatriate press allowed a considerable variety of opinions to be aired in these papers by Arab writers from different backgrounds concerning the issues relating to the Intifada. This enabled the Arab reader to come to an understanding of how the events of the Intifada were perceived and viewed outside his home boundaries and to gauge its influence on the international scene. Such a process would not have had the same chance of occurring
through the home press. The self-perceived purpose of the expatriate papers was primarily that of 'educating' an élite readership, including the rulers and ruling groups, contrasted with the typically more blinkered opinions in home newspapers concerning the Intifada where such un-biased discussion was virtually non-existent. The readers of the expatriate papers were therefore at an advantage.

The image of the expatriate papers in the readership mind as an "international" press is further emphasized by the fact that the papers do not generally allocate pages for home affairs in the way the home dailies do. The expatriate papers, with the exception of Al-Ahram International and Al-Quds Al-Arabi, have dedicated pages to general Arab affairs, though some of them have also paid particular attention to the owner's home country. For example, Al-Hayat focuses on Lebanese affairs more than on any other issue, with the exception of the Palestine issue on some occasions. In general, as far as their opinion and analytical articles are concerned, the expatriate newspapers show an ample interest in the hottest issues in the Middle East and world-wide, rather than a specific Arab country. The local events in the owner's home country, or even in another Arab country, do not necessarily form the subject of the papers' editorial or equivalent, or feature as headlines. In their analysis and reports, they also have different priorities. Priority is given to the intrinsic importance of a particular event under analysis and to its journalistic news value for inclusion in a paper's reportage. This is obviously a relative issue, since each newspaper has its own concerns and interests. However, this observation is generally valid when compared with the Arab home newspapers, whose headlines, editorials, chief opinion and analytical articles are primarily dominated by home affairs. The reason for this is that the home newspapers are directly linked with the local government, the local political situation, and the local readership.

The home newspapers do, however, play an important role in covering local issues in a way the expatriate press cannot afford to do. This is usually because such issues are
out of the expatriate papers' concerns (Tayash, interview, 1995). Moreover, the home papers sometimes dare to introduce local issues and tackle sensitive events that no expatriate paper is willing to do. Therefore, the expatriate papers seldom discuss Arab domestic and internal affairs, particularly if these affairs are not of interest to the wider range of readers in the Arab world and abroad. They usually concentrate only on domestic events of importance beyond the particular country, regional crises and disputes, and play a vital role in introducing and exchanging ideas and thoughts on common Arab issues such as the Intifada. They play a similar role in relationship to other matters affecting the Arab world in general, such as the conflict in the Arab Gulf, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the rising issues of democracy and Islamic fundamentalism. Essentially therefore, the local Arab presses and the expatriate Arab presses play complimentary roles within the imperfect world of the Arab press as a whole.

By possessing the "international" character, the expatriate papers also gained a prestige which the Arab home presses lack. This character, supported by being 'London-based' as another dimension of prestige, led to significant consequences, in addition to their respectful status as a 'free press' in the readership's eyes. This character permitted the expatriate dailies access to and communication with Arab politicians and policy-makers who make more frequent visits to London than to any Arab capital. London, in its fundamentally liberal environment, has for a long time been the centre of various political activities for many Arab leaders and interactions between them and international leaders. This has provided the papers with a golden opportunity of getting close to policy-makers. This has meant receiving first-hand information, enriching their analysis and discussions, and thus providing the readers with valuable and unique material denied to the local presses. Moreover, this in turn led to another important consequence, namely that their main readers have become the Arab élite and policy-makers. Although each paper's ownership connections, as well as the difficulties under which they operate, are perfectly well known, nowadays,
many Arab intellectuals, politicians, and diplomats rely on, and get their day-to-day diet of, news and views from the expatriate dailies, which are viewed as far preferable to those which appear in the local presses. By gaining the attention of the élite and politicians in the Arab world, the expatriate papers have increasingly received special attention, more favourable treatment, more prestige, and to some extent the kind of influence which most local papers do not have. They, have thus managed, to some extent, to have the regulations of censorship relaxed in the Arab countries, particularly in issues not directly associated with the regimes in related countries and in issues that would not upset the leaders.

It should be pointed out that in the Arab countries there are always limits for all presses, home and expatriate, the most important of which is touching directly or indirectly the head of state. No Arab state would allow any communication medium to criticize, offend, or disagree with the head of state. To a lesser extent, there are also taboo subjects, such as the activities of the members of the head of state's family, those of the senior politicians, and those of the members of the government; the overall ideologies and central policy matters of the government; and all matters associated with national security, religion, and the social values represented by them. These taboo issues vary in importance from one Arab country to another. Some Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Morocco, and Lebanon) tolerate criticism of the general policies of their governments and some of the social values, while others (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria) categorically do not allow such criticism. This explains the reason for the generalized criticism of the Arab world by the expatriate papers in respect of the Intifada. No single newspaper specified which Arab country, and who was responsible, for failing to support the Intifada. This was true even when Al-Arab criticized the Egyptian role in the early days of the Intifada, and when Al-Arab and Al-Quds Al-Arabi sided with Iraq in the Gulf crisis.
Within these vary substantial limitations, which are the common factors bringing the expatriate and the home Arab presses into the same broad category of the presses of the world operating within the "authoritarian" model, the expatriate Arab press represents the more liberal extreme. Its coverage of the Intifada thus also provided the relatively fuller and most balanced presentation of the events and the issues to the Arab readership as a whole - or at least the Arab élite with access to these papers - and probably had relatively the greater influence in the sense in which newspapers can have an influence on the course of events.
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Appendix A

Photographs and cartoons of the Intifada
(A1) Photographs

Image of Palestinian defiance

A Palestinian student throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, while other students build a barricade of stones yesterday in one of the streets of Ramallah in the occupied West Bank.

(The caption for the same picture in Al-Quds Al-Arabi on 6.12.1990 was: "School pupils, both boys and girls, are throwing stones at the occupation forces in Ramallah").

Al-Hayat 18.12.1989

Palestinian children hide their faces and raise their hands in the victory salute in Ramallah on Saturday when the occupation soldiers injured four Palestinians including a 14-year-old girl. (Reuter)
The Confrontation

The developed weapons of the occupiers: made in the USA, and the weapons of the owners of the land: stones, naked chests, and will.

They fire bullets to make the Palestinian Arab man kneel, and force him to accept the tank of the occupation, while the owners of the land wave their fists and shout to crush the brutality of that tank.

The picture shows a view of the fierce confrontations, the biggest in twenty years, between the Palestinian citizens and the Zionist occupation forces.

The Guardian 15.1.1988

A Palestinian youth, armed with a slingshot and marbles, taking aim at photographers and Israeli soldiers yesterday in the Israeli-occupied West Bank town of Nablus as a tyre burns behind him.
The Guardian 1.12.1989

Guardians of the Intifada... masked Al-Mulathamin brandish knives and axes in the kasabah, but the deadly Red Eagles and Black Panthers shun the photographs.

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 22.12.1987

A fully-equipped Zionist soldier standing in front of a crowd of "the children of stones" of the Palestinian people at the Nuseirat (refugee) camp. Some of them are holding the Palestinian flag and the Kufiyah... the symbol.
The Palestinian Intifada which spread in the occupied land, confirmed that the Palestinian people will not keep quiet until they regain their legitimate rights. In the picture, the Israeli soldiers, with their modern automatic weapons, are retaliating against the stones which are thrown by the civilians of the occupied land.

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 10.1.1988

Two youngsters of the "heroes of stones" confronting yesterday the well-equipped enemy soldiers in the Jabaliya (refugee) camp, which was invaded by the enemy forces' tanks.
A revolution against the enemy in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian youths face the enemy forces with stones in the Gaza Strip, which witnessed a violent revolution against the occupation for four days. Two youths were martyred and thirty injured. In the picture demonstrators burn tyres to block the passageway of enemy tanks. The Intifada expanded to the West Bank where the enemy forces killed a youngster and injured another group of demonstrators.

Palestinian youths throwing stones at the occupation soldiers in the Gaza Strip.
Al-Quds Al-Arabi 2.12.1989

One of the masked youths attacking the Israeli army with his stones.

Al-Ahram International 8.1.1989

Children of Palestine giving the victory salute

Today.. the Palestinian Intifada has completed its first month. In the streets of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip the Palestinian children went out carrying small stones in a demonstration rejecting the Israeli occupation.. And with stones, they raised their hands in the V sign. (Reuter)

(The caption for the same photograph in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat on 7.1.1988 was: "The children of stones", their weapons in their hands and on their faces: stones, a sign of victory and a smile").
(A2) Photographs

- Image of Israeli oppression

- Image of Palestinian suffering
Soldiers search Palestinians in Beit Jala in the West Bank. (Reuter)

Al-Hayat
20.12.1989

An image of the daily humiliation which we experience as Arabs in our occupied land as portrayed in the brutal treatment by this Zionist pushing the Palestinian youth. So is it possible for this ruthlessness to survive and continue without the help and encouragement of the supporting American friend - the American who is praised and admired by many so-called fellow "Arabs and Muslims"?!!
Al-Arab 11.1.1988

The Zionist occupation forces arrest a Palestinian youth after the fierce demonstrations took place yesterday in occupied Jerusalem.

It is clear from the picture that the problem exceeds a 'simple' arrest of a Palestinian citizen; it is an attempt to strangle him in front of the camera.

So terrified have the occupation forces become by the "youths of the Palestinian stones".

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Al-Arab 8.1.1988

A stance of dignity

This picture, undoubtedly, surpasses those known during the Nazi concentration camps in the World War II. The Zionists, who are inspired by the Nazis have turned the city of Gaza and its refugee camps into a huge detention camp for the Palestinian youths. Those youths are not humiliated by the gun of the Zionist myth at their heads, while they are handcuffed. Deprived of all but dignity. This humiliation is in fact a stance of pride.
Under suspicion... A policeman detains eight Palestinians in Jerusalem's Old City at the weekend, after an Israeli woman soldier was stabbed in the back.

HAMMER TACTICS: An Israeli soldier uses a sledge hammer to open a shop in central Gaza City yesterday.
The Guardian
15.12.1987

Armed Israeli soldiers drag a Palestinian youth from his house yesterday during a sweep through the town of Khan Yunis on the Gaza Strip. The youth was taken to an alleyway and beaten unconscious. Another Palestinian, aged 25, was shot dead by security forces in the clashes.

(The caption for the same picture in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat on 27.12.1987 was: "The picture speaks for itself and about the cruelty of the Israeli soldiers towards the citizens of the occupied land").

Al-Quds Al-Arabi 22.1.1990

Three Israeli police beat a Palestinian girl in Jerusalem.
An Israeli soldier taking a young Palestinian from one of the villages near Jerusalem to detention, while his old mother accompanies him with defiance on her face. (Associated Press)

The arrogance of the Israeli occupation did not deter its soldiers from dealing with the Intifada of the unarmed Palestinian people, by firing ammunition and tear gas.
Mohammed Al-Jouri, a 76-year-old Palestinian, sitting with his two grandson on the remains of his house in Ramallah which the occupation authorities have demolished claiming that his son, who is in prison, is a member of the "Masked Lions".¹

¹ To the best of my knowledge there is no such group in Palestine, and therefore I suspect that the newspaper has used this title erroneously for the "Black Panthers".

² The newspaper seems to have printed the wrong name for the refugee camp since there is no such camp called "Amara". The right name of the camp, which is located near Ramallah in the West Bank, is "Al-Am'ari".
(A3) Photographs

Image of continuation of the Israeli occupation
Despite streets empty of people because of the curfew imposed by the occupying Israeli authorities on 70,000 Palestinians, the soldiers are chasing every person they see trying to violate the curfew. (AP)
Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 23.12.1987

Ignoring the Israeli occupation forces who are fully armed, this Palestinian citizen is riding his donkey and entering the streets of Gaza which witnessed bloody demonstrations during the Palestinian Intifada.
(A4) Photographs

Image of Arab and international solidarity with the Intifada
Damascus (Syria and Palestine) shows solidarity with the Intifada

15,000 Syrian and Palestinian citizens, including the Deputies of the Syrian President and Palestinian leaders, participated in a big rally in Damascus in solidarity with, and in support of, the popular Intifada in the occupied land in the face of the Zionist terrorist practices. Speeches delivered in the rally insisted on the need for a united Arab line behind the Intifada, and on providing support to sustain the revolutionary people against the Zionist enemy for the purpose of regaining the legitimate national rights, and for assuring the legitimate Palestinian existence.
(A5) Photographs

Image of Israeli casualties
The two Israeli policemen, who experienced an attempt on their lives, are being treated in one of Jerusalem's hospitals. (Reuter)

Victim of Intifada... A nine-month-old Jewish girl is comforted by her father in hospital after she was hurt in a stone-throwing attack on the West Bank.
Figure A.32

The Guardian
15.12.1990

Death wish... An angry Jew shouts "Death to the Arabs" at the scene of the killings.

Figure A.33

Al-Quds Al-Arabi
5.1.1991

An Israeli soldier cries in front of the Israeli military vehicle which was hit by a Palestinian driver yesterday in the Gaza Strip.
(A6) Cartoons

- Image of Palestinian defiance and heroism
- Image of Israeli weakness
- Image of Israeli fear
Figure A.34

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 21.12.1987

Figure A.35

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 5.12.1988
(Note the Jewish stereotypical characteristics particularly the soldier's hooked nose).
Figure A.38

Al-Arab 18.12.1987

Figure A.39

Al-Arab 3.12.1990
Al-Ahram International 20.1.1990

(Shamir the PM has his hand on the trigger of a weapon called ‘oppression’, which ‘in the end’ acts like a boomerang.)

Al-Ahram International 7.1.1989

"Help!... the kid has grown... and has become a 3-year old Intifada fighter."
(A7) Cartoons

Image of Israeli Brutality
Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 27.12.1990

Figure A.48

What one learns in childhood is like carving on stone.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi 17.1.1991

(Note: Israeli Prime Minister Shamir is waiting for the Iraqi attack on Israel).
(A8) Cartoons

Image of Arab ignorance and fear
Figure A.50

Support for the Intifada

Al-Arab 20.1.1988

Figure A.51

In support of the blessed Intifada in its first year, we have decided to recognize "Israel"

Al-Arab 19.12.1989
Figure A.52

God, protect me from the support of my friends. And I shall deal with my enemies.

The Intifada in its third year

Al-Arab 11.12.1989

Figure A.53

Al-Quds Al-Arabi 8.1.1990
Figure A.54

Clearly they are talking about us. But, I swear, I don't understand a single word!!!

Figure A.55

One minute’s silence for the souls of the martyrs of the Palestinian Intifada

Al-Ahram International 17.1.1990

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 22.12.1987
Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 11.1.1988
(A9) Cartoons

- Image of the indifference of the UN and the West towards the Palestinians

- Image of the UK (and the West) realising the true character of Israel and making efforts to unveil this reality

- Image of the former USSR betraying the Palestinians

- Image of the UN disappointing Israel
Figure A.57

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 15.1.1988

Figure A.58

Figure A.61

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 24.12.1987

Figure A.62

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 17.12.1987
Figure A.65

Al-Hayat 15.12.1990

Figure A.66

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat 24.12.1990
Appendix B

UN Major Resolutions on Palestine and the Intifada
Resolution No. 181 (II) of 29 November 1947

RECOMMENDING A PARTITION PLAN FOR PALESTINE

A

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that:

(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

*Calls* upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

*Appeals* to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

*Authorizes* the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commissions by the General Assembly.

**B**

The General Assembly,

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purpose set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future of Palestine.

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*At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution, elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and Philippines.*
Resolution 242 (1967)
of November 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principle:

   (I) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously
at the 1382nd meeting
Resolution 338 (1973)
of October 21/22, 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease firing and terminate all military activities immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting, on 21/22 October 1973
Resolution 605 (1987)

of 22 December 1987

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 11 December 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations, in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations for the month of December,

Bearing in mind the inalienable rights of all peoples recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories, occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and including its resolutions 446 (1979), 465 (1980), 497 (1981) and 592 (1986).

Recalling also the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Gravely concerned and alarmed by the deteriorating situation in Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

Taking into account the need to consider measures for the impartial protection of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation,

Considering that the current policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied territories are bound to have grave consequences for the endeavours to achieve comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. Strongly deplores those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular the opening of fire by the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians;

2. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2 General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).
3. Calls once again upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and to desist
forthwith from its policies and practices that are in violation of the provisions of the Convention;

4. Calls furthermore for the exercise of maximum restraint to contribute towards the establishment
of peace;

5. Stresses the urgent need to reach a just, durable and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to examine the present situation in the occupied territories by all
means available to him, and to submit a report no later than 20 January 1988 containing his
recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian
civilians under Israeli occupation;

7. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since
1967, including Jerusalem, under review.

Adopted at the 2777th meeting by
14 votes to none, with 1 abstention
(United States of America)
Resolution 607 (1988)

of 5 January 1988

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 605 (1987) of 22 December 1987,

Expressing grave concern over the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories,

Having been apprised of the decision of Israel, the occupying Power, to "continue the deportation" of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories,

Recalling the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, \(^1\) and in particular articles 47 and 49 of same,

1. Reaffirms once again that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. Calls upon Israel to refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories;

3. Strongly requests Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by its obligations arising from the Convention;

4. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.

Adopted unanimously at the 2780th meeting.

Resolution 608 (1988)
of 14 January 1988

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 607 (1988) of 5 January 1988, Expressing its deep regret that Israel, the Occupying Power, has, in defiance of that resolution, deported Palestinian civilians,

1. Calls upon Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported;

2. Requests that Israel desist forthwith from deporting any other Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories;

3. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by the Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.

Adopted at the 2781st meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America).
Resolution 636 (1989)
of 6 July 1989

The Security Council,


Having been apprised that Israel, the occupying Power, has once again, in defiance of those resolutions, deported eight Palestinian civilians on 29 January 1989,

Expressing grave concern over the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories,

Recalling the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and in particular articles 47 and 49 thereof,

1. Deeply regrets the continuing deportation by Israel, the occupying Power, of Palestinian civilians;

2. Calls upon Israel to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those deported and to desist forthwith from deporting any other Palestinian civilians;

3. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian territories, occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to the other occupied Arab territories;

4. Decides to keep the situation under review.

Adopted at the 2870th meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America).
Resolution 641 (1989)

of 30 August 1989

The Security Council,


Having been apprised that Israel, the occupying Power, has once again, in defiance of those resolutions, deported five Palestinian civilians on 27 August 1989,

Expressing grave concern over the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories,

Recalling the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,¹ and in particular articles 47 and 49 thereof,

1. Deplores the continuing deportation by Israel, the occupying Power, of Palestinian civilians;

2. Calls upon Israel to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those deported and to desist forthwith from deporting any other Palestinian civilians;

3. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian territories, occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to the other occupied Arab territories;

4. Decides to keep the situation under review.

Adopted at the 2883rd meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America).

¹ Document S/20949, incorporated in the record of the 2887th meeting.
Resolution 672 (1990)

of 12 October 1990

The Security Council,


Reaffirming that a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must be based on its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, through an active negotiating process which takes into account the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel, as well as the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people,

Taking into consideration the statement of the Secretary-General relative to the purpose of the mission he is sending to the region and conveyed to the Council by the President on 12 October 1990,

1. Expresses alarm at the violence which took place on 8 October at the Haram al-Sharif and other Holy Places of Jerusalem resulting in over twenty Palestinian deaths and the injury of more than one hundred and fifty people, including Palestinian civilians and innocent worshippers;

2. Condemns especially the acts of violence committed by the Israeli security forces resulting in injuries and loss of human life;

3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, which is applicable to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

4. Requests, in connection with the decision of the Secretary-General to send a mission to the region, which the Council welcomes, that he submit a report to the Security Council, before the end of October 1990, containing his findings and conclusions and that he use as appropriate all of the resources of the United Nations in the region in carrying out the mission.

Adopted unanimously
at the 2948th meeting.
Resolution 673 (1990)

of 24 October 1990

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also its resolution 672 (1990) of 12 October 1990,

Having been briefed by the Secretary-General on 19 October 1990,

Expressing alarm at the rejection of resolution 672 (1990) by the Israeli Government, and its refusal to accept the mission of the Secretary-General,

Taking into consideration the statement of the Secretary-General relative to the purpose of the mission he is sending to the region and conveyed to the Council by the President on 12 October 1990,

Gravely concerned at the continued deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories,

1. Deplores the refusal of the Israeli Government to receive the mission of the Secretary-General to the region;

2. Urges the Israeli Government to reconsider its decision and insists that it comply fully with resolution 672 (1990) and permit the mission to proceed in keeping with its purpose;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council the report requested in resolution 672 (1990);

4. Affirms its determination to give full and expeditious consideration to the report.

Adopted unanimously at the 2949th meeting.
Resolution 681 (1990)

of 20 December 1990

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, set forth in resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with resolution 672 (1990) of 12 October 1990 on ways and means of ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation,¹ and taking note in particular of paragraphs 20 to 26 thereof,

Taking note of the interest of the Secretary-General to visit and to send his envoy to pursue his initiative with the Israeli authorities, as indicated in paragraph 22 of his report, and of their recent invitation extended to him,

Gravely concerned at the dangerous deterioration of the situation in all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and at the violence and rising tension in Israel,

Taking into consideration the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 20 December 1990² concerning the method and approach for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict,


1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report;

2. Expresses its grave concern over the rejection by Israel of its resolutions 672 (1990) of 12 October 1990 and 673 (1990) of 24 October 1990;

3. Deplores the decision by the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, to resume the deportation of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories;

² S/22027.
4. *Urges* the Government of Israel to accept the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Convention;

5. *Calls upon* the High contracting Parties to the said Convention to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for its obligations under the Convention in accordance with article 1 thereof;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to develop further the idea, expressed in his report, of convening a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the said Convention to discuss possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention and, for this purpose, to invite the Parties to submit their views on how the idea could contribute to the goals of the Convention, as well as on other relevant matters, and to report thereon to the Council;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to monitor and observe the situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, making new efforts in this regard on an urgent basis, and to utilize and designate or draw upon the United Nations and other personnel and resources present there, in the area and elsewhere, needed to accomplish this task, and to keep the Security Council regularly informed;

8. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit a first progress report to the Security Council by the first week of March 1991 and to report every four months thereafter, and decides to remain seized of the matter as necessary.

*Adopted unanimously at the 2970th meeting.*
Appendix C

The Structure of the Papers’ Pages
The structure of the papers' pages

Al-Arabi

Al-Arabi newspaper consists of twelve pages apportioned as follows: The front page is devoted to major Arab and international news. Usually 'hot' Arab news items and those concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict have the priority on this page. International news stories, particularly those related to the Arab world, come next. This is in fact the system of all expatriate dailies, as will be shown later. Also the editorial comment of Al-Arabi appears on this page and is always signed by the editor-in-chief or his deputy. For instance, on 18.1.1990, the main headline, which, as usual, was printed in red, was: "[Yasser] Arafat attacks the United States and declares, 'I will resign if the current peace efforts fail.'" Other sub-headings have focused on: preparations in Egypt for the release of prisoners imprisoned under martial law; Libya's call on Turkey to make clear whether it intends to dam and reduce the flow of water of the river Euphrates which subsequently passes through Syria and Iraq; the Kuwaiti Prime Minister's statement that the government wants some kind of democratic order which would enable the country to overcome its problems; the declaration of a five-point peace proposal prepared by the Egyptian President and the PLO Chairman; and, lastly, the Israeli criticism of a proposal by an American Member of Senate to reduce the USA's aid to Israel. The editorial comment on the sample date, entitled "The principle 'Land for Peace' has collapsed", indicated that the Israeli intentions to settle in the Occupied Territories the Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union undermined the principle 'Land for Peace' and uncovered the real Israeli purposes.

Page two is devoted to Arab affairs. A secondary cartoon usually appears on this page, sometimes reprinted from other Arab papers. In the chosen issue, the sub-headings of the news stories appearing on page two are as follows: The chairman of the Palestinian Union of Journalists says that the Intifada is a humanitarian and a peaceful mission; the American propaganda continues against the Intifada; a Jewish woman gives birth in a Palestinian camp in the West Bank while she was travelling to the hospital in Jerusalem; the PLO factions hold extensive meetings in Tunisia; Iraq prepares to receive Iranian pilgrims; a meeting, the first of its kind, takes place between the new Lebanese government and a UN envoy; the Islamic

1 This date has been selected randomly to give examples of the papers' major topics in each page of their issues in the period under study.
Society in North America unites the Muslim organizations to face common problems; the International Islamic Popular Leadership in Libya issues a communiqué on the renewal of sanctions by the USA on Libya; Arab and German experts at a conference in Jordan state that greater freedom is required for Arab journalism; and the Israeli Foreign Minister visits Portugal. A column by Tayseer Kamleh, entitled "Hadath wa Maghza" (An Event and its Significance) also appeared on this page. In the chosen issue, the columnist expressed his resentment against the policy of the PLO and its consequences, since all the PLO tactics remain meaningless without recognising the existence of the State of Israel. This page also included a section of classified and other small advertisements.

Page three entitled "Tayyarat Siyasiyyah" (Political Tides) includes opinion articles as well as the main daily cartoon. On 18.1.1990 the main article by Jamal Eddin Husein dealt with the American perception of the changes in the former Soviet Union and argued that the USA viewed and dealt with Michael Gorbachov cautiously. Another article, by Majdi Nasif, monitored the emergence of opposition in eastern Europe and mentioned a number of new political parties in a number of countries there. A column entitled "Mujarrad Ra'i" (Just an Opinion), to which different writers contribute every day, also appears on this page. On the chosen day, two writers contributed. Dr. Ismail Al-Ameen wrote on the policy of France in Lebanon and its involvement in supporting some militias there. The second article was by Abdel Tawwab Yusuf, who wrote about his experience with the communists and stated that Islam is much greater than communism. Page three also includes a daily column by Yusri Husein entitled "Nuqtat Daw" (A Spotlight). In this issue, Husein wrote about the return of the fundamentalist tide in the Arab world after the 1967 war between the Arabs and Israel. He argued that the moderate intellectuals, who believe in modernizing the Arab societies and enlightening the Muslims' thinking with contemporary inter-cultural experiences, have come to the fore again to revive the modernization march which started a century ago. A small item entitled "Sirri Jiddan" (Very Secret), appears beside the daily cartoon, probes and interprets certain politicians' activities or certain events. In this issue, the paper drew the conclusion from recent USA-Soviet contacts over the war in Afghanistan that there were an agreement and arrangements taking place for the return of the monarchical regime as a compromise to end the conflict. The cartoon in this issue depicted an Arab man sitting on his sofa (with a kufiyah on his head, which usually indicates the Arabs of the Gulf) talking on the telephone and saying, "Please, send me a private aeroplane because I am far away from the events and I want to arrive on time." The cartoon highlighted the fact that the Arab leaders are not aware of what is going on in the world and do not make any effort to find out. This page is one of the most
important pages of the paper since it presents the analysis and comments of the paper's editors and chief writers, usually on current Arab and sometimes international affairs.

Page four is devoted to international (i.e. non-Arab) affairs. In the chosen issue the paper published the following news stories on page four: the head of the (former) Soviet delegation for the disarmament conference in Geneva says, "We expect an international conference to be held this year on the prevention of chemical weapons"; India expects a new peace and friendship treaty with Sri Lanka; the former UN Secretary General warns that optimism should not go too far on the changes and reforms in eastern Europe; the Americans show understanding for the Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan and the Armenians declare a state of emergency; Soviet tanks are progressing toward the capital of Azerbaijan, Bacu; Switzerland helps in the investigation of (the former President of Panama) Noriega's illegal monetary dealings; and the army bans the [female] leader of the opposition in Burma from participating in the general election. The page also included a daily column by Mohammed Sa'id Al-Juneidi entitled "Ma Wara' Al-Akhbar" (What is behind the news). In this specific issue, Al-Juneidi discussed the consequences of the changes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the Arab world. He stressed that the Arabs should anticipate what could happen if the Western countries were to suspend their aid to the Arab world and Israel and how that would affect the Arab-Israeli conflict. The page also included a section as a guide for the Arabs in Europe, which contained the addresses and telephone numbers of the Arab embassies, Arab airlines, mosques, Arab-European bureaux of commerce, emergency services such as fire brigades, ambulances, and police, in all capitals of the European Community (except Britain).

Page five is devoted to business and finance. The main news stories in the chosen issue were: experts expect that in the next two months the Japanese yen will weaken against the American dollar because of instability; three international economists express their optimism on a promising international economic future and the likelihood of avoiding any possible global recession; Israel launches a campaign to collect a billion dollars to settle the Soviet Jewish immigrants; and OPEC sponsors the training of eleven Palestinian students in various scientific fields. The page also contains a summary table of the dollar rates against the European currencies. On the chosen date the paper allocated half of this page to one advertisement for the National Bank of Kuwait.

Page six presents in-depth analysis of one or two major Arab (or sometimes international) topics. The page, which is entitled "Sabah Al-Uroobah" (The Morning of Arabism) is designed
to emphasize the notion of Arab nationalism, which shapes the paper's principles and policies. In the monitored issue of 18.1.1990, the paper handled two topics. The first of these was a report on a conference held in Egypt on the third anniversary of the Intifada and was entitled

"a large number of people attended a conference in the University of Cairo which called for the declaration of a holy war. Al-Ghazali [an Egyptian Islamic leader] says that there are Zionist plans for the transformation of our holy places into Jewish synagogues while we are silent. A Jordanian member of parliament, Ali Al-Hawamdeh, says that Judaism and Zionism are two faces for one coin."

A sub-heading under a photograph of the conference stated, "The Palestinian youths reject negotiations." The second story, entitled "Fathi Kamel... and the unity of the Arab movements", was prepared by Ahmad Yusuf Al-Qar'i, who reviewed the establishment of the Union of Workers in Egypt in the 1940s, and then across the Arab world, by Fathi Kamel, who was described by the writer as an Arabist who believed in Arab unity. The page included a column by Fathi Ghanim entitled "Min Mufakkirati Al-Khassah" (From my Private Diary). In the chosen issue, Ghanim discussed the problem of Arab unity in the light of the great gap between the rich Arabs in the Gulf and the rest of the Arabs, not so fortunate, in the Arab world. He argued that this constituted a challenge and a gap that should be bridged before any discussion on unity takes place. Another column, by Abdallah Imam, entitled "Afkar Arabyyah" (Arabic Thoughts), also appears on this page. On the date selected, Imam argued that the winds of democracy have swept the Arab world since a number of Arab countries have allowed the establishment of opposition parties and have begun for the first time parliamentary life based on elections. He added that this is a natural development and a response to the democratic changes in the world, especially in eastern Europe. The page also included the television programme schedules of the four British channels and two advertisements: one for the American University in London, and the other for Al-Arab newspaper itself.

Page seven, entitled "Alam Al-Usrah" (The World of the Family), handles social, medical, and miscellaneous issues. In the examined issue of the paper, the main story was about the problems which the children of Nairobi face because of malnutrition. Another story handled the discussion of the rights of women, the family, and mankind generally in a recent Islamic conference. The third story was about a case in an American court of a woman who had been sacked from her job because of her age and the judge's ruling that she should receive compensation. A photograph of a model showing new dresses in Paris also appeared on this page. On this page a column by Muna Ghabbashi entitled, "Sabah Al-Khair" (Good Morning),
was also concerned with family issues. Ghabbashi argued that British families tend to leave London, where life is found to be too complicated and uncomfortable. A section the children, entitled "Sindibad" (the Arab hero of legend) is also included in this page. In the examined issue, the paper combined pictures of children on their birthdays, an information item about poisonous gases used in daily life, and a short story about the honesty of the Muslim people in the early period of Islam. Lastly, the page includes the daily horoscopes.

Page eight is devoted to British affairs, where prime stories from within the United Kingdom, as well as a translation of one the editorial comments of the British dailies, are presented. The page also includes a brief guide for Arabs in London. The guide provides the telephone codes of the Arab states, and some foreign capitals, from Britain, telephone numbers of Islamic centres in London, the addresses and telephone numbers of the Arab embassies, and telephone numbers of a large number of airlines. On 18.1.1990, the main news stories were: pollution caused by oil spills turns the North Sea into a 'deserted' sea; the blast in Paddington which killed Mustafa Mazeh (person believed to be a terrorist) could be connected with the Salman Rushdi affair; the Jordanian ambassador in London praises Saddam Husein for his peace initiative on the Iraq-Iran dispute; the British authorities arrest six members of Greenpeace; and Douglas Hurd will begin a visit to some Arab states. The editorial comment of the Financial Times, entitled "The Arabs and Islam" was also translated and published on this page. It assessed the heightening of Islamic awareness in the Arab world and expected that Islam would play a significant role in the future since the Muslim movements have enlisted up to 40% of the peoples in the Arab world.

Page nine is allocated to letters from the paper's readers. The page is entitled "Hyde Park" and the paper states on the top of the page that the opinions published on this page represent the readers' views and that the paper does hold any responsibility for what is published on this particular page. Letters published on this page often voice sharp criticism of the Arab people and Arab governments, and make attacks on Israel, the USA, and the peace process, indicating the typical nature of the paper's readership, i.e. from opposition and expatriate positions. The page also includes a section for personal advertisements, including notices of marriage, lost and found, and appeals for donations for medical purposes. On 18.1.1990, two long letters appeared in the paper. The first attacked those who defended or sided with Salman Rushdi and his cause, and criticized anybody who might find excuses for Rushdi and his book. The second was on John Garang, the leader of the rebels in southern Sudan, accusing him of being a puppet in the hands of Zionism and accusing some of the Sudanese opposition of being not so different
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from Garang. The page also combines a section on religion. Sometimes the topics in this section are of a political, social, or cultural nature. The article included in this section on 18.1.1990 was by one of the great Islamic scholars, Yusuf Al-Qardawi, on bringing up children according to the Quran and the Prophet's traditions.

Page ten, for culture and arts, usually discusses films, plays, and television series, as well as other issues such as novels. In the examined issue of the paper, page ten presented an overview of the film festival in Cairo and presents an outline on the top films in the festival. Another article was an extensive discussion of one of the television series "Al-Raya Al-Baida" (The White Flag), which was controversial in Egypt. A third article by Al-Sayyed Husein, discussed the cultural reaction in Europe to the political changes in the former eastern bloc.

Page eleven, covering events (particularly sporting events) in the Arab world and elsewhere, includes a section entitled "The World of Crime" in which it presents the true story of a crime that has taken place, mainly in Britain or elsewhere in Europe. The prime story in this page on 18.1.1990 was a report on the Egyptian football team for the African Cup in Algeria. Another story dealt with a round-the-world yacht race, while a third story covered the tennis championship in Australia. "The World of Crime" section narrated the killing of the 98-year-old lady, Dina Armstrong, in Britain. This page also carried an advertisement for Radio Orient from the USA, which specializes in news and broadcasts around the clock. Also, this page includes a sizeable section on information about the paper itself, boasting that Al-Arab is "Europe's leading Arabic daily newspaper". This section presents details on the editorial, the administration, the address, telephone, and fax numbers of its head offices abroad.

Page twelve, the last page, is usually devoted to 'soft' news. On the chosen date, the whole last page was occupied by a huge advertisement for the National Bank of Kuwait. The page usually includes a daily article by Mohammed Mahfuz, entitled "Sawwah" (Traveller), in which he makes comments on issues and events from his personal experience such as the death of somebody, or a story he has heard. Mahfuz tackles the issues in a narrative, comic, but philosophical way. This page also includes a section entitled "Aakher Al-Kalam" (The Last Words), presenting a saying (by some wise person), a prayer, and a joke. Lastly, the page includes some 'soft' news and advertisements, such as news of Lady Diana and Prince Charles, actors and actresses, news of animals and plants, and advertisements for Arab clubs and restaurants in London which present live Arab music and singers who come from the Arab world.
Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat

Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat contains of twenty pages. It is characterized by the large number of advertisements included. The pages are apportioned as follows.

The front page contains top Arab and international news. On the chosen date, 18.1.1990, there were two main headlines: the first about the media war in Lebanon and the decision by the opposition to prevent the press calling the President and the Prime Minister by the title 'president', while the second headline tackled the problems which the President of the former Soviet Union, Michael Gorbatschov, faced in Azerbaijan and Georgia. The story was accompanied by a large photograph of Soviet soldiers in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. The other news items were the following: Iraq takes measures to receive the Iranian pilgrims and lifts restrictions on travelling abroad for its citizens; and Shimon Peretz will visit Cairo next week, and the Egyptian foreign minister will meet the former American Secretary of State, James Baker to prepare for the peace talks. A small cartoon of Peretz holding flowers, indicating the intention of peace, accompanied this news story. Short news stories also appeared on this page, and included the following: Libya requests clarifications from Turkey over its intention to dam the Euphrates river; five Egyptians are charged with throwing explosive at police stations; clashes in southern Sudan; and a trial is delayed in Algeria because of concerns over the safety of the judges. The page gave a sizeable area to two advertisements of two kinds of perfumes. Also at the top of the page, beside the logo, there were two small, but significant advertisements: one for a computer programme and the other for Konica films.

Pages two to five are devoted for Arab affairs. The news stories on page five on 18.1.1990 were: (the Iranian oil-tanker) Kharj 50 (which recently suffered an explosion and an oil leak near Morocco) was hit three times during the Iraq-Iran war; calls in the USA to divert American financial aid from the Middle East to eastern Europe increase fears in Israel; an official invitation to the Emir of Kuwait to visit the former Soviet Union; the personal political consultant of Yasser Arafat mentions the particular financial aid of Saudi Arabia; the French government has not received a request from the Lebanese government to relieve the Lebanese embassy in Paris of the supporters of the Lebanese opposition who have been occupying the embassy for a week; and a Jewish campaign in the USA to collect money for settling the Soviet Jews in Israel. A column of news in brief is also included in this page. The stories appearing on the sample date were: Saddam meets the Prime Ministers of the Arab Co-operation Council (Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen); Mauritania's President's wife has died; the Tunisian foreign minister leaves Riyadh; and the British Foreign Secretary intends to visit Arab states.
Moreover, the page contained a large photograph of masked Palestinian youths holding a Palestinian flag and surrounded by children, with the accompanying caption indicating the escalating Intifada and the increasing world-wide support for it, and mentioning the place of the scene in the photograph. There were also three advertisements on the page. One of these was for a free gift of perfume with a packet of sweets, while the second only indicated a surprise early in 1990. The two advertisements did not mention who and where the advertisers were. The third advertisement was for a wholesale fish merchant in Saudi Arabia.

Page three included on 18.1.1990 two investigative reports, in addition to two columns. The first story was an interview with the Palestinian (holding Israeli citizenship) poet Samih Al-Qasem, in which emphasis was placed on the significant role played by the "1948 Palestinians" (the Palestinians who remained in Israel during the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948 and now hold Israeli citizenship), and arguing that the Intifada has caused changes and transformations in Israeli society. The second story was an analytical report about the situation in Lebanon. It discussed the reasons for the recent crisis between the government and the opposition, and the prospects for future compromises. The first column entitled "Su'al Al-Yawm" (Today's Question), was a statement made in Paris by a Lebanese MP, Othman Al-Dina, in response to a question posed by the paper about the situation in Lebanon and the way out of the current crisis. Al-Dina warned that the political situation might divide Lebanon into a number of mini-states if no action were taken by the different parties to defuse the tension. The second column was a daily contribution by the prominent Egyptian writer, Mustafa Ameen, and entitled "Fikrah" (A Thought). On the sample date, Ameen commented on an article by Ameenah Al-Sa'id in the Kuwaiti daily, Al-Siyasah, in which she had pointed out that attaching the press to the government system, in the way that former Egyptian President Nasser had done when he nationalized the press, was an offence against press freedom. The columnist, Ameen, approved this argument and added that restrictions on the press spread corruption and immorality in society. The page also included two large advertisements: one for a clothes and fashion store and the other for Kentucky Fried Chicken shops, both in Saudi Arabia.

Page four combined two extensive investigative reports. The first was on the Israeli fears of the military strength of Iraq, pointing out that the Iraqi army started the war with Iran with two legions of its army and ended the war with seven legions. The report highlighted the warning of Saddam Husein to Israel, stressing that this warning reflected the confidence of the Iraqi leader. The report was accompanied by two photographs showing the Iraqi tanks and air force on parade. The second report dealt with the effects of the changes in eastern Europe on the third
world and the Middle East. The report echoed the statement of the Egyptian ambassador to the
United Nations that the countries of the southern portion of the globe should activate their
dialogue among themselves to cope with the political changes in the world. Page four also
included two large advertisements: one for jewellery and the other for fashions stores, both in
Saudi Arabia.

Page five included three main news stories and two items in brief. The main news stories were:
Egypt will release those prisoners who have completed their terms of sentence, but remained in
prison under the state of emergency; Egyptian security forces besiege a village during a Jewish
festival to protect the pilgrims; and the government of Greece removes its embassy from
western Beirut to the eastern part of the city for security reasons. The items in brief were:
Tunisian President Zein Al-Abidin Bin Ali will visit Egypt for the first time since he came to
the presidency; and the United Nations halt the distribution of food to Palestinian children in
Jordan. These news stories occupied only one fourth of the page, while the rest was allocated to
one large advertisement for Safeway supermarkets in Saudi Arabia involving possible prizes to
be won when shopping at these stores.

Pages six and seven are allocated for international news. In the chosen issue of the paper, on
18.1.1990, page six included the following items: the political tension intensifies in Azerbaijan
and Armenia as a state of emergency is declared (with a map showing the sites of the former
Soviet states); a meeting in Bulgaria between the government and the opposition is initiated
amid a tense atmosphere; the Czechoslovakian President, Hafel, declares his approval for plans
to turn his country peacefully into a democratic state; West Germany does not expect deals
with East Germany before the elections; the (female) leader of the opposition in Burma is
prevented from participating in the elections; and a series of arrests is made among the extreme
right wingers in France. A column of news in brief was also included in this page and combined
the following news stories: the Japanese Prime Minister, Kaifo, is prepared for the next
elections; Sri Lanka intends to make diplomatic links with Iran; the Romanian elections have
been delayed; the Chilean President is unharmed after being involved in a road accident; eight
Indian workers die in a sunk boat. A column on this page concerning outstanding events on this
date in the past referred to the discovering of the Hawaiian islands. An advertisement, filling
about a quarter of the page, on a cartoon exhibition in Bahrain, also appeared on this page.

Page seven presented four investigative reports of one column each. The first report was on the
unification of the two Germanys and Western aid to eastern Europe in the eve of the EEC
summit in Dublin. The second report was on the political changes in Mongolia, as one of the countries which were affected by the collapse of communism and the domination of the former Soviet Union. The third item dealt with the internal crisis in Greece arising from the problems facing the Greek minorities in Albania. The forth report discussed Turkey's attempts to join the EEC and the obstacles in the way of membership. The column appearing on this page, entitled "'Alam bidun Hudud" (World Without Boundaries) and written by Farouq Luqman, dealt with the unique personality of the Singapore Prime Minister, who has been ruling the country since independence.

Page eight contains letters to the editor. It also includes a long column about the newspaper itself, specifying the owners, manager, editor-in-chief, addresses and telephone number of the headquarters and offices, and information about subscription. Moreover, a portion of the page is devoted to crosswords puzzles. The letters to the editor on 18.1.1990 may be summarized as follows: a reader from Saudi Arabia commented on a previous article about the conflict in Sudan and called for an agreement to preserve the unity of the country; a Saudi reader asked for details about eye diseases; a third Saudi reader disagreed with a previous article about whether film directors may deviate from authors' ideas; the fourth, also a reader from Saudi Arabia, discussed the American invasion of Panama and the double standards of the Americans when it comes to Arab and Palestinian issues. The reader questioned the future of the world, whether it will witness a new role for the USA as a world policeman. Lastly, short replies to letters were presented in a column entitled "Bi Ikhtisar" (In brief). The letters came from two Saudis, one Algerian, one Jordanian, and one from Greece.

Pages nine to twelve cover business and finance. In the examined issue of the paper, page nine included the following stories: Washington has entered a difficult war, involving itself in the International Investment Bank of Commerce in order to obtain evidence to convict Noriega; a Saudi company calls for the contributions of Saudi investors in its services installations on the motorways; the satellite company, Arabsat, will launch a new satellite; an OPEC spokesman says that the demand for oil will increase by two million barrels by the year 2000; the Saudi Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance visits Germany and will sign economic protocols for co-operation. A column of short news items was also contained in this page, including reports stating the following: Sudan allows its citizens to sell cement using the dollar as currency; profits from Japanese investments in Malaysia have doubled; inflation in France rises; Morocco establishes a factory for the production of matchsticks in Djibouti; the British Minister of Commerce will visit the Arab Gulf. The page also included three large advertisements: the first
for Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company in the United Arab Emirates; the second for Toy-
Town in Saudi Arabia; and the third for a Saudi company advertising jobs.

Page ten included the following stories: The Iraqi Minister of Labour says that his country
intends to establish companies with the participation of investors from other Arab countries,
and that the local market can absorb the demobilized army staff; British companies announce
the sinking of new oil wells in the North Sea; the Arab countries agree on copyright law; Arab
Gulf air-conditioning companies plan to compete with foreign companies; a new motorway will
be built between the two continents of Asia and Europe; and the Arab Institute for Investment
will sponsor five new projects. A column of brief economic news stories, entitled "Isharat
Iqtisadiyah" (Economic Signs), is also included in this page. The stories on the chosen date
were: the Egyptian authorities in the Suez Canal will impose penalties on ships which cause
pollution of Egyptian waters; unemployment rises in Israel; a new Egyptian oil-refinery has
commenced operation; the Omani Chairman of Commerce and Industry calls for an
intensification of Arab co-operation in the face of foreign challenges, especially the expected
European unity in the 1990s; and a large number of workers arrive in the United Arab
Emirates. The page also contained five advertisements: one for stationery stores, the second for
a motor car valeting service; the third and the fourth for fashion stores, and the fifth for
computer training, all in Saudi Arabia.

Page eleven, which is devoted to news about travel and tourism, contained the following stories:
Gulf Airline makes twenty-seven million Bahraini dinars in the profits; an interview with the
manager of the Saudi-Tunisian Institute of Finance about the achievements of the Institute and
the projects it has supported; Abu-Dhabi National Company for Hotels will build new hotels;
Egypt offers sites of tourism at symbolic prices to attract Arab and foreign investment; and
British Airways uses Boeing 767 aeroplanes in its Middle East trips. A long, wide column,
entitled "The News of Travel", contained short news stories in this page. The stories on that
date were: plans for opening new airlines between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Iraq; Yemeni Airlines expects more profits in 1990; American Airlines (which has started
operating outside the USA) searches for new routes to the Middle East and Asia; more than
four million travellers passed through Dubai Airport in 1989, marking an increase of 4.3%;
shipping faces decline at Sharja Airport; Saudi Airline will make one hundred and nineteen
additional journeys in the coming spring holiday; and an African conference will be held in
Nairobi on the safety of passengers.
Page twelve presented a few business news stories, in addition to the market prices of oil, precious metals, currencies, and stocks. The stories appearing in the sample issue were: the dollar falls against other currencies; Germany makes increased profits in the stock market and expects more in the light of the political changes in eastern Europe; new offices will be established for two Yugoslavian companies in Dubai; the number of Dutch workers in the United Arab Emirates reaches 600; eighteen billion dirhams (the currency of the Emirates) were allocated for water and electrical projects in the Gulf states; and the Lebanese lira has risen against other currencies. There were in addition two large and three small advertisements on the page. The first two were about a hotel and shopping complex, and a call for advertising in the publications of the Saudi Research and Marketing Company, both in Saudi Arabia. The small advertisements were for a hotel, a health centre and clinic, and a store for rent, all again in Saudi Arabia.

Page thirteen is devoted to opinion. The page includes the paper's daily editorial comment, at the top of which the logo of the paper is shown, to which the statement "the international Arab daily" is usually attached. The page also includes two or three opinion articles by the paper's senior writers or editors, and a column entitled "Istirahah" (A Break, or Rest) written by the writer, Yusuf Idrees. The daily cartoon, by the Lebanese cartoonist Mahmoud Keheil, also appears on this page. On 18.1.1990, the editorial comment tackled the dispute between Iraq and Syria on the one hand and that between Iraq and Turkey on the other hand, and it argued that this issue should be resolved peacefully and with a high degree of responsibility since the three countries all have rights to the water of the river Euphrates. An article by Patrick Brogan, an Irish journalist with The Observer newspaper, entitled "Cambodia and the American hypocrisy", dealt with the USA's involvement in the conflict in Cambodia. An opinion article by Samir Atallah, entitled "Perhaps Revenge, but not Conspiracy", also appeared on this page. Atallah discussed the crisis in Lebanon and noticed that although there were many differences and acts of revenge, no one can say that any of the parties is a traitor. Another article also included in this page, by Ali Al-Dajani, was entitled "The Roots of Religious Fanaticism in the Israeli Heads". Al-Dajani stressed that Judaism, and the rabbis in particular, feed the fanatical and extremist political trends in Israel, and are the inspiration for the Israeli leaders' aggressive attitudes and continuous attacks on the Islamic holy shrines and sites in the Holy Land. The column by Idrees discussed the differences between the Arab societies and the Western and the Eastern societies. He stressed that whatever happens in the West or in the East does not have to be copied in the Arab societies. Lastly, the cartoon addressed the problems which the Arab world was facing, particularly Turkey's decision to dam the Euphrates river, and the Soviet
Jewish immigration to Israel. The cartoon depicted the Arab world as a man who intends to have a bath, but the tap (on which is written "Euphrates river") is stopped by a hand, while a shower (made of a hammer and a sickle), symbolizing the Soviet Union, showers Jewish men (pygmies with long beards, black suits, and black caps), filling the bath and settling on the men's heads, which symbolizes the Arab land.

Page fourteen is devoted to religion. The page included points of view on different matters affecting life and society discussed from the religious angle. On 18.1.1990, the page started at the top with a saying by the Prophet Mohammed, a prayer, and a prayer timetable. The saying of the Prophet was about the length of hope vis-à-vis the short life of mankind. There was also a long timetable for the day's five prayers in about forty towns and capitals world-wide. A column entitled "Baqaya Midad" (Ink Drops), written by the editor of the page, Mohammed Al-Hashimi Al-Hamidi, was also included in the page. The column discussed the participation of the different Islamic groups in the process of Islamic awakening in the contemporary period. He argued that no one can claim that only one group has contributed and deny the participation of the others in enhancing the voice of Islam. The second article, accompanied by a photograph of girls covering their heads with scarves, was by the Syrian Muslim scholar, Ali Al-Tantawi, and commented on an article in the Saudi paper, Al-Muslimoon. Al-Tantawi argued that women in the Muslim countries enjoy a better life than those in the West. He gave examples, drawn from his observations on a visit to Western countries, of the suffering of women in the West, which he contrasted with the rights of women in Islam and concluded that women are in a better position in Muslim societies. The last article was on the impact of the Islamic system of al-hisbah (weighs and measures control) on the fight against crime and the Karakas declaration which had been made by the United Nations to confront crime, and it concluded that Islam laid down the best way to deal with crime, fourteen centuries ago. The page included a sizeable advertisement (a quarter of the page) for its pages of business and finance.

Page fifteen is devoted to culture and arts. In the examined issue of the paper, a sub-title for the page was "Cinema", indicating that the articles in this issue covered topics relating to cinema. The first article was a critical discussion of a French film, "Woman's Revenge." The second article was on the crisis of the Italian cinema and the way it tackles social problems. The third article was on an Egyptian film which was intended to fight against corruption. The article reviewed the scenes of the film and criticized the technical problems which the director had failed to overcome. A number of cinema stories were also included in this page. They were: a German cinema director will follow the "Rambo" example; the daughter of the Arab poet,
Adonis, will work as an actress; and an Arab film, "The Mummy", will be shown on French television. A column entitled "Kitabah 'ala Al-Shashah" (Text on the Screen), by Qusai Saleh Al-Darwish, also appeared on this page. Al-Darwish discussed the reasons for producing violent and horror films in the West, and sharply criticized this film genre.

Pages sixteen and seventeen are devoted to sports. On 18.1.1990 the stories on page sixteen were: the Moroccan trainer of the national football team looks forward to keeping the championship; the French football team makes a visit to Kuwait on a sporting tour; an interview with the trainer of the Sudanese football team, in which he explained that his team had achieved a respectable standard by winning many matches; and the Saudi football team, Al-Ittihad, lost its match with Austria, 0: 1. A quarter of the page was occupied by an advertisement for a leading weekly magazine published by Saudi Research and Marketing Company, Al-Majallah.

Page seventeen on 18.1.1990 included the following stories: the Brazilian trainer of the Egyptian football team stated that a good programme has been set up for his team, but it will take some time to complete the training; the prime Egyptian teams are to play a series of matches; the American boxer, Mike Tyson, is in Tokyo for the world heavyweight championship; the French football team arrives in Kuwait on a sporting tour; two Sudanese football teams will meet today in a championship contest; a Soviet football team defeats the Algerian national team 2:1; the results of basketball games in the United States; and the results of tennis games in Australia. The page also included a column of short news stories about the world cup in Italy. The stories focused on the preparations of the various countries for this major event and the competition between different countries for the next world cup. The page also gave space to two small advertisements: one for a job, and the other for flats for sale, both in Saudi Arabia.

Pages eighteen and nineteen, entitled "People" are devoted to social, criminal, scientific, and art news. They contain in fact a wide miscellany of news, except the previously mentioned politics, economics and sport. In the examined issue of 18.1.1990, the following stories appeared on page eighteen: an interview with the chairperson of a folklore festival in Saudi Arabia, in which he stressed that the festivals are very important since they reflect the cultural dimensions different the generations; an awful crime in Liverpool in Britain; the first establishment of an

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1 This item also appeared on page sixteen of that issue, and was repeated on this page as a mistake by the editorial of the paper.
Arab association for cancer care; a new library, which will contain three hundred million books, two centres for documents, and an archive for all international newspapers, will be established in London in 1993; a festival of culture and art will be held in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia in the mid-term holiday this month; a new Arab satellite will be shortly launched to enhance the satellite Arab communications; and mountains of rubbish grow in Athens because of the workers' strike. The page included an advertisement for the leading advertising company in Saudi Arabia: Tihamah.

Page nineteen included the following stories in the same issue: a column containing an interview with one of the prominent Egyptian writers, and a discussion of the problems the Arab book faces; a story about "the white Zulu" who danced for Mandela in South Africa and the campaign by 800 white demonstrators who danced and sang for the African leader; a story shedding light on a television editor who had died recently; and a news story on a comprehensive programme declared by the World Health Organization to spread awareness of AIDS. A column entitled "Abyadh wa Aswad" (Black and White), written by Nadeem Nahhas, argued that Japan remains the number-one country in the world in terms of productivity and thus economy, and in its ability to compete with the superpowers in terms of technology. The page also included a section on activities, visits, weddings, births, and deaths of Arab politicians and prominent figures. The page also included three advertisements: one for luxury furnished flats (in one block called "The Palace"), the second for a fashions store, and the third for wall clocks, all in Saudi Arabia.

Page sixteen is devoted to 'soft', non-political, news. On 18.1.1990, the stories appearing on this page were: pollution is a lethal threat to East Germans; a British doctor left a patient, who later died, in the operating theatre while he went for a cup of coffee; an earthquake shakes California; the oldest village in the world has been discovered in Turkey; news of a medical development in Belgium for treating prostate dysfunction. Another news story, entitled "Do not read this News Item" and reporting the deaths of eight children in Russia because of a fault in a central heating system, was also included in the page. Two more stories accompanied by two large photographs with captions, also appeared on this page. The first told of a man from Taiwan who had migrated to mainland China to play music in prisons and so gain popularity, at a time when people were rebelling against ruthlessness in eastern Europe. The second story was about a storm in California, which had forced the people of a town to leave their homes. Two further columns were also included in the page, the first by Khaled Qashtini and entitled "Sabah Al-Khair" (Good Morning), and the second by Abdallah Babjir and entitled "Ma'
Qahwat Al-Sabah" (With the Morning Coffee). The first column looked at freedom of expression in countries ruled by dictatorships and argued that in such countries jokes spread quickly. He stated that where freedom of expression is restricted, jokes bring a dimension of reality and reflect the people's feelings and aspirations. The writer included a number of examples of such jokes. In the second column, Babjir continued this story about the freedom of press with a personal account, relating how he was a schoolboy, he had had a clash with his headmaster over his contribution to the school's bulletin board. A daily cartoon appeared on the page depicting a man talking on the telephone and saying, "Hello, CIA? What is the latest news of Noriega?" indicating the involvement of American intelligence in the Noriega affair. Lastly, the paper included three advertisements: two at the top of the page, beside the logo, as on the front page, and the third, a large one, at the bottom of the page. All of the advertisements were about two different kinds of perfume, sold by Saudi agents.

Al-Hayat contains sixteen pages apportioned as follows. The front page is devoted to major Arab and international news. The paper considers the major international news stories as no less important than the Arab hot issues, so that there is always noticeably room for both kinds of story. On 18.1.1990, there were two main headlines occupying the forefront of the paper. The first referred to the "media war" between the Lebanese government and the opposition militias on the eve of a Syrian-Lebanese summit. The other headline focused on the situation in Azerbaijan and the inability of the Soviets to deploy their forces in the capital Baku. The paper highlighted the serious situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia because of the state of emergency which had been declared there by the former Soviet leadership. The secondary headlines were: Jordan declares the anti-communist law inactive; the former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peretz will visit Cairo to meet President Mubarak, and Washington expresses its hope that a meeting in the USA between the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Israel, and the USA will be soon arranged to prepare for the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue; Iraq prepares to receive the Iranian pilgrims, and Saddam Husein makes a sudden visit to Jordan; an Iranian religious leader is under house-arrest and the authorities close his school; Syria is the prime looser from the damming of the river Euphrates by Turkey; the former American President George Bush welcomes a proposal by the Senate to reduce the USA's aids to Israel, and Israel expresses its deep resentment; and new Soviet air-carriers will start operating after a series of tests, marking a new era in Soviet marine operations.
Pages two to five are devoted to Arab, usually Lebanese affairs. In the chosen issue of the paper the main news stories on page two were: the Lebanese President, Elias Al-Herawi receives a UN delegate, and the Prime Minister was contacted and informed of the recent developments by Lakhdar Al-Ibrahimi, the delegate of the Arab Committee for the situation in Lebanon; a report on the conflict between the President and his government on the one hand, and the opposition militias and some politicians on the other hand; two newspapers have suspended their publication in protest against the opposition's activities, particularly its demand that the press do not use the title 'president' for the President and the Prime Minister; the Lebanese delegate to the USA seeks to persuade President Bush to move from moral support for the Lebanese government to practical support, and requests a military aid; and clashes in the Iqlim Al-Tuffah province.

On the sample date, page three was fully occupied by an advertisement for the Arab investment company, Investcorp Bank, which has its offices in Bahrain, London, and New York.

Page four is usually devoted to Palestinian affairs. On the sample date, the main stories were: Arafat declares that he will resign if the peace efforts fail and states that the financial aid to the Intifada is now extremely minimal; Nabil Sha'th (the personal adviser of Yasser Arafat) warns that the Intifada's momentum is declining; the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir says that Israel gets bigger with the immigration of the Soviet Jews and the establishment of a Palestinian state means Israel's death; Israeli soldiers have killed a Palestinian in a village near Bethlehem and an Israeli policeman is sacked because he unjustifiably attacked Palestinian demonstrators; UNRWA (United Nations for Refugees and Workers Agency) denies the Israeli accusation that it exceeded its limits; the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ismat Abdel-Majid, met the American Secretary of State, James Baker, and confirmed the continuation of the peace efforts; a Palestinian communist poet (and Israeli citizen) has compared Israel with communism and published a letter renouncing communism.

Page five covers general Arab affairs, apart from Lebanese and Palestinian news. On 18.1.1990, the main stories were: the former Egyptian Interior Minister, Zaki Bader, is convicted of 14 crimes and may lose his parliamentary immunity; Egyptian fundamentalists will appear in court charged with throwing explosives at police; demonstrators attack policemen in an Algerian town; Iraq and Iran exchange prisoners of war; Gambia and Ghana mediate in the conflict between Mauritania and Senegal; the Sudanese rebels attack a government military convoy near the town of Yei in the south; and an Egyptian-Libyan
dialogue between the political parties starts in Egypt with co-operation regarding water resources between the two countries on the agenda. The page also contains a section entitled "Dunia Al-Arab" (The Arab Universe), including a number of concise news stories mainly on Arab leaders' activities, speeches, and visits. On the chosen date, this section included the following stories: while receiving the new USA ambassador, Sheikh Zaied Bin Sultan (the Emir of the United Arab Emirates) calls on Washington to give priority to its relations with the Arabs; the Jordanian Prime Minister, Mudar Badran, hands a letter to the Iraqi President from King Husein; King Fahd (of Saudi Arabia) sends a letter to Sultan Qabus (of Oman); the general commander of the army in Djibouti meets his Qatari counterpart in Qatar; and negotiations in Yemen are taking place for the preparation of the conference on Egyptian-Yemeni relations.

Pages six and eight are allocated for international news. On the chosen date, the paper covered the following stories on page six: an exclusive report on former Czechoslovakia and its relations with the former Soviet Union. The report indicated that Czechoslovakia was maintaining its relations with the Soviets because it feared a potentially unified Germany; Iran warns about the deteriorating situation in Azerbaijan; the former leaders of East Germany warn that the "peaceful revolution" may obstruct the intended free elections and West Germany plays down its convergence policy with East Germany; the permanent members of the Security Council adopt the Australian proposals to end the civil war in Cambodia; Burma bans the (female) leader of the opposition from participating in the general elections; the Indian government orders all the twenty-five governors of the provinces to resign in a cleansing step against the Congress Party; and the authorities in the Philippines arrest one of the leaders of the attempted coup d'etat.

On page seven the following stories were covered on 18.1.1990: a Turkish spokesman accused a neighbouring country of supplying the Kurdish rebels with arms; Greece is concerned over the Greek minority in Albania; in the light of the current developments in eastern Europe, Soviet general expect radical changes in the Warsaw Pact; the Democratic Front in South Africa defies the government's decision which outlawed it, and declares that it will practise its activities openly; and drugs traders in Colombia declare their willingness to halt violence against the government.

Page eight is devoted to in-depth reports and discussions. On 18.1.1990 this page contained two reporting items, in addition to a letter to the editor, and one advertisement (for Rothman's
cigarettes). The first item was part two of a five-part dialogue between Ahmad Baha Eddin, the prominent Egyptian writer, and the columnist in one of the expatriate dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat; it was entitled "The Arabs should not imitate the Experiences of other Countries". The second item was a report on the challenges which Turkey faces with the collapse of the eastern bloc. The report analysed the options for Turkey and its future role, particularly as Western countries house millions of Turkish migrant workers, and their future could be threatened because of the collapse of the Berlin wall. The letter to the editor attacked those who had deceived the former Romanian President and killed him, and those who were undermining communism. The letter, written by Abdel-Karim Al-Masri from Denmark, attacked the former Soviet Union and warned that the killing of the former Romanian President would threaten the future of those who disagreed with the one-sided Western policies.

Page nine is given over to opinion articles written by a number of the paper's senior editors and writers. Articles on this page analyse the most recent Arab and international events. The paper's daily cartoon also appears on this page. In the chosen issue of the paper, there were two articles written by two prominent people in the Arab world, and two columns by two well-known and experienced journalists and editors of Al-Hayat. The first article was by Joseph Abu-Khalil, who was described in a footnote as "a political writer and the former editor-in-chief of Al-Amal, the daily published by Al-Kata'eb (a Lebanese Militia). The article, entitled "Is the War between [the two Lebanese Militias], Amal and Hizbullah, a civil or a regional one?", discussed the dispute between the two factions and its regional dimensions, particularly how it could affect Lebanon as a whole and in the light of the Israeli presence in the south of Lebanon. The second article, by Salah Eddin Hafiz, the deputy editor of the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram and the manager of its International edition, was entitled "Israel and its Undermining of the Peace Efforts". The writer argued that Israel was exploiting the dramatic political changes in the world, particularly in the former eastern bloc, the Arab laziness in the peace process, and the American weariness with the Arab and Israeli evasiveness, to avoid involving itself in the peace process.

The two remaining columns of this page were as follows. The first, which was written by the editor of Al-Hayat, Abdel-Wahhab Bader Khan, dealt with the conflict between the militias in Lebanon and focused on the freedom of press, which had recently been threatened by some of these militias. The second column was written by the editor Hazem Saghieh, who discussed the changes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, highlighting the problems which the societies there face. He indicated that Lebanon should learn from these events, since not only
does the political system suffer from weakness and constant problems, but also the values of the society are poisoned so that violence, dictatorship, and regression ensue.

The cartoon on the opinion page of the sample day depicted the former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, building a house on a railway line. On one side of the rails there was a broken sign bearing the inscription, "the compromise way", while on the other side was a new sign with the inscription, "building settlements all along the line". In the bottom corner of the page was a small section containing the logo of the paper, its date of establishment with the name of the person who founded it, the name of the owner, the name of the editor-in-chief, the addresses and telephone numbers of its headquarters and offices, and the rates of subscription.

Pages ten and eleven are allocated for finance and business matters. They provide up-to-date coverage of outstanding Arab and international economic news stories. On the chosen date, page ten included the following news stories: Washington gets help from the International Investment Bank of Commerce to obtain more evidence against the former President of Panama, General Noriega; Fayez Bader, the Saudi Minister of State, says that the Saudi harbours are fully equipped and geared for another twenty-five years; fears grow over mad-cow disease in Britain as a British delegation visits Arab countries to increase exports of beef; a news reported about Franco-Iranian talks on establishing an aluminium smelter in Iran amid Iranian fears of competition from the Arab Gulf states; the United Arab Emirates starts an ambitious plan to raise its oil production oil to four million barrels daily; the Saudi Minister of Oil starts a series of visits to Asian states to discuss the possibilities of increasing co-operation with those countries; and the buoyant Omani economy attracts Western companies, which intend to enter the Iranian market, to invest in Oman because of its closeness to, as well as its unique good relations with, Iran. The page also includes a column entitled "Ittijahat Iqtisadiyah" (Economic Trends) under which short economic news stories are printed. This column in the examined issue of 18.1.1990 contained the following stories: Prince Salman Bin Abdel-Aziz (of Saudi Arabia) attends the opening of the new electricity generator in Wadi Al-Dawaser (in Saudi Arabia); Burma has agreed to co-operate in building the Asian motorway (which links Asia with Europe from Singapore to Turkey); Gaddafi calls for the formation of an Arab common market; Iraq uses almost all its energy in pumping oil through Turkey; four hundred and thirty-four million dollars were realized in Jordanian income from phosphate last year; and Mexico will sign a treaty with the creditor commercial banks next month to reduce its debts.
Page eleven included two main in-depth news reports and one news story. It also included a long, wide column showing currency tables and interest rates. The first report was on the Second International Exhibition of Tourism in Morocco, adverting that the host country, on this occasion, hopes to increase the number of tourists it receives to ten million before the year 2000. The second report was about the two Lebanese airlines - Middle East Airline and TME Airline - and the government's decision to make no change to their legal status. The news story covered the fall of the American dollar and the effects of the situation in the former Soviet Union on the money markets.

Page twelve is allocated for culture and arts. The page is intended to present reviews and comments on recent art and cultural events, mainly in the Arab world. On 18.1.1990, there were four stories in this page. The first was a detailed report on an exhibition of the plastic arts in France. The second was a critical article on the novels of (the Palestinian novelist) Rashad Abu-Shawer. The article, whose title could be translated "We Live in a World in which Babies Refuse to be Born", focused on Abu-Shawer's recent work. Shawer, according to the article, attempts to describe the suffering and agony, as well as the challenges of the Palestinians in their land. The third article was also a critical one, discussing a recent novel entitled "Al-Ightiyal" (The Assassination) by the Egyptian novelist Ibrahim Shukri. The article described the novel as a sardonic attempt to depict contemporary problems facing society. The fourth article was a review of the recent book by the Arab-American senator and writer, James Abu-Riziq. The book is an autobiography of Abu-Riziq, in which he presents his experience in the USA starting from point zero to become ultimately one of the most prominent Arab-American personalities.

Page thirteen entitled "Usrah" (Family), is devoted to social and family issues. In the examined issue of the paper there were the following stories: an interview with an Algerian-French actress, highlighting the idea that the French cinema does not give Arab actresses any opportunity; a short story for children about a dialogue between a butterfly, a bird, and a tree; a true story about a lady in Lebanon who works as a shoe-repairer and the hard work that she does; and a report on a symposium in Syria about the Arab laws concerning women and women's contribution in the different aspects of life. There was also a column entitled "Sihhah" (Health) suggesting patent remedies for certain ailments, such as the use of ice to alleviate swellings and drinking fruit juices for different purposes. A large photograph of a model wearing a new fashionable dress, accompanied by a short description, also appeared on this page. In addition, a medium-size advertisement for a perfume marketed by a prominent Saudi
company appeared at the bottom of the page. Lastly, the page contained a small strip cartoon in which a man was first depicted watching a television programme about nuclear weapons while his child blew up a balloon. Scared by the noise of the balloon, the man jumped up and declared, "I am for disarmament!"

Page fourteen is allocated for Arab and international sports. The stories covered in the chosen issue of the paper were: the Saudi and Iraqi football teams prepare for the tenth Arab Gulf championship; the standard of table-tennis in Egypt has improved since the arrival of Chinese trainers; easy games in Australia for the American champion John McEnrow and the Chilean champion Evan Landl; Southampton defeats Swindon in a football match; the Brazilian trainer of the Egyptian Al-Zamalek football team says, "Egypt is preparing for the world Cup and Italy may not reach the last match"; an international musical festival is to accompany the World Cup in Italy; tiredness causes the Algerian football team to lose the match against the Soviet team; the world-famous boxer, Mike Tyson, prepares to meet Douglas in Tokyo and Holefield in Atlantic City.

Page fifteen is devoted to miscellany. The page including a column entitled "Min Al-Hayat" (From Life), written by one of the paper’s editors, Irfan Nizam Eddin. It also included a section containing crossword puzzles and the daily horoscope. The stories included in this page on 18.1.1990 were: furs are out of fashion and traders lose a lot of money; a new film is released on the life of Asmahan (an Arab singer and actress who died about forty years ago); and the music of Joni Klig, which was composed in support of Nelson Mandella, unites whites and blacks in South Africa. The column also focused on the legacy of the prominent Egyptian journalist and author, Ihsan Abdel-Quddoos. This was a short presentation to elegize the death of Abdel-Quddoos and give a brief introduction to his novels and personality.

Page sixteen, the last page of the paper, offers 'soft' news and light columns. The stories included in the page on 18.1.1990 were: Sylvester Stallone abandons Rambo, because the latter is an arrogant rightist; Tom Cruze divorces his wife and offers her eight million dollars; boats manned by the world’s youth (from Arab and foreign countries) leave Japan (heading for Greece on a friendship voyage); a court granted financial compensation to be paid a pop singer by two British dailies (The People and The Sunday Mirror); an Egyptian television programme loses its director who died of a heart attack; the author of The Quran in Pictures for children denies violating Islamic principles. A section reporting the activities of some Arab diplomats and personalities also appears on this page. The section which entitled "Hawl Al-Madinah"
(Around the City) related on the chosen date the intention of Egypt to participate in a musical festival in the United Arab Emirates; news that the Omani Minister of Information was visiting Qatar; a report that the Lebanese architect Marwan Dakkash was presenting a lecture in a Christian university in Lebanon; and so forth. The page included a further two columns, the first entitled "Uyun wa Aadhan" (Eyes and Ears) by the editor-in-chief, Jihad Al-Khazen, and the second entitled "Nuqtat Hiwar" (A Point of Argument) by Abdallah Al-Jafri. The first column dealt with the difficulties which the Arab people face in Western airports because of the Arabs' image in the West of linking them with international terrorism. The writer argued that terrorism is everywhere and nobody can be held responsible for others' guilt. The second column was a discussion between the writer and the Syrian poet, Fawaz Ede. Lastly there were two cartoons and an advertisement on page sixteen. The advertisement was for a perfume marketed by a Saudi company. One of the cartoons was a tiny one and simply drew the word "Moscow" as a bridge between Iraq and Iran, indicating the role of the former Soviet Union in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. The second cartoon, which appeared at the top of the page and which was a daily cartoon, tackled social issues in an ironic way. The cartoon showed a doctor in a hospital talking to a patient and saying, "Now.. as I have done the surgical operation for you, I can say congratulations. But, may I ask, what did you want to say before I gave you the general anaesthetic?" The patient replied, "I wanted to say that the patient was not me; he was somebody else."

Al-Quds Al-Arabi

Al-Quds Al-Arabi contains of twelve pages apportioned as follows.
The front page of Al-Quds Al-Arabi covers the major Palestinian, Arab, and international news. On 18.1.1990, the headline was on the peace effort led by Egypt and the USA. It focused on the visit made by Shimon Peretz to Egypt, the visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister to the USA, the statement of the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, that he would resign if the peace efforts failed, and the American proposition to reduce financial aid to Israel. This main story was accompanied by a photograph of a Palestinian woman with her children sitting on the remains of her house demolished by the Israeli forces. In addition, the following stories appeared on the front page: an Israeli man kills an Arab woman by driving into her with his car; 'Awn, the leader of the Lebanese opposition militias, threatens the press and prepares to evict the Arab ambassadors from the area he controls; Gaddafi accuses Israel of building dams on the river Nile in African countries to strangle Egypt and says that the USA wants him to kneel and surrender; Iraq grants its citizens freedom to travel abroad and Saddam makes a sudden visit to Jordan; the people of Baku prevent the former Soviet tanks from entering the city, and Iran
enters the conflict in Azerbaijan and warns Moscow; Jordan has officially abolished the anti-communism law and the leader of the Jordanian Communist Party demands the right to publish a newspaper; the Algerian judicial authorities demand security guarantees after a shooting incident in a court which killed three people; Turkey fears Kurdish attacks on its dams; and the Kuwaiti Prime Minister calls for people's participation and avoids mentioning the parliament. The page included a brief financial news item on the fall of the US dollar and the gold prices, and the rise of the German mark.

Pages two and three are devoted to Arab and international affairs. Page two is usually occupied mostly by international news, while page three contains mainly news of Arab affairs. In the examined issue of the paper, page two included the following stories: the Czechoslovakian President trusts the experience of the President of the former Soviet Union, and differences emerge between Prague and Moscow on the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia; a photograph of Azerbaijani forces in the capital Baku to stop the antagonistic activities of Armenian citizens; trials start soon in Romania amid talks on delaying the elections, and the two daughters of the former Romanian king return to the country; the leader of the attempted coup in the Philippines is detained and states that he does not regret his attempt; the German Chancellor supports the East German leaders and delays making deals with them; James Baker is well experienced and looks to succeed President Bush; Washington allocate 330 million dollars in aid to eastern Europe after cutting 5% from its aids to six foreign countries; Moscow reduces its forces in the Atlantic Ocean; and a six-months extension is made for the USA to withdraw its forces from Greece. A column of news in brief is also included in this page. The stories in that column on the sample date were: Gorbatshev meets the UN Secretary-General; India dismisses the governors of the provinces; a statue of Stalin has been removed in Mongolia; and Sri Lanka establishes diplomatic relationship with Iran.

Page three included the following stories: the Sudanese rebels prepare to attack Juba (a town in southern Sudan), and John Garang (the leader of the rebels) doubts the Sudanese peace efforts and accuses Egypt of siding with the government; Mubarak requests a report on the prisoners from the Interior Minister in preparation for their release; Lebanese radios and newspapers start a strike because of 'Awn's threat to the Arab ambassadors and restrictions on press freedom; mourning is declared in Mauritania for the death of the President's wife and the President calls a compromise to resolve the dispute between Senegal and Mauritania; a new (third) Yemeni party criticizes the political monopoly; amid news of withdrawal of Soviet experts from Damascus, Moscow has sold Syria developed Sokhoi fighters; and the conference
of the Arab Prime Ministers of the Arab Co-operation Council discusses current issues and
agrees on twelve proposals to strengthening solidarity among its members. A column reporting
news in brief was also included in this page. The news stories mentioned in that column were:
Moscow desires a dialogue with the Arab Gulf states and will soon exchange ambassadors with
Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia accuses criminals of attacking the car of a Saudi diplomat in
Turkey (i.e. the attack was not attributed to political motives); Kuwait considers the
development of its military corps; Damascus supports an Arab Summit over Lebanon; a court
has convicted five Egyptians accused of using explosives in an ambush; the state of South
Yemen examines reports of unification committees; a Lebanese opposition party denies having
allowed Iranian forces to enter Lebanon; strikes have taken place at the universities in Tunisia
with demands for the release of student detainees.

Pages four and five are devoted to Palestinian affairs. In the examined issue page four included
the following stories: the Palestinians in Lebanon try to keep the balance in the conflict between
two Shi'ite factions; a report from Reuter indicates that the South Lebanon Army is financed by
Israel and takes orders from the Israeli army; the Israeli Foreign Minister, Arenz, discusses in
Portugal the Israeli-European relationship; the Soviet Jewish immigrants suspect Shamir's
policies and Washington opposes their settlement them in the Occupied Territories; UNRWA
stops distributing meals to the Palestinian children in the refugee camps in Jordan; a report by
UNRWA uncovers Israeli torture of a Palestinian child, a Palestinian youth has been killed by
the Israelis, and there is a general strike against protest on Washington's policy toward the
Palestinians' suffering; there are anxiety and fears in Tel Aviv concerning reduction of the
USA's financial aid; and Yitzhaq Rabin says, "Moscow supplies the Arab states with developed
weapons". The page also included two photographs, the first of masked youths holding a
Palestinian flag, and the second of a masked youth in the Occupied Territories writing slogans
on a wall.

Page five contained the following stories in the examined issue of the paper: "killing for the
sake of killing" is the policy pursued by Israel in the Occupied Territories. Alleging that their
aim was to arrest a man, the occupation authorities killed a boy and a girl in the village of
Jaba'. The story was accompanied by a photograph of Israeli soldiers aiming their guns toward
Palestinian demonstrators; the British Council of Churches stated that Israel's arbitrary
measures against the Palestinians have never been used by any other country; the Israeli
judicial adviser, Harish, demands that police interrogate the Palestinian leader, Faisal Al-
Huseini, for provocation and encouraging violence; an Israeli soldier has died in a road accident
in the Occupied Territories; northern Israeli Kibbutzes continue their strikes; and a report from Reuter argues that the Palestinians try to penetrate and influence Israeli society. A column of news in brief also appeared on this page and included the following stories: Israeli tax enforcement officers seize ten cars belonging to Palestinians; Israeli tax enforcement officers summon to their office a dead Palestinian lady; a Palestinian youth has suffered burns through a mysterious explosion; grocery stores have been closed in the town of Jenin for three days by the Israeli army; and the Israeli army has uprooted trees in a Palestinian village. The page also included a daily section consisting of a list of the names of the Palestinians who had been sentenced by Israeli military courts, those who had been released from prison, and those who had passed away in the Occupied Territories.

Pages six and seven are devoted to arts and culture. On 18.1.1990, page six included a critical article by the Egyptian writer, Khairi Shalabi, on the distorted image of the Egyptian novels and novelists in a Palestinian magazine published in Israel. A critical article on a Moroccan novel discussed the relationship between the intellectual and the political authorities. The writer of the article supported the novel's argument that if the intellectual were to link himself with the authorities would lose sight of reality, because he would view events from only one angle. A third item was a news story about the signing of a cultural agreement between Kuwait and India. The last item was a poem by an Iraqi poet.

Page seven contained three items. The first was a report about a Palestinian film director, Muna Al-Ghusain, who had attempted to envisage the Palestinian dream on the wide screen. She stated that she had been accused of being anti-Semitic, only because she loved her homeland. The report focused on the problems Al-Ghusain had had with the British Jewish newspaper, The Jewish Chronicle, and with other British media, particularly the BBC and The Observer newspaper. The second item was a report on the theme of the theatre and the theatre in the Arab world. The last item was a column of short art news stories, as follows: a festival in London on the Russian cinema before the revolution; a new book at the theatre in Strasbourg; an Egyptian director prepares two new plays; a Tunisian director begins work on a new film; Kuwait holds an exhibition for marketing the plastic arts.

Page eight is allocated for sports. On 18.1.1990, the following stories appeared on that page: the Brazilian trainer of the Egyptian football team says that the Egyptian players do not exert themselves enough in physical training; the countries participating in the football World Cup take part in a musical festival in Italy; the result of the European Basketball Championship;
four cities apply to host the world Olympic Games in 1993; and the world heavyweight boxing champion, Mike Tyson, is confident that he will retain his title. The page also included a section about medical questions from the readers, and answers by a doctor. In the examined issue of the paper, the questions related to foot-swelling, plastic surgery, and tear-duct and eye diseases.

Page nine is devoted to business and finance. The page included the following stories on 18.1.1990: the US dollar and gold prices fall, and the German mark rises; oil prices continue to fall; OPEC sponsors research to developing the Palestinian economy; Gaddafi calls for the establishment of an efficient Arab common market; Australia exports lamb to Saudi Arabia; the International Investment Bank of Commerce (IIBC) admits its role in laundering drugs money; a spokesman for former North Yemen confirms co-operation with former South Yemen in establishing a company to exploit the oil in the no-man's-land between the two countries; and the profits of the Jordanian Phosphate Company increase by 160 million dollars; Algeria increases its share in oil production; Iraq uses to the maximum its double lines to pump oil through Turkey; and the former Soviet Union reduces its oil exports to Bulgaria. The page included a column by Ibrahim Abu-Nuwar, entitled "Ala Hamesh Al-Souq" (At the Margin of the Market). In this sample that issue of the paper, Abu-Nuwar argued that the west intended to totally destroy the former Soviet Union, not merely to dismantle it. The page also included a small section entitled "Hadith Al-Arqam" (Numbers Chit-chat) presenting news in brief and mostly in statistics. In the examined issue of the paper, the following notes were included: unemployment in Canada declined in 1989; Sri Lanka and Iran establish commercial co-operation; Japan and Malaysia start a new common petrochemical complex.

Page ten, entitled "Hadith Al-Sahafah" (Talk in the Press), specializes in presenting selected articles and editorial comments from the Israeli press. On 18.1.1990, the following articles appeared on that page: Shimon Nekdemon wrote in Yediot Ahronot that some people in the Likud Party had realized that the Defence Minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, feels tired, frustrated, and unable to put an end to the Intifada. Yo'eil Markus, a permanent commentator in Ha-Arets, has written that the formation of the coalition between Likud and Labour was the reason for the failure of the diplomatic activities in Washington, London, and Paris. An article reprinted from Ma'ariv newspaper focused on the American demands that Israel should specify a date for the negotiations for the final compromise. An article by Amos Ben Fered in Ha Arets argued that the Weizman affair (involving contacts with the PLO) had led the two main parties into compromise. An article from Ma'ariv tackled the return of Egypt to the Arab world, and argued
that Mubarak had become the first player in the Palestinian negotiations, and that the next Arab Summit would be his summit. The last article was from Ha-Arets and discussed the improvement is the relationship between Syria and Egypt.

Page eleven is allocated for opinion. The page includes the daily editorial comment of the paper and a number of opinion articles by the paper's senior writers. On 18.1.1990, the page included the following items: the editorial comment, dealing with two topics, first the open appearance in Nablus of armed youths (the paper argued that this should be considered as a clear message to Tel Aviv and Washington that the Intifada could turn to armed struggle) and the second, reference to the insistence of Egypt in pursuing the peace process, stressing that Israel was the obstacle in the way of peace. The page includes a daily cartoon, located at the top of the page beside the editorial comment. The cartoon in the examined page considered the pronouncement made by the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, of the need for a greater Israel. The cartoon showed an Arab man opening a tin, on which was written "peace negotiations", and a genie, on which was written "the greater Israel". The cartoon thus suggested that while the Arabs wanted peace and searched for it, Israel was taking frightening measures that blocked all possibilities of peace. In an opinion article, the Egyptian writer, Mohammed Abdel-Hakam Diyab, dealt with the Egyptian government's decision to sack the Interior Minister and discussed the problems the Minister caused for the country, the government, and the people. Another article, by Abdel-Bari Atwan, the editor-in-chief of the paper, called for an Arab Summit, not to discuss the problems in Lebanon, but to analyse and probe the radical political changes in the world and their effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lastly, Wasef reviewed Mansour briefly in his article the achievements of the Palestinian revolution from 1965 until 1987.

Page twelve presents 'soft' news. The stories included in that page on 18.1.1990 were: a photograph at the top of the page of a car containing eight passengers, captioned "The longest Ferrari"; the largest international campaign to fight against AIDS; a comprehensive failure of the telephone system in Washington; an Egyptian television director dies in the studio; an Egyptian actor will face trial; new research shows that women are more vulnerable to heart diseases; and discussion of the appropriate food to protect children against heart diseases. A column by Zakariya Tamer was also included in this page containing short imaginative narratives, aiming to emphasize particular ideas. One, for instance, presented a conversation between a policeman and a child, in which the policeman was angry on the child because he play while Palestine was occupied.
Al-Ahram International

Al-Ahram International contains of fourteen pages apportioned as follows. The front page covers the major Egyptian, Arab, and international news. In the edition for 18.1.1990, this page carried three large-type headlines, one of them accompanied by a photograph. The first headline was about a letter which the Egyptian Prime Minister had handed to the USA's Secretary of the State, James Baker, from President Mubarak. The second headline focused on the request made by President Mubarak to his Interior Minister to review the lists of prisoners, as the intention of the Egyptian government was to release all those prisoners who had completed their terms of sentence. The third story was accompanied a photograph showing the Iraqi President, Saddam Husein, receiving the Egyptian Prime Minister. The story focused on the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Arab Co-operation Council in Baghdad and their decision to form a committee for following up the agreements. Other news stories on that day were: the Arab Co-operation Council renews its approval for the Iraqi initiative for peace between Iraq and Iran; a Tunisian newspaper stresses the significance of the intended visit by the Tunisian President to Egypt; Shimon Peretz will visit Egypt next week to discuss the peace efforts; American M1-A1 tanks will be produced in Egypt; a new chairman is appointed for the Egyptian Atomic Energy Institute; the funeral has taken place yesterday of a prominent Egyptian television director; the Iraqi and the Egyptian Ministers of Labour affirm that the salaries of the Egyptian workers in Iraq have been improved; the Muslims in Azerbaijan prevent the Soviet forces from entering their country; the USA considers modifications in its foreign aid programme as Washington tells Shamir, "The American money is not for settling the Soviet Jewish immigrants in the Occupied Lands"; Brant (the president of International Socialism) says that starvation and the environment are the issues of the 1990s; and a strike in Poland involving 7,500 mine workers is called by Solidarity. The page also included a large advertisement for one of the most prominent Egyptian computer companies: Salsabil.

Page two is allocated for radio and television. On 18.1.1990, the page included the following items: the timetable for the day's prayers in 24 international capitals; the day's programmes on British, American, French, and German channels, highlighting two programmes on BBC2 and ITV by including two photographs; the programmes of the Egyptian radio channels targeting USA (in English), France (in French), and Germany (in German); the weather forecast and temperature in Egypt; and detailed information about the paper's offices in Egypt and abroad, in addition to a list of subscription rates in Europe and the USA. The page included a daily column by Ahmad Bahjat entitled "Sundooq Al-Duniya" (The Life Box, or Package). In the
examined issue of the paper, Bahjat published a letter he had received from car owners complaining about the rise in parking rates.

Page three is allocated for investigative reports, mainly about home affairs. On 18.1.1990, this page was occupied by one of the important problems in Egypt: child labour. The first story in this presentation was an interview with a social worker who supported the right of children to work in the light of the poor conditions of the lower class in Egypt. A second report was about the daily life of a child worker who felt happy with his work. The third report was on the success which Egypt had achieved in protecting children and babies from diseases by providing 80% of the children with the necessary vaccinations. The page included six advertisements, one of which is in large format, and the rest of medium size. The first advertisement was for a gasoline heater, the second for an Egyptian food-preserving company, the third advertised buildings and stores for sale, the fourth was for kitchen furniture, the fifth for a large fashion store chain, and the last (the large advertisement) was for the Egyptian Building Bank. All advertisements were placed by companies and stores in Egypt.

Page four is allocated for international affairs, although it also includes a section for the headlines and comments of the Arab and other (American, Israeli, British, and so forth) dailies. This latter section reported the following stories on 18.1.1990: (1. from Arab papers:) special attention should be given to the Lebanese crisis amid the domination of eastern European news; lack of progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process in the light of the Israelis obstinate policy; (2. from American newspapers:) the Washington Times's comment on Shamir's announcement that large-scale immigration (of the Soviet Jews) necessitated a large Israel, calling this "provocative". The international stories dealt with on the sample day in page four were: armed fighters in Azerbaijan prevent Soviet forces from entering the areas affected by disturbances, and the Armenians storm weapon stores and police stations; preparations for the Strasbourg symposium for Christian-Muslim dialogue are under way; the Colombian government refuses conciliation with the drug traders; a major political purge is taking place in India; an adviser to Gorbatshov warns that perestroika may fail; elections in Romania have been delayed and the opposition parties have been allowed to launch their campaigns; tension is renewed between Panama and Peru; Bonn rejects any deal with East Germany before the elections there; efforts continue to execute a plan to solve the problem of Cambodia. Moreover, the following four short news stories also appeared on this page: new medicine in Russia for the cold weather; speleologists hold a conference in Havana; and the largest number of female soldiers is in China. A special report was also published on this page on the future of the monarchy system
in Britain, with a review of alternatives be. Another special report including interviews with three American experts on the Middle East, was also allocated a sizeable portion of the page (more than a quarter). It was stated that experts emphasized the importance of the participation of the PLO in the dialogue with Israel and focused on the American attempts to break the deadlock and convince Israel to change its stance.

Page five is devoted to Egyptian home news. The stories in the examined issue of the paper were: the government forms a higher council for the marketing and the distribution of products to co-operative societies; Farouq Abdel-Aziz has been appointed as chairperson for the Roads Institute; 131 exploratory oil-wells were drilled last year; Egypt and Yugoslavia call for the declaration of particular regions as free of nuclear weapons; Egypt and Qatar sign an educational co-operation deal; the mayor of Cairo says that the campaigns for cleaning the districts of the city will be intensified and a million trees will be planted; the Interior Minister witnesses the graduation ceremony of a new group of security forces; the new Czechoslovakian ambassador has arrived in Cairo; new, specially pricereduced programmes are planned for internal tourism; co-operation in transport and communications with Iraq has been improved; arrangements have been made to facilitate the paying of telephone bills at the Egyptian and Al-Ahli Banks; a new company for wind-power electricity generation will be established in the Red Sea region; in the International Conference for Peace, representatives of 23 countries praise Mubarak's achievements for peace; the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs opens a new branch for the free market in Aswan; names of the people accepted for the College of War will be announced today; and academic committees will be formed to study the problems of floods. About a quarter of the page was allocated for domestic economic affairs. This section included the following stories: a new financial system has been designed to solve the problem undisclosed company accounts; a Czechoslovakian delegation arrives in Cairo to sign a mutual trade agreement worth 180 million dollars; a report on the taxes and fees on applications for birth certificates and similar issues; and a list of the rates of the Egyptian pound against other currencies. On this page there were also two advertisements, one for building contractors, and the other for building estate agent, both in Egypt.

Pages six and seven are allocated for opinion articles. On the examined day, page six included a number of reprinted articles from other Egyptian press sources, in addition to the paper's daily editorial comment. The first article included on this page asked the question, has the course of events passed Gorbachov by? a report written by Mohammed Sayyed Ahmad, who discussed the changes in the eastern bloc during the rule of Gorbachov and his future status.
The second article was written by Salah Dasooqi, and discussed the link between principles of freedom and justice, and the personality of the rulers, and argued that those principles are strengthened when good people rule the country. The third article, by Farouq Al-Taweel and reprinted from the Egyptian magazine Aakher Sa'ah, was about the normalization of relations with Israel and argued that there are serious obstacles (which he called war and challenges) in the way of normalization. A fourth article, by Sa'd Kamel and reprinted from the Egyptian Al-Akhbar newspaper, tackled the current status of socialism and socialist parties in Egypt in the light of the political changes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A column by Salameh Ahmad Salameh dealt with the problems which Egyptian youths face in the light of the changes in eastern Europe. The editorial comment of the paper consisted of three parts, dealing with three issues, as follows: the wise decision of the Egyptian government to release prisoners; the dangerous and unlawful acts of the Lebanese opposition in the recent crisis; and the illogical Israeli proposal to hold elections in the Occupied Territories and the PLO's refusal to assist in this move. The page further included a cartoon reflecting on a social issue. The cartoon depicted two thieves looking at a man, one of them saying to the other, "I was going to rob that man, but I felt sorry for him when I found out that he had no income."

Page seven included one major article by Mursi Atallah and two additional columns. It also included a selection of news items published by the paper a hundred years ago, the daily cartoon, and the daily letters to the editor. In his article, Atallah discussed a number of issues and challenges facing the Arabs in the 1990s in the light of the radical changes in the world political arena. In a column written by Nagib Mahfouz, he argued that the collapse of the eastern bloc should teach the people in the world a lesson: not to be a slave to any person or theory. The other column, by Salah Muntaser, dealt with a problem in Alexandria city because of the existence of a factory in a populated area. The letters to the editor focused on Egyptian local affairs and were as follows: why Egyptian families with girls reject the young men who propose to their girls; spread of the bilharzia; the increasing Egyptian population; a war veteran's appeals to the Agricultural Minister to let him buy land; the importance of defining political expressions, such as democracy; and criticism of an Egyptian singer for exaggeratedly claiming that his songs constituted a revolution in the world of song. The cartoon, mocking arrogant people, showed a donkey (representing the arrogant) talking to a dog (no less arrogant) and saying "Hey, you dog, are you saying I am a donkey?" thereby revealing the arrogance of both animals. Lastly, one of the two advertisements included in the page was for a floor tiles company, while the other was for a large national company offering air-conditioning systems for private and the national buildings.
Page eight is allocated for intellectual topics, ideologies, and applications of political theories. On 18.1.1990, there was an article by Lutfi Al-Kholi discussing the approach of the President of the former Soviet Union, Gorbatshov, and how he managed to distance his policies from Marxist ideology and Lenin's principles. The page also allocated a sizeable area (about one third of the page) for classified advertisements, all of them for advertisers in Egypt.

Page nine is devoted to Arab affairs. The news stories included in the page on 18.1.1990 were: the Turkish government takes new measures to prevent further Kurdish attacks on Euphrates dams; and a general strike takes place in the Occupied Lands (the occupation forces had apparently stormed a picket at the offices of the Red Cross in Gaza); Arafat's adviser, Nabil Sha'th, says that Egypt is the main Arab actor in supporting the Intifada and most Arab countries do not provide adequate support for the Intifada; a new American film shows Israeli fears of the continuation of the Intifada; the Lebanese President seeks to obtain American weapons to enhance his military forces' capability against the rebels; a symposium on the security of the Red Sea will soon be held in Yemen; the Arabsat council consider launching a third satellite; the Kuwaiti Prime Minister links the return of parliament with finding a proper means of popular participation; the Arab Organization for Industrial and Mining Development will hold its first meeting in Cairo next July; the Arab Gulf states agree on plans to study international changes; the ruling party in Algeria calls for the preservation of democratic institutions after an attack on a court in which three people were killed; Jordan cancels the anti-communism law; Iraq prepares to receive the Iranian pilgrims; and Iraq allows its citizens to leave the country. There were in addition three advertisements on this page, one of which occupied almost a quarter of the page. One of the advertisements was placed by the Ministry of Energy in Egypt to advertise a job, the second announced on the opening of a casino in Egypt, and the largest one was for Al-Ahli Bank in Egypt, announcing the annual general meeting of the stockholders.

Page ten is allocated for travel and tourism news and issues. The page included the following stories on 18.1.1990: Egypt has established a medical centre for drowning incidents; Moscow closes the Kremlin and the Red Square in the face of tourists, and tour companies demand compensation; tourists in Egypt face a search for foreign currency on their departure via the airport and many of them are accused of smuggling out hard currency; Italy considers the prohibition of alcohol during the football World Cup; and the collapse of the communist regimes will lead to an increased flow of tourists to Egypt. The page included five large, and
one small advertisements. One of the advertisements was for the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo, and musical evenings featuring for top singers and musicians. Three more advertisements were for tourist and holiday hotels, and one for the Egyptian Airline. The small advertisement was for a company which installs modern kitchens in hotels and restaurants.

Page eleven is devoted to the arts. The page included on 18.1.1990 the following items: four Egyptian actresses and one actor prepare for film and television series; the prominent Egyptian actor, Ahmad Mazhar, says that there is a demand for scenarios and roles in the cinema for aged actors; an obituary of an Egyptian film director; the Egyptian singer, Madhat Saleh, says that he gets great support from his audiences in the poor quarters; an article on the characteristics of an Egyptian plastic artist who died and left a large legacy; the Egyptian actor, Magdi Wahbeh, who was declared innocent of charges of drug-dealing, returns to play his part in a television series which had been interrupted by his arrest; three plays have been translated into Arabic and published recently in Kuwait; a review of the life of the British actor, Laurence Olivier; a review of two plays theatres in Kuwait; and a symposium on problems of the theatre in Bahrain.

Page twelve is allocated for sports news. The page also includes the horoscope and the crossword puzzles. On 18.1.1990, the stories were: the announcement of seven football matches in Egypt for the main clubs in the country; the Egyptian Al-Ahli and Al-Zamalek women's volleyball teams will play in the African Cup; the Egyptian football team will leave for Bahrain to take part in the African Cup championship; a German football club sacks its trainer; Egypt defeats Bulgaria in volleyball 3:2; the Egyptian skiing championship starts today; Britain seeks to host the Olympic Games in 1993; an Egyptian club decides to establish new playing grounds; 36 Egyptian players will participate in a water-skiing championship; a former tennis champion appears in court in Stockholm to answer accusations of business malpractice made by his partner; and the Egyptian national table tennis championship starts today. In a section entitled "Events and Issues" on this page, the following stories also appeared: the authorities storm a gambling house and arrest a number of prominent and business people; a person convicted of tax evasion made a compromise agreement with the authorities to pay 100,000 Egyptian pounds; the seizure of 100,000 US dollars by the authorities from a currency trader in the black market; a thief who stole from a police chief has been detained; the leader of the opposition, Ibrahim Shukri, accuses the former Interior Minister of encouraging the security forces to kill citizens; and a money collector for the electricity company filched 1,500 Egyptian pounds from customers.
Page thirteen contains death notices of Egyptian citizens. The whole page on 18.1.1990 was devoted to many small announcements of and condolences on deaths.

Page fourteen is devoted to 'soft', social, and art news. In the examined issue of the paper, there was first a section entitled "Alam min al-Suwar" (A World of Photographs) which included three photographs, depicting (i) the erection of a statue of a boxer in the USA, (ii) clothes and fashions in France, and (iii) primitive fishing in Oman. These were followed by stories on the Academy of Arts in Egypt, which was to establish an art institute for children; a new project for the treatment of child cancer, to be established in Egypt; the death of a television director, who had been appointed as Deputy Minister; the discovery of the oldest village in the world in Turkey; an American actor who was appearing in court in an action to divorce his wife; a life sentence for a drug dealer in the USA; an exhibition photographs in Al-Ahram House; and the establishment of the first Egyptian-British Friendship Society. There was also a photograph of a monkey and a bear in a circus, and further stories on a German orchestra playing in Egypt; a new collection of novels published by two prominent Egyptian writers, Ameen Al-Shayeb and Suheir Basim; the establishment of a new musical and folklore ensemble in Al-Daqhaliya town in Egypt; and two plastic art exhibitions held in Egypt. The page also included two columns by the prominent Egyptian writers, Ahmad Baha Eddin and Anis Mansour. In his column, Baha Eddin discussed the personality of the President of the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev, and the way he handled his policy of reforms. In the second column, Mansour discussed the medical advantages of one of the popular soft drinks in Egypt. Lastly, the page included six small and one large advertisements. One of them was for a travel agent, the second and the third for low-interest loans (by anonymous business companies, one of which was located in the USA), the fourth for training and education courses offered by a private institute, the fifth for the newspaper itself, and the sixth placed by an international estate company and calling for agents in Egypt. The large advertisement was for Radio Orient in the USA.
Appendix D

List of Newspapers Analysed in the Research
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